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
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
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ON SOME CONCEPTIONS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT PSALTER*

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Cambridge, Mass.

Though the poems of the Psalter were edited and collected doubtless for liturgical purposes, both poets and collectors allow themselves considerable freedom in choice of material. The majority of the hymns deal with the experiences, painful or pleasant, of the nation or of individuals. But not a few are merely reflective; and on some fundamental points contradictory opinions are expressed by different writers. This is natural in a community as large as that which produced the psalms, and in a transition period when different men would be affected in different degrees and in different ways by the new ideas that were coming into vogue. Even if the psalmists were all Palestinians (which is probable, though not certain), there would be diversities in their points of view; and, in the absence of any history of the Jewish culture of the later pre-Christian centuries, the Psalter gives welcome hints regarding the ideas of the time.

§ 1

Some points in the attitude of the book toward the sacrificial cult are worthy of notice. In general, as has often been remarked, little prominence is given to this cult. A few times sacrifices

*The first three articles in this issue of the *Journal* are by consent of the authors, and of the editors and publishers of the *Old Testament and Semitic Studies in Memory of William Rainey Harper*, published simultaneously with their issue in that volume.

are mentioned approvingly as a part of the current worship: 4:6 (men are urged to offer right, that is, ritually correct and ethically pure, sacrifices); 20:4 (hope that Yahweh will remember the king's cereal offerings and holocausts, and grant him victory over his enemies); 26:6 (reference to the ceremonial procession around the altar, in connection with some thanksgiving sacrifice); 27:6 (a service of praise); 51:21 (holocausts promised in joyful recognition of God's goodness in building the walls of Jerusalem); 54:8 (free-will or willing offering with thanks for rescue from enemies); 56:13 (the same); 66:13, 15 (holocausts as thank-offerings); 107:22 (exhortation to men to offer sacrifices of thanksgiving for rescue from danger—possibly here thanksgiving itself is thought of as a sacrifice¹); 116:13 (apparently some sort of offering is involved, but the expression כֹּסֶם יְשׁוּעָה is doubtful; it hardly refers to a libation, for which the verb אָשַׁן 'lift' is not appropriate; possibly to some late ceremony not mentioned elsewhere, a solemn raising of a cup, in commemoration of deliverances at a sacrificial meal; it is, perhaps, a current expression = "I will make acknowledgment of rescue;" Graetz's כֹּסֶם for כֹּסֶם is improbable); 116:17 (as in 107:22). Mention of vows occurs in 56:13; 61:6, 9; 65:2; 66:13; 76:12; 116:14, 18 (cf. Eccl. 5:4); the expression of joy in the temple as the special abode of God is found in 27:4; 84; 96:8, 9 (exhortation to all nations to offer homage in the temple); 138:2; with special regard to priests, in 132:9, 16; 134; 135:1, 2; festivals, which were occasions of sacrifice, are spoken of with longing or enthusiasm in 42:5; 81:3 f.,² and the pilgrim-psalms attest the devotion of distant Jews to the central spot of their cult. There is, probably, no reference to sacrifice in 22:27, 30,³ and the text of 118:27 (where Eng. vers. has "bind the sacrifice with cords," etc.) is in disorder.⁴ The passages cited above show that there was a general hearty delight in the sacrificial ritual as the symbol of God's presence and protecting care. Nothing is said of an expiatory efficacy in the offerings; the specific sin-offering is mentioned only once (40:7), and then only to be rejected;⁵ it


¹ And so, perhaps, 50:14, 23.

² See note 1, p. 5.

³ See note 2, p. 7.

⁴ See note 3, p. 8.

⁵ See note 4, p. 11.



appears to be the temple around which the hopes and aspirations of the psalmists cluster—the temple as the locus of divine glory and kindness, the sacrifice being felt to be rather the traditional and necessary accompaniment of worship. On the other hand, we find expressions of indifference or antagonism to the sacrificial ritual. Some of the psalmists appear to live in a religious atmosphere almost completely divorced from priestly ceremonies: in the temple what they think of is God's graciousness (48:10), and the conditions of taking part in the service of Yahweh and sharing its blessedness are purely ethical (15; 24; 101). Besides the passages referred to above (107:22; 116:17; 50:14, 23), in which thanksgiving may be regarded as itself a sacrifice, prayer is identified in 141:2 with incense and the evening oblation. In several passages sacrifice is frankly dismissed as without efficacy or divine authority: 40:7 (God takes no delight in זבח and במנחה, and does not require עולה and חטאת);⁶ 50:8–15 (Israel cannot be charged with neglect of the ritual, but God does not desire *their* bullocks and goats, does not need animal flesh for food, rather asks for thankfulness and the payment of vows);⁷ 51:18 f. (God requires not זבח and עולה, but a spirit of humble dependence on him); 69:31 f. (praise and thanksgiving are more acceptable to Yahweh than oxen and bullocks). This unfriendly attitude toward the sacrificial ritual seems at first sight to be identical with that of certain prophetic passages that run from Amos to Jeremiah (Am. 5:21–24; Hos. 6:6; Isa. 1:11–17; Mic. 6:6–8; I Sam. 15:22; Jer. 7:21–23) and are commonly cited in illustration of the psalmists' point of view. And certainly, so far as regards the conviction of the futility of sacrifices in themselves, the two groups of passages are identical, and it is quite possible that the later writers had the earlier in mind. Nevertheless, there is a difference between the conceptions of the two groups. Down to the capture of Jerusalem by the Chaldeans there was no official announcement of the divine authority of the sacrificial ritual—it was the traditional form of worship, and had only the authority of custom, so that Jeremiah could say simply that Yahweh had not commanded it. The prophets, as moralists,

⁶ See note 4, p. 11

⁷ See note 5, p. 12.

were naturally offended by the superficial and non-moral character of the current worship, and in their sweeping, indiscriminating fashion denounced the whole procedure as an insult to the deity, though there is no reason to doubt that there was much simple, honest, though crude, devotion in the sacrificial routine of the people. The intellectual atmosphere of the Psalter is different. In the time of the prophets the popular creed was frankly and naively polytheistic, and a part of their indignation came from the foreign coloring of the popular cult; in the psalms monotheism (of an impure form) is the accepted faith; the attitude toward worship of foreign deities is one, not of fierce anger (as in the prophetic writings), but rather of contempt, and hostility to the ritual is not based on the corruption in foreign cults. The divine authority of the ritual is not questioned; the author of Ps. 50 (certainly a late production) speaks of it with good-natured tolerance, while he professes himself indifferent to it. The tone of the psalm passages cited above is one rather of philosophical reflection than of religious indignation. The summary in Mic. 6:6-8 is a passionate ethical protest; the argument of Ps. 50:9-15 is an exposition of the absurdity of supposing that God needed animal food—perhaps a rebuke of an existing opinion, perhaps intended as a *reductio ad absurdum*, as if the writer would say: "the only conceivable ground for animal sacrifice is such an opinion, which is manifestly absurd." The reflective tone, with indifference to the sacrificial ritual, these psalmists have in common with the sages (Proverbs, Ben-Sira, Koheleth, Wisdom of Solomon, *al.*). The decadence of trust in sacrifice, while a deep religious spirit existed, led to the suggestion of substitutes for it. The prophets demanded a moral life, not as a substitute for sacrifice, but as being in itself the essence of loyalty to Yahweh; later writers, not rejecting the ritual, recognized as its equivalents prayer, gratitude, penitence, almsgiving (Ben-Sira 7:9; 35[32]: 1 f.; Dan. 4:27; Tobit 4:7-11; 12:8 f.; cf. Judith 16:16). In seeking for the causes of this movement, the limited range of the Jewish sacrificial system must be borne in mind. It was never a universal atonement—it dealt with inadvertencies and physical impurities; it did not touch the deeper religious expe-

rience, and the better thinkers recognized its insufficiency as a means of reconciliation with God. This inadequacy was, of course, not peculiar to the Jewish cult—it attached to all cults, being inherent in the nature of sacrifice, which has its origin in the crude beginnings of religion. In the popular worship it was commercial, selfishly utilitarian, a *quid pro quo* to the deity, and, because of this element of bargaining, was repugnant to finer natures. This repugnance shows itself among the Greeks as well as among the Hebrews; in the four centuries preceding the beginning of our era there was a general movement, in the western world, of protest against sacrifice and of withdrawal from it.⁸ While this movement had its roots in human nature, and was therefore a natural Jewish growth, it was doubtless helped by the foreign thought with which the Jews came into contact. In the Psalter the conception of sacrifice is purified into an expression of thankfulness, and its place is largely taken by worship. The commercial feature of worship is not lacking. Yahweh is praised for his intervention in national and individual affairs, or is besought to intervene; the author of Ps. 116 expresses the general attitude of most of the psalmists when he says: "I love Yahweh because he has heard my prayer." This attitude, however, does not exclude a sense of ethical dependence on God and the desire of ethical union with him. The moral standard of the psalms is admittedly good, except in the passionate demand for vengeance on enemies (a result of the excited social relations of the time). The conception of God as the ethical ideal and the aspiration after ethical purity for its own sake appear in certain of the psalms, especially in Pss. 51 and 119.

NOTES

NOTE 1. PSALM 81:4

תקעו בחדשי שפר בכסה ליום חגנו. The two feasts here mentioned are variously understood by recent critics. The commoner view is that they are New Moon and Passover; for the second some hesitate between Passover and Sukkot; others take the two to be New Year's Day and Sukkot. This last is probably the correct view. The statement in vs. 6, "he made it a law in Joseph when he went forth over [or,

⁸ See note 6, p. 13.

against] the land of Egypt," is supposed (by Graetz and others) to make it certain that the reference is to Passover. But Sept. reads more naturally "from the land of Egypt" (cf. Ps. 114:1), a reading that may include Sukkot as well. The psalm is not a unit: the paragraph vss. 7-17 is an exhortation to Israel based on a review of the exodus history, and has no natural connection with the joyful summons in vss. 2-5. Vs. 6 might belong to either part: to vss. 2-5 as a chronological statement, or to vss. 7-17 as an introduction. But the peculiar phraseology, the use of the name Joseph (יְהוֹסֵפֶת) instead of Jacob or Israel (as in the rest of the psalm), suggests that it is an editorial insertion to connect the two parts. The third line, שִׁפְחָ לֹא יִדְרֹזֵי אֲשַׁבֵּעַ, is again a gloss to the second line, a parallel to 'Egypt,' describing it as a land of a foreign language (so 114:1); an allusion to a mysterious message from Yahweh, an unknown speech or lip uttering the following words, would be out of keeping with the conditions—the divine utterances were plain to Moses, as later to the prophets. The first of the two feasts is probably the New Moon of the seventh month, which was ushered in with blowing of the trumpet (Lev. 23:24; Num. 29:1); so Targ.: בִּירְחָא בִּדְרֹזֵי; another reference to the feast, according to Jewish ritual, occurs in Ps. 47:6, and others probably in 98:6; 150:3. If this be the first feast, the second is naturally Sukkot (so the Jewish tradition). The word כִּסָּה (written כִּסָּה in Prov. 7:20, the only other place in the Old Testament in which it occurs) is apparently Aramaic (for the Syriac usage see Payne-Smith); Pesh. uses it for the fifteenth day of the month (I Kings 12:32) and for the twenty-third day (II Chron. 7:10); that is, for the full-moon week. The etymology of the word is uncertain. The derivation from כִּסָּה 'to cover' (*Rosh ha-Shanah*, 7b, 8a) is improbable. The Hebrew Lexicon of Brown-Driver-Briggs compares Assyr. kuse'u = agu 'cap;' the latter word means 'full moon' and also the god Sin (Delitzsch, Muss-Arnolt), but no light is thereby thrown on the etymology, the origin of the sense 'moon' being as obscure in Assyr. as in Heb.; it is hardly probable that the moon should be called kuse'u as being the cap of a god. Compare Arab. كُتْسَمُ 'that which follows after, the latter part of anything': كُتْسَمُ الشَّهْرِ 'the latter part of the month.' From this sense the meaning 'full moon' may well have come (cf. the Syr. usage), and the word may thus have been employed as a designation of the Assyrian moon god. Arabic forms from the stem دَبَّرَ 'to follow' are employed similarly to express the latter part of anything, as, for example, of the month; cf. also the old Arab. name for the fourth day of the week, دُبَّار, perhaps = 'the latter part of the week.' In II Chron. 7:10 the Arab. Version renders the Heb. "twenty-third day" by نصف

الشهر, "the half of the month." Possibly an Aram. stem כַּשַׁת 'to follow' is to be recognized.

NOTE 2. PSALM 22:27, 30

In vs. 30 many commentators, from Pinsker on, read אָדָּ לִי instead of the unsuitable אֲכַלִּי of the Mas. text. This אֲכַלִּי seems to have been copied or imitated by a scribe from the יֵאֲכַלִּי of vs. 27. But this latter term also is inappropriate. Vss. 27-32 form a separate psalm, an expectation of triumph for Yahweh and for Israel, with which, the poet declares (according to the Mas. text), the pious shall be satisfied. In vs. 27 the expression "the עַנְוִים shall eat and be satisfied" is commonly explained as a reference to a sacrificial meal, or else as a general expression of complete content. Neither of the explanations is probable. The mention of vows in vs. 28 does not involve a sacrificial meal, and there is no room for such a meal in the psalm; and the choice of the word "eat" in this connection to express pious satisfaction would be strange. The proper reading is suggested in the substantially identical verse 69:33: "the pious will see [Yahweh's gracious intervention] and rejoice;" we should probably read יֵרְאוּ and יִשְׂמְחוּ for the יֵאֲכַלִּי and יִשְׂבְּעוּ of 22:27. Further, the דְּשֵׁנִי in vs. 30 is suspicious: the "fat ones of the earth" may indeed be understood to mean the "flourishing, prosperous," but the parallel line "all that go down to the dust" and the general context suggest a larger expression. Vss. 28, 29, 31, 32 announce the coming universal worship of Yahweh, and a universal statement in vs. 30 is to be expected. Universality may indeed be gained by recognizing in the verse two classes (individuals or nations), the rich (דְּשֵׁנִי) and the poor (יֵרֵדֵי עֶפֶר), or the prosperous and the feeble, or those who are in vigorous life on earth and those who have gone down to Sheol. But the expression עֶפֶר יֵרֵדֵי does not mean either "the poor" or "the dead," but rather "those who are in process of going down to the dust of death," that is, mortals (cf. 104:29; Job 7:21; 17:16; Eccles. 3:20). Wellhausen avoids the difficulty by omitting כָּל יֵרֵדֵי and rendering the second line: "before him bow themselves in the dust." But the form of vss. 27, 28 suggests a separate subject in this line; an appropriate reading is obtained by changing דְּשֵׁנִי to שִׁכְנֵי (so also Brill), which gives the sense: "Him alone shall worship all the inhabitants of the earth, before Him shall bow down all mortals." The remainder of the verse is a gloss, intended to be an explanation of כָּל יֵרֵדֵי עֶפֶר, which is taken to mean "the poor." In several verses there are third lines that confuse the general couplet arrangement. In vs. 24 "fear him all the folk (זָרַע) of Israel" is virtually a repetition of the preceding "all the folk of Jacob honor Him"—it might be an original parallel, but is probably a scribal addition. The same thing is true of the unnecessary ending of vs. 25: "when he cried

to him he heard." Vs. 27c, "may your hearts live forever!" is formally and logically indefensible; it appears to be the exclamation of a reader whose soul was stirred by the psalmist's picture of the happiness of the righteous. In vs. 28 the יזכריו is unnecessary, and the suffix in לפניך must be made third person. The paragraph vs. 27-30 will then read: "The pious will see and rejoice, they will praise Yahweh that seek him. All the earth will turn to Yahweh, all nations will worship him. For the kingdom is Yahweh's, he is ruler of the nations. All dwellers on earth will see and worship, all mortals will bow before him." Vss. 31, 32 seem to be a later addition.

NOTE 3. PSALM 118:27

אֵל יְהוָה וַיֵּאָר לָנוּ אֲסָרוּ חֵג בַּעֲבָתִים עַד קִרְנַת הַמִּזְבֵּחַ. The antiquity of the text is vouched for by the ancient versions, which all follow it literally. All take חֵג in the sense of 'festival,' and all except Pesh., Aq., and Hex. Syr. understand עֲבָתִים as = 'leafy boughs;' both Syr. versions have 'cords' (or 'chains'), and Aq. has 'fat' (*πυλέλαιον*), which term is explained by a note in \mathfrak{S}^m to the effect that 'cords' here are intestines bound with fat, without dung (an allusion to a sacrifice). The rendering 'festival' for חֵג yields no satisfactory sense for the second half of the verse. The expression 'bind the feast' is unintelligible, and the Hebrew cannot here mean 'begin the feast;' the phrase אֲסָרוּ בַלְחֻמָּה (I Kings 20:14), cited for the meaning, refers to joining two armies in battle—it supposes two things to be joined, and the verb cannot have a single thing as its object. Wellhausen translates: "bind the festival with ropes," with the remark that the line is "altogether enigmatical." And it is decisive for this interpretation of חֵג that there is no hint of a festival in the connection. The psalm appears to represent a body of persons (soldiers or others) who, celebrating a recent victory, march to the temple to render thanks, and are received and blessed by the priests (vs. 26); vs. 27a is apparently the response of the people, and on this follows vs. 27b, which thus does not refer to a festival. A procession there seems to be, and accordingly the sense 'procession' or 'dance' is assigned by some scholars to חֵג. But this interpretation does not relieve the difficulty: apart from the question whether it is legitimate, it is not clear how a procession or a dance can be said, according to Old Testament usage of terms, to be 'bound.' Those who so render חֵג generally take עֲבָתִים in the sense of 'leafy boughs,' as in Sept. and Lat., but without arriving at a satisfactory sense for the passage. Cheyne (in the first edition of his *Book of Psalms*): "bind the procession [that is, the members of the procession] with branches, (step on) to the altar-horns;" but a 'procession' cannot be bound, and the supposition that the personages of a procession were linked together by branches is purely imaginary; nor does it appear why the procession should advance to the horns of the

altar (surely a difficult procedure) rather than to the altar simply. This interpretation is abandoned by Canon Cheyne in his second edition, where he substitutes for the Masoretic text an entirely different verse. The objections to Cheyne's first rendering apply also to Duhm's: "bind [or, twine] the dance with boughs up to the horns of the altar" (if, he adds, the text is correct), and, in part, to Baethgen's suggestion that the meaning is: "bring the branches to the altar-horns and touch them," the supposition being that the sacred branches communicate a sacredness to the altar—there is no authority for supposing such a ritual procedure. Luther, "adorn the festival with thick boughs," and Haupt (in *SBOT*), "decorate the route of the procession with garlands," give an unwarranted meaning to the verb אָסַר. As to the word עֲבָתִים it occurs in the Old Testament only in the sense 'cords' and 'clouds' (Ezek. 19:11; 31:3,10,14); but, as there is an adjective עֵבֶת 'leafy,' the Sept. rendering may be accepted as possible, the reference being, apparently, to the boughs employed in the Sukkot celebration (Lev. 23:40), though these were used, not for processions or dances, but to build booths as temporary places of abode. With such a sense for עֲבָתִים the difficulty remains, however, that the term cannot be brought into intelligible connection with the other words of the verse. The 'sacrifice' of the English Version represents what was up to a few years ago the prevailing rendering of קָדַח in this passage. This rendering is based on the paraphrases of early rabbinical expositors who wished to secure literal exactness in the sacrificial ritual and in biblical references to it. The transitional interpretation appears in Targ. Onkelos on Ex. 23:18 where for Heb. "the fat of my קָדַח" the targumist writes, "the fat of the sacrifice of my פֶּסַח," inserting "sacrifice" because the fat was that of the sacrificial animal. The discussion of קָדַח in Hag. 10*b* (with reference to Ex. 12:14; Lev. 23:41; Ex. 23:18) is cited in Levy's *Neuhebr. u. Ch. Wbch.* and Jastrow's *Dict. Talmud* to prove that the word is used in the sense of 'festal offering;' but the context shows that all that is meant is that a קָדַח must be accompanied by offerings, in illustration of which Ex. 10:25 is quoted, where Moses says to Pharaoh: "thou must also give us sacrifices (זִבְחִים) and holocausts." The verb קָדַח also is used in the Tract Ḥagiga simply in the sense 'keep a feast': Mishna 1:6, "he who does not keep the festival on the first day may keep it on any succeeding day"—it is unnecessary to render, "he who does not sacrifice," etc. The Targum on the psalm passage under consideration follows the method of Onkelos and expands so as to extract a meaning from the text: "bind the lamb for the sacrifice of the festival with chains until ye bring it near and apply its blood to the horns of the altar." The Targum interpretation was followed by Kimḥi and Rashi, and later many Christian commentators took קָדַח in the sense of 'victim' simply—so Schmid, Ainsworth, J. H. Michaelis, Delitzsch, Hitzig, Ewald, Hupfeld, Perowne, and others. It was explained that the animals were

bound because they were very numerous, and in order that they might not get away; it was even suggested that they were raised up on to the horns of the altar and sacrificed (though animals were never slain on the altar). In support of the meaning 'victim' for זָבִיחַ recent writers have cited Ex. 29:18 ("the fat of my זָבִיחַ ") and Mal. 2:3 ("the dung of your זָבִיחַ 's"); but there is no difficulty in regarding the fat and the dung as things pertaining to the festival. There is no reason for rendering זָבִיחַ by 'festival offering' in any passage.¹ Nor is there authority for the senses 'procession' and 'sacred dance' sometimes given it. The author of Ps. 42 associates keeping festival (זָבִיחַ) with joy and thanksgiving, and probably alludes to a procession; but these are merely accessories of the זָבִיחַ . In I Sam. 30:16, where the Amalekites are $\text{לְעֵינֵינוּ וְלְעֵינֵיהֶם}$, the "דְּמִיָּה" means 'having a merry time,' that is, indulging in the merriment that was an ordinary feature of a זָבִיחַ —there is no ground for particularizing 'dancing.'² For the significations 'procession,' 'pilgrim feast,' appeal is made to the Arab. noun حَجٌّ which,

though it is actually used only for pilgrimage to Mecca or Jerusalem, meant originally no doubt a journey or resort to a place (particularly a shrine or other sacred place), and then came naturally to include the ceremonies connected with the cult of the place. Such was probably the early use of the word in Hebrew; but in the Old Testament it means definitely the 'festival' as a whole, not particularly any one detail of the ceremonies. It may, then, be assumed that in the psalm-verse זָבִיחַ means 'festival'; that the psalm has nothing to do with a festival; that the verb זָבַח yields no satisfactory sense in the connection; that the expression זָבַח אֲלֵהֶם is unintelligible (except in accounts of the construction of altars, of men seeking asylum, and in Am. 3:14 where it is threatened that the זָבַח , זָבַח shall be cut off, the horns of the altar are elsewhere mentioned only in connection with the ritual application of blood to them, the preposition being עָלֵיהֶם). The first part of the verse may be a gloss, a fragment of the priestly blessing, Num. 6:26, $\text{יְצַדֵּק אֲלֵיכֶם יְיָ אֱלֹהֵיכֶם וְיָבִיט יְהוָה אֶת אֵינֶיכֶם וְיֵצֵא מִיְדֵיכֶם הָרָע וְיִשְׁמַח יְהוָה אֶת אֲנַפְתְּכֶם וְיֵבֶן עֲלֵיכֶם הַשָּׁמַיִם וְיִשְׂמַח יְהוָה אֶת אֲנַפְתְּכֶם$. suggested by vs. 26; how much of the blessing was inserted it is not possible to say—perhaps a couplet. The remainder of the verse seems to be a mechanical combination of fragments of several glosses. A scribe who supposed the psalm to refer to the Sukkoth festival vs. 26 was later זָבַח II זָבַח with the festival, may have written זָבַח and perhaps זָבַח II in the sense of 'branches'. As a sacrifice was taken for זָבַח II זָבַח II זָבַח II with a festival or as a part of a thank-

¹The word זָבִיחַ is used in the Old Testament not only of the festival, but also of the victim (Ex. 29:18; Lev. 1:13; 2:1; Num. 28:24; 31:17; 35:8; 36:14; 36:15; 36:16; 36:17; 36:18; 36:19; 36:20; 36:21; 36:22; 36:23; 36:24; 36:25; 36:26; 36:27; 36:28; 36:29; 36:30; 36:31; 36:32; 36:33; 36:34; 36:35; 36:36; 36:37; 36:38; 36:39; 36:40; 36:41; 36:42; 36:43; 36:44; 36:45; 36:46; 36:47; 36:48; 36:49; 36:50; 36:51; 36:52; 36:53; 36:54; 36:55; 36:56; 36:57; 36:58; 36:59; 36:60; 36:61; 36:62; 36:63; 36:64; 36:65; 36:66; 36:67; 36:68; 36:69; 36:70; 36:71; 36:72; 36:73; 36:74; 36:75; 36:76; 36:77; 36:78; 36:79; 36:80; 36:81; 36:82; 36:83; 36:84; 36:85; 36:86; 36:87; 36:88; 36:89; 36:90; 36:91; 36:92; 36:93; 36:94; 36:95; 36:96; 36:97; 36:98; 36:99; 36:100). but this usage holds only for the זָבִיחַ , and the expression זָבַח אֲלֵהֶם suggests that 'animal' or 'victim' may be the original sense of the word.

²In זָבַח II זָבַח II זָבַח II see the Hebrew and Aramaean; it may mean the offering of the זָבִיחַ .

giving ceremony), another rubric may have referred to the putting of blood על קרנת המזבח. The אסרו may possibly be corruption of the יסא of the priestly blessing, or of עשו, the technical term for the celebration of a festival. These rubrics, however they may have arisen, appear to have got into the text in the form of a sentence, which, however, is unintelligible.¹¹

NOTE 4. PSALM 40:7-9

In regard to the translation of this passage it is to be noted that דסאד (v. 7) must, from the context, be rendered 'sin-offering' and not (as in Sept.) 'sin;' that באתי במגלת ספר (vs. 8) does not mean, "I am come with [or, I bring] the roll of the book" (DeWette, Ewald, Hitzig, Delitzsch), but the במ' is to be taken with the following כחוב עלי; and אונים כריח לי (vs. 7) is not clear; but, whether the σωμα δὲ κατηγορίω μοι for ἑρία (which appears in some Sept. MSS, and in the other Greek versions), or the clause be a Sept. paraphrase, or have passed into the Sept. from the Epistle to the Hebrews 10:5 (as Grotius suggests), where it may be held to represent the free messianic interpretation of the writer (not a probable supposition)—whatever its origin—it does not help the interpretation of the psalm passage or call for a change of the Hebrew text. The exegetical difficulties relate to the expressions אונים כריח לי, אז אמרתי הנה באתי, במגלת ספר. Apart from the strange and improbable use of the stem כרה in connection with ears (we might substitute פתח, פקח, or גלה), and the אונים instead of אוני, the clause separates the parallel lines of the verse and has no natural connection with the thought of the paragraph; the first difficulty may be avoided by transposing the words, placing them, for example, after "then I said" (so Olshausen), or substituting them for the first line of vs. 8 (Wellhausen, "mine ears hast thou opened by means of the book"). But these changes being made, the difficulty remains that in the Old Testament the opening or uncovering of the ears comes by a divine voice, not by a book; the psalmist lives in a literary period when guidance is received not by prophetic revelation, but by a written word. The allusion in אז אמרתי הנה באתי also is obscure: the point of time of the אז is not indicated, the באתי suggests an unexplained movement, and the אמרתי a preceding unrecorded address. It may be supposed, indeed, that the שאלת of vs. 7 involves an address; but this word is preceded by the negative לא—God has made no demands. The construction in vs. 9b is not clear: the natural sense is, "in the book (a duty) is prescribed to me"—a book cannot be prescribed, only a course of conduct (as in II Kings 22:13); and, further, the

¹¹ Briggs regards vs. 27 f. as glosses.

relation of the remark (concerning a duty prescribed in the passage is not clear. Much must be read into the text to get a satisfactory meaning from it. Various emendations have been proposed. Grotius in vs. 7 writes לֹא instead of לֵךְ . לֵךְ for לֵךְ . לֵךְ for לֵךְ , and renders: "if thou desirest . . . I would choose for (instead, if thou desirest) . . . that we לֵךְ I would say," etc.: these changes, however, are too numerous and violent, and the resultant sense does not commend itself. Duhm takes לֵךְ to be a corrupt variant of לֵךְ and transcribes לֵךְ and the rest of לֵךְ : "an offering thou hast not required — לֵךְ . I have read it לֵךְ in a roll of a book written for me," and regards this as a gloss intended to furnish the authority for the seemingly radical statement of לֵךְ : here also the changes of text-words are not provable (on the *gloss see below*). Briggs reads in לֵךְ לֵךְ and in לֵךְ לֵךְ , which he connects with the preceding line—changes that are phonetically easy, but still leave the course of the thought vague. It seems clear that לֵךְ "sure thou hast digged to me" cannot stand in its present place (even as parenthesis), since it separates the two lines of the couplet and destroys the rhythmic symmetry (so Olshausen, Wellhausen). Vs. 8 also is interruptive; Duhm's suggestion of a *gloss* may relieve the difficulty in part, but unity and clearness are secured only by the omission of לֵךְ and לֵךְ .² Vs. 8 is possibly the corrupt form of a marginal protest against לֵךְ c: "sacrifice," the glossator may be supposed to say, "is nevertheless prescribed in the law."³ Vs. 9 would still remain a problem; reversing Duhm's conjecture, it might be corrupt doublet of לֵךְ . In any case the thought of the passage is contained in vs. 7 and 9; the writer may have had in mind Jer. 7:21 ff. and similar ideas in the prophets; the glossator, on the other hand, would be appealing to the ritual law. This does not show that the original psalmist wrote before the time of Nehemiah, but only that he, like the sages, laid no stress on the sacrificial ritual.

NOTE 5. VOWS IN THE PSALTER

There are a number of references in the Psalter to vows, all approving or sympathetic; the most relate to a favor received, and the vows were probably conditional: 22:26, the vows are to be paid because Yahweh has heard the cry of his servants; 50:14, the payment of vows is in connection with a thank-offering;⁴ 56:13 f. the writer recognizes his obligation to pay his vows and make offerings because he has been rescued from death; 61:6, 9, God has heard vows and bestowed a blessing, and the

² Vs. 8 is *transcribed out* by Stade in his paper on Ps. 69 in *Oriental. Studien* Th. Nöldeke *gesammelt* 27, 1887.

³ *Probably*: "But I say, an offering [לֵךְ for לֵךְ לֵךְ] is prescribed," etc.

⁴ *As* vs. 22 Wellhausen's לֵךְ לֵךְ , for לֵךְ לֵךְ , seems probable.

psalmist sings praise day by day in order to pay his vows; 65:2 f., praise and payment of vows is due to God who is a hearer of prayer; 66:13 f., 19, the psalmist will pay vows uttered when he was in distress, for God heard his prayer; 76:12, vow and pay, for God is terrible; 116:12-18, for benefits conferred a thank-offering is to be made and vows are to be paid; 132:2, reference to a vow said to have been made by David, to prepare an abode for Yahweh, that is, for the ark (there is no mention of this vow in our historical books—the reference rests, doubtless, on a current tradition). In all these cases (the last are, probably, not excepted) there was, it seems, the promise of an offering provided a certain request were granted. But, though the *quid pro quo* is of the essence of the vow, it is not necessary to suppose that the psalmists' feeling was baldly commercial; it is probable that, along with the belief that success depended on divine intervention, the vow expressed a simple, devout thankfulness. Vow-making continued among the Jews into the talmudic period (Acts 18:18; 21:23, and the Tract Nedarim), but with diminishing significance. In Prov. 31:2 the vow, with prayer that a son be given, is of the simplest sort; the naïve, non-moral popular usage is described in Prov. 7:14; the text of Prov. 20:25 is in disorder, but the reference seems to be the effort to avoid payment. Eccles. 5:3 f. is contemptuous of those who delay payment; the business-like mode of conducting the affair is indicated by the fact that a messenger is sent to collect the amount due. In Ben-Sira there is no mention of vows—the sages took little interest in them. And though legislation and comment on the practice was continued by Jewish scholars till a late period (Maimonides, *Yad*, and the *Šulḥan 'Aruk*), there are indications (as in Ned. 20a, 22a) that it was disliked and discouraged by some rabbis. It is a survival from an early low stage of religion, and tended to fall into disuse in proportion as religion became ethically and intellectually clear.

NOTE 6. PROTEST AGAINST SACRIFICE

That there was a Jewish movement of indifference to sacrifice down to the fall of Jerusalem is clear from the history. It is only necessary to recall, in addition to the passages cited above, the broad thought of Dan., chap. 9, the failure of the Onias temple to attract the worship of the Egyptian Jews (though the superior dignity of the Jerusalem temple doubtless contributed to this result), the strict ethical tone of the sages mentioned in the Pirke Abot, particularly Antigonos of Soko (whose Greek name and his expression "let the fear of Heaven be on you" [cf. Dan. 4:23] suggest foreign influence), the attitude of the Essenes, and the tone of the greater part of the New Testament, particularly the Sermon on the Mount and such spiritualizing conceptions of sacrifice as those of Rom. 12:1; Phil. 2:17. The Jewish movement was part of a general western movement that included Greece and Rome, Egypt, and western Asia.

The recoil from the native, non-moral popular worship, visible as early as Plato, took the form of the establishment of mysteries and new cults like those of Isis and Serapis. There was a succession of great moralists, Greek and Roman Platonists and Stoics, and a long line of men of noble moral character. In Plato, Cleanthes, Seneca, Plutarch and many others there are indications of desire for individual religious independence and individual union with God. The period, one of extraordinary religious excitement and activity and of religious creative power, was marked by moral exaltation and by a corresponding elevation of the conception of God. It was in this world that the great body of the psalmists lived, and it is natural to suppose that they were affected by its tone and its ideas. The Jewish movement was, doubtless, as is remarked above, in part native, but it was probably stimulated, heightened, and colored by the outside influences. The Jews were far from being intellectually isolated. They mixed freely, as the narratives of Josephus and I Maccabees show, with Persians, Greeks, and Romans; and the intellectual and religious influence thence resulting is visible in such books as Proverbs, Koheleth, Wisdom of Solomon, Tobit, and Enoch, as well as in Philo and the New Testament. There was then a meeting and partial amalgamation of all the elements of the western world.

§ 2

The Jews formulated a noteworthy conception of law—not of natural law, but of social and religious law, supernaturally given, infallible and eternal. In contrast with the theory of a world governed by immutable natural or physical forces, they conceived a society resting on rules that supplied all the material of life. This view is expressed more or less distinctly in a number of passages in the Psalter: 12:7; 19:8 ff.; 25:4 ff.; 26:3; 37:31; 94:10, 12; 111:7 f.; 119. The striking characteristic of this law, as the psalmists and other Jews thought of it, is that it is external to man, given from without and imposed on life by non-human authority. It is true, of course, that the details of the code were the product of Jewish experience; but they were held to have been given directly by God, and in that fact lay their special value to pious Jews. The law took the place of the old spontaneous utterances of the prophets, and, to a great extent, of the sacrificial ritual; in Ps. 119 it is almost personified, and appears to take the place of God himself in the affection and reverence of the writer. This change in the religious attitude

rested on a justifiable instinct. The prophets were not seldom creatures of impulse, and their utterances were sometimes called forth by ill-understood circumstances. The sacrificial ritual was a ceremony that did not take hold of the daily life of man. Society, to be well ordered, required an organic law, dictated by wisdom, fixed once for all, competent to guide men in the doubtful and dangerous experiences of life. All civil or social law is in a certain sense based on external authority; the peculiarity of the Jewish view was that the authority was regarded as divine. The law was external, not only in its source, but also in its material: it dealt with the visible actions only, not concerning itself with motives and feelings; the command of the Decalogue against coveting refers not to mere desire, but to desire that it is intended to realize in action.

In the Psalter this conception of externality in its double sense, is modified and in part neutralized by the distinct attribution of moral purity to the law (as in Ps. 19) and by the appeal to man's own sense of its perfection. A pivotal term in Ps. 119 is "knowledge." Knowledge is said to be necessary in order that the law may be comprehended, and it is the law that is represented as giving insight. The psalmist turns unconsciously from the outward authority to the inward, and becomes himself the judge of the excellence of the law; his "knowledge" is substantially identical with the "wisdom" of Proverbs, though it is not formally applied, like the "wisdom" of Proverbs, to all the affairs of life; it rather represents the beginning of the movement that culminated in the Hokma literature. This movement stands isolated in the Jewish development—it is equally remote from the early life of public worship and ceremonial obedience and from the later rabbinical science. After the first century B. C. it passes out of existence—the current of Jewish thought went in a different direction. The exaltation of knowledge was not a pure Jewish product—it must be referred in part to foreign influence, perhaps Persian,¹⁵ but probably mainly Greek. It is not surprising that some of the writers of our psalms should be affected by the Persian and Greek worlds in which they lived.

¹⁵ See note 7, p. 17.

The reason for the reception of such a production as Pa. 119 into the collection of psalms is probably to be found, not in the supposition that it was written for synagogue worship, but in its national tone. It glorifies the national law, and it alludes to experiences of trial and rescue, which, if individual, befell the man as a member of the nation. Of the services in the synagogues of the pre-Christian time we have no information except what is suggested by the name *προσευχή* given to an Egyptian synagogue in a Greek inscription of the second century B. C.¹⁶ From this and from Luke 4:16 ff. it may be inferred that the exercises consisted in prayer and reading from the Scriptures, that is, the Tora and the Prophets; the poetical books were certainly not canonized before the second century B. C. (probably not before the first century), and it is not likely that singing or chanting hymns formed part of the exercises in a *προσευχή*.

While there was no scientific recognition of natural law among the Jews of the pre-Christian period, there are traces in the Psalter of a half-scientific curiosity respecting the physical world and the life of beasts and men. Without laying undue stress on the description in Psa. 19 (the sun traversing the sky, like a bridegroom issuing from his chamber or a strong man joyously entering on a race), 29 (the passage of a thunder-storm over Palestine),¹⁷ 104 (the habits of terrestrial and marine beasts), 107:23-30 (the experiences of mariners), we may feel that the writers, in their framework in praise to God, yet lose themselves in admiration of the phenomena described. A comparison of Psa. 8:4-9 with Gen. 1:28 and Job 7:17 f. (cf. IV Exr. 8:34) is instructive. The passage in Genesis is the mere statement of a fact of experience—man's dominion over the lower animals; Job asks with bitter or scornful skepticism, why the supreme deity should occupy himself with so insignificant a being as man; the psalmist, reflecting on man's twofold position—his smallness and weakness in comparison with the great heavenly bodies, and his lordship over all other terrestrial creatures—appears to have in mind a problem; he is neither scornful nor a mere chronicler, but seeks

¹⁶ See Grenfell, Hunt and Smyly, *The Tebtunis Papyri*, I, No. 86, ll. 18, 20.

¹⁷ See note 8, p. 19.

to understand the significance of man's place in the universe.¹⁸ Ps. 139, in addition to its noteworthy formulation of the conception of God's omnipresence and his acquaintance with men's thoughts, shows a peculiar interest in the formation of the human body in the womb (vss. 13-16)—a physiological inquiry similar to that of Job 10:8-11 and more detailed than that of Eccles. 11:5. The Hebrew text is unfortunately in bad condition, so that the whole thought of the passage cannot be recovered, but the writer's approach to scientific curiosity is apparent.¹⁹ Such reflections as appear in these psalms (8 and 139), though their application is religious, betray a mundane interest in man, and suggest that more lay in the minds of the writers than is visible in the text. They may be referred to the general progress of Jewish thought at a time when their world was full of intellectual excitement. In Ecclesiastes the allusion to the embryo is intended to illustrate human ignorance—in the psalm it is made the occasion of devout wonder, and thus acquires liturgical value.

NOTES

NOTE 7. PERSIAN RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE

The traces of Persian influence in the later Jewish angelology and demonology, and also in the formulation of the doctrine of resurrection, are unmistakable. For the earlier period (the fifth, fourth, and third centuries B. C.) the fact of such influence is less certain. It is not quite clear what the Persian religious thought of that time was. But, assuming that the ideas now found in the Gathas were then current, it is obvious that there are noteworthy resemblances between them and certain ideas of the Old Testament Psalter. Thus, the Gathas have the contrast of righteous and wicked (Yasna 31:17; *al.*), and the righteous body appears substantially as a church, which is spoken of in the reverent and affectionate tone that is common in the Psalter. Both works portray national struggle, and deplore national suffering: the yasnas represent a conflict between an agricultural population and a nomadic, and lament the loss of kine; the psalms speak less definitely of deprivations and oppressions. In both the human qualities insisted on are piety and obedience, and these are held to bring happiness. In both it is sometimes hard to distinguish a moral element in the lamentations; in many cases the "righteousness" of the Gathas seems to be wholly or partly ritual. Ahura Mazda guides and blesses by his righteousness, goodness, and

¹⁸ See note 9, p. 20.¹⁹ See note 10, p. 20.

power, and by his spirit; his religion is called the Truth, as against the Lie of the enemy. The "wisdom" of the Gathas is enlightenment that guides men in the affairs of life (Yasna 31:22; 32:9; 48:3, 5, 11; *al.*)—it is based on and directed by the divine law, and so far corresponds to the "understanding" of certain psalms, especially Ps. 119, and to the "wisdom" of Prov., chaps. 1-7, etc. There is no trace in the Gathas of the personified cosmogonic Wisdom—no one of the Amesha Spentas has such a rôle. It would seem, therefore, that the conception of wisdom in Prov. 8:22-31 and Wisdom of Solomon cannot have come from Persian sources, and this fact throws doubt on the existence of specific Persian influence in the earlier conception of wisdom in the Psalter. Probably the most that can be said is that the Jewish idea grew up naturally in the Persian-Greek intellectual atmosphere in which the Jews lived. It may be added that the *ameretât* of the Gathas, supposing it to signify ethical immortality, marks an important difference between them and the psalms—in the latter there is no statement of immortality. The passages commonly relied on in Ps. 49 and 73 to prove the existence of this idea are not decisive. In Ps. 49:16, if the verse be genuine (by some it is rejected as a gloss), the expressions *אלהים יפדה נפשי* and *מיד שאיל כי* do not signify in the Psalter life after death; see Pss. 18:5 f.; 30:4; 33:18 f.; 86:13; 88:4, 7 (cf. Prov. 23:14), where similar terms are used to express rescue from physical death on earth, and this interpretation of 49:16 accords with the context. So also the course of thought in Ps. 73 points to such rescue in vs. 24: *בצחק תנהני ואחר כבוד תקחני*—the psalm is an exposition of the precariousness of the earthly life and ambitions of the wicked, and of the folly of envying these persons—for himself the psalmist expects a different lot on earth (vss. 25-28). The first clause of vs. 24 is explained by the preceding verse: *ואני חמיד עמך* *אחות ביד ימיני*, where the reference is to this life. The second clause, according to the poetic usage, naturally has a similar reference, but the text is in disorder. The *כבוד* cannot well mean glory on earth or glory in heaven. Graetz and Wellhausen propose *ואחריך ביד תקחני* (Graetz: perhaps *תחוקני*), to which an objection is that the resultant sense is the same as that of vs. 23b, and the expression "takest me after thee" is strange. Duhm thinks that *לקח* is a technical term for the translation of a man to heaven or to paradise (Gen. 5:24; II Kings 2:9 f.); it is employed, however, in Ps. 18:17 to express rescue from deadly peril. The *כלה שארי ולבבי* of vs. 26 does not necessarily signify death—it may mean only great distress; cf. Pss. 31:11; 39:11; 90:7; 119:81. The parallelism of 73:23-26 with 16:7-11 is obvious: both begin with a reference to divine guidance in earthly life, and end with expressions of the conviction that God will not abandon his servants to death (that is, premature or unhappy earthly death); the *בצחק תנהני* of 73:24 corre-

sponds to the יֵצְנִי . . . יְהוָה of 16:7; vs. 24b, וְאֶחָד כְּבֹד תִּקְחֵנִי, may be a corrupt fusion of two readings בִּיד וְאֶחָדָה בִּיד and בִּיד תִּקְחֵנִי, both taken from vs. 23b. The omission of vs. 24 would not impair the thought of the passage, would rather make it clearer: "I am always with thee—thou holdest my hand; I have no helper but thee in heaven or on earth—though I be reduced to extremity, God is my strength always; those that are far from thee perish, but I draw near to thee."

NOTE 8. PSALM 29

The description of the thunderstorm is contained in vss. 2-10 (or, as some hold, in vss. 2-9). Vss. 1 and 2 are a liturgical formula (cf. 96:7 f.) and vs. 11 is liturgical ending. With Briggs I omit 3b (as a gloss explaining that the voice of Yahweh is thunder, and as destroying the couplet symmetry) and, with many critics, insert קֹל before יְהוָה in 3c. In vs. 5b I omit יְהוָה as a rhythmically undesirable scribal explicitem. In vs. 6, with all recent critics, the suffix is to be omitted, and the first half of the verse made to end with לְבַנּוֹן. Vs. 7 is defective (so Olshausen, *al.*); most commentators complete it by adding a noun in the first half and a verb in the second half. Briggs omits it as interrupting the thought, but it is not probable that a scribe would insert an independent sentence that is not of the nature of an explanatory gloss. The יְהוָה of 8b is better omitted, in accordance with the norm of the couplets, as explicitem. It seems necessary in vs. 9a, in order to maintain the reference to inanimate nature, to point אֵילֹת instead of אֵילֹת (so Lowth, Cheyne, Duhm, Briggs, *al.*) and in 9b, with Briggs, to substitute קֹל יְהוָה for ׀, for the sake of the meter. Vs. 9c stands isolated—it has no natural connection with the preceding or the following context; the כֹּל has no antecedent—it cannot well refer to the objects just enumerated, and the הֵיכַל must mean the celestial palace of Yahweh. It may be a misplaced gloss on vss. 1, 2, and is here better omitted (so Briggs). The מְבוֹל of vs. 10 has defied all attempts at explanation; an allusion to Noah's flood is out of the question, since it would be here irrelevant, and the picture of Yahweh sitting on the celestial ocean (if מְבוֹל could be so used, which is improbable, if not impossible) would be contrary to Old Testament usage and somewhat grotesque; nor can the מְבוֹל mean the storm just described, in which there is wind, thunder, and lightning, but no flood. The text appears to be corrupt, and Ps. 9:5 suggests the reading יְהוָה יֵשֵׁב עַל כִּסְאֵי יֵשֵׁב; in the second half, יְהוָה may be omitted. It is a question whether the verse should be assigned to the body of the psalm or to the liturgical ending; but, as it lacks the ejaculatory and petitionary tone proper to such ending, it seems better to make it part of the description; the poet may be supposed to conclude his picture of Yahweh's power with

the general statement that he sits on his throne as king forever. The psalm proper will then consist of eight couplets, to which an ascription of praise has been prefixed and a liturgical sentence appended.

NOTE 9. PSALM 8

The original psalm consists of vss. 4-9. Vss. 2 and 10 are current expressions, liturgical introduction and conclusion. Vs. 3 bears no relation to the thought of the psalm (which is reflection on the manifestation of Yahweh's power in the heavenly bodies, and on man's remarkable position in the world), is rhythmically loose, almost prose, and interrupts the rhythmical structure of the psalm. It is an allusion to national fortunes that might be appropriate in Ps. 44, where the expression *מפני ומתנכסם* occurs (vs. 17), but is here out of place. The allusion in the first clause is obscure to us: the *עיללים* and *יונקים* may be meant figuratively—there is, perhaps, a reference to some historical fact (military or similar occurrence), not mentioned elsewhere, when a great salvation was wrought by feeble means. The verse appears to have been inserted by an editor or a scribe who thought that the psalm should not be left without a national coloring.

NOTE 10. PSALM 139:13-16

The text of this paragraph is in such condition that it is impossible to recover its full meaning, but some emendations may be suggested. On account of the initial *כי* of vs. 13 it seems better to follow Hitzig in transposing 13 and 14 (so Duhm, *al.*). In vs. 14 the *נראות נפליתי* appears to be a gloss in explanation of the following *נפלאים*; the form *נפליתי* is suspicious (*6^B* omits the final *י*). Vs. 15 has three clauses, of which the third seems to be a gloss on the second. The expression *רקמתי בתהויות ארץ* has received several explanations, none of which is satisfactory. A reference to the pre-existence of souls is excluded by the fact that it is not the soul but the body that is here spoken of; cf. *Wisd. Sol. 8:20*, where it is said that the pre-existent soul came into a body fitted to receive it. The supposition that the secret workshop in which the body is constructed (the womb) is here figuratively called Sheol, the dark and mysterious depths of the earth (Perowne, Cheyne, with references to Aesch., *Eumen.* 665, *ἐν σκοτεινῶσι γυνῶς τετραμμένη*, and Koran 39:8, "he created you . . . in the wombs of your mothers . . . in three darknesses") hardly does justice to the words—there is no suggestion of a figure here, and the fact that the womb is described as dark would not account for the definite statement of the text. Nor does it seem allowable to suppose an allusion to the earth, out of which Adam was formed, as the mother and womb of man; and the reference here is

not to the "earth," but to the "depths of the earth," which elsewhere in the Old Testament means "Sheol" (Ezek. 26:20; 31:14, 16, 18; 32:18, 24; Isa. 44:23; Ps. 63:10, cf. Deut. 32:22; Ps. 86:13; 88:7). Evidence that the womb is imaginatively identified with the earth or with Sheol is supposed to be found in Job 1:21: "naked I came forth from my mother's womb and naked I shall return thither." But it is doubtful whether the two passages are parallel. Job 1:21 is admittedly obscure and difficult. On the face of it the "thither" refers to the "mother's womb." If this last expression be taken literally, such a reference in the "thither" is impossible. If it be held to mean "mother earth," then the "thither" refers to the earth and not to Sheol (and therefore does not explain the psalm passage in question); if "thither" refers to Sheol (as, from the usage of the Book of Job, it must do), then, since "womb" cannot be Sheol, there must be a leap of imagination between the beginning of the sentence and its end—the "mother's womb" is most naturally to be taken in its literal sense. Job may use the word "thither" loosely, not so much to describe a condition similar to that which preceded life (Davidson) as to point to the future abode of all men (Budde); he would say: "Naked I was born, naked I shall return to where all men rest after death"—the curtness of the expression being intelligible in an epigrammatic utterance like his.²⁰ In the psalm, on the other hand, in a quasi-scientific account of the formation of the embryo, it is explicitly stated that it was shaped in Sheol—an impossible conception. Nor is much gained by inserting \supset and reading "as [=as it were] in Sheol" (Perowne, Duhm), for the naturalness of the comparison in this connection is not obvious. The clause is best treated as a scribal insertion, and an explanation of how the insertion came to be made may be found in Isa. 45:19, where the expression "in secret" is parallel to "in the land of darkness," that is, "in Sheol;" a scribe familiar with this passage or with this sense of the words "in secret" may have written on the margin of the psalm-verse what he thought to be its synonym. As is remarked above, the psalm formulates distinctly for the first time in the Old Testament the ideas of Yahweh's absolute omnipresence (including his control of the dwellers in Sheol) and his immediate knowledge of men's thoughts. In earlier Old Testament writings Yahweh's special abode is his temple; he is not thought of as being in Sheol (Isa. 38:18—44:23 is hardly an exception); and he deals with deeds, infers motives from acts (Gen. 6:5), and communicates his will by words, or changes men's spirits (Ezek. 36:26), sometimes by the infusion of his own spirit (Ps. 51:12b). The reason for the complete absence of relations between Yahweh and Sheol in the greater part of the Old Testament is not clear. With a few exceptions, Sheol is mentioned only as the abode of the

²⁰Cf. Ben-Sira 40:1, where the antithesis "mother's womb" and "mother of all things" is expressed clearly.

dead. Yahweh may cause the earth to open and swallow men up (Num. 16:30)—these then go down to Sheol, but he has nothing more to do with them. His anger may kindle a fire that will burn to the subterranean Sheol and set on fire the foundations of the mountains (Deut. 32:22), but he himself does not enter the underworld. To ransom one from the hand of Sheol (Hos. 13:14, *al.*) is to rescue him from earthly death. Even when Sheol shouts for joy, along with the heavens and the earth, at the redemption of Israel (Isa. 44:23), Yahweh is not concerned with the life below, though here we must recognize a step toward the larger view. According to Am. 9:2, Yahweh's power reaches to Sheol—he is able to take men thence; this statement occurs in a passage that is probably late, since the next verse makes mention of the mythical marine dragon, and these mythical figures appear only in late parts of the Old Testament (see note 12). The first hint of a friendly social interest in Sheol on Yahweh's part is given in Job 14:13, where, however, it is put as a bare possibility: "Oh that thou wouldest hide me in Sheol . . . wouldest appoint me a set time and remember me!" Ps. 139 goes beyond all other Old Testament utterances in its distinct statement that Yahweh is in Sheol as he is in heaven. The constantly broadening conception of his rule forced this psalmist to the conclusion that he was as really in the underworld as he was on earth; and this conclusion was doubtless a preparation for the introduction of a moral element into the future life such as appears in Enoch and Wisdom of Solomon. The absence of Yahweh from Sheol in the earlier Hebrew literature leaves the lower world without a divine head. The presence of a well-defined god in the Babylonian underworld might suggest that the Hebrew cosmological scheme once included such a deity, and that he has been effaced from the existing records by the late monotheistic editors. It is in favor of this view that, not to mention Hindus, Greeks, and Romans, even barbarous and half-civilized peoples, such as the Fijians and the Maoris, when they have constructed a tolerably well-organized hades, provide it with a divine ruler, as, indeed, it seems natural that a people possessed of gods should have a god for every place. On the other hand, we know too little of the early theological history of the Semitic Canaanites and North Arabians to hazard an opinion on their attitude toward the life after death and their conception of hades; and it seems unlikely that, if there had been a Hebrew god of the underworld, there should not have survived some mention of him or allusion to him in the Old Testament. There is no such mention or allusion: the proposed identification of the בליעל of Ps. 18:5 (parallel to מרת and שאול) with the Babylonian Belili, or Belilitum, a goddess of the underworld, is precarious and unnecessary; בליעל, as = 'ruin,' gives a good sense, and in any case it must mean 'Sheol' and not 'the god of Sheol.'

§ 3

The view, held by the psalmists in common with the prophets, that the world was governed in the interests of the Israelite people, might seem to make a rational system of ethics impossible—it is not only unscientifically narrow, it also makes the divine governor of the world unjust. Nor is it the whole Jewish nation that the Psalter regards as the center of the world—it is only a part of it, called “righteous” in distinction from another part called “wicked;” the term “wicked,” it is true, sometimes refers to non-Jews, but in a number of passages it designates those Israelites who are held by the writer to be disloyal to the national faith. The terms צדיק, חסיד, רשע are often simply party-names, and therefore they have in themselves no moral content. A חסיד or צדיק, maintaining his allegiance to the national law, may be ethically bad; a רשע, sympathizing with foreign thought, or a personal enemy of the psalmist, may be ethically good. The accounts that we have of the “wicked” come chiefly from the opposing party, and must be taken cautiously.²¹ Nor is the optimism of the Psalter in itself ethical. It is ultimately a healthy and frank, though narrow, confidence in the national destiny; as the prophets regarded their convictions of right as the voice of God speaking in them, so prophets and psalmists regarded their confidence in the national future as a divine promise. This was healthy in so far as confidence in self is an element of success; it becomes a misfortune when it engenders fatuous hope and supineness, but into this pit the psalmists and Jewish people generally did not fall—they never ceased to struggle. Their trust in God tended to give them calmness and happiness, and had the important ethical result that suffering was interpreted as disciplinary. If the ethical theory of the Psalter is thus somewhat confused, there is visible in the book, on the other hand, the feeling that human destiny is determined by conduct (so in all confessions of sin, individual and national), and this remains as a fundamental ethical principle, though its particular applications are sometimes marred by narrow nation-

²¹ See note 11, p. 25.

alism and party feeling. At the bottom of lamentations and rejoicings lies an unformulated conviction that the constitution and course of things is on the side of virtue; that is, in the language of religion, that God favors and maintains what is right and good; and this belief has ethical value (since it holds up the right as an ideal) apart from the question whether the conception of the good is always pure. If the question be asked whether a psalmist conceives of God as a good being, a distinction must be made between his acceptance of his idea of good as a necessary quality of the supreme deity, and his definition of good. As to the first point, there is no hint (none, for example, in 51:6) that God is regarded in the Psalter otherwise than as perfectly just and good—there is no such skepticism as appears in Job and Koheleth. The thought of the book (as is natural in a liturgical collection) lies outside of that spirit of philosophical inquiry that existed in the Jewish world for several centuries. To the psalmists Yahweh is sometimes hard to understand, but there is no doubt of his ethical perfection. As to the second point, the moral code of the Psalter is in general the current one of the time. Omitting its hatred of enemies (to which attention is called in Matt. 5:43), it recognizes the ordinary social virtues (as in Pss. 15, 24). There is perhaps a hint of a finer feeling in 35:13 f. (sympathy with persons who afterward proved to be enemies), but the situation alluded to is not clear. There is no injunction to be kind to enemies, such as is found in Prov. 24:17; 25:21 f., nor any prohibition of retaliation like that in Prov. 24:29; Tobit 4:15; the commands to rescue an enemy's ox or ass (Ex. 23:4 f.) and to love one's fellow-countryman as one's self (Lev. 19:18) are doubtless taken for granted. The non-moral side of sacrifice is rejected. Man is assumed to be a free agent, but there is no recognition of temptation and moral struggle; he stands in direct relation with God—Satan is not mentioned, and there is no intermediary between God and man.

The question whether the doctrine of original sin and total depravity is found in the Psalter is of no great importance for its ethical attitude. Only one passage (51:7) has been supposed to contain this idea, and it, standing alone, does not affect the

general position; it is immaterial whether the speaker in the psalm is an individual or the nation, but the phraseology of vs. 7 points naturally to an individual. The majority of modern scholars hold properly that the verse does not contain the notion of innate sinfulness, but merely (like 58:4; Jer. 17:9, and the story in Gen., chap. 3) regards man (every individual or the nation) as weak and liable to go astray. The view that generation is sinful is not Hebraic (Gen. 1:28; Pss. 127, 128); the law of Lev., chap. 12, is the survival of a tabu custom of savage times (in which birth is regarded as something mysterious and dangerous), and the prescription of a sin-offering treats the woman as the sanctuary and the altar are treated in Ezek. 45:18 f.; Lev. 16:16, 18. The "צַר" of the Old Testament, described as רָע, is simply bad thought, regarded as leading to bad action; there is no trace of the half-personification of Ben-Sira 37:3 and the later Judaism. Nor is it clear that the conception of inherited qualities is to be found in Ps. 51:7 or elsewhere in the Old Testament. It is probable rather that the phenomena of life were observed every one for itself, without any attempt to construct a theory of derivation and perpetuation through birth; of such a theory there is no trace. Nor is predestination to be found in 51:6: "against thee, thee only, have I sinned." The words express the speaker's conviction (be he Israel or an individual) that he has been blameless toward man, but has sinned against God; the nature of his sin is not indicated, but probably it was somehow connected with the non-observance of the national law, that is, with disloyalty to the national God.²² The verse is therefore regarded by Olshausen and others as pointing to Israel as the speaker; this interpretation is possible, and gives a good sense, yet the words and those of vs. 15 ("I will teach transgressors thy ways") may well have been uttered by an individual who shared the experiences and the ideals of the nation. The antithesis of natural and supernatural is not peculiar to the Psalter—it is found throughout the Old Testament and in all religions except Buddhism; its bearing on the creation of a rational system of ethics cannot be discussed here,

²²The expression הָרַע בְּעֵינַי עֲשִׂיתִי makes it less possible that the sin referred to is one inadvertence or merely the cherishing of pride or other sinful feeling.

but it may be remarked that, though it may dim the conception of the natural moral life, it does not in the Psalter wholly destroy it; cf. 15; 24:4; 50:18-20; 119, and also 144:12-15.

NOTES

NOTE 11. רשעים, חסידים, צדיקים

While many psalms reveal a conflict between the צדיקים and the רשעים, and the antagonism may be partly one of ideas, there is not satisfactory evidence in the Psalter that the רשעים stand for specific Greek skeptical and theosophical opinions and practices. Friedländer goes beyond the record in discovering in the Psalter a polemic against literal atheism and cosmogonic mysteries;²³ the collision between the "pious" and the "wicked," he says, was a struggle of the national particularistic piety against the new spirit that was forcing its way in and threatened to do away with the traditional simple piety, to gentileize the masses, and to destroy the Jewish nationality—a struggle of the piety of humility against the intellectual arrogance that dared to philosophize about God and his ways. Now, it is true that at the time of the Maccabean uprising, and before and after that time, there was a hellenizing movement among the Jews: Greek customs were widely adopted, and certain Greek ideas were accepted. But, according to our records, the modification of religious doctrine did not go beyond a certain point. Job and Koheleth doubt whether there is a moral government of the world, and advance toward a naturalistic conception of life, but both maintain the theistic point of view and are silent respecting esoteric religious teachings; and Agur's sarcasm (Prov. 30:2-4) is directed, not against a theistic belief, but against those theologians (not mystagogues, but practical Jewish teachers) who professed to be intimately acquainted with God's designs and methods of procedure. It is conceivable, of course, that speculative atheism and gnosticism existed among the Jews as early as the second century B. C.; but, if so, the circle holding such views appears to have been too small to call forth a protest from the orthodox leaders.²⁴ The atheism referred to in the Psalter is a quasi-Epicurean feeling that God does not concern himself with human affairs—it is allied to the skepticism of Job and Koheleth, though ethically different from it: the רשע of Ps. 10 who says to himself that there is no God (vs. 4) says also that God has forgotten to look into his deeds (vs. 11); the נבל of Ps. 14 (and 53) is a man who acts as if there were no God to call him to account; these persons are like those of Mal. 3:14 who thought there was no profit in being good. Nor does the polemic

²³ In his *Griechische Philosophie im Alten Testament*, pp. 40-50.

²⁴ A reference in the Psalter to the Essenes is not probable; for, whatever their creed, they were not atheistical, and were in general loyal to the Jewish faith.

in the Psalter against the "proud" refer to the arrogance of philosophical speculation. The insolence that speaks "great things" (Ps. 12:4) shows itself in oppression of the poor (vs. 6); the arrogant of Ps. 75:4-7 are those who fancy that their power resides in themselves without regard to man or God; and whatever the גדלות and נפלאות with which the author of Ps. 131 declines to occupy himself, the concluding exhortation, "Oh Israel, hope in Yahweh," points rather to social and political than to philosophical difficulties. The Job passages cited by Friedländer are to be understood in a similar way: the רשע of 15:20-35 who stretches out his hand against God and defies the Almighty (vs. 25) is an עריץ who conceives mischief and brings forth iniquity; the picture in Job, chap. 21 and 22:13-17 is like that in Ps. 10, of prosperous and unscrupulous wicked men, and their bidding adieu to God with the conviction that there is no profit in serving him (21:14 f.; 22:17) is moral recklessness and not speculative atheism. Friedländer finds the key to all these passages in Ben-Sira 3:17-25, in which men are warned not to seek things too high and too hard for them, not to occupy themselves with mysteries. In vs. 19 (found in א^c, but not in B) the Greek has *μυστήρια*, and the Heb. לענינים יגלה סודו; in vs. 22: *ὁ γὰρ ἐστὶν σοὶ χρεία τῶν κρυπτῶν*; וואיך לך עסק בנסתרות. The meaning of these Hebrew terms is fixed in Old Testament usage (which Ben-Sira, as a rule, follows): סוד, used of God, in his intimate, friendly association, which involves his favor (Job 29:4 f.; Ps. 25:14; Prov. 3:32); נסתרות are his secret designs as contrasted with his announced commands (Deut. 29:28; cf. Prov. 25:2). His "secret" is revealed to the pious (vs. 19); as to the hidden things not revealed by God, it is well not to concern one's self with them, but (vs. 22) to do what is commanded. The author appears to be dealing with conduct, not with creed—he concludes the paragraph with a reference to the sorrows of a stubborn spirit. Since these verses inculcate humble obedience, the adjoining verses are probably to be interpreted in accordance with this sense. Vss. 23 f.: "do not concern yourself with what is beyond you—you have been shown what is too great for you [or what is above human understanding, or (Friedländer) too many matters of human wisdom]—many men are led astray by their own vain opinions," may, certainly, be supposed to refer to some sort of non-Jewish theosophic doctrine; but it is equally possible (as also the context suggests) to see in them a reference to an emancipated point of view that led a Jew to discard his national customs and adopt foreign ways and ideas. Among these (as was the case in the Greek period) may well have been some philosophical notions concerning the divine—not atheistic or esoteric—but freer than Jewish orthodoxy permitted, and also customs repugnant to Jewish conservative ideas of decency. But, whatever foreign conceptions may be alluded to in this passage, it is not permissible

to deduce from it a definition of the *רשע* in general, and particularly it is not permissible to carry over such a definition into the Psalter in the face of the evidence in the psalms themselves. There the *רשעים* are regarded simply as the social or political enemies of the true Jewish people or of individual *חסידיים*.

§ 4

The well-accredited native Israelite myths of the Old Testament (excluding the demons, deities, and heroes of the popular faith) are all genealogical, and are regarded by the Old Testament writers as representing real historical persons and events. Jacob and his sons are as real to the psalmist as Moses and David, and belong to the current construction of the national history. The same thing is true of the foreign myths in Gen., chaps. 1-11; these were sanctioned by long-established opinion, and have become thoroughly Hebraized. The case may be supposed to be different with the dragon figures Rahab and Leviathan that appear in Job and Isaiah and in the Psalter (74:13 f.; 89:11, and possibly 104:26). These came in comparatively late (they do not appear before the sixth century²⁸) and differ from the native mythical figures in being cosmogonic. It is, perhaps, not possible to determine whether or not they are regarded by the psalmists as historically real. It is possible that they are employed in the way of literary allusion, as Ezek. 32:2 may perhaps be understood. Yet the way in which they are introduced makes on the reader the impression that they are considered as historical. In Ps. 74, for example (where the context shows that the reference is not to the exodus but to a cosmogonic event), the crushing of dragons (and leviathan) is spoken of along with the establishment of day and night and the seasons as the work of God, and in 89:11 the breaking-up of Rahab is put in the same category with the creation of heaven and earth. Nor is there anything in the Hebrew thought of the time to make a realistic conception of such events by the psalmists improbable. The mysterious remote past offered room for strange beings and histories, no natural history of creation was known, and the best current view of Yahweh did not exclude other powers in the extra-human world. Probably the psalmists

²⁸ See note 12, p. 32.

held the cosmogonic dragons to be a part of the history of the beginning of things, and wove them into their conception of the activity of the God of Israel. They are introduced simply to illustrate his power: they were his enemies and he destroyed them. No moral quality is ascribed to them, and there is no symbolic interpretation of the stories nor any recognition of their poetical character. They are treated baldly as historical facts, and have no moral or religious or poetic value. In Ps. 91:6 (and possibly in vs. 5) there seems to be reference to demons of darkness and noon; it is not clear whether these are native, but, native or foreign, they belong to the lower stratum of religious conceptions, and have nothing to do with the essential thought of the psalm. The same thing is true of the reference, in 121:6, to the hurtful power of the moon; or the writer may have in mind, not demons, but merely a supposed fact of hygienic experience. In 19:5, where the sun is compared to a bridegroom and an athlete, it is hardly necessary to see an allusion to the sun-god; the comparison may well be a bit of poetical imagery.

Foreign deities are recognized in the Psalter as existing, and are variously treated. So far as regards idols (עצבים), these are ridiculed (115:4-8; 135:15-18) in the vein of Isa. 40:18 f.; 41:6 f.; 44:9-17 (cf. the different tone in Hab. 2:18 f.). The gods also in a couple of passages (96:5; 97:7) are contemptuously dismissed as worthless (אלילים), incapable of helping their worshippers; in 97:7, while the parallelism appears to identify the אלילים with פסל, they seem also to be spoken of as אלהים.* In general in the Psalter, as in the prophets, a distinction is made between gods and their images; the latter are treated as obviously absurd, the former are regarded as beings to be reckoned with. Part of the glory ascribed to Yahweh is his superiority to other deities (86:8; 95:3; 96:4; 97:9; 136:2, and probably 113:4 by emending גרים into אלהים—the emendation is suggested by the context: “his glory is above the heavens,” and “who [that is, among the gods] is like to Yahweh?” as well as by the similarity in form to 97:7—probably an editor thought it desirable to bring

* Cf. Sab. אלאל referred to in the BDB lexicon, and Professor A. T. Clay's suggestion (*American Journal of Semitic Languages*, XXIII, 289 ff.) that the Hebrew word may be the Babylonian אליל (אנליל), the name of the god of Nippur.

the idea down to the sphere of visible and practical relations, as in 96:7 *בני אלים* has been substituted for the *משפחות עמים* of 29:1). The same conception of Yahweh's superiority to other gods is found in Ex. 15:11; Mic. 7:18; Isa. 41:21-24; 43:9; in these passages his superiority is demonstrated by his great deeds, in the psalms it is taken for granted. The gods, however, are believed to exist and to form part of a great extra-human society. They are exhorted or declared to worship Yahweh (97:7, if the text be correct)—a noteworthy conception of governmental unity in the divine world, to be compared with the prediction (Isa. 24:21 ff.) that Yahweh will punish the hostile heavenly Powers, and with the references, cited above, to his dealing with the great dragon beings. This demand for unity in the universe is a step toward monotheism, and 97:7 seems even to contain the idea of unity of thought, a conversion of the gods to right religious practice, a sort of *ἀποκατάστασις* on the largest scale. Elsewhere in the Psalter foreign gods appear to be brought into intimate social relations with men. In 58:2 (reading *אלים* for the *אלם*²⁷ of the Masoretic text) they are unjust judges of men, dealing out violence on the earth. Psalm 82 gives a definite picture of a heavenly assembly—a judicial inquiry into the administration of human affairs. God (that is, the God of Israel) presides—around or before him stand the inferior deities, each of whom has his function as divine head of some non-Jewish people (so it may be inferred from vs. 8). These are charged with injustice, and are to be punished—though they are in truth *אלהים בני עליון*, they must die like men. This picture of the government of the world—"divine" judges who are to be put to death by the Supreme Judge—has given rise to doubts as to the text and the meaning. It is proposed to read *בני אלהים* (cf. *בני עליון*, 82:7) instead of *אלהים* and *אלים*; but in that case the expression must be understood in a sense different from that of the earlier books, and the beings referred to must be identifiable with the gentile deities who were supposed to be subject to death (82:8).²⁸ It is held by

²⁷ The word is by some deleted, but the metre calls for a word here. Others point *אלם* (Sept. *ἄλα*), but such an adversative term seems not in place here. On the other hand, the reading *אלים*, = 'gods,' is favored by the apparent contrast with the *אלים* at the end of the verse; and the rendering 'mighty ones' (= rulers) is less probable.

²⁸ See note 13, p. 32.

some scholars that the title אֱלֹהִים is sometimes given in the Old Testament in a serious sense to men, but the passages cited for this view do not support it: in Ex. 21:6 the context shows that it is the household god to whose image or shrine the slave is brought (Sept.: πρὸς τὸ κριτήριον τοῦ θεοῦ); in Ex. 22:7, 8, two cases are mentioned in which, the ordinary judges not being able to decide (and to them other cases are tacitly referred in the code), the matter is left to God (to be settled by oath or by the sacred lot or in some similar way—cf. Num. 5:21, I Sam. 2:25); Ex. 22:27 distinguishes between אֱלֹהִים (Sept. θεοῖς) and the human נְשִׂיא (cursing a god was not uncommon, see I Sam. 3:13, Sept., I Kings 21:10, Isa. 8:21, Job 1:5; 2:9, Lev. 24:15); the text of Judg. 5:8 is doubtful, and in any case there is no good ground for rendering אֱלֹהִים 'judges,' the Sept. in Ps. 138:1 has ἀγγέλων, which is an incorrect translation, but shows that the translators did not think of men in the connection (so in Ps. 8:6 ἀγγέλους for אֱלֹהִים). It may be assumed that there is no authority from usage for taking אֱלֹהִים (or אֱלִים) in a serious sense as 'judges' or 'rulers,' whether native or foreign. Some critics, however, suppose that the title may be given to men sarcastically. Ewald (followed by Olshausen) thinks the reference in Pss. 58, 82 is to gentile judges whom the poet calls "gods" after the gentile fashion, but in his own sarcastic sense; Duhm sees in the passages an attack on the proud Hasmonean priest-princes whom their hellenizing flatterers may have affected to consider divine. The objection to this interpretation (in addition to what is said above) is that the text gives no hint of sarcasm—the tone of 58 and 82 is serious (82 is so taken in John 10:34 f.), and the expression, "I say, ye are gods," can hardly be understood to be employed derisively. However strange this recognition of foreign deities may appear, the Old Testament usage seems decisive for the interpretation of the אֱלֹהִים and אֱלִים of the two psalms in question as gentile gods, treated as unjust (because their people are suffering) and as mortal. The conception that every people has its own god to whom it looks for protection, appears in the older books (Judg. 11:24; cf. I Sam. 26:19) in crude form; in the psalms above cited the gods belong to an organized body,

and take part in human life in a modern human way. The variety of views expressed in the Psalter respecting gentile deities indicates that the Jews of the later period were much exercised about these beings; it was impossible to deny their existence, and the only course left for pious thought was to weave them into the recognized scheme of the divine government of the world, under the headship of Yahweh. The same method had already been adopted in the treatment of the old divine beings who appear in the Old Testament as angels, seraphs, cherubs, and sons of the Elohim. To the psalmists, as to Socrates, the conception of the co-existence of the supreme God and the subordinate gods seems not to have been a difficult one; and while it rendered their monotheism theoretically impure, left it practically intact.

NOTES

NOTE 12. OLD TESTAMENT DRAGONS

The earliest definite mentions in the Old Testament of the mythical dragon are found in Isa. 51:9; 27:1; Am. 9:3; Job 7:12; the reference in Ezek. 29:3; 32:2 (where read תנין) is doubtful, but the context rather points to the crocodile, a sacred and distinctive animal, which the prophet names as the symbol of Egypt. As the cosmogonic figures are doubtless of Babylonian origin, and taken from the Babylonian cosmogonic poems or current beliefs, it seems probable that the history of creation therein contained was accepted by certain Israelite writers so far as was compatible with their conception of Yahweh as creator and supreme ruler. If so, these figures represent the earliest form of the Jewish idea of intermediate agencies between God and the world—an idea destined to be developed in a very fruitful way. The intermediate agency in this case would be hostile, and the conception of its activity would be crude, but it would contain the notion that other powers besides Yahweh were concerned in the formation of the world. Such a conception would not impair seriously the practical Jewish monocratic faith (which never was absolute monotheism), but it would give a certain richness to the idea of God.

NOTE 13. THE בְּנֵי אֱלֹהִים

It appears from Ben-Sira 17:17 and Dan. 10:20 f. that in the second century B. C. the opinion existed among the Jews that beings of the בְּנֵי אֱלֹהִים class presided over gentile peoples. According to the Sept. text of Deut. 32:8, the Most High assigned the nations their territories *κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀγγέλων θεοῦ*, the Heb. being לְמִסְפָּר בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל (Sept. read בְּנֵי אֱלֹהִים). Ben-Sira, citing Deut. 32:8, writes *ἀκάστω ἔθνη κατέστησεν*

ἡγεμόνες (unfortunately the Heb. of this verse of Ben-Sira has not yet been found), apparently interpreting the Sept. expression in a general way in the sense that appears in Daniel where the שַׂר of Israel (Michael) is in the same category with the שַׂרִים of Persia and Greece. The two passages, however, differ greatly. The שַׂרִים of Daniel are neither angels nor demons in the ordinary senses of these terms—they are celestial princes who manage the affairs of the world, each in the interest of his nation, Yahweh apparently leaving things in their hands; the struggle is between Michael and Gabriel on the one side, and the princes of Persia and Greece on the other. These latter figures appear to be developments of the Satan of Zech., chap. 3, the adversary of Israel, under the influence of the Persian dualistic scheme, and Michael and Gabriel are individuals formed on the model of the בני אלהים. Ben-Sira has nothing of this elaborate organization of the celestial world, only a simple ἡγεμόνες for each nation. The אלהים of Ps. 82 are very different figures from the שַׂרִים of Daniel: they are not celestial magnates conducting international affairs, but quiet divine rulers whose function it is to attend each to the well-being of his own people. The difference between them and the figures of Gen., chap. 6, Isa., chap. 6, and Job, chap. 1, is obvious. The psalmist's conception of the realness but inferiority of foreign gods appears to be expressed in Dan. 3:18, and a similar view is ascribed to the king (3:28 f.). The persistence of such opinions centuries later (I Cor. 10:19 ff.) makes the representations in the Psalter intelligible.

NOTES ON THE NAME יהוה

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I. THE PRONUNCIATION JEHOVAH

In modern books of reference the origin of the hybrid Jehovah is usually attributed to Petrus Galatinus, a Franciscan friar, confessor of Pope Leo X, in his *De arcanis catholicae veritatis*, published in 1518. Thus, in the new Hebrew and English Lexicon (p. 218), Professor Briggs writes: "The pronunciation Jehovah was unknown until 1520, when it was introduced by Galatinus."¹

The writers who in the seventeenth century combated the pronunciation Jehovah make similar assertions, though not all with equal positiveness. Drusius, in the preface of his *Tetragrammaton* (1604),² calls Galatinus "pater vulgatae lectionis;" and, again (p. 67), declares "primus in hunc errorem nos induxit Galatinus;" but, when he comes to discuss more particularly Galatinus' words (p. 90), expresses himself more cautiously: "Fieri potest ut errem, tamen inclino ut credam, parentem lectionis Jehova Petrum Galatinum esse. Nam, ante qui sic legerit, neminem novi."³ Sixtinus Amama (*De nomine tetragrammato*, 1628), a pious pupil of Drusius, says (*Decas*, p. 205): "Nullus certe, vocem eam cuiquam ante P. Galatinum usurpatam, adhuc ostendit." He rightly attributes the occurrence of Jehova in certain printed editions of Jerome,⁴ Paul of Burgos, and Dionysius Carthusianus, to the editors. Cappellus (*Oratio de SS. Dei nomine tetragrammato*, 1624)⁵

¹ Similarly, and with the same error in the date, A. B. Davidson, in *Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible*, II (1899), p. 199; and E. Kautsch, *ibid.*, Extra Volume, p. 625 (with the correct date).

² Reprinted, with other discussions, on both sides of the question, by Beland, *Decas exercitationum philologicarum de vera pronuntiatione nominis Jehova*, 1701. For convenience of reference I cite these dissertations, some of which in their separate form are rare, by Beland's pages.

³ In a note on this passage Beland pointed out that Jehova was used by Porchetus de Salvaticis, who wrote in 1303. See p. 36.

⁴ *Breviarium in Psalterium*, on Ps. 8, Plantin edition.

⁵ The *Oratio* was first printed at the end of Cappellus' *Arcanum punctationis* (1624), pp. 312-322; then in the revised edition of the *Arcanum* (1649); finally, as an appendix to his *Critica Sacra* (Paris, 1650), pp. 690-712, with a *Defensio*, chiefly against the reply of Gataker (*ibid.*, pp. 712-739). In this ultimate form it is reprinted by Beland.

is less guarded; he speaks of "Galatinus, quem primum dicunt in orbem terrarum vocem istam *Jehova* invexisse" (*Decas*, p. 270); and roundly affirms, "Nemo ante Galatinum legit vel *Jova*, vel *Jehova*" (*ibid.* p. 291).

The scholars who defended the pronunciation Jehovah—Fuller (1612), Gataker (1645), and Leusden (1657)⁶—were apparently unable to discover any instances of the earlier occurrence of Jehovah other than those cited and accounted for by Drusius and Amama.

In 1651, however, Joseph Voisin, the learned editor of the *Pugio Fidei* of Raymundus Martini, produced conclusive proof that Jehovah had been used long before Galatinus. In the *Index capitum libri Galatini*, a catalogue of Galatinus' plagiarisms appended to his edition of the *Pugio*, in a note on *De Arcanis*, l. ii. c. 10, Voisin showed that *Jehova* (*Yehova*, *Yohova*) occurred in three of the four manuscripts of the *Pugio* which he had collated. Thus in Part III, Dist. 2, chap. iii, §4 (fol. 448),⁷ in Raymundus' translation of a quotation from *Bereshith Rabbah* on Gen. 2:19 f. (cf. our *Bereshith Rabbah*, 17, 4), where, in a tradition of R. Aḥa, God asks Adam, "And what is my name?" Adam answers: "יהוה *Jehova*, sive Adonay, quia Dominus es omnium."⁸ In Part III, Dist. 3, chap. ii, §11 (fol. 515). Raymundus writes: "*Cum gloriosus nomen de cunctis Dei nominibus, scilicet יהוה, quod pro sui dignitate nullus praesumat Judaeus suis quatuor literis nominare, sed dicunt loco ejus אדני, ut supra dictum est: si istud, inquam, tam gloriosum nomen,*" etc.⁹ Here Cod. Majoricanus and Cod. Barcinonensis read: "*Cum gloriosus nomen de cunctis Dei nominibus, videlicet Yehova, vel Yod, He, Vau, He: vel nomen quatuor literarum.*" Voisin accordingly castigates Cappellus for asserting that the name *Jehova* was unknown before the sixteenth century, and was introduced by Galatinus:¹⁰ inas-

⁶ All reprinted in Reland, *Decas*, etc.

⁷ The pagination of Voisin's edition is noted on the margin of J. B. Carpsov's reprint, Leipzig and Frankfurt, 1687.

⁸ In this place only Voisin has admitted *Jehova* into his text, on the authority of Codex Fuxensis, which was the basis of his edition; Codex Majoricanus here reads, "*Yohova, id est Dominus.*" The Hebrew has only לכול שמו יהוה אדני לכל.

⁹ So Voisin, with Cod. Fuxensis.

¹⁰ *Critica Sacra* (1650), p. 691; *Decas*, pp. 269, 270, 291; see p. 34.

much as Scaliger had proved¹¹ that the *De Arcanis* of Galatinus was taken bodily from the *Pugio*. Capellus ought to have examined the latter, one manuscript of which was readily accessible to him in the Plessy-Mornay library in Saumur; he would have learned that Jehova is found in a work written about 1275.

A cooler scrutiny of the testimony adduced by Voisin will doubtless convince the modern critic that the occurrence of the name Jehova in manuscripts of the *Pugio* is not to be attributed to the author himself, but to subsequent copyists. The purely casual appearance of the name in the two passages cited, and the variations of the codices, are conclusive.¹² But, though in error in thinking that Raymundus himself used Jehova, Voisin proved that it was found in copies of the *Pugio* as far back as the fourteenth century.¹³

A generation after Raymundus Martini, Victor Porchetus de Salvaticis wrote his *Victoria contra Judaeos* (1303),¹⁴ taken largely, as he expressly says, from the *Pugio*. In this work the tetragrammaton is regularly represented by *Jod, He, Fau, He*; but once or twice *Jehova* appears, and once *Johotcha* [*? sic*].¹⁵ This variation might suggest the surmise that the manuscript of the *Pugio* used by Porchetus was related to the Codex Majoricanus, in which both *Jehova* and *Johotcha* occur; without an examination of the *Victoria* it is, however, impossible to determine this point, or even to be sure whether Porchetus himself wrote Jehova. But even if, in this case also, the introduction of the name be the work of copyists, the fact remains that it was in use before Galatinus.

Voisin, in his polemic against Cappellus, assumes that Galatinus got the name Jehova, with the rest of his learning, from the *Pugio Fidei*. It is, of course, entirely possible that Jehova was

¹¹ In a letter to Casaubon in 1608; see Scaliger, *Epistolae*, etc., Ep. 84, cf. 90.

¹² In the fourth of the manuscripts collated by Voisin (D), from the Monastery of St. Dominic in Toulouse, it is to be inferred from Voisin's silence that the name did not occur at all.

¹³ Cod. Majoricanus was written in 1361; the age of the other manuscripts used by Voisin is not given.

¹⁴ Printed by Justiniani, Paris, 1520. I have not succeeded in finding a copy of this book.

¹⁵ Roland, *Decas*, 90, n. b.

found somewhere in the manuscript of the *Pugio* which Galatinus used;¹⁶ but it is to be observed that there is no indication of such dependence; and, on the other hand, that the only connection in which Jehova occurs in the *De Arcanis* is in a formal discussion of the question how the Tetragrammaton should be pronounced, a question not raised in the *Pugio* at all. Moreover, as we shall see, Galatinus' own words make it perfectly clear that the pronunciation Jehova was current in his time.

The *De Arcanis*,¹⁷ although it passed through at least five editions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,¹⁸ seems to be little known to modern scholars. The quotations from it in recent books are apparently derived—at several removes, with natural increment of errors—from Drusius; and detached from their connection, and garbled (as they frequently are), give an erroneous notion of the author's position. Under these circumstances it will not, I trust, be thought superfluous to quote the context somewhat fully.

The work was written, with the encouragement of the Emperor Maximilian and of Pope Leo X, to sustain the cause of Reuchlin in his famous controversy with the Dominicans concerning the books of the Jews, by showing that the distinctive doctrines of Christianity can be proved from the talmudic and cabalistic literature. It is in the form of a dialogue, the speakers being Capnio (Reuchlin), Hogostratus (Hoogstraaten, the Prior of the Dominicans in Cologne, Reuchlin's most bitter antagonist), and Galatinus. Galatinus is the principal speaker; Reuchlin plays the rôle of interrogator, and Hoogstraaten is an occasional objector. Almost everything in the book of any significance is taken from the *Pugio Fidei*, which Galatinus has not the grace even to name; what Galatinus adds from other sources is drawn chiefly from cabalistic writings, among which one entitled גלי רזיא has a prominent place.

¹⁶ Perhaps a Codex Neapolitanus noted by Possevinus; see Carpsov, *Introductio*, etc., p. 90.

¹⁷ The full title is: *Opus toti christianae Reipublicae maxime utile, de arcanis catholicae veritatis, contra obstinatissimam Iudeorum nostri temporis perfidiam: ex Talmud, aliisque hebraicis libris nuper excerptum; et quadruplici linguarum genere eleganter congestum.*

¹⁸ The Catalogue of the British Museum enumerates editions of 1518, 1550, 1581, 1603, 1672. I quote the editio princeps.

It has been asserted, for example, by Maussacus, that Galatinus was by birth a Jew; perhaps on the same ground on which Justiniani suspected that Raymundus Martini was a Jew—he knew too much Hebrew to be a Christian. I have been unable to find any evidence pointing in that direction. That he had Jewish assistants may be regarded as certain. The conjecture, however, that Elias Levita served him in this capacity has no basis beyond the known relations of Elias to Cardinal Egidio and other Christian students of the Cabala. The presumption is that the two Jews who adorn the back of the title-page with an acrostic and a rhymed poem in Hebrew in praise of Galatinus, and his book demolishing Hogostratus, were his helpers. One of these is named in the Latin title to his epigram “Moses Aharon Hebraeus” (the acrostic itself bears משה אהרן), the other is “Ishac Hyspanus Hebraeus medicus physicus.”

Book II, chaps. ix–xvii, discuss the names of God; in chap. x, on the Tetragrammaton, after Galatinus has given extended extracts from the *Galē razaia* and from Maimonides on Shem Hamephorash, Reuchlin asks:¹⁹

Dic obsecro, hoc nomen quatuor literarum, ut scriptum est, siue ut literae ipsae sonant, quomodo proferatur?

Galatinus.—Quidam ex nostris aiunt hoc nomen in nostris literis sonare Ioua, a quo dicunt forte apud antiquos nomen Iouis irrepsisse. Sed maxime profecto errant, huiusmodi gentilitatis blasphemiam tam sancto nomini inferentes. Non enim hae quatuor literae, יְהוָה, si ut punctatae sunt legantur, Ioua reddunt, sed (ut ipse optime nosti) Iehoua efficiunt. Quamuis Iudaei illud pronunciare ut scriptum est non audeant, sed loco eius אֲדֹנָי Adonai, quod idem est quod Dominus, proferant. Qui autem in nostris literis Ioua sonare contendunt, id ex eo potissimum probare conantur, quod Hebraeorum grammatici dicunt, cum sceua aliqua literarum gucturis sequitur, plerunque et sceua ipsum et gucturis literam simul per syncopam auferri. Nam, exempli gratia, יְהוּדָה Iehuda non nunquam יוּדָה Iuda et scribitur et pronunciat; et יְהוֹשֻׁעַ Iehosua, יוֹשֻׁעַ Iosua; et יְהוֹיָכִין Iehoiachin, יוֹיָכִין Ioiachin; et תְּהִלִּים tehilim, תְּלִים tillim, et reliqua multa id genus. Quod similiter quoque in hoc nomine Dei magno fieri uolunt. Qua ex re illud Ioua apud nos sonare inferunt, cum in eo sceua litera he literam gucturis praecedat. Quod si uerum esset ipsum nomen non יְהוָה sed יְהֹה sine sceua et he litera scriberetur. Et sic non tetragrammaton, siue quatuor literarum esset, sed trium dumtaxat. Quod nec cogitari quidem licet. Nefas enim est eo in nomine quicquam uel addi uel minui, sed sic omnino debet et scribi et

¹⁹ Ed. 1518, fol. 48a. I preserve the spelling, but have resolved the abbreviations and modernized the punctuation.

pronunciari (si tamen pronunciandum est) sicut Deus ipse Mosi illud scribi debere mandavit. Quo circa grammaticorum Hebraeorum regula quam inducunt in eo locum nullum habet, quamvis et in reliquis nusquam uel rarissime in sacris uiginti quatuor libris seruata reperiatur, sed in aliis fortasse tantum codicibus et praecipue apud Talmudistas. Ipsum igitur nomen Dei tetragrammaton cum sceua et he litera, quae lenem habet aspirationem, et scribi et pronunciari necesse est. Quare caueant, qui illud apud nos Ioua sonare affirmant. Non enim Ioua nec Ieoua, sed Iehoua, cum leni aspiratione, sicut scribitur, pronunciandum est.

Somewhat farther on (fol. 49a), after the question has been answered why the Jews dare not utter the name, and it has been shown from Maimonides that it was pronounced in the temple, in the priests' benediction, Reuchlin asks:

Si hoc nomen apud eos (ut optime probasti) aliquando proferebatur, quamobrem igitur ineffabile dicebatur? *Galatinus*.—Hoc magno absque mysterio esse non potest. Non enim hoc nomen quo ad uocem ipsam nominis ineffabile dicitur, cum et ipsi (ut dictum est) quandoque pronunciarint, et aequè ut scriptum est facile proferri possit, si literae ipsae cum apicibus et punctis legantur. Ex ipsis enim (ut dictum est) haec uox Iehoua redditur. Sed quo ad mysterii significatum omnino ineffabile est.

It is plain from Galatinus' own words that among his contemporaries the vowels of יהוה were commonly taken for the proper vowels of the name. Some of them, however, instead of pronouncing *Jehova*, as the points would naturally be read, were led by the seductive comparison with the Latin (Jupiter) *Jovis* to pronounce *Jova*, and defended the contraction by an ingenious grammatical argument, which Galatinus refutes. The controversy, therefore, whether the name should be pronounced *Jehova* or *Jova* is older than Galatinus. Who the "Jovists" were against whom he argues, I do not know. The opinion that the name *Jov-is* was derived from יהוה (or יהוה) was common in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries;²⁰ it inevitably suggested itself as soon as Christian scholars began to pronounce the name. In the controversy of the seventeenth century the resemblance to Jove was argued to prove that Jehovah was the true pronunciation. The form *Jova*, after the analogy of Judah for Jehudah, was pre-

²⁰ Later the tables were turned, and many scholars derived Jehovah from the Indo-European root from which the name Jove comes. Ed. Glaser, *Jehovah-Jovis und die drei Söhne Nochs* (1901), is the most recent discoverer of this etymological mare's nest.

ferred by several scholars in the sixteenth century, and was admitted as possible by some of those who preferred Jehova.²¹ The question is, however, of no significance for our present purpose. The important point is that Galatinus did not introduce the pronunciation Jehova, but only defended it against those who pronounced יהוה *Jova*.

Nor have I been able to find any evidence that the common use of Jehova by scholars in the sixteenth century was due to the example and influence of Galatinus.

A thorough investigation of the use of Jehovah in the first half of the sixteenth century has never been made. The following notes make no claim to completeness, but they include the authors whose example was most influential.

Luther, in his translation of the Old Testament, follows the usage of the Church in rendering יהוה by HERR, Lord; but in his own writings sometimes uses Jehovah. In an exposition of Jeremiah 23: 1-8,²² originally delivered in two sermons, November 18 and 25, 1526, and printed in 1527, he says (p. 569):

Es hat die Ebreische sprache fast bey zehen nahmen, damit sie Gott nennet,²³ unter wilchen yhr viel sind, damit sie Gott von seinen wercken nennet; aber dieser nahme "Jehovah," "HERR," bedeut allein Gott, wie er ist ynn seinem Göttlichen wesen. Diese unterschied können wir ynn unser sprache nicht halten; wir Deutschen heissens alles "Herr" und können das wort "Herr" nicht zwingen, das es Gott allein heisse; denn wir heissen ein Fürsten herr, ein hausvater heisst man auch ein herrn, ist uns Deutschen fast gemeyn. Das wir aber Gott auch ein Herrn nennen, haben wir aus den Evangelisten, die heissen yhn "Dominum," Herr, den folgen wir nach und lassens auch dabey bleiben. Die andern nahmen ynn Ebreischen werden nicht allein Gotte zu geschrieben, sondern werden auch zu andern leuten gesagt; aber dieser nahme "Jehovah," Herr, gehört alleine dem waren Gott zu.

It is noteworthy that this passage occurs, not in an academic lecture or a commentary addressed to the learned, but in a sermon, immediately published as a popular pamphlet. The name Jehovah

²¹ See p. 41.

²² *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, XX, 547 ff. In the brief Latin report of the sermon (Börer) Jehovah does not appear. The title of the pamphlet is, *Ein epistel aus dem Propheten Jeremia, von Christus reich und Christlichen freyheit, gepredigt durch Mar. Luther*. Wittenberg, 1527.

²³ Jerome, Ep. 25, ad Marcellam, *De decem nominibus Dei*.

is not introduced as something new; on the contrary, it is used as if it was familiar to the hearers or readers.²⁴

Jehovah appeared in the English Bible in Tyndale's translation of the Pentateuch (1530) in Exod. 6:3, "but in my name Iehouah was I not knowne unto them," and maintained itself in the whole succession of English Protestant versions, except Coverdale (1535). The margin of Matthews' Bible (1537), on Exod. 6:3, has the note, "Iehouah is the name of god wherewith no creature is named, & is as moch to say as one that is of hymselfe & dependeth of no thing."²⁵

Sebastian Münster, in his notes on Exod. 3:15, and on 6:3 (where Jehova stands in his text), accompanying his Latin translation of the Old Testament (1534, 1535), uses the name as though it were well known. The Jews, he says, infer from the words "this is my memorial (זִכְרִי) forever" (3:15), "nomen Domini tetragrammaton non proferendum secundum dispositionem literarum et punctorum; sed in animo tantum commemorari debet, non autem labiis exprimi Atque adeo haec superstitio invaluit apud Iudaeos, ut obstupescant ad prolationem hujus nominis, si forte a Christiano audiant ipsum pronuciari, timeantque ruere coelum." Leo Judae used Jehova in his Latin version (1543), in Exod. 6:3, and has a note on the significance of the name. Paulus Fagius, a pupil of Elias Levita, in the notes on his translation of the Targum of Onkelos (1546), at Exod. 6:3, says of the name, "quod juxta elementa et puncta quidem יהוה *Jehovah* sonat."²⁶ Castalio, who uses *Jova* throughout his Latin translation (1551; Pentateuch, 1546), in his note on Gen. 2:4 justifies this pronunciation against those who denied that the points of יהוה were its own vowels by citing Josaphat, Joram, Hallelujah, etc. Servetus uses Jehovah, from which Jove is derived:²⁷ "Iouem illi [sc. the Romans] dixerunt, ex antiqua traditione Hebraeorum,

²⁴ Böttcher, in a note in his *Lehrbuch der hebräischen Sprache*, I, 49, says that Luther, "as is well known," never uses the name in his popular writings, though in his learned exegetical works he shows his familiarity with it. Singularly enough, the passage above quoted is one of those which he cites!

²⁵ In Zwingle's writings, so far as a hasty examination shows, the word Jehovah is not used.

²⁶ Fagius was acquainted with Galatinus, whom he quotes on Exod. 3:15.

²⁷ *Christianismi Restitutio* (1553), p. 125 ff., see esp. p. 133.

Deum Ioua appellantium. Ioua indeclinabile, inflexione quadam est versum in Iouem, Ioua autem est dictum pro יהוה Iehova, cum scheua in capite non profertur, et aspirationis prolatio omititur, ut in ea lingua passim fit."²⁸ In 1557 Jehova got established in the dictionary,²⁹ and in the same year was introduced throughout the Old Testament in Stephanus' edition of Pagninus' Latin version.³⁰ In Calvin's commentaries on the Psalms (1557) and on the Pentateuch (1563) יהוה is uniformly rendered by Jehova.³¹ Tremellius—a Jew by birth—employs Jehova throughout his translation (1575), though he was aware that the points belonged not to יהוה but to יהוהי.³² Similarly A. R. Cevalerius, a son-in-law of Tremellius, in his *Rudimenta Hebraicae Linguae* (1559),³³ gives Jehovah as the equivalent of the Tetragrammaton, yet elsewhere explains that the vowels are those of יהוהי.³⁴

The examples last cited show that the pronunciation Jehovah was by this time so firmly established that even scholars who knew that it was a hybrid used it as a matter of course.

Among the Catholic scholars of the sixteenth century the use of Jehovah was probably less common than among Protestants, partly because of the stronger hold of the Vulgate; but it was employed constantly by a man of no less influence in his time than Cardinal Thomas de Vio Cajetanus in his Commentary on the Pentateuch (1531);³⁵ his translation of Gen. 2:4, for example, has Iehoua Elohim, and on Exod. 6:3 he notes, "Juxta Hebraeum habetur: Iehouah Elohe patrum vestrorum visus est mihi." According to Stephanus, Sanctes Pagninus, one of the most learned Hebraists of his age, used Jehova in his annotations.³⁶ Hieronymus ab Oleastro in his commentary on the Pentateuch (Genesis

²⁸ Observe the argument of Galatinus' Jovists.

²⁹ Ioann. Forster, *Dictionarium Hebraicum Novum*, pp. 206-211.

³⁰ See pp. 44 f.

³¹ The text of the harmony of Exod.—Deut. is substantially that of Sebastian Münster, slightly revised, and with *Jehova* consistently introduced.

³² Drusius, *Decas*, 85 f., from manuscript notes of Tremellius' lectures on Isa. 1:2.

³³ Ed. 1567, p. 195.

³⁴ Drusius, *Decas*, 88; Letter of Cevalerius to the Bp. of Ely, 1569.

³⁵ Cajetanus knew no Hebrew, but he had a very literal translation made for him by the collaboration of a Jew and a Christian Hebraist (Fritzsche, *PRE³*, VIII, 462).

³⁶ See p. 44.

1556, Exodus 1557), derived Jehova from יהוה, making it mean "Destroyer" (sc. of the Egyptians and Canaanites),³⁷ an etymology which Daumer rediscovered. Marcus Marinus admitted Jehova to his Lexicon, *Arca Noae* (1593). In the seventeenth century Jehova appears in the commentaries of Estius (1621), Menochius (1630), and Tirinus. Malvenda (†1628) is the first in whom I have found the name written with the consonants alone, *Ihuh* (e. g., Gen. 2: 4, 8); ordinarily he writes *Jehu* (e. g. Ps. 1:2; 8:2).

It is a singular error to assume, as scholars seem generally to have done, that the pronunciation Jehovah originated with any single author, and was propagated in one direct line of literary succession. In the massoretic text the name is written יהוה, without any indication, such as in ordinary cases of substitution is given in the margin, that the points are not the proper vowels of the word; nor is the substitution included in the massoretic category of *Kerē* and *Ketib*.³⁸ Christian scholars knew that the Jews did not pronounce the name, reading Adonai instead; but they generally regarded this as a superstitious scruple. If the better informed among them were aware that Jewish grammarians held the vowels of יהוה to belong to אֲדֹנָי,³⁹ two answers would occur; *first*, the vowels are manifestly not those of אֲדֹנָי, and, *second*, compound names such as יהוֹשֻׁפָט and שֹׁפְטֵי־יהוה prove that the punctuation יהוה gives the true vowels of the tetragrammaton.⁴⁰ There is every probability that many Christian scholars independently, reading what actually stood written in the Hebrew text, pronounced the name Jehova or Jova. It is therefore, a bootless inquiry who first made this inevitable blunder; it is certain that Galatinus was neither the first nor the last.

Genebrardus, in his *Chronologia* (1567), inveighing against the pronunciation Jova or Jehova, attributes the introduction of this error, not to Galatinus, as Drusius and his followers do, but

³⁷ Drusius, *Decas*, 66, n.

³⁸ The term *Kerē perpetuum*, applied to it by modern grammarians, appears to be a figment of their own.

³⁹ See, e. g., Elias Levita, *Massoreth ha-Massoreth* (1538), Pt. II, §9 (ed. C. D. Ginsburg, 1867, p. 233).

⁴⁰ Both these arguments are, in fact, persistently repeated by the defenders of the pronunciation Jehovah from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth.

to Sanctes Pagninus, "si modo ab haereticis non sit corruptus."⁴¹ In the original edition of Pagninus' translation of the Old Testament (1527) the name Jehovah does not occur, nor is it found in his *Thesaurus Linguae Sanctae* (1529); but in Robert Stephanus' edition of Pagninus' version (1557),⁴² Jehova is uniformly put for יהוה. In a note on Ps. 2:1 Stephanus remarks that the substitution of Adonai is to be rejected as a Jewish superstition, and continues: "Nonnulli nomen ipsum Iehova non mutant; nec ipse Sanctes in suis Annotationibus manuscriptis, quas apud me asservo: quos et secuti sumus."⁴³ In the Preface, also, Stephanus refers to these annotations: his reprint of Pagninus' version was based on two copies of the preceding edition containing the author's manuscript corrections and revisions; "venerunt etiam in manus nostras ejusdem Sanctis in V. T. annotationes, ex quibus ibidem omnia quae ad hujus interpretationis recognitionem pertinebant sedulo excerpsimus."

The notes in Stephanus' edition were vehemently impugned by the theologians of the Sorbonne, who complained that he made the orthodox name of Vatablus⁴⁴ cover a compilation taken largely from the works of Swiss Protestants; but there is no reason to question the explicit statements quoted above. The time at which the annotations of Pagninus were written is not known. His translation of the Old Testament, with which it may be surmised that they were contemporaneous, was completed, after twenty-five years of labor, before 1518, although it was not printed until 1527.

There is another edition of Pagninus' version, published at Lyons in 1542, with a preface and marginal scholia by Servetus ("Michael Villanovanus"), in which, also, reference is made to the manuscript notes of Pagninus. Servetus writes: "In ipsa Pagnini nostri versione non parum est nobis post omnia ejus

⁴¹ Ed. Paris, 1600, pp. 79 f.

⁴² The Vulgate and Pagninus' new version in parallel columns, with annotations. This edition I have not been able to see; but the lemmata of Stephanus' notes (reprinted in the *Criticus Sacri* under the name of "Vatablus"), and the Basel reprint of Pagninus (1564), which is said by Le Long-Masch accurately to reproduce Stephanus' text of 1557, make the fact certain.

⁴³ See also on Exod. 6:3.

⁴⁴ Vatablus was Professor of Hebrew in the Collège de France; he died in 1547, having published nothing. Stephanus used notes of his lectures taken down by students.

annotamenta desudatum: annotamenta inquam, quae ille nobis quam plurima reliquit. Nec solum annotamenta, sed et exemplar ipsum locis innumeris propria manu castigatum." A second preface, by Joh. Nic. Victorius, informs the reader that the differences of the Lyons edition from the preceding (Cologne, 1541) are the result of a revision by the author himself, so thorough "ut nunc non tam restituta, quam primum edita videri possit."⁴⁵ Victorius, also, speaks of Pagninus' annotations, which were in the possession of his heir,⁴⁶ and expresses the desire that a publisher might be found for them.⁴⁷

It appears, therefore, that Stephanus used for his edition the same apparatus which Victorius and Servetus had in their hands for the Lyons edition. The descriptions of the exceedingly rare Lyons edition do not make it possible to determine with certainty whether Jehova was introduced in it; on the whole, I incline to think that it was not.

While the pronunciation Jehovah was thus widely current in the sixteenth century, its correctness was not universally admitted. Some scholars recognized that the points of יהוה belonged to the substitute, אֲדָנִי; it was a mistake to read the consonants of one word with the vowels of another; how the name was really pronounced in Old Testament times could be inferred only from external tradition or from grammatical analogy. Mercerus, the successor of Vatablus in Paris, gives a warning against the recent fashion of reading יהוה with the vowels of אֲדָנִי or אֱלֹהִים, *Jehova* or *Jehovi*.⁴⁸ If the name is to be pronounced it would be better to read it יהוה, *Jeheveh*, after the analogy of אֲדָנִי in Exod. 3:14. Genebrardus condemns the pronunciation *Ioua* or *Iehoua* as "aliena, imo vero irreligiosa, imperita, nova et barbara . . . ut contra Calvinianos et Bezanos multis locis

⁴⁵ The extent of these differences appears to be greatly exaggerated in these prefaces. Mosheim (*Anderweitiger Versuch einer vollständigen und unpartheyischen Ketzergeschichte*, 1748, p. 89) affirms that the changes are neither numerous nor important. See also Le Long-Masch, II, 477 f.

⁴⁶ Pagninus died in Lyons, in 1541.

⁴⁷ Rosenmüller, *Biblische Litteratur*, IV, 174 ff.

⁴⁸ On Gen. 2:4; cf. on Exod. 3:13 (Drusius, *Decas*, 82 f.; Cappellus, *ibid.*, 317); see also his additions to the article יהוה in his edition of Pagninus' *Thesaurus* (1577). Mercerus (a Protestant) succeeded Vatablus in Paris in 1546, and died in 1570. His commentaries were not published till after his death (*Minor Prophets*, 1583, Genesis, 1598).

docuimus."⁴⁰ "Vel ejus genuina prolatio per temporis longinquitatem et longam ob eversum templum desuetudinem oblivioni tradita est, vel est *Ihué* (*Ieué* habet Ioachimus Abbas in I Apoc.) vel *Iahué*" (cujus apocope sit *Iah* in illo vulgato *Halelu Iah*) *laβal*, ut Theodoritus in Epitome divinarum dogmatum Samaritas protulisse ait." Arias Montanas explains that the vowels of יהוה, יהוה, belong to יהוה and יהוה respectively:⁴¹ "Nostri hujus rationis ignari *Iehovah* pronuntiant." "Si vero certam quandam ex aliorum similium nominum ratione indicare pronuntiationem fas est, *Ievah* dicendum est, atque ita existimo veteres illos pronuntiasse, tum Israelitas, tum ex aliis gentibus homines, ad quos nominis hujus et Dei ipsius notitia pertinuit." Bellarmin asserts that that the true pronuntiation is unknown; the points belong to יהוה (which he proves with conclusive grammatical reasons); the name should therefore not be read *Iehoua*.⁴² It is noteworthy that no one of the scholars of the sixteenth century who reject the pronuntiation *Jehovah* lays the responsibility for the blunder upon Galatinus.

The controversy so hotly waged in the seventeenth century was opened by Drusius, *Tetragrammaton* (1604). The advocates of *Jehovah* had much the worst of the argument, but they had on their side an established usage upon which argument made no impression. Learned defenses of this usage continued to be made from time to time in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; for example, by J. D. Michaelis (1792),⁴³ Rudolph Stier,⁴⁴ and Hölemann.⁴⁵ It is interesting, in the light of his later writings, to know that Ewald, in his earliest publication (1823), entered the lists not only for the unity of Genesis, but for the pronuntiation *Jehovah*. At another time I shall show that the current opinion that Ewald is the author of the pronuntiation *Jahveh* is one of the

⁴⁰ *Chronologia* (1567); ed. Paris, 1600, pp. 79 f.; *Comment. in Psalmos*, Praefat. (the latter I have not seen).

⁴¹ This is, so far as I know, the first suggestion of the pronuntiation *Jahveh*, now generally accepted.

⁴² *Joseph, sive de Arcano Sermone* (in the Antwerp Polyglot, T. VII, 1572), p. 4.

⁴³ *Institutiones Linguae Hebraicae* (1778); ed. Colon. 1616, pp. 284 f.; cf. his exposition of Ps. 8:1.

⁴⁴ *Supplementa ad Lexica Hebraica*, I, p. 52A.

⁴⁵ *Lehrgebäude der hebräischen Sprache*.

⁴⁶ *Bibelstudien* (1859), 54 ff.

legends of learning, of the same sort with the Galatinus myth.⁵⁶ The pronunciation Jahveh was "propounded" in the sixteenth century, and it stood in the pages of the Lexicon in most general use in Germany (Eichhorn's *Simonis*) ten years before Ewald was born. Gesenius had adopted it when Ewald was still defending Jehovah (1823).

II. "JEVE" IN JOACHIM OF FIORE

Genebrardus, in a passage quoted above (p. 157), observes that Joachim, in his commentary on the first chapter of the Apocalypse (written about the year 1200),⁵⁷ has the form *Ieve*. Attention was called to this fact a few years ago by Franz Delitzsch, who had come upon it in a manuscript containing a part of this commentary.⁵⁸ A more recent hand had written in the margin, at the first occurrence of *Ieve*, the gloss *Iehovah*. Delitzsch adds: "Ein Stück urkundlicher Geschichte der Aussprache des Tetragrammatons innerhalb der Kirche lag vor mir." Delitzsch assumes that Joachim's *Ieve* represents a traditional Jewish pronunciation יהוה, and thinks that a trace of such a tradition may be found in Rabbi Samuel ben Meir on Exod. 3:15; יהוה in vs. 15 was read with the vowels of יהוה, vs. 14. This interpretation of the mystification in Rashbam seems to me doubtful; but with that I am not immediately concerned. It can be shown, I think, that *Ieve* in Joachim did not have its origin in pronunciation at all, but in a trite cabalistic play on the consonants of יהוה.

In his commentary on Apoc. 1:8 Joachim has a long disquisition on the name of God, combining the "A et O" of the Apocalypse with Exod. 3:14 f.; 6:3, in which he writes the name constantly IEVE.⁵⁹ The part which bears upon the question in hand is as follows:⁶⁰

Populo autem Iudeorum, etsi tribus suprascriptis modis in deo omnipotente apparuit, docens se esse trinum et unum deum, nomen tamen

⁵⁶ See e. g., *Encyclopaedia Biblica* (III), 3320: "The controversy as to the correct pronunciation of the tetragrammaton . . . has been gradually brought to an end by the general adoption of the view, first propounded by Ewald, that the true form is Yahwè."

⁵⁷ Published in Paris, 1254.

⁵⁸ *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*, II (1882), 173 f.

⁵⁹ *Expositio . . . in Apocalipsim* (Venet., 1527), fol. 33b ff.


⁶⁰ *Op. cit.*, fol. 35a f. I modernize the punctuation.

suum IEVE, quod Hebrei legunt Adonay, non indicavit eis, quia esse se trinum et unum deum non illis per specialem intellectum aperuit quousque verus ille Moyses, mediator dei et hominum Christus Iesus; qui cum instaret hora passionis sue ut transiret ex hoc mundo ad patrem, post multa que locutus est discipulis suis, adiecit et ait: Jam non dicam vos seruos, quia seruus nescit quid faciat dominus eius; vos autem dixi amicos, quod omnia quecumque audiui a patre meo nota feci vobis. Quando autem dixit hoc verbum, nisi cum nomen illud ineffabile, quod est IEVE, notum fecit illis, loquens eis manifeste de spiritu sancto et de patre, et de gloria maiestatis sue, dicens: Ego in patre et pater in me est? etc. [John 14:13, 16]. . . . Et quia tam aperte docuit esse tres personas coeternas sibi et coequales, unum scilicet et trinum deum, quod est dicere IEVE, oportebat nihilominus eum docere, que istarum personarum ingenta esset, que autem genita, et que procedens, quod in subsequentibus luce clarius manifestat cum dicit: Cum venerit paraclitus, quem ego mittam vobis a patre, spiritum veritatis, qui a patre procedit, ille testimonium perhibebit de me.

For Joachim, therefore, the name JEVE imports the mystery of the Trinity. A little further on he writes (fol. 35b):

Sciendum est igitur, quod nomen illud venerabile, quod congrue satis ineffabile dicitur tam ab Hebreis quam a Latinis, pronuntiatu Adonay; et tamen in Hebreo non eisdem characteribus quibus scriptum est pronuntiatu, sed aliis. Scribitur enim quatuor literis, propter quod et apud Grecos thethragrammaton nominatur, cuius inscriptio ista est, IEVE. Est autem nomen istud, ut tradunt peritissimi Hebreorum, tante virtutis ut si distinguatur in tribus dictionibus ad hoc ut sigillatim proferatur, IE sigillatim, EV sigillatim, VE, singula distinctio integritatem sui nominis habeat, et si proferatur simul, IEVE, unitatem demonstret.

If, now, he continues, these three monosyllabic names are written in a triangle, A,⁶¹ each of the three will have its own perfection, each the distinctive attribute (*proprietas*) of some one person; and, what is more, the second name springs (*propagatur*) from the first, and the third from the second, in such a way that one cannot be pronounced without the other. These syllables are not divided in pronunciation, but the V (vowel) blends with the preceding and following so that the enunciation is a unit. Joachim employs diagrams to show this, as follows (fol. 35b, 36a):



Scribendum est enim simpliciter quatuor literis istis, IEVE, et tamen legendum primo IE, EV, VE, deinde IEVE; quod, ut diligenter ostendi queat, literis quidem formatis nomen ipsum scribendum est, pronuntiationes vero ipsius clausulis minutissimis designande, verbi gratia,

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \bar{i}e & & \bar{u}e \\ \text{IE} \text{---} & \text{VE} & \underline{\text{ieue}} \\ & \underline{\text{eu}} & \end{array}$$

Et quid magis hoc mysterio veritati vicinum? Certe vides scriptum quatuor literis ineffabile nomen; certe vides—immo nondum in toto vides—quanta profunditas sacramenti contegatur in eo. Unde et non immerito ab Hebreis scribitur quidem sed non profertur, quod si temptas in eo quod mente distinguitur lingua proferre, desinit esse tetragramaton; ideoque melius mente percipitur quam lingua ministerio personatur.

IE is one name; EV is one name; VE is one name; yet IEVE is not three names but one. Just so in the Trinity: the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God; yet these are not three Gods but one. If the three names are written in a triangle you have the letter A; if IEVE be inclosed in a circle, O—trinity in unity.

Joachim observes, further (fol. 37a), that there are only three different letters in the name, IEV (E being repeated), and finds in this, too, an allegorical significance.

Galatinus likewise discovers the mystery of the Trinity in the three syllables of Jehova.⁶²

Capnio asks:

Quid tres huius nominis [sc. Iehova] syllabae significant? *Galatinus*.—Tres utique personas diuinas. Quemadmodum enim unaquaeque huius nominis syllaba (ut aiunt Cabalistsae) id totum significat, quod totum nomen ipsum importat, ita quaelibet diuina persona, cum perfectus Deus sit, totam in se continet diuinitatem; nec diuinitas ipsa magis est in tribus personis simul quam sit in unaquaque, sed tota est in unaquaque et tota in tribus. Tres igitur huius nominis syllabae tres diuinas designant personas, quarum unaquaeque est uerus et perfectus Deus Et sicut tres huiusce nominis syllabae simul sumptae unum nomen efficiunt, ita tres personae diuinae sunt unus Deus. *Capnio*.—Quae sunt illa diuina nomina, quae ueteres Hebraeorum ex quatuor literis huius nominis componiasserunt? *Galatinus*.—Haec, sive יהוה iah, הוה hu, יהו uehu.⁶³

⁶² *De Arcanis*, fol. 50b f.

⁶³ Galatinus distorts the tradition for the sake of his interpretation; the third, as he himself says just below, must be יהוה. See also Petrus Alphonsi, quoted p. 51.

Primum enim ex prima et secunda componitur litera, sive ex iod et he hoc modo יְהִ, quod idem est quod Deus et patrem designat, qui totius diuinitatis fons est. Secundum uero nomen ex secunda et tertia constat litera, sic הִי hu, quod *ipse* interpretatur et filium significat . . . Tertium denique nomen ex tertia et quarta constituitur litera, sive ex uau et he; sic הִיְוִהוּ vehu, et id totum sonat quod *et ipse*, et spiritum sanctum denotat. . . .

Galatinus remarks (fol. 51a) that הִ is common to the first and second names, וִ to the second and third; from which the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son, the Son and the Spirit follows.

Raymundus Martini had remarked that there are but three different letters, יְוִהוּ, in the Tetragrammaton, הִ being repeated, a fact of which he first makes an application to the person of the Messiah:⁶⁴

Quando verò dicitur de Deo simpliciter, tunc, ut ait Magister Petrus Alphonsi, qui fuit in Hispania, priusquam fieret Christianus, magnus Rabinus apud Judaeos, tres literae priores hujus nominis, scilicet יְוִהוּ, indicant in Deo hoc nomine vocato tres esse מְדִוּת, id est, proprietates à seipsis invicem differentes ex sua diversitate, quam habent tam in figura quam in nomine, ut praedictum est. Una verò earum quae repetitur et in fine nominis ponitur, quae est הִ, et est prima in hoc nomine הִיְוִהוּ Essentia, indicat trium מְדִוּת, id est, proprietatum vel personarum, unitatem Essentiae.

Petrus Alphonsi, to whom Raymundus refers, was baptized in 1106, in the forty-fourth year of his age. After his conversion he wrote a controversial Dialogue to refute the Jews and demonstrate the Christian faith.⁶⁵ The Jewish disputant in the Dialogue bears Petrus' own name before his baptism, Moses. In the chapter on the Trinity,⁶⁶ Petrus undertakes to prove, from the name יְוִהוּ itself, that there must be just three persons in the Trinity. I quote the whole passage in order that the dependence of Joachim upon it may appear more evidently.⁶⁷


⁶⁴ *Pugio Fidei*, fol. 540, ed. Voisin.

⁶⁵ First printed in Cologne in 1536, under the (publisher's) title: *Dialogi lectu dignissimi, in quibus impiae Judaeorum opiniones . . . confutantur*, etc. Reprinted (with a different title) in the *Bibliotheca Patrum* (Lyons), XXI, 172 ff., and thence in Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, CLVII, 535-572.

⁶⁶ Migne, 608 ff.

⁶⁷ Migne, 611. Voisin in his notes on the *Pugio* (fol. 556) quotes part of this paragraph.

Trinitas quidem subtile quid est ineffabile, et ad explanandum difficile, de qua prophetae non nisi occulte locuti sunt et sub velamine, quoadusque venit Christus, qui de tribus una personis, fidelium illam mentibus pro eorum revelavit capacitate. Si tamen attendas subtilius, et illud Dei nomen, quod in Secretis Secretorum⁶⁸ explanatum invenitur, inspicias, יהוה, nomen inquam trium litterarum, quamvis quatuor figuris, una namque de illis geminata bis scribitur; si inquam illud inspicias, videbis quia idem nomen et unum sit et tria. Sed quod unum est, ad unitatem substantiae, quod vero tria, ad trinitatem respicit personarum. Constat autem nomen illud his quatuor figuris, י et ה et ו et ה, quarum si primam tantum conjunxeris et secundam, י scilicet et ה, erit sane nomen unum. Item si secundam et tertiam, ה scilicet et ו, jam habebis alterum. Similiter, si tertiam tantum copulaveris atque quartam, scilicet ו et ה, invenies et tertium. Rursus si omnes simul in ordine connexueris, non erit nisi nomen unum, sicut in ista patet geometrali figura



A comparison of this passage with that quoted above from Joachim's commentary on the Apocalypse proves that Joachim, in his speculations on the Tetragrammaton, is dependent (directly or indirectly) on Petrus Alphonsi: his IEVE is merely a transliteration of יהוה, the Latin E standing for *He*. That Joachim pronounced the name *Ieue*, with its constituents *Ie*, *eu*, *ue*, and exercised his phonetic ingenuity upon it, in no way militates against this origin. His other departures from Petrus' scheme are the consequence of the fact that his starting-point is the A and O of Apoc. 1:8; which leads him to dispose the syllables in a triangle (A), and then the whole name in a circle (O), instead of in intersecting circles within a circle. His insistence that in pronunciation the vocalic V blends with the preceding E and the following E (IE V E) is his substitute for Petrus' geometrical demonstration by intersecting circles.

The tradition of the "peritissimi Hebraeorum" to which Joachim appeals is not, therefore, as Delitzsch imagined, a traditional

⁶⁸ See p. 52

pronunciation, but a cabalistic combination of the letters of the written name, as, indeed, Galatinus and Petrus expressly say.

Petrus Alphonsi cites specifically the *Secreta Secretorum* as a book in which the name רַזִּיֵּל is (cabalistically) explained.⁶⁰ This reference is of considerable interest on its own account. The Hebrew title was presumably רַזִּיֵּל סֵפֶר or סֵפֶר רַזִּיֵּל, and the citation of this work in a writing of the early part of the twelfth century is an important datum in the intricate history of the "Raziel" literature.

⁶⁰ Doubtless with permutations of the letters of רַזִּיֵּל, as in the *Sepler Yefirah*.

THE PRE-EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL IN THE BOOK OF WISDOM AND IN THE RABBINICAL WRITINGS ✓

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I. THE PRE-EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL IN THE BOOK OF WISDOM

Out of the popular eclectic Greek philosophy of the second or third centuries before Christ, the writer of the *Book of Wisdom* is commonly understood to have borrowed elements both Stoic and Platonic in origin. Stoic influence is seen especially in his conception of Wisdom as no longer only a personification of the creative thought and energy of God, as in Proverbs, chap. 8, but a substantial entity, a spirit filling the world and holding all things together (1:7), uniting in itself physical, rational, and moral qualities, and betraying unmistakably in many of its attributes and functions the influence of the Stoic world-soul.¹ The Platonic element is found chiefly in the conception of the soul of man, its pre-existence, its relation to the body as something foreign to its proper nature and a hindrance to its attainment of knowledge and virtue, and its essential immortality.

The title of this essay calls, therefore, for a discussion of the supposed Platonic element in this book. Grimm² describes this element as follows:

From the Platonic philosophy he adopts the doctrines of the ἄλη ἀμορφος, the formless matter of which the world was made (11:17), of the pre-existence of souls (8:19, 20), of the body as the seat of sin (1:4; 8:20) and as an obstacle to the attainment of a knowledge of the divine (9:15), and of the elevation of the wise and pious after death to communion with God.

Other modern writers³ differ little from this statement of the doctrines of the book as to the pre-existence and the immortality

¹ πνεῦμα νοερόν, λεπτόν, εὐκίνητον, διήκει καὶ χωρεῖ διὰ πάντων, ἀπόρροια τῆς δόξης, ἀπαύγασμα φωτὸς αἰδίου, κ.τ.λ. (1:22—8:1).

² *Das Buch der Weisheit*, 1860, p. 19.

³ See, for example, Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, 3d ed. III, ii, pp. 272 f.; Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes* (1898), III, 380; Siegfried in Kautzsch's *Apokryphen und Pseudepigraphen*, I, 477, and in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, IV, 929; Toy, *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, IV, 5342; Farrar in Wace's *Apocrypha*, I, 401.

of the soul, and as to the dualistic conception of the world and of human nature upon which these doctrines rest.

It is customary, in other words, to attribute to the author of the *Book of Wisdom* almost the fully developed doctrine of Philo in regard to the soul and its relation to the body.* Souls, in Philo's view, pre-exist, the air being full of them. Those that remain true to their nature, incorporeal, are the angels. It is only souls that somehow have lower propensities that sink to earth and enter bodies. Of these some are further degraded by the earthly prison or grave that holds them. The task of the philosopher is to flee from the body and the outer world. By contemplation, rising to ecstasy, the soul may even now escape sense and attain a vision of truth and of God. On this ecstatic vision Philo puts even greater emphasis than on the escape of the soul from the body at death. Such a doctrine of the soul's pre-existence and of the body as a prison from which release is a blessing is attributed by Josephus to the Essenes (*B. J.* ii. 8. 11). Some such view indeed Josephus himself professes (*B. J.* iii. 9. 5), and puts also into the mouth of Eleazar (*B. J.* vii. 8. 7). A sentence from his own argument against suicide (*B. J.* iii. 9. 5) may be quoted, because it expresses well the idea that is commonly ascribed to the *Book of Wisdom*: Τὰ μὲν γὰρ σώματα θνητὰ πάντων καὶ ἐκ φθαρτῆς ἕλης δεδαιμουργήται, ψυχὴ δὲ ἀθάνατος αἰεὶ καὶ θεοῦ μοῖρα τοῖς σώμασιν ἐνοικίεται. This sentence is consistently Hellenic, but in the context we have a curious blending of inharmonious Greek and Jewish conceptions which constitutes an effective warning to the student who looks for consistency in Jewish eschatology.

The most elaborate study of the Greek element in the *Book of Wisdom* is that of Menzel.⁵ His conclusion in regard to the Platonic (dualistic) element is that it is certainly to be recognized in the doctrine of the immortality of the soul (3:1, 9; 1:12; 6:19), the doctrine that the righteous after death are at once near to God, the pre-existence of the soul (9:19-20), the idea that as long as the soul is in the body it is imprisoned and oppressed (9:15),

*See especially *De significatione*, 2-18; *De somniis*, i. 21-23, 31; *De confus. ling.*, II, 35; *De migrat. Abr.*, 5; *Leg. all.*, iii. 14, 22; *De opif. mundi*, 21, 46.

⁵*Der griechische Einfluß auf Prediger und Weisheit Salomos*, 1899.

and the conception of ὕλη ἄμορφος (11:17). The question is open whether he derived these ideas directly from Plato, or not.⁶ It was the eclectic blending of Stoicism and Platonism by which he was affected. Nevertheless the relation between 9:15 and *Phaedo* 81 C is to Menzel, as it is to E. Pfeiderer,⁷ conclusive proof that the writer had actually read at least the *Phaedo*, and perhaps also, as Pfeiderer⁸ argues, on account of 7:22-30, the *Cratylus*. Menzel regards the idea that the body is a source of evil and sin (1:4; 8:20, 21; 9:15) as one of the points of likeness between the *Book of Wisdom* and Philo.

In regard to the Stoic element it is commonly acknowledged that our author's conception of Wisdom marks only a step, though an important one, from the Hebrew conception toward the Logos of Philo; but with reference to the Platonic element there is less caution; and since it is my purpose to show that greater reservations, rather than less, are called for in the case of this latter element, I wish to point out what little support I may claim for a position against which the presumption is so strong. I do not find any doubt expressed of late as to the fully Platonic, or Philonic, character of the doctrine of pre-existence in 8:19, 20. With the earlier debate, which turned on the question of the canonicity of the book, and on the interest of one side in affirming and of the other in denying the presence in it of an unchurchly doctrine, we need have nothing to do. There seems to be equally unanimous consent to the opinion that the immortality of the soul is here accepted in the Greek sense, in contrast to the Jewish idea of resurrection. But even Grimm thinks that our author's Greek notions were picked up as a part of the current culture of his time, rather than derived from study. Grimm notes also the entire absence in the *Book of Wisdom* of some Platonic doctrines which had an important place in Philo, such as the trichotomy of human nature, and most of all the doctrine of Ideas. He says, too, that the opinion, fundamental to Philo, that the body is the seat and source of evil, is only casually alluded to in *Wisdom* 1:4; 8:19; and that this idea is used for religious and practical rather than for

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 61.

⁷ *Die Philosophie des Heraklit von Ephesus* (1886), pp. 295 f.

Pp. 299 f.

speculative purposes (pp. 22, 23). But these reservations do not affect his interpretation of the crucial passages. Drummond,⁹ while he accepts the doctrine of pre-existence in the Greek sense, and says that souls are good and bad before their entrance upon earthly life, and that the quality of the bodies they obtain depends on their moral condition, yet finds that 9:15 does not represent the body as the active source of sin, but only as a check upon man's higher aspirations, and that 1:4 does not mean that the body is a source of evil to the soul, but that it shares the ethical quality of the soul. Bousset, if I do not misjudge him, feels even more strongly the slenderness of the thread on which the supposed Platonic dualism of the book depends. The writer, he says, touches it in passing (9:15), but on the other hand implies that the divine wisdom dwells both in the soul and in the body of man (1:4). The pre-existence of souls is indeed indicated in 8:19, 20, but the passage means that the constitution of the body answers to the constitution of the soul. Though the author does not know the resurrection of the body, yet he does not directly express the thought that death is a freeing from the body, and that the contents of moral effort is the renunciation of the world. "Der dualistische Gedanke ist hier also nur in den ersten Ansätzen vorhanden."¹⁰

It has long been my conviction that the current language in regard to the Hellenism of the *Book of Wisdom* is misleading, and that it is more important to define the kind and degree of this Hellenism than to assert its reality. In particular in regard to the pre-existence of the soul, not only in *Wisdom* but in rabbinical and other Jewish books, it is not so useful to assert or deny as to define. What did the Jews mean by pre-existence, and above all what did they mean by soul?

The difference between the Jewish and the Greek ideas of pre-existence has been suggestively discussed by Harnack.¹¹ He argues that to the Greek mind pre-existence is connected with the contrast between spirit and matter, and expresses the thought

⁹ *Philo Judaeus*, I, 200 ff.

¹⁰ *Die Religion des Judentums* (2. Aufl., 1906), pp. 461 f.

¹¹ *History of Dogma*, I, Appendix i.

that the idea, or form, or energy, of all things exists before their physical embodiment, and remains independent of this imperfect material copy. It is only the higher spiritual nature of things that pre-exists. The Jewish conception of pre-existence, on the other hand, rests on the contrast between God and man, and pictures or objectifies God's foreknowledge and determination of all things, and his special thought and purpose regarding things of special worth. Things pre-exist just as they are afterward to appear, not in their idea or form, but in their proper selves. They are hidden with God, and in the appointed time are manifest on earth. Pre-existence in the Greek sense is an explanation of the nature of things and an exaltation of their value; in the Jewish sense it glorifies the power and wisdom of God. Such generalizations may, with some reserve, be accepted, and we may agree with Harnack's conclusion that when Paul connected the contrast of spirit and flesh with the pre-existence of the Messiah he started the transition from a Jewish to a Greek Christology; and that incarnation is a Greek and not a Jewish conception.

With reference to the pre-existence of the soul we may with due caution venture a somewhat different generalization, namely, that to the Greek the soul that pre-exists was or tended to be the personality, the man's real thinking self; while to the Jew it was only a part of the coming man, the divine breath or spirit which was to make him alive, the breath (*neshamah*) of life which God breathes into the earthly form, making it a living being (*nephesh*).¹² There is scarcely a greater cause of confusion and difficulty in the comprehension of Hebrew modes of thought than the tendency—in part, to be sure, the necessity—that impels us to translate *nephesh* by the word "soul." The *nephesh* is the life or the self of man, the living man himself, just as he is here and now. The older Hebrews had no word for body (*σῶμα*), and what we call body was not to them the opposite of *nephesh*, but was inseparable from it. When the Jews wished to speak of that which preceded and survived the earthly life of man the word they naturally used was not *nephesh* but *neshamah* (less often *ruah*), not the word that expressed the personal self of man, but

¹² Gen. 2:7.

the word that suggested the divine in contrast to the earthly element that entered into his making. But the pre-existence of the neshamah is a very different thing from the pre-existence of the $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$. There is a kind of pre-existence of man which belongs naturally to the dualistic view of the world, of which Plato was the prophet. There is an entirely different kind of pre-existence which belongs to the religious attitude which the Hebrews instinctively maintained. That man comes from God and returns to God is said in Genesis 2:7 and in Ecclesiastes 12:7; in a very different sense in John 13:3; 16:28; still differently by the modern poet,

When that which drew from out the boundless deep,
Turns again home.

Such expressions can be used by those who believe both in the pre-existence and in the immortality of the conscious personality; by those who accept immortality, but not pre-existence, in this personal sense; and by those who reject personality in both cases. When we meet with the idea of the pre-existence of the soul, therefore, we need chiefly to ask what is meant by soul, what is it that pre-exists?

In order to determine whether the *Book of Wisdom* and the rabbinical writings contain a Jewish or a Greek conception of the pre-existence of the soul we must define these two conceptions a little more precisely, though it can be only in bare summary.

There is a sense in which pre-existence entered into the old Hebrew conception of men. It was, however, not the pre-existence of the person himself, the "I," the nephesh, that was in mind, but that of the two elements of which the man was made. The fundamental passage for the later Jewish ideas on the subject was Gen. 2:7. Man is on one side dust from the earth, and on the other, living breath, or spirit, from God. Man is taken out of the earth and returns to earth again (Gen. 3:19). God's breath (neshamah or ruah)¹⁸ which makes him a living nephesh is withdrawn at death; and this also goes back to the source from which it came. Death, then, is the return of each part of man

¹⁸ Compare Gen. 2:7 with 6:17; 7:15, 22; and see Job 32:8; 33:4; 34:14; Isa. 57:16.

to its source.¹⁴ It would be possible, therefore, for the Hebrew, in reflecting on what precedes man's birth, to think either of the body as it is formed in the womb and comes ultimately from the earth, or of the neshamah (ruah) of life which God breathes into the earthly form. As a matter of fact, however, this breath or spirit of God seemed to the Hebrews to belong to God to such a degree that for a long time they did not even individualize each man's share in it, still less connect with it the man's personal consciousness. It remained more natural for them to apply the personal pronoun to the pre-existing body than to the pre-existing neshamah: man comes from earth and returns to earth again.¹⁵ The nearest approach to actual reflection on the pre-existence of man in the Old Testament is found in Psalm 139; and here it is the pre-existent body with which the poet in some sense identifies himself. It is "I" that am formed in the womb and even wrought in the lowest parts of the earth—these two being curiously blended in thought, as they are also in Job 1:21, and *Sirach*, 40:1. But we should expect the idea to arise in course of time that the breath of God also was for each man in some sense a distinct entity. Beginnings in this direction may possibly be found in such passages as Job 32:8; 33:4; Prov. 20:27, and especially the expression "the neshamoth that I made," in Isa. 57:21. There is also the hint in Eccles. 3:21 that there were in the writer's time those who claimed (in contrast to Ps. 104:29, 30, etc.) that the ruah of man had a different destiny after death from the ruah of the beast. It is not my purpose to trace the history of these conceptions, but only to indicate the line along which Jewish thought, so long as it remained distinctly Jewish, would naturally move.

In regard to Greek conceptions, what needs here to be said relates principally to Plato, and especially to the *Phaedo*, since this is the book by which the writer of *Wisdom* is thought to have been influenced.¹⁶ Homer determined popular Greek ideas about death far more than Plato ever did. The Homeric Hades

¹⁴ Job 34:14, 15; Eccles. 12:7; *Sirach*, 40:11 [Heb.].

¹⁵ Gen. 3:19; Job 10:9; 34:14, 15; Ps. 22:30 [29]; 30:10 [9]; 103:14; 104:29; Eccles. 3:20; 12:7; *Sirach*, 16:30; 17:1; *Pirke Aboth*, 3:1.

¹⁶ See especially Rohde, *Psyche* (2. Aufl., 1898).

is very like the Hebrew Sheol. There are the same objective pictures of the dead, and at the same time gloom and emptiness and unreality characterize their lot. One distinction, however, is significant. Homer can call the shades in Hades *ψυχαί*; and at the height of the Greek faith in a future life Plato is still willing to describe the immortality he contends for as a persistence of the *ψυχή* in Hades.¹⁷ The word *nephesh* is not so used in the Old Testament, and at the height of Jewish thought Sheol becomes exclusively the place of punishment for the wicked. *Psyche* is an appropriate title for Rohde's book on the worship of the soul and the faith in immortality among the Greeks; but no one would use *Nephesh* as the title of a book on Hebrew ideas of the life after death. Greek thought issued at its best in a doctrine of the immortality of the soul; Hebrew thought in a doctrine of the resurrection. Undoubtedly the Greek conception of the transmigration of souls represented in its early popular forms a feeling like that which the Jewish conception of resurrection expresses, that there can be no true life of man apart from a body. But on the higher levels of Greek thought, in the Orphic Mysteries, in Pythagoras, and in Plato, metempsychosis was so transformed that reincarnation was a disciplinary punishment, and the ideal to be striven after was the permanent escape of the soul from the body. The highest point attainable in the Hebrew line of development is that expressed by Paul's conception of a *σῶμα πνευματικόν*. Greek thought culminates in Plato's *τότε γὰρ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν ἔσται ἡ ψυχή χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος* (*Phaedo*, 67 A). The tendency of Greek thought, then, was to regard the soul as the personality, and with reference both to what precedes and to what follows man's earthly life, to fix attention upon the soul. The difference between the Greek idea of metempsychosis as a series of incarnations of the soul in different bodies, and the Jewish idea of resurrection, the reunion of the soul with its former body, or the reviving of the dead body by a (new?)¹⁸ breath of life from God, illustrates the Greek tendency to connect the personality

¹⁷ *Phaedo*, 71 D, E, 81 C, 106 E, 107 A.

¹⁸ See Ezek. 37:1-14, which, though it describes in figure, the revival of Israel, discloses the way in which a Hebrew would conceive of the resurrection of the individual. Here the old bones are re clothed with flesh, and revived by a fresh breath (r u a ḥ) of God.

with the soul, and the Hebrew tendency to connect it with the body. The fact that resurrection is characteristic of the Jewish view and immortality of the Greek is connected also with the national character of the Jewish religion and the individual character of the Greek. But resurrection, in contrast to immortality, did not arise and maintain itself simply as a part of the Messianic hope. It was deeply rooted in Jewish ideas of man and God. The Greek asked, Is the soul immortal? The Jews, If a man die, shall he live again?

The ruling conception in the philosophy of Plato was that there is a realm of eternal and changeless ideas, of which earthly and sensible things are copies, and upon which all things depend for their being. True being, reality, belongs to this realm alone. Man's highest capacity is that of knowing this invisible world of ideas, that is, the capacity for abstract thought. That the soul of man has this power is proof that it belongs by nature to that higher realm. Moreover, since the soul's knowledge of the ideas is not given to it by the senses, it must be in reality memory, and hence attests the fact of the soul's pre-existence in the sphere of eternal realities. The soul is in its nature related to the ideas, and shares with them their quality of eternity. All abstract thought bears witness to the soul's unearthly origin, but especially its knowledge of the highest ideas, such as goodness, beauty, justice.¹⁹ The immortality of the soul is therefore an inference from this pre-existence, of which we have immediate evidence in our knowledge, or memory, of abstract truths and ideals. "In its capacity to know the eternal the soul bears within itself the surest guarantee of being itself eternal."²⁰ But this soul, which has no end because it had no beginning, and attests its eternity to itself by its power to know things not given it through the bodily senses, is bound while on earth to a body which is foreign to its nature. The body hinders it in that search for knowledge which is its true life. The doctrine of transmigration, as developed by the Mysteries and Pythagoras, furnished Plato perhaps with the basis for his theory that knowledge is memory, and certainly with his explanation of the unnatural union of soul with body. The

¹⁹ See *Phaedo*, 73-76; *Symposium*, 211, 212.

²⁰ Rohde, *Psyche*, II, 285.

eternal soul must pass through the discipline of successive incarnations in the bodies of men, or even of beasts, until it attains such purity that it may be delivered from the circle of births and remain in the realm to which in truth it belongs. To attain this salvation is the aim of the philosopher. His method is to separate the soul as much as possible from the body, to dwell in the realm of ideas, not in that of sense, to repress bodily passions and desires.²¹ Even in the case of the philosopher it is only the complete separation of soul from body by death that brings the open vision of truth. He practices dying even now, and welcomes the approach of death.

The pre-existence of the soul is, then, more certain than its immortality, for it is attested by present experience. Plato has other arguments for the soul's immortality based on its nature, especially as not composite and as self-moving; but to the argument from "memory" he returns as the surest basis of his hope.²² This means that the pre-existence and the immortality of the soul alike depend for him upon the reality of the ideas; and this is the supreme article of faith in the religion of Plato. The true nature of reality is not in matter, and the true nature of man is not in the body.

This brief statement may serve to bring before our minds the characteristic marks of the Platonic doctrine of pre-existence. It is clear that it concerns the soul alone, and that the soul which pre-exists is not only that which lives, but that which thinks. It is evident that the doctrine stands in the closest relation to a general view of the world, a dualistic view, in which the contrast of spirit and matter is central and all-determining. It is a doctrine which involves a definite conception of the nature of evil as having its source and seat in matter, and a distinctly ascetic theory and ideal of conduct. It is inseparable, also, from a belief in immortality in which two elements are to be distinguished, the inherent, unconditional indestructibility of the soul as such (*ψυχή πάντα ἀθάνατος*),²³ and the goal of a permanently incorporeal life of the soul, a *blessed* immortality, which is conditioned on its renunciation of the pleasures and passions of the body and its attaining of

²¹ *Phaedo*, 65 ff.

²² *Ibid.*, 91, 92; cf. 72-77.

²³ *Phaedrus*, 245 C.

knowledge and virtue. The souls that carry with them out of the earthly life no taint of the body, but have desired death and practiced dying while on earth, will live forever in the realm of reality, in communion with the gods.²⁴ Plato's doctrine of immortality is therefore in part a metaphysic and in part a religion. The two, however, are not to be separated as if Plato wavered inconsistently between the natural and the conditional immortality of the soul. The redemption of the soul from the body is accomplished by knowledge, the knowledge of eternal truths and realities, and of the soul as belonging by nature to the realm of eternal things. The philosopher is one who knows and applies the fact that the soul is imperishable. By realizing the soul's inescapable immortality, and living in the light of this knowledge, he attains immortality in the full and blessed sense.

It is evident how great a difference separates the native Hebrew from the Greek, and especially from the Platonic, ideas of the pre-existence of the soul; and also that the difference is closely connected with the idea of the soul. In general the Hebrew meant by the pre-existing soul the life or life-giving energy which man receives from God; while Plato meant by it not only that which makes the body alive but also that in man which knows truth, the power of thought; hence, certainly in a far higher degree than *neshamah* to the Hebrew, the $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ to Plato was the self-conscious moral personality, and the pre-existence of the soul was therefore more truly the pre-existence of the person.²⁵

The contention of this paper is that, contrary to the current view, both the rabbis of the Talmudic period, and the writer of the *Book of Wisdom* were, at this point, Jewish, not Greek.

Turning now to the *Book of Wisdom*, we shall look first at the short list of passages from which it is inferred that the writer accepted the Platonic doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul.

²⁴ *Phaedo*, 80, 81.

²⁵ So much may be said without entering into the difficult question just how far Plato succeeded in securing immortality for the conscious personality in our modern sense of that word. It must be confessed that metempsychosis, the successive inhabiting of different bodies by the soul, though it connects the personality more closely with the soul than with the body, does not convey so vivid a sense of the personal identity of the one who now lives with the one who will live hereafter as does the doctrine of resurrection, which connects the personality with the body more closely than with the soul. See E. K. Gaye, *The Platonic Conception of Immortality*, 1904.

The first of these passages, 1:4, cited by Grimm, with 8:20, as evidence of the Platonic conception that the body is the seat of sin, can be shortly dismissed. Surely nothing that other passages may yield can avail to make this Platonic. The author begins his book with the thought that God can be found and known by men only on the condition of righteousness. Sin shuts men off from that Power (1:3), or Wisdom (1:4), or Spirit (1:5), which is the medium, or representative, of God's immanent presence in the world (1:7) and in men (1:4-6). "For into a soul devising evil wisdom will not enter, nor will it dwell in a body that is in debt to sin." Grimm remarks (pp. 50 f.) that although "body and soul" means the human being in his totality, yet "the author would not have used this paraphrase if he had not assumed a source and seat of moral evil also in the body (well known as a fundamental dogma of developed Alexandrianism in Philo), although according to his view not all bodies are in equal degree permeated by the principle of sin (8:19, 20)." If in the words, "wenn er nicht Quelle und Sitz des sittlich Bösen auch im Leibe angenommen hätte," the "auch" means "as well as in the soul," then the Philonic character of the verse is denied in the sentence that affirms it. In fact it is brought in by Grimm only by sheer force, and is positively excluded by the verse itself and by its context. The two clauses of the verse are in rhythmical parallelism, and mean, individually and together, simply that the divine wisdom will not enter into a sinful man. At most they supplement each other by suggesting that there are more spiritual and more physical sorts of sin which equally shut the divine spirit out. But the body is no more the seat of sin than the soul, and there is nothing to suggest that either body or soul is the source of sin. This verse says the same thing that is said in other words in vs. 3 and 5. The sins which are in the writer's mind as those that especially shut out the spirit of God are not sins of sense, but perverse thoughts and blasphemous or lying words about the meaning and conduct and end of life, such as chap. ii reports. The man described by the phrase, *κακότεχνος ψυχή*, is more vividly present before the writer's eye than the man suggested by the phrase, *σῶμα κατάχρητος ἀμαρτίας*. The verse is definitely un-

Platonic, for it implies that the divine Wisdom can dwell in the body as well as in the soul, and that the soul is not good by nature and the body evil, but that body and soul alike may be either good or evil. The contrast between *ψυχή* and *σῶμα* is like that of Prov. 11:17 rather than that of Greek dualism. The words are Greek, but the thought is Hebraic. Man is a unity, and his character, good or bad, belongs to both of the two parts of which he is composed. Paul, the Hebrew, could think of the body as a dwelling-place of the spirit of God (I Cor. 6:19), and of a purity that includes body as well as soul (I Thess. 5:23);* but this is not Platonism.

There remain three verses on which the Hellenistic dualism of our author depends, 8:20; 9:15; 11:17. On 8:19, 20 alone depends the accepted view that he held to Plato's and Philo's doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul. It is a rather heavy weight for these two short verses to sustain. They form, in fact, a parenthesis, and would not be in the least missed if they were dropped out. It is not my purpose, however, to cast doubt upon them. Though they are parenthetical, they serve a good purpose, and are, as I hope to prove, quite characteristic of the author's mode of thought. In the person of Solomon he describes his early love of Wisdom, and his determination to find and follow her (8:2-18). But when he sought her he discovered that she was not to be gained except as the gift of God, and that he must therefore resort to prayer (8:21-9:18); and this in spite of the fact that he was thoroughly and exceptionally good by nature (8:19, 20), and so had fulfilled that fundamental condition for the obtaining of wisdom which is set forth in 1:1-6. The thought in general is that expressed in 7:1-7. Even Solomon, great as was his natural endowment, was only like other men, and gained Wisdom only by a way that is open to every man, that of prayer. He was perfect among the sons of men, and yet he needed the Wisdom that comes from God (9:6).

How then is this natural goodness of Solomon described?

*παῖς δὲ ἤμην εὐφυῆς,
 ψυχῆς τε ἔλαχον ἀγαθῆς,
 μᾶλλον δὲ ἀγαθὸς ὢν
 ἦλθον εἰς σῶμα ἀμίαντον.*

* See also Rom. 6:12; 12:1.

According to the usual understanding of the passage the author means by *μᾶλλον δὲ* to substitute the second expression for the first; and this second expression is thought to imply that the soul pre-exists, and has already attained a certain character, good or bad; and that, according to this character, it is assigned to a better or a worse body. To this it is commonly added that the body is in any case something foreign to the soul and a source of evil to it (9:15), because it is composed of matter (11:17). It will serve our purpose to reproduce in summary Grimm's comments.

The author, he thinks, started to write the common expression, which would have been, "I was of good nature and was allotted a good soul *and an undefiled body*," but as he did not share the common view he did not complete the sentence, but substituted another for it (vs. 20). This would have been clearer if he had written, "Or rather, being a *good soul* I came into an undefiled body." This is evidently what he meant. The "undefiled body" is a body not defiled by the power of the sensuous, or one in which the power of the sense-impulse is not so strong as to hinder the effort of the spirit toward wisdom and virtue. The author accordingly sees in the body, as a part of matter (9:5 [15?]), the source of evil, although his view on this point is not so fully developed as in Philo. In saying that the soul was *good* even before its union with the body, the pre-existence of souls is presupposed, according to the familiar Platonic conception, which Philo and the Essenes also appropriated. Yet our author has somewhat modified the Platonic idea, for he thinks of the character of the body as dependent on the character of the soul in its pre-existent state, and so assumes two sorts of pre-existing souls, good and bad. There are points of analogy with this in Plato and in Philo, but in Plato the best souls escape reincarnation, and in Philo they are not drawn to earth and do not enter human bodies at all, while of those that do enter the earthly life the better class regard the body as a prison, and long to return to their heavenly home. But in spite of this difference, Philo's view teaches us the spirit in which the writer of *Wisdom* also may have thought of the difference between good and bad souls in their pre-existent state. The good were less attracted by the earthly and sensuous than the bad. It is also to be assumed that the writer did not imagine that souls were created good and bad by God. They could only become so by their free choice.²⁷

Now have we a right to say that in vs. 19 the author falls into a traditional (Jewish) form of expression with which he does not agree, and then in vs. 20 corrects himself and substitutes his new

²⁷ Grimm, *Das Buch der Weisheit*, pp. 176-78.

(Greek) conception; so that we ought to neglect the first verse and use only the second in interpreting his thought? Grimm says that *μᾶλλον δέ* is used sometimes to heighten, but more often to correct, what has been said; but in none of the instances he cites does the second sentence simply displace the first, or put a correct statement in the place of an erroneous one. In speech one may slip into an error and correct it with an "or rather." "On p. 8, or rather 10, we read, etc." But in writing we do not leave the error standing and add the correction. When one deliberately writes and leaves two alternative forms of expression, connected by *μᾶλλον δέ*, we know that each has value to him, and that he feels that he conveys his meaning better by leaving them both and expressing a preference for the second, than he would do by striking out the first in favor of the second. Sometimes the adversative force of the *δέ* in this phrase is so slight that we can only express it in English by an inflection of the voice; sometimes it is strong enough to bear a "but;" but in all cases the two clauses together are clearer or stronger than the second would be alone. In the sentence, "Steal no more, but rather labor" (Eph. 4:28), the labor does displace the stealing, but the charge to labor does not displace, but only intensifies, the charge not to steal. Examples like the following could just as well be taken from English literature, for they illustrate not a peculiar Greek phrase but the working of the human mind. "It is Christ Jesus that died, nay rather that was raised from the dead" (Rom. 8:34); "Now that ye have come to know God, or rather to be known by God" (Gal. 4:9); "Those who were formerly despised and near to Hades, or rather had entered it" (III *Macc.*, 6:31); "As slaves, or rather traitors" (III *Macc.*, 7:5); "Pharaoh appointed Joseph successor of his kingdom, or rather king" (Philo, *De Josepho*, 21); "The stars are said to be . . . intelligent living beings, or rather each one is intellect itself" (*De opif. mundi*, 24).²⁸ In such examples the value of the first clause is evident. It is usually the more familiar, the more easily understood, and even the more literally correct form; while the second is newer, more striking and bold, giving a peculiar force to a certain phase of the thought, never simply

²⁸ See further II *Macc.*, 6:23; Eph. 5:11; I Cor. 14:1, 5; Acts 5:13, 14.

displacing the first, and not necessarily more correct. In many instances the second expression could not stand alone, but depends on its contrast to the first for its meaning. All this is almost too simple, and calls for an apology. But in the passage before us it is the habit of commentators to take the second clause apart from the first, and to make it alone support the great doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul. Farrar, for example, says that vs. 19 is "an expression on which we need not dwell, because the writer proceeds, in the next clause, to correct it, and to intimate the view which he took of the relations between the soul and the body." Can we now follow the process of the writer's mind as he wrote the two clauses, and left them both standing? What he wanted to say was simply that Solomon was one of the favored men who possessed beauty and health and purity of body and also native goodness of character. The writer is a Jew writing Greek; and when he uses *σῶμα* and *ψυχή* for the two parts of human nature he inevitably thinks of man somewhat more dualistically than he would have done had he been writing Hebrew. But he is still a Jew, and man still consists, in his thought, in the union of these two parts, and not in either one alone. When, then, he wishes to explain that this child, Solomon, was *εὐφύης* in both parts of his being, the first way that occurs to him of expanding the bare statement is to say that he got by divine allotment a good soul. He is thinking of the body formed in the womb as if it were the person, and of the soul as chosen by God from his treasury of souls and breathed into the growing embryo, or into the child at birth. God fortunately allotted, or graciously chose, for Solomon, a good soul. Then it occurs to him that it would be better to connect the personality with the soul, and to say that the body was happily matched to the soul, rather than that the soul was matched to the body. So he adds, "Or rather, being good, I came into a pure body." I think he would hardly have ventured to say what Grimm thinks would have made his thought clearer, "Being a good soul, etc." He does not expressly connect the man with the body in the first clause, nor with the soul in the second. The man, the "I," got a good soul, or rather entered a good body. He prefers to bring the "I" into close relation with

the soul, but he does not so far identify them that he cares to take back the expression, "I obtained a good soul." The birth of a man is the coming together of body and soul, and the man is most favored by nature who has a soul natively good, united to a body natively pure. It is almost, even though not quite, a matter of indifference to the writer whether this union is described by saying that the man (as if he were first a body, or were with the body) obtained the soul, or that the man (as if he were first a soul, or were with the soul) entered the body. That he hesitates between the two expressions, and that he leaves the first unerasred, is entirely inconceivable if he had a fully developed doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul, such as is now uniformly ascribed to him. That he leaves the first clause standing is conceivable only on the supposition that it expressed his thought naturally and well and in the familiar way, but that a newer, more striking way of looking at and expressing the same thing comes into his mind, and that he ventures to set it over against the other. The fact that he leaves the first clause as it is, presents, as it seems to me, positive proof that no such doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul as that of Plato or Philo was in his mind. The birth of Solomon was the coming together of a good soul and a pure body. Did not the soul, then, exist and have a certain character before it came into a body? Yes, but only in a sense comparable to that in which the body existed and had a certain character before it received a soul. If we ask without presupposition what sort of prenatal existence is implied in the two verses taken together, I think we must say that the suggestion of vs. 19 is that God has made and has in keeping souls for all men who are to be born, and allots one to each new child. Then vs. 20, not contradicting the suggestion of vs. 19, modifies it by taking a tentative step in the direction of connecting the person with the soul instead of with the body. God provides a soul for the body, or rather a body for the soul. One can use either expression, for it is not the man himself that pre-exists, but only the two parts that are to make the man.

What has already been said of the Jewish idea of the pre-existence of the body and of the soul is sufficient to indicate that

this interpretation of 8:19, 20, though it separates the writer of *Wisdom* at this point from Philo, does not set him apart in isolation from such movements of thought in his time as would naturally influence him. It does not attribute to him an anomalous position, but simply reveals the fact that he is still more Jew than Greek. When Jews began to speak Greek, and called the two parts of man *σῶμα* and *ψυχή*, they would naturally use *ψυχή* of that which God breathed into man, the neshamah or *ruah*, and then the thought would be within easy reach that the personality, the "I," might associate itself as well with that part of the future man which comes from above as with the part which comes from below. Now it seems to me that in the *Book of Wisdom* we are at just such a point, and that 8:19, 20 is a significant landmark in this development of thought. This writer first and more naturally thinks of the body as that pre-existing part of man with which the personal pronoun could connect itself; but then he thinks of the *ψυχή*, the other part of the coming man, that which God breathes into him or lends to him,²⁹ as better deserving to be called "I." The significance of this tentative and partial connection of the personality with the *ψυχή* for the author's doctrine of immortality will be discussed later on. But it would be a great mistake to suppose that one who stands at this transitional stage, and has made only such a start toward identifying the person with the *ψυχή* as 8:19, 20 indicates, has adopted Platonism, or anything remotely resembling it. He does not hold to what we should call a real pre-existence of man at all. We are not to forget vs. 19. The writer is still more at home with the idea of a pre-existing body than with that of a pre-existing soul; and granting that both in a sense pre-exist, man is still to him neither one nor the other, but the union of the two. Neither Plato nor Philo could have written either of these verses; not vs. 19, because it seems to connect the person with the body; not vs. 20, because it implies that there is such a thing as a pure body, a fit abode for a good soul.

In 7:1-6 the origin of man is described in detail, the origin of the same man, Solomon, as in 8:19, 20, narrated with the same

²⁹See the discussion of 15:8, 1, 16; 16:14 below.

purpose, that of showing that, however he may have excelled other men in endowment, he was like all men in nature, and gained his pre-eminent wisdom, not by peculiar native talents, but only, as every man must gain it, by prayer and as a gift from God. Man is here described wholly from the point of view of his body. He is mortal, earth-born and related to earth, molded as *σάρξ* in the womb; while that which comes from heaven into man is no part of his original nature, but the "spirit of wisdom," which is given in answer to prayer, and secures for men friendship with God. There is hardly room here for the idea of a descent of the soul into a human body, bringing with it some memory of its native region. The movement is upward by divine help, from mortality and earthliness toward God, not downward from nearness to God, through some degrading impulse, into earthly life.

The origin of man is described again in 15:11, in dependence on Gen. 2:7. Of the idol-maker it is said:

*ἠγγόησεν τὸν πλάσαντα αὐτὸν
καὶ τὸν ἐμπνεύσαντα αὐτῷ ψυχὴν ἐνεργοῦσαν
καὶ ἐμφυσήσαντα πνεῦμα ζωτικόν.*

The last two lines are quite certainly identical in meaning. The verbs are synonymous, the descriptive attributes are not distinctive, and between the nouns themselves, *ψυχή* and *πνεῦμα*, the author seems in this connection to have made no clear discrimination (cf. 15:8, 16; 16:14). The *πνοή ζωής* which, according to Gen. 2:7, God breathed into man, and the *ψυχὴ ζῶσα* which man became, are not here kept apart. The *ψυχή* or *πνεῦμα* of man is what God breathes into him, and is first of all vitality, life itself. At death man returns to the earth from which he was taken, *τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαιτηθεὶς χρέος* (15:8). The *ψυχή*, then, does not fully belong to man. The earth is his native element. The *ψυχή* is a loan from God, and at death the debt is paid. The man returns to earth and his soul is taken back by God. This is obviously Jewish and nothing else. It agrees with 8:19, but not with 8:20; that is, man is not a soul that enters a body, but a body, formed of earth, growing in the womb (7:1 ff.), to which a soul is allotted, or lent. So in 15:16 man is one who has

borrowed his spirit (τὸ πνεῦμα δεδανισμένος). Again, alluding to God's healing by means of the brazen serpent, the writer says (after I Sam. 2:6, etc.), that only God can both slay and make alive. Man can slay, ἐξελθὼν δὲ πνεῦμα οὐκ ἀναστρέφει, οὐδὲ ἀναλίπει ψυχὴν παραλημφθείσαν; that is, he cannot turn back [into the one whom he has slain] the spirit that has gone forth, nor can he release a soul that has been received, or taken possession of [by God] (16:14).³⁰ Grimm supplies εἰς ἄδου, but it is more probable that the idea in the author's mind is still the same as in 15:8, 16; moreover he nowhere says that the ψυχή goes to Hades—another indication that he is more Jew than Greek. The soul is taken back at death by God, and man cannot recover it.

But to all that has been argued thus far it will of course be objected that in 9:15 and 11:17 we have ideas unmistakably Platonic, and that if these verses reveal the author's knowledge and acceptance of the Platonic dualism, it is right to assume that 8:20 is also Platonic, and if 8:20, then 1:4.

Solomon's prayer for wisdom (9:1-18) confesses that, though man was made for dominion and for righteousness, yet he is at best weak and short-lived and lacking in understanding, so that even one who is perfect as a man is to be reckoned as nothing unless he have the wisdom that comes from God. The necessity of this divine help is enlarged upon in vss. 13-18, chiefly in the language and spirit of the Old Testament;³¹ but in vs. 15 a ground of man's limited powers of knowledge is found in his body. Because of its weight and burden the mind of man can know earthly things but imperfectly, and heavenly things not at all unless God sends his holy spirit. This, however, God does send, in answer to prayer, and a sufficient and saving knowledge of God is therefore within every one's reach. The "corruptible body" or "earthly tent" (cf. Isa. 38:12; Job 4:19)³² is an explanation, not of the sin, but of the ignorance of man. This is the prayer of a perfect man,

³⁰ Cf. Eccles. 8:8.

³¹ Compare, e. g., Isa. 40:13, 14; Jer. 23:18a; Job 15:8; 28: 20-22; 36:22; *Sirach*, 42:21.

³² Σκῆνος had almost lost its figurative sense and become practically a synonym of σῶμα. See illustrations of this use in Heinrici, *Das Zweite Sendschreiben des Paulus an die Korinther*, p. 241.

one in whom a good soul is united with an undefiled body. It is not therefore the impurity of the body, whether ritual or moral, that is in mind, but its mortality. The thought is the same as that of 7:1-6 and 9:5. The verse reads:

φθαρτὸν γὰρ σῶμα βαρύνει ψυχὴν,
καὶ βρίθει τὸ γεῶδες σκῆνος νοῦν πολυφρόντιδα.

That the language is Platonic is not to be questioned; whether the thought is Platonic, the author himself should be allowed to decide. The sentence in the *Phaedo* (81 C) on which the verse is commonly thought to depend runs as follows:

Ἐμβριθὲς δέ γε τοῦτο [τὸ σωματοειδές]²² οἶσθαι χρὴ εἶναι καὶ βαρὺ καὶ γεῶδες καὶ ὀρατὸν· ὃ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσα ἢ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ βαρύνεται τε καὶ ἔλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὀρατὸν τόπον, κ. τ. λ.

The common or related words in the two passages are:

<i>Wisdom</i>		<i>Plato</i>
1. βρίθει		ἐμβριθίς
2. τὸ γεῶδες σκῆνος		γεῶδες
3. βαρύνει ψυχὴν		βαρὺ and ἡ ψυχὴ βαρύνεται.

Grimm hesitates to affirm direct literary dependence, but E. Pfeiderer²⁴ and Menzel²⁵ think this certain.

Plato is speaking here, not of the hindrance that the body offers to the mind in its search for truth, but of the lot after death of souls which have been defiled by the body during the earthly life. Such souls, he says, have, through constant occupation with the body, taken something corporeal into themselves; and this corporeal element which the soul has absorbed, not the body itself—τὸ σωματοειδές, not τὸ σῶμα—we must think to be burdensome, and heavy, and earthy, and visible, so that such a soul is weighed down and dragged back to the visible region. Hence such a soul may sometimes even be seen at its tomb because of the body-like element that it has taken with it from its life with the body. After such wanderings it must be again imprisoned in a body, perhaps that of some animal most fitting its character. The connection of our verse with this passage

²² Not τὸ σῶμα, which Grimm and others supply.

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 295 f.

²⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 61.

in Plato is therefore purely one of words and not at all one of thought, a fact which commentators do not seem to have regarded as important. But if our author had the *Phaedo* before him he could easily have found striking expressions of a thought at least in form closely like the one he has in mind, namely, that the body stands in the soul's way in its effort to gain wisdom,²⁸ instead of fixing upon a passage which has an entirely different meaning, and has nothing whatever to do with this thought. That it is remotely through the influence of this passage in Plato that the words *ἐμβριθές, γεῶδες, βαρύνω*, became associated as expressing the relation of body to soul is not impossible. But that the writer of *Wisdom* selected them from Plato and made the application (expressing a Platonic thought in Platonic language which Plato used to express an entirely different thought) is improbable. The improbability will not lessen when we find that one so deeply concerned as our author is with the subject of immortality shows in all that he says about it not the slightest trace of the influence of the *Phaedo*, though this was the greatest book on the subject which the world had up to his time produced. Both in conception and in argument he follows a wholly different and unrelated course. But our immediate concern is with the question whether the *thought* of 9:15 is really Platonic, or not. Our author thinks of a body free from impurity as hindering the mind merely by the limitations of finiteness and mortality, while Plato regards the body as the seat of passions, of evil appetites, desires, and fears, which obscure the soul's natural vision of truth by a morally degrading and corrupting influence. In the *Phaedo* the only way in which the soul can see things as they are is by freeing itself as much as possible from the body. Indeed, it is only after actual death, which consists in the separation of body and soul, that the soul can fully gain truth. But the *Book of Wisdom* contains no such ascetic doctrine, and suggests absolutely no ascetic practice. The verse before us describes an inevitable fact about man. It does not find a moral cause of this fact in some sin or defect of the soul which brought it into the body, nor in the inevitable evil of the body as matter; nor does it seek escape by the moral effort

²⁸ See, e. g., *Phaedo*, 66, 67.

of suppressing the body, by the practice of dying. Neither is the body man's fault, nor is its burden to be removed by his effort. It is natural and indispensable to man, and belongs to the best of men. It is not an insurmountable barrier in the way of wisdom, for there is an open path by which wisdom can be gained here and now. The way is not escape from the body as from a prison or grave, but the coming into body and soul (1:4) of the divine spirit of wisdom. Our author's positive injunction could only be to keep body and soul alike pure, since only on this condition can the prayer for the divine wisdom be granted (1:4). The man in whose person our author speaks gained wisdom in this way, through prayer and by the gift from above. He possessed a pure body, and when he asked for wisdom he received with it all good things of the bodily life, health and comeliness, riches, power, and honor (7:11; cf. vs. 8-10).²⁷ Our author knew how to idealize the Solomon of biblical history, but even he would hardly have chosen this hero if his own ideal had been that of asceticism. The book is full of the spirit of confidence and exultation in the actual possession of wisdom.²⁸ This verse, 9:15, can therefore only mean that wisdom must be sought from God, and cannot be gained by man's unaided effort. But this is not a Platonic dualism; it is Jewish religion, expressing itself first in Scripture form (9:13), then in certain Platonic phrases which the author had caught from the popular philosophical teaching of his day. Such a literary use of current phraseology, derived from a different world-view from one's own, is not unnatural. This verse does not, then, compel us to admit a dualism which 1:4 and 8:19, 20 exclude. It neither compels nor permits us to attribute to our author "the Platonic conception of a pre-existence of souls and a banishing of them into earthly bodies because of a pretemporal fall."²⁹

What has been said of 9:15 applies even more obviously to 11:17. The verse contains a Platonic phrase, but not a Platonic thought. The phrase *ἄμορφος ὕλη* arose among Platonists, Aristotle being the first to use *ὕλη* in this sense. Plato had

²⁷ In accordance with I Kings 3:5-14.

²⁸ Zöckler, *Die Apokryphen*, p. 5.

²⁹ See, e. g., 6:22-7:14; 7:15-21; 8:2 ff.

used *ἄμορφος*⁴⁰ of the world-stuff, and the phrase *ὕλη ἄμορφος* was used by Stoics and by Philo.⁴¹ The Stoic use indicates that it did not necessarily carry dualistic implications with it, and our further study will make it probable that it was from the popular Stoicism of his time, rather than from Platonism, that our author took the phrase. That God made the world out of formless matter was not indeed a Hebrew conception; but the question that concerns us is whether to our author, as to Philo, the matter of which God made the world was evil and a cause of evil; and to this we may return a confident negative. In the material world as God made it only wholesome powers are operative (1:14). That God created the world of formless matter is an evidence only of his greater power, and it is only to illustrate and magnify his power that it is mentioned. God's creation is altogether good. It is only man whose sin brings evil into it, and his sin is nowhere traced to the matter of which his body is formed.

One verse which Grimm interprets in a Platonic direction we need not discuss in detail, since it is generally agreed that his rendering is mistaken. In 8:21 he rendered the word *ἐγκρατής* by *enthaltensam* (as in *Sirach*, 26:15), whereas it must certainly be translated "possessed of," "master of" (as in *Sirach*, 6:27; 15:1; *Bar.* 4:1), supplying *σοφίας* from vs. 18, vs. 19, 20 being parenthetical. Grimm's inference that we have here the Alexandrian principle that the greatest possible freeing of oneself from the body is the foundation of virtue and the condition of the elevation of the spirit to the supersensible realm, is baseless. This is indeed the view that necessarily results from the dualistic theory of Plato and Philo, and is strenuously urged by them. The fact that it appears neither here nor elsewhere in the *Book of Wisdom* surely confirms us in our belief that its author did not accept the dualistic theory.

It must already be evident that our writer's view of the world should not be inferred from two or three isolated sentences, but rather that these sentences should be interpreted in the light of his general view. To this we must therefore now give some attention. The Platonic or Philonic doctrine of the pre-existence of

⁴⁰ *Timaeus*, 51 A.

⁴¹ See Grimm on *Wisdom* 11:17.

the soul, which is commonly attributed to our author, is a part of a certain philosophy and psychology. Its presence is indicated by causes and effects especially in three directions. It belongs, in the first place, to a dualistic conception of the universe, in which the ruling contrast is that between matter and spirit, and in man between body and soul. In the next place, evil in this universe is due to matter, and sin in man to the body. Sin is to be conquered by a war against the body and by separation from the world, by anticipating that freedom of the soul from the body which only actual death can fully effect. Finally, to the pre-existence of the soul corresponds its immortality. That which comes into the body as a foreign being is not involved in the body's death. The bodily existence appears as an interruption of the soul's normal life. We must therefore test our thesis that there is no Platonic doctrine of pre-existence in the *Book of Wisdom* by asking whether the grounds and results of such a doctrine are to be seen here, as they clearly are in Philo, in these three directions.

The writer's general view of the world is set forth in his conception of Wisdom. This is the most philosophical idea that the book contains, and the one most affected by Greek influence. But this conception, rooted in the native soil of Jewish monotheism, branches out, not in the direction of Platonic dualism, but in that of Stoic monism. The most philosophical and the most Hellenic passage in the book is 7:22—8:1; and here, as in related passages (1:7; 12:1), it is not the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, but the Stoic conception of the World Soul that contributes to its development. Even here, however, the writer remains more Jew than Greek.⁴² Wisdom, which is once called Power (1:3) and several times Spirit, is the agency through which God made and maintains the universe, rules human history for the ends of righteousness and love, and imparts to individuals knowledge, friendship with himself, virtue and immortality. There is undoubtedly a certain want of adjustment between the physical and the ethical qualities and functions of Wisdom, but the author's purpose to make it a unifying conception is unmistakable. As a

⁴² The doctrine of Wisdom is expounded in 1:1-7; 6:12-25; chaps. 7-9 (especially 7:22-8:1); chaps. 10-11:1; cf. 12:1.

semi-physical substance and energy it fills the world, making and holding together all things; while as the pure image and outflow of the goodness of God, it refuses to dwell in unrighteous men. Regarded as the immanence of God in the creation, it is described as an all-penetrating, all-moving, all-renewing energy, various yet one, mobile yet steadfast. Regarded as God's self-revelation and self-communication to men, it is characterized by moral qualities—righteousness, purity, and especially love. In both aspects Wisdom is the image of God; in one, of his power; in the other, of his goodness. In one view it penetrates all spirits, in the other it enters only into holy souls. No doubt the writer, though more Hebrew than Stoic, takes the physical aspects and activities of the Wisdom Spirit seriously. It literally fills and makes and rules all things (1:7; 7:22 ff.; 12:1). The formless matter of which God made the world he evidently conceives of as wholly penetrated and ordered and mastered by this Spirit. There is no hint that matter presents an obstacle to this creative energy of God, or produces any defect in the creation. The divine declaration that the world is very good is accepted without reserve (1:14), and demonstrated with enthusiasm. Only one thing stands opposed to this Spirit of God, and that is not matter, even in 9:15, and not the devil, in spite of 2:24, but always and everywhere the sin of man. Death, which is the author's summary word for all evil does not belong to God's purpose, and was not made by him.⁶⁶ Wicked men brought it upon them by their own deeds and choice (1:12-16; 2:23, 24). Nothing else excludes the presence or limits the potency of this divine Wisdom except the evil thoughts and deeds of man. Death is the only evil thing in the universe, and sin is the only cause of its presence.

Wisdom, as the artificer of all things, knows and can reveal the mysteries of the physical universe (7:17-22a); but these, which occupy so large a place in books like *Enoch*, our author does not care to unfold. His interests are chiefly to set forth Wisdom as the way of personal salvation (1:1-7; chaps. 6-9), and to prove that it orders human life justly and with loving care for men (chaps. 10-19). It would lead us too far to show in detail how

⁶⁶ Contrary to *Sirach*, 11:14; 33:14, 15; yet see 39:29; 40:9, 10.

eagerly the writer contends that there is no problem of evil, that all is well with the world, that even if not in seeming, yet always in reality, the forces of the world are working together to the ends of justice and goodness. In the last section of the book (chaps. 10-19) an effort is made to prove from sacred history that Wisdom in reality rules all things graciously (8:1), and that the creation itself fights on the side of God (5:17, 20 ff.). The history of Israel, from Egypt to Canaan, exhibits the power, and especially the love, of God (11:21-12:2; 12:12-18, etc.). Through God's all-pervading Spirit all things are ordered "by measure, and number, and weight" (11:20), in ideal fitness for moral ends. Men are punished in ways exactly fitting their sin (*δι' ὧν τις ἀμαρτάνει διὰ τούτων κολάζεται*, 11:16). This principle is variously illustrated (12:24-27; 16:1; 18:4, 5), and is shown to be a principle of love even more than of justice. The righteous suffer only in obviously beneficent measure and manner (12:19-22; 15:2; 11:8-10; 16:4-11; 18:20-25). The physical creation acts with God in blessing and in punishment, in such ways that even the very thing that afflicts the wicked benefits the righteous (16:1 ff., 15 ff.; 19:6, 18-21). Beyond question the general view of the book is the thorough goodness of the creation, and the complete subordination of nature to moral ends through the all-penetrating and ruling Spirit. Formless matter meets us nowhere but in 11:17, and it is clear that material elements and forces do not block the way or limit the power of the divine government, but marvelously assist and further it. Philo, also, maintained the goodness of the universe, but in his view its perfection is seriously impaired by the matter of which God made it. In the *Book of Wisdom* the ruling contrast is decidedly not between matter and spirit, or body and soul, but between righteousness and sin.

What then of sin? What is its source, if not the "corruptible body" composed of "formless matter"? Sin appears to be simply a man's free choice of evil by which he renounces his true nature as a son of God and throws away his heritage of rulership and immortality.⁴⁴ The nature and growth of sin are described in

⁴⁴ See 1:12, 16; compare 2:16-18; 2:21-24; 9:2, 3; 6:3, 4, 20, 21.

connection with those types of incorrigible sinners, the Egyptians and the Canaanites. The plagues of the Egyptians and their destruction in the Red Sea, and the extermination of the Canaanites required justification as deeds of a God whose nature was distinguished above all by forgiving and saving love. The justification was found in the hopeless and final character of their wickedness. The sin of the Canaanites was especially heinous and deeply ingrained (12:3-6, 10, 11); yet the language that describes it contains no doctrine of original sin, nor any suggestion that either the devil or the material body was responsible for it. Even to them God gave room for repentance: οὐκ ἀγνοῶν ὅτι πονηρὰ ἡ γένεσις αὐτῶν καὶ ἔμφυτος ἡ κακία αὐτῶν, καὶ ὅτι οὐ μὴ ἀλλαγῆ ὁ λογισμὸς αὐτῶν εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, σπέρμα γὰρ ἦν καταραμένον ἀπ' ἀρχῆς (12:10b, 11a). The inference is that God's forbearance toward these who were "due to death" (12:20), was only the greater proof of his strength (vss. 12-18), and that we, in imitation of God, ought to be lovers of men (vs. 19).

The fundamental sin, in our author's view, is not sensual passion, but idolatry. Idolatry issues indeed in all sorts of immoralities, but its root is ignorance of God; and this again seems to be traced to some inherent perversity or dullness of the mind, rather than to the bodily nature. "Foolish were [*ἦσαν* must be supplied on account of the following *παρῆν*] all men by nature [*φύσει*], and ignorance of God was with them" (13:1). It is of course possible with Grimm to interpret *φύσει* by 9:15, as referring to the body; but we should surely have a right to expect some hint of this in the elaborate discussion that follows, and no such hint is given. The visible world is good, not evil (13:1), and it is because it is so good, because of the beauty and grandeur of created things, that men have stopped with these and failed to see that they revealed the greater beauty of their invisible author (13:1 ff.). For this men are partly excusable (vss. 6, 7), but partly at fault (vss. 5, 9). The beauty of the world which should reveal God, is in fact a cause of idolatry. Another explanation of idolatry (14:12-21) traces it to images of a lost child, or of an absent ruler. These images are idealized, and finally worshiped. Then from this radical fault spring all sorts of immorality, at first

as a part of worship, and then as an all-dominating wickedness (14:22-31): *ἡ γὰρ τῶν ἀνωνύμων εἰδώλων θρησκεία παντὸς ἀρχὴ κακοῦ καὶ αἰτία καὶ πέρας ἐστίν* (14:27). This is surely not the language of one to whom *ὑλη* or *σῶμα* is the beginning or principle and the cause of evil. That it is ignorance of God,⁴⁵ unbelief in him,⁴⁶ with the resulting idolatry, that is the root of sin and evil is no less evident in chapters 1, 2, where the author describes the contemporary form of the ancient sins of Egyptians and Canaanites. The denial of God and of the unseen is the fundamental creed of the ungodly (2:1-5, 22), and sensuality and cruelty are its results (2:6-20).

Here, however, we meet the famous sentence, "By envy of the devil death entered into the world, and they experience it who belong to his part" (2:24). The language of this verse belongs to another type of dualism, not the Hellenistic, but that which we find especially in the apocryphical books of Palestinian Judaism. The foreign relations of this sort of dualism, if we are to look for them at all, belong rather in the Persian than in the Greek world. But does our author adopt the views of this school or tendency when he falls in this single verse into its language? No one has ever urged that Satan or demons had an important place in our author's theology. He has, in strict consistency, no room in his world for any divine being except God, or for any spirit except God's one omnipresent and omnipotent Spirit of Wisdom. He nowhere connects idolatry with demons, a connection easy and often made; just as he nowhere connects immorality with the body. Idolatry, that primary sin, is due to ignorance of God, and immorality is the result of idolatry. Of course if the author had denied the existence of a devil he would hardly have written this verse, or would have allegorized the story of the fall as Philo does. He touches for this once upon ideas capable of development into a pronounced dualism, and actually so developed by some Jews, but he does not adopt the dualism. The verse is of course a summary allusion to Genesis, chap. 3; but though it is the first definite identification of the serpent with the devil which we meet in Jewish literature, it is safe to affirm that our author was not the first to

⁴⁵ See 12:27; 13:1-9; 14:22; 15:11, 12; 16:16.

⁴⁶ Ἀπιστείν, 1:2; 10:7; 12:17; 18:13.

make the identification, for he has no special interest in it and makes no further use of it. It is quite evident that 2:23, 24 is exactly parallel in thought to 1:12-16. The fact that the devil tempted man belonged to the story as he had been taught to understand it, but does not explain or excuse man's sin; and it is man's sin alone which explains his death. Sin is the choice of death, and actually appears to be the cause that called it into being. The close likeness between the last lines of 1:16 and of 2:24 deserves attention. Supplying the line of 1:15 which is wanting in the Greek, we obtain *θάνατος* as the reference of *αἰὼν* and *ἐκείνου* in 1:16. Death is personified, as Hades is in 1:14, where it is said that he has no palace (or crown, cf. 5:16) on earth. The ungodly make Death their friend, *ἐπὶ ἀξιοί εἰσι τῆς ἐκείνου μερίδος εἶναι*. When now we compare this with 2:24, *καταξουσιν δὲ αὐτὸν [θάνατον] οἱ τῆς ἐκείνου [διαβόλου] μερίδος ὄντες*, our impression is that the devil is scarcely more than the personification of death. Certainly death is his proper realm and portion. Our author maintains his doctrine that the universe is altogether good and wholly filled with the divine Spirit by denying that God made death (1:13; 2:23), and by denying its reality in the case of the righteous (3:1 f.). We may infer that a devil whose realm is dependent on sin, and manifests itself only in the self-destruction which sin brings upon itself, would be incapable of lifting himself up into serious rivalry with God, or becoming a menace to the author's monism. His being and reign border close on the non-existent. Our writer's mode of thinking made it quite possible for him to accept the reality of the devil of current thought; and yet give him practically the value of a mere symbol of temptation and death. The distinction between the figurative and the literal in Jewish writing can seldom be made by a sharp line, and needs to be drawn with almost as much tact in the case of the writer of *Wisdom* as in that of Paul and the writer of the Fourth Gospel. It is of course possible to infer from this verse, 2:24, that the writer divided the universe between God and Satan: *annihilated sin and death, which God did not make, to Satan; and separated mankind into two classes, those who belong to God and those who belong to the devil.* But as a matter of

fact this is not his way of thinking. He expresses himself so explicitly as to God's sole activity and universal presence and rule through the Spirit of Wisdom, and as to man's sole responsibility for sin and death, that we confidently refuse to draw such inferences from a single verse, and because of it to class the book with *Enoch*, chaps. 1-36, and the *Assumption of Moses*. In just the same way we have seen how possible it is to infer from 9:15 that the writer adopted the Jewish Hellenistic type of dualism, dividing the universe between matter and spirit, making matter the source of evil, ascribing sin and death to the corruptible and defiling body, and regarding the soul as an immortal being temporarily imprisoned in the body. But the author in fact does not adopt and carry through this dualism any more than the other; and 9:15 is as isolated as 2:24. He expresses himself explicitly in regard to the nature of sin and death and the way of escape from sin and from mortality; and he does not locate sin in the body, nor attribute death to the body, nor prescribe a dying to the body as the way of salvation. There is in reality a close analogy between the two cases. There is quite as much ground for the former inference, which no one makes, as for the latter, which almost everyone accepts. I am bound to believe that the reason why the Hellenistic dualism is accepted as the doctrine of the book and the Palestinian (apocalyptic) dualism is rejected, lies not in anything in the book itself, but in the fact that it is a Greek book, and that in its conception of Wisdom it occupies a midway position between Proverbs, chap. 8, and the Logos of Philo. If 2:24 is a harmless use of current language which really says no more than 1:16, why should it be insisted that 9:15 must mean so much more than 9:5 and 7:1-6? In fact both passages illustrate this writer's habit of adopting modes of expression that belong to views of the world and types of religion different from his own. In this he is not indeed so different from other men; but one who is not a systematic thinker, and who finds it everywhere easy to slip into spiritualizing interpretations will go farther in this direction than others.

But if neither in his general view of the world nor in his conception of sin and evil does our author prove to be a Platonist,

does it not remain true that his doctrine of the immortality of the soul is Platonic and harmonizes with, if it does not actually require, his acceptance of the Platonic doctrine of the soul's pre-existence? If in our book the immortality of the soul takes the place of the Jewish doctrine of the resurrection, and is maintained in contrast to the corruptible nature of the body it would seem natural to infer that the writer accepted the Greek distinction of body and soul, and that the pre-existence and the immortality of the soul, were with him as with Plato and Philo, inseparable parts of one view of the nature of man. We have, therefore, to ask whether his conception of immortality is of the sort that implies pre-existence, or agrees well with it, or at the very least permits it.

We notice at the outset that the writer's conception of immortality rests, as that of the rabbis did, primarily on Genesis, chaps. 1-3. The story of creation and the fall is taken to mean that God made man for dominion and eternal life, and that sin is man's free choice of death (*Wisdom*, 1:12-16; 2:23, 24). Not because in man a soul immortal by nature is united with a mortal body is the death of the body powerless to destroy the life of the soul; but because God, entering upon creation from the impulse of love (11:24-26), made man in his own image, is immortality man's destined end. Only his sin shuts him off from the goal. The writer's interpretation of the story of the fall shows his characteristic blending of the literal and the figurative. That he accepts the story as historical fact is a matter of course (2:24), but in effect the story means to him that each man who sins brings death upon himself, and that those who do not sin do not really die (1:12-16). Adam is not made responsible for the power of sin, nor for the reign of death. On the contrary, following a line of which *Sirach*, 49:16 is our first witness, Adam is thought of as an example of righteousness (10:1, 2). According to the principle of 1:15; 3:1, 2, Adam did not die. His repentance must have saved him from death. Cain was the first one in reality to die; and we find almost the thought of Philo⁴⁷ that Cain really killed himself, not his brother, because he killed the virtue in which true life consists (10:3). There is of course the literal sense in

⁴⁷ *Quod det. potiori insid. solet*, 14.

which all men descended from Adam are mortal as he was (7:1), and all, good and bad, have the same lot in birth and death (7:6). But there is a reality in comparison with which this outward lot is only a seeming. The reality is that only sinners die.

Next, then, to the dependence of the author's doctrine of immortality on Genesis, chaps. 1-3, is to be put the resulting fact that his doctrine is not the immortality of the soul, but the immortality of righteousness and of righteous men. His text is: *δικαιοσύνη γὰρ ἀθάνατος ἐστίν, injustitia autem mortis est acquisitio* (1:15). With this our question might seem to be already answered. The immortality of righteousness is not the sort of immortality that involves a doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul. It is not the sort of immortality which the soul brings with it into the mortal body. It is the sort that man can gain by moral effort. This, however, does not excuse us from further study, for Plato and Philo also think that it is by philosophy that men are immortalized. It is possible on the basis of Platonism, to think of the soul as indestructible, and yet use the word immortality of a *blessed* life of the soul in communion with God.

Our next observation is that the doctrine of immortality is maintained in the *Book of Wisdom* in opposition to a definite denial of it by the "ungodly" (*ἀσεβείς*). They used in part the familiar arguments from appearances. Birth happens in an off-hand way; life is short; death is certain, and no one ever escaped it (2:1, 2a). But they added a theoretical argument based on the nature of the soul (2:2b, 3): The breath of life in man is as insubstantial as smoke. His reason (*λόγος*) is a spark produced by the beating of the heart. When the spark goes out the body becomes ashes, and the spirit is dispersed like thin air (*τὸ πνεῦμα διαχυθήσεται ὡς χαῦνος ἀήρ*). Apart from these expressions the argument that death ends all is Hebraic in character, and is closely paralleled in Job and *Sirach*,⁴⁸ and especially in Ecclesiastes.⁴⁹ The verses before us (2:2b, 3) have in part Old Testament connections. Ecclesiastes 12:7 is reflected in vs. 3, but it is as clearly materialized here as it is spiritualized in IV *Ezra*, 7:78. The

⁴⁸ E. g., Job 7:7, 9; 14:10-12; 27:3; 34:14, 15; *Sirach*, 17:28 (23); 38:21; 44:9.

⁴⁹ See Grimm, p. 30, n. 3.

chapter depicts a degenerate type of Epicureanism, and vs. 2, 3 contain a defense of it in the form of a popular materialistic theory of the soul, the roots of which are in Heraclitus and Zeno. Now it is a striking disclosure of our author's point of view with reference to immortality that, although he states the theory of his opponents that the soul is a product of bodily functions and hence ends with the body, he yet offers no theory of his own in reply. We should expect him at least to affirm, if not to argue, that the soul is not produced by bodily processes, but is independent of the body and not involved in its dissolution. But neither here nor anywhere in the book do we find an argument or even an assertion of this kind. In the *Phaedo* (70, 77, 78) the same theory is stated, that the soul is of the nature of air or smoke, and will be blown away and dissipated when removed from the body; and over against it the independent and indestructible nature of the soul is proved. But the author of *Wisdom* meets the assertion that death is due to the material nature of the soul only by the assertion that death is due to nothing but sin. He makes no effort to disconnect the soul from the body, or to find in the nature of the soul a ground for belief in its immortality. He draws out the crooked thoughts and wicked devices of his adversaries at length (2:6-20; cf. 5:1-14). He finds the root of their fault in ignorance of God and the denial of his righteous rule and sure rewards (2:22). He does feel the need of affirming and proving the reality and universal presence of the Spirit of Wisdom in the world. The immortality in which he believes belongs primarily to this Spirit (12:1), and is imparted by it to men (6:17-21; 8:17; 15:3); but it does not belong to the nature of the soul.

One is tempted to think that the author did not disprove the theory of 2:2, 3 because he accepted it as true for those who uttered it. These are the perverse thoughts that separate men from God (1:3), the words by which the ungodly call death to them (1:16). Their final lot, as they themselves confess, is in accordance not only with their desert but with their expectation (5:1-20). They expected to be as though they had never been (2:2), and this is in fact their end (5:9 ff.). Indeed in the

proper sense of the word they have never lived at all (5:13), for only righteousness is life. "The ungodly shall be requited even as they reasoned" (3:10). It shall be to them according to their faith. Their death illustrates that fitness of the penalty to the sin which characterizes the rule of the divine wisdom.⁴⁸ The argument of the wicked that death ends all is their choice of death as their portion, and does not contradict the writer's faith that immortality can be gained by righteousness. The only difference between them is that, while they think that it is their nature, he declares that it is their sinful choice that makes hopeless death their final lot. He offers, not a theory that the soul is immortal, but a way of escape from death, open to any who will enter it.

Is it not, then, the soul in distinction from the body that he believes can attain immortality? This is neither to be affirmed nor denied hastily. It is really a difficult question to answer with confidence. It is of course commonly affirmed. Schwally, for example, says that the book knows no resurrection, but only an immortality of the soul;⁴⁹ and cites 6:19; 1:15; 3:4; 15:3; 8:13, 17, in proof of the statement that the phrase *τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς ἀθανάτους*, which Josephus uses in describing Essene doctrine, applies to the *Book of Wisdom*. The passages cited contain the words *ἀθανασία*, *ἀθάνατος*, *ἀφθαρσία*, but not one of them contains the word *ψυχή*, nor is this connection found anywhere else. These three words are favorite and characteristic words of our author. They are used of the destination for which God made man (2:23); of the hope of the righteous (3:4); of that which Wisdom imparts to those who love and follow her (6:18, 19; 8:13, 17), that which belongs, together with righteousness, to the knowledge of God (15:3); of the memory of virtue (4:1; cf. 8:13); and *ἀφθαρτος* is applied to the Spirit of God and to the Law (12:1; 18:4). It is scarcely an accident that these words are never used of the soul. The omission would be strange in the case of one whose eschatology rested on the contrast between a mortal body and an immortal soul. The contrasted word *θνητός* is used of man (7:1;

⁴⁸ Compare *M. Sanhedrin*, X. 1: He who says that the resurrection of the dead is not to be derived from the Law has no part in the world to come. That is, He who denies the resurrection will not rise.

⁴⁹ *Das Leben nach dem Tode*, p. 180.

9:14; 15:17); φθαρτός of an idol (14:8), and, in the one verse whose rights we are testing (9:15), of the body. The question whether in this verse φθαρτὸν σῶμα implies the ἀφθαρτὸς ψυχή which we look for elsewhere in vain is precisely the question before us.

The word ψυχή does occur in connection with the thought of the life after death in 2:22; 3:1, 13; 4:14; but the expressions used are not conclusive proof that immortality belongs to the soul apart from the body. The order of words in the phrases γέρας ψυχῶν ἀμώμων, δικαίων δὲ ψυχῶν, κ. τ. λ., ἀρεστή γὰρ ἦν Κυρίῳ ἡ ψυχή αὐτοῦ, shows that the emphasis is not on ψυχή, as if in contrast to σῶμα, but on the characterizing words. It is the blameless soul, the souls of *righteous* men, the *God-pleasing* soul, that gains the reward. It is the wages of *holiness* for which men should hope (2:22). The subject of the verbs in 3:2 ff., though in form ψυχῶν, is certainly in the writer's thought δίκαιοι.⁵⁰ In 4:14 it is clear that it is the man, not the soul, that is translated (cf. 4:10). Nor does any stress belong to ψυχῶν in the phrase ἐν ἐπισκοπῇ ψυχῶν (3:13; cf. 2:20; 3:7; 4:15). In all these passages the Old Testament meaning of nephesh, 'person,' is almost, if not quite, an adequate rendering of ψυχή. When it is asked, then, whether 9:15 does not imply the idea of an ἀφθαρτος ψυχή we have a right to hesitate. That this was the implication in the minds of those who first shaped the language of the verse, Plato and his successors, we have already fully acknowledged. That a Jew could adopt the language without this implication, Paul makes it easier for us to realize. Paul remained a Hebrew in his vigorous rejection of the Greek (Platonic) idea of the immortality of the incorporeal soul; yet he either quotes this very verse from *Wisdom* or says the same thing in similar language in a passage in which he is affirming resurrection in contrast to immortality (II Cor. 5:1-4). Unquestionably the opposite of φθαρτὸν σῶμα in Paul's view is ἀφθαρτον σῶμα. He hoped for a body not corruptible and earthly, not burdening the soul, but fitted for its highest and best life. The right to compare the writer of *Wisdom* with Paul is wholly independent of the current opinion

⁵⁰ Compare 4:7 ff.; 5:15 f.

that Paul knew and used the book. In antecedents and training, and in their modes of thought, the two men are somewhat related to each other; and at more points than one each of them helps us to understand the other. According to Paul the *ψυχή* is not the immortal part of man. Body and soul must both be spiritualized if man is to attain immortality. In *Wisdom* 6:17-21 the successive steps of the process of moral and religious discipline are traced by which man reaches the goal of immortality. Taking the passage in connection with others which speak of the indwelling of the Spirit of Wisdom in man (1:1-5; 7:27) we reach a conception not far from that of Paul, that it is the gift and indwelling of the divine Spirit that becomes in mortal man the power both of righteousness and of immortality (cf. 8:7, 17; 15:3).

Lest it should be objected that Paul's doctrine is solely the result of the resurrection of Christ and of the identification of the Spirit with him, it must be pointed out more fully how deeply our author's doctrine of immortality is rooted in the Old Testament. His doctrine is that righteousness leads to life and sin to death; and stated in this way it is at once evident that it is essentially a Hebrew doctrine. We have already noticed one of the Old Testament sources of our author's doctrine of immortality, namely Genesis, chaps. 1-3.⁵¹ More than one inference could be drawn from the account of the fall. It might be said that Adam's sin brought death upon all his descendants, or that since all men have died, all must have sinned.⁵² Our author adopts neither of these views, but denies that all men do in reality die. The righteous only seem to die, but are really translated into the presence of God (3:1 ff.).

That the word translation best expresses the process by which the righteous escape death is indicated by the writer's use of a second Old Testament source of his doctrine, the story of Enoch. This also was capable of being variously applied. By the majority the fact was simply accepted that Enoch, Elijah, perhaps Moses and a few others,⁵³ never experienced death, but were transported to

⁵¹ Especially Gen. 1:26, 27 (cf. Ps. 8:6-10); 1:31; 2:7, 17; 3:19.

⁵² IV *Ezra*, 7:48; Rom. 5:12.

⁵³ See IV *Ezra*, 6:26; *Syr. Apoc. Baruch*, 13:5; 24:2; 25:1.

Paradise, where they are still living in the body. In this there was no element of hope for the average man, though such exceptional cases enforced the thought of Genesis, chaps. 1-3, that man was made for immortality. But to our author Enoch's translation is a type of the death of the righteous, and especially the vindication of God's love and power in the case of their early death (4:7-19). According to this passage death is not preferred because it frees the soul from the burden of the body; it is not desired as the condition for the attainment of wisdom; but one who in youth has already attained that perfection in knowledge and character which is usually gained only by the discipline of a long life, having in the real sense reached old age while still young (4:8, 9, 13), may be taken out of this world that his virtue may not be harmed by the influence of evil men. His death is an ideal condemnation of those who live long and yet do not possess virtue (4:16).

A third Old Testament source of our author's doctrine is the often repeated faith of Law and Prophecy and Wisdom that life is for the righteous and death for the wicked.⁵⁴ Although the Psalms probably and the Proverbs certainly, contained no doctrine of a life after death, yet one who holds that doctrine can find abundant and satisfying expression of it in such passages as Psalms 16:11, 12; 34:21-23; 73:23-26, and in the conception of life and death in Proverbs.⁵⁵ Here as, in the preceding instances, the question is one of interpretation. The original writers evidently meant by life, long and happy and honorable life, rich in the experience of the favor of God; and by death, premature and unhappy death, and the absence of what gives life its higher worth. Dillmann well says,

Such sentences are not exhausted by saying that wisdom and piety keep men from untimely death, and that sin and folly cast men down in misfortune and early death. Although this is certainly meant, yet there lies in such words the further thought that there is a death apart from bodily death, and a life in spite of bodily death. The absolute contrast which exists for the common consciousness between temporal life and

⁵⁴ Lev. 18:5; Dent. 30:15-20; Jer. 21:8; Ezek. 20:11, 13; *Sirach*, 15:17, etc.

⁵⁵ E. g. 1:31, 32; 2:18, 19; 3:22; 4:4-22; 5:5; 7:2, 26, 27; 9:18; 10:2; 11:4, 5, 7; 12:28; 13:14; 14:27, 32; 15:24, etc.

temporal death is removed. There is a higher, truly immortal life within the temporal life, for which even the terrors of death have lost their power. From this the step is not a long one to the knowledge of a life *after* death, although in Proverbs this is not expressly affirmed.⁵⁶

I quote the passage because it expresses quite exactly the position of the writer of *Wisdom*. He no doubt takes this last step, but he takes it from the ground gained in the Book of Proverbs, and not from any other line of approach; and for him the step seems—and is—a short one. Proverbs 8:35, 36 comes little short of being an adequate summary of our writer's doctrine of immortality, and was almost certainly in his mind when he wrote 1:11b, 12, 16. It reads: *αἱ γὰρ ἔξοδοί μου ἔξοδοι ζωῆς, καὶ ἐτοιμάζεται θέλησις παρὰ Κυρίου. οἱ δὲ εἰς ἐμὲ ἀμαρτάνοντες ἀσεβοῦσιν τὰς ἑαυτῶν ψυχάς, καὶ οἱ μισοῦντές με ἀγαπῶσιν θάνατον.* The Greek language and atmosphere of the writer of *Wisdom* no doubt helped him to take such words of his Hebrew Scriptures in a more absolute sense than they were meant; but on the other hand his Hebrew instincts prevented him from taking the Greek phrases and conceptions which he adopted as literally as they were taken by Greeks. His doctrine of immortality is, in the end, far nearer to Proverbs 8:35, 36 than to Plato's *Phaedo*; and among those more nearly contemporary his relationship, in my judgment, is much closer to Paul than to Philo. His doctrine is not the immortality of the soul because of its nature, but the immortality of the righteous because of the justice and grace of God, and through the power of his indwelling Spirit.

Does this mean that in any sense comparable to the Pauline the *Book of Wisdom* teaches a doctrine of resurrection, rather than immortality? It is safe to say that one who admitted 9:15 into his book did not believe in the resurrection of the physical body; but other Jews besides Paul held to a resurrection in which the body was not earthly and corruptible, but starlike or angelic in nature.⁵⁷ Our author's language is anything but explicit. Siegfried confesses that immortality in this book vacillates between continued personal existence [3:1 ff.] and survival in the memory of posterity (8:13 [4:1]), or even the conception of an ideal

⁵⁶ *Alttestamentliche Theologie*, p. 399.

⁵⁷ See Volz, *Jüdische Eschatologie*, pp. 358 ff.

communion of life with Wisdom (8:17 [15:3]) which the righteous enjoy in this earthly existence.⁴⁸ It should be added that his occasional use of Messianic language leaves us in final uncertainty whether he regarded the Messianic hope as a figure which found fulfilment in individual immortality, or as destined to be literally fulfilled on some definite future day of judgment. The destiny of the righteous to rulership, which is the essence of the Messianic hope, is a favorite conception of the writer's. He repeats it from Genesis 1:26, 28 (9:2, 3), and uses it to express the final goal of the righteous (3:7, 8; 5:15, 16; 6:20, 21; cf. 4:16; 5:1). In chap. 6 this rulership appears to be spiritualized. Kings who have misused their divinely given authority are instructed that true rulership can be gained only by the love and discipline of Wisdom, and consists in an incorruption which brings men near to God. Whether this is a future or, as perhaps in 8:17; 15:3, a present eternal life is not certain.

The principal Messianic passage in the book is 3:7, 8. The whole passage 3:1-9, might mean that the souls of the righteous, when they return to God at death, are kept in that only half personal state in which the rabbis, as we shall see, conceived of souls as waiting in the divine treasury for the coming resurrection. Rest and peace and nearness to God describe their condition (3:1-3). Then the time of their visitation would be the resurrection, which would restore them to full life and activity in their destined calling as rulers of the world (3:7-9).⁴⁹ This may be the purpose for which the Lord safely kept them (4:17). If this is the writer's forecast, then 5:1-14 must describe the actual judgment of the wicked by the righteous. On the other hand it is at least equally probable that 3:7, 8 does not follow after 3:1-6 but is parallel with it, and merely asserts that their heavenly blessedness is the real fulfilment of the prophetic hopes for the righteous people. In that case 5:1-14 is only a dramatic counterpart to 2:1-28. The figurative meaning seems more natural in 5:15, 16, for verse 16 does not appear to follow after vs. 15 in time, but rather to

⁴⁸ Kautsch's *Apokryphen*, p. 930a.

⁴⁹ Grimm interprets the passage as describing, first, the immortal blessedness of the righteous dead (vss. 1-6), and then the coming Messianic glory of the righteous who are still alive (vss. 7-9).

unfold in the language of Messianic eschatology the blessedness and glory of the righteous with God. In the description of judgment that follows (5:17-23), in distinction from 3:7-8, they seem to have no part. The Messianic language of these passages may be one more instance of the author's facility in appropriating terms that do not properly belong to his own way of thinking.

What is clear is only that the writer looked forward to a complete overthrow and final destruction of the wicked and to an immortal life of the righteous with God. The effort to define details will always be baffled by the vagueness of his language and by the habit of his mind, in which the outward and literal and the inward and spiritual pass over by indefinite gradations one into the other. The final overthrow of the wicked seems to be on earth, and their destruction in Hades (4:18, 19; 4:21-5:14; 5:17-23; 17:21). The end of the righteous seems to be the realization in communion with God in heaven of that life and dominion for which man was made. We are tempted to say, by the help of 15:8, 11, 16; 16:13, 14, that the writer thinks of the righteous as going with their souls to God, and of the wicked as going with their bodies to the dust (2:3). But this is beyond the evidence and is probably too definite, or too theoretical, for such a mind. The one certainty in regard to the wicked is that they die. We get the truest impression not from the slight intimation that they are conscious of suffering after death (4:18, 19),⁶⁰ but from the heaping up of words declaring that they have utterly gone and left no trace behind (5:10-14). They fall by their own deeds into the hands of one who destroys both body and soul (cf. 1:11; 12:6). But while the wicked shall die, and indeed have never really lived (5:13), the righteous through their righteousness and by the gift of the Spirit live and shall live.

The assumption that our author must have had a clear and consistent eschatology, and the effort to secure consistency and clearness either by rigorous interpretation or by literary analysis,⁶¹

⁶⁰ Compare Job 14:22.

⁶¹ The book has been declared composite of late by Wm. Weber, *Zeitschrift für Wissenschaftliche Theologie* (1904), pp. 145 ff.; by Lincke, *Samaria und seine Propheten* (1903), pp. 119 ff., and by K. Kohler, *Jewish Encyclopedia*, art. "Wisdom of Solomon." The analyses do not agree, and the grounds are not convincing.

reveals a misunderstanding of the working of the Jewish mind in this region. Rohde⁶² remarks that in the late period of Greek thought all the stages of development in regard to the continuance of the soul after the death of the body which had been reached in the course of time were present and valid at the same time, side by side. Much the same can be said of the Jewish eschatology, and the effort to obliterate this fact by literary analysis is largely a mistaken one.

In spite, then, of remaining uncertainty at various points as to our author's conception of the life after death and even on the crucial question whether he held to immortality of the soul or to some form of resurrection, it is, I believe, certain that his view, both in form and in spirit, is more Jewish than Greek. It is clear, if I am not quite mistaken, that his conception of immortality is not of the sort that requires the pre-existence of the soul as its pre-supposition. In fact it is hardly of such a character as would admit that doctrine by its side. Immortality is not connected with the divine breath which gives man life and constitutes his soul or spirit (15:8, etc.); it is conferred rather by that divine Spirit of Wisdom which the mature man gains by moral effort and by prayer. It is not man's nature that decides whether he is to live or die, though the godless profess that it is (2:2, 3); it is his character. Immortality is at the same time man's moral achievement and God's gracious gift through his Spirit.

Plato and Paul are the two greatest champions of faith in immortality, and represent the two great lines of argument, or ways of approach. Plato argues from the nature of the soul, Paul from the character and purposes and spiritual operations of God. What has just been said indicates that the ideas of the *Book of Wisdom* on this subject are distinctly of the Pauline rather than of the Platonic type, and we are better justified in filling out the vacant places in his thought by a cautious use of Paul than by the use of Philo. The writer of *Wisdom* does not care for the philosophical or scientific questions: Is the soul immortal? Will the soul live on after the body dies? He is interested only in the religious questions: Will God save man from death? Can man

⁶² *Psyche*, II, p. 379.

attain immortality? The only sort of death with which he is concerned is the death which sin causes, the sort of death which already is, wherever sin is. The wicked only seem to live. And the only sort of immortality he cares about is that which rewards righteousness, and is already possessed by those in whom because of their righteousness the Spirit of Wisdom dwells, making them friends of God. The righteous only seem to die. In kinship to Wisdom is immortality.

My conclusion is that the Platonic doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul is not found in the *Book of Wisdom*. It is not the natural meaning of the one verse which is thought to assert it (8:20); it is not sustained by the two Platonic phrases (9:15; 11:17) which are adduced in its support; it has not its inevitable accompaniments, its roots and fruit, in the writer's views as to the world in general, which so far as they are not Jewish are Stoic in character, nor in his conception of the origin and nature of sin, nor in his view of death and his doctrine of immortality. It is not asserted that the book contains no idea of the pre-existence of the soul. A certain sort of pre-existence is implied in 8:19, 20; 15:8, 11, 16; 16:14; but it is not the pre-existence of the person, the conscious moral self; it is not of the Greek, but of the Jewish, type. A doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul of which no use is made to refute a current materialistic notion of the soul's nature (2:2, 3); with which the belief in immortality, though earnestly urged, stands in no relation; from which no theoretical or practical inferences are drawn in the direction of an ascetic suppression of the body; which has nothing to do with the theory of ideas; can surely not be called Platonic.

II. THE RABBINICAL DOCTRINE OF THE PRE-EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL

The limits of this essay do not permit a complete study of the conception of pre-existence in Jewish literature. In particular a critical study of Philo and Josephus cannot here be undertaken. There are, however, two reasons for bringing forward in some detail illustrations of rabbinical ideas on this subject. One is that the argument thus far has turned on a distinction between Jewish

and Greek ideas of the soul; and on this and other subjects no literature is so well adapted as the rabbinic, to familiarize one with the ways of thinking characteristic of the Jewish mind. The other reason for introducing it is the currency here, as in the case of the *Book of Wisdom*, of what I must regard as a serious misconception. It is quite the accepted assumption of modern writers on Judaism that the pre-existence of the soul was a common doctrine of the rabbis, and that they meant by it practically what Philo meant, or what we ourselves mean when we use the phrase. The proof that is generally offered for this assumption is a reference to Weber's *Judische Theologie*, pp. 212, 225 ff. I have elsewhere had occasion to criticize Weber's too dualistic (Platonic) account of the rabbinical doctrine as to the seat of sin;⁴² and this criticism applies in part to his exposition of the doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul. I attempted to show that the rabbis did not adopt the Greek dualistic idea that the body is by nature, because made of matter, evil and the seat of the evil impulse, and that the soul is by nature pure and good, the seat of the good impulse. Their conception rather was that both good and evil propensities reside in the soul, or more strictly in the heart, the moral nature of man. The rabbis, in their doctrine of the *yeqer*, have to do with simple moral facts and forces, and not with metaphysical theories. Now there is, I believe just a little evidence of Greek influence in the rabbinical doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul as in the doctrine of the *yeqer*.

The ideas of the rabbis as to the relations of soul and body rested on the old Hebrew conception of the nature of man, not on the new Greek dualistic psychology. They had indeed provided themselves in the word נֶפֶשׁ with an equivalent for $\sigma\acute{o}\mu\alpha$; and, especially on the basis of Genesis 2:7, had adopted נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה as its usual antithesis. They were able, therefore, to distinguish more clearly than Old Testament speech allows between the two parts of human nature. But their conception was not so much that of contrasted substances as of opposite origins; not that the *guf* was made of matter and the *neshamah* of spirit, but that the *guf*

⁴²"The *Yequer Hara*, a Study in the Jewish Doctrine of Sin," *Biblical and Semitic Studies* (1901), pp. 93-153.

was from below, from the earth, and the neshamah from above, from God. The basis of their reflections on the relation of these two to each other and to the human personality is to be found not in scientific observations or in philosophical theory, but in a few often repeated texts of Scripture: first of all, Gen. 2:7; then as interpreting this, Isa. 57:16, with its suggestion that the life-giving breath of God is individualized, and that the individual "souls" are already made; I Sam. 25:29, furnishing the idea that God keeps the "souls" he has made, that is, the souls of the righteous, in a storehouse; then Job 12:10; Eccles. 3:21; 12:7, and a few other verses. The use made of such passages will appear from the quotations following.

One of the most typical passages is the following morning prayer:

When one awakes let him say, My God, the soul [נשמה] which thou hast given me is pure [טהורה]. Thou hast formed it [יצרתה] in me, and thou hast breathed it [נפחתה] in me, and thou dost keep it within me [משמרה בקרבי]; and thou wilt hereafter take it from me, and thou wilt give it back to me again in the [Messianic] future [עתיד לבא]. As long as my soul is within me I thank thee, O Lord my God, and the God of my fathers, ruler of all worlds and Lord of all souls. Blessed art thou who givest back souls to dead bodies [המחזיר נשמות לפגרים מתים] (*Berakoth*, 60b).

This prayer, as it is used in the Jewish Prayer Book today, may be taken to express almost any form of belief in the divine origin and destiny of the soul which the worshipers may hold, as we use verses from the Psalms to express our own faith in a life after death. But when we ask what conception of the soul this prayer was originally intended to express, it is surely evident that no Platonic or modern idea of pre-existence was in the mind of those who first shaped and used it. It rests upon the conception of man contained in Gen. 2:7. The neshamah is not the person, but is here, as uniformly in the rabbinical sayings, spoken of as something distinct from the "I," and objective to it. It is God's gift to the person, formed, or breathed, and kept in man by God. It always belongs to God and remains in his keeping (Job 12:10). When, at death, God takes this "soul" back, it is not the man's self that returns to the heavenly regions from which he came, but

only the divine breath that animated and preserved his body during his earthly life. Yet this divine breath is so far individualized and connected with this man that when the time comes for him to be raised from the dead, God will give back the same neshamah to the same body,⁶⁴ and the man himself, the same man, will live again. In the whole passage the human person is thought of from the point of view of the body, not from that of the neshamah; in other words, its standpoint is that of *Wisdom* 8:19. Not only is it implied that the man's personality did not belong to the "soul" in its pre-existent state, but it is equally clear that the person does not go with the "soul" when God takes it back at death. All that one can hope and pray for is that God will keep his "soul" for him during his slumber in the grave, and give it back to him, that is, raise him from the dead and give him life again, in the age to come. The neshamah is still primarily the "breath of life" (Gen. 2:7). God is praised as the one who gives back "souls" to dead bodies; that is, as he gives souls to bodies that men may enter upon the earthly life, so will he do again that they may enter the new life of the Messianic age. The doctrine of resurrection which the passage contains is surely proof enough that we are in a Hebrew and not in a Greek world of thought.

A man's responsibility with reference to his soul is to return it to God pure as it came from him. On Eccles. 12:7, "and the ruah returns to God who gave it," we read (*Sabbath*, 152b):

What was given to you in purity, so give back to him in purity. Like a human king who divided royal garments among his servants. The wise folded them up and laid them in a chest; the fools did their work in them. After a time the king inquired after his garments. The wise gave them back to him clean, but the fools gave them back soiled. . . . As to the wise, he ordered that their garments go into the treasure-house [אוצר], and that they themselves go to their homes in peace. As to the fools he ordered that their garments be sent to be cleaned, and that they go to prison. So says the Holy One as to the bodies of the righteous, "He enters into peace, they rest in their beds" (Isa. 57:2); and as to their souls, "They shall be bound in the bundle of life with Yahweh" (I Sam. 25:29). As to the bodies of the wicked he says, "There is no peace to the wicked" (Isa. 48:22); and as to their souls, "And the souls of thine enemies shall he sling out," etc. (I Sam. 25:29).

⁶⁴ This marks an advance beyond the idea that underlies *Ezek.*, chap. 37

Remembering that this is strictly an allegory, not a parable, we notice how much more closely the man himself is associated with the body than with the soul. It is not the body, as we should expect, that is likened to a garment worn by the soul during the earthly life; but the soul is the garment lent to man by God during the earthly life, and at death, if it has not been defiled, it goes back into God's treasury, while the good man himself is thought of as resting with his body in the tomb.

We read on in *Sabbath*, 152b: R. Eliezer says: The souls of the righteous are kept [בגזרות] under the throne of glory, but the souls of the wicked are slung back and forth (I Sam. 25:29).⁶⁵ A similar saying is ascribed to R. Eliezer ben Jose ha-Gelili in *Sifre*, Num., § 139: The soul, as long as a man lives, is kept in the hand of the Creator (Job 12:10), and after death is taken to the treasure-house (I Sam. 25:29). But this [as the verse shows] is true only of the souls of the righteous. So Jose b. Halaphta interpreted the two phrases in Eccles. 3:21 of "the souls of the righteous which are kept in the divine treasury (I Sam. 25:29), and the souls of the wicked which descend into Sheol (Ezek. 31:13)."⁶⁶

According to R. Meir⁶⁷ the place where souls are kept, both before and after their earthly life, is in the highest heaven, the seventh, with those things that are nearest to God. Here are the souls of the righteous [dead], according to I Sam. 25:29, and also the spirits and souls which are yet to be created [רוחות ונשמות שעתיד להיבראות] (Isa. 57:16). Here is also the dew with which God will hereafter awaken the dead (Ps. 68:10 [cf. Isa. 26:19])—a striking indication that the righteous dead have not reached their consummation when their "souls" have been received back into the presence of God. It is not they themselves that live there in the seventh heaven, but only their "souls." They are there after death only in the same impersonal or partial sense in which they were there before birth. Their real life and blessedness will not begin until God gives them back their souls again.

⁶⁵ Compare *IV Ezra* 7:80.

⁶⁶ *Kohleth rabba*, on 3:21.

⁶⁷ *Hagigah*, 12b. For the attribution of this view to Meir, see Bacher, *Tannaiten*, II, 65; cf. *Aboth d. R. Nathan*, 37, 9.

The souls of all men are first in heaven, because all men are created by God, but only the souls of the righteous are in heaven after death, because only the righteous are to be raised from the dead.⁶⁸ When God puts souls back into their sheaths [i. e., in the resurrection], he will not put the souls of the wicked into their sheaths [i. e., they will not rise from the dead].⁶⁹

But if the neshamah is not the man's self, but only one half of the man that is to be created, what is the significance of its pre-existence in the divine treasury, in the highest heaven, in nearness to God? It signifies first of all that the breath of life is God's gift to man, and that while one part of his nature is from below, the other is from above. But it means further that God has planned and fixed the number and lot of human beings. The souls kept in the divine chambers picture to the imagination the divine predestination of the life of all men and of each man. The pre-existence of the soul is more significant for the conception of God than for the conception of man; not the nature of the soul but the power of God is heightened by it; that is, it is Jewish, not Greek, in value. The life and lot of the soul both now and hereafter depend not on its natural constitution, on the question of its substance, whether perishable or imperishable, but altogether on God's keeping; and this is a question of the man's conduct, whether sinful or righteous. God says to man: "If you will keep my light (the Law, Prov. 6:23), I will keep your light (the soul, Prov. 20:27)."⁷⁰ "My daughter, the Law, is in your hand; your daughter, the soul, is in my hand (Job 12:10). If you will keep mine I will keep yours (Deut. 4:9)."⁷¹ "The Law was given in forty days, and the soul of man is formed [נִצְרָ] in the first forty days [after conception]. He who keeps the Law, his soul will be kept, and he who does not keep the Law his soul will not be kept."⁷²

⁶⁸ For different views on this point see Castelli, *Jewish Quarterly Review*, I (1889), pp. 325 ff.

⁶⁹ *Gen. rabba*, 26, 11: An interpretation of לֹא יִדְרֹךְ דְּרֹחֵי (Gen. 6:3) by נִדְרָנוּ in I Chron. 21:27; see Bacher, *Die Agada der paläst. Amordler*, I, 268; III, 129 f. It is attributed both to R. Joḥanan and to E. Aḥa.

⁷⁰ *Midrash Tehillim*, on Ps. 17:8 (Eleazar ha-Kappar; elsewhere cited in the name of Bar Kappara); see Bacher, *Tannaiten*, II, 500 f.

⁷¹ See Bacher, *Amordler*, III, 629, and n. 5.

⁷² E. Joḥanan and R. Eleazar, *Menahot*, 90b. Bacher, *Amordler*, I, 234.

When God gives the soul to man it is, as we have seen, pure, and it is man's task to keep it so. "God says to man, You see that I am pure, and my dwelling is pure, and my servants are pure, and the neshamah which I give you is pure. If you give it to me as I have given it to you, it is well; but if not I will burn it before your face," as a priest would burn sacred things which had been made impure by one in whose charge they were left.⁷³ And with the destruction of his "soul" the man beholds his chance of living again forever lost.

It was said that Rabba bar Nahmani uttered the words, "Pure, pure" as he died; and that a *bath qol* said, "Blessed art thou, Rabba bar Nahmani, for thy body is pure, and thy neshamah went forth in purity" [שגופך טהור ויצאתה נשמתך בטהור].⁷⁴ Here as in *Wisdom* 8:19-20, is the idea of a pure body and a pure soul. The word טהור describes, of course, ritual, not ethical purity. What is meant by a pure body can be understood from Lev. 21:16-24; 22:4. The purity of the soul, as God gives it to man, belongs to it because it belongs to God, because it comes from above, and does not at all imply that it has received by creation or gained by choice a moral quality before its entrance into a human body. In the same ritual sense a certain impurity could be said to belong to the body because it belongs to the earth, or comes from below; but this does not mean that the body is the source or seat of moral evil. There is, I believe, no proof that the rabbis thought of the birth of man as the coming of a morally pure soul into a morally defiled and defiling body. Weber's summary statement on p. 225,⁷⁵ I have elsewhere shown to be an entirely unjustifiable hellenization of the rabbinical doctrine.

In the famous parable of the lame and the blind watchmen an answer was given to the question as to the relative responsibility of soul and body for sin. In *Sanhedrin* 91ab the story runs as follows:

Antoninus said to Rabbi, Body and soul can both free themselves from judgment. Body says, The soul has sinned, for from the day that

⁷³ *Kohleth rabba*, on 12:7.

⁷⁴ *Baba Meziá*, 86a.

⁷⁵ "Nach der jüdischen Theologie ist der Leib des Menschen von Natur unrein, weil er irdisch ist, und macht auch die Seele, die vom Himmel her rein in ihn eingeht, durch die Verbindung mit sich unrein." The final clause is unobjectionable; namely, "aber die Seele ist nun verantwortlich für das Thun des Leibes." See my *Yezer Hara*, pp. 98 ff.

it went forth from me I lie like a stone in the grave. Soul says, The body has sinned for from the day that I went forth from it I fly like a bird in the air. The answer is the parable of a king who had fine first fruits in his orchard, and set a lame man and a blind man to guard it. The lame man said to the blind, I see fine fruit in the orchard; come let me ride on you and we will get it and eat it. . . . When the owner of the orchard came and asked them where the fruit was, the lame man said, Have I feet to walk with? The blind man said, Have I eyes to see? What does he do? He puts the lame man on the blind man and punishes them together. So God brings the soul and puts it into the body and punishes them together, according to Ps. 50:4, "He calleth to the heavens above, that is the soul, and to the earth, that is the body, that he may judge his people."

According to this allegory it is not the body that involves the soul in sin, but rather the reverse. The soul suggests the transgression, and makes use of the body for its accomplishment. It is an excellent picture of the "evil-devising soul" and "the body bound as debtor, or subject, to sin," of *Wisdom* 1:4.

In *Lev. rabba*, 4, 5 (on Lev. 4:4, "If a soul sin"), the parable is told in much the same words, and to it is added another, of a priest who had two wives, one the daughter of a priest, the other of a (lay) Israelite. He left some dough with them which they made unclean. He reckoned only with the priest's daughter for the offense of which both were guilty, because she had been instructed in her father's house. So with soul and body when they stand before the judgment, God leaves the body and reckons with the soul. It answers, Lord we both sinned; why do you leave the body and reckon with me? God answers, The body is from below, from the place where they sin; but thou art from above, from the place where they do not sin before me." Therefore I leave the body and judge with you.

The parable of the lame and the blind watchers is introduced, though not quoted, in *Mechilta*, ed. Friedmann, p. 36b (*Beshallah*, *At NADVA*, 2) as follows: Antoninus asked Rabbi

בשעה שאדם מת והגה מלה הקדוש ברוך הוא מעמידו ברין אמר לו עך
שתשאלני על הגה שהוא סמא שאלני על הנשמה שהיא טהורה אמר לו
משל וגר

"הגה מן התחתונים הוא ממקום שהן חוטאין את מן העליונים ממקום
שאין חוטאין לפני.

Fiebig translates and interprets thus:"

In der Stunde, wo der Mensch stirbt und der Leib zu Grunde geht: wie kann ihn (d. h. den Menschen) der Heilige—gepriesen sei er—vor Gericht stellen? (denn der Leib, der Sitz der Sünde, damit aber die Sünde überhaupt, ist ja vernichtet!). Da sagte er (d. h. der Rabbi) zu ihm: ehe du mich über den Leib befragst, der doch unrein ist [Note: Vgl. Röm. 7:8. Die Anschauungen des Paulus in diesem Punkt sind danach sowohl jüdisches als hellenitisches Gut jener Zeit.], befrage mich lieber über die Seele, die doch rein ist! (denn diese bleibt ja bestehen. Hier liegt also die eigentliche Schwierigkeit der Frage nach dem Gericht. Aber es ist zu antworten): Ein Maschal.

This interpretation is surely quite without justification. The parable itself gives no place for the idea of the body as the seat of sin, but makes the "pure" soul even more responsible for sin than the "impure" body. The passage means: In the hour when a man dies and his body perishes the Holy One makes him stand in judgment. [How can this be? How can he stand in judgment when his body has ceased to be?] Rabbi answers: Instead of asking me about the body which is unclean, ask about the soul which is clean [i. e., as the parable requires us to assume, it is more important to ask about the soul, which is from above, than about the body which is from below. The soul can be judged even if the body is at an end. But in fact soul and body will be reunited and judged together.]

The rabbis are never dualists after Plato's kind. It is man that sins, and man is neither body nor soul but the union of the two. And the contrast between body and soul was not so much a contrast between material and spiritual being as between earthly and heavenly origin. This is expressed in a popular interpretation of Genesis 2:7. When God created the world he made peace between things above [העליונים] and things below [התחתונים]. On the first day he created heaven and earth. On the four days following he alternated between heaven and earth. On the sixth he preserved the balance by creating man both from above and from below. He formed man dust from the earth (בין התחתונים), and breathed into his face the breath of life (בין העליונים).⁷⁸ In

⁷⁷ *Altjüdische Gleichnisse und die Gleichnisse Jesu* (1904), pp. 31 f.

⁷⁸ *Gen. rabba* 12, 8; *Lev. rabba*, 9, 9. See Bacher, *Amoræer*, I, 412. Rashi adopts this interpretation of Gen. 2:7.

Sifre, on Deut., 32:2 (§ 306, near the end) it is said that "all beings which are created from heaven have their *nephesh* and their *guph* from heaven; and all beings which are created from earth, their *nephesh* and their *guph* are from earth. Man is an exception, his *nephesh* is from heaven and his *guph* from earth. If he acts according to the will of his Father in Heaven he is like the heavenly (Ps. 82:6), if not he is like the earthly" (*ibid.*, vs. 7). The soul is not the man's self, but it is his dearest possession. As a man who has a king's daughter for his wife cannot do enough for her because she is the daughter of a king, so whatever a man does for his soul he thinks he has not done enough, because it is from above." It is this heavenly origin of the soul which the word pure, *טָהוֹר*, expresses. The soul is elaborately compared with God himself. As God fills the world (Jer. 23:24), so the soul fills the body. As God sees, and is not seen (Zech. 4:10), so the soul. As God bears the world (Isa. 46:4), so the soul bears the body. As God endures after the world ends (Ps. 102:27), so the soul outlasts the body. As God is one in the world (Deut. 6:4), so is the soul in the body. As God is pure in his world (Hab. 1:13), so the soul is pure in the body [*וְנֶפֶשׁ הַזֶּה טָהוֹרָה*] *בְּגוֹיָהּ*."*

The reason why man should return his "soul" to God pure is first of all because it belongs to God and not to the man, and then because only if it is pure can it go back into the divine treasury to be kept and given again to the man hereafter.

The language used to describe God's giving of the *neshamah* to man is consistent with this view of the nature of its pre-existence, and not with any other. Weber remarks that the rabbis avoided the use of the word *נֶפֶשׁ* (Gen. 2:7), and substitute for it *זֶרֶק*⁸¹ (*Gen. rabba*, 14, *Sanhedrin*, 38b). This substitution, he says, is "without doubt" a sign that while the Bible is *traducianist* the Talmud and Midrash represent *creationism* and *pre-existence*.

Now, in fact *נֶפֶשׁ* is retained in the morning prayer cited above. As an alternative expression "צַר" is there used, perhaps derived

⁷⁹ *שׁוּרֵיָא מִלְמַעְלָה* *Lev. rabba*, 4, 2.

⁸⁰ *Lev. rabba*, 4 (end); cf. *Berakoth* 10a.

⁸¹ As *זֶרֶק* is commonly used in the O. T. of the ritual throwing of blood, it is tempting to suppose that the old association of the *nephesh* with the blood led to the use of the word in this connection.

from Zech. 12:1.⁸² This word, which suggests creationism, but not pre-existence, is used also in *Menahoth* 99b (see above), and Weber can only say that it must be understood according to the general view that the soul comes from above into human bodies as a personal hypostasis, already long finished (p. 228). But in the description of the seventh heaven we have met with an expression still less consistent with a real pre-existence. "Spirits and souls which are hereafter to be created [להבראות]" is indeed a strange description of pre-existent souls, if the soul and its pre-existence are to be taken in Philo's sense. An important saying, several times recorded, and ascribed to different authors, declares, on the basis of Isa. 57:16, that the Messiah will not come until all the souls which God has made, or intends to make, have entered into earthly existence. In the Talmud⁸³ the saying reads: אין בן דוד בא עד שיכלו כל הנשמות שבגוף. Bacher supposes גוף to be used here in the literal sense of body,⁸⁴ but it is usually taken in the figurative sense, according to which it was a name for the chamber (אוצר) in which God keeps souls. In that case the meaning would be: "The Son of David will not come until all the souls which are in the guph have been exhausted." In the Palestinian sources (*Gen. rabba*, 24, 4; *Lev. rabba*, 15, 1) the saying is given thus: אין מלך המשיח בא עד שיבראו (שיכלו) כל הנשמות שעלו במחשבה להבראות "The King Messiah will not come until all the souls are created [or finished] which rise in the thought [of God] to be created."

If, now, we apply a Greek or modern measure, the two forms of this saying express two completely different conceptions, the Babylonian affirming and the Palestinian excluding the conception of the pre-existence of the soul. But if pre-existence meant to the rabbis essentially the divine predetermination of all human

⁸² ויצר רוח אדם בקרבו. So נתן is used in the prayer, in accordance with Isa. 42:5.

⁸³ *Jebamoth*, 62a, 63b; *Abodah Zarah*, 5a; *Niddah*, 13a. See Bacher, *Amordor*, II, 172, n. 5, who ascribes the saying to R. Assi. It may go back to R. Jose. See Klausner, *Die messianischen Vorstellungen des jüdischen Volkes* (1904), pp. 37 ff.

⁸⁴ Bacher translates, or paraphrases thus, Der Sohn Davids kömmt nicht früher, als bis alle Seelen, die in's irdischen Dasein treten sollen, zu Ende erschaffen sind; and thinks R. Assi may have interpreted Isa. 57:16 thus: "for the Spirit (i. e., the Messiah) will delay only until I have created all souls."

lives, and not the actual existence of the persons themselves in heaven, it would follow that the Babylonian form only expresses in a more pictorial fashion what the Palestinian expresses more literally. The free use of the word נִשְׁמָה to describe God's in-breathing of the soul at man's birth is therefore not evidence of conflicting opinions, but one of the many indications that the pre-existence of the soul was not thought of at all in the Greek sense.

Is there, then, no evidence that the pre-existing neshamah was, as Weber says, "a personal hypostasis" (p. 228) or a "truly living, active being" (p. 212)? The only proof that he adduces is the statement (*Gen. rabba* 8, 7) that when God thought of creating man he consulted with the souls of the righteous. This is R. Levi's interpretation of the difficult phrase in Genesis 1:26, "Let us make man in our image." It was but one among many interpretations of a verse which provided so dangerous a tool for polytheists. It was not an accepted interpretation,⁶⁵ and it does not at all bear the weight of Weber's inference. Nor is this sustained by the few other similar applications of the idea to solve exegetical problems. Thus Deut. 29:14[15] was thought by some to imply that the souls of coming generations were present at the making of the covenant in Moab.⁶⁶

The way in which this pre-existence was pictured and the fact that it was no real pre-existence of the person may best be set forth by citing an exposition of Deut. 29:15 attributed to R. Isaac.⁶⁷ He said:

The prophets who were to prophesy in the future,⁶⁸ in all their generations, received [their prophecies] from Mt. Sinai. As Moses said to the Israelites (Deut. 29:15), not "he who does not stand with us today," but "he who is not with us today." These are the souls which are to be created, in whom there is as yet nothing actual, and of whom the word "stand" could not be used. Although they were not there at that time,

⁶⁵ The reference was thought by others to be to the angels, or to heaven and earth, or to God's own heart. The latter view, that God consulted only with himself, was favored by vs. 27, where "his own image" is substituted for "our image." See *Gen. rabba*, 8, 3 ff., and *Sanhedrin*, 88b.

⁶⁶ See Bacher, *Amorder*, I, 547 f.; II, 232. Compare III, 453, where a different interpretation is given.

⁶⁷ *Exodus rabba*, 28, 4; see Bacher, *Amorder*, II, 232 f.

⁶⁸ מִזֶּה שֶׁהַנְּבִיאִים עָתִידִים לְעֹמְדִים [Bacher erroneously reads לְהַתְּנַבְּאוֹת].

yet each one received what belonged to him.⁹⁸ So Mal. 1:1 says "in the hand of Malachi (ביד, not ברימי), because already this prophecy was in his hand from Mt. Sinai, but the permission to prophesy was not given him until this hour. Again, Isa. 48:16 means, From the day when the Tora was given at Sinai I was there and received this prophecy, but only now has God sent me and his spirit. Permission was not given him to prophesy until now. And not only did all the prophets receive their prophecies from Sinai, but also the wise men who stand in every age, each received his own from Sinai. So Deut. 5:19[22] says, Yahweh spoke these words unto all your assembly, with a loud voice, and no more.

To this may be added a saying of R. Assi (*Sabbath*, 146a): When asked about the proselytes, he said. Though they were not themselves present [at Sinai] yet their stars [the angels of their destiny?] were present,⁹⁹ as Deut. 29:14 says.

These passages represent in part an effort to explain a difficult passage (Deut. 29:14 [15] last clause), and in part the natural impulse to make the revelation at Sinai complete and final. The language used does not justify Weber's description of the pre-existent souls as "personal hypostases" or "truly living, active, beings," but explicitly excludes the literal and real presence of future generations, and only provides, through the conception of pre-existing neshamoth for a semi-actual, semi-poetic way of picturing the finality of the revelation at Sinai. The most, I think, that can be said is that we find here a slight and tentative movement toward connecting the person with the pre-existing neshamah, which is comparable to that of *Wisdom* 8:20; so that we are prompted to say that while *Wisdom* 8:19 represents the more natural Jewish mode of conception, verses 19 and 20 together still express certain tendencies of late Jewish thought about the relation of body and soul. We are not led beyond this by the picture of the conversation of Moses at sight of the soul of Akiba, in *Menahoth*, 29b.

⁹⁸אלו הנשמות העתידות להבראות שאין בהם ממש שכא נאמרה בהם עמידה שאה על פי שלא היו באותה שעה כל אחד ואחד קבל את שלר
With this compare the sentence on which Bacher bases his retention of the usual sense of the word גרם in the sentence cited above (p. 259): Because the souls were there and the guph was not yet created, therefore a standing is not here spoken of (Samuel b. Nachmani, *Tanchuma*, Nisṣabim, near the end. Bacher, *Amorder*, I, 547 f.; II, 172, n. 5, 232, n. 2).

⁹⁹אה על גב דאינהו לא הוי מזלייהו הרה.

The union of soul and body is not even in this later Judaism the fall of the soul or its misfortune, or a mere incident interrupting its true life. It is that for which the soul exists, and it is that which constitutes the creation of the human personality.

The upper beings [angels] are created in God's image and do not have offspring. The lower beings [animals] have offspring but are not created in God's image. I create man, says God, in my image like the upper beings, with offspring like the lower beings. If I created man like one of the upper beings he would live without dying; if like one of the lower beings he would die without living again. I will therefore make him belong to both the upper and lower order. If he sins he will die. If he does not sin he will live.⁹¹

This conception of man as partly of earth and partly of heaven, and of his destiny as depending on his deeds, not on his nature, is thoroughly characteristic of Judaism. Equally characteristic is the persistence of the doctrine of resurrection. To a belief in the pre-existence of the soul, such as Plato and Philo represent, belongs inevitably the belief that the soul is immortal, that its original incorporeal state of existence is more native to it, and higher, than its earthly life, and that the recovery of this is its final destiny. But all this is foreign to rabbinical teaching. Abundant proof is furnished by the citations Weber himself gives under the topic *Tod und Todeszustand* (pp. 336-40). He is obliged to say that "the connection of soul with body, that is, this earthly existence, was more highly prized in the consciousness of Judaism, and therefore more firmly held, than the hope of the union of the soul with God" (p. 340). Even here in the last clause the word "soul" is misleading. The rabbis did not hope for a union of their self-conscious personalities with God after death at all. Their hope was a new life in the age to come.

There is a long account of the death of Moses in a mediaeval *Midrash Petirat Mosheh*, which was incorporated in part in the *Deut. rabba*, chap. 11, though not originally belonging to it.⁹² Although this account is much too late to be cited in proof of rabbinical ideas, and is in part out of line with the ruling spirit

⁹¹ *Gen. rabba*, 8, 11.

⁹² Text in two recensions in Jellinek, *Beth ha-Midrash* I, 115-129; VI, 71-78. Compare Zunz, *Gottesdienstliche Vorträge*, 2d ed., p. 154 and note e, p. 265, note b; also article "Midrash Petirat Mosheh," in *Jewish Encyclopedia*.

of Judaism,²⁸ yet it may not be out of place to summarize it here merely as an illustration of the long persistence of distinctly Jewish ideas of the relation between body and soul. When God declared that Moses must die (Deut. 31:14), he fasted and prayed with such power that it was thought that God would perhaps bring in the new age [the only thing that could annul the decree that Moses must die], until a *bath qol* said that the time for this had not come. God must close the gates of heaven lest the prayer move him from his fixed purpose. Moses prays that he may see the prosperity of Israel as he has seen its adversity; but if he may not cross Jordan that he may at least be left in this world, that he may live and not die. God answers, If I do not make you die in this world, how shall I make you alive for the world to come. Moreover, to grant his prayer would contradict Moses' own words in Deut. 32:39 (last line). Nevertheless Moses persists. He would be like a beast of the field, or like a bird, if he could but live and see the world. When the time came that he must die, God sent Gabriel to go and bring his soul [צֵן וְהָבֵן נִשְׁמֹתוֹ], but Gabriel would not see the death of one so strong. Michael would not see the death of his pupil. God must send the evil angel, Samael. He goes eagerly but is twice driven back in fear, although the souls of all men are given into his hand. At last God himself comes with three archangels, and Moses submits and is stretched out in preparation for death. But when God calls to his neshamah to come forth, saying, My daughter, one hundred and twenty years I ordained that thou shouldst be in the body of Moses. Now thy end is come, that thou shouldst go forth. Do not delay; then the neshamah answered: I know that thou art the God of all ruḥoth and of all neshamoth; the nephesh of the living and of the dead are given into thy hand. Thou hast created [בִּרְאָ] me, and thou hast formed [יִצַרְ] me, and thou hast put me in Moses' body one hundred and twenty years. And now is there a body more pure [טְהוֹרִי] in the world than the body of Moses, in which was never seen any breath of stench, nor worm,

²⁸ The idea of the reluctance of the righteous to die does not go back to early rabbinical sources. Our earliest evidence of it is in the *Testament of Abraham*. See M. R. James' edition (Cambridge, 1862), and his discussion of this subject, pp. 64-70. The idea is found only in the older recension, A, chaps. 7, 8, 15, 16, 20; and James thinks it may go back to the *Assumption of Moses*. See Jude, chap. 9.

nor vermin? Therefore I love him and am not willing to go forth from him. God answers, Go forth, do not delay. I will make thee to mount up to the highest heavens, and dwell under the throne of my glory near to Cherubim and Seraphim and the hosts. The neshamah answers, Two of these highest angels, Uzzah and Azael, descended from thy shekinah and corrupted their ways with the daughters of earth, until thou didst make them hang between earth and the firmament. But Moses has not known his wife since thou appearedst to him in the burning bush (Num. 12:1). I pray thee leave me in Moses' body. In that hour God kissed him and took away his soul [נשקרו ונטל נשמחו] with the kiss of his mouth. Then God wept and said Ps. 94:16; the Holy Spirit said Deut. 34:10: Heaven wept and said Mic. 7:2 *aa*; Earth wept and said Mic. 7:2 *ab*; Joshua wept and said Ps. 12:2; the angels of service said, He did the righteousness of Yahweh; the Israelites wept and said, And his judgments with Israel. All were saying Isa. 57:2, He enters into peace, they rest in their beds, he who walks straight forward; Prov. 10:7, The memory of a righteous man is for a blessing, and his soul is for the life of the world to come [זכרו צדיק לברכה ונשמחו] [לחיי עולם הבא].

It would be hard to find a better summary of the Jewish doctrine of a future life than the last sentence, with its addition of the new to the old; the immortality of a blessed memory for this present world, and the neshamah kept in order that the man may live again in the world to come. The whole passage is most suggestive. The death of Moses, the most divine of men, was hard to explain; and the account here given of it enforces several lessons as to Jewish ways of thinking, which it is hard for western minds to grasp. The neshamah is a being, or a personification, quite distinct from Moses. In leaving Moses' body it is evidently being separated from Moses himself. Moses clings to life, but it is only the arrival of the world to come that could have brought him escape from death when its appointed hour was at hand. What is promised to Moses in order to counterbalance the evil and loss involved in death is that he will live again in the world to come; and death in this world is a condition of the

gift of life in that. Even in view of this, life, even the life of animals and birds, seems better than death. It is to the neshamah, not to Moses, that a place is promised in the highest heavens, beneath the throne of glory; and the neshamah would prefer to remain in Moses' body, since sin has not entered there, while some of the highest angels fell.

We turn finally to the long passage from the *Tanchuma*, quoted by Weber (pp. 225-27) as proof of the general statement cited above, and as the text for his further exposition of the nature of soul and body and their relation to each other (pp. 227-31). The passage is late in its attestation,²⁴ and could not in any case be allowed to outweigh the older material already discussed. But while it seems to mark a certain progress in the direction of Philo as compared with the morning prayer quoted at the beginning, it is in fact still very much nearer to that prayer than to Philo, very much more Jewish than Greek, in its conception of the pre-existence of the soul. According to this passage the pre-existing souls are called also ruḥoth. They are said to be in the Garden of Eden, but this seems to be contradicted by the fact that the angel has to show the soul, after its union with the human seed, but before birth, the Garden of Eden and the blessedness of the righteous there, as well as Gehenna and the torments of the wicked; and also by the fact that God assures the soul, reluctant to leave its heavenly abode, that it will enter a more beautiful world than it leaves. But the soul objects that it is pure and does not wish to enter this "impure seed." To this the answer is that God formed this soul for nothing else than to enter this seed. It is evident that though the soul, as from God, is ceremonially pure, and though conception involves ceremonial impurity, yet the soul's coming into the body is in no sense a fall or indeed a moral choice in any sense. It is that for which alone the soul was made. It is evident also that the soul brings with it no moral character, no personal quality, from its pre-existence. Righteousness or unrighteousness, which is the only thing that God does not predetermine about the coming man, is wholly

²⁴This passage, *Tanchuma Pikkude* 3. like the one last cited, should not be used for the Talmudic period. It is not a part of the original *Tanchuma*, and is probably very late. See Buber, *Midrasch Tanchuma*, Introduction, pp. 55b, 56a.

future when the soul enters the body. It is only human life that furnishes the opportunity for such obedience to the Law as shall win the reward of Paradise. Moreover, such memory of the other world as the soul brings with it into this, is due not to its pre-existence as a soul, but to the visit it makes after union with the human seed, to the places of reward and punishment. Even this memory it loses at birth. The reluctance of the soul to leave its abode is only like the reluctance of the babe to leave the womb. It pictures the fact that man does not enter human life of his own will, but by compulsion.⁶⁵ All this is far from Hellenic; and the passage, late as it evidently is, turns out to be little more than proof of the persistence of the distinctive Jewish conception of the relation of body and soul. Man is even here first of all body, that which is "formed in the mother's womb," and the soul though it has a longer pre-existence than the body, comes into it as a stranger from without. We have here only a more pictorial representation of the familiar Jewish conception that man is in part from above, in part from below, and that he determines by his deeds to which realm of being he will finally belong. Once more I would say that while the standpoint of the morning prayer is that of *Wisdom* 8:19, that of this last passage is more nearly that of *Wisdom* 8:20, but is still better expressed by the two verses in their connection. The reading of these later Jewish sayings serves, I venture to think, to confirm our impression of the Jewish, the un-Hellenic, character of those verses, with their hesitation between the two forms of expression, the first impulse to associate the "I" with the body, the failure fully to identify it with either body or soul, the absence of any thought that the union of soul with body is unnatural. If our interpretation of these verses seemed strange and improbable when we had Plato or Philo in mind as a standard, it seems, I am sure, natural when we look back at it through the atmosphere of simple Judaism. (Of course I do not mean that the *Book of Wisdom* contains nothing but rabbinical Judaism. It is a Greek book and could not have been written in Hebrew. We cannot even assume that its author shared the rabbinical idea that the reunion of soul and

⁶⁵ Cf. *IV Koru* 11b.

body, the resurrection, is necessary to a true life of man after death. His *ψυχή* may have been a somewhat more independent and personal being than the neshamah of the rabbis, but I think not much more; and so far as pre-existence is concerned he seems to me to have had nothing but the Jewish conception, namely this: The neshamah, which God has created, remains his and in his keeping before and during and after the life of man. It is not the man's self, the person, but is an individualization and personification of that breath or spirit of God which is the life of the man, and, uniting with the earthly body, makes him a living being. The pre-existence of this neshamah was no doubt thought of as real; but since it was not the man himself, its pre-existence was of more significance for the conception of God than for that of man. It expressed the idea that God foreknows and has pre-determined the number and lot of all men; and it is substantially this same idea, and not a different one, that is expressed when it is said that God has fixed the number of men who are to be born, or that at conception or during the pre-natal period of each man's existence he creates or forms the neshamah within him.

It is not too much to say, in view of rabbinical usage, that there is a strong presumption that the pre-existence of souls when it appears in other Jewish books is to be understood in this impersonal, or only half personal, sense; that it magnifies God rather than man; that it does not carry with it, as full personal pre-existence does, a guarantee of immortality; in other words that it does not make resurrection unnecessary. It does not lie within the scope of this essay to carry such an investigation through in detail, but a few illustrations may here be added.

One of the most explicit statements is that of the *Secrets of Enoch* 23:5: "For every soul was created [Bonwetsch, *bereitet*] before the foundation of the world." But even apart from the distinction between "created" and "prepared"⁹⁶ it is probable that these are "souls" in the Jewish and not in the Greek sense. The preceding verse suggests this, and elsewhere the thought expressed is that the number and lot and place of men are fixed (49:2; 53:2; 58:5; 61:2). Moreover, the eternal life which the

⁹⁶On this see Dalman, *Die Worte Jesu*, pp. 104 ff., 245 ff.

righteous are to inherit (50:2), although it is an incorruptible form of existence (65:8-10), is not the mere continuance of the "soul" which was made from the beginning, but is the transformation of the man (body and soul) into an angel-like glory; for Enoch's transfiguration (chap. 22) is certainly typical of the resurrection of the righteous.⁹⁷

The *Apocalypse of Ezra* insists on the dogma of predetermination. The longed-for consummation can neither be hastened nor delayed. All is by measure and number (4:37; cf. *Wisdom* 11:20). The fixed number of the souls of the righteous who are waiting in their chambers (*promptuaria*) for their reward must be filled (4:35, 36). This can only describe the interval between death and the resurrection. But the following verses (40-42) seem to refer to the souls of men unborn which were committed to the earth "from the beginning," kept in chambers in sheol, and brought forth by the earth as a mother from her womb, only in a determined order, and at a fixed time. The book therefore seems to contain a doctrine of the pre-existence of souls, but that it is in the Jewish and not in the Greek sense is clear from what is said of the birth of man and of his death and of the resurrection. In 3:4, 5 (cf. 8:7-14) we find a thoroughly Jewish paraphrase of Gen. 2:7. Man is emphatically derived "from the earth." The earth is the mother, and at God's command produces man (5:48, 49, 50; 7:62, 63, 116). With increasing age her offspring are less vigorous (5:51-55). Death is described as a giving back of the soul (7:75), or in almost Hellenistic terms as a separation of the soul from the body (7:100), the corruptible vessel (7:88). But to read a Philonic type of Judaism into the book on account of these phrases, or even because of the praise of abstinence (7:125), would be a serious mistake. It is true that in this elaborate "teaching concerning death" (7:78 ff.) the soul appears to carry the personality with it to a greater degree than the rabbinical sayings lead us to expect of a Jew. Yet even here the incorporeal existence of the soul is distinctly a partial existence, an intermediate state of waiting between life in this world and life in the world to come. Like the rabbinical

⁹⁷ Compare 22: 8-10 with Paul's "not unclothed but clothed upon" II Cor. 5:1-4. See further as to the Hellenistic character of this book, *The Yezer Hara*, pp. 154-56.

interpretation of I Sam. 25:29 is the idea that the souls of the wicked wander about, while those of the righteous are kept in chambers (7:80, 85, 91, 93, 95, 101). Rest and peace in general characterize their existence in these habitations, though they may also complain of the delay of their reward (4:35, 36). They have escaped the corruptible, and they will hereafter inherit the incorruptible (7:88, 96, 97). Whether these chambers are the same that they occupied in sheol before birth (4:41, 42) would seem doubtful. At all events as they were then waiting for their real life to begin, so are they now again waiting for a new beginning. They do not indeed rise to another earthly life in the Messianic time (7:28); but after it, when God creates the new, incorruptible world, they will rise. According to 7:32 it would appear that the body from the earth or dust, and the soul from its chambers, would be reunited. If so, some such transformation of the body from a corruptible to an incorruptible nature as the *Secrets of Enoch* describes must be assumed, for the new life of the righteous in the age to come is of an angelic nature (7:96, 97, 125). As in the rabbinical view, therefore, all souls must be born before the Messianic age can come; and the souls of the righteous are kept in safety and peace in the divine treasury for the life of the world to come. Death belongs to this world and to sin, and life belongs to the coming world and to righteousness.⁸⁸ As there is no proper doctrine of the immortality of the soul but only of the keeping and waiting of the soul for resurrection, so we may safely infer that there is no true (Platonic) doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul in this book."⁸⁹

The Syriac *Apocalypse of Baruch* contains the same ideas of a determined number of souls, and a place prepared for each (23:4, 5; 48:6), of treasuries in which the souls of the dead are kept (21:23; 30:2, 3), and of resurrection as including the body from the earth (42:8; 50:2) as well as the soul from the chambers (30:1, 2), and as involving a transfiguration of the earthly and corruptible nature into a glorious form, angel-like and star-like, fitting them for the immortal world (50, 51).

⁸⁸See 3:7-8, 26; 7:21, 48; 7:11-13, 113.

⁸⁹See a further discussion of the nature of the dualism of *IV Ezra* and *Apoc. Baruch* in *The Yezer Hara*, pp. 146-54.



PRAGMATISM AND THEOLOGY

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That branch of philosophy known as the theory of knowledge is not generally conceived to be either the most humanly interesting or the most practical part. Yet to religious belief, and to the general ethical temper of individuals and of generations, it is shown by historical experience to have, after all, very close and pregnant relations. Theoretically, epistemology, since it professes to determine the criteria of truth and the scope of real knowledge and legitimate affirmation, should affect natural science as vitally as theology. But in practice it has usually not done so. Natural science has gone on its way, using the working hypotheses that it found empirically serviceable, without greatly caring about their ultimate foundations or their precise logical status and implications; and it has perhaps more often shaped the epistemological tendencies of a period than been shaped by them. But theology has been less able to be indifferent to what the epistemologists were saying. The reasons for this are various and for the most part obvious. Religion, dealing largely with supersensible realities and involving affirmations usually not susceptible of empirical testing and verification, has occupied intellectual territory requiring a title-deed of a different sort from those provisional ones that served the purposes of science adequately enough. The success of the procedure of science has itself often suggested a question as to the possibility of the acquisition of real truth in fields so remote, and by methods of mental action so different from those which characterized the scientific investigation of nature; and such doubts, once raised, made inevitable for the serious religious consciousness some attempt to find, by a more profound examination of the nature and limits of knowledge than was indispensable for science alone, a proper and defensible place for itself in the mental world. Constituting, also, a more ultimate

and decisive human reaction upon life than does scientific curiosity and inquiry, religion has naturally been brought into contact with more ultimate issues respecting the intrinsic character and the degree of actual accessibility of truth; and the craving for certitude, for a mental quietude and confidence that no imaginable doubt could shake, may be considered a peculiarly religious need. This assurance has often been sought in the way of the mystic; but mysticism itself is only a form of rather impatient epistemology.

Such being the relations of the theory of knowledge to theology, the appearance and rapid spread of a comparatively new and ostensibly revolutionary epistemological doctrine is necessarily an occurrence of moment to the theologian. Few such doctrines, certainly, have spread so rapidly or got themselves talked about so universally in so brief a time, as that known as pragmatism; and none appear to have more direct bearings upon religious issues. Unfortunately, it is more the diffusion of a name than of a theory that has to be recognized in a good deal of the current talk about the pragmatists' opinions. The term pragmatism, like "transcendentalism" before it, has far outrun any precise ideas which might be supposed to be its proper traveling companions. Even those who profess themselves pragmatists do not invariably appear to have an altogether clear apprehension of the exact meaning of their theory, or to agree with one another as to its bearing upon specific metaphysical and theological problems. In view of this prevalent confusion and uncertainty as to the import and ulterior implications of the doctrine, perhaps the most serviceable thing that can just now be done is to attempt to discriminate the several fairly distinguishable contentions—of which the most important is much more than an epistemological theory—which appear to be concealed under the one name; to set aside those that appear to be lacking in consistency with themselves or with demonstrable facts, or destitute of any important application; and only after the completion of this analysis, to seek to determine the significance and value for theology of the residuum that remains. Fortunately, the distinguished American philosopher to whom we owe both the name and the origination of the whole

movement has just published a volume¹ in which he attempts, more systematically than ever before, both to clarify and to justify the pragmatistic doctrine. Any consideration of pragmatism at the present juncture is likely to touch the point most nearly, and to serve the reader best, if it takes Professor James's book for its text.

One broad distinction, and a consequent limitation of the scope of this paper, must be made at the outset. The word pragmatism has been applied not only to quite dissimilar theories, but to theories bearing upon two entirely separate questions in epistemology. As first employed by Professor James, and as still often used by him, the term designates a doctrine about the *meaning of propositions*—about the conditions under which a proposition can be said to have real meaning, and the way in which the genuine and vital issue in the case of any controverted question, theological or other, can be made clear. As used by many others, and frequently by James, the word indicates a certain theory as to the nature of truth or the *criterion of validity* in propositions—the theory, namely, that what, in general, entitles a proposition to be regarded as true is its functional value as an instrument to the satisfaction of a vital need or to the accomplishment of indispensable activities; in other words, the theory that (I quote these phrases with their ambiguities all upon them) a proposition is true “in so far as it will work,” and that “ideas become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relations with other parts of our experience.” Now these two doctrines—the doctrine about meaning and the doctrine about truth—are not only distinct but independent. A proposition which is found to have definite meaning, according to the first sort of pragmatism, is not therefore held to be true, by the second sort of pragmatism. And it is perfectly possible to accept the first sort without being logically compelled thereby to accept the second. To all who care anything for clear thinking it must appear a misfortune that two conceptions which—though they, of course, have elements in common—are essentially different in meaning, and possibly in value, should have come to be called by the same name.

¹ *Pragmatism*, by William James, New York, 1907.

It is impossible within the limits of a single paper to discuss adequately both sorts of pragmatism in their relation to theology. Here, therefore, I shall undertake to deal only with the first sort. It is the one more strictly entitled to the name. It is in some respects more fundamental—for a theory telling us whether any given proposition has any real meaning, and what its meaning is, begins, so to say, farther back than does a theory telling us which, among the propositions that possess meaning, are true. The first kind of pragmatism, moreover—James's theory of the import of propositions—is relatively more novel, and has been a good deal less discussed. The pragmatic theory of truth—pragmatism in the second sense—so far as it relates to theology, is a variant, or a more generalized statement, of a type of doctrine tolerably familiar in the religious thought of the past century—the type which makes a thoroughgoing theoretical skepticism the preliminary to—and the justification of—the postulation of whatever propositions are held to be called for by one or another sort of “practical” consideration. For these reasons, and because, in philosophy as in other serious business, it is well to clear up one thing at a time, and to take time to try to do so thoroughly, I shall here ask the reader to consider primarily—and as exclusively as the logic of the matter itself permits—the pragmatic theory in the first of the two senses which have been indicated.

I

Pragmatism, first of all, then, is a doctrine which undertakes to provide us with a criterion by which we can judge, not what beliefs are true, but what differences between beliefs contain enough of significant meaning to be legitimate and intelligible subjects of discussion. As a theory concerning the meaning of propositions, it has no power either to sanction or to condemn any particular meaningful proposition; the function which it professes is simply to put out of court, as unfit for consideration, a large class of propositions which it declares to be really destitute of meaning. It asserts, essentially, that the import of any proposition framed by our minds consists in some reference to the future—as it is usually added, to “concrete future experience,

whether active or passive." We are characteristically temporal, active, purposing, willing creatures, with our faces toward the future; the whole significance and interest of that ever-vanishing pin-point of time which we call the present lies in its transitive character. If that present is engendered of the past, it is fed out of the future; it is in the vital sense of such transition and of purposeful control and direction of it, that we really feel our life. And our intellectual faculty of judgment, like all the rest of our organic functions, is adapted to this forward-looking process of conscious life and instrumental to it. To judge is not to mirror things as they are, but to forecast things as they are to be and to make adjustments for dealing with them. A judgment, accordingly—says the pragmatist—which contains or implies no such reference to the future has no meaning at all; and the meaning of propositions which have this reference is precisely and fully stated when you have made clear what that specific and concrete future experience is to which they point.

It was, as has been said, in this sense that the term was originally used by Professor James when he first gave it to the world as a name for a short and easy method in philosophy, in a now celebrated address delivered at Berkeley in 1898; and although he has also contributed notably to the development of the other sort of pragmatism, hereafter to be discussed, this theory about the meaning of propositions, which others of the school have a good deal neglected, may be regarded as peculiarly James's form of the doctrine. It is copiously illustrated in his newly published volume.

To obtain perfect clearness [he says, p. 46] in our thoughts of an object, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve—what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has any positive significance at all.

And the application of this criterion of meaning to a special case is exemplified by the controversy between the materialistic and the theistic conceptions of the nature and source of the world. That controversy has meaning, says Professor James, only because,

and in so far as, theism implies the expectation of future possibilities in the world different from those implied by materialism. Suppose the world to have no future; and then (p. 96),

let a theist and a materialist apply their rival explanations to its history. The theist shows how a God made it; the materialist shows, and we will suppose with equal success, how it resulted from blind physical forces. Then let the pragmatist be asked to choose between their theories. How can he apply his test if a world is already completed? Concepts for him are things to come back into experience with, things to make us look for differences. But by hypothesis there is to be no experience and no possible differences can now be looked for. . . . The pragmatist must consequently say that the two theories, in spite of their different-sounding names, mean exactly the same thing, and that the dispute is purely verbal. . . . If no future detail of experience or conduct is to be deduced from our hypothesis, the debate between materialism and theism becomes quite idle and insignificant. *Matter and God in that event mean exactly the same thing*—the power, namely, neither more nor less, that could make just this completed world—and the wise man is he who in such a case would turn his back upon such a supererogatory discussion.²

With the spirit that engendered this doctrine—and, in particular, with the temper and purpose of Professor James's latest book—it is impossible, for any save the most crabbed of scholastic metaphysicians, not to feel a great deal of sympathy. The book is a sharp and emphatic demand—enforced with wonderful humor, with an unequalled insight into human nature, and with a sense for concrete realities rare among philosophers—for a philosophy and theology that shall be in touch with the life of human beings who live in a temporal world, who hope and fear and strive and achieve. And one of the primary aims of it, though not the only one, seems to be to put an end to the waste of energy and the needless discord that results, in a world so full of real business to be done, from the jangling and (as the author considers them) the purely verbal and sterile controversies of many of the philosophical and theological schools. One could not, indeed, con-

² For the sake of accuracy of citation, it is necessary to mention that James adds in brackets at this point the following proviso: "I am supposing, of course, that the theories have been equally successful in their explanations of what is." The proviso is a rather peculiar one. It seems to mean that if the theories had *not* been equally successful in their purely retrospective explanation of the sources of the supposed moribund world, there *would* be a difference of meaning between them. And this is equivalent to admitting that the pragmatic doctrine asserted in the same paragraph is untrue. But one must, doubtless, regard this, not as a retraction, but as a momentary and unintentional lapse.

vincingly call the book an eirenicon. Professor James's usual method of peacemaking is to try to annihilate both combatants in the quarrels of which he disapproves, using his pragmatic formula as a bludgeon to that end. But this betokens at least so much of the spirit of the peacemaker as is implied by a strong dislike for the spectacle of avoidable quarrels. And it is perhaps this militant part of that spirit which, as human nature goes, is assured of the most general sympathy. But it neither befits the philosophic temper, nor is it pragmatically safe, to permit one's sympathy with the general spirit of a doctrine, or one's respect for the practical purposes of its author, to absolve one from a patient and analytical examination of its precise meaning, and of the validity of it in the specific form in which its author has expressed it. The pragmatic theory of the meaning of propositions is put forward primarily as a contribution to logic or epistemology; it implies that a correct view upon the logical question which it raises is worth having; and it purports to give a coherent and true account of a certain matter that is not intrinsically unverifiable. The coherency and truth, therefore, of that account we ought now to examine more closely. For the success of Professor James's somewhat aggressive peacemaking depends entirely upon the solidity of his weapon.

Now, in examining into the truth of the pragmatist theory, in this first of its two senses, we must first of all ask how the validity of a theory concerning the meaning of propositions is to be tested. There appears to be no imaginable way of testing it, except by ascertaining what we do in point of fact mean by our propositions—in other words, by introspection. If a certain philosopher contends that no judgment made by a human mind ever contains any meaning beyond—let us put it algebraically— x , y , z , we do well to look into our judgments; and if we find in some of them certain elements of meaning which do not seem to be quite satisfactorily described as either x or y or z , we are justified in concluding that the philosopher's contention, as a generalization, is simply not true. Now applying this kind of test to Professor James's pragmatism, it is easy to find at least two classes of propositions, either of which constitutes a negative

instance fatal to the theory as it is formulated. It is, indeed, so easy, that I find it scarcely conceivable that a great master of psychological analysis can ever have set up a general rule to which the exceptions are so obvious; and I go back and read again and again all the ways in which James states his theory, with a feeling that they must mean something other than that which they, none the less, appear explicitly and unambiguously to affirm.

In order that, in presenting our negative instances, we may avoid all difficulty over the question of idealism, let us confine ourselves, first, to one class of judgments: those, namely, concerning the real existence, *für sich*, not of things, but of persons. My belief that Professor James now consciously exists, and is probably at this moment engaged in writing about pragmatism, certainly (whether true or false) means, for me and for anyone who is unwilling to call himself a "solipsist," a good deal more than the mere expectation that I shall in the future have evidence of Professor James's existence, and shall continue to be instructed and stimulated by further profoundly interesting contributions to philosophy and psychology. The belief, for one thing, refers primarily, not to the future at all, but to something conceived as strictly contemporaneous with the moment at which the belief itself arises. And something similar is, in fact, true of all beliefs which have either a contemporaneous or a retrospective reference. The pragmatist seems to forget so commonplace a circumstance as that most of our beliefs refer to matters that have a date, and that the date is not always future. When I try to imagine what Galileo's state of mind was while he was recanting, at least the temporal part of my meaning, the "pastness" of the incident with which it is concerned, cannot be identified with any "future practical consequences in my experience" or anybody's else. Yet one cannot suppose that the pragmatists intend to deny the validity of the temporal distinction—they are the last philosophers in the world who could be expected to do so. As little do they seem actually to reject that other non-predictive element in my meaning, in the instances cited—namely, the "externality" of the mental state referred to, the fact that what my mind is trying in some degree to reproduce is the conscious state of another, numeri-

cally distinct, mind. *Some* objective practical consequences are usually (by no means invariably) implied by propositions of this sort; but they are implied only mediately or inferentially. These implied future aspects of the judgment's meaning constitute, not its essence, but only the means to its verification. The complete *verification* of most judgments about concrete matters of fact is, indeed, usually subsequent to the making of them; and beliefs about past facts which contain no incidental implications as to possible future experience are (except in one important class of cases, to be noted) not in the strictest sense verifiable at all. If somebody has a theory that Queen Elizabeth was married to Leicester, but makes it a part of the same hypothesis that all possible evidence bearing upon the point has been completely destroyed, he says what is foolish and unimportant, because by his own admission no one can ever find out whether it is true or not. But he is not saying a thing that has no distinct and intelligible meaning. To maintain, then, that a belief which is empirically unverifiable is *ipso facto* meaningless, appears not only unwarranted but absurd.

II

Our pragmatist seems, in fact, to have confused these two quite different things: the meaning or import of a judgment, and the means to its verification. Recognizing this confusion, it seems advisable—in order that we may not take advantage of a mere infelicity in the formulation of the doctrine—that we restate the theory in a corrected and more promising form. What it, so far, appears to reduce to, is the contention that propositions are *verifiable* only in so far as they imply anticipated future practical experiences. The pragmatist might offer this corrected principle as a criterion of the limits—not, indeed, of the meaningful, but of the verifiable; and, by implication, therefore, as a means of distinguishing the properly debatable from the undebatable. And in so doing the pragmatist would, if his criterion were sound, be at length doing something practically useful. He would, in effect, be setting up a sort of practical syllogism, which should have the function of regulating controversy, theological

or other, and quieting the strife of tongues. The syllogism would run:

1. It is foolish and immoral to dispute about matters the truth of which cannot be verified.

2. All dispute about propositions that do not contain the implication of specific future practical experiences resulting from their truth is dispute about matters which cannot be verified.

3. Therefore, all dispute about such propositions is foolish and immoral.

No one is likely to quarrel with the major premise. The point now at issue is whether the minor premise (2)—the revised version of the first sort of pragmatism—is admissible. In one of the later chapters (chap. vi) of Professor James's book his theory—though confused, more or less, with another quite different doctrine—seems substantially to have assumed the form of this minor premise. All verification, we are there told, in the last analysis consists in the comparison of a concrete experience with a judgment of anticipation which had preceded it and had pointed or led to it. There are, indeed, certain indirect verification-processes that appear to lack this character; but they are merely provisional substitutes for the real thing. "All roads lead to Rome, and in the end and eventually all true processes must lead to the face of directly verifying sensible experiences *somewhere*, which somebody's ideas have copied."³

Now a full discussion of this point would involve us at once in a consideration of pragmatism in its second sense as a theory of the criterion of truth. For you cannot tell what propositions are verifiable and what are not, until you know in what the verification of a proposition consists; and you cannot know this without knowing the generic nature of the mark or quality which distinguishes all "true" judgments from all false ones. Upon that larger discussion I do not now wish to enter. But one or two observations may be introduced here which will not necessarily bring up the broader epistemological problem. In the first place it should be evident that—whatever others may say—no one who admits that there are such things as "necessities of thought"—or "external

³ *Pragmatism*, p. 215.

truths," or "self-evident propositions," or "*a-priori* knowledge" —can consistently hold the view under consideration, that only empirically predictive judgments are verifiable, and that all verification consists in the comparison of an anticipation with a subsequent concrete experience. For a "necessary" truth, an axiom, is, by hypothesis, precisely the kind of thing that is automatically self-verifying. It may imply a prediction; all general propositions do so, since they profess to apply to all future, as well as past and present, cases of the kind of thing you may be talking about. But if they are really self-evident propositions their verification does not depend nor wait upon the realization of the future facts which happen to come within their scope; their truth is known, as the jargon of the logicians implies, "from beforehand." And, further, there appears no reason why there should not be truths of this character which do not point to any subsequent, concrete, sensible verification. "Eternal" truths seem likely sometimes to deal with eternal matters; or they may deal with past matters, the necessity for the reality of which is involved in the necessity of some general truth which covers them. The elaborate systems of metaphysics and rational theology built up by the whole series of post-Kantian idealists constitute affirmations which do not imply the possibility of their own verification, for our minds, by any future sensible experience. But the pragmatist (though he may dissent from their actual arguments) cannot rule these systems out of court at the outset as by their very nature unverifiable, unless he refuses to admit the existence of necessities of thought. For what each of these systems professes and (however unsuccessfully) strives to be, is a sequence of necessary and inter-connected truths which leads from some common and admitted fact of experience to the discovery of the ulterior and unescapable implications of that fact. Here again, then, the pragmatic contention can only be maintained at the cost of a further and very questionable doctrine—that of the non-existence of any *a-priori* and necessary truth. Some may be prepared to pay this cost, and with them we must deal hereafter. But many—and Professor James, in particular—are not of their number. The author of *Pragmatism* gives very full and liberal

recognition to the reality of eternal truths, which constrain the mind to assent in advance of experience and independently of any comparison of an anticipation with a subsequent sensible verification.

Our ready-made ideal framework for all sorts of possible objects follows from the very structure of our thinking. We can no more play fast and loose with these abstract relations than we can do so with our sense-experiences. They coerce us; we must treat them consistently, whether or not we like the results.

These observations appear to be true, but they do not appear to be consistent with the doctrine about the nature and limits of the verifiable which constitutes the restated form of the pragmatic theory.

It could be shown, if space permitted, that, even apart from the restricted field of necessary truths, we have ways of reaching conclusions which, though not absolutely coercive, we regard as convincing, about matters concerning which, at the moment when we make the judgment, we have no anticipation whatever of any subsequent experience, on our own part or that of any other person. But it is needless to multiply negative instances. A single class of exceptions to a generalization is as effective as a multitude in showing the generalization to be untrue. The second formulation, then, of James's sort of pragmatism seems also to break down. We can as little maintain that verifiability is limited to the reference in judgments to future sensible experience, as we can that the meaning of propositions is so limited.

III

There still, however, is left something of the original pragmatist contention; there is a residuum to which the pragmatist would cling—and to which, so far, he is entitled to cling—even after his first two more imposing affirmations have successively been abandoned. This is the assertion that, even if propositions lacking a reference to "concrete future experience" may have both meaning and verifiability, they can at all events have no importance or practical interest or religious value. It is to this and no more than this, I think, that a great part of the argument of James's book

reduces. The substance of his pragmatic doctrine is to be found in this view which defines what constitutes, not the intellectual meaning nor the logical validity, but the moral worth and human significance of propositions. It is impossible to suppose that the author of this first form of pragmatism really thinks that, if the world had no future, there would be no difference of meaning (in the popular and the logical sense of that word) between the materialistic and the theistic accounts of the world's origin and past operation—when the very sentence in which he enunciates this paradox betrays that the author himself, irrespective of any future reference, very clearly contrasts the meaning of the one account with that of the other. It is equally impossible to suppose that he fundamentally and consistently thinks that all verification depends upon the *ex post facto* comparison of a prediction with an experience predicted, when in the same discussion he sets forth, with characteristic felicity in exposition, certain modes of verification of a wholly different character. But there can be no doubt that he thinks that propositions which have no bearing either upon future experience or future conduct have no useful function in human life.⁴ What, he constantly asks, shall it profit us—creatures whose connatural business is to act and whose treasure is in that concrete future that our desires or our ideals foreshadow and our choices may help to form—what shall it profit such as we to hold beliefs which define no expectation and prescribe no action? Unless a proposition put before man's volitional nature the promise of some hope realized, the possibility of some risk to be faced, the means that may be seized upon for some desirable consummation,

⁴ This doctrine is, of course, not particularly new. I find, for example, in a forgotten German logician of the eighteenth century, whom, by coincidence, I chance to be reading just after writing this paragraph, the following distinction between "dead" and "living" knowledge: "Whenever a piece of philosophical knowledge (*eine gelehrte Erkenntnis*) is capable of putting in motion man's appetitive or volitional faculty, and actually does so, it contains grounds of action (*Bewegungsgründe*) and is *living*. Any knowledge which can, or does, have no influence upon the will, is a *dead* knowledge. . . . There are three things requisite in order that any piece of knowledge may be called living: (1) it must be perceptual [by this he means, not abstract or symbolical]; (2) it must arouse some rational feeling of satisfaction or dissatisfaction (*Vergnügen oder Missvergnügen*); (3) it must at the same time rationally represent this satisfaction as not only future, but also as capable of being furthered or hindered by our own powers" (Meier, *Vernunftlehre*, 1752, §§ 263, 266). Meier goes on to reason that only "living" knowledge is truly important. This comes near to making a pragmatist of the logician whose book (from which the quotation comes) was used by Kant as the textbook for his university classes.

what does it humanly signify whether the proposition be affirmed or rejected?

It is really upon such considerations as these, I think, that James chiefly relies, when he tries to justify even his technically logical theory; it is, in the last analysis, by means of this practical test that he seeks to distinguish the legitimate from the illegitimate subject of controversy in theology or elsewhere. Thus the issue between a spiritualistic or theistic, and a materialistic, conception of the world, *may* be of great importance, a question upon which we have every reason for employing the best energies of our minds. But it is so only if you mean by theism a belief which justifies you in hopes and expectancies to which the other view gives no sanction.

Give us a matter that promises *success*, that is bound by its laws to lead our world ever nearer to perfection, and any rational man will worship that matter as readily as Mr. Spencer worships his own unknowable power. . . . Doing all that a God can do, it is equivalent to God, its function is a God's function, and in a world in which a God would be superfluous; from such a world a God could never be lawfully missed.

This, it will be noted, is very far from saying that the idea of self-evolving matter and the idea of divine personal agency are—even in their past relations—ideas of identical logical import; it implies, in fact, quite the contrary. It says merely that, if the materialistic and theistic hypotheses pointed to identical and equally valuable cosmic futures we should have no serious motive for caring to know which is the true hypothesis. But since, in reality, "materialism means the denial that the moral order is eternal, and the cutting off of ultimate hopes," while "spiritualism means the affirmation of an eternal moral order and the letting loose of hope," our moral interests and the sanction of our forward-looking emotions are at stake in the matter; and it is for that reason that "we have here a genuine issue, which as long as men are men will yield matter for serious philosophic debate."

In its "pragmatic" residuum, then, the first sort of pragmatistic doctrine must be regarded as essentially a practical and ethical attitude; James's attempt to convert it into an epistemological theory is an untenable and a superfluous exaggeration. He has

apparently been led by enthusiasm, and by an instinct for the effective and emphatic way of putting things, to translate a strong conviction concerning the relative importance of propositions into a logical doctrine concerning the import of propositions. The value of this third transformation of pragmatism we have now to consider. We shall find it open to a very different sort of objection from those which it was necessary to urge against the preceding two.

It must be borne in mind that we are not now concerned with the analysis of the meaning of a proposition nor with the verification of the assertion contained in it; we are now interested in its functional value, *its relation to the future in any way*. In order, therefore, to come up to the requirements of our present pragmatist formula, a proposition need not be expressly predictive; its reference to the future need not be a verbal or even a logical part of its own content. So long as it actually bears upon, affects, or predetermines the future, and can be apprehended by us in advance as capable of doing so, it must escape the pragmatist's condemnation. In his original statement,⁵ even of his doctrine about meaning, James explicitly made his pragmatic criterion take in every kind of future consequences of a proposition's being true—"active or passive, direct or indirect, express or implied;" and certainly, when the criterion drops its masquerade as a logical theory, and presents itself now purely as a means of discriminating practically significant from practically trivial differences of opinion, it must necessarily be taken with this latitude of meaning. Any judgment, then, which by being true, and known as true, entails

⁵ There is, however, in James's recent book a radical ambiguity in the statement of the pragmatic criterion. The "future consequences in experience of the proposition's being true," in which the meaning or the importance of any proposition is declared to consist, may either (a) include only the future experiences which the proposition predicts as about to occur, no matter whether it is believed or not; or (b) it may also include the future experiences which will follow if the proposition is believed. James applies the formula sometimes in one sense, sometimes in the other, and his results vary accordingly. When he takes the formula in sense (a), it tends to exclude a variety of beliefs—or all except certainly restricted elements in those beliefs—from consideration, as meaningless or unimportant. It is, for example, applied in this sense in the passage cited, referring to the issue between materialism and spiritualism. More usually, the criterion is applied in sense (b); and then it appears able to exclude no belief that anyone really cares about. It does not, for example, permit the relegation of either the Vedantist, or the modern idealistic monism to the limbo of non-significant issues. Neither doctrine is in any concrete way predictive; but, as James recognizes, the holding of either makes a difference in the life of the believer; and both, therefore, are acknowledged to have pragmatic value.

future consequences in any way different from those which would follow upon its falsity, is as "pragmatic" as need be, and fully meets all the demands that our pragmatist can ever make of any judgment.

This being recognized, I do not see how anyone can question the entire truth of the formula. A belief which turned an absolutely blind eye, a dead face, to the future in which alone value still remains possible for us, would be a thing itself utterly and inexpressibly valueless and unimportant. But just the obviousness of this fact suggests to us the question which may still be asked about the present pragmatic principle—one concerning, not at all its truth, but its applicability. Doubtless, no beliefs that neither enable us to prognosticate any future experience nor prescribe any future behavior, can be useful or interesting or morally or religiously serviceable. *But are there any such beliefs?* Do judgments of this sort exist in nature? Assuredly, we must answer, they must be few in number and of a wholly peculiar character. *For any belief which I am supposed to be capable of carrying with me into the future, ipso facto constitutes an item of my future experience; it will in that future engender its own concomitant states of thought and feeling and call for its appropriate reactions, and it will therefore have importance and efficacy corresponding to the degree of interest and of influence which there attaches to it*—no belief, while held, being wholly destitute of such interest and influence. This is the consideration which compels me unwillingly to conclude that the pragmatic enterprise of ruling out a whole class of propositions in advance, on the ground of their non-functional character, is a completely hopeless, or rather a completely redundant undertaking.

That this is no verbal and sterile quibble may be seen by reverting to Professor James's own chosen illustration and using that once more as a test case. Suppose that a theistic and a materialistic account of the source and essential nature of the world both implied in all other respects exactly the same futures; suppose, for example, that we *could* put a thoroughly optimistic construction upon materialism, and infer from it the "success" of all our highest ideals of social good or of individual perfection.

There would still inevitably remain one difference between the two views, arising precisely from the fact that they are two views and not one. If the theistic view be true, and accepted as true, then our future will contain an additional item of fact; our sensible experiences, even though no other than those which the materialistic theory might have led us to expect, will be construed by us as the expression of a personal consciousness behind them; and this will give to them a re-interpretation, and will awaken in us a sense of communion, which may very well come to seem the most significant element in our whole universe of discourse. A future world with a God in it will, both for our intellectual modes of representation and for our feeling, be incommensurably different from a world with no God in it, even though all the choir of heaven and furniture of earth be the same in the latter as in the former world. From no standpoint save that of a shop-keeping sort of utilitarianism—which is the last attitude that anyone could regard as characteristic of the originator of the pragmatist movement—can it be maintained that my experience, when I have a set of physical sensations which I ascribe to the working of unconscious automata, is “equivalent” to my experience when, having the same sensations, I ascribe them to the agency and purpose of conscious, feeling, loving, or hating minds analogous to my own. And between a theistic and a non-theistic way of construing the facts of experience—even the facts up to date—there is, at least for a large class of minds, a far more pregnant difference. There is an eloquent and familiar passage in Romanes’s early writing, *A Candid Examination of Theism*, in which he gives expression to his sense of all that he had lost out of the universe through that abandonment of theistic faith to which he found himself constrained; and it was as much in the vanishing of a spiritual presence from Nature, as in the quenching of hopes of personal immortality or cosmic “success,” that the tragedy of his intellectual illumination seemed to him to consist. Throughout the reflective poetry of the nineteenth century there sounds an often recurrent cry of protest or of lamentation before the seemingly irresistible march of a purely mechanistic conception of the world; and the expected consequence of that threatened triumph which

these poets have bemoaned has been, not usually the darkening of the hopes of the future, but the disenchantment of the present, through the baffling of man's imaginative craving for meaning, purpose, fellowship, and kinship in the outer world of physical phenomena. Better—the modern poet has sometimes cried, reversing the argument of Lucretius—the somewhat disorderly and capricious, but responsive and essentially personal Nature of paganism, than a cosmos never so neat and regular in its behavior, but empty of any consciousness either of our existence or of its own.

We yearn for fellowship with lake and mountain;
Our conscious souls seek conscious sympathy—
Nymphs in the forest, naiads in the fountain,
Gods on the craggy height and roaring sea.

We find but soulless sequences of matter,
Fact linked to fact by adamantine rods;
Eternal bonds of former sense and latter;
Dead laws for living gods.⁶

It is from entirely the same point of view that the melancholy preacher in James Thomson's *City of Dreadful Night* brings to his pessimistic and despairing congregation, as the first and deepest consolation remaining to them, an assurance that the evil universe in which they suffer has at least no purpose nor personality behind it. "The facts of experience"—this is the burden of his message—"are as bad as you think them; but it is not necessary to make that evil intolerable by conceiving it as the expression of a conscious will."

There is no God: no fiend with names divine
Made us and tortures us; if we must pine,
It is to satiate no Being's gall.

In neither of these cases does the idea of a divine presence imply any change in the facts external to itself; yet both to the poet who finds those facts in themselves beautiful and to the poet who finds them monstrous, that idea is what, by his personal rejection of it, chiefly gives the coloring to his total experience and determines his emotional reaction upon life. The belief in God thus,

⁶Grant Allen: "Magdalen Chapel," in *The Lower Slopes*.

even where it predicts no future experiences that might not have equally been predicted by the negative of that belief, still predetermines a difference in experience. It is the difference in the belief that *makes* the experience different.

The question of theism, considered apart from its prophetic implications, is doubtless the most important example of the existence of real issues which turn upon propositions that have of themselves neither a predictive nor a prescriptive reference to the future. But it is not a unique example. Any non-predictive proposition whatever will possess, in greater or less degree, the same kind of *pregnancy* of future differences in experience, if any strong feeling or any lively need of the human imagination chance to be implicated in it. Logically speaking, the difference between a proposition's truth or falsity is always, in this sense, a pregnant one, since, once more, the experience even of the vaguest and mildest affirmation of the proposition is bound to be different from the experience of its negation. The presence of the associated emotions or special interests determines only the degree of the difference, not its existence. When we look about us, or turn the pages of history, we find scarcely any limit to the number and variety of the affirmations which different minds have been desirous of carrying along into the future with them, though none of the other elements entering into that future were thereby deducible. Occasionally we find men caring in this way about purely past matters of fact—for example, the aristocratic origin of their own family, or the saintliness of the character of Jeanne D'Arc, the historicity of Moses, or the reality of the miraculous conception. In some of these cases such purely historical beliefs appear significant merely because they are supposed to be inextricably involved in some complex body of truths that has a predictive side to it. But examples are not wanting of retrospective judgments that have of their own force taken a singular hold upon the imaginations of great masses of men. More usually, however, the pregnant sort of non-predictive belief relates to some permanent or non-temporal element or aspect of the world, that does not manifest itself in any specific, efficacious relation to the other phenomena of experience. Of these purely descriptive or

interpretative beliefs, the provinces of metaphysics and religion afford an inexhaustible supply of illustrations. Many persons, for example—as Professor James has himself remarked, in a passage that is an admirable example of sympathetic humor—find great inward satisfaction, and even a very practical sort of relief from unhealthy mental perturbation and restlessness, in simply being able to apply the numerical adjective “one” to the world with considerable frequency. It is not any particular or working kind of oneness that they care about; the vaguer it be, the better it is able to arouse those subtle reactions that seem to be especially associated with the idea of unity. Others, again, are analogously affected by the number three—for there is a trinitarianism that is much wider than orthodox Christianity—and are strongly sensible of the need of representing the general nature of things under the form of a triad. Perhaps the great majority of mankind find some sense of an ultimate mystery and ineffableness in things almost indispensable, and therefore resent any doctrine which conceives the universe as nothing more than a neat system of regularly moving atoms, completely calculable by a sufficiently good mathematician. It is for this reason that Mr. Spencer and those of like mind cling to their “unknowable power,” and are not content with even the most serviceable and “successful” matter.

Now, we are, of course, accustomed to recognize that not all of these “needs” are equally legitimate and serious; and it is generally agreed that the question of truth or falsity is more urgent and more important in the case of some of these non-predictive but pregnant beliefs than in the case of others. It is, indeed, questionable whether any belief that a considerable part of mankind have cared about is unimportant, if true. We should be somewhat shy of any doctrine which proposes to deny to even the most outlaw sort of belief its day in court—its opportunity to be tested by the two ultimate questions: First, does the proposition expressing it have any definite, intelligible and consistent, *logical* meaning? Second, is it in any way verifiably true? Still, it would doubtless be an advantage to have some canon whereby we could arrange these purely descriptive and interpretative judg-

ments according to their relative seriousness and significance, in advance of any consideration of the evidence for their truth. It should, however, by this time be entirely clear that pragmatism, even in its amended form, is incapable of providing us with such a canon. It has no facilities for either excluding from consideration, or even for subordinating, any proposition. Every affirmation that is not pure nonsense is either true or false. If true, and if its truth be verifiable, the acceptance of it will be a fact which alters the future of somebody. Thus every belief that actually waits at the gates of anyone's mind wears at least some shreds of the pragmatic wedding garment. A doctrine which confines itself to the distinction between propositions that have, and those that have not, future consequences, can furnish no criterion for distinguishing, *within the limits of the former class*, the important from the unimportant. And virtually all propositions, we have seen, fall within those limits. The pragmatic principle itself, indeed, comes very near to being an exception. But it is not really one. It cannot, it is true, perform its chosen rôle of extinguisher of controversy. But (in the diminished sense to which we have now seen it reduce itself) it is undoubtedly true; and it expresses a certain descriptive generalization about a common characteristic of our judgments, that may conceivably awaken some obscure emotional reverberations in some minds.

IV

Our results thus far appear to be chiefly negative. But after this clearing of the much-incumbered ground, it is possible to discover the more clearly in the philosophy of James an insight more profound and much less questionable than any of these variations of pragmatism. It is not properly an epistemological insight at all, but a directly metaphysical one; and it is not reducible to any of the pragmatist formulas. But it springs, none the less, I think, from the same root as they, and is the substance of a *idea* of which they are vague adumbrations. Those who have followed Professor James's writings from the beginning must have long since seen what aspect of human experience, what sort of *moment* in life, has presented itself to him always as the central

and illuminating fact, the fixed datum to which any philosophy that could be considered sound must be required to do justice, the point at which we have most reason to suppose that the inner and ineffable nature of reality is directly revealed to us. This is the moment of voluntary choice—the moment in which, in the presence of alternative real possibilities, and with the consciousness that some actual content of the future now truly hangs trembling in the balances of volition, the mind somehow reaches its fiat, and, by the “dumb turning of the will,” performs the daily miracle of excluding one of those real possibilities thereafter and eternally *from* reality. And it is to this sort of experience as a touchstone that James comes back in his latest book, when he attempts finally to settle what he himself declares to be the gravest and most momentous of philosophical issues—the issue, in general, between monism and pluralism. He is, confessedly, not in the least helped to his own settlement of this issue by his pragmatic criterion, in the first sense; for both of the opposing views are recognized as having pragmatic meaning and potential value in experience. Nor is it upon any merely general application of pragmatism in the second sense—of the conception of the true as simply the morally or practically serviceable—that he bases the main outcome of his reflection. It is rather upon a more original and an entirely specific principle (which has this in common with the first sort of pragmatism, that it, too, is the expression of a sense of the necessity of maintaining the vital significance of the relation of present action to future experience) that James rests his characteristic metaphysical doctrine. This principle may be expressed thus: no proposition is to be accepted as legitimate which, directly or by implication, *denies to the future the genuine character of futurity and contradicts the reality of open possibilities* at any present moment of conscious choice between alternatives. It appears to be a reasonable, a natural, and even a necessary, presupposition of all action and of all reflection, that future time is future; that in the act of choice something is chosen; that in the process of deliberation there is a process and there is something determined thereby; that possibilities, before decision, have just that kind of reality which it is, *at the moment of deci-*

*sion, impossible to think of them as not having; and that at the moment after decision one bit of this kind of reality is extinguished forever. This is for James, at the least of it, a hypothesis which has the right of way in philosophy, and one which no conflicting doctrine can show to be illogical or untrue. "Our acts, our turning-places, where we seem to ourselves to make ourselves and to grow, are the parts of the world to which we are closest, the parts of which our knowledge is most intimate and complete. Why may they not be the actual turning-places and growing-places which they seem to be, of the world—why not the workshop of being, where we catch fact in the making, so that nowhere may the world grow in any other kind of way than this?"*⁷

This presupposition is, indeed, so natural to every man, that it may seem to many a mere commonplace. But the implications of it, for philosophy and theology, are, on the contrary, revolutionary. In particular, it leads to the rejection of a mode of religious thought that has influenced many minds—and minds of a high order—in our time. This is the doctrine—which has received its most systematic and persuasive presentation at the hands of Professor Royce, but is to be found also in many other and less coherent forms—that all which enters, or has entered, or shall enter, into the experience of any conscious life is eternally embraced in one Absolute Experience. This all-including Divine Life, we are told for our comfort, is itself, in its timeless existence, eternally triumphant; the world that is, is the world that the Absolute wills and finds very good; even our suffering and sin and shame are, every single jot of them, indispensable elements in the bliss and glory of the Universal Self who alone sees and understands the whole. This doctrine is, by its philosophical defenders, declared to express only what is necessarily implied by the very conception of the existence of such a thing as truth; its technical basis, in other words, is epistemological,⁸ and the rejection of it involves the denial of the soundness of its epistemological premises. But apart from all purely dialectical considerations, it

⁷ *Pragmatism*, p. 287.

⁸ One form of a kindred epistemological argument for a supratemporal and eternally perfect Self, manifesting itself in the temporal experiences of humanity, is familiar in the writings of Thomas Hill Green.

has seemed to many to possess profound religious value. Thus an anonymous correspondent, whom James quotes, finds that the thought of the limitations, failures, and sufferings of himself and others becomes endurable "only on one condition; namely, that through the construction, in imagination and by reasoning, of a rational unity of all things, I can conceive of my acts and my thoughts and my troubles as supplemented [not merely to be supplemented] by all the other phenomena of the world, and as forming—when thus supplemented—a scheme which I can adopt and approve as my own." Such a conception of all evil as completely taken up into, and required by, the total plan of things—and of this total plan as eternally willed and approved by a timeless Consciousness that knows and possesses all the content of it from the beginning—may be said, indeed, to be necessarily involved in any thoroughly optimistic view of the world. Whoever says that the universe of our experience is through and through, and in all its items, rational, the expression of a single Reason and a single Will—whoever intends to maintain literally that because God's in his Heaven, *all's* well with the world—implies some such doctrine as this to which the philosophers of idealistic monism have given systematic and logical expression.

Now, Professor James's aversion to this type of theology is not, apparently, due solely to the fact that such a doctrine conflicts with the fundamental presupposition of which I have spoken. There is another characteristic conviction of his—also appearing in some of his earliest papers—which, if it does not serve of itself to confute the monistic theology, at least establishes, on both ethical and logical grounds, a serious presumption against it. This is the conviction that the rather prevalent fashion of intellectually playing fast and loose with evil—of calling in the religious consciousness to bless what the moral consciousness has pronounced accursed—is not, in the long run, compatible with either logical or moral integrity. Especially since the time of Hegel, and partly as a result of the diffusion of Hegelian ideas, this sort of bookkeeping by double entry has become exceedingly common, even among those having little acquaintance with philosophical systems; the very essence of religion has seemed to some to con-

sist in the affirmation that there is a higher point of view, a superior plane of insight, at which the stubborn differences of things—and, among others, the difference between the good and the bad—disappear in a transcendent synthesis where all is unity and all is good. Of this tendency Professor James has been the lifelong opponent; he has stood stoutly as the defender of what he has called “the chastity of the intellect,” insisting that differences do not disappear by being ignored, and that, in particular, evil is neither annulled nor absolutely compensated by being—as it happily may be—passed beyond or even utilized to further future good. The point has been well expressed by a sane and admirable humanist of our time, who makes small pretensions to technical philosophy:

Evil comes from the gods, no doubt; but so do all things; and to extract good from it—the great Prometheus-feat of man—is not to evil’s credit, but to the credit of good. The contrary doctrine is a poison to the spirit, though a poison of medicinal use in moments of anguish, a bromide or an opiate.*

To a mind thus deeply impressed with the necessity of keeping distinct things distinct, and above all of honestly facing the irresolvable evilness of evil, and loyally maintaining the rigorous dualism of the moral judgment—the monistic system must inevitably appear suspect. For in that system the point of view represented as highest—the point of view of the Absolute Consciousness—transcends and confounds the ethical distinction. The sinner, if he be also a monist clear-headed enough to see the implications of his own metaphysical belief, may always have the consolation of considering that he in his sin, no less than the saint in his virtue, is contributing an indispensable ingredient in that strange compound of Being which his God has from all eternity willed and in which is his everlasting delight.

But the ultimate ground of objection to the monistic theology now, I think, for the philosopher of pragmatism, in the fact that

if it be construed literally—it takes away from our “present” moments of action that character of real, determinative responsibility, and from the future that character of possessing real and

* Vernon Lee in *Hortus Vitae*, 1907.

undetermined possibilities, the presupposition of which is inexpressibly implicit in the act of conscious and purposive volition. "The essential contrast," he writes, "between pragmatism and rationalism [really between the opposing metaphysical conceptions of pluralism and monism] is that for rationalism reality is ready-made and complete from all eternity, while for pragmatism it is still in the making, and awaits part of its complexion from the future." According to the latter view, in our cognitive as well as our active life we are creative. "We *add*, both to the subject and to the predicate part of reality. The world stands really malleable, waiting to receive its final touches at our hands. Like the kingdom of heaven, it suffers violence willingly. Man *engenders* truths upon it."¹⁰

The conception of the universe which is implied by this doctrine is radically new in at least this sense, that it has rarely been taken seriously and whole-heartedly by either theology or the general religious consciousness. It runs counter to what is perhaps the strongest and most characteristic religious tendency of the present generation—the craving for the consolations and the mystical intoxications of thoroughgoing monism and unqualified optimism. It is, for example, essentially uncongenial to what appears to be the metaphysical side of that somewhat confused medley of conceptions now exercising the minds of the English churches under the name of the New Theology. And it is almost as little in harmony with what may be considered the dominant (though far from the unique) strain in the greater part of the theological thought of the past. For (as a paper in this *Journal* by the present writer sought to show several years ago¹¹) theology has rarely taken the reality of the time-process, of the temporal aspect of human experience, seriously; it has always been in haste to fix itself upon the eternities. But the doctrine of the pragmatistic philosopher takes the time-process so seriously as to imply that all the reality of which we have any possible knowledge is strictly temporal and

¹⁰ *Pragmatism*. pp. 257, 256.—The philosophical reader will observe that this doctrine, though not really based upon the pragmatist epistemology as formulated by James, does undoubtedly imply a reconstruction of certain parts of epistemology. That, however, is a matter lying beyond the scope of this paper.

¹¹ Vol. VI, 3, 1902, p. 439.

processive in character. Religious emotion, too, in the past (even when most conjoined with the ethical temper) has often been prone to seek the opiate of an eventual optimism, to demand a final assurance against all real loss, to cultivate the confidence that all things (even their own sins) work together for good to them that love God. The doctrine of the pragmatist, if it has its encouraging and its bracing aspect, has also its drastic aspect; and it is unable to give any such assurance. There are, in its universe, indefensible evils and uncompensated losses. Our business with these is not to harmonize them, or even to explain how they came to be there; our business is to get rid of them, and devote our powers to eliminating them from the world that is to be. And even in that future we may expect obstacles and we must face risks. The salvation of the world, says James, is no absolutely predictable certainty. So far as we have knowledge, it appears to be a world "the perfection of which is potential merely, the condition being that each several agent does its own 'level best.' . . . The world's safety is unwarranted. It is a real adventure, with real danger, yet it may win through. It is a social scheme of co-operative work genuinely to be done."

Such a doctrine, while it rejects the arguments for theism offered by the monistic philosophy, finds the theistic faith a reasonable and a needful postulate. It has a natural affinity for the belief in a power not ourselves that makes for righteousness, and from whose abounding supplies we may, in the ways known to religious experience, draw reinforcement of our own spiritual energies. It is, perhaps, in this hidden and mysterious source of moral power empirically known in the inner life of men, that James himself is chiefly interested. But from his general doctrine there follow certain consequences in regard to the conception of God, in so far as that relates, not only to a power that functions in our experience, but also to a being of whom we may have some sort of intellectual representation. Such a philosophy as that of the pragmatist sees no reason for belief in the reality of an idle perfection, however sublime, having no real contact with the mud and dust of things, no truly militant part and no vital stake in the battle which for us is often so full of hazard and of desperate seriousness. Its God

must be a God having an existence in the temporal world which alone is real to us, and therefore one having his own perfection of being and his own triumph still to achieve—with us, and through our loyalty in that vast, co-operative work in which we have every reason to think that the universe consists.

It must suffice for the present to have recapitulated this conception, and to have disengaged it from the ambiguous and unconvincing epistemological theories with which it has needlessly been involved. The conception, it is fairly manifest, is still far from being fully worked out; and it suggests some serious questions which it does not answer. It is doubtless something less than the whole truth of the rational theology of the future. But it contains, I think, truth to which the theology of the future will find it necessary to give a place among the fundamentals. The greater number of the theologians and the philosophers of the past have sought the solution of their problems by taking the considerations that lead to the monistic type of thought as their starting-point. By this time, any who will consent to think clearly may, as it seems to me, see that the result of these efforts is, and must be, a doctrine struck through with inevitable self-contradiction, on its logical side, and, on its ethical side, tending to the eventual divorce of the religious from the moral consciousness. In this situation, it is from the way of thinking that has as yet scarcely ever been fairly tried, that we have most reason to expect light.

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

THE DICTIONARY OF CHRIST AND THE GOSPELS

It is not surprising that in this overburdened age of ours the busy worker should seek after his knowledge rather in the tightly packed columns of dictionaries and encyclopaedias than in the more spacious fields of independent discussions. And if the demand is inevitable we cannot imagine how it could be more adequately met than by the untiring labors of Dr. Hastings and his coadjutors.¹ "This is, first of all, a preacher's Dictionary." So the Preface describes it. But that does not mean that it is chiefly a storehouse of homiletic material. The articles aim at a thoroughly scientific treatment of their subjects. But a number of topics are introduced as being of living interest to practical theologians, which would not appear in the ordinary Dictionary of the Bible. As examples we may name the articles, "Authority of Christ," "Back to Christ," "Criticism," "Fact and Theory," "Historical."

Certain obvious criticisms are involved in the very scheme of an undertaking like this. "It includes everything that the Gospels contain. . . . It seeks to cover all that relates to Christ throughout the Bible and in the life and literature of the world" (p. v). Not to speak of the common ground covered by this Dictionary and the *Dictionary of the Bible* which preceded it, there is bound to be an immense amount of overlapping. In a good many instances, as it seems to us, that might have been avoided. Why have independent articles on "Communion" and "Fellowship," or "Boyhood" and "Boyhood of Jesus," on "Leading Ideas" (in general), embracing such themes as the Kingdom, the Great Example, the Fatherhood of God, the Son, etc., when each of these themes is treated separately and at length? The article, "Appreciation of Christ," covers practically the same ground as that on "Influence." "Circumstantiality in the Parables" might surely be included in "Parables." And if the scheme is so large as to embrace such topics as "Christ and Evolution," the world itself could not contain the volumes which might be produced. There is often a curious disproportion of scope in the case of some articles. No doubt this is due to their respective writers. Thus, "Kingdom of God" is treated in six columns,

¹ *A Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*. By James Hastings, D.D. Vol. I, *Aaron-Knowledge*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: Scribners, 1907. xii + 936 pages. \$6. Sold only by subscription.

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while "Caesarea Philippi" occupies nine. "Immanence" occupies three columns, while "Amen" covers four. The same restriction of space is found in the very important subjects, "Fatherhood," "Eternity," "Disease," "Dispersion."

The level attained by the Dictionary as a whole is very high. Hastings has shown his practiced skill in bringing writer and subject together. The general standpoint of the work is very much the same as that of the *Dictionary of the Bible*. Only in isolated instances does one come across positions so divergent from one another as those of Mr. Morgan (article, "Back to Christ"), and Dr. C. W. Hodge ("Fact and Theory").

An excellent test of a work like this is the quality of the shorter articles. None of these surpass Professor B. W. Bacon's treatment of the phrase, "Alpha and Omega," and of the enigmatic "Aristion." Under the former heading he adduces a number of remarkable Hellenic and Rabbinic parallels, and luminously indicates the important theological bearing of the expression. Under the latter the complicated evidence is discussed with scientific insight, and the conclusions drawn seem to us unassailable. The same combination of compact treatment with scholarly accuracy may be found in the articles, "Blessing," "Hallel," and "Hymn," by Rev. G. H. Box. An immense amount of careful knowledge, the result of first-hand study of the sources, is presented with the least possible ostentation. Mr. W. E. Oesterley contributes very valuable discussions of "Blood" and "Demon, Demonic." The admirable bibliography under "Demon" would itself give distinction to the article. But the treatment is equally thorough. The beliefs of the Old Testament, later Judaism, and the Gospels are dealt with in succession. Mr. Oesterley contrasts the Talmudic idea of demoniacal action, as external to its victims with the Gospel accounts (p. 440, note), but at a later point calls attention to the strong differentiation of the demon from the person possessed, as in Luke 6:18. "Very few" he remarks, "could be found nowadays who would claim to point to any instance in their experience of the existence of demoniacal possession." Some of the most intelligent and unprejudiced missionaries of the East can vouch for phenomena of this order which, at least, call for careful examination. Other excellent short articles, to select from a long list, are those of Professor R. Mackintosh on "Fulfillment" and "Historical." In view of many current discussions (notably, of the Gospels), nothing could be more apt than the statement that "the attempt to make history a special science, too coy or too scientific to deal with a (possibly real) supernatural, is hopelessly artificial. Scientific history must deal with all the demonstrable, nay, with all the probable, events of the real past" (p. 727).

We can refer only to a very few of the many masterly longer articles to be found in this volume. To take the more historical first, special mention ought to be made of "Apocalyptic Literature" by Professor Zenos, and "Apocryphal Gospels" by Rev. A. F. Findlay. Professor Zenos gives a brief but adequate account of the various Apocalypses, and then discusses their general characteristics, theological ideas, and points of contact with the New Testament precisely on the scale required by the readers of a dictionary. Perhaps nowhere else could a more convenient summary of the facts be found. Mr. Findlay has shown admirable judgment in his treatment of the apocryphal gospels. The subject lies so far away from the beaten track that it is difficult to condense, without reducing the discussion to a mere catalogue of dry details. But the writer's scholarly instinct has wisely guided him as to the placing of emphasis. This, together with a very skilful classification of the material, makes the article one of the most instructive in the volume.

Perhaps the ablest articles in the Dictionary are those on the "Authority of Christ" (pp. 146-53) and the "Holy Spirit" (pp. 731-45) by Dr. Denney, and that on the "Incarnation" (pp. 796-813) by Dr. Kilpatrick. The first-named discussion abounds in those flashes of unerring insight which distinguish Dr. Denney as an interpreter of New Testament thought and life. What pages of futile argumentation would be saved, for example, as regards the Sermon on the Mount, if the true criterion of Jesus' requirements were kept in view.

His precepts are legal in form, but he came to abolish legalism and therefore they were never meant to be literally read. . . . What the precepts of non-resistance and non-retaliation mean is that under no circumstances, under no provocation, must the disciple of Jesus allow his conduct to be determined by any other motive than that of love (pp. 147, 148).

Such a position seems to us final. Equally convincing is the writer's attitude toward the authority of Jesus in matters of current knowledge, a theme which has aroused such keen and often such irrational controversy, in recent years.

The truth which we owe to Jesus, and for which he is our authority, is not information; it is not a contribution to science, physical or historical—for this we are cast by God on our own resources; it is the truth which is identical with his own being and life in the world, which is embodied or incarnate in him (p. 149).

This is, of course, a familiar idea, but it could scarcely be better expressed. Of quite unique importance is the article on the "Holy Spirit." Perhaps nothing more genuinely illuminating has been written on this complex

subject, except Dr. Denney's own study of the New Life and the Spirit in his articles on the "Theology of the Epistle to the Romans" (*Expositor*, Vol. VI, 4, pp. 422 ff.). He would confer an inestimable boon on scientific theology by elaborating his ideas in a work on the New Testament conception of the Spirit. In the present instance he deals with the conception in the earliest Evangelic tradition, Acts, the Pauline Epistles, and (very fully) the Johannine literature. It is only intended to be an outline, but every paragraph is rich in suggestion. For example, the student of the Synoptic Gospels must often be struck by the paucity of references in these books to the Spirit. What is the explanation? Surely Dr. Denney is right in saying that it takes nothing less than the life of Jesus himself "to show us what the Spirit means. If the last Evangelist tells us that the Spirit interprets Jesus, the inference from the first is that Jesus also interprets the Spirit and that only through him can we know what it means" (p. 734). We are glad to observe that he lends the weight of his authority to the true interpretation of the "tongues" at Pentecost as determined by I Cor., chap. 14. And he brushes aside a good deal of devout nonsense by reminding us that in the New Testament "the Spirit and faith are correlative terms. . . . Each of them covers, from a different point of view [i. e., from God's side and from man's respectively], all that is meant by Christianity" (p. 738). The list of literature is meager.

We wish we had space to do justice to Dr. Kilpatrick's masterly treatment of the "Incarnation." His classification of his material is a model of lucidity and insight. The idea of union with God is the key to the conception. He traces this idea through Greek philosophy and the religion of Israel until the appearance of Christ announces it as a fact. Among much that is of exceptional value in the discussion we may refer specially to his conclusions as to Christology proper.

If Christology is supposed to be an intellectual process, governed by forms of discursive thought, and issuing in propositions for which is claimed the cogency of a logical demonstration, it stands condemned as being out of all relation to Christian experience. But this personal experience is knowledge of Christ (p. 810).

It was in this field that the church of the fourth century took precarious ground.

The danger lay in supposing that . . . the category of substance is adequate to express the infinite wealth of the Divine Personality, or, worse still, in directing men's minds to conceive of God as substance rather than as Personality (p. 811).

Thus the standpoint is given from which a really fruitful reconstruction of Christological doctrine may be expected.

Dr. Hastings and his collaborators may justly be congratulated on the production of this most valuable work, whose external equipment, it ought to be said, is thoroughly worthy of the importance of its contents.

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TWO UNUSUAL APOLOGIES FOR CHRISTIANITY

Of Dr. Abbott's two recent books,² the second is, in the main, simply an explanation and defense of the first, as its title announces, and it seems best to treat them both in one review.

Stanzas for Christians is a novel, in which the author, as he assures us in the *Apology*, is not attempting to write an accurate antiquarian romance but to grapple earnestly and honestly with the most formidable difficulties that beset Christian belief in the twentieth century, and to show how much a twentieth-century man may necessarily doubt or even utterly disbelieve, and yet be drawn, with St. Paul, to the foot of the Cross, by the "convincing love of Christ."

This clear statement of the author's purpose relieves the critic from the necessity of treating separately what might, without it, seem to be grave anachronisms, as when Dr. Abbott attributes to his characters, who are supposed to have lived in the early part of the second century, some of the most important conceptions concerning the text and interpretation of passages in the New Testament, and permits Clement, a Christian from Achaia, to quote a verse of one of Cowper's hymns as written by "one of our poets." This is done so frankly that any criticism of it must judge it by the standards of literary taste, not of historical accuracy. It may not be legitimate to attribute to people who lived in Nineteenth-century England the intellectual and theological difficulties which perplex us today, and the selfish solutions of them which our learned author develops. When, however, he suggests that Epictetus was influenced by the epistles of Paul, and perhaps also by the Gospel of Mark, and, on the other hand, that "John alludes in parts of his gospel to the teaching of Epictetus," and when he makes several one of his characters say that, even in this early period, the appendix to Mark's Gospel "is probably very ancient," he touches upon questions of historical fact which are of considerable interest, but concern-

¹ *Stanzas for Christians*. By Edwin A. Abbott. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1927. 324 pages. 1s. 6d.

² *Apology: An Explanation and Defense*. By Edwin A. Abbott. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1927. 122 + 102 pages. 1s. 6d.

ing which he could not present the evidence fully in either of these books. Perhaps his forthcoming *Notes on the New Testament* will give us his views as to the date at which the last section in Mark was added to the gospel.

The ruling purpose of these books is to show that a man in the second century, or a man in the twentieth century, can heartily accept the principles of the Christian religion, while he rejects all accounts of miracles connected with the birth, ministry, death, and resurrection of Jesus; and that he can believe that Jesus was "the son of Joseph and Mary, born in a natural way," and yet that, in some way, "the eternal Son of God descended from heaven . . . to 'become,' flesh as the Son of Joseph and Mary, and then returned to heaven, having been manifested to men as King of its Kingdom." That one very sincere, acute, and scholarly man can take and maintain this position is clear from the contents of these books. It is not so clear, however, that such a combination of skepticism and faith can win and hold any considerable number of men. It requires a low estimate of the testimony of the Synoptic Gospels, a free use of the allegorical method in interpreting the gospels, and a conviction that the Christian church and its leaders have been seriously in error in their estimate and interpretation of their ancient sacred documents, and in their deductions from them. Moreover, while it seems to simplify the Christian faith and to remove some perplexities, it retains the doctrine most difficult of all to understand. The man who believes that the eternal son of God became flesh in the son of Joseph and Mary, and then returned to heaven, is not usually much troubled by being asked to omit from this statement of his faith the name of Joseph, and to add to it the confession that this eternal Son of God once stilled a tempest, and walked on the water, and multiplied a number of loaves and fishes. A supreme revelation of God, unaccompanied by such miracles, may seem very reasonable, and perhaps, quite preferable to that which the Evangelists supposed they were recording. But what we know of this supreme revelation is in the documents written by these uncritical and mistaken men, and in the doctrine of a very fallible church. Can we expect many others to follow the example of Silanus of old and Dr. Abbott of our own times, in accepting the most difficult of all the doctrines supposed to be taught in the Scriptures, and held by the theologians of the church, while they regard these Scriptures and the theology of the church as seriously astray in many other matters?

The aim of Dr. Gardner's course of lectures,² prepared at the request of

² *The Growth of Christianity*. London Lectures. By PERCY GARDNER, LITT.D., LL.D. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1907. xiv + 278 pages. \$1.75.

the rector of a London parish, but, for some reason, never delivered, is to show how Christianity, in its entrance into the world, and in its progressive development, has adopted, assimilated, and consecrated—has “baptized,” as the author terms it—the ideas and customs and rites which belonged to other faiths, and the convictions which the growth of knowledge and culture has brought into Christian society. It traces, in clear and untechnical language, the contributions which were made to Christianity by Judea, Greece, Asia, and Rome, in its earliest history; follows the development of the Catholic church through the mediæval period; discusses the influence of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, and closes with a calm estimate of the forces which are now operative in Catholic and Protestant churches. It is an impartial, learned, constructive book, and we can but regret that the London parish did not have the benefit which must have been derived from hearing the lectures. We are sincerely grateful that the author persisted in his purpose to write and to publish them. The point of view is much the same as that taken by Pfeleiderer in his *Christian Origins*, but Dr. Gardner covers a wider range of history, and presents his conclusions in a way which leaves the impression of a more moderate and constructive, perhaps a more English, spirit.

Certainly, the book, free as the criticism is which pervades it, leaves the reader in a cheerful frame, with the conviction that God has spoken to his children at sundry times and in diverse manners, and that the supreme revelation which he has made in his Son fits into the world which he has created, absorbs and sanctifies what is best in it, and is able to maintain itself, not only by controlling the forces which operate in human society, but also by adjusting itself to the changing convictions through which a race, which is ever progressing in knowledge and culture, must pass.

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RECENT TREATISES ON SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

Students of theology will hail with interest the appearance of Dr. Strong's well-known *Systematic Theology* in a new dress.¹ The book has been before the public for many years and has already passed through seven successive editions. In these days, when so many tell us that systematic theology has had its day, this is no small tribute to pay to a com-

¹ *Systematic Theology*, a compendium and commonplace book, designed for the use of theological students, by Augustus Hopkins Strong, D.D., LL.D., in three volumes. Vol. I, *The Doctrine of God*. Philadelphia: Griffith & Rowland Press. xvii + 370 pages. \$2.50.

pendium of doctrine. Dr. Strong is not one of those who believe that systematic theology is an unchanging discipline in the sense that a dogmatic treatise once written needs no revision. The earlier editions of his book have given evidence of the industry with which he has followed the currents of contemporary thought and the patience with which he has laid their results under contribution. In the present edition the new material has so largely increased in bulk that it has proved no longer practicable to compress it into a single volume, and the result is a new work in three volumes, of which the first is now before us for review.

It would be a superfluous task at this late date to characterize Dr. Strong's work as a whole. It has been so long before the public that its character is well known to all students of theology. The purpose of this notice is simply to point out the nature of the changes which have been made in the new edition, and to comment upon their significance.

In amount the additional material is considerable. The 370 pages of the first volume now before us carry us only to the end of the doctrine of decrees, a point reached at p. 182 of the seventh edition, which bears the imprint of 1902. Thus, more than half the matter in the volume is new. The changes consist, however, in large part in the addition of new illustrative and explanatory matter and affect the general structure and plan of the work but slightly. So far as we have been able to discover, the Table of Contents remains unchanged, with four exceptions. These consist of the introduction, of a brief section under chap. ii (The Material of Theology) discussing "the relations of material to progress in theology;" of a section on ethical monism, under Part II, chap. iii, and of two subheadings under Part III, chap. ii, on the development theory of Harnack and the higher criticism in general. Frequent changes have, however, been made in the text, the most important of which occur in the discussion of miracle, in Part III, chap. i, and of inspiration, in Part III, chap. iii. The explanation of the changes, so far as they affect the structure of Dr. Strong's thought, and not simply the form, is to be found in the section on ethical monism, by which term the author describes a type of theism which lays greater stress upon the divine immanence than has commonly been the case in traditional theology. Readers of Dr. Strong's book, *Christ in Creation and Other Essays*, as well as those who have had the privilege of personal conversation with him, will remember that his thought has recently been moving along this line, and that the doctrine of the immanent Christ, or Word, as the fundamental theological conception, has come to hold a greater relative importance in his thought than was the case before. The present revision registers the effects of this changed emphasis and is an

interesting example of the way in which the new view-point affects a scheme of doctrine originally wrought out under very different presuppositions.

The place at which the change in point of view comes to clearest expression is in the treatment of miracle and of inspiration. Dr. Strong indeed retains unchanged his original definition of miracle as, "an event palpable to the senses, produced for a religious purpose by the immediate agency of God; an event therefore which, though not contravening any law of nature, the laws of nature, if fully known, would not without this agency of God be competent to explain" (p. 117). But he goes on to substitute therefor an "alternative or preferable definition," namely, that "a miracle is an event in nature, so extraordinary in itself and so coinciding with the prophecy or command of a religious teacher or leader, as fully to warrant the conviction, on the part of those who witness it, that God has wrought it with the design of certifying that this teacher or leader has been commissioned by him" (p. 118). In this alternative definition all reference to a miracle as an event inexplicable by the laws of nature, even if fully known, is omitted; and, in the further explanatory comment, it is distinctly stated as a merit that "it leaves it possible that all miracles may have their natural explanations and may hereafter be traced to natural causes, while both miracles and their natural causes may be only names for the one and self-same will of God" (p. 119). Thus, he goes on to say that

such wonders of the Old Testament as the overthrow of Sodom and Gomorrah, the partings of the Red Sea and of the Jordan, the calling down of fire from heaven by Elijah and the destruction of the army of Sennacherib, are none the less works of God when regarded as wrought by the use of natural means. . . . The virgin birth of Christ may be an extreme instance of parthenogenesis . . . and Christ's resurrection may be an illustration of the power of the normal and perfect human spirit to take to itself a proper body, and so may be the type and prophecy of that great change when we too shall lay down our life and take it again (pp. 119, 120).

The possibility of miracle is no longer explained in the old deistic sense as due to the action of a transcendent God upon nature, but as an evidence of the presence in nature of Christ, who is "none other than the immanent God manifested to creatures" (p. 123). The extent of the distance traversed between this point of view and that which is marked by the earlier definition is apparent to all. The only question which suggests itself is why, since Professor Strong has so firmly planted himself upon the new ground, he should any longer retain in his text evidence of the discarded position.

No less striking is the change in the treatment of inspiration. In the fourth edition inspiration is defined as that

special divine influence upon the minds of Scripture writers, in virtue of which their productions, apart from errors of transcription and when rightly interpreted, together constitute an infallible and sufficient rule of faith and practice (p. 95).

In the seventh edition, while retaining this definition in the text, the author suggests as an alternative the following (p. 104*a*):

Inspiration is that influence of the Spirit of God upon the minds of the Scripture writers which made their writings the record of a progressive divine revelation, sufficient, when taken together and interpreted by the same Spirit who inspired them, to lead every honest inquirer to Christ and to salvation.

In the present edition the earlier definition is finally abandoned and the second adopted as its substitute (p. 196). The point of the substitution consists in the fact that the inerrancy, upon which the first definition insists, is omitted in the second. The reference to errors of transcription falls away, and even the word "infallible" disappears from the final statement.

The effects of the change appear in the discussion which follows. The point insisted upon is no longer scientific accuracy, but religious efficacy. The record is (p. 198) "essentially trustworthy and sufficient;" in other words, we may reasonably presume "that the same Spirit who originally communicated the truth will preside over its publication, so far as is needed to accomplish its religious purpose." The chief proof of inspiration is to be found in the "internal characteristics of the Scriptures themselves, as these are disclosed to the sincere inquirer by the Holy Spirit" (p. 201). In the detailed treatment of the alleged errors of Scripture, the original position that (p. 108) "every advance in historical and archaeological discovery goes to sustain the correctness of the Scripture narrative, while the objector may be confidently challenged to point out a single statement really belonging to the inspired record which has been proved to be false" is abandoned, and we are told instead (p. 226) that "even if error in matters of science were found in Scripture, it would not disprove inspiration, since inspiration concerns itself with science only so far as correct scientific views are necessary to morals and religion." Where the earlier edition states (p. 103) that inspiration "went no farther than to secure an infallible transmission by the sacred writers of the special truth which they were commissioned to deliver" we now read (p. 215) that "inspiration did not guarantee inerrancy in things not essential to the main purpose of Scripture."

Here again, the explanation of the change of position is to be found in

Dr. Strong's conception of the immanent Christ. We read (p. 220) that "the unity and authority of Scripture as a whole are entirely consistent with its gradual evolution and with great imperfection in its non-essential parts." And the question, "How may we know what parts are of most value and what is the teaching of the whole?" is answered (p. 221): "The same Spirit of Christ who inspired the Bible is promised to take of the things of Christ, and, by showing them to us, to lead us progressively into all the truth."

It is not necessary to comment at length upon the significance of these changes. They are far-reaching in importance, involving the entire shifting of the basis of authority from an external and dogmatic basis to one which is spiritual and inherent. It is the more to be regretted that the insight so clearly expressed in the passages cited should not have been allowed to determine the treatment in other parts of the volume. Had this been done we cannot help believing that structural changes would have taken place more radical than any which we have discovered in our survey. Two such changes we may be allowed briefly to suggest in closing. The first has to do with the place of the religious experience itself as a source of theology; the second, with the vexed question of the significance of the historical element in revelation, or, in other words, the relation of the immanent Christ to Jesus of Nazareth.

So far as the first of these points is concerned, it is only necessary to say that Dr. Strong still retains the conventional order in his treatment of the introductory matter, passing directly from the arguments for the existence of God to the proof of the Scriptures as a revelation of God, without laying a basis for the transition in a preliminary discussion of the religious experience itself. Had he followed the latter method, which has become almost universal in modern theology, he would have been forced to the discussion of fundamental questions of principle which would have clarified his subsequent treatment and avoided some of the inconsistencies to which that treatment is now exposed. In like manner, had he taken note of the recent discussions of Harnack, Kaftan, and others, as to the nature of Christianity as a historic religion, and the extent to which the historic Jesus has significance as a norm of theology, he would have been forced to raise the whole question of the relation of the universal to the distinctive in religion and so would have gained a conception of the Logos, or the immanent Christ, more clear-cut and satisfying than that with which we actually find him operating. The result of this lack of preliminary discussion appears most clearly in the doctrine of the Trinity, which is conducted almost entirely along the older lines, and in which the original interest which led to the

formation of the doctrine, namely, the effort to reconcile the work of the historic Jesus with the universal activity of the Spirit of God finds inadequate recognition or, at least, inadequate expression. It is one of the misfortunes of theology as of all philosophical disciplines, that one cannot make a change at any point of his system without being logically committed to corresponding changes in all. We cannot but feel that more is involved in Dr. Strong's principle of the immanent Christ than has yet received full expression, even in his revised system.

But our present purpose is not so much to criticize as to congratulate. It is no slight achievement for any man who has taught theology as many years as Dr. Strong has done, to come to three score years and ten with as open a mind, as broad a sympathy, and as keen a vision as he has done, and we can only hope that he will long continue in his work as teacher of theology to exemplify these admirable qualities.

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Professor H. H. Wendt, well known to the English-speaking world as a brilliant New Testament student, has made an important contribution to the discussion of the broader theological questions in his *System der Christlichen Lehre*.² The introductory portion of the work contains a statement of the scientific problem of a Christian doctrinal system and a discussion of fundamental principles. Afterward the whole body of Christian divinity is presented in five sections under the headings—God and his eternal purpose of salvation, the world and man, Jesus Christ as the mediator of salvation, the mediating functions of Christianity (the church, the Gospel, and the sacraments), and sonship with God.

The author's view that Christianity is a specific type of *practical* piety reposing on a definite religious view of reality leads to the combination of ethics with dogmatics as equally essential to the organism of Christian doctrine and to the consequent effort to unite in thought objective truth and the ethico-religious life. At the outset true Christianity is distinguished from the truth of Christianity, the former is a given magnitude, and its original content is as surely discoverable by historical science as is the ground-type of Buddhism. The original type having been found, the genuineness of later forms, after discriminating the characteristic and permanent elements from the accidental and temporary, is determined by conformity with the type. But the proof of the truth of Christianity cannot be established

² *System der Christlichen Lehre*. Von Hans Heinrich Wendt. Vols. I and II. xvi + 676 pages. Göttingen: Vanderhoeck und Ruprecht, 1906 and 1907. M. 15.

after the manner of exact science. It can be accomplished, on the one hand, only by exhibiting the world-view and the solution of the world-puzzle which is supplied in the Christian ideas of God and his saving activity, and on the other hand, by reference to the Christian experience of a satisfaction of human need.

This refusal to separate apologetics from dogmatics and ethics is to be commended. For the instant that the truth of Christianity is tested by something outside of itself it is subordinated to the worth of that external standard. Dogmatics is the best apologetics. The truth of Christianity is really self-attesting after all, and the "proof" of it is found by an exposition of its meaning. But to regard Christianity, even in its beginnings, as a purely objective reality is to miss one of its essential features, the human experience, without which Christianity is only a theory and not a reality at all. For this reason we may dispute Wendt's claim that a knowledge of the true Christianity is separable from a knowledge that Christianity is truth. The true Christianity is known only to the true Christian. He to whom Christianity is not true does not know what it is.

How then, according to Wendt, is the original type discovered and what is it? By reference to the Scriptures: not, however, as inspired, for erroneous world-views, mutual disharmonies, and the uncertainty of interpretation disqualify them as an objective norm. But the use of the New Testament Scriptures primarily and of the Old Testament secondarily, as the nearest documentary sources of the knowledge of original Christianity, brings us to the standard test of all that professes to be Christian, namely, the evangel of Jesus. Jesus, therefore, has a definitive significance for Christianity, not so much in himself as in his evangel, for this is the standard test of every estimate of his person. The essential content of his evangel is the revelation of God the Father and his purpose to save. In the final analysis this, and not the view of the person of Jesus held by the apostolic church, is Christianity. Many objections to this view are answered by Wendt, but the most important remains unanswered: Even if Jesus' preaching of the fatherhood of God is the touchstone of Christianity, yet that fatherhood can be apprehended only through the quality of sonship exhibited in Jesus, which again is conditioned on human interpretative power. Thus Wendt does not get rid of the Christian (including, of course, the apostolic) consciousness as a constituent element of Jesus' revelation of the Father.

Jesus' preaching of the fatherhood of God and the divine purpose of salvation is the governing conception of the author's whole body of theology, and it becomes the objective basis of religious authority. God

is absolute personality, distinct from the world, unchangeable and necessary love-will. Out of this is developed a world-knowledge which carries the scientific and philosophic view of the world up into the highest interpretation of the universe and which, again, satisfies the human longing for the assurance of a blessed supermundane fellowship with God. With this is connected an optimistic doctrine of man and his destiny.

The mediatorship of Jesus has two ground-forms—revelation and expiation, the former being primary. The redemptive facts are not isolated wonders, such as miracles and prophecies, but those processes of ethico-religious life which are set in operation through Jesus' revelation. The most signal of these, to wit, the impulse to abandon sin and love God, flows from his death on the Cross. Jesus saved men from the guilt of sin by saving them from its slavery. In this sense only is he a "ransom."

Wendt accepts the "homouosios" of the Athanasian Creed though in sense which differs from the original. He has no place for the pre-existence of Christ, does not believe that Jesus taught it, and says that the distinction between the creaturely and the divine must be made "*with Christ's humanity*" (p. 382). But he does not mean that Jesus was merely a man. "He was Son of God in a unique sense—the mediator of the highest divine revelation of redemption and the bearer of the true divine essence," moral identity.

It is not surprising to find the author rejecting the belief in the reanimation of Jesus' body after death. He regards the New Testament narratives relating to it, not as accounts of the resurrection, but as intended proofs of it. The true resurrection, he urges, consists in Christ's continued personal existence and blessedness in the spiritual world, and that this is what Jesus himself taught and what Paul believed. The author thinks, moreover, that since the hope of the Christian is not in a renewal of this earthly life, but in a heavenly life with its eternal blessedness, any supposed connection between the physical resurrection of Jesus and our own resurrection is annulled. The significant thing about Wendt's view is that it voices not so much the scientific objections against a physical resurrection as the religious conviction that the traditional view is antithetic to a true conception of Christianity. But we cannot help wondering whether he has not allowed preconceptions of what Christianity ought to be to determine what must have happened at its beginning.

Professor Brown's *Christian Theology*³ is a natural sequel to his history of attempts at a definition of Christianity, published three years ago. The

³*Christian Theology in Outline*. By William Adams Brown, Ph.D., D.D. New York: Scribners, 1906. xiv + 468 pages. \$2.50.

aim of the present work is to aid people who hold to faith in Christ and make their home in the Christian church to unite inherited religious conviction with modern modes of scientific and philosophic thought without damage to either. It is, in effect, a reinterpretation of Christianity for the modern man of reflective mind. That is to say, it is a book of definitions. Almost every question of importance in the whole range of theology is touched, and if not always satisfactorily, at least suggestively. Perhaps if the book had taken a narrower range it would have been improved in clearness and warmth for at times the wealth of the author's learning and the depth of his thought have been cramped into too narrow a space.

Accepting Schleiermacher's position, now become axiomatic, that theology rests on personal religious experience as its basal fact, Professor Brown goes beyond that famous theologian in holding Christian theology to be a *normative* science with the further practical aim of giving clearness to thought and definiteness to purpose. Accordingly it proceeds from Christian experience to the God revealed in that experience. The subject-matter of theology is not the religious experience itself but the "unseen spiritual reality" which is brought to experience. That is, Christianity brings into view "something" objectively real to be interpreted by the theologian. But how we get to know that "something" the author does not make plain. Like other theologians of the Ritschlian school of which he may be fairly reckoned a member, he does not seem to have a clear theory of religious knowledge.

Religion is defined as the life of man in relation to God, "a relation personal and pre-eminently practical." The Christian religion springs out of the Christian revelation. But, disagreeing with Wendt's view that the touchstone of Christianity is found in Christ's preaching of the Gospel, he contends that the exact relation of the historic Jesus to the Christian religion remains a problem. Christianity is a progressive religion; "it is not exhausted in the original revelation of God in Christ, but includes also the entire process through which that revelation is made effective among men." This prepares us for the author's explanation of what he means by the *finality* of the Christian religion:

that through all the stages of this progressive self-manifestation of God, the person of Christ remains the controlling factor; that he still keeps his place, and, we believe, will continue to keep it, as the highest realization of the divine ideal, and the most powerful means of realizing that ideal among men (p. 50).

The revelation as well as the religion must therefore be progressive. I observe that the name *Christ* rather than *Jesus* is mostly used, but what the author means by that term is often difficult to tell. He accepts

Schleiermacher's dictum that revelation in a special sense may be said to occur only when a common religious life is produced, but why should that be so if religion is primarily a personal matter, and if, as the author says (p. 68), "the religious authority of Protestantism is . . . the Bible as interpreted to the individual by the Spirit of God"?

It is said that the Bible preserves the contents of the Christian revelation in "permanent and authoritative form," but it is not a law book; its authority consists in its spiritual effectiveness, and that in the final analysis is what is meant by calling it inspired—a very helpful and illuminating treatment which reminds us of the old Anabaptists.

The principal Christian religious conceptions are treated under the following divisions: "The Christian Idea of God," "The Christian View of the World," "Of man and His Sin," "Of Salvation through Christ," "Of the Christian Life." This order is said to be "most convenient." But would it not be more scientific to regard the proper order of treatment as determined by the nature and relations of the fundamental Christian principle? It seems also to the reviewer that it would be more in keeping with the author's own view of the relation between Christianity and theology to take the last topic first.

There is space to refer to only two or three of the many extremely interesting statements of this work. God is described as absolute personality. Not will but *character* is fundamental in that conception. The Christian idea of God as Father involves a redefinition of the commonly received extra-Christian attributes of God. A keen and discriminating criticism of the traditional arguments for the divine existence follows, and with it an attempt to deepen their spiritual significance. With regard to all the rational "proofs" of God's existence the author finely says: "The God whom they prove may be God, but he is not the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ." Might we not go a little farther and ask, How can any being who is not the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ be regarded by the Christian as God?

The chapter on "Christ, the Mediator of Salvation," seeks to bring out the religious significance of the traditional ascription of a double nature to Christ, his pre-existence, his incarnation, his humiliation, and his exaltation. They are predicates of faith, not bare statements of fact. Brown does not speak decisively, so far as I have noted, of the physical resurrection of Christ, but he says:

It is enough to know that the Master who drew men with such persuasive power while upon earth, still lives and loves those for whom he showed his care here. . . . This is a truth which is consistent with very different conceptions of

the life after death, and has its support less in any detailed information derived from the early witnesses of the resurrection than in our present experience of Jesus' continued influence, and the witness of history to the growing supremacy of his kingdom among men (p. 348).

A good deal is made of the "mediatorial function" of the church, but while Brown distinguishes it as a religious society from the kingdom of God and from the ecclesiastical organization as well, when he comes to the doctrine of the sacraments we are thrown into doubt as to the real meaning, for we find him saying that the sacraments "are means through which spiritual influence is actually conveyed to men, and the communion between man and his Maker is rendered more real and vital." Here is that latent realism which it is so hard for Protestants to discard.

This work is significant of the present powerful influence of modern Lutheran theology among the Calvinistic churches, and the influence appears, on the whole, to deepen and vitalize the religious character of those churches. Professor Brown's book may not be read by the people; but it must be read by the American theologian.

Professor Terry's *Biblical Dogmatics*⁴ is an attempt, as the author says, to present "the old abiding truths" in a manner somewhat new. In fact he is careful not to exploit any "strange doctrines." His method of exposition is based on the persuasion that the Bible is "a remarkably self-interpreting book," when its different portions are studied in their proper historical connections and in the light of contemporary literature and circumstances, so that a single system of theology may be constructed out of it. The difference in view-point of the biblical writers is not overlooked, but they are regarded as mutually complementary, never as opposed. The whole work exhibits an intimate acquaintance with the language of the Scriptures and a reverent submission to their teachings, without any of the bitterness toward opponent, which, unfortunately, so often appears in works similarly conceived. On the contrary, there is a frank acknowledgment of the value of critical studies. None the less it seems to the reviewer that the harmonistic purpose interferes at times with freedom of interpretation and a full recognition of differences in the writers, while at times they appear to be made to say more or less than they really do. Only thus can we understand such a statement as the following: "We find nothing in these sacred writings which, rationally interpreted, conflicts with any clear disclosures of scientific research." Professor Terry, of

⁴ *Biblical Dogmatics: An Exposition of the Principal Doctrines of the Holy Scriptures.* By Milton S. Terry, D.D. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1907. xviii+698 pages. \$2.00

course, does not accept "the necessitarian doctrine of inspired verbal inerrancy," or Bible infallibility, as an essential outcome of the Protestant principle, for, as he says, "the Bible is not God;" but he holds that the explicit revelation given by Jesus Christ is the "final test of every doctrine and every question of morals," the Scriptures, understood in the light of his teaching, are the final authority in matters of faith and practice. Their truths are "self-evidencing." But after all is not this position, in the last analysis, the same as that of the rationalist, namely, the teaching of the Bible "commands the honest assent of the reason and the conscience"? Is not the view that the Bible is at bottom a book of doctrines—a view suggested by the very title of the work—a mistaken one?

On the other hand, it is impossible to speak of the author's familiarity with the Scriptures, his illuminating treatment of their ideas, his critical handling of questions as to their meaning and value, linked with a deep conviction of their spiritual force, and, withal, his broad and charitable spirit, in any language but that of praise and admiration. Also the order of treatment, namely, first, the constitution and possibilities of man; second, the manifestation of the Christ; third, our Father in heaven, which is the reverse of that followed by confessional theologians, is, I think, the natural order. The work closes with a select bibliography and indexes.

The Christian Faith,⁵ by Professor Curtis, is out of the ordinary line of works of this class. It is by no means destitute of learning and broad acquaintance with the great problems of science and philosophy, but its language is so free and unconventional as to be fairly startling. He writes for the layman as well as for the theologian. The author's own independence and positiveness correspond with the individualism and emphasis on personality which characterize his cast of thought—a very wholesome correction to the present trend toward immanency and pantheism. Curtis begins, like Terry, with a discussion of *man* and he ends with *the triune God*. He keeps fairly within the lines of Arminian orthodoxy. The cock-sureness of the author in some points of great difficulty does not add to the convincingness of the work. It ought, however, to be widely read.

Dr. J. Agar Beet⁶ has written a manual of liberal orthodoxy based on the principles of rationalism combined with biblicism. The main interest of the book is in "the last things," to which about 120 pages are devoted in order to bring out the author's view of the future state. The Bible is

⁵ *The Christian Faith, Personally Given in a System of Doctrine*. By Olin Alfred Curtis. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1905. xi + 541 pages. \$2.50.

⁶ *A Manual of Theology*. By Joseph Agar Beet, D.D. New York: Armstrong; London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1906. xi + 588 pages.

used too much like a textbook. The different portions of the treatise are joined, rather than built, together.

Professor Valentine⁷ has written a two-volume work on the lines of Lutheran orthodoxy slightly modified. It embodies his lectures to students in the seminary at Gettysburg, Pa., and on every page bears evidence of the author's love for his Church and assurance of the truth of her doctrines. The whole body of Christian theology is treated with much fulness. It was his intention to add to the introduction a chapter on the authority of the Scriptures, but that was prevented by his lamented death. The publication of the work fell to the lot of his son, M. H. Valentine.

Professor Hall's⁸ *Introduction* is the first of an intended series of ten volumes, covering the entire theological field as commonly outlined. The aim is instructive rather than investigative. There is, he says, an "immutable body of truths contained in the primitive Catholic faith." It is admitted that no great work of systematic theology has yet been produced on Anglican lines—a defect he hopes to remedy. The declaration that "every particular Catholic church" possesses "authority in doctrine," and his claim that "these doctrines are contained in a deposit of faith which was committed to the church of God in pentecostal days; that it is the double advantage of a Catholic theologian that he is taught the premises of his science by the Spirit-guided Church, and receives sacramental grace within the church to master the truth thus conveyed to him" (p. 18), sufficiently indicate his accepted limitations and the class of readers he may expect to reach.

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SOME PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSIONS OF RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS

In the latest books of Professors Sterrett,¹ James,² and Rogers,³ we have fresh and stimulating discussions from widely different points of

⁷ *Christian Theology*. By Milton Valentine, D.D., LL.D. Philadelphia: Lutheran Publication Society, 1906. Vol. I, iv+476 pages. Vol. II, vii+454 pages. \$5.

⁸ *Introduction to Dogmatic Theology*. By Rev. Professor Francis J. Hall, D.D. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1907. xlii+273 pages. \$1.50.

¹ *The Freedom of Authority: Essays in Apologetics*. By J. Macbride Sterrett, D.D. New York: Macmillan, 1905. 319 pages. \$2.

² *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking*. Popular Lectures on Philosophy. By William James. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1907. 307 pages.

³ *The Religious Conception of the World: An Essay in Constructive Philosophy*. By A. K. Rogers, Ph.D. New York: Macmillan, 1907. 284 pages. \$1.50.

view, both philosophical and religious, of identical or closely related problems in the philosophy of religion. In philosophy, Professor James is well known as a pragmatist; Professor Sterrett, being an ardent disciple of Hegel, is consequently an opponent of the new philosophy; Professor Rogers, however, while pointing out what seem to him the errors of pragmatism, shows that he himself has been fundamentally influenced by that school. Religiously, it is the Harvard professor again who is most radical; his aim is not explicitly to make room for a world-view that will be distinctly Christian; but simply for one that will "work" morally and religiously in the experience of the empiricist. Rogers, on the other hand, adopts as his working hypothesis in metaphysics what he takes to be the essentially Christian point of view, while Sterrett stands for nothing less than the rational justification of the Christianity authoritatively taught by the church which he finds accredited by its possession of the Holy Scriptures, the Apostles' and Nicene creeds, the two sacraments, and the historic episcopate.

The real *animus* of Sterrett's work seems to be a recoil from the alleged extreme individualism and agnostic subjectivism in religion of Sabatier, Harnack, and the whole Ritschlian school. While James and Rogers allow for something in the way of objective validation of religious beliefs by an examination of their value in experience and of their relation to other acknowledged truths, Sterrett endeavors to avoid subjectivity by means of a somewhat scholastic combination of external authority and philosophical speculation. It is interesting to note how distant from each other oftentimes are the final positions of Hegelians who travel by "purely objective" processes of thought from the same philosophical starting-point. Witness Sterrett, the churchman; Campbell, the non-conformist, and McTaggart, who claims that the logical outcome of Hegelianism is an atheistic pluralism.

With Sabatier, Sterrett admits the psychological necessity of being religious, but insists that the rational necessity of religion can also be established. Against the Kantian agnosticism of Sabatier and the Ritschlians, it is claimed with Hegel that thought *can* make the ascent to the divine, and that, having done so, it *must* descend to a reinterpretation of the phenomenal.

As against Harnack and Sabatier, Sterrett sides with Loisy in his main contention that real Christianity is no mere abstract "essence" or "religion of the spirit," but a concrete, institutionalized religion, a religion of authority in all its historic forms. With considerable heat he protests against the watchword, "Back to Christ," which, together with the cries, "Back to Kant" and "Back to Nature," he stigmatizes as the "crab-cry" of back

to the first empirical form of anything as to its true form. It is not true, he says, that the personal religion of Jesus, his sense of filial relation to God, constitutes the essence of Christianity. Beginnings are necessarily seen in the light of their developed form. Sterrett's a priori and dogmatically optimistic Hegelian philosophy of history, leads him to assert that the actual at any time is the rational done into humanity up to date by the eternal Logos.

It is questionable whether Sterrett is not to be charged with making the mistaken or misleading use of the dialectic method to which Hegelians of the "Right" have shown themselves especially prone. The thesis is that freedom is possible only by a continued conformity to custom and submission to external authority, but it turns out that, after the relative justification of non-conformity—its function of the negative in the dialectic process—is admitted, this freedom is to be interpreted as self-realization, and authority as "the power or influence through which one does or believes what he would not of this own unaided powers." The "freedom of authority" has evaporated into the trite truth of the necessity of social influence for individual self-realization. If, as appears, there is no intention to argue in favor of "yielding blindly to external authority by the arbitrary repression of thought," why should there still be an insistence upon conformity and "submission to the authority of the church" as essential to rationality? Why subscribe to creeds as authoritative, if we can only take them at a "relative rationality, as more or less harmonious with the general Christian sentiment"?

In Professor James we have the apostle of the new pragmatic philosophy. In his first lecture attention is called to the philosopher's temperament as a factor in determining the character of his philosophy. Idealistic and optimistic rationalists, whether theists or Hegelian pantheists, are such chiefly because they are temperamentally "tender-minded," clinging to values at the expense of facts. Empiricists, who are not uncommonly materialistic and pessimistic, are the constitutionally "tough-minded," not unwilling to part with other values for the sake of facts. The result is a dilemma; one finds an empirical philosophy that is not religious enough and a religious philosophy that is not empirical enough for his purposes. Pragmatism is offered as a philosophy that can satisfy both kinds of demand.

Pragmatism is defined as primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes by interpreting each notion by tracing its practical consequences. If it were to make no difference practically whether this notion rather than that were true, then the alternatives would mean practically the same thing, and all dispute would be idle. It is insisted, for instance, that the

whole meaning of such concepts as design, free-will, the absolute mind, spirit, consists in the better promise they give as to this world's outcome.

Thus pragmatism is presented as a method only; it stands for no special results. But in its use as a method there is involved a genetic theory of what is meant by truth. Theories are instruments whose truth is their utility in leading to finally satisfactory experience. The true is the expedient thought, and "absolute truth" is that ideal vanishing-point toward which we imagine that all our temporary truths will some day converge. At times our author pushes this functional definition of truth almost to the verge of a pseudo-pragmatism which confuses unverified hypotheses with truths, as when it is stated that we cannot reject any theory if consequences useful to life flow from it; when the absolute or transcendental idealism is called *true* in so far as it affords comfort; when it is stated that the greatest enemy of any one of our truths may be the rest of our truths; and again when it is declared that while common-sense is *better* for one sphere of life, science for another, and philosophy for a third, whether either be *truer* absolutely, Heaven only knows. But elsewhere this tendency is corrected. What is better for us to believe, the author says, is true unless the belief incidentally clashes with some other vital benefit. This criterion would make room for harmonious systematization of beliefs as an element in verification.

In the lecture on "The One and the Many" it begins to appear that, in spite of previous intimations to the contrary, pragmatism does seem to Professor James to stand for certain metaphysical results. After a luminous discussion of the different senses in which reality may be thought of as one, the hypothesis of one eternal Knower is weighed in the pragmatic balances and found wanting. We cannot imagine, it is claimed, how our several inner lives could be known as one systematic whole. Hence absolute monism is unverifiable; it can only be affirmed dogmatically, and on this account pragmatism must take as its hypothesis the pluralistic view.

In this pluralistic pragmatism it is maintained that nothing outside the flux secures the issue of it. Instead of the absolutist's optimism, insisting that the world must and shall be saved, James, as a pluralistic pragmatist, proposes *meliorism*, the belief that the world may be saved. With this is bound up moralism, in the sense of self-sufficingness, in contrast with religion in the sense of self-surrender. There are doubtless those who will accept the pragmatic method, but who will take issue with these conclusions and will stand for a more distinctly Christian pragmatism. It is not surprising that the author feels called upon to remove the suspicion

that his philosophy has atheistic implications. The hypothesis of God is "a truth which works," and the problem is to determine it so that it will combine satisfactorily with other truths.

This is the problem which Professor Rogers sets himself to solve. He is a thoroughgoing exponent of the "instrumental" logic of Dewey and the Chicago school, and a certain religious pragmatism is one of the marked features of his book; yet he attacks current pragmatism for its supposed implication that things have their entire being in the developing human experience. He advances reasons for holding to the reality of the external world, such as the necessary belief in the real existence of other selves, the demand of the religious consciousness for an objective and transcendent deity, and the persistent conviction that the arbitrary and unexpected elements in our experience are due to extra-experiential causation.

More satisfactory—in fact, one of the most sane and satisfactory discussions of religious epistemology, I take it, in recent literature—is the chapter on the validity of knowledge. The intellectual interest is not denied but is functionally interpreted. The value-judgment is given its rights, while the dualistic opposition of fact and value is happily avoided. Moral, aesthetic, religious, and social values should be considered, it is claimed, in our final estimate of the world. The only really fatal objection to taking account of religion in philosophy would be that religion serves no real human interest. The functional value of emotion as an instrument of discovery is emphasized. And yet it is urged, on the other hand, that no feeling can overthrow the authority of science or the claims of logic. Rationality, as the impulse to harmonize all our experience and impulses, must be allowed to rule. Verification of faith, however different in kind from that of physical science, is still necessary. The ultimate task of philosophy is to attain to a way of thinking about the universe which shall satisfy us as complete human beings. This is all good pragmatism, but if facts are themselves values, it is hard to see how room is to be found for absolutely extra-experiential reality.

In applying these principles in his constructive religious philosophy, Rogers does some suggestive work. He adopts as his hypothesis the world-view of Christianity, as that of the only religion at all adequate to the needs of human life. In defending philosophically this religious view the following subjects are discussed: the argument for purpose, the relation of God and nature, the relation of God and man, the nature of God, the problem of freedom, the problem of evil, and the problem of immortality.

The world of physical nature is held to represent the content of a larger and conscious experience, analogous to our own, viz., God's. The con-

scious life of individuals, however, is theirs alone; it is not shared even by God himself. The only identity of God with man is the self-identification of man with the purposes of God. The ultimate reality is not God, or Absolute Consciousness, but a society of selves of which God is one. In so far as the life of the individual is dependent upon the body and the physical world, it is dependent upon God. But while God and man are alike free and yet responsible for their acts, in that these acts are the outcome of their natures, no one is responsible for these natures. They are not caused; they simply are. As human selves we are metaphysically just as ultimate as God.

Numerous criticisms will suggest themselves in connection with these results. The similarity to the philosophy of Leibniz is marked, and the weaknesses of that system are largely reproduced here. One in particular is aggravated by the substitution of a *pre-existing* for a *pre-established* harmony. Teleology and providence are insufficiently guaranteed for religion in an absolutely pluralistic world. But even if the attempt here made has not been wholly successful it nevertheless represents a much-needed movement in both metaphysics and theology, and doubtless makes some real contribution toward a theological philosophy and a philosophical theology.

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF

Dr. Pratt has made a very appreciable addition to the literature of the psychology of religion.¹ The author displays acquaintance with the wide fields of religious experience, anthropological, historical, and psychological. It is written with firmness and precision, and for the most part, with clearness. The book gains noticeable unity in the elaboration of a single thesis, namely, that religious belief is fundamentally a matter of feeling broadly interpreted. It appears in three phases—primitive credulity, reasoned belief, and emotional conviction. These are traced historically and in present experience.

Part I presents an analysis of the psychical life in terms of the "center" and the "fringe" of consciousness. The former indicates the describable, rational, sensory elements which are capable of being communicated. The fringe is the sphere of feeling, of the background. This "background" is indescribable and non-rational. It is clearly distinguishable from feeling (p. 14), yet is so intimately related to feeling that the two together constitute "the second of the two great divisions in our classification of

¹ *The Psychology of Religious Belief*. By James Bissett Pratt. New York: Macmillan, 1907. ix + 319 pages. \$1.50.

psychic elements." The first division consists of ideation and sensory experience. The various forms of sensation and of ideation are gradually differentiated out of this "vital background," "continuum," this "matrix," "this original chaos, big with all the possibilities of conscious life." The depth and extent of this background are unknown and incalculable. It is the region in which the instinctive desires and impulses have their roots and from which they get their power. "It seems to be the primary form of consciousness." "The objective, describable, communicable regions of consciousness, ideation, and sensation may, therefore, be considered as two small islands, bathed in the sea of vital feeling."

It is the first chapter of the book which determines the whole treatment. All modern psychologists would agree that the instinctive, volitional aspects of mental life have not had sufficient emphasis, and that they are proportionally more powerful and dominant than has been recognized. Undoubtedly this insight requires a restatement of all religious experience, inspiration, prayer, and dogma, as well as conversion. But many psychologists are more cautious than Pratt, who follows James and Starbuck in making this "vital background" so distinct and separable a sphere. They would not allow the implication in the statement, "it is feeling alone that gives value to life." But Professor Pratt is not dogmatic. He says frankly: "How the subconscious should be construed I cannot pretend to say." He might have done well to have taken more seriously the general standpoint of Joseph Jastrow's recent work on *The Subconscious*, in which the subconscious is approached, and to some extent at least explained, in terms of normal experiences, such as the tendency of habitual activities to subside from the high lights of attention.

Part II is historical and works out the three phases of belief—primitive credulity, reasoned belief, and emotional conviction—in the religions of primitive peoples, of India, of Israel, and of Christianity. In Part III the present status of religious belief is discussed under the subjects, "The Development of Religious Belief during Childhood and Youth," "Types of Belief in Mature Life," and "The Value of God." A valuable appendix is added giving a well-selected bibliography of the psychology of religion.

There are two strong features in Dr. Ferries' book.² It frankly recognizes the fact that the Christian religion has special difficulties at the present time in maintaining a vital interest in its claims and activities, especially on the part of those scientifically trained. "To untold numbers of church members the person of Christ is practically a myth, is buried in the obscurity

² *The Growth of Christian Faith*. By George Ferries. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribners, 1905. xvi + 360 pages. \$2.50.

of the past, and language about Christian truth is little more than empty verbiage." To this class the book is addressed. Another clear insight concerns the method of cultivating interest. It is shown that this must be done by a gradual process. One should not be expected to accept the entire body of doctrine at once. In this connection the one-sided and stultified nature of much religious experience is rightly attributed to a widespread tendency to set up the sudden conversion of Paul as the type which is most desirable. Luther and Bunyan are not the most normal or healthful examples of religious experience. The church should therefore give more attention to teaching. It should imitate Jesus in this. It is well maintained, too, that practical righteousness is more easily cultivated than the acceptance of doctrines concerning the person of Christ, the atonement, immortality, and authority of Scripture. The author seems to hold, however, that it is desirable that there should be a direction of attention increasingly in individual experience to the apprehension of such dogmas.

The book is more convincing in stating the problem and the method than in working them out. It seems disproportionate, for example, to devote almost one-third of the entire work to a discussion of the atonement, and it is certainly an unnecessary *excursus* to go back to the Anselm-Abelard controversy to make vivid for present readers the superiority of the good example theory over that of vicarious expiation. The abstract statement of what is needed is often well made. For instance: "A 'gospel' that stands apart from the current of life, and eludes all thought, conveys no 'news.' It must commend itself as suited for the mind of the age." There is, however, no concrete elaboration of this contention. There is no reference to the modern religious-educational movements, to practical missionary agencies, to social experiments of various kinds. The word "spiritual" is often used, but with no indication of a definite content. It is constantly asserted that "Christianity is a practical subject," that "personal experience is fundamental," and that "spiritual truth has been imparted to the world in history;" but one could never discover these things from this book, nor help himself in realizing in tangible ways what these expressions mean. One gets a vague impression that the author holds that the "growth of Christian faith" should be in the direction indicated by the historic dogmas of the church, but his contention that these may be vitalized for the modern man of science is not convincing. He does not recognize sufficiently the fact that new times not only develop new interests and activities, but also demand the formulation of new doctrines. Christian nurture not only results in appreciating old doctrines. It makes new ones, too.

EDWARD SCRIBNER AMES

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FAITH AND FREEDOM IN MODERN RELIGION

In order to determine what must be regarded as unbelief in the the-
 of the nineteenth century Professor Sheldon¹ applies as a standard
 measurement the essential content of the Christian system, namely
 "a certain theistic conception, that conception in which the ultimate re-
 is presented as thoroughly personal;" that "Jesus Christ was a transc-
 personality and came into the world to fulfil an extraordinary medi-
 office," and "such a view of man as is consonant with his dignity as a
 fact of moral rule and a son and servant of the Most High." He clas-
 the unbelief of the century under the three heads of philosophical theo-
 of quasi-scientific, theological, and ethical theories; and of critical theo-
 Radical idealism, sensationalism, positivism, agnostic evolution, and pe-
 ism, are treated in the first division, while the challenging of the supernat-
 the denial of the finality of Christianity, the denial of the transcen-
 sencing of Jesus Christ, and utilitarian and naturalistic ethics are discus-
 under the second, and the theories of Strauss, Baur, Renan, Keim,
 the more radical criticism of the Old and New Testament form the
 portion of the book.

Mr. Sheldon writes in a clear style and shows wide reading in the
 field he covers. He aimed to observe a "proper balance" between "im-
 pact and accurate exposition" and criticism of the different forms of unbel-
 and in this he has succeeded. His exposition is clear and historical
 his criticism such as is commonly urged by enlightened orthodox apolo-
 The treatment is very general and the criticisms are commonplace.
 ordinary history of philosophy would give a fuller exposition of the phi-
 sophical theories discussed and the most that can be said of this work
 that it gives under one compass with its criticism upon them the theories
 modern orthodoxy regards as opposed to the Christian system. He has
 appropriated or used in criticism the newer psychology with its functi-
 character of knowledge, nor has he felt the need of a new apologetic
 harmony with the philosophical thinking of today. Professor Sheldon
 not seem to realize the profound change that is demanded by our mo-
 view of the world, and clings to elements that belong to a deistic inter-
 pretation of the universe. This lurks in his discussion of miracle. Evolu-
 admits of the principle of progress, of uncaused variations, of new for-
 but this emergence is in the processes of nature or in the consciousness
 man; it is the character of the natural world. In our modern world wit-
 doctrine of the immanence of God it is difficult to find place for mirac-

¹ *Unbelief in the Nineteenth Century*. By Henry C. Sheldon. Cincinnati: E
 & Malin, 1907. 300 pages. \$2.00 net.

it has been traditionally held. As Dr. Oman says, "it has its home in a deistic system where it is the one loophole for prayer or any spontaneous utterance of piety, the one skylight in the mechanical prison-house." Since the whole process of the natural with every act therein is divine, would it not be more to the point to show the psychology of "miracle," to point out that miracle is a term of religious valuation, that the religious faith regards as miracle an event which comes as extraordinary and unexpected and as a medium of redemptive grace? Science may determine the place of that event in the causal series but religious faith appropriates the grace it brings and leads it back to the omnipotent love of God.

It can readily be seen from the manner of treatment that the unity of the book is external; it is a form of classification such as existed in some sciences in the pre-evolutionary stage. Though in his concluding remarks the author admits that in the intellectual engagements of the century an improved exposition of "one or another point of the content" of the Christian system should be gained, yet, in the treatise it is fair to say that Christianity is taken rather as a static magnitude, as a "system," and the movements of thought deviating from this system are put down as unbelief. Thus Ritschlianism and Unitarianism are discussed under forms of unbelief. The moderate spirit and historical method of his discussion are a criticism upon the method of treatment.

In his *Problem of Faith and Freedom in the Last Two Centuries*² Dr. Oman considers much the same material but there is a vitality, a freshness and unity about his treatment because he sees in all these movements of thought a struggle of faith and freedom, a struggle as to "how faith is to be absolute and freedom absolute, yet both one." It is in this struggle that the essential nature of both becomes clear, and the essential values of the moral life and of religious faith emerge in their purity and can be brought home to the man of today.

Dr. Oman treats his subject historically, starting with Luther's doctrine of faith and freedom, considering the intellectual movement of Descartes and the English philosophers, then Pascal and Jesuitism, English Deism and Butler's analogy, Kant and Rationalism, Romanticism and Schleiermacher, Newman's Apologia, the critical theories of Baur and the following centuries, and the theology of experience with Ritschl as its chief exponent.

The essential value of this book is in its clear recognition of the absolute necessity of freedom and of its real unity with faith. "Freedom is not merely fundamental, it is the exclusive basis of spiritual belief now left us. We

² *The Problem of Faith and Freedom in the Last Two Centuries*. By John Oman. New York: Armstrong, 1906. 443 pages.

must now found faith upon the very thing we have thought would destroy it." "Faith in a material guarantee is not faith." Rationalism regarded faith and freedom as intellectual instead of moral, as purely individual and so formal, lacking the content which comes through appropriation of the social values. But faith is a matter of conscience, and "we must recognize the absolute right of conscience to rule, to utter its own verdict, and to listen to no alien voice." There can be absolutely no formal, external authority, as such, since it crushes freedom and corrupts faith. But the Ritschlian doctrine of the church as the medium of redemption, or the recognition of the social and historical character of religious values is essential, and for this reason Jesus Christ will occupy an absolute place in the religious life.

One may not agree with the author in all his interpretations and criticisms. Is it true that Ritschl ignored the moral order of the world and thought only of the honor of God in his doctrine of reconciliation? Is Ritschl subject to the criticism which he brings so trenchantly against the theologians of the Middle Ages? He made prominent the social nature of God and the social character of the kingdom of God. Does not this save the value Dr. Oman wishes preserved? It may be questioned if on the fact and reality of freedom we can draw deductions and distinctions with such absoluteness and finality as is done in the last chapter of this book. But it is evident that while our author will have no alien element in the faith he does not mean to surrender any essential of the faith itself.

Dr. Oman has written an excellent book, which, though it may not have a new message, has a vital one and a mission to the religious workers of today. The student will value it as a contribution to historical theology and a much needed supplement to such a work as Pfeiderer's *Development of Theology Since the Days of Kant*. The reader will admire the lucidity, purity, and nobility of his style; his appreciative, illuminating interpretation of the great thinkers, and of their place in, and contribution to, the great currents of thought; his clear recognition of the supremacy of conscience, and of faith as an inner and personal conviction; his spiritual intuition; his trenchant criticism; his sanity of judgment and reverent spirit.

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CHRISTIANITY AND THE SOCIAL CRISIS

Professor Rauschenbusch has had the courage to present¹ the argument for socialism from the standpoint of a Christian scholar. At the moment

¹ *Christianity and the Social Crisis*. By Walter Rauschenbusch. New York: Macmillan, 1907. 429 pages. \$1.75.

when the socialists themselves base their argument on the materialistic interpretation of history, and when more ecclesiastical authorities declare that socialism is of necessity a foe of the church, here comes a learned and devout Christian to show us that the collective ownership and control of the materials and instruments of production is, at this crisis, the only system of industry consistent with the principles of Christianity. The first chapters are historical and set forth "the religious development of the prophets of Israel, the life and teachings of Jesus, and the dominant tendencies of primitive Christianity, in order to ascertain what was the original and fundamental purpose of the great Christian movement in history." In the course of this investigation the author formulates a definition of the essential purpose of Christianity, which he says was "to transform human society into the Kingdom of God by regenerating all human relations and reconstituting them in accordance with the will of God."

The fourth chapter claims to present a novel explanation of the fact that the Christian church "has never undertaken to carry out this fundamental purpose of its existence." In primitive Christianity the causes lay in the antagonism of the church to pagan civilization, the lowly social position of the members, and the catastrophic element in their millennial hope. Asceticism and monasticism drove men from social contact; controversy over creeds exhausted their energies; the union of church and state corrupted the clergy.

Then follows a series of criticisms of the conditions of workingmen under capitalism, of the temptations which make morality impossible in the business world, of the enslavement of the church itself to very rich persons. All these points are familiar to readers of socialistic literature from Marx and Engels down to the daily papers published by social labor parties in our cities. Unquestionably many of the assertions are true, and all are made in good faith. If the evils described cannot be remedied without giving up private property in the instruments and materials of production, then private property as thus defined will disappear. If the capitalistic manager cannot or will not correct the acknowledged wrongs, he will be convicted of failure and commanded to step aside. But it is not scientific nor reasonable to paint our present system as all black, without adequate statement of its advantages; nor to promise all salvation from government ownership without a complete examination of the weakness of public management. It is just here the book is weak and unsatisfactory to economists. The conclusion of the author may be as sound as his plea is morally earnest, but the proof is not complete. There is much insistence on the moral evil of competition; and yet socialism would have no way of

selecting its managers of business without competitive examinations and practical tests. The trial of strength, ability, and character is not evil in itself, nor can humanity dispense with it without surrendering direction to the incompetent; that would be ruin.

It would be unfair to ask the author to present all possible facts within the compass of one volume, but we do have a right to demand of him some more adequate acknowledgment that defenders of the capitalistic system are not altogether either fools or knaves. We did not make this system, and we cannot reconstruct it to order. Where it works evil we can correct its methods, which is precisely the purpose of "social legislation." If it is fundamentally vicious, it will gradually grow into something better under the guidance of increasing intelligence.

Therefore we welcome the honest, manly, deeply spiritual criticism of the wrongs of an age, the noble appeal to the church for a revision of its ethical standards; but on the constructive side the argument is not conclusive. The method of meeting the crisis means that this generation can do little to improve conditions. Socialism is afar off; meantime practical men must bend thought and energy to measures which can be worked with the institutions we have. Private property in the instruments of production did not always exist, and something better may one day take its place; indeed, collective ownership and control have already made great progress. But it is hard to mention a single evil described in this remarkable, inspiring, and searching work which is not in a way of correction under the laws and constitutions of modern states.

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BRIEF MENTION

MEYER, CONRAD, LIC. THEOL. *Der Zeugnistweck des Evangelisten Johannes.*

Nach seinen eignen Angaben dargestellt. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1906.
vi - 110 pages. M. 2.

The author sets himself the task of showing from the contents of the Fourth Gospel that its composer had a clearly defined purpose in writing his book. This purpose was to prove the divinity and the humanity of Jesus, but not to unbelieving Jews nor to gnostics of the docetic type, but rather to Greek-speaking Christians, in order that their faith might be more perfect. The writer of John's gospel, therefore, sketches in general a life of Jesus in which he lays special stress upon the miracles which Jesus performed in the name and by the power of God. Of these miracles, the author contends, the writer of the Fourth Gospel was an eyewitness. He cites no other proofs for his views than the gospel itself, and this he calls the *Zeugnistweck* of the gospel. Meyer has read the gospel with painstaking care and he states his

conclusions with much force, but not with such clearness as he might or ought to have employed. While his interpretation of most of the more difficult passages is generally sound and scholarly, some are far fetched, notably the one on John 19:35, where he says the *εκεῖνος* refers to the ascended Christ. In the judgment of the reviewer the book adds nothing to the solution of the puzzling Johannine question. There is involved in that question more than an explanation of fact of the relative independence of the Fourth Gospel of the other three, however plausible that explanation may be. The larger question, as to the origin of the Johannine conception of the Christ, is not touched upon in the book.

MILLER, DR. JOHANNES. *Die Bergpredigt, verdeutscht und vergegenwärtigt*. München: Beek, 1906. viii + 356 pages. M. 3.

The book under review is not an exegetical exposition of our Lord's Sermon on the Mount, but, as its title indicates, an interpretation and an application of that discourse to present-day's needs. It is essentially a book on ethics and might appropriately be entitled "an urgent call to a better righteousness." The author has a very strong conviction that the message of the Sermon on the Mount is the concentrated expression of what Jesus lived and died for, and that this message, if only it be rightly understood, freely accepted, and acted out in life, would bring the peace the world longs for. The book is very stimulating, although at times one has the conviction that the author is expounding his theories and not the passage from our Lord's discourse.

ROSS, REV. G. A. JOHNSTON. *The Universality of Jesus*. Chicago and New York: Revell, 1906. 124 pages. \$0.75.

The central idea of the book is that in Jesus of Nazareth we have not simply a man among men, but "the representative man in whom the idea of the species is incarnated." In him the local and temporary do not appear. "He belongs to all time and is at home in every age and place." He rises above sex, racial temperament, rank, and bondage to environment. "He is the mediator of the ages." The author discusses the various phases of Jesus' experience as, e. g., "Origin," "Baptism," "Temptation," "Transfiguration," "Teaching," "Death and Resurrection," as setting forth his thesis. He writes with strength and enthusiasm and the book is very readable and stimulating. However, he so conceives the representative character and universality of Jesus as to destroy his vital connection with man. He is a sort of specially created divine anthropoid, whose value is that he is so colorless and unattached that he contains all of the universals and fundamentals but none of the particulars of man. We have not so learned him. One also frequently dissents from the interpretation of particular events and experiences. His discussion of the origin of Jesus greatly overemphasizes some facts, and his conception of the significance of the Transfiguration seems notably wide of the mark.

LLOYD, SAMUEL, AND OTHERS. *The Corrected English New Testament*. A Revision of the Authorized Version. New York: Putnam, 1905. 516 pages. \$1.50.

This volume is issued as a memorial of the centenary of the British and Foreign Bible Society. Recognizing the substantial results of textual criticism and the great

advance which has been made in Greek studies since the publication of the Authorized Version, this volume is corrected first on the basis of a more correct and a better-understood Greek text. The text adopted is the resultant text of Nestle. Recognizing also the growth in the English language itself in the past three centuries, the author and his assistants have endeavored to render the language conformable with present-day English. Attention has been given not only to the accurate construing of words but also to the translation of the thought. A special feature is the transposition of many words and clauses, generally to good effect. In choice of vocabulary there is some attempt to be "modern." This translation marks a considerable advance over the Authorized Version for present-day usage and preserves most of the qualities which have given that version its place and power in the hearts of the people. Combined with this we have the qualities of scholarship which have gained for the Revised Version its acceptance with Bible students. The conception of the work and its execution are both commendable.

RIX, HERBERT. *Tent and Testament. A Camping Tour in Palestine, with some Notes on Scripture Sites.* New York: Scribners; London: Williams and Norgate, 1907. 304 pages. \$2.50 net.

This book by the late Herbert Rix, B.A., is much more than the usual chronicle of the impressions and experiences of a tourist in the Holy Land. While confessedly a layman (p. 79), the author was by no means uncritical. If he could not "get up any historical enthusiasm" in an atmosphere of doubt (pp. 88, 205), he could not on the other hand confront the few sacred sites that are reasonably free from uncertainty without a thrill (pp. 164, 214, etc.). As the title suggests, it was the New Testament that he had especially in mind in his five weeks' journeying. Of the nearly fifty works named in the bibliography, especially diligent use was made of the *Encyclopaedia Biblica* and Professor Cheyne's conjectures are often taken far more seriously than they deserve; e. g., in the appendix (A), discussing the possibility of Nazareth being a synonym for Galilee. The most valuable of the six appendices is one on the site of Capernaum and the conclusion is in favor of Kohân Minyeh.

The few conjectures which the writer ventures will probably not meet with much approval; e. g., that Bethsaida was the name of a small district lying on both banks of the Jordan near its outlet into the Sea of Galilee and including Julias and fourteen dependent villages (pp. 273 f.); that a great rocky area north of the temple platform, as the site of the Basis built by Antiochus, was cut away at the destruction of this fortress by Simon Maccabeus (p. 226); that the Pool of Siloam is probably the Bethesda of the New Testament because the water would seem mysteriously troubled by the periodic inrush from the Virgin's Spring (p. 215).

For the most part, however, the decisions regarding disputed questions are impartially made in the light of existing evidence. Zion is put on the east hill and the *Prætorium* on the west (pp. 204 f.). The author confesses that continued investigation brought more doubt than he at first felt regarding Gordon's Calvary (p. 160). Besides the frontispiece there are sixty-three excellent half-page illustrations.

As a whole the book can be most heartily commended to those wishing to prepare themselves for a visit to Palestine. It will help to make impossible both the disgust and the disappointment so often experienced, and also to prepare for an intelligent appreciation of what is seen.

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THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE CHURCH TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF THE PRESENT

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The pulpit must present to men a "religious" view of the world and life; it must inspire and aid men to enter into a "religious" experience and to live a "religious" life. But to say this means nothing until we discover and define what is meant by "religious." The essence of the religious might conceivably be sought in some special quality of feeling, emotion, impulse, or intuition. This would be analogous to finding the specific character of the moral in a moral sentiment, or of the aesthetic in an art impulse, or a "sense of beauty." But just as we now recognize in ethics that no single emotion or instinct apart from ideas is distinctively and adequately *the* moral sentiment, so we may recognize in the history of religion that ideas determine religious emotion and experience in its higher forms, just as truly as the emotions and aspirations help to shape in turn the ideas. Primitive fear and awe, thrill or ecstasy, become transmuted into a genuine reverence, or elevation of spirit, when the idea of an ethical God has emerged from the stress of prophetic struggle with grossness and immorality. And again in turn the conception of God is touched with tenderness when the deity is viewed no longer as chiefly the protector in war, but rather as the Father, the Husband, the Goël or Next-of-Kin (Redeemer).

In modern times, as in ancient Israel, two conceptions of God have been especially prominent: the conception of sovereignty and

the conception of kinship. These have very largely determined the type of religious experience, and the dominant note of preaching. They have had a basis in the psychological conditions of the age as well as in the scriptural phraseology. It was natural for the mediaeval church, the successor of the Roman Empire, to conceive God as an almighty sovereign, governing his subjects, accepting satisfaction and penance for their sins. The Reformers continued the same imagery. The Old Testament out of which was built the very structure of Puritan religious experience was in its historical books a record of a religious polity in which sovereignty was the all-important interest. Sin took the form of rebellion against God. Conviction of sin from this standpoint meant acute emotional consciousness of a conflict of the human with the divine will. The ordinary man, brought up in religious surroundings, might not be conscious of active opposition to God. But there was a way to rouse the feeling. The preachers of Calvinism had not studied modern psychology but they had discovered that emotion is brought out by tension. The doctrine of sovereignty in its baldest form as including the principle of "reprobation" was an effective instrument in bringing about the consciousness of opposition between natural feelings and divine law. As Nathaniel Emmons puts it:

There is no divine truth which is more directly suited to discover the hearts of sinners to themselves than the doctrine of reprobation; it never fails to awaken their native enmity to the divine character.

If strong emotion was not aroused by this or other means, then this coldness was itself the sin. Wesleyanism, which emphasized the "grace," rather than the decrees, of the divine sovereign, preserved the general imagery and expected the same general type of emotional experience.

The past century has shown a tendency to shift the emphasis in imagery from the conception of sovereignty to that of kinship. God is the Divine Father. Men are to be brothers. The type of religious experience has been affected by this shift. The family relation appeals more strongly to the young and probably more strongly to women than to men. Or perhaps it is more accurate to say that it appeals to men and women more in times of sorrow or discouragement than

in times of war against the sins of passion, or of fierce battles for the right.

These two conceptions of sovereignty and kinship are permanent aspects in possible religious experience. We shall always find religious expression in the prayer: "Our Father who art in heaven, thy Kingdom come." But they are not the only terms in which the divine may be imaged, and they are not the terms which best interpret some of the life and interests of today. Men—to say nothing of women and children—do not think of life largely in terms of allegiance, or obedience to a sovereign. Democracy has made all such ideas seem remote. Nor does the family relation mean to the present mind such an all-inclusive system of human interests and activities as to make it the sole and adequate symbol for all religious experience. In early life the kinship group did include all human relations, and the religious could appropriately be conceived in its terms. Authority, wisdom, protection, justice, were all administered through the father. But progress has brought the development of new institutions, new organizations, corresponding to more complex experience and expanding mental and spiritual life. The political, the economic, the educational, the ecclesiastical, have been split off or extruded and given new significance by their independence. And of these the political has been made the center of a specific religious life. The economic and the educational or scientific developments of experience have never as yet entered so intimately into western religious conceptions, if we except the remarkable interpenetration of religion and philosophy in the Logos doctrine of the early church.

The two lines of activity and thought which are most characteristic of our time are, first, the organization of men for industry and business; and, second, the promotion and application of science and education. Instead of the political, the economic and scientific-educational interests are in the center. Family relations keep their place as a part of life, but they are certainly not all.

The economic relation of man to man under the present system of collective production, machine industry, world-markets, and financial systems, is one of vastly increased interdependence. It is also one in which the individual is relatively helpless, either to protect himself or to accomplish unaided any effective moral act. This has

brought to the front two great moral issues. First: this great collective system with its connected machine process is immensely more productive than any method of industry the world has known before, and is therefore capable of freeing men from the exhaustion and drudgery of overwork and from the misery of want. At the same time it has a fearful possibility of submerging the individual in a collective, impersonal whole, and of making the machine master instead of servant. Secondly, the industrial and business system affords the opportunity for a genuine social service and interdependence distinct from that of kinship or political co-operation. The exchange of goods and services may be no less a moral interchange because it is paid for. It may be all the more moral; or rather it may bring out a new and valuable kind of personal relation, over and above the sympathetic bonds of kin. It may preserve the dignity and self-respect of each party. Its specific note is then that it evokes the consciousness of rights, and at its best demands respect for rights of others. But undeniably it presents also possibilities of sacrificing others' interests to one's own in freer fashion than family solidarity allowed. It may mean exploitation, even if there is no question of violence or fraud. It is sometimes said that the conception of brotherhood among men, growing out of the relation of divine fatherhood, would solve all our social and industrial problems. This is open to serious doubt. Brotherhood does not place the emphasis where the present man wants it placed, or where the economic process naturally requires. Brotherhood stands for sympathy, for give and take without any careful reckoning of debit and credit, for loyalty and standing by in time of trouble. No one can question the need of all this in human society. But brotherhood does not most appropriately symbolize perfect fairness toward all men in relations where it is not sympathy but justice that is wanted. It does not suggest the guidance by reason rather than by emotion. It does not suggest the recognition of rights—that bulwark of personal worth which the modern man feels so strongly. The demand for social justice is becoming a dominant note in the moral consciousness of today. It is forced to its position by the very nature of the business and industrial world.

The second aspect of the present mind is the power of science and the general spread of education. There has been culture since the

Renaissance; there has been free thought; there have been schools built and sustained by the church. But the present scientific spirit is not that of culture, nor is it primarily that of free thought—of the opposition of reason to dogma or superstition. The schools of today are not in the service of the church or of any other interest. The scientific attitude of today is that of positive investigation, partly for the joy of knowing, but largely to enable man to master his environment and move forward more surely in the overcoming of disease, in the use of natural resources, and in the better organization of society. The schools are based on the democratic conviction that every child should have a share in the social heritage, and so far as the elements of education can give it, an equal opportunity to enjoy the benefits and contribute to the welfare of society. Joined to the institutions for scientific research the schools make it possible for the general results of investigation to be taken up by people generally. The high schools of today have better equipment and represent more genuinely the scientific point of view than did the colleges of a generation ago.

And why are these obvious facts recited? Is it to urge ministers to leave ethical religion for economic discussion, and to accept boldly the doctrine of evolution? The purpose is to suggest a much more fundamental change in attitude, although it does not demand of the preacher that he leave his own field and pose as an authority where he is not competent to speak. The central fact is that if the preacher is to present religious truth as something vital he must make it mean something for the two fields in relation to which it is now essentially an onlooker. To make it mean something in these two fields it must identify itself with principles and conceptions which represent in these fields the life of the spirit. It must invest these principles and conceptions with the same larger relation to the divine by which it has given religious meaning to the ethical conceptions of duty and sympathy. In doing this it must enlarge our conceptions of God and of religious experience, just as they have before been enlarged when other ethical conceptions have been taken up into religion. What then are the conceptions and principles which have such ethical significance and generality in the economic and scientific worlds that religion may use them as centers of recrystallization or as characteristic notes in genuine types of religious experience? They will not

sound novel, nor will it be necessary to search outside the Bible for texts on which to preach them. The novelty will be rather *in using these as central conceptions for defining the religious rather than as corollaries from other supposedly more fundamental conceptions of sovereignty and kinship.* They are simply the conceptions of personal worth, of justice, and of inquiry. The words are indeed familiar enough, but the actual ideas behind the words are getting new emphasis and definition from present conditions. Consider them further, therefore, before concluding that no new message can be framed from them.

1. And first, the conception of personal worth. We are told that this has ever been one of the keynotes of Christianity. Puritanism proclaimed the equality of all before the Almighty, Wesleyanism emphasized the worth given the soul by Christ's sacrifice. The last century, and perhaps especially Unitarianism and transcendentalism, emphasized the worth given man by his divine sonship and his spiritual capacities. These made worth a corollary. The present danger to personal life is not in organizations of church or monarchy; nor is it, as it appeared to more recent generations, in the abasement of man before God, or in the seeming triviality of man as part of the physical universe. Personal worth is now threatened rather by the collective economic organization, and by the machine process. These, like the political organization, have been brought about as a necessary instrument toward human progress. But just as political organization has often been a tyranny when first effected, and has threatened to crush out freedom and religion, so our collective and machine process has thus far had perhaps as much moral and religious loss as gain. We need not repeat how corporate organization loosens individual responsibility, and submerges the individual in some group. We know, if our eyes are open, how the machine process may lend itself to using up men, women, and even children, in order that more goods may be produced. And the peculiar feature of this collectivism is that no individual can effect much alone. The individual merchant, employer, labor unionist, is forced to act about as others do, or go under. What is needed then is general and united effort. Just as political organization, once largely selfish, has been converted to be, on the whole, a democratic institution, serving the common man,

and making possible a far freer, nobler life, so we may hope that the collective methods of industry and business will be controlled by man in the interest of the moral and spiritual life, instead of dominating him for material ends. And just as the political triumph of democracy was won largely under the religious conceptions of divine sovereignty, God-given rights, and human equality before God, so it is at least possible that the reassertion in a new setting of the worth of man in comparison with what he produces or possesses may be a powerful factor in the democratizing of our economic process. This is not a partisan or divisive principle—except so far as every moral or religious principle is divisive. It is a principle that the individualist and the socialist both profess to honor. But it is a principle that needs to be made so central, to be so re-enforced by the earnestness and emotion which respond to the religious appeal, that it will become a dominant note in our business and legislation.

President Tucker has said that the man of today would scarcely understand how to repent of the sin of his city. He does not understand any better how to repent of the sin of his corporation or his union—or of the unorganized but no less potent collective action of the body of consumers of which he is a member. And yet most of the sin of today is being committed, not by individuals as such, but by nations, states, cities, corporations, unions, associations. They—not any individuals as such—permit exploitation, child labor, wage scales which encourage vice, unprotected machinery, mine explosions. The homicides due to individual intent are insignificant in number compared with the deaths due to society's neglect, or to the alleged "expense" of proper care.

When the individual of the eighteenth or nineteenth century came to realize that he had "a soul to save," he felt the emotional enlargement and uplift which naturally attend the awakening of higher aims and ideals. It is for the preacher of the twentieth century to show men just what their soul, their personal worth, their true life, is, or may be, under present conditions. It is his further task to show how we may co-operate in saving the souls of multitudes which are now being lost by society's acts or neglect. If the preacher finds any awakening to this new life, let him not hesitate to recognize it as a new birth, a birth into the spiritual world, needing no doubt

further experience and nurture, but nevertheless a genuine beginning.

2. Justice is likewise an old word, but it is getting a new meaning and is coming to be far more deeply the expression of man's inmost self than it has ever been before. Hitherto it has usually been invoked to obtain protection for person or property against force or fraud. But this is not its present aim. Men who believe that we need a larger social justice do not necessarily hold that present inequities are due to either force or fraud. They may be, in particular cases. But generally speaking, the inequities are due to the system for which we are all in a measure responsible, and to practices which are simply the carrying-over of the methods—and even the virtues—of one age into the changed conditions of another. When individuals tilled their own soil, or produced articles by their own unaided labor—relatively speaking—it was possible to say who owned the products. Justice could then mean protection to person and property. But now our production is by a gigantic pool. Capitalist, laborer, farmer, statesman, physician, teacher, judge, minister, are all co-operating, and who can say how much of the product “belongs” to anyone? “Supply and demand” is theoretically our method for division. But practically we know that this is often interfered with by legislation for special interests, and by combinations for the benefit of certain groups. The ethical point is that we are coming to be no longer satisfied to adjust our conceptions of justice to fit the workings of a supposed economic law, or of an economic law manipulated for a class. We are determined rather *to take advantage of our knowledge of economic laws in order to secure greater justice*. Knowledge of gravitation does not mean that we must all fall down and stay there. The principle of justice is based on the worth of every person, of every member of society. We demand that our systems of industry, business, education, sanitation, shall recognize this as paramount. Our Supreme Court, in extending the police power to include whatever is for the “welfare” of the public, however much this may conflict with “freedom of contract” or “vested rights,” has given recognition to this new and far more thoroughgoing meaning of justice. If religion is to align itself with the social conscience of today it must recognize this fuller meaning. It must stand as broadly and yet

as whole heartedly for this as it has stood for chastity and for charity.

But it may be said, is not this to take sides in the as yet unsettled conflict between individualism and socialism and therefore to risk the loss of all the spiritual values in a partisan wrangle? No, it is not to take sides between socialism and individualism so far as these are sincerely animated by the desire to secure justice. Bentham and Carlyle, Mill and Ruskin, Charles Kingsley and Henry George, were all animated by love of justice, however much they differed in method of securing it. And if the preacher can awaken in his people the desire to promote justice in the school and library facilities, the parks, the taxation, the control of corporations, the adjustment of wage scales, he may very well decline to pose as the universal expert in the details of all these difficult matters. To one kind of individualism, indeed, this conception is opposed—namely, to the individualism, which holds that so long as the few rise high it matters not how many they crush in climbing. From the standpoint of ruthless sacrifice of the “too many” for the sake of the “superman,” Nietzsche was right in believing himself opposed to Christianity. But for the democratic individualist, as for the enlightened socialist, the exact programme to be followed is subordinate to the great aim of justice; and because the issue between the democratic individualist and the intelligent socialist is one of intricate analysis and careful experimentation there is the more need that to these principles of personal worth and social justice the minister should add that of “inquiry” as a third determining element in his message.

3. Inquiry—the open mind joined to the resolute use of all the means for reaching truth—this too is a familiar name. But in the past it has meant frequently a polemic against dogma or a destructive criticism of the received, rather than a positive method of analysis and construction in the service of human development and social progress. Most men of science today are glimpsing the possibility of assisting man to take possession of his inheritance. Science has been applied to many processes of manufacture, but in matters of health and disease, of marriage, of education, of economic methods, of social organization, we pursue our course largely by the guide of habit, tradition, or blind impulse. The demand of the scientific spirit

is that reason, inquiry, patient investigation, carefully planned experiment, shall take the place of unreasoned advocacy or hasty fervor in all these fields. The very complexity of our present social conditions, as briefly referred to above, makes it doubly important that the preacher inform his message with this scientific spirit. He must make it clear that the very disposition to learn, to see every situation in all its bearings, to weigh conflicting hypotheses, not to dogmatize on insufficient data, but to set at work to get data for judgment, is itself a moral duty—no less a duty than under other conditions may be immediate action of some sort. Tennyson gave religious value to "honest doubt," but the attitude of science today is characterized not so much by "doubting" as by constructing working hypotheses and devising experiments to try these out and test them. The preacher must then encourage this attitude toward the whole problem of life. He must lead the young man or young woman to see in it a genuinely religious attitude. To be either indifferent or uncandid is sin, from the standpoint of science: it should be no less sin from the standpoint of religion. And if the sincere mind is led to believe that in the very process of inquiry it is following a divine leading, the result will be to give greater sacredness to science and greater sincerity to religion.

In a recent address on "The Social Settlement: Its Basis and Function" Professor Mead has called attention to the function of the settlement in enabling us "to form new moral judgments as to what is right and wrong," and contrasts the settlement with the pulpit which "is called upon to inspire to right conduct, not to find out what is the right—unless the right is so plain that he who runs may read." In the case of new social and industrial problems, he continues, "the pulpit is unable to solve them, because it has not the apparatus and the scientific technique which the solution of such problems demands. In the meantime it holds its peace, for it must give no uncertain sound to the battle. The only overt social issues with which the pulpit in recent time has identified itself have been temperance and chastity." It may be freely granted that the pulpit has not the apparatus and scientific technique to solve the details of many of our intricate social problems. Neither has it the

apparatus and technique for psychological analysis. Nevertheless, it has been able to urge with unhampered power the transcendent value of the spiritual life, and the kinship of man to the realizing purpose he discerns in the universe. And what I should maintain now is that although the pulpit must rely on the settlement, the university, and the courts to supply technique, it is not therefore compelled to hold its peace on the most important issues of life. It may intrepidly proclaim inquiry, rather than complacent acquiescence or partisan dogmatizing, to be the religious duty. It may assert the superiority of persons to products, and the passion for justice as lying at the very heart of religion. The "living" God, interpreted for other times as sovereign and father, must mean for the present generation the source and inspirer of that specific life which is now in the deepest sense the life of the spirit. The prophets were able to take up the conception of justice into their conception of Jehovah. The early church was able to give religious meaning to the philosophy of its day by its conceptions of God as Logos and as Teacher. If the pulpit of today proves itself equally constructive, it may interpret the scientific and social conscience and make these the foci of a religion more powerful, because more inclusive and vital, than the present uncertain position allows. So long as there is sorrow, defeat, and loneliness, the pulpit will preach the Father and Comforter. So long as there are lusts and passions, the pulpit will present a divine law which is holy, and a salvation from the sins of the flesh. But if it hears what the spirit says to the churches, will it not also present God as manifest especially in those movements and aspirations of our time in which man is seeking to gain a new vision of what spirit means, new instruments by which to secure the larger life of the soul, new guarantees for the citizenship of all in the City of God?

Other conceptions will find reshaping if the standpoint is once taken that inquiry, respect for humanity, and social justice are not merely corollaries from some other divine attributes but are themselves of the essence of God. Faith, for example, would mean from the standpoint of the religious value of inquiry, not the acceptance of certain fixed content of truth or value, but the resolute venture of the soul into the search, undaunted by the possible reconstruction

required. Unbelief would mean such fear that this is not really a spiritual universe, or such apathy as to whether it be or not, that there would be no effort to enter into the larger possibilities of the as yet untraveled world. And from the standpoint of the worth of man and of social justice, unbelief would be the acquiescence in the physical "struggle for existence" as a supreme law of life. Faith would mean the bold assertion of belief in the possibility of victory over the conditions which would crush or submerge the life of the spirit. It would mean staking oneself upon the possibility of securing a larger justice than the world has ever seen, or than the slow of heart think to be within the powers of human nature. For the true religious faith believes in a divine event larger than can be demonstrated from what has been—or is now. Such faith is already on earth; it is for the pulpit to say whether it may not be given the help which the great historic symbols and organization of religion afford, and whether it may not in turn give to religion that enlargement which is essential for every institution or system if it is to be a mansion or a temple of the soul and not a prison or an outworn shell.

THE VIRGIN BIRTH OF OUR LORD

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There can be no doubt that there are grave difficulties in the minds of many educated men and women of this generation in the way of their acceptance of the doctrine of the virgin birth. However much older men, trained in a different theological atmosphere, may regret it, and be unable to understand it, we should not hesitate to recognize that the situation exists. Therefore we cannot overcome these difficulties by a mere appeal to the authority of the church, or in any dogmatic way. We must squarely meet them by removing misconceptions and so restating the doctrine that it will no longer be open to reasonable objection.

The doctrine of the virgin birth is historically and dogmatically involved with the doctrines of the incarnation and the divinity of Jesus Christ; but that by no means implies that men may not hold to the divinity and incarnation of our Lord without the definite acceptance of the virgin birth. The apostle Paul is firm in his statement of the divinity of Jesus Christ, and in many passages he discusses the incarnation of the pre-existing Son of God from several different points of view; but nowhere does he directly or indirectly give us the least hint that he thought of a virgin birth. The author of the prologue of the Gospel of John is still more emphatic in his doctrine of the divinity of Christ and of the incarnation and he seems to approach very closely to the doctrine of the virgin birth. If we follow the ancient reading of vs. 13 in Tertullian, Irenaeus, and Justin Martyr: "He who was born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God," we get something very near the virgin birth. This reading from Latin texts of the third century cited by Tertullian, one hundred years earlier than the earliest extant Greek codices, and from Greek texts, nearly two hundred years earlier cited by Irenaeus and Justin Martyr, is favored for rhetorical reasons and by the fact that it is the most difficult reading. But on the other

hand, the external evidences of Greek codices and versions are overwhelmingly against it, and we cannot reasonably build our faith upon it. So that in fact while this gospel may possibly have implied the virgin birth, this is at most a probability, and there certainly is no explicit statement of it.

The authors of the Epistle to the Hebrews and of the Book of Revelation teach plainly enough the divinity of Christ, but there is not the slightest trace of a virgin birth in their writings. There is no more reasonable connection between the woman in childbirth of Rev., chap. 12, and the virgin Mary than the fancies of allegorists, revived in recent times by mythologicistic interpreters.

The virgin birth is known only to the Gospel of Matthew and the Gospel of Luke. What then does this situation teach us as to the doctrine? What else can we say than that the virgin birth rests upon the authority of these gospels alone? The other New Testament writings that set forth the divinity of Christ and his incarnation, so far as we know, did not connect these doctrines with the virgin birth.

And yet on the other hand we cannot permit the opponents of the virgin birth to pervert this silence into authority against the doctrine. The argument from silence cannot be used as a nose of wax to prove anything you please. It has its laws and its limitations like any other argument.¹ If the other writers of the New Testament do not indorse the doctrine there is nothing whatever in their language that can be cited against it. Indeed sufficient reasons may be given for this silence in the earlier writings of the New Testament. If the authors knew of this doctrinal fact, they would have abstained from mentioning it for prudential reasons lest they should expose the mother of our Lord to scandal during her lifetime—such scandals as did in fact arise so soon as the virgin birth was declared, and which were certain to arise, as any sensible person could foresee. The Jews did not assert that Joseph was the father of Jesus, but that his father was a soldier named Ben Pandera. This is evidently a fiction based on Ben Parthena, son of the virgin, and this implies the Christian doctrine which it antagonizes. Jesus himself set the example of such prudence when he refrained from declaring or acknowledging his messiahship until near the close of his life, and even then forbade his disciples to

¹ See my *Study of Holy Scripture*, pp. 101 ff.

make him known.² St. Peter, St. Paul, and the early Christian preachers followed their master in the same Christian prudence and reticence in their early teaching and preaching.

Much is made by modern opponents of the virgin birth, of the representation that Jesus was the son of Joseph, and that the son of God was born of the seed of David, according to the flesh (Rom. 1:3). But how else could the New Testament writers speak if Jesus were indeed the son of Joseph by public and private recognition, and so the son of David and heir of the messianic promises? He was the legal and acknowledged son of Joseph, and that accounts fully for all such statements. They do not imply that Jesus was begotten by Joseph any more than the term "born of a woman" (Gal. 4:4) implies that Jesus was born of a woman in the ordinary way.

It is indeed astonishing that reasonable men should make so much of the four instances in the gospels in which Jesus is said, not by the evangelists, but by the people, to be the son of Joseph the carpenter. Two of them are in Luke 4:22 and Matthew 13:55, gospels which definitely tell us of the virgin birth previously, and therefore they could not have been so inconsistent with themselves as to assert and deny the virgin birth within the limits of a few pages. Two of them are in John 1:45, 6:42, the gospel which gives us throughout the highest conception of Jesus as the Son of the Father, the pre-existent divine being. Mark, singularly enough, does not in the parallels to Matthew and Luke give us "son of Joseph," but simply "son of Mary" (6:3). We have in this situation a much better reason to claim that "son of Mary" in Mark implies virgin birth than to say "son of Joseph" in Matthew and Luke implies that Joseph was his natural father.

Much is made by some recent writers of the recently discovered old Syriac text which in Matt. 1:16 reads "Joseph, to whom was betrothed Mary the virgin, begat Jesus called the Messiah." It is quite possible that this may have been in the original text, as Allen in his recent *Commentary on Matthew* thinks, but even then, as Allen shows, "beget" is used, not in the sense of natural, but of legal, sonship, for the reasons: (a) that the genealogy of Matthew was composed by the author on the basis of the genealogy of Chronicles, and

² See my *New Light on the Life of Jesus*, pp. 91 ff.

gives the official line as distinguished from Luke's genealogy, which was based on private documents of the family of Jesus and gives the natural line. (b) In several instances the term "beget" is used when the natural meaning is impossible for two reasons, one that there is an occasional leaping over one or more names, and the other that the one begotten is sometimes not the real son, but the son of another line and only the son by inheritance. Therefore "beget" is at times nothing more than legal descent and does not imply any more than that Jesus was his legal father. Furthermore, it can hardly be doubted that the author of the gospel was the author of the genealogy, and he could not be so inconsistent as to say in vs. 16 that Joseph was the natural father of Jesus and then in vs. 18-25 that Jesus was virgin-born and that Joseph was only his legal father.

It did not come within the plan of St. Mark and St. Paul and other writers of the New Testament to state the mode of the incarnation but only the fact. Indeed Mark carefully abstains from any statement whatever as to the life of Jesus before his baptism. Mark represents Jesus as the son of God, fulfilling the predictions of Isaiah and Malachi as to the advent of Yahweh, and therefore implicitly as the Yahweh of the Old Testament, the God of the Jews. He certainly could not have thought of his entrance into the world in the ordinary way of human birth. His silence may most reasonably be accounted for under the circumstances as an intentional silence as to the birth and early life of our Lord, in order to avoid an awkward controversy in the early days of Christianity.

The same might be said of St. Paul. It is evident that he represents Jesus as pre-existing as the theophanic angel of God of the Pentateuchal history (I Cor. 10:3-4), and in Godlike majesty and glory before he entered the world by incarnation (Phil. 2:5-11), which he magnifies in several passages without mentioning human father or mother.³ This careful avoidance of the birth of Jesus, except in the general phrase, "born of a woman" (Gal. 4:4) and "of the seed of David according to the flesh" (Rom. 1:3) may have been for prudential reasons; for St. Paul clearly teaches that Jesus Christ was the second Adam, the man from heaven with a life-giving spirit (I Cor. 15:45-49), a spirit of holiness (Rom. 1:4), and that while himself

³ See my *Messiah of the Apostles*, pp. 520 ff.

of the race of Adam, he was apart from the race in that he alone was possessed of sinless and incorruptible flesh (Rom. 5:12 ff.; 8:1-4; II Tim. 1:10). St. Paul avoids telling us how Jesus Christ was born son of Adam, and at the same time different from every other son of Adam as Son of God. But the Christian church saw very clearly that the necessary and inevitable consequences of his teaching were, that such sinless, incorruptible flesh could not be born of a human father by ordinary generation, but only of a pure virgin; and that such a holy and life-giving spirit could only originate by the power of the Holy Ghost, as the Gospels of Luke and Matthew tell us.

This avoidance of the doctrine of the mode of the incarnation by most of the writers of the New Testament, while emphasizing its reality, is an interesting and significant fact. This situation, which is so clear in the New Testament, ought to teach us that it is quite possible that many men today may be convinced of the divinity of our Lord, and of the reality of his incarnation, but who for various reasons, are reticent as to the virgin birth, and are not able to see its necessity to confirm these other doctrines.

The virgin birth does however rest upon the authority of two of the holy gospels, and that authority must be regarded as sufficient for those who recognize their divine inspiration. It has never been regarded by the Christian church as necessary that a doctrine should be sustained by a large number of passages. It is sufficient that the doctrine be clearly and unmistakably stated. That is undoubtedly true of the virgin birth. It is impossible by any mode of explanation to remove that doctrine from these two passages of Holy Scripture.

It used to be urged by the opponents of the virgin birth that it was a myth or a legend that grew up gradually in the apostolic community and was eventually tacked on to the gospels of Matthew and Luke. Biblical criticism has made it evident that no such opinion is tenable. This is only one of many instances in which biblical criticism verifies and confirms Christian doctrine. It is certain that these passages in Matthew and Luke were in those gospels when they first came from their authors hands. It is also certain that they were not altogether composed by these authors, but were based on older sources, which they edited, adapted, and explained. These sources belong to the earliest layer of Christian documents, such as the original

Mark, the Logia of Matthew, and the epistles to the Galatians and Corinthians. They were among those sources which, St. Luke tells us, he made use of in composing his gospel.

Furthermore these were poetic sources, in the measures and strophical organization of Hebrew poetry. They undoubtedly were composed in Semitic originals, and were translated by the authors of our gospels into Greek.⁴ This takes them back to the Palestinian community before the destruction of Jerusalem, when it was under the superintendence of St. James, St. Jude, and St. Simon, the half-brothers, or cousins of our Lord. It may be shown by the most probable literary and historical evidence that these poems were composed subsequent to the death of Mary between the years 55 and 64 A. D. They were used independently by the authors of Matthew and Luke, who both depend upon the same poetic sources, but use them in a different way without any relation to one another.

It is incredible that St. Luke, who tells us in his preface that he "traced the course of all things *accurately* from the first," and that he wrote to Theophilus that he might "know the *certainty* concerning the things wherein thou wast instructed" (1:3, 4), could have used these poems setting forth a doctrinal fact of such uniqueness and importance, without consulting with the immediate family of Jesus, represented as it was by the chiefs of the Palestinian community. How can anyone think that Christian poems stating so clearly the virgin birth of our Lord could have been written and circulated in the Palestinian community during their presidency without their sanction, and have attained such an authority as to be recognized by St. Luke, after the most careful and accurate inquiry, as valid sources alongside of the Gospel of Mark and the Logia of Matthew for the life of our Lord? Under these circumstances we should recognize that the virgin birth has the authority of the immediate relatives of our Lord, who alone could by any possibility know anything about it. It is therefore vain to appeal to the Gospel of Mark as giving the original teaching of the apostles with reference to Jesus over against Matthew and Luke who *give* a later tradition; for these gospels get the story of the virgin birth *from* poetic Palestinian sources just as truly as they get the greater *part* of their narrative from Mark and the greater part of the teaching

⁴ See my *Messiah of the Gospels*, pp. 45 ff.

of Jesus from the Logia of Matthew. Mark does not speak of the virgin birth because he says nothing about the life of Jesus prior to his baptism by John, as we have seen.

Much is made by some critics of the representation of Matthew that the virgin birth of Jesus is in fulfilment of the prophecy of Immanuel in the earlier Isaiah. But this use of Old Testament prophecies is a characteristic feature of the Gospel of Matthew alone,⁵ which is not found in Luke, and which was not in the poetic sources used by both evangelists. Therefore it is absurd to make the prophecy of Immanuel the source of the supposed myth or legend.

It is impossible on the principles of historic criticism to explain the virgin birth as a myth or a legend. It has not their characteristic features.⁶ The statement of this dogmatic fact is too near the event, too close to the family of Jesus for this to have been possible. Besides, the virgin birth of our Lord, though it has analogies in the mythologies of other nations, as the early Christian writers recognize, yet differs from all these in an unparalleled uniqueness in that all these mythological births are by natural generation by God, who assumes the forms of man or animals for the purpose, and therefore these are not virgin births; whereas the birth of our Lord was by the power of the Holy Spirit without any generation whatever, whether of man or God. The efforts of some scholars to find a basis in oriental myths are still greater failures, for the reason that it is impossible to show in these early Christian poems any trace whatever of such myths, and because the early Christian poems tell of the virgin birth in such a simple, artless way that it is altogether unreasonable to think of them as depending upon grotesque and highly colored oriental myths.

It must be plain to everyone that such a unique event as the virgin birth of our Lord would have been an insoluble mystery even to Joseph and Mary. They needed special divine communications, such as the gospels record, to enable them to think of its possibility. But they received no explanation of it, and could not understand its purpose. The gospel, in simple and lucid terms, tells us that Mary "kept all these things and pondered them in her heart." Joseph and Mary could not report them to others. They would have been

⁵ See *Messiah of the Gospels*, p. 319.

⁶ See *Study of Holy Scripture*, p. 522.

laughed to scorn. It is therefore simple perversity to use the statements of the gospels as to the relations of Joseph and Mary and his brethren to Jesus as an argument against the virgin birth. Mary's secret knowledge that she had conceived Jesus by the power of the Holy Spirit, and given birth to him in her virginity, would not prevent her from bringing up Jesus as her child. She could not do other, even under these circumstances, than look upon the boy as her boy, and the man as her son, and feel for him the natural maternal anxieties and responsibilities. The virgin-born was yet a babe in her arms, a boy under parental discipline, a man under maternal solicitude and affection. His sorrows were her sorrows, his joys her joys, his trials pierced her heart. The same set of sacred canticles that Luke used in giving us the "Hail Mary" and the virgin birth gives also the words of Simeon to Mary: "Yea, a sword shall pierce through thine own soul also." St. Luke found no inconsistency here; no more will any man who is not anxious to find it.

From the nature of the case the report as to the virgin birth of our Lord could only emerge from his own near relatives after his divinity and his incarnation had been made evident, not only to the family of Jesus, but also to the entire apostolate and the Christian church. It is hardly conceivable that Mary would have kept altogether secret the fact as to the virgin birth of our Lord after it had been made evident that he was the Messiah and was indeed divine. Her natural modesty and holy purity would have withheld these most delicate facts from the Christian public, but inevitably she would have confided them to her confidants and especially to the chiefs of the Christian community. They would most certainly have been kept esoteric as long as the virgin mother lived, in order to save her from scandalous misrepresentations, but after her death when the Christian church had become firmly established under the headship of James and Simeon, the reasons for such reticence would soon pass away, and so soon as it was necessary to combat the Ebionites who denied the divinity of our Lord and asserted that he was the son of Joseph and simply a human Messiah, it became necessary for the chiefs of the church to make public the doctrinal fact of the virgin birth, which in itself made the Ebionite position untenable, and speedily forced them to become truly Christians, or to leave the church. Thus the doc—

trinal fact of the virgin birth was made known just about the time when we could reasonably expect it. One would be unreasonable to ask for it at an earlier date.

We may therefore say with the utmost confidence: there is no valid reason, so far as biblical or historic criticism is concerned, to doubt the doctrinal fact of the virgin birth.

The doctrine of the virgin birth became imbedded in the primitive Roman creed, which cannot be dated later than the middle of the second century. But it is evident that the Roman creed was only a gradual development of baptismal creeds based on the trinitarian formula going back to the apostles themselves. Every clause of that creed is biblical and apostolic in its character. Not one of its statements can be regarded as a later development of Christian doctrine. There is not the slightest trace of any evidence in the Christian church of the second century to impeach the doctrine of the virgin birth apart from Ebionite and Gnostic sects. It was only natural that the Gospel of the Roman physician, St. Luke, should influence the Roman creed, rather than the Gospel of John, which was more influential in Asia.

It is quite true that the primitive form of the Nicene Creed does not contain the statement of the virgin birth, but that cannot be used as an argument against it, or against its importance. It was precisely the same situation that we meet in the New Testament in St. Paul and St. John, who are the chief dogmatic writers, and who therefore must be the basis for any dogmatic creed. The fathers of Nicea did not, under the circumstances of the Arian heresy, feel the need of stating the virgin birth, which was not involved in that controversy. They had one definite purpose, to overcome and destroy Arianism. It is clear however that in the East as well as in the West the doctrine of the virgin birth was considered essential; for the Synod of Antioch, which condemned Paul of Samosata in 269 A. D., said in its official acts:

We confess and proclaim that the Son, being with the Father, God and Lord of all created things, and being sent by the Father from heaven and incarnate, has assumed man, wherefor the body, taken from the Virgin, containing all the fulness of the Godhead bodily, has been, without capability of change, united with the Godhead, and has been deified.

When the creed of Nicea was enlarged and presented to the

Council of Chalcedon (A. D. 451) as the faith of the Fathers of the previous council of Constantinople, the virgin birth appears as an essential part of the historic Nicene faith in that form of the creed which for nearly fifteen centuries has been the creed of the entire Christian church. No one thought of questioning it during these centuries, whether at the division of the East and West, or of Protestantism from Rome, except a few Anabaptists and Socinians, until recent times.

I know that there are some excellent scholars and historians who give an interpretation of the article of the virgin birth which weakens its importance. They tell us that virgin birth is one thing, and that born of the virgin Mary is another thing; that the latter term was used merely to emphasize the reality of the birth of our Lord over against Docetic heresies, which denied his entrance into the world by birth. This is certainly a novel interpretation. It cannot be sustained either by grammatical exegesis or by historic interpretation. It is quite true that it was necessary to emphasize the reality of the birth of Jesus Christ into the world. But that might have been done by saying: "born of Mary," a phrase as old as Ignatius, or "of Mary of Nazareth," or, "Mary, the wife of Joseph." When they said "Mary, the virgin," they distinctly recognized that the mother of our Lord was known in the church as "the virgin." It seems to me altogether probable that this meant what the Roman church has always claimed that it meant: that Mary was not only a virgin when she gave birth to our Lord, but that she always remained a virgin. She was consecrated to be the mother of God: how could she ever be the mother of merely human children? But whether the traditional Roman interpretation be true or not, certainly the very least that we can put into the term, Virgin Mary, in the old Roman creed, is that she was a virgin when she gave birth to Jesus our Lord.

There are some who urge that all the articles of the creed have received new and different interpretations from that which was designed by their authors. This is true in the sense that they have received truer and richer explanations, and that they have been relieved of misinterpretations; but it is not true in the sense that any of them has lost its real original meaning. It is always necessary in any doctrinal statement to distinguish between the form and the

substance of doctrine, between that which is essential and that which is unessential and temporary. What if we mean by creation something different now from what the Fathers meant? We do not deny that God made the world. What if our conceptions of flesh and body differ from those of the ancients? We no less hold to the resurrection of the body. Our opponents would have us interpret the phrase, "born of the Virgin Mary," in a sense which excludes the virgin birth altogether, or makes it a mere detail of the reality of the birth. That is not interpretation: it is denial of this article of the creed.

There is no fact, no Christian doctrine that is more emphasized by early Christian writers than that of the virgin birth of our Lord. It was indeed the burning question from Ignatius to Tertullian, from the close of the first century to the middle of the third century. Ignatius, Justin, Irenaeus, Hippolytus, Tertullian, overlapping one another in linked succession in their combat with Jew and Ebionite and Gnostic, show through their writings that the virgin birth was the doctrine which overthrew Jew and Ebionite on the one side, in its assertion of the divine origin of our Lord, and Gnostic on the other side, in its assertion of his true humanity as born of the Virgin Mary. It is therefore a perversion of history for anyone to say that "born of Mary the virgin" means any less than what St. Luke gives us, or than Ignatius, Justin, Irenaeus, Hippolytus and Tertullian battle for.

The battle for the virgin birth continued through the third and fourth centuries though subordinate to more profound and subtle Christological problems. As it was necessary to maintain the reality of the birth of the Son of God over against those who held that the Son of God attached himself to the man Jesus, either at his baptism, or when he first appeared in the temple, or after his birth; so it was just as necessary to maintain the virgin birth over against a more subtle form of Docetism which thought that the Son of God attached himself in the womb of Mary to the child conceived by Mary; for in all these cases alike the same situation emerges that the man Jesus is a separate and distinct being from the Son of God, the union between them being only external or ethical, not at all vital and organic. Over against any such doctrine not only do the two gospels that teach the virgin birth cry out, but also St. John and St. Paul, and the entire apostolic teaching. For St. John does not tell us that the Son of

God took possession of the man Jesus, whether prior to his birth or later; but that he became man, and so became just as truly man as he had been truly God. So St. Paul tells us that the pre-existing Son of God was born of a woman, and that he who was in the form of God took to himself the form of man, and that this pre-existing divine person suffered and died, rose again and reigns with the name above every name. If only two writings teach the virgin birth directly, yet the whole New Testament cries out with one voice, without dissent, against any such idea as that the pre-existing Son of God merely attached himself to the man Jesus.

All those New Testament writings which emphasize the pre-existence of Christ think naturally of the divine side of the incarnation, and are only concerned with its reality on the human side. It is significant that the two gospels, which alone give the virgin birth, have nothing to say about the pre-existence of Christ. Interested in the life of Jesus, naturally they are most concerned with the mode of his entrance into the world. There is no inconsistency here, but only complementary teaching, both being necessary to the completed doctrine.

It is true that I said in my sermon on the virgin birth,⁷ alluding to the previous discourses of the series: "All that we have thus far learned of the incarnation from the teachings of Jesus and the writings of St. Paul, St. John, and the Epistle to the Hebrews, would stand firm, if there had been no virgin birth; if Jesus had been born of Joseph and Mary, having father and mother as any other child." I see now that this language was not sufficiently guarded, and so it has been misinterpreted by many. I said this in a sermon in which I strove to maintain the reality and importance of the virgin birth, and I meant by this statement nothing more than what I have said already in this paper, that the express teaching of these passages does not give the virgin birth, and therefore cannot be used for or against it, or even against the opinion that Joseph was the father of Jesus. But when it comes to making logical deductions from these statements and reconciling them with the pre-existence and divinity of Jesus Christ, and constructing a consistent dogma, it is an entirely different matter. These passages then also cry out against a human father, because a

⁷ See *The Incarnation of Our Lord*.

child begotten by ordinary generation would yield us an individual man, a separate and distinct person and being, from the second person of the Trinity; God and man, not one person and being, the God-man.

In these days when the authority of the church counts but little to many minds, and when even the authority of the Holy Scriptures is questioned by not a few Christian scholars, it is inevitable that the whole range of Christian doctrines will come into the field of criticism, and that these will be compelled to maintain themselves against every variety of attack; most of all the fundamental doctrine of Christianity, the divinity of Jesus Christ, and the related doctrines as to his incarnation and virgin birth.

Undoubtedly the divinity of Christ is the most essential doctrine, the incarnation is secondary to this, and the virgin birth of a third grade of importance. I have already recognized that a man may doubt or deny the third without, in his own mind, denying the second, or the first. And yet, from a historic and dogmatic point of view, he surely has put himself in an untenable position, which he cannot long maintain. Historically and logically the divinity of Christ and the incarnation are bound up with the virgin birth, and no man can successfully maintain any one of them without maintaining all.

The early Unitarians departed from the historic faith in the Holy Trinity at first into semi-Arianism, then they divided between Sabellianism and Arianism; but it was not long before most of them abandoned altogether the divinity of Christ, and recognized him only as the greatest of all the prophets. The departures from the Nicene faith in recent times have taken another direction. Some have advocated a more subtle Nestorianism; but the most recent fad is to make Paul of Samosata the wronged apostle of their creed. According to this ancient heretic the man Jesus was inhabited by the Son of God, and was divine in the sense that God dwelt in him and influenced all his mental, moral, and physical activities. This theory gives nothing more than an ethical union of deity with humanity. It is true that they try to bridge the chasm between the creator and the creature by denying that the creature man is of any different nature from his creator; and therefore the ethical union may be conceived of as so close that no practical difference exists. But in this they simply add pantheistic tendencies to an ancient heresy, and do

not thereby improve it, but really make it all the more dangerous. Difficulties, numerous and of great magnitude, spring up on every side much greater in many respects than those involved in the faith of the Christian church. They still name Jesus Christ God, and think of his entering the world by incarnation, yet not in the historic sense of the Bible and the church, but only in a sense which Bible, history and sound reason all alike condemn; for Jesus thus inhabited by the Son of God is really no longer divine as the one only unique Son of the Father, the second person of the Holy Trinity, but the first-born son of an innumerable family of sons of God—all gods as truly as Jesus Christ himself, when they shall eventually become as fully inhabited by God as Jesus was. The incarnation of the Son of God is then only a prelude to an indefinite number of incarnations of sons of God in all perfected Christians. Of course from the point of view of this error, virgin birth is no more needful for Jesus than it is for the Christian brethren. It is evident that they use "Son of God," "divinity," and "incarnation" in unbiblical and unhistoric senses, merely as a cloak to cover doctrines which are as wide apart from the Nicene faith as earth from heaven.

The Christ of the Bible and the church is not merely a divinely inhabited man, but the God-man. The deity and the humanity are inseparable, and eternally united in one and the same divine person. Mary the virgin, the mother of Jesus, was the mother of God because she gave birth, not simply to a man, but God who had become man in her womb when she conceived him by the Holy Ghost. Christ is not God in the sense that he is the elder brother of an indefinite number of gods; but in the sense that he is, and always will be, the one only unique Son of the Father, the second person of the Holy Trinity. Only by a virgin birth could such a God-man be born into the world. A birth by human generation would give us only an individual man, inhabited by the Son of God, and so two distinct persons, the second person of the Trinity and the person of the man Jesus. That cannot in any way be reconciled with the faith of the Bible, or the church. It is simply the revival of ancient errors rejected by the church once for all and forever nearly fifteen centuries ago.

These opponents of the virgin birth are masking behind biblical criticism and the new theology. But biblical criticism gives them

no countenance. The chief biblical critics of our day are against them. And the new theology, so far as I know it, knows them not. How absurd to revive errors exploded fifteen centuries ago, and call them new theology. Let these opponents tell us something new and worthy of attention and we will give heed to them; but it is vain for them to suppose that they can dress up ancient errors and ask us to accept them as new theology.

Some months ago I was conversing with a number of gentlemen on an ocean steamer and explaining to them the doctrine of the virgin birth. The next day one of them came to me, and said: "I have had a talk with a biologist on board. He said: 'I wish I had Dr. Briggs in my laboratory. I would show him that there could be no such thing as a virgin birth.'" This biologist was careful not to make this statement to me. If he had I would surely have said to him: "My dear sir, I have no need to go to your workshop to know how a man-child is born into this world, and I am very sure you cannot show me how the God-man must be born." It should be said that St. Luke who gives us the fullest statement as to the virgin birth was a physician as well as a historian, and undoubtedly aware of the biological processes connected with conception and generation. Doubtless modern biologists know more than he did about those subjects; but the ancient Jewish, Greek, and Roman physicians knew as much as the moderns of everything connected with conception and generation that can in any way have to do with the doctrine of the virgin conception and virgin birth. If Luke saw no biological difficulties, and if the greatest physicians the world has produced have not hesitated to accept the doctrine, it is vain for any modern biologists to object to it. They do not in fact object from biological reasons, but because they are unwilling to accept the supernatural, or any kind of divine interposition in the world.

We say born of a virgin. What we mean however is that his mother was a virgin at his birth; she had not known man. It is more properly therefore virgin conception than virgin birth. We say virgin birth because we mean to imply that the mother retained her virginity from conception to birth.

Of course, if Jesus Christ were merely a man, or the second person of the Trinity had simply attached himself to an individual man,

there would be no reason for the birth of such a man in any other way than by generation from a human father. But when you begin with a divine person, and ask how that divine person was to become man and be conceived in the womb of a woman, biology has no information whatever to give us. The Bible and the church teach that Mary conceived by the power of the Holy Spirit; that there was a theophany at the conception, a divine overshadowing of glory, such as there were at the Transfiguration, and at the taking possession of the ancient temple and tabernacle by the glory of God. Whether that was so or not, biology cannot tell us of its own knowledge. All the physical sciences combined cannot deny it, because it is altogether beyond their sphere of investigation. It is a mystery of dogmatic fact, for which we require sufficient evidence. That evidence is given, by those best qualified to know, in the gospels; and it is sustained by the proprieties of the case, for it is evident that in no other way than by the conception by a virgin could God become really incarnate. He could inhabit an individual man conceived in the ordinary way, but he could not become man, taking to himself all that is essential to human nature while remaining himself divine in his personality, and constituting, not an individual man, but an individual God-man.

We have in the gospels two births in close connection, that of John the Baptist and that of Jesus. John the Baptist was born in just the way that our opponents would have it that Jesus was born. John the Baptist was born in a remarkable manner, as was Isaac of ancient times, of old people, and of a woman who had been barren from youth to old age. John the Baptist was "filled with the Holy Spirit even from his mother's womb." That is, he was divinely inhabited from birth. The birth of Jesus is distinguished from such a birth. He was not simply filled or inhabited by the divine Spirit from birth: he was conceived by the power of the Holy Ghost in the womb of the Virgin Mary. This antithesis between John and Jesus in their births shows how impossible it is to regard Jesus as merely a divinely inhabited man without altogether discarding the gospels.

I was told recently by one of the younger members of the ministry, who is unsettled as to the virgin birth and the Nicene faith, that modern philosophy does not regard the doctrine of two natures in one person as possible. It is evident to anyone who has gone over the

history of philosophy that great confusion prevails among modern teachers. I cannot see that there is any such thing as a consensus as to what modern philosophy is. I certainly know of no consensus of philosophic opinion that is inconsistent with the formula of Chalcedon. The faith of Chalcedon was formulated and has maintained itself on the basis of the two greatest philosophic systems the world has ever seen, those of Plato and Aristotle. All modern philosophy builds upon them. New philosophers arise of various degrees of importance, but after they have had their say the world generally swings back toward either Plato or Aristotle. Moreover the greatest philosophical theologians of our age, who have been entirely familiar with the best modern philosophy, have maintained the virgin birth of our Lord. But in fact philosophy has no more to say on this question of the virgin birth, and the two natures in one person, than has science, because the question is beyond her sphere. She can tell us something about human personality and the faculties of the human mind, heart, and will, and of the relation of these to the human body. Philosophy can speak guardedly about metaphysical relations; but philosophy has no knowledge of the divine person, or of the nature of the divine mind, affections, and will, except so far as these are reflected in man, and nature, and Holy Scripture; and all this, as any thinker must admit, can only be very inadequate. Christian philosophy, when it builds on Christian theology, may help much today, as it has ever in the past, in the explanation of the mysteries of our religion; but when it disregards Holy Scripture and Christian theology, it is impotent to tell us anything whatever of the Holy Trinity, or the mode of the incarnation of the Son of God. It is altogether beyond the range of philosophy to say that the second person of the Trinity may not take a human nature to himself, as the faith of Chalcedon implies, without taking therewith human personality.

The church adopted this formula, because it alone was consistent with biblical statements as to the humanity and divinity of Jesus Christ—a formula not altogether adequate, it is true, for it makes a statement with reference to one of the greatest mysteries of our faith, but a statement made necessary by historical circumstances, to harmonize the statements of Holy Scripture and apostolic tradition, and to ward off dangerous errors. It is quite true that modern philosophy

may justly object to many statements that have been made by theologians ancient and modern, as to the human side of the formula of Chalcedon. It may say that it sees no reason why original sin may not be transmitted through the mother as well as through the father. Quite true: theologians have sought out many ways of accounting for this, other than the immaculate conception of the blessed Virgin. It is not necessary for us to overcome this difficulty in our minds; for it would certainly be presumptuous for anyone to say that God could not overcome it, even without a miracle.

It may be said that personality and individuality may come from the mother as well as from father and mother. If that were so it would not by any means imply that when the second person of the Trinity became man, he assumed the personality and individuality of man from the virgin. The personality was in the divine nature of the second person of the Trinity when he assumed human nature. Why should anyone suppose that he must assume another and a human personality with the human nature, even if such a thing were possible in the passive element in the conception? The Son of God became man according to the purpose of the incarnation. He was not obliged by any moral or physical necessity to become any more of man than he chose to become.

The conception was by the power of the Holy Spirit, and not by any kind of parthenogenesis, as some of our opponents would state it. The church has never thought of any such thing as parthenogenesis. The doctrine based on St. Luke as given in the Apostles' Creed is: "Who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary," and in the Nicene Creed: "Who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven and was incarnate of the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, and was made man." A parthenogenesis would give us an individual man with a human personality, and therefore be just as much against the Christian faith as the natural fatherhood of Joseph. Hippolytus says (*Com. Luke 2:7*): "The Word was the first-born of God who came down from heaven to the blessed Mary and was made a first-born man in her womb." Irenaeus says (*Haer.*, iii, 22:2) "Why did he come down into her if he were to take nothing from her?" Tertullian says: "This Word called His Son, under the name of God, was seen in divers manners by the patriarchs, heard at all times

in the prophets, at last brought down by the Spirit and power of God into the Virgin Mary, was made flesh in her womb" (*Haer.*, 13). Athanasius says: "When he was descending to us he fashioned his body for himself from a virgin."

The gospels make the Holy Spirit the active agent; early Fathers make the second person of the Trinity; but what matters it? In all divine actions, the three persons of the Trinity co-operate. In all these cases it is clear that the conception of the holy seed by Mary was by divine power, and therefore we are not to think of it as of an ordinary conception, or that that which was conceived was identical with what mothers conceive under other circumstances. What Mary conceived was different from that which any other mother ever conceives, for it was not mere man, but the God-man, and even as man different from every other son of Adam as possessed of sinless, incorruptible flesh and a holy, life-giving spirit; and if so it is folly to insist that the human nature then conceived must have had human personality and individuality, for that personality and individuality must be centered in the divine person, the active agent in the incarnation.

The doctrine of the Bible and the church is that the second person of the Trinity entered the womb of the Virgin, and became incarnate there, when she conceived, by the power of the divine spirit, the God-man. If God is immanent in nature, especially in the person of the Logos, or second person of the Trinity, surely there is no valid philosophical objection to the opinion that the divine presence, which was really there, as in all things, took to himself that primal human nature, which was appropriate to the mother's womb to be nourished there until the birth. He who manifested himself to man in so many theophanies, as the biblical narratives record, now brought the theophanic manifestations to their culmination in a permanent incarnation.

Under the general conception of the virgin birth there are many possible explanations that may be made; doubtless some that no one has yet proposed; and it is quite possible that we may never learn the real method of the conception of Jesus. Neither the Bible nor the church requires anything definite here. Only we cannot admit any such definition of the conception of Mary as excludes the divine activity, or represents that Jesus must have been conceived by Mary just exactly as every other man child is conceived when begotten by a

human father, with a distinct individuality, to which the second person of the Trinity could be united only externally or ethically, as a second and distinct being.

I have in my sermon on the Kenosis⁴ distinctly stated the limitations to which the God-man subjected himself in his life in this world, and have urged the doctrine of a gradual incarnation, perfected only at the resurrection and ascension. I certainly cannot see any inconsistency between such a kenosis and the formula of Chalcedon. All these supposed inconsistencies are in the minds of our opponents, or of those who in the supposed interests of Christian liberty of opinion weaken the doctrine of the virgin birth so as to empty it of reality. I have fully recognized the difficulties that beset the denial of human personality to Jesus. I have given what seemed to me a possible solution of the difficulty:

Complete personality of the Godhead, in the human sense, was in the unity of the divine nature. There is only one divine person in this sense. Therefore it was necessary that the Son of God should take up into himself all those elements of personality which are necessary to an individual, as a distinct and separate being, which he did not have as the Son of God, and which therefore he must have as the Son of man. Accordingly we are compelled to think of a divine human personality for the God-man: that is, of certain elements of human personality in which human nature was centered, as in organic union with the central, divine, personal distinction of the Word of God.⁵

The formula of Chalcedon as the necessary unfolding of the doctrine of the virgin birth, is not responsible for any particular theory of human personality, or for any of the particular explanations of the difficult problems involved, whether those of Leontius of Byzantium, John of Damascus, whom Christian theologians have generally followed, or any other ancient or modern divine. There is room here for considerable difference of opinion, and fresh study in which philosophy may be helpful. All that the church doctrine requires as it faithfully adheres to the teaching of Holy Scripture, is that we should recognize that the unity of the God-man is in the person of the Logos; that there are not two distinct beings, God and man, in Jesus Christ, united only by an ethical union of indwelling, but one unique being, the God-man, with a single, not a dual personality, or individuality.

⁴ *The Incarnation of Our Lord*, Scribner's.

⁵ *Incarnation*, p. 201.

The modern mind uses by preference the inductive method. I have used this method all my professional life, as much probably as anyone else in the field of Holy Scripture and theology. But it is not the only method. All legitimate methods should be used for the discovery and the verification of truth and fact. It is evident that the inductive method has its place and importance; but it ought not to be so exaggerated as to make men skeptical of other methods. We cannot limit our knowledge, especially in theology, to what induction gives us. We can never know God save very inadequately by the inductive method. We may be scientists, and in a measure philosophers and historians of a certain grade, without going beyond it; but it is impossible to be biblical scholars or theologians resting on that method alone, and it is difficult even to be Christians. The Holy Scriptures have vindicated their divine authority for nineteen centuries, and the creeds of the church formulated on their basis for nearly so long—the Apostles' Creed since the middle of the second century, the Nicene since the early fourth, the faith of Chalcedon since the fifth. It is vain to suppose that Christians will abandon their faith in Holy Scripture and the creeds simply because inductive reasoning does not yield their doctrines, or because science and philosophy cannot vindicate them. If they could, the Christian religion would be reduced to the level of commonplace, and its divinity be open to suspicion.

The evidence for the faith of the church in the virgin birth is as strong as anyone could reasonably exact. What stronger evidence would men have? It was impossible to present any evidence that science, philosophy, or ordinary investigation in any department of knowledge could altogether verify. We may surely ask scholars to be reasonable, and not exact impossibilities.

It has seemed to me for a long time that modern preachers and writers have exaggerated the human nature of our Lord. This is, it is true, a reaction from the exaggeration of the divinity and neglect of the humanity in former times. But this reaction has already gone too far. It is necessary to a true biblical and historical faith that the humanity and the divinity should be more comprehensively studied. It is not merely the virgin birth that is in question, in the interest of the more complete humanity of our Lord, it is also the doctrine of

original sin and the sinlessness of Jesus; it is also his bodily resurrection and ascension, and the giving of his body in the eucharist. It is moreover the whole nature of the atonement and Christian salvation with its doctrine of sacrifice and propitiation. All of these doctrines are trembling in the balance in those very minds which doubt or deny the virgin birth. Those who give up the virgin birth will be compelled by logical and irresistible impulse eventually to give up all of these.

Jesus Christ was man, but not an individual man, altogether like other men. He was unique in his humanity, because he is the only God-man. The center of his complex being was not human but divine. Jesus Christ became man to identify himself with man and nature forever. If Jesus were only loosely connected with the divine being within him, if the union were merely an ethical one, then there could not have been any real sacrifice for the sins of the world; his death would be only that of a martyr and his blood have only educational value. If the Son of God were only loosely joined with the man Jesus, a resurrection of his body would be useless, and if no resurrection of the body, then no giving of his body in any sense in the holy eucharist, and that most sacred sacrament of our religion would become merely a love feast. A second advent and a world judgment also disappear from the scheme of such a theology. And what have we left? A religion such as the brilliant Harnack gives us in his *Essence of Christianity*, a quintessence indeed, but with all the life and glory of Christianity squeezed out of it, a religion such as never has existed, and never can exist, except in speculative brains.

I do not mean to say that men may not hold to many, if not the most, of the essential doctrines of our religion without belief in the virgin birth; but I do say that the very same influences which lead some men to discard the virgin birth lead others to discard, some one of these doctrines, some, others; and that these are really to the logical mind all linked together in one massive chain, a comprehensive whole, the historical faith of the Christian church; not of any one denomination of Christians, but of them all; not as special to any particular age, but as the one faith transmitted from Christ and his apostles; not merely dogma, but the vital experience of all generations of Christians for nineteen centuries.

CONCERNING THE RELIGIOUS BASIS OF ETHICS

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There are various current forms of stating the general subject upon which some critical observations are to be made in this paper: "religionless morality," "morality without God," "religion the foundation of ethics," "the religious basis of ethics," and the like. Objections may be urged against all of them. For one thing, the word "ethics" is ambiguous, at once designating the science so called, and signifying morality. But the controversy is not as to whether religion is the foundation of the science of ethics, but as to whether it is the foundation of morality. Historically, religion seems to have been the mother of all of the sciences, ethics with the rest; yet all of the sciences, ethics with them, have achieved their emancipation from the control of religion. The autonomy of the science of ethics, most intimately related historically with religion, is quite generally acknowledged today. If one cares to inquire into the cause of this emancipation, one will find it, I think, first in the division of labor which has been going on since the rise of the modern world in the life of the human spirit; and, secondly, in the epoch-making discovery that religion has no scientific function at all. If one is interested in the result of this emancipation of the science of ethics from religion—as from metaphysics—one will find that it has been beneficial to ethical science as the same process has been of service to all the other sciences; and that it has contributed to a better understanding of the essence, truth, and function of religion as well. To be sure, here as elsewhere, specialism and empiricism have been not without their evils, both theoretical and practical. On the practical side, there has been a lack of piety on the part of ethics toward religion—religion, like King Lear, having distributed her goods among her children, only to be cast out upon the streets as a beggar. On the theoretical side the empirical *science* of ethics has been dogmatically all too ready to deny that *morality* has religious or

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contact with the final nature of things.”¹ But, if religion and morality are thus the same thing, my subject is gone, save a historical investigation of how the race fell to using both words at all, the issue raised is a false one, and much time and energy are needlessly consumed by modern thought upon the whole matter. Practically, the task comes to be one of ceasing to use two words for one and the same phenomenon—whether “religion” or “morality” be the one eliminated being of little consequence. I note that Mr. Muirhead’s point of view is much the same as that of Mr. Salter: “To conceive of the establishment of moral relations and the sovereignty of conscience as elements in the end or final cause of a cosmic process”—that is religion according to Mr. Muirhead.²

I am reluctant to suggest any objection to a point of view so fine and high as this—one, moreover, so closely akin to my own. In reality, it does not ignore the difference between morality and religion. For it is one thing to do a deed out of sympathy for a special group of my fellow-men, and quite another thing to do that same act as also charged with meaning for a universal moral order, or for a cosmic process on its way to consummation. Even from this point of view it may very well be that religion is indispensable for such morality. It may very well be that the act as done with reference to the narrower group, is not perfectly done unless it be informed with meaning and enthusiasm due to reference to that vast whole of which the agent is so small a part. Therefore, even if we do have from these important thinkers an adequate conception of religion, the indispensableness of religion for the best moral life is assumed.

But it seems to me that their conception of religion is not quite complete. In addition to the service which I render the cosmic process, there is the consideration as to whether the cosmic process seeks to serve me or not. Religion has to do not simply with the *whither* of human life, but also with its *whence*. These men with their exclusive emphasis upon the moment of activity in experience are quite as one sided as Schleiermacher was when he thought that he exhaustively defined religion as “the feeling of absolute dependence.” Indeed, I think it could be shown that Schleiermacher’s phrase comes nearer to expressing the heart of religion than is done

¹ *Ethics of Religion*, pp. 82, 84.

² *Ethics*, pp. 167, 168.

by the moralism of the ethical-culture society. It is important that we should be clear as to the issue at this point. I am to do the least, nameless, unremembered act of kindness and of love to the humblest of my human brothers with a view to furthering the cosmic process, these ethicists tell me, or else my act, not being on that account completely moral, is not religious. I must have a care for the cosmic process in what I do. I do not now raise the question whether as a fact the moral agent has such care when he acts, but, allowing that he does, I ask: Is that all? What of the care of the moral process for me? What is the attitude of my life as to the matter of *that* care? And, especially, what worth for my moral conduct has this apprehension of the cosmic care for me and my values? This, I take it, is the larger and truer conception, which must replace the partial and one-sided view of the ethicists whom I have quoted. And in the end it is my purpose to discuss the problem from this larger point of view.

Let it be repeated then, that we are in agreement as to the fact that there is a distinction between religion and morality, and that religion's larger vision is of incomparable service to morality. What I have just urged is that that distinction has not been correctly drawn, and that we must assign to each, morality and religion, its proper and *independent* function, and then alone are we ready to raise the further question as to whether religion be the foundation of morality, or, better, indispensable to morality.

If I turn for light upon my subject to the sun of history I find three factors which must be taken into account. Indeed, one's interpretation of these factors will probably decisively determine one's conclusion on the main problem.

In the first place, it is a fact that, historically, moral commandments have been found throughout in intimate combination with religion. It is most remarkable, deserving a consideration never yet accorded it, that moral precepts, unlike the rules for knowledge or for artistic creation, appear as commandments of the gods or of deity. This circumstance, in turn, is closely connected with the community-preserving purpose of all moral requirements in the life of a people. Oftentimes the moral emerges in opposition to the interests of the individual, as the individual counts interest. There—

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fore the moral is in need of a special authorization, a strengthening and protecting which faith in mere earthly authorities cannot sufficiently supply. Where shall it find all this more naturally than in religion? Moral requirements announce themselves to the consciousness of the individual as groundless and unconditionally mandatory. The divine will is the natural explanation of this categorical form of moral precepts. That form seems intelligible in this garb. But it is not simply the moral imperative that is thus sanctioned and strengthened; the universality of the moral, its extension to all human intercourse with all men, was developed entirely in connection with the religious hegemony of the moral life. The universal validity of moral precepts was not original in history. Initially moral attitudes were limited to small groups of men in which one man felt himself in living bond with a few other men. The aliens to one's own tribe, one's own folk, were fundamentally excluded from the benefits of the latter. But, among other things, by virtue of the connection of morality with religion, and the evolution of religion to monotheism which itself is connected in turn with the ethicization of the gods, these tribal and folk limits are gradually overcome. While every folk had its own god, it was self-evident that their god-given commandments were valid only for that folk. But when only *one* God existed, the same God for all peoples, then that God could not categorically say: "Thou shalt not lie," and call a halt with his command when he came to a certain people's domain; that would be absurd. Hence it is that in the last century before the Christian era we find, along with the development of a monotheistic religion and a monistic thought, the gradual development of a universally valid morality, embracing all men. Plato said that the righteous man did not injure his enemy, and he said something new and surprising to his compatriots. So Zeno, the Stoic, also: men are not divided by cities and villages and laws, but are to be considered as citizens of *one* state, as members of one flock. Finer than all else is the teaching of Jesus: Love your enemies—at once the test and climax of morality, supplying qualitative to quantitative universality. But Jesus connected this with religion by his profound saying: So shall ye be like your father in heaven.

This, then, is one factor. As religion gave man his science up to

a certain stage of his development—his whole conception and understanding of reality—so also it gave man his ethics, that is, designated and authorized the chief end of volition and conduct, set up models, gave commandments and laws. As the explanation of nature rested upon supernatural agencies, so morality rested upon the revelation of the dependence of man on supernatural powers and authorities that guided his destinies here and hereafter.

The basis of *morality* was then a supernatural history. Whether man could live aright in the natural world depended upon his relation in the supernatural world. But it must be admitted that a great change has taken place. As has been already indicated, not only have art and science succeeded in emancipating themselves from religion, but the autonomy of ethics and morality is urged with like insistence. Indeed, the question once was as to the worth of morality to religion; now the only question ever discussed is as to the worth of religion to morality. If it be admitted, as I think it must, that religion was indispensable to the historical origination of moral values, it does not on that account follow that, once originated, religion is indispensable for their persistence and serviceability. However, I am not concerned with this systematic consideration now, but simply with a statement of the first of the three historical factors which throw light on our question.

In the second place, history yields another factor which apparently, but not really, is in contradiction with the above. I mean the chronological priority of the ethical. As primitive man could not initiate a personification, or, rather, a psychification, of external objects, thus making gods for himself, prior to his achieving a knowledge of himself as person or *psyche*, so, similarly, he could not affirm an ethical content in his gods, antecedent to his own production of moral values. It is in this sense that I speak of the chronological priority of the ethical. If man had never had an experience of thunder, or of light, or of war, he would have conceived no god of thunder or light or war. It is a psychological impossibility for man to carry over into the gods capacities, purposes, values, of which he himself knew nothing in his own experience. Only an ethicized man could ethicize the gods. Hence religious faith developed under the practical influence of the ethical feeling of man. He that does not love his brother whom

he has seen, how can he love God whom he has not seen? Whoever beholds his brother in need and shuts up his compassion from him, how does the love of God abide in him? We must already have recognized moral distinctions before we can declare God to be good. Whoever is righteous because the God in whom he believes is righteous must first have attributed worth to righteousness. In a word, man must have antecedently achieved the moral values he ascribes to God. Historically, there have been the two great worlds, the man-world and the god-world. And historically, also, peace on earth, good will among men, came ever first, and was transferred to the god-world secondly. Solidarity among men was followed by solidarity among the gods. Mono-humanism preceded monotheism. Evermore the god-world is but a duplication of the human world—with this difference: by transferring our human values to the god-world they become idealized and infinitized, and as such react upon our human world to the purification and authorization and endearment of our values. First is the experience of our human fatherhood, then fatherliness is ascribed to our God, finally human fatherhood becomes more sacred and more worthy on that account. But, always, first the human, then the divine. Admitting then the *chronological* priority of the ethical, does it follow that the ethical has *logical* priority. Because the human world antedates the god-world does it follow that the human world can advantageously dispense with the god-world? Again, I am not now examining this systematic question, but reporting upon a fact of historic experience.

In the third place, it is a fact that morals have sought to sunder themselves from what was empirically judged to be religion. "The Church has kept alive a belief that good conduct is the result of orthodox opinion and that morality is conditioned by supernatural beliefs." "Ethics has been relegated to a secondary and derivative position, persecuted whenever it presumed to dispense with theological support."³

³ So spoke Dr. David Saville Muzzey before the Ethical Culture Society of Chicago, February 23, 1908, in a critical address directed against my book, *The Finality of the Christian Religion*. In an address before the Ethical Congress, Chicago, December 29, 30, 1907, I interpreted the rise of the ethical-culture movement as I have done a little farther on in this article. The ethical-culture movement was continuous with the dogmatico-critical disintegration of *belief*, since it disavowed adhesion to any religious *idea* whatever, though it subsequently sought to escape something of the harshness

"The religion of the future." While the doctrine of religious freedom may be partially true today, it may be wholly false and may then have to take some account.

But the doctrine of religious freedom: it is a far cry from the doctrine of the future. It is a history of the compulsory surrender of the religious conscience to be necessary to the modern world. In general, it was claimed that the religious type of religion was necessary to certain dogmatic doctrines as well as observance of certain moral precepts and discipline. The processes of life and of thought in the religious life are necessary to the Christian religion. It is a dogmatic and sacerdotal Christianity which is a distortion of the moral life. But a distinction was soon made between the morality of Christianity, and the dogmatic and sacerdotal religion of Christianity, i. e., the dogmatic and sacerdotal religion of Christianity. Already, this morality of Christianity, but of the *Christian* morality, could not long remain exempt from the influence of what has come to be a

religion of the future. The new light of religious freedom was a new light. In their earlier work exception to this account of religious freedom was made. It was moral, but *could not* be religious. We must not expect all things of all men; we must not expect all things of all men; we must not expect all things of all men. And now Dr. Muzzey has taken the religious freedom of the future? As to Dr. Adler, since he would excuse some men from being moral, on what ground would he excuse some men from being religious? Would he favor the religious freedom of the future? I am still of the opinion that the moral and religious freedom of the future is more accurate and more appreciative than that of Dr.

changed view of the world and of life. Upon the corrosion of the metaphysics of Christianity there followed the corrosion of the ethics of Christianity. Upon the religious crisis followed the moral. It turned out to be misguided superficiality to suppose that Christian *faith* could be renounced and the Christian *ethic*, which was the counterpart of that faith, abide. Our modern phrase, "practical Christianity," which is proving to be such an impotent and bewildered thing, is but the epitome of a lost faith.

Then came, as a last impulse out of the same root, as continuous with the whole disintegrating process, the society of ethical culture. Its aim originally was, if I am not mistaken, not only to hold aloof from the dogmatic and cult and institutional features of the Christian religion, but also from that religion itself as hitherto understood, and even from the raging *Kampf um Weltanschauung*; its aim was at least to found a society of morality-religion on the basis of morality—as against the old redemption-religion—a society that should be a meeting-place for all the spirits that had been divided and worsted in the losing struggle for faith. Today we are hearing much of the return to faith. Personally, I am unable to see any such *return*—there may be indeed signs of the birth of a *new* faith, but no return. In my opinion Christianity is in the most grievous crisis of its history. I do not refer to controversy in newspapers and on the street, but to the quiet, bitter battle which serious men are fighting out in their own souls.

It may be objected that the old churches were never so powerful and active as today, never engaged so much in labors of love. But the question is whether all this is the blush of health or the last flush of fever on the cheeks of the dying—whether its glory is the glory of her springtime or of her autumn—whether the next season is summer or winter. It is the dying of the old faith which western Christendom is experiencing. To be sure, they are not the deepest spirits of our day who are shouting "God is dead!" Many of them think that science has killed the old world, and that they can dwell in the embrace of every pleasure. They think that they are now free from what once fettered them, from what never was therefore high and holy to them, but only an alien commandment. Many of them think that, because the traditional redemption is in many of its features

indefensible, they can fling conscience to the winds. Such people, I say, are not the most serious minds of our day who are in the midst of the fray over the ever-vexed question as to the religious basis of morality. The deepest doubters of our day, rather, are those *whose very consciences themselves* are precisely the forces which have given birth to their doubt—and that deep doubt is, not now with reference to dogma and cult and organization of a historic church, but whether the ideals which were sacred to the fathers are real gods worthy of all adoration, giving stimulus and direction and goal to life, or whether those ideals are grinning and grotesque idols, in the gloom of ancient temples, and which can endure no sunlight of modern moral thought.

To be specific, there is the modern attitude to the ethics of Jesus. Many years ago, Schopenhauer began to write about the world-denying character of Christianity. Then there began a partition between the essential and the unessential, the literal and the figurative, in the Sermon on the Mount. Then historical theology joined in, and the eschatological school showed, or thought it showed, that the entire ethics of Jesus is conditioned by his expectation of the speedy end of the world and the day of judgment. Thus colored, his moral precepts are provisional, and not norms for all time. But the world did not end, and Christianity had to conclude a compromise with it. A morality of the world was coupled and fused with a morality that negated the world, and the product was so-called Christian morality. To be sure, ever and anon bearers of the old, genuine, world-negating, heroic Christianity rebelled against this hybrid. But the modern man has drawn the opposite conclusion, that for us who are looking upon the world with different eyes the eschatological ethics of Jesus and of primitive Christianity no longer have formal validity. Then the socialistic development set in, with its demand that Christianity should settle the social question. An effort was made to derive a social programme from the Bible. The effort was impracticable. It was abandoned in favor of the idea that the gospel furnished the spirit, the ultimate principle, for an order of economic things. But no sooner had the new enthusiasm kindled than the hour struck for the knowledge that the historical Jesus was much farther from us and much stranger to us than we had believed, and that we could

not count on him off-hand to play a leading part in our social programme. Jesus' ethic of pity and of purity, of inner disposition and of personality—and this is what he meant by "Kingdom of God;" he had in view the individual and not society, in our sense of society—this ethic of Jesus was not quite to the liking of the socialists, who required an ethic of worldly conflict, of class-war, and of world-politics, an ethic of justice and right, and not of philanthropy.⁴

So much, then, by way of history and orientation. Owing to the importance of the last of the three considerations, I may restate it.

First, the church even in its empirical details was declared the basis of morals—the sole saving church. Next, some cult was affirmed to be unnecessary, some sacrament, some discipline; but the dogmatic must be kept intact. Then part of the dogmatic articles of faith could be dispensed with as non-fundamental. Then more of them had to go. Finally, all orthodox belief could be displaced by the rationalistic belief in God, freedom, and immortality. Then this belief could be surrendered and with this the entire religious metaphysics of Christianity, but the ethics of Christianity should remain. Finally, this ethic was summoned before the judgment-seat of modern humanity. The cry is from Christian dogmatics to Christian ethics; from Christian ethics to the ethics of Jesus, from ethics of Jesus as precept to the sentiment of his inner life, according to which, however, it is thought that the struggle for life and existence cannot be carried on. Thus, the thought comes to be of a morality, not only without the specifically Christian religion, but without the belief in God, freedom, and immortality of the so-called natural religion. It would carry me too far afield to point out how even this religionless morality degenerated into a sorry utilitarianism and Eudaemonism on the one hand and into Nietzsche's *Uebermensch* on the other—both, from the Christian point of view, being the *descensus averni*.

But it is not simply that a religionless morality is counseled. Whether it is an exaggeration or not, such morality is urged. It is urged that religion has no connection with morals, that a divorce between the two would better serve the interest of ethics. Some go

⁴ I have drawn the substance of the last paragraph from my book, *The Finality of the Christian Religion*, pp. 248 f.

so far as to maintain that morals will not improve until ethics has freed itself completely from religion, for the influence exerted by religion upon morals is bad.

I may now specify and examine, point by point, some of the main systematic objections to religious morality, before I conclude with a statement of my own attitude to the problem.

For one thing, it is urged that there are moral men who have no religion. In reply it may be admitted that in the case of *individuals*, an energetic moral endeavor *can* continue without religious faith. But, on the basis of *history*, as we have seen, it is a fact that moral ideas have always found access, and evinced their power, in the *life of peoples* only in connection with the corresponding religious ideas. Moreover, whether those religionless moral men would not exhibit a finer beauty of character were they touched by the light of religion, may well be a debatable question. And the question could be decided, not by comparing the religionlessly moral man with the religiously moral man, but the former with what he, the same man, would be, were he truly religious. Certainly, whether the moral principles and moral attitude of religionless men be not in part due to the glory of a sun that for them is set, can hardly be a debatable question. The very pathos with which some moral men disclaim all religious faith betrays a religious life in their souls of which they are not cognizant. Besides, those who think that they are estranged from religion, or repudiate it, often are estranged from or repudiate an antiquated world-view which they have simply mistaken for their religion. Not denying that some men are sub-religious, or, rather, prereligious, religionless men are very rare, even theoretically, less so practically.

But for another thing, it is maintained that the connection of morality with religion has introduced morally worthless "works of merit" as co-ordinate with moral conduct. As church, religion has preformed and fixed and final standards of what is true and good. Hence man is prevented from striving for a knowledge of the truth, from the exercise of independent testing and judging, from the attainment of a firm personal conviction. Man's sense of truth is thus stifled and atrophied, so that he becomes deceitful or ignorant. In reply, it must be pointed out that the objection overlooks the

essential difference between religion itself and its positive ecclesiastical forms, doctrines, ordinances, and customs. We ought to be permitted to take for granted that anyone who talks about these matters today knows that these things are not religion, but merely its imperfect forms of manifestation, or coverings, or shells, which are conditioned by time, changeable in time, possibly transitory. The objection tacitly assumes that religion is exempt from evolution and that its primitive crude form is its only form, while at the same time considering physical and historico-moral life from the point of view of development. And as to the deadly infraction of the ethics of the intellect of which custodians of religion are sometimes indeed guilty, the sin is due, not to faith, but to lack of faith, and the religious interest thus safeguarded is not religion but some obsolete form in which religion in a previous incorporation has found a vehicle. I do not linger over the first item of the objection, since religion, in its Christian form at least, does away entirely with works of merit. God is not a task-master, but father; man is not servant, but son; salvation is by grace, not by works of merit; religion is a thing of freedom and of spirit, not of servility and letter. To this matter I shall return in another connection.

Not much different from it is the objection that the moral motive is corrupted by the anticipation of reward and punishment. In reply, it must be pointed out that the expectation of reward is freed from all egoistic characteristics. It is not denied that religion, at certain stages and under certain conditions, has pointed almost exclusively to a realm beyond and represented this earthly existence as vain and valueless, thus embittering toil, disparaging vocations, and disqualifying for the human lot. But it must be remembered that the idea of immortality is not specifically and integrally religious, since it is not present in all religions; and that a paralyzing world-weariness is not a necessary factor in the religious consciousness, nor a necessary product of religious experience. It has appeared rather as a disease of certain epochs in history—passing away, like youthful world-woe, with the passing of the age. The stage of world-denial is not the only stage, but is conquered by the inner form of faith itself.

But, coming closer to the objection, as religion grows more perfect,

the reward ceases to be external, material, egoistic, and becomes inner, ethical, and personal. It comes to be, not goods, but goodness, not happiness but holiness, not quantity but quality of life. This internalization and spiritualization of reward is the elimination of reward as understood by the objector.

Other objectors urge, again, that the connection of morality with religion cripples moral energy; that, instead of pleading man to depend upon his own moral power and effort, religion refers him to divine grace and providence, which will do all things for him, thus making him indolent. Here it is a question of fact, and the appeal must be to experience. Experience would seem to support the proposition that religion supplies the most effective and powerful motive for moral action. Belief in *providence* has ever sustained moral strugglers. The guarantee of the attainability of our moral goal has ever been found in a Divine Pilot who knew the high seas over which we must sail and fitted the ship for the storms. As a matter of fact it is not the man who trusts in a God who is on the side of right against wrong, of love against selfishness, of truth against falsehood, whose energies are paralyzed; it is the man who builds solely upon his own weak powers and doubts cosmic ends and righteousness, that suffers moral collapse. But, as I say, the appeal must be to experience, and the great heroes of the history of religion have never been idle or impotent men.

I have reserved the more familiar objection to the last, viz., Religion subordinates man to the alien will of God, thereby robbing man of his own free self-determination. It is easy to talk about human freedom as if it was a *datum* or dower. But it is not thus a donation to man, it is an achievement by man. In the child-stage, for example, the good cannot be desired or done through voluntary self-determination. To each one there comes an external command which demands the subordination of the personal will under the commanding will. Something like this is true in the divine education of the human race. Hence there was, for pedagogic purposes, a theoretic form of religion and morals. There was the idea that the good is a command to men from the strange external will of God, the supramundane Lord. Here God is master, man servant; God is tutor and man child. But as religion matures this idea passes away. The moral command-

ment is inwardly acknowledged, as a law of freedom. The relation between God and man becomes one of love and not of law. As there is no lawless freedom, so there is no unfree legality. As there is no autonomous caprice so there is no theonomous absolutism, since either would annihilate free personality. As God is father and man is son, as the divine and the human will are one, the divine authority is the human freedom, the command of the will of God the normal expression and effectuation of the moral nature of man. In a word, theonomy is not heteronomy but autonomy.

But, on its formal side, certainly, all this, whether objection or rejoinder, is somewhat old fashioned. Implicated in all of the points, underlying the last one in particular, there is at least a survival of dualistic metaphysics. Modern thought has abandoned the formula: God *and* world, as two different powers. It has not canceled the God-concept and kept the corresponding world-concept, but in its attitude to that old form of the religious consciousness, it is as certainly a-cosmic as it is a-theistic. A view of existence as *unitary* has taken the place of that dual conception which philosophic criticism has overcome. Of all the epochs in the history of religion, two are outstanding in a singular manner; the one in a distant past when there was the formation of a stronger moral consciousness, the extension of ethical requirements beyond national limits, the appreciation of conduct according to the disposition from which it springs, and the corresponding moralization of the gods; the other in modern times as the enlargement of knowledge affects the evolution of the idea of God.

Things are no longer subject to the caprice of gods, but to fixed rules. Both material and spiritual processes follow inviolable laws. Instead of there being a God of changless perfection from whom a world of change and evil and decay has arisen either through emanation or creation, existence is self-originating, self-directing, self-dependent, self-criticizing. Thus religion seems to be undermined. For if Deity cannot arbitrarily encroach into things and into the hearts of men, how can He help them? And yet religion seems to be able to adapt itself even to this change of ideas. Prayer has at all events a psychic value for the supplicant, filling him with hope and confidence, so that he can do in his own strength what he, in self-

distrust, had believed he could do only with alien help. By way of definition, prayer comes to be the inner self-collectedness and self-concentration in quiet moments whereby one heartens and steels oneself for endurance and endeavor. Prediction becomes a matter of scholars, to be sure in a different sense. Deity, which in the first stages of the development of modern science was denied any free encroachments into the world, and was in danger of total expulsion and alienation from the universe, has been drawn completely within the universe, thus forming the value side of that cosmos whose fact side is the great immeasurable system of causal groups and causal series with which alone science has to do. God is the world—not the world of the old formula, God *plus* world, according to which the world was vain and valueless—but this new world, i. e., world apprehended in the peculiar root of its existence, the fulness of things at the fountain. The laws of the relations of things are not the external works of God, but his veriest effectuations—are the laws of the soul also: “in me, in thee, in all.”

Briefly stated, this is the modern view of the world. This being so, then as science, in idea, is world-explanation, so religion, in principle, is world-appraisal. My query now is: What value has religion, thus understood, for the moral life of man? May we still maintain that religion is indispensable? I believe that it is, and must now state the reason why. My contention still is that religion is a necessary factor in the struggle for life. Yet as I have already indicated I do not wish to be understood as going so far as to maintain that each exemplar must necessarily be religious, since it is possible that the religion of a community may function vicariously for this or that individual. I only mean that the thesis holds good as a general proposition.

At this point it will facilitate matters to recall a conclusion upon which biologists are agreed. A living organism is a system constituted for its own development and preservation. It is a sort of self-preservation arrangement. And it compasses this self-preservation in the use of two great means.

First, through conflict. The organism preserves itself through constant conflict with its external surroundings and their forces, conflict with animate and inanimate nature, with beings both like

itself and different from itself; conflict, moreover, within itself, of its own parts with each other, for space, for means of nourishment, in short for supremacy. The aim of this conflict is ever the same: escaping, diminishing, demolishing what is injurious on the one hand; utilizing, strengthening, incorporating what is helpful, on the other hand.

The second means of self-preservation is the developing of a certain peculiarity, or rather of numerous peculiarities combined to a unified whole. A mammal selects or escapes its environment in a different way from the bird; the lion in a different way from the horse. The means with which each of these beings encounters things, relates itself to them, the mode of its behavior and of its conflict with them—all this is very various. Now the reliability of this peculiarity of the organism, the use of the organs lent it, and the exercise of functions peculiar to it, are as necessary to the continuance of the organism as is conflict. Organs are preserved through their activity—otherwise they decay.

The conflict and the formation of the weapons of conflict—the employment of those two means of preservation are intimately connected in most cases. They are both operative at one and the same time. The struggle for existence proceeds by means of the peculiar equipment for war and this equipment arises that the organism may preserve and protect itself in the struggle. The point is that the organism at once struggles and grows—its struggle issues in growth and its growth equips it for struggle. Yet there is a difference: certain expressions of the soul are predominant phenomena of struggle; others, of self-effectuation.

Now what is true of organism in general, is also true of the human soul.

The soul is a system of inwardly experienced formations and functions striving for its own preservation. This preservation is actualized in a twofold manner: first, through conflict with what is given to us in external phenomena as outside world; and secondly, through effectuation of its specific peculiarity, through the living-out and the working-out of its forces and endowments. The soul preserves itself through its development and it develops itself in the process of its preservation.

Now the question is whether religion has a necessary place in this process of the soul's self-preservation and self-effectuation. Is religion a function necessary at once to the reactions of the psychic organism against its environment and to the inner perfection of that organism itself? Is religion a form of the higher spiritual life of that organism? By higher spiritual life, I mean life in the achievement of truth and beauty and goodness. If the religious function should perish from the soul, would that higher life be fatally weakened—not for this individual or that—but for society? If religion as a form of the spiritual life should vanish from the soul, can new and equivalent forms of life develop to take its place? These are the great questions—and in my opinion, they are the most serious questions with which the modern world has to deal. And since, of course, they can be settled in the last analysis, not by speculation but only by the experiences of life itself, time alone can tell what the answer is to be.

But there are some things which we can tell already. If we turn to primitive religions, we see man living a life of fear and need. Overpowering foes, ferocious beasts, storms, earthquakes, hunger, sickness, death—those horrors menace him. Then there is his ignorance of tomorrow, and of the issue of his undertakings and struggles. He confronts two things: the unconquerable might of foreign power in the present and the impenetrable darkness of the future. And it is against these two things that the soul creates help for itself in religion. Primitive man thinks of everything as analogous to himself—equips everything in heaven and earth with forces and dispositions like those of which he is conscious, only indefinitely magnified. He does so for the sake of the most vital, practical interests. Since he humanizes them, it is possible for him to treat them as he has found by experience it is worth while to treat man. By treating the spirits in things in a certain way—now this way now that, as he would a man—he gains a certain power over them. Such spirits exist therefore—*they must exist, because he needs them of necessity*. Without them, he would be helpless and impotent.

To be sure, as men know that they themselves assume two attitudes to each other, friendly and hostile, so do the spirits that reside in all things. And he must behave himself accordingly if he would avoid

injury or receive benefit from the spirits. So cult arose—a kind of diplomacy and etiquette toward the gods.

But, this, then, is the root of religion. Religion is a form of the adaptation of the soul to definite evil consequences of its foresight and at the same time a warding-off of these consequences with the means that are at its disposal. Fear and need are the mother of religion. And there will be religion as long as there are fear and need. If the fear and need are great, religion can be all the stronger.

Suppose now that I have apprehended my human vocation to be the achievement of values: truth and beauty and goodness—this is my moral vocation, the vocation of all men by which we at once preserve and complete ourselves. But truth, beauty, goodness—these are not easy donations to us, all of us must *acquire* them by the sweat of our brow as we till life's thorny field. But is there nothing for us to fear? Have we no need? Under what conditions would we be permanently perplexed and helpless and impotent as we went about our great task? Under two conditions—first, if there be no activity on the part of the reality of which we are a part, such as is the case in a living organism. That there is such activity, even science urges today. If I look through the structure of creatures, I find them different from clock-work. A clock does not make its wheels. But living beings build their own selves up, generate their organs out of their own selves, and other beings like themselves. So there is this dynamic activity in all that is. Such activity is coextensive with reality. And this is the first thing that must be if, through self-activity, we are to achieve values, preserve and complete ourselves individually and socially.

But mere activity is not enough. The second thing that must be, if our need is met, is that this activity, coextensive with reality, shall somehow be on the side of our values. The essence of man is his ideal-creating and ideal-realizing capacity. This is ethics. Does this capacity belong to the cosmos? That is the great question. Do love and righteousness come out of the constitution of the universe? The conviction that they do is the essence of religion. Any nearer determination of the question would inquire whether they were prius and cause, or whether they were characteristic and natural product, as the fruit is of a tree, or whether they were transitory by-products.

But such inquiry lands us in insoluble problems and unknowable issues. It may be that, as with man, love and righteousness are not chronologically prior, but first the natural then the spiritual, so with that whole of which man is so small a part. Certainly we have no grounds for thinking that they are static and stagnant properties of the cosmos. We know nothing of spiritual values extraneous to human (and animal?) experience. We do not know that the ideal-producing capacity which is central and supreme in man is likewise the central fact of the universe. Man is but a single line in the long cosmic story and we may not be sure that we know the point of the whole story from a single line of it. It may be that the everlasting ongoing cosmic process will in ages to come leave man and man's kind of values as far behind as man has distanced the ichthyosaurus of geologic history. And cosmic experience lends some color to such an assumption. On the other hand it may be that human ideality is identical with the central supreme concern of the universe. Such a position may be cherished as a *faith* by him who has the courage to do so, and no science can dislodge him from his position. But the point is that since man is an integral part of the cosmos, his ideal-achieving capacity is in some degree, if not centrally so, an activity and expression of existence as a whole. The structure and function of the universe are such as to render the production of our human kind of values possible. Our faith in this worth of the world is the essence of religion. Without this faith, human activity in consistency would be paralyzed. With this faith—faith that activity is commensurate with reality and that care for values is commensurate with activity—man's courage is braced up, his loins girded with strength, his fear driven out, and there are hope and joy and peace in the storm and stress of life.

SOME RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF PRAGMATISM

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There exists in many quarters a more or less defined opinion that the growth of the pragmatic movement implies a danger to the religious interests. Just why this opinion should be held it is at first sight a little difficult to see, unless for the reason that all philosophies with a flavor of newness are looked upon as dangerous. Added to this is the fact that pragmatism is showing itself most hospitable to science, and that science and religion are rather popularly supposed to resemble the lion and the lamb before they had decided to lie down together. Moreover, absolutism seems to offer a fairly well-fixed conception of God, and one which absolutists claim to be in fairly close agreement with that demanded by the common religious consciousness.

Thus it happens that a philosophical friend of mine asks: "I wonder what these pragmatists are going to do with God," and that another friend remarks: "We scientists couldn't ask anything better for our purposes than pragmatism gives us. But I rather hope that the absolutists will keep up their end of the fight a little while longer, if only to supply us with some of the inconsistently mystical variety of satisfaction in off hours," (a delightfully pragmatic justification of absolutism, by the way).

Now this short-sighted criticism of pragmatism entirely overlooks the fact that the kind of satisfaction which pragmatism offers to science—an assurance of the right to try an hypothesis and to find its validity in its results—is exactly the kind of satisfaction which the historical religious consciousness has always demanded. Whatever dogmatic theology may have said concerning doctrines, religion has been for the popular mind a sort of trial and error process, not so different in principle from science. From the Psalmist's "taste and see that the Lord is good," and the New Testament "if a man willeth to do His will, he shall know of the teaching," and "I will prove my faith by my works," down to modern revival methods, good and bad,

with their emphasis on "experience," religion has been largely a matter of verifying an hypothesis by acting on it.

From this point of view, assuredly, religion has everything to gain from pragmatism, if, as Schiller holds, pragmatism has succeeded at last in overcoming the old antithesis between reason and faith. Pragmatism claims to do this, "on the one hand, by showing that faith must underlie all reason and pervade it, nay, that at bottom rationality itself is the supremest postulate of faith, and on the other hand by enabling us to discriminate between the spurious faith which shuns the warmth of action and the genuine faith which is an ingredient in the growth of knowledge." The pragmatic emphasis on faith, "where faith in a fact can help create that fact" is so notorious that when Dr. Russell sneers at pragmatism for offering, not an intellectual compulsion, but an exhortation, like that of the revivalist, to "try this experience which we are all enjoying," one is forced to recognize the justice of the comparison, albeit a very distant one, even if one resents the injustice of the sneer.

But if one phase, at least, of the ordinary religious consciousness has always been thus "scientific" in the broad sense, the case is somewhat different when we come to theology proper. For theology has shown a tendency to follow a very rationalistic philosophy, taking its materials indeed from the religious consciousness of certain famous leaders, but working them up into an abstracted "system" which made up for its failure to take account of the concrete whole of experience by an excessively dogmatic emphasis on those details of which it did take account. And being very conservative (excusably so, on account of the value of its material), it has maintained almost to this day the old Platonic view of the concept and of ideas and of the function of knowledge, as sufficient unto itself and unto its own pet purpose, which was the copying of reality. Hence, theology has dealt, not so much with the functioning of the religious consciousness as with the intellectual interrelations of certain concepts.

Theology, however, is not the only sinner in this regard. Philosophy itself has pursued an exactly similar course, and has only been aroused by the growth of the scientific conception of the meaning of truth, and (possibly) by the great emphasis on action in this strenuous century, to a more "pragmatic" interpretation of its material. And

in the change which seems to be coming over philosophy, theology will doubtless participate.

The discussion of the theological side of pragmatism will fall naturally into two divisions: first, a consideration of the place allotted by a pragmatic philosophy to theology, and second, a view of the effect which pragmatism must have on the categories of theology itself.

The first of these topics I shall treat very briefly, as it has already been hinted at in this paper, and as it has been explicitly treated in Dr. Ames's paper, "Theology from the Standpoint of Functional Psychology,"¹ and in Dr. Lyman's essay in the Garman Commemorative Volume,² entitled "The Influence of Pragmatism on the Status of Theology." The resultant view of both these articles is that theology must become more "scientific" and historical. This means, according to Dr. Ames,

the recognition and justification of the gradual and continuous modifications of doctrines. Heretofore, doctrinal changes have either gone on in a random way or they have been opposed by the established habits of thought. If changes in theology were understood to be the marks of growing religious life and real aids to such growth, theology would come to take its place among the sciences. These sciences are always subject to revision and yet they are employed in affairs of the greatest moment.

Practically the same view is taken by Dr. Lyman, though, as a theologian, he declines to give up altogether the "absoluteness" of the Christian religion. He does not hold this a priori, he carefully explains, nor will he assert that it is yet proven, but he thinks it not inconsistent with pragmatism to discover some "absolute" religion. He means by this a religion which will subordinate to itself the norms of all other religions and thus satisfy all the religious needs of life. Taken with several grains of salt, in the form of conditions which Dr. Lyman imposes, this is not impossible. But Dr. Lyman is a good enough pragmatist to admit that there always remains the possibility that "in a world of growing reality new values may arise and that these may modify the old values or be quite discontinuous with them."

There seems to be a little looseness of statement in this conclusion of Dr. Lyman's. In a world of growing reality new values

¹ *American Journal of Theology*, Vol. X, April, 1906, pp. 219 ff.

² *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology*, by former students of Charles Edward Garman; Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1906.

must arise, and must modify old values. On the other hand, they can *not* be discontinuous with them, since they arise out of them. And the religion which accommodates itself to these new values will change along with them, but not necessarily with such rapid change that it need ever vary in name. Such a phenomenon is indeed a very common one, for who will say that any of the great religions of the world are the same now as when they were founded. And what has happened to diverse religions would happen to Dr. Lyman's "absolute" religion, if it ever comes to exist. That is, while it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that one religion should come to satisfy the varied needs of all mankind, that very religion would be a changing religion, changing not only in time but also in every individual application. It might be called "one" by courtesy: it might be "one" in fellowship: it could not be "one" in any absolute sense.

In addition to the scientific character which pragmatism would impose on theology, it has one other marked influence on the status of that branch of study—an influence brought out by Dr. Lyman's article and also in several suggestions by Professor Schiller. This influence lies in the fact that "the pragmatic form of empiricism can do what the old empiricism could not, namely, recognize the ethical life as an integral and constitutive part of reality. And furthermore it is able to regard the specifically religious needs and reactions as means of attaining rationality that are as rightful as those which are more definitely of an intellectual sort. Thus at length empiricism takes on a form which does not in principle rule out the truth of religion." The pragmatic "justification of faith," as Schiller calls it, this founding of metaphysics, not indeed, as Kant did, on ethics, but, in a broader way, on conduct, of which ethics deals with a most important part, is bound to give to ethics, and to theology in so far as it is related to ethics, a status refused to it by the older empiricism, and demanded but not obtained for it by the older rationalism.

In these two ways, then, pragmatism must influence the status of theology, first, by making it a science as other sciences, second, by giving it, in so far as it remains a science, an honored place among other branches of study.

Passing now to a consideration of the effect of pragmatism on

current theological doctrine, I shall limit the subject in a most arbitrary way, not merely to the three conceptions of God, freedom, and immortality which have always been the chief fighting ground of the theologians, but to a discussion of the first of these—the effect of the pragmatic movement on the conception of God. The reasons for this particular delimitation may be briefly stated as follows:

First, the question of freedom, while undoubtedly an important, (probably the most important) question of ethics, is for that reason not the chief question of theology. If there is to be any separation of the fields at all for the sake of convenience, it is as well to let each field take care of its own most characteristic problem. Moreover, the effect of pragmatism on ethics has already been somewhat more thoroughly studied than its effect upon theology. And, according to Schiller, this influence is to be very great and very beneficial. It is to free us from the paralyzing horror of an “indifferent universe.” Nature “may be hostile; it may be friendly; it *must* respond in various ways to our various efforts.” And moreover, pragmatism is to stimulate our feeling of moral responsibility and to sweep away the stock excuse for fatalism, by proving that “human action is always a perceptible factor in the ordering of nature.” This involves more danger, but one might well be willing to accept these in order to escape from the “weary grinding out of a predetermined course of things.”

Second, the conception of immortality, as influenced by pragmatism, I shall omit even more entirely, largely because, while a bona-fide, theological question, it does not seem to me to be its chief question, and partly because Professor Schiller has given three chapters of his *Humanism* to the subject. In this discussion he founds a belief in immortality on the ethical postulate, the only really firm ground which has ever been found for the belief, from the time of Kant down. And the effect of pragmatism is here manifest in the validity which it gives to ethical demands in its emphasis on conduct.

Turning now to the third of the “ideas of reason,” the question becomes: “What effect does pragmatism have on the idea of God?” And of course the most general answer, the one which immediately comes to mind, is that pragmatism would make any reality, God included, a dynamic rather than a static reality.

The ordinary religious person is quite accustomed by this time

to the statement that the *idea* of God changes throughout the ages. He will follow without shock the skilful sketch of this development given by Dr. Ames in his paper on "Theology from the Standpoint of Functional Psychology," showing how the tribal religions of the Semites developed into an ethical monotheism at the rise of the Jewish monarchy, how the idea of God's transcendence was emphasized by the exile, and produced, under the stress of national humiliation, the idea of a suffering reconciler, and how finally, the modern forces of democratic feeling are changing the old monarchical view of God the ruler into a conception which shall emphasize the immanence of God in his world. This history is quite acceptable to the average religious person, as long as it is only the "idea of God" which is changing. But as soon as to the question: "How could David be called a 'man after God's heart,' when he did so many wicked things?" one makes the answer: "Perhaps God wasn't as good in those days, or as particular," then there is apt to be some objection raised. And yet what does this statement mean except that in that time, there did not exist *anywhere*, in the whole of experience, the same ideals that exist today. This contention granted, the validity of all that pragmatism has to say on the subject is granted also. And if the pragmatic tendencies in philosophy gain ground, as they seem to be doing at present, this contention will inevitably be accepted for theology as well as for philosophy.

Under this general conception of a dynamic God, there are opportunities for many differing views, depending not so much on the theologian's conviction concerning the nature of reality, as upon the particular phase of this reality which he is inclined to dignify with the name of God. And here much depends on temperament. Throughout the history of theology there have been two conflicting tendencies, one desiring a God who should include as much of reality as possible, the other a God who should be as responsive as possible to man's needs and desires. These two tendencies should not be confused with the absolutistic and pragmatic interpretations of reality, though there is a certain similarity in the difference of temperament which calls them forth. For both views of God exist among absolutists and pragmatists alike. In the one case, God is identified with reality, be it static or dynamic; in the other, with a part of reality.

It is not always recognized that this difference of opinion exists in absolutism as well as in pragmatism. The friend mentioned above, who inquired: "What are these pragmatists going to do with God?" took it for granted that the absolutists had no such difficulty, but identified God with the Absolute once and for all. But this is not the case. Some absolutists, like Mr. Bradley in one passage, expressly do not; others, like Mr. Royce, expressly do; and many, as indeed Mr. Bradley himself does in many places, shift back and forth between an Absolute which shall satisfy the religious need of unity, and a finite being of some sort who shall satisfy the demand for personality.

It is the same with pragmatism. Viewing reality as a process, it becomes possible to regard God as the entire process or as a part of it. And the second of these views is given, with accompanying pluralistic hallmarks, in the well-known passage in James's *Varieties of Religious Experience*, in which is summarized what Mr. James considers the philosophic outcome of the book:

We have in the fact that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come, a positive content of religious experience which, it seems to me, is literally and objectively true as far as it goes.

This of course does not dismiss polytheism from the rank of a very possible theory, as James takes pleasure in announcing, but it obtains the "personality" which is such a precious part of the religious consciousness. And in other essays (notably that on "Reflex Action and Theism,") James goes even farther in this direction, asserting that God is a personality like us in the sense that "both have purposes for which they care and each can hear the other's call."

It does not seem to me likely that the theologian will rest content with James's conception of God. It leaves out of account the demand for a certain unity and persistence which is felt by pragmatists as well as absolutists. It seems much more probable that the theologian will prefer to give the name "God" to the entire process of reality, and will mean by religion either, like Höfding, a "faith in the persistence of value," although a changing value, or a faith in a personality like ours, meaning by personality simply, as a writer in the *Hibbard Journal* puts it, "a unifying power which in some way binds our experiences into a continuous (changing) whole which we call our life, and which gives our life an inner aspect or meaning." For

if we are to agree to call the entire process "God," when speaking in terms of the religious consciousness, the question which at once arises is: "Can the process be called 'conscious' or not?" If not, there will undoubtedly be some who will prefer to revert to Professor James's view and apply the term "God" to that "wider self from which saving experiences come," thinking thus to gain in personality what they lose in inclusiveness. If on the other hand, the process can be said to be "conscious," the religious person feels that his needs will be met to the full—to a much fuller extent, indeed, than he usually expects to find them met in this world.

Of course the word "consciousness" is a very ambiguous term. If we are using it in the sense in which Woodbridge and James have been using it in their most recent articles, then we must admit at once that the process of experience cannot be proved "conscious." This use of "consciousness" identifies it with the cognitive processes, and then proceeds quite conclusively to deny it any continuous existence, asserting that it is merely a function of experience, sometimes operative, sometimes not. With this view, it would of course be impossible to predicate consciousness (at least in any dogmatic way) of the entire process of experience; it would even be impossible to affirm a priori that there might not be moments in which no consciousness existed in any individual anywhere in the universe.

But this view of consciousness seems at best a partial view, if we have any regard at all for the general usage of a term. Shall we then define consciousness more broadly as psychical or mental experience? And shall we predicate consciousness in this sense of God? At once we are reminded of certain contentions of Professor Baldwin, which seem to carry conviction, to the effect that the conception of mental versus physical is a dualism springing up in the process of experience. And although Professor Baldwin does not always stick to this position, and is even willing to write the term "psychical" over his first undifferentiated experience, still we cannot rid ourselves of the feeling that his first criticism was well founded, and that if the term "psychical" is to be used in this all-inclusive sense, it must be forced from its customary meaning.

What term then can be used? Well, "experience" is a broad word; it has been used to cover a multitude of sins and may perhaps

avail for one more. But it brings us back to our starting-place. God is to be the process of experience. This seems at first sight quite vague and unsatisfying. And yet, why? If we have reached the stage where we can look upon ourselves quite comfortably as a "stream of consciousness" (or, if James wants to restrict that word now, a stream of experience), why should we feel lost when told that the most we can think of reality is that it is also such a stream? We find no difficulty in concrete cases in calling a process a "person," provided there is in this process a certain dynamic unity.

To the statement that such a form of unity is hard to comprehend, I should answer that such is simply not the case. It is the one form of unity, and indeed the one form of experience, that we do know. Or, if "know" has too exclusively a cognitive significance, then say that we *are* it, we live it, we (to use again the much-abused word) experience it. And our experience is the key to all other experience in relation to which we can have the slightest cognition or feeling or volition. Take it all in all, the particular process we know will be found our best analogy for the total process.

At this point some critic, pragmatist or absolutist, will be tempted to say: "Your 'pragmatic' view of God sounds suspiciously like certain passages in Royce about the Self, and Royce, you know, is an absolutist." I confess the indebtedness. There are many passages in Royce to which the most ardent pragmatist could offer a smiling assent. And there is no reason why a perfectly good "Self" should be monopolized by the absolutists, and then, by a manipulation of the time category, turned into a timeless Absolute which is really not a self at all. In short, from one point of view, the chief quarrel a good pragmatist would have with Royce would be merely on this question of time. Once grant the reality of a process in time, that is, a process which really proceeds, and there is very little further trouble.

And just here some absolutist will ask: "Are you going back to pre-Kantian days to affirm the existence of time, as a thing through which reality moves?" Not at all. A pragmatist would be the last to assert, if I understand pragmatism at all, the existence of a long stretch of empty time, in which experience does not yet exist, but will exist some day. A pragmatist would merely assert that time and experience have the same limits, neither being "inside" the other.

Sufficient unto the evil is the day thereof. The pragmatist would simply hold Kant's point logically and consistently, that time does not indeed apply to anything outside of experience (which statement would have no meaning), but that it is a form of all experience. And experience being the ultimate category in the pragmatist's world, time thus becomes "real" not only for us, but for any God or Absolute we may postulate.

A pragmatist need offer this conception of God to the ordinary religious consciousness with no apologies or excuses of any kind. For it satisfies this religious consciousness better than any absolutist view possibly could. The only demand made by this consciousness which would seem to prefer an absolutistic solution, the demand for a God who shall be "one yesterday, today, and forever," is simply the requirement of relaxation, of rest in an experience which shall be in some way larger than ours. And I see not why this need is not met by pragmatism as easily as by absolutism. Moreover, this demand has, in my opinion, been unduly exaggerated in comparison with other demands which are for the natural religious consciousness just as insistent. Chief among these is the demand for a God who is *not* the same yesterday, today, and forever, a God whom our finite struggles can in some way advance or retard. Only so does our striving seem anything more than a mocking pretense. Going farther, the demand is for what Fiske calls a "quasi-human God," a God who is to our minds really in some sense understandable. The timeless Absolute furnishes no such God. We cannot understand it in any possible sense of the word. We cannot know it; we cannot act it; we cannot even grasp it in Mr. Bradley's "immediate feeling."

Now of course I am not insisting that all these religious views are of necessity bound up with pragmatism in just this form. The contrary views of many pragmatists would be a sufficient answer to such an assumption. The religion of a pragmatist is the result of many conditions, one and only one of which is his pragmatism. His pragmatism will undoubtedly determine the form of his belief, but he may not be temperamentally inclined toward the holding of any religious belief at all. The categories of the religious experience may not be vital for his use. My point is this: for a person to whom such categories *are* vital, pragmatism furnishes a completer and more consistently satisfactory response to his needs than absolutism possibly can.

CRITICAL NOTES

PROFESSOR ORR AND HIGHER CRITICISM

Professor James Orr's attack on biblical higher criticism deserves, and we believe is getting, careful consideration.¹ With regard to the Old Testament religion he asks, "Is it a *natural* product of the development of the human spirit, as scholars of the distinctively 'modern' way of thinking allege; or is it something more—a result of special, *supernatural* revelation to Israel, such as other nations did not possess?" (p. 4; italics ours). According to the extreme criticism which Orr assaults, the system connected with Moses in the Pentateuch does not stand at the beginning of Israel's national history, but along toward the close of its career; and even the idea of Jehovah as the creator of the world and the one, true God is a late feature, being introduced at the earliest by the eighth-century prophets. The larger part of Orr's book is devoted to showing that the radical criticism is wrong, and that the older view is right.

Dr. Orr admits, for purposes of argument (chap. iii), that the critics rightly assume two separate histories, "J" and "E," which were combined by later editors. Holding thus to the critical hypothesis, he asks what follows from it, and answers that the publication of the same cycle of stories in the same general way by two different writers proves the fixed character of the tradition at a period not later than the ninth century. He then deduces that a tradition common to both kingdoms in the ninth century must have had a settled form a long while before that period. Carrying the argument farther, Orr pushes back to the conclusion that much first-hand Mosaic material is preserved in the books dealing with the Mosaic period (p. 81).

For the purposes of argument, we are willing to grant his claim that the narratives are much older and more trustworthy than the "radicals" have supposed, and that the main outlines of the Mosaic system were present in Israel—at least in ideal fashion—a long time before the Exile. We cannot grant, however, that he has proved any definite pre-exilic *dates*. On this point he sees but two possibilities: either the critics are right, or the entire cycle of religious ideas and institutions distinctive of Israel goes back to Moses. There is no evidence that we are in such a dilemma. As we see the situation, the deadlock between adherents of the contrasting

¹ *The Problem of the Old Testament*, New York: Scribner, 1906.

views arises from the fact that both sides are in possession of truths which they have not succeeded in separating from the error common to both. The old theology, to which Orr adheres, confessedly makes the history of Israel proceed upon the basis of *motives* which do not control society elsewhere. In other words, from the standpoint of experience outside the biblical realm, the old view is *unreal* or *unnatural*. On the other hand, criticism has paved the way toward a scientific account of Israel; but it has not yet placed the history squarely within the category of real life. It is a fact which the radical critics do not seem to see, and which Orr certainly overlooks, that the phrase "natural development," in the critical use of it thus far, is a term *without concrete content*. In spite of its "naturalism," the higher criticism lacks *naturalness*; and in this the old and the new views are alike. The former really explains nothing; the latter does not explain enough. It is not because the higher criticism is wrong, but rather because it is incomplete, that there is room for attacks like those of Orr and Robertson.

In the view of Orr the antagonism between the worship of Jehovah and the worship of the Baalim was due to a moral character supernaturally impressed upon the former worship at the beginning of the national history by Jehovah, the God of the universe and the Redeemer of Israel. The critics, on the other hand, regard this antagonism as due primarily to the ethical perceptions of the great *prophets*. Orr, again, regards the priestly system as communicated by deity to Moses. The critics, on the other hand, contend that the priestly side of the religion is due to the *priests*. It is the task of a scientific exegesis to account for the phenomena of this religion as exhibited in the struggle and accommodation of these two elements.

Dr. Orr passes over all those facts in the text which indicate that the great Jehovah-Baal struggle did not begin till the ninth century. He absolutely ignores the fact that the life-work of every character in Israel's history before this late period is to be described in terms of *other* activity than that of struggle against the Baalim. On the basis of the biblical writings, which Orr on his own premises must accept, there was as much work for Elijah and succeeding prophets *before* the ninth century as there was in and after that time. Why, then, did the succession of men devoted heart and soul to Jehovah versus Baal have such a tardy beginning?

To this question, Dr. Orr would inevitably retort that there *were* prophets before Elijah, and that the history before the ninth century *was* marked by protest against the Baalim. But he would fail to note (as he has actually failed to note in his bulky treatise) that the inauguration of the new prophecy

in the ninth century was merely an *incident* of a larger movement which then first affects the history. In that remarkable period the names of Israelitish political heads first begin to be compounded with that of Jehovah; Baal-worshipping monarchs are driven from the thrones of both kingdoms, and replaced by sovereigns who were zealous for Jehovah; a sect known as the Rechabites is founded which supported these revolutions; and more miracles are alleged to have occurred than at any time except the Exodus. The general movement of the ninth century, thus variously displayed, is bound up with other phenomena running through the entire history, from the invasion to the Exile, which likewise find no mention between the covers of Orr's book.

In ignoring the so-called "conquest" of Canaan, Dr. Orr makes an omission that throws his whole historical treatment out of focus. In the Book of Judges the Israelites come pouring into the country districts, but are unable to take the many *walled cities* of the Canaanites. A good example of the situation is furnished by the fortified city Jerusalem. Many years after the invasion we find it still in the hands of strangers that were not of the children of Israel (Judg. 19:10-13). Later in the history, David occupies the city (II Sam., chap. 5). The older inhabitants are not exterminated, for David merely reaches an accommodation with them whereby he lives in the fort of Zion, and builds on an "addition" to the municipality (cf. Josh. 15:63). He not only established his capital here; he married the daughters of the older inhabitants (II Sam. 5:13). All the Israelitish characters in the Judges period were country folk. Saul, the predecessor of David, never had a capital city. David, also, at first, was a rustic Israelite, beginning life as a shepherd boy. But where Saul failed to establish a stable government, David succeeded in uniting country and city—the newer and the older inhabitants—in a single political body. In the time of his successor, Solomon, the rest of the strong Canaanite cities began to come into the biblical narrative as Israelitish cities, after having been absent from the history all through Judges and First and Second Samuel (I Kings 4:9-12). These are most interesting and significant facts, fundamental in importance; but Orr's book, from first to last, has no place for the history from this point of approach. David marks the transition of the government from country to city. After his time Israel was always ruled from the walled cities.

Along with this political evolution there went an economic development which brought the peasantry still further under control of the cities. The frequent wars and the inroads of desert clans reduced the condition of the peasantry as compared with the walled cities. The cities escaped, while

the rural districts were depleted. The farmer would have to go to war and neglect his work; and oftentimes the crops of the peasantry were destroyed by the enemy. In addition to this, the pressure of taxation always bears harder upon the farmer than it does upon the wealthy city class. Under these conditions it was the custom in ancient Israel for the smaller and less fortunate property holders to apply for loans on real security. They were accommodated by the wealthier classes, most of whom had their headquarters in the walled cities. Such loans are always obtained with great ease under a stable government; but the very situation that forces borrowing makes repayment a matter of difficulty. Property and financial power always tend to concentrate in the larger cities of every nation; and all the biblical evidence indicates that the rustic descendants of the Israelites who had originally acquired freehold estates by right of conquest were compelled to see a larger and larger share of the proceeds of their toil, and finally the ancestral property itself, pass gradually into the hands of the wealthy city class. The cities, indeed, were wealthy long before the Israelitish invasion; and they probably were not much affected by that event. On the other hand, the Israelitish clans naturally brought no considerable wealth with them from the desert.

The inevitable protest of the peasant class against the wealthy city classes came to a head in the ninth century. Its exponents were Elijah and Elisha, the first of the new prophetic line. Elijah is introduced abruptly as one of the inhabitants of Gilead (I Kings, chap. 17). This was one of the outlying and most primitive sections of Israel—"a place for cattle" (Num. 32:1). Elisha was also a man from outside the walled cities. His home was in the little Ephraimitish village of Abelmeholah (I Kings 19:16, 19). On a certain occasion the widow of one of the "sons of the prophets" came to Elisha saying, "My husband is dead; and thou knowest that he feared Jehovah; and the creditor is come to take unto him my two children to be bondmen" (II Kings 4:1). Elijah himself came forward in the name of Jehovah to rebuke with an awful curse a wealthy city man, Ahab of Samaria, who had seized land belonging to one of the smaller Israelite proprietors (I Kings, chap. 21). The facts here set in order carry the suggestion that the great struggle between Jehovism and Baalism was, *at first*, a struggle of the small country proprietors against the wealthy city classes. This is not to say that all creditors were in the walled cities and all debtors were in the country villages; it merely formulates the situation as a whole. The prophet Jeremiah, who was born in the rustic village named Anathoth, declares plainly that the Baalism of the cities has drained the life blood of the peasantry. "The Shame [i. e., *Baal*, as in 11:13] hath

devoured the labor of our fathers from our youth; their flocks and their herds; their sons and their daughters" (Jer. 3:24).

The worship of Jehovah had been brought into Canaan by the tribes who took possession of the country districts; while the worship of the ancient Canaanite Baalim had been, for many centuries, mostly connected with the shrines that were located in the walled cities where the markets were held. The tendency of city temples and altars to concentrate devotion upon themselves is visible throughout the entire field of ancient civilization. At a *later* period the organized ritual of Jehovah obeyed this law. But for a long while after the invasion the worshipers of Jehovah were stronger in the country; while the worshipers of the old Canaanite Baalim were strongest in the walled cities that survived the invasion. Thus we see how the two cults were set in a kind of contrast in different sections of the same political body. As late as the time of Elijah, Jehovah was regarded more in his old character as a god of war and a patron of desert clans than as a god of the cultivated soil, as witness Elijah's trip to Horeb. Even Hosea, in the following century, labored hard to convince the people that it was Jehovah's power that blessed the soil.

The Jehovah movement was crystallized into definite form by the policy of King Ahab, who married a daughter of the king of Tyre, and built for her a chapel in Samaria to Melkart the Baal of the Tyrians (I Kings 16:31). As Professor A. B. Davidson remarks, "it was the act of Ahab . . . that brought the movement to a head, raising, if one may say so, *the whole question of the Baals.*"² The aim of the Jehovah party is clearly stated in the biblical text (I Kings 19:16). The prophet Elijah was sitting on a mountain, far away from the sound of human strife, when the conviction was forced upon him that the peasantry must regain control of Israel's government, which had now for over a century been in the hands of the wealthy city class. Accordingly, Elisha, the farmer prophet, incited the army officer Jehu to exterminate the house of Ahab and seize the reins of power (II Kings, chap. 9). The usurper was upheld by the forces that lay behind the rustic prophets Elijah and Elisha. Prominent among these forces was the country sect of the Rechabites, whose leader Jehonadab now came forward publicly to support the revolution of Jehu and the prophets (II Kings 10:23; Jer. 35; I Chron. 2:55). This movement in the northern kingdom was matched by a like revolution in the southern kingdom. Here, the country people (the *am-ha'areks*, as the Hebrew text calls them) arose and supported the assassination of the queen and the priest of Baal, placing their own candidate on the throne in the person of Jehoash.

² *Old Testament Prophecy*, New York, 1903, p. 69; italics ours.

We are told that after all these things the country people rejoiced; but that the *city*,¹ whose population was largely descended from ancient Canaanite Baal worshipers, was merely *quiet* (II Kings 11:20).

These revolutions of course had no effect in curbing the concentration of property; and the Jehovah movement now entered a broader stage. At first Jehovah represented the demand of the peasantry for justice; while the Baalim stood for the injustice which the farmers and their prophetic spokesmen identified with the wealthy city classes. But the logic of the situation forced the movement into a stage in which Jehovah was dramatized on the side of the principle of righteousness and the Baalim on the side of iniquity in the struggle which is always going forward in all parts of human society. Although the earlier and cruder stage of the movement was necessary as a beginning, the later stage adapted it to make converts among the lower, oppressed class in the cities as well as among the farmers. Nevertheless, the Jehovah movement still found its principal support among the peasantry. Amos, the next prophet after Elisha, was also a countryman. He identified Jehovah with universal justice; but the animus of the prophet against the wealthy city class is evident. We do not know the home of Hosea, contemporary with Amos; but his book shows that he sides with the peasantry. Micah, the next prophet, was a countryman; and his book, as Professor W. R. Smith has observed, reveals clearly "the old prejudice of the country folk against the capital."³ The eighth century is a chronological pivot on which the leadership of the Jehovah movement swings round from rustics to city men. The next great prophets (Isaiah, Zephaniah, and Jeremiah) did their work in Jerusalem; but they stood on the platform built by the peasantry.

In the time of the prophet last named we reach a momentous period. There had been a great reaction against the Jehovah party during the long reign of Manasseh; but at last the pendulum swung back. In the country village of Bozkath lived a Jehovah worshiper named Adaiah (II Kings 22:1). His daughter married into the royal house of David, and gave birth to a son. At the age of eight this child, Josiah, was chosen king and placed on the throne by the *am-ha'arets*, or "party of the country people," as they are called by the critical historian Kittel (II Kings 21:24). But after Josiah had been king for about ten years the wealthy urban class had rallied sufficiently to force a compromise. Up to this late period Jehovah had been worshiped at simple altars "on every high hill and under every green tree." But the country altars were now suddenly abolished; and the ritual of Jehovah was concentrated at the capital city. The Deuteronomic reforma-

³ *Prophets of Israel*, New York, 1895, p. 364.

tion is to be interpreted, in view of the political origin of Josiah, as a compromise between two parties. Josiah, the figurehead of the *am-ha'areks*, remained on the throne; Jehovah was acknowledged as the sole god, in accordance with the platform of the country prophets; but the religious life of the people, which was closely involved with their civil business, was organized under control of the city class. The logic of the Deuteronomic reformation is clearly perceived when that movement is viewed in relation to the completed system of Judaism, which is in the hands of the very class to which the earlier prophets were opposed. With regard to the Deuteronomic revolution, Dr. Orr says that "investigation naturally begins with the finding of the 'book of the law' in the eighteenth year of Josiah" (p. 256). But this is precisely where it ought *not* to begin. We are glad to see that Cornill perceives the double nature of the reformation, even though he sounds no clear note on the controlling forces. "Deuteronomy," he writes, "represents a compromise and alliance between prophecy and priesthood, which resulted, however, in benefiting the latter only."⁴

The development of this great religion enlisted, *first*, the struggles of a debt-burdened peasantry, in order to get its ethical monotheism; and it *then* made requisition upon the wealthy urban classes in order to get the organization and machinery necessary to propagate it forward in history. All the elements of the final system were clearly set in their characteristic order before the Exile; and the post-exilic history stereotyped the results. All the interests in Israelite society were necessary to the Jehovah religion as a factor in world-history—prophet and priest, rich and poor, city and country. The great spiritual good of the religion of Israel for mankind could not have been secured if there had not been an intractable social problem at the heart of the national history. This problem was not solved by the people of the Bible, nor by any other ancient nation. It has not been solved yet. But its first function is to enforce the lesson of the Josian law book, "Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that cometh out of the mouth of God." The higher criticism, we believe, will go forward into a distinctively sociological stage. If analysis of social conditions indicates the presence in Israel's history of powerful forces tending to moralize the idea of God, why assume that the Jehovah religion got its character in such an artificial, objective way as Dr. Orr and the editors of the Bible claim?

When a biblical writer or prophet announces that Jehovah said or did certain things, we are bound to take such an assertion, to begin with, in the same way that we take the statement of King Mesha on the Moabite stone,

⁴ *Introduction to the Old Testament*, New York, 1907, p. 62; italics ours.

for example, where he declares that the god Chemosh did and said certain things. But Dr. Orr says that the religion of Chemosh cannot be compared with the religion of Jehovah; and that the religion of Moab has not won for itself the place in the world that the religion of Israel has. We reply that the sociology of Moab cannot be compared with the interesting and complicated sociology of Israel. The social situation of Israel, from the time of the covenant at Sinai down to the exile, differentiated it from all other history. Nevertheless, intricate as are the phenomena of Old Testament evolution, they lend themselves to scientific interpretation. The origin of the Jehovah cult makes no more difference to this principle than the origin of the Chemosh cult. Enough that the *idea* of Jehovah, like the idea of Chemosh, arose in the ancient Semitic world, and that it was a primary fact in Israel's life. This idea of a local god, together with the common theological usages and conceptions of antiquity, are all that we need to assume at the outset. We have a right to assume these without inquiring very closely where or how they came into existence. But granted these primary data in connection with the peculiar sociology of Israel; and we maintain that purified Jehovahism and the Old Testament as it now stands would inevitably result.

All this is aside from the doctrine that the universe is grounded in a personal God. Interpretation of the phenomena of the Jehovah movement in Israel is a problem for pure science. On the other hand, the doctrine of theism is a problem for philosophical theology. Dr. Orr does not seem to be able to keep the two standpoints apart. To him, "naturalism" is a bugaboo that drives God out of the biblical field. But there is ample room for faith in the working of a redemptive personal Providence through the purely "natural" process of Israel's history, as through the course of universal history. We go farther, and assert that science cannot gainsay confidence that God was working in a special way through Israel's history—perhaps no differently, but more intensely than elsewhere; and that he was using the development of the Jehovah cult to lift men's minds and hearts gradually up to himself until, in the fulness of time, the implicit Christianity of the great prophets attained complete expression in the life of the Son. But this, as just observed, is a matter apart from the problem of interpreting the phenomenal coexistences and sequences of Israel's history. Dr. Orr has written a large book on the problem of the Old Testament, in which he begins by confusing the fundamental categories of the subject. It will be useless for him to plead that it ought to be judged from its own special point of view. He has chosen to enter a broad field with a big book in which (we believe) he might profitably have said much that has been omitted, and

have left out much that has been said; and his book will, in the long run, be appraised, not on its own grounds, but from the standpoint of an interpretation whose terms are valid at once for modern science, philosophy, and theology.

We feel quite confident in predicting that Dr. Orr's book will not evoke a library of controversial volumes in defense of the extreme criticism which he attacks; for we believe that the biblical scholarship of today is about to enter new territory. We are far from expecting that what we have said here will change the opinions of the able author of *The Problem of the Old Testament*. But if we succeed in convincing him that the biblical material can be handled from a standpoint of which his book takes no account, we shall not, perhaps, have spoken in vain.

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THE SYNTAX OF I COR. 7:18, 27

The crisp interrogatives used by Paul in I Cor. 7:27, "Art thou bound unto a wife? seek not to be loosed. Art thou loosed from a wife? seek not a wife"—are obviously vigorous substitutes for conditional clauses which would have been more formal and doubtless less effective. A similar form of sentence occurs in 7:18 and in James 5:3, while I Cor. 7:21 exhibits one element of the construction. Professor Blass has found parallel sentences in the practical writings of the Greek orators, and properly questions whether it is necessary to treat the first clauses as really interrogative, save perhaps in origin.¹

The informal, perhaps even colloquial, character of these constructions is freshly evidenced by a third-century letter from Tebtunis recently published. This letter is an urgent message to a certain Didymus, informing him that his sister is ill and bidding him come without delay. In the course of a dozen short lines, the writer, Apion, directs Didymus to dispose of a certain turquoise tunic, in language precisely parallel in syntax to Paul's. The context will show the hasty tone of the letter.

Ἄπιων Διδύμῳ χαίρειν. πάντα
ὑπερθέμενος ἐξαντῆς ἅμα τῷ
λαβεῖν σε ταῦτα μου τὰ γράμματα
γένου πρὸς ἐμὲ ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀδελφή σου
νωθρεύεται. καὶ τὸ κιτῶνιον
αὐτῆς τὸ λευκὸν τὸ παρά σοι ἐνι-
γκῶν ἐρχ[ό]μενος τὸ δὲ καλλᾶϊνον

¹ Blass, *Grammar of New Testament Greek*, p. 302.

² *Tebtunis Papyri*, II, No. 421.

μ[ῆ] ἐνίγκης, ἀλλὰ θέλεις³ αὐτὸ πωλῆ-
 σα[ι] πώλησον, θέλεις³ αὐτὸ ἀφείναι
 τῇ θυγατρὶ σ[ου] ἄφες. ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀμελή-
 σης τὴν αὐτῆς [κ]αὶ μὴ σκύλης τὴν
 γ[υνα]ίκα σου ἢ τὰ παῖδιά, ἐρχόμε-
 ν[ο]ς δὲ ἔρχου ἰς Θεογενίδα.
 ἐρῶσθαί σε εὐχομαι.

Apion to Didymus, greeting. Put off everything, and come to me immediately upon receiving this letter of mine, as your sister is sick. And when you come, bring the white tunic of hers that you have, but the turquoise one do not bring; but if you wish to sell it, sell it; if you wish to let your daughter have it, do so. But do not neglect her in any way, and do not trouble your wife or children, and when you come, come to Theogonis. I pray for your good health.

This is clearly an intimate personal communication, of a thoroughly informal character, and the curious double conditional interrogative is plainly a well-understood colloquial ellipsis. If we may argue from the third century to the first, it bears fresh witness to the rapid, informal, sometimes even colloquial character of Paul's style. At all events, it supplies a striking syntactical parallel for an idiom somewhat unusual in Greek writings. Does it not further suggest that the originally interrogative clauses in these sentences, from being only logically subordinate, have become grammatically so, that is, that in writing *δέδεσαι*, *λέλυσαι*, and *θέλεις*, Paul and Apion were conscious of no rhetorical use of interrogative for conditional, but only of employing the most concise conditional mechanism known to them?

The use of *ἐρχόμενος* with *ἔρχου* in the last lines of the letter at once recalls the Hebrew infinitive absolute construction, used to express frequency or emphasis, which appears in Hebraistic Greek under such a variety of forms. Thus understood, it would mean: "By all means come to Theogonis." Yet there is no clear hint that the writer was a Jew, and here and in the other construction Hebrew influence is hardly to be invoked.

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³ Papyrus has *θελις*.

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

THE HARPER MEMORIAL

These two stately volumes¹ published on the second anniversary of President Harper's death are the monument he would have chosen. The university of which he was the head is indeed his monument and his name will always be connected with it. But the Old Testament was his first love; to Old Testament and Semitic science he gave his best efforts throughout his active life. The volumes are not only a tribute of affection from the men whose esteem he most prized; they make a substantial contribution to the studies he had most at heart. For this reason we say this is the monument he would himself have chosen.

It was no ordinary man who could call out such an expression of regard. Twenty-six scholars² representing fifteen institutions of learning, members of almost all Christian denominations and the Jewish church as well, have brought of their best to honor their friend. It is not too much to say that all the leading Old Testament and Semitic scholars of this country are found in this company and that our chief educational institutions here speak their word. When we reflect that he in whose honor the work was undertaken passed away at an age when most men think themselves in the prime of life; when we think further that during his later years he was engaged in the exacting work of organizing a great university, we are impressed anew by the power of his personality.

The volumes are fittingly introduced by a discriminating estimate of President Harper from the pen of Professor Francis Brown. The first point here emphasized is one in which we may find the secret of Harper's success—he gave himself ungrudgingly to his work as a teacher. If genius is an immense capacity for taking pains, Harper was a genius among teachers. The first reward came in the realization of the fact that he had made Hebrew and the Old Testament (subjects which have not had the reputation of

¹ *Old Testament and Semitic Studies, in Memory of William Rainey Harper*. Edited by Robert Francis Harper, Francis Brown, George Foote Moore. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1908. Two vols., large 8vo, xxxiv + 400 and 438 pages with a photogravure of President Harper. \$10.

² If we count the three gentlemen who had papers in preparation but who were prevented by illness from completing them in time, the number will be twenty-nine and the institutions represented will be sixteen.

being interesting) accessible and delightful to a large company of men and women. But there was more here than the conscientious and tireless industry of a great teacher. The most iron industry will not give a man a position of prominence and usefulness unless he has insight into the conditions and requirements of the time in which he lives. Harper came into his work at a time when new methods were imperatively needed. The impulse given to Hebrew study a generation before had exhausted itself. Hebrew study in the seminaries was in large part a tradition, and its first care seemed to be to keep clear of the rationalism which was supposed to be rife in Germany. American students went to Germany, but not to study the Old Testament. Those who went fell under the influence of men like Tholuck and Dörner—powerful in the field of dogmatics, but who had little of the really historic spirit when they approached the Old Testament. The enthusiasm with which they welcomed Oehler's *Old Testament Theology* sufficiently characterizes their attitude. Christlieb is said to have remarked that the American churches were to be spared the unhappy debates in reference to Scripture which had disturbed the brethren in Germany. He meant that Hengstenberg and Keil had wrought out defenses of the traditional faith which could be taken over by us without the trouble of working out our own system. Thus we should be spared much perturbation of spirit.

It is not the will of God however to spare his church the pains of its own thinking. At the very time when Harper began to teach at Morgan Park (1879) the signs of a revolution were beginning to show themselves. The Robertson Smith case had agitated the Scottish churches two years before this date; Wellhausen's *Prolegomena* had appeared in 1878; Professor Briggs was already actively engaged in teaching at Union Seminary and was contemplating a series of articles on biblical criticism to be published in the *Presbyterian Review*.

It is unnecessary to suppose that Harper foresaw all that was coming. His motto was: "Each day's portion in its day." His strength was in seeing clearly the immediate duty. If there was to be advance in biblical study, there must be sincere and intelligent study of Hebrew. If the questions which had been sprung in Scotland and Germany were to be discussed here, we must be competent to discuss them with first-hand knowledge of the documents. The amount of Hebrew imparted in the seminaries and forgotten as soon as ordination had been attained could not suffice for the crisis not far away. What the exigency called for was a more vitalized study of Hebrew. To have seen this was Harper's first merit.

The enforcement of this view would seem to be easy. The Protestant churches with one voice proclaim the word of God contained in Scripture

Harper was a constantly progressive scholar. Where he stood at the culmination of his career may best be read in the words of Professor Brown, who, speaking of Harper's work on Amos and Hosea, says: "We have in these sections more than the expositor of two books. We have the historian of life and thought in Israel who has looked with his own eyes at the panorama of events, who has caught the true perspective, who sees the past as a living spectacle full of real men and women with perplexed minds and troubled hearts; we have the student of religion and theology who has the dominant interest of life always before him; we are aware of a shrewd judgment of individual character and action; we are in the company of a practiced critic, now discussing Moses and his influence with the respect due to one of the great men of the world, now analyzing the Hexateuch, now comparing and weighing the documents which grew into the body of Hebrew law."³

With this estimate of the man we turn to the volumes which commemorate his life and work. An adequate discussion of their contents would fill another volume. We can notice only their significance as revealing the state of Old Testament and Semitic studies among us. The first thing that will impress the reader is the breadth of the field covered. We have represented here Hebrew syntax, Hebrew prosody, textual criticism, the history of exegesis, the higher criticism, Old Testament theology, the theology of the Apocrypha, comparative religion, Assyrian, Arabic, Ethiopic, and the specific question of the attitude of Moslems toward Jews and Christians. As marking the progress we have made since Harper began to teach, we recall that a generation ago the majority of the subjects indicated in this list were not taught in this country at all.

As to the quality of the scholarship revealed in the various articles it is a delicate matter for one of the collaborators to pronounce judgment. So far as I am able to estimate them they reach a high standard. All of the articles are informing and some of them are of first-rate importance. I have noticed with especial interest Torrey's discussion of the text of Chronicles-Ezra-Nehemiah, and Arnold's essay on the rhythms of the ancient Hebrews. But any of the articles will well repay study, and of the longer ones it is hardly too much to say that to work them through carefully would be a liberal education. The volumes are a mark of progress as well as a testimonial to a great teacher. Reading them with an open mind we have reason not only to be thankful for the past but to be hopeful for the future.

HENRY PRESERVED SMITH

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³ Vol. I, p. xxix.

RECENT STUDIES OF THE PSALMS

There is no book in the Old Testament at the same time easier and more difficult to interpret than the Psalms. While anyone can appreciate their beauty and understand in a general way their meaning, and while almost anyone who studies them sympathetically can contribute something either to their interpretation or their application, there is yet no book with regard to which the commentators are so hopelessly at variance—whether as to the authorship and date of composition of the Psalter as a whole or of the different minor psalters and individual psalms of which it is composed, or as to the origin and first purpose of the Psalms, their meters and metrical systems, the method of their rendering, the interpretation of individual passages and even the determination of text. The reason of this is not far to seek. Many of the psalms have sung themselves through the lives and experiences of a generation of generations, and in doing so absorbed into themselves continually new experiences, new allusions, new turns of phraseology and thought. This has resulted in the introduction into one and the same psalm of divergent views and doctrines. Sometimes in the process of development the larger part of the original poem has been eliminated; always there have been changes of language and readaptations of allusions and references. As a result of this long use of the older psalms, individual experiences and personal references have tended to lose their individuality and personality and become collective in fact through the addition of new experiences and allusions, although still retaining the personal form. And on the other hand, the existence of such psalms, as a result of their origin, individualistic and personal in form but collective in fact, has led the composers of other later hymns, in their original intent, national or congregational, to cast their compositions in the personal form. The result of all this is that one interpreter sees the earmarks of one period or locality and another of another; one perceives the personal, another the national or congregational element; one sees one sense and is blinded to another, and vice versa; and the form is as elusive as the substance. The subjective element plays a large part in all art, poetry, music, painting, sculpture. Beyond and above all rules there is a question of sensation which cannot be defined. Consequently there is always a great divergence of view with regard to the quality and method of poetry. What one age approves another disapproves. What one nation loves is not attractive to the ear or the thought sense of another nation. That which charms the sense of the few does not appeal to the ear or the intelligence of the many. It is doubly difficult to criticize the poetry of a distant age and an alien people and feel oneself with genuine sympathy into its metrical and artistic forms.

For forty years, Professor Briggs tells us in various places, he has labored on the Psalms, and especially he has devoted himself to the question of their metrical composition. We have in this volume¹ the final result of these studies and an opportunity to test his theories of Hebrew poetry in their application to the Psalter as a whole. To many scholars this will seem the most interesting and most important part of these volumes. There is no doubt that Professor Briggs has made important contributions to the study of Hebrew meter, and, through that, to the correction of the text of individual psalms; but while this is true, we are compelled to say that we do not believe that the general consensus of students of Hebrew poetry will bear him out, in the long run, in his cut-and-dried calculations of tone and measure. He is essentially a critic, not a poet. He seems to have developed a theory of what Hebrew poetry should be, and with this before him to have criticized the actual poetry of the Psalms. Stretching each psalm in its turn on the Procrustean bed of his trimeters, pentameters, and hexameters, he has not only excised words which would not fit his measure, but has mercilessly cut off whole verses, or transposed the members, thus producing a machine-like evenness which will scarcely appeal to those who have loved the Psalms for the charm of their quaint and varied rhythm. The sense he has treated like the sound; and as for the text—he has made it conform to the exigencies of his metrical system, with the result that few or none of the Psalms remain unchanged, and some are almost unrecognizable. These very serious textual changes are based almost entirely on his judgment of metrical or sometimes of sense requirements, and with the object of restoring the text of the original Psalms.

It is much to be regretted, in our judgment, that he did not translate each psalm substantially as it exists in its final form, and then analyze it into what he believes to have been its original component parts. We should then have had the Psalms to begin with, and could have taken or rejected as much of Professor Briggs's emended psalms as the evidence presented might commend to our judgment. A very desirable check, also, which Professor Briggs does not give us, is the actual text of his emended psalms. We have in fact in these volumes, not the Psalms, but Professor Briggs's theory of the original psalms which lay behind the Psalms, and these theoretical original psalms are represented to us, not in the original, but only in translation.

¹ *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Psalms.* [*The International Critical Commentary.*] By Charles Augustus Briggs, D.D., D.Litt., and Emilie Grace Briggs, B.D. New York: Scribners, 1906. 2 vols. cx+422 and 572 pages. \$3 each.

Professor Briggs realizes more fully, we believe, than any of his predecessors, the extremely composite character of the Psalms, and his study of psalm composition and development is on that account especially interesting; but it seems to us that he has failed oftentimes to reach the root of the matter, and to recognize the fragmentary character of the really original material preserved in those composite psalms. He sees, or emphasizes, in fact only one period of the development of the psalm, and that often not the earliest. Let us take, for instance, Ps. 89, which he divides into three original psalms, transposing certain verses in order to accomplish that result. The first part, or Psalm A, consists, according to him, of vss. 2, 3, and 6-15, with a liturgical addition, vss. 16, 17. This psalm was not earlier than the late Persian period, considerably post-dating the second psalm, B, which consists in his division of vss. 18-22, vss. 4 and 5, and vss. 23-46. Now, in the first psalm, A, we have, following Professor Briggs' translation, this verse;

North and south thou didst create them;
Tabor and Hermon in thy name ring out joy.

The point of this parallelism Professor Briggs fails to appreciate, his comment on the passage being: "The chief mountain peaks of the Holy Land, Tabor, commanding the great plain of Esdraelon, and Hermon, the giant of Lebanon, commanding the greater part of the entire land, representatives therefore of the mountains." But in point of fact Tabor and Hermon are the parallels of north and south in reverse order. If a poet or an orator of our own time were to say: "From north to south, from the Gulf to the Great Lakes," we should have no doubt whatever that he was neither a Russian nor a Frenchman nor even an Englishman, but an American. We should be sure, also, that he did not live in the times of the Roman republic, but since the creation of the American commonwealth. The same is true of this allusion. There is only one region in all the world where a poet could have written those words, and that is Galilee, because there and there alone do Hermon and Tabor mark north and south. They are the two conspicuous mountains which one notices from every point, and to which one involuntarily turns as landmarks: Hermon, the giant of the mountains, always visible, towering high above the landscape northward, and Tabor, not a mountain of great height, but, on account of its peculiar form and isolated position, the one conspicuous southern landmark. No one who has lived or even traveled much in Palestine could for one instant mistake this reference, and this reference, by fixing the locality of origin, carries the date of this verse back to a very much earlier period than that assigned to the psalm by Professor Briggs.

In his comment on the first stanza of Ps. 80, Professor Briggs points out that the Psalms of Asaph exhibit a peculiar interest in the people of northern Israel. Throughout that Psalter Jacob is prominent, and in certain parts, notably in the more primitive sections of Pss. 77, 78, 80, and 81, Joseph and the tribes of Joseph occupy the poet's mind. We have also in these psalms, as Professor Briggs has himself pointed out, certain peculiar phrases, such as "Shepherd of Israel," "He leadeth like a flock," which appear elsewhere only in the Elohist narrative in the Book of Genesis, and certain expressions and turns of thought which connect themselves with the north-Israelitish literature contained in the early historical books. It seems to us that the only rational explanation of these phenomena is that these psalms go back in their origin to northern Israel, and particularly to the realm of Joseph.

In the Korahite Psalter we have even more exact references to north-Israelitish localities. Like almost all modern commentators, Professor Briggs recognizes that the local references in Ps. 42 connect that psalm with the region of Dan and the sources of the Jordan. He explains this connection thus:

The internal evidence points to a Levitical singer who had been accustomed to share in the festival processions in the holy places at Jerusalem, 42:5; who was especially at home in the region of the upper Jordan and Mount Hermon, 42:7. . . . He seems to have been one of the earlier exiles, before the destruction of Jerusalem, one of the companions of Jehoiachin. (Vol. I, p. 367.)

But what an unnatural and extraordinary explanation of the evident connection of this psalm with that locality! Why should Jehoiachin, and those who were exiled with him, have tramped up to the foot of Mt. Hermon? And supposing they had done so, is it likely that a "Levitical singer" from Jerusalem would have sung about the temple feasts at Jerusalem in the terminology of the quondam temple of Dan?

The allusions to Hermon and the hill of Mizar or the little hill, and to the fountains of the Jordan, are indeed unmistakable, as are also the allusions to ritual processions connected with religious festivals. This psalm, as all agree, has undergone repeated change and enlargement, finally receiving a whole new stanza, Ps. 43, and an elaborate chorus or refrain. The Jerusalem references belong to some of these later recensions or additions. The references to the region of the sources of the Jordan belong to the primitive psalm, which it is quite impossible to restore in detail. These references are sufficient, however, to show the origin and purpose of that psalm: namely, that it was a ritual hymn composed in connection with the worship of the temple at Dan, which stood by the greatest of the sources of

the Jordan, the most wonderful fountain in the world, where deep calls to deep and the noise of the water courses is deafening, and where, also, there was a levitical priesthood descended from Moses.

There is almost as clear a reference to the same region in Ps. 46, which, strangely enough, Professor Briggs connects with an earthquake at Haifa, or some place in that neighborhood, between Mt. Carmel and the sea. (What, by the way, could a temple singer from Jerusalem have been doing in that heathen country?) Whoever visits Dan and Banias and that immediate neighborhood at the foot of Mt. Hermon, where, with a deafening roar, the Jordan springs full grown from the waters under the earth, cannot fail to feel the local force of the description of the mountains that totter in the heart of the sea, the waters that roar and foam, the hills that shake with the swelling of the same, and the river whose brooks make glad the city of God, the holy place of the tabernacle of Elyon.

If, following the indications of these references, we regard the psalms of the Asaphite and Korahite Psalters as having their origins in northern Israel, we obtain a satisfactory explanation of the use of Elohim in the middle books of the Psalter. The same influences which tended to cause the use of Elohim as the name of God in the Israelite narrative in Genesis, and which perpetuated that use, even after that narrative had been carried over into Judaea and incorporated with the Judaeian narrative, led to the use of Elohim in the second and third books of the Psalter, in contrast with the Yahawistic use of the first, fourth, and fifth books. I may add that I believe the first part of Ps. 89 to have been originally Elohist, inasmuch as by substituting Elohim for Yahaweh we obtain that assonance which seems to have been part of the poem and which is lost in those verses where Yahaweh is used.

In his comments on the first part of Ps. 19, the sun hymn, Professor Briggs suggests the possibility that it may have had its origin in a shrine of Shamash. We think that the suggestion is a fertile one, and that in point of fact not a few of the older hymns which were afterward worked over into their present form as hymns of the Jerusalem temple in the Persian or Greek periods go back in their origin to different shrines and earlier occasions.

The same lack of appreciation of the value of local references which we have noted in Professor Briggs' treatment of the Korah and Asaph Psalters makes itself felt also in other parts of this commentary, and especially in the treatment of the Pilgrim Psalter, Pss. 120-34. Not a few of these psalms contain allusions to the desert march from Babylonia to Jerusalem. This is the meaning of the reference to Meshech in Ps. 120, which Professor Briggs throws out because he supposes the psalm to have been composed

by someone familiar with the Negeb, south of Judah. It is the conditions of the approach from Babylonia also which occasion those frequent references to the hills on which Jerusalem stands, in such striking contrast with the plain of Babylonia and the dreary plateau one must traverse on the journey. Some of these psalms fairly quiver with the apprehension of the dangers of the desert, which the ordinary traveler experiences on this journey, the unseen foes of every sort, man and beast, the mysteries of nature, so alien to the life of the city dweller. Here are reflected precisely those fears which fill the mind of the city traveler of today traversing the region between Baghdad and the Mediterranean and which, according to the book of Ezra, appalled the priestly lawgiver and his comrades on their journey to Jerusalem. You see the camp fires; you share the anxiety about the watch; you experience the treachery and hostility of the Arabs who are for war when you would give them the greeting of peace; you feel the heat of the sun by day and the cold of the moon by night, those extremes of daily temperature which bring discomfort and even danger to every traveler through that region. To him who has traversed that route it seems almost impossible that anyone should fail to perceive the origin and inspiration of the poems of this Psalter. And the language of these psalms supports this view, several of them showing pronounced Babylonianisms. But if Professor Briggs has failed to appreciate the exact origin of this charming collection, the nearest approach to folk-song in the Psalter, we have at least no quarrel with the period to which he assigns them. They could not have come into existence until the temple at Jerusalem had become the goal of pilgrimage for the pious Jews of Babylonia; and while those pilgrimages began before the time of Nehemiah, they certainly did not become a general practice until after his restoration of Jerusalem.

Here we may add, not as a criticism on these volumes in particular, but rather as a criticism on Bible commentaries in general, that the best results cannot be obtained by closet scholarship alone. Linguistic and philological study and study of the cognate languages and religions must be supplemented by personal acquaintance with the land as it is today, and some familiarity with the results of archaeological research. What has been done for Greek and Latin scholarship by the schools of archaeology at Athens and Rome it is equally necessary to do for Hebrew scholarship. We must supplement the home study in our seminaries, colleges, and universities by a course of training in Palestine before we shall obtain that combination of expert closet scholarship with archaeological research and personal touch with the country, which is requisite for a proper interpretation of the books of the Old Testament.

Space will not permit extended comment in detail, but to one or two minor points we desire to call attention. Professor Briggs has failed, we believe, to apprehend the original intent of such penitential psalms, as Pss. 6, 13, 38, and 51. They are to be compared with the Babylonian penitential psalms. They were liturgical in their original intent, a part of the ritual for freeing a man from sickness and calamity resulting from unwitting sins, the sacrificial prescriptions for which ritual are contained in Lev., chaps. 4 and 5, or from bewitchment and the like. The foes of these psalms, in their original conception, were, as in the case of the Babylonian penitential psalms, sometimes the evil spirits which have possessed the sufferer, sometimes those enemies who by their machinations and charms have caused the evil spirits to enter into the man, bringing upon him sickness and calamity. In their origin this class of psalms goes back to an early period.

Professor Briggs is too anxious to refer psalms to some particular historical occasion, and especially to assume their composition by or for some king or other great man. So, for example, he refers Ps. 45 to King Jehu of Israel. It is in point of fact precisely what it calls itself: a marriage hymn. Each bridegroom is the king and each bride the queen, as in the songs contained in Canticles.

We believe that Professor Briggs is right in laying emphasis on the titles of the psalms in determining connection and date, but we do not think that he is happy in the particular titles which he has selected for this purpose. It is the actual collections of "Psalms of David," "Prayers of David Son of Jesse," "Psalms of the Sons of Korah," and the like, which are helpful in this connection, not the musical titles out of which Professor Briggs has created his *Director's Psalm Book*, his collections of *maskils*, *miktams*, etc. In the large the Psalms are chronologically arranged, representing a gradual growth of collection added to collection; at least to this extent: that the earlier psalms are all to be found in Books I, II, and III, and that the connection of psalms as to date and locality is in general to be determined by their relation in the collections in which they now stand, not by their musical assignments, which belong to a somewhat later arrangement affecting their temple use.

Professor Briggs's discussion of the musical and liturgical titles is interesting, and we suppose that there are few who will not accept as satisfactory his general explanation of *selah*, as indicating the place at which the selection might be closed, or the end of a stanza or a section, and as indicating also that a benediction should be sung at this place; except that we are inclined to think that *selah* does not necessarily indicate that the selection might end at that point, but rather that at that point an antiphon, benedic-

tion, or interlude might be sung. In his comment on Ps. 3 Professor Briggs has failed to note what appears to be a confirmation in the text of this view. The *selah* divides this psalm into three stanzas, the first two of equal length, the third a little more than double the length of either of the two preceding. In the middle of this latter stanza, into vs. 8, break the words: "Arise, Yahaweh; save me, oh my God!" which disturb the meter and which Professor Briggs, on that account, throws out. But these words come exactly at the point where the third *selah* should have been. They are, in our judgment, the equivalent of that *selah*, and give us an indication of the sort of thing that was sung where *selah* is written in the Hebrew text.

Professor Briggs's interpretation of some of the other musical terms, *maskil* and *miktam*, does not seem to us satisfying. Is it possible that the use of *maskil* at the close of Ps. 47:8 may throw some light on the liturgical sense and purpose of this word? The preceding verse reads:

Praise God, praise Him,
Praise our King, praise Him.

Then comes our verse, as follows:

For God is King of all the earth,
Praise *maskil*!

Now praise "*maskil*" is metrically an imperfect, if not an impossible verse; and it gives, moreover, no satisfactory sense. It would seem as though what is needed after the last "praise" were a repetition of the chorus:

Praise God, praise Him,
Praise our King, praise Him.

as though, in other words, *maskil* were here a technical term to indicate a repetition, without writing out in full the words to be repeated.

Professor Briggs's interpretation of the general psalm title, *tehillim*, also seems to us to lack something. This word is the same as the Arabic *tahlel*, sacrificial praise song, and marks the purpose of the Psalter in its final collection as the ritual song-book of the second temple.

Numerous and serious as these criticisms seem to be, we would not wish it to be understood that our attitude is one of condemnation or even of unfriendly criticism. The work is interesting and valuable to the advanced student, just because of its speculations and theories, like the *Encyclopedia Biblica*, but for exactly the same reason it is not a book to be commended to the uninitiated as an authoritative interpretation of the Psalter.

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As we read Dr. Thirtle's book² the disposition grows upon us to query whether it is to be taken seriously, or whether a sense of humor is required for its understanding. It is to be presumed that the former is in accord with the author's purpose, and in that light it will be considered.

The title is a misnomer; it would be more in harmony with the contents to call it "Hezekiah, the Central Figure in Hebrew Literature;" for the whole Psalter, Isaiah, and Job are considered the products of the king's pen, or of the men of his court. It may be said here that our author gives the titles in the Psalms and in Isaiah an authority not often accorded them in modern works on the Bible; and that he quotes all parts of the Bible as of equal evidential value. The book is divided into three sections, which will be considered in order.

I. *The Pilgrim Songs*, or as Thirtle insists they must be called, *Songs of the Degrees*.—This is certainly one of the most interesting collections in the Psalter, and one which has not yet received any generally accepted interpretation. It is, however, agreed that the collection once existed by itself with the title, "Songs of the Going-up," and that it is post-exilic. Dr. Thirtle examines the various theories that the title comes from the stairlike parallelism, that the songs were sung on the temple steps, that they were songs of the returning exiles, or of the pilgrims going up to keep the feasts, and he pronounces them all unsatisfactory. In his constructive work he lays stress on the fact that there are just fifteen songs, and that the correct title, to which great weight must be given, is "a song of *the* degrees."³ The fifteen songs correspond to the fifteen years added to Hezekiah's life after his seemingly fatal sickness. The degrees or steps refer to the return of the shadow on the steps or dial of Ahaz, the sign by which Isaiah confirmed his promise of the king's recovery. It is unfortunate that the shadow did not return fifteen degrees, but here stress is laid on the name, not on the number. The idea thus suggested is confirmed by reference to the writing of Hezekiah, the genuineness of which our author confidently assumes, in which the king says:

Therefore we will sing my songs with stringed instruments
All the days of our life in the house of Jehovah (Isa. 38:20).

Hezekiah's time is deemed one of great literary activity, a fact established by the statement that the "men of Hezekiah copied out Proverbs of Solomon" (Prov. 25:1).

² *Old Testament Problems: Critical Studies in the Psalms and Isaiah*. By James William Thirtle, LL.D., Member of the Royal Asiatic Society. London: Frowde, 1907. 336 pages. \$2.40.

³ If a literal rendering is to be pressed, as the author does, then we must translate—"the song of the degrees."

Four of these songs have a Davidic title (122, 124, 131, 133), and one a Solomonic (127). That authorship is accepted for these, but it is held that they were adapted to Hezekiah's age by changes in the text. The other songs were written by the king, or by his literary circle.

Dr. Thirtle takes each psalm and explains it in the light of his theory. But a single specimen can find place here. Pss. 127 and 128 are very pronounced against race suicide. Our author holds that Hezekiah had no children, was probably unmarried at the time of his sickness, since fifteen years later Manasseh came to the throne at the age of twelve years. The occasion of the Psalms is therefore obvious.

II. *The Formation of the Psalter*.—The thesis of this part of the book is that the Psalter in its present form was compiled and in large part composed by Hezekiah. All the psalms with Davidic titles were composed by the famous poet-king, but they were modified by his greater successor to suit the needs of the temple service. We have here, therefore, not so many fugitive poems, but rather a single document continuously written. This remarkable hypothesis is supported, among other things, by quotations from parts of Isaiah which are certainly exilic or later. Here again one specimen of the author's "critical studies" must find place. Take Ps. 137. It was written in Jerusalem (vss. 5, 6) but still it refers to an exile, but an exile in Babylon in the time of Hezekiah. Now Sennacherib was king of Babylon as well as of Assyria. He captured many Judean cities and carried off 200,150 prisoners, many of whom were sent to Babylon to replace the peoples transported to Samaria. These facts afford a suitable Hezekian background for the poem.

III. *King Hezekiah in the Book of Isaiah*.—It is assumed as certain that the whole book was written by the son of Amoz. Since Ahaz is named in 14:28, and since Isaiah wrote in the days of Uzziah, Jotham, Ahaz, and Hezekiah, it follows that cc. 15-66 all belong to the time of the last-mentioned king. Wherever there is a reference to an exile, it is that referred to above. This theory is worked out in great detail, but it will suffice to call attention to a few points.

The Servant of Jehovah is the good king Hezekiah. Isa., chap. 53, is explained as being occasioned by the king's sickness, in this book made the most famous illness in history. The nature of the disease from which the king suffered is easily determined from the treatment, a cake of figs. It was *elephantiasis*, the most terrible form of leprosy. That diagnosis explains some of the expressions like "his visage was so marred more than any man" (52:14). The discovery of one fact often solves other problems. The author notes that Job had long years before suffered from the same

disease. The book of Job was written by Isaiah to console the righteous sufferer, and to convince the king that in the end he would be more blessed than at the beginning.

One recalls the fact that Cyrus is named in Isa., chaps. 44 f. No problem is too hard for our author, and here he deserves commendation for ingenuity. In chap. 44 we have the words "smith" and "carpenter," part of which in Hebrew is *חָרַשׁ* (*Harash*). *חָרַשׁ* would be artificer. That was the word which stood originally in the text and referred to Hezekiah. That word afterward was changed to *כָּרַשׁ*, to adapt the passage to post-exilic conditions.

The book is interesting and in many places ingenious; but the criticism is generally fanciful and frequently absurd.

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This book on the text of the Greek Psalter⁴ is part second of *Septuaginta-Studien* edited by Professor Alfred Rahlfs. Part I (1904) contained *Studien zu den Königsbüchern*. Professor Rahlfs shows himself skilled in textual criticism. So far as the Psalter is concerned, he builds on, but seeks to advance beyond, the labors of Swete, Holmes and Parsons, Lagarde, Klostermann, von Soden, etc., on the Septuagint text. Of course, a book of 256 pages could not be exhaustive in dealing with the text of the Psalter.

In chap. i he sets before us the materials for the Septuagint text of the Psalter—the uncials and cursives, naming three uncials, L, B, and S, as belonging to the fourth century. He names some small fragments from the third and fourth centuries which he urges should be used in making the next critical edition of the Psalter. He emphasizes Lpz¹⁷⁰ which Heinrich dates from the beginning of the third century and which contains Ps. 118:27-58. As to minuscules, he adds only a few points to Holmes and Parsons' and Swete's collations. He regards MS 294 as a cursive, not an uncial, as do HP and Lagarde. He mentions several cursives that have come to light since HP's collation—two are known with precision, Lpg^v and Rom¹²⁰⁰. As to versions he names Lat, Sah, Boh, Eth, Gall, Arm, Syr, Pal, and Arab with their MS witnesses.

In chaps. 2, 3, and 4, he considers MSS under two great types of text, B and G^{vulg} (Vulgar text), thus really following Baethgen, though differing in nomenclature. He examines 129 characteristic readings and gives the relation of various MSS, versions, and Fathers to these two types of text.

⁴ *Septuaginta-Studien*. 2. Heft. Der Text des Septuaginta-Psalters. Edited by Alfred Rahlfs. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1907. 256 pages. M. 8.

Boh is nearest to B, Eth coming next. A is mixed, fluctuating between B and G^{vulg}, which proves that the latter must have existed as early as the fifth century A. D. After dealing with corrections and mixed readings, he concludes that B and the Vulgar text have influenced each other, though the tendency is to force B back into its own region, since even Boh, closely related to B, is in some MSS corrected according to the Vulgar text.

As to the relation of the Latin Psalter to the two main types, he concludes that MSS Carn, Corb, Germ, H, and R incline more to B, while Med, Moz, Rom agree more with the Vulgar text, and so, since the Latin text generally agrees with B, we may regard Carn, Corb, Germ, H, and R as Old Latin texts, while the remaining MSS are late. As to the Fathers, Hilary and Ambrosius used mixed texts; Jerome, though making three Psalters (Rom, Gall, Heb), did not follow, in his quotations, any one of them, but often went back to the Greek text; Augustine quotes different Latin texts, sometimes going back to the Greek, though R and Gall are the usual text-forms in Augustine. Professor Rahlfs dissents from Vallarsi's view that R is a recension by Augustine. His general conclusion is that the Latin Fathers did not use a uniform type of text.

Professor Rahlfs makes an interesting general conclusion as to the relation to B and G^{vulg}, of MSS, versions and Fathers: of 170 witnesses tested, 18 incline rather to B, 9 have 50 to 25 per cent. B-readings, the rest agree with G^{vulg}, with little or no B-mixture. As to time, early revisers (except Jerome in Lat Rom) follow B, but late ones entirely G^{vulg}. As to place B-texts belong to Egypt and the West, while the original home of G^{vulg} is uncertain. After the seventh century G^{vulg} prevails in the East and West. He divides B into Oä (Upper Egypt), Uä (Lower Egypt), and Western types.

In chap. v the relation of the hexaplaric text to other texts is considered, concluding that Gall is an uncertain witness for the hexaplaric text, and that the text of Syr is not hexaplaric; that the Vulgar text agrees with the hexaplaric text in only a few exceptional cases; so the general conclusion is that either Origen made as base of his hexaplaric text, a text closely akin to Oä and Uä, or Oä and Uä are strongly influenced by the recension of Origen.

As to the peculiar readings in Oä and observations on Eastern versions (chaps. 6 and 7) there is much detail work, but there are no striking conclusions. In chaps. 8, 9, and 10 Professor Rahlfs seems too sanguine as to his conclusions on recensions as based on quotations from the Fathers. Theodoret follows G^{vulg}, though Chrysostom is the chief witness of G^{vulg}, and so it presents the recension of Lucian. Cyril of Alexandria agrees more with Uä than with G^{vulg} and in Uä we see the recension of Hesychius. Justin agrees largely with G^{vulg}, though Uä, Oä, and Western readings

groundwork the Decalogue, Exod. 20:2-17, and the Book of the Covenant, Exod. 20:23-23:19, are the most important. The original Decalogue is regarded as Mosaic, the Book of the Covenant as probably prepared by the priests at Shiloh before the time of the monarchy. The other later elements, E², are interpolations made *ca.* 700 B. C. in Judah. They are all related in their tendency and theologically more advanced than E, approaching more or less to Deuteronomic ideas. Yet they are not a new source, but additions based on E itself. In the story of Joshua we have E and E² worked over by D. In the following section E's influence on the prophets and Deuteronomy is traced, but this is shown convincingly only in the case of Hosea, Jeremiah, and Deuteronomy.

In the third part there is first a beautiful characterization of J, which according to Procksch was composed in the reign of Solomon. Then follows a comparison of J and E, the result of which is that J, though older, is yet less antique and primitive than E, that there is indeed no literary dependence of E on J, both J and E being dependent rather on a third original source. From this it follows that the Hebrew legends beginning with Abraham down to the conquest of Palestine were in the main complete before J's time. The question whether this source was in written form Procksch raises especially in view of the original metrical character which he assumes for E, but he must leave it unanswered. This old source is north-Israelitish. Upon it J, who was a single writer, grafted ancient Judean legends, e. g., the Dinah-story, etc. There are thus two cycles of legends, a Judean, connected with the Leah-tribes, and an Israelitish (the main stock common to both J and E) connected with the Rachel-tribes.

Now in regard to the date of J, it is certainly the earliest that can be assigned; it is not really impossible, but the high conceptions and the comprehensive grasp of the history in J suggest a later date as far more reasonable. It cannot be denied that there are many primitive features preserved in E, but taken as a whole they are but so many details which do not weigh heavily enough to warrant the conclusion that E in general is more antique than J. Procksch's position is more difficult than that of the defenders of E's priority, for he believes that E originated several centuries after J. J's book had existed for centuries without exerting any influence before it could finally be understood by such men as Deutero-Isaiah and P. Why was it then after all incorporated by the final redaction? For though P used it, he at the same time wished to supersede it. If it had not been a popular book its combination with P would be inexplicable. Of course, one has to bear in mind that Procksch relegates to E² a good many points usually regarded as characteristic of E, e. g., the

distinction in the name of God before and after Horeb, and the tendency to remove primitive cultic forms. Yet even so the character of the remainder does not justify his position.

The theory of the independence of E is well worked out and very attractive, for it explains many things. And yet the close literary resemblance of J and E even in minute details is not explained by it. In a previous section Procksch had minimized the influence of J on contemporaries and successors without being convincing; here he does the same. It is true that E does not have J's grand, comprehensive view of history. In this he was not influenced by J. And this accounts for the fact that he has no *Urgeschichte*; he treats only of Israel's history. But in the parallel narratives the detailed resemblances are too close to permit the assertion of the younger E's independence. To what strange explanations Procksch is sometimes forced in this connection is seen, e. g., when he explains the omission of Gen., chap. 22 (E), which belonged to the original common stock as being due to the fact that to J's enlightened mind the old narrative was too cruel! Why not rather refer the story also to E²?

In the next section Procksch discusses P and its relation to J and E. The original P, purged of its later elements but including the Holiness-code, is outlined and its date fixed as the end of the seventh century. P used J and E before they were combined. The latter is not very likely, but the former is debatable.

On the basis of his literary results, Procksch gives in the concluding part a reconstruction of the early history of Israel. This portion is perhaps the most interesting, though by no means the most important. The main source for the early history is E, and there are two cycles of legends, one of the Leah, the other of the Rachel-tribes. This is for Procksch the guiding idea.

These two sets of tribes had a different history. The home of the Leah-tribes was in the region of Haran. With Moab and Ammon they emigrated thence and dwelt east of Jordan on the edge of the desert. In the Amarna-time they (Habiri) invaded Palestine, and *ca.* 1400 B. C. we have traces of them all over Palestine. Only Gad remained east of Jordan. Asher became subject to the Canaanites. Reuben settled originally at Migdal-Eder near Bethel, Simeon and Levi at Shechem. But these three tribes were driven out of their seats by the Amorite invaders about the middle of the fourteenth century. Reuben fled across the Jordan finding refuge among the Gadites. The remnants of Simeon and Levi fled southward, Simeon living on the border of the desert south of Judah, Levi becoming now priests among the related southern tribes. Judah, whose

seats were around Adullam and Timnah, Bethlehem and Hebron remained unmolested by the Amorites.

The Rachel-tribes were also of Aramean origin, living originally west of the Euphrates. They seem to have been pushed southward together with Edom by the migration of the Leah-tribes. In the South they separated from Edom and went westward settling around Beersheba. In the first half of the fourteenth century they were compelled, probably by famine, to migrate to Egypt. Only the Rachel-tribes, not the Leah-tribes, went to Egypt. Joseph in Egypt was not merely the representative of the Rachel-tribes, but also a historical person. It is most probable that a Hebrew, Joseph, was the minister under Amenophis IV, who changed the land into crownland and left only the priestly class in its influential position, perhaps because of his relations to the priests at Heliopolis.

The two tribal groups were bound together by almost nothing else but the Jahve-religion of Abraham. Possibly they had already been thus united in their trans-Jordanic seats. Abraham is not the physical but the spiritual father of Israel. The significance of the historical Abraham lies in his fundamental discovery of the spiritual character of the Jahve-religion, which resulted in the abolition of human sacrifices. He influenced both tribal groups, though he may have belonged to Leah rather than to Rachel. Isaak, the ancestor of the Rachel-tribes, is also a historical person, and his covenant with Abimelech, another historical person, is also historical.

In the reign of Merneptah the Rachel-tribes left Egypt under the leadership of Moses and crossed the sea between the Timsach and Bitter Lakes. The pursuing Egyptian army, commanded by a royal prince, perished in the returning tide. The destiny of Israel's march was Kadesh, where they stayed all through the wilderness-period. Here they came in conflict with the Amalekites and entered into friendly relations with the Kenites and the Levites, for the Levites (Aaron) were priests at Kadesh before Moses. Most likely Moses was intimately related with the priests at Kadesh, for he was a Levite and probably came from Kadesh to Egypt and brought the people back to Kadesh. Moses is not a mythical but a historical figure, who had his fundamental religious experience on Mount Sinai in the region of Gebel Musa, not at Horeb which is on the east border of Wadi Kadish. He becomes sure that Jahve, the God of the past, will be also the God of the future. This conviction eventually results in the creation of the nation of Israel. It became a nation through a solemn covenant with Jahve at Sinai whither Moses went with representatives of the people from Kadesh. The Decalogue in its original form is the document of this covenant. On the basis of it the people was organized at Kadesh

not without opposition. Through holy war the union was to be cemented. A Levite himself, son of the scattered and almost annihilated tribe, Moses led the new nation back to reconquer the ancient Israelitish territory. The first attempt to regain it by invading Canaan from the South failed. A considerable time later they marched around Edom, defeated Sihon probably with the help of Gad and Reuben, and encamped at Shittim, where they first felt the temptations of Baal-worship (Baal Peor).

The conquest of Canaan by Joshua had to do merely with Mount Ephraim, the old territories of Reuben, Simeon, and Levi, which were won by the victory at Gibeon over the Amorite coalition. Judah, Issachar, Zebulon, Gad, and Asher had remained in Palestine. Judah had not been touched by the immigration of the Rachel-tribes. Together with Simeon, the Kenites, and Kenizzites, it had wrested southern Judah from the Canaanites and maintained it against a southern alliance with Adonibezek at its head. Thus the southern tribes were cemented together.

While the house of Joseph became stronger and stronger, Dan and Naphtali were forced to migrate northward about the middle of the twelfth century. And here Naphtali and Zebulon defeated Jabin at Tabor. It is in the war against the coalition under Sisera that the national consciousness of Israel first broke through. Judah indeed still held aloof, but now that Leah and Rachel lived again together they became more and more one through their common Jahve-religion. And the sanctuary at Shiloh, to which we owe E, worked silently at this high task of welding the tribes into one great nation and thus made possible the national development under David.

All of this is very interesting, very acute and ingenious, but not convincing. It is a remarkable attempt to combine conservative and radical positions, a mixture of tenable and untenable points. Of course, there are many fine, illuminating observations, e. g., in connection with Moses, but the reconstruction as a whole is, what in the nature of the case it cannot help being, without solid foundation. It is brilliant but not substantial. It should, however, not be forgotten that this whole section is not the most important part of the book—indeed it is really a work of supererogation on the part of the author. The value of the book lies in the other parts. Not a small contribution is the conception of the whole itself; it lays emphasis on the importance of E and the study of its literary, historical, and religious problems in a large comprehensive way. Neither in the study of the history nor of the theology of the Old Testament have J or E received due attention, and this book will do much to correct this neglect. One cannot but feel grateful to Dr. Procksch for his work, for the clear and lucid statement of

the questions at issue, their impartial treatment, and his ingenious interpretations. Even though one may differ on important points, the book is a contribution of real worth, a work of distinction.

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RECENT TREATISES ON THE NEW TESTAMENT CANON

In the matter of the New Testament canon, works in English have been few and incomplete. No thoroughgoing treatise has been undertaken since Bishop Westcott's *Survey*, written more than fifty years ago, and since often amplified and republished. The point of view and not a few important historical positions there taken however, have become antiquated, and despite its invaluable collection of materials the book has been used with increasing dissatisfaction. Moreover Bishop Westcott's book, at its best estate, can never have been interesting; indeed it is doubtful if the bishop would have ventured to write as freely, informally, and entertainingly as does Professor Gregory,¹ even had he been able to do so.

Professor Gregory's work on the canon arrests and holds the reader's interest beyond any book ever written on the subject. It is not a work of reference, full of citations of current literature and strewn with the lumber of scholarship; but a book to read and to enjoy. Its pages possess a quality of vivid interest, even fascination, very rarely attained by works of like solid scholarship. With the rapid and vigorous movement of Professor Gregory's conversational style, we are carried pleasantly forward through the scenes and among the figures of early Christian history, which are made to live again before us. Our author has in a pre-eminent degree vital human sympathy, and an informal and original manner of presentation, familiar to all who have sat under his teaching. These will in these pages renew their delightful experience of his instruction, and their enthusiastic recognition of his skill and power as a teacher. It is cause for congratulation that we have at length in English an adequate treatment of the New Testament canon so sound in scholarship and so attractive in form.

It is perhaps ungracious to regret that the very strength and charm of Professor Gregory's book carry with them certain weaknesses. For a classroom manual, we should have welcomed clearer definition as to the critical points in the history of the canon, and fuller information as to the most recent treatises and discussions of them. It is certainly well that the book has not been confused and burdened with such materials, but the total

¹ *Canon and Text of the New Testament*. By Caspar René Gregory. (International Theological Library.) New York: Scribners, 1907. vii + 539 pages. \$2.50.

absence of them simply forces us to seek them elsewhere. One of these vital points concerns the genesis of the canonizing motive; how comes it that a community under the guidance of the spirit should at a certain point in its history have substituted the guidance of the letter? Had the heretics something to do with it, as Harnack would have us believe? Did the New Testament canon emerge silently and simultaneously, in all parts of the world, from the collective consciousness of the churches, or did it originate in one place and thence spread, under powerful ecclesiastical influence? And if the latter be the case, what was the place of its origin? The study of the rise of the canon seems to many to be the study of a series of problems, such as these, and to be most helped by clear statement of the successive problems and definite direction to the best solutions of them. Professor Gregory has conceived his task quite differently. In some details, the positions taken require qualification. Certainly 117 A. D. is much too early for the earlier part of Diognetus, and thirty years later is still much too early for its closing chapters. We must suppose a slip here (p. 73). The old view of the second-century origin of the Peshitto shows itself on p. 156, although it is advanced with all diffidence. But we cannot escape the conviction that that position, however diffidently advanced, is likely to produce serious misconception in the history of the rise of the canon. If the canon did not exist in Syria in A. D. 170—and that it did seems to be pure assumption—it is a fact of decisive importance, for all the other second-century witnesses to it can be directly connected with Rome. But if the framing of the canon can be traced to Rome, and be shown to have spread thence throughout the world, that action can be understood only in connection with the founding of the Catholic church, of which great enterprise it formed an integral part.

As an authority upon the Greek manuscripts of the New Testament, Professor Gregory is acknowledged pre-eminent. His *Prolegomena* in Latin and his *Textkritik* in German are the standard and indispensable works of reference in this field. The part of the present work dealing with the New Testament text is no mere English counterpart of these. It is a continuous account of ancient writing materials, the ancient Greek manuscripts of the New Testament, the various versions of it, the editions of it, the history of the text, and the detailed discussion of various passages. To this part of his work, Professor Gregory's wide and direct acquaintance with the scenes, the men, and the books dealt with contributes extraordinary elements of interest and value. The account of the manuscripts is summary and popular, and presents what is most interesting as well as what is most important about each. In the sketch of textual history Professor Gregory

professes himself a follower of Westcott and Hort, of whom he says, that they "did more than anyone else ever did to place the history of the text of the New Testament upon a sound basis" (p. 463). His discussion of the printed text and its editors, from Stunica and Erasmus to Nestle and Von Soden, is frank, keen, and intelligent. His effort to group cursive manuscripts according to scribes or schools of writing is especially helpful and promising. In his acceptance of Westcott and Hort's view that the Peshitto reflects the Syrian revision, arrested after its first stage, Professor Gregory seems oblivious of the powerful arguments recently advanced, notably by Burkitt, for the fifth-century date of the Peshitto, a finding which demands a modification, and perhaps a serious one, in Dr. Hort's brilliant theory. It is hard to realize, as we close this learned and delightful volume, that within six weeks of its appearance textual students have learned of a new uncial manuscript of the gospels and another of the Pauline epistles, recently brought to America and now awaiting critical examination, which promise to take rank among our most important and ancient textual witnesses. Truly the age of wonders is not past.

Mr. Ferris sketches the rise of the New Testament canon with bold and telling strokes.² He thinks the existence of a New Testament canon no matter of course, like a river, which has only to be calmly traced from its sources to its mouth, but rather like some rocky cliff, thrust up by an internal convulsion, the nature and occasion of which have to be investigated. The early church, relying upon the spirit's guidance, had no immediate need for a closed canon of scripture, but when the speculations of the heretics and the eccentricities and even excesses of Christians claiming the old prophetic gifts, began to produce confusion in Christian thought, Christian bishops, especially at Rome, where the regulative disposition seems always to have prevailed, found a means of correcting this confusion in a closed canon of authoritative scripture. The author thus relates himself, in his view of the rise of the canon to Professor Harnack, whose illuminating interpretation of this history has certainly never been surpassed. Mr. Ferris has clothed a well-known position in a clear, vigorous, and trenchant form, and his work is a welcome addition to the current, if not to the permanent, literature of the subject. His attention to the character and fortunes of those early Christian books which did not find their way into the canon is especially well bestowed, since what books were left out is of hardly less importance to the understanding of the process and its motive, than what books were taken in. Rome is the focal point in the process with Mr.

² *The Formation of the New Testament*. By George Hooper Ferris. Philadelphia: Griffith & Rowland Press, 1907. 281 pages. \$0.90 net.

Ferris, and we must believe that he is right. Indeed, in spirit and in execution this is a strong study of the thought and life of the churches of the first two centuries. Some statements are perhaps a little overdrawn, for example, that "the Shepherd of Hermas was probably more widely read and admired than any book now in our New Testament" (p. 17). And it is hardly true that Irenaeus "prided himself on the fact that in his very early years he had been a pupil of Polycarp" (p. 182). There are some misprinted names on pp. 53, 248, 274.

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Professor Leipoldt of Halle-Wittenberg publishes in the book under review³ the first volume (*die Entstehung*) of his history of the canon of the New Testament. The second volume, dealing with the completed canon in the church, is promised within a twelvemonth. The work is characterized throughout by the infinitely painstaking and exhaustive research of the German scholar. The wealth of source material in the notes is almost bewildering. The author has taken up into his work the immense labors of Credner, Lipsius, Zahn, and Harnack on the canon, and has brought to bear on the theories of these scholars a criticism at once fresh and convincing. His own remarkable work in the field of early Egyptian and Syrian Christianity has fitted him to make new contributions of great importance to the history of the canon in the Alexandrian and Syrian communities.

After a short section showing the attitude of the early Christians toward the Old Testament and the significance for the formation of the canon of the New Testament of such a dogma as verbal inspiration and its corollary, allegorical exegesis, the author proceeds to treat the early Christian literature out of which the New Testament was formed under three heads: Apocalypses, Gospels, Apostolic Letters and Acts. Each of these three topics is treated again in a threefold scheme dealing with the authority underlying the type of literature considered (first age), the way in which that literature became Holy Scripture (second age), and the determination of the exact bounds of that literature in the canon (third age). For example, under the Apocalypses, first we have a study of the authority of the Prophets in the early church, then the story of how the written and ancient prophecies came to be regarded as Scripture in the anti-Montanistic struggle, and finally the circumstances which limited the apocalyptic literature that found final acceptance in the church at large to the Revelation of St. John.

Among the many excellent qualities of Dr. Leipoldt's work—its scholar-

³ *Geschichte des neutestamentlichen Kanons*. Erster Teil: Die Entstehung. By Johannes Leipoldt, Ph.D. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1907. vi + 288 pages. M. 3.60.

ship, its pleasing style, its appreciation of individuality in the early fathers, its constant insistence on a psychological factor in the determination of ancient dogmas—we would point especially to a certain saneness and largeness of view, too seldom met with in historians of much controverted questions. There is no thesis to be defended in this book. Inexorable logic does not frighten the author into sacrifices of material or method for conformity's sake. He tells us plainly that men who are in the midst of a development themselves cannot see it with the definiteness of perspective of those who live centuries later. So an Irenaeus can be both mistaken and sincere when he refers the authoritative episcopate, which he was himself helping to develop, to the age of the Apostles. Dr. Leipoldt's largeness of view also shows itself in his refusal to see in any single formula, such as a process of weeding, or a process of combination, or a product of the strife with Montanists and Gnostics, the key to the formation of the canon of the New Testament.

Despite the relief of an excellent style the book suffers somewhat from the ponderousness of its learning, and gives the reader the unpleasant sensation of being unduly solicitous to record every testimony, grave or slight. The sense of overburdening is still further encouraged by a great number of *Zusätze* in fine print, in many of which it is impossible to discover the reason for a different size of type from that of the main text. But the only serious adverse criticism to which the book seems to us to be obnoxious is the position taken by Dr. Leipoldt in his *Rückblick* on the significance of the canon as Holy Scripture. In full and reiterated agreement with Luther's definition of Scripture as, "Was Christum treibt," Dr. Leipoldt still finds our actual, and in many parts amply proven accidental, canon of the New Testament providentially complete and exclusive; and after brilliantly proving, in the historical-critical part of his work, the composite character and unequal value of the books making up the New Testament canon, he speaks of the whole collection as a *single* piece of edifying literature with which no other can compare ("Es gibt keine Schrift . . . die sich an . . . erbaulicher Bedeutung mit dem N. T. messen könnte," p. 269); and he further congratulates the church on getting rid of the Barnabas Letter (which he calls "*sehr lehrreich*"), on the ground that "Schwierigkeiten ohne Zahl hätten sich an seine Fersen gehaftet!" As if the "canonical" Letters to Timothy and the Ephesians could show clean heels to all *Schwierigkeiten!* That the highly prized Epistle of Barnabas was rejected while the trivial Epistle to Philemon was kept certainly has another reason than the application of Luther's canon of criticism.

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JESUS IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT GOSPEL CRITICISM

Phases in the life and thought of Jesus, in the light of modern gospel criticism, are treated by several books here brought together for examination.

Jülicher, in October, 1906, reviewed briefly the work of five previous years upon the criticism of gospel tradition.¹ His views are especially interesting, both because of his competency to pass judgment and because of the importance of the field. He begins by sharply challenging Schweitzer's assertion that modern criticism has produced only negative results and that historical study fails utterly the purposes of religion so far as present needs are concerned. He will concede that the Jesus whom Schweitzer finds in the gospels—a volcanic apocalyptic visionary—is inadequate for present religion, but such a Jesus is Schweitzer's own creation on the basis of an arbitrary and inadequate criticism. He ridicules the idea that the appearance of a book by Schweitzer and by Wrede on the same day in 1901 marks an "epoch," since which historical criticism has made no progress and consequently has been compelled to give itself to popularizing. He believes thoroughly in the validity of the historical method, not as a means of awakening new spiritual life but as necessary to clarify faith and make it more intelligent. Therefore Jülicher notes the new elements in recent criticism of gospel tradition, pointing out what seems to have permanent value and indicating the lines along which future work will be pursued. Wrede's *Messiasgeheimnis*, Wellhausen's recent writings on the first three gospels, and Harnack's *Lucas der Arzt* claim his chief attention.

According to Wrede, Mark's gospel is the outgrowth of primitive theologizing. Jesus had made no messianic claims, but the messianic faith of the community read itself back into his earthly career. He must have been then what they so firmly believe him to be now, the Messiah—or at least he must have expected to become such. But this fact had not been generally recognized by his followers, hence the theory of the hiding of the Messiah, as in Mark. Jülicher rejects this conclusion but commends Wrede's critical spirit. It should teach future investigators the necessity of recognizing that even the earliest tradition cannot be assumed to be entirely free from the bias of the first interpreters. The weakest point in Wellhausen's work is thought to be his depreciation of the value of the logia material as compared with Mark; his picture of the earthly Jesus is also too colorless, and is insufficient to account for the vitality of the first believers'

¹ *Neue Linien in der Kritik der evangelischen Ueberlieferung*. Von Adolf Jülicher (Vorträge des Hessischen und Nassauischen theologischen Ferienkurses. Heft 3.) Giessen: Töpelmann, 1906. 76 pages. M. 1.60.

faith. To say that their exalted religious confidence was merely a creation of their own, based upon the catastrophic close of Jesus' career, makes too strong a demand upon the creative genius of the community. While Jülicher admits that no extant document carries us back to the actual Jesus, he will not grant that the real Jesus differed radically (as Wellhausen seems to think) from the first believers' account of him. Jesus was the creator of the community, and the gospels are greater than the first church. Had Harnack's *Sprüche und Reden Jesu* been in hand it would have given additional significance to Jülicher's review. As it is, he has some misgivings regarding Harnack's conclusions. The identity of authorship for the we-document and the rest of Acts does not appeal to him, nor does he think a companion of Paul would have presented so colorless a life picture of the apostle as that found in Acts. Moreover, to suppose Luke's special material (e. g., the account of the prodigal son, etc.) came from the ecstatic Philip and his hysterical daughters seems to Jülicher somewhat incongruous with the thought content of these narratives. Yet he is in sympathy with Harnack's inclination to trace all tradition back to Palestine, and he especially praises a chance remark in which Harnack suggests that the gospel of Matthew arose in the Hellenistic branch of the Palestinian church to refute the Jews. Hence the ease with which it supplanted Paulinism and took first place in the Greek church.

Jülicher is hopeful for the future of critical investigation in the gospel field. One thing he regards as now established: the synoptic tradition comes almost entirely from Palestine, where it was written down by believing Jews even before the first generation passed away. This conclusion does not prove the authenticity of all tradition; it is still necessary to examine the thought of the primitive community with care in order to eliminate more accurately material distinctive to it.

Schmiedel is so well known through his articles in the *Encyclopaedia Biblica* that his published address² is especially important as a constructive presentation of the results of his critical work upon the gospels. He selects nine passages which he calls the foundation-pillars of a truly scientific life of Jesus. These statements, from their very nature (e. g., "Why callest thou me good?"), could not have been invented. He finds much else in the gospels that is in line with the "foundations," and so is able to reconstruct a portrait of Jesus which he thinks corresponds with reality. This Jesus is primarily a man of deep religious convictions, but still a man of his

² *Die Person Jesu im Streite der Meinungen der Gegenwart*. Vortrag, bei der 17. Hauptversammlung des schweizerischen Vereins für freies Christentum zu Chur am 11. Juni, 1906, gehalten von P. W. Schmiedel. Leipzig: Nachfolger, 1906. 31 pages.

own time. He did not at the beginning of his career think of himself as the Messiah, but when the compelling force of his religious convictions drove him to criticize Israel's most sacred institution, the law of Moses, he inferred that his mission must be messianic. Thereupon he adopted the apocalyptic programme, though his earthly life in the main was not lived in any high state of excitement—he preserved to the end an inward balance of thought and feeling. But he is in no sense to be regarded as divine. Here is Schmiedel's confession of faith (with his own italics): "My inmost religious convictions would suffer no harm were I forced to conclude today that *Jesus never lived at all.*"

Mehlhorn³ and Robertson⁴ take a more comprehensive survey of Jesus' career. Each book is written in popular style, and so reads interestingly. The former writer takes the current critical view of tradition, which recognizes that the gospel story is not all to be taken literally; in fact some entire narratives were originally pious fiction. In general, however, the synoptic representation is true, and Mehlhorn sets forth accordingly the facts which he thinks to be trustworthy—a life picture of Jesus in which the apocalyptic interpretation of his messiahship is made central. Robertson, on the other hand, pays little attention to the results of modern historical criticism, though he professes to write "in the light of modern knowledge." One would never imagine from his treatment that there was such a thing as a scientific examination of early tradition. But the book does not suffer so seriously from this defect as might be supposed. Of course to the historical inquirer it will be valueless, but it will be found helpful for those who wish a devotional study based upon some crucial experiences in the life of the composite Christ of all four gospels.

Kratz⁵ is concerned to discover the gospel portrait of Jesus' personality. He has no sympathy with modern gospel critics, who, as he thinks, are merely able to substitute the "findings" of their fancy for the real historical documents, the four gospels. To question the complete reliability of these is to forfeit one's right to the title Christian. Then the pendulum of the author's judgment swings to the other extreme. The Jesus whom he discovers, omitting no part of the gospel record, is only a man, a good man,

³ *Wahrheit und Dichtung im Leben Jesu.* Von Paul Mehlhorn. (Aus Natur und Geisteswelt: Sammlung wissenschaftlich-gemeinverständlicher Darstellungen.) Leipzig: Teubner, 1906. iv+132 pages. M. 1.25.

⁴ *Epochs in the Life of Jesus.* By A. T. Robertson. New York: Scribners, 1907. xii+190 pages. \$1 net.

⁵ *Die Persönlichkeit Jesu nach den Evangelien.* Von Heinrich Kratz. Leipzig: Nachfolger, 1906. 63 pages.

deeply spiritual, most highly favored of all men in God's sight; yet he is deluded as to his future hopes, the wish being father to the thought. How strange that God, who arbitrarily delegated to this man miraculous powers in order that men might believe in his unique teaching, should have allowed him to teach so obvious an error about the future world-programme! The author's efforts at toning down the Christology of the Fourth Gospel are more amusing than interesting.

Fendt⁶ and Bischoff⁷ deal with special historical problems, Meyer⁸ and Schnedermann⁹ with items that have a theological bearing. Fendt gathers all evidence touching the question of the length of Jesus' public ministry, and after carefully weighing the data concludes that it cannot be supposed to have covered much more than one year. Perhaps it began some time before a Passover season and closed at the time of the next Passover. The work is a valuable reference booklet. Bischoff aims to prove that Jesus' thought, as compared with that of the rabbis, is original in all essential points; and it is assumed that Matthew preserves Jesus' teaching in its most original form. After laying down cautious rules for criticism, the material of Matthew, chaps. 5-7, is treated *seriatim* to prove Jesus' independence; but the "kingdom of Heaven" is treated in a separate section. The "kingdom" for Jesus had a different meaning from that entertained by the Jewish writers before him and by the rabbis after him; and only the much later rabbis connected a meaning similar to his with a wholly different expression, "the future life." The unique work of Jesus was the spiritualization of the "kingdom" idea. While Bischoff is probably on the right track, his treatment is inadequate because of its brevity: the peculiar content of Jesus' thought seems sometimes assumed rather than proved, and too little notice is taken of the possible influence upon Jesus of contemporary eschatological Jewish ideas. Meyer discusses the conception of "life" according to the gospel of Jesus from the standpoint of historical

⁶ *Die Dauer der öffentlichen Wirksamkeit Jesu.* Von Leonhard Fendt. (Veröffentlichungen aus dem Kirchenhistorischen Seminar München. II. Reihe Nr. 9.) München: Lentner, 1906. viii + 148 pages. M. 3.50.

⁷ *Jesus und die Rabbinen: Jesu Bergpredigt und "Himmelreich" in ihrer Unabhängigkeit vom Rabbiniismus dargestellt* von Erich Bischoff. (Schriften des Institutum Judaicum in Berlin Nr. 33.) Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1905. 114 pages. M. 2.20.

⁸ *Das "Leben nach dem Evangelium Jesu."* Von Arnold Meyer. (Sammlung gemeinverständlicher Vorträge und Schriften aus dem Gebiet der Theologie und Religionsgeschichte 44.) Tübingen: Mohr, 1905. 44 pages. M. 0.75.

⁹ *Das Wort vom Kreuze religionsgeschichtlich und dogmatisch beleuchtet. Ein Beitrag zur Verständigung über die Grundlagen des christlichen Glaubens.* Von Georg Schnedermann. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1906. 74 pages.

interpretation, and then comments upon its permanent validity for religion. The "kingdom" is the theme of Jesus' preaching; it is to be set up on earth, even in Jerusalem, and it comes through God's power; but it is to be realized primarily in men's hearts. It means salvation to men because they have thereby come into fellowship with the Father, and this is the essence of life according to Jesus' gospel. This truth has permanent significance because it indicates what was and ever will be the true way of salvation—inward God-likeness expressing itself in loving service to men, and humble trust in God. But Schnedermann would attach prime significance to the "cross." He regards the "word of the cross" (I Cor. 1:18) to have been the essence of Paul's gospel. Its central meaning for him was the abrogation of the law; but to Jews it was an offense because it did away with the necessity of circumcision, and to Greeks foolishness because of their anti-Semitism. But this fundamental fact of Paul's faith has a remarkable present religious worth; it is the proper "viewpoint for the exposition of Christian teaching in the past and present." The consequent inferences for doctrinal theology are summarized in fourteen closing paragraphs.

Völter¹⁰ and Schlatter¹¹ write about Jesus' messiahship. Völter's conclusion stands in direct opposition to that of H. J. Holtzmann, whose treatment of the same theme appeared nine months earlier. Holtzmann had said that Jesus either did not claim messiahship at all, or else claimed it in the apocalyptic sense as "Son of man." Völter will accept neither horn of this dilemma. So far as the linguistic evidence goes, he agrees that the phrase in Jesus' day could have meant *mankind*, *a man*, or the apocalyptic *Messiah*. The evidence of the New Testament alone will determine the significance of Jesus' usage; and first place should be given to the testimony of the earliest literature, namely, the primitive portions of the Johannine apocalypse and the original sections (Völter is an expert with the scalpel) of Paul's epistles. Here Jesus is not the "Son of man" but the slain lamb, the one who dies for men; that is, the suffering servant of God (Isa., chap. 53). This, the oldest and most original tradition, presumably reflects Jesus' own conception. But how are the "Son of man" passages to be explained? In several instances the original significance was "man" (the ordinary meaning of the Aramaic); and other occurrences where messianic meaning is evident are due to the primitive theologians. Interpreting Jesus' inner consciousness accordingly, it is found that his assumption of messianic

¹⁰ *Das messianische Bewusstsein Jesu*. Von Daniel Völter. Strassburg: Heitz. 47 pages. M. 1.50.

¹¹ *Der Zweifel an der Messianität Jesu*. Von A. Schlatter. (Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie. XI. Jahrgang, 1907. 4. Heft.) Gütersloh: Bertelsmann. 75 pages. M. 1.50.

office is reached by gradual steps during his ministry. He began activity as an assistant of John in proclaiming the nearness of the kingdom; and the death of the Baptist, whom he recognized as Elias who was to come, awoke in him practically the first hints of his own mission. This conviction, interpreted in the Isaian sense, increased in strength until he finally came to look upon his approaching death, in submission to the divine will, as the final proof that he was God's chosen servant. His exaltation to lordship would come when, with the near approach of the end of the world, the general resurrection would take place. In this representation one is struck with the serious impoverishment of the richness of Jesus' inner life; but the monograph has some value as a protest against the one-sided tendency, at present prevalent in several quarters, to interpret Jesus as essentially an *Apokalyptiker*. But the corrective for this error probably is not a leveling of his life down to that of an Old Testament prophet. The wealth of his spiritual life-content is too great to be compressed within the compass either the prophetic or the apocalyptic mold.

Schlatter does not examine Jesus' inner consciousness, but makes a plea for the recognition of the kingly dignity of his messianic majesty. Those who think the historical records are not primarily an attestation of Jesus' "kingly will" are likened to the teachers of Capernaum and the theologians of Jerusalem. They fail to recognize that not words but power is the essential thing in kingship—"the king proves himself to be such by his work which is demonstrated with respect to Jesus by his absoluteness in matters of religion. Of course there are restraints manifest in his career, for example, his breach with Israel growing out of his call to repentance, but the very content of this message is witness to his "kingly thought." He was also dependent upon the word as a means of expressing his will, but this word as spoken by him was no ordinary religious teaching—it came from God and revealed his will, therefore had "absolute worth." Moreover, Jesus shows a certain amount of passivity toward his kingly name, but this is because he wishes to emphasize God's supremacy. It may fairly be said that no part of the argument will adequately meet any particular phase of doubt that is likely to arise regarding Jesus' messiahship.

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There are four problems discussed in the four essays of Spitta's book,¹² *The Geographical Disposition of the Life of Jesus according to the Synoptics*,

¹² *Streitfragen der Geschichte Jesu*. Von Friedrich Spitta. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1907. viii + 230 pages. M. 6.80.

The Great Confession of Peter and the conversation of Jesus with the disciples at that time, The Question of Jesus concerning David's Son and David's Lord, and Christ the Lamb. Of these, the discussion of the first is the most detailed, and the discussion of the last is the most original and the most interesting. Spitta himself is half inclined to apologize to the critical school for the fact that his conclusions are for the most part conservative. He declares however that this is not his fault, for his methods are scientific throughout; and he challenges anyone who is dissatisfied with the results to show where these methods are faulty at any point. Very characteristically he suggests that both conservatives and radicals are in danger of running in ruts, and he claims perfect freedom from prejudice in his own investigations. He looks upon these matters with fresh eyes, as if a whole flood of critical essays had not already been poured over them. He seldom quotes from other authorities, and only when they seem to aid in the presentation of his own view.

In the first essay Spitta divides the life of Jesus into eight periods and studies the synoptic account of each in turn, with a view to determine the geographical setting in each case. He concludes that Mark confines the active ministry of Jesus, after the baptism in the Jordan, to Galilee. In this narrative Jesus never goes to Jerusalem until he goes there to die. Matthew presents a similar picture. Luke differs radically in putting the beginning and the end of the ministry of Jesus in Judea. Between these there is a double stay in Galilee, the two portions of which are divided by a long period of activity again in Judea. Luke is nearer John at this point than he is to Matthew or Mark; and John's account cannot be set aside until Luke's great insertion has been explained more satisfactorily.

In the second essay Spitta discusses the place of the narrative of the day at Caesarea Philippi in the synoptic tradition, the meaning of the speech made by Peter, and its significance in the life of Jesus. In the third essay the claim of Jesus that he was David's Son is studied in connection with the question concerning the greatest commandment and the question of the Sadducees concerning the resurrection, and then in its setting in Luke, and finally in Matthew and Mark; and the conclusion is that Bousset is wrong in saying that Jesus denied the Davidic sonship of the Messiah, for on the contrary Jesus without any hesitation represented himself as David's son.

In the fourth essay we come upon the interesting result that the later church conceptions of Jesus as Lamb and Shepherd have absolutely reversed the original presentation by Jesus himself. His whole conception was a noble one, that of the protector and defender of the flock. In his use of

these figures Jesus did not think of passive suffering and patient endurance of evil, but rather of active leading and fighting in behalf of the weak. Spitta shows that this more heroic attitude is that presented in the Book of Enoch and the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs and the later interpretations of Old Testament types.

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RECENT DISCUSSIONS ON THE VIRGIN BIRTH OF CHRIST

Professor Allen¹ attempts to show that a modern man may be a clergyman in the American Episcopal church, subscribe to its creed, and take the necessary oath of the clergy without stultifying his conscience. But while the book is restricted to a concrete denominational question it retains interest for the general reader because of the historic significance of the Anglican and Episcopal church, the principles involved in the church's rulings, and the various interpretations of the Apostle's Creed, especially of the virgin-birth clause. The author is well aware that to insist upon the Creed in its "catholic" sense is to bar many honest men from the ministry and discomfit others who are already serving in holy orders. But since every clause in the Creed has been interpreted by the church in a different way from time to time it therefore follows that the ordination vow does not bind the minister to any one traditional interpretation.

One feels that Professor Allen has done justice to the Articles of Religion of his church, when he points out that their original purpose was to guarantee the very freedom for which he pleads, viz., an appeal from tradition to the commandments of God as they are found in the Scriptures. He further shows that the church regards "the Scriptures as the word of God containing all things necessary to salvation," and not as an infallible or inerrant oracle.

The section of the book devoted to the virgin birth demonstrates that the primary purpose of the credal phrase "born of the Virgin Mary" was to refute Doceticism. In his desire to show that the church's interest in the virgin birth was relatively late, the author overstates the case as follows: "Turn to the Christian apologists of the age before Constantine for the impressive contrast. Very little had they to say about the virgin birth and nothing about the Mother of God." So far from this being the case, references to the virgin birth are numerous in practically all of the ante-Nicene Fathers and the theological import is considered as very weighty. Upon

¹ *Freedom in the Church; or the Doctrine of Christ.* By Alexander V. G. Allen, D.D. London, New York: Macmillan, 1907. xi + 223 pages.

the basis of the virgin birth the Fathers prove now the divinity and now the humanity of Jesus, as well as his sinlessness, mediatorship, and headship of the new race in him, the new Adam.² This is true of Methodius, Lactantius, Archelaus, Malchion, Novatian, Hippolytus, and in a degree of practically all the Fathers back to Ignatius.

As to the expression "Mary the Mother of God," it is found in Arche-laus' Disputation with Manes, § 34. Of course there is the possibility of interpolation. To say that Arnobius made no reference to the virgin birth carries little weight in view of the immediate issue which confronted him in the gross heathen idolatry from which he had so recently been converted. His apology was of so primary a nature as to forbid emphasis upon the disputed elements of Christianity or upon anything but the barest fundamentals of faith. What Arnobius does say is, "You worship, 'says my opponent,' one who was born a mere human being. *Even if that were true,* as has been already said in former passages, yet, in consideration of the many liberal gifts which he has bestowed on us, he ought to be called and be addressed as God" (*Adversus Gentes*, I, 37).

The attempt of the author to bring the ante-Nicene Fathers to our way of thinking is apparent and may explain the strange arrangement which places the Patristic material under the caption "Modern Sensitiveness." One is sometimes at a loss to understand Dr. Allen. For example in his preface (p. v), "No amount of practice in ethical theorizing qualifies for judgment on the complicated issues of religion. For religion constitutes a department of life by itself, independent of science or ethics or philosophy;" and on p. 40, "the world has been revolutionized, new issues have arisen, the outlook upon life has changed. The new learning, the modern sciences have modified our beliefs." The first statement needs explanation in the light of the second.

In conclusion it should be said that the book is fundamentally right in its contention for liberty and in its interpretation of the Apostles' Creed. It is a valiant attempt to show that the traditional Roman armor, although heavy to be borne, has enough joints and therefore enough flexibility to at least be endured by the modern ministerial hero in the Episcopal church.

Among the many books which are being written in defense of the historicity of the gospel infancy stories and the traditional view of the virgin birth Mr. Sweet's is undoubtedly among the best.³ The writer seldom

² See *The Virgin Birth*. By Allan Hoben, Ph.D. The University of Chicago Press, 1903.

³ *The Birth and Infancy of Jesus Christ According to the Gospel Narratives*. By Rev. Louis Matthews Sweet, M.A. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1906. xiii + 365 pages.

lapses from a strictly judicial frame of mind, while at the same time the conscious importance of his task guarantees painstaking study and clarity of statement. A little warmth, however, is pardonable in one who believes that "no portion of the Scripture has contributed more to the maintainance of a complete and adequate Christology in the faith of the church," and for whom "the issue of the investigation has been an assured belief in the authenticity and authority of the infancy narratives." While the author makes the virgin birth the chief question in Christology and agrees with Lange that "without the virgin birth a man cannot understand any incident of Christ's life perfectly," he nevertheless concedes that it does not involve "the stability and integrity of the Christian faith as a whole."

The book contains, besides the preface and an introduction by the Rev. James S. Riggs, D.D., chapters upon "The Statement of the Problem," "The Influence of the Old Testament Prophecies in the Formation of the Infancy Story," "The Theory of Late Jewish-Christian Interpolation," "The Theory of Late Composite Origin," "The Theory of Early Mytho-Theological Origin," "The Theory of Heathen Influence," "The Exegetical Construction of the Sections," "The Uniqueness of Christ in Its Bearing upon the Question of His Birth," and "The Doctrinal Construction of the Historic Fact." Valuable notes are appended as follows: Historical Review of the Discussion; The Origin and Publication of the Infancy Narratives—A Comparative Study; A Summary and Estimate of Dr. Ramsay's Argument . . . with Some Remarks on the Census Question; Christ's Birth and the Messianic Hope; The Apostles' Creed; Bibliography; and Index.

The author's contention that the virgin birth was not fabricated to fill out a prophetic suggestion but that the available prophecy of Isaiah 7:14 was used to substantiate what Matthew believed to be a fact seems well grounded. The currency of the story in the times of Ignatius and Justin Martyr is held to indicate an apostolic source. But any use of Justin in the argument, especially on the part of one for whom the virgin birth is so important, should include those remarkable concessions found in the *Apology* I, 22, 48. In these Justin separates the question of the divinity of Jesus from that of the manner of his birth and falls back upon his character and ability as a more tenable apologetic ground than that of his peculiar generation. At the same time he does not himself surrender the virgin birth although he leaves room within the church for those who do.

The late composite origin of the infancy section as advanced by Soltau is unraveled with a deal of telling and incisive criticism in which the argument for apostolic authorship and an early date has the best of it. Lob-

stein's theory, viz., an amalgamation of theology and popular imagination, an attempt to account for the Christ who to his followers had become the risen and divine one, is controverted, but with less success. The author does not feel the due weight of the retroactive tendency in hero worship, nor does he appreciate the suggestive facilities provided by Old Testament narrative. His conclusion is "that the Protevangel is neither dogma nor legend, but history, authentic in its origin, and well and soberly narrated, although in the forms of sacred poetry." It is denied that heathen analogies have had the slightest influence in the formation of the infancy narratives and the Jewish Christian authors of the accounts are considered as absolutely impervious to non-Jewish influence or suggestion. "The admission of heathen elements into a Jew's system of belief would result in the radical modification of the tone and atmosphere of his thought. The admission of a single important heathen conception would change the entire contents of the mind." The author is rather blind to the possibility, at least, of the adoption and refinement of pagan analogies. By making the uniqueness of Jesus the basal argument for the virgin birth the author is on the path which he is certain no feet could have found in the first century.

To say that "no one ever believed Jesus to be divine on the ground that he was born of a virgin" is probably too strong a statement. The reviewer has the written testimony of 58 modern Christians who do that very thing, and we may read even in the writings of Tertullian, whose object was to substantiate the real *humanity* of Jesus, the following principle, "It is a settled point that a God is born of a God, and that which lacks divinity is born of that which is not divine" (*Ad Nationes* 3).⁴

That the virgin birth was an importation from Buddhism is well controverted, as is also the theory that it was supplied by the priestly philosophers of Egypt. However, one should bear in mind that the final word has not been said when it is shown that the doctrine as used in Egypt was "but a flatterer's idealization of the birth of a prince." The idea, no matter how used, was in the air.

After considering the exegetical construction of the sections the author concludes, "that the interpretation of the accounts as substantially historical is attended with less serious difficulties than any other hypothesis," and "we have no warrant for supposing that there was in any mature apostle's mind any other belief than the one which we have been taught, that Jesus was supernaturally begotten, and born of the Virgin Mary." The miracles

⁴ See also the "Perfect-God and Perfect-Man" theory of Hippolytus (*Contra Beronem et Heliconem*, VIII). So of Lactantius, Malchion, Novatian, Archelaus, Methodius, and others.

are regarded as of the substance of the gospel and the uniqueness of Christ is again and again reaffirmed as calling for the virgin birth.

On p. 267 a typographical error "except" inverts the author's meaning. The doctrinal construction is substantially patristic. If he does not say a physical miracle guarantees a moral miracle he at least makes the latter necessitate the former. However, it is conceded that "the arguments from the *comparative* silence of Paul and John have this force and this force only. They show that the virgin birth is not the corner-stone of our faith in Christ's divinity or sinlessness."

Professor Orr, like other distinguished Scotch theologians and writers, has the faculty of making that which is truly scholarly also thoroughly readable. His book⁵ is composed of lectures delivered in New York and other American cities "to establish faith in the miracle of the Lord's Incarnation by Birth from the Virgin, to meet objections, and to show the intimate connection of fact and doctrine in this transcendent mystery." The book contains a good synopsis of each lecture, valuable appendices, and an adequate index.

Dr. Orr believes that Christian truth is an organism in which the virgin birth is of vital importance, that this doctrine is being vehemently and unjustly assailed, that the "so-called historical-critical school" openly repudiates everything supernatural in the history of Jesus, that those who decry the virgin birth are such as would do away with all miracle and that their present attack is directed against what is supposed to be the weakest point. Hence the book is slightly polemic while fundamentally apologetic, aiming to conserve the faith of those who have not adopted the naturalistic point of view. A rollcall of eminent scholars is made with a good showing on the conservative side. The debate is removed from the subjective contention, "The virgin birth does not enter into the foundation of my *faith* in Christ's incarnation and sinlessness" to the question of objective fact. Does it "enter into the foundation of the *fact* of the Incarnation"?

In taking up the gospel witnesses it is pointed out that our two independent and only accounts of Christ's birth declare him born of a virgin, and that these accounts are genuine parts of their respective gospels upon the evidence of MSS and versions. The author inclines to an early date for Matthew in its present form in order to furnish a direct apostolic witness for the virgin birth. The credibility of the narratives is supported upon the external evidence of the definite historical setting and the internal evidence

⁵ *The Virgin Birth*. By James Orr, M.A., D.D., Professor of Apologetics and Systematic Theology in the United Free Church College, Glasgow, Scotland. New York: Scribner, 1907. xiv + 301 pages. \$1.50.

of substantial agreement, each account being a literary entity centering in the miraculous birth. The evidence of an Hebraic or Aramaic source is very evident in Luke as also in Matthew, indicating first-hand evidence of the events related and excluding the possibility of late or legendary origin. The conclusion is reached that in Matthew Joseph is the informant, in Luke, Mary. The author contends that the only remaining objection, the supernatural element, is of none effect for those who really believe in the Incarnation; and the supernatural element is shown to be sane in comparison with that of the apocryphal gospels. The narratives were either honest and reliable or dealt in deliberate fiction. There is no other alternative.

The two genealogies through Joseph constitute an unremoved stumbling-block. The treatment is inadequate, perhaps owing to the necessities of public address. The probability that the genealogy used by Luke was that of Mary who like Joseph was also of Davidic descent (the lines meeting in Matthan and Matthat) is only a possibility. The author summarizes rather hastily with "So far from the genealogies reflecting on the credibility of the narratives of the virgin birth, it seems to me more correct to say, with Godet, that it is really the peculiarity of Christ's birth which furnishes the key to the striking divergence of the genealogies."

As for the New Testament outside of the infancy sections, Dr. Orr is by no means convinced that it is silent on the question of the virgin birth. He is of the opinion that Jesus knew the fact (e. g., John 8:14, 23, etc.), Mark may have been ignorant of it. John indirectly implies it in "That which is born of the flesh is flesh," etc. John has in view the mode of Christ's birth "which furnishes the type of the new birth of believers." So also Paul necessitates a virgin birth for the sinless Jesus by the doctrine of Adamic sin and race solidarity. Old Testament prophecy is made to apply to the event specifically by resort to the double meaning. The mythical theories are combated as in Sweet's book with the same premise that myths must be accepted *in toto* or not at all. The doctrinal import is urged upon the authority of the Bible of which the virgin-birth record is part. It is held that in Matthew Jesus is constituted Savior by the miraculous birth and in Luke his holiness and divinity are thus secured. From this starting-point the patristic theology is reaffirmed item by item. As there is but one incarnation so there is fittingly but one virgin birth. The spiritual miracle demands the physical. The mysterious possibilities of nature should prevent adverse dogmatism.

Dr. Cooke attempts "to show the untrustworthy character of rationalistic thought" with reference to the incarnation, virgin birth, deity of Jesus,

etc.⁶ Declamation, partisan method, and superficial scholarship are not calculated to produce this result. Sonorous sentences, a sprinkling of poetry and Greek type upon the pages, and the denunciation of eminent New Testament students will hardly produce the real effect of open-minded and patient scholarship. To say that, if there was no census, "we must revise our entire content of belief;" to impute sinister motives and hypocrisy wholesale; to use editorial notes as sayings of Christ; to consider the evidence from prophecy that "which appeals to the modern mind with a greater force than was possible to any previous age;" to find in prophecy a predetermined programme for the life of Christ ("and he shall not judge after the sight of his eyes" Isa. 11:3—"When thou wast under the fig tree I saw thee" John 1:48), and to combat the lower criticism as well as the higher, is to make a book which bids fair to be the poorest of its kind.

Grützmaker's booklet, edited by R. J. Cooke, D.D., is a digest of a translation (by Rev. B. Pick, Ph.D.) of Grützmaker's book.⁷ Its aim is to convince the reader that a notable European scholar supports the traditional view and import of the virgin birth. With reference to Matthew's genealogy we read (p. 14): "He alludes to the special form of the birth of Jesus, and mentions four women who, notwithstanding religious and moral stain—Ruth a heathen, Tamar, Rahab, and the wife of Urias, adulteresses—are nevertheless found worthy by God to become ancestresses of the Messiah. In an anti-typical manner, and perhaps in a conscious opposition to the Jewish blasphemies of the illegitimate birth of Mary, the special part which the virgin mother plays at the birth of the Messiah is already pointed out in the genealogy." John alludes to it (1:13), making the birth of the Christian parallel to that of Jesus. So also Paul, probably (Gal. 4:4).

The fact was probably first made known to the Christian circle in Jerusalem after the resurrection and by Mary herself. There must be no separation "between natural and spiritual miracles." "If divinity and holiness belong to Christ they belong to him from the beginning, from his birth. Natural birth never produces anything holy and divine, but human and sinful." The failure to realize the virgin birth of Jesus, which historical investigation makes thoroughly possible, is due to an immature or meager Christian life.

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⁶ *The Incarnation and Recent Criticism*. By R. J. Cooke, D.D. Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham, 1907. 243 pages. \$1.50.

⁷ *The Virgin Birth*. By Richard H. Grützmaker, Professor of Theology, University of Rostock. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1907. 80 pages. \$0.40 net.

RECENT LITERATURE IN CHURCH HISTORY

GENERAL SURVEYS

Professor Lietzmann is bringing out an interesting series of booklets for the use of theological classes¹ where it is desired to study the original texts of important documents. Each one is sold at a price so low that the students can easily buy it and consult it in classwork. The best critical form of the text is secured, and a good critical apparatus is provided. There are twenty-one numbers in the list, of which the following are before me:

(1) "Die Wittenberger und Leisniger Kastenordnung, 1522-23;" (2) "Die Didache;" (3) "Antike Fluchtafeln;" (4) "Ordo Missae, secundum Missale Romanum;" (5) "Martin Luthers Geistliche Lieder;" (6) "Symbole der alten Kirche." The price of each is from fifteen to eighteen cents.

All students of church history will welcome the third edition of Lea's great study of sacerdotal celibacy.² It has held a place of final authority during the forty years since the first edition appeared. Twenty-three years have gone by since the publication of the second edition, and it is time for a third. The author modestly expresses regret that he had not anticipated a call for a third edition, and hence had not spent these years in arranging the valuable materials which have come to light during the interval. Nevertheless he has greatly enlarged his work. In the later chapters the additions are notable for their extent and their importance.

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It is now more than ten years since the Göttinger Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften undertook an edition of papal Regesta previous to the year 1198, of which the initial volumes are here reviewed.³ In one sense this work is a new edition of *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum ab condita ecclesia ad annum post Christum natum MCXCVIII*, edited by P. Jaffé, Berlin, 1851, and of the enlarged edition of Jaffé prepared under the supervision of Wattenbach by F. Kaltenbrunner, P. Ewald, and S. Loewenfeld, Berlin,

¹ *Kleine Texte für theologische Vorlesungen und Uebungen*. Herausgegeben von Hans Lietzmann. Bonn: Marcus u. Weber, 1907.

² *History of Sacerdotal Celibacy in the Christian Church*. By Henry Charles Lea, LL.D., S.T.D. 3d ed., revised. In 2 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1907. 481 pages. \$5.

³ *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*. Italia Pontificia sive repertorium privilegiorum et litterarum a romanis pontificibus ante annum MCLXXXVIII Italiae ecclesiis, monasteriis, civitatibus singulisque personis concessorum iubente Regia Societate Gottingensi congressit P. F. Kehr. Vol. I, *Roma*; Vol. II, *Latinum*. Berlin: Weidmann, 1906, 1907. xxvi + 201 and xxx + 230 pages. M. 14.

1885-88. Good as these Regesta were, they were made inadequate by discoveries of new documents, until a revision was necessary. These works had other defects besides incompleteness: Jaffé who worked alone found it impossible to base his work on manuscript sources, and was compelled to rely on printed materials, a course which laid his work open to much inaccuracy; to this the Wattenbach edition fell heir, with this additional objection, that it was without an index of persons to whom the letters were addressed.

These defects Professor Kehr, who was placed in charge of the work of the Göttinger Society in 1896, proposed to correct. In order to base the work on original materials and make it as exhaustive as possible, a systematic examination of European, especially of Italian, archives was instituted. Of the amazing success of this search interested scholars have been informed by the *Nachrichten der Göttinger Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften*, which from time to time reported almost incredible discoveries of hitherto unprinted papal correspondence. The present volumes illustrate the extent of these new discoveries. The first volume, *Roma*, contains 586 letters of which Kaltenbrunner, Ewald, and Loewenfeld had only 186; the second volume, *Latium*, has 677 letters of which 290 are found in the earlier edition. This enormous amount of new matter added to the old and subjected, as both have been, to a rigorous criticism makes Professor Kehr's work practically new.

But however important the additions to the work, its novel and striking feature is the arrangement. Jaffé, Wattenbach, and other editors chose to present papal letters as far as possible in chronological order. Professor Kehr abandoned this plan and grouped the letters according to the institution or person to whom they were addressed. This arrangement naturally produced a grouping by locality, and the volumes that are appearing cover a geographical unit rather than a space of years. Letters, the destination of which was some point in Italy, form the subject-matter of the first portion of the new work. Vol. I includes the letters of Roman pontiffs addressed to churches, monasteries, and individuals in Rome; Vol. II is limited to Latium. Obviously the letters of any given pope, grouped according to destination, lose connection with each other; in order to facilitate consultation and comparison with older Regesta, each volume contains, immediately after its table of contents, a five-column analytical table in which the letters are arranged chronologically. This table gives the number of the letter, its date, the number of the same document in the older editions, the name of the institution or the person addressed, and finally the page of the volume on which the letter is to be found.

The body of Vol. I, *Roma*, falls into four sections each of which is conveniently subdivided. In the first section are the letters pertaining to *S. Romana Ecclesia*, its cardinals and urban clergy; in the second are those relating to the *Patriarchium Lateranense*; in the third are the letters and acts addressed to *Urbs Romanae Ecclesiae et Monasteria*. This section has sixteen subdivisions, fourteen of which relate to monasteries and other institutions whose location is known; the fifteenth concerns institutions whose locations could not be determined, and the sixteenth, institutions outside of the city walls. In the fourth section are documents relating to *Urbs Roma*, its institutions, patrician families, and individual citizens. Under each separate title—church, monastery, or whatever it be, and there are between 150 and 200 titles in each volume—is given a list of the books which served the author in his studies upon the particular subject; this list is followed by a brief, exact historical note upon the same subject, to which there is usually added some information as to the whereabouts of existing manuscript sources for the institution under discussion; after this introduction the letters themselves are given in chronological order as far as that was ascertainable; each summary of a letter is followed by references stating where the original is to be found, if it still exists, and where the document is printed. If it is to be found in the Jaffé or Wattenbach edition, the fact is noted; when circumstances seem to demand it, references are given to critical studies upon documents; letters of which the original is lost, or of which a single notice has been preserved are designated with an asterisk; spurious documents are indicated with a dagger.

The plan of the second volume is the same as that of Vol. I. The learned editor explains in the preface that the title, *Latium*, is misleading, as the contents correspond to the boundaries of neither ancient nor modern Latium; and he justifies his arrangement on the ground, that for the purpose in hand, ecclesiastical history was a more proper guide than political history. Omitting the few documents relating to unlocated places (p. 230), the present volume falls into four parts with appropriate subdivisions: (1) *Patrimonia S. R. E. in Latio*; (2) *Dioceses Suburbicariae*; (3) *Campania Romana*; and (4) *Tuscia Romana*.

The figures given above are ample evidence of the completeness of this new work, and a very cursory comparison will show that it is more accurately and thoroughly done than are the earlier *Regesta*; a closer examination shows that many changes and additions have been made in details. Now and then documents accepted by earlier editors are rejected by Kehr as being spurious [I, Nos. 42, 155, 294, 319, 418, 576; II, Nos. 132, 306]; again, he accepts as genuine others which were rejected by his predecessors

[II, Nos. 133, 157, 288]. Though the greater completeness and accuracy of this work are highly commendable, yet both could have existed had the work been arranged chronologically, and therefore the question of merit is bound to turn on the new arrangement. The chronological editions have certain good features: Besides giving a valuable idea of the correspondence of a pontificate as a whole, they lend themselves readily to the addition of a papal itinerary—a thing well worth having—and give a natural place at the beginning of each pontificate for notes on diplomatics, and on the officials of the papal chancellery. These features, though they need not disappear, have no natural place in a topical arrangement. Still it is obvious that, since the dates of many letters cannot be determined, there can be no absolutely chronological arrangement. Each method having its limitations, the real test of any arrangement is its usefulness, which in turn depends on the nature of a student's problem, or on the mode of approach. A scholar studying a single pontificate or a given period of church history would probably prefer to have papal correspondence arranged chronologically, whereas one concerned with some topic for which papal correspondence is incidentally a source would certainly prefer this new arrangement. Probably the majority of students approach questions in the latter fashion and therefore the topical arrangement will be useful to the greatest number. Students requiring the other arrangement will find their needs satisfied by the chronological table at the beginning of each volume. To those accustomed to the easy mode of citing Jaffé by number, this present work will seem inconvenient, and doubtless some, forgetting the practical difficulties it would entail, will wish that the letters had been consecutively numbered. Still difficulty of citation is hardly a valid criticism of a work which, in all other respects, so adequately meets the needs of scholars.

It is no wonder that there is still a demand for Harnack's little work on monasticism,⁴ suggestive and readable as it is. Though the first edition appeared twenty-seven years ago, subsequent editions, including the present one, show no material change; and hence no comment on the subject-matter of the work itself is necessary. Attacks by scholars, notably Denifle, upon some of its statements induced Professor Harnack to give his production a careful revision, and he now issues the work slightly altered, with the comment that he has left in it nothing which he does not still maintain. The text itself is changed in only one place (p. 54), and there the alteration is made because the expression formerly used was open to misunderstanding. Footnotes have been added on several pages (pp. 6, 21, 34, 52, 58). These

⁴ *Das Mönchtum, seine Ideale und seine Geschichte*. Von Adolf Harnack. Siebente verbesserte Auflage. Giessen: Topelmann, 1907. 64 pages. M. 1.40.

on pp. 58, 59 where he begins a schedule of synodal prohibitions. Here we read:

. . . . 150 A. D. (about). A synod of bishops of Asia Minor, meeting either at Ephesus or at Smyrna, prohibits the *Acta Pauli*. The *Acta Pauli* was an historical romance written about the middle of the second century and having for its purpose the glorification of the life and labors of St. Paul. . . . The book is referred to by Eusebius and also by Photius. . . . There is an earlier reference by Tertullian in his work on baptism, written about 200.

Putnam's authority for these statements seems to be the Roman Catholic writer Thomas J. Shahan, in the *Catholic University Bulletin* (January, 1905). This is not accessible to the reviewer, but a council of Ephesus about 150 in which bishops condemned the Acts of Paul (probably written at least twenty years later—Schmidt's researches seem to make 170 the most probable date) seems as apocryphal as the book supposed to have been condemned. The reviewer fails to find in Tertullian's treatise on baptism any reference to the *Acta Pauli*. On p. 135 (Vol. I) our author quotes Dr. Shahan again as saying that "in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries . . . doctrinal theology was largely Bible-commentary." As a matter of fact the study of the Bible in mediaeval universities sometimes consumed six years and had to be completed before the student became a sententiary or a student of the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, the widely used textbook in doctrinal theology. On p. 22 (Vol. I), the author thinks it probable that an Index referred to by Panzer as printed in Louvain in 1510 never existed, but that Panzer had been misled in cataloguing the item. On p. 140 he places this Index at the head of his list of Indexes and mentions the fact that Gesner (1545; nearly 240 years earlier than Panzer) refers to it. The reviewer has not Gesner's work at hand, but his authority, if his attestation be explicit, should be decisive. Too much weight should not be given to the fact that no copy of the book is known to be in existence. On p. 351 (Vol. II), he states that Hubmayer, the "leader of the Baptists in Southern Germany," was burned in Vienna "for circulating prohibited literature." There it not a word in the death sentence pronounced upon him about the circulation of literature; it was on charges of a different character that he was condemned. He can hardly be said to have been the leader of the Anabaptists of Southern Germany, his sphere of work having been in the Austrian Breisgau, in Switzerland, and in Moravia. Putnam seems not to know that Hubmayer and Pacimontanus are the same individual. On p. 221 (Vol. I), he makes two distinct persons of Polydorus Vergilius. Vadianus appears as Vadianus, Matthias Flacius the Illyrian appears as Illyricus, Froschower as Trochsover, Lamennais is always given as La Mennais,

early Indexes. Next come "The Council of Trent and the Index of Pius IV," and "The Censorship Regulations, 1550-1591." Six chapters of descriptions of later Indexes published in various countries up to 1815 follow. A chapter is given to "Erasmus and Luther in the Index," and one to "The Jansenist Controversy and the Bull Unigenitus."

The second volume will be found by most readers more interesting than the first. Some of the topics treated are "Theological Controversies in France, Germany, England, and the Netherlands, 1600-1750," treated of course from the point of view of the Roman Catholic Indexes. One of the best chapters is "The Treatment of the Scriptures under Censorship." A chapter of "Examples of Condemned Literature," with forty-eight items, is well worth reading. The chapter on "The Censorship of the State and Censorship by Protestants" makes it abundantly evident that Roman Catholics had no monopoly of intolerance and that Protestants trusted as much in the arm of flesh for the preservation of purity of doctrine as did their Romanist contemporaries. "The Book-Production of Europe as Affected by Censorship, 1450-1800" is the title of a very interesting and instructive chapter. Under the title "The Literary Policy of the Modern Church" the Indexes of Leo XIII and other recent pronouncements are freshly treated. But the author can hardly be said to have done wisely in quoting so largely from Father Hilgers, the Jesuit defender of the papal policy. The final chapter is on "The Authority and the Results of the Censorship of the Church." The author takes pleasure in the fact that in France and some other countries little heed is given to church prohibitions; yet he recognizes the strength of Ultramontane policy which is still exercising the strictest supervision over the literary productions of Catholics. He gives an interesting account of Dr. C. A. Briggs's somewhat quixotic efforts to induce the pope to allow to Catholic scholars a larger freedom in the matter of biblical criticism. While the results have not been such as Dr. Briggs and the author could have wished, the latter expresses himself somewhat hopefully as regards the future.

I can but feel that these utterances of sane and reverent Catholic believers of today (he refers to Dr. Briggs and Baron Hügel in their *The Papal Commission and the Pentateuch*) are expressions of a state of mind with which the church of Rome will have to reckon in the near future unless the realm of its believers is to be restricted to those who are the less sane and less scholarly and to those who, to put it frankly, have a smaller measure of intellectual integrity.

That the papacy has not yet changed its policy is manifest in the recent declarations against Modernism.

It should be said in conclusion that while Dr. Putnam's book has many

inclines to the old enumeration of ten persecutions, though he does not formally adopt it. He writes after wide reading on all parts of his theme. He gives us in footnotes brief discussions of doubtful points, and exhibits here an admirable mastery of the entire literature. He writes so entertainingly that one is inclined at times to doubt his scholarship, and with so much scholarship that one is surprised at the interest with which he invests his subject. I find myself differing from him here and there, but only to be gratified that my views are opposed on grounds worthy of respect. For example, it seems to me that he underestimates the numbers punished in these early persecutions. He seems to me to argue from our lack of information. But how should we have definite information concerning all the places where persecution raged or concerning the total number of the victims? There were no newspapers, no telegraphs, no good methods of sending letters. If a writer had wished to give a complete survey of the persecutions he could have gathered his materials only by visiting every part of the vast empire, in a time when there were no railways or steamboats. It is necessary to infer much which cannot be demonstrated. It is not unreasonable to infer much from the wide diffusion and the fierce passions of the pagan priesthoods, from the fixed determination of the imperial government, and from the readiness of the pagan populace to follow their religious and political leaders. It is not unreasonable to infer that thousands of whom history knows nothing were put to death, impoverished by excessive fines, or sent to the mines. Nor is it unreasonable to infer much from the number of the Christians, which it seems to me Workman puts too low. He does not even mention the astonishing multitudes of Christians whose remains are found in the catacombs, and the impossibility of accounting for these millions without vastly increasing our estimate of the Christian population of the capitol and of the empire. But while I find myself differing from the author here and there, I always find myself interested in his discussions, impressed by the wide range of his studies, and helped even where I cannot agree with him.

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A new book on Gnosticism by a competent scholar will be welcomed by the religious and philosophical worlds.⁸ Professor Buonaiuta has already won distinction among Italian Roman scholars, and the present volume will fully sustain his reputation. The subject of Gnosticism has been too much neglected, and so not sufficiently understood. The author does not

⁸ *Lo Gnosticismo storica di antiche Lotte Religiose*. By E. Buonaiuta. Roma: Libreria Editrice Francesco Ferrari, 1907. 288 pages.

The form of Stoicism was fixed forever by the older stoa. Zeno stood for general physical theory, logic, purity of ethics, "plain living and high thinking;" with Cleanthes religion was the interpreter of physics—poetic—touched with emotion, yet "calm, contemplative, kind, deeply reverential, and devoutly submissive to the world order; Chrysippus was the logician *par excellence*, systematizing, safeguarding, controverting." From the foundation Stoicism developed through the middle stoa into the Roman period. Here logic and physics fell into the background, and ethics became supreme and more emotional.

The pantheism of the older stoa tended steadily to theism. The universe is constantly personalized, and the deity is spoken of as the Creator, Father, Guardian, and men are viewed as his sons. . . . The Cosmopolitanism of the Stoics now attained a warmth and intensity it did not formerly possess.

On the whole this statement is true, although individual Stoics and numerous passages would seem to contradict it.

Stoicism has its roots deeply set in history and its fruitage has gone into the nourishment of history. It laid heavy contribution on the pre-Socratics; as for example in its physics it goes back to Heracleitus. The influence of Plato and Aristotle was only indirect; and this is because Stoicism was strongly individualistic, whereas Plato especially almost entirely sacrificed the individual. Epictetus and Seneca came remarkably near to Paul's conception of the God in whom we live and move and have our being. Among many other points of interest today may be mentioned: Its vivid realization of the universe as a whole; its deep sympathy with nature, and its clear insight into nature's workings and processes; its intense experiential character—its psychology, ethics, and religion are based on experience; "its unwearied insistence on character as the supreme concern for man; its firm belief in the World as a manifestation of Divine Order, and man's life and human society as a plan of God."

And so Dr. Davidson has given us a very complete, but concise, exposition of Stoicism; and while sympathetic throughout, his attitude has been that of the just critic pointing out the serious shortcomings of the system. At the end of the volume is a short but valuable essay on Pragmatism and Humanism. The merits and defects of Pragmatism are briefly considered.

J. W. MONCRIEF

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The professors of the Catholic Institute of Paris have undertaken in the *Bibliothèque de théologie historique* an immense work in some sixty volumes, dealing with the great masters of theology in the ancient and mediaeval

torical chapters. He is rather heavy and commonplace in his exposition; and one feels that he may have made them earn his *imprimatur* in the face of the rather bold independence of Catholic tradition manifested in the historical part of his work.

DAVID S. MUZZEY

NEW YORK CITY

THE MEDIAEVAL PERIOD

A controversy over an election of a bishop of Chichester arose in England in 1244. It occasioned some literary discussion and gave occasion for Somercote to write a Latin tractate,¹¹ which Professor Wretschko now edits and republishes. It is the oldest documentary testimony which we have detailing the various steps in the election of a bishop. It gives us an interesting glimpse of Roman Catholic official procedure in the thirteenth century.

In the Roman Catholic church it is held that the sacraments, when properly carried out, possess an objective power of their own, regardless of the personal character of the administrator and of the recipient. A priest properly ordained by a bishop who is wicked, schismatic, or heretical, is validly ordained, and must not be reordained. Similarly, a priest who is wicked or schismatical or heretical or simoniacal, if properly ordained, is always a priest, and must not be reordained, and, though he may be deprived of a parish, is not forbidden to administer absolution or extreme unction. It follows that priests of the Greek church, and of churches much farther gone in what the Roman Catholics regard as heresy, are real priests, and are not to be reordained if they are admitted to the Roman Catholic church. But the Roman Catholics have not always been clear on this subject, and it was debated through many centuries, and many priests of heretical churches were reordained, while others were received without reordination. The abbé Saltet, in the book before me,¹² traces the controversy from beginning to end, and shows himself a master of historical research. To Protestant readers the debate will possess only historical interest, but the Roman Catholic will be glad to know the best book on the subject.

M. Quentin, in a volume of ample size and as ample learning,¹³ dis-

¹¹ *Der Traktat des Laurentius de Somercote, Kanonikers von Chichester, über die Vornahme von Bischofswahlen; entstanden im Jahre 1254.* Herausgegeben und erläutert von Alfred von Wretschko. Weimar: Hermann Böhlans Nachfolger, 1907. 96 pages. M. 2.40.

¹² *Les réordinations.* Etude sur le sacrement de l'ordre. Par l'Abbé Louis Saltet. Paris: J. Gabalda & Cie, 1907. vii + 419 pages. Fr. 6.

¹³ *Les martyrologes historiques du moyen âge.* Etude sur la formation du martyrologe romain. Par Dom Henri Quentin, bénédictin de Solesmes. Paris: J. Gabalda & Cie, 1908. xiv + 741 pages.

THE MODERN PERIOD

The third volume of the well-known church history by Moeller¹⁵ treats of the Reformation and the Counter Reformation. The high qualities of this church history have long been recognized, and they are especially conspicuous in this revised edition, into which the editor has brought much of the rich harvest gathered in the most recent investigations. Moeller is often a brilliant discoverer of the inner relations of events. For example, he treats the years 1524 and 1525 as a period of definitions and separations, in which the Lutherans come to a consciousness of their own beliefs, and part company with those who could not agree with them. Thus they distinguish themselves first, from the humanists, represented by Erasmus; secondly, from fanatics like Carlstadt and Münzer, and thirdly, from the revolutionists of the Peasants' War. Moeller might have added a fourth example in their acceptance of the doctrine of a wedded clergy, and their separation from all ascetics, in the marriage of Luther the monk and Katharina von Bora, the nun. It is for such brilliant generalizations as this that he is especially useful.

But sometimes he errs in trying to force events into new classifications, which they obstinately resist, and which bring darkness, rather than light. Nothing is gained, and much is lost, by treating the reformation in German Switzerland under Zwingli as a part of the German Reformation, and by thus tearing it away from the later Calvinistic reformation in French Switzerland. There is no genetic connection between the Reformation in Germany and the reformation in German Switzerland. But there is a distinct genetic connection between the reformation in German Switzerland and the reformation in French Switzerland, and the history is only obscured when we overlook this natural relationship.

Moeller devotes less than a hundred pages to the reformation in countries other than Germany, and this part of his work is therefore a mere sketch, though in the main well done. He treats more intelligently the Counter Reformation, but, as the volume comes down only to 1648, it does not trace the movement very far. On the whole, the volume is an admirable guide to a knowledge of the German Reformation, and a fair review of the other subjects named.

Dr. Kalkoff was moved to write his book on *Capito in the Service of*

¹⁵ *Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte*. Von Dr. Wilhelm Moeller. Dritter Band: Reformation und Gegenreformation. Bearbeitet von Dr. Gustav Kawerau. Dritte überarbeitete und vermehrte Auflage. Tübingen: Mohr, 1907. xvi+496 pages. M. 11.

*Albert of Mainz*¹⁶ by a remark of Briegers that "among the ecclesiastical princes of the age of Luther no other occupied a position as influential as that of Albert, though it has not yet been ascertained in detail exactly what he did and what he left undone, or how he worked in this direction or in that." Although Albert of Mainz occasioned the German reformation by his extravagance and his efforts to pay his debts, he remains to this day one of the dimmest figures of the period. Kalkoff has contributed something, and yet not much, to relieve the twilight. He has succeeded better with his portraiture of Capito, the shrewd and learned humanist, who swayed the policy of Albert as his ecclesiastical counselor, and kept him from taking decisive steps against the reformers during the critical years from 1519 to 1523. But the figure of Albert remains almost as indistinct as before, and still awaits the labors of some biographer who shall picture the man, his follies, his vices, his amusements, his squanderings, as well as his wavering policy. Capito has always been an indistinct character; but henceforth he will stand out in the history of the German Reformation as one of its most important promoters. So skilfully has Kalkoff used his large collection of sources, hitherto unedited, that Capito may be said to have arisen from the grave, and to be a strong and memorable figure, and no longer a shadow or a ghost.

Dr. König publishes a charming lecture concerning the Wandering Jew.¹⁷ It falls naturally into two parts. In the first he defends the originality of the conception of the Wandering Jew found in a German book of 1602, to which all later references to the character may be traced. In the second part he takes the Wandering Jew as a character in literature, and shows us how various writers, chiefly German, have dealt with it. He seems not to be acquainted with Eugène Sue's famous novel.

Bonnefoy writes to justify the separation of church and state in France,¹⁸ but not because he is an enemy of the church. On the contrary, he professes to be one of its warm friends. He mourns the low state to which religion fell under the old arrangement, and hopes for a revival, now that the church is set free from an entangling alliance which did her only injury.

In an addition to the fifth volume of his *Latest Church History*, a work

¹⁶ *W. Capito im Dienste Erzbischof Albrechts von Mainz*. Quellen und Forschungen zu den entscheidenden Jahren der Reformation. Von Dr. Paul Kalkoff. Berlin: Trowitsch u. Sohn, 1907. 151 pages.

¹⁷ *Ahasver, "der ewige Jude," nach seiner ursprünglichen Idee und seiner literarischen Verwertung betrachtet*. Von Eduard König. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1907. 74 pages.

¹⁸ *Les leçons de la défaite; ou la fin d'un catholicisme*. Par l'Abbé Jehan de Bonnefoy. Paris: Nourry, 1907. 111 pages. Fr. 1.25.

which I reviewed in the number of this *Journal* for last January, Nippold records a remarkable controversy in Solingen, which sprang from a series of lectures delivered there by Professor Weinel, of Bonn. The lectures represented what Weinel considers scientific theology, denied the supernatural, the virgin birth, and the bodily resurrection, and sought to establish constructively a new conception of Jesus and a new valuation of him in the sphere of religion. Replies were made. The newspapers were brought into the debate. The excitement on both sides was great. The controversy extended far beyond the city and the province. The book¹⁹ is important as an indication of the bitter feeling which pervades religious circles throughout Germany and which threatens the disruption of the established Protestant church.

FRANKLIN JOHNSON

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

IN GENERAL

From the American Baptist Publication Society we have a revised edition of Professor Vedder's well-known *Short History*.²⁰ It is twice the size of its predecessor, yet is not too large to be called brief. In preparing it the author has gone over the entire ground afresh, has traveled much in search of illustrative materials, and has rewritten the whole. The volume is distinguished by vigor of thought and expression and by ample knowledge. I take exception to but few of Professor Vedder's judgments, but the following, concerning Robert Hall, is so remarkable that I venture a word of dissent: "To the present generation his sentences seem cumbrous, his style is pronounced affected and stilted, his tropes frigid. Indeed, the reader of today is at a loss to understand how his sermons could have won such encomiums as they received." If this be so, what about Milton and Burke? They must be worse. But there are many today who read Milton, Burke, and Hall with delightful appreciation of the splendor of their imagination and the inimitable felicity of their style. And these readers find Hall not unworthy to be classed with the two others.

Professor Swing has given us a readable biography of an able theologian

¹⁹ *Der Solinger Kirchensreit und seine Nachwirkung auf die rheinisch-westfälische Kirche bis zum Fall César*. Zugleich eine Ergänzung des fünften Bandes des Handbuchs der neuesten Kirchengeschichte. Von Friedrich Nippold. Leipzig: Verlag von M. Heinsius Nachfolger, 1907. 92 pages. M. 2.

²⁰ *A Short History of the Baptists*. New and Illustrated Edition. By Henry C. Vedder. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1907. xvi+431 pages. \$1.50.

and college president.²¹ The story has no great literary excellences, but it fits the subject, for Fairchild was a plain man, remarkable for rugged strength and practical efficiency, rather than for fanciful refinement. Though he died only five years ago, he seems the product of another age. He had an old-fashioned conscience, and would never travel on Sunday or smoke or drink a glass of soda-water. The people about him seem to have possessed the same scrupulosity and troubled themselves about ethical questions which seem insignificant to us today, as, for example, whether it is wrong to attend an exhibition of tableaux prepared by a blameless social circle. We think that we are broader than all this. Are we better? Are we possessed of greater spiritual power than that which made the career of Fairchild a blessing to thousands?

FRANKLIN JOHNSON

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Among the numerous publications on the present politico-religious embroglio in France we do not know of a more important one than Paul Sabatier's.²² The author is a religious man after his own fashion. He is not a Catholic, neither is he a Protestant. For example, he speaks on p. 115 of: "Protestantism for which I have the highest possible respect and a little admiration." Perhaps the same form of words with considerable added emphasis on "admiration" could be used in expressing his attitude toward what he conceives to be the true Catholicism. So far as Protestantism and Catholicism are concerned he is an outsider. Yet he has abundant knowledge of this entire controversy, and he very skilfully brings it to bear on the question at issue.

He draws a sharp distinction between Catholicism and Vaticanism or Clericalism. With Catholicism he has no quarrel, and if it had remained true to itself there would never have been any trouble in France, because "the great majority of French free thinkers are not, whatever people may say, rabid anti-Christians" (p. 125). But Vaticanism with its narrow bigotry and selfish aggressiveness has encroached upon the republic until it has precipitated the present crisis. The fight is going to be protracted and bitter; but in the end Vaticanism will go down and in its place will abide the true Catholicism—or neo-Catholicism. The fore-gleams of this he sees in "a kind of confidential Journal in which for three years some pupils of the *grand séminaire* had written down their thoughts, their ideals, their

²¹ *James Harris Fairchild; or Sixty-Eight Years with a Christian College.* By Albert Temple Swing. Chicago: Revell, 1907. 297 pages. \$2.

²² *Disestablishment in France.* By Paul Sabatier. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Imported by Scribners, 1906. 173 pages. \$1.25 net.

dreams. Never have I seen anything so touching in some respects, so remarkable and so virile in others" (p. 126). New forces are gathering. There is a vigorous craving for sincerity, manliness, initiative, effort; an instinctive aversion against the physically miraculous, against mechanical devotion, rites, and incantations; and at the same time an intense love for humanity as it is. Here is the rising of a new clergy, and it is destined to prevail.

France, Sabatier thinks, will never become Protestant. The French "look upon Protestantism as a great historical fact, but a fact of the past." France is essentially Catholic. In his closing paragraph he says: "The Revolution of 1789 was only a preliminary lightning flash, the anticipation of a fundamental and organic reformation. Lay France is preparing to write the book of which the Declaration of the Rights of Man was but one chapter, and in this work lay France will be aided by the *élite* of the clergy. Clericalists may treat these priests as apostates; their cries of hate will not even reach the ears of the workers in this great cause. There will then be a new Catholicism, in which earnestness, hard work, manliness, love, will be the supreme virtues—a Catholicism which resembles the old no more than the butterfly resembles the chrysalis, and yet it will be the old, and will be able tomorrow to emblazon on the pediments of its temple the words of the Galilean: *Non veni solvere, sed adimplere*—"I am not come to destroy but to fulfil."

The value of the book is enhanced by an appendix giving the text of the law of December 10, 1905, for the separation of the churches and the state, with an English translation.

Mr. Lea has brought us to the end of the horrible story of the Spanish Inquisition.²³ In Vol. III he continues Book VI on "Practice—Treating of Torture;" and "The Trial." Book VII treats of "The Sentence;" "Minor Penalties;" "Harder Penalties;" "The Stake;" "The *Auto-da-Fé*." Book VIII is on "Spheres of Action, Including Jews;" "Moriscos;" "Protestantism;" "Censorship," and, continuing into Volume IV, "Mysticism;" "Solicitation;" "Propositions;" "Sorcery and the Occult Arts;" "Witchcraft;" "Political Activity;" "Jansenism;" "Freemasonry;" "Philosophism;" "Bigamy;" "Blasphemy;" "Miscellaneous Business." It is a great relief when we come to Book IX, "Conclusion," in which we follow the irregular but unmistakable progress of decadence and extinction, until at last—at last we come to the definite abolition of the Inquisition,

²³ *A History of the Inquisition in Spain*. By Henry Charles Lea, LL.D. In four volumes. Vols. III and IV. London and New York: Macmillan, 1907. xi + 575 and xii + 619 pages. \$2.50 a volume.

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July 15, 1834, and the beginning of the gradual development of toleration. The work closes with an admirable retrospect.

The wide, accurate, and profound learning of the author, his grasp and co-ordination of the material, his manifest disposition to be unbiased, and his balanced judgment lead us to believe that for years to come this will be the standard history of the Spanish Inquisition.

It rarely occurs in history that we find an institution lasting so long and extending so widely for which it is so difficult to speak a single good word. For, says Mr. Lea, in the full light of all the facts and influences:

The conclusion can scarce be avoided that its work was almost wholly evil and that through its reflex action the persecutors suffered along with the persecuted.

Contrasted with the Reformation, he says:

However deplorable were the hatred and strife developed by the rivalry which followed the Reformation, it was yet of inestimable benefit in raising the moral standards of both sides, in breaking down the stubbornness of conservatism and in rendering development possible. Terrible as were the wars of religion that followed the Lutheran revolt, yet they were better than the stagnation preserved in Spain through the efforts of the Inquisition.

The closing sentence of this monumental work is well worth our thoughtful consideration.

So long as human nature remains what it is, so long as the average man requires stimulation from without as well as from within, so long as progress is the reward only of earnest endeavor, we must recognize that rivalry is the condition precedent of advancement, and that competition in good works is the most beneficent sphere of human activity.

J. W. MONCRIEF

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With a supplementary volume²⁴ the author completes his great history of the Inquisition. He does not take up the career of the unholy office in the Netherlands, because the documentary sources for that work are not yet accessible. But he treats of Sicily, Naples, Sardinia, Milan, the Canaries, Mexico, Peru, and New Granada. The volume is marked by the characteristic excellences of its predecessors: a style which is useful, without possessing much literary charm, an inexhaustible knowledge of his subject, and an organization of his materials so exact and so natural that the reader easily follows the narrative.

²⁴ *The Inquisition in the Spanish Dependencies.* By Charles Henry Lea, LL.D., S.T.D. New York: Macmillan, 1908. xvi + 564 pages. 8vo. \$2.50.

The German *Church Year-Book* for 1907 has just made its appearance.²⁵ Thirty-three annual editions have preceded this one. The *Year-Book* is indispensable for all who wish to understand the Protestantism of Germany as it is today. It purposes to present the entire organization and work of the evangelical church in the form of official lists and statistical tables. The lists and tables are always accompanied by comments pointing out their chief instructive features, thus saving the reader much time and trouble. Yet, admirable as the *Year-Book* is, it might be improved. Why is the German Baptist Foreign Mission Society included in the list of twenty-five "German Evangelical Missionary Societies"? Or, if the Baptists are properly placed in this list, why are the Methodists excluded from it? If the gifts of the Baptists to missions are to be reported, why are not their numbers given, so that the reader may judge intelligently of their sacrifices? Why are the Baptists mentioned nowhere except in this one list? In the statistical tables in general, why are the reports of the smaller, but growing and aggressive denominations, all thrown together under the heading of "sects"? Why are they not distinguished from one another? Thirty pages are devoted to the German church in foreign lands; but no mention is made of its condition in the United States, where it is far stronger than in any other foreign land. The Lutheran and Reformed statistics are uniformly lumped together, even where they refer to states in which the two confessions are wide apart. A still more serious omission is that of the exact numerical relation to each other of the two great confessional armies, the Catholic and the Protestant. It is admitted, however, that the Catholics are increasing more rapidly than the Protestants throughout the entire country, with the sole exceptions of Bavaria, Baden, and Alsace-Lorraine; and that since 1890 the Catholic gains have been made at a constantly accelerated rate. The change is attributed chiefly to two causes: first, immigration; and secondly, "the greater natural increase of the Catholic population." A very full and careful statement is made concerning the new evangelistic movement in the German church, for which no definite name has yet been found, which is declared to be advancing "by strides," which has given rise to a number of training-schools for the preparation of leaders, and which has led to the publication of several statements of their belief on the part of those prominently identified with the work. It is significant that in all these statements the critical view of the Scriptures is repudiated and the entire Bible accepted as inerrant, as also that the doctrine of baptismal regeneration in infancy is declared to constitute a

²⁵ *Kirchliches Jahrbuch*. Auf das Jahr 1907. Von J. Schneider. 34. Jahrgang. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann. 561 pages.

serious intellectual difficulty, since those engaged in the work everywhere proclaim that conversion is necessary to salvation. The movement embodies itself in definite organizations within the local churches, with assemblies much like our prayer-meetings.

The opinion is generally accepted, that the effort of Bismarck to limit the power of the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Germany failed rather ignominiously and did only injury to both state and church. Graue²⁶ combats this view, and maintains two propositions: first, that the evils which the battle produced are only such as must have proceeded from any thoroughgoing movement against the papacy; and secondly, that the battle resulted in a substantial victory for Protestantism, and produced lasting benefits for the nation and the world.

The story of the greatest of the German hymn-writers is always fascinating, though it has been told so often. Burdach²⁷ repeats it in a very attractive manner. He has made some discoveries of minor details, which give an added value to his little book.

FRANKLIN JOHNSON

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Russia affords a striking illustration of the futility of a resort to force to secure uniformity in the political or religious life of a nation. Under the most autocratic and remorseless government in Europe she has developed almost every possible variety of political and social revolt. And beside her state church, armed with knout and sword and frowning upon dissent from her monastery-prisons, there have grown up innumerable religious sects. Not only are these dissenters numerically important, constituting as has been estimated one-eighth of the entire population, but they manifest well-nigh every conceivable variation from the doctrines and usages of the established church.

Some of them in their strange superstitions and cruelly ascetic or licentious rites reveal chiefly the backward, mediaeval state of Russian civilization. The Stundists, who are distinctly Protestant, are the only ones to show clearly the influence of western thought, while the Raskolniki, the largest sect, numbering over ten million, illustrate the earlier fanatical

²⁶ *Nachwirkungen des Kulturkampfes*. Zur tatsächlichen Berichtigung der weitverbreiteten abfälligen Urteile über O. v. Bismarcks Vorgehen gegen Rom. Von Georg Graue. Leipzig: M. Heinsius Nachfolger, 1907. 36 pages. M. o. 60.

²⁷ *Paul Gerhardt*. Ein Lebensbild. Zur dreihundertjährigen Jubelfeier seiner Geburt. Von Artur Burdach, Pfarrer. Barmen: Verlag der Weuppertaler Traktat-Gesellschaft, 1907. 102 pages. M. o. 70.

conservatism of the Russians as to the minutiae of rites and customs and their dogged resistance to the ecclesiastical reforms of Peter the Great.

An interesting parallel has been drawn between those Russian sects that find authority for their tenets and customs in independent study of the New Testament and the Protestant bodies of western Europe. The Roman type of Christianity was imposed upon the Germanic peoples while they were still in their racial youth. When they came to maturity, they cast it off and developed Protestantism, which may be regarded as the native form of Teutonic Christianity. The Greek form of Christianity was likewise adopted by the Russian rulers when their people were too barbarous to comprehend its deeper and more subtle characteristics. The Russian sects which have arisen in recent times from a fresh and independent study of the New Testament are conceived of as the pioneers of a great religious movement in which will appear the native and mature type of Slavic Christianity. It must be admitted that the first-fruits of this undertaking are not encouraging. They illustrate impressively the misunderstandings to which the Bible is subject in the hands of the ignorant.

There are many considerations which give interest to a fresh study of the Russian sects, such as that undertaken by Karl Konrad Grass of the University of Dorpat, whose first volume in four sections has been issued recently in Leipzig.²⁸ The author evidently has in prospect two other volumes. In this volume he confines his attention mainly to one of the mystic sects, the Chlūsten, or People of God. It is a strange world into which he introduces us, an under-world of incredible superstitions, secret meetings and rites, religious dances, flagellations, and other physical means to produce that state of ecstasy in which it is believed that mystical union with God is obtained.

The better to secure their secrecy and protect themselves from the suspicion of the church or the government, the members of the sect ordinarily conform to the requirements of the church and appear as its exemplary members. No doubt one of the strong attractions of the sect is the fascination which secrecy has to a certain type of mind—its esoteric teachings, its *disciplina arcani*. But deeper than that, and explaining all the mystical sects in Russia and elsewhere, is the conviction that through their society and its doctrines and rites they are brought into immediate union with God and so receive divine illumination and the gift of prophecy.

This explains their belief in frequent incarnations of Christ and the Virgin. God's miraculous intercourse with men is regarded not as some-

²⁸ *Die russischen Sekten*. Von Karl Konrad Grass. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1905-7. 312 pages. M. 15.

fessor Grass was led into this investigation by studies made in preparation for an earlier work (1902) on the history of dogma in the Russian church. His work derives value not only from the wide and independent research which it reveals, but from its comments upon the work of other writers on this difficult subject.

The strange beliefs and customs of these Chlūsten—only one of many sects—cast an interesting side-light upon the Russian character, and indicate the complexity of the social and political problems which confront the Russian reformer.

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The publication of the present volume²⁹ completes a four-volume manual of church history of which the first is by the present author and the second and third (Middle Age and Reformation) were written many years ago by Archdeacon Hardwick and were edited several years ago by Bishop Stubbs. The volume before us is in many ways disappointing. In no part of it is there evidence of research or even of an effort to know all that can be learned from the best secondary authorities; nowhere is there evidence of agonizing over difficult problems; nowhere does the narrative rise above the commonplace. Only a very few of his references are to books more recent than 1890, and many even of the best older works appear to have been neglected. There is no indication that the author has made any use of the third edition of the Hauck-Herzog *Encyclopædia* and only a few references are made to the second edition. He seems to have no knowledge of the American "Church History Series," and his information about American denominations seems to be of the slightest. He seems to be a stranger to Baird's books on the Huguenots. No logical arrangement of the materials is manifest. The apportionment of space seems to sustain no relation to the importance of the topics discussed. The first chapter (52 pages) entitled, "Last Struggles of the Reformation," gives an account of Protestant effort in France, Switzerland, Piedmont, Hungary, Transylvania, Poland, England, Scotland, and Ireland, and of the Thirty Years' War and the Peace of Westphalia, covering in general the seventeenth century. Why the end of the seventeenth century should be supposed to mark the end of the struggles does not clearly appear, unless the destruction of the Huguenots at about that time suggested the terminus. Four pages are all he can spare for French Protestantism in this momentous period, during which great insti-

²⁹ *History of the Christian Church since the Reformation*. By S. Cheetham, D.D. London: Macmillan, 1907. 615-674 pages. \$2.00 net.

tutions of learning were built up, wars were waged with the government, theological literature was enriched, new types of doctrine were wrought out and propagated, persecutions suffered, the Edict of Nantes revoked, and more than a million staunch Protestants were destroyed, banished, or forcibly converted. Considerably more space is devoted to the English struggle from the beginning of the reign of James I to the Revolution and beyond. One hopes, as his reading progresses, that as a Low Churchman the author will wax indignant at the atrocities of Laud or else as a High Churchman he will glorify Charles I and denounce the regicides. But throughout all these stirring scenes he pursues the even tenor of his way, tamely narrating the main facts with hardly a suggestion of praise or blame. He expresses no sympathy either with the ejected Nonconformists of 1662 or the Non-jurors of 1689. The author devotes considerably more than a fourth of his space to England and he is of course on firmer ground at home than abroad. Roman Catholics and Lutherans receive a much larger share of attention than evangelical dissenters at home or non-Anglican denominations in America. Under "English Sects" (a section two and a half pages long) Baptists get less than eight lines, while Quakers disport themselves in a page and two-thirds. In a later chapter, under "Non-Anglican Religious Bodies," Baptists are treated more liberally and nearly a page is devoted to a characterization of the denomination. The writer has evidently not heard of the union of the "General" and "Particular" Baptists in England and the disuse of these epithets. North America is treated in a very step-motherly way. Only about twenty-five pages are given to the religious history of this not unimportant part of the world from the beginning of English colonization to the present. He admits, however, that "There is probably no country on which the religion of Christ has a stronger hold than the United States of America." The nearly six millions of American Baptists have to put up with five lines which tell that they are numerous, that they are active in home and foreign mission work, and that they are divided into many sects. The Methodists get nearly a page, the Unitarians, the Quakers, and the Christian Scientists over a page each, the Mormons nearly six pages, and the Roman Catholics two. The "Disciples" are not even mentioned. Canada with its rich denominational life is passed over entirely except that some mention is made of early Jesuit missions there. Germany and France receive more adequate attention, and the Eastern Church is treated as fully as could be expected in a work of this kind.

It was a happy thought of the family and colleagues of the late lamented Dean Hulbert to commemorate his singularly active and useful life by the

publication in a handsome volume,³⁰ with an excellent portrait, a brief sketch of his career, memorial addresses, and letters of condolence, of the series of lectures which he had wrought out most fully and a few other articles that were thought worthy of permanent preservation. The reading of this volume will no doubt lead many of the author's friends and many who now for the first time become acquainted with his personality and gifts to wish that he might have been permitted to elaborate in the same way other courses of lectures that he delivered to his students from year to year.

These lectures bear witness to an adequate acquaintance with the literature, though no references are given except when quotations are made in the text. The author has shown good judgment in his selection of phases of the movements treated for special emphasis. His style is vigorous, pungent, and many passages when delivered must have been truly eloquent. The first chapter, on "Some Preparations for the English Reformation," treats chiefly of the surviving influence of Wiclif and the Lollards and of the Revival of Learning. He pays a very high tribute to Wiclif, placing him as a reformer above all Englishmen and above Luther. It may be that he overestimates the evangelical quality of Wiclif's theology. He seems to take no account of his rigorous predestinarianism, which made God the absolute author of every human act and gave no place to human responsibility. But his evangelical zeal and his knowledge of and reverence for the Scriptures largely neutralized the effect of his fatalistic philosophy and fairly entitles him to the designation "evangelical doctor." His doctrine of the Lord's Supper implies the real presence of the body and blood of Christ, though transubstantiation is expressly rejected and the manner of the presence is not clearly defined. His doctrine of the negativity of evil is a natural outgrowth of his ascription to God of every act of every creature. *Savonarola* does not seem to the reviewer to have been quite so evangelical as Dr. Hulbert represents him. He was an ascetical enthusiast and a moral reformer, but he could never have led in an evangelical reformation.

The second chapter on this subject deals with the influence of Erasmus and that of Luther. Little fault can be found with the representation of the character and work of Erasmus in the text; but in a footnote (pp. 76, 77) quotations from a book review published by Dr. Hulbert in this *Journal* in representation of which applies epithets to the great apostle of the new learning

³⁰ *The English Reformation and Puritanism, with Other Lectures and Addresses.* By H. H. Hulbert, D.D., LL.D., Professor and Head of the Department of Church History and Dean of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago. A Memorial, edited by A. K. E. Young, Ph.D. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1908.

1 page. \$7.50 net.

that the reviewer considers unjustifiable, such as "arrant poltroon," "conceited, grumbling, cowardly, unlovable man," "bundle of contradictions, inconsistencies, pettinesses, trivialities, sinuosities," "singular compound of wisdom and deceit," "craven, evasive, character . . . incapable of telling the truth." Such an estimate fails to take account of Erasmus' fundamental aim and purpose, of the spirit of his age, and of the difficulties and the perplexities of the situation in which he found himself. With his convictions it would have been utterly impossible for him to cast in his lot with the Protestant revolution led by Luther. Moreover he did not claim to be a religious reformer. The promotion of the new learning was in his opinion the way to bring about a gradual and peaceable reformation, and he was exceedingly jealous of any movement that threatened to impede its progress or destroy it.

The chapters that follow treat of the religious movements in England under Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary, Elizabeth, James I, Charles I, Cromwell, Charles II. The rise and growth of Puritanism, Brownism, and Congregationalism receive special attention and are ably and sympathetically handled. It seems a pity that the author did not include in his scheme a chapter on the rise and early history of the English Baptists. This he probably reserved for a special course of lectures. Several detached essays conclude the volume: "The Education Act of 1902," "The Baptists of Today in Great Britain and Ireland," "The Influence of Christianity upon Education," "The Place of the Home Mission Society in the Evangelization of American Cities," "The Baptist Outlook," "The Man and the Message for the Twentieth Century," and "'Lest We Forget'—President William R. Harper." These essays, as well as the course of lectures that forms the body of the volume, all make very interesting and instructive reading and the book should find many readers among intelligent laymen as well as among students and ministers.

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A NOTEWORTHY SCIENTIFIC EXPOSITION OF CHRISTIAN HISTORY AND DOCTRINE

We are tired of merely aggregating material, say the Germans. We wish to become spiritually master of the material, to penetrate through particulars to that which is the end of science: a great universal world-view. It is becoming generally recognized that the labor of the modern spirit, in its ever-increasing specialization and complexity, can mature really useful

fruits only in case it can win the power of connecting and co-ordinating what has been achieved in the separate fields of *Kultur*. This integration of one's own work with all that the human spirit has effectuated in the past and in the present, this demand for depth and unity of operation, is a requirement once again not merely of science, but of all regions of practical activity. But theoretically and practically pressing as this need is felt to be, the Germans have lacked a work that could satisfactorily meet it. They have their encyclopaedia's and dictionaries, of course. But these are, in the nature of the case, atomistic, and cannot satisfy the deep desire of the human spirit for a knowledge of those last fine connecting threads which bind together into the unity of modern *Kultur* the creations and conclusions in the manifold regions of human thought and achievement, in religion and science, in art and technique, in state and society, in law and economics. A work which shall meet this need adequately must compass three equally difficult tasks. The articulation of material must proceed in constant co-operation of the editor with the leading minds in the various regions of *Kultur*—this to insure the harmony of system amid the multitude of single expositions. The tasks must be distributed as fully as possible among the recognized outstanding representatives of each *Fach*—this to guarantee a collective result which the times could not surpass. The treatment of the subject-matter must combine scientific content with popular and artistic form.

*Die Kultur der Gegenwart*¹ claims to be the first German attempt to fulfil these three conditions. It is a noble ideal nobly approximated. Representing all parties, it is non-partisan. We are concerned more particularly with that generous section of the whole work which is devoted to an encyclopedic exposition, historical and systematic, of the Christian religion. Wellhausen begins with the Israelitish-Jewish religion. After a brief discussion and evaluation of the sources in conformity to his well-known critical hypothesis, he traces the history of the people and their religion from the initial stages down through kings and judges and prophets, through exiles and restorations, to the final conflict of Judaism with Hellenism. It is a brilliant and illuminating exposition in so brief a compass. To Jülicher's safe hands is assigned the task of setting forth the religion of Jesus and the beginnings of Christendom down to Nicaea (p. 325). After brief discussion of sources, which does not deviate essentially from that of Wernle and Bousset,

¹ *Die Kultur der Gegenwart: Ihre Entwicklung und ihre Ziele*. Herausgegeben von Paul Hinneberg. ["Die Christliche Religion," I. Hälfte: Geschichte der Christlichen Religionen; II. Hälfte: Systematische Theologie. Berlin und Leipzig: Teubner, 1906. 752 pages. M. 17.

he seeks to reconstruct tentatively the outer course of the life of Jesus and the religion of Jesus. He gives a reasonable account of the rise of faith in the resurrection of Jesus, even if historical criticism cannot affirm the objective fact of the resurrection of Jesus. To the Jerusalem *Urgemeinde* and to Paul he gives a masterly treatment. The Christianity of the Epigone, the conflict with Gnosticism, and the ecclesiasticizing of the new religion, are comprehensively but suggestively expounded. Then comes the section on church and state down to state church, by Harnack, wherein he epitomizes his monumental *Dogmengeschichte*. Greek orthodoxy is presented by Bonnwetsch; Latin orthodoxy by Karl Müller, modern Catholicism and its church by Franz Xavier Funk; Protestant Christianity and modern churches by Troeltsch. Significant as all of these interpretations are, that by Troeltsch is somewhat novel. The Reformation did not amount to the historic and psychological breach in the religious life, with which the traditional histories of church and dogma have made us so familiar; but, instead of this, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were religiously and even ecclesiastically quite continuous with scholastic categories and norms. I, too, am of the opinion that it was not Luther, but Kant, who put an end to the Middle Ages. Troeltsch's appreciation of the service to the spirituality and autonomy of religion rendered by the Anabaptists and other independents—coming as it does from a member of the German state church—is as generous as it is just, and a good omen for the future. The whole discussion of Protestantism is one of remarkable power and insight.

The second part of the great work—pp. 461-752—is given up to systematic Christian theology. Detailed statement and criticism are prohibited by the nature of the treatment. Troeltsch, again, discusses the essence of religion and the science of religion. Pohle summarizes the Catholic dogmatic; Mausbach, the Catholic ethics; Krieg, the Catholic practical theology. Hermann in his characteristic way gives a splendid account of the history of theology in Protestantism, and of the present task of Protestant theology.

This is followed by Seeberg upon Christian ethics, setting forth in a stimulating way the content, sanction, and practicability of the Christian morality. Practical theology is treated by Faber, under the captions of "homiletic," "catelectic," and "poimenic." Last, but truly not least, we have H. J. Holzmann's prophetic section upon the religion of the future. As against Buddhistic pessimism, Christian optimism lives on faith in the possibility of a progressive social salvation of humanity.

All in all, *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, in the section devoted to religion

and theology, is among the best contributions which the German *praeceptores* have made to the world.

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RECENT BOOKS ON THE HISTORY AND SCIENCE OF RELIGION

Two volumes before us are signs of the times.¹ They show that comparative religion as a branch of knowledge has passed the probationary stage, since both are attempts to "popularize," i. e., to present in untechnical language, the results of the insight into the religious life of the world, past and present, gained by fifty years of close study. Bousset's work in eight chapters deals, after the introduction, with the religion of savages, with national, prophetic, legal, and redemptive religions, and with the nature and future of Christianity. It is an ambitious attempt, therefore, to review popularly all of religion as at present understood, to show its origins and development, its varieties, its present status and future prospects. It reaches the conclusion that Christianity is the acme of development in its union of the elements of morality, redemption, and assurance of the future life. But, Professor Bousset concludes, certain phases of Christian doctrine—expiatory sacrifice in the atonement, sacramentalism in church offices, deification of Christ, and belief in miracles—are no longer tenable as integral factors of the religion as realized in modern thought. The Christianity of the future will eliminate these, just as it has sloughed off asceticism as a practice which, so to speak, compels God to concede merit to the ascetic. Some infelicities are due to the author, some to the translator. Of the latter sort is the Germanic form "Kopernican;" of the former, the use of "Trinity" for "triad" (pp. 72, 91); the statement that Amos was "sent into exile" by the high-priest (p. 115; cf. the correct statement, p. 130); and the affirmation that Islam is "a religion . . . of retrogression" (p. 138).

Professor Bros's work is less ambitious, is one of a series of volumes ("Bibliothèque d'histoire des religions"), and has for its province primitive religion only. In ten chapters the author expounds the method of study (psychological), discusses animism, magic, gods, the cult, taboo, totemism, mythology, the *ensemble* of primitive religion, and the abiding character and

¹ *What Is Religion?* By Wilhelm Bousset, professor in the University of Göttingen, author of *Life of Jesus*. Translated by F. B. Low. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1907. xvi + 304 pages. \$1.50.

La religion des peuples non civilisés. Par A. Bros, professeur au Grand Séminaire de Meaux. Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1907. 351 pages. Fr. 4.

value of the religious sentiment. The author claims no originality, but states that he is presenting the results of the researches of such masters as Max Müller, Ganneau, Lang, Frazer, Huet, Spencer, W. Robertson Smith, and Tylor. He sometimes falls into grave error, as when he follows Fraser in asserting the existence of three kinds of totems (cf. the article "Comparative Religion," in Vol. III of the *New Schaff-Herzog*, where the error is corrected). But for the student to whom the subject is new, or to the teacher seeking suggestions for the handling of these topics before a class, the book has value. It is lucid, and the reader may always recognize his landmarks. In this respect it is in contrast with Bousset's work, in reading which it is necessary to keep pencil in hand and, so to speak, chart one's way as he reads, or else rise from the book with mind befogged by detail and discursiveness. The French work has a good table of contents and a serviceable index; Bousset's has a perfunctory index, and the table of contents gives simply the titles of the chapters.

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We have here an authorized and beautiful translation of Pfeiderer's lectures entitled *Religion und die Religionen*, lectures delivered at the University of Berlin during the last winter semester (1905) before an audience composed of students of all the faculties and older non-collegiates.² The spirit of the spoken word is manifest in the lectures, since they were prepared for the press on the basis of stenographic reports. With Pfeiderer's skill in hitting the nail on the head, he has emphasized in the narrow limits of a few lectures the essentials of the wealth of material afforded by the history of religion.

Points of difference and of contact between the various religions are clearly pictured. As is the case with all of Pfeiderer's historical work, his conclusions are powerfully conditioned by his philosophic view-points, of which he has given abundant exposition in former treatises. Nevertheless, in discussing Christianity, he writes—and justly—of other historians as follows:

We will guard carefully against committing the error so widespread today of reading into the biblical documents something they do not contain and of putting aside everything which they do contain that is not entirely agreeable to our modern manner of thinking. It is in such fashion that the well-known Jesus romances originate, shooting up like mushrooms from the ground; we may well grant those poets the privilege of doing such work, but they ought not to lay claim to

² *Religion and Historic Faiths*. By Otto Pfeiderer. Translated from the German by Daniel A. Huebsch, Ph.D. New York: Huebsch, 1907. 291 pages. \$1.50.

the credit of telling actual history. Just that which to the modern consciousness is odd, which in fact seems to offend it, just that usually reveals that which is historically most characteristic—the thing upon which the thoroughgoing success of the Christian faith at its time rested (pp. 252, 311).

The book may be strongly recommended as a fine *résumé* of Pfleiderer's investigations and reflections upon the most important things of life. And if our answers to questions and solutions of problems deviate at times from his, still we live, not by answers and solutions, but by questions and problems.

Dr. Farnell's three Hibbert lectures³ deal with the following subjects: "The Comparative Study of Religions: Its Method and Problems;" "The Ritual of Purification and the Conception of Purity: Their Influence on Religion, Morality, and Social Custom;" "The Evolution of Prayer from Lower to Higher Forms." If disproportionate space (88 pages) be given to the subject of the first lecture, in a work of so small a compass, the urgency of the questions there discussed may well serve as an apology. The quite thorough discussion of the other two subjects is timely, since they do not yet appear to be exhaustively treated by comparative theology.

They are fascinating subjects of study scientifically, and very important practically, especially for the work of missionaries, and for tempering the heated atmosphere of dogmatic controversy. The author's aim is to present certain religious facts in their true proportion and proper setting.

The lecture on the ritual of purification traces the evolution of the practice from the stage where certain bodily acts and states and certain material substances are regarded as unclean and impure, and thus likely to imprint a stain upon the person, on to those examples of practices in the advanced religions aiming at the purging of internal and spiritual sin. He also points out that the older and more materialistic view of impurity as a physical taint or as the miasma of an evil spirit, has not wholly faded, even from historic Christianity.

This is one of the most important subjects in the history of the life of the human spirit, and the author has made a path-breaking contribution to its better understanding.

The same remark may be made of his investigation of the phenomena of prayer. There is no part of the religious service of mankind that so clearly reveals the various views of the divine nature held by the different races at the different stages of their development as the formulæ of prayer, or that reflects so vividly the material and psychologic history of man. The

³ *The Evolution of Religions. An Anthropological Study.* By L. R. Farnell, M.A., D.Litt. New York: Putnam; London: Williams & Norgate, 1905. x+234 pages.

author outlines the history of progress from primitive magic and the magic spell to a spiritual worship more and more purified from the associations of the spell, recognizing however that lower and higher elements are able to coexist.

It is such studies as these which call forth the gratitude of all who are interested in the great problems of the origin and validity of our own religion.

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HÖFFDING'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION¹

Years ago in his *Kierkegaard als Philosoph*, and recently again in his article "Autobiographische u. Antikritische Bemerkungen über meine Religion und Philosophie," published in *Religion und Geistes Kultur*, Höffding describes his personal development in a way that helps us to a fuller appreciation of the book before us. For, as he says, an investigation of the religious problem, not only in its relation to science, but also in its relation to personal life, must of necessity be colored by the personality of the investigator. Always the personal element may be both help and hindrance to the clearness and thoroughness with which the problem should be treated. Which it has been in the case of Höffding he of course is not in a position to decide, but he may help a little to a decision on the part of others by an autobiographic account of his personal and scientific development.

We learn then, that in his early years he was a student of theology, like Hegel, with a view to the Christian ministry. He admits that some of his critics are right in finding in this circumstance some explanation of his present attitude toward religious questions. While he is a free thinker, his free thinking is what it is partly because the effects of those early theological studies are still in his blood. Sharp as is the opposition between his present views and those in which his youth found nourishment, he yet thinks—and this is a conviction which points to the main characteristic of his entire philosophy and leads me to doubt Professor James's right to classify him as a pragmatist—that continuity in his development preponderates by far. Still, he thinks that he has found in another direction that inner satisfaction of his needs which impelled him to theology in the days of his youth. Nevertheless it is precisely from those days that he has preserved his sense of the importance of the inner life, and his feeling of the need of that life to find

¹ *The Philosophy of Religion*. By Harold Höffding, Professor in the University of Copenhagen. Translated from the German edition by B. E. Meyer. London: Macmillan, 1906. 410 pages.

expression for the strivings and sentiments of the heart in the struggle of existence—the need, that is, to see the worth and the fate of life expressed in great and impressive pictures and thoughts. As we read this book we see that it is just this symbolic expression of our human religiousness to which he has devoted such masterly descriptive and critical psychological examination. And it was this need, moreover, which gave to positive religion its power over him for so long and accounts for his reluctant and gradual surrender of that religion. The most painful experience of his inner life—as indeed it is of every such man—came when he saw that ecclesiastical Christianity could no longer satisfy that need, in consistency with the scientific and moral development of his maturer years.

It was Sören Kierkegaard who led him to doubt the validity of ecclesiastical Christianity. The first great change in the life of Höfding came when he discovered the self-deception of those who effected harmonization between the church and “modern Christianity,” on the one hand, and the “Christianity of the New Testament,” on the other—that is, between the life of the spirit according to the requirements of original Christianity and modern life in the family, in the state, in art, and in science. The effort of theology to bridge this gulf rests on a great misunderstanding. Of course, years of doubt and sorrow ensued—aggravated by anxiety with reference to a vocation which should possess essential significance for his personality. At length he broke with theology. Life itself led him forth from a dualism of the inner and outer life, by teaching him, through his own experience, the *worth of purely human relationships*. As Kierkegaard taught him to cast aside his theological books on account of their specious and artificial amalgamations of things incommensurable, so now he had to cast aside the books of Kierkegaard because their content was found to be incompatible with the realities which life itself had taught him. At the same time science became a reality to him as never before, and had to be accorded a place of its own in any serious calculation. From Greek thought, also, he learned *the possibility and the worth of free human relationships and conduct*. It was in life and in actual experience that he must find that satisfaction whose search has impelled him, first, to theology, then to the Kierkegaardian dualism. But the way was long, and Höfding does not seem to have had great faith that he could make much headway therein, for he soon encountered problems from which he has not even yet conquered release.

Doubting the ability of theology to satisfy either his religious or his scientific interest, under the influence of the philosophic criticism of theology by Kierkegaard, he gave himself to the study of the history, poetry, and philosophy of the Greeks, acquiring thus a conviction of the independ-

ent importance of science and of human life. Still hoping to maintain that he could find a true expression of the religious life in ecclesiastical dogma, he came to view religion and science as two thoroughly separate regions that could on that account co-exist. This was Kierkegaard's standpoint. It was partly the drastic criticism of this position by Professor Hans Bröckner, partly the more dogmatic stamp which Kierkegaard gradually gave to his own doctrine, which influenced Höffding to turn away from his past, to take up independent philosophic reflection, in search of unity and harmony of world-view, confident in the ability of the human spirit to attain thereunto.

It turns out that the poles between which Höffding's personal development moved were Kierkegaard's doctrine of personality (which is Kantian-Ritschlian) and the French-English positivism. To this must be added the influence of Spinoza who, after all, gave Höffding his central point of view, by virtue of which he must be classed as a (critical) monist, and not as a pragmatic pluralist. Personality, positivism, Spinozism—these are the constituents of that view of the world and of life in which Höffding has found such satisfaction for his own spirit, and of which he is such an eloquent apostle to others.

I have gained the conviction [he writes] that the highest and the noblest reality in the world of the spirit [personality] is subject to the laws of a great natural order, laws which it is the task of science to find [positivism], and that it is not limitation but gain for that which is most worthful to have its roots firmly in the great connection and system of things [Spinozism].

By brackets I have indicated the ingredients in this comprehensive statement of his philosophy. But the freedom and self-dependence of the individual without which there is no personality, conjoined with the deterministic phenomenalism to which all science strives to reduce all reality, and with the locked system of Spinoza—there is a problem in harmonistics before which that of primitive and modern Christianity which so agitated Höffding's youth pales into insignificance, and which the Kantian discrimination between "valuation" and "explanation," and the pragmatistic segregated absolutes of one's private creation to serve as tools in the workshop of one's own life, are solutions which but lend countenance to Höffding's contention that the problem is insoluble to thought. One must also sympathize with Höffding in the conviction that the farther one wanders in the world of thought, the greater and sharper the problems become.

Höffding's effort to write psychology and ethics on the basis of experience and in disregard of speculative and religious presuppositions profoundly affected his apprehension of the religious problem.

In this way I recognized more keenly the necessity of psychic equivalents, that is, the necessity of new forms of the spiritual life which would be substitutes for those that were disappearing, if life, in the course of its development, was not to lose its worth, perhaps even its energy.

This problem of psychic equivalents, he finds to have claimed the attention of all the outstanding philosophers now for more than a hundred years. And in his opinion:

The future of the problem depends upon the decision of the question as to whether (a) the *personal Lebensanschauung* can and ought to be built upon the results of science or whether, (b) in reflection concerning the worth of life, consideration must not be accorded to elements and tendencies which cannot be scientifically grounded but with which the results of science are not in conflict.

This is the key to his philosophy of religion. The position is, of course, Kantian.

His work consists of an (1) epistemological, (2) psychological, and (3) ethical investigation. By means of the *first* we learn that religion does not emerge from purely intellectual motives, and that religious ideas are not gained in a purely intellectual way, and that they cannot be established in such a way. If religious ideas are to have lasting worth, they must be pictorial expressions of life's experience which is of a special and personal character, rather than that experience upon which science builds. In the *second* section we are shown that the religious feeling receives its natural place in conscious life if it is considered as an effect of the experiences which are elaborated with reference to the relation between the worth of life and Reality or Existence. Thus, such feeling would abide, even were the day of positive religion past, nay, even if the word religion were to be given up. The religious stress has to do with the conservation or permanence of values.

In no other work on the philosophy of religion have we such an original and powerful discussion of this point—a point which is most vital to the whole problem. And yet it is precisely here, more than anywhere else in his book, that there are possibilities to which he either does no justice or which he neglects entirely. For example, what shall we think concerning the existence of non-human values? He assumes that extra-human existence is the home of static values. It is as if the golden egg that the goose lays were a ready-made entity, a possession of the goose apart from her own efficiency.

There are two alternatives: Cosmic values are *achieved* by the dynamic agencies structural to the cosmos, antecedent to and independent of all that is human; or, are arrived at in cosmic evolution only in and through the human.

Certainly, there is no more difficulty in conceiving the structure and function of the universe to be such as to *produce* either extra-human or human values than there is in the idea of dualistic supernaturalism on the one hand or that of increate static values on the other. Values, like golden eggs, are *grown*; certainly, *unachieved* values of a moral kind are a contradiction in terms, to the human way of experiencing. It would seem that even Thomas Aquinas had some glimpse of this matter when he was working so hard over the *aseity* of God.

In the *third* section the worth of religion itself is investigated—the worth consisting in its bearing upon the discovery of new, and its preservation of old values. Religion is, to be sure, no necessary presupposition of moral conduct. With reference to the idea that belief in immortality is such a presupposition, Höffding has these wise words to say:

Only he who has honestly and honorably labored for the values which can be found and produced in *this* world is prepared for a future world—if there be a future world, a question which experience alone can decide. . . . The more I have looked round on the world of thought and of reality, the more clearly it has been borne in upon me that those who are still ready to preach that were there no future life *this* life would lose all its value, take a great responsibility upon themselves (pp. 380, 381.)

The final result is that religion is a form of the life of the human spirit, which—if the power of that life is not to be weakened—may not vanish without our developing meantime a *new and equivalent form of life*.

The great question is whether this be possible.

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TWO WORKS ON APOLOGETICS

This is the last work¹ from the pen of Professor Zöckler, who passed away while the volume was in press. He asserted in a letter to the publisher that it filled a distinct gap in theological literature, and the claim is well founded. We do not know any similar work that can compare with it in breadth and thoroughness of treatment. The author's aim is to present a concise yet complete history of Christian apologetics in all lands from the beginning of the second century down to the present time—i. e., to the year 1905. His method is to describe the general state of thought and the prevailing anti-Christian tendencies in every period, and then to exhibit the various ways in which the apologists of the age attempted to meet these tendencies.

¹ *Geschichte der Apologie des Christentums*. Von Otto Zöckler. Nebst einem Verzeichnis der literarischen Veröffentlichungen des heimgegangenen Verfassers. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1907. xii + 747 pages. M. 12.

To execute successfully a task of this kind demands not only a high order of scholarship, but a discriminating judgment; and we are sure the general verdict will be that Zöckler has accomplished his undertaking remarkably well. Nearly all the apologists of any prominence since the beginning of the Christian era are mentioned; and, in the case of the principal ones, the aim, method, and effectiveness of their works are set forth. The volume thus becomes also a bibliography of great value. In connection with many of the more important apologists even a short life-sketch is given. There is, of course, room for a difference of opinion as to what apologists should be considered worthy of mention, and as to the relative importance that should be assigned to them; but there will be, in the main, on the part of the reader an acquiescence in the author's judgment.

The term "apology" is taken in a broad sense, as including not merely the defense of essential Christianity, but also of many of its fundamental presuppositions, especially theism. This comprehensiveness of definition necessarily determines the breadth of discussion.

The characterization of the task set before the apologists of the second century is excellent, and in the author's estimate of their accomplishment of it the reader will probably concur. Among the ancient apologists Zöckler puts Augustine *facile princeps*. In the Middle Ages, Aquinas (*Summa contra Gentiles*) is given the chief place among the apologists. Strange to say, Anselm's name is mentioned only incidentally, no allusion being made to his celebrated ontological argument. Savonarola (*The Triumph of the Cross*) meets with an especially high encomium. Pascal is warmly praised, with a proper recognition at the same time of his leaning toward philosophical skepticism. The account of Hume is perhaps too meager, considering the enormous impulse he gave to apologetic activity. It is probable that Zöckler's estimate of Robert Boyle, the man and his work, would be regarded by many as rather too high, while his estimate of Bishop Butler and the *Analogy* would be considered correspondingly low. Jonathan Edwards is singled out among American apologists as worthy of special commendation, his influence in America being likened to that of Schleiermacher in Germany. Paley is given due attention, but it is rightly pointed out that much of his work would have to be recast in the light of Darwinism. Archbishop Whately is for insufficient reasons placed under the head of Roman Catholic apologists.

It is significant of the epoch-making character of Charles Darwin's labors that the nineteenth century period should be divided by Zöckler into the two sections, Before and After Darwin. Cardinal Newman is spoken of appreciatively, and his *Grammar of Assent* receives its due meed of praise.

his system as materialistic pantheism rather than as simple monism. Under idealistic pantheism the author discusses Spinoza's pantheism of substance and von Hartmann's evolutionistic pantheism. There is nothing new or especially original in Steude's treatment, but his exposition of these various theories is clear and faithful, and the exhibition of their weak points is comprehensive and, on the whole, satisfactory.

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RECENT WORKS ON IMPORTANT PHILOSOPHERS

An important volume,¹ edited by Dr. Herman Nohl, contains the theological writings of Hegel's youth. The manuscripts from which the work has been edited, are the property of the Royal Library in Berlin. The editorial task was to arrange the manuscripts according to contents and chronological order, involving a reconstruction of the various works, the separation of finished copy from mere suggestions, and the supplying, as far as possible, of dates of composition. Hegel wrote on paper folded, one sheet inside of another. Though each such section was marked by a notation, inevitably some sheets have gone astray. The fate of certain manuscripts used by previous editors is, for the most part, obscure. It is possible that an important collection of such manuscripts was lost in the San Francisco earthquake.

The results of Nohl's difficult work have been a series of fragments on "Folk-Religion and Christianity," five in all; a completed "Life of Jesus;" an incomplete work on "The Positivity of the Christian Religion," which lacks the opening page—a defect supplied in part by Hegel's revision of the first portion of the manuscript; two kindred fragments, one seemingly a continuation of the previous work but itself defective; a work on "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate," nearly complete; and a brief fragment of a system written in 1800. Through these several sections there is continuity and progress. Starting with the principle that religion is not historical or reasoned knowledge, but an affair of the heart and a determination of the will, the effect of religion is a strengthening of motives to morality. In the case of Christianity, the object of faith is a personalized ideal; Christ is virtue. Hegel writes his "Life of Jesus" from this point of view. The supernatural has no interest for him, save in the ethical sense. Jesus signifies the demand that higher vocation shall not be subordinated to meaner

¹*Hegels theologische Jugendschriften nach den Handschriften der kgl. Bibliothek in Berlin.* Herausgegeben von Dr. Herman Nohl. Tübingen: Mohr, 1907. xii + 405 pages. M. 6.

ends. Through the seed of good that is in every man, he teaches that love for the good is the highest law. Jesus' work meant the bringing of freedom and morality to his nation. This involves autonomy. It, therefore, is necessary to account for the positivity—dependence on commandment—found in the historic church. In effect Christianity has become Jewish, for it is under bondage to law. This result impels Hegel to study the spirit and fate of Christianity in contrast with that of Judaism. This requires an analysis of the morals of Jesus. They culminate in love rather than in obedience, as with the Jew. God becomes a Father rather than a Lord and Ruler. Through love, realized by faith, man is led back to God and enters the kingdom of heaven. Love finds its fate in dispensing with all forms. Consequently Christianity as a church finds it impossible to merge church and state, service of God and life, piety and virtue, spiritual and worldly action.

The appendix presents a series of notes and outlines which in some cases throw light upon the main works. This is especially true in the case of the work on "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate," which Nohl regards as "the most important part of our volume." The chronological note which closes the appendix is very valuable.

The editorial work has been carefully done. The worth of the volume as a contribution toward the study of Hegel's thought is considerable. With it, together with Dilthey's *Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels*, already published, and a volume on Hegel's political writings of the same period, suggested in the preface of the present work, sources for a complete analysis of Hegel's growth as a systematic thinker before 1800 will be at hand. Nohl's contention that "the history of philosophy has few as urgent tasks as that of comprehending Hegel's life-work and its effect on all the fields of spiritual being up to the struggles of his fortieth year," is true even though keen sympathy be not stirred by his prophecy of a Hegelian renaissance. Yet certainly such a renaissance could take place only through that penetration into Hegel's vital forces and their correlation with modern life which Nohl regards as so desirable.

The ethics of Pascal is the subject of two studies. The first,² that of Bornhausen, is the second number in "Studien zur Geschichte des neuern Protestantismus," now being issued under the joint editorship of Dr. Heinrich Hoffman of Leipzig and Dr. Leopold Zscharnarck of Berlin. The significance of Pascal for such a series lies in the fact that "Pascal's ethics proves the impossibility of the religious-ethical emancipation of the indi-

² *Die Ethik Pascals*. Von Lic. Karl Bornhausen. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1907. vi + 171 pages. M. 4.

vidual soul-life within the sphere of Catholicism." Three periods may be distinguished in his ethical development. In the first he gained a moral knowledge of his own ego; in the second, a moral knowledge of the world; in the third, a moral knowledge of God. Not rationalism but Christianity of the Augustinian type furnishes the final solution of the ethical problem. Pascal, however, is a modern both in his scientific method and by his stress on individuality. He is a psychologist rather than a dogmatist. His ethics cannot be reduced to unity; natural and revealed ethics exist side by side, the former showing man's wretchedness without God, the latter man's happiness with God. Our sensuous nature must be overcome by rigorous ethical nurture in order to discover the kingdom of God within us. Yet the moral ideal is realized in the Aristotelian middle rather than in extremes. The aid of religion is essential to moral attainment. Faith, working upon human will, after the reception of God's grace, is the ethical principle. Religion, therefore, is not a matter of the reason, but of inner experience. Believing that the senses are the chief enemies of faith, his ethics becomes ascetic and even mystic. Solitariness leads to God; therefore Pascal's interest in the state is scant. Even in the church he admits the right of individual judgment; yet he was a firm Catholic. Outside of the church he knew no salvation. Bornhausen concludes his volume with a survey of the literature on Pascal briefly summarizing his estimates of the various works.

Köster³ treats the same subject by a different method. He rejects the treatment of ethics under the formula of self, world, and God, because it is intolerable to evangelical thought, however acceptable to Catholicism. He regards Pascal's works as an effort to answer the question, "How can I begin to be happy?" Finding the same perplexities as Bornhausen in the sources, Köster regards the *Pensées* as Pascal's debates with his own soul. Köster notes the same identity of ethics and religion. He traces three stadia of spiritual life: first, the aesthetic, or naïve, unreflective period swayed by the pleasure of the moment, love and honor being prevailing motives; second, a period of resulting skepticism, thoroughgoing in its scope and attaining to no hope of solution through the soul's own resources; third, the Christian period effected by grace and resulting in a moral personality, its own evidence and authority. While this was essentially a Protestant principle, Pascal remained, in dogmatics, a Catholic. Christ is the standard of ethical life, and perfection is its goal. His individualistic ethics is ascetic, hence history, the family, and every social impulse yield

³ *Die Ethik Pascals*. Eine historische Studie von Kandidat Adolph Köster zu Marburg. Tübingen: Mohr, 1907. xvi + 172 pages. M. 3.50.

to the religious community. Quietism was his refuge from the defects of the church. For the state he prescribed communism. Mysticism was his salvation from the consequences of his radicalism. Pascal is to be regarded, Köster believes, neither as an apologete nor as a pathological phenomenon, but pre-eminently as an ethicist. His non-historical method will be valid so long as there are men who hunger for spiritual values. Köster confesses the influence of Herrmann in his work. His bibliography is more complete than that of Bornhausen, though it does not present critical estimates. One feature of the work is the abundant illustrative citations from Pascal's text. There is only such connective comment as seems needful for interpretation.

Either the work of Bornhausen or that of Köster will afford important aid to the student of Pascal. Together they supplement each other. Bornhausen presents a clear, well-analyzed, historical study while Köster's book presents an interesting psychological study of what he plausibly conceives to be Pascal's own ethical development. Bornhausen treats of the resulting ethics; Köster traces the ethical process itself.

Zänker⁴ in his study of Augustine, after defining primacy in the Kantian sense of stress of interest, contends for the primacy of the will over the intellect. God and truth are Augustine's goals; but his theology cannot be separated from his philosophy. He attains his goals by the will, rather than by intellect. In fact volition prepares the way for the intellect and continually exercises control over it. In conversion God works on the will, not on the intellect. Even faith is an issue from volition. Faith is supreme until the attainment of the contemplative life, which is neither thinking, feeling, nor volition, but having, possessing, enjoyment. Hence even in contemplation volition is not absent.

Schlatter⁵ reviews philosophy since Descartes in order to show its ethical and religious consequences. He does this in the interest of theology which, he believes, demands observation rather than construction. He finds that Kantian thought has issued in pessimism, Grecian logic in agnosticism, and that monism is the last word in natural science. Theology, therefore, needs no longer to be the servant of philosophy. Christ and his commands are above philosophy. Yet Christianity ought not to be hostile to its thought

⁴ *Der Primat des Willens vor dem Intellekt bei Augustin*. Von Lic. Theol. Otto Zänker. Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1907 (1 Heft, elfter Jahrgang, Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie). 150 pages.

⁵ *Die philosophische Arbeit seit Cartesius nach ihrem ethischen und religiösen Ertrag*. Vorlesungen an der Universität Tübingen gehalten von Dr. A. Schlatter. Gütersloh; Bertelsmann, 1906 (4/5 Heft, zehnter Jahrgang, Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie). 255 pages. M. 4.50.

environment. Criticism is valuable, but must not imperil independence. "Living dogma" is supreme, yet even here is demanded clarity.

Delvolve⁶ has done an excellent work in his study of Bayle's philosophy and religion. The life of Bayle forms the interesting background upon which is projected the development of Bayle's system, if such a term can be applied to his writings. As is well known, Bayle became early in life a convert to Catholicism, but soon afterward renounced his newly found faith in favor of the rejected Calvinism. Thereafter he remained a Calvinist, but displayed great uneasiness in his efforts to ground his faith. His work touched at many points the best thought of his times, yet was done in an independent spirit and without regard to personal relations, as, notably, in his contests with Jurieu. He was a constant enemy of prejudice, and on that ground opposed religious persecution of sect by sect. Grace is the only constraining power that he recognized. This liberality, as Delvolve remarks, was a new note in French literature. In morals he insisted upon a separation from religion. For him the two terms were not convertible; an atheist was often found to be a moral man. Two noteworthy points in the ethics of Bayle are his insistence upon the utility of vices and his distinction of a practical from a theoretical use of reason. Delvolve calls attention to the fact that the former is an anticipation of Mandeville's doctrine, while the latter, in no accidental sense, foreshadows the essence of Kant's ethical theory. Bayle as a critic was influenced by a keen regard for "facts." These he viewed objectively. The true historian was not an interpreter; a partisan history was not really history, for it departed from fact. This attitude he maintained in his approach to religion. Prejudice must be laid aside and regard had only for the facts. A-priori approaches to truth could be justified only when joined to experience; otherwise they remain hypotheses. Hence, his critique of religion was skeptical in its method. Submitting the fundamental doctrines of theology to rigid analysis, none of them could justify themselves by philosophical thought. This was true even of God's existence. Yet Bayle was only a theoretical atheist. The facts of religion are supplied by revelation. If inquiry be made as to the certitude of revelation, that certitude is faith. If you press the question as to the certitude of faith, Bayle rests that upon grace. Bayle, however, would urge that revelation must submit itself to historic criticism. Delvolve insists that the chief interest in Bayle rests upon his method, which consists in a constant appeal to facts as the criterion in every field of knowledge. It led him to separate religion from both morals and metaphysics. It brought

⁶ *Religion, critique et philosophie positive chez Pierre Bayle*. Par Jean Delvolve. Paris: Alcan, 1906. 445 pages. Fr. 7.50.

character of Spinoza and to welcome any evidence of insincerity as dissimulation on its part.

It is our good fortune to have in this volume⁸ a very readable translation of Th. Ribot's brilliant monograph on the creative imagination—an activity of mind which, although of great importance, has been strangely neglected by contemporary psychology. In the first part of the work the creative imagination is analyzed into its constituent factors. The second part is genetic, the development of the imagination being traced from its lower stages in animals, primitive men, and children up to its higher forms as manifested in the various inventions of civilized men. The laws of this development are worked out in a general way, first for the individual and then for the race. Thirdly, the principal types of the creative imagination are distinguished and described—the plastic, diffident, mystic, scientific, practical, mechanical, commercial, and utopian.

H. W. WRIGHT

LESLIE FORREST, Ed.

STUDIES IN MONISTIC PHILOSOPHY

The work of Bullard⁹ makes no claim to originality; it does not seek "to emulate a Kant, a Lotze, or a Martineau." The theme of the work is a statement of the attitude of modern thought toward the problem of God. The author feels the imperfectness of all of our theologies. He believes that both orthodoxy and heterodoxy are dying natural deaths and that "the brotherhood of a loftier faith and a more actual love" is destined to take their places. He desires to prove that spiritual monism is the only legitimate conclusion of philosophical science, that theism is the only valid type of spiritual monism, that theistic monism involves a larger monotheism, "which includes as essential not only the personality of God, but the equally real personality and moral freedom of man." This is what he terms theonism. The demonstration of his theme involves him in a detailed examination of the traditional arguments for the existence of God, together with the question of the influence upon them of modern thought. A theistic solution of the problem of the universe is the only tenable one. The current trend is toward monism, and some monism is antitheistic. Is this a necessary characteristic of monism? "If there is a credible monism at all, it must be one in which the essence is mind." This is justified by an analysis of the prerequisites of "a valid monism." The spiritualistic mon-

⁸ *Studies in the Creative Imagination*. By Th. Ribot. Translated from the French by H. W. Wright. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1906. ix+370 pages.

⁹ *Studies in Monism: God and the Universe in Modern Light, a Sequel to "Haeckel's Monism Examined"*. By Frank Bullard. London: Kelly, 1907. xviii+524 pages. 5s.

ism which he has set forth demands "a purification and enlargement of theism." This is secured by full recognition of God's immanence, while his real transcendence is not lost. The correlation of the two presents no greater problem than does consciousness in its relation to the body. The dualism is relative, not absolute. Monotheism characterizes such a monism. Pluralism, pantheism, and necessitarianism are to be rejected. The resultant theomonism involves "the oneness of God in the inner and the outer world, subjectively and objectively," "the oneness of God as the All and the Personal," "the oneness of God as presented in religion and in philosophy." Ballard's method, he confesses, "would not commend itself to all." He is "saved from a loneliness" and from a savor of "immodesty" by an ingenuous and free use of quotations from other writers. Seldom do we meet the author; he shrinks behind another. Some doubt is provoked as to the justice of some quotations to the author cited. It would have been in better taste to avoid quotations from secondary sources. This is quite noticeable in the citations from Kant, though instances are not wanting of a similar fault in references to English authors, for instance, Hume and Huxley. The work will not appeal to the scientific student.

Graue² also deals with the subject of monism. Accepting monism as the result of a native tendency of the intellect toward unity, he desires to ascertain whether naturalistic monism can be united with an ethico-religious view of the world. He finds that naturalistic monism involves many rash assumptions, particularly in its mechanistic view of man. The immanence of God as personality furnishes the hint toward a true theory of monism. Faith aids by its view of God as love. From this point of view Graue attempts to reconcile aesthetics, ethics, and religion. The book acknowledges its incompleteness, but fulfils its aim in giving some helpful suggestions.

The interesting feature of the book by Eleutheropulos³ is his hint of a scientific philosophy to be elaborated independently of philosophic tradition. As the result of a rapid but careful résumé of earlier and present philosophies, he concludes that none satisfy. Modern philosophy either is not original or, at its best, merely hypothetical. He would distinguish metaphysics and philosophy, and would give to the latter the task of presenting a unitary view of the whole comprised within the several scientific disciplines. Science,

² *Zur Gestaltung eines einheitlichen Weltbildes. Anregungen und Fingerzeige von D. Georg Graue.* Leipzig: M. Heinsius Nachfolger, 1906. x+263 pages.

³ *Einführung in eine wissenschaftliche Philosophie: Der Wert der bisherigen und Der Zustand der Philosophie der Gegenwart.* Von Eleutheropulos. Leipzig: M. Heinsius Nachfolger, 1906. viii+172 pages.

therefore, consists of two parts, philosophy and the several sciences. In accord with this view, a classification of the sciences is given and a brief prospectus of the proposed treatment. The resultant philosophy is to be scientific and entirely free from all presuppositions. The study given in the work is suggestive, and the proposed work ought to be a decided contribution to philosophic thought.

WILLIAM THEODORE PAULLIN

GREEN BAY, WIS.

BRIEF MENTION

STAERK, W. *Die judisch-aramaeischen Papyri von Assuan*. Bonn: Marcus u. Weber, 1907. 39 pages. M. 1.

This is an edition of the text of the Assuan papyri first published by Sayce and Cowley. The text is fully pointed and accompanied by textual linguistic and historical notes. It should prove exceedingly useful in the hands of students.

KRÜGER, PAUL. *Abodah zarah. Der Mischnatractat "Götzensdienst" ins Deutsche übersetzt und unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Verhältnisses zum Neuen Testament mit Anmerkungen versehen*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1907. 28 pages. M. o. 90.

FIEBIG, PAUL. *Berachoth. Der Mischnatractat "Segenssprüche" ins Deutsche übersetzt und unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Verhältnisses zum Neuen Testament mit Anmerkungen versehen*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1906. 43 pages. M. 1. 20.

These pamphlets belong to a series which aims to place the contents of the Mishna tracts within reach of all earnest students. They consist of translations from the Mishna tracts, together with brief footnotes containing explanatory aids and citations of parallel or analogous materials. The work is accurate and of a thoroughly high-class character and can be commended to all students.

Die Theologie der Gegenwart, herausgegeben von PROFESSOR GRÜTZMACHER, et al. 1. Jahrgang, 1. Heft. *Altes Testament*, von PROFESSOR DR. KÖBERLE. Leipzig: Deichert, 1907. 52 pages. M. 1. 20.

This is a new biblical journal differing from preceding reviews of this kind in that it aims rather to trace the trend of scholarship in the various fields than to estimate the value of isolated books. With that end in view, of course not all books are included, but only such as are of real significance in their respective fields. The first number of this new journal is devoted to the Old Testament. The point of view that prevails is that dominant in the more conservative wing of the historical school, as may be at once recognized from the name of the editor, the recently deceased Dr. Köberle. The new review will doubtless commend itself to all students, and will prove eminently useful in its own sphere.

WOODBIDGE, J. L. *The Story of the Covenant and the Mystery of the Jew*. New York: Broadway Publishing Co., 1907. 105 pages. \$1.

This book is the outcome of the biblical and religious interest of a "ruling elder in the Presbyterian Church of Marshall, Missouri." It is unfortunately characterized by more zeal than discretion. Its point of view is wholly unscientific and dogmatic and may be estimated from the following language: "It seems clear by inference, by deduction and by specific language in the epistles that baptism was the application of the seal of the Abrahamic Covenant;" and again, "We conclude that the covenant between God and Abraham and its seal are in full force in the church at this time, and that infants and adults alike are to be baptized."

STRACK, H. L. *Hebräische Grammatik mit Übungsbuch*. München: Beck, 1907. 128 pages. M. 4.

STRACK, H. L. *Hebräisches Vokabularium (in grammatischer und sachlicher Ordnung)*. Achte und neunte neubearbeitete Auflage. München: Beck, 1907. 45 pages. M. 0.80.

Strack's *Hebrew Grammar* and vocabulary have long held a high place in German schools. It is an admirable example of the old method of teaching Hebrew by first of all insisting upon memorization of the fundamental elements of Hebrew grammar. The ninth edition takes account of some of the more recent contributions to the science of Hebrew grammar, and contains a larger number of pages for translation than its predecessors, but represents no essential change in method or subject-matter.

FLEMING, J. DICK. *Israel's Golden Age: The Story of the United Kingdom (Handbooks for Bible Classes and Private Students)*. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribners, 1907. 160 pages. \$0.45.

This is an excellent manual to place in the hands of the average student. Its point of view is thoroughly historical and free from all theological prejudice, but at the same time reverent and devout. A student who works through the period of Saul and David under Professor Fleming's guidance will have a new conception of Old Testament history and religion.

WRIGHT, G. F. *Scientific Confirmations of Old Testament History*. Oberlin, Ohio: Bibliotheca Sacra Company, 1906. 432 pages. \$2.

This book contains a mass of interesting information. It is packed full of facts. Unfortunately, however, the interpretations placed upon those facts do not always carry conviction. One feels that with Professor Wright's presuppositions the conclusions are foregone. The biblical interpretation is sophistical in the highest degree. The facts of the record are made to conform to the beliefs of our author. Furthermore, the attempt is consistently made to furnish scientific demonstration of things that are beyond reach of demonstration. Mathematical methods and results do not belong to the higher things of the spirit, and the faith that insists upon such demonstration is inevitably doomed to disappointment and failure. It is to be hoped that the scientific methods of Dr. Wright are more reliable than his exegetical and theological methods. To those for whom the problem of reconciling science and the Bible is still a serious one, the book will have some value.

FLOODY, R. J. *Scientific Basis of Sabbath and Sunday. A New Investigation after the Manner and Methods of Modern Science, Revealing the True Origin and Evolution of the Jewish Sabbath and the Lord's Day for the Purpose of Ascertaining Their Real Significance and Proper Observance.* With Introduction by G. STANLEY HALL. Second and revised edition. Boston: Turner, 1906. 359 pages.

This volume comes highly recommended by President G. Stanley Hall as both scholarly and practical. Concerning the practical character of it there can be no question. The last seven chapters are given to such matters as "The Right of the State to Make Sunday Laws," "Sunday and the Child," etc. The book as a whole falls into three sections, the Seventh Day of the Heathen, the Seventh Day of the Hebrews, the Seventh Day of the Christians. The territory covered is vast and the author therefore labors under the inevitable disadvantage of not being able to control all of his sources. He is necessarily at the mercy of his guides, and he has not always chosen the best guides; for example: there is no sufficient reason for declaring that the Hebrew idea of the Sabbath was borrowed from a neighboring people.

APPEL, H. *Die Komposition des äthiopischen Henochbuches (Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie, X, 3).* Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1906. 101 pages. M. 1.80.

A careful and original treatment of the much-vexed question concerning the origin of the Book of Enoch. Appel finds the original book to have consisted of chaps. 1-36 in their original form. This was widely imitated and finally three of these imitations were combined into a Methuselah book and added to the original Enoch. Then the final redactor appeared and freely edited and interpolated the original book, expanded the first and third of the Methuselah pieces greatly, and added two more Methuselah sections, and himself wrote the hortatory addresses and inserted them into the center of the book. The book as a whole belongs to the first years after the death of Herod the Great.

FIEBIG, PAUL. *Babel und das Neue Testament.* Tübingen: Mohr, 1905. iv + 23 pages. M. 0.50.

Herr Fiebig offers some incisive suggestions for comparative religion and for theology. Oriental mythology, he urges, throws light on the New Testament as well as on the Old. From it we can gather material bearing upon the origin and development of the New Testament views of Jesus' resurrection, his birth, the apocalyptic symbols, the visit of the magi, and the "twelve" apostles. The "Babel-Bibel" investigations ought to result, Herr Fiebig thinks, in a work which shall comprehend the history of religion as a whole from about 400 B. C. to 250 A. D.

BERTLING, C. *Der johanneische Logos und seine Bedeutung für das christliche Leben.* Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1907. [viii] + 72 pages. M. 1.

The author regards the question of the authorship of the Fourth Gospel as of great importance for understanding the Logos doctrine. He finds the gospel to be the work of John the son of Zebedee. John was not dependent on Philo for anything except the

word "Logos;" he received his doctrine through personal contact with Jesus. The Logos teaching is not so much a doctrine (*Logoslehre*), however, as it is a message (*Logospredigt*) addressed to the heart (*Gemüt*). It does not teach that "the Logos was another being than God;" it teaches that "*the Logos was God.*" In the Logos the reader of the gospel may see God and come to know him. Dr. Bertling's pamphlet is well worth reading.

MOULTON, RICHARD G. *The Modern Reader's Bible: The Books of the Bible, with Three Books of the Apocrypha, Presented in Modern Literary Form;* edited, with introductions and notes. New York: Macmillan, 1907. xiv + 1,733 pages. \$2 net.

Professor Moulton has brought into a single compact volume the entire contents of his twenty-one previous volumes of *The Modern Reader's Bible*. Many students will be grateful to see the Bible thus arranged as a whole from the point of view of its significance as literature. In this form these studies will continue the useful service which they have already rendered in separate issues.

KEFERSTEIN, SELMAR. *Die Offenbarung St. Johannis nach rein symbolischer Auffassung.* Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1907. viii + 348 pages. M. 4.

The author thinks the Apocalypse is neither a history of the times from which it came, nor a forecast of the course of events in the Christian church, nor a prediction of world-politics. "There remains only the conception of it as pure symbol, which finds no history of any kind in the Apocalypse" (p. 3). Accordingly, "beast and prophet, even the chained dragon—as good as non-existent, because they are already stripped of power or are becoming so—live merely a life of shadow, in danger of the constantly impending final judgment of annihilation" (p. 9). The conception is novel but hardly convincing. The author has erred in thinking that the New Testament apocalypse is different in conception from other apocalyptic writings, and in disregarding the present assured results of the historical study of the Johannine books.

AYERS, SAMUEL GARDINER. *Jesus Christ Our Lord: An English Bibliography of Christology, Comprising over Five Thousand Titles Annotated and Classified.* New York: Armstrong, 1906. 502 pages. \$3.90.

The titles are arranged alphabetically according to authors in each of some sixty divisions and subdivisions, which represent the compiler's ideas of the different aspects of Jesus' life and teaching. At the head of each division is given the author's recommendations from among the list as a whole. There is an index of subjects and one of authors, which will be serviceable. The book will certainly be of use as a book of reference for English readers.

Addresses on the Gospel of St. John, Delivered in Providence, R. I., at Eight Conferences Held between October 21, 1903, and May 11, 1904. With Appendix. Providence: The St. John Conference Committee, 1906. xvi + 505 pages. \$1.25.

Some sixty prominent theological teachers, pastors, and other religious leaders, mostly of New England, are represented in the book. The Appendix contains an

interesting biographical index of their names, which, however, unfortunately, lacks page references to their discussions. The addresses are generally homiletic or devotional in character and will be likely to furnish religious stimulus to a wide circle of readers. In some cases the same practical benefit might have been secured along with a larger recognition of the results of recent gospel study. It was not to be expected of course that such a series of addresses would deal with the historical problems of the Fourth Gospel which now press for solution.

GOTTSCHED, H. *Das Königreich der Himmel*. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1907. 279 pages. M. 3.20.

The subtitle, "A Collection of Theological (*biblische*) Meditations," permits a wide latitude in reflections on many subjects of vital interest to the ultra-conservative theologian. The short chapters, the uninvolved direct sentences, the plain outlines, the illustrations from common life, the concluding appeal, all indicate a predominant homiletic ideal. The author, crowding in biblical quotations, makes no attempt at a chronological arrangement of the gospel material. He shows a strong antipathy to the Roman church and a marked aversion to a traditional mechanical Methodism. With all premillenarians he paints a black present, even such an approved and well-established movement as foreign missions being viewed skeptically.

BRUCKNER, A. *Quellen zur Geschichte des pelagianischen Streites (Sammlung ausgewählter kirchen- und dogmengeschichtlicher Quellenschriften, II. Reihe, 7. Heft)*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1905. 103 pages. M. 1.80.

A collection of excerpts in the original Latin from the chief literary productions called out by the Pelagian controversy. Fifty-two selections are given by which the progress of the controversy may be historically traced. Then follow twenty-three additional selections, giving the dogmatic positions of Pelagius, Caelestius, Julian, Agricola, and Augustine. The volume is a worthy addition to the admirable series of source-books to which it belongs.

HOUTIN, ALBERT. *La question biblique au XXX^e siècle*. Paris: Nourry, 1906. 300 pages. Fr. 4.

This book by the well-known ex-priest, who is using all his powers to compel the Catholic church to look at the present religious situation honestly, is a sequel to his account of the history of biblical scholarship in the Catholic church during the nineteenth century. After three chapters calling attention to advances in biblical scholarship during the past few years, the author gives a detailed account of the controversy over Loisy's publications. The correspondence and official decisions involved in the controversy are reproduced very fully. The volume is thus a valuable source-book for the history of this important development in modern Catholicism. The author is, of course, an enthusiastic partisan of Loisy.

PLUMMER, ALFRED. *English Church History*. Vol. III. *From the Death of Charles I to the Death of William III, 1649-1702*. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribners, 1907. 187 pages. \$1 net.

Dr. Plummer gives us four popular lectures, learned and thoughtful, on one of the most stirring periods of English history. They treat of the triumph and failure of

Puritanism during the Commonwealth; the restoration and retaliation under Charles II, the struggle for religious toleration under the later Stuarts; and Latitudinarianism—failure and success—after the revolution of 1688. Dr. Plummer is an Anglican, but he succeeds very well in divesting himself of the personal equation, and takes a large view of all the parties and interests prominent during his period. For example, we should not expect him to be very favorable to Cromwell, yet when he makes his final estimate we fancy that there will not be much difference of opinion.

RAMAKER, A. J. *Eine kurze Geschichte der Baptisten*. Cleveland, O.: Verlagshaus der deutschen Baptisten, 1906. 159 pages.

Professor Ramaker has written a very comprehensive and well-proportioned history of the Baptists for German young people. The book contains an exact reprint of a course of study published in the *Jugend Herald* from October 1905 to June 1906.

GIBSON, WILLIAM. *L'Eglise libre dans l'état libre. Deux idéals: Laménais et Grégoire*. Paris: Nourty, 1907. 115 pages. Fr. 1.25.

In the history of the relations of church and state in France Laménais is an important and interesting figure. He started out orthodox and loyal, passed through the stage of maintaining the conception of a free church in a free state, and then to complete rejection of the church. There were no religious ceremonies at his interment. He was censured by Pope Gregory XVI in 1832. Mr. Gibson brings before us the two ideals; Laménais and Gregory. The volume is valuable in view of the present situation in France.

SCHIELE, M. PIETESTEN. (*Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher*, herausgegeben von FR. MICHAEL SCHIELE.) Tübingen: Mohr, 1906. 76 pages. M. 0.50.

On the eighty pages of this little book we have discussions on the presuppositions of pietism and its religio-historical parallels, Philip, Jacob Spener, the pietism of Spener, August Hermann, Francke, the "Halle Christianity," Gottfried Arnold, Nicholas Lewis, Count of Zinzendorf, pietism in the nineteenth century, and a short review. The style is spirited and much is given in a small space.

BURRAGE, CHAMPLIN. *The Retraction of Robert Browne, Father of Congregationalism*. Oxford: The University Press, 1907. 67 pages. 2s. 6d.

Mr. Burrage has been doing some excellent work in the life and writings of Robert Browne. More than a year ago he published a pamphlet entitled *The True Story of Robert Browne*. The present pamphlet is an original manuscript, and goes to show conclusively that Browne's critics have dealt too harshly with him. It is an important contribution toward a better appreciation of him.

SCHWARTZ, E. *Christliche und jüdische Ostertafeln*. Mit 3 Tafeln. Berlin: Weidmann, 1905. 201 pages. M. 14.

In volume seven of the new series of transactions of the Royal Scientific Society of Göttingen, we have an exhaustive treatment of the Easter controversy between Christian and Christian and between Christian and Jew. It is full of all sorts of abstruse reckonings and astronomical tables. It must have cost the author enormous labor.

HOUTIN, ALBERT. *La crise du clergé*. Paris: Nourry, 1907. 344 pages. Fr. 3.50.

M. Houtin was once a priest, but has become a rather bitter and sometimes unfair critic of the French ecclesiastics. He is well informed; he has been behind the scenes and talked with actors; he has read widely in the church papers and books; he is familiar with the tendencies, cliques, and petty interests in the establishment; and he uses all his ammunition to compel the church to keep step with modern ideas. The crisis which he foretells means that the church must accept modern knowledge, and yet cannot make up its mind to confess past errors. So long as priests are educated away from science they will never have the courage and intelligence to adjust themselves to the new reality;† they can do no more than expel heretics and suppress free discussion. While there is a rather extreme severity of tone, the book, carefully used, will furnish many precious documents which reveal the inner mind of the Catholic leaders.

KIRSTEN, RUDOLF. *Sorgen oder Glauben? oder die Heilsnotwendigkeit der Wahrheitsgewissheit*. I. Teil. *Die Sorge um das verkannte Heil*. Leipzig: Dörffling u. Franke, 1905. 337 pages. M. 5.

A vigorous protest against the modern attempt to place religion on a scientific basis. Faith, the author believes, can rest only on a divine authority. All attempts, historical and psychological, to reduce this authority to that of human experience or discovery mean the death of religion.

WOLF, KARL. *Ursprung und Verwendung des religiösen Erfahrungsbegriffes in der Theologie des 19. Jahrhunderts*. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1906. 134 pages. M. 2.30.

A suggestive survey of the use in theology of the conception of religious experience as a source for dogmatics. Schleiermacher, Hofmann, Plitt, Frank, Dosner, and Köstlin are the principle theologians considered.

SCHEEL, OTTO. *Die dogmatische Behandlung der Tauflehre in der modernen positiven Theologie*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1905. 258 pages. M. 4.50.

A careful and thoroughgoing exposition and criticism of modern theological attempts to retain the inconsistent elements of the traditional Lutheran doctrine without either abandoning infant baptism or making the sacrament an *opus operatum*. The problem would seem to be well-nigh insoluble. The bulk of the discussion appeared in the *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* in 1905.

WOBBERMIN, GEORG. *Der christliche Gottesglaube in seinem Verhältnis zur heutigen Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft*. Zweite umgearbeitete Auflage. Berlin: Duncker, 1907. 171 pages. M. 2.50.

This second edition of Wobbermin's thoughtful discussion of the relation between the Christian faith in God and the conclusion of modern science and philosophy traverses essentially the same ground as the first edition, which was reviewed in the *Journal* in October, 1903 (p. 781). The 127 pages of the first edition have been expanded to 171, and much of the book has been rewritten. It is an unusually suggestive and attractive contribution to apologetics.

MONOD, WILFRED. *Aux croyants et aux athées*. Paris: Fischbacher, 1906. 320 pages. Fr. 3.

A collection of addresses, dealing with the present religious and theological crisis in a vigorous fashion, and indicating certain rational and empirical ways of approach to the supreme problems of Christianity.

FICHTE, J. G. *The Vocation of Man*. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1906. 178 pages.

In this age, when the facts of empirical science threaten to overshadow the significance of the man who conceives scientific method and masters the facts, it is a good thing to read the vigorous defense of the supreme right of the inner man to doubt, to know, and to believe. The translation by William Smith is well done.

SEAVER, R. W. *To Christ through Criticism*. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribners, 1906. 211 pages. \$1.50.

This book, embodying the substance of the Donnellan lectures before the University of Dublin, 1905-6, considers the main problems of New Testament theology which are now subjects of controversy. The author's standpoint is conservative, but he frankly recognizes that the critical method has absolute right of way in investigating historical questions. He attempts to show that the use of such critical methods does not compel one to abandon the essentials of traditional faith.

STAFFER, PAUL. *Questions esthétiques et religieuses*. Paris: Alcan, 1906. 208 pages. Fr. 3.

Three essays collected in one volume. The first deals with the question of the relation of art to morality. The second furnishes an interesting study of Pierre Leroux, who is shown to be in many respects a precursor of liberal Protestantism. The last chapter is a vigorous exposition of the crisis for Christian beliefs in our age, and contains a strong plea for a free religion of the spirit to replace the moribund systems of Catholicism and orthodoxy.

EATON, T. T. *Faith and the Faith: The Nature and Functions of Faith; What Doubt Is and What It Does; The Value and the Claims of Religious Truth*. Louisville: Baptist Book Concern, 1906. 78 pages. \$0.50.

A popular, incisive defense of the rights of faith in human experience, with particular emphasis on the duty of conserving the traditional religious beliefs which have proved themselves potent in human history.

ROADS, CHARLES. *Child Study for Teacher-Training*. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1907. 107 pages. \$0.50.

HUGON, ED. *Cursus Philosophiae Thomisticae: I. Logica; II. Cosmologia; III. Biologia et Psychologia*. Paris: Lethielleux, 1907. 508, 326, 337 pages.

A carefully prepared introduction to the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, consisting of brief paragraphs devoted to a definition of the terms and concepts employed by the great theologian. The work is dominated by the purpose to fortify Catholics against heretical opinions both ancient and modern.

DINSMORE, CHARLES ALLEN. *Atonement in Literature and Life*. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1906. 250 pages. \$1.50.

This book is an excellent example of the way in which men of our age may be brought to see the truth in the traditional doctrines of Christianity. The author gives a suggestive sketch of the ideas of sin and its consequences together with the way in which the evil of sin may be made good, as expounded in some of the world's masterpieces of literature. In this way he shows that the Christian doctrine of atonement embodies a reality universally felt by mankind. The emphasis on the fact that sin is more than mere individual wrong-doing, that it grows out of and involves social, and even cosmic, relations, is especially valuable.

SANTAYANA, GEORGE. *Reason in Religion; Reason in Art*. New York: Scribners, 1905. 279 and 230 pages. \$1.25 each.

The first volumes of Santayana's series of philosophical discussions were reviewed in a previous volume of the *Journal*.¹ The fourth and fifth volumes of the author's work, entitled *The Life of Reason, or The Phases of Human Progress*, are now before us.

The volume on religion is an attempt at a vivid description of religion in all its empirical historical and individual details, leaving the reader somewhat in doubt as to whether the author thinks there are no false gods or that there are no true ones. The same plan is followed in the volume upon art, with much the same result in the mind of the reader. Still, one can detect that the underlying philosophy is pragmatic, although it is impossible to decide whether the author's chief interest is literary or philosophical. However, for an appreciation of the philosophy implicated in the work, the reader is referred to the laudatory exposition in the review mentioned above.

ADAMS, JOHN. *Sermons in Accents, or Studies in the Hebrew Text. A Book for Preachers and Students*. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribners, 1906. 199 pages. \$1.80.

This is an attempt to make the Hebrew system of accentuation yield rich material for sermonizing. It is to be welcomed as an attempt to keep the minister in touch with his Hebrew Bible, but it is to be feared that its efforts are somewhat quixotic. The learning seems to be sound, and as an introduction to the more exhaustive treatments of accentuation by Wickes, it may prove very useful.

RUST, C. H. *Practical Ideals in Evangelism*. Philadelphia: Griffith & Rowland Press, 1906. \$0.75.

A very wise and helpful guide.

SCHUEN, JOSEPH. *Outlines of Sermons for Young Men and Women*. Edited by EDMUND J. WIRTH. New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benzinger Bros., 1906.

These sermons represent the didactic Roman Catholic pulpit.

¹ Vol. X, January, 1906, p. 161.

NICOLL, W. ROBERTSON. *The Garden of Nuts*. New York: Armstrong, 1905. 232 pages. \$1.25.

Mystical expositions of Scripture with an essay on Christian mysticism.

HALL, A. C. A. *The Example of Our Lord, Especially for His Ministers*. New York, London, Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co., 1906. 86 pages. \$0.90.

A series of six addresses delivered at the General Theological Seminary.

ALLEMAN, HERBERT C. *The Gist of the Sermon*. Philadelphia: Lutheran Publication Society. \$0.75.

A series of twelve homiletical reflections on Ecclesiastes. The author finds the whole meaning of Ecclesiastes in the closing words, interpreting the book, with Cox, as an autobiographical poem.

GRAVES, HENRY C. *Lectures on Homiletics*. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1906. 156 pages.

Twelve practical lectures to the students of the Gordon Bible School.

RICHARDS, WILLIAM R. *The Apostles' Creed in Modern Worship*. New York: Scribners, 1906.

These homilies on the creed are sympathetic and mediating in interpretation.

GIRGENSOHN, KARL. *Zwölf Reden über die Christlichen Religion*. München: Beck, 1906. xii + 383 pages. M. 3.20.

The attempt to preach the old truth to the modern man, to stand on the basis of "presuppositionless" modern theology and yet hold the faith of the Fathers in its essential principles, characterizes Girgensohn's preaching. Thus it comes under the head of modern positive theology. The religious tone pervading the addresses is their most important feature. Still the book has merit as showing how one must preach the old truth to the modern man—not as a sum of indifferent revealed doctrines, but as the outgrowth of religious experiences and impressions, and as appropriate expression in thought of the latter under given conditions of time and place. Hence the best part of the book is found in the four central chapters on personal Christianity. The first section, on Christian origins, illustrates the way in which historical criticism as such need not be irreligious. To be sure, the author's picture of Jesus is not sufficiently *zeitgeschichtlich*. "Perhaps Jesus was right when he said that he was more than a man" (p. 88). This is dogmatic, not historical. Nor is his dogmatic work entirely satisfactory, e. g., his empirical deduction of the "deity" of Christ.

We see everywhere today a clinging to the general notion of the deity of Christ combined with a distaste for any special conception of that deity, for any definite Christological doctrine.

NIEBEGALL, F. *Wie predigen wir dem modernen Menschen?* Tübingen: Mohr, 1905. 199 pages. M. 3.

An exceptionally suggestive treatise on efficient preaching, based on a psychological

analysis of the conditions of arousing spiritual activity. The main titles of the three parts, "Intelligible," "Interesting," and "Efficient," indicate the unhackneyed methods of dealing with the problems which every pastor must face.

CLEMEN, CARL. *Predigt und biblischer Text: Eine Untersuchung zur Homiletik.* Giessen: Topelmann, 1906. 88 pages. M. 2.

An illuminating discussion of the modern theories as to the use of a Scripture text in preaching, with a view to setting forth Clemen's own view, viz., that a text is not indispensable, but if used it should actually furnish the basis of the sermon. The discussion should do much toward eliminating the all too prevalent superficial use of texts in preaching.

BITTING, W. C. *The Ministry of the Eternal Life.* Philadelphia: The American Baptist Publication Society, 1906. 32 pages.

CONRAD, DR. *Busstags-Predigten.* 92 pages. M. 1. *Missionsfestpredigten.* 88 pages. M. 1. Dresden: Ungelenk, 1906.

NEUMEISTER, CLEMENS. *Pilgerstand und Vaterland.* Dresden: Ungelenk, 1906. 52 pages. M. 0.60.

Sermons intended for consolation for the bereaved.

LEWIS, ALEXANDER. *Sermons Preached in England.* New York: Revell, 1906. 233 pages. \$1.25.

RICHARDS, WILLIAM R. *God's Choice of Men.* New York: Scribners 1905. \$1.50.

The pastor of the Brick Presbyterian Church has put into a continuous discussion a series of sermons, which may be called a popular, modern defense of moderate Calvinism in its application to life.

SUTRO, ALBERT. *Das Heil und die Pflicht der Sozialdemokratie.* Goslau und Leipzig: Verlag für Lebensreform, 1906. 29 pages. M. 0.30.

A tract written from a "free-thinking" standpoint to attract Socialists, but without definite programme.

MILLS, L. H. *Zarathushtra, Philo, the Achaemenids, and Israel, Being a Treatise upon the Antiquity and Influence of the Avesta.* Parts 1 and 2. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1906. 460 pages.

The value of the study of certain branches of Persian lore for the understanding of the Bible is fully recognized by Old and New Testament scholars. Attention may therefore be drawn briefly to a recent book on Zoroastrian doctrines by the well-known Iranian specialist, Dr. Lawrence H. Mills, professor in the University of Oxford.

In the first half of his volume the learned author discusses the relation between the Ameshaspentas, or Zoroastrian archangels, and the Logos doctrine, with reference

particularly to the writings of Philo the Jew. In the second part he treats of the Avesta, the inscriptions of the great Persian kings, Cyrus, Darius, Xerxes, and Artaxerxes, in relation to the Semitic scriptures of the time of the Babylonian exile. Throughout the entire volume we find special emphasis laid on the correspondences between Zoroastrianism, Judaism, and Christianity, and particularly on the wonderful manner in which the Christian eschatological system was anticipated in Iran several centuries before the coming of the Messiah.

AMIRCHANJANZ, ABR. *Der Koran, eine Apologie des Evangeliums.* Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1905. 45 pages. M. 1.

This pamphlet, written by a missionary in Varna (Bulgaria), gives evidence of much study not only of the Koran itself but also of some oriental and European writers on the subject; but its tone is so extremely partisan as to deprive it of all scientific value.

DOWNEY, DAVID G., LOCKWOOD, FRANK C., DIXON, JAMES M., AND QUAYLE, WILLIAM A. *Modern Poets and Christian Teaching.* New York: Eaton & Mains; Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham, 1907. 4 vols., \$1 each.

The series of volumes, to which these four belong, discusses the Christian significance of the modern poets. They are popular treatments showing considerable genuine insight.

WILLIAMS, J. E. *The Life of Sir George Williams, Founder of the Young Men's Christian Association.* New York: Armstrong, 1906. xv+358 pages. \$1.25.

This "official biography" of the founder of the Young Men's Christian Association furnishes at the same time a history of the inception and growth of that world-famous organization. It presents a vivid picture of the conditions in which "assistants" in the great London drapers' shops lived sixty years ago, and recounts the endeavor of a young man from the country to resist these demoralizing influences, and by an open, courageous testimony to the satisfactions of a Christian life to draw his companions away from coarse pleasures and degrading vices. The association, born in a prayer-meeting held in George Williams' bedroom, entered at once under his leadership, never to be relinquished during his lifetime, upon widening evangelistic, philanthropic, social, and educational activities. Its progress was marked by no serious check or disaster. Williams' own career was one of uninterrupted prosperity. He was the means of the conversion of his employer, married his employer's daughter, acquired large wealth, was knighted, and lived to a good old age to be honored in jubilee meetings of the association in England and America, and last in the jubilee of the World's Alliance of the Young Men's Christian Associations in Paris in 1905. The book is written with literary skill and effectiveness.

SHAKU, SOYEN. *Sermons of a Buddhist Abbot.* Translated from the Japanese MS by DAISETZ TEITARO SUZUKI. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1906. 220 pages.

This book contains sermons of "His Reverence the Buddhist Abbot" delivered through an interpreter at various places in California, with the addition of the inter-

esting "Sutra of Forty-two Chapters," the first Buddhist literature introduced into China. Two articles on War and an open letter addressed to the late John Henry Barrows which have already been published in the *Open Court* are also included. These sermons contain little that is abstruse or difficult, and probably represent the teaching of modern Buddhism at its best. The abbot does not admit that Buddhism is atheistic, though he prefers not to use the word "God." It believes in a Being immanent in the universe but more than the sum total of all individual existences, the highest reality and truth. It rejects the doctrine of the immortality of a mythical being known as self. It holds that salvation consists in the total removal of ignorance. The religious life "has nothing to do with prayer and worship," but may be thus defined: "Attend to your daily business, do all you can for the promotion of goodness in this world, and out of fulness of heart help your fellow-beings to gain the path of enlightenment." It ought not to be difficult to distinguish Buddhism, however noble its ethical teaching, from Christianity.

Theologischer Jahresbericht. XXV. Band, 1906. Herausgegeben von G. KRÜGER und W. KÖHLER in Giessen. Leipzig: Heinsius, 1906. 1,586 pages.

The twenty-fifth volume of this remarkable and indispensable publication appears in seven parts. It covers the whole field of recent religious literature in all the leading countries of the world. The parts are: Extra-Biblical History of Religious and Anterior Asiatic Literature; The Old Testament; The New Testament; Church History; Systematic Theology; Practical Theology; and an Index. In this volume Church History has the largest share of space, covering 601 out of an aggregate of 1,619 pages. It includes all of Church History. The ancient period is done by Krüger. He notices works of a general nature, and then groups those more special under the Ante-Nicene and Post-Nicene divisions. The mediaeval period is done in twenty-three sections by Clemens and Vogt. The modern period is divided into three parts—from the beginning of the Reformation to 1648 by Köhler; from 1648 to 1789 by Herz, and from 1789 to the present by Werner.

The reviewers have diligently sought to give in a very condensed but intelligible statement the substance of every valuable book or monograph or article from every point of view that appeared during 1905. It appears that they have succeeded in an unusual degree. The activity and output in Church History ranging from text-criticism, examination of microscopic points, larger and more general treatments, have been remarkable.

So complete and thoroughgoing is this *Abteilung*, that no student of Church History can safely go on, however limited his specialty, without consulting it, for he can be almost sure that he will find something that he has overlooked.

Each part has an alphabetical catalogue of abbreviations which will prove of constant service. Part seventh is a very minute index consisting of 169 pages.

With the appearance of the twenty-fifth volume the Journal passes over to the publication of M. Heinsius Nachfolger.

EMERSON, ALFRED. *The Art Institute of Chicago: Illustrated Catalogue of the Antiquities and Casts of Ancient Sculpture in the Elbridge G. Hall and Other Collections*. Part I. *Oriental and Early Greek Art*; Part II. *Early Greek Art*. Chicago: The Art Institute, 1906.

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WHAT DOES MODERN PSYCHOLOGY PERMIT US TO BELIEVE IN RESPECT TO REGENERATION?

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The occasion for this question is found in the recent growth of two closely related movements—the psychological analysis of religious experiences, and the demand for improved religious education. Neither of these movements had attained much headway a decade ago, yet today they are present to the consciousness of a large part of the American church. The reception given to them speaks for the church's sense of reality, and for its hospitality toward new points of view. For both these movements tend to reverse long-accepted notions of the Christian life. Experiences concerning which the church has insisted that "thou knowest not whence it cometh" are now described as coming in definite ways, like other mental phenomena. The agitation for religious education, likewise, rests upon a notion of the naturalness of religious growth that is inconsistent with the assumption that genuine Christian life must begin with conversion.

It is not to be supposed, however, that all truth that has been accepted has been assimilated. Intelligent and liberal-minded pastors sometimes make reservations with reference to religious education, lest it substitute education for regeneration. What is needed in religion, some declare, is not the mature mind, but the regenerated mind. Others, accepting the facts of psychology and the principles of education, ask what remains of the doctrine of regeneration. What, then, does psychology permit us to believe on this point?

For the form of this question the present writer does not hold himself responsible. He seeks merely to express thereby what seems to be a prevalent attitude of mind in large circles of Christian believers. A man of science, writing from his own standpoint, would hardly ask, "What am I permitted to believe?" but rather, "What are the facts, and what inferences can be drawn from them?" It is somewhat startling, indeed, to be asked what beliefs psychology *permits* Christians to entertain. For why should our beliefs trail at the heels of science? But, instead of moralizing on the origin of the question, let us undertake to answer it just as it comes to us from the people. Postponing for the present all formal analysis of our problem, and fixing attention upon the more obvious interests of the plain people, we may say at once that the popular belief that profound and permanent changes of character may take place suddenly; that likes and dislikes may thus be revolutionized, and that the whole may occur with little or no sense of effort, so that even persons of weak and perverted will may be set right and kept right—this belief, so dear to the evangelical heart, is strengthened, on the whole, by psychological study. The facts were known, of course, before the psychologist took a hand, but impressiveness has been added to the facts by freeing them from their setting of tradition and popular impressionism, and by recording them in the more accurate language of science.

On the other hand, careful study fails to support the notion that such a change is within the reach of all. We observe that revivalists almost invariably overlook the negative cases that occur in revival meetings, that is, the persons who diligently but vainly seek for the phenomenon that is popularly understood to be regeneration. The negative cases are, in truth, abundant, and the evidence concerning them shows that the negative results are not due to some unfulfilled condition of either belief or moral attitude. It is just as impossible that all persons should experience this transformation as that all should write sonnets or paint portraits. If, on the other hand, the term regeneration is made broad enough to cover the experiences of all persons who are recognized as Christians, then regeneration has no specific mark of its own whereby it can be discriminated from other advance steps in Christian character.

These two statements have two practical consequences. In the

first place, there is *prima facie* ground for defending the use, in certain cases, of evangelistic methods that look toward sudden and profound upheavals of the mind. But, in the second place, there is imperative ground for the careful limitation of such methods, and for the general use of methods that look to more deliberate and controlled reactions. Confirmed drunkards as a class present a field in which the former method seems to be justified. The reason therefor is found in the same traits of the drunkard's mind that enable "Keeley cures" and specialists in nervous diseases to overcome the drink habit by suggestion. But, just as the general health of the community is maintained primarily by physiological forces that act spontaneously, and not by medical treatments, so the religious health of the generality of men is to be secured through the action of a normal intelligence and a deliberate will.

Passing now from these popular and practical phases of our question to the deeper theoretical considerations involved in it, we may ask at what points the accepted notions of modern psychology tend to affect the theory of regeneration. But first it should be said that psychology does not directly teach anything with regard to God. Whether God exists, whether he is graciously inclined toward sinners, and whether our Christian impulses in some way come ultimately from him, are questions outside the scope of a strictly empirical science. It is only when the doctrine of regeneration asserts that some event occurs within the realm of actual observation that psychology becomes at all involved.

The main points at which such psychological questions arise are these: First, the asserted contrast between a natural state of depravity and the regenerate state; second, the asserted discontinuity of regeneration with other mental processes; third, the significance of the fact of regeneration for Christian apologetics. The first of these points is found in all the orthodox Protestant creeds. Whether regeneration is thought of as occurring at baptism in infancy, or only in connection with repentance, and whatever its relation to the sacraments, to the intelligence, or to the individual will, the intended meaning of regeneration is a passage from a natural state of moral defect and helplessness to a state of moral health and efficiency. The second point is almost universally assumed or asserted in these

creeds. It is involved, in fact, in the contrast between the state of nature and the state of grace. Nothing can well exceed the clearness and emphasis with which regeneration has been asserted to be a creative act, an infusion of new life in the strictest sense of the term, an event not to be included in any explanatory way within the series of antecedents and consequents that make up the natural life of the mind. The third of our three points is not derived directly from the creeds, but from the usage of certain theological writers who maintain that some of the essential doctrines of Christianity can be proved partly or wholly from observable facts of Christian experience. This empirical apologetic rests, in most cases, almost exclusively upon the asserted fact of regeneration, together with a group of accompanying or subsidiary facts. The basis of the argument is therefore psychological, so that its proper success depends upon the soundness of its psychological analysis.

First, *Does psychological observation discover any such contrast as is alleged to exist between the natural and the regenerate mind?* In the opinion of the present writer, religious teachers have never adequately weighed the oft-repeated criticism made against Christians that, in spite of all their claims, they are not so very unlike other persons, after all. For such teachers have usually assumed that the whole force of the criticism is overcome if only it can be shown that Christians as a whole are better than the world's people, or else that in individual cases virtues blossom in the Christian life that are unknown outside it; whereas a deeper problem commonly underlies the criticism. The problem is whether the process of the moral life is essentially different in the case of a Christian from what it is in the case of the "merely moral man." It is as if a morally earnest man outside the church should say, "I aspire, struggle, partly attain, and partly fail; what more can you say for yourself?" If the theory of regeneration is correct in its contrast between the state of nature and the state of grace, we ought to be able to pick out the regenerate individuals by some external or internal mark. That they cannot be discovered by any external mark is too obvious to need argument. On the other hand if the mark is internal, it should be possible to state wherein the mental process of the regenerate man, when he deals with the moral problems of life, is different from that of the

unregenerate. Here, again, we find no dividing line whatever. The man who claims to be regenerate must employ his understanding to discover what is right, and also the best means of attaining goodness; he must make choices, form habits, resist impulses, criticize his conduct, seek social support and co-operation, precisely as his neighbor does who is not regenerated.

The common rejoinder, that the Christian has peculiar sources of help upon which he can draw, such as prayer and communion with God or with Jesus fails to meet the case that we are considering. For, again, there is no external test whereby we can discover which individuals have received such help, and further, there are exceedingly few instances, comparatively, in which this special kind of help enables one to dispense with the same study-and-struggle processes that the unregenerate man employs. To say that only the few who have been lifted above this struggle have been genuinely regenerated would be too costly for the theory itself.

Nor is the difficulty overcome by the fact that disciples of Jesus, all in all, reach a higher moral plane than other persons or other religions. The simple fact of being the highest in a series surely does not remove one from the series, or establish any such contrast as that between "state of nature" and "state of grace." Further, it is the constant effort of the body of Jesus' disciples to be better disciples. Shall we say, then, that Christians are regenerate or that they are striving to be regenerated?

Comparing Christians with others, then, a psychologist will find no such contrast between the natural and the regenerate mind as the theory alleges. If he arranges in a serial order all persons whom the moral judgment of Christians themselves recognizes as having attained moral control, purity, sweetness, and Christlike virtues, he finds side by side at all steps in the series those who lay hold upon the promise of regenerating grace, and likewise those who do not; and if he examines the mental process whereby they have attained their moral position, he finds it substantially the same in all except the few who have had the extraordinary experiences already referred to.

There is, in the next place, no empirical evidence that mankind is or ever was in a condition of complete moral helplessness or depravity. Not so very long ago the faults of little children were adduced as

evidence of natural depravity. In particular, children's "lies," which are so natural and oftentimes obstinate, seemed to reveal the depth of the iniquity of the unregenerate heart. A little analysis of the processes of the child-mind, however, completely discredits this interpretation. We can see just how the falsehoods of children arise, and just what such falsehoods mean to the children themselves. The same is true of other childish traits, such as selfishness and cruelty, not one of which, in the spontaneous form in which it appears in young children, is a sign of badness or perversity. On the other hand, as Bushnell remarked in *Christian Nurture*, children spontaneously manifest, in advance of instruction and of special religious experiences, various beautiful qualities, particularly love. Such qualities, according to Bushnell, should be interpreted as a sign of divine grace present in the child, so that natural depravity is, as a matter of fact, counteracted from the beginning of life. This view recognizes facts, but in doing so it takes refuge in a remarkable theory. For now depravity or moral helplessness is not predicated of any actual human being in infancy, but only of human nature as such, or conceived by itself apart from the divine grace that is, in fact, in every case imparted. Some persons are so tenacious of the theory of depravity as to hold that regeneration may come at birth, or even before birth, so that, though the child is never really alienated or lost, it is, nevertheless, a victim of depravity. Obviously every such theory pushes regeneration out of the moral sphere and reduces it to an essentially magical performance upon the child. Further, it puts regeneration, in every such case, totally outside the sphere of scientific observation.

As far as observation of present conditions can show, therefore, there is no reason for asserting the natural moral helplessness or depravity of all human beings, or of any of them. There is moral immaturity, and there is necessity of moral effort and struggle; but there is also capacity for moral growth; and moral effort and struggle are as natural as human society itself. Nor is there reason for supposing that the childhood of the race differed in this respect from the childhood of the individual. Everything that we know of the beginnings of humanity indicates that the roots of moral capacity are identical with the roots of human nature itself. At no point do we find moral capacity entering into the race, or, for that matter,

departing from it. There is, in short, no historical ground for affirming the contrast in question. As a race, and as individuals, we have what Lowell calls "the climbing instinct." We are like children who are learning to walk; there is ahead of us a more mature and satisfactory mode of moral life, and there is within us an impulsion toward it; we stagger and stumble and bruise ourselves; our wills become in some cases perverse; but it is natural to try to walk, and no man can properly be described as morally helpless unless either he is morally imbecile or lunatic, or else he has degraded himself by his own repeated evil choices.

Second. *Can psychology entertain the notion of discontinuity between the natural and the regenerate state?* The considerations already advanced tend to discredit the notion that in the life of the Christian there occurs an infusion of new life that is entirely discontinuous with his past life and with the ordinary processes of consciousness. Nevertheless the belief in such discontinuity deserves an examination on its own account.

This belief is supposed to rest upon the authority of Scripture, so that, though we at this day might not be able to point out an instance of the supposed discontinuity, the fact would still remain adequately authenticated. Yet it would seem, first of all, rather useless to offer evidence that a certain religious experience occurred to somebody in past ages unless we can ourselves repeat that experience today. Why should I care whether God entered creatively into the life of patriarch or prophet or apostle, or even Jesus himself, unless that fact is a sure sign that God is ready to enter into my life in similar creative fashion? Further, any inability of ours to enter into the religious privileges of these historic characters inevitably weakens our belief that these characters themselves enjoyed the supposed privileges. In a word, unless revelation is continuous, the belief in revelation must tend to perish as the facts move farther and farther into the past.

But to admit the continuity of revelation is equivalent to incorporating revelation into our notion of natural process, for the notion of the natural is precisely that of the recurrence of similar events under similar conditions. As a matter of fact, the practical teaching of the evangelical churches has commonly assumed or even asserted that the Scripture revelation can be verified in our own experience.

Further, this teaching has laid stress upon definite conditions under which alone it is said that such experience occurs. Indeed, the conditions have been so successfully observed, that each of many sects, and even subdivisions of sects, has built up a technique whereby particular experiences are evoked with some approximation to regularity. The revival churches have all adopted a general technique for securing repentance and faith; Methodists have known how to produce the "witness of the Spirit;" the "holiness" movement has successfully produced a sense of being free from all inborn depravity; at various centers in the United States, Europe, and India at the present time, the "baptism in the Spirit," manifested by the gift of tongues, is successfully propagated. In every one of these churches on other groups the assumption is made that the desired experience depends upon definite antecedents. But this implies that it is included in the general system that is called nature.

The difference between these religious bodies at this point and the psychologists, if there is any difference, lies in the degree of consistency and rigor with which they respectively apply this principle. Undoubtedly the evangelical consciousness, like that of the Roman church, has hankered after the supernatural in the sense of a superior order of fact, discontinuous with the regular or natural order of experience, yet interpenetrating it here and there. The fancy prevails that, beyond the last fact that psychology can find in religious experiences, there are other facts, which are in the same series, yet of a different order. It is said that there are certain "elements" or "factors" or "forces" that the psychologist cannot reach. Here, in the gray unknown, the Divine Being is said to operate. It is as if someone should tell us that God is just over the horizon, but when we move in that direction we find the horizon moving too, so that what is just beyond the horizon always eludes us.

Any such theory of regeneration is not less dangerous to religion than it is obnoxious to psychology. It is dangerous to religion because it puts God into an equivocal position in our lives. For, on this theory, our assertions of fact cannot be controlled by reference to facts definitely ascertained and analyzed. This assumption of empirical facts which we cannot know as we know other facts has led unnumbered souls to chase after the experience of regeneration

as one might chase after a will-o'-the-wisp; and it has led to a sense of the unreality of religion that churches of the evangelical type are finding hard to understand or deal with. It is obnoxious to psychology because it plays fast and loose with facts. It asserts that certain mental processes occur, but when the psychologist asks what the processes are, and under what conditions they occur, he is told that they are totally beyond the reach of his science.

Under these circumstances, the psychologist's procedure is as follows: He assumes the usual scientific postulate of continuity or law, and proceeds to analyze the observable facts. Among the observable facts are those which are preached and interpreted as the experience of regeneration. These facts yield to analysis precisely as any other complex mental phenomena, so that the psychologist can explain them in the same sense in which he explains anything else. It is definitely ascertained that the experience popularly called conversion, which includes what theology calls regeneration, is determined in part by the religious environment, so that the phenomenon varies from sect to sect of Christians, and even with variations of instruction and custom within a given sect. Parallel experiences are found in other religions, as Buddhism, and in each case the content and direction of the change are determined by historical and environmental influences. The psychologist goes on to inquire how any such body of ideas becomes thus suddenly or profoundly effective in the individual. Social influences, taking the form of early training, and often of crowd suggestion, play an obvious part. The effect of such influences in different cases depends upon such facts as the condition of the nervous system as affected by age, the state of the health, or incidental circumstances like fatigue, or upon the permanent modes of functioning called temperament and suggestibility. The psychology of the subconscious adds its contribution to the understanding of some of the more obscure cases. Moreover, parallel transformations of a non-religious sort are discovered. Finally, it is shown that the experience in question has various degrees of suddenness, of emotional vividness, and of impulsive force, and that it is, in fact, continuous with the phenomena of religious growth.¹

¹ The continuity of the phenomenon with religious growth, its relation to the stages of general mental growth, and its psychological identity with abrupt mental

So much is already ascertained; if the psychologist should come across a case that cannot be explained by any of these principles, he would not, even then, admit its entire intractability to psychological analysis under the postulate of law. He would not, indeed, say that this or that fact is impossible; rather, he would redouble his energy in the presence of the mystery, confident that patient analysis will show the law-abiding relations of even the most unusual phenomenon.

Wise religious leaders and workers take advantage of the ascertained facts, perceiving that increased knowledge brings increased power to influence men. Unwise leaders and workers shun such knowledge, and as a consequence there is growing up a religious quackery parallel to the quackery that practices medicine but refuses to be guided by medical science.

Third. *What is the bearing of psychology upon the evidence for Christianity that is based upon the experience of regeneration?* The "argument from Christian experience" is intended to be an inductive proof of the validity of certain Christian dogmas, or of the general authority of the Christian religion. More specifically the evidence takes substantially the logical form of the experimental verification of an hypothesis. With general unanimity the writers who set forth this evidence fix upon regeneration as the crucial fact. Out of this fact various conclusions are drawn by various writers, but the typical conclusions concern the great doctrines of the person of Christ, the trinity, and the atonement. The limits of this article do not permit a detailed critique of apologetic literature of this kind, but only a general description of the class, and a somewhat specific reference to the latest example of it:²

changes of a non-religious sort, are proved by E. D. Starbuck, *The Psychology of Religion*, London, 1900. The automatic character of the typical cases, and the influence of suggestion are treated by G. A. Coe, *The Spiritual Life*, New York, 1900. The apparently sudden maturing of a new character is explained by W. James, (*The Varieties of Religious Experience*, New York, 1902) as the uprush into consciousness of ideas, motives, etc., that had been subconsciously incubated. Finally, Morton Prince (*The Dissociation of a Personality*, New York, 1906) seems to have discovered a case in which the new state of elevated emotion, etc., is first evoked by a set of definite ideas in a trance, and then carried over to the waking state but without recollection of these ideas. It is clear that the process differs from individual to individual, and that the factors are generally complicated. Direct suggestion may be predominant in one case, subconscious maturing in another, and in still others actual trance or hypnosis.

² For specimens of the class, see the following: L. F. Stearns, *The Evidence of*

Since the force of the argument depends upon allegations of fact, we have a right to expect these writers to scrutinize their data with the greatest care. The following questions, for example, are pertinent to any such investigation: (1) How many cases of the experience in question has the writer investigated? (2) What measures have been taken to secure universally representative facts, as distinguished from denominational types of experience? (3) What measures have been used for securing accuracy as to the facts, and particularly for eliminating the ordinary errors of memory, as also the errors of testimony arising out of prejudice, expectation, etc.? (4) Has adequate search been made for possible negative cases? (5) Have the negative cases been explained? (6) What are the relations of the experience here in question to the other experiences of the moral life?

If we are to have any reasonable assurance as to what the data really are, these questions must be answered. They do not ask for the impossible, or for anything more difficult than ordinary enterprises of psychologists. Yet every one of these reasonable requirements is commonly ignored in the argument from experience. It is doubtful if any one of them has been faithfully observed by any writer who has used the argument.

Indeed, what passes in these arguments as description of empirical data, and sometimes even claims to be "scientific" analysis, is ordinarily a mixture of facts (picked for the occasion), traditions as to Christian experience, and dogma. The whole is little more than a description of supposed experiences in terms of a preconceived theory. The experience of regeneration, with its concomitants, is painted in the highest colors, and the impression is given—sometimes the assertion is directly made—that this picture represents the universal experience of Christians.³ Instead of an empirical investigation of facts, we have

Christian Experience, New York, 1891; R. S. Foster, *Philosophy of Christian Experience*, New York, 1891; F. H. Foster, *Christian Life and Theology*, Chicago, 1900; J. C. Granberry, *Experience the Crowning Evidence*, Nashville, 1900. To the same class belongs H. W. Clark, *The Philosophy of Christian Experience*, Chicago (no date), though its method of approach to its problems is different. Stearns gives on pp. 382-402 a short summary of the history of this type of apologetic. The latest example, above referred to, is an article by P. T. Forsyth; "The Distinctive Thing in Christian Experience," *Hibbert Journal*, April, 1908 (Vol. VI, No. 3, pp. 481-99).

³ Consider, for example, the statement that when a sinner accepts the divine call the result is "one and invariable, as all Christians will testify." See Stearns, p. 130. The description that follows this statement of Stearns goes into many details, each

in these cases an effort to determine the facts *a priori*. Hence it comes to pass that the central fact of the regeneration experience becomes marvelously fecund as the argument proceeds. Here the Christian is said to secure indubitable knowledge of the deity of Jesus, the atonement, even the resurrection of the body and eternal life. No one who makes the experiment is disappointed. These statements, taken directly from one writer,⁴ are typical of the ordinary mode of procedure.⁵ By "mode of procedure" is here meant only two things, the description of the facts, and the use made of them in the argument. It is not to be denied that, along with this uncritical procedure, there sometimes goes a deal of religious wisdom.⁶

There are signs that conservative theology is abandoning its old apologetic, which was essentially an effort to make past religious experience authority for the present religious life. Instead of the authority of history we are now offered the authority of a present superlative in its kind, and then declares that this new life is supernatural, and a miracle. See pp. 139-41.

⁴ Stearns, pp. 144, 147-50, 151. This writer declares that no one who makes the experiment is disappointed (p. 211), but this position of his necessitates the declaration that even Christians (known to be such by their fruits) who declare that they have little "assurance" really have much (p. 193).

⁵ F. H. Foster is, on the whole, more cautious than the other writers who have been named. Regeneration, on its human side, he says, is "the permanent choice of duty as such" (p. 21), and this is a fact of immediate consciousness. How a permanent choice could be a fact of immediate consciousness is not clear, nor is it clear that the Christian choice is a choice of so abstract a thing as "duty as such." Out of the fact as thus stated, however, Foster draws the traditional "plan of salvation."

⁶ The extravagant praise that has been given to Clark's *Philosophy of Christian Experience* must have been called forth by its style, its atmosphere, and its practical wisdom rather than its thought-structure. For here, once more, we have an effort to exhibit the traditional idea of the Christian revelation as known and established in the experience of the new life, but a slipshod and irresponsible analysis of the crucial facts upon which the whole thought-structure of the book rests. For example, in the face of any possible philosophy of history, Clark declares that "all dealing with human life, all suggestion for its future, all systematizing of its programs, has to start from the admitted fact that somehow human life has failed" (p. 21). His description of faith asserts that "faith must be the actual movement of man's whole personality to identify itself with, and lose itself in, the personality of Christ" (p. 159). "A vital belief makes exchange of personalities with Christ" (p. 195). The result of such faith is that those who have it "put themselves beyond all experimentings and past all uncertainties, and may know themselves to be on the straight road" (p. 133). "Qualities of mind and heart and character are given—in most absolute truth and reality given" (p. 161).

Christian experience. This shifting of the base will ultimately result, if the movement is thoroughgoing, in the rejuvenation of orthodoxy. Its theology will come near to real life. The liberal has been charging the conservative with clinging to theories against facts and with hanging his faith upon the past; the conservative now comes back with the retort, "Very well, let us look at real life, and see which theory, yours or mine, is in closer accord with the present facts." The contest will be interesting from many points of view, and not least from that of psychology. For now at last there is reason to hope that fidelity to psychological facts will come to be recognized as a virtue in theology and in preaching.

It is not unnatural, however, that the first essays of conservative theology in this direction should betray some lack of familiarity with psychological technique. In the firm confidence that practice will remedy the difficulty, let us notice a recent vigorous and thought-provoking article of Principal Forsyth.⁷ With admirable courage he faces the issue between conservatism and liberalism, neither ignoring nor belittling the contrast, nor hoping for reconciliation. "We find our charter in history," he says, "and not in human nature; in the Word, and not the world. The seat of revelation is in the cross, and not in the heart. The precious thing is something given, and not evolved. Our best goodness is presented to us rather than achieved by us. The Kingdom of God is not a final goal, but an initial boon. . . . The gospel stands with the predominance of intervention, and it falls with the predominance of evolution. Grace is essentially miraculous."⁸ This position, he holds, is made good by the Christian's present experience of Christ, or rather, by the Christian's faith, for we are told, "We know him by faith to be much more than he has ever been to our experience."⁹

Apparently we have here two stages of knowledge, both attained in the Christian experience, but one of them transcending the experience and here called faith. The experience here referred to, it is perhaps needless to say, is that of regeneration. According to Principal Forsyth, regeneration is experienced as a "causal creative action" of Christ, in which the believer's inmost being meets "with

⁷ *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. VI, No. 3, pp. 481-99.

⁸ P. 486.

⁹ P. 494.

Christ in his act on the Cross."¹⁰ This experience yields the highest degree of certainty as to the believer's own relation to Christ. But beyond this, the believer also knows "him, and the Church knows him, as a person of infinite power to create fresh experience of himself," so that an individual experience yields an absolute truth, and in one's own salvation the salvation of the world is assured.¹¹ This larger assurance is the "knowing by faith" that has been referred to. This faith is also an experience, for it includes a sense that itself as an act "is not perfectly spontaneous but evoked, nay, created, by its content. . . . It is the sense that it is created by another and parent act—which is the one eternal decisive act of an eternal person saving a world. I am forgiven and saved by an act which saves the world."¹² Thus a way is found, as so often before, for claiming that the truth of a historically evolved dogma is directly revealed in present experience.

The article from which these remarkable citations are made is entitled, "The Distinctive Thing in Christian Experience." The distinctive thing here referred to is apparently the Christian's supposed experience of Christ's universal redemptive act upon the cross. This is as much as to say that the distinctive thing in Christian experience is that it fixes a dogma upon the mind. The dogma in question may be true enough, and it is entirely conceivable that it might receive logical support by inferences drawn from the facts of Christian experience. But are the facts of this experience correctly described in the passages just cited? The answer lies on the surface: We have here an effort to establish historical facts by a present experience of them, and to establish a broad generalization by a single one of its particulars. Once more, a system of doctrine has been read into Christian experience. The procedure is *a priori*, and the facts on which reliance is placed are distorted almost beyond recognition.

What, then, does psychology permit us to believe in respect to regeneration? First, it permits us to believe anything whatever as to

¹⁰ P. 492.

¹¹ Pp. 494, 495.

¹² P. 495. One minor sign of the lack of psychological technique in the passage from which the above citation is made is the confused use of elementary psychological terms in the following sentence: "It is not an afferent, but an efferent consciousness, as the psychologists would say, like the muscular sense, the sense not of rheumatism, but of energy."

the character of God; anything whatever as to the significance of the life and death of Jesus for the consciousness of God; anything whatever as to a state of helplessness that man would be in if God's disposition toward him were different from what it is; anything whatever as to the ultimate source of human goodness. It permits any hypothesis as to the power of Jesus to transform a human soul, and the only function of psychology with respect to such hypotheses is to see that the facts of mind therein involved are correctly described and related to one another and to their contemporary and historical conditions. It permits belief in a mystical presence and operation of Jesus Christ or the Holy Spirit provided only that this presence and these operations are not thought to be within the range of observation; if they are thought of as within the range of observation, then psychology steps in to see whether the facts are as they seem to be, to discover their antecedents, and to determine their place in this ordered and law-abiding universe of ours.

That the name of Jesus stands for a morally constructive power of the first rank no instructed person will deny. Here is the practical side of the doctrine of regeneration. But the doctrine does not stop with the merely practical; it goes on to say how the moral effects of the Christian religion are wrought, and it commonly claims that some of these effects are wrought by an act of Christ or the Holy Spirit that is separate from the historical order. Here is where the difficulty in adjusting the doctrine of regeneration with psychology is most acute. At present the problem takes this form: Does the Christian become acquainted with Jesus Christ otherwise than through the historic process (the Scriptures, the church, etc.)? No psychology would deny that Jesus is operative in the lives of men today in the same sense in which Washington and Lincoln and St. Paul still work within us. Nor would any psychologist draw from his science a denial that all these persons have survived bodily death, or that they are now taking an active part in the life of the universe. When, however, a claim is made that we can identify these present activities so as to say that this or that particular effect is wrought by a certain one of these persons, and otherwise than through the historical process, then the psychologist demands that the phenomenon in question be scrutinized.

There may be psychologists who hold that, even if a disembodied spirit were to return to us, we could not know the fact or identify the individual. Certainly most psychologists exclude such questions from psychological inquiry. But there appears to be no inherent necessity for supposing that the conditions of the recognition of one another change at death. Just as our present studies of sensation, memory, etc., record the reactions of A, B, and C as three "subjects," so it is conceivable that further phenomena of the same kind, recorded by laboratory instruments in the same way, might be set down to three disembodied subjects. That we might discern the personal presence of Jesus Christ is therefore not to be condemned as a psychological impossibility. The difficulty in the matter is no such *a priori* dictum as this would imply, but rather the exceedingly unsatisfactory evidence for the alleged fact. Indeed, nothing is more common among believers themselves than the assertion that the experience in question is beyond the reach of regulated observation. The proper inference from this is that a value has been confused with fact, or, more specifically, that a theory for interpreting a value has been taken to be a fact of experience.

Those who insist that they know Jesus otherwise than through the historic process inevitably place themselves upon the psychological plane of spiritism. Not a few Christian ministers see that this is the logic of their position, and therefore they show increasing sympathy toward beliefs which the ministry of twenty years ago branded as superstitious. If this tendency should spread, one almost inevitable result would be to make it more and more difficult for scientific men to find standing room within the Christianity of the church. If we were investing money, rather than defending a dogma, there can be little doubt that we would invest under the guidance of the scientific intellect rather than under the guidance of a tradition which, when hard pressed for its facts, forms an alliance with spiritism.

But why should Christian theologians permit such an issue as this to arise? Is it really true that, after nineteen centuries of Christian history, the moral power of Jesus needs to be defended by the most doubtful psychology? Or, have some men merely failed to see the woods because of the trees?

THE NEW TESTAMENT MIRACLES
AN INVESTIGATION OF THEIR FUNCTION

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I submit the following report of a recent, somewhat novel investigation which I have been led to make, in the hope that it may help clear up certain difficulties and be found to contribute to genuine progress.

Long before the time of Hume, but especially since his famous argument against them, the New Testament miracles have been a standard topic for discussion in Christian apologetics. The argument in their favor, in the form which may be called the standard form, runs something like this. Miracles are (1) possible, because of the personality of God, according to which he can interfere, if he will, in the ordinary progress of events by special intervention to effect a special purpose. They are (2) necessary to revelation, because necessary to attest the divine mission of the teachers whom God sends into the world. They are thus (3) necessary to human salvation, to which a knowledge of God by revelation is necessary. And therefore (4) they will actually be wrought, because God, who can interfere for man's salvation, will do so, since otherwise man must be lost. The argument for miracles is, in a word, that there is a sufficient reason for them in the great need of man.

This argument most men trained in the Christian church are inclined to accept without great question. It sounds eminently reasonable. It falls in with the general tone of the Bible, with the gift of a sign to Moses by which to authenticate himself and his message to Israel, with Gideon's request for a sign, with Hezekiah's, and with the perfect answer which seems to be given to the Pharisees who grumble at Jesus' forgiving the paralytic his sins, when he *does* a thing, in healing the paralytic, as impossible to human powers as the act of forgiving which he has *professed* to perform. The appeal of Jesus to men to "believe his works" though they would not believe

him, seems to be the appeal from what might possibly be questioned to what was unquestionable, and thus a recognition of the necessity of attestation for the message which he had to bring. With so much of consideration as this, most students of theology have been inclined to let the matter rest. They have accepted the idea of an epoch of miracles, or better of successive epochs, corresponding to the successive epochs of revelation. Modern professed miracles they have joined with the world of thinkers in rejecting, because there is now no need of further attestation of the Christian revelation; but the miracles of the Bible they have regarded as occupying a unique position in the history of the world, and as therefore having a unique claim upon our acceptance.¹

Meantime, the modern course of thought has brought the world of thinkers to a more decided, and a deeper grounded, rejection of the supposition that miracles have ever been wrought, than has been pronounced at any previous period in the history of thought. The uniformity of law in the universe as a postulate of thinking has assumed greater importance as time has gone on. The successive explanations of mysteries and marvels by natural laws under modern methods of investigation have created the conviction that there is no mystery but what is capable of being explained by some law, possibly yet altogether unknown. An atmosphere of disbelief in the miraculous has been wrapped around the modern world, till even the Christian disciple has been affected by it, and to him the problem of a more satisfactory defense of miracles has become a personal issue, a thing necessary for his own faith, whether he concerns himself about the defense of Christianity against objectors or not. And hence every step of the old argument demands a careful re-examination from him.

I propose at this time to examine the second of the four steps of the argument sketched above, the necessity of miracles to revelation. I shall not do this by raising abstract issues, and considering general propositions. I shall appeal to facts. I shall take the New Testament in hand and ask the simple question whether, upon the face

¹ It may be of interest to note that Professor H. B. Smith, whose apologetics follow precisely the line sketched in the above given summary, never once raises the question as to what the effects of the gospel miracles actually were, but assumes this point—that they must have powerfully served to attest revelation—as self-evident.

of the gospel story as it stands, apart from all theories which may there be found as to the effect of miracles, there is or is not evidence, in the facts related, that the miracles served to attest the mission of Jesus and to recommend him to the acceptance of his times.

One word more. We are, in this investigation, to perform the work of criticism, dogmatic criticism. We do not forget the splendid work of historical criticism upon the contents of the New Testament, nor can dogmatics in the long run ignore the results of that science. It is the province of dogmatics to receive materials from every kindred branch of investigation and build its own constructive work therewith. But just here dogmatics is concerned with itself. It turns upon one of its own favorite arguments the light of its own peculiar criticism. Accepting the premises as to the Scriptures upon which that argument rests, so far as those premises are at all legitimate, it asks the question whether the facts bear out a supposition which is confidently made as the basis of still further arguments. It may be that the results of this, the dogmatic form of criticism, will be found to sustain some relation to that other form, the historic. And then, again, historic criticism itself takes, more or less unconsciously, a pretty well-defined attitude toward miracles, and this is that of the scientific thought of the day. If it does not deny miracles outright, it is strongly inclined to their denial. It generally assumes that history is continuous and a unit, and that the principal key in the interpretation of the past is to be found in the occurrences of the present. Thus historical criticism belongs to a stage of the discussion which is logically later than the present, which is concerned with settling the credibility of the New Testament miracles as a whole. In some of its forms it is as naïve in the rejection of the miraculous as apology has been in the supposition of the necessity of the miraculous. We therefore waive it and its results for the present for the sake of an investigation of another kind, reserving to ourselves the liberty to return to it when and where we will.

With these few preliminary remarks we may now proceed directly to the consideration of our question, viz., whether the miracles of the New Testament, according to the testimony of the New Testament itself, did, or did not, serve actually to attest the great messenger of revelation and to commend him to the favorable attention of men.

I. THE MIRACLES OF THE INFANCY OF JESUS

Among these we place first those that accompanied the birth of John Baptist. The conception of John is represented as miraculous, since Elizabeth was barren, and the time of expecting a child had passed. It was also accompanied with miraculous events, the evident design of which was to point out the connection which the child to be born was to have with the Messiah. The acquaintance between the families of John and Jesus would render it antecedently probable that knowledge of the relation miraculously established between forerunner and Messiah would be maintained, and thus the miracles of John's birth should be the warrant of his proclaiming Jesus as the Messiah.

Actually they seem to have nothing to do with it. According to the evangelist John, John Baptist knew the Messiah only by the sign of the dove at his baptism (1:33). As far as the miracle of the vision to Zachariah was an evidence of the messiahship of Jesus, it failed to have the influence to be expected, even with John, being replaced by the sign of the dove. We may explain this fact by the ignorance in which John may have been left as to the person of Jesus, although the whole purpose of the narrative is to show that the family of Zachariah fully understood how Mary became pregnant, and that her expected child was to be the Messiah whose coming John was to "prepare." That John should have been left in ignorance of his person or his entrance upon a public ministry is simply inconceivable, if the narrative of the miracles we are considering is to be taken at its face value. However that may be, the center of gravity is later shifted to the miracle of the dove. But even this did not convince John. Later, in prison, he fell into doubt, and sent his disciples to investigate the messiahship of Jesus (Matt. 11:2-19). He had to be convinced again by miracles, but this time by the *report* of miracles. Would these convince him? It is significant in this connection that he nowhere prophesies that the Messiah shall do miracles.

The question of the miraculous conception of Christ we leave for the present to ask the question as to the effect of the miracles of the angel vision and of the star seen in the east. These were apparently intended to introduce the new-born king to the knowledge and favorable reception of the world. Did they actually effect anything?

Nothing, so far as the evangelical records inform us. When Jesus appeared in Galilee, according to the synoptists, preaching repentance, not a soul among those whom he addressed knew of the wise men, or the shepherds' vision of the angels, or even that he was born in Bethlehem. He was called Jesus of Nazareth, and this evidently meant born in Nazareth. His previous ministry in Judea, according to the Fourth Gospel, was introduced only by the witness of John. So far as any authentication or favorable introduction of Jesus to his people and time was concerned, all the events of the infancy might never have occurred. The rest of the New Testament is equally silent concerning them. Bethlehem is only once mentioned in connection with Jesus after his appearance as a teacher, and this is where it is mentioned as the birthplace of the Messiah by the Jews for the purpose of proving that Jesus is *not* the Messiah, since, as was well known, he was born in Nazareth (John 7:41, 42).

These miracles, therefore, stand in the light of ineffective works of God. It is exceedingly difficult to believe that they ever occurred. Does God work without purpose and without result? The difficulty is increased by the fact that one very sad result is proclaimed in connection with them, the slaughter of the innocents. Would God work works which would have so injurious an effect, which subsequent history was to show to be ineffective in the line of the legitimate influence of miracles, and therefore altogether unnecessary? If the apology of miracles depends upon their necessity, then such apology cannot defend these miracles, for their ineffectiveness exhibits their utter lack of necessity.

But, it may be said, the cause of the evangelical miracles in general is not affected by this particular case, since the genuineness of these passages as a part of the evangelical record has long been doubted on other grounds. They stand alone in the first and third gospels, and no trace of the record of their most important element, the miraculous conception, is to be found in the remaining New Testament. Paul does not mention it, and seems not to have heard of it, for it would naturally have come in in such passages as the passage on the incarnation in Phil. 2:5-11, had he known of it. Weiss has argued elaborately in his *Leben Jesu* for the genuineness of the accounts, urging particularly the nature of the secret revealed in them as the

ground of its long concealment, since it would have been an argument against the gospel until that gospel was substantiated by a considerable period of successful propagation. If, however, miraculous conception was essential to the fact of the incarnation, it would seem to be essential to the defense of it; and since Paul does not use it in the defense, it can scarcely be that he thought it essential to the fact; and if it was not essential to the fact, it did not occur. The argument seems to incline against the passages. When we add the considerations which have been marshaled above, and see that the miracles which form the chief burden of these passages play no actual part in the furtherance of the work of the Christ, then the argument against the passages would seem to be complete.

But, if we reject them, the argument for the evangelical miracles is not thereby relieved. Rather a suspicion is raised in the mind that other miraculous accounts in the gospels may harm their effect and argue their imperfection. We must unavoidably pass on our way from this earliest phase of our investigation with that attitude of criticism, with which we entered upon it, confirmed.

But the rejoinder may be made that the miracles of Bethlehem may have had an influence in recommending Jesus to his times, although no trace of it appears in the present records. We cannot expect these to be complete, it may be said, and their silence may cover many important facts. It may be that many a one whose coming to Jesus is totally unexplained in the narratives, came because some shepherd had told him of what took place upon the plains of Bethlehem.

At this juncture of our argument it is necessary that we proceed cautiously and it may be well to pause upon this objection long enough to say that it presents us merely with a conjecture, not with anything in the remotest degree related to a fact. We want simply to know whether there is in the New Testament any *evidence* that the reputed miracles actually did exercise an influence in attesting Jesus to his doubtful contemporaries. A possibility is not evidence; conjectures are not facts; suppositions are not arguments. We need something which shall raise the second premise of our main apologetic argument to the level of a truth, a sound premise, the basis of a sound argument. There is nothing here which serves this purpose.

Another rejoinder to our argument may be made, that, although these early miracles may have had no effect in introducing more favorably the new king to his people, they did bring blessing to the individuals concerned, and were particularly helpful in confirming the faith of Mary herself, and fitting her to train her wondrous child more suitably for his future work. But the element of spiritual teaching by which alone the wise men or the shepherds could profit, is conspicuously absent from the whole account; and as for Mary, she had a greater proof of the nature and meaning of her son in her knowledge of his miraculous conception, if that be a fact, than could ever have been given her by choruses of angels (which, by the way, she did not see), or the worship of wise men. It remains that when we ask the question: What was the divine purpose in these miracles? there is no answer; and when, in particular, we ask: Did they serve in any way to confirm the divine message of Jesus to those who heard it? we must reply: Not in so far as the narratives give information. If there is a necessity for miracles to confirm revelation, no evidence of such a necessity from the fact that they *did* confirm it, is to be found here.

II. THE MIRACLE OF CANA. "SIGNS" IN JOHN

This event was, of course, a true miracle—an event which could not have happened without the intervention of the creative act of God. There was at one moment nothing but water in the water-jars, which is a chemical combination of oxygen and hydrogen. At the next moment there was wine—a combination of a large number of very complex hydrocarbons. Carbon in considerable quantity must have been created there, and new combinations of the elements produced without any of the common processes. It is a clear display of omnipotence.

What influence, now, as a sign, did this miracle have? Did it help the delivery to man of the revelation of God? The answer is, not that the ruler of the feast was converted or any other hostile member of the company, but that "his *disciples* believed on him." Now these disciples had been gained without any miracle that they had themselves seen. John "did no signs;" but he had pointed out Jesus as the Lamb of God on the authority of the sign which he had

seen, but not they, at the baptism (1:33, 36), and they had learned what they received about Jesus in association with him (1:39), and by what he had said to Nathaniel (1:48, 49). They believed upon him without a miracle. Was a miracle "necessary" to confirm this faith? Other effect it does not seem to have had.

The word "sign" used in connection with this miracle is a favorite word with John, occurring less frequently of the miracles in the other gospels. I think that it will appear, upon examination of the account, that the attitude of Jesus himself toward the signs is different from that of the evangelist. The evangelist regards them as the credentials of Christ's character and commission. So in this passage, and also in 2:23; 3:2; 4:29, 30; 6:2, 14; 7:31; 9:16; 11:47; 20:30. But when he comes to simple narrative of facts, and particularly to the narrative of the words of Jesus himself, a different face is put upon the whole matter. In the midst of this account of the first and following miracles occurs the demand of the Jews, after the cleansing of the temple, that Jesus should give them a sign as evidence of his authority to act in a way apparently so high-handed and unauthorized. He refers them, by an obscure and Delphic-like oracle, to the resurrection. In other words, he refuses a sign. Though the evangelist declares that the feeding of the five thousand was a sign which led the people to believe (6:14), Jesus himself says, "Ye seek me, *not* because ye *saw* signs, but because ye *ate of the loaves* and were filled." And even the evangelist refutes his own statement that the miracle of the loaves was taken as a conclusive proof of revelation when he goes on to record the demand of this same multitude, fed by an exertion of the almighty power of Christ, for still another sign, "What, then, dost thou for a sign, that we may see, and believe thee?" (6:30). And this demand Jesus entirely ignores. Again, in 11:47, we have a confession on the part of the Jews that Jesus wrought signs; but instead of believing, they plot to slay him. Even that marvelous miracle, the resurrection of Lazarus, which ought forever to have stilled the objections of all who knew of it and to have produced genuine faith in Jesus on the part of all, was entirely ineffective. In a word, in spite of the belief and theory of the evangelist, his whole treatment of the subject of signs is against the supposition that they

had any appreciable effect upon commending the message of Christ to his day and world.

The same attitude toward signs is to be found in the synoptists, as will be brought out at a later point. But attention should be given in this connection to Matt. 12:39 ff. and parallels. Here, in answer to the demand for a sign, it is expressly said by Jesus that "no sign shall be given . . . but the sign of Jonah the prophet." The next verse, which refers this sign to the three days' sojourn of Jonah in the whale's belly, and prophesies the resurrection in an obscure manner, does not probably belong here, for it has no pertinence, since a sign so far in the future affords no reply to the request of men then asking for a sign, and does not occur in the parallels. Furthermore, the true sense of the passage is that Jonah is himself the sign (compare Luke 11:29). He "became" a sign (Luke 11:30) unto the Ninevites, so that the sign was not in something which had happened before they ever knew him; and that sign was that he was a preacher of repentance (Matt. 12:41; Luke 11:32). The only sign that Jesus would give was therefore his preaching. Here two very vital points are to be noticed, (1) that Jesus refused to give a sign, and (2) that he left the preaching to rest upon its own evidence, and said that this was enough to secure the condemnation of men who should not receive it. His thoroughgoing rejection of the position that miracles were necessary to attest his divine mission could not be more distinctly marked.

III. THE ABSENCE OF MIRACLES AT CERTAIN POINTS

A phenomenon is now brought to our attention which we should naturally defer to a later point in this discussion, but which the chronological order of the story, as given by the evangelists, brings in just here. It is the absence of miracles at points at which one would imagine, if miracles were essential to Jesus' message, that they would be introduced. The instance supplied by the narrative is the interview with Nicodemus. True, Nicodemus says in his introductory remarks (John 3:2) that it is the signs of Jesus which have given him his conviction of Jesus' coming from God. That will have less influence upon us after the discussion of the last paragraph. But,

in any case, it will seem somewhat remarkable that this discourse, in which is to be found the "microevangel" itself, nowhere cites miracles as proof of its remarkable claims, and is nowhere accompanied by a sign.

Another example, still more remarkable, is that of the Sermon on the Mount. This was also preceded by a series of miracles (Matt. 4:23-25). But it will be noted that these were all miracles of healing, of which something must be said at a later point, which were not intended as signs in the exclusive meaning of that word, since their object was chiefly the relief of suffering, the simple and uncalculating doing of good. Their effect was to gather a multitude. But the address to that multitude was the address of a teacher who depended upon the conviction which the truth would carry of itself for the effect of his preaching. And it was, as a matter of fact, his manner and his matter which convinced, for "the multitudes were astonished at his teaching," and it was because "he taught them as one having authority, and not as the scribes" (7:28, 29).

When, in fact, was his teaching of any other sort? He repulsed the demand for a sign, and went right on with teaching, which he apparently expected would appeal to the enlightened conscience as axiomatic truth of God. It does so appeal today to us. This Sermon on the Mount, the parable of the Prodigal Son, the remaining parables, the discourse in John, chaps. 14-16—upon what do they rest for their authority with men today? Is it not upon their self-evidencing moral value? Certainly to the modern thought the miracles hinder this impression rather than help. One follows them with difficulty and with embarrassment. When he turns to the discourses from the miracles it is with a diminished sense of the value of the teaching. But if he dwells upon the teaching apart from the miracles it soon assumes its inherent worth in his eyes. Then he begins to *defend the miracles by the teaching!* What better proof could be asked that the teaching is really independent of the miracles and always has been? What stronger reason could be given for doubting whether the miracles ever did occur?

But we resume the examination of the facts given by the gospels.

IV. MIRACLES OF HEALING

Of these I have noted twenty-five distinct cases. It will not be necessary to consider them all, or in great detail. Of all the works of Jesus, these are the ones which modern thought finds the least difficulty in accepting. The possession of healing power by persons of great physical endowment in our own day, with the acknowledged power upon the mind of contact with a greater mind actuated by courage and hope, are too clear to our modern understanding to allow us to deny such power to so remarkable a personality as was Jesus Christ.

The actuality of these miracles in general will be readily granted; but this may be at the expense of their miraculous character and of their power to attest the divine character of the message which Jesus brought. It is therefore necessary, for our present purposes, to consider them as signs, and to ask the question whether, as a matter of fact, they seem to have served the purpose of confirming the revelation made by our Savior.

The first effect of these miracles of healing mentioned by the evangelists (Mark 1:23-39) was to call the attention of the people far and near to the new prophet and to give him a great popularity. From the first Jesus seems to have deprecated this effect. The announcement is made to him by Peter, "All are seeking thee;" but this does not please him, or lead to expressions of conviction that now the people were about to accept his message. He replies, "Let us go elsewhere." He actually shuns this multitude which the healings had gathered, as if this one result of the healings was to be regretted. And, why not? If his work was a spiritual work, if it was his object to introduce the kingdom of God by leading men to the firm belief and active practice of its foundation principle, that of love, what he needed was quiet, calm, thoughtfulness, deliberate assumption of the right attitude of heart toward great truths—all of which finds little place in the presence of a crowd.

We see, accordingly, a peculiar phenomenon which has never been explained to my own satisfaction by any of the forms of apology which I have had the privilege of examining. In the very next miracle narrated, and in many a subsequent one, Jesus says to the man healed,

"See thou say nothing to any man" (Mark 1:44). Why does he forbid the spreading abroad of the account of that which, on the theory that miracles are signs necessary to the conveyance of the message of revelation to the blind and hardened hearts of men, would powerfully attest his message and open the hearts of men to it? Was it not that *he did not rely upon signs* for this purpose? Why did he flee from the multitudes when they sought him (1:45), if not that he did not welcome this sort of faith because he sought another, one which should grow up in quiet, and establish itself upon the evidence for the truth which lies in the truth itself?

It is to be noted here in passing that, whether the works of healing served as signs or not, they were not done for the sake of originating signs, but were the offspring of Jesus' love for suffering men. He healed to make men well. It is a powerful argument against the supposition that miracles of omnipotence (such as the making of the water into wine) were performed by Jesus as signs, that even the simple outflow of Jesus' compassion in works of healing stirred up uncomfortable and injurious notoriety for him, against which he had to defend himself as well as he could. How much greater and how much more injurious would the influence of miracles proper have been, had they really occurred!

Some of these works of healing, which one would expect to produce at least a kindly feeling toward Jesus, even if they did not commend his message and secure the acceptance of it by the people, seem rather to have stirred up hatred and opposition. What ought to have been more convincing than the healing of the man at Bethesda (John 5:1 ff.), or that of the man with the withered hand (Matt. 12:9-14)? But they both led simply to persecution, as if he had broken the Sabbath by his "working" thereupon! The same effect followed in other cases (John 9:16; Luke 13:10-21).

Among the most remarkable miracles of healing were those where the sick were not brought into the presence of Jesus. Such were the healing of the centurion's servant (Matt. 8:5-13 and parallel), the healing of a centurion's son, which may be another form of the same incident (John 4:46-54); and that of the Syrophenician woman's daughter (Matt. 15:21-28 and parallel). Of the first of these, nothing is mentioned as to its effect. Of the second, the effect, so far as related,

is confined to the household of the centurion himself. This is, practically, to fail to mention any effect, for the centurion already had faith, since he was ready to take the simple word of the Master and believe it, though he had come to ask his presence in his house. As to the last, no effect of the miracle is mentioned, and no subsequent trace is found of any movement toward Jesus of any sort in Tyre and Sidon.

Some of the miracles of healing are expressly called signs, or else given as signs. Among these is that of the palsied man in Matt. 9:1-8. To this an effect is ascribed, in that "the multitudes were afraid and glorified God;" but no multitudes became the followers of the messenger of salvation thus marvelously attested. The healing of the man with the withered hand (Matt. 12:9-14) called forth positive hostility. After it there followed, not a period of the multiplication of signs, under the impression that at last the truth thus attested would break through, but an effort to *suppress* the report of the healings wrought (Matt. 12:16)!

One case more, and one only, needs to be considered. It is that of the casting out of the devil in Matt. 12:22-37. The Pharisees charged Jesus with casting out devils by Beelzebub. Jesus makes a strange answer, and one which I do not think has been sufficiently noted. "If I cast them out," he says in substance, "by demoniac power, then am I laboring against the very kingdom to which I belong. But you know well that my work does militate against that kingdom, and that it is intended and adapted to bring in the kingdom of God and that I work these works by the Spirit of God. Therefore, casting devils out by the Spirit of God, I show you the kingdom of God brought near. But you, if you blaspheme that which you know to be done by the Spirit, by attributing it to Beelzebub, are committing the unpardonable sin." *Jesus thus appeals to his doctrine, as evidently divine, to sustain his miracle which had been attributed to the prince of evil!* Here, then, also, in the midst of the so-called epoch of revelation and miracle, the doctrine sustained the miracle rather than the miracle the doctrine.

V. RAISING THE DEAD

The multiplication of the miracles, far from giving strength to the argument for their value as attestations of the divine authority of the

prophets and Jesus, weakens it; for, if an act of the character of a miracle is worth anything at all as an attestation of truth, it ought to be absolutely convincing and stand in no need of repetition. Professor H. B. Smith seems to have felt this in some degree, for he writes: "There are *test miracles*, which admit only of the alternatives, Miracle or Fraud: e. g., the raising of Lazarus. We should not care *if there were only one*—that is enough."² Certainly, so remarkable a miracle as this might well be "enough." Special attention should, therefore, be given to this miracle; and of it, if of any, the demand may be made that it shall sustain the argument whose validity we are considering, and show the power of the miracle to attest the truth.

A sentence or two may first be given to dispatching the raising of the widow's son at Cana (Luke 7:11-17). The evangelists, whose theory is that miracles were very effective, might be expected to see effectiveness in this; and, accordingly, we find Luke adding to the account the verse: "And fear took hold on all; and they glorified God, saying, A great prophet is arisen among us: and, God hath visited his people." But the fact that this is a conventional addition, without special meaning, will impress one who compares it with the quite identical expressions in Matt. 9:8. Jesus was certainly in the full current of a spurious and injurious popularity at this time, in which this exceptional miracle ought to have wrought startling effects, but was really lost in the mass, which was strangely ineffective. It seems, even to the evangelists, to have meant nothing more than other healing—a fact which alone shows how incompetent they were to transmit to later times a narrative in which miracles should play so large a part.

The raising of Jairus' daughter presents no new points, and may, indeed, not fall under this head at all.

We come, therefore, to that remarkable miracle, upon which Smith would have been willing to rest everything, the raising of Lazarus (John 11:1-57). It is unquestionably the view of the evangelist that this miracle was effective in producing belief. "Many of the Jews believed on him" (5:45); the "common people" came to the feast at Bethany "that they might see Lazarus also" (12:9); "by reason of him many believed on Jesus" (vs. 11); on Palm Sunday "the multitude that was with him when he called Lazarus out of the tomb, and

² *Apologetics*, p. 95.

raised him from the dead, bare witness" (vs. 17); and "for this cause also the multitude went and met him" (vs. 18). That is, the common people, who needed little persuasion, but were always inclined to receive Jesus favorably, believed; but the "Pharisees," the people who needed a complete and an overwhelming proof, treated it with contempt and "took counsel that they might put him to death" (11:53). The thousand-ton trip-hammer is used to crush the crystal of a watch, but brought down upon the glowing iron of the anchor needing to be forged it produces no effect! And these multitudes, what of them? They come and usher Jesus into the city in the triumphal procession, but in 12:37 they again disbelieve, and from that point on are never heard of again, unless Paul's "five hundred brethren," who saw the Lord after the resurrection, are their reappearance in the gospel history; but not even they had a word to say, or a thing to do, in the first preaching of the gospel by Peter and his associates, or appear at any other point to do anything or to bear any testimony for Jesus. Surely, the miracle has evaporated!

VI. THE APOSTLES AND MIRACLES

Some of the miracles have reference to the apostles themselves alone. The miraculous draught of fishes at the call of the four disciples (Luke 5:1-11) and the transfiguration are examples of this class. Were the miracles necessary to render the call of the apostles effective? Must Simon Peter be brought to a feeling of his own sinfulness by an exhibition of the apartness of Jesus ("Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord!") before he could be induced to follow Jesus? It is not at all certain, especially when we consider the case of Matthew, who was a tax-gatherer, and who was far less likely to be moved by a mere call to leave that in which his wealth and position were bound up for the discipleship of a teacher who was poor. And if any such feeling of profound awe really marked the early hours of his association with Jesus, the subsequent familiarity—one might even say presumption—which Peter manifested (Matt. 16:22) is difficult to explain. Had he forgotten the hour when he was overwhelmed by the marvelous draught?

The transfiguration took place in the presence of Peter, James, and John, and these three apostles had been earlier selected as witnesses

of the raising of Jairus' daughter. Why? Were they still in need of the confirmation of the message by miracles? Was one, such as the making of water into wine, not enough? And must they have multitudes of miracles, and even some which no one else was permitted to behold? If one can accept new miracles as necessary in new environments, is he to accept miracles as necessary to revelation in cases where they ought to have effected their end long before if they had any such power?

Yet it became the current view that the apostles not only saw many miracles, but were sent out to work miracles by Jesus himself (Mark 6:7,13); and the Acts of the Apostles is full of accounts of miracles. Precisely the same phenomena are to be noted as to the attesting value of miracles in the Acts as in the gospels. Healings are most frequent, and the motive seems to have been simple compassion; though doubtless many of the second class, that of signs, belong among the healings. Four visions are mentioned, three cases of miraculous deliverance, and there are two miraculous punishments, that of Ananias and that of Elymas. Paul himself wrought comparatively few miracles; and it is a point of the utmost importance that he seems to have succeeded just as well in making converts where he did no miracles as where he did them (cf. Acts 18:1-18). And, generally, the miracles which were wrought were met with incredulity by many (14:4), and were very limited in their effects (e.g., 14:8-20).

VII. INCREDIBLE MIRACLES

I employ this term to express the fact that there are certain miracles which can be believed to have happened only when the actuality of other miracles has been established without a doubt, and then only with difficulty. Such are, for instance, the miracle of the sun's standing still, in the Book of Joshua. That miracle is so astounding and so immense, involving, as it does, the stopping of the whole system of the universe, that modern knowledge rejects it. The ancients knew nothing of what it involved. It was nothing more to them than the making of water wine. But, while omnipotence can do all things, still there is sense and proportion in all of God's works; and this miracle calls for too much exertion of power to be proportionate to the object sought or obtained. The same is true of the miracle of

the two she-bears sent out by God to eat up forty and two "young lads" who had "mocked," or sauced, as we should say, the prophet Elisha. It is a story of a disproportionate punishment, and reflects a great defect in the moral feeling of its author. It belongs among the well-recognized imperfections of this stage of religious progress among the Hebrews.

The stilling of the tempest upon the Sea of Galilee, the walking on the water, and the feeding of the thousands, belong in the same category. The first involves natural changes which are incredible, though not impossible. For what was the miracle wrought? For purposes of confirmation of revelation? No! For the relief of the disciples from danger? Forethought and providence would have been more consonant with the character of Christ. For the purposes indicated in the text, viz., to astonish and overwhelm the disciples? That, also is scarcely consonant with the character of Christ. The miracle and its companion, the walking on the water, remain without adequate motive, after all has been said for them which can be said.

If any objector does not see anything incredible in the element of the magnitude of the miracles of the miraculous feeding, he must, at any rate, recur to the original question which lies at the basis of our investigation. Did these miracles actually serve to confirm the message of Jesus? The answer must be, on the whole: No. The first impression which the evangelist John has about the feeding of the five thousand is that it did confirm the message of Jesus (6:14); but later (vss. 26, 27) he shows that this influence was evanescent. And, even if there was such an effect, the immediate result was harmful, for (vs. 15) it was of the wrong kind, leading to an attempt to make Jesus what he could not become, a secular king, and compelling him to retire for the time from sight. According to Mark, the disciples needed to be later reminded of the miracles, so that even upon them, who ought to have been, and doubtless were, the most easily impressible of all the multitudes who witnessed these wonderful events, the influence was transient. Miracles which can effect so little, and for so short a time, would seem to lack every quality of things which might be regarded "necessary." The truly necessary thing was either something much more or much less, either a crucial miracle settling the divine character of Jesus once for all, or else the

simple and plain truth, unattested by any miracle, shining by its own light, and bringing that conviction which rests upon evident reasonableness, and which nothing can ever shake.

Two miracles remain to be mentioned under this head, which are incredible for another reason, because they offend the moral sense and are unworthy of Jesus. They are the cursing of the fig tree, and the destruction of the Gadarene swine. The incongruousness of the former has been relieved in some minds by the supposition that it was a symbolical action; but it belongs really in the category of the apocryphal story of the boy whom the child Jesus slew by his word because he interfered, child-like, in Jesus' play—though, of course, this is worse. The destruction of the swine, while it might gratify a narrow Jewish feeling, was a destruction of the property of unoffending persons, impossible to a large-minded man like Jesus, who came to introduce a new order of things under which the prescriptions of the Jewish law should pass away.

VIII. THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS

The result of our investigations thus far has been unfavorable to the success of the apologetic argument, the premises of which we set out to examine. As a matter of fact, the New Testament miracles do not seem to have served to authenticate the mission of Jesus and thus to introduce him to the favorable attention of his times. The premise that they were necessary to attest revelation, and thus necessary to revelation, and to the salvation of men, cannot be maintained, so far as now appears. A thing cannot be necessary to do that which it actually does not do. The failure of the expected effect shows that the thing has no causal potency in that direction. Its nature and character are misconceived when an office is attributed to it which it does not fulfil.

But we have not completed our task. We have not met its chief difficulties. We have now to consider one more cycle of New Testament miracles, those connected with the resurrection of Jesus and embracing the evidence of that resurrection. Our question remains the same. Did the various events narrated, and did the resurrection itself, actually serve to authenticate the mission of Jesus, and thus to show their necessity, and give a sufficient ground for believing that

they occurred? There are, of course, a great many other questions which surround this subject which are of both interest and importance; but we have nothing to do with them now. We are seeking the sufficient reason for the miraculous, and are limiting ourselves to the one apologetic argument already cited.

We cannot, however, approach this part of our investigation with quite the same confidence in the narrative of the gospels which we had when we began. We have already discovered two distinct views of the office of miracles as signs in the gospels, and we cannot, if we would, and ought not, if we could, neglect the natural inference from this fact, that, quite possibly, there may be discordant elements in the story of the resurrection also. In fact, we strike such at once in the emphasis laid upon the complete consternation of the disciples at Jesus' death, and the fact, so inconsistent with this, that they still continued to gather together, ere the evidence of miracles was introduced to re-establish their faith. The general impression of the New Testament is, and is designed to be, that this consternation was removed, and that the apostles were enabled to go on their way, by the fact of the resurrection, which was brought home to them by Jesus' frequent appearances to them; and that upon that fact, upon which their own faith depended, they built up the faith of their converts whether at Jerusalem or at Corinth. This is the theory of the gospels and the Acts. Our question is whether the facts as stated sustain this theory.

1. We notice that almost nobody in the apostolic circle will believe the report of another that he has seen the risen Lord. Thus the apostles did not believe the women who saw Jesus at the sepulcher (Luke 24:11); nor did they believe Mary Magdalene (Mark 16:11) nor did they believe the report of the two that went to Emmaus (Mark 16:13, although Luke 24:34, 35 gives the reverse impression); nor would Thomas believe the testimony of all the rest (John 20:25).

This attitude is made the occasion of blame by Jesus, and, indeed, must be, for if the knowledge of the resurrection was to be communicated at all to future times, it must be so by testimony, since the resurrection itself could not be repeated nor the appearance of the risen Jesus. Thus the disciples are not represented to us as being in a mood to be influenced by the miraculous as such, weighing its evidence,

clearly perceiving its essential nature, and giving it its due weight, once for all, as establishing the reality of the mission of Jesus. What that mood was, we shall see as we go on. But it was different, as different as zenith from nadir, from the attitude which the apology requires of the public which it contemplates, in order that to it miracle may attest revelation.

2. Some of them did not believe the vision they had themselves seen. The women who went to the sepulcher and saw the angels, did not believe, according to Mark (16:8), for they were "afraid" and "said nothing to anyone." True, Matthew corrects this statement by adding to "fear" the opposite emotion of "joy," and thus prepares the way for the statement that "they ran to bring the disciples word." And Luke amplifies this into the account of their telling the apostles (Luke 24:10). The original account is thus against the others, and against the idea that the miracle of the angels had any convincing power such as the argument requires.

3. The real attitude of the narrative toward these miracles is revealed by its attitude toward the prophecy of the resurrection of Jesus repeatedly made, according to the gospels by Jesus himself. In John 20:9 we read that "as yet they knew not the Scripture, that he must rise again from the dead." Here there appears to be more than a suggestion of forgetfulness of the prophecies on the disciples' part, or failure to understand Jesus, for their source of information is intimated to be the "Scripture," as if they were to have understood so much of its teaching as the resurrection of Christ, of themselves. The writer himself seems to have forgotten the prophecy. Here is another miracle which did not have its proper weight, the miracle of prophecy.

4. After they were finally convinced by a series of appearances, their conviction seems all to have evaporated, for in the scene by the Sea of Galilee, narrated in John 21:1-24, especially vss. 4 and 12, the manifestation had to begin at the starting-point once more, since they did not recognize Jesus, and their primary feeling after they had recognized him was fear (vs. 12). Certainly a series of miracles such as those which precede this miracle of the draught of fishes and the reappearance of the departed Lord, must have been exceedingly ineffective in attesting the fact of the resurrection and bringing it into

their permanent consciousness. And, yet, it is almost more remarkable still that this narrative, having put the disciples into the attitude of awe, cannot keep them there, or, at least, cannot keep the irrepressible Peter, for we find him asking the jealous and impertinent question in regard to John: What shall this man do?

5. The miracle of the resurrection actually interfered with a true understanding of the mission of Jesus, for it served to confuse the mind of the apostles again about the spiritual nature of this kingdom, and thus led them to ask, upon the very day of the ascension, "Dost thou at this time restore the kingdom to Israel?" Now that which confuses the mind as to the essence of a mission has no proper place in attesting that mission.

6. Were the miraculous appearances of Jesus given their appropriate importance in the subsequent preaching of the apostles? Do we find the apostles referring to the mission and work of Jesus as now permanently and perfectly established and needing no more confirmation? To ask the question is to answer it. Nothing is clearer than that every question is still open with every new congregation, and that fresh miracles are as necessary as if no miracles had ever occurred. Thus while, on the one hand, it is assumed, as the current theory of the New Testament, that miracles are necessary to attest revelation, on the other hand, this attestation is treated as if it had effected nothing for the world at large, whatever it may have effected for individuals, such as the apostles. Let us look at this peculiar condition of things more closely:

a) The appeal of Peter at Pentecost is not to the numerous miracles which had been wrought during the life-time of Jesus, as sufficient to attest his mission, though these had been wrought in the presence of Peter's hearers (Acts 2:22); but he proceeds to mention Jesus' resurrection (vs. 24), and this he proves by a twofold argument, (1) the witness of the apostles, and (2) the descent of the Holy Ghost, which had been made manifest to the people by the miracle of the gift of tongues. It was all these things, culminating in the effusion of the Spirit, which was the last miracle, upon which, in fact, all the rest depended, that constituted the reason why the multitude should repent and be baptized in the name of Jesus Christ.

b) At the Beautiful Gate of the Temple, it was not the evidence

of testimony to the resurrection, and then that of the resurrection thus attested, which is to convince the people of the authority of Christ and lead them to repentance, but a new miracle is wrought, the healing of the lame man. We are no nearer the end of miracles than we were at the beginning. Every miracle that is wrought, instead of furnishing evidence which may at last be regarded as final, requires a new miracle for its own attestation. And, then, this miracle does not receive the kind of credence which it properly demands; for the rulers and elders and scribes, though they confess that "indeed a notable miracle hath been wrought," manifest no tendency to give acceptance to the message of the apostles. The miracle is like all juggling tricks to them: proving force, it has none.

c) Thus we might go on indefinitely. Is there any evidence that the writers of the New Testament had any conception of a "period of miracles," in which, for a special exigency, God interfered in an exceptional way to attain a great end in the salvation of men? Is there any evidence in the New Testament that miracles were ever to end? Did not the following church, after the writers of the canon had stopped their labors, still believe that miracles were wrought about them in the ordinary course of the work of the church? Was not this belief rampant in the mediaeval church? and was it not a *continuous* belief from the ancient period into the mediaeval? And, does it not exist *today* in large portions of the so-called Catholic church?

The fact is—and we are not likely to give it too much emphasis in this discussion—the whole attitude of the modern apologete is foreign to that of the apostles and to the New Testament. The modern apologist appreciates what a miracle really would be—the writers of the New Testament did not: he sees what a tremendous, decisive, and permanent effect it ought to have—they viewed it as a transient wonder: to him, it must have clear outlines, inner harmony, logical consistency, and innate dignity—to them it needed none of these things. Hence no one can tell what their view of the nature of the resurrection body of Christ was, nor have they so narrated Jesus' appearances as to remove them clearly from the category of the purely subjective and imaginary. In fact, many Christians who are now trying to hold on to the idea of the resurrection are explaining

it in such a way as to leave little to it except a *conviction somehow gained that Jesus still lived!* And thus there disappears from the narrative all substantial evidence that there was any effect of the resurrection at all such as the modern exegete and apologist demands to fulfil the requirements of our argument and afford a real and effective attestation of the message of Jesus, by which men might be brought to a real belief in him.

IX. RESULT

We have now completed the brief investigation which we proposed. It was our object to examine a single proposition, the premise of an argument, the proposition that, if a revelation is to be conveyed from God to man, the interference by God in the ordinary course of natural phenomena for the purpose of attesting the message of his chosen agents of revelation was a necessity. We have shown that such an attestation was *not a necessity*, by showing that it was *not a fact*. The proposition is a merely theoretical one, of no actual force; and, however well it may sound, or however probable it may at first appear, has no substantial basis in the real historical world. The argument is therefore invalidated. The standard apology of our time in behalf of miracles is shown to be untenable. A new apology will have to be constructed, or, in deference to the principles upon which all our modern thinking is founded, the reality of the New Testament miracles will have to be surrendered by the modern thinker.

WERE THE SPIRITUAL FRANCISCANS MONTANIST HERETICS?

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About the middle of the second century there was inaugurated in an obscure corner of the Roman Empire a movement which noisily claimed to be pure and undefiled Christianity; and for two centuries this movement bade dangerous defiance to the solidifying structure of the Holy Roman Catholic Church. Montanism was ascetic, prophetic, and chiliastic in its nature. It was not a subtle philosophy like Gnosticism, the contemporaneous plague of the Catholic Fathers. Hence, despite the desperate efforts of the acute logical mind of Tertullian, it could not be vindicated as a refined, esoteric interpretation of Christian doctrine; and it did not succeed, as Gnosticism did, in securing substantial recognition in the system of some of the greatest of the constructive theologians of the third and fourth centuries, notably the Alexandrians. Montanism remained an open foe which it was necessary to *keep* out of the church, while Gnosticism was the insidious poison which it was necessary to *purge* out of the church. Consequently, Montanism has been of minor import in the history of ecclesiastical dogma. Until the evolutionary theory of the nineteenth century gave impulse to the study of origins, revealing the formation of the Catholic church as a very travailing historical process, the Montanist movement failed of respectable treatment at the hands of the ecclesiastical historians. But that lack has been abundantly supplied within the last two generations. The sections treating of Montanism in the *Ecclesiastical Histories* of Neander, Baur, Ritschl, and Schaff, with the special treatises of Schwegler, de Sayres, Stroehlin, and Bonnwetsch, have given us as complete a presentation of the movement as the scantiness of the sources will allow.

It is not the purpose of this essay to deal primarily with either the sources or the history of the Montanistic heresy. They are of interest here only for the purpose of orientation in the doctrine of the imme-

diate and efficient gift of the Holy Spirit, which was first conspicuously championed by the Montanists, and which was an important article in the program of the Spiritual Franciscans. The Spiritual Franciscans, and not the Montanists, are the subject of the essay. Its standpoint is the mediaeval world of the Roman church of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and not the ancient world of the Roman state of the second and third centuries. It discusses in detail a statement which appears invariably in treatises on Montanism; the statement, namely, that Montanism, though conquered and condemned by the Fathers of the early church, reasserted itself among those Franciscans of the stricter observance called Spirituals. I shall examine the practices and tenets of the Spiritual Franciscans under the three aspects of the Montanistic movement that are most strikingly characteristic—its enthusiastic-prophetic nature, its ascetic-disciplinary regulations, and its antisacerdotal-heretical doctrines.

I. PROPHECY

The most obvious feature of Montanism was its apocalyptic-prophetic character. It claimed to be a revelation new and sudden, a revelation whose proclamation was intrusted to a certain man of Phrygia and two women helpers.¹ The form of the prophecy was wildly ecstatic, the Spirit seizing on the prophet and using him as a passive instrument to give voice to its Delphic utterances.² The substance of the prophecy was no less startling than its form: the end

¹ Eusebius, *Historiae Ecclesiasticae*, IV, 27; V, 16-18; Epiphanius, *Haereses*, XLVIII, 1 ff.; Hippolytus, *Philosophoumena*, VIII, 19. The last-named author says that the Montanists claimed to "learn more from the writings of these prophets than from the Law, the Prophets, and the Gospels; and above all the Apostles and every divine gift they set the words of these women." On the statements defaming Montanus' character in Saint Jerome (*Epistola*, 133), Apollonius (in Euseb., *Hist. Eccl.*, V, 18), and the anonymous writer in Euseb., *Hist. Eccl.*, V, 16, it is enough to quote Renan's words: "Ce sont là les calomnies ordinaires qui ne manquent jamais sous la plume des écrivains orthodoxes quand il s'agit de noircir les dissidents."—*Marc Aurèle*, p. 214.

² "Behold the man is like a lyre, and I strike upon him like a plectrum; the man sleeps, but I wake. Behold the Lord, that stirreth to ecstasy the hearts of men."—Montanist oracle in Epiphanius, *Haer.*, XLVIII, 4. According to the account of the anonymous writer cited by Eusebius (*Hist. Eccl.*, V, 16) Montanus is seized by the Spirit, like the prophets of the Old Testament, and suddenly thrown into a state of ecstatic raving. His oracles end in a flood of incomprehensible jargon (ὧς καὶ λαλεῖ ἐκφρονᾶς καὶ ἀκαιρῶς καὶ ἀλλιοτρόπως).

of the world was at hand;³ the New Jerusalem was about to descend upon the Phrygian villages of Pepuza and Tymion;⁴ the Paraclete promised in the Gospel of John was incarnate in the new prophet,⁵ and had come to inaugurate the perfect kingdom in which only the spotless saints should share.⁶

Unfortunately our knowledge of Montanism in its pristine vigor, in the East, is limited to a few oracles reputed to come from the prophet and his helpers, and to such paragraphs of censure as the later heresy-hunting historians (Eusebius, Epiphanius, Theodoret, Pseudo-Tertullian) deem it important enough to provoke. In the West, in the second generation of its existence, Montanism achieved its greatest triumph by winning to its banner the foremost churchman of the age, the presbyter Tertullian of Carthage.⁷ But the Montanism of Tertullian at the beginning of the third century was a far different thing from the Montanism of the Phrygian prophets of the middle of the second century.⁸ Tertullian was a Puritan of the

³ "And Maximilla the prophetess says, 'After me no more prophets, but the end.'" —Epiph., *Haer.*, XLVIII, 13.

⁴ Epiph., *Haer.*, XLIX, 1; Bonnwetsch, *Geschichte des Montanismus* (Erlangen, 1881), p. 198, Oracle, 9.

⁵ Epiph., *Haer.*, XLVIII, 4, 11: "I am the Lord descended into man;" Didymus, *De Trinitate*, XLI, 1: "Neither angel nor ambassador, but the Lord God have I come."

⁶ Epiph., *Haer.*, XLVIII, 4, 10.

⁷ The Roman church has been at a loss just how to deal with Tertullian. He is revered as a great anti-Gnostic champion of the purity of Catholic doctrine, yet stained with the heresy of Montanism. Jerome naively considered that Tertullian was provoked to heresy by the insults of the Roman clergy ("invidia et contumeliis clericorum Romanae ecclesiae ad Montani dogma delapsus," *Catalogus*, 53). The later Catholic apologists simply met the fact of Tertullian's "lapse" on the question of discipline, and called it a "macula." Tertullian's undoubtedly Montanistic writings (composed after the year 201) are: *De Jeunio*, *De Monogamia*, *De Pudicitia*, *De Virginibus Velandis*, *De Fuga in Persecutione*, *De Exhortatione Castitatis* (Bonnwetsch, *Die Schriften Tertullians*). A work of seven books, *On Ecstasy*, mentioned by Jerome, is lost. Some others of the works of Tertullian are often reckoned as Montanistic or *montanisierend*. See Neander's painful *triage* in the *Antignostikus*. Vincent of Lerius finely says of Tertullian's marvelous style: "Quot paene verba tot sententiae, quot sensus tot victoriae."

⁸ Adolf Harnack (*Dogmengeschichte*, I, 392) calls attention to the rapidity with which even the primitive eastern Montanism must have accommodated itself to the demands of the spreading church, tending to justify itself as an evolutionary and not a revolutionary movement. He says, "Wo der Montanismus für uns in das helle Licht der Geschichte tritt, da zeigt er sich bereits als eine gedämpfte wenn auch noch sehr wirksame religiöse Bewegung."

strictest type. His acutely logical mind and his legal training furnished him the means for the development of a theology of the extremest rigor. It was the Montanistic insistence on uncompromising moral sanctity that appealed to him.⁹ The pledge of that moral sanctity was the Paraclete, who was not so much to inaugurate as to restore the perfect state of purity to the world.¹⁰ Neither Montanus nor Phrygia was aught to Tertullian. He would have none of the dithyrambic ambiguities which characterized the Phrygian oracles. And if he still held the awful picture of the impending judgment day before his readers, it was more to compel them to righteousness than to forewarn them of catastrophe. Many a page in his writings proves that, whatever he may say of the immediate end of the world, he has, as a matter of fact, accepted the dogmatic standards of the established Catholic church and joined valiantly in its battle against heresy. Obviously Tertullian, the Catholic Father, with his pen ready to defend the sufficiency of Scripture and the apostolicity of the rule of faith, was not a Montanist of the old school. They had no divine institution besides the New Jerusalem to claim their allegiance, no authority to bow before but the Paraclete's, no past or present system with which to "harmonize" their prophecies. The overshadowing genius of Tertullian has obscured the real character of Montanism (or at least confused the main issue of the Montanists), by shifting the emphasis from highly specialized and localized prophecy (no longer realizable in Tertullian's day) to the justification of a legalistic ethics in the face of an established church. Tertullian is a copious source of undisputed authenticity; but the "Montanism" which he championed was probably no more akin to the doctrine of Montanus than the republicanism of a Lamartine resembled the program of the Mountain.

Now, prophecy entered as a very conspicuous feature into the doctrines of the Spiritual Franciscans. Not only do we find among

⁹ "Nos quos merito spirituales dici facit agnitio spiritualium charismatum; sed psychicis non recipientibus spiritum. . . ."—Tertull., *De Monog.*, I; "Tamquam castigando et castrando, ut ita dixerim, erudimur a Deo saeculo."—Tertull., *De Cultu Feminarum*, II, ix; cf. Tertullian's *De Pudicitia* and *De Monogamia*, *passim*.

¹⁰ "Ut paracletum restitutorem potius sentias . . . quam institutorem."—*De Monog.*, IV; "Contenta erat veritas pacisci cum consuetudine."—*De Virg. Vel.*, III; "Paracletus . . . deductor omnium veritatum."—*De Fuga in Pers.*, XIV.

the zealots, almost at the very inception of the Franciscan movement, that mystic resignation of their case to God which is the chief incentive to vaticination; but from about the middle of the thirteenth century we can trace the enormous influence upon them of the writings of Abbot Joachim of Flora, the Calabrian mystic. The substance of Joachim's genuine prophecies was the perfection of the church in a process of religious evolution which began with Adam and was to culminate about the year 1260 in the triumph of the spiritual over the carnal church. This process was working itself out in three ages: the first began in Adam and reached its fruition in Abraham; the second began in Hosea and reached its fruition in John the Baptist; the third began in St. Benedict of Nursia and was even now coming to its fruition. These ages were typified in Joachim's works by the trinities: servitude, filial obedience, liberty; fear, faith, love; star-light, dawn, day; nettles, roses, lilies; patriarchs, saints, monks; water, oil, wine. In the perfect age impending the Jews were to be converted to Christianity, and the Greeks brought back to the fold of the papal church. The herald and instrument of the perfect age was the "everlasting gospel," intrusted to "an angel flying in the midst of heaven, to preach to every nation, kindred, tongue, and people." This everlasting gospel was the spiritual sense of Christianity, which proceeded from the letter of the Old and New Testaments as the Holy Spirit proceeded from Father and Son.¹¹

In adopting the Joachitic prophecies the Franciscan zealots modified or falsified the original to suit their own purposes. First of all, they treated Joachim's writings as the eternal gospel itself, whereas they were only the commentary on the eternal gospel. By the latter term Joachim understood the new spiritual comprehension of both testaments; not a new gospel but the true interpretation of the old one, not a book but a creed. But the Spiritual Franciscans not only

¹¹ The chief genuine works of the Abbot Joachim of Flora (*Liber concordias novi et veteris testamenti, Psalterium decem chordarum, Expositio in Apocalypsin*) were published at Venice, 1517-27. Renan (*Rev. des deux Mondes*, Vol. LXIV) claims that Joachimism was derived from the Greek church, and rests his claim on the fact of the great numbers of Greeks in southern Italy and on the constant elevation of the Greek church above the Latin in the prophecies current in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Tocco also finds an eastern source for Joachimism: "Io son d'avviso che la dottrina di Gioacchino si connette strettamente col Catarismo" (*L'Eresia nel medio Evo* p. 402).

elevated Joachim's writings to a parity with inspired Scripture; they also composed words to which they signed Joachim's name, and in which they made concrete and specific the rather vague, indeterminate prophecies of Joachim's genuine writings.¹² For example, in reference to the Emperor Frederick II, Joachim simply says that the son of Constance will be a great enemy of the church—a prediction safe enough for anybody to make of the son of Henry VI, and grandson of Barbarossa. But the pseudo-Joachitic writings of the Spiritual Franciscans enter into the details of Frederick's contumacy, as it was possible only for one living after the final break of the emperor with Gregory IX (1239).¹³ Furthermore, the Franciscan zealots, following the author of the *Introductorius in Evangelium Aeternum*,¹⁴ introduced St. Francis into the Joachitic program, sometimes substituting him for St. Benedict, and sometimes applying to him the prophecy of the "angel having the sign of the living God."¹⁵ Finally, the author of the *Introductorius* used Joachim's name to sanction an attack on the Roman church, wilfully perverting the meaning of passages in the *Liber Concordiae* (Books II and V, *passim*) which referred to the new order of *virī spirituales* and the triumph of the contemplative over the active life. Salimbene's denunciation of the *Introductorius*, however, shows that such extreme doctrine was by no means acceptable to the Franciscan zealots as a body, and that one

¹² For extended proof of the relation between Joachim's writings, and the eternal gospel as set forth here, see Denifle's article on "Joachim von Floris und die Commission zu Anagni," *Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte (A.L.K.G.)*, I, 45-145.

¹³ Cf. Pseudo-Joachite, *Commentarius in Isaiam*, 39-56, for many "vaticinia post eventum" in reference to the Hohenstaufen, the flight of Innocent IV to France in 1243, the split in the College of Cardinals, 1241 and 1270, etc.

¹⁴ Gerhard da Borgo San Donino. The *Introductorius*, published at Paris in 1294, caused more strife probably than any other writing of the thirteenth century. It was a fierce denunciation of the corrupt papal church, and was formally condemned by a papal commission sitting at Anagni (1255). Although repudiated by such well-known Franciscan zealots as Salimbene, the *Introductorius* was nevertheless believed both by the people and by the clergy to be a faithful record of the sentiments of the Franciscan Spirituals. Nevertheless Alexander IV in his condemnation of the book ordered the bishop of Paris to deal circumspectly with the Spirituals, and not to assume the guilt of the whole body of zealots from the adherence of a few to its teachings. (Letter of the pope in D'Argentré, *Coll. judic.*, I, 166.)

¹⁵ "Illum angelum qui habuit signum Dei vivi, qui apparuit circa MCC incarnationis Dominice, quem angelum frater Girardus vocat et confitetur sanctum Franciscum."—Process at Anagni, Denifle, *loc. cit.*, 91b.

might be a good Joachite without falling into the fatuous heresies of Gerhard.¹⁶

We know that in some quarters the stricter brothers of the Franciscan order adopted the prophecies of Joachim before the middle of the thirteenth century. Salimbene speaks frequently in his discursive *Chronicle* of the adherents of the Calabrian Abbot in Provence and Italy, naively confessing his own faith in the oracles, until the untimely death of Frederick II, who was cast for the rôle of Antichrist, upset all his calculations.¹⁷ The *Chronicle of the XXIV Generals* tells us of a group of brothers in Crescentius' day (1244-48) who "ascribed everything to the Spirit."¹⁸ And William of St. Amour, in his bitter invective against the Minorites of Paris (1254), says that "for fifty-five years certain persons have been laboring to convert the Gospel of Christ into another Gospel, which they say will be more perfect."¹⁹ But these are all vague allegations that offer no hold for critical study.²⁰ It was only with the appearance of Gerhard's *Intro-*

¹⁶ Salimbene characterizes the *Introductorius* as containing "verba frivola et risu digna," and "multas falsitates contra doctrinam abbatis Joachim, quas abbas non scripserat."—*Fra Salimbene Parmensis ordinis nimirum Chronica*, ed. Parma, 1857, pp. 233, 236.

¹⁷ Salimbene, *Chron.*, pp. 102, 107, 133, 207, 227. The genial author tells us how when he confessed his unwillingness at first to believe that Frederick was dead, Fra Gherardino of Parma rebuked him, exclaiming, "Well, you know it now; so drop your Joachim and apply yourself to wisdom." In another passage Salimbene tells us of an abbot who used to hide behind his monastery to read Joachim.

¹⁸ "Qui ad libitum vivebant et omnia Spiritui tribuebant."—*A.L.K.G.*, II, 256.

¹⁹ *De Periculis novissimorum Temporum*, ed. Paris, 1632, p. 38.

²⁰ Tocco is certainly exceeding the justification of his sources when he speaks of Joachites in the generalate of Elias (1232-39), and says that from this time "il partito intransigente cominciara a prendere il nome di Spirituali conforme alle idee di Gioacchino," *op. cit.*, p. 438. The name "Spirituales" as a party name was not used in the thirteenth century at all. The very commonplace phrases, "spiritualiter ambulare" and "regulam spiritualiter observare," which occur in the Rule of St. Francis do not point to a distinct sect of his followers, of course. Ehrle has collected a number of instances, from the thirteenth century where even the phrase "viri spirituales" means only "devout men" (*A.L.K.G.*, III, 600, 601). So the expression was neither new nor unique in the Franciscan order. It was probably the fierce persecutions of the last years of the thirteenth century and the early years of the fourteenth in Italy and Provence that led to the use of the word "Spirituales" as the name of a sect. We find the zealots of Provence, for example, in 1316 protesting that "they never have wished to be called 'Spirituales,' but only that name which Francis himself had given them, namely, 'Frates Minores.'" Ubertino da Casale about the same time (1310) acknowledges that the

ductorius in 1254 that Joachimism became an important issue, if not the chief issue, in the prosecution of the zealots. The tribunal of Paris, before which John of Parma and his associates were tried after John's deposition from the generalate, regarded sympathy with the teachings of the Calabrian seer as the chief cause of all their offending.²¹ The Council of Arles (1263 cir.) ordered the destruction of Joachim's writings.²² Thenceforward we find in every complaint of the Community against every branch of the Spirituals the recurring charge of sympathy with the prophecies (meaning, generally, the pseudo-prophecies) of Joachim of Flora. The records of the Inquisition abound with such charges.²³ Angelo, Olivi, Conrad of Offida, Ubertino da Casale, are all obnoxious to the accusation of Joachimism.²⁴ The gift of prophecy was carried back to the early zealots, to John of Parma, to Leo, and even to St. Francis himself.²⁵

We shall now examine the prophecy of the Franciscan zealots a name is used to denote a small sect in Italy ("Reply to Community," Ehrle, III, 22a). We might indicate the real significance of the word by speaking of the "spiritual part" of the Franciscans in the thirteenth century, and the "spiritual party" of the Franciscans in the fourteenth century.

²¹ "Tandem ventum est ad ancusationum omnium caput praecipuum, et interrogatum quid sentirent de Joachimo abbato eiusve doctrina."—Wadding, *Annales Minorum Ad Ann.*, 1256, No. 5.

²² In 1263; cf. Denifle, *A.L.K.G.*, I, 46.

²³ *Lib. Sent. Inq. Thol.*, *passim*. Ehrle has published in the *A.L.K.G.*, Vol. IV., some proceedings of the Minorite inquisitors against the Spirituals in Italy, taken from a manuscript (*Vat. Cod.*, 4029) discovered by himself. In a trial in the year 1334 a brother of the Fraticelli confesses: "quod habetur una profecia quod ecclesia Romana facta est meretrix" (fol. 75a).

²⁴ See letter of Angelo to the pope and the Community, Ehrle, *A.L.K.G.*, I, especially p. 560. For Conrad and Ubertino see *Hist. Trib.*, 52a, 60a; *A.L.K.G.*, II, 305 ff. For Olivi, the accusation of the Community before Clement V (March, 1311): "Et falsas prophetias de ecclesia dixit, scripsit, et docuit . . . et maxime in Postilla quam scripsit super Apocalypsin . . . et quod fuit eidem a Spiritu sancto revelata."—"Olivi's Apology," *A.L.K.G.*, III, 418-21. Wadding says of Olivi: "in eadem Postilla veneni aliquid loco mellis suxerit ex Joachim Expositione in Joannem."—*Ad Ann.*, 1325, No. 24.

²⁵ For the elaborate prophecy attributed to John of Parma, see *Hist. Trib.*, fol. 59b; Ehrle, *loc. cit.* On the appearance to the sect of Segarelli, Leo is made to exclaim, "Illi sunt illi Sathane apostoli, quos pater noster sanctus Franciscus praedixit esse venturos: Ve mundo, quoniam undique scandala consurgant ex quo tales apparuerunt apostoli."—*Hist. Trib.*, fol. 60b. See also a long prophecy attributed to St. Francis by Angelo da Clarino in a letter to Philip of Majorca in 1329, Ehrle, *A.L.K.G.*, I, 566.

little more closely, to determine whether it can fairly be called Montanistic in its character. We shall examine (a) its nature; (b) its content; (c) its form; and (d) the circumstances attendant on its appearance.

a) The Montanistic prophecy was immediate, not telic. It was coterminous with Christianity, or, more strictly speaking, it claimed to be Christianity itself first revealed in its perfect form. Hence the language of finality in Montanus' oracles: "I am the Lord God, all-powerful, come down to man;" "I am neither messenger nor envoy but Lord God the Father;" "I am the Father, Son, and Paraclete."²⁶ The church of the second century had not yet set a bound to immediate inspiration. Prophecy, the spirit of Jahveh which seized and overpowered the chosen instruments of the Old Testament revelation (Amos 7:15), was still recognized as a gift of the new dispensation, "gratia gratis data" (II Peter 1:21; I Cor. 14:3; Rom. 12:6). Justin the Martyr, Hermas, Irenaeus—all contemporaries of Montanus, and men of note in the early church—recognize the gift of prophecy as original, divine inspiration.²⁷ It was not until the end of the second century, and largely as a direct result of the bold use of prophecy by the Montanists, that the church disallowed the continuance of the "divine gift," except for the inoffensive purposes of healing the sick and driving out demons. It limited inspiration to the apostles.²⁸ As the church solidified, providing in its decrees a complete rule of faith and conduct and furnishing in such works as Augustine's and Gregory the Great's a final program for the progress of history, all that was left to "prophecy" was the subordinate rôle of noting the signs and conditions of the triumph of that program. By the very nature of the case, then, "prophecy" in the Middle Ages, so long as

²⁶ Eiph., *Haer.*, XLVIII, 11; Didymus, *De Trin.*, XLI, 1.

²⁷ Justin (*Dial. cum Tryph.*, 82) says that the charisma which was bestowed upon the Hebrew prophets was continued in the prophets of Christianity. For Hermas, see *Mand.*, XI, 8; *Vis.*, III, 11. For Irenaeus, *Adv. Haer.*, I, 13, 3; II, 49, 3; V, 6, 1. Schwegler has even claimed Irenaeus as a Montanist on the ground of his warm championship of the prophetic gift in the church (III, 11, 9), and even Harnack declares that in such passages Irenaeus is *montanisierend* (*Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, III, 371, n. 2).

²⁸ "The signs of the Holy Spirit were numerous immediately after the ascension of Jesus; later they became fewer, and now there are only traces of them among the few whose hearts are cleansed by the Logos."—Origen, *Adv. Cels.*, VII, 337.

it did not set itself in opposition to traditional dogma, was not a vehicle of revelation at all, but a mere form of exegesis.²⁹

Now the Franciscan prophecy was purely ethical in its motive, an instrument of reform. It was called forth by the persecutions suffered by the minority of the brothers, who remained faithful to the literal interpretation of the Rule of St. Francis. Joachim of Flora, in the interest of the reform of the church of the twelfth century, had expounded the Apocalypse and found the harmony of the Old and New Testaments in the prediction of a new world-era in which the spiritual sense of the Scriptures was to be realized in a spiritual priesthood. That was exactly the doctrine to comfort the persecuted Franciscan zealots. They adopted it, adapted it, heightened it, falsified it to suit the Franciscan program, and used it both for a solace to themselves and a warning to the lax Community.³⁰ Prophecy, then, with the Franciscans was only a means to an end. It was not original but something grafted upon the faith delivered them by St. Francis. They were driven to it by persecution, and probably would have abandoned it willingly had peace been restored to their party and purity to the order. In all this the Franciscan prophecy differed utterly from the Montanistic prophecy, which was original, immediate, and final.

b) The content of the Franciscan prophecy also differed widely from Montanism. The latter announced the immediate descent of the New Jerusalem upon the Phrygian villages of Pepuza and Tymion, called for the dissolution of earthly ties even to the severance of the marriage relation, that the faithful might be gathered to the scene of the cataclysmic Parousia, ordained strict fasts and ascetic practices,

²⁹ It is interesting to note the struggle in Tertullian to harmonize the conception of Montanism as a revelation with the established rule of faith. He lived at a time when the church had formulated its standards, and he accepted them. The ingenious means he hit upon for the reconciliation of a new revelation with an old creed was the theory of progressive revelation, corresponding to successive stages of world-development—a perfectible, but always continuous, process. It was the same device as was employed by Joachim in his trinities of types, and in fact the only device possible for those who are in Tertullian's and Joachim's situation. Cf. Tertull., *De Virg. Vel.*, 1.

³⁰ That this process began in the generalate of John of Parma (1247-57) is indicated by the fact of the publication of the *Introductorius* (1254) and by the introduction of Joachim into the trial of John of Parma. Wadding says John was censured, "nimium tribuens Joachimo abbati," *Ad Ann.*, 1256, No. 5.

condemned second marriage, and praised virginity as the ideal state.³¹ They celebrated mysterious rites at Pepuza, of which a picturesque bit is preserved to us in Epiphanius: "Virgins clad in white and bearing torches marched into the assembly to prophesy, and, rousing their audience to a frenzy of religious excitement, they placed themselves at the head of a procession which hastened out to do penance amid weepings and wailings."³² There was a spontaneity in their prophetic celebrations which reminds one of the response of Europe to the preachers of the First Crusade.

The burden of the Joachitic prophecy as adopted by the Franciscans, on the other hand, was the emergence of a spiritual hierarchy in a church already forever established. There was no call for the faithful to come out from the communion of Rome and form a new religion. The Holy Catholic church, though "wounded in the house of its friends," was still the inviolable purveyor of divine grace. The authority of the prophet was never invoked for the ordination of new fasts or the multiplication of penances. The Rule and Testament of St. Francis contained the sum and substance of the law, and it was only for their faithful observance that the zealots asked. The Joachitic prophecies were used by such men as Olivi and Angelo rather as a counsel of patience than as a summons to revolt. Unfortunately we have hardly any details of the Joachitic tenets held by the leaders of the Spiritual Franciscans. The *Postil on the Apocalypse* by Olivi probably contained the substance of their doctrine, but that work has been lost. The report of the examination of Gerhard's *Introductorius* by the commission at Anagni (1255) is preserved in a manuscript of the Sorbonne (No. 1,726). It has been published, with a magnificent introduction by Denifle.³³ This report charges the author of the *Introductorius* with manifest and scandalous heresies, namely: "that the doctrine of Joachim excels the doctrine of Christ;" "that the New Testament is superseded by the Eternal Gospel, as the Old Testament was superseded by the New;" "that the Gospel of Christ never leads anyone to perfection;" "that the Greeks live more after the Spirit

³¹ Apollonius, in Euseb., *Hist. Eccl.*, V, 18; Hippolytus, *Phil.*, VIII, 19; Epiphanius, *Haer.*, XLVIII, 9; and (so far as the ethical clauses go) Tertullian, *passim*.

³² Epiph., *Haer.*, XLIX, 2.

³³ In the *A.L.K.G.*, I, 1-45.

than the Latins;" "that Christ and his Apostles were not perfect in the contemplative life;" and many like blasphemies. But we have seen that the *Introductorius*, even if this be a fair representation of its contents, was by no means a fair expression of the views of the Spirituals, even of the pronounced Joachites.³⁴ From the accusations of the Community and the papal agents, as well as from the records of the Inquisition, we get only the general complaint of "Joachimism" against the Spirituals. So we must judge by an analysis of works like the *Historia Septem Tribulacionum*, the defense of the zealots before Clement V by Ubertino da Casale, the *Quaestiones* of Olivi, and other fragments of the writings of the Spirituals which we have preserved in the Chronicles, whether their prophecy was revolutionary or not. In a careful study of these works I have been unable to discover anything that could be called subversive of the church or of the Order, anything theatrical in their conception of the introduction of the age of the Spirit, any frenzied cults or crass chiliasm.

c) Again, the form of the Franciscan prophecy differed so completely from the Montanistic enthusiasm that we can hardly speak of the one as the continuation or revival of the other. Neander, in his *Ecclesiastical History*, published nearly a century ago, was the first historian to recognize the ethnic influence in Montanism. He traced the whole movement to the Phrygian character, which we discover in the old nature religion of Phrygia and the ecstasies of the priests of Cybele and Bacchus.³⁵ Although he emphasized this element too much, and himself modified his extreme views in the next edition of his work,³⁶ still it was a suggestion of great value in the estimation of the real character of Montanism, and has been duly appreciated by later writers on the subject (Baur, Schwegler, Ritschl, Renan). We have already quoted passages from the *Oracles* of Montanus, showing the ecstatic form of the Montanistic prophecy.³⁷ The sentences preserved by ancient writers and collected by Bonnwetsch in the appendix to his valuable essay on Montanism³⁸ are all of the concise,

³⁴ See above, note 16.

³⁵ Neander, *Allgemeine Geschichte der christlichen Religion und Kirche*, 1827.

³⁶ Second ed., Hamburg, 1843, II, 877-908.

³⁷ See above, notes 2 and 5.

³⁸ G. N. Bonnwetsch, *Die Geschichte des Montanismus*, Erlangen, 1881.

inconsequent sort that characterize the Delphic utterances of the Sibyl. Epiphanius, who understood Montanism better than any other of its early critics, and who is our source for most of the information we have of Montanism in the east (i. e., primitive Montanism), constantly addresses his polemic against this crypto-hierophantic character of the *Oracles*, as if that were the chief offense of the sect.³⁹

Now we find, to be sure, a few passages in the writings of the Spiritual Franciscans which indicate a sympathy with the mystic-ecstatic view of prophecy. There is a long passage of total obscurity, for example, filled with algebraic *x*'s and *y*'s, inserted in the sixth *Tribulation* of Angelo da Clarino.⁴⁰ We hear from the same source of a certain brother Girard, who paused in the midst of a sermon in the market-place of Constantinople, and, with eyes raised in rapt contemplation to heaven, exclaimed: "Now is the eagle taken!" Regaining his normal senses, he explained that the divine oracle meant that King Louis of France had been captured by the Saracens. And so it proved, at the very hour in which Girard had spoken.⁴¹ We read, again, of a brother, Jacobus da Massa, who, in the days of John of Parma, entered into a trance, and remained insensible to the world for three days, until the brothers began to fear that he was dead;⁴² and how Brother Conrad of Offida "in his youth was often found raised bodily from the earth and suspended while in the act of prayer."⁴³ Finally, the *Index* of Raymond of Fronciacho has a chapter in which are contained the confessions of Brother Francis (of Borgo San Sepulcro? de Lutra?), the prophet, who says that the Holy Spirit inspires in some the way of perfection, and they who are led by the angel of light reach the deepest serenity of spirit, and attain

³⁹ Here again we must not let the copious and cogent eloquence of Tertullian deceive us as to the original spirit of Montanism. He paid tribute to that spirit in a few phrases like "excidere sensu," "amentia rapi" (*Adv. Marc.*, IV, 22; *De Anima*, IX); but his whole interest lay in the work, not in the advent of the Paraclete. The immense distance between Tertullian and Montanus is shown by such a passage as the following: "Quae est ergo Paracleti administratio, nisi haec, quod disciplina dirigitur, scripturae revelantur, intellectus reformatur, ad meliora proficitur" (*De Virg. Vel.*, 1). What were "Scripture," intellect," and "progress" to Montanus!

⁴⁰ *Hist. Trib.*, foll. 63b-65a; Ehrle, *loc. cit.*

⁴¹ *Hist. Trib.*, fol. 34a; Ehrle, *loc. cit.*

⁴² *Hist. Trib.*, fol. 38a; Ehrle, *loc. cit.*

⁴³ *Hist. Trib.*, fol. 52a; Ehrle, *loc. cit.*

the heights of virtue with the blessed apostle Paul, who was caught up into the third heaven.⁴⁴

These incidents, however, are not at all characteristic of the prophecy of the Spiritual Franciscans. As prophecy with the Franciscans subserved an ethical end and its purpose was, like the Paraclete's with Tertullian, to reveal the character of a new and perfect age; so its form was didactic rather than ecstatic. Joachim's names for the church and the saints of the third age all have a flavor of repose in them: the church is to be an "ecclesia contemplantium" or "ecclesia contemplativa;" the saints are an "ordo justus," "sapiens, spiritualis," a "populus spiritualis," "viri spirituales." The Spirit is the teacher who is to prepare the saints for the new age as well as the agent who is to inaugurate the new age for the saints. He is not the Paraclete of the Montanists, who "stirs the hearts of men to ecstasy" and robs them of their senses.

d) Finally, the circumstances attendant on the Montanistic prophecy were particularistic in the extreme. Its lone trinity of prophets, its pompous glorification of a country village of Phrygia, its hard and fast ceremonial rules, all made it incapable of becoming a world-movement. In fact, the very design of Montanism was to be a wholly extramundane phenomenon. Its goal was the end of history. The New Jerusalem was not a state to be attained by a long process of world-development, but was suddenly to be let down from the skies above Pepuza. Already Tertullian felt the awkwardness of these particularistic features. He never mentions Montanus or Pepuza. He defends the ecstatic state with only faint ardor. For him the criterion of Christianity is, to be sure, as with Montanus, the reception of the Paraclete; but a Paraclete who is the guide to all virtue ("deductor omnium virtutum"), rather than the plectrum that strikes the lyre (above, note 2).⁴⁵ He explains ecstasy as simply the "overshadowing of man by divine virtue."⁴⁶

Among the Franciscans there was no return to the particularism of the Montanistic prophecy. Olivi is clearly the one commanding

⁴⁴ *Index* of Raymond of Fronciacho, Pars II, chap. xx; Ehrle, *A.L.K.G.*, III, 11, 12.

⁴⁵ "Et nos quidem agnitio Paracleti . . . disjuncta a Psychicis."—Tert., *Adv. Prax.*, 1.

⁴⁶ "Cum per ipsum hominem Deus loquitur necesse est excidat sensu, obumbratus scilicet virtute divina."—Tert., *Adv. Marc.*, IV, 22.

figure of the Spirituals, and yet he cannot be thought of as in any way a parallel to Montanus. During the synchronous interregnum in the generalate and the papacy (1314-16) the zealots had full control of the monasteries of Narbonne and Béziers; yet there was no attempt to elaborate a legalistic code of ethics or to institute new fasts. There were strong groups of Spirituals in various localities in Italy and Provence; yet we do not hear of any of these localities as the scene of the near descent of the New Jerusalem.

It seems scarcely justifiable, then, in the light of this complete diversity in point of motive, content, form, and attendant circumstances, to run the Franciscan prophecy in a parallel with Montanism. The bare fact that there was a body of prophecy in the two instances is of little consequence. In Montanus' day, as we have already noted, prophecy was still recognized by the great lights of the church—a Justin, a Hermas, a Papias, an Irenaeus. It was the common form for teaching to take, even diabolical teaching.⁴⁷ And in the later Middle ages, after the mind of Europe had been roused to some degree of self-inspection through the introduction of Arabic learning, the cosmopolitan influence of the Crusades, the stimulus of trade and industry, prophecy became a common medium both for voicing the hopes of a long-suffering Christian peasantry and for scoring the sins of the Roman *curia*. It pictured the last of the seven epochs pre-figured in the seven days of creation as at hand. The judgments of God were to be realized. Empire and papacy, both sunken in iniquity, were to crumble away, and on their ruins was to appear a new nation of God, illuminated from on high, living in poverty and purity. Then the divine mysteries should be revealed, the Holy Spirit should shed abroad on the people the dew of his wisdom and holiness, peace should reign over a regenerate world, and the angels should return with confidence to dwell among men.⁴⁸ The language of the prophets was unsparing: 'Woe, for the world hath become darkness. The Lord's vine hath shriveled and there is none to care for it. The head

⁴⁷ "Not every one that speaketh in the spirit is a prophet, but only he who has the character of the Lord."—*Didache*, XI, 8. "Prove every man that hath the spirit by his life," Herm., *Mand.*, XI, 7. St. Paul would have had a "pneumatic church," in which the Spirit was the constant factor in the life of each Christian. Cf. Gunkel, *Die Wirkungen des heiligen Geistes*.

⁴⁸ Roth, *Die Visionen der heiligen Elisabeth von Schönau* (1884), p. 115.

of the church is ill, and its members are dead. Shepherds of my church, ye sleep, but I will wake you."⁴⁹ Such was the language of prophecy a full generation before the appearance of Joachim of Flora or Saint Francis of Assisi. There is not one of the manifold sects of the high Middle Ages that is free from this mania of prophesying. It was more common to foretell the history of the future than to write the history of the past.

For the modern world prophecy has ceased to be a respectable employment, and we are tempted to class in the same calendar of frauds all agencies or mediums that claim to reveal the future. The very fact of prediction itself seems so monstrous to us that it matters little who claims to prophesy or what the content of the prophecy is. But we miss the whole significance of mediaeval prophecy if we treat it from the modern point of view. We must reverse the glasses through which we look on history, turning the long view upon the future and the short view upon the past. Then we are in the spirit to appreciate such a movement as Joachimism, for example, in its full significance, to seek its provocation, and study its purpose. Studied so, the movement appears neither "eccentric" nor "phantastic,"⁵⁰ but simply as a very ingenious piece of exegesis in the interest of ecclesiastical reform. If it took on some less worthy features in the hands of the Spiritual Franciscans,⁵¹ it still retained, nevertheless, its substantial character as a process of history whose goal was the transformation of a church corrupted by worldly ends and bestial sins into a community of saints. The ecstatic element is almost entirely absent, replaced by the contemplative.⁵² The program is free from offensive particularism. To be sure, it proclaimed the dawn of a third and perfect age, the dispensation of the Spirit to succeed the dispensations of the Father (Old Testament) and the Son (New Testament). But this idea of the perfectibility of Christianity was by no means exclusively Mon-

⁴⁹ Extract from the prophecies of St. Hildegard of Bingen (twelfth century); quoted by Sabatier, *Vie de Saint François d'Assise*, Eng. transl., p. 52.

⁵⁰ "Jenes (das Evang. Aet.) mochte Manchen an das excentrisch-phantastische des Montanismus erinnern."—Reuter, *Aufklärung im Mittelalter*, II, 207.

⁵¹ See above, notes 12, 13, 16.

⁵² "Est igitur totius rationis summa quod contemplatio ex suo genere perfectior est omni alia actione."—Olivi in Ehrle, *A.L.K.G.*, III, 503.

tanistic, or more strictly, Tertullianistic.⁵³ It was part of the legacy of neo-Platonism to the Christian church, and appeared frequently in the works of the most orthodox of the churchmen who are touched with the platonic spirit.⁵⁴

We conclude then, that the Joachitic prophecy of the Spiritual Franciscans had little or nothing in it to recall the wild dithyrambic oracles of the Phrygian Montanus; and we proceed to examine the two movements from another point of view, namely, their enthusiastic-ascetic character.

II. ASCETICISM

It was a question of morals, not of dogma or ritual, that caused the Spiritual Franciscans to break away from the Order. From the time when Bernard of Quinteville and Brother Leo retired from the evil counsels of the generalate of Elias (1232-39), to wait in solitude deliverance from heaven, to the days when Ubertino da Casale and Angelo da Clarino presented their apologies to the pontiff at Avignon, nearly a century later, the evidence from both friends and enemies of the zealots shows clearly that it was the failure of the order at large to observe the Rule and Testament of St. Francis that drove the zealots to revolt. As early as the generalate of Crescentius da Jesi (1244-48), if we may trust the author of the *Historia Septem Tribulacionum*, the abuse of the moral code inculcated by St. Francis was shocking.

There were in those days [he says] men of incomparable sanctity among the brethren . . . who grieved and lamented over the flood of evils and the enormous laxity which had undone the primitive purity of the order. Seeing, therefore, that in the place of the pure observance of the Rule there had possessed the brothers a great thirst for wealth and craze for fine buildings, that prayer was abandoned for the subtle and sterile science of Aristotle, and the syllogisms of logic more eagerly conned than the words of divine wisdom, that great and small alike received the learning of the schools as a new revelation—these men, taught in the spirit of St. Francis, decided to have recourse to the supreme pontiff.⁵⁵

⁵³ *De Virg. Vel.*, 1.

⁵⁴ "Fide credimus trium legum tempora, scilicet naturae, scripturae, et gratiae, sibi succedere et ordinatissime decurrisse. In primo potentiam, in secundo providentiam, in tertio justitiam. . . . Efficitur noster spiritus hierarchicus."—St. Bonaventura, *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, chaps. i, iv, ed. Hefele, Tübingen, 1860. Comparing with these words of the great Catholic scholastic the sentences of Olivi, we are tempted to apply to the latter the trenchant remark of Pascal in his third *Lettre Provinciale*: "Cette proposition serait catholique dans une autre bouche."

⁵⁵ *Hist. Trib.*, fol. 29a; Ehrle, *A.L.K.G.*, II, 258.

The fate of the seventy-two brothers who undertook this mission to Pope Innocent IV was harsh. They were sent in pairs to distant lands.⁵⁶ Crescentius' successor, John of Parma, tried to set a bound to the rising flood of worldliness in the order, and for his reward was deposed from the generalate.⁵⁷ His successor, Bonaventura, though chosen as a *persona grata* to the Community, was obliged, at the very opening of his term of office, to write a severe letter of warning against the "luke-warm and undevout, who were wise after the flesh."⁵⁸ Wadding, who was a determined enemy of all schismatic tendencies in the order, though a partisan of the strict observance, gives us a long list of abuses against "holy poverty" which had invaded the convents during the generalate of Acquasparta (1287-89).⁵⁹ The exaction of money for every priestly service, the sale of masses, "more presbyterorum saecularium," the collection of funds at the church doors, the decay of the missionary spirit, the refusal of the brothers to leave the comforts and luxuries of their homes, the abandonment of primitive hermitages for elegant chapter houses, were some of the practices which prompted the zealots of the Mark of Ancona to seek the restoration of the ideal of St. Francis in dismissal from the order which bore his name.⁶⁰ Other testimonies to the degeneracy of the order may be read in Salimbene's, Jordan of Giano's, and Thomas of Eccleston's *Chronicles*.⁶¹

⁵⁶ Wadding, *Ad. Ann.*, 1244, No. 1.

⁵⁷ Wadding, *Ad. Ann.*, 1256, No. 2.

⁵⁸ Wadding, *loc. cit.*; Bonaventura was a mystic and came to the generalate with rather advanced "spiritual" ideas. But when he saw tendencies toward schism encouraged in the ranks of the radical "spirituals" he receded from the position taken in the accusatory epistle, and, like Pius IX in the papal chair after the flight to Gaeta, became a sturdy champion of the established order.

⁵⁹ Dante contrasts Acquasparta with the famous zealot Ubertino da Casale. He makes Bonaventura, who holds the balance between the two, say:

Ma non fia da Casal nè d'Acquasparta
Là onde vengon tali alla Scrittura
Chè l'un la fugge, e l'altro la coarta.

—*Paradiso*, XII, 123-26.

Matthew Paris, an enemy of the Mendicants, in his *Chronica Angliae*, p. 46, says that "monks of the orders of St. Benedict and St. Augustine did not stray so far from the path of righteousness in centuries as the new orders (of Dominic and Francis) in thirty years." It was just thirty years after St. Francis' death when John of Parma fell.

⁶⁰ Wadding, *Ad. Ann.*, 1289, No. 23.

⁶¹ Salimbene, ed. Parma (1857), pp. 407, 410; Jordan, *Memorabilia*, ed. Voigt (1870), chaps. 61-63; Thomas of Eccleston, *De Adventu Minorum in Angliam*, coll. 12.

If we turn to the petitions and apologies of the zealots themselves, we find there the same insistence on the moral issue. When the Fraticelli of the Mark of Ancona sought from Celestin V the privilege of living the strict life of poverty apart from the order, the pope "accepted [their] petition, and in the presence of all the court received [their] vows; and ordered [them] to observe the will and mandates of St. Francis sincerely, even adding to the rigor of the Rule and Testament."⁶² Ubertino da Casale in his defense of the Spirituals (especially Olivi) before Clement V, in 1311, insists again and again that the whole trouble in the order has been caused by the fact that those in positions of influence, the

prelates, lectors, confessors, and the like, have so led the brothers astray that hardly a handful can be found who will abstain from luxuries, wearing cheap, patched tunics, and going without shoes, like the first brethren and the blessed Francis⁶³ . . . and such a business is carried on for the gain of such delicacies that to many it seems as if all the spiritual offices of the order were rated at a price.⁶⁴

Ubertino's testimony is rendered all the more credible by the fact that he shows the moderation, rare in modern times and almost undiscoverable in the Middle Ages, of conceding some virtue to the opposite party.⁶⁵ Furthermore, Angelo da Clarino, in his long letter of apology tendered to John XXII in 1317, protests that he has never been a heretic, "unless perchance it is a heresy to believe, confess, love, and practice, with steadfastness and charity, what St. Francis professed in his Rule, taught in his life, loved in his death, and commanded in his will."⁶⁶

⁶² Angelo da Clarino, *Epistola Excusatoria*, fol. 141b; Ehrle, *loc. cit.*

⁶³ Ubertino da Casale, *Responsio ad Communitatem*; Ehrle, III, pp. 56 ff.: "Et plurium vita magistrorum, ministrorum, custodum, est nimis excessiva in varietate vinorum, carniurn, piscium, et specierum" (spices).

⁶⁴ *Responsio*, *loc. cit.*, p. 105.

⁶⁵ "Non autem quoad praedicta [objurgations] totam ordinis multitudinem volo temerarie condempnare . . . nam quidam . . . parati essent aliter vivere si eis aliud mandaretur."—*Responsio*, *loc. cit.*, p. 85. We have no way of discovering the amount of sympathy with the high ideals of the Spirituals which existed in the order at large, but were either suppressed by misrepresentation of the officials or timidly abandoned for fear of heretical complications. How thoroughly the Community succeeded in diverting the mind of the pope and the church from moral to theological interest in the zealots is proved by the case of Olivi.

⁶⁶ Angelo da Clarino, *Epistola Excusatoria*, fol. 138b; Ehrle, *loc. cit.* Compare the beautiful Pauline statement of the ideal life of the Spirit in a private letter of Angelo's

Finally the testimony of opponents and accusers is unanimous in the emphasis which it puts upon the ascetic pretensions of the zealots. "Se aliis meliores reputantes," is the cry of the Community against the Spirituals from Crescentius' day down. That they would overthrow the authority of Rome "sub pallio sanctitatis," is the charge of their opponents before the pope's commission at Avignon.⁶⁷

St. Francis in his Rule had absolutely forbidden the brothers to receive money for any service in any place under any conditions, adding that they "ought to regard silver as of no more worth than stones."⁶⁸ But the order, under the fiction of holding funds in trust for the Roman see,⁶⁹ had amassed wealth and acquired valuable realty all over Europe. St. Francis in his Testament had forbidden the brothers to solicit or accept any favors from the pope, "directly or indirectly, for church or convent, or even for personal protection."⁷⁰ Yet the pages of Wadding teem with papal decrees and letters touching the order, and Potthast's *Regesta*⁷¹ contains over fifty bills of privileges and exemptions granted the Minorities before the end of the thirteenth century. St. Francis had enjoined humility of spirit, simplicity of life and worship, caution against the pride of learning, and constant readiness for mutual service.⁷² But the order had hardened into a great institution with its hierarchy of ministers, provincials, custodians, each jealous of his utmost authority; had builded magnificent churches like the basilicas of St. Francis in Assisi, Santa Croce in Florence, St. Fortunatus in Todi, and St. Antony in Padua; had entered the competition with Dominicans for chairs of theology in the universities; and in the place of readiness for gratuitous services of love had substituted a scale of prices for divine offices.

to his Roman companions during the former's residence in Avignon: "Caelestia quarere spiritualia desiderare, terrena despiciere, et extendere ad ea quae sunt ante et quae retro sunt oblivisci;" Ehrle, I, 561.

⁶⁷ "Zur Vorgeschichte des Concils von Wien," Ehrle, in *A.L.K.G.*, III, 1-195.

⁶⁸ *Rule of 1221* (wrongly printed in Wadding, *Ad. Ann.*, 1210; cf. Müller, *Die Anfänger, des Minoritenordens und der Bussbruderschaften*, p. 189), chap. 8.

⁶⁹ Bull, *Ordinem vestrum*, of Innocent IV, 1245.

⁷⁰ Testament printed in full in Sabatier's *Vie de St. François* (Eng. transl.), pp. 337-39.

⁷¹ *Regesta Pontificum*, 1198-1303.

⁷² *Rule of 1221*, chaps. 6, 11, 14, 15, 17, 22.

We are not concerned directly with the question of either the necessity or the explanation of this rapid change in the ideals of the Franciscans. Ehrle, in reply to Müller's arraignment of the church of Rome for the degeneracy of the order, argues laboriously that, although abuses did enter the Order, it was not the fault of the church, but rather in spite of the church, and that St. Francis could never have wished his brethren to remain in the cramped quarters of the hermitage which sufficed them as a little company of pioneers.⁷³ But, nevertheless, it is certain that the papal glosses of the Rule⁷⁴ and the papal privileges which opened the way for the establishment of the Minorite institution in the mediaeval world, were in direct contravention of the written orders of St. Francis. What his own attitude would have been had he lived to see the incredible growth of the order which came within a generation of his death,⁷⁵ is purely a matter of surmise. But surely the opinion of his companion, Brother Leo, and his disciples Angelo and Ubertino, is of greater weight than that of a modern Jesuit scholar on this point.

Our present interest, however, in the enthusiastic-ascetic program of the Spiritual Franciscans, is to inquire whether it can fairly be called a manifestation or a recrudescence of Montanism in the church. At first sight it seems as if we must reply in the affirmative. Both Montanism and the Spiritual Franciscan movement were protests against the worldliness arising from the rapid spread and consequent modification of an ideal of singular simplicity, embodied in a personality of compelling force. Both proscribed luxury and learning. Both looked to the apocalyptic consummation of their hopes in the inauguration of the reign of the saints on earth. Yet when we examine a little more closely into the motive and purpose of

⁷³ Ehrle, "Zur Beurtheilung der Umgestaltung des Ordus," *A.L.K.G.*, III, 568 ff.

⁷⁴ Gregory IX's *Quo Elongati*, 1230; Innocent IV's *Ordinem vestrum*, 1245; Nicolas III's *Exiit qui seminat*, 1279.

⁷⁵ In a bull of 1258 Alexander IV addressed the Franciscan provincials of twenty-two nationalities; and the roster of the Order, as made up in the chapter of 1260 at Narbonne, showed thirty-three provincial ministers, with about a hundred custodies: "Mirum sane quomodo in brevi annorum curriculo universos orbis angulos penetravit humile hoc institutum."—Wadding, *Ad Ann.*, 1260, No. 53. Hurter estimates the Minorites in 1260 as comprising 8,000 monasteries with 200,000 souls: *Innocens der Dritte*, Vol. IV, p. 227.

the asceticism practiced by the Montanists and by the Spiritual Franciscans, we discover a great divergence in the two systems.

In the first place, the asceticism of the Montanists was a consequence of their apocalyptic tenets. The end of this present world was at hand; the New Jerusalem was about to descend from heaven; *therefore* let the church of Christ be spotless!⁷⁶ Even Tertullian, with whom the expectation of the Parousia was dulled by a generation's delay, still felt the influence of this primal motive of the sect so strongly as to appeal constantly to the "shortness of the time," in support of the increased moral demands of the Paraclete.⁷⁷ This view of morality as a condition for the consummation of the Parousia, as a great dress-rehearsal for the millennial age, necessarily involved a very legalistic conception of ethics. The advent of the Paraclete being as much a part of the complete Christian revelation as the advent of Christ, the commands revealed to men by the Paraclete and his prophets had the force of the commandments of God ("imperium Dei," Tert., *De Jejuniis*, 13). It was not a conception of Christian life within the revealed truth of the gospel, but was the programme of a

⁷⁶ There has been more controversy over the relation between the moral precepts and the prophetic oracles of Montanism than over any other question connected with the movement. Unfortunately, the only two authors who have preserved us any knowledge of Montanism in its eastern form, Epiphanius and Eusebius, were both so concerned to prove the movement a heresy that they paid little attention to its discipline. Tertullian, on the other hand, presents us, in his interpretation of Montanism, a system of discipline almost exclusively. We are left, therefore, to reconcile the two views as best we can. Schwegler, in the full spirit of the Tübingen school of theology, saw in Montanism a recrudescence of Ebionism in the church, and found in the doctrine of the Paraclete and the dawn of the new age the mainspring of the movement. Baur modified Schwegler's theory to the extent of denying the connection between Ebionism and Montanism, but still held to the view of the latter as the proclamation of the age of the Paraclete in opposition to the solidifying episcopate on the one hand and to the Gnostic speculations on the other. Other scholars have seen in Montanism a moral revival carried to the pitch of prophecy (Ritschl, Neander, Schaff). My own sympathies are with Baur and those scholars who see in the proximate Parousia the dominant characteristic of Montanism. It seems the sounder view from a psychological standpoint; and, furthermore, among the twenty-one "oracles" of Montanism collected by Bonnwetsch, I find only one that represents the Paraclete as wielding a distinctly moral power: "Ipsum paracletum habes in prophetis novis dicentem, Potest ecclesia donare delictum sed non faciam ne et alia delinquant."—Tert., *De Pudic.*, 21.

⁷⁷ "Deus nunc sub extremitatibus temporum compressit quod miserat et revocavit quod indulerat."—Tert., *De Exhort. Cast.*, 6; "Tempus in collecto," *De Jejuniis*, 12; *De Monog.*, 14.

new revelation on a par with, nay, even superior to, the gospel. "Whereas," says Didymus, "the apostle Paul said that now we know in part and prophesy in part, they affirm that Montanus came bringing the perfect knowledge of the Paraclete, to wit, the teaching of the Holy Spirit,"⁷⁸ while Tertullian signals the coming of the Paraclete as the deliverance from the infirmities of the flesh, parallel to the deliverance from sinfulness of heart which was wrought by the advent of Christ.⁷⁹

Under this feverish summons to impeccability, specific ethical cases were handled with a view rather to accumulating as much ascetic virtue as possible against the sounding of the trumpet than to chastening character for the service of one's fellow-men. Marriage is to be despised and its joys the more readily foresworn, because the end of humanity is at hand and both heaven and hell have population enough.⁸⁰ Fasts are chiefly recommended as preparations for the impending judgment day and the reign of the Paraclete in which there is neither eating nor drinking: "If the Eternal God knoweth no hunger, man will be most like God in such time as he lives without food; and, besides, it was eating that caused Adam's fall!" Such is the lofty reasoning of Tertullian!⁸¹ Martyrdom becomes less dreadful, because the lease of life purchased by cowardly flight or by a bribe ("nummaria fuga") may only be a few years, or even a few days. The Paraclete is at hand!⁸² In short, the prophets of Montanism are intent on proclaiming the end of the world and the consequent outpouring of the "last gifts" (*τὰ ἔσχατα χαρίσματα*). The reward of virtue is so near and so palpable that it becomes a bribe to virtue (Tert., *De Jejun.*, 12). The Christian had better take no risks.

⁷⁸ Didymus, *De Trinitate*, XLI, 2.

⁷⁹ "Regnavit duritia cordis usque ad Christum; regnaverit et infirmitas carnis usque ad Paracletum."—Tert., *De Monog.*, 14.

⁸⁰ Tert., *De Monog.*; *De Exhort. Cast.*; *passim*.

⁸¹ Tert., *De Jejun.*, 6.

⁸² Tert., *De Fuga in Persec.*, *passim*. The exceedingly rare mention of Montanist martyrs (cf. Euseb., *Hist. Eccl.*, V, 18, 5-9; V, 16, 20) is explicable from the fact that our information as to the early history of the sect comes exclusively from hostile sources. What is martyrdom in the eyes of the persecuted sect is only the penalty for incorrigible stubbornness in the eyes of the persecutors. Only the Catholic victims were allowed the palm of martyrdom. What is "constantia" in the Catholic is only "contumacia" in the heretic! (Augustine.)

Let him not say, "What is not expressly forbidden is permitted," but rather, "All is forbidden that is not expressly permitted."⁸³ The words which occur over and over again in Tertullian's works as synonymous with virtue are purely negative words—"emendare," "resecare," "amputare," "excidere," "temperare," "fugere," "destruere," "deponere."

Now, this academic asceticism of Montanism was entirely different from the spirit of self-denial which we find among the Franciscan zealots. The latter fixed their eyes, not upon the end of the world, but upon the dawn of a new age. Their ascetic discipline was to train them in the virtues which would make them a leaven of spirituality in a carnal world. It was truly a "discipline"—a teaching, a preparation for something better, namely, service; whereas the Montanistic asceticism was not a discipline but a feat of endurance, a final accomplishment. St. Francis' ideal was the imitation of the life of Jesus, and his disciples also were to preach the good tidings of the kingdom of God. I cannot find in the words of St. Francis as reported by the chroniclers a single indication that his ambition was to build up a sect of privileged persons to enjoy the blessings of the millennium. On the contrary, there are many warnings against the spirit of exclusiveness, pride, and preferment,⁸⁴ and cautions against mistaking mere increase in numbers for the accomplishment of the Minorites' purpose.⁸⁵ Thomas of Celano in his *Second Legend* puts into the mouth of St. Francis a prayer of a single sentence, pregnant with the counsel of unostentatious service: "O that it might come to pass that the world should see the Brothers Minor so rarely that it wonder at their fewness." Compare with this Tertullian's boasting: "We it is in whom the centuries have reached their fulness; we, who were destined by God before the creation of the world to be the consummation of the ages."⁸⁶

The disciples of St. Francis, even those who clung most faithfully to his ideal, did not preserve his catholicity of spirit in its full degree.

⁸³ Tert., *De Corona Militis*, 2.

⁸⁴ *Rule of 1221*, chaps. 5, 7, 10, 11, 14.

⁸⁵ Salimbene's curt apostrophe to Elias: "Ah! domine Helya, multiplicasti gentes sed non magnificasti laetitiam."—*Chron.*, p. 404.

⁸⁶ Tert., *De Cultu Feminarum*, II, 9.

The zealots were forced gradually to an attitude of protest and prophecy. Yet for all that, they preserved the saving idea of ascetic practice as training of character for the service of humanity rather than as an end in itself. The apologies of Ubertino da Casale before the committee of Clement V⁸⁷ and of Angelo da Clarino before the tribunal of John XXII⁸⁸ clearly demonstrate the practical character of the Franciscan asceticism. In fact, it was not asceticism at all, in the strict sense of denial for denial's sake, that was the ideal of St. Francis, but rather poverty, the absence of the encumbrance of wealth, that the soul might be single in its devotion to service. For, "in so far as the brothers should desert the standard of poverty, in just so far would the world reject them and they would seek but not find."⁸⁹ In other words, if they yielded to temptations to ease and self-indulgence, they would lose not heaven but the world, not their salvation but their power. This distinction is fundamental. It far outweighs any obvious similarity of ascetic practice such as abstention from meats or misprision of learning.

Perhaps the essential difference between the Montanistic and the Franciscan asceticism is shown most convincingly in the attitude of the two toward marriage. As the attraction of man to woman is the strongest instinct (barring that of self-preservation) in human nature, all systems of philosophy or of religion that have undertaken to crush or train human nature have had this impulse to reckon with. In the early days of the church we can distinguish three progressive stages in the attitude toward marriage. The Essenes, a community of Jewish zealots, rejected marriage entirely; and a branch of Jewish Christianity adopted their extreme doctrine.⁹⁰ A more widely spread, but hardly nobler conception, was that of marriage as the "lesser evil," which was the view of St. Paul (I Cor. 7:2-9), and probably of the apostles generally.⁹¹ The third conception of marriage, which finally prevailed in the church, when provision was made for the ascetics in the institution of monasticism, was that of a solemn

⁸⁷ Ehrle, *Zur Vorgeschichte des Concils von Wien*, A.L.K.G., III, 175.

⁸⁸ Angelo da Clarino, *Epistola Excusatoria*; Ehrle, *loc. cit.*

⁸⁹ Cf. Wadding, *Ad Ann.*, 1226, No. 51.

⁹⁰ The following sentence from the apocryphal *Gospel to the Egyptians* is quoted in Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.*, III, 6): "I have come to destroy the works of the female."

⁹¹ Jesus himself does not discuss the question of marriage and virginity.

compact of mutual fidelity, prefigured by the relation of the church to Christ as bride, and as old at least as the prophet Hosea.

Now we learn from the few notices of eastern Montanism that have come down to us that the sect praised virginity as the ideal state.⁹² Tertullian seems to have combined all three of the views of marriage mentioned in the preceding paragraph. He champions the state of virginity in his *De Exhortatione Castitatis* (chap. 9), adding that the Parousia is near, and that those women will rise more easily from earth to heaven who have no children at their breasts. In the *De Monogamia* Tertullian approves a single marriage, for the same reason St. Paul gives in his first Epistle to the Corinthians; while in the *De Anima* he defends marriage as a divine institution.⁹³ But we have to remember that Tertullian was a champion of the church against heretics as well as a zealot for the ascetic doctrines of Montanism. The rejection of marriage as a pollution of the spirit by the flesh was already one of the fundamental doctrines of the Gnostic-encratic heretics, whose dualism of matter and spirit was the most dangerous the church had to meet in the first three centuries.⁹⁴ The orthodox opinion had to steer a narrow way between the Scylla of luxury and the Charybdis of heresy. Except for the danger of falling into Gnostic dualism, it seems certain that Tertullian would have supported unreservedly the extreme view of the Montanists—the rejection of marriage as an unmitigated and irreparable evil.⁹⁵ Given his contempt for the flesh and his expectation of the Parousia, it was the only logical position for him to take.

The Spiritual Franciscans took quite a different view of marriage. To be sure they, like the rest of the brethren of the order, assumed the vow of chastity with those of obedience and poverty; but they did

⁹² Euseb., *Hist. Eccl.*, V, 18, 2; Tert., *Adv. Valenti.*, 5.

⁹³ "Natura veneranda non erubescenda est. Concubitus libido non condicio foedavit. Excessus non status est impudicus, siquidem benedictus status apud Deum: Crescite et multiplicare. . . ."—Tert., *De Anima*, 27.

⁹⁴ See the elaborate justification of marriage in Tertullian's work against the heretic Marcion, *Adv. Marc.*, IV, 34; V, 7.

⁹⁵ "Haeretici nuptias auferunt, psychici ingerunt. Illi nec semel, isti non semel nubunt. . . . Penes nos autem quos spiritalis merito dici facit agnitio spiritalium charismatum continentia tam religiosa est quam licentia verecundia."—Tert., *De Mon.*, 1.

not make it a subject of casuistry. Their abstinence from marriage was like their abstinence from wealth-getting, a freedom from encumbrances on the life of single devotion to deeds of mercy and leisure for prayer and contemplation. If there are one or two passages in which St. Francis expresses a somewhat dualistic view of the flesh,⁹⁶ they are, as Sabatier has said, "momentary obscurations, moments of discouragement when a man is not himself."⁹⁷ The real St. Francis was a lover of nature, who rejoiced in all God's creation, and who saw in the body not an enemy but a brother.⁹⁸ The same contentment and evenness of spirit is evident in the writings of the Spirituals, whose ideal was the imitation of the life of the saint. Their apologies have a note of repose and dignity which comes from absorption in a great and satisfying ideal.⁹⁹ A tangible proof of their liberal position on the question of marriage is furnished in the sympathy which existed between them and the pious laity of the neighborhood about their monasteries. The very name *Fratricelli* was a popular term of endearment given to the zealots in the Mark of Ancona and in Tuscany;¹⁰⁰ and when the negotiations with Clement V failed to bring independence to the Spirituals of Provence, they "withdrew from the persecuting brethren in the convents of Narbonne and Béziers, because the men of those towns held them in great reverence and affection."¹⁰¹

⁹⁶ "Cum majorem inimicum quam corpus non habeam."—II Cel., 3, 63.

⁹⁷ Sabatier, *Vie de Saint François d'Assise* (Eng. transl.), p. 41, n. 2.

⁹⁸ "Cepit hilariter loqui ad corpus, Gaude, frater corpus!"—II Cel. 3, 137.

⁹⁹ "Item paupertas evangelica et regule est totaliter in divinam spem sursum activa unde est certa de divino promisso, qui sine superflua sollicitudine promittit omnia ministrare."—Ubertino da Casale, *Responsio*, fol. 131b; Ehrle, *loc. cit.*

¹⁰⁰ The name was first used in John XXII's sweeping bull of condemnation of all heretical sects, issued in 1317, and for that reason has been regarded as a term of opprobrium. But John XXII only copied a term of popular use in his bull. For a discussion of the subject see the author's *The Spiritual Franciscans*, Winthrop Press, N. Y. (1907), note 145.

¹⁰¹ Angelo da Clarino, *Hist. Trib.*, fol. 66b; Ehrle, *loc. cit.*; and Ehrle, *Zur Vorgeschichte des Concils von Wien*, *A.L.K.G.*, III, 195. Father Mandonnet, a Dominican professor of the University of Freiburg, and a man deeply interested in the modern Franciscan movement, argued at the International Scientific Congress at Freiburg, 1897, for the original democratic unity of the whole Franciscan body, out of which came by later differentiation the Minorites, the Clares, and the Tertiaries. The change was effected partly by the church, partly through the natural growth of the order. If M. Mandonnet's theory be right—and it has the commendation of no less a critic of Fran-

The frequent complaint of the order at large that the zealots were attempting to gain power by ingratiating themselves with the people, "sub pallio sanctitatis," substantiates the fact of this cordial relationship, and clearly shows that the ascetic-legalistic proscription of marriage as a sin, or even as a concession to the flesh, was not a doctrine of the Spiritual Franciscans as it was of the Montanists.

Asceticism in stronger or weaker form has been so constant an element of the teaching of the Christian church from the earliest days to the present, that it constitutes no proof in itself, when appearing in almost identical terms in two movements within the church, of the connection or even the remote relation of those movements. In order to prove the connection or the relation of such movements, it would be necessary to prove that the end envisaged in the ascetic practices in question was the same. It is easy, for example, to quote passages almost identical in substance from Tertullian and Angelo da Clarino. On the subject of contempt for learning the former writes (and in an ante-Montanistic work at that), "What have Athens and Jerusalem in common? For us there is no need of study since Christ's advent nor of inquiry since the Gospel."¹⁰² And Angelo writes, "When a man has once received the sufficient work of faith in his heart, the laborious arguments of the wise ones of this world are superfluous and vain: for hath not God made the wisdom of this world folly?"¹⁰³ Yet one cannot fail to see, on careful study of the works of Tertullian and the chiefs of the Spiritual Franciscans, that the former's contempt for learning is of the nature of a forced penance in view of the impending judgment, whereas with the Franciscans worldly wisdom is discouraged as a distraction from the service due the world from the Minorite. With the former the attitude is strictly ascetic, with the latter it is disciplinary.¹⁰⁴ This formula might, with fair approach

ciscan origins than Paul Sabatier (*Revue Historique*, V, 75)—it affords interesting confirmation of the Democratic sympathies of the branch of the Franciscans which held most closely to the doctrines and precepts of the founder. Cf. *Compte Rendu du 4me Congrès* (Friburg), p. 184.

¹⁰² Tert., *Apolog*, 46.

¹⁰³ Angelo da Clarino, *Hist. Trib.*, fol. 31b; Ehrle, *loc. cit.*

¹⁰⁴ Compare Celano's statement of Francis' attitude toward learning: "Dolebat si virtute neglecta scientia quareretur. Fratres ait mei qui scientiae curiositate ducuntur in die retributionis manus invenient vacuas. Non hoc dicebat quod scripturae

to truth, be applied to the whole range of ascetic practices in the two systems. The simple fact that almost the entire weight of Montanistic emphasis fell on the subjects of fasts and continence (the regulation of the most intense appetites of the flesh), whereas virtue for the Franciscan zealot was summed up in the phrase "voluntary poverty" (freedom from secular distractions), shows the fundamental divergence of the two movements.

Finally, in the nature of the authority which lay behind ascetic practices the Franciscan system differed totally from Montanism. The doctrines of Montanism claimed to be a new, direct revelation from God, superseding the teaching of the gospel.¹⁰⁵ Consequently, the asceticism prescribed by Montanism was binding as a divine decree.¹⁰⁶ It was not recommended or solicited: it was ordained. Maximilla, the prophetess, said: "Listen not to me, but to Christ,"¹⁰⁷ and Tertullian argues in regard to second marriage: "If Christ abrogated divorce, which Moses allowed, why should not the Paraclete forbid second marriage which Paul condoned?"¹⁰⁸ On the other hand the self-denial practiced by the Franciscan zealots was a counsel of perfection recommended and exemplified by St. Francis, contained entirely within the gospel as revealed to the world and intrusted to the church. If the Spiritual Franciscans introduced the prophecies of the third and perfect age about to dawn, it was not as a basis for their ethics (that they had already in the legacy of St. Francis)¹⁰⁹ but rather as a comfort and an encouragement in the face of bitter persecution.

studia displicerent, sed quo a superflua cura discendi universos retraheret et quosque magis charitate bonos quam curiositate sciolos esse vellet."—II Cel., 17, 256.

¹⁰⁵ This view is well illustrated for the earlier forms of Montanism by the quotation from Hippolytus' *Philosophoumena* given above (note 1). But it even persisted in the modified Montanism of Tertullian: "Cum propterea paracletum miserit Deus, ut quoniam humana mediocritas omnia semel capere non poterat paulatim dirigeretur et ordinaretur et ad perfectum perduceretur disciplina ab illo vicario Domini, Spiritu Sancto."—Tert., *De Virg. Vel.*, 1.

¹⁰⁶ "Hunc (Paracletum) quem recipimus, necessario etiam quae tunc constituit observamus."—Tert., *De Jejun.*, 13.

¹⁰⁷ Epiph., *Haer.*, XLVIII, 12.

¹⁰⁸ Tert., *De Monog.*, 14.

¹⁰⁹ See the protestations of Angelo, Ubertino, and Olivi in their *Apologies and letters*, *passim*; e. g., "Solam regulam petimus sicut eam promisimus et beatus Franciscus eam instituit."—Ubertino in Ehrle, *A.L.K.G.*, III, 194.

Although both Montanism and Spiritual Franciscanism then were in their ascetic-enthusiastic features a protest against the secularization of Christianity; although both condemned all forms of indulgence of the flesh and proscribed mundane learning, yet it is inexact to speak of the asceticism of the Franciscans as Montanistic, because it proceeded from a widely different conception of the Christian religion, aimed at a far higher ideal of Christian perfection, and found its sanction and inspiration in the example and precept of a great teacher, rather than in the terrors of an impending cataclysm.

THE REFORMATION PRINCIPLE OF EXEGESIS AND THE INTERPRETATION OF PROPHECY

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Perhaps in no department of Old Testament study have the modern methods of investigation effected greater changes than in the interpretation of prophecy. While the predictive element, which has been almost exclusively emphasized in the history of Christian apologetics, is not altogether ignored, it is certainly minimized to a startling degree. Is this due solely or even mainly to an anti-supernaturalistic tendency, to a desire to eliminate the supernatural omniscience of prediction along with the supernatural omnipotence of miracle, or is there a more powerful influence at work, less subjective in character and therefore more worthy of respect? A brief sketch of the history of the interpretation of prophecy from the Reformation period to the present time may throw some light on this question and at the same time enable us better to understand the viewpoint and the aims of recent investigators and to face the probable future developments in the interpretation of prophecy without fear.

I

In the Patristic period the burning questions were christological. In the Reformation period they were soteriological. In the Patristic period the great subject of debate with Jew, gnostic, and even gentile was whether Jesus was the Messiah foretold in the Old Testament. In the Reformation period the messiahship of Jesus was no longer a matter of dispute. It had become an axiom of Christendom. The Fathers had succeeded in meeting the attacks of the first foes of Christianity and in handing down to subsequent ages the assured conviction that Jesus was indeed the promised Messiah. The attention is now fixed not so much upon what Jesus was, as upon what he did. To the Reformers Jesus does not appear so much as the Messiah; he absorbs their attention, rather, as the great and all-sufficient sacrifice for sin. This was natural in view of the supreme

object of the Reformers, which was to vindicate the evangelical doctrine of justification by faith against the papal doctrine of works. Not Jew and gnostic but priest and pope were now the great assailants of evangelical religion. The authority of the hierarchy had become supreme. It had arrogated to itself the power of the keys and the salvation of the individual soul was virtually conditioned upon submission to the prescriptions of "Holy Mother Church."

One of the most influential causes which had contributed to the authority of the priest was the patristic method of exegesis. This method may be called the allegorical, or, perhaps, more accurately, the mystical method of exegesis. The whole emphasis in the argument from prophecy in proof of the messiahship of Jesus had been placed by the Fathers upon the predictive element. But the remarkable correspondences between prophecy and fulfilment which were urged by them could only be attained, at least to the *extent* affirmed by the Fathers, when the historical meaning of the prophecies was ignored and they were compelled to

suffer a sea-change
Into something rich and strange,

by being submerged in the warm, fancy-breeding floods of the allegory. But the allegorical method of necessity turned the Old Testament into a book of enigmas, an Alice-in-Wonderland species of literature, which needed an authoritative interpreter. And who could furnish the authentic interpretation of Scripture so readily as the priest, the possessor of the apostolic tradition handed down through the unbroken succession of bishops?¹ Thus, back of the allegory stood the pope.

In combating the papal errors the Reformers were compelled to return to the Scriptures. The authority of Scripture had to be re-asserted over against the authority of tradition and the church. The organic connection between the doctrine of justification by faith and the sole authority of Scripture is most clearly observed in the development of Luther's position in the Thesis controversy.² But to the re-

¹ Cf. Tertullian, *Prescription against Heretics*, 19, 21, 32; Irenaeus, *Against Heresias*, iii, 2-4.

² Cf. Preuss, *Die Entwicklung des Schriftprinzips bei Luther bis zur Leipziger Disputation* (Leipzig, 1901).

assertion of the sole and ultimate authority of Scripture, the assertion of its perspicuity was a necessary corollary. An ambiguous authority is no authority at all. The Scripture, however, is ambiguous so long as the allegorical method of exegesis is applied in interpreting it. The allegorical method turns the Bible into a picture-puzzle. Hence the Reformers found it necessary to discard the allegorical method if they wished to re-establish the Bible as a principle of authority. In its place they enunciated what may be called the Reformation principle of exegesis, viz., that the sense of Scripture was one and that this was the grammatico-historical sense. By means of this principle they were enabled to restore the authority of Scripture which had been rendered illusory through the allegorical method, and upon this authority to base the great Reformation doctrine of justification by faith.

It is instructive to observe what a complete reversal had been effected in apologetics. With the change in the point of attack there is a corresponding change in doctrinal emphasis and exegetical method. In the early church the messiahship of Jesus was the question at issue. In the Reformation this was not discussed but assumed while the question of authority—Scripture or tradition—was pushed to the front. In the early church the allegorical method of exegesis had been employed to defend the messiahship of Jesus in the argument from prophecy. In the Reformation this method was abandoned and the grammatico-historical method was adopted to defend the authority of Scripture. The consequences for the interpretation of prophecy and for the general argument from prophecy, of the changed emphasis in doctrine and the changed principle of exegesis were of fundamental importance. Since the question of Jesus' messiahship was no longer at stake, the new exegetical principle was left free for a time to work out its logical results without being hampered unduly by dogmatic considerations, until a new issue was raised from within Protestantism itself of which we shall speak later.

The grammatico-historical sense means two things: (1) that a given verse in a prophecy can have but one meaning, (2) that the prophecy must be interpreted out of the historical situation which has given rise to it, so far as this can be discovered. The words of Luther in his preface to Isaiah are significant. "It is necessary," he says, "if

one will understand the prophecy, to know how it stands in the land, what events transpired, what the people thought, what the relationships were which they sustained to their neighbors, friends or foes, and especially what their attitude was toward their God and toward his prophets."³ Such a statement means, theoretically at least, a radical change in the attitude adopted toward prophecy from that held by the Fathers. They asked what a prophecy meant in the light of the New Testament fulfilment and the whole emphasis fell upon prediction. But in the above statement of Luther the emphasis begins to shift. The interpreter must ask himself what was the meaning of the prophecy in view of the historical situation out of which it arose.

But Luther was not an exegete so much as a homilist and he did not rigidly apply his own exegetical principles in his interpretations of the Old Testament. He was not a scientific interpreter. Calvin was. As an exegete he is the acknowledged chief among the Reformers. Adopting the same principles of interpretation as Luther did, he consistently applied them in his commentaries as Luther did not. It is in Calvin's works, therefore, that we must look for illustrations of the logical results of the Reformation principle of exegesis, and when we compare Calvin's interpretations with those of the Fathers the contrast is truly astonishing.

1. Calvin regularly seeks to discover the historical background of the so-called messianic psalms which the Fathers referred without hesitation directly to Christ. The historical background of Ps. 2 is David's reign.⁴ The favorite interpretation of vs. 7 of the eternal generation of the Son is expressly rejected. Ps. 22 also finds its historical background in David's misfortunes. On vs. 16 Calvin says, "if they object that David was never nailed to a cross (a favorite argument of the Fathers)⁵ the answer is easy, namely, that in bewailing

³ Erlanger edition of Luther's works, Vol. LXIII, pp. 52 ff.

⁴ The following citations from Calvin are taken from the English edition of his works published by the Calvin Translation Society, but they have been verified or corrected from the Latin editions of Baur, Cunitz, and Reuss (for the citations from Genesis and the Psalms) and of Tholuck (for the gospels and epistles). Unfortunately a Latin edition of the prophets is not at present accessible to me but I feel quite sure that the translations given convey the real meaning of Calvin.

⁵ Justin Martyr, *Dialogue with Trypho*, 97.

his condition he made use of a similitude" (*metaphorice conquestum*). Similarly he speaks of the parting of the garments as metaphorical (*translatitium*). These expositions are of special interest as the verses referred to had always been interpreted exclusively of Christ. Ps. 45 is explained of Solomon's marriage with the Egyptian princess, though with the qualification that "under what is said of Solomon as a type, the holy and divine union of Christ and his church is set forth." Pss. 47, 96, and 99 are all interpreted typically of Christ's kingdom, but there is no attempt to give them a personal messianic reference by construing Jehovah as the Messiah, and the absolute silence at Ps. 96:10 on the LXX addition, "from the wood," which played such a prominent part in patristic apologetics,⁶ is significant. On Ps. 72 Calvin says expressly, "those who would interpret it simply as a prophecy of the kingdom of Christ seem to twist the words too violently. And then we must always beware of giving the Jews an occasion of making an outcry, as if it were our purpose sophistically to apply to Christ those things which do not directly refer to him." Thus, in all these psalms Calvin bases his exposition *on the historical background* and arrives at a messianic reference indirectly through typology. At first glance this may not seem very important, but when compared with the traditional exposition of these psalms handed down from the Fathers, this consistent emphasis of the historical background as the starting-point of interpretation is a remarkable evidence of the subtle influence of the Protestant principle of exegesis.

As in the Psalms he searched for a historical background, so also in the prophecies proper. As conclusive instances may be mentioned Isa. 8:23—9:6 and 40 ff. Calvin holds that the deliverance promised in both these prophecies was primarily from the Babylonian exile.

2. Purely exegetical and historical reasons led Calvin to reject absolutely some of the messianic interpretations which had the support of a hoary tradition behind them and were most confidently believed in. Thus he denies that the seed of the woman in Gen. 3:15 is to be interpreted of the personal Messiah on the exegetical ground that "a collective noun cannot be understood of one man only."⁸ Gen.

⁶ Justin Martyr, *op. cit.*, 73; Tertullian, *Against Marcion*, iii, 19.

⁷ Contrast Justin, *Dialogue*, 34.

⁸ At Galatians 3:16 he is not so bold.

49:10 is messianic, though Christians have here "betrayed some excess of fervor in their pious diligence to set forth the glory of Christ," but vs. 11 is correctly explained as a description of the fruitfulness of the territory which fell to Judah, and Calvin purposely "abstains from those allegories which to some appear plausible" (he is alluding to the fanciful explanations such as may be found in Justin or Tertullian)⁹ as he does not "choose to sport with such great mysteries of God." On Isa. 4:2 Calvin observes, "after a careful examination of the whole I do not hesitate to regard the branch of God and fruit of the earth as denoting an universal and abundant supply of grace. . . . They who limit it (the branch) to the person of Christ, expose themselves to the ridicule of the Jews as if it were in consequence of scarcity that they tortured passages of Scripture for their own convenience." The patristic interpretation of Isa. 8:1-4¹⁰ is "a pleasing enough ingenuity but cannot at all harmonize with the context." At Isa. 63:1 Calvin says, "This chapter has been violently distorted by Christians as if what is here said related to Christ whereas the prophet speaks simply of God himself."

3. The examples already given would be quite sufficient to show how powerfully the Reformation exegetical principle of the historico-grammatical sense was affecting the interpretation of prophecy, but the reach of this new principle is exhibited even more clearly and in a more startling manner in the attitude which Calvin assumed toward the New Testament method of prophetic citations. It had hitherto been taken for granted that the New Testament use of a passage cited from the Old Testament determined its meaning. But the appeal to a New Testament writer as the final authority for the settlement of the meaning of an Old Testament passage is in reality to forsake exegesis for dogma. That is to say, the meaning of an Old Testament passage is no longer determined upon exegetical principles, the grammar, the context, the historical background, but upon the declaration as to what it means by the New Testament writer, the assumption being that such a writer, as an inspired man, is entirely competent to decide upon the meaning, and back of his authority there is no right nor necessity to go (*vid. infra*). But when a serious attempt was made to

⁹ E. g., *Dialogue*, 53, 54.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 77; Tert., *Against Marcion*, iii, 12, 13.

interpret the Old Testament prophets exegetically and not dogmatically, it was soon discovered that the meaning which was given in the New Testament to many of the prophecies could not possibly have been their historical meaning. It is interesting to notice how frequently Calvin says that the Evangelists *seem* to twist (*torquere*) the prophets though he never admits that they *really* do so. The question arose—was the Reformation principle of exegesis to be qualified in order to avoid the dogmatic difficulty raised by the New Testament method of citation? It is at this point, I think, more than anywhere else, that Calvin showed his candor as an exegete. He refused to allow the New Testament to determine the historical sense of an Old Testament passage. Not that at times he did not yield to the pressure of the dogmatic interest, as for example in his treatment of Isa. 7:14 which must have given his exegetical conscience some painful twinges, but the amazing thing is, that, with the very high inspiration theory which he maintained, he allowed himself to be influenced so little in his interpretation of the Old Testament by the New Testament method of citation. As the position of Calvin on this point is of fundamental importance it merits an ampler discussion and illustration. There are some statements of Calvin, it is true, which seem to indicate the very opposite of my contention. At Isa. 28:16 Calvin prefers one of several interpretations “both because that meaning agrees best with the context and because it is supported by the authority of the apostle Paul.” “I do acknowledge,” he continues, “that the Apostles followed the Greek translation and used such liberty that, while they were satisfied with giving the meaning, they did not quote the exact words. Yet *they never changed the meaning*, but, taking care to have it properly applied, they gave the true and genuine interpretation. Whenever, therefore, they quote any passage from the Old Testament, *they closely adhere to its object and design*. Again at I Cor. 2:9 (= Isa. 64:4) he rejects one exposition though it “appears at first view to suit better with the prophet’s context in respect of the verb [because] it is farther removed from Paul’s meaning on *which we ought to place more dependence than on any other consideration*. For where shall we find a surer or more faithful interpreter of this authoritative declaration which (the Spirit) himself dictated to Isaiah, than the Spirit of God in the exposition which he has furnished

by the mouth of Paul?" Yet, in spite of this statement, Calvin does not alter the historic meaning of the passage, but only seeks to show that it is in harmony with Paul's citation. So much for Calvin's thesis! But observe how he departs from his own thesis or at least from the inferences which we might suppose naturally followed from it. On Matt. 2:15 (=Hosea 11:1) Calvin observes, "They who have not been well versed in Scripture confidently applied to Christ this place, yet the context is opposed to this." The passage is then correctly explained of the Exodus. On the other hand, he contends that it is only scoffers who say that the evangelist has misapplied the passage (*Commentary on Hosea*). "It is skilfully accommodated (*aptatur*) to the matter in hand" (*Commentary on Matthew*). The explanation offered is that Hos. 11:1 is a prophetic "analogy." "God begat the Church anew in the person of Christ. Then did the Church come out of Egypt in its head as the whole body *had been formerly* brought out" (*Commentary on Matthew*). The statements on Matt. 2:18 (=Jer. 31:15) are even more uncompromising. "It is certain that the destruction of the tribe of Benjamin which *happened in his own time* was described by the prophet. . . . Since the vaticination of the prophet was then (i. e., in Jeremiah's time) fulfilled, Matthew does *not mean that it was here predicted what Herod would do* but that, by the advent of Christ, that mourning was *renewed* which the Benjaminites had endured many ages before" (*Commentary on Matthew*). The passage in his commentary on Jeremiah is even more unequivocal. Matthew "meant no other thing than that the same thing happened at the coming of Christ as had taken place before when the whole country was reduced to desolation. . . . To no purpose then do interpreters torture themselves by explaining this passage (in Jeremiah) allegorically, for Matthew did not intend to lessen the authority of *ancient history*, for he knew in what sense this had been *formerly* fulfilled. But his only object was to remind the Jews that there was no cause for them to be greatly astonished at that slaughter (viz., of the innocents) for the region had *formerly* been laid waste and bereaved of its inhabitants. We now see how Matthew accommodated this passage to his own purpose." Here we do not have even a typical interpretation of Jeremiah as we do in the case of Hos. 11:1. In such an exposition the *ἵνα πληρωθῆ* receives an

extension of meaning sufficient to relieve any difficulty that might arise out of Matthew's citations *but at the same time the proof from the minute fulfilment of specific predictions is correspondingly weakened.* Furthermore, it would be difficult to show that Matthew attached any such elastic sense to *ἵνα πληρωθῆ* as Calvin's exposition demands for it. The frankness with which Calvin admits differences between Old Testament prophecy and New Testament citation is well illustrated in his comment upon Matt. 8:17 (=Isa. 53:4.) "This prediction has the appearance of being inappropriate (*videtur parum apposite citari*) and even of being twisted (*torqueri*) into a foreign sense (*alienum sensum*). For Isaiah does not there speak of miracles but of the death of Christ, and not of temporal benefits but of spiritual and eternal grace. *Now what is undoubtedly spoken about the impurities of the soul, Matthew applies to bodily diseases.*" Here one of the difficulties, at least, in this citation is most tersely and lucidly stated. Calvin seeks to justify Matthew's use of the prophecy by pointing to the purpose for which Christ healed diseases. His healing of the physical diseases was symbolic of his power to heal spiritual diseases. "He gave life to the blind in order to show that he was the light of the world, etc." One more example may be presented. At Ps. 8:5 (=Heb. 2:7) he will not translate אֱלֹהִים by angels, although it is so translated by the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews following the LXX, but he will adhere to the translation "God" as that "seems more natural (*genuina*) and as it is almost universally adopted by Jewish interpreters." He then points out again very clearly the great difficulty in the application of this verse in Hebrews. "While the psalmist here discourses concerning the excellency of men and describes them in respect of this as coming near to God, the apostle applies the passage to the humiliation of Christ." His comment upon this is as follows: "What the apostle says in this passage (Heb. 2:7) concerning the abasement of Christ *is not an explanation* (of the text), *but by way of enriching the subject, he turns to his own purpose what was spoken in a different sense (non est exegeticum sed κατ' ἐπεξεργασίαν ad suum institutum deflectet quod alio sensu dictum fuerat).* For Paul did not hesitate at Rom. 10:6 in the same manner through amplification to embellish the words of Moses in Deut. 30:12 (a very happy comparison, though in his earlier commentary on

Romans Calvin hedged somewhat on this passage). The Apostle, therefore, in quoting this psalm had not so much an eye to what David meant, but making an allusion to the words applies this (*diminution*) to the death of Christ and that (glory) to his resurrection. A similar account may be given of Paul's exposition of Eph. 4:8 in which *he does not so much explain the meaning of the text (Ps. 68:18) as by a pious turn he accommodates it to the person of Christ (non tam interpretatur quam pia deflexione ad Christi personam accommodat).*" A franker admission that the apostle does *not* give the historical meaning of the words could not be made, yet at the beginning of his exposition of Ps. 8:6 Calvin still maintains that the apostles did not twist (*torquerent*) the words of the Old Testament to a foreign sense.¹¹

From these illustrations which give, as I believe, a very fair idea of Calvin's interpretation of prophecy, we may make the following deductions: (1) Calvin, though denying as a dogmatic theologian any *real* difference between the original meaning of a prophecy and its manner of application in the New Testament, as an exegete unhesitatingly admits differences. (2) As an exegete he refuses to allow the method of citation by the New Testament writers to determine the historical meaning of the passages in their Old Testament setting. In all the above passages he adheres to the historical meaning of the prophecies. (3) As a dogmatic theologian he will not allow that the evangelists really misapply the Scripture, though their peculiar methods of citation often compel him as an exegete to say that they "seem to twist" Scripture. (4) He explains their use of the Old Testament prophecies either by the theory of types or by analogy or simply as an accommodation. (5) As an exegete Calvin, in his fearless application of the Reformation principle of exegesis to prophecy, had thus succeeded in emasculating the *ἵνα πληρωθῆ* of any distinctive meaning and so far forth he had weakened very materially the apologetic argument from the fulfilment of specific predictions.

Would the exegetical results of Calvin be adhered to or would they be qualified in the interest of dogma? This leads us to a brief consideration of the developments in the post-Reformation period. But

¹¹ Calvin's discussion of Matt. 2:6 (=Mic. 5:2) is also exceedingly interesting as an example of his dogmatic theory on the one hand and his exegetical freedom on the other.

before passing to the discussion of this period it will be well to make a brief résumé of the results of our study thus far. (1) The apologetic interest in the sixteenth century had completely shifted as compared for example with the apologetic interest in the Patristic period. The issue now was the doctrine of salvation—justification by faith, an individual experience, or justification by works through ecclesiastical mediation. This issue involved the question of authority—either Scripture which supported the doctrine of the Reformers, or tradition which supported the contention of the papal church. The Reformers in their contention against Rome had been compelled to assert the sole authority of Scripture. (2) To be an authority Scripture must be perspicuous. To maintain its perspicuity the allegorical method of exegesis which had been handed down from the Patristic period must be abandoned and the Reformation principle of the one grammatico-historical sense must be substituted. This principle in its application to prophecy logically led to the following results which are exhibited most clearly in the works of Calvin where the principle finds its most sincere and consistent application: (a) The grammatico-historical method which interprets according to the context and the historical background of the prophecy occasions a change of emphasis. The attention is unavoidably diverted from the asserted fulfilment of the prophecy to its original meaning. (b) The grammatico-historical method of interpretation revealed the fact that many passages hitherto referred directly to the Messiah could, in their historical sense, be at most indirectly or typically referred to him. (c) It revealed the fact that other passages referred to the Messiah by means of the allegorical method of exegesis had no reference to him at all, not even typical. (d) It revealed the fact that the meanings attributed to many Old Testament prophecies by the New Testament writers were not the meanings originally attached to them by their authors. (4) Such a radical departure from the received methods of prophetic interpretation did not at once arouse the opposition which we might have expected, since the great issues having changed, men's minds were not so engrossed as in the early church by the argument from prophecy. Their interests were elsewhere. But in the results obtained by Calvin lay the possibilities of a great strife. What this strife was, how it originated, and how it affected the interpretation of prophecy will now be considered.

II

The two great Reformation principles are, as we have seen, justification by faith and the supreme authority of Scripture. The post-Reformation period intellectualized the former principle, externalized the latter principle, and devitalized both. The apologetic interest in the anti-papal polemic was responsible for these consequences. For our present purposes it will be necessary to trace the development only of the post-Reformation doctrine of Scripture.

"We assert," says Bellarmin, the great expounder of Tridentine theology, "that the whole doctrine which is necessary as respects faith or as respects morals is not contained in the Scripture, and that in addition to the written word of God there is also an unwritten word of God, i. e., the divine and apostolic tradition,"¹² and of course it was the pope who was the incarnation of this tradition. Against this boldly stated position Lutheran and Reformed alike combined to formulate the dogma of the infallibility of Scripture. In place of the infallible pope we have the infallible Word. In order effectually to secure this infallibility it was thought necessary to exclude, rigorously, every human element from Scripture, and to this end the verbal dictation theory of inspiration was formulated. According to this theory the real author of Scripture is God the Holy Spirit. The biblical writers were not authors in any true sense of the word but mere *calami*, penmen, passive agents. Thus Gerhardt analyzes the *causa efficiens* of Scripture into a "principle" and an "instrumental" cause. "The principle cause is the true God, one in essence, three in person."¹³ The instrumental causes of Scripture were the men peculiarly called and elected of God to consign the divine revelation to writing and who are therefore justly called "amanuenses of God, hands of Christ, notaries and secretaries of the Holy Spirit, since they neither spoke nor wrote with any proper human will but *φερόμενοι ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος ἁγίου, acti, ducti, impulsu, inspirati et gubernati a Spirito Sanctu*. When, therefore, any canonical book is called Book of Moses, Psalter of David, Epistle of Paul, this is merely with the meaning of service, not with the meaning of principal cause."¹⁴ "God was so with them," says John Owen the great Puritan divine,

¹² Cf. also *Canons of the Council of Trent*; Scaff, *Creeds of Christendom*, II, 79 ff.

¹³ *Loci Theologici*, i, 12.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, i, 18.

“and by the Holy Ghost so spake in them that their tongue in what they said or their hand in what they wrote was *עַם סֵפֶר*, no more at their own disposal than the pen in the hand of an expert writer. *They obtained nothing by study or meditation, by inquiry or reading.* Whether we consider the matter or the manner of what they received or delivered, or their receiving or delivering it, they were but an instrument of music, giving a sound according to the intention and skill of him that strikes it.”¹⁵ Quenstedt expressed the same theory with equal stringency. He combats the statement of Grotius “that there was no need that the histories should be dictated by the Holy Spirit”¹⁶ and maintains, for example, that “when Luke wrote these things he did not put them down from the relation of others or from his own memory but from divine inspiration of the Holy Spirit who directed the mind and pen and suggested the things to be written and the words in which they should be written.”¹⁷ This theory culminated in a *reductio ad absurdum* when, in 1659, the theological and philosophical faculties of Wittenberg maintained that Beza’s view that the Greek of the New Testament contained barbarisms and solecisms was blasphemous.¹⁸

The consequences of this theory of Scripture for interpretation in general and for the interpretation of prophecy in particular are exceedingly interesting.

(1) It resulted, in many instances, in a practical reversion to the theory of a double sense of Scripture and so led to a thoroughgoing typologizing of the Old Testament which, in its practical results, can scarcely be distinguished from the results obtained by the patristic exegesis. There is not only the historical sense which the words give, but also the mystical sense which was intended by the Holy Spirit. This idea is expressly formulated by Glassius, whose work, *Philologia Sacra* (1623), was commended by the faculty of Jena, was welcomed by Gerhardt, and may be considered to represent the current views of the time on hermeneutics, though more especially among the Lutherans. “The sense of Scripture,” says Glassius, “is duplex,

¹⁵ *Works*, XVI, 298 ff. This is only a revival of the Philonic theory of ecstasy.

¹⁶ Cited in his *Theologia Didactico-Polemica*, I, 67b.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, I, 69b, 72a.

¹⁸ Cf. Ladd, *The Doctrine of Sacred Scripture*, II, 182.

literal and spiritual or mystical. . . . In this thesis the assertion is not indeed made that everywhere in every text and individual passage of Scripture this (double) sense ought to be recognized and accepted, but this statement concerning Scripture ought to be taken in this way, that in certain places which the Scripture itself points out as it were with raised finger, it is not to be explained in a literal sense but, beyond the sense which is derived from the words, it admits also a mystical sense, i. e., the Holy Spirit himself intends a certain mystery or spiritual meaning in such a text, it having been first literally understood and expounded, and He shows that this (spiritual meaning) is to be elicited from it." Again he says, "If it is said that Christ made an accommodation of this history (Num. 21:8) to himself (John 3:14) I respond, I concede the accommodation. But if it is asked whether he made it *beyond the intention of the Holy Spirit* speaking in the written history, certainly this cannot be held."¹⁹ That is, if God is the author of Scripture in the sense recognized by the verbal dictation theory of inspiration, he can put into the words much more than the penmen, who may have written them down, were aware of. This is certainly a fair deduction from the postulate and Glassius is only consequential when he proceeds to elaborate the mystical sense into an allegorical, a typical, and a parabolic sense.²⁰ It is clear that Glassius is here on the road to surrender the Reformation principle of exegesis. The mystical sense, or the sense which the Holy Spirit intends, would, of course, be the most important, and the inevitable tendency would be to ignore in its favor the historical sense. But it may be asked what was the motive which led these post-Reformation theologians to re-enunciate the principle of a double sense of Scripture. We have seen *how*, on the verbal dictation theory of Scripture, this idea of a double sense *could* easily arise, but the question is just *why* did it arise?

(2) This leads to the second point, the bearing of which on the interpretation of prophecy we have to consider in the light of the verbal dictation theory of inspiration—the Protestant principle,

¹⁹ Cited in König, *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, 534.

²⁰ Glassius, indeed, tried to limit the sphere of such interpretation by introducing his three criteria of raritas, concinnitas, or agreement with the analogy of faith, . . . and utilitas or homiletical value, but his attempt was abortive.—Cf. Diestel, *Geschichte des Alten Testaments*, 375 ff.

namely, that Scripture is to be interpreted by Scripture. We find the formulation of this hermeneutical principle in terms of the verbal dictation theory in the following thesis of Quenstedt: "The certain and infallible interpretation of Scripture can be gained from no other source than from Scripture itself. For Scripture, *or rather the Holy Spirit speaking in and through Scripture*, is his own legitimate and absolute interpreter."²¹ Now it was very clear on examination that the Bible was not equally perspicuous in all passages. Hence the above general canon of interpretation resulted in the further special canon that the more obscure passages of Scripture were to be interpreted by the clearer passages. For the interpretation of prophecy, this means that a prophecy, the more obscure, must be interpreted in the light of its fulfilment, the clear passage. We find Gerhardt expressly reaffirming the position of Irenaeus that a prophecy before its fulfilment has no clear or certain exposition and maintaining that "the best interpretation of all the prophetic vaticinations can and should be sought out of the fulfilment described in the New Testament."²² The dogmatic interest involved in the reaffirmation of the mystical sense of Scripture may be made very clear, if, following the proof-text and syllogistic method of the post-Reformation theologians themselves, we construct the following syllogism: Major premise—Gerhardt *loquitur*: "When all Scripture is given by the immediate afflatus of the Holy Spirit and is *θεοπνευστος*, then all things in it are *συναληθη* and agree together so that nothing is contrary or repugnant to or dissident from itself."²³ Minor premise—Glassius *loquitur*: "For why do the sacred writers in the New Testament cite the words of Moses and the prophets from the Old Testament? Surely in order to gain faith for their writings. But what faith can they gain if they usurp in bad faith the words of the authors, if they either twist or, what is worse, pervert their intention and meaning?"²⁴ Conclusion—Witsius *loquitur*: "It must be held that the theopneustic doctors (in this connection

²¹ *Op. cit.*, I, 137b. And cf. the naïve syllogistic formulation of the same view in Gerhardt, *op. cit.*, I, 529. "(a) He who is the principal and chief author of Scripture is the chief and authentic interpreter of Scripture; (b) The Holy Spirit is the principal and chief author; (c) Ergo, He is its authentic interpreter."

²² *Ibid.*, XXIX, 93, 3, and 90, 10; cf. Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, IV, 26, 1.

²³ *Op. cit.*, I, 532.

²⁴ Cited in König, *op. cit.*, 534.

the New Testament writers) show us the way and method by which we ought to proceed in the elucidation of types and hand us the key for the unlocking of these things.”²⁵ How far the idea that the New Testament was normative for the interpretation of the Old Testament led may be seen in the statement of Amyraldus who belonged, moreover, to the Reformed Church and to the very liberal school of Saumer, that “what the Apostles offered in this matter (i. e., in interpreting Scripture) is an example according to whose norm all the theologians should conform all their thought and meditation.”²⁶ On the basis of such principles the prophecies became as completely separated from their historical background as they were in the patristic exegesis. Thus according to Gerhardt, while certain prophecies are to be received *ρητως et ιστορικως*, as Isa. 7:14, others are to be received *μυστικως, τυπικως, συμβολικως και αλληγορικως*, “to which class belong those which treat in metaphorical terms of the state of the church militant in the New Testament and of the state of the church triumphant in heaven. For if anyone will adhere too strictly to the words, he would be compelled to hold that the earthly Jerusalem would again be rebuilt, that the Israelites would again be collected to it from all the nations, that corporeal and external sacrifices would again be offered and that even the Levitical law would again be reinstated,” a most interesting and significant observation. He then adds this formula: “Just as the Apostles describe the things of the future age in terms of the present age, so the Prophets describe the things of the New Testament in terms of the Old Testament.”²⁷ At a later time Francke of the Pietistic school referred fifty psalms directly to Christ and argued from Luke 24:44 that in the case of each psalm it must first be proved that it *cannot* refer to Christ.²⁸ Typology was everywhere pushed to the greatest extremes. Rambach adduces thirty-nine “*sedes classicae*” for the type and held that Samson’s marriage figured Christ who loved the church taken from the gentiles, while Zeltner actually defended the polygamy of the patriarchs as a “*schema typicum*.”²⁹ Gerhardt him-

²⁵ Diestel, 379.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ XXIX, 90, 6.

²⁸ Diestel, 414.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 379.

self allegorizes the tabernacle furniture with the ingenuity of a Clement of Alexandria.³⁰

It is clear from such examples that the pious imagination is as free to exercise itself as it had ever been. Typologizing was developed, to be sure, more among the Lutherans and the federal school of Cocceius. The Reformed theologians, with the exception of the followers of Cocceius, were held in check to some degree by the stricter scientific method of Calvin. But even among the Lutherans it was felt by some that the views of a Glassius, for example, were prejudicial to the Reformation principle of the single sense of Scripture. Calovius opposed these views and Quenstedt, following Calovius, makes a distinction between the sense of Scripture and its use, and he cites Calovius to the effect that "the sense of the words or sayings is one thing and the typical signification of a thing or a history described in Scripture, which is intended by God himself, is another. For God is able to intend something by a certain history, but when the history is described the words by which it is described do not have a double sense, one literal and one mystical, but the sense of them is one; yet through the thing itself, described in the words, God desired to set before the eyes of men at the same time something else, yet not at all by the words which described it."³¹ This is a very judicious position and by it Calovius and Quenstedt sought to avoid the Scylla upon which Glassius had been wrecked. But in fleeing Scylla they were engulfed in a Charybdis of their own which in some respects proved even more fatal.

3. Those who held to a double sense could still find room for a historical sense. But those who denied the double sense and at the same time held to the normative value of the New Testament for the interpretation of prophecy, could only hold to the mystical sense, i. e., that sense of a prophecy which the New Testament put upon it. According to the Reformed theologian Rivetus the distinction between the literal (i. e., historical) sense and the spiritual sense is absurd since the Scripture affords only the sense of the Holy Spirit.³² It is

³⁰ Cf. Clement, *Stromata*, V, 6. According to Gerhardt the seven golden candlesticks signify Christ, the light of the world; Aaron's rod that budded typifies Christ, sprung from the dry root of Jesse, etc.

³¹ *Op. cit.*, I, 130a.

³² Diestel, 380.

significant that Quenstedt prefers the term "literal sense" to "historical sense."³³ According to his view the literal sense of an Old Testament prophecy is not what would seem to be the historical sense but the sense which the New Testament gives it. It is bad enough to distinguish two senses. It is worse to confound them, for this means the obliteration of the historical sense entirely. To what exegetical crimes such a view may lead is well illustrated in Quenstedt's murder of the contextual meaning of Hos. 11:1. He objects to the interpretation of Gerhardt that Hos. 11:1 referred immediately and historically or *sensu literali* to Israel, but immediately and prophetically or *sensu mystico* to Christ. "In this way many senses would be constituted of one and the same biblical passage, as the Papists here would have" (note the apoiogetic interest in his attempt to maintain the Reformation principle of exegesis). Accordingly Hos. 11:1 must be referred in its literal sense directly to Christ and the following astounding interpretation is offered in support of which Quenstedt is able to cite Osiander, Tarnovius, and Calovius among the Lutherans and Gomarus and Rivetus among the Calvinists. "Although Israel is a boy, uneducated, tender, weak, and unable to control himself, nevertheless I loved him. Then, lest he should entirely perish, if left to himself and without a guide, out of Egypt I called, i. e., decreed to call in his own time, not the boy Israel, but as it distinctly says, my son, i. e., the Messiah, who should receive and guide Israel lest in his imprudence he should precipitate ruin upon himself. Thus while antecedents and consequents are referred without any distortion to Israel, the words which are cited in Matthew can be accepted in the literal sense of Christ."³⁴ In such a passage as this, post-Reformation dogma has completely triumphed over Reformation exegesis as illustrated in Calvin. It is no wonder, therefore, that to the men whose views we have been discussing and illustrating, the result at which Calvin had arrived in his interpretation of prophecy could not fail to be offensive. How could his frank admissions of differences between prophecy and New Testament citation square with these high theories of inspiration and with the principle of interpreting Scripture by Scripture as that principle was controlled by these inspiration

³³ I, 128a.

³⁴ I, 133.

theories? No doubt Calvin also had a very high theory of inspiration, but it had not been drawn out and elaborated by him in the formal way in which it was subsequently developed by the post-Reformation scholastics and through which the essential disagreement between Calvin's theory of inspiration and his exegetical results became apparent, as it had not become to Calvin himself. The more logically and sharply Calvin's theory of inspiration was defined, the more inconsistent with this theory was his exegesis of prophecy seen to be. If any doubt is still cherished that we have interpreted Calvin's attitude toward prophecy correctly, it should be entirely dissipated by the criticisms passed upon it by the post-Reformation theologians. They saw very clearly the incompatibility of his exegesis with the orthodox theories of prophecy and of Scripture. It is not surprising, therefore, to learn that in 1593 Hunnius of Marburg published a book with the title *Calvinus judaizans* and it is instructive to note that the same Hunnius wrote a work on Scripture in which its authority was defended in a way that became typical for subsequent Lutheran apologetics as to this subject. It is not surprising to hear Calovius praising Cocceius because "he did not snatch away with his Calvin the many oracles of the Old Testament from Christians or render them ambiguous, but dexterously explained them of Christ," or to hear Glassius blaming Calvin for denying the messianic reference in Isa. 63:1-6.³⁵

Thus, in conclusion, we meet with the strange and instructive phenomenon that the principle of the one grammatico-historical sense, originally enunciated by the Reformers in order to maintain the doctrine of the authority of Scripture which had been undermined by the allegorical method of interpretation, is now, for all practical purposes, abandoned by the post-Reformation theologians in the interest of an erroneous development of that doctrine, and the results which Calvin had obtained through the honest application of the Reformation principle of exegesis are now ignored or rejected in favor of the orthodox theory of inspiration. Through their adhesion to this theory the post-Reformation theologians were confronted in their interpretation of prophecy with a dilemma, either horn of which meant exegetical disaster. If, as the orthodox theory of inspiration

³⁵ Diestel, 369, 377.

demanding, the New Testament methods of citation were absolutely normative for the meaning of the Old Testament prophecies, then either there must be allowed a double sense to the prophecies, one historical, the other mystical, in which case the Reformation principle of exegesis must be practically surrendered, or, if the singleness of sense is adhered to, the historical sense must be altogether abandoned in favor of the mystical, called literal only by courtesy (cf. Quenstedt, *supra*), in which case all barriers against typologizing and allegorizing are completely swept aside.

Thus unfortunately, though not unnaturally, the interpretation of prophecy became indissolubly bound up with the inspiration controversy. A difficult and delicate alternative was presented to Protestant theology. It must either practically abandon the Reformation principle of exegesis or modify the post-Reformation doctrine of Scripture. In the attempt to interpret prophecy the absolute incompatibility of the two principles was most clearly revealed. Into the inspiration controversy generally many factors entered, some of them no doubt rationalistic and anti-supernaturalistic. But so far as the connection of this controversy with the interpretation of prophecy is concerned the question of the supernatural has, strictly speaking, nothing to do. It was simply a question as to whether Protestant scholarship would interpret prophecy historically in line with the first reformers, most notably Calvin, or allegorically on the basis of a certain theory of inspiration. The possibility or impossibility of predictive prophecy did not in principle enter into the discussion.

The inspiration controversies of the past three hundred years have made it unmistakably clear which horn of the above dilemma Protestant theology has chosen. In the controversy of the seventeenth century which raged over the lower or textual criticism of the Bible, the death-blow was struck at the verbal dictation theory of Scripture. In the great battle of the nineteenth century over the higher criticism, the smoke of which has scarcely yet cleared away, a historical conception of Scripture has been substituted for a dogmatic conception. This means that Protestant theology has decided in favor of the Reformation principle of exegesis as against the post-Reformation doctrine of Scripture. For prophecy this means that the work of interpretation must be taken up again practically where Calvin left off.

But at this point one thing is to be carefully borne in mind. The Reformation principle of exegesis was enunciated by Luther and Calvin in an intensely dogmatic interest, namely, to secure the perspicuity of the Bible and so protect it as a final authority as against the claims of the pope. But in the purging fires of the inspiration controversies this principle became freed from the dogmatic interest and has now emerged as a purely scientific principle. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that a principle which attained such remarkable results even in the hands of Calvin, hampered as it then was by the strongest dogmatic considerations, should arrive at more far-reaching consequences than Calvin ever dreamed of, when moving freely and flexibly as a scientific principle. The inevitable result of Calvin's generalization of the *ἵνα πληρωθῆ* into a prophetic analogy has been the gradual restriction of the predictive element of prophecy within comparatively narrow limits due to the more rigid application of Calvin's own method. But with the increasing elimination of the predictive element upon which the church has always laid such supreme emphasis a reformulation of the apologetic argument from prophecy has become imperative. It cannot be avoided. Protestantism, which formulated the Reformation principle of exegesis in self-defense, must be prepared to accept the consequences of its own act.

The gains or the losses for apologetics in the reformulation of the prophetic argument space forbids us even to indicate. The purpose of this article has been attained if the imperative reason for its reformulation has been made clear—not an anti-supernaturalistic bias but the application to prophecy of Calvin's principles of exegesis.

CRITICAL NOTES

A PARIS FRAGMENT OF PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM

The Greek cursive manuscript, Coislin. 299, in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, has prefixed to it a leaf from an earlier and larger uncial codex, which has apparently remained unidentified. Coislin. 299 is a thirteenth- (or, according to Montfaucon, eleventh-) century manuscript containing works of various Greek Fathers—Athanasius, Dionysius, Gregory, Cyril, and others. The uncial leaf has been folded once, and inserted at its beginning, thus making a pair of tolerable flyleaves, which are lettered A and B.

The fragment is referred to in Montfaucon's *Bibliotheca Coisliniana* (Paris, 1715), in his description of Coislin. 299, in the following terms:

Initio autem hujus Codicis habentur duo folia Codicis cujusquam IX. saeculi, unciali item caractere oblongo et deflexo, ex quadam Homilia vel Sermone (p. 416).

In his *Fac-Similes de plus anciens Manuscrits Grecs . . . du IV^e au XII^e siècle* (1892), H. Omont mentions this leaf (pp. 4 and 10), referring it to a homily, and connecting it with a similar uncial fragment, now forming part of Coislin. 46, of which he gives a facsimile (planche XX, 3¹). Certainly the hand of the two fragments is much the same. Both 299 and 46 come, according to Montfaucon and Omont, from the laura of St. Athanasius on Mt. Athos.

The leaf in question is of fairly thick parchment, and measures 23.5 cm. by 35.5 cm. It is inscribed in two columns of forty-one lines each, in Greek uncials of a date not later than the tenth century, although perhaps not much earlier, for the letters are of the exaggerated, sloping type, shaded and adorned with pendants in the usual late uncial style. Montfaucon and Omont refer it to the ninth century. The book from which it has strayed must have been a noble codex, both for size and workmanship.

While engaged in other work upon Coislin. 299, in 1903, I copied the four columns preserved on the leaf. For the identification of the text, I am indebted to my friend and pupil, Mr. Martin Sprengling, who has found the passage among the Spuria ascribed to Chrysostom, and appended to his genuine works in Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, 63 (Joannes Chrysostomus 12), coll. 935-37, being part of a discourse entitled: *Εἰς τὴν ἀγίαν Πεντηκοστήν*. I must also acknowledge the courtesy of Professor Sebastian Haidacher of

¹ But numbered "2" in the description on pp. 9, 10.

Salzburg, the well-known authority upon manuscripts of Chrysostom, in directing me to the works of Montfaucon and Omont cited above.

The manuscript exhibits several itacisms, and there are the abbreviations usually met in uncials: $\overline{\pi\nu\alpha}$, $\overline{\kappa\varsigma}$, $\overline{\theta\varsigma}$, etc. It begins: ἀπεστάλη ἐν τῶν σεραφίμ ξ | χων ἀνθρακα πυρὸς, and ends: ὁυδε γὰρ ἐν ἔστιν, οὐδὲ γνώμη ἴση, ἀλλὰ διὰ. The text is on the whole a good one, presenting some divergences from the printed text, and the fragment is worthy of the attention of future editors of this homily.

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MOSES AND MONOTHEISM

Gentlemen of the Wellhausen school are invited to take notice. Thirty years ago they were the ones who attempted to understand the religion of Israel in its relation to the other religions of western Asia. But they have failed to keep up with the advance of science. Their theories have in fact undergone the usual but none the less sad process of petrification. Those who once welcomed the light are now striving to keep it out by erecting a division wall between Israel and Babylon. They are given fair warning that it is time for them to revise their musty lectures and to rewrite their antiquated textbooks. Otherwise the advance of their science will leave them hopelessly in the rear. This is the demand of a well-known Old Testament scholar;¹ and a younger specialist whose earlier work has made a favorable impression upon us echoes the demand for a thorough change in present critical methods.² Before the publication of either of these demands Professor Baentsch claimed to have brought forward certain facts "unprejudiced consideration of which means a complete change in the present view of the course of Israel's religious history."³ In the face of so widespread a demand the Wellhausenian who refuses to look at the new light will write himself down as desperately hardened indeed.

Wellhausen himself would be the last to claim that there can be no progress. But those who have learned much from him may possibly have clung too closely to his results. The radicals of one generation are the

¹ Sellin, *Die alttestamentliche Religion im Rahmen der anderen altorientalischen* (Leipzig, 1908), pp. 2, 21.

² *Mose: ein Beitrag zur Untersuchung über die Ursprünge der israelitischen Religion*. Von Paul Volz. Tübingen: Mohr, 1907, 115 pages, M. 3. Dr. Volz is the author of an instructive essay entitled *Die vorexilische Jahveprophetie und der Messias* (1897), and of a meritorious monograph on Jewish eschatology, *Die jüdische Eschatologie von Daniel bis Akiba* (1903).

³ Baentsch, *Altorientalischer und israelitischer Monotheismus* (1906).

conservatives of the next, and they often show to others the intolerance from which they themselves have suffered—as the new school Presbyterians who were most strenuous in claiming liberty for themselves in 1870 were least willing to grant it to others in 1891. It behooves us therefore to keep an open mind and to welcome all new light. On the other hand, it is allowable to examine the alleged light and to determine its real quality. Not every revolution which publishes a manifesto accomplishes what it promises. The insinuation that Wellhausen's *Prolegomena* are antiquated must be tested by the facts; probably the most of us would be glad to be assured that our treatises will show as much vitality thirty years after publication as is shown by this classic. In any case it will do us no harm to ask for a bill of particulars: In what respect does the Wellhausen theory need a thorough reconstruction? To this question we address ourselves under the guidance of the authors before us.

The point at which the criticism is directed is the Wellhausenian treatment of Moses and his relation to Hebrew monotheism. The complaint is twofold: First, members of this school do not admit that Moses was a monotheist; secondly, they do not give enough weight to the evidences of monotheism in Babylonia and Egypt. It might be fair to say that the two specifications neutralize each other; if monotheism was accepted in Babylonia and Egypt before the time of Moses and came thence to Israel it makes no difference what we think about Moses. His originality and his importance in the history become quite subordinate. But this would be an argument *ad hominem* only.

The inquiry into the development of monotheism in Israel is one of the most important on which we can enter, and it is desirable that we should make clear to ourselves the method in which to answer it. Three things suggest themselves as almost self-evident: First, the Hebrew documents in our possession must be made our primary source; secondly, these documents must be used critically, that is, they must be arranged in a really historical sequence; and thirdly, the argument from silence is valid.

First, the Hebrew documents in our possession must be our primary source. These documents are much less in extent than we should like to have, but they are sufficient for our purpose. Being distinctly religious in their nature it is not allowable to suppose that they will refuse light on the fundamental question of religion. In making this claim we must not be supposed to undervalue the light which comes from Babylonia, Assyria, or Egypt. Sellin points out afresh the resemblances between the institutions of Israel and those of her neighbors. He shows how the cultus,

the priesthood, the festivals, even special observances like circumcision and the nazirate, are strikingly similar to what we find among the Canaanites, Phoenicians, Syrians, and Babylonians. Social institutions, laws, customs, ethical ideas, are also of the same pattern. In this respect recent discoveries have undoubtedly enabled us to understand Israel better than our fathers understood it. Israel has come out of its isolation and in many respects is seen to form a part of that western Asia in the midst of which it had its home. Wellhausenians have been ready to welcome all this light; but they have hesitated to infer that Israel had nothing of its own to teach us. To argue that because of these similarities Hebrew literature must be understood not from what it says but from what these other nations say seems to them extravagant. To claim that because the history of Holland receives welcome light from the contemporary history of Germany therefore all Dutch literature must be interpreted according to German ideas would expose one to ridicule. No more reasonable seems the claim of the Pan-Babylonians, which underlies the discussions now before us, and which is perhaps as well expressed as anywhere in the following quotation:

Study of the ancient East as a single civilization compels us to estimate the intellectual movements which have taken place on its soil as a unity. Just as Christianity and its ideas were not limited to the soil of Judea, and just as its fundamental ideas developed in other districts, so also monotheism, the fundamental idea which sets Yahwism into opposition to the prevalent oriental view of the universe, *cannot have arisen in Judah alone*, and especially cannot have been fostered here alone. (*KAT*³, p. 208 (italics mine).)

If on this first point the Wellhausenians show a not unreasonable reserve, they may claim concerning the next point—the critical use of the documents—that there is substantial agreement on all hands. The only comment that seems called for is that this agreement is due to Wellhausen himself. For it is his merit that he brought the higher criticism to its present assured results. Without slighting the labors of Vatke, Reuss, Graf, or Kuenen it may fairly be claimed that Wellhausen's brilliant argument first showed the true order of the Old Testament documents in so convincing a light that he has never successfully been contradicted. Wellhausen's *Prolegomena* are in fact the basis on which all our present Old Testament science rests. So completely has his position established itself that the present generation of scholars forgets how much is due to him.

The particular question forced upon us by the books before us then is this: Assuming the Wellhausenian order of the documents, do these documents allow us to think that Moses was a monotheist? To define

monotheism would not seem to be difficult. Monotheism is the belief formulated in the Christian creeds in the words: There is but one only, the living and true God. This is today the recognized faith of Christians, Jews, and Mohammedans. When it first appeared is a historical question to be decided by historical methods. We start with the fact universally acknowledged, that this monotheism had its origin among the Jews. Tradition ascribes it to Moses; but the first duty of the historian is to scrutinize tradition. And, as is universally admitted by critical scholars, this particular tradition is of late date. A fact which stands out prominently is that we have no direct assertion of monotheism from Moses himself. It is significant that when we ask for such an assertion we are put off with such statements as the following:

The documentary evidence shows that there was a *kind* of monotheism in ancient Babylonia and Egypt. This ancient oriental monotheism *differed* indeed *essentially* from the Israelitic; in one case it was speculative, an abstraction from polytheism, in the other it was a thoroughly practical matter; on one side it was calculated only for the educated, on the other it was enforced on all the people; on one side the monotheistic speculation *embraced polytheism within itself*, the one God was the *Summus Deus* as being the totality of the many individual gods, on the other side polytheism was strictly banished and destroyed; one made the one God an astral divinity, a *pantheistic nature-power*, the other made him an ethical personality. Yet on both sides is monotheism. There is, further, a historical connection between oriental and Israelitic monotheism as the Old Testament itself affirms when it brings Abraham into touch with Ur and Haran, Joseph with Heliopolis, and Moses with Egypt and Midian.⁵

We ask for bread and we receive—moonshine. To realize this, one has only to ask what the biblical writers would have thought had they been told that, by bringing Abraham into connection with Ur and Haran, Joseph into connection with Heliopolis, and Moses into connection with Egypt and Midian, they were attesting the derivation of Israel's faith from these various quarters. Even if we concede that Ur, Haran, Heliopolis, and Midian were centers of monotheistic religion we shall not be compelled to derive Moses' monotheism from this source. For the pantheistic monism which is all that is alleged for these sanctuaries differs enormously from what we find enforced in Israel. In Israel monotheism was not so much a theology as a religion. It was not so much concerned to affirm the uniqueness of God as to declare that the worship of any other being was a sin and an absurdity. It is *a priori* probable that a pantheistic conception which in its way affirms the unity of the divine

⁵ Volz, pp. 73 f., summarizing Baentsch. The italics are mine.

has arisen in every nation which has reached a certain stage of civilization. Baentsch quotes a late Babylonian text (already made use of by others) which identifies Marduk with the other divinities of the pantheon: "Ninib is the Marduk of might, Nergal is the Marduk of battle, Bel is the Marduk of kingship, Nebo is the Marduk of business, Sid is Marduk as luminary of the night," and so with others. But how impossible it is even to conceive of a Hebrew text that should declare Baal to be the Yahweh of agriculture, Hadad to be the Yahweh of the storm, Melek to be the Yahweh of royalty. One has only to formulate such a text to see that Hebrew monotheism is something quite different in kind from that which is alleged to have existed in Babylonia. In actual history the pantheistic monism which makes all the gods manifestations of one divine substance offers no opposition to the crassest polytheism (India is an example to the present day) whereas the outstanding feature of Hebrew monotheism is its intolerance of the worship of any but the One.

Whether the Babylonian texts cited in this connection would not bear a very different interpretation from the one given by these scholars is a question into which we do not need to enter. Granting all that is claimed for them, we see that the kind of monotheism claimed for them has no historic or logical connection with the Hebrew religion. This is in fact admitted in the quotation just given and it leaves the way clear for us to examine the Hebrew documents and ascertain from them directly what the course of development has been. For this inquiry we naturally begin with the later documents and work our way backward. If our critical method is sound we ought to arrive at results on which men of all schools can agree. This is not a superfluous remark. Dr. Volz is an example of the confusion which seems to take hold of some minds when they approach this question. He gives us a long discussion of the prepossessions with which men study the Old Testament. He divides investigators into two schools which he characterizes as *religionsgeschichtlich* and *heilsgeschichtlich*. The difference between them he finds in their attitude toward God and revelation. The adherent of one of them

treats religion as a human affair; he looks upon it as the essence of culture. In investigating the religion of Israel he endeavors to set forth everything as human, natural, and in constant connection with the whole culture of the people. It is with him only a last resource when he speaks of God and revelation. In using these as explanations of the religious mystery, of the origin of religion, or of the progressive religious force in Israel he thinks he has overstepped his proper boundaries. But for the *Heilsgeschichtlicher*, God and revelation stand at the beginning of all his investigation. It is to him self-evident and he says so, that

the Old Testament religion when it first appeared was introduced into the world by God (Volz, *Mose*, pp. 4 f.).

The difference in point of view here described is too obvious to need comment. In default of English equivalents for the German titles let us call the two schools the *comparative* and the *theological*. The comparative student approaches the religion of Israel simply as one of the great religions of the world; the theological student approaches it as the preparatory stage of the Christian faith which is to him the chief object of interest. But if the existence of this difference is obvious, it would seem equally obvious to remark that value-judgments ought not to interfere with judgments of fact. To deny this is to surrender the hope of any assured historical science whatever. The Roman Catholic and the Protestant approach the history of the Reformation with very different prepossessions. But so far as they are genuine historians they will not differ in their conclusions on the actual course of history. So in the case before us; the question whether Moses was a monotheist is a question of fact. We may find our evidence insufficient to establish the fact; we may give an affirmative or a negative answer; but if one of us gives one answer and another gives another, one of us must be wrong. And this means that the one who gives the wrong answer has used the wrong historical method.

It is legitimate then to point out that the strength of Wellhausen is precisely in his historical method. That his critical results are almost universally accepted has already been shown. He is equally to be admired for his clear presentation of the history of tradition—this also has never been successfully assailed. The one thing which stands out most clearly after careful study of Wellhausen is the complicated redaction to which the Hebrew sources have been subject and the consequent need of caution in using their data.

It is this fact which the recent assailants of this school have chosen to ignore. One is tempted to think that the men who so loudly demand a change in critical method do not know what Wellhausen's method is. This would doubtless do them an injustice. Yet what shall we think when Dr. Volz repeatedly uses documents of the eighth or ninth century as evidence for the thirteenth? Not only this; he reads into his texts what is not there, strains the interpretation, gives insufficient consideration to details. On this basis he is able to tell us all about Yahweh, the ethical God of the universe who was preached by Moses. The necessity of thus maltreating the sources in order to make them teach what is here set forth condemns the whole argument.

In order rightly to judge the questions in dispute let us now briefly

formulate the results to which we are led by a critical study of the sources. It will be conceded on all hands that in the post-exilic period there was a real monotheistic belief in Israel. Our evidence is the writer whom we know as Deutero-Isaiah. He declares, speaking in the name of Yahweh: "I am the first and I am the last and besides me there is no God." One stage earlier we meet the celebrated declaration of the Deuteronomist: "Yahweh our God is one Yahweh." These we may accept as monotheistic affirmations in our sense of the word. Even the Deuteronomic assertion may be susceptible of another interpretation—its first concern was evidently to enforce the *worship* of the one God on Israel, and it does not affirm the nonentity of the gods of the nations. But we will not insist on this. Let us look at the prophets of the eighth century. Has anyone ever discovered an affirmation of Amos or Hosea to the effect that the gentiles ought to give up the worship of their divinities and devote themselves to Yahweh? This after all is the test of a real monotheism.

Or let us question Elijah and Elisha, jealous as we know them to have been for Yahweh Sabaoth. When Naaman begged a little earth that he might make a Yahweh-sanctuary in Damascus, how easy it would have been for Elisha to instruct him that the whole earth is Yahweh's and that the soil of Damascus is as truly his as the soil of Palestine. But the opportunity passed without improvement. Neither Elijah nor his biographer thought that the woman of Zarephath ought to give up the service of her Baal on the ground that there was no God but Yahweh. These facts are inexplicable except on the theory that neither Elisha nor Elijah nor the men who wrote their lives denied the existence of the heathen gods. Only for Israel there was one legitimate object of devotion, to desert whom was treason. Dr. Volz is obliged to suppose that the originally pure monotheism of Elijah has been obscured by the popular tradition. But the whole tendency of tradition we know to have been to elevate the religious conceptions of its heroes, rather than to bring them to a lower level.

When we examine the earlier narrative sources we find no evidence that Moses uttered anything like our sentence: There is but one only, the living and true God. The utmost that tradition affirms of Moses is that he gave the command to Israel not to have other gods along with Yahweh. How this was understood in the earlier time is seen in the legend which makes Jacob command his household to put away other divinities before going up to the sanctuary at Bethel. That these writers did not think of Yahweh as God of the whole earth is seen further, in their conception of Moses as the minister of the local Yahweh at Kadesh, and if we need other evidence we find it in Cain's complaint that when driven from the

cultivated country he is exiled from the presence of Yahweh, parallel to a saying of David's to the same effect. Add the account of Mesha's sacrifice to Chemosh and that god's consequent wrath against Israel and we are convinced that the common belief in Israel in the tenth century was: *Cujus regio ejus religio*.

It will be objected that the Yahwistic account of the creation assumes that Yahweh is the only God. But this is far from being the case. Acquaintance with the mythologies shows many creator gods who are simply members of the pantheon, sometimes even not prominent members of the pantheon. When this very account makes Yahweh say: "The man has become like one of us," it is difficult to shut our eyes to the fact that the author thought of Yahweh as one of a class of beings all of whom had a right to the name god. And it must be confessed that the anthropomorphic Yahweh who experiments with his creatures, who walks in his garden in the cool of the day, and who has to guard his tree of life lest man take of it, makes the impression of a being far inferior to the one God of heaven and earth for whom Deutero-Isaiah pleads so eloquently.

We are still three hundred years from Moses, and of literature earlier than these narratives we have only fragments. The song of Deborah and the Testament of Jacob tell us only that Yahweh is Israel's God who leads them against the enemy—just as Chemosh leads Moab. We search in vain for an affirmation of Yahweh's uniqueness. And then we recall that the greatest and wisest of Israel's kings built sanctuaries of other gods in the immediate vicinity of the temple. Granted that these were for the convenience of his foreign wives, could not the philosophic king make plain to them that Yahweh was the real God who would accept their devotions and that the others were only stocks and stones? The temple itself had frequently to be cleansed from the worship of other gods, and so far as we know no prophet took occasion to justify this by asserting that these other gods were nothings. That Yahweh would have no other divinity share his own sanctuary seems to be all that anyone claimed. And there is the brazen serpent worshiped from Moses' time till the time of Hezekiah; there are the teraphim in David's house. How could Moses have preached monotheism and these divinities survive?

This then is the Wellhausenian position: No evidence exists that monotheism in our sense of the word was known in Israel in the tenth and eleventh centuries B. C., and of course there is no evidence that it existed in the time of Moses two centuries or more earlier. This conclusion has been reached by a careful historical method. Now comes Professor Sellin and with him Dr. Volz, and they insist that Wellhausen's method is hope-

lessly antiquated and must be thoroughly changed. What we look for from them is the production of evidence. For this we search their books and we are disappointed. We find abundance of other things—edifying disquisitions about the axioms and postulates of different schools of inquirers. But on the main point we find only this significant confession: "A strictly historical source (for the person and work of Moses, that is) does not exist; even a brief notice that can be called historical is not in our possession." (Volz, p. 15.) The meaning is that our belief in the existence of Moses rests on an inference: "We find ourselves *compelled to suppose* a personal originator at the beginning of the ethical religion of Israel, and to meet this demand we take Moses who is presented to us by popular tradition." (*Ibid.*) The most hidebound Wellhausenian may do as much as this. In fact it is just what Wellhausen himself does. How it can be claimed that such an inference must reverse the ordinary methods of historical research does not appear, and it is almost an insult to one's intelligence to have it argued that the assertion of a historical personage at the beginning of Israel's religion is equivalent to: Moses was a monotheist.

No more to the point is it to adduce the evidence of the inscriptions as to the high civilization of Egypt and Babylon. We are told "even the coldest skeptic must admit that Babylonian and Egyptian antiquity had reached a remarkably high grade of culture in every respect and that the national life (*Volksleben*) of Israel was from the beginning imbedded in a greater and more important environment than had been supposed." Granted: the sceptic would be cold indeed who would deny it. But what has it to do with the question of Moses and his monotheism? If it can be shown that a high state of civilization brings with it a practical monotheism like that of Israel let it be shown. The actual evidence however is all the other way. The high civilization of Greece and Rome was in essence polytheistic.

Moreover, we must not lose sight of the fact that the characteristic monolatry of Israel which resulted in monotheism rose in the circles most averse to the higher culture of neighboring nations. The mark of Hebrew monotheism is its exclusiveness, not to say intolerance. Its watchword is: Yahweh is a jealous God, and this watchword took shape in the school of Elijah and Elisha, among the Rechabites who would have no agriculture, no settled habitations, who would drink no wine and eat none of the fruit of the vine. Here if anywhere is to be found the solution of the problem before us. Wellhausen indeed declines to say why Yahweh God of Israel should have become the God of the whole earth rather than Chemosh of

Moab;⁴ and it is apparently this reserve which has roused the wrath of our objectors. Yet Wellhausen goes on to say of the prophets:

The Israelites say that Yahweh wakened them, they are the men of God. They find the revelation of God in these men, and they know no revelation apart from such living organs. Beyond this answer we shall scarcely advance although the divinely favored personality remains a mystery still.

Yahweh had the power which Chemosh had not—the power to impress his followers (chosen ones among them, that is) with his exclusive right to their devotion and so that they were impelled to preach the message: Him only shalt thou serve.

Moses may have been the first in this line of preachers. But this does not prove him to have been a monotheist, as has been abundantly shown. Our authors in their better moments do not seem to claim that it does.

If out of the premosaic period there rise such commanding figures as Hammurabi and Chuenaten then Moses must grow proportionately in our estimation; for Moses, out of whose religious knowledge *monotheism grew*, and whose *tora* finally made morality the common possession of Israel and Judah, must have been a greater than Hammurabi and Chuenaten.

The reader will not have failed to notice how we have shifted our ground. Moses is no longer a monotheist; all that is affirmed is that out of his religious knowledge monotheism grew, and that his *tora* made morality the common possession of Israel and Judah. Elsewhere the author confides to us that he is *inclined to think* "that Moses towered above the period which followed, because this is suggested by the parallel instances of the prophets, of Jesus and of Luther." In other passages monotheism is lost out of sight and nothing more seems to be claimed than that "to Moses Yahweh was an ethical personality." Even this is an inference from the postulate that he *must* have brought his people something *new* and *epoch-making*. In contrast with this we find, however, that Moses had no special originality; for the hard-worked code of Hammurabi is made to increase the probability that Moses gave a code to his people "which code cannot have differed much" from that of the Babylonian monarch. The anticlimax is reached when we are calmly assured: "It is *uncertain* whether the foundation of Israel's religion was laid by *any* historical event whatever, or if so what that event was."⁵

It may be thought that we have devoted too much space to a single pamphlet. But the pamphlet does not stand alone. Its demand for a

⁴ Hinneberg, *Kultur der Gegenwart*, I, p. 15.

⁵ These citations occur on pp. 27, 66, 67, and 88 of Volz's book (*italics mine*).

revision of Old Testament methods is echoed by a number of recent publications. There seems to be widespread confusion of mind as to what historical science is. At the risk of uttering a truism, it seems to be necessary to say that history seeks for actualities; it inquires what actually took place at a given epoch as shown by the evidence in our possession. When a man demands a change in method we look to him for new evidence or for more careful examination of the old. But what we find in the books before us is neither of these but a series of alleged axioms which turn out after all not to be self-evident, of postulates which no one but the author actually postulates, of inferences whose logic is doubtful, and of impressions which are plainly subjective and individual. Not thus will the established critical method be displaced.

It is refreshing to turn from these vagaries to one who, although not an Old Testament specialist, is unusually competent to pronounce on the validity of historical method. This is Felix Stähelin from whom we have an address on Problems of Israelitic History.⁶ This author, after sketching the theories of the Pan-Babylonians, says:

From this quarter the Wellhausenian conception certainly cannot be shaken. The picture of the external history of Israel and the determination and evaluation of the different documents will stand in its main outlines as the present critics—Wellhausen at their head—have drawn it. . . . The discoveries in western Asia have indeed enriched our knowledge of Israel's history and culture in many ways thankfully to be recognized; but they have brought absolutely nothing to light which can shake the main results of Wellhausen's criticism.

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⁶ *Probleme der israelitischen Geschichte*, Basel, 1907.

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

RECENT OLD TESTAMENT LITERATURE

Professor Brown has undertaken to present a concise commentary upon the Book of Jeremiah,¹ scholarly in character and structure, and withal adapted to the needs of the intelligent reader, whether or not he be acquainted with the Hebrew. The book fills in part the place of the German *kurzgefasste Commentare*, a form of biblical literature which, strangely enough, is still sadly lacking in our language. The work differs from its German parallels in being less original, less desirous of striking out into new paths of criticism and exegesis, while much is made, comparatively, of the edifying functions of a biblical commentary.

The book gives in the left-hand column of the page the text of the Authorized Version; on the right, the author's own translation, the metric passages being presented typographically in poetical form, but without any attempt to produce the exact rhythm of the original. The commentary appears below the text. It was hardly necessary to reprint the Authorized Version, inasmuch as it is at everyone's hand, and its omission would have given room either for more material or for a larger display of the author's translation, the type of which is altogether too fine. In the commentary reference is made primarily to the text of the Authorized Version, but as in most of the cases that need comment, that text requires immediate correction, space and patience would have been saved by reference to the fresh translation. These minor criticisms, however, are to be laid at the door of the general plan of the whole series, not at that of Professor Brown.

In the field of criticism the author moves with the spirit of full religious liberty. His apology is expressed in the following words:

From the present point of view, it will be seen that in the use of the terms "genuine" and "not genuine," and in denying to Jeremiah the authorship of parts of our book, the writer must not be understood as questioning the *authority* of a given passage, or its value to the Christian life, although from a literary point of view it must be allowed that Jeremiah's own words are superior to those of the authors that have been associated with him.

Professor Brown appears to have been especially influenced by Duhm in criticism and exegesis. Yet he refuses to go with that master to the

¹ *The Book of Jeremiah*. An American Commentary on the Old Testament. By Charles Rufus Brown, Ph.D. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1907. 257 pages.

length of excising from the Jeremianic material all but the poetical passages. He is not always very positive in his decisions, which rather often appear as a summing-up of the evidence on both sides (e. g., on chaps. 46 ff.), and he inclines to the more conservative position. To be sure, in view of the vast differences of opinion among the recent commentators, such as Giesebrecht, Duhm, Driver (Cornill's commentary appeared after the present work went to press), the book would have exceeded its intended scope, if every critical point were argued out in detail. It may be noticed that the author is inclined to regard the references to the seventy years' captivity (25:12; 29:10) as Jeremianic.

As for the compilation of the Book of Jeremiah, our commentator holds that Jeremiah's edition of 603 B. C. (36:32) consisted substantially of chaps. 1-17, and that the subsequent chapters were added as successive strata, which had appeared independently. Chaps. 18-20, 22-24, 25, which once circulated as separate rolls, were brought together and added to chaps. 1-17, thus forming a new edition; subsequently there were added chaps. 46-51, 30-31, 32-33, 34, 35, 36, 37-39, 40-43, 44, 45. The statement of the construction of the book is clear and reasonable. Baruch is considered to be the author of the historical narratives and prefaces. The commentary is clear and concise, and in general very satisfactory. In all cases of text criticism, the Hebrew original and the author's emendation are given, along with transliteration for the use of the English reader. Critical emendations and interpolated passages are designated in the translation by proper typographical marks. The book is to be welcomed as capitally meeting its purpose and filling a long-felt want. It will be prized by the seminary teacher whose students cannot be referred to the German commentaries, and by the many who desire a brief scholarly, exegetical treatment, with an introduction to the critical problems, but without the confusion that would arise from too radical or individualistic criticism.

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To know a religion scientifically, says Professor Strack,² is a prime requisite for mission work among its adherents. The essence of Judaism is not merely the blood bond, since the nation has absorbed many foreign elements. More important, as a unifying influence, are the recollections of history—the great deeds wrought for their fathers, and the severe persecutions they have endured. While critical views of the Bible vary among

² *Das Wesen des Judentums*. Vortrag gehalten auf der Internationalen Konferenz für Judenmission zu Amsterdam. Von Professor Dr. Herm. L. Strack. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1906. 23 pages. M. o. 30.

Jews, there is a striking uniformity of belief in the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. This must be met by a sane criticism. Most significant is the belief in the future of Judaism. Among most Jews the idea of a personal Messiah is abandoned. Judaism has, however, a world-mission: she has given to the world the idea of monotheism. Strack thinks it passing strange that she makes no attempt to spread abroad this idea, but regards Christianity and Islam as her ambassadors to the heathen in this regard.

Dr. Kaatz has given a study of prophetic Judaism,³ in two parts, of which the first has some twelve sections treating of the general theme, and the second has a treatment of such topics as: providence, anthropomorphism, the divine punishment, the election of Israel, Israel's past, divine judgment, the indestructibility of Israel, the law, fasting, the ark of the covenant, repentance, Israel and Judah, sacrifice. The work is written confessedly for Jews—to strengthen their faith and to show that the Scriptures, as the Word of God, contain the infallible truth. Judaism stands or falls with the absolute truth of the Scriptures. The writer is strenuously opposed to evolution and thinks the choice lies between Moses and Darwin. As strenuously does he contend for the efficacy of prayer and the miraculous. Biblical criticism is severely handled. The customary argument about the inability of the critics to agree, is adduced and we are assured that yet newer theories will replace those which prevail today. The task of the critic must prove abortive since his conclusions are based entirely on subjective grounds. So far the introduction.

Part I treats of the essence of prophetic Judaism. By this he means the characteristic features or the tendency of the religious efficiency of the prophets. The deductions are drawn from the prophets Amos to Malachi—those who have left written testimony of their views. If we knew the earlier prophets as we do the later we should not say that prophecy reached its zenith among the latter.

By prophetic Judaism is not to be understood a Judaism which has dispensed with the law, an "ethical" Judaism, or a reformed Judaism. Prophetic Judaism can be understood only by an appeal to the prophets and to those passages whose meaning is unequivocal. Prophecy must not be regarded as mechanical. We cannot get the meaning of any prophet on a given subject by merely counting his utterances. All the prophets equally condemn idolatry, but all the prophets have not spoken with equal force about it. Malachi has a passage that even seems to commend it.

³ *Das Wesen des prophetischen Judentums. Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis der Propheten.* Von Dr. S. Kaatz, Rabbi in Zabrze. Berlin: Poppelauer, 1907. 109 pages. M. 2.

This was due to the fact that idolatry had disappeared in his day. The prophets have a message for men—for men of their times, and the goal and direction of their message are determined by the spirit of the times. They were neither theologians nor religious philosophers.

The contents of prophetic Judaism agree with that of the Torah, everywhere (Hos. 8:1). Here the author takes issue with Duhm in the claim of the latter that prophets are unconscious of a Mosaic law. A sentence is quoted from Duhm to the effect that the pre-exilic prophets were conscious of an antipathy to the ceremonial law, but attention is called to the fact that Duhm fails to mention among these prophets Jeremiah, because this name would have furnished such a striking refutation of his claim. After having taken issue with Duhm on this point the author cites Malachi, to show how faithful the prophets were to the law. More to the point is a reference to Jeremiah, chap. 34, to prove that the pre-exilic prophets were acquainted with the regulation setting slaves free after six years of service. One does not need to point out, however, that such reference is a long way from settling the question of a written Torah at this time.

Part II applies the principles laid down in the first part to the solution of several themes. It is impossible to unite the teaching of the prophets concerning Providence into a regular scientific system. The fundamental prophetic view of Judaism is the same. God loves the good and rewards it: he hates evil and punishes it. There is no difference of opinion as to what is good and evil. To man is given free choice of action and upon him rests the responsibility for its use. The prophets did not discuss the enigma of man's free will and God's foreknowledge. This lay entirely without the sphere of prophecy.

Strong anthropomorphic expressions, such as Hos. 11:8 f., which speaks of God's affection for Israel in the first part and in the second denies that he is like a man, are to be explained by looking at the purpose of the writer. In the case before us, it is to assure Israel of God's favor. From the presence of such strong anthropomorphisms in Hosea the author argues against the view that they arise out of primitive views of religion—a very incomplete reply I fear. The seeming contradiction in I Sam., chap. 15, where God is said to have repented that he made Saul king, and when asked to forgive Saul replies that he is not a man to repent, is explained on the ground that it is the rejection of Saul that is the irrevocable thing. The author reveals no consciousness of various documents beneath the interesting history of this period.

The doctrine of the indestructibility of Jerusalem, said by Cornill to have originated with Isaiah, is combated on the ground of several passages

which he quotes from Isaiah. Prophetic sympathy for the law is proved by citations from Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel on the Sabbath. The book closes with a short discussion of the favorable manner in which sacrifices were regarded by the prophets Isaiah, Jeremiah, Hosea, Micah, and Malachi.

Semitic scholars will welcome the first of a projected series of pamphlets⁴ written in defense of that view of the ancient civilization called pan-Babylonianism. The theme of the book itself is the ancient East, and the Egyptian religion, and the discussion of this part of the subject is preceded by a score of pages setting forth the general view of the author, to wit, that the oldest civilization is astral. It is a picture of space and time to be read in the starry heavens. The cosmogony or succession of worlds, and the calendar or succession of ages are set forth through the movement of the planets (especially the sun and moon) and the heavenly dial or zodiac.

This new view had its inception in Eduard Stucken's *Astralmythen*, which claimed an astral character for all myths. Winckler's investigations showed that astral mythology was a part of the world-view which proceeded from the home of all astronomy—Babylon—and spread itself over the eastern world. Everything earthly had its counterpart in heaven where was sketched everything that should appear on earth. All sciences and historical processes were therefore astral. In this introduction Jeremias argues earnestly for the diffusion hypothesis of myths and cites many witnesses in its favor.

The discussion then goes on to prove that the world-idea lying at the base of the Egyptian religion is that which has been denominated pan-Babylonianism. It is time, he says, to open the door that leads from Babylon to Egypt and to show that the religious system of Egypt is fundamentally that of Babylon. The appearance of the God in an animal form has nothing to do with totemism in the majority of cases: it is to be explained as an incarnation of the deity, whose animal form is a representation of forms seen in the star groups. Poertner is quoted in support of the claim that Egypt was one of the first nations to entertain the star cult of the East. Eduard Mahler in a discussion sought to show that in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties the signs of the zodiac existed. Heretofore Egyptologists have refused to accept a view of the Egyptian religion which made it dependent on Babylon. The oldest teaching of Egypt is connected with

⁴ *Im Kampfe um den alten Orient*. Wehr- und Streitschriften herausgegeben von Alfred Jeremias und Hugo Winckler. I. Die Panbabylonisten. Der alten Orient und die aegyptische Religion. Von Alfred Jeremias. Mit 6 Abbildungen. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1907. 65 pages. M. o. 80.

the city of On, the Sun city. Nearly all the religious texts bear the stamp of its priesthood and were written or revised there. The primal deep appears in the theology of Egypt. Keb and Nut correspond to Assyrian Apsu and Tiâmat, while Shu corresponds to Mummu and *ruah*. Nut and Keb are separated by Shu which corresponds to the heavens which separates the two halves of the original chaos. Here he is equivalent to Marduk.

The paths of the Egyptian temples in ancient times were protected on either side by statues of animals, as was the case in Babylon. The ritual which expressed honor to the gods on calendar days is suggestive of similar Babylonian ritual. The New Year's celebration of Marduk along the great road Ai-ibur-shabu in a ship is paralleled by the festival of the year god. An inscription which deals with the death and resurrection of Osiris is very similar to the Tammuz festival of the Babylonians. Amon of Thebes is the counterpart of the Marduk of Babylon. Both gladly hear the cries of men. As Marduk fights Tiâmat, so Amon battles with the serpent Apophis. Amon is the Sun god, creator, upholder, and nourisher of life. The pamphlet closes with a discussion of the world of the dead which lies in the West, and describes the judgment scene before Osiris. Throughout reference is made to Erman's work with which the author, of course, takes issue. Any discussion that will help us to understand the relation between these two primitive civilizations will receive a hearty welcome. Jeremias has gone far beyond the suggestion of Hommel, and no doubt his paper will provoke a further discussion of a very interesting theme. It is not to be expected that in so short a book anything like an adequate treatment of the Egyptian religion will be found.

The second pamphlet in the series⁵ is an answer by Winckler to an attack made on his theories by Drs. Gressmann and Küchler, two students of Jensen, who receives some pretty hard blows as the instigator of the attack. It is Jensen who "junge Männer in's Feuer schickt," and who should at least teach his zealous scholars that before a man enters the arena he should have some acquaintance with the facts which he attempts to discuss. The titles of the pamphlets which have aroused Winckler's wrath are *Winckler's Altorientalisches Phantasiebild*, by Gressmann, and *Die Stellung des Propheten Isaia zur Politik seiner Zeit*, by Küchler.

A good deal of feeling is displayed by Winckler—whether just or not need not here be discussed—but while reading the book one has the unpleasant sensation of being present at a family quarrel. The plan of the reply

⁵ *Im Kampfe um den alten Orient*. Wehr- und Streitschriften herausgegeben von Alfred Jeremias und Hugo Winckler. II. Die jüngsten Kämpfer wider den Panbabylonismus. Von Hugo Winckler. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1907. 79 pages. M. 1.

is to quote excerpts from the two writings named above where Winckler is criticized and to answer them. Winckler protests too often that he is unfairly treated, that his works have not been read, and insists, perhaps too frequently, on the vast amount of time he has given to the study of the oriental question, a fact which he seems to think ought to exempt him from criticism, at least from mere schoolboys.

The dispute with Gressmann is not long protracted and concerns principally the question of the presence of astrological matter in the religion of Israel. With Kùchler, however, he at once joins issue on the question of Isaiah's relation to the politics of his time, and holds, as it seems to me correctly, that no matter how religious Isaiah's work was, we cannot escape admitting its political bearing. Kùchler says in the objectionable passage: "The thesis of Winckler, that Isaiah got his inspiration from Nineveh, is wholly untenable. I am convinced that Isaiah held no positive relation to politics, but on the contrary held himself aloof and dealt with the religious situation of his people, not from a political but from a religious point of view." Winckler in reply takes exception to the phrase "inspiration from Nineveh," a phrase which he disclaims, and holds that all prophetic work was both religious and political; the occasion may have come from Nineveh while the inspiration in a theological sense was from God.

On the burning question of Mušri, Kùchler admits that perhaps one might confess to the existence of a Mušri in North Syria, which has been confused in the Old Testament with Egypt (II Kings 7:6), but a southern Mušri can exist only in the imagination of the scholar. The passage from which Winckler sets out to prove a North Arabian Mušri is from Tiglathpileser III, where he speaks of appointing an Arab Idi-bi'ul as *kepu* of Mušri. It is impossible to think of Tiglathpileser appointing as an Assyrian officer in Egypt an Arab, especially when he is not in possession of Egypt. Further, Kùchler is ignorant of the meaning of *kepu*. It signifies an officer appointed by the Assyrian king in a conquered country to be responsible for his vassals.

Again, since Mušri is on the border of Meluhha it is difficult to think of it as meaning Egypt. Since 1889 when Winckler first discussed the question, Meluhha is admitted by all scholars to be the Sinaitic peninsula and surrounding territory—in the wider sense West Arabia. No one now identifies Meluhha with Nubia, yet Kùchler returns to the old theory because of the expression "schwarze meluhhaer." This Winckler shows occurs in connection with Kùš, which must mean an Arabian Kùš. Communication between Arabia and Africa accounts for the presence of dark-skinned people in Meluhha. Further, a passage from Gudea speaks of Magan, Meluhha, Gubi, and Dilmun together as places having brought wood in ships to Lagash. Nubia is impossible here.

Winckler holds that *mlk jrb* is to be translated king of Jareb. To this Kùchler objects: (1) That the parallelism of the passage demands that Jareb correspond to the Assyrian king; (2) that we know of no kingdom of Jareb; (3) that in Hos. 10:6 it is impossible to think of anyone except the king of Assyria. Winckler replies, (1) the Massoretic text of Hos. 10:6 intends king of Jareb, otherwise it would read *el ha-melek Jareb*; (2) the parallelism of Hos. 5:13, "Ephraim goes to Assyria, And he (Israel or Judah) sent to the king of Jareb," supports his theory; (3) in the passage, Hos. 10:6, King Jareb is an interpolation. We are also cited to the passage in I Sam. 15:5, where the text is amended by the omission of a *waw* to read, "Saul came to the town of Amalek, Jareb."

In a little brochure Peisker discusses the extent of the relations of Jahweh to the non-Israelites.⁶ Starting from a statement of Stade, that Israelites were theoretical polytheists, that is, that they believed in the existence of the foreign gods, he attempts a proof of the theory by citations. The appeal made by the king of Moab when he offered up his son upon the walls was effective against Israel, because they believed that Chemosh had actually responded to the appeal. (See II Kings 3:27.)

In the second chapter of Genesis Jahweh is creator of heaven and earth and therefore of heathen lands, so we must have in this place a higher view of the nature of Jahweh. He is also creator of the first pair from whom were derived all the families of the earth. Consequently he is their lord. Here we have a higher view of Jahweh than in the first passage. From such passages as Gen. 9:25 ff., and 27:39 f., where Jahweh curses Canaan and blesses Japheth, we infer that he is enthroned in the heaven and that his arm reaches alike the Israelite and the heathen. This objective lordship cannot be doubted, though it may be explained as the result of later theological development. Other passages declare that Jahweh is subjective lord of the heathen—that is, he is worshiped by them. See I Kings, chap. 17, where the widow of Zarepta speaks of Jahweh as if there were no other God. This may be explained as due to the naïveté of the writer, or the reflected monotheism of the Deuteronomic editor. In Gen., chap. 41, Pharaoh and Joseph are worshipers of the same God. So Abimelech (Gen., chap. 20) receives his dream from the God of Abraham. In a Jahvistic passage Joseph cries out, when tempted, "How shall I sin against Elôhîm?" (Gen. 39:9; cf. 43:29). Does the author here use a neutral

⁶ *Die Beziehungen der Nichtisraeliten zu Jahve nach der Anschauung der altisraelitischen Quellenschriften.* Von Lic. Dr. Martin Peisker. [Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, XII.] Giessen: Töpelmann, 1907. 95 pages. M. 2.50.

word? Not so. In Gen. 31:53 we read of the *elôhîm* of Abraham and the *elôhîm* of Nahor. This is naïve monotheism and in places where Jahweh is found instead of *elôhîm* we may think of editing.

Part two discusses the content of the relations between Jahweh and the non-Israelites, whether of a direct or indirect character. In the former class belong Jahweh's creative activities and his immediate control of the course of history. The latter grow out of the relationships between Israel and non-Israelites. Non-Israelites are helped by Israel; they sometimes are of assistance to Israel. Hence when they injure Israel unintentionally they are not punished. Pious non-Israelites, coming under the protection of Israel, may not be injured.

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The third volume of the *Hilfsbücher zur Kunde des alten Orients*⁷ gives the essentials of Assyrian grammar in the briefest possible space. Such a book has long been needed by the beginner of Assyrian. The choice and arrangement of the material for a book of this kind is always a difficult matter, and it is easier to offer criticisms than to suggest remedies.

The introduction gives a brief sketch of the history of the language and its relation to the other Semitic tongues, followed by an account of the origin of the cuneiform script. The author still holds the improbable theory that the Semitic Babylonians, on entering the Tigris-Euphrates valley, found there a non-Semitic people, the Sumerians, who had already reached a high stage of culture and had developed the script later taken over by these Babylonians. That the Sumerians invented the cuneiform script is probable; the rest of the theory is highly improbable.

The remainder of the book is taken up with a section on phonology, and another on etymology, interspersed with remarks on syntax. The quantity of the vowels is carefully given; in fact, some vowels are incorrectly marked long. For instance, it is improbable from the side of phonetics that the *a* in the enclitic *ma* is long, and there is nothing in the literature to prove it. In the same way, some of the rules of accent given in § 25 are quite arbitrary.

The verb is fully treated. There is, however, no excuse whatever for choosing new verbs for the paradigms. The paradigms of Delitzsch's *Grammar* are and should be the standard. In the paragraph given to the verbs *nadânu* and *nazâzu*, *ulziz* for *uŝziz* is not noted.

The syntax is inadequately treated. Assyrian grammar has advanced

⁷ *Kurzegefasste Assyrische Grammatik*. Von Bruno Meissner. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1907. v+80 pages. M. 3.50.

beyond the stage where it is possible to disregard the force of the present, preterite, or permansive forms of the verb. A careful study of such a text as Nebuchadrezzar's *East India House Inscription* would have removed the doubt expressed in § 51 as to whether the permansive can be used like the present in circumstantial clauses.

For completeness a "Lesestücke" should follow.

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Professor Kent's latest addition to "The Student's Old Testament" series⁸ presents all the legal material of the Old Testament classified according to the various codes and arranged on a scheme suggested by Ex., chaps. 21ff. The divisions are: (1) personal and family laws; (2) criminal laws; (3) humane laws; (4) religious laws, defining obligations to God; and (5) ceremonial laws. The citation of the laws, which are explained by copious footnotes excellently adapted to the needs of students, is preceded by six essays on the Babylonian background of Israel's laws, the origin and growth of Israelitish law, the primitive Hebrew codes, the Deuteronomic codes, Ezekiel and the Holiness code, and the Priestly codes. In addition to this there is an index of biblical passages, several useful charts and diagrams, and a valuable appendix.

While the present volume is by no means the only attempt to deal with the laws of Israel, being preceded by some four or five comparisons of the Mosaic with Hammurabi Code—notably that of Müller—yet it has the unique distinction of presenting the material classified and in chronological order. It is not to be wondered at that there has been little interest shown in the Mosaic legislation by persons who believed that Exodus and Deuteronomy were the product of one period, not to say one man. With this book the study of Israel's laws takes a new form and one of exceeding interest. The light that is thrown on every sphere of life among the Hebrews is wonderful. The student can trace the development of the family and the growth of what we call society and the increasing complexity of economic problems. At the expense of some repetition the material has been put in most convenient form. The chief merit of the book is not that it makes new additions to knowledge, but that it presents the material in such orderly arrangement that others can use it as a field for original research.

The discovery by Bertheau in 1840 that there was an original decadal arrangement in the primitive codes and the later subdivision of the decads

⁸ *Israel's Laws and Legal Precedents: From the days of Moses to the closing of the Legal Canon.* ("The Student's Old Testament.") By Charles F. Kent. New York: Scribners, 1907. 301 pages. \$2.75.

into pentads has aided much in the restoration of the true order. The explanation of the pentad arrangement of laws as originating in the childhood of the race, when the fingers were used as an aid to memory, is interesting, but the requirement that all laws on a certain subject should number five or ten, and especially that the moral law should fall into this arrangement, while undoubtedly quite in harmony with the Hebrew mind, introduces a mechanical element which does not favor the theory of prophetic origin.

The treatment of the Decalogue of Ex., chap. 20, which is naturally the center of interest, is the least satisfactory part of the work. It is doubtless encompassed with difficulties, the solution of which seems to Professor Kent to be hopeless. From a mathematical standpoint it may be so, but there are considerations which render the current theory that the present setting is to be referred to the eighth century and the simplest form to Moses altogether too improbable. In the first place everyone is familiar with the position of the "Commandments" in the time of Christ. The word has but one sense and everyone knows it. The binding force of the "Commandments" is unique and it has persisted to the present day. That this should be the case, and that there should be no recognition of this authority in the Old Testament with the possible exception of the latest apocryphal books, is something which must be well explained before it can be supposed that the Decalogue was set forth, with the prestige of its present position, in the eighth century. It may be said that the only "argument" for the traditional view of the Decalogue is the fear of the consequences of relinquishing it. Again the ignorance shown in the Old Testament of any authoritative ethical law is an argument which grows on a student in proportion as he rids himself of his prejudices. That David should have committed murder and adultery and been rebuked by Nathan for meanness is hard to reconcile with any Mosaic authorship. When, in the eighth century, the prophets were so powerfully impressed by the incidents of the Exodus, what is the reason they are silent about the tremendous theophany and the moral law? Again the "visiting sins" is directly contrary to the mind of Deuteronomy, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel. The conclusion which fits best with the facts is that the Decalogue of Ex., chap. 20, represents a slow crystallization of moral ideas, which a late post-exilic editor, desiring to give it the prestige of a divine revelation, placed in its present position, displacing an original Ephraimitic ten words, corresponding to Ex., chap. 34, and concealing them in the three chapters following Ex. 20: 18.

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The first chapters of Genesis have been discussed for many years, but the last word has not yet been said on them and there is still room for a thorough scientific investigation of their character. Such an investigation is given us by Professor Gordon in his *Early Traditions of Genesis*.⁹ This book cannot be praised too highly for its scientific method and its thoroughness. It is written with full mastery of the earlier literature and brings many new and valuable suggestions to the solution of the problems. It may unhesitatingly be recommended as the best book in English on the subject, and it is doubtful whether there is a better treatise in any other language. Through such monographs as this, that discuss a limited theme thoroughly, critical science is more advanced than by more ambitious works that cover a wider field in a superficial manner.

The author begins with an analysis of the documents in the first eleven chapters of Genesis. Following earlier critics he distinguishes, first, the elements drawn from the Priestly Code (P). Here the agreement of scholars is so complete that there is no need for an extended discussion. This material constitutes a "complete, clear and close-knit context." The residuum that belongs to the Jahvistic narrative, on the other hand, is highly complex. Most easily discriminated is the Flood Story and kindred sections in 4:25, 26; 6:5-8; 7:1-5, 10, 7-9, 16c, 12, 17b, 22 f.; 8:6a, 2 f., 6b, 7-13b, 20-22; 9:18 f.; 10:1b, 17-18a, 19, 18b, 21, 25-30, which since Budde's discussion have been regarded as a later element intruded into J and commonly known as J². The material that is left after the subtraction of J² is distinguished from J² by speaking of "the man" instead of Adam ("man" used as a proper name without the article), and by the fact that it assumes the steady development of the arts and industries from the earliest down to the latest times without the interruption of the Deluge. This older stratum of J is also composite. It consists of an original nucleus found in 2:4b-7, 9a, 18-24; 4:1, 17-24. "In these verses, then, we have a clear and consistent account of the making of the world, and the beginnings of civilization from the desert point of view" (p. 7). "On this hypothesis the author of the main body of J had before him an earlier narrative of the making of the world and man, and the origins of civilization, from the desert point of view, round which as a nucleus he gathered his other materials, giving them what seemed to him the most suitable position in the system. Thus, as we have seen, the story of Eden found its appropriate setting in the account of the Creation (2:4b ff.). On the same principle, the most natural place for the introduction of the tragedy of Cain and Abel was

⁹ *The Early Traditions of Genesis*. By Alex. R. Gordon, D. Litt. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribners, 1907. xii + 346 pages. \$2.25

after 4:1, which told of the birth of Cain, the firstborn son of "the man," (pp. 11f.). The different strata obtained by the process of critical analysis are exhibited in detail with notes in an appendix. Here it would have been helpful if the layers of tradition within J had been discriminated by the use of different types.

In the second chapter Professor Gordon discusses the age and relations of the documents discovered by the foregoing processes of literary criticism. "The most probable date (for the original nucleus of J) would seem to be the reign of Solomon, to which we may plausibly ascribe the first collections of Israelite song and tradition found in the *Book of Jashar* and the *Book of the Wars of Jahveh*" (p. 22). "In J the Palestinian coloring of 4:22 f. and 9:20 ff. presupposes the settlement of Israel in the land of Canaan. . . . More exact indications are not found in the chapters immediately under review. We must content ourselves, therefore, with a bare reference to the facts noted by scholars: the inclusion in J of a list of kings of Edom "before there reigned any king over the children of Israel" (Gen. 36:31 ff.), with more doubtful suggestions (Gen. 27:40; Josh. 6:26), pointing to a date later than the early monarchy, but in any case earlier than Deuteronomy, whose historical narratives are based on J and E, and earlier, too, than the first literary prophets, who show unmistakable acquaintance with the Jahvistic traditions, and most probably with the written narrative . . . in other words, to the generally accepted date—*circa* 850 B. C., or very shortly after" (p. 22). "J² is well acquainted with the chief cities of Babylonia and Assyria, and shows likewise a far more detailed knowledge of their traditions and myths than the earlier Jahvist. This widening of the field of knowledge we can only explain by the supposition that in the interval the Assyrian Empire had crossed the horizon of Israel. This would carry us to the beginning of the reign of Menahem, king of Israel (*ca.* 745), when Tiglathpileser III first interfered in the affairs of the Western kingdom. But, if the narrative be Judean, as is most probable, we should find the date somewhat after 735-734, when Ahaz, king of Judah, purchased the help of Tiglathpileser against the allied armies of Israel and Syria in the Syro-Ephraimitic war, in consequence of which the Assyrian king threw his forces against Damascus and Israel, and Ahaz became his vassal" (p. 23). P, in the list of names in Gen., chap. 10, shows evidence of its post-exilic origin. "The mention of Gomer among the 'sons of Japhet' necessitates a date later than 667 B. C., when the Gimirrai first came into contact with the Assyrian power. . . . Other names in the list lead to the same point: e.g., Javan, with his 'sons' (10:4), presupposing the Ionian colonization of Asia Minor and the Mediterranean coasts during the sixth

and fifth centuries B. C." (p. 25). P shows dependence upon J throughout, and also uses an earlier document which he cites as the "Book of the Generations of Adam" in 5:1 (p. 31).

Having thus investigated the literary analysis and the dating of the constituent parts, the author proceeds to the more difficult problem of the oral sources of the early traditions on which the Hebrew documents have been based. In the light of Israel's historical origin he recognizes that these traditions must come from a variety of sources. Traditions learned in the desert, traditions borrowed from the Kenites and Canaanites, and traditions derived from Babylonia, must be woven together in the complex tissue of folk-lore that underlies the early chapters of Genesis. Some of the traditions bear such clear marks of their origin that they can easily be assigned to one or other of these classes; others are more doubtful. After a searching examination of the material the conclusion is reached that the stories in Gen., chaps. 1-11, are derived from the following oral sources: I. Traditions purely Israelite: (1) Reminiscences of their wanderings in the East: the scenic coloring of Paradise (2:8 ff.), the dispersal from Babel (11:8 ff.), the descent from Arpachshad (10:24), the Mesopotamian line (11:14 ff.), and the migrations of Abram (11:28 ff.). (2) Palestinian traditions: Noah and his sons (9:20 ff.), Cain and Abel (4:2 ff.). II. Traditions introduced by the Kenite allies of Israel: the origin of the world (2:5 ff.), the line of aboriginal patriarchs (4:1, 17 ff.), and the beginnings of civilization (4:20 ff.). III. Traditions derived from the Canaanites: the *amours* of the angels (6:1-4). IV. Traditions transmitted from the Babylonians: (1) Through Canaanite influence in the earlier period: the raw materials of the narratives of Paradise and the Fall (chaps. 2, 3), and the Tower of Babel (11:1 ff.); (2) Directly, about the reign of Ahaz: the Flood story of J², a general acquaintance with ten antediluvian patriarchs (4:25 ff.), and knowledge of Babylonian and Assyrian geography and legends (2:10 ff.; 10:8 ff.); (3) Again directly, during the Exile: P's more minute acquaintance with these traditions, as shown in his account of Creation (chap. 1), his elaborate line of patriarchs (chap. 5), and his story of the Flood (chaps. 6-9).

One might be disposed to question some of the details of this analysis, for instance, the assignment of the story of the dispersal from Babel to a Hebrew source, and some of the discriminations between Hebrew and Kenite tradition, still this chapter is a fine piece of work, and is a real contribution to the study of the origins of ancient Hebrew tradition. This is a field in which Old Testament criticism has made little more than a beginning, and the investigations of this volume will do much toward

clarifying thought and stimulating further research. As a protest against current German Pan-Babylonianism, which traces everything in Hebrew tradition to a Babylonian root, this study is timely. Although Professor Gordon recognizes that the sources of Hebrew tradition are manifold, he does not minimize the extent of Babylonian influence. This he does not limit to any one period, but holds that it was exerted at intervals throughout the whole history of the Hebrews, from the time of their residence in Ur of the Chaldees down to the period of the Babylonian captivity.

He then takes up the important but often neglected question of the religious significance of these ancient traditions. Under the heads of "Myth and Legend," "Israel's Conception of God," "The Cosmogonies," "The Nature and Destiny of Man," he points out in an admirable manner how in early times myth and legend have always been the bearers of the highest religious ideas. He shows how the idea of God in Israel was distinguished from the idea in all other ancient races by his unity; by his supremacy over nature as a free Personality, self-existent and self-sufficient, who acts and works according to his own sovereign will; by the names that are given him and the meaning attached to them; by the limits placed upon anthropomorphism, by the prominence given to the ethical element in his character, and by the thought of his love and care for men. Through this new conception of God ancient materials derived from the most heterogeneous sources have been purified and elevated until they have become a worthy vehicle for conveying the message of the earlier Hebrew prophets. These myths cannot be treated either as history or as science, in the modern sense of the word, and it is futile to try to reconcile the cosmology which they presuppose with the conclusions of astronomy or geology; nevertheless, this does not impair their profound and enduring religious and moral value. No recent writer has succeeded so well in showing how the keenest literary and historical criticism leaves unimpaired the religious value of the opening chapters of Genesis. People whose faith has been disturbed by modern critical research will doubtless find this volume very helpful.

The eighth chapter is devoted to the historical traditions of the Hebrews, that is, to the traditions which comprise the latter part of the Book of Genesis from the twelfth chapter onward. This is the least satisfactory portion of the work. Although the author has recognized four main oral sources of the primeval traditions in the first eleven chapters of Genesis, he here recognizes only one source, the national tradition of the Hebrews. All the heterogeneous and frequently contradictory statements of the patriarchal stories are interpreted as reminiscences of the migrations of the forefathers of Israel in the East and in Canaan. When one tradition says that they came

from Haran and another from Ur, this is interpreted in the old-fashioned harmonistic manner, that they were first in Ur and then in Haran. That all these traditions are derived from one source is very improbable. Israel of the period of the kings, when these legends first took literary form, was a composite people made up out of the Hebrews that had come in across the Jordan and the Canaanites who were indigenous in the land. The early historical records all agree that the Canaanites were not exterminated, but that they mingled with the Hebrews, and that they left a deep impress upon their civilization and their religion. It is inconceivable, therefore, that the Canaanites should not have contributed stories of their forefathers and origins, to the common fund of tradition of the united people. That this actually occurred is shown by the curious duplication of traditions that runs through the whole later part of Genesis. One tradition puts the patriarchs back in the time of Hammurabi (*ca.* 2250 B. C.), the other regards them as part of the Aramaean migration, that did not enter Palestine before 1400 B. C. One places them in the desert; the other, in the land of Canaan. One brings them from Haran in Mesopotamia; the other, from Ur in Babylonia. Most of the patriarchs have a double set of names, e.g., Abraham and Abram, Jacob and Israel, Esau and Edom, which points to a fusing of two cycles of tradition. When we add to this the discovery of Jacob and Joseph as place-names in Palestine in the lists of Thothmes III, and remember how many Babylonian traditions came to Israel by way of the Canaanites, it becomes clear that many of the patriarchal traditions in Genesis must be of Canaanite origin. They have been fused with the genuine Hebrew traditions just as closely as Canaanite and Hebrew elements have been fused in the first eleven chapters of Genesis, and the disentangling of the elements is just as much a necessity in one case as in the other. It is also hard to see why Babylonian traditions should cease with the eleventh chapter. Professor Gordon has not reckoned sufficiently with the probability that interwoven with Hebrew and Canaanite elements there are also Babylonian stories in the latter part of Genesis.

The last chapter is devoted to an admirable sketch of ancient social and religious institutions as depicted in the early narratives of Genesis. Elaborate appendices contain the analysis of the documents, a philological commentary upon them, and also translations of the more important Babylonian parallels.

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AN IMPORTANT ARCHAEOLOGICAL WORK

The keenness with which excavations have been undertaken in Palestine during the last ten years makes Father Vincent's¹ detailed and synthetic record—the first of its kind—a valuable and welcome contribution to biblical research. The earlier labors of Flinders Petrie and F. J. Bliss at Tell el-Hesi (Lachish), of Bliss and Macalister in the Shephelah (including Tell es-Safi, perhaps Gath), of Macalister at Gezer, Ernst Sellin at Taanach, and of G. Schumacher at Tell el-Mutesellim (Megiddo) have brought an accumulation of archaeological evidence, the significance and lasting value of which could scarcely be appreciated until the whole had been re-examined and grouped by an expert hand. The ability of Father Hugues Vincent of the Frères Prêcheurs to perform this task is undeniable. His extensive knowledge of archaeological data is seen in his unceasing range for illustrative material from Elam and Susa to Carthage, from Asia Minor, Greece, Crete, and Cyprus to Egypt; he has, in addition, an admirable sobriety of judgment—the highest qualification in research of this kind—and he exercises a wise reserve in the treatment of questions which are the subject of controversy and debate. It is a distinct advantage also, that he has a first-hand acquaintance with the actual conditions of life in the land with which he is dealing, and he is fortunate in possessing among his colleagues specialists in studies upon which archaeological research is necessarily dependent. In a word, it would not be easy to find a writer more fitted for the work; it would perhaps be impossible to obtain a more successful result considering the various difficulties with which the author has had to contend.

A brief introduction (pp. 1–22) describes the history of the excavations, and explains archaeological methods and the stratification of ruins. To avoid overloading the work the author has set for his lower limit the close of the Jewish period in the fifth century (i. e., before the Seleucid Age), and has reserved for a future occasion the excavations at Jerusalem, which have chiefly topographical importance. The first chapter deals at length with the ancient sites: their situation, fortification, materials, private houses, etc. Chaps. ii–iv (pp. 90–284) discuss in detail the evidence relating to places of worship, idols, objects of cult, religious practices, burial customs and beliefs, etc. The treatment of ceramics (chap. v, pp. 297–360) is technically the most important section in the book, since, apart from the intrinsic interest of Palestinian pottery, Petrie's demonstra-

¹ *Canaan d'après l'exploration récente*. Par Père Hugues Vincent, professor of biblical archaeology at Saint-Etienne, Jerusalem. Paris: Lecoffre, 1907. 488 pages. Fr. 15.

tion of its value in determining the relative dates of the various strata has been proved by subsequent research to be substantially correct. A chapter on prehistoric archaeology provides a careful summary of the geological formation of Palestine and reviews the evidence for paleolithic and neolithic man. This is continued in the concluding essay (pp. 427 ff.) where Vincent sketches the early history of Canaan in the light of archaeology and the monuments from the age when the neolithic inhabitants were overrun by the Semites to the time when the Israelites appear in complete possession of the land.

The book is a solid piece of reading, full of the most valuable information, simplified by useful summaries which enable the student to follow the trend of the evidence, and elucidated by eleven plates and three hundred and ten well-chosen illustrations. One could wish, however, that cross-references had been more liberally introduced. The book does not of course claim to be either complete or final. Schumacher's brief reports will have to be superseded by the promised memoir on Megiddo, the excavation of Gezer is still in hand, and fresh sites are being or are to be opened. On the other hand, it is only necessary to compare Vincent's book with the works of Perrot and Chipiez, Babelon, Benzinger, or Nowack to realize the very great advance which Palestinian archaeology has made in the last few years; and Father Vincent repeatedly warns the reader that future research may solve or at least illuminate this or that problem, and recognizes that many questions concern the historian or student of comparative religion rather than the archaeologist. One cannot appreciate too highly his careful distinction between material remains and the precise interpretation which is to be placed upon them; much confusion has been caused in the past by arrogant claims made in behalf of archaeology, and the unsuspecting reader has often assumed that the construction which writers have placed upon archaeological discoveries was as real and objective as the precious "finds" themselves. Father Vincent, however, has not failed to realize the limitations of our present-day knowledge, and it can safely be said that the future will not nullify the conclusions that are based upon his comprehensive survey of the available evidence.

As the land in which the Old Testament took shape continues to reveal its secrets, the history of the past, which its writers have left us, reappears in a new light. From a number of independent data (cuneiform tablets, scarabs, pottery, etc.) it is possible to distinguish certain characteristic archaeological periods. There is the period marked by cuneiform tablets of the Amarna age (fifteenth to the fourteenth century, B. C.) and by Aegean pottery-types. It is preceded by an indigenous culture which admits of being

subdivided into pre-Semitic and Semitic ages. Subsequently, however, the Aegean pottery disappears and Cypriote and early and late Greek ware carry us down by successive stages to the Seleucidan era. By a careful comparison of types and strata—the evidence as in literary criticism is cumulative—the archaeologist arrives at conclusions which are approximately correct, leaving it for more complete evidence to simplify the problems which remain. There are, in fact, many complex questions which arise from a consideration of the various spheres of external influence (e. g., the too exclusive use of “Aegean”); but they are mainly technical, and there is no reason to suppose that the future will do other than confirm the very gradual development of earlier features which excavators have been unanimous in recognizing (see pp. 18 ff.).

Should one hesitate between conflicting views of the character of the Israelite immigration, it will be found that the excavations speak with no ambiguous voice, and the conclusions which Sellin was able to draw from his labors at Taanach continue to be completely substantiated.² The evidence shows no sudden movement progressive or retrograde in the history of the pottery (p. 345); the sepulchers reveal no sensible innovations (p. 225); the high places still flourish (p. 151); objects of heathen cult persist (pp. 161 ff.), and even foundation-sacrifice is not unknown in the latter part of the monarchy (pp. 199 ff.). There is, in general, only a gradual evolution without any trace of the interruption which would necessarily have been produced had there been a violent substitution of Israelites in the place of the exterminated Canaanites (p. 464); this evolution “est la plus directe confirmation que pouvaient apporter les fouilles au schéma historique de la conquête tel qu'on peut le tracer d'après la Bible” (*ibid.*; also pp. 204, 461, note 3).

Father Vincent does not write as an Old Testament critic; he has confined himself to the archaeology; he has collected and discussed the facts; he has left it for others to determine their bearing upon the critical study of the Old Testament. And the evidence has made it ever more unmistakable that it is the work of *scientific* research, not to trace the religion and history of Israel within the chronological limits of the Sacred Writings, but to view these records in the light of all external knowledge. All critical study of the Old Testament—as distinct from the injudicious or indiscriminate selection of heterogeneous data—will henceforth be obliged to consider the

² See his *Tell Ta'annek* (1904), p. 102, and his *Ertrag der Ausgrabungen im Orient j. d. Erkenntnis d. Entwicklung d. Religion Israels* (1905), pp. 33 ff. One may note also Macalister's remarks, *Quarterly Statement of the Palestine Exploration Fund* (1904), p. 123; and *ibid.* (1907), p. 203; George Adam Smith, *ibid.* (1905), pp. 287 ff.

evidence which has now been made readily accessible for the first time, and two features in particular merit careful study. First, archaeology has quite independently proved that there was a development in Israelite religion—the appeal has often been made to archaeology; its verdict could scarcely be more explicit. But it is clear that the reconstructions, that is to say, the attempts which have been made to sketch the development historically from the Mosaic to the post-exilic age, are not final, and a re-examination of the problem seems necessary. Secondly, it is undoubtedly useful in a text-book such as Vincent's to bring the archaeological evidence into touch with biblical history, and especially with that period where the Israelites appear upon the scene. But it is the work of historical criticism to investigate the traditions which prevailed among the Israelites themselves regarding their origin and the two distinct bodies of evidence (material remains and written traditions) must be surveyed critically and independently. Through a failure to observe this principle it has been found necessary in the past to adjust or modify certain conclusions which arose from the very natural inclination to bring archaeological results into line with the biblical traditions as they stand. From the archaeological standpoint alone it is doubtful whether it is justifiable to distinguish a "Canaanite" from an "early Israelite" period. No radical differences seem to sever the culture of the Amarna period from that of several centuries later, and the problem of the growth of Israel's culture, religion, and historical traditions cannot ultimately be separated from the more comprehensive problem of the general history of ancient Palestine itself.

There are many interesting questions of detail upon which I have no space to enter—questions which concern both the lay reader and the professed student. However, those who are opposed to modern criticism will scarcely fail to see that the inquiry into the origin of the Old Testament is necessitated by external evidence alone, while others will perceive that the study grows more intricate and the preparation for specialist research becomes more arduous as our horizon is widened from time to time by fresh discoveries. The admirable picture of the Palestinian background which Father Hugues Vincent has drawn is one which every serious student should assimilate, and one may venture to express the conviction that his volume will have a profound effect upon future research in directing attention to the important factors which have influenced Israel's career.

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RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO NEW TESTAMENT STUDY

The origin and character of the Sadducees has been investigated anew by Lic. Dr. Gustav Hölscher.¹ His conclusion is that the Sadducees were not such a distinct and compact entity as is commonly supposed. The name is rather a contemptuous designation for a tendency, manifested in the period of the Roman dominion in Palestine on the part of some Jews, to follow after foreign law, culture, and customs, to the neglect or disregard of their own ancestral law and religion. This class was not composed, as Abraham Geiger concluded,² and as many following him have assumed, mainly of the priestly nobility of Jerusalem, but included the rich and distinguished of various classes, proprietors, merchants, military and customs officials, and the group of the priestly class descended from Simon ben Boethus. The Sadducees were not thus a philosophical school, a religious brotherhood, a political party, or indeed a closed group. They were simply those whose official, political, or property interests led them to desire the maintenance of the existing order and inclined them to be well disposed to the ideals and civilization of their rulers. To express their abhorrence of this godless and unpatriotic attitude the Pharisees borrow a name from an earlier age, the Syrian, under Antiochus Epiphanes, when a like disposition had manifested itself. The descendants of Zadok then filled the high-priestly office and their name came to stand for the Hellenism that provoked the Maccabean revolt. Accordingly it could later be appropriately used to brand with ignominy the new manifestation of the same spirit. The foregoing conclusion of Hölscher is reached after a critical examination (hence the sub-title of his book) of the three sources available for the history in question, Josephus, the New Testament, and Talmudic literature. He finds running through each of these a double tradition, an older reliable account appearing in Josephus' *Bellum*, in Mark, and in the *Mischna*, and a later unhistorical one in *Antiquities*, Acts, and later Talmudic literature. This latter tradition makes all the high-priests after the year 59 B. C. godless and therefore Sadducean, whereas the former true account attests this tendency only for the members of the house of Boethus who served as high-priests under Herod and Archelaus. All notices of Josephus as to the Sadduceeism of the late Hasmoneans are untrustworthy,

¹ *Der Sadduzäismus: Eine kritische Untersuchung zur späteren jüdischen Religionsgeschichte.* Von Lic. Dr. Gustav Hölscher, Privat-docent an der Universität Halle. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1906. 116 pages. M. 1.40.

² Urschrift und Übersetzungen der Bibel, 1857, pp. 101-58; and "Sadduzäer und Pharisäer," in *Jüdische Zeitschrift*, Bd. II, 1863, pp. 11-54.

representing as they do simply the Pharisaic judgment of Josephus' age regarding these older rulers.

Hölscher's main theses can be ranged under three heads: (1) that the Sadducees did not consist mainly of the priestly nobility of Jerusalem; (2) that they did not constitute a party in any real sense; and (3) that the tendency referred to by this name was confined to two brief periods of history. The first of these may be regarded as the most important and as the one that the author most successfully defends. As for the second, it still remains true that sheer force of circumstances would make of the Sadducees virtually a party, and our sources can hardly be altogether wrong in representing them as acting and feeling themselves as such. Regarding the last it may be said that existing evidence does not warrant such complete exclusion of Sadduceism from the Maccabean age.

To write a strictly historical work, that shall present to the laity of his land the facts regarding the origin and development of Christianity, is the task that Charles Guignebert has set himself in his *Manuel d'histoire ancienne du christianisme*.³ The volume in hand, entitled *Les Origines*, deals with the period of beginnings down to the second century. The layman who reads this book will no longer be behind the times regarding the latest critical views. They are presented clearly and in rather fuller detail than might be anticipated. The chapter on sources (chap. i), among other things calls attention to the large measure of uncertainty attaching to the New Testament records. We are thus prepared for the meager gleanings from the history of Jesus' life that are brought to us in a later section (chap. v). Three successive chapters (ii, iii, iv) are devoted respectively to Palestinian Judaism, its institutions and beliefs, to the Judaism of the Diaspora, and to the moral and religious state of the Graeco-Roman world. The consideration of the teaching of Jesus (chap. vi) is introduced by the question of his messianic self-consciousness. In spite of the uncertainty that surrounds this subject, two facts incline the author to conclude that Jesus did regard himself as Messiah, the manner of his death and more particularly his preaching of the imminent coming of the kingdom (p. 210). The history of the Jewish church of Jerusalem (chap. vii) is followed by an account of Paul's life and missions (viii) and of his conception of the church (ix). I and II Romans, Corinthians, Galatians, "and even" I Thessalonians, are received as authentic sources and Philipians and II Thessalonians as Pauline, if not written

³ *Manuel d'histoire ancienne du christianisme: Les Origines*. Par Charles Guignebert, chargé de cours à la faculté des lettres de l'Université de Paris. Paris: Picard, 1906. 549 pages.

entirely by the apostle's hand. Chap. x takes up Jewish speculation and the two lines of its development represented by the Johannine writings on the one hand, and by Hebrews on the other. The Epistle of James and the Didaché have large place in the chapter (xi) on the Jewish-Christian churches. It is pointed out that the sources of the Synoptic Gospels would properly belong in this section, had they been preserved to us. The origin of the Christian church in Rome, its literature, and influence are considered in chap. xii, while the final chap. (xiii) has as its theme the separation of Judaism and Christianity at the end of the first century. This date marks the dawn of the real Christian church.

Throughout the book one is impressed by the writer's grasp of his subject and mastery of his material. A query arises whether the zeal to avoid dogmatic prepossessions and theological considerations (p. ii) has not brought down the irreducible minimum of facts in the gospel history to too low a point? When one feels himself master of considerable possessions, and such certainly remain here, his endeavor for impartiality may induce him to surrender too readily that which should be retained. It is hard to avoid feeling that this has been done more than once in Guignebert's work.

WARREN J. MOULTON

BANGOR THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
Bangor, Me.

The exterior title of Professor Ramsay's book on *The Cities of St. Paul*⁴ receives an important modification on the title-page, and the promise which it holds out to the reader is there materially reduced. Instead of dealing with the cities of Paul—of which we may count at least seventeen—it deals only with those of eastern Asia Minor, five in all.

The title suggests unity, but the volume is somewhat miscellaneous. Thus, of the seven parts into which it is divided the first has to do with "Paulinism in the Graeco-Roman World," in which we find a discussion of such topics as the "Pauline Philosophy of History," the "Empire as the World's Hope," and "Paulinism in the Roman Empire," and the last part is entitled "St. Paul in the Roman World." It is difficult to discover any very close connection between these two parts and the theme of the book, or to see why they might not coalesce or even change places.

The author observes in his preface, in an apologetic tone, that "considerable parts" of the book have appeared in reviews, and that it is only by availing himself of such material that he is equal to the task of composing

⁴ *The Cities of St. Paul: Their Influence on His Life and Thought.* By W. M. Ramsay. New York: Armstrong, 1908. 452 pages. \$3.00.

a book, for his winters are spent in college duties and his summers in exploration. Is the distinguished author then—one is tempted to ask—under strict obligation to furnish a new volume on Paul every year or two? Would not his numerous and appreciative readers prefer that he should take ample time to work up carefully the results of his studies and explorations?

Let us look a moment at Part I. The writer thinks that Paul and Robertson-Smith held diametrically opposite views regarding the course of religious history, and though he began as a pupil of the latter he is now a strong advocate of what he supposes to be the Pauline view, viz., that the history of religion is, with the rarest exceptions, a history of degeneration. He throws a sop to the Cerberus of evolution, saying that "We are all devotees of the theory of development," but then he excepts from the action of this principle the wide field of man's religious history. He is led to this step by his study of Paul. But one is disposed to ask whether Paul was in possession of data on which a rational judgment in the question at issue could be based. Was it possible in his day to have a science of comparative religion? Again, the writer argues at considerable length that there has been a decline in agriculture among the Mediterranean peoples since the earliest historical period. But if that were granted, would it follow that religion also must have degenerated there? The author thinks it not scientific to "invent" a primitive savage with potentialities equal to the production of the classic civilization, but is it any less arbitrary to declare, as he does, that the modern savage has no such potentialities? Who possesses insight adequate to such a declaration?

The fifth paragraph of Part I is on "Hellenism and Hebraism." Paul, it is said, though not for the first time, combined the aims and ideals of the East and the West. He was Jewish and also Hellenic. The author takes occasion here to speak of the "fashionable opinion" of modern times regarding the relation of the East and the West and the "strengthening of racial antipathy." He declares that "race-hatred and color-hatred are under present conditions forming barriers far more impassable than ever existed in ancient times." As an illustration of the truth of this statement we have a little farther on the following sentence: "You see it (i. e., the exaggeration of racial pride and intensification of racial hatred) in the entrance hall of an American hotel, where the clerk refuses admission to a well-dressed and well-educated man because a tinge of blue in the finger nails betrays a slight intermixture several generations back of negro blood." But it is not necessary to comment either on the general principle here enunciated or on the illustration. The American nation, in which almost all the races of earth are living together in peace, is a sufficient refutation of the general

assertion. If there is "color-hatred"—and the fact is not to be denied—it should be borne in mind that the conditions today are such as never existed in ancient times. But we must hasten and take a cursory glance at the central portion of the book. The reviewer confesses to an impression that the material at the author's disposal is often too slight for the conclusions that are based upon it. Thus, e. g., that the spirit of Tarsus was oriental rests on the testimony of Dion Chrysostom that the women went deeply veiled. Now while this testimony is good for the time of Dion Chrysostom, we cannot at once apply it to the state of Tarsus, a century earlier; and, moreover, even for the time of Dion Chrysostom, it may be doubted whether this feature alone is sufficient ground for a sweeping statement to the effect that the spirit of Tarsus was oriental.

Take one other illustration of this characteristic of the book out of many possible ones. The question under discussion is the Jewish citizens of Pisidian Antioch. The sole proof thus far (outside of Acts) that there were Jews in Antioch consists in an epitaph of a certain Debbora which was found in Apollonia. The name is regarded as evidence that the person was a Jewess. According to the epitaph she was from Antioch, and her ancestors had held many offices of state in the "fatherland." As to the date of this epitaph the author's statements fluctuate. On p. 256 he says, "It belongs to the late second or third century after Christ," but on p. 257 we read, "The epitaph of Debbora may belong to the first or second century after Christ, more probably the first." Apparently the date of the epitaph is uncertain, but even supposing that it belongs to the first century, does it prove all that the author claims? The evidence appears weak at two points: first, we do not know to which of the many Antiochs the epitaph refers, and then, we do not know that the word "fatherland" in the epitaph refers to a city at all. Why may it not refer to a province?

Some other noticeable features of the book, as, e. g., its somewhat slighting references to higher criticism and to modern scholarship in the field of Pauline research, also its scarcity of points of living contact with Paul, cannot now be considered.

NORTHAMPTON, MASS.

GEORGE HOLLEY GILBERT

The *International Handbooks to the New Testament* series is complete with the fourth volume.⁵ The author has well borne out the intention of the editor of the series (Orello Cone) in providing for the busy pastor and

⁵ *The Johannine Literature and The Acts of the Apostles*. By H. P. Forbes. *International Handbooks to the New Testament*, Vol. IV. New York: Putnam, 1907. viii + 375 pages. \$2.00.

New Testament student a serviceable handbook of the Johannine literature, and of the Acts, by admirably concise and intelligible statement of critical results in introductions and frequent notes. One will find much suggestive treatment of important passages without the confusion of encyclopedic detail. A bibliography might have been added without defeating the object of the series and one finds the index to the four volumes too compact.

Forbes's position on the rise and authorship of the Johannine literature cannot be better expressed than in his own words (pp. 172 f.): "Some time during the last third of the first century a disciple . . . John by name," but not the apostle (pp. 170 f.), "perhaps a priest (Acts 6:7), resident at Jerusalem, familiar with Jewish" and other oriental (p. 96) "learning and with the earlier and later forms of Christian tradition as they developed at Jerusalem, went to Asia Minor," probably making Ephesus the center of his activities (pp. 167, 97), "came into high esteem, lived on into the opening years of the second century, died of old age. He brought much Jewish Messianic-apocalyptic tradition, was the chief agent in its collection into the Book of Revelation, of which he was perhaps a redactor," though Forbes inclines to the theory of pseudonymity (p. 95). It is probable that both visions and residence—not banishment—in Patmos are simply literary devices (p. 97), the work being finally published in Ephesus, during the Domitianic persecution *ca.* 93–96 A. D. (p. 97), or possibly after Domitian's death (p. 98).

This John of Ephesus "became to the 'elders' of Asia Minor a venerable source of Christian tradition, a 'witness,' a great authority; even during his lifetime, as the 'memoirs' of the Synoptics came into circulation, his venerable age and his Palestinian origin brought about a confusion of his personality with that of the Galilean John, of whose end there was no widespread tradition," but who died at the hands of the Jews before John of Ephesus came to Ephesus (pp. 166 ff.). "Soon after the death (for he was dead when 21:23 was written) of this 'disciple,' 'elder,' 'witness,' an Asian Christian, discerning the demand for a presentation of Jesus in accordance with the higher Christology and other current conditions, composed from the traditions of this 'witness,' from the Synoptics, from oral sources, from ideal invention, a 'spiritual' Gospel, and put it forth under the authority—not in the name of—this ancient witness, whose personality was in the common mind already confluent with that of the Galilean John."

Accordingly, this spiritual gospel is primarily a christological supplement to the Synoptics (p. 156) as a counteractive of the effect on Christians of Jewish sneers based on the accounts of the latter. The current conception of Jesus as Messiah having proved inadequate, the publisher has

furnished the needed interpretation of him in terms of eternity (1:1 ff.) and deity (20:31). Our author finds a gnostic tendency fused with the christological interest despite the fact that the First Epistle, from the same school (p. 342), clearly, and probably the Gospel also are antidocetic (p. 160). The Gospel and First Epistle were published between 100 and 140 A. D. (p. 164). The Second and Third Epistles come from the same school and possibly from Ephesian John himself (pp. 363 f.).

Our author happily emphasizes the fact, sometimes not appreciated by critics, that neither superficial examination nor detailed analysis of sources of the Acts reveals any one dominant or determining principle of composition (p. 2). Evidences of tendency are rather due to the varied sources used than to the composer of the book (pp. 6 ff.). The sources vary from the first-hand testimony of Luke in the we-source (p. 4) through various grades to oral and conflicting testimony gathered by the composer (pp. 4 ff.), a Christian of the second generation (p. 3), whose "fervent religiosity and interest in persons" (p. 9) has resulted in this rather idealized picture of the primitive church, into which the early controversies are sketched with softened outlines.

RALPH H. FERRIS

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Part VII of Dr. Abbott's *Diatessarica*⁶ is simply a connecting link between Silanus the Christian and The Fourfold Gospel, which is now in preparation. The notes upon Silanus are, in the main, brief; the longest and most important is upon the Apocalypse of John, defending the substantial unity of that document, and holding that it was written about 96 A. D. To this part he adds two "longer notes," as he terms them, upon "The Son of man," and "The Self-Manifestations of Christ."

The main interest in the volume centers in the discussion of the term, "The Son of man." This is a learned and suggestive, but a preliminary, discussion of this difficult and illusive title. The full interpretation of it, as used in the gospels, is reserved for the forthcoming volume. The author holds that the efforts made to recover the meaning from the current Aramaic speech of the time of Christ have thus far failed, and give no promise of success; too little is known of the Palestinian Aramaic of that period. The uncertainty as to the date of the Similitudes of the Book of Enoch and the integrity of the text leads him to attribute less influence to their use of the title than some recent scholars have done. He proceeds, therefore, to investi-

⁶ *Notes on New Testament Criticism*. By Edwin A. Abbott. London: Black, 1907. xxix + 313 pages. 7s. 6d.

gate the use of the term in the Old Testament Scriptures and other Jewish writings, with such help as may be gathered from Christian writings, aside from the gospels, both those within the New Testament and those of the earliest Christian Fathers. His conclusion stated "provisionally," "only as a working hypothesis" is that

"the Son of Man" implied man in his physical weakness, man seemingly inferior to the beasts of the field, man represented by "the babes and sucklings" on whom "the mighty" look down with contempt. This "man," or this "son of man," the Psalmist regards as but "a little lower than God," and destined to have lordship over the beasts.

The title thus combines a recognition or confession of weakness and dependence with the consciousness of that dignity and supremacy which come from belonging to and representing that order of beings which is most nearly like God and most closely related with him.

WILLIAM H. RYDER

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The names of the editor and the contributing authors of the two volumes of the Weiss *Commentary on the New Testament*⁷ are a complete guarantee of authoritative scholarship and of a reverent zeal both to conserve and to intensify the values of Christian faith. Reading them with an ever-increasing satisfaction of mind and quickening of spirit, one feels it a chief duty adequately to estimate their significance in the general movement of religion in our time. The work was barely completed when Pius X issued his Syllabus and Encyclica to arrest the invasion of the modern spirit in the Roman church and it is a work which offers to the cultivated laity of Protestant Germany a consummate expression of modernism truly so called in its relation to the New Testament. Repressive authority and the religion of the liberated mind; which has the greater power? The Syllabus and Encyclica are angry, defiant, contemptuous, the arrogant edict of alarmed ecclesiastics whose control of a passive laity is threatened. The Protestant work is calm, assured, relentlessly critical but yet reconstructive and inspiring, and it conveys to the laity the process and the outcome of a method of culture which emancipates them from all blind tradition. It is not simply one more commentary added to the shelves of commentators. As a ripe

⁷ Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments neu übersetzt und für die Gegenwart erklärt, von Otto Baumgarten, Wilhelm Bousset, Herman Gunkel, Wilhelm Heutmüller, Georg Hollmann, Adolf Jülicher, Rudolf Knopf, Franz Koehler, Wilhelm Lueken, Johannes Weiss. Herausgegeben von Johannes Weiss. Zweite Auflage, i, vi, 704; ii, 954. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1907. M. 12.

fruit of generations of investigation, experiment, corrections, and restatements, as the co-operative work of a body of eminent scholars brought into harmony not by institutional policy but by the method and spirit of science blending with unfeigned religiousness, it is a powerful product of the Protestant movement against which the waves of any mere reactionism will beat in vain.

That this work will have an eminent influence is assured by the unexampled circulation which it has already won and by the evidence that it finds an immediate and enthusiastic welcome among the teachers engaged in the German system of *Religionsunterricht*. The time was ripe for it, the scientific discussions of the theologians being now matured to the point of popularization. It is safe to say, moreover, that no more interesting exposition of the New Testament is in existence. The dulness of commentaries is proverbial, but he who reads this one will turn its pages with an interest that does not flag. There is a continual incentive to read farther, not only because the reader wins the illumination of a historical comprehension, but also because the frank expression of modern views and modern feeling capacitates and moves him to reflection and spiritual valuations. What in literature is more interesting to any earnest mind than the New Testament! And this splendid exposition brings the interest home to the reader by its revelation of the fresh original reality and by its sympathetic suggestions to men controlled by the situations of modern life.

The work opens with a history of the New Testament by Jülicher and the separate books have independent introductions. The text is divided into sections as dictated by the content, and the translation is new and modern in diction. Apparently pains have been taken to gain a fresh and vivacious effect in translation and the results vary with the individuality of the collaborators. One is struck by the force and pungent effectiveness of Jülicher's version of Romans won by a neglect of mere verbal equivalence. Compare with Luther's version the rendering of Rom. 1:20: *Ist doch seit der Weltschöpfung an seinen Werken etwas von seinem unsichtbaren Wesen seine ewige Macht und Majestät mit dem Auge des Geistes zu sehen*. Occasionally this freedom raises a doubt of its judiciousness, as when Jülicher chooses *gerechtmachen* for Rom. 3:28, but *rechtfertigen* in other parts of the same chapter. This brings into the text itself the exegesis which is defended on p. 240. The excursus provided for the exposition of topics like Son of God, Justification, Grace, Faith, offer most valuable materials for the student's synthetic reconstruction of Paulinism as a total view of Christian experience and Christian interpretations, but it is possible that they make rather severe demands on the lay reader. Yet whatever

the feeling of the one who reads for edification, for the student of New Testament theology the appearance of this commentary on Romans is an event of great importance.

It is difficult for a foreigner to gauge the adaptation of the work to the audience addressed. Audience is a natural term, for most of the exposition rests on prolonged and repeated exegetical courses for university students and we hear the talking teacher as we turn the pages. Possibly it has been difficult to lose the consciousness of an academic audience before which one must guard himself in every detail. In reading the interpretation of Mark by Johannes Weiss the opinion is inevitable that the critical necessities of the cultivated layman have been somewhat overestimated. True, Weiss has cultivated the illusion of being read by *das schlichte Gemeindeglied* who has the point of view of the childlike ancient narrator (p. 238). In reality that plain person would either quickly drop this book in resentment or by the reading cease to be a *schlichtes Gemeindeglied* and doubtless lose such keen tenacity of interest in the single phrase as Weiss ascribes to him. No one will withhold an enthusiastic admiration for Weiss's skill in interesting exposition, but some may judge that he might have been more effective through greater brevity. He is advocating a very close theory as to Mark's Gospel and secures himself in every detail against rival critical views with excessive fulness and finesse. For the discrimination between what Jesus said and Mark's construction of the saying no commentary is so useful as this, but Weiss yields to the temptation of knowing too much and the childlike ancient narrator becomes a man of subtlety. When, for example, in Mark 1:13 Weiss imagines that for readers accustomed to allegorical interpretation, Mark suggests a comparison of the first and second Adam, a strain is put on our power of belief. Similarly, "arose from thence" in Mark 7:24 means in the mind of Mark a material connection between the journey into the heathen world and the attitude of Jesus concerning purity and impurity. "*Der Leser soll fühlen: Jesus hielt die Heiden nicht für unrein, wie seine Volksgenossen.*" Subtleties of this sort, which are abundant, might well be relegated to a footnote as questions de luxe. Introduced into the exposition they needlessly diminish confidence in the artlessness and value of Mark's narration. The reviewer regards as forced and regrettable the apparent tendency now increasing to construe Mark's Gospel much as the Fourth Gospel must be construed. Such elements of a debatable and speculative character have no place in a work which is intended for such as are being initiated into a critical historical appreciation. It is questionable, too, whether such a commentary should be made an insistent argument for Weiss's *Urmarkus*

theory, though it is most effectively argued. However, such criticisms depend on the estimate we make of a power of discrimination and sustained attention on the part of the readers for whom the work is primarily intended.

With regard to critical questions it may be said that the determination of them is in general accord with Jülicher's *Introduction*, though Pauline authorship is not claimed for the epistle to the Ephesians. Our attention is naturally drawn most of all to the gospels, for which we have not commentaries as adequate as for the epistles. There is therefore special reason for expressing delight in Heitmüller's exposition of the Fourth Gospel, and it is regrettable that one may not transcribe such an illustration as p. 760 affords of a mode of comment both scrupulously scientific and emotionally suggestive to a religious inquirer. The whole is a charming and convincing presentation of the Johannine conception as molded by antecedent Pauline notions and by the conditions of missionary experience in the second century. A distinctive trait of the exposition is an appreciation of the artistic intention and method of the evangelist, an aesthetic consideration which is often a happy escape from doubtful profundities of theological explanation. It is a treatment which preserves the narrative value of episodes, even though they are also to be viewed as transparent media of a higher truth. But while metaphysical intentions are not unduly forced upon the text, Heitmüller's frequent use of the Logos terminology is somewhat misleading. As he holds that the prologue was not externally prefixed but is intimately united with the ideas of the gospel, it is the Logos-Messiah who is always presented and (cf. 7:1-13) is sharply discriminated from the Jewish Messiah. Agreeing with Heitmüller that the gospel projects the Pauline "Christusbild" into the Galilean story, we may refuse to import the cosmological implications of the Alexandrian Logos into the gospel itself in spite of the suggestions of the Prologue.

A happy arrangement of this book of religious interpretation makes it end with Baumgarten's truly devotional study of the Johannine epistles. Here we have the developed type of Christian experience after the struggle with the Law had subsided and the antitheses of thought by which Paul battled to wrest the Christian movement from a fate of assimilation to Judaism had lost their sharpness. While Baumgarten's expression of this assured and contemplative piety does not neglect the historical relations to gnosticism and Greek sacramental mysticism, his comment deals mainly with the relation of Johannine ideas to modern situations of religious thought. A multitude of sermons might spring from the study of this homiletic expression of critical scholarship which sets a fine example of

sympathetic penetration into the spirit of the epistle with a quiet correction of its limitations.

For our author [says Baumgarten on 2:16] the decadent culture and art of the empire coincided with this perishable world, the sensuous material world of nothingness on which Plato no less than John looked with aversion. But is it correct when the preaching of our day in order to accord with the text copies this identification?

The intention of this notice is simply to convey an impression of the character and worth of the work as a whole, and the impression takes the form of a strong conviction that the volumes ought to be translated into English. The Germans have a practical talent in such works which is not easily equaled, and the tone and atmosphere of this serene modernity might not be paralleled in the checks and hindrances of our situation. It may be noted that a similar commentary on the Old Testament is promised as well as a work on Primitive Christianity based on the present volumes.

FRANCIS A. CHRISTIE

MEADVILLE THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL

What has early Christianity to say about the "last things"? Knopf⁸ gives a very clear exposition of this subject. He treats the question from the historical point of view, examining the first three centuries of Christian thought. A bare outline of the argument will indicate the importance of the book and the suggestiveness of the treatment. Behind primitive Christianity lay the eschatological conceptions of the Jews, which fall into two classes: the popular national hope, and the formal apocalyptic expectations. The former looked for a new Israel, with Jerusalem as the capital, presided over by an ideal Davidic king who would dispense peace and blessing to the world; the latter, for a new Jerusalem from heaven, with the Messiah appearing upon the clouds, his coming having been preceded by a season of great distress in which the appearance of the anti-Christ formed the climax, then would follow judgment and the new age. The addition of a thousand-year period between the advent of the Messiah and the full dawn of the future age was an early and important modification. This "realistic" eschatology is thought to have had its origin, for the most part, in the Jews' interpretation of their own experience, though Babylonian and Persian items are to be found in it. These views passed over into Christianity with two slight alterations: (1) more definiteness as to the Messiah, who was now the risen Jesus, and (2) a new test for application

⁸ *Die Zukunftshoffnungen des Urchristentums.* Von Rudolf Knopf. (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher. I. Reihe. 13. Heft.) 64 pages. M. 0.50.

at the judgment—only those who believed in the messiahship of Jesus would escape condemnation. But three causes were early at work in bringing about a change of view; a delay in the Lord's return, an influence of Greek thought in which spirit was conceived to be superior to and independent of matter, and an increasing emphasis upon individualism as Christianity began to break with the state and become more distinctly an affair of private life. By tracing the history of Greek eschatology, independently of Christianity, to about 300 A. D. it is seen to issue in a thoroughgoing dualism of spirit and matter. Spirit alone is immortal and matter is essentially evil. This "spiritualistic" eschatology made large conquests in the church, but there was no open controversy between the old and the new, except in the case of the gnostics, who rejected outright the earlier "realistic" ideas of the Jews. The prevailing tendency was to blend the two, which resulted in the belief that the soul entered the future life immediately after death to receive blessing or punishment, and at some indefinite future the end of the world would come with the accompanying bodily resurrection and judgment. This composite view has generally remained prominent in the teaching of Christianity. Knopf thinks it cannot be said that our religion has shaped for itself a peculiar and original eschatology, nor has it solved the entire problem of the future. The land of death is still the "unknown land." Paul has expressed the strongest ground of the Christian hope: nothing can separate us from the love of God (Rom. 8:35-39).

SHIRLEY J. CASE

LEWISTON, ME.

Dr. George Milligan, minister of Caputh, Perthshire, son of the late Dr. Wm. Milligan, is already favorably known to the world of scholarship by his volume on *The Theology of the Epistle to the Hebrews*, and more recently by his studies in the Greek of the New Testament, in which work happily he has now joined forces with Dr. James Hope Moulton. Two purposes are apparent in the present commentary on Thessalonians,^o one to follow Swete, Mayor, and Robinson in filling up what was lacking in the task which Lightfoot, Westcott, and Hort had set before themselves; the other, to bring to bear upon the language and grammar of the Thessalonian letters the results of the author's investigations in papyri, inscriptions, and ostraca. Both these purposes are manifestly attained and in the attainment of the same lies the warrant for publishing still another English commentary on these epistles.

^o *St. Paul's Epistles to the Thessalonians*. By George Milligan, D.D. New York: Macmillan, 1908. cix + 195 pages. \$2.60.

The arrangement of the edition is similar to that with which we are familiar in the commentaries of Lightfoot and Westcott, consisting of Introduction, Greek text with notes, and a series of additional notes. From the Introduction we learn that both letters were written by Paul at Corinth somewhere about 50-51 A. D. The problem of the resemblances between the letters is considered insoluble at present and the hypothesis of a *falsarius* for the second letter is rejected as inadequate. At this point, an exacting reader, coming fresh from Wrede's exhaustive discussion, the force of which is admitted cordially, might demand of Dr. Milligan a stronger rebuttal of Wrede than is given, in order to be convinced of the authenticity of the second letter. And I fancy the same reader might be quite bothered by the present editor's contention that the case of Colossians and Ephesians is a close parallel to that of the first and second Epistle to the Thessalonians. Passing to other points in the Introduction it is to be regretted that under the head of "language" words only are studied and not also phrases and turns of thought. In the section termed "Literary Affinities," there is no table of parallels from late Judaism, while the tabulation of the relation of Paul's language to the words of Jesus requires rigid revision. The discussion of Doctrine is perhaps hampered by the fact of the particular path which the author chooses to follow, God, Christ, Spirit, Soteriology, Eschatology, and Ethics. It is interesting to note that Dr. Milligan feels with Dr. Mathews and others the essential place which eschatology has in Paul's thinking. As was to be expected, the most recent authorities for the text are adequately given. No theory of textual criticism, however, is suggested. Furthermore, there is an excellent selection of commentaries, although mention might have been made of some of the early English expositors and annotators.

Some ten additional notes are appended, of which we need not speak in detail. The editor refuses to translate *ἀτακτέω* "to be idle," although he admits that the *τάξις* here is "work." On p. 154, in quoting a good passage for his own view (P. Oxy. 725), he curiously neglects to render *ἀτακτήση*. There is a slight slip in computation on p. 136, one of the very few in the book.

In the Commentary proper, Dr. Milligan usually states not only his own opinion but also an important opinion which he rejects. The reader wishes at times that this habit had been even more regular. For example, in the difficult passage I Thess. 4:3 ff., which is interpreted as referring solely to impurity, little or nothing is said of the view that both impurity and avarice are in mind. Nor do we learn anything of the very attractive view which makes *κτᾶσθαι* (in the sense of "get," not in the sense of "possess" which

may be true in papyri but which Dr. Milligan's cases do not make certain) begin a new clause, putting the four infinitives ἀπέχου, εἰδέναι, κτᾶσθαι, and ὑπερβαίνειν in parallelism, and giving to εἰδέναι the meaning found in I Thess. 5:12, a usage there, Dr. Milligan avers, "for which no adequate parallel has yet been produced in biblical Greek." So also in II Thess. 3:6, where, though there is a general reference to Professor Heitmüller's "Im Namen Jesu," there is no mention of that German scholar's view that Paul, in giving the command, names the name of Jesus, thus strengthening his appeal. At times again, the reader desires a fuller exegesis, as in I Thess. 5:23. No new light is shed on the passage about "the Lawless One," which is not to be wondered at unless it could be shown that ὁ κατέχων is not the Roman Empire, not the power which helps the divine only to be rewarded by being got out of the way, but the Satan himself who is in control, and has the mastery over the present evil age, the very prince of the power of the air, the spirit that now operates in the sons of disobedience, who after his final revolt in heaven, is flung from the heavenly places, only to incarnate himself in his human agent, who in his turn and after the manner of the ancient dragon, attempts the assault on the throne of God, the temple of the Most High, only to be cut off in his dastardly adventure by his successful adversary, the Messiah himself, by the breath of his mouth.

The great excellence of this edition of Thessalonians lies not in the fineness of the exegesis proper, nor in the comprehensiveness of the Introduction, but in the contribution which it makes from contemporary Greek to the language and grammar of these epistles. Only those can be aware of its excellence at this point who have themselves been gathering from the same sources. It is not oversight which accounts for the absence of parallels to words like εἰσόδος, ἡγεῖσθαι (I Thess. 5:13), ὁμείρομαι or phrases like ἐν βάρει εἶναι, ἐκ μέσου γίνεσθαι, to mention a few cases. While Milligan's *Thessalonians* does not quite supersede Ellicott and Lightfoot, Findlay and Denney, it does supplement them most valuably.

In conclusion, it may be said that thorough acquaintance with the literature of the subject, catholicity of outlook, caution in the expression of opinion, and a distinct winsomeness in the personal equation are in evidence throughout the book.

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NEW YORK

RECENT PATRISTIC STUDIES

Fifteen years ago the textual materials for the Epistle of Clement of Rome to the Corinthians were increased by the discovery of a latin version, in a manuscript of the eleventh century. They are now still more importantly enriched by the discovery of a Coptic version.¹ It is significant that the so-called Second Epistle of Clement does not appear with the first in these ancient versions, a circumstance that importantly corroborates the prevalent view that the Second Epistle has very little to do with the First. The new Coptic witness to the text is in the dialect of Akhmim, and was discovered in the course of some restorations in the famous White Monastery at Sohag, near Akhmim, the monastery of the great Shenute, or Sinuthios, the founder of Coptic learning. This convent library had previously supplied thousands of leaves of Coptic literature to continental libraries, and may still yield up other treasures of Christian antiquity to the scholar. For the present manuscript we may well be grateful to the enlightened Shenute and his successors, for the textual witnesses for I Clement are by no means numerous. One Greek manuscript, Constantinopolitanus, preserves the text in full, one, Alexandrinus, in large part, and there are Syriac and Latin versions. To these four witnesses, Carl Schmidt now adds a fifth in this Akhmim manuscript. It is written on papyrus, and belongs to the fourth century, being thus older than Alexandrinus. In type of text, it stands with the Greek manuscripts rather than with the other versions. As a version, it does not of course take rank with the Greek witnesses to the text, but its evidence is none the less welcome and useful. The manuscript is in book form and in good preservation, the very leather cover still protecting it when it reached Schmidt's skilful hands, and but five leaves being missing. Schmidt publishes full introductions and the Coptic text in the pages of the manuscript, with the chapter numbers of the editions, and concludes with full indices of Greek and Coptic words, and a facsimile of a page of the papyrus. In the foot-notes the Coptic variants of each page are given in Greek equivalents, so that non-Coptists can use the edition to some purpose. Altogether, Carl Schmidt has done patristic study a fresh and notable service in this *editio princeps* of a new version of I Clement. The text is in itself a notable addition to the Akhmimic literature, and the glossary is an important contribution to Coptic lexicography. Another somewhat fragmentary manuscript of the same version is reported at Strassburg, where Rösch is undertaking its publication.

¹ *Der Erste Clemensbrief in alkoptischer Uebersetzung.* Untersucht und herausgegeben von Carl Schmidt. Mit Lichtdruck-Faksimile der Handschrift. (*Texte und Untersuchungen*, XXXII, 1.) Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1908. 160 pages. M. 9.

For the *Shepherd of Hermas*, one of the most popular of early Christian works, the textual evidence is less complete and satisfactory than for I Clement. Of Greek witnesses, we have but two, one, the Sinaiticus, preserving perhaps one-fourth of the text, the other, the Athous, about nine-tenths. For the remainder we are, except for a few scraps of papyrus, dependent upon the versions. The Athos manuscript, however, has never been made to yield up its evidence in a direct and unambiguous form. Its history is of interest. It originally consisted of ten parchment leaves, dating probably from the fifteenth century, and until after 1840 it lay complete and undisturbed in the Monastery of St. Gregory on Mt. Athos. Soon after that time, the monks of Athos say, the last leaf of it was taken from the mountain by Minas Minoïdes, who visited Athos in the forties, and is known to have taken some manuscripts away. Shortly after, the manuscript dealer and forger, Simonides, visited Athos, and took away to Leipzig three leaves of the nine still at St. Gregory's, as well as a somewhat inexact copy of the rest, and disposed of the whole to the University of Leipzig, in 1855. Upon this very unsatisfactory evidence, supplemented for the first fourth by the discovery of Sinaiticus in 1859, Greek editions mainly rested for nearly thirty years. In 1883 Spyridion Lambros sent his pupil, Georgandas, to Athos to copy the leaves still there, and in 1888 he, with J. Armitage Robinson, published a collation of this copy with that of Simonides.

The need of a fresh, independent, and authoritative publication of the Athos manuscript has thus been needed for fifty years, and is at length admirably supplied by Professor Lake.² On his many visits to Athos, he has, at the instance of Dr. Grenfell, made repeated efforts to find this famous codex, and, after several failures, he at length succeeded, in 1905, when he photographed and copied the six Athos leaves. The hand is crabbed and crowded, and presents no small difficulties to the decipherer, but Professor Lake's publication of his photographs, with his transcriptions, puts the evidence of these six leaves before textual scholars in a form that leaves nothing to be desired, and makes patristic study his lasting debtor. The difficulty of reading the small and irregular hand of the manuscript makes Professor Lake's transcript doubly welcome, and rounds out a notable and epoch-making contribution to the study of *Hermas*. We should now have a similar photographic edition of the Leipzig leaves.

Fresh materials for the study of Severus of Antioch are supplied in an

² *Facsimiles of the Athos Fragments of the Shepherd of Hermas*. Photographed and Transcribed by Kirsopp Lake. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907. 12 plates; 16 pages.

edition of six of his sermons,³ lost in Greek, but twice translated into Syriac, and now published in the version of Jacob of Edessa (A. D. 701), from a British Museum manuscript of A. D. 868. Only one of these sermons has been previously published.

EDGAR J. GOODSPEED

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The manuscript of Irenaeus' recently recovered work found in an Armenian church at Erivan, Russian Armenia, in December, 1904, is published under a title which is agreeably full and descriptive.⁴ The Greek is that preserved by Eusebius, H. E. 5. 26, and heretofore the only thing known of the work. The text occupies the first part of the volume and furnishes a basis of study for Armenian scholars; the German translation presents Irenaeus' thought for others. The importance of the work, as Harnack has pointed out (p. 55), is not in any considerable addition to our knowledge of Irenaeus' thought and teaching, for it covers much the same ground as the last part of the *Adversus Haereses*. Even the characteristic appeal to the teaching of "the elders, the disciples of the apostles" appears twice. It is significant rather for the view it gives of Irenaeus' personal religious and theological position. It thus serves to emphasize what we did know and to urge due attention to Irenaeus for the unique place which he occupies as a connecting link between the New Testament and the third century.

FRANK G. LEWIS

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

For half a century and more a good, critical edition of Clemens Alexandrinus, as of so many other things in early Christian literature, has been felt by the world of scholars to be a real desideratum. Dindorf's edition (Oxford, 1869) appeared with the avowed purpose of supplying this need. But as the reviews of the time show, and as ampler examination has since confirmed, the promises given in the preface and the hopes awakened by

³ Les Homelies cathédrales de Sévère d'Antioche. Traduction Syriaque inédite de Jacques d'Edesse. I. Homélie LII-LVII. Publiées et traduites en Français par Rubens Duval (*Patrologia Orientalis*, T. IV, Fasc. I). Paris: Firmin-Didot. 94 pages. 1906.

⁴ *Des heiligen Irenäus Schrift zum Erweise der apostolischen Verkündigung* (Ἐπίδειξις τοῦ ἀποστολικοῦ κηρύγματος). In armenischer Version entdeckt, herausgegeben und ins Deutsche übersetzt von Lic. Dr. Karapet ter-Mekerttschian und Lic. Dr. Erwandter-Minassiantz; mit einem Nachwort und Anmerkungen von Adolf Harnack. [*Texte und Untersuchungen*, 31. Band, Heft 1.] Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1907. viii + 69* + 68 pages. M. 6.

the name of the great editor lacked much of being fulfilled. Since then the excellent work of Hort-Mayor upon *Stromateis*, Book VII (1902), and of P. M. Barnard on *Quis dives salvetur* (1895), has but served to accentuate the need of similar work for the rest of the great Alexandrian's writings.

This work⁵ has been undertaken by Dr. Otto Stählin, who was selected by the Kirchenväterkommission of the Royal Prussian Academy to be the editor of Clemens Alexandrinus in their great series, "Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte." The first volume of this edition of Clement's works appeared in 1905 and was reviewed in Vol. X (1906), pp. 735 ff., of this *Journal*. Thanks to the diligent labors, past and present, of Dr. Stählin, the publishers were enabled in the autumn of 1906, little more than a year after the appearance of Vol. I, to bring out Vol. II.

This contains Books I-VI of the *Stromateis*. Stählin uses the Latin title *Stromata*. This is but a small matter, and of course *Stromata* is justifiable from the Latin point of view. Yet, to follow Hort-Mayor's precedent in using everywhere Clement's own title *Stromateis* would not have been difficult, and would have added a touch to the pleasing accuracy in details, otherwise so well maintained in this work of Stählin's.

The text of the *Stromateis* is preceded by a very brief introduction (pp. ix-xiv). Much of the prefatory material to the *Stromateis*—account of manuscripts and auxiliary text-critical material in excerpt manuscripts, catenae, florilegia, and quotations, of former editions, etc.—had been given in Vol. I. Such additional information as is to be given, e. g., on the orthography of the one independent manuscript of *Stromateis* (designated by Stählin L) which at present is in the hands of scholars, has been relegated to Vol. III (see Vol. I, p. XLI, n. 1). Thus the present volume was left free to devote itself almost exclusively to the presentation of the text. Besides a brief statement supplying information, which had been omitted in Vol. I, concerning the correctors and the textual condition of L, and the acknowledgment of aid received from other scholars in the preparation of this edition, the prefatory pages of this volume present as their chief feature an exhibit of about 100 errors found in Dindorf, chiefly in manuscript readings, which have been corrected by Dr. Stählin. This exhibit, together with the fact, stated in Vol. I, p. xlii, that, in addition to the use of the two collations made for previous editions, two further collations of L were made for

⁵ *Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte*. Herausgegeben von der Kirchenväterkommission der Königl. Preuss. Akademie der Wissenschaften. *Clemens Alexandrinus*, Zweiter Band. Herausg. von Otto Stählin. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1906. 518 pages. M. 16.50.

this edition, the last by the careful hand of Stählin himself, gives ground for the presumption that we have here before us an exact presentation of the manuscript readings for the *Stromateis*. And, of course, besides L, all other text-critical material obtainable has been carefully used. But the labors upon the external evidence were among the least of the editor's troubles. The crux lay elsewhere. The manuscript tradition, direct and indirect, was scanty, and in many places very imperfect, often obviously faulty. This necessitated in large measure the use of conjectural emendation. Of the difficulties and imperfections of this method of text-construction the editor was, of course, well aware. Nor does he lead the reader to expect a perfectly assured text. Yet here, too, former editions had left room for improvement. And to make such improvement as with the aid of the resources of modern scholarship could be made, Dr. Stählin has spared no pains. The text which he offers, so far as I have been able to examine, has successfully avoided the pitfalls of wild and unsafe conjecture. And not infrequently a more or less obvious correction, a slight change in punctuation, makes a decidedly better reading. Thus *πρῶτος* for *μῦθος* (p. 281, l. 30), though perhaps not all will agree that Clement must necessarily have so written, fits the context beautifully. P. 1, l. 13, interrogation-point instead of period probably represents what the author had in mind. And there are other examples of similar changes probably still better.

Besides the improved text, the reader has in the one set of notes at the bottom of the page an apparatus giving the variant manuscript readings and a generous selection of the conjectures of such scholars as Sylburg, Potter, Klotz, Markland, and Dindorf of former times, and of such present-day men as Mayor, Schwartz, von Willamowitz-Möllendorf, and Münzel (the latter's, arriving too late, in the appendix), to choose from. Of course, even so one may differ at times with all the variants offered. P. 114, l. 21, e. g., Sylburg's suggestion *διεληλυθέναι* for L's *διαλεληθέναι* looks most reasonable and would seem worthy of a place in the apparatus at least. But such omissions were of course unavoidable in making a selection of readings for even so fine and full an edition as this. And altogether it may be said, though Dr. Stählin will certainly not be able to please every reader in every passage, yet we have as a result of his work that modern, critical edition of Clemens Alexandrinus which we have been looking for, offering to the user practically all the aids to text-construction at present obtainable—an edition which scholars working upon Clement may not safely neglect.

Another feature of this edition, which it shares with its sister-volumes in the "Schriftsteller" series, is the full, and probably well-nigh exhaustive,

notation of quotations, especially valuable in the Stomatist, given in the first set of notes under the text. These have not yet been gathered up, as is the custom in this series, into an index at the end of the volume. But this, as well as the other indices which form one of the valuable adjuncts to all the "Schriftsteller" editions, is no doubt in preparation and will probably find its proper place after the conclusion of all of Clement's extant works.

As some of the minor features worthy of mention in this volume may be noted: the printing of the page-numbers of Sylburg and Potter in the margin; a table exhibiting the page-numbering of the Paris edition of 1629 is to be given at the end of Vol. III; to avoid further confusion in the handling of quotations, the somewhat faulty paragraphing of Klotz has been retained; to facilitate reference, however, subdivisions have been added, printed in heavy, legible type in the margin. Another mark of the careful work in detail upon this volume is the precision of the proofreading. In such examination as I have been able to give this matter but one slight misprint, not noted in the table of errata, has come under my notice—the lack of circumflex over ω , p. 197, l. 2.

M. SPRENLING

CHICAGO

The second "volume" of the Berlin Academy edition of Eusebius is dedicated to the church history. Of this two parts, each a substantial volume, have appeared.⁶ These contain the Greek text edited by Schwartz, Rufinus' Latin translation edited by Mommsen, the Greek of the Martyrs of Palestine, and Rufinus' continuation of Eusebius. The Greek and Latin texts are printed on opposite pages and both are furnished with footnotes, first of references and second of variations of text. A third volume containing prolegomena and indexes and completing the work is promised for 1908.

In his *Propheten- und Apostellegenden*,⁷ Schermann handles two distinct documents or groups of documents slightly connected by the facts that they are found together in manuscript, that they are both ascribed now to Euphrosynus and now to Dorotheus and that they both originated in Syria.

The stemma of the *Vitae prophetarum* on p. 132 and that of the Legends of the Apostles on p. 353 give the gist of this laborious work. Each dis-

⁶ *Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte*. Herausgegeben von der Kirchenväterkommission der Königl. Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. 2. Band, Eusebius, Th. I. u. II. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1903 and 1908. 2 vols. 1040 pages.

⁷ *Propheten- und Apostellegenden*. Von Theodor Schermann. Nebst Jungerkatalogen des Dorotheus und verwandter Texte. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1907. vii + 368 pages. M. 11.50.

tinguishes half a score or more recensions. The recensions of the *Vitae*, mostly tinged with Christian ideas, lead back through a Jewish-Greek translation to a Hebrew original. The recensions of the apostle-legends lead back through groups of Syriac and Greek recensions to a Syriac original. The careful and conservative datings of the various recensions form perhaps the most valuable part of the work.

The bibliographical value of a painstaking work of this sort on minor writings is almost greater than its critical value. The distinguishing and labeling of all the forms which reveal distinct authorships, is, at least in this case, a practical contribution of considerable interest in literary history, and the evidences which distinguish the kindred documents into various recensions are quite as interesting as the evidence which these recensions bear to the original form.

In the present temper of scholarship the publication of almost any hitherto unedited Greek text is welcomed with something, if not of eagerness, at least of satisfaction. When that text can be described as "the most comprehensive and valuable dogmatic *florilegium* which the ancient church has handed down to us" and proves to be critically edited⁸ in extremely good form, and provided with unusually clear and interesting preliminary matter as well as tolerable indexes, the welcome is bound to be cordial. The importance of the publication is very little qualified by the fact that some of the more significant parts have been fragmentarily published before.

The *Doctrina* is a collection of nine hundred and seventy-seven, mainly christological, quotations drawn from ninety-three early ecclesiastical and heretical writings and arranged in forty-five chapters. The first thirty-one chapters were probably written between 662 and 680 and were obviously compiled to confute the Monophysite and Monothelete heresies: the remaining chapters were composed before 726 and contain various matters.

The publication of the complete work is thus of direct practical interest for the study of the modern questions as to the nature of Christ and its indirect critical interest is rather exceptional. In the first place it contains an uncommonly large number of quotations from lost early writings; in the second place it furnishes seventh-century evidence for the transmission of the text of a large number of important writings, and in the third place it is itself a fine example of that higher text criticism which has a place between the simple variations of direct manuscript transmission below and compara-

⁸ *Doctrina patrum de incarnatione verbi*. Von Professor Dr. Franz Dickamp. Ein griechisches Florilegium aus der Wende des siebenten und achten Jahrhunderts. Zum ersten Male vollständig herausgegeben und untersucht. Münster: Aschendorff, 1907. 61 + 367 pages. M. 20.

tive literature above. Incidentally it involves a matter of the highest palaeographical interest in its chief manuscript (Cod. Vat. 2200)—a paper manuscript at least as early as ninth century, having a large sprinkling of beautiful majuscules and exhibiting in its minuscule writing the rare transition writing between the Roman Cursive and the later minuscule.

Diekamp treats adequately his five complete manuscripts and sundry other manuscripts of parts, the previous editions of the fragmentary portions hitherto published, the quotations, chapter heading, scholia, etc., quotations by later writers, date, and authorship. In his discussion of the relationship to other kindred works he disputes point blank Schermann's opinion that Codex P is the ground work of the *Doctrina*, and holds, on the contrary, that it is only a brief and casual series of extracts from the *Doctrina*.

In the matter of date Diekamp accepts the dictum of Loofs (662-80) as to thirty-one chapters, and puts the remainder but little later. In the matter of authorship he concludes that one must grant at least a probability that it was composed by Anastasius Sinaiticus. It will be a matter of unqualified regret to many that the editor of this first "complete" edition of the *Doctrina* has, to save space, thought it best in the case of many of the longer quotations to print only a few guiding phrases, referring to the Migne edition for the remainder and giving in the apparatus the chief variations from the Migne. If one may roughly judge from the manuscript length of the work it could not have taken more than two or three hundred more pages of print, easily managed in the same volume, and the omission reduces by 50 per cent. the satisfactory and convenient use of the work. Printed in full it would have been a model handbook and, as it is, with its excellent apparatus and identifications of quotations it is likely to be one of the real working-books of the patristic student. The general index and indexes to quotations and parallel passages are useful. An additional table of chapter headings corresponding with the German headlines would have been a real convenience, by no means duplicating the Greek manuscript index. There are two excellent specimen facsimiles.

E. C. RICHARDSON

PRINCETON, N. J.

Five years after Axon published his article on "The Mohammedan Gospel of Barnabas" in the *Journal of Theological Studies* (April, 1902) Dr. Lonsdale Ragg and Miss Ragg have completed the immense labor of editing, with critical apparatus, and translating the Italian Manuscript (Cod. 2662 Eng.) of the Gospel of Barnabas, which was a part of Prince

Eugene's library, given in 1738 to the Imperial Library of Vienna.⁹ The manuscript, a thick quarto of 255 leaves, $6\frac{1}{2} \times 4\frac{3}{8}$ inches, with rich oriental binding, belongs to the second half of the sixteenth century. It is copiously provided with Arabic glosses (translated for the present work by Professor Margoliouth), and even the word *Dio* is erased the first three times it occurs, and *Allah* written over it in red. The work is probably that of an Italian of the Renaissance period, recently converted to Islam. There is no trace of the Gospel before the year 1709, and no proof whatever of an Arabic original, assumed by George Sale in his *Preliminary Discourse*.

The Gospel of Barnabas is longer than our four canonical gospels put together. Its 222 chapters include the whole narrative of our evangelists, besides a great deal of rabbinical and talmudic teaching, distinct Mohammedan traits, and many mediaeval allusions. The author appears to know nothing about Palestine, and while pretending to be the Barnabas who accompanied Jesus in his wandering ministry, he speaks of going from Nazareth to Jerusalem by boat. He has all the mediaeval respect for potentates, dwelling much on King Herod, and always spelling the word *Re* with a capital, while *dio* has to get on with a small letter. Mary, Martha, and Lazarus are owners of feudal manors. The miracles, too, at times, take the form of Voragine's stories in the *Aurea Legenda*. For example, some Roman soldiers in the Temple, doubting the power of God's name, are rolled out of the Temple, when Jesus cries *Adonai Sabaoth*, "as one rolleth casks of wood when they are washed, to refill them with wine; insomuch that now their head and now their feet struck the ground, and that without anyone touching them" (168a). If the writer was not acquainted with Dante, his description of the punishments of sinners in hell, where the principle of *per quae peccat quis per haec et torquetur* is developed in all the grim strength of the *Inferno*, is a wonderful coincidence. And even his aphorisms sometimes suggest Dante, as when he says: "the *Wherefore* is the gate of hell" (*State contenti, umana gente, al "quia," Purg. iii, 37*).

The theological doctrine of the Gospel is a hodge-podge of rabbinical disquisitions filled with mathematical typology, of Augustinian championism of human dignity without prejudice to divine predestination, of communism among the saints and curses on the enjoyment of unearned wealth, of an asceticism rivaling in language even the dithyrambic self-depreciation of a Jacopono da Todi; of reiterated subordination of Jesus to the true and final messenger of God, Mohammed, and of bitter polemic against the

⁹ *The Gospel of Barnabas*. Edited and translated by Dr. Lonsdale Ragg and Miss Laura Ragg, from the Italian manuscript in the Imperial Library at Vienna. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907. lxxvi + 489 pages. 16s.

Pauline tenets of Christ's divinity, and the supersession of the Mosaic law.

The writer of the Gospel of Barnabas has used our canonical gospels freely, and is singularly free from the silly extra-canonical miracles connected with the birth and babyhood of Jesus. The main thesis of the long document seems to be the subordination of Jesus. Again and again, in the most solemn moments of his ministry (as at the raising of Lazarus) Jesus exclaims, "I am a man like yourselves," "I shall die like yourselves," or even pronounces a solemn curse on any who should call him Son of God. The Roman Senate even enacts a decree that Jesus shall not be called Son of God, on pain of death, and has the decree engraved in copper and posted in the Temple. Yet the author of the Gospel lets the name *Christ* stand for Jesus, while violently denying that he is the Messiah (who is Mohammed): a queer bit of philological ignorance for a man who knows enough to turn *παράκλητος* into *περικλυτός*, the latter word corresponding to Allah, "the Renowned." How unskillfully the author has combined his discordant material is shown by the fact that one of the most marvelous of Jesus' miracles (the feeding of the Five Thousand) follows the very chapter in which the Roman Senate posts the copper engraved decree in the Temple.

Whether or not the Gospel is based on the gnostic apocryphal *Evangelium Barnabae*, mentioned in the Gelasian Decree (vi, 10), must remain undetermined for want of sufficient data. However, one strikingly gnostic trait in the Gospel is the docetic account of the crucifixion, according to which Judas himself was miraculously transformed into the likeness of Jesus (even to the deception of the disciples themselves), and crucified in his stead, Jesus being caught up by God into heaven.

DAVID S. MUZZEY

NEW YORK

THEOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS

The author of *The Christian Religion: Its Meaning and Proof*¹ states in the preface the purpose of his work. It is "an attempt to explain and verify the Christian religion by means of the fatherly-filial relationship." It is not intended, therefore, to be a compendium of Christian Evidences, but rather to set forth a point of view. The writer asserts that there is a widespread dissatisfaction with the ordinary systems of Christian Evidence. They are not in accordance with the demands of modern thought, especially in its emphasis upon the principle of continuity throughout the whole range

¹ *The Christian Religion: Its Meaning and Proof*. By J. Scott Lidgett, M.A. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1907. 516 pages. \$2.50.

of reality, upon the historic, comparative, and psychological points of view, and upon the experimental note in religion. Mr. Lidgett's restatement, accordingly, professes to be along the line of these demands and he endeavors all through the volume to knead these ideas into his treatment. It is especially the last one that may be called the fundamental thesis of his work, viz., that Christianity is true because it satisfies the needs of the soul as witnessed by the Christian consciousness.

The author divides his work into three books, of which the first deals with the history and task of the Christian Evidences. It is impossible to understand the present needs of apologetics without a survey of its history. Lidgett considers the apologetic content and method of the Old Testament and then of the New Testament. This history of Christian Evidences (for this term and apologetics are practically equated) is carried through the Middle Ages and modern times down to the present day. Considering the conciseness of the treatment, this historical survey is very good. In setting forth the inadequacy of the present systems of Christian Evidences, the writer declares that, besides not meeting the demands of modern thought, they have a wrong method. This method is, first to prove theism, then the need of revelation and redemption, and finally that this need is met in Christ and his gospel. This Lidgett declares to be an inversion of the actual successive stages of theological belief; men first believe in the divine through their religious consciousness, and this is true in all religions. It is only later that the idea of God emerges as the result of the speculative interpretation of the universe. There is, of course, truth in this statement, and the theistic writer should never forget that he is trying to justify not a mere hypothesis as to the divine existence, but a belief which, potentially at least, is universal and ineradicable. Nevertheless, Mr. Lidgett should see that what the apologist would regard as the most skilful method of marshaling the Evidences would depend not only upon his philosophical and theological view-point but also upon his practical judgment. Would the Ritschlian view-point and apologetic satisfy the writer? Not entirely. He recognizes elements of great value in it, especially because it emphasizes the historical facts of religion, and these facts in their relation to the satisfaction of the spiritual life. Nevertheless, the method denies to theoretic reason a real place and an ultimate function in world-interpretation, and wrongly sets nature and man in antagonism to each other.

In his second book on *Christianity as the Absolute Religion*, our author outlines the content of the Christian religion; for, as he says, we must know what a religion is before we can vindicate its truth. Lidgett is right here. Harnack's gibe that the apologists did not in general know what

they wished to defend, yet calmly proceeded to defend it, had the sting of partial truth in it. What is this apologetic area that the writer places before us? It is larger than many apologists would make, in fact it is practically the entire content of evangelical dogmatics. All of this, however, is the Christianity which in Mr. Liddett's judgment Christian Evidences are called upon to vindicate as the absolute and final religion. In order to accomplish this task, he examines religion itself in general, its nature, origin, and relation to life, and discusses well its factors—finally laying down detailed tests by which all religions must be tried. In the light of these principles, the ethnic religions are passed in review, and their weaknesses and organic defects are pointed out. Finally, Christianity is exhibited as the fulfilment of religion, and as presenting a perfect synthesis of all the worthy elements contained in other religions.

But how can this subjective verification have universal validity? This is discussed in the third and last book, which is entitled *The Proof of the Christian Religion*. The primary argument advanced for the truth of Christianity is that it is indispensable to the full realization of the noblest human life, and that its consciousness of filial relationship to God gives abounding satisfaction and spiritual power.

The task remains to show that Christianity furnishes the only satisfactory explanation of the universe, and this is done by setting forth the world as an ordered whole, manifesting regular development, culminating in man with his civilization and religion, and fulfilled and mediated by Christ. The author's arrangement of his material here lacks, we are sorry to say, the orderly system which he is explicating and praising so highly in the universe. He very properly emphasizes general rather than specific teleology, and while admitting much truth in evolution as a process, points out that naturalism cannot make it work. Mr. Liddett's discussion, brought in just here, of the problem of evil is excellent. The author in the next place shows how Christianity in its doctrine of man and redemption gives the only key to his nature, condition, destiny, and salvation. Finally, in the last chapter in the work the writer discusses the theistic belief as an object of strictly intellectual inquiry, i. e., he sets forth in detail the elements in the Christian idea of God given in revelation and worked out by the Christian consciousness, and shows how they are in accordance with the highest reason. To the objection that the Christian consciousness may be entirely subjective, and therefore may not point to any cause outside of itself, our author gives only a short and meager reply. In fact he betrays no knowledge whatever of the work done lately in the psychology of religion by such men as James, Starbuck, Coe, Pratt, and others.

In addition to the criticisms already made, we would say that one great defect of the work is its arrangement, which leads to overlapping divisions, a large amount of repetition, and therefore to prolixity. In his treatment of the revelation of God in the Scriptures, he does not touch upon the problems of Old Testament and New Testament criticism, which a work of this kind cannot afford to ignore. The author's reading, we should judge, had been more intensive than extensive. On the other hand, the work evinces long, earnest, and sometimes original thinking. It heads in the right direction by its emphasis on religious facts and experiences, by its use of the comparative method, and by its readiness to accept the results of modern philosophy and science. The author takes a comprehensive view of his subject, and his main thesis is consistently, even though somewhat awkwardly, worked out.

BENJAMIN LEWIS HOBSON

MCCORMICK THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

In the January number of this *Journal* appeared a notice of Vol. I of the new edition of Dr. Strong's work.² Since the reader is supposed to be familiar with the earlier editions of the treatise, attention is here confined to the changes introduced into this issue. These, proportionately the same as in the first volume, due to changes in Dr. Strong's philosophical and critical point of view, are determined by two principles: an ethical monism, and an evolutionary idea as to the origin and progress of the world.

According to the first of these principles, Christ is the exclusive revealer of God in nature, humanity, and Scripture. God's creative and providential activity is exercised through him alone. Second causes in nature are only constant and automatic workings of the First Cause. Only in the free will of intelligent beings has God detached from himself any portion of force, so that it is capable of opposition to his will. Miracles, like special providences, are simply different degrees of extraordinary nature.

In the section on good and bad angels he holds that the personality of Satan is as well grounded as the personality of the Holy Spirit, of God the Father, and even of the human soul. For confirmation of his belief in these spirits, he appeals to psychology, to the objective and subjective mind, to hypnotism and suggestion, and to "demon-possession" in non-Christian lands. And he adds, "Angels were created in Christ and consist in him;

² *Systematic Theology*; A compendium and commonplace book, designed for the use of theological students, by Augustus Hopkins Strong, D.D., LL.D., in three volumes. Vol. II. "The Doctrine of Man." Philadelphia: Griffith & Rowland Press. xii + 371-776 pages. \$2.50.

he must suffer in their sin. God would save them if he could." For some of the fallen angels he holds out at least a possible hope.

In his doctrine of man he now declares that man was created, not "like the first introduction of life on this planet" (1st ed.), but through a divine reinforcement of the forces of life, not *from* but through the brute. The laws of organic development through which he originated as self-conscious, in the image of God, are divine methods and proofs of creatorship. By virtue of man's relation to the Eternal Son, there is a natural and physical sonship of all men, which antedates and prepares the way for spiritual sonship, thus conditioning the history of the fall and qualifying the doctrine of sin. Dr. Strong seems to have pared down the notion of original created righteousness to that of "holiness so far as this could belong to a yet untried being, i. e., to his tastes and dispositions prior to moral action."

He confirms his doctrine of sin by recent psychological discoveries concerning the unconscious and the subconscious elements in human character. Since man cannot be severed from the Eternal Word, no "soul is wholly given over to the power of evil." The doctrine of depravity receives an important modification (pp. 551, 552). On the other hand, it is still maintained that men are by inborn and original, not acquired, nature "children of wrath," and that physical death is part of the penalty of sin. His earlier doctrine of original sin is qualified (1) as the ethical interpretation of biological facts—hereditary and universal congenital ills, and (2) as correlated with ideas of original grace—the immanent God in every man of the race, in spite of his sin. Instead of reaffirming that Arminianism is wholly extra-Scriptural, he now confesses a large element of truth in its recognition of the universal gift of Christ, i. e., the natural light of reason and conscience, impulses to good struggling against evil, mitigating the effects of the fall and impelling men to salvation.

His ethical monism has influenced his theory of the person of Christ. He no longer objects to Dorner as pantheistic. Perhaps his most characteristic remarks here are the following: "We know of but one underlying substance and ground of being . . . self-limiting and so self-manifesting in Jesus Christ. . . . The Infinite Source has a finite manifestation; but in the finite we see the Infinite" (p. 699).

In his doctrine of the atonement which he designates as ethical he has inserted several interesting and profoundly modifying suggestions, the most significant of which is that the historical work of the incarnate Christ is not itself the atonement—it is rather the manifestation in space and time of the eternal suffering of God on account of human sin, without which "the age-long suffering of God could never have been made comprehensible

to men." He has not, however, throughout ethicised the doctrine of the atonement, since many of the old terms—punishment, payment of claims of justice, guilt of Adam's sin, bearing of penalty, suffering as penal—are still retained with much of their traditional meaning.

This volume, like the first, contains an amazing wealth of quotation drawn from wide circles of thought; sometimes the passages are more cogent and convincing than his refutation of them. The Scripture references are still printed in full, leaving nothing to be guessed by his readers. One is delighted that while he takes theology seriously, he has here and there inserted flashes of humor, as when he reports the colored physician whose method was "first to remove the disease and then to eradicate the system." In no other treatise will one find the traditional view so fully and clearly argued in the presence of modern thought. One wonders, however, how deep and far reaching the changes would be, if Dr. Strong were now to rewrite his entire system in the light of his newer principles—the Scriptures not infallible but sufficient for salvation, the universal immanent Christ, and evolution as the method of the transcendent personal Christ.

The method of theology is addition, never subtraction, except under necessity. When, therefore, a writer declares that "theology has been overloaded" and that she staggers under the burden, and at the same time offers to ease her of her load, although he knows she will resist, we are interested to ascertain first what part of the burden he proposes to unload, then on what principle he sets to work, and finally what is to be left. Dr. Johnson's aim in his book, with its apparently antithetic title,³ is to distinguish religious knowledge from theological inference. His fundamental principle, that the spiritual is real and certainly known, is coupled with the paradox, that "what we know best we know least;" "the objects of the Christian's deepest ignorance are objects of secure and indubitable knowledge." In working out this thesis under the lead of the critical principle, he analyzes one after the other traditional and prevailing theories concerning self, things, God, the Redeemer, the Paraclete, the future, and the Scriptures. The criticism, keen, central, unsparing, is judicial, reverent, evangelical, conclusive. With each new discussion entered upon, we wonder what if anything is to be left. But it is always inferences, theories, explanations that are discarded; the reality at the heart of revelation and Christian experience is unerringly seized upon and restored to its apostolic integrity, its spiritual authority. Here is agnosticism but not despair of the

³ *Christian Agnosticism as Related to Christian Knowledge*. By E. H. Johnson, D.D., LL.D. Edited with a biographical sketch and an appreciation by Henry C. Vedder. Philadelphia: Griffith & Rowland Press, 1907. xxxii + 302 pages.

reason, since it is by reason that the results are reached; and the agnosticism is Christian, since it rests in the great verities which have been the content of Christian belief from the beginning. Both ministers and thoughtful laymen will find here a book which will drive them back from speculation and dogma to "the things which cannot be shaken."

CLARENCE AUGUSTINE BECKWITH

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At a time when, as many seem to believe, an original and indigenous American philosophy—original and indigenous so far as any philosophy can be so—is at or at least near the hour of its birth, special interest and value must belong to such a historical survey of philosophy in America as Dr. Riley has undertaken.⁴ It is true that the single volume, recently published and now in review, covers only the "early schools" or in years the time roughly from 1600 to 1825; but this is only a first volume "to be followed by others in an historical series" (author's preface); for the period covered it is remarkably faithful and comprehensive, and it foreshadows, not only a proportionate thoroughness for the subsequent volumes, but also the probable method and standpoint of the whole history. This volume, then, for its particular period both more critical in its estimates and more comprehensive in its scope than Père van Becelaere's *La philosophie en Amérique*, which is the only other work at all comparable, introduces what will generally be recognized as the first serious and adequate history of American philosophy.

It is true, also, that Dr. Riley's history, to judge from this first instalment, is to be rather objective than organic, rather a history giving material in a faithful and comprehensive way, tracing the succession of men and, above all, of isms in American philosophy, and showing the contacts of these among themselves and especially with the men and isms of other countries, than a history directly and consciously alive with a developing philosophical spirit or standpoint characteristically American. But, although Dr. Riley does find that America has used the philosophies of other countries with some originality or in a way more or less her own, and although in just so far he shows himself conscious or at least suspicious of an American quality in the philosophy that he reports, still with America's philosophical spirit not yet born, however near the hour of its birth, a vital and clearly conscious history, organic and purposeful, moving progressively to a certain definite end, was hardly to be expected. One cannot

⁴ *American Philosophy: The Early Schools*. By I. Woodbridge Riley, Ph.D. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1907. ix + 595 pages. \$3.50.

write of the forerunners of an unborn philosophy as of those of Socrates or Kant. The history, then, which this volume introduces, has interest and value for being, just by its comprehensiveness and by its objective and factual character, an important event or even a turning-point in the history of American philosophy. Being what it is, must it not greatly help to make or develop America's characteristic philosophy? Directly through what it is and indirectly through the studies, I suggest through the doctor's theses, that it is likely to stimulate, is it not bound to hasten America's philosophical liberation and so eventually to make possible the more conscious or more dramatic history against which, at least by implication, I was measuring it above? Certainly there is no extravagance in saying that America's philosophical independence will never be truly accomplished until she understands and respects herself sufficiently, that is, deeply and clearly enough, to make the scholarly study of her own past thinkers and their ideas as respectably intellectual or academically proper as that even of the ancient Greeks or the modern Germans. In thought and in time Ethan Allen was far from being a forerunner of Socrates or *even* of Hegel, but many a forerunner has owed his dignified place in history only to the accident of birth. Dr. Riley may not have written a very dramatic history; he may not show much real development in his succession of isms; but he has added materially to the interest and dignity of America's intellectual past.

It is true, thirdly, that—as already charged by at least one of his reviewers—Dr. Riley has sometimes cast his net very widely, making philosophy a very hospitable thing; but must not any history do just that? Must not any history be from the broad to the narrow, from the undeveloped and confused to the highly developed and differentiated expression of that with which it deals? Puritanism and Deism, for example, were not philosophies, but Dr. Riley is right in giving them large space, for history as well as poetry must have its license. Again, the introductory chapter on "Philosophy and Politics," although in my opinion better in conception than in execution, is both pertinent and important, for it shows in a special relation a regard for the origin of philosophy in actual life and in so far emphasizes the broad foundations of philosophy as to invite interest in other relations.

So we have here an important book, important both for what it is and for what it promises. Nor must anyone infer from what has been said that this book is valuable only materially or factually and is accordingly not very readable, being lacking in literary character. The book has indeed great material value, and it is the scholarly result of extensive research, requiring

just for this one volume over three years of study and involving investigations among rare works and unpublished manuscripts, but, more than this, in spite of some passages, such as that beginning on p. 88, too long to be quoted here, that are tangles of isms and ologies, and have rather the character of algebraic formulae than of stimulating literature, it is as a whole quite readable. No portion, perhaps, will be found more interesting than the series of chapters on Deism. To the rise and decline of this "reaction against Puritan determinism," involving all the important colleges of the time and summoning to its support men of widely different temperaments, if not also of even widely different views, such men, for conspicuous examples, as Mather, Chancy, Channing, Johnson, William Smith, Franklin, Jefferson, and Thomas Paine, Dr. Riley has succeeded in giving special life and interest. For the progressives in the history of American institutions deism was manifestly a valuable asset. Intellectually or philosophically its religious rationalism, though constantly suggestive of boiling ice, was of great service in the transition from Puritanism to the Transcendentalism of Emerson. "Without the [radical] deism of Paine," declares Dr. Riley, "there had been no Emerson."

Finally, the volume in review suggests for American philosophy what might be called an experience-meeting, the testimony given being mainly that the first motives to philosophy were religious or theological. America's early philosophers were, for the most part, theologians; her early isms were Puritanism, Anti-Puritanism, Deism, and the like; so that, whatever may be true of the subsequent volumes, which will be awaited with interest and confidence, this first volume concerns the theological student no less than the student of philosophy. Indeed all students of American ideas, whatever their special point of view, will find themselves indebted to Dr. Riley.

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Professor Watson has published a series of lectures⁵ that may be regarded as a continuation of the discussion in his earlier work, *Christianity and Idealism*. At the outset he discusses the problem of authority in religious belief. An examination is made of Cardinal Newman's views and their variations and modifications in the writings of Dr. Wilfrid Ward and Abbé Loisy. Against the view that the church must guarantee a faith that is supposed to be incomprehensible to reason it is affirmed that the history

⁵ *The Philosophical Basis of Religion*.
Canada. Glasgow: Maclehose & Sons, 1907.

⁴iversity,

of religious growth is the genuine development of a living principle ever coming to clearer self-consciousness and indestructible because of its own inherent significance and truth.

A number of lectures follow, dealing with recent controversies in philosophy, special attention being given to the views of Professor James. Some keen criticisms of "pragmatism" will be found here especially in the note on "The Pragmatic Conception of Truth."

The author next discusses Harnack's historical method which is condemned because of its futile attempt to exclude philosophical interpretation. Against Harnack's static view of Christ's teaching in relation to which later theological or philosophical speculations are regarded as extraneous excrescences, the author affirms that Christ's teaching should be regarded as dynamically progressive and vitally informing in succeeding religious experience and thought. The influence of philosophical speculation on the development of Christian doctrine is traced through the Mediaeval and early modern period, with special attention to Philo, the gnostics, Augustine, Aquinas, and Leibnitz. The book concludes with a refutation of agnosticism, mysticism, and pantheism and a brief presentation of the author's views on the interrelations of God, world, and man from the standpoint of "constructive idealism."

In dealing with the vexed question of the origin and nature of evil it is said that "from the highest point of view evil is a necessary element in the development of a finite self-conscious being who only becomes good by the exercise of his freedom" and also that "free subjects only come to the clear consciousness of the higher through experience of the lower." Many who would admit the freedom would hesitate about making evil a "necessary element" "a lower" to be "experienced" to come to "clear consciousness of the higher," for this seems to be diametrically opposed to the view that evil is a stage in a descent not in an ascent, not a preparation for good but a perversion of it.

In more accordance with the usual opinion is the statement that "the teaching of Jesus was based upon his direct intuitions, not upon a process of scientific ratiocinations," but as it is on this theory that the Christian mystic rejects all "scientific ratiocinations" in his own procedure which is to be an *imitatio Christi*, the opponent of mysticism might well pause to ratiocinate a little more on this subject. Is it reasonable to suppose that the One who as a boy of twelve years of age was found in the temple with the teachers asking and answering questions would spend the later years of youth and manhood until he was thirty years of age without pondering deeply and often on those same questions of life, duty, and destiny?

It by no means proves that there has been no "scientific ratiocinations" and that everything has been secured by "direct intuitions" when results and details have been so fully and clearly thought out and comprehended that all the earlier tentative partial aspects have been superseded by complete mastery of the principles involved.

The book contains an excellent summary and index. It would improve the arrangement of the lectures if those on Kant and recent controversy were placed after Leibnitz where they belong chronologically.

In every part of the book subjects of long-standing debate have been so treated as to bring out the most recent phases of the controversy and it is scarcely necessary to add that these lectures will be warmly welcomed by many earnest students of philosophy and theology.

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THREE BOOKS ON ORIENTAL MISSIONS

Books in China are out of date so quickly in these days, when the Occident expects some startling news from the Orient at least once a week, that the latest comer upon the library table is quite sure of attention, whatever its claims otherwise. The work¹ just now in hand bears an honored name upon its title-page, and presents beside so unusually attractive an appearance in paper, print, and photographic illustrations that one is reluctant to confess to a little disappointment in its contents. Dr. Martin's very timely theme as set forth in his preface is the explanation of the subterranean forces in which the social movement in China had its origin. This is an announcement to awaken large expectations, but it can hardly be said that the interesting promise of the preface is adequately kept. What is really offered is an informal, agreeable, chatty volume of personal experiences gained through a long residence in China, with reminiscences of distinguished Chinese officials. He would be ungrateful indeed who did not welcome cordially a contribution to our knowledge of eastern affairs made by one who has been contemporary with great events in the Middle Kingdom and held many responsible positions. From the time when the boom of British cannon in the Canton River, announcing the beginning of the opium war, turned his attention to China as a mission field, Dr. Martin has had a first-hand acquaintance with its foreign and domestic affairs. He was a sympathetic observer of the course of the Tai-ping rebellion. He was one of Mr. Reed's interpreters in the negotiation of the Treaty of

¹ *The Awakening of China*. By W. A. P. Martin, D.D., LL.D., formerly president of the Chinese Imperial University. Illustrated from photographs. New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1907. 328 pages. \$3.80.

Tientsin in 1858, which contained the famous "toleration clauses" well called the "Magna Charta of Christianity in China." He was in Peking during its siege by the Boxers in 1900, an experience he confesses which rendered it "a delicate task" not long after to make a speech in congratulation of the Empress Dowager on the occasion of her seventieth birthday. But nothing in modern history is more extraordinary than the speedy and complete rehabilitation of that astute old lady in the confidence and respect of the western world. Dr. Martin has known personally such men as the great viceroy, Li Hung Chang, and Prince Kung, for fifteen years the president of the imperial council, and Sir Robert Hart, inspector general of customs, and easily the most notable figure among the foreigners residing in China.

But of all that Dr. Martin has to tell nothing will be read with greater interest by the friends of missions than his comments upon current affairs. Although by his own confession he has more than once in the past "demanded the expulsion of the Manchus, and the partition of China" he believes that the present reform movement is thoroughly serious. The Manchu government appears to be in dead earnest this time. Not that China is learning at last to love the foreigner—he is still *persona non grata*. Anti-foreign riots still express the deep-seated dissatisfaction of the Chinese people with the treaty relations with the western powers into which the government has been forced to enter. The recent boycott of American imports is not due, as some have maintained, to the sinister influence of Japanese agitators, but "is purely the result of provocation on our part." Nothing will satisfy the ruling classes of China but the entire repeal of our exclusion laws. The "new opium war," a resolute and intelligent effort to suppress a ruinous and degrading national vice, is "the most brilliant in a long series of reformatory movements."

What is the future of Christian missions? Apparently, the outcome will be the establishment of a native Christian church, quite free from any form of foreign control. "What the Chinese object to," says Dr. Martin frankly, "is not the creed but the foreigner who brings it," and the native Christian is already asking why he may not be allowed to propagate the Christian faith in his own way. Why not? His own way is presumably better than ours, because it is his own. Let us hope that the "foreigner" will succeed by and by in convincing China that he does not desire to impose upon her people an alien religion, but rather to aid her people to understand the universal religion and to claim it as their own.

The literature of the foreign missions of the Roman Catholic church is not in general accessible to Protestant students, and there is a disposition

consequently on their part to underrate the significance and the seriousness of the movement. The two volumes of *Le christianisme et l'extrême orient*² are well adapted to correct any such misunderstanding in showing that this most important and far-reaching enterprise presents problems not altogether unlike that with which Protestants are becoming familiar, and that its leaders, deeply sensible of their responsibilities, are not indisposed to confess frankly that its conduct has been marked by grave mistakes. Canon Joly openly avows himself in his preface the critic of the missions of the Roman Catholic church in India and the Far East. So far from boasting of their success he inquires rather why they have failed. Can anyone doubt that they have failed? Three hundred years sufficed to Christianize not only the Roman Empire but barbarian peoples beside who had never worn the yoke of Rome. On the other hand, the results of thirteen hundred years of a missionary propaganda in India, China, Corea, Tibet, Japan, are at the best miserably scanty. Of the eight hundred millions who people these regions *la véritable église* can claim barely four million adherents. Today the East is awakening from her long slumber, and the indications are plain that with the grave political changes impending the missionary enterprise has reached a crisis. Christianity must conquer and that speedily, or be conquered. Canon Joly turns for illustration, where we are all looking, to the Far East. In ten years, he says, China, with the help of Japan, will boast a disciplined army of a million men. And no one can doubt that the first use to which it will put this formidable force will be to drive the "foreign devils," missionaries included, into the sea. Nothing other is to be expected thereupon than that the Far East will be henceforth hermetically sealed against Christianity. This is truly an alarming prospect. Can anything be done to ward off the threatening calamity of the extinction of Christianity in these countries? M. Joly's reply compels him to set forth first an explanation of the confessed failure of the missionary enterprise of his church. He attributes it, briefly, to the refusal in the past of the clergy in India, China, and Japan to commit the control of the church to native Christians. To this selfish, timid, and short-sighted policy it is due that Christianity in these regions wears still the aspect of a foreign religion under foreign leadership and that native Christians still suffer reproach and persecution. Missionaries persist, generation after generation, in treating their converts as minors whose careful tutelage must continue "indefinitely." M. Joly's remedy is the obvious one. Re-

² *Le christianisme et l'extrême orient*. I. Missions catholiques de l'Inde, de l'Indo-Chine, de la Chine, de la Corée. II. Mission Catholique du Japon. Par Chanoine Léon Joly. Paris: B. Lethielleux, 1907. 407 and 308 pages. Fr. 7-

lease these native churches as speedily as possible from tutelage. Establish at once a native priesthood. A native episcopate, even. But may not these churches abandoned thus to leaders of their own race, fall into disorder and be led astray by heresiarchs? That is not impossible, but we have apostolic precedent in accepting the risk. An illustration is found in the story of the defeat of Christianity in Japan. If the successors of Xavier had had the courage to give Japan a self-perpetuating native church and to intrust it with the sacraments indispensable to its existence, that church might have survived the expulsion of the foreigners and even the furious persecution which followed it, and made Japan a Christian country today.

The argument thus meagerly stated Canon Joly has developed and illustrated in a clear and effective narrative of the rise and progress of Roman Catholic missions in India and the Far East. However his own church may receive his vigorous arraignment of its disastrous missionary policy, very many Protestant missionaries will sympathize with him. To quote Dr. Martin again, "it is not the foreigner's creed that the Oriental hates, it is the foreigner himself." Let the missionary therefore hasten to make himself useless, by aiding to plant in oriental soil a self-perpetuating oriental church of Christ. M. Joly's prophecy that the foreigner will be driven out of the East may fail, but the missionary policy he urges is in any event, and for Catholic and Protestant alike, the only defensible course.

Dr. Griffis's³ discussion flows into many channels and the perplexed though diligent reader is sometimes in doubt as to the particular current of speculation or events upon which he is embarked; but the author's central theme, the proposition he undertakes to prove, is clear. To quote the preface: "In the potencies of blood inheritances, geographical situation and advantages in the age and the ages, the Japanese people seem to me to have above every other nation on earth the power to become the true middle term in the coming union and reconciliation of the Orient and the Occident." That is to say, the Japanese of today are not pure Mongolians, but a composite race into which a marked Aryan strain enters, and as such peculiarly fitted for a peculiar task. The intricate argument begins with the Ainu whose ancestors, Dr. Griffis contends, were Aryans, "white men." Aryan names of places linger still today, recognizable by the student under the disguise of the Chinese characters in which they are now written. The Caucasian type of face persists. "I found the Ainu students in Tokio," says Dr. Griffis,

³ *The Japanese Nation in Evolution: Steps in the Progress of a Great People.* By William Elliot Griffis, D.D., LL.D. New York: Crowell, 1907. 420 pages. \$1.25.

"after the application of soap and water, were genuine white men, looking exactly like fresh arrivals at Ellis Island, New York City." The Malay and the Mongolian have had something to do, unquestionably, with the making of the Japanese of the present day. Nevertheless, by virtue of his Aryan inheritance through his Ainu forefathers, he is our cousin. He has a right to demand social equality. It may be taken for granted that he will understand us and sympathize with us, since his mind is "thoroughly un-Mongolian." To the establishment of this proposition Dr. Griffis brings large erudition and a wide acquaintance with "things Japanese." It is a learned, novel, and interesting argument. Its conclusion appears to explain the striking differences between the Japanese and the Chinese in art, philosophy, religion, and, most of all, in the power of assimilation from other civilizations. Japan has borrowed freely to her own enrichment. China has had but the one indigenous culture. Our cousin Japan, we are assured, is taking her place with the Aryan world-powers. May we hope that she will be recognized also one of these days as a Christian nation? "Yes," says Dr. Griffis confidently. But Christianity in Japan will be a Japanese Christianity. "Every theology or philosophy yet acclimated in Japan has been compelled to wear a Japanese kimono." It is the common conclusion reached by all Christian men who take large views of the missionary enterprise in the Orient. If the expectation that China and Japan may one day become Christian nations is no longer, as once, accounted extravagant or ludicrous, it is because we no longer expect or desire that oriental Christianity shall be based upon a traditional occidental theology or ecclesiastical policy.

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RECENT WORKS ON PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

The second number has appeared¹ in the series of studies published by Professor Clemen of Bonn under the general title, "Studien zur praktischen Theologie." Its author, Professor Dr. Eger, is director of the Theological Seminary at Friedberg, Germany. It treats concerning the preparation necessary for the ministry of the Protestant state church.

The pamphlet merits careful study. In the first part the author maintains the position that the primary qualification for a minister in the state church consists in the thorough training furnished by the German universities. In this connection the nature of the minister's office is considered,

¹ *Die Vorbildung zum Pfarramid der Volkskirche.* Von Professor Dr. Karl Eger. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1907. 72 pages. M. 1. 70.

first as that office was conceived of by Luther and his contemporaries; then as it was conceived of by the Pietists who, as he claims, placed a one-sided emphasis upon the spiritual preparation of the candidate, and lastly as that office was conceived of by Schleiermacher, who acknowledged the importance of the experimental factor but insisted at the same time upon a more thorough academic preparation. With some modification Dr. Eger adopts and defends Schleiermacher's position.

In the second part the question is raised, whether the usual university training given at the present time fully meets the needs of candidates for the ministry. It is granted that there are some defects in this respect for which, however, university teachers are not to be held responsible. Some plans are proposed for meeting this demand. Stress is laid upon the value of special seminary training to follow theological study at the university, and to serve as a more immediate and practical introduction to the labors of the ministry. Valuable hints are also given regarding the intellectual and spiritual advancement of the student after he has entered the ministry.

From our point of view we may think that in this discussion academic preparation for the ministry is emphasized too exclusively and that the criticism in regard to what the author calls the pietistic conception of the ministry is one-sided to some extent; at the same time the treatise is very suggestive and will repay careful reading.

A recent pamphlet,² the third number in a series of studies in Practical Theology, published by Professor Clemen of Bonn, discusses the peculiarity of the American sermon. We may congratulate ourselves that the peculiarity of the American pulpit is here presented to readers in Germany by Rev. Hans Haupt, a German pastor at North Tonawanda, N. Y., a man evidently well qualified to fulfil his task in an impartial manner.

The author first considers the American sermon as influenced by the absence of regard for a church year. His conclusion is that this absence does not, on the whole, have an unfavorable influence, while it is conceded that there is in American preaching less consideration of longer and connected portions of Scripture than could be desired. The American sermon is next considered as it is influenced by the national character of the American people. Here the peculiarity of the American character is sketched in a sympathetic manner and its manifestation in the sermon is pointed out. In the last division types of American preaching are considered as they are affected more or less by denominational distinctions, as well as by the individuality of the preacher.

² *Die Eigenart der amerikanischen Predigt.* Von Hans Haupt. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1907. 46 pages. M. 1.20.

The discussion must strike the reader as, on the whole, fair and impartial. We may be glad that such a pamphlet is issued in Germany, where it may serve to correct false impressions; at the same time the study of this treatise will prove suggestive and fruitful for the American pastor.

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It is refreshing to see a book on the Pastoral Teaching of Paul,³ sounding a note that has long been wanting. We have had, one is almost tempted to say, a surfeit of Pauline theology, and it is a matter of wonderment, why so few authors have tried to exhibit for the benefit of the ministry the phase of the apostle's life in which he has never been excelled.

It is a truism to say that Paul made himself felt most in his day by virtue of his public ministry, and that a study of the characteristics of this ministry ought to be valuable and inspiring for the modern servants of the church.

This book aims to study the principles upon which Paul acted and the methods he employed, rather than to listen to his injunctions to other ministers. For this reason little use is made of the pastoral epistles. The arrangement is interesting. Chap. i treats of the minister as a workman, his instrument, the gospel; his material, social beings; his object, Christian maturity, Christian perfection, ideal society. Chap. ii deals with Paul's conception of the pastor and the pastorate. Chap. iii analyzes Paul's conceptions of the ministry under the twelve ideas—apostle, servant or minister, herald, prophet, preacher, teacher, ambassador, steward, worker unto the Kingdom of God, soldier, husbandman, skilled master-builder. The Miletus address, the love of souls, the charity chapter, Paul's prayers, are made subjects of discussion in successive chapters. Chap. viii is the most important one of the book with a keen analysis of Paul's estimate of the royal ordinance of preaching. Here the author gives some timely hints: The object of Paul's preaching was to produce repentance and faith in the safety in the Messianic Kingdom (Acts 26:18; cf. Eph. 1:18). In order to attain this object, he uses as subjects of his preaching chiefly the facts of Christ's life, the preparation for Christ, his own personal experience of Christ.

Preachers assume that the knowledge of their hearers in reference to the facts of the life of Christ, as found in the gospels, is equal to their own. But examination into the actual state of the case will often reveal a remarkable ignorance of the contents not merely of the New Testament but of the gospels.

³ *The Pastoral Teaching of St. Paul: His Ministerial Ideals.* By W. Edward Chadwick. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribners, 1907. xxii + 394 pages. 3s. 6d.

A strong plea is made for emphasis on the message of the gospel to the whole man in all his social relations. The last two chapters deal with Paul's conception of prophecy and his idea of wisdom, under which heads the author pleads for increased attention to the highest functions of the ministry and for increased devotion to proper intellectual pursuits.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

HUGO P. J. SELINGER

BRIEF MENTION

KAFTAN, JULIUS. *Drei akademische Reden*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1908. 71 pages. M. 1.50.

The first of these addresses is on Kant's Doctrine of the Categorical Imperative, which the author regards as the central feature of that philosopher's system. Kaftan concedes the necessity of supplementing the Kantian principle by means of more concrete ideals and an empirical study of the adaptation of means to ends, but maintains that the sense of duty is a safer guide than calculation as to the probable effect of one's action. Little room seems to be left for the deliberate revision of habitual moral judgments. The second address is on the Ethical Value of Science. The Kantian ideal (the development of moral personality) is set over against that of Schleiermacher (the control of nature by reason). According to the latter view, scientific investigation, when successful, would have more ethical value than other work equally conscientiously done. But on the Kantian principle, which Kaftan accepts, the scientist's work has no more ethical value than any other labor, save as it develops in him such qualities as truthfulness, patience and deliberation. In the third address, which is on the Unity of Knowledge, the author combats once more the attempt to co-ordinate faith in God with the findings of science. He maintains that such an attempt has no value for knowledge, and is, on account of its pantheistic tendency, injurious to religion. It expresses the scholastic and essentially pagan evaluation of knowledge as the highest good, and fails to appreciate the true evangelical conception of faith as being not a function of the theoretical spirit, but a personal relation to its object. The author does not make clear, however, that the difference between the psychological conditions of the rise of the knowledge of God and those of the knowledge of the world necessarily results in such a difference in the two groups of propositions that no attempt should be made to relate them to each other in an orderly system.

BARNES, EARL. *Where Knowledge Fails*. ("The Art of Life Series.") New York: Huebsch, 1907. 60 pages. \$0.50.

This is an attempt to cure agnosticism in religion by homeopathic treatment. With the aid of popular Kantianism, knowledge, as the copying of extra-mental reality, is removed, leaving room for faith, interpreted as the making and using of such hypotheses with regard to the unknown as may be necessary to vital interests. Religious faith must be careful, however, to avoid trespassing upon the territory of science.

MÉNÉGOZ, E. *La valeur religieuse des principes de la théologie évangélique moderne*. Paris: Fischbacher, 1908. 12 pages. M. o. 70.

In this pamphlet in which the author gives an interesting sketch of a typical modern religious experience, "modern evangelical theology" is defined as the theology which establishes an intelligent distinction between the essence of religion and its contingent and temporary manifestations, and which applies to these manifestations the methods universally recognized in the study of the secular sciences. This theology is profoundly religious and Christian, and is qualified to contend successfully against contemporary materialism. It places religion in the domain of conscience, and in the matter of repentance cannot make the slightest concession, but in questions of criticism it fully concedes all that scientific honesty demands.

KNABENBAUER, JOSEPHO. *Commentarius in duos libros Machabaeorum*. Paris: Lethielleux, 1907. 435 pages.

The first two books of Maccabees are bound to have a perennial interest and value for the New Testament student. They are our main source for forty years of most important history, viz., the Maccabean period, 175-135 B. C. Two books bearing on this period have lately appeared from Roman Catholic scholars. The one is a general survey of the apocryphal books of the Old Testament by André entitled *Les apocryphes*; the other, the book by Knabenbauer here under review, viz., a commentary on the first two books of Maccabees. André's work must have antedated this commentary by at least a year but Knabenbauer makes no reference to it. The present commentary is dedicated to Pope Leo XIII and belongs to a series upon the Old and New Testaments, "ad sanctorum patrum et vetustiorum scholae doctorum iuniorumque interpretum normam." Naturally one cannot expect it to be radical or advanced.

The book consists of prolegomena, text (Latin and Greek in parallel columns), and commentary. The prolegomena or introduction to I. Macc. treats the matter under the usual heads of title, contents, letters, and documents, etc., closing with a careful analysis of the whole into sections. Knabenbauer does not construct a text nor does he accept that of Swete, but goes back to the text of Fritzsche (1871), making but few changes. The text he prints by sections according to his analysis, following each section with a running commentary. Of the unknown author, he says perhaps too little. He was a Palestinian Jew, while the translation of his work was probably Alexandrian. In regard to date Knabenbauer certainly seems to have the advantage of the argument over Toy and others in placing it shortly after the death of John Hyrcanus, about 105 B. C., rather than earlier. He holds very strongly that both Geiger and Niese have exaggerated the partisan spirit of the author and also the objections to the letters and documents inserted in the book as not being authentic. Exaggeration in the numbers of combatants and slain he readily admits, but shows by numerous references to Appian, Diodorus Siculus, and even Polybius, that it was a type of exaggeration common to the time.

A precisely similar plan is followed in II Macc. with the addition in the introduction of three topics, the purpose of the author, the historicity of the narrative, and the language. The book, as its author states, is an epitome by himself of five books by one Jason. This statement Knabenbauer accepts as genuine in opposition to Koster and Kamphausen. He recognizes that the author's purpose is particularly religious and patriotic. He holds that both the book itself and the two introductory

letters to the Jews in Egypt were first written in Greek. His conservative tendency appears strongly in his holding to the general reliability of II Macc., in opposition to Wellhausen and most modern scholars. He apparently holds to its inspiration in the theological sense and goes to considerable pains to harmonize I and II Macc. where they seem parallel. With Fritzsche and Schürer against Geiger and Wellhausen, Knabenbauer holds that I Macc. was not known to the writer of II Macc. The work as a whole is thoroughly readable and helpful. The continuous running commentary makes it somewhat difficult to find the comment on any given verse. A list of abbreviations and an alphabetical index of leading words and names would be an improvement.

GRENFELL, B. P., AND HUNT, A. S. *Fragment of an Uncanonical Gospel from Oxyrhynchus*. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1908. 22 pages. 1s.

This pamphlet is a reprint from the Oxyrhynchus Papyri of Part V, No. 840, containing one of the many finds made by the Egyptian Exploration Fund in the mounds at Oxyrhynchus. The find seems a small one, only one vellum leaf closely written on both sides on a space hardly two inches square. But insignificant as it seems, its contents bring it at once into prominence for all who are especially interested in the thoughts and words of Jesus.

After a broken reference to a warning to his disciples, the fragment, in a dramatic way, pictures Jesus as coming with his disciples into the place of purification in the Temple, in sight of its holy vessels, when a Pharisee, a chief priest, rebukes him for doing this without having washed. The priest claims that he has washed in the Pool of David, descending to it by one staircase and returning by another, and thus properly surveying the Temple and its holy vessels. Jesus ridicules this cleansing in water where dogs and swine have been cast day and night, cleansing only the outside skin like the harlots and flute girls. He and his disciples, on the other hand, have been dipped in the waters of eternal life.

It seems quite clear that the essential thought is truly Christian, i. e., true to Jesus, who emphasized the contrast between outward religious observance and inward purity; cf. Matt. 15: 1-20; Mark 7: 1-23. The fragment is exact in a few details, but in several points, notably "place of purification," "pool of David," it seems to be inexact and suggests an imaginative setting by a writer who had but scant and general knowledge of the temple precincts. Grenfell and Hunt place the manuscript in the fourth century A. D., but think the text was composed probably shortly before 200 A. D. in Egypt and conclude, "while the story of the dialogue between Christ and the chief priest has no claim to be accepted as authentic . . . the fragment is an interesting and valuable addition to the . . . uncanonical traditions concerning Christ's teaching."

SCHWARTZ, EDUARD. *Eusebius Kirchengeschichte: Kleine Ausgabe*. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1908. 442 pages. M. 4.80.

This is an abridged edition of the larger work in two parts or volumes by the same author, the first of which appeared in 1903 and the second with this shorter edition. It presents in one volume the full Greek text of the larger work, omitting the Latin translation of Rufinus, edited by Mommsen, and the less important textual variants. All the references to the Old and New Testaments are given but the apparatus. The

page and line numbering of the two-volume edition is given on the right margin. This will enable the student to use the third volume of prolegomena and indices promised for next year, in connection with this abridged edition.

JERMAIN, FRANCES D. *In the Path of the Alphabet: An Historical Account of the Ancient Beginnings and Evolution of the Modern Alphabet*. Fort Wayne, Ind.: Page, 1906. 160 pages. \$1.25.

This volume is gotten out as a memorial of its author, by her many friends. It traces the development of the alphabet from the Egyptian and cuneiform beginnings down to the teaching of Mohammed. In the very nature of the case it can be and is nothing more than a rapid bird's-eye view and the author has been necessarily dependent upon others to a large extent for her information. Unfortunately her authorities are not always the most reliable. It is difficult to see of what practical use such a volume can be.

BECKER, C. H. *Christentum und Islam (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher)*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1907. 56 pages. M. 0.50.

Becker's pamphlet furnishes a brief comparison of the ideals and institutions of Mohammedanism with those of Christianity and arrives at the conclusion that Mohammed was indebted to Christian influences for practically all of the more important of his teachings. Judgment as to the correctness of this position must be left to specialists in Mohammedan learning.

TOFFTEEN, O. A. *Researches in Assyrian and Babylonian Geography*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1908. 59 pages. \$1.

This is in large part a reprint from the *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures* of Professor Toffteen's dissertation for the doctorate. It will be found of interest and value only to those capable of reading the cuneiform tablets for themselves.

ROBERTS, R. *Das Familien-, Sklaven- und Erbrecht im Qorân (Leipziger Semitische Studien, II, 6)*. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1908. 56 pages. M. 2.20.

This is a careful study of family laws as reflected in the Qorân. The author takes up such matters as marriage, divorce, adultery, the rights and duties of children, slave laws, and inheritance. It seems to be a reliable and careful piece of work and should prove of interest and value to all students of Moslem jurisprudence.

THE MESSANIC HOPE OF THE SAMARITANS. By JACOB, SON OF AARON, High Priest of the Samaritans. Translated from the Arabic by ABDULLAH BEN KORI. Edited with an Introduction by W. E. BARTON. Reprinted from *The Open Court*, 1907. 36 pages. \$0.25.

This is an interesting document as affording an insight into the aims and hopes of the little Samaritan Community at Nablous. Several good photographs enliven the text. The High Priest's exegesis is in the highest degree rabbinical in its method and spirit.

ADENEY, WALTER F. *How to Read the Bible*. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1907. 128 pages. 50 cents net.

A very simple introduction to Bible-study on thoroughly scholarly lines. It will serve as a good handbook for elementary teacher training.

VINING, E. P. *Israel, or Jacob's New Name, Showing that the Meaning of the Name and the Use of Cognate Words Furnish Several Convincing Proofs of the Historicity of the Biblical Record Concerning Him and of the Early Date of the Pentateuch*. Reprinted from *Watchword and Truth*. Boston: American Printing Company, 1908. xii + 192 pages.

"It has therefore been fully demonstrated, as our first point, that it pleased our Heavenly Father to embody in the meaning of the name 'Israel' conclusive proof of the falsity of the skeptical theories of modern 'higher' criticism" (p. 81).

SMALL, ALBION W. *Adam Smith and Modern Sociology*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1907. 247 pages. \$1.25.

To the ethical philosopher and theologian this book is valuable as indicating the concrete contents in actual life of the moral law. It is shown that political economy treats only one aspect of the world of obligation, and that sociology is needed to establish the relative significance of larger, higher, and more abiding interests than those of wealth.

DENSMORE, ERNEST. *Sex Equality: A Solution of the Woman Problem*. New York: Funk and Wagnalls Co., 1907. 390 pages. \$1.50.

A popular argument, with copious quotations from biologists and stories of successful women, to prove that, with a fair chance, women can do almost anything that man can do, or something better.

BUREAU, PAUL. *La crise morale des temps nouveaux*. Paris: Blond et Cie, 1907. 460 pages.

Professor Bureau is a lay representative of the liberal, republican, and modern group in the Catholic church of France. He believes in modern scientific methods and in the possibility of harmony between church and reason. Trained as a lawyer and scholar he studies the dark side of French or rather human life in our day with the anxiety and solicitude of a serious patriot. With painful accuracy he discloses the immorality which has invaded domestic, industrial, and political conduct, and demonstrates its destructive tendency. He turns away from the remedies offered by the fanatics of free thought and by the reactionaries and obscurantists of the clergy; and he seeks for grounds of sober optimism in the movements of earnest spirits in all sects and lands who manifest in devotion to the common welfare a spiritual insight. His definition of religion includes all who rise above debasing materialism and discover in the universe a moral meaning and consecrate themselves to their best ideals. His pages show familiarity with the literature of our age and his notes serve as a guide to the characteristic thoughts of the conflicting and mediating parties. He shows a generous appreciation of America; unfortunately the vices he portrays are only too common on this side of the Atlantic; and we also need his argument and appeal.

PORTER, S. F. *The Shepherd Heart*. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1907. 63 pages. \$0.20.

A simple, vital discussion of the personal qualities in the work of the preacher. "The minister who lives among men and for men, and has a heart disciplined into purity until with open face he beholds the glory of the Lord, and is changed into the same image from glory to glory, will not fail of a vision, nor want a message of comfort and power."

AKED, CHARLES A. *A Ministry of Reconciliation*. Chicago: Revell, 1907. 27 pages. \$0.15.

The first sermon in his American pastorate of a man who has been a fearless and persuasive preacher of the gospel in Liverpool. That Dr. Aked has much true understanding of American conditions and great desire to be a man of "light and leading" among us is evidenced by this sermon. It is also evident that an authoritative word must come from a longer and deeper experience of our complex life.

DILLMANN, AUGUST. *Ethiopic Grammar*. Second Edition, enlarged and improved (1899) by CARL BEZOLD. Translated by JAMES A. CRICHTON. London: Williams & Norgate, 1907. xxx+581+ix pages. 25s. net.

This admirable translation of Dillmann's grammar will be heartily welcomed by all English and American students of Ethiopic. In fact it should encourage many to take up work in this field where there is abundant opportunity for original work. As Professor Bezold remarks, this translation "will form a worthy companion-volume to Dr. Crichton's recent edition of Professor Nöldeke's *Syriac Grammar*. And one may add, a worthy companion-volume to the Collins-Cowley translation of the Gesenius-Kautzsch *Hebrew Grammar*."

WEINEL, HEINRICH. *Die Stellung des Urchristentums zum Staat*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1908. 64 pages. M. 1.50.

The address which Weinell delivered on his entrance upon the office of professor of theology at Jena in June of last year treats an important subject, but in an indefinite manner. After reading it one still asks, What was the precise attitude of the primitive Christians toward the state?

HEUSSI, KARL. *Kompendium der Kirchengeschichte*. Erste Hälfte. *Die Kirche im Altertum und im Frühmittelalter*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1907. 192 pages. M. 3.

Dr. Heussi calls his church history a "compendium." But it is something more. It gives the conclusions of recent historical writers on almost all important questions, and ample literary references for those who wish to go farther. He often follows Harnack, but is not in bondage to him. Teachers will find in this book an admirable guide.

KRÜGER, GUSTAV. *Das Papsttum, seine Idee und ihre Träger*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1907. 163 pages. M. 1.

A small book on the history of the papacy, written by a specialist, and designed for the German people. It is one of that very able series of popular writings published

for the purpose of sowing among the laity the conclusions of liberalistic theologians. There is but little in this book to which any Protestant will object, though the Catholic will find it subversive of much that he believes.

GORDON, S. D. *Quiet Talks on Personal Problems*. New York: Armstrong, 1907. 224 pages. \$0.75.

Mr. Gordon's helpful naïve, little books have had a remarkable sale. They do not touch religious problems profoundly, but are adapted to the immature mind that needs practical guidance.

MOORE, WILLIAM THOMAS. *Preacher Problems*. New York: Revell, 1907. 387 pages. \$1.50 net.

This book makes no contribution to pastoral theology. It is a series of very brief practical discussions of the problems of the modern minister.

BASHFORD, J. W. *God's Missionary Plan for the World*. New York: Eaton & Mains. viii + 178 pages. \$0.75.

Bishop Bashford of the Methodist Episcopal church presents in nine lectures, with a Methodist constituency in view, the familiar, long-accepted argument for foreign missions. This conversion of the world is the purpose of God from the beginning and the Old and New Testaments are the revelation of the progressive accomplishment of this eternal purpose. The divine method to be pursued in securing power, workers, means, results, is revealed in the Bible. A qualified plea for "tithing" is made as the divine method of securing means.

SCHERER, JAMES A. B. *What Is Japanese Morality?* Philadelphia: The Sunday School Times Co., 1906. viii + 87 pages. \$0.75.

Japanese morality, in a word, is loyalty. "The spirit of loyalty in one form or another is the sole controlling ideal of Japanese morals," and the supreme rule of conduct. Falsehood, treachery, murder, suicide, the contemptuous and even cruel renunciation of the most sacred family ties are wholly admirable and praiseworthy if prompted by loyalty. Bushido, still the controlling popular ideal, is nothing more than a large-sounding word for an extravagant devotion to a divine Emperor. Nevertheless, Professor Scherer finds in this paradoxical conception of morality a preparation in some sort for Christianity. It makes easy the acceptance of the teaching of the fatherhood of God; and the complete surrender of Jesus Christ to the will of his Father appeals to the reverence and enthusiastic devotion of the Japanese. The brief discussion is fortified by illustrations from the history of Japan and anecdotes furnished by the author's residence in the land of the rising sun.

Jahrbuch der evangelischen Judenmission. Volume I, HERM. L. STRACK, Editor. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1906. 124 pages. M. 2.

The papers contained in this yearbook were presented to the International Jewish Missionary Conference meeting at Amsterdam in 1906. They are published as they were delivered in German or in English. A table of "Protestant Missions to Jews"

catalogues nearly ninety societies or institutions, English, Continental, American, which, by a great variety of methods, and some with very slender resources, are engaged in the undertaking. It would appear certainly that interest in this particular missionary effort is not declining.

DEWHURST, F. E. *The Investment of Truth and Other Sermons*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1907. 274 pages. \$1.25.

The sermons of the lamented Frederick E. Dewhurst need the atmosphere of his church and the pulse of his living breath for their best interpretation. But even the critic who never heard the preacher feels the genuineness and vitality of the thinker and the quiet intensity of the sermons. The Scripture is used but as suggestion of principle or symbol of truth; there is little or no critical explanation; the seed-thought at once grows in modern life; but the sermons are remarkably true to the Scripture. Only a careful scholar would discuss "The Investment of Truth" from the parable of the talents, and yet truth, not capacity for truth as in Horace Bushnell's famous sermon, properly fits the talent in every part of the parable.

The sermons have the modern touch, the understanding of the questions of life, especially those that confront thoughtful men, who are unable to express the new experiences under old forms of truth. And yet there is the constant effort to remove the sermons from mere inquiry by the illustrations and applications of common life. They not only connect modern thinking with the deepest religious truth, but they often have a searching ethical quality, as in "The Higher Legalism." He shows that true Christian ethics demands a growing ethical ideal; "new occasions teach new duties."

It is a criticism against the range of the sermons, not their reality, that they are a philosophy of religious truth, more than an evangel, not emphasizing, what every man, thinker or worker, needs to hear, the message of divine forgiveness and help to the weary and heavy-laden, the sinning and suffering.

NIEBERGALL, F. *Was ist uns heute die Bibel?* Tübingen: Mohr, 1907. 85 pages. M. 1.20.

Another volume in the "Lebensfragen" series. The author shows that the abandonment of the conception of the legal authority of the Bible and the acceptance of the historical point of view compels us to ask what the value of the Bible is. He argues that the person of Christ as set forth in the New Testament compels from us a voluntary recognition of the supreme authority of the divine purpose which Christ reveals. The Bible, from this point of view, is the record of the progressive revelation of the divine purpose.

LOBSTEIN, P. *Etudes sur la doctrine chrétienne de Dieu*. Paris: Fischbacher, 1907. 187 pages.

Those who are familiar with Professor Lobstein's suggestive *Introduction to Protestant Dogmatics* will welcome this little volume of studies. He discusses the doctrines of eternity, omnipresence, omniscience, omnipotence, and personality, seeking, in accordance with his theological programme, to disengage the religious elements from the philosophical, and to make positive use of the gospel in Scripture in constructing a positive statement.

BROCKINGTON, A. A. *Old Testament Miracles in the Light of the Gospels*. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribners, 1907. 144 pages. \$1.25.

The author sets out with the point of view of the Fourth Gospel: All miracles are "teaching signs" (viii). Consequently the "Plagues of Egypt" exhibit for our learning Jehovah's "creative power" (p. 14); the "Passage of the Red Sea," Jehovah, the Deliverer (*ibid.*); the "Pillar of Cloud and Fire," Jehovah as Light (*ibid.*); Manna and the Water from the Rock," Jehovah, as Sustainer (p. 15). Other chapters present "The Signs of God the Healer;" "Warning Signs;" "The Signs of God the Resurrection and the Life." No attempt was made to cover the entire list of the Old Testament miracles and this selection is treated without regard to critical studies (viii).

The style is very simple and clear. The few printed Greek words—always translated—would not in the least interrupt the interest of the average reader. Where modern science assists in the elucidation and comprehension, it is invoked. The book, so filled with apt quotation and pointed pious illustration, lends itself easily to a series of devotional sermons on Old Testament miracles prepared for a distinctive Christian congregation, seeking divine comfort and guidance. Thus probably the material first took shape.

MILLS, L. H. *Avesta Eschatology, Compared with the Books of Daniel and Revelations (sic!): Being Supplementary to Zarathushtra, Philo, the Achæmenids, and Israel*. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1908. vii + 85 pages.

An expansion of a discussion which first appeared as an Appendix to C. H. H. Wright's *Daniel*. The work is valuable as a compendious statement of the more important teachings of Zoroastrianism from the pen of the distinguished professor of Zend philology in Oxford. In tracing dependence of Hebrew ideas upon Persian, however, Dr. Mills has pushed his facts too far. The mere fact of more or less close resemblances is insufficient of itself to establish interdependence.

Parallel development of thought are not at all uncommon. The history of exilic and post-exilic Israel renders it *a priori* probable that Israel did learn much from Persia; but the only conclusion possible in the light of facts so far adduced to show dependence is a Scotch verdict.

BEE, JOSEPH AGAR. *A Key to Unlock the Bible*. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1907. 160 pages. 50 cents net. An elementary introduction to the Bible.

WEIDNER, R. F. *The Doctrine of the Ministry*. Chicago: Revell, 1907. 142 pages. \$0.75.

This book is a part of the author's *Systematic Theology*. It is a minute and thorough syllabus of the Scripture and confessional teachings concerning the Christian ministry, based on the studies of Luthards and Krauth, though greatly enlarged from their work. Dr. Weidner has studied all important writers on the subject, and his syllabus is really a history of opinions.

The New Testament teaching on the subject is well summarized on p. 64, and this is followed by a full exposition of Lightfoot's views in his "Essay on the Christian

Ministry." It is a question whether this mass of bricks can be made into a living temple; whether the microscopic criticism and statement can be made to give a prophetic vision.

FREEMAN, JOHN D. *Life on the Uplands*. New York: Armstrong, 1907. 139 pages. \$0.75 net.

Another attempt to unify the Twenty-third Psalm under the figure of the Shepherd. Exegetically it cannot be called very successful, but it is a beautiful bit of devotional writing.

SOUTHHOUSE, ALBERT J. *The Making of Simon Peter*. New York: Eaton & Mains. \$1.25.

The story of Peter homiletically told.

RICHTER, JULIUS. *Indische Missionsgeschichte*. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1906. 443 pages. M. 6.

A well-written, comprehensive historical survey of missionary activity in India, with illustrations and tables of statistics to present the concrete situation to the reader.

STOSCH, R. *Der innere Gang der Missionsgeschichte in Grundlinien gezeichnet*. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1905. 275 pages. M. 4.

The Materials of Religious Education: Being the Principal Papers Presented at, and the Proceedings of the Fourth General Convention of the Religious Education Association, Rochester, New York, February 5-7, 1907. Chicago: Executive Office of the Association, 1907. 379 pages. \$3.

The last volume published by the Religious Education Association, like the previous ones, is stimulating reading. The early volumes of necessity were devoted more largely to discussions of an inspirational character. This element is refreshingly in evidence here, but we also begin to reap the benefit of the valuable investigative work which the Association is directing. More and more we may expect the publications to become invaluable sources of information as to what is actually being accomplished in the realm of religious education.

VERDUNOY, ABBÉ. *L'évangile: Synopse, vie de notre seigneur, commentaire*. Paris: Gabalda, 1907. xx+380 pages. Fr. 3.50.

The title indicates concisely the general purpose of the work. An introduction of thirty pages sets forth the importance of the gospels, their inspiration, and their literary formation, from a Roman Catholic point of view. The gospel material is divided into three main parts (birth and early years of Jesus, his public life, and his glorified life), which are subdivided into 190 sections. The novel feature of the harmonic arrangement is the insertion of the first eleven chapters of John in a body between vs. 28 and 29 of the nineteenth chapter of Luke. The Abbé does not present this as a chronological arrangement, of course, and suggests another "possible" one in his table of contents, but the inferiority of any such arrangement for the ne-

which this book is intended, appears at once when it is compared with such a work as that of Professors Stevens and Burton. The comments throughout the work naturally accord with the point of view of the introduction. Nevertheless, the advantages of the work for Catholic students must be recognized and appreciated. Though the method and the historical material offered are not abreast of present-day scholarship, yet the book betokens progress for those who will use it. The volume has agreeably serviceable indexes.

HEMMER, OGER ET LAURENT. *Doctrine des apôtres, épître de Barnabé: texte grec, traduction française, introduction et index.* Paris: Picard, 1907. cxvi + 122 pages. Fr. 2.50.

This is Part I of *Les pères apostoliques* in the general series, *Textes et documents pour l'étude historique du christianisme, publiés sous la direction de Hippolyte Hemmer et Paul Lejay*. The editors, in their general announcement, state that the collection will include the most useful sources for the study of Christian history and doctrine in a cheap, and at the same time scholarly, form. The appended list of the writings which the series is to include is attractive, and the volumes will undoubtedly receive a hearty welcome. For English students the chief attraction will be the prospect of better texts of some of the early Christian literature, since the series of Ante-Nicene Fathers and the two series of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers supply translations and introductions—confessedly unsatisfactory in various respects to be sure—for most of the works which the French editors intend to offer. The text is not to be a critical one, but rather a resultant from the best already recognized texts. The volume now at hand presents some variations from the familiar text of Gebhardt, Harnack, and Zahn. The editors are to be congratulated on their willingness to undertake so important and so promising a task.

CLARK, MARY MEAD. *A Corner in India.* Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1907. 168 pages. \$1.

Dr. and Mrs. Clark have lived in the Naga Hills of Assam as missionaries of the American Baptist Missionary Union for more than thirty years, and their steadfast and self-sacrificing labors in this "corner in India" have borne abundant fruit. They are able to report today eleven little churches with about eight hundred members and a training school in a region which when they first visited it was inhabited by spirit worshippers. Of their unique experiences among these savages Mrs. Clark has written a cheerful and picturesque narrative which may well have a conspicuous place in the mission section of the church library.

LINDSAY, ANNA R. B. *Gloria Christi: An Outline Study of Missions and Social Progress.* New York and London: Macmillan, 1907. 302 pages. \$0.50.

Gloria Christi, the seventh of the textbooks prepared for the use of women's missionary circles, supplements its predecessors by a presentation of the sum total of the modern missionary achievement, apart from its evangelistic endeavor, in its various educational, medical, industrial, and philanthropic activities. Furnished as it is with questions for discussions and a bibliography of the most accessible books, it should be a convenient and useful manual if the class using it were provided in addition with a competent teacher. But its style calls aloud for correction and revision.

MONCRIEFF, G. K. S. *Eastern Missions from a Soldier's Standpoint*. London: The Religious Tract Society, 1907. 181 pages.

Colonel Scott-Moncrieff writes to correct the impression that "the average Anglo-Indian official is indifferent to the highest interests of the people over whom he rules," and also to place on record his conviction that "the missionaries are the agents of effecting a change far more lasting and beneficial than any government can bring about." Military duty afforded him an excellent opportunity to observe missionaries and their ways in the Punjab and the Northwest Frontier. And he was also an eye-witness of the courage and steadfastness of the Chinese Christians during the siege of Peking by the Boxers. His valuable testimony is embodied in a direct simple narrative which is altogether winning and convincing.

BARTON, J. L. *The Unfinished Task of the Christian Church*. Introductory Studies in the Problem of the World's Evangelization. New York: Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, 1908. 205 pages. \$0.50.

The evangelization of the world is of course the "unfinished task" to the completion of which Dr. Barton calls, in particular, the student volunteers of American colleges. His definition of evangelization is large enough to embrace any and every form of missionary activity, and he appears to be at pains to emphasize as little as possible the words "in this generation" commonly thought indispensable to the effectiveness of the famous "watchword." Successive chapters set forth the obligation to undertake the task, the obstacles, the successes already won, and the adequacy of available resources. The book is admirable in the selection and arrangement of very useful material.

ZWEMER, S. M. *Islam, a Challenge to Faith Studies on the Mohammedan Religion and the Needs and Opportunities of the Mohammedan World from the Standpoint of Christian Missions*. New York: Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, 1907. 281 pages.

A textbook on the great missionary problem of the twentieth century and a useful compendium of up-to-date information regarding a subject in which Christian churches today are only beginning to take an interest. Mr. Zwemer will convince them if anybody can that missions to Moslems is a matter vital to the future of Christianity, and that they have already met with encouraging success.

MOSCROP, THOMAS, AND RESTARICK, A. E. *Ceylon and Its Methodism*. London: Robert Culley, 1908. 128 pages. 1s. 6d.

This little volume belongs to "The Methodist Missionary Library," and with the exception of two readable chapters of general information it contains merely a recital of the planting and growth of Methodist churches in Ceylon. We learn that it is possible today to speak of a "Ceylon Methodist church, and that a Provincial Synod is rendering great service in Methodizing our scattered churches." This will be good news for Methodist readers.

CARUS, PAUL. *The Dharma, or The Religion of Enlightenment*. An Exposition of Buddhism. Fifth edition, revised and enlarged. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1907. 161 pages.

CUSHING, J. N. *Christ and Buddha*. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. 157 pages.

Dr. Carus expounds Buddhism from Buddhist sources, presenting in abundant citation the pure teaching or what is reported to be the pure teaching of the Enlightened One. Of the founder of Buddhism or of the history of the faith little or nothing is said. There is explanation but no criticism. Dr. Cushing deals not only with the teaching of the Buddhist Scriptures but with present-day Buddhism, the religion of the people of Burmah and Ceylon, both in the coast cities where foreign influences have modified it and in the distant interior where ancestral beliefs have been held intact. With cordial recognition of what is good and true in Buddhism, he brings it into comparison with Christianity as respects its ethics, its doctrine of God, of man, of sin, of salvation, of a future existence. It cannot be said that the one book either supplements or corrects the other. Their authors stand on different planes. But certainly the readers of either book would find profit in reading the other.

CURTIN, JEREMIAH. *The Mongols: A History*. With a Foreword by Theodore Roosevelt. Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1908. 412 pages. \$3.

Nothing in this volume is so readable as the seven animated pages of "Foreword," and it is not unlikely that many would-be readers will go no farther. Writing, it would seem for scholars and specialists, Mr. Curtin has told his story at great length and with fatiguing detail. At the best the records of the birth and growth of the Mongol power, translated with enormous industry out of many Asiatic languages, do not make lively reading, and the really significant facts are not given the prominence they deserve. The narrative closes with the expulsion from China of the Mongols early in the fifteenth century.

The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Vol. XXX, No. 3; November, 1907.

This is a noteworthy symposium on the burning questions of the day. Edward Judson treats the church in its social aspect in his usual, winsome way, making evident the claim of the Institutional church. J. W. Cochran and Charles Stelzle have fine papers on the "Industrial Group and the Church's Relation to Them." E. W. Capen has an unusually interesting article on "Missionary Principles." Professor Kerby's article on the social work of the "Roman Church in America" will be a surprise to many. Mr. Thomas J. Evans, of the University Settlement, Philadelphia, and Miss Simkhovitch, of Greenwich House, give us the religious influence of the settlement. Mr. Farwell and Mr. Evans describe the suburban and factory town work. The articles by Mr. R. R. Wright, Jr., on the "Negro Church" and Mr. Mangold are very able, while Dr. Allen's pages on "Efficiency in Religious Work" give the mature judgment of this pioneer worker in municipal research. Dr. Carsten's intelligent criticism of the Salvation Army may be commended to the perusal of sympathetic observers.

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The editors of the *American Journal of Theology* record with sincere regret the death on July 1, 1908, of the Reverend Dr. Alexander Viets Griswold Allen, professor of ecclesiastical history in the Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge, since 1867. He was born in 1841, and was trained at Kenyon College, and Andover Theological Seminary, whence he graduated in 1865. He was granted the honorary degree of D.D. by Harvard in 1886 and Yale in 1901. His more important books were *The Continuity of Christian Thought*, 1884; *The Life of Jonathan Edwards*, 1889; *Religious Progress*, 1893; *Christian Institutions*, 1897; *The Life and Letters of Phillips Brooks*, 1900, and *Freedom in the Church*, 1907. He was one of the best-known and most valued contributors to the science of church history in this country. His death at the too early age of sixty-seven years is a distinct loss to American scholarship. Professor Allen became a co-operating editor of this *Journal* in January of the present year.

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DOES THE FOURTH GOSPEL DEPEND UPON PAGAN TRADITIONS?

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The so-called religio-historical interpretation of the New Testament which has been in vogue for the past few years often attempts to trace the New Testament back to non-Jewish influences, even when there is actually no need of assuming such. The discovery is made that certain views of the New Testament are also to be found in other religions and philosophies, and it is inferred that the former are derived from the latter, though they do not require such an explanation on the basis of alien, i. e., non-Jewish, sources. Indeed, in these interpretations one sometimes finds ideas of the New Testament set forth as dependent on alien views of quite a different nature, or even more recent than the New Testament, and with which, as far as we can judge, the New Testament writers were entirely unacquainted. It is true, by the transition of ideas from one religion into another they are always somewhat modified. Also views may be much older than the sources in which we for the first time meet them. Moreover, they may have penetrated into another religion, for example into primitive Christianity, without our being able to trace the way in which this occurred. In any case, ideas which can be explained adequately from Christianity, or from Judaism whence Christianity sprang, must not be traced back to other religions. To ignore this

rule means to state a religio-historical interpretation without a sound foundation.

As to the Gospel of John we have in the conception of the Logos the definite necessity for a broader basis of interpretation. The author of the gospel, presupposing as he does familiarity with the meaning of the term, cannot have taken it from the Old Testament or from later Judaism; for it is not found, at least not in this form, in the Jewish literature of his time. It occurs, however, as has often enough been shown, in Philo, who was influenced by Greek philosophy as well as by Judaism. From Philo, therefore, it has lately been customary to derive the Logos-conception of the Fourth Gospel.

Nevertheless this explanation of the matter is not entirely satisfactory. The Logos is not ordinarily conceived by Philo as representing a personality, so that it would have been natural to declare: the Logos became incarnate in Jesus. Besides, it is especially to be noted that the two conceptions which in the prologue of the Gospel of John (1:4) are co-ordinated with that of the Logos—namely, life and light—by no means play the same rôle in Philo. They are occasionally employed by him, but even Grill¹ who undertakes to derive them from Philo, is compelled to admit that the attempt is not altogether successful.

Some time ago Aall² referred incidentally to the so-called Hermetic literature, and recently Reitzenstein³ with the approval of Soltau⁴ and Heitmüller⁵ has definitely applied it to the interpretation of the Fourth Gospel. Indeed here we find the Nous, with whom the Logos is originally identical, used as a designation for the Egyptian Thot or the Greek Hermes, i. e., a personality, and co-ordinated with him, life and light.⁶ Moreover, Reitzenstein has called attention to other parallels between the Hermetic literature and the Gospel of

¹ *Untersuchungen über die Entstehung des vierten Evangeliums*, I (1902), pp. 206 ff.

² *Der Logos*, II (1899), p. 78, 4.

³ *Poimandres* (1904).

⁴ *Das Fortleben des Heidentums in der allchristlichen Kirche* (1906), pp. 151 f.

⁵ *Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments*, herausg. von J. Weiss, II (1907), 3, pp. 174 f., 190-92. Cf also the "Nachtrag" by Grill, *Untersuchungen*, I, xi f., and the review by A. Meyer, *Theol. Rundschau* (1904), p. 528.

⁶ Cf., e. g., I, 9: ὁ δὲ Νοῦς ὁ θεός, . . . ζωὴ καὶ φῶς ὑπάρχων, ἀπεκρίθη [λόγῳ] ἕτερον Νοῦν δημιουργόν.

John, few of which, however, indicate a relationship between the two.

In the first place, the stupid misunderstandings attributed to the disciples and to the Jews in the Fourth Gospel surely need not be explained by the Hermetic literature, where they have another explanation. Here the condition for a complete understanding of the divine revelation is the new birth; in the Fourth Gospel, it is the sending of the Spirit. Above all the stupidity of the disciples and of the Jews in the Fourth Gospel may be understood, as Wrede⁷ has shown, without this subsidiary hypothesis. Also, the omniscience of Jesus as it appears in his words to Nathanael (1:48), "Before Philip called thee, when thou wast under the fig-tree I saw thee;" and as it appears again in the conversation with the Samaritan woman (4:17 ff., 39), needs no explanation on the basis of the corresponding representation of the Nous in *Poimandres*, the first part of the Hermetic Corpus (2), no more than does the requirement of the new birth (John 3:3) need explanation from the word in the later *Poimandres* (1): "no one can be saved before the new birth." Again, the statements concerning the unity of Jesus with God and of the believers with both need not be deduced from the similar statements of the Hermetic literature concerning the unity of the regenerate with the deity, much less the passage John 14:26 ("the Holy Ghost . . . shall bring all things to your remembrance whatsoever I have said unto you") from the statement of Hermes in the above-mentioned later *Poimandres* (2): "this generation shall have its recollection refreshed by God whenever he wills."

However, the expression "the Good Shepherd," which is used by Jesus in John 10:11 and 14, points to a foreign origin of this name. The interpretation cannot be sought in the passages: Heb. 13:20, and I Pet. 2:25 and 5:4, in which Jesus is called the Great Shepherd of the sheep, the Shepherd of our souls, or the Chief Shepherd, for in these passages, also, the titles before mentioned go back perhaps to a foreign source. They can indeed be partially explained from the description of Moses as the shepherd of God's flock (Isa. 63:11), and of Israel as his sheep (Ezek. 34). Moreover, it may be that in this case as in others I Pet. is dependent on the epistle of the Hebrews.

⁷ *Das Messiasgeheimniss in den Evangelien* (1901).

Nevertheless, this favorite description of Jesus as the Shepherd is a striking one, and the expression in the Fourth Gospel shows plainly that here a name which had been used of others elsewhere is in the fullest sense applied to Jesus. It is true that Yima, the first man and lord of the kingdom of the blessed in Parseeism, is also called the beautiful and good shepherd. Attis, too, is frequently thus named, but after all that has been said, the *Poimandres* of the Hermetic literature lies much closer at hand than these other references.

Now we know that in this very respect this literature actually exercised an influence on Christianity in later times. In the *Shepherd of Hermas* (vis. 5) the author tells us that a man came to him clothed like a shepherd who then revealed himself to him as the real shepherd to whom he (Hermas) had been intrusted and who was to live with him during the rest of his life. This is an unmistakable reminiscence of the beginning of the older *Poimandres* where he also appears to the author representing himself as *Poimandres*, i. e. the shepherd of mankind, who was everywhere staying with him. But whereas it is here quite comprehensible that the *Nous* who, as we saw, is the light, should resume this his cosmic form of appearance, the transformation of which, we read in the *Shepherd of Hermas*, is an entirely meaningless masquerade, the purpose of which is not discoverable. Reitzenstein and Lietzmann⁸ are thus right when they regard the *Shepherd of Hermas* as dependent upon the *Poimandres*, or at least upon its source. If so, it is also possible that this had a direct influence on Hebrews and I Peter as well as on the Fourth Gospel.

It is true this does not yet offer a complete explanation of the conceptions: Logos, Life, Light, and Shepherd. The Logos-conception, as is well known, comes partly from Greek philosophy; at the same time, however, in addition to the Old Testament creation narratives, the Egyptian doctrine of the creation through the word may possibly have influenced the later signification of the term. Mrs. Grenfell⁹ believes that the characterization of the Logos as Light can also be explained from this source; a more probable reference, however, is to Parseeism, or to Mandaism which is dependent upon it, and in which

⁸ *Theol. Literaturzeitung* (1905), p. 202.

⁹ "Egypt Mythology and the Bible," *Monist* (1906), p. 170.

both Light and Life play a large part. Finally, it is quite possible that by the shepherd originally Yima was meant; but this conjecture is of course entirely uncertain.

Even the relationship of the Gospel of John to the Hermetic literature is perhaps less close than might be inferred from the above discussion. As I have before said, it may have been merely a source of *Poimandres* which had its influence on Christianity; and this source may have been quite different from the *Poimandres* writings as they now lie before us. Moreover, in regard to these recent discoveries we must not forget what has previously been demonstrated concerning the extensive correspondence between the Fourth Gospel and Philo. It is thus possible that the Gospel is dependent upon a form of the Hermetic literature which is related to Philo in a much closer degree than the Corpus which we at present know. Or, there may have been, besides influences from this or from an earlier form of it, the influence of Philo, or of other philosophers. We cannot make absolute statements on this matter. One thing, however, is incontrovertible, namely, that the Gospel of John is dependent on foreign influences in the points which have been mentioned.

In other points which have in part already been referred to incidentally, scholars have thought to discover an influence of Buddhism. Thus particularly, Seydel¹⁰ and van den Bergh van Eysinga¹¹ have argued. But this is scarcely probable. Though we can establish the fact of occasional diplomatic relations between India and Asia Minor, and though there existed a commercial intercourse, we nevertheless do not know that before the second century after Christ any Indian views (a few animal fables excepted) found currency in the West. Nevertheless, since Indian ideas certainly were adopted in Asia Minor subsequent to 100 A. D., it is possible they were also current at an earlier time. Therefore we cannot dispense with the necessity for subjecting the theory of a Buddhist origin of particular narratives in the Fourth Gospel to a detailed examination.

One preliminary remark must be made concerning the date of the

¹⁰ *Das Evangelium Jesu in seinem Verhältnis zur Buddha-Sage und Buddha-Lehre* (1882), *Die Buddha-Legende u. das Leben Jesu nach den Evangelien* (1884), 2. Aufl., 1897.

¹¹ *Indische Einflüsse auf evangelische Erzählungen* (1904).

Buddhist literature as far as it concerns our problem. The *Mahā-parinibbāna Sutta* and *Mahāvagga* are at any rate earlier than the Christian era. The *Lalita Vistara*, translated into Chinese soon after 65 A. D., may be pre-Christian, but only in a form no more to be made out, and which surely did not agree with the present one. Of this Rhys Davids¹² says: "As evidence of what early Buddhism actually was, it is of about the same value as some mediaeval poem would be for the real facts of the gospel history." The story of the Tschandāla girl, which we shall soon consider, dates (in a Chinese translation) from a time not earlier than the Han dynasty (25-220 A. D.) and the *Lotus* of the good law belongs demonstrably to the period of the Tsin dynasty (265-316 A. D.). "It is quite justifiable," says Hopkins,¹³ "to suppose that the original of the *Lotus* may be some centuries earlier; but it is quite as unhistorical to refer legends of our present *Lotus* to a pre-Christian era as it would be to put the history of Herodotus into the eighth century because some of his stories may have had a more antique form." Nevertheless, it still remains a possibility with which we must reckon, that some of the traditions contained in these writings may have been in existence in pre-Christian times, and that on this account if they at all penetrated to the west they may have had an influence on primitive Christianity.

But when the attempt is made to compare the story of the conversion of two of John's disciples to Jesus, one of whom, Andrew, finds first his own brother Simon, and the succeeding call of Philip and Nathanael (John 1:35 ff.), with the story of the conversion of five disciples of Rudraka to Buddha, as it is narrated in the Tibetan redaction of the *Lalita Vistara*, the so-called *Rgya tch' er rol pa* (17 ff., 26), translated into French by Foucaux (II, 235 ff., 253 ff., 382 ff.), the resemblance between the two is not so close as might perhaps seem at first sight. It is true, in the Gospel of John five disciples are named, but they are not thought of collectively or as a unit; indeed, on closer examination not five, but six, are presupposed, for when we read concerning Andrew, "he first findeth his own brother Simon," it may plausibly be inferred that afterward the *other* disciple, i. e. John, found *his* brother, i. e. James. Finally, if Nathanael is to be

¹² *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion* (1888), p. 197.

¹³ *India Old and New* (1901), p. 135.

identified with Bartholomew, we have here the same six disciples who stand first in the catalogues of the apostles in the Synoptic Gospels. This means that there is no need of assuming a foreign source for this passage. On the other hand, the word of Jesus to Nathanael: "Before that Philip called thee, when thou wast under the fig-tree, I saw thee" (John 1:48) is indeed not altogether clear to us; but does it become intelligible in the light of the narrative of the *Rgya tch' er rol pa* (24, translated by Foucaux, II, 356 ff.) which is paralleled also in the *Mahāvagga* (I, 6, 5 ff., *Sacred Books of the East*, XIII, 90 ff.), where we read of Buddha receiving his call under a fig-tree? Apparently this is quite a different story; and to assume that originally Jesus himself had sat under the fig-tree because, according to a Mohammedan tradition, Abubekr recognized Muhammed as the prophet of God because he sat under a tree under which no one else was allowed to sit after Jesus—such an explanation is altogether too audacious.

The story of the Tschandāla girl, which even Weber¹⁴ regards as the original of the story of the Samaritan woman (John, chap. 4), in the form in which alone it has a bearing here, and in which it appears in the *Divyāvadāna* (f. 217a), reads in Burnouf's French translation¹⁵ as follows:

Un jour Ânanda le serviteur de Çākya-muni, après avoir longtemps parcouru la campagne, rencontre une jeune fille Mâtangi, c'est-à-dire de la tribu des Tschândālas, qui puisait de l'eau, et lui demande à boire. Mais la jeune fille craignant de le souiller de son contact, l'avertit qu'elle est née dans la caste Mâtanga, et qu'il ne lui est pas permis d'approcher un Religieux. Ânanda lui répond alors: "Je ne te demande, ma sœur, ni ta caste, ni ta famille; je te demande seulement de l'eau, si tu peux, m'en donner.

It is a disciple who figures in this, not—as is the case in the Fourth Gospel—the Master himself. It tells of a young girl, not of a woman who had had five husbands. Also in other respects the story differs widely from that in the Gospel of John. We actually find only one

¹⁴ "Die Griechen in Indien," *Sitzungsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Berlin* (1890), p. 928, 4; *Indische Beiträge*, VI (1897), p. 605, 3.

¹⁵ *Introduction à l'histoire du Bouddhisme indien*, I (1844), p. 205. Beal, *Abstract of Four Lectures on Buddhist Literature in China* (1882), 166 ff., recognizes, besides, three forms of the story in Chinese, one of which corresponds almost exactly with the one reproduced by Burnouf. The second which he himself publishes contains nothing corresponding. The third he does not describe more closely.

trait common to both, viz., a request for a drink of water made to a woman who was regarded as unclean. But is this common trait so very striking? Nor must the comparison of the gospel to living water (vss. 10 ff.) be referred to a Buddhist origin, as Franke¹⁶ suggests; for a similar comparison is found in Isa. 55:1. And here I may also remark that I can still less agree with Edmunds¹⁷ when he sees a citation from a Buddhist document in John 7:38, "He that believes on me, as the Scripture hath said, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water." It may be explained either by the sight of human forms used in the construction of fountains whereby a text like Isa. 58:11 ("The Lord shall . . . make strong thy bones, and thou shalt be like a watered garden, and like a spring of water whose waters fail not") was transformed in the recollection of the evangelist; or it may be explained as a citation from some apocryphal book, in accordance with some other occasional citations from these writings in the New Testament.

In John 8:56 ff. the Jews object to Jesus' statement, "Your father Abraham rejoiced to see my day, and he saw it and was glad," saying, "Thou art not yet fifty years old, and hast thou seen Abraham?" whereupon Jesus replies, "Before Abraham was I am." This objection of the Jews does not harmonize with the statement of Luke 3:23 that Jesus entered his public ministry at about the age of thirty. Is it possible, then, that here we are to seek the explanation from Buddhism? In the *Lotus* (14, 43 ff., *SBE.*, XXI, 293 ff.) the Bôdhisattva Maitreya expresses doubts similar to those of the Jews in the Fourth Gospel. The objection runs as follows: Since Buddha fled his native city but a round forty years before, how can he possibly assert that he has taught and converted all the numberless Bôdhisattvas who here appear before him as numerous as the sands of unnumbered Ganges-streams and who lived in ages long past upon the earth? The Master solves this riddle by referring to his previous incarnations. He has already been Buddha a million times. The objection that the *Lotus* belongs to a somewhat late date Seydel tries to meet by pointing to the fact that the Buddhist doctrine of pre-existence is unquestionably pre-Christian. But even if we are

¹⁶ *Deutsche Literaturzeitung* (1901), pp. 2760, 2764.

¹⁷ *Buddhist Texts Quoted as Scripture by the Gospel of John* (7:38, 12:34), 1906.

to understand by it the belief in the repeated incarnations of Buddha, the fact remains that nothing similar is to be found in Christianity, and that the doctrine of the pre-existence of Christ can be explained without resorting to foreign models. That stupid objection that Jesus claimed to have seen Abraham, and had not yet passed middle life, the fourth evangelist could of himself readily attribute to the Jews.

In the story of the man who was born blind (John 9:2), the disciples asked, "Master who did sin, this man or his parents that he was born blind?" Here the belief in the pre-existence of the soul may be presupposed and since this belief does not appear elsewhere in the sacred Scripture, it may be derived from foreign influences. And again in the *Lotus* (5, 44, *SBE.*, XXI, 129 f.) we read of a man born blind who was afterward healed: "the disease of this man originates in his sinful actions in former times." But it is more natural to think here of the Greek conception of pre-existence which we find in the *Book of Wisdom* (8:20), in the *Secrets of Enoch* (23:5; 49:2; 58:5), also in Philo (*De gigant.* 7, ed. by Mangey, I, 266 f.). Thus again we have no need of turning to oriental influences. Indeed, it is possible that the author of the gospel is not thinking of the belief in pre-existence at all, but is again simply putting a stupid question into the mouths of the disciples. Thus this passage does not at all require a religio-historical explanation.

When the multitude (John 12:34) objects, "we have heard out of the law that Christ abideth forever," Edmunds again sees here a Buddhist citation. We read in *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* (3, 3, *SBE.*, XI, 40) according to his translation:

Ānando, anyone who has practised the four principles of psychical power can, if he would wish, remain on earth for the aeon or the rest of the aeon. Now, Ānando, the Tathāgato has practised and perfected these, and if he should wish the Tathāgato could remain on earth for the aeon or the rest of the aeon.

Now even if the Tathāgato could be identified with Christ he still shares that privilege with others, and takes advantage of it only if he so desires. The statement in the Fourth Gospel on the contrary is absolutely unconditional. There is no reason for referring it in any way to other religions. The true explanation is rather to be found

in the prevalent opinion in Judaism that the Messiah would abide eternally.

When in John 14:16 the Spirit is called *another* Paraclete or Advocate, and then in 14:26; 15:26; and 16:7 is called *the* Paraclete, the later passages may indeed be explained by the earlier one. However, the striking term, "Paraclete," which cannot even be satisfactorily explained on the basis of Philo, may point to foreign origin. But neither here is Buddhism to be thought of, for the expectation of a later Buddha does not belong to primitive Buddhism. Moreover, it is evidently quite a different conception. Even his name, Maitreya, that is, son or child of friendship, charity, benevolent disposition, does not permit him to be regarded as the prototype of the Holy Spirit in Christianity. However, I shall refer to this passage later on.

Here we must consider another narrative of the Fourth Gospel, namely, the story of the dividing of the garments of Jesus (19:23 ff.). This story also has been derived from Buddhism as a variant of the dispute concerning the relics of Buddha which broke out among the Brahmans and kings who were present at Buddha's burial—a dispute which a Brahman finally settled by dividing the relics into eight parts.¹⁸ But here again the two stories are quite different. The evangelic tradition may be much more simply explained from the words Ps. 22:19 which John himself cites: "They part my garments among them and upon my vesture they cast lots." There is absolutely no trace of Buddhist influence in the Fourth Gospel, no more than in the Synoptics.

Nor can the *Bhagavad Gita*, the most renowned Upanishad in the *Mahabharata* epic, have influenced the Fourth Gospel. It is true that not only Lorinser¹⁹ and Nève²⁰ but also Tiele²¹ and Hopkins have noted points of contact between the two which cannot be accidental. These, however, are much better explained by assuming the dependence of the *Bhagavad Gita* upon the Gospel of John—a dependence which Hopkins has shown to be quite probable. An

¹⁸ *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*, 6, 51 ff., *SBE.*, XI, pp. 131 ff.; cf. also Foucaux, *Rgya*, II, pp. 423 ff.

¹⁹ *Die Bhagavad Gita* (1869), especially pp. V ff., 267 ff.

²⁰ "Des éléments étrangers du mythe et du culte indien de Krishna," *Annales de philosophie chrétienne*, 1876, pp. 231 ff., 305 ff., 405 ff.

²¹ "Christus en Kṛṣṇa," *Theologisch Tijdschrift*, 1877, pp. 75 f.

Indian origin of the Johannine theology thus cannot be proved, even in the very general form in which Tiele attempted to show it—not to mention the derivation of the doctrine of the incarnation from that source, as Grill would have it.

Still more improbable from its very beginning is Jensen's²² recent attempt to derive both the Johannine and the synoptic traditions of the life of Jesus from the Babylonian epic or *Saga of Gilgamesh*, or, to be more exact, from an Israelitish form of this. Indeed, I should not even allude to this theory if Jensen had not announced that people would strive to smother in silence the unwelcomed truth which he believes himself to have discovered. This challenge should not pass unanswered. But before we enter upon a critical examination of his hypothesis we must set forth the contents of the epic as far as it concerns our problem.

Eabani has been created as the adversary of Gilgamesh, but is decoyed by a certain hierodule and brought to Erech where Gilgamesh enters into a compact of friendship with him. Both then go out to battle against Chumbaba and conquer him. Upon their return the goddess Ishtar makes a proposal of love to Gilgamesh, but he rejects her with these words:

Who is thy lover whom thou wilt love through all the future? Who is thy shepherd-boy who will always be thy favorite? For Tammuz, the lover of thy youth, didst thou year after year destine tears. When thou didst love the bright bird of the young shepherd thou didst smite him, and didst shatter his wings. . . . When thou didst love the lion, perfect in strength, thou didst dig for him seven and seven hidden pits. . . . When thou didst love the horse, terrible in his onrush, thou didst destine for him whips, goads, and scourges. . . . When thou didst love the shepherd of the herd . . . thou didst smite him, and didst transform him into a savage dog. When thou didst love Ischullanu, thy father's gardener . . . thou didst lift thine eyes to him. . . . Ischullanu speaks to thee saying, Of me, what dost thou desire? When thou didst hear this his speech thou didst smite him and thou didst transform him. . . . Me also thou wilt love and make me like to them.

Then Eabani dies, and Gilgamesh sets out for a journey to his glorified grandsire Utnapishtim in order to ask him how he also

²² *Das Gilgameschepos in der Weltliteratur*, I (1906). Cf. also Zimmern in Schrader, *Die Keilinschriften u. das Alte Testament* (1872), 3. Aufl., 1903, p. 582; *Literarisches Centralblatt*, 1906, p. 1712 ff.; Brückner, "Jesus u. Gilgamesch," *Christliche Welt*, 1907, pp. 193 ff.; *Theol. Jahresbericht für 1906*, p. 223.

may escape death. On the way he encounters a storm, he unties his girdle and makes ready to fasten himself with it to the mast—apparently in order to save himself thus if the ship should go down. Utnapishtim first gives him general information concerning the fate of man after death, and then tells him of his own transfiguration. Farther on he puts seven loaves of bread before Gilgamesh, scolds his boatman, and tells Gilgamesh to bathe and to clothe himself in fresh garments. Then Gilgamesh returns to Erech, calls up the spirit of Eabani, and receives from him information concerning the realm of the dead. Thus closes the epic in the form in which we have it.

At first sight, it seems utterly incredible that the origin of the evangelic story should be discovered here. Jensen accomplishes this derivation only by presupposing as we have already said a divergent Israelitish form of the Gilgamesh saga, and besides this by assuming a divergent, older form of the evangelic tradition. Thus according to him, the marriage at Cana originally dealt with the marriage of Jesus and Mary, the sister of Martha, and this story, like other wedding accounts in the Old Testament, is said to go back to the experience of Eabani with the hierodule. If the legitimacy of his method of interpretation be allowed, it is evident that we may explain the most divergent events one from another.


So when Jensen traces back the first journey of Jesus to Jerusalem in John, and the cleansing of the temple to the battle against Chumbaba, there exists absolutely no similarity between the two. Moreover, the cleansing of the temple certainly belongs to a later time in the life of Jesus, and was transposed to its present position for reasons which have absolutely nothing to do with the Gilgamesh epic.

The meeting between Jesus and the Samaritan woman is also referred by Jensen to the meeting of Eabani and the hierodule, and at the same time to the answer of Gilgamesh to Ishtar which we have above given in full. (It does not matter to our author that in the first case Jesus corresponds to one of the two friends, and in the second to the other one.) The woman who had had five husbands, and who is now living with a man that is not her husband, might indeed be correlated with Ishtar, who had also had six lovers, and who had made them all unhappy. But here a difference immediately

appears. Ischullanu has already been transformed, and is no longer the husband of Ishtar. Thus resemblances between the Gilgamesh epic and the Fourth Gospel are again very slight, and must be purely accidental.

It is an altogether artificial procedure, furthermore, to declare that not only the feeding of the five thousand, but also the discourse concerning bread, in John, chap. 6, is derived from the seven loaves of bread of Utnapishtim; or from Gilgamesh's complaint, "What shall I do, Utnapishtim? Where shall I go?" to derive the saying of Peter (who here suddenly corresponds to Gilgamesh), "Lord to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life" (vs. 68); or to find in the scolding which Utnapishtim gives to the boatman of Gilgamesh the original of the saying of Jesus, "One of you is a devil" (vs. 70). Indeed it is nearly impossible to see how the washing and attiring in new garments of Gilgamesh should have given rise not only to the story of the transfiguration of Jesus, but also to his words in John 7:34, "Ye shall seek me and shall not find me, and where I am thither ye cannot come." And again, Gilgamesh unfastens his girdle, whereas Peter, in the passage which is supposed to correspond to this (21:7), girds himself up. Gilgamesh receives seven loaves of bread which are set before him, while Jesus (who in this passage plays the part of Utnapishtim rather than Gilgamesh) puts before his seven disciples bread and fish (vss. 9, 13). Also, the prophecy to Peter, "When thou shalt be old thou shalt stretch forth thy hands and another shall gird thee and carry thee whither thou wouldst not," and the statement to the disciple whom Jesus loved, "If I will that he tarry till I come what is that to thee?" (vs. 22 ff.), cannot be derived from the announcement of the death of Gilgamesh and Utnapishtim's narration of his translation. Neither can it be proved that this entire narrative originally belonged in an earlier place. And yet Jensen is compelled to assume this if the raising of Lazarus (chap. 11) is to correspond to the citation of Eabani's spirit. Indeed, he must also trace back what follows this narrative to earlier episodes of the Gilgamesh saga, a proceeding which is utterly impossible.

His theory thus proves, as was to be expected from the start, entirely untenable even in details. There is not a single instance



in which his explanation can be shown to be necessary, or even probable. For if one were to point to the entire number of his alleged parallels, the value of a hundred zeros would never amount to the slightest positive quantity.

Still, it is possible that some other views found in the Fourth Gospel actually do originate from the Babylonian or from some other heathen religion. In conclusion, therefore, we must consider those passages in which such a relation has been or may be assumed.

Cheyne²³ makes the attempt to explain the designation of Jesus as the only begotten of the Father, or the only begotten Son of God (John 1:14, 18; 3:16, 18) by reference to the similar cognomen which, according to Epiphanius (*Haer.* 51, 22, ed. Dindorf, II, p. 484), the north Arabian god Dusares perhaps bore. But is it possible that this cult had any influence on the Fourth Gospel? Would it not then be more correct to reason back from the use of the expression "only begotten" among the Gnostics to an older speculation, even if a cogent proof for the necessity of this argument cannot be brought forward, and the speculation itself must then again be explained? So in conclusion we may say that it is also possible to assume that in the sense in which it is here used the expression first became current in the Johannine circle itself.

The story of the miracle at Cana has been traced back by Dupuis,²⁴ Barrows²⁵ and finally by Heitmüller to similar stories concerning the shrines of Dionysus. "In his temple at Elis, for example, empty pitchers were wont to fill themselves with wine during the night at the time of his festival. At Andros, in the temple of Dionysus, on the fifth of January, wine instead of water used to spurt forth from a fountain." But why should anyone think of relating similar things concerning Jesus? There must have been some occasion for such a procedure, and if some such historical kernel actually existed, there is no need of appealing to these examples to account for the embellishment of the story.

The Johannine doctrine concerning the baptism and the Lord's

²³ *Bible Problems and the New Material for their Solution* (1904), p. 74.

²⁴ *Origine de tous les cultes*, III (1794), p. 70.

²⁵ "Mythical and Legendary Elements in the New Testament," *New World*, 1899, p. 295.

Supper have been favorite subjects for reference to heathen influences. Of course if such heathen influences had already affected Paul there would be no need of discussing them here. But, in my opinion, that is not the case. Surely the Corinthians who allowed themselves to be baptized for the dead (I Cor. 15:29) must have had a magical, if not a mechanical, conception of baptism. But Paul did not share this conception. Moreover, in the Book of Acts we read, "Be baptized everyone of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost" (2:38); and again, "Be baptized and wash away thy sins, calling on the name of the Lord" (22:16); but a corresponding conception of baptism in the Fourth Gospel could hardly be explained on the basis of these texts. Now does such a conception actually lie before us?

It is true in John 3:5 we read, "Except a man be born *of water* and of the Spirit he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." But water is not again mentioned in this discourse. We have only the Spirit. So the saying in 13:10, "He that is washed needeth not save to wash his feet, but is clean every whit," is to be understood of the baptism of the Spirit. In other words, the evangelist himself places no emphasis upon baptism, although such emphasis must have been common at his time, for only by this hypothesis can his expressions be explained. Now, what is the origin of this conception of baptism which is presupposed by the evangelist?

As a matter of fact, in connection with this conception one naturally thinks of the mystery-cults which were at that time widely current in Asia Minor and in Greece. For although these mysteries in the first place were believed merely to impart immortality, moral effects were at the same time expected from them. But there is no question here concerning an influence of the mysteries on the Johannine theology. This theology simply presupposes conceptions which spring from the mysteries.

The case is exactly the same with the doctrine of the Lord's supper. A reference to it appears in the words (6:51), "The bread that I will give is my flesh which I will give for the life of the world. Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood ye have no life in you, etc." But when the discourse continues (vs. 63), "It is the Spirit that quickeneth, the flesh profiteth **nothing; the words that**

I speak unto you they are spirit and they are life," flesh and blood cannot here be understood in the sense in which they were originally taken. In other words, the evangelist here also presupposes a conception which he himself does not share; viz., that in the Lord's Supper the flesh and blood of Christ is to be eaten, and that through this certain supernatural effects are experienced. As far as I can see, this conception is not yet to be found in Paul either. We must therefore ask what its origin really is.

Many theologians and philologists in this connection remind us again of the mysteries, in which according to their opinion, through the eating of a meal, men believed themselves to be united with the deity. But I think there is no sufficient proof for this view. It is true that in two representations of the sacred meal in the Mithras mysteries,²⁶ in which the participants standing around the table are represented as a raven, a Persian, a soldier, and a lion, these animal masks used by the participants on certain occasions and these names assigned to them originally meant that the believer became one with the god who was represented in the form of an animal. But there is no evidence that this origin of the animal masks and names was still known in later times; such knowledge is quite improbable. But even if we were to assume this we should not thereby have proved that it was believed that through the meal man put on the god. Rather it seems probable that the participant was not allowed to partake of the meal, until he put on the lion-mask and thus the lower degrees must be considered to have been united with the god in some other way. Finally, it is on general grounds extremely improbable that the Mithras cults as early as the first century after Christ had any perceptible influence on Christianity. The most that can be said, then, to explain the conception presupposed by the Fourth Gospel is that in the mysteries the sacred meals played a large part, and moreover, that men still believed to some extent in the possibility of union with the deity. But, as has been stated, such considerations do not show an influence of heathen religion on the Fourth Gospel, but merely on certain circles known to the evangelist.

²⁶ Cf. Cumont, *Textes et monuments figurés relatifs aux mystères de Mithra*, I (1899), p. 176; "Notice sur deux bas-reliefs mithriaques," *Revue archéologique*, I (1902), pp. 10 ff.

On the other hand, when in 11:6, 39 it is narrated that Lazarus was not raised until the fourth day after his death, this is to be referred in its origin to the Persian conception, that the soul leaves the body not earlier than the fourth day after death. It is therefore assumed in order that no one might doubt that Lazarus was really dead. Heitmüller attempts, indeed, to refer also the conception of prophetic powers on the part of the high priest, in vs. 51, to possible heathen influences. But there is no need of doing so. It is sufficient in this connection to recall that both Philo (*De creat. princ.*, 8, ed. Mangey, ii, p. 367) and Josephus (*Ant.*, vi, 6, 3) regard the high priest as the mediator of divine revelation.

The attempt has been made by Zimmern²⁷ to trace back the conception of the Paraclete (John 14:16, 26; 15:26; 16:7), of which we have already spoken, to the interceding deities which are so often present in the Babylonian religion. This, however, is altogether too general an analogy. The attempt, therefore, to find a foreign origin for the striking word "Paraclete" has, at least thus far, been unsuccessful.

It is possible that such foreign origin may be established for the conception of the vine (15:1), as is certainly the case with the conception Shepherd (10:11, 14). Edmund²⁸ and Otto Pfeiderer²⁹ would derive it from the Dionysus myth; Jeremias³⁰ finds it in the oriental calendar-myth. But such a myth has not yet been shown to exist in this form, and the influence of the Dionysus myth cannot have been felt by early Christianity. It is, then, possible to think of Mandaism, in which the vine also figures; for it cannot be explained from Christianity as Brandt³¹ attempts to do. The fact that it is presupposed in the "treasure house of the upper world," and is described as "that first chief vine" is to be explained by reference not to Christianity but to Parseism. According to the *Bundehesch* (14, 1, *SBE.*, V, pp. 45 f.), there originated from the blood of the primitive ox among other things the vine. And on the back of

²⁷ *Vater, Sohn u. Fürsprecher in der babylonischen Gottesverehrung* (1896).

²⁸ *Die Philosophie des Heraklit von Ephesus* (1886), pp. 379 f.

²⁹ *Das Urchristentum* (1887), 2. Aufl., 1902, II, p. 378.

³⁰ *Babylonisches im Neuen Testament* (1905), p. 33.

³¹ *Die mandäische Religion* (1889), pp. 63, 197.

the Mithras monument at Heddernheim, the sun-god is represented as giving to Mithras a bunch of grapes. This conception has indeed also in other instances had its influence upon Christianity as well as upon Judaism. We hear from Josephus (*Bell. jud.*, v, 5, 4; *Ant.*, xv, 11, 3), Tacitus (*Hist.*, v, 5) and from the Mishna (*Middoth*, iii, 8) that a golden vine was placed in the temple at Jerusalem, and we learn from Herodotus (vii, 27) how the Persian king Darius Hystaspes also received such a vine as a present. Finally, in the Eucharistic prayer of the *Didache* (9, 2) we read, "We thank thee, Father, for the holy vine of thy servant David which thou hast proclaimed to us through thy servant Jesus." Here the expression "vine" is used in a sense plainly different from its original meaning. It is quite possible then that the expression may have originated from another religion, very likely from Parseeism. If so, we may assume the same origin for the expression "vine" in the Fourth Gospel; for the fact that both here and in the *Didache* it is used in a different sense from that which it has in the *Bundehesch* is no argument against it.

The outcome of this discussion is, that the influences of non-Jewish religions and philosophies on the Fourth Gospel reduce themselves in general simply to certain expressions. Often, indeed, mostly the assertion of such foreign influence is entirely unjustified. In the cases where it is really to be assumed, it relates almost exclusively to the form and not to the contents. The Johannine theology would not have been expressed very differently if such foreign influences had not occurred at all. It is fundamentally independent of them.

CAN CHRISTIANITY ALLY ITSELF WITH MONISTIC ETHICS?

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I

The term monism is variously used in modern philosophical thinking. In a sense every philosophy is monistic that attempts to explain reality by means of a single principle, whether that principle be matter or mind or something of which both matter and mind are the expressions or manifestations. Adopting this meaning we might call materialism and spiritualism and the so-called identity or double-aspect theory monistic systems: materialistic monism, spiritualistic or idealistic monism, and parallelistic monism. In each case it is assumed that however different the things of the world may seem, they are ultimately the same in essence or in nature. Sometimes the term monism is employed synonymously with pantheism and in antithesis to pluralism, characterizing the view that reality is fundamentally one, a unity of which the many are the manifestations. Here the problem is concerned not with the essence or nature or stuff of reality, but with the relation or connection or form of things: individuals are but seemingly independent; in reality all particular objects and minds are expressions of a fundamental world principle, the real and true independence. Monism in this sense can easily go with monism in any of the other senses: there is one basal and universal reality, universal matter or universal spirit or universal identity, of which all things are parts or expressions or reflections.

Very frequently the term monism is applied as a specific label for the double-aspect theory: that reality is both mental and physical. Here mind and body are two phases or aspects or manifestations of one and the same underlying principle. Monism in this sense appears in several forms. The mental aspect is two

aspects of one and the same substance or substratum. The one substance has two attributes or qualities, a physical side and a psychical side. Each one of these attributes takes equal rank with the other. Wherever there is mind there is matter or body, wherever there is body there is mind. Mental processes and material processes run parallel with each other in the universe; none can ever exist without the other. When a change takes place in the mental world a corresponding change takes place in the world of bodies, and vice versa. But the two worlds are independent of each other, each must be explained in terms of itself. Physical processes must be explained physically; changes in the material world can never be caused by mental processes. Mental or psychical processes must be explained mentally; changes in the mental realm can never be brought about by material processes. At the same time both phases of existence are the expressions of an underlying reality. From monism conceived in this way there follow several necessary consequences: automatism, mechanism, determinism, and pan-psychism. The body is a machine, an automaton, having its mental side, it is true, but uninfluenced by the spiritual factor; indeed, this has no more power over it than the melody has over the harpstring or the shadow over the object of which it is the shadow. The universe is an animated universe, however, a universe of spiritual processes, which keep time with the physical events, but neither influence nor are influenced by them. Mind on this theory is not necessarily conscious mind; there are many gradations of mind, all the way from the unconscious to the conscious. Moreover, the essential quality of mind is not necessarily intelligence, but may be will or impulse or blind striving, which manifests itself as force in the stone and clear consciousness in man.

This world-view is easily transformed into an idealistic or spiritualistic monism. The question arises: What is this underlying principle which manifests itself in such different ways? It is unknowable, say some; it is its attributes, the unity of its attributes, say others: the vibration in the brain, for example, and the thought process form one being. But still another interpretation—and this is the idealistic one—is to regard the two attributes as two ways of looking at one and the same reality. In other words, looked at from without, externally; through outer perception, the principle of things appears to be

extended, material, or physical; looked at from within, through inner perception, it is unextended, psychical or mental. Looked at from without, the principle is brain vibration, let us say; looked at from within, it is thought or mind or consciousness. The principle of reality looking at itself, becoming aware of itself, is mental; mind is therefore the true reality; in introspection reality comes face to face with its true self; the world is at bottom what it appears to be in consciousness. The world is at bottom a spiritual world: the world of bodies is only the way it appears to mind from a certain angle or point of view, as it were.

This idealistic monism may be completed in a pantheistic sense. There is one all-pervading, all-embracing spirit, of which all minds and objects are the reflections or expressions or manifestations or parts. Just as there are many thoughts, feelings, and impulses in my individual mind, and this mind of mine is yet one, a unity in diversity, so all the individual minds are thoughts in the universal mind or world-soul, parts of it as the parts of an organism are parts. Just as my mind is its thoughts, its mental processes, just as it expresses itself in its ideas and feelings and volitions, just as the self as knower and the self as known are one, so God and his thoughts, the different minds and objects of the world, are one. God manifests himself in nature and in minds; he is in them, they are in him; he is they, they are his ideas.

It may perhaps be said that this form of monism is the dominating theory of modern philosophical thought. It is presented in its clearest and most attractive form in Professor Paulsen's *Introduction to Philosophy*, a book which has gone through as many editions in Germany as Büchner's materialistic and atheistic *Force and Matter*. Nor is this conception unknown to modern Christian theology: indeed, it is often asserted that this mode of thinking represents the *Weltanschauung* of the educated clergy today. It has received clear and popular expression in the *New Theology* of Mr. Campbell, and it is his presentation of the theory that we shall particularly keep in mind in discussing the subject of this article: Can Christianity Ally Itself with Monistic Ethics? In the next section we shall let Mr. Campbell tell us in his own words what is his conception of monistic ethics and on what philosophical foundation it is reared.

II

The word God stands for the uncaused cause of all existence, the unitary principle implied in all multiplicity. By God is meant the mysterious power which is finding expression in the universe, and which is present in every tiniest atom of the wondrous whole. In order to manifest even to himself the possibilities of his being God must limit that being. There is no other way in which the fullest self-realization can be attained. Thus we get two modes of God—the infinite, perfect, unconditioned, primordial being; and the finite, imperfect, conditioned, and limited being of which we are ourselves expressions. And yet these two are one, and the former is the guaranty that the latter shall not fail in the purpose for which it became limited. We can only think of existence in terms of consciousness: nothing exists except in and for mind. The universe is God's thought about himself, and in so far as I am able to think it along with him, "I and my Father (even metaphysically speaking) are one." The so-called material world is our consciousness of reality exercising itself along a strictly limited plane. The larger and fuller a consciousness becomes, the more it can grasp and hold of the consciousness of God, the fundamental reality of our being as of everything else. Our ordinary consciousness is but a tiny corner of our personality; it is not all there is of us. Of our truer, deeper being we are quite unconscious. Our true being belongs not to the material plane of existence but to the plane of eternal reality. This larger self is in all probability a perfect and eternal spiritual being integral to the being of God. The surface self is the incarnation of some portion of that true eternal self which is one with God. It is probable that the higher self is conscious of the lower. The higher self of the individual man unfolds more of the consciousness of God than the lower self, but the lower and the higher are the same thing. Moreover, the whole human race is fundamentally one. Ultimately your being and mine are one and we shall come to know it. Individuality only has meaning in relation to the whole, and individual consciousness can only be fulfilled by expanding until it embraces the whole. Nothing that exists in your consciousness now and constitutes your self-knowledge will ever be obliterated or ever can be, but in a higher state of existence you will realize it to be a part of the universal stock. I

shall not cease to be I, nor you to be you; but there must be a region of experience where we shall find that you and I am one.

The highest of all selves, the ultimate self of the universe, is God. The body is the thought-form through which the individuality finds expression on our present limited plane; the soul is a man's consciousness of himself as apart from the rest of existence and even from God—it is the bay seeing itself as the bay and not as the ocean; the spirit is the true being thus limited and expressed—it is the deathless divine in us. The soul therefore is what we make it; the spirit we can neither make nor mar, for it is at once our being and God's. What we are here to do is to grow the soul, that is to manifest the true nature of the spirit, to build up that self-realization which is God's objective with the universe as a whole and with every self-conscious unit in particular. My God is my deeper self and yours too; he is the Self of the universe and knows all about it. The whole cosmic process is one long incarnation and uprising of the being of God from itself to itself. There is no such thing as perfect freedom in a finite being. Perfect freedom belongs only to infinity; finiteness implies limitations. But there is a certain amount of individual initiative and self-direction, that is, a limited freedom. As to personality there need be no fear that it will finally be obliterated on this theory. The being of God is a complex unity, containing within itself and harmonizing every form of self-consciousness that can possibly exist. No form of self-consciousness can ever perish. It completes itself in becoming infinite, but it cannot be destroyed.

The problem of evil is solved in the usual way of pantheistic theories. Evil denotes the absence rather than the presence of something. It is not a principle at war with the good; good is being and evil is not being. In our present state of existence evil is necessary in order that we may know that there is such a thing as good and that we may realize the true nature of life eternal. Evil is not a thing in itself, it is only the perceived privation of what you know to be good, and which you know to be good because of the very presence of limitation, hindrance, and imperfection. Nor is pain in itself evil, it is the evidence of evil, and also in a different way the evidence of good. Pain is life asserting itself against death, the higher struggling with

the lower, the true with the false, the real with the unreal. There are some things impossible even to omnipotence, and one of them is the realization of a love which has never known pain. If creation is the self-expression of God, pain was inevitable from the first. Love is life, the life eternal, the life of God. Love is essentially self-giving, it is living of the individual life in terms of the whole. In a finite world this cannot but mean pain, but it is also self-fulfilment. The law of the universe is the law of sacrifice in order to self-manifestation. In this age-long process all sentient life has its part, for it is of the infinite and to the infinite it will return. In the slaughter of the rabbit and the stag nothing perishes but the form, the life returns to the soul of the universe.

What is sin? Sin is the opposite of love. Sin is selfishness; the true life is the life which is lived in terms of the whole, the sinful life is the life which is lived for self alone. Sin is self-ward, love is All-ward. Sin is always a blunder; in the long run it becomes its own punishment, for it is the soul imposing fetters upon itself, which fetters must be broken by the reassertion of the universal life. Sin is actually a quest for life, but a quest which is pursued in the wrong way. The dedication of life to something higher than self-interest is of the very essence of true morality, and its highest reach is perfect love. Religion is the response of human nature to the whole of things considered as an order; morality is the living of the individual life in such a way as to be and do the most for humanity as a whole; it is making the most of oneself for the sake of the whole. True morality involves the duty of self-formation and the exercise of judgment and self-discipline in order that the individual life may become as great a gift as possible to the common life. Hence there is a vital relation between morality and religion, the one implies the other and both are based on the immanence of God.

Our present consciousness of ourselves and of the world can reasonably be accounted a fall, for we came from the infinite and to the infinite perfection we shall in the end return. Our true being is eternally one with the being of God, and to be separated from a full knowledge of that truth is to have undergone a fall. But the purpose of this fall is good, and there is nothing to mourn over except our own slowness in getting into line with the cosmic purpose. The imper-

fection of the finite creation is not man's fault but God's will, and is a means toward a great end.

Two tendencies are ever in conflict in nature, the struggle for self-preservation and the struggle for others. The two tendencies are antithetic and must be in opposition until the life-ward (disinterested) tendency absorbs the self-ward, and God is in all and love reigneth world without end. Sin is the divisive, separating thing in our relations with one another and with God, the source of all. Until Jesus came no self-offering had been so complete and consistent. To be effective the atonement has to be repeated. The divine nature is present potentially in every human being. What needs to be done is to get it manifested or brought forth into conscious activity. If sin is selfishness, salvation must consist in ceasing to be selfish: it represents the victory of love in the human heart. This may be represented as the uprising of the deeper self, the true man, the Christ man, in the experience of the penitent. The Christ, the true Christ who was and is Jesus, but who is also the deeper self of every human being, is saving individuals by filling them with the unselfish desire to save the race. The spirit of man and the spirit of God are one, hence the infinite life behind the human spirit will assert itself irresistibly against the endeavors of sin to inclose that spirit with finite conditions. The uprising of Christ in the individual soul must inevitably mean pain to the man whose true life has been entombed in selfishness. Pain caused by sin arises from the soul, which is potentially infinite and cannot have its true nature denied. You cannot continue to live apart from the whole, for the real you is the whole, and do what you will it will overcome everything within you that makes for separateness, and in the process you will have to suffer. This is what punishment of sin means. It is life battling with death, love striving against selfishness, the deeper soul with the surface soul.

We must destroy the social system which makes selfishness the rule. We want collectivism instead of competition; we want the kingdom of God. Collectivism must be the expression of the spirit of brotherhood working from within. We can at least recognize the presence of the guiding spirit of God in all our social concerns, and work along with it for the realization of the ideal of universal brotherhood. We can show men what Jesus really came to do, and as his servants we

can help him to do it. We can definitely recognize that the movement toward social regeneration is really and truly a spiritual movement and that it must never be captured by materialism. The New Theology is the theology of this movement for it is essentially the gospel of the kingdom of God. The mission of the New Theology is to brighten and keep burning the flame of the spiritual ideal in the midst of the mighty social movement. It is ours to see God in it and to help mankind to see him too.

III

This idealistic monism, if it is logically carried out, is full of all the difficulties and open to all the objections which have been urged against pantheistic systems in general. If God is the one and only independent reality, what, we may well ask, becomes of the independence of individuals? If they are mere expressions or manifestations of his nature, they cannot be absolutely free and responsible personalities. If God exhausts his being in all existing personalities or consciousnesses, if these personalities constitute God, then the term God is but a collective name; there is no personal God, and the term pantheism is a misnomer. If, however, God is a personal consciousness and all other personalities are reflections or thoughts of God, then the other personalities are personalities in name only; the thoughts are the thoughts of another person who has or is these thoughts. To call us God's thoughts is to rob us of our independence. Of course, there is no objection to all this, provided we do not afterward make claims with respect to these matters which we have already waived in our premises. If, on the other hand, we try to save our personal independence and yet insist that we are persons in the personality of God, the problem arises, How can there be countless persons in one person? Moreover, if everything is the reflection of the one basal spiritual principle, God, then all the sin and evil in the world are the expression of God's nature, just as much as the good is, and God is responsible for the evil as well as the good. That too may be the only valid conclusion, but if it is, then we must stick to it in our thinking, and not forget that we have drawn it.

These difficulties have caused some of the more recent pantheists to make compromises with theism and dualism; indeed, few pantheists have had the courage to accept the logical consequences of their

premises. This is as true, it seems to me, of Thomas Hill Green as of Mr. Campbell. The German philosopher, Krause, has coined the term *panentheism* to designate such a compromise system or rather amalgamation of systems. According to the New Theology, for example, God reveals himself in everything; nothing that exists is outside of God. God must limit himself in order to realize himself; to know his own possibilities he must take on finitude. Imperfection, finitude, conditionality, limitation, and everything these imply are therefore necessities of God's being. There are two modes of God: the infinite or perfect and the finite or imperfect, the latter being the expression of the former. God is immanent in this finite universe, indeed this finite universe is part of him. But this finite universe does not exhaust God, his nature is not fully revealed in these expressions; there is a mode of God that transcends. We have here the attempt to reconcile the transcendency of God, a doctrine peculiar to theism, with his immanency, a doctrine peculiar to pantheism. The infinite transcendent God *wants* to express what he is; he is ceaselessly uttering himself through higher and ever higher forms of existence; it will take him to all eternity to live out all that he is. The universe, including ourselves, is one instrument or vehicle of the self-expression of God; he is the universe and infinitely more. Professor Paulsen offers a similar compromise:

Immanency and transcendency do not exclude each other. Theism cannot exclude the immanency of God in the world. If God is the creator and preserver of all things, it is his power in the things which gives them their reality at every moment of time. On the other hand, philosophical pantheism does not exclude transcendency; God and nature do not absolutely coincide. This is true as far as their quantity is concerned. The nature which we see is finite, God is infinite; it is merged in him, but he is not merged in nature. The world known to our cosmology is but a drop in the ocean of reality. The same statements may be made of his quality. The essence of things as it is known to us is not absolutely different from God's, but God's essence itself is infinite; it is not exhausted by the qualities of the reality which we behold: by mind and body extension and thought, or however we may designate the most general qualities of existence. Hence God is transcendent in so far as his infinite nature infinitely transcends the reality known to us.¹

These attempts at a compromise between theism and pantheism, to reconcile immanency with transcendency, do not, however, remove

¹ *Introduction to Philosophy*, English translation, p. 257.

the difficulties in the problem of the personality and the responsibility of both God and man. Thus we are told by the New Theology that there is a deeper side of our being, which is perfect and eternal, and integral to the being of God. In our surface self, our ordinary everyday consciousness, we are wholly unconscious of our real and true self, though the real self may be conscious of the so-called lower self. To our everyday surface consciousness the world appears split up into individuals, the surface soul is a dividing, separating consciousness; in reality, however, there is no such division anywhere; my deeper self and my surface self are one; your self and my self are one, the whole human race is one; God and all life are one, he is the highest self. If these statements were taken at their face value, they would lead us to believe that all individualization was an illusion of a human consciousness, that there were no real personal selves, except the self of God. Then the teaching that God limits himself, expresses himself in finite forms, would lose its bottom, the so-called finite manifestations of God would be mere appearances, the apparitions of a finite consciousness and not real expressions of a self-limiting God. How there could be such a surface consciousness to conjure up these ghosts of separate beings, would be a mystery of mysteries! But this cannot be the real thought of Mr. Campbell; in his monistic enthusiasm he evidently forgets that God does actually express himself in finite individuals, that the separation while it lasts—and it will go on forever—is a real separation. He forgets what he has said: that “the being of God is a complex unity, containing within itself and harmonizing every form of self-consciousness that can possibly exist.” If we accept this view of the case, then God expresses his being in human persons; the subconscious core of the human personality is a part of God’s nature; it is “the deathless divine in us.” According to the logic of the situation the true self in me is really God’s self; human personalities are like blossoms on the stock of reality, or the crests of the wave of the infinite ocean of existence. I am a thought in the mind of God, not the mind that does the thinking, not a real independent personality. Besides, I am a *passing* thought. God will think other thoughts by and by, thoughts like me perhaps, but not me, for “the cosmos is changing every moment,” “God is ceaselessly uttering himself through higher and higher forms of existence.” “To

see one form break up and another take its place is no calamity, however terrible it may seem, for it only means that the life contained in that form has gone back to the universal life, and will express itself again in some higher and better form."

This is real pantheism. But Mr. Campbell does not stick to this text consistently; he modifies his doctrine in such a way that the different parts will not hang together. God is a complex unity, as we have already seen; the subconscious selves seem to be eternal realities in God, and not mere passing thoughts after all. "I shall not cease to be I, nor you to be you." Indeed, not only the subconscious or higher selves endure, but even the surface consciousnesses appear to be immortal. We shall come to know that ultimately your being and my being are one. "I build my belief in immortality on the conviction that the fundamental reality of the universe is consciousness, and that no consciousness can ever be extinguished, for it belongs to the whole and must be fulfilled in the whole. The one unthinkable supposition from this point of view is that any kind of being which has ever become aware of itself, that is, has ever contained a ray of the eternal consciousness, can perish." "No form of self-consciousness can ever perish." Here we have a kind of intelligible kingdom, a world of spirits, a divine person who expresses himself in separate persons who seem to be eternal. The doctrine reminds one very much of Origen's doctrine of the eternally created son of the Father, only here we have an eternal creation of countless sons of the Father. It is an attempt to save both monism and pluralism by adopting them both.

We find similar inconsistencies in the ethical teachings of the New Theology; efforts are made to draw the consequences of a monistic philosophy and at the same time to secure to the individual a share in the work of realizing the divine purpose. We are told that we can neither make nor mar this inner, true self of which we have already spoken, and which is our being and God's. If we keep to this view, there is nothing for man to do but to let things take their course. If we can neither make nor mar the real self, if we are not even conscious of it, if it is in the last analysis the inexorable God working out his own salvation, realizing himself, then what use and chance is there of the surface consciousness doing anything that counts? It is true,

we are reminded, that we are helping him to utter himself when we are true to ourselves; "or rather, which is the same thing, he is doing it in us." And we are encouraged to "grow the soul," to manifest the true nature of the "spirit," to put ourselves in line with the cosmic purpose, to bring it forth into *conscious* activity, but after all, the divine nature, the true man in us, will assert itself, the true self will win, whate'er betide. How can this conscious surface self, which is as nothing to the universal, deeper self, a mere ripple on the wave, influence the basal self, of which it is not even conscious?

Sin, it is said, is selfishness, living for self alone, while morality is living a life for humanity as a whole. The struggle for self-preservation and the struggle for others are two conflicting tendencies in nature. Sin is the attempt to misuse the energies of God, it is the expression of individuality at the expense of the race. The life of love is the God spirit manifesting itself. But so on the monistic theory must selfishness be an expression of the basal principle of things. God *wants* to limit himself, he wants the world as it is; and he *must* limit himself; in order to realize his nature he must become individualized. That means pain and sin of course, but these things are inevitable. Hence the struggle of love and selfishness cannot but be a struggle of the limiting God with himself and within himself. So that if sin is the attempt to misuse the energies of God, it must be God who is misusing his own energies, for all energy is in God, or rather is God. There seems to be a certain dualism in God's nature. Yes, the farther back we go in the history of the race, the stronger the self-ward tendency is, the fiercer the struggle the more divided is God's own being between light and darkness. But the victory is assured for the love principle; love will win, the disinterested tendency will absorb the self-ward tendency, and God will be in all and love will reign world without end. Do what you will, the real you in you, the love side, will overcome everything in you that makes for separateness and sin. "The infinite life behind the human spirit will assert itself irresistibly against the endeavors of sin to inclose that spirit with finite conditions." The fight is after all God's fight, and the outcome is certain. All the individual can do is to put himself in line, but whether he does so or not, it would seem that the result will be the same; as in the rigorous determinism of ancient Stoicism:

volentem fata ducunt, nolentem trahunt. It is hard to see how the surface self's unwillingness to fall in line could retard the march of the innermost love-self; indeed it is not easy to understand how there can be any opposition between the surface self and the deeper self, since the former is the partial manifestation of the latter.

Here again we seem to get a dualism, a dualism within the individual himself, if we look at the matter from the point of view of the individual. It is the antagonism between the self-ward and the disinterested tendencies, and the antagonism will be overcome by the victory of love. But here again the teaching is not consistently adhered to. We are told that the struggle for self-preservation and the struggle for others are antithetic, but we are also told that morality is making the most of *oneself* for the sake of the whole. Common sense comes to the rescue of the New Theology, and the exaggerated opposition between the self-regarding and other-regarding impulses is toned down. It is held that the disinterested tendency will absorb the self-ward one, but it is also held that true morality involves the duty of *self*-formation and the exercise of judgment and self-discipline in order that the individual life may become as great a gift as possible to the common life. Here again common sense triumphs against the strict logic of monism. So long as there are individuals, there must be *self*-ward tendencies; there is no help for it. We can have no personal life without self-assertion. Nor can we care for others unless we first care for ourselves. And so long as there is society, there must be disinterested tendencies and acts. There is no irreconcilable conflict between the *self*-ward and the *other*-ward strivings of our nature. The problem of morality is to fashion the so-called egoistic and sympathetic impulses in such a way as to bring about a proper balance between the two. Irrational egoism is bad, and irrational sympathy is bad. The problem is not to eradicate the self-ward tendencies, for that would mean the elimination of selfhood. It is my duty to save my own soul as well as to help save others. And so long as personalities exist and persist, so long as self-realization is at least part of the ideal—and the New Theology asserts that the selves will never disappear, but will go on perfecting themselves—so long will the self-ward tendencies be essential elements of human nature. The purpose of living is to realize selves; and living for the whole can mean nothing but

living in such a way that human personalities, my own included, may reach their fullest fruition. The absolute absorption of the self-ward tendencies by the disinterested tendencies, would be the obliteration of all personal selves. If everybody sacrificed himself for everybody else, there would be nobody left upon whom the benefits of such a sacrifice could fall. In placing a value upon other personalities I am tacitly fixing a value upon my own; if their souls are worth saving, mine too must be worth saving.

IV

To me there seem to be two lines of thought running through most of the modern pantheistic systems: the one monistic, the other dualistic or pluralistic. The one shows the author's desire to reason logically from his premises, the other betrays his unwillingness to accept consequences which conflict with the beliefs of common sense. As we have seen, some attempt is made to spin out the monistic thread. Everything is God, man included; God expresses himself in a countless variety of finite forms. This self-limitation carries with it sin and pain and evil, but all these will be overcome in the process of cosmic evolution through which God will realize his nature; everything comes from the infinite and to the infinite it will return. Human personalities are not exceptions to the rule, they too are manifestations of the Godhead, dependent on God for what they are and do. Through them, as through everything else, he realizes his purpose; they, however, have no real independence; as reflections of the divine essence they can have no influence on the core of things. So the monist goes bravely on until he reaches man. Then forgetting the logical demands of his system he halts and reconstructs his notion of the human personality: he endows it with a certain degree of initiative and self-determination, he gives it immortality, he makes it eternal. In this way he tries to save the independence of the human personality. But he tries to save his monism too, by making human personalities parts of the complex unity of the Godhead. He must have his cake and eat it. But as this might seem to limit God, he adds another story to the edifice of his philosophy, and God becomes a transcendent, infinite being, in whom there are no limitations, in whom all dualisms and differences are overcome.

The answer to the question therefore: Can Christianity ally itself with monistic ethics? depends in part upon what phase of the monistic philosophy, as taught by modern writers, we emphasize. One phase of it *is* Christian in the sense that it agrees with the popular Christian world-view: it teaches the transcendency and spirituality of God, the immortality of the soul, and the freedom of the will, freedom enough to enable man to help in realizing the Divine purpose in the universe. In these respects there is no obstacle to an alliance between Christianity and systems like the New Theology which call themselves monistic. But, as I have repeatedly pointed out, these systems are not consistently monistic. They are patchwork philosophies. A strictly logical monism or pantheism leaves no room for independent personalities. If I am the thought in the mind of God, I am dependent upon him who thinks me, I am a part in a great system of thoughts; and by and by when this system gives way to another as it must in the process of evolution, I shall be no more. To say that there are such *independent* personalities and that they are eternal *manifestations* sounds to my ears like a contradiction in terms: it represents the endeavor to save both pluralism and monism. Now whether Christianity can ally itself with a *consistent* monistic theory will depend upon how we interpret Christianity. If Christianity means a belief in a personal God, the immortality of the soul, free will, human responsibility for sin; if it teaches a dualism between God and world, soul and body; and if these doctrines are essential to a belief in Christianity; then, obviously, it cannot ally itself with a philosophy which denies most of these things. If the deeper subconscious self in me, the true core of my being, is in reality God himself; and if *I*, meaning by me the everyday conscious self, can neither make nor mar this deeper self, if it is bound to break all fetters and to realize God's purpose; if all the surface consciousness can do is to recognize the purpose of God, but neither hasten it nor retard it; then Christianity as popularly understood will find its ethical occupation gone. The only way to reconcile it with such a monistic, deterministic, pantheistic doctrine is to interpret Christianity allegorically, and when it comes to that, almost any system can be read into it.

So far, however, as the practical moral precepts of monistic ethics are concerned, Christianity will have no difficulty with them.

Whatever may be the metaphysical views of idealistic monism, this philosophy urges men to strive for the highest good, to help realize the purpose of the universe or the will of God. Even the Stoics with their rigorous determinism ask us to live according to nature or reason, to act in accordance with the will of the world. And so we shall find no great difference between the practical morality enjoined by modern pantheists and that enjoined by modern Christians; they preach the same virtues. There is nothing, for example, in Professor Paulsen's *System of Ethics* which a modern Christian cannot accept, in spite of the pantheistic foundation upon which it is reared. I say *modern* Christian, because if Christianity is taken to be an ascetic, world-denying religion, aiming at the uprooting of all natural impulses, then, to be sure, an ethical teaching like Professor Paulsen's is in spirit opposed to Christianity.

V

There is another problem connected with this whole discussion upon which I have not touched, and that is the relation of Jesus to God and man. It is held that this is the paramount question of the Christian religion, that the truth of Christianity depends upon the divinity of its founder. The New Theology offers the answer which is characteristic of monistic or pantheistic systems written in a Christian key. The answer is as follows: Jesus was divine simply and solely because his life was never governed by any other principle than perfect love. But this is not to say that we shall not reach the standard too; quite the contrary; we must reach it in order to fulfil our destiny. If by deity is meant that Jesus possessed the all-controlling consciousness of the universe, then assuredly he was not the Deity; his consciousness was as purely human as our own. We cannot, however, dispense with the doctrine of the Trinity; we have to postulate God, the universe, and God's operation within the universe. The universe is an expression of that side of God's being which can only be described as the ideal or archetypal mankind. Whatever else God may be, he is essentially man, i.e., he is the fount of humanity. There must be one side of the infinitely complex being of God in which humanity is eternally contained, and which finds expression in the finite universe. Jesus is the fullest expression of that eternal divine man in the field of human history, of the fontal or ideal Man

who contains and is expressed in all human kind. But as we have come forth from this fontal manhood, we too must be to some extent expressions of this eternal Christ. Jesus lived his life in such a way as to reveal the very essence of the Christ nature. He is therefore central for us, and we are complete in him. Here is the goal of all moral effort—Christ; here too is the highest reach of the religious ideal—Christ.

We have here the old Platonic philosophy applied to Christianity. The eternal and perfect idea of man in the intelligible world or in the mind of God reveals itself in countless finite and imperfect forms, Jesus being the most complete exemplar of the original and eternal type that has thus far appeared. The archetypal man is the Christ, the logos, the son of God, the *δευτερος θεος*; the historical Jesus is one of the many reflections of the true reality. It is not to be supposed that the Christian religion would cease to exist if this doctrine should be accepted; for it is after all in the example of Jesus rather than in any metaphysical theories or dogmas about him that the moral strength of Christianity lies. At the same time the teaching means no more than that God contains within himself the potency of the highest type of human being conceivable, that he has expressed this type in Jesus, that he is approximating it more or less in all human beings, and that he will finally realize it in humanity as a whole. This thought is a cheering thought and one with which any religion can ally itself provided it does not take too seriously the logical consequences of the teaching to which we have constantly called attention. But, carried to its logical conclusions, it is not in harmony with a religion that seems so careless of the type, so careful of the single life as Christianity, that places such a high value upon the human personality.

VI

In conclusion it should be stated that we have considered this entire problem solely in its logical bearings. We have asked whether a consistent monistic philosophy and Christianity agree in their teachings, and have found that they do not. The question whether it might not be possible and perhaps even better for Christianity to adopt this monism in spite of logical difficulties, has not been considered by us. Can Christianity thrive in combination with a world-

view theoretically contradicting it? It has been linked with all kinds of doctrines in the past, without losing its practical efficacy and it would doubtless survive a union with modern pantheism in the future. Religions are not logic-proof systems of thought. There are difficulties and inconsistencies even in theistic conceptions, similar to those we have pointed out in pantheism, but they have not prevented large numbers of thinking men from accepting theism, nor have they led to any marked changes in Christian practice. The inconsistencies are generally ignored, and the thinker experiences no uneasiness in holding a theory in his metaphysics that does not exactly agree with his ethics. Thus, for example, if God created the world and everything in it, then the world is a manifestation of his Nature. Then too God created man and is responsible for him, and it is hard to see how man can be free under these circumstances. But even if we should admit a certain degree of freedom, God would still be responsible for man's acts because God could have made him so that he would always choose the good. It is hard, in other words, on such a hypothesis to shift the responsibility for evil from God. A theology that teaches an absolute creation out of nothing can hardly be differentiated from pantheism. The only way to relieve God of responsibility for evil in the universe is either to explain it away or to call it by another name or to place it in the service of good, or to put the blame for evil on something independent of God, that is, to introduce another principle into the universe. This last alternative would give us dualism or pluralism; it would relieve God of the responsibility for sin and evil, but it would at the same time limit him. We see, theology like philosophy has its antinomies.

THE RELATION BETWEEN THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS AND THE BELIEF IN IMMORTALITY

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The question proposed for discussion in this paper is: What is the logical relation between the resurrection of Jesus and the doctrine of immortality? Plainly, therefore, the resurrection of Jesus as an historical event is to be taken for granted. To avoid misapprehension, however, let me state that I do not believe in the resurrection of Jesus, in any legitimate use of terms, but do believe in immortality. It follows therefore that to my mind faith in immortality is not dependent upon belief in the resurrection of Jesus although the possibility is recognized that it may be confirmed thereby. It is this point alone which the present paper undertakes to consider.

Historically, faith in immortality did not arise out of belief in the resurrection of Jesus. Long before the time of Jesus, there seems to have been a virtually universal belief in a world of shades wherein some semblance of man survived after his bodily death. This was immortality, but it was never the object of hope or desire, save in the negative sense of release from the troubling of the wicked and the wearying restlessness of mortal life. The early Christians, however, convinced that Jesus had arisen both from the tomb and from Hades, thought of him as living in the heavenly realm, and believed that at death they also should pass into the heavens to be henceforth and forever with Jesus their Lord, entering into his present bliss and destined to return with him to share in changed bodies the glories of the changed world. His resurrection was the pledge of their own at his second advent, however that may have been conceived, but their faith in immortality was not really new save as it now was accompanied by longing and aspiration. To depart and be with Christ was as much better than the earthly life as the earthly life had been deemed better than a spare and bloodless existence in Hades. The resurrection of Jesus gave them not the idea but the hope of

immortality; it assured them not so much of immortality as of an immortality that was worth having, especially during the period between death and the resurrection.

Before proceeding farther, we must define our terms by indicating the various ideas for which they respectively stand. Among Christians who believe in immortality, three groups are discoverable. In the first class, are those who hold that man either has by nature, or may acquire by moral discipline, a psychical structure unaffected by the physical experience of death, and hence capable of continuance in spiritual conditions and environment regardless of bodily disintegration. The second class comprises those who deny the possibility of independent psychical existence and teach that with the death of the body consciousness also terminates, to be resumed only when on some future day of resurrection God shall reanimate this present body, with some modification of nature which shall make it henceforth superior to death. In the third class, are those who combine the essential elements of both views, holding that there is independent psychical continuance but that in the future this psychical structure will again take to itself a body in some way related to that which died yet miraculously transformed into another condition of which present experience gives no sure intimation. These three classes may be designated for convenience as, believers in spiritual immortality alone, in reanimation alone, and in immortality and resurrection combined.

Those who avow belief in the resurrection of Jesus as an historical event fall into one or the other of two groups. In the first are those who accept the traditional view that there was an actual reanimation of the body of Jesus, accompanied by a mysterious transformation, prefiguring, perhaps, that which is to be wrought at the general resurrection. The second class, however, which has been numerically small but seems to be increasing in numbers and influence, denies the reality of the vacant tomb and the reanimation of the body, maintaining that Jesus, having survived spiritually the tragedy of Calvary, was able, either by special gift of God or by reason of his firm and noble personality, to reveal himself inwardly to his disciples with such vividness that the inward experience was indistinguishable from objective reality. It is a fair question whether the adherents to the

latter view can rightfully be called believers in the resurrection at all, but since they like to differentiate themselves from those who believe in the spiritual immortality of Jesus but regard the reported appearances, so far as they are authentic, as subjective and not "subjective-objective" in character, and therefore proclaim fervently their belief in the resurrection, it seems best to take them at their word and put them in a distinct class among believers in the resurrection of Jesus.

In view of these different ideas of immortality and theories of the resurrection, it is plain that the question of the paper cannot be answered in general terms but calls for an examination into the logical bearing of each of the views of the resurrection upon the several ideas of immortality. Let us begin then, with the first, the traditional, view of the resurrection and see how it affects the three ideas of immortality severally and respectively.

Those who maintain belief in spiritual immortality may justly claim that the alleged fact of the resurrection of Jesus has nothing whatever to do with their belief: if accepted, it does not strengthen, if denied, it does not weaken it. For faith in the immortality of Jesus is quite without reference to belief in his bodily resurrection. Paul's vision of the Christ in celestial glory, if given full credence, and taken at his own valuation, does not imply, although he may have thought it did, the previous fact of the resurrection of Jesus, in the sense now under consideration. His continued existence, in the heavens, is wholly independent of the history of his body. For immortality and resurrection belong to different orders: the former pertains to the psychical, the latter to the physical existence; we speak of the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the body. To believers in spiritual immortality, the fate of the body is quite immaterial. Certainly resurrection of the body cannot prove immortality of the soul. If indeed it could be shown that between the death on Friday and the resurrection on Sunday, Jesus was consciously alive, the possibility of psychical existence apart from the body would thereby be demonstrated, but it should be observed that this is not necessarily involved in the traditional theory as to the resurrection of Jesus. The first view of resurrection therefore has no logical relation whatever to the first view of immortality since the mere resurrection of a body could never demonstrate the immortality of a soul.

It is different however with the second idea of immortality, which deems it conditional upon bodily reanimation. For if after death Jesus returned to life in a body, related indeed to the old since the tomb was vacant, yet essentially immaterial in character, two inferences are legitimate: first, that such a bodily existence as this theory of immortality requires is possible; and, second, that the reanimation of Jesus may be regarded as promise and pledge of a similar act of God in the case of all men. The first view of the resurrection, therefore, decidedly strengthens, although as will presently be shown it does not conclusively prove, the second idea of immortality.

With respect to the third view of immortality, nothing further need be said than that its full proof depends upon proof of both its component parts. Knowing nothing of the existence of Jesus between death and resurrection, we cannot argue from this resurrection to spiritual immortality—that is, the resurrection has no logical relation to the first element of the idea; and, with the dropping out of that member, the third idea becomes identical with the second which has just been considered, so far as concerns its logical relation to the first view of the resurrection.

Turning now to the second theory of the resurrection, that of subjective-objective vision, and applying this in its turn to the three ideas of immortality, we see at once that it has direct and vital relation to the doctrine of spiritual immortality. For it presupposes, and affirms, the continued psychical existence of Jesus apart from the physical organism, thus demonstrating the possibility of such a mode of being. As regards universal immortality, however, this must be deemed, for a reason soon to be given, a possibility and nothing more; but it cannot be denied that the idea of immortality in question gains much in weight, and one prime objection to it is removed, when it is certainly believed that in the case of Jesus, psychical continuance, notwithstanding death, has been proved actual thus demonstrating the possibility of such a survival in the case of all men. The second idea of resurrection, therefore, materially strengthens although it does not conclusively prove the first idea of immortality. To the second idea of immortality, this theory of the resurrection is decidedly adverse, for by affirming as actual in the case of Jesus and hence possible in the case of others, that psychical continuance which the believer in

immortality through reanimation rejects, and by denying the physical reanimation of Jesus, it deprives his resurrection of all significance with reference to universal resurrection. With respect to the third idea of immortality, the disappearance of its second element, for the reason just given in the discussion of it as a separate theory, simply throws the theory itself under the category of the first from which it now becomes indistinguishable.

The results of the examination may be briefly summed up. We have seen that the traditional theory of the resurrection has no logical relation to the doctrine of spiritual immortality but establishes immortality through resurrection as a possibility. On the other hand, we have seen that the subjective-objective theory of the resurrection of Jesus establishes spiritual immortality as a possibility, but is distinctly adverse to immortality through resurrection. And now our final inquiry remains—can the possibility in either case be transformed into a certainty? The answer is, that in so far as the uniqueness of Jesus is insisted upon, does it become illogical to base a universal proposition upon his unique experience. If, according to the traditional view, God raised this unique being, Messiah and Son of God, second person in the Trinity, from the dead, what evidence does that fact give that he will similarly raise all others or even any others? If, according to the subjective-objective theory, this unique being survived the death of the body, how does that fact support the belief that we common mortals can similarly survive? If it was because of the compactness of his achieved personality that this victory was possible for him, and of like personalities like victory may be predicted, then his experience becomes predictive only upon denial of his uniqueness. The outcome is, therefore, that in view of the uniqueness claimed for Jesus, in neither case does his resurrection enable us to argue beyond the mere possibility of immortality in general. The utmost that can be said is that those who hold to the subjective-objective theory of the resurrection and attribute such “reappearances” to the achieved personality of Jesus may find in this belief some support for the doctrine of conditional immortality. For all others, the possibilities indicated remain, so far as the logical bearing of the resurrection is concerned, possibilities and nothing more.

Only one more point remains for consideration. It may be argued

that the resurrection established the divine authority of Jesus, so putting beyond question his teaching as to human destiny, and that accordingly his resurrection proves, thus indirectly, human immortality. This argument however carries us beyond the rigidly limited field of the present discussion since it rests belief in immortality upon his teaching rather than upon his resurrection. Two questions however may be asked in closing: Does the resurrection establish the truth of all his teaching, including that concerning demons and the nearness of the second advent, and if of only a part, how is it possible to decide with certainty in which part the doctrine of immortality is to be placed? Secondly, Do we really need, at this day, confidence in his resurrection to justify his insight into the ways of God and the destiny of man?

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The editors of the *American Journal of Theology* have asked me to discuss the subject indicated by the title of this article. It is one of the many problems in the relations of Christian faith to philosophic thought, concerning which many minds are peculiarly sensitive today. Hence any attempt to meet the difficulties which are involved in it must encounter some delicate situations. In advance, however, let it be understood that the subject is strictly limited. On the one hand, it does not require an exposition of the general or philosophical arguments for immortality, although it will require some reference to these and a more explicit emphasis upon some aspects of them. Nor, on the other hand, does it necessitate a study of the teaching of Jesus regarding the future life, nor of the differing points of view from which that life may be set forth by various New Testament writers. What is before us is a discussion of the one definite question: whether the resurrection of Christ has had and must have a direct and vital relation to the belief in immortality, whether at any points it may be said not only to illuminate but to sustain and confirm that belief. The discussion of this specific topic is forced upon us by a tendency which is manifest in various directions when the relations of Christianity to philosophy are being discussed. For example we find those who maintain that the science of ethics is complete and presents an adequate

view of human experience without any reference to religion. In other words, it is believed that the race has now come to a level of moral intuition and moral habit at which it can maintain itself without those religious sanctions which have confessedly played an important part in raising it to that level. It is but one aspect of this general position which appears when it is maintained that belief in a worthy conception of immortality has now become a final possession of the human race and that, although the resurrection of Christ or any other event or form of religious doctrine in the past has helped to produce this result, these are not indispensable for the continuance of that belief. Of course, such a position must rest ultimately upon the theory that when in the process of evolution a certain form of reality or experience has been attained, this effect can be permanent even though the causes which produced it have ceased to operate. But that general assumption, which underlies a great mass of current theological and philosophical discussion, and which I believe to be erroneous, must not be entered upon here. At the other extreme, there are those who find themselves ready to maintain that all beliefs in immortality before Christ were so vague and so poorly supported by evidence that they were really worthless, and that, therefore, our whole and sole dependence for proof of that belief must rest upon the resurrection of Christ and upon the flood of light which that event has cast upon human destiny.

Neither of these alternative positions seems reasonable to the present writer. I hold that the belief in immortality, however dim and even when poorly supported by formal reasoning, has been of immense significance and value, that its age-long and well-nigh universal prevalence among men has exerted a steady, even if varied, influence upon human thought and character. Moreover, the philosophical discussions of the arguments for immortality and of the nature of the future life have, in my view, always possessed real power and have seldom wandered utterly from the truth. The position, therefore, which I wish to describe, as simply as possible, in the following article is this: that the belief in immortality has arisen naturally in the human mind and heart and therefore has had its place in the universal history of man; further, that this belief has received incalculable reinforcement and illumination from the

resurrection of Christ; and, still further, that this event, through the effects which it has produced upon human character and opinion, has wrought itself into the very substance of most modern philosophical arguments in favor of immortality. It will follow, therefore, that to lose that event, to be convinced that Christ never rose from the dead, must throw the human mind back into pre-Christian uncertainty and must cut the very nerve out of the noblest and most convincing of the philosophical arguments which have been adduced in Christendom on behalf of the belief in a future life.

I

THE BELIEF IN IMMORTALITY

It is necessary, therefore, in the first place, to take brief account of the belief itself, and of its current philosophical defenses.

1. We may assume here that practically the whole human race has believed in some form of human existence after death. The science of religion has gathered an enormous amount of evidence on this point, and the conclusion is inevitable that in practically all grades of development man has felt himself to be related to a super-human world, and that his relation to it does not cease but enters upon new forms when he dies. Naturally the mind of man has conceived of that future life in ways differing according to the measure of his moral and intellectual culture. Sometimes it has appeared as a mere continuation of his present life. Sometimes it has been pictured as a dim underworld where the poor bodiless ghosts wander in dreary monotony and impotence of life.¹ Sometimes glimpses have been obtained of a moral universe where truth and righteousness prevail, requiring that the human soul shall appear before some judgment bar and be assigned to a destiny appropriate to the character of its moral life in this world.² Perhaps the best that can be said of all pre-Christian beliefs in immortality is that they reflect the moral attainment of those who cherished them, rather than that they have inspired or sustained the soul in its striving after a higher life. Hence it is that we find the popular imagination unable to hold the highest views suggested by ancient thinkers and seers, and the moral consciousness of

¹ See Stephen Phillips's splendid poem, "Christ in Hades."

² See the close of Plato's *Republic*.

ancient peoples changing in quality from one period to another, practically without reference to its conceptions of a future life. These were the children of its own desires, the pictures of its own more or less enlightened imagination. They were not spurs to its sensual and sluggish soul. They were not objective and authoritative standards known to be fixed by God, rebuking its sin, and yet rousing it with the joy of a great hope and the certainty of a distinct destiny. Moreover no ancient idea of immortality was definite and clear enough to become attractive to any but especially trained minds. Even in the writings of Plato, as in the *Phaedrus* or the *Republic*, where majestic myth as well as noble argument reveal possibilities in the future life of man which surpass anything but the Christian view, we feel that there is a great lack of definiteness as well as of certainty. The moral stimulus which the reasoning and the glowing illustration suggest is yet without supreme power; for they at best arise from the glorious genius of one of the greatest of the sons of men. They reflect his nobility of soul, his individual aspirations, his eagle-like passion to gaze open-eyed upon the splendor of the eternal sun. But a doctrine thus supported, difficult to expound, which describes an ideal difficult to conceive of, could never and did never take its place as a great, living, social force. It just lacked the seal of an objective, historical event. The discussion of the matter by Plato's own pupil, Aristotle, and the fate which his arguments encountered in subsequent philosophical movements, the easy way in which Cicero now accepts and now almost ignores them, prove the point that the mightiest philosophical arguments, the most marvelous moral intuitions, were unable to become permanent and universal causes in the evolution of human society.

2. As might be expected, the philosophical discussions of the doctrine of immortality in the history of Christendom have undergone a great variety of development. In our own day, since our historical references must be brief, we find that the doctrine is receiving an extraordinary amount of attention. This is not wholly due to the somewhat artificial stimulus of the Gifford or the Ingersoll lectureships. The very foundation of these sprang from an interest in the spiritual view of the universe. And the trustees of these Lectureships have had no difficulty in discovering that large numbers of our ablest

scholars and thinkers are prepared to declare themselves at great length, with great scholarship, upon the fundamental problems that surround man's idea of God and his hope of a future life. The arguments for immortality which have been worked out in recent days may perhaps be classified under three distinct heads.

a) In the first place, we have those which are concerned with man's relation to the physical universe, and which aim at showing that life and the soul of man are facts so distinct from the existence of physical substance that their history may be independent of its movements. Thus Sir Oliver Lodge in his *Life and Matter*, maintains that since life appears as a something which controls the movements of material things, we cannot possibly hold that it is produced by those movements or that its continuance as a form of reality depends upon them. So with the psychological arguments adduced by Professor James and others, which would insist that the human brain and nervous system must be regarded as the instruments of a form of reality which is manifested in human thought and action, but that the instruments neither produce the soul nor can be proved to be necessary to its existence.

b) In the second place, we have those arguments which base themselves upon metaphysical and ethical views of human nature. These, of course, are of an infinite variety. Among the most recent may be named the elaborate argument of Mr. Haldane in his Gifford Lecture, "The Pathway to Reality," and that of Professor Royce in his Gifford Lecture on "The World and the Individual," as well as in the Ingersoll Lecture on "Immortality." Each of these arguments, while professedly moving in the realm of pure metaphysics, is yet concerned very closely with the question of moral values; for each, man appears as a being who is pursuing a flying goal. In the one case let it be called "reality;" in the other case let it be called "individuality." In both we are made to feel—although the argument sedulously avoids the concrete—that the ideal, thin and purely intellectual as are the forms of its description, must somehow be the pale reflection of the teeming and central passions of the human heart. Both of these, as well as many other modern writers on this topic, owe their best not to Hegel with whom they consciously ally themselves, but to Kant whom they are apt to deride. An ethical element runs through the argu-

ments both of Mr. Haldane and Mr. Royce, and that ethical element, urgent, authoritative, is in best accord with the position which Kant assumed and which must control the thinking of many generations to come. Our very nature demands a life to come; and it is not the mere self-seeking element in us, but the self-respecting element, which makes this demand. It is our reverence for the moral self in all selves which makes the cry for reality and for individuality both real and mighty. I believe that all such arguments, though ostensibly based upon metaphysics implicitly rest upon the ethical consciousness of man, and are therefore to be taken as arousing within the mind of cultured persons the conviction that a future life is probable, as the biologist and psychologist have sought to prove that it is possible. This probability may be thin and dim when a metaphysician has reduced it to its most abstract and technical terms, but it speaks with concrete power when it breaks from the heart of the avowed moralist. Still more wonderful is its influence when the moralist is a poet; and when, like Browning and Tennyson, the poet has spent years in meditation upon this subject and has found that it passes into his whole view both of human life and of outward nature, in their fundamental and central relations to the living and eternal Spirit, his utterances assume almost the force of the prophets of God.

c) In the third place, we have those arguments for immortality which are derived from a theistic view of the universe. Where a man's philosophy has compelled him, or allowed him, as the case may be, to hold the belief in a personal God as the creator and ruler of all things, as the Father of the human spirit, he is driven to a belief in the doctrine of immortality which far surpasses either the bare possibility of the man of science, or the probability of the moralist. For him man appears as a being who is inwardly and directly related with the living God, as a being concerning whom the living God has definite purposes. These purposes cannot be discovered on the surface of his physical nature or history. They must lie in his true and inward being and that, of course, for all men must be sought in the life of the soul. At this point argument passes into insight, search into faith, conviction that an endless life for a moral being is probable, into the conviction that it is as certain as God and man.

3. If we brood over the large masses of argument which have been

produced under the three heads which I have so briefly described, we shall become aware at once of their value and their weakness. Their value arises from the fact that they belong natively to a spiritual view of the universe, and that in all their variety and power they reveal the nature of man as a being made for more than the earthly life, a being who has his true significance in another sphere and in other relations than those which can be summed up by the food that he eats and the diseases which rush him and his dreams to the grave. And so far as these arguments arise from and confirm this spiritual view in the general consciousness of men, they are of immense value. They tend both to confirm and to illuminate our great hope. They often recall us to our true selves and give us a fresh impulse in our race toward that goal which, in varying phrase, they help to make at once clear and attractive. And yet the weakness of all such arguments, whether taken singly or in their converging lines of effect, appears from the fact that taken alone they appear abstract and bloodless. They are woven in the dens of philosophers out of their technical conceptions of reality, conceptions which for the thinkers themselves have become most real, but for the palpitating hearts of men are weak as gossamer. Moreover they all suffer from the fundamental criticism that after all they only describe the desire of man. But man finds himself face to face with physical nature, and nature has only one word to say, an inexorable word of doom. All the generations are in their grave. Man's long and passionate hope and desire, his marvelous will to live forever, has for its one terrible and unbroken answer this universal fact of death. How, after all, do we know that death does not end all? It is that poignant cry of the human soul which has awakened with such keenness the desire for historical proof that souls live after death. The Psychological Research Society is the chief witness to the impatience even of many philosophers with the most powerful arguments for immortality. We believe in it, they say; our arguments kindle the fire of hope within our hearts; and yet our hope is staggered by the grim face of death and we pine for some definite, scientific, indubitable proof that someone has survived or escaped the stroke of death and spoken to his friends. This is the cry of the Psychological Research Society, but it was answered long ago when Jesus appeared to his own.

II

THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS CHRIST

1. The evidence which can be gathered, and that mainly from the New Testament writings, proves that the Jews at the time of the birth of Christ had come to possess the hope of a resurrection. Whatever the sources of the hope may have been, its forms were earthly. They expected that when the "last day," the day of Jehovah, came, ushered in by the power of the Messiah, the dead would be raised, that those who had maintained their faith in the past ages of striving and waiting should not lose their share in the final glory of Israel. This hope, while it marked an advance upon even the Old Testament attitude of mind, was by no means definite or powerful enough profoundly to react upon character and conduct. Especially did it fail of comfort in the very presence of bereavement, as the sisters of Lazarus found.

Then arose what we call the Christian consciousness. This term describes a new range and quality of human experience which was made possible and indeed created by the person of Jesus Christ. The consciousness covered large ranges of human life and contained many elements with which, in this paper, we are not concerned. But we are concerned with one which is undoubtedly among the most startling as well as the most powerful of these new elements. For if anything characterizes the writers of the New Testament in a manner to distinguish them from the attitude of human minds around them, it must be found in their conscious possession of eternal life. On the one side, it may indeed be said to depend immediately and directly upon the vivid sense of personal fellowship with God. They knew that their consciences were cleansed by his grace, that he, the holy and eternal Lord, stood to them individually in the relation and spirit of a Father. They who were his in this new sense could not brook the thought of death. To be conscious of this sonship is to be conscious in very deed and truth of immortality. But we must ask whence the apostolic church derived this very sense of fellowship with God. It was the vision of the risen Christ which flung its light over all other views of God and salvation. Easter morning revealed God and Jesus Christ and humanity in their eternal relations to one another. In the Christian system nothing stands alone as central and essential. Neither

the incarnation nor the cross nor the resurrection, neither Father, Son, nor Spirit, neither forgiveness nor sanctification nor the final redemption can be used as sole fountain-heads for a system of Christian truth. That system is derived from all of these, and each exercises its own energy upon the entire contents of the human consciousness. So the vision of the risen Christ is bound up with every other element of Christian experience and with every phase of distinctively Christian doctrine. But what we are concerned with here is the fact that its supreme and distinctive effect was produced upon man's view of death and of the life to come.

2. Let us briefly set down the main features of the new hope. *In the first place*, let us note that it was a definite apprehension by each believer of his own destiny as an immortal child of God. He knew as truly as anything else that he would not merely die, but rise again. The New Testament throbs with the livingness of this conviction. It saturates every portion of these writings. *In the next place*, this saturation affects the moral consciousness of the early Christians. There can be no more pitiable fallacy than to believe that man has deduced ethical values by a series of logical processes from concrete experience. The noblest instances of moral life have ever seemed to defy logic, have risen from intuitions of duty and of the worth of righteousness which can by no means be reduced to any syllogistic argument. And one of the remarkable features of the New Testament is the unparalleled certainty with which these men walk among the virtues and the graces of the moral universe. The sun of righteousness is blazing in their mid-sky. Only familiarity with their precepts blinds us to their distinction from the moral teaching of any other race or age of literature. There can be no doubt that a large part of the light which illumined their moral universe came from the consciousness of their personal immortality through the risen Christ. The being who knows that God has destined him to eternal life cannot but weigh all the elements of experience and the significance of his own feelings and emotions with new standards. And if that future life is seen to flow into the heart from the heart of an eternal holiness and an eternal mercy, speaking through the lips of an eternal Saviour, the crucified and risen Christ, the man who has felt its force in his soul must understand all things anew and have a feeling for what we

so poorly call "ethical values," which is separated by a whole universe from that of any other class of men. *In the third place* we find that these men viewed that future life in a manner entirely new as regards the relation of the immortal soul to the processes of nature. For as Dr. George A. Gordon has so well put it,

The Christian idea of the future life is not happily expressed by the phrase, immortality of the soul. Soul stands for the seat of thought, feeling, activity; body for the instrument of manifestation, the passive principle in the service of the active. This is the complete life here, and the Christian idea is that the complete life there will be analogous. Thought, and feeling, and activity will have in the future a mode of manifestation, a form of being, an instrument of service, like that which they have in this world.³

The view that the future life takes up into itself by the principle of continuity the present natural or physical life was undoubtedly derived not from any speculation upon nature and its relations to the soul, but directly from the vision of the risen Christ. But to this I must return.

Here then are three features of the Christian hope which distinguish it completely from all other forms known to antiquity, or possible to philosophy in its conception of an immortal life. It is the gift of God to the individual consciousness. It conveys a new moral insight, even a perfect knowledge of the character of God. It reveals the fact that the physical itself shall in some transcendent manner be included in the glory which is to come.⁴

3. Whence were these elements of the Christian consciousness derived? It has already been affirmed that they did not come from the ingenuity of the apostles, thinking out the scheme of a new universe and of man's place in it. No men in history were ever more surprised than they were by the event which we know as the resurrection of Christ. It became evident to them that in that event God himself had intervened. He had raised the Jesus whom they knew from the dead. For them, of course, there was a background to that event. This Jesus was no mere incidental personality, no casual acquaintance. The resurrection, as it has been said, "was not an extraordinary event in an ordinary life." Already they had begun to feel that in him was a new elevation of spirit, a new power which

³ *The Witness to Immortality*, p. 252.

⁴ Rom. 8:18-23; I Cor. 15:35-58; II Cor. 5:1-10; John 20:1-9; I John 3:1 ff.

they could not recognize as native to a human being. The quality of his life in all its aspects and elements had overawed them and drawn them to the conclusion that he was the Messiah. And then death came, death in its most harrowing form, death which bore upon its very face the curse of Jehovah—and their hope was shattered. But when Easter morning showed them him who had been dead that event was at once rationalized for them by their past experience of the power and character of Jesus. They had failed indeed, even in spite of his own words, to anticipate the event; but the event justified itself when it had occurred, through their previous experience.

And God had not simply raised him from the dead, but revealed him to them. The pathetic hunger of the Society of Psychical Research for some indubitable proof that some private individual has appeared to his friends must ever, for the Christian man, seem something like a mockery in view of the resurrection of Christ, the Son of Man. God further had made their continued faith in Jesus as the risen Christ the channel of that inner and real union with himself. Rapidly they were educated to see that for all succeeding generations this is the mode of union between God and man. It is not faith in a God who is merely the picture flung upon the clouds by man's desire, nor in a God who is the wraithlike creation of the speculative brain. He is the living God, the Master of life and death, who raised Jesus, the Redeemer of the race, from the grave and made him known to his own. He is the God of all who through those first believers also believe, and into the hearts which their belief has opened he pours his immortalizing energy.

4. It was from this aspect of the new experience that much of early Christian life took its rise. It changed the inscriptions on their tombstones. No longer did these men write there the words of a final and bitter farewell. These mothers did not reveal broken hearts over their dead children. The light of the new hope shone upon their tombstones and wrote the words of an eternal life, an unconquered hope. It inspired their martyr spirit, for they died, not as the crushed victims of despots, but as the irrepressible witnesses of a divine power and a living expectation. It threw a new quality and added sense of reality into the present earthly life. For a time, indeed, many seemed to view this world as if it had shrunk into a small and evil thing, so

great was the glory of the life to come; in subsequent generations of Christian history there arose many crass and unworthy views of the life that now is. And, of course, the new vividness with which the future life was realized tempted men to speculate with undue daring and confidence regarding the detailed conditions both of the saved and the lost in the future. But for the vast majority and for the permanent consciousness of the Christian Church the resurrection of Christ with all its immediate and legitimate inferences filled the present life with a new majesty. All human interests and relations appeared *sub specie aeternitatis*. Hence it is that in the early church we find the doctrine of the resurrection gathering to itself, as around a living center, much of the doctrine concerning the incarnation and the atonement. The conquest of death seemed so vast and glorious a fact that everything else was studied in relation to it. That was the end for which Christ came into the world, that the end for which he died on the cross, in order that the evil element in our very physical life might be overcome and that into our mortal frame he, the risen Christ, might pour the energies of the eternal life.

III

PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORICAL EVENT

Can it then be said that faith in a future life is now so adequately sustained and described by current philosophy that it lives in the human heart independently of the resurrection of Jesus Christ? Is it true that the faith of the apostles and of the church must, since the rise of modern idealism, have no further share in directing the thought and shaping the character of humanity? These questions may be studied from several points of view.

1. An appearance of truth is given to the position under consideration by the spread in certain circles of a mystic type of religious experience. This mysticism may, in one form of it, strive to ally itself directly with that of the Orient by adopting the name Theosophy, and interpreting various elements of oriental belief in a manner appropriate to occidental science and experience. Another type is somewhat vaguely indicated in the writings of Professor James, who describes with great enthusiasm the intense inner experience of those who, by prayer, seek to connect themselves with the superhuman life.

He will not, of course, allow himself to play with oriental language, but use or coin what seem to be adequate phrases for his own purpose, drawn mainly from psychology. Thus he will speak about a "wider self" with whom the believer feels himself to be "continuous," and from whom energies pour into his life, raising it to higher levels of moral intensity. So far in his works Mr. James has remained frankly indefinite in his descriptions of this eternal One with whom man is "co-conscious." All devotees of mysticism in either of these kinds will contrast their position with that occupied by the ordinary Christian. They will probably sum up his position as that of devotion to a dogmatic faith, or, as the acceptance of a historical religion, each of these phrases seeming to imply inferiority to the mystical form of religion, which has no dogmas and no historical roots. The dogmatic faith is, of course, described as a hard intellectualism which has grown up through the strifes of angry theologians, or as a mere passing phase of Christian history. It is the fashion at this point to quote Harnack, and to insist that the dogmas of Christianity are more Greek than Christian. Or some contempt is suggested in a reference to those who imagine that God can be found in the events which happened to an individual in Palestine two thousand years ago. The implication runs through all such discussions that they occupy a superior position who can claim a direct and personal contact with the Eternal, independently of all history and apart from all dogmatic formulations of belief.

I need hardly point out that in Christian history we have the story of many and varied forms of true mysticism, and Professor James himself has chosen to describe some of these in his work on *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. But he ignored many of the noblest of the Christian mystics and avowedly concentrated attention upon extreme types, fastening upon these the opprobrious epithet of "psychopathic." The fact is that the New Testament itself is full of sublime mysticism. No human souls in history were ever more intensely conscious of immediate and direct contact with the eternal God than those men. They were bathed in the Holy Spirit. They were filled with the presence of the risen Christ. The eternal God was in their hearts. Even apart from the rare instances named in the New Testament of anything like extreme rapture, these men walked

with the open-eyed joy of those who tread the solid earth sanely but in their hearts possess consciously, intensely, the sense of oneness with the living God.

It may not be inappropriate to set down here what seem to be the permanent defects of a mysticism which has no dependence upon such historical events as are described in the New Testament. *In the first place*, this mysticism consists in the seeking of God by man. God is conceived of as the All or the universally Present One, the underlying Unity, the essential Principle which is realized in every fact of the outer world and every soul of man. He is discovered not as himself deliberately, selectively active upon the human soul, but as everywhere and always equally available to the soul which will pass through certain severe forms of inward self-discipline. This self-discipline may or may not include ascetic practices, but it always does include a carefully cultivated habit of concentration upon certain ideas or principles through which the universe of experience is said to be explained or conceived. *In the second place*, this mysticism is always esoteric. It cannot be preached upon the streets. It has created no salvation army, no missionaries to the drunkards and the outcasts. It appeals to those who have leisure and opportunity for the careful and systematic cultivation of the necessary habits of mind. It is for the élite of the human race, and always wears the manners of the aristocrat. *In the third place*, it is intensely individualistic. While schools may exist and groups may meet for the study of its history and its method, it knows nothing of common inspiration because it has nothing of outward objective reality upon which the eye can fasten, and the faith of all men rest. A religion which is defective at these points can never be more than the aesthetic joy of a few. It is not born of history and cannot make history. It despises the earthly, and the earthly will not hear it. It knows not a personal God and sees not his ways where he has chosen to reveal himself through the welter of human passion and even trodden the winepress of sin and sorrow till his garments were stained.

The peculiar and glorious feature of the Christian religion is that it binds the mystical and the historical together. It is from definite events, transactions in the light of day, in which God is distinctly seen that the soul finds its way to God as he now is and as he now acts upon

the human soul. These events of the long past are by the Christian spirit instinctively read in terms of eternity. For this Christian mysticism the past is present, and all the future is here. But the present moment of repentant agony, of joyous trust, of stern obedience, is bound in direct and living fashion with the deeds which God did in Christ, as with those deeds which he yet has to do upon us all in the unseen world. It is false therefore to contrast mysticism with dogmatic faith or with historical religion. There are in these dogmas of the church, in these events which gave it birth, the very channels in which, for the believing soul, the divine grace mystically runs. To open the heart to these is to lie open to God. Here there is no aristocracy in a derisive and narrow sense. Here there is no individualism in opposition to or separation from the social life. One of the wonders of this religion is that its sublimest experiences are offered to the grossest sinners upon earth, and that actually they do come upon such, often exerting an immediate and marvelous transformation. They are not offered to the wise, the secluded as such; they are within reach of the simple, the honest heart, clothed in any garb, of roughest hand and least intelligence; and yet the best that earth has known have not been superior to the experience of the grace of God in Christ, nor to those energies which flow from him raised from the dead to those who, dying, become aware of that eternal love.

2. According to the New Testament, the resurrection of Christ was a physical as well as a spiritual fact. There can be no doubt that from the beginning the disciples believed this. They unanimously assert that when their Lord was raised from the dead it was on the third day, it was by a transformation, through the divine energy itself, of his earthly body into the heavenly, of the psychical into the spiritual. The body of his humiliation became the body of his glory. This they attribute to the direct action of God himself, and even Paul uses phrase upon phrase (cf. Eph. 1:19) to express his sense of the majesty of the act and of the force employed in its consummation. Nothing more disingenuous has characterized the history of New Testament criticism than the attempt to prove that the apostle Paul did not believe in the physical resurrection of Jesus Christ.

It is seldom observed that through the conception thus steadily presented to the minds of men, the whole ancient view of nature was

changed. The material universe was no longer considered as something essentially evil or so alien to the nature of God that it could have no part in his designs. It was no enemy to be conquered, no contemptible stuff to be cast away. The physical shone before the eyes of spiritual men. It now glowed with a new meaning. It had been made the instrument of the life of the Son of God, and he had redeemed not merely human souls but Nature herself in his triumph over death and the grave. The ancient dualism met its death on Easter morning. The real foundations of a humble and modest, yet true and sublime, idealism were then laid. It is well to bear in mind that modern idealism which seeks to establish itself upon an analysis of the nature and conditions of human knowledge, and which seeks to spiritualize the universe by interpreting it as existing "for consciousness," really had its birth when first men came to believe that material things are the instruments of the will of God. Every form of idealism is confronted forever with certain stubborn facts which it is unable to reduce to its own delicately conceived unity. The facts of sin and death are ever present. In sin the human will distinguishes itself from the will of God. In death the physical universe quenches the hopes of men. What can idealism say to these, that the whole world will feel to be an adequate solution? These facts are problems first for the human will itself, and no idealism will ever be adequate which does not attach itself to a practical solution of these in the region of life. Hence it is that one views with such fascination the breaking in upon the calm of philosophic Idealism, sweet and dignified and gray haired, of that wayward but charming gipsy maiden called Pragmatism. How she laughs through the writings of Mr. James, how she triumphs with a bolder air, if with less grace and skill, in the pages of Mr. Schiller, at the solemn ways of the highly civilized idealists! She is rendering to all of us a great service. She may not know the way to God any better than the idealist whom she joys to tease. But at any rate she is making it clear that he has not said the last word. The last word can never be said by any who rule out the historical element in the Christian religion from their survey of human experience. The resurrection of Christ belongs as truly to the final interpretation of nature and man as any other fact of which we must take account. For that event is now a *vera causa*, permanently and

rapidly covering the earth with its influence. Wherever it is preached, human hearts accept it, and those hearts at once pass into new ranges of experience, the loftiest known to man. Through such a faith nature is looked upon as really closer to God, if I may use the phrase, than is possible under any other condition. The idealism which would make God wholly immanent in the physical and spiritual facts loses the sense of their meaning. Their reality becomes dim. It is only those who see the universe as the New Testament presents it to us in the form of an instrument of the eternal and transcendent Spirit who learn how real it is and how glorious its significance.

3. I have pointed out that one of the most powerful modes of dealing with the argument for immortality in our day bases itself upon our modern conceptions of individuality and virtue. But where did these modern conceptions take their rise? How have we come to know that individuality is an infinite fact, and that virtue has an absolute worth, and that love must be the final law of the universe? These, which are used with deftness and power by many of our best philosophers and our greatest poets, are not derived from Plato or from Buddha. They come by direct and continuous descent from the apostolic consciousness. There began a new history when those eyes of men gazed upon the risen Christ. There, in the victorious Son of God, human individuality stood triumphant; there, virtue had the seal of the Eternal set upon it; there, from the cross and empty tomb of Christ, love, the love of the very God for man, shone forth with a splendor beyond which no dream of man has ever passed. If we lose faith in that event we are then left dependent wholly upon our separate estimates of what it is to be a man, and how much worth while it is to do what is good in presence of the clamant voices of self-indulgence. We are left to answer as best we may when asked, What is the meaning of life? Why should I allow my heart to clothe with ideal worth any earthly object and give itself finally to that object, if neither it nor I can have more than a brief space for the knowledge of love, for the exercise of that which seems to demand an eternal life if it is to be real? It may be urged that these questions do not necessarily arise for those who have given up their faith in the resurrection. I answer that they not only may but do arise. Current literature is filled with answering voices of despair. Cynicism and

pessimism are twin sisters, and they are haunting the hearts of many of our best minds today. We have but to read the stern self-determination of Huxley in the conclusion to his *Romanes Lecture* on "Evolution and Ethics" to feel how hard is our lot if this life is all. We have only to glance at the last number of the *Hibbert Journal* (July, 1908), to read the article on "Civilization in Danger," or on "Science and the Purpose of Life," or even on "Religion and our Schools," not to speak of "The Problem of Immortality" or "The Religion of the Sensible American," to feel that for men who are breathing the atmosphere of our day the fundamental problems have arisen in a new fashion to which the more avowedly Christian generations were strangers. Many of these writers are frankly asking themselves afresh, What is the meaning of life? Many of them have avowedly given up their faith in the risen Christ, and they find, therefore, that the old questions are reopened. They still must ask whether life is worth living, and why; and what kind of life it is which must be lived by men who have lost the Christian hope. They must ask, What forces are at hand which we may employ to save civilization, to retain enthusiasm, to prevent corruption, to encourage moral idealism. How can we reject the story of the New Testament and yet retain the joy, the hope, the pure spirit, the fragrance of morning which belong to its pages? It seems to me a most evident fact that wherever faith in the resurrection of Christ has disappeared, the idealistic arguments for immortality have begun at once to lose their convincing power. The nerve of their life has been cut.

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WERE THE SPIRITUAL FRANCISCANS MONTANIST HERETICS?

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III. ANTIERARCHISM

The relation of the Franciscan Spirituals to the church, with special reference to the attitude of Montanism to the ecclesiastical powers of its day, is the subject of the following section. Since both these movements were directed toward the moral improvement of humanity and were attended by prophecy (which is the commonest form of divine revelation), it was only natural that they should come into close relations with the institution which claimed the oversight over the morals of the community, by virtue of the revelation intrusted to it. From the point of view, then, of the development of the power of the church as well as of the history of the party itself the aspect of the Spiritual Franciscans which we are to study in this section is the most significant.

From the beginning, the movement inspired by St. Francis had been under the close supervision of the Roman church. Experience with the Waldensians and other reforming sects of the twelfth century had taught the curia that it must choose between active hostility toward the rapidly swelling sentiment of popular piety and the invitation to the new brotherhoods to pursue their missionary work under the auspices and protection of the church. Wisely the church chose the latter course. Innocent III approved, at least provisionally, the foundation of the Order of St. Francis (1210), and bade the brothers receive the tonsure; and the succeeding pontiffs issued letter after letter bestowing favors upon the order. We count fifty papal bulls in Potthast's *Regesta* granting the brothers privileges or exemptions, within the first two generations after St. Francis' death: guarantees of safe conduct on missionary journeys; appointments to special missions as inquisitors, emissaries, plenipotentiaries; exemptions from episcopal jurisdiction; concessions of portable altars, of

mutual absolutions, of religious services in regions under the interdict; powers of excommunication; appointments to inquisitorial offices;¹¹⁰ dispensation from various fees incumbent on the secular clergy—until the latter complained that the Minorites had “stolen the keys of the kingdom of heaven.”¹¹¹

The church, quite naturally, did not shower these favors on the Minorites gratis. The *quid pro quo* which it demanded was nothing less than the protectorate, in other words, the direction, of the order. Only four years after St. Francis' death, Pope Gregory IX “expounded” the simple Rule (which St. Francis had ordered to be observed “without gloss”) in the bull *quo elongati saeculo*. The important point in this exposition of the Rule is the elaborate subterfuge which allows the Order to acquire wealth through the medium of agents (*nuncii*), and still hold to the letter of the Rule. Innocent IV's *Ordinem vestrum* of 1245 permitted the Minorites to hold real estate under the fiction of holding the same in trust for the Roman See. Nicolas III in the decretal *Exiit qui seminat* (1279) fixed the definitive interpretation of the Rule. This decretal had fair words for the strict observance of St. Francis' commands, yet in five points it violated the spirit of his foundation, namely: (1) it held fast to the papal modifications of the Rule introduced by Gregory IX and Innocent IV, (2) it made a sophistic distinction between “use” and “possession” which formed a bone of contention for years in the Order, (3) it placed the disposal of the houses of the Minorites in the hands of the pope, (4) it distinguished between “workers,”

¹¹⁰ The general opinion that it was the Dominicans alone who conducted the Inquisition is erroneous, as far as the thirteenth century goes. Wadding's *Annales* are full of papal bulls appointing Franciscans to inquisitorial offices, and it has even been claimed that Conrad of Marburg, the arch-inquisitor of Germany was a Franciscan (Winkelmann, *Geschichte Friedrichs des Zweiten*, II, 434). At any rate, Brother Gerhard of the Minorites was murdered with Conrad (*Annales Wormatenses*, ad Ann. 1231). It was only after the Franciscans became somewhat discredited in the eyes of the pope, through the long quarrel between John XXII and the Michaelists that the Dominicans began to monopolize the inquisitorial powers.

¹¹¹ Words of the Bishop of Poitiers (1284). Leclerc and Renan, *Histoire littéraire de la France*, XXI, 28. See also Cardinal Simon de Beaulieu's complaint: “multi falcem in alienam messem mittunt.” Even as early as 1245 the bishops were complaining at the Council of Lyons that the Minorites and Preaching Friars had supplanted the parochial clergy. Huillard-Bréholles, *Pierre de la Vigne*, Ep. I, 220.

"scholars," and "mystics" in the Order with a different implication of the Rule for each type. It revoked the provisions of Francis' will forbidding the solicitation of privilege from the Roman church.¹¹²

The zealots of the Order had opposed the modification or "interpretation" of the Rule at the hands of the pope from the first; but it was especially after the promulgation of the decretal *Exiit qui seminat* that their opposition became organized and effective. The explanation of this is clear if we recall the repressive measures of Bonaventura in the Paris decree of 1266,¹¹³ and the stir created by the rumors of compulsion which came from the Lyonsese council of 1274.¹¹⁴ It was the beginning of the period of desperation and defiance among the Spirituals. It led to the *magna disceptatio* before the tribunal of Clement V, to the cruel policy of "thorough" adopted by John XXII, and even, if we may believe Bartholomaeus Pisanus, to the plan of Boniface VIII for the abolishment of the Order altogether.¹¹⁵ But it may be that here, as Wadding suggests, Bartholomaeus confuses the Spirituals who were living in Achaea with the whole Order.

Thus the Spiritual Franciscans combated a definite policy of the church, namely, the modification of the literal commands of St. Francis in the Rule and the Testament. That their whole cause of complaint against Rome lay just here we have ample proof in the statements of the leaders of the Spirituals themselves. Angelo da Clarino in his *Epistola Excusatoria* addressed to John XXII (summer of 1317) says: "All that we asked was to be allowed to observe the Rule in its pristine purity according to the will of God and the founder of the Order; and for this they (the inquisitors in Italy) have condemned us to the pains of wicked heretics."¹¹⁶ Ubertino da Casale,

¹¹² These bulls are printed in full in Wadding, *Ad Ann.*, 1230, 1245, 1279.

¹¹³ Ordering the destruction of all the older "legends" of Saint Francis.

¹¹⁴ Wadding, *Ad Ann.*, 1274, No. 1. The rumor, according to Wadding, was to the effect that the papal wing of the Order was to institute a policy of "thorough" against the dissenters in the spiritualist ranks.

¹¹⁵ "Scribit Pisanus nimium eum (Bonifacium) cogitasse de nostro abolendo Instituto, atque Sciarram Columnensem inventas inter ceteram direpti spoliū supellectilem plures bullas eiusdem tenoris quibus extinguī volebat Minores in platea Anagnina combussisse."—Wadding, *Ad Ann.*, 1303, No. 25.

¹¹⁶ Angelo da Clarino, *Epist. Excus.*; Ehrle, *A.L.K.G.*, I, 524.

chief of the Tuscan Spirituals protests before Clement V's solemn tribunal at Avignon (1311): "Let it be thoroughly understood by the supreme pontiff, the college (of Cardinals), and the masters (of theology) that we have always maintained that we are not concerned with the opinions of any man, but the Pope may correct what there is in our doctrine to be corrected. We aim wholly at the observance of the Rule, as the blessed Francis prescribed and as we ourselves have promised."¹¹⁷ Though we have no apology from Olivi's pen preserved to us, his enthusiastic follower Ubertino, in his defense of the great Provençal zealot, tells us that

The principal cause of anger against the books of Petrus Johannis Olivi is that in them the present relaxation of the Rule is exposed with merciless force and a dreadful condemnation is meted out to certain men who declare in their sermons and books that the poverty of Christ and the Apostles mentioned in the Gospel, and the command to poverty in the Rule do not include moderation in the use of things but only forbid actual ownership.¹¹⁸

Wadding adds that the first accusation of heresy was brought against Olivi in the chapter of 1282 at Strassburg, by brothers against whose soft living he had inveighed in bitter objurgation.¹¹⁹ Even the pope himself, Clement V, who was himself thoroughly fair to the Spirituals, recognized that the whole burden of the Franciscan dissent lay in the question of the observance of the Rule. In his famous constitution *Exivi de Paradiso* (1312), designed to reconcile the Spirituals to the community, he "resolved the chief difficulty by declaring that the Franciscans, by the profession of their Rule, were specially held to the limited use (*usus pauper*) of property."¹²⁰ It would be easy to multiply quotations from the writings of the zealots and the chronicles of the annalists to substantiate the assertion that the opposition of the Spirituals to the church was founded exclusively on the pretensions of the latter to tamper with the legacy of St. Francis.

¹¹⁷ Ubertino's reply to four points of heresy brought against the Spirituals by Bonagratia and others of the community at Avignon 1331; Ehrle, *A.L.K.G.*, III, 194.

¹¹⁸ Ubertino da Casale, *Responsio ad libellum diffamatorium in Petrum Johannis Olivi*; Ehrle, *loc. cit.*, II, 384. Compare Olivi's fourteenth *Quaestio*: "An possit papa in omni voto dispensare et specialiter in votis evangelicis," which Olivi answers in the negative; Ehrle, *loc. cit.*, III, 528.

¹¹⁹ "Prodiit haec accusatio ab eis quorum vitam laxam incusavit."—Wadding, *Ad Ann.*, 1282, 4.

¹²⁰ Wadding, *Ad Ann.*, 1312, No. 3. Bull printed in full in Supplement of Melissano da Macro, *Ad Ann.*, 1312.

I say "founded" on such pretensions, because undoubtedly some of the Spirituals, by the adoption of the Joachitic prophecy, were led much farther, even to the quasi-heretical position of doubting the permanence of the Roman church. One must proceed with the greatest caution, however, in dealing with the Joachimism of the Franciscans. If, as Harnack maintains,¹²¹ the prophetic system of Joachim of Flora stands in clearer historic light than any other apocalyptic epoch of the church, still its influence in the socialistic-ascetic movements of the late thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries, while evident, is one of the most difficult points to determine with precision. On the one hand, Joachim's own writings were falsified and interpolated, while numerous forgeries were circulated under his name. On the other hand, it is not at all certain how generally these writings, both genuine and spurious, were appropriated. We have seen already that the famous *Introductorius* of Gerhard of Borgo San Donino, published at Paris in 1254, can by no means be regarded as a "manifesto" of the Franciscan zealots.¹²² Denifle in his superb article on the "Eternal Gospel" in the *Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte* for 1885 challenges Reuter to show that Gerhard had a following of more than two among the Franciscan zealots,¹²³ and at the same time shows the weakness of Preger's argument that because Pope Alexander IV ordered the bishop of Paris to deal circumspectly in his condemnation of the *Introductorius*,¹²⁴ it necessarily followed that the Minorites were in large numbers committed to the doctrine set forth in the book.¹²⁵ That the author was a Franciscan is explanation enough for the caution.¹²⁶ It will not do, therefore, straightway to attribute to the Spiritual Franciscans as a body the acceptance of passages in the pseudo-Joachitic writings

¹²¹ "Sie (die Bewegung Joachims) ist noch immer zu wenig studirt, während sie doch für uns die heftigste aller der Epochen ist, in welchen der Prophetismus eine Rolle gespielt hat."—Harnack, *Neuzeitgeschichte*, III, 390, n.

¹²² See above, 2, 10.

¹²³ For Reuter's view see his *Geschichte der Aufklärung im Mittelalter*, II, 363.

¹²⁴ See above, 2, 14.

¹²⁵ For Preger's view see his article on "Joachim von Floris und das Evangelium Aeternum," in the *Abhandlungen der bairischen Academie*, XII, 1-39.

¹²⁶ Denifle in *A.L.K.G.*, I, 64, 65. Alexander IV's letter is in D'Argentré, *Coll. jurid.*, I, 200.

which attack the divine nature of the church—especially in the face of repeated professions by the heads of the Spirituals of full loyalty to the church and faith in its doctrines and sacraments.

The genuine Joachitic writings were not heretical in their doctrine of the church. Joachim completed the *Concordia Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, which contains his fullest expression of the theory of the church, at the behest of Clement III,¹²⁷ and in the preface he professes the utmost deference to the church in all matters of faith and conduct.¹²⁸ The church of St. Peter, he declares, has been exalted by the promise of Christ, above all other churches.¹²⁹ The Roman church is the "mother of all the faithful."¹³⁰ It still holds the Catholic faith unshaken.¹³¹ The church founded upon the rock (Peter) will remain forever and increase in glory.¹³² Criticism of its head, the pope, does not become us who are his sheep.¹³³ Nevertheless Joachim finds that divine church sadly in need of reform, and prophesies the dawn of a new age when its officers shall all be spiritual men understanding the spiritual sense of the gospel. God will in those days "raise up other preachers like the apostles of old and the church will be rejuvenated by their message;" "the faithful will go to the infidels to preach to them the word of salvation;" the Jews and the Greeks will return to the bosom of the true spiritual church; the clergy will live in poverty and service; litigation, persecution, and schism will cease, for all will be united in the millennial love.¹³⁴

¹²⁷ Jaffé, *Regesta Pontificum*, 10085.

¹²⁸ "Et quod semper paratus sim quae ipsa (ecclesia) statuit et statuerit observare nullamque meam opinionem contra eius defendere sanctam fidem, credens ad integram quae ipsa credit, et tam in moribus quam in doctrina suscipiens correptionem, abiciens quod ipsa abicit, suscipiens quod ipsa suscipit, credens firmiter non posse portas inferni praevalere contra eam et si ad horam turbari et procellis agitari contingat non deficere fidem eius usque ad consummationem seculi."—*Praefatio ad Concordian*, etc., D'Argentré, I, 1.

¹²⁹ "Ex placuit Christo praeferre omnibus romanam Ecclesiam."—*Conc.*, V, 63.

¹³⁰ "Sancta romana ecclesia quae est mater omnium fidelium et ecclesiarum.—*Ibid.*, 118.

¹³¹ "Fides catholica quam inconcussa tenuit et tenet."—*Conc.*, II, 27.

¹³² "Non igitur, quod absit, deficiet ecclesia Petri, quae thronos est Christi sed commutata in majorem gloriam manebit stabilis in aeternum."—*Ibid.*

¹³³ *Conc.*, V, 63.

¹³⁴ *Conc.*, V, 58, 74, 86, 102, et aliubi.

Now it was on the basis of this programme of reform that the pseudo-Joachitic prophecies developed their heretical teachings. Whereas Joachim spoke of a new order of preachers like the apostles, they said, "of greater dignity and authority than the apostles." Whereas Joachim prophesied that the Greeks would come back to the church, they said that the church would go over to the Greeks.¹³⁵ They called Rome "Babylon," the curia a court of extortion, the church the barren fig tree of the parable.¹³⁶ The errors charged against the Spirituals of Provence in 1318 were: (1) that they spoke of two churches, one spotted (Rome), the other pure (the spiritual church); (2) that they were Donatists, denying that any but the pure could be true priests; (3) that they sympathized with the Waldensians; (4) that they claimed that the sacraments were void when administered by a sinful man; (5) that they declared that the Christian gospel was complete in them alone, and until their day had been in abeyance, nay, extinct; (6) that they inveighed against the venerable sacrament of matrimony; (7) that they prated of the "last days" and the coming of Antichrist.¹³⁷

All this was undoubtedly heresy, except the last charge, and if it could be proved that any considerable portion of the Spiritual Franciscans held such views, we should be justified immediately in speaking of them as a heretical sect. Gerhard of San Donino did undoubtedly make himself obnoxious to the charge of heresy in some of the propositions of the *Introductorius*. For example, he set a limit to the endurance of the church: he exalted the Order of St. Francis above all other orders and "above the whole church;" he predicted the passing of the clerical order to make way for the contemplative saints.¹³⁸ But aside from these passages from the meanly endorsed book of Gerhard's, we have no proof of heresy among the Spiritual Franciscans. Accusations in plenty we have. Eymerich

¹³⁵ Quoted by Prager, *Abbasvangelium*, inc. ed., p. 35, from the pseudo-Joachitic "Tract on Joseph and Pharaoh."

¹³⁶ Pseudo-Joach. *De Operibus Ecclesie*, III, 15-18, 2023-, 30; *Super Hieremiam passim*.

¹³⁷ Wadding, *SS. Ann.*, 1228, No. 3.

¹³⁸ MS. Cod. Pat. 17397 of the province of the commission of Anagni, fol. 93r, 96r, 100r. Published by Denifle, *S. S. K. G.*, I, 99-142. These excerpts are all we have left of the famous *Introductorius*.

in his *Inquisitionis Directorium* attributes twenty carefully enumerated heresies to Petrus Johannis Olivi, including all the errors of Beghards, Beghines, and Fraticelli.¹³⁹ But as the same Eymerich calls Olivi one of the combatants in the controversy about the poverty of Christ, which broke out nineteen years after Olivi's death, we may take his catalogue of the heresies of the Provençal zealot *cum grano salis*. Raymund of Fronciacho also, in his *Index*,¹⁴⁰ most unjustly groups the errors of Olivi and "those who under the guise of the Spirit seek to delude men's minds" with the heresies of Mohammed and Manes, Arius and Segharelli.¹⁴¹ Angelo and his companions also were pursued by heresy hunters. A certain Hieronymus followed them to their retreat in Achaea and charged them with eighteen heresies "which he excogitated from his own heart."¹⁴² When they returned to the Neapolitan kingdom the inquisitor forthwith hailed them before his tribunal as protectors of "forty heretics of the sect of Dolcino, Lombards by race, who had entered the kingdom to poison it with their errors."¹⁴³

Opposed to these charges of heresy we have the equally fervid disclaimers of the leaders of the Spirituals themselves. Olivi declares in his reply to the Parisian censors that he "always had been and a'ways will be zealous for the Roman church and its doctrine, as well as for the purity of the Order."¹⁴⁴ Angelo protests in his apology before John XXII that he has "never doubted that the Roman church is the only true church, that in its prelates is authority and in its ordinations eternal salvation;" and that if need be he "will go through fire and water to purge away the charge of heresy wickedly and falsely brought" against himself and his companions.¹⁴⁵

¹³⁹ Nicolaus Eymerich, *Inq. Direct.*, Pt. II, question 9.

¹⁴⁰ This *Index* contains the outline of a projected work on the heresies of the Spirituals. Whether Raymund finished the work or not we do not know. The *Index* alone fills twenty-six pages of fine print in the *A.L.K.G.* (Vol. III, 1-26), and the work itself, which "roars so loud in the index," must, if completed, have been a formidable indictment of the Spirituals.

¹⁴¹ Ehrle in *A.L.K.G.*, III, p. 10; *Index*, Pt. II, chaps. i-x.

¹⁴² Angelo da Clarino, *Epist. Excus.*; *A.L.K.G.*, I, 529.

¹⁴³ Angelo da Clarino, *Hist. Trib.*, fol. 55b; Ehrle, *loc. cit.*

¹⁴⁴ *Olivis Leben und Schriften*; Ehrle in *A.L.K.G.*, III, 419.

¹⁴⁵ Angelo da Clarino, *Epist. Excus.*; *A.L.K.G.*, I, 523. Compare letter of Angelo to Roman friends written from Avignon: "Melius enim est omne genus tormenti et mortis sustinere quam ab obedientia . . . ecclesiae separari," *A.L.K.G.*, I, 545.

He also declares, in reply to the charge of harboring the Lombard heretics, that his companions had "never believed, recognized, or even noticed apostates."¹⁴⁶

Even the Roman popes bore witness to the orthodoxy of the Spiritual Franciscans. When Nicholas IV (the old Franciscan General Hieronymus von Ascoli) was urged to prosecute Petrus Johannis Olivi, he replied: "God forbid that I should molest a man who exceeds all the men of this generation in devotion and love for Christ."¹⁴⁷ Clement V bore the same testimony to the orthodoxy of the party, when by his constitution *Exivi de Paradiso* he took the dispute out of the realm of dogma and declared it one of morals alone. In default of further evidence, we are left to form our own judgment of the case. The *onus probandi* rests upon the accusing community. In judging whether they have shouldered it, we must remember also that the apologies of the Spirituales were made before a tribunal which was hostile to them, and in the presence of enemies who would not have allowed a single misstatement of fact to go unchallenged.

There is no doubt that the zealots criticized and even severely rebuked the church. There is no doubt that from the time when the Chapter of 1244 which elected Crescentius general rejected the exposition of the Rule contained in Gregory IX's *Quo elongati*,¹⁴⁸ the stricter Franciscans opposed such decrees of the pope as threatened the purity of the Order.¹⁴⁹ But opposition to the pope is not opposition to the papacy, and the call for a reform of the church, so far from being a proof of defiance is rather a proof of intense love and ambition for the church's welfare. The simple fact is that the Roman curia of the late thirteenth century had become so confirmed in its despotism that it could not listen to such correction as it bore when Bernard of Clairvaux addressed his *De Con-*

¹⁴⁶ Epist. Episc. A. I. I. G. I. p. 238.

¹⁴⁷ Anger. in Concilio. Hist. Franc. A. I. I. G. II. 288. fol. 430.

¹⁴⁸ It was perhaps this fact that misled Müller (*Lebensg.* p. 180) to state that "the election of Crescentius was a triumph of the zealots." Crescentius himself persecuted the zealots.

¹⁴⁹ The question of papal obedience took the form of whether the Spirituales believed that the pope could prohibit what was contrary to the Rule. They answered in the negative. See Olivi's *Questiones*, No. 24. *Epist.* in A. I. I. G., III. p. 238.

sideratione to Eugenius III, warning the church to "throw out its nets for souls and not for silver and gold." If the demand for apostolic singleness of purpose in the church is a heresy, then some of the greatest names of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, a Gerhoh of Reichersperg, a John of Salisbury, a Robert Grossteste, a Conrad of Salzburg, a Hildegarde of Bingen would have to be classed among the heretics. For ever since Innocent II in the Lateran Council of 1139 had forced the church completely into the feudal frame of government, in order to preserve its autonomy against the state, there had not been lacking voices of protest and rebuke. The world-tainted church was charged with simony, cruelty, extortion, indulgences, fetish-worship, immorality, neglect of preaching, heaping up of pluralities, etc., etc.¹⁵⁰ The eagerness with which thousands flocked to the standards of Waldo, Durand, Francis, and Dominic for the realization of the simple ethical precepts of Christianity shows how great a measure of justification these strictures on the great church must have had.

We must be careful not to confuse the ethico-religious sentiment which, while holding fast to the dogmas of the church, repudiates the mediacy of a corrupt clergy, with the dualistic Manichaeian speculations which attacked the fundamental doctrines of Christianity. We find no trace of the latter among the Minorites. It was not David of Dinant and Amalrich of Bena who were the precursors of St. Francis, but rather Durand de Huesca and Waldo of Lyons. The persistent efforts of the community to divert emphasis from the ethical to the doctrinal aspect of P. J. Olivi's writings shows how little hope they had in being able to procure his condemnation as a reformer merely. They tried to make him a heretic, but they failed in the attempt.¹⁵¹

The line which divides heresy from schism, and again that which divides schism from reform, is often a very faint one. In their zeal for moral reform the Spiritual Franciscans actually did separate from the Order in Provence and Italy, and some brothers in Tuscany

¹⁵⁰ For the extreme case against the church see H. C. Lea's *History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages*, I, chap. i.

¹⁵¹ The community did finally succeed in getting John XXII to condemn Olivi's *Postil on the Apocalypse* in 1326. But after the heat of controversy had passed, Sixtus IV, near the close of the fifteenth century, removed the sentence. Lea, *Hist. Inq.*, III, 46, 47.

undoubtedly separated from the church through denial of the validity of Boniface VIII's accession. But the leaders of the Spirituals of Provence and central Italy hastened to disculpate themselves from any complicity with schism from the church. Olivi wrote a letter to the Italian zealots chiding them for their ban against Boniface VIII,¹⁵² and Angelo da Clarino declared before John XXII that "neither angels nor apostles could make him believe that the papal power had lapsed or that Boniface was not truly pope."¹⁵³ Surely we are bound to respect these decided professions of Olivi and Angelo above the vague accusations preferred by the community. Ubertino da Casale in his reply to the question whether there were heretics or not among the Spirituals, manfully replied that he could not answer that question since he did not know all the Spirituals, but that the party as a body had no heretical doctrines whatever and were utterly faithful to the church.¹⁵⁴ Six years after Ubertino's apology was written John XXII foolishly forced all the Provençal Spirituals into rebellion, and drove some to heresy even by his foolish policy of "thorough" embodied in the decretal *Quorundam exegit*. The noble contention of the Vicar of Christ in this solemn decretal was that the Spiritual Franciscans should wear longer gowns and allow granaries in their monasteries.¹⁵⁵ Therewith we reach a point where the charge of heresy becomes farcical and its discussion futile.

If we look back now for a moment to Montanism, to inquire whether that heresy can be fairly said to be traceable in the anti-hierarchical features of Spiritual Franciscanism, we are at once confronted by a fact of fundamental importance, namely, the absence, in the middle of the second century, of the full-formed church, with its triple standard of orthodox creed, canonized scripture, and

¹⁵² Boniface had been provoked by the misrepresentations of the "lax" party of the Franciscans in Italy to persecute the missionaries of the stricter profession who had enjoyed his predecessor Celestin V's favor.

¹⁵³ Angelo da Clarino, *Epist. Excus.*, A.L.K.G., I, 522, fol. 139a.

¹⁵⁴ Reply to charges against Olivi, Ehrle, "Zur Vorgeschichte des Concils von Vienne," A.L.K.G., II, 411: "Tamen esto quod inter eos dicerent se habere tales (i. e., hereticos), in caput ipsorum recidat et nihil ad nostrum honus quia nos et nobis fratres adhaerentes omnium errorum si qui in Ordini vel alibi apparuerunt, fuimus et sumus principalissimi destructores."

¹⁵⁵ *Extravagantes Johannis XXII*, Tit. XIV, cap. i.

apostolic bishop. In the thirteenth century there was practically but a single sin—the sin against the Catholic church; in the second century there were many sins—sins against religion, of which heresy was one only, and by no means the greatest. All the pre-Irenaic literature of the church bears witness to the ease with which heresy was pardoned, when compared with adultery, murder, or apostasy. We cannot expect, then, to find that sharpness of distinction between heresy and orthodoxy in the case of Montanism which we find applied to the religious movements of the high Middle Ages. The fathers who wrote against Montanism in the first half of the third century were in confusion as to the real nature of the movement. Hippolytus testifies to the dogmatic orthodoxy of the system, and yet calls it a heresy.¹⁵⁶ Origen is not sure whether the “Kataphrygians” ought to be called heretics or schismatists merely.¹⁵⁷ On the other hand, by Cyprian’s time the Montanists were classed with heretics and were rebaptized for admission to the Catholic church.¹⁵⁸ Eusebius of Caesarea, writing in the first half of the fourth century, called Montanism “the work of the adversary of the church of God,” and fixed its evil reputation as a baneful heresy firmly in the minds of the doctors of the church until the days of Protestantism.¹⁵⁹ The apparent leniency of the earliest fathers toward Montanism has always been an enigma to those theologians who postulate the immutability of ecclesiastical dogma. They find it difficult to explain how such staunch champions of Catholic tradition as Irenaeus could favor these “prophets;”¹⁶⁰ and even the great bishop of Rome himself could write them a cordial letter, which was stayed only by the intercession and entreaty of the “Confessor” Praxeas.¹⁶¹ Baronius, the ponderous Catholic annalist of the sixteenth century solves the question by assuming three periods in the history of Montanism.

¹⁵⁶ Hippolytus, *Philosophoumena*, VIII, 19. Epiphanius (XLVIII, 1) and Philastrius drew their accounts of Montanism largely from Hippolytus.

¹⁵⁷ “Requisiverunt sane quidam utrum heresim an schisma oporteat vocari eos qui Cataphrygiae nominantur.”—Origen, *In Titum*, IV, 696.

¹⁵⁸ Letter of Firmilian to Cyprian, *Opera Cypriani* (ed. Hartel, Vienna), II, 75.

¹⁵⁹ Euseb., *Hist. Eccl.*, V, 14.

¹⁶⁰ Irenaeus, *Haer.*, II, 32, V, 6, 1.

¹⁶¹ Tertullian, *Adv. Prax.*, I; “Litterae pacis jam emissae.”

At first, he says, Montanism was able to conceal its heretical character so successfully that it deceived the church and won a certain amount of favor in the eyes of the orthodox fathers (Irenaeus, Tertullian). Then came a time when its real character began to be discovered, or at least suspected, and the church grew doubtful of its propriety (Origen, Hippolytus). Finally the horrible nature of the heresy was fully realized, and it was consigned to its appropriate place among the accursed creations of Satan (Eusebius, Epiphanius, and following theologians).¹⁶² The fact is, however, that it was the "immutable" church that was developing so rapidly as to leave behind it the amorphous Christianity of prophetism as a belated stage of religion. Bonnwetsch has shown in his admirable summary of the doctrines of the Montanists concerning marriage, prophecy, fasts, and penance, that not a single one of their tenets was in contradiction to the professed belief of the earliest fathers of the Catholic church.¹⁶³

What then was the cause of offense in these Asiatic enthusiasts? It could not be better stated than it has been by Stroehlin: "Les montanistes avaient le tort de favoriser l'anarchie ecclésiastique dans une période où les communautés éprouvaient le besoin d'une forte concentration, et se groupaient autour des évêques, leurs protecteurs naturels, pour triompher de l'hérésie."¹⁶⁴ The Montanists, in other words, were a centrifugal force in the midst of a centripetal church. It was the inevitable logic of their premises. Montanism was a new revelation: hence its prophets spoke with a final authority not given to the apostles; hence a new criterion of righteousness was established, namely, the acceptance of the prophet's words. Montanism declared that the Paraclete was at hand: hence his ascetic prescriptions had the force of divine law; hence those who rejected them were of the carnal church, while those who obeyed them formed

¹⁶² Baronius, *Annales Ecclesiastici* (ed. Theiner, Paris, 1864), II, pp. 347 ff., 467 ff.

¹⁶³ Bonnwetsch, *Geschichte des Montanismus* (Erlangen, 1881), pp. 59-139. Later antagonists of Montanism accuse the movement of heresy on the Trinity, but they speak from the point of view of their own day, not from that of the second century, when the doctrine of the Trinity was not yet elaborated. The fight for the recognition of the Holy Ghost as a third "person" of the Trinity was long and bitter, extending to the close of the fourth century.

¹⁶⁴ Stroehlin, *Essai sur le Montanisme* (Strassburg, 1876), p. 67.

the true church of the saints.¹⁶⁵ The moment came, as the second century advanced, when the church had to decide whether holiness or catholicity was her chief note and desideratum. The church decided for the latter, as it had to decide to save itself from being engulfed by the Gnostic heresies. The Montanists, however, clung to the test of holiness, even at the risk of wrecking the whole solidifying structure of the church. The movement, then, was anti-hierarchical in its very essence. It was no accident that it had its rise in Asia Minor, where the evolution of the monarchical episcopate was most rapid, and where bishops were securely ruling their little flocks while the churches of Greece and Rome were still under the guidance of the primitive colleges of presbyters.¹⁶⁶

Although we have scant knowledge of the Montanistic societies in Asia Minor, we know that they separated from the church and endured persecution as schismatists. Tertullian informs us that the same Praxeas who prevented the Roman bishop from sending his letter of recognition to the Asiatic Montanists, also maligned the latter by "spreading falsehoods about their prophets *and their churches*."¹⁶⁷ The Spirit through Maximilla the prophetess declares: "I am pursued as a wolf among the sheep."¹⁶⁸ By Tertullian's time, however, the original Montanistic motive for separation from the church had been weakened by a twofold development; first, the original enthusiastic-prophetic spirit which had informed the movement and summoned the faithful to assemble at Pepuza to await the immediate descent of the New Jerusalem had been modified into a rather vague expectation of the millennium as an event long deferred; and secondly, the great African father had fully accepted the new standards of Scripture, creed, and episcopate as the indis-

¹⁶⁵ Tertullian's writings abound in antithesis between the "Spiritual" and the "psychical" churches. The reception of the Paraclete as the new lawgiver is always the test. Cf. *De Corona Militis*, I; *De Fuga in Persec.*, I; *De Virg. Vel.*, I; *Adv. Prax.*, I.

¹⁶⁶ Cf. Theodor Zahn, *Ignatius von Antiochien*, pp. 296 ff. We have a hint as early as the pastoral epistles that the increasing administrative duties of the leaders or presidents (*προεστῶτες*) of the communities were taking them from the activities of teaching and guiding their flocks (*κοιτῶντες ἐν λόγῳ καὶ διδασκαλίᾳ*, I Tim. 5:17); cf. I Thess. 5:12 for the earlier condition of the full combination of the two offices.

¹⁶⁷ Tert., *Adv. Prax.*, I: "falsa de ipsis prophetis et ecclesiis eorum asseverando."

¹⁶⁸ Oracle in Bonnwetsch, p. 198, No. 12; cf. Euseb., *Hist. Eccl.*, V, 16, 17.

pensable bulwark of the historic church against the insidious attacks of Gnostic heretics. In a single word, the Catholic church came in between Tertullian and the Montanists of Asia Minor. The former still emphasized, to be sure, the note of holiness above the note of catholicity.¹⁶⁹ but no longer at the cost of wrecking the framework of the church.¹⁷⁰ His was a prophecy modified by constant reference to an established orthodoxy.¹⁷¹ He was already being carried along by the swelling tide of ecclesiastical autocracy which converted Irenaeus' "Ubi spiritus Dei ibi ecclesia" into St. Augustine's "Quantum amat quisque ecclesiam, tantum habet spiritum sanctum!"

Herewith we have the data for the comparison of the Spiritual Franciscans with the Montanists in respect to their attitude toward the church. Both were antihierarchical. But, whereas Montanism opposed the clergy as a sacerdotal caste and the church as the repository of a revelation already antiquated, the Franciscans rebuked the clergy as corrupt men and scored the church as a carnal institution needing renewal. Montanism was a rival system aiming to supplant the church of the second century;¹⁷² the Spiritual Franciscans were a leaven entering the church of the thirteenth century for its purification. "If we closely examine the state of the church of primitive times," says Jacques de Vitry, writing of the spread of the Minorites, "we shall see that St. Francis did not so much add a new rule of life as renew the old rule of the Apostles, in that he revived religion,

¹⁶⁹ Cf. Tertullian's virulent attacks on the polluted Church in *De Pudicitia* and *De Jejunio*: "gloriosissima multitudo psychicorum" is his designation of the church in *De Jej.*, 11.

¹⁷⁰ "Certa membra sua habet ecclesia: episcopos, presbyteros, diaconos, ministros et turbam fidelium."—*De Exh. Cast.*, 7. The hold which the church, victorious over Gnosticism, had on Tertullian is further illustrated by the fact that he clung to its standards at the very moment when the secularization of the church was making the most rapid progress (190-220). Cf. Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte*, I, 397.

¹⁷¹ "Una nobis et illis (the Church) fides, unus Deus, idem Christus, eadem spes, eadem lavacri sacramenta."—*De Virg. Vel.*, 2.

¹⁷² The Montanists, Saint Jerome tells us, had an organization including bishops (who ranked third) to oppose to the nascent hierarchy of the Catholics. "Habent primos de Pepusa Phrygiae patriarchas, secundos quos appellant senonas atque in tertium locum episcopi devolvuntur."—Jerome, *Ep.*, 41. Epiphanius and Eusebius preserve for us several details of the organization; e. g., women were on the same level as men in the Montanistic church (Epiph., *Haer.*, XLIX, 2); the Montanists were keen in the collection of money (Euseb., *Hist. Eccl.*, V, 18, 2).

which was near its death in the evening of a world hastening to its destruction."¹⁷³ The Montanists maligned the church in its essence, as an apostolic institution;¹⁷⁴ they had writings, at least oracles and epistles, which they cited with the *κατά* of the orthodox gospels and held in greater reverence than the writings of the apostles.¹⁷⁵ The leaders of the Spiritual Franciscans professed the humblest obedience to the church, declaring that "any fate was better than being separated from obedience to the church and its head."¹⁷⁶ As for their reverence for Scripture, it is enough to quote a passage from Angelo da Clarino's long letter to Philip, Duke of Majorca (1329): "Nec debemus quicquam opinativum aut apocrifum pro fide tenere, sed solum certas et fixas et determinatas ab ecclesia et sanctis apostolis et eorum successoribus traditas et scriptas veritates et pro illis loco et tempore debito ponere vitam."¹⁷⁷

We are not justified, therefore, in running Montanism and the Spiritual Franciscanism in a parallel in their antihierarchism. The former were against the development of the Catholic hierarchy by the very principle of their existence: the triumph of the church meant their disgrace and downfall.¹⁷⁸ The Spiritual Franciscans were

¹⁷³ Jacques de Vitry, *Epist. ad Famil.*, in Bongars' *Gesta Dei per Francos*, p. 1148.

¹⁷⁴ τὴν δὲ καθόλου καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν ὑπὸ οὐρανὸν ἐκκλησίαν βλασφημεῖν.—Euseb., *Hist. Eccl.*, V, 16, 9. βλασφημῆσαι εἰς τὸν Κύριον καὶ τοὺς ἀποστόλους καὶ τὴν ἁγίαν ἐκκλησίαν.—*Ibid.*, 18, 5.

¹⁷⁵ καιρὰς συντάττονσι γραφάς.—Euseb. VI, 20, 3. γραφὴ κατ' Ἀστέριον.—*Ibid.*, V, 16, 17; Hippol., *Phil.*, VIII, 19. Tertullian does not mention the Montanistic writings. He accepted the canon of the New Testament (not completely determined, even in his day). He does, however, recognize a new prophecy (*nova prophetia*) which takes precedence over the Gospel (*nova lex*): "Nova lex abstulit repudium (uxoris) . . . nova prophetia secundum matrimonium."—*De Monog.*, 14. On the state of the canon of the New Testament in Montanus' day see Harnack, *Das Neue Testament um das Jahr 200*, chap. ii; and *Dogmengeschichte*, I, 389 ff.

¹⁷⁶ Angelo da Clarino, *Epistula ad fratres Romanos*; Ehrle, *A.L.K.G.*, I, 555. Olivi, likewise, in his solemn plea for disculpation before the Parisian censors writes that he has always been "Zelator constans et fervidus Romanae ecclesiae et fidei eius. Ehrle in *A.L.K.G.*, I, 568.

¹⁷⁷ Letter printed by Ehrle in *A.L.K.G.*, I, 568.

¹⁷⁸ Of course these statements regarding Montanism have to be modified considerably if Tertullian is to be taken as a fair representative of the movement. Tertullian was already reconciled to the church as an anti-Gnostic institution, although by no means so fatally encompassed by the church as was the man of the Middle Ages. Even Tertullian rebels indignantly against the church as a power by virtue of

opposed to the hierarchy of their day as an insult to its trust: the spiritualization of the church means and justification. The church has been as hostile to those who have sought its reformation as to those at its destruction—for the good reason that the reformation of the church has always meant the destruction of a great power which the hierarchy have deemed indispensable. The only fruit of antihierarchical movements is an investigation of their motives and purposes. And here just as in the questions of asceticism, we find a great difference between the second century and the Spiritual Franciscanism of the thirteenth century. The former was fundamental and absolute in its demands; the latter was relative and telic.

Finally, the vagaries of many a heresy of the thirteenth century that sought protection under the hallowed name of the Spiritual Franciscans were not to be laid to the charge of the Spiritual Franciscans. The privileges and exemptions granted to the Medicis by the Holy See proved an irresistible temptation to the heretics. The heretics of all kinds and hoods all over Europe which were seeking a more radical experience under more or less democratic forms—Beguines, Humilists, Soldiers of Christ, etc. As early as the thirteenth century Salimbene tells us that the Spiritual Franciscans "taught all the world to assume the gown with holes." The records of the inquisition in Provence show the same name and prophecies of the Spiritual Franciscans used by the heretical Beghards and Beghines.¹⁸⁰ The movement of the Roman church by Olivi—like Luther years later—conjured up a spirit which the reformers could not control. As early as 1299, less than two years after the death of Olivi, the archbishop of Narbonne, in a provincial synod at Carcassonne, condemned a number of men and women, who, under the influence of the Franciscan zealots, had fallen into scandalous

its apostolic origin merely. It is the "ecclesia spiritus personarum" (a phrase that Ubertino or Olivi might have used!), not the "ecclesia personarum" that has power to enforce God's decrees. *De Pudic.*, VII: "Nonne et laici sacerdotes sumus?"

¹⁷⁹ Salimbene, *Chron.*, p. 107.

¹⁸⁰ *Lib. Sent. Inq. Tolos.*

¹⁸¹ Martène, *Thesaurus*, IV, 226; *Conc. Biterren.* (1299), c.

But it was not until after John XXII had hounded the Spiritual Franciscans to heresy on the issue of gowns and granaries that the full storm of rebellion broke. The author of the *Quorundam* was called Antichrist, and his church the Harlot of Babylon and the Synagogue of Satan. The arms of Frederick of Sicily should overthrow the abominations of the Roman church, and St. Francis should be resurrected in the flesh to lead the saints of the millennium.¹⁸² The wild sectaries interpolated and falsified the writings of Olivi, just as the zealots of the middle of the thirteenth century had treated the prophecies of Joachim. They advanced far beyond the position of the Spirituals of the Italian and Provençal groups. In fact, they repudiated the fellowship of the Italian Spirituals—the men whom Olivi had rebuked for antagonizing the election of Boniface VIII—and even went so far as to call the sainted Angelo da Clarino himself Antichrist.¹⁸³

It is evident, then, that these rebels against the Order and the church alike are not fairly to be classed, as Mr. Lea classes them,¹⁸⁴ with the Spiritual Franciscans, whose leaders, both in Italy and in Provence, professed the strongest faith in the permanence of the Roman church, and utter submission to its doctrines. They have generally been called *Fratricelli*, in the sense given to that term in John XXII's constitution *Quorundam exegit*. But it would be better to call them Beghards and Beghines, to avoid confusing them with the real Fraticelli of Angelo da Clarino and Ubertino da Casale.

We cannot, then, call the antihierarchism of the Spiritual Franciscans Montanistic. It was a secondary phenomenon, induced by the church's encouragement of the lax tendencies of the majority of the Order. It was corrective, not destructive, in its aim. In a word, however violent its attacks upon a perjured pope or a polluted sacrament, it never got outside the mediaeval church either to question its dogmas or to pronounce its doom.

CONCLUSION

If the endeavor made in the preceding pages, to interpret the doctrines of the Spiritual Franciscans from a study of their own

¹⁸² Bernard of Gui, *Pratica*, Pt. V; *Lib. Sent. Inq. Tolos.*, 298-316.

¹⁸³ Wadding, *Ad Ann.*, 1341, No. 21.

¹⁸⁴ H. C. Lea, *History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages*, III, chap. i.

writings has been successful, we are justified in absolving them from the charge of Montanistic heresy. Whatever points of resemblance the two movements may have had in their employment of apocalyptic prophecy, their insistence on ascetic practices, and their opposition to the ecclesiastical powers of their day, a closer inspection of their doctrines reveals a wide divergence of aim and dissimilarity of method in the two. The prophecy which the Montanist announced as the end, the Franciscan zealot employed as a means. The asceticism of the Montanist was a penance, that of the Franciscan an equipment. The Montanists claimed to supplant the church, the Spirituals sought to renew its primitive holiness. Yet, after all, the church was profoundly right in its judgment of the danger which would attend the triumph of the Spiritual Franciscans. The thirteenth century was an extremely critical period in the history of the church. It was the age of the laity *par excellence*. The eleventh century had seen the movement which freed the church from the tutelage of the mediaeval empire; the twelfth century had seen the church in feudal form advance to rule the world which in theory it renounced; the thirteenth century saw the world wake to a realization of the inconsistency between the ideals and the practices of the church of the twelfth. From the moment of that realization began the third act of the stupendous religious drama of the Middle Ages—the deliverance of the world from the church.

Furthermore, the church of the thirteenth century endured simultaneous attacks from many quarters. It saw a Guelph emperor in revolt against the pope; it saw a large portion of Catholic France abandon its faith for the heresies of the Cathari; it saw professors of the University of Paris weighing its doctrines against the philosophy of Averroes; it saw the fruition of the political heresies of Arnold of Brescia in the contumacy of Frederick II, and the consummation of the strictures of Joachim of Flora in the shameless gibes of the Goliards. It heard the voices of actual revolt, refusing the tithes by which it lived,¹⁸⁵ and defying the thunders of its decrees.¹⁸⁶ And to

¹⁸⁵ "Decimas non dandas esse dicunt sacerdotibus et clericis. Dicunt enim quod de officio deberent vivere sicut faber aut sutor de suo officio vivit."—Ortlieb von Strassburg in Boehmer's *Fonles rer. Germ.*, II.

¹⁸⁶ John of Winterthur tells how, when Innocent III placed Zürich under the interdict for cleaving to Frederick II, the Minorites, upheld by the citizens, defied

crown it all, the political rivals of the Roman church were quick to seize the language of malcontent reformers, and, masquerading in the sheep's clothing of pure disinterestedness, presumed to instruct the church with complacent recommendations of apostolic poverty and simplicity.¹⁸⁷ It is small wonder that the harassed church of the thirteenth century was irritated to a point beyond the fair and patient discussion of the merits of each new sect and each new programme of correction; small wonder that protestations of orthodoxy, however sincere, failed to justify in the eyes of Rome a sect which spoke of its "saint (Olivi) who needed no canonization at the hands of men since he was already canonized by God."¹⁸⁸ The tone of the Spirituals was keyed to so high a pitch of confidence in their cause that it sounded remarkably like defiance. Ubertino da Casale's defense of the position of the Spirituals before the tribunal of Clement V, and Angelo da Clarino's *Epistola Excusatoria*, addressed to John XXII, in the summer of 1317, were written with the avowed purpose of recommending the case of the Spirituals to the favorable consideration of the pope. Yet both these documents end with a virtual threat: the one, that "the blessed Francis will in no wise be defrauded of a legitimate succession of sons to observe the Rule which the spirit of the crucified Christ inspired,"¹⁸⁹ the other, that

the interdict and performed religious services throughout the town.—*Archiv für schweizerische Geschichte*, Zürich, 1856.

Renan, in writing on the Eternal Gospel and Joachim of Flora says: "Je ne crois point exagérer en disant qu'il y eut là une tentative avortée d'une création religieuse. Il n'a tenu qu'à peu de chose, que le treizième siècle, si extraordinaire à tant d'égards, n'ait vu éclore une religion nouvelle, dont l'institution franciscaine renfermait le germe."—*Revue des deux mondes*, 1886, p. 292.

¹⁸⁷ Frederick II, adopting the language of the Spiritual Franciscans (whom he persecuted!) unctuously says: "In paupertate quidem et simplicitate fundata erat ecclesia primitiva cum sanctos quos catalogus sanctorum commemorat fecunda pariturirent."—Huillard-Bréholles, *Histoire diplomatique de Frédéric II*, III, p. 50.

Matthew Paris publishes a manifesto of the French nobles of the year 1246, in which they say of the Roman clergy: "Let them return to the primitive state of the church, and, living in contemplation, show us, whom it befits to live the active life, those miracles which long ago were their glory." A pious plan for shelving the Roman clergy!—M. Paris, *Hist. Maj. Angl.*, 483.

¹⁸⁸ "Item dixit quod frater Petrus Johannis erat pater eorum et sanctus non canonizatus."—*Lib. Sent. Inq. Tolos.*, p. 329.

¹⁸⁹ Ubertino da Casale, *Defensio*; *A.L.K.G.*, III, p. 416.

unless the zealots were left free to fulfil their vows to holy poverty, "God would require their blood at the hands of the church."¹⁹⁰ It was such sentiments as these that won for the Spiritual Franciscans the enmity of the distressed curia. It made little difference that these sentiments were inspired by a desperate devotion to an ideal unheeded, rather than by any positive hostility to Rome. They came practically to a denial of the Catholic dogma of the finality of the church, and the very dangerous doctrine of the perfectibility of Christianity. With Gregory VII the church had proudly assumed the programme of world-rule, and committed herself to the immense task of the direction of all the forces of Christendom. Under the burden of that task she had begun, already in the thirteenth century, to stagger. It seemed as if her powers of absorption were beginning to flag, while the activity and complexity of European life were increasing apace.

Just at that critical moment came the Spiritual Franciscans with their apocalyptic programme for the renewal of the corrupted world-church, with their uncompromising veneration for the Rule of St. Francis, with their rebuke for the luxury of the great order to which they belonged and on which the church had set the seal of her approval. If they were not heretical they were certainly revolutionary. Their offense was the disturbance of the decrees of the curia. In their appeal to the Rule of St. Francis as an authority beyond the power of the pope to modify or abrogate, they assumed a principle as dangerous to the sovereignty of the church as Martin Luther's appeal to Scripture interpreted by the light of every man's conscience. They would not be absorbed by the church, therefore they were put down with a strong hand. But it was the last great wave of popular religion that the church was able to check when it could not guide. The next wave overwhelmed the mediaeval church and swept one-half of Europe from its allegiance.

¹⁹⁰ Angelo da Clarino, *Epistola Excusatoria*; *A.L.K.G.*, I, p. 533.

THE CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE OF THE TRINITY

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A pragmatic view may, in this practical age, be taken for granted. Already in sermons and lectures we have had ethical treatments and ethical descriptions of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. Yet most, even of those who have thus treated this central Christian dogma, have gone no farther. One of two attitudes has usually been assumed: either the dogma with its incomprehensible terms has been accepted and allegorized, or it has been explained away. Neither is the attitude proper to the science of theology. Starting with the "ethical," that is, the practical side of the doctrine, from an analysis of this a theory must be built up which either supports or undermines the Christian dogma. Lest it seem that the outcome is prejudged, it may be remarked that what the church has held, in some sense, from the very beginning, cannot be fundamentally untrue to its own experience. Men cannot be mistaken for two thousand years as to the central element of their religious experience. We must expect, therefore, to find ourselves in virtual agreement with the Christian dogma. Yet we may enter the inquiry with our eyes open, and not attempt to steer our course by a philosophy that for us does not exist.

Starting from the Christian religious experience, one thing forces itself on men's attention today; the Christian experience is not totally different from that of other religions. A little study of the history of religions shows this. No sharp line can be drawn between the experience of Christians and the religious phenomena of pre-Christian times and of non-Christian lands. Christian mysticism cannot be sundered by a gulf from the mysticism of India, nor the Christian zeal for monotheism from the Mohammedan's devotion to the one God, nor the ethical bearing of Christianity from the Confucian emphasis on morals. Hence it should be expected that the grounds for a doctrine of the Trinity may be traced, though less clearly, in other religions than Christianity. This has two results: (1) the final

theory will have relation with the general theory of religion and hence of the world; (2) as a result of this last, the idea of the Trinity takes its place as necessary to the idea of God even for metaphysics. This last point is important as showing the general attitude. If the theory which is reached from a logical analysis of religious experience is connected with experience in general, then metaphysics, the science of abstract experience, must take account of the analysis of this particular experience. The connection is even closer, since the special experience is in this case the deepest experience of reality. God is the power behind all existence, as even Spencer argues; relation to God, therefore, is the deepest experience of reality, hence the best subject of metaphysical study. The attempt to construct a theory of the Christian experience of God is therefore a study in metaphysics, and must be conducted as metaphysics. A metaphysical inquiry has two main requirements. It must first start from an analysis of experience, and, secondly, it must draw out the implications of this analysis. In this case the experience which is the object of study has two forms: it is first the Christian experience in general, and, secondly, the Christian relation to Christ. We have to analyze the relation which Christians find themselves to be in toward God through their worship, through prayer, through the conviction of sin and of redemption, and the immediate relation which may be called mysticism. Of course in this paper no details of treatment can be given. Besides this there is the relation to the historic founder of Christianity. The primary experience is at bottom the same as in the first case—the verification or denial of this is the primary problem. Is the relation to Christ a relation to God or not? The answer to this is the answer to the problem of the Trinity.

The second mark of a metaphysical inquiry is the dialectic which takes such an analysis and forms from it a theory. It is necessary to insist on this because today dialectic in Christian theology is supposed to have ceased with the scholastics. It is not necessary to rehabilitate the schoolmen, for the dialectic since Kant is different from theirs, yet the spirit is the same. The result which will be reached through modern dialectic is not far different in spirit from the feeling of the Middle Ages. It cannot be too strongly asserted that it is not the doctrine of the Trinity which is a mystery, but the

Trinity itself. The Christian dogma is no mystery. It is the expression in the terms of a past dialectic of the Christian experience. That experience, no more than any deep experience, can be made completely intelligible. But the statement of what analysis we can make should and must be intelligible and logical, the direct outcome of the analysis. If such a method is followed, Christian theology need not fear a "scientific" philosophy, for it will go deeper into reality than any natural science. The opponents of the application of metaphysics to theology do not see that the result of such an application will be that metaphysics must take account of theology. To follow such a method means to found theology again on sure foundations, and not leave the central Christian dogma in the realm of fancy or of art. Christian doctrine must be shown to be the necessary logical expression and outcome of Christian experience.

In analyzing the religious experience in general, one element is almost always clearly present. The savage, whatever else be his motive, performs religious ceremonies because he believes that the god can bring good or ill on him. If he did not believe this, there would be no religion. A god who could neither harm nor benefit his worshiper, would soon cease to be worshiped. The religion of fear is not alone in this. The god of rain as well as the god of storm is worshiped. These acts of worship, then, spring from a belief in the power of the god to help or harm. Such a belief cannot be explained as chance or as deception. It is based on some human experience. What the experience is in the case of the savage we can only infer, but that there is some experience which forces the human being to pay attention to powers beyond himself is plain. Nature and ancestor worship show two forms of this feeling of dependence. Man feels that nature and his ancestors have some power over him. What we find in low forms of religion comes to light also in the higher. Confucianism is a higher form of ancestor worship (taking it as a religion, and as it now is), hence dependence on powers larger than the individual is central in the Chinese religious experience. Buddhism, as we find it today, makes use of a power deeper than the individual will. It clearly teaches the uselessness of individual endeavor. All creation, gods and men, acclaim the power of the Buddha. The Buddha, though proclaiming himself to be only the teacher of

the way, becomes in the eyes of his followers a power to which heaven and earth bow. With the monotheistic religions, what was an inference becomes the central truth. The Mohammedan assertion of the oneness of God is an assertion of the limitless power of God. God is the cause of all. Fatalism is but the extreme expression of this belief in God's power. The experience which led Mohammed to the insistence on this was the consciousness of the presence in his life of but one creative power. Against the Christian Trinity he can only appeal to this experience. Can God have a son? He cannot conceive of another sharing the creative power. His experience of God is that of the all-powerful. As in Mohammedanism, so in Christianity. The center of the Christian experience is of God as the powerful, helping father. The Christian experience, as all religion, involves prayer to God and experience of His power to answer it. Too many have borne witness to the power that comes from prayer to God for any to doubt. Central in the Christian experience is the certainty of relation to a creative power, a power which is above the forces of nature, since it can make their violence powerless to hurt the spirit and will of man. Man knows God as a source of power over nature which has its source outside humanity.

Peculiar to the Christian religion is the relation to Christ. That relation in Buddhism is contrary to the teachings of Buddha, who says that no man can help another, while the essence of Christianity is that men are saved through the man Christ Jesus. As this is peculiar to Christianity, the traces in other religions are too dim to be of use. The description must come from Christianity itself. For this reason, since the experience is not universal, it must be more carefully described. The relation of the Christian to Christ is first that of follower to a leader. Christ started a certain movement, in which all Christians are members. The nature of this movement, whether to convert the world to certain moral truths, or to love God, or to something else, is not important here. Christ is the head of an organization which is to carry out his work of teaching, if you will, or of something more. The essence of such a relation is the feeling of dependence. In acknowledging Christ as leader, the Christian accepts Christ's direction as to certain acts. He promises to obey. In the Christian experience we find more, however, than this. In

the second place, Christ is the redeemer, the savior. The Christian experiences through his relation to Christ a change of relation to sin. Through Christ the Christian becomes able to resist sin. This is fundamentally different from the relation to Christ as leader. In the relation as follower, the Christian yields himself to a power outside him; in the relation to the redeemer, he is in relation to a power within him. As a third relation there exists the consciousness of union with Christ. Not only is he known as leader, and as a power against sin, but, more intimately than this, the Christian is joined to Christ. This we may take to be the principle content of the phrase, "members of Christ." To describe it more explicitly would be impossible, but this at least is clear, Christ is known in the Christian experience, not as an intruding force, but, when the consciousness of union is present, as the deeper power of the man himself. It is this consciousness that has always prevented the final triumph of an objective expression of redemption.

This is the experience, and we have answered our question in its first form. This relation to Christ is not different, when analyzed, from the relation to God which is fundamental to all religion. God is experienced as the source of power. The fundamental Christian experience is that Christ also is a source of power. With whatever right the savage worships nature, the Chinese their ancestors, the Buddhists Buddha, or the Mohammedans Allah, the same rights have the Christians to worship Christ. Not only is Christ a source of power; for the Christian he is as great a source as, or greater than, the god of nature. The analysis has shown the Christian experience to be at least dual. What it knows of the God of nature as power, it knows also of Christ.

There is yet a third element in the Christian experience. The phenomena of conscience cannot be reduced to either of the elements we have considered. Conscience is not the consciousness of a power outside of us—it is most certainly within. Nor is there any consciousness of relation to Christ. As far as we can tell, the moral experience of Socrates was that of a Christian in this respect. His "demon" is the Christian conscience. Hence there is no necessary relation to Christ. In cases where it is said conscience acts, a power within man either prevents or tends to prevent some act. It is an arbitrary

distinction which does not also include the impetus to action. A sense of duty would seem to be as clear when a right act is performed as when an evil act is not done. Similarly, it is arbitrary and illogical to call an impulse to right, God, and the impulse against evil, conscience, and divide the two. The experience here to be analyzed is then the experience of some power within man, neither the Creator nor Christ, acting in favor of righteousness. The best description in objective terms of this is that certain acts, whether by inheritance or training, or both, have come under the ban of the better nature of man. This phrase, "the better nature of man," is not begging the question, for by it is meant simply those instincts and tendencies in man which make him a better member of human society. This "better," or social nature acts in favor of those activities which benefit society, and against those which harm it. Here there is again a power. Here again the power is larger than the individual, though not exterior to him. It is larger because it is a racial, and not an individual, tendency. The things which are right and the things which are wrong have been wrought out by the race. The individual inherits, or is trained in, the racial standards. As a member of the race he shares the power to distinguish between those acts which do, and those acts which do not, conform to the racial standard. This power, if it was acquired at all, was acquired by the race, certainly not by the individual alone. Hence it is correct to say that this power is supra-individual. Better than "conscience," if it were not too cumbrous, might be the term, "the power of humanity." In the power revealed in the phenomena of conscience we have the experience by man of a power in himself. The source of power which he worships need no longer be sought only outside; man finds God in himself. No distinction can be made on this empirical basis which can destroy the results of this analysis. The power in the human race is as worthy of worship, and is as true an experience, as the consciousness of relation to God the Creator, or to Christ. The Christian experience is threefold. It contains a relation to the creative power outside of man, to the creative power in the man Christ Jesus, to the spirit of man itself.

The three elements in the Christian experience which have been described do not stand apart. The power which Christ exerts is not

apart from the creative power of nature. There are many ways in which the connection between the two may be shown, but only one can here be followed out, and even this must be suggested rather than fully developed. The power of Christ is mainly evident as the power against sin. Whatever definition of sin may be proposed, it must include the idea of sin being necessarily opposed to the will of God. That which is a power against sin would be a power for God. Before this identification can be finally made, however, the nature of the Creator as revealed in the religious experience must be more carefully analyzed than has yet been done. The creative power, known to the savage as the power of nature, to the Chinese as the influence of heredity and parental training, is known to the Christian as the power of love. In speaking of the Creator, the idea must not be limited to the Creator of the physical, non-human world. The same power, in the current cosmologies, created man as created the rocks; man is a part of nature, not apart from it. This is the meaning of the religious statement that God created man as well as the beasts or the solid earth. So in the Christian experience the two are connected. As in biology, so for the Christian, no uncrossable gap is known between the God of the storm and the earthquake, and the God known within man. Suppose an earthquake has destroyed the houses of a group of men. They pray to the power of nature, and renewed energy is given them to rebuild their homes. For them the force of the earthquake is broken. If man has power over inanimate nature, if he uses winds and electricity and fire as he wills, certainly the power in man which gives him strength and energy to overcome nature is itself greater than nature. This means that the true creative power is in man in such a case, rather than in nature outside of man. This small attempt to point out that the God of nature is known also as the God of man, may be left for a moment as it is. In considering the third element in the Christian experience we shall return to it. Christ is known as a power opposed to sin. Those things are sinful, by the definition of sin, which are opposed to the will of God. Sin, in man, is the tendency to oppose God. Christ is, then, a power to aid God. God, in relation to humanity, is the power of nature, the forces of the universe taken as a whole. What the Christian or any worshiper regards as God's will comprises those things which the

forces of the universe demand. For the human race these forces are the forces of the social life and its advance. Man is by nature a social being. The God of nature and his demands are the force of the social life and its demands. These demands Christ helps to be obeyed. The Christian knows Christ as one who brings him into harmony with the ethical requirements of man's life. The conflict with the "world" may seem to contradict this, but this conflict is not the deepest word of the Christian experience. That word is "peace" (John 20:19). Christ is then one with the demands and forces which create man. It must be remembered in saying this, that these natural forces include the innate tendency of man to struggle and progress. The Christian knows Christ as coworker with the deepest tendencies and forces in man's own nature and so as coworker with the Creator, the God of nature. If Christ, a power exterior to man, is thus connected with the Creator, certainly the power of humanity itself, which is the third element in the Christian experience, is also connected. Evolutionary ethics has proved that conscience is part of the moral structure of man, evolved as his physical nature is evolved. The power in the human race is certainly, unless we put a gulf between man and the lower creation, at one with the creative power in nature generally. Basing this simply on experience, the Christian feels that what nature demands, Christ helps to perform; to that the spirit of man guides.

The three elements in this experience are connected, but it would be speaking too hastily to say that they are identical, or even the same power coming through different channels. That they are not identical in their immediate source is evident. One is perceived as a power outside of humanity, the second as the power of a man, the third as a power in man. The further question is whether they may not be traced back to a common source. The alternative to this is that they exist in conjunction, but have no one origin. The evolutionary description of man, which has been more or less assumed, may seem to be incompatible with this latter alternative. The genius of man has the same source as the power in animals or plants, and all these sprang from the inorganic forces. There are two answers to this, both of which have some truth in them; first, it is by no means certain that anything was added to the inorganic forces to produce the

organic. If that is the case, the organic were really present in the inorganic. That the two are today different forces, no one can deny. It is impossible to reduce our pure experience of organic nature, with will and purpose, to the inorganic. Hence, if this hypothesis is true, the organic was really present in the beginning with the inorganic. The alternative to this is that the organic was developed out of what was in no way organic. Now, however, organic forces do exist, and that from which they were developed, which is by hypothesis entirely non-organic, also exists. Hence we have two distinct powers.

In this whole consideration reference is made to our pure experience, not to the reduction to a third something of both organic and inorganic. Whatever that third thing may be supposed to be, it is not experienced by us. From experience there are known two distinct powers, and evolution does not concern this fact. In the special experience before us, as far as experience goes, certainly the power of nature outside man, and the power of Christ are distinct. They are so distinct that the problem of Christianity has been to connect the two, hence the trinitarian controversy. The essence of the distinction is found in the fact that the power of nature in general does not to any great extent work against sin. The rain falls on the just and the unjust alike. Disregard of natural law may bring disaster, but the power that can guard against this is man's intelligence, not the physical force. Whatever attempts may be made to interpret natural calamities, earthquakes or storms, no sure connection can be made with the moral idea of God. So true is this that it has led some to say that the God of nature is not the God of Christians. Connected with this, and a further illustration of the same thing, is the deeper consciousness of sin which the Christian has. The savage has no such deep conviction of sin as the Christian. This supports the view that an essential difference between the power of nature and the power of Christ is the relation to sin. This distinction forces the conclusion that the creative power of nature is not known to man as primarily ethical. Man's relation to nature is that of a person subject to arbitrary powers. The idea of the righteousness of God, that is, that God is moral, is a later development in the history of religion, and is fully expressed only in Christianity, where the relation is not to the creative power alone, but to a distinctive moral power. Where the

former alone is present, as in Mohammedanism, God may love or pity, but he does not judge right or wrong. He blesses whom he will, not necessarily the good. So it is a fundamental and unshakable distinction that the God of nature is not, and Christ is, concerned with sin. This would also distinguish the third element, the spirit in man, from the first, power in nature. There is another distinction that separates the power of Christ and this spirit. The influence of Christ is the influence of a historic person. It is a power introduced into history, and comes to the Christian from without, through the Bible or the Church. The spirit of man is within, and comes from within. However much the Christian may feel himself to be in union with Christ, Christ is always other than himself. Man is at the most only one member of Christ. With the spirit known in conscience, however, man identifies himself. The "no" of conscience springs from the depths of a man's own nature. The power of Christ is essentially the teacher of the brotherhood of man. The relation to Christ is a relation to the Christian social consciousness, while in conscience the source is in the individual. Thus neither of the three elements in the Christian experience can be resolved into either of the others.

Many of the terms which have been used in describing the Christian experience need now to be justified. So far, description alone was the main point; now it is necessary to draw out some of the results. On the basis of this experience, from the relation which the Christian holds to the powers of the universe, something may be concluded as to those powers themselves. The Christian's relation to the power in natural phenomena, it was said, was a relation to a power which could fortify against those phenomena. This is the relation of the worshiper, but primarily every man feels the powers of the storm and the wind and the earthquake without reference to his attitude toward them. Man is subject to the powers of nature. A storm at sea tosses a man as much as it does the rock ballast on the ship on which he sails. There is no question, however, that the effect on the man, if he has courage, is different from that on the rock. The storm, if it is not too violent, brings out the will of man to conquer it. So the ships for which the Mediterranean voyage was a great danger have given place, through man's courage in meeting danger, to the great steamships of

today. The joy of fighting and overcoming nature is as certain a fact as the joy of battle against human enemies. Perhaps the best illustration is that for many men mountains exist but to be climbed. That this advance of the power of man over nature has been due to religion cannot be denied. Unless the earliest sailors had had faith in the possibility of propitiating the gods of the sea and the storm, they would never have sailed. This relation is today often not recognized as religious, but it is due to the religious beliefs, hidden though they may be. Facts of this kind prove that to man the powers of the universe have been revealed as not entirely purposeless. Though the force which man can exert is certainly less than the total forces of the universe, through purpose and will and trust in himself, man can govern, to a certain extent, inanimate nature. The forces of the universe include the supreme power in man. The powers, therefore, that are at the basis of existence, give a place to the purposiveness of man. The connection between the power of the universe and the power of Christ against sin shows that the universal forces include the ethical. Because the Christian experiences the God of nature in connection with an ethical power, the God of nature takes on an ethical or moral character. The power against sin that Christ and the spirit of man exert is not something totally out of relation to the forces of nature. These forces, therefore, must be conceived, in their highest development, as purposive. The universe is experienced by the Christian as due to the personal power of will, or rather, as most fully expressed in conscious will. The experience that forces this conclusion on the Christian is mainly the influence of Christ. This influence, if it is to be given a place in the world, is primarily to be classed with the influence of man on man. From Christ himself no direct word reaches us. His followers' memory of him is all we have, and that comes to almost all through some teacher or through their parents. Hence the power of Christ comes to us only through men. It is therefore the influence of men. Yet it is certainly larger than the individual. It is a power which includes a great body of men in a common purpose. Each man who is "joined to Christ" is joined also to his fellow-Christians. The power of Christ is thus one of the great cohesive forces of humanity. This shows the relation it holds to universal forces. It is included in them. One of the great effective agents

in the world is this power of Christianity. It stands also, however, in a still closer relation to the primal forces. In the course of ages the powers of the universe have successively produced the earth, organic plant life, the animals, and finally man. How this has come about is not here of importance. But it is important to see that under any general terms which are used to denote all the forces of the universe, man, and the forces at work in man must be included. Hence the power of Christ must be explained as one of these forces, or as the product of these forces. It cannot, as has been shown, be reduced to any of the non-human forces, nor to the powers in physical nature. Hence, at the least, Christ, is a power as much as nature. He does not, however, stand apart from nature, but gives strength to obey her demands, the demands of the social life of man. Hence the power in man that Christ is, is fundamentally in union with the forces at the basis of all existence. For one statement there is, however, no foundation. To say that Christ and physical nature are both the expressions of a single power is an unwarranted extension of human knowledge. What is known is, that they are distinct, though connected. Whatever may be the thing common to both which connects them, it is neither of the two. Physical nature and Christ stand equal. Materialism and subjective idealism are both at variance with Christian experience if they assert that either is the basis of the other. It must also be repeated here, that priority in time is no proof that Christ was produced by the purely physical forces. Christ is therefore to be regarded as the power in man which works toward the success of the forces which underlie all experience. The third element in the Christian experience brings the first two into close connection. This third element was described as the power larger than the individual lodged in the individual. As the natural forces have or acquire a certain line of action in rocks, as plants follow out the innate tendency of their species, so man tends to follow the forces which most deeply and really express his nature. Each individual has individual traits, but below all these are the racial and inherited tendencies. Of these conscience and the natural impulse to good are the expression. In man the forces of nature, the forces which produce him, become the force of the race and its power. This power is expressed in and affects the wills of men. It is experienced as power

acting on human will yet greater than it. It might be said that this power is acquired, not natural to the race. This objection is unscientific. Any power that is acquired must have had some source, and must, if it is not natural to the human race, have existed somewhere else. Either it is the natural expression of the race itself, or, given to the race by an outside source, it arose or was natural to something else in the universe. Natural to something it must have been, for science allows no chance in the world. It is this power, or rather this power in the wills of men that connects Christ and the Creator. This spirit of man is natural and is allied to the spirit of nature; Christ appeals to this spirit of man, and aids it against evil; therefore Christ is a power connected with the spirit of nature. Thus the Christian experience is consistent. Since it is the third element that connects the two first, the third element must, although the others cannot be reduced to it, yet reveal something of their nature. This third element is in itself a purposive power, that is, a power directed toward an end of which man becomes conscious. Often, by itself, this power does not prevail over the will in man to sin, but when, through the influence of Christ, it does so prevail, the end and tendency of this force of man comes to consciousness. In the Christian experience the universe is known to have one goal. The powers of physical nature to the non-Christian seem often to war against the tendency of the human race, but for the Christian, the power of nature, brought to consciousness in Christ and in his followers, is seen and known as the real expression of man, of nature itself. Thus the Christian experience is essentially monotheistic. The powers of the universe are seen to have one goal and that goal is ethical.

So far the Christian experience in its usual form has been followed. This form is, however, very probably partly molded on the form of doctrinal expression. Yet the underlying experience has been made clear. It is now possible, therefore, to state the conclusion reached in terms of the experience itself, and, if it employs philosophical terms, using those of the present day. Taking the results of the analysis the conclusion reached is that Christ is a power to bring to man's consciousness and will the demands which the spirit of man, as embodying for the man the spirit of nature, is making on him. Turning this around the spirit of the universe finds its expression in

a man, and in that expression becomes a conscious will. How this spirit of the universe finds its expression in man has been discussed. The last two phrases must be made more plain, however. First, what follows from the fact that Christ is a power against sin, is that a power against sin is expressed in him. The tendency of man to follow the spirit of man in its demands for the betterment of the social life comes to full consciousness and expression in Christ. Such is the Christian experience. Secondly, this expression is not the same as the expression of thought in words. With Christ what was before a somewhat hidden tendency comes to full light, and becomes, for Christians, a conscious will in them. It is not merely known to them, but it is a purpose that, in them, is conscious of itself. So the analysis of the Christian experience supports the statement, which may be taken to represent the scientific and metaphysical account of the doctrine of the Trinity: the will of the universe reaches its expression in man, and in him becomes a conscious will. In this form the Christian dogma is justified.

CRITICAL NOTES

THE EXPERIENTIAL THEOLOGY

It is a coincidence which seems to call for some notice from me that Professor Coe's article in the last number of this *Journal*, upon "Modern Psychology and Regeneration," in which he refers in kindly criticism to my *Christian Life and Theology*, immediately precedes my own article, upon "Miracles," in which I occupy a different theological standpoint from that occupied in the book. I shall not attempt to explain now how I have come to a change in my position, except to say that I have always been trying to learn as I have studied, and seem now to myself to have made radical progress; but a criticism upon the whole experiential theology from one who once embraced it may be calculated to throw some light upon it.

Professor Coe's direct reference to myself is, as I have intimated, of the kindest sort; but I am not inclined entirely to accept his criticism. I said that regeneration "upon its merely human side, is the permanent choice of duty." He objects to the abstractness of "duty as such" as the object of the Christian choice. I have not maintained that it is commonly or, indeed, ever chosen in this abstract form, although that could be maintained of certain examples in academic circles. I have simply put this as the common element *involved* in all forms of the Christian surrender to God. The choice, however it may be conceived by the individual, is a matter of consciousness, and needs nothing but the clarification of a little analysis to become the conscious choice of duty as such. It is also a *permanent* choice, for one cannot truly choose duty, as duty, for any limited period; and this is also a matter of consciousness in the sense that the Christian knows that he *intends* permanence, though of course he is not conscious, and cannot be, of the actual permanence through the future of this or of any other choice. I think it will be found that the word "conscious" is employed in the book with strict accuracy throughout. At a later point in the book (pp. 133 ff.) I have dwelt upon the concrete forms which the experience of conversion actually takes.

I cannot speak with so much satisfaction of the criticism which Professor Coe has made upon the school of experiential writers as a whole. Of the six questions (and very excellently chosen ones) which he says should be asked by such writers of themselves, and must be asked by their

critics, in the scrutiny of their data, he says, "It is doubtful if any one of them has been faithfully observed by any writer who has used the argument. Indeed, what passes in these arguments as description of empirical data . . . is little more than a description of supposed experiences in terms of a preconceived theory." This is partially true, as I shall explain later. It is true that the "possible negative cases" which Professor Coe says, with great truth and force, ought to be "searched for" and "explained," have been entirely neglected. I shall show why. But "measures *have* been taken to secure universally representative facts as distinguished from denominational types of experience" by these writers. In the course of one of these analyses in my own book (p. 53) it is remarked in a note: "To all these epitomes of individual experience historic names might be attached." The brief paragraph is the result of wide reading in narratives of conversion and of long observation of Christian people in many diverse regions. Professor William James has conducted a large part of his investigations in his *Varieties of Religious Experience* by the study of carefully selected "personal documents." He quotes largely from Tolstoy, Bunyan, Finney, Brainerd, etc., etc. It is in a similar way that the writers upon religious experience as a Christian evidence have collected their facts. And it is a strong confirmation of their success in getting at real facts that they have so largely agreed. Frank, Professor at Erlangen, was an "old" Lutheran; Stearns was by training a Presbyterian; R. S. Foster, a Methodist; F. H. Foster, a "new school" Congregationalist: and yet there is a remarkable likeness of statement between them. Certainly "dogma" did not make a German sacramentarian Lutheran university man and an American Methodist bishop agree!

I do not think, therefore, that Professor Coe has done justice to his opponents, though he has meant to; but his failure at this point is of little importance in comparison with the correctness of his general criticism that their study has not been sufficiently objective as manifested particularly by their neglect of the negative cases. I shall sharpen this criticism still more and say that the fundamental error of the whole school lies in their having *assumed* that Christianity is a unique phenomenon in the religious world. It is certainly scientific to segregate a class of cases for a special examination when they have a common distinguishing trait: and there can be no objection to examining the large class of men who profess conversion for the discovery of their peculiarities or for determining what those peculiarities have to teach us in the world of systematic theology. But this has not been the simple and scientific attitude of these investigators. They have assumed the existence of a "world of evil" as opposed to the church,

and have made the former the object of God's displeasure as the church is the organization of his kingdom and the home of his forgiven and accepted children. But *are* converted men the only men with whom God is pleased? They are, if the world is essentially evil, if the church is a company of men rescued out of the ruin impending over all, if the agency of the rescue is God himself, and if God has thus done for some men what he has not done for others and thereby introduced some into a state in which none are found who have not been thus introduced. But this is the question of the personally selective action of God, of his supernatural interference in the course of history, of special revelation, and of miracle. To presuppose this is really to presuppose the answer of the whole apologetic problem. Apologetically, this argument *begs the question*. That is its great condemnation.

Hence the neglect of the negative cases. Here is a man whom his neighbors would call a religious man, who is interested in the church, who does good, who has the same moral struggles that other men have, and sometimes stands firm in the hour of temptation when converted men fall, who says, however, that he was never converted, who has no experience of prayer and who is conscious of no special and divine help in the conflicts of life. How will the experiential apologist explain such a case? He does not suppose himself to be under any necessity of explaining it. It is non-Christian and has nothing to do with his argument, which is the development of the meaning of *Christian* experience, which alone is truly normal and divine. So he thinks, because he thinks that Christianity is divinely unique. Of one thing he feels sure, that, if the experience of the man is actually as described, he is not pleasing to God, not an heir of heaven, and not at all certain to persevere in the morality which he has apparently attained: and this harsh criticism the apologist passes, not out of lack of charity or because of his personal hardness, but because he believes in the divine uniqueness of Christianity and in the moral worthlessness of everything which falls short of complete conscious surrender to God.

But if this presupposition is dropped, the question recurs, What is religion and what is a religious man? a question upon which Professor Coe's article gives us many valuable hints. Certainly there is found in every man a desire of happiness, which in certain relations becomes merged in the desire of the good and the right. Now and then men generally perceive that the right course is the course which leads to happiness. Suppose any man, even the lowest, to perceive the desirability of right doing in any case. He chooses it. Is such a choice pleasing in any sense to God? In the physical sphere obedience to natural law, even the most trifling, by the

most constant violator of it, will immediately result in some degree of well-being. May it not be so in the moral? Is not such a man more likely to perceive the desirability of right doing tomorrow for what he has done today? Has he not begun what is *potentially*, under the influence of his implanted tendencies, an upward course, by this one right choice? Take the man by his side, in similar circumstances, who has been "converted," and in what respect do you find him to differ? What warrant has God for *his* persevering in the right way, for the "permanence" of *his* choice which he has not for the other's, except in God's own purpose to carry him on by divine action upon him? But are not the operations of the man's natural tendencies, etc., *also divine*? If we leave the special divine operation of God out of the account, the most orthodox of all theologians would say, that the prospects of the unconverted and the converted man are equally bright. Then why are they not equally pleasing to God?

It seems to me that here is a waiting field for the investigations of the religious psychologist. When I was teaching systematic theology, I taught it for ten years upon the basis of experience, beginning with the experience of the new birth as the starting-point. I had about come to the conclusion to abandon this method of approach to the subject (as I certainly should today), because I found a very unsatisfactory attitude in most of my students to the question of this fundamental experience. Is it possible that there are many people, especially among the young, and more particularly yet, among those who have recently passed through our colleges, who have never been "converted" and have little of the old forms of Christian experience, who are yet on God's side in this world, and are maintaining as successfully as the rest the struggle with temptation and the performance of good? That is a very important question. If a proper *questionnaire* bearing upon this point could be sent to some thousands of present college seniors, it might unearth facts of great value. And if another *questionnaire* addressed to those who positively object to the church, asking for the reason of this objection, and then searching out the elementary facts of the religious life of such objectors, could be scattered among men at both ends of the intellectual series, among college men, graduate and non-graduate, and among the working men who gather in our labor unions and who maintain so active a life of thought upon a wide range of subjects, it is probable that a great service to religion would be thereby performed. It would soon be evident whether the church is unique in the sense of our experiential theologians or not.

I wish, if the patience of my reader is not exhausted, to add one thing more by way of "retractation." I presented the argument from experi-

ence to the divinity of Christ (summarized upon p. 141) in this form, that the Christian refers all those activities which give him his experiential proof of the existence of God, to Christ as well as to God; hence, if they prove the existence of God, they also prove the divinity of Christ. I now regard that argument as fallacious in that it is impossible for the Christian to say that his reference of the phenomena to Christ is legitimate. Making such a reference, he undoubtedly experiences the divine blessing; but so does the devotee of Mary in Catholic churches when he ascribes to her attributes that are divine. The reference may be a mistaken one in the one case as in the other. Man is feeling for God in both cases. God honors man's approach according to its intention, not according to its intellectual correctness.

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HETZENAUER'S EDITION OF THE VULGATE

It is curious that there is no accessible official edition of the Vulgate which corresponds to our authorized edition of the Holy Scriptures. For though the Council of Trent decreed that an authentic text of the Vulgate should be issued, and both Sixtus V and Clement VIII carried out the decree, copies of their editions are very rare, and there has been no authorized Vulgate published at the Vatican Press since. The various copies of the Vulgate now in circulation are by private editors with the authority of their bishops, taken indeed from one or other of the three editions of Clement VIII; but they are neither free from mistakes, nor do they adhere to the authorized text in spelling or punctuation. Dr. Hetzenauer, professor of biblical exegesis in the Roman Seminary of St. Anollinaris, has now edited with the utmost care the Clementine Vulgate. He has given fifteen years' laborious study to the work; in conjunction with a band of zealous associates he has carefully reproduced the smallest details, that it may be absolutely correct; he has gone over the proofsheets seven times before the work was published; he has noted such small and apparently insignificant points as the division of words, the ligature of letters, the form of an "s" or an "i," the use of capital or small letters, besides the spelling of words, the punctuation of the text, and the division of verses. He has even chosen type which should be the same size as that used in the second edition of 1593. This work has been partially done with great accuracy by Cardinal Vercellone, but he took for his text the first edition of 1592. Dr. Hetzenauer gives us the variations of the three editions issued by Clement VIII, and constructs a critical text from their comparison. For this purpose he lays

down the following rules: (a) That reading is certainly authentic, which is given in the list of mistakes to be corrected, issued by Clement, though it is not contained in any of the three editions, because the list was drawn up by the authority of the Pope himself. (b) That reading is certainly authentic, which is given in all three editions, unless it is clearly a printer's blunder. This rule has been neglected by all editors of the Vulgate. (c) That reading is clearly authentic, which is contained in two out of the three editions, unless it is a printer's blunder. (d) A reading, though it is contained in only one edition, is authentic, if the variations in the others are manifestly erroneous, either from undue haste, or carelessness. (e) A reading is authentic which is clearly demanded by the context, even if it is not actually contained in any edition. For instance, in all three editions it is said that Deborah was buried *above* an oak, instead of *under* an oak (*super* for *subter*), Gen. 35:8.

Dr. Hetzenauer has included a good deal of additional matter which had been omitted by Cardinal Vercellone and other editors, e. g., the list of quotations, the interpretation of names, and the biblical concordance, which were contained in the first edition, but omitted in the two later ones; he has reprinted the marginal references, and various prefaces contained in the later editions but omitted in the first. At the end of the volume he gives a list of all the variations in the three editions of the Clementine Vulgate, as well as those between the Sixtine and Clementine Vulgate. The latter amount to about 4,000.

When the art of printing was invented in the fifteenth century, the current form of the Scriptures was a small and handy volume written in two columns, with many contractions, and illuminated with beautiful initial letters. Such MSS are common in most of our great libraries. But the text had become very corrupt. No great revision had been attempted since the time of Alcuin and Theodulf. The common type, known as the Exemplar Parisiense, was hastily and unscientifically prepared, and Roger Bacon bitterly complains of it. Various *correctoria* were drawn up, of which the best was the *Correctorium Vaticanum*.

The earliest book that was printed was a Bible at Mentz, and few later books are more beautiful or valuable than the Mazarin Bible. But the earliest editions were only reprints of the current text of the time. The first printed Bible of any critical value was published in 1502 by Frobenius at Basel. He was a learned man and employed scholars like Erasmus and Oecolampadius among his correctors for the press. In 1514 Cardinal Ximenes published the Vulgate in his Complutensian Polyglot at Alcala. Among the authorities he used were some Spanish MSS of the ninth or

tenth century which he had collected, and are now preserved in the University of Madrid. Next followed the first edition of the Vulgate Bible by Robert Stephens in 1528. He collated the best MSS he could find for the purpose. He used seventeen for the edition of 1540, some of which have been identified. In 1547 Hentenius of Louvain improved upon Stephens' text by a new revision based on thirty-one MSS.

Meanwhile the Council of Trent at their fourth session on April 8, 1546, had drawn up two decrees. In the first it enumerated the books in the canon of the Old and New Testament. In the second it declared that that old Vulgate edition itself, which by long use of many centuries had approved itself to the church, should be chosen from all the Latin editions of the Holy Scriptures which were in circulation, and in public readings, disputations, preachings, and expositions, should be regarded as authentic; and that hereafter the Holy Scriptures, but especially that old Vulgate edition, should be printed as accurately as possible. Professor Hetzenauer gives two illustrations of a MS of a Bible of the thirteenth century, which belonged at the time to the Bishop of Trent, and may have been used at the council. It is now preserved in the public library there.

But it was many years before the Vatican took any steps to publish an authorized edition of the Vulgate. Pope succeeded pope. MSS were collected from all parts of Europe, commissions were appointed, but still nothing was done. At length Sixtus V, who was himself a scholar, set to work to produce an authentic text. He had felt, he says, from his first accession to the papal throne great grief or even indignation that the Tridentine decree was yet unsatisfied. He appointed a board to carry out the work with Cardinal Carafa at its head, but he himself took a prominent part in the labor of examining the MSS, determining the reading, correcting the proofs. Corrections were printed on little pieces of paper pasted over the mistakes in the text. The long-promised Authentic Edition appeared in 1590. The title-page bore the inscription: "Biblia sacra Vulgatae Editionis Tribus Tomis Distincta Romae ex typographia apostolica Vaticana MDXC;" on a second page was printed "Biblia Sacra Vulgatae Editionis ad Concilii Tridentini praescriptum emendata et a Sixto V P. M. recognita et approbata."

Accompanying the edition was a papal bull, "Aeternus ille." It declared the text to be true, lawful, authentic, and unquestioned in all public and private discussion, reading, preaching, and explanation; no future edition was to be published without the express permission of the Apostolic See, nor was anyone to print a private or independent text himself; nor was the Sixtine edition for the next ten years to be printed any-

where else than in the Vatican; after that time editions might be printed elsewhere but must be carefully collated with the Sixtine edition; not even the smallest particle might be added, changed, or omitted; no variant readings, scholia, or glosses were to be printed in the margin; disobedience was to be punished with the greater excommunication.

But the Sixtine edition met with a great deal of opposition. Clergy and people clung to the unrevised texts with which they were familiar. They resented the order that all missals, breviaries, etc., should be corrected by the Sixtine text. A new system of division into verses caused much confusion (e. g., *Matt.*, chap. 1, contains 46 verses; *Mark*, chap. 1, 37; *Luke*, chap. 1, 58; *John*, chap. 1, 42). Above all Bellarmine was much opposed to the edition. Sixtus had placed one of his books on the index. He persuaded Gregory XIV that the Sixtine Edition was full of mistakes which he suggested were due to printers' blunders and that Sixtus had determined to recall it, had he not been prevented by death. Examination, however, shows that there were very few typographical blunders. A commission was appointed under Cardinal Colonna to revise the Sixtine Edition. All copies that could be obtained were recalled, so that a Sixtine Vulgate is now extremely rare. In 1592 Clement VIII became pope and he intrusted the revision of the text to Franciscus Toletus. A new edition was printed in 1592. It still bore the name of Sixtus on the title-page: "Biblia Sacra Vulgatae Editionis Romae ex typographia apostolica Vaticana MDXCII." On the next page the title is "Biblia Sacra Vulgatae Editionis Sixti Quinti Pont. Max. Iussu recognita atque edita." A preface was written by Bellarmine in which he claims that though because of human weakness it was not absolutely free from error, yet it was more correct than any previous edition.

A second edition was published in 1593 and a third in 1598. Dr. Hetzenauer gives a collation of the three editions, showing all the differences in punctuation and type as well as in reading. There were lists of corrections added in all three editions, but they are not complete. Cardinal Vercellone considered the first edition of 1592 the best. It is certainly printed on the best paper and in the most beautiful type. But the work was hastily done; the edition was corrected in nineteen days and the edition published in less than four months. Dr. Hetzenauer considers the second edition of 1593 the best; the mistakes of the previous edition are corrected, and there are fewer printers' errors. The third edition of 1598, though many regard it as the most accurate, contains a large number of printers' blunders. Hetzenauer enumerates 87. It now remains to inquire (1) into the relative value of the three editions of the Clementine Vulgate; (2) into the relative value of the Sixtine and Clementine texts; (3) into the general worth of these editions as representing the text made by Jerome.

1. We have examined the various readings of the three Clementine editions in the gospel and the Book of Acts. Leaving out differences of punctuation, type, accents, and manifest blunders, we find that the first edition agrees with the Bishop of Salisbury's Vulgate 45 times, the second edition 41 times, the third edition 26 times. The variations are generally supported by MS evidence, and are not mere errors of the press.

2. There is no doubt that the Clementine Vulgate is a great improvement on the Sixtine. The latter seems to have been based mainly on the edition of the Vulgate published by Robert Stephens in Paris. He gives a list of 17 MSS and three printed editions which he used. Of these 17 MSS, five were in the great library of St. Germain des Prez; two more came from St. Denis; others were from St. Victor, from St. Taurinus, and from Soissons. Of these the St. Germain's MSS are clearly identified. "Germanum oblongum" is now Paris Lat. 11504-5 (Bible, ix cent.); "Germ. latum," Par. Lat. 11553 (second half of a Bible, ix); "Germ. parvum," Par. Lat. 11937 (Gen-Psalms, ix-x); "Germ. aureum," Par. Lat. 11955 (Matt., Mark, vii); and "Germ. argenteum," Par. Lat. 11947 (Psalter, vi). Stephens also used the Sorbonne Correctorium. Other readings he obtained indirectly through Erasmus' Annotations from Bruges, Constance, Turnhout, St. Paul's, London, etc. He made use also of the Mentz Bible, Froben's edition, and the Complutensian Polyglot.

The commission appointed by Sixtus V used the edition of Hentenius as well, and there is a copy in existence in which its president, Cardinal Carafa, entered the various readings in the margin. The MSS Amiatinus, Gothicus, and Legionensis, and a very old and carefully corrected Greek MS in the Vatican are cited. Where the two editions vary, the Sixtine agrees with the editions of Robert Stephens, and the Clementine with that of Hentenius.

We have examined 363 readings in the gospels and in Acts, and have found that the Sixtine Vulgate agrees with Stephens' edition 220 times, and Hentenius 52, while the Clementine agrees with Stephens 32 and Hentenius 300. The Sixtine adopts the readings of Cardinal Carafa in 112 cases, and the Clementine in 33. So the Clementine Vulgate abandoned many of the variations which Cardinal Carafa made in Hentenius' edition. We have further compared the readings with the Bishop of Salisbury's edition of the Vulgate, and we find that the Clementine Vulgate agrees with his text 304 times, while the Sixtine agrees only 48 times. The following are a few of the interpolations which the Clementine Vulgate has omitted:

Matt. 7:1: nolite condemnare & non condemnabimini.

Matt. 24:41: Duo in lecto, unus assumetur & unus relinquetur.

Mark 2:1: [dies] octo.

Mark 5:11: [pascens] in agris.

Luke 11:2: Fiat voluntas tua, sicut in cœlo, & in terra.

Luke 18:7: [pascentem] boues.

John 6:13: [ordeaciis,] & duobus piscibus.

Acts 7:55: [dextris] virtutis.

Acts 14:6: & commota est multitudo in doctrina eorum. Paulus autem & Barnabas morabantur Lystris.

Acts 24:18: & apprehenderunt me clamantes, & dicentes: tolle inimicum nostrum.

3. The worth of these editions as representing the text made by St. Jerome. The Council of Trent had ordered that the text of the Vulgate of Jerome, which had become very corrupt, should be printed with great accuracy; and it is claimed in the preface of Bellarmine that great pains were taken to make the edition as correct as possible. The chief source of corruption was the substitution of readings from earlier translations for the text of St. Jerome. We have no MSS earlier than the sixth century. Those written in Italy would probably be the best. Some Italian MSS were brought over to Northumbria by Benedict Biscop and Ceolfrid, and several copies made from them are still extant. They are the purest texts in existence. The Irish scribes on the other hand freely corrected the text by earlier translations, and also by Greek MSS. The Spanish scribes did the same, but not to so great an extent. At the beginning of the ninth century two recensions were made, one by Alcuin, in Tours, the other by Theodulf in Orleans. From this time the differences of reading were not so strongly marked in the MSS of the different countries, and many of the old readings, some good and some bad, died out. In course of time, however, fresh corruptions crept in. How did the editions of Sixtus and Clement do the work of purifying the text? Let us see.

The Bishop of Salisbury is now engaged in printing the text of the Vulgate from the best of the earliest MSS. For the gospels he has selected thirty varying in date between the sixth and ninth centuries. One MS (W) from Malmesbury Abbey, of the thirteenth century, is chosen as a specimen of the mediaeval text. We have compared his edition with the Clementine Vulgate in Luke, chap. 11. Omitting differences of spelling, we have found 34 places in which they vary. This is about the average number of variations. We have compared also the MSS in the British Museum earlier than the thirteenth century. These we have arranged in chronological order, and the following apparatus criticus will show how

some readings came into existence and others died out between the sixth and thirteenth centuries. We have only taken account of the writing of the original scribe. Vg=the reading of Stephens, Hentenius, Sixtine, and Clementine Vulgate, where they all agree. We have given the Greek authority for the various readings and the old Latin MSS which agree with them.

- (1) xi. 1: quodam loco Vg. OL (*a b i l q r*), ix (E), xii (*Add 27926*).
 >loco quodam *Gr. Vulg. rel.*
- (2) xi. 1: docuit & Ioannes (Hent. Sixt. Clem.). xii (*Harl. 1802*).
 et iohannes docuit *Gr. fere omn* OL (*de ff₂*), vi (FMP), vii (X), viii (AQY *Reg. iB vii. Harl. 2788*), ix (H. Brit. Mus. 5 MSS), x (*Brit. Mus. 2*), xi (Brit. Mus. 5), xii (Brit. Mus. 5).
 iohannes docuit (*om et*) (Ste.) *Gr. N^oA. 1. 12. 69*), OL (*a b c f i l q r δ a u r*), vii (JOZ *Reg. iE vi*), viii (BT *ept Add 5463*), ix (CDEGΘKR *mt Brit. Mus. 6*), x (Brit. Mus. 5), xi (Brit. Mus. 3), xii (Brit. Mus. 6), xiii (W).
- (3) xi. 3: hodie Vg. *Gr. D aliq* OL (*a b c e f f₂ i l r*), vii (JOXZ), viii (QT *ept*), ix (DEGR *Add 9381*), x (Brit. Mus. 3), xi (Brit. Mus. 2), xii (Brit. Mus. 4).
 quotidie (Hent. marg.), *Gr. pl.* OL (*q*), vi (MP), vii (*Reg. iE vi*), viii (ABY *Add 5463 Harl. 2788*), ix (CHΘKV *mt Brit. Mus. 10*), x (Brit. Mus. 4), xi (Brit. Mus. 6), xii (Brit. Mus. 9), xiii (W).
- (4) xi. 8: Et si ille perseuerauerit pulsans Vg., xii (*Add 14813*), xiii (W).
 et ille si perseuerauerit pulsans OL (*c f₂ i l m r a u r*), vii (OXZ), viii (AQT *Add 5463 Harl. 2788*), ix (CΘKRV *mt Brit. Mus. 11*), x (Brit. Mus. 6), xi (Brit. Mus. 8), xii (Brit. Mus. 10).
 et ille perseuerauerit pulsans (*om si*), ix (DE), x (*Add 21921*), xii (*Harl. 1802*).
om. Gr. OL (*b d f g δ*), vi (FMP), vii (J. *Reg. iE vi*), (viii BY *ept Reg. iB vii*), ix (G), xii (*Harl. 1023*).
- (5) xi. 8: quotquot Vg. OL (*c δ a u r*), vi (M), vii (JCZ *Reg. iEvi*), viii (BQT *ept Add 5463 Harl. 2788*), ix (CDEKRV *Brit. Mus. 11*), x (Brit. Mus. 7), xi (Brit. Mus. 8), xii (Brit. Mus. 13), xiii (W).
 quot *Gr. (δωω)* N'ABC, etc., vi (FP), vii (X), viii (A), ix (Θ).
 quod *Gr. (δωω)*, N'DEFL, etc., viii (Y *Reg. iB vii*), ix (G).
 quantos OL (*a b f i l m q (ff₂) (d r)*) ix (*mt*).
- (6) xi. 9: dico uobis Vg. OL (*d f ff₂*), ix (EH), xii (*Harl. 1802 Harl. 1023. Harl. 2799*).
 >uobis dico *Gr. Vulg. rel.*
- (7) xi. 11: aut Vg. OL (*d δ*), vi (M), vii (JOXZ *Reg. iE vi*), viii (BQT *ept Add 5463 Harl. 2788*), ix (CGHΘ *Brit. Mus. 5*), x (Brit. Mus. 4) xi (Brit. Mus. 7), xii (Brit. Mus. 13), xiii (W).
 aut si OL (*a b c f r a u r*), vi (FP), viii (AY *Reg. iB vii*), ix (DEKRV *mt Brit. Mus. 4*), x (Brit. Mus. 3), xi (*Reg. iD iii*).
- (8) xi. 17: desolabitur Vg. OL (*c f₂ l δ a u r*), vi (P), vii (JX), viii (Q *ept Harl.*

- 2788), ix (DEGHØKRV *mt* Brit. Mus. 9), x (Mus. 6), xii (Brit. Mus. 11), xiii (W).
- desolatur (Hent. marg.) *Gr.* OL (*b f i q r*), vi (Fñ viii (ABTY *Add* 5463 *Reg.* iB vii), ix (C. Brit. 2), xi (Brit. Mus. 2), xii (*Harl.* 2799).
- (9) xi. 18: eius Vg. OL (*b c d f i q r*), viii (Y *Add* 546 x (Brit. Mus. 2), xi (Brit. Mus. 3), xii (Brit. Mus. ipsius OL (*ff*), vi (MP), vii (JOXZ *Reg.* iE vi 2788), ix (CDGHØKV *mt.* Brit. Mus. 11), x (Mus. 5), xii (Brit. Mus. 10), xiii (W).
- (10) xi. 18: me elicere Vg. xii (*Add* 15459).
 >eicere me *Gr. fere omn.* OL (*a, d f*), vi (MP), (ABQTY *ept Reg.* iB vii *Harl.* 2788), ix (CEC 9), x (Brit. Mus. 6), xi (Brit. Mus. 8), xii (Brit. M om me *Gr.* F 69. OL (*c*), vii (O), viii (*Add* 5463), ix (x (*Reg.* iA xviii).
- (11) xi. 20: peruenit Vg. OL (*c l ð aur*), vi (FMP), *mt* Brit. Mus. 10), x (Brit. Mus. 7), xi (Brit. Mu xiii (W).
 praeuenit *Gr.* OL (*b f q r*), vii (Z *Reg.* iE vi), viii *Reg.* iB vii *Harl.* 2788), ix (CEHR *Harl.* 2795).
- (12) xi. 22: eo Vg. illo *omn.*
- (13) xi. 23: contra Vg. OL (*d r ð*), ix (D). aduersum V
- (14) xi. 24: ambulat (Ste. Sixt. Clem.). OL (*b f*), vi (2821), xi (Brit. Mus. 3), xii (Brit. Mus. 5), xiii (perambulat (Hent.) *Gr.* OL (*c ff, q r*), vi (M), v (ABQY *ept Add* 5463 *Harl.* 2788), ix (CEGHØK Mus. 4), xi (Brit. Mus. 4), xii (Brit. Mus. 8).
 ambulabat, xi (*Burn.* 41).
 perambulabat, vii (X), viii (T *Reg.* iB vii), ix (RV),
- (15) xi. 25: [inuenit] eam (Ste. Sixt. Clem.). OL (*b c ff, om eam* (Hent.) *Gr.* OL (*a, d e f q*), *Vulg. rel.*
- (16) xi. 25: [mundatam] & ornatam (Hent. Sixt. Cle (*a, b ff, i q r ð (d) (l)*), ix (ER), x (Brit. Mus. xii (Brit. Mus. 1) xiii (W) *cor vat.*
 om et ornatam (Ste.) *Gr.* 225. *Vulg. rel.*
- (17) xi. 26: Tunc Vg. *Gr.* OL (*a, e f q r ð*), ix (D), xii (E et tunc OL (*b ff, i*), *Vulg. rel.*
 et iterum vii (*Reg.* iE vi).
 et (*om tunc*) OL (*c*), xi (*Harl.* 2831).
- (18) xi. 26: [spiritus] secum (Ste. Sixt. Clem.).
 [adsumit] secum *Gr.* ^{corr}CX 33.69, OL (*tr*), ix (om secum (Hent.) *Gr. rel. Vulg. rel.*

- (19) xi. 26: *sunt* Vg. Gr. OL (*a a, d e r (b f f, i q)*), vi (P), ix (DER *mt*), xi (Add 15304).
sunt OL (*c d a u r*) cor vat *Vulg. rel.*
- (20) xi. 28: *Quin immo* Vg. OL (*ð*), vii (JZ), viii (B *Harl.* 2788), ix (KV. Brit. Mus. 11), x (Brit. Mus. 6), xi (Brit. Mus. 7), xii (Brit. Mus. 13), xiii (W).
quippini, vi (MP), vii (OX *Reg.* iE vi), viii (AY *ept Reg.* iB vii), ix (Θ).
quippe enim, vi (F).
quippe, x (*Reg.* iA viii), xi (*Reg.* iD iii).
immo, OL (*cer*), viii (Q Add 5463), ix (DGHR).
manifestissime, viii (T), ix (C).
om OL (*a a, b f f, i q*), ix (E).
- (21) xi. 28: *custodiunt illud*, Vg. Gr. ΧΓΑΠ, etc., ix (HΘKV Brit. Mus. 10), x (Brit. Mus. 6), xi (Brit. Mus. 6), xii (Brit. Mus. 10), xiii (W).
om illud Gr. Ν^aABCDLΔΞ OL, vi (MP), vii (JOXZ *Reg.* iE vi), viii (ABQTY *ept Add* 5463 *Reg.* iB vii *Harl.* 2788), ix (CDEGR *mt. Harl.* 2795), x (*Reg.* iA xviii), xi (*Harl.* 2830), xii (Brit. Mus. 3).
- (22) xi. 29: *ei* Vg. OL (*a d f*), ix (DGR Add 9381), xi (Brit. Mus. 2), xii (Brit. Mus. 5).
illi OL *rel. Vulg. rel.*
- (23) xi. 29: [Ionæ] *prophetæ* (Hent. Sixt. Clem.) Gr. ACXΓΔΑΠ, etc., OL (*e f q r ð*), ix (R), xiii (W) cor vat.
om prophetæ (Ste.) Gr. ΝBDLΞ. OL (*a b c f f, i*) *Vulg. rel.*
- (24) xi. 30: *fuit Ionas* Vg. Gr. OL, ix (D *mt Eg.* 768), x (Brit. Mus. 2), xi (Brit. Mus. 2), xii (Brit. Mus. 5), xiii (W).
 > *ionas fuit*, vi (MP), vii (JOXZ *Reg.* iE vi), viii (ABQTY *ept Add* 5463 *Reg.* iB vii *Harl.* 2788), ix (CGHΘKV Brit. Mus. 6), x (Brit. Mus. 3), xi (Brit. Mus. 5), xii (Brit. Mus. 7).
 > *fuit sicut*, ix (*Harl.* 2797 *Eg.* 873 *Coll. Tib.* A ii), x (*Reg.* iE viii).
 > *signum fuit*, ix (ER), x (*Reg.* iA xviii), xi (*Reg.* iD iii).
- (25) xi. 31: *plus quam Salomon* Vg. OL (*b d q r*), vi (P), vii (*Reg.* iE vi), viii (T), ix (EΘ Brit. Mus. 2), xi (Brit. Mus. 2), xii (Brit. Mus. 2), xiii (W).
plus salomone OL (*a e (f f, i ð a u r)*), vi (M), vii (JOX), viii (ABQY *ept Add* 5463 *Reg.* iB vii *Harl.* 2788), ix (CDGHKRV Brit. Mus. 7), x (Brit. Mus. 4), xi (Brit. Mus. 5), xii (Brit. Mus. 11).
plus quam salomone OL (*c f*), vii (Z), ix (*mt Harl.* 2790, *Harl.* 2797), x (*Harl.* 2821), xi (*Burn.* 41).
- (26) xi. 32: *plus quam Iona* Vg. OL (*b*), xiii (W).
plus iona OL (*e f f, i ð*), vi (M), vii (J), viii (AQY *ept Reg.* iB vii), ix (CDGR Brit. Mus. 6), xi (Brit. Mus. 4), xii (Brit. Mus. 8).
plus quam iona OL (*a (c) f q r*), vi (P), vii (OXZ *Reg.* iE vi), viii (BT Add 5463 *Harl.* 2788), ix (EHΘKV *mt* Brit. Mus. 5), x (Brit. Mus. 7), xi (Brit. Mus. 4), xii (Brit. Mus. 5).
- (27) xi. 44: *apparent* (Hent. Sixt. Clem.) OL (*i q a u r*), vi (P), vii (XZ *Reg.* iE vi),

- viii (*Add 5463*), ix (Brit. Mus. 4), x (Brit. Mus. 2), xi (Brit. Mus. 5), xii (Brit. Mus. 6), xiii (W) *cor vat mg.*
- parent (Ste.) OL (*b e f f a r*), vi (M), vii (JO), viii (AQTY *ept Reg. iB vii Harl. 2788*), ix (CDEGHΘKRV *mt Brit. Mus. 7*), x (Brit. Mus. 5), xi (Brit. Mus. 4), xii (Brit. Mus. 7).
- (28) xi. 45: *contumeliam nobis Vg.*
 > *nobis contumeliam, Gr. OL Vulg.*
- (29) xi. 46: *portare Vg. OL (b q aur), vii (O), viii (Add 5463), ix (H Add 11849 Harl. 2823), x (Harl. 2821), xii (Add 15459).*
portari (Hent. marg.) Gr. OL (d f i l), Vulg. rel.
- (30) xi. 48: *ipsi quidem Vg. Gr. OL (d i r c δ (a b f q)), ix (mt).*
 > *quidem ipsi OL (c) Vulg. rel.*
- (31) xi. 53: *Cum autem Vg. Gr. ΑΧΓΑΠ etc., OL ((c e) (a d)), ix (Harl. 2797).*
om autem Gr. D al pauc OL (b f i q r), Vulg. rel.
- (32) xi. 54: *insidiantes ei Vg. Gr. ΑΒCΛΔΔΠ, etc., OL (θ), Vulg. rel.*
om ei Gr. ΝΧ 130, OL (aur), vi (M), vii (X), viii (AY Add 5463), ix (DEGHΘV Harl. 2790).
- (33) xi. 54: *aliquid capere Vg. Gr. (KII al., ix (DE mt), xii (Add 17738 Harl. 2799)).*
 > *capere aliquid Gr. pl. OL (f) Vulg. rel.*
capere aliquid capere, xi (Burn. 41), xii (Harl. 2834).
- (34) xi. 54: *de, xii (Harl. 4773).*
ex OL Vulg. rel.

From the above it will be seen that, except in vss. 11, 20, and 54, there is very little support for the readings in the Clementine Vulgate earlier than the ninth century. Eleven have the support of all or some Greek MSS, sixteen others are found in Old Latin versions. Eight are corruptions which we cannot trace earlier than the twelfth century.

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RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

EERDMANS' *KOMPOSITION DER GENESIS*¹

This latest study of the Old Testament problem will certainly arouse interest. The chief attacks on the dominant critical position have hitherto been delivered from without the citadel. Here we have an assault from within. The author is professor of Semitic Languages and Literature in the theological faculty of Kuenen's old university. A personal student of the master's, and himself for several years a "firmly-convinced" upholder and exponent of his views, he has been led through doubts and uncertainties as to various results of the accepted hypothesis into a position of uncompromising hostility. In this change of view, moreover, he has been influenced by no regard for traditional orthodoxy. His standpoint is purely critical, and his guiding *motif* yet more radical than that of the position he now assails. He fully recognizes the presence of discordant elements in the historical books of the Bible. These he too can only explain by the hypothesis of redaction of earlier "sources." It seems to Eerdmans, however, that the current analysis into Jahvistic, Elohist, and priestly documents rests on no real basis of fact. He claims to have discovered a better way. In an article in the *Theol. Tijdschrift*, published as early as 1894, he observed that in the "Book of the Covenant" the divine name Elohim cannot refer to the God of Israel, but must be treated as plural. At the time, he says, he failed to carry out his discovery to its legitimate conclusions. But since then it has become clear to him that "polytheism is found not only in the Book of the Covenant, but in the narratives of Genesis as well," that "that book also contains legends which use the word Elohim for a plurality of gods, and regard Jahve as one of these gods" (p. iv). The recognition of this fact gives Eerdmans his key to the solution of the problem. In his view, the different strata of the Hexateuch are to be arranged according to the transition from the original polytheism which underlies the oldest elements to the fully developed monotheism which colors the later exilic redaction of the text. Eerdmans proposes to establish his position in a series of "Old Testament Studies." The present treatise is the first of the series. This will be followed by a con-

¹ *Alttestamentliche Studien*. Von B. D. Eerdmans, ord. Professor der Theologie in Leiden. I. "Die Komposition der Genesis." Giessen: Töpelmann, 1908. viii + 95 pages. M. 2.60.

structive study of the "early traditions of Israel" view. The remaining literature will be dealt with in

Whatever our verdict regarding Eerdmans' con- no question of his courage. He boldly attacks the strongest point. Critics are still at variance regard- respective documents, and the exact analysis of J's existence and compass of the Priestly Document (I of one mind. Eerdmans joins issue here with the To him there is no such thing as "the so-called priestly document, beginning with Gen., chap. 1" (p. 2), such unanimity have given consent. And the first devoted to the traversing of this ground.

By way of preliminary skirmishing, a number of which seem to Eerdmans to cast grave doubt on the (pp. 2 ff.). The field is thus cleared for the attack. Eerdmans' method is to discuss each separate section critics have assigned to P, with the object of ascertaining actually form part of a consecutive narrative of the character currently ascribed to the document in question well illustrated in the treatment of the first passage. According to the accepted critical view, this section is parallel to the Jahvistic narrative in vss. 1-4a. Eerdmans' view of this. He admits, indeed, that vs. 5 simply repeats what is stated in vs. 4a. But there is no occasion to attribute the use of different "sources." We have here but the "prolixity" of Hebrew style. The difficulties, however, are smoothed over by this "smoothing over" process. Eerdmans' criticism is offended by the chronological note in vs. 4b, which states that she was 65 years old when her "youthful beauty" so fascinated him. He regards this half-verse, therefore, as "the work of the older tradition with chronological notes" (pp. 9 ff.). His method, in the first instance, through the patriarchal finds that the "P" passages here are not isolated elements but a complete and self-consistent document, as the critical view either instances of prolixity, or explanatory glosses were inserted way into the body of the text, or later notes of a scribal nature. His more method and order into the plastic deposits of tradition. His explanation is held sufficient to cover such passages as Gen. 12a; 16:1a, 3, 15, etc. On the other hand, 19:29 (cf. pp. 11 ff.). It is more interesting, however, to

"scribal" elements accumulate. To this source are attributed, not merely the chronological notices which prove such a stumbling-block to the historical conscience (e. g., 12:4b; 16:16; 17:1; 21:5; 23:1; 25:7 ff.), but the framework of the book in general, including the "Toledoth" formulae. But these are not the only parts of Genesis which are assigned to post-exilic times. The four cognate sections which relate to the covenant with "El Shaddai" (chap. 17; 28:3 f.; 35:9-15; 48:3-6) are held from their free universalistic tone to belong to an age still later than the accepted date of P. According to Eerdmans, the age of Ezra and Nehemiah was too "exclusive" in its spirit to admit the idea of an "eternal covenant" which embraced not only Ishmael, but even slaves of foreign descent (cf. 17:26 f.). These sections are therefore assigned to the fourth century B. C. (pp. 13 ff.).

The weakness of Eerdmans' method lies in its very rigor. By viewing each passage in isolation, he loses sight of the whole. It may be quite possible to explain away separate passages by the hypothesis of "prolixity" or glossing or later annotation. But the problem still remains unsolved. However we explain the fact, a distinct unity of style and tone pervades the sections at present under review. A really scientific treatment of the problem must do justice to this. Eerdmans offers us, indeed, a few remarks on the literary and religious characteristics of individual passages; but we miss the broad, reasoned survey which the subject demands. Had more regard been shown to literary considerations, it seems hardly possible that Eerdmans would have separated the chronological notices, as he does, from their context. In so doing, he really reduces his "redactional" hypothesis *ad absurdum*. The introduction of such notices into a formal and systematic document like the critics' P, which passes entirely over the popular traditions of Sarah and her fascinating beauty, is perfectly in keeping. The appearance of these elements, side by side with the older traditions, in a "Harmony" such as our present Hexateuch forms, finds analogies in the Arab historians, or the "Diatessaron" of Tatian. But that a later scribe should have inserted these notices into the body of the text, thus deliberately creating the incongruities which Eerdmans is candid enough to acknowledge, does appear to us inconceivable.

If the elements which Eerdmans treats in isolation can thus be shown to be parts of a larger whole, we have really returned to the position he assails. If the chronological notices are post-exilic, the context as a whole must be post-exilic. There seems no real ground for bringing the "covenant" sections down to a later date. The age of Ezra and Nehemiah was by no means so "exclusive" as Eerdmans assumes. The third part

of Isaiah, which gives such characteristic expression to the feelings and hopes of the Judaism of that time, extends the blessings of the "covenant" freely to the "sons of the stranger," and even the eunuchs, who keep the Lord's sabbath, and restrain their hands from evil (cf. Isa. 56:3 ff.). The spirit of these sections thus appears in perfect harmony with the more liberal outlook of the age.

In the same way Eerdmans attempts to break down the unity of the "priestly" elements in Gen., chaps. 1-11. Here too we find the framework isolated from its context (e. g., 2:4a; 5:1; 6:9), and the annotations of the post-exilic scribe with which we are already so familiar (cf. 5:3 ff.; 7:6; 9:28 f.). But still other fragments appear. "Gen. 5:1 is not the continuation of 1-2:4, but marks a new beginning. Gen. 11:10 ff. stands as an independent whole opposed to Gen., chap. 10. In 10:22 Arpachshad is the third son of Shem, in 11:10 he is the eldest. The Toledoth of the sons of Noah and the Toledoth of Shem cannot be parts of the same document, since the Toledoth of Shem have already appeared in 10:22, and therefore no reason exists for repeating them" (p. 28). Even granting the justice of Eerdmans' criticism, it seems too summary a procedure to deny forthwith the existence of P. The present reviewer has dealt with the difficulty, and suggested that in chaps. 5 and 11:10 ff. P has incorporated an earlier "Book of the Generations of Adam" (cf. *Early Traditions of Genesis*, pp. 31 f.). This simple suggestion would meet all the objections urged by Eerdmans. It is certainly more scientific to seek for some such explanation of difficulties than to present us with an absolute *impasse*.

In the story of the flood, Eerdmans comes into closer touch with the critical position. He frankly recognizes the presence here of two independent accounts. His analysis of the respective sources, too, is practically identical with that of modern critics. But even here he seeks to eliminate P. The account currently attributed to him is really pre-exilic: (1) because of the presence of older elements like "the primeval myth of the rainbow, the tradition of the cessation of the time of peace, the covenant with the animals, the names of Ararat, the ark (תִּבְרָת) and the flood (מַבּוּל);" (2) because of the polytheistic background, which appears in 6:9; 6:13 (reading וְהָיָה מִשְׁחִיתָם, "and behold, we, i. e., the gods, destroy the earth") and 9:16 (regarding the covenant as one between "the gods" and men); and (3) because of the dating in terms of the "sun-year," which Eerdmans assumes to be the purely pre-exilic practice (pp. 28 ff.). We cannot admit the force of any one of these contentions. The first would be valid only if P were supposed to spin his tale out of his own self-consciousness. But every serious critic recognizes that P had older

documents before him, among others the Jahvistic narrative, from which such early elements as the names for ark and flood were derived. We fail, too, to find real traces of polytheism in the texts cited by Eerdmans. The first is but a technical expression for living a devout life, met with again in 5:24, where אֱלֹהִים appears with the singular verb. To support Eerdmans' view, the two following texts demand emendations which carry no conviction to our mind. The third argument for the pre-exilic date of this narrative appears equally groundless. It is somewhat difficult to decide whether the writer meant to represent the primeval year as "sun-year" or "moon-year." In either case, the former belongs to the late and early periods alike. The change effected through Babylonian influence in the exilic age was not (as Eerdmans affirms) from sun- to moon-year, but from an autumn to a spring New-year's day (cf. Benzinger, *Hebr. Archäologie*, pp. 198 ff.).

We have dealt in such detail with Eerdmans' treatment of the "priestly" element in Genesis because this is really the key to the whole position. If this be found to be no mere collection of *dissecta membra*, of varied origin and character, but a self-consistent narrative, distinguished by certain definite literary and religious characteristics which mark it off from the rest of the book, Eerdmans' attack fails all along the line.

In his examination of the remaining elements in Genesis, Eerdmans' own position comes to view. He will as little allow a separation of these elements into "Jahvistic" and "Elohistic" narratives as the unifying of the former *membra* into a "priestly document" (pp. 33 ff.). Instead, he directs attention to certain passages where אֱלֹהִים is followed in MT by a plural verb (20:13; 31:53; 35:7). These he regards as but instances of many more which have now received a monotheistic "overworking." The bulk of the narratives hitherto ascribed to E and P are thus swept together into one and the same net. Further, by following the LXX in various other instances where $\delta \theta\epsilon\acute{o}s$ takes the place of אֱלֹהִים, Eerdmans is able to include several "Jahvistic" sections with the rest. The *Grundstock* of Genesis is thus found to consist of a heterogeneous mass of traditions, originally bearing the polytheistic stamp, though this has become obscured by later editing, and in many instances by later glosses and annotations. According to Eerdmans, the collection embraces the patriarchal line (5:1-32), the so-called "priestly" account of the Flood in chaps. 6-8, the covenant with Noah (9:17), the family trees of Shem and Terah (11:10-32), the history of Abraham (chap. 12; 13:1-13, 18; 15:7-12, 17-21; chap. 23; 25:7-11), that of Isaac (25:19-34; chap. 27; 28:11-22; 32:4-23; 33:1-17; 35:1-8, 16-20, 23-29), Esau (36:1-14),

and Jacob (37:2, 25-27, 28b, 34, 35; chaps. 40, 41, 47:6-12, 28; 49:1a, 29-33; 50:12 f.). This was parallel cycle of traditions relating to the adventures designated by Eerdmans the "Israel-recension," from the patriarch (26:34 f.; 27:26; 28:1-9; chaps. 24-33; 35:21 f.; 37:3-24, 28a, 29-33, 36; chaps. 2a, 28-34; 47:1-5 (LXX), 13-27, 29-31; 48:1, 2b, 8). These collections being equally "polytheistic" in contrast to the pre-Deuteronomic period, before monotheistic belief of Israel. The traditions themselves will naturally be of a still earlier age. "In part they go back to a time when Yahweh was not yet the national God of Israel, as 35:1-7 presuppose the early regal period, as 27:29 ff." (pp. 10-11).

A more advanced stage of religious development is seen in the "Jahvistic" narrative of creation (Gen. 2:4b-3:11). This narrative being uniformly bears the name יהוה אלהים. This is explained as the result, either of the final redaction or of the fusion of two original sources (cf. Budde). Eerdmans regards this as an integral element of the text, and finds it to be a transitional stage when polytheism was indeed still in vogue and regarded as "one of the Elohim," assumed the first thought of Israel (cf. pp. 78 ff.). To this cycle of traditions belong the story of Cain and Abel (4:1-26a); the main story of the Nations (chap. 10); the story of Abraham and Isaac (25:1-34 f.; 27:46; 28:1-9); and yet another group of traditions (29:1-32:3; 33:18-34:31; chaps. 38 and 39). The complex of these sections being that of an "early Deuteronomic age" they are brought nearer than the former collections to the Deuteronomic age (cf. pp. 91 ff.).

As the result of the Deuteronomic reform, monotheism was established as the national religion of Israel. The influence of this movement is felt in another cycle of traditions where Yahweh is the only God, though polytheistic "survivals" still remain. This cycle embraces the "Jahvistic" story of Noah and the flood (1:1-9); the tower of Babel (11:1-9); and traditions of Abraham (12:1-20, 16, 18; 19:1-29, and chap. 26). According to Eerdmans "the monotheistic over-working of polytheistic legends and holds must have been effected "in monotheistic circles" during the movement (pp. 89 ff.). Finally, we have a cycle of traditions in which every trace of polytheism has disappeared. To this

record of creation (chap. 1), with its sequel (9:1-8); one version of the covenant with Abraham (15:1-6), the story of Sarah and Abimelech (chap. 20), and probably also the idyll of Rebekah (chap. 24), besides the later "priestly" sections with which we have already dealt (chap. 17, etc.).

Eerdmans does not deceive himself that his revolutionary hypothesis will forthwith command assent.¹ He bespeaks, however, a patient study of the problem from this new point of view, and looks hopefully to the future (pp. iv f.). The open-minded student will welcome every serious endeavor after the truth. It seems very questionable, however, whether much progress will be made along the lines laid down by Eerdmans. The accepted critical hypothesis does bring order into hitherto tangled webs. Eerdmans' attempted solution of the problem appears to us to make confusion worse confounded. We have already seen how he separates elements which show unmistakable evidence of literary and religious kinship. He likewise unites elements which lie widely apart. It is difficult for us to understand how a critic with any feeling for literary style, and who on other grounds readily admits the presence of different "Sources," could have classed together in the same cycle of traditions dry and formal genealogical trees like those in Gen., chap. 5 and 11:10 ff., with romantic tales and idylls like the stories of Sarah (12:10 ff.), Jacob (28:10 ff.), and Joseph (37:2 ff.), or, on the other hand, naïve myths and legends like Gen., chaps. 2, 3, and 4:2 ff., with erudite geographical constructions such as the main body of the Table of Nations in chap. 10. But Eerdmans' theological *motif* seems equally misguided. Waiving altogether his assumption of the survival of polytheism in Israel until the Deuteronomic era, his "polytheistic" reading of the narratives of Genesis awakens persistent suspicion. We have already seen the nature of the emendations required in the "priestly" version of the flood. The same strain is put upon our critical feeling in many other places. Thus we are asked to accept without question LXX's δ $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\varsigma$ or $\kappa\acute{\upsilon}\rho\iota\omicron\varsigma$ δ $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\varsigma$ as more accurately representing the original reading than the Mass. יהוה, although it is certainly a more probable assumption that the translators were influenced by the tendency of their age. Or when there is no other evidence for Eerdmans' "polytheistic stage" of Israelite religion than his own assumption, we are told that "the chapter must have been thoroughly worked over in the post-exilic age" (p. 39), or that "the whole account is clear if only we strike out the word Jahve," thus restoring the original "polytheistic complexion of the tradition" (p. 45), or that "the scribes of the later age, which heard no more of the distinction between Jahve and Elohim, when they met with one occurrence of the name Jahve, thoughtlessly wrote Jahve again

in the following verses" (p. 53), and so forth. (The desired passage could be made to bear out the author's development. It is interesting to note that, while the story of the flood is classed among the purely "polytheistic," "Jahvistic," in spite of its naïve anthropomorphic third stage, together with the story of Babel (11:1) a sophisticated student would more readily find traces of the whole treatment, in fact, savors too much of speculation and conviction. The better way is still that of the unjaded school," which judges the literature as literature, and the development follow the texts. All honest work will lead us ever onward to the truth.

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THE MINOR PROPHETS

Of the literature upon the Book of the Twelve that has come to naught but name, this group of prophets has increased in number during the last quarter of a century. The lack of aids to their interpretation; hence every new work of literature must make good its claim to recognition. The works which are to be noticed here are worthy of a place in the canon. Among them they touch the Minor Prophets on every point alike to form, content, origin, and purpose.

Sievers and Guthe put forth an arrangement of the Minor Prophets in accordance with the well-known metrical system. The present study includes the Hebrew text as reconstructed by Sievers and Guthe and metrical analysis of the reconstructed text. The study of the meter and style by Sievers, textual, metrical,

¹ *Amos metrisch bearbeitet.* Von Eduard Sievers und Hermann Guthe. XXIII Bandes der Abhandlungen der philologisch-historischen Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, No. III.] Leipzig, 1908. 91 pages. M. 5.

Ausgewählte poetische Texte des Alten Testaments in ihrer Gliederung zum Gebrauch in Vorlesungen und Seminar-Unterricht. Heft 2. "Amos, Nahum, Habakkuk," herausgegeben von Hermann Guthe. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1908. ix + 25 pages.

La composition du livre d'Habacuc. Par F. Nicolard. Paris: Klincksieck, 1908. 99 pages.

Études bibliques. "Les douze petits Prophètes." Traduit par A. van Hoonacker. Paris: J. Gabalda et Cie., 1908. xxiii.

Sievers and Guthe, and an account of the origin of the Book of Amos by Sievers. That the results do not lack in novelty and daring may be gathered from the fact that the text of Amos is distributed among thirty-six sections and subsections, and that of the 145 verses constituting the book only about 100 verses are allowed to Amos himself, and these have not been left in their original purity. The exigencies of the metrical system are responsible for many of these omissions; e. g., 3:7, 8 are regarded as interpolations solely because the meter here changes to tetrameter in a pentameter context. In 4:1-3, on the other hand, in order to secure alternating lines of eight and four beats respectively, it becomes necessary to suppose the loss of fourteen beats; while in 4:6-12, where alternating lines of eight and three beats are desired, fifty-nine words are dropped, at least thirty-three of them for metrical reasons only. These are typical passages. Only an exceedingly strong metrical theory can carry such heavy burdens. Not only so, but the meter sometimes is made in disregard of the sense, e. g., in 1:3 the phrase *לֹא אֲשִׁיבֶנּוּ* certainly belongs logically with the preceding line rather than with the following; and, again, in 7:1 it is surely impossible to close line 1 with *יִצִיר*, leaving its object *גְּבִי* to open a new line with which it has no close connection. These and many other similar difficulties are due to Sievers' fondness for seven-beat lines, of which he finds 107 in a total of 180 lines of genuine text. Other meters are the hexameter, pentameter, tetrameter, and trimeter.

On the basis of his metrical finding, Sievers ventures a theory as to the origin and history of the prophecies of Amos in book form. Long logically integrated addresses or poems are not to be expected from Amos, a man of the people addressing the people. Short pithy comments on current affairs and conditions are the only utterances possible for such a one. Three main collections of such oracles may be traced in the book, viz., I, twelve heptameters in 1:3-2:2, eight in each of the sections 2:6-8+2:14-16; 5:18-25; 6:1-11; 7:1-6; 7:7, 8+8:1, 2; 9:1-4; II, twelve lines in 2:9-13+3:1, 2, eight lines in each of sections 3:3-8; 3:9-12; 4:1-3, four lines each in 5:1-3 and 5:4-6, and two in 5:14; III, three lines in 4:4, 5, ten lines in 4:6-12, seven in 5:7-13, three in 5:16, 17, five in 8:4-8, eight in 8:9-14+8:3. Each of these original groups was closed by one of the three doxologies; the meter of the second and third groups varies. Group I formed the nucleus for our existing book; into this II was first inserted as a whole, leaving the order of I undisturbed except at the point of its entrance. Then III was inserted into the combined I and II, having first been broken up into three sections and articulated with the composite

work at three different points. Finally this joint product was given homogeneity and polish by an editor who attached glosses, transition passages, and superscriptions wherever necessary to the sense.

A firmer support for such a complicated hypothesis would seem to be required than is afforded by the necessities of a metrical system which is as yet on trial. No other considerations can be adduced demanding such a complete upheaval of current opinions concerning the logical continuity of the Book of Amos. The improbability of the results arrived at upon this metrical basis seems to be good ground for calling in question the system which has produced them. The fact that Sievers and Guthe independently arrived at the same essential results (p. 3) is evidence only of the fact that where the same principles and methods are employed the results attained are necessarily almost identical. With such treatment, the Old Testament writings cease to be finished products and become only raw material from which the artificer may create a new construction according to his own skill and fancy. The place of metrics in textual and literary criticism is only subordinate and supplementary to other more objective disciplines; it can never assume the leading rôle with safety.

Staerk's metrical and strophic arrangement of the text of Amos, Nahum, and Habakkuk furnishes good opportunity for comparison with the results of Sievers and Guthe. Declaring himself a disciple of Sievers, he yet deplores the fact that the latter did not have better guidance in the application of his metrical system to the text of Amos. Staerk's preface is devoted to an attack upon Beer, the purpose of which is to clear himself of certain aspersions upon his ability as a metricist made by the latter in a review of Heft I of this series of selected poetical texts. Beer can scarcely be said to have gained anything by the encounter.

While accepting Sievers' views as to the metrical bases of feet and lines, Staerk differs from his master in refusing to make identity of metrical structure the test of a poem's unity. In chaps. 1 and 2 of Amos, for example, where Sievers eliminates everything not falling into heptameters, Staerk finds room for lines of 3+3, 2+2, 3+2+2, 2+3, and 2+2+3 beats each respectively; and all this within the limits of one poem, or address! In 4:1-3, where Sievers finds so much confusion in his endeavor to restore a poem with alternating lines of eight and four beats, Staerk permits the following variety of meter: line 1, 3+2+2 beats; line 2, 2+2+2+2 beats; lines 3 and 4, 3 beats each; line 5, 3+3 beats; and line 6, 2+2+3 beats. In addition, it becomes necessary to regard כִּי הִנֵּה in vs. 2 as outside of the meter; hence, in reality, no two of the six lines have the same number of beats. Indeed no piece of more than four lines

in extent is composed throughout in the same meter. Judging from the work of these two exponents of the newer metrical science, we are forced either to permit the wildest metrical license within a poem, or to resolve the poetical pieces of the Old Testament into their original metrical elements and reorganize them on the basis of metrical uniformity into entirely new poems. These alternatives are alike unreasonable.

But whatever may be thought of Staerk's metrical analyses of his larger poetic unities, it must be granted that he has fully recognized the force of the parallelism and given it its proper place in the determination of his metrical lines. Furthermore, his strophical groups are logical units and the strophes of any given poem are constituted of a uniform number of lines. Here he has more in common with scholars like Duhm, Cornill, Marti, and Harper, than with Sievers.

Van Hoonacker's attitude toward metrical and strophical questions is revealed by these remarks at the close of a review of the poetical reconstructions of Müller, Löhr, Baumann, Zenner, Sievers, Condamin, Marti, Elhorst, and Harper:

The divergences of which we have just cited some examples do not by any means prove that the theory of the strophic composition of the prophetic discourses is arbitrary and rests upon no real basis. On the contrary, we shall find in them a stimulus to the pursuit of this study with greater caution and zeal. But while waiting till the laws which controlled this kind of literary composition among the Hebrews may be better known, it would be hazardous to be in too great haste to take the exigencies of strophic distribution as a criterion of the authenticity or of the order of texts, even for Amos.

Consequently, no consideration is given to metrical matters in the commentary proper.

It is no easy task to interpret the Book of the Twelve within the limits of a single volume. To Van Hoonacker belongs the credit of having done this well and of having produced the most complete commentary on the Minor Prophets as a whole to be credited to the last half-century. A new translation furnishes the basis of the commentary. Herein the author appears most venturesome. Many emendations are incorporated in the text, some of them here presented for the first time. These are often more ingenious than convincing; e. g., Hos. 4:5, *וְדַמִּיתִי אֶמְךָ* becomes *וְדַמִּיתִי אֶמְךָ*, i. e., "night shall be the likeness of thy day." Again, Hos. 11:7, a difficult text, becomes "the men of my people will be hung near their cities, and in the sight of those going up to their towns; none will raise them up." In Amos 5:9, *שֹׁד עַל עַז*, "destruction upon the strong," is changed to *יִשָּׁע עַל-עָנִי*, "deliverance upon the weak;" and in Mic.

2:1 ~~וְעַל~~ ~~וְעַל~~ is transposed into ~~וְעַל~~. "Shalmaneser." Similar freedom and badness are manifested in the readiness with which accents is laid to ~~וְעַל~~ and transpositions.

The authority of the superscriptions, however, seems to weigh heavily upon the author. Amos, Hosea, and Micah being as a whole in the prophets whose names they carry. The same holds good of Obadiah, Zephaniah, Habakkuk, and even Zechariah. Yet the method and spirit of the commentary are thoroughly historical, and at least an endeavor is made to look at the facts squarely in the face. Theological presuppositions and prejudices are left largely out of consideration. Hence the commentary is to be cordially commended to all students as a competent and conservative exposition of the Minor Prophets.

It would have been of far greater value had the author seen fit to recognize the poetic form of the prophetic utterances and to give it full weight in his interpretation. No scientific treatment of these books can afford to ignore this element in their composition. A less strenuous attempt to establish the unity of each book would likewise have saved the author from the exercise of much ingenuity. For example, in the seventh chapter of Micah, which clearly deals with more than one period and set of conditions, van Hoonacker finds it necessary to place vs. 11-13 between vs. 6 and 7. Vss. 1-6 clearly describe the retrograde condition of Israel, while vs. 11-13 describe the rebuilding of the city walls, the return of the exiles, and the prosperity awaiting Israel in the messianic age. But van Hoonacker interprets vs. 11-13 as describing an invasion of foreigners coming to chastise Israel for the sins depicted in vs. 1-6. This interpretation of vs. 11-13 is entirely out of harmony with the language of these verses which is certainly that of promise rather than threat. Making due allowance, however, for the author's point of view, much may be learned from him: his work repays careful study.

The point of view of Nicollardet in his treatise on Habakkuk is radically different from that of van Hoonacker. The latter treats the book as a unit, the former as composite: van Hoonacker considers it prose with the exception of chap. III. Nicollardet accepts it as poetry. The study falls into four chapters, preceded by an introduction and an extensive bibliography, the latter marked by too many errors; e. g., Arnold's article appeared in the *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literature*, not in the *American Journal of Philology*; and Cornill's *Einführung* is to the *Old Testament*, not the *New*. Chap. I contains a new translation with textual and critical notes, the text being arranged in strophes and printed in varying styles of type to indicate the different sources of

the material. Chap. ii is devoted to a presentation and criticism of the various attempts to maintain the unity of Habakkuk. Chap. iii presents, with discriminating criticism, the interpretations of the book involving its analysis into sources. In connection with this task the author's own view finds expression. Chap. iv traces the process of redaction which gave the book its present form.

In the poetical reconstruction no attempt is made to indicate the metrical analyses. The parallelism and the logic are apparently the main guides in the discovery of the various poetical units. In this respect Nicolardot agrees with the school of Ley, Briggs, Harper, *et al.*, rather than with Sievers and his followers. Staerk and Nicolardot agree practically as to the parallelism of lines; but in the organization of strophes their ways separate. Staerk finds strophes of various lengths, whereas Nicolardot arranges the whole book, with slight exception, in strophes of four lines each, in agreement with Marti and Duhm. In 1:2-4, for example, Nicolardot treats each of the three verses as a four-line strophe, while Staerk groups all three in one strophe. Again, in 1:12-17 Staerk discovers an eight-line strophe, whereas Nicolardot organizes three four-line strophes each with a two-line appendix, so to speak. In 1:2-4 Nicolardot has good basis for his division; in 1:12-17, however, the text is made to fit the strophe, as in the case of 1:13 where one line ends with the subject **רשע** and the verb is assigned to the following line. In his analysis of Habakkuk, Nicolardot follows closely upon Marti simply carrying Marti's principles a little further, and pushing the division hypothesis to its utmost limits. Four original constituent elements are laid down, viz., (a) a psalm consisting of 1:2-4, 13 and 2:4; (b) a second psalm, chap. 3; (c) a prophecy concerning the Chaldeans, 1:5-10, 14-17; (d) the series of curses, 2:5 ff. The oldest (c) dates from about 604 B. C.; the next in age (d) from about 550 B. C.; the first psalm, utilized by a redactor to bind (c) and (d) together, belongs somewhere between the fifth and third centuries; and the second psalm, (b), comes from the fourth century in connection with the oppression by Artaxerxes III. Glosses and redactional notes complete the whole. To this analysis it may be objected that the connection of 1:13 is at least as good where it is in MT, as it is when placed after 1:4, and that 2:4 is certainly more appropriate where it stands, as an answer to the prophet's problem, than after 1:13 with which it has no close connection, to say nothing of the fact that 1:14 follows well upon 1:13.

The study shows wide acquaintance with the literature on Habakkuk and an intelligent appreciation of the problems raised by the book, as well as a good control of scientific method. It will serve admirably to put the

student *au courant* with the present state of opinion concerning the book, and may serve as an offset to Duhm's *tour de force* of converting Chaldeans into Greeks in order to preserve the unity of the prophecy.

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RECENT CRITICISM OF THE SYNOPTIC NARRATIVES

Among the most important contributors to solution of the great problems of this field are certainly to be reckoned Wellhausen, Harnack, and B. Weiss, the first the most distinguished living expert in Semitic philology and the analysis of sources as combined in the narrative books of the Old Testament, the second of equal pre-eminence in the field of patristics and church history, the third a veteran in the special field into which the other two bring the qualifications of experience in outside yet closely related sciences.

In three "Contributions to New Testament Introduction," I, *Lukas die Persönlichkeit*, II, *The Sayings of Jesus*, III, *The Acts of the Apostles*, Harnack proves the thoroughness of his method. He will not carry back his great work as historian of the post-apostolic age into the domain of the New Testament without working through again and for himself the whole and the New Testament critics in testing the sources in respect to their authority and credibility. And he begins where Wernle had stopped, with the writings of Luke.

In Luke I have already found an excellent translator² we doubt not the same work will soon be performed for III. But why need the pages be cluttered with the Anglican mannerism which prefixes "St." before every name of a church father, and substitutes "our Lord" for the simple "Jesus" in the original? Is it respectful to speak of David, Isaiah, and Ignatius, and disrespectful to speak of Jesus and Paul and Ignatius?

German criticism has for years treated the tradition of the Luke-Acts as surviving only through the belated

Einleitung in das Neue Testament von Adolf Harnack. I, Lukas die Persönlichkeit des dritten Evangeliums und der Apostelgeschichte. Leipzig: 1907. iv + 100 pages. II, Sprüche und Reden Jesu, die zweite Quelle des Lukasevangeliums. 1907. iv + 220 pages; III, Die Apostelgeschichte, 1908. vi + 100 pages.

Hereafter the three works will be referred to respectively as I, II, and III.

² *Lukas die Persönlichkeit*, translated by Rev. J. R. Wilkinson. The Crown Theol.

Putnam, 1907. 231 pages; \$1.50. *The Sayings of Jesus*.

† *St. Matthew and St. Luke*. By the same translator and pub-

lished. \$1.50.

adherence of a few prejudiced reactionaries and traditionalists. Most liberals were convinced that as a whole it could not possibly emanate from that companion of Paul whose diary of travel with him in the second part of Acts formed the most engaging feature of the story. Its representation of the great issues of the period when Christianity ceased to be a mere reformed sect of Judaism and became a world religion seemed to be too un-Pauline, and its picture of church origins, especially in the first part of Acts, too idealized. English criticism was reluctant to fall in with this verdict, partly from its characteristic conservatism, but partly also for sound philological and archaeological reasons. As advocates of the unity of the whole work, maintaining the identity of the author of the gospel and the parts of Acts outside the "We-document" with the Diarist himself honorable mention must be made of Hobart, whose *Medical Language of St. Luke* is vindicated in its main contention by Harnack. Sir John C. Hawkins is deserving of greater honor for his *Horae Synopticae*, which presented the linguistic data with far greater effect because of his admirable poise and judicial reserve. In archaeology Sir Wm. Ramsay had also entered the lists as defender of the traditional authorship with all the enthusiasm of a Hobart, and with something of the anti-critical animus of a Blass. Under such conditions it falls now to Harnack to supply the judicial spirit, and in his contributions I and III to justify against German incredulity all that was tenable in the English contention, while vindicating also the rights of historical criticism.

Harnack is convinced that the linguistic argument furnishes absolute *demonstration* of the Lukan authorship. The major part of I is devoted to this alone. Only after a purely literary analysis of style and language does he take up the question of the author's divergence from Paul and from the real facts of historical development. Even then it is professedly a matter of supererogation. Yet here is some of Harnack's own best and most original work. A trained and fully informed historical imagination enables him to triumph over that narrowness of the German literary critic who cannot conceive how far more lightly the responsibilities of a historian would weigh upon the conscience of a converted Greek of A. D. 50-100 than upon a modern. Harnack shows how even a companion of Paul might be "un-Pauline" (I, p. 142) in the very vital principles of Paulinism, and might substitute legend for history in sheer hero-worship and love of the marvelous. The great defense which turns the edge of all critical attack upon the authenticity along this line is the actual deterioration of first-hand witness in undisputed cases. In the twenty years which at the assumed time of writing (*ca.* 80 A. D.) had elapsed since Luke's brief con-

nections with Paul it was possible for him to become thus in principle "un-Pauline," thus saturated with ecclesiastical convention.

And yet Excursus V of III seems almost ready to surrender this defense! "Luke wrote in the period of Titus or early in the reign of Domitian, *but perhaps even as early as the beginning of the sixties.*" Had Blass but lived to read these words! As it is, the great Greek philologist could welcome I as "three-fourths" commendable. In his *Professor Harnack und die Schriften des Lukas*³ he brings to bear all his skill as philologist and textual critic to extend Harnack's "demonstration" of the Lukan authorship to the variant readings of the β text, which Blass's own peculiar theory (emphatically rejected by Harnack) attributes to no other than Luke himself. We can well imagine future critics of Harnack's linguistic argument making Blass's effort the starting-point for a complete *reductio ad absurdum*.

In fact Harnack himself goes far toward nullifying the force of his own contention. The major part of I is the "demonstration" that the supposed "We-source" of Acts 16-28 is not a "source," but the original composition of the author of the whole. This rests upon elaborate proof that the same style and vocabulary extend over the entire Gospel and over Acts 1-15. Yet chap. 5 of III is devoted to the extrication and characterization of "written" sources, which are admitted to underlie Acts 1-15, but which it is expressly declared (p. 131) could not be detected by mere lexical and stylistic tests. Nay, the whole contents of II is devoted to reproducing "the second source [i. e., besides Mark] of Matthew and Luke." Yet here too Harnack thinks it might well have proved impossible in the absence of Matthew and Mark to determine the use of these documents (III, p. 132). How much then remains of the contention that the lexical and stylistic uniformity of the whole negatives the use of a "source" in Acts 16-28? More than the superficial application of this argument would suggest; and yet certainly not enough to rule out of court the typical German explanation of drastic "redaction." In fact the resultant gain to traditionalists of this kind of authentication is microscopic. Blass rejoiced over Harnack as Sanday over Drummond; but a "credulous," idealizing Luke, elaborating, twenty years after, his brief notes or recollections of travel with Paul, without appreciation of Pauline principles or of the real origins of the church, so that he perverts the history into the conventionalized mold of current ecclesiasticism (III, p. 128), is scarcely more serviceable

³ *Professor Harnack und die Schriften des Lukas*. By Professor F. Blass. In "Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie," XI, 2. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1907. 55 pages. M. 1. 20.

to the traditionalist than a nameless "redactor" of the same period. However, it is serviceable to the open-minded critic. And besides there are many to whom it seems a vast gain to prove that a thing was said by "St. Luke" or "St. John," even if it wasn't exact.

As already noted, II aims at reconstruction of Q, the source employed by Matthew and Luke for their discourse material, to which the question-begging name of *Logia* was formerly given in Germany and is unfortunately still applied by English writers. Harnack's "contribution" is the most thorough that has yet appeared; immeasurably superior to the attempts of Wendt and Resch, an advance also, chiefly by its greater detail, upon the truly scholarly work of Hawkins (1899), Wernle (1899), and Burton (1904).⁴ It suffers, however, from the very rigidity of the author's method. W. C. Allen to the contrary notwithstanding, it appears to be a "demonstration" by Wernle that canonical Matthew and Luke are independent writings. Their common source, Mark, subtracted, the remainder, so far as coincident, will therefore give Q material, and *probably* nothing else; since the hypothesis of a *third* common source is unlikely. But will it give all, or even a sufficient proportion to justly characterize the source? One vital factor disappears *ex hypothesi*. Whatever of Q has passed into either Matthew or Luke *through the medium of Mark* will fail to appear. And it is precisely the narrative element, or elements, which like the barren fig tree, could be transformed by the pragmatism of Mark from discourse to story, which would suffer this fate. It becomes therefore largely a *petitio principii* to argue from the paucity of narrative in Q *thus reconstructed* that it was not, like our gospels, a story of the "sayings and doings," but merely a manual of the "teachings" of Jesus (p. 120; *Engl.*, p. 170). This defect of method becomes the more apparent when Harnack is obliged to admit exceptions such as the healing of the centurion's servant. We feel it again when the supposed mere collection of sayings is admitted to have begun with the narratives of the Preaching of the Baptist and of the Baptism of Jesus. The writer who begins his work as a story, and ends it as a homily, without so much as permitting the preacher to leave the pulpit, is a curiosity. This is less logical than Wernle's discrimination of a purely discursive Q¹, editorially supplemented by a narrative framework Q².

⁴ *Principles of Literary Criticism and the Synoptic Problem*. By E. D. Burton. "The University of Chicago Decennial Publications," 1904. An unfortunate oversight led to the omission of this fine example of American scholarship from the summary in the reviewer's article, "A Turning-Point in Synoptic Criticism," *Harvard Theological Review*, January, 1908.

Wellhausen, whose striking and original commentaries on the Synoptic Gospels are now completed by an *Introduction*,⁵ considers the idea of mutual literary independence of Q and Mark, such as might justify Harnack's reasoning, as "unthinkable" (p. 73). This is a just verdict. But Wellhausen will have few adherents in his paradoxical contention for the priority of Mark! Jülicher and others have already given excellent reasons for treating this as the aberration of a great mind. The relation must almost certainly be reversed. Nevertheless, no one who knows the superb originality of Wellhausen's genius, the keenness of his scholarship, and the pungency and pith of his style will fail to welcome heartily this co-ordinating fourth volume.

The true antithesis to Harnack's theory of Q appears in the most recent of all discussions, by one of the oldest veterans in the field, Professor Bernhard Weiss, of the University of Berlin.⁶ Here we are almost surprised to find it conceded that Q had no passion-story, so determined is the endeavor to claim everything as derived from it. Even the *ecclesia* passages of Matthew 16:18; 18:17, are attributed to Q, to say nothing of the underlying substance of Mark's narrative! The only marvel is that the church should ever have permitted a gospel so nearly perfect in almost every particular which appealed to the taste of the post-apostolic age to be superseded by gospels in many respects less likely to prove acceptable. If anything is certain it is that the lack of "order" for the events of Jesus' career, so keenly felt both by "Luke" and "the Elder" of Papias, was a real lack, such as could not have existed if the apostolic Q source had been what Weiss supposes. Almost equally certain is it that the distinction likewise attested by both these primitive authorities between *synagmas* of the teaching of Jesus, and *diegeses* of his sayings and doings (Acts 1:1; cf. Luke 1:1 and Papias fragment) corresponds to the real conditions when "Luke" was written and largely accounts for the disappearance of the "order." Matthew and Luke were as helplessly dependent as we ourselves on the confessedly post-apostolic and unhistorical order of Mark. Q therefore cannot well be supposed to have had an "order." In fact, from that which tradition and criticism agree must have been its nature, the order of a *diegesis*, or consecutive story, would be inappropriate.

The microscopic reconstruction of sources undertaken by Weiss is

⁵ *Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien*. Von J. Wellhausen. Berlin: Reimer, 1905. 116 pages.

⁶ *Die Quellen der synoptischen Ueberlieferung*. Von B. Weiss. Hinrichs: Leipzig, 1908. Pp. 256. M. 8.50.

serviceable and will contribute to the ultimate solution as clearly presenting the alternative to Harnack's broader apprehension of the facts. The three types of research, Wellhausen, Harnack, Weiss, coupled with the thorough method of Wernle, Hawkins, and Burton, cannot fail to advance the student who is in earnest with this vital question of the gospel sources a goodly stage toward the goal.

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AN IMPORTANT STUDY OF THE BIBLICAL DOCTRINE
OF THE SPIRIT

No Christian doctrine was more carelessly formulated in the early church or more negligently treated later than the doctrine of the Spirit. It has been protected from wholesome criticism by its connection with the dogma of the Trinity. The doctrine of the Spirit has held the place of the spoiled child in the theological family, and has never had enough healthy discipline to be good for it. Perhaps the fact will be no loss in the end, however, for it will profit more than most doctrines by criticism in the light of historical Bible study, comparative religion and comparative psychology. Such study it is now beginning to receive. The most extensive study which has yet appeared is the subject of this review.¹ The first volume is called *La doctrine paulinienne*. It is introductory to the proposed study of the doctrine of the Spirit in the history of the church. The author recognizes quite properly that the Pauline idea is the basis of the later Christian conception and so, while he reviews briefly the entire biblical history of the idea, he justifies his title by giving more than two-thirds of the book to Paul's thought of the Spirit. The first part of the book is devoted to "The Antecedents," divided into non-Christian, and Christian. The Pauline portion of the book is arranged under the sections, "The General Thought of St. Paul," "The Work of the Spirit," "The Nature of the Spirit."

The treatment of the Old Testament and the extra-biblical Jewish writings is compact and excellent. The writer recognizes the difference in the idea of the Spirit of God between Hebraism and Judaism. In Hebraism "the Spirit is a power outside of man, the agent of good as well as of evil, the organ of the action of God in the world and in the individual" (p. 30). In the post-exilic Judaism the Spirit is "the creative agent, the principle of life, the messenger of Jehovah, the revealer of God" (p. 67).

¹ *La notion de l'Esprit: la genèse et son évolution dans la théologie chrétienne*. I. *La doctrine paulinienne*. Par Jean Arnal. Paris: Fischbacher, 1908. 361 pages.

Judaism has grown sectarian. Whereas Hebraism thought of all men as having the same origin and the same destiny, Judaism regards the pagan as not a man, but a simple animal (IV Ezra 4:56; Midrash Wayikra 13, concerning Levites 11:1. See Westphal, *Flesh and Spirit*, p. 96). The Spirit then is not given to pagans, but at the resurrection the Jew will receive it in abundance. There is discussion of the origin and growth of angels and demons. Angelology has its roots in Hebraism, but demonology is Mazdean. One would welcome more discussion of the reasons why the Spirit had, in the Judaic period, lost its connection with experience and was no more thought of as moving in the minds of men then living. The answer, it seems to the reviewer, throws a flood of light upon both the idea of the Spirit and the character of religion in Judaism.

The teaching of Christ offers nothing essentially new regarding the Spirit. It is still a power of God working against an evil power. The one change of importance is that it now becomes, especially in the Fourth Gospel, dependent upon Christ himself. After Christ's death a further change takes place. The Spirit of God is now *within* man, whereas before it had been *upon* him. This difference dates from Pentecost. "It would seem that Pentecost marks the moment when the Spirit ceases to be external to the individual, and becomes a constituent element" (p. 110). One questions whether the modern scholar can lay such emphasis on Pentecost. Doubtless it was a turning-point in the history of the disciples, but rather because it gave them the inspiration of confidence than because the divine relation to them became essentially different. Was the Spirit *in* Peter and *upon* Isaiah? The facts of experience, indeed, remain the same from the Hebrew prophets down to the present day. The different interpretation of experience seems to take its rise, not from the early church in its Pentecostal blessing, but from Paul.

To the study of Paul's idea of the Spirit M. Arnal brings wide reading and clear thought. Careful attention is given to specific passages of importance. Different views are discussed fully, and judged judiciously. There is much reference to the older commentators, like Godet, Meyer, and Reuss, but the modern work of Gunkel on the Spirit is not neglected. The criticism which can be passed upon the work is that it is done rather in the spirit of exegesis than in that of modern psychology. One feels that while the author has not wholly neglected the psychological side of his study, he might have made more of it than he has. Not merely the glossolalia, of which he gives a good account, but prophecy, miracles, and even the sense of divine presence in the calmer levels of quiet living, in fine, all the experience which Paul calls the life of the Spirit, may be illustrated

and in part explained by the study of the psychology of Christianity and other religions. The essential factor of Paul's doctrine M. Arnal sees and states clearly. It is that Paul's doctrine of the life of the Spirit grows out of his experience. That experience goes back to the vision on the road to Damascus. The vision brought a new life to Paul, a life dependent upon the revelation of God through Christ. The life was felt to be the result of a divine power. Using old Hebrew terms, he calls it the Spirit. It is indifferently the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of God, or the Spirit of Christ. The three terms mean the same. This divine Spirit is not side by side with the human spirit, but it identified with the personality. It is a present possession, not merely a promise of life at the parousia, and makes the spiritual man a new creation, a miracle of God, an insoluble problem to the world. It is not occasional and temporary, as in Judaism and primitive Christianity, but an abiding and permanent possession. The "gifts of the Spirit" are not enlargements of natural ability, but new endowments. And yet the Spirit is the possession of the natural man. In the unregenerate it differs in quantity, not in quality; in degree, not in existence. "At the moment of his creation man received the Spirit, which became diminished, but not entirely destroyed, by the fall" (p. 349). Does this represent Paul? It is true that post-exilic Judaism once held that the principle of life, not in man only, but in all living things, was the Spirit of God (Ps. 104:30), but one questions if this was Paul's conception. However, the writer has made a strong and scholarly defense of his position.

One of the most interesting sections of the book is that upon "the Nature of the Spirit," because it is refreshingly frank and straightforward. The writer sees, as do most students of the subject, that everything assigned to the Spirit is assigned equally to God and to Christ. There is, then, no separate office of the Spirit, nor does a separate personality need to be assumed for the Spirit. A study in detail of the texts sometimes held to imply personality is presented, and the author's conclusion is that "the Spirit appears as a divine force, Christ as a personality bearing in himself that force" (p. 310). One feels strongly the force of the criticism of the doctrine of the separate personality of the Spirit. That doctrine has always been taken much too easily, on both its biblical and its logical sides. Some will, however, admitting all M. Arnal says regarding it, still raise the question, Does Paul mean by the Spirit, the power of God, or God himself? "Is a person able to dwell in another person?" our writer asks. Ordinarily we should say No. But did not Paul—has not religion often—assumed that when one person is divine and the other human, that is exactly what does happen? This is, I take it, the center of the problem of the Pauline

doctrine of the Holy Spirit, and right here comes in the great value of the study of comparative religious psychology. Meantime, we shall look with great interest for the fulfilment of M. Arnal's promise to write another volume covering the history of the doctrine of the Spirit in the church.

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SOME BY-PRODUCTS OF THE VIRGIN-BIRTH CONTROVERSY

It was natural that such a question as that regarding the dogma of the virgin birth of Jesus as embodied in the Apostles' Creed should broaden so as to involve underlying principles and correlated beliefs. On one side the question has already called forth a considerable amount of study regarding belief in analogous supernatural births among the non-Christian peoples of the earth. It is to the class of works that embody the results of such study that M. Saintyves¹ aims to make a contribution. He chooses as his specific theme beliefs regarding unisexual generation of human beings, or rather regarding births of children by the substitution of the divine efficacy for that of the human father. The birth of Jesus naturally receives only incidental attention in the treatment of this theme; for the author is not concerned with the simple and narrow problem of the historicity of the gospel narratives on the subject. He aims rather to investigate the whole subject of alleged unions of women with divine or supernatural beings and of births of exceptional men through such unions. Theogamy he finds is a notion peculiar to no people or age but common among all men in all stages of intellectual growth. Sometimes the theogamy is supposed to involve the disguise of the divinity under the form of a stock or a stone; sometimes under that of a plant, flower, or fruit; sometimes under that of an insect, reptile, bird, or other animal; sometimes under that of a nature force, such as the sun or moon, some star, or stream, or spring of specially vital water; finally, sometimes the disguise of the god is imperceptible and he comes as a jinn or subtle spirit. In all cases the result is a virgin birth and an exceptional man, a Buddha, a Pythagoras, a Plato, an Alexander the Great, etc. The volume is full of material bearing on the question under discussion; and this material is drawn from the lore of every imaginable people upon earth. Unfortunately the author has used very little discrimination in its collection and

¹ *Les vierges mères et les naissances miraculeuses*. Essai de mythologie comparée. Par P. Saintyves. Paris: Nourry, 1908. 280 pages. Fr. 3.50.

shows little skill in classifying, sifting, and arranging it, and showing its significance. Beyond the obvious fact that theogamic births are believed in universally among unscientific peoples, a fact which no one will care to deny, the volume yields nothing of value to the scientific student of religion.

In sharp contrast with this work is that of M. Neubert,² who takes up the subject from the point of view of its relations to Roman Catholic doctrine and practice. It is evident that to the scholar who has to reckon with the doctrine of the immaculate conception and the practice of the adoration of Mary, not to mention the belief in her perpetual virginity, which has been and is held by others than members of the Roman communion, the discussion of whether Jesus was the offspring of a virgin mother must be one of the utmost importance. It is a great gain for the man who occupies this view-point if he can establish upon purely historical grounds that as far back as Christian belief can be traced there is nothing to contravene his complex of tenets. Accordingly the author has wisely made his inquiry a historical one and limited his sphere of investigation to the first three Christian centuries. But his inquiry is threefold. It involves the questions, Was Mary regarded by the ante-Nicene Christians as the virgin mother of Jesus? Was she believed to have remained a childless virgin after the birth of Jesus? and Was she made the object of a peculiar reverence or adoration? To all these questions M. Neubert finds affirmative answers, which he aims to support and illustrate by citations from the writers of the period under investigation. Although the evidence he adduces is not equally convincing on all the points at issue, and is especially weak on the last of these, upon the whole, the method of the author is to be commended as the only sound one to use in attempting a solution of the virgin-birth problem which will be satisfactory to the modern thinker.

With these products of the French press we may put into the same group a work of an eminent English scholar. Professor H. B. Swete³ delivered the contents of this little volume in the form of Lenten lectures as far back as 1894, with the avowed purpose of enabling educated members of the English church who do not possess the leisure or the opportunities necessary for a further study of the subject to form some judgment upon the recent controversy regarding the miraculous basis of Christianity as expressed in the oldest of the Christian creeds. The phase of the con-

² *Marie dans l'Eglise Antenicenne*. Par E. Neubert. Paris: Lecoffre, 1908. xv + 283 pages.

³ *The Apostles' Creed: Its Relation to Primitive Christianity*. By H. B. Swete, D.D. Cambridge: University Press, 1905. 112 pages.

troversy to which Dr. Swete particularly addresses himself is that in which Professor Harnack of Berlin made some broad statements regarding the historical articles of the Apostles' Creed. Dr. Swete defends the historicity of these articles, especially of that concerning the virgin birth. It is scarcely necessary to say, that though popular in style and plan these lectures show all the soundness and strength of their eminent author.

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THE ETHIOPIC VERSION OF THE BOOK OF ENOCH

The Book of Enoch is one of those apocryphal books which "have begun to come into their own, not indeed on the ground of their intrinsic religious worth, but from their immeasurable value as being practically the only historical memorials of the religious development of Judaism during the two centuries which preceded the birth of Christianity, and particularly of the development of that side of Judaism to which historically Christendom in large measure owes its existence." Yet, for many centuries the knowledge of western Christendom has been limited to the single quotation in Jude, vs. 14; the original text having been lost completely, and of its translations almost all but one. That we have now a practically exhaustive edition of the only extant version, the Ethiopic, together with the fragmentary Greek and Latin renderings, we owe to the painstaking labor of Professor Charles,¹ the leading editor of Ethiopic texts and one of the best scholars of the Ethiopic language and literature. Readers of this *Journal*² will readily recall his searching review of Flemming's edition of the Ethiopic text in which he announced the early appearance of this critical edition. It is by no means an exaggerated statement that the edition of Professor Charles is one of the most admirable pieces of accurate scholarly work.

The introduction, of chief interest to the general reader, is divided into nine paragraphs. Secs. 1 and 9 discuss the fortunes of the book, which was originally written in prose and in verse, a discovery that has proved most helpful in the criticism of difficult passages. Joseph Halévy in the *Journal asiatique*, 1867, April-May, pp. 352-95, first advanced the opinion that the whole book was written originally in Hebrew. The present editor maintains that, like the Book of Daniel, it was written originally in Hebrew and Aramaic. In Hebrew were composed chaps. 1-5, which do not come

¹ *The Ethiopic Version of the Book of Enoch*, edited from twenty-three MSS, together with the fragmentary Greek and Latin versions. By R. H. Charles. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906. xxiii + 237 pages. 17s. 6d.

² Vol. VII, 1903, pp. 689-703.

from the same author or period as chaps. 6-36; 72-82, most probably; and 91-104; in Aramaic, chaps. 6-36; in Aramaic or Hebrew, chaps. 37-70 and 83-90—Secs. 2, 3. The entire book was translated into Greek and from Greek into Ethiopic, and possibly into Latin. The Greek version has been preserved only in part. Chaps. 1-32:6, and, again, chaps. 19:3-21:9 were discovered in 1886-87 at Akhmīm by the Mission archéologique française au Caire, and published by Bouriant in their *Mémoires*, 1892-93, together with the apocryphal gospel and revelation of Peter. Large fragments, of chaps. 6-16:1, also partly in duplicate form, have been preserved in Syncellus. The relation of these texts to each other and to the Ethiopic version is discussed in sec. 4. The text of the Akhmīm fragments and the Ethiopic spring from a common ancestor. This ancestor and the Greek text of Syncellus proceed ultimately from the same original, the first Greek translation of the book of Enoch. Sec. 5. The Latin version is preserved only in a fragment of 106:1-18 and a few scattering quotations. Sec. 6. The Ethiopic translation has been found in twenty-nine MSS. It must date from a very early period, probably from the period of the earliest translations from Greek into Ethiopic.³ Professor Charles assumes the sixth century. The editor has been able to examine all these manuscripts except one. The division of the book into chapters was made apparently in the sixteenth century. Dillmann, in 1851, arranged the text into 108 chapters, a division retained, since, by every editor. The relation of the Ethiopic MSS is treated at length in sec. 7. It is in this section, especially, that Charles shows his complete mastery of the text and subject. Sec. 8 enumerates all the editions of the text and of translations from that of Laurence, in 1838, to that of Flemming in 1902.

The introduction is followed by the Ethiopic text together with the Greek text and the Latin fragment, pp. 1-226. Pp. 227, 228 contain an appendix on chap. 6, verse 7. Then follows a complete Greek index, pp. 229-37, and a page of addenda et corrigenda.

It is almost needless to add that the publication of this edition is an honor both to the learned editor as well as to the *Anecdota Oxoniensia*.

W. MUSS-ARNOLT

THE PUBLIC LIBRARY
BOSTON, MASS.

³ See F. C. Burkitt in *The Journal of Theological Studies*, April, 1907, pp. 446, 447.

FREDERIC HARRISON'S EXPOSITION OF POSITIVISM

The two volumes in which Frederic Harrison has collated, with some new material, the substance of his life thought upon positivism¹ are marked by his usual brilliancy and vigor. They will constitute a worthy memorial of Mr. Harrison's intellectual activity in behalf of his faith. In some respects the most significant single essay is the "Apologia pro Fide Mea," for it gives a résumé of a spiritual and intellectual struggle that induces a deep sympathy for the earnestness of the man. Yet that early struggle against the tenets of a static view of Christianity which he had been drilled to conceive as the only true religion furnishes the key to all that follows. "*Intra ecclesiam nulla veritas*," became the inevitable conclusion of his mind when questionings arose. Of theological reconstructions he is impatient. Liberty of thought within the church, he believes, is purchased at the cost of honesty. Yet Mr. Harrison is an intensely religious man so far as his attitude toward agnosticism, materialism, or ethical culture is concerned. With all of these he feels a certain sympathy yet rejects all because they do not satisfy man's religious nature. But in maintaining a religion of humanity he is unwilling to be regarded as in any sense a high priest. Nor will he consent that he belongs to any one man's way of thinking. It is true that he esteems Comte highly but he is not a Comtist, he insists, for he holds to the letter of no man's thought. In *The Creed of a Layman*, then, he illustrates his belief that established Christianity cannot meet the intellectual and social demands of the age and still remain true to itself. As a positive conclusion to this negative critique he sets forth the scheme of positivism considered especially upon the side of cult. The worth of that cult will be variously estimated. In the *Philosophy of Common Sense* he considers the more philosophic aspects of the situation. The impossibility of metaphysic and the failure of every philosophy of human life save positivism is proclaimed. Other interests may be served by them but not the religious interest. Yet in the end we find that Mr. Harrison has been toying with words. If words are to be emasculated of their meaning, why use such words with their unfortunate associations? But here we find that the author is guilty, in some sense, of that which he condemns in Spencer and his own remark in that case applies forcibly. "Better bury religion at once than let its ghost walk uneasy in our dreams." It is inevitable in the thinking of any man

¹ *The Creed of a Layman: Apologia pro fide mea.* By Frederic Harrison. New York: Macmillan, 1907. viii + 395 pages. \$1.75 net.

The Philosophy of Common Sense. By Frederic Harrison. New York: Macmillan, 1907. xxxvi + 418 pages. \$1.75 net.

that statements made decades apart do not always cohere. Possibly it is this that leaves a sense of dissatisfaction with Mr. Harrison's final results. What is this humanity of which he speaks and for which he supplicates reverence? He calls it a sum total of human life but in what sense is it a sum total? At times we are tempted to believe that here we are in the very presence of god—Mr. Harrison would gladly spell it so—but we are puzzled to find that it is neither God nor a substitute for God. So we must be adroit if we would not be lost among these paradoxes of which the author is fond. What place shall be given social evils in this scheme? Does humanity imply some selective principle? Indeed positivism provokes a host of unanswered queries. But, whatever may be true of other religions, positivism should be able to answer every reasonable question. So the relation of this system to ethic, the character of the immortality it promises, the practical worth of the system not to the dreamer but to the common man, all suggest debatable ground. Yet the movement, upon the whole, has been of worth in the emphasis it lays upon scientific method in religious thinking, in the subordination of the ontological interests to the practical interests of human life and in the stress that it lays upon the social relations of man even in religion. Mr. Harrison has done good service in these matters and therefore his volumes are of interest despite the fact that they add little to what he had already printed.

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AN IMPORTANT STUDY OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MYSTICISM

Professor Delacroix' admirable work aims to study a few of the great Christian mystics from both the historical and the psychological points of view.¹ The author fortunately combines the learning of the historian with the insight and training of the psychologist—a combination too often lacking in recent writers on mysticism, but one that is essential to a just presentation of the subject. The detailed and exact historical knowledge possessed by our author gives a broad empirical basis for his psychological conclusions; and his ability and insight as a psychologist make the historical parts of his work luminous and intelligible.

Four typical mystics are chosen for investigation, namely, St. Theresa, Mme. Guyon, St. John of the Cross, and Suso. These were selected both because of the amount of trustworthy historical material concerning them,

¹ *Etudes d'histoire et de psychologie du mysticisme: les grands mystiques chrétiens.* By Henri Delacroix. Paris: Alcan, 1908. 470 pages. Fr. 10.

and also because they display the full circle of the mystic life, which many of the lesser mystics experienced only in part. The method pursued is, first, intensive study of each of the four individuals and an analysis of the moments and of the evolution found in each separately; a comparison of results and the formulation of a general type and a law covering all; and finally an analysis of this type and an explanation of its elements, in part by the facts of psychology, in part by the historical doctrines and traditions of the Christian church.

Three chapters are devoted to St. Theresa. As a result of this careful study her life as a mystic falls into three distinct stages. The first is that of the joyous *oraison*, the sense of self united with God, the ecstasy—all sought for their own sakes and characterized by great emotional excitement and delight. This is followed by a second stage of diametrically opposite emotional tone—an ecstatic pain, a painful ecstasy, in which God is felt as absent and the soul is miserably conscious of itself as unworthy and as separated from God. Finally, in the third stage, which is the last, there is no ecstasy of joy or pain, no consciousness of self as united to or separated from God, but the self is completely forgotten, and God only seems present. There is now no more alternation between ecstasy and periods of "dryness," no more seeking for emotional effects, but God seems constantly present and guides each detail of life, as the mystic believes. This final stage is therefore not so emotional as active. St. Theresa goes into the world and shows great energy and practical wisdom in founding and guiding nunneries. Action replaces ecstasy.

The same evolution through these three stages is found, with greater or less distinctness, in each of the other mystics studied; so that the mystic life is seen to be a systematized development, each stage of which has its part to play. "La vie mystique est un progrès et non un état." To those whose acquaintance with mysticism is confined to some of the recent psychological studies of the subject, this will seem surprising. Murisier,² for instance, knows nothing about the third stage as depicted by Delacroix, and makes ecstasy and the narrowing of consciousness the essence of mysticism. Delacroix' broader historical knowledge and more empirical point of view has saved him from the narrowness of Murisier's otherwise brilliant book. He has given us not merely a cross-section but a longitudinal section of the mystic life.

This systematization of the mystic's life Delacroix accounts for partly by physiological and psychological causes, partly as a search, through trial and error, for a satisfactory inner life. In this the mystic is guided

² *Les maladies du sentiment religieux.*

largely by subconscious aims and ideas. No psychologist has made greater use of the subconscious as a means of explanation than has Delacroix. The passivity of the mystic's visions, locutions, and intuitions, the sense of externality that comes with them, and the wisdom which they often display, in short nearly all that the mystics attribute to God, Delacroix explains by the subconscious. But, as he points out, theirs is not an ordinary subconsciousness, but one by nature religious, and, in addition, trained by years of constant moral endeavor, ascetic practices, and Christian teaching.

By his use of this hypothesis Delacroix is able to deal with all the facts without taking refuge in any supernatural or theological explanation. And on the other hand he avoids equally well the extremes of such writers as Janet,³ Murisier, Leuba,⁴ and others, who regard the essential and distinctive characteristics of mysticism as pathological. That many of the phenomena found in the experiences of the mystics are pathological Delacroix does not deny, but these he regards as the excrescences rather than as the essentials of the mystic life. This much sounder attitude (for so at least it seems to me) he is able to take because of his broader view of mysticism as a development, rather than as a single state, and also because of his more empirical and exact study of the historical facts.

If space permitted something should be said of the admirable chapter in which the author analyzes and distinguishes the elements in the mystic life and doctrine due to teaching and tradition and those to be accounted for by immediate experience and psychic disposition. The book is replete with keen psychological analyses and deserves careful study. It is occasionally marred by repetitions and faulty arrangement of material, in this respect falling short of the clearness and brilliancy of exposition which one has come to expect in a French writer. This, however, is a matter of minor importance, and the book as a whole is probably the best treatise on the psychology of mysticism that has yet appeared.

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RECENT BOOKS ON CHRISTIANITY AND THE SOCIAL PROBLEM

Must moral leadership be sought outside the church? The church's position in present-day life will be determined by the facts which furnish

³ "Une extatique," and "Obsessions et psychasthenies," *Bulletin de l'Institut psychologique*. Paris, 1901.

⁴ "Tendances fondamentales des mystiques chrétiens," *Revue Philosophique*, LIV, 1-36 and 441-87.

an answer to this question. Men's most urgent need and desire are for moral leadership and men will give to the church as pre-eminent a place in their own lives as the church itself takes in meeting this need and desire. This situation is tersely put by Professor Mathews in *The Church and the Changing Order*:

In a large way, transitions involve morals as truly as politics and economics. The breaking down of tradition and of inherited thought and standards characterizes our entire social life. . . . There is a general break down among Christian people of a conventional morality which resulted from the teaching of the church in a less sophisticated age. . . . Pathetic enough is the perplexity of soul that results. Men have not ceased to want to do right, but they have become confused as to what really constitutes right. The growing moral sense refuses to submit to the control of the past but is not convinced as to just what course of conduct newer ideals demand. . . . The Christian church has a distinct office and duty to perform in bringing in unity through fraternity. Will it face this duty?

The question of the church's moral leadership is raised not because the church has ceased to furnish the moral leadership which it once did; but because there has been a broadening of the field in which moral leadership is needed and the church has not yet occupied the new territory. The church has guided men in their individual relations and obligations to their fellows as individuals. The church speaks authoritatively and specifically as to whether a man may take by stealth or violence that which is the property of another; as to whether children must obey parents, husbands be faithful to wives, and the grounds upon which husband and wife may be rightly separated; as to whether those with means should give to the needy; as to false weights and balances being an abomination unto the Lord; and as to men's use of intoxicants and opportunities for pleasure. But today men have other than these personal and individual relations with consequent moral obligations. Tax obligations are not between man and man but between man and the social or civic group to which he belongs. (Similarly the assessment of taxes is not a question of an individual doing right by his neighbor but a question of a social body doing justice and giving equity to its constituent members.) Just so socially involved and impersonal are the problems of the relations of employer and employee; of government, corporations and people, and of the state's care for children, its future citizens. Because such moral questions as this latter kind bulk so large in men's lives at the present compared with former times and because the church has stuck so closely to the kind of moral leadership formerly furnished, the question is raised as to the adequacy of the church's present moral leadership.

The common element in all the four books reviewed in this article¹ is the question as to whether and how the church should furnish this necessary moral leadership in social as distinguished from individual relations. The situation above discussed is a starting-point for them all. Two of the books also, *Jesus Christ and the Civilization of Today* and *The Church and the Changing Order*, discuss the relation of the church and modern scientific and philosophical thought. This phase of these books will be treated only incidentally as the writer, so far as he is capable of judging the books at all, must treat them from a view point gained from his experience in the social complexities of modern life. The encouraging and hopeful thing to him in the midst of the turmoil of these confusions is that there are these books along with others of their kind which make serious and sympathetic efforts to contribute to the most perplexing problems and pressing burden of both men and the church. Welcome to every fellow-student and pioneer who strives to clear the way and let in the light.

In *Social Aspects of Religious Institutions* Mr. Earp recognizes the call to the church to assume this larger leadership. He well says:

The work of the Christian minister is not done when he has preached his message to the individual alone, but it reaches further and includes the redemption of the social order so that the individual may find it easier to keep saved. Much of the territory once occupied by Christianity has been lost because this principle was not thoroughly recognized by the church; that is to say, while individuals and masses of individuals were being redeemed yet human governments and the social order in which these individuals lived continued wrong in organization and in practice. . . . If the chief object of religion is to develop the complete and abundant life, then the field for religious institutional activity is mankind wherever found, and its work is not complete when its message has been delivered to the individual or the social group, but must continue until mankind is organized and integrated for the greatest social efficiency of the individual and the group, for their reciprocal development of the better and fuller life.

This is true and to the point; but the reader is disappointed and left

¹ *Social Aspects of Religious Institutions*. By Edwin L. Earp. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1908. xii + 152 pages. \$0.75.

Jesus Christ and the Civilization of Today. The Ethical Teaching of Jesus Considered in Its Bearings on the Moral Foundations of Modern Culture. By Joseph Alexander Leighton, Ph.D. New York: Macmillan, 1908. x + 248 pages. \$1.50.

The Church and the Changing Order. By Shailer Mathews. New York: Macmillan, 1908. viii + 255 pages. \$1.50.

Christianity and the Social Order. By J. R. Campbell, M.A. New York: Macmillan, 1908. xiii + 284 pages. \$1.50.

in a quandary when the question as to the method of this organizing and integrating is answered as follows:

Christianity does not deny that moral evil is a fact of human relations and conditions, but proceeds to deal with these evils in a practical way by asserting that the source of evil is in the human heart, and that most of the ills of life result from a qualitative derangement of the social order and not from a quantitative one. It believes that when treated from this view point the social evils growing out of a quantitative derangement in society will take care of themselves. The man who has become qualitatively readjusted to society by personal relation to Jesus Christ will restore four fold those whom he has defrauded and will give the half of his goods to feed the poor.

The contrast between these two quotations is another illustration of the church's failure to furnish moral leadership as to social duties. Men need more than to be told to establish a personal relation to Jesus Christ. They inquire as to this relationship's specific requirements and consequences in the field of social morality. The church is willing to be very specific as to the requirements of this relationship in matters of man to man. The author drifts into such specific obligations at the end of the last quotation. He shows that he fails to distinguish between the duties which a man can discharge to another man and those which he can discharge only through or to a social group. It is no wonder then that this book makes little concrete contribution to the supply of the most insistent demand made upon the church. Men want some content given to their social obligations but as far as this author is concerned they are given an answer as disappointing and devoid of content as his definitions of social betterment and social welfare:

By the term "social betterment" we mean the process by which society in general is made better. Social welfare may be defined, objectively, as the relative condition of society as compared with a normal state to which it hopes to lift all its abnormal members.

But what this normal state should be and how it is to be obtained the reader is left to guess. This is a *laissez-faire* leadership in social morality and is satisfied with stating that there is a duty but that men must go and find out for themselves what it is. If the church has no better answer for the current perplexity and demand for leadership, men will, of course, turn away disappointed.

Professor Mathews in *The Church and the Changing Order* seems to assume the same standpoint as the reviewer; so much so that the writer could readily state his own point of view at the outset in quotations from this book. This large promise is made more hopeful as the author pro-

ceeds to discuss and analyze present social ills and the resulting discontent. He appreciates the disadvantages and burdens of large groups of our people. Their dissatisfaction and new ideals are most sympathetically treated. The close kinship of these ideals and the ideals of Jesus is emphasized most clearly. This is a long step toward the church's participation in a social reconstruction in which all shall be for each and each for all. But the reader's hopes are shattered when he puts in juxtaposition the kernel of the quotation cited at the first of this review and the gist of the book's conclusion on the church's social duty.

The breaking down of tradition and of inherited thought and standards characterizes our entire social life. Pathetic enough is the perplexity of soul that results. Men have not ceased to want to do right, but they have become confused as to what really constitutes right.

With this contrast:

The age today, as never before, knows the right, but needs the power to do the right. . . . Yet to determine the forms in which this social goodness shall express itself does not fall within the power of the church as an institution.

Does it? or does it not? Between these points the author constantly vacillates. Many quotations might be cited which are now on one side, now on the other. But were all these passages written out in full they could add nothing to the statement of the reader's difficulty in finding guidance as to the church's social duty. The contrasted quotations state the question that must be settled before men will find in the church any message that will guide them in the solution of their most pressing moral perplexities. To such answers as are given in this book also they will respond with the cry at the empty tomb. To touch for a moment on another point, the writer surmises that men with intellectual difficulties will be left as much at sea by Professor Mathews' effort to harmonize modern thought and the content which he gives the gospel. An illustration may be found in his treatment of the resurrection of Christ on p. 65 as compared with that on p. 68.

In *Jesus Christ and the Civilization of Today* Professor Leighton most satisfactorily carries out his purpose as stated on p. 215.

It has been the aim of this sketch to show in general terms that Jesus' principles and personality are still of vital and supreme import to the ethical problems of civilization, and that the principles of moral renovation and progress resident in His influence are pertinent to the higher personal life today.

The author proceeds to show how harmonious are Jesus' principles with the scientific thought as to world structure, human nature, theistic philosophy and the individual's relation to the universal. A thorough

student of philosophy is needed to do justice to this part of the book. The satisfactoriness of the book to the present writer can best be indicated by its treatment of the church's social duty.

There must be a minimum of recreation and leisure as well as of bodily food, proper housing, and mental training which are essential to the welfare of the normal or average person. And the possession of these minima seems to be an ethical right which it is the pre-eminent obligation of society to make right. This question leads us directly into the heart of the moral aspect of social problems; . . . in short, the problems of the right distribution of opportunity and means of maintenance, of welfare and enjoyment for the average man.

Dr. Leighton finds these rights of man and judges all social institutions by two principles, viz.,

1. Every man has an essential dignity and worth which may indeed be hidden and potential but is none the less real 2. The higher or ethical and spiritual life of man is social.

He goes on to show how this is the very heart of Jesus' estimate of man and elaborates most helpfully the teachings of Jesus which would make for a society promotive of these human rights. He sums up:

Without a definite idea of social justice, springing from a recognition of the inherent worth of every individual and the impassable limits of mutual respect for one another's persons, men will recognize no limits in their search for power and wealth, for enjoyment and gratification of the senses. [For if man neglects or denies the reality of his spiritual nature and capacities, the lower or sensuous nature will cease to recognize any limit but those of power and opportunity. . . . What Jesus contributes to social betterment is the ennoblement of personal character, the deepening of personal obligation, and the resolve to make every institution and organization subservient to the fellowship of free men.

This book does not profess to discuss specifically the church's duty in social problems, but neither does it except the church from the obligation imposed in the last quotation. But if the church is to teach the ethics of Jesus, its responsibility is stated in no uncertain terms:

The entire teaching and work of Jesus Christ rests on the same presupposition which has underlain the movement of European civilization toward religious, industrial, intellectual, and social freedom, toward justice for all men, toward equality of opportunity and social democracy, toward, in short, freedom and scope for every individual, viz., that the lives of persons, realized in fellowship one with another, are the highest and worthiest realities in the cosmos and that the principle of personality is the supreme and governing principle of things. The ethics of Jesus, the ethics of spiritual democracy, the ethics of personality—these are convertible terms.

With these thoroughgoing and fundamental principles stated the reader regrets only that Professor Leighton is not a participant in work-a-day life where he would develop and preach the practical applications of this most timely book.

In *Christianity and the Social Order* Mr. Campbell states his thesis that the only consistent present-day expression of Christianity is socialism. This he shows by his interpretation of Jesus' teaching and the preaching and conduct of the early church. He identifies the ideals of socialism with that of Christianity. With this identification the writer agrees:

The object of our analysis of primitive, as contrasted with modern, Christianity has been to show that its original objective was the realization of a universal brotherhood on earth, a social order in which every individual would be free to do his best for all and find his true happiness therein. But this is the fundamental principle of socialism too. . . . Socialism may be defined thus: "All for each; each for all." It means from the individual the utmost for the whole; from the community it means the best for the weakest.

Nearly half of the book is given to demonstrate that socialism would realize this ideal. One will probably think this convincing only if already a convert to political socialism. That all men would be contented or justly treated by the awards made by the whole body of citizens; that a democratic government can necessarily see what justice is or that the majority will be controlled by desire for justice for all rather than by the interests of this controlling majority the author fails to establish. We cannot go with him in being convinced by saying: "We may as well admit, without any further demur, that whether socialism be the remedy or not there is no other."

While the writer cannot agree with the ultimate conclusions of this book he believes that it of all the four takes the most forward step in that it accepts for the church the task of definitely applying moral principles to social ills. Ministers need not and must not become propounders of scientific political economy and civics. There is an as yet almost unmet demand that they fearlessly and specifically state what is required in social readjustment and reorganization in order to satisfy the moral and religious principles of Jesus and Christianity. Christianity, equally with economics and civics, must assert its demands in any definite social situation. This last book undertakes to do this; the others do scarcely more than give more or less helpful statements of the problem.

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TWO RECENT BOOKS ON MISSIONS

Doctor Mabie has published a vigorous and telling defense of the right of the church to propagate Christian truth among peoples who hold the ethnic faiths.¹ His proposition is that

Christianity holds the supreme conception of the oneness of mankind; it alone cherishes the idea of a redemptive purpose—a cure for sin—at the heart of God; it places a premium upon the faith principle conceived as loyalty to present light; it is the one religion which centers in a unique divine-human person; it alone guarantees human well-being in providence irrespective of outward, circumstantial conditions; and it affords the only practical hope of godlike character and final blessedness like his own.

The present little book is a presentation, in somewhat modified form, of the same author's previous deliverances on similar subjects, the first part was prepared for the Congress of Arts and Sciences of the St. Louis Exposition in 1904 and the second part appeared in this *Journal*, Vol. XI, No. 1, in a symposium on the question "Has Christianity the Moral Right to Supplant Ethnic Faiths?"

Doctor Vedder's book² is an apologetic too, but unconsciously so. His proposition would be that "nineteen centuries have proved that Christianity is the only religion which has the power of regeneration for a man or for a nation." This proposition is never argued, with the possible exception of the introductory chapter on the "Philosophy of Christian Missions." There is, however, a cumulative presentation of the truth of the proposition. The book is not a history of missions, such as Warneck's or Merriam's. It is rather a presentation, as the title promises, of the salient epochs in missionary advance, grouped about the personality of the men who were the leaders in the various periods, as is indicated by the chapter headings. But the book is really a study of a phase of history for the purpose of arriving at principles. And here lies its value. Uhlhorn and Ratzinger in their *Geschichte der christlichen Liebesthätigkeit* and *Geschichte der kirchlichen Armenpflege* have given us some historical sketches which miss the point, for the reason that they are written for the purpose of defending the claims of the protestant or Roman systems of

¹ *The Divine Right of Missions; Or, Christianity the World-Religion and the Right of the Church to Propagate It.* A Study in Comparative Religion. By Henry C. Mabie. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. 117 pages. 50 cents net.

² *Christian Epoch-Makers.* The Story of the Great Missionary Eras in the History of Christianity. By Henry C. Vedder. Philadelphia: The Griffith & Rowland Press. x+368 pages. \$1.20 net.

ecclesiasticism. Doctor Vedder is not primarily concerned with defense, as just noted, but his very presentation of methods and demonstration of merit and demerit, makes this book a valuable apologetic. And what is still better, it preserves the method of proper scientific inquiry. His treatment of the great Romanist missionaries is as sympathetic as is that of the evangelicals. In connection with the chapter on Schwartz, Doctor Vedder argues for a very limited emphasis on mission schools, owing to competition with governmental institutions, and gives it as his conviction that over-emphasis on mission schools may frustrate the ends of evangelism. In connection with the chapter on Zinzendorf there are some generalizations as to missionary methods and ministerial professionalism, which are well worth careful perusal. The treatment of the Franciscan Tertiaries as a socializing influence is especially noteworthy. The case of Mohammedanism vs. Christianity is stated in burning words in the chapter on Livingstone. The value of this book lies in the bringing together in a unique manner of a vast mass of materials, in their lucid interpretation, and in the really fine generalizations, which are interpolated without obtrusiveness.

HUGO P. J. SELINGER

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

BRIEF MENTION

La liberté intellectuelle après l'Encyclique Pascendi. Lettre de Mgr. L'Evêque de Beauvais à un Député. Paris: Bauchesne, 1908. 43 pages. Fr. 0.80.

A vindication from the Roman Catholic point of view, of this remarkable pronouncement. Modernism, which confines itself to the phenomenal, must be condemned, the Thomasian philosophy must be established, the church is right—has been right for 2,000 years—and “the bark of Peter will sail securely on.”

PETAVEL-OLLIFF, E. *Une réforme urgente dans l'enseignement Évangélique.*

Lettre ouverte à M. le pasteur R. Saillens. Reprint from the February issue of the *Revue Chrétienne*. Paris: Fischbacher. 1908. 15 pages.

A plea for reinvestigation of conditional immortality, fortified by the standard “proof texts” and the usual arguments of sanity, tranquillity, and candor.

SETON, ERNEST THOMPSON. *The Natural History of the Ten Commandments*
New York: Scribner, 1907. 78 pages. \$0.50.

The famous “nature faker” here invades the realm of theology and “proves” that “maybe in the instinct of the brute in extremity . . . we have the root of what has come to fruit in the Realm of Light.”

TEMPLETON, J. S. *A Layman's Mind on Creed and Church*. London: Macmillan, 1906. vii+228 pages. 3s. 6d.

An interesting contribution to the "Wee Church Controversy" by an intelligent carpet manufacturer, to which are appended the Westminster confession and Declaratory Acts.

PAULIN, GEORGE. *No Struggle for Existence; No Natural Selection*. A critical examination of the fundamental principles of the Darwinian Theory. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner, 1908. xx+261 pages. \$1.75 net.

This is a book by a mature scholar, written for the purpose of establishing the Lamarckian theory against the Darwinian. The second part of the book is devoted to a reactionary refutation of the Malthusian doctrine of population.

CARRICK, J. C. *Wycliffe and The Lollards*. ("The World's Epoch-Makers Series.") New York: Scribner, 1908. x+329 pages. \$1.25 net.

This is a scholarly treatment, condensed and highly attractive. The treatment is conventional and characterized throughout by a belligerent attitude toward Romanism. The last part gives a very fine, concise statement of the work of the reforming councils, which in the author's opinion are due to the "ne'er-ending influence of Wycliffe."

APPY, F. *Pacification sociale*. Paris: Daragon, 1907. 64 pages. Fr. 1.

Another Christian socialist has a message in three essays on the relations of capital and labor, population and wealth, and the resources of settling strikes.

MATHESON, GEORGE. *The Representative Women of the Bible*. New York: Armstrong, 1907. 269 pages. \$1.50 net.

A posthumous and really unfinished work of the eloquent blind preacher of Edinburgh. These studies have that mystical insight and charm, which lovers of Matheson know so well. They are not of course critical expositions. They are essays on womanhood.

CRAPSEY, ALGERNON SIDNEY. *The Rebirth of Religion*. Being an account of the Passing of the Old and Coming of the New Dogmatic. New York: Lane, 1907. 323 pages.

The subtitle sufficiently describes the book. The author discusses the present unrest in England and America, which he ascribes to the dying of the immoral conceptions of religion and the coming of the new and the true.

JEFFERSON, CHARLES E. *The New Crusade*. New York. Crowell, 1907. 290 pages. \$1.50 net.

Popular and practical occasional sermons and addresses by the pastor of the Broadway Tabernacle, New York.

JONES, JENKIN LLOYD. *Love and Loyalty*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1907. xi+454 pages. \$1.50 net.

The pastor of All Souls Church, Chicago, conducts a confirmation class every

year and at the time of "graduation" preaches a class sermon upon the motto of the class. The sermons of twenty-two years are here published. They are models of their type, fresh, simple, poetic, striking the true note, deeply religious.

TIPPLE, EZRA SQUIER. *Drew Sermons on the Golden Texts for 1908*. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1907. vi+312 pages. \$1.25 net.

The Faculty and some forty graduates of Drew Theological Seminary have written these sermons on the Sunday School Golden Texts. It is questionable whether this is the most practical way of serving the Sunday school.

GOODELL, CHARLES L. *Pastoral and Personal Evangelism*. New York: Revell, 1907. 221 pages. \$1.00 net.

An earnest and significant message of a Methodist minister of New York, who has had remarkable success in winning men and women to the Christian life.

HAYNES, J. A. *Social and Religious Ideals*. New York: Scribners, 1907. 168 pages. \$1.

A book of short and unrelated essays, expressions of moods, all rising, however, from "full sympathy with that movement of religious life which is finding its interpretation in what is known as the New Theology." There is an effort to establish a just balance between "personal and social values."

IVERACH, JAMES. *The Other Side of Greatness and Other Sermons*. New York: Armstrong, 1906. 269 pages. \$1.50.

A book of pastoral sermons, in which the elements of teaching and comfort are prominent.

CAMPBELL, R. J. *New Theology Sermons*. New York: Macmillan, 1907. xiii+294 pages. \$1.25 net.

The pastor of the City Temple preaches his new theology from the Bible. He discusses his texts with great freedom, pointing out the limitations of view and the geocentric conceptions of the writers. He brings forth, sometimes perhaps in too much detail, the critical difficulties. But he is a true preacher, and can go back to the great spiritual experiences of prophets, apostles, and Christ, and in them find stirring messages for today. Mr. Campbell believes himself in very close essential agreement with Christ and Paul when he is most in disagreement with modern orthodoxy. These sermons are a very interesting exhibition of the homiletic possibilities of what Mr. Campbell reluctantly calls the new theology.

BLACK, HUGH. *Christ's Service of Love*. New York: Revell, 1907. 324 pages. \$1.25 net.

Professor Black believes in the high value of the Communion Service. These sermons are not controversial but are designed for devotional reading.

MORRISON, G. H. *Glasgow Addresses*. New York: Armstrong, 1907. xii+328 pages.

Thirty-one brief evening sermons preached in Glasgow. Mr. Morrison believes that the preacher should deal with weightier matters in his morning discourses and with simple themes, handled briefly and suggestively, at his second service. The biblical interpretations are somewhat poetic.

GARVIE, A. E. *A Guide to Preachers*. New York: Armstrong, 1906. xv+352 pages. \$1.50 net.

Professor Garvie has prepared this suggestive and eminently sane work for the men of limited education who desire to make themselves useful as lay preachers, of whom there are a much larger number in England than in America. The book covers in outline the whole subject of homiletics. It would be an excellent text book for many of our training schools, for while it is simple, it is based on sound scholarship.

CLASSEN, W. F. *Suchen wir einen neuen Gott?* Tübingen: Mohr, 1907. 51 pages. M. 0.80.

This is one of the well-known series of "Lebensfragen," edited by Weinel. It consists of an exchange of letters between a young artisan who has become a social democrat and imbibed anti-Christian principles, a clerk who is of a rather romantic temperament, and an older and more cultured man who explains and defends the Christian religion as he understands it. Some of the customary objections to Christianity, especially along the line of Christian theism, are brought forward and answered. Some readers would not always agree with the defender of the faith in his way of meeting objections, but in many cases the replies are well put and effective. It is, however, a popular presentation, and will appeal rather to the poetic than to the logical mind. The death of a common friend of the *dramatis personae* lends its aid to the side of God and religion.

GÖMBEL, KARL. *Vernunft und Gottesgedanke*. Ein Beitrag zur Apologetik. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1907. 188 pages. M. 3.60.

The object of this book is to exhibit the rationality of the idea of God, and also briefly to indicate the relation of Jesus and his religion to this idea. The work is based on the Kantian philosophy, and the author's method is to expound the fundamental principles of this philosophy as set forth in the *Pure Reason*, and in the *Practical Reason*, and at the same time to introduce at certain points what he regards as necessary corrective and supplementary elements. He also broadens the discussion by showing how reason works in the regions of language, custom, civilization, literature, morals, and the state. The pure reason cannot prove the existence of God, but this idea brings unity and harmony into the world-whole, and is a postulate of the practical reason. Jesus comes, and by his person and work makes God known. Men see in him the divine life and believe in God. The author is apparently an adherent of the Ritschlian school, but to which wing of the school he should be assigned it is difficult to say. He expresses a belief in the miracles and resurrection of Jesus, but his words are ambiguous, and to what extent he would admit a supernatural element in these events cannot be determined from the text. The writer has a strong grasp of the Kantian philosophy, and the exceptions he takes to it are generally with reference to features

that are often criticized. The work is a good presentation of the subject from the writer's viewpoint.

HOPPE, EDMUND. *Naturerkenntnis und Christentum*. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1907. 104 pages. M. 0.80.

This brochure is the first issue of a series of *biblische Volksbücher* projected by a number of professors and pastors in different parts of Germany. The series is entitled, *Für Gottes Wort und Luthers Lehr*, and is, therefore, avowedly apologetic and even polemic. The pamphlet before us discusses the question whether there are any grounds in our knowledge of nature which make belief in the Christian's God impossible. The author treats all his topics *de novo*, beginning with the fundamental principles of epistemology and psychology, and passing to the meaning of natural law in physical science. He considers the evidence for the existence of God, his relation to the world, the problem of the person of Christ, and the question of the relation of miracles to the Christian faith. He exhibits an accurate knowledge of philosophy as well as of physical science, and says a good deal along the line of Christian Evidence that is true and valuable. His attitude toward miracles is that the disciples arrived at the conviction through experience, not through speculation, that Jesus was God; miracles, therefore, were natural to him. In the same way, we believe through our own spiritual experience today in Jesus as the Son of God, and therefore miracles become credible to us. In thus placing the consideration of the internal before that of the external evidence, the author is in harmony with the more modern apologetic procedure. He has taken, however, a surprising position with reference to the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus—basing belief in it upon a prior belief in the Virgin Birth. Because Jesus was born of a virgin, his body is taken out of the category of ordinary bodies and of natural law, and we may, therefore, believe in its resurrection!

ARNAL, ANDRÉ. *La philosophie religieuse de Charles Renouvier*. Paris: Fischbacher, 1907. 335 pages. Fr. 7.50.

Arnal's *La philosophie religieuse de Charles Renouvier* calls attention to one whose philosophic method was striking. Its point of departure was the antinomies of Kant. Mathematical critique led Renouvier to reject the infinite of quantity, to reduce the potentially infinite to the indefinite and to conserve only the infinite of quality. The absolute he rejected. He declared that atheism did not exclude true theism and called himself an atheist. His God is personality possessing a non-localized body and having a beginning in time. He believed in moral but not in physical intervention in the world by Deity. He inclined to a pantheistic view of immortality. His view of the origin of evil is quite fantastic.

MILLARD, B. A. *The Quest of the Infinite, or The Place of Reason and Mystery in Religious Experience*. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1907. 206 pages. \$0.75 net.

Millard in "The Quest of the Infinite" presents an apologetic based upon religious experience. He rejects all authority and aims "to show religion is not in its essence theological however useful and necessary theology may be on its scientific side." The surest ground of faith "is simple experience, the experience of each

individual." God is known through this experience and not through logical definition. The only essential is experience; all other is non-essential. The book is popular in style yet carefully wrought. It will be found worthy of attention.

McCONNELL, F. J. *The Diviner Immanence*. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1906. 159 pages. \$0.75 net.

"The Diviner Immanence," as defined by McConnell, is a moral rather than a physical sense of immanence. God is "near" to man in loving thought and purpose. The author acknowledges his indebtedness to Bowne. The discussion applies the theory of a diviner immanence to the interpretation of various phases of religious thought.

BALLARD, FRANK. *Christian Essentials*. A Restatement for the People of Today. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1908. xviii+354 pages. \$1.50 net.

Ballard's *Christian Essentials* curiously mingles several types of thinking. He denies that essential Christianity is "mere dogma however carefully, earnestly, scientifically formulated." Yet much of modern theology is not Christian, whatever else it may be. The criterion is to be reasonable and inevitable inferences from the New Testament records. But this criterion he applies dogmatically both in accepting and rejecting views.

HENDERSON, A. R. *God and Man in the Light of Today*. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1907. viii+293 pages. \$1.25 net.

The title *God and Man in the Light of Today* chosen by Henderson is misleading. One finds a series of sermonical treatments of theological themes without special thoroughness of thought. However attractive in a popular way they are of no interest to the student.

GARDOIL, A. *La crédibilité et l'apologétique*. Paris: Lecoffre, 1908. viii+299 pages. Fr. 3.50.

Gardoil treats "La crédibilité et l'apologétique" from the point of view of the Thomists. His book is interesting mostly as a modern unfolding of the doctrine of Thomas. It confesses its dependence upon the acceptance of the theory of knowledge taught by him. For that very reason it is at variance with modern positions.

WHEELER, HENRY. *History and Exposition of the Twenty-Five Articles of Religion of the Methodist Episcopal Church*. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1908. 392 pages. \$2 net.

A traditional, "confessional," treatment of the Twenty-Five Articles as an exhaustive creedal statement of Methodist doctrine. The Articles are given a limiting authority and finality that Mr. Wesley possibly never intended, and inconsistent with the genius of Methodism. Mr. Wesley's critical "touch" in adapting the Thirty-Nine Articles to his own conceptions of Christian truth, and the needs of the Church in his age seems here regarded also as an "inspired" touch that transmutes its material into a statement of faith official, authoritative, and complete. The book contains a brief introduction by Bishop Warren, a preliminary account of the Articles, a parallel

presentation of the Thirty-Nine Articles with Wesley's abridgment, and as the body of the work, a discussion of each article verbatim, giving origin, aim, and exposition. The book lacks a concluding chapter.

TILLET, WILBUR F. *A Statement of the Faith of World-Wide Methodism*. Nashville, Tenn.: Smith & Lamar, 1906. 71 pages. \$0.20.

An earnest and scholarly plea for a common up-to-date statement of the faith of Methodism on the ground of the inadequacy of the Twenty-Five Articles and the difficulty of ascertaining from scattered sources a clear notion of Methodist teaching. Various branches of Methodism are invited, in accordance with action of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, to co-operate in formulating a confessional statement that shall express present thought in present-day language. The advantages and disadvantages of having creeds are well discussed. While the author points out the unwisdom of forcing the theological definitions of a former age on the present, he guards against making a present statement a handicap to future thinking by emphasizing the function of a creed as pedagogical and inspirational rather than legalistic and absolute.

FAULKNER, ALFRED. *The Socialism of John Wesley*. London: Culley, 1908.

BALLARD, FRANK. *Christian Churches and the Modern Outlook*. London: Culley, 1908. 32 pages. 2 cents.

These two recent "Social Tracts for the Times" are significant of the movement for church socialization now prevalent in England. Professor Faulkner argues that although Wesley was not a socialist, yet he believed that riches have an inevitable tendency to corrupt; he had the Tory optimism that the ruling powers wish well to those governed, and that in the latter's independence they have no more liberty than they had before; that men have the right to full civil liberty; the chief thing is the kingdom of God and his righteousness.

Doctor Ballard reviews the place of the church in public esteem and summons it to rise to its opportunity and responsibility in the social situation.

HOFFMAN, F. S. *The Sphere of Religion: A Consideration of Its Nature and of Its Influence upon the Progress of Civilization*. New York: Putnam, 1908. 387 pages. \$1.75.

The subtitle of this book exhibits its aim, and, in a sense, its nature. It seeks to give, in 387 short pages, a summary of religion and all its relations to the various activities of life, for the benefit of the busy general reader. Its merit lies in its attempt to give an inclusive, bird's-eye view of a large field. It has the defects of its qualities,—and also some others, the most unfortunate of which is a careless and inexact use of the word "religion," which is sometimes identified with all that is ideal and excellent, or with the practical recognition of some—any—"power nor ourselves pervading the universe," and at other times is used in the orthodox sense as referring to "the Almighty," the "infinite mind that created" all things. The book contains many important facts about religion which all should know, and those to whom these facts are unknown should certainly read it, or its equivalent. To say so in this place, however, is irrelevant; for one can hardly reach the class of persons referred to through the pages of the *American Journal of Theology*.

MÉRIDIÉ, LOUIS. *Grégoire de Nysse: Discours catéchétique*. Texte grec, traduction, française, et index. ["Textes et Documents pour l'étude historique du Christianisme."] Paris: Picard, 1908. 212 pages. Fr. 3.

The Paris series of texts and documents for the historical study of Christianity has already given us half a dozen little volumes of patristic texts in Greek and Latin, with French translations, and explanatory essays, under the general editorship of Hemmer and LeJay. Justin, Eusebius, the Apostolic Fathers, and Tertullian, have been treated, at least in part, in these highly attractive little volumes. The recent renewal of interest in patristic studies, Greek, Latin, and Oriental, in French circles is most gratifying, and is already proving very fruitful, and this series of "Textes et Documents" is one of its most practical features. The *Catechetical Discourse* is reckoned the most important of Gregory's apologetic writings. It is designed to supply to Christian catechists a defensive statement of the main Christian positions. It occupies a significant place in the history of dogma, and exhibits Gregory's well-known indebtedness to Origen. In printing the text of the *Discourse* Méridier follows the recent critical edition of Srawley (Cambridge, 1903), prefacing it with introductory essays on the life of Gregory and on the *Catechetical Discourse*, and with a compact body of explanatory notes. The Greek text is accompanied on the opposite page with a French translation, and a brief index concludes the book. The editor has not undertaken to make any new contribution to the textual or historical criticism of the *Discourse*. The volume is rather intended, like others of the series, to make important patristic works, with the results already attained in their study, accessible to larger circles of students. As such a manual-edition, it promises to be convenient and useful.

DURAND, P. A. *L'enfance de Jésus-Christ d'après les Evangiles Canoniques, suivie d'une étude sur les Frères du Seigneur*. Paris: Beauchesne, 1908. xli+287 pages. Fr. 2.50.

The purpose of the author, a member of the Society of Jesus, is to ascertain what historical reasons the Catholic has for holding strictly to the dogma that "Jesus Christ was conceived of the Holy Spirit and was born of the Virgin Mary." M. Durand recognizes something of the difficulties of his task, but he has hardly met the serious ones with any considerable measure of satisfaction, and his discussion often becomes essentially dogmatic rather than historical and scientific. Nevertheless the work offers suggestions which are interesting and perhaps to some degree fruitful even when they are not convincing.

MARSHALL, WILLIAM. *The Nature of Christ: or, The Christology of the Scriptures and of Christ*. London: Elliot Stock, 1908. x+237 pages. 3s. 6d.

This is the third edition, "revised and enlarged," of the author's work of the same title published in 1896. The book assumes to lay "a broad and deep foundation for a new Theology," but one "vastly different" from that of R. J. Campbell and similar writers. The author is eminently devout, but his point of view is dogmatic rather than historical, and the reader who is looking seriously for information on the subject presented will not gain the help which he desires.

KELLY, WILLIAM. *An Exposition of the Gospel of John*. Edited, with additions, by E. E. Whitfield. London: Elliot Stock, 1908. x+552 pages. 7s. 6d.

Mr. Whitfield offers a new edition of the late Mr. Kelly's work which was first published in 1898. The point of view and the substance of the contents have not been materially changed. The discussion is a devotional comment rather than a historical exposition. It will not lead to better understanding of the origin and meaning of the fourth gospel, but some, if not many, will undoubtedly find its pages conducive to religious meditation.

RICHTER, G. *Ипос 'Ропалоу. Die Epistel Pauli an die Römer verdeutsch und erlüttert*. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1907. 90 pages. M. 1.50.

In this modest monograph we have four things: An analysis of the letter; a German rendering of the letter, which, by its divisions, shows the analysis; exegetical and text-critical notes; explanatory notes. It is a suggestive and useful piece of work.

CREMER, E. *Rechtfertigung und Wiedergeburt* [Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie]. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1907. 163 pages.

The essay is divided into two parts. In the first the author discusses the conception of regeneration in Luther, in the creeds, and in the Lutheran and Reformed dogmatics, describing how the emphasis has moved, in the process of time, from objective faith to subjective experience. "No longer does justification guarantee regeneration, but regeneration guarantees justification" (p. 69). In the second part, regeneration is treated from the New Testament point of view. This treatment leads to the conclusion that Lutheran doctrine has suffered greatly by the separation of regeneration from justification. "Justification is regeneration" (p. 163).

KELLY, WILLIAM. *An Exposition of the Gospel of Mark*. Edited, with additions, by E. E. Whitfield. London: Elliot Stock, 1907. vi+282 pages. 5s.

The work is a posthumous volume prepared from lectures and notes left by Mr. Kelly and intended by him to furnish the material for a separate publication. The editor has endeavored to carry out the purpose of the author. The "Introduction" is devoted chiefly to the "divine design" of the gospel, two statements of which show the author's point of view: "All we contend for is the divine character of indisputable Scripture." The differences between the four gospels are "the beautiful and instructive effect and evidence of God's varied designs." Accordingly, the reader will not expect to find a historical interpretation of the evangelist's language, but rather a devotional appreciation.

JACKSON, HENRY LATIMER. *The Fourth Gospel and Some Recent German Criticism*. Cambridge: The University Press, 1906. xiv+247. 3s. 6d. net.

The author, an English clergyman, here gathers the results of his study of the problems connected with the fourth gospel. He grants that he has not offered any contribution to the subject, and his presentation is intended to be popular, the material having first been used in addresses to his congregation. For this reason, perhaps,

the style and the manner of presenting the material are loose, in some cases apparently careless. Aside from this defect, the work is a brief but comprehensive and suggestive presentation of recent views of the problems of the fourth gospel.

DICKEY, SAMUEL. *The Position of Greek in the Theological Education of Today*. Chicago: Privately printed, 1907. 45 pages.

Under this title we have the address delivered by Professor Dickey on his inauguration into the chair of New Testament Literature and Exegesis in McCormick Theological Seminary, Chicago, together with the charge addressed to him. He finds the outlook "decidedly discouraging," for everywhere Greek is giving place to other subjects in the colleges, and the students who enter the theological seminaries are correspondingly deficient in Greek attainments. But Greek is necessary, he thinks, for understanding the New Testament. To meet the situation, there must be a "reorganization of the entire curriculum upon a group system," with Hebrew and Greek elective and no student allowed to begin both languages at the same time.

PREUSCHEN, EDWIN. *Die philologische Arbeit an den älteren Kirchenlehren und ihre Bedeutung für die Theologie* [Vorträge der theologischen Konferenz zu Giessen]. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1907. 48 pages. M. 1.20.

Dr. Preuschen here traces succinctly the history of the publication of the Church Fathers from the discovery of the art of printing to the present time, showing the character of the texts of the various editors and the special significance of each. As might be expected from a work of Dr. Preuschen, the pamphlet serves admirably, though in brief compass, the purpose which its title indicates.

Pastoralblätter für Homiletik, Katechetik und Seelsorge. Herausgegeben von PASTOR LIC. THEOL. NEUBERG. Dresden: C. L. Ungelenk, 1907.

The number for October, 1907, is the semi-centennial jubilee number of this fine homiletical journal. It contains an important historical review of the last 50 years of homiletical journal-making in Germany, and some exceptionally fine sermons on important subjects, e. g., "How May the Clergyman Maintain His Joy of Office?" "Christianity and the Humanistic Education," "The Evangelical Movement in Bohemia." The book reviews, too, are excellently done.

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
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
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