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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL  
OF SOCIOLOGY



THE AMERICAN JOURNAL  
OF  
SOCIOLOGY

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# THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

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JULY, 1905

NUMBER I

## A DECADE OF SOCIOLOGY

### EDITORIAL

The launching of this *Journal*, ten years ago, was a leap in the dark. The editors were well aware that it was a reckless experiment. Disinterested observers in abundance at once gave ample evidence of unfaltering trust that the rash venture would soon meet the usual fate of attempts to supply a non-existent demand.

The most serious pitfall in the path of the enterprise was not the absence of demand, but the presence of an unintelligent and misguided demand. A very large constituency might be gathered by a journal that would cater to popular interest in air-castle architecture. A large fraction of the earlier subscribers to this *Journal* were evidently of the genus rainbow-chaser. They wanted a spring-board that would land them in Utopia.

On the other hand, the competent thinkers among whom a journal of sociology should seek its constituency were mostly preoccupied with other interests. Many of them were students of social problems from points of view which could not readily adjust themselves to a change of perspective. Philosophers, psychologists, theologians, historians, economists, political scientists, moralists, reformers, each for his own type of reason, regarded sociology very much as physicians and surgeons look at "Christian Science."

More significant than either of these factors was the situation of sociology itself, which no one intimately interested had the stoicism frankly to admit. Sociology was in fact nothing more than wistful advertisement of a hiatus in knowledge. It was a peering after an eighth color in the spectrum, or a fourth dimension of space. Only here and there a perverse spirit betrayed longings for such unattainables, and it was not to be expected that the few irregulars could win over responsible members of society to patronage of their vagaries. Although wise books had been written in the interest of sociology, books that will be read for many years to come, the sad fact was that no sociologist had quite found himself, or, if he thought he had, he could not give a convincing account of himself to others. Sociology was a science without a problem, a method, or a message. The many confident prophesyings in the name of sociology, but conflicting with each other, served not to mitigate the case, but to aggravate it. Our purpose is not to describe the differences that a decade has wrought from the publisher's standpoint, but to indicate some evident changes in the status of sociology itself.

In the first place, the sociologists understand themselves and each other much better than they did ten years ago. It would be premature to say that they have come to an agreement about their problems, and their methods, if not about their message. There is at least more ability among them to act on the assumption that "he who is not against us is on our part." There is more readiness to admit that the man who states sociological problems in terms different from those which we prefer is still promoting the same search for knowledge to which we are committed. There is more keenness to welcome good work, and to grant that it fits into a vacant place, even if it is not the kind of work that we most value. Whether we have a formula for it or not, we have a more catholic instinct of the range that sociological research must occupy, and we are more ready to hail as fellow-laborers types of workers whose particular interests and presumptions and methods vary widely from our own.

In the second place, there is not merely a sympathetic gain,

but there has been a marked increase in actual co-operation. A decade ago the isolation of sociologists from each other was pitifully amateurish. Comte, and LePlay, and Lilienfeld, and Spencer, and Schäffle, and Ward had been first free-lances, then standard bearers of groups that were more conscious of differences than of common interests. Younger men had meanwhile caught the scent and were following more or less independent trails. In the retrospect, in comparison with their present attitude, the sociologists of ten years ago seem to have been much more engaged in getting their own personal credentials accepted than in coming into touch with their peers for mutual support in united effort. Meanwhile each of them has learned that others besides himself have promising clues and are reaching results. They are less ready to cry a piece of work up or down because it makes for or against their own preconception of society. They are more ready to accept from any source, for what it is worth, any sort of critical study of social relations. The literature of the subject, in whatever country produced, shows respectful attention to more different types of investigation than it did ten years ago. There have been notable additions to our bibliographical apparatus. The *Institut International de Sociologie* has been remarkably successful in promoting interchange between sociologists of different countries. The Sociological Society of London is good evidence of like progress within a narrower area; and a promising movement is on foot to form a similar society in the United States.

In the third place, there is evident increase of the sociological public. We cannot tell whether there is increase or decrease in the number of people who use the term "sociology" as the name for their belief in an occult art of compounding social cure-alls. Not confusing any of these with genuine students of society, we have no trouble in detecting an enlargement of the circle in which there is intelligent interest in the facts and the laws of social cause and effect. Ten years ago we spoke of the present as "the era of sociology."<sup>1</sup> We used the phrase with the meaning that more people than ever before are thinking about their

<sup>1</sup> *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 1.



situation as less satisfactory than it might be, and trying to hit upon means of changing it for the better. It would be extravagant to claim that the words may now be interpreted in a stricter sense. There is not yet a body of technical sociologists large enough to give distinctive character to a period, as the physical scientists have to the past century, and the biologists in particular to the last half-century. More people are in evidence, however, than there were ten years ago, who are willing to consider social relations in the light of all that can be discovered about them, by comparison with similar relations under all the other circumstances in which they can be traced. More people believe that it is worth while to pursue these large generalizations, and to organize them into a fundamental social science.

It would be easy to specify numerous particulars in which there has been approach toward consensus among the sociologists, but it would be less easy to prove that our judgment about these items is correct. Without taking the risk of mistaking individual opinion for general consent, we merely observe, first, that the number of details passing into the rank of accepted sociological results is as great as could fairly be expected so early in the history of a science; and, second, it is safe to predict that a considerable body of principles will have been provisionally accepted by the sociologists before the close of another decade.

At all events, there is no doubt worth mention that the viewpoint from which the technical sociologists observe social facts has already become essentially one and the same. Whatever their specific hypotheses in explanation of social phenomena, they all refer the facts to the same psychic forces, operating in the same physical environment. They all regard human experience as the evolution of human choices, conditioned by both the controllable and the uncontrollable factors of physical nature. In other words, the attitude of the sociologists toward their problems is precisely that of chemist, or physicist, or physiologist toward his. In either case the problem is to discover the particular relations of cause and effect involved in a given situation. Of course, sociology is far behind the older sciences in making out the specific causal relations to which it is devoted. On the other hand, it



is doubtful if the record of any science contains a decade of more secure progress in formulating real problems, or in clearing off the methodological dead-work that must in every case be out of the way before close investigation can begin.

It is an open question whether the progress of sociology is not most conspicuous in evident changes of mind and heart among representatives of the older social sciences. Many scholars of the first rank, who would deny that they are so poor as to do reverence to sociology, have given ample unconscious proof that they accept the sociological premises, without having followed them out to inevitable conclusions. The social logic which the sociologists have undertaken to discover has revealed itself to such an extent to many philosophers, historians, and economists, that their ways of stating their own particular conclusions betray essential agreement with the fundamental position of the sociologists. Generalizations upon which the latter are working directly have impressed other scholars indirectly. These are taking the ideas for granted, usually without putting them into definite terms, and without recognizing their necessary implications. The sociologists, on the contrary, are deliberately analyzing these ideas, and following out their pointings, to see what they mean in the way of explaining concrete social conditions.

It is easy therefore today, as it would not have been ten years ago, to make the *ad hominem* argument convict these scholars of stultifying themselves, if they do not concede that their own reasoning leads to the precise division of labor which the sociologists have undertaken. In other words, a decade ago the sociologists were at best poachers in fields supposed to be fully occupied by scholars of other types. Today the function of sociologists, among the scholars in those fields, is challenged only by those who have stopped short of thinking through the process involved in reaching complete knowledge of human relations.

A single change of perspective between sociology and other divisions of social science deserves specific mention. Ten years ago it was assumed that there was peculiar rivalry between sociology and economics. Today the sociologist or the economist who should betray belief that the two disciplines are really

antagonistic would be classed as a survival. The relation between sociology and economics is not competitive, but complementary, and the fact is now taken for granted by scholars in both fields, with exceptions as rare as they are unfortunate. In the end there can be but one political economy, just as there can be but one calculus and chemistry and physiology. Neither can there be at last more than one sociology. Political economy can never maintain a sociology peculiar to itself, nor sociology a peculiar political economy. The economic and the sociological problems are not alternatives, but part and whole. If political economy should become a body of formulas as unalterable as the multiplication table, it would still be, like the multiplication table, an abstraction. If the last word were said about the economies of wealth, it would still be only a single term in the larger problem of sociology, viz.: What is the *meaning* of the economies of wealth in the total economy of life? Within the past decade this relation has become common knowledge, and has thus dropped out of the list of questions for debate. The men who do not know it have simply not arrived.

Meanwhile the relation between sociology and history has come to be a live issue. Broadly speaking, the historians today seem to be of two types: first, those who treat history as science; second, those who cultivate it as an art. The latter are merely phenomena to the sociologists, not colaborers. Between the former and the sociologists there are mutual and interdependent interests. Failure to define and adjust these relations is the most obvious reproach upon present social science. The sociologists have no more urgent task than that of closing the gap between themselves and the scientific historians.

By a law of association which need not be justified, we would group among favorable signs even the testimonies which many scholars utter against sociology. There is internal evidence in most of these cases that the objections are based on insufficient knowledge of the sociological argument. Much of the depreciation of sociology, and opposition to it, is in itself conclusive proof that there is need of the precise type of work which the sociologists are trying to do.

One of the most respected clergymen in the United States wrote not long ago in a private letter :

I am free to say that I do not expect much from sociology. The moral life of man is old, and one of the greatest books upon the moral life of mankind is the *Ethics* of Aristotle, written fifty years before Christ. Thinkers make a mistake, in my judgment, in supposing that because the cosmos is new, and surprising, therefore, in its revelations through modern science, the moral and spiritual life of mankind is new; and that philosophical interpretations of that moral and spiritual life based upon history and experience are premature. I cannot agree to that position.

We would condemn ourselves neither by belittling Aristotle nor by admitting that explanation of human life stopped with him. In order to fall into either error, one must misknow both Aristotle and modern positive philosophy. There is as much difference between Aristotle's static version of the world and the modern process-conception as there is between an eight-day clock and the evolution of species.

The fact that a profound and progressive thinker can write the last part of the paragraph we have quoted, under the impression that it impeaches recent sociology, is the best sort of index that our field is white for the harvest.

The time is past for wasting effort in arguing that the sociological point of view must have cumulative influence upon every division of social science and social art. So much progress has been made in preliminary survey of the social process as a whole, that it will not be much longer possible for ostensible explanation of any fraction of human affairs to obtain credit, unless that fraction is accounted for as a part of the whole social process. There is no such reality as an abstraction in human experience. Everything, from the most rarefied image in the mind of a philosopher to the most weighty affair of state, is merely a more or less complex mesh in a concrete fabric of human relations. We are children playing with blocks, if we suppose we can account for parts of life without giving due credit to the rest of life.

Reduced to its lowest terms, the argument of the sociologists is: We have not been thinking things through to the end. We



are satisfied with cutting human experience up into little chunks, that may be seen and handled with ease. We are uttering wise-sounding saws about these fragments of things, but we are not ferreting out the ultimate connections of things by which they are related as wholes. The entire range of time and space occupied by human beings is a continuum filled with unbroken persistence of human interests toward satisfaction. Every occurrence of human life is a function of all the social forces engaged in this ceaseless effort to express themselves. To explain society, we must be able to state every type of occurrence that takes place in human association in terms of the ultimate elements, namely, purpose-reactions in the individuals that are factors in the occurrences. Only here and there a person has discovered the difference between this sort of explanation and mere photographing of wide fields of unexplained events by means of essentially descriptive formulation. In other words, the work of causal explanation in the field of social phenomena has just reached the stage of discrimination between mere repetition of the circumstances in a phrase or formula that is explanatory in form, but in essence only a descriptive generalization of the things to be explained, and, on the other hand, actual identification and measurement of the involved factors.

Looking toward the future it is easy to distinguish two lines of development which can hardly fail to characterize the social sciences in general, and especially those workers in pure or applied social science who fully adopt the sociological viewpoint. In the first place, the work of analyzing social processes will encounter subgroups of problems, upon which research must become more and more specialized beyond any limit that can be foreseen. Sociology as pure science must necessarily repeat in a way the experience of biology. On the basis of a fundamental conception of process, it must differentiate many groups of problems relating to particular processes.<sup>2</sup> Probably the tradition of applying the term "science" to work and results in connection with an abstracted group of problems, will remain in force. As

<sup>2</sup> For illustrations, *vide* the papers of Professors Thomas and Ross, in this *Journal*, Vol. X, pp. 445 and 456.

in the case of biology the generic name for the organic sciences has lost all specific content, while real work in biology is distinguished by one of the many subtitles, so it will be in sociology. We shall have an increasing number of investigators, all contributing toward the ultimate desideratum—knowledge of the whole social process—but each concentrating attention upon selected elements or phases or types of social processes.

In the second place, applied sociology, or “social technology,” will progressively accredit itself in functions that have relations to pure sociology closely analogous with those of public hygiene to biology. The notion of an ideal social condition, in the statical sense, can never again secure even *quasi*-scientific endorsement. *Progressive functional adaptation to conditions that change in the course of the functioning* is human destiny. The ultimate art of life will be the utmost skill in adjusting conduct to the evolving conditions of this process. There will be increasing work and demand for men trained in knowledge of social processes in general. There will be a vocation for them in pointing out the particular failures of adaptation in given situations, and in showing how ascertained means of adjustment may be employed to best advantage.

The type of constructive influence that genuine sociologists will exert in the future will not be that of the ideologist, but rather, in the expressive German phrase, that of a “helper-of-births.” Our present means of studying society will teach us more and more credible signs that ideas, feelings, purposes are in travail, and we shall learn more and more skill in removing obstacles that resist the forces of life. The whole tendency of sociology, both pure and applied, is to educate away from irrational dogmatism toward rational opportunism. Ten years ago the sociologists were not quite sure how to answer the men who would make an end of the whole matter with the dictum, “You cannot change society.” Today we know that nothing can arrest the incessant change which we call society. Our problem—the eternal human problem—is to understand as much as we may of the change, while we are factors of it, and to do our

part toward turning the forces of reconstruction in the most profitable directions.

We shall neither boast of the share of this *Journal* in the development of sociology during the past ten years, nor shall we profess to believe that it has been inconsiderable. Whatever may be the due appraisal of its past, the second decade of its work begins with confidence that the sociologists have a mission among the interpreters of life, and with a renewed pledge of the utmost endeavor to promote their labors, and to enlarge the circle of thinkers who will pay due attention to their results.



# STUDIES IN EUGENICS<sup>1</sup>

FRANCIS GALTON, F.R.S., D.C.L., SC.D.  
London

## I. RESTRICTIONS IN MARRIAGE

It is proposed in the following remarks to meet an objection that has been repeatedly urged against the possible adoption of any system of eugenics,<sup>2</sup> namely, that human nature would never brook interference with the freedom of marriage.

In my reply I shall proceed on the not unreasonable assumption that, when the subject of eugenics shall be well understood, and when its lofty objects shall have become generally appreciated, they will meet with some recognition both from the religious sense of the people and from its laws. The question to be considered is: How far have marriage restrictions proved effective, when sanctified by the religion of the time, by custom, and by law? I appeal from armchair criticism to historical facts.

To this end, a brief history will be given of a few widely spread customs in successive paragraphs. It will be seen that, with scant exceptions, they are based on social expediency, and not on natural instincts. Each paragraph might have been expanded into a long chapter, had that seemed necessary. Those who desire to investigate the subject further can easily do so by referring to standard works in anthropology, among the most useful of which, for the present purpose, are Frazer's *Golden Bough*, Westermarck's *History of Marriage*, Huth's *Marriage of Near Kin*, and Crawley's *Mystic Rose*.

1. *Monogamy*.—It is impossible to label mankind by one general term, either as animals who instinctively take a plurality of mates, or who consort with only one; for history suggests the one condition as often as the other. Probably different races, like different individuals, vary considerably in their natural

<sup>1</sup> Read before the Sociological Society of London.

<sup>2</sup> Eugenics may be defined as the science which deals with those social agencies that influence, mentally or physically, the racial qualities of future generations.

instincts. Polygamy may be understood either as having a plurality of wives, or as having one principal wife and many secondary but still legitimate wives, or any other recognized but less legitimate connections; in one or other of these forms it is now permitted—by religion, customs, and law—to at least one-half of the population of the world, though its practice may be restricted to a few, on account of cost, domestic peace, and the insufficiency of females. Polygamy holds its ground firmly throughout the Moslem world. It exists throughout India and China in modified forms, and it is entirely in accord with the sentiments both of men and women in the larger part of negro Africa. It was regarded as a matter of course in the early biblical days. Jacob's twelve children were born of four mothers, all living at the same time, namely, Leah and her sister Rachel, and their respective handmaids Billah and Zilpah. Long afterward the Jewish kings emulated the luxurious habits of neighboring potentates and carried polygamy to an extreme degree. For Solomon see 1 Kings 11 : 3; for his son Rehoboam see 2 Chron. 11 : 21. The history of the subsequent practice of the custom among the Jews is obscure, but the Talmud contains no law against polygamy. It must have ceased in Judea by the time of the Christian era. It was not then allowed in either Greece or Rome. Polygamy was unchecked by law in profligate Egypt, but a reactionary and ascetic spirit existed, and some celibate communities were formed, in the service of Isis, which seem to have exercised a large, though indirect, influence in introducing celibacy into the early Christian church. The restriction of marriage to one living wife subsequently became the religion and the law of all Christian nations, though license has been widely tolerated in royal and other distinguished families, as in those of some of our English kings. Polygamy was openly introduced into Mormonism by Brigham Young, who left seventeen wives and fifty-six children. He died in 1877; polygamy was suppressed soon after.<sup>3</sup>

It is unnecessary for my present purpose to go further into the voluminous data connected with these marriages in all parts

<sup>3</sup> *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Vol. XVI, p. 827.

of the world. Enough has been said to show that the prohibition of polygamy, under severe penalties by civil and ecclesiastical law, has been due, not to any natural instinct against the practice, but to consideration of social well-being. I conclude that equally strict limitations to freedom of marriage might, under the pressure of worthy motives, be hereafter enacted for eugenic and other purposes.

2. *Endogamy*.—Endogamy, or the custom of marrying exclusively *within* one's own tribe or caste, has been sanctioned by religion and enforced by law, in all parts of the world, but chiefly in long-settled nations where there is wealth to bequeath and where neighboring communities profess different creeds. The details of this custom, and the severity of its enforcement, have everywhere varied from century to century. It was penal for a Greek to marry a barbarian, for a Roman patrician to marry a plebeian, for a Hindu of one caste to marry one of another caste, etc. Similar restrictions have been enforced in multitudes of communities, even under the penalty of death.

A very typical instance of the power of law over the freedom of choice in marriage, and which was by no means confined to Judea, is that known as the Levirate. It shows that family property and honor were once held by the Jews to dominate over individual preferences. The Mosaic law actually *compelled* a man to marry the widow of his brother, if he left no male issue.<sup>4</sup> Should the brother refuse, "then shall his brother's wife come unto him in the presence of the elders, and loose his shoe from off his foot, and spit in his face; and she shall answer and say, So shall it be done unto the man that doth not build up his brother's house. And his name shall be called in Israel the house of him that hath his shoe loosed." The form of this custom survives to the present day, and is fully described and illustrated under the article "Halizah" (= "taking off," "untying") in the *Jewish Cyclopaedia*. Jewish widows are now almost invariably remarried with this ceremony. They are, as we might describe it, "given away" by a kinsman of the deceased husband, who puts on a shoe of an orthodox shape which is kept for

<sup>4</sup> Deut., chap. 25.



the purpose, the widow unties the shoe, spits, but now on the *ground*, and repeats the specified words.

The duties attached to family property led to the history, which is very strange to the ideas of the present day, of Ruth's advances to Boaz under the advice of her mother. "It came to pass at midnight" that Boaz "was startled<sup>5</sup> and turned himself, and behold a woman lay at his feet," who had come in "softly and uncovered his feet and laid her down." He told her to lie still until the early morning and then to go away. She returned home and told her mother, who said: "Sit still, my daughter, until thou know how the matter will fall, for the man will not rest until he have finished the thing this day." She was right. Boaz took legal steps to disembarass himself of the claims of a still nearer kinsman, who "drew off his shoe;" so Boaz married Ruth. Nothing could be purer, from the point of view of those days, than the history of Ruth. The feelings of the modern social world would be shocked, if the same thing were to take place now in England.

Evidence from the various customs relating to endogamy show how choice in marriage may be dictated by religious custom, that is, by a custom founded on a religious view of family property and family descent. Eugenics deal with what is more valuable than money or lands, namely, the heritage of a high character, capable brains, fine physique, and vigor; in short, with all that is most desirable for a family to possess as a birth-right. It aims at the evolution and preservation of high races of men, and it as well deserves to be strictly enforced as a religious duty, as the Levirate law ever was.

3. *Exogamy*.—Exogamy is, or has been, as widely spread as the opposed rule of endogamy just described. It is the duty, enforced by custom, religion, and law, of marrying *outside* one's own tribe, and is usually in force among small and barbarous communities. Its former distribution is attested by the survival, in nearly all countries, of ceremonies based on "marriage by capture." The remarkable monograph on this subject by the late Mr. McLennan is of peculiar interest. It was one of the

<sup>5</sup> See marginal note in the Revised Version.

earliest, and perhaps the most successful, of all attempts to decipher prehistoric customs by means of those now existing among barbarians, and by the marks they have left on the traditional practices of civilized nations, including ourselves. Before his time those customs were regarded as foolish, and fitted only for antiquarian trifling. In small fighting communities of barbarians, daughters are a burden; they are usually killed while infants, so there are few women to be found in a tribe who were born in it. It may sometimes happen that the community has been recently formed by warriors who have brought no women, and who, like the Romans in the old story, can supply themselves only by capturing those of neighboring tribes. The custom of capture grows; it becomes glorified because each wife is a living trophy of the captor's heroism; so marriage within the tribe comes to be considered an unmanly, and at last a shameful, act. The modern instances of this among barbarians are very numerous.

4. *Australian marriages.*—The following is a brief clue, and apparently a true one, to the complicated marriage restrictions among Australian bushmen, which are enforced by the penalty of death, and which seem to be partly endogamous in origin and partly otherwise. The example is typical of those of many other tribes that differ in detail.

A and B are two tribal classes; 1 and 2 are two other and independent divisions of the tribe (which are probably by totems). Any person taken at random is equally likely to have either letter or either numeral, and his or her numeral and letter are well known to all the community. Hence the members of the tribe are subclassed into four subdivisions: A1, A2, B1, B2. The rule is that a man may marry those women only whose letter and numeral are both different from his own. Thus, A1 can marry only B2, the other three subdivisions, A1, A2, and B1, being absolutely barred to him. As to the children, there is a difference of practice in different parts: in the cases most often described, the child takes its father's letter and its mother's numeral, which determines class by paternal descent. In other cases the arrangement runs in the contrary way, or by maternal descent.

The cogency of this rule is due to custom, religion, and law, and is so strong that nearly all Australians would be horrified at the idea of breaking it. If anyone dared to do so, he would probably be clubbed to death.

Here, then, is another restriction to the freedom of marriage which might with equal propriety have been applied to the furtherance of some forms of eugenics.

5. *Taboo*.—The survival of young animals largely depends on their inherent timidity, their keen sensitiveness to warnings of danger by their parents and others, and their tenacious recollection of them. It is so with human children, who are easily terrified by nurses' tales, and thereby receive more or less durable impressions.

A vast complex of motives can be brought to bear upon the naturally susceptible minds of children, and of uneducated adults who are mentally little more than big children. The constituents of this complex are not sharply distinguishable, but they form a recognizable whole that has not yet received an appropriate name, in which religion, superstition, custom, tradition, law, and authority all have part. This group of motives will for the present purpose be entitled "immaterial," in contrast to material ones. My contention is that the experience of all ages and all nations shows that the immaterial motives are frequently far stronger than the material ones, the relative power of the two being well illustrated by the tyranny of taboo in many instances, called as it is by different names in different places. The facts relating to taboo form a voluminous literature, the full effect of which cannot be conveyed by brief summaries. It shows how, in most parts of the world, acts that are apparently insignificant have been invested with ideal importance, and how the doing of this or that has been followed by outlawry or death, and how the mere terror of having unwittingly broken a taboo may suffice to kill the man who broke it. If non-eugenic unions were prohibited by such taboos, none would take place.

6. *Prohibited degrees*.—The institution of marriage, as now sanctified by religion and safeguarded by law in the more highly civilized nations, may not be ideally perfect, nor may it be uni-



versally accepted in future times, but it is the best that has hitherto been devised for the parties primarily concerned, for their children, for home life and for society. The degrees of kinship within which marriage is prohibited is, with one exception, quite in accordance with modern sentiment, the exception being the disallowal of marriage with the sister of a deceased wife, the propriety of which is greatly disputed and need not be discussed here. The marriage of a brother and sister would excite a feeling of loathing among us that seems implanted by nature, but which, further inquiry will show, has mainly arisen from tradition and custom.

We will begin by giving due weight to certain assigned motives. (1) Indifference, and even repugnance, between boys and girls, irrespectively of relationship, who have been reared in the same barbarian home. (2) Close likeness, as between the members of a thoroughbred stock, causes some sexual indifference; thus highly bred dogs lose much of their sexual desire for one another, but will rush to the arms of a mongrel. (3) Contrast is an element in sexual attraction which has not yet been discussed quantitatively. Great resemblance creates indifference, and great dissimilarity is repugnant. The maximum of attractiveness must lie somewhere between the two, at a point not yet ascertained. (4) The harm due to continued interbreeding has been considered, as I think, without sufficient warrant, to cause a presumed strong natural and instinctive *repugnance* to the marriage of near kin. The facts are that close and continued interbreeding invariably does harm after a few generations, but that a single cross with near kinsfolk is practically innocuous. Of course, a sense of repugnance might become correlated with any harmful practice, but there is no evidence that it is *repugnance* with which interbreeding is correlated, but only *indifference*, which is equally effective in preventing it, but quite another thing. (5) The strongest reason of all in civilized countries appears to be the earnest desire not to infringe the sanctity and freedom of the social relations of a family group, but this has nothing to do with instinctive sexual repugnance. Yet it is through the latter motive alone, so far as I can judge,



that we have acquired our apparently instinctive horror of marrying within near degrees.-

Next as to facts. History shows that the horror now felt so strongly did not exist in early times. Abraham married his half-sister Sarah: "she is indeed the sister, the daughter of my father, but not the daughter of my mother, and she became my wife."<sup>6</sup> Amram, the father of Moses and Aaron, married his aunt, his father's sister Jochabed. The Egyptians were accustomed to marry sisters. It is unnecessary to go earlier back in Egyptian history than to the Ptolemies, who, being a new dynasty, would not have dared to make the marriages they did in a conservative country, unless popular opinion allowed it. Their dynasty includes the founder, Ceraunus, who is not numbered; the numbering begins with his son Soter, and goes on to Ptolemy XIII, the second husband of Cleopatra. Leaving out her first husband, Ptolemy XII, as he was a mere boy, and taking in Ceraunus, there are thirteen Ptolemies to be considered. Between them, they contracted eleven incestuous marriages, eight with whole sisters, one with a half-sister, and two with nieces. Of course, the object was to keep the royal line pure, as was done by the ancient Peruvians. It would be tedious to follow out the laws enforced at various times and in the various states of Greece during the classical ages. Marriage was at one time permitted in Athens between half-brothers and half-sisters, and the marriage between uncle and niece was thought commendable in the time of Pericles, when it was prompted by family considerations. In Rome the practice varied much, but there were always severe restrictions. Even in its dissolute period, public opinion was shocked by the marriage of Claudius with his niece.

A great deal more evidence could easily be adduced, but the foregoing suffices to prove that there is no instinctive repugnance felt universally by man to marriage within the prohibited degrees, but that its present strength is mainly due to what I called immaterial considerations. It is quite conceivable that a non-eugenic marriage should hereafter excite no less loathing than that of a brother and sister would do now.

<sup>6</sup> Gen. 20: 12.

7. *Celibacy*.—The dictates of religion in respect to the opposite duties of leading celibate lives, and of continuing families, have been contradictory. In many nations it is and has been considered a disgrace to bear no children, and in other nations celibacy has been raised to the rank of a virtue of the highest order. The ascetic character of the African portion of the early Christian church, as already remarked, introduced the merits of celibate life into its teaching. During the fifty or so generations that have elapsed since the establishment of Christianity, the nunneries and monasteries, and the celibate lives of Catholic priests, have had vast social effects, how far for good and how far for evil need not be discussed here. The point I wish to enforce is not only the potency of the religious sense in aiding or deterring marriage, but more especially the influence and authority of ministers of religion in enforcing celibacy. They have notoriously used it when aid has been invoked by members of the family on grounds that are not religious at all, but merely of family expediency. Thus, at some times and in some Christian nations, every girl who did not marry while still young was practically compelled to enter a nunnery, from which escape was afterward impossible.

It is easy to let the imagination run wild on the supposition of a whole-hearted acceptance of eugenics as a national religion; that is, of the thorough conviction by a nation that no worthier object exists for man than the improvement of his own race; and when efforts as great as those by which nunneries and monasteries were endowed and maintained should be directed to fulfil an opposite purpose. I will not enter further into this. Suffice it to say that the history of conventual life affords abundant evidence, on a very large scale, of the power of religious authority in directing and withstanding the tendencies of human nature toward freedom in marriage.

*Conclusion*.—Seven different subjects have now been touched upon. They are monogamy, endogamy, exogamy, Australian marriages, taboo, prohibited degrees, and celibacy. It has been shown under each of these heads how powerful are the various combinations of immaterial motives upon marriage selection;

how they may all become hallowed by religion, accepted as custom, and enforced by law. Persons who are born under their various rules live under them without any objection. They are unconscious of their restrictions, as we are unaware of the tension of the atmosphere. The subservience of civilized races to their several religious superstitions, customs, authority, and the rest is frequently as abject as that of barbarians. The same classes of motives that direct other races, direct ours; so a knowledge of their customs helps us to realize the wide range of what we may ourselves hereafter adopt, for reasons as satisfactory to us in those future times as theirs are or were to them at the time when they prevailed.

Reference has frequently been made to the probability of eugenics hereafter receiving the sanction of religion. It may be asked: How can it be shown that eugenics fall within the purview of our own? It cannot, any more than the duty of making provision for the future needs of oneself and family, which is a cardinal feature of modern civilization, can be deduced from the Sermon on the Mount. Religious precepts, founded on the ethics and practice of olden days, require to be reinterpreted to make them conform to the needs of progressive nations. Ours are already so far behind modern requirements that much of our practice and our profession cannot be reconciled without illegitimate casuistry. It seems to me that few things are more needed by us in England than a revision of our religion, to adapt it to the intelligence and needs of the present time. A form of it is wanted that shall be founded on reasonable bases, and enforced by reasonable hopes and fears, and that preaches honest morals in unambiguous language, which good men who take their part in the work of the world, and who know the dangers of sentimentalism, may pursue without reservation.

## II. STUDIES IN NATIONAL EUGENICS

It was stated in the *Times*, January 26, 1905, that at a meeting of the Senate of the University of London, Mr. Edgar Schuster, M.A., of New College, Oxford, was appointed to the Francis Galton Research Fellowship in National Eugenics.



"Mr. Schuster will in particular carry out investigations into the history of classes and families, and deliver lectures and publish memoirs on the subjects of his investigations."

Now that this appointment has been made, it seems well to publish a suitable list of subjects for eugenic inquiry. It will be a program that binds no one, not even myself; for I have not yet had the advantage of discussing it with others, and may hereafter wish largely to revise and improve what is now provisionally sketched. The use of this paper lies in its giving a general outline of what, according to my present view, requires careful investigation, of course not all at once, but step by step, at possibly long intervals.

I. *Estimation of the average quality of the offspring of married couples, from their personal and ancestral data.*—This includes questions of fertility, and the determination of the "probable error" of the estimate for individuals, according to the data employed.

a) "Biographical Index to Gifted Families," modern and recent, for publication. It might be drawn up on the same principle as my "Index to Achievements of Near Kinsfolk of Some of the Fellows of the Royal Society."<sup>7</sup> The Index refers only to facts creditable to the family, and to such of these as have already appeared in publications, which are quoted as authority for the statements. Other biographical facts that may be collected concerning these families are to be preserved for statistical use only.

b) Biographies of capable families, that do not rank as "gifted," are to be collected, and kept in manuscript, for statistical use, but with option of publication.

c) Biographies of families, which, as a whole, are distinctly below the average in health, mind, or physique, are to be collected. These include the families of persons in asylums of all kinds, hospitals, and prisons. To be kept for statistical use only.

d) Parentage and progeny of representatives of each of the social classes of the community, to determine how far each class is derived from, and contributes to, its own and the other classes. This inquiry must be carefully planned beforehand.

e) Insurance-office data. An attempt to be made to carry out the suggestions of Mr. Palin Egerton,<sup>8</sup> of obtaining material that the authorities would not object to give, and whose discussion might be advantageous to themselves as well as to eugenics. The matter is now under consideration, so more cannot be said.

<sup>7</sup> See *Sociological Papers*, Vol. I, p. 85.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62.

## II. *Effects of action by the state and by public institutions.*

f) Habitual criminals. Public opinion is beginning to regard with favor the project of a prolonged segregation of habitual criminals, for the purpose of restricting their opportunities for (1) continuing their depredations, and (2) producing low-class offspring. The inquiries spoken of above (see c) will measure the importance of the latter object.

g) Feeble-minded. Aid given to institutions for the feeble-minded are open to the suspicions that they may eventually promote their marriage and the production of offspring like themselves. Inquiries are needed to test the truth of this suspicion.

h) Grants toward higher education. Money spent in the higher education of those who are intellectually unable to profit by it lessens the sum available for those who can do so. It might be expected that aid systematically given on a large scale to the more capable would have considerable eugenic effect, but the subject is complex and needs investigation.

i) Indiscriminate charity, including outdoor relief. There is good reason to believe that the effects of indiscriminate charity are notably non-eugenic. This topic affords a wide field for inquiry.

III. *Other influences that further or restrain particular classes of marriage.*—The instances are numerous in recent times in which social influences have restrained or furthered freedom of marriage. A judicious selection of these would be useful, and might be undertaken as time admits. I have myself just communicated to the Sociological Society a memoir entitled "Restrictions in Marriage," in which remarkable instances are given of the dominant power of religion, law, and custom. This will suggest the sort of work now in view, where less powerful influences have produced statistical effects of appreciable amount.

IV. *Heredity.*—The facts, after being collected, are to be discussed, for improving our knowledge of the laws both of actuarial and of physiological heredity, the recent methods of advanced statistics being of course used. It is possible that a study of the effect on the offspring of differences in the parental qualities may prove important.

It is to be considered whether a study of Eurasians—that is, of the descendants of Hindoo and English parents—might not be advocated in proper quarters, both on its own merits as a topic of national importance and as a test of the applicability of the Mendelian hypotheses to men. Eurasians have by this time

intermarried during three consecutive generations in sufficient numbers to yield trustworthy results.

V. *Literature*.—A vast amount of material that bears on eugenics exists in print, much of which is valuable and should be hunted out and catalogued. Many scientific societies, medical, actuarial, and others, publish such material from time to time. The experiences of breeders of stock of all kinds, and those of horticulturists, fall within this category.

VI. *Co-operation*.—After good work shall have been done and become widely recognized, the influence of eugenic students in stimulating others to contribute to their inquiries may become powerful. It is too soon to speculate on this, but every good opportunity should be seized to further co-operation, as well as the knowledge and application of eugenics.

VII. *Certificates*.—In some future time, dependent on circumstances, I look forward to a suitable authority issuing eugenic certificates to candidates for them. They would imply more than an average share of the several qualities of at least goodness of constitution, of physique, and of mental capacity. Examinations upon which such certificates might be granted are already carried on, but separately; some by the medical advisers of insurance offices; some by medical men as to physical fitness for the army, navy, and Indian services; and others in the ordinary scholastic examinations. Supposing constitution, physique, and intellect to be three independent variables (which they are not), the men who rank among the upper third of each group would form only one twenty-seventh part of the population. Even allowing largely for the correlation of those qualities, it follows that a moderate severity of selection in each of a few particulars would lead to a severe all-round selection. It is not necessary to pursue this further.

The above brief memorandum does not profess to deal with more than the pressing problems in eugenics. As that science becomes better known, and the bases on which it rests are more soundly established, new problems will arise, especially such as relate to its practical application. All this must bide its time; there is no good reason to anticipate it now. Of course, useful



suggestions in the present embryonic condition of eugenic study would be timely, and might prove very helpful to students.

### III. EUGENICS AS A FACTOR IN RELIGION<sup>o</sup>

Eugenics strengthens the sense of social duty in so many important particulars that the conclusions derived from its study ought to find a welcome home in every tolerant religion. It promotes a far-sighted philanthropy, the acceptance of parentage as a serious responsibility, and a higher conception of patriotism. The creed of eugenics is founded upon the idea of evolution; not on a passive form of it, but on one that can to some extent direct its own course. Purely passive, or what may be styled mechanical, evolution displays the awe-inspiring spectacle of a vast eddy of organic turmoil, originating we know not how, and traveling we know not whither. It forms a continuous whole from first to last, reaching backward beyond our earliest knowledge, and stretching forward as far as we think we can foresee. But it is molded by blind and wasteful processes, namely by an extravagant production of raw material and the ruthless rejection of all that is superfluous, through the blundering steps of trial and error. The condition at each successive moment of this huge system, as it issues from the already quiet past and is about to invade the still undisturbed future, is one of violent internal commotion. Its elements are in constant flux and change, though its general form alters but slowly. In this respect it resembles the curious stream of cloud that sometimes seems attached to a mountain top during the continuance of a strong breeze; its constituents are always changing, though its shape as a whole hardly varies. Evolution is in any case a grand phantasmagoria, but it assumes an infinitely more interesting aspect under the knowledge that the intelligent action of the human will is in some small measure capable of guiding its course. Man could do this largely so far as the evolution of humanity is concerned, and he has already affected the quality and distribution of organic

<sup>o</sup>This section was communicated to the Sociological Society in supplement to three papers, viz.: "Eugenics: Its Definition, Scope, and Aims" (*vide American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, pp. 1-25), and the first two sections of this article.

life so widely that the changes on the surface of the earth, merely through his disforestings and agriculture, would be recognizable from a distance as great as that of the moon.

As regards the practical side of eugenics, we need not linger to reopen the unending argument whether man possesses any creative power of will at all, or whether his will is not also pre-determined by blind forces or by intelligent agencies behind the veil, and whether the belief that man can act independently is more than a mere illusion. This matters little in practice, because men, whether fatalists or not, work with equal vigor whenever they perceive they have the power to act effectively.

Eugenic belief extends the function of philanthropy to future generations; it renders its action more pervading than hitherto, by dealing with families and societies in their entirety; and it enforces the importance of the marriage covenant by directing serious attention to the probable quality of the future offspring. It sternly forbids all forms of sentimental charity that are harmful to the race, while it eagerly seeks opportunity for acts of personal kindness as some equivalent to the loss of what it forbids. It brings the tie of kinship into prominence, and strongly encourages love and interest in family and race. In brief, eugenics is a virile creed, full of hopefulness, and appealing to many of the noblest feelings of our nature.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Space does not permit publication of the comments upon Mr. Galton's papers. A portion of the discussion at the two sessions of the Sociological Society devoted to them will appear in the department "Notes and Abstracts" of the September number.

## SOCIOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION LINES. III

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### SECTION V. SOCIOLOGY A STUDY OF CAUSAL RELATIONS

There are two ways in which a process may be identified: by its effects and by its origin. The attempt to identify, by its effects, a social process, distinct and unified, and requiring for its investigation a separate science of sociology, may fail. It may lead to the perception that the effects of social processes are the diverse phenomena already studied by the particular social sciences of economics, politics, etc., and that with reference to effects there is discernible no unified social process such as to require a general science, either to combine or to supplement these particular sciences. Even in that case, as appeared in the foregoing section, the extension of the dynamic concept to social phenomena, so as to think them in terms of process, may have far-reaching effects upon our views and explanations of such phenomena. And now it is to be added that, although a unified social process, requiring a general sociology, may not be identified by its unified results, we still may seek to identify such a process by the other method, that is, by reference to its origin. Do social activities arise in a particular way? Are they due to forms of causation that should be comprehended apart from the special content of the activities that emerge—forms of causation that apply to social activities, whether the content of these activities be political or economic, or otherwise, and that can be understood more adequately by a study that is not confined to the field of any of the special social sciences; and is such study a proper office for a general science of sociology?

The naïve and common-sense way to identify processes by their origin is to regard them as the expressions of different forces. Thus people often refer to physical, chemical, and vital forces. But we know absolutely nothing of any force in and

of itself; we perceive only the results of force. We see results issue into the field of our observation, as if spontaneously; they boil up out of non-being into being. The power from which they issue may be One, as a single mighty vein of water feeds many never-failing springs. To that subterranean source we cannot penetrate; beneath the world of being to the world of causing our science cannot reach. We speak freely of causation, but of *original* causation we are absolutely ignorant.

It is not uncommon to suppose that there is only one kind of original force; that all purely mechanical effects can be traced to a single power, the operation of which we recognize in gravity and every form of attraction and repulsion; and not only that all mechanical effects are operations of that single power, but also that chemistry, if fully understood, would be seen to be only a subtler mechanics; and that life itself, when thoroughly comprehended, would prove to be a yet subtler and more intricate combination of chemical and mechanical processes. If all this were proved, it would not disturb the biologist, the chemist, or the physicist, nor cause anyone to doubt that there is a special sphere for each of these sciences. This view seems rather to give aid and comfort to promoters of these special sciences. If there is but one originating power that *continuously* causes all phenomena, then explanation may go a step farther in the same direction and add that whenever the manifestations of the One Power, which we have named physical, chemical, and vital, enter into certain further combinations, there issue those other manifestations that we call conscious, psychic; and that creation proceeds from the lowest to the highest stages without ever the addition of a new force that had not been operative at the lowest levels; but rather that out of combinations of the simplest emerge the more complex, and out of the lower the highest; phenomena thus rising nearer to the level of their source, and disclosing yet more of the potentiality inherent in all existence. Then it would remain to add that a combination of phenomena of all these kinds—the physical, chemical, physiological, and psychic—issues in the most highly modified stream of manifestations, which we name social.



Whether this conception is ever proved or not, the case at present is that, although we speak freely of causation, of *original* causation, we know nothing, and what we call causes are only *occasions*. Particular combinations of phenomena furnish the occasions for the causal Power resident in nature to manifest particular results. When different streams of phenomena issuing from the source of being meet, the current of manifestations consequent upon their union is often different from either of the confluents. Each "higher" process *appears* as a more complex resultant of such unions of simpler processes. And, so far as we can see, the primordial processes of nature are continuous manifestations of power which, with their countless combinations and recombinations, make up the vast diversity of the phenomenal world. That which we call the study of causes, which is the soul of science, is observation of the changes that ensue when phenomena have met. Phenomena that meet, and from the union of which other phenomena emerge, are what we call "causes." They are not forces, but conditions—conditions of change in the manifestations that arise from the operations of the force already present in the phenomena that combine. The combining phenomena may be uninteresting, and our interest and attention first be fixed by the resultant. When we seek to explain the resultant process, we do so by discovery of those conditions which we name "causes," although to identify them contributes no knowledge of the *original* causation of the interesting phenomenon which we have thus, as we say, "explained." The study of causes that is possible to science is observation of the phenomena that unite to form the conditions of new phenomena. When again and again we have observed phenomena of a certain kind, arising in the presence of certain conditions, we affirm that these conditions contain the causes of such phenomena. To know that phenomena of the kind thus explained have been observed countless times to arise in presence of these conditions, and never in the absence of any of them, that the phenomena have varied as these conditions have varied, and disappeared with the disappearance of each of these conditions, when all the others were present, is to have established the scien-

tific conclusion that these conditions are the "causes" of such phenomena.

Description and explanation, so far as explanation is possible to science, are essentially alike as well as essentially different. Each consists in thinking phenomena together in relations in which they exist together. The difference between explanation and other description is that in mere description we may think together whatever may be observed together, and share our interest together; while in explaining a thing we think it together with *certain* other things, namely, such things as are alleged as causes. All our knowledge consists in thinking phenomena together in the *relations* in which they exist together. This is true of the whole range of understanding, from sense-perception to philosophy. The isolated sense-impression is meaningless. The splotch of variegated light falling on the newborn baby's eye has no meaning for his mind. That light may be reflected from the vine that clammers past the window, but not a leaf upon the vine can be perceived until the present sensation is put together with a variety of other present or remembered sensations that combine to give the notion "leaf out there." Our knowledge of a phenomenon extends as we think more phenomena together with it; as they exist or have existed together with it; as we know more *about* it. The advancement of knowledge consists a little in seeing more things, and a great deal in becoming aware of more relations between things—relations of time, relations of space, and especially the relations which we name causal.

A child in a museum, looking at a chipped flint or a bit of corroded bronze, sees as much of the things as the paleontologist, but he knows less about them, because the vision of these things does not conjure up in his mind the ideas of other things which are known or believed to have been related to every object of the class represented by the ancient arrow-head or sword. There are three phases of knowledge. The first and most elementary is seeing things, present results, static phenomena; the two other and higher phases are the observation of changes, differences, and resemblances till, first, we can think of the resem-



blances, differences and changes together with their conditions in the relations that we call causal; and, second, until we are aware of the tug and trend toward change that is present in even the seemingly inert object, that maintains its static equilibrium, and that again and again bursts into change, and is always ready and waiting for its occasion—the streaming of phenomena, the dynamic essence of being.

If we know nothing of forces in and of themselves, and therefore nothing of original causation, so that we cannot characterize different processes by declaring them to be the expressions of separate and distinct forces, how then can we identify processes on the side of their origin? A review of the scientific meaning of causation has helped us to this answer: A distinct process is the function of a distinct set of conditions. We may give the name "process" to any stable *continuation* of a phenomenon, or to the *maintenance* of phenomena of a given class. We do more obviously and universally give the name "process" to any temporal *succession* of phenomena that are sufficiently connected with each other and sufficiently discrete from other phenomena. Such a continuation or succession, however discrete and different from other processes, does not imply a peculiar kind of force as its cause, but it does imply a peculiar combination of conditions from which it arises. Where there is a special kind of stream of results issuing from a special confluence of conditions, there may be sought the task of a special science, if the results are sufficiently numerous and interesting to invite study, and the conditions sufficiently obscure and intricate to require it. Thus, for example, the physiological results which the biologist investigates, and which we call the process of life, while they do not necessarily involve the presence of any force that is not present in physical and chemical phenomena, nevertheless do arise out of a peculiarly obscure and intricate combination of physical and chemical conditions; and it is the issuance of this particular kind of process, from its particular set of conditions, which forms the object of the biologist's attention. And such is the task of each one of the established physical sciences. A special kind of phenomena, issuing from its special concurrence

of conditions, is the largest justification there can be for any such science.

The kind of phenomena that arise in society do not arise except in society. Society affords a peculiar set of conditions that distinguish the social process. And while the issuing phenomena, besides being numerous and interesting, are so different among themselves as to be subdivided among a number of special sciences, yet the intricate causal complex from which they issue is, in an important sense, common to them all. The view just set forth of what constitutes the task of a science seems to make possible the following solution of our present problem: Explanation is thinking together, and society is the togetherness that must be thought, in order to explain the phenomena which we call social. This thinking society together is not the exclusive business of any of the separate social sciences, for society includes forms of causal relations that are not peculiar to any of the particular social sciences. These forms of causal relations are independent of the differences of content which characterize the activities that emerge from them. They are equally effective with respect to religious, ethical, economic, or political activities, etc. Therefore they do not belong to either of the special social sciences that correspond to these particular kinds of activities, and if the investigation of these causal relations can be elevated into a science, then it must be a general sociology underlying all of the special social sciences, as mathematics underlies the special physical sciences; or, at any rate, it must constitute a portion or phase of the work of general sociology.

Among the general forms of social causation which have been recognized are suggestion and imitation; "consciousness of kind;" coincidence, opposition, and reciprocity of interests; superiority and subordination, and other forms of relations, not only with associates, but also relations of associates to a common physical environment.

Some writers call "imitation" a process. But the essential significance of imitation for sociology does not appear until imitation is seen to be a *relation* between activities to be explained and similar occasioning activities. It is not so fundamentally viewed

as a kind of action, since *any* kind of action, from saying "Mamma" to building a ship, is imitation, provided it is occasioned by this particular type of relation to an antecedent similar action. The fact that all these heterogeneous forms of social activity are spoken of as instances of the "process of imitation" is an illustration of the fact that actions the most heterogeneous in outcome may have an intrinsic similarity on the side of origin, and with respect to origin are unified into a single class. The word "association" itself, if it is a name of activity, is a name for *all kinds of activity*, however diverse, which, after all, are unified by virtue of this peculiar relationship of occasioning or being occasioned by the activities of associates. It is its origin in this peculiar conditioning that all social activity has in common. With reference to this mutually occasioning relationship association is unified and distinct from all other phenomena.

Even on the side of their outcome, the social activities, different as they are from each other, are also different from all other phenomena, and thus set apart from all other phenomena as one general class by themselves; while on the side of their origin they are seen to be the offspring of types of occasioning relations that are common to them all. At first, and so long as attention is mainly fixed upon their practical outcome, the greater methodological advantage may be secured by emphasizing their differences and analyzing the study of association into economics, politics, ethics, etc. But when we pass on to the deeper genetic task, the task of investigating their rise, and the methods by which they are occasioned, it may appear that the same types of rise and of occasioning are common to them all; that on the side of origins the social activities constitute one unified field of research; and that methodological advantage is secured by recognizing that society constitutes one complex of causal conditions, and that the same forms and methods of causation are effective throughout the whole range of social phenomena. Indeed, though it may be impossible to identify by its outcome any general social process distinguished from the processes to be investigated by special social sciences, already considerable



achievements appear to have been made by studying the origination of these various social processes in the general forms of social causation which are common to them all.

Professor Georg Simmel defines sociology as a study of the forms of social relations. This definition has seemed particularly barren, uninteresting, unpromising, and capable of eliciting protracted toil only from one who is willing to devote himself to intellectual gymnastics, and it is somewhat startling to have emerged from this discussion at a point so close to his position. But substitute the more particular concept "forms of *occasioning relations* in society" for the more general "forms of social relation," and the appearance of academic barrenness is removed from this definition of what seems to be at least a part of the task of general sociology. In the view of Simmel, the sociologist's object of study includes nothing else than the general forms of relationship which apply to all association, whatever its purpose, whether economic, ecclesiastical, political, or otherwise, to a nation, a school, or a family. He not only holds that the abstract forms of relationship constitute the whole of the sociologist's field of study, but adds that these forms are all varieties of one most general form of relationship, that of "superiority and subordination."

The conception of Professor Simmel has been accepted by sociologists as meaning mere *morphological description*. But the conception here proposed is *causal explanation*, recognizing both the resemblance and the difference between explanation and mere description, and the truth that the only explanation possible to science is identification of causal *relationships*.

A study of the mere *forms* of social causation may never yield a quantitative explanation of any social phenomenon. Apparently that must be left to the special sciences that study the social processes with reference to their content. But it may hope to furnish these sciences with a list and description of the various forms or kinds of social causation, so that each can be recognized when it is present, and missed when it is absent; and, indeed, it may even hope to furnish social practice with knowledge of the conditions which must be promoted or combated. Too much

currency has been given to the notion that there is nothing deserving the name of science without accurate quantitative knowledge. Quantitative knowledge is by no means always present where there is science that is both intellectually enlightening and practically applicable. It is something to know that a given *kind* of disease is caused by a given kind of microbe, and that a given treatment will destroy the microbe. Sociology is a science of life. And while neither biology nor sociology ignores or despairs of quantitative results in some connections, a science of life is already a science when it is discovering the nature and method of causation, the forms and kinds of conditioning that promote phenomena of given kinds.

Sociology is a study of social *activities*, and the *conditions* of the origin, continuance, and change of social activities. The highest results of such study, as well as the most important aids to further advance, are not knowledge of particular *instances* of change, nor the particular conditions of such particular changes, but knowledge of the *types of change* and *forms of causation*. This is for sociology what the knowledge of "natural laws" is to physical science. Types of change in social activity, and especially forms of occasion or causation out of which social activities and their changes emerge, are not peculiar to economic or political activity, nor any other activities that form the object of explanation of a special social science. They belong to *the social process as a whole*, of which political, economic, and ethical phenomena, etc., are particular manifestations. And, in so far as this is true, investigation of the elicitation and change of social activities is a comparative study in which each form of elicitation must be observed wherever it occurs, not alone in the field of any one special social science, but throughout the whole range of social activity. If this is true, the necessity of a general social science appears to be demonstrated on the side of methodological theory, and only requires to be emphasized and illustrated by the results of research in this wide field and by this broadly comparative method. The results already achieved are quite sufficient to encourage further devotion to this field and method. The full importance of such results can appear only when they are taken

up by the students of particular social sciences and applied in the solution of their special problems. The logical order of progress must be, first, the observation of particulars in many fields; second, the discovery of modes of activity, types of change, and forms of elicitation; and, third, the explanation of special phenomena. Progress of the three kinds will go on simultaneously.

I have not hastened to this conclusion, but in the previous section, when this conclusion was so near, it was postponed, to allow full admission of the fact that much of the importance of the dynamic concept of society can be worked out in the special social sciences, and that, indispensably important as is the extension to social phenomena of the concept of universal process in its application, not only to change, but also to continuity of phenomena, yet the method of sociology is not revealed in that concept, and has not been discovered until a view of what constitutes scientific explanation has been applied to the explanation of social activities, and we have recognized as the final objects of sociological research the *forms of relationship* in which social activities find their characteristic conditions of rise, continuance, and change. Diversified as are the social phenomena, and undesirable as it is to confuse the fields of existing social sciences, and impossible as it may be to regard the social process, viewed only from the side of its results, as affording the appropriate field for a general science of sociology; still, so long as the laws of social causation, or, as they may better be called, the modes of activity, types of change, and *forms of elicitation*, are general to the social process, and not peculiar to the phenomena of the special social sciences, the investigation of social causation calls for a science that brings the whole range of social activity and its eliciting within one horizon and perspective.

At this point it is opportune to reiterate, in conspectus, three salient features of the view thus far set forth.

First: Society is associates associating. Associating certainly includes every kind of action that is not merely physical, or biological, but distinctly human and conscious; that is, elicited by conditioning relations with associates, and that becomes overt



and momentarily prevalent in its similar repetitions, such as social valuations, institutions, customs, etc. This associating, apprehension of which makes the word "society" appear to be "virtually a verbal noun," is the "social process" in the most important and fundamental sense of that phrase; and the varieties, modes, or classes of activity that become thus socially momentous are the social "processes" or subdivisions of the "process." The social phenomena are processes in the sense of activities; this is their nature and essence, not alone when they are undergoing change and transformation, but also when most established and unchanging.

Second: With changing conditions these activities change, and — what is of main importance — there are general *types of change* in social activities. These may be referred to as social processes, although the more specific phrase "types of social change" contributes more to clearness and accuracy. These types of change are general in that they apply to the different varieties of social activity; for example, the most diverse social activities may become either more or less prevalent, more or less similar in their individual repetitions, more or less imposing and effective as conditions affecting other activities, etc. To identify and describe these types of change is a second phase of the task of sociology.

Third: Explanation consists in describing the conditions of a phenomenon with recognition of their comparative importance as determinants of the phenomenon explained; and there are recurrent forms of conditioning which are effective in eliciting the different varieties of social activity, and which correspond to the types of social change. These forms of conditioning are separable into four groups, to be enumerated later. Moreover, conditions are both phenomena and relations, and relations are as real as things, and as necessary to describe. And among the conditions of any given social activities are *other social phenomena*, and the direct products of social activities; these interest the sociologist *both* as conditions of social phenomena and as themselves social phenomena to be explained in their turn, while non-social phenomena, such as climate, etc., interest him as con-

ditions of the phenomena which he seeks to explain, but their own explanation is left to the antecedent sciences.

Among sociologists there has been too little criticism and assimilation of each other's work. In general, each has spun away in his own corner, but little disturbed by other spiders in other corners. Discussion is necessary to the development of an authoritative and consistent body of doctrine. Therefore one may venture to refer, in this connection, to the work of one of the most eminent writers upon sociology. Some time after the original presentation of the foregoing sections, which treat of the social process, Professor Edward Alsworth Ross contributed to the *American Journal of Sociology*<sup>1</sup> an article, which recently has been reprinted,<sup>2</sup> the thesis of which is that the chief objects of sociological investigation are processes. Professor Ross does not state either of the three views just summarized. He does not hold that the social phenomena—whether permanent or changing—are in essence activities, but instead he regards “groups, relations, institutions, imperatives, uniformities,” the “products” of the “actions and interactions” of men, as the phenomena which sociology is to explain, and turns to processes only as the means of explaining them.

From our point of view, the five “products” which he enumerates do not all belong to the one category of products. “Institutions and imperatives” are activities, and “uniformities” are similar activities. All these belong to the social processes, but groups and relations do not. It is hardly necessary to say groups *and* relations, for the chief meaning of “group” is a set of established relations. “Groups and relations,” in so far as they are incidents or “products” of the social activities, admit of sociological explanation; but their explanation is only a step in the explanation of the activities which such relations condition, and which are the ultimate objects of sociological explanation.

Since Professor Ross does not identify the ultimate objects of sociological explanation as processes, but turns to processes only as the means of explaining “products,” the word “process” is used by him to designate whatever is necessary to explain products. Our discussion of what constitutes scientific explana-

<sup>1</sup> September, 1903.

<sup>2</sup> E. A. Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*.

tion led to the conclusion that "conditions" and not "processes" is the word to use for this purpose, since explanation is not the search for a special force or process, but for special conditions out of which special phenomena emerge, and the changes of which are accompanied by changes in the phenomena emerging.

The successive changes in social phenomena we called social processes in a secondary sense. But tracing a succession of changes down to its latest manifestation is not explanation, but rather an important preliminary to explanation; it is more fully stating the problem, and each succeeding change is a part of the problem to be explained by reference to the changing conditions.

His use of the word "processes" as a name for whatever is necessary to explain "products," leads Professor Ross to set down a heterogeneous list under the head of "processes," omitting from it the social activities, or social processes in the primary sense, as defined above, and tabulating a variety of other things. First in his list stands "assimilation" by "environment, education, occupation, mode of life, and dialectic of personal growth." All these he surprisingly designates as "preliminary" processes, and those following as "social." For example, biological multiplication is a "social" process, but "assimilation by environment, education, occupation, and mode of life" are "preliminary." Biological multiplication of one race may furnish all the similarity that is the necessary preliminary of association, and "assimilation by environment, education, occupation, and made of life" is preliminary in the same sense that everything down to yesterday is preliminary to what follows, for which it prepared the way. Assimilation, according to our system, is a type of social change. Common occupation, etc., are forms of conditioning relations. Common "environment" and "education" are too complex ideas to be made co-ordinate with the other items in this list. His next group, and the first of the "social processes," is "multiplication, congregation, and conjugation." This is getting together a population, and we should say supplies *conditions* for the social process. It is the setting up of groupings and relations, the changing of conditions that affect the social process.



The next group in his list is "communication, fascination, and intimidation. And he appropriates the word "association" as a generic name for the three. Would it not be better to let the three stand together as related, if necessary without a common name, rather than to assign this limited meaning to the word "association?"

The confusion or great overlapping of divisions in a tabulation, though it is much less serious than absence of clear ruling concepts as basis for classification, is nevertheless commonly regarded as so serious a defect that it is fitting to raise a query with reference to placing, as co-ordinates in the same list, "communication" and "intercourse;" "fascination" and "imitation;" "assimilation" and "amalgamation;" "multiplication, congregation, conjugation," and, later, "increase of numbers."

Imitation, as shown above, is not the name of a distinct process, but of a form of conditioning relation. The like is true of "fascination," as well as of "division of labor," "organization," "subordination," etc. On p. 91 "exposure to similar external influences, such as climate," is given as a select example of a social process!

Without further specification, does it not appear that Professor Ross has used the phrase "social process" merely as a convenient heading and symbol, without formulating any distinct concept of what constitutes the (or a) social process; and has tabulated social processes under the head of "products," while under the head of "social processes" he has tabulated a long list of heterogeneous and non-co-ordinate entries, some of which are varieties of activity, some types of social change, some forms of conditioning relations, and others changes in conditioning relations? The entries tabulated under the heading "processes" divide, not far from equally, into these four sorts.

Changes in conditions with which, as we have put it, changes in social activities (processes) are to be correlated, and by which such changes are to be explained, are of great importance. And these changes in conditions affecting social phenomena can be thought together as a distinct concept. It does not appear to have been a distinct concept underlying the formation of this list,



since only one-fourth of the entries, scattered through the list, can be brought under this head. Such changes might be called social processes of the third degree. Then, if it were wise to confuse that phrase so far, we should have named social *activities*, as such, the "social process of the first degree;" *changes* in social activities, "social processes of the second degree;" and changes in *conditions* affecting social activities, "social processes of the third degree." It appears simpler to refer to the last as changes in conditions.

The main substance of what is now suggested is that there seems to be reason for thinking that the absence of the three points of view above formulated may be the absence of principles for classifying the aspects of reality which are sociologically important, while by aid of those points of view the sociologically important aspects of reality can be simply and consistently classified, as forms of social activity, types of social change, and forms of conditioning relations, together with the significant changes in conditioning relations.

#### SECTION VI. SOCIAL PHENOMENA ARE PSYCHIC

All phenomena of consciousness are activities. Those which are called "passive," are so called only in contrast with volition and because they do not connect directly with overt deeds; in them the activity remains subjective, and is not immediately observable to onlookers. Even emotion, and each so-called "passive" experience, is a state of *subjective activity*.

Social phenomena are activities, whether they be "deeds" or "experiences." The phenomena of human society are human activities—activities that go on in the consciousness of men. That amounts to saying that social phenomena are psychic phenomena. The social process is a complex of psychic activities. Social causation is the eliciting of psychic activities, and the most efficient causes of these phenomena are expressions of the psychic activities of associates. A society, in the high and important sense of that word, is a group of persons who carry on related psychic activities because they are all exposed to similar solicitations to activity, each member of the group finding

among the solicitations to activity that most affect him, the activities evinced by the other members of his group. In other words, they are a society because their activities are elicited by a similar environment, and especially because the psychic activities of the group constitute the most important part of the environment of every member of the group.

There is a sense in which the words "subjective" and "psychic" are synonymous, for all psychic phenomena are for someone subjective. But in another sense, which is quite as accurate, there are for me no subjective phenomena but my own experiences, *my own* psychic activities; and those of every other man, if I know them at all, are to me objective. Nothing is subjective to me but that which I know directly in my own consciousness; everything of which I become aware indirectly, by the intervention of the senses, is objective. The thoughts, deeds, and sentiments of others, in so far as I become aware of them, are then objective facts. My own patriotism is a subjective fact, but the patriotism of the other eighty million Americans cannot be, to me, a subjective fact; the patriotism of eighty million people cannot be a subjective fact to any *one*: it is a psychic fact, but it is an objective fact. It is a part of the objective psychic world into which the American child is born—a vast objective fact as real and pervasive as the climate.

Society is the objective psychic world; sociology is the explanation of the objective psychic world. In the physical world, some facts, like climate, are of great extent, and others are narrowly local, like the hillside on which one was born. Physical science in the person of the meteorologist tries to explain our climate, and in the person of the geologist it tries to explain hillsides. Likewise, in the objective psychic, or social, world some facts are of great extent, like patriotism, language, and religion; while others pertain to limited and local groups, like particular families and schools, each of which may have a character of its own, just as each hill and valley and lake has a character of its own; and social science tries to explain the being and becoming, both of the great and singular social facts, and of those that are local and multiple.

Both the vast pervasive social facts, and those that are local and personal, are psychic phenomena. When your friend is speaking to you, the objective social fact is not the noise he makes, but the thoughts that are passing in his mind, of which you become aware while listening to his voice, and to which your own thoughts respond. If he smiles, the objective social fact is not the wrinkling of his face, but the love and cheer which you read in his smile. Voice and smile may be necessary to enable us to perceive the objective social facts, as the ether is necessary to enable us to perceive the stars, and as some medium is required to enable us to see or to hear anything in our material environment. The social environment is made up of the objective psychic facts, and the physical signs are the media that enable us to become aware of our psychic environment. To perceive the very actions of the neurons in the cortex of your friend, without becoming aware of the conscious experience that accompanies the neuroses, would apprise you of no social fact; for the social fact is not the sign which is physical, but the thing signified, which is psychic.

It is persons that are associates, and personal acts—that is, psychic acts: thoughts, feelings, and conscious deeds—that are the social phenomena. The presence of other individuals, which is the social condition, is their psychic presence; and this by no means always requires their bodily presence. It is necessary only that they be present to the mind, in order to inspire us with love, hate, envy, emulation, ambition; the physical signs of their psychic activities may be totally absent, or may come to us across oceans of space and centuries of time.

The great pervasive social facts are as essentially and completely psychic as are the facts of individual association. A great ideal that modifies the character and activities of a people, like the prevalent notion of the smart, successful man, or like our forefathers' ideal of liberty, is a purely psychic reality, but it may be as objective and imposing as a range of mountains, and ten times more causally significant of social consequences. The vast objective social facts are exemplifications of the social process in both the uses of that phrase. They exemplify one of



its meanings in that they are evolved through the process of social change and causation. Such an ideal has a social history, and that not alone after it has spread from man to man, and become the characteristic of a group, and embodied in those settled and approved methods of practice which we denominate institutions, but also it may be that even when it first looms up in the mind of the individual prophet or seer, it is already in an important sense a social product. That experience of the prophet would have been impossible but for a long process of social causation. How clearly this is true will appear somewhat in a later connection. The great pervasive social facts exemplify the "social process" also in the profounder meaning of that phrase, since they exist in the sentiments, judgments, and deeds, that is, in the *psychic activities* of men.

We sometimes speak of certain buildings as "institutions;" and the usage may convey a certain meaning accurately enough for colloquial speech. But in the sense in which the sociologist employs the term, an institution is no more a thing of brick and mortar than the Sermon on the Mount is a thing of ink and paper. If our county courthouse should be burned down, would the institution of the courts be destroyed from our midst? No; it would still be here ready to rebuild the edifice. Where would it be? In the minds of the people. Similarly, the institution of the public schools is a conviction and a sentiment and a plan of action, including the readiness to use a hundred and fifty millions of dollars a year in ways approved for ends desired.

Not only institutions, ideals, moral standards, popular judgments and beliefs are psychic phenomena, which stand forth as commanding features of the objective psychic world, but also subtler phases of psychic activity may become pervasive and continental in extent. Similarity of sentiments and motives may characterize a population, and emotional dispositions, which are due, not to ethnic temperament alone, but to other causes also, since they pervade mixed populations, and, moreover, prevail for a period among a given people and then disappear and are replaced. Whole peoples may be said to have their moods, their periods of exaltation and of depression, of courage and of dis-



couragement, their backslidings and regenerations. An age of Pericles, an Elizabethan era, or the triumphant optimism of America, reveals the presence of such pervasive psychic phenomena, the rise of which the sociologist may investigate, and the conditions of which he may seek to point out.

Prevalent modes of psychic activity, whether they characterize periods or groups, or an element diffused through various populations, present sociological problems. Why is it that John Jones, the English farmer, hitches his horse to a cart so clumsy that it is a man's lift to raise the shafts, and the empty wain is half a load, packs in his load of dressing as carefully as if he were going to haul it around the world, and, having reached the field, does not dump it, but forks it out again, so that two to four loads a day is the limit of his speed; while Tom Jones, his brother, who emigrated to America, visiting at the old English home, watches John's waste of time and energy with nervous pain; for Tom in Kansas cuts his grain with a fourteen-foot cutter bar and reaps a hundred acres in a day? Why is it that the bricklayer in London lays seven hundred bricks a day, and the bricklayer in Chicago lays two thousand? Why is it that the baggage-smasher on the station platform in Boston tells the anxious passenger, who has failed to get his trunk onto the Fall River boat train, that there is no need to be troubled, as there is a later train, and the baggage-handler knows the exact hour and minute of its departure, and that at a certain minute in the night the train will reach a point where the Fall River boat stops, and that the steamer reaches the point enough later than the train so that the passenger and his baggage can connect with the steamer there? Now, this baggage-smasher may have immigrated from Germany a few years before, and whoever heard of a German porter knowing anything about connections? The American baggage man knows the details of the business that come within the range of his observation, as if he expected sometime to be general superintendent. Moreover, he will act upon his information without orders, or even against orders, if he is sure there is sufficient reason, somewhat as if he were already general superintendent.

Professor Münsterberg, in his book *The Americans*, avers

that the activities of the people he describes present a distinct psychological type; that a characteristic mode of action determines *alike their economic, political, and cultural activities*; and that this mode of action is the offspring of prevailing ethical ideas which have been occasioned by the past and present conditions of American social development. These ideals, he says, are self-direction, self-initiation, self-perfection. Of our political activities he writes :

Such is the America which receives the immigrant and so thoroughly transforms him that the demand for self-determination becomes the profoundest passion of his soul. Such is the America toward which he feels a proud and earnest patriotism. . . . A nation which in every decade has assimilated millions of aliens, and whose historic past everywhere leads back to strange peoples, cannot, with its racial variegation, inspire a profound feeling of indissoluble unity. And yet that feeling is present here, as it is perhaps in no European country. American patriotism is directed neither to soil nor to citizen, but to a system of ideas respecting society, which is compacted by the desire for self-direction. And to be an American means to be a partisan of this system. Neither race nor tradition, nor yet the actual past, binds him to his countryman, but rather the future which together they are building. It is a community of purpose, and it is more effective than any tradition because it pervades the whole man. . . . To be an American means to co-operate in perpetuating the spirit of self-direction throughout the body politic; and whoever does not feel this duty and actively respond to it, although perhaps a naturalized citizen of the land, remains an alien forever.

If this be true, the American differs from other peoples, not in that the social life is any more psychic than elsewhere, but that it is compounded of certain ideals and hopes rather than of venerable traditions. Of our teeming economic activity Professor Münsterberg writes :

The colossal industrial successes, along with the great evils and dangers which have come with them, must be understood from the make-up of the (acquired) American character. . . . When a short time ago there was a terrific crash in the New York stock market, and hundreds of millions were lost, a leading Parisian paper said: "If such a financial crisis had happened here in France, we should have had panics, catastrophies, a slump in *rentes*, suicides, street riots, a ministerial crisis all in one day; while America is perfectly quiet, and the victims of the battle are sitting down to collect their wits. France and the United States are obviously two entirely different worlds in their civilization and in their way of thinking."

Such statements are the more significant in the light of the fact, fully recognized by Professor Münsterberg, that America makes Americans out of Frenchmen, and of other diverse races; not perhaps Americans of identical traits, but yet men who conform with all their might to the American modes of activity.

Lafcadio Hearn, in his "Interpretation" of Japan, tells us that the Japanese habits of thought, feeling, and action are so different from ours that after years of residence there he "cannot claim to know much about Japan;" and adds:

The best and dearest Japanese friend I ever had said to me a little before his death: "When you find in four or five years more that you cannot understand the Japanese at all, then you will begin to know something about them." After having realized the truth of my friend's prediction—and having discovered that I cannot understand the Japanese at all—I feel better qualified to attempt this essay. . . . The underlying strangeness of this world—the psychological strangeness—is much more startling than the visible and superficial. You begin to suspect the range of it after having discovered that no adult occidental can perfectly master the language. East and West, the fundamental parts of human nature—the emotional bases of it—are much the same: the mental difference between a Japanese and European child is merely potential. But with growth the difference rapidly develops and widens, till it becomes, in adult life, inexpressible. The whole of the Japanese mental superstructure evolves into forms having nothing in common with western psychological development: the expression of thought becomes regulated, and the expression of emotion inhibited, in ways that bewilder and astound. The ideas of this people are not our ideas; their sentiments are not our sentiments; their ethical life represents for us regions of thought and emotion yet unexplored, or perhaps long forgotten. Any one of their ordinary phrases, translated into western speech, makes hopeless nonsense; and the literal rendering into Japanese of the simplest English sentence would scarcely be comprehended by any Japanese who had never studied a European tongue. Could you learn all the words in a Japanese dictionary, your acquisition would not help you in the least to make yourself understood in speaking, unless you had learned also to think like a Japanese—that is to say, to think backwards, to think upside down and inside out, to think in directions totally foreign to Aryan habit. Experience in the acquisition of European languages can help you to learn Japanese about as much as it could help you to acquire the language spoken by the inhabitants of Mars. To be able to use the Japanese tongue as a Japanese uses it, one would need to be born again, and to have one's mind completely reconstructed from the foundation upward.



That is, he would need to be the product of Japanese social relationships.

These quotations are intended merely to illustrate the existence of psychic contrasts due to social causation. It is by no means necessary to look chiefly for psychic contrasts that coincide with international boundaries—a position that was sufficiently emphasized in our second section, while discussing the question, “What is a society?” The “national” sociologists and essayists who describe great populations as if each citizen of a country were of the same psychic type, are perhaps tempted to make interesting reading at the expense of scientific accuracy. The fact, however, remains that there are contrasting psychic types, and the question how nearly universal a single type may be throughout a whole population is insignificant at this point, compared with the fact that such psychic contrasts are not due to temperamental dissimilarities alone, but also to social conditions which tend both to give prominence, leadership, and power to set the model for conformity to dominant persons of this or that type, but also to elicit from given individuals moods, motives, and sentiments, as well as thoughts and ideals, of a certain type, instead of another type, of which in other surroundings the same individuals would have proved capable. This is the great truth that calls sociology into being, for the purpose of analyzing the social process into modes of activity, and giving account of the types of change, and especially of the forms of causation, elicitation, and conditioning, in accordance with which it is determined which modes of activity shall predominate, continue, or succeed each other.

The significance of the view that social phenomena are psychic phenomena has by no means been made fully to appear, and sociologists may see objections and difficulties involved in the view thus badly affirmed. If sociology is thus psychological must it therefore be semi-metaphysical? How can it avoid confusion between sociology and psychology? Are not the physical



traits which reveal themselves in the temperamental differences of Chinamen, Latins, and Anglo-Saxons, social phenomena? And are not tenements, roads, and factories social phenomena? To these difficulties we shall address ourselves in the following section.

[*To be continued*]

## A PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF REVOLUTIONS

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Among the phenomena of social evolution there are none more striking to the student of history and sociology than those commonly called revolutions. I do not use the word in a loose sense, to designate any sudden political or social change from *coups d'état* or "palace revolutions" to reversions in fashions and industrial changes due to great inventions; but I refer to those convulsive movements in the history of societies in which the form of government, or, it may be, the type of the industrial and social order, is suddenly transformed. Such movements always imply a shifting of the center of social control from one class to another, and inwardly are often marked by a change in the psychical basis of social control; that is, a change in the leading ideas, beliefs, and sentiments upon which the social order rests. Outwardly such movements are characterized by bloody struggles between the privileged and the unprivileged classes, which not infrequently issue in social confusion and anarchy. Revolutions in this sense are best typified in modern history, perhaps, by the Puritan Revolution in England and by the French Revolution. Less typical, but still in some sense revolutions, were our War for Independence and our Civil War.

The objective explanations of revolutions which have usually been offered by historians and economists—that is, explanations in terms of economic, governmental, and other factors largely external—have been far from satisfactory, inasmuch as they have lacked that universal element which is the essential of all true science. These explanations have, to be sure, pointed out true causes operating in particular revolutions, but they have failed to reveal the universal mechanism through which all revolutions must take place. In the mind of the sociologist, there-

fore, there has arisen the further question: Is there any explanation of revolutions in general? What is their significance in the social life-process? Have they any universal form or method of development, and is that method capable of scientific formulation?

To have even asked these questions a score of years ago would probably have called forth a storm of ridicule. But such has been the progress of science that today many, if not most, social investigators would admit the possibility of finding universal forms in social occurrences, and so in revolutions. If a digression may be permitted, I would say that this change of attitude on the part of scientific students of society is due largely to the progress of the science of psychology. The new functional psychology has proposed to interpret all mental life in terms of habit and adaptation; and the new psychological sociology, which is building itself up on the basis of the new psychology, proposes to do the same thing for the social life. Thus the possibility of finding universal forms for social occurrences on the subjective side, if not on the side of objective, environmental factors, is today more widely accepted than ever before. The reasons for the failure of the objective method of explaining social events are, indeed, now quite obvious. It is now seen that nearly all social occurrences are in the nature of responses to external stimuli. But these responses are not related, psychology tells us, to their stimuli as effects are to causes, as sociologists have so often assumed. The same response or similar responses may be called forth by very different stimuli, since the stimulus is only the opportunity for the discharge of energy. Consequently, any explanation of social occurrences in terms of external causes or stimuli is in a sense foredoomed to failure, since such an explanation will fall short of that universality which science demands. Hence the demands for a subjective or psychological explanation of social phenomena, a demand which is being met today by the new psychological sociology. It is in accordance with this demand that I venture to offer a psychological theory of revolutions.

The theory of revolutions here presented was first formulated

by the writer in 1898, and first published in brief outline in an article of this *Journal*<sup>1</sup> in May, 1899. The purpose of this paper is merely to expand and restate the theory there presented. It is not an attempt, however, to give the theory anything more than a tentative form; its details must necessarily be left to be worked out through the further development of psychology and sociology. Moreover, it is not claimed that this theory of revolutions is anything absolutely new; foreshadowings of it are to be found in many historical and sociological writers.<sup>2</sup> The essence of the theory is this: that revolutions are disturbances in the social order due to the sudden breakdown of social habits under conditions which make difficult the reconstruction of those habits, that is, the formation of a new social order. In other words, revolutions arise through certain interferences or disturbances in the normal process of the readjustment of social habits.

The merit which is claimed for this theory is that it is in harmony with the new psychology and attempts to explain revolutions in terms of habit and adaptation. Habit and adaptation have their social consequences, not less than their individual mental consequences. The institutions and customs of society are but social expressions of habit; while the normal changes in the social order may be looked upon as social adaptations. Habit and adaptation are, therefore, fundamental categories for the interpretation of the social life-process not less than of the individual life-process; and the theory of revolutions here presented attempts to bring their phenomena within these categories.

Normally social habits are continually changing; old habits are gradually replaced by new ones as the life-conditions change. Normally the breakdown of a social habit is so gradual that by the time the old habit disappears a new habit has been constructed to take its place. Thus the process of social change, of continuous readjustment in society, goes on under normal condi-

<sup>1</sup> *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. IV, pp. 817, 818.

<sup>2</sup> Among historical writers Carlyle might be mentioned (cf. his *French Revolution*, Vol. I, p. 38); among sociologists, Ward especially has approximated the above views (cf. his *Pure Sociology*, pp. 222-31).



tions without shock or disturbance; new habits, or institutions, adapted to the new life-conditions replace the old habits and institutions which are no longer adapted. This transition from one habit to another is effected under ordinary conditions in society by such peaceful means as public criticism, discussion, the formation of a public opinion, and the selection of individuals to carry out the line of action socially determined upon. But where these normal means of effecting readjustments in the social life are lacking, social habits and institutions become relatively fixed and immobile, and a conservative organization of society results. Now, societies, like individuals, are in danger when their habits for any reason become inflexible. In the world of life, with its constant change and ceaseless struggle, only those organisms can survive which maintain a high degree of flexibility or adaptability. It is even so in the world of societies. As Professor Ward says: "When a society makes for itself a procrustean bed, it is simply preparing the way for its own destruction by the on-moving agencies of social dynamics."<sup>3</sup> It is evident, then, that a society whose habits become inflexible for any reason is liable to disaster. That disaster may come in two forms: it may come in the form of conquest or subjugation by a foreign foe; or it may come in the form of internal disruption or revolution, when the conditions of life have sufficiently changed to make old habits and institutions no longer workable. It is with this latter case that we are concerned.

The conditions under which social habits become inflexible, hard and fast, are many, and I shall attempt no specific enumeration of them. In a general way they have already been indicated by saying that the mechanism by which the transition from one social habit to another is effected—namely, public criticism, free discussion, public opinion—has been destroyed. This has occurred most frequently no doubt, under despotic forms of government; and hence the connection in popular thought between tyranny and revolution. Not only absolute monarchies, but aristocracies and oligarchies also, have frequently created types of social organization which were relatively inflexible. Despotic

<sup>3</sup> *Pure Sociology*, p. 230.

governments, however, are only one of many conditions favorable to social immobility. Authoritative religions which have glorified a past and put under ban all progress have also had much to do with creating social inflexibility. Again, the mental character of a race or people has much to do with the adaptability and progressiveness of the social groups which it forms, and some writers would make this the chief factor. Finally, it is well known that in societies without any of the impediments of despotic government, authoritative ecclesiasticism, or inferior racial character, public sentiment, prejudice, fanaticism, and class interest can and do suppress free thought and free speech, and produce a relatively inflexible type of society.

Whatever the cause of their immobility, societies with inflexible habits and institutions are bound to have trouble. The conditions of social life rapidly change, and opposing forces accumulate until, sooner or later, the old habit is overwhelmed. Under these conditions the breakdown of the old habit is sharp and sudden; and the society, being unused to the process of readjustment, and largely lacking the machinery therefor, is unable for a greater or less length of time to reconstruct its habits. There ensues, in consequence, a period of confusion and uncertainty in which competing interests in the society strive for the mastery. If the breakdown under these conditions be that of a habit which affects the whole social life-process, and especially the system of social control, we have a revolution. It is consequent upon such a breakdown of social habit, then, that the phenomena of revolutions arise.

But before considering some of these phenomena in detail, let us note somewhat more concretely how the old habits and institutions are overthrown. Of course, the opposing forces must embody themselves in a party of opposition or revolt. This party is composed, on the whole, of those individuals whom the changed conditions of social life most affect, those on whom the old social habits set least easily. The psychology of the revolt of large numbers of men to an established social order is, at bottom, a simple matter. It is simply a case of the breakdown of a social habit at its weakest point, that is, among those individuals

with whom the habit is least workable, or, in other words, whose interest lies in another direction.<sup>4</sup> From these the attitude of revolt spreads by imitation, first among those to whom the old social habits are ill-adapted, and finally among all who are susceptible to the influence of suggestion. Thus the party of opposition grows until it comes to embody all of the influences and interests which make the old habits and institutions ill-adapted or even unworkable. If these forces continue to grow, it is evident that there is possible to the ruling classes only two alternatives: either they must make concessions, that is, attempt themselves the readjustment of institutions; or they must face actual conflict with the party of opposition. As a matter of fact, historically the former alternative has much more often been chosen, thus open conflict avoided, and so-called "peaceful revolutions" effected. If, however, no concessions are made by the ruling classes, or only such as are insufficient to bring about the readjustments demanded by the life-conditions; if, in other words, the relative inflexibility of the social order is maintained, then the antagonism between the old social habits and the new life-conditions can be resolved only by open conflict between the ruling classes and the party of revolt. And when this conflict results in the success of the party of revolt, we call it a "revolution."

Thus the old social order is overthrown, violently, suddenly, and sometimes almost completely. Now in the transition from one habit to another in the individual there is frequently to be observed a period of confusion and uncertainty; and this confusion is intensified if the breakdown of the old habit has been sudden or violent. We should expect, therefore, an analogous confusion in society upon the breakdown of social habits; and this is exactly what we find. The so-called anarchy of revolutionary periods is not due simply to the absence of efficient governmental machinery, but to the general breakdown of the social

<sup>4</sup>Of course, the whole process of social differentiation and the resulting antagonism of social interests are closely connected with the phenomena of revolutions; but the psychology of this process has been so fully worked out by Ratzel, Tarde, Simmel, Ward, and others, that it is only necessary for the details of this aspect of revolutions to refer to those writers.



habits of the population. The anarchy is, of course, proportionate to the violence and completeness with which the old habits and institutions are overthrown. Again, in such periods of confusion in the individual consequent upon the entire breakdown of a habit, we observe a tendency to atavism or reversion in his activities; that is, the simpler and more animal activities tend to come to expression. This tendency not only manifests itself in revolutions, but is of course greatly intensified by the struggle between the classes; for fighting, as one of the simplest and most primitive activities of man greatly stimulates all the lower centers of action. Hence the reversionary character of many revolutionary periods. They appear to us, and truly are, epochs in which the brute and the savage in man reassert themselves and dominate many phases of the social life. The methods of acting, of attaining ends, in revolutions are, indeed, often characteristic of much lower stages of culture. These methods, as a rule, are unreflective, extremely direct and crude. Thus resort to brute force is constant, and when attempts are made at psychical control, it is usually through appeal to the lower emotions, especially fear. Hence the terrorism which is sometimes a feature of revolutions, and which conspicuously marked the French Revolution.

Here another striking phenomenon of revolutionary epochs must be noted; and that is the part played at such times by mobs and other crowds. Le Bon has worked over this matter so thoroughly that only a word on this phase of our subject is necessary. It is evident that in the confusion and excitement of revolutionary times the most favorable conditions exist for the formation of crowds and the doing of their work. There is an absence, on the one hand, of those controlling habits, ideas, and sentiments which secure order in a population; and, on the other hand, there is the reversion to the unreflective type of mental activities. Under such conditions crowds are easily formed, and a suggestion suffices to incite them to the most extreme deeds. Thus much of the bloodiest work of revolutions is done by crowds. But it is a mistake to think that true revolutions can be initiated by mobs, or carried through by a series of them.



Revolutions simply afford opportunities for mobs to manifest themselves to a much greater degree than they can in normal social life.

The duration of the period of confusion, anarchy, and mob-rule in a revolution is dependent upon a number of factors. If the party of revolt is united upon a program, and if the population generally has not lost its power of readjustment, the period of confusion may be so short as to be practically negligible. Under such circumstances the reconstruction of new social habits and institutions goes on rapidly under the guidance of the revolutionary party. As an illustration of this particular type of revolution with a happy outcome we may take our War of Independence. In this case the relative unity of the revolutionary party, the incompleteness of the destruction of the old social order, the vigorous power of readjustment in a relatively free population, all favored the speedy reconstruction of social institutions.

Unfortunately, this speedy reconstruction of social habits is not the outcome of all revolutions. Too often the revolutionary party is unified in nothing except its opposition to the old régime. It can find no principle or interest upon which a new social order can be reconstructed. Moreover, through a long period of social immobility the population seems often to have lost in great degree its power of readaptation. Indeed, in rare cases, peoples seem to have lost all power of making stable readjustments for themselves. Under any or all of these conditions it is evident that the period of confusion, anarchy, and mob-rule in a revolution must continue for a relatively long time. During this time frequent attempts may be made at the reconstruction of the social order without success. These attempts are continued until some adequate stimulus is found, either in an ideal principle or in the personality of some hero, to reconstruct the social habits of the population. Or, if no basis for the reconstruction of the social order can be found, revolution may become chronic; and the period of relative anarchy and mob-rule may last for years, only to be ended perhaps by the subjugation and government of the population by an external power.

A more usual outcome, however, to the chronic revolutionary condition is the "dictatorship." How this can arise from the conditions in revolutionary times is not difficult to understand. The labors of ethnologists have shown us that democracy in some shape is the natural and primitive form of government among all races of mankind; that despotism has arisen everywhere through social stresses and strains, usually those accompanying prolonged war, when a strong centralized system of social control becomes necessary, if the group is to survive. Now, in that internal war which we call a revolution, if it is prolonged, it is evident that we have all the conditions favorable to the rise of despotism. When the party of revolt are unable to agree among themselves, and can offer to the population no adequate stimulus for the reconstruction of the social order, nothing is more natural than that that stimulus should be found in the personality of some hero; for social organization is primitively based upon sentiments of personal attachment and loyalty far more than upon abstract principles of social justice and expediency. The personality of a military hero affords, then, the most natural stimulus around which a new social order can, so to speak, crystallize itself, when other means of reconstructing social institutions have failed, and when continued social danger demands a strong centralized social control. The dictatorship, in other words, does not arise because some superior man hypnotizes his social group by his brilliant exploits, but because such a man is "selected" by his society to reconstruct the social order. Cæsar, Cromwell, and Napoleon, these typical dictators of revolutionary eras, would probably have had their places filled by other, though perhaps inferior, men, had they themselves never existed.

Here may be briefly explained, finally, the reaction which frequently follows revolutions. No revolution is, of course, complete; it is never more than a partial destruction of old habits and institutions. Now new habits, psychology tells us, have to be erected on the basis of old habits. What remains of the old social habits after a revolution must serve, therefore, as the foundation for the new institutions, since no other foundation

is possible. After repeated attempts at reconstruction of the social order which have failed, it is the easiest thing to copy the old institutions, and this is often the only successful means of restoring social stability. Hence the reversion to pre-revolutionary conditions. But, in the nature of things, such a reaction is usually only temporary. The population has learned that the social order can be changed, and at some later time is quite sure to attempt it again.

If the theory of revolutions here outlined is in any degree correct, it is evident that they are regular phenomena conforming to the laws of the mental life. It is possible, therefore, to predict their occurrence in the sense that the conditions favorable to their development can be stated. This has already been done in the discussion of our theory, but it may be worth our while to consider these conditions more critically, in order to see how far social prevision is possible in this matter and in social science in general.

It is evident that, according to our theory, revolution is impossible in a perfectly flexible and adaptable type of social organization. On the other hand, revolution is inevitable, barring foreign conquest, in those types of social and political organization which do not change with changing life-conditions. Thus from a purely theoretical point of view everything seems clear. But when we apply these principles to concrete societies, we experience difficulties. It is easy to predict, in the case of extremely inflexible societies like China and Russia, that revolution is, sooner or later, inevitable, unless conditions greatly change. Even in this easiest instance, however, our foresight is qualified by a great "if." But we cannot say with even as much assurance that our democratic societies are free from the danger of revolution. They may have the forms of freedom without the substance. Our own American society, for example, may be relatively inflexible in certain matters which are of vital importance to the life of our group. A tyrannical public sentiment or class interest may induce even in a democracy such an inflexibility or stagnation in institutions that only a revolution can sweep away the obstructing social structure. This is what



actually occurred in the case of slavery in our country, which institution required a war of essentially revolutionary character for its overthrow. This can happen again in the future; for example, in the relations of the capitalistic and wage-earning classes. Whenever, in fact, an institution or a condition of society is set above public criticism, and freedom of discussion and thought is suppressed concerning it, we have a condition of social inflexibility and a loss of the power of adaptation which may breed revolution. Thus the most that can be said in the way of predicting revolutions must be in very general terms. All that we can say is that some societies are more liable to revolutions than others, while no society can safely be judged to be entirely free from the danger of revolution. In other words, no one can say where revolutions will occur, and much less when.

But this negative conclusion regarding the predictability of revolutions is not valueless. If the social sciences cannot foretell social events, they nevertheless can so define the conditions under which they occur that social development can be controlled. Thus it is of value to society to know the general conditions under which revolutions occur; for such knowledge points out the way by which revolutions can be avoided. Surely it cannot be valueless for a society to know that by encouraging intelligent public criticism, free discussion, and free thought about social conditions and institutions, by keeping itself adaptable, flexible, alert for betterment, it is pursuing the surest way to avoid future disaster. Social science, if it cannot foretell the future, can nevertheless indicate the way of social health and security.

The important practical truth, then, brought out by this study of revolutions, is that which has been so well expressed by Professor Ward when he says of societies:

Only the labile is truly stable, just as in the domain of living things only the plastic is enduring. For lability is not an exact synonym of instability, but embodies besides the idea of flexibility and susceptibility to change without destruction or loss. It is that quality in institutions which enables them to change and still persist, which converts their equilibrium into a moving equilibrium, and which makes possible their adaptation to both internal and external modification, to changes in both individual character and the environment.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> *Pure Sociology*, p. 230.



INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY XV  
PART III. GENERAL STRUCTURE OF SOCIETIES  
CHAPTER VII. THE SOCIAL FRONTIERS (CONTINUED)  
SECTION VI. THE ROMAN WORLD (CONTINUED)

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We have seen that the Roman ceremony relating to the delimitation of the city, a preliminary which is the prime condition of all social structure, was modeled upon Etruscan ceremonies. These in their turn rested upon analogous beliefs derived from similar economic conditions antecedent to the division of lands among families and the foundation of towns in Greece. Everywhere the reality is constantly the same. According to times and circumstances, its interpretation and its forms alone vary. Always and everywhere also the social fact, whether it is military or peaceful, has an economic foundation at once material and psychic.

With Greeks and Romans defeat brought in its train destruction of the social autonomy of the defeated group. It lost its frontier, with everything connected with it—the town with all its contents, living and dead, men and gods, goods, animals, and people. Thus the conquered city gave itself over entirely to the conqueror, with its territory and its population, including its ancestors. The formula of surrender or *deditio*, as given by Livy runs: "I give my person, my town, my land, the water which runs there, my boundary gods, my temples, my furniture, all the things that belong to the gods, I give these to the Roman people."<sup>1</sup> The formula of surrender is also found in the *Amphitryon* of Plautus: "Urbem, agrum, aras, focus, seque uti dederent;"<sup>2</sup> and later: "dedunteque se divina humanaque people."<sup>1</sup> The formula of surrender is also found in the "omnia, urbem et liberos."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I, 38; VII, 31; XXVIII, 34. See also Polybius, XXXVI, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Vs. 71.

<sup>3</sup> Vs. 101.

Moreover, in the military city, just as it is the military and at the same time religious chieftain who founds the city, by locating its boundaries, it is in like manner the chief who in case of defeat gives it up, and cedes the terminal gods and all the contents of the social group to the preservation of which these gods were supposed to be devoted. If the limits of the ancestral land were strict and continuous and if the town itself was guarded from its neighbors by its inclosure, nevertheless the latter was less closed than the domestic territory. The town communicated with the region beyond by gates. Its territory, although limited, had openings. It is remarkable that even in our language these openings recall the partly pacific character of their primitive function. Thus, for example, in the form of expression "to make overtures of peace" (*ouvertures*).

The ancient town was, in its normal situation, in harmonious relations with the surrounding agricultural domains; accordingly, with progress of inequality, the rural family estates finished by falling into the hands of residents of the town, or of great proprietors who located in the town and ceased to work their estates directly. Moreover, the town with its agricultural dependencies was more accessible to the stranger than the ancestral estate, whether that of the clan or of the tribe. If the city represented by the town and the annexed agricultural estates thus formed virtually the embryo of the modern state, and if it developed by conquest of new territories and of other cities, it is certain that it presented in its very structure the germs of pacific development. In the sociological differentiation resulting from the distinction between town and country there is a complication of structure which gives to the internal organization an importance almost as great as that belonging to the external structure. There is an exterior frontier and a center. In societies chiefly military this center will be as distinct as the frontier, but much less significant, because it is in pacific relations at least with the agricultural territory and population forming part of the same social aggregate with itself. This pacific tendency of urban centers cannot fail to increase in strength. For example, when, as in our day, they have become commercial and indus-

trial, they tend to break down and even to abolish entirely economic frontiers, and indirectly to do away with the whole military structure. If the ancient city advanced its frontiers by war, it developed equally within by peace. The essential forms of the state remained the same, but the increase of the social mass of the territory and of population was paralleled by an increasing differentiation in the interior, with a corresponding co-ordination of all parts of the society.

In Greece the Amphyctionic confederations succeeded at last in controlling and organizing certain relations between the states, and in imposing limitations even upon war. These confederations were concluded and commemorated by a sacrifice and a common meal. These international feasts, analogous to those of the clan, and equally to those which had continued to be the custom in each city, although in different degrees according to the greater or less force of the ancient communal traditions, were in reality at this moment the equivalent of the commercial and other treaties which led to the foundation of later political federations by basing them upon a durable economic understanding. In Greece, at Rome, and everywhere else the extension of external frontiers, or the abolition of them by reciprocal intersocial penetration, corresponded continually to a reduction and to a leveling of the different classes in the city. These classes dissolved gradually through the weakening of economic, religious, moral, and legal conditions; in a word, through more and more complete participation of all in the same religious and legal rights. In these cases the struggle was always between the democracy and the oligarchy, as well between the groups of the same society as between different states. At Rome the treaty between the *plebs* and the patricians was concluded at a certain moment in the same forms as the treaties between two different states: "foedere icto cum plebe," says Tacitus.<sup>4</sup> Dionysius of Halicarnassus<sup>5</sup> tells us that the *fetiales* acted as intermediaries, and he gives extracts from the treaty called *lex sacrata*.

All the internal development of Roman civilization progressed *pari passu* with the extension of its frontiers. How different in

<sup>4</sup> IV, 6.

<sup>5</sup> VI, 89.



everything that concerns these latter the situation was from that which it had been before the foundation, by a band of adventurers and of colonists, of a petty center as jealously closed as was primitive Rome! Then the Etruscans, separated from other populations by physical frontiers and by their ethnic traits, stretched from the Adige and the Alps to the Tiber. The center and the Mediterranean slope were inhabited by homogeneous tribes—Umbrians, Sabians, etc.—sometimes united and sometimes at war with each other. The Oscans formed a barrier across the peninsula from one sea to the other. The Oenotrians dominated down to the Sicilian strait. On the north of the Adige there were, besides the Veneti, and on the south of Mount Garganus, the Iapygi, an Illyrian people.

What a change if we place ourselves a few years before our era, under the empire! All the barriers and the ethnic and physical divisions are leveled. The whole peninsula bears the name of Italy, reserved in primitive times for the populations inhabiting Bruttium and Lucania. In reality, then, the name has no longer any ethnic or geographic significance.

Without speaking of Gaul, to which we shall later give attention in connection with the formation and development of the French nation, and of its successive frontiers and the conquest by Cæsar, Egypt, and then Galatia and Paphlagonia, were annexed about thirty years before our era. Even these annexations were brought about peacefully, inasmuch as they were only the transformation of earlier protectorates. At the beginning of the first century the empire is bounded on the north by the Rhine, the Danube, and the Euxine; on the east, by the Euphrates and the mountains of Syria and Judea; on the eastern side of the Mediterranean it stretched on the south to Egypt and to the southern shores of the great sea. It occupied these coasts as far as Mauritania. On the east it reached the ocean and the North Sea. The Mediterranean had thus become an internal waterway.

The principal purpose of Augustus had been to assure the defense of Gaul against the Germans, as that of Cæsar had been to guarantee Italy against invasions from the Gauls. Both were agents of that destiny which decreed that purely physical obstacles



could not serve as a frontier. A physical frontier consisting of a river or a mountain is not adequately defended except on the condition of being extended. The defensive force of these barriers is insufficient, even from the military point of view without reckoning that the social forces tend in addition to extend not merely beyond geographical divisions, but also military limits. Cæsar conquered Gaul to guarantee Italy and to assure Spain. Augustus was not content with completing the subjection of the tribes of the Alps, with establishing colonies in Narbonne, and with communicating regularly through them with the left bank of the Rhine, where he stationed his legions. The Rhine is only a physical frontier. To make it a social frontier, it was necessary to prevent access to it. Accordingly, Augustus advanced upon the right bank, where Varus met with decisive disaster. The advance was pushed into regions which no organized Roman social force had penetrated. The zone had not been prepared for conquest as a sphere of influence. Augustus contented himself, consequently, with annexing Norica, Pannonia, Mœsia, and the interior of Dalmatia, and with establishing secure continental communications between the eastern and the western parts of the empire.

Within these limits interior peace is assured—the fusion of races and varieties of peoples is complete. Hence all the legions are distributed in the northeast of the empire, upon the banks of the Rhine and of the Danube, in Syria, and in Egypt. All the military forces are at the extremities in proportion to the needs. This is the fusion which took place in the interior as well as in Africa from the year 37 of our era. All the legions are concentrated in Numidia. Nowhere is the empire any more in arms except against the barbarians; that is to say, against those who are outside the zone of the influence of Roman civilization, or in the zone still partially affected by this influence. The emperor, supreme war-lord, and thus the successor of primitive petty kings, governs directly the frontier countries. He is the head, the front (*frons, frontier*), armed for attack and defense. The frontiers called geographic are not used except as bases. They are worthless unless they are combined with a powerful human force to

make a social frontier. This military frontier has in reality to face in two directions. It must oppose two hostile forces: the exterior enemy, and the more positive and penetrating social forces of which it is the envelope, on one side; and, on the other, its own interior forces, which are incessantly developing themselves, and which oblige the military frontier to press forward in order to make place for stable, regular, and peaceful communication with the regions over which military protectorate is exercised. Thus progressive civilizations continually chase war before them, expelling it from their own borders and relegating it to remote frontiers. This is a constant law, applicable to petty states as well as to the largest empires.

All frontiers are social, even the military frontiers; and this is why they change continually. It is also why the military form is incapable, as historical experience has proved it to be, of establishing a regular mode of inter-social equilibrium, and why other forms must be substituted. It is a task for the sociologist to discover what is the most advantageous form in a civilization which, like ours, has long since passed the frontiers of the Roman power at the height of its grandeur; in which, nevertheless, narrow military frontiers not at all consistent with the real development of civilization continue to divide people who for a long time have shared a common life.

In his political testament Augustus advised contentment with the limits which he assigned to the empire. He was thus imbued with the idea that there are natural and fixed limits. On the contrary, every social frontier is variable as the society itself. Indeed, it merely expresses in reality the limits of the power of the society to penetrate surrounding territory—limits themselves variable and diverse, as we have seen, according to the nature of the energies or social capacities and external resistances. The advice of Augustus was wise in appearance, but impracticable. To defend itself, a society must be able to attack. Accordingly, from Augustus to Trajan, besides temporary acquisitions, the empire annexed Armenia as far as the Caucasus, as well as the eastern shore of the Euxine as far as the Cimmerian Bosphorus. It also absorbed Cappadocia, Lycia, and the whole

basin of the Euphrates and the Tigris. In Syria it extended its rule toward the interior beyond the mountains. In Egypt it approached the second cataract. In Europe it conquered, not only Thrace, but Dacia beyond the Danube. Accordingly, the mountains of Bastarnia became in this region the strategic point of its frontier against the barbarous Sarmatians. As in the case of the Danube, the empire again crossed the Rhine on the east, and it also made the *agri decumates* a defense in that quarter.

After Trajan the empire consolidates and completes its Asiatic possessions. In Europe it prolongs the holdings on the Euxine as far as the mouth of the Hypanis and the Borysthenes. The Euxine is thus, like the Mediterranean, transformed into an interior lake and route of communication. On the northwest the frontier is carried as far as the Elbe. From the center to the extremities the great routes, whether military or commercial, run together and complete each other in ramifications that carry out a common internal system of circulation for goods, for men, and for ideas. During all the imperial period the system of routes of communication was completed, not merely in Italy, but throughout the different regions to the remotest extremities. The analogy of their development with that of our railroads is remarkable. Strategic necessities exerted upon their direction an influence at first superior to that of economic needs. Of course, it was necessary in building them to take account of topography and of the situation of the large towns, but these were neglected frequently to such an extent that many very important ancient centers found themselves left outside of the great circulating system; and it is perhaps more exact to say that the position of the towns was henceforth determined by the routes of communication, than that the latter were located by the position of the towns.

And still, as always, the armed force is pursued by the overflowing civilization toward the extremities. There were thirty legions under Vespasian in place of twenty-eight in the year 95 A. D., and of twenty-five earlier; but now Dalmatia is stripped of troops. Anterior Spain has only two legions, Africa only one.



On the other hand, along the Danube there are seven legions in the place of four, and in the Orient eight in the place of six.

At the beginning of the second century the emperors were busy consolidating the frontiers. The movement toward expansion seems to have attained its extreme limit. The *vallum Hadriani* is built between the Solway and the Tyne, the *vallum Antonini* between the Clyde and the Forth. The *limes* of the Rhine is fortified like that of Rhætia. The rivers are thus not themselves the barriers against the barbarians; it is necessary to add to them a human force. The frontier therefore always presents the physical and human combination which is fundamentally the basis of every social phenomena. It is a social phenomenon, not purely physical nor purely human. It is nothing else than social.

If the empire is from this moment on the defensive, it is the intermediate stage between full development and decline. The frontiers are closed. Interior commerce suffers. Infiltration of barbarians takes place irresistibly, in spite of everything, and it prepares the way for the violent removal of the barriers. The establishments of military colonies, of Germanic or other origin, becomes more common. The empire under Constantine (324-37) moves its capital to Byzantium. At the beginning of the fifth century, in accordance with the *notitia dignitatum*, it is divided into four prefectures: that of the East, of Illyria, of Italy, and of Gaul; with fourteen dioceses and one hundred and twenty provinces. *Duces* and *comites* are charged with command at the frontiers. In the interior large private proprietorship is developed and strengthened more and more at the expense of small ownership and of the public domain. The forms of dismemberment and of the feudal hierarchy begin to be prepared. The dismemberment and the feudal régime would have occurred without the invasions of the barbarians. The latter, however, everywhere accentuated the military character of the process. If the external frontiers were removed, we must attribute it in large part to the transformation of internal forces, but always as we have shown, in their external equilibration, which could not be sudden, but adjusted itself slowly and gradually, like all the



great natural transformations. These do not appear in the form of cataclysms, except to superficial observers who consider only results.

The emperors had fringed the frontiers with castles, strongholds encircled by a fosse, and *limes*, especially where there was no river to serve as a barrier. The neighboring lands were the collective property of the bodies of troops, always accompanied by their women and children, with their counts and their dukes as military chieftains. They were literally *marches*. Lampridius says that Alexander Severus (222-35), after his wars in Mauritania, Illyria, and Armenia, "gave the lands taken from the enemy to the chiefs and the soldiers of the frontiers, on condition that their heirs should be soldiers, and that these lands should never pass into the possession of men who were not soldiers." Likewise Vopiscus says that Probus (276-82) "gave to his veterans certain lands in Isauria, adding that their male children should be under obligation to become soldiers at the age of eighteen years." Here is evidently one of the origins of the feudal contract, which was destined to reorganize the law of property by putting it in connection with military service and sovereignty.

Nevertheless, the Theodosian code<sup>6</sup> contains a law of Honorius which justifies the supposition that the obligation of military service, even in his time, was not always strictly observed, and that chiefs of military colonies tended to make themselves independent. Thus as the law expresses it, "the lands which the far-seeing goodness of our early predecessors ceded to soldiers called *gentiles* [genuine military clans and an apparent return to primitive forms], to protect the frontiers of the empire, are according to reports that reach us, sometimes alienated to men who are not soldiers, but care must be taken that such holders of land shall perform their proper service in protecting the frontiers. If they fail in this duty, they must leave their lands and make them over to the *gentiles* and to the veterans." Failure to perform military duty accordingly resulted, as in later feudal times, in breaking the contract which was later a part of the tenure in

<sup>6</sup> Book VII, title 15.

the case of all feudal lords. The consequence evidently was that the feudal régime was a natural development of property as organized by the law of the *quirites*, just as in our day commercial and industrial trusts are a development of economic law as it was formulated, for instance, by the Code Napoléon. The organization of the colonial system extended from the frontiers, where its form was military, to the interior, where it was at first entirely economic; but where it ended by developing a corresponding legal and political régime. Thus the colonial system, in extending itself from the frontiers to the interior of the empire, prepared the way for the system of serfdom. Labor that was free, as compared with ancient personal slavery, began to be considered more profitable than that of chattels. The latter accordingly passed into a species of colonists. Thus the whole society tended to model itself upon the combined economic and military structure of the frontier colonies. The development of large proprietorship could have no other end than a tremendous advantage on the part of the owners, and in proportion to their economic power the latter increased in military importance, in right to administer justice, and at length in all the attributes of political sovereignty, according to a hierarchical scheme in accordance with the military and economic structure of the new society. Feudalism and the whole Middle Age régime thus issued directly from the empire.

For two centuries the jurists had taught that provincial land was not susceptible of complete ownership; the *dominium* over it belonged by right of conquest to the state. The individual proprietors could have nothing more than possession and usufruct. In the fourth century of our era this distinction between Italian and provincial land no longer existed and for a long time the provincials were Roman citizens. At the same time, proprietorship lost its religious character. There was no longer any worship of the god Terminus. There came to be cultivators who were at the same time judges and surveyors, who fixed boundaries and settled conflicts. Violation of boundaries is no longer sacrilege, but crime. The military form of social structure, with the suppression of interior frontiers and their removal to a great

distance, greatly modified the forms of authority in the interior of the empire, and especially in Italy.

Meanwhile, under the empire from the close of the third century, there had already begun a modification of the general defensive limits. The countries protected by the *limes* of Germany and of Rhetia are lost. The frontier is brought back to the Rhine and the Danube. Dacia is lost, and in 368 a portion of Mesopotamia. General instability, greatest in the most distant regions, which are the latest acquired and the most exposed, the danger resulting from the excessive power of the governors of military provinces, the increasing multiplicity of conflicts of all kinds, and of problems to be solved far from the administrative centers, tended to increase the number of the contractions. While at the beginning of the first century there were only twenty-nine provinces at the end of the same century there were thirty-six; at the end of the second, forty-two; at the end of the third they had become ninety-six; and at the year 400 the number of provinces was one hundred and twenty.

Augustus had divided Italy into eleven regions or circuits. Some of these still had mountains and rivers as boundaries, but none of them any longer corresponded to earlier ethnic conditions. Italy had now become cut up into provinces scarcely at all corresponding with the physical characteristics of the older regions. These natural physical and ethnic traits had become secondary in importance and had passed into neglect. Thus there was a province of Liguria, but it was located north of the Po, with Milan as its capital.

While increasing differentiation of internal administration went on, a hierarchy established itself in the administration itself. Aurelian and Diocletian grouped all the provinces into twelve dioceses, and between the governors and the central power he created *vicarii*. The unity of the empire is only administrative, hence in reality very feeble in view of the new social situation. All in all, the political center has become as fragile as the frontier. Rome for centuries is no longer a military march nor a frontier capital (*caput, frons*). She is at the center of a world, but an already insufficient center, because the Orient is less solidly and



directly attached to it than central and occidental Europe. In the year 395 the empire is divided, and there are two prefects in each of its two parts. The division of the central power of necessity increased parallel with the shifting of frontiers and the internal social transformation. Under the later empire the principle of separating military and civic functions is to prevail. There will be masters of the forces, and under them counts and dukes whose prerogatives extend over regions of various size, sometimes including several provinces. Instead of being concentrated, the troops are dispersed in garrisons of various sizes along the Rhine and the Danube from source to mouth. Danger threatens everywhere from without, and society is in full transformation within. New conditions must necessarily have as a result a transformation of the frontiers. The dissolution of the empire goes on parallel with the social reorganization of its content, in connection with the internal and external conditions of the latter.

Religious and philosophical beliefs were in continuous correlation with the evolution already passed through, and with that which was in progress.

Just as the fosse around the primitive towns was the *mundus*, at first the strictly inviolable circle of social life, so under the empire the "Roman world," including its most distant extremities, was such a life-circle. At its boundaries all social assimilation ceased to be possible. However great the Roman city became, whatever was its force of expansion, it was always limited. At its apogee as at the beginning, its limitations are very rigid. It has a belt of strong castles and of military colonies wherever physical obstacles do not afford sufficient means of defense. In fact, there is so little confidence in the latter that at the approach of danger military posts are scattered all along the frontier, even where there are large rivers and high mountains.

In the midst of this world, so broad that to the eyes of the great mass of its inhabitants it might well have seemed limitless, a homogeneous social life developed itself progressively by the extension of the great routes of commerce; by the necessity of a more and more intensive production, both agricultural and industrial; by the slow fusion of human varieties; by the fusion of usages of customs, of divinities, and even of philosophies; by



the application of a uniform law, and of a strongly centralized political and administrative regulation. The "great Roman peace" was a period unique in the history of human societies, at least in a civilization on so large a scale. The citizens of this Roman world might well have cherished the illusion that this world did not have frontiers, since they were so distant, and any conflicts which arose with the regions beyond made so little impression in the central regions. What they could not see was that not only at the exterior did Roman civilization have its limits, not merely military or political properly speaking, and still others more or less extended than the military limits; but that in the interior of Roman society an enormous differentiation of the functions of social life was taking place in correlation with the development of territorial extension and of the mass of the population. This differentiation of the functions of social life had necessitated an adequate organic differentiation, and consequently an enormous multiplication of structures and internal delimitations unknown and non-existent before. If Roman development had been simply a development in mass and in extent, without internal organic differentiation, it would have had no interest for the historian and the sociologist. But the evolution of the frontiers of Roman civilization was always correlated with its internal evolution. The two were in continuous and variable equilibration, and there was at the same time progressive adjustment with the exterior world.

Then as now the political theorists and the philosophers, considering chiefly the most apparent external aspect—the frontier in its purely military and political factors, which is like the protective shell of all the internal portions of this great social body, the envelope of which they even lost consciousness in proportion to its distance from the superior centers, and also losing from view that this envelope is not only an organ of separation and of defense, but also an organ of relation and of adaptation with the exterior world whose existence they ignored—fell into complete idealism. They arrived at the absolute negation of frontiers, at universal equality and fraternity, as though all barriers, all inequalities, not merely physical and ethnical, but social, had com-

pletely disappeared, or at least were about to vanish. But, in spite of the increasing equality of purely civic and political conditions, under the leveling influence of the same imperial system, the real limits between classes and interests had perhaps never been more pronounced. Nor had the social organization been more highly differentiated, and hence necessarily limited in each of its functions by coexistent institutions and forms. And everywhere, from the stage of simple associations, corporations of laborers, up to the formation of powerful commercial and financial societies and of various colleges, religious, political, and others, the whole internal social structure was in the aggregate firmly closed and organized in elaborate gradations. Only the torpid feudal and Catholic Middle Age, and then the later constitution of absolute monarchies, could suffice to bring attention back to the stern reality, the appreciation of which Stoicism and then primitive Christianity had lost, while their moral ideal, although high, was fatally lacking in positive content.

Already with Diogenes, when the Greek city was founded in the empire of Alexander, the school of the Cynics had ignored patriotism. The Epicureans were also uninterested in public affairs. Man was to them a citizen of the universe. He did not cast his lot with any definite social group. Diogenes boasted of having no rights of citizenship. Crates extended this cosmopolitan individualism to every community, even that of thought. His country was in the contempt of the vulgar human mass. The *super-man* is not an invention of our century. The theory is formulated especially in the Stoic philosophy, which thus became a philosophy or general conception of the social world. Man supplants the citizen. Seneca, Plutarch, Marcus Aurelius, Zeno, have for their country the world. All men, including slaves, descend from the same god, all are brothers, according to Epicurus. It was a general mollifying of the ancient law of the classes. Christianity was the product of this dissolution of ancient institutions and beliefs. It was communistic, and in this sense it represents a remarkable effort to articulate the new moral and social conception with a superior economic law. But its fraternal idealism presently clothed itself with an authoritative form

at first moral, then more and more temporal. It had to adapt itself to the social environment. It submitted little by little to authorities, up to the day when, having itself become powerful, it became Catholicism. Then also it proved not only that the frontiers of a belief may be more extended than the bounds of the temporal sovereignty of the chief of this faith, but that they may extend beyond the frontiers of a considerable number of separate political sovereignties. What was proved in that case for religion will be proved later in a universal measure for science, and at last for the world-economy which is destined to be the effective and secure basis of that unity which neither empires nor religions can realize—the principle of authority being too feeble to serve as bond of union for the infinite variety of forms and of functions which the republic of the human race presupposes.

*[To be continued]*

## THE RELATION OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT TO AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC IDEALS

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John Stuart Mill opens his discussion of *Representative Government* with the remark that government

by some minds is conceived as strictly a practical art, giving rise to no questions but those of means and an end. Forms of government are assimilated to any other expedients for the attainment of human objects. They are regarded as wholly an affair of invention and contrivance. Being made by man, it is assumed that man has the choice either to make them or not, and how or on what pattern they shall be made. Government, according to this conception, is a problem to be worked like any other questions of business.

Mill here expresses a view which still dominates modern political thought, in spite of the fact that the philosophy of which it is the expression has long been outgrown in the study of institutions other than political. It is a curious fact that, while the doctrine of evolution, with its leading principle of the adaptation of form to function, has profoundly influenced our reasoning on all matters pertaining to social relations, it has failed to overcome the influence of tradition upon our political thinking. We still deal with political phenomena as if governmental organization could be made, unmade, and remade without reference either to industrial conditions or to the special problems with which government has to deal. The principal effect and the immediate danger of this attitude toward questions of civil government are that our reasoning on political affairs is usually "in harmony with what we want, rather than with the conditions and problems which government has to face." The history of city government in the United States presents a peculiar interest to the student of politics, because it illustrates so clearly these general principles.

The formative period in the development of our American cities was dominated by an essentially negative view of govern-



ment. During the eighteenth and the greater part of the nineteenth centuries American political thought was concerned primarily, in fact almost exclusively, with the protection of individual rights. A minimum of government and a maximum of individual liberty represented the primary standards of political thought and action. From our present perspective we can appreciate the great service rendered by these essentially negative political ideas. They strengthened that feeling of personal responsibility and initiative which has contributed so much toward our industrial development and served to maintain that alertness to possible encroachment upon the domain of individual liberty which has been the admiration and envy of the people of continental Europe. Furthermore, the restriction of government activity to the protection of person and property, and the care of the dependent, defective, and delinquent classes, enabled the country to train the electorate at a time when the functions of government were few and the possibilities of harm due to inexperience reduced to a minimum. Local government was then looked upon as the cradle of American liberties and as the bulwark against the possible tyranny of the state and federal governments; it was expected to preserve and foster a feeling of opposition toward any extension of the positive action of government.

Viewed in the perspective of the last hundred years, the contrast between the conditions out of which our ideas of local government developed and the circumstances which now confront us, is fraught with lessons which we cannot afford to ignore if we hope to build up vigorous local institutions. The menace to individual liberty from the tyranny of government is no longer a real one, and to this extent, therefore, the justification for the essentially negative prevailing views of government has disappeared. On the other hand, the concentration of population and the growth of great industrial centers have brought into the foreground a mass of new problems which the community is compelled to face. Many of them come directly within the legitimate sphere of government, but so strong is the hold of the political ideas of the eighteenth century that in most of our cities we must

depend upon private effort for their solution. The widening gap between the life of the community and the activities of our city governments is impressing itself on every student of American city life. The first step in the development of greater civic vigor is a method of bridging this gap which shall include, primarily, such an extension of municipal functions that the community will be enabled to grapple with the problems which cannot be solved without organized action; and, secondly, such a readjustment of the machinery of government that positive action will be fostered, rather than being made increasingly difficult, as it is under our present system. The ideas of governmental organization which we have borrowed from an earlier period, and which have worked great good as applied to our state and federal governments, are no longer applicable to the conditions that prevail in our cities.

If we examine the history of city government during the last fifty years, we find that slowly and with great reluctance we are beginning to acknowledge, in fact if not in theory, that the political ideas which have dominated our political thinking for more than a century are no longer adequate to meet the complex conditions of modern city life. We continue to reason as if the political principles of the eighteenth century had lost none of their force, but the pressure of circumstances has nevertheless forced us to make certain compromises, the full import of which we have hardly begun to realize.

Our inherited notions of democratic government have dictated a form of city organization in which the local representative assembly or city council occupies an important position. The same political traditions dictate that the higher administrative officials of the city, no matter what their functions, shall be chosen by popular election. It is a significant fact that this tenacious adherence to what we regard as the essentials of democracy has been contemporaneous with a totally different movement in other branches of administrative activity. The management of great business enterprises is being concentrated in the executive heads of industrial corporations. The responsibility for the conduct of the affairs of educational and charitable institutions is likewise drifting from the board to the single executive head.

Even in the management of the affairs of the church this tendency toward the concentration of executive power is distinctly apparent. Wherever the form of board management is still preserved, the actual control and responsibility is vested in one individual, whether he be called the president of the board or the chairman of the executive committee. However we may regard this tendency, there is every indication that it is not merely a passing phase, but that the immediate future will witness a strengthening of its influence.

It should not require lengthy argument to prove that tendencies which are so clearly marked in American business and institutional activity are certain to exert an influence on the administration of public affairs. We cannot hope permanently to preserve the illusion that by some occult force political organization can be kept free from the influences which are dominant in every other department of our national life.

If this concentration of power in the mayor represents a permanent tendency in American administrative policy, the question immediately presents itself whether we can reconcile these changes with our views of democracy. No one will deny that the increase of executive power, as well as its concentration, has been accompanied by a marked increase in efficiency. The choice presented to our American communities, therefore, takes the form of an apparent opposition between democracy and efficiency. Thus presented, there is little doubt as to the ultimate choice of the American people. Above all other peoples of western civilization, we are worshipers of efficiency. The establishment, therefore, of a harmonious relation between democracy and efficiency, both in thought and in action, becomes a necessary requisite for the maintenance of those institutions which we are accustomed to regard as the distinctive products of our American civilization.

If this analysis of the present situation be correct, the outlook for the municipal council is anything but encouraging. The analogy between a business and a municipal corporation, while faulty in many respects, is of real value when viewed from the standpoint of the organization of city departments. Whether or not we agree with this analogy, we cannot disregard the fact that



the popular view with reference to the administration of the city's executive departments is moving toward the standards which have proved so successful in the management of great corporate enterprises. This means that the people are prepared to accept the same administrative standards in municipal affairs as those which prevail in the business world. The recent proposal to give to the police commissioner of New York a term of ten years, or possibly a life tenure, would have been received with scorn and indignation fifty years ago. Today it is regarded by many as the best means of securing an efficient administration of this service.

Similarly, the increasing limitations on the powers of the municipal council are not due to any decline in the character of its membership, but rather to a growing appreciation of the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of enforcing responsibility against a large assembly. The repeated failure of the effort to enforce such responsibility is accountable for the steady decline of popular interest in the work of the council.

It is a significant fact that, even in those cities in which years of effort have finally secured an improvement in the character of the men serving in the local legislative body, the improvement in the administrative service is in no sense commensurate with the amount of effort thus expended. The vital interest of the citizens is in strengthening the administrative service rather than the legislative body. The gradual appreciation of this fact has led to the transference of what were formerly regarded as legislative functions to administrative officers. Although the movement is by no means uniform, the general trend of institutional development in this country is to reduce the power of the council to a control over finances, and by means of constitutional and statutory limitations to set definite limits even to this control. The council is gradually assuming the position of an organ of government whose function is to prevent the extravagant or unwise expenditure of public funds. It is thus rapidly becoming a negative factor in our municipal system. To an increasing extent the American people are looking to the executive, not only for the execution, but also for the planning of municipal improvements. Even the freedom of discussion in the council is being subjected to statutory limita-



tions by provisions requiring that the vote on financial and franchise questions shall not be delayed beyond a certain period.

It is a mistake to suppose that this decline in the power of the council involves a loss of popular control. In every city in which the mayor has been given independent powers of appointment and has been made the real head of the administrative organization of the city, the sensitiveness of the government to public opinion has been considerably increased. When rightly viewed, the change involves possibilities of popular control which we have hardly begun to realize. Almost every city in the country offers a number of instances in which the mayor, when supported by popular opinion, has been able to withstand the combined influence of the council and any machine organization that attempted to direct his action. The lessons of this experience have left their impress upon the political thinking of the American people and explain the tendency to look to the executive rather than to the legislative authority for the solution of every difficulty. Popular control over the city government will become more effective as public opinion becomes more thoroughly organized. At present we must depend upon a great number of voluntary organizations representing different elements in the community, but which cannot, from the nature of the case, represent the opinion of the community as a whole.

The danger involved in this tendency toward the concentration of executive power is that the council will be shorn, not only of its administrative, but of its legislative powers, as well. The desire for greater administrative efficiency may lead us to a type of government in which the determination of executive policy will be left exclusively to the mayor and his heads of departments. This form of organization is certain to give us better government than our present large and unwieldy council. The accumulated experience of American cities has shown that, unless the council is reduced to a single chamber with a small membership, responsibility cannot be enforced. The choice that presents itself is clear and simple. We must either make the council a small body of nine or eleven members, elected by the people, having complete power over the finances of the city, or we shall inevitably drift

toward a system in which the council will disappear and all power will be lodged in the mayor and his heads of departments.

The reconciliation of the idea of popular government with the concentration of executive power represents the first step toward a better adjustment of our political thinking to the conditions of city life. A second and no less important step involves some further modifications in our ideas of municipal organization. American cities are organized as if they were the small towns and villages of fifty years ago. We have proceeded on the assumption that an aggressive and progressive municipal policy can be developed out of the compromise of conflicting district interests. As a matter of fact, our present plan of district representation clogs positive action and prevents the systematic planning and economical execution of great public improvements.

Placing the mayor as a check upon the council, and the council as a check upon the mayor, has served, furthermore, to strengthen that most baneful of political superstitions—the belief in a self-acting governmental mechanism which will carry on the work of government without the need of watchfulness and alertness on the part of the people. For every evil, no matter what its nature, we recur to the statute book. There is a widespread belief throughout the country that for every abuse there is a legislative remedy. This belief in the moralizing power of law is one of the most insidious as well as one of the most corrupting influences in our public life. It leads us to place unenforceable laws on the statute books, and the disregard of these laws becomes the instrument of blackmail and bribery. The same political superstition pervades the organization of our city governments—to construct a self-acting mechanism which will secure honesty and guarantee efficient administration. By pitting the executive against the legislative authority, by electing one official to exercise control over another, and by making official terms as short as possible, we have beguiled ourselves with the illusion that it is possible to construct a mechanism of government which only requires the attention of the citizen body at stated election periods. It is not surprising that this search for a self-acting governmental machine has proved fruitless, for it represents an attempt to relieve ourselves of a

responsibility which we cannot throw off. The complexity of organization that has resulted from this attempt to secure efficiency and honesty through statutes rather than through men has done more than any other influence to retard municipal progress.

The problem presented by city government in the United States is not merely to construct a well-balanced mechanism of government, but so to construct that government that it will require the alertness and watchfulness of the people. The situation in Philadelphia is an instructive instance of the effect of so organizing the government as to leave the people under the impression that the officials are sufficiently encompassed with statutory limitations to have little power for evil. With a bicameral council, a mayor whose appointments are subject to the approval of the upper branch of the local legislative body, and such important services as the control of education vested in a board appointed by the local judiciary, authority is split to such an extent that the people believe that no one official or group of officials enjoys sufficient power to work much harm. We fail to appreciate the fact that this splitting of authority means that harmony can be secured only by gathering these loose threads in the hands of some person or group of persons who, while not officially recognized in the organization of government, exercise the real governmental power.

If the foregoing discussion has served any purpose, it has shown that industrial and social organization in the United States is tending toward an increasing concentration of executive and administrative power, and that this movement has been accompanied by a corresponding increase in efficiency. In the organization of our municipalities the fear of absolutism has led us to offer considerable resistance to a plan of organization whose value is no longer questioned in other departments of organized effort. The partial and unwilling recognition of this principle has led to a series of makeshifts which have failed to give satisfactory results. Instead of giving the mayor complete control over the administrative work of the city, we have, in most cases, hampered his powers of appointment, making them subject to the approval of the council. The unfortunate compromises which this system has



compelled the mayor to make, have been laid at the door of the council, and have served further to weaken its hold on the people. If this feeling continues to increase in intensity, it is likely to carry us to a form of city government in which the mayor and the heads of executive departments will exercise, not only the administrative, but also the legislative functions of the municipality.

The council, if restricted to distinctly legislative functions, may continue to be an important organ in keeping the government of the city in close touch with the people, and in keeping the people in close touch with city affairs. Under our present plan of organization this is impossible, because the participation of the council in the exercise of executive functions leads it to bend its energies to control the executive rather than to deal with broader questions of municipal policy.

The alternative that presents itself to the American people is clear and distinct. If we wish to preserve the council, we must be prepared to make three changes: first, to deprive it of all participation in the appointment of executive officials; secondly, to transform it from a bicameral organization to a single chamber; and, thirdly, to reduce its membership. Unless we are prepared to make these changes, it is safe to predict that we shall gradually move toward a system in which both executive and legislative powers will be vested in the mayor and the heads of executive departments.

We need not shrink from giving to the mayor greater executive powers, if by so doing we can save the council. It is important for those who are interested in the betterment of city government to realize that, while in the organization of government all kinds of compromises may be attempted, the actual operation of any system is determined by deep underlying forces over which the individual has but little control. The compromises that have been dictated by our unwillingness to accept the consequences of certain fundamental canons of political organization have placed our city governments at the mercy of a small group of men who understand these principles more clearly than we, and who are able to manipulate this organization for their own ends.



The traditional fear of absolutism need not deter us from making the mayor the real executive head of the city government. Correctly interpreted, this plan offers possibilities of popular control which our present system lacks. At all events, it is well for us to understand that the demand for efficiency, which the American people place above their desire for democratic rule, will inevitably lead to this concentration of executive power. The real alternative that presents itself is, therefore, whether this concentration of power will be accompanied by the destruction of the city council, or whether the city council will survive as an organ of government restricted to purely legislative functions.

## SOCIOLOGY IN SOME OF ITS EDUCATIONAL ASPECTS<sup>1</sup>

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The establishment of sociological studies, especially in France, Italy, and America, was one of the outstanding culture advances of the last two or three decades of the nineteenth century. As part of this general movement toward a science of social phenomena may be counted the formation of the Sociological Society in Great Britain, in 1903. This country, as J. S. Mill pointed out, is habitually late in perception of, and response to, general movements of thought. Sociologically considered, British leadership, long maintained in economic teaching and investigation, has been the undesigned cultural reflex of the contemporary industrial evolution. British emphasis of economic science embodies and expresses the speculative and educational aspects of the industrial revolution. National development of coal fields and iron fields has of necessity its corresponding points of view and modes of thought in university, school, and press. Hence the belief, widespread both in popular and scientific circles, that economic science may be made to cover the whole social field with an elastic reservation for ethics and religion. This restriction of sociological science has seldom been explicit, but it has to a considerable extent limited the teaching of sociology. Against this national tendency to narrow the sociological field, protests and counter-movements have ceaselessly gone on. Chief among advocates and exponents of the larger sociological interests have been, in science, Spencer; and in literature and journalism, Ruskin. But in respect of corresponding movements in education only two instances can be noted here, as main sources of impulse toward the formation of the Sociological Society. Needless to say both are extra-academic initiatives. In Edinburgh a broad conception of social science, as

<sup>1</sup> Written for the forthcoming *Encyclopædia of Education*.

having not only the dominant economic approach, but many correlative ones, survives from the time of David Hume and Adam Smith, Ferguson and Miller, Robertson and Kames. Continuing this, and also the Scottish tradition of intercourse with continental thought, Professor Geddes began in Edinburgh, about 1880, sociological teaching, which has since grown into an extramural school of sociology. Its record of publication is not considerable, but its efforts have been rather directed to a combination of speculative and practical work, sociological observation and research being considered as theoretical activities, which have been given their full cultural value only when conjoined with practical efforts toward social progress, either urban or rural. Hence the usefulness and productivity of this school, in the direction of education and hygiene, housing and art; in a word, by civic rather than literary activities. Its aim in science, and its policy in education, are alike summed up in Professor Geddes' phrase "social survey for social service." This is well seen in its characteristic achievement on the educational side—the "Outlook Tower," a sociological station described by Professor Zueblin as "The World's First Sociological Laboratory," in the *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1899. Some of the main ideas inspiring the origin and designing of the Outlook Tower are:

1. Sociology, like all other sciences, must be based on factual observations, methodically made, systematically arranged, and generalized by the aid of verifiable hypotheses.
2. The student's observations may best begin with field investigation of the facts of his own region; and for this he must utilize the resources of the preliminary sciences, commencing with those of geography, passing on through the physical and the biological sciences, and finally calling in the aid of the several social specialisms, economic and other. From this "regional survey" of his immediate environment the student passes on to a comparative study of his own and other regional units, of city and province, nation and empire, language and civilization, till the expanding area of observation and study covers the globe.
3. Observation of contemporary social phenomena soon leads

to the recognition of changes especially when based on the comparative study of region by region. To interpret these current events, the resources of historical specialisms and the general history of civilization have alike to be utilized; contemporary social phenomena being largely survivals and recapitulations of past historical developments. But while preliminary studies in geography begin with a survey of a particular region, and ascend to a general view of the world-theater of mankind, the corresponding historical preparation of the sociologist essentially proceeds in the reverse order, the student using the general history of mankind to interpret the particular history of his own region. Its industry and art, its politics and religion, its education and custom, being thus viewed as parts of a general evolutionary process, the possibilities of its modification by conscious human endeavor next present themselves to the student, who thus passes by a natural transition from pure to applied sociology, from science to art, from social survey to social service. From this point of view, every individual type, every social institution, industrial and political, educational and religious, is seen as an empirical racial experiment toward a certain social ideal, though this may be but obscurely known to the participating individuals. Given, however, such evolutionary ideals, the transition from empirical to rational (i. e., scientific) experiment in social evolution is inevitable. The history of every branch of science shows, at a certain stage of its development, the emergence, not only of observational, but of experimental institutes; in fact, laboratories, in which the conditions of rational experiment are thought out and organized. It is thus the practical endeavor of the Outlook Tower to work toward the beginnings of such departures in sociological science, upon civic and even wider levels.<sup>2</sup>

The London movement has a different origin, developing out of the unique environment of the metropolis. Of all cities, London exhibits the wealthiest and most luxurious aggregation of the leisure class and at the same time herds within itself what is probably the vastest mass of poverty, disease, lunacy, vice, and crime ever accumulated on a like area. The social problems thus

<sup>2</sup> Geddes, *City Development* (Edinburgh, 1904).



presented to an enlightened philanthropy evoked the charity-organization movement, with its manifold ramifications of district committees, and local visitors and helpers. Primarily for the sociological instruction of these, but also for utilizing the sources of social observation thus opened up, Professor C. S. Loch inaugurated lectures, teaching, and research work, which have grown into an organized "School of Sociology and Social Economics." This, under the guidance of Mr. E. J. Urwick, has specialized in aim, on problems of poverty and, in method, on field observation and tutorial instruction; but at the same time the school is organized for imparting a sociological training to all who are concerned with civic problems, whether in a purely administrative way or on the side of scientific observation, philanthropic work, religious and educative effort, or political endeavor.

Coincidentally with the formation of the Sociological Society, a beginning was made of specifically sociological teaching inside the universities. To inaugurate this, a fund was placed at the disposal of the London University by Mr. J. Martin White, one of the founders of the Sociological Society. To superintend the experiment, a Sociological Committee of the Senate has been formed, whose deliberations are assisted by representatives of several extra-mural sociological interests. Under the scheme thus set on foot, lectures are being given, and postgraduate research is being carried on, so that a strong university school of sociology promises to result. The courses already given include "Civics" by Professor Geddes, "Anthropology" by Dr. Haddon, "Social Institutions" by Dr. Westermarck, and "Comparative Ethics" by Mr. L. T. Hobhouse—this last being part of the work of the Sociological Society. Following on this initiative, there has been inaugurated a further development of sociological investigation by the donation of funds to the University of London, by Mr. Francis Galton, for the establishment of a Research Fellowship in National Eugenics. Mr. Galton's long-continued researches toward the establishment of eugenics—in literal English, good breeding—as a branch of applied science, were resumed in a paper he read to the Sociological Society during its first session now published in the society's *Sociological Papers*, Vol. I

(Macmillan, 1905). The first president of the society was Mr. James Bryce; and among those who have already contributed papers to the society, or taken part in its discussions, are, in addition to Mr. Galton, Mr. Bateson, Mr. Charles Booth, Professor Bosanquet, Dr. J. H. Bridges, Dr. Beattie Crozier, Professor Durkheim, Professor Geddes, Professor Höffding, Mr. L. T. Hobhouse, Mr. J. A. Hobson, Mr. T. C. Horsfall, Dr. E. Hutchinson, Mr. Benjamin Kidd, Professor Loria, Dr. Maudsley, Dr. Mercier, Professor Muirhead, Mr. J. M. Robertson, Professor Karl Pearson, Professor Sadler, Mr. Bernard Shaw, Professor Sorley, Mr. H. G. Wells and Dr. Westermarck. It will be obvious, from the representative character of these names, that the society seeks to focus on the social problems, knowledge derived from every possible source. In other words, it is the aim of the society, not to advocate a policy, but to accumulate, organize, and integrate, sociological knowledge.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Information about the society may be obtained on application to the secretary, 5 Old Queen Street, Westminster.

## CRIME IN RELATION TO THE STATE AND TO MUNICIPALITIES

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The federal government has jurisdiction in the case of crimes committed against the United States, but this jurisdiction is wholly distinct from the criminal jurisdiction vested in the several states of the Union. With this federal exception, all criminal law in this country has its sole source and authority in the sovereign power of the state. The state is territorially divided into counties and subdivided into towns, cities and villages; but all these local subdivisions are created by the state. For convenience in the administration of government, these localized political units are vested with certain powers; still, it is true that all the powers they possess are granted and delegated to them by the central sovereignty of the state. Thus the *state* is the *fons et origo* of all criminal as well as of all civil jurisdiction.

This supremacy of the state involves, for the purposes of the present discussion, four elements: the state has the sole power (1) to enact all criminal laws; (2) to enforce those laws by the detection and arrest of offenders; (3) to try judicially, and to convict or acquit, persons accused of crime; and (4) to inflict the penalties prescribed by law.

All these powers are delegated by the state, to a greater or less extent, to the counties towns, cities, and villages (all of which are comprised under the term "municipal corporations," and are herein designated as "municipalities"); and it is the object of the present paper to discuss the question to what extent such delegation of power is necessary and proper, and to determine in what cases the power ought to be, not delegated, but exercised by the state itself. The four powers above enumerated will be considered separately and in the order in which they have been stated.

## CRIMINAL LEGISLATION

The power is delegated to municipal corporations to enact ordinances and regulations, and to enforce them by fines and penalties. These ordinances and regulations have all the force of law and as their violation is a misdemeanor, they form a part of the body of criminal law. To delegate the power to enact criminal laws may seem, *prima facie*, an improper and dangerous transference of sovereignty. The municipal power thus conferred, however, is strictly limited and defined by statute. There are countless subjects, affecting the public health and orderly living, that demand regulation in accordance with the varied circumstances and local diversities of separate communities; these subjects cannot be adequately covered by a general statute of universal application, nor can they be wisely treated by special statutes relating to each separate community. It is impossible for the state legislature to act with that accurate knowledge of the local needs of a municipality in its internal life which the municipality itself possesses and which is the essential basis of salutary legislation. "Home rule" for municipalities is a political principle which stands in no danger of being carried to excess, and sound government demands rather its extension than its repression. Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of it rests in its tendency to increase the power and dignity of citizenship; by intrusting the well-being of the municipality to the keeping of its own citizens, it serves to develop in them a sense of individual responsibility for good government, an intelligent interest in public affairs, and a conviction of civic duty—sentiments which a strictly paternal government by the state tends to deaden.

## DETECTION AND ARREST OF OFFENDERS

The detection of crime and the arrest of persons accused of crime are delegated almost exclusively to the municipalities. A thorough enforcement of the laws can be secured only through the loyal co-operation of the whole community. It needs, not alone a public opinion in favor of the laws, but a public opinion which imposes on every man the personal duty of rendering aid and co-operation in enforcing the law, and holds one guilty of



complicity who being cognizant of a crime, maintains silence or shrinks from giving testimony. The most effectual enforcement of the laws will result from laying upon each local community the responsibility of securing its own protection against crime. Municipal action is likely to be more drastic and effective than any system by which the duty of detection and arrest is centered in some department of the state government.

#### THE TRIAL OF PERSONS ACCUSED OF CRIME

From the delegation to the municipality of power to enact ordinances the violation of which is a misdemeanor, it is a natural step to invest the municipal courts with power to try, and to pronounce sentence upon, those who disobey such ordinances. The culprit in such case is an offender against the municipality, which ought, logically to be clothed with jurisdiction to enforce its own enactments. The liberty of the individual is sufficiently protected if in every case an appeal lies from the municipal courts to those of the state.

But the case of persons accused of violating the penal laws of the *state* is widely different. Such a person, if guilty, is an offender against the state, and should be dealt with solely by the courts of the state. The state has no higher function than to guard the personal liberty of every law-abiding citizen on the one hand, and on the other to protect the whole community against crime. When a person accused is brought to trial, he is the defendant, with the presumption of innocence in his favor, and the people of the state are the plaintiffs; if the accused be innocent, his right of personal liberty is put at jeopardy by the trial; if he is guilty, the safety of the whole community is at stake in the trial. When issues of such momentous importance are involved, the state is called upon to use the highest powers that pertain to its sovereignty; it has no right to delegate such powers and duties to any inferior tribunal. The courts of the state, embodying the supreme judicial power of the state, are alone competent to assume the responsibility of deciding whether a person has violated a penal law of the state—a responsibility equally great whether the judgment be one of conviction or of acquittal.

Another reason why the state courts alone should be invested with criminal jurisdiction is found in the fact that such exclusive jurisdiction tends to secure uniformity in the administration of criminal law. A person now arraigned may secure acquittal through the rulings of any court excluding certain evidence, while in another court a different ruling would result in conviction; or, if found guilty, a prisoner may receive a sentence of thirty days in one court, and another prisoner under the same circumstances in another court may receive a sentence of three years. These gross divergences between different tribunals in the conduct of trials and in the length of sentences imposed cast disrepute upon the administration of justice and weaken the force of the criminal law. If all criminal trials were confined to the state courts such inequalities and inconsistencies would in great measure disappear. For the state courts, though separated from each other locally, have equal and concurrent jurisdiction and collectively constitute, practically, one court; in recognition of this fact, their judges have always aimed at a harmonious procedure; there is a body of practice, of precedent, of tradition, which constantly tends to effect, and does largely effect, a certain unity in judicial thought and action among these co-ordinate courts. The beneficial effect of this unity is now observable in such criminal cases as come to trial in the state courts. Most of the incongruities and contradictions that mar the administration of the criminal law arise from the clashing of the inferior municipal courts.

#### IMPRISONMENT

There are two kinds of imprisonment, widely different in their nature and object: imprisonment after sentence, which is punitive, and imprisonment before sentence and while awaiting trial, which is a mere continuation of the arrest having no penal feature, but aiming simply at the safe custody of the prisoner. These two forms of imprisonment require wholly different modes of treatment and must be considered separately.

1. *Imprisonment after sentence.*—It is now universally admitted that the state imprisons the convict from no motive of vengeance or retribution. He is imprisoned for precisely the

same reason that demands the forcible confinement of persons affected by violent insanity or contagious disease, whom it is dangerous to the community to have at large; so the *protection* of the community constitutes the sole motive and justification for putting a convict in prison. Such protection is secured so long as the incarceration continues. But incarceration differs in its effect from quarantine against contagion, for example. When the quarantine has continued long enough, the danger of contagion often becomes extinct. Mere incarceration, however, no matter how long it continues, has no tendency to produce any improvement in the character of the convict; on the contrary, experience shows that its tendency is hardening and demoralizing. Imprisonment without reformative training affords protection to the public only so long as it lasts; and when the convict is discharged, he becomes the source of greater danger to the community than ever before. Reformation alone yields a protection which is both effective and lasting.

All this is rudimentary and not calculated to excite serious discussion. The only difficulty is in a widespread incredulity as to the possibility of reforming a convict by any measure of prison discipline. The reformation of a criminal is popularly regarded as a visionary delusion, a chimera. This skepticism is susceptible of ready explanation; it rests upon the total lack of popular information regarding the reformative methods that have been tested and approved, and regarding the results that have been actually attained. These methods and their supposed operation are generally viewed as a recondite subject, not easy of comprehension, the fabric of fanciful ideals by optimistic and unpractical philanthropists.

In fact, however, the principles underlying reformative measures are quite simple, and the methods used in their application have been developed by experiment and by careful observation of the tangible results. Nothing can be more practical than the modern reformatory system of treating convicts; and the evolution of that system has proceeded along lines strictly scientific—scientific in the sense that every step in the development of the system has been tested by the practical effects of actual experi-



ment. The proof of any system is in its results; the statistics of the New York State Reformatory at Elmira, where the new system, so far as this country is concerned, had its origin, and the statistics of other reformatories in other states, show that about 80 per cent. of the convicts there treated have been actually reclaimed and transformed from felons into law-abiding members of the free community. Results, the same in kind if not in degree, have been reached at Mettrai in France, in Spain by Montesinos, in Ireland by Sir Walter Crofton, in Munich by Obermaier, at the Rauhe Haus in Germany by Wichern and his successors; and the Elmira system has now been introduced and is in operation in Japan.

Without entering upon the details of this reformatory system, the magnitude and importance of the results it has accomplished are indisputable. They compel the conclusion that every prisoner convicted of crime ought to be subjected to the disciplinary treatment which has proved effective with the large majority of those to whom it has been applied, with the hope of accomplishing his reformation. This conclusion rests not on philanthropic reasons only; it is dictated by sound governmental policy; reformation is the only possible protection of the public against the discharged convict.

Here then, is a vast responsibility and an imperative duty imposed upon the state: to make all prisons within its borders reformatory in character; to give the public the benefit of the application of reformatory treatment to every person convicted of crime and sentenced to imprisonment. Under the non-reformatory system of imprisonment, which is now the prevailing system, the states turn loose upon the country every year an army of desperate criminals, thus replenishing the criminal class and furnishing it with leaders and expert instructors in crime; the discharged convict is the anomaly and the despair of modern civilization. In reformation lies the hope of the future in the struggle against crime.

The establishment of such a reformatory system, extending to all convict prisoners within a state, is manifestly an enterprise which the state alone is competent to undertake. From the



nature of the case, it cannot be delegated to the municipalities. A reformatory conducted on approved lines is a costly institution; it requires, for many reasons, an extensive equipment. The cornerstone of the reformatory system is *industrial training*, and a cardinal principal in its administration is the *individual treatment* of convicts. A reformatory can achieve success only under the management of skilled experts, who are thoroughly versed in the approved modern systems of prison discipline, in the methods employed and the results attained; who have tact in dealing with prisoners and insight in observing their individual characteristics; they must have the power of detecting the special weakness and the peculiar aptitude of each prisoner, and must adapt the treatment to the individual requirements of each case. This demands an extensive variety of industrial trades and employments, fitted to widely differing capabilities and each of these industrial departments must be manned with a corps of competent instructors and overseers. Again, in many cases it is found that the criminal tendency can be traced to some physical defect, or to some abnormal, or arrested, development of the mind or of the moral sense. In treating such cases, some most interesting experiments made at Elmira have demonstrated that a sane body tends to develop a sane mind; strengthening of the body has been followed by brightening of the mind. To this end, baths, massage, and athletic exercises have worked wonders, and Elmira has for some years been equipped with Turkish baths and a large gymnasium. To effect a rounded development, intellectual and moral education are an essential accompaniment of industrial training, and schools of trades must be supplemented by schools of letters, all under the management of skilled instructors.

Enough, perhaps, has been said to show that an effective reformatory prison involves an expensive plant and a large and varied equipment; more than this, it must be manned by a corps of experts who know how to handle convicts with a single view to their reformation. This is too large an enterprise for a municipality to undertake; it is quite beyond municipal resources, except in the case of a few very large cities; it is outside the proper scope of a municipality which resembles a business cor-

poration and deals mainly with the material interests of the community. The state alone has the resources in men and in money requisite to carry on an enterprise so broad in character and important in results as the maintenance of a reformatory prison system. This, as a measure of public protection affecting all the inhabitants of the state, logically comes within the highest function of the state. The state cannot abdicate this supreme duty and delegate it to the municipalities with any more fitness than it can commit to the counties of the state the control of its military state guard.

Uniformity of prison administration is essential to the successful operation of a reformatory system. If one prison treats its convicts with greater severity or allows them fewer privileges than another prison does, a sense of the injustice of such inequality tends to counteract reformatory influences. It is characteristic of the criminal to regard himself an injured person; the only way in which he tries to justify to himself the depredations he commits upon the public is by the fancy that the public has not dealt justly by him; he becomes embittered against society by nursing the belief that he has not had a fair chance in life, and he sets his hand against every man because he imagines that every man's hand has been set against him. To cure this morbid state of the mind, nothing is more indispensable in the administration of prisons than a discipline which is inflexible and uniform. Such uniformity of administration can be secured only by bringing all the prisons in a state under the direction and control of a central authority. It must not be forgotten that a reformatory system is, and always must be, a growing and developing system. It advances by tentative methods; new experiments will constantly be tried and the results carefully tested. By this scientific method, existing systems have reached their present stage of development, and by the same method their future evolution must proceed. In this view, the advantages of centralization are sufficiently obvious. All the prisons in the state are then working in perfect harmony toward the same end; experiments receive a broader and more conclusive testing; a successful measure secures universal adoption; and every con-

victed prisoner within the limits of the state is subjected to the reforming influences of the most approved system of treatment.

The administration of prisons, under the system, or lack of system, now prevailing, is of a miscellaneous and haphazard character. Some are under state control, some under municipal control, some under private charitable management and others are under a mixed charge, partly private and partly public. In the state of New York, for example, there are three state prisons, five reformatories, and one industrial school under the exclusive control of the state; there are six penitentiaries under the exclusive control of the counties where they are severally located; there is a county jail in each of the counties of the state under the exclusive control of the county; and then there are numerous city prisons, houses of refuge, juvenile asylums, protectories and other institutions under local control and management. And though the state takes no part in the administration of these municipal and other local prisons, they are crowded with persons convicted of violating the laws of the state.

The county jails afford the most convincing proof (were any proof needed) of the unfitness of a municipal corporation to operate a prison. Some forms of cruelty were expelled from the modern prison, never to return, by John Howard and Elizabeth Fry; but most of the surviving abuses that are still found in the worst prisons in civilized countries now exist in our average county jail. Unsanitary conditions that are positively dangerous to life, insecurity against escapes, danger from fire, undue crowding from insufficiency of space, the absence of facilities needed for personal cleanliness and of accommodations required for common decency, the prevalence of vermin and of all filth and squalor, the absence of sunlight, and an all-pervading and nauseating stench—these are some of the features that characterize the buildings which are used for the average county jail. The administration of the jails is even worse than their physical condition; the management of the jail is a perquisite of the sheriff of the county, who derives a large part of his income from the profits gained from boarding the prisoners and from extortions levied on the prisoners and their friends. Thus the jails are



made the "spoils" of politics, and are exploited by each succeeding sheriff with the aim of extracting from their management for his own personal profit as large a pecuniary return as possible. The "plum" is too rich a one to be held by the same person longer than a single official term, and so the control is apt to be shifted to a newly elected sheriff at each successive election. Considerations wholly political control the selection of the successful candidate; uniformity, and even continuity, of administration and the establishment of reforms thus become practically impossible. Necessary appropriations for improving or rebuilding the jails are obtained with greater difficulty than appropriations for any other public purpose; the rottenness of the county jails seems to have spread a taint of demoralization throughout the whole community with reference to every measure affecting them. And so it is that the county jails in the United States, except in a very few isolated instances, remain in a condition as utterly reprehensible and abandoned now as prevailed a hundred years ago.

The worst features of the county jail, however, still remain to be stated. In all county jails, with a very few possible exceptions, all the prisoners are herded together, during the daytime, in a common yard or room, with unrestrained freedom of intercourse and converse; in some of the jails there is even an imperfect segregation between the male and female prisoners. Persons awaiting trial and persons convicted, the innocent and the guilty, the old and the young, the hardened criminal and the novice in crime, all are thrown together into enforced and promiscuous association. There is no labor or industrial occupation; even in states where the laws require that the prisoners in the county jail shall be kept at work, the counties fail to make appropriations for the introduction of labor; there is no instruction; there is no discipline, except rough, and sometimes brutal, measures against insubordination and violence. The corrupting effect of these conditions upon the inmates is so inevitable and so blighting as to justify the estimate, which has often been expressed, that the county jails are a more productive cause of crime in the United States than is the use of intoxicating liquor.



The common designation of these jails as "nurseries of vice" and "schools of crime" is but a feeble characterization of their atrocities. To sentence any human being to imprisonment in a county jail is so sure to effect his moral deterioration that every such sentence is a distinct injury to society; it is nothing less than the promotion and fostering of crime by public authority.

Still, the institution of the county jail is firmly entrenched in the law and the politics of the country and all efforts to reform it have been, and are likely to be, futile. Its abuses are so radical and inveterate that there is no hope that it can ever be purged and rehabilitated. The only practicable remedy is to cease to use the jail at all as a place of confinement for persons convicted of crime. The invincible evils of the county jails and the urgent necessity of providing some substitute for them have brought into prominence the question, which is now being widely discussed, whether the state should not withdraw from the municipalities all power (heretofore delegated) to deal with offenders against state law, and itself assume the charge and custody of every person sentenced to imprisonment for crime. The reasons which have been already urged to show that this is the logical function and duty of the state gain added force from the position that there is no other practicable way of supplanting and suppressing the county jail.

The plan here advocated of bringing all convict prisoners under the central control of the state involves the acquisition of additional prisons by the state. In many cases the country penitentiaries and other local prisons could be purchased by the state and be rendered available for reformatory uses. The proposed change would doubtless necessitate in every state the construction and equipment of one or more entirely new prisons, and would unquestionably entail upon the state a largely increased initial expenditure. The municipalities, on the other hand, would be relieved of the expenditures they now incur from this cause. The increased expense might be, in whole or in part, apportioned by the state and assessed upon the municipalities in proportion to the number of convicts coming from each locality; this would put upon each municipality the incentive of self-interest to use vigi-

lance in the suppression of vice and to purge itself of the criminal class. Whether the large expense here advocated can be justified on the ground of political economy depends upon the answers to be given to some very complicated questions: What is the direct and indirect cost of crime to a community? What would be the saving in money to a state if 80 or even 50 per cent. of its convicts were rescued from a life of crime and transformed into industrious and law-abiding citizens? In the light of experience, estimating the results that have been actually wrought by reformatory prisons, it is possible, by careful computation, to arrive at but one conclusion. The establishment of a reformatory prison, and its operation through skilled managers upon approved scientific methods, yield larger pecuniary returns to the public than the investment of an equivalent amount in any other public work whatsoever. It would not be difficult to prove that the pecuniary benefit gained by the people of the state of New York from the Elmira Reformatory has already far exceeded in amount all that the state has expended both in the erection and in the maintenance of that institution.<sup>1</sup>

Another objection that may be urged to the exclusive control of prisons by the state is the danger that they may be made the "spoils" of party politics. That is precisely the evil which has ruined the county jails, and which must always prove fatal to any prison or prison system brought under purely partisan control. There is only one way of meeting this evil, and that is by a system of efficient inspection and supervision, with power to correct abuses; and such supervision can be made efficient only by the support of an enlightened and alert public spirit. If all the prisons in the state were brought under a central and uniform control, the system on which they were managed would command a greatly increased importance and publicity; the obscure and petty jails now existing would be supplanted by great institutions, avowing large aims and claiming to be conducted on scientific principles; the public attention and interest would be arrested, and abuses which pass unnoticed and unknown in the local jails would become impossible under the administration of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *The Science of Penology*, by Henry M. Boies, pp. 135, 161.

the state and in the full blaze of public opinion. The danger of partisan control, now seen at its worst in the county jails, would surely be greatly diminished, and there is ground to hope that it would entirely vanish before the increased publicity of a centralized state system, and the increase of public interest and enlightenment which such a system would inevitably foster.

What would then become of the buildings now used as county jails? Some of these are of such faulty construction, or so saturated with filth, or so impregnated with the germs of disease as to be wholly unfitted for any use and are only meet for destruction. Very many of the jail buildings, however, can be so repaired and altered as to make them available for use as places of detention for persons arrested under civil process, for witnesses in criminal cases, and for persons accused of crime and awaiting trial. And this brings us to the consideration of the proper treatment of that second class of prisoners, mentioned above; those, namely, who have been arrested on a charge or on suspicion of crime and are detained while awaiting trial.

2. *Imprisonment before trial.*—These prisoners form a class entirely distinct from guilty and convicted prisoners, and are entitled to receive a wholly different kind of treatment. The law presumes them to be innocent, and the law should treat them as if they were innocent. Their imprisonment has no other object than their safe custody until the question of their guilt or innocence can be judicially determined. There is, in their case, no occasion for any disciplinary or reformatory training; they may be, and in many instances they are, wholly innocent, and, until they are actually adjudged guilty, they have all the rights of other members of the community, subject only to their enforced detention. To treat them as if they were criminals, to confine them in association with prisoners who are guilty and are serving sentence for crime, and thus to subject them to most corrupting influences, is much more than a mere personal outrage; it is a grievous wrong to the public whereby the authority of law is used to foster crime by keeping a presumably innocent person in enforced contact with criminals.

When a youthful offender is for the first time arrested for



crime, it is the most critical turning-point in his life. He ought to be confined in solitude; then, if ever, his reflections will bring him to a realizing sense of his sin and folly, of the downward course he has been following, and, if continued, its inevitable end; he cannot but see that he stands at the parting of the ways; then, if ever, his better impulses will assert themselves and awaken within him new purposes to amend his life for the future. These beneficent meditations and resolutions, the present system, instead of promoting, does all that it can to stifle; it hurries the arrested person to the county jail, and thrusts him into the midst of the vile company there congregated. There is no opportunity for quiet thought, no means of withdrawal into privacy; any natural manifestation of sorrow or depression is greeted with ribald taunts and jeers; the voice of conscience is drowned; the talk is of exploits in vice and crime; the air reeks with blasphemy and obscenity; the future is the subject of reckless derision. How is it possible that repentance or self-respect or any worthy purpose should thrive in such an environment?

The bad policy, as well as the grievous wrong, of confining an arrested person whether guilty or innocent (but in law presumably innocent), in enforced and unrestrained association with criminals is sufficiently obvious. But there is another consideration that should not be overlooked. Not only does the law presume innocence, but a very large majority of persons arrested are in fact not guilty. When a crime is committed, it often happens that several, and sometimes a good many, persons are arrested upon a suspicion of guilt which proves to be unfounded. Thus the number of arrests will always be found largely in excess of the number of convictions. In the city of New York there are five times as many arrests for felony as there are convictions; that is, for every person there found guilty of felony there are four other persons arrested on charge of felony who are not found guilty.<sup>2</sup> It is a disgrace and an injury to reputation to be confined in a prison. The public does not stop to inquire whether the person imprisoned was really innocent or

<sup>2</sup> See tables of statistics in appendix of *The Science of Penology*, by H. M. Boies.



guilty; the mere fact that he has been "in prison" places any man in an ambiguous position and creates, in the public estimation, a presumption against his character which is a distinct, and often a very serious, injury. This is a stain that ought not to be put upon any person arrested on a mere charge or suspicion of crime. Until found guilty, he should not be placed in the same category with convicts, and he should be confined in a "house of detention," and not in a "prison;" prisons and jails, penitentiaries and reformatories, should contain only adjudged criminals.

Confinement while awaiting trial is, as has already been said, a mere continuation of the arrest, and may well be committed to the charge of the municipality that made the arrest. None of the reasons which have been urged for placing all convicted prisoners in the exclusive custody of the state, to the end that they may be subjected to reformatory discipline, apply to persons under arrest while awaiting trial. On the contrary, the rightful distinction between the two classes ought to be emphasized, not only by confining them in different buildings called by different names and under wholly different régimes, but by the further difference that no arrested person shall be turned over to the state or be put in prison until after conviction; before conviction, he shall be confined in a house of detention under the charge of the municipality. Moreover, the management of a house of detention should be widely different from that of a prison. It should never be forgotten that any member of the community, no matter how upright and pure in character, is liable to be arrested at any time on a charge of serious crime; this may happen through the malice of enemies, through mistaken identity, through a fraudulent conspiracy of which he is the innocent victim, through false deductions from circumstantial evidence. The right of every arrested person to receive decent treatment must be recognized and enforced, and it is imperatively necessary that a stop should be put to the scandalous intermingling of the innocent and the guilty. Every person arrested should be confined alone in a separate apartment and should be treated in a manner consistent with the legal assumption that he is innocent

of the crime of which he is accused. The municipalities have shown in so striking a way their incapacity to conduct a prison that one may well hesitate to commit the custody of anyone to their charge; such a course is here advocated only when coupled with the condition that the state enact laws prescribing with definite precision the character and appointments of the buildings in which arrested persons shall be confined and the manner in which they shall be treated. Nor is the mere enactment of laws sufficient; the duty should be laid upon a state board, or officers of the state, to keep these buildings under constant and rigid inspection, and to enforce all statutory enactments regarding their structure and management.

To summarize briefly the propositions here advocated: The salutary principle of home rule demands that municipalities should be invested with power to enact such ordinances as they may deem fitted to protect the interests of their inhabitants, with imprisonment as the penalty for infraction, subject to the limitations contained in their charters and subject to the general laws of the state. The municipal courts should have jurisdiction to try and to sentence persons accused of violating such ordinances, and persons so sentenced should be imprisoned in prisons maintained and operated by the municipality.

Municipalities should also be thrown upon their own responsibility to protect themselves against crime; and the duty of maintaining instrumentalities for the detection of crime and for the arrest of persons charged with any violation of law, whether municipal or state law, should rest upon the municipalities. Persons so arrested should be confined while awaiting trial in houses of detention under the control of the municipality.

The power of the municipality, however, to maintain prisons (for the incarceration of persons sentenced for violation of municipal ordinances) and houses of detention (for the custody of persons arrested and awaiting trial) should be made subject to strict limitations. Municipal prisons and houses of detention should be required to bear different names and to be distinct and separated in location from each other. The state should enact

general laws relating to the construction of such buildings and the system on which they are to be conducted; and the power and duty should be vested in a state board or officers of the state to maintain a constant and rigid inspection of such buildings and of their management, and to enforce their conformity to the law.

All persons arrested upon a charge of violating state law should be brought to trial before state courts only, which should have exclusive jurisdiction in all such cases.

All persons found guilty of violating laws of the state and sentenced to imprisonment should be committed to the custody of the state, and sent to prisons under the exclusive control and management of the state.

All prisons should be conducted upon a reformatory basis, where every person sentenced to imprisonment shall be treated in accordance with those approved scientific methods which have resulted, and can be made to result, in the actual reformation of a majority of convicted offenders. When this consummation is reached—and it will only be after long and strenuous effort—the volume of crime must steadily grow smaller and smaller, until it is reduced to a minute residuum of incorrigible and irreclaimable criminals (if such there are) who are beyond the reach of human effort and science. When the existence of such a residuum is demonstrated, its perpetual imprisonment seems the only efficient and practical measure of public defense.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> For a very important application of the main principles of this paper to a concrete situation, see the valuable report of the Prison Commission to the governor of Indiana, December 26, 1904.—EDITOR.



## THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN FRANCE

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Political opinion in France is divided into a number of groups, as follows: Royalists or Monarchists, Imperialists, Bonapartists, Catholic Conservatives, Progressist Republicans, Nationalists, Radicals, Socialist Radicals, Reformatory Socialists (*Socialistes réformistes*), Revolutionary Socialists, and Anarchists.

The Royalists or Monarchists are constantly decreasing in number and influence. For more than half a century France has not had a king. Since 1830 no member of the royal family of Bourbons, and since 1848 no Orleanist, has sat upon the throne. Thus the average Frenchman of the present generation cannot conceive, or at least can conceive only with difficulty, a king reigning over France. At most, those who were men before 1870 can imagine France governed by an emperor, by a Bonaparte. They have known an emperor; consequently they can imagine him. To the younger generation the monarchistic or imperialistic idea seems odd. Among the young men the only ones who are still Royalists or Imperialists are so through family tradition. They believe that they must inherit from their fathers their political opinions as well as their revenues and their names.

At the general election of 1898 the number of Monarchists and Bonapartists could be estimated approximately at 1,300,000; that is, 10.6 per cent. of all the electors. It is necessary to note here that all the figures presented in this article are roughly approximate, and must never be considered as having an absolute value. They have been obtained by copying the returns given by the papers at the time of the elections. Sometimes the papers would give wrong figures; at other times they would forget to give all the votes, or all those registered. Often they would report inaccurately the party affiliations of the candidates, whom they would represent as being Socialists or Socialist Radicals,



Radicals or Progressist Republicans, Nationalists or Monarchists. The figures in themselves have, therefore, only questionable value, but as the causes of error are the same for every shade of opinion, it seems to us that the proportion resulting from them gives a fair idea of the division of the parties.

In 1902 there were new parliamentary elections, in which the number of votes cast for Monarchists and Imperialists was reduced to 970,000; or 9 per cent. of the total number of electors, which was then 10,800,000. This is still a high figure. It does not, however, exactly represent the real opinion of those included in it. Indeed, in many electoral circuits, especially in the country, the candidate is voted for, not because his political opinions are such and such, but because he is Mr. So-and-so, because he is a great landowner or manufacturer in the district, or because he is rich and spends money freely at the time of the elections. To form a correct idea of the political situation in France, one must take into consideration the fact that political interest is not at all intense among the peasants. The farmer generally cares little about politics, his only concerns being of a material nature. For a long time the rural population was Bonapartist and imperialistic, because their economic condition was good under the empire. Now, under the republic, however, their prosperity is just as great; and that is why today a majority of the peasants are devoted to the republic. The countryman is a republican even when he votes for the Royalist or the Bonapartist, the rich man of the district. Still another cause which contributes toward maintaining a rural majority for republicanism is the inertia of the farmers. They do not like to change the existing order of things. They have grown used to the republic, and they wish to keep it. If the large landowner of the region is a Royalist, they will vote for him because they know him, and because they voted for his father, his uncle, and his father-in-law. He would be elected as well if he were a Radical.

These reservations must be made if the reader is to understand the relativity of the figures quoted in this article, and is to get a just appreciation of the division of parties in France.

The Royalists are the partisans of a king, and that king is for

them the Duke of Orleans, the great-grandson of Louis Philippe I. Of him it is known that he is married to an archduchess of Austria, and that he has no children. He is immensely wealthy, his fortune being estimated at 50,000,000 francs. He is banished from France and lives abroad, by virtue of the law of exile for the pretenders. He has always busied himself more with his private affairs than with politics. He maintains, however, a political bureau in Paris, which keeps him informed and issues orders to the Royalist papers of Paris and the provinces. These papers are very few. Many which were formerly Royalist are now Progressist Republican or Nationalist, and are enlisted for the republic.

The Royalist papers of Paris are *La Gazette de France*, *Le Gaulois*, *Le Moniteur universel*, and *Le Soleil*, though the last-named generally masks its royalism. As a rule, these papers have no great circulation. *La Gazette de France* does not issue more than four or five thousand copies. It is the official organ of the party, and expresses the views of Charles Maurras—a man of about forty, and a writer of great talent. His dream was to regenerate royalism with new social ideas, especially reforms in the relations between employers and employees. His efforts have not been successful. The other Royalist papers did not come to the support of his theories, which they deemed revolutionary. They held to the purest conservatism, being more or less avowed adversaries of all social reforms along democratic lines, and confining their program solely to a propaganda for a monarchical form of government which would maintain the existing social order, with its well-marked social hierarchy. To this class belongs *Le Gaulois*, the official organ of the nobility. Its circulation amounts to some 15,000 copies. Its leading writer is Arthur Meyer, an Israelite, who was born in humble circumstances, but is now rich. A few years ago he abjured his religion and was baptized. Recently he was married to Mademoiselle de Turenne, who is nearly forty years younger than himself. *Le Moniteur universel* exists only in name. As regards *Le Soleil*, it was formerly the organ of liberal royalism, but apparently tends to give up royalism and to label itself "Liberal Republican." The

reason for this change of front, which has likewise been made by a number of other papers, is the fact that public opinion is felt to be drifting away from royalism. Thus the paper has sacrificed the name of "Royalist" in order to go on defending conservative principles behind the screen of a "republican" label. The circulation of *Le Moniteur* is 20,000.

In short, the Royalist party is becoming weaker every day. It tends to disappear and give place to a great Catholic Conservative party, which, though accepting the republic, wants it to be conservative. This is styled the "Liberal Republican" party.

The Imperialists and Bonapartists are also continually losing ground, though they are more active than the Royalists. Their candidate is Victor Napoleon—a man about forty years of age and of moderate intelligence. He is living in Brussels, in modest surroundings. He is unmarried, although rumor has married him morganatically to a countess who has borne him several children. It has been said that his brother Louis, who is a general in the Russian army, is likewise a pretender. This may be true, although he has always denied it. In 1900 there was a Bonapartist plot. M. Demagny, the secretary of Waldeck-Rousseau, then minister of the interior, was bought. There was no attempt at a *coup d'état*, perhaps because public opinion was warned by a few papers—among them *L'Humanité nouvelle*, in an article which caused a great sensation. It is possible that the present disturbance, the object of which is to prevent the army and the civic functionaries from being republican, is the work of the Bonapartists, who are inviting a last assault.

There are in the demands of the Imperialists certain democratic elements which would give this party a better chance than the Royalists have of getting the sympathy of the public. We must, however, distinguish between two tendencies among the Bonapartists. One is democratic, the other conservative. Those who are influenced by the latter tend toward royalism. They follow *L'Autorité*, the organ of Paul de Cassagnac, who died recently. Cassagnac was a journalist of great talent and an energetic polemic. He it was who, with his daily article, made *L'Autorité* an influential organ, its circulation reaching 40,000



copies. We gravely doubt that the Imperialist organ will long survive its director. It is certain that it will lose the greater part of its readers, even if it does not entirely disappear.

At all events, the Royalist and Imperialist parties are both dying out. Day by day their power decreases. They have no particular ideal, simply wanting to maintain the present social order. This they have in common with the great Catholic Liberal Conservative party, which gives itself the name "Liberal Republican." This latter party is ever growing stronger, absorbing little by little both Royalists and Imperialists. It is recruited especially from the ranks of the nobility—that nobility which did not, in spite of all, persist in its royalism and imperialism—and also from the higher and middle strata of the bourgeoisie. Catholics, Protestants, and Jews alike make up its rank and file. They are not all believers, but they all agree in considering religion a useful instrument in the hands of the government. Religion is necessary for the people.

The political program of this party in formation is maintenance of the republic, but a conservative republic, different from a parliamentary monarchy only in that a president is substituted for the king. However, from a social standpoint its program is different from that of the Royalists. It desires to ameliorate the condition of the proletarians; it advocates protective laws for work and wages, laws of insurance, and provision for old-age pensions. Nevertheless, it wants to keep the working class of town and country under obedience to the rich, to the capitalist manufacturers and the landowners; it wants to keep the proletarians in a state of social inferiority to the wealthy classes. The proletarians must stand in the same relation to the latter as children to their father.

The names commonly given to the members of the Liberal Republican party vary according to the different factions. They are called by turns "Ralliés," "Cæsarians" "Christian Democrats," "Social Catholics," "Liberal Republicans," "Nationalists," "Anti-Semites," "Catholic Conservatives" (*Conservateurs catholiques*), and "Progressist Republicans," etc.

The "Ralliés" are the Royalists or Bonapartists of former



times who accept the republic, being unable to kill it. The "Cæsarians" are Imperialists. Victor Napoleon is their Cæsar, but if this Cæsar will not come and reign over them, they are ready to accept anyone else, so great is their longing for an emperor. "Nationalist" is a name born of the Dreyfus affair, which severed all party ties and mixed men together regardless of political groupings. They are, however, now beginning to separate, and to align themselves according to policies and affinities. The Nationalists are recruited, in large part, from the elements which constituted Boulangism. They have no definite program, because they are such a miscellaneous collection. They loudly proclaim their "love of country and militarism." Many of them were Anti-Semites; some of them, but a constantly decreasing number, are Socialists; and all of them were "Anti-Dreyfusards." Their principal organs in Paris are *La Patrie*, *La Presse*, *L'Écho de Paris*, *L'Éclair*, *L'Intransigeant*, and *Le Petit Journal*. *La Patrie* issues 90,000 copies daily. Its manager, Émile Massard, is at present a member of the Municipal Council of Paris. Some twenty years ago he was a Revolutionary Socialist, as were Jules Guesde and Paul Lafargue. M. Millevoye, the Nationalist deputy, who was formerly a Bonapartist, is its editor-in-chief. *La Presse* has a circulation of 70,000. These two papers are much read in the evening in Paris. Both of them belong to Jules Jaluzot, the Liberal Republican deputy, who is one of the principal owners of the great dry-goods house of "Le Printemps." *L'Écho de Paris*, managed by Henri Simond, who became a millionaire through his marriage to the widow of M. Récipon, has a circulation of 100,000 copies. It is a very well-written paper, with an able editorial staff. *L'Éclair*, nominally managed by M. Sabatier, but now owned by M. Jubet, formerly editor of *Le Petit Journal*, is in reality the work of Alphonse Humbert and G. Montorgueil. The former is editorially responsible and dictates the politics of the paper. He is an ex-president of the Municipal Council of Paris, and an ex-deputy. Upon the suppression of the Commune in 1871, he was condemned and sent to prison, where he remained ten years. *L'Éclair* has a daily sale of more than 100,000 copies. It is one of the best

Parisian newspapers. *L'Intransigeant* is managed by Henry Rochefort. This old war-horse is as full of spirit as ever, and as fiery as a youth. His peculiar controversial style, which, though witty, is not very deep, does, however, not now please the multitude as much as it formerly did, and the number of copies daily issued by the paper does not exceed 70,000, while fifteen years ago it was double and even sometimes triple that number. *Le Petit Journal* is read especially for its miscellaneous news, its general information, and its serial stories. Its sale is 1,000,000 copies.

The Anti-Semites flourished especially between 1890 and 1900. Now there are very few of them left—I mean of those who proclaim themselves to be such; because, in spite of himself, every Frenchman is prejudiced against a Jew. The Anti-Semitic program was very simple: fight the Jews and expel them. Beyond that, it varied with the different individuals. All shades of political opinion were represented, from Royalism to Socialism. The official organ of Anti-Semitism is *La Libre Parole*, the circulation of which has now fallen to 70,000 copies, after having exceeded 200,000. This paper was founded by Edouard Drumont, who is still its manager. It is his paper, it subsists only through him, and it is for him alone that it is read. Edouard Drumont is a writer of talent, whose numerous political and social works, written between 1880 and 1895, exercised a notable influence upon the young men of that time. Though a deputy from 1898 to 1902, his influence has been decreasing ever since.

The "Christian Democrats" or "Social Catholics" are few in number. They advocate social reforms with socialistic tendencies, but they also want the supremacy of the church and religion. The social program of the French Christian Democrats is not so well-defined as that of the Belgian party of the same name. They differ from the Catholic Conservatives only in that they desire social reforms in which more emphasis is laid upon democratic principles. They publish an organ in Paris, *Le Peuple français*, the editor of which is the Abbé Garnier. It is in Paris and in the North that the Christian Democrats are most active; but without a great degree of success, especially in Paris. The central part of the country is too far advanced for such influences.

The Christian Democracy would, however, find very fertile soil for the spread of its doctrines in the West, in Brittany, where the clergy are still powerful; but it has not as yet extended its activity to that region, and if later on it should desire to do so, it may be too late, as the ground will then have been occupied by the Socialists.

The Catholic Conservatives are old Monarchists and Imperialists who care more for the clerical than for the royal power, and would be satisfied if they could be masters of the republic and govern it so as to maintain the principles of a social hierarchy. They are quite willing to improve the condition of the humble, but they propose to do this through charity, and not through the principle of equity. The church is for them a spiritual as well as a temporal power, which must govern souls from all points of view. This pre-eminence belongs to her by right. These Catholic Conservatives have numerous points of contact with the Christian Democrats or Social Catholics. The leaders of the movement are generally members of religious orders — Jesuits, Franciscans, and Dominicans — or laymen belonging to the “Third Order” of the Franciscans or Jesuits.

This “Third Order” possesses a very strong organization. Its membership is composed of women as well as men. It has local groups, with a president, a secretary, and a treasurer. The president merely communicates with a sort of directing committee, which works on the mass of the initiated through him. It is therefore difficult to know the leaders, who are generally Jesuit or Franciscan friars. Nor are the lay members, as a rule, known. It was said — and it is probably true — that the Comte de Mun, a deputy, and Admiral de Cuverville, among others, are members of the Third Order. Among the vanguard of Jesuits who are supposed to have a leading influence we may mention Fathers Dulac and de Pascal; and among the Dominican friars, Fathers Maumus and Olivier. The religious congregations having a secret organization, there is no proof that those whose names are given to the public are the real leaders of Catholic politics. These may very well be persons quite unknown to the public. One fact is certain — that in a great number of the departments of France,



ever since the dispersion of the religious orders, there has been a Jesuit father who is closely mixed up in politics and seems to give the keynote in the Conservative concert. Besides, the Jesuits have divested themselves of their former frocks to become secular priests. Such men are, in two of the departments of Brittany, the Jesuits de Sesmaisons and Le Mareschal. Another thing that is certain is that in the general conduct of Catholic politics the secular clergy — archbishops, bishops, and rectors — have a very small share. The power is entirely in the hands of the regular clergy and laymen.

The Catholic Conservatives possess several papers in Paris. These are *L'Univers et le Monde*, *La Vérité française*, and *La Croix*. The latter is represented in the provinces by numerous other *Croix*, as the principal town of nearly every department has a *Croix* of its own, which often bears the name of the department; for instance, *La Croix des côtés du Nord*. The circulation of *La Croix* is considerable, both in Paris and in the provinces, and is said to exceed 1,500,000 copies. The price of all these papers — Imperialist, Royalist, Nationalist, and Social Catholic — is generally one cent (five centimes). *Le Gaulois* and *La Gazette de France* are sold at three cents.

Besides their daily in Paris, the political parties have a number of papers in the provinces which are published one, two, or three times a week. These provincial papers are read by only a narrow circle. They often reproduce the leading articles of Drumont, Paul de Cassagnac, Rochefort, and other leading journalists. Thus, some Parisian papers with a small circulation have more influence than those with a large issue. The Parisian paper penetrates relatively little into the country, because the peasant, as a rule, does not read much, partly through economy and partly because he has not acquired an interest in reading.

In addition to their daily press, the political parties control several periodicals. The Nationalists have *Les Annales de la Patrie française* and *L'Action française*, in which latter Charles Maurras and Vaugeois, both Royalists, write. The Catholic Conservatives and Social Catholics have *Les Études*, published by the Jesuits; *La Revue thomiste*, published by the Dominicans; *La*



*Quinzaine*, edited by M. Fonssagrive; *Le Correspondant*, the beautiful Liberal Catholic review; and *La Réforme sociale* and *La Science sociale*, two periodicals which defend the sociological theories of Le Play. Some of these periodicals have a large circulation; *Le Correspondant*, for instance, prints 15,000 copies, and *La Quinzaine* 8,000. The last two of the above-mentioned have a very small circulation. *Les Études* and *La Revue thomiste* are rather abstruse in their treatment of political subjects, and philosophy occupies a large share of their space. *Le Correspondant* and *La Quinzaine* are periodicals of general interest which devote much attention to the politics of the day.

The shades of opinion of the parties are sometimes so little differentiated and so numerous that it is difficult to estimate the number of their adherents. The total number of Catholic Conservatives, Social Catholics, Nationalists, Anti-Semites, and "Ralliés" may be roughly given as 2,325,000.

The Liberal Republican or Progressist Republican party is wealthy, composed, as it is, principally of rich manufacturers, merchants, financiers, and big landowners, who for traditional or other reasons cannot belong to any of the other factions of the great Liberal party in formation. Naturally enough, all those depending upon the great capitalists follow them in their political opinions. The membership of this party may be estimated at 1,675,000. It is, above all, conservative. It is quite willing to improve the conditions of the workingmen and the peasants through protective labor laws or a tariff, but it has no wish whatever to undertake any of the great social reforms which the Socialist Radical and Socialist parties demand. One may say that the only difference between the Progressist Republicans and the Catholic Conservatives or "Ralliés" is that republicanism is of older date with the former than with the latter.

The Progressist Republicans possess a number of influential papers, such as *Le Figaro*, *Le Journal des Débats*, *La Liberté*, *Le Soir*, and *La République française*. *Le Figaro*, edited by Gaston Calmette, has now lost the importance it formerly had. Its political influence would be a negligible quantity, were it not for its numerous foreign readers, who still see in it what it once was,

but is no longer — namely, the great organ of France, we may even say of Paris, *par excellence*. Its sale is 32,000 copies, at three cents each. *Le Journal des Débats*, edited by M. de Naleche, is always admirably written, but its circulation is very small — only four or five thousand copies. It is more serious and less worldly than *Le Figaro*, and sells at two cents. *La Liberté* is edited by M. Berthoulat, a Progressist Republican deputy, and its chief contributor is Maurice Spronck, another Nationalist deputy. The number of copies published is 22,000, sold at one cent. It is an evening paper, very seriously written, with a good news service and a capable editorial staff. *La République française* was formerly edited by Jules Méline, the well-known Progressist Republican deputy. M. Latapie is now filling his place. The political shade of this paper is always the same. Its circulation is seven or eight thousand. Of *Le Soir* we shall say nothing, as it is read only in Paris, by financiers and politicians.

*Le Temps*, the daily sale of which amounts to 33,000 copies, sold at three cents, has M. Hement, a Jew, for its editor-in-chief. Its position is somewhat different from that of the other Progressist newspapers. Although it is not Radical, its opposition to the Combes cabinet was only intermittent, though the latter showed decidedly Radical proclivities. It was even often employed as the semi-official organ of the cabinet. It is an evening paper, with a good domestic and foreign news service, and is the great source from which the other Parisian and provincial papers borrow, thus reducing their expenses for news to a minimum.

Conservative Republicanism is defended by numerous periodicals: *La Revue des Deux Mondes*, *La Revue politique et parlementaire*, and sometimes also *La Revue de Paris*, which is open to Radical doctrine. The old and celebrated *Revue des Deux Mondes* is managed by M. Brunetière, whose Catholic tendencies are well known. It has tended, and is still tending, toward the Catholic Conservative party — a fact which has served to prejudice many readers against it. The number of its subscribers probably does not now reach 20,000, while formerly it had a large circulation. *Le Bulletin politique*, which is con-

sistently Conservative Republican, is edited by Francis Charmes, a politician of great ability. *La Revue politique et parlementaire*, edited by M. Fournier, has a much smaller circulation. It sometimes accepts articles written by Radicals, but it clearly prefers the ideas of Republican Conservatism represented in Parliament by M. Méline and M. Ribot. *La Revue de Paris* contains few studies in French home politics, and those published are usually of a Progressist Republican color.

All the political groups last mentioned tend to merge into a single party, a great Republican Conservative party. The number of their adherents aggregates approximately 4,970,000. They do not call for any thoroughgoing social transformation: neither the separation of church and state, nor an income tax, nor the socialization of industries and means of transportation. Though they accept the principle of protective laws for the working class, they want to frame the laws so that the workman will always remain under the guardianship of the state. Above all they are conservative. In the country they organize lectures and various associations of men and women, such as "L'Action liberale," "La Ligue de la Patrie française," "La Ligue anti-sémitique," and "Le Grand Occident de France." The two last-named are wasting away and retain only nominal existence. It was the Grand Occident of France which was responsible for the famous siege in Paris during the ministry of Waldeck-Rousseau. Its instigator was Jules Guérin, who was convicted by the Supreme Court in 1899, and is now living in Brussels. The women make house-to-house canvasses, especially in the small towns and in the country, among both the poor and the rich, to collect funds for the political, and particularly for the electoral, campaigns. The Republican Conservative party is notably richer, and disposes of much more money, than its opponents. This may be easily understood when it is remembered that the majority of the capitalists—manufacturers, merchants, financiers, landowners—belong to this party.

Opposed to the Conservative party stands the great party, also in formation, of political and social reform. This party is composed of the Radicals, the Socialist Radicals, the Reformatory



Socialists, and the Revolutionary Socialists. Besides these, there are the Communistic Anarchists.

The Communistic Anarchists are few in number, but include several eminent personalities, and through their propaganda wield a great influence among the trades-unionists of the labor exchanges (*bourses de travail*). They spread their doctrine by means of weekly papers and lectures. *Les Temps nouveaux*, *L'Ennemi du Peuple*, and *Le Libertaire*, with Jean Grave, P. Delesale, Charles Albert, and Giraud as the leading writers, are the principal Anarchist organs. Besides, there spring up from time to time ephemeral papers which disappear soon after seeing the light. The principal lecturers are Sébastien Faure and Giraud. Lately the Anarchists are often called "Libertarians." The anarchistic movement is no longer talked about as it used to be, and the intellectual class does not follow it as it formerly did. Some of its most active agitators, like Émile Fouget, who was creator and editor of the famous *Père Peinard*, have gone over to trades-unionism. M. Pouget is now one of the editors of *La Voix du Peuple*, the organ of the General Federation of Labor at the Labor Exchange of Paris. Here exists an active center of "Libertarian Socialism." Its influence is felt by all trades-unionists, who are thus kept away from the electoral strife, and from the political parties of the Reformatory and the Revolutionary Socialists. In short, except for a few scattered individuals among the intellectuals, one may say that there are not now any Communistic Anarchists. But the doctrines of liberty, of libertarian organizations, have pervaded the labor and socialistic circles; and thus we are in the presence of a strong libertarian movement toward a freely organized society.

The Radical Republicans, or simply Radicals, are the strongest group of the Reform party now in formation. Their number may be estimated at 2,780,000. The Socialist Radicals do not number more than 1,890,000. It is especially from the southern, eastern, and central parts of France that the ranks of the Radicals and Socialist Radicals are recruited. In the West, the North, and the Northwest the people are prevailingly conservative. There are, however, a few centers of Socialists, both Reformatory and



Revolutionary, in some regions of Normandy, Brittany, and Picardy. The Socialist groups are many, well disciplined, and active in French Flanders, the Artois, the central provinces (Berry, etc.), the East (Bourgogne, Ardennes), Provence, and also in Bordelais and Languedoc.

The Radical newspapers are *Le Gil Blas*, with a sale of 10,000 copies, edited by MM. Périvier and Ollendorf, and with Ernest Charles as editorial writer; *Le Matin*, with a sale of 600,000 copies, and with Charles Laurent, Harduin, and ex-Captain Humbert as its chief contributors; *Le Petit Parisien*, which belongs to Pierre Dupuis, a deputy and former minister, 1,500,000 copies of which are issued daily; and *Le Radical*, which publishes 48,000 copies. *Le Radical* is edited by M. Maujan, a deputy, and belongs to Victor Simond, the owner of *L'Aurore*, the Socialist Radical paper of M. Clemenceau. It was formerly edited by Henry Maret, a deputy, who is now a contributor to *Le Rappel*. The circulation of the latter is 20,000 copies; its manager is Charles Bos; it is Radical, though in practice dissenting from the politics of the Radical party, as it was opposed to the Combes ministry. The same may be said of *Le Siècle*, edited by M. de Lanessan, the minister of marine in the cabinet of Waldeck-Rousseau. The chief contributor to this paper is M. Cornely, who ten years ago was still a Royalist and a Catholic. We may add to this list of Radical papers *Le Signal*, the organ of the Protestant church, and consequently very clerical.

The Socialist Radical newspapers are *La Lanterne*, which is first and foremost an anti-clerical paper, and has a circulation of 42,000; and *L'Aurore*, the sale of which does not exceed 28,000 copies, though its editor, Georges Clemenceau, is perhaps the most remarkable politician of France.

We have been talking so far only of the Parisian press. In the provinces there is a veritable swarm of papers. Each departmental capital, each big town, possesses several daily, bi-weekly, or tri-weekly papers, of the most diverse opinions. We have seen that there exist a whole provincial series of *Croix*, the organs of the Catholics. We might also have mentioned a similar series of *Nouvellistes*, found in many cities, and affiliated with the Con-

servative party; also a number of papers, of rather small circulation, but of considerable influence in their respective regions. Most of these dailies are Progressist Republican. Sometimes, however, they show tendencies toward a more advanced position.

The organs of Radicalism in the provinces are many and difficult to enumerate. They include one or two monthly and weekly reviews, but have much difficulty in maintaining themselves, as their circulation is limited. Radicalism has also smaller organs of propaganda, such as *Les Annales de la Jeunesse laïque*, with a circulation of nearly 10,000—a small monthly review appealing especially to a public of school-teachers; *Pages libres*, edited by Charles Guieysse, whose Socialistic and even Anarchistic tendencies are much marked; and *Les Cahiers de la Quinzaine*, which, like the preceding, is more Socialistic than Radical, and is edited by M. Peguy.

Every year the Radical and Socialist Radical parties hold a general congress, where all the delegates of the groups that follow Radicalism meet. Frequently these groups are electoral committees which live only during the period of the election. They have but a small number of members, and sometimes the delegate appoints himself. The Radical party has no such organization as the Socialist party. The Radical and Socialist Radical congress appoints from among its members an executive committee. Recently the president of this committee was M. Berteaux, a deputy who served as minister of war in the Combes cabinet. Its president is now Jean Bourrat, a deputy. The difference between the Socialist Radicals and the Radicals lies in the varying degree of emphasis which they place upon democratic reform.

As we have already seen, French conservatism has a live organ in the "Third Order." Radicalism possesses a similar organ in Freemasonry, represented especially by the "Grand Orient of France." It is difficult to ascertain the numbers in this secret association. It is known that they are divided into lodges, each of which has a president, who is styled "Venerable," and several other officers. There may be several lodges in the same town, according to its importance. The Freemasons of the Grand Orient of France hold an annual convention. Though secret, this

convention was freely discussed in the press this year. It appoints a permanent council, which is charged with the direction of French Masonic affairs. This council is called the "Council of Order." Its president is M. Lafferre, a deputy and a barrister. Besides the Grand Orient of France, and in friendly relations with it, there are the "Grand Lodge of France" and the "Supreme Council" for France and its dependencies. These constitute what is commonly called the "Scottish Rite." It appears that the influence of the Scottish Rite Masons is less than that of the Grand Orient, whose lodges cover the whole country.

Republicans of all shades of opinion live harmoniously side by side in these Masonic lodges. M. Bonnet, the orator of the last convention, said in his speech, as reported by the newspapers: "We are the only association—and we are proud and happy to say so—where moderate but true Republicans, Radicals, Socialist Radicals, Socialists, and Libertarians discuss together all the political, economic, and social problems." It seems, however, from what is known of the lodges, that the great majority of Freemasons are Radicals, with a Socialist minority in Paris, Marseilles, and other large cities. As for Libertarians and Anarchists, their number is very small.

The tendencies and program of Freemasonry may be considered as those of the Radical and Socialist Radical parties. The Grand Orient of France is unanimously anti-clerical. Its members one and all demand the separation of church and state. Once this goal has been attained—and it has the first place upon its program—it will work for the political "purification" of the state functionaries; that is, the appointment to government positions of such persons only as have proved themselves to be good republicans. It desires a state monopoly of all elementary instruction, thus completely debarring the clergy from teaching. It favors laws increasing the liberty of citizens with respect to divorce, the press, etc. It advocates democratic legislation, improving the condition of the working classes in city and country, making taxes weigh more heavily upon the rich than upon the poor, providing for old-age pensions, introducing an inheritance and an income tax, fixing a weekly holiday, etc. Aside



from the question of the separation of church and state, and the destruction of the last remnant of the political power of the church, the Freemasons are, however, not entirely agreed on all of these points, some favoring a more thoroughgoing scheme of democratic reform than others.

We must also mention the National Association of Free-thinkers of France, with Ferdinand Buisson, a deputy, as its president. In this association we find Radicals, Socialists, and Anarchists of both sexes. The Grand Orient of France is not open to women. The Association of Freethinkers has members scattered all over the country. Some of these have organized local groups. Their number is still restricted—4,500—the association being quite young. Its purpose is to search for truth, the liberation of minds from all confessional practices, and the laicization of education and morals.

Socialism is divided into two great factions—the Revolutionary Socialists and the Reformatory Socialists. The official name of the former is the “Socialist Party of France;” the latter is called the “French Socialist Party.” The former is known by the initials of the French title, P. S. D. F.; the latter, as P. S. F. Each of these parties holds an annual congress, and is managed by a committee of delegates appointed by this congress or by the district federations of the group. The groups are many, and those of the P. S. D. F. are well organized and strong. The membership of the P. S. D. F. is recruited chiefly from the northern, central, and southeastern parts of France, and from Paris; that of the P. S. F. is scattered all over the country. Independent of these two organized factions, there are the “Revolutionary Socialist Labor Party” (*Parti Ouvrier socialiste révolutionnaire*, P. O. S. R.), and the “Breton Socialist Federation” (*Fédération socialiste bretonne*, F. S. B.). All these groups together comprise about 1,200,000 members, of whom nearly 425,000 are in the P. S. D. F. Their ideal is the same: the transformation of the present capitalistic division of property into a social division; that is, into collective or common ownership. The difference is in their tactics. And yet, when one examines the policies carefully, they are more different in form than in substance.



The Reformatory Socialists propose to transform society through slow and successive steps, gaining incessantly on the capitalistic state. They are inclined toward an alliance with the Radical and Socialist Radical parties, so as to secure a governmental majority, and lead the government on a more and more democratic and socialistic road. They therefore accept compromises and somewhat modify their ideal. The Revolutionary Socialists, on the other hand, are opposed to any form of alliance or union. They want a party independent of all others, preach incessantly the socialistic ideal, and concern themselves about reform only to the extent of accepting them when they emanate from the bourgeois groups, using them as a means for exacting more. They depend on the revolution to transform society, and that transformation must be complete as well as sudden.

The truth is that this difference in tactics is more apparent than real, as all the Socialist members of Parliament support the present government. Ever since the International Congress at Amsterdam, each faction is doing its utmost to effect a union with the other. If they succeed—which we rather doubt—there will be but one Socialist party in France.

The leaders of the P. S. D. F. are Jules Guesdes, Paul Lafargue, and Dubreuilh, without mentioning those who sit in Parliament. The leaders of the P. S. F. are nearly all deputies, except Fournière and Paul Brousse, who is a member of the Municipal Council of Paris.

The Socialists draw their recruits chiefly from the ranks of the workingmen of the cities, and from the young professors and school-teachers. There are also a few Socialist groups among the peasants and the vine-dressers of the Southwest, and in Brétagne-Vendée.

There are in Paris three Socialistic dailies: *L'Action*, edited by Henry Bérenger, which has a circulation of 60,000, is intimately associated with Freemasonry, and consequently has Radical tendencies; *La Petite République*, edited by Gérault Richard, a deputy, which has a sale of 72,000 copies; and *L'Humanité*, the organ of Jean Jaurès, which has a circulation of 15,000. There are no dailies belonging to the Revolutionary

Socialist parties. The official organ of the P. S. D. F. is *Le Socialiste*, a weekly newspaper which attacks, at times quite vehemently, the Reformatory Socialists, whom it calls "Confusionary Socialists." In the provinces there are many daily and weekly papers, such as *Le Reveil du Nord* (Lille), *Le Bréton socialiste* (Morlaix), etc. There are three Socialistic periodicals: *Le Mouvement socialiste*, edited by Hubert Lagardelle, which leans toward the P. S. D. F.; *La Vie sociale*, edited by F. de Pressensé, a deputy; and *La Revue socialiste*, the manager of which is Gustave Rouanet, a deputy. The two latter have close relations with the P. S. F.

Such is the present situation of the political parties in France. The means of propaganda of which they all make use, aside from the newspapers, are lectures and public meetings. The Catholics and Socialists add to this pamphlets sold for one or two cents apiece.

The political situation of the country is reflected in the Chamber of Deputies. The majority that supported the Combes ministry from 1902 to 1905 was composed of different groups, namely: the "Democratic Union," led by M. Étienne; the "Radical Left," led by M. Sarrien; the "Socialist Radical Left," led by Bienvenu Martin; the "Group of Independent Socialists," with Jean Jaurès, Aristide Briand, and F. de Pressensé as leaders; and the "Group of Revolutionary Socialists," with Édouard Vaillant and Marcel Sembat as leaders. The majority was about thirty votes. Besides these groups there were the so-called "Dissenting Radicals," who were anxious to hold the portfolios in the new cabinet, and did not hesitate to form an alliance with the Conservatives of all shades in order to fight the ministry of M. Combes.

M. Combes, who is seventy-two years old, was appointed president of the council in 1902, after the resignation of the ministry of Waldeck-Rousseau. He thus held office nearly three years. His cabinet was not very homogeneous, as it contained Moderate Republicans, such as Rouvier (finance), Chaumié (public instruction), and Vallé (justice), as well as Socialist

Radicals, like Pelletan (marine) and Berteaux (war). In spite of this lack of homogeneity, the Combes cabinet resisted all the combined attacks of the Right (Liberal Catholic Republicans) and the Left (Dissenting Radicals). These were sometimes very violent.

The policy of M. Combes's cabinet was above all anti-clerical. He enforced the law of Waldeck-Rousseau against the religious congregations and the law forbidding these to teach. He broke off all diplomatic relations with the Holy See. He also paved the way for the separation of church and state, which will probably be passed by the Chamber before July, so that it may pass the Senate this year. We may therefore presume that the year 1906 will see the separation as an accomplished fact. There are some who doubt that there will be a majority for it in the Chamber, but we do not share this doubt. Parliament will pass the bill, because it realizes that public opinion demands it. Besides, the Radical papers, the Freemasons, and the groups of free thought are making an active propaganda to that end. The fight is carried on with eagerness on the part of the Radicals. On the Catholic side many wish the separation, hoping to use the liberty which will result to regain their lost power. M. Combes was in the habit of taking the hints given by these groups in the Chamber or in the country at large. The feature which most distinguished his régime from that of his predecessor was the fact that he did not have a personal policy, but that he took pains to find out in what direction lay the preference of the parliamentary majority and of the country, thus following the opinion of the nation instead of leading it. He did not oppose the forward march, nor did he promote it. During the thirty years or more that France has been a republic, his was the first really republican cabinet. The merit of M. Combes consists in realizing the aspirations of the majority and in executing its will.

The result of this policy was that great influence came to be vested in a few individuals and a few groups. It is certain that the Grand Orient of France had considerable influence over M. Combes personally, and consequently over the whole ministry. The committee composed of the delegates of the parliamentary groups



of the majority, of whom we have spoken above, exercised a powerful influence. It may perhaps be said that it was M. Jaurès alone who, thanks to the authority which he derived from his fame as an orator, directed the policy of M. Combes. One fact is certain, namely, that he saved the cabinet from defeat three or four times. Another source from which he draws his power springs from the fact that he represents the Socialist party—the only party which has an ideal, as was said by M. Ripert, a Conservative deputy, who added: “The Socialist Party is really the leader and master of our parliamentary policy.” Thus expressed, it is an exaggeration; but there can be no doubt that the Socialist party is a very influential factor in the guidance of the politics of France.

This is why the social reforms, such as laws for the protection of the working classes and the transformation of the present taxes into an income tax, are studied so zealously in Parliament. To be sure, this zeal is only relative, and does not satisfy many Socialists; which fact is easily explained when it is remembered that the complete understanding regarding the religious policy which prevails between the Radicals, Socialist Radicals, and Socialists does not extend to social reforms, with respect to which there are different, and even contrary, opinions. The result is that, while these reforms may be accomplished, it will be but slowly and gradually. Indeed, some of them, too socialistic in their tendencies, did not win a majority in Parliament. It seems probable, however, that the social laws will soon be passed: the reduction of the term of military service from three to two years, old-age pensions for workingmen, the law of weekly rest, the income tax, etc. Perhaps the present Chamber will not see these reforms carried through, its term expiring in May, 1906; but the next one will certainly carry out these measures.

In its religious policy the cabinet of M. Combes advanced with the Left toward emancipation from all state religion. In this it was clearly Radical. It was in accord with the country; for, in spite of the furious assaults of the opposition and the money used for propaganda, the by-elections nearly always gave the victory to the Radicals. The country is becoming Radical, and is gradu-

ally drifting toward Socialism. Already in 1898, writing of the parliamentary elections, we commented upon this fact in *L'Humanité nouvelle*. Even since then the fact has become more and more accentuated. Frequently, in the elections, the Royalist or Bonapartist gives place to a "Rallié" or a Catholic Republican, who himself makes room for a Progressist Republican, who in his turn is supplanted by a Radical. The Radical next sees his votes given to a Socialist Radical, who in turn has to give his seat to a Socialist. The Radical majority is gradually increasing, and little by little it is becoming impregnated with socialism. It may therefore be predicted that the future ministries, called to direct the affairs of France, will have a long life. They will find themselves in the presence of an opposition of the Right which will go on decreasing, and a majority in which the extreme Left, with its most advanced ideas, will continually increase in number. It may be presumed with a fair degree of certainty that the policy of France will tend more and more in a democratic and socialistic direction. Gradually it will give to the nation laws improving the condition of the working classes of city and country, increasing the civic liberties, reducing the burdens of the proletarians to shift them to the shoulders of the capitalists, and even socializing a few industries, such as railways, navigation, etc.

One may say, without fear of contradiction, that France, after thirty years as a nominal republic, has at last begun to realize the true republic, to the great satisfaction of the majority of her people.

## REVIEWS

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*Foundations of Sociology.* By EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS. New York: The Macmillan Company. Pp. xiv + 410.

It would have been a miracle if the author of *Social Control* had been able to follow it up so soon with another equally original book. The volume before us traverses ground much of which has been often, if not well, surveyed before. The unity of impression made by the earlier book is lacking here, although the studies of which it is composed are organized to serve a definite purpose. In spite of these obvious qualifications, one can hardly read *Foundations of Sociology* without a sense of closing the Antean circuit with reality.

In my judgment, Professor Ross is as hot on the scent of the next important results in sociology as any of the men to whom we are looking for additions to knowledge. This book is, on the whole, devoted to the method, rather than to the content, of knowledge. It does much in the way of clearing the cobwebs out of the sociological skies. It is, however, a general survey rather than a treatise. It will be profitable reading for sufficiently mature students who are making their first approach to sociology. It will be not less useful to older students for review and recapitulation. At the same time, I predict that the author will very soon think beyond certain of the forms in which this summary leaves mooted questions. Indeed, it seems to me that he has not quite done justice to the full results of his own analysis up to date. He has left some things in less satisfactory shape than other parts of his work seem to dictate.

For instance (p. 6) he defines sociology by implication as the science of "social phenomena." As a way of putting it, this seems to me inadequate and unfortunate. No one has better thought out the reasons why than Professor Ross himself. If we stickle for the strict meaning of phrases, there is almost a contradiction of terms in the expression "science of phenomena." Considering phenomena simply as such, we exclude the relations which are the conditions of science. Every science must deal with some sort of relations between phenomena. In chap. 1, therefore, we have, so far as mere words go, a much less mature conception of the scope of sociology than the one contained in chap. 4. On p. 91 the author virtually reaches the con-



clusion that sociology is the science of *the social process*, that is, of the whole system of *relations* between social phenomena. The discussion of the difference between history and sociology (pp. 81 f.) expresses the substance of my reasons for preferring the later to the earlier formula.

Again, the author sometimes says very severe things, which are not quite consistent with his own professions of faith in a slightly different connection. For instance, he says (p. 71):

That bizarre forerunner of sociology, the philosophy of history, assumed that the experiences of a particular society — Sicily or Poland, for example — are but *parts of a single mighty process*.<sup>1</sup> The life of humanity — or at least of occidental humanity — can be brought under a single formula, etc., etc.

But on p. 14 Professor Ross had summed up the superiority of sociology to older social philosophy in the assertion that institutions are now “studied rather as different aspects of *one social evolution!*” If it is a virtue for the sociologists to think of all social phenomena as a part of one process, why was it a vice for the philosophers of history to do the same thing? Is not the difference in the *nature* of the processes posited in the two cases, rather than in a contrast between assuming and not assuming one process?

It seems to me that Professor Ross has not fully considered the case in the short passage on the *science of religion* (pp. 16, 17). The argument of the book as a whole tends to the conclusion that the science of religion must ultimately become a chapter in sociology. But in this passage the author distinctly disavows this conclusion. Was it not in the interest of *religion*, rather than the *science of religion*, that he was moved to make the disclaimer? No division of conduct can be merely a chapter of a pure science; but I see no escape from the conclusion that *sciences* of abstracted portions of conduct must correlate themselves at last with the science of conduct in general.

One of the most searching chapters in the book is that on “Social Laws.” It provokes a great many questions which must be threshed out in due time; but they cannot be referred to with advantage within our present limits. Has the author been happy, however, in formulating his first count against the philosophers (p. 42)? Have they taught us to be too “objective,” or not objective enough? Is not the proper indictment brought in the later term “*exteriority*”

<sup>1</sup> Italics mine.

(p. 54), and should we not guard the former term against compromising associations?

I am disposed to question Professor Ross's application of the terms "law" and "generalization" (p. 66); and it seems to me that in the last two paragraphs of the chapter (p. 69) he has said "social law" when he meant "sociological law."

The "Map of the Sociological Field" (p. 98) contains so many points of departure, and the lines of connection between them are so complicated, that comment must be reserved. At all events, the alterations that have been made since the scheme was first published<sup>2</sup> show that the author's plan of campaign is developing, and that in his mind there is a large tentative element in the whole perspective. On the other hand, even if our point of view brings out a very different correlation of social processes, we can have no doubt that the frontier of discovery will be securely advanced by using this plan as a base of operations.

Chap. 6, "The Properties of Group Units," fails to convince me at points which might not have been left equally questionable if the actual working approach to them had begun with p. 138, thus inverting the order of argument. It seems to me that this would have led to something more than mere transposition of paragraphs. Some closer criticism of the contents would have been suggested. My contention would be that we are at present disposing all too summarily of the perceptive and purposive element in the phenomena of group-action, and crediting to the purely affective element a ratio of influence which final analysis will considerably reduce.

In the beginning of chap. 7 Professor Ross has wisely qualified the language in which his dissent from Professor Giddings was originally expressed.<sup>3</sup> The change is merely verbal, however, and the chapter aims to weaken the prestige of the idea that "social facts admit of a double interpretation, the objective and the subjective." After all, are the two views as far apart as they are made to appear? Is not the gist of the matter that men are in part phenomena of physical nature, as really as the winds and the waves and the trees, while they are also in part virtually as distinct superimpositions upon nature as though they were shot upon the planet from another cosmic system? Do Giddings and Ross really differ here, or is the apparent difference merely in ways of getting at analysis and expression of the different species of factors which they equally recognize?

<sup>2</sup> *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. IX, p. 206.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 526.

There is an issue between Professor Ross and myself about my classification of human interests (p. 165). One's self-satisfaction can certainly not be inflated by failure to convince so acute a thinker, yet in a case about which one feels somewhat secure, the failure may be accounted for as due to faulty expression, rather than to essential error. Professor Ross's reason for rejecting the classification seems to me like refusal to group the states of our Union as "eastern and western," on the ground that some of them are Democratic and others Republican.

Our queries have by no means referred to the most important questions raised by the book. These could hardly be treated fairly without entering upon more extended discussion than our present limits permit. From the very fact that the author is on the skirmish line of method and theory, his positions are exposed, but not necessarily weak. As we intimated above, he is gaining ground as surely as any scholar in our field. The present volume can hardly fail to serve, for some time to come, as one of the most effective path-breakers in sociological inquiry.

ALBION W. SMALL.

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*L'Année sociologique.* Publiée sous la direction d'ÉMILE DURKHEIM. Huitième année (1903-4). Paris: Alcan. Pp. 663.

This annual occupies an important place in our literature, and it has from the beginning performed a useful service. We have to confess, however, that we have never been quite able to calculate its personal equation. Its judgments about sociological work do not place themselves in easily definable relations with those of any other group of scholars in the same field. The point of view occupied by the contributors gives an outlook that can hardly seem clear to anybody else.

For instance, the first of the two *Memoires originaux* in the present number is by M. H. Bourgin, and is entitled "Essai sur une forme d'industrie: l'industrie de la boucherie à Paris au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle." The writer says of his own work that its positive results are of three kinds: first, a certain number of facts; second, certain causal explanations; third, certain hypothetical indications (p. 112). We will not deny that the results exhibited in the monograph may have each of those values in a degree that justifies the amount of skilled labor evidently expended in the study. From all that appears



in the monograph itself, however, its outcome has no more value for a general explanation of society than an equally critical study of the number, kind, and location of buttons on the costume that Henry VIII wore when he married Anne Boleyn. The meaning of technique and output all turns upon its place in a complete methodological system; and in the absence of definite instruction about the correlation assumed, we cannot decide whether the author has a correct or an incorrect appraisal of the place of his work in the scale of sociological values. We feel this same uncertainty about the standard of judgment which the reviewers apply when they pronounce upon the work of others.

Of course, the views of Professor Durkheim himself are familiar, and in reading his monograph — “*Sur l'organisation matrimoniale des sociétés australiennes*” — we are able to connect it with his general methodology. The position of no other contributor is equally well known, and the consequence is that we are often at a loss to decide how much or how little the opinions imply.

For example, an estimate of Simmel's “*Sociology of Conflict*,”<sup>1</sup> signed “H. H.,” concludes that “*des tentatives ambitieuses comme celle de M. Simmel n'ajouteront rien à notre connaissance.*” If Simmel's method of analyzing social forms purported to be complete in itself, and to have no connections with other ways of inquiring into the social forms, its author would be as emphatic as anybody in pronouncing it abortive. A writer who gives no evidence of insight into the relation between Simmel's inquiries into social forms and his whole scheme of knowledge, cannot be accepted as a competent appraiser of his work.

A brief notice of Ross's “*Moot Points in Sociology*”<sup>2</sup> concludes with these words: “*Malgré son éclecticisme et ses laborieuses distinctions de concepts, M. Ross ne semble pas avoir éclairci les questions controversés qu'il agite: ces controversés sont d'ailleurs d'un autre temps.*” We would not imply that ambiguity in the mind of the writer as to the trifling accident of tense clouds his title to credit for a first-rate perception. We cordially recommend to our worthy friends of *L'Année sociologique*, however, that they attentively watch “M. Ross,” for it is not impossible that degrees of othertimeliness may presently be measured from his meridian.

<sup>1</sup> *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. IX, pp. 490, 672, 798.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. IX; incorporated into *The Foundations of Sociology*, noticed above.

*The Suffrage Franchise in the Thirteen English Colonies in America.* By ALBERT EDWARD MCKINLEY. (Publications of the University of Pennsylvania, Series in History, No. 2.) Published for the University. Ginn & Co., selling agents. Pp. 518.

In a bulky monograph of more than five hundred pages, Mr. Albert Edward McKinley, of Philadelphia, presents the results of exhaustive study in colonial archives to determine the conditions of the suffrage franchise. After an appropriate introductory chapter on "Parliamentary Suffrage in England" follow thirteen chapters, each devoted to a single colony. The author indicates his purpose to have been "to present the dynamic or developmental aspect of the subject, rather than the analytic; he has not been content with a mere summary of the suffrage qualifications in the several colonies, but has endeavored to trace the growth of the colonial ideals and practices respecting the elective franchise." What seems to have been a most thorough examination of colonial archives, covering a wide range, indicated by a wealth of footnotes, reveals certain conclusions of interest:

1. Political rights everywhere were restricted to males, only two cases appearing in the records of women seeking the franchise.
2. The legal age, twenty-one, was a requirement in eleven of the colonies, and by implication in the other two. There were cases where a greater age was required under certain conditions.
3. There were limitations regarding race and nationality, provision being made for naturalization, limitations of religion and character, restrictions as to residence; and property qualifications of varying character were important factors.
4. Some special features of interest were connected with freemanship in corporations; in some places there were prerequisite qualifications similar to the English borough franchise; in one case, that of the College of William and Mary, the president and six masters could elect a member of the house of burgesses.

Mr. McKinley's volume is full of interest. In connection with each colony the narrative style is followed, and the text, therefore, is free from the dulness which might be supposed to attend a discussion of details of so dry a subject as electoral qualifications. Taken in connection with Mr. Bishop's *History of Elections in the Colonies*, the whole ground seems thoroughly covered.

F. W. S.

*La Teorica dell' Individualismo secondo John Stuart Mill.* By A. L. MARTINAZZOLI. Milan: Ulrico Hoepli, 1905. Pp. viii + 352. L. 4.50.

There is likely to be a renewal of interest in the social philosophy of John Stuart Mill as the struggle between the two opposite principles of individualism and collectivism becomes more severe. Weapons for both sides may be forged from his thought. The individualism of *Liberty* and the socialism of his *Autobiography* and other writing have doubtless been more or less of a puzzle to his casual readers. We have in this volume a clearing up of the apparent inconsistency. The profound and original ideas of Mill in regard to social life are set forth with lucid clearness. The criticism is objective and penetrating, though genial. The book is edited with the usual elegance of works issued by l'Editore Hoepli.

I. W. H.

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*Elementi di Sociologia.* By ALESSANDRO GROPPALI. Gerwa: Libreria Moderna, 1905. Pp. xv + 383. L. 4.

This book is an excellent text for beginners in sociology, and may be recommended to all the uninitiated who wish to acquaint themselves with the results of sociology thus far attained. It comprises eleven chapters (lessons), each chapter containing at its close a brief bibliography. The author presents impartially the principal views of the leading sociologists, European and American, and treats with great clearness the origin and evolution of economic, juridical, political, moral, religious, artistic, and scientific phenomena. Nothing equally serviceable for the purpose avowed has yet appeared in English. The book is in its second Italian edition.

I. W. HOWERTH.



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## NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

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**An Open Letter from John K. Ingram**, formerly professor of political economy, Trinity College, Dublin, to the secretary of the Sociological Society of London, on the papers of Professor Durkheim and Mr. Branford, entitled "On the Relation of Sociology to the Social Sciences and to Philosophy" (published in this *Journal*, Vol. X, p. 134):

DEAR SIR: I have carefully read more than once the two papers you have been good enough to send me, and in accordance with your desire, I proceed to state, as fully as my other occupations will permit, my views on the subject of which they treat.

I do not recognize the multiple "social sciences" spoken of in the papers. There is, in my view, only one abstract sociology, which deals with the constitution, the working, and the evolution of society in all their aspects. (There are, of course, studies of different actual societies, but these are foreign to the present question.) The only philosophical division of abstract sociology, as distinguished from those dictated merely by convenience, is into social statics and social dynamics. The "social sciences" enumerated in the papers are, for the most part, in reality only chapters of general sociology. Thus, the abstract study of economics is a part of sociology. Anthropology is only the first section of dynamical sociology. The study of the nature and development of religion is an element—the most important element—of general sociology. Statistics is not a branch of science at all; it is a congeries of observations ancillary to several sciences. Education is not a science, but an art, borrowing materials from several sciences. So also is jurisprudence. "Social geography" must, from the nature of it, be concrete. Morals, indeed, is a true science—one of the seven rightly enumerated by Comte—distinct from sociology, though closely akin to it, being the theory of individual human nature. The attempt to set up a number of "social sciences" can only tend to encourage pedantry and idle research, in a province where broad principles are not only the one thing needful, but are alone accessible.

Sociology cannot be built up out of the "several sciences;" like biology, it is radically synthetic; and as in the latter we start from the general notion of the organism and analyze it afterwards, still referring everything to its unity, so we must in sociology set out from collective humanity and its fundamental attributes, and study all sociological phenomena in the light of the social consensus.

To me this endless trituration of social inquiry, and separation of the workers into distinct specialisms, appear to overlook the real meaning and end of sociology, which is to establish on scientific bases a non-theological religion. It is positivism, as a foundation, first of social renovation, and then of permanent social guidance, that seems to me to supply the explanation of historical tendencies in the past, and to point to the goal of future effort. The notion of the construction or development of sociology by the joint work of theologians and positivists I regard as chimerical. We cannot shirk the previous decision as to the reality or non-existence of a supernatural interference in human affairs. The attempt to do so will break down. The world has come up to this question and must face it, while, if I understand the case aright, the Sociological Society proposes to evade it.

What is now, in my judgment, most wanted is a real study of Comte, who, though his fame has been irresistibly rising and spreading, is more talked of than understood, and is not as yet at all adequately appreciated. Some would set him aside as pre-evolutionary, the fact being that, so far as *social evolution* is concerned, he has done immensely more than anyone else, and at an earlier date. I have endeavored to expound his principles, with which my own essentially coincide, in several publications, to which—especially to *Human Nature and*

*Morals and Practical Morals*—I would refer anyone who cares to know my opinions more in detail than they could be presented in these few sentences.—  
JOHN K. INGRAM.

**Discipline in Industry.**—The bloody strike at Limoges has caused justifiable apprehension throughout France. Not only on account of the violence which accompanied it, and the blamable weakness of the local authorities in dealing with it, but much more by reason of the cause of the strike itself, it has afforded occasion for a serious inspection of industrial tendencies.

Limoges has always been a radical city; its mayor is a socialist, and it is hardly to be expected that socialist leaders—creatures of the crowd whose every passion they flatter servilely—should be able to restrain the crowd in times of crisis. But, however deplorable the incidents which have occurred, we repeat that they do not constitute the most disturbing element in the situation at Limoges. The question is rather one of the very organization of industry itself: Shall that discipline which is indispensable in any long series of operations involving the co-operation of large numbers of workmen, be left in the hands of the employer, whether he be an individual or a company; or shall the management of the shop, the hiring and discharge of foremen and superintendents as well as laborers, the general administration of industry, be made dependent upon the choice, or at least the ratification, of the employees?

This was the principle at stake at Limoges. Here, as in many other quarters, these anarchistic claims were advanced that the employees had the right to pass upon the superintendents and foremen chosen by the employer to guide their work. Of course, it is desirable that these agents of the employer should be men possessing in a high degree the sense of justice and of humanity, as well as technical and executive ability; but it is true, at the same time, that the firmness and energy which are after all indispensable in the industrial superintendent, will always be offensive to a portion of the personnel of the factory, notably the thoughtless, the idle, and the insubordinate; and to sacrifice the superintendent or the foreman or other agents to the susceptibilities or the rancor of this portion of the employees could have no other effect than to put an end to all industrial discipline. The delicate organism of industry would speedily fall into the most fatal slackness and laxity of management; production would become insufficient, poor, and expensive, and certain decadence would follow.

Unskilled labor, as M. Tarde shows, is only the repetition of an example set by some inventor, ancient or modern, and it is clear that it is not entitled to the choice of the agents of direction, of oversight, or of control of industry.

The socialists, while waiting to confiscate capital, are seeking to propagate the idea that it ought to be merely the sleeping partner of labor. Kantsky, the leader of pure Marxian socialism in Germany, writes that it is necessary that labor should become the master of the factory: These last words are characteristic; that the proletariat should be master of the factory is the end agreed upon by socialists of all shades of belief. Kantsky continues: If the workman has his maintenance assured even in times of the stoppage of production (and it is to this end that municipal grants during strikes are tending), nothing will be easier for him to do than to put a check to capital. Then he will have no need of the capitalist, while the latter without the workman will be unable to continue his exploitation. When this shall be the case, the entrepreneur will be under a disadvantage in all conflicts with his workmen, and will be forced to yield. Capitalists will still continue to direct their factories, but they will no longer be the masters and exploiters. But if the capitalists recognize that there remain for them only risks to be run and charges to be borne, they will be the first to renounce capitalistic production, and to insist that their enterprises which yield them no profit should be purchased and taken off their hands (that is, by the state or the municipality). This is the socialist program according to Kantsky, and he is doubtless correct in maintaining that entrepreneurs would renounce capitalistic production under such conditions; but will collectivism take their place? Here Kantsky may deceive himself; what will result from this situation will be simply the discouragement of the capitalists, the gradual closing of the factories, general impoverishment, and the return of society to primitive poverty.

Thus it is necessary to turn from the incidents of the strike, painful as they are, to the contention that lies at its foundation, that the proletariat ought to become master of the shop, and to recognize the gravity of this pretention, as well as the consequences which will follow if it is allowed to spread and triumph.—PAUL LEROY-BEAULIEU, in *Économiste français*, April 22, 1905.

E. B. W.

**Midsummer Customs in Morocco.**—The present article is based on information which I have obtained in the course of three years and a half devoted to anthropological research in Morocco, chiefly among its peasantry.

The population of Morocco consists of two groups of Arabic-speaking tribes, inhabiting the plains and the northern mountains respectively, and some four different groups of Berbers. Among these various groups of natives certain ceremonies are performed on June 24 (old style), the so-called *l'ânsara* day; or on the eve of that day. In certain mountain villages, upon this day, after sunset, the villagers kindle large fires in open places, and men, women, and children leap over them, believing that by so doing they rid themselves of all misfortune which may be clinging to them; the sick will be cured, and childless couples will have offspring. The smoke possesses benign virtue and prevents injury from the fire. Fig trees, grain fields, and beehives are made more fruitful in many localities by the kindling of fires near them, pennyroyal, and other herbs being sometimes thrown into the fire. The smoke from these midsummer fires is also thought to be beneficial to the domestic animals.

In some places fire ceremonies of another type are practiced at the same season, namely, ceremonies which are supposed to destroy misfortune by the flame rather than the smoke. For this purpose three sheaves of unthreshed wheat or barley are burned, "one for the children, one for the crops, and one for the animals."

Beside smoke and fire customs, water ceremonies are very commonly practiced at midsummer. On *l'ânsara* day the people bathe in the sea or in the rivers; they also bathe their animals, sometimes maintaining that persons thus bathing will be free from sickness for a whole year. Rain which falls on April 27 (old style) is also supposed to be endowed with magic energy in a special degree, and it is carefully collected and afterward used for a variety of beneficent purposes. Sprinkling fruit trees, domestic animals, and bees with fine earth or dust alternates with the smoke custom referred to above.

Oleander branches and marjoram are held to possess magic charms. The stones which are used as weights in the market-place are held to possess efficacy as charms, due in part to the fact that many eyes have been gazing on them at the market. By catching so many glances of the eye, these stones have themselves become like eyes; and as the eye serves as a transmitter of baneful energy, it also, naturally, is capable of throwing back such energy on the person from whom it emanates; hence the image of the eye is often used as a charm against the evil eye.

Eating ceremonies, in which a portion of the grain or other food of which an abundant harvest is wished is consumed, take place on Midsummer Day. In this custom there is evident the rule of *pars pro toto*, so commonly applied in magic.

In some localities ceremonies similar to those described above occur, not in midsummer, but at the Muhammedan New Year, or *âsur*. These two sets of ceremonies largely supplement each other, for where no fire or water ceremonies are practiced at *l'ânsara*, we may be sure of landing them at *âsus*. In view of the fact that I have been unable to find a single trace of midsummer ceremonies among Arabs who have not come in contact with the Berber race, I venture to suppose that such ceremonies prevailed among the indigenous Berbers. Although not found among pure Arabs, such customs, as is well known, are or have been universally practiced in Europe, and for a similar purificatory purpose. Considering that such purification ceremonies at midsummer, so far as I know, occur only in Europe and northern Africa, I cannot help thinking that this coincidence



gives some additional strength to the hypothesis of a racial affinity between the Berbers and most European nations of the present day.—EDWARD WESTERMARCK, in *Folk-Lore*, March, 1905. E. B. W.

**Social Life in the United States.**—M. Paul Ghio opened the discussion of this subject before the Paris Society of Sociology by affirming that the essential character of American life is furnished by the Economic struggle. In the United States the mania for acquiring wealth absorbs both intelligence and initiative. The American democracy, which is free from mixture with the institutions of the old régime, has not proved that democratic institutions assure true equality among citizens. This is due to the principle of authority which flows from economic oppression.

Sentiments of revolt against untoward industrial conditions manifest themselves less in a militant socialism than in an individualistic anarchism, which finds in America a field favorable to its development.

M. Louis Vigouroux, in continuing the discussion, called attention to the need of prudence in carefully defining the subject which one intends to treat, when speaking of America, in view of the vast differences in the social characteristics of the population in different and remote sections of the country. He agreed with the preceding speaker that in the United States the possession of wealth confers a more irresistible power than in other societies either past or present.

While there are legally no decorations in the United States, yet the insignia of fraternal organizations, and the magnificence of gold lace and towering plumes with which their leaders adorn themselves, form a social equivalent.

It is just to observe that in the midst of this active practical society, eager for riches and material satisfactions, an intellectual and artistic movement traces itself very distinctly. All who have resorted to American universities have cherished very favorable impressions of them. The instruction is very broad and very independent, and every worthy source is freely drawn upon without bias; close touch is kept with the work done in Europe, and one feels that from this society, already in a state of fermentation, there will proceed some day, and that not a distant one, a rich intellectual, scientific, and artistic production. Moreover, this will be a normal phenomenon. M. Vigouroux recollects that the Greek civilization followed the development of the wealth and commerce of Athens, and it is not to be expected that art and letters will flourish in a country without resources. The prestige of the artist, the author, or the savant in America is as yet not to be compared with that enjoyed by these classes among us.

Many of the immigrants in America who have come from repressive and tyrannical states, find themselves ill-prepared for life in a land where so large a part is still left to individual initiative and to personal merit. The result is that in New York and Chicago there are quarters where poverty reaches a degree never met with in France.

In connection with the labor problem, the efforts of the skilled workmen to effect organizations among the unskilled is worthy of note, as well as the ingenious invention of the union label to designate products turned out by union workmen. In regard to the effect of American trade unions upon the laborer, it is evident that the organization has benefited those within it, and consequently, in spite of assertions to the contrary, has contributed toward the amelioration of the lot of unorganized laborers, whether by causing a direct rise of wages for the same duration of labor in certain occupations, or in others by a mitigation of the lowering of wages resulting from the development of machinery and of immigration.

Of the political customs of the United States M. Vigouroux has a few words to say. To his mind two principal causes favor corruption: (1) the multiplicity of elections (municipal, school, judicial, state, national) has given rise to a class of professional politicians, for the mass of the citizens are not able to leave their occupations every moment to go and intrigue, barangue, and vote from one end of the year to the other; (2) immigrants are allowed to vote before they are able to become assimilated with the political institutions of democracy.—PAUL GHIO et LOUIS VIGOUROUX, "La vie sociale aux Etats-Unis," *Revue internationale de sociologie*, April, 1905. E. B. W.

**The Reform of Trade-Union Law.**—On July 22, 1901, the House of Lords delivered the famous Taff Vale judgment. For over three years trade-unionists have been up in arms against the law. Driven to its last trench, "orthodox" political economy has grappled in the law courts with the encroaching forces of modern collectivism; now the smoke of battle clears, and over a holocaust of reversed decisions and dissenting judgments the unmoved champions of individual competition look out, in splendid solitude, upon a world whose face has changed.

Without further digression upon this fascinating theme, it should be said that the present article is limited to a proposal for reforming the law which now governs the civil liability of trade unions to be sued for wrongs committed by their servants. It is no exaggeration to say that the decision of *Quinn vs. Leatham* has put into the hands of the judges a principle of law which, applied to trade unions, amounts to a denial of their right to exist.

The Taff Vale case, in the first place, constitutes trade unions as "persons" in the law. In the second place, there has been established by the *Quinn vs. Leatham* cases a new right, giving rise to a whole fresh series of possible wrongs; this is the right of every man to earn his living in his own way. This is a right entirely inconsistent with trade-unionism, inasmuch as it is unlimited competition over again. For trade-unionism is at bottom a denial, on behalf both of the individual and of the whole trade, of the right of the individual to consider nothing but his own immediate circumstances in deciding how he shall work.

An effective limitation of this right to earn one's living in one's own way, which forms the substratum of the modern law of trade unions, results in practice from the nature and from the universality of the right itself. Its equal existence in everyone must put practical limits to its full enjoyment by anyone. Is a refusal, for instance, to work with another interference with his right of earning his living in his own way, or is it a mere assertion of one's own right?

There are, it may be noted, two things which make it very hard for unionists, harassed by another's right to earn his living in his own way, to set up an equivalent claim of their own as a defense. First, the right is the right to earn one's *own* living in one's own way. It can only be used to justify action directly concerning one's own wages, hours, and conditions of labor; the individualism of the law will not allow it to place among the things directly concerning a man's own labor, the wages, hours, and conditions of his fellow-workers, or the description of those fellow-workers. Second, the right of earning one's living in one's own way can be claimed only by a worker. It cannot be claimed by a trade union itself, which, though a separate person, has no living to earn.

Trade-unionism and the law are in conflict all along the line, just because they are developments of two contradictory principles. The rule that in certain respects every man should work, not as seems best to himself, but as is best for the whole trade (represented in the union), cannot live with the individualist denial of any conceivable opposition between "what seems best to the individual" and "what is best for the trade." The law of civil liability for trade interference is the recent creation of judges who learned their political science, in briefless and impressionable youth, from the apostles of unlimited individualism. It is a pleasing generalization, not too remote from truth, that in England legislation is always twenty-five, and judicial decision forty or fifty, years behind the times.

In the teeth of reiterated demonstration that individual bargaining between employer and workman is no bargain at all; with the revelations of the Sweating Committee and the horrors of unorganized trades before them; with the companion picture at hand of the great industries dominated by vast associations, wise according to the measure of their strength; after a century of factory laws, the House of Lords had full power to decide that among the fundamental principles upon which our prosperity rests is the absolute right of every man to earn his own living in his own individual way. The effects of this decision must be corrected by express legislation.

The trade-union program which the opposition to these judgments has developed, involves three points: (1) protection of the union funds from liability

for the acts of the union or its executive; (2) abolition of the law of conspiracy in relation to trade disputes; (3) amendment of the law of "picketing" laid down in *Lyons vs. Wilkins*. It is the first of these proposals upon which the unions have particularly set their hearts. This is, however, open to serious criticism. It is evident that trade-union management must be vested in a comparatively small executive upon whom the constitution of the union confers certain powers. It is also evident that no union can at present be absolutely secure against reckless action on the part of its officers. No more can any employer. But will any candid trade-unionist assert that what he wants to be protected against is the possible imprudence of his officials? The unions are not really much concerned to avoid responsibility for actions which they would repudiate; they object rather to being penalized for actions which have their cordial approval.

The reform of trade-union law should not proceed in the direction of a reversal of the *Taff Vale* decision so as to render the unions financially irresponsible, but rather of an extension of the rights of the unions so as to sanction them as legally created artificial persons, in performing the functions for which they exist, namely, the limitation of the extreme individual liberty, which, though fifty years out of date, still stands as the economic norm, upon the statute-books.—W. H. BEVERIDGE, in *Economic Review*, April, 1905.

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**Hygienic and Moral Education of the Child.**—Before the ordinary work of the school curriculum can be undertaken by the pupil with any prospect of satisfactory progress, it is quite essential that careful and expert attention be turned to the cure of physical defects, such as those of eye and ear, and to the protection of healthy children from those affections of eye, ear, nose, and throat which are more widespread among our school population than is supposed, and which for many years have paralyzed the best efforts of our educators.

To this end there must be the closest of affiliation between parents, teachers, and physicians, in order that the instruction of every child may be entirely adapted addition to that of securing for children the benefits of an adequate physical training and hygienic education to procure for each a full measure of bodily vigor.

In a certain number of cities a league of physicians and parents has been established in connection with the secondary schools. Heads of families ought to give their hearty support to this work so eminently patriotic, and calculated to regenerate our race impaired by excess of every kind. Is there any reason why this league should not extend its roots down into the department of primary instruction, and even into the maternal school?

There is a further aim cherished by the National University League, in addition to that of securing for children the benefits of an adequate physical, moral, and intellectual education, and that is the securing of greater assiduity on the part of scholars. That there is abundant opportunity for improvement in the regularity and continuity of school attendance is evident when we consider that a quarter of a century after the promulgation of compulsory education there still exist departments where the children have scarcely 120 to 150 days per year of actual school attendance.—F. BARTHÈS, "Education sanitaire et morale de l'enfant," *Revue philanthropique*, May 15, 1905.

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## THE NEGRO RACE AND EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION

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While in the past century populations and racial elements which had formerly been far distant from each other have been brought into intimate contact, the twentieth century will witness the formation of new mixed races and the attempt to adjust the mutual relations of all the various peoples that inhabit the globe. The recent great advance in the safeness and rapidity of communication has made the whole world into a community whose solidarity of interests becomes more apparent day by day. Closer contact with the more advanced nations of the Orient will have a profound influence upon European civilization, because these nations, though ready to adopt our industrial methods, are determined to maintain their national beliefs and customs. Though from the races that stand on a lower level of civilization no such deep-going influence upon European and American life is to be expected, their relations to the peoples of more advanced culture will nevertheless be a matter of great moment. Some of them, the weakest and lowest in organization, may indeed continue to fade away before the advance of European power; but this is not likely to be the fate of the negro race. The negroes have come in contact with the worst side of European civilization; yet their buoyant, vigorous constitution and their fundamental common-

sense carry them safely through dangers which have proved fatal to other races. They are therefore destined to be a permanent element in the composite population of the future, and when we consider the extent and fertility of the regions which they hold, the necessity of their ever-increasing co-operation in the economic life of the world becomes apparent.

The negro race may be studied in four different sets of conditions: in their original state in the forests of central Africa; as a mixed race under the control of the Arab and Hamite races of the northern Sudan; living side by side with a white population in respect to which they occupy a socially inferior position, as in South Africa and North America; and in a few isolated communities which enjoy rights of self-government based upon European models, as in Hayti and in the French Antilles. A correct understanding of any part of the negro question demands a review of the situation of the negro under all these varying conditions, because only through a comparison of the aboriginal characteristics of the negro with the qualities acquired through contact with other races and civilizations can we form a just estimate of his relative capacity for progress.

We need not here enter into the controversy between polygenists and unigenists, since it has a purely ethnological interest, whereas we intend to approach the question from the point of view of the political activities of the present. No matter what may be the origin of the diversity which the human races at present exhibit—whether the result of the amalgamation of an almost infinite number of disparate groups, or the consequence of continued diversification of an original type—the negro race today exhibits such characteristic features and such distinct traits as to induce many observers to consider it as entirely incommensurate with the white race; yet, on the other hand, it is physiologically connected with the Aryans through a long series of mixed races. As we pass from Morocco or from Cairo toward the center of the Sudan, the color of the population gradually grows darker, and their features, from the regular and often beautiful type of the Hamite, merge off into the coarser characteristics of the negro race. From the pure white skin of the Berber to the

yellow of the Tuareg, the copper tint of the Somali or the Fulbe, the chocolate of the Mombuttu, and the ebony of the Jolof, the color gradations are imperceptible; and no conception is more utterly mistaken than that which would people all of central Africa with a black-skinned race.

The physiological aspects of race-mixture have lately attracted much attention. Mr. James Bryce, in his recent lecture on "The Relations of the Advanced and Backward Races," carefully reviews the experience of mankind in this matter, and adds his support to the current assumption that mixed breeds are morally and physically weak when the parents belong to widely disparate races and civilizations. However, it would seem that this assumption is true only in cases where the two societies to which the parents respectively belong maintain a repugnant attitude to each other, so that the mestizos form an outcast class and suffer a total loss of *morale*. Where friendly relations exist, the mixed races produced by Europeans and negroes exhibit some very fine qualities. The rich yet delicate beauty of the mulatto women in Martinique, their sweetness of temper and kindness of heart, so excited the admiration of visitors that they all, lay and clerical, French and British, join in the chorus of admiration and declare the women of Martinique the most charming in the world. Intellectually, the mulatto race has produced a number of remarkable men, and the liberality of mind among the leaders of this class in Martinique is certainly most noteworthy. Still it is generally true that the men of a mixed race will exhibit fewer pleasing qualities of character than the women: they must make themselves useful often by activities not conducive to sweetness of temper or honesty of mind; while the women naturally develop more gentle and attractive characteristics.

The question of race-mixture between Europeans and negroes is, however, at present of little practical importance. In the regions where large numbers of Europeans and negroes live side by side the social laws more and more stringently forbid a mixture of the two elements; moreover, the number of Europeans who settle in central Africa will probably always be exceedingly small. But there is another racial element which will in the future have



a very prominent part in the physiological modification of the African race. All along the east coast of Africa immigration from India is taking place. Both coast and inland regions are very well adapted to settlement by the Hindus, and no race-antipathy exists between them and the negroes. We may in the near future look for a great inpouring of Indian coolies, tradesmen, and settlers, who, together with the Arab and Hamite elements coming from the north, will leaven the mass of the African population.

While physiologically the transition from the negro to the white race is a gradual one, the distinctive type of negro civilization is yet very different from that which we call European. The last few years have witnessed a great change of mind in matters of humanitarianism; the absolute unity of human life in all parts of the globe, as well as the idea of the practical equality of human individuals wherever they may be found, has been quite generally abandoned. Without going into the question of origins, it is clear that conditions of environment and historical forces have combined in producing certain great types of humanity which are essentially different in their characteristics. To treat these as if they were all alike, to subject them to the same methods of government, to force them into the same institutions, was a mistake of the nineteenth century which has not been carried over into our own. But, after all, it is difficult to say which is the more surprising—whether the remarkable recurrence of similar customs and ideas, similar ways of looking at things, in the remotest parts of the world, and in most distant epochs,<sup>1</sup> or whether it is the existence of clearly marked, almost unchangeable psychological types differing radically from each other. Thus when we study the negro race we encounter many characteristics and customs which bear witness to the common unity of mankind, and which can be accounted for only by assuming the same fundamental instincts, or the transmission of ideas and institutions through tradition; on the other hand, we find many psychological characteristics which distinguish the negro race sharply and

<sup>1</sup> E. g., the almost universal recurrence among the aboriginal peoples of the ordeal, animistic beliefs, marriage by purchase, etc.

clearly from the European, the Hamite, or the oriental world. Whether these differences are irreducible is a question which further development alone can solve.

Low social organization, and consequent lack of efficient social action, form the most striking characteristic of the negro race. Among the Africans of the western Sudan the matriarchal organization of the family, combined with the practice of polygamy, makes the mother the real center of the family-group and renders impossible the upbuilding of strong families through the inheritance of power and property combined from father to son. The father's property goes, not to his children, but to those of his eldest sister. He can, therefore, not supplement, by his accumulated wealth, the physical and mental endowment bestowed upon his son. The redeeming social trait of the African race is the love of sons for their mothers, which is often very deep and touching. But no great families, and therefore no truly great men or leaders to the manor born, exist among Africans.

Among most of the tribes, although there are notable exceptions, the duties of the marriage relation are strictly observed. This is due primarily to the fact that the husband has paid a respectable sum to acquire his spouse, and his strongly developed sense of private property would brook no interference. Her person, her labor, her attentions, belong exclusively to him. In fact, there is but a difference in degree between the position of the wife and that of the slave. The reasons for entering into marriage are almost always prudential: among the poorer people, the working power of the wife; among the wealthier, the influence of her relatives, form the main consideration. The African bush traders have a wife in every important village on their route, not only on account of the business advantage accruing from her connections, but also for the reason that traders are in constant danger of having their food poisoned unless the kitchen is managed by a friendly spirit.

Slavery among the African negroes is an institution which does not at all correspond to what we understand by that term. No special social disgrace attaches to it, nor is a slave a mere chattel; on the contrary, his property rights are scrupulously

respected. He is merely a more dependent member of the community. Thus a "trade boy" slave on the west coast is obliged only to pay a fixed amount to his master, and he may in prosperous times acquire a good deal of wealth for himself. He may then purchase other slaves, and when he has become powerful even free men will place themselves under his protection, and he will thus become a "king." Even during the last decade, of the three most powerful chieftains in the Oil River region, two were slaves. The fact that a man may be "king" and slave at the same time is certainly unprecedented in any other civilization, which of itself shows that the African institution of slavery can in no way be classed with that of Rome or of the southern states. We shall revert to this matter later on in our discussion of the slave-trade—the dark and terrible side of the institution in Africa.

A lack of social fellow-feeling, an absence of every vestige of patriotism, is shown by the readiness with which negroes allow themselves to be used to fight against their neighbors. The Arab slave-raiders never lack men to fight their battles; for, though their Hamite troops may refuse to attack the bands of another trader, the negroes are always ready for a savage onset, even upon men of very nearly their own flesh and blood. The terrible custom of cannibalism, too, can be explained only by taking into account this absence of a feeling of common humanity. Cannibalistic feasts are usually accompanied by religious frenzy or the fury of war; but this is not always the case. There are thrifty tribes which, in the words of De Cardi, "tap their older people on the head, smoke-dry them, then break them up into small bits, which are rolled into balls and laid away for future use in the family stew." It is remarkable that some tribes, like the Mombuttu, which are distinctly advanced in industrial civilization, are the most voracious among the cannibals; thus the greediness of the Sandeh has earned them, among their neighbors, the suggestive nickname of Niam-niam. In the presence of whites these cannibals are, however, generally anxious to conceal their peculiar practice, and when Schweinfurth visited the realm of King



Munza, the monarch had forbidden all open cannibalism in order to keep offense from the eyes of his guest.

The greatest deficiency of the negro race lies on the side of the mechanical arts. While they practice the smelting and forging of iron, and while some of the tribes have advanced considerably in the art of weaving, the negroes nevertheless show little originality, and have acquired most of these arts from the Hamites. They are far more ready to engage in trade; in fact, the trend of the African negro mind is primarily commercial. Living in a country endowed with abundant natural resources, the negro tribes have found it far easier to procure the few things they need, in addition to what nature furnishes them, by trading with Arabs and later with the Europeans, than by developing industries among themselves. This is, of course, especially true of the coast tribes, and in general it may be observed that industrial civilization is higher in the interior regions of Africa than on the coast, the negro race reversing in this particular the historical experience of Europe and America. No shrewder merchants can be imagined than the bush traders of the forest belt and the "trade boys" of the coast. The subtlest tricks for practicing deception are known to these simple-minded forest-dwellers. Women who have learned the art of mixing with the rubber balls sold to merchants the largest amount of dirt that can escape detection, are said to be especially sought after in the marriage-market.

When we pass on to the specific psychological traits of the African race, we enter a field of darkness and uncertainty. "Race psychology" has of late become a fashionable term; but with most writers it stands merely for a more or less interesting description of racial characteristics, without that close study of origins and causal relations which constitute the science of psychology. Even when employed with great care and scientific precision, as in the works of Herbert Spencer, the psychological method does not always produce convincing results; and often the material it deals with becomes so unmanageable as to furnish no clear generalization, as in the painstaking and ponderous *Afrikanische Jurisprudenz* of Post. Yet, from the point of view

of political activities and social reform, the psychic phenomena of primitive races are a matter of the greatest importance, deserving the most careful attention of the colonial administrator.

The art-sense of the negro is rudimentary. Unlike the Bushman, he has no pictorial or plastic art. His chief pleasure is the dance and the entrancing sound of the tom-tom. Of the marvelous sense for melody that the negro has developed in the Antilles and the plantation states of America hardly a trace is found in the African. But the sense of rhythm exists, and the rhythmic drumming on the tom-tom has an almost hypnotic effect upon the blacks. They sit as in a trance, listening to the marvelous sound for hours; or, should the tom-tom player move about the village, they will follow him in utter abstraction, so that they will often tumble headlong into ditches. On the occasion of great military displays, given in the honor of European commissioners, the various chieftains will each bring forward a band of musicians, who at the height of the festivities all play their instruments with the greatest vigor and totally regardless of their fellow-artists. The tremendous discord and strident volley of sound thus produced give rise to the greatest popular satisfaction. Toutée, however, reports that if a simple tune, like "Casquette du père Bugeaud," is played to the negroes, they will listen to it with rapt attention, and will gladly abandon for a time their accustomed instruments.

The art of oratory is much cultivated in Africa. As most of the tribes have no written language, their rich folk-lore is handed down by word of mouth, and whenever men come together they listen to the expert story-teller and orator. The capacity of the American negro for oratory, which has again and again placed young negroes and mulattoes in the position of class orators at leading universities, is therefore an inheritance from customs practised in the primitive villages of Africa. The great occasion for the display of oratorical talent is the palaver—a meeting for the discussion of questions of public interest among prominent persons, or for the trial of cases at law. The African negro shows great ability in the development of systems of law and in the enforcement of rights; this is especially true of the

rules of private property, which are strictly defined and scrupulously observed. Palaver, however, is costly, so that persons who cause much litigation are looked upon as undesirable citizens. Thus, Miss Kingsley saw on a stake before a village the head of a woman whose offense had been that she had "caused too much palaver." In order to prevent the stringing-out of actions, each party has to present the judge with a calabash of palm wine for every day of the sessions.

The intellectual life of the African negro is taken up chiefly with fetishism; that is, with the construction of a spirit-world by which he feels himself surrounded and which he believes is influencing his every act. Fetishism is not unlike the animism of the Brahmin, but it is without the latter's belief in the duality of spirit and matter, and looks upon visible existence as only a grosser form of spirit. According to the belief of the negro, the world was created by potent divinities, who now hold aloof and allow the brutal forces of nature to fight out their battles among themselves. Man, himself a spirit, is caught in the midst of this struggle of forces superior to his own and entirely regardless of his welfare; his only salvation, therefore, lies in escaping as much as possible the attention of these sinister beings. The Africans have neither hero- nor ancestor-worship, and with them, therefore, the idea of divinity is not a development of ancestor-cult. It is true that the spirits of their ancestors are supposed to continue in a sentient existence; they are consulted, but they are not worshiped. Thus, a man will often turn aside, when in company with other men, to say a few words to the spirit of his departed mother, or to ask her advice on the matter in hand. These spirits are called the "friendly ones;" they need not be worshiped; their good-will is already enlisted on account of their natural regard for their mortal relatives. Some of the most cruel customs of Africa result from this conception. Lest the spirit of the husband suffer from solitude, the wives of a deceased man are killed at the time of his funeral. In order that a powerful chieftain may have the proper service and be able to support his dignity in the other world, scores of slaves are beheaded in order to form his spirit retinue. Often the successor of a dead chieftain will send news to him by



a slave, to whom the message is given, and who, after being treated to liberal drafts of palm-wine, is then dispatched as messenger to the other world in the most blissful of moods.

In view of the barbarous customs which continue to exist among the negro population, many investigators have entirely denied the capacity of the negro to advance in the scale of civilization. The physical reason assigned for this inability is the fact that the cranial sutures of the negro close at a very early age. Negro children, it is admitted, are exceedingly bright and quick to learn; remarkable instances of precocious intelligence among them are frequently observed. Thus, the young son of Behanzin, the exiled king of Dahomey, carried off all the honors at the Parisian *lycée* to which he had been sent from Martinique. But after the age of puberty development soon ceases, the expectations raised by the earlier achievements are disappointed, and no further intellectual progress is to be looked for. It is true, many investigators claim that the negro continues his mental growth in adult life, although the sutures of his brain have closed; but the proofs given in support of this favorable view relate rather to increased cunning and craftiness in trade than to the growth of the general intellectual capacities; no one would deny that negroes accumulate experience in later life, but organic development of the faculties seems to cease at an early stage. Even if we accept this unfavorable view, however, it does not necessarily follow that the negro race is permanently uncivilizable. When we look at the low stage of civilization among the African negroes, we can hardly avoid the conclusion that it is due rather to social, political, and climatic conditions than to the physiological, personal incapacity of the negro. The difference between the average negro and the average European does not explain, nor is it at all commensurate to, the difference between their respective civilizations. The social conditions that have kept the negro from acquiring a higher organization lie in the fact of the constant shifting of the African populations, which are not held in place by the physical conformation of territory such as that of Greece and Italy. The African societies were thus not given time to strike roots and to acquire a national tradition and history—the

memory of races—which is one of the chief ingredients of civilization.

We have already seen how utterly all social or national self-consciousness is lacking in the negroes, and how localized their interests are. It is a noteworthy fact, in this connection, that as the negroes have no experience of social or political unity, so their languages can express very few general conceptions. In conversing with negroes, Europeans constantly note that the mind of the individual seems far stronger and more apt than the language which he must use to express his thoughts. Can we not here surmise a subtle connection between the realization of true social and national unity and the existence in the psychology of a race of those general conceptions upon which all higher intellectual civilization is founded? No more striking proof could be found of the truth that we are what we are through society, than the fact that the negro race, powerful in physique, strong and normal in intellect, has not achieved a higher social and intellectual civilization. Should favorable conditions for the existence and development of permanent societies in Africa be brought about, it then would admit of little doubt that the negro race would develop in civilization—a civilization proper to it, rather than an imitation of the European type. In view of the fact that the physiological characteristics of the white race have been profoundly modified in the course of its development, it may not seem altogether extravagant to say that even the cranial structure of the negro race may be affected by a change in its social, political, and economic conditions; or, if we should decide that cranial structure lacks all demonstrable importance in this matter, it might at least be asserted that, if certain conditions inimical to intellectual development after puberty are removed, the negro race may, notwithstanding its unpromising characteristics, develop in civilization. Now, perhaps the circumstance most unfavorable to progress is the powerful strain of sensuality in negro nature, which swallows up all the best energies after puberty has been reached. The deadly climate of parts of Africa, and the horrid conditions of internecine warfare and cannibalism, have heretofore rendered a high birth-rate necessary. With more peaceful

and settled conditions, a gradual moderation of the powerful sexual impulses could reasonably be expected, and we might then hope for the growth of intellectual capacity even after the age of maturity.

In the past the negro race has shown no tendency toward higher development, except under the tutelage of other races; and, among the alien civilizations that have exerted a profound influence upon the African race, that of the Moslem Hamites and Arabs is the most important. Penetrating into Africa from the north by way of the Sahara, the cavalry hordes of the Hamites of north Africa succeeded in forming reasonably permanent states throughout the northern Sudan, and in influencing the native negro societies both physiologically and intellectually. The great principalities founded by the Fulbe in the Niger country, and by the Tuaregs in the region about Timbuctoo, are the most striking examples of this activity. The states thus founded belong to the feudal type; the agricultural negroes form the subject peasant class; while the Moslem invaders constitute a nobility of armed cavaliers. It admits of no doubt that the civilization of Africa has been improved by this conquest. The conquering tribes brought with them a written literature, and many industrial and domestic arts, which they imparted to the conquered races. Of course, this form of conquest was possible only in the regions where cavalry could penetrate; the dense primeval forests of Africa, where the tsetse fly renders the raising and keeping of horses impossible, set limits to the out-and-out conquest by Berber and Arab tribes.

This great forest region, however, the Arabs entered from the north and east as traders, and in so doing they gave an entirely new and sinister meaning to African slavery. As beasts of burden cannot survive in these parts of Africa, the traders needed human carriers to convey their freight. Starting from some commercial town on the upper Nile, they would purchase a sufficient number of slaves to carry their wares into the interior. But the goods transported back, the rubber and ivory, necessitated a much larger number of carriers, so that a great demand for slaves arose wherever the traders penetrated. The chieftains of



the interior were naturally anxious to obtain the goods which added to the not very extreme luxury of their existence. They gave up their slaves in payment, and reimbursed themselves by making slave-raids into neighboring territories. The mutual hostility of the African populations was thus increased a hundred fold. Negroes themselves, converted to Islam, or negro and Arab half-breeds, often became the most cruel slave-hunters. One of the most notorious of these—Tippu Tib—had an escort of ten thousand armed slaves when he made his raids in the neighborhood of Nyangwe on the upper Congo. Whole countries were in this way depopulated, among them the fertile and prosperous region of the upper Congo, whose entire population was driven from its villages, murdered, or carried off into slavery. The entire Makololo tribe, which Stanley had visited, was in this way annihilated, with the exception of the women and children, who were carried to the slave-markets. The cruelty of this traffic and the suffering inflicted upon the captives pass description and comprehension. It is therefore clear that the Moslems acted as a civilizing influence only in the countries where they settled down permanently, and that they brought only woe and destruction to the regions invaded by their slave-trade.

The religion of Islam has been adopted by most of the negro tribes that are subject to Mohammedan rule. But the conversions are usually superficial; a few ceremonious observances are adopted, but for the rest the old customs and practices of fetish continue. Many observers believe that Islam is destined to conquer all of tropical Africa, and that Christianity will not there make any progress. It seems, however, that in the forest region, where the negro race exists in its original form, the rule of fetish is not as yet seriously threatened by either of the two great Aryan religions. Christianity has one advantage over Islam: it can use images to typify noble qualities and characteristics, and thus can make its teachings more comprehensible to the mind of the African, who is not trained to deal with abstract ideas. This Islam cannot do because of its iconomachy; on the other hand, the latter cult has a great advantage in the fact that it demands only a few concrete observances of prayer and fasting, whereas

the code of morals of the Christian religion is so loftily ideal, and is, moreover, so frequently disregarded by most of the whites themselves, that the negroes, in their matter-of-fact way of judging actions and men, lose confidence in Christianity, and fail to understand its true greatness and strength. The idea of a personal, sympathizing divinity has a great attractiveness to the negro mind, haunted as it is by terrible fears of a hostile spirit-world; but the converted negroes are inclined to make very definite demands upon the benevolence of God. Converted to either religion in form, they usually remain fetishists in substance; and when, on an evil day, a prayer for help is not answered, strong doubts spring up, and the negro convert decides that, after all, he had better conciliate the cruel spirits who would make a plaything of him, than trust to help from the great divinity, mighty, but far off, and perhaps, after all, indifferent to his fate. Great social transformations will have to take place in Africa before either Islam or Christianity can truly become the religion of the central African populations.

Having already briefly touched upon the influence of European civilization in Africa, it still remains for us to investigate more closely the momentous problems summoned up by the meeting of white and black races in the Dark Continent. The basis of European intervention in Africa was from the first the clear and well-defined interest of commerce—both the need of *dépôts* of trade close to the great reservoirs of the natural wealth of Africa, and the fact that the native tribes of the coast levied excessive transit dues upon the commerce of Europeans and of natives. As this has been the primary cause of European interference, so the methods employed in African administration must have in view first of all the creation of a sound economic basis for African life. A civilizing policy must begin at this point. The African negro cannot be civilized by the destruction of his native institutions or by pouring into his mind the sum of European education. The entire economic basis of negro society must first be changed. With the social growth consequent upon this development the individual, too, will become more highly civilized, and the gravest abuses that now bind the negro race will be overcome.

With almost mathematical precision it can be demonstrated that the reform of the most vicious characteristics of African life will be the certain consequence of a few simple changes in economic organization; and we may, indeed, anticipate an unfolding of new and better social energies, when the ground has thus been cleared of the worst impediments to progress.

As the African natives are specially deficient on the side of the mechanical arts, the development of industrial education is of great importance. The African missions, especially those of the English Protestant church, have been much criticised for their methods of education. Thus, Archdeacon Farler, in his report on eastern Africa, says that the instruction given by these missions is too scholastic; other travelers and explorers are most severe in their judgment of the characteristics and behavior of the "missionary-made man." Dressed in European frock-coat and top-hat, and displaying with pride a smattering of English education, the "civilized" natives love to swagger about in the coast towns, despising manual work and the customs of their race. They have stripped off the restraints of their native religion and are far from having adopted the morals of Christianity. In order to avoid the continuance of conditions like these, the missions are being urged to educate the natives to an appreciation of the dignity of labor in the handicrafts, to instruct them in their native language, and to encourage the maintenance of all local customs that are not barbarous. Some of the missions have already achieved much in industrial education and in the manual training of natives. State industrial schools are also being established, both in the French, the German, and the British colonies. By nature, the African negro is averse to labor, which he thinks ought to be performed by women and slaves. He is only too ready to apply to himself the English definition of "gentleman." To many colonial publicists the gradual methods of education appear too slow and uncertain in their results; in order to develop the great natural resources of Africa and to teach the mass of the natives proper industrial methods, they believe that some system of forced labor will have to be introduced; and withal the agitation for the abolition of the native system of slavery in



Africa continues. All these considerations render the labor question in Africa exceedingly intricate and difficult.

In all discussions of African slavery it is very important to distinguish between the slave-trade and domestic serfdom. We have already described the suffering and desolation wrought in large parts of Africa by slave-raids and transportation. Through the efforts of a number of humanitarian spirits, like Cardinal Lavig erie, the public opinion of Europe has been directed toward the extirpation of the slave-trade, and by international agreement the traffic is now forbidden throughout the European dominions in Africa. It has not, however, been possible as yet entirely to suppress it; in fact, such a radical cure could be hoped for only after a total revolution in the methods of African trade has been accomplished. Today the slave-trade is carried on covertly, under the name of "contract labor," even by Europeans in their own colonies, especially in the Congo Free State and in the Portuguese possessions.

When we consider the real nature of the African slave-trade, we shall see how completely its existence is conditioned by the general character of African economic life. As slaves are the only beasts of burden that can be used in the interior, so they are also the most universal and satisfactory currency. At present, when the slave-trade cannot be openly carried on in the coast towns, the trader will start with a consignment of powder and guns, which are comparatively easy to transport. When he reaches the confines of the slave-holding regions, he will begin to purchase slaves, whom he carries with him on his journey, and uses partly to pay for the ivory and rubber which he buys, partly to convey these purchased goods back to the trading-stations. An example of the status of African currency is given by Miss Kingsley, when she describes the fine paid by a local chieftain to a British commissioner for having killed and eaten several converts. It consisted of one hundred balls of rubber, six ivory teeth, four bundles of fiber, three cheeses, a canoe, two china basins, and five "ladies in rather bad repair." The commissioner, being a newcomer, was much astonished, especially at the last item, but Miss Kingsley assured him that they were perfectly "correct" and could be

traded off for ivory. This combination of servant, carrier, and currency makes the slave almost indispensable as long as no railways, roads, and metal money exist. In the remoter regions of Africa this abuse will therefore continue to thrive in some more or less veiled form until the industrial conditions of the country have been changed radically. One result of the long-continued slave-trade is that the population of Africa is far below the natural limit, and large districts of fertile land are almost entirely deserted; an opportunity is thus afforded for bringing in large bodies of alien settlers, from India or other regions, without any displacement of native tribes.

When we turn to consider domestic slavery among the Arabs and negroes in Africa, we encounter far fewer abuses. The African slave is not looked down upon, nor is the door of hope forever closed to him. Slaves who have survived the sufferings of transport, when exhibited in the market-places of such towns as Kano in Nigeria, were often apparently in the happiest of moods. Being an object now of considerable value, they were cared for more properly and groomed up so as to present the best appearance to intending purchasers. The slave women know that they may, through gaining the favor of their masters, become powerful and even be the mothers of kings. The male slaves also may rise to importance and wealth, if luck favors them; of course, there is still a good deal of suffering in domestic slavery, and the separation from home and dear ones is most cruel; but it does not mean absolute and abject degradation forever, and often it even opens the door to new opportunities and to a welcome change of experiences.

The slave-trade is throughout European colonies and dependencies made a criminal offense; a man so influential as the cousin of the sultan of Zanzibar was imprisoned for six months and lost all his slaves, by sentence of his sovereign relative, for being mixed up with the slave-trade. Domestic slavery, however, cannot be dealt with so harshly. The experience in Zanzibar and Pemba in this respect is most instructive. By the decree of the sultan of Zanzibar, any slave in the protectorate may demand his freedom by simply applying to the so-called "Court of Slavery."

Comparatively few, however, make use of this opportunity; thus, in the year 1899, the total number was only 3,757. As a matter of fact the slaves in Zanzibar have little to gain by seeking emancipation. They are usually bound to work for only three days on the lands of their masters; in return for this they receive a house and a land-allotment. The word *mtumwa*, unlike our "slave," carries no stigma, and is simply a class designation. In fact, the relation is generally a mild kind of serfdom. The slaves often say: "Why should we seek freedom? We have a good home, plenty of food, and no hard work. Our master is kind, and we are fond of the children. What should we gain by being freed?" The serfs live in small communities around the master's house, where they enjoy fellowship and protection; emancipation, therefore, means a loss of caste and home to them. When freed, they find life dull and monotonous, and have to work too hard for a living. They often come before the court, asking to be returned to slavery, and are deeply disappointed because this cannot be done. Among those who are liberated, a large number become vagrants and a public charge. For a time it was attempted to enforce Article VI of the sultan's decree, which provides that "any person who applies for emancipation shall show that he will have a regular domicile and means of subsistence." The usual method of showing this was by bringing in a labor contractor who was ready to hire the emancipated slave and give him shelter. While the two senior missions approved of this method as preventing vagrancy, the junior mission, less experienced in African affairs, objected on the ground that it was merely a way of transferring the slave from one master to another, and its view was adopted in England. Article VI is therefore no longer enforced, and vagrancy has again increased. This example is a typical one, and shows that domestic slavery does not press very heavily upon the serfs, and that those who seek freedom generally become a public charge.

The true and complete abolition of slavery can come only with a structural change in African economic life, and can only gradually be brought about. The economic ruin of the large Arab plantations on the east coast, which is already beginning, as a



result of the changed economic conditions, will throw a larger population into the towns, and will lead to a parceling-out of the estates among peasant holders. Among the negroes in central and west Africa the increased opportunity of the slaves for gaining wealth is also tending to break down the system.

With the gradual disappearance of slavery, the question arises what system of labor organization is to take its place. The importation of contract labor from China and India is far too costly in most parts of Africa to become a general system. In western Africa it is made well-nigh impossible on account of the unfavorable climatic conditions. When it was attempted to use coolie labor in the French Congo, the mortality among the laborers ran as high as 70 per cent. In east Africa alone has Hindu contract labor been used successfully. Another method of gaining an adequate labor supply is to sanction labor contracts with the natives, or force them to work by imposing heavy taxes upon them. The high hut-taxes of southern Africa are levied for this purpose, as the only way in which the native can get the currency for paying his taxes is by working for white men in the mines or on the farms. In more direct fashion, the Glen Grey Act levies a tax of ten shillings upon every native who has not worked outside of his district for three months in the year. The extension of this peculiar use of fiscal methods to central and west Africa is often advocated, and a moderate hut-tax has already been introduced in many colonies on the west coast; but, as the conditions in these regions are so utterly different from those which prevail in white man's Africa, the initiation of methods which do not pass without challenge even in the Rhodesian sphere would certainly be unwise, and would probably invite disastrous consequences.

While it is true that the natives of the tropical regions of Africa are at present not much inclined to labor, there are still certain tribes, like the Krumen and the Hausas, and the agricultural populations under Mohammedan rule, that prove the capacity of the African for toil under proper economic conditions. Before all, there is one prominent fact which must not be overlooked in this matter: with the establishment of peace throughout Africa, with the stoppage of the murderous slave-raids and of

cannibalism, with the introduction of sanitary measures, such as vaccination, the population of Africa, which has a great natural fecundity, will rise rapidly toward the limits of subsistence. While the natives are now surrounded with an abundance of natural fruits, methods of intensive agriculture and of careful industrial work will soon become necessary in order to support the growing population. Thus far the African has made his life possible by killing his neighbor; this resource being cut off, the only alternative will be to work. No legislation, no contract-labor system, will be necessary to induce the natives to work more steadily. Moreover, it should not be believed that they are without economic wants. As a matter of fact, they already require large amounts of European manufactured goods, and their demands are constantly expanding; a corroding climate and careless habits make them far more frequent purchasers of textiles than are the thrifty Chinese. A policy that would attempt unduly to accelerate the operation of these natural causes, and would not shrink from breaking down native societies and employing force, in order to gain a quick supply of labor for the exploitation of African natural wealth, must be qualified as distinctly opposed to the purposes of civilizing activity in Africa. The general enslavement of the negro race does not offer a proper solution of the problems of African development.

It will be seen that, throughout, the foundation of a civilizing policy in Africa must be an economic one. The prevention of wasteful exploitation, and construction of roads and railways, the introduction of a metallic currency, will do away with the most inhuman abuses in African life. It will change the constitution of African society so as to prevent the exploitation of the dependent classes, while the establishment of universal peace will turn the energies of the people toward economic development. The negro population in Africa has thus far lived in the presence of overwhelming natural phenomena, and in a constant state of fluidity which has allowed but very little of settled civilization and of national self-consciousness to grow up. The negroes have, however, developed a strong sense of individual justice, and it is justice that they require, rather than the rarer gifts of benevolence

and the blessings of civilization. Now, if justice has any definite meaning, it implies respect for the sphere of an individual existence. We certainly cannot be just to the African if we demolish all his native institutions, simply because we will not take the trouble to understand them. No cruelty of war, no suffering, will be resented by the African so much as an attack upon his private property; and unless the system of concessions to European companies is to prove a curse to Africa, it must respect scrupulously the native property rights. The European must also have a care not to break up further such tribal and social unity as exists among the African populations. The basest forms of social life exist among the jetsam and flotsam of tribal populations along the African coast and in south Africa, where the original unity has been dissolved by European interference. It is here that the missions have their greatest work to do, by creating a new social unity and morality for those which have been so recklessly destroyed.

We have seen that European interference may succeed in creating a new economic basis for African life. Whether it can do more, whether it can deeply and permanently influence African life in the direction of specifically European civilization in its intellectual and moral aspects, is more doubtful. The most potent civilizing agency at all times has been example, and in this respect the relations of the white to the negro race have been particularly unfortunate. The white men who have come to Africa have either been colonial officials, impatiently waiting for their next leave of absence, with little insight into the true needs of native society; or traders whose sole purpose was to get the wealth of the natives rapidly and for the cheapest possible return. The missionaries, men often of single-hearted devotion, have been too few to act as a leavening force upon the entire mass of the African negroes. Moreover, many of them have found it difficult to put their message into the form of greatest helpfulness to the African. Their example, too, holds up the ideal of an intellectual and spiritual life, rather than that of mechanical and industrial efficiency which the Africans so much need. In these respects the Islamic races have the advantage. They come in contact with the Africans in large numbers, as merchants, industrials, and



rulers; and it is not unlikely that they will continue to exert a far greater personal influence upon the African race than will the Europeans. This is true also of the Hindus, who are settling in large numbers along the east coast. The French seem of all European nations to be most successful in charming the African natives into civilization. Their missionaries work in large communities, and are thus assisted by the experience of many societies operating for a long time. Moreover, the French do not exhibit an excessive sense of race-superiority over the negroes. They have therefore already exercised a distinctive civilizing influence in northern Africa. The classical example of a relation of mutual friendliness between the white race and the black is the life of the unhappy island of Martinique—unhappy not only on account of cruel natural catastrophes, but on account of the terrible force of atavism which, with the gradual departure of the white population, is dragging the charming race of the island back toward the dark superstitions of African life. It is remarkable that in countries like Martinique, Hayti, and the southern states of the Union, the vices of the negro populations assume more repulsive aspects than they bear in the African home. This is due no doubt to the fact that the original social unity has in these cases been destroyed. An African society, although it may have barbarous customs, still has a certain moral character which preserves individual morality and dignity of life. This social check is very much impaired, and often totally absent, among the American negroes.

The two things which the negro race needs most are a feeling of social cohesion and responsibility, and the presence of true models in the person of leaders. The mass of the negroes cannot pattern primarily upon the whites with whom they come in contact, but should have leaders of their own race to look up to. It is only by showing consideration to negroes of high character and intelligence that the whites can assist in setting up the best models for social imitation among the negro race. No more statesman-like and far-seeing principle, both for Africa and for America, can be imagined in this matter than that of President Roosevelt, when he says that "the door of hope must not be closed upon the negro race." This does not mean, even in its most distant impli-

cation, political power over the whites, nor does it demand general social equality; it simply means that the men who are natural leaders among the negroes, on account of high qualities of mind and soul, shall not be degraded by being excluded from all chance of preferment on account of their color, and that no better service can be done the negro race than a generous recognition of the worth of its best men. Applied to Africa, it means that any policy which would treat the native negro race as destined to permanent bondage in favor of the whites, that would destroy African social life and degrade its leaders, is taking the straight road away from the salvation of the African race, and from rendering it a truly useful member of the family of nations.

## SOCIAL SOLIDARITY IN FRANCE \*

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After prolonged discussion both in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate, the national legislature of France has practically approved a measure which commits the people to a principle of far-reaching consequences. While the final action has not yet been taken, there is general agreement that the two chambers will adopt a law at the opening of the next session which will embody the conclusions already reached by separate votes. The student of administrative law, or of social psychology, or of public finance, or of public assistance, will find in the bills and the discussion instructive illustrations of his special studies.<sup>1</sup>

1. *The principle of national obligation* is formulated in the bills now before the French legislature in the phrase "social solidarity." The opponents of the bill do not like to give up the word "charity." There may be some hairsplitting in the dialectic of debate, but the essential issue is the question whether the nation will adopt an efficacious measure to meet adequately and earnestly a moral obligation which all parties admit. The conservatives

\* The minister of the interior, in August, 1905, issued a circular addressed to the prefects, giving them an analysis of the essential changes which will be made by the new law of July 14, 1905. Since many preliminary arrangements must be made, this law will not go into effect until January 1, 1907. The points to which he calls attention are fully stated in the text of the article. One statement found in the circular illustrates the tactful skill required in making the law acceptable to the rural communes, where distrust is most liable to be awakened. The law lays the heavier part of the burden on the state at large when the commune is poor. Thus, if the pension accorded is 100 francs, in a poor commune belonging to a department with limited resources, the ratios would be: payment by the state, Fr. 85.50; the department, Fr. 4.50; and the commune, Fr. 10.

<sup>1</sup> Official sources for this study are found in: "Rapport fait au nom de la commission d'assurance et de prévoyance sociales," etc., by M. Bienvenu Martin, member of the Chamber of Deputies, Annexe au Procès-verbal de la séance du 4 avril 1903, No. 889; "Rapport fait," etc., by M. Paul Strauss, Senator, Annexe au Procès-verbal de la séance du 23 février 1904, No. 43; discussions in the Senate, June and July, 1905, *Journal officiel*.



assert that relief of all indigent persons is a duty of all the strong; but they are not ready to modify the method on which reliance has been placed for centuries, the method of voluntary charity, nor to recognize in the government the proper organ for performing the duty. In the minds of many of the conservatives still under church influence, the very word "charity" is almost sacramental; it has for them a supernatural significance; it is above common humanity; and they are in revolt against the phrase "social solidarity." Perhaps those with a strong clerical or ecclesiastical bias instinctively feel that a certain kind of social power, surely an important social function, is slipping away from them; for charity in the ancient régime was administered chiefly by the church, while the obvious tendency now is to increase the activity of the commune, the department, and the state in all this field. These feelings, which are entirely natural in a people whose history and traditions are those of France, have injected an element of pathos, of regret, and of bitterness into the debate. The controversy over the separation of church and state is going on in the Chamber of Deputies, while the Senate is considering the extension of obligatory relief. To the conservative theological sentiment is joined the economic and political prejudice against the enlargement of the functions of the local and general governments.

The advocates of the new measure do not think it necessary to base action on individual motives and sentiments. "Charity" as a religious motive and benevolent disposition is beautiful and worthy when it is sincere, but it is intangible, impossible to verify by objective signs, and cannot be made the foundation of the action of a democratic people. They think that many of the works which are done in the name of this "supernatural grace" are often the result of mixed motives, in which pride, ambition, selfish hope and fear may make large contributions. The English and American student of private charity will add with regret that the vice of gambling is sanctioned by private charities, and that much money is raised by lotteries, which are legally authorized, and which are favored by some of the best people in the nation.

It is less pretentious and more practical to act upon the prin-

ciple of "solidarity," which includes enlightened self-interest, national duty, and the sentiment of charity. Individual motives are left to the conscience of citizens and to expert psychologists.

In 1902 the "Commission d'assurance et de prévoyance sociales," appointed by the Chamber of Deputies, formulated the principle in these resolutions:

The commission believes that it is the duty of the republic to establish a public service of social solidarity; that social solidarity differs essentially from charity in the fact that it recognizes the right of persons designated by the law and gives them a legal means of enforcing their right; that the principle of social solidarity inspires and commands two distinct forms of realization, insurance and assistance. In so far as insurance is concerned, its purpose is to furnish for all the members of the nation the means of assuring, by their own personal efforts, a pension for old age and incapacity for labor. In relation to assistance: in view of the duty of the nation to aid an old person or invalid who from any cause is deprived of resources, and believing it to be a necessary deduction from the premises that all the members of the nation are bound to share the burden of social solidarity, it is resolved to create, upon these principles, a service of social solidarity, and to take for the basis of study the two reports of MM. Guieysse and Bienvenu-Martin, and their propositions for a law.<sup>2</sup>

2. *History.*—The principle of solidarity is not a recent discovery. Even in mediæval times church and state co-operated in measures of relief, though the church generally acted as almoner of charity, and the intervention of the government was for a long time chiefly repressive and primitive. At the Revolution the national obligation to the poor was distinctly recognized and embodied in legislation, although the measures adopted were not fitted to the conditions, and came to grief in the reactionary movement which has not yet spent its force. The law of March 19, 1793, declared in its preamble that relief of the poor is a national

<sup>2</sup>When Senator Strauss was challenged (June 8, 1905) for favoring the expression "solidarity" rather than "charity," he replied: "Whether you call beneficence by the name of charity or solidarity, and whatever be the motive followed by each individual, we agree in striving for the same end. But when I speak of private charity, it is almsgiving that I have in view; I do not bring into question the charitable spirit which is one of the manifestations of fraternity and of solidarity. We are establishing here something more and better than a charity which is voluntary, capricious, and intermittent, . . . something better than a charity which is inadequate and humiliating."

debt. Early in the nineteenth century the principle of obligatory relief of dependent children found expression in the law which gave to foundlings the protection of government.<sup>3</sup> More recent legislation has developed and applied the principle in various laws and decrees relating to dependent and neglected children.<sup>4</sup>

In 1838 the support of insane indigents was made legally obligatory in the course of administration; but this may have been brought about by the exigencies of public protection.

The creation of the Superior Council of Public Relief in 1889 marked a new stage of development in poor-relief legislation. A body of competent persons in a position of influence, charged with the duty of studying the problem, has constantly pressed upon Parliament the necessity of improvement in the treatment of the helpless citizen.

Gratuitous medical relief was provided by the law of 1893.<sup>5</sup> When it was discovered by the competent that private charity was unable or unwilling to provide for the dependent sick of the nation, and when the legislation finally decreed the organization of a system which should guarantee every French citizen necessary relief in the hour when sickness renders him incapable of labor, the principle of national obligation was formally and distinctly expressed in a statute. More than a decade of experience with the administration of this law has furnished arguments and instruction for the new measures. Since 1893 no such important proposition directly affecting the people at poverty line has been brought before the law-making bodies. Theories of the functions

<sup>3</sup> "Loi du 15 pluviôse au XIII (4 février 1805) relative à la tutelle des enfants admis dans les hospices;" "Décret du 19 janvier 1811 concernant les enfants trouvés ou abandonnés et les orphelins pauvres."

<sup>4</sup> "Loi du 5 mai 1869 sur les dépenses du service des enfants assistés;" "Loi du 23 décembre 1874 (loi Roussel) sur la protection des enfants du premier âge;" "Loi du 24 juillet 1889 sur la protection des enfants maltraités ou moralement abandonnés;" "Loi du 19 avril 1898 pour la répression des violences, voies de fait, actes de cruauté et attentats commis envers les enfants;" "Loi du 27 juin 1904 sur le service des enfants assistés;" "Loi de finances du 22 avril 1905." The texts of these laws are published by M. G. Rondel, for the Société internationale pour l'étude des questions d'assistance, in *Législation française en vigueur sur l'assistance et la bienfaisance* (Paris, 16 rue de Miromesnil).

<sup>5</sup> "Loi du 15 juillet 1893 instituant l'assistance médicale obligatoire."



of government, of political economy, of the relation of public to private assistance, and of administrative law are involved, and the debate is a battle of opposing tendencies and schools of thought. The objections to public poor-relief familiar to Malthus and Chalmers were urged to prevent the passage of the law of 1893, and they are repeated in 1905; but in vain. Both friends and foes of this particular bill agree that its success will lead to further extension of state action, and that some form of compulsory workingmen's insurance will logically follow. Probably many conservatives would be willing to accept this measure for relief of the poor, if they did not fear that similar laws will push in while the door stands ajar. The time to call a halt was in 1893; for the obligation to afford medical relief necessarily involved some degree of aid for the aged, the incurable, and the infirm. It has been found in practice simply impossible to distinguish dependent persons of these categories. Old age is liable to disease, and to diseases which place the person in a condition where he is unable to work for his own support. The Superior Council of Public Assistance stated the result of experience in this language: "Public assistance is due to those who, temporarily or permanently, find themselves in a situation where they cannot provide for themselves the necessities of life." The International Congress of Public and Private Assistance in 1889 passed a resolution to the same effect.

Since 1893 some tentative steps have been taken to provide for the aged who are indigent.<sup>6</sup> In the law of March 27, 1897, the state bound itself to give subsidies wherever the communes and departments voluntarily took the initiative in providing pensions for the indigent aged and infirm. This law was not altogether a failure. In 1897 the number of departments which acted on the law was fourteen; in 1901 this number had increased to fifty-two. The subsidy contributed by the state rose from 13,041 francs in 1897 to 273,181.47 francs in 1902. This shows a certain degree of progress, and the opponents of obligatory

<sup>6</sup> "Articles des lois de finances de 1897 et 1902 sur la participation de l'Etat aux pensions constituées en faveur des vieillards, des infirmes et des incurables pauvres."

relief took the ground that this optional law should remain. M. Guyot, senator of the Rhone, brought in a counter-bill in which this idea was embodied. But the advocates of obligatory, compulsory assistance declare that the optional laws are inadequate. They refer to the fact that during the experimental period, when gratuitous medical relief was optional with local administrations, its action was irregular, unequal, and uncertain. There were some departments which introduced it with vigor and afterward refused to continue free medical relief, and within departments there were communes which refused to co-operate.

Nothing short of a uniform and compulsory law, under which the central administration is actually required to exercise initiative and control, will prove adequate. Many local bodies are reluctant to introduce a new tax unless constrained by supreme authority. Other municipalities would be quite willing to accept the new burden, but they refuse to pay the debts of their neighbors; they are aware that, unless there is a universal law requiring uniform relief in all communes, the liberal communes would attract to themselves the infirm, incurable, and aged from surrounding places where the burden is declined. As poor persons feel age and infirmity coming on, they would move into places where pensions are assured, and gain a legal settlement in time to avail themselves of the bounty. The inadequacy of the optional method was argued by M. Henri Monod, a man of high authority :

If relief of the aged and infirm exists in an optional form and has some degree of efficacy in the large cities, it is almost nothing in the rural communities. In the presence of extreme cases the only means left to the administrators of relief to spare these unfortunates the tortures of hunger and cold is to class them with vagabonds and mendicants and place them in a *dépôt de mendicité*.

The authority of M. Sabrau, president of the general council of the asylums of Lyons, is invoked as a witness of the insufficiency of optional legislation. Commenting on the results of an investigation made by the minister of the interior in 1898, he said :

The impression produced by this investigation is that the relief of aged and incurable indigents is imperfect, and that the *conseils généraux* would favor a complete system. We sum up this part of our report by saying: Under our laws relief of the aged and incurable is purely optional; it is prac-

tically confined to cities of the larger size; it is often administered in a way to injure the patients of certain hospitals; it is almost always administered to the disadvantage of the *dépôts de mendicité*; in all circumstances it is insufficient, and we should be in a position much more miserable if private charity did not support a great number of aged people.

The effects of the optional law on hospitals are very grave. It is claimed that many old, infirm, and incurable persons are retained in hospitals designed for the treatment of curable maladies — persons who could be more economically supported in their homes, or boarded in families and asylums; while many persons suffering from acute disease are denied the help of hospitals because the wards are already crowded with the feeble and incurable. The law of 1893 (gratuitous medical relief) does not provide for chronic cases; but the local authorities, when they see that an invalid has no sheltering asylum, will retain him in the hospital in spite of the law, rather than turn him out to perish. But this act of humanity deprives many curable cases of the relief which the law intends to give them. In the hospitals for the insane, also, many senile demented are kept who should be placed in colonies or asylums, or boarded out. The *dépôts de mendicité* were designed for places of correction, but they have often become mere asylums for the decrepit. Even prisons and houses of correction are crowded with the helpless and incurable for whom the law provides no means of support.

The present incomplete system involves much financial waste. In the case of hospitals the need of central control and direction is obvious. Under optional relief, with local initiative, there were, in 1886, 39,248 beds in hospitals, of which 15,709 were not used; and in hospices (asylums) 10,772 beds out of 67,964 were unoccupied. In 1892, a census taken in summer showed that out of a total of 165,694 beds, only 125,534 were occupied on June 30, or 75.76 per cent. On February 28, 1901, a census showed that out of a total of 183,883 beds, 144,743 (78.81 per cent.) were occupied. The figures indicate that after medical relief was made obligatory, national in scope, and placed under central control, the resources were more fully and economically used.

The extent of private relief of the aged and infirm is shown



by the fact that 93,438 persons were cared for in asylums, of whom 40,000 were old or incurable. In these institutions 30,000 were under ecclesiastical and 7,000 under laic care.

3. *The essential factors in the new law.*—An analysis of the Senate bill, as compared with the bill previously adopted by an almost unanimous vote of the Chamber of Deputies, will give concrete expression of the principle of social solidarity as now accepted by French public opinion. The two bills are almost identical in language, and they are in entire agreement in matters of principle, although there are minor variations in details, and various amendments will be required before agreement has been reached.

There are six titles: the organization of assistance, admission to relief, modes of relief, ways and means, jurisdiction, and miscellaneous provisions.

#### TITLE I. ORGANIZATION OF ASSISTANCE

The vital principle of social legislation is expressed in the first article: "Every Frenchman who is deprived of resources, is of the age of seventy years, is afflicted and sick of an incurable disease, and is thus unable to provide for his own wants by labor, is to receive, under the conditions here recited, the relief provided by the present law." This solemn declaration of the law-making representatives of the nation assures to every citizen, when he is indigent and helpless, the friendly aid of the whole people. The law explicitly requires that no citizen shall be left to the chance of being discovered and aided by some charitable agency. Caprice is excluded, and the local authorities are legally required to act so as to make relief certain.<sup>7</sup> An alien is to be guaranteed the same relief as a citizen, if, by treaty or other legal arrangement, the government to which the alien belongs has bound itself to treat indigent Frenchmen within its territory in the same way.

<sup>7</sup> One difference in phrase is significant. The Chamber of Deputies had said: "Tout Français . . . a droit . . . au service de solidarité sociale institué sous forme d'assistance obligatoire par la présente loi." The Senate document says: "Tout Français . . . reçoit . . . l'assistance institué par la présente loi." The idea of the legal right to relief and the rather vague phrase "solidarity" are avoided in the Senate bill.

*The civil organization which is required to administer relief is the commune.*—If the person has no legal settlement (*domicile de secours*) in the commune where he is found dependent, then his department is responsible. If he has no legal settlement in any commune or department, then the state is to give relief. If he is residing away from his own commune, he must be relieved where he happens to be, and the cost is recovered from the administration legally liable. The time required for the acquisition of a new settlement is made five years; and after his sixty-fifth year a citizen cannot lose his former settlement nor acquire a new one. When children, infirm or incurable, reach their majority, they retain the settlement of the department to whose service they have belonged, until they acquire a new settlement. The commune, department, or state which gives relief to an aged, infirm, or incurable dependent who has no settlement when he is aided, has right to be reimbursed for the sums advanced, within a limit of five years. Relatives who have means may be required to pay for relief advanced.<sup>8</sup> This recourse is limited to five years.

The *conseil général* in each department is required to organize the service of relief provided for in the law. If the *conseil général* refuses or neglects to perform this duty, then a decree in the form of public administration provides an organization. The central government is given full power to see that local avarice or inefficiency does not defeat the purpose of the law of the land.

#### TITLE II. ADMISSION TO RELIEF

The basis of procedure is the official list of the aged, infirm, and incurable dependents in the commune. The bureau of assistance, one month before the first ordinary session of the *conseil municipal*, makes a list of all persons entitled to relief under the law; it also proposes the method of relief suitable in each case, and, if this method is to be relief at home, the monthly allowance is to be stated. The list shows whether the person has a legal settlement in the commune or elsewhere. One copy of this list is sent to the municipal council, another copy to the prefect. The list must be revised from time to time, so that improper pensioners

<sup>8</sup> *Code civil*, Arts. 205, 206, 207, 212.

may be removed. The municipal council, deliberating as a committee in secret session, decides on the admission of indigents to relief, and determines whether the person shall be aided at home or in an institution. This is a critical point. Friends of the law insist that the local councils, having a strong interest in economy of taxation, will scrutinize the lists very carefully; and as neighbors they will understand the needs of the poor, especially in rural communities, and the best ways of giving them the right kind and amount of relief.

The list of dependents is deposited in the office of the mayor, and the public is informed by posted notices of the place where it may be examined. This publicity will act as a check on improper applications; it will deter professional mendicants, but it will also make relief painful and humiliating to "the poor who are ashamed." The prefect, being furnished with a copy of the list, is in a position to represent the views of the central authority. Within a period of twenty days rejected applicants can appeal from the decision of the council, and the same right is given to any taxpayer who finds on the list the name of a person who, in his belief, should not receive public relief. The prefect also may file objections. The amounts of the allowances are open to criticism in the same way.

A cantonal commission is provided to consider all these objections, and its president reports the decisions to the prefect and mayor. Within the following twenty days appeal may be made to the minister of the interior, who receives advice from a central commission, but who, under the French system of executive responsibility, is not required to follow the advice. During the litigation the relief is not suspended.

If the municipal council refuses or neglects to act as required by the law, the prefect calls the attention of the cantonal commission to the matter; and if the cantonal commission fails to perform its duty, the minister takes the necessary steps, after hearing the central commission. No part of the administrative machinery is missing; the law is made to be enforced.

It is the prefect who invites the municipal councils to act upon the lists in the communes, the departmental commission to act



upon the cases of those having settlement in the departments, and who sends to the minister the names of those who, having no domicile, are state charges. The departmental commission decides provisionally as to the relief of the aged, infirm, and incurable, although the *conseil général* may reverse their action later. The rejected applicant or the prefect may take an appeal to the minister of the interior. All these provisions for appeal show the tendency, evident in all recent administrative legislation, to enlarge central control.

Relief is to cease when the reasons which prompted it have ceased to have force; and suspension of allowance is declared by the municipal council, the departmental commission, or by the minister, in accordance with principles already recited.

#### TITLE III. MODES OF RELIEF

It is provided that relief may be given in the home or in an asylum. The law does not attempt to fix this matter, but leaves administrators free to employ the method best suited to the individual case. The plan of boarding dependents in families at public cost is admissible under this article. The two bills agree in providing that relief at home shall be in the form of a monthly allowance; the rate to be fixed by the municipal council, with the approval of the general council. The minimum and maximum rates are different in the proposed laws. The Chamber of Deputies placed the minimum at 8 francs and the maximum at 30 francs; in the Senate bill the rates proposed are 5 and 20 francs, save in exceptional circumstances. At this point two considerations enter to complicate the problem of a proper rate: the relation of relief to habits of thrift and the factor of private charity. The discussions and the drafts of law show that the lawmakers are seeking, though thus far by somewhat different devices, to encourage thrift, in the form of savings-bank deposits, societies of mutual benefit, etc.; and also to leave a legitimate field for individual and associated charity wherever it is able and willing to carry a share of the burden. It has already been found in the working of the law of obligatory medical relief that these objects can be fostered.

The Chamber of Deputies voted in favor of payments exclusively in money, while the Senate bill favors the payment of allowances in rent or commodities for consumption in exceptional cases, as drunkenness. The argument of M. Bienvenu-Martin, leader of the discussion in the Chamber of Deputies, in favor of exclusively cash payments, is a significant indication of the spirit of recent legislation and of the tendency to revive expressions used at the period of the Revolution:

The commission rejects in the most formal manner the payment of relief in kind to old people, and this for several reasons, the first of which is that relief in kind too strongly reminds us of "charity." We think this method does not treat with sufficient respect the dignity of the person assisted. We reject it also because it would give rise to great complications and abuses. How can we tell whether the relief in kind is an equivalent in value of the money voted? . . . It is true the *bureaux de bienfaisance* do this, but they have not before them persons who have a right to a definite sum. The grant provided by our law is of quite a different character; it represents a real debt due to the person assisted. The system of grants in money is not novel in public relief. At Paris, the aid given in lieu of indoor relief in hospices is paid in money, not in kind. The temporary aid given to unmarried mothers is of the same order, and you know this works perfectly in all the departments.

The commission of the Senate admits the force of the argument, but urges that payment in kind should be permitted local authorities when all interests can be better served. Local relieving officers, as experience shows, can often give the allowance a higher value in the form of rent, fuel, and food, than the person assisted can do, so that many indigents prefer this method of receiving their allowance. In the case of habitual drunkards it is absolutely necessary to furnish relief in kind, because money would be wasted in drink. It is also urged that gratuitous medical assistance is in kind, and that it does not thereby lose its quality as an expression of "social solidarity."

The law protects the allowance against claims of creditors.

When a commune has insufficient asylum facilities, the municipal council may place the infirm, incurable, or aged in private asylums or with families to board. The general council designates the institutions which may be used for this purpose. The number of beds is fixed by the prefect, on the advice of the adminis-

trative commission, and the price per day is regulated in the same manner, the general council also giving its opinion. All establishments where the assisted persons are kept are subject to the supervision of public inspectors. The minister of the interior designates the place of relief for persons who have no legal settlement. If the person assisted by a community has a settlement elsewhere, the amount forwarded is reimbursed by the place of settlement.

#### TITLE IV. WAYS AND MEANS

The law lays the primary obligation of relief on the commune of residence. The resources of the communes are (1) the income of funds devoted to the purpose of the law; (2) contributions of the *bureau de bienfaisance* and of the hospice; (3) ordinary receipts; (4) subventions of the department and of the state. In certain conditions the department is required to furnish relief.<sup>9</sup> If the ordinary funds are insufficient, a special tax may be authorized, or a subsidy may be paid by the state. The state bears the cost of relief of persons who have no legal settlement, and of general expenses of administration. The *bureaux de bienfaisance*, the hospices, and the hospitals are required to assist with any income from funds intrusted to them for the aged, infirm, or incurable. The communal hospices are required to receive without payment, so far as their resources extend, all aged, infirm, and incurable persons who have legal settlement in the same commune. The intercommunal and cantonal asylums are under a similar obligation. The intention is to utilize all resources so as to make the new burden as light as possible and avoid duplication of agencies and of expences. The state is required to contribute to the expenses of construction or rent of asylums. Plans for building must be approved in advance by the minister of the interior; that is to say, by the corps of experts in the bureau which supervises and directs public assistance.

#### TITLE V. JURISDICTION

Disputes in relation to matters of settlement are considered by the council of the prefecture of the department where the aged, infirm, or incurable person has his residence. In case of dis-

<sup>9</sup> Law of August 10, 1871, Arts. 60, 61.



agreement between the administrative commissions of asylums and the prefects, or between the *bureaux de bienfaisance* or asylums and the municipal councils, the decision is made by the council of the prefecture of the department where the establishment is situated. The decisions of the council of the prefecture are subject to revision by the council of state.

#### TITLE VI. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

In all legislation the city of Paris must have an exceptional place on account of the peculiarities of the administrative problems of the metropolis. The adaptations called for are adjusted by regulations of public administration; it would be impossible to arrange all details in a general law.

The necessary legal papers are exempted from stamp duties and fees of registration. Special clauses cover the cases of vagrants and of the insane. The proposed law is to take effect six months after publication. A regulation of public administration, made within three months after publication, is to determine the measures necessary for carrying it into effect.

#### ESTIMATES OF COST

It is easy to learn the approximate number of aged and incurable persons in France. There are about 1,900,000 persons over seventy years of age, or about 5 per cent. of the population. The number of infirm and incurable persons under seventy years is somewhat less. But no exact statement of the number who are really indigent can be made. The Senate report estimates that the number of aged persons who will need relief will be about 114,000, and of incurables about 76,000, or 190,000 in all. A basis for further calculations is found in the statistics of the *bureaux de bienfaisance* and of other forms of public charity. The total expenditures of the *bureau de bienfaisance* are now 35,553,491 francs; those of beds of hospices, about 30,000,000 francs. The expenditures under the law of obligatory medical relief were in 1899 about 8,500,000 francs in the departmental services, and 7,864,999.66 francs in the autonomous communes. Senator Strauss estimates that the additional expense involved in the new law will be about 43,000,000 francs :

Endowments and special resources.....	7,000,000
Contribution of communes.....	15,250,000
Contribution of departments.....	12,650,000
Contribution of the state.....	8,250,000
Total .....	43,250,000

Experience alone can supply exact data, and the policy of administrators will affect the final result. But the bill is careful to restrict the sum which can be expended, so there will be no blind leap into the dark. The only question is whether the provision made will be adequate. It will at least be an improvement on the present methods, and it will furnish a foundation for further experience. It is hoped that the complementary bills relating to workingmen's insurance, now under discussion, will complete a system of social legislation, and place France, along with Germany, in the first rank of nations which not only tax all citizens, and require of them in times of war their surrender of life, but which offer to the humblest citizen the assurance of support in the emergencies of existence.

# ITALIAN IMMIGRATION INTO THE UNITED STATES 1901-4

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At this time Italian immigration has reached the highest point yet attained, and perhaps to be attained in the future.

The Italians, who until 1879 had contributed but a meager part to the mass of energy which immigration represents, since that year, have gone on giving an element more and more relevant to the general body of immigration. In the last three years they have taken the lead among the diverse nationalities of the Old World which furnished men to this, the younger nation of the New World. This is shown in the following table, which indicates, by decades, the proportion of the Italian element to the entire immigration into the United States:

TABLE I

Decades	Total	Yearly Average	Percentage
1821-30 .....	408	41	0.25
1831-40 .....	2,258	226	0.37
1841-50 .....	1,870	167	0.09
1851-60 .....	9,231	923	0.17
1861-70 .....	11,728	1,173	0.50
1871-80 .....	55,759	5,576	1.98
1881-90 .....	307,309	30,731	5.85
1891-1900 .....	655,668	65,567	17.05
1901-4 .....	741,986	185,496	27.86
1821-1904 .....	1,786,217		

The increase of Italian immigration into the United States, rather than depending upon the general increase of the emigration from Italy, is the effect of a change of direction of the mass of Italian immigrants, as is shown in the next table, which gives the percentage represented by the Italian emigration to the United States as compared with the entire emigration from Italy:



TABLE II

Year	Per Cent.
1891.....	23.46
1892.....	37.00
1893.....	35.25
1894.....	28.34
1895.....	20.56
1896.....	27.28
1897.....	27.01
1898.....	40.74
1899.....	44.14
1900.....	48.73
1901.....	40.12
1902.....	61.20
1903.....	61.91
1904.....	67.28

As is clearly seen from these figures, it is only during the last few years that the Italians represent a large percentage of general immigration into the United States. This fact is accounted for, in part if not entirely, by the diminution of prosperity in the South American republics, where, because of the greater similarity of climate, and race, customs, and language, the Italians have always preferred to emigrate.<sup>1</sup> For some time, however, the South American labor markets have been traversing periods of depression, which at present show no signs of disappearing; and consequently they have had, and still have, an immediate and strong repercussion upon the human current which flows in that direction. Moreover, the Italian emigration, which was formerly subventioned and encouraged by the Brazilian government, has been restrained by the Italian authorities because of the insufficiency of legislation in Brazil for the protection of the Italian laborers, who were unable to exact the payment of their wages from the masters of the haciendas, to the plowing and cultivation of which they devoted their labor. Recently, however, a remedial law has been approved by the Brazilian parliament, and

<sup>1</sup> It is a well-known fact that in the Argentine Republic and contiguous states, and to a certain extent in Brazil, the Italians represent the predominating factor of the foreign population, and in these countries, especially the first-named, they have succeeded in imprinting their own national character upon many of the social manifestations of these communities.

it is probable that in a short time the Italian government will withdraw its opposition, and that Brazil will again take up the work of encouraging Italian immigration. In such event, the immigratory current toward the United States will undergo a certain change, and necessarily diminish. It may be foreseen, therefore, that the succeeding years will bring into the United States a progressively decreasing number of Italians. Nevertheless, even in view of these facts, it will be of interest to study in detail the present immigration into the United States. The analysis of this immigratory current will form a basis for a true conception by American public opinion of its greater or less desirability, and, by showing its component parts and its distribution over the areas of the United States, will indicate what is necessary to be done, either by private enterprise or by the government, to utilize the qualities and energies which it brings into the country.

For the sake of brevity, and also because it is only in recent years that Italian immigration has assumed important proportions, the four years 1901-4 have been selected for the purposes of this study. It is thought that this limitation will not be prejudicial to a general conception of the entire Italian immigration, as in the preceding years it was composed of similar elements.

According to the statistics compiled by the Bureau of Immigration, the entire Italian immigration, from the point of view of its derivation, has been divided, in the last three years, as follows:

TABLE III

Year	Northern Italy	Southern Italy	Total	Per Cent. of Southern Italians
1901 .....	22,103	115,704	137,807	83.23
1902 .....	27,620	152,915	180,535	84.70
1903 .....	37,429	196,117	233,546	83.97
1904 .....	36,699	159,329	196,028	81.28

It is southern Italy, then, which furnishes the greater number of immigrants. The southern element represents more than 80 per cent. of the total. This fact is explained by the geographical position of Italy. While the exuberance of the northern

Italian population can overflow toward the north of Europe, in Switzerland, Germany, and Austria, the overplus of southern Italians has only the North African coast and the Americas. To Africa, and especially Tripoli, where they have founded flourishing agricultural colonies, the Sicilians from the southern and eastern part of their island direct their steps, while to America, North and South, turn those who come from the territory south of Tuscany, to the extreme point of Calabria and the northern part of Sicily. In this portion of Italy clusters a closely packed population which presents an average density to the square kilometer sometimes superior to the average density of the whole of Italy (113). This mass of people, generally very prolific, has no industries, its only source of production being agriculture, which in these last decades has suffered severe crises, one more violent than the other, principally those which have affected the sale of wine and oranges.

Submerged in their proliferation, impoverished by the decline of agriculture, and discouraged by the unjust distribution of taxes between the north and the south, to these people emigration offers the only relief, and they desert the land which produces in abundance the good things of the earth, for which there is little demand, and at first temporarily, but afterward permanently, abandon their native country to establish themselves in others where they find conditions sufficient for their maintenance.

The emigration from the southern provinces of Italy is destined to continue until the general conditions are changed, or until a diminution of the birth-rate establishes equilibrium between production and population. As neither of these solutions is probable before a period yet remote, emigration must necessarily remain a permanent feature for a long time to come, and, what is more important — a point which the reader should note particularly — it must assume more and more the character of definitive emigration to the countries where these people have found means to live and prosper. From this it will readily be seen that the cry of danger, which many Americans still repeat, is without foundation in fact. That the accusation, so readily made against the Italians, that they come here only for a time, and return to their



home country with their accumulated gains, has no substantial basis, is well established by the American consul at Naples in his reports, which state that, if the southern Italian emigrant returns once, or even a second time, to Italy, he finally gives up repatriation, and, together with his wife and family, goes back to the United States with the firm idea of remaining there permanently.

Such conclusion is favored also by the consideration of two other series of data, which indirectly re-confirm it: (1) the number of immigrants who have been in the United States before, and (2) the number of those leaving to return to Mediterranean ports. The following table is an extract from the figures gathered by the Bureau of Immigration:

TABLE IV  
IMMIGRANTS WHO HAVE BEEN IN THE UNITED STATES BEFORE

Year	Northern Italians	Southern Italians	Total
1901 .....	3,017	11,524	14,524
1902 .....	3,475	11,829	15,304
1903 .....	4,452	12,619	17,071
1904 .....	5,163	14,870	20,033

Of 741,986 who came to the United States during the four years, 66,932 had been here before. They had therefore decided not to repeat the experiment of repatriation.

Before giving the figures collected for (2) it must be noted that they were furnished by the reports of the conferences of the different transportation companies which serve between the ports of the United States and the Mediterranean, from the agents of the *Compañia Transatlantica of Barcelona* and the *Compagnie Transatlantique Française*; and, also, that these data include not only Italians, but all third-class passengers for Mediterranean ports and Havre. How many among these may be Italians is difficult to determine, but, considering that these companies touch not only at Italian ports, but also at French and Spanish, and remembering that eastern and southern Europeans return generally by way of Italy, and Belgians by way of Havre, it cannot be far from the truth, after deducting 15 per cent. from the com-

panies' figures, to consider the balance as the approximate number of Italians who during the three years have left the United States. Proceeding in such manner, we have the following table, in which the calendar and not the fiscal year is used:<sup>2</sup>

TABLE V

Year	Italians Sailed from the United States	Italians Arrived
1901.....	32,266	143,071
1902.....	48,684	201,260
1903.....	83,333	235,088
Total.....	164,283	579,419

The number of Italians, then, who left the United States in the three years represents, as the largest approximate number, a little more than one-fourth of the total number arrived in the same period.

Uniting the data derived from the last two tables with the general considerations, it may be seen that Italian immigration is not temporary in character, but a permanent contribution to the American population. Observation and knowledge of general conditions in those regions of Italy whence flows the stream of immigration into the United States, as well as into the other parts of the globe toward which the Italians direct their emigration, strengthen the opinion already expressed. It is certain that among the enormous mass of Italians arrived and arriving in this

<sup>2</sup> From the official publications of the Italian government for the calendar years 1902 and 1903 we have the following data in regard to the passengers arrived at the ports of Naples and Genoa from the United States:

	1902	1903
Arrived at Genoa.....	7,859	5,571
Arrived at Naples.....	44,357	72,662
	52,216	78,233

These figures include all passengers landed in Italy, either Italians or foreigners. The totals are different from those derived from the calculation made upon the figures supplied by the navigation companies, but they only tend to confirm our conclusion in regard to the small number of Italian immigrants in the United States who go back to Italy.

land there are some who, temperamentally unadapted to struggle in new climatic and social conditions, or already too advanced in life to take root in a new soil, prefer to finish their life where it began, and decide to return to Italy. Apart from the fact that this phenomenon is common to all immigratory currents, it should be considered a fortunate circumstance, and not a cause of contempt for Italians, since of all who come here, only those remain permanently who are more adapted to be absorbed in the new environment, and such represent the very large majority of Italian immigrants.

An analysis of Italian immigration in respect to sex gives the following results :

TABLE VI

YEAR	NORTHERN ITALIANS		SOUTHERN ITALIANS		TOTAL	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
1901.....	17,852	4,251	90,395	25,309	108,247	29,560
1902.....	22,425	5,195	124,536	28,379	146,961	33,574
1903.....	30,477	6,952	158,939	37,178	189,416	44,130
1904.....	28,784	7,915	122,770	36,559	155,554	44,474

A glance at these figures is sufficient to perceive the large preponderance of males. To bring out this fact more clearly, a table showing the percentage of females in the total number of immigrants coming from the north and south is here appended :

TABLE VII

Year	North	South	Total
1901.....	19.23	21.87	21.44
1902.....	18.20	18.55	18.59
1903.....	18.57	18.95	18.03
1904.....	21.56	23.00	22.68

Among immigrants from the north as well as among those from the south we find the males in the same large proportion, which proves the strength of the Italian immigration, in that it consists almost entirely of individuals who must work for their living, and not of women, who, to a certain extent, must depend



upon others. This is explained by the work they are called to perform—a kind of work where the presence of women would be a hindrance and not an aid. The Italian women belonging to this class, should they come in large numbers, would be unable to find work, and would be obliged to depend upon the men, who, employed as day laborers and paid small wages, would find it difficult to maintain families, which in America requires large means.

The vigor of Italian immigration is further demonstrated by the abundance of individuals between the ages of fifteen and forty-five. The figures are given in the table below:

TABLE VIII

YEARS	NORTHERN ITALIANS		SOUTHERN ITALIANS		TOTAL	
	Under 14 Years	45 Years and Over	Under 14 Years	45 Years and Over	Under 14 Years	45 Years and Over
1901.....	1,830	1,117	14,794	9,593	17,624	10,710
1902.....	2,215	1,376	16,954	12,216	19,169	13,692
1903.....	3,404	1,419	21,619	9,837	25,023	11,256
1904.....	3,633	1,537	20,895	9,443	24,528	10,980

PERCENTAGE

1901.....	8.22	5.05	13.64	8.29	12.79	7.71
1902.....	8.01	4.98	11.08	7.98	10.61	7.52
1903.....	9.09	3.79	11.02	5.00	10.71	4.00
1904.....	9.89	4.18	13.11	5.92	12.51	5.60

Referring to the above tables, it can be seen that the number of boys and old men does not surpass 20 per cent. of the entire immigration, except in the year 1901, and then but slightly. The great majority, then, is composed not only of individuals who can procure directly the means of subsistence, but of young men who are physically capable of working immediately upon landing.

The physical integrity of Italian immigration is also shown by the negligible number refused access to the United States by the immigration authorities at the ports. The small number deported, besides proving the florid health of the Italian immigrants, shows also the infinitely few excluded for political, economical, or moral

reasons. The figures below demonstrate the exactness of these observations:

TABLE IX  
NUMBER OF DEBARRED

Cause of Rejection	1901			1902			1903			1904		
	North	South	Total	North	South	Total	North	South	Total	North	South	Total
Idiots.....	..	2	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	3	4
Insane.....	..	4	4	..	5	5	..	8	8	1	8	9
Paupers.....	51	1292	1343	51	2049	2100	160	2164	2324	141	1396	1537
Dangerously ill..	10	30	40	..	7	7	9	147	156	35	235	270
Convicts.....	..	2	2	..	..	..	3	46	49	..	25	25
Prostitutes.....	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1	..	..	..
Contract laborers	67	125	192	11	100	111	71	447	518	83	425	508
Total.....	128	1455	1583	78	2235	2313	243	2813	3056	261	2092	2353

To bring out more clearly the extremely small number refused access, the percentage of the total number of immigrants is here given:

TABLE X  
PERCENTAGE OF THE DEBARRED IN TOTAL ITALIAN IMMIGRATION

Year	Northern Italians	Southern Italians	Total
1901.....	0.57	1.25	1.14
1902.....	0.28	1.36	1.28
1903.....	0.60	1.43	1.30
1904.....	0.71	1.31	1.20

As is shown, the number of deported does not exceed 1.3 per cent. of the total number of immigrants. This is the result of severe legislative action in Italy, which forbids emigration to all persons comprised in the categories excluded by the American laws. The Italian government has established special offices at every port of departure to enforce the laws of emigration. Another safeguard is the inspection by the salaried physicians attached to the American consulates in Italy. These physicians, with the acquiescence of the Italian authorities, and furnished with the permission of the navigation companies, inspect one by one all the departing emigrants, and prevent those from leaving

who, according to their opinion, would not be allowed to land in America. Thus it is seen that, by the Italian government's work, all elements which could menace law and order in the United States are removed from the emigratory stream, while the consular physicians see to it that it is freed from those individuals who might imperil the public health. The insignificant number refused access by the United States authorities is composed of the few who at times succeed, owing to the enormous number embarking, in eluding the vigilance of the Italian authorities and the inspection of the consular physicians.

The preceding data therefore authorize the statement that the Italian immigration into the United States is vigorous and desirable from the physical point of view, and pure and healthy from the moral point of view.

The question of education now presents itself. Analytical investigation of the Italian immigration from this point of view gives the following results:

TABLE XI

YEAR	ILLITERATES OVER FOURTEEN YEARS			PERCENTAGE OF ILLITERATES IN TOTAL IMMIGRATION		
	Northern Italians	Southern Italians	Total	Northern	Southern	Total
1901.....	3,122	58,493	61,615	14.12	50.55	45.44
1902.....	3,556	76,529	80,085	12.87	50.00	44.35
1903.....	4,283	84,512	88,795	11.45	43.09	38.01
1904.....	4,150	74,889	75,039	11.31	47.00	40.32

The progressive improvement in regard to primary instruction is evident. The year 1901 shows a proportion of over 45 per cent. of illiteracy; the year 1904, about 40 per cent. Nevertheless, illiteracy remains a characteristic disadvantage of the Italian immigrants, especially those from southern Italy. The difference of intellectual conditions between the north and south of Italy is the result of long years of misgovernment and neglect in the provinces of southern Italy. Although in these provinces, as well as in the whole of Italy, the law of compulsory elementary education is now in force, yet complex circumstances, among which



may be named low financial conditions and lack of administration in the communes, have hindered the southern populations from enjoying the fruit of legislative action in the same proportion as the northern populations have been able to do. Healthier economic conditions, the communes administered by more modern classes than the governing officials in the south, have, in a little more than forty years of national life, almost obliterated the plague spot of illiteracy in the northern parts of Italy. Illiteracy must diminish, as in fact it has always diminished, among the immigrants; but it remains in relatively large proportion because improvement in this respect is necessarily slow. The question arises then: Is the illiteracy of the Italian immigrants a menace to those countries—especially the United States—to which they betake themselves?

Many writers upon immigration have given this question first place when speaking of the greater or less desirability of the same, but a closer view of the subject cannot but disclose the exaggeration of those who maintain that a heavy percentage of illiteracy is a grave peril for the United States. In the first place, illiteracy is not a new fact, nor can it be affirmed to be a characteristic of Italian immigration alone, because we ignore the number of illiterates in the great immigratory currents which in the past fifty years have inundated this country. Only during the last few years has it become a feature of immigration statistics to take note of illiteracy. Given the relative recency of the acceptance of the principle of compulsory popular education in European states, and keeping in mind the origin of the Irish and German immigrants (who formed the bulk of the immigration into the United States in the past), coming, as they did, from the least developed regions of their respective countries, it is not difficult to believe that the proportion of illiterates was, if not equal, at least little inferior, to that which the Italian immigration actually presents. As is well known, the Irish and Germans become elements of force and prosperity in the new country in which they settled. What, then, are the criteria for judging the desirability of immigrants? First, the possibility of utilizing the qualities of the new-

comers, and, second, the facility of absorption, with the loss of the distinctive character of their national origin.

When the Italian may be utilized in the development of the country's mines, the culture of its lands, and the embellishment of its cities, his grammatical attainments in his own language may well be a negligible quantity. A country in its period of development has need of brawn as well as brain, and the vigor of the Italian as a laborer cannot be placed in doubt; and, therefore, considered in the light of the first criterion for judgment, the Italian immigration cannot be held to be undesirable.

In regard to the facility of absorption, illiteracy should be an advantage in the work of Americanizing newcomers. The individual who cannot read brings fewer impressions and ideas from his native country than one who has been able through education to observe the movements in which he was born and bred. The illiterate man, in some respects, and especially if he comes from the rural regions, is more like a child. While deficient in past impressions, he has an intellectual freshness and curiosity. His adaptability to a new environment, therefore, will be accomplished more rapidly and with greater ease, like that of a child's. Moreover, instruction does not necessarily include the idea of intelligence, and when the observations made upon the physical force and vigor of the Italians are joined to those made upon their intellectual brightness (Italians of southern Italy are noted for their quickness of perception and other strong mental qualities), one is forced to the conclusion that the percentage of illiteracy among the Italians cannot constitute a peril for the United States, and, further, that this defect may even become an aid to the work of assimilation.

Instead of meditating exclusion for the illiterate immigrant, it would be much more logical and just to add to the conditions demanded for obtaining citizenship the obligation, not only of stammering a few English words, but of speaking and writing English. In such manner the intellectual youth of the illiterate immigrant would come to be exploited effectively for the advancement of his Americanization. Apart from this, however, it is use-

ful to note that the illiteracy existing among the immigrants is reduced only in small proportion among their children. The census of 1900 establishes this fact. On the other hand, the same census shows that the children of new immigrants manifest greater diligence in study, and greater profit from it, than do the children of parents born in America. Seventy-five per cent. of the first-mentioned class, and 65 per cent. of the second, frequented the schools. Of 30,404,762 persons of ten years and over, born of American parents, 1,737,803, or 5.7 per cent., were illiterates; while of 10,958,803 persons born of foreign parents, only 179,384, or 1:67 per cent., were in the same condition. It is necessary only to cite, in regard to Italian immigration, the deductions made by Mr. R. P. Falkner with respect to all immigration from southern Italy: "From the foregoing analysis it should, I think, be clear that the evidence of a declining average of intelligence and capacity, which has been alleged to characterize recent immigration, is just as inconclusive as that brought forward to show an increasing volume."

The usefulness of a body of immigration, as has been pointed out before, can be judged only by the mass of capacities it brings into countries, and the relation of the same to the work demanded by the country's needs. As an immigration of learned people into an undeveloped country could be a detriment rather than an advantage to its interests, so an immigration of laborers into a country already well provided in that respect might be held to be perilous for its economic and social order.

Taking up this part of the subject, it is necessary to ascertain what kind of work the Italians know how to do, and what productive capacities they possess; and from this can be seen in what numbers they may be utilized in the United States.

The following table shows the three larger categories of Italian immigration constituted of farmers, farm laborers, and laborers:



TABLE XII

	1901			1902		
	North	South	Total	North	South	Total
Farmers .....	23	7	30	9	140	149
Farm laborers.....	311	26,566	29,877	6,455	39,128	45,583
Laborers.....	8,735	43,210	51,945	10,143	38,396	68,539
Total.....	12,069	69,783	81,852	16,607	97,664	114,271

	1903			1904		
	North	South	Total	North	South	Total
Farmers .....	200	678	878	260	269	529
Farm laborers.....	6,462	32,391	38,853	5,154	42,471	47,625
Laborers.....	15,622	85,682	101,304	13,526	42,502	56,028
Total.....	22,284	118,751	141,035	19,940	85,242	104,102

All of this part of the immigration originates in the rural districts of Italy; even those classified by the Bureau of Immigration as laborers are in fact peasants. The enormous majority comes from the south, and, as is shown by the statistics published by the Italian government, the urban population in general, and that of the south in particular, does not emigrate except in very small proportion. It is misleading to consider the laborers as distinct from the farm laborers; actually they form but one class, and, with the tillers of the soil, represent the total agricultural element. They constitute more than one-half of the entire immigration, and, as the gross figures do not bring out clearly the characteristic note of the observation, it can be seen by the percentage table below:

TABLE XIII

PERCENTAGE OF THE AGRICULTURAL ELEMENTS IN TOTAL ITALIAN IMMIGRATION

Year	Northern Italians	Southern Italians	Total
1901.....	54.60	60.21	59.39
1902.....	60.12	63.86	63.29
1903.....	61.14	60.55	60.38
1904.....	51.60	53.50	53.14

In the three years under consideration — except the first — the urban population, made up of skilled workmen and professionals, represents less than 40 per cent.; the remainder consists of farm laborers more or less skilled in the art of agriculture. Thus it is readily seen that the Italians in large majority should find their way to the fields of agriculture, the ground adapted to the development of their activities. There they would find the greatest advantage with the least proportionate sacrifice, and at the same time would be able to contribute most effectively to the increasing productivity and wealth of the United States.

Before observing the actual direction taken by the Italians once disembarked, it is well to note what capital, in addition to their personnel, they bring with them. This investigation gives the following results:

TABLE XIV

Year	Amount of Money Shown by the Italian Immigrants	Average per Capita
1901 .....	\$1,523,284	\$12.67
1902 .....	3,018,641	14.47
1903 .....	2,123,625	13.09
1904 .....	3,100,664	20.00

The figures reported show a progressive improvement in the amount of money brought by the Italians. These figures, it must be observed, cannot be considered exact, because the Italian peasant in general, and the southern Italian in particular, is diffident toward strangers and obstinate in refusing to make known his personal affairs, and still more so when it is a question of money in his possession. It can well be imagined, then, that a large number of immigrants have kept hidden the exact amount of money they possessed; so much the more so owing to the widespread opinion among them that \$10 is a sufficient sum to own up to at the port in order to obtain admittance into the country.

Allowing for this, however, it is but just to say that the Italian immigration is composed principally of poor people in the strictest sense of the word — people who have not enough money to pay transportation expenses from the ports of disembarkation, and who must find work immediately upon disembarking.

Having examined in detail the ethnic and demographic composition of the Italian immigration, and having seen the conditions, physical, economic, social, and financial, which it presents, it remains to study the direction taken by the immigrants toward the different parts of the country. The figures below indicate the percentage of Italian immigrants who have directed their steps toward the different geographic divisions of the United States, according to the origin of the immigrants, during the four years under consideration :

TABLE XV

	NORTHERN ITALIANS				SOUTHERN ITALIANS				TOTAL			
	1901	1902	1903	1904	1901	1902	1903	1904	1901	1902	1903	1904
North Atlan. Div.	61	28	59	56	88	86	86	85	83	82	82	80
North Centr. Div.	16	18	18	17	6	8	8	8	7	9	10	10
South Atlan. Div.	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	3	2	1	2	2
South Centr. Div.	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3
Western Division	20	21	20	20	2	2	1	1	5	5	4	5
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

The percentages are referred to as approximative, exact figures not being necessary to show the objective points.

By these data it is seen that the northern states of the Union absorb more than 90 per cent. of the Italian immigration, less a small fraction from the north of Italy, which goes to the western states. The great majority of the Italians remain in the vicinity of the ports of disembarkation; and even those who travel west, instead of dispersing in the eleven states and territories which form that division, concentrate mostly in California, which fact is set forth in the following figures :

TABLE XVI

PERCENTAGE OF NORTHERN ITALIANS DIRECTED TO CALIFORNIA OF ALL  
NORTHERN ITALIANS WEST-BOUND

1901.....	.63.14
1902.....	.64.95
1903.....	.70.76
1904.....	.72.61



Neglecting to consider this tendency of a part of the northern Italian immigrants to concentrate in California, precisely the most populous point of the Western Division, it is well to return to the principal deductions to be made from Table XV; i. e., the enormous prevalence of Italians in the states of the North Atlantic and North Central Divisions. The figures below set forth that in these divisions the great majority of the Italians are concentrated in a few states :

TABLE XVII  
NORTH ATLANTIC DIVISION

	1901	1902	1903	1904	1901	1902	1903	1904	1901	1902	1903	1904
New York.....	50.44	46.17	42.91	44.28	60.57	60.68	53.82	56.11	59.37	59.10	53.09	5,445
Pennsylvania .....	30.87	30.15	33.87	31.96	20.58	24.79	25.31	22.29	21.78	21.37	26.30	2,350
New Jersey.....	5.00	6.84	5.22	5.17	5.79	3.47	5.91	7.76	5.70	5.70	5.83	744
Massachusetts.....	8.64	9.43	10.13	10.46	7.25	9.00	7.41	8.03	7.41	7.41	8.32	861
Connecticut .....	32	6.13	5.63	6.46	3.67	3.38	3.34	3.47	3.34	3.34	3.95	386

NORTH CENTRAL DIVISION

Illinois.....	39.53	47.56	47.75	43.20	50.16	45.99	41.61	39.89	42.69	46.48	43.41	4,099
Michigan.....	25.62	21.14	18.25	12.51	8.32	7.16	9.85	7.26	14.36	11.50	12.27	895
Ohio.....	6.05	7.49	7.57	9.92	26.74	34.50	33.67	35.47	19.52	26.11	26.06	2,646

The data are wanting for showing what centers of population in the states considered become the final destination of the immigrants, or in what proportions they are scattered in the different parts of these states. It can be assumed, however, that the mass of Italians cannot spread in the farming lands, since these farms are already occupied, and it may be affirmed that the immigrants go to augment the population of the cities, and principally the large cities. This idea is favored by common observation, by the census of 1900, and by the conclusions of Dr. Tosti in his study of the Italian population of New York state. According to the census of 1900, 62.4 per cent. of the Italians established in the United States were settled in centers whose population was greater than 25,000. According to Dr. Tosti, who secured data up to December, 1903, of 486,175 Italians resident in New York state, 382,775, or 78.7 per cent., were established in New York city.

The conclusion, then, from the figures reported is that more

than 80 per cent. of the Italians settle in the states of the northern divisions, and that from 75 per cent. to 85 per cent. of these concentrate in the large cities. Remembering now the arts and trades of the Italians, as established by the data given previously, it is seen that, while more than 60 per cent. of them are peasants and farmers, instead of going to the agricultural districts, they come to increase the urban populations of the United States.

The concentration of the Italians in the large cities is as detrimental to themselves as it is to the United States. The peasant who establishes himself in a large American city cannot be anything but a laborer; all of his technical qualities are lost both to himself and to the country which harbors him. The Italian peasant, who has had centuries of experience in tilling the land, who understands all kinds of cultivation, who is not only expert in viniculture, but also in the culture of all the vegetables and fruits of his new country, is giving but the minimum part of his productive habits, i. e., his physical force.

The evils of concentration do not consist only in this dispersion of energy, or rather this mistaken employment of forces; they are not only economic evils, but they extend also to the moral and political fields. In fact, the Italian immigrant as a laborer, alternating only between stone-breaking and ditching, remains an alien to the country. The immigrant, to whatever nationality he may belong, does not feel himself a part of the collectivity as long as no ties, first economic, then moral, are formed to attach him to the new soil. The laborer cannot form these ties while he remains a machine, pure and simple, furnishing only brute force, and no special interest can be felt in the work he accomplishes. Thus the Italian immigrant, thrust into the large cities, surrounded and outclassed by those who do not understand him and whom he does not understand, shuts himself in with his fellow-countrymen and remains indifferent to all that happens outside of the quarters inhabited by them. Although renouncing the idea of repatriation, because he knows the economic conditions in his own country forbid, and becoming an American citizen, he remains always a stranger to the new country.

The crowding into the large American cities brings other

harmful effects. The cost of living in the northern states, and especially in the large centers, is very high, while the wages, on account of the greater competition, are relatively low. This lack of equilibrium imposes upon the Italian large material sacrifices which deplete him physically and lower him socially. The high rents force him to live in the worst quarters and in restricted space. In the Italian quarters of New York and Philadelphia can be seen the alleged lodging-houses, with seven or eight or even ten persons occupying one bedroom. Families of seven or more members crowd into houses containing only two rooms, one of which is the kitchen. This mode of existence, apart from the fact that it is fruitful in the development and extension of infectious diseases, renders the people vile in their personal habits, and, as has been alluded to before, makes them appear repulsive to the Americans. If these material conditions influence the Italians to feel no sincere or profound attachment to the adopted country, on the other hand they influence the native American to disdain the newcomers, thus causing a reciprocal psychologic state of mind which is a powerful obstacle in the way of assimilation.

But the influence of this agglomeration of the Italians goes still farther, for, besides the evils already spoken of, it furnishes an effective stimulus for the development and deepening of moral corruption. Among Italian immigrants, as among all others, there are certain elements which belong to no class, having lived the life of all, with no trade or capacity for honest work of any kind. Such people have no moral curb or scruple, and prey upon the others. They find in the swarming Italian quarters of the large American cities fruitful fields in which to exercise their baneful powers for the despoliation of their countrymen, who, ignorant and ingenuous, become their ready victims. In the guise of agents, solicitors, or journalists, they extort money. As founders of gambling dens and houses of ill-fame, they organize schemes of blackmail and other crimes. It is among these people that the ward politicians find their agents. The existence of people like these depends upon the crowded conditions referred to. The number of such individuals is not large, but they are



indefatigable propagators of corruption among the immigrants.

Thus are conditions formed which, while placing obstacles in the way of reciprocal advantage, ruin the Italian immigrant morally, materially, and physically.

It is not the large number of Italian immigrants which constitutes a peril for the United States. The immigrants are young, honest, strong, and overflowing with energy; they possess potentially all the factors to represent an increase of development of the American people. The real danger is their concentration in the large cities, their defective distribution in the territory of the republic, which renders impossible their proper utilization, and forms an ever-increasing plethora of labor in the more populous states, while at other points there is a large and unsatisfied need of laboring-men.

The problem is not, as some are inclined to think, to find means for limiting or stopping the immigratory current, but to avoid the evils of concentration, and to find a way effectually to distribute the mass of immigration.

What causes provoke the concentration of Italians in the large cities? Why is it that these peasants prefer to live in crowded centers, rather than to scatter over the country, where they would be able to continue the art of agriculture and find the most appropriate outlet for their energies? Looking for the causes of this phenomenon will aid powerfully to solve the problem, and a brief survey of present and former conditions reveals the two principal causes: (*a*) the poverty of the Italian immigrants; (*b*) their previous mode of existence.

As has been demonstrated, the average amount of capital of the newcomer is a sum which, at the most, enables him to live without work ten or twelve days. If work be not found in that limited period, he must turn for help to his countrymen or to public charity. He has no time—aside from all other difficulties encountered, such as ignorance of the language, difference in all the conditions of life, etc., etc.—to study the advantage or disadvantage of points in the United States where he might be able to develop his activities. Even if he knew before landing that the South or West was adapted to his needs, his lack of funds would

prevent his using that knowledge. Furthermore, the same lack of money forbids him to choose work in the fields, for, although better paid, it depends upon circumstances, which he has neither time nor money to command, and the fact that the land can be bought at a low price must be neglected, while he is glad to secure any kind of work which will provide for his present needs.

In addition to the economic causes, there is another, far more complex, because derived from habits of life which have obtained for centuries. The population of southern Italy is composed in great part of peasant farm laborers massed in large boroughs, which might be called cities, not for the perfection and complexity of their municipal and social life, but for their number of inhabitants. In order to live in these crowded haunts and mix with their fellows, the peasants walk morning and night several miles to and from the fields. They leave their homes long before dawn and return after sunset. This custom arose in feudal days, when the organization for public safety was deficient, and existed in those communities until the foundation of Italian unity, thus forming tendencies and psychological conditions in the peasant peculiar to him.

A study of the character of the southern Italians shows that they cannot live isolated; the conditions indicated above have formed in them the necessity of living in homogeneous groups, to reunite with their own kind. At the same time, they have acquired great diffidence toward the outside world of all who do not belong to the nucleus in which they were born and bred. Such tendencies, however, with the conditions which created them, are slowly passing away, but are yet strong enough to influence the deliberations of the individual, and especially in his choice of a mode of life.

This fear of isolation and this distrust of strangers become stronger and deeper in a new, strange country, and the peasant, although provided with money enough to buy and stock a small farm, finds in his own social needs a powerful obstacle to the realization of such a plan; but, joined with a sufficient number of his own countrymen in similar financial conditions, he does not hesitate to choose the farm.

These, then, are the principal reasons which account for the agglomeration of Italians in large cities. Suppressing them, the resulting evil will necessarily cease to exist.

The means best adapted to solving this problem would appear to be the formation of colonizing societies which should propose to found agricultural colonies composed of Italian peasants. It is well known that the greater part of the good arable land, once the property of the government, has been pre-empted, and has become the property of railroad companies and private individuals; but we are still far from the time in which all the good land will be under cultivation. Large areas await the hard and continued work of the laborer to be productive. As stated above, most of these lands belong to private corporations or individuals, and these should, in their own interests, favor the colonizing idea and aid in realizing it.

The work of the society would consist in locating the land, and in providing transportation, and other expenses incident to the placing of the laborer in working contact with the land. A fixed wage-rate might be advanced, or the peasant guaranteed the living of himself and family until such time as the land became productive. The ultimate aim of the colonizing society would be (*a*) to render the peasant proprietor of the land he has put under cultivation, or (*b*) to remain proprietor of the land and administer the agricultural plant it has established. In the second case, the society would pay the laborer wages, or rent the land, exacting a part of the harvest. The choice of either of these two plans should not prejudice the practicability of success. However, the first would appear to be better adapted to invoke the ready formation of colonies. Should the second plan be preferred, and the obligation to provide for the needs of the laborers and the land remain for a time, the peasants could be treated as tenants, and tenants with long leases, rather than as wage-earners; for only in this way could they be permanently established and attached to the land.

It is certain that such a society, organized to place Italian immigrants to the best advantage, would be able to reap large profits upon the capital invested. The Italian peasant, if not the



best, is one of the best cultivators of land in Europe. Despite the drawbacks existing for ages in his own country, he has shown heroic resistance, and has confronted misfortunes and persecutions before which many others would have sustained ultimate defeat. In spite of all the disadvantages of climatic conditions, and the varying qualities of land, lack of capital, and wise administration, ignorance of modern agricultural science and its inventions, he has known how to produce cultures of every kind. But in agricultural industry—different from many other forms of work—the most important factor of production is always the man. It is the capacity, the force, of the man that assures the success of a colonizing enterprise. In America, where he would find all the help he could not find in his own country, the Italian peasant would yield marvelous and remunerative results, if placed where he could prove his ability.

Now, as never before, the conditions are propitious for an experiment of this nature. After many trials the cultivation of the mulberry tree in the United States—without which the raising of the silk-worm would be impossible—is an assured fact. There are numerous plantations flourishing in several states, and it can be predicted that its culture will be universal in the South and West. Every Italian peasant understands the mulberry, and knows how to foster the silk-worm with its cocoon. In Italy, anywhere except in a very few provinces, the silk culture is undertaken, at some points being the only culture made, at others subsidiary. In the United States the Italian colonies could propose the extension and exploitation of this new fountain of riches, certain that it would repay largely, especially those who would initiate it. The United States imports all raw silk needed for its manufactories, which consume immense quantities. Such culture, aided by the experience of the Italians, would absolutely assure success.

The establishment of an Italian colonization society in the United States would be looked upon favorably in both countries. Every report of the commissioner of immigration exposes the perils of concentration and exhorts Congress to adopt special

precautions for a right distribution of the new immigration.<sup>3</sup> It is certain that the government would give moral, if not material, support to such an undertaking. In Italy, attached to the ministry of foreign affairs, is a special bureau created for the purpose of protecting and advising emigrants to seek the countries most adapted to their needs. This bureau is more than ever convinced of the necessity of aiding the formation of agricultural colonies where the Italian emigrant would be able to secure conditions more favorable to his development and assimilation.

The two governments, therefore, the one indirectly and morally, the other directly and materially, would contribute to spur on the Italian immigrant toward the destination best adapted to him by his previous mode of living and by his special aptitude for tilling the soil.

<sup>3</sup> See reports of the general commissioner of immigration for the years 1901-3 (Washington, D. C.).

## THE CIVIC PROBLEM FROM A SOCIOLOGICAL STANDPOINT.<sup>1</sup>

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The discussion of the civic problem from a sociological standpoint demands an explanation of what the sociological standpoint is. There are not a few who deny the existence of sociology, to say nothing of granting it the development and independence which the possession of a standpoint would imply. And, in spite of the fact that such a denial is deemed unworthy of special attention, it must be admitted that sociology is not yet sufficiently advanced to speak on any subject with convincing authority. Still there is a sociological standpoint, and much of the confusion of thought in regard to civic and social questions might be avoided if this standpoint were always taken by those who discuss them.

Sociology is commonly defined as the science of association. As such it may limit itself to the description of social phenomena and their causal explanation. It may be as indifferent to human progress, as contemptuous of the utilitarian purpose which its conclusions may serve, as ethically colorless, as "pure," as the science of mathematics. This conception of sociology is, I think, as far as it goes, legitimate. But every science has its application, and few scientists are able to preserve the neutrality they claim for their science. As Arnold Toynbee said of political economists: "While affecting the reserved and serious air of students, [they] have all the time been found brawling in the marketplace." So, if sociology were merely a pure or abstract science, we should still undoubtedly have at least the standpoint of the sociologist, if not of sociology.

<sup>1</sup> An address delivered on Civic Day, Thursday, October 6, 1904, in the Louisiana Purchase Exposition, at a meeting arranged by the National Municipal League, the League of American Municipalities, and the American Civic Association.



Sociology, however, is something more than a descriptive and explanatory science. It does not limit itself to a study of the past and the present, of things as they are and have been, but asks of every "is" what it ought to be. It is constructive, it is teleological, it is a science of social values. It recognizes the unity and organic nature of a city or nation, and frankly proposes the improvement of the collective life as its end. Municipal sociology, if I may use that expression, projects from the best discoverable elements in municipal life a civic ideal which serves as a criterion and standard of judgment. It proves all things, and holds fast to that which is good; the good being that, and that only, which enhances the municipal life. Its measure of the good and evil consequences of facts and conditions is always in terms of general civic well-being.

The sociological standpoint is, therefore, the standpoint of absolute impartiality with respect to the interests of a social group. It is the standpoint of the life of the people as a whole. From this standpoint all the elements of human well-being are duly regarded. From it we observe the actual or probable effects of a measure, not only upon the industrial, political, religious, or social interests of the municipality, but also upon its physical, moral, and intellectual life. From the standpoint of the political economist, for instance, that form of municipal government is best which best promotes the economic prosperity of the city; from the standpoint of the physician, that which best promotes the health of the people; but from the sociological standpoint, that form of government alone is best which best promotes the general welfare. The standpoint of sociology is, in a word, the standpoint from which we see all around the circle of human interests.

What, then, from this standpoint, is the civic problem? The civic problem, as ordinarily understood, is, I suppose, the problem of good government. Perhaps it might be stated in this form: Given the conditions of a municipality, what form of government is best applicable to it, and how may the adoption of that form be secured? But from the sociological standpoint the civic problem is something more than the problem of municipal

government. It is the problem of municipal life. The good and evil of a municipal administration are usually measured in terms of the dominant interest of the municipality. If these interests were religious, that form of government would be pronounced good which best subserved the interests of the church; if industrial, that form which best promoted the economic activities of the people. Now, the dominant interests of the average American municipality are industrial and commercial. It is a complimentary remark to say of a city that it is on a "boom." The demand is, therefore, for a business administration, and in more senses than one. Any form of administration of municipal government that would drive away business would be, I suspect, *per ipso facto* condemned as bad. But the business interests of a city are not its only, nor indeed its chief, interests. They are important, they are fundamental; and certainly no thinking person would propose or advocate a system of government which would wantonly disturb them. But still business is not sacred; or, if so, it is not as sacred as human life. Therefore, the business which does not contribute to the health and happiness of the people ought not to be continued. The problem with respect to certain forms of business is not how to promote them, but how to render them unnecessary. Life is the test of all things—of conduct, of government, of institutions, of all human activity, individual or collective. Whatever contributes to the quantity or quality of life, no matter how apparently insignificant, is dignified and noble, is sacred, is divine. On the other hand, whatever detracts from, or is injurious to, life; whatever abates one jot or one tittle from true living, no matter how ancient and respectable it may be, is undignified, unworthy, ignoble. The true object of a city's consideration, and of all its agencies, is the life of its citizens. The civic problem, from the sociological standpoint, is therefore the problem of promoting, improving, enlarging, the life of the people. It is the problem of general civic well-being; not a problem of wealth, but of weal. It is the problem of utilizing all the powers of man and nature for the good of all the inhabitants of the city. It may be stated, perhaps, as follows: Given a municipal population with its physical, mental, and moral

development, its wealth and its natural resources, how can it best utilize these powers for the attainment of the most complete well-being of all its citizens? The civic problem so stated may indeed be considered a problem of government, providing we understand by government, not an external, and more or less independent factor of control, but a ready servant of the people, the active agency through which the collective will of the municipality finds expression. But the problem will be more clearly grasped, I suspect, if it is conceived as a problem of the development and economy of force. This is the character, indeed, of every civic or social problem. The negative phase of the civic problem is how to deal with municipal waste of wealth and life.

The thought of municipal waste is usually limited, I suppose, to the extravagances and corruption of municipal authorities; and this in itself constitutes an enormous leakage and a grave problem. The rapidly accumulating indebtedness of our cities, the increasing annual cost of such government as we have, have been noted with alarm by all students of municipal administration. There is not a city in the country, perhaps, which does not pay more for its government than the service is worth; which does not support supernumerary or superannuated politicians—public functionaries which are either barnacles pure and simple, or rudimentary municipal organs as useless, if not as dangerous, in the municipal anatomy as the *appendix vermiformis* is in the human. The removal of this latter organ is said to be in the way of becoming a fad. Let us hope it will extend to municipal surgery.

Examples of official waste crowd upon the student of the civic problem. I shall present only a single illustration from Chicago. A couple of years ago an investigation of the accounts of the West Town Board and the West Park Board showed that the tax-payers of our city had been for years systematically robbed by the wasteful and extravagant practices of these boards. On one original bond issue of \$667,000 interest amounting to \$1,160,400 had been paid, and the issue once refunded was half outstanding. The special taxes paid by the people year by year to meet interest and principal had gone chiefly into the pockets of officials, and the estimated waste was about a half million



of dollars. That this is a mild illustration of graft could be shown by other experiences of Chicago, and by that of other cities; but it is a typical illustration. Now, graft is, of course, a crime, according to any legitimate definition of that word; but until it is recognized as such, and its punishment is as swift and as severe as that of other crimes of equal enormity, a problem which might well absorb the whole attention of a body like this is how to abolish it.

Official waste, however, great as it is, is only one phase of the civic problem, as it appears from our present standpoint. Wealth and energy not utilized for the public good; unemployed labor power, whether in the slums or on the boulevard; the performance of labor socially unnecessary; the premature exhaustion of labor power by too early, too long, or too strenuous employment, or by the unsanitary, dangerous, or degrading conditions imposed upon it, are all forms of municipal waste. All the money and energy put into the art of industrial competition; in puffing articles, good, bad, and indifferent; in pushing trade, is an expenditure for which there is no adequate return. The lives enfeebled and shortened by preventable diseases, and by the conditions of the slums and the sweat-shops, the needlessly dangerous and brutalizing conditions under which many are compelled to work, represent an incalculable economic loss. The employment of women and children in hours and conditions which injure their vitality, however profitable it may be to the individual employer, is plainly municipal folly. The civic ideal is an ideal of humanity and economy.

In view of all the waste of our municipalities, and the narrow conception of government commonly accepted, Mr. Bryce's oft-quoted statement, that the government of cities is the one conspicuous failure of the United States, is extremely charitable. From the standpoint of wholesome and happy human life, the city itself is a failure. Who can contemplate the dirt and disorder, the ugliness and filth, the smoke and noise, of a great city, the tenements and flats, and the fact that human beings live in them, without pitying the necessities of the people, or questioning their sanity? Ruskin has doubtless uttered many

extravagances, but what he has said of a modern city is true. It is, indeed, a place "where summer and winter are only alternatives of heat and cold; where snow never fell white, nor sunshine clear; where the ground is only a pavement, and the sky no more than a glass roof of an arcade; where the utmost power of a storm is to choke the gutters, and the finest magic of spring to change mud into dust." We read of the "downward draft" in the cities; that they must be recruited from the country; that their mortality is at least 20 per cent. greater than in the rural districts. This is only another way of saying that life in a city tends to physical and moral degeneration. Now, the relative population of our cities is rapidly growing larger. How much greater will be the effect on the nation when we are practically an urban people? Obviously, if the conditions of the cities remain the same, there will be a distinct degeneration of the people, as a royal commission recently reported of Scotland. In England three-fourths of the population live in cities. The vitalizing current from the country grows less and less, and, in spite of improvements in municipal administration, the people of England are declining in strength and vigor. This was shown at the recruiting offices for the recent war in South Africa. Only about a third of those applying for service were physically fit. It is a plain inference, too, from the appearance and condition of the English working-people. The average life of the English laborer, who, of course, suffers most from the evils of city life, is only twenty-two years. An English city is not very different from an American city. The effects upon human life are essentially the same. In Massachusetts cities, for instance, the average life of a common factory operative is thirty-six and three-tenths years, while that of a farmer is sixty-five and three-tenths years.

Obviously, then, there is a great opportunity for the city to promote the economy of one of its best assets, namely, the physical life of its people. Perhaps half the deaths of cities are due to diseases that are preventable. If our municipal authorities should devote half as much time and thought to the physical welfare of the people as they ordinarily do to politics, mortality

might be reduced one-half, and thus the real wealth of the city be enormously increased.

Take, for instance, the economic loss due to the familiar disease known as consumption. The number of deaths annually in the United States from this disease is estimated at from 145,000 to 160,000. A recent writer declares that "one in three of all the deaths between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-four years is due to consumption; one in four, between the ages of thirty-five and forty-four." And he continues:

These are the years wherein a worker is at his best, when he repays to the community what it has spent upon him in his nurture and upbringing. . . . The average man's earnings in the working period of his life are about \$12,600. The average earnings of a consumptive, taking into the calculation the short period which he earns full wages, the period when he can work only part of the time at what light tasks he can find, and the still longer period when all that he can do is to gasp for breath, a burden to his family, and more than a burden, a menace—the average earnings of a man that dies of consumption are no more than \$4,075, a loss of \$8,525 on every man. . . . Leaving out of the calculation all that it costs for medicines and nursing, counting only the loss of wages, we are out more than a billion and a third of dollars every year by the Great White Plague. It is as if every year the city of Columbus, Ohio, were utterly depopulated and not a living soul left in it. It is as if ten times what it costs us for the postal system of the United States every year were absolutely thrown away, and we got nothing for it. For this loss of wages by consumptives is a needless loss. They have to die some time, it is true, but they need not thus die before their time.

So much for a single preventable disease. As a further illustration, consider the loss from typhoid fever. Thirty-five thousand deaths a year in this country are due to it; and yet medical authorities assure us it is one of the most readily controlled and preventable diseases. An epidemic of typhoid in a city, town, or village is an evidence of culpable ignorance on the part of the people or criminal negligence on the part of the authorities.

Now consider what could be done, if the municipality gave the same attention to health as to wealth. New York, with attention to the matter by no means ideal, has reduced its mortality from consumption 40 per cent. Chicago, by such care as she has given to the promotion of health, has reduced her death-rate from 73 per 1,000 in 1854 to 15.43 in 1904. London has



decreased its mortality from 29 per 1,000 in 1835 to from 17 to 19 at present. The armies of the leading nations of the world, by the enforcement of simple sanitary measures, have greatly decreased their mortality from disease. In our own army since 1872 there has been a decrease of nearly 40 per cent., and officers and men of that army, with their superior knowledge of sanitation, have stamped out the yellow fever in Havana. Does it not seem, then, that the wisest expenditure of money that a city can make is in the endeavor to approach the sanitary ideal, namely, the absolute prevention of all parasitic diseases? In view of the possibilities in this direction, how childish and foolish are some of the expenditures of municipal funds—in the entertainment of a foreign figure-head, for instance, or in the jubilee celebrations at the close of the Spanish War!

What has just been said of the economic loss due to municipal neglect of health might also be said of education. No one can estimate the loss of a municipality from suppressed or undeveloped capacities. True economy practiced here would take every child out of the factory and off the streets, and put it into the school, and keep it there for whole-day sessions until it is sixteen years old. It would more than double the expenditure for teachers and equipment. As a nation, we boast of our educational system and the money we expend upon it; and it seems a pity to say anything derogatory of it now while we are busy appropriating the flattering comments of the Moseley Commission. But I venture the assertion that, while in comparison with other countries we may have some reason to boast, this educational system upon which we pride ourselves, when considered in the light of what it ought to be, is pitifully defective and inefficient. As a nation, we spend \$225,000,000 a year for common schools; but the sum is small compared with what some nations spend on their armies. Our own military appropriations for 1903 were \$220,000,000, and there are loud complaints of the comparative insignificance of our army and our navy. We pay four or five millions for a warship, and begrudge a slender appropriation for schools. We do not recognize how much more economical it is to invest money in men than in men-of-

war; how much more important to a nation is brain-power than sea-power.

But I cannot point out, much less consider, all the problems involved in the civic problem as it appears from the sociological standpoint. I must content myself by offering, in conclusion, a suggestion or two in regard to its solution.

From the sociological standpoint, the civic problem, embracing as it does a whole cluster of problems, is primarily educational. But the problem of education is, from one point of view, a problem of government. A municipal government truly representative of the people is, as I have said, the active agent for promoting all their interests. This implies a liberal theory of the functions of government. Theories of government, however, are relative, not absolute. When the government of a nation or a city is from without—of a nation by a king or a privileged class, or of a city by a state legislature, a ring, or a boss—the *laissez faire* theory of government has much to commend it. For if history teaches anything at all, it is that, as a rule, the business of governing will be run in the interest of the governors. It is not strange, then, that with the ignorance, selfishness, and corruption of the governments of the world before their eyes, men like Mr. Spencer should conclude that government should keep hands off; that in its attempts to mitigate human suffering it continually increases it. All governments have been in the past, and are now, more or less external, and consequently more or less paternal. They should, therefore, be restrained. But restraint is not the end; they should be popularized. When the government of a city becomes popular in reality as well as in name; when it is a government of, by, and for the people, then selfish and corrupt aims are no longer to be feared—because a city could hardly be said to be corrupt and selfish with regard to itself—and the only danger is ignorance. Then the positive theory of government applies. Then a municipal government, no matter how extensive its functions, is but the self-directed activity of the municipality, which is as wholesome for a city as that sort of activity is for an individual. The dangers of popular ignorance will remain to be feared, blunders will be made,

and perhaps the economy will be less than under government by an external agency. Self-government is by no means necessarily the best in point of immediate achievement. It is only in the light of its final results that it is superior. Its end is the interests of all, and all public action, no matter how mistaken, is disciplinary. It learns to do by doing. The action of such a government is not paternalism. What the government as an outside agency does for the people may be so called; but what the people consciously do for themselves through the government acting as their agent is not paternalism, but democracy. Democracy and paternalism is a contradiction in terms.

The first step, then, toward the solution of the civic problem is to popularize the government; to take it out of the hands of the politicians, and put it into the hands of the people. Obviously, the principle of home rule is a sound one. But home rule alone is not sufficient. Home rule may still be the rule of the boss or the ring. The end is not attained when the government of a city is located within its limits. It must be brought into right relations to the people. Not home rule, but self-rule, is the object to be attained. Hence, *direct legislation*, *popular initiative*, *the referendum*, and *popular veto* are measures which should be approved. These reforms will not remove all the evils of municipal life; but we shall not be on the direct path to a correct solution of the civic problem until these measures are enacted. There are evils of democracy; but the only cure for them is more democracy. All proposals, therefore, for lessening the activity and the influence of the people of a city in their own government should be frowned upon. The proposal of a restriction of the suffrage, whether by an educational or by a property qualification, is, I think, reactionary. Such restriction would deprive those who need it most of the experience and discipline without which they never would become good citizens. The immediate results might be better; but to prefer an immediate advantage to a deferred but greater good is not the mark of intelligence in a man or in a municipality.

Now, the problem of popularizing the government of a city is largely a problem of developing the civic consciousness, which,



in turn, is a problem of education. Hence, education in the school and in adult life should be consciously turned toward that end. The evils of city government are due in part to defective teaching in the schools. If the sociological standpoint were there taken; if relative social values were there always considered, and the habit of estimating them were there formed, there would be a readjustment of the curriculum and an improved quality of citizenship. If the voters of this generation had been taught in the schools the economic value of health and life, and the social effects of individual ignorance and action, the passage of a health ordinance — as, for instance, against spitting in public places — would never have been described as “four-flushing.” As the school, however, is not the only educational agency, we need not rely altogether upon it for civic education. There should be the widest diffusion possible of civic knowledge among adults. General publicity of the work of all departments of the municipal service should be secured, not merely by publications of interest to scholars only, but in a form that will appeal to the understanding and the interest of every voter.

Formal education, however, is not the only method of developing the collective will. It should be supplemented by experience. For this reason the public ownership of public utilities is to be encouraged, not only upon economic grounds narrowly conceived, but upon the highest civic grounds. Until the government of a city is lifted into the high prominence and commanding dignity which the performance of great functions, which touch closely the daily life of every citizen, gives it, the exercise of the right of suffrage will not be in the highest degree educational. From the sociological standpoint, then, municipal ownership is not merely an ideal to be striven for, it is an educational necessity.

By this general view of the civic problem I am led, then, to the conclusion that education and municipalization should be the watchwords of municipal reform. Of the details of legislation and governmental machinery I have not spoken; for time would not permit, even if I were competent to do so. But the things to which I have referred are fundamental. The socio-

logical standpoint, the standpoint of life, should be taken in the study of all civic and social questions. From this standpoint the civic problem is the problem of all-round civic well-being. The primary conditions of its solution are a purified and developed democracy, and an integrated and intelligent civic consciousness. There is no immediate and final solution of the problem, to be sure; but that is no excuse for inaction. Everything that leads to life should be desired and striven for, and the things which lead to destruction should be scorned and destroyed.

INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY. XVI  
PART III. GENERAL STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY  
CHAPTER VII. THE SOCIAL FRONTIERS (CONTINUED)  
SECTION VII. GAUL AND GERMANY—THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH

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In his *Atlas of Historical Geography* M. F. Schrader says:

The limits of Italy often changed in antiquity. . . . We see that the Romans never regarded the Alps as the natural and necessary frontier of Italy. In their eyes the Alps were only the geographical boundary of that country; the political limits were always traced either to the south or to the north of the range.

This observation is perfectly correct, although vague; after all that we have already pointed out, it would have been more exact if the author had concluded that there are no natural frontiers, but only social frontiers; then only are explained the continuous changes of frontiers, not only of ancient Italy, but of the Italy of the Middle Ages and of modern times as well, and even of those of all other societies, whether political or not.

In order to protect Italy and communicate with Spain, it was necessary to conquer Gaul. Likewise in order to make sure of Gaul, it would have been necessary to advance beyond the Rhine into Germany. There was, moreover, a further necessity imposed upon society, which was to procure through conquest the possibility of the continuous economic exploitation of the population of new territories. It was not exactly commercial outlets which Rome sought to create as do modern states, but rather to draw upon the labor and wealth of other peoples. The rigid law of property which she had established for the interior extended in a vaster form, through her *domination*, to the exterior.

We have here, however, to concern ourselves only with the



frontiers, and to seek the facts which may serve as the basis of a positive theory in regard to this main problem.

If we consult the works especially of G. de Mortillat upon prehistoric France and the formation of the French nation, and other works not less remarkable, and put them in relation with geographical facts, we observe, in the age of reindeer and of caves, the well-established existence of more than five hundred caverns scattered through half a hundred of the present departments of France. These caverns are in general distributed along, and on either side of, water-courses, streams, or rivers. Therefore, even at this remote period, water-courses, which were doubtless followed imperceptibly from source to mouth, no longer constituted, if they had ever done so, natural barriers or frontiers.

The same observation is applicable to the age of polished stone, characterized by megalithic monuments, dolmens, etc. The area of the megalithic monuments extends almost without interruption from the beaches of Norway and Sweden along the coast of western Europe to the shores of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunis; it follows the Rhone and the Saone upon either side, thence turns toward the east, through Chalons to Berlin. Outside of this extensive zone, embracing a uniform civilization, one does not find a trace of it; but, whatever its inner subdivision into distinct groups, one perceives that this civilization was already both fluvial and littoral. According to Alexander Bertrand, it reappeared on the one side as far away as the foot of the Caucasus, and on the other, in Lencoran in Transcaucasia.

All these cave and megalithic populations were subdued by the Celts, and they were, moreover, distinct from the Ligurians, whose area of expansion was almost entirely outside of the limit of the regions occupied by the megalithic populations.

Another Indo-European current was oriental. Starting from the Black Sea and the valleys of the Caucasus, or the great plains of the Don and the Volga, it followed the banks of the Danube and the Dneiper. It established the lacustrine cities in the Swiss lakes, and as far as Lake Bourget in Savoy, as well as in those of the valleys of the Danube, always indifferently upon both banks; and also in northern Italy.

According to d'Arbois de Jubanville, the oldest Celtic settlements were to the East of the middle Rhine in the basin of the Main and upon both banks of the upper Danube. Toward the end of the seventh century before our era, too cramped for room, or driven back by other tribes, they divided into two groups. The one, turning toward the North Sea, occupied the northern plains of Germany and the British Isles; the other crossed the Rhine and established itself between the Atlantic Ocean and the Alps, spreading later into Spain, where it dominated from the sixth century until the Carthaginian conquest effected between the years 236 and 218. All of these Celtic populations thus spread by following river basins and natural highways, and, when necessary, by crossing mountains. It was impossible to confine them between rivers or mountains; they even crossed the sea.

The Alps even were surmounted; the Celtic invasion of Italy was quickly followed by the taking of Rome by the Gauls in 390. Some established themselves in the valley of the Po; the others, toward the southeast in the region between the Appennines and the Adriatic. At the same time, other tribes occupied Pannonia and northern Thrace. The Celtic race touched the Black Sea, and thence spread into Galatia in Asia Minor. In Europe, just as in Asia, this civilization was essentially fluvial and continental, and in reality interfluvial. Other movements, of settlements, of repulse, and of replacement, were produced in succession at the same time with regional differentiations. Thus the Belgæ, driven out of Germany, settled from the Rhine to the Seine; others established themselves in the center of Gaul. The Belgæ also crossed the Channel and colonized Britain. As to the Ligurians, who occupied the whole basin of the Rhone and the upper portions of the Garonne and of the Seine, they were forced back toward the Mediterranean. All the divisions and subdivisions which were produced in the mass of the Celtic populations were social combinations, of which the mountains and the rivers were only accessory elements and by no means decisive.

At the coming of Cæsar, Gaul extended on the south to the middle and lower basin of the Garonne (it should be observed that it occupied both banks). On the east it touched and pene-

trated the Cevennes, and extended as far as the upper course of the Rhone; and, if it stopped at this river, it was because behind it was the Roman province, which was a social force. It included a part of Switzerland with its mountains and the upper course of the Rhine. From this point the Rhine served as its boundary, but was continually crossed in both directions. Gaul thus embraced a great number of fluvial basins: the Garonne, the Loire, the Seine, the Scheldt, the Meuse; and many orographic systems besides. It touched upon the Atlantic and the North Sea, and it crossed the Channel.

It would, however, be an error to consider Gaul as forming what we call a nationality. It was divided into tribes, which formed alliances and federations, following circumstances in a more or less permanent fashion, and which were divided among themselves by divergent social interests exploited by the ambition of the chiefs.

It is here necessary only to keep in mind that all the tribes occupied portions of basins; they were thus geographically interdependent; they were separated neither by rivers nor by mountains. This will prove to be a factor favorable to their fusion.

A number of years before our era, under Augustus, we find Gaul divided into three provinces—Belgic Gaul, Celtic Gaul, and Aquitaine. All the old territorial limits of the tribes or groups of tribes, already so slightly geographic, were overthrown. The Celtic province had henceforth only half of its old territory; that of Aquitaine was quintupled, including all the country between the Loire and the Garonne. In return, two Belgian *civitates* were annexed to the Celtic province, and three Celtic *civitates* to the Belgic. Even the number of *civitates* changed; from the year 10 B. C. to 20 A. D. the number increased from 60 to 64. Toward the year 400, Gaul included not less than 17 provinces and 113 cities. Both had become simple administrative, financial, and military divisions. As to the two parts of Germany, they were both independent of the Belgic province from a military point of view, and dependent from a civil and financial point of view. There can therefore be no question in regard to the natural frontiers of the tribes; for, supposing that there had been such, they



had disappeared, and there can no longer be any question regarding the supposed natural frontiers of Gaul, since it was included within the Roman Empire. What, then, are these pretended natural frontiers which never are frontiers?

In Gaul all the traditional forms of the tribes were overthrown at the point where we see the name of the chief generally substituted for that of the *civitas*. On the contrary, in the three Gauls we see the principal place take the name of the *civitas*; thus Lutetia was called Parisii.

Gaul was only a geographical expression; Galates and Gauls are Celts; they are the successive names of the same population. They crossed over the Pyrenees, and toward the northeast extended, by way of the valley of the Danube, as far as the Scythians, with whom they mixed at their extremities, and formed the Celtoscythians. All the consecutive divisions and differentiations of the Celts are purely sociological divisions and differentiations; that is to say, they are more complex than those which are only physical. The Germans themselves appear to have been only Celts or Gauls whose type was preserved in its purity for a longer time.

Less advanced in civilization than their brothers in Gaul proper, the Germans, according to Tacitus, still lived separately and dispersed, in discontinuous village settlements, surrounded by unoccupied territory. The lands were occupied by all the tribes successively, and in proportion to the number of cultivators; they were distributed according to the rank of each. The vast extent of their plains facilitated these divisions. They changed their pieces of ground each year, and there was always free land; they did not, therefore, need to take account of the fertility and the extent of their lands. They raised only wheat; they seem neither to have planted vineyards nor to have inclosed meadows. They were at once hunting, pastoral, and agricultural tribes, partly sedentary and partly migratory. According to Tacitus,<sup>1</sup> these populations were held within natural—that is to say, physical—limits: the Rhine, the Danube, the mountains, the ocean. But Tacitus recognized that the Cimbri, having set out from Jutland, encamped simultaneously upon both banks of the Rhine,

<sup>1</sup> *Germania*, I, xvi, xx.

where they left "vast remains of their camps and their inclosures." As to the Teutons and the Suevi, Marius and Cæsar were obliged to drive them out of Gaul, whither they had penetrated. Belgic Gaul included also populations considered Germanic.

Among the ancient Germans the tribe was still the fundamental force of society. Each of them dwelt within limits which were not physical, but fixed by agreement either previous to or after conflict. The German *mark* was a territory held in possession by a colony formed in primitive times of a family, or a larger or smaller related group. German colonization was effected through the creation of successive *marches*, which, even when German expansion had been carried very far, long preserved the character which we have already met with in the case of all *marches* whatsoever. In the *mark* each free member of the community had a right to the enjoyment of the forests, pastures, and arable land; this was only a right of usufruct or of possession. After each harvest, the plot of ground returned to the common holdings, and the German remained the permanent possessor of only the land upon which he dwelt, with its immediate surroundings. The Germans were also unacquainted with wills, although they permitted inheritance, in so far as the holding was considered the property of each head of a family. Inheritance took place in the following order: first, children; second, brothers; third, paternal and maternal uncles.

When the population of the *mark* became excessive, emigration and the formation of a new *mark* occurred. The same phenomenon was produced almost simultaneously in all the ancient *marks*, the emigrants forming enormous bands which searched for lands and wealth in the most distant countries beyond rivers and mountains. All the German *marks* adhered to this social organization. The Teutonic Mark was formed by a primitive establishment of a group of related persons among whom, as Cæsar said of the Suevi, the land was distributed *inter gentes et cognationes hominum*.

The *marks* most recently formed, those which were the most distant from the primitive *marks* and which found themselves at the extremities of the German possessions, upon the frontiers,

were naturally the most warlike; and still more was this true of the bands which set out *en masse* at random. We also see that always, or almost always, the *military marches* became the centers for the formation of great military states, and indeed of the greater part of those which constitute the great powers of modern Europe.

Such are the general laws of development of societies whose type is, in whole or in part, the *Mark-Genossenschaft*, and the *allmend* or ordinary *mark* of the Germans. This presents the strongest analogies with the primitive forms of populations which have not been in relation with Germany; for example, those found among the American tribes. However, these latter have in general a less evolved economic structure. Thus, while the Germans pastured their cattle in the *mark*, and had even established certain rules for the exploitation of the forests, and had distinguished a sort of private property from the common ownership, the Indian tribes, still in the hunting stage, recognized only common property, with the exception of certain movable objects. Already the German custom approached more nearly the Greek stage, where the free man was proprietor of his piece of ground, with a right of inheritance in favor of his family. But in Greece and among the American Indians, as well as among the Gauls and the Germans, the communistic forms reappeared regularly with greater or less distinctiveness in military colonization. The military, hunting, pastoral, or agricultural colony tended everywhere and always to reproduce the communistic type with its military accessories. The *mark*, whenever it has an economic form in military societies, is the most characteristic in the *military marches*, upon the extreme frontiers, while in the original centers this character tends to become more complex and to give birth to a peaceful development. In the interior the social development tends to become more and more differentiated from the military structure, whose force, on the other hand, increases in proportion as we approach the frontier.

The evolution, for example, of the possession of the soil, in spite of accessory variations, has followed almost everywhere an identical direction; namely: (1) right of possession of the



horde; (2) right of possession of the tribe; (3) right of possession of the clan; (4) right of possession of a family of the clan. Now, it is always on the frontiers of each civilization that the most simple forms are found; they are at the limits of the social space as they are at those of time.

When one observes that the *lex Salica* and the *Saxenspiegel* of the Germans reveal a customary right corresponding to the traditional usages of the American tribes, it is evident that these fundamental resemblances cannot be explained by imitation; and as it is true of possession and ownership, it is equally so in the case of the frontiers which are the external form of the combination of a population and a fixed territory — a combination out of which a society results.

Everywhere for genetic social structures with their corresponding frontiers we see substituted, under similar conditions, divisions whose bases are no longer natural, in the sense of physical or genetic. The same evolution occurs at the same stages, with the same essential characters, as well in Asia, in America, and in Africa as in Europe, and as well among the Aryans as among the Semites, the yellow, black, or red-skinned races. It is no more astonishing to see the ancient Peruvian capital divided into separate and unalterable quarters, according to the places of origin of the population, than to learn that the military forces were actually stationed in general in distinct districts and buildings, and even that each arm had its special quarters. In the Middle Ages, and even later, there were such quarters for every occupation, and also for inhabitants of different origins, as even today the names of a great number of our streets recall.

As the regional and genetic divisions tend to disappear, we see appearing simply numerical divisions, which recall only remotely the structure of the clan and of the family. Thus, the Hebrews were grouped in tens, fifties, hundreds, and thousands. These same subdivisions are met with everywhere under analogous conditions. Thus in Japan, according to Alcock,<sup>2</sup> in certain parts of the country there exists a sort of hierarchial system of chiefs of tens and of hundreds, the *otonos* of the towns and vil-

<sup>2</sup> *The Capital of the Tycoon.*

lages. They are responsible individually and collectively for the good conduct of their groups. The fact is that these Japanese towns and villages had a structure which was no longer that of the tribe or the clan. Japan, at the time when the above-mentioned author wrote, was in a situation analogous to that of our states of the Middle Ages, where we find the same kinds of division. Will anyone claim that Japan has *imitated* Europe of the Middle Ages? The most general conditions of the life of societies being everywhere the same, and the number of social combinations possible in view of adaptation to these conditions being limited, what wonder that the same forms are met with everywhere at the same stages? This is no more extraordinary than the homogeneity of the human species, or than the homogeneity of the evolution of each individual of this species. It is necessary to bear well in mind this leading sociological conception, that not only are all men of the same species, but that *human societies are also all of the same species*, in spite of their possible, but always limited and accessory, variations.

E. de Laveleye confirms the preceding observations relative to the simply arithmetical divisions which, at a certain moment, replace the genetic groupings, when he recalls, in *La propriété et ses formes primitives*, that in former times in Russia

every member of the society must enter a group of ten (*decanie*), which had as its mission the defense or the guarantee of all in general and of each in particular; that is to say, it was the function of the group of ten to avenge the citizen who belonged to it, and to exact the *wehrgeld*, if he had been killed; but at the same time it went security for all its members.

If the division into groups of ten took the place of that into communities of clans or of tribes, it was evidently because the social frontiers had passed beyond those of the tribes and the clans whose structure was broken down. The inner social divisions are always correlated with the general structure of the society or of the state, and notably with that of its frontiers.

As to the Russian *mir*, it still exists, as in France before the Revolution of 1789, and it still preserves certain village communities. The *mir* is in fact the village commune, formed by the descendants of the same family group of nomads who have

become sedentary. It has a judicial existence; it is proprietor of the soil; its members enjoy only usufruct or temporary possession; it is governed by the heads of families assembled in council under the presidency of the *starosta*, or mayor, chosen by them.

The same groupings, with the same delimitations, are met with in all civilizations at the same stage—in Egypt, in China, in India, in Persia, among the Semites, and the Aryans, Celtic, German, and Slavic. This internal organization, in connection with the technique and the modes of economic circulation and production, always corresponds to an organization adequate to the general structure of the societies, and notably to the frontiers which separate them from other societies.

In England, in the early centuries, the *hundred moot* was the basis of the social organization, as the assembly for local government. Every free man under Canute II and Edward the Confessor must be a member of a *hundred* and of a *tything*. Ten similar *gylds* formed a hundred (Stubbs). Under the Frankish law there was the *decanus* and the *centenarius*. Under the Merovingians it was likewise obligatory that every free man should be present at the assemblies, especially of centuries; fines were imposed for absence. In time of war the Germanic peoples, *when no other bond united them*, formed in families, and in companies under chiefs. These German chiefs had their *comites*.

Thus, when new groupings are formed no longer tending to be genetic, these new internal divisions correspond naturally to a larger extension of the frontiers.

[To be continued]



## ETHICS AND ITS HISTORY

THE DEPENDENCE OF ETHICS ON NATURAL SCIENCE, AND THE  
IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ETHICS AS PERSONAL  
EXPERIENCE AND ETHICS AS A SOCIAL PROFESSION

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It is a very commonplace remark that with each new event, or at least with each new important event, in the unfolding of human life and human experience, history needs to be rewritten. This remark, moreover, however commonplace, applies very forcibly to the history of ethics. Perhaps in the case of ethics the disturbing event is psychology; perhaps it is biology; perhaps it is sociology or anthropology; perhaps it is in practical instead of theoretical life, if the two may ever be divorced; but, whatever or wherever it be, there can be no doubt that the science of ethics, which studies the phenomena of the moral life, is no longer commonly viewed, or even commonly defined in the books, as it used to be, and that the standards of morality in many quarters have changed in significant ways. A change in the definition would be enough to call for a new history.

And so, as my subject, "Ethics and its History," will now suggest, in this paper it is my purpose to indicate what I conceive to be the most timely definition of "ethics," and then, by use of an important distinction between ethics as real personal experience and ethics as a social profession, to show, through an illustration or two, how in the history of ethics the definition has been exemplified. To use history as an illustration in this way will be also to indicate how the history itself should be rewritten.

If, then, after the manner of certain mystics, we should begin our present task by seeking a symbol of this wonderful thing which so glibly we are wont to call "human life," we could find

nothing so adequate as the question-mark. Stars, crosses, triangles, circles, would stand for something, but the question-mark would tell most; nay, it seems as if the question-mark would tell all. Since life began, life has had its fundamental questions. Moreover, these questions, the typically philosophical questions—What is the world? What am I? What is God? or, How do I have knowledge? What ought I to do? and, What may I hope for?—these questions, in spite of occasional variations in form, have been, on the whole, as constant as they have been perennial; they have, indeed, been so constant, and have so truly been perennial, in their nature that some men, through losing sight of what the question really is, have even denied that philosophy has ever had or ever could have a real history. Still, on such a view the question-mark could hardly be a suitable symbol of life; and as for the nature of the question itself, instead of being a mere collocation of words followed by a little curve, snakelike in appearance and peculiarly depressing to the dot below called a period, it is a real, living experience, in which all the interests and relations of the inquirer or inquirers are moving with power. A grammatical form is always dead; it is only a mummy, revived in imagination for dramatic or rhetorical purposes; and, in view of this fact, men should not let it or its constant form determine their ideas of history. Who sees only the formal questions or the equally formal answers that have been deposited through the centuries by the course of events, should hardly expect to find a real history of philosophy in general, or of any of its special branches.

Of the question in general still more needs to be said before we can turn to the ethical question, which is, of course, our special interest. Thus, it seems worth remarking—though there will be little difference of opinion in the matter—that life's questions, like life's experiences at large, are not strictly departmental, are not independent of each other. To ask any one of them is to involve all the others; and, equally, to answer any one is to involve answers to all the others. This is, of course, a familiar fact of positive history, not to say also of general personal experience; but perhaps it has not always been

reflected upon to the appreciation of its full meaning; to the appreciation, for example, of the intimacy between, What ought to be? and, What really is? If, however, it serves here only to strengthen the idea that every question is more than its manifest, articulated form, enough has been said. Of much more importance is the following. If the real question be indeed a living experience, in which, as was said, all the interests of the inquirer are moving with power, then, in a certain very significant way, every question must determine its answer. An answer cannot be external to a real question or, more fully, to the conditions under which the real question has been asked. In short, the real question is necessarily what is known as a "leading" question; for the conditions of its putting determine its reply. Two and two equal what? Given certain equations containing  $x$  and  $y$ , what are the values of  $x$  and  $y$ ? Here, very obviously, we have leading questions; they are leading "to a degree;" but they are not different in kind from all others. I was once in the class of a good old German pedagogue, whose questions were often only German sentences with the rising inflection at the end in place of the auxiliary verb. The pupil was allowed to reply by supplying the verb; in German not a very difficult matter. Sunday-school instruction is often as childlike. Still, except for the needlessly light exercise required of the pupils in these cases, the method is pedagogically and psychologically sound. In our modern laboratories those who put questions to nature do so only by arranging their experiments in such a way that the answer is bound to come out of the conditions of the inquisitive experimentation, not out of the proverbial clear sky. Neither the worst of pedagogues nor the feeblest of investigators makes inquiries about the price of wheat, given the cost per dozen of Florida oranges; nor about the effect of gravity on a pound of feathers, granted the logical correctness of Descartes' famous argument for the existence of God. Even their questions are leading questions, having in themselves, as they are formulated, the answers always determined, although, of course, not fully worked out. Answers spring from questions very much as oaks from acorns. Who is not enough of a poet to hear the buried



seed ask of nature what it really is? Who is not enough of a psychologist to detect in every formulated question a movement toward its own answer?

And in another way every real question is a leading question. Thus it can never have more than a tentative reply. A reply that claimed more than tentative value, than the value of a working hypothesis, would betray its origin most shamefully. Nowhere so fully as in modern science is this principle recognized; it belongs to scientific etiquette or morality—which should I say? Yet not in science alone does it impose its responsibilities on human thinking. Throughout the length and the breadth of human experience, answers take form only to aid in re-defining the old, old questions. Like oaks, answers are valuable only because they are not final, but useful, being the means to further life, the instruments of continued inquiry. So is the perennial question evidence of real history, not evidence against it.

These three things, then, I have wished to bring to mind at the beginning of this paper: (1) the only tentative nature, which is also to say the really historical value, of the answer to any question; (2) the seedlike character of every question; and (3) the intimate dependence at once of all questions, and all answers—especially of, What ought to be? and, What is?—upon each other. These three things have an important bearing upon the true nature of ethics, and upon the proper way of reading or writing the history of ethics.

Turning now to the consideration of the ethical question, the question which ethical theory has always sought to answer, from among the philosophical questions already given here our selection is easy. Thus, personally, what ought I to do? Or, more objectively, man being what he is, what ought man to do? What is the ideal life of a human being? Such is the ethical question, and it sounds, and often it has been interpreted, as an inquiry for something quite apart from what is, from what is manifest and actual. With a meaning that to me has never been altogether intelligible, although I remember for a time to have received it as somehow highly edifying, ethics is often called a "normative" science. It is not an "objective" science, the con-

tention runs; it is not a truly "scientific" science. Ethics would grasp the ideal of another world, not the real of this; it has a causation all its own; a living creature that is absolutely *sui generis*; even a validity that rests ultimately on emotion rather than on reason, perhaps on spiritual emotion, perhaps—if there be any difference, and this *if* is a point frequently in controversy—on the emotions of sense; and, besides all these, ethics has had other peculiarities too numerous to mention. But, after all has been said, the fact stands out, I think, that the real appeal of all ethical inquiry has been sooner or later to the world of the actual; or say, rather, to the sciences giving report of that world and of its laws, chiefly, no doubt, to the anthropological sciences, notably psychology, yet in some measure to all the sciences, even to physics and astronomy; and for my part it is hard to see where else ethical inquiry should go or could go. Surely, if life's questions are dependent on each other, What is? and, What ought to be? among the rest; and if, again, any real question is a leading one, having its answer in the actual conditions that have given it rise, any other appeal would be unnatural. And on most general principles it simply passes my comprehension how what is ideal can ever be known except through the evidence of what is actual. Can one's moral life be anything more than one's real life? Can there be any *ought* in life that is not true to the conditions of life, to what is in life? If so, then, among other things, the use that ethical inquirers in the past have undoubtedly made, although often with much parade of condescension, of the objective sciences is only one more sign—in quarters where, if anywhere, it would and should be least expected—of man's remarkable capacity for going wrong.

Yet here somebody objects vigorously that, in spite of ethics' *use* of the objective sciences, its history in general is far from warranting the assertion of its real dependence on them. Ethics in history has always been, the objector declares, a search after the *summum bonum*, a discussion of such things—save the mark!—as duty, pleasure, happiness, freedom, and the like; and its occasional use of the objective sciences has been only like the Mad Hatter's use of figures to show what was to be proved,

not to prove anything; or like the dogmatic theologian's discovery and use of analogies in nature to establish his doctrines of the supernatural. All this may perhaps for a time save the face of ethics as a "normative" science, although its unhappy, yet inevitable, association with the Mad Hatter or the analogy-of-religion-to-nature theologian must bring some immediate discomfiture; but the true evidence of history is just one of the questions of fact that have been raised in this paper, so that the case of our vigorous advocate of a "normative" ethics in history must await the further development of our present argument.

Without more ado, therefore, I am constrained to define ethics, not as the science of what ought to be, nor as a normative science in any way dealing with a life of conformity to what is ideal as opposed to the real or actual, nor even as the science of moral conduct; for these are all misleading definitions, the best of them too much hampered by certain traditional meanings and sentiments; but *almost* pragmatically as "science of practical life"<sup>1</sup>—in the hope perhaps of deepening the ideas both of science and of what is truly practical—or, more fully and with some change of emphasis, as the *science which studies and interprets the conditions of action with a view to action*. So defined, ethics is made, to the satisfaction of everybody I think, as much art as science. Also, at the height of its theoretical or scientific enthusiasm it may appeal to a complete account of nature, nature being—is it not?—only the totality of the conditions of man's activity; or—more practically, at least in the opinion of most—it may appeal to the distinctly anthropological sciences, such as psychology, sociology, and anthropology in the narrower sense; but whichever of these appeals it makes, the more theoretical or the more practical, it is plainly and properly depending on something as sound and basal as reality for its determination of what ought to be. A demand, in short, for well-informed, nay for always better-informed, conduct, and a conviction that conduct is moral or ideal, not to say also effective or practical, only as it is consciously loyal to reality—such is ethics now; and such in effect, if not always clearly in its own conceit, or unwittingly, if

<sup>1</sup> Vide Fite, *Introduction to the Study of Ethics*, pp. 6 f.



not always openly and consciously, ethics has been throughout history.

As study of the conditions of action with a view to action, ethics is plainly in accord with what was said of all questions properly being leading questions; for to define ethics so is only to say in a special way that the answer to a question must be found in just those things which have given the question its rise and determined the manner of its putting. Two and two are what? Two and two are four. Man ought to do what? Man ought to do, only more simply and directly, more wisely and more effectively, more as if in a single sum, what he has always been doing. Still, let us now turn to ethical inquiry in history, and see how there our present view of ethics has been exemplified.

Without going into any of the details of history, whether of the history of the Greeks or of the history of the English, by both of whom peculiarly significant contributions to ethical theory have been made, it is safe to say, without fear of being charged with dogmatism, that the inquiry, What ought man to do? has always arisen as a most natural incident of a changing life. Has conduct ever become problematic, either in isolated personal experience, or in experience involving a whole class or a whole people, then there has been change of a more or less violent and radical sort; and this is merely to say that the ethical question—not to mention what may be true of the other questions also—is simply an incident of that conflict, typical in all life, between the old and the new; the old as something that, because most certainly having a part in what is real, is bound to survive, and the new as something that, because with equal certainty having a part in what is real, is bound in its turn to be born. The old and the new, what is conservative and what is radical, what is formed and what is unformed, law and license, the institution and the free life, reason and sense, or finally man, that is, civilized man, and nature—these, in their natural conflict, each having some claim to recognition—else there would be no real conflict—have ever given rise to ethics; and these, being the formative conditions of ethical inquiry, have determined also—

the question itself, remember, being a leading one—the peculiar answers, so familiar to all students of history, of duty and pleasure, or loyalty and personal desire, given, as constantly and as perennially as the question has been asked, by idealism, sometimes more characteristically called rigorism, and hedonism.

That duty and pleasure, as moral ideals given in apparent answers to the question of ethics, correspond to the two conflicting interests, the old and the new, which have aroused the question itself, can hardly need any special explanation; but the fact itself is full of significance, as will very speedily appear. First, however, finding in duty the appropriate ideal of conservatism, we must observe several things, and among them that conservatism cannot assert itself without becoming at once supernaturalistic. Man cannot, after the manner of the conservative, treat his institutions, the established forms and tenets of his life, as having intrinsic worth, without in just so far ascribing to them a more than natural authority. No doubt, too, there is a peculiar justice, intensely interesting to anyone studying the logic of history, in the fact that, with important changes and the ensuing assertion of conservatism, the idea of sanctions from another world, always darkly suggestive of something new, of something to come, should get possession of the minds and hearts of men; but, the justice and the logic of it aside, certainly nothing is more pertinent to the conflict of the time. Think but a moment how the doctrine of the divine right of kings did not precede, but grew out of, the conflict between monarchy and democracy in early modern times, and you will have an excellent illustration of the point here under discussion. Conservatism in any form must be dogmatic, and its necessary dogmatism makes it supernaturalistic. Hence its ideal, duty, has always been as if imposed from without, as if having power and right from another world. Moreover, on the other hand, if duty is thus a supernatural visitor, pleasure, the appropriate ideal of radicalism, is infra-natural, carrying its devotee below the bounds of what can be natural to any living creature. Most surely mere pleasure is quite as far from what is natural as abstract duty. "Seek pleasure," as the principle of conduct, is neither more nor less practical than, "Do

what you do only for duty's sake." Both are unworldly; both, to devise a word free from any invidious distinctions, are extra-natural.<sup>2</sup>

Nor is the extra-naturalism the only thing to be said here of rigorism and hedonism. Their ideals, besides being other-world visitors, are also bound to be formal and empty. Perhaps other-world visitors must always have this ghostly character; but duty and pleasure as ideals are unavoidably possessed with it. Duty may, indeed, be the appropriate exhortation of the conservative, but just in being made an ideal it becomes generalized. Can a man teach or preach patriotism to the American people without making patriotism apparent to them as something broader and deeper than devotion to their own country; without, perhaps, illustrating his theme by the history of other peoples; in short, without making the Americans cosmopolitan even while he would make them patriotic? Can a man urge loyalty to a particular creed without raising loyalty itself, say loyalty to any creed whatsoever, higher than the creed in question? Can a man, then, bid his fellows to do their duty, even though he has in mind very definite things that he wishes done, without extolling duty in the abstract above the particular things? Again, pleasure may be the appropriate ideal of radicalism; but just in being made an ideal it, too, becomes generalized. A man may be a constant devotee of pleasure, as reckless and lawless and unconventional as you please; but let someone come to him and say: "Now be just what you are; make this pleasure-life your ideal life; raise your very appropriate standard where it can be seen of men and live under it;" and at once, if he takes heed, he is thrown quite off his feet. From having the form of something good to eat, or an interesting novel, or a visit to the theater, his pleasure has suddenly flown from the present things of this world and become an ideal without any determinable character.

<sup>2</sup> Thus "extra-natural" is a generic term intended to include "supernatural" and "infra-natural." As to the invidious distinction involved in the application of these opposed terms, for my part I do not care whether duty or pleasure is called supernatural. According to Paley, Christianity would view pleasure so; and, in any case, the opposition of the two, of the super- and the infra-natural, is the only significant factor.



To seek it, just as to do only what is duty, is to try to shake hands with an intangible, invisible, wholly insensible spirit. Pleasure, then, and duty, although the pertinent ideals of radicalism and conservatism, are evidently only pure principles or spirits of life; they are not, and as ideals they cannot be, programs for life. The hedonism and the rigorism, which advocate them, have no choice but to say, as they defend their standpoints: "We mean not the program, but the principle; not the letter, which is apparently associated with our life, but the spirit." "Not the letter, but the spirit," has ever been the last fortress, the inner citadel, of extra-naturalism in any form.

And not only do we need here to observe that duty and pleasure are extra-natural, and that they both have the merely formal character of abstract principles; but also we need to remind ourselves that they are opposed, and that accordingly they do but repeat or continue the conflict out of which the ethical question, that one or the other of them is supposed to answer, has sprung. We need to remind ourselves of this fact of their opposition, because, taken in connection with their extra-naturalism and their purely formal character, it shows, as perhaps nothing else could, the real significance of their relation to the interests of the conflicting old and new. It shows, in a word, that they afford no real settlement of the ethical problem. Can what is extra-natural, formal, and never without an opponent having equal demands, ever really answer such a practical question as that of ethics? What ought man to do? Can the conclusive solution of any problem come from either one of the parties to the conflict that is, or that makes, the problem?

Evidently, in the genesis of ethical theory, rigorism and hedonism alike belong to the class of doctrines, or intellectual formulations, commonly known as apologetics. They are characteristically *ex parte*; they are one-sided, then, and so dogmatic; they are extra-naturalistic. Their opposition, too, makes them apologetic or on the defensive. Perhaps all formulations of doctrine, particularly of philosophical doctrine, arising no doubt under similar or even under the same conditions, are apologetic on all these counts; but, be this as it may, with the general

principle we are not now concerned. Sufficient unto the moment is the conclusion that rigorism and hedonism are apologetic in character, and are in consequence, just as much of what has been said already has suggested, necessarily abstract and artificial, impractical and, so far as satisfying ethical interest, altogether inadequate, being in themselves, whether singly or collectively, no intelligible indication of *what* man ought to do. Perhaps their formal abstract character, their common innocence of any positive applicability, reduces to a minimum, or even to zero, the opprobrium of their partisanship and opposition; but they are not on that account answers to the important question, although, as will hereafter appear, taken together they may make a sort of mold, into which the desired answer can be put. They may make a mold; but as yet we must see this mold as quite without content, save for the opposition or tension between the two parts.

And the opposition or tension between the two parts is only the ethical question over again, but defined in terms of the demands which the conditions of its rise and articulation have put upon the answer. The questioner finds himself standing between two principles, whose *opposition* has made his question; and we may imagine him to say first to the rigorist: "Yes, there is that I ought to do;" and then to the hedonist: "Life must, indeed, bring pleasure, else it is surely not for me; but how does either of these things satisfy my hunger for what is concrete? Your duty and your pleasure are only the formal demands that must be met together and equally before my hunger can be appeased. You say they may not be mingled; but I know their mingling is just what my problem is; and if you have nothing more to offer except a choice of the two things, both of which I must have to really solve my difficulty, then I must simply thank you for telling me so well what my problem is, and look elsewhere for its answer."

With this speech from the ethical inquirer for a minute or two let us leave the field of ethics, and, for the sake of an illustration, turn to that of natural science, which for the time being we may assume to be quite independent. The scientific question

is this: What is nature? Now, I can hardly say between its lines, but behind its three words, this question, just because of the circumstances in experience that have brought it into expression, involves nothing more nor less than the problem of finding something that is both a thing and a law, both substantial and ideal. The question raises the issue of nature's law, presupposing her abstract lawfulness; and of her substance, presupposing from the start her substantiality; so that, as was said, the real difficulty to be met is to determine what nature is as both law and substance. In other words, the distinction between law and substance, or mind and matter, is exactly like that between duty and pleasure; a distinction, in the first place, arising with, or involved in, the putting of the question; and, in the second place, both showing the question to be a very real one, and marking the demands necessarily imposed upon the answer. Can a mere theory or a mere formula, however high or strong mathematically, answer the question? Or can a brute force answer the question? No; the only acceptable answer lies in something concrete that is both law and force; say, for example, in a machine, in an effective application of the theoretical to the physical and substantial. The method of science today—so dependent on experimentation and on the mechanical devices of experimentation, and in this dependence so incapable of confining itself within its laboratories, its successful applications there passing out into practical life—shows this very clearly. Once more, then, like the case of science is the case of ethics. As the real solution of the scientific problem must lie in something concrete that is both law and substance, so the real solution of the ethical problem must lie and in the past always has lain, in something concrete uniting both duty and pleasure, satisfying the demand of one for order in life, and of the other for vital interest and delight.

Now, what may this something concrete, this veritable *summum bonum* of the ethical consciousness, be? How may inquiring man attain to it? How in the past has he attained to it? These are now our queries. Rigorism and hedonism having been weighed in the balance and, except for their part in formulating the ethical problem, found wanting, we must ourselves



search for what they have proved unable to provide. By replying to an objection, moreover, that has for some time been pressing for attention, we shall find ourselves well on our way in this search.

The objection, strangely enough, is again in the form of an appeal to history. Thus the objector asserts that history shows unmistakably how the ideals of duty and pleasure have been more than the pure abstractions with which they have been identified here; how they have been, not merely the inspiration of philosophical systems, positively and concretely interesting to scores of thinkers, but also the avowed standards and programs of whole classes of society in practical life. Also, apart from the evidence of history, we are told that both have their devotees now. History, however, is much too easily read by many people, the present objector among them. Whether in reading history or in reading the life of the present time, it is a very serious error to take any character that determines a distinct social class for evidence of a well-rounded, self-sufficient experience, or, say, for a true unity of experience. From the social distinction between conservatives and radicals, and again between those who follow duty and those who follow pleasure; between the rigorists, whether in practice or in theory, and the hedonists, the historian has no right to deduce two separate, self-sufficient modes of life, or two independent, and accordingly satisfactory, solutions of the problem of ethics. The conditions of the rise of that problem, and their demands upon the solution of it, hold quite as forcibly for social as for personal experience. Conservatives and radicals, rigorists and hedonists, as forever at war with each other, exhibit, not distinct wholes or unities of experience, but only the social or phylogenetic expression of the very conflict that dwells within the fact of their being in any form, personal or social, ontogenetic or phylogenetic, such a thing as ethical inquiry. It is true that distinct social characters have so commonly been regarded as meaning wholly distinct things—wholly distinct sorts of people, for example, or modes of life or views of conduct—that the present view, while not at all novel in some quarters, is sure to meet with considerable resistance;

but the arguments which have brought us where we are, and which would make us read both the past and the present in our own way, seem unassailable. Whether we have been thinking of inquiry or of the answer to inquiry, or of any other incident in experience, we have been dealing with something that may be said to be superior to the distinction between what is personal and what is social. There can be no personal experience without its large-written expression in society. There can be no social divisions or distinctions that are not within every individual person. In short, for all the incidents of human experience the personal and the social are so intimate with each other that, though the distinguishing characters which determine social classes may make professions, they cannot make, and should not be interpreted as making, such wholes of experience as belong to personality. Society, the social environment, is only the writing on the wall of personal life. The social professions—conservatism and radicalism, rigorism and hedonism among the rest—only show society as a whole dividing the labor of maintaining socially the same unity of human experience that belongs to the life of every individual person.

This distinction between the profession, as the basis of class distinctions in society, and the unity of experience as to be found only in either society as a whole or the personal individual, is a very important one.<sup>3</sup> It suggests what the real function of society may be. Thus the professions of the many social classes, by the specialism which their division of the labor of experience makes possible, are of incalculable value to the individual. I have called society the writing on the wall. It is also, through the specialism of its different professional classes, the individual as seen under a microscope, each phase of his life being professionally separated from the rest, and exaggerated or magnified for public scrutiny many diameters. Every individual, too, is bound to have his professional associations, so that he is sure in some

<sup>3</sup> For other discussions of this distinction see two articles, "History and Materialism," *American Historical Review*, July, 1905, and "The Personal and the Factional in Social Life," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Method*, July 6, 1905. These articles were written some months later than this present one, which the accidents of publication have delayed.

measure to reap the advantages of the peculiar labor of the social life, of the writing on the wall, of the microscopic exposure; but —and this brings us back to our special interest— no profession, no social affiliation, has ever, in and of itself made a well-rounded experience, a unity of experience for any personal individual. The individual's profession is more safely viewed as his environment, or at least as a part, of course the less remote part, of his environment, with reference to which he has his truly personal experience. Thus, society may be divided professionally into honest men and thieves; and however dishonest the thieves may be professionally, it is proverbially true that personally honor dwells among thieves; and however honest the honest men may be professionally, it is true, though perhaps not proverbial, that thieving has as often used the laws as broken them. Think, too, of the intense party fealty among radicals, of the arbitrariness of conservatism, of the current leisure of labor and the labor of capital, and you will get the meaning here. No profession settles personal life one way or the other. No profession relieves the individual of that from which it seems itself to stand aloof. In short, all the differences and conflicts of life belong within the unity of experience, so that no mere class affiliation can ever solve any problem—be it ethical, religious, political, or what you will—in human experience.

Accordingly, the evidence of history, or of the social life at the present time, can really give no support to the objection that was raised. Conservatives and radicals, rigorists and hedonists, in human society only show the professional development of the ethical question as still a question. They emphasize, by their natural magnification, the demands that the conditions under which the question arises make upon the answer; they do not give an answer themselves. They only tempt the ethical inquirer to say again: "If you have nothing more to offer except a choice of two things, both of which I must have really to solve my difficulty, then I must simply thank you for telling me so well what my problem is, and look elsewhere for its answer."

Looking elsewhere for the answer, for that something concrete which, by uniting both duty and pleasure, will be the



veritable *summum bonum* of the ethical consciousness, means, socially, as what has just been said above would indicate, and as the historian should make a point of remembering, to appeal for help from the professional rigorists and hedonists to the profession of natural science; and it means, personally, to supplement sentiment about duty or pleasure with a careful study of the situation. After all that has been said above, it may not be necessary to say here that science as a profession is to be distinguished from science as a personal experience; but, whether professional or personal, it is study of the conditions of action. Its professional expression may search life more broadly and more deeply; it may be protected by the *esprit de corps* of the class that has assumed its special labor; and, just because of its greater breadth and depth, and because of its being the standard of a distinct class, it may be slow to get application in real life; but none of these things affects its ultimate use in life or its real relation to life. Personal or socially professional, as was said, it is always scrutiny of the situation; it is study of environment as comprising the conditions of action; and it has an important part in the solution of the problem of conduct.

So are we once more reminded of our definition of ethics: *study of the conditions of action with a view to action*. If class characters could be taken for wholes of experience, ethics might still keep itself aloof from such study, or resort to such study only in the Mad Hatter's or the analogy-of-religion-to-nature theologian's condescending way; it might be self-contained and self-sufficient in its devotion to its abstract extra-naturalistic ideals, depending for the zest of its pursuits only on the brilliant contests between its two great parties; it might boast itself literally a science of the ideal, a "normative" science, a science with its own peculiar methods and criteria; and its historian might busy himself only with the rigorists here and the hedonists there, as they play at their unending logomachies, in his historical explanations turning to science and to other factors in the contemporary life of society, very much as a would-be poet sometimes uses metaphors, only for their ornamental and hit-or-miss illustrative value; but the class-character never is a whole of experience,

and before this simple fact the entire fabric of a self-sufficient, "normative," ideal-bartering ethics, with its peculiar history, and its many other conceits about causation, a living creature *sui generis*, and the rest, goes hopelessly to pieces. Professional ethics has its place, and its important place, in the life of society; its more or less technical doctrines of duty and pleasure have very naturally aided society; yet, with all due allowance for professional etiquette and privilege, for the value of professional jealousy and exclusiveness, it is, after all, like any other profession, in constant need of remembering that its conceits do not justify dogmas, and that, in spite of its name and good intentions, even morally it is not—with apologies for the phrase—the whole thing.

But somebody now reminds me that the argument of this paper is still defective, and defective in a very important point. How science as study of the conditions of action really meets the natural demands of the ethical question by supplying that "something concrete uniting both duty and pleasure," has not yet been made evident. To this special point, then, I must turn in conclusion. Thus, science, whether personal or professional, meets the demands of ethics, first, through what it reveals; second, through the methods it employs; and, third, through the attitude it inculcates; or let me say through its message, through its institutions, and through its spirit.

As to the message of science, its peculiar ethical worth, its reconciliation of duty and pleasure, lies in the fact that, whatever restraints it imposes, it assumes from beginning to end that the ideal dwells in the real. Is life so simple a thing as a race? Very well; you are racing, with all the zest of the life that is within you, across the hills and fields. Suddenly, as you break through a thicket, a brook confronts you, and you stop abruptly. What are you to do? You only half articulate the question to yourself; you run up and down, partly from mere force of habit, partly to vary your view; with a careful eye you measure this distance and that, the position of a stump or a stone, the depth of the water, perhaps even the force of the current; and then, the looking and trying over, you almost surprise even yourself

with a leap, let me believe a successful leap; and on you go, living as before, only more alive than ever for the success. In that moment of the looking and trying before leaping you were a scientist; not professionally, it is true, for you were in no laboratory, and had no carefully selected material, and were without instruments of precise measurement; but nevertheless personally and vitally. Out of just such looking and trying before leaping, moreover, the social profession of science, with all its instruments and its methods, has been developed. You were a scientist, then; and what your science taught you was just what, runner that you were, you both ought to do and most decidedly would do. The study of the conditions of action manifested in the course of action—which is exactly what science is when stripped of its professional disguises—always reveals at once an *ought* and a *would*, a duty and a pleasure; and it reveals these, moreover, in a thoroughly concrete way, finding the ideal only in what is real and manifest.

The methods and instruments of science, secondly, show how science meets the inquiry of ethics with something concrete uniting both duty and pleasure. Science is, above all else, experimentation; it is trying as well as looking before leaping; and in the methods and instruments it employs, be they the rules of thumb and the crude tools of ordinary experience, or the careful methods and precise instruments of professionally trained investigation, he who runs can read loyalty without bondage to the old, and regard without abandon to the new. Experimentation, whether in the science of direct personal interest or in professional science, deals, of course, with the concrete, and this besides; it is plainly as conservative as it is radical, relying on its past for the methods and instruments with which it achieves its future, and even taking these very methods and instruments up into the achievement and making them vitally a part of it. Is not every experiment as much a test of the means employed as of the particular objects experimented upon?<sup>4</sup>

Earlier in the course of this paper the demand of natural

<sup>4</sup>On the conservatism of pure science, see an article, "Some Unscientific Reflections upon Science," *Science*, July 2, 1902.



science for something that is both substantial and ideal, both a thing and a law, was referred to, and the suggestion was then made that this demand was always answered in a machine, that is, in an efficient application of the theoretical—the looking—to the physical and substantial—the leaping. Now, such a machine has many names in human life, depending on the particular relations it may assume. Such a machine is anything that is practically serviceable or useful to the maintenance of life's activities. Allowing a certain amount of abstraction, which any particular relation, indeed, always implies, we may see it in some subjective or in some objective form, or again we may see it as directly a utility of a personal life or as a social utility. Thus, socially, when viewed subjectively—that is, with reference to the standpoint of science, or of any other profession for that matter—it is an established method, or the accepted instruments, of observation and expression; and when viewed objectively, it is the instituted life as a whole, as the total social environment of the different professional activities; while, personally, when viewed subjectively, it is a developed habit, even what we sometimes call a character, or the immediate conditions and instruments of personal life, including peculiarities of dress, language, and the like, which are so much more truly subjective than objective; and, when viewed objectively, it is, first, the professional life, in which as member of a class the individual has his more or less mechanical part, and then the outer environment as a whole. Under whatever name or form it appears, however, it certainly stands for something concrete, for something that is as concrete as life and the conditions of life; and in bringing both order and freedom into natural human activity it, in just so far, meets the two demands of the question of ethics. It both is satisfying and, because experimental or mediative, is an earnest of something yet more satisfying. Since life began, thanks to its habit of both looking and trying before leaping, no one of the instruments of its activity has failed to lead to a worthier, more efficient exemplar of itself; and a life with instruments that have thus had part in their own making, and that

must continue to make improvements upon themselves, is both dutiful and pleasant.

My point, possibly not yet clear, is just this. Science has its message, its doctrinal formulæ, its discovered knowledge about the world in which we live, and through this message it serves ethical inquiry in a practical way, supplying something actual and concrete, imparting realistic information, but it has also more than this and serves life in another way. Indeed, knowledge itself, or information, or consciousness generally, is not something we simply have about us, as we have money in our pockets or treasures on a shelf; it is functional, or organic, to our whole nature. Thus, besides standing for intellectual discoveries it stands also for the development of acquired activities into appreciated powers or instruments, the aforesaid "instruments of science." These instruments, too, are not merely those to be found in a laboratory; they comprise also the various developed conditions of social and personal life. Thus, there is psychological or sociological as well as historical significance in the fact that an age of scientific investigation is always an age of conventionalism and utilitarianism, an age, then, in which forms, rites, conditions of personal and social organization, are becoming mere utilities, just as there is psychological, not merely biographical significance in the fact that any individual, turned reflective and studious, leads a life in the world of things and affairs, a practical life, that is perfunctory and mechanical, or, in other words, only instrumental. An age of science, then, is one in which life's developed activities, or modes of special organization, are getting into use. To begin with, these activities are used for exploration, in investigation, and the like, but in the end, their development into utilities becoming even more complete, they are the appropriated means to a new mode of life, perhaps a new civilization. History seems to move by the institutes of one era becoming the instruments of the next, and the changes thus indicated are an important part of the reply to the problem of conduct.

It would be interesting at this point to discuss in detail some, or even all, of the different forms of life's machines that have just been brought to mind. The methods and instruments of

precision, for example, which belong peculiarly to professional science, are interesting as showing how a lawful, responsible nature has been made, so to speak, to observe and measure herself; and in personal life the experimental nature of habit, or the one habit of treating all other habits as experiments, also invites attention. But I can speak now only of the social institution. The institution is not infrequently described as crystallized experience, and certainly in social evolution it takes form during a period of intellectual fermentation. The rise of the Roman state or of the Roman church will occur to many as an illustration, for Rome shows the treasures or attainments of the previous civilizations become utilities. Rome, the Roman law, and the Roman institutions generally took form out of the intellectual activities that had accompanied the decline and the leveling conflicts of the earlier civilizations in Greece and in the east and the south; and if that intellectual activity was an effort on man's part to determine what his life really was, and what its proper ideals were, it is to be added at once that the great professionally ethical systems of Stoicism, which represented the standpoint of rigorism, and Epicureanism, representing the standpoint of hedonism, served together as a solvent for the entrance of Rome, concrete something that she was, into the life of the Mediterranean peoples. Also the skepticism of the time, which of course was not foreign to the spirit of the ethical teachings, although professionally it found independent formulation, is seriously misunderstood if taken to mean that men relinquished absolutely the fruits of their past. They relinquished only their personal and racial conceits; the fruits of the past remained, but as impersonal or non-human products, and so as quite available resources; and the skepticism served only to bring those available resources into positive use. Free use is always of material things, not of personal, national, or racial treasures; and the skepticism made things of all that the past had to give; it made the things which Rome used—whether for her law or for her games. Moreover, no sooner was Rome well established than her conflict with Christianity set in; a conflict in which she took a losing part; and her final conversion to Christianity



meant, above all else, that the life of her people could receive the form, which she had so skilfully developed, only as a means to an end, not as an end in itself; only as a great experiment, not as a finish to all things.

And every institution is like Rome. Every institution is a product of the skepticism that makes material things out of human conceits or personal effects; every institution enters life through the solvent of Stoicism and Epicureanism; and every institution is bound to be converted to Christianity. However large the scale, then, or however small, the institution shows society answering its question about human life, not dogmatically, but experimentally; and, in giving form to its answer, depending, as Rome depended, on the double sanction of duty and pleasure. Habits, methods, characters, tools, as well as laws and governments, are institutions.

But, thirdly and lastly, the attitude or spirit of science is also satisfying to the ethical question. The "study of the conditions of action manifested in the course of action" is not a mere way to morality; it is itself a part of morality. The treatment, too, of all the developed forms of experience as means, not ends; as instruments of experimentation, not completed and intrinsically valuable products, is also positively moral; it is not more and not less moral than the ethical question itself, to which the experimental forms are given in reply. The question is a leading question, first, because its answer must spring from the conditions under which it has been formulated; and, second, because as a question it can receive only a tentative answer. It calls for honesty as well as for an answer, and any answer, as was indeed asserted almost at the beginning of the present paper, would grossly betray this call, if more than tentative. Can life even court finality? Its ever-rising conflict between the old and the new may make it ask and seek, but it can find only to ask and seek again. Some is often much; yet, much or little, some satisfies not only for what it is, but also because it always calls for more. If you do not believe this, read your Dickens or the much-abused book of Genesis. The living spirit of science, then, is an important factor in the reply to ethical inquiry.

So, in a rapid summary, through the message, through the institutions, and through the spirit of science, ethics, which is the study of the conditions of action with a view to action, has a definite, pertinent reply to its leading question: What ought I to do? or, What ought man to do? As only professional, however, as standing aloof from science, as finding an answer now solely in the extra-natural ideal of duty, and now solely in the equally extra-natural ideal of pleasure, ethics only formulates the question in terms of its natural demands upon the answer, and so reveals the conflict that has made the question from the start and that has made necessary the resort to science; it does not definitely and serviceably give any answer at all. And in the history of ethics, as indeed in the history of human life from any standpoint, one needs especially to remember that class characters make only professions, not wholes of experience, and that history, accordingly, can never be adequate and well-rounded, can never be living, human history, if it confines itself narrowly to a single class or profession, as if this were a whole by itself. Such confinement, such abstraction, by making all that it excludes seem really external, and so, when in any way active upon the objects of direct interest, also arbitrary, has in my opinion done more to give color to the charge of materialism against history than any other one cause. Indeed, just such abstraction is the very essence of materialism; and as a last word, broadening the view perhaps beyond the ordinary consciousness of the historian, and seeing history with the eyes of an evolutionist, I would suggest that even the material world can stand only for a special labor, say even a special profession — the very important labor or profession of maintaining, relatively to any one side of life, all other sides of life, within the real unity of experience.

## THE THEORY OF COLONIZATION<sup>1</sup>

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Two opposite notions of colonies are widely prevalent. Perhaps the commoner opinion is, or used to be, that colonists walk about everywhere in their shirt sleeves, get from one place to another in open boats, and, when the humor seizes them, promiscuously fire off pistols on the streets. "There will be none of your kind out there," said an old Scotch lady to a disabled literary worker who was about to emigrate to the Antipodes. That there could be colleges or universities in such countries was incredible. A German scholar wrote to a friend in New Zealand, asking him to give an account of life in that colony; and a celebrated English philosopher suggested to his former assistant that he should contribute to a London morning journal a series of papers on Australian life. Both evidently believed that the way people lived in the British colonies under the Southern Cross was radically unlike the life led by people in Europe. The thoughtful inquirer might rather swing to the opposite extreme. He might naturally assume that a colony hiving off from an old country, on being planted in a new country, would merely continue the civilization it had left behind. What else could it do? Civilization is not a thing, but a cerebral state, which the colonists carry with them in their brains. Once they have settled in their new environment and overcome the inevitable initial obstacles, it might seem, the ways of life, the institutions, the arts and literature,

<sup>1</sup> It is of the writer of this paper that Herbert Spencer wrote (*Autobiography*, Vol. II, p. 308): "It was not until after many months had passed that I succeeded in finding, in the person of Mr. James Collier, a capable successor to Mr. Duncan. Educated partly at St. Andrews and partly at Edinburgh, Mr. Collier, though he had not taken his degree, possessed in full measure the qualifications requisite for the compilation and tabulation of the *Descriptive Sociology*; and the third division of the work, dealing with the existing civilized races, progressed satisfactorily in his hands." — Ed.



and all that is characteristic of the old community, would spring up in the new as a transplanted flower or tree blossoms or fruits in new soil.

There is no little truth in both views. Under the mask of twentieth-century civilization, which plunges gaily into state socialism, produces utopian romances of the highest quality, idolizes Paderewski, and is proud of its agnosticism, there is much in contemporary colonies that is primitive in the conditions of life, the pursuits and occupations, the passions of the soul, and even the religious views. On the other hand, the earlier stages of colonization are sometimes more truly reproductive of the mental level of the motherland at the time when the colony was founded than later generations always witness. The earlier legislatures and ministries in New England, Australia, and New Zealand far surpassed, in the quality of their members, their degenerate successors. Picked men when they emigrated, sometimes graduates and savants, enthusiasts and philanthropists, the first colonists often carried with them a degree of culture to which their sons and grandsons are strangers.

The truth lies in a blending of the two views. An emigrant community that settles in a new country, where it has to battle with adverse physical conditions and hostile indigenes, undergoes an inevitable degeneration. It has to begin life afresh and pass through all the stages of collective infancy, childhood, and youth, with all their imperfections. But it also starts with new opportunities and new hopes. Usually a variant on the motherland, formed of progressive elements that were too rebellious to be successfully reared in the old soil, the colony enters on a new career, with potentialities of development that could hardly have been realized in the old land. It is a new and improved social organism that has been generated.

Agassiz was among the first to discover the resemblance between ancient or extinct members of certain species and the embryonic forms of recent or contemporary members of similar species; and he generalized the luminous conception by suggesting that the chain of extinct forms runs parallel with the successive phases of the embryo in existing forms. With the instinct

of a discoverer, Darwin perceived the accordance between this view and his own notions of organic development. The growth of the embryo thus became a picture of forms now extinct, or a map of the stages a species had traversed. After the pioneer came the toiler, to reap gloriously where he had not sown. Guided by a few lines in the *Origin of Species*, Hackel saw wider horizons open before him, and he proved the Columbus of a new biological continent. By investigating the evolution of the embryo, he was able for the first time to establish the pedigree of man.

The discovery furnishes the key to colonial evolution. A colony rehearses not only the main historical stages of the motherland, but also those stages that precede history. In the movements of unrest and discontent that issue in emigration, the political rebellions, the rise of new religious sects, the agitations and organizations that prepare it, colonial emigration recapitulates, and first makes visible and vivid, the embryonic preliminaries of the birth of European states, of which no record remains. The landing of the immigrants, we can hardly doubt, reproduces the colonization of the various motherlands, which myth and legend still appropriate. The relations they form with the natives, their collisions, associations, and intermarriages with them, their absorption or destruction of them, re-create the facts of the same order that marked in older countries the advent of an invading race. The foundation of the new states will often, as we shall find, bear witness to the formation of that derided social compact which the imagination of the elder philosophers perceived at the beginnings of all societies. Just as often will it witness to the formation of societies on the Filmerian principle of the expansion of the patriarchal family, or the Carlylean principle of mixed force and persuasion that constitutes hero-worship. We shall see the rudiments of political institutions, and will thus revive almost the earliest age of social man. A but slightly more recent epoch will be seen to live again in the patriarchal life that spread itself over the vast pampas of South America and the wide plains of Australia. Those political institutions that arise from coercion will again spring up from the relations of the immigrants with the

indigenes, and the more beneficent institutions that grow out of the forms of co-operation will also repeat themselves. Colonial governorship, sometimes in half a century, will recapitulate the history of the monarchy for more than a thousand years, and the legislature and the judicature will pass as rapidly through similar phases. Colonial slavery in its darkest shape will make ancient slavery seem bright; convict labor will recall the slave of the Roman *ergastulum*; and mediæval serfage will live again in modern times. In industry we shall find the primitive undifferentiated state repeat itself, and the division of labor rapidly grows up in the daughter-land as it had slowly grown up in the motherland. We shall see the first colonists take shelter in burrows, like animals, and in caves, like savages. The strongest moral sentiment of savage peoples—the thirst for revenge—shows itself unslaked and predominant even in advanced colonies, and the highest public sentiment—that which forbids wanton aggression upon others, whether individuals or peoples—is hardly to be found in colonies, as indeed it is of slow growth and precarious existence in older peoples. Colonial religion seems completely to overlap the alleged earliest stage, at least if that stage be ancestor-worship, but it often sinks into, and starts afresh from a stage that seems to be still earlier—that of virtual agnosticism. Literature in the colony, as in the motherland, is at first imitative of an older literature, and it continues to repeat the literary evolution of the mother-country long after the colony has become independent. Colonial art passes through only a few of the phases it describes in old countries.

A social state may reproduce itself. In several European countries the church before the Reformation possessed one-third of the land; and shortly after independence, as presumably before it, the church in Mexico possessed fully one-third of the real and personal wealth of the republic. There, too, as in mediæval Europe, the clergy played a disturbing part in public life.

Mere events may strangely repeat themselves. Spain held the silver mines whence its Carthaginian rulers sent the tribute which left them free to pursue a career of conquest, and in these mines they compelled the native Spaniards to labor. Seventeen or



eighteen centuries later Spain recapitulated this feature in her history by drawing still larger sums from the silver mines of Peru and the gold mines of Mexico, and the Spaniards were still more merciless in forcing the natives to work in the South American mines. In 1676 Bacon's rebellion in Virginia repeated the English rebellion of the forties; and in 1686 James Colleton, a governor of South Carolina, imitated Cromwell by expelling refractory members from the legislature. The English revolution of 1688 was repeated on the banks of the Ashley and the Cooper, as in New England. Even in the details of a colonial loan the repetition may be observed. A loan of two millions sterling was contracted in 1894 by the Bank of New Zealand and guaranteed by the government, and of this sum one million was appropriated by the government; just as in 1857 the Bank of France was allowed to add one hundred million francs to its capital on condition of handing it over to the government.

Forgotten or obscure stages in the development of the mother-country have already been recovered in the records of colonial evolution. A few examples may be cited. The close connection between the constitutional history of a country and the development of landed property in mediæval times has been shown by von Maurer and Maine. It was doubtless no less true of the ancient than of the modern world, but the materials for exhibiting the relationship were scanty and imperfect. Two inscriptions not long since discovered in Tunisia reveal the gradual development of serfage in the Roman Empire, and prove that, so far from having been created all of a piece by a law of Constantine, it was almost in existence in the time of Commodus, was already in germ in a statute of Hadrian, and probably goes back to a custom that dates from the origin of Rome. The heredity of the military profession was enacted by the emperors; African inscriptions found at Lambèse prove that, as a matter of fact, soldiering was already hereditary, and that the law merely confirmed a practice that had insensibly grown up. The same and contiguous inscriptions throw fresh light on the Roman army, and enable us to reconstruct its organization and ranks. They also show us more clearly than before the oppressive incidence of the require-

ments that the decurions should themselves bear the heavy burden of the cost of the municipal administration—the cause to which Guizot chiefly ascribes the fall of the empire. They also newly illustrate the rise and growth of towns. And it is largely such inscriptions, discovered lately in Africa or less recently in Gaul, that permit us to realize the character, the reality, and the wide prevalence of that strange worship of the emperors which had killed all other native cults to such an extent that the emperors at one time dreamt of making it the center of resistance to the advance of Christianity.

Modern colonies, their histories once ransacked, will have other tracts to light up. The obscure problem of the disappearance or absorption of the Britons by the invading English, on which authoritative history is, or was, at variance with anthropology, will perhaps take on a new complexion, as the nature of the absorption or suppression of indigenous races in former or contemporary colonies is thoroughly understood. Are we not reading, in its main outlines, the story of the German conquest of England, and its expulsion or assimilation of the Britons, when we witness the advance of British colonization in New Zealand? Early linguistic stages, which have passed away in England and left no record of their passage, are still to be found in Kentucky and Tennessee. The township, which long ago disappeared from among English institutions, experienced a vigorous resurrection in the New England colonies, and became the unit and center of their political activity. Doubtless, it had undergone a sea-change in its transit across the Atlantic. Social protoplasm does not remain constant, but, as Weismann believes of vital protoplasm, it receives a historical modification.

But when we have recounted the parallel between the evolution of the mother-country and the evolution of its colonies, we have told only one-half of the story of colonial evolution. Evolutionists of the new school would say that it is not even the more significant half. The final cause of colonies, they would allege, is not merely to recapitulate the evolution of the parent state. That is but their embryology and their infancy. Their chief end is to supply a field for variations already in germ in the mother-

land, to let them run there a new course, and to develop a new social type.

The new point of view was, in reality, as familiar to Darwin as to his critics. To him the struggle for existence is a struggle "for the production of new and modified descendants." When one group conquers another and reduces its numbers, it thus lessens "its chance of further variation and improvement." It will at the same time lessen the power of that group, and increase its own power, to fill unoccupied places in nature, to create new places, and thus to generate an improved species. Could a biological philosophy be less egotist? And the philosophy of a colonization legitimately founded on it bears the same stamp of idealism. When a community colonizes a new country, it is not for gold, or glory, or territory, or even for freedom and justice to its own, that the work is undertaken. These may be the lures or the pretexts; one or another of them may be the motive. The infant colony is striving to produce future new generations of a higher type and with a grander civilization. Schopenhauer would have said that it was the unborn generation that was struggling to come into existence. Colonization is thus raised to being an expression of high altruism—the higher that it often means, like parturition generally, the sacrifice of the present generation to the future one.

For it is in the new peoples formed by colonization that new institutions, new arts, new ethical sentiments, new religions and philosophies, and new literary forms are found to arise. Under brighter or it may be, still sterner skies, but at all events in a changed social environment, the germs of variation whose growth would have been checked in the old country have free scope for expansion. The Greek colonies are in this respect by far the most notable. Picturesque and inspiring as is the history of ancient Greece, even it might pale before the splendors of Hellenic colonial history in Asia Minor, Magna Græcia, and Sicily, did we know it better. Of Greater Greece the grander part lay outside of Greece proper. Hellenic civilization there spread its wings for a freer flight, and in these favored lands it produced forms more dazzling than even in Athens or Corinth. Perhaps no city in Greece could vie with Ephesus or Miletus, Agrigentum or



Syracuse, Croton, Sybaris, or Tarentum. From the dimensions, magnificence, and opulence of the temples we may infer that religious worship received a large expansion. The Diana of the Ephesians must have ceased to be the chaste huntress of the Acroceraunian Mountains. No temple in the motherland can have possessed the wealth of that of Juno Lacinia at Croton. A Greek colony at Thurium, in Italy, anticipated all the world in establishing free, universal, and compulsory education. But in no field did Greater Greece shine more resplendently than in its production of a long series of scientific and philosophical ideas. Early Greek philosophy and science are almost exclusively colonial. That transcendental physics of which Herbert Spencer is the latest and most illustrious representative, was founded by four Greek colonials — Thales, Anaximenes, and Heraclitus, all of Miletus, and Empedocles of Agrigentum. The founder of the atomic philosophy, Leucippus, was probably also a Milesian. Another Milesian, Anaximander, initiated that philosophy of the unconditioned whose last phasis appeared in the encounter between Mill and Mansel in 1867. Pythagoras founded at Croton that philosophy of numbers of which Boole and Jevons, Edgeworth and Pierce, are the modern spokesmen. Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Zeno laid at Elea the bases of that absolute idealism which culminated in Hegel. Porphyry, a Syrian colonist, continued the tradition of neo-Platonism that found its last expression in Schelling. Aristippus, of the African colony of Cyrene, was perhaps the originator of that hedonism in ethics whose latest advocate was Henry Sidgwick. Another Cyrenæan, Carneades, who was not, however, a Cyrenaic, led a reaction to Plato, as Thomas Hill Green, in our own days, headed a return to Kant. In pure science, Euclid himself was hardly a greater discoverer than the Sicilian Archimedes, who also ranks among the many martyrs of science. Epicharmus was the colonial parallel to Menander; Theocritus created the idyl; and the Lost Tales of Miletus were probably also a new literary departure. Asia Minor, Magna Græcia, and Sicily were the America, Australia, and New Zealand of Hellas.

No radiance of idealism tinged the foundation of Roman

colonies, but if we remember that African theologians — Cyprian and Tertullian, Augustine and, it seems, the author or authors of the Athanasian Creed — shaped the religion that was to mold barbarous Europe, we may consider that no colonies, ancient or modern, ever lived for more idealist ends, or produced a set of more important variations, than the Roman colony of Africa.

Not only greed of gold, but a passion for adventure, lay at the beginnings of most of the colonies in South America. The dream of a golden age and a fountain of youth gilded, and sometimes tarnished, the romance of Spanish colonization. A new type of individual, if hardly a new social type, was for a time generated among the *conquistadores*. Blended patriotism and religious enthusiasm inspired the short-lived Calvinist colony in Brazil and the assassinated Huguenot colony in Florida. A new social form was the object of their founders. Religious zeal likewise gave rise to the first Spanish settlement in the same country, and it almost founded, as it almost discovered, French North America.

A sober idealism gave birth, a century later, to the largest and most durable political variations that any modern colony has presented. The social structure of Virginia was, of all the North American colonies, the most continuous with England; yet it was the first state in the world where manhood suffrage was conceded. The representative assembly thus elected was supreme and possessed all the rights of an independent state: it levied war and concluded peace, acquired territory, and framed treaties. It elected its governor and deposed him. The sovereignty of the people was declared. The governor acknowledged himself the "servant of the assembly," and could not dissolve it. It asserted unlimited liberty of conscience and opposed arbitrary taxation. A love of liberty was a passion. With a single exception, religious tolerance was complete; and the colony was almost an independent commonwealth. All unconsciously, Bancroft believes, the Virginians obeyed the impulses that were controlling the advancement of humanity, but the movement was in part conscious as well. In 1659 the Virginian Assembly claimed the

confirmation of its independence on the ground that "what was their privilege now might be the privilege of their posterity."

If conservative and English Virginia proved so democratic and progressive, we need not be surprised that the New England colonies were revolutionary. Massachusetts founded a kind of theocracy, with the important variant that the clergy, while exerting no small political influence, were absolutely denied the possession of political power. The ecclesiastical leaders remained clergymen of the Church of England, as the two Wesleys did; but it was a new ecclesiastical polity they founded, as did John Wesley. The church was separated from the state; the congregational system was established; ministers were elected; the ceremonies were simple, and liturgies were abolished. While the Church of England drifted into the Arminianism natural to easy-going people, the church in New England became sternly Calvinist. The Puritans expelled the Anglicans, as the Anglicans had expelled the Puritans. Tolerance was still repudiated.

The advance was as great in constitutional law. While the Massachusetts charter, strictly interpreted, granted limited powers, circumstances gave it a wider significance. All the freemen were electors; possessing absolute power, they elected the governor; and the principle of electing all officers was established. Hereditary dignities were refused. The ballot-box was introduced. Arbitrary taxation was made unconstitutional. A written constitution was drafted. Almost unconsciously, a colonizing company was transformed into a representative democracy.

The dynamic was spiritual. Not less than early Virginia—far more than later Virginia—the Puritans lived under the shadow of the invisible. "Their thoughts," says Bancroft, "were always fixed on posterity," and a solicitude for future generations was manifest in all their legislation. It was a prime motive for fleeing from persecution, since persecution "might lead their posterity to abjure the truth." Like the leader of the migration to Connecticut, they were true to the "cause of advancing civilization . . . even while it remained a mystery" to them. More than any other living people, they and their successors have acted on the injunction of the real founder of the Plymouth settle-



ment, who charged the Pilgrims that "you be ready to receive whatever truth shall be made known to you from the written word of God." It was a new sociological species that had been planted on the historic capes of New England.

A still greater advance was made in a colony that hived off from New England. Like Massachusetts, Rhode Island realized the philosophical ideal by being founded on the social compact of equal freemen. It came nearer than any other state to Humboldt's and Spencer's "administrative nihilism." It repeated the Swiss, and anticipated the Australian, referendum. It initiated the payment of members. It enjoyed the memorable distinction of setting the first example the world has seen of universal tolerance combined with an intense and deep-seated religious faith. Its animating principle was benevolence and its bond a mutual affection. There has been but one Rhode Island, even in a country that has "a city of brotherly love."

No less visibly are the British colonies at the Antipodes the seat of a new social system. Though there was much enthusiasm and no little idealism at the inception of certain of these colonies, especially of the southern New Zealand settlements, no design was consciously entertained by their founders of making them other than continuations of English society. Circumstances have proved too strong for them. With an obviously English exterior, which differentiates them from the United States and from Canada, some of their distinctive principles either are un-English or are anticipative of future English developments. While the motherland remains largely aristocratic in its Parliament and administration, its state church and the spirit of its social life, the Australian colonies are irrevocably pledged to a straight-out democracy. Title-grabbers and title-worshippers still fleck their surface, as they do that of the United States, but these either lie outside of its active potencies or are soon expelled from them. Equality of station is the rule. Equality of opportunity is the claim. New Zealand and South Australia were among the first states, and Australia was the first commonwealth, to admit women to the suffrage, now universal; and they are following the United States in admitting them to the professions. All careers are open

to all. Four successive premiers of New Zealand were, respectively, butcher, schoolmaster, commercial traveler, and engine-driver. Two farm-laborers have risen to the still higher position of premier of the mother-state of New South Wales, and many of the cabinet ministers are illiterate men. The Commonwealth and also Western Australia have witnessed the original phenomenon of a labor ministry; Queensland has a mixed liberal and labor ministry; and New South Wales rejoices in a parliamentary opposition that consists mainly of labor members and is led by their leader. Tolerance is unlimited, and avowed freethinkers are premiers and ministers, chief justices and judges. But it is in their governmental socialism that the lineaments of a new social type are most palpable. Hardly had they been planted when the young colonies varied in this direction. Governments began to do for them what had been done in the motherland by private enterprise. They built the railways, and this has led to the establishment of state manufactures and the purchase of state coal-mines. They owned the waste lands, and their ownership of them has grown into laws for the nationalization of the land. They pensioned their employees, and out of this have come government fire- and life-insurance departments. Nowhere else have the workmen more completely succeeded in asserting for themselves a position of equality with the masters by means of state courts of arbitration. Old-age pensions secure them against want in the sunset of their days. The artisan and the laborer are being raised as much above the oppressed workman of last generation as he was above the serf and the serf above the slave. A protected laboring class in a semi-socialist state is doubtless the new social type that is being generated in Australia and New Zealand.

The new departures taken in colonies are often projected in the mother-country or in older countries. The political constitutions of the American colonies sprang in part from the Puritan ideals of the English commonwealth. "The Agreement of the People" drawn up in 1648-49 contains all that is distinctive of the earlier phases of American public life. The sovereignty of "the people" (the term is notable) is clearly stated. A representative assembly (the word became American and is now Aus-

tralian) is to be elected by all taxpayers, residing in equal electoral districts. Parliaments are to be biennial. The representatives (again note the word) have "the supreme trust" and, as the United States and the Australian Commonwealth have done, will establish courts of justice and other institutions. The power of the assembly is for the first time limited by means of a distinction between the fundamental and the changeable articles of the constitution. The legislature is divorced from the executive. There is to be no compulsion in religion, and liberals are to be protected in the profession of their faith. Such details as the appointment of a commission for rearranging electoral districts and the holding of all elections on one fixed day, anticipate usages now in force in Australia as well as the United States.

The ideas embodied in the socialist legislation of New Zealand and Australia are also derivative and have been drawn from German systems of state socialism, as expounded by English and American writers — chiefly Gronlund and Bellamy and the Fabian socialists. The nationalization of the land had been advocated by Spence, Godwin, and Herbert Spencer (who became a renegade to the cause) before it was made a war-cry by Henry George. Old-age pensions had been proposed by Canon Blackley in England, and were in force in Germany and Denmark. Courts of industrial arbitration and the minimum wage had been incorporated in a measure laid before the Reichstag. In their most audacious innovations colonies therefore still repeat the development, even if only speculative, of older countries. They rear and foster ideas they could not have originated, and which could less readily have germinated in the impoverished soil and harsh climate of the motherland or its congeners.

Such is the theory of colonization. Rapidly passing through the embryonic stages that repeat the prehistoric era in the history of the mother-country, or those it has in common with other nationalities of the same race, or even with other races, a colony cuts the umbilical cord, and then, in the few generations consumed by infancy and youth, it swiftly recapitulates the stages the motherland had slowly traversed till the time when the colony had come to the birth. Some colonies are arrested at this point



from sheer inability to develop further; others, weighted by incompatible racial elements, are checked at a still earlier point. Those that carry in their womb the new-births of time shoot on an original course, and first then fulfil their true mission. Their dominant characters, the nature of their institutions, and the spirit of their civilization are radically different from those of the mother-country. The ethos even of colonies living in adjacent latitudes may be mutually incongruous. Temperate New Zealand has refused to federate with tropical and subtropical Australia because the genius of the two countries is dissimilar. Each must pursue its own path, as Scotland refused to unite with England till it had shaped an individuality of its own. A still higher mission will then be found to be inherent in the new organism, and the community that was great in independence will become still greater as an organ of a composite commonwealth.

## REVIEWS

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*A Text Book of Sociology.* By JAMES QUAYLE DEALEY, Professor of Social and Political Science in Brown University, and LESTER F. WARD, of the Smithsonian Institution. New York: The Macmillan Co. Pp. xxxv + 326.

To say that this book comes nearer than any predecessor to satisfying reasonable demands for an elementary textbook in general sociology, may seem to those acquainted with the possible range of comparison a deliberate attempt to damn with faint praise. The estimate expresses my judgment, however, and the opinion is in no sense or degree a "tainted" tribute. I welcome the book, and both hope and predict that it will prove an important factor in securing for sociology the academic attention which it deserves. The mere fact that it is a collaboration, instead of the work of a single writer, is in itself a guarantee that it will have certain availabilities which no author of a sociological system could achieve alone, if he attempted to recast his theories for classroom use. The reasons for this are implied clearly enough in the book itself, in its statement of the way in which sciences grow (pp. 4-6).

At the same time, the great need in sociology just now is not a textbook, but teachers qualified to win due respect for the subject, whether they have a textbook or not. The only teachers of this type are sure to have a plan of instruction of their own, which might be made into a textbook, and they are likely to find anyone's else book a sort of Saul's armor at best. Less qualified teachers have already queered the subject in numerous unfortunate instances, and no book can be good enough to enable the unfit to make sociology reputable.

A textbook cannot be held responsible, however, for supplying either brains or training, and we must judge it upon the presumption that it will be used by competent men. Taking so much for granted, the present text can hardly fail to be serviceable in popularizing the system which has earned for Dr. Ward a permanent place in social science.

As I review his philosophy in this epitome, however, an impression already derived from study of Dr. Ward's more elaborate books

is confirmed. Although he must always rank as a prince of the apostles of psychic influence in society, Dr. Ward does not succeed, in spite of himself, in giving to his rendering of society an unmistakably human tone. He carries from his work in physical science a certain abstractness of statement which is partly inseparable from all generalization, but which has the effect of holding the interpretation farther aloof from actual life than is desirable or necessary. In reducing social factors to the least common denominator, "force," Ward does not retain such control of the denominator that it always suggests, when it should, the qualities of *psychic* force. Beginning with "synergy" and ending with "social appropriation," I have a feeling that the medium of expressing the thought retains a foreign element that needlessly veils the thought. The language itself suggests to my mind images of conjunctions of impersonal forces, rather than flesh-and-blood men working together. Everybody who values Ward's work in sociology, as I certainly do, ought to be aware that it needs to be personalized far beyond the letter of its formulas, before its essential truth can be made impressive. It is one thing to get our theory of life firmly grounded upon the basis of cosmic forces; it is quite another thing to reduce our theory of life to an algebra of cosmic forces among which live individuals do not appear. If there must be an exclusion of one extreme or the other, we should be nearer the truth in expressing our sociology in terms of people than in terms of forces. Neither extreme need be adopted, but in following Ward there should always be an addition of human terms to the equations.

Speaking with the bias of a teacher who has a method of his own, I cannot agree with the judgment of the authors in distributing the material of the book. Perhaps it would be more correct to say that a fair digest of Dr. Ward's system calls for a plan of treatment which does not seem to me to provide for the wisest allotment of the time of students. We are in the middle of the book (p. 169), before we reach the topic "The Social Order." Assuming that the book is to be used with college seniors, I should say that every day spent on preliminaries, before introducing them to the social order, is relatively a day lost. Few colleges have so far relaxed their step-motherly attitude toward sociology as to afford room at best for more than a glimpse at it in undergraduate courses. This glimpse ought to go as near to the heart of the matter as possible. Prying into the metaphysics of the plan of salvation may well be reserved for the



rare few brands plucked from the burning who are elected to a graduate career.

But the volume is more than a textbook in the pedagogical sense. It is an interpretation of a system of thought which comparatively few people have had the enterprise to master in its original form. It ought to influence many readers to correct their mistake of omitting to find out what Ward has been teaching for a quarter-century. Even those who have studied Ward's books from the beginning will find ample reason for acknowledging the service which Professor Dealey has rendered both as editor and commentator.

Between adoption of the elective system, and rejection of the old-fashioned "mental and moral philosophy," which until recently served at all events to give a certain coherence to the college course, the colleges have gone farther than most of them are aware toward forfeiting one of their chief claims to respect. They are putting students off with a list of uncorrelated courses instead of giving them a unified view of life. The stronger the college, the greater the probability that the proposition is literally true. If the average student of the larger colleges has at graduation a definite conception of his relation to society, it is very seldom traceable to the direct influence of the college. The opposite was once the case, and doubtless will be again. A college course that leaves the knowledge imparted in a state of uncorrelated chaos is lamentably defective. The only thinkable substitute, in the near future, for the speculative philosophy which used to shape the general world-view taught in American colleges must be some version of sociology. Whether the merits of the sociologists in particular, or the logic of events in general, will most directly fulfil this prophecy, we need not predict. In either case, such books as this will play an important part in preparing the way for a needed reform in college programs.

ALBION W. SMALL.

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*Jugendfürsorge und Strafrecht in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika: Ein Beitrag zur Erziehungspolitik unserer Zeit.*  
Von J. M. BAEMREITHER. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot,  
1905. Pp. lxxviii + 305.

The author is already well known in the English-speaking world and has taken pains to study the problems of the social care of youthful citizens in all civilized states. The introduction is devoted to a

comparison of methods in France, England, Germany, Austria, and America. While this part is brief, it gives the essential and characteristic elements in the new legislative and philanthropic movements of those countries, and furnishes the perspective for the special study of educational philanthropy in the Union. The course of thought deserves the attention of American students and practical administrators, for the author's warm sympathy and intelligent appreciation of our achievements have not prevented his making critical observations and offering warnings which we can profitably consider.

The people of the United States vary much, not only as individuals, but also as groups; and yet they have a sense of unity and many common characteristics, economic interests, laws, customs, and impulses. Everywhere there is united with vast industrial energy an enthusiasm for education.

The description of methods begins with a chapter on our voluntary associations for preserving the morality of imperiled children and youth: the Children's Aid Societies founded or inspired by Charles Loring Bruce; the societies for the prevention of cruelty to children; Girard College; the Catholic Protectory of New York; and the laws which have been enacted for the benefit of their activities.

The author then passes to the systems of care administered by several states, and he describes the systems of Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, and Michigan as types of varying methods with one common ideal. These accounts of the treatment of children lay the foundation for a discussion of the methods of dealing with delinquent youth. The institutions especially studied by the author were the Lyman School in Massachusetts, the House of Refuge in New York, the Rochester School, Glens Mills in Pennsylvania, Whittier in California. In all these forms of action there are certain common principles: that education must be substituted for punishment; that transformation of character is the decisive consideration; that courts cannot carry out an educational policy without a system of probation and the aid of competent probation officers; that police supervision is fatal; that the court must take time for the fruition of the educative process, and must employ the "indeterminate sentence" in order to make sure that its reformatory work is thoroughly done; and that the judge must be given large freedom in adapting his measures to his purpose according to the needs of the individual.

It is when the author comes to persons in later youth and early

manhood that he finds the American ideas of reformatory treatment clash with the ancient legal notions of Europe, and we can easily imagine that the conservative jurists of his own land will give him uneasy hours, if he is very sensitive to criticism. First of all he tells them roundly that they are in the habit of misrepresenting the American idea; that they falsely picture our reformatories as luxurious abodes of criminals made attractive by sentimentalism and blind philanthropy. In clear, vivid outline Baemreither sets forth the pioneer conceptions of Edward Livingstone, Z. R. Brockway, and the leaders of reform in Massachusetts and elsewhere, as E. C. Wines, Dwight, and Sanborn. Selecting Concord and Elmira reformatories as typical institutions, the author describes, praises, and critically estimates the procedure employed in the practical working of the "indeterminate sentence."

A valuable chapter is devoted to the meaning and method of "probation" under friendly supervision, which is rightly regarded as an essential factor in the successful administration of the educational principle in dealing with offenders. Young men cannot be trained for liberty while confined in prison and constrained by military drill; and yet they cannot be trusted to live in society without some degree of direction and counsel, supported by the authority of the court.

Another chapter is devoted to the juvenile court, its law, procedure, administration, and results. On this last point a note of general criticism is gently introduced: "The Americans are fond of showing off statistics, especially if the figures are large, and they repeat them very many times; but they take less pains to test them and sift the results. All this belongs to the American optimism, but it renders it difficult to secure unbiased conclusions." The work concludes with discussions of the union of science and practice, and an analysis of the law of domestic relations. "Science, public administration, and private enterprise are united in spirit and practice, work together, learn from each other, and so increase the store of experience and knowledge. The teachers of science in colleges and universities draw from the experiments of practical men, but they in return enrich the ideas of the workers and keep the members of boards, the directors of institutions, and the laborers in fields of private philanthropy from the danger of falling into routine." Very interesting observations are made on the practical applications of psychology in the study of motives which influence juvenile offenders



both for evil and good. "Science is made democratic; practice is elevated." Altogether this book of Dr. Baemreither is full of interest as a criticism of American ideals and a special study of one important field of social effort.

C. R. HENDERSON.

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*Loi sur la protection de la santé publique (Loi du 15 Février 1902), travaux législatifs, guide pratique est commentaire.*  
Par PAUL STRAUSS, Sénateur de la Seine, et ALFRED FILLASSIER, Docteur en Droit. Deuxième édition revue et très augmentée. Paris: Jules Rousset, 1905. Pp. 504.

The law which went into effect on February 15, 1903, is the present expression of the conclusion reached by the administrative genius of a great nation after more than a century of experiments in all directions. The philosophy of the law is summarized by the authors in the introduction. It is the purpose of the code to secure the establishment of sanitary regulations in every commune in the country; to introduce regulations looking to the prevention of disease and securing conditions of health; to provide for exceptional measures in times of epidemics; the protection of sources of water supply; the regulation of buildings in the interest of health.

An important step in advance, marked by the usual increase of central administrative control, is the transfer of authority over unhealthy dwellings from local commissions to commissions of districts, whose members are nearly all appointed by the prefect. The consulting committee of public hygiene in France is given considerable control over drinking-water in certain situations. The state, the departments, and the communes share the necessary expenses.

The details of the law and of the administrative regulations issued to give it full effect offer valuable suggestions for our boards of health and legislators who are beginning to meet the problems of city residence and more compact rural population. The topics of the law indicate the scope of the discussion: sanitary regulations of communes; models of sanitary codes for cities and towns; public ways; houses and lodgings; management of contagious diseases; vaccination; disinfection; care of drinking-water; construction of buildings; organization of local and general administrative bodies; and penal sanctions of the law. The name of Senator Strauss gives to the volume the authority of one of the principal leaders of philan-

thropy in France, one who today represents in the national legislature the most progressive modern measures in respect to public relief.

C. R. HENDERSON.

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*Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals.* By FREDERICK MORGAN DAVENPORT. New York: The Macmillan Co. Pp. x + 323.

After a sketch of the mental traits of primitive man, a brief study of the psychological traits of a "crowd," and a presentation of the suggestive elements in the ghost dances of the American Indian and the religious revivals of the American negro, the author devotes the larger part of his treatise to a detailed description of the great religious revivals of England and the United States. His collection of materials in this field is highly interesting, and a valuable supplement to Stoll's *Suggestion und Hypnotismus in der Völkerpsychologie*.

While not unsympathetic with religious revivals, Professor Davenport points out that areas of greatest religious excitability in the South are also areas of most frequent lynchings, and that the prevalence of rational over emotional mental processes is finally fatal to religious revivals, lynching, and political oratory. "The influence upon the world of growing men in our time is to be more and more the indefinable and the unobtrusive influence of personal character."

W. I. THOMAS.

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*The Place of Industries in Elementary Education.* By KATHARINE ELIZABETH DOPP. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Third edition, 1905. Pp. 270.

Dr. Dopp had the fortunate conception of presenting for teachers a most important element in education—the manual element—in the light of modern psychological, race-psychological, and pedagogical results, and the third edition remains, perhaps, the most suggestive single work which can be placed in the hands of teachers. It is, indeed, of more importance just now that teachers should be in possession of this volume than that improved textbooks should be in the hands of the pupils. The third edition is improved by the addition of numerous illustrations, and an important chapter on the ways of procuring a material equipment, and the ways of using it so as to enhance the value of colonial history.

W. I. THOMAS.

*The Bontoc Igorot.* By ALBERT ERNEST JENKS. Manila, 1905.  
Pp. 266.

*Negritos of Zambales.* By WILLIAM ALLAN REED. Manila,  
1904. Pp. 89.

No government as such has done so much for the promotion of the study of early forms of society and the non-civilized races as the government of the United States, and these two volumes (Vol. I, and Vol. II, Part 1) of the publications of the Ethnological Survey of the Philippines, we may hope, are the beginning of a series which will be of as much significance to science as the Reports of the Bureau of American Ethnology. Dr. Jenks and Mr. Reed have made a most creditable beginning. Their profuse use of photographs is fortunate, and their tendency to give a description of the whole life of the people, and to disclose the intimate and personal side of the life of the natives, is most welcome to those of us who are more immediately interested in problems of mental and social development than in physical statistics.

W. I. THOMAS.



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# NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

## FRANCIS GALTON ON EUGENICS

### DISCUSSION IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY, LONDON<sup>1</sup>

DR. HADDON<sup>2</sup> said: We have been greatly favored this afternoon in listening to one who has devoted his life to science and has just presented us, in so able a paper, with the conclusions of his mature age. Future generations will hold the name of Dr. Galton in high reverence for the work he has done in so firmly establishing the theory of evolution, and I consider that we have listened to a memorable paper, which will mark a definite stage in the history of the subject with which Dr. Galton's name will remain imperishably associated. It is refreshing, if Dr. Galton will allow me to say so, to find a man of his years formulating such a progressive policy; for this is generally supposed to be a characteristic of younger men; but he has done so because all his life he has been studying evolution. He has seen what evolution has accomplished among the lower animals; he has seen what man can do to improve strains of animals and plants by means of careful selection; and he foresees what man may do in the future to improve his own species by more careful selection. It is possible for people to change their customs, ideas, and ideals. We are always accustomed to regard the savages as conservative, and so they are; but, as a matter of fact, savages do change their views. In Australia we find that different tribes have different marriage customs and different social regulations, and it will be generally found that the change in marriage custom or social control is nearly always due to betterment in their physical conditions. The tribes which, as some of us believe, have the more primitive marital arrangements, are those which live in the least favored countries; and the tribes which have adopted father-right are those which live under more favorable conditions. In Melanesia, Africa, and in India social customs vary a very great deal, and this proves that even their marriage customs are not in any way hide-bound, and that social evolution is taking place. When circumstances demand a change, then a change takes place, perhaps more or less automatically, being due to a sort of natural selection. There are thinking people among savages, and we have evidence that they do consider and discuss social customs, and even definitely modify them; but, on the whole, there appears to be a general trend of social factors that cause this evolution. There is no reason why social evolution should continue to take place among ourselves in a blind sort of way; for we are intelligent creatures, and we ought to use rational means to direct our own evolution. Further, with the resources of modern civilization, we are in a favorable position to accelerate this evolution. The world is gradually becoming self-conscious, and I think Dr. Galton has made a very strong plea for a determined effort to attempt a conscious evolution of the race.

DR. MOTT<sup>3</sup> said: I have to say that I think it is of very great importance to the nation to consider this subject of eugenics very seriously. Being engaged as pathologist to the London County Council Asylums, I see the effect of heredity markedly on the people admitted into the asylums. The improve-

<sup>1</sup> This *Journal*, Vol. XI, p. 11.

<sup>2</sup> F.R.S.; lecturer on anthropology, Cambridge University; ex-president of the Anthropological Institute.

<sup>3</sup> F.R.S.; Croonian lecturer, etc.; pathologist to the London County Council Asylums, etc.

ment of the stock can in my opinion be brought about in two ways: (1) by segregation, to some extent carried on at present, which in some measure checks the reproduction of the unfit; and (2) by encouraging the reproduction of the fit. Checking the reproduction of the unfit is quite as important as encouraging the reproduction of the fit. This, in my opinion, could be effected, to some extent, by taking the defective children and keeping them under control, at least a certain number that are at present allowed to have social privileges. It would be for their own welfare and the welfare of the community; and they would suffer no hardship, if taken when quite young. This is included in the question of eugenics which Dr. Galton has brought forward, and has shown his practical sympathy with, by establishing a fellowship, which will, no doubt, do great good in placing the subject on a firm basis, and also in getting a wide intellectual acceptance of the principle. It seems to me the first thing required is that it should become generally known that it is to the advantage of the individual and of the race to have a healthy heritage. Whether any practical steps could be taken to forward this principle, when it has a widespread acceptance, is a question; and I consider that any state interference would be harmful at first, but it would be proper for the state to encourage setting up registry offices where not only a form would be given, with particulars as to marriage, but also a form that would give a bill of health to the contracting parties; and that bill of health should be of some value, not only to the possessors, but to their children. If children had a good heritage, there is no doubt it would have actuarial value, in the matter, for instance, of obtaining life-insurance policies at a more reasonable rate; also in obtaining municipal and government employment, because the chances of paying pensions to people who have a good heritage is very much less. It seems to me that the subject is one of national importance, and this society, by spreading the views of Dr. Galton, will do a very great work, not only for individuals, but for the race as a whole.

MR. A. E. CRAWLEY<sup>4</sup> said: Dr. Galton's remarkable and suggestive paper shows how anthropological studies can be made fruitful in practical politics. Sociology should be founding its science of eugenics upon anthropology, psychology, and physiology. I hope that it will avoid socialistic dreams and that, while chiefly considering the normal individual, it will not forget the special claims of those abnormal persons whom we call geniuses. In a well-ordered state they should be considered before the degenerate and the diseased.

With regard to one or two minor matters: I should like to ask the author if he has examined the evidence for McLennan's examples of marriage by capture. It is not, perhaps, a very important point, but anthropological theories are often houses of cards, and I doubt the existence of a single real case of capture as an institution. As to exogamy, it is important to understand that in the great majority of cases it is really endogamous, that is to say, the favorite marriage in exogamy is between first cousins, and the only constant prohibition is that against the marriage of brothers and sisters. Exogamy, in fact, as Dr. Howitt, Dr. Frazer, and myself agree, reduces to this one principle. McLennan, the inventor of exogamy, never understood the facts, and the term is meaningless. If, as I have suggested in *Nature*, the normal type of primitive marriage was the bisectational exogamy seen in Australia, which amounts to cross-cousin marriage, two families, A and B, intermarrying for generation after generation—we have found a theory of the origin of the tribe, an enlarged dual family, and we have also worked out a factor which may have done much to fix racial types. Lewis Morgan suggested something of the latter notion as a result of his consanguine family.

I am still persuaded that one or two forms of union are mere "sports;" group-marriage, for instance, which is as rare as the marriage of brother and sister. Neither of these can be regarded as the primal type of union, though anthropologists have actually so regarded them. I think we may take it as

<sup>4</sup> Author of *The Mystic Rose*; one of the ablest of the younger anthropologists.

certain that there are two permanent polar tendencies in human nature: first, against union within the same home, and, secondly, against too promiscuous marriage.

In questions like this I think it is most important to avoid confusing sexual with matrimonial concerns. It seems to me, on the evidence of history and anthropology, that polygamy is the result of such a confusion. For efficiency and individuality monogamy is the best foundation of the family. Dr. Galton has not, I think, shown any cause for concluding that the prohibition of polygamy is due to social considerations. Schopenhauer indeed suggested the adoption of polygamy as a solution of the problem created by the preponderance of females, and as likely to do away with what he thought to be a false position, that of the lady—a position due to Christian and chivalrous sentimentalism. His suggestion, by the way, shows the same confusion between sexual and domestic matters, but it certainly would solve many social difficulties. The sexual impulse in men seems to have several normal outlets. In spite of defects, the ancient Greeks in their best period seem to show the results of an unconscious eugenic tradition; and I believe the same is true of the Japanese.

Dr. Galton's suggestions as to the part religion may play in these matters seem to me to be excellent. Religion can have no higher duty than to insist upon the sacredness of marriage, but, just as the meaning and content of that sacredness were the result of primitive science, so modern science must advise as to what this sacredness involves for us in our vastly changed conditions, complicated needs, and increased responsibilities.

DR. ALICE DRYSDALE VICKERY said that there appeared to her to be three essentials to success in any attempt to improve the standard of health and development of the human race. These were (1) the economic independence of women, so as to render possible the exercise of selection, on the lines of natural attraction, founded on mental, moral, social, physical, and artistic sympathies, both on the feminine and masculine side; (2) the education of the rising generation, both girls and boys, so as to impress them with a sense of their future responsibilities as citizens of the world, as co-partners in the regulation of its institutions, and as progenitors of the future race; (3) an intelligent restriction of the birth-rate so that children should be born only in due proportion to the requirements of the community, and under conditions which afforded a reasonable prospect of the efficient development of the future citizens.

The present economic dependence of women upon men was detrimental to the physical, intellectual, and moral growth of woman, as an individual. It falsified and distorted her views of life, and, as a consequence, her sense of duty. It was above all prejudicial to the interests of the coming generation, for it tended to diminish the free play and adequate development of those maternal instincts on which the rearing and education of children mainly depended. The economic independence of women was desirable in the interests of a true monogamic marriage, for, without this economic independence, the individuality of woman could not exercise that natural selective power in the choice of a mate which was probably a main factor in the spiritual evolution of the race. Where the sympathetic attraction between those concerned was only superficial, instead of being deeply interwoven in all their mutual interests and tastes, the apparent monogamic relation only too frequently masked an unavowed polygamy, or polyandry, or perhaps both. Therefore it would forward truly monogamic marriage if greater facilities should be afforded for the coming together of those who were spontaneously and pre-eminently attracted to each other.

In respect of limitations of offspring, we had to consider both organic and social criteria. For the determination of these, physiologist must combine with sociologist. From the individual and family point of view, we wanted guidance in determining the size of family adapted to given conditions, and from the social point of view we wanted guidance in determining the



numbers of population adapted to a given region at a given time. Incidentally it was here worth noting that in the case of Great Britain, the present birth-rate of 28 per 1,000, with a death-rate of 15 per 1,000, giving an excess of 13 per 1,000, compared with a birth-rate of 36 per 1,000, and death-rate of 23 per 1,000, shown by the vital statistics of 1877; but yet the lower contemporary birth-rate gave the same, or a rather higher, yearly increase, i. e., rather over 400,000 per annum, and with this annual increment of between 400,000 and 500,000, we had to remember that there fell upon the nation the burden of supporting over a million paupers, and a great number of able-bodied unemployed. It seemed, therefore, desirable that sociologists should investigate the conditions and criteria of an optimum increase of population. The remarkable local and class differences in the birth-rate were well known. If the birth-rate of 18 per 1,000 and death-rate of 15 per 1,000 which prevailed in Kensington could be made universal throughout the United Kingdom, it would give, from our total population of 42,000,000, a yearly increment beginning at 130,000. Incidentally she wished to call attention to a paper by M. Gabriel Giroud which went to show that the food-supplies of the human race are insufficient, and that one-third of the world's inhabitants exist habitually in a condition of semi-starvation.

The propositions which she desired to submit were (1) that sexual selection, as determined by the individuality of the natural woman, embodies eugenic tendencies, but that these tendencies are more or less countered and even reversed by a process of matrimonial social selection determined by the economic dependence of woman in contemporary occidental society—in short, that eugenics may be promoted by assuring an income to young women; (2) that artificial control of the birth-rate is a condition of eugenics.

MR. SKRINE said: Dr. Galton, in treating of monogamy, says that polygamy is now permitted to at least one-half of the human race. I have lived for twenty-one years among polygamists, and, having come home to Europe, I seem to see conditions prevailing which are not in essence dissimilar. The conclusion I have arrived at is that monogamy is purely a question of social sanction, a question, as it were, of police. In regard to endogamy, we may trace back its origin to periods before the dawn of history. The origin of caste and endogamous marriage is due, I believe, to the rise of powerful or intellectual families, which everywhere tend to draw to themselves less powerful families. The higher family was looked up to, and it was thought an honor to marry within it. And thus a small group was formed by a combined process of social and sexual election. The history of certain group formations determined by this sort of marriage selection might be compiled from that royal stud-book, the *Almanac de Gotha*. There is, it is true, the method of evading the selective process by the custom of morganatic marriage, but that only proves the rule. Dr. Galton has not touched on polyandry; that, I think, may be interpreted as one of the devices for limiting population, and can be accounted for, I believe, by scarcity of land.

DR. WESTERMARCK, speaking from the chair, said: Ladies and Gentlemen: The members of the Society have today had an opportunity to listen to a most important and suggestive paper, followed by a discussion in which, I am sure, all of us have taken a lively interest. For my own part, I beg to express my profound sympathy and regard for Mr. Galton's ardent endeavors to draw public attention to one of the most important problems with which social beings, like ourselves, could be concerned. Mr. Galton has today appealed to historical facts to prove that restrictions in marriage have occurred and do occur, and that there is no reason to suppose that such restrictions might not be extended far beyond the limits drawn up by the laws of any existing civilized nation. I wish to emphasize one restriction not yet touched upon. The husband's and father's function in the family is generally recognized to be to protect and support his wife and children, and many savages take this duty so seriously that they do not allow any man to marry who has not previously given some proof of his ability to fulfil it. Among various Bechuana and Kafir tribes the youth is not allowed to take a wife until he has killed a rhinoceros. Among the Dyaks of Borneo, and other peoples in the Malay Archipelago, no one can marry unless he has acquired

a certain number of human heads by killing members of foreign tribes. Among the Arabs of Upper Egypt the man must undergo an ordeal of whipping by the relations of his bride, and if he wishes to be considered worth having, he must receive the chastisement, which is sometimes exceedingly severe, with an expression of enjoyment. [Laughter.] I do not say that these methods are to be recommended, but the idea underlying them is certainly worthy of imitation. Indeed, we find in Germany and Austria, in the nineteenth century, laws forbidding persons in actual receipt of poor-law relief to contract marriages, and in many cases the legislators went farther still and prohibited all marriages until the contracting parties could prove that they possessed the means of supporting a family. Why could not some such laws become universal, and why could not the restrictions in marriage be extended also to persons who, in all probability, would become parents of diseased and feeble offspring? I say, "in all probability," because I do not consider certainty to be required. We cannot wait till biology has said its last word about the laws of heredity. We do not allow lunatics to walk freely about, even though there be merely a suspicion that they may be dangerous. I think that the doctor ought to have a voice in every marriage which is contracted. It is argued, of course, that to interfere here would be to intrude upon the individual's right of freedom. But men are not generally allowed to do mischief simply in order to gratify their own appetites. It will be argued that they will do mischief even though the law prevent them. Well, this holds true of every law, but we do not maintain that laws are useless because there are persons who break them. There will always in this world be offspring of diseased and degenerated parents, but the law may certainly in a very considerable degree restrict their number by preventing such persons from marrying. I think that moral education also might help to promote the object of eugenics. It seems that the prevalent opinion, that almost anybody is good enough to marry, is chiefly due to the fact that in this case the cause and effect, marriage and the feebleness of the offspring, are so distant from each other that the nearsighted eye does not distinctly perceive the connection between them. Hence no censure is passed on him who marries from want of foresight, or want of self-restraint, and by so doing is productive of offspring doomed to misery. But this can never be right. Indeed, there is hardly any other point in which the moral consciousness of civilized men still stands in greater need of intellectual training than in its judgments on cases which display want of care or foresight. Much progress has in this respect been made in the course of evolution, and it would be absurd to believe that we have yet reached the end of this process. It would be absurd to believe that men would forever leave to individual caprice the performance of the most important and, in its consequences, the most far-reaching function which has fallen to the lot of mankind.

DR. DRYSDALE said he would like to ask the chairman if he was aware that some of the restrictions he had referred to were actually in force in England. In some of the great English banks, for instance, clerks are not allowed to marry until their salary has reached a certain level. But for his part he thought the principle unsound. Would it not be better to say to these young men that they might marry, but that they must restrict the number of their children?

#### WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS

FROM PROFESSOR B. ALTAMIRA<sup>5</sup>: The subjects of Mr. Galton's communications are very interesting, and there should be some very valuable information forthcoming on the forms of marriage (endogamy, exogamy, etc.) to be unearthed from the actual juridical manners and customs of Spain. It is a great source of regret to me that pressure of other duties prevents me at present from making any contribution to the subject.

FROM DR. HAVELOCK ELLIS: The significance of Mr. Galton's paper lies less in what is said than in what is implied. The title, "Restrictions in Marriage," bristles with questions. We need to know precisely what is meant by "marriage."

<sup>5</sup> Professor of the history of law in the University of Oviedo.



Among us today marriage is a sexual union recognized by law, which is not necessarily entered into for the procreation of children, and, as a matter of fact, frequently remains childless. Mr. Galton seems, however, to mean a sexual union in which the offspring are the essential feature. The distinction is important, for the statements made about one kind of marriage would not hold good for the other. Then, again, by "restrictions" do we mean legal enactments or voluntary self-control?

Mr. Galton summarizes some of the well-known facts which show the remarkable elasticity of the institution of marriage. By implication he asks whether it would not be wise further to modify marriage by limiting or regulating procreation, thus introducing a partial or half monogamy, which may perhaps be called—borrowing a term from botany—*hemigamy*. I may point out that a fallacy seems to underlie Mr. Galton's implied belief that the hemigamy of the future, resting on scientific principles, can be upheld by a force similar to that which upheld the sexual taboos of primitive peoples. These had a religious sanction which we can never again hope to attain. No beliefs about benefits to posterity can have the powerful sanction of savage taboos. Primitive marriage customs are not conventions which everyone may preach for the benefit of others, and anyone dispense with for himself.

There is one point in Mr. Galton's paper which I am definitely unable to accept. It seems to be implicitly assumed that there is an analogy between human eugenics and the breeding of domestic animals. I deny that analogy. Animals are bred for points, and they are bred by a superior race of animals, not by themselves. These differences seem fundamental. It is important to breed, let us say, good sociologists; that, indeed, goes without saying. But can we be sure that, when bred, they will rise up and bless us? Can we be sure that they will be equally good in the other relations of life, or that they may not break into fields for which they were not bred, and spread devastation? Only a race of supermen, it seems to me, could successfully breed human varieties and keep them strictly chained up in their several stalls.

And if it is asserted that we need not breed for points, but for a sort of general all-round improvement, then we are very much in the air. If we cannot even breed fowls which are both good layers and good table birds, is it likely that we can breed men who will not lose at other points what they gain at one? (Moreover, the defects of a quality seem sometimes scarcely less valuable than the quality itself.) We know, indeed, that there are good stocks and bad stocks, and my own small observations have suggested to me that we have scarcely yet realized how subtle and far-reaching hereditary influences are. But the artificial manipulation of human stocks, or the conversion of bad into good, is still all very dubious.

It would be something, however, if we could put a drag on the propagation of definitely bad stocks, by educating public opinion and so helping forward the hemigamy, or whatever it is to be called, that Mr. Galton foresees. When two stocks are heavily tainted, and both tainted in the same direction, it ought to be generally felt that union, for the purposes of procreation, is out of the question. There ought to be a social conscience in such matters. When, as in a case known to me, an epileptic woman conceals her condition from the man she marries, it ought to be felt that an offense has been committed serious enough to annul the marriage contract. At the same time, we must avoid an extreme scrupulosity. It is highly probable that a very slight taint may benefit rather than injure a good stock. There are many people whose intellectual ability, and even virtues as good citizens, seem to be intimately bound up with the stimulating presence of some obscure "thorn in the flesh," some slight congenital taint. To sum up: (1) let us always carefully define our terms; (2) let us, individually and as a nation, do our best to accumulate data on this matter, following, so far as we can, the example so nobly set us by Mr. Galton; (3) let us educate public opinion as to the immense gravity of the issues at stake; (4), in the present state of our knowledge, let us be cautious about laying down practical regulations which may perhaps prove undesirable, and in any case are impossible to enforce.



FROM MRS. FAWCETT: Mr. Galton evidently realizes that he has a gigantic task before him, that of raising up a new standard of conduct on one of the most fundamental of human relations. At present, the great majority of men and women, otherwise conscientious, seem to have no conscience about their responsibility for the improvement or deterioration of the race. One frequently observes cases of men suffering from mortal and incurable disease who apparently have no idea that it is wrong to have children who will probably enter life heavily handicapped by inherited infirmity.

Two-thirds of what is called the social evil would disappear of itself, if responsibility for the welfare of the coming generation found its fitting place in the conscience of the average man.

I wish all success to Mr. Francis Galton's efforts.

FROM MR. A. H. HUTH<sup>6</sup>: Everyone will sympathize with Mr. Galton in his desire to raise the human race. He is not the first, and he will not be the last. Long ago the Spartans practiced what Mr. Galton has christened "eugenics;" and in more modern times Frederick I of Prussia tried something of the sort. I have often thought that if the human race knew what was good for them, they would appoint some great man as dictator with absolute power for a time. At the expense of some pain to individuals, some loss of liberty for, say, one generation, what might not be done! Preferably, they should choose me; not because I think myself superior to others, but I would rather make the laws than submit myself to them!

Mr. Galton shows very clearly, and, I think, indisputably, that people do submit to restrictions on marriage of very different kinds, much as if they were laws of nature. Hence the deduction is drawn that, since people submit, without, in most cases, a murmur, to restrictions which do not benefit the race, why not artificially produce the same thing in a manner that will benefit the race?

There are, however, two difficulties: One, the smaller, is that, in our present state of civilization, people will not accept, as they did in the childhood of their race, the doctrine of authority. The other is that all the restrictions on marriage cited by Mr. Galton, with the one exception of celibacy, to which I shall come later, only impeded, but did not prevent, marriage. Every man could marry under any of the restrictions, and only very few women could not lawfully be joined to him in matrimony.

Now, what is Mr. Galton's contention? He wishes to hasten the action of the natural law of improvement of the race which works by selection. He wishes to do as breeders have done in creating superior races by the selection of mates. He recognizes that, unhappily, we cannot compel people to mate as the scientist directs: they must be persuaded to do so by some sort of creed, which, however, he does not (at least in this paper) expressly define. You could not make a creed that your choice of a wife should be submitted to the approval of a high-priest or of a jury. You would not, again, submit the question from a quasi-religious point of view to the like authorities, as to whether you are to marry at all or not. Mr. Galton does indeed point out that people were doomed to celibacy in religious communities: but here you have either a superior authority forcing you to take the vows, or you have the voluntary taking of the vows. Would the undesirable, the weak, the wicked, the frivolous—any of those beings who ought not to propagate their species—take these vows? I fear not. Only the best, those who have strength of mind, the unselfish—in short, only those who should propagate their species—would take the vows with any prospect of respecting them.

I have said that Mr. Galton is seeking to hasten a natural process. We all know the Darwinian law of the selection of the fittest; and also that other law of sexual selection which is constantly going on. I think that even within historical times they have told. I think that if you study the portraits which have come down to us (excluding, of course, the idealistic productions of the Greeks and some others), if you study even the prints of the grosser multitude, and then walk down any of the more populous streets of London, you will find that you have

<sup>6</sup> Author of *The Marriage of Near Kin*.

reason to congratulate the race on a decided general improvement in looks and figure. We have also undoubtedly improved in health and longevity; but this may be due, as also the improvement in looks may be partly due, to improvement in the conditions of life. But with all this, with all these natural forces working untiringly, effectively, and imperceptibly for the improvement of the race, our whole aims as a social body, all our efforts, are directed to thwart this natural improvement, to reverse its action, and cause the race, not to endeavor to better its best, but to multiply its worst.

The whole tendency of the organized world has been to develop from the system of the production of a very numerous offspring ill fitted to survive, to the production of much fewer offspring better fitted to survive, and guarded at the expense of the parents until they were started in life. This law so permeates the world, and is so general, that it is even true of the higher and lower planes of humanity. The better classes, the more educated, and those capable of greater self-denial, will not marry till they see their way to bring up children in health and comfort and give them a start in life. The lower class, without a thought for the morrow, the wastrels, the ignorant, the selfish and thoughtless, marry and produce children. Under the ordinary law of nature, of course, the natural result would follow: the children of the more desirable class, though fewer, would survive in greater proportion than the more numerous progeny of the less desirable class, and the race would not deteriorate. But here legislation, and, still worse, the so-called philanthropist, step in. Burdens are heaped upon the prudent; they are taxed and bullied; the means which they have denied themselves to save for their own children are taken from them and given to idle wastrels in order that their children may be preserved to grow up and reproduce their like. Not only are these children carefully maintained at the costs of the more prudent, but their wretched parents are fed and coddled also at the expense of the more worthy, and saved against themselves to produce more of the—shall I call them kakogenetics. Not content with this, we freely import from the sweepings of Europe, and add them to our breeding-stock.

In the days when England made her greatness, she did not suffer from the cankers of wild philanthropy and a promiscuous alien immigration.

FROM PROFESSOR J. G. MCKENDRICK: I am sorry that, owing to university work, I am not able at present to contribute to the discussion of Mr. Galton's very suggestive papers. He is opening up a subject of great interest and importance—more especially in its relation to improving the physical, mental, and pure qualities of the race. At present much is carried on by haphazard, and I fear the consequence is that we see indications of degeneration in various directions.

I heartily wish much success to those who are carrying on investigations of these important problems. We are all indebted to Mr. Galton for his valuable and deeply suggestive papers.

FROM MR. C. A. WITCHELL<sup>1</sup>: There is one factor operating in the selection of husbands and wives which will be extremely difficult to bring within the purview of eugenics, and which is yet supreme in its influence. The union of the sexes, in its higher form, is not a matter of passion, but of the more powerful and enduring sentiment which we call love. The capturing of mates is not confined to mankind; the polygamous birds exhibit it. But there are birds that sing to win a mate—these have a delayed courtship; and in man this is developed to still nobler ideals.

Let a man look around him at a public ball. Would he choose for mother of his children the woman who of all present has the greatest physical attractions? Nothing of the kind. The one he chooses (by instinct) is the one who inspires him with a certain elevation of spiritual sentiment, who, indeed, freezes his physical nature out of his thought—whom he could hardly pay a compliment to, and yet whom he knows he would select from among them all. Why does he choose her? Has he not made selection through the assessors chosen by nature—certain subtle and undefinable perceptions received through the senses of sight and hearing. These perceptions, fleet and instant messengers, have not been

<sup>1</sup> Author of *The Cultivation of Man*.



delayed by social distances. They have pierced all the flimsy armour of fashion, they have penetrated the shams of culture, and have told his inmost sense of consciousness—his soul—what hers is like. By that knowledge his soul has chosen hers; and unless science can analyze this subtle process of spiritual selection, it must stand aside.

By all means let eugenics advance! But let its exponents pause to analyze first what is now the most powerful factor governing the selection of the sexes, and seek to take advantage of it rather than to stifle it with mere physical agencies. To sterilize defective types is one thing; to eliminate the criminally weak and diseased is another—equally reasonable. But let us beware lest we do anything that may tend to obliterate by physical means the higher instructive teachings of sexual selection.

FROM PROFESSOR J. H. MUIRHEAD: I think Mr. Galton's suggestions for the advance of the study and practice of eugenics most important, and hope our Society may do something to forward the subject.

FROM DR. MAX NORDAU: The shortness of the time at my disposal, and the vastness of the subject treated by Mr. Galton, do not permit me to deal with the paper as it deserves. I must limit myself to a few *obiter dicta*, for the somewhat dogmatic form of which I crave the indulgence of the Sociological Society.

Theoretically, everybody must hail eugenics. It is a fine and obviously desirable ideal, to direct the evolution of the individual and the race toward the highest possible type of humanity. Practically, however, the matter is so obscure and complicated that it can be approached only with hesitation and misgivings.

We hear often people, even scientists, say: "We breed our domestic animals and useful plants with the greatest care, while no selection and foresight is exercised in the case of the noblest creature—man." This allusion to the methods of breeding choice cattle implies a biological fallacy. The breeder knows exactly what he wants to develop in his stock; now it is swiftness, now it is staying power; here it is flesh, there it is wool; in this case it is abundance of milk, in that a capacity for transforming, quickly and completely, food into muscle and fat of a high market value. The breeder is working out the one quality he is aiming at, at the cost of *other* qualities which would be of value to the animal, if not to its owner. The selection practised by the breeder in view of a certain aim creates new types that may be economically superior, but are biologically inferior. To put it flatly: our vaunted thoroughbreds, the triumph of selection exercised for many generations, may be wonderfully adapted to the one particular end they are destined for; they may flatter our utilitarianism and fetch high prices; but their general vital power is diminished; they are less resistant to the injuries of life; they are subject to diseases far less frequently, or not at all, met with in non-selected animals of their kind, and if not constantly fostered and protected by man, they would be unable to hold their own in the struggle for life.

It is clear that we cannot apply the principles of artificial breeding to man. Which quality of his are we to develop by selection? Of course, there is the ready answer: "*Mens sana in corpore sano.*" But this is so general and vague a rule that it means nothing when it comes to practical application. There is no recognized standard of physical and intellectual perfection. Do you want inches? In that case, you have to shut out from your selection Frederick the Great and Napoleon I, who were undersized, Thiers, who was almost a dwarf, and the Japanese as a nation, as they are considerably below the average of some European races. Yet in all other respects than tallness they are very commendable specimens of our species. What is your ideal of beauty? Is it a white skin, clear eyes, and fair hair? Then you must favor the northern type and exclude the Italian, Spaniard, Greek, etc., from your selection, which would not be to the taste of these nations.

If from somatic we turn to intellectual perfection, we encounter the same difficulties. Some highly gifted individuals have inductive, others deductive talents. You cannot easily have in the same man a great mathematician and a great poet, an inventor and a statesman. You must make up your mind whether you wish to breed artists or scientists, warriors or speculative philosophers. If



you say you will breed each of these intellectual categories, each of those physical types, then it amounts to confessing that you will let things pretty much have their own way, and that you renounce guiding nature and directing consciously the species toward an ideal type. If you admit that you have *no* fixed standard of beauty and mental attainment, of physical and intellectual perfection, to propose as the aim of eugenic selection; if your artificial man-breeding is not destined to develop certain well-defined organic qualities to the detriment of others, then eugenics means simply that people about to marry should choose handsome, healthy young individuals; and this, I am sorry to say, is a mere triviality, as already, without any scientific consciousness or intervention, people *are* attracted by beauty, health, and youth, and repulsed by the visible absence of these qualities.

The principle of sexual selection is the natural promoter of eugenics; it is a constant factor in biology, and undoubtedly at work in mankind. The immense majority of men and women marry the best individual among those that come within their reach. Only a small minority is guided in its choice by considerations of a social and economical order, which may determine selections to which the natural instinct would object. But even such a choice, contrary as it seems to the principle of eugenics, might be justified to a certain extent. The noble Ernest Renan would never have been chosen for his physical appearance by any young woman of natural taste; nor would Darmesteter, the great philologist, who was afflicted with gibbosity. Yet these men had high qualities that were well worth being perpetuated in the species. A young and beautiful woman could put in a plausible plea for her marrying an elderly rich financier or nobleman of not very pleasing appearance. In both cases her proper organic qualities may vouchsafe fair offspring which will better develop in economically and socially favorable surroundings than it would have done in poverty and obscurity, even if the father had been a much finer specimen of man.

It seems to me that the problem must be approached from another side. There have been pure human races in prehistorical times. Actually every European nation represents a mixture, different in its *proportion* only, of *all* the races of Europe, and probably some of Asia and northern Africa. Probably every European has in his ancestry representatives of a great number of human types, good and indifferent ones. He is the bearer of all the potentialities of the species. By atavism, any one of the ancestral types may revive in him. Place him in favorable conditions, and there is a fair chance of his developing his potentialities and of his growing into resemblance with the best of his ancestors. The essential thing, therefore, is not so much the selection of particular individuals—every individual having probably latent qualities of the best kind—as the creating of favorable conditions for the development of the good qualities. Marry Hercules with Juno, and Apollo with Venus, and put them in slums. Their children will be stunted in growth, rickety and consumptive. On the other hand, take the miserable slum-dwellers *out* of their noxious surroundings, house, feed, clothe them well, give them plenty of light, air, and leisure, and their grandchildren, perhaps already their children, will reproduce the type of the fine, tall Saxons and Danes of whom they are the offspring.

If eugenics is only to produce a few Grecian gods and goddesses in the sacred circle of the privileged few, it has a merely artistico-aesthetical, but no politico-ethnological, interest. Eugenics, in order to modify the aspect and value of the nation, must ameliorate, not some select groups, but the bulk of the people; and this aim is not to be attained by trying to influence the love-life of the masses. It can be approached only by elevating their standard of life. Redeem the millions of their harrowing care, give them plenty of food and rational hygienics, and allow their natural sympathies to work out their matrimonial choice, and you will have done all the eugenics that is likely to strengthen, embellish, and ennoble the race. In one word: Eugenics, to be largely efficient, must be considered, not as a biological, but as an economic question.

One word more as to the restriction of marriage. There is no doubt that laws and customs have had, at all times and in all places, the effect of narrowing the circle within which the matrimonial selection could take place. But I believe it would be an error to conclude that therefore it would be within the power

of the legislator to modify these laws and customs, and to create new restrictions unknown before our own time. The old marriage laws and customs had the undisputed authority of religion, they were considered as divine institutions, and superstitious fears prevented transgression. This religious sanction would be absent from modern restricted laws, and, in the case of a conflict between passion or desire and legal prohibition, *this* would weigh as a feather against *that*. In a low state of civilization the masses obey traditional laws without questioning their authority. Highly differentiated cultured persons have a strong critical sense; they ask of everything the reason why, and they have an irrepressible tendency to be their own law-givers. These persons would not submit to laws restricting marriage for the sake of vague eugenics, and if they could not marry under such laws in England, they would marry abroad; unless you dream of a uniform legislation in all countries of the globe, which would indeed be a bold dream.

FROM PROFESSOR A. POSADA: Without entering into a discussion of the bases on which Mr. Galton has raised eugenics as a science, I find many very acceptable points of view in all that is proposed by this eminent sociologist.

The history of matrimonial relationship in itself discloses most interesting results. The relative character of its forms, the transitory condition of its laws, the very history of these would seem to show that the reflex action of opinion influences the being and constitution of the human family.

Granting this, and assuming that the actual conditions of the matrimonial régime—especially those that bear upon the manner of contract—must not be considered as the final term of evolution (since they are far from being ideal), one cannot do less than encourage all that is being done to elucidate the positive nature of matrimonial union, and the positive effects resultant from whether such union was effected with regard, or disregard, to the exigencies of generation and its influence on descendants.

Marriage is actually contracted either for love or for gain; more often than not the woman marries because she does not enjoy economic independence. In such circumstances physiological considerations, the influence of heredity, both physiological and moral, have little or no weight—perhaps because they are neither sufficiently known or demonstrated in such a manner that the disastrous effects of their disregard can induce direct motives of conduct.

On this account I think that (1) we should work to elucidate, in as scientific a manner as possible, the requirements of progressive selection in marriage, and we should rigorously demonstrate the consequences of such unions as are decidedly prejudicial to vigorous and healthy offspring; (2) we should disseminate a knowledge of the conclusions ascertained by scientific investigation and rational statistics, so that these could be gradually assimilated by public opinion and converted into legal and moral obligations, into determinative motives of conduct. But we must bear in mind that one cannot expect a transformation of actual criteria of sexual relationship from the mere establishment of a science of eugenics, nor even from the propagation of its conclusions; the problem is thus seen to be very complex.

The actual criteria applied to sexual relationships—especially to those here alluded to—depend on general economic conditions, by virtue of which marriage is contracted under the influence of a multitude of secondary social predispositions, that have no regard to the future of the race; and it is useless to think that any propaganda would be sufficient to overcome the exigencies of economic conditions. On the other hand, the actual education of both the woman and the man leaves much to be desired, and more particularly in regard to sexual relationship. And it would be futile to think of any effectual transformation in family life while both the man and woman do not each of them equally exact, by virtue of an invulnerable repugnance to all that injures morality, a purity of morals in the future spouse.

The day that the woman will refuse as husband the man of impure life, with a repugnance equal to that usually felt by man toward impure womanhood, we shall have made a great step toward the transformation of actual marriage—to the gain of future generations.

FROM PROFESSOR E. B. POULTON: I entirely agree with the aims Mr. Galton has in view, and profoundly admire his papers on this subject. I think they unfold great possibilities for the human race.

FROM HON. BERTRAND RUSSELL: I have read Mr. Galton's two papers in abstract with much interest, and agree entirely with the view that marriage customs might be modified in a eugenic direction. But I have no views of my own worth expressing in a written communication such as is asked for.

FROM PROFESSOR SERGI<sup>8</sup>: As an abstract proposition I believe Mr. Galton's proposal is entirely right and has many attractions. But, nevertheless, it seems to me to be not easily practicable, and perhaps even impossible.

The sexual relations are vital in the life of all animal species. Any restrictions, to be at all tolerable, must irrefutably demonstrate a great and conspicuous gain. But, unfortunately, we are ignorant of the consequences of restrictions in marriage relations.

It is important in this connection to bear in mind that in modern societies there are certain unmistakable new tendencies at work. These tendencies are all in the direction of dissolving the old restrictions, both religious and social. They constitute, in fact, a movement toward what is called "free love." Now, this tendency runs, it seems to me, counter to Mr. Galton's proposals and makes it particularly difficult to initiate any restrictions of a new form and character.

It is, I believe, an illusion to expect that from any intellectual convictions there may arise a conscious inhibition of sex-relations in the population generally. Instances are not wanting of men of high culture marrying women who are the daughters of insane and epileptic parents.

But, notwithstanding these objections, which I hold to be a most serious obstacle, and even perhaps fatal to the practical application of Mr. Galton's eugenic principles, nevertheless I believe the studies which, in the second of his two papers to the Sociological Society, he proposes to institute will be both interesting and useful.

FROM DR. R. STEINMETZ<sup>9</sup>: I quite agree with Mr. Galton and others (e. g., Dr. Schallmeyer, of Munich, author of *Vererbung und Auslese im Lebenslauf der Völker*, 1903) that one of the highest objects of applied sociology is the promotion of eugenic marriages. I think there is no worthier object of discussion for a sociological society than that of the means of this promotion. To be sure, the thorough and real knowledge of the true, not the expressed and the reputed, motives for introducing restrictions on marriage might be a means to this end. What we want to know is the real objective cause of these restrictions; there need not, of course, have been any conscious motive at all.

Coming to detailed examination of some points in Mr. Galton's paper on "Restrictions in Marriage," I would ask: Is it certain that prohibition of polygamy in Christian nations was due "to considerations of social well-being," as Mr. Galton has it? Surely other causes were also at work. I think, where the number of adult men and women is nearly equal, monogamy is the natural result; polygamy is possible only when, by wars and other causes, this proportion is reversed, and when other circumstances, as social inequality, allow some men to take more women than one.

A special distribution of labor between men and women may contribute to this result, but cannot be the cause of it, as every man wants the assistance of more women when he may get them. And in respect of sexual relations it has to be observed that many are polygamous in intention, and are only deterred by practical difficulties.

Social inequality, poverty, successful wars are the condition of polygamy. Economical or sexual wants drive men to it.

When these conditions are no longer fulfilled, monogamy will replace it. This is furthered by any rise in the position of women, by the freer play of the purer

<sup>8</sup> Director of the Museum and Laboratory of Anthropology, University of Rome.

<sup>9</sup> Lecturer on sociology in the University of Leyden.



sentiments between the sexes, and by at least official or public chastity. I believe I am so far in agreement with Westermarck's views on the question. Christianity was very ascetic, as is attested by Paul's expressions in the epistle to the Corinthians. By these ascetic tendencies Christian morals were opposed to polygamy. This tendency was enforced by the Christian ebionistic sympathies, by which all the fathers of the church were governed. Asceticism and social equality can both make for monogamy. Monogamy is certainly in accordance with one very mighty human instinct, that of jealousy; therefore it is the only democratic form of marriage. And I think it is the only one in harmony with the higher sentiments between the sexes, and with a right moral relation between offspring and parents.

But, in considering it, we should never forget that it is largely traversed by irregular love, whether this be sentimental or more sensual, and also by very general prostitution in all ages and classes.

So we must be very cautious in deducing from the fact of monogamy any conclusions as to new and rational marriage regulations, desirable as they may be.

Generally, the term "endogamy" is employed in a narrower sense than the prohibition of Greeks to marry barbarian women (concubinage with them was allowed, so the restriction was not severe).

I do not consider that Mr. Galton's view of the causes and conditions of endogamy and exogamy is in strict accordance with the results of "anthropology" (the continental term is "ethnology"); Mr. Galton thinks exogamy is usually to be found in "small and barbarous communities;" but combined with the marriage restrictions by blood-ties, and the very general horror of incest, which are only its expression, exogamy is by far the commonest rule of the Chinese; and the Hindus are exogamous in the strict sense, and in the other sense all civilized nations are exogamous, marriage between close kindred being prohibited (Post, *Grundriss der ethnischen Jurisprudenz*, 1897, pp. 37-42).

The possibility of the complicated Australian marriage system, of which we know not yet the real motives and causes, does not at all warrant the conclusion that "with equal propriety" it might be applied "to the furtherance of some form of eugenics" among the Australians or among us. The conclusion from the Australians to us stands in need of demonstration; it cannot be assumed. Is it certain that motives of the same strength as those unknown may be found?

The motives for the horror of incest we do not yet know quite certainly. Perhaps they are the result of very deep-seated and fundamental causes, which suggest the gravest caution in postulating their analogies.

As yet we are even incapable of restraining the very deplorable neo-Malthusian tendencies in the higher classes and some others in all civilized nations, nor those very generally and strongly operating in the eastern United States, in France, in English Australia. We are powerless against the dangers in this direction with which we are threatened by the widely spread feministic movement.

The race-love of civilized men and women is regretfully feeble. The real problem is first to enforce it. At present the care for future man, the love and respect of the race, are quite beyond the pale of the morals of even the best.

The nobility of old, yea, the patriarchal family generally, entertained a real love and care for the qualities of their offspring. So, perhaps, the turn for this feeling may come again. The intensification of economic and social life will raise the demands on everybody's mental and bodily capabilities; the better knowledge of the hereditary qualities and their signification in attaining the highest degree of capacity will perhaps, and I think should, in some degree inevitably waken the care for the qualities of one's own offspring.

I put much more hope on this resultant of intensified social demands, of increase and spreading of pathological knowledge, and of evermore enlightened egoism, than on public morals embracing the future of the race. Improved care for one's own offspring according to science may possibly come. The result will be a change in our ideas, morals, and morality.

The next measures that then could be taken by the legislator seem to be that

formulated by Dr. Schallmeyer in his excellent paper, "Infection als Morgengabe."<sup>10</sup>

FROM SIR RICHARD TEMPLE:

NOTE I. STUDIES IN NATIONAL EUGENICS

*Topic I.*—It seems to me that definitions of "gifted" and "capable" are required. Are the "gifted" to be those who perform the initiative reasoning, out of which the practical results arise? Are the "capable" to be those who bring into effect the reasoning of the "gifted"? It has always seemed to me that the work accomplished in the world is due to both classes in an equal degree. Neither can be effective without the other. Both are equally important. The success of either demands mental powers of a very high order; I am not at all sure that it is going too far to say, of an equally high order. Then there are those who combine in themselves both the capacities, the initiative reasoning and the bringing into effect. Where are these to be placed? Many who possess the one in an eminent degree also possess the other; but, as reasoning and giving effect each requires so much thought and absorbs so much energy and time, the majority have not the opportunity to perform both. I suggest that, as regards family eugenics, both the "gifted" and the "capable" be, if the above definitions are to stand, taken as divisions of one class of mankind. This should be the safest method of bringing the inquiry to a practical result, because of the tendency, so strong in human beings, to look on their own description of work as that which is of the most importance to their kind. The great practical difficulty in the inquiry on the lines indicated, that impresses itself on me is that, especially among women—owing to their place in the world's work—qualities essential to usefulness are frequently present in individuals who are otherwise possessed of no specially high mental qualities, and are therefore "unknown," and in no way remarkable; such qualities as initiative, discretion, "common-sense," perseverance, patience, even temper, energy, courage, and so on, without which the "gifted" and "capable" are apt to be of no practical value to the world. I suggest that progress represents the sum of individual capacities, past and present, at any given period among any given population in any given environment. Then again, in the prosecution of eugenics by statistics of achievement there is another great difficulty, which may be best expressed in the words of the preacher in Ecclesiastes: "I returned, and saw under the sun, that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill: but time and chance happeneth to them all." Existing social conditions and prejudices, all the world over, will force eugenical philosophy to take root very slowly. This is, perhaps, as it should be, in view of the above practical reflection.

*Topic II.*—It would appear that a beginning has been made, as regards men, in the Rhodes Scholarships.

NOTE II. RESTRICTIONS IN MARRIAGE

In one sense, eugenics is the oldest and most universal philosophy in the world, of which the convention called marriage is the outward and visible sign. Everywhere, among all peoples in all times, marriage was originated for the enforcement and maintenance of real or supposed eugenics. The object of the convention has been fundamentally always the same, the direct personal advantage in some tangible form of a group in its environment. All that can be done by individual philosophers is to give marriage a definite turn in a direction deemed beneficial, because human beings in a mass, in a matter affecting every individual, act upon instinct—defining instinct as unconscious reasoning. In human affairs the outward and visible sign of instinct is custom. By reasoning, instinct can be given a definite direction, and hence a definite form can be given to a custom.

<sup>10</sup> For my own opinions on this *vide* "Die neuern Forschungen zur Geschichte der menschlichen Familie," *Zeitschrift für Socialwissenschaft*, 1899; cf. my "Die Wachswuth der Feminismus und Rasse," *ibid.*, 1904.

This has often been accomplished, but, so far as I can apprehend history, reasoning has succeeded only in creating instinct, and thus custom, when the masses subjected to its pressure have been able to see the direct personal advantage to be gained by the line taken. This is the practical point that the eugenical philosopher has to keep ever before him. A custom can be created. The questions for the philosopher are what should be created and how it should be created.

All forms of marriage are due fundamentally to considerations of well-being. Exogamy exists where it is thought important abnormally to increase the numbers of a group. Endogamy exists where it is thought important in a settled community to reserve property and social standing or power for a limited group. Monogamy, polygamy, polyandry, are all attempts to maintain social well-being in a form that has seemed obviously advantageous to different groups of human beings. Religion, taboo, and the prohibited degrees are all methods of enforcing custom by moral force. The Australian marriage system is merely a primitive, and therefore complicated, method of enforcing custom. But the human instinct as to incest is something going very deep down, as there is the same kind of instinct in some of the "higher" animals of the two sexes when stabled together, e. g., horses, elephants. Celibacy seems to be due to different causes in different circumstances, according as to whether it is enforced or voluntary. In the former case it is a method of enforcing marriage customs maintained for the supposed common good. In the latter it is due to asceticism, itself a universal instinct based on a philosophy of personal advantage.

The restrictions enforced by marriage customs have led to hypergamy, a *mariage de convenance* exchanging position and property, but really an unreasoning form of eugenics adopted because of the supposed personal advantage; and this has led, in one disastrous form, to female infanticide in a distinctly harmful degree. All the restrictions of marriage are modified in uncivilized communities by promiscuity before marriage and in civilized communities by hetairism. The greater the restrictions, the more systematic has hetairism become. Illegitimacy has taken on many almost unrecognizable forms in various parts of the world. It really represents the result of rebellion against convention. Every one of these considerations materially affects any proposition for a reform of eugenics. Caste is the outward manifestation of an endogamic marriage system by the "intellectuals" of a people for the personal advantage of their own group within the nation, and imitated without reasoning by other groups. This system of endogamic marriage, adopted for the real or supposed advantage of a group, has brought about national disaster, for it has made impossible the instinct of nationality, or the larger group, and has brought the peoples adopting it into perpetual subjection to others possessing the instinct of nationality. Its existence and practical effect are a standing warning to the eugenical philosopher, which should point out to him the extreme care that is necessary in consciously directing eugenics into any given channel.

FROM PROFESSOR TÖNNIES<sup>11</sup>: I fully agree with the scope and aims of Mr. Galton's "eugenics," and consequently with the essence of the two papers proposed. But with respect to details I have certain objections and illustrations which I now try to explain.

1. There can be no doubt but that the three kinds of accomplishments are desirable in mankind: physical, mental, and moral ability. Surely the three — or, as Mr. Galton classifies them, constitution (which I understand to imply moral character) physique, and intellect — are not independent variables, but if they to a large extent are correlate, on the other hand they also tend to exclude each other, strong intellect being very often connected with a delicate health as well as with poor moral qualities, and *vice versa*. Now, the great question, as it appears to me, will be, whether eugenics is to favor one kind of these excellencies at the *cost* of another one or of both the other, and which should be preferred under any circumstances.

2. Under existing social conditions, it would mean a cruelty to raise the average intellectual capacity of a nation to that of its better moiety of the present

<sup>11</sup> Professor of philosophy in the University of Kiel.



day. For it would render people so much more conscious of the dissonance between the hopeless monotony of their toil and the lack of recreation, poorness of comfort, narrowness of prospects, under which they are even now suffering severely, notwithstanding the dulness of the great multitude.

3. The rise of intellectual qualities also involves, under given conditions, a danger of further decay of moral feeling, nay, of sympathetic affections generally. Town life already produces a race of cunning rascals. Temptations are very strong indeed, to outrun competitors by reckless astuteness and remorseless tricks. Intelligence promotes egotism and pleasure-seeking, very much in contradiction to the interests of the race.

4. A strong physique seems to be correlate with some portions of our moral nature, but not with all. Refinement of moral feeling and tact are more of an intellectual nature, and again combine more easily with a weak frame and less bodily power.

5. I indorse what Mr. Galton shows, that marriage selection is very largely conditioned by motives based on religious and social connection; and I accept, as a grand principle, the conclusion that the same class of motives may, in time to come, direct mankind to disfavor unsuitable marriages, so as to make at least some kinds of them impossible or highly improbable; and this would mean an enormous benefit to all concerned, and to the race in general. But I very much doubt if a sufficient unanimity may be produced upon the question: Which marriages *are* unsuitable?

6. Of course, this unanimity may be promoted by a sufficient study of the effects of heredity. This is the proper and most prominent task of eugenics, as Mr. Galton luminously points out by his six topics to be taken in hand under the Research Fellowship. Highly though I appreciate the importance of this kind of investigations, to which my own attention has been directed at a very early date, I am apt to believe, however, that the *practical* outcome of them will not be considerable. Our present knowledge, scanty and incoherent as it is, still suffices already to make certain marriages, which are especially favored by social convention, by religion, and by custom, appear to sober-thinking men highly unsuitable. Science is not likely to gain an influence equivalent to, or even outweighing, those influences that further or restrain particular classes of marriage. On the other hand, the voice of reason, notably with respect to hygienic as well as moral considerations, is often represented by *parents* in contradiction to inclinations or even passions of their offspring (especially daughters), and the prevailing individualistic tendencies of the present age, greatly in favor of individual choice and of the natural right of love, mostly, or at least very often, dumb that voice of reason and render it more and more powerless. Eugenics has to contend against the two fronts: against the *mariage de convenance* on the one side, and the *mariage de passion* on the other.

7. But this applies chiefly to the upper strata of society, where a certain influence of scientific results may be presumed on principle with greater likelihood than among the multitude. Mr. Galton wishes the national importance of eugenics to be introduced into the national conscience like a new religion. I do not believe that this will be possible, unless the conditions of everyday existence were entirely revolutionized beforehand. The function of religion has always been to give *immediate* relief to pressing discomforts, and to connect it with hopeful prospects of an *individual* life to come. The life of the race is a subject entirely foreign to popular feelings, and will continue to be so, unless the mass should be exempt from daily toil and care, to a degree which we are unable to realize at present.

8. However, the first and main point is to secure the general *intellectual* acceptance of eugenics as a hopeful and most important study. I willingly and respectfully give my fullest sympathy and approval to this claim.

I have tried to express my sentiments here as evoked by the two most interesting papers. I have been obliged to do so in great haste, and consequently, as I am aware, in very bad English, for which I must apologize.

FROM PROFESSOR AUGUST WEISMANN: It has given me great pleasure to learn that a sociological society has been formed in England, and to see that so many distinguished names are associated with its inauguration and proceedings.

As for the request that I should send "an expression of my views on the subject" of Mr. Galton's two papers, I fear I can have nothing to say that will be at all new.

I think there is one question, however, of very great importance which has not yet, so far as I know, been investigated, and to which the statistical method alone can supply an answer. It is this: whether, when an hereditary disease, like tuberculosis, has made its appearance in a family, it is afterward possible for it to be entirely banished from this or that branch of the family; or whether, on the contrary, the progeny of these members of the family who appear healthy must not sooner or later produce a tuberculous progeny? I am fully aware that there exists already a great mass of statistical matter on the subject of "tuberculosis," but I cannot say that it seems to me sufficient, thus far, to justify a sure conclusion. Talking for myself, I am disposed, both on theoretic grounds and in view of known facts, to opine that a complete purification and re-establishment of such a family is quite possible in the cases of slighter infection. For I believe that hereditary transmission in such cases depends upon an infected condition of the seed germ or generative cell; that it is conceivable that single generative cells of the parent may remain free from bacilli; that an entirely healthy child may be developed from one such generative cell, and that from this sound shoot an entirely healthy branch of the family may grow in time. I would almost go so far as to say that, if this were *not* the case, then there could hardly be a family on earth today unaffected by hereditary disease.

Let me ask you to accept this note as merely an indication of my willingness to make at least a very small contribution to the list of those sociological problems which you aim at solving.

FROM HON. V. LADY WELBY: It is obvious that in the question of eugenic restrictions in marriage there are two points of view from which we may work: (1) that of making the most of the race, which concentrates interest, not on the parents—who are then merely, like the organism itself, the germ-carrier—but always on the children (in their turn merely race-bearers); and (2) that of making the most of the individual, and thus raising the standard of the whole by raising that of its parts. May we not say that we must learn to marry these points of view? Indeed, already they may be said to be married in actual family life; for, in a certain sense, the mother represents the first, and the father the second.

In my small contribution to the discussion on Mr. Galton's first paper I appealed to women to realize more clearly their true place and gift as representing their original racial motherhood, out of which the masculine and feminine characters have arisen. It seems advisable now to take somewhat wider ground.

When, in the interests of an ascending family ideal, we emphasize the need for restrictions on marriage which shall embody all those, as summarized in Mr. Galton's paper, to which human societies have already submitted, we have to consummate a further marriage—one of ideas; we have to combine what may appear to be incompatible aims. In the first place, in order to foster all that makes for a higher and nobler type of humanity than any that we have yet known how to realize, we must face the fact that some sacrifice of emotion, because relatively unworthy, is imperative. Else we weaken "the earnest desire not to infringe the sanctity and freedom of the social relations of a family group." But the sacrifice is of an emotion which has ceased to make for man and now makes for self or for reversion to the sub-human.

We are always confronted with a practical paradox. The marriage which makes for the highest welfare of the united man and woman may be actually inimical to the children of that union. The marriage which makes for the highest type of family, and its highest and fullest development, may often, and must always tend to, mean the inhibition of much that makes for individual perfection.

And since the children in their turn will be confronted by the same initial

difficulty, it may be desirable not only to define our aim and the best method of reaching it, but to suggest one or two simple prior considerations which are seldom taken into account. One of these is the fact that, speaking generally, human development is a development of the higher brain and its new organ, the hand. It may, I suppose, be said that the rest of the organism has not been correspondingly developed, but remains essentially on the animal level. What especially concerns us here is that this includes the uterine system, which has even tended to retrograde. Here, surely, we have the key to many social and ethical difficulties in the marriage question.

This relatively enormous complexity of brain, disturbing, or at least altering, the organic balance, coupled with the sexual incompleteness of the individual, has cost us dear. All such special developments involving comparative overgrowth must do this. In this case we have gained, of course, a priceless analytical, constructive, and elaborative faculty. But there seems to be many indications that we have correspondingly lost a direct and trustworthy reaction to the stimuli of nature in its widest sense—a reaction that should deserve the name of intuition as representing a practically unerring instinct. A eugenic advance secured by an increase of moral sensitiveness on the subject of parentage may well tend to restore on a higher level these primordial responses to excitation of all kinds. But, of course, it will still rest with education, in all senses and grades, either (as, on the whole, at present) to blunt or distort them, or to interpret and train them into directed and controlled efficiency.

At present our mental history seems to present a curious anomaly. On the one hand we see what, compared with the animal, and even with the lower intellectual human, types, is an amazing development of logical precision, ordered complexity of reasoning, rigorous validity of conclusion; all ultimately depending for their productive value on the validity of the presuppositions from which they start. On the other hand, this initial validity can but seldom, if ever, be proved experimentally or by argument, or established by universal experience. Thus the very perfection of the rational development is always liable to lead us farther and farther astray. The result we see in endless discussions which tend rather to divide than to unite us by hardening into opposed views of what we take for reality, and to confuse or dim the racial outlook and hinder the racial ascent.

It is to be hoped that one result of the creation of a eugenic conscience will be a restoration of the human balance, bringing about an immensely increased power of revising familiar assumptions, and thus of rightly interpreting experience and the natural world. This must make for the solution of pressing problems which at present cannot even be worthily stated. For there is no more significant sign of the present deadlock resulting from the anomaly just indicated, than the general neglect of the question of effective expression, and therefore of its central value to us; that is, what we are content vaguely to call its meaning.

Such a line of thought may seem, for the very reason of this neglect, far enough from the subject to be dealt with—from the question of restrictions in marriage. But in the research, studies, and discussions which ought to precede any attempt in the direction of giving effect to an aroused sense of eugenic responsibility, surely this factor will really be all-important. It must be hoped that such discussion will be carried on by those in whom what, for convenience sake, I would call the mother-sense, or the sense of human, even of vital, origin and significance, is not entirely overlain by the priceless power of co-ordinating subtle trains of reasoning. For this supreme power easily defeats itself by failing to examine and rectify the all-potent starting-point of its activities, the simple and primary assumption.

I have admitted that the foregoing suggestions—offered with all diffidence—seem to be far from the present subject of discussion, with which, indeed, I have not attempted directly to deal. I would only add that this is not because such questions have not the deepest interest for me, as for all who realize their urgency.

We shall have to discuss, though I hope in some cases privately, such questions as the influence on descendants of the existence or the lack of reverent love and loyalty between parents, not as “acquired characters,” in the controversial sense, but as giving full play to the highest currents of our mental and spiritual



life. We shall have to consider the possibilities of raising the whole moral standard of the race, so that the eugenic loyalty, shown in instinctive form on the sub-human plane, should be reproduced in humanity, consciously, purposively, and progressively. Finally we shall have to reconsider the two cults of self and happiness, which we are so prone to make ultimate. The truly eugenic conscience will look upon self as a means and an instrument of consecrated service; and happiness, not as an end or an ideal to strive for, since such striving ignobly defeats its own object, but—as sorrow or disappointment may also become—a means or a result of purifying and energizing the human activities to an extent as yet difficult to speak of.

MR. GALTON'S REPLY: This Society has cause to congratulate itself on the zeal and energy which have brought together such a body of opinion as is here represented. It is not only what we have heard tonight. We have had contributions from four eminent specialists: Dr. Haddon, Dr. Mott, Mr. Crawley, and Dr. Westermarck; men who have, all of them, written books which are well known. But this is not all. I have in my hands fifteen different written communications, all of which have been sent in by well-known persons. It was suggested that, as these could not be read, I might make a few remarks on the points in them that seemed more especially to call for observation. First of all, it gives me satisfaction to find that no one impugns the conclusion which my memoir was written to justify, that history tells how restrictions in marriage, even of an excessive kind, have been contentedly accepted very widely, under the guidance of what I called "immaterial motives." This is all I had in view when writing it.

Unfortunately, eugenics is a wide study, with an uncounted number of side issues into which those who discuss it informally are tempted to stray. If, however, sure advance is to be made, these issues must be thoroughly explored, one by one, and as little desultory discussion as possible should be indulged in. To change the simile, we have to deal with a formidable chain of strongholds, which must be severally attacked in force, reduced, and disposed of, before we can proceed freely.

Now, I am bound to say that the greater part of these comments deals with side issues, not relevant to the immediate purpose of the memoir. It would be discourteous to their authors to pass them over in total silence, though I am unable to discuss them properly, each in a short paragraph.

The first of these comments is that we might make great mistakes as to what is, and what is not, eugenics; therefore, that it is far too early to devise practical regulations. I cannot consider this to be an objection, for it is precisely what I have all along maintained. A partial though long list of subjects that need serious inquiry is given in my second memoir.

It is objected by many that there cannot be unanimity on the "points" that it is most desirable to breed for. I fully discussed this objection in my memoir read here last spring, showing that there were some qualities, such as health and vigor, that all thought desirable, and the opposite undesirable, and that this sufficed to give a first direction to our aims.<sup>12</sup> It is a safe starting-point, though a great deal more has to be inquired into as we proceed on our way.

It is also objected that if the inferior moiety of a race are left to intermarry, their produce will be increasingly inferior. This is certainly an error. The law of "regression toward mediocrity" insures that their offspring, as a whole, will be superior to themselves, and if, as I sincerely hope, a freer action will be hereafter allowed to selective agencies than hitherto, the portion of the offspring so selected would be better still. The influences that now withstand the free action of selective agencies include indiscriminate charity.

I wish that competent persons would severally take up one or other of the many topics mentioned in my second memoir, or others of a similar kind, and work it thoroughly out, as they would any ordinary scientific problem; in this way solid progress would be made. I must be allowed to re-emphasize my opinion that an immense amount of investigation has to be accomplished before a definite system of eugenics can be safely framed.

<sup>12</sup> *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, p. —.

FROM MR. F. CARREL: I should like to ask Mr. Galton whether the general practice of eclectic mating might not tend to the production of a very inferior residual type, always condemned to mate together until eliminated from an existence in which they would be too unfitted to participate; and, if so, whether such a system can be adopted without inflicting suffering upon the more or less slowly disappearing residuum.

PROFESSOR YVES DELAGE,<sup>13</sup> in a letter to Mr. Galton, wrote: I am delighted with the noble and very interesting enterprise which you are undertaking. I have no doubt that if in all countries the men who are at the head of the intellectual movement would give it their support, it would in the end triumph over the obstacles which are caused by indifference, routine, and the sarcasms of those who see in any new idea only the occasion for exercising a satirical spirit in which they cloak their ignorance and hardness of heart. . . .

We should translate "eugenics" into French by *eugonie* or *eugénese*. Could you not, while there is still time, modify the English term into "eugonics" or "eugénesis," in order that it might be the same in both languages?

I see with pleasure that you have had the tact to attack the question on the side by which it can be determined. Many years ago I had myself examined the subject that you prosecute at this moment, but I had thought only of compulsory, or rather prohibitive, means of attaining the object. . . . You are entirely right in laying aside, at least at the outset, all compulsory or prohibitive means, and in seeking only to initiate a movement of opinion in favor of eugenics, and in trying to modify the mental attitude toward marriage so that young people, and especially parents, will think less of fortune and social conditions, and more of physical perfection, moral well-being, and intellectual vigor. Social opinion should be modified so that the opprobrium of *mesalliance* falls, not on the union of the noble with the plebeian, or of the rich with the poor, but on the mating of physical, intellectual, and moral qualities, with the defects of these.

As you have so well put it, public opinion and social convention have a considerable prohibitive force. You will have rendered an incalculable service if you direct these toward eugenics.

The thing is difficult, and will need sustained effort. To impress the public, not only men of science must be asked to help, but those of renown in literature in all countries.

<sup>13</sup> Professor of biology in the University of Paris.

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## A LABORATORY EXPERIMENT IN JOURNALISM

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The University of Chicago

The enthusiasm of the universities during the past fifteen or twenty years for "getting into closer relations with the national life"—as the phrase runs—has led them to establish technical schools and courses of many kinds. Of these several—notably curricula in engineering and agriculture—have been undoubtedly successful. Even schools of finance, giving instruction in banking, insurance, railway administration, etc., have met with some favor from the business world. But academic courses in journalism have so far failed either to define themselves clearly within the university or to commend themselves to a cynical newspaperdom without. The proposal of Mr. Joseph Pulitzer to endow a school of journalism at Columbia University revived for a time the flagging interest in the experiment, but the character of the studies outlined, and even the vigorous defense of the plan by its author,<sup>1</sup> seemed not to carry conviction to the doubters.

The reasons for this skepticism are not far to seek. While as a rule editors admit that, other things being equal, a college training is of distinct value to a newspaper worker, they say that the university cannot create conditions in which the future reporter or leader-writer must learn the technique of his profes-

<sup>1</sup> "The College of Journalism," *North American Review*, May, 1904.



sion. They insist that the only way to become a newspaper writer is to "go through the mill." According to these critics, journalism has no clearly defined, conventionalized technique analogous to that of law or medicine. The general principles of newspaper work are mere empty platitudes apart from the concrete, ever-changing problems of the daily press. All that the university can hope to do for the newspaper man is to give him a general training in languages, literature, history, economics, and the other social sciences, as well as some knowledge of the world of nature. The rest must be left to the office, where by a painful process he learns to utilize his resources and to transform his literary style to meet the peculiar needs of the modern paper.

There is much plausibility as well as a great deal of sound sense in this position of experienced newspaper men. It is always a thankless, and even a presumptuous, thing for an academic person to question the dicta of hard-headed, practical men as to the fields in which they are experts, but the writer believes that something is to be said—and more to be done—for another kind of university training in journalism. He proposes therefore to describe an academic course which recently reached its culmination with the publication of one number of a modern city daily, written and edited by a class of university students organized as an editorial staff.

During the last three years the writer has conducted at the University of Chicago a course entitled "The History and Organization of the American Press." This class meets four hours a week for three months. The work falls into two parts: (1) historical or descriptive, and (2) practical or technical. The first division includes the development of the American press, through the colonial and revolutionary period, into the partisan press of the early nineteenth century; thence into the period of "enterprise," the telegraph press, and the Civil War period, to the contemporary press. The great papers and the famous editors of the era of personal journalism are treated in some detail. The story of the rise of press associations and the history of the Associated Press also receive attention. Copies of old newspapers, facsimiles, etc., are used to make the historical descriptions more

vivid, and to give some idea of make-up, typography, and illustrations. Next follows a brief outline of the development of the printing and illustrating processes. The students become familiar with the different fonts or "points" of type, and are given practice in correcting unrevised galley proofs supplied by the office of the college daily. The evolution of the printing-press from the Washington press to the contemporary web perfecting machine is suggested, and the nature and significance of stereotyping are pointed out. The various kinds of illustrations from early woodcuts to "tooled" half-tones are described, and examples of each are shown. Lectures and assigned reading on these topics are supplemented by visits to the plants of the leading Chicago dailies. Then comes an analysis of the organization, mechanical, business, and editorial, of a modern paper. The general functions of the departments are indicated, and the duties of each worker—especially on the editorial staff—are outlined.

All this should make one more intelligent concerning newspaper work. Every journalist of course must know something of the history of his profession, and he should conceive in a large way all aspects of his chosen field. But it is perfectly true that such knowledge may not tell immediately upon his efficiency in doing his daily work. There must be more than information about the profession; there must be practice in doing the kind of things which it demands of its members. How far this practice is attempted, by what methods and with what results, are after all the vital questions. Throughout the course, in addition to the lectures and reading, students are given daily exercises designed to test them on many sides. One day editorials are handed in on a topic assigned in advance. Often three different editorials will be required on the same subject, but treated in harmony with the editorial policies of three different papers. Again each member of the class will be given, at the opening of the hour, an unheaded "story," clipped from some prominent daily. Three or five minutes will be allowed for the writing of a suitable heading. Sometimes the size and character of the "head" will be indicated; sometimes the student will be left to use his own judgment. At another period the chief facts of a current "story" in color-

less, chronological form will be put upon the blackboard, and a brief time allowed for the turning of these into copy for a designated kind of daily. Still another device consists in sending students on assignments to cover stated events, copy which has been finished within a given time limit being turned in next day. Often members of the class are permitted to accompany reporters of the city dailies and of the local press association on their rounds.

The material secured in these different ways becomes the subject-matter for "copy-reading"—i. e., revision, rewriting, head-writing, etc.—and of active criticism and discussion in class. Since each student is a subscriber for the quarter for one of the leading dailies of the country; constantly reports upon its contents and methods, and hands in almost every day typical matter from its columns, a broad basis of observation is afforded. Comparisons and general conclusions inevitably follow. A generalization, such as the rule that a heading must always contain a verb, or at least an idea of action, may be tested in a most instructive fashion when the usage of twenty-five or thirty prominent papers is immediately available. Out of these discussions come principles and theories to be constantly tested and revised. "What is news?" and the "structure of a news story" are no longer abstract theories when they thus emerge from a mass of concrete material. Under these conditions the work of the class gradually improves in sureness of touch and simplicity and directness of style. The more obvious blunders are avoided. Each student prides himself on his ability to put the whole story in the opening sentence or paragraph. Superfluous words and phrases, hackneyed expressions, fine writing, tend to disappear. The individuality of the men begins to show itself. The imitative produce commonplace, conventional copy, but now and then a clever, sprightly story in a different vein will be turned in and come up for discussion in the class. Someone declares that the story is too "fresh" or undignified, and that any city editor would "turn it down." The writer of the copy stoutly contends that it is quite the sort of thing one finds in the *Sun*, etc. Thus as the discussions go on, standards and ideals get themselves more clearly defined.



Toward the middle of the quarter, when individual tastes and abilities have been partially disclosed, the class is organized as an editorial staff. This gives occasion for useful discussion as to the respective duties of managing editor, news editor, city editor, copy-reader, *et al.*, and also provides a means for handling more systematically the daily grist of copy. But a staff suggests a paper, and something definite and tangible to be done at a given time in an efficient way. The mere turning out of haphazard, unrelated copy palls after a time upon active young persons. So a year ago last June it was proposed that the last exercise of the course should be the preparation of complete copy for one issue of a daily paper. Everything was to be done up to the point of sending the matter to the composing-room. No line was to be written before nine in the morning nor after midnight of the day on which the trial was made. The class entered upon the undertaking with enthusiasm. The rooms of the University College, in the heart of the city, were put at the service of the staff. By one o'clock these quarters were transformed into editorial offices. Amateur reporters were rushing off on assignments in company with the professionals of the city dailies. The editorial writers had already been at work, and when the copy began to come in, the copy-readers set about their task. The reports of the City Press Association and of the Associated Press—generously furnished for the occasion—arriving by messenger at frequent intervals, were eagerly seized upon by the city and telegraph editors. As fast as the completed manuscript came from the copy-readers it was turned over to the make-up man, who had spread out before him eight forms drawn on manila paper. Following the suggestions of the managing editor—who on this paper stayed until the forms closed—the stories were estimated for length, space was marked off in the columns, and thus the pages were filled up. About midnight the excitement reached its height as the last copy was turned in and the brown paper forms were “locked up.” As a bit of make-believe, with a certain amount of incidental profit, the attempt was a success. But it left much to be desired. The results were too vague—a big roll of manuscript and a few sheets of wrapping-paper. There was no

way of estimating definitely the work of the responsible editors, no certain tests of the copy-readers' skill—in short, little or nothing to show for a good deal of hard work. "If only it could have been printed!" was the regretful sigh. To be sure, one valuable result grew out of the experiment. The city editor of one of the leading Chicago dailies volunteered to go over the copy, and then to criticise it before the class. His acute, incisive, luminous comments were of the greatest service to the students. He said the copy was not so much crude as commonplace, imitative, conventional. This was doubtless the result of studying the newspapers so closely and of attempting to acquire a professional style. The results were largely negative; the common blunders and infelicities were pretty well avoided, but that rare originality which editors so eagerly seek in "cub" reporters had not been much stimulated. After all, instruction is largely a conventionalizing process, and too much must not be expected in the way of developing genius from average material. Even the best newspaper offices are not conspicuously successful in discovering and developing great abilities on a large scale.

The class of this year—in the spring quarter of 1905—numbered twenty-five, and included three student reporters for the Chicago papers, several men who had worked on country weeklies, and one employee of the Associated Press. The class as a whole showed intelligence; much good copy was turned in. The editorials written by two or three graduate students in political science and economics were unusually pointed, clear, and vigorous. When the plans for the final practice were proposed, the question, "Why not print the paper?" again came up. The matter had already been investigated in a tentative way, but the enthusiasm of the class was so evident, and its ability so well proved, that the time seemed auspicious for pushing the experiment farther. The plan was broached to the manager<sup>2</sup> of one of the afternoon papers, who instantly and with cordiality offered to put his whole plant at the service of the class any day from five in the afternoon until the forms were locked up. Moreover, he

<sup>2</sup> Mr. John Eastman, of the *Chicago Evening Journal*, whose generosity and courtesy contributed in a fundamental way to the success of the experiment.

promised to produce the edition at actual cost. This was an encouraging beginning. Next the news services must be secured. The Associated Press and the City Press Association, with the hearty consent of their Chicago members,<sup>3</sup> agreed to supply copies of their complete reports, with the understanding that the paper should not be published before noon. The city editors of the morning papers were equally friendly, promising to give access to their assignment books, and to send out students with their own reporters. The sum needed to cover the cost of bringing out the paper was quickly secured from friends who took advertising space to the amount of three columns.

These preliminaries settled, the class set about the further preparations with enthusiasm. The staff had already been organized with the editor-in-chief of the college daily as managing editor, two student reporters as news and city editors, and the Associated Press employee as telegraph editor. All the usual departments—finance, society, sport, art, literature and the drama, exchange, etc.—had been assigned to responsible editors; a cartoonist had been selected, copy-readers appointed, and now the original staff of reporters was enlarged by volunteers among friends of the class, and from one of the university courses in English composition. The complete staff numbered nearly forty, each having clearly defined duties, and responsible to a designated superior.

The following important points were decided upon after full discussion in the class. The name the *Daily Times* was adopted. The policy and tone of the paper were to be Republican in national affairs, with a somewhat independent attitude toward state and municipal politics; to be dignified in the treatment and display of news, avoiding sensational methods and smartness; to aim at accuracy, abjuring "fakes" and "pipe stories." Only by fixing a policy in this way would it be possible to make a consistent and homogeneous paper. While the usage of the office in which the

<sup>3</sup> Acknowledgment is due to Mr. A. C. Thomas and Colonel C. S. Diehl, of the Associated Press; to Mr. H. L. Saylor, of the City Press; and to the following members of these associations: Mr. R. W. Patterson, of the *Chicago Tribune*; Mr. F. B. Noyes, of the *Record-Herald*; Mr. G. W. Hinman, of the *Inter-Ocean*; and Mr. H. W. Seymour, of the *Chronicle*.



edition was to be brought out would be followed so far as spellings, abbreviations, etc., were concerned, a special style-sheet for headings was prepared and printed. By this the copy-readers were guided in their preliminary practice. They quickly became skilful in meeting the requirements of substance, space, and symmetry.

As the seriousness of the task which had been undertaken became more and more apparent, the class readily acquiesced in a plan for a preliminary practice in the course of which all copy for an edition should be prepared just as though it were to be printed. A night was selected and the work done. The trial was in many ways discouraging. The city and telegraph desks were nearly swamped by the Association reports; many of the reporters went sadly astray and failed to get a grip on their stories; the make-up was vague and the proportions of news ill-balanced. The effect, however, was the traditional stimulus of a poor rehearsal. The young newspaper men saw more clearly the problems to be met, and pursued all the more vigorously their training for the final trial, which had been set for June 6, the paper bearing date of June 7.

On the evening of June 5 an editorial conference decided upon the cartoon<sup>4</sup> and upon the leading editorials. It was the aim to keep these close to the events of the moment, and at the same time to make them well-considered, informing, and incisive. The editorials decided upon at the evening conference were: "English Diplomacy," the visit of the Spanish king to the court of St. James being made the starting-point for a review of England's diplomacy by which in ten years her own position of isolation has been in a large measure transferred to Germany; "Evolution of

<sup>4</sup>This was suggested by the visit of the Spanish king to Paris, where he narrowly escaped a bomb, and to London, where at the moment he was said to be pursued by heiresses. The picture was to represent his royal highness flying incontinently from an anarchist with a bomb poised in the manner of a shot-putter, and from a young woman in bridal dress with a money bag in her outstretched hand. The descriptive line was to read, "After you, My Dear Alfonso." It is, to be sure, a question whether this was quite in harmony with the policy of the paper, but such was the decision. The drawing, which was not begun until noon next day, was admirably executed. It was turned over to the engraver at five.

Roosevelt's Cabinet," in which the rumored appointment of Bonaparte was the occasion for describing the gradual change of the cabinet from a McKinley legacy to a personally sympathetic council of the President; "Democracy in Unionism," a comment upon the autocratic methods of labor leaders, and the apathy of the rank and file, as illustrated in the existing teamsters' strike; "Two Kinds of Reformers," in which the attitudes of Mayor Dunne and of James Dalrymple, the Glasgow traction expert, toward municipal ownership were contrasted. These leading editorials having been tentatively decided upon both as to subject-matter and length, a column or more space remained available for topics to be suggested by the news of the next day. It was agreed that no copy should be actually written before 9 o'clock on the morning of June 6. With the exception of the book reviews and one or two short special articles, no manuscript was prepared before the designated hour.

The editorial offices were opened June 6 at noon in the rooms of the University College. The managing editor had prepared a preliminary schedule, and had assigned to the city, news, and department editors the approximate space available for each. This distribution was understood to be subject to change with the news developments of the afternoon and evening. The paper was to be a four-page, seven-column sheet, with solid minion as a body type. The editorials were to be set in leaded brevier. This make-up called for almost exactly twenty-five columns of matter, practically the amount carried by an eight-page paper which has good advertising patronage. In spite of all these careful preparations, there remained the inevitable uncertainty as to the news which would have to be handled. "Suppose the Czar were to be assassinated?" "How could we handle such a thing as that?" was the sort of question raised now and then by the anxious editors. The chief stock stories of the day were: the Russo-Japanese War, the rumors of peace, the Zemstvo's appeal, the interned ships at Manila, the French cabinet crisis, the Prussian wedding, the Spanish king in London, the Philadelphia revolt, the Equitable scandal, the Chicago traction situation, and the strike of the local teamsters. Some of these were active, and

“follow stories” and bulletins might be expected; others would be covered by the afternoon papers, and would therefore lose much of their news value. Here were problems in plenty. Some early copy must go to the compositors by 4—a full quota of men could not be provided for the evening—and after seven the stream of stories must flow steadily and copiously. All uncertain matters must be postponed until the latest possible moment, everything sure to be printed must go up promptly, while “over-setting”—i. e., the composition of more matter than there was space for—must be minimized. The editorials already mentioned, supplemented by three which grew out of the news of the morning—viz., “Finance and Publicity,” “Admiral Enquist and His Cruises,” and “A New Theatrical Conscience”—were the first of the copy to be set. These, together with short, original paragraphs, a half-column of clippings, literary reviews, dramatic criticisms, society notes, and an exclusive special article, an interview with the Japanese consul on Togo’s telegram to the Mikado, completed the editorial page, which was locked up about 8, at which time the staff had been installed for two hours in the editorial rooms of its newspaper host.

From this time on the situation grew more complex and exciting. The press reports were coming in rapidly, and being handled by the telegraph editor and his copy-readers. The telegrams were being checked off, sorted, selected, condensed, provided with headings. All the war dispatches and other rapidly changing stories were put to one side for late treatment, while the shorter, miscellaneous telegrams were sifted and rewritten for a column of “Telegraphic Brevities,” a device for handling a large number of items in a condensed form. At the same time the city desk was a center of activity. Stories of the afternoon—special men had been devoting the whole day to traction and strike developments—were being sifted and copy-read; reporters were arriving, summarizing their results, receiving space instructions from the city editor, and sitting down to write out their copy, which was quickly merged in the stream now flowing steadily through the copy-readers’ hands to the composing-room. The managing editor had before him the news schedules of the differ-



ent editors and the proofs of the matter already in galley. He modified his "make-up" from time to time and hurried frequently to the composing-room, where the three remaining pages were beginning to fill. The base for the cartoon was waiting in the upper center of the first page for the zinc etching still in the engraver's hands; the leading first-page stories were being assembled under their headings, while vacant spaces showed where the final bulletins and latest "leads" were to find place. On the third page "The City in Brief" and "Telegraphic Brevities" were lengthening rapidly, while more important telegrams, foreign and domestic, together with local stories were being assembled. The fourth page early began to fill with financial reports and sporting news. To one side stood galleys of matter as yet unassigned, awaiting the exigencies of the final make-up, which was scheduled for 1 A. M. The paper was to be a first or mail edition, not the city edition which contains later telegrams and local reports.

At midnight the climax approached. The telegraph editor was working at top speed. He turned a mass of items concerning federal affairs into a special correspondent's Washington letter—what are principles and policy in a crisis such as this?—and dictated to a stenographer, provided for an emergency, a clear condensation under a St. Petersburg dateline of telegrams from Moscow and other Russian cities, at the same time skilfully weaving in the chief facts as to the Zemstvos situation, and other related items. It was a clever and effective piece of work. With the turning in of this copy the labors of the staff were practically over. The composing-room now became the center of interest. Thirty amateur journalists watched with keen parental solicitude the work of a deft and marvelously long-suffering foreman who, under the guidance of the managing editor, in consultation with three or four of his chief aids, "lifted" this story and substituted that in order to secure symmetry and balance of heads, to recognize news values, and to meet the exigencies of space. The fourth page was locked up, the third was on the point of being closed, when in rushed the telegraph editor with a fresh war bulletin. It must go at the head of the first page war story. It was ten

minutes before 1 o'clock. In a few moments the "stickful" was set, read, and in the foreman's hand. A short telegram had been lifted from the first page and had displaced a less important item on page 3. The space gained had been shifted to the top of the war column, into which the late bulletin was dropped. At last the word was given; the cartoon etching had come down and been tacked on its base; the forms were closed, the set screws driven home, and the task accomplished at five minutes after the appointed hour. On the galleys lay three and one-half columns of "overset." Page-proofs were made, and the weary but elated editors went home to await eagerly the printed edition, which was distributed at noon next day.

So much of detailed description seems necessary to give a fairly vivid idea of the working conditions under which this practice paper was sent to press. To the members of the class were thus brought home certain typical problems of the daily paper: the collection of news, the preparation of it, the estimation of its value in both space and position, the proportions of different kinds of matter, the exigencies of final make-up. Under the strain of the night's work the students were tested in a searching fashion. Resourcefulness, good judgment, coolness, were demanded. While for the most part the different men did about what was expected of them, several distinctly failed to meet the emergency effectively, while others—one fellow in particular who during the quarter had seemed aimless, if not indifferent—surprised all by their alertness, adaptability, and industry. There could be no better illustration of the different ways in which students react to academic exercises on the one hand, and to calls for action, accomplishment, on the other.

The *Daily Times* was on the whole a success. It sought in no sense to be a model paper, or to introduce innovations. It aimed simply to conform to the best standards of alert, dignified, self-respecting journalism. The editorial page was by common consent the best of the four, and might challenge comparison with any save the leading metropolitan papers. The first page looked well, and corresponded closely with the Chicago papers so far as the choice of news went. The only conspicuous mistake of judg-

ment was betrayed in giving the Prussian wedding "follow story" a place on the front page, when the afternoon papers had covered the event rather fully. The one bad "break" was in an equivocal "hanger" in the heading of this same news item. It read "Oldest Son of Emperor William and Duchess Cecilia Married Yesterday." In general, the news was presented in a straightforward fashion, and the heads were especially well done, terse, and vivid, without frivolity or smartness. No important local event was wholly overlooked, and the condensation of the Associated Press report showed good judgment and a fair degree of skill. The amateur editors were naturally gratified by the many friendly comments of practical newspaper men who frankly expressed surprise at the excellence of the result.

It would be easy to overestimate the significance of this experiment. It must be remembered that it was made under the most favorable conditions: a class of more than average ability, several of them with some experience in journalism, one an employee of the Associated Press; editorial writers of maturity and scholarly training; the co-operation of four city editors;<sup>5</sup> careful, preliminary practice; expert, professional proofreaders; a well-organized mechanical department; and—this was of much moment—a quiet, normal news day. Nevertheless, the attempt and the training which preceded it did show that it is possible to give under university auspices a practical introduction to the technique of newspaper work as distinguished from that general culture which is already provided. Whether distinct schools of journalism are possible or desirable is a question which may be left for the decision of time and experience. It seems, however, quite worth while to offer college and university courses which shall deal with the practical problems of newspaper work. Whether the practice-paper idea is practicable as a regular device, or whether some other plan would serve the purpose better, it at

<sup>5</sup> The writer has found newspaper men unfailingly friendly and always ready to give aid. In this case these city editors sent out with their own reporters the amateurs of the *Daily Times*. It should be noted, however, that no newspaper men even visited the *Journal* office during the trial, which was carried through without professional advice or supervision.



least suggests the possibility of creating an approximation to working conditions. At present the following seem to be feasible first steps toward journalism courses in any urban university:

1. The appointment of a journalist, who combines practical experience with academic tastes, to a permanent faculty position.

2. The appointment on salary of leading men from the city press to lectureships in the several fields of journalism. This would be strictly analogous to the relation which practicing doctors and lawyers sustain to medical and law schools.

3. The establishment of a museum, such as the writer has begun to organize, designed to illustrate (*a*) the history of newspapers by originals and facsimiles of old papers; (*b*) the mechanical side—by showing all the stages from copy to the printed paper; (*c*) the editorial side by scrapbooks containing actual copy from newspapers in the transition from reporters' manuscript to final proofs; (*d*) a seminar room in which files of prominent typical papers, including a few foreign journals, are kept for reading and study.

4. The installation of a small plant, with a linotype machine—or access to such a printing-office—for setting up the daily exercises of the class.

5. Frequent visits to the leading newspaper offices for observation in connection with class lectures.

6. Assignment work for students, at first independently, and then, when experience warrants, as understudies to reporters on the staffs of the city dailies.

7. Courses in English especially adapted to the cultivation of a good newspaper style, which is far from deserving the opprobrium which too many literary men and college instructors heap upon it.

8. Courses in modern history, diplomacy, political science, economics, and sociology may easily be given slight modification which will make them of more value to men preparing for journalism.

The sum of the whole matter, however, is to bring practical newspaper men into the lecture and seminar room, not for mere general addresses on the importance of the press to civilization,

but for careful, discriminating criticism and concrete suggestion; in short, for clinical, laboratory work. All efforts which the universities may make in the direction of journalistic training of a definite, practical sort will be futile until they succeed in securing the regular, compensated services of men recognized as leaders in their profession, representing its best achievements and its highest ideals and aims.

## THE NECESSARY SEQUEL OF CHILD-LABOR LAWS

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Recent agitation against the abuses of child-labor has been confined to the needs of children to the age of fourteen or at most sixteen years. This vital issue should not obscure the imperative need of relief from overwork of young girls above that age. For obvious reasons, girls between sixteen and twenty-one years stand in need of protective legislation, primarily a limitation upon their hours of labor. That women *as women* should have certain safeguards secured by law, that women need special legislation, is a proposition adopted and acted upon by all enlightened states. In view of the fact that practically one-half of the working-women in the United States (49.3 per cent. in 1900) are girls— young women under the age of twenty-five years— such special legislation is specially needed.

In the census of 1900 the section on "Occupations" shows very clearly in what direction the employment of women has been tending during the last twenty years. Two striking facts stand out vividly: (1) the increase in the percentage of working-women over the percentage of men between 1880 and 1900; (2) the large percentage of young women (sixteen to twenty years) in the total number of working-women, as compared with the small percentage of young men of the same ages in the total number of working-men.

In 1880 the percentage distribution *by sex* of all persons engaged in gainful occupations was: working-men, 84.8; working-women, 15.2. By 1900 this ratio had changed as follows: working-men, 81.8; working-women, 18.2— an increase of 3 per cent. of women workers, with a corresponding decrease of 3 per cent. of men workers.

In every geographic division, and in every state and territory except three, females formed an increased proportion from 1890 to 1900 of the total



number of persons gainfully employed, and in the three states excepted—Georgia, Florida, and Louisiana—the proportion remained practically stationary.

To illustrate the increase in the percentage of working-women over working-men in particular industries, the figures given for manufacture and trade are of striking interest: In 1880 the percentage of working-men in manufacture was 83.8; by 1900 this figure had sunk to 81.5. The percentage of working-women in manufacture, on the contrary, rose from 16.7 in 1880 to 18.5 in 1900.

In trade and transportation—a division of industry including the employment of women as “stenographers, typewriters, telegraph and telephone operators, bookkeepers, clerks, and sales-women”—the percentage of women rose from 3.4 in 1880 to the surprising figure of 10.5 in 1900; while the percentage of men sank from 96.6 to 89.5 in the same twenty years.

Thus the rapid increase in the number of working-women, and the rate at which they are gaining upon men, comparatively, in the industries that call for the labor of women, warrant a careful study of the results of such employment, and of the status of the working-woman before the law, in the various states, as a means of obtaining more adequate protection.

The enormous proportion of young girls among “working-women” will be dealt with below.

Legislation for working-men has been most advanced in the western mining states. The eight-hour day is no longer an ideal, but has been obtained as a legal maximum for all laborers in mines in Arizona, Colorado, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming. Eighteen states, both east and west, restrict to an eight-hour day all work contracted for by the state.

If it is recognized as desirable that men should not be obliged to work more than eight hours in a day in certain industries, the work of women should, without question, be limited to that maximum. If a working-day of ten, twelve, or fourteen hours reduces a man to the level of a mere machine, it leaves a woman in a more unhappy plight—in imminent danger of physical breakdown.

*The new strain in industry.*—From the point of view of

health, two particular hardships exist for the woman worker: the extreme length of the working-day and the requirement of night work. The former is the more widespread evil, and directly affects the larger number.

The industries of today differ most markedly from those of the past in the relentless speed which they require. This speed is acquired in various ways: by mechanical devices which "speed up" the individual machines; by increasing the number of machines attended by each worker; by the specialization which trains a worker to one detail of production year after year; and by other methods.

To trace this undeniable evolution of the different industries employing women does not fall within the scope of this article. That the increase in speed affects all manufacture has been considered at once a national distinction and a superiority. It is as marked in the lowest depths of sweat-shop labor as in the most advanced New England mills, where the eight looms per worker, normal a few years ago, have increased to twelve, fourteen, and even sixteen looms per worker.

One of the most conspicuous examples of trades which have vastly increased their output during the last few years—and an example most pertinent to the discussion of women's employment—is the stitched-underwear trade. A brief description of this industry may illustrate the conditions under which a large and rapidly increasing class of young girls are employed. The machines have been so improved that they set twice as many stitches as they did five years ago, the best machines, driven by dynamo power, now setting 4,400 stitches a minute.

The operative cannot see the needle; she sees merely a beam of light striking the steel needle from the electric lamp above her head. But this she must watch, as a cat watches a mousehole; for one variation means that a broken needle is cutting the fibers of the garment, and a different variation means that the thread is broken and the seam is having stitches left unsewn. Then the operative must instantly touch a button and stop the machine. Such intent watching wears out alike nerves and eyes.

The result of speed so greatly increased tends inevitably to nervous exhaustion. Machines may be revolved more and

more swiftly, but the endurance of the girl workers remains the same. No increase in vitality responds to the heightened pressure. A constant drain of nervous energy follows — particularly deplorable in the case of young women, whether they are to marry after a few years of overstrain, or to continue through longer years of such employment.

*Larger proportion of young workers.*—In the ages of the workers the difference between working-men and working-women is most marked. The largest percentage of men engaged in gainful occupations are adults in the prime of their strength, between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-four years. The largest percentage of working-women are between sixteen and twenty years of age—a fact which indicates more clearly than all comments how immature, how helpless, and how dependent upon the beneficence of employers is this rapidly growing body of wage-earners.

The enormous proportion of young girls in certain branches of manufacture is brought out in the following statements: In silk-mills, for instance, the percentage of young men (between sixteen and twenty years) is less than one-third of the older men over twenty-one years. Young girls are employed in such large numbers that the percentage of those between sixteen and twenty years is *the same* as that of all the women over twenty-one.

Young men between 16 and 20 years.....	8.8
Men over 21 years.....	26.8
Young girls between 16 and 20 years.....	24.2
Women over 21 years.....	24.4

So, too, in knitting and hosiery mills the percentage of young men is small — only one-half of the older men. The percentage of young girls is again practically the same as that of the older women:

Young girls between 16 and 20.....	29.1
Women over 21.....	30.1

This high proportion of young girls is found in almost all branches of manufacture in which women are employed. The advancing army of “working-women” continues to be recruited



from the ranks of growing girls, as the older women marry and retire from wage-earning.

*The length of the working-day.*—Obviously it is impracticable, if it were desirable, to retard the industrial pace. Machines once speeded or duplicated will not be slowed or simplified to save the workers, young or old. A different and entirely feasible plan is to lessen the daily hours of application to work so insidiously exhausting. In proportion to the increased velocity of the machines, and the greater strain of attention, justice and the barest economy of strength would suggest a shortened workday. Night work for women and young girls should be entirely eliminated. The tables which follow show how far women are already protected by legislation in the various states.

Only five states specifically prohibit the employment of women at night:

#### WORK AT NIGHT PROHIBITED

Between 7 P. M. and 6 A. M., in Ohio, for girls under 18 years.

Between 10 P. M. and 6 A. M., in Massachusetts, for all women in manufacture.

Between 10 P. M. and 6 A. M., in Indiana, for all women in manufacture.

Between 10 P. M. and 6 A. M., in Nebraska, for all women in manufacture and commerce.

Between 9 P. M. and 6 A. M., in New York, for all women in manufacture.

Between 10 P. M. and 7 A. M., in New York, for women under 21 years in stores.

Fourteen states restrict the hours in which women may be employed to a specified number by the day and by the week, but do not forbid work at night.

#### WORK RESTRICTED BY THE DAY AND BY THE WEEK

*Work restricted to—*

10 hours in 24, 54 hours in one week, in California, for minors under 18 years.

10 hours in 24, 55 hours in one week, in Ohio, for girls under 18 years.

10 hours in 24, 55 hours in one week, in New Jersey, for minors under 18 years.

10 hours in 24, 58 hours in one week, in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, for all women.

10 hours in 24, 60 hours in one week, in New York, for women in factories, and girls between 16 and 21 years in stores.

10 hours in 24, 60 hours in one week, in Connecticut, Louisiana, Nebraska, and New Hampshire, for all women.

10 hours in 24, 60 hours in one week, in Michigan, for girls under 21 years.

10 hours in 24, 60 hours in one week, in Indiana and Maine, for girls under 18 years.

12 hours in 24, 60 hours in one week, in Pennsylvania, for all women.

In a third group of states the labor of women is restricted to a specified number of hours in the twenty-four, but no restriction by the week is named, thus inviting the twofold evil possibility of work by night and of work every night in the week, including Sunday.

WORK RESTRICTED BY THE DAY ONLY

*Work restricted to —*

8 hours in 24, in Colorado, for women in all employments requiring them to stand.

10 hours in 24, in Maryland in mills, North Dakota, South Dakota, Virginia, and Washington, for all women.

*Practical working of the restrictions.*—Like all statistics, these tables afford merely an outline of the conditions under which women may be employed. Various factors, such as the nature of the industry, the efficiency of enforcement, the power of public opinion, or the demands of trade, all vitally affect the practical working of legal restrictions. Thus in the retail stores of New York city the law which prohibits the employment of girls under twenty-one years of age after 10 P. M. indirectly benefits the whole body of older saleswomen; for so great is the number of young employees to be dismissed at 10 o'clock that the large establishments find it most practicable to close at that hour, releasing the older saleswomen, who would otherwise be employed to a much later hour, especially in the holiday season. Although in this particular case the protection of working-women is ampler than seems indicated by the few existing statutes, the reverse is rather the rule, and legislation tends to lose its proposed effect through various omissions and ambiguities.

With the exception of the five states which prohibit outright night work for women, mere usage actually determines whether their hours of labor shall be by day or by night. When labor is

restricted to a specified number of hours *in the twenty-four*, instead of being restricted to a specified number *in the daytime*, tacit permission for night work is thereby given. In most of the states which restrict labor to a certain number of hours in the twenty-four, usage prevents the employment of young girls and women at night. That usage *need* not so prevent their employment is shown by Pennsylvania, where, until the recent law was enacted (May, 1905), little girls from thirteen years of age up legally (and many much younger illegally) worked ten hours every weekday night. The statutes of Washington and Oregon expressly state that women may be employed ten hours *at any time*, and women have accordingly been employed in Washington, not only for ten hours at night, but for almost twenty consecutive hours (in a mill)—a period supposedly divided into two days' labor by the convenient hour of midnight.

Usage is thus no trustworthy safeguard: such protection always tends to break down when most bitterly needed. On the other hand, the legal prohibition of inhumane hours works no hardship to the employers who are humane, since precisely those competitors who are unfeeling in their requirements are authoritatively checked.

Again, many of the existing statutes are marred, and some totally invalidated, by the damaging exceptions which they permit. In New York, for instance, women are restricted to ten hours' labor a day, *except* when overtime is allowed to make one shorter workday in the week, supposedly a Saturday half-holiday. But such an exception is manifestly impossible of enforcement. Without an army of inspectors to see whether overwork is fairly compensated by off-time each week, such an exception merely makes the law evadable. Nine states render their restrictions non-enforcable by such exceptions, allowing overtime in order to make one workday in the week shorter, or on account of a breakdown in the machinery. These states are California, Connecticut, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.

*Progress and retrogression.*— Besides the defects in the present statutes, a recent and deplorable retrograde step should be



recorded against the state of New Jersey. The child-labor law of 1904 repealed the older law of 1892, under which the employment of all women and minors up to the age of eighteen years had been prohibited after 6 P. M., and after noon on Saturdays, except in the manufacture of glass and of canned goods, and the preserving of perishable fruit. This statute, unexcelled by any other (barring its unfortunate exception), was sacrificed in the effort to obtain better protection for younger children. Workers over sixteen years, from being safeguarded by one of the most enlightened measures devised, are now left entirely without legislative protection.

If the example of New Jersey shows how one state has retrograded through a lack of effort to retain its wise legislation, Massachusetts has lately illustrated how an alert public interest may carry through and preserve beneficent laws. The provision restricting women's labor to fifty-eight hours in one week in manufacture was extended to include mercantile establishments in 1901. But this valuable statute was suspended, and the employment of women in retail stores was allowed for unlimited hours at precisely the season when protection is most urgently needed—during the rush of the holiday season in December. Public condemnation of an exception so susceptible of abuse grew, until in 1904 the exception permitting December overwork was repealed. Only one year later, in 1905, an attempt was made to legalize again the unlimited hours in stores during December. Unable to obtain this wholesale exception, certain merchants attempted to secure at least some modification of the law. They asked the legislature to authorize unrestricted hours for women during part of December, if not the whole month. They asked that women over twenty-one years of age be exempted from the law, and, failing to secure these exceptions, they wished the law to be suspended during December in all the state of Massachusetts outside of Boston. These requests were refused, and the legislature, persuaded of the gain to employees from the one year's enforcement of the law, preserved it intact.

The new (1905) law of Pennsylvania deals with overwork at the Christmas season in the same way, by limiting each day's

work and each week's work to a specified number of hours. There is no time at night set when employees must be dismissed, provided they are not detained more than the maximum number of hours. The hardships of the holiday trade are recognized by reducing to ten hours, during December, the inhumane Pennsylvania working-day of twelve hours for women and children.

This direct method of restricting the hours of labor during December, which has been admirably enforced in Massachusetts, is clearly the most effective check upon a deplorable abuse. The indirect method of New York, where the older employees are automatically benefited by the law prohibiting employment of girls under twenty-one years after 10 P. M., is at best uncertain. Those establishments which employ no minors under twenty-one years may detain their older saleswomen until any hour of the night, and for as many hours in the day or in the week as they may see fit.

*Women in stores.*—The shortened workday is as greatly needed by the employees of mercantile establishments as it is by factory workers. The increased activity of the modern department store, with its long hours of standing, especially at the rush seasons, adds to the strain of such employment, as the improved machinery does to the modern factory. Moreover, the very general legal provision requiring seats for employees is most difficult to enforce. The existence of the seats is easily secured; liberty to use them may as easily be denied. The comparative leisure for their use is at best short; but the curtailed working-day, such as the best shops now approximate, would be a definite and enforceable protection.

*Sweat-shops.*—As the agitation against child-labor has brought to light numbers of child workers until recently ignored by any protecting legislation (the little newsboys, the peddlers, the lads in the messenger service, and other street workers), so a renewed interest in legislation for women reveals the army of nondescript women workers unprotected by any law. The thousands upon thousands of women in the tenements of large cities who carry on tenement industries— who sew by hand or on foot-power machines, who make every variety of women's wear

from the coarsest to the finest, and every variety of article from paper bags to umbrellas and cigarettes—continue to labor for hours limited only by the extreme of physical endurance. Not until tenement work is totally prohibited will these workers be freed from the intolerable conditions of pauper employment in the home: unlimited hours, a bare minimum of pay, and the wreck of all the decencies of home life.

*Prohibited trades.*—Certain industries have already been closed to women by law in the United States, but these prohibitions are few and sporadic, enacted in obedience to certain local interests rather than to any broad theories of fitness.

The employment of women in mines is forbidden in most of the states. The employment of women in bar-rooms, such as is customary in England, is contrary to public opinion in America, and consequently is prohibited by many states. Seven states have enacted laws against the employment of women in the trade of buffing and polishing metals, and several do not allow young girls to be engaged as public messengers. The elaborate regulations of dangerous trades enacted in England and on the continent for both adults and children find no parallel in the United States. The injurious effects of employments involving the use of poisons, acids, gases, atmospheric extremes, or other dangerous processes, still await adequate investigation and legislation in this country.

*Other trades.*—Of more immediate concern are the great numbers of women who, young and unorganized, so insufficiently guarded by the law, work at the ordinary industries. The census figures, confirming the statements of all careful observers, have borne witness to the rate at which this body of young wage-earners is increasing in different trades. It answers the demand for labor, not only in the vast number of factories and stores, but in many other fields of industry. The telegraph and telephone service—a service which strains to the utmost the operator's nervous energy—requires every year a larger number of employees. In every state many young girls are employed in laundries and bakeries, where the work is of a peculiarly tiring order, involving hours of standing, the lifting of heavy weights, and the breathing of overheated or overhumid air. Many others are



found in the exacting service of the restaurant, with its long and irregular hours; or at the flower- and book-stands of railway stations the country over. There are also large numbers of older women, employed at coarser work for unlimited hours, such as those who scrub and clean offices and public buildings.

*The Supreme Court on labor legislation.*—For all these workers, those partly protected and those unprotected, any future legislation must be broad and inclusive, to afford real relief. Labor legislation prohibiting certain employments or restricting the hours of labor has in some instances been wrecked upon the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which assures to every man liberty of contract. This liberty of the individual, however, to contract for such purposes and under such conditions as he pleases, must yield to superior considerations of life, health, and safety. Under the police powers of the state, specific measures can be enacted from time to time against clearly proved abuses. When laws restricting the hours of labor have been declared unconstitutional by the federal Supreme Court, the state legislatures have been held to infringe upon the individual right of contract *without good cause*; or, in other words, the evil against which legislation was aimed was held *not evil enough* to justify the interference with individual rights. On the other hand, the labor laws which have been upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court have been regarded as legitimate measures, conspicuously necessary for health or safety, and therefore not in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment.

In a noble decision of the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of the eight-hour law of Utah (*Holden vs. Hardy*), the court held that the hours of labor of men might constitutionally be restricted when the employment was a hazardous one, like mining, liable to injure the health of the men engaged in it. The court took the high ground that the health of workers should be protected as their lives are protected; that the health of the workers is of concern, not only to themselves, but, as members of a community, to the society of which they are an integral part. The court said:

If it be within the power of a legislature to adopt such means for the

protection of the lives of its citizens, it is difficult to see why precautions may not also be adopted for the protection of their health and morals. It is as much for the interest of the state that the public health should be preserved as that life should be made secure. With this end in view, quarantine laws have been enacted in most, if not all, of the states; insane asylums, public hospitals, and institutions for the care and education of the blind established; and special measures taken for the exclusion of infected cattle, rags, and decayed fruit. In other states laws have been enacted limiting the hours during which women and children shall be employed in factories; and while their constitutionality, at least as applied to women, has been doubted in some of the states, they have been generally upheld.

Again :

But the fact that both parties are of full age, and competent to contract, does not necessarily deprive the state of the power to interfere, where the parties do not stand upon an equality, or where the public health demands that one party to the contract shall be protected against himself. The state still retains an interest in his welfare, however reckless he may be. The whole is no greater than the sum of all the parts, and when the individual health, safety, and welfare are sacrificed or neglected, the state must suffer.

The court concludes in detail :

We concur in the following observations of the Supreme Court of Utah in this connection: "It may be said that labor in such conditions must be performed. Granting that, the period of labor each day should be of reasonable length. Twelve hours per day would be less injurious than fourteen, ten than twelve, and eight than ten. The legislature has named eight. Such a period was deemed reasonable."

The latest decision of the Supreme Court upon the restriction of the hours of labor (*Re Lochner vs. New York*, April, 1905) may, at a superficial view, seem a partial reversal of this important decision. The ten-hour law for bakers in New York is held unconstitutional. But the fact that four of the justices of the court dissented indicates how much difference of opinion existed within the court itself. The majority held that the proposed "health law" was arbitrary and unreasonable in attempting to regulate the hours of labor "in a private business, not dangerous in any degree to morals, or in any real or substantial degree to the health of the employees," and therefore violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. Justice Harlan, however, said :

We know that the number of hours which should constitute a day's labor in particular occupations involving the physical strength and safety of workmen has been the subject of enactments by Congress and by nearly all of the states. Many, if not most, of those enactments fix eight hours as the proper basis of a day's work. . . . There are many reasons of a weighty, substantial character, based upon the experience of mankind, in support of the theory that, all things considered, more than ten hours' steady work each day, from week to week, in a bakery or confectionery establishment, may endanger the health and shorten the lives of the workmen, thereby diminishing their physical and mental capacity to serve the state and to provide for those dependent upon them. . . . I take leave to say that the New York statute, in the particulars here involved, cannot be held to be in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment, without enlarging the scope of the amendment far beyond its original purpose, and without bringing under the supervision of this court matters which have been supposed to belong exclusively to the legislative departments of the several states when exerting their conceded power to guard the health and safety of their citizens by such regulations as they in their wisdom deem best.

The right of the state to restrict the hours of labor, as a police measure, is not denied by the court in this case; the point of disagreement is the degree of unhealthfulness or danger in the trade at issue.

*Labor legislation for women.*—Protection ampler and more far-reaching than exists, enacted under the police powers of the state, is now claimed for women as necessary for health and safety. All the arguments which apply in favor of the restriction of the hours of working-men apply with a hundred-fold power to the restriction of women's hours of labor. Their youth, their helplessness, their increasing numbers, the conditions under which they are employed, all call for uniform and enforceable statutes in their behalf. Eight hours were deemed by the Supreme Court a "reasonable" period for men's employment in an industry liable to injure the health. Eight hours cannot be called an unreasonable period for the young girls who constitute so large a proportion of the army of working-women.

To obtain this restriction will require a campaign of education. The National Consumers' League is asking co-operation for this next great step in protective legislation from the General Federation of Women's Clubs, an organization whose wide influence has



done much to secure the gradually improving child-labor laws of the nation.

There is needed, first, the co-operation and sympathy of all who have at heart the welfare of the industrial state. "The whole is no greater than the sum of all the parts, and when the individual health, safety, and welfare are sacrificed or neglected, the state must suffer."

## THE JAPANESE AS PEERS OF WESTERN PEOPLES

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The finest—that is, the most rapid and complete—adjustment to political environment ever made by a people was that achieved by the Japanese in their revolution, which was at the same time a restoration, culminating in 1868. Although further acquaintance with Japanese history reveals the fact that for over a century scholars and princes alike, though from different motives, had been working up that restoration of the imperial family to power, the same further acquaintance also reveals the astonishing depth and breadth of that revolution, so that wonder at the total achievement need not diminish. This marvel of statesmanship was generally perceived and generously acknowledged by the civilized powers that had proved useful as its exciting cause; but no proper inference was ever drawn as to what might be expected in other spheres of culture. Indeed, the favorite position for wiseacres, resident in Japan or elsewhere, was to query whether the Japanese had done more than don the garb of civilization, while its body and soul remained foreign to them. Probably no one would put this query now; certainly no Russian would put it in respect to the science and art of warfare; and continuous and brilliant success in this terrific branch of modern culture has so called universal attention to its authors that the query will probably never be put again in reference to any sphere whatsoever of human achievement. The Japanese learned from the fame they gained in the recent Chinese war that only by this sternest test of human endeavor could the full respect of western nations be won, and they are now taking a second object-lesson to the same effect.

But the Japanese are as great in the arts of peace as in that of war; and well will it be for western nations if, now that their attention is forcibly directed to this wonderful yellow race, they

take the trouble to examine its entire culture. Let the reader test the following survey of Japanese traits for this astonishing thesis: while the Japanese stand on the same general plane of culture as the peoples of Europe and North America, they are distinct rivals with them for pre-eminence on that plane, by reason of the number of points wherein they are demonstrably supreme. Should this thesis prove true, it follows, of course, that no "yellow peril" can come from the Japanese; nor, since they now enjoy leadership of the Far Orient, is it likely that any can come from Korea or China. To be sure, should the entire Mongolian race rise to the plane already reached by the Japanese, the Indo-Keltic race would then have rivals for both material and mental supremacy such as it had never met before; but that would be no peril, except to our follies and foibles, and these we really ought to be willing to part with. Rivalry in culture can only increase our own culture, provided always that we are willing to learn in turn from rivals, although these be of the yellow race. But it is time for our survey, which need not here touch more than what Hokusai, the great Japanese artist, called "the vital points."

As physical basis for his culture, the Japanese owns a body which makes up in agility what it lacks in size. Japanese closely resemble the famous Ghoorkas of India. They have the same admirable balance of bone and muscle, and the same lightness of movement and power of endurance.<sup>1</sup> This vigor, with a related healthiness, the Japanese owe to various causes. When only a month old, the baby is taken to some Shinto shrine, where it receives a name, is devoted to the *uji-gami*, or family deity, and, the next day, is strapped upon the back of mother, elder brother, or sister, whom it automatically clasps with arms and legs, so as frequently to acquire bowlegs, but always muscles of a fiber resembling that of wild animals, because both have exercise from early life onward. This outdoor life, with its fresh air and sunshine, reduces infant mortality below that of other peoples, so

<sup>1</sup> Here plainly is the physical basis for those recent military achievements that elicited from Colonel Gädke, a German military expert, the astonishing verdict that the Japanese infantry is now the best in the world.



that the death-rate of children under five years of age runs no higher than that among older people. The simple food and drink of the masses, with their moderation in smoking and liquor-drinking, further promote health; while the daily use of a very hot bath protects them from rheumatism, and this in turn from organic heart disease, of which it is the chief cause. Japanese men are as entirely free from the opium-smoking of their Chinese neighbors as Japanese women are from their foot-binding; nor do the women lace their waists as westerners persist in doing, in spite of all warning to the contrary. What little waist there is to the Japanese figure is filled by the *obi*, or broad sash, and freedom from restrictive coverings results in a faultless shape and marvelous flexibility of both hands and feet. The daily bath makes the Japanese crowd the sweetest-smelling one in the world, and the Japanese skin elastic and velvety. Athletics had fallen into disuse since the revolution in 1868; but a unique national sport called *jujutsu*, or the "soft art," in which a wrestler throws his assailant by skilfully diverting the onset, has of late been enthusiastically revived, along with other sports, throughout Japan, so that the Japanese Athletic Association now numbers nearly a million active members.

The skill and industry of the Japanese in agriculture may readily be judged from the fact that nearly fifty million people subsist mostly on foods raised upon the rim and crevices of a long but narrow chain of volcanic islands, over most of which will grow only a bambu scrub that not even goats will eat. As grass is scanty, cattle are few; and meat, milk, and butter practically unknown until recently. Fish of fine quality in great abundance has supplied the place of meat, though fowls and eggs are eaten, as indeed they are eaten the world around, being the only generally diffused food of man. Under these conditions, agriculture must be intensive, and it is. Rice, now the staple grain, is sown thickly, and subsequently transplanted by hand and a blade at a time; but the crop never fails, and its quality is the best in the world. In face of the impossibility of raising more food in Japan, and an annual net increase of 600,000 in the population, emigration to Hawaii, the Philippines, Formosa, and Korea has

become a plain necessity, except where population is absorbed by the recent extraordinary growth in manufactures and commerce. Japanese show equal skill with French and Italians in the culture, reeling, and spinning of silk; and this article forms the chief item of export. They grow tea, mine coal and copper, and are every year making an increased number of articles in demand by the home and foreign markets, as well as these are made anywhere. Their skill and industry quail at nothing that other peoples can do; and when the raw material fails at home—as with cotton, iron, sugar, and kerosene—it is imported from abroad. Under such conditions, Japanese commerce grew from 13 million dollars in 1869 to 303 millions in 1903, of which exports furnished 145 millions and imports 158—an unprecedented increase in the world's history, of course! Growth in the merchant marine has reached from a mere coasting trade with junks to a place fifth in the list of nations! As an example of organization, Japanese may offer their postal system, now the cheapest and perhaps the best in the world, besides an excellent system of postal savings-banks. Letters are carried for one cent, and postal cards for half a cent each.

If the Baconian maxim, that the start is all, be correct, then Europe is debtor for its mathematics and science to the marvelous Greeks, whom Francis Galton credits with the highest genius of any people that have yet lived. This science other Indo-Keltic peoples in Europe and America have hitherto enjoyed the sole credit of deepening and extending; but within a few decades the Mongolian Japanese have shown such brilliant results in the same direction that here, too, they must now be included in "the foremost files of time." The Murata rifle, with which the Japanese army is so well equipped, is the invention of a Japanese, and was further improved by Colonel Arisaka; while the smokeless powder used was invented by Mr. Shimose. The German bacteriologist, Dr. Behring, must freely share his laurels with his collaborator, the Japanese Dr. Kitasato, for the discovery of diphtheritic antitoxin; while the distinction of isolating the active principle of the suprarenal glands called adrenalin, now the most powerful astringent and hemostatic known, fell to Dr. Takamine,

after European and American chemists had sought it for decades in vain. Messrs. Hirose and Ikeno are equally distinguished in botany.

For the foundations of logic and philosophy the civilized world is indebted to the Greeks, precisely as it is for mathematics and science. It now seems that — to use Goethe's phrasing — pretty nearly all that is reasonable in these disciplines has already been thought; and certainly Japanese have no more need to show originality in these subjects than Americans have. As to general philosophic ability and interest, Japanese students have betrayed no deficiency to their instructors whether at home or abroad. Those who suppose they have gained benefit from the peculiar metaphysics of Christian Science will be interested to learn that it was closely matched in the early nineteenth century by Kurozumi Sakyō, who at thirty-five years of age, while rapt in his devotions to the rising sun, was so penetrated by the *yōki*, or positive and cheerful spirit, that "his heart suddenly became pure, and he laid hold upon that life which vivifies the universe." The *yōki* had previously saved him from mortal sickness, and now it enabled him to cure others of various diseases — a practice which has been continued to this present by his followers, who constitute a considerable sect in Japan.

Though the Japanese have proved, not simply position, but pre-eminence on the modern plane of culture in the spheres of politics and warfare, they had learned the principle of these activities from the West. But in the case of art no such discount can be made; for the Japanese art, both fine and decorative, that has won recognition the wide world around, is an exclusively Mongolian product. This recognition has been tendered, not only by confessed admiration, but by that imitation which makes the sincerest praise. We have the authority of Richard Muther for the fact that French impressionism was inaugurated by enthusiasm for the artistic marvels that Japan exported soon after its opening to foreign intercourse. Enthusiasm for the Japanese swept over the studios of Paris like a storm; and in a short time great collections were made by such masters as Manet, Tissot, Whistler, Degas, and Monet. Finally, the Paris Inter-



national Exposition of 1867 brought Japan entirely into vogue.

Where there had been rhythm, tension, clarity, largeness, and quietude in the old European painting, there was in them [the Japanese] a nervous freedom, an artificial carelessness, and life and charm. . . . Artists learned from them another manner of drawing and modeling, a manner of giving the impression of the object, without the need for the whole of it being executed, so that one knows that it is there only through one's knowledge.

As Paris was art center for the western world, these Japanese traits, once adopted there, spread everywhere, and have now become so familiar to our eyes as to lose some of their erstwhile novelty. By reason of this currency, much Japanese art now seems as familiar to us as Shakespeare's plays seem full of quotations. The puerilities of Dresden china and the improprieties of Sèvres have been revealed by the advent of the famous Royal Copenhagen, which closely follows a Japanese model; while the American Rockwood has won its deserved fame by adopting a Japanese type to American clays and American tastes, and a Japanese is regularly found on the staff of art-craftsmen at the Rockwood studio in Cincinnati. William Anderson sums up the survey in his superb *Pictorial Arts of Japan* with the words:

In its motives it claims a share of originality at least equal to that of any art extant; in the range and excellence of its decorative application it takes perhaps the first place in the world; though in the qualities of scientific completeness (perspective, chiaroscuro, and anatomy) it falls much below the standard of modern Europe.

But while these faults are the pardonable and remediable effects of a mistaken reverence for traditional conventions, and indeed are already being remedied, the remarkable beauties reveal qualities that no academic teaching could supply.

But most people have heard some echo of Mr. Alfred East's dictum that "Japanese art is great in small things, but small in great things." This error arose in part from the seclusion of "great things" in private collections and temple treasuries, whereas "small things" of fine artistry are abundant in Japan as they are nowhere else on earth. But also the fact is that, in point of both subject and form, Japanese fine art compares fairly with European, as Mr. E. F. Fenollosa demonstrates in his lec-

tures; while Mr. K. Okakura has shown, in his *Ideals of the East*, that Japanese art has been informed with patriotic, religious, and philosophic sentiments as pronounced as those of any other people. Nor has this ample content failed to run through a development correspondent to that in Europe. Thus, a religious period of sculpture, Chinese-derived, in the seventh and eighth centuries was succeeded by one of painting in the ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries. The statues—really idols, as with the Greeks—show a more abstract modeling, as becomes the Buddhist subject, and have a more decorative setting on lotus and glory than was practiced in the West. The painting reached its consummation in Yeishin, who was the Fra Angelico of Japan in tenderness of line and glory of color. Then followed in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries a national school—the Yamato-Tosa—mostly with military subjects descriptive of the current civil strife. Then renewed Chinese influence gave rise to a grand idealistic landscape in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which yielded in turn to realism in the sixteenth and subsequent centuries, though all pre-existent schools have representatives to this day.

A unique phase of this realism was the colored block printing, extra-academic and democratic alike in artists, subjects, and patrons, but attaining a refinement of line and color appreciable by no other pavement populace in the world. The originals were painted by such masters as Kiyonaga, Utamaro, Hiroshige, and Hokusai; and the process work done by unnamed engravers and pressmen, whose perfection of craftsmanship is almost incomprehensible to the westerner. E. F. Strange declares this “the highest form of a purely democratic art the world ever saw.” The people’s sense for nature also is so keen that Wordsworth could have no message for them; and their sense for decoration so sound and simple that neither could Morris do them service. Also Morris’ maxim, that art should be made by the people and for the people as a joy to the maker and user, is an everyday fact in Japan. In fine, the Japanese are the greatest draftsmen and colorists living, and in decorative composition have given the world that asymmetric style which forms the only alternative

from the symmetry which was bequeathed us by the great Greeks. If, therefore, there is any peril to art involved in current international relations, it must be *to* the yellow race quite as much as *from* it. It is worth while to notice here, as a precondition of all art, that the Japanese are beyond compare the neatest and cleanest people upon earth. Neither street, yard, nor house is ever seen in the least littered or disordered; while, as already noticed, a daily hot bath keeps the whole people as fresh and fragrant as new hay.

Even a slight acquaintance with the history and present practices of the Japanese can leave no doubt that they possess a keen moral faculty, however it may have been diverted from our standards by varying conditions. There is added comfort in this fact for those who believe in the "yellow peril;" for, even should the Mongolian develop his vast material resources in his own behalf, he could still be depended upon to respect our rights at least as much as we have his, for that could strain no moral faculty at all worth the name. The "varying conditions" just cited were communalism as contrasted with our individualism, and feudalism in contrast with our industrialism. Such broad political and social facts as these determine special virtues by the score. Thus, the chief duty in Japanese eyes was loyalty to the feudal lord, which, since the restoration in 1868, was transformed into loyalty to the national lord or Mikado, now emerged from his sacred seclusion in the Kyoto palace. This loyalty was binding, whatever might be the character of the liege lord; indeed, retainers have sometimes committed suicide to place emphasis upon disregarded admonitions to a dissolute or headstrong master; and the duty of vendetta—avenging the murder of a lord or kinsman—was carried out with a self-sacrificing zeal that reached its climax in the "Forty-seven Ronins" glorified by all Japanese to this day. And this Japanese loyalty still possesses the sovereign seal of *kesshi*, "ready even to death," as is everywhere evident in the war just closed. In a call for a forlorn hope, practically everyone responds, some observing an old custom of writing the petition in their own blood. Japanese can count the cost and then be perfectly determined. In feudal times children



of *samurai* were made familiar with death from a tender age by their parents, who taught the little boy how the sword should be directed against his bosom, and the little girl how the dagger must be held to pierce her throat. The *bushido*, or knightly code, of these choice souls rested on a tripod of *chi, jin, yu*—respectively wisdom, benevolence, and courage. “*Samurai* must have a care of their words, and are not to speak of avarice, cowardice, or lust.” And though the *samurai* as a caste have been abolished, the *samurai* spirit still pervades the Japanese army and navy, producing officers whose plain living and high thinking render them doubtless the most efficient in the world.

In contrast with this noble *samurai*, the farmer, the artisan, and especially the trader were contemned. Said Aochi to his son: “There is such a thing as trade. See that you know nothing of it. . . . To be proud of buying high-priced articles cheap is the good fortune of merchants, but should be unknown to *samurai*.” In addressing the *samurai* the trader was required to touch the ground with his forehead, and while talking with a *samurai* to remain with his hands upon the ground. Is it any wonder that under such conditions the trader fell into lying and dishonesty; and that, during his transition from a feudal to an industrial system, he retains some of his vicious habits?

The communalism of old Japan took the family as its social unit, and valued each member thereof for work done and not for intrinsic worth. Judged thus, woman had value only as a mother and a domestic, while man was left free to resort to concubinage or harlotry, as soon after marriage as the fading charms of his wife ceased to please him. The resultant licentiousness, together with the lying mentioned above, form the evil pair that some critics claim especially disgrace Japan; but, in any case, both are doomed under the new conditions. Professor Gubbins, translator of the new Japanese legal codes, is authority for the view that “in no respect has modern progress in Japan made greater strides than in the improvement in the position of woman.” And in certain respects practice is even preceding theory, as in honor accorded the empress, and in the public wedding of the prince imperial with mutual pledges for bride-

groom and bride. In contrast with such looseness of the marital bond, the relation between father and son was and is exceedingly strong. Filial piety ranked next to loyalty in the scale of duties, and was carried even to excess; whereas, according to competent observers of both Orient and Occident, we allow our children to fall short of duty in this particular.

In the realm of religion, the Japanese, like ourselves, adopted the faith of an alien race: we a reformed Judaism of the Semites, they a reformed Brahmanism of the Indo-Kelts. Position on the plane of human culture in this matter must be estimated by what Japanese did for this imported Buddhism; and that, at least, equals all that any European people ever did for Christianity, exceeding much though it might be. There was the ardor of early faith, a development extending over a millennium of years, dogmatic interest resulting in the extant eight great sects with thirty-six subjects, provision of stately temples with their gorgeous cult, and the wide extension of monasticism. Nowhere in Japan can one travel ten miles without coming upon some *tera* or temple, devoted to this noble faith; but, still more, nowhere can one travel a single mile without coming upon some *miya*, or shrine, devoted to a primitive, native faith, that of Shintoism, faithful devotion to which, even in presence of the more imposing Buddhism, must be counted a service to religion over and above anything achieved in Europe, where only mere fragments — what Professor E. B. Tylor calls “survivals” — survived the incursion of the superior faith. This faithful preservation of their early religion has rendered Shintoism the most picturesque, complete, and ancient religion of the natural or tribal type now extant. This statement may seem open to challenge, but the writer is on familiar ground here, and is ready to defend his thesis against all comers.

It follows from this survey that the thesis stated at the outset is established: the Japanese do hold position upon the same plane of culture as western peoples, and are even rivals for pre-eminence in many respects. There can be no “yellow peril,” therefore, in the Japanese leadership of a progressive Far Orient, but only an honorable rivalry, profitable alike to yellow and white.

## THE MUNICIPAL LEAGUE OF PHILADELPHIA

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After thirteen years of unceasing activity, the Municipal League of Philadelphia adjourned *sine die* in the autumn of 1904, after providing, however, that the work in which it had been so long engaged should be carried on by new men with enlarged resources.

The Municipal League of Philadelphia was organized in 1891, and played an important part in municipal affairs, until its activities were definitely suspended on November 28, 1904. There had been numerous reform movements organized in Philadelphia which in their day and generation had done much for the cause of better municipal administration, and whose work was of great importance and advantage to the city and its citizens. In all these organizations, however, there was wanting that element of representation, in the American and republican sense, and that thorough organization, which experience has proved to be essential to political movements in the United States, and which must of necessity precede permanent reform. Then, again, these movements had made little or no provision for distinctly educational work. Because of these omissions—the lack of representation, thorough organization, and of continued and distinctive educational work—many who had been active in behalf of the city's welfare felt that a newer and more comprehensive effort, with adequate provision for party organization, was necessary; and in the autumn of 1891, as an outcome of numerous conferences and much discussion, the plan of the Municipal League was evolved.

The league was organized to secure certain definite ends: the practical separation of municipal affairs from state and national



politics; the extension of the principles of civil-service reform to all city departments; the conduct of the city's affairs by enlightened methods and upon business principles, so that Philadelphia should have the most improved system of taxes, of street-paving, of lighting, of water, of drainage, of schools, of transit, and other public necessities and conveniences.

To secure these ends, the league proposed so to arouse public sentiment and to awaken civic pride that the citizens of Philadelphia would consciously and deliberately demand such a conduct of the city's affairs as would result in the highest possible municipal development. It did not feel (to quote the language of an early report) that any permanent good would be accomplished by spasmodic effort, although such effort might have the excellent result of temporarily abating what for a time was an intolerable nuisance. The politicians, however, who are much the same in all parties and in every city, have learned to allow periodical outbursts of public indignation to blow over, and then to return to their old haunts and old ways, and rule with greater vigor, greater audacity, and less regard for public opinion than ever. To avoid this decline in the public interest, to maintain the demand for good government at the sticking point, and to create what may be called a permanently persistent public spirit, was the problem to which the league addressed itself.

How successfully it accomplished these ends it is difficult accurately to determine; although an account of what it achieved during its thirteen years of activity may answer the question in part. Taking up, in the first place, the work the league did along the lines of organizing public sentiment, and those who believed in its principles, we find that it participated in twenty elections,<sup>1</sup> and was definitely recognized under the law as a political party.

Its vote varied from 5,000 to 58,000, according to the degree of public interest.<sup>2</sup> What is of vastly greater importance, how-

<sup>1</sup> There are two elections a year in Philadelphia.

<sup>2</sup> As showing the extent of the league's political activities, the following table

ever, is that the league organized a number of ward organizations and, where these were not possible, nuclei of workers, who could be depended upon to represent the league and fight its battles, and who now constitute a very important and effective element of the present City Party movement, which bids fair at this writing to overthrow the Philadelphia machine and measureably restore to the people of Philadelphia the control of their government.

Any citizen of Philadelphia, or any person whose business was in the city, was eligible to membership in the league upon signing a statement to the following effect :

Believing that the affairs of our municipal government will be better and more economically administered by the absolute separation of municipal politics from state and national politics, and being in hearty accord with the Declaration of Principles of the Municipal League of Philadelphia, I hereby make application for membership in the same.

Once a member of the league, a person was not only eligible to any office within its gift, but had a direct voice in its affairs,

of nominations made for election officers and councilmen is illustrative. The figures are for the elections of February 19, 1901, and February 18, 1902.

Ward	1901	1902	Ward	1891	1892
First .....	84	..	Twenty-third .....	..	69
Second .....	72	66	Twenty-fourth .....	16	117
Third .....	21	..	Twenty-fifth .....	21	..
Fourth .....	6	..	Twenty-sixth .....	..	2
Fifth .....	..	50	Twenty-seventh .....	40	71
Seventh .....	16	19	Twenty-eighth .....	81	89
Eighth .....	6	45	Twenty-ninth .....	21	90
Ninth .....	..	1	Thirtieth .....	67	1
Tenth .....	21	26	Thirty-second .....	39	78
Eleventh .....	3	..	Thirty-third .....	..	129
Twelfth .....	26	..	Thirty-fourth .....	78	93
Thirteenth .....	16	54	Thirty-sixth .....	46	83
Fifteenth .....	122	117	Thirty-seventh .....	48	64
Seventeenth .....	54	..	Thirty-eighth .....	..	63
Nineteenth .....	6	..	Forty-first .....	21	9
Twentieth .....	14	120	Forty-second .....	..	18
Twenty-first .....	9	60			
Twenty-second .....	37	107	Total .....	991	1,641

	1891	1902
Select councilmen .....	10	11
Common councilmen .....	51	39
School directors .....	55	49
Total .....	116	99

which were managed by a central board of managers composed of twenty-five members elected at large, and one delegate, at first from each organized ward, and afterward from each ward of the city whether organized or not. The league's interests in organized wards were looked after by a ward committee consisting of ten or more men elected at large, and delegates from each division, at first only from organized divisions, latterly from organized and unorganized divisions alike. The work in the divisions was looked after by division committees consisting of ten or more members. In this way a municipal party, governed upon the same general principles as national parties, was built up. While the efficiency of this organization varied from time to time and from ward to ward, nevertheless it represented the first definite effort in Philadelphia to maintain a distinctly municipal party which would be recognized as such by the courts under the existing Pennsylvania statutes, and which would have a permanent existence. Moreover, it was effective in developing a group of men who have since shown the benefits of their training in the splendid work which they are doing for the present City Party. It created the skeleton upon which the subsequent superstructure has been built; it created an *esprit de corps*, and made possible much of the splendid work of the recent days and months.

While a detailed account of the various campaigns of the league might prove interesting, it would be aside from the purposes of this article to go into them. Suffice it to say that in a number of its campaigns its candidates were elected; but in the majority of them they were defeated, either because of the overwhelming odds against which the fight was conducted; or because of the insufficient education of the voters; or because of the coalition between the Republicans and the Democrats for their mutual preservation; or (what was frequently the case) because of the frauds practiced at the election.

Indeed, one of the most effective lines of activity in which the league engaged was its exposure of fraud at the elections, and its unceasing campaign aimed, not only at its exposure, but at its correction. In 1896, realizing that the existing registration laws of Pennsylvania were totally inadequate, and that no effective



revision of them was possible so long as the constitution of the state of Pennsylvania permitted anyone whose name was omitted from an assessor's list to have his vote sworn in on his own oath and that of another, an amendment to the constitution making possible an effective personal registration law was drafted. This amendment was introduced into the Legislature in 1897 by the counsel of the league, who had been its secretary from 1891 up to the date of his election to that body. The amendment failed of passage in the session of 1897; but it was again introduced in the session of 1899, of which the counsel was again a member. This time it passed the House and Senate, receiving the necessary constitutional majority in both chambers.

After its passage, the then governor of the state, William A. Stone, vetoed the amendment. The league at once challenged his right to take this action, maintaining that proposed amendments to the constitution did not have to be submitted to the executive for his approval, but, after receiving the necessary vote in two successive sessions of the Legislature, were to be submitted to the people forthwith. Holding this view, the league took steps to overcome the effect of the governor's veto, and began a suit in the Dauphin County Court to that end. The lower court denied the league's petition for a mandamus, maintaining the right of the governor to take the action that he did. An appeal from this decision was taken to the Supreme Court, and argued at length before a full bench. After mature consideration, the Supreme Court unanimously overruled the Dauphin County Court, sustaining the league's position, and denying the right of the governor to veto a proposed amendment to the constitution.<sup>3</sup>

The league thereby established the important principle of the right of the people through their representatives in the Legislature to propose amendments to their constitution without fear of executive interference.

The fight for the adoption of the amendment was continued by the league. It was re-introduced in 1901, as required by the constitution, and received a constitutional majority in the House

<sup>3</sup> See *Commonwealth ex rel. Burnham vs. Greist*, 196 *Pa. State Reports*, 396.

and in the Senate, and was then ready to be submitted to the voters of the state for adoption.

To avail itself of the co-operation of other organizations which by this time had become interested in the movement for the personal-registration amendment, a "Union Committee for the Promotion of Election Reforms in Pennsylvania" was formed. Of this committee the league was a constituent part during the period of its existence, and a dominating factor. The committee (afterward known as the Joint Committee for Election Reforms, and now known as the Electoral Reforms Committee) conducted a campaign for the adoption of the amendments, which was successfully concluded in November, 1901, the amendments receiving 214,798 votes to 45,601 *contra*.

Thus the constitution of Pennsylvania was amended, and effective personal registration made possible. This at the time and since was considered a great achievement for the cause of pure elections. Without it subsequent efforts would have availed but little. The next step was to secure the passage of an adequate personal-registration bill. The league participated in this work through the Union Committee. A bill representing the most complete form of personal registration was drafted and introduced in the session of 1903, and again in the session of 1905. Thus far it has not been enacted into law; but the state of public sentiment in Pennsylvania is such as to justify the belief that the Legislature of 1907 will grant the now almost unanimous demand for legislation on this subject.<sup>4</sup>

The Municipal League was, moreover, very active in the agitation for ballot reform, which in Pennsylvania means the elimination of the party square, which is the equivalent of the party column, or group in other states, and the substitution of the Australian system. Thus far this effort has not been successful; but, as in the case of personal registration, the present prospects favor an early granting of the people's demand. Indeed, steps have already been taken looking toward the drafting of a more

<sup>4</sup> Those who are interested in the discussion of the inefficiency of the present election laws in Pennsylvania will find the whole subject considered at length in an article entitled "The Election Laws of Pennsylvania," published in the *Annals of the American Academy*, 1901, by the present writer.

comprehensive election code, embracing sections dealing with the question of ballot reform, personal registration, nomination reform, as well as with the general features of election machinery, the league's work along these lines being the basis of consideration.

Incidental to its work along political lines, the league was of necessity compelled to take an active part in the interpretation and execution of the election laws. In 1901 it called the attention of the court to the fact that for a number of years the "list of voters," which the law contemplated should be filed in the prothonotary's office (an office of record, and open to the public under proper restrictions), had been locked up in the ballot box and stored away in the cellars of the city hall, and so rendered inaccessible to persons interested in ascertaining the correctness of the vote at any particular election. The league instituted test suits; and, after a careful consideration of all the questions involved, in which the league was represented by its counsel, the court sustained the position of the league, and decided that thereafter the "list of voters" must be filed in the prothonotary's office. This had the result of cutting off an important form of election fraud, it having been the custom theretofore to run in fraudulent votes, and file the evidence of it away in the ballot boxes, which could be opened only after a most difficult process. Now the lists are filed in the prothonotary's office; and it is possible and feasible for any person to examine them, and ascertain just who voted at a particular election and in a particular precinct.

The league was likewise instrumental in determining the right of municipal parties to a circle at the top of the column on the ballot. The county commissioners maintained (under instructions from the secretary of the commonwealth) that only parties having a full, city, state, and national ticket were entitled to a circle at the top of their column. The case instituted by the Municipal League established the right of the league and similar organizations to the same privileges enjoyed by the Republican and Democratic parties for a circle at the top of their column on the ticket. If the Legislature should pass the ballot-reform law which is being urged, this particular decision will have no further



value. If, however, we are still to have party circles or squares, it is important to know that municipal parties similar to the league are entitled to have them as well as those which nominate a full ticket. This decision will therefore be of great value in the pending campaign in Philadelphia; because the City Party, which is waging the independent campaign in Philadelphia, will under this decision be entitled to a party square for its candidates, although it has nominated candidates only for local offices, and its supporters will have the same convenience as those of the regular (national) parties.

The league co-operated with every effort of the Joint Committee in its work for improved election laws in the state of Pennsylvania, and made many of its acts possible by reason of this co-operation; moreover, it was instrumental in securing a considerable number of decisions of the court concerning election laws, and the rights of parties and of voters under them. A detailed account of these would be only incidentally interesting and useful. The more important and significant cases are those which have already been mentioned.

The league, during its entire thirteen years of activity, carefully scrutinized local and state legislation, and called public attention to the defects of proposed ordinances and acts of assembly. In doing this, it preached a consistent doctrine, and was influential in creating a public sentiment which is now beginning to manifest itself in most decisive fashion.

Always true to its declaration that "the interests of the people will be best served by the municipal ownership, control, and operation of public services; that no lease or franchise should in any case be granted except for a limited period, and with full provision for adequate regulation by and remuneration to the city," it consistently called attention to the shortcomings of franchise legislation both in the city hall of Philadelphia and the state capitol at Harrisburg. At first its opposition was considered merely academic; and while, I regret to record it, its policy has not yet been enacted into law, nevertheless the sentiment of the people of Philadelphia now seems to be substantially as expressed in the declaration of principle just quoted; and whenever the

people have had an opportunity of expressing themselves on the subject, it has been in accord with this fundamental thought.

The great demonstration of last spring against the proposed extension of the existing gas lease for a period of seventy-five years was a concrete manifestation of the thought and feeling of the people on the subject of franchises. In this case they were successful in stopping what otherwise would have been a great outrage upon the people of Philadelphia, not to call it by harsher terms. Moreover, in 1901, after the passage of the "midnight" laws and ordinances relating to street railways, the expression of public opinion was such as to indicate a substantial acceptance of the league's principles. Unfortunately, in that case the demonstration was not sufficiently extended to stop the prostitution of the people's rights; but this much can be said, that public sentiment in Philadelphia in the matter of franchises is growing steadily, and will in time manifest itself in the election of representatives, both to the local and to the state legislature, who will treat franchises in accordance with the modern principles embodied in the league's platform.

In 1897 the league led the fight against the leasing of the gas works to the United Gas Improvement Co., the story of which has been told in the *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. III, No. 5. The league's contest was based on the ground that so valuable a property should not be committed to private hands, and that the city should reap all the benefits accruing from its operation—a position that was more than sustained by the first year's operation of the plant under the lease. Payments to the city for the year ending July 31, 1899, amounted to \$467,628.41. President Dolan, in his annual report to the stockholders of the United Gas Improvement Co. for that year, reported the profits for its fiscal year to be \$1,864,129, an increase of \$489,930, largely due to the new lease. The Equitable Illuminating Gas Co. (which was brought into existence by the lease, and was the company created in the financing of the scheme) paid on June 3, 1899, a dividend of \$3 per share. Inasmuch as there were 62,500 shares, this represents a payment of \$187,500. Adding the amount paid to the city to the increase in profits and the divi-

dend of the Equitable Co., we have a total of \$1,145,058 profits accruing from the operation of the city gas-works for a year. The market price of the stock of the United Gas Improvement Co. is also an evidence of the immense value of the lease. On May 3, 1897, the United Gas Improvement Co.'s stock sold at  $70\frac{7}{8}$ ; on October 1, 1897, at  $82\frac{1}{4}$ ; on May 1, 1899, at 161 and  $163\frac{3}{4}$ ; on September 9, 1899, at  $168\frac{3}{4}$ ; or an increase of \$97.87 per share in two years and four months. As there were 300,000 shares of stock outstanding in 1899, this represented a total increase of \$29,361,000 in the value of the stock.

It is an interesting fact to note that the leaders of the opposition to the recent proposed extension of the gas lease were mainly young men who had been actively identified with the Municipal League, and who had received their training in public work while identified with it; so that, while the league itself no longer took a part as such in the fight, the spirit which animated it during its career found reincarnation in the men whom it had developed and trained.

The league also took an active part in the solution of the water problem, beginning with the prosecution of the bribery incident to the introduction and attempted passage of the Schuylkill Valley Water Co. ordinance, and continuing through to the formation of the joint committee which had so large a share in the solution of the difficulties standing in the way of positive action on the subject.

As was pointed out in the report for the year 1897-98, no sooner had the gas-lease scandal been fastened upon the city by the betrayal of the people's interests, than the stock-jobbers, promoters, and lobbyists began to originate various schemes to secure control of the water-works. The necessity for an abundant supply of pure, wholesome water has long been a pressing one in our community; but, owing either to the inefficiency and to the incapacity of our municipal government, or its criminal neglect and indifference, no satisfactory and permanent solution had been agreed upon up to that time. The filtration committee, composed of representatives of various public bodies, and on which the league was represented by its president and vice-president, had



been working persistently to secure the introduction of an adequate system of filtration; but for some inscrutable reason, this committee had not been able to accomplish its end. It was difficult to apportion the blame for delay in the solution of the problem, which was fraught with such serious consequences to the comfort and health and protection of our city. The league, appreciating the gravity of the situation confronting the citizens, at once began an active campaign to preserve to the city its sole remaining asset, and a vigorous protest was prepared, and sent to the presidents and members of select and common councils, urging continued municipal control and operation of the water-works. The league was also represented before the councilmanic committee having charge of the matter, and urged the necessity of positive action in the direction of filtration, and negative action on the ordinances providing for the leasing of the works.

Before long, as in the case of the gas lease, it was to be observed that one ordinance—that providing for the leasing of the water-works to the Schuylkill Valley Water Co. for a period of fifty years—had insinuated itself into the good graces of the councilmen and was preferred above all others. Why this was so the judicial investigation, subsequently held, disclosed. The Schuylkill Valley ordinance passed Select Council easily, and was proceeding with equal ease through the lower branch, despite determined opposition, when a member from the Thirty-second Ward rose in his seat and openly charged that he had been offered \$5,000 to vote for the ordinance. Under the influence of this exposure, the ordinance was indefinitely postponed, and, as a matter of fact, was never again pressed for passage. A committee was appointed to investigate the charges; but little came of this. The Municipal League, however, was not idle. It retained Hon. Wayne MacVeagh and other counsel to assist its regular counsel to prosecute all who might in any wise be implicated in the attempted bribery. The league raised a guaranty fund to provide for the expenses of the investigation and prosecution. The counsel determined not to appear before the committee, whose action was considered a foregone conclusion, but to secure, if possible, the co-operation of the district attorney,

whose personal abilities and official powers were such as to insure, if he should decide to co-operate earnestly and efficiently with the league, that the corruption incident to the promotion of the bill would be exposed.

After numerous conferences, the district attorney took hold of the matter; steps looking toward the indictment of Smith (the man who offered the bribe), and the prosecution of an investigation by two judges sitting as justices of the peace, and as such vested with the authority to inquire into the welfare of the county, were inaugurated; Judges Brêgy and Gordon agreed to sit as committing magistrates and justices of the peace; Stevenson (the councilman making the charge) gave his evidence again; and Smith was bound over in \$10,000 bail to answer at the then present term of court the charge of corrupt solicitation.

After this, the district attorney proceeded with an examination of some of the members of the Committee on Water to ascertain, if possible, to what extent corruption had been practiced in connection with the Schuylkill Valley ordinance. One select councilman testified, under skilful cross-examination, assisted by the judges, that he had been paid \$500 in cash by a common councilman in his saloon to sign the report of the committee favoring the Schuylkill Valley ordinance; and that another select councilman had subsequently offered him \$5,000 for his vote on final passage. Chairman Bringham, of the Water Committee, testified that the promoter of the ordinance had approached him with a view of interesting him in the ordinance, but, upon his refusal to have anything whatever to do with it, Colonel Green declared that no other ordinance could be got through the committee. Selectman Henry Clay gave similar and other testimony tending to show Green's corrupt connection with the ordinance; and at one of the hearings Dr. William Pepper testified that Judge Henry Green, of the Supreme Court, had introduced the promoter Green to him, and that the latter had attempted to secure his support of the scheme; and the mayor testified that the promoter had shown him a copy of the Supreme Court decision declaring the \$11,000,000 loan invalid on the very morning and at the very hour that the court itself had handed down the decision at Harrisburg over

one hundred miles away. As a result of the testimony elicited at these hearings, Seger and Byram were bound over in bail of \$10,000 each, and Green in \$50,000 bail, to answer the charge of corrupt solicitation.

None of these defendants, notwithstanding the convincing character of the evidence against them, was convicted. After the indictments had been found, the matter passed entirely into the hands of the district attorney, and the league's control of the prosecution ceased; so it was in no wise responsible for the failure to secure the conviction of these men. This much is to be said, however, that the investigation and prosecution for which the league was responsible succeeded in defeating the efforts to lease the works, and made it possible for those who were interested in the introduction of a filtration system to have their plans eventually put into force and effect. In this work the league took a leading part; and, as William Waterall at one of the inspections of the filtration plant several years afterward declared, "whatever one may think of the league, credit must be given to it for its signal service in helping to preserve the water-works to the city, and in making possible the inauguration of the filtration plants."

The league's constant scrutiny of legislation at Philadelphia and Harrisburg led to the defeat or veto of many obnoxious measures, and to the amendment of others. For instance, in the matter of the gas lease, while it could not and did not prevail in its opposition to the passage of the ordinance authorizing the lease, a large number of amendments to the ordinance itself were incorporated by the city solicitor, and the interests of the city very materially safeguarded. So in the matter of water, as we have just seen. Along the lines of the street-railway franchises the league persistently opposed the granting of privileges without the city's being adequately compensated for them and its interests duly protected.

The league's scrutiny, discussion, and criticism of ordinances granting privileges to the electric-lighting companies, to the telephone companies, to the railways, and granting wharf leases, would constitute an interesting and instructive story of itself. The action of the league on such legislation was based upon a



careful consideration of the interests of the city, not only for the present, but for coming generations, and had always in mind the fundamental principles for which the league stood.

Moreover, the league carefully considered and scrutinized all legislation having to do with municipal questions. In 1897, for instance, it led the movement for the veto of the notorious Becker bills of that year, which, had they become laws, would have accomplished then what has since been authorized, but not fulfilled by the notorious ripper bills of the present year. The Becker bills were intended to transfer the effectual government of the city to one-third of the members of the Select Council plus one, as their object was to compel the mayor to submit all his appointments to the Select Council for approval, a two-thirds vote being necessary for confirmation. The Becker bills, together with the ripper bills of 1897, were as notorious in their way as were the ripper bills of 1905. Fortunately, the league was able so to arouse public sentiment, and so to secure the co-operation of the governor, as to prevent their enactment into laws.

At every session of the Legislature during the league's existence it kept in touch with the more important measures affecting Philadelphia. While it was not able, because of its lack of financial resources, to maintain so complete a representation at the state capitol as the City Club maintains at Albany, nevertheless it was helpful and influential in calling the attention of the people of Philadelphia to those measures which required their support on the one side, or which called for their opposition on the other. It did not confine its efforts to opposing bad legislation, but constantly sought to put its ideas concerning municipal government into concrete form. We have already seen what it was able to accomplish in the passage of the personal-registration amendment. In 1897 it introduced a series of seven bills intended to extend the principles of the Bullitt Bill and remedy the defects of that instrument. These bills, viewed from the broad standpoint of the development of municipal institutions, represented something of far deeper interest and importance than a disconnected series of amendments to our existing system. While containing great diversity in subject-matter and contents, there was nevertheless

an underlying purpose pervading all, which gave them a unity they would have otherwise lacked, namely, the endeavor to adapt the form of our municipal institutions to the changing conditions of city life.

The committee preparing these bills was fully aware of the relatively subordinate place which should be given to questions of forms of government; but it recognized the fact that a form of government poorly adapted to the problems with which it has to deal is a source of weakness in the body politic. The committee declared that "we have begun to realize that city problems are not of the same nature as state and national problems; but we have not drawn the further and more fruitful conclusion that this difference calls for a difference in the form of government."

It is in this connection that the bill reorganizing city councils marked a step in the right direction. Framed in a conservative spirit, it was designed to preserve the point of contact between the present and the proper system. It did not attempt to make a radical change from a bicameral to a single-chambered local legislature; it merely proposed to rehabilitate the present system, profiting by the experience of other cities. Our present legislative system is the cause of an enormous waste of energy, combined with which there is a complete lack of responsibility to the community as a whole. The attempt to enforce responsibility, and to elect the best type of men to councils by working within ward lines, has proved to be a disastrous failure. Political responsibility is inherently different from business responsibility, and must be enforced by methods which only remotely resemble the enforcement of responsibility in private corporate management. Instead of trying to develop a progressive municipal policy out of the dickerings and compromises of local interests, we must endeavor to give expression to the highest standards of the community as a whole. Instead of judging a man's efficiency by the number of special favors obtained for his small district, we must come to gauge it by his contribution to the welfare of the whole community. Instead of constructing a system in which representatives from constituencies arranged upon one plan are played off against representatives elected by districts based upon another

plan of division, we should endeavor to facilitate the expression of the most enlightened opinion of the community.

I have summarized the conclusions of the committee, not only because of their inherent value, but because they foreshadowed, to so considerable an extent, the conclusions reached by a similar committee on charter reform appointed some months later by the National Municipal League. The pioneer work of the Municipal League of Philadelphia, not only along the lines already considered, but in other similar directions, has not been fully appreciated—not because of any desire to deny to it its full share of credit, but simply because its activities have been so numerous and varied that its own later work has, to a certain extent, obscured its earlier efforts.

Another of the bills prepared by the league dealt with the granting of franchises. It illustrated a sound principle of administrative law, of equal validity at all times and under all circumstances. No matter how strong our desire for municipal home-rule may be, we must recognize the fact that in those cases where there is the possibility of a conflict between the immediate and permanent interests of the municipality some form of central control is necessary. That such a conflict is always present in the case of the granting of franchises has been abundantly proved by the history of American municipalities. It is the function and duty of the state to safeguard the interests of coming generations; to assure to them a participation in the financial and other resources of the community. Hence the propriety of the appeal to the Legislature to prohibit the granting of franchises by councils for a longer period than thirty years. The fact that our bill was ignored, while the legislative bodies of other cities are prohibited from granting franchises for a longer period than twenty-five years, shows how difficult it is to secure wise and progressive legislation in this state under its present leadership.

The Legislature in no sense encroaches upon the sphere of local liberties when it fixes the standards of action in cases of this kind. On the contrary, it is simply protecting the municipalities against the short-sighted action which results from the lack of proper perspective between immediate and ultimate interests. In



this matter the experience of European countries is conclusive. Wherever we turn, whether it be to England, Germany, France, or Austria, we find this principle incorporated in one form or another in the municipal system. As a result, the municipalities are receiving with each year increasing benefits from its operation. In Glasgow, Huddersfield, and Sheffield the municipality is operating the street-railway lines. In Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, and Bradford the returns from franchises increase with each year, and at the expiration of the twenty-one-year period — which is the limit of grants — new and more favorable conditions have been obtained from the street-railway companies. Turning to France and Germany, we find precisely the same principles adopted, resulting in a continuous lightening of the burdens of taxation. In addition to the financial advantages accruing from the limited period of franchise grants, there is another and equally important principle involved. At the expiration of each period the municipality obtains complete control over its highways, which is impossible under any other system. In the United States constitutional prohibitions of one kind or another make state control over corporate management extremely difficult. The principles of constitutional law, that no state shall make nor enforce any law impairing the obligation of contracts; that life, liberty, and property shall not be taken without due process of law; and that the right of eminent domain can be exercised only for purposes which the court regards as distinctively public in character, are usually disregarded at the time franchises are granted; but they assert themselves in the most uncomfortable manner the moment the municipality wishes to exercise any control over the use of such franchises. This fact makes the necessity of such guarantees as were embodied in the league bill far greater than in any other country.

Through its control of the patronage, and the opportunity thereby afforded to assess public employees for political purposes, the "machine" has been able to maintain its power in state and municipal affairs. If a permanently improved municipal government is to be secured, we must remove city employees from politics. They must be appointed only on the basis of their merit and

fitness, and continued in office free from political exactions and dominations, and for so long a period as they discharge their duties faithfully and satisfactorily. The Bullitt Bill intended to place our municipal service on a merit basis; but, because of the provision giving to the heads of the departments, who were themselves the appointing power, the authority to draft the rules and regulations governing appointments, it has failed of its object, and has resulted only in keeping the very worst and most inefficient out of office. There is no more vicious principle in administrative law than that which places in the hands of appointing officers the ability to formulate the rules in accordance with which they are to make appointments. Experience has time and again demonstrated that they will be unable to resist the demands for office on the part of interested politicians and office-seekers, and that they will therefore make the requirements as meager as possible. President Proctor, of the United States Civil Service Commission, testified before the Senate Investigation Committee that such provisions were practically worthless.

Two of the league's bills provided for a civil-service system based upon the most advanced legislation and the experience of other cities. They were intended to remedy the defects of the present charter, and to establish a system whereby only those best fitted to carry on the city's business should be selected. A third bill prohibited political assessments, and was designed to relieve office-holders of what amounted practically to forced levies, extorted by fear of the possible consequences of refusal. The moderate and conservative character of the league's proposed legislation was shown in this latter bill, which only went as far as prohibiting assessments, although the committee, as well as the board of managers, felt that the only effective way of putting a complete quietus to the whole pernicious system was by making it a misdemeanor for any public officer or employee to contribute any sum for political purposes. Until this is done there will be contributions in one form or another for political purposes on the part of this class of citizens. It is no hardship to an office-holder to deny him the right to contribute for political purposes, because there is no legal obligation resting on him to hold office. If he

values the right to contribute above his desire for office, he need not accept the latter; but public sentiment has not as yet reached the point where it is ready to insist upon this method of reforming the abuse, and until it is ready other means will have to be tried to prevent the evil now existing in all our larger cities. The collection of large sums for political purposes, aggregating tens of thousands of dollars in Philadelphia at each election, which are disbursed without an accounting, and only too frequently for purposes which will not bear the light of day, serve to perpetuate the machine and its influence, and at the same time undermine the political sentiment of our communities.

The league also prepared a bill to prevent dual office-holding — an evil which has seriously afflicted the city for many years. Although, by reason of the political conditions which then existed, the bill did not become a law, the league was successful in individual cases in ousting from council men who held other and conflicting positions. For instance, in 1895 it succeeded in having one DeCamp, a manager of one of the local electric-lighting companies, ousted from councils on the ground that his position was incompatible. Later Samuel G. Maloney, a notorious local character, was forced to resign as select councilman because of his incumbency at the same time of the position of harbor master.

The league participated in a very considerable number of local activities, to enumerate which would serve only to illustrate the breadth of its sympathy and the scope of its activity. It is to be noted, however, that the league was the first organization in Philadelphia to inaugurate the demand for sectional high schools — a demand which is now generally recognized as well founded, and is finding expression, not only in the platforms of the parties, but in the policy of councils and of the Board of Education.

The active spirits of the Municipal League always considered that the political campaigns which it waged were important and valuable, if for no other reason, because of their educational effect. These campaigns not only developed a group of active, interested, intelligent workers, and created a party machinery which exists to the present day, although under a different name; but it served to present in concrete form the principles for which the league



stood. As Mr. George Burnham, Jr., pointed out in his address at the tenth anniversary of the founding of the league:

While I believe that the true work of the league is educational, let me hasten to add that I also think there is no better way of educating voters than by conducting campaigns at the polls, as it has done in the past and no doubt will continue to do in the future. Every time you place a worthy candidate on the ballot as against a machine henchman, you force the issue of good government upon the attention of each voter. He cannot escape it. He has not heard the general appeal of the minister in behalf of political righteousness, because he does not go to church; he has not read the warnings of the press, because he seldom looks at the editorial page; he has not read your specific campaign circular; but he must read his ballot; and the fact that he has a chance to vote for worthy candidates, as against unworthy ones, is placed before him at the critical moment.

The aims and purposes of the league were always primarily educational. It sought in every possible way to bring home to the people of Philadelphia the gravity and importance of the municipal problem as it affected them; the necessity for personal effort, if it was to be solved, and solved in the interests of the largest number. It sought at all times to enforce the fundamental principles for which it stood; it did this not only by the printed page, of which it circulated many hundreds of thousands; not only by the word of mouth, but in every other feasible and honorable way. It had numerous meetings of a social character, to bring men of like mind together, and to bring into contact with these men others who would be influenced by their personal example and influence. It sought through the medium of receptions, informal suppers, and similar devices to create and maintain an *esprit de corps*, an intelligent opinion, and a personal touch, the benefits of which are to be seen, not only during the years of the league's active work but at the present time and in the way that those who were brought up under the league's influence are attacking the present problem.

For years it advocated the establishment of a city or municipal club; but apparently the time was not ripe. Now a movement for the establishment of the City Club has succeeded beyond expectation; and within a few months there will be opened in Philadelphia a clubhouse for municipal workers — for men who

are interested primarily in the city of Philadelphia and in its honest and efficient administration.

The National Municipal League, which has become such an active factor in the municipal affairs of the United States, owes its existence to the Philadelphia Municipal League which, in 1893, took the first steps toward calling a national conference for good city government. Hearing that the City Club of New York was considering a similar move, it joined forces with that organization, and planned the conference which was held in Philadelphia in January, 1894. That meeting appointed a committee, which reported in favor of the organization of a national body to bring together all who were interested in the solution of the municipal problem; and the National Municipal League, which was formally organized in May of that year in the city of New York, was the formal expression and outcome of that movement. The fact that the secretary of the Philadelphia Municipal League was made secretary of the National Municipal League served further to identify the local body with the national movement, and to justify the claim, so often made by members of the Philadelphia league, that the National Municipal League was one of the products of its activity.

It may be asked why, after a career of such persistent activity, the league retired from the field. It did not retire until after it had called a conference for the organization of a new body which was to take up its work under a fresh name and with fresh blood, and along somewhat broader and more general lines. It must not be overlooked that the work of reform in any particular community is never an easy or a gracious task. It must be accomplished, if at all, at the sacrifice of personal comfort and popularity; and very often those who are most largely responsible for dissatisfaction with a condition of affairs are those receiving in the popular esteem the least credit or consideration. During its career the Municipal League adhered with great consistency and persistency to its fundamental principles. While at times its alliances were with one side and then with another, it always had in mind the education of public opinion, and the enforcement and embodiment of its principles in concrete action. Naturally, in

pursuing such a course, it had to refuse a great deal of interested advice, which almost invariably resulted in the estrangement of those offering it. As each year had its quota of those so estranged, in time there came to be a considerable number who felt that the league had lost its usefulness, because it failed to follow their advice. The active managers, realizing this fact; realizing further that people are always attracted by new names, and that there was a sentiment in every community, as old as the times of Aristides, which grew tired of those who were persistently teaching a doctrine at variance with that held by a majority of the community, felt that the great principles of municipal government and municipal policy for which the league had stood could best be served by the league's retirement and the formation of a new body.

Events have abundantly justified the wisdom and foresight of this action. The revolution of last spring, and the present widespread and hopeful revolt against the Philadelphia machine, were unquestionably made possible by the action. A new, vigorous group of men has been brought to the front and all that was worth while in the league has been preserved and continued, and its influence multiplied many fold; so that, in place of the comparatively little band of devoted workers, we have the new men constituting the Committee of Seventy, and a considerable infusion of new men in the City Party, plus the old rank and file of the Municipal League trained to march steadily on in the cause of better government and higher standards.

Thus the work inaugurated by the Municipal League is continued and extended, and its influence and efficacy assured.

To sum up, the Municipal League was a persistent, and not an intermittent, factor in the fight for good government in Philadelphia. As was said at its tenth anniversary, it recognized "that to accomplish permanent results it must adopt as its guiding policy 'all at it and always at it'."

The league represented an organized effort, not a spasmodic attempt, to change municipal conditions. With a nucleus of workers in every ward, and a good working association in 50 per cent. of them, they formed a wholesome offset to the strongly



intrenched and highly organized machine. With no spoils to offer to those who maintained the ward organizations, it was able to keep those whom it once enlisted, and gradually to increase their number. Its organized political work illustrated the growing force of the cohesive power of enlightened public interest.

The league was a representative, not a self-constituted, body; it stood for constructive work, it never stood for mere destructive criticism. While often required to speak sharply concerning municipal abuses, it never contented itself with mere criticism, but invariably sought to suggest and apply an adequate remedy. Thus it became a positive factor for the regeneration of Philadelphia and her politics. The full measure of its usefulness cannot yet be determined; but the fact remains that for thirteen years it maintained high standards of public service, insisting upon them under all circumstances, and so familiarized the people of the city with the ideal of good government that now, when they are thoroughly aroused to their personal responsibility in the matter, they have but to apply the principles which had been laid down and advocated by the league under circumstances not always fraught with the greatest encouragement.

## A CONTRIBUTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION<sup>1</sup>

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The ambiguity which surrounds the origin and nature of religion will never be removed so long as we insist upon approaching the problem as one for which a single word will be the "open sesame." Thus far, no one has been able to offer a definition which, without vagueness and yet with sufficient comprehensiveness, has told once for all what religion is in its essence, in that which is common alike to the religion of Christians and South Sea islanders, to Buddhism and Mexican idolatry. Thus far it has not been distinguished, on the one hand, from mere metaphysical speculation, nor, on the other, from the credulity which believes in "ghosts." Its purest and highest manifestations are not yet proof against comparison with these. And the multiplicity of psychological causes to which religion is ascribed corresponds to this indefinite conception as to its nature. It matters not whether fear or love, ancestor-worship or self-deification, the moral instincts or the feeling of dependence, be regarded as the subjective root of religion; a theory is only then entirely erroneous when it assumes to be the sole explanation, and then only correct when it claims to point out merely one of the sources of religion. Hence the solution of the problem will be approached only when all the impulses, ideas, and conditions operating in this domain are inventoried, and that with the express determination that the significance of known particular motives is not to be arbitrarily expanded into general laws. Nor is this the only reservation that must be made in an attempt to determine the religious significance of the phenomena of social life which preceded all religion in the order of time. It must also be emphatically insisted upon that, no matter how mundanely and empiri-

<sup>1</sup> Translated by W. W. Elwang, A.M., University of Missouri.

cally the origin of ideas about the super-mundane and transcendental is explained, neither the subjective emotional value of these ideas, nor their objective value as matters of fact, is at all in question. Both of these values lie beyond the limits which our merely genetic, psychological inquiry aims to reach.

In attempting to find the beginnings of religion in human relations which are in themselves non-religious, we merely follow a well-known method. It has long been admitted that science is merely a heightening, a refinement, a completion, of those means of knowledge which, in lower and dimmer degree, assist us in forming our judgments and experiences in daily, practical life. We only then arrive at a genetic explanation of art when we have analyzed those æsthetic experiences of life, in speech, in the emotions, in business, in social affairs, which are not in themselves artistic. All high and pure forms existed at first experimentally, as it were, in the germ, in connection with other forms; but in order to comprehend them in their highest and independent forms, we must look for them in their undeveloped states. Their significance, psychologically, will depend upon the determination of their proper places in a series which develops, as if by an organic growth, through a variety of stages, so that the new and differentiated in each appears as the unfolding of a germ contained in that which had preceded it. Thus it may help us to an insight into the origin and nature of religion, if we can discover in all kinds of non-religious conditions and interests certain religious momenta, the beginnings of what later came to be religion, definitely and independently. I do not believe that the religious feelings and impulses manifest themselves in religion only; rather, that they are to be found in many connections, a co-operating element in various situations, whose extreme development and differentiation is religion as an independent content of life. In order, now, to find the points at which, in the shifting conditions of human life, the momenta of religion originated, it will be necessary to digress to what may seem to be entirely foreign phenomena.

It has long been known that custom is the chief form of social control in the lower culture conditions. Those life-conditions



which, on the one hand, are subsequently codified as laws and enforced by the police power of the state, and, on the other hand, are remitted to the free consent of the cultivated and trained individual *socius*, are, in narrower and primitive circles, guaranteed by that peculiar, immediate control of the individual by his environment which we call custom. Custom, law, and the voluntary morality of the individual are different unifying elements of the social structure which can carry the same obligations as their content, and, as a matter of fact, have had them among different peoples at different times. Many of the norms and practices of public life are supported both by the free play of competing forces and by the control of the lower elements by higher ones. Many social interests were at first protected by the family organization, but later, or in other places, were taken under the care of purely voluntary associations or by the state. It can, in general, be asserted that the differentiations which characterize the social structure are always due to definite ends, causes, and interests; and so long as these continue, the social life, and the forms in which it expresses itself, may be exceedingly diverse, just as, on the other hand, this differentiation may itself have the most varied content. It seems to me that among these forms which human relations assume, and which may have the most diverse contents, there is one which cannot be otherwise described than as religious, even though this designation of it, to be sure, anticipates the name of the complete structure for its mere beginning and conditioning. For the coloring, so to speak, which justifies this description must not be a reflection from already existing religion; rather, human contact, in the purely psychological aspect of its interaction, develops that definite tendency which, heightened, and differentiated to independence, is known as religion.

We can safely assume that many human relations harbor a religious element. The relation of a devoted child to its parent, of an enthusiastic patriot to his country, of the fervent cosmopolite toward humanity; the relation of the laboring-man to his struggling fellows, or of the proud feudal lord to his class; the relation of the subject to the ruler under whose control he is, and

of the true soldier to his army—all these relations, with their infinite variety of content, looked at from the psychological side, may have a common tone which can be described only as religious. All religion contains a peculiar admixture of unselfish surrender and fervent desire, of humility and exaltation, of sensual concreteness and spiritual abstraction, which occasion a certain degree of emotional tension, a specific ardor and certainty of the subjective conditions, an inclusion of the subject experiencing them in a higher order—an order which is at the same time felt to be something subjective and personal. This religious quality is contained, it seems to me, in many other relations, and gives them a note which distinguishes them from relations based upon pure egoism, or pure suggestion, or even purely moral forces. As a matter of course, this quality is present with more or less strength, now appearing merely like a light overtone, and again as a quite distinct coloring. In many and important instances the developing period of these relations is thus characterized; that is to say, the same content which previously or at some subsequent period was borne by other forms of human relation, assumes a religious form in other periods. All this is best illustrated by those laws which at certain times or places reveal a theocratic character, are completely under religious sanctions, but which, at other times and places, are guaranteed either by the state or by custom. It would even seem as if the indispensable requirements of society frequently emerged from an entirely undifferentiated form in which moral, religious, and juridical sanctions were still indiscriminately mingled, like the Dharma of the Hindus, the Themis of the Greeks, and the *fas* of the Latins, and that finally, as historical conditions varied, now one and now the other of these sanctions developed into the “bearer” of such requirements. In the relation of the individual to the group also these changes can be observed; in times when patriotism is aroused, this relation assumes a devotion, a fervor, and a readiness of self-surrender which can be described only as religious; while at other times it is controlled by conventionality or the law of the land. For us the important thing is that it is, in every case, a question of human relations, and that it is merely a change, as it were, in the

aggregate condition of these relations when, instead of purely conventional, it becomes religious, and instead of religious, legal, and then, in turn, voluntary, as a matter of fact, many socially injurious immoralities first found a place in the criminal code because of the resentment of the church; or, as illustrated by anti-Semitism, because a social-economic or racial relation between certain groups within a group can be transferred to the religious category, without, however, really becoming anything else than a social relation; or, as some suppose, that religious prostitution was merely a development of sexual life which was earlier or elsewhere controlled by pure convention.

In view of these examples, a previously indicated error must be more definitely guarded against. The theory here set forth is not intended to prove that certain social interests and occurrences were controlled by an already independently existing religious system. That, certainly, occurs often enough, brings about combinations of the greatest historical importance, and is very significant also in the examples cited. But what I mean is precisely the reverse of this, and, it must be admitted, of much less apparent connection, and one more difficult to discover; namely, that in those social relations the quality which we afterward, on account of its analogy with other existing religiosity, call religious, comes into being spontaneously, as a pure socio-psychological constellation, one of the possible relations of man to man. In contrast to this, religion, as an independent phenomenon, is a derivative thing, almost like the state in the Roman and modern sense, as an objective and self-sufficient existence, is secondary in contrast to the original causes, relations, and customs which immediately controlled the social elements, and which only gradually projected upon or abrogated to the state the conservation and execution of their contents. The entire history of social life is permeated by this process: the positively antagonistic motives of individuals, with which their social life begins, grow up into separate and independent organisms. Thus, from the regulations for preserving the group-life there arise, on the one hand, the law which codifies them, and, on the other, the judge whose business it is to apply them. Thus, from socially necessary tasks, first



performed with the co-operation of all, and according to the rude empiricism of the times, there develop, on the one hand, a technology, as an ideal system of knowledge and rules, and, on the other hand, the laborer as the differentiated means for accomplishing those tasks. In a similar manner, although in these infinitely complex affairs the analogy constantly breaks down, it may have happened in things religious. The individual in a group is related to others, or to all, in the way above described; that is to say, his relations to them partake of a certain degree of exaltation, devotion, and fervency. From this there develops an ideal content, on the one hand, or gods, who protect those who sustain these relations; who brought the emotions which they experience into being; who, by their very existence, then bring into sharp relief — as an independent entity, so to speak — what had hitherto only existed as a form of human relation, and more or less blended with more actual life-forms. And this complex of ideas or phantasies finds an executive representation in the priesthood, like law in the person of the judge, or learning in a scholarly class. When this identification or substantialization of religion has been accomplished, it, in turn, has its effect upon the direct psychical relations of men among themselves, giving them the now well-known and so-called quality of *religiosity*. But in so doing it merely gives back what it had originally received. And it may, perhaps, be asserted that the so often wonderful and abstruse religious ideas could never have obtained their influence upon men if they had not been the formulæ or embodiments of previously existing relations for which consciousness had not yet found a more appropriate expression.

The intellectual motive underlying this explanation is a very general one, and may be expressed as a comprehensive rule, of which the materialistic conception of history affords a single illustration. When materialism derives the entire content of historic life from economic conditions, and defines custom and law, art and religion, science and social progress accordingly, a part of a very comprehensive process is exaggerated into the whole. The development of the forms and contents of social life, throughout its wide territory and multiplied phenomena, is

such that the selfsame content finds expression in many forms, and the same form in many contents. The events of history arrange themselves as if they were controlled by a tendency to make as much as possible of every given sum of movements. This is, apparently, the reason why history does not disintegrate into a collection of aphoristic movements, but binds together intimately, not only the synchronous, but the successive. That any particular form of life—social, literary, religious, personal—should survive its connection with a single content, and also lend itself unchanged to a new one; that the single content should maintain its essential nature through a mass of successive and mutually destructive forms, is precisely what the continuity of history will not permit. On the contrary, it prevents it, so that there should not be at some point an irrational leap, a break in the connection with the past. Since, now, the evolution of the race generally advances from the sensual and objective to the mental and subjective—only, it is true, frequently to reverse this order—there will often occur, in economic life, factors in the form of the abstract and intellectual, the forms which have built up the economic interests will intrude themselves into entirely different life-contents. But that is only one of the instances in which continuity and the law of parsimony are found in history. When, for example, the form of government exhibited in the state is repeated in the family; when the prevailing religion gives direction and inspiration to art; when frequent wars make the individual brutal and offensive even in peace; when political divisions influence non-political affairs and align diverging tendencies of culture according to party principles; then these are all expressions of this emphasized character of all historic life, of which the materialistic theory of history illuminates only a single side. And it is this side precisely which illustrates the development with which we are here concerned; forms of social relations either condense or refine themselves into a system of religious ideas, or add new elements to those which already exist; or, viewed differently, a specific emotional content which arose in the form of individual interaction, transfers itself in this relationship into a transcendent idea; this builds a new category

according to which the forms or contents are experienced which have their origin in human relationships. I shall try to demonstrate this general suggestion by applying it to a particular phase of the religious life.

The faith which has come to be regarded as the essential, the substance, of religion, is first a relation between individuals; for it is a question of practical faith, which is by no means merely a lower form or attenuation of theoretical belief. When I say, "I believe in God," the assertion means something entirely different from the statement, "I believe in the existence of ether waves;" or, "The moon is inhabited;" or, "Human nature is always the same." It means not only that I accept the existence of God, even though it be not fully demonstrable, but it implies also a certain subjective relation to him, a going out of the affections to him, an attitude of life; in all of which there is a peculiar mixture of faith as a kind of method of knowledge with practical impulses and feelings. And now, as to the analogy of all this in human socialization. We do not base our mutual relations by any means upon what we conclusively know about each other. Rather, our feelings and suggestions express themselves in certain representations which can be described only as matters of faith, and which, in turn, have a reflex effect upon practical conditions. It is a specific psychological fact, hard to define, which we illustrate when we "believe in someone"—the child in its parents, the subordinate in his superior, friend in friend, the individual in the nation, and the subject in his sovereign. The social rôle of this faith has never been investigated; but this much is certain, that without it society would disintegrate. Obedience, for example, is largely based upon it. In innumerable instances it depends neither upon a definite recognition of law and force, nor upon affection, or suggestion, but upon that psychical intermediate thing which we call faith in a person or a group of persons. It has often been remarked that it is an incomprehensible thing that individuals, and entire classes, allow themselves to be oppressed and exploited, even though they possess ample power to secure immunity. But this is precisely the result of an easy-going, uncritical faith in the power, value, superiority, and goodness of



those in authority—a faith which is by no means an uncertain, theoretical assumption, but a unique thing, compounded of knowledge, instinct, and feeling, which is concisely and simply described as faith in them. That, in the face of reasonable proof to the contrary, we still can retain our faith in an individual is one of the strongest of the ties that bind society. This faith, now, is of a most positive religious character. I do not mean that the religion was first, and that the sociological relations borrowed their attribute from it. I believe, rather, that the sociological significance arises without any regard for the religious data at all as a purely inter-individual, psychological relation, which later exhibits itself abstractly in religious faith. In faith in a deity the highest development of faith has become incorporate, so to speak; has been relieved of its connection with its social counterpart. Out of the subjective faith-process there develops, contrariwise, an object for that faith. The faith in human relations which exists as a social necessity now becomes an independent, typical function of humanity which spontaneously authenticates itself from within; just as it is no rare phenomenon for a certain object to produce a certain psychical process in us, and afterward for this process, having become independent, to create a corresponding object for itself. Human intercourse, in its ordinary as well as in its highest content, reveals in so many ways the psychological form of faith as its warrant that the necessity for “believing” develops spontaneously, and in so doing creates objects for its justification, much as the impulses of love or veneration can fasten themselves upon objects which in themselves could by no means evoke such sentiments, but whose qualifications for so doing are reflected upon them from the needs of the subject, or, as looked at from the other side, God as creator has been described as the product of the causal necessity in man. This last assertion by no means denies that this conception also has objective reality; only the motive out of which it grew subjectively into an idea is in question. The assumption is that the infinitely frequent application of the causal idea in the realm of its origin, the empiric-relative, finally made the need for it a dominating one, so that it found satisfaction, which was really denied it in the realm of the

absolute, in the idea of an Absolute Being as the cause of the world. A similar process may project belief beyond the confines of its social origin, develop it into a similar organic need, and beget for it the idea of deity as an absolute object.

Another side of the social life which develops into a corresponding one within the religious life is found in the concept of unity. That we do not simply accept the disconnected manifoldness of our impressions of things, but look for the connections and relations which bind them into a unity; yes, that we everywhere presuppose the presence of higher unities and centers for the seemingly separate phenomena, in order that we may orient ourselves aright amid the confusion with which they come to us, is assuredly one of the important characteristics of social realities and necessities. Nowhere do we find, so directly and appreciably, a whole made up of separate elements; nowhere is their separation and free movement so energetically controlled by the center, as in the gens, the family, the state, in every purposive organization. When primitive associations are so often found organized in tens, it means, clearly, that the group-relationship is similar to that of the fingers of the hand—relative freedom and independent movement of the individual, and, at the same time, unity of purpose and inseparableness of existence from others. The fact that all social life is a relationship at once defines it as a unity; for what does unity signify but that many are mutually related, and that the fate of each is felt by all? The fact that this unity of society is occasionally attacked, that the freedom of the individual prompts him to break away from it, and that it is not absolutely true of the closest and most naïve relations, like the unity of the constituent parts of an organism—all this is precisely what must have driven it home to human consciousness as a particular form and special value of existence. The unity of things and interests which first impresses us in the social realm finds its highest representation—and one, as it were, separated from all material considerations—in the idea of the divine; most completely, of course, in the monotheistic, but relatively also in the lower, religions. It is the deepest significance of the God-idea that the manifoldness and contradictoriness of things find in it their rela-

tion and unity, it matters not whether it be the absolute unity of the one God, or the partial unities of polytheism. Thus, for example, the social life of the ancient Arabians, with the all-controlling influence of its tribal unity, foreshadowed monotheism; among Semitic peoples, like the Jews, Phœnicians, and Canaanites, the method of their social unification and its transformations was plainly reflected in the character of their gods. So long as family unity was the controlling form, Baal signified only a father, whose children were the people. In proportion as the social aggregate included foreign branches not related by blood, he became a ruler objectively enthroned above. So soon as the social unity loses the character of blood-relationship, the religious unity also loses it, so that the latter appears as the purely derived form of the former. Even the unification which rises superior to the sex-differentiation forms a particular religious type. The psychological obliteration of the sex-contrast, found so conspicuously in the social life of the Syrians, Assyrians, and Lydians, terminated in the conception of divinities which combined the two—the half-masculine Astarte, the man-woman Sandon, the sun-god Melkarth, who exchanges the sex-symbols with the moon-goddess. It is not a question about the trivial proposition that mankind is reflected in its gods—a general truth which needs no proof. The question is, rather, to find those particular human characteristics whose development and extension beyond the human create the gods. And it must also be borne in mind that the gods do not exist as the idealization of individual characteristics, of the power, or moral or immoral characteristics, or the inclinations and needs of individuals; but that it is the inter-individual forms of life which often give their content to religious ideas. In that certain phases and intensities of social functions assume their purest, most abstract, and, at the same time, incorporate forms, they form the objects of religions, so that it can be said that religion, whatever else it may be, consists of forms of social relationships which, separated from their empirical content, become independent and have substances of their own attributed to them.

Two further considerations will illustrate how much the



unity of the group belongs to the functions that have developed into religion. The unity of the group is brought about and conserved, especially in primitive times, by the absence of war or competition within the group, in sharp contrast to the relations sustained to all outsiders. Now, there is probably no other single domain in which this non-competitive form of existence, this identity of aim and interest, is so clearly and completely represented as in religion. The peaceful character of the group-life just referred to is only relative. With the majority of the efforts put forth within the group there is also implied an attempt to exclude others from the same goal; to reduce as much as possible the disproportion between desire and satisfaction, even if it be at some cost to others; at least to find a criterion for doing and enjoying in the corresponding activities of others. It is almost solely in religion that the energies of individuals can find fullest development without coming into competition with each other, because, as Jesus so beautifully expresses it, there is room for all in God's house. Although the goal is common to all, it is possible for all to achieve it, not only without mutual exclusion, but by mutual co-operation. I call attention to the profound way in which the Lord's Supper expresses the truth that the same goal is for all, and to be reached by the same means; and also to the feasts which objectify the union of those who are moved by the same religious emotions, from the rude feasts of primitive religions, in which the union finally degenerated into sexual orgies, to its purest expression, the *pax hominibus*, which extended far beyond any single group. That absence of competition which conditions unity as the life-form of the group, but which always reigns only relatively and partially in it, has found absolute and intensest realization in the religious realm. It might actually be said of religion, as of faith, that it represents in substance — yes, to a certain extent consists of the substantialization of — that which, as form and function, regulates the group-life. And this, in turn, assumes a personal form in a priesthood which, despite its historic connection with certain classes, stands, in its fundamental idea, above all classes, and precisely on that account represents the focus and unity of the ideal life-content for all indi-

viduals. Thus the celibacy of the Catholic priesthood frees them from every special relation to any element or group of elements, and makes possible a uniform relation to each; just as "society" or the "state" stands above individuals as the abstract unity which represents all their relationships in itself. And, to mention a thoroughly concrete instance, throughout the Middle Ages the church afforded every benevolent impulse the great convenience of a central reservoir into which every benefaction could flow unchallenged. He who desired to rid himself of his wealth for the benefit of others did not have to bother about the ways and means, because there existed for this very purpose a universal central organ between the giver and the needy. Thus benevolence, a form of social relation within the group, secured, in the church, an organization and unity above the individual.

In like manner the reverse of this relation, with, however, the same germ, is seen in the attitude toward heretics. That which arrays great masses in hatred and moral condemnation against heretics is certainly not the difference in the dogmatic content of teaching, which, in most instances, is really not at all understood. It is rather the fact of the opposition of the one against the many. The persecution of heretics and dissenters springs from the instinct which recognizes the necessity for group-unity. Now, it is especially significant that in many instances of this kind religious variation could very well exist in conjunction with the unity of the group in all vital matters. But in religion the social instinct for unity has assumed such a pure, abstract, and, at the same time, substantial form that it no longer requires a union with real interests; while non-conformity seems to threaten the unity—that is to say, the very life-form—of the group. Just as an attack upon a palladium or other symbol of group-unity will evoke the most violent reaction, even though it may have no direct connection with it at all, so religion is the purest form of unity in society, raised high above all concrete individualities. This is demonstrated by the energy with which every heresy, no matter how irrelevant, is still combated.

And, finally, those internal relations between the individual and the group which we characterize as moral offer such deep

analogies to the individual's relations to his God that they would seem almost to be nothing more than their condensation and transformation. The whole wonderful fulness of the former is reflected in the many ways in which we "sense" the divine. The compelling and punitive gods, the loving God, the God of Spinoza who cannot return our love, the God who both bestows and deprives us of the inclination and ability to act—these are precisely the tokens by which the ethical relation between the group and its members unfolds its energies and oppositions. I call attention to the feeling of dependence, in which the essence of all religion has been found. The individual feels himself bound to a universal, to something higher, out of which he came, and into which he will return, and from which he also expects assistance and salvation, from which he differs and is yet identical with it. All these emotions, which meet as in a focus in the idea of God, can be traced back to the relation which the individual sustains to his species; on the one hand, to the past generations which have supplied him with the principal forms and contents of his being, on the other, to his contemporaries, who condition the manner and extent of its development. If the theory is correct which asserts that all religion is derived from ancestor-worship, from the worship and conciliation of the immortal soul of a forbear, especially of a hero and leader, it will confirm this connection; for we are, as a matter of fact, dependent upon what has been before us, and which was most directly concentrated in the authority of the fathers over their descendants. The deification of ancestors, especially of the ablest and most successful, is, as it were, the most appropriate expression of the dependence of the individual upon the previous life of the group, even though consciousness may reveal other motives for it. Thus the humility with which the pious person acknowledges that all that he is and has comes from God, and recognizes in him the source of his existence and ability, is properly traced to the relation of the individual to the whole. For man is not absolutely nothing in contrast to God, but only a dust-mote; a weak, but not entirely vain, force; a vessel, but yet adapted to its contents. When a given idea of God is, in essence, the origin and at the same time the unity of all the varieties of



being and willing, of all the antitheses and differences especially of our subjective life-interests, we can without more ado put the social totality into its place; for it is from this totality that all those impulses flow which come to us as the results of shifting adaptations, all that multiplicity of relations in which we find ourselves, that development of the organs with which we apprehend the different and almost irreconcilable aspects of the universe. And yet the social group is sufficiently unified to be regarded as the real unifying focus of these divergent radiations. Furthermore, the divine authority of kings is merely an expression for the complete concentration of power in their hands; as soon as the social unification, the objectification of the whole as against a part, has reached a certain point, it is conceived of by the individual as a supra-mundane power. And then, whether he still directly conceives it as social, or whether it is already clothed with divinity, the problem arises how much he, as an individual, can and must do to fulfil his destiny, and how much that supra-mundane principle will assist him. The independence of the individual in relation to that power, from which he received his independence, and which conditions its aims and methods, is as much a question in this case as in the other. Thus Augustine places the individual in a historic development against which he is as impotent as he is against God. And the doctrine of synergism is found throughout the entire history of the church conditioned by her internal politics. Just as, according to the strict religious conception, the individual is merely a vessel of the grace or wrath of god, so, according to the socialistic conception, he is a vessel of the forces emanating from the universal; and both instances reproduce the same fundamental ethical problem about the nature and the rights of the individual, and in both forms the surrender of the one to the other opposite principle frequently offers the only satisfaction still possible when an individuality, thrown wholly upon its own resources, no longer has the power to maintain itself.

This arrangement of religious and ethical-social ideas is supported by the fact that God is conceived as the personification of those virtues which he himself demands from the people. He is

goodness, justice, patience, etc., rather than the possessor of these attributes; he is, as it is sometimes expressed, perfection in substance; he is goodness itself, and love itself, etc. Morality, the imperatives that control human conduct, has, so to speak, become immutable in him. As practical belief is a relation between persons which fashions an absolute over and above the form of relation; as unity is a form of relation between a group of persons which raises itself to that personification of the unity of things in which the divine is represented; so morality contains those forms of relation between man and man which the interests of the group has sanctioned, so that the God who exhibits the relative contents in absolute form, on the one hand, represents the claims and benefits of the group, as against the individual, and, on the other, divests those ethical-social duties which the individual must perform of their relativity, and presents them in himself in an absolutely substantial form. The relations of persons to each other, which have grown out of the most manifold interests, have been supported by the most opposite forces, and have been cast into the most diverse forms, also attain a condition in the aggregate whose identification with and relation to a Being above and beyond them we call religion—in that they become both abstract and concrete, a dual development which gives religion the strength with which it again, reflexively, influences those relations. The old idea that God is the Absolute, while that which is human is relative, here assumes a new meaning: it is the relations between men which find their substantial and ideal expression in the idea of the divine.

If investigations like this, touching the fundamentals of being, are usually accompanied by the hope that their significance should be understood sufficiently comprehensively, the reverse must here be the case, and the wish expressed that the arguments here set forth must not be permitted to intrude upon neighboring domains, beyond their own limited boundaries. They are not intended to describe the historical course of the origin of religion, but only to point out one of its many sources, quite irrespective of the fact whether this source, in conjunction with others, also from the domain of the non-religious, gave birth to religion, or whether

religion had already come into being when the sources here discussed added their quota to its content—their effectiveness is not dependent upon any particular historical occasion. It must also be borne in mind that religion, as a spiritual experience, is not a finished product, but a vital process which each soul must beget for itself, no matter how stable the traditional content may be; and it is precisely here that the power and depth of religion are found, namely, in its persistent ability to draw a given content of religion into the flow of the emotions, whose movements must constantly renew it, like the perpetually changing drops of water which beget the stable picture of the rainbow. Hence the genetic explanation of religion must not only embrace the historical origin of its tradition, but its present energies also which allow us to acquire what has come down to us from the fathers; so that in this sense there are really “origins” of religion whose appearance and effectiveness lie long after the “origin” of religion.

But, more important even than to deny that we offer here a theory of the historical origin of religion, is it to insist that the objective truth of religion has nothing whatever to do with this investigation. Even if we have succeeded in the attempt to understand religion as a product of the subjective conditions of human life, we have not at all impinged upon the problem whether the objective reality which lies outside of human thought contains the counterpart and confirmation of the psychical reality which we have here discussed. Thus the psychology of cognition seeks to explain how the mind conceives the world to be spatial, and of three dimensions, but is content to have other disciplines undertake to prove whether beyond our mental world there is a world of things in themselves of like forms. It is true, there may be a limit beyond which the explanation of subjective facts from purely subjective conditions may not be sufficient. The chain of causes may have to terminate somewhere in an objective reality. But this possibility or necessity can concern only him who has in view the complete elucidation of the origin and nature of religion, but it does not affect our attempt to trace only a single one of the rays that are focused in religion.

Finally, the most important consideration remains. The emo-



tional value of religion—that is to say, the most subjective reflexive effect of the idea of God—is entirely independent of all assumption about the manner in which the idea originated. We here touch upon the most serious misconception to which the attempt to trace ideal values historically and psychologically is exposed. There are still many who feel that an ideal is deprived of its greatest charm, that the dignity of an emotion is degraded, if its origin can no longer be thought of as an incomprehensible miracle, a creation out of nothing—as if the comprehension of its development affected the value of a thing, as if lowliness of origin could affect the already achieved loftiness of the goal, and as if the simplicity of its several elements could destroy the importance of a product. Such is the foolish and confused notion that the dignity of humanity is profaned by tracing man's origin to the lower animals, as if that dignity did not depend upon what man really is, no matter what his origin. Persons entertaining such notions will always resist the attempt to understand religion by deriving it from elements not in themselves religious. But precisely such persons, who hope to preserve the dignity of religion by denying its historical-psychological origin, must be reproached with weakness of religious consciousness. Their subjective certainty and emotional depth must assuredly be of little moment, if the knowledge of their origin and development endangers or even touches their validity and worth. For, just as genuine and deepest love for a human being is not disturbed by subsequent evidence concerning its causes—yes, as its triumphant strength is revealed by its survival of the passing of those causes—so the strength of the subjective religious emotion is revealed only by the assurance which it has in itself, and with which it grounds its depth and intensity entirely beyond all the causes to which investigation may trace it.

## THE LITERARY INTERESTS OF CHICAGO. I

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### I. THE PIONEER PERIODICALS

"We shall be slow to believe there is not talent enough in the West to maintain a character for a work of this kind."—From the *Western Magazine*, Chicago, October, 1845.

"Present indications seem to show that we did not overrate the literary taste of the West, when we believed the western people able and willing to support a magazine of their own."—From the *Western Magazine*, Chicago, November, 1845.

"'The literary interests of Chicago'—they belong, do they not, in that important category where one discovers the historic 'snakes of Ireland'?" This whimsical question, put to the collector of material for these papers by a distinguished New York publisher, suggests a long-standing estimate of Chicago character. This city, the second in America and the metropolis of the Middle West, has not been noted for traits of æsthetic interest. Ever since the days of its earliest prominence as a small market-town, and through the quick years of phenomenal growth into a great business center and world-mart, the name "Chicago" has been the one above every city name standing for materialism. As a rough characterization, this has been accurate enough. And yet, from common knowledge, everyone knows that there have been in this community some manifestations of the æsthetic interest, including the literary interest.

Just exactly what are the variations of the universal literary interest which arise in such a market-metropolis? That is the question which may well lead to a detailed search for more than the commonly known facts concerning this particular interest. The term "interests" is much in vogue among the leading professors of general sociology in America, as well as with the sociologists of Europe. Interests may be defined as the concrete,

working expressions of those constant forces generated by the daily desires of men, women, and children. The concept may well serve as the starting-mark for an endeavor to describe and explain the social process in whole or in part. It leads to the selection of some particular interest. The one thus picked out from the congeries of interests that go to make up the life of Chicago, as the subject for the reports here submitted, is a subdivision of the æsthetic interest. The main query as to the character of the literary interest in this commercial city unfolds into many subsidiary questions. And since the idea of interests connotes their interdependence in the social process as a whole, some of these questions are directed at tracing the relations of the literary interest to the other interests of Chicago; for example, to the business interests. Half are inquiries about literary production; the others, on the reading done by all classes of people to satisfy the desire for the artistic through literary form—literary consumption. In getting answers, the collection of facts for narrative reports on merely a few phases shows that in Chicago the literary interest has been greater in quantity, and more varied and interesting in quality, than is generally supposed, even among the local litterateurs.

Efforts to establish literary magazines and periodicals in Chicago were begun as far back as the early prairie days. These attempts were the earliest budding of the creative literary desire in this locality; and similar undertakings have been its most constant expression since then. All told, at least 306 magazines and journals, whose generic mark is an appeal chiefly to the æsthetic or artistic sense, have sprung up in Chicago; and there have been some fifteen distinct varieties. Of this large crop, twenty-seven, or 9 per cent. of the total, germinated, lived their lives, and died in the forties and fifties.

About these pioneer magazines and journals, as of those in each decadal period, one may ask many questions: What was the character of the typical literary periodicals? What were the social factors in their origin? How go the stories of their struggles for permanence? What were the interrelations between these publishing enterprises and other interests? Was the literary



interest always engrafted on a business interest? What were the causes for the brevity of duration and early death of these periodicals?

In reply, a half-dozen dusty files, to be found in the library of the Chicago Historical Society, will tell an interesting story. It is often said that Chicago is the graveyard of literary magazines. And it is true that in the vaults of the Historical Society library, the Public Library, the Newberry Library, and other institutions of Chicago, the remains of fifty-five such literary creations lie buried, the relics filed for all the periods. In gathering data on the magazines of the later periods, thirty-three men and women who were connected, as publishers, editors, or contributors, with forty-three Chicago literary periodicals, have been interviewed.

Only three living witnesses of periodical events in the pioneer times could be found; and two of these were merely newsboys in those days. General James Grant Wilson, of New York city, is the only surviving literary man who was among the editors directing campaigns for the periodic publication of literary efforts in the Chicago field before the Civil War. From his present literary headquarters, General Wilson sent on illuminating recollections of these undertakings. The histories of Chicago are more instructive concerning the literary development of the earlier periods than of the later, and they also furnish side-light on the economic and social conditions. However, they give no adequate literary history of Chicago. Even Rufus Blanchard, having himself, in 1858, undertaken the establishment of an ambitious quarterly, made no mention of literary magazines when he wrote a history of Chicago. It is, then, to the old files that we turn for the story of the pioneer periodicals.

Although the impulse to write and to publish is a phenomenon of the individual, the constant reflection of environment, both physical and spiritual, or social, has shone in the literary magazines and papers of Chicago and "the West." This was clear and simple in those of the forties, the days of the western prairie pioneers. In the magazines of today it is clear, but complex. The keynote to which the literary publications of the midland metropolis have been attuned is westernism. In the sweep of six

decades of local, national, and international development, the character of this western spirit has unfolded in various modifications. It has passed, with shading emphasis, through western sectionalism to national westernism and western nationalism, and has come, finally, to cosmopolitan westernism and western cosmopolitanism. We find this at once apparent by dipping into these published records by periods. Nothing is stamped so clear on the pages of all the literary magazines and journals of Chicago, however, as the picture of the prairies and the expression of the western *Zeitgeist* of this section filling those of the period prior to our nation's Civil War — those of the forties and fifties.

The titles proclaim this fact. The first weekly of predominantly literary character was named, in response to the stimulus of environment, the *Gem of the Prairie*. This paper retained its prairie name from the founding in 1844 until it became the Sunday edition of the *Chicago Daily Tribune* in 1852. Before it was started, the *Prairie Farmer*, 1841-1905 — an agricultural journal which, during its pioneer stage, was largely literary in leaning — had set the copy for titles derived from the fields and lands. *Sloan's Garden City*, 1853-54, a weekly, achieved considerable prominence because of a serial story, by William H. Bushnell, entitled "Prairie Fire." This "tale of early Illinois" attracted many subscribers, and was copyrighted in January, 1854, and reprinted in pamphlet form. Finally, for a few months in 1856, D. B. Cooke & Co., booksellers, published the *Prairie Leaf*.

The word "western" or the name "Chicago" appears in the titles of nearly all the early periodicals not named from the prairies. Only one in this period had a caption of distinctly national significance; and that one was most ephemeral. The first literary magazine, in standard magazine form, to be published in Chicago was the *Western Magazine* — October, 1845, to September, 1846 — from which quotations appear in the headpiece to this paper. In later decades there were two magazines given the same name. Other early ones with typical titles were the *Garland of the West*, July, 1845; the *Lady's Western Magazine*, 1848; the *Youth's Western Banner*, 1853; and the *Western Garland*, published simultaneously at Chicago, Louisville, and St. Louis for a short

time in 1856. The *Chicago Ariel* was a short-lived sprite of 1846. The *Chicago Dollar Weekly*, a literary journal of merit, existed through a part of the year 1849. The *Chicago Record*, 1857-62, was the longest-lived periodical during the latter part of the pioneer season, and one of the most important containing the city's name in its title. Both the Chicago and western sentiments were among the features, which — if we may quote a salutatory — “the Iron-willed Press has forever stamped” upon a meritorious literary-historical magazine having five monthly issues in 1857. Its name, printed in large letters, was the *Chicago Magazine: The West as it Is*.

This western interest the editors and publishers consciously avowed. It was heralded with virility in many salutatories and editorial announcements. The *Literary Budget*, a journal of truly high standard, on changing from a monthly to a weekly, said, January 7, 1854:

The West should have a marked and original literature of its own. Writers of fiction have used up all the incidents of our glorious revolutionary period. The romantic scenery of the East, too, has been made to aid in the construction of some of the best romances ever written. We do not object to this. On the contrary, we rejoice — are thankful it is so. But a new field is open to authorship. We wish to present its advantages.

THE GREAT WEST, in her undulating prairies, deep-wooded highlands, mighty rivers, and remnants of aboriginal races, presents topics teeming with interest to every reader, and big with beautiful scenes for the artist's eye. The West is full of subject-matter for legend, story, or history. Sublime scenery to inspire the poet is not wanting. All that is lacking is a proper channel. This channel we offer. The *Budget* claims to be a western literary paper, and we invite writers to send us articles on western subjects, for publication.

Such unqualified western sectionalism had its roots in the economic and political situation, and the facts regarding the population of Chicago and its envioning prairies. In the late forties and early fifties Chicago was the growing center of a more or less isolated western or northwestern empire. Despite the lake transportation, which began in 1835, as Blanchard says, in his *Discovery and Conquest of the Northwest, with a History of Chicago*, “up to the era of railroads, the Mississippi River was a more important channel of trade to the state of Illinois than the lakes.”



It was not until 1852 that lines of railroad giving connection with the eastern states entered Chicago. For four years before that time the engine "Pioneer," brought here on a brig, had been hauling trains on the Galena & Chicago Union Railway, which was the nucleus of the Northwestern system. Ever since 1837 the citizens had been active over a big internal improvement scheme for a railway system to cover the state as a unit; and by 1850 a charter had been granted the Illinois Central, assuring a Mississippi Valley system centered in Chicago.

The population when the first magazine was established, in 1845, numbered 12,083. It grew rapidly to 84,113 by 1856. In the early part of this period the people composing it were chiefly native-born, the adventurous sons of Yankees in the seaboard section. When the foreign immigration set in heavily, during the later forties, the newcomers did not produce any marked effect by giving a varied, cosmopolitan character, such as masses of men from other lands have since contributed.

These men from the states near the eastern seaboard had brought with them a tradition of American magazines which dated back to 1741, when Benjamin Franklin had established, on English models, the *General Magazine and Historical Chronicle*. But that recollection was of magazines that were, almost necessarily, of, by, and for a distinct section, many of them having had state names, such as the *Massachusetts Magazine*. And the magazines which came from the East for Chicago readers in the ante-Civil War days were emphatically of the East. But even these did not begin to come regularly to the West until 1850, after ten literary periodicals had already been attempted in Chicago. It should not be surprising that in their literary isolation these pioneers should have undertaken the creation of their own literature, and that their literary journals should have been as sectional in spirit as those they had known in their earlier homes.

This tone in Chicago periodicals was not changed, but really heightened, by the coming of the seaboard city magazines which were then so markedly eastern in character. Mr. George H. Fergus, an old gentleman who today, at an office in Lake Street, continues the business of his father, Robert Fergus, Chicago's

first printer and the printer of several of Chicago's first periodicals, talks vividly of the first arrival of *Harper's New Monthly Magazine*. That was in 1850, when *Harper's* was founded. Getting copies from W. W. Dannenhower, who two years later started publication of the *Literary Budget*, Mr. Fergus sold them at an eight-cent profit. By 1854 the *Literary Budget* contained notices of *Putnam's Magazine*, *Graham's Magazine*, and *Knickerbocker Magazine*, which latter, by its very name, showed its sectionalism. The *Atlantic Monthly*, with its emphasis on the Atlantic idea, was not begun until 1857, the same year that saw the advent of the *Chicago Magazine: The West as it Is*. In an article on "American Periodicals," October 1, 1892, the *Dial*, a recognized authority, says:

It is a little surprising that the eastern magazines should so long have exemplified the provincial spirit. Until about twenty years ago they rarely took cognizance of the existence of any country or population west of the Alleghanies.

In the founding of magazines and literary journals in early Chicago is perhaps to be seen an example of the principle "imitation," made so much of by the French sociologist, Tarde. And his "invention" and "adaptation" may be found in some of the developments and in the westernization of these periodicals. Western sectionalism was the counterpart, in magazinedom, of New England and Knickerbocker sectional spirit.

Nevertheless, more than one of these pro-western publishers expected an eastern circulation. "Devoted to western subjects—consequently more interesting to distant readers and equally so to western people"—this quiet assumption is quoted from No. 1, Vol. I, of *Sloan's Garden City*. It appeared in 1853. By 1857 Chicago and the West found themselves leaping forward in such a rapid pace of growth that self-confident boasting became a characteristic of the city and section. "We believe failure was never yet wedded to Chicago," declared the editor of the *Chicago Magazine: The West as it Is*, in his "Introductory," which appeared during March of that year. Then, concerning the breadth of the field for circulation, he went on to say:

We propose to fill these pages with such matter as will make this publication a Chicago-western magazine. We shall aim to make it a *vade mecum* between the East and the West—a go-between carrying to the men of the East a true picture of the West which will satisfy their desire for information on the great topics connected with this part of their common country. We therefore bespeak for our work a place in the eastern market, and some offset there to the competition we must meet with in the circulation of eastern periodicals in the western field. The West will learn to patronize this monthly for the love of its own ideas; the East will read it to get that knowledge of us which they cannot get from any other source.

In the April number the publisher said: "Buy extra copies to send east." In the August number, which was the last, there appeared an advertisement addressed to "Men of the West," urging them to purchase copies of the magazine, and thereby aid in establishing a literature of their own, and a monthly magazine, also of their own, "as good as *Harper's*, *Putnam's*, or *Godey's*."

An exclusively western support was all that the periodical publishers of the forties and earlier fifties had sought. The *Gem of the Prairie*, 1844-52, in its editorial columns from time to time asked for "such support as it might receive from the people of the northwestern states of the Union." In 1851, the last year before its identity was submerged in that of the *Tribune*, the editor announced that for six years the periodical had enjoyed such support. As a result, the *Gem of the Prairie* could then be regarded as "established on a permanent basis." The publisher of the *Western Magazine*, 1845-46, Chicago's initial venture in magazine form, rated the western demand for a western periodical of that type as large enough to furnish permanent support. Many subsequent projectors of western magazines have held to the same belief. The *Literary Budget*, 1852-55, expected western subscribers only, and called upon "the friends of western literature" to organize clubs for co-operation "in the maintenance of a good literary paper in this section of the country."

The number of copies in the *Literary Budget's* first issue on becoming a weekly, January 7, 1854, as recorded in an editorial announcement, was 3,000. This is the only figure on the circulation of ante-bellum periodicals that could be found. The first of the annual *Newspaper Directories*, which are the chief source



of the statistics compiled for these reports concerning the distribution of the magazines and periodicals of the later periods, did not appear until 1869. The figure given by the *Budget*, however, undoubtedly indicates the average number of copies printed for the prairie periodicals of western circulation.

A lack of businesslike estimates, and an abundance of over-optimistic speculations about the geographic extent of the market for them, have been constant causes of death for literary publishing projects in Chicago. In general, those publishers who have sought only, or mainly, a western market for their output have had a measure of success. Those who, like the editor of the *Chicago Magazine: The West as it Is*, expected readers in the eastern states eagerly to accept their literary product, have, until recently, been altogether disappointed. They have found that, while the people of the states east of Illinois wish to know of the West, they want a literary presentation of western life made from their own point of view. The outlook of the writers for the early periodicals of Chicago was too restricted.

A detailed story of each of these early efforts, however, would show that the central motive of the men making them was not commercial success. Seriously and earnestly they strove to create a literature. Some even were so devoted that it might truly be said they were the high-priests of a fetish, the idol being a Literature of the West. Of the twenty-seven literary periodicals started at Chicago in the decades before 1860, 44 per cent. may be classified as purely literary, while 33 per cent. were of the literary-miscellany type, and 11 per cent. of the literature-information variety. The proprietors were not publishers, not highly developed captains in the industry of manufacturing and marketing letters. They were, rather, or strove to be, editors.

William Rounseville, of Rounseville & Co., the founder of the first literary magazine published in Chicago, was such an editor. He literally unfurled the banner of western literature, in the Indian summer month of 1845. The cover of his magazine was illustrated with two large trees, an Indian and his tepee at the base of one, and a prairie schooner at the base of the other. A streamer was strung from tree to tree. This streamer bore the

words *Western Magazine*. The name of William Rounseville, as author, appears in the first number at the head of five articles, including the first instalment of a serial story entitled "A Pioneer of the Prairies."

The development of western literary talent was the chief task which this editor undertook. Since his day editors and publishers in Chicago have discovered and brought out many writers, though some have not laid so much emphasis on that part of their work. Mr. Rounseville's first editorial chat with his public was headed "Our Contributors." He cited the fact that several entire strangers to him had contributed, as evidence of the interest in literary efforts here. William H. Bushnell, a journeyman printer who was the most prolific of the pioneer writers, contributed a "Legend of the Upper Mississippi," entitled "Ke-O-Sau-Que," and a poem on "The Dead Indian." J. T. Trowbridge, another prairie poet, was the contributor of some verses on "The Prairie Land." The number contained a few woodcuts. The best of the illustrations was a picture of Starved Rock, accompanying a legend of that historic spot.

The style of many of the contributions to the *Western Magazine* was crude, though in some the literary form was excellent. Without doubt, Rounseville & Co. paid little or nothing for articles and stories. Mr. Rounseville sold out after issuing ten numbers, and the purchaser suspended publication after the twelfth number of the magazine. The founder's belief that "the western people were able and willing to support a magazine of their own" had not materialized in cash. Lack of attention to the commercial side of the enterprise was a prime cause for the brevity of its life.

The name of Benjamin F. Taylor, a brilliant literary man, is given in the histories of Chicago as chief editor of the *Lady's Western Magazine*. This periodical, which came out for a few months in 1848, was in imitation of several "ladies' magazines" published in New York and Philadelphia. Mr. Taylor was a genuine poet, a westerner of rare genius. From the forties until after the great Chicago fire, in 1871, he wrote verses which first appeared in the literary periodicals, and also the newspapers, of

Chicago. His work attracted the attention, not only of western readers, but also of the literary critics, who pronounced it to be poetry that had the quality of real literature. But Mr. Taylor had none of the executive ability required for the business of editing and publishing a periodical of any kind; hence the short life of the *Lady's Western Magazine*.

In contrast with the direction of the foregoing magazines, the strict attention to business in the management of the *Gem of the Prairie*, a paper devoted to literary miscellany and information, stands out most sharply. Founded before them, it lived after them. It endured as the *Gem of the Prairie* for nearly eight years, which was longer than any other early periodical of predominantly literary turn continued to exist. "To Please Be Ours" was the motto of the publishers through changing ownerships. The proprietors on January 1, 1848, John E. Wheeler and Thomas A. Stewart, said editorially:

We mean to, and we believe we do, give the people who buy our literary wares their money's worth, and therefore we do not pay them so poor a compliment as to call them patrons.

Nevertheless, they expressed themselves as "not satisfied with mere pecuniary compensation," and mentioned those "more subtle ties connecting with the World of the Highest." This connection was striven for in departments called "The Muse," "The Story," "Miscellany," "Variety," and "Local Matters." Bushnell and Taylor were among the more able contributors. Many contributions came from those whose chief interest in life evidently was something other than letters. Not a few stories were selected from the magazines of the East and of England. The department called "Miscellany" was typical of the channels for literary flow provided by all kinds of newspapers and periodicals in the era of American journalism prior to that of specialization. It contained bits of prose and verse culled miscellaneously and thrown together in a kind of literary salad. This combining of appeals to the desire for æsthetic pleasure through the use of stories, poems, and literary miscellany, and to the desire for knowledge through general information and local news, was an evidence of business sagacity on the part of the publishers.



In order to meet a growing demand for news alone, in 1847 the proprietors established the *Chicago Daily Tribune*, as an offshoot to the *Gem of the Prairie*. They continued the *Gem of the Prairie* as a literary miscellany until 1852. By that time the offshoot had become bigger than the original trunk. The *Gem* was changed from a week-day weekly to a Sunday weekly, and its name became the *Chicago Sunday Tribune*. The idea of publishing a secular weekly to appear on Sunday had been gaining ground, though slowly, since the founding of the *Sunday Morning Atlas* at New York in 1838. Publishers must aim to catch readers during their hours of leisure. These Sunday weeklies, though largely literary, were one factor in the development of the Sunday dailies of today devoted primarily to news. The first exclusively Sunday paper to appear in Chicago came out in 1856. It was the *Sunday Vacuna*, named from the goddess of rural leisure. The first exclusively Sunday paper of any permanence, according to the historian Andreas, came out in the spring of 1857. It was the *Sunday Leader*, and had able men connected with it. Among them were Bushnell, and Andrew Shuman and Rev. A. C. Barry, who turned off a department called "Whittlings from the Chimney Corner." But neither of these exclusively Sunday papers lasted long. Without a doubt, the competition of the *Chicago Sunday Tribune* was too strong.

Up to the exciting days of the Civil War, however, there was a strong conviction on the part of substantial, church-going citizens that Sunday papers should not be read. But with their hearts burning for the success of the northern cause, and aching for loved sons at the front, the first demand of every man and woman, on Sunday as on a week day, was for news. This was supplied and the habit of reading news on Sunday was begun. It has grown since then, and today the first appeal of the Sunday edition of a daily paper is the appeal of news. Yet in the supplements of the *Chicago Sunday Tribune* today, containing stories, comic pictures, "Worker's Magazine" features, and miscellaneous reading, one can see the outgrowth of the old *Gem of the Prairie*. The development of those pages in the *Chicago Sunday Tribune* which broadly may be classed as literary in character is

typical of morning dailies in Chicago and elsewhere. This type of growth has reached its highest form of specialization, as we shall see later, in the "Sunday Magazine" of the *Chicago Record-Herald*, and newspapers of other cities associated in its publication. Incidentally, the points about the course of development in the *Gem of the Prairie* and the *Chicago Sunday Tribune* show, in outline, the history of the only periodical of a literary character established in prairie days which has continued in any form and retained such character to the present time. The *Prairie Farmer*, established in 1841, has altogether lost its literary flavor, although it has retained its name and identity, and has become a highly specialized paper of agricultural technique.

In January of the year when the *Gem of the Prairie* lost its original name, the *Literary Budget*, which grew into a journal of the same type, made its first appearance. The establishment of the *Literary Budget* gives the first example of a phenomenon which has frequently appeared in Chicago publishing. This may accurately be termed "engraftment." And "engraftment" may be defined as the dependence of one interest upon another previously established. W. W. Dannenhower, the "editor and proprietor" from the first flash to the snuffing out of this publication, was an old-fashioned bookseller. At his bookstore in Lake Street he gave counsel to his patrons and helped to set the literary fashions for the community. He established the *Literary Budget* as a medium in which to advertise books and periodicals. For seven numbers it appeared as a monthly. It then grew into a weekly literary journal of distinct merit, and as such was even more effective as an aid in selling books. And by the increase of book business the periodical was helped.

The character of the journal as a literary miscellany is shown by the frequent appearance of *noms de plume*—"Paulina," "Katy Darling," and "Daisy Poet." It is said by the early historians that the first music ever printed from movable type appeared in this paper. Each issue contained a page or two of printed music. To accompany some of this, Benjamin F. Taylor, who was a corresponding editor, wrote verses. T. Herbert Whipple, another of these editors, wrote for the *Literary Budget*

an original "nouvellette" entitled "Ethzelda; or, Sunbeams and Shadows: A Tale of the Prairie Land as it Was," which was afterward published in covers by Rufus Blanchard. On every page the *Literary Budget* tried to give that "marked and original literature of its own" which Mr. Dannenhower had "dipped his nib in ink" to declare the West should have.

After two years and a half of editing, Mr. Dannenhower deserted literature for politics. In the summer of 1855 he became state leader of the "Native American" or "Know-Nothing" party, which had during the year preceding carried two eastern commonwealths, and had shown strength in the middle states. He announced that the *Budget* would "close its existence," that he would "launch his bark" once more, and that his numerous readers would receive the *Weekly Native Citizen*. As a spokesman of the reaction against the immigration due to the Irish famine and the continental revolutions of 1848 and 1849, he wrote vehemently. With the *Budget's* last breath, he said:

We trust that our future exertions will be such as to exemplify to the world that the pure fire of American sentiment is sweeping over our vast prairies; that hereafter America shall and must be governed by Americans.

There was not a sigh for the literature of the West. We shall see how minutely history repeated itself—in the periodical *America* four decades later.

*Sloan's Garden City*, another literary miscellany, was started as a graft, in the original sense of that word. Walter B. Sloan, the publisher, was a vender of patent medicines—"Sloan's Remedies"—and had advertised in the *Gem of the Prairie*. In the first few numbers of his own periodical he printed a "Sloan's Column," which told the great merits of "Sloan's Family Ointment," "Sloan's Instant Relief," "Sloan's Horse Ointment," and "Sloan's Life Syrup." Later Oscar B. Sloan, a son, became editor. The patent-medicine notices disappeared. The periodical became a pro-western literary organ of genuine merit, having, however, a trend toward the family-story type of literary appeal. In 1854 it was merged with the *People's Paper* of Boston, which lived until 1870. But throughout its last years it contained only a few advertising notices, the subscription price of \$2 a year afford-



ing sufficient revenue. The history of this periodical has interest, however, chiefly on account of its origin in advertising.

The *Chicago Magazine: The West as it Is*, the literary-historical magazine of highest tone, expressed the pioneer sentiment on advertising. In the second number, April, 1857, it said:

We respond to the wish of a contemporary, that we might be able to dispense with this avenue of public patronage. But at present the law of necessity must overrule the law of taste.

As in the other early periodicals, the only advertisements in this magazine were those of local firms, including a "Business Directory," and those of the railroads. The well-deserved price of this magazine was 25 cents a copy. And the circulation was "all that the publishers asked."

The publishers looked for another source of revenue in their illustrations. The magazine was profusely and beautifully illustrated. The cuts, portraits, and pictures of buildings and towns were made from daguerreotypes. In presenting their "true picture of the West," the proprietors considered it their first duty "to daguerreotype" the towns and the leading citizens. This was done at great expense. But in their second number the publishers complained that no pecuniary aid had been received from that class of citizens whom they had undertaken to daguerreotype—the long-resident, wealthy and prominent men. They also expressed disappointment because the towns written up were slow to respond. It was almost a sacrifice of the dignity of this fine magazine thus to expect revenue from articles bordering close upon that species known among publishers as "write-ups." Write-up schemes, some of them really hold-up schemes, have caused the disrepute, decline, and death of not a few publishing ventures in Chicago, as elsewhere. The proprietors of the *Chicago Magazine: The West as it Is*, however, did not solicit payments for its excellent biographical and historical sketches in advance. They merely voiced disappointment that the publication of such articles had not met with recognition in the form of the cash the magazine so much needed.

This magazine was founded by and published for the Mechanics' Institute. It was engrafted on a culture agency. The

Mechanics' Institute was an organization for night study, which brought lyceum lecturers to the city and established a library. One object in founding the magazine was to secure exchanges for this library gratis. The serious money panic of 1857 in Chicago embarrassed the institute, and further hurt the magazine's circulation. In John Gager & Co., publishers of maps, the magazine had able business managers. Zebina Eastman, the editor, was a distinguished lawyer as well as writer. But he was a prominent abolitionist; and his interest in political affairs may have taken some energy from his literary efforts.

An outside passage on "the world's literary omnibus" was all they asked in March. In April they announced that the magazine had conquered for itself a place in the literary omnibus. The May and June numbers were late in coming out. The July number was omitted. The August number was the fifth and last. Andreas, the historian of Chicago, says the failure was a great loss to the literary interests of the city.

The last of the prairie-day periodicals were brought out under the editorship of James Grant Wilson, then a young pioneer making his literary debut at Chicago; now, in 1905, with more than three-score years and ten to his credit, a conspicuous figure in the Authors' Club, Century Association, and other circles of literary men at New York. He was the editor of two literary periodicals which closed the pioneer period. With a literary bent inherited from his father, a poet-publisher, and an educational equipment secured at College Hill, Poughkeepsie, Mr. Wilson took Horace Greeley's advice to young men, and came west in 1857. Andreas in his *History of Chicago*, 1884, says, on p. 411 of Vol. I: "In March, 1857, James Grant Wilson, editor (Carney and Wilson, publishers), began the publication of a monthly magazine designated the *Chicago Examiner*, devoted to literature, general and church matters." In a letter written October 9, 1905, Mr. Wilson informs us that this is an error, saying: "The title *Chicago Examiner* is new to me, and I think no paper or periodical could have appeared at that period without my knowledge."

In April, 1857, however, Mr. Wilson, as sole editor and proprietor, founded a rather enduring journal, the *Chicago Record*.

In an introductory editorial salutation he called attention to the springtime advent of the birds, and asked for this journal a welcome like that given to the April songsters. With artistic Old English lettering in its title, the *Chicago Record* was consecrated to literature and the arts, and, although conducted by a layman, was also "devoted to the church." It was an example of engrafting, the literary interest being made dependent on the interests of the Chicago diocese of the Protestant Episcopal church. It may perhaps be significant that, along with the advertising notices of books and reading which it contained, there were advertisements of stained-glass windows. The contents of the *Record's* neatly printed pages were, however, distinctly literary in character, and of excellent quality, having a polish which the news of the Episcopal church only helped to emphasize, as one can readily see on looking at the file which the founder presented to the Chicago Historical Society. The articles were written in pleasing essay style. The editor himself contributed "Wanderings in Europe," narrative accounts of experiences in the summer of 1855. Another series of papers told of "Painters and Their Works" in a manner that was interesting, although the journal had no illustrations. Poetry and "miscellanea" were interspersed. Among the poems "Written for the *Record*" were several by Benjamin F. Taylor; and of those evidently reprinted were many from the pen of William Cullen Bryant. All of the literary periodicals of the pioneer period, excepting the *Chicago Magazine: The West as it Is*, which was undertaken contemporaneously with Mr. Wilson's first effort in March, 1857, had already died, or else lost their character and identity, by the time of his arrival. Therefore, General Wilson is under the impression that the *Chicago Record* "was the first literary periodical to appear in Chicago."

While still bringing out the *Chicago Record*, Mr. Wilson became the editor of the very best magazine among those which have left merely first-number mementoes in the library of the Chicago Historical Society. This was the *Northwestern Quarterly Magazine*, a volume of 104 pages in thick paper cover, which was published by Rufus Blanchard, the cartographer and historian whose death occurred in 1904. It was a heavy maga-



zine of the *North American Review* type, the most ambitious of the kind ever attempted in Chicago, and quite pretentious for so early a date as October, 1858. Mr. Blanchard, in a conservative announcement on the last page, said:

On the issue of the pioneer number of this magazine the publisher would beg leave to state that he is as well aware that no high pretensions can sustain a feeble attempt, as that a worthy effort would be successful without them. The *Northwestern Quarterly* is now before the tribunal of public opinion to stand or fall as its merits shall determine.

In the course of telling what would be the aims of the magazine, he said "the broad fields of literature" were to be traversed, and "the progress of fine arts to be traced."

The contributions which had been selected by his editor were printed without authors' signatures attached, but were of high character both as to critical insight and literary style. Typical articles in the number bore the following titles: "The Northwest," "Padilla," "A Trick of Fortune," "The Home of Robert Burns," "The Broken Pitcher," "About Painters and Their Works," "Puns and Punsters," and "The Atlantic Telegraph." The "Literary Notices" contained a review of *Titcomb's Letters to Young People*. Three local book stores, including "the largest book-house in the Northwest," were represented by full-page advertisements of a character in keeping with the literary merit of the periodical, for which the booksellers thus signified their approval. General Wilson cherishes many recollections of the *Northwestern Quarterly*. Being president of the Biographical Society in New York, and the author of various works on memorabilia, historical recollections are his great delight. Among reminiscences concerning the *Northwestern Quarterly Magazine*, the most pleasing, told in his own words, is as follows:

Both Washington Irving and James K. Paulding, and also William Cullen Bryant, in letters to the editor, commended it, Paulding saying it was "the best first number of any magazine ever published in this country."

But although Mr. Wilson had the material for a second number in proof, it never was published. And this was not because either the "high pretensions" mentioned by the publisher or contributions of genuine merit were lacking. Mr. Blanchard was over-

taken by financial troubles in his chief business of map-publishing; so the magazine was brought to a sudden end, and sent to the oblivion of ephemeral publications.

Mr. Wilson, however, continued the editing and publishing of the *Chicago Record* each month. This journal lived, under his fostering care, for five full years, until March, 1862, when it was purchased by a clergyman, through whose literary ministrations it lasted only a brief period longer. In "A Word at Parting" Mr. Wilson said of the *Chicago Record*:

It was the pioneer paper of its character in the Northwest, and various were the expressions in regard to its success:

"Some said, Print it, others said, Not so;

Some said, It might do good; others said, No."

It has been a success—we humbly trust it has done some good. Other demands upon our time compel us to relinquish, most reluctantly, a post that we have endeavored to fill to the best of our ability.

The other demands, mentioned but not described in this editorial valedictory, were those felt by all men at the time in response to the nation's call for volunteers. Mr. Wilson quite literally left the pen for the sword. He entered the Union army as a major in the Fifteenth Illinois Cavalry, served in the Vicksburgh campaign, and resigned as a brigadier-general in 1865. While in the war, General Wilson absorbed the material for his printed addresses on Lincoln and Grant, and was led on into the literary work which he has since done continuously in New York, his last book, *Thackeray in the United States*, having come out in 1903. But it was the war which ended his training-school days in letters at periodical editing and publishing in pioneer Chicago.

The war put a temporary stop to the founding of literary periodicals. As we have already seen, at least one publication of literary interest was begun in each year after 1841 until 1858. And since the war, new ones have sprung up every year. But between 1858 and the end of the war in 1865, only one periodical of literary character was attempted in Chicago. Even that one was first announced in a prospectus issued at Washington, D. C., and it proved to be a direct engraftment on the national interest in the war. This unique bit of war-time literary effort bore as its

name the words *National Banner*. No. 1 of Vol. I, having a Chicago imprint, appeared in May, 1862; the last number issued at Chicago came out in December of that year; and then the headquarters were again located in its place of origin at the national capital.

The *National Banner* was a sixteen-page journal "devoted to art, literature, music, general intelligence, and the country." The objects of the venture, as framed more fully by Miss Delphine P. Baker, the proprietor, and proclaimed through a standing announcement, were in part, as follows:

First, to create a patriotic fund for the relief of disabled soldiers and their families; second, to diffuse a high-toned moral literature throughout the land; and, third, to bind with the golden chain of love all hearts together in one grand, glorious national cause.

The *National Banner* held out a novel inducement to prospective subscribers in the form of a promise that a good part of their payments would be turned over directly to "the patriotic fund." Still, the dominant interest aroused by the contents of the periodical was of a literary nature. A leading feature from month to month was a continued story entitled "Olula: A Romance of the West." Among the contributors mentioned, in announcements frequently made, were George D. Prentice, Benjamin F. Taylor, James Grant Wilson, Horace Greeley, James W. Sheahan, and William Mathews. Although sounding the new national note, the periodical paraded its contributions from "the most eminent northwestern clergymen," and paid special attention to literary efforts designed for the western section of the country.

## II. PERIODICAL LITERATURE FOLLOWING THE WAR

"Born of the prairie and the wave—the blue sea and the green—  
A city of the Occident, Chicago lay between.

"I hear the tramp of multitudes who said the map was wrong—  
They drew the net of longitude and brought it right along,  
And swung a great meridian line across the Foundling's breast,  
And the city of the Occident was neither East nor West."

—Benj. F. Taylor, in the *Lakeside Monthly*, October, 1873.

The effect of the Civil War in lessening sectional antagonism throughout the North, especially the sectionalism of West versus



East, was reflected in the literary periodicals of Chicago. This impulse toward the national standpoint showed itself in the magazines and journals undertaken in the period between 1865 and the great fire of 1871. There was also the influence of an intensified local spirit. Chicago was growing like an adolescent giant. The population had increased from a little more than 100,000 in 1860 to over 200,000 in 1866, and by 1870 it was more than 300,000. This growth was matched by a buoyant movement in commerce and industry. A flood of energy which had been diverted to the war was directed anew to these channels. The name "Chicago" appeared on thirteen periodicals of literary appeal in the late sixties and early seventies. The *Chicagoan*, a literary weekly coming out on Saturdays in the years 1868 and 1869, was one of the best of these. But in tracing development, the beginning of a tendency toward nationalization is more important. It is to be found in the magazines that were published east as well as west.

The establishment of agencies for distributing periodicals and newspapers aided in widening their scope. Mr. John R. Walsh founded the Western News Co. in 1866. This machine for Middle West distribution of periodic publications was built upon the growing web of railway lines centered in Chicago. The Western News Co. became an organic part of the American News Co., which had been established in New York ten years earlier. Like every branch agency at a subcenter, the Western News Co. proved a great aid to the magazines of New York in securing national circulation. Mr. Walsh held then, as he does today, in 1905, that there can be only one literary center in a country. He cites the shifting of literary production from Edinburgh to London, in Great Britain's experience, as evidence. At any rate, but few promoters of western publishing ventures have had capital enough to send out through the news company, for display at the newsstands, many copies which might be returned unsold. The news company holds back the collections on three issues of a new periodical as a guarantee that the publishers will fulfil their agreement to take back copies not sold. Nevertheless, Chicago publishers, except those of the present decade, have complained that

the Western News Co. has not been an aid in establishing western literary periodicals.

Within the five years following the close of the Civil War, a periodical was started in Chicago which stands today as the most notable in the city's literary history. This was a monthly magazine which, crudely begun as the *Western Monthly*, became the classic *Lakeside Monthly*. Of all the periodicals undertaken in Chicago, the *Lakeside Monthly* remains the one most distinctive in unalloyed literary appeal, the one most chaste and finished in form. Its history is rich in significance.

In its first number the *Western Monthly* announced that it was "intended to be purely an institution of the West." The western tocsin was again sounded lustily as in the *Western Magazine* of prairie days. The worth of the magazines of the East during the preceding decades in affording an outlet for eastern writers, and thereby placing American literature side by side with the best of the Old World, was loudly praised; but, said the announcement,

the West, with her vast resources, her intellectual men and growing genius, is not represented by any magazine whose mission is to explore the fields of literature and gather the ripe fruits of her pioneer talent.

It was declared that western writers looked with an "unbecoming awe" upon those of the East, and "feared to compete with them in the literary arena as then established." The fault was laid at the door of the West for not publishing a magazine of its own. Hence the advent of the *Western Monthly* and the concluding words:

We believe the proverbial go-aheaditiveness of the western people will be demonstrated in literary as well as commercial matters, now that the opportunity is presented.

All this appeared in the number of January, 1869.

Not long before that time, Mr. Francis Fisher Browne, truly a pioneer of American culture then and today, arrived in Chicago, coming from Buffalo and the East, by steamer on the lakes. Mr. Browne had served in the Civil War with a Massachusetts regiment; and, having seen many men from many sections marching to the nation's common battlefields, he had come out of the war

with an enlarged experience and a broadened point of view. As a boy, he had learned the printer's trade in his father's newspaper office, thus acquiring knowledge of the aid that typographic art can give to literary form. Like many literary men, he had also studied law — first in an office at Rochester, New York, and then at the University of Michigan. Ever since his boyhood days in the newspaper office and in a New England high school, he had, however, been keenly interested in letters. After locating in Chicago, his tastes again turned to them. His alert eye saw possibilities in the *Western Monthly*; and, after three or four numbers had been published, he purchased an interest in the magazine and joined the projector of it, Mr. H. V. Reed, in its management. After a time Mr. Reed withdrew from the enterprise, and Mr. Browne became its sole director.

The beginning of Mr. Browne's work in the management of the magazine was marked by immediate improvement in its style and character. The typographical dress of the periodical was changed, and its appearance became at once more dignified and elegant. Biographical features were dropped out, and its appeal became purely literary. The interest in form and subject-matter was not then, or afterward, given auxiliary strength by the use of illustrations. But the typography became so nearly perfect that the *Inland Printer* has declared it to have been the best in any Chicago periodical excepting only that influential journal of literary criticism, the *Dial*, which Mr. Browne himself established later.

The change in the name of the periodical was probably the most typical single act of a Chicago publisher during the post-bellum period. The adjective "western" in a magazine title bespoke something provincial, something narrow and restricted in aim and scope. Other publishers evidently felt this. Besides the *Western Monthly*, only three Chicago literary periodicals started in these years contained the word "West" in their names; and they were journals of a low literary order. A broader and more inclusive title was needed to make the magazine expressive of the spirit of the times. A study of its files and of the history of the period suggested the idea that the editor had doubtless gone



through an interesting personal experience in creating the new name thus called for by the social movements following the Civil War.

A call upon Mr. Browne in the *Dial* office at the Fine Arts Building was rewarded with a vivid narration of this important incident. Looking out over the green space bordering Michigan Boulevard to the great blue lake in the distance, Mr Browne consented to give his recollections of the transforming of the *Western Monthly* into the *Lakeside Monthly*. Soon after his advent into the magazine, he felt the narrowness of the word "western," and began feeling for a name which, while it might retain the flavor of locality, would first of all connote a wide interest in the æsthetic. The title of the *Atlantic Monthly* had some such connotation. Mr. Browne devised a long list of possibilities, compounding words to suggest beauty and fertility—the lake and the land. And one day, in 1870, he struck off the word "Lakeside"—a name which, perhaps because it so clearly mirrors the most beautiful physical feature of the Chicago environment, has become a popular favorite for many ambitious enterprises. For its first use Mr. Browne chose it as the looked-for title, and the magazine became the *Lakeside Monthly*.

Under its new name the magazine made rapid advances in influence and reputation, so that it became the nucleus of a large publishing and printing house organized in 1870 for the avowed purpose of making Chicago as important a center for the manufacture of books and periodicals as it had already become for their marketing and distribution. The magazine gave its name to the new house, the Lakeside Publishing and Printing Co., for which it became the literary organ. In November, 1870, it announced editorially that the *Lakeside Monthly* would hold such a relation to this company "as does *Harper's Magazine* to the great publishing house of Harper Bros. of New York." The new publishing company was a successor to the magazine company and the printing firm of Church, Goodman & Donnelly. It started with a capital stock of \$500,000, and had, besides the magazine and other literary interests, a large and well-equipped printing-plant. It also erected the Lakeside Building, which,

rebuilt, still stands at the corner of Clark and Adams Streets, materially reminiscent of the high enterprise. The great fire of 1871 destroyed the new building and seriously crippled the business, so that book and magazine publishing in Chicago did not then assume the proportions reasonably promised at the outset of the new organization. A division of interests was made, and from that time on the sole responsibility of the magazine rested with Mr. Browne.

The character and quality of the *Lakeside* became notable, and its distinctive literary tone became pronounced, editor and contributors seriously striving to maintain the point of view of the creative artist. An endeavor was made to present the contents in such form as to interest American readers not only residing in the Middle West, but in all parts of the country, and also the English-reading lovers of beauty residing in the Old World as well. This outlook was from a height which no previous periodical in Chicago had attained. The appeal to the æsthetic interest was supplemented with an appeal to the interest in knowledge, through the publication of many profound articles of solid information. A scholarly tone resulted. The men connected with the popular and sensational magazines today, on reading the files of the *Lakeside*, are inclined to ridicule this characteristic. They call it didactic. Such didactics, however, served to emphasize the fact that the purely literary contributions to the magazine were measured critically by a standard derived from classic literature.

The retention of a decidedly western character was another marked feature of the *Lakeside*. Mr. Browne tried always to get material that was indigenous, racy of the soil, expressive of the fertility and virility of the Mississippi Valley. The fiction, poetry, and essays in the files of the *Lakeside* show success in expression of the life of the Midland West. In the Far West the picturesque freshness of the mountains inspired a like use of local color in Bret Harte's *Overland Monthly*, which was contemporary with the *Lakeside Monthly*, as it in the Middle West was with the *Atlantic Monthly* in New England. Most of the men and women who wrote for the *Lakeside* lived in Chicago and the Middle

West, although some were from the South and a few from the East. Many of them were brought out by the *Lakeside*, and much in their first manuscripts was rewritten in Mr. Browne's office. An article on "Literary Chicago" in the *New England Magazine* of February, 1893, states the result, by saying that The *Lakeside Monthly* early took high rank among the first-class literary magazines of the country, and elicited the warmest praise, not only from American organs of critical opinion, but from such foreign authorities as the *Saturday Review* and *la Revue des Deux Mondes*.

The circulation, according to the newspaper annuals, reached 9,000 in 1871, 10,000 the next year, and in 1873, 14,000, its maximum. While the bulk of this was in Chicago's supporting market, west and northwest, a part was east of the Alleghanies.

The pages of the *Lakeside*, with their portrayal of mid-western character, proved to be one source of satisfaction for a widespread desire to read the literature of locality—a desire which was one effect of the war and the growth of the nation. Before that time, publishers in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia had generally disregarded western subjects and western authors. The few remaining literary workers who were active then say it is impossible for the present generation to appreciate the indifference which eastern publishers then felt for the West. With the advent of the *Lakeside*, *Scribner's Monthly*, the forerunner of the present *Century*, began to give attention to western subjects, and to seek the work of western writers. During the years of the *Lakeside's* growth other eastern publishers began to glean in Mid-West fields, and the competition among them for the virile western productions, which has since become so keen, was fairly on by the time the magazine had reached the zenith of its career.

Such an influential position came only from years of patient perseverance and indomitable energy. Unlike the publishers of 148 literary ventures of various orders in Chicago lasting only a year or less, Mr. Browne went into this undertaking prepared to stay. Although loving literature for its own sake, he knows well its commercial side; that even the highest grade of literary output, like grosser wares, must be marketed as merchandise. Mr. Browne was prepared to carry on his chosen enterprise with the



highest literary ideals, but with practical business methods for reaching the market made by those who appreciate the higher literature. The recognition of merit was sought, and it was the recognition of such an effort of merit, as that which critics say today puts the *Atlantic Monthly* in a class by itself. Mr. Browne evidently felt that this policy, if followed out with patient devotion, was bound to win in time; and it did win for the *Lakeside*, in spite of business changes and ordeals by fire during years of work and waiting. In October, 1870, the *Lakeside Monthly* had a foretaste of fire, from flames which, though confined to its office, burned up an entire issue just off the press, and inflicted other serious damage. Then, in October, 1871, the great Chicago conflagration nearly obliterated the magazine, not only weakening the new publishing house which had grown out of it, but reducing the office furniture and subscription list to ashes. But the spirit of the *Lakeside* survived. Mr. Browne passed through all this undaunted. The magazine, omitting only the November and December issues, went on its way. Not, however, until its fifth year, in 1873, did it reach a self-supporting basis. The revenues were chiefly from sales and subscriptions at 35 cents per copy and \$4 a year. The advertising patronage was small, in comparison with that of the popular magazines of today. It came mainly from local merchants, since the general advertising agencies had merely been started in a small way by that time.

Nearly all of this advertising support and 40 per cent. of the circulation fell off in the fretful times following the "Black Friday" of the Jay Cooke panic toward the end of 1873. The struggle had been hard, the strain long and severe, and when, on account of these general financial conditions, additional resources of capital and energy were called for, Mr. Browne broke down, and, in the spring of 1874, was ordered away by his physician. As sole proprietor and editor, Mr. Browne had not specialized the establishment sufficiently. There was no one at hand trained to take his place either in business management or in editorial direction. At this time the publishers of *Scribner's Monthly* made a proposal for consolidation, which was a unique recognition of Chicago publishing on the part of New York publishers. But

this was declined, Mr. Browne deciding that, if the magazine must die, it should go down as it had lived—the *Lakeside Monthly*. In February, 1874, it suspended publication—a measure of necessity which at the time was thought to be only temporary. But it proved otherwise; and thus was closed the career of an enterprise in periodical literature which, in many respects, was the most important in the history of the literary interests of Chicago.

A publication of magazine form, generally called the *Chicago Magazine*, came out in the period of prosperity following the war. Its complete name, however, was the *Chicago Magazine of Fashion, Music, and Home Reading*. It was created by a coterie of fashionable ladies. Mrs. M. L. Rayne, who today contributes "Fun and Philosophy" to the editorial page of the *Chicago Record-Herald*, was the editor and leading spirit in the company. This magazine was the first of several Chicago periodicals designed to couple an interest in æsthetic writing with the æsthetic interest in dress. Possibly the fashions then did not call for tailor-made gowns. At any rate, the literary style of the poems, short stories, and serials, the printed trimming for the substantial material on *modes*, was characterized by something of looseness. The magazine secured a circulation of 3,000, chiefly local. It first appeared in 1870; numbers in the file of the Historical Society run to 1872; and the name appears in newspaper annuals until 1876.

One of the military titles used by boys at play in the Civil War time was stereotyped on the cover of a remarkable journal of juvenile literature, the *Little Corporal*. This little periodical was begun in Chicago the second month after fighting men came, from Appomattox, to their homes and children. The *Little Corporal's* slogan, shown in the files for 1865 and 1866 at the Historical Society's library, sounded forth as follows: "Fighting against Wrong, and for the Good and the True and the Beautiful."

The authors of the periodical resided in Evanston, the suburban center of culture. Alfred L. Sewell, of the *Evanston Index*, was the publisher; Mrs. Emily Huntington Miller was the

editor; Miss Frances Willard was a contributor. The *Little Corporal* was not, however, a temperance or religious organ. Nor did it uphold any sectionalism as the only papers for children attempted in the prairie period had done. There had been two of these, one in each decade of that period. The first, a weekly attempted by Kiler K. Jones, who later founded the *Gem of the Prairie*, antedated all but two of the quasi-literary periodicals for adults started in Chicago's young days, being begun in May, 1843. A tattered copy of its last number, dated July 26, 1843, which is one of the Historical Society's curios, contains, besides the pioneer projector's farewell words to the effect that he had done his best at "editor, compositor, pressman, and devil's duty," the original prospectus. Its significant line is this: "The *Youth's Gazette*: devoted expressly to the interests of the youth of the West." The other early paper for children, begun at Chicago in 1853, and lasting only a short time, was christened the *Youth's Western Banner*. But in 1865 no western modifier was given to the name of the *Little Corporal*. In the nationalizing which marked the social process in the United States at the time, it was even easier to find common ground for the children than for older people, especially when the ground taken was the universal interest in story. The paper, a monthly in journal form, was filled with secular, juvenile literature, of the best quality.

The *Little Corporal* became permanent by accident. It was originally published for the United States Sanitary Commission in connection with a fair. But it proved to be so popular and successful that it was continued, enduring for an entire decade. It quickly attained a national circulation, being the first periodical from Chicago to secure wide attention, and the first juvenile in the country to be read by children everywhere. It was the forerunner of *St. Nicholas*, which magazine was established at New York during the *Little Corporal's* sixth year. From it the *Youth's Companion*, though established long before, in Boston, made adaptations which have promoted the popularity of that paper.

The enormous circulation of the *Little Corporal* is historic in the records of Chicago publishing. The first *American Newspaper Directory*, issued in 1869, by George P. Rowell & Co., New



York, rated it at 80,000. But in the recollections of Mr. Francis F. Browne, Mr. John McGovern, and others who were among its readers, the *Little Corporal* is credited with having reached a circulation of 100,000 in its first or second year.

This large circulation was unhappily the cause of its decline and cessation. The price of subscription for twelve monthly numbers was \$1, one of the first instances of low prices in publishing. But the thousands and thousands of subscribers added to Mr. Sewell's lists did not bring proportionate additions of thousands of dollars from advertisements. In periodical publishing the unit on which advertising rates are based is each 1,000 copies per issue. And for each of the added units of circulation the publisher must get additional revenue from his advertising pages, especially if he is publishing at popular prices. Mr. Sewell, with his long list of subscribers in hand, found himself ahead of the times. Advertising had not yet become extensive and the first source of success in business. The local firms which gave him advertising notices would pay only small sums; for they cared to reach but a part of his readers. With a small circulation these sums would bring a profit; but, after a certain point was reached, every copy demanded was printed at a loss. *Everybody's Magazine*, of New York, was threatened during the past year, on account of the increase in circulation caused by the Lawson articles on "Frenzied Finance," with a similar predicament, but could immediately raise the selling price per copy, and at the expiration of advertising contracts secure their renewal at a higher rate. Many a Chicago publisher since Mr. Sewell's day has sighed for such a circulation.

A squad of juvenile publications, in imitation of the *Little Corporal*, sprang into existence. Fifteen such were started between 1865 and 1871. Eight of these were not revived after the fire, and all except the *Little Corporal* and two others were very short-lived. *Little Folks*, begun in 1869, lasted until 1877. This was advertised as a monthly of "illustrated juvenile literature," but was sold for 30 cents a year. The *Young Folks' Monthly*, undertaken in 1870, continued until 1883. An advertisement in a newspaper annual for 1880 said it was "a live,

sparkling, illustrated magazine for boys and girls, and older people with young hearts, containing thirty-two pages of illustrations and reading matter best calculated to amuse and instruct the young." This advertisement, with its tone of commonness, has a meaning for this essay. It helps to show the range of interest people have in literary productions, from the classic to the common. In these juveniles we readily see one tendency toward the development of the "family-story" periodical—a type which not long after this period became well known to the printing trade.

Another part of this "family-story" line of specialization appeared in the periodicals for adults. Back in the prairie period some of the pioneer publishers of general literary-miscellany periodicals had called attention to the "family reading" in their columns, and had emphasized the special interest it had for families in homes on the farms. But in 1868 home papers with home titles made their first appearance. The *Home Eclectic* came out, and continued monthly until 1870, acquiring only a small constituency. The *Chicago Western Home* also was started, secured 20,000 subscribers by 1870, and disappeared in the disaster of 1871. In 1869, A. N. Kellogg, the inventor of "patent insides," the printed sheets sent to country newspapers for completion with local items, founded the *Evening Lamp*. This is a large co-operative newspaper, printed from the best plate-matter of the A. N. Kellogg Newspaper Co. It is filled with serials, stories, sketches, and miscellaneous matter of interest and of fair quality. It is sent out weekly to this day. Three other family fireside papers were started in time to be burned out by the fire.

Chicago's famous holocaust destroyed the files of some magazines and journals from the earlier period, and a majority of those originated after the war. Many periodicals lived only long enough for their names to be put into the newspaper directories published in New York and Philadelphia. This is true concerning not a few of the 306 in the bibliography of literary publications attempted in Chicago up to 1905, compiled during the course of investigation for these papers. The newspaper annuals are the one source of information about them. And at least one such directory for every year since the first was brought out, has been

consulted. These records are not altogether satisfactory on the point of duration. The founding dates which they contain are sometimes inaccurate. They do not give the dates of suspension. And often the name of a periodical and data concerning it have been repeated in the annuals for one or two years after its publication has ceased. But when no corrections from files or interested persons were obtainable, the first and last years of a publication's appearance in the directory lists have been taken for the statistics herein given. Andreas commented that for his *History of Chicago* (1884) it was occasionally impracticable to decide whether some of the publications announced "had assumed form or remained inchoate in the projectors" because the records in newspaper directories were inaccurate. He said it was impossible to get specific dates, the fire having destroyed printed evidence, and memories proving unreliable. Paul Selby, in preparing a section on "Defunct Newspapers and periodicals" for Moses and Kirkland's *History of Chicago* (1895), drew heavily on Andreas for the early period, and then devoted only a column and a half to the periodicals after 1857, saying: "The records of subsequent years are even more imperfect than the preceding." In no history of Chicago has the ground been covered. The *Inter-Ocean's History of Chicago, Its Men and Institutions* (1900), dismisses the subject with a brief paragraph stating that Chicago has made a number of attempts at high-grade literary magazines, but that "none has met with noteworthy success, probably owing to the fact that literature is not of a local character." A list of 107 newspapers and periodicals destroyed in the fire was compiled in 1872 by James W. Sheahan and George P. Upton, who complained that they had to depend solely on memory in getting it ready for their volume, *The Great Conflagration: Chicago, Its Past, Present, and Future*.

[To be continued]



INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY. XVII  
PART III, GENERAL STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY  
CHAPTER VII. THE SOCIAL FRONTIERS (CONTINUED)

SECTION VIII. THE DECLINE OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE AND THE FORMATION OF THE  
FEUDAL RÉGIME

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The Middle Ages are completely incomprehensible if one does not connect them with the whole evolution of Roman civilization of which they form the continued development. If the Christianity of the Orient and the barbarians of the North succeeded in their slow conquest of the Roman world, it was because this world was profoundly prepared for it, and had even arrived at an analogous result without their intervention. One may say that for all the peoples that had been included within the Roman Empire, as well in Asia and Africa as in Europe, the rural estate was until the end of the fifteenth century the foundation of social life, of its political organization, and notably of the establishment of frontiers. Commerce and industry had declined; gold and silver were withdrawn from circulation in order to be turned toward the Orient; all exchanges tended to be made in kind; and even within the rural estates production was carried on with a view to direct consumption upon the estate; even the public prestations were paid in kind: corvees, military service, etc. The great social inequalities arose from the soil; these inequalities, clad in military magnificence and invested with the authority of the courts of justice, formed the basis of the feudal system. This did not bind together the parts of one society alone, but of diverse collectivities; there was a hierarchy of states, just as there was a hierarchy within each of them. The feudal system at a certain period bound together the most diverse populations of several continents, although without their knowledge, into a really com-

mon organization, which was very striking, for example, in the case of the Mussulmans and the Christians at the time of the Crusades.

During almost all of this period political sovereignties were demesial properties which had their frontiers just as all estates have their boundaries; they expanded or shrunk like other estates through fraudulent or violent occupation, by purchase or sale, through marriage, inheritance, or partition. All the surplus of social superstructure modeled itself upon this demesial organization, as well as Christianity itself, whose primitive tendencies had been toward equality. External frontiers are always related to internal inequalities, upon which the principle of sovereignty in reality rests; they also represent existing inequalities between different societies. They arise or decline according to the establishment of regular and peaceful relationships, and they are restrained or developed as they prevent or favor the leveling of intersocial conditions and their integration into a common existence.

In the first century almost all the Christian churches were in the East, with the exception of those of Rome and Pozzuoli; the Jews figured in large numbers in them. Christianity, however, was not a unilateral development of Judaism, and as it grew it was augmented by the theological and philosophical tributaries of all the beliefs and doctrines which, relative to the existing conditions, were the best adapted to their environment. Already in the second century Christianity developed in Asia, in Greece, in Italy, and gained a foothold in Gaul and in Africa. In the third, it continued to spread where it had already been introduced, and it penetrated into Spain, especially into Batica, which was the part most Romanized; in the fourth, it established itself in the center of the Balkan peninsula.

In proportion as it spread it became definite and organized. At the Council of Carthage in 258 there were eighty-one bishops from Africa. About the year 400 there were bishops in every Roman province, and their bishoprics did not correspond with the divisions of the empire. About the year 324 the frontiers of the latter were crossed; there was a bishop of the Goths, and another of the Cimmeric Bosphorus. In short, the religious

frontiers tended to become independent of the internal administrative and governmental divisions, and to overstep the military and political frontiers of the empire. This, indeed, is evidence that there are other frontiers than the latter. I add that even religious or moral frontiers are not purely ideological, but imply a temporal constitution.

Like the Christian invasion, that of the barbarian peoples was slow, but irresistible. It was often and at first an obscure and apparently peaceful infiltration. Gradually they were admitted either as colonies, or as mercenaries with their chiefs. These chiefs ended by taking high military rank, and being charged with the defense of the empire against new invaders. In the fourth and fifth centuries the invasions became more violent; they harassed both the East and the West. Beginning with the end of the fifth century, the Visigoths made themselves masters of Spain and of Gaul; of the latter as far as the Loire, and of the former the whole except the region included between the Duero on the south and the ocean on the west, where the Suevi set up a kingdom. The kingdom of Burgundy included almost all of the basin of the Rhone, where, however, Provence was held by the Visigoths. It is seen that these new states were not bounded by rigorous physical frontiers. They embraced one or several basins and mountain regions.

The kingdom of the Franks extended from the ocean on the west to the lower course of the Rhine on the north, and along the whole middle basin of the Rhine on the east and of the upper Rhine on the southeast. Burgundy, to the south of the Frankish kingdom, occupied the sources of the Seine, of the Marne, and of the Meuse. One can therefore no longer say that these peoples occupied one or more basins which naturally confined them within these limits. Mountains, rivers, and basins may occasionally be adapted as frontiers, but only to the extent to which they may temporarily correspond to the internal state of the forces of a society relative to surrounding forces. The kingdom of the Franks included the mouths and the greater part of the basins of the Seine, the Scheldt, the Marne, the Meuse, the Moselle, and the Rhine.



The kingdom of the Ostrogoths extended over the whole of Italy as far as the Alps on the west, and the Danube on the north and the east, and included Noricum, Pannonia, and Dalmatia as far as Cattaro on the Adriatic. The Roman Empire no longer included anything but the peninsula south of the Danube, Asia Minor, Syria, Egypt, and the two Libyas. The rest of the north coast of Africa was held by the Vandals, with the Balearics, Corsica, and Sardinia. Where in all this are the natural frontiers? When the frontier chances to be represented by mountains and rivers, it is always temporarily, just as if it were a matter of simple guide-boards. And yet it will not occur to any sensible person to say that *it is the guide-board which makes the frontier*. Moreover, the boundaries of these newly constituted kingdoms, like those of the empire, were changing continually. In 526, at the death of Theodoric, the kingdom of the Visigoths was overthrown in Spain, but it continued to occupy Provençal Septimania, on the other side of the Pyrenees in Gaul. In Spain itself the kingdom of the Suevi extended the length of the mountains among the Cantabri and the Basques. The kingdom of Burgundy was slightly modified, but that of the Franks extended now from the Pyrenees northward, embracing, besides its former basins, those of the Garonne, the Dordogne and the Vienne. That of the Ostrogoths continued. All that one may conclude is the tendency in the West toward the establishment of three great states: Italy, Spain, and France; but neither mountains nor rivers formed their *a priori* boundaries. Spain retained, in geographical Gaul, Septimania, while Italy possessed, beyond the Alps, the lower valley of the Rhone, and also Rætia, Noricum, Pannonia, and Dalmatia; the Franks also held Alemannia.

This situation was an unstable one, by reason of the internal social constitution as well as of intersocial relations and conflicts. Thus, in the kingdom of the Franks, the German custom of division of the sovereignty among the sons of the king, either at or before his death, tended constantly to the destruction of political unity, without taking account of other peoples that would continue to disturb the map of the West — a map which was destined to be modified, independently of this consideration, by the fact that all

social equilibrium is by definition a living and unstable equilibrium.

The same continuous changes occurred in the Mediterranean world. Since 476 there had been no emperor at Rome; the Roman Empire of the East persisted. In 533 it reconquered Africa, Sardinia and Corsica, and the Balearics from the Vandals; in 535. Sicily and Dalmatia from the Ostrogoths; from 536 to 553 it regained the whole of the Italian peninsula, with the exception of the northern part of the old diocese of Italy, that is to say, Rætia, Noricum, and Pannonia. In 554 it had retaken all of the southeast of Spain from the Visigoths, and it extended beyond the Guadalquivir. It was a real offensive return of the old empire, but its center was at Byzantium, and the force of this return scarcely made itself felt in the West. At the accession of Justinian there were sixty-four provinces, grouped in six dioceses, which were again divided between two pretorian prefectures, that of Illyria and that of the East, the latter the more extensive. These divisions were neither ethnic nor geographical. After the reconquest of Africa, seven new provinces were established with one prefecture; after that of Italy, twelve provinces and one prefecture. Under these conditions, Justinian restored to Rome her old privileges; but peoples and regions were confused without regard to their ethnical affinities or to geographical regions. The true delimitations were of another sort; the civil and military powers were everywhere clearly separated; quite in contrast with the old imperial policy, the provinces might from this time become more extended, without this extension, thanks to the separation of powers, presenting any dangers.

However, in the administrative districts where the domination lacked complete stability, and especially in those bordering upon the frontiers, the two powers, civil and military, were reunited. This system was even extended at times to Italy and to Africa in case of necessity. It is always, in fact, upon the frontiers, where instability relative to internal forces is the greatest, that military force tends to appear. From here this military force tends also to impress its authoritative character upon the whole internal social structure, and even at times, as we see in the case

of the military marches, it is here that are formed the military centers of new states which at certain times become the centers for the formation of new military states.

Since at the frontiers the civil authority was confused with the military power, the boundary line was fortified. Garrisons and fortresses were increased upon the Danube as far as the sea, and behind this first defensive line six hundred strong places were put in a state of defense in Dardania, in Thrace, in Macedonia, in Epirus, and in Thessaly. The mountains and rivers were not, as a matter of fact, even military frontiers, except as they were defended, just as the sword does not become a weapon until it is taken in hand. Still farther toward the interior, the defiles of Thermopylæ, the isthmus of Corinth, the Chersonesus of Thrace, and the Crimea were barred by long walls. Already the emperor Anastasius had erected them from the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmora in order to defend Constantinople; and in Asia the same thing was done between Trebizond and the Euphrates; a long line of fortresses extended along the Persian frontier. Africa itself was covered with strongholds. It was not that rivers and mountains were lacking, but that they were ineffective as social frontiers, because they are not social nor even military frontiers. They are rendered secure only upon condition of being fortified; that is to say, by social, even merely military, frontiers. They are secured only by being fortified or crossed; and even then this is only from the military point of view, which itself is subject to all the fluctuations of other social forces from without and from within.

Thus true *military marches* were established; the commanders of these marches lacked only sovereignty, and even this was delegated to them. In the echeloned places of the *limes* bands of stationary *limitanei* held garrison; *ducs* were placed in authority over the guards of the marches, with *commanders of militia* at their head. Only with this difference from the period of the Roman Empire that the fortifications and garrisons were no longer solely at the extreme frontiers; the whole Byzantine Empire was covered with them. It was a sign of evident weakness; but it prevented neither the Slavs, nor the



Lombards, nor the Huns and other barbarians, from invading the empire either with violence or by means of concessions of lands.

On the other hand, the Christian church continued to spread and to become organized. It became centralized through the establishment of its hierarchy. From the middle of the fifth century it was divided into five provinces or patriarchates: Rome, Constantinople, Antioch, Jerusalem, Alexandria, besides the autonomous province of Cyprus. The boundaries of these divisions were modeled, at least in the East, upon the civil boundaries. The city had its bishops; the chief place of the province, its metropolitan; the patriarch was at the head of one or of several dioceses. Just as the temporal power was divided between the East and the West, so the bishop of Constantinople tended to become the pope of the Eastern church. The council of 381 had given him the first place after the bishop of Rome. In the sixth century he became ecumenical patriarch, in spite of the popes of Rome, who were sole patriarchs of the West.

Just as kingdoms were founded at the expense of the empire both at home and abroad, so too there were formed national churches in Ethiopia, in Persia, in Armenia, and in Iberia. These churches were, at the most, vassals of the patriarchs of Alexandria, of Antioch, and of Constantinople. The feudal hierarchy was thus organized within the bosom of the government of souls. The bonds of this hierarchy, like those of the temporal hierarchy, were weak or powerful according to circumstances. From the end of the fifth century the church of Persia inclined toward Nestorianism; that of Armenia, toward the Monophysite heresy.

In Gaul there existed a national church, with its vicariate at Arles. There was also the Celtic church of Bretagne and of Ireland. In reality, it was, as always, through adaptations and differentiations, which went sometimes to the point of schism and heresy, that Christianity developed. In the second half of the sixth century its domain extended as far as Nubia, as well as among the pagans of the Caucasus and the Black Sea. In the West the barbarians, Burgundians, Suevi, Visigoths, at first Arians, went over to Rome; the Lombards remained recalcitrant.

In the diocese of Africa the church struggled against the Donatists, and converted Tripolitana, Mauretania, and Sardinia. At the North it incorporated within itself the Anglo-Saxons and the Scots. It organized its less stationary or mobile militia. The principal phenomenon is that the frontiers of the church extended beyond those of any of the states of the period, and even beyond the limits of the old Roman Empire. Gregory the Great established the real primacy of the Roman church in the West—a primacy hitherto rather nominal than effective. At the same time, the temporal domain was extending; for just as the soul, in spite even of the doctrine of the church, is inseparable from the body and the power of matter, so there is no spiritual *sovereignty* without temporal sovereignty. That is possible only with doctrines which are not fitted to become social beliefs. The temporal sovereignty of the popes sprang naturally, like all sovereignty in its beginnings, from property. The popes had become the greatest landed proprietors in Italy at a period when land comprised the principal sort of wealth. Their domains, arranged in divisions designated by the name of *patrimones*, comprised each the total real property, *massae*, held in each province. The papacy thus had patrimones not only in Italy, but in Gaul, in Africa, and elsewhere. The different portions of each of these patrimones were occupied and cultivated by colonists attached to the soil; they were worked either directly or through tenants, but always under the direction and oversight of an ecclesiastical rector. At the time the pope was, it is true, still only a great proprietor, but nevertheless here lay the origin of his temporal power—an origin analogous to that of the temporal power of the feudal lords, which inversely became invested with a spiritual power such as that of the administration of justice.

From all that precedes, one may see perfectly that the formation of new states at this period, with their respective frontiers, was determined above all by the development of internal social conditions in correlation with external forces of the same character. Under feudalism and during the Middle Ages, the play of these forces was more complex than it perhaps had ever been. A given man might be vassal in one territory and paramount lord of

another, in regions which might even be far distant from one another and not bound together in any way; just as one may be the proprietor of lands which are not contiguous. The true hierarchical bond which set limits to social forces was the feudal contract; general frontiers and particular subdivisions were only the verification of these relations. These frontiers and these divisions of sovereignty, like those of property, took account, and were obliged to take account, of mountains, or rivers, or streams, only in so far as these coincided, to a greater or less degree, with kingdoms, principalities, or seigneurial domains; just as, in the case of present titles to property, one indicates its boundaries, which may be in a given case a stream, but which may also cross it.

It is no more astonishing to see the continuous changes of frontiers in the Germanic west, beginning with the sixth century, than it is to observe those which occur in private domains at all times. Political sovereignty always tends to approach economic sovereignty. At this time the latter rested upon the ownership of the soil. In 511 the four sons of Clovis divided the Frankish Empire among themselves as a hereditary domain. Aquitaine was made the subject of a special division among them, on account of the superior richness of its products. Likewise in 561, at the death of Clotaire the First, who had again become sole master of the empire, and had increased his patrimony by the addition of Burgundy and Provence, the inheritance was divided among his four sons. In this partition they took account of the *value* of the divisions, and not of their extent or geographical limits, which were secondary matters. One portion comprised all the south and west of present France (except Bretagne), with the basins of the Garonne, the Loire, and the Seine; another, the north and the west, with the whole basin of the Scheldt; the third, the basin of the Rhone; the last, those of the Meuse and the Rhine. These boundaries changed as the result of new deaths and partitions. The unity re-established in 613 was again broken up to make place, in 634, for two distinct kingdoms, the one of Austrasia, the other of Burgundy and Neustria. Each of the two kings, says Fredegarius, obtained "an equal number of subjects, and equal



territories." And by equal territories it is not necessary to understand equal areas, but rather equivalent areas; for otherwise the number of the subjects would not have been equal. In reality, in order to make the partition, they established a balance of social, and especially of economic, forces. These forces are the result of a combination of territory and of population. It was in accordance with this balance that the delimitation of the frontiers was traced.

Again, at the death of Charles Martel, in 741, the Frankish heritage was re-established in its unity, and was even increased by the addition of the duchies of Thuringia and Alemannia; and Bavaria and Frisia were rendered tributary. The Mussulmans had been completely driven out of Gaul. On the northwest the empire extended as far as the mouth of the Weser; on the south, to the Pyrenees and the Mediterranean; on the west, except for Bretagne, it touched the ocean; on the east it skirted the Saale, the Erzgebirge, and the Böhmerwald, and included the upper basin of the Danube, with the secondary basins of its southern tributaries. In 768 the empire was again divided. The first Carolingian kings scarcely took account of what we call nationalities, nor even of the great provincial divisions of Frankish Gaul. Austrasia and Aquitaine, for example, were divided into two zones of almost equal extent, with artificial frontiers. Far from being separations, they were destined to be reunited, from a strategical and political point of view, in such a way that a community of action was naturally imposed. Such was the spirit of the act by which Pepin himself determined the division between his two sons. Karlman having died in 771, the unity of the inheritance was reconstituted in favor of Charlemagne. For a time three great empires coexisted, and the evolution of each of them shows that no society is arrested, either in its extension or in its decline, by physical limits. Neither in an exclusively ethnic sense, nor in one exclusively geographical, are there natural frontiers, any more than there are natural laws. There are no laws but social laws, nor any frontiers but social frontiers.

At the death of Mahomet, in 632, the political and religious unity of the Arabian peninsula, shaken for a moment, had been

reconstituted by force. What admirable natural frontiers were those which constituted the geographical limits of this peninsula, with its largely homogeneous peoples!

And yet, shortly after the death of the prophet, the Arabs spread beyond the peninsula to the north, and, in spite of mountains, conquered Syria, and even Egypt and Persia, in spite of their rivers. The republic of Arab tribes became a great empire, at once religious and military. It was internal social conditions which brought about unity in the peninsula of its origin, and it was the same conditions which in their development provoked the Arab overflow of boundaries; but wherever it succeeded in spreading, it adapted itself to existing conditions by seeking in part their level; and when the inundation was stopped, it was because it had exhausted its own strength, and was, moreover, halted by other social forces which were more powerful relative to the state of civilization at that time. Successively, Africa, upper Asia, the isle of Cyprus, and Spain, with the exception of the mountainous part in the northwest, became subject to Mussulman domination. Septimania even was conquered in the eighth century, and the other islands of the Mediterranean during the two following centuries. Thenceforth the frontiers of the Mussulman world in Asia were, upon the east, the whole basin of the Indus and the mountains; upon the north, the Aral Sea and the Caspian Sea, and the Caucasus between the latter and the Black Sea; in Africa it included Egypt and the whole coast of the Mediterranean to a point beyond the Strait of Gibraltar; in Europe it overstepped the Pyrenees. The empire embraced the basins of the Indus, the Euphrates, the Tigris, the Amu Daria, the lower and middle Nile, and all the Spanish streams; it touched two oceans and dominated the Mediterranean upon the west, the east, and the south. Where shall we draw the natural frontiers of this empire? Where ought it to stop? To what point could it legitimately advance? Why did it end by being broken up politically and religiously? Why were distinct caliphates formed in Spain, in Maghreb, in Egypt, in Bagdad, with their distinct territorial divisions? Why, finally, from 870 to 874, were the Arabs and the Arabic tongue in Asia reduced to the same limits

as before Islam? It is evident that all these important changes can be interpreted only by means of internal and external social conditions, of which military conflicts are only the violent expression, and so-called political frontiers the result. A people has never been restored to its natural boundaries, any more than it has reached them during the period of its growth. It is, in fact, impossible to determine them. When the Turkish and Mongolian domination had begun in Asia, and after the Mongols in 1258 had overthrown the caliphate, the Arabs remained only in the Semitic countries, or in those formerly made Semitic by the Phœnicians.

The three great empires—Carolingian, Arab, and Byzantine—represented an unstable and momentary equilibrium, like all social and organic equilibria. The very causes which favored their formation led also to their dissolution. Any one of the three disappearing, the other two had no longer any *raison d'être*.

From 806, at the apogee of his power, Charlemagne determined upon the division of his empire after his death. It included regions simply tributary. At this time the empire extended beyond the Pyrenees as far as the Ebro; on the west it extended along the Atlantic, the English Channel, the North Sea, the Eider, and the Baltic Sea as far as the mouth of the Vistula, whose course bounded it on the northeast; from this point it was bounded on the east by the Tisza, and by the Narenta as far as the mouth of the latter stream on the Adriatic; on the south it included north and central Italy, and touched the Mediterranean coast of Gaul. Neither the Alps nor the Pyrenees served as its frontiers. As to rivers, it included the great fluvial basins of the Adour, the Po, the Garonne, the Loire, the Seine, the Somme, the Scheldt, the Meuse, the Rhine, the Ems, the Weser, and the Elbe, and, besides, the basin of the Dánube as far as the country of the Avars. A military march was established beyond the Pyrenees, where the empire was in direct contact with the Arab power.

At his death, in accordance with the act of partition, the empire was divided among his three sons; this could be done without danger at that time, or else it is probable either that the Germanic custom had been modified in regard to the right of primogeniture, or that, in the absence of this adaptation, the



empire, thus divided, had been in a state of inferiority as compared with its neighbor. One portion extended from the Ebro to the Loire and the Alps; the second, from the Loire to the Vistula at the south and at the north, as far as the Danube and the mountains of Rætia and of Neustria on the east, whence it commanded the valleys of Lombardy. The third, including its tributary countries, comprised Lombardy, the greater part of Bavaria, Alemannia to the south of the Danube with Rætia; in Italy it bordered upon the pontifical states which, extending from the Adriatic to the Mediterranean, separated Carolingian Italy from the duchies of Spoleto and Benevento—tributary states which were, however, rather inclined toward attaching themselves to the Empire of the East, which held Sicily and the southern part of the peninsula, as well as the coasts of Dalmatia, with their islands.

[*To be continued*]

## REVIEWS

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*Elements of Sociology.* By FRANK W. BLACKMAR, PH.D., Professor of Sociology and Economics in the University of Kansas. New York: The Macmillan Co.

The most essential thing in a book review is to see the point of view of the author and to make prominent the chief merit of his work.

The need which Professor Blackmar has attempted to meet in his *Elements of Sociology* is very evident from a mere glance at its table of contents. The outline, divisions, and general treatment of the subject are at once a comment upon former textbooks and an explanation of the appearance of a new one.

Professor Blackmar is aware of the fact, as other teachers of sociology must be, that there is an urgent demand for a textbook throughout the country. There are colleges in which the study of sociology has lagged for want of a suitable textbook, and other colleges which would have introduced the subject but for the same lack of a good book to begin with. Not only has the absence of a good textbook kept sociology out of the curriculums of many institutions, but has kept it out of favor among students where it has been taught. Only in universities where the resources render a textbook less necessary has sociology been able to make much headway.

This urgent need of a textbook does not imply that the books which have been heretofore used are of no value. *The Principles of Sociology* by Giddings contains subject-matter which cannot be omitted in any study of the fundamental principles of society, but it does not deal with many aspects of the subject with which the student should be made acquainted. Ward's textbook, while containing an admirable condensation of his own system of sociology, gives almost no information in regard to the ideas and points of view of other writers. *The Introduction to the Study of Society* by Small and Vincent has answered to the demand for a systematic and scientific plan for studying contemporaneous problems, but it does not now meet the need of students who wish to obtain a general view of the science up to date. Spencer's books on sociology are too large and expensive. And so none of the books thus far are free from serious objections as texts for beginners.

It is clear that Professor Blackmar proposed to write a book which would give a general view of both the theoretical and practical aspects of the science, and to make prominent the chief ideas of sociological writers to date.

Viewed in this light, the book is a success. It opens up the whole field of sociology, and, while keeping himself modestly in the background, the author attempts to give a fair and explicit presentation of the ideas of others.

The book has seven subdivisions: (1) "Nature and Import of Sociology;" (2) "Social Evolution;" (3) "Socialization and Social Control;" (4) "Social Ideals;" (5) "Social Pathology," dealing with practical subjects such as charity, poverty, crime, social degeneration; (6) "Methods of Investigation;" (7) "History of Sociology." It brings out the general views found in the works of Spencer, Gumpłowicz, Schaeffle, Lilienfeld, Mackenzie, Tarde, Le Bon, Letourneau, De Greef, Giddings, Small, Ward, Ross, Ely, Mill, Malthus, Warner, Henderson, etc.

The chief merit of the book from the theoretical side is that it gives an intelligent statement of the view-points of all the leading sociological writers. The chief merit from the practical side is that it touches upon a variety of vital and interesting problems in such a way as to tempt the student to go forward and specialize.

While it is not often easy to grasp the central idea and chief merit of a book, it is always easy to point out defects. The vast field which every book must leave uncovered gives the critic a wide range for fault-finding. In the present case the reviewer ventures to suggest that the book would have been stronger if it devoted more careful attention to Comte and Spencer. An outline of Comte's *Positive Philosophy*, and especially of his fine study of the evolution of society, would have added a few very valuable pages. More details might have been given showing Spencer's conclusions as to origins and as to the general laws governing the evolution of industry, the family, religion, etc. And some statement of the factors of society, such as Spencer gives in his first volume of *Principles of Sociology*, would have helped to indicate to the student the sources from which social laws are to be derived. The space devoted to Le Play does not seem proportionate to his contribution to sociology, as the whole modern habit of investigating actual conditions is largely the result of Le Play's example. In the discussion of crime some mention might have been made of Lombroso and the Positive



School to which he belongs. In the chapter on the "History of Sociology" it would have added to the clearness of the origin of sociology if the ideas of St. Simon and Turgot had been presented which Comte borrowed and used as the framework of his great philosophy.

Upon the whole, Professor Blackmar has the correct idea of a textbook, and the work which he offers to the public is likely to cause sociology to be introduced into many institutions, and to bring the study into more general favor among students.

The style of the book is easy, and free from any ambitious flights or phrasing, but clear and agreeable.

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*Evidence in Athenian Courts.* By ROBERT J. BONNER, PH.D.  
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1905. Pp. 98.

Generally speaking, the separation of court from jury, of the declarers of the law from the triers of the fact, has been a prerequisite to the growth of a law of evidence. Where the court passes upon the facts in issue, as is generally the case in the countries of continental Europe, and elsewhere where the law is based upon Roman law, no systems of evidence have been developed. There the court receives all the evidence offered, trusting its own power to avoid giving undue weight to matter of slight value, and to avoid being prejudiced by evidence likely to appeal to the emotions. English courts, however, early began to fear the discretion of the jury, and to exclude much evidence from its consideration *per doubt del lay gents*. This fear is largely responsible for our law of evidence. It would be surprising, therefore, to find that the Athenians had any detailed law of evidence. In their popular courts there was no separation of judge and jury. The court, composed of a great number of citizens, passed upon the entire case. It was more like a town-meeting than like either judge or jury. Mr. Bonner's monograph astonishes one more by the comparatively large amount of law on evidence that he seems to discover than by its paucity. In reading it the feeling that he has given at least full, and possibly too full, credit to his meager materials is constantly present.

The facts adduced to show that there was a rule against irrelevant evidence (p. 14) may be taken as typical. Such a fundamental rule should leave plain traces. Of course, the most common application

of it is the exclusion of matter foreign to the issue, but tending to prejudice the jury against a party. The evidence he relies on to establish the rule is as follows: protests by the orators against the *prevailing practice* of using it; arguments by them that going into side issues consumes too much time and is the resort of those who have bad cases; instances of parties refraining from answering irrelevant evidence given on the other side; apologies for introducing irrelevant matter; an understanding that speeches *ought* to be relevant; orders from the court to "stick to the main issue." The only real indication of a rule is that parties speaking in the Areopagus had to take oath to confine themselves to the record. In the other courts that was not required. Is it not rather plain that the limitations on irrelevancy were merely such as any body, a town-meeting for example, would place upon its speakers, rather than a hard and fast legal rule? The former was to be expected; the latter would be surprising.

The evidence of a rule permitting one to refuse incriminating himself (p. 43) is slight indeed. An advocate, who apparently has prepared a deposition for a witness, writes him that the so-called deposition is carefully composed and will not subject him to legal liability, danger, or disgrace. Does it appear from this that the witness could not be compelled to testify if such results would follow? The advocate may well have been merely stating the care he had taken in preparing the deposition, or he may have been inducing a reluctant witness to testify without compulsion.

Even the evidence of a rule against hearsay, which it is said (p. 20) "was expressly forbidden by law," is not convincing. Isæus says it is right to testify to things one was present at, that to testify to others is hearsay. Demosthenes says that the laws forbid hearsay. But in none of these cases was it excluded. Perhaps all Demosthenes meant was that one could be punished for palming off hearsay knowledge on the court as first-hand knowledge. Mr. Bonner tells us (p. 20) that such a fraud on the court was punishable. But that would be far from excluding hearsay when frankly offered as such.

In some places Mr. Bonner's statement of the English law is not absolutely accurate. It is hardly true that "*any* inducement being held out by anyone in authority" (p. 29) makes a confession of crime inadmissible. The common law rules concerning incompetency (p. 27) are neither fully nor accurately stated. Religious belief and sanity as qualifications, for example, are not mentioned. But Mr.

Bonner was not investigating nor writing a treatise on our law of evidence. Slight inaccuracies as to it may be pardoned.

One or two odd things may be mentioned. It seems that in criminal cases in the Areopagus a witness could not testify to important facts of which he had knowledge, unless he knew whether the accused was guilty or innocent and would first testify to that (pp. 15, 17). If a witness testified falsely, he was punished for the perjury. But he could make an oath disclaiming knowledge, and though this was wilfully false, he was not punished (p. 43). The evidence of this, however, is remarkably slight. Cross-examination was unknown (p. 20). Omens and dreams were admissible evidence (p. 19). The gratitude of the jury for past good deeds of the defendant was appealed to, as was also their cupidity for further financial benefits to the state which might arise from leniency (p. 13).

Mr. Bonner seems to have exhausted his sources, both original and secondary. He has shown acuteness in his deductions. The only real doubt as to his conclusions arises from the fear that he was overzealous in his search for a body of law on evidence in Athens.

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*Modern Methods of Charity.* By CHARLES RICHMOND HENDERSON, assisted by others. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1904. Pp. 715. \$3.50 net.

We learn our lessons of charity at vast expenditure of substance and of energy. We waste ourselves in experiments. We attack the bubbles which rise to the surface, and fail to dig deep for the nucleus of decay whence the bubbles come. We harm where we would help. The astronomer can calculate to a second the occurrence of an eclipse a hundred years away. The chemist can reduce a rock to its elements and determine the presence of each in its exact proportion. But no such certainty is possible in the vaguely defined territory which we call the "field of charity." In charity we are dependent on experience. The greater the variety and volume of experience at our back, the nearer we approach to sure-handed performance. Therefore any means by which the experiences and methods of others may be placed at our service, in convenient and usable form, saves us the time and labor necessary to obtain the experience for



ourselves. It also gives us the benefit of the differing points of view of others engaged upon problems similar to ours.

Perhaps no writer has done more than Dr. Henderson in gathering up the scattered and unarticulated results of experience in charity, and placing them before us in concise, simple form. Several years ago appeared his admirable book; *Dependents, Defectives and Delinquents*, which has become a widely used textbook. Later was published his summary of the writings of Dr. Thomas Chalmers, in which is given the gist of that eminent man's conclusions after many years of study and work among the poor. This in turn was followed by *Modern Prison Systems*. But the task which Dr. Henderson has undertaken in *Modern Methods of Charity* far surpasses that involved in the preparation of any of his books previously published. The work is monumental, both in the vast amount of labor required in collecting, sifting, and condensing material, and in the magnitude of the object intended to be accomplished. This object is nothing less than the description, in convenient form, of the methods and organization of public and private charity today in the more important countries of Europe and America. To each country is devoted a chapter, introduced by a brief historical sketch, showing the successive steps which have marked the development of charity, as general intelligence has increased and industrial and social conditions have changed. This prepares us to understand the present-day laws, methods, and point of view.

The book is encyclopedic, concrete. It is not a discussion of principles, but a record of experiences and a statement of methods based on lessons of experience. It is not philosophy, it is not theory; but it is a foundation upon which theory and philosophy may be erected. It is the product of the hardest and most tedious delving, searching, translating, comparing, and verifying. As it is a pioneer, it has lacked the help which predecessors, however incomplete, would have given. It has broken new paths which will not have to be broken again. The courage and patient industry which the book represents compel admiration.

Naturally there are errors. It is scarce conceivable that the reducing, sorting, and editing of the huge volume of material drawn from hundreds of widely scattered sources could produce a flawless result. That the work was performed by several persons, differing in experience, point of view, and judgment, accounts for some unevenness in clearness and in the value of examples selected as

illustrations. Here and there sources of information were not the latest accessible, and descriptions which would have been true a number of years ago were not accurate at the time they were written. Illustrations are not always representative or typical. Small experiments of unproved value, in a few instances, are set down as though they bore the seal of general acceptance.

It is worth noting that, at best, such a publication as this cannot remain accurate as an up-to-date statement of facts. It is no sooner off the press than it begins to fall behind the times. New laws are enacted, new ideas put into practice and old discarded. The entire body of charitable effort throughout the world is in a state of flux, and a picture of it at any moment must be a "snapshot," differing in countless details from any preceding or subsequent picture. This obvious fact is mentioned because it tends to minimize the importance of most of the errors which have found place in the book. That all the information in its 715 pages is not brought down to precisely the same date line will seem a smaller mistake with each succeeding year. When we cease trying to make the descriptions in the book fit minutely the comparatively unimportant details of the institutions about us, and come to regard the publication as a comprehensive picture of the charitable activities of the world at the beginning of the twentieth century, we shall appreciate better than now how faithfully, in all important aspects, the great task has been accomplished.

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*Our Own Times: A Continuous History of the Twentieth Century.* Edited by HAZLITT ALVA CUPPY, and a Board of Special Editors. Vol. I, by BONNISTER MERWIN. New York: J. A. Hill & Co. Pp. xv + 453.

The central idea of the enterprise of which this volume is the first fruit may be described as a design to do year by year what Dr. Albert Shaw does month by month in his comments upon current events in the *Review of Reviews*. As the publishers' announcement suggests, the perspective of a single year may turn out to be different from that of a century; and it is equally true that a year will change the assortment of things worth remarking from month to month. Accordingly a volume made by binding together the most sagacious

monthly surveys of a year's events would not displace this history. Even if there were no variations from the general plan of the monthly review, the wider outlook of a year would necessarily reconstruct the material.

The present work is novel, however, in more than its plan of reporting a single year at a time. It has its own classification of the events to be reported. It assumes a theorem about the relative value of historical occurrences, and about the relations in which the events recorded may most profitably be presented. It is an adventure in the making of history upon a sociological presumption, virtually new to historians. That premise is that the instruction to be gained from general history would be most available if the facts were told, not nationally, but in their relations to civilization in general; and, further, that the facts may be assembled most advantageously around four principal human interests, viz.: first, man's interest in *controlling* himself and his surroundings; second, his interest in *learning* more about himself and his surroundings; third, his interest in *improving* himself and his surroundings; fourth, his interest in *enjoying* the beautiful.

Nothing has occurred to shake my belief that the best division of human interests for ordinary purposes is the sixfold grouping—health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty, and rightness. The first three are the chief forms of objective appropriation of the life-conditions; the second three, the subjective forms. While it would be easy to give reasons for preferring this classification to Dr. Cuppy's, his scheme is such an evident improvement upon the conventional historical categories, and it serves so well in arranging the memorable achievements of the year to which the classification is applied, that it would savor of hypercriticism to press the issue.

The present volume is devoted to the year 1901. To indicate most directly the scope of the book, we quote the chapter titles, viz.: "The Keynote of the New Century," "The New American Possessions," "The Trend of National Energies," "The South African War," "The Chinese Problem," "The International Web," "The Year's Legislation," "Conflicting National Elements," "Political Changes," "The Work of the Explorer," "Achievements in Science," "The Work of the Inventor," "The War against Disease," "Religion," "Education," "Miscellaneous Social Changes," "Books and Plays," "Art and Music." An appendix of thirty-eight pages contains: "The Year of Sports," "The Nobel Prizes," "Prominent



Persons Who Died in 1901," "General Statistics," "Financial Statistics," "Railroad Mileage," "Corn and Wheat Crops," "Armaments of the Nations," "Immigration into the United States," "Religious Statistics." There are good maps (*a*) of the Philippine Islands; (*b*) of central and southern Africa; (*c*) of China, Japan, and Korea. There are fifty-three illustrations, nearly all full-page, and the majority of them excellent pictures of persons prominent during the year 1901. The editor had the assistance of sixteen men named as "The Advisory Council." But for a single circumstance, I should say without hesitation that the advice of these men must have increased the value of the book.

It is safe to say that if we had a census of the people who do now or ever will take an interest in the year 1901, we should have the exact number of persons who would feel able to point out inclusions of the less worthy and omissions of the more worthy. I have not yet been able to examine the volume carefully enough to make out my own bill of particulars. Whether I am able later to locate important over- or under-sights, I am satisfied that the history must be accepted on demand as a sheer necessity for everybody who has occasion to refer to recent events. I cannot see how any editorial office, except of the patent-inside variety, can do without it. I already feel toward it very much as I do toward the index that changed my pamphlets from rubbish to equipment. That every reference library must have the series goes without saying. Dr. Cuppy should have the hearty gratitude of every literary worker.

A. W. S.

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*A Modern Utopia.* By H. G. WELLS. Pp. xii + 393. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$1.50 net.

The visible use of utopias is to make readers temporarily forget their present grievances, and contemplate the program of revolt which they would promote if the imaginary conditions were realized. Nothing is more obnoxious to present human nature than a presumption of social conditions fixed beyond chance of change.

Mr. Wells hardly reckons on being understood as having completed plans and specifications of a perfect world. Like most utopists, he has indicated a series of modifications which in his opinion would increase the aggregate of human happiness. Since tastes differ, it is always an open question whether the result in practice would increase

or diminish satisfaction. Few of us would deny that there is room for improvement in the management of hotels, but we are not all agreed that the use of a single language would be either cause or effect of wholly desirable social conditions. Few of us would deny that the people of the world should get together in a thousand ways not at present practicable. Not many of us can entertain without a shudder the thought of actually averaging ourselves in a mechanical federation of the world. We all believe in improving governmental efficiency. Most of us would prefer a régime of drum-head courts to a reign of such priggism as the officials in Mr. Wells's picture exhibit. As a rhetorical device for getting attention for social theorems that would attract no notice in the abstract, utopias may still be available. We can discover nothing in this sample, however, that goes beyond good-natured satire of conditions which none would be so poor as to defend.

A. W. S.

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*The Labor Movement in America.* By RICHARD T. ELY. New Edition, revised and enlarged. New York: The Macmillan Co. Pp. xvi + 399.

Although this book is nearly twenty years old, it is still timely, and it is to be hoped that the author will be able to carry out his purpose of enlarging its scope, and bringing the history down to date. At present we have no book that could be a satisfactory substitute for Professor Ely's volume.

A. W. S.

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## NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

**A Sociological View of Taxation.**— There are three points from which to view taxation— financial, economic, sociological. The latter is most comprehensive, so much so that we may get guidance from the laws of nature. Looking, then, to natural laws, we find that energy is taxed; every living being must exert energy to secure food and sustenance. The law of nature is: Diminish taxation as ability increases; the law of economics is: Increase taxation as ability increases. The lower we descend the scale of life, the greater is the proportion which nature's tax bears to the entire energy of the individual. It is the same in the human race, no matter whether the individuals are free or restricted. As the standard of ability rises, the individual units exert a greater modifying effect on this law; the higher the order, the greater the voluntary effort exerted by the strong for the weak. This modification of nature's law or nature's system of taxation renders the subject before us complex.

The question is how much shall we superiors tax our energies for our wasteful inferiors? What shall we expect in return for such tax? What is the object of giving support to the useless members of society? Of course, "faith, charity, and humanity," are answers.

In generosity economists believe perhaps the weak and inferiors are subjects of the existing system of government. What kind of government interference is desirable? Professor A. W. Flux points out two fallacies: first, thinking what benefits the individual will benefit the whole community—it may be an injury to the community; second, that the individual will always devote himself to what is best for him; he does not always know what is best for him. Now, why should the government concern itself with the welfare of those incapable of judging their own best interests? Because humane, and because "state outlay is a part of the consumption of society, of which the state is the regulating organ." The state is justified in providing for requirements by means of taxation. Sociological inquiry wants to know the nature of those requirements, in order to promote the greatest social and evolutionary advancement. Now, on what principle should our system of taxation be based?

The source of all prosperity is power to produce "productive goods." We go beyond this to seek the principle by which the energies may be directed, through taxation, so as to secure control and increase that control over the forces of nature. We call this "giving-power," which means not only power to produce productive goods, but also such an application of energy as to increase its own self. Each individual should conserve to himself an average giving-power, and an average giving-power to increase the community. Our system of taxation should encourage mutual helpfulness by conserving the energy of those making personal sacrifice for all, and also diminish the energy of those consuming without return.

Present taxation is not synonymous with voluntary sacrifice; it implies compulsion. Professor Bastable's definition is "a compulsory contribution of the wealth of a person for the service of the public powers." Parting with ill-got gain is not a sacrifice proportional to parting with the physical necessities of the wage-earner. To define the sociological ideal of taxation, the word "energy" must be substituted for the word "wealth" in Professor Bastable's definition. To make a willing sacrifice of giving-power for a tax would make a complete change in our social system.

Ethical considerations introduced into taxation make a paradox. But the problem is not what the individual should do or be made to do, but what the state should do in the matter of taxation. The sociological solution is: the state should make the individual conserve giving-power. The state should make the individual save the energy so easily wasted, then collect a tax in accordance with ability. The best way to impress the unconscious wasters of evolutionary power is through



taxation. Taxation would then serve two purposes: first, secure revenue; second, direct the energies of the people most profitably.

Glance at some of our taxes in the light of these principles. The income tax is not according to ability; the same may be said of the tax on wasting securities. The "estate duties" cause much hardship. Rates fall hard on persons with large families. These taxes serve the first purpose, but not the second purpose of taxation. These taxes diminish the demand for labor; direct and indirect taxes finally cause wages to fall.

We would not want a tax solely on the rich. Taxation, to be productive, must draw on the resources of the middle and working classes; such taxes would represent energy. It is bad economy to take in taxes, energy which could more profitably be employed by individuals than by the state so long as energy unproductively applied by individuals still remains available to the state.

If we tax unproductive luxuries in every part of the world, and leave untaxed the necessities, including those things needed for their production, this will set free a large amount of land and labor to produce the necessities. Don't let the amount of land and labor released by taxation exceed the amount needed for the demand of necessities; then the wages paid on producing the necessities will never fall below the amount needed to purchase necessities.

Under existing conditions, the objections to this system are: (1) It does not follow that all available labor would be employed. (2) A country not able to produce enough necessities must give luxuries. (3) The natural demand for necessities is always greater than the economic demand, and always exceeds the supply. None of the objections are insuperable.

To establish a just system of taxation providing for the welfare of all the people, the government should be open to employ all free labor; also acquire land on which to produce the necessities of life for those in need, and tax the luxuries to provide this. As it is, we have free education for children too hungry to learn. The prosperity of the nation does not seem to improve the condition of the unskilled laborer, but does increase the earnings of the skilled. Many earn just enough to keep alive, not enough to keep in full vigor of mind and body. This is a waste of giving-power. Society must make provision for bodily sustenance to attain the highest efficiency. This can be done through the government taxing the surplus energy. Each member must also be fully nourished; this can be derived from the energy, taxed by scientific government distribution.

This is the elementary principle that should underlie scientific taxation.—Walter Howgrave, in *Westminster Review*, September, 1905.

S. E. W. B.

**The Ethics of Marriage and Divorce.**—Marriage is essentially neither a religious nor a civil institution, but a purely biological one. Marriage is a creature neither of the church nor of the state; it antedates them both. Marriage created both. The Decalogue and common law simply recognize it. The law has been content to leave it as found, but the church has done what she could to make it unnatural and intolerable. While the church deserves great credit for insisting on the "sanctity," her contempt for reason has led to an insistence on its irrevocability to the extent of disaster to both morals and happiness. The contention of the church to make marriage for life is admirable, but to insist on the irrevocability of the tie, and on divorced persons not marrying, is absurd.

Consider the origin of marriage and its existence among the races. Looking backward, primitive man, although with promiscuous proclivities, is monogamous. The anthropoid ape is monogamous—probably for life; also the higher monkeys and lemurs. Monogamy is the condition among almost all pure savages.

The condition of the marriage tie among savages may be roughly stated thus: It is loose monogamy, lasting at least during child-bearing and in a majority of cases for life. As the tribes rise in the scale, they accumulate property and have need of help; this gives occasion for slavery and polygamy. It is safe to say that a large majority of barbaric tribes permit and indulge in polygamy to a certain extent.

The advantages of polygamy are these: (1) the successful man forms influential relationships through marriages; (2) it increases his influence on the make-up

of the next generation; (3) it means an imposing household. Its disadvantages are these: (1) it destroys paternal training of the young; (2) the quality of offspring deteriorates; (3) the management in the polygamous household devolves on slaves; (4) when the head of a polygamous family dies, there is complete disruption and no head to succeed. There is small possibility of the development of noted families.

Polyandry seems to offer no advantage to the race, yet it is practiced.

Our study of the origin and growth of marriage leads us to feelings of the profoundest respect and confidence toward monogamy. Its bindings are just as strong on evolutionary grounds as on legal or ecclesiastical. Its prevalence rests on the decree of no prince or pope, but upon inherent superiority. This evolutionary sanction is not low nor selfish; it looks to the interests of no man or woman, but to those of the children, i. e., the race. Biology declares as a guide to probable racial suitability of a mate, sexual instinct, ennobled by generations of monogamy; marriage should be "for love." Moreover, on biological grounds we would hesitate to dissolve a union, suitable and fit in racial respects, on any personal grounds, or imaginary loss of affection.

Thus far evolutionary ethics stand shoulder to shoulder with the law and the church; but here they part. Holding that unions should be for life, or till the children are trained and sent into the world, and that only for grave reasons should they be dissolved, we have no sympathy for the churchly fanaticism declaring that divorces are always evil and that the divorced should never marry. We claim that divorce is not yet easy enough. Conditions where epilepsy, insanity, etc., are discovered are enough for the marital relations to be immoral. Adultery on the part of the woman is recognized by the church as ground for divorce. This is as far as the church goes. The law goes farther, recognizing most of the biological demands for dissolution of the tie. But this avails little, especially for the woman, who is the most frequent sufferer, so long as the antiquated standards of the clergy control society. The divorced woman is looked upon as disgraced. There is another point where the liberty of the woman is limited, i. e., the problem of support for herself and children. A decree of alimony is of little value save where property can be seized.

Many a woman is living with a brutal husband, bearing children with his vicious traits, because she knows not where to turn for the necessities of life. The church urges her to "save" the soul of the "brute," but any woman who knowingly bears a child to a drunken or criminal husband is herself committing a crime against the state.

We have funds for taking care of the bastard and orphan, but practically none for the support of legitimate children of noble mothers who need protection against vicious fathers.

Many are the ecclesiastical shrieks against the increase in divorces, but one-half now obtained are evening up old scores of ten to twenty years of legal outrage and ecclesiasticism. Over 70 per cent. of divorces are on the ground of cruel treatment. Two-thirds of the divorces are on grounds valid for biological and racial reasons. The increase in divorces is a benefit, not an evil. The proportion of divorces to marriages is 12 per cent. Can any other institution of church or state show a record of 88 per cent. success? There is no need for fear so long as the limit is 20 to 25 per cent. The law or ceremony no more holds people together than varnish holds furniture together. If all marriages were declared off, within forty-eight hours eight-tenths would be remarried, and seven-tenths could not be kept apart by bayonets.—Woods Hutchinson, in *Contemporary Review*, September, 1905. S. E. W. B.

**Regulation of Home-Shop Production.**—The legislation in France which regulates the industries makes no mention of the home shop; the legislator has not felt it his right to enter the private domicile. Only two conditions give the inspector the right to enter: (1) the use of a motor machine, and (2) unsanitary conditions. Farther than this, there are no restrictions on such production.

By the centralization of industry, it is the single laborer, the artisan, not the home shop, which has suffered. The latter is constantly increasing. Its progress



constitutes a systematic effort at decentralization. The small electric motor favors this form of labor, and decreases the superiority of the shop over the home.

The legislature of 1892 was too lenient when it made this form of production an exception to the regulations then passed. Students of sociology and hygiene have spoken against home production, not so much because of the principle as because it offers such favorable opportunities for exploiting the labor of children, for overworking and underpaying laborers, etc. Now the protection of children is guaranteed by the school and health laws, if they are properly enforced. The sweating system is that which stands in greatest need of remedy.

Some, especially socialistic writers, have demanded the entire suppression of such centers of labor. That would be unjust; for to many it is more agreeable and more productive than shop labor. It is neither possible nor desirable to prohibit. Should it, then, be regulated? Attempts have been made so to do, but the right of private domicile stands in the way and would have to be revised first.

But many shops can be regulated, as it is. Every employer who uses a laborer, not a member of his own family, converts his home shop into one that comes under all the regulations of the larger shops. By requiring lists of all those employed by any one patron, and their addresses, the inspector of labor can trace their identity.

Why restrict the regulation to *motor machines*? This has been asked by many. Some have said that it is unnecessary, for most of those who carry on home labor have not the resources to provide such a machine; and even if they have, it cannot be installed without requiring a separate shop, in which case they come at once under proper regulation. But these people forget about the electric motor, which is neither noisy, dangerous, nor unhandy. A little motor fastened to the wall appears less a machine than an ornament. The installation of such a machine as this becomes the signal for inspectors to enter. But out of 380,000 home shops in 1896, only 164 had motors, and these were, of course, among those who left least to be desired in the conditions of production; and thus the sweat-shop evil is not reached.

Justice and logic demand the same: neither to neglect all regulation of the home shop, nor to throw it into the same class as all others. A practical question presents itself in the difficulty of tabulating and visiting all these home shops; it will require a great increase in the force, and a corresponding increase of expense. Again, we must come to some decision about the private family life. Anyone who employs others than his family lays himself open to inspection; but where the family life and the shop life are really one, what is to be done? The inspector should be empowered to enter at all hours of the day and night, in order that he may really accomplish his end. It would seem impossible to reduce the work in the family to a régime, as is done in the shop; thus regulations for overwork are difficult; and where a laborer works for several employers, which is to be held responsible for abuses, the laborer or the employers; and if the latter, which of them?

Exorbitant in principle, vexatious in application, the regulation of family labor would be lacking in results. Any regulation under the present view of the case would be a dead letter, a simple declaration of principle, a pure form devoid of imperative virtue and paralyzed by lack of sanction.—J. Cavaillé, "Faut-il réglementer le travail des ateliers de famille?" *Revue politique et parlementaire*, September, 1905. D. E. T.

**Legal Status of Labor Unions in The United States.**—Down to the time of the Revolution, any banding together of laborers in this country for the purpose of bettering their conditions was considered by the common law opposed to the common well-being and a conspiracy against the limitations on trades and business, and anyone who took part in the same was punishable. A single laborer might refuse to perform a given piece of work under given specifications; but when two or more combined for any purpose of benefit to themselves, they were guilty. Since the Revolution, seldom have such unions been called in question. At the present time, only the motives of violence, intimidation, and fraud can prevent men from combining to accomplish their purposes. Several of the states have



passed laws expressly regulating such unions; others have taken legal measures to limit and protect them, and to grant to them special privileges. In most states their legal rights as corporations are defined, and Congress, by an act of June 29, 1886, defined "national trades-unions," requiring that such corporations should have their headquarters in the District of Columbia.

All states grant the right of peaceable assembly, the general limitation on all such gatherings being the motive of violence to the rights of others, or transgression of the law concerning mobs and conspiracies. The right of any man to labor or employ labor must not be interfered with. If a state has no law on this point, any emergency is met by the right of injunction.

Strikes are fully permissible, if they are voluntary co-operations of persons for the purpose of bettering their conditions, or of changing the existing status by proper means; they are unlawful, if they have a purpose of evil. An organization may call out its workers, unless some special form of contract exist, even though it do great harm to the business of the employer; provided only that some violence to the employer is not intended. The strike would then become a conspiracy.

Nine states have special laws forbidding locomotive engineers wilfully to abandon their engines except at the regular destination; also forbidding anyone or any body of persons to intimidate, impede, or obstruct, except by due course of law, the regular business of any railroad.

It is unlawful to use force or violence to compel a laborer either to quit work or to join a union. Many states make it a punishable offense for a union or an individual to intimidate an employer or a laborer, with the purpose of hindering the undertaking or carrying out of a proper task. Here again the right of injunction may be used, if the case demands it.

The practice of "picketing," within certain determined limits, is forbidden by national and state laws, and violation permits injunction.

Nearly all the states have passed laws permitting unions to use special labels or trade-marks to distinguish their products, and forbidding other persons and unions to imitate them. In five states it is unlawful for anyone falsely to exhibit the insignia of any union, and in some states this applies more specifically to railway employees.

Most of the states have laws to the effect that it is a misdemeanor for any employer of labor to coerce a laborer into a contract not to join a union, as a condition of being employed. Some states also indirectly protect labor unions by legislation against trusts; others have passed laws favoring the employment of union men in the prosecution of public works.

A hopeful sign for labor-unionism is the fact that it is being granted an increasingly large representation in the settlement of disputes. Labor laws are still in a stage of experiment. Legislators have been unsympathetic, and courts have had a tendency to feel that there was something inherently wrong in labor combinations for the purpose of raising wages and upholding the laborers' rights.—J. H. Ralston, "Die Rechtslage der Gewerkvereine in den Vereinigten Staaten," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, September, 1905.

D. E. T.

**Physical Deterioration in England.**—Among the unhappy surprises that have come to Great Britain in this beginning of a new century, one is the result of a careful and conscientious study of the physical and moral condition of the lower classes in the cities. Sir Walter Besant and Mr. R. H. Sherard have vividly described the conditions in which the people of the manufacturing districts are born, live, and die. The man who has every comfort of life is totally without knowledge of such terrible suffering, and of the fact that it is growing gradually worse.

The military department has also made a statement that for some years it has been compelled to turn away from 40 to 60 per cent. of its applicants because of failure in the physical examinations. Driven by such cries of dissatisfaction, the government instituted a commission to investigate physical conditions, to note tendencies, and to determine, so far as possible, whether they are permanent or accidental.

This commission notes first of all the very general phenomenon—the exodus to the cities. In 1850, 50 per cent. of the people lived in the country; now only 23 per cent. The movement is still going on, for these strong tillers of the soil find ready employment in places where great strength is required.

But it is startling to learn that 30 per cent. of the entire population of London live in extreme poverty; and not only in London, for of at least 25 per cent. of the population of Manchester and York, and the other large cities, can the same be said. This means that one-fourth of the people are unable to find means of recuperation, and must deteriorate.

What are some of the causes? The commission mentions, first, insufficient salaries. These laborers move about, and almost all of them are married. Add to this, sickness in the family, enforced idleness, etc., and it is easy to see that, to keep within the slender support, the size of the family must be reduced, or suffering results. We must remember, however, that about 10 per cent. of the population are morally unable to rise above poverty. A second cause is a false aristocracy, which leads people, even of the lower classes, to imitate higher classes, and thus to live far beyond their slender means. Especially are the women wasteful, when compared with those of other nations. Third, a seeming democracy, which has kept the lower classes from revolting and claiming their rights. Fourth, inferior food. Instead of ale and beef, they use poor pork and tea. This point is strongly emphasized by the commission. People try to satisfy their present hunger without any thought of recuperating their physical forces. Parents are very neglectful of the welfare of their children.

The outcome of this investigation is not all pessimism. The death-rate is decreasing, and England's population is still doubling every sixty years. The human body has a wonderful recuperative power, and uncalculated resistance and endurance.

The tendency noted is not necessarily a permanent one. The investigation has brought to light facts that will arouse; the evils are not incurable, now that they are known.—Robert Savary, "La détérioration physique du peuple anglais (à propos d'une enquête récente)," *Annales des sciences politiques*, September, 1905.

D. E. T.

**The Gist of Marxism.**—Karl Marx established the science of political life. It is the science of collective action, of social life considered as a "process." There is no such thing as individualism; present society is not individualistic. The rights of the individual are sacrificed; there is something higher in present society than the individual. Society is collective; it is managed for a collectivity, i. e., a property class called the capitalistic class. Today fealty to this collectivity is the essence of religion, ethics, and patriotism.

This is the discovery made by Marx. Its importance is seen from the outcry against it. Marx took another step, explaining how classes are formed out of industrial conditions. The issue is not socialism versus individualism. Both are forms of collective life. Marx's discovery has called into existence a number of new words, e. g.: "classism," "classal," "class-interests," "class-consciousness."

In civil life classes have no formal existence in law; i. e., none on paper. In political life classes exist in fact. They are parties. Some say they are a necessary evil; Marx says they are a necessary good; the sacrifice of individual interests for party welfare is the noblest sacrifice. So long as classes exist, no other ethics is possible save partisanship or class fealty.

There is a form of ethics higher than partisanship; that is, under socialism, where all classes and parties merge into the totality. Sacrifice of individual interests will then be, not for a class or for a party, but for the totality. Then individual sacrifice will lose its altruistic character and become self-interest. Then collectivism and individualism will be merged into each other; but never can they be under classism. This is the gist of Marxism.—Marcus Hitch, in *International Socialist Review*, October 1, 1905.

S. E. W. B.

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## THE SOCIOLOGY OF SECRECY AND OF SECRET SOCIETIES<sup>1</sup>

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Berlin

All relationships of people to each other rest, as a matter of course, upon the precondition that they know something about each other. The merchant knows that his correspondent wants to buy at the lowest price and to sell at the highest price. The teacher knows that he may credit to the pupil a certain quality and quantity of information. Within each social stratum the individual knows approximately what measure of culture he has to presuppose in each other individual. In all relationships of a personally differentiated sort there develop, as we may affirm with obvious reservations, intensity and shading in the degree in which each unit reveals himself to the other through word and deed. How much error and sheer prejudice may lurk in all this knowing is immaterial. Just as our apprehension of external nature, along with its elusions and its inaccuracies, still attains that degree of truth which is essential for the life and progress of our species, so each knows the other with whom he has to do, in a rough and ready way, to the degree necessary in order that the needed kinds of intercourse may proceed. That we shall know with whom we have to do, is the first precondition of having anything to do with another. The customary reciprocal presenta-

<sup>1</sup>Translated by Albion W. Small.



tion, in the case of any somewhat protracted conversation, or in the case of contact upon the same social plane, although at first sight an empty form, is an excellent symbol of that reciprocal apprehension which is the presumption of every social relationship. The fact is variously concealed from consciousness, because, in the case of a very large number of relationships, only the quite typical tendencies and qualities need to be reciprocally recognized. Their necessity is usually observed only when they happen to be wanted. It would be a profitable scientific labor to investigate the sort and degree of reciprocal apprehension which is needed for the various relationships between human beings. It would be worth while to know how the general psychological presumptions with which each approaches each are interwoven with the special experiences with reference to the individual who is in juxtaposition with us; how in many ranges of association the reciprocal apprehension does or does not need to be equal, or may or may not be permitted to be equal; how conventional relationships are determined in their development only through that reciprocal or unilateral knowledge developing with reference to the other party. The investigation should finally proceed in the opposite direction; that is, it should inquire how our objectively psychological picture of others is influenced by the real relationships of practice and of sentiment between us. This latter problem by no means has reference to falsification. On the contrary, in a quite legitimate fashion, the theoretical conception of a given individual varies with the standpoint from which it is formed, which standpoint is given by the total relationship of the knower to the known. Since one never can absolutely know another, as this would mean knowledge of every particular thought and feeling; since we must rather form a conception of a personal unity out of the fragments of another person in which alone he is accessible to us, the unity so formed necessarily depends upon that portion of the other which our standpoint toward him permits us to see. These differences, however, by no means spring merely from differences in the quantity of the apprehension. No psychological knowledge is a mere mechanical echo of its object. It is

rather, like knowledge of external nature, dependent upon the forms that the knowing mind brings to it, and in which it takes up the data. When we are concerned with apprehension of individual by individual, these forms are individually differentiated in a very high degree. They do not arrive at the scientific generality and supersubjective conclusiveness which are attainable in our knowledge of external nature, and of the typically individual psychic processes. If A has a different conception of M from that of B, this does not necessarily mean incompleteness or deception. On the contrary, the personality of A and the total circumstances of his relation to M being what they are, his picture of M is for him true, while for B a picture differing somewhat in its content may likewise be true. It is by no means correct to say that, over and above these two pictures, there is the objectively correct apprehension of M, by which the two are to be corrected according to the measure of their agreement with it. Rather is the ideal truth which, to be sure, the actual picture of M in the conception of A approaches only asymptotically, that is as ideal, something different from that of B. It contains, as integrating organizing precondition, the psychical peculiarity of A and the special relationship into which A and M are brought, by virtue of their characteristics and their fortunes. Every relationship between persons causes a picture of each to take form in the mind of the other, and this picture evidently is in reciprocal relationship with that personal relationship. While this latter constitutes the presupposition, on the basis of which the conceptions each of the other take shape so and so, and with reference to which these conceptions possess actual truth for the given case, on the other hand the actual reciprocity of the individuals is based upon the picture which they derive of each other. Here we have one of the deep circuits of the intellectual life, inasmuch as one element presupposes a second, but the second presupposes the first. While this is a fallacy within narrow ranges, and thus makes the whole involved intellectual process unreliable, in more general and fundamental application it is the unavoidable expression of the unity in which these two elements coalesce, and which cannot be expressed in our forms of thought except as a building

of the first upon the second, and at the same time of the second upon the first. Accordingly, our situations develop themselves upon the basis of a reciprocal knowledge of each other, and this knowledge upon the basis of actual situations, both inextricably interwoven, and, through their alternations within the reciprocal sociological process, designating the latter as one of the points at which reality and idea make their mysterious unity empirically perceptible.

In the presence of the total reality upon which our conduct is founded, our knowledge is characterized by peculiar limitations and aberrations. We cannot say in principle that "error is life and knowledge is death," because a being involved in persistent errors would continually act wide of the purpose, and would thus inevitably perish. At the same time, in view of our accidental and defective adaptations to our life-conditions, there is no doubt that we cherish not only so much truth, but also so much nescience, and attain to so much error as is useful for our practical purposes. We may call to mind in this connection the vast sums of human knowledge that modify human life, which, however, are overlooked or disregarded if the total cultural situation does not make these modifications possible and useful. At the other extreme, we may refer to the *Lebenslüge* of the individual, so often in need of illusion as to his powers and even as to his feelings, of superstition with reference to God as well as men, in order to sustain himself in his being and in his potentialities. In this psycho-biological respect error is co-ordinated with truth. The utilities of the external, as of the subjective, life provide that we get from the one as well as from the other precisely that which constitutes the basis of the conduct which is essential for us. Of course, this proposition holds only in the large, and with a wide latitude for variations and defective adaptations.

But there is within the sphere of objective knowledge, where there is room for truth and illusion, a definite segment in which both truth and illusion may take on a character nowhere else observed. The subjective, internal facts of the person with whom we are in contact present this area of knowledge. Our fellow-man either may voluntarily reveal to us the truth about himself,



or by dissimulation he may deceive us as to the truth. No other object of knowledge can thus of its own initiative, either enlighten us with reference to itself or conceal itself, as a human being can. No other knowable object modifies its conduct from consideration of its being understood or misunderstood. This modification does not, of course, take place throughout the whole range of human relations. In many ways our fellow-man is also in principle only like a fragment of nature, which our apprehension, so to speak, holds fast in its grasp. In many respects, however, the situation is different, and our fellow-man of his own motion gives forth truth or error with reference to himself. Every lie, whatever its content, is in its essential nature a promotion of error with reference to the mendacious subject; for the lie consists in the fact that the liar conceals from the person to whom the idea is conveyed the true conception which he possesses. The specific nature of the lie is not exhausted in the fact that the person to whom the lie is told has a false conception of the fact. This is a detail in common with simple error. The additional trait is that the person deceived is held in misconception about the true intention of the person who tells the lie. Veracity and mendacity are thus of the most far-reaching significance for the relations of persons with each other. Sociological structures are most characteristically differentiated by the measure of mendacity that is operative in them. To begin with, in very simple relationships a lie is much more harmless for the persistence of the group than in complex associations. Primitive man, living in communities of restricted extent, providing for his needs by his own production or by direct co-operation, limiting his spiritual interests to personal experience or to simple tradition, surveys and controls the material of his existence more easily and completely than the man of higher culture. In the latter case life rests upon a thousand presuppositions which the individual can never trace back to their origins, and verify; but which he must accept upon faith and belief. In a much wider degree than people are accustomed to realize, modern civilized life—from the economic system which is constantly becoming more and more a credit-economy,

to the pursuit of science, in which the majority of investigators must use countless results obtained by others, and not directly subject to verification—depends upon faith in the honor of others. We rest our most serious decisions upon a complicated system of conceptions, the majority of which presuppose confidence that we have not been deceived. Hence prevarication in modern circumstances becomes something much more devastating, something placing the foundations of life much more in jeopardy, than was earlier the case. If lying appeared today among us as a sin as permissible as among the Greek divinities, the Hebrew patriarchs, or the South Sea Islanders; if the extreme severity of the moral law did not veto it, the progressive upbuilding of modern life would be simply impossible, since modern life is, in a much wider than the economic sense, a "credit-economy." This relationship of the times recurs in the case of differences of other dimensions. The farther third persons are located from the center of our personality, the easier can we adjust ourselves practically, but also subjectively, to their lack of integrity. On the other hand, if the few persons in our immediate environment lie to us, life becomes intolerable. This banality must, nevertheless, be brought out to view, because it shows that the ratios of truthfulness and mendacity, which are reconcilable with the continuance of situations, form a scale that registers the ratios of the intensity of these relationships.

In addition to this relative sociological permissibility of lying in primitive conditions, we must observe a positive utility of the same. In cases where the first organization, stratification, and centralization of the group are in question, the process is accomplished by means of subjection of the weaker to the physically and mentally superior. The lie that succeeds—that is, which is not seen through—is without doubt a means of bringing mental superiority to expression, and of enabling it to guide and subordinate less crafty minds. It is a spiritual fist-law, equally brutal, but occasionally quite as much in place, as the physical species; for instance, as a selective agency for the breeding of intelligence; as a means of enabling a certain few, for whom others must labor, to secure leisure for production of the higher

cultural good; or in order to furnish a means of leadership for the group forces. The more these purposes are accomplished by means which have fewer disagreeable consequences, the less is lying necessary, and the more room is made for consciousness of its ethical unworthiness. This process is by no means completed. The small trader still thinks that he cannot dispense with a certain amount of mendacious recommendations of his wares, and he acts accordingly without compunctions of conscience. Wholesale and retail trade on a large scale have passed this stadium, and they are accordingly able to act in accordance with complete integrity in marketing their goods. So soon as the methods of doing business among small traders, and those of the middle class, have reached a similar degree of perfection, the exaggerations and actual falsifications, in advertising and recommending goods, which are today in general not resented in those kinds of business, will fall under the same ethical condemnation which is now passed in the business circles just referred to. Commerce built upon integrity will be in general the more advantageous within a group, in the degree in which the welfare of the many rather than that of the few sets the group standard. For those who are deceived—that is, those placed at a disadvantage by the lie—will always be in the majority as compared with the liar who gets his advantage from the lie. Consequently that enlightenment which aims at elimination of the element of deception from social life is always of a democratic character.

Human intercourse rests normally upon the condition that the mode of thought among the persons associated has certain common characteristics; in other words, that objective spiritual contents constitute the common material, which is developed in its individual phases in the course of social contacts. The type and the most essential vehicle of this community of spiritual content is common language. If we look a little closer, however, the common basis here referred to consists by no means exclusively of that which all equally know, or, in a particular case, of that which the one accepts as the spiritual content of the other; but this factor is shot through by another, viz., knowledge which the one associate possesses, while the other does not. If there were



such a thing as complete reciprocal transparency, the relationships of human beings to each other would be modified in a quite unimaginable fashion. The dualism of human nature, by reason of which every manifestation of it has its sources in numerous origins that may be far distant from each other, and every quantity is estimated at the same time as great or small, according as it is contemplated in connection with littleness or greatness, makes it necessary to think of sociological relationships in general dualistically; that is, concord, harmony, mutuality, which count as the socializing forces proper, must be interrupted by distance, competition, repulsion, in order to produce the actual configuration of society. The strenuous organizing forms which appear to be the real constructors of society, or to construct society as such, must be continually disturbed, unbalanced, and detached by individualistic and irregular forces, in order that their reaction and development may gain vitality by alternate concession and resistance. Relationships of an intimate character, the formal vehicle of which is psycho-physical proximity, lose the charm, and even the content, of their intimacy, unless the proximity includes, at the same time and alternately, distance and intermission. Finally — and this is the matter with which we are now concerned — the reciprocal knowledge, which is the positive condition of social relationships, is not the sole condition. On the contrary, such as those relationships are, they actually presuppose also a certain nescience, a ratio, that is immeasurably variable to be sure, of reciprocal concealment. The lie is only a very rude form, in the last analysis often quite self-contradictory, in which this necessity comes to the surface. However frequently lying breaks up a social situation, yet, so long as it existed, a lie may have been an integrating element of its constitution. We must take care not to be misled, by the ethically negative value of lying, into error about the direct positive sociological significance of untruthfulness, as it appears in shaping certain concrete situations. Moreover, lying in connection with the elementary sociological fact here in question — viz., the limitation of the knowledge of one associate by another — is only one of the possible means, the positive and aggressive technique, so to speak, the purpose of which in general

is obtained through sheer secrecy and concealment. The following discussion has to do with these more general and negative forms. Before we come to the question of secrecy as consciously willed concealment, we should notice in what various degrees different circumstances involve disregard of reciprocal knowledge by the members of associations. Among those combinations which involve some degree of direct reciprocity on the part of their members, those which are organized for a special purpose are first in eliminating this element of reciprocal knowledge. Among these purposeful organizations, which in principle still involve direct reciprocity, the extreme in the present particular is represented by those in which utterly objective performances of the members are in view. This situation is best typified by the cases in which the contribution of so much cash represents the participation of the individuals in the activities of the group. In such instances reciprocity, coherence, and common pursuit of the purpose by no means rest upon psychological knowledge of the one member by the others. As member of the group the individual is exclusively the agent of a definite performance; and whatever individual motive may impel him to this activity, or whatever may be the total characteristics of his conduct as a whole, is in this connection a matter of complete indifference. The organization for a special purpose (*Zweckverband*) is the peculiarly discreet sociological formation; its members are in psychological respects anonymous; and, in order to form the combination, they need to know of each other only *that* they form it. Modern culture is constantly growing more objective. Its tissues grow more and more out of impersonal energies, and absorb less and less the subjective entirety of the individual. In this respect the hand laborer and the factory laborer furnish the antithesis which illustrates the difference between past and present social structure. This objective character impresses itself also upon sociological structure, so that combinations into which formerly the entire and individual person entered, and which consequently demanded reciprocal knowledge beyond the immediate content of the relationship, are now founded exclusively on this content in its pure objectivity.

By virtue of the situation just noticed, that antecedent or consequent form of knowledge with reference to an individual—viz., confidence in him, evidently one of the most important synthetic forces within society—gains a peculiar evolution. Confidence, as the hypothesis of future conduct, which is sure enough to become the basis of practical action, is, as hypothesis, a mediate condition between knowing and not knowing another person. The possession of full knowledge does away with the need of trusting, while complete absence of knowledge makes trust evidently impossible.<sup>1</sup> Whatever quantities of knowing and not knowing must commingle, in order to make possible the detailed practical decision based upon confidence, will be determined by the historic epoch, the ranges of interests, and the individuals. The objectification of culture referred to above has sharply differentiated the amounts of knowing and not knowing essential as the condition of confidence. The modern merchant who enters into a transaction with another, the scholar who undertakes an investigation with another, the leader of a political party who makes an agreement with the leader of another party with reference to an election, or the handling of a proposed bill—all these.

<sup>1</sup> There is, to be sure, still another type of confidence, which our present discussion has nothing to do with, since it is a type that falls outside the bounds either of knowing or not knowing. It is the type which we call faith of one person in another. It belongs in the category of religious faith. Just as no one has ever believed in the existence of God on grounds of proof, but these proofs are rather subsequent justifications or intellectual reflections of a quite immediate attitude of the affections; so we have faith in another person, although this faith may not be able to justify itself by proofs of the worthiness of the person, and it may even exist in spite of proofs of his unworthiness. This confidence, this subjective attitude of unreservedness toward a person, is not brought into existence by experiences or by hypotheses, but it is a primary attitude of the soul with respect to another. This condition of faith, in a perfectly pure form, detached from every sort of empirical consideration, probably occurs only within the sphere of religion. In order that it may be exercised toward men it probably always needs a stimulus or a sanction from the knowledge or the inference above referred to. On the other hand, it is probable that in those social forms of confidence, however exact or intellectually sanctioned they may seem to be, an element of that sentimental and even mystical "faith" of man toward man is hidden. Perhaps the type of attitude here indicated is a fundamental category of human conduct, resting back upon the metaphysical meaning of our relationship, and realized only empirically, accidentally, and partially through the special conscious grounds of confidence.



with exceptions and modifications that need not be further indicated, know, with reference to their associates, precisely what it is necessary to know for the purposes of the relationship in question. The traditions and institutions, the force of public opinion, and the circumscription of the situation, which unavoidably prejudice the individual, are so fixed and reliable that one only needs to know certain externalities with reference to the other in order to have the confidence necessary for the associated action. The basis of personal qualities, from which in principle a modification of attitude within the relationship could spring, is eliminated from consideration. The motivation and the regulation of this conduct has become so much a matter of an impersonal program that it is no longer influenced by that basis, and confidence no longer depends upon knowledge of that individual element. In more primitive, less differentiated relationships, knowledge of one's associates was much more necessary in personal respects, and much less in respect to their purely objective reliability. Both factors belong together. In order that, in case of lack in the latter respect, the necessary confidence may be produced, there is need of a much higher degree of knowledge of the former sort.

That purely general objective knowledge of a person, beyond which everything that is strictly individual in his personality may remain a secret to his associates, must be considerably reinforced in the knowledge of the latter, whenever the organization for a specific purpose to which they belong possesses an essential significance for the total existence of its members. The merchant who sells grain or oil to another needs to know only whether the latter is good for the price. The moment, however, that he associates another with himself as a partner, he must not merely know his standing as to financial assets, and certain quite general qualities of his make-up, but he must see through him very thoroughly as a personality; he must know his moral standards, his degree of companionability, his daring or prudent temperament; and upon reciprocal knowledge of that sort must depend not merely the formation of the relationship, but its entire continuance, the daily associated actions, the division of functions between the partners,

etc. The secret of personality is in such a case sociologically more restricted. On account of the extent to which the common interest is dependent upon the personal quality of the associates, no extensive self-existence is in these circumstances permitted to the personality of the individual.

Beyond the organizations for distinct purposes, but in like manner beyond the relationships rooted in the total personality, stands the relationship, highly significant sociologically, which is called, in the higher strata of culture, "acquaintance." That persons are "acquainted" with each other signifies in this sense by no means that they know each other reciprocally; that is, that they have insight into that which is peculiarly personal in the individuality. It means only that each has, so to speak, taken notice of the existence of the other. As a rule, the notion of acquaintanceship in this sense is associated only with mere mentioning of the name, the "presentation." Knowledge of the *that*, not of the *what*, of the personality distinguishes the "acquaintanceship." In the very assertion that one is acquainted with a given person, or even well acquainted with him, one indicates very distinctly the absence of really intimate relationships. In such case one knows of the other only his external characteristics. These may be only those that are on exhibit in social functions, or they may be merely those that the other chooses to exhibit to us. The grade of acquaintanceship denoted by the phrase "well acquainted with another" refers at the same time not to the essential characteristics of the other, not to that which is most important in his inmost nature, but only to that which is characteristic in the aspect presented to the world. On that account, acquaintanceship in this polite sense is the peculiar seat of "discretion." This attitude consists by no means merely in respect for the secret of the other — that is, for his direct volition to conceal from us this or that. It consists rather in restraining ourselves from acquaintance with all of those facts in the conditions of another which he does not positively reveal. In this instance the particulars in question are not in principle distinctly defined as forbidden territory. The reference is rather to that quite general reserve due to the total personality of another, and

to a special form of the typical antithesis of the imperatives; viz.: what is not forbidden is permitted, and, what is not permitted is forbidden. Accordingly, the relationships of men are differentiated by the question of knowledge with reference to each other: what is not concealed may be known, and what is not revealed may yet not be known. The last determination corresponds to the otherwise effective consciousness that an ideal sphere surrounds every human being, different in various directions and toward different persons; a sphere varying in extent, into which one may not venture to penetrate without disturbing the personal value of the individual. Honor locates such an area. Language indicates very nicely an invasion of this sort by such phrases as "coming too near" (*zu nahe treten*). The radius of that sphere, so to speak, marks the distance which a stranger may not cross without infringing upon another's honor. Another sphere of like form corresponds to that which we designate as the "significance" (*Bedeutung*) of another personality. Towards the "significant" man there exists an inner compulsion to keep one's distance. Even in somewhat intimate relationships with him this constraint does not disappear without some special occasion; and it is absent only in the case of those who are unable to appreciate the "significance." Accordingly, that zone of separation does not exist for the valet, because for him there is no "hero." This, however, is the fault, not of the hero, but of the valet. Furthermore, all intrusiveness is bound up with evident lack of sensitiveness for the scale of significance among people. Whoever is intrusive toward a significant personality does not, as it might superficially appear, rate that person high or too high; but on the contrary, he gives evidence of lacking capacity for appropriate respect. As the painter often emphasizes the significance of one figure in a picture that includes many persons, by grouping the rest at a considerable distance from the important figure, so there is a sociological parallel in the significance of distance, which holds another outside of a definite sphere filled by the personality with its power, its will, and its greatness. A similar circuit, although quite different in value, surrounds the man in the setting of his affairs and



his qualities. To penetrate this circuit by curiosity is a violation of his personality. As material property is at the same time an extension of the ego—property is precisely that which obeys the will of the possessor, as, in merely graduated difference, the body is our first “property” (*Besitz*)—and as on that account every invasion of this possession is resented as a violation of the personality; so there is a spiritual private property, to invade which signifies violation of the ego at its center. Discretion is nothing other than the sense of justice with respect to the sphere of the intimate contents of life. Of course, this sense is various in its extension in connection with different personalities, just as the sense of honor and of personal property has a quite different radius with reference to the persons in one’s immediate circle from that which it has toward strangers and indifferent persons. In the case of the above-mentioned social relationships in the narrower sense, as most simply expressed in the term “acquaintanceship,” we have to do immediately with a quite typical boundary, beyond which perhaps no guarded secrets lie; with reference to which, however, the outside party, in the observance of conventional discretion, does not obtrude by questions or otherwise.

The question where this boundary lies is, even in principle, by no means easy to answer. It leads rather into the finest meshes of social forms. The right of that spiritual private property just referred to can no more be affirmed in the absolute sense than that of material property. We know that in higher societies the latter, with reference to the three essential sides, creation, security, and productiveness, never rests merely upon the personal agency of the individual. It depends also upon the conditions and powers of the social environment; and consequently its limitations, whether through the prohibitions that affect the mode of acquiring property, or through taxation, are from the beginning the right of the whole. This right, however, has a still deeper basis than the principle of service and counter-service between society and the individual. That basis is the much more elementary one, that the part must subject itself to so much limitation of its self-sufficiency as is demanded by the existence and purposes of the whole. The same principle applies to the

subjective sphere of personality. In the interest of association, and of social coherence, each must know certain things with reference to the other; and this other has not the right to resist this knowledge from the moral standpoint, and to demand the discretion of the other; that is, the undisturbed possession of his being and consciousness, in cases in which discretion would prejudice social interests. The business man who enters into a contractual obligation with another, covering a long future; the master who engages a servant; and, on the other hand, this latter, before he agrees to the servile relationship; the superintendent who is responsible for the promotion of a subordinate; the head of a household who admits a new personality into her social circle—all these must have the right to trace out or to combine everything with reference to the past or the present of the other parties in question, with reference to their temperament, and their moral make-up, that would have any relation to the conclusion or the rejection of the proposed relationship. These are quite rough cases in which the beauty of discretion—that is, of refraining from knowledge of everything which the other party does not voluntarily reveal to us—must yield to the demands of practical necessity. But in finer and less simple form, in fragmentary passages of association and in unuttered revelations, all commerce of men with each other rests upon the condition that each knows something more of the other than the latter voluntarily reveals to him; and in many respects this is of a sort the knowledge of which, if possible, would have been prevented by the party so revealed. While this, judged as an individual affair, may count as indiscretion, although in the social sense it is necessary as a condition for the existing closeness and vitality of the interchange, yet the legal boundary of this invasion upon the spiritual private property of another is extremely difficult to draw. In general, men credit themselves with the right to know everything which, without application of external illegal means, through purely psychological observation and reflection, it is possible to ascertain. In point of fact, however, indiscretion exercised in this way may be quite as violent, and morally quite as unjustifiable, as listening at keyholes and prying into the letters of

strangers. To anyone with fine psychological perceptions, men betray themselves and their inmost thoughts and characteristics in countless fashions, not only in spite of efforts not to do so, but often for the very reason that they anxiously attempt to guard themselves. The greedy spying upon every unguarded word; the boring persistence of inquiry as to the meaning of every slight action, or tone of voice; what may be inferred from such and such expressions; what the blush at the mention of a given name may betray—all this does not overstep the boundary of external discretion; it is entirely the labor of one's own mind, and therefore apparently within the unquestionable rights of the agent. This is all the more the case, since such misuse of psychological superiority often occurs as a purely involuntary procedure. Very often it is impossible for us to restrain our interpretation of another, our theory of his subjective characteristics and intentions. However positively an honorable person may forbid himself to practice such cogitation with reference to the unrevealed traits of another, and such exploiting of his lack of foresight and defenselessness, a knowing process often goes on with reference to another so automatically, its result often presents itself so suddenly and unavoidably, that the best intention can do nothing to prevent it. Where the unquestionably forbidden may thus be so unavoidable, the division line between the permitted and the non-permitted is the more indefinite. To what extent discretion must restrain itself from mental handling "of all that which is its own," to what extent the interests of intercourse, the reciprocal interdependence of the members of the same group, limits this duty of discretion—this is a question for the answer to which neither moral tact, nor survey of the objective relationships and their demands, can alone be sufficient, since both factors must rather always work together. The nicety and complexity of this question throw it back in a much higher degree upon the responsibility of the individual for decision, without final recourse to any authoritative general norm, than is the case in connection with a question of private property in the material sense.

In contrast with this preliminary form, or this attachment of secrecy, in which not the attitude of the person keeping the secret,



but that of a third party, is in question, in which, in view of the mixture of reciprocal knowledge or lack of knowledge, the emphasis is on the amount of the former rather than on that of the latter—in contrast with this, we come to an entirely new variation; that is, in those relationships which do not, like those already referred to, center around definitely circumscribed interests; but in relationships which, at least in their essential idea, rest upon the whole extension of the personalities concerned. The principal types in this category are friendship and marriage. The ideal of friendship that has come down from antique tradition, and singularly enough has been developed directly in the romantic sense, aims at absolute spiritual confidence, with the attachment that material possession also shall be a resource common to the friends. This entrance of the entire undivided ego into the relationship may be the more plausible in friendship than in love, for the reason that, in the case of friendship, the one-sided concentration upon a single element is lacking, which is present in the other case on account of the sensuous factor in love. To be sure, through the circumstance that in the totality of possible grounds of attachment one assumes the headship, a certain organization of the relationship occurs, as is the case in a group with recognized leadership. A single strong factor of coherence often blazes out the path along which the others, otherwise likely to have remained latent, follow; and undeniably in the case of most men, sexual love opens the doors of the total personality widest; indeed, in the case of not a few, sexuality is the sole form in which they can give their whole ego; just as, in the case of the artist, the form of his art, whatever it may be, furnishes the only possibility of presenting his entire nature. This is to be observed with special frequency among women—to be sure, the same thing is to be asserted in the case of the quite different “Christian love”—namely, that they not only, because they love, devote their life and fortune without reserve; but that this at the same time is chemically dissolved in love, and only and entirely in its coloring, form, and temperature flows over upon the other. On the other hand, however, where the feeling of love is not expansive enough,

where the other contents of the soul are not flexible enough, it may take place, as I indicated, that the predominance of the erotic nexus may suppress not only the practically moral, but also the spiritual, contacts that are outside of the erotic group. Consequently friendship, in which this intensity, but also this inequality of devotion, is lacking, may more easily attach the whole person to the whole person, may more easily break up the reserves of the soul, not indeed by so impulsive a process, but throughout a wider area and during a longer succession. This complete intimacy of confidence probably becomes, with the changing differentiation of men, more and more difficult. Perhaps the modern man has too much to conceal to make a friendship in the ancient sense possible; perhaps personalities also, except in very early years, are too peculiarly individualized for the complete reciprocity of understanding, to which always so much divination and productive phantasy are essential. It appears that, for this reason, the modern type of feeling inclines more to differentiated friendships; that is, to those which have their territory only upon one side of the personality at a time, and in which the rest of the personality plays no part. Thus a quite special type of friendship emerges. For our problem, namely, the degree of intrusion or of reserve within the friendly relationship, this type is of the highest significance. These differentiated friendships, which bind us to one man from the side of sympathy, to another from the side of intellectual community, to a third on account of religious impulses, to a fourth because of common experiences, present, in connection with the problem of discretion, or self-revelation and self-concealment, a quite peculiar synthesis. They demand that the friends reciprocally refrain from obtruding themselves into the range of interests and feelings not included in the special relationship in each case. Failure to observe this condition would seriously disturb reciprocal understanding. But the relationship thus bounded and circumscribed by discretion nevertheless has its sources at the center of the whole personality, in spite of the fact that it expresses itself only in a single segment of its periphery. It leads ideally toward the same depths of sentiment, and to the

same capacity to sacrifice, which undifferentiated epochs and persons associate only with a community of the total circumference of life, with no question about reserves and discretions.

Much more difficult is measurement of self-revelation and reserve, with their correlates intrusiveness and discretion, in the case of marriage. In this relationship these forms are among the universal problems of the highest importance for the sociology of intimate associations. We are confronted with the questions, whether the maximum of reciprocity is attained in a relationship in which the personalities entirely resign to each other their separate existence, or quite the contrary, through a certain reserve — whether they do not in a certain qualitative way belong to each other more if they belong to each other less quantitatively. These questions of ratio can of course, at the outset, be answered only with the further question: How is the boundary to be drawn, within the whole area of a person's potential communicability, at which ultimately the reserve and the respect of another are to begin? The advantage of modern marriage — which, to be sure, makes both questions answerable only one case at a time — is that this boundary is not from the start determined, as was the case in earlier civilizations. In these other civilizations marriage is, in principle, as a rule, not an erotic phenomenon, but merely a social-economic institution. The satisfaction of the instincts of love is only accidentally connected with it. With certain exceptions, the marriage is not on grounds of individual attraction, but rather of family policy, labor relationships, or desire for descendants. The Greeks, for example, carried this institution to the most extreme differentiation. Thus Demosthenes said: "We have *hetaerae* for our pleasure, concubines for our daily needs, but wives to give us lawful children and to care for the interior of the house." The same tendency to exclude from the community of marriage, *a priori*, certain defined life-contents, and by means of super-individual provisions, appears in the variations in the forms of marriage to be found in one and the same people, with possibility of choice in advance on the part of those contracting marriages. These forms are differentiated in various ways with reference to the economic, religious, legal,



and other interests connected with the family. We might cite many nature-peoples, the Indians, the Romans, etc. No one will, of course, fail to observe that, also within modern life, marriage is, probably in the majority of cases, contracted from conventional or material motives; nevertheless, entirely apart from the frequency of its realization, the sociological idea of modern marriage is the community of all life-contents, in so far as they immediately, and through their effects, determine the value and the destiny of the personalities. Moreover, the prejudice of this ideal demand is by no means ineffective. It has often enough given place and stimulus for developing an originally very incomplete reciprocity into an increasingly comprehensive attachment. But, while the very indeterminateness of this process is the vehicle of the happiness and the essential vitality of the relationship, its reversal usually brings severe disappointments. If, for example, absolute unity is from the beginning anticipated, if demand and satisfaction recognize no sort of reserve, not even that which for all fine and deep natures must always remain in the hidden recesses of the soul, although they may think they open themselves entirely to each other—in such cases the reaction and disillusionment must come sooner or later.

In marriage, as in free relationships of analogous types, the temptation is very natural to open oneself to the other at the outset without limit; to abandon the last reserve of the soul equally with those of the body, and thus to lose oneself completely in another. This, however, usually threatens the future of the relationship. Only those people can without danger give themselves entirely to each other who *cannot possibly* give themselves entirely, because the wealth of their soul rests in constant progressive development, which follows every devotion immediately with the growth of new treasures. Complete devotion is safe only in the case of those people who have an inexhaustible fund of latent spiritual riches, and therefore can no more alienate them in a single confidence than a tree can give up the fruits of next year by letting go what it produces at the present moment. The case is quite different, however, with those people who, so to speak, draw from their capital all their betrayals of feeling and

the revelations of their inner life; in whose case there is no further source from which to derive those elements which should not be revealed, and which are not to be disjoined from the essential ego. In such cases it is highly probable that the parties to the confidence will one day face each other empty-handed; that the Dionysian free-heartedness may leave behind a poverty which — unjustly, but not on that account with less bitterness — may so react as even to charge the enjoyed devotion with deception. We are so constituted that we not merely, as was remarked, need a certain proportion of truth and error as the basis of our life, but also a similar mixture of definiteness and indefiniteness in the picture of our life-elements. That which we can see through plainly to its last ground shows us therewith the limit of its attraction, and forbids our phantasy to do its utmost in adding to the reality. For this loss no literal reality can compensate us, because the action of the imagination of which we are deprived is self-activity, which cannot permanently be displaced in value by any receptivity and enjoyment. Our friend should not only give us a cumulative gift, but also the possibility of conferring gifts upon him, with hopes and idealizations, with concealed beauties and charms unknown even to himself. The manner, however, in which we dispose of all this, produced by ourselves, but for his sake, is the vague horizon of his personality, the intermediate zone in which faith takes the place of knowledge. It must be observed that we have here to do by no means with mere illusions, or with optimistic or infatuated self-deception. The fact is rather that, if the utmost attractiveness of another person is to be preserved for us, it must be presented to us in part in the form of vagueness or impenetrability. This is the only substitute which the great majority of people can offer for that attractive value which the small minority possess through the inexhaustibility of their inner life and growth. The mere fact of absolute understanding, of having accomplished psychological exhaustion of the contents of relationship with another, produces a feeling of insipidity, even if there is no reaction from previous exaltation; it cripples the vitality of the relationship, and gives to its continuance an appearance of utter futility. This is the danger of

that unbroken, and in a more than external sense shameless, dedication to which the unrestricted possibilities of intimate relationships seduce, which indeed is easily regarded as a species of obligation in those relationships. Because of this absence of reciprocal discretion, on the side of receiving as well as of giving, many marriages are failures. That is, they degenerate into vulgar habit, utterly bereft of charm, into a matter-of-course which retains no room for surprises. The fruitful depth of relationships which, behind every latest revelation, implies the still unrevealed, which also stimulates anew every day to gain what is already possessed, is merely the reward of that tenderness and self-control which, even in the closest relationship, comprehending the whole person, still respect the inner private property, which hold the right of questioning to be limited by a right of secrecy.

(1) All these combinations are characterized sociologically by the fact that the secret of the one party is to a certain extent recognized by the other, and the intentionally or unintentionally concealed is intentionally or unintentionally respected. The intention of the concealment assumes, however, a quite different intensity so soon as it is confronted by a purpose of discovery. Thereupon follows that purposeful concealment, that aggressive defense, so to speak, against the other party, which we call secrecy in the most real sense. Secrecy in this sense—i. e., which is effective through negative or positive means of concealment—is one of the greatest accomplishments of humanity. In contrast with the juvenile condition in which every mental picture is at once revealed, every undertaking is open to everyone's view, secrecy procures enormous extension of life, because with publicity many sorts of purposes could never arrive at realization. Secrecy secures, so to speak, the possibility of a second world alongside of the obvious world, and the latter is most strenuously affected by the former. Every relationship between two individuals or two groups will be characterized by the ratio of secrecy that is involved in it. Even when one of the parties does not notice the secret factor, yet the attitude of the concealer, and consequently the whole relationship, will be modified by it. The historical development of society is in many respects characterized



by the fact that what was formerly public passes under the protection of secrecy, and that, on the contrary, what was formerly secret ceases to require such protection and proclaims itself. This is analogous with that other evolution of mind in which movements at first executed consciously become unconsciously mechanical, and, on the other hand, what was unconscious and instinctive rises into the light of consciousness. How this development is distributed over the various formations of private and public life, how the evolution proceeds toward better-adapted conditions, because, on the one hand, secrecy that is awkward and undifferentiated is often far too widely extended, while, on the other hand, in many respects the usefulness of secrecy is discovered very late; how the quantum of secrecy has variously modified consequences in accordance with the importance or indifference of its content—all this, merely in its form as questions, throws a flow of light upon the significance of secrecy for the structure of human reciprocities. In this connection we must not allow ourselves to be deceived by the manifold ethical negativity of secrecy. Secrecy is a universal sociological form, which, as such, has nothing to do with the moral valuations of its contents. On the one hand, secrecy may embrace the highest values: the refined shame of the lofty spirit, which covers up precisely its best, that it may not seem to seek its reward in praise or wage; for after such payment one retains the reward, but no longer the real value itself. On the other hand, secrecy is not in immediate interdependence with evil, but evil with secrecy. For obvious reasons, the immoral hides itself, even when its content encounters no social penalty, as, for example, many sexual faults. The essentially isolating effect of immorality as such, entirely apart from all primary social repulsion, is actual and important. Secrecy is, among other things, also the sociological expression of moral badness, although the classical aphorism, "No one is so bad that he also wants to seem bad," takes issue with the facts. Obstinacy and cynicism may often enough stand in the way of disguising the badness. They may even exploit it for magnifying the personality in the judgment of

others, to the degree that sometimes immoralities which do not exist are seized upon as material for self-advertising.

The application of secrecy as a sociological technique, as a form of commerce without which, in view of our social environment, certain purposes could not be attained, is evident without further discussion. Not so evident are the charms and the values which it possesses over and above its significance as a means, the peculiar attraction of the relation which is mysterious in form; regardless of its accidental content. In the first place, the strongly accentuated exclusion of all not within the circle of secrecy results in a correspondingly accentuated feeling of personal possession. For many natures possession acquires its proper significance, not from the mere fact of having, but besides that there must be the consciousness that others must forego the possession. Evidently this fact has its roots in our stimulability by contrast. Moreover, since exclusion of others from a possession may occur especially in the case of high values, the reverse is psychologically very natural, viz., that what is withheld from the many appears to have a special value. Accordingly, subjective possessions of the most various sorts acquire a decisive accentuation of value through the form of secrecy, in which the substantial significance of the facts concealed often enough falls into a significance entirely subordinate to the fact that others are excluded from knowing them. Among children a pride and self-glory often bases itself on the fact that the one can say to the others: "I know something that you don't know." This is carried to such a degree that it becomes a formal means of swaggering on the one hand, and of de-classing on the other. This occurs even when it is a pure fiction, and no secret exists. From the narrowest to the widest relationships, there are exhibitions of this jealousy about knowing something that is concealed from others. The sittings of the English Parliament were long secret, and even in the reign of George III reports of them in the press were liable to criminal penalties as violations of parliamentary privilege. Secrecy gives the person enshrouded by it an exceptional position; it works as a stimulus of purely social derivation, which is in principle quite independent of its casual content, but is naturally heightened in the degree in

which the exclusively possessed secret is significant and comprehensive. There is also in this connection an inverse phenomenon, analogous with the one just mentioned. Every superior personality, and every superior performance, has, for the average of mankind, something mysterious. To be sure, all human being and doing spring from inexplicable forces. Nevertheless, within levels of similarity in quality and value, this fact does not make the one person a problem to another, especially because in respect to this equality a certain immediate understanding exists which is not a special function of the intellect. If there is essential inequality, this understanding cannot be reached, and in the form of specific divergence the general mysteriousness will be effective — somewhat as one who always lives in the same locality may never encounter the problem of the influence of the environment, which influence, however, may obtrude itself upon him so soon as he changes his environment, and the contrast in the reaction of feeling upon the life-conditions calls his attention to this causal factor in the situation. Out of this secrecy, which throws a shadow over all that is deep and significant, grows the logically fallacious, but typical, error, that everything secret is something essential and significant. The natural impulse to idealization, and the natural timidity of men, operate to one and the same end in the presence of secrecy; viz., to heighten it by phantasy, and to distinguish it by a degree of attention that published reality could not command.

Singularly enough, these attractions of secrecy enter into combination with those of its logical opposite; viz., treason or betrayal of secrets, which are evidently no less sociological in their nature. Secrecy involves a tension which, at the moment of revelation, finds its release. This constitutes the climax in the development of the secret; in it the whole charm of secrecy concentrates and rises to its highest pitch — just as the moment of the disappearance of an object brings out the feeling of its value in the most intense degree. The sense of power connected with possession of money is most completely and greedily concentrated for the soul of the spendthrift at the moment at which this power slips from his hands. Secrecy also is sustained by the conscious-



ness that it *might be* exploited, and therefore confers power to modify fortunes, to produce surprises, joys, and calamities, even if the latter be only misfortunes to ourselves. Hence the possibility and the temptation of treachery plays around the secret, and the external danger of being discovered is interwoven with the internal danger of self-discovery, which has the fascination of the brink of a precipice. Secrecy sets barriers between men, but at the same time offers the seductive temptation to break through the barriers by gossip or confession. This temptation accompanies the psychological life of the secret like an overtone. Hence the sociological significance of the secret, its practical measure, and the mode of its workings must be found in the capacity or the inclination of the initiated to keep the secret to himself, or in his resistance or weakness relative to the temptation to betrayal. From the play of these two interests, in concealment and in revelation, spring shadings and fortunes of human reciprocities throughout their whole range. If, according to our previous analysis, every human relationship has, as one of its traits, the degree of secrecy within or around it, it follows that the further development of the relationship in this respect depends on the combining proportions of the retentive and the communicative energies—the former sustained by the practical interest and the formal attractiveness of secrecy as such, the latter by inability to endure longer the tension of reticence, and by the superiority which is latent, so to speak, in secrecy, but which is actualized for the feelings only at the moment of revelation, and often also, on the other hand, by the joy of confession, which may contain that sense of power in negative and perverted form, as self-abasement and contrition.

All these factors, which determine the sociological rôle of secrecy, are of individualistic nature, but the ratio in which the qualities and the complications of personalities form secrets, depends at the same time upon the social structure upon which its life rests. In this connection the decisive element is that the secret is an individualizing factor of the first rank, and that in the typical double rôle; i. e., social relationships characterized by a large measure of personal differentiation permit and promote secrecy in a high degree, while, conversely, secrecy serves and

intensifies such differentiation. In a small and restricted circuit, construction and preservation of secrets are technically difficult from the fact that each is too close to the circumstances of each, and that the frequency and intimacy of contacts carry with them too great temptation to disclose what might otherwise be hidden. But in this case there is no need of secrecy in a high degree, because this social formation usually tends to level its members, and every peculiarity of being, acting, or possessing the persistence of which requires secrecy is abhorrent to it. That all this changes to its opposite in case of large widening of the circle is a matter-of-course. In this connection, as in so many other particulars, the facts of monetary relationships reveal most distinctly the specific traits of the large circle. Since transfers of economic values have occurred principally by means of money, an otherwise unattainable secrecy is possible in such transactions. Three peculiarities of the money form of values are here important: first, its compressibility, by virtue of which it is possible to make a man rich by slipping into his hand a check without attracting attention; second, its abstractness and absence of qualitative character, in consequence of which numberless sorts of acquisitions and transfers of possessions may be covered up and guarded from publicity in a fashion impossible so long as values could be possessed only as extended, tangible objects; third, its long-distance effectiveness, by virtue of which we may invest it in the most widely removed and constantly changing values, and thus withdraw it utterly from the view of our nearest neighbors. These facilities of dissimulation which inhere in the degree of extension in the use of money, and which disclose their dangers particularly in dealings with foreign money, have called forth, as protective provisions, publicity of the financial operations of corporations. This points to a closer definition of the formula of evolution discussed above; viz., that throughout the form of secrecy there occurs a permanent in- and out-flow of content, in which what is originally open becomes secret, and what was originally concealed throws off its mystery. Thus we might arrive at the paradoxical idea that, under otherwise like circumstances, human associations require a definite ratio of secrecy which merely changes its

objects; letting go of one, it seizes another, and in the course of this exchange it keeps its quantum unvaried. We may even fill out this general scheme somewhat more exactly. It appears that with increasing telic characteristics of culture the affairs of people at large become more and more public, those of individuals more and more secret. In less developed conditions, as observed above, the circumstances of individual persons cannot protect themselves in the same degree from reciprocal prying and interfering as within modern types of life, particularly those that have developed in large cities, where we find a quite new degree of reserve and discretion. On the other hand, the public functionaries in undeveloped states envelop themselves in a mystical authority, while in maturer and wider relations, through extension of the range of their prerogatives, through the objectivity of their technique, through the distance that separates them from most of the individuals, a security and a dignity accrue to them which are compatible with publicity of their behavior. That earlier secrecy of public functions, however, betrayed its essential contradictoriness in begetting at once the counter-movements of treachery, on the one hand, and of espionage, on the other. As late as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, governments most anxiously covered up the amounts of public debts, the conditions of taxation, and the size of their armies. In consequence of this, ambassadors often had nothing better to do than to act as informers, to get possession of the contents of letters, and to prevail upon persons who were acquainted with valuable facts, even down to servants, to tattle their secrets.<sup>2</sup> In the nineteenth century, however, publicity takes possession of national affairs to such an extent that the governments themselves publish the official data without concealing, which no government would earlier

<sup>2</sup> This counter-movement occurs also in the reverse direction. It has been observed, in connection with the history of the English court, that the actual court cabals, the secret whisperings, the organized intrigues, do not spring up under despotism, but only after the king has constitutional advisers, when the government is to that extent a system open to view. After that time—and this applies especially since Edward II—the king begins to form an unofficial, and at the same time subterranean, circle of advisers, in contrast with the ministers somehow forced upon him. This body brings into existence, within itself, and through endeavors to join it, a chain of concealments and conspiracies.



have thought possible. Accordingly, politics, administration, justice, have lost their secrecy and inaccessibility in precisely the degree in which the individual has gained possibility of more complete privacy, since modern life has elaborated a technique for isolation of the affairs of individuals, within the crowded conditions of great cities, possible in former times only by means of spatial separation.

To what extent this development is to be regarded as advantageous depends upon social standards of value. Democracies are bound to regard publicity as the condition desirable in itself. This follows from the fundamental idea that each should be informed about all the relationships and occurrences with which he is concerned, since this is a condition of his doing his part with reference to them, and every community of knowledge contains also the psychological stimulation to community of action. It is immaterial whether this conclusion is entirely binding. If an objective controlling structure has been built up, beyond the individual interests, but nevertheless to their advantage, such a structure may very well, by virtue of its formal independence, have a rightful claim to carry on a certain amount of secret functioning without prejudice to its *public* character, so far as real consideration of the interests of all is concerned. A logical connection, therefore, which would necessitate the judgment of superior worth in favor of the condition of publicity, does not exist. On the other hand, the universal scheme of cultural differentiation puts in an appearance here: that which pertains to the public becomes more public, that which belongs to the individual becomes more private. Moreover, this historical development brings out the deeper real significance: that which in its nature is public, which in its content concerns all, becomes also externally, in its sociological form, more and more public; while that which in its inmost nature refers to the self alone—that is, the centripetal affairs of the individual—must also gain in sociological position a more and more private character, a more decisive possibility of remaining secret.

While secrecy, therefore, is a sociological ordination which characterizes the reciprocal relation of group elements, or rather

in connection with other forms of reaction constitutes this total relation, it may further, with the formation of "secret societies," extend itself over the group as a whole. So long as the being, doing, and having of an individual persist as a secret, his general sociological significance is isolation, antithesis, egoistic individualization. In this case the sociological meaning of the secrecy is external; as relationship of him who has the secret to him who does not have it. So soon, however, as a group as such seizes upon secrecy as its form of existence, the sociological meaning of the secrecy becomes internal. It now determines the reciprocal relations of those who possess the secret in common. Since, however, that relation of exclusion toward the uninitiated exists here also with its special gradations, the sociology of secret societies presents the complicated problem of ascertaining the immanent forms of a group which are determined by attitudes of secrecy on the part of the same toward other elements. I do not preface this part of the discussion with a systematic classification of secret societies, which would have only an external historical interest. The essential categories will appear at once.!

The first internal relation that is essential to a secret society is the reciprocal *confidence* of its members. This element is needed in a peculiar degree, because the purpose of maintaining the secrecy is, first of all, protection. Most radical of all the protective provisions is certainly that of invisibility. At this point the secret society is distinguished in principle from the individual who seeks the protection of secrecy. This can be realized only with respect to specific designs or conditions; as a whole, the individual may hide himself temporarily, he may absent himself from a given portion of space; but, disregarding wholly abstruse combinations, his existence cannot be a secret. In the case of a societary unity, on the contrary, this is entirely possible. Its elements may live in the most frequent commerce, but that they compose a society—a conspiracy, or a band of criminals, a religious conventicle, or an association for sexual extravagances—may remain essentially and permanently a secret. This type, in which not the individuals but their combination is concealed, is sharply distinguished from the others, in which the social formation is

unequivocally known, but the membership, or the purpose, or the special conditions of the combination are secrets; as, for instance, many secret bodies among the nature peoples, or the Freemasons. The form of secrecy obviously does not afford to the latter types the same unlimited protection as to the former, since what is known about them always affords a point of attack for further intrusion. On the other hand, these *relatively* secret societies always have the advantage of a certain variability. Because they are from the start arranged on the basis of a certain degree of publicity, it is easier for them to accommodate themselves to further betrayals than for those that are as societies entirely unavowed. The first discovery very often destroys the latter, because their secret is apt to face the alternative, whole or not at all. It is the weakness of secret societies that secrets do not remain permanently guarded. Hence we say with truth: "A secret that two know is no longer a secret." Consequently, the protection that such societies afford is in its nature, to be sure, absolute, but it is only temporary, and, for contents of positive social value, their commitment to the care of secret societies is in fact a transitional condition, which they no longer need after they have developed a certain degree of strength. Secrecy is finally analogous only with the protection which one secures by evading interruptions. It consequently serves only provisionally, until strength may be developed to cope with interruptions. Under these circumstances the secret society is the appropriate social form for contents which are at an immature stage of development, and thus in a condition peculiarly liable to injury from opposing interests. Youthful knowledge, religion, morality, party, is often weak and in need of defense. Hence each may find a recourse in concealment. Hence also there is a predestination of secret societies for periods in which new life-contents come into existence in spite of the opposition of the powers that be. The eighteenth century affords abundant illustrations. For instance, to cite only one example, the elements of the liberal party were present in Germany at that time. Their emergence in a permanent political structure was postponed by the power of the civic conditions. Accordingly, the secret association was the



form in which the germs could be protected and cultivated, as in the case of the orders of the *Illuminati*. The same sort of protection which secrecy affords to ascending movements is also secured from it during their decline. Refuge in secrecy is a ready resort in the case of social endeavors and forces that are likely to be displaced by innovation. Secrecy is thus, so to speak, a transition stadium between being and not-being. As the suppression of the German communal associations began to occur, at the close of the Middle Ages, through the increasing power of the central governments, a wide-reaching secret life developed within these organizations. It was characterized by hidden assemblies and conferences, by secret enforcement of law, and by violence—somewhat as animals seek the protection of concealment when near death. This double function of secrecy as a form of protection, to afford an intermediate station equally for progressing and for decaying powers, is perhaps most obvious in the case of religious movements. So long as the Christian communities were persecuted by the state, they were often obliged to withdraw their meetings, their worship, their whole existence, from public view. So soon, however, as Christianity had become the state religion, nothing was left for the adherents of persecuted, dying paganism than the same hiding of its cultus which it had previously forced upon the new faith. As a general proposition, the secret society emerges everywhere as correlate of despotism and of police control. It acts as protection alike of defense and of offense against the violent pressure of central powers. This is true, not alone in political relations, but in the same way within the church, the school, and the family.

Corresponding with this protective character of the secret society, as an external quality, is, as already observed, the inner quality of reciprocal confidence between the members. This is, moreover, a quite specific type of confidence, viz., in the ability to preserve silence. Social unities may rest, so far as their content is concerned, upon many sorts of presumption about grounds of confidence. They may trust, for example, to the motive of business interest, or to religious conviction, to courage, or to love, to the high moral tone, or—in the case of criminal combinations—

to the radical break with moral imperatives. When the society becomes secret, however, there is added to the confidence determined by the peculiar purposes of the society the further formal confidence in ability to keep still—evidently a faith in the personality, which has, sociologically, a more abstract character than any other, because every possible common interest may be subsumed under it. More than that, exceptions excluded, no kind of confidence requires so unbroken subjective renewal; for when the uncertainty in question is faith in attachment or energy, in morality or intelligence, in sense of honor or tact, facts are much more likely to be observable which will objectively establish the degree of confidence, since they will reduce the probability of deception to a minimum. The probability of betrayal, however, is subject to the imprudence of a moment, the weakness or the agitation of a mood, the perhaps unconscious shading of an accentuation. The keeping of the secret is something so unstable, the temptations to betrayal are so manifold, in many cases such a continuous path leads from secretiveness to indiscretion, that unlimited faith in the former contains an incomparable preponderance of the subjective factor. For this reason those secret societies whose rudimentary forms begin with the secret shared by two, and whose enormous extension through all times and places has not even yet been appreciated, even quantitatively—such societies have exerted a highly efficient disciplinary influence upon moral accountability among men. For there resides in confidence of men toward each other as high moral value as in the companion fact that this confidence is justified. Perhaps the former phenomenon is freer and more creditable, since a confidence reposed in us amounts almost to a constraining prejudice, and to disappoint it requires badness of a positive type. On the contrary, we “give” our faith in another. It cannot be delivered on demand, in the same degree in which it can be realized when spontaneously offered.

Meanwhile the secret societies naturally seek means psychologically to promote that secretiveness which cannot be directly forced. The oath, and threats of penalties, are here in the foreground and need no discussion. More interesting is the fre-

quently encountered technique for teaching novices the art of silence. In view of the above-suggested difficulties of guarding the tongue absolutely, in view especially of the tell-tale connection which exists on primitive social planes between thought and expression—among children and many nature peoples thinking and speaking are almost one—there is need at the outset of learning silence once for all, before silence about any particular matter can be expected. Accordingly, we hear of a secret order in the Molucca Islands in which not merely silence about his experiences during initiation is enjoined upon the candidate, but for weeks he is not permitted to exchange a word on any subject with anybody, even in his own family. In this case we certainly have the operation not only of the educational factor of entire silence, but it corresponds with the psychical undifferentiation of this cultural level, to forbid speech in general in a period in which some particular silence must be insured. This is somewhat analogous with the fact that immature peoples easily employ the death penalty, where later for partial sins a partial punishment would be inflicted, or with the fact that similar peoples are often moved to offer a quite disproportionate fraction of their possessions for something that momentarily strikes their fancy. It is the specific “incapacity” (*Ungeschicklichkeit*) which advertises itself in all this; for its essence consists in its incompetence to undertake the particular sort of inhibition appropriate to endeavors after a strictly defined end. The unskilled person moves his whole arm where for his purpose it would be enough to move only two fingers, the whole body when a precisely differentiated movement of the arm would be indicated. In like manner, in the particular types of cases which we are considering, the preponderance of psychical commerce, which can be a matter of logical and actual thought-exchange only upon a higher cultural level, both enormously increases the danger of volubility, and, on the other hand, leads far beyond prohibition of the specific act which would embarrass its purposes, and puts a ban on the whole function of which such act would be an incident. When, on the other hand, the secret society of the Pythagoreans prescribed silence for the novice during a number



of years, it is probable that the aim went beyond mere pedagogical discipline of the members in the art of silence, not, however, with special reference to the clumsiness just alluded to, but rather with the aim of extending the differentiated purpose in its own peculiar direction; that is, the aim was not only to secure silence about specific things, but through this particular discipline the adept should acquire power to control himself in general. The society aimed at severe self-discipline and schematic purity of life, and whoever succeeded in keeping silence for years was supposed to be armed against seductions in other directions.

Another means of placing reticence upon an objective basis was employed by the Gallic druids. The content of their secrets was deposited chiefly in spiritual songs, which every druid had to commit to memory. This was so arranged, however—especially by prohibition of putting the songs in writing—that an inordinate period was necessary for the purpose, in some cases twenty years. Through this long duration of pupilage, before anything considerable could be acquired which could possibly be betrayed, there grew up a gradual habit of reticence. The undisciplined mind was not suddenly assailed by the temptation to divulge what it knew. There was opportunity for gradual adaptation to the duty of reticence. The other regulation, that the songs should not be written down, had much more thoroughgoing sociological structural relations. It was more than a protective provision against revelation of the secrets. The necessity of depending upon tradition from person to person, and the fact that the spring of knowledge flowed only from within the society, not from an objective piece of literature—this attached the individual member with unique intimacy to the community. It gave him the feeling that if he were detached from this substance, he would lose his own, and would never recover it elsewhere. We have perhaps not yet sufficiently observed to what extent, in a more advanced cultural stage, the objectifications of intellectual labors affect the capacity of the individual to assert independence. So long as direct tradition, individual instruction, and more than all the setting up of norms by personal authorities, still determine the spiritual life of the individual, he is

solidly merged in the environing, living group. This group alone gives him the possibility of a fulfilled and spiritual existence. The direction of those connective tissues through which the contents of his life come to him, run perceptibly at every moment only between his social *milieu* and himself. So soon, however, as the labor of the group has capitalized its output in the form of literature, in visible works, and in permanent examples, the former immediate flow of vital fluid between the actual group and the individual member is interrupted. The life-process of the latter no longer binds him continuously and without competition to the former. Instead of that, he can now sustain himself from objective sources, not dependent upon the actual presence of former authoratative persons. There is relatively little efficacy in the fact that this now accumulated stock has come from the processes of the social mind. In the first place, it is often the labor of far remote generations quite unconnected with the individual's feeling of present values, which is crystallized in that supply. But, more than that, it is before all else the form of the objectivity of this supply, its detachment from the subjective personality, by virtue of which there is opened to the individual a super-social natural source, and his mental content becomes much more notably dependent, in kind and degree, upon his powers of appropriation than upon the conventionally furnished ideas. The peculiar intimacy of association within the secret society, of which more must be said later, and which gets its place among the categories of the feelings from the traits of the specific "confidence" (*Vertrauen*) characteristic of the order, in consequence of what has been said very naturally avoids committing the contents of its mysteries to writing, when tradition of spiritual contents is the minor aim of the association.

In connection with these questions about the technique of secrecy, it is not to be forgotten that concealment is by no means the only means under whose protection promotion of the material interests of the community is attempted. The facts are in many ways the reverse. The structure of the group is often with the direct view to assurance of keeping certain subjects from general

knowledge. This is the case with those peculiar types of secret society whose substance is an esoteric doctrine, a theoretical, mystical, religious gnosis. In this case secrecy is the sociological end-into-itself. The issue turns upon a body of doctrine to be kept from publicity. The initiated constitute a community for the purpose of mutual guarantee of secrecy. If these initiates were merely a total of personalities not interdependent, the secret would soon be lost. Socialization affords to each of these individuals a psychological recourse for strengthening him against temptations to divulge the secret. While secrecy, as I have shown, works toward isolation and individualization, socialization is a counteractive factor. If this is in general the sociological significance of the secret society, its most clear emergence is in the case of those orders characterized above, in which secrecy is not a mere sociological technique, but socialization is a technique for better protection of the secrecy, in the same way that the oath and total silence, that threats and progressive initiation of the novices, serve the same purpose. All species of socialization shuffle the individualizing and the socializing needs back and forth within their forms, and even within their contents, as though promotion of a stable combining proportion were satisfied by introduction of quantities always qualitatively changing. Thus the secret society counterbalances the separatistic factor which is peculiar to every secret by the very fact that it is *society*.

Secrecy and individualistic separateness are so decidedly correlatives that with reference to secrecy socialization may play two quite antithetical rôles. It can, in the first place, as just pointed out, be directly sought, to the end that during the subsequent continuance of the secrecy its isolating tendency may be in part counteracted, that *within* the secret order the impulse toward community may be satisfied, while it is vetoed with reference to the rest of the world. On the other hand, however, secrecy in principle loses relative significance in cases where the particularization is in principle rejected. Freemasonry, for example, insists that it purposes to become the most universal society, "the union of unions," the only one that repudiates every particularistic character and aims to appropriate as its material exclusively that



which is common to all good men. Hand in hand with this increasingly definite tendency there grows up indifference toward the element of secrecy on the part of the lodges, its restriction to the merely formal externalities. That secrecy is now promoted by socialization, and now abolished by it, is thus by no means a contradiction. These are merely diverse forms in which its connection with individualization expresses itself—somewhat as the interdependence of weakness and fear shows itself both in the fact that the weak seek social attachments in order to protect themselves, and in the fact that they avoid social relations when they encounter greater dangers within them than in isolation.

The above-mentioned gradual initiation of the members belongs, moreover, to a very far-reaching and widely ramifying division of sociological forms, within which secret societies are marked in a special way. It is the principle of the hierarchy, of graded articulation, of the elements of a society. The refinement and the systematization with which secret societies particularly work out their division of labor and the grading of their members, go along with another trait to be discussed presently; that is, with their energetic *consciousness* of their life. This life substitutes for the organically more instinctive forces an incessantly regulating will; for growth from within, constructive purposefulness. This rationalistic factor in their upbuilding cannot express itself more distinctly than in their carefully considered and clear-cut architecture. I cite as example the structure of the Czechic secret order, *Omladina*, which was organized on the model of a group of the *Carbonari*, and became known in consequence of a judicial process in 1893. The leaders of the *Omladina* are divided into "thumbs" and "fingers." In secret session a "thumb" is chosen by the members. He selects four "fingers." The latter then choose another "thumb," and this second "thumb" presents himself to the first "thumb." The second "thumb" proceeds to choose four more "fingers"; these, another "thumb;" and so the articulation continues. The first "thumb" knows all the other "thumbs," but the remaining "thumbs" do not know each other. Of the "fingers" only those four know each other who are subordinate to one and the same "thumb." All transactions

of the *Omladina* are conducted by the first "thumb," the "dictator." He informs the other "thumbs" of all proposed undertakings. The "thumbs" then issue orders to their respective subordinates, the "fingers." The latter in turn instruct the members of the *Omladina* assigned to each. The circumstance that the secret society must be built up from its base by calculation and conscious volition evidently affords free play for the peculiar passion which is the natural accompaniment of such arbitrary processes of construction, such foreordaining programs. All schematology—of science, of conduct, of society—contains a reserved power of compulsion. It subjects a material which is outside of thought to a form which thought has cast. If this is true of all attempts to organize groups according to *a priori* principles, it is true in the highest degree of the secret society, which does not grow, which is built by design, which has to reckon with a smaller quantum of ready-made building material than any despotic or socialistic scheme. Joined to the interest in making plans, and the constructive impulse, which are in themselves compelling forces, we have in the organization of a society in accordance with a preconceived outline, with fixed positions and ranks, the special stimulus of exercising a decisive influence over a future and ideally submissive circle of human beings. This impulse is decisively separated sometimes from every sort of utility, and revels in utterly fantastic construction of hierarchies. Thus, for example, in the "high degrees" of degenerate Freemasonry. For purposes of illustration I call attention to merely a few details from the "Order of the African Master-Builders." It came into existence in Germany and France after the middle of the eighteenth century, and although it was constructed according to the principles of the Masonic order, it aimed to destroy Freemasonry. The government of the very small society was administered by fifteen officials: summus register, summi locum tenentes, prior, sub-prior, magister, etc. The degrees of the order were seven: the Scottish Apprentices, the Scottish Brothers, the Scottish Masters, the Scottish Knights, the Eques Regii, the Eques de Secta Consueta, the Eques Silentii Regii; etc., etc.

Parallel with the development of the hierarchy, and with

similar limitations, we observe within secret societies the structure of the ritual. Here also their peculiar emancipation from the prejudices of historical organizations permits them to build upon a self-laid basis extreme freedom and opulence of form. There is perhaps no external tendency which so decisively and with such characteristic differences divides the secret from the open society, as the valuation of usages, formulas, rites, and the peculiar preponderance and antithetic relation of all these to the body of purposes which the society represents. The latter are often guarded with less care than the secret of the ritual. Progressive Freemasonry emphasizes expressly that it is not a secret combination; that it has no occasion to conceal the roll of its members, its purposes, or its acts; the oath of silence refers exclusively to the forms of the Masonic rites. Thus the student order of the *Amicisten*, at the end of the eighteenth century, has this characteristic provision in sec. I of its statutes:

The most sacred duty of each member is to preserve the profoundest silence with reference to such things as concern the well-being of the order. Among these belong: symbols of the order and signs of recognition, names of fraternity brothers, ceremonies, etc.

Later in the same statute the purpose and character of the order are disclosed and precisely specified! In a book of quite limited size which describes the constitution and character of the *Carbonari*, the account of the ceremonial forms and usages, at the reception of new members and at meetings, covers seventy-five pages! Further examples are needless. The rôle of the ritual in secret societies is sufficiently well known, from the religio-mystical orders of antiquity, on the one hand, to the *Rosenkreutzer* of the eighteenth century, and the most notorious criminal bands. The sociological motivations of this connection are approximately the following.

That which is striking about the treatment of the ritual in secret societies is not merely the precision with which it is observed, but first of all the anxiety with which it is guarded as a secret—as though the unveiling of it were precisely as fatal as betrayal of the purposes and actions of the society, or even the existence of the society altogether. The utility of this is probably



in the fact that, through this absorption of a whole complex of external forms into the secret, the whole range of action and interest occupied by the secret society becomes a well-rounded unity. The secret society must seek to create among the categories peculiar to itself, a species of life-totality. Around the nucleus of purposes which the society strongly emphasizes, it therefore builds a structure of formulas, like a body around a soul, and places both alike under the protection of secrecy, because only so can a harmonious whole come into being, in which one part supports the other. That in this scheme secrecy of the external is strongly accentuated, is necessary, because secrecy is not so much a matter of course with reference to these superficialities, and not so directly demanded as in the case of the real interests of the society. This is not greatly different from the situation in military organizations and religious communities. The reason why, in both, schematism, the body of forms, the fixation of behavior, occupies so large space, is that, as a general proposition, both the military and the religious career demand the whole man; that is, each of them projects the whole life upon a special plane; each composes a variety of energies and interests, from a particular point of view, into a correlated unity. The secret society usually tries to do the same. One of its essential characteristics is that, even when it takes hold of individuals only by means of partial interests, when the society in its substance is a purely utilitarian combination, yet it claims the whole man in a higher degree, it combines the personalities more in their whole compass with each other, and commits them more to reciprocal obligations, than the same common purpose would within an open society. Since the symbolism of the ritual stimulates a wide range of vaguely bounded feelings, touching interests far in excess of those that are definitely apprehended, the secret society weaves these latter interests into an aggregate demand upon the individual. Through the ritual form the specific purpose of the secret society is expanded into a comprehensive unity and totality, both sociological and subjective. Moreover, through such formalism, just as through the hierarchical structure above discussed, the secret society constitutes itself a sort of counterpart of the official

world with which it places itself in antithesis. Here we have a case of the universally emerging sociological norm; viz., structures, which place themselves in opposition to and detachment from larger structures in which they are actually contained, nevertheless repeat in themselves the forms of the greater structures. Only a structure that in some way can count as a whole is in a situation to hold its elements firmly together. It borrows the sort of organic completeness, by virtue of which its members are actually the channels of a unifying life-stream, from that greater whole to which its individual members were already adapted, and to which it can most easily offer a parallel by means of this very imitation.

The same relation affords finally the following motive for the sociology of the ritual in secret societies. Every such society contains a measure of freedom, which is not really provided for in the structure of the surrounding society. Whether the secret society, like the *Vehme*, complements the inadequate judicature of the political area; or whether, as in the case of conspiracies or criminal bands, it is an uprising against the law of that area; or whether, as in the case of the "mysteries," they hold themselves outside of the commands and prohibitions of the greater area — in either case the apartness (*Heraussonderung*) which characterizes the secret society has the tone of a freedom. In exercise of this freedom a territory is occupied to which the norms of the surrounding society do not apply. The nature of the secret society as such is autonomy. It is, however, of a sort which approaches anarchy. Withdrawal from the bonds of unity which procure general coherence very easily has as consequences for the secret society a condition of being without roots, an absence of firm touch with life (*Lebensgefühl*), and of restraining reservations. The fixedness and detail of the ritual serve in part to counterbalance this deficit. Here also is manifest how much men need a settled proportion between freedom and law; and, furthermore, in case the relative quantities of the two are not prescribed for him from a single source, how he attempts to reinforce the given quantum of the one by a quantum of the other derived from any source whatsoever, until such settled proportion is reached.

With the ritual the secret society voluntarily imposes upon itself a formal constraint, which is demanded as a complement by its material detachment and self-sufficiency. It is characteristic that, among the Freemasons, it is precisely the Americans—who enjoy the largest political freedom—of whom the severest unity in manner of work, the greatest uniformity of the ritual of all lodges, are demanded; while in Germany—where the otherwise sufficient quantum of bondage leaves little room for a counter-demand in the direction of restrictions upon freedom—more freedom is exercised in the manner in which each individual lodge carries on its work. The often essentially meaningless, schematic constraint of the ritual of the secret society is therefore by no means a contradiction of its freedom bordering on anarchy, its detachment from the norms of the circle which contains it. Just as widespread existence of secret societies is, as a rule, a proof of public unfreedom, of a policy of police regulation, of police oppression; so, conversely, ritual regulation of these societies from within proves a freedom and enfranchisement in principle for which the equilibrium of human nature produces the constraint as a counter-influence.

These last considerations have already led to the methodological principle with reference to which I shall analyze the still outstanding traits of secret societies. The problem is, in a word, to what extent these traits prove to be in essence quantitative modifications of the typical traits of socialization in general. In order to establish this manner of representing secret societies, we must again review their status in the whole complex of sociological forms.

The secret element in societies is a primary sociological fact, a definite mode and shading of association, a formal relationship of quality in immediate or mediate reciprocity with other factors which determine the habit of the group-elements or of the group. The secret society, on the other hand, is a secondary structure; i. e., it arises always only within an already complete society. Otherwise expressed, the secret society is itself characterized by its secret, just as other societies, and even itself, are characterized by their superiority and subordination, or by their offensive pur-



poses, or by their initiative character. That they can build themselves up with such characteristics is possible, however, only under the presupposition of an already existing society. The secret society sets itself as a special society in antithesis with the wider association included within the greater society. This antithesis, whatever its purpose, is at all events intended in the spirit of exclusion. Even the secret society which proposes only to render the whole community a definite service in a completely unselfish spirit, and to dissolve itself after performing the service, obviously regards its temporary detachment from that totality as the unavoidable technique for its purpose. Accordingly, none of the narrower groups which are circumscribed by larger groups are compelled by their sociological constellation to insist so strongly as the secret society upon their formal self-sufficiency. Their secret encircles them like a boundary, beyond which there is nothing but the materially, or at least formally, antithetic, which therefore shuts up the society within itself as a complete unity. In the groupings of every other sort, the *content* of the group-life, the actions of the members in the sphere of rights and duties, may so fill up their consciousness that within it the formal fact of socialization under normal conditions plays scarcely any rôle. The secret society, on the other hand, can on no account permit the definite and emphatic consciousness of its members that they constitute a society to escape from their minds. The always perceptible and always to-be-guarded pathos of the secret lends to the form of union which depends upon the secret, as contrasted with the content, a predominant significance, as compared with other unions.

In the secret society there is complete absence of organic growth, of the character of instinct in accumulation, of all unforced matter of course with respect to belonging together and forming a unity. No matter how irrational, mystical, impressionistic (*gefühlsmässig*) their contents, the way in which they are constructed is always conscious and intentional. Throughout their derivation and life *consciousness of being a society* is permanently accentuated. The secret society is, on that account, the antithesis of all genetic (*triebhaft*) societies, in which the unifica-

tion is more or less only the expression of the natural growing together of elements whose life has common roots. Its socio-psychological form is invariably that of the teleological combination (*Zweckverband*). This constellation makes it easy to understand that the specifications of form in the construction of secret societies attain to peculiar definiteness, and that their essential sociological traits develop as mere quantitative heightenings of quite general types of relationship.

One of these latter has already been indicated; viz., the characterization and the coherence of the society through closure toward the social environment. To this end the often complicated signs of recognition contribute. Through these the individual offers credentials of membership in the society. Indeed, in the times previous to the general use of writing, such signs were more imperative for this use than later. At present their other sociological uses overtop that of mere identification. So long as there was lack of documentary credentials, an order whose subdivisions were in different localities utterly lacked means of excluding the unauthorized, of securing to rightful claimants only the enjoyment of its benefits or knowledge of its affairs, unless these signs were employed. These were disclosed only to the worthy, who were pledged to keep them secret, and who could use them for purposes of legitimation as members of the order wherever it existed. This purpose of drawing lines of separation very definitely characterizes the development manifested by certain secret orders among the nature peoples, especially in Africa and among the Indians. These orders are composed of men alone, and pursue essentially the purpose of magnifying their separation from the women. The members appear in disguises, when they come upon the stage of action as members, and it is customary to forbid women, on pain of severe penalties, to approach them. Still, women have occasionally succeeded in penetrating their veil of secrecy sufficiently to discover that the horrible figures are not ghosts, but their own husbands. When this occurred, the orders have often lost their whole significance, and have fallen to the level of a harmless masquerade. The undifferentiated sensuous conceptions of nature people cannot

form a more complete notion of the separateness which orders of this sort wish to emphasize, than in the concealment, by disguise or otherwise, of those who have the desire and the right thus to abstract themselves. That is the rudest and externally most radical mode of concealment; viz., covering up not merely the special act of the person, but at once the whole person obscures himself; the order does not do anything that is secret, but the totality of persons comprising it makes itself into a secret. This form of the secret society corresponds completely with the primitive intellectual plane in which the whole agent throws himself entire into each specific activity; that is, in which the activity is not yet sufficiently objectified to give it a character which less than the whole man can share. Hence it is equally explicable that so soon as the disguise-secret is broken through, the whole separation becomes ineffective, and the order, with its devices and its manifestations, loses at once its inner meaning.

In the case in question the separation has the force of an expression of value. There is separation from others because there is unwillingness to give oneself a character common with that of others, because there is desire to signalize one's own superiority as compared with these others. Everywhere this motive leads to the formation of groups which are obviously in sharp contrast with those formed in pursuit of material (*sachlich*) purposes. As a consequence of the fact that those who want to distinguish themselves enter into combination, there results an aristocracy which strengthens and, so to speak, expands the self-consciousness of the individuals through the weight of their sum. That exclusiveness and formation of groups are thus bound together by the aristocracy-building motive gives to the former in many cases from the outset the stamp of the "special" in the sense of value. We may observe, even in school classes, how small, closely attached groups of comrades, through the mere formal fact that they form a special group, come to consider themselves an élite, compared with the rest who are unorganized; while the latter, by their enmity and jealousy, involuntarily recognize that higher value. In these cases secrecy and pretense of secrecy (*Geheimnistnerci*) are means of building higher the wall



of separation, and therein a reinforcement of the aristocratic nature of the group.

This significance of secret associations, as intensification of sociological exclusiveness in general, appears in a very striking way in political aristocracies. Among the requisites of aristocratic control secrecy has always had a place. It makes use of the psychological fact that the unknown as such appears terrible, powerful, and threatening. In the first place, it employs this fact in seeking to conceal the numerical insignificance of the governing class. In Sparta the number of warriors was kept so far as possible a secret, and in Venice the same purpose was in view in the ordinance prescribing simple black costumes for all the *nobili*. Conspicuous costumes should not be permitted to make evident to the people the petty number of the rulers. In that particular case the policy was carried to complete concealment of the inner circle of the highest rulers. The names of the three state inquisitors were known only to the Council of Ten who chose them. In some of the Swiss aristocracies one of the most important magistracies was frankly called "the secret officials" (*die Heimlichen*), and in Freiburg the aristocratic families were known as *die heimlichen Geschlechter*. On the other hand, the democratic principle is bound up with the principle of publicity, and, to the same end, the tendency toward general and fundamental laws. The latter relate to an unlimited number of subjects, and are thus in their nature public. Conversely, the employment of secrecy within the aristocratic régime is only the extreme exaggeration of that social exclusion and exemption for the sake of which aristocracies are wont to oppose general, fundamentally sanctioned laws.

In case the notion of the aristocratic passes over from the politics of a group to the disposition (*Gesinnung*) of an individual, the relationship of separation and secrecy attains to a plane that is, to outward appearance, completely changed. Perfect distinction (*Vornehmheit*) in both moral and mental respects, despises all concealment, because its inner security makes it indifferent to what others know or do not know about us, whether their estimate of us is true or false, high or low. From the standpoint of such superiority, secrecy is a concession to outsiders, a

dependence of behavior upon consideration of them. Hence the "mask" which so many regard as sign and proof of their aristocratic soul, of disregard of the crowd, is direct proof of the significance that the crowd has for such people. The mask of those whose distinction is real is that the many can at best not understand them, that they do not see them, so to speak, even when they show themselves without disguise.

The bar against all external to the circle, which, as universal sociological form-fact, makes use of secrecy as a progressive technique, gains a peculiar coloring through the multiplicity of degrees, through which initiation into the last mysteries of secret societies is wont to occur, and which threw light above upon another sociological trait of secret societies. As a rule, a solemn pledge is demanded of the novice that he will hold secret everything which he is about to experience, before even the first stages of acceptance into the society occur. Therewith is the absolute and formal separation which secrecy can effect, put into force. Yet, since under these conditions the essential content or purpose of the order is only gradually accessible to the neophyte—whether the purpose is the complete purification and salvation of the soul through the consecration of the mysteries, or whether it is the absolute abolition of all moral restraint, as with the *Assassins* and other criminal societies—the separation in material respects is otherwise ordered; i. e., it is made more continuous and more relative. When this method is employed, the initiate is in a condition nearer to that of the outsider. He needs to be tested and educated up to the point of grasping the whole or the center of the association. Thereby, however, a protection is obviously afforded to the latter, an isolation of it from the external world, which goes beyond the protection gained from the entrance oath. Care is taken—as was incidentally shown by the example of the druids—that the still untried shall also have very little to betray if he would, inasmuch as, within the secret principle which surrounds the society as a whole, graduated secrecy produces at the same time an elastic zone of defense for that which is inmost and essential. The antithesis of the exotic and the esoteric members, as we have it in the case of the

Pythagoreans, is the most striking form of this protective arrangement. The circle of the only partially initiated constitutes to a certain extent a buffer area against the totally uninitiated. As it is everywhere the double function of the "mean" to bind and to separate—or, rather, as it plays only *one* rôle, which we, however, according to our apperceptive categories, and according to the angle of our vision, designate as uniting and separating—so in this connection the unity of activities which externally clash with each other appears in the clearest light. Precisely because the lower grades of the society constitute a mediating transition to the actual center of the secret, they bring about the gradual compression of the sphere of repulsion around the same, which affords more secure protection to it than the abruptness of a radical standing wholly without or wholly within could secure.

Sociological self-sufficiency presents itself in practical effect as group-egoism. The group pursues its purposes with the same disregard of the purposes of the structure external to itself, which in the case of the individual is called egoism. For the consciousness of the individual this attitude very likely gets a moral justification from the fact that the group-purposes in and of themselves have a super-individual, objective character; that it is often impossible to name any individual who would directly profit from the operation of the group egoism; that conformity to this group program often demands unselfishness and sacrifice from its promoters. The point at issue here, however, is not the ethical valuation, but the detachment of the group from its environments, which the group egoism effects or indicates. In the case of a small group, which wants to maintain and develop itself within a larger circle, there will be certain limits to this policy, so long as it has to be pursued before all eyes. No matter how bitterly a public society may antagonize other societies of a larger organization, or the whole constitution of the same, it must always assert that realization of its ultimate purposes would redound to the advantage of the whole, and the necessity of this ostensible assertion will at all events place some restraint upon the actual egoism of its action. In the case of secret



societies this necessity is absent, and at least the possibility is given of a hostility toward other societies, or toward the whole of society, which the open society cannot admit, and consequently cannot exercise without restrictions. In no way is the detachment of the secret society from its social environment so decisively symbolized, and also promoted, as by the dropping of every hypocrisy or actual condescension which is indispensable in co-ordinating the open society with the teleology of the environmenting whole.

In spite of the actual quantitative delimitation of every real society, there is still a considerable number the inner tendency of which is: Whoever is not excluded is included. Within certain political, religious, and class peripheries, everyone is reckoned as of the association who satisfies certain conditions, mostly involuntary, and given along with his existence. Whoever, for example, is born within the territory of a state, unless peculiar circumstances make him an exception, is a member of the highly complex civic society. The member of a given social class is, as a matter of course, included in the conventions and forms of attachment pertaining to the same, if he does not voluntarily or involuntarily make himself an outsider. The extreme is offered by the claim of a church that it really comprehends the totality of the human race, so that only historical accidents, sinful obduracy, or a special divine purpose excludes any persons from the religious community which ideally anticipates even those not in fact within the pale. Here is, accordingly, a parting of two ways, which evidently signify a differentiation in principle of the sociological meaning of societies in general, however they may be confused, and their definiteness toned down in practice. In contrast with the fundamental principle: Whoso is not expressly excluded is included, stands the other: Whoever is not expressly included is excluded. The latter type is presented in the most decisive purity by the secret societies. The unlimited character of their separation, conscious at every step of their development, has, both as cause and as effect, the rule that whoever is not expressly adopted is thereby expressly excluded. The Masonic fraternity could not better support its recently much emphasized assertion that it is

not properly a secret order, than through its simultaneously published ideal of including all men, and thus of representing humanity as a whole.

Corresponding with intensification of separateness from the outer world, there is here, as elsewhere, a similar access of coherence within, since these are only the two sides or forms of manifestation of one and the same sociological attitude. A purpose which stimulates formation of a secret union among men as a rule peremptorily excludes such a preponderating portion of the general social environment from participation that the possible and actual participants acquire a scarcity value. These must be handled carefully, because, *ceteris paribus*, it is much more difficult to replace them than is the case in an ordinary society. More than that, every quarrel within the secret society brings with it the danger of betrayal, to avoid which in this case the motive of self-preservation in the individual is likely to co-operate with the motive of the self-preservation of the whole. Finally, with the defection of the secret societies from the environing social syntheses, many occasions of conflict disappear. Among all the limitations of the individual, those that come from association in secret societies always occupy an exceptional status, in contrast with which the open limitations, domestic and civic, religious and economic, those of class and of friendship, however manifold their content, still have a quite different measure and manner of efficiency. It requires the comparison with secret societies to make clear that the demands of open societies, lying so to speak in one plane, run across each other. As they carry on at the same time an open competitive struggle over the strength and the interest of the individual, within a single one of these spheres, the individuals come into sharp collision, because each of them is at the same time solicited by the interests of other spheres. In secret societies, in view of their sociological isolation, such collisions are very much restricted. The purposes and programs of secret societies require that competitive interests from that plane of the open society should be left outside the door. Since the secret society occupies a plane of its own—few individuals belonging to more than one secret society—it exercises a kind of absolute

sovereignty over its members. This control prevents conflicts among them which easily arise in the open type of co-ordination. The "King's peace" (*Burgfriede*) which should prevail within every society is promoted in a formally unsurpassed manner within secret societies through their peculiar and exceptional limitations. It appears, indeed, that, entirely apart from this more realistic ground, the mere form of secrecy as such holds the associates safer than they would otherwise be from disturbing influences, and thereby make concord more feasible. An English statesman has attempted to discover the source of the strength of the English cabinet in the secrecy which surrounds it. Everyone who has been active in public life knows that a small collection of people may be brought to agreement much more easily if their transactions are secret.

Corresponding with the peculiar degree of cohesion within secret societies is the definiteness of their centralization. They furnish examples of an unlimited and blind obedience to leaders, such as occurs elsewhere of course; but it is the more remarkable here, in view of the frequent anarchical and negative character toward all other law. The more criminal the purposes of a secret society, the more unlimited is likely to be the power of the leaders, and the more cruel its exercise. The *Assassins* in Arabia; the *Chauffeurs*, a predatory society with various branches that ravaged in France, particularly in the eighteenth century; the *Gardunas* in Spain, a criminal society that, from the seventeenth to the beginning of the nineteenth century, had relations with the Inquisition—all these, the nature of which was lawlessness and rebellion, were under one commander, whom they sometimes set over themselves, and whom they obeyed without criticism or limitation. To this result not merely the correlation of demand from freedom and for union contributes, as we have observed it in case of the severity of the ritual, and in the present instance it binds together the extremes of the two tendencies. The excess of freedom, which such societies possessed with reference to all otherwise valid norms, had to be offset, for the sake of the equilibrium of interests, by a similar excess of submissiveness and resigning of the individual will. More essential, however,



was probably the necessity of centralization, which is the condition of existence for the secret society, and especially when, like the criminal band, it lives off the surrounding society, when it mingles with this society in many radiations and actions, and when it is seriously threatened with treachery and diversion of interests the moment the most invariable attachment to one center ceases to prevail. It is consequently typical that the secret society is exposed to peculiar dangers, especially when, for any reasons whatever, it does not develop a powerfully unifying authority. The Waldenses were in nature not a secret society. They became a secret society in the thirteenth century only, in consequence of the external pressure, which made it necessary to keep themselves from view. It became impossible, for that reason, to hold regular assemblages, and this in turn caused loss of unity in doctrine. There arose a number of branches, with isolated life and development, frequently in a hostile attitude toward each other. They went into decline because they lacked the necessary and reinforcing attribute of the secret society, viz., constantly efficient centralization. The fact that the dynamic significance of Freemasonry is obviously not quite in proportion with its extension and its resources is probably to be accounted for by the extensive autonomy of its parts, which have neither a unified organization nor a central administration. Since their common life extends only to fundamental principles and signs of recognition, these come to be virtually only norms of equality and of contact between man and man, but not of that centralization which holds together the forces of the elements, and is the correlate of the apartness of the secret society.

It is nothing but an exaggeration of this formal motive when, as is often the case, secret societies are led by unknown chiefs. It is not desirable that the lower grades should know whom they are obeying. This occurs primarily, to be sure, for the sake of guarding the secret, and with this in view the device is carried to the point of constructing such a secret society as that of the Welfic Knights in Italy. The order operated at the beginning of the nineteenth century in the interest of Italian liberation and

unification. At each of its seats it had a supreme council of six persons, who were not mutually acquainted, but dealt with each other only through a mediator who was known as "The Visible." This, however, is by no means the only utility of the secret headship. It means rather the most extreme and abstract sublimation of centralized coherence. The tension between adherent and leader reaches the highest degree when the latter withdraws from the range of vision. There remains the naked, merciless fact, so to speak, modified by no personal coloring, of obedience pure and simple, from which the superordinated subject has disappeared. If even obedience to an impersonal authority, to a mere magistracy, to the representative of an objective law, has the character of unbending severity, this obedience mounts still higher, to the level of an uncanny absoluteness, so soon as the commanding personality remains in principle hidden. For if, along with the visibility of the ruler, and acquaintance with him, it must be admitted that individual suggestion, the force of the personality, also vanish from the commanding relationship; yet at the same time there also disappear from the relationship the limitations, i. e., the merely relative, the "human," so to speak, which are attributes of the single person who can be encountered in actual experience. In this case obedience must be stimulated by the feeling of being subject to an intangible power, not strictly defined, so far as its boundaries are concerned; a power nowhere to be seen, but for that reason everywhere to be expected. The sociologically universal coherence of a group through the unity of the commanding authority is, in the case of the secret society with unknown headship, shifted into a *focus imaginarius*, and it attains therewith its most distinct and intense form.

The sociological character of the individual elements of the secret society, corresponding with this centralized subordination, is their individualization. In case the society does not have promotion of the interests of its individual members as its immediate purpose, and, so to speak, does not go outside of itself, but rather uses its members as means to externally located ends and activities — in such case the secret society in turn manifests a heightened degree of self-abnegation, of leveling of individuality, which is

already an incident of the social state in general, and with which the secret *society* outweighs the above-emphasized individualizing and differentiating character of the *secrecy*. This begins with the secret orders of the nature peoples, whose appearance and activities are almost always in connection with use of disguises, so that an expert immediately infers that wherever we find the use of disguises (*Masken*) among nature peoples, they at least indicate a probability of the existence of secret orders. It is, to be sure, a part of the essence of the secret order that its members conceal themselves, as such. Yet, inasmuch as the given man stands forth and conducts himself quite unequivocally as a member of the secret order, and merely does not disclose which otherwise known individuality is identical with this member, the disappearance of the personality, as such, behind his rôle in the secret society is most strongly emphasized. In the Irish conspiracy which was organized in America in the seventies under the name Clan-na-gael, the individual members were not designated by their names, but only by numbers. This, of course, was with a view to the practical purpose of secrecy. Nevertheless, it shows to what extent secrecy suppresses individuality. Among persons who figure only as numbers, who perhaps—as occurs at least in analogous cases—are scarcely known to the other members by their personal names, leadership will proceed with much less consideration, with much more indifference to individual wishes and capacities, than if the union includes each of its members as a personal being. Not less effective in this respect are the extensive rôle and the severity of the ritual. All of this always signifies that the object mold has become master over the personal in membership and in activity. The hierarchical order admits the individual merely as agent of a definite rôle; it likewise holds in readiness for each participant a conventional garb, in which his personal contour disappears. It is merely another name for this effacement of the differentiated personality, when secret societies cultivate a high degree of relative equality among the members. This is so far from being in contradiction of the despotic character of their constitutions that in all sorts of other groupings despotism finds its correlate in the leveling of the ruled. Within the secret



society there often exists between the members a fraternal equality which is in sharp and purposeful contrast with their differences in all the other situations of their lives. Typical cases in point appear, on the one hand, in secret societies of a religio-ethical character, which strongly accentuate the element of brotherhood; on the other hand, in societies of an illegal nature. Bismarck speaks in his memoirs of a widely ramified pederastic organization in Berlin, which came under his observation as a young judicial officer; and he emphasizes "the equalizing effect of co-operative practice of the forbidden vice through all social strata." This depersonalizing, in which the secret society carries to an excessive degree a typical relationship between individual and society, appears finally as the characteristic *irresponsibility*. In this connection, too, physical disguise (*Maske*) is the primitive phenomenon. Most of the African secret orders are alike in representing themselves by a man disguised as a forest spirit. He commits at will upon whomsoever he encounters any sort of violence, even to robbery and murder. No responsibility attaches to him for his outrages, and evidently this is due solely to the disguise. That is the somewhat unmanageable form under which such societies cause the personality of their adherents to disappear, and without which the latter would undoubtedly be overtaken by revenge and punishment. Nevertheless, responsibility is quite as immediately joined with the ego—philosophically, too, the whole responsibility problem is merely a detail of the problem of the ego—in the fact that removing the marks of identity of the person has, for the naïve understanding in question, the effect of abolishing responsibility. Political finesse makes no less use of this correlation. In the American House of Representatives the real conclusions are reached in the standing committees, and they are almost always ratified by the House. The transactions of these committies, however, are secret, and the most important portion of legislative activity is thus concealed from public view. This being the case, the political responsibility of the representatives seems to be largely wiped out, since no one can be made responsible for proceedings that cannot be observed. Since the shares of the individual persons in the transactions remain

hidden, the acts of committees and of the House seem to be those of a super-individual authority. The irresponsibility is here also the consequence or the symbol of the same intensified sociological de-individualization which goes with the secrecy of group-action. In all directorates, faculties, committees, boards of trustees, etc., whose transactions are secret, the same thing holds. The individual disappears as a person in the anonymous member of the ring, so to speak, and with him the responsibility, which has no hold upon him in his intangible special character.

Finally, this one-sided intensification of universal sociological traits is corroborated by the danger with which the great surrounding circle rightly or wrongly believes itself to be threatened from the secret society. Wherever there is an attempt to realize strong centralization, especially of a political type, special organizations of the elements are abhorred, purely as such, entirely apart from their content and purposes. As mere unities, so to speak, they engage in competition with the central principle. The central power wants to reserve to itself the prerogative of binding the elements together in a form of common unity. The jealous zeal of the central power against every special society (*Sonderbund*) runs through all political history. A characteristic type is presented by the Swiss convention of 1481, according to which no separate alliances were to be formed between any of the ten confederated states. Another is presented by the persecution of the associations of apprentices by the despotism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. A third appears in the tendency to disfranchise local political bodies, so often manifested by the modern state. This danger from the special organization for the surrounding whole appears at a high potency in the case of the secret society. Men seldom have a calm and rational attitude toward strangers or persons only partially known. The folly which treats the unknown as the non-existent, and the anxious imaginativeness which inflates the unknown at once into gigantic dangers and horrors, are wont to take turns in guiding human actions. Accordingly, the secret society seems to be dangerous simply because it is secret. Since it cannot be surely known that any special organization whatever may not some day turn its legally

accumulated powers to some undesired end, and since on that account there is suspicion in principle on the part of central powers toward organizations of subjects, it follows that, in the case of organizations which are secret in principle, the suspicion that their secrecy conceals dangers is all the more natural. The societies of Orangemen, which were organized at the beginning of the nineteenth century in England for the suppression of Catholicism, avoided all public discussion, and operated only in secret, through personal bonds and correspondence. But this very secrecy gave them the appearance of a public danger. The suspicion arose "that men who shrank from appealing to public opinion meditated a resort to force." Thus the secret society, purely on the ground of its secrecy, appears dangerously related to conspiracy against existing powers. To what extent this is a heightening of the universal political seriousness of special organizations, appears very plainly in such an occurrence as the following: The oldest Germanic guilds afforded to their members an effective legal protection, and thus to that extent were substitutes for the state. On the one hand, the Danish kings regarded them as supports of public order, and they consequently favored them. On the contrary, however, they appeared, for the same reason, to be direct competitors with the state. For that reason the Frankish capitularies condemned them, and the condemnation even took the form of branding them as *conspiracies*. The secret association is in such bad repute as enemy of central powers that, conversely, every politically disapproved association must be accused of such hostility!



THE LITERARY INTERESTS OF CHICAGO. III AND  
IV

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III. LITERARY PERIODICALS FOLLOWING THE CHICAGO FIRE

"I found Chicago wood and clay," a mighty Kaiser said,  
Then flung upon the sleeping mart his royal robes of red.

.....  
And so the swift evangels ran by telegraphic time,  
And brought the cheer of Christendom from every earthly clime;  
Celestial fire flashed round the globe, from Norway to Japan,  
Proclaimed the MANHOOD of the race, the BROTHERHOOD of man!

.....  
They all were angels in disguise, from hamlet, field and mart,  
CHICAGO'S fire had warmed the World that had her woe by heart.  
"Who is my neighbor?" One and all: "We see her signal light,  
And she is our *only* neighbor now, this wild October night!"

—Benj. F. Taylor, in the *Lakeside Monthly*, October, 1873.

The whole nation and the whole world centered attention upon Chicago on October 8 and 9, 1871. On these days flames, starting on the West Side, swept through the heart of the business district to the very shore of the lake, like prairie fire through stubble; then leaped over the Chicago river, traversed the North side, died away there; and left the lusty, young giant city of marvelous growth burned and prostrate. A stream of sympathy from the people of the New World and the Old World poured in upon the citizens of Chicago. The effect is shown in the pages of the literary periodicals which survived the catastrophe, and in those of the many new ones started in the years of the seventies following the fire. From them it may be seen that the fire melted some of the barriers of western sectionalism. The world-wide sympathy caused the Chicago literary men to feel after a world-wide point of view, more

consciously than they had done before under the merely nationalizing influence of the Civil War.

The outside aid was a great stimulus to local energy, helping the ambitious rebuilders of the city to start upon a remarkable period of business enterprise; a period which, along with success in more material lines, led to the establishment of literary periodicals of kinds that were money-makers. Not only food and clothing for the sufferers, but goods for the merchants on long-time credit, and capital on easy terms, came in large quantities from other parts of America and from Europe. All this, added to their own determined spirit, led Chicago men not merely to rebuild on a larger scale, but also to launch new enterprises. Among such were papers of the "family-story" literary order.

That the typical ventures of this period were not of a higher literary type is explained by the fact that the "family-story" paper was the most promising for quick returns in cash. In fact, it is because investments in high-grade publishing in general do not yield returns more quickly than the development of serious publishing has continued to be comparatively slow in Chicago. In an article on "Chicago as a Publishing Center" in "The Commercial Association Number" of the *Chicago Evening Post*, March 8, 1905, Mr. T. J. Zimmerman, managing editor of *System*, a successful Chicago magazine of information on business, puts this point as follows:

The whole history and present condition of the publishing business in Chicago may be summed up in this statement: the westerner is looking for quick profits; when he makes an investment of money and labor, he wants to know what it is going to bring, and he wants to see the results at once. In the publishing business—that is, real, sincere publishing—this is impossible. The initial investment in a book or magazine is heavy. And not only this; returns are spread over a long period of time. Westerners have not gone into the publishing field to a greater extent, because there have been so many opportunities at hand for quick returns into which their energies could be turned.

Twenty years before the Chicago fire it had been discovered in New York that a popular story paper would bring returns to an investor. And we have already seen in the Chicago periodi-

cals of the sixties a drift toward this "family-story" type. In 1872 the *Chicago Ledger* was founded in direct imitation of the *New York Ledger*. Concerning the "Popular Story Papers," in a section on "The Weekly Literary Press," Mr. S. N. D. North, commissioner for the special Census Report on "The Newspaper and Periodical Press" (1880), says in part:

The most notable successes attained by American publications not of a purely news character are found in the type of periodical of which Robert Bonner, of the *New York Ledger*, may be said to have been the fortunate discoverer. Mr. Bonner purchased the *Ledger* in 1851, and shortly thereafter converted it from a commercial sheet into a family newspaper, excluding from its contents everything relating to the business and news of the day, and substituting therefor a series of continued and short stories, not generally of the highest class of fiction. But he attracted public attention to his venture by engaging the best-known literary men of the country to write for the *Ledger* over their own signatures. It rapidly rose to an enormous circulation, which at times has reached as high as 400,000 per issue. The *Ledger* may be said to be the original of that class of literary publications. The imitations of the *Ledger* have been numerous, and frequently their publication has been attended with great pecuniary success.

The *Chicago Ledger* has met with such success.

This paper was begun in connection with a newspaper plate supply business. For about twenty years Samuel H. Williams, a man of ability, was the editor. Like the *New York Ledger*, the *Chicago Ledger*, during its first few years, made a leading feature of stories which were literary in the accepted sense of that word. Containing this grade of literature, printed on cheap paper, and sold at \$1 for fifty-two numbers, it met with immediate favor, especially in the rural districts, during the seventies. By 1879 the *Chicago Ledger* had a circulation of 10,000, which was a paying start for it.

Little by little, however, the higher class of well-written fiction was dropped. One reason for this was competition introduced by the advent of the "Lakeside Library," published by Donnelly, Lloyd & Co., 1875-77. The books of this "library" were tri-monthly pamphlets, the first of the kind, containing cheap reprints of standard fiction, selling at ten cents per copy and attracting millions of readers. The stories of the *Chicago*



*Ledger* took on that more thrilling tone which is retained by those appearing in the current issues of 1906. Although selected by an editor who is the author of contributions accepted by high-grade magazines, their form is unfinished. The contents, however, are not of an immoral tone. In fact, the stories, like the melodramas of the cheap theater, often point a moral, with a not harmful effect.

The motto of the W. D. Boyce Co., the present publishers, as stated by Colonel William C. Hunter, the secretary and active manager of the *Chicago Ledger*, is: "The higher the fewer." In more positive terms it might be put: "The lower the more." At any rate, this paper, listed in the newspaper annuals as "literary," has, according to their figures, since 1900 enjoyed a regular circulation of nearly 300,000 a week. For "Boyce's Weeklies"—the *Chicago Ledger* and the *Saturday Blade*, a weekly imitation of a metropolitan daily—an average circulation of 631,869 copies is claimed; and for the *Woman's World*, a monthly which has grown out of the success of the *Ledger*, 829,982 copies. Although but few of the residents of Chicago have ever heard of these periodicals, these figures show the banner circulation of "literary" periodical publishing in Chicago. It was not until in 1891 that Mr. Boyce acquired the *Chicago Ledger*. Since then its growth has been remarkable. It is the basis of success with a paper mill and a city office building, which fact, like many of the points already made in this series of papers, again shows the engraftment of interests.

In "the trade" such periodicals as the *Chicago Ledger* have come to be more commonly called "mail-order" papers than "family-story" papers. It is thus recognized that they are run primarily for revenue. With the development of houses selling all kinds of goods direct to people in country homes, on orders by mail, the *Chicago Ledger* and the "mail-order" papers have been used for advertising by such firms. These mail-order houses, of which the original, that of Montgomery Ward & Co., started during the same year as the *Chicago Ledger*, in 1872, were among the new ventures in the period of enterprise after the fire. Their proprietors wanted to reach the country popu-

lation. *The Chicago Ledger* managers often point out that 60 per cent. of the people of the United States live outside of the cities, and that the circulation of the "mail-order" papers is in the country towns, villages, and rural communities. In the seventies the percentage of the population classed as rural was even larger. And since the *Chicago Ledger* and the "family-story" papers have never been much read in the cities, they were used from the start to get advertisements to the country people. The general advertising agencies were becoming an important factor in certain lines of business by the late seventies. For the large campaigns which they conducted, the first mediums they used, after the local newspapers everywhere, were the "family-story" papers, whose publishers were thus saved from great outlay in their organization for securing advertisements. This aided greatly in a quick realization of profits.

However sensational the call for a reader's attention, and despite the country reader's interest in the advertisements, the *Chicago Ledger* still appeals to the æsthetic interest broadly defined—to the interest in story. Incidentally this journal has lived for thirty-three years, and maintained its identity, character, and name. No other Chicago periodical having some sort of a dominant literary character can boast as much.

Thirty per cent. of the literary periodicals begun in Chicago during the period after the fire were of this "family-story" type, a larger percentage than the figures for those of its kind started in any decadal period since then. Among the ventures of this class in Chicago following the fire were the following papers: *Our Fireside Friend*, 1872-75; the *Cottage Monthly*, 1873; *Turner's Minaret*, 1873-75; *Western Home*, 1874-75; the *Old Oaken Bucket*, 1876; and *Sunset Chimes*, 1876-87. One of the newspaper annuals contained a standing line which described the contents of these and similar periodicals as "entertaining literature."

The relative permanence of the literary periodicals started in Chicago after the fire, including those of the higher as well as those of the lower literary orders, is one notable feature of the period, despite the fact, pointed out by E. Steiger, of New York.

in a compilation of American periodicals for the "ephemeral intellectual department" of the Vienna exposition in 1873, that in general "literary enterprises are ephemeral"—a generalization also brought out by the census of 1870. Statistics compiled in the course of study for these papers show that eight of the forty-seven periodicals of a literary character started in Chicago after the fire and before 1880 lived for more than fifteen years, and that four started in that period are extant. This is all the more remarkable when it is pointed out that, as the result of the financial panic of 1873, a dozen periodicals died. But in 1876, in Rowell's list prepared for the national Centennial Exposition, there were titles of twenty literary Chicago periodicals. Following the panic there was a new spurt of energy injected into the business activity which followed the fire.

In the establishment of the profitable, low-grade story periodicals the indirect influence of world-wide assistance to the burned-out city has been traced. Its more direct effects, through enlarging the point of view of Chicago editors, may be found in the journals and periodicals of a higher literary order during the fire decade.

The most notable direct aid from the Old World to the literary interests of Chicago came in a gift from England, a contribution which was the beginning of the Chicago Public Library. In the fire the semi-public libraries were destroyed, and the people lost the books of their homes. Moved by the thought of such a loss, Thomas Hughes, the author of *Tom Brown at Oxford*, led his countrymen in collecting a large library of fiction and general works. This was sent to Chicago and accepted gladly, the whole community being deeply impressed by an act of such refined sympathy.

Dr. W. F. Poole, a pioneer in the public-library movement, was called as librarian. And in October, 1874, with the bookwise doctor as editor, W. B. Kern, Cooke & Co., booksellers and publishers, brought out a three-column folio entitled the *Owl*, and subtitled "A Literary Monthly." In No. 1, to be found in a file at the Newberry Library, there appeared a dialogue, in which the Public said to the *Owl*: "*Qui vive?*" The *Owl* gave the



countersign "A pure literature." And the Public said: "All right, and all hail," As "an organ of all that is good and true, and an enemy of all that is bad and false in this age and country," the *Owl* was devoted chiefly to new books. The essays by Dr. Poole were a feature in which he carried out his policy of impressing on the community high standards, and at the same time a belief in popular fiction reading, an influence from him which was recently acknowledged by the *Dial*.

There were many manifestations of the striving toward metropolitan breadth of view-point in Chicago literary periodical ventures during the later seventies. This was so, notwithstanding the fact that in population Chicago was not yet the metropolis of the Mississippi valley. St. Louis, with 310,864 inhabitants, outranked Chicago, the fifth in the list of cities, with 298,977 at the census of 1870. The *Inland Monthly Magazine*, 1872-77, advertised as "the only magazine of the West and South devoted to literature, science, art, humor, sketches, etc.," had its main office at St. Louis, and merely a branch in Chicago.

By 1873 Chicago had reached such a stage of metropolitan sophistication as to have its first periodical devoted exclusively to humor. "Carl Pretzel" was the *nom de plume* of C. H. Harris, the editor. He began with *Carl Pretzel's Magazine Pook*, in which the sketches, like all his works, were written in the style of Leland's *Hans Breitmann*. This *Pook* was a weekly folio, filled with good fun on local topics, phrased in a pseudo-German-English lingo. In this form of expression is to be seen one influence of Chicago's large and important German population. Many anglicized German expressions and many germanized English phrases have made fun in the ordinary conversation of Chicago people. Hence "Carl Pretzel's" form of humorous expression met with a specially ready welcome. In attitude his humor was of the comic variety, which, as is seen in the current work of Ade, McCutcheon, and Dunne, is the characteristic Chicago humor—the comic as against the cynic of more sophisticated New York. Mr. Francis F. Browne, Mr. John McGovern, and Mr. John R. Walsh, from their varying points of view, agree in recollections that "Carl Pretzel's"

"stuff" was decent, clever humor, not in the least coarse. The only file of his periodicals available, a sample of *Der Leedle Vanderer*, 1876, in the "Number 1 Book" at the Historical Society Library, gives the same impression.

From his beginning with the use of local material, Mr. Harris branched out, and in 1874 established *Carl Pretzel's National Weekly*, which later had the word "illustrated" in its title to advertise its cartoons, and was published regularly until 1893. After a time "Carl Pretzel" was more or less written out, and his paper gave considerable attention to politics, Robert G. Ingersoll and John A. Logan being among the contributors. It also became an organ of some secret society interests. It never reached a circulation of more than 5,500, which shows that its constituency was more local than national. In 1886 an advertisement showed that it kept something of its original character. This announcement read as follows:

Subscription price, \$2 for one year, or \$150 for 100 years. By subscribing for 100 years, subscribers can save \$50. Anyone can see that here is an excellent opportunity to save money. Twelfth year and the largest circulation of any weekly newspaper in Chicago.

Changes made in the name of a journal devoted to stories and news of sportsmanship, which was begun in 1874 and is continued today, are significant of movements toward a wider outlook. The founder, Dr. N. Rowe, who always signed himself "Mohawk," first called this periodical *Field and Stream*. The next year he changed the name to the *Chicago Field*. Then in 1879 it became the *American Field*; and from 1883 on it has been dated from New York as well as Chicago, although the main office has been in the Masonic Temple at Chicago. Since the death of its founder several years ago, the periodical has been carried on with Mrs. N. Rowe as editor.

Another sign of the stir toward metropolitanism was seen in a literary periodical based on the social stratification then developing. There was a joining of interest in literature, art, and music with the news of the local society sets, in this journal. the *Saturday Evening Herald*, founded in 1874 by Lyman B. Glover, who later became a newspaper dramatic critic, having

a wide following. This paper is still published, although devoted almost exclusively to society. In its first years, however, with John M. Dandy and G. M. McConnell doing editorial work in addition to that of Mr. Glover, the paper was distinguished for essays and other literary efforts of excellent quality. Among the quasi-literary journals of Chicago it was, in its day, one of the most influential.

More important, however, as an index of an expanding point of view, was the advent of a periodical founded in 1873, by a group of liberal, literary preachers—Professor David Swing, Rev. Robert Collyer, Dr. Hiram A. Thomas, and others. To symbolize their getting together, they named the periodical the *Alliance*. It contained a faint religious dye. But it was first of all colored with an effort at literary expression, chiefly in the essay form. The denominational religious press in Chicago, although it has been most successful and has been marked by the incidental use of material appealing to the literary interest, is not a subject for treatment here. In a more general account of the æsthetic interests of Chicago such religious-literary periodicals should be given attention, because the purely religious desires and the most purely æsthetic desires are closely allied. But the main features of the denominational papers are the items of church news. The *Alliance*, however, was primarily literary—so distinctly literary that, at one time, Mr. Francis F. Browne, in the latter part of the decade, consented to be its managing editor. At the inception of the *Alliance* the literary clergymen attempted to settle their editorial problems in meetings as a board of editors. This proved fatal to any progress. Soon Professor Swing became the editor-in-chief and chief contributor. His weekly essay was one of the literary treats of the period, and was later continued when the *Alliance* was merged with the *Weekly Magazine* in 1882. According to the testimony of those concerned, the *Alliance* lost its identity from deliberate wrecking by its business manager, who is alleged to have taken advantage of the allied ministers' lack of business experience.

A western magazine from the newer West moved east to



Chicago in 1879, drawn by the centripetal force the city was exerting as the growing metropolis of the West. This was the *Western Magazine*—the third in Chicago to bear that name. It had been established in Omaha three years before. The periodical was of regular magazine form, with two columns of neatly printed matter on each page, and many excellent woodcuts illustrating mountain scenery and the towns from “British Columbia to the Gulf of Mexico.” It was divided into two departments, whose character was told by the following headings: “The Original Department of ‘The Western Magazine,’ containing Select Articles from Our Best Western Writers;” and, “The Eclectic Department of ‘The Western Magazine,’ containing the Cream of European Literature.” Although containing original stories, the leading feature of the “original department” was illustrated articles and historical sketches on the towns of the western states, in the form of travel letters from John H. Pierce, the publisher. One of these referred to Kansas City as “the new Chicago of the West.” These articles were accompanied by local advertisements from the places written up, and thus brought the publisher his principal receipts, which were augmented by subscriptions secured in these towns, at \$1 a year. Like Chicago’s pioneer literary journals, the *Western Magazine*, while at Omaha, said, May, 1879:

Give a prompt and willing support to the only periodical that illustrates our western country; and in the not far distant future we will furnish a magazine equal in size and variety of attractions to the standard monthlies of the eastern states.

When the *Western Magazine* came to Chicago, Mrs. Helen Elkin Starrett was engaged to be its editor. Mrs. Starrett, having in her youth contributed to Holland’s *Springfield Republican*, in Massachusetts; having written a volume of poetry; having later edited a newspaper at Lawrence, Kans.; having written editorials and literary criticisms for Joseph Pulitzer’s *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*; and having been before the public as a lecturer on literary and social topics, particularly in the western states, was regarded as especially well qualified for

the position. Mrs. Starrett, who today conducts a school for girls in Chicago, teaches literature, and writes poetry for an accredited New York publisher, gave many interesting suggestions on the period treated in this paper.

The files of the *Western Monthly* show an immediate improvement in its literary quality after its transference to Chicago. The *Burlington* (Iowa) *Hawkeye*, in the reviewers' comments, reprinted by the *Western Magazine*, said: "Mrs. Starrett is eminently qualified and will be to the western literary interests what Mary Mapes Dodge and other eminent lady editorial workers are to eastern literature." The same paper quoted the *Chicago Tribune* as declaring that the *Western Magazine* would be "the foundation of great things in the literary history of Chicago."

"A Welcome Suggestion," from a "Well-Wisher and Reader," which is most significant of the Chicago desire for a literary organ of metropolitan character, was published in the September, 1880, issue of the *Western Magazine*. It turned out that this anonymous suggestion had come from Frederic Ives Carpenter, now a professor of English literature at the University of Chicago, at that time a Chicago high-school boy. The contribution said, in part:

Since the days of the *Lakeside Monthly* and the *Chicago Magazine*, it has seemed to many of the literary and semi-literary people of this city as though the day must be a long way off when Chicago might hope to have any exclusively literary organ of its intellectual interests.

Now, your magazine is the rising sun of our hopes. Will it be long before the *Western Magazine* is recognized as a worthy representative of our literary interests, before you allow it to become metropolitan?

Rushing, trade-maddened Chicago is well supplied with periodicals that uphold its myriad trade and labor and religious fields of activity. Yet not a sheet for its literature. Why should New York have its *Scribner's* and *Harper's*, Boston its *Atlantic*, Philadelphia its *Lippincott's* and we only our dailies and the denominational religious weeklies?

The *Western Magazine* can make a career. Broaden your interests; admit fiction (the modern home of geniuses) and literary criticism; or at least, if we are not ready for that—literary gossip. Do this for the sake of the cosmopolitan culture that any metropolis like this possesses, and which calls for this.

The publication of this significant communication was made the occasion for opening a new department in the magazine, called "The Club." Mrs. Starrett declared editorially that there was "no more significant sign of social progress than the spread of literary and social organizations known as clubs, whether woman's clubs, art clubs, social science clubs, or study clubs." The Chicago Philosophical Society, really a literary society in which Mr. Franklin Head, Mr. Lyman J. Gage, and other prominent business and professional men interested in reading, met for discussions, was the most important club in Chicago at the time. The Saracen Club, the Fortnightly, the Chicago Woman's Club, and the Athena, of which Mr. Carpenter's mother was president, were notable, the woman's-club movement having become well started. Mrs. Starrett says that Chicago people interested in letters were much more closely associated in those days than has since been possible in the enlarged city.

A sub-title was added to the name of the *Western Magazine* announcing it to be "A Literary Monthly." The editor was flooded with manuscripts from local writers and from writers in other cities, for both "The Club" department and the general literary pages. Much of the material was amateurish. But some of it was done in promising style by authors, who, through their start in this medium, later attained some prominence, among them being Lillian Whiting. After one of the later issues, Professor Swing sent a note to Mrs. Starrett in which he said:

There is no better-edited magazine, nor one containing finer writing, east or west or anywhere, than our little magazine which has just come to my desk.

But at that time the interests of Mrs. Starrett, who had previously found 75,000 readers for an article on "The House-keeping of the Future," in the *Forum*, turned more keenly to social and economic questions than to form in literature. The contributions to "The Club" department soon were almost exclusively along these lines—the reproductions of essays read at club meetings by studious women. For this reason, among others reflecting the general situation, it is not surprising that



on merging the *Alliance* in March 1882, the *Western Magazine* became the *Weekly Magazine*, and announced that thereafter it would

present to its readers each week the same choice collection of literary matter, with an added department of great interest devoted to discussions, by able and well-known writers, on the important political, social, and economic topics.

While the weekly sermon-essay by Professor Swing, written after the manner of Addison in *The Roger de Coverly Papers*, was the leading literary feature, and there were some stories and poems, the main source of interest in the contents of the *Weekly Magazine* came more and more to be inquiry about social questions. A regular letter from Washington was sent by Gail Hamilton. James G. Blaine contributed an article on "The South American Policy of the Garfield Administration." Mr. William A. Starrett, Mrs. Starrett's husband, at first associate editor, wrote such acceptable reviews of political events that in the later numbers his name was put above Mrs. Starrett's in the lines naming the editors.

The circulation of the *Weekly Magazine* reached 23,450 in 1883, not equaling, however, the 50,000 credited to the *Western Magazine* in 1880. It was backed to an extent by prominent Chicago business men. George M. Pullman and C. B. Farwell contributed \$1,000 each for stock, and Marshall Field \$500. The editors had no part in the business management. The business manager, who had previously been in charge of the *Alliance*, got the affairs of the *Weekly Magazine* into such a hopeless tangle that it became bankrupt, and ended its career in 1884.

The history of the *Western Magazine* and the *Weekly Magazine* gives another example of the diverting of the æsthetic literary interest to the knowledge interest. But the story of its attraction to Chicago from the farther West, and of its development thereafter, shows the movement toward metropolitanism in Chicago, and carries us over into a period of greater development toward that characteristic in the eighties.

IV. JOURNALS FOR LETTERS IN THE MARKET METROPOLIS,  
1880-90

"It is universally conceded that Chicago is rapidly achieving world-wide reputation as the great literary center of the United States."—From *Culture's Garland, Being Memoranda of the Gradual Rise of Literature, Art, Music and Society in Chicago, and Other Western Ganglia*, by Eugene Field (Ticknor & Co., Boston, 1887).

Chicago arrived at the rank of a metropolis during the decade of 1880. A position of metropolitan character was reached, as far as the groundwork of materialistic supremacy in a large territory is concerned. In tracing the origin and character of the literary periodicals outcropping in these years, and the interplay of literary and other interests, the first requirement is a picture of Chicago as a material metropolis.

It has often been said by the citizens of older centers that a nation can have only one metropolis, only one "mother-city." Unquestionably, New York city has been the metropolis of America for many decades. But the essential idea of metropolis is that of the relation of the city center to an expanse of its surrounding country. The United States covers so large a sweep of country that several European cities of metropolitan rank, along with their supporting empires, could be set down in it. In position Chicago is the center of the most fertile and extensive expanse of valley and prairie in the North Temperate Zone—a territory which by 1880 had become populous. And in every way before the close of the eighties Chicago had become the chief city of the West, and also the first of the nation, and indeed of the world in not a few phases of business and commercial command.

The foremost of the chief positions of which Chicago men could and did boast was the rank attained as the greatest railroad center. Ever since the prairie days Chicago had been growing rapidly as a railroad center. This growth had come out of the food-supply industry, and had been reared on the bringing of wheat and cereals to Chicago for shipment over the lakes, and of live stock to the Union Stock Yards, the greatest wholesale meat-market in the world. Established in 1865, after commissary work for the Civil War had demonstrated the importance of

Chicago as a point for supplies, this market had grown to immense proportions by 1880. On the bread- and meat-supply business had been built the so-called "Granger Railroads," and their development was followed by the locating in Chicago of manufacturing plants for the making of all sorts of goods. All this called for more railroads.

Seven new main lines were built into the city during the eighties. This made the total number of trunk lines with terminals in Chicago an even twenty, which, according to Blanchard, was the full quota of "railroads entering Chicago on their own tracks August 1, 1900." Chicago became not only a receiving point for raw materials, but the growth of the railway systems made the city the center of a most striking example of that which was defined by Herbert Spencer in his elaborate analogy between the structure of society and that of an animal organism, as the "social distributing system."

As it took a multitude of people to handle all this market, manufacturing, and railway business, the number increased so rapidly that by 1880 Chicago had, in population, become the metropolis of the West. The census of 1880 showed that in numbers of people Chicago had far surpassed St. Louis, which had before led in the states west of the Alleghanies. In that year Chicago's population was more than half a million by several thousand. This meant a large distribution of any marketable commodity for consumers within the city itself. But the population of the Middle West, Northwest, and Southwest, increasing proportionately, made a larger market. Chicago became the chief inland distributing center, not only for life-sustaining products—food, clothing, druggists' supplies, and lumber for housing—but also for material luxuries, and finally for those classes of goods designed to satisfy the æsthetic interest.

Among the many jobbing-houses which had grown to large proportions by 1880, one of the most notable was that of a firm whose largest business was in book-jobbing. This was the McClurg house, known since 1886 by the firm name of A. C. McClurg & Co., which today, in a nine-story building, does, besides a large retail book-selling business and a good amount of



original publishing, the most extensive book-distributing business for all publishers by any single house in the United States. In 1880 this house was the most conspicuous among three large book-stores in adjoining buildings on State Street, known to residents of the city, to visitors from the Middle West, and to tourists as "Book-Sellers' Row."

The immense book-distributing business of the McClurg firm was built up in conjunction with, and as an engraftment upon, another line of jobbing. The retail book-sellers of the small towns throughout the West are the druggists, who, in addition to proprietary medicines and drugs, sell a varied line of sundries. Such a retailer would often ask the McClurg company to deliver an order of books to some Chicago house jobbing these sundries, so that shipment could be made in one box. Therefore the firm decided to supply these articles direct. And today, in addition to a *Monthly Bulletin of New Books*, A. C. McClurg & Co. send out a large annual volume, the cover of which says: Catalogue of Blank Books and Tablets, Stationery, Typewriter Paper and Supplies, Hair and Tooth Brushes, Druggists' Sundries, Pocket-Books, Pipes, Pocket Cutlery, etc." More than one floor of their large building is filled with such prosaic supplies.

Directly out of this book-distributing agency, so built up, ramifying to drug-stores and book-stores in all towns of the West, and centered in the McClurg house, there originated a journal of literary criticism—the *Dial*. In 1880 the McClurg firm started this periodical in conjunction with Mr. Francis Fisher Browne, who from its first number until the last of the current volume in 1905 has been in charge of its editorial management. At the time, Mr. Browne, whose work in editing and publishing the *Lakeside Monthly* had been so notable, was connected with the book-house as literary adviser in its publishing department, which General A. C. McClurg was then personally making special efforts to develop.

Devoted exclusively to literary criticism and information concerning new books, the *Dial* did not and does not make the appeal of literary form direct to the æsthetic interest, although the style of its contents is excellent. Its appeal is to the interest

in knowledge about the form and contents of literary works. The *Dial* was raised up for keeping time on the knowledge of current productions of literature.

Nevertheless, the *Dial* is significant of Chicago and western literary interests as they developed in the decade of its founding, and as they have grown to be since then. With Chicago having attained a metropolitan prominence in materialistic things, one characteristic of the majority of Chicagoans in the eighties became self-confident boasting about their city. It was the crass clamor of a puissant metropolitanism of the market-place. When this note became most strong, many citizens, with material achievements accomplished, began to have some doubts as to whether business success is all of greatness possible. The appearance of the *Dial* marked the fact that the central inland market for grosser products had become a great central market for literary goods. In a section where literary appreciation was much more predominant than the creative literary interest—writing and publishing—it is perhaps remarkable that such a journal as the *Dial* did not come earlier. The West was buying books. The West began to criticise books. And incidentally other journals of literary criticism, among them being a short-lived magazine called the *American Critic*, were started at this time. Of course, from the earliest days of periodical-publishing in Chicago there had been some literary criticism. But the attitude of appraising quality had not been a characteristic of Chicago until the decade of the eighties, when this element found a place in the public mind of a community which had reached a material metropolitanism, and was growing toward a broader and higher metropolitan spirit.

The history of the *Dial* during the eighties and later tells of the advance toward, not only breadth, but also independence in the judgment of letters. During the entire decade of the eighties, and for two years in the nineties, the business success of the *Dial* was made easy because A. C. McClurg & Co. were heavy wholesale purchasers from all of the large publishing-houses of the East. Naturally the publishers were quick to place advertisements in the *Dial*. Furthermore, the *Dial*, published by Mc-

Clurg's had to criticise books from the publishing department of McClurg's. The effect of these relationships was to arouse disbelief in the independence of the journal; and in July, 1892, the interest of A. C. McClurg & Co. in the *Dial* was sold to Mr. Browne. At the time the *Dial* was disconnected from their house, A. C. McClurg & Co. made the following statement through its columns :

The change looks wholly to the good of the paper, which, it is believed, will be better served by its publication as a separate and independent enterprise. It is perhaps natural that a critical literary journal like the *Dial* should be to some extent misunderstood through its connection with a publishing and book-selling house. To relieve the paper from this disadvantage, and to make its literary independence hereafter as *obvious* as it ever has been *real*, is the prime object of the present change.

From the first, Mr. Browne, though a prophet of Western literature, had maintained, besides a broad critical outlook, the high ideals of editorial independence for which he had been respected while editing the *Lakeside Monthly*. With Mr. Browne small. The character of the editor, and the fact that experts on 1906, it stands as the only authoritative American journal devoted exclusively to literary criticism that is not connected with a book-publishing house. While in the eighties its circulation was in largest part western, today it is national, although not large as compared with the popular magazines, because the constituency of publishers, reviewers, librarians, teachers, ministers, and general readers deeply interested in literary criticism is relatively small. The character of the editor, and the fact that experts in special topics are paid for reviews expressing their opinions freely, have made the independence of the journal have meaning. It is safe to say that the *Dial*, although published in the inland metropolis, is the leading journal of literary criticism in the nation.

After all is said about the *Dial* as a symbol of the growing metropolitan independence of criticism in Chicago, that which stands out as most striking concerning the developments of the eighties is its origin in a book-distributing agency erected, like other freight-distributing houses, along with the railway systems



which made the dot on the map marked "Chicago" a metropolitan center.

The distributing of people as well as packages by the railway systems centering here brought the *Arkansaw Traveler* and Opie Read, who had founded this periodical at Little Rock in 1882, to Chicago in 1887. It might appear that the name *Arkansaw Traveler* was given in a punning mood, because its contents were prepared for the amusement of railway travelers. But it was taken from a tune made familiar in Arkansas by a local character, one "Sandy" Faulkner, who as a candidate for the legislature had gone about the state playing a "fiddle" and reciting a monologue. The contents of the paper were of a humorous character—sketches and jokes, drawn chiefly from the lives of southern dialect characters, with whom Mr. Read had made himself familiar when local editor of the *Little Rock Gazette*. While during the early eighties the comic papers of New York were, according to Frederick Hudson, the authority on American journalism, first becoming successful, the *Arkansaw Traveler*, still at Little Rock, leaped into popularity, first in the Southwest and then through the North, attaining a circulation of 85,000 in its second year. The year 1887, in which the headquarters of the *Arkansaw Traveler* were removed to Chicago, was one in which the last two of the seven lines of railroad coming into Chicago in the eighties were opened. Mr. Read, in an interview given to contribute material for these papers, said:

Chicago had become the great railway center. Our paper was sold chiefly on railway trains. We moved to Chicago so as to be in position for reaching the largest number of railway passengers most easily. The mailing facilities of Chicago, as the central point in a spider's web of railways, also led us here. In those days schoolboys were not used extensively for the sale of weekly papers. Besides making sales on the trains through the news companies, we had a subscription list. For years Chicago had been a great point for the sale of subscription books. For our weekly of general circulation the business manager, P. D. Benham, my brother-in-law, found that it was not possible to get advertising in the same proportion to the number of subscribers as with a local newspaper. The advertising patronage came from the general agencies, and in those days magazine advertising was not done so generally as it is today. We counted on sales and subscriptions.

For five years after its migration to the western railway

metropolis, the *Arkansaw Traveler* held its own. In fact, it is still brought out regularly from a bookkeeping supply house. But it has lost its unique characteristics, and has an insignificant circulation.

Mr. Read resigned from the editorship in 1892, and has not since contributed to the paper. His resignation was made partly because some promoters acquired control of the organization of the periodical, converted it into a stock company, and proposed to put Mr. Read, its creator, on salary. But a more important reason was that Mr. Read had come to the conclusion that humor and character sketches put into ephemeral form in a weekly periodical were more or less wasted. He aspired to write books, and had been encouraged by Ticknor & Co., of Boston, who had already published one of his southern dialect productions, entitled "Len Gansett." For thirteen years, since resigning from the periodical whose interests brought him here, Mr. Read has been in Chicago writing for publications chiefly in book form. He has probably been the most prolific user of the fiction form working continuously in Chicago since the eighties. A score of his books of fiction are to be found in the Public Library. Most of them have been published, by Chicago printing-houses, between paper covers. The news-company boys on passenger trains east and west will tell you that Opie Read is the author most popular among train readers. He has held and enlarged the audience before which he secured his first hearing with sketches and jokes in the *Arkansaw Traveler*. And recently eastern magazine and book publishers have solicited and secured his output.

From the day of his arrival, Mr. Read has been the personification of the fact that the growing mid-American metropolis has been constantly drawing to itself men with unique points of view — writers whose outlook is first of all that of some other locality. To busy Chicago Mr. Read brought the point of view of quaint and quiet southern life, the eye and ear of an interpreter of the dialect characters in the region from which he came. Always picturesque in character, wearing a long black coat, black string tie, long locks, and a broad-brimmed hat, Mr. Read has visited the Press Club almost daily, and, meeting the younger news-

paper men, as well as those of "the old guard," in avowed and democratic freedom and simplicity, has imparted his point of view to others. Men from other places in America having distinct local color have brought other variations in point of view. The attraction of such men was specially notable in the eighties. Since then more men trained to the cosmopolitan view of letters and art derived in Europe have come to the Chicago field. But in that decade these various local view-points, along with the attitude of men versed in classic English literature, such as Mr. Browne of the *Dial*, fused with the virile mercantilism through which those in the roar of Chicago's busy streets saw life into a new composite metropolitan outlook. It affected the writers and publishers of Chicago in the eighties.

The conspicuous patronage of artistic endeavor, in various mediums, by citizens who had acquired wealth with the city's growth into rank as a great mart, worthy of satire as it was in some aspects, was another factor in creating a metropolitan attitude. The Art Institute by 1882 had a brick building, and in 1887 erected for school and museum the excellent four-story Romanesque structure of brown stone, on Michigan Boulevard, at the southwest corner of Van Buren Street, now occupied by the Chicago Club. There, in the heart of the market city, on a boulevard which was fast becoming the fine-arts avenue of Chicago, was a material temple fixing in the public mind the idea of art. Theodore Thomas and his orchestra, besides filling winter engagements in Chicago, had been giving long series of summer-night concerts in the Exposition Building which stood on the Lake Front until 1887. Grand opera was annually presented by foreign companies, and the drama, exceptionally well patronized for years, was presented by the best of visiting American and English actors. All this told on the attitude of the literary workers and publishers of periodicals.

But the most interesting expression of the growing metropolitan literary consciousness of the decade was "the Saints' and Sinners' Corner." Eugene Field, the poet and prose humorist, who had been in newspaper work in Missouri and Colorado for ten years before he was drawn to Chicago, in 1883, was the



voice of this unique group. The "Saints and Sinners" were a score of bibliophiles—clergymen, general readers, and literary workers—who held meetings, imaginary for the most part, in the rare-book corner of the retail department of the house of A. C. McClurg & Co., from another section of which, as we have seen, there emanated a journal of literary criticism. It was really a corner in the *Daily News*, where Field had a column devoted to gossip about "The Saints and Sinners," and local literary and artistic topics, under the caption "Sharps and Flats." This was widely read and had a great effect on the ideas of the community. From it, in 1887, Field culled selections, which were published in book-form by Ticknor & Co., of Boston, under the title: *Culture's Garland—Being Memoranda of the Gradual Rise of Literature, Music and Society in Chicago, and Other Western Ganglia*.

The garland with which Field wreathed Chicago culture, as shown in a frontispiece, was a string of sausages. He made a reference to the time "when Chicago's output of pork swept the last prop from under the old Elizabethan school at Cincinnati;" and said, on p. 168:

Here in Chicago "a hand well known in literature" is a horny, warty but honest hand which, after years of patient toil at skinning cattle, or at boiling lard, or at cleaning pork, has amassed sufficient to admit of its master's reception into the *crème de la crème* of Chicago culture.

Besides the extreme expression of satirical criticism which he gave to sham in literary patronage, Field also played with superficiality in efforts at literary and artistic production, including some fun at the expense of three ambitious literary periodicals started in Chicago during the decade. All this was the expression of an attitude that is typical of metropolitan centers, and which in older, cosmopolitan capitals attains a degree of frigid or flippant cynicism never yet reached by Chicago.

The three periodicals noticed by Field, while not devoted to satire, were more metropolitan in character than any which had preceded them in the succession of those started in Chicago. These were the *Current*, a weekly begun in 1883 and lasting until 1888; *Literary Life*, a monthly magazine, 1884-87; and *America*, a literary and political weekly journal, 1888-91.

The *Current* was the creation of Edgar L. Wakeman, a brilliant newspaper man. Magazinedom is a kingdom of heaven of which many newspaper men, in Chicago as elsewhere, often fondly dream. Mr. Wakeman's venture stands as one of the most conspicuous efforts to get over the wall. As Chicago correspondent for the newspaper of Colonel Henry Watterson, Mr. Wakeman had, by the use of postal cards which he sent out to prominent people, saying, "You will be interested in such and such a number of the *Louisville Courier*," attracted much attention to his work in a paper that allows scope for individuality. Both in promotion and character the *Current* was sensational. In an early number the *Current* declared that it was "the weekly, literary, news, and family journal of our time." Its ambitious ideal was stated as follows: "The *Current* is yet a model of brevity and does *every week* what the pretentious magazines aim to do once a month."

While a family journal, the *Current* was far above the plane of the "family-story" type of papers in literary quality. Its contents had distinct literary merit. And yet they were not of the classic character approached in such a magazine as the *Lakeside Monthly*. It was a magazine of popular literature. It may with approximate accuracy be listed as the first of that type undertaken in Chicago. And by Mr. Forrest Crissey, the western editor for two current eastern magazines of the popular literature type, its career of five years is rated as the most significant of efforts at periodical publishing in Chicago prior to those of the present decade. Its popular character is to be seen by dipping into a file at the Public Library. For example, a serial story by E. P. Roe, entitled "An Original Belle," is to be found in its pages.

The field from which Mr. Wakeman gathered serials, short stories, poems, and articles was not confined to the city limits, nor by the boundaries of the Middle West, nor yet by those of America. The management of the *Current* was the first among Chicago publishers to seek manuscripts from England. While not so well favored with results as has been the editor of the *Red Book* of the present day, the effort shows a metropolitan breadth approached by Chicago publishers in the eighties.

In securing contributions from American authors of established reputation the *Current* was more successful. James B. Cable, with "Southern Silhouettes," James Whitcomb Riley, and Joaquin E. Miller were among the contributors. In its early career the *Current* was reported to have \$100,000.00 worth of excellent manuscripts pigeon-holed. From the first, however, Chicago men were important contributors. Eugene Field, Ernest McGaffey, Colonel William Lightfoot Visscher, and John McGovern were among them. Field played with the pretensions of the editor of the *Current* in the report of a "Convention of Western Writers" at Indianapolis, where he said literary workers would be asked: "But have you never written anything for the *Current*? He remarked that the implication was: "If you have, you must be all right.

In 1885 Mr. John McGovern, a vivid imaginative writer, who honestly believes that the "West is in literary rebellion against the East," and that "General McClurg's chief office was to command a literary blockhouse and keep down the Indians of the frontier," became editor of the *Current*. The periodical became an avowed exponent of the literary interest of the people in Chicago and the West, and their support was asked. As an experiment to see if such support could not be secured, in 1885 a beautiful Easter edition was prepared. With the enterprise backed by Mr. George Wiggs, a member of the Board of Trade interested in the patronage of local letters, 100,000 copies, four times the normal number, were printed. The paper bill alone was \$3,000. But the bulk of the issue went to the ragman.

Under Mr. Wakeman's administration the circulation and advertising had been sufficient to give promise of success. With the magnetism of enthusiasm, Mr. Wakeman had interested able financial supporters. But by the end of his second year the finances were in a tangle. Mrs. Starrett, who characterizes the *Current* as "a flash in the pan," says that Mr. Wakeman proposed to sell the *Current* to the owners of the *Weekly Magazine*, which had grown in metropolitan character and was continued until 1884. The proposition was rejected. Mr. Wakeman left town. The *Current*, embarrassed financially and narrowed to



"its chosen field as a representative of western literature" dragged out a profitless existence until 1888, when it was merged with *America*.

In the meantime, *Literary Life*, a contemporary of the *Current*, attracted attention. It appeared in regulation form, and was advertised as "an illustrated magazine for the people; only \$1 a year, ten cents a copy." Charles Dudley Warner was quoted as having written to the publisher saying: "I am amazed that you can afford to publish such a very handsome periodical at so little cost to the subscriber."

There was nothing local about the contents of *Literary Life*. Essays on literary topics, biographical sketches and portraits of well-known authors in America and England, with engravings to show their "homes and haunts," appear to have made up the material sought for the magazine, which also announced a somewhat broader ambition—namely, to be "the *Century* of the West." To what degree the aspirations it advertised were realized cannot be ascertained in Chicago. There is no reliquary file in the libraries here.

The name of Rose Elizabeth Cleveland, sister of President Grover Cleveland, was conspicuously connected with *Literary Life*. Miss Cleveland was the editor of some of the early numbers. But although a Boston organ was quoted as saying, "*Literary Life* helps to make Chicago one of the literary centers of the country," Miss Cleveland never came to this literary center. All her work as editor was done at her home in New York state. Perhaps this arrangement for long-range editing may be interpreted as a sign of a broad, metropolitan outlook on the part of A. P. T. Elder, the publisher.

Miss Cleveland, in a letter recently sent for use in these papers, said:

I was interested in *Literary Life* for three months, and then dropped it because of a wide divergence between myself and its business manager as to policy in its management. During the three months in which I did my rather amateurish "editing" it was quite successful, and would in the hands of a more discriminating manager, or a less fastidious editor, have been a profitable enterprise.

The close of its career was chronicled by Field in 1887, with the following paragraph :

For the information of our public we will say that the *Atlantic Monthly* is a magazine published in Boston, being to that intelligent and refined community what the *Literary Life* was to Chicago before a Fourth Ward constable achieved its downfall with a writ of replevin.

The efforts of the editor-publishers of *America*, the literary-political weekly, 1888-91, are of more interest in many ways than any others by periodical publishers at Chicago in the eighties. Mr. Slason Thompson and Mr. Hobart Chatfield-Taylor were the founders of *America*, and Mr. Thompson stuck to it as editor and publisher to the end of its career. At the time of its founding, Mr. Thompson, as he is today, was a strong journalist. Mr. Chatfield-Taylor, now a novelist and prominent society man, was then a recent college graduate of independent means, just beginning a career of literary endeavor.

Mr. Thompson is one of the men drawn to Chicago by the growing importance of the north-central American metropolis. Educated for the bar at the University of New Brunswick, admitted to practice in that Canadian province, and later to the bar in California, he had entered journalism at San Francisco, served on the *New York Tribune*, and, after coming to Chicago as agent for the New York Associated Press, had been one of the founders of the *Chicago Herald*, and had held numerous important editorial positions. While in San Francisco, Mr. Thompson had been an admirer of the *Argonaut*, published there by Frank Pixley. He believed that if a serious literary periodical published on the Pacific coast could succeed, one brought out in Chicago should surely do so. Mr. Thompson was one of the "Saints and Sinners," an intimate friend of Field, and in later years the collator of some of that author's writings. In "Sharps and Flats," Field, referring to an imaginary sale of pews in the famous corner, made the following remark :

Mr. Slason Thompson, boiling over with indignation, declared that if the Rev. Mr. Bristol and General McClurg intended to form a trust on pews, they must expect to feel the castigatory torments of the nimble pen and sarcastic pencil wielded by the facile editor of *America*.

In *America* Mr. Thompson was strong in writing castigations. His supreme interest was in political questions, and he made them all hinge on one—that of immigration.

Mr. Taylor had just come home to Chicago from Cornell University, where he had been connected with the undergraduate journals. Today he laughingly says: "Having been on the college papers, I thought I could set the world on fire." Mr. Taylor was not greatly interested in political and sociological questions. His supreme interest, as an editor, was in literary form.

Although the endeavor to combine the literary and political interest was a striking phenomenon in *America*, during the first few months a remarkably strong, cosmopolitan literary character in a large part of its contents was the feature which attracted wide attention. The greatest array of contributions from noted American authors ever secured for a Chicago periodical was spread in the pages of *America* during the first few weeks of its publication. Some, also, were from England. The file in the Chicago Public Library would please any reader fond of the works of American authors. A poem by James Russell Lowell, contributions from Charles Dudley Warner and Julian Hawthorne, and an instalment of a serial by Frank R. Stockton are among the contents of the first number. Hawthorne conducted a department of literature for many weeks, and was succeeded in that by Maurice Thompson. Andrew Lang, the English essayist, was a frequent contributor. Swinburne was among the authors of poems. Poetry by Holmes, Scollard, Morris, McGrath, Riley, Garland, and Waterloo was printed. Eugene Field wrote his "Little Boy Blue" for *America*. Ella Wheeler Wilcox and Louise Chandler Moulton were among the contributors. The aim of Mr. Taylor was not to secure material with which to make the popular type of magazine, but to get for *America* the best of the current American literary output. Fabulous prices were paid for these contributions. For Bret Harte's "Jim" the sum of \$500 was given. Mr. Taylor is said to have sunk from \$50,000 to \$100,000 in the *America* venture; and a good part of that sum went for manuscripts. *America's* outlook over American litera-



ture was broader than that of any literary magazine containing fiction and poetry undertaken in Chicago during the eighties.

The publication of this representative American literary output, secured at such extravagant prices, was continued for only a few weeks. It did not pay. But few copies of *America* circulated east of the Alleghanies. "Literary trade-winds blow from the east," says Mr. Thompson today. The circulation of *America* was for the most part western, and at no time did it exceed 10,000. After the period of high prices for contributions, Mr. Taylor wrote nearly all of the literary contents under a series of *noms de plume*. In recounting this part of his experiences with *America*, Mr. Taylor said: "That is where I gained my literary training."

Two local writers who have since attained national prominence in lines of artistic production were assistant editors of *America* during parts of its career as a training school—Reginald De Koven, composer, and Harry B. Smith, light-opera librettist. Writing as "Quaver," Mr. De Koven conducted a department of musical criticism. Of Mr. De Koven's column, *Belford's Magazine*, a Chicago contemporary of *America*, said:

His notes will be read with much interest, for he is an eminently qualified musician; a graduate of Oxford University, England, and essentially cosmopolitan as regards his education.

Mr. Smith, who was beginning his literary work, was at first listed as assistant editor and later as business manager, although Slason Thompson says the periodical never had any business management in the present-day sense. Mr. Smith was a frequent contributor of verse.

While starting out with a notable character as to genuine American literature, *America* from the first was distinguished for the virile political interest and the vigorous personality of Mr. Thompson, which stood out in its pages most emphatically. The very title, while suggesting the literary interest, was conspicuous for its political significance, and a sub-title declared *America* to be "a journal for Americans." Articles by Seth Low on "American Patriotism," and by Theodore Roosevelt on "Americans Past and Present, and the Americanization of Foreigners," appeared

in the first numbers. In editorials, and in a department headed "Americanisms," Mr. Thompson hammered away continually in favor of the restriction of immigration and of limiting the influence of the Roman Catholic church in American affairs.

The literary character of the weekly faded away with the twenty-third number. By mutual agreement, Mr. Taylor retired, and Mr. Thompson became sole editor and publisher. In an editorial announcement, Mr. Thompson remarked that there would be "no deviation from the high literary entertainment," and then laid all emphasis on a statement that *America* would

continue to urge the restriction of all immigration by consular inspection and a per capita tax, the making of citizenship essential to the privilege of suffrage, and the limitation of the right to vote to citizens who can read and write;

and other propositions for the protection of "America's free schools, American morality, and American nationality." To enforce these ideas, in some of the later numbers there was a use of cartoons, the first and only illustrations published in *America*. One of these was sublined, "America for the Irish." Another, a lurid thing with much black ink, done by the famous Thomas Nast, was called "Foreign Thrones among Us." But the advocacy of such sentiments did not prove popular enough to bring large business returns, and with the number of September 24, 1891, the transfer of *America* and all that pertained to it, except the "personal opinions of the editor," was announced by Mr. Thompson. In penning his farewell editorial he said: "In respect to several subjects too much slighted in the daily press, *America* has been a voice crying in the wilderness;" and declared that the policy had been to put forth "a firm but moderate opposition to the political and educational policy of the Roman Catholic church in the United States," and to give expression to faith in the American common school as an "alembic" for the varied nationalities represented in American population.

While the mixture of representative American literature and national political policy in *America* makes it stand as an index of the growing metropolitan spirit of Chicago in the eighties, it was this mixture, and the gradual increase of the political element

— the advocacy of a cause — which brought failure to *America*. Mr. Taylor says:

Besides our inexperience, the fact that the periodical was published in Chicago and not in New York kept it from gaining a sure foothold.

Mr. Thompson, also, says:

Of course, there was a prejudice against a journal from Chicago; and the labor organizations here made prices of printing higher than in New York. But these magazine failures are not peculiar to Chicago. There has been no greater extinction here than those of *Putnam's* and the *Eclectic* in New York.

Nevertheless, the chief reason for the disappearance of *America* remains the decline of its appeal to the pure literary interest, and the phenomenal persistence and increase in its appeal to interest in one political idea. In forsaking literature to follow the anti-immigration will-o'-the-wisp, *America* followed the line of extinction taken in Chicago in the earliest period by the *Literary Budget*, founded in 1852 and transformed in 1855 to the short-lived *Native Citizen*. It is difficult to make a literary tree grow out of a political platform.

That *America* in dying was transferred to the *Graphic* was in line with the developments of periodical publishing at Chicago in the decade following the eighties. The *Graphic* was an illustrated weekly of about the same age as *America*. "With the World's Columbian Exposition coming," said *America's* editorial valedictory, "during the next two years, the *Graphic*, having the facilities, will render valuable service to Chicago."

Other weeklies with metropolitan earmarks springing up in the eighties were those of the smart variety. These contained a melange of clever comment on current events and local society news, verse, and other material of interest for its form of expression. The *Rambler*, started in 1884, by Reginald De Koven and Harry B. Smith, and carried on until 1886 by Elliott Flower, was the most interesting of these weeklies. It was "A Journal of Men, Manners, and Things." Mr. Flower, in an interview for these papers, said:

We wanted to do for Chicago what *Life* does for New York. The manager of the Western News Co. said: "Put a New York date line on it, or the West won't take it." We did not do so. But he was right.



The *Rambler* never secured more than 5,000 readers, and the experiment cost its promoters several thousand dollars. Its chief result of permanence was the training Mr. Flower had through it for writing the humorous sketches and fiction which he has since contributed to magazine- and book-publishers elsewhere. *Vanity Fair* was the name of a "literary and society weekly" which was of sufficient interest to be listed in the newspaper annuals for 1885 and 1886. *Appleton's In the Swim*, a "literary, travel, and society weekly," engrafted on an advertising travelers' bureau, flourished from 1887 to 1891. And a "pictorial weekly" having the name *Life* was attempted in 1889, but did not survive. A monthly in regular magazine form, designated the *Society Magazine*, and filled with selections from the periodicals of England, came out during the entire calendar year 1888, and left a file in the Public Library.

A most creditable monthly for "gentlemen of wealth and culture," as its advertising read, was *Wildwood's Magazine*, edited by "Will Wildwood" (Fred E. Pond), and undertaken in Chicago in 1888. During its first year it was devoted to "the higher literature of manly sport." "To readers seeking reflection of the charms of woodcraft we offer the work of contributors whose genial essays partake of the breezy character of forest and field," said the initial number, which commented on the expansion of the literature of sport during the twenty years just then past. Perusal of a file in the Newberry Library shows that the magazine contained charming tales, essays, and memoirs of sportsmen. Both in subject-matter and in form its pages made a pleasing appeal to the play instinct, which some of the authoritative psychologists say is essentially the same as the æsthetic interest. But at the end of a year, Charles Hallock, the former editor of *Forest and Stream*, became associated in the editorship, a philosophy of the serious interest in outdoor activity was announced, the name was changed to *Recreation*, and "geological picnics" were organized from a branch office at Washington. This brought public ridicule. An editorial retort in the magazine listed the national capital as "the graveyard of journalism," and a delightful

æsthetic publication of high literary quality went to pieces on the dry rocks of a knowledge interest.

A phase of the increasing complexity in the character of Chicago—complexity growing out of the industrial magnitude of the city in the eighties—was reflected in the starting of several magazines devoted to serious subjects but appealing to the popular literary interest through the form of essays, supplemented with fiction and, in some, with illustrations. Questions on the relations of capital and labor began to be the subject of much talk and action in Chicago—questions whose consideration has since grown to such importance here as to make the city one of the caldrons in which much of social import is seething. In 1886 a violent manifestation of this came in the anarchist riots at Haymarket Square, which, it may be mentioned incidentally, were pictured with large wood cuts in the *Illustrated Graphic News*, published simultaneously in Chicago, New York, Cincinnati, Detroit, and Kansas City, in that year. But the riots and the execution of the anarchists were merely the extreme expression of elements constantly stimulating serious thought.

A monthly magazine called the *Commonwealth*, started in 1888, was recorded in the newspaper annuals until 1892. But *Belford's Magazine*, of which No. 1, June, 1888, bore the imprint "Chicago, New York, and San Francisco," is the most significant serious periodical of the decade which is represented among the files. It appears that, during its second year, the periodical was issued from New York, that in 1892 its headquarters were moved back to Chicago, and that it died in 1893. A statement on American life and serious periodicals was made by the editor, in June, 1889. In an editorial he said:

When the best blood of Europe sought these shores as laborers or pirates, they sought to conquer a continent. The victory achieved between the first landing and now is simply a marvel of industry, endurance, energy, and enterprise. In this struggle of man versus matter we have become materialists. Out of sixty odd millions of population, about three million read books, and these mainly novels. To attempt the publication of a monthly devoted to the discussion of grave subjects, to be to the thoughtful reformer of this country what the *Westminster* of London has been to the Liberals of England, would be commercial insanity. Successful American magazines are devoted to

pictorial exhibits, which, although they are artistically done, yet make only picture-books, to be looked at, not read.

The file shows, however, that in *Belford's Magazine* an endeavor to popularize serious subjects was made. On the occasion of locating in Chicago again in 1892, the magazine editorially declared that "the literature of the West has been acted, it has been *done*" — not written.

Another type of serious magazine broadly to be classed as literary, which grew up in the eighties at Chicago, was the home-study journal. Some of these were: the *Correspondence University Journal*, monthly, 1884-86; the *University*, 1885-86, biweekly, claiming to be a successor to the *Weekly Magazine*; the *Home Library Magazine*, monthly, 1887; and the *National Magazine*, published by a so-called "National University" from 1889 to 1894.



## THE BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIOLOGY<sup>1</sup>

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Probably no facts can be named of such importance as those of heredity. They lie at the basis of every science and every pursuit that deals with living beings. Hardly a social, moral, or intellectual question can be thought of but we find that in its deeper aspects it is a problem of heredity. Heredity concerns not only the philosopher and the man of science, but also the parent, the teacher, the doctor, and even the statesman, the social reformer, and the historian. Properly handled, it is not a very abstruse subject. We are able to reach tolerably certain conclusions without traveling much beyond the range of knowledge common to most educated men. Nevertheless, though in all ages heredity has greatly interested all men, it has as yet few real students. The very interest it has excited has burdened it with superstitions, which in the past have been accepted as matters of common knowledge by men of science, who have added to the obscurity by elaborately seeking to explain the existence of the non-existent, the possibility of the impossible. Only very recently have some of these cobwebs been swept away.

The basis of all life is the cell. A cell is a minute mass of living protoplasm. Cells multiply by absorbing nutriment and dividing into two or more daughter-cells. In the lowest organisms the daughter-cells separate. Each individual, therefore, consists of a single cell. Higher organisms consist of many, it may be billions, adherent cells which work together for the common benefit. Among the cells of multicellular individuals are the germ-cells, to which is delegated the function of producing future individuals, future cell-communities. A germ-cell from one indi-

<sup>1</sup>Read before the Sociological Society, at the School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), Clare Market, W. C., October 24, 1905. Sir John A. Cockburn in the chair.

vidual unites with a germ-cell from another. The compound cell thus formed, the fertilized ovum, multiplies by dividing and redividing many times the one cell into two cells, till a new individual, a new cell-colony—a man, for instance—arises. During multiplication, differentiation in form and function occurs among the cells, so that ultimately the individual is compounded of many different kinds of cells—muscle-cells, skin-cells, gland-cells, nerve-cells, and so forth. In the fertilized ovum is a dot, the nucleus. In the nucleus are ultra-microscopical dots and threads of a substance which, when multiplication occurs, displays remarkable movements and is divided, seemingly with great precision, among the daughter-cells. In this way it passes, apparently with little change, from the germ-cells of the parent to those of the offspring. This substance has been identified, with a high degree of probability, as the germ-plasm, the bearer of heredity. We need not pin our faith to any theories as to the composition of the germ-plasm; but some such substance there must be—some substance which is the bearer of heredity. If this theory of the transmission of the germ-plasm from germ-cell to germ-cell be correct—and all the evidence indicates that it is correct—the child resembles his parent, not because his several parts are derived from similar parts of his parent—his head from his parent's head, his hand from his parent's hand, and so on—but because his germ-plasm is derived by direct descent from the parental germ-plasm, and therefore is very similar. The nature of the germ-plasm, therefore, determines the nature of the individual that arises from the germ-cells. Thus from one variety of germ-plasm proceeds a man, and from another a rabbit. When a species undergoes evolution, the germ-plasm undergoes gradual change. When we improve our domestic plants and animals, the alteration is always in essence a germinal change. It is the germ-plasm that is the main fact to be grasped in a study of heredity.

All the characters, all the physical and mental parts, of a living being are either "inborn" or "acquired." An inborn character is one which comes to the individual "by nature," as part of his natural inheritance. An acquired character, on the other hand, is a modification of an inborn character caused, as a

rule, by use, disuse, or injury. For example, a man's hand is inborn. It comes to him by nature; it arises because the germ-plasm in the germ-cell whence he sprang was so constituted that it caused that germ-cell, under fit conditions of shelter and nutrition, to multiply into a being having a man's hand. In brief, a man's hand is a germinal character; but the thickening of the skin in the palm of the hand which results from use, or a scar which results from injury, is not an inborn character, but an acquirement.

The principal mass of both inborn and acquired characters are ancient possessions of the race. Thus the hand and the thickened skin of the palm have been possessed by innumerable generations of men. But in some characters offspring differ from their parents. When these new characters are inborn, they are technically termed variations. Thus, if the child of normal parents were "blind" "by nature," his peculiarity would be a variation; but if he became blind by injury, it would be an acquirement. The great importance of distinguishing between inborn and acquired characters lies in the fact that the former, including variations, tend to be inherited by offspring, whereas most students of heredity deny that the latter are ever inherited. It should be noted that some acquirements are of great magnitude. Thus, in the human being, the limbs develop beyond the infantile standard mainly under the influence of use, a paralyzed infant limb growing little, if at all. Almost all growth, therefore, that occurs in the limbs after birth is an acquirement.

Offspring tend to reproduce the main mass of the parental inborn characters, but always with variations—with innumerable inborn differences—which, as a rule, are minute as compared with the likenesses. Thus the child of a human being is always another human being, but "by nature" he is invariably somewhat different from his parent—a little taller or shorter, stronger or weaker, fairer or darker, and so forth. The chief problem of heredity, both theoretical and practical, is the question as to what causes offspring to differ from their parents in this inborn way. The importance of the problem at once becomes evident when we remember that all racial change, all evolution,



depends on the variations of the individual members of the species; that is, on changes in the germ-plasm. A race evolves when it piles variations on variations during successive generations. It is in this way that species undergo change during a state of nature. It is in this way that we improve our domesticated plants and animals.

Several theories have been formulated to account for the occurrence of variation, but they may all be placed in one of two categories. On the one hand, it is supposed that the variations of offspring are caused by changes in the environments of the germ-cells whence the offspring arise; on the other hand, it is supposed that they are not so caused, but arise "spontaneously." The first theory is very popular with medical men. Thus it is believed by them that, if a man leads a healthy, active life, his children will be innately stronger and more vigorous than they would otherwise have been; whereas, if he falls into ill-health through want, hardship, disease, dissipation, or some such cause, his germ-cells will be injured, and his offspring will tend to be innately inferior. A natural corollary to this hypothesis is a belief that a race will grow strong and vigorous if placed under conditions that benefit its individuals; whereas it will degenerate if placed under opposite conditions. This belief, of course, is fundamentally opposed to the doctrine of natural selection, which supposes that races evolve only when placed under influences which, because injurious to the individual, weed out the weak and the unfit, and leave the race to the strong and fit.

We can easily test these opposing doctrines by noting what has happened to various races of men. Negroes on the west coast of Africa, for example, have been exposed for hundreds, perhaps thousands, of generations to severe malaria. This disease is caused by a microbe which invades the body in great numbers and floods it with a virulent poison, in which, therefore, the germ-cells are literally soaked. Practically speaking, every negro suffers for a prolonged period from malaria, and many perish of it. If ever the environment of the germ-cell causes variations in offspring, it should do so in this instance. But what do we find? Neither the negroes nor any other races exposed to malaria

have grown degenerate. The negroes, for example, are a tall and robust race. On the contrary, every race that has been exposed to the disease is resistant to it precisely in proportion to the duration and severity of its past sufferings; and this, apparently, is the sole effect that malaria has had on any race. The same is true of every other disease and every other adverse condition to which any race is subjected. Thus Englishmen, who have suffered much from consumption, are more resistant to it than negroes, who have suffered less, and much more resistant than Polynesians, who have had no previous experience of the disease and are exterminated when it is introduced to their islands. Extreme cold has not rendered degenerate the Eskimos, nor extreme heat the Arabs; they have merely been rendered, by the survival of the fit, resistant to heat or cold respectively. Many races have been afflicted by alcohol for thousands of years. Some men are naturally more susceptible to the charm of alcohol than others. These, because they are more tempted, drink, on the whole, to greater excess, and thus are weeded out to a greater extent. As a consequence, every race is temperate precisely in proportion to its past experience of alcohol. Thus west-African savages, who have long possessed unlimited supplies of palm toddy, the Jews, and the inhabitants of the vine countries of the south of Europe are more temperate than north-Europeans, and infinitely more temperate than most savages. What is true of alcohol is true also of opium. Thus the natives of India, who have long used the drug, are very temperate; the Chinese, who have used it for two centuries, are less temperate; whereas Burmans, Australians, and Polynesians, who have only lately made its acquaintance, are extremely intemperate. City life, particularly slum life, is injurious to the individual. Each succeeding generation of slum-dwellers presents a very debilitated and puny appearance, and the mortality is immense. But races that have been most subjected to the influences of city life—the Chinese, for example—are in no way degenerate. The Chinese are a particularly fine race of people.

On the other hand, as is well known, if a race is placed under conditions highly beneficial to its individuals, so that the elimina-

tion of the unfit is reduced to a minimum, it tends to degenerate. Thus we cannot improve or even preserve our breed of race-horses merely by supplying good food and the other conditions necessary for a healthy existence. We must weed out the unfit, and so breed the race with care.

Were the prevailing medical doctrine, that variations are normally caused by the direct action of the environment on the germ-plasm, true, all life would be impossible on earth; for all living species are subjected to deteriorating influences, such as cold, want, and disease. Unless the germ-plasm were resistant to the environment, every species would drift steadily and helplessly to destruction. Natural selection could not preserve it. There could be no selection when all variations were unfavorable. There could be no improvement in a race when in each generation all its individuals were inferior to their predecessors. Medical men found their belief chiefly on certain statistics, compiled mainly by gentlemen in charge of lunatic asylums, which demonstrate that a large number of feeble-minded people have parents or grandparents diseased or intemperate. But these statistics fail to take into account the proportion of cases which have inherited parental defects, or which have varied spontaneously from the parents. They fail also to demonstrate that asylum patients have parents diseased or intemperate in a greater proportion of cases than people of the same social stratum outside the walls. I hope it will be understood that, in controverting the prevailing medical doctrine, I do not mean to imply that variations in offspring are never caused by parental disease or intemperance. I mean to imply merely that instances of variations so caused must be very rare. Otherwise the race would become extinct. We know that the offspring of diseased and intemperate people are often perfectly normal and robust. That implies that their germ-plasm was unsusceptible to the action of toxins and alcohol. This unsusceptible type survives. The susceptible types are weeded out. A high degree of unsusceptibility is thus established as a necessary condition of individual and racial survival, and in the process of ages becomes almost absolute. Doubtless the germ-plasm of every species is most unsusceptible to the influences to which it is normally exposed.



Under exceptional circumstances, as when exposed to novel and powerful influences, the whole race is sometimes rendered really degenerate, as is proved by the deterioration of European dogs in India and horses in the Falkland Islands. But the mere fact of deterioration under novel conditions proves clearly how necessary for the preservation of the race is a high degree of insusceptibility to the influences to which the race is normally exposed. In view of the indisputable fact that races undergo evolution, not degeneration, when exposed to disease and alcohol, the medical doctrine of heredity amounts in effect to this, that if only a race goes down hill long enough, it will ultimately arrive at the top. It is literally inconceivable that evolution can have resulted from continuous degeneration.

We must conclude, therefore, that variations are very rarely due to the direct action of the environment on the germ-plasm. This conclusion is confirmed by another set of facts, which serve also to indicate the true source of variations—the true reason why offspring differ innately from their parents. The members of a litter of dogs, cats, or pigs always vary, not only from their parents, but among themselves, and may vary very greatly. Thus one puppy may be large, strong, vigorous, dark, and rough-haired; while others may exhibit different qualities in all sorts of combinations. One puppy may resemble the father, another the mother, and a third some distant ancestor. Obviously, their extreme variations cannot be due to the action of environment; for all the germ-cells and all the puppies before birth were placed under conditions that were practically identical. We have no choice, therefore, but to believe that the variations of the litter are spontaneous; in other words, that their source lies in the nature of the germ-plasm, not in the action of the environment. We know that a germ-cell, on being fertilized, spontaneously produces many different kinds of body-cells, such as skin- and muscle-cells. In just the same way it produces spontaneously germ-cells which differ among themselves. These variations are absolutely necessary to the persistence of the species. Otherwise natural selection would have no material to work on. Children would be exact copies of the parent, and the race could not adapt itself to changes

in the environment. Thus it is only because children vary spontaneously from their parents in all directions, like bullet marks round a bull's-eye, that natural selection has been able to render the races of mankind resistant to all the diseases by which they are assailed.

We reach thus two fundamental biological laws. The first law is that the germ-plasm is very highly indifferent to the action of the environment, and therefore that children are seldom affected by the influences to which their parents are exposed. The second law is that germ-cells, and therefore the individuals that arise from them, vary spontaneously among themselves, just as the body-cells vary, and for the same reason. It follows that we cannot improve races of plants and animals by improving the conditions under which they exist. Such a course benefits the individual, but results in racial degeneration. The race can be improved only by restricting parentage to the finest individuals. All the practice, if not the theory, of breeders confirms us in this belief.

It will be well worth our while to devote a little space to a consideration of some of the effects resulting from man's evolution against disease. Probably this evolution is the only form of evolution which civilized races are now undergoing. Such is our care for the weak in body and mind that there is nothing to indicate, for example, that big and strong and active men, or clever men, have, on the average, more children than smaller or duller men. Nearly all our deaths are due to disease or old age. The few that are otherwise caused are not selective in the sense that they eliminate particular types of individual. Thus death by drowning does not select particular types. It falls on the fit and unfit in a fashion that is quite haphazard.

Zymotic diseases — that is, diseases due to living microbes — appear to have originated among the ancient and crowded populations of the Old World. Our oldest histories, even our oldest myths, tell of plague and pestilence. But we have no indication, with the exception of malaria, that any such diseases existed in the Western Hemisphere before the arrival of Europeans. On the contrary, while we never hear of European adventurers in the

Western Hemisphere falling ill of any new disease except malaria, we have quite definite accounts of the first introduction of this or that Old World malady to this and that region of the western world. The microbes of certain diseases, such as malaria and the sleeping-sickness, are transferred from one human being to another by winged insects, and may therefore prevail in regions where the population is scanty. But most other zymotic diseases pass directly from man to man, and therefore prevail most where the population is densest. Thus the mortality from consumption, and therefore the stringency of selection by consumption, is much greater in the slums of great cities than in the open country. During uncounted centuries, therefore, with the advance of civilization and the increase of population, man in the Old World underwent evolution against many forms of disease. By means of this evolution he achieved the power of dwelling in towns and cities, of living a civilized existence in spite of the prevalence of disease. Then, when the germs of disease were rife in every home and thick on the garments of every man, Columbus discovered America. At once the vastest tragedy in human existence began. The New World was swept from end to end by recurrent pestilences of air- and water-borne diseases, such as small-pox, measles, and cholera. Whole tribes and nations were destroyed or decimated. But an equal part was played by consumption. This disease particularly affects such dark and ill-ventilated houses as are built by men of European race in cold climates. The natives of all the temperate parts of the New World melted away before it. They could not at once achieve, under the worst conditions, an evolution which the natives of the Old World achieved during the course of many centuries, at the cost of hundreds of millions of lives, under conditions that became worse only very slowly. Nowhere in all the temperate parts of the New World has a settlement of white men a native quarter such as every white settlement has in Asia and Africa. The destruction wrought among the inhabitants of the tropical forests was less. Malaria, to which they had become resistant, protected them from the inrush of Europeans, while the abundance of heat and light, and the absence of towns and cities, checked the prevalence of consumption.



While, therefore, the native races of all temperate America, as well as of all Australasia and Polynesia, seem irrevocably doomed to extinction, it is possible that the aborigines of tropical America, strengthened as they have been by a large infusion of European blood, may persist. In the more temperate regions even half-castes perish of consumption; hence the absence of a mixed race.

The political effects of the invasion of the New World by the disease of the Eastern Hemisphere have been very remarkable. Spain and Portugal, powerful nations in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, had the first start in the race for empire, and chose the seemingly richer tropics. But there malaria checked colonization, and consumption did not cause the elimination of the natives. The weaker British were shouldered into the inhospitable north, where the vast void cleared by disease gave their race almost limitless room for expansion. Subsequently they secured all Australasia, in which the conditions are similar. In the New World, then, the Anglo-Saxons have founded permanent empires. Under no probable conjunction of circumstances are they likely to be uprooted. But the fate of their Old World dependencies will be different. Here the natives outnumber, and will always outnumber, them. In the course of time they are sure to be expelled or absorbed. Their fate will be like that of the Romans and the Normans in England, not like that of the Saxons who nearly exterminated the Britons. Disease has spread over the whole world, and no other race will ever again have the opportunities so unconsciously used by the Anglo-Saxons. So vast and fertile are their territories that it seems probable that their world-predominance in the future has been secured by disease.

Roughly speaking, the stimuli under which a human being develops are three in number: nutrition, use, and injury. All individuals develop at first under what may be regarded as the sole stimulus of nutrition. Thus up to the time of birth the human being develops under the influence of this stimulus alone. Subsequently some of his structures continue to develop under it; for example, his ears, his hair, and his teeth. He never uses his hair nor his external ears in any active sense; obviously, therefore, they grow simply because they absorb food. He uses his teeth,

but we have no reason to suppose that they would not grow equally well if he did not use them. But after birth other of his structures develop little, if at all, except under the added influence of use; for example, his limbs, his heart, and his brain. If no strain were placed on these structures, they would grow little, if at all. Food alone is not sufficient for their continued growth. Lastly, if the individual be injured at any time, as by a cut, the stimulus of injury causes growth to take place during the process of healing. In man the development which results from injury is of infinitely less importance than that which results from nutrition, and from nutrition plus use.

Now, since no parts can be used or injured unless they first exist, and so are capable of being used and injured, nutrition must always play the first, and generally the principal, part in the development of living beings. And, moreover, when living beings first came into existence, it must have played the sole part in their development, until subsequently there was evolved the power of growing under the stimulus of use and injury.

The power of growing and developing under the influence of use is apparently quite a late product of evolution. It seems quite absent except in the higher animals, and is present to the greatest extent only in the highest. Thus an adult man owes the greater part of his bulk to growth made under the influence of use; but there is not the least evidence that most insects, for example, owe any part of their growth to its influence. They grow, as the infant grows before birth, under the sole influence of nutrition. Indeed, the most of their structural changes occur when they are quiescent undergoing metamorphosis; that is, when they are not using the growing part of their structures. But it is not body but mind that supplies the clearest evidence that the capacity of developing under the influence of use is a late and a high product of evolution. This is easily seen when we contrast the mental development of a typical insect with that of man.

A certain beetle (*Sitaris*) lays its eggs at the entrance of the galleries excavated by a kind of bee (*Anthophora*), each gallery leading to a cell. The young larvæ are hatched as active little insects, with six legs, two long antennæ, and four eyes, very different from the larvæ of other beetles. They emerge

from the egg in the autumn, and remain in a sluggish condition till the spring. At that time (in April) the drones of the bee emerge from the pupæ, and as they pass out through the gallery the *Sitaris* larvæ fasten upon them. There they remain till the nuptial flight of the *Anthophora*, when the larva passes from the male to the female bee. Then again they wait their chance. The moment the bee lays an egg, the *Sitaris* larva springs upon it. Even while the poor mother is carefully fastening up her cell, her mortal enemy is beginning to devour her offspring; for the egg of the *Anthophora* serves not only as a raft, but as a repast. The honey, which is enough for either, would be too little for both; and the *Sitaris*, therefore, at its first meal, relieves itself from its only rival. After eight days the egg is consumed, and on the empty shell the *Sitaris* undergoes its first transformation, and makes its appearance in a very different form. . . . It changes into a white, fleshy grub, so organized as to float on the surface of the honey, with the mouth beneath and the spiracles above the surface. . . . In this state it remains until the honey is consumed; and, after some further metamorphoses, develops into a perfect beetle in August.<sup>2</sup>

Now, the notable thing about *Sitaris* is that he appears to have no memory. He seems to learn nothing; for instance, he does *not learn* how to do anything. Many of his actions he does only once, and all of them he does as well the first time of doing as the last time. Memory, therefore, would be of no use to him. He arrives in the world perfectly equipped for the battle of his life, and is quite independent of all experience. He absorbs food, and, as he grows, his mind, such as it is, develops. Nothing besides the food is necessary for its development. He uses his mind, but the use of it does not add anything to it. His mental characters, therefore, are all inborn. They are instincts. An instinct is an emotional impulse which develops under the mere influence of nutrition, and which prompts to a corresponding action, the instinctive action. A man is very different. He is born very helpless, with few instincts, most of which are very imperfect. He has the instincts of sexual and parental love, but he *learns* to love this or that particular person. He has the instinct to sport, and so to develop his body by using it. He has the instincts of curiosity and imitativeness which cause him to use his mind, and so to develop it. He has, besides, the instinct to eat when hungry, and to rest when tired, and one or two other instincts. But, on the whole, his

<sup>2</sup> Lloyd Morgan, *Animal Intelligence*, pp: 438, 439.



equipment of instinct is reduced to a minimum, which is the reason he is so helpless at birth. But he has a most enormous memory, a most prodigious power of growing mentally as he uses his mind. From birth forward he continually stores experiences, by which he guides his future conduct, and thus becomes the most helpful of animals. Only a very little part of his mind, therefore, is inborn and instinctive; immensely the greater part is acquired, in the sense that it develops under the influence of use, of experience.

Now, because the beetle's mind is inborn, owing nothing to experience, therefore one beetle is mentally almost exactly like every other beetle of the same species. If different beetles have different experiences, that makes no difference to their minds, since they are incapable of profiting by it. But, because a man's mind develops almost wholly under the influence of experience, the minds of no two men are alike. Think how different are the minds of the various people in this room—how different the contents of their memories, how different their hopes and hates, their ideals, and ambitions, and temptations. If, were it possible, we exchanged minds one with another, and were conscious of the change, we should feel almost that we had entered a new and extraordinary world. But if one *Sitaris* exchanged mind with another, he would not know the difference. In brief, our minds differ because we are able to store in memory our experiences, which are never alike in any two men. The minds of beetles, on the other hand, are alike, because they are not affected by experience. According to the experience he has, an average baby may become a fool or a wise man, a yokel or a statesman, a savage or a civilized man, a saint or a thief. He may be trained to love or abhor a particular religion, or code of morals, or country. *Sitaris* can be trained to nothing, because he is able to learn to remember nothing. It is possible to trace the evolution of memory, of the power of learning by experience. In the fish and frog this power is extremely limited. These animals have almost purely instinctive minds. Their bodies also appear to develop almost solely under the influence of nutrition, for frogs imprisoned in cavities from the tadpole stage have emerged with the body and mind fully

developed. The cat, on the other hand, learns much. By its play it develops both body and mind. A dog is still more capable of learning. This capacity of learning and utilizing experience is what we term "intelligence." All our domestic animals have some intelligence, which is why we are able to tame them. Man, the latest product of evolution, is pre-eminent above all other animals in his capacity for storing and utilizing experience. It is this that makes him human. It is this alone that makes him rational. All thinking depends on memory. Such an animal as *Sitaris* cannot think; it can only feel. Man is inferior to *Sitaris* in instinct, but in intellect, which is the product of stored experience, he is immeasurably superior.

To sum up, man is distinguished from all other animals, first, by his enormous power of storing mental experiences, a power which we term "memory"; and, second, by his equally splendid power of utilizing the contents of his memory, a power which we term "reason." These powers are possessed by all races of mankind and by all sane individuals; though it may be that this or that race or individual has greater powers than another. Similarly, all races and sane individuals have the same instincts; for these, like memory and reason, are not sudden developments, but products of prolonged evolution. It is possible, of course, that one race or one individual has more or less of this or that instinct than another, but the difference can seldom be great. No word is more abused in popular, and even in scientific, literature than "instinct." Thus we often hear of the "instinct" of the savage for tracking game. But no savage baby is born with a knowledge of the appearance and habits of wild animals, nor does the knowledge arise in him during later life, in the absence of experience, any more than a knowledge arises thus in a civilized baby. Presumably, an English child, under fit tuition, would acquire the knowledge just as quickly and easily. So also we hear of a blow being dodged "instinctively;" but no human being dodges blows until he has learned the nature of blows and how to avoid them. In the house-fly, on the contrary, the knowledge, if we may so term it, of dodging blows is really instinctive. We hear of the human "instinct" of fear; but a baby fears nothing till he has

learned what to fear. We hear of the "instinct" to scratch an itching spot; but, unlike the bird or the rabbit, no baby ever scratches until he has learned how and when and where to scratch. Man is almost the one mammal who is unable to swim instinctively. It is, indeed, very plain that instincts have greatly dwindled in man. It is fortunate for him that they have dwindled. The loss of them has rendered him all the more adaptable. Reason is a greatly superior substitute, provided his parents tend and protect him till he has acquired it.

We know that different individuals and races of man differ greatly in body and mind. Thus the Englishman has one set of physical and mental characters, the Chinaman another, and the west-African black a third. We know that, to a large extent, the physical differences between races are inborn, and we are apt to assume that the mental differences are also innate. But when we remember how little is instinctive in the mind of man, and how much acquired, a strong suspicion is raised that we are mistaken in supposing that inborn mental differences between races and individuals are so great as are commonly supposed, or, at any rate, are of the kind that most people think they are. In practice, we assume that mental training is everything, and for that reason we carefully educate our children, seeking to endow them with a fund of useful knowledge, with energy and ability, and with high ideals. But if we meet a man who is clever or stupid, or energetic or slothful, or morose or amiable, and so forth, we almost invariably assume he has been made what he is by nature, not by the experiences through which he has passed. We cannot settle the question as to whether nature or nurture plays the more important part in molding character by observing individuals, for, after training a man under one system, we cannot make him young again so as to train him under another. But what we cannot observe in the case of individuals we can observe in the case of races, which, after all, are only aggregates of individuals. Races are perpetually young, for each generation starts afresh. The so-called old races are only races whose history is known for a great length of time.

Many races quite suddenly changed their mental environment.



That is to say, the new generations have been differently trained, have developed under different sets of mental experiences, as compared to their ancestors. If, under these circumstances, the race has changed its mental characters, we may be sure that the alteration is an acquired, not a germinal, one; for the latter can occur only under a very slow process of evolution or degeneration extending over many generations. The Greeks are a case in point. At first they were rude barbarians, apparently in no way distinguished from the surrounding tribes. Then quite suddenly, in quite a few generations, they became the most splendid race of which history holds record. Subsequently, with equal suddenness, they became an exceedingly wretched and degraded people. Obviously, these great mental differences were due in the Greeks to mere training, not to a process of evolution. A remarkable thing about Greece, in its period of greatness, was the vast number of able men that it produced. Among a population hardly equal to that of an average English county more really great men arose in a couple of hundred years than all Europe produced in fifteen centuries. Ancient Rome is another case in point. It also produced numbers of able men in quite a short time. Much the same thing happened in western Europe during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Flocks of great men arose in all countries that the Renaissance touched; that is, in all countries in which Greek learning and Greek methods of thought were revived. The doctrine of averages and the theory of evolution forbid the belief that these crowds of great men were due to sudden innate, that is germinal, changes in the races that produced them. On the contrary, we are forced to the conclusion that they occurred in greater numbers in some generations than in others, because in those particular generations the youth were better trained mentally than in preceding and succeeding generations. And this belief forces on us the corollary that the mental status of any individual or of any race is not necessarily in accord with the innate mental powers. It may be due, and generally is due, largely or wholly to mere training, to mere education.

The truth is vividly illustrated by a study of the mental effects produced on their followers by various religions. Every religion

influences its followers, not only by its distinct doctrines, but even more by the method by which the doctrines are taught. Some methods of religious training permit much greater intellectual freedom than others, even when the doctrines are much the same. Thus the Protestant section of the Christian religion imposes fewer restrictions than the Greek church. A little thought makes it evident that every race is enlightened and progressive, and produces men of distinguished achievement, precisely in proportion to the intellectual freedom permitted by the religion it follows. Mahomedans, Buddhists, and Hindus produce few great men. Mediæval Europe produced few. Modern Christianity is divided into three great sections. For the last century and a half almost every man who has achieved world-wide fame has arisen from among members of only one of those sections, or has been a rebel against the doctrines and restrictions of the other two. This section of Christianity has not a monopoly of innate genius, but it has a large monopoly of effective genius.

All this evidence renders it abundantly plain that mental power is not a mere matter of innate capacity, but is very largely a matter of intellectual training. No doubt, men differ as much in their inborn mental capacity as they do in bodily powers; but the former is much more difficult to detect. You can train a man of great innate capacity to have every appearance of a fool. You can so train a man of comparatively mean capacity that among worse-trained men he has every appearance of ability. When, therefore, we meet a distinguished man, it is unsafe to jump to the conclusion that he is necessarily of great mental capacity. And when we see a distinguished son follow a distinguished father, it is not entirely safe to conclude that great innate capacity has been inherited. We must remember the child's imitative instincts and the environment in which he has been reared — an environment in which his father, with his own intellectual methods and his energy, bulked large. Statistics of distinguished families illustrate the power of training quite as much as they do the power of heredity.

Since, with rare exceptions, variations of offspring from parents are spontaneous, it is obvious that we can improve a race

only, as breeders do, by restricting the output of offspring to individuals who have varied favorably. But we have seen how vast are the acquirements of man. Therefore we can often greatly improve the individual by improving the conditions under which he develops. We have our choice then. Shall we improve the innate qualities of our race by eugenic breeding; or shall we improve the acquirements of the individuals of the race by improving their surroundings; or shall we do both? I think all people with any sense of duty to their fellow-creatures will declare that, if practicable, we ought to do both. We should bear in mind, however, that, were eugenic breeding possible, we could improve the race to an unlimited extent; whereas our power of improving the individual by placing him under better conditions is strictly limited. We should remember, moreover, that an improved environment tends ultimately to degrade the race by causing an increased survival of the unfit. Our power to benefit the individual physically by improving his acquirements is less than our power to benefit him mentally. Most civilized people develop under fairly good physical surroundings. Only in the slums of great cities, as a rule, is bodily growth much stunted and the individual enfeebled by insufficient nourishment and by bad hygienic conditions. There is every hope, besides, that, with the spread of knowledge and the awakening of the public conscience, the worst features of slums will disappear in the near future. If, then, we wish to improve the nation physically, it must be mainly by selective breeding. Since we are a strong and robust race, most people will agree that this is unnecessary as regards stature, strength, and stamina. But, as we have seen, certain types of men are unfit for existence under civilized conditions of life; for example, people susceptible to consumption or to the charm of alcohol. The experience of very many centuries has proved that it is impossible to abolish the abuse of alcohol. Among civilized peoples especially, repressive measures—at any rate, severely repressive measures—actually increase the total amount of drunkenness. It will, I think, prove equally impossible to banish the tubercle bacillus. It is spread by the mere act of coughing. Improved hygiene will result in such a revival of people suscept-



ible to consumption that the mortality will always tend to keep pace with the improvements. In the Pacific islands a very susceptible race dwelling under ideal hygienic conditions undergoes extinction when consumption is introduced. Probably, therefore, our only hope of permanently reducing the mortality and misery caused by intemperance and consumption lies in selective breeding.

As regards mind also, we have our choice between selective breeding and an improved environment; that is to say, improved mental training, improved education. No one who contrasts the ancient Greek type of mind with the modern Thibetan type, and realizes that the difference resulted mainly from mere education; who knows that the cannibal Maoris in a single generation have acquired all the characteristics of a civilized race except the power to resist disease; who is aware that during one year a school of aborigines produced better results than any school of white children in Australia; who thinks of what Japan has done within thirty years; and who perceives how vile is the present system of education in this country, especially the education of the upper classes, will doubt that it is in our power to affect an immense and immediate improvement in mind. There is no reason why we should not rival, and even surpass, the Greeks. We have their example, a knowledge of their methods. We could stand on their shoulders, and possess a vastly larger fund of positive knowledge. The subject of education is far too large to enter on here, but we may note that, when we compare Greek and modern methods of instruction, one fundamental difference becomes manifest. The Greeks taught their youths how to think; we teach them what to think. The Greeks devoted their main attention to developing the understanding; we devote ours to loading the memory. Whatever the Greek boy learned linked up with the interests of adult life, and was therefore remembered. Much that the English boy learns has no bearing on the interests of adult life, and therefore is forgotten. In brief, the Greek youths were educated in a real sense; the English youths, in a sense, are merely crammed. Dogmatic education is, of course, the merest cram, with the added element that care is designedly taken to stifle independent thought. Classical education in which

the language, but not the methods of thought of the ancients, are inculcated is also cram. But perhaps the least excusable form of cramming, since it is perpetrated by men who should know better, is that utter neglect of the reasoning faculty, combined with an enormous overloading of the memory, by means of which the thinking powers of scientific students are destroyed.

So vast might be the benefit to mind which would quickly follow a mere improvement of education that, until we have done all that it is possible in this direction, any attempt to exalt the innate mental qualities of the race by the slower process of selective breeding would be lost time. As we have seen, such an attempt, owing to our present lack of means to distinguish in practice between inborn capacity and acquired ability, would present peculiar difficulties. In one particular, however, the selective breeding of mind is imperative. The number of the insane is very rapidly increasing in all civilized countries. Various explanations have been offered. It is said that the stress of modern life is the cause of the increase. But there is no evidence that the stress is greater than formerly, except perhaps among that small class which is wealthy enough to devote itself to pleasure. The falling death-rate would seem to indicate the contrary. Moreover, the rise of insanity is as great in remote country districts, where conditions have changed little—for example, in the west of Ireland—as in towns. Again, it is said that the rise is due to parental intemperance and consumption. But consumption and, probably, chronic alcoholism are much less than formerly. Moreover, this theory is opposed to the doctrine of natural selection. Were it true, life would be impossible on earth. Yet again, it is thought that improved medical treatment has caused insane people to live longer, and so to accumulate, and that the registration of the insane is more efficient than formerly. No doubt this theory contains a large element of truth. But the rise of insanity is so great and continuous that it is manifestly insufficient to explain the whole facts. We must seek for an additional factor. Formerly the insane were treated with the greatest barbarity.

While many were burned as witches, those who were recognized as insane were compelled to endure all the horrors of the harshest imprisonment. Blows, bleeding, and chains were their usual treatment, and horrible accounts are given of madmen who had spent decades bound in dark cells . . . not until the eighteenth century was the condition of this unhappy class seriously improved.<sup>3</sup>

We may judge of the former treatment of the insane from Shakespeare's words: "Love is merely a madness I tell you, deserves as well a dark house and a whip as madmen do."<sup>4</sup> Until very recently, then, in the vast majority of cases, the unfortunate lunatic was placed under conditions which insured death or permanent insanity. From the moment his mental unsoundness declared itself he ceased to have offspring. The natural selection of the sane, therefore, was very stringent. For some generations past, however, lunatics have been treated with great humanity and skill. Beyond all classes of the community, they are now watched over by the state. Men of sound mind, but suffering from bodily illness, may perish in the slums for want of proper nourishment and care; but the insane are removed to special sanatoria, where, without expense to themselves, they receive food and lodging, and are placed under the care of trained nurses and medical specialists, over whom in turn the Commissioners in Lunacy exercise a jealous supervision. As a consequence, the lunatic frequently recovers, and is restored to his family and to the right to have as many children as other people. Here is a case in point. A lady writes:

For years I have been struggling to prevent idiots and lunatics being sent from our county asylum to marry and breed idiots — just as if the thing were desirable. I gave it up in hopeless despair about four years ago, owing to the following case: A woman who is more than half idiotic came to live with two sisters — one a total, the other a partial, idiot. She married a very dull, partially idiotic man, and had almost immediately to be taken to the asylum. There she gave birth to a complete idiot, and was sent home a few weeks afterward, with the result that the same thing has been repeated nine times.<sup>5</sup>

The severity of natural selection with regard to the insane has been greatly reduced; and, as in all similar cases, characters

<sup>3</sup> Lecky, *History of European Morals*, Vol. II, pp. 86, 87.

<sup>4</sup> *As You Like It*. Act III, scene 2.

<sup>5</sup> Quoted by Dr. Rentoul.



which selection formerly eliminated are tending to become more common. The huge brain of man is a very complex and delicate machine. A defect (an unfavorable variation) in any of its parts is apt to throw the whole out of gear; and, like other variations, such a defect, such a predisposition to insanity, tends to be inherited. Unless, therefore, we find means to check the output of children by the mentally unsound, the insane will multiply until the state is no longer able to bear the weight of their maintenance. Selective breeding in this case is a dire necessity, and, therefore, a certainty in the near future.

As I understand him, Mr. Galton proposes to exalt our race by encouraging the finest types to have large families. I venture to suggest, instead, that, for the present at least, we shall limit our efforts to discouraging the multiplication of the most unfortunate types. The latter proceeding would be more practicable, since, as regards mind at least, the feeble types are more easily detected than the best, and since it is always more easy to stop a horse drinking than to make him drink. But, as a fact, both Mr. Galton's suggestion and my own are utterly impracticable in the present state of public opinion, and even, if I may say, of public intelligence. Before the one proposal or the other can be thought of as anything more than a mere subject for academic discussion, we must have a more enlightened public, a wider diffusion of the knowledge of the laws of heredity. Of sheer necessity, that diffusion of knowledge will come ere long. I think I know the path it will follow. The medical profession comprises the largest and, if united, the most powerful body of scientific men in the world. At present no systematic instruction in heredity is given to its members. Presently that will be changed. The doctor will realize that other things and more things are known about heredity than he supposes. He will recognize that the science is not summed up by the hypothesis that, if a man contracts a disease or is drunken, his offspring will tend to be sickly or insane. He will perceive that the facts of heredity are just as essentially and naturally a part of his medical equipment as the facts of physiology and anatomy. At present he is in no way distinguished intellectually above his contemporaries of the same

social stratum. Man of science though he be, he and his fellows contribute less to the thought of the nation, and guide public opinion less, than any other of the great professions. But when he studies heredity, he will understand the development of mind in the individual; he will separate the acquired from the inborn, and will know why certain systems of education have depressed some nations, whereas other nations have been exalted by different systems; and then he will reform his own education and come into his kingdom. Indeed, the mere study of heredity will constitute the necessary reform; for, though the additional facts with which he will have to load his memory will be few, yet the close, accurate, and prolonged course of thinking that he will have to undergo will develop his intellectual powers, and, lifting him above the often petty minutiae of his daily life, will bring him in contact with many great subjects. A trained expert now in all that is connected with the development of the body, he will become a trained expert in all that is connected with the development of mind. His will be the most commanding voice in that most vital of all questions, the education of the young. Under his influence, mental training will become scientific, in the sense that it will be conducted with a full knowledge of means and ends. In that day he will perceive also that selective breeding, the only possible remedy against dangers that loom great and terrible in the future, is really a question of public health; and then men like Mr. Galton, who have devoted their lives to a noble purpose, will not speak to a small and impotent circle, but to the intellectual flower of the nation.

# ORGANIZATION OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

## OFFICIAL REPORT

During the summer of 1905 Professor C. W. A. Veditz, of the George Washington University, wrote to a number of the well-known sociologists of the United States with a view to securing an expression of opinion with regard to the desirability and feasibility of forming some sort of an organization of sociologists. This correspondence indicated, among those who participated in it, a unanimous desire for such an organization. Dr. Lester F. Ward, of Washington, believed that there is certainly need for a national sociological association, inasmuch as the sociologists of the country need to get together, and no existing association of a scientific character enables them to do this to the extent that is necessary. Professor S. N. Patten was of practically the same opinion. Professor S. M. Lindsay and Professor T. N. Carver, while they favored an organization of sociologists, were not convinced that it ought to be an entirely separate and independent organization; they felt that it would be unwise, perhaps, to separate at this time from the Economic Association, with which most sociologists are now connected, and in which almost all sociologists are interested.

More detailed expressions of opinion were received from Professor Albion W. Small, of the University of Chicago, and Professor E. A. Ross, of the University of Nebraska. The former wrote, in part, as follows:

The formation of a sociological association has been suggested by a number of sociologically inclined people in this region, and I should certainly be glad to co-operate most heartily in any plan which may seem feasible. The main thing is a getting together for free threshing out of ideas of common interest. My suggestion is that you take the responsibility of corresponding with the program committee of the Economic Association, and suggest that the program for the December meeting be arranged in such a



way that there would be room for the sociologists to get together at a time during the session when the economic papers would be of a sort not necessarily of interest to the sociologists. Whether we should throw logic to the winds and organize a section of the Economic Association, simply for the practical reason that most of us are members of that body, and in general would prefer concentration of interests rather than division; or whether we should organize a parallel society like the Historical or the Political Science Association; or whether we should disregard the older societies altogether—these are questions of detail about which I should be ready to acquiesce in the views of the majority. My present opinion is, however, that it would be most advisable to make our first step as above suggested.

Professor E. A. Ross wrote as follows :

For three or four years I have thought the time was ripe for American sociologists to come together and thresh out their differences. . . . I should therefore heartily welcome the project for some sort of national association, and believe that such an association could do a great deal to clarify our minds, acquaint us with one another's opinions, and exalt the dignity of sociology in the public eye. Sociology has grown up through one-idea thinkers, each of whom has worked his idea for all that it is worth clear across the field. Now, however, there is a get-together spirit abroad, and a continuance of the isolation of the past cannot but prove a damage to the development of our science.

This correspondence resulted, after communication with the officers of the American Economic Association, in the following circular letter, which was sent to about three hundred persons throughout the country supposed to be interested in sociology :

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 2, 1905.

DEAR SIR :

You are invited to attend a conference of persons interested in sociology which will be held at Baltimore during the coming sessions of the American Economic Association and of the American Political Science Association, to discuss the advisability of forming a national sociological association designed to perform for sociologists services similar to those rendered for economists by the Economic Association, and for those interested in political science by the Political Science Association.

Sociologists have been so largely accustomed to working along divergent lines, and so frequently hold radically different views, that there seems to be peculiar justification for some sort of an organization which shall bring together at regular intervals those interested in the same group of problems, and permit of that interchange of ideas and comparison of projects which in

other fields of knowledge has so frequently contributed to the advancement of science. Several European nations already possess sociological associations for this purpose, although nowhere, perhaps, is there a greater, more widespread, or more truly scientific interest in the science of society than in the United States.

The proposed conference will take up the following questions, among others:

1. Is there need for an organization of sociologists?
2. Should it be formed now?
3. If needed and formed now, what should be its scope?
4. Ought it to be a separate, independent organization, or should it, at least for the present, form a part or division of some existing association?

The first session of the conference will be held Wednesday afternoon, December 27, 3:30 P. M., at the Johns Hopkins University.

If you cannot attend, it is earnestly requested that you send an expression of opinion on the above questions, together with whatever other suggestions you may care to make. All communications should be addressed to C. W. A. Veditz, George Washington University, Washington, D. C.

Respectfully yours,

THOMAS N. CARVER, Harvard University.

FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS, Columbia University.

SAMUEL M. LINDSAY, University of Pennsylvania.

SIMON N. PATTEN, University of Pennsylvania.

EDWARD A. ROSS, University of Nebraska.

ALBION W. SMALL, University of Chicago.

WILLIAM G. SUMNER, Yale University.

LESTER F. WARD, Washington, D. C.

C. W. A. VEDITZ, George Washington University.

In accordance with this invitation, the first meeting of those interested was held in McCoy Hall, at the Johns Hopkins University, Wednesday afternoon, December 27, at 3:30 P. M. The meeting was attended by some fifty persons, among whom were a number particularly interested in the practical aspects of sociology. Professor Davenport, of Hamilton College, acted as chairman of the meeting.

Professor C. W. A. Veditz, of the George Washington University, reported that he had received about forty replies to the circular letter of invitation, and that the great majority of these letters were from persons unable to attend the meeting. Among the writers of these replies there was practically a unanimity of

opinion in favor of the creation, and of the immediate creation, of a sociological organization of some sort. Differences of opinion seemed to arise only in connection with the third and fourth questions stated in the invitation, but even with regard to these there was a considerable majority in favor of the creation of a separate and independent organization (which it was felt, however, should meet at the same time and place as the Economic Association), and of providing that the scope of the new organization be sufficiently wide to include among its members not only those interested in sociology from a purely theoretical and academic point of view, but also those who are engaged in practical sociological work. It was suggested, in a number of the replies received, that the work of the new organization should be so arranged as to avoid duplicating the work being undertaken by other associations already in existence—such as the National Prison Association and the National Conference of Charities and Correction.

The trend of opinion among the writers of these replies may be indicated by the following quotations from letters received:

Says Professor E. A. Ross, of the University of Nebraska:

I think it is high time to organize a sociological group . . . that will make provision for three sessions of its own at the time of the meeting of the Historical, Economic, and Political Science Associations. These sessions should be held at the time that the economists are busy with the pure theory portions of their program. As the *American Journal of Sociology* will no doubt publish the best part of the proceedings, I see no reason for our group doing any publishing. . . . In a few years, when the status of sociology is more assured, it will be time to develop into a full-fledged association.

Professor Albion W. Small wrote as follows:

I count much on this conference of sociologists. I have shifted my own view-point somewhat since the idea was first broached. I should now be in favor of a separate society, not with a view to a permanent split from the other societies engaged in the study of the social sciences, but in order to stand up and be counted more definitely, and to attract the attention of the other people more clearly than we can while merely lost in the old-time shuffle. . . . I should urge that the sociologists keep the machinery of their society as simple and inexpensive as possible, so that dues will not be a serious additional burden to anybody; and that we attempt to recognize



in our fellowship and in our program all the different divisions of sociological interest. That is, the few general sociologists should not say to the social technologist of any type, "We have no need of thee," or *vice versa*. The social psychologists should not assume to be the sociologists *par excellence*, to the disparagement of the Galtonites, for instance, or any of the economists or historians who are really trying to interpret any part of life by correlating it with the whole. We should look forward, not to a suppression of division of labor within the social sciences, but to large development of it, and our emphasis should always be upon the reinforcement that all partial knowledge of society must get from finding the actual correlations of its abstraction with the plexus of social processes.

A practical sociologist, Mr. Wallace E. Miller, of the First Social Settlement Society of Columbus, Ohio, expressed the opinion that

there is a clearly defined need for an organization of sociologists which will bring together those who are engaged in practical work. Such an organization would strengthen the work done in sociology throughout the country.

Another practical sociologist, Miss Anna Garlin Spencer, of the New York School of Philanthropy, expressed

keen interest in any effort to consolidate and make more effective the labors of those who are trying to solve social problems and initiate social movements by the light of science. I am very desirous that there shall be a "clearing-house" in the field of sociology, especially that which has focused into practical effort. I hope that applied sociology, or the new scientific philanthropy, will receive due attention in the considerations of the conference.

Professor F. G. Young, of the University of Oregon, wrote:

If all the men whose names are signed to the note of invitation feel the need and disposition to get together to co-ordinate views and co-operate through division of labor, your first two inquiries and the first part of the third are answered for all very positively in the affirmative. The matter of the scope of the organization is not so simple. I would suggest the advisability of having three or four quite definite lines of inquiry represented in each program:

1. Fundamental problems as to postulates and methods should always be given a hearing.
2. The significance in sociological theory of new departures or tendencies in the older sciences is a matter of prime importance, and would lend itself admirably to elucidation before such an association.
3. Discussions bearing on the application of the principles of the science

to large social questions affecting the national welfare, and having particular prominence in the social consciousness, should have consideration; such matters as race-suicide and normal racial relations under a single political sovereignty would at this time receive notice.

4. Co-ordination of the results from the different American and European tendencies in the science would, I think, be a matter worthy of some attention from such a body.

It was the opinion of Professor C. R. Henderson, of the University of Chicago, that

an organization of sociologists is inevitable, and it is desirable. For the present, however, I should advise that a very modest beginning be made, and that the meetings be held in connection with the Economic, the Historical, and the Political Science Associations.

Professor Charles A. Ellwood, of the University of Missouri, wrote:

It seems to me that the time has come to form an American sociological association. No organization of national scope now in existence gives anything but the most trifling attention to the problems which the sociologist is trying to investigate. The American Economic Association has occasionally had on its program papers dealing with sociological problems; but if this can satisfy the group of American sociologists, we shall but proclaim to the world our lack of interest in, and enthusiasm for, the science in which we are working.

I am in favor, therefore, of an independent sociological association—organized somewhat on the plan of the American Political Science Association—to meet at the same time and place annually as the American Economic Association. I am also in favor of making membership in this association open to all who have any interest in sociological problems; and I believe that the program of the association should not be definitely limited in any way, but should be left to be determined by the program or executive committee.

Professor Frank W. Blackmar, of the University of Kansas, gave expression to the following opinion:

There certainly is a need for an organization of sociologists at the present time. It would undoubtedly advance the study of sociology very much, and would be of special service in bringing about a consensus of opinion in regard to disputed points in sociological development. It should be formed now, because we are ready for such an organization. I think it safe to say that we have never been ready for such an organization before. . . . Its scope should be sociology—general, pure, and applied. Care

should be taken to keep it from encroaching on the ground pre-empted by the American Historical Association, the American Political Science Association, the American Economic Association, or the American Anthropological Society.

In my estimation it should be a separate and independent organization, To make it a part of one of the associations named would give it a subordinate position, and, what is worse, would seem to indicate that sociology is a branch of either history, political science, economics, or anthropology. It might be possible that it should form a division of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. As a section of this association, it would be placed close to biology and psychology, which might be of some advantage. However, it appears to me that the A. A. A. S. is already far too large and cumbersome for the best quality of work, and that more vital work would be done in a separate organization.

Nearly all of the letters received in reply to the circular, of which only a few are quoted above, came from persons who would be unable to attend the conference. The circular was so worded as to suggest a reply by letter only as a substitute for personal participation in the conference.

At the conference it was moved, after hearing the report of Professor Veditz, that a sociological association be formed, and that it be formed at once. This motion prevailed. Professor Giddings, of Columbia University, pointed out that probably in no country in the world is there so much interest in the problems of sociology, whether theoretical or practical, as in the United States. Many, if not most, of our colleges and universities offer courses in sociology. The American literature of the subject is noteworthy both with regard to quantity and quality, and has received frequent and ready recognition abroad. Before many of those present at the meeting had even entered college, Professor Sumner, of Yale, was giving courses in sociology, using Herbert Spencer's *Sociology* as a textbook. Yet, while France and England both have successful sociological associations which publish valuable papers on sociological subjects, we have as yet, strange to say, no distinctively scientific national organization of sociologists.

In discussing the scope of the new organization or group, Mr. Clinton Rogers Woodruff, of Philadelphia, raised the question whether those interested in practical reform work would be



allowed to become members. While this question was not specifically answered, the opinion appeared to prevail that so long as the predominating point of view in the association be scientific, practical sociologists ought certainly not to be excluded from its membership. In fact, it would appear that practical sociological workers in different parts of the country, and engaged in different lines of activity, have quite as much to gain from an interchange of views and of experiences as have the purely theoretical or academic sociologists. Moreover, one of the best results of the new organization would be achieved by bringing into close and regular contact the "theoretical" and the "practical" sociologists; each has much to learn of the other.

With regard to the question whether the new organization should be separate and independent or not, remarks were made by Dr. Lester F. Ward, of Washington, D. C.; Professors David C. Wells, of Dartmouth College; W. F. Willcox, of Cornell; Franklin H. Giddings, of Columbia; David Kinley, of Illinois; Thomas N. Carver, of Harvard; E. C. Hayes, of Miami; C. W. A. Veditz, of George Washington University; and S. M. Lindsay, of Pennsylvania. In the course of this discussion it was pointed out that if the new organization were to become a section of an already existing association, it would not be easy to answer the question: Of *what* association should it be made a part? There seemed to be almost equally good reasons for annexing it to any of several organizations—such as the Economic Association, the Statistical Association, the Social Science Association, the Anthropological Society, and the Association for the Advancement of Science. It was urged by some, moreover, that if the new organization is made part of an existing organization, one could become a member only by joining the parent organization. Again, if the sociologists form merely a part, let us say of the Economic Association, that would imply that sociology is either subservient to economics or a part of it. And if the sociologists were to ask for a part in the program of the Economic Association, the part which the economists would be willing or able to give them would probably be insufficient, and the practical result of such an arrangement would be apt to

be a program which would satisfy neither the sociologists nor the economists. Not only has the sociologist problems of his own, which seem to him to merit as elaborate discussion as the problems which interest the economist, but those problems are as numerous and as varied in character as the problems to which the Economic Association now devotes its time at each annual meeting. There ought, to be sure, to be one or more "joint meetings," in which problems are discussed which are germane to both economics and sociology; and these meetings would emphasize the close relationship which subsists between economics and sociology, without implying that economics is sociology or that sociology is economics.

The hope was expressed by some of those who spoke that there would ultimately be formed a federation of the societies engaged in the study of the social sciences—particularly the Economic Association, the Political Science Association, and the new sociological association—to avoid the wastes and difficulties and disadvantages of a multiplication of societies while retaining the advantages of having distinct interests. Such a federation might have but one organ, one publishing committee, one president (with a vice-president for each of the three subdivisions), and a single membership fee for all three branches.

At all events, in the opinion of those who spoke upon this point, the meetings of the sociological association should invariably occur at the same time and place as those of the Economic Association.

Professor Lindsay remarked that the newly created Political Science Association had carefully gone into the question whether the political scientists should form a new association, or join some one already in existence, and be content with sharing in the program. He asked whether anyone present was able to furnish information on the results of this investigation. To this question Dr. Max West, of the federal Bureau of Corporations, who participated in the formation of the Political Science Association, replied that the political scientists had reached the conclusion that the problems which interested them were so distinct, so numerous, and so important as to require practically a

separate program with separate meetings, and therefore a separate organization, and that, should any arrangement looking toward a combination with the economists be found desirable, this arrangement had better be made by a completed independent organization, able to deal with the Economic Association on a footing of equality.

Professor Carver, of Harvard, questioned the desirability, for the present at least, of a separate organization. He believed that in many respects the multiplication of organizations is undesirable, and that for a considerable period there would be too few persons interested in sociology to warrant the creation of an independent society. He was willing, however, to accept the decision of the majority of those interested.

Professor Kinley, of the University of Illinois, considered the formation of a sociological association inevitable, and advocated "taking the bull by the horns at once" and starting a separate organization, even though its beginnings might be modest.

Professor Willcox, of Cornell, made mention of the American Social Science Association as an association with which we might possibly affiliate in some way. That organization has a long and honorable history, but, so far as Professor Willcox knew, it was declining, if not already defunct. Perhaps a union of the new organization with this old one might prove extremely beneficial and acceptable to both.

Dr. Ward's motion, that the sociologists form a separate and independent organization, was thereupon put to a vote and carried with but two dissenting voices.

Mr. C. R. Woodruff moved that a committee of five persons be appointed to draw up a "scheme of government" for the new organization, and that this committee, appointed by the chair, report at the next meeting, to be held at 3:30 the next day. This motion was seconded and carried, and the meeting adjourned.

Shortly after adjournment, Professor Davenport named the following committee on organization: Professors Veditz, Willcox, Wells, Cooley, and Lindsay.



The second meeting of the conference was held at the time appointed, and attended by the following persons, among others:

B. W. Arnold, Jr., of Randolph-Macon College; Franklin H. Giddings, of Columbia; George K. Holmes, of the United States Department of Agriculture; Lester F. Ward, of Washington, D. C.; C. W. A. Veditz, of George Washington University; Charles Cooley of the University of Michigan; Henry M. Leipziger, of the New York Bureau of Education; Edward C. Hayes, of Miami University; Jiro Aburtani, of Columbia University; Carl Kelsey, of the University of Pennsylvania; J. Elbert Cutler, of Wellesley; Alvan A. Tenney, of Columbia; A. V. Heester, of Franklin and Marshall College; John H. Dynes, of the United States Bureau of Corporations; Simon N. Patten, of the University of Pennsylvania; Thomas N. Carver, of Harvard; David Kinley, of the University of Illinois; William Davenport, of Hamilton College; William H. Allen, of New York; Miss Lucile Eaves, of New York; U. G. Weatherley, of the University of Indiana; W. F. Willcox, of Cornell; C. R. Woodruff, of Philadelphia; George G. Wilson, of Brown; D. L. Wing, of the United States Bureau of Corporations; Max West, of the United States Bureau of Corporations; C. C. Morhart, of Washington, D. C.; A. G. Keller, of Yale; Edward H. Davis, of Purdue University; George S. Sumner, of Pomona College; H. Wirt Steele, of Baltimore; S. N. Lindsay, of the University of Pennsylvania; David C. Wells, of Dartmouth; W. E. Miller, of Columbus, Ohio; J. Dorsey Forrest, of Butler College; Walter E. Weyl, of New York.

The chairman of the committee on organization, C. W. A. Veditz, reported the following constitution:

#### ARTICLE I—NAME

This society shall be known as the American Sociological Society.

#### ARTICLE II—OBJECTS

The objects of this society shall be the encouragement of sociological research and discussion, and the promotion of intercourse between persons engaged in the scientific study of society.

#### ARTICLE III—MEMBERSHIP

Any person may become a member of this society upon payment of Three Dollars, and may continue such by paying thereafter annually a fee of Three Dollars.

By a single payment of Fifty Dollars any person may become a life member of the society.

Each member is entitled to a copy of the current publications of the society.

## ARTICLE IV—OFFICERS

The officers of this Society shall be a President, two Vice-Presidents, a Secretary, a Treasurer—elected at each annual meeting—and an Executive Committee consisting of the officers above mentioned *ex officio*, together with six elected members whose terms of office shall be three years; except that of those chosen at the first election two shall serve for but one year and two for two years.

The offices of Secretary and of Treasurer may be filled by the same person.

## ARTICLE V—ELECTION OF OFFICERS

All officers shall be elected only after nomination by a special committee of the society appointed by the Executive Committee; except that the officers for the first year shall be nominated by a committee of three, to be appointed by the chairman of the meeting at which this constitution is adopted.

All officers shall be elected by a majority vote of the members of the society present at the annual meeting.

## ARTICLE VI—DUTIES OF OFFICERS

The President of the society shall preside at all meetings of the society and of the Executive Committee, and shall perform such other duties as the Executive Committee may assign to him. In his absence his duties shall devolve, successively, upon the Vice-Presidents in the order of their election, upon the Secretary, and upon the Treasurer.

The Secretary shall keep the records of the society, and perform such other duties as the Executive Committee may assign to him.

The Treasurer shall receive and have the custody of the funds of the society, subject to the rules of the Executive Committee.

The Executive Committee shall have charge of the general interests of the society, shall call regular and special meetings of the society, appropriate money, appoint committees and their chairmen, with suitable powers, and in general possess the governing power in the society, except as otherwise specifically provided in this constitution. The Executive Committee shall have power to fill vacancies in its membership occasioned by death, resignation, or failure to elect, such appointees to hold office until the next annual election.

Five members shall constitute a quorum of the Executive Committee, and a majority vote of those members in attendance shall control its decisions.

## ARTICLE VII—RESOLUTIONS

All resolutions to which objection is made shall be referred to the Executive Committee for its approval before submission to the vote of the society.

## ARTICLE VIII—AMENDMENTS

Amendments to this constitution shall be proposed by the Executive Committee and adopted by a majority vote of the members present at any regular or special meeting of the society.

After the reading of this constitution, it was voted to take action upon each article separately. The only articles, however, on which there was any discussion were Arts. II and VII. Professor Kelsey raised the question whether Art. II might not be interpreted to exclude those interested mainly in practical sociological work. Miss Eaves and Dr. Leipziger wished that it might be made clear that practical sociologists could be included in the membership of the society. Professors Giddings and Wells were of the opinion that the original wording of the article was ample enough to include everybody interested in sociology, so long as their interest is not exclusively practical. The purposes of the society being mainly scientific, the emphasis should be placed on that aspect of sociology. But while the society, as a society, is mainly interested in the scientific and critical, rather than the popular or propagandist, aspect of sociology, it does not follow that its members must be exclusively, or even mainly, interested in theoretical sociology. All that is necessary is that they be *interested* in sociological discussion and research. Art. II was then adopted unanimously.

Concerning Art. VII the question was raised whether it might not be well to provide specifically that the society be not allowed to pass any resolution approving or disapproving specific sociological doctrines or specific schemes for social betterment. The ensuing discussion of this question indicated that, in the belief of a majority of those present, Art. VII was sufficient to prevent the submission and consideration of undesirable motions. This article was then passed unanimously, and the constitution likewise adopted unanimously as a whole.

In accordance with its provisions, the chairman, Professor Davenport, appointed the following Nominating Committee: Professors Wells, Kelsey, and Cutler; with the request that they report as soon as possible.



Meanwhile a motion was made and carried, to the effect that the Executive Committee be requested to appoint a Committee on Membership as soon as possible, for the purpose of making known the existence and objects of the society and enrolling members.

In reply to the question whether the new organization would issue any publications, and by whom they would be issued, it was stated that, in the opinion of the Committee on Organization, it was deemed advisable not to create a Publication Committee as yet, but to leave that matter to the Executive Committee in accordance with the constitution. Moreover, the matter of publications depends largely on the extent of funds available for that purpose, and this depends in turn on the membership of the organization. Consequently this entire subject was left in abeyance.

At this stage of the meeting the Committee on nominations had returned with the following report:

For President—Lester F. Ward, of Washington, D. C.

For First Vice-President—Professor William G. Sumner, of Yale University.

For Second Vice-President—Professor Franklin H. Giddings, of Columbia University.

For Secretary and Treasurer—Professor C. W. A. Veditz, of the George Washington University.

Members of the Executive Committee—for three years: Professors E. A. Ross, of the University of Nebraska, and W. F. Willcox, of Cornell University; for two years: Professors Albion W. Small, of the University of Chicago, and Samuel M. Lindsay, of the University of Pennsylvania; for one year: Professors D. C. Wells, of Dartmouth College, and William Davenport, of Hamilton College.

Professor Giddings moved the acceptance of that part of this report which concerned the office of president. He took occasion to remark that nothing which he had ever done gave him so keen a sense of justice and fitness as he enjoyed in moving that Dr. Ward be made the first president of the American Sociological Society. Many years ago, when even among educated people the name of sociology was not merely discredited, but almost entirely unknown, Dr. Ward was already actively engaged in

giving the word an important meaning and insisting on the great rôle played by reason in the evolution of human society. All sociologists are under a heavy debt of gratitude to him, and their indebtedness to Ward is at least as great as to August Comte and Herbert Spencer.

Professor Giddings' motion was carried unanimously, and Dr. Ward was at once conducted to the chair by Professors Wells and Giddings. In taking charge of the meeting, Dr. Ward expressed briefly his appreciation of the totally unexpected honor thus thrust upon him, and declared himself proud of the distinction of being the first president of the first sociological society in America.

The remainder of the report of the Committee on Nominations was accepted unanimously, and the meeting was then adjourned, subject to the call of the Executive Committee, in accordance with the constitution.

## REVIEWS

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*The Color Line: A Brief in Behalf of the Unborn.* By WILLIAM BENJAMIN SMITH. New York: McClure, Phillips & Co. Pp. xv + 261.

This is in many respects a notable book on the negro problem. Its author is professor of mathematics in Tulane University, New Orleans, and is well known for his interest along a number of scientific lines. The book has already had a wide sale, especially in the South; and for this reason, as well as because of its scientific pretensions, it demands the attention of the sociologist. Its publishers advertise it as the first treatment of the negro problem in America "from the scientific point of view"; and the author himself in his "Foreword" speaks of it as a "purely scientific, and ethnological inquiry." It must be said at the outset, however, that the book is not a scientific inquiry. It is distinctly controversial in its character; and is, in fact, as its sub-title indicates, a brief, or rather a polemic, in defense of the attitude of the southern white towards the negro. The author makes such skilful use, however, of scientific facts and principles in his argument that the book has a value far beyond that which ordinarily attaches to controversial works. The polemical character of the work—and, we may add, of its literary style—should not be permitted to obscure its value as a contribution to the study of the negro problem in the United States.

The first chapter adheres faithfully to the purpose set forth in the title of the book. It is a plea for the continuance of the social separation of the races *in the South*. It is a justification, from the social and racial point of view, of "the color line," as it is maintained in the South even against exceptional individuals. There is nothing in this chapter which any sensible person, resident in a southern community, or even tolerably familiar with the conditions in our southern states, could possibly object to. If the book contained simply this plea for the maintenance of "the color line" in the South, I personally could find little to criticise in it.

But the rest of the book after the first chapter is taken up mainly with the larger problem of the destiny of the negro race in America, and, by implication, with the problem of the practical measures which



should be adopted in dealing with the negro. The author finds, he believes, good grounds for concluding that the negro cannot possibly take on the substance of the white man's civilization (pp. 35, 55, 102, 127); that education, whether intellectual or industrial, cannot benefit him as a race, but will only aid in his undoing and his demoralization (pp. 159, 165, 171, 259); and that, since the negro is hopelessly inferior, and incapable of being lifted to even approximate equality of efficiency with the white race, he is destined through competition with the white to disappear from this continent (pp. 180-92, 215, 248). Moreover, this extinction of the negro in the United States is no far-off event, thousands of years removed, but is within appreciable distance. "There are those now living," our author tells us, "who will actually see the Afro-American moving rapidly toward extinction" (p. 248). In other words, within a generation or two we may expect the negro population of the United States to come to a standstill, and then rapidly to decrease in actual numbers.

It is not my purpose to point out in detail the fallacies in the argument which leads to these sweeping conclusions, but it is my duty as a reviewer to note the more obvious errors in fact and theory upon which the argument is based.

In support of his conclusion as to the early disappearance of the negro element in the population of this country, Professor Smith cites as an authority Professor Willcox, of Cornell. It is true that some of Professor Willcox' statements regarding negro vital statistics would seem to lend support to our author's view, especially the one quoted at length (pp. 180-85). But it is noteworthy that Professor Willcox' most recent utterance on this subject gives little comfort to those who expect the early disappearance of the negro element in our population. In an article on "The Probable Increase of the Negro Race in the United States," in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, for August, 1905, Professor Willcox estimates the probable number of persons of negro descent in our population at the close of the present century at about 25,000,000—an estimate in which most experts in vital statistics would probably agree. Thus, so far as statistics are concerned, it must be said with emphasis that even the cessation of the increase in our negro population is not yet definitely in sight. The idea of the early—or for that matter, of the remote—elimination of the negroid element in our population is, therefore, a mere speculation.

As a matter of fact, Professor Smith's conclusions are based, not

upon statistical facts, but, as he himself admits, upon two assumptions: first, the natural inferiority of the negro as a race; and, secondly, the necessary degeneracy of the types produced by the intermixture of white blood with negro blood (pp. 29, 72). As to the first assumption, it may be granted that Professor Smith has the weight of scientific authority on his side, especially in so far as the inferiority claimed is in respect to intellectual and moral qualities. But even here it is to be noted that a large and growing school of anthropologists and race-psychologists finds the explanation of the mental and moral differences between races, not in innate qualities or capacities, but in differences in their social equipment or machinery.

If, however, Professor Smith has the weight of authority on his side in his first assumption, it is equally certain that the weight of authority is against him in his second assumption. This he seems to be ignorant of, or else he ignores it. As if half-conscious of the weakness of this second premise, he avoids stating it in plain and consistent terms. Sometimes he speaks of "the half-way nature of the half-breed"; sometimes of "the degeneracy induced by intermixture." But these are evidently entirely different propositions. No one questions the former. By the law of reversion to the mid-parent type, we should expect the half-breeds to fluctuate about the mid-line between the races; and this is what we actually find. From the point of view of the superior race those of mixed blood are, of course, inferior; but from the point of view of the inferior race they are superior. But this is not Professor Smith's assumption. His assumption is that the half-breed is inferior to both races, at least in all cases of crossing between races so diverse as the negro and the white. The former assumption, though sufficient for the purpose of maintaining the wisdom of social separation between the races, was not sufficient for our author's larger purpose, of proving the unimprovability of the negroid stock and the hopeless destiny of the negro race in America; hence he assumes "the racial [i. e., physiological] deterioration of the mulatto."

Now, if there are any of the larger questions of ethnology which may be said to have approached settlement during the last dozen years, it is this question of the physiological effects of the intermixture of races; and the all but universal consensus among ethnologists at present is that no bad physiological effects follow the intermixture of races even of the most diverse type, provided that

the crossing takes place under entirely normal circumstances; in other words, all races of mankind are perfectly fertile among themselves. Where bad physiological effects do follow the intermixture of races, this is in all cases due to vice or other socially abnormal conditions which accompany so frequently the crossing of superior with inferior peoples. The evidence in support of this conclusion cannot be presented here. Suffice to say that it has been ably presented by Boas and is summarized by Keane.<sup>1</sup> Professor Smith cites Bryce in support of his assumption that the crossing of such dissimilar races as the negro and the white necessarily results in physiological deterioration; but Bryce, though unprejudiced, can hardly be considered an authority on this matter. His somewhat ambiguous statements are derived from Broca, whose monograph on *Hybridity in the Genus Homo* has long since ceased to be authoritative.

Nor will it do to say that, since socially abnormal conditions so frequently accompany the crossing of the races in the United States, the result is practically the same as if degeneracy was the necessary physiological result. For in the past, at least, particularly under the régime of slavery, the conditions under which crossing took place were often relatively normal. Not all of the white blood infused into the negro race has been vicious and depraved; and if heredity counts for anything, this good white blood must greatly improve the negroid stock. This is exactly what we find; for the leaders of the negro race, its van and its hope today, are almost without exception of mixed blood. It is idle to call all these "degenerates." On the other hand, we should expect, from the way in which the mixed class is formed, that it would contain a large number of degenerate individuals, who make up the bulk of the criminal and the depraved among the negroes, and who lower the average of their class. But this is manifestly one of those many cases in statistics in which the average cannot be said to represent the general condition of the class.

Finally, even if we grant the natural inferiority of the negro in respect to intellectual and moral capacities, it may be noted that this does not make the future of the negro race in the United States anywhere near as hopeless as Professor Smith makes out. For the biological factor is not a fixed quantity, or utterly beyond human control, as he assumes. Even if the negro is inferior, there are at least three influences at work among the negroes of the United States slowly modifying the inferiority. The first of these is the

<sup>1</sup> See Keane, *Ethnology*, pp. 151-55.



infusion of white blood, which was discussed above. Just as a new invention breaks up the old cake of custom in the social world, so, breeders tell us, the infusion of a new strain of blood breaks up the cake of heredity, induces variability, and gives plasticity to the stock, all of which are the very conditions of progress. The strain of white blood now in our negro population is bound to become widely diffused (is so already, in fact), and is the best ground for the hope in the plasticity and improvability of the race in the future. A second influence which is at work modifying negro racial character in the United States is natural selection. Natural selection, biology teaches us, may often work very rapidly in a new environment. That it is at work very rapidly among the negroes of the United States is shown conclusively by their high death-rate; and it is doubtful if their high death-rate shows anything more than this. The stupid, unintelligent and vicious negro is being eliminated in competition with the white. The hope of the negro is that this natural elimination of inferior elements through competition will continue. Progress everywhere waits on death—the death of the inferior individual—and nowhere more so than in racial problems. A third influence which is modifying negro racial character is education. For all education which is worthy of the name is, not merely a training of the individual, but is a kind of artificial selection; and this Professor Smith forgets when he argues against the value of education for the racial improvement of the negro. The educative process is primarily a selective process; only it selects the best instead of merely eliminating the worst. Working along with the two influences named above, a rationally devised system of education might accomplish much for the improvement of the race.

Thus one can give full weight to the biological factor in the race problem, and still remain relatively optimistic regarding the future of the negro. Moreover, beyond racial heredity, however much weight we may give to it, we all recognize the possibility of training the individual, and thereby providing the mass of the race with a social equipment, which through tradition and imitation shall be passed from generation to generation, and become finally an acquisition of the race itself. Of this I have said nothing, and shall say nothing, because I have preferred to criticise Professor Smith upon his own ground, along the line of the argument which he adopted.

To sum up: I would say that the book is all right as a plea for

the continuance of the social separation between the races in the South, and would recommend those to read it who think there is no ground for maintaining a social and moral quarantine against the negro even where he exists in large numbers; but as an argument for the unimprovability of the negro race, the ultimate futility of negro education, and the early or remote extinction of the negro element in our population, it is weak, built upon fallacious reasoning, and unsound scientific theories.

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*A History of Political Theories: From Luther to Montesquieu.*

By WILLIAM ARCHIBALD DUNNING. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1905. Pp. xii + 459.

Students of political philosophy, and that larger and growing body of students who are now attracted by that broad field of social science described by the title of sociology, must have no small interest in so excellent a piece of work in the history of social philosophy as that which is the subject of this review. The admirable series of studies in the history of political theory begun by Professor Dunning in his first volume, *Political Theories Ancient and Medieval*, which appeared in 1902, is now followed by this second volume, which brings the history of political theories from Luther to Montesquieu.

It has been noticed long since, and perhaps by no one with more appreciation than by Bosanquet in his *Philosophical Theory of the State*, that there have been only two productive periods in political philosophy: the period of the Greek city-state, the period of Plato and Aristotle with echoes from Polybius and Cicero; and the modern period of awakened national self-consciousness. Luther marks an important epoch of time, a magnificent panorama of events by which we conveniently separate the modern world from the mediæval. Bodin rather than Luther must be taken as the inaugurator of the second productive period in political philosophy, if judged by the place assigned to him as the first of the great modern masters in political theory. This second volume is more compact than the first. From Luther to Montesquieu we traverse about two centuries, from the Sophists to Machiavelli approximately twenty centuries.

The volume opens with a chapter on the Reformation, in which the political theories of the four great Protestants, Luther, Melancthon, Zwingli, and Calvin, are noticed, followed by an examination

of the more systematic treatises which expound the antimonarchic doctrines that reflect the struggle of Europe against the oncoming absolutism of the new monarchy—the *Vindiciae contra Tyrannos*, the work of George Buchanan; the *Systematic Politics* of John Althaus (Johannes Althusius); and the astute *De Rege et Regis Institutionis* of the Spanish Jesuit, Mariana.

Bodin, Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, and Montesquieu each have the distinction of a separate chapter devoted to their political philosophy. Between Bodin and Grotius falls a chapter on the Catholic controversialists and jurists; among them, Bellarmin, Barclay, Suarez, and Campanella. Between Grotius and Hobbes come two studies, first a survey of the English political philosophy before the Puritan revolution, embracing a notice of the commentators on the common law like Glanvil, Richard Nigell, and Bracton, lawyers like Sir John Fortescue and Sir Edward Coke, and writers of the Tudor century like Moore and Hooker; and, second, the theories of the Puritan Revolution.

Between Hobbes and Locke we are asked to turn aside for a study of the development of continental theory during the age of Louis XIV. Spinoza, Pufendorf, and Bossuet receive commanding attention; Leibniz and Fenelon are considered as classing within the minor currents of continental theory. In passing from Locke to Montesquieu, Johann Christian Wolff, Frederick the Great, Bolingbroke, Hume, and Vico are considered—Germans, Englishmen, and Italian. This array of names and hint of historical episode give some intimation of the vast labor requisite for pronouncing qualified judgment on such a number of writers of books. But this self-imposed task has been well performed.

If I were to venture to name the distinguishing excellence of this volume, I should say it is the fine sense of proportion that guides the author in the distribution and arrangement of his ponderous material. Professor Dunning skilfully accords the great epochs and the great names their due place and importance, without neglecting to give a fair measure of recognition to minor currents and lesser lights. The order of subjects is not always chronological—it could not well be so; but it is always logical, and always guided careful weighing of inner relations of men and events. There is enough reference to contemporary history to guide the student not too unfamiliar with the setting of the great treatises in the real world of strife and conflict. Occasionally one finds himself wishing for a change of



emphasis, or the citation of omitted facts; as, for example, when the author, speaking of the political ideas of New England, does perhaps not sufficiently guard himself, leaving the impressions that the ideas of Roger Williams were the sole political ideas of New England.

Professor Dunning is placing the English-speaking world of scholars under great obligations for supplying so the great need of a reliable and readable treatise in English on the history of political theory. We hope a third volume will in time be added to complete this history, so conceived as to embrace the story of the new work in history, politics, and law, as well as the widening of social science as marked by the rise of sociology.

I. A. Loos.

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*Colonial Administration.* (The Citizens Library.) By PAUL S. REINSCH. New York: The Macmillan Co. Pp. viii + 422.

The task of colonial administration set before the American people in the last few years has turned public attention to a consideration of the methods adopted by other nations in handling this delicate matter. Among the several volumes appearing on this subject is one by Mr. Reinsch which will command attention. He might have considered the means employed by the English, French, Dutch, and other nations; he might have traced certain factors of control through the policy adopted by each of these governments; or he might have considered each of the most important colonies along these several lines of administration. Most wisely he chose the latter method. It pre-assumes that the real success of the colonial method is to be found in its development in the colony rather than in its theoretical aspects in the mother-country or fatherland. The several lines along which Mr. Heinsch examines the principal colonies of the world are education and general social improvement, finance, currency and banking, communication, agricultural and industrial development, public lands, labor, and defense. The treatment is purely descriptive. The author has no theories to exploit, and makes but few criticisms in the condensed space at his command. The Philippine revenue act of 1904 he regards as the most sweeping measure of taxation ever devised. "The government has certainly been successful," he says, "in discovering all possible objects of taxation; it remains to be seen what effect this measure will have on

the business of the islands, which has additional burdens to bear in the form of industrial taxes." Valuable bibliographies are appended to the various chapters.

EDWIN E. SPARKS.

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*The Liquor Problem: A Summary of Investigations Conducted by the Committee of Fifty, 1893-1903.* Prepared for the Committee by JOHN S. BILLINGS, CHARLES W. ELIOT, HENRY W. FARNAM, JACOB L. GREENE AND FRANCIS G. PEABODY. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1905. Pp. 182.

This investigation was confined almost exclusively to conditions in the United States, and so the lessons of European experience are not fully brought to attention. In the last chapter a positive recommendation is made in the description of the Norwegian or "company" system, "which may be said to contain the essence of scientific modern liquor legislation."

For educators the chapter by Dr. Billings has great interest; for he shows with the quiet confidence of an expert that much of the instruction given on the physiological effects of alcohol in public schools is misleading and false. It is a pity that zealous and earnest people will insist on compelling teachers to isolate a subject from all its natural connections and then drill young children to believe errors. When these pupils become adult, they will discover the facts, and must lose respect for those who deceived them in hope of serving a good cause by unfair means. The actual facts, as Dr. Billings summarizes them, without any exaggerations to destroy the moral influence of teachers, are all that is needed for a temperance argument.

The committee, by publishing the results of their study in a single volume, will gain access to a far wider audience, and will thus induce many more persons to go more deeply into the evidence by turning back to the earlier special reports for more prolonged study. No more sane, balanced, and convincing statement of the problem has been made, and the influence of the investigation will widen and deepen as men discover, through disappointment and defeat, that steady progress by rational means is both more rapid and more secure than spasmodic bursts of mob rule. If a great part of the money

and energy which are wasted in misdirected methods were trained to united and rational action, many of the evils of alcohol could be reduced far more effectively than is true at present.

C. R. HENDERSON.

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*Russia and Its Crisis.* By PAUL MILYUKOV. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1905.

Mr. Milyoukov has given us in this book a profound, detailed, and scientific study of the historical elements which have made Russia what she is today. There is no other book in the English language which permits the reader to penetrate so far into the mysteries of that witch's kettle boiling between the Baltic and the Black Seas. If you wish to know about the development of autocracy and its Satanic limb, the Orthodox church; if your interest is directed to the peasant and his economic and moral condition; or if you want to inform yourself about the development of socialism and political parties in general—about these things and a dozen other matters, you will find a treasure of material collected at first hand and presented with a cogency which will convince the most skeptical. Not that the author holds a brief for any cause or party. He is, of course, a generous believer in free popular activity, but his argument is primarily historical, and his method vigorously scientific. Without the use of a vituperative phrase, and with no other help than his vast information and his penetrating power of analysis, he gradually leads the reader to the perception of the sham, the iniquity, and the utter untenableness of the autocratic system. The closeness of the argument, delivering stroke upon stroke, requires the most unremitting attention, and will weary the superficial student long before the end is reached. All such are warned from these premises, not, however, without an expression of regret that the author, who commands a stout and clear pragmatic style, was not able to lighten the labor of the conscientious reader by an infusion of some of the grace and picturesqueness in which even the most stubborn historical material abounds. This excessive solidity is adequately explained when we remember that Mr. Milyoukov employs, and on the whole with admirable effectiveness, a tongue to which he was not born.

FERDINAND SCHWILL.



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## NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

**Social Work: A New Profession.**—The educated man, in deciding on life's work, wishes two things: to fill the place fitted to his talents, and to touch and affect the vital things in the life of his own times. Consider first the demand of one's times made upon him. The patriots of the revolutionary period were patriots because they grasped, with the moral imagination, the immediate and prospective bearings of the facts and conditions which confronted them. How can one be sure of touching the realities of one's own day? Not by education nor by philosophizing, but by actual contact with people and conditions.

The new profession—social work—has its quality in understanding and affecting by direct contact all men, in politics, industry, and culture. To do this two social forces must be understood and grappled with, viz., democracy and cosmopolitanism. This cannot be done by studying the past alone. The democracy of the future will be, not merely a scheme of government, but an *ethical* system touching all life, intending to bring all classes together. Cosmopolitanism is presented in our many immigrants and the problems of bringing them together, giving them an education and an economic basis. Thus the social worker will unite the now scattered industrial, racial, and religious elements.

Social work is in results and intentions unofficial statesmanship. It may mean personal sacrifice, but it is the same kind of devotion in times of peace shown by our forefathers in times of war. This work offers a career of service at the points where public need is greatest; it opens the way in some cases to public career and public office. Social work in its wide scope includes the extension of the older professions to meet new needs; e. g., the doctor, lawyer, clergyman, musician, etc.

This work offers peculiar opportunities for woman, where her co-operation with man is based on a really sound type of equality between the sexes. The social worker is not a builder, but uses existing institutions where he can, creating only when adequate means do not exist to embody his ideas; does not dream of utopias, but takes the next immediate step for improvement.

The great variety of work offers problems for any talent discovering a person's special aptitudes. It places him in contact with the practical scholars of his community, thus furnishing fellowship and inspiration. A living must be considered by a person thinking of giving himself to this work. Social work in this country is not so well paid as in England, yet on an average it offers a living equal to the clerical and educational professions. It also offers a good temporary employment as preparatory to other professions, e. g., the law. This work had its origin in the university, and it calls for fulfilling the university ideal—a life of service.—Robert A. Woods, in *International Journal of Ethics*, October, 1905.

S. E. W. B.

**Recent Tendencies in German Social Democracy.**—The convention of the Social Democratic party in Germany was recently held in Jena. Discussion before and at the meeting indicates a climax reached in the party development in Germany.

Never has a convention been held when the times were so violently revolutionary. The events of 1870-71 are insignificant compared with the Russian revolution. This is a revolution of the proletariat, not of a single city, but of a whole nation.

The Russian revolution is the conclusion of the era of bourgeois revolutions in Europe, and also the beginning of the era of proletarian revolutions on which we are now entering. The period means unstable relations or war, famine, the overthrow of the present legal order of landlords and usurers, violent resistance of the proletariat. Every moment is pregnant with the unexpected.

The report of the convention shows an increased strength at every point. Institutions for instruction of the membership of the party have been founded,



e. g., in Düsseldorf. It is impossible to give exact figures on membership, but large increases are reported from every locality. The party press shows everywhere increased circulation. The *Vorwärts* shows a profit of over \$20,000 the last year; *Der Wahre Jacob*, nearly \$5,000; *Die Neue Zeit*, a deficit of \$1,000. The total income of the party was over \$180,000. The number of agitation leaflets and books runs high in the millions.

Meanwhile the party is engaged in internal discussions — more important than any since the days of the laws of exception. The whole form of the organization is tending toward centralization. These discussions take various forms, one being an attack on the editorial management of the *Vorwärts* by the *Leipziger Volkszeitung* and *Neue Zeit*. The paper has been taking the attitude of indifference to party differences, holding that it could see no quarrels, e. g., denying the divisions between the Revisionists and the Marxists. It was indifferent toward the general strike and the Russian revolution. The long-smothered discussions have broken out with great intensity, the *Vorwärts* being at the center of the storm.

The following brief statement shows the struggle. The *Vorwärts* is not today the same as in the days following the socialist laws of exception. In those days it sought to grasp the difference between economics and politics; then to set it forth and explain it to its readers. Today the ethical-æsthetic attitude predominates in *Vorwärts*. It seeks to produce strong moral and æsthetic effects in order to arouse the disgust of its readers against the immorality and hideousness of the existing order. Its former attitude was "scientific socialism;" its present attitude is "sentimental socialism."

It is impossible to give reports of the work of the congress, only Associated Press dispatches being available. These report three topics of the convention: the question of celebrating May 1; reorganization of the party; the "political mass strike." The discussions reflected the strained relations now existing in Germany. The kingdom of Saxony, together with several Hanse cities, among them Hamburg, has taken steps for the restriction of popular suffrage. On account of this, the party decided that, if anything definite was done in this direction, the mass strike would be declared. This action is significant because the general strike has been disdained by the German socialists. It suggests what we may see in the United States. The recent action of the capitalist class in Colorado in resorting to violent and illegal means shows what they will do in sharp conflict. It behooves the Socialist party to prepare itself for these attacks.—A. M. Simons, in *International Socialist Review*, October, 1905.

S. E. W. B.

#### **Welfare Institutions of the Royal Transportation Lines of Württemberg.**

—The report for the year 1903-4 contains noteworthy items concerning the welfare work of the state railways of Württemberg. State pensions to the amount of 362,070 marks were paid. This amount is comparatively small, because the great majority of the operating force belongs to an association which insures them.

There are some changes in the arrangements for accident insurance. This service now includes all who are injured while on duty. The payments to the injured are increased, in severe cases, to equal the wages of the injured. The payments to orphans are increased.

The life-insurance association of employees is incorporated, and is increasing in members and in income.

The 565 dwellings erected for employees and their families are paying between 2 and 3 per cent.

The Savings and Loan Association of Transportation Employees receives deposits, invests carefully, shares profits, and loans amounts up to 500 marks. Members are required to deposit a minimum of 100 marks.

There is dentistry service for railway employees, and it is being extended. Since January, 1904, there has been a dentist-in-chief (*Oberbahnarzt*) located in Stuttgart.

For men employed on the railways, other than regular employees (*Beamten*), there are special arrangements for insurance paid in cases of illness. From 3 to

3 5-7 per cent. is collected from the day-wages. The payments in cases of illness range from 50 to 66 $\frac{2}{3}$  per cent. of the wages. In cases of death, thirty-fold to forty-fold wages are paid. In cases of illness the payments are continued for from thirteen to fifty-two weeks.

The general invalid and old-age state pension of Württemberg insures the railway employees.

Men who have been transportation employees for twenty-five years consecutively, and have rendered good service, receive 50 marks. In 1903-4 fifty-six men received this special payment.

Men employed for three years consecutively have the right to three days off, in the year, with full pay. Those who have seen ten years' service have five days off.—“Wohlfahrtseinrichtungen der königlich württembergischen Verkehrsanstalten,” *Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen*, September-October, 1905. H. W.

**Workingmen's Insurance and Industrial Solidarity.**—The cause of workingmen's insurance is receiving more favorable attention with each passing year, and its obligation upon the consumer of labor is being more fully recognized; for it will introduce a larger reciprocity of interests, a greater solidarity, into industry.

Sismondi, a hundred years ago, declared that the laborer has a right to the protection of his employer; that there exists a natural solidarity between them—a bond which ought to assure the laborer and his family of the necessities of life; yet in his day the employer had but little regard for the health and safety of his employees; when they were old or disabled, he cast them upon the state, as public charges.

One of the greatest evils resulting from this irresponsibility, and the effect of which falls for the most part upon the laborer, is the “fever of incoherent production,” subject to immediate demands for the product. The laborer is overworked for a time, and then thrown entirely out of work. The primary object of an insurance law is more than compensation for—it is prevention of—the risk against which one is insured.

The real call for obligatory workingmen's insurance does not come from the protestations of a public conscience against legislation which permits cast-off laborers to be thrown on public or private charge, but from the affirmation that the salary paid ought not only to sustain life, but to include also necessary provision against risks which menace the life and capacity of the laborer. With Sismondi, “every enterprise in the service of which accidents are liable ought to support the consequences of accident.”

“Professional responsibility” is no longer an exceptional, but an ordinary, term. It expresses a duty which the most careful employers of labor admit to be due to their workmen. The schedule of indemnities in the law of 1898, a law “forfaitaire et transactionnelle,” leaves much to be desired along this line in France, and has prevented proper action. England and Belgium have shown that such insurance laws are possible.

The great problem in such insurance is whether the workman shall be compelled to contribute to the fund, and, if so, to what extent. This must depend on his income, and on the number of persons dependent on him for support. Any plan of procedure must be more than a legal agreement, if it is to contribute to industrial solidarity. It must have a moral basis, and a spirit and vitality which recognize the rights of both classes. Such an arrangement has been, in Germany, the means of creating a really social spirit and a rapid development in systems of production.

A proposed law in France would have local mutual societies and a larger central company. The former would care for all cases of need lasting less than thirty days, and would be administered by a committee consisting of three laborers and three employers, and a president elected by the six. The central company would take charge of cases of more than thirty days and of rents. It would be administered by employers alone.—Raoul Jay, “L'assurance ouvrière et la solidarité dans l'industrie,” *Revue politique et parlementaire*, September, 1905.

D. E. T.

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## THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN MODERN CIVILIZATION

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It is commonly held that modern Christendom is superior to any and all other systems of civilized life. Other ages and other cultural regions are by contrast spoken of as lower, or more archaic, or less mature. The claim is that the modern culture is superior on the whole, not that it is the best or highest in all respects and at every point. It has, in fact, not an all-around superiority, but a superiority within a closely limited range of intellectual activities, while outside this range many other civilizations surpass that of the modern occidental peoples. But the peculiar excellence of the modern culture is of such a nature as to give it a decisive practical advantage over all other cultural schemes that have gone before or that have come into competition with it. It has proved itself fit to survive in a struggle for existence as against those civilizations which differ from it in respect of its distinctive traits.

Modern civilization is peculiarly matter-of-fact. It contains many elements that are not of this character, but these other elements do not belong exclusively or characteristically to it. The modern civilized peoples are in a peculiar degree capable of an impersonal, dispassionate insight into the material facts with which mankind has to deal. The apex of cultural growth is at this point. Compared with this trait the rest of what is com-



prised in the cultural scheme is adventitious, or at the best it is a by-product of this hard-headed apprehension of facts. This quality may be a matter of habit or of racial endowment, or it may be an outcome of both; but whatever be the explanation of its prevalence, the immediate consequence is much the same for the growth of civilization. A civilization which is dominated by this matter-of-fact insight must prevail against any cultural scheme that lacks this element. This characteristic of western civilization comes to a head in modern science, and it finds its highest material expression in the technology of the machine industry. In these things modern culture is creative and self-sufficient; and these being given, the rest of what may seem characteristic in western civilization follows by easy consequence. The cultural structure clusters about this body of matter-of-fact knowledge as its substantial core. Whatever is not consonant with these opaque creations of science is an intrusive feature in the modern scheme, borrowed or standing over from the barbarian past.

Other ages and other peoples excel in other things and are known by other virtues. In creative art, as well as in critical taste, the faltering talent of Christendom can at the best follow the lead of the ancient Greeks and the Japanese. In deft workmanship the handicraftsmen of the middle Orient, as well as of the Far East, stand on a level securely above the highest European achievement, old or new. In myth-making, folklore, and occult symbolism many of the lower barbarians have achieved things beyond what the latter-day priests and poets know how to propose. In metaphysical insight and dialectical versatility many orientals, as well as the Schoolmen of the Middle Ages, easily surpass the highest reaches of the New Thought and the Higher Criticism. In a shrewd sense of the religious verities, as well as in an unsparing faith in devout observances, the people of India or Thibet, or even the mediæval Christians, are past-masters in comparison even with the select of the faith of modern times. In political finesse, as well as in unreasoning, brute loyalty, more than one of the ancient peoples give evidence of a capacity to which no modern civilized nation may aspire. In

warlike malevolence and abandon, the hosts of Islam, the Sioux Indian, and the "heathen of the northern sea" have set the mark above the reach of the most strenuous civilized warlord.

To modern civilized men, especially in their intervals of sober reflection, all these things that distinguish the barbarian civilizations seem of dubious value and are required to show cause why they should not be slighted. It is not so with the knowledge of facts. The making of states and dynasties, the founding of families, the prosecution of feuds, the propagation of creeds and the creation of sects, the accumulation of fortunes, the consumption of superfluities—these have all in their time been felt to justify themselves as an end of endeavor; but in the eyes of modern civilized men all these things seem futile in comparison with the achievements of science. They dwindle in men's esteem as time passes, while the achievements of science are held higher as time passes. This is the one secure holding-ground of latter-day conviction, that "the increase and diffusion of knowledge among men" is indefeasibly right and good. When seen in such perspective as will clear it of the trivial perplexities of workday life, this proposition is not questioned within the horizon of the western culture, and no other cultural ideal holds a similar unquestioned place in the convictions of civilized mankind.

On any large question which is to be disposed of for good and all the final appeal is by common consent taken to the scientist. The solution offered in the name of science is decisive so long as it is not set aside by a still more searching scientific inquiry. This state of things may not be altogether fortunate, but such is the fact. There are other, older grounds of finality that may conceivably be better, nobler, worthier, more profound, more beautiful. It might conceivably be preferable, as a matter of cultural ideals, to leave the last word with the lawyer, the duelist, the priest, the moralist, or the college of heraldry. In past times people have been content to leave their weightiest questions to the decision of some one or other of these tribunals, and, it cannot be denied, with very happy results in those respects that were then looked to with the greatest solicitude. But whatever the common-sense of earlier generations may have held in this

respect, modern common-sense holds that the scientist's answer is the only ultimately true one. In the last resort enlightened common-sense sticks by the opaque truth and refuses to go behind the returns given by the tangible facts.

*Quasi lignum vitae in paradiso Dei, et quasi lucerna fulgoris in domo Domini*, such is the place of science in modern civilization. This latter-day faith in matter-of-fact knowledge may be well grounded or it may not. It has come about that men assign it this high place, perhaps idolatrously, perhaps to the detriment of the best and most intimate interests of the race. There is room for much more than a vague doubt that this cult of science is not altogether a wholesome growth—that the unmitigated quest of knowledge, of this matter-of-fact kind, makes for race-deterioration and discomfort on the whole, both in its immediate effects upon the spiritual life of mankind, and in the material consequences that follow from a great advance in matter-of-fact knowledge.

But we are not here concerned with the merits of the case. The question here is: How has this cult of science arisen? What are its cultural antecedents? How far is it in consonance with hereditary human nature? and, What is the nature of its hold on the convictions of civilized men?

In dealing with pedagogical problems and the theory of education, current psychology is nearly at one in saying that all learning is of a "pragmatic" character; that knowledge is inchoate action inchoately directed to an end; that all knowledge is "functional;" that it is of the nature of use. This, of course, is only a corollary under the main postulate of the latter-day psychologists, whose catchword is that The Idea is essentially active. There is no need of quarreling with this "pragmatic" school of psychologists. Their aphorism may not contain the whole truth, perhaps, but at least it goes nearer to the heart of the epistemological problem than any earlier formulation. It may confidently be said to do so because, for one thing, its argument meets the requirements of modern science. It is such a concept as matter-of-fact science can make effective use of; it is drawn in terms



which are, in the last analysis, of an impersonal, not to say tropismatic, character; such as is demanded by science, with its insistence on opaque cause and effect. While knowledge is construed in teleological terms, in terms of personal interest and attention, this teleological aptitude is itself reducible to a product of unteleological natural selection. The teleological bent of intelligence is a hereditary trait settled upon the race by the selective action of forces that look to no end. The foundations of pragmatic intelligence are not pragmatic, nor even personal or sensible.

This impersonal character of intelligence is, of course, most evident on the lower levels of life. If we follow Mr. Loeb, e. g., in his inquiries into the psychology of that life that lies below the threshold of intelligence, what we meet with is an aimless but unwavering motor response to stimulus.<sup>1</sup> The response is of the nature of motor impulse, and in so far it is "pragmatic," if that term may fairly be applied to so rudimentary a phase of sensibility. The responding organism may be called an "agent" in so far. It is only by a figure of speech that these terms are made to apply to tropismatic reactions. Higher in the scale of sensibility and nervous complication instincts work to a somewhat similar outcome. On the human plane, intelligence (the selective effect of inhibitive complication) may throw the response into the form of a reasoned line of conduct looking to an outcome that shall be expedient for the agent. This is naïve pragmatism of the developed kind. There is no longer a question but that the responding organism is an "agent," and that his intelligent response to stimulus is of a teleological character. But that is not all. The inhibitive nervous complication may also detach another chain of response to the given stimulus, which does not spend itself in a line of motor conduct and does not fall into a system of uses. Pragmatically speaking, this outlying chain of response is unintended and irrelevant. Except in urgent cases, such an idle response seems commonly to be present as a subsidiary phenomenon. If credence is given to the view

<sup>1</sup> Jacques Loeb, *Heliotropismus der Thiere and Comparative Psychology and Physiology of the Brain*.

that intelligence is, in its elements, of the nature of an inhibitive selection, it seems necessary to assume some such chain of idle and irrelevant response to account for the further course of the elements eliminated in giving the motor response the character of a reasoned line of conduct. So that associated with the pragmatic attention there is found more or less of an irrelevant attention, or idle curiosity. This is more particularly the case where a higher range of intelligence is present. This idle curiosity is, perhaps, closely related to the aptitude for play, observed both in man and in the lower animals.<sup>2</sup> The aptitude for play, as well as the functioning of idle curiosity, seems peculiarly lively in the young, whose aptitude for sustained pragmatism is at the same time relatively vague and unreliable.

This idle curiosity formulates its response to stimulus, not in terms of an expedient line of conduct, nor even necessarily in a chain of motor activity, but in terms of the sequence of activities going on in the observed phenomena. The "interpretation" of the facts under the guidance of this idle curiosity may take the form of anthropomorphic or animistic explanations of the "conduct" of the objects observed. The interpretation of the facts takes a dramatic form. The facts are conceived in an animistic way, and a pragmatic animus is imputed to them. Their behavior is construed as a reasoned procedure on their part looking to the advantage of these animistically conceived objects, or looking to the achievement of some end which these objects are conceived to have at heart for reasons of their own.

Among the savage and lower barbarian peoples there is commonly current a large body of knowledge organized in this way into myths and legends, which need have no pragmatic value for the learner of them and no intended bearing on his conduct of practical affairs. They may come to have a practical value imputed to them as a ground of superstitious observances, but they may also not.<sup>3</sup> All students of the lower cultures are aware of

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Gross, *Spiele der Thiere*, chap. 2 (esp. pp. 65-76), and chap. 5; *The Play of Man*, Part III, sec. 3; Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*, secs. 533-35.

<sup>3</sup> The myths and legendary lore of the Eskimo, the Pueblo Indians, and some tribes of the northwest coast afford good instances of such idle creations. Cf. various *Reports* of the Bureau of American Ethnology; also, e. g., Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, esp. the chapters on "Mythology" and "Animism."

the dramatic character of the myths current among these peoples, and they are also aware that, particularly among the peaceable communities, the great body of mythical lore is of an idle kind, as having very little intended bearing on the practical conduct of those who believe in these myth-dramas. The myths on the one hand, and the workday knowledge of uses, materials, appliances, and expedients on the other hand, may be nearly independent of one another. Such is the case in an especial degree among those peoples who are prevailingly of a peaceable habit of life, among whom the myths have not in any great measure been canonized into precedents of divine malevolence.

The lower barbarian's knowledge of the phenomena of nature, in so far as they are made the subject of deliberate speculation and are organized into a consistent body, is of the nature of life-histories. This body of knowledge is in the main organized under the guidance of an idle curiosity. In so far as it is systematized under the canons of curiosity rather than of expediency, the test of truth applied throughout this body of barbarian knowledge is the test of dramatic consistency. In addition to their dramatic cosmology and folk legends, it is needless to say, these peoples have also a considerable body of worldly wisdom in a more or less systematic form. In this the test of validity is usefulness.<sup>4</sup>

The pragmatic knowledge of the early days differs scarcely at all in character from that of the maturest phases of culture. Its highest achievements in the direction of systematic formulation consist of didactic exhortations to thrift, prudence, equanimity, and shrewd management—a body of maxims of expedient con-

<sup>4</sup>“Pragmatic” is here used in a more restricted sense than the distinctively pragmatic school of modern psychologists would commonly assign the term. “Pragmatic,” “teleological,” and the like terms have been extended to cover imputation of purpose as well as conversion to use. It is not intended to criticise this ambiguous use of terms, nor to correct it; but the terms are here used only in the latter sense, which alone belongs to them by force of early usage and etymology. “Pragmatic” knowledge, therefore, is such as is designed to serve an expedient end for the knower, and is here contrasted with the imputation of expedient conduct to the facts observed. The reason for preserving this distinction is simply the present need of a simple term by which to mark the distinction between worldly wisdom and idle learning.



duct. In this field there is scarcely a degree of advance from Confucius to Samuel Smiles. Under the guidance of the idle curiosity, on the other hand, there has been a continued advance toward a more and more comprehensive system of knowledge. With the advance in intelligence and experience there come closer observation and more detailed analysis of facts.<sup>5</sup> The dramatization of the sequence of phenomena may then fall into somewhat less personal, less anthropomorphic formulations of the processes observed; but at no stage of its growth—at least at no stage hitherto reached—does the output of this work of the idle curiosity lose its dramatic character. Comprehensive generalizations are made and cosmologies are built up, but always in dramatic form. General principles of explanation are settled on, which in the earlier days of theoretical speculation seem invariably to run back to the broad vital principle of generation. Procreation, birth, growth, and decay constitute the cycle of postulates within which the dramatized processes of natural phenomena run their course. Creation is procreation in these archaic theoretical systems, and causation is gestation and birth. The archaic cosmological schemes of Greece, India, Japan, China, Polynesia, and America, all run to the same general effect on this head.<sup>6</sup>

Throughout this biological speculation there is present, obscurely in the background, the tacit recognition of a material causation, such as conditions the vulgar operations of workday life from hour to hour. But this causal relation between vulgar work and product is vaguely taken for granted and not made a principle for comprehensive generalizations. It is overlooked as a trivial matter of course. The higher generalizations take their color from the broader features of the current scheme of life. The habits of thought that rule in the working-out of a system of knowledge are such as are fostered by the more impressive affairs of life, by the institutional structure under which the community lives. So long as the ruling institutions are those of blood-relationship, descent, and clannish discrimination, so long the canons of knowledge are of the same complexion.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Ward, *Pure Sociology*, esp. pp. 437-48.

<sup>6</sup> Cf., e. g., Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, chap. 8.

When presently a transformation is made in the scheme of culture from peaceable life with sporadic predation to a settled scheme of predaceous life, involving mastery and servitude, gradations of privilege and honor, coercion and personal dependence, then the scheme of knowledge undergoes an analogous change. The predaceous, or higher barbarian, culture is, for the present purpose, peculiar in that it is ruled by an accentuated pragmatism. The institutions of this cultural phase are conventionalized relations of force and fraud. The questions of life are questions of expedient conduct as carried on under the current relations of mastery and subservience. The habitual distinctions are distinctions of personal force, advantage, precedence, and authority. A shrewd adaptation to this system of graded dignity and servitude becomes a matter of life and death, and men learn to think in these terms as ultimate and definitive. The system of knowledge, even in so far as its motives are of a dispassionate or idle kind, falls into the like terms, because such are the habits of thought and the standards of discrimination enforced by daily life.<sup>7</sup>

The theoretical work of such a cultural era, as, for instance, the Middle Ages, still takes the general shape of dramatization, but the postulates of the dramaturgic theories and the tests of theoretic validity are no longer the same as before the scheme of graded servitude came to occupy the field. The canons which guide the work of the idle curiosity are no longer those of generation, blood-relationship, and homely life, but rather those of graded dignity, authenticity, and dependence. The higher generalizations take on a new complexion, it may be without formally discarding the older articles of belief. The cosmologies of these higher barbarians are cast in terms of a feudalistic hierarchy of agents and elements, and the causal nexus between phenomena is conceived animistically after the manner of sympathetic magic. The laws that are sought to be discovered in the natural universe are sought in terms of authoritative enactment. The relation in which the deity, or deities, are conceived to stand to facts is no longer the relation of progenitor, so much as that

<sup>7</sup> Cf. James, *Psychology*, chap. 9, esp. sec. 5.

of suzerainty. Natural laws are corollaries under the arbitrary rules of status imposed on the natural universe by an all-powerful Providence with a view to the maintenance of his own prestige. The science that grows in such a spiritual environment is of the class represented by alchemy and astrology, in which the imputed degree of nobility and prepotency of the objects and the symbolic force of their names are looked to for an explanation of what takes place.

The theoretical output of the Schoolmen has necessarily an accentuated pragmatic complexion, since the whole cultural scheme under which they lived and worked was of a strenuously pragmatic character. The current concepts of things were then drawn in terms of expediency, personal force, exploit, prescriptive authority, and the like, and this range of concepts was by force of habit employed in the correlation of facts for purposes of knowledge even where no immediate practical use of the knowledge so gained was had in view. At the same time a very large proportion of the scholastic researches and speculations aimed directly at rules of expedient conduct, whether it took the form of a philosophy of life under temporal law and custom, or of a scheme of salvation under the decrees of an autocratic Providence. A naïve apprehension of the dictum that all knowledge is pragmatic would find more satisfactory corroboration in the intellectual output of scholasticism than in any system of knowledge of an older or a later date.

With the advent of modern times a change comes over the nature of the inquiries and formulations worked out under the guidance of the idle curiosity—which from this epoch is often spoken of as the scientific spirit. The change in question is closely correlated with an analogous change in institutions and habits of life, particularly with the changes which the modern era brings in industry and in the economic organization of society. It is doubtful whether the characteristic intellectual interests and teachings of the new era can properly be spoken of as less “pragmatic,” as that term is sometimes understood, than those of the scholastic times; but they are of another kind, being conditioned



by a different cultural and industrial situation.<sup>8</sup> In the life of the new era conceptions of authentic rank and differential dignity have grown weaker in practical affairs, and notions of preferential reality and authentic tradition similarly count for less in the new science. The forces at work in the external world are conceived in a less animistic manner, although anthropomorphism still prevails, at least to the degree required in order to give a dramatic interpretation of the sequence of phenomena.

The changes in the cultural situation which seem to have had the most serious consequences for the methods and animus of scientific inquiry are those changes that took place in the field of industry. Industry in early modern times is a fact of relatively greater preponderance, more of a tone-giving factor, than it was under the régime of feudal status. It is the characteristic trait of the modern culture, very much as exploit and fealty were the characteristic cultural traits of the earlier times. This early-modern industry is, in an obvious and convincing degree, a matter of workmanship. The same has not been true in the same degree either before or since. The workman, more or less skilled and with more or less specialized efficiency, was the central figure in the cultural situation of the time; and so the concepts of the scientists came to be drawn in the image of the workman. The dramatizations of the sequence of external phenomena worked out under the impulse of the idle curiosity were then conceived in terms of workmanship. Workmanship gradually supplanted differential dignity as the authoritative canon of scientific truth, even on the higher levels of speculation and research. This, of course, amounts to saying in other words that the law of cause and effect was given the first place, as contrasted with dialectical consistency and authentic tradition. But this early-modern law of cause and effect—the law of efficient causes—is of an anthropomorphic kind. "Like causes produce like effects," in much the

<sup>8</sup> As currently employed, the term "pragmatic" is made to cover both conduct looking to the agent's preferential advantage, expedient conduct, and workmanship directed to the production of things that may or may not be of advantage to the agent. If the term be taken in the latter meaning, the culture of modern times is no less "pragmatic" than that of the Middle Ages. It is here intended to be used in the former sense.

same sense as the skilled workman's product is like the workman; "nothing is found in the effect that was not contained in the cause," in much the same manner.

These dicta are, of course, older than modern science, but it is only in the early days of modern science that they come to rule the field with an unquestioned sway and to push the higher grounds of dialectical validity to one side. They invade even the highest and most recondite fields of speculation, so that at the approach to the transition from the early-modern to the late-modern period, in the eighteenth century, they determine the outcome even in the counsels of the theologians. The deity, from having been in mediæval times primarily a suzerain concerned with the maintenance of his own prestige, becomes primarily a creator engaged in the workmanlike occupation of making things useful for man. His relation to man and the natural universe is no longer primarily that of a progenitor, as it is in the lower barbarian culture, but rather that of a talented mechanic. The "natural laws" which the scientists of that era make so much of are no longer decrees of a preternatural legislative authority, but rather details of the workshop specifications handed down by the master-craftsman for the guidance of handicraftsmen working out his designs. In the eighteenth-century science these natural laws are laws specifying the sequence of cause and effect, and will bear characterization as a dramatic interpretation of the activity of the causes at work, and these causes are conceived in a quasi-personal manner. In later modern times the formulations of causal sequence grow more impersonal and more objective, more matter-of-fact; but the imputation of activity to the observed objects never ceases, and even in the latest and maturest formulations of scientific research the dramatic tone is not wholly lost. The causes at work are conceived in a highly impersonal way, but hitherto no science (except ostensibly mathematics) has been content to do its theoretical work in terms of inert magnitude alone. Activity continues to be imputed to the phenomena with which science deals; and activity is, of course, not a fact of observation, but is imputed to the phenomena by the observer.<sup>9</sup> This is, also

<sup>9</sup> Epistemologically speaking, activity is imputed to phenomena for the purpose of organizing them into a dramatically consistent system.

of course, denied by those who insist on a purely mathematical formulation of scientific theories, but the denial is maintained only at the cost of consistency. Those eminent authorities who speak for a colorless mathematical formulation invariably and necessarily fall back on the (essentially metaphysical) preconception of causation as soon as they go into the actual work of scientific inquiry.<sup>10</sup>

Since the machine technology has made great advances, during the nineteenth century, and has become a cultural force of wide-reaching consequence, the formulations of science have made another move in the direction of impersonal matter-of-fact. The machine process has displaced the workman as the archetype in whose image causation is conceived by the scientific investigators. The dramatic interpretation of natural phenomena has thereby become less anthropomorphic; it no longer constructs the life-history of a cause working to produce a given effect—after the manner of a skilled workman producing a piece of wrought goods—but it constructs the life-history of a process in which the distinction between cause and effect need scarcely be observed in an itemized and specific way, but in which the run of causation unfolds itself in an unbroken sequence of cumulative change. By contrast with the pragmatic formulations of worldly wisdom these latter-day theories of the scientists appear highly opaque, impersonal, and matter-of-fact; but taken by themselves they must be admitted still to show the constraint of the dramatic prepossessions that once guided the savage myth-makers.

In so far as touches the aims and the animus of scientific inquiry, as seen from the point of view of the scientist, it is a wholly fortuitous and insubstantial coincidence that much of the knowledge gained under machine-made canons of research can be turned to practical account. Much of this knowledge is useful, or may be made so, by applying it to the control of the processes in which natural forces are engaged. This employment of scien-

<sup>10</sup> Cf., e. g., Karl Pearson, *Grammar of Science*, and compare his ideal of inert magnitudes as set forth in his exposition with his actual work as shown in chaps. 9, 10, and 12, and more particularly in his discussions of "Mother Right" and related topics in *The Chances of Death*.



tific knowledge for useful ends in technology, in the broad sense in which the term includes, besides the machine industry proper, such branches of practice as engineering, agriculture, medicine, sanitation, and economic reforms. The reason why scientific theories can be turned to account for these practical ends is not that these ends are included in the scope of scientific inquiry. These useful purposes lie outside the scientist's interest. It is not that he aims, or can aim, at technological improvements. His inquiry is as "idle" as that of the Pueblo myth-maker. But the canons of validity under whose guidance he works are those imposed by the modern technology, through habituation to its requirements; and therefore his results are available for the technological purpose. His canons of validity are made for him by the cultural situation; they are habits of thought imposed on him by the scheme of life current in the community in which he lives; and under modern conditions this scheme of life is largely machine-made. In the modern culture, industry, industrial processes, and industrial products have progressively gained upon humanity, until these creations of man's ingenuity have latterly come to take the dominant place in the cultural scheme; and it is not too much to say that they have become the chief force in shaping men's daily life, and therefore the chief factor in shaping men's habits of thought. Hence men have learned to think in the terms in which the technological processes act. This is particularly true of those men who by virtue of a peculiarly strong susceptibility in this direction become addicted to that habit of matter-of-fact inquiry that constitutes scientific research.

Modern technology makes use of the same range of concepts, thinks in the same terms, and applies the same tests of validity as modern science. In both, the terms of standardization, validity, and finality are always terms of impersonal sequence, not terms of human nature or of preternatural agencies. Hence the easy copartnership between the two. Science and technology play into one another's hands. The processes of nature with which science deals and which technology turns to account, the sequence of changes in the external world, animate and inanimate, run in terms of brute causation, as do the theories of science. These

processes take no thought of human expediency or in expediency. To make use of them they must be taken as they are, opaque and unsympathetic. Technology, therefore, has come to proceed on an interpretation of these phenomena in mechanical terms, not in terms of imputed personality nor even of workmanship. Modern science, deriving its concepts from the same source, carries on its inquiries and states its conclusions in terms of the same objective character as those employed by the mechanical engineer.

So it has come about, through the progressive change of the ruling habits of thought in the community, that the theories of science have progressively diverged from the formulations of pragmatism, ever since the modern era set in. From an organization of knowledge on the basis of imputed personal or animistic propensity the theory has changed its base to an imputation of brute activity only, and this latter is conceived in an increasingly matter-of-fact manner; until, latterly, the pragmatic range of knowledge and the scientific are more widely out of touch than ever, differing not only in aim, but in matter as well. In both domains knowledge runs in terms of activity, but it is on the one hand knowledge of what had best be done, and on the other hand knowledge of what takes place; on the one hand knowledge of ways and means, on the other hand knowledge without any ulterior purpose. The latter range of knowledge may serve the ends of the former, but the converse does not hold true.

These two divergent ranges of inquiry are to be found together in all phases of human culture. What distinguishes the present phase is that the discrepancy between the two is now wider than ever before. The present is nowise distinguished above other cultural eras by any exceptional urgency or acumen in the search for pragmatic expedients. Neither is it safe to assert that the present excels all other civilizations in the volume or the workmanship of that body of knowledge that is to be credited to the idle curiosity. What distinguishes the present in these premises is (1) that the primacy in the cultural scheme has passed from pragmatism to a disinterested inquiry whose motive is idle curiosity, and (2) that in the domain of the latter the making of

myths and legends in terms of imputed personality, as well as the construction of dialectical systems in terms of differential reality, has yielded the first place to the making of theories in terms of matter-of-fact sequence.<sup>11</sup>

Pragmatism creates nothing but maxims of expedient conduct. Science creates nothing but theories.<sup>12</sup> It knows nothing of policy or utility, of better or worse. None of all that is comprised in what is today accounted scientific knowledge. Wisdom and proficiency of the pragmatic sort does not contribute to the advance of a knowledge of fact. It has only an incidental bearing on scientific research, and its bearing is chiefly that of inhibition and misdirection. Wherever canons of expediency are intruded into or are attempted to be incorporated in the inquiry, the consequence is an unhappy one for science, however happy it may be for some other purpose extraneous to science. The mental attitude of worldly wisdom is at cross-purposes with the disinterested scientific spirit, and the pursuit of it induces an intellectual bias that is incompatible with scientific insight. Its intellectual output is a body of shrewd rules of conduct, in great part designed to take advantage of human infirmity. Its habitual terms of standardization and validity are terms of human nature, of human preference, prejudice, aspiration, endeavor, and disability, and the habit of mind that goes with it is such as is consonant with these terms. No doubt, the all-pervading pragmatic animus of the older and non-European civilizations has had more than anything else to do with their relatively slight and slow advance in scientific knowledge. In the modern scheme of knowledge it holds true, in a similar manner and with analogous effect, that training in divinity, in law, and in the related branches of diplomacy, business tactics, military affairs, and political theory, is alien to the skeptical scientific spirit and subversive of it.

The modern scheme of culture comprises a large body of worldly wisdom, as well as of science. This pragmatic lore stands over against science with something of a jealous reserve. The pragmatists value themselves somewhat on being useful as

<sup>11</sup> Cf. James, *Psychology*, Vol. II, chap. 28, pp. 633-71, esp. p. 640 note.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Ward, *Principles of Psychology*, pp. 439-43.



well as being efficient for good and evil. They feel the inherent antagonism between themselves and the scientists, and look with some doubt on the latter as being merely decorative triflers, although they sometimes borrow the prestige of the name of science—as is only good and well, since it is of the essence of worldly wisdom to borrow anything that can be turned to account. The reasoning in these fields turns about questions of personal advantage of one kind or another, and the merits of the claims canvassed in these discussions are decided on grounds of authenticity. Personal claims make up the subject of the inquiry, and these claims are construed and decided in terms of precedent and choice, use and wont, prescriptive authority, and the like. The higher reaches of generalization in these pragmatic inquiries are of the nature of deductions from authentic tradition, and the training in this class of reasoning gives discrimination in respect of authenticity and expediency. The resulting habit of mind is a bias for substituting dialectical distinctions and decisions *de jure* in the place of explanations *de facto*. The so-called “sciences” associated with these pragmatic disciplines, such as jurisprudence, political science, and the like, is a taxonomy of credenda. Of this character was the greater part of the “science” cultivated by the Schoolmen, and large remnants of the same kind of authentic convictions are, of course, still found among the tenets of the scientists, particularly in the social sciences, and no small solicitude is still given to their cultivation. Substantially the same value as that of the temporal pragmatic inquiries belongs also, of course, to the “science” of divinity. Here the questions to which an answer is sought, as well as the aim and method of inquiry, are of the same pragmatic character, although the argument runs on a higher plane of personality, and seeks a solution in terms of a remoter and more metaphysical expediency.

In the light of what has been said above, the questions recur: How far is the scientific quest of matter-of-fact knowledge consonant with the inherited intellectual aptitudes and propensities of the normal man? and, What foothold has science in the modern culture? The former is a question of the temperamental heritage

of civilized mankind, and therefore it is in large part a question of the circumstances which have in the past selectively shaped the human nature of civilized mankind. Under the barbarian culture, as well as on the lower levels of what is currently called civilized life, the dominant note has been that of competitive expediency for the individual or the group, great or small, in an avowed struggle for the means of life. Such is still the ideal of the politician and business man, as well as of other classes whose habits of life lead them to cling to the inherited barbarian traditions. The upper-barbarian and lower-civilized culture, as has already been indicated, is pragmatic, with a thoroughness that nearly bars out any non-pragmatic ideal of life or of knowledge. Where this tradition is strong there is but a precarious chance for any consistent effort to formulate knowledge in other terms than those drawn from the prevalent relations of personal mastery and subservience and the ideals of personal gain.

During the Dark and Middle Ages, for instance, it is true in the main that any movement of thought not controlled by considerations of expediency and conventions of status are to be found only in the obscure depths of vulgar life, among those neglected elements of the population that lived below the reach of the active class struggle. What there is surviving of this vulgar, non-pragmatic intellectual output takes the form of legends and folktales, often embroidered on the authentic documents of the Faith. These are less alien to the latest and highest culture of Christendom than are the dogmatic, dialectical, and chivalric productions that occupied the attention of the upper classes in mediæval times. It may seem a curious paradox that the latest and most perfect flower of the western civilization is more nearly akin to the spiritual life of the serfs and villeins than it is to that of the grange or the abbey. The courtly life and the chivalric habits of thought of that past phase of culture have left as nearly no trace in the cultural scheme of later modern times as could well be. Even the romancers who ostensibly rehearse the phenomena of chivalry, unavoidably make their knights and ladies speak the language and the sentiments of the slums of that time, tempered with certain schematized modern reflections and speculations.

The gallantries, the genteel inanities and devout imbecilities of mediæval high-life would be insufferable even to the meanest and most romantic modern intelligence. So that in a later, less barbarian age the precarious remnants of folklore that have come down through that vulgar channel—half savage and more than half pagan—are treasured as containing the largest spiritual gains which the barbarian ages of Europe have to offer.

The sway of barbarian pragmatism has, everywhere in the western world, been relatively brief and relatively light; the only exceptions would be found in certain parts of the Mediterranean seaboard. But wherever the barbarian culture has been sufficiently long-lived and unmitigated to work out a thoroughly selective effect in the human material subjected to it, there the pragmatic animus may be expected to have become supreme and to inhibit all movement in the direction of scientific inquiry and eliminate all effective aptitude for other than worldly wisdom. What the selective consequences of such a protracted régime of pragmatism would be for the temper of the race may be seen in the human flotsam left by the great civilizations of antiquity, such as Egypt, India, and Persia. Science is not at home among these leavings of barbarism. In these instances of its long and unmitigated dominion the barbarian culture has selectively worked out a temperamental bias and a scheme of life from which objective, matter-of-fact knowledge is virtually excluded in favor of pragmatism, secular and religious. But for the greater part of the race, at least for the greater part of civilized mankind, the régime of the mature barbarian culture has been of relatively short duration, and has had a correspondingly superficial and transient selective effect. It has not had force and time to eliminate certain elements of human nature handed down from an earlier phase of life, which are not in full consonance with the barbarian animus or with the demands of the pragmatic scheme of thought. The barbarian-pragmatic habit of mind, therefore, is not properly speaking a temperamental trait of the civilized peoples, except possibly within certain class limits (as, e. g., the German nobility). It is rather a tradition, and it does not constitute so tenacious a bias as to make head against the



strongly materialistic drift of modern conditions and set aside that increasingly urgent resort to matter-of-fact conceptions that makes for the primacy of science. Civilized mankind does not in any great measure take back atavistically to the upper-barbarian habit of mind. Barbarism covers too small a segment of the life-history of the race to have given an enduring temperamental result. The unmitigated discipline of the higher barbarism in Europe fell on a relatively small proportion of the population, and in the course of time this select element of the population was crossed and blended with the blood of the lower elements whose life always continued to run in the ruts of savagery rather than in those of the high-strung, finished barbarian culture that gave rise to the chivalric scheme of life.

Of the several phases of human culture the most protracted, and the one which has counted for most in shaping the abiding traits of the race, is unquestionably that of savagery. With savagery, for the purpose in hand, is to be classed that lower, relatively peaceable barbarism that is not characterized by wide and sharp class discrepancies or by an unremitting endeavor of one individual or group to get the better of another. Even under the full-grown barbarian culture—as, for instance, during the Middle Ages—the habits of life and the spiritual interests of the great body of the population continue in large measure to bear the character of savagery. The savage phase of culture accounts for by far the greater portion of the life-history of mankind, particularly if the lower barbarism and the vulgar life of later barbarism be counted in with savagery, as in a measure they properly should. This is particularly true of those racial elements that have entered into the composition of the leading peoples of Christendom.

The savage culture is characterized by the relative absence of pragmatism from the higher generalizations of its knowledge and beliefs. As has been noted above, its theoretical creations are chiefly of the nature of mythology shading off into folklore. This genial spinning of apocryphal yarns is, at its best, an amiably inefficient formulation of experiences and observations in terms of something like a life-history of the phenomena ob-

served. It has, on the one hand, little value, and little purpose, in the way of pragmatic expediency, and so it is not closely akin to the pragmatic-barbarian scheme of life; while, on the other hand, it is also ineffectual as a systematic knowledge of matter-of-fact. It is a quest of knowledge, perhaps of systematic knowledge, and it is carried on under the incentive of the idle curiosity. In this respect it falls in the same class with the civilized man's science; but it seeks knowledge not in terms of opaque matter-of-fact, but in terms of some sort of a spiritual life imputed to the facts. It is romantic and Hegelian rather than realistic and Darwinian. The logical necessities of its scheme of thought are necessities of spiritual consistency rather than of quantitative equivalence. It is like science in that it has no ulterior motive beyond the idle craving for a systematic correlation of data; but it is unlike science in that its standardization and correlation of data run in terms of the free play of imputed personal initiative rather than in terms of the constraint of objective cause and effect.

By force of the protracted selective discipline of this past phase of culture, the human nature of civilized mankind is still substantially the human nature of savage man. The ancient equipment of congenital aptitudes and propensities stands over substantially unchanged, though overlaid with barbarian traditions and conventionalities and readjusted by habituation to the exigencies of civilized life. In a measure, therefore, but by no means altogether, scientific inquiry is native to civilized man with his savage heritage, since scientific inquiry proceeds on the same general motive of idle curiosity as guided the savage myth-makers, though it makes use of concepts and standards in great measure alien to the myth-makers' habit of mind. The ancient human predilection for discovering a dramatic play of passion and intrigue in the phenomena of nature still asserts itself. In the most advanced communities, and even among the adepts of modern science, there comes up persistently the revulsion of the native savage against the inhumanly dispassionate sweep of the scientific quest, as well as against the inhumanly ruthless fabric of technological processes that have come out of this

search for matter-of-fact knowledge. Very often the savage need of a spiritual interpretation (dramatization) of phenomena breaks through the crust of acquired materialistic habits of thought, to find such refuge as may be had in articles of faith seized on and held by sheer force of instinctive conviction. Science and its creations are more or less uncanny, more or less alien, to that fashion of craving for knowledge that by ancient inheritance animates mankind. Furtively or by an overt breach of consistency, men still seek comfort in marvelous articles of savage-born lore, which contradict the truths of that modern science whose dominion they dare not question, but whose findings at the same time go beyond the breaking point of their jungle-fed spiritual sensibilities.

The ancient ruts of savage thought and conviction are smooth and easy; but however sweet and indispensable the archaic ways of thinking may be to the civilized man's peace of mind, yet such is the binding force of matter-of-fact analysis and inference under modern conditions that the findings of science are not questioned on the whole. The name of science is after all a word to conjure with. So much so that the name and the mannerisms, at least, if nothing more of science, have invaded all fields of learning and have even overrun territory that belongs to the enemy. So there are "sciences" of theology, law, and medicine, as has already been noted above. And there are such things as Christian Science, and "scientific" astrology, palmistry, and the like. But within the field of learning proper there is a similar predilection for an air of scientific acumen and precision where science does not belong. So that even that large range of knowledge that has to do with general information rather than with theory—what is loosely termed scholarship—tends strongly to take on the name and forms of theoretical statement. However decided the contrast between these branches of knowledge on the one hand, and science properly so called on the other hand, yet even the classical learning, and the humanities generally, fall in with this predilection more and more with each succeeding generation of students. The students of literature, for instance, are more and more prone to substitute critical



analysis and linguistic speculation, as the end of their endeavors, in the place of that discipline of taste and that cultivated sense of literary form and literary feeling that must always remain the chief end of literary training, as distinct from philology and the social sciences. There is, of course, no intention to question the legitimacy of a science of philology or of the analytical study of literature as a fact in cultural history, but these things do not constitute training in literary taste, nor can they take the place of it. The effect of this straining after scientific formulations in a field alien to the scientific spirit is as curious as it is wasteful. Scientifically speaking, those quasi-scientific inquiries necessarily begin nowhere and end in the same place; while in point of cultural gain they commonly come to nothing better than spiritual abnegation. But these blindfold endeavors to conform to the canons of science serve to show how wide and unmitigated the sway of science is in the modern community.

Scholarship—that is to say an intimate and systematic familiarity with past cultural achievements—still holds its place in the scheme of learning, in spite of the unadvised efforts of the short-sighted to blend it with the work of science, for it affords play for the ancient genial propensities that ruled men's quest of knowledge before the coming of science or of the outspoken pragmatic barbarism. Its place may not be so large in proportion to the entire field of learning as it was before the scientific era got fully under way. But there is no intrinsic antagonism between science and scholarship, as there is between pragmatic training and scientific inquiry. Modern scholarship shares with modern science the quality of not being pragmatic in its aim. Like science it has no ulterior end. It may be difficult here and there to draw the line between science and scholarship, and it may even more be unnecessary to draw such a line; yet while the two ranges of discipline belong together in many ways, and while there are many points of contact and sympathy between the two; while the two together make up the modern scheme of learning; yet there is no need of confounding the one with the other, nor can the one do the work of the other. The scheme of learning has changed in such manner

as to give science the more commanding place, but the scholar's domain has not thereby been invaded, nor has it suffered contraction at the hands of science, whatever may be said of the weak-kneed abnegation of some whose place, if they have one, is in the field of scholarship rather than of science.

All that has been said above has of course nothing to say as to the intrinsic merits of this quest of matter-of-fact knowledge. In point of fact, science gives its tone to modern culture. One may approve or one may deprecate the fact that this opaque, materialistic interpretation of things pervades modern thinking. That is a question of taste, about which there is no disputing. The prevalence of this matter-of-fact inquiry is a feature of modern culture, and the attitude which critics take toward this phenomenon is chiefly significant as indicating how far their own habit of mind coincides with the enlightened common-sense of civilized mankind. It shows in what degree they are abreast of the advance of culture. Those in whom the savage predilection or the barbarian tradition is stronger than their habituation to civilized life will find that this dominant factor of modern life is perverse, if not calamitous; those whose habits of thought have been fully shaped by the machine process and scientific inquiry are likely to find it good. The modern western culture, with its core of matter-of-fact knowledge, may be better or worse than some other cultural scheme, such as the classic Greek, the mediæval Christian, the Hindu, or the Pueblo Indian. Seen in certain lights, tested by certain standards, it is doubtless better; by other standards, worse. But the fact remains that the current cultural scheme, in its maturest growth, is of that complexion; its characteristic force lies in this matter-of-fact insight; its highest discipline and its maturest aspirations are these.

In point of fact, the sober common-sense of civilized mankind accepts no other end of endeavor as self-sufficient and ultimate. That such is the case seems to be due chiefly to the ubiquitous presence of the machine technology and its creations in the life of modern communities. And so long as the machine process continues to hold its dominant place as a disciplinary

factor in modern culture, so long must the spiritual and intellectual life of this cultural era maintain the character which the machine process gives it.

But while the scientist's spirit and his achievements stir an unqualified admiration in modern men, and while his discoveries carry conviction as nothing else does, it does not follow that the manner of man which this quest of knowledge produces or requires comes near answering to the current ideal of manhood, or that his conclusions are felt to be as good and beautiful as they are true. The ideal man, and the ideal of human life, even in the apprehension of those who most rejoice in the advances of science, is neither the finikin skeptic in the laboratory nor the animated slide-rule. The quest of science is relatively new. It is a cultural factor not comprised, in anything like its modern force, among those circumstances whose selective action in the far past has given to the race the human nature which it now has. The race reached the human plane with little of this searching knowledge of facts; and throughout the greater part of its life-history on the human plane it has been accustomed to make its higher generalizations and to formulate its larger principles of life in other terms than those of passionless matter-of-fact. This manner of knowledge has occupied an increasing share of men's attention in the past, since it bears in a decisive way upon the minor affairs of workday life; but it has never until now been put in the first place, as the dominant note of human culture. The normal man, such as his inheritance has made him, has therefore good cause to be restive under its dominion.



## THE RELIGIOUS DEDICATION OF WOMEN

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Among all groups of men the inferior has been wont to turn away the anger or win the good-will of his superior by gift-making. Religious worship in many of its forms is, at bottom, gift-making by man, the inferior, to God, the superior.<sup>1</sup> The nature of the gift from man to man varies according to prevailing social values. Cattle, slaves, women, precious stones or metals, manifold forms of personal service or devotion, are the gifts characteristic of various economic and cultural states of society. The form of man's gift to God is likewise determined by social values. The following discussion is an attempt to tell the story of one particular form of religious gift, the gift of women.

In almost all primitive groups women are valued as a form of property which their owners—husbands, fathers, or brothers—may dispose of at pleasure. Ordinarily they are disposed of by male relatives in marriage by barter, purchase, or service, or by husbands in conjugal servitude, in wife-exchange, or in sexual hospitality.<sup>2</sup> Occasionally they serve as gifts to chiefs or gods. The occasion sometimes requires the immolation of the gift. Peter de Cieza relates of the Quillacingas of New Granada that neighboring chiefs sent one, two, or three women to be buried alive with a deceased chief, that he "might go to the devil with company."<sup>3</sup> There is a Chinese story that a man once interred

<sup>1</sup>Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, Vol. II, pp. 340, 341. Granted, with Robertson-Smith, Jevons, and Frazer, the hypothesis of the origin of sacrifice as a means of assimilation with the totem-god, it is, nevertheless, a fact that sacrifice as an expiatory or propitiatory offering exists in all forms of religion which have passed beyond the stage of sympathetic magic.

<sup>2</sup>A variation of the practice of sexual hospitality, particularly interesting in connection with the following discussion, is found on the west coast of Africa. Bosman, quoted by McClennan (*Studies in Ancient History*, 2d series, p. 424), states that in polygynous Guinea a man's second wife is "consecrated" to his god.

<sup>3</sup>*The Seventeen Years of Travels of Peter de Cieza through the Mighty Kingdom of Peru* (London, 1709), pp. 89, 34.

two of his daughters with his deceased sovereign as a mark of gratitude for his having, on a certain occasion, shown clemency to his father.<sup>4</sup> We may note, in this connection, that the practice of widow-immolation has prevailed more or less among all ancestor-worshiping peoples as a means of providing the deceased husband with conjugal service after death. In gifts of women to gods the occasion is also at times one of blood-sacrifice. The blood-sacrifice of human beings is generally supposed to point to original cannibal practices by the sacrificers. The fact that in the blood-sacrifice of women to gods the women are not infrequently virgins suggests that they are sometimes destined for the sexual service of, instead of for food for, the propitiated god.<sup>5</sup>

Whatever may be the explanation of the blood-sacrifice of virgins, however, the dedication to the use of gods of living women during their whole lifetime, or for limited periods—a practice customary among many peoples—is based on the idea of the existence of sexual relations between the dedicated women and the god to whom they are given.<sup>6</sup> The devotion of *living* women to deity is analogous to the dedication in an earthly abode of deity of non-perishable articles of value. The act of immolation or destruction seems to be no longer a condition necessary to

<sup>4</sup> De Groot, *The Religious System of China*, Vol. II, p. 725 (Leyden, 1894).

<sup>5</sup> The practice of the natives of New Granada shows in a gruesome way how the same women may be considered useful for both purposes. They took their war-captives "when they were virgins, and brought up the children they had by them, with much care, until they were twelve or thirteen years of age, when they ate them, as well as their mother, so soon as she was past child-bearing." (Garcilasso del Vega, *Royal Commentaries of the Incas*, Vol. I, pp. 55, 56.) If human sacrifice be interpreted as a blood-covenant with deity, the sacrifice of women might be taken as an added means of alliance through sexual relations between the victims and the god. The fact that in China, when sutteeism in general was abolished, the self-immolation of widows or affianced virgins to escape violation was allowed, suggests that the immolation of god-given women may have been thought of as the most thorough way of securing them inviolable to the god.

<sup>6</sup> Crooke cites from a Settlement report an instance in northern India which may point to a transition from blood-sacrifice to dedication of living women to gods: "In the Gurgão District, in the Rewâri Tahsil, at the village of Bâs Doda, a fair is held on the 26th of Chait and the two following days. I was told that formerly girls of the Dhinwar class used to be married to the god at these festivals, and that they always died soon afterwards." (*Folk-Lore of Northern India*, Vol. II, p. 118.)

the enjoyment of the offerings by the gods. An analogous stage of thought is reached in the relations between men and women when the immolation of widows changes into the observation of chastity during prolonged widowhood, or of perpetual virginity, as in China, when the affianced husband dies before the marriage.<sup>7</sup> Pertinent in this connection is the fact that in certain communities where widow-marriage in general is not forbidden, marriage with the widows of hypothesized chiefs or semi-divine personages is banned. For example: "It is not right for you to . . . wed his [Mahomet's] wives after him ever; verily, that is with God a serious thing."<sup>8</sup>

The practice of the Guinea Africans is a notable instance of the crudest form of the religious dedication of women. Most of the gods of the polygynous and polytheistic Ewe- and Tshi-speaking negroes of the Slave and Gold Coasts have women consecrated to their service as *wives*. (This is the native term. It would be more proper to call the human wives concubines, as their god-masters also have divine mates.) In the kingdom of Dahomi, where it is estimated that every fourth woman is in the service of the gods, the god Khebioso alone is said to have fifteen hundred "wives." Dañhgbi, another god of the Ewe-speaking peoples, has probably two thousand "wives." The marriages of these "wives" are consummated by the priests as representatives of the gods. The priests are allowed to marry, but the gods' wives or priestesses are not; for they belong to the gods they serve. They are unrestricted, however, in sexual intercourse, and may send for any man they fancy to live with them. No man dare refuse, and some priestesses have as many as six men in their train at once.<sup>9</sup> We may note, in this description of the African priestesses, that divine conjugal proprietorship does not preclude sexual intercourse between the wife-priestess and

<sup>7</sup> In the imperial Chinese edict forbidding sutteeism the argument is used that faithful wives should continue to live because they can best serve their husbands by so doing. The custom then arose of widows dwelling near the graves of their husbands, and there observing the rites due to his spirit. (De Groot, *The Religious System of China*, Vol. II, pp. 727-806.

<sup>8</sup> *Qur'ân*, XXXIII, 54 ("Books of the East" series).

<sup>9</sup> Ellis, *The Ewe-Speaking Peoples*, pp. 38, 60, and chap. ix; also Ellis, *The Tshi-Speaking Peoples*, pp. 121, 122.



the priest-proxy or male worshiper. The erotic activity of the priestess is thought to be inspired by the god. Among the same peoples conjugal proprietorship among men does not preclude the practice of sexual hospitality.<sup>10</sup>

As female chastity in general becomes more valued, however, divine, like human, proprietorship in women takes on a more exclusive character.<sup>11</sup> We may also note that, as adultery is forbidden to the royal wives, so chastity is required of the girls dedicated to the temple-service of a deified king.<sup>12</sup> The ideas and practices of the ancient Peruvians in regard to the sexual privileges of their Sun-god and their god-descended ruler represent

<sup>10</sup> It may occur to the reader that at this point a discussion of temple-prostitution were pertinent. Temple-prostitution may contain elements of the form of worship that we are considering. The fact, however, that in phallic worship temple-prostitutes are even more frequently in the service of female than of male deities leads us to suppose that there are other ideas expressed in this practice besides ideas of sexual service. For the servant-priestesses of phallic goddesses, see Pearson, *The Chances of Death and Other Studies in Evolution*, Vol. II, pp. 106, 107 (London and New York, 1897).

Wilutzky has, in his *Vorgeschichte des Rechts* (Breslau, 1903), pp. 37-40, brought together the instances of temple-prostitution reported by the ancient writers. In a rather singular attempt to revivify the outcast promiscuity theory, he concludes that temple-prostitution was a tribute to the gods as supporters of primitive customs; it was planned to please them as a return to ancestral promiscuity. Whatever may be the explanation of temple-prostitution, it appears that in religious as in human relations the juridical idea of sexual proprietorship was, in contrast to the idea of sexual promiscuity, the teleological line of development. And yet facts of religious proprietorship in women have hitherto passed unobserved or uninterpreted. This may be due to the disproportionate amount of attention that has been bestowed upon facts of religious promiscuity as a crop of the general "wild oats" theory of promiscuity.

<sup>11</sup> Ritualistic phrases are sometimes reminiscent of the earlier and grosser ideas and practices. In ancient Egypt, under the New Empire, female singers were employed in the temples in great numbers. Erman writes that "we scarcely meet with one lady . . . whether she were married or unmarried, the wife of an ecclesiastic or layman, whether she belonged to the family of a high-priest or to that of an artisan, who was not thus connected with a temple" (*Life in Ancient Egypt*, p. 295). These singers were supposed to form the harem of the god. They held various degrees of rank, as in an earthly harem. Certain women of high rank had the honor of bearing the title of chief concubine of the god. At the head of the mystical harem at Thebes there stood the legitimate consort, called the "wife of the god," the "hand of the god," or the "adorer of the god," and to her house belonged the singers. She represented the heavenly consort of Amon, the goddess Mut. (*Ibid.*, pp. 295, 296.)

<sup>12</sup> Ellis, *The Ewe-Speaking Peoples*, pp. 89, 90.

an early stage of the transition from the idea of divine proprietorship in women, as expressed in sexual acts, to the developed form of this idea expressed in the practice of perpetual virginity. The parallelism between the virgins dedicated to the Sun and the virgins dedicated to the Inca, as seen in the following citations from Garcillasso del Vega, is of itself the best exposition of this transition. Attached to every temple of the Sun was a house of virgins called the house

of the chosen ones, because they were selected by reason either of their lineage or of their beauty. They were obliged to be virgins; and to insure their being so, they were set apart at the age of eight years and under.<sup>13</sup>

At the house at Cuzco there were usually as many as fifteen hundred virgins. These virgins lived

in perpetual seclusion to the end of their lives, and preserved their virginity; and they were not permitted to converse, or have intercourse with, or to see any man, nor any woman who was not one of themselves. For it was said that the women of the Sun should not be made common by being seen of any; . . . The principal duty of the virgins of the Sun was to weave and to make all that the Inca wore on his person, and likewise all the clothes of his legitimate wife the Coya. They also wove all the very fine clothes which were offered as sacrifices to the Sun.<sup>14</sup>

[They] made all these things with their own hands, in great quantities for the Sun, their husband; but, as the Sun could not dress nor fetch the ornaments, they sent them to the Inca, as his legitimate son and heir, that he might wear them.<sup>15</sup>

As those things were made by the hands of the Ccoyas, or wives of the Sun, and were made for the Sun, and as these women were by birth of the same blood as the Sun,<sup>16</sup> for all these reasons their work was held in great veneration. So that the Inca could not give the thing made by the virgins to any person whatever who was not of the blood royal, because they said that it was unlawful for ordinary mortals to use divine things. The Incas were prohibited from giving them to the Curacas, or captains, how great soever their services might have been, unless they were relations. . . . [The virgins had also] to make the bread called *cancu* at the proper season, for the sacrifices that were offered up to the Sun at the great festivals called *Raymi* and *Situa*. They also made the liquor which the Inca and his family drank on those occasions.<sup>17</sup>

All the furniture of the convent, down to the pots, pans, and jars, were

<sup>13</sup> *Royal Commentaries*, Vol. I, p. 292.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 293, 296.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 297.

<sup>16</sup> See below.

<sup>17</sup> *Loc cit.*, pp. 297, 298.

of gold and silver, as in the temple of the Sun, because the virgins were looked upon as his wives. . . . All things relating to them were in conformity with the life and conversation of women who observed perpetual seclusion and virginity. There was a law for the nun who should transgress this rule of life, that she should be buried alive and that her accomplice should be strangled. But as it seemed to them but a slight punishment only to kill a man for so grave an offense as the violation of a woman dedicated to the Sun, his god, and the father of his Kings, the law directed that the wife, children, servants, and relations of the delinquent should be put to death, as well as all the inhabitants of his village and all their flock, without leaving a suckling nor a crying baby, as the saying is. The village was pulled down and the site strewn with stones, that the birthplace of so bad a son might forever remain desolate and accursed, where no man nor even beast might rest. This was the law, but it was never put into execution, because no man ever transgressed it.<sup>18</sup>

The Sun or Inca clan was endogamous; for their great ancestor the Sun had married as his legitimate wife the Moon, his sister. His earth-wives or concubines were also

obliged to be of the same blood, that is to say, daughters of the Incas, either of the King or of his relations, being free from all foreign blood. . . . They gave as a reason for this that as they could only offer virgins for the service of the Sun, so it was likewise unlawful to offer a bastard with mixed foreign blood. For though they imagined that the Sun had children, they considered that they ought not to be bastards, with mixed divine and human blood.<sup>19</sup>

The Inca, the lineal representative of the Sun-god, had also his houses of virgins. All things were the same in the Inca's houses as in the Sun's houses, except that women of all kinds were admitted into the former as long as they were virgins and very beautiful.<sup>20</sup> When the Inca asked for one, they selected

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 298.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 292.

<sup>20</sup> Polo de Ondegardo gives a rather different classification for the "devoted women." Part were sent to Cuzco for blood-sacrifice (this statement is significant for the hypothesis that living dedication was the outcome of blood-sacrifice), and part were secluded in women's houses. There were three kinds of houses: the Sun's, the Inca's, and the captains' and governors'. (Vol. XLVIII, pp. 165 ff., "Hakluyt Society Works.")

In support of the hypothesis that blood-sacrifice of women to deity is analogous to widow-immolation is the fact that the latter as well as the former was practiced in Peru. "When an Inca or any great Curaca died, his favorite servants and most beloved wives were buried alive with him or killed. . . . It is certain that they themselves [wives] volunteered to be killed, and their number was often such that the officers were obliged to interfere, saying that enough had gone at



the most beautiful to be sent to where he was, as his concubine.<sup>21</sup>

Those who had once been sent out as concubines to the King, could not again return to the convent, but served in the royal palace as servants of the Queen, until they obtained permission to return to their homes, where they received houses and lands, and were treated with much veneration, for it was a very great honor to the whole neighborhood to have near them a woman of the Inca.<sup>22</sup> Those who did not attain to the honor of being concubines of the King, remained in the convent until they were very old and then had permission to return home, or else died in the convent.<sup>23</sup>

These girls were guarded with the same care and vigilance as those of the Sun. They had servant-maids like the others, and were maintained out of the estate of the Inca, because they were his women. They could do the same work as those of the Sun, weaving and sewing, making clothes in very great quantities for the Inca, and making all the other things we have mentioned as being the work of the virgins of the Sun. The Inca distributed the work of these girls among the royal family, the Curacas, war captains, and all other persons whom he desired to honour with presents. These gifts were not prohibited, because they were made by the Incas and for him, and not by the virgins of the Sun for the Sun.<sup>24</sup>

The same severe law existed against delinquents who violated the women of the Inca as against those who were guilty with virgins dedicated to the Sun, as the crime was considered to be the same.<sup>25</sup>

Still another form of religious chastity was practiced by the Peruvian women :

present, and that the rest would go to serve their master, one by one, as they died." (*Royal Commentaries*, Vol. II, p. 113.)

Transitions from widow-immolation are also found in Peru. (1) In a burial mound at Gran Chimu were found metal figures representing human beings, (Squier, *Peru: Incidents of Travel and Exploration in the Land of the Incas* [London, 1877], p. 158.) (2) "The chastity of widows must not be forgotten, which they preserved, with great strictness, during the first year of their bereavement. And very few of those who had no children ever married again, and even those who had continued to live single; for this virtue was much commended in their laws and ordinances. It was there directed that the lands of the widows should be tilled first, before those of either the Curacas or the Incas, and other privileges were conceded to them. It is also true that the Indians did not approve of marriage with a widow, especially if the man was not a widower; for it was said that such an one lost, I know not what, of his quality in marrying a widow." (*Royal Commentaries*, Vol. I, pp. 305, 306.)

<sup>21</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 299.

<sup>22</sup> Cunow points out, in quoting other Spanish writers on the subject, that this was one of Garcillasso's many rosy views of the Inca despotism (*Die soziale Verfassung des Inkareichs* [Stuttgart, 1896], pp. 110-12).

<sup>23</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 301.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 299, 300.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 300.

Besides the virgins who professed perpetual virginity in the monasteries, there were many women of the blood royal who led the same life in their own houses, having taken a vow of chastity, though they were not secluded; for they did not cease to visit their nearest relations when they were sick, or in childbirth, or when their first-borns were shorn and named. These women were held in great veneration for their chastity and purity, and, as a mark of worship and respect, they are called Ocllo, which was a name held sacred in their idolatry. The chastity of these women was not feigned, but was truly observed, on pain of being burnt alive if it was lost, or of being cast into the lake of lions. I myself was acquainted with one of these women, when she was in extreme old age, and who, having never married, was called Ocllo. She sometimes visited my mother, and I was given to understand that she was her great aunt, being a sister of her grandfather. She was held in great veneration and was given the first place, and I am witness that my mother so treated her, as well because she was her aunt, as on account of her age and purity of life.<sup>26</sup>

It would be interesting to know whether the cloistered women of Peru developed from the home-staying celibates, as in early Christendom, or *vice versa*. The severity of the punishment inflicted upon violators of the Sun's women is also suggestive of early Christian practice. In 826, for example, Louis-le-Débonnaire decreed that the seduction of a nun was to be punished by the death of both partners in guilt, that the property was to be consecrated to the church, and that if the count in whose district the crime occurred neglected its prosecution, he was to be degraded, deprived of his office, undergo public penance, and pay his full wer-gild to the fisc.<sup>27</sup>

The exclusive character of divine proprietorship in women is also seen in the recently published Babylonian code of Hammurabi. The code prescribes that if a priestess leave the cloister and go into a tavern to drink, she shall be burned.<sup>28</sup> In this code, as well as in Garcillasso del Vega's description of the ancient Peruvian customs, the parallelism between the women devoted to the god Marduk and the wives of men is enlightening: "If anyone defame a priestess or the wife of a free man without proof, he shall be taken before the judge and his forehead shall be cut."<sup>29</sup> Fathers dedicated their daughters to Marduk with or

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 305.

<sup>27</sup> Lea, *An Historical Sketch of Sacerdotal Celibacy* (Boston, 1884), p. 136.

<sup>28</sup> *Mémoires*, Vol. IV, "Textes élamites-sémitiques" (Paris, 1902), p. 142.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 144.

without the customary marriage dowry. If without the priestess could claim a portion of the patrimony at her father's death. If the father failed to stipulate, in providing the dowry, that the priestess was free to do with it what she willed, her brothers were entitled at the father's death to take from her the field and garden of which the dowry consisted, in exchange for wheat and oil and linen.<sup>30</sup>

I shall not attempt at present to analyze the final stage in the development of the religious dedication of women. The subject would require an exhaustive study of the practice of religious female celibacy in Christianity. Let me point out tentatively, however, that the Christian nun may well be thought of as the descendant of the African wife-priestess and the Peruvian Sun-wife. In Christianity sacrifice passed over from the gift stage to the self-abnegation stage.<sup>31</sup> And this change in the general conception of sacrifice involved a change in the ideas of the meaning of religious female celibacy. In Christianity, too, the exclusive character of divine proprietorship was thought of rather as precluding sexual intercourse with men than as leading to it with deity. Besides, the idea of a mystical union with deity took the place of ideas of sexual relations with deity.<sup>32</sup>

I also refrain from a full discussion of certain practices which at first sight seem to be closely akin to the subject under consideration. I mean the practices of religious defloration and of conjugal abstinence at more or less sanctified periods. Mr. Crawley has pointed out, in developing his theory of sexual tabu, that both practices are due to the idea of danger from sexual intercourse.<sup>33</sup> Let me remark, incidentally, that religious defloration is undoubtedly at times an act of phallicism, the adoration or

<sup>30</sup> *Loc. cit.*, pp. 151, 152.

<sup>31</sup> Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, Vol. II, pp. 359 ff.

<sup>32</sup> Mariology, the widespread mediæval beliefs in the existence of *incubi* and *succubi*, the endless incidents of sexual pathology in the lives of the saints, and the consecration of the nun with its simulated marriage rite of "taking the veil" as the "bride of Christ," show that the primitive attitude of mind was still held by many.

<sup>33</sup> *The Mystic Rose*, pp. 188, 189, 349. Durkheim thinks ("La prohibition de l'inceste," *L'année sociologique*, 1896-97, p. 55, n. 1) that this very danger is due, in primitive thought, not, according to Mr. Crawley, to female weakness, but to



placation of deity for the sake of fertility. As a fertility rite it may certainly be viewed as a form of the religious dedication of women in general. Hamilton gives us a clear statement on this point in relation to the practice of the *jus primae noctis* as a religious ceremony on the Malabar coast:

When the Samorin (ruler of Calicut) marries, he must not cohabit with his bride till the hambourie or chief priest has enjoyed her, and, if he pleases, may have three nights of her company, because the first-fruits of her nuptials must be a holy oblation to the god she worships; and some of the nobles are so complaisant as to allow the clergy the same tribute.<sup>34</sup>

Conjugal abstinence on religious occasions may also partake of the nature of a dedication in communities where sacrifice has become self-abnegation. Nevertheless, I do not wish to introduce these subjects into my argument. To do so, a close and exhaustive study would be necessary of every case of defloration or conjugal abstinence as a religious rite in relation to other social facts in the specific community, in order to determine the respective parts played by phallic worship, self-sacrifice, and sexual tabu in the rite. For example, the dictate of Moses to the Hebrews, ordering them to refrain from sexual intercourse with their wives, preparatory to the appearance of Yahweh on Mount Sinai, was probably a purificatory observance, a tabu due to fear of female contamination on a sacred occasion.<sup>35</sup> In this early period of Hebrew history the gift theory had not yet passed into the self-abnegation theory. Self-sacrificial, on the other hand, may have been, in view of early Christian asceticism, the synodal decrees of Bishop Raterius and of Egbert, archbishop of York, prescribing conjugal abstinence for a period of two weeks at Christmas, of one week at Easter and Whitsuntide, for the eves of feast-days, for Saturdays and Sundays, and for three days and nights before and after partaking of the holy communion.<sup>36</sup> A like difference of motive is seen in the Jewish story of Tobias, and in certain of the early papal admonishments in regard to postponing the con-

female sanctity. Because of the meaning attaching to blood in general and therefore to menstrual blood, women are thought of as peculiarly close to the totem-god. Hence clan exogamy. Compare with what has preceded in regard to the sin of violating ecclesiastically dedicated women.

<sup>34</sup> Schmidt, *Jus Primae Noctis*, pp. 313-18.

<sup>35</sup> Exod. 19:15.

<sup>36</sup> Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 149, n. 1.

summation of marriage. Again, when the priest-god of the kingdom of Congo left his residence to visit other places within his jurisdiction, all married people had to observe strict continence the whole time he was out. Frazer gives this fact in illustration of sexual tabu;<sup>37</sup> but, after a close scrutiny of other facts about this Congo people, it is possible that we might conclude that this practice was a worn-down survival of sexual hospitality during the journeys of the priest-god.

I also refrain from discussing the practice of male chastity as a religious rule. As in religious defloration and conjugal continence, sexual tabu and self-sacrifice are undoubtedly important factors. But here, too, they need to be carefully analyzed in relation to other social facts. At present we need only note that religious male chastity may also develop from religious female chastity by the process of false analogy, which plays such an important part in many other social phenomena. When the origin of religious female chastity in divine proprietorship is lost sight of, and the state is considered only one of self-sacrificing worship, it is naturally thought of as fit for male worshipers as well.<sup>38</sup> This process is part of the general development of male from female chastity. When prematrimonial chastity and conjugal fidelity come to be valued as abstract social virtues, they cease to be thought of as specifically female characteristics. I suggest that the practice of sexual abstinence by men as a form of religious self-sacrifice may also have developed in the same way as the religious practice of fasting has been thought to develop. The Chinese practice of abstaining from sexual intercourse during mourning is interesting in this connection. De Groot writes:

<sup>37</sup> *Golden Bough*, Vol. I, p. 113.

<sup>38</sup> Dulaure describes a sacred bas-relief on the town-gate of one of the towns of Sisupatnam, which represents a crude stage of male sacrifice. Sita, the goddess-wife of Vishnu, is being worshiped by six Indian penitents who appear to be offering up to her their virile members. (*Des divinités génératrices*, p. 80.) According to Ovid (*Fast.*, 4, 223), priests of Attis emasculated themselves because of the like act of Attis. The myth relates that Attis, a Phrygian youth, aroused the love of the goddess. She made him her temple servant, and made him take a vow of absolute chastity. He broke his vow from love of a nymph, and then from remorse emasculated himself.

Mourning in ancient China meant expropriating one's self temporarily of all one's possessions. As a natural consequence, custom then required mourners to divest themselves for a time also of their wives and concubines, who constituted mere objects of wealth.<sup>39</sup>

From this point of view, conjugal abstinence during mourning is assimilated to fasting, likewise a mourning custom in China. In view of the fact that in China women were at one time buried alive with their masters, may not conjugal abstinence be a worn-down survival, like widow-chastity, of the sacrifice of women to deceased relatives? Again, sexual abstinence by women under certain circumstances necessitates the same sacrifice by men. How this may occur in general is specifically and curiously illustrated by the myth of the origin of Priapus-worship at Lampsacus. The god's attentions to the women of that town angered their husbands. They therefore drove him away. In revenge, Priapus inflicted the jealous husbands of Lampsacus with venereal disease, and thereby forced them to re-establish his worship in their city.<sup>40</sup>

Implicit throughout all of the foregoing discussion is the view that religious ideas and practices are determined by non-religious social relations. It seems unnecessary to point out the converse fact that religious ideas and practices vitally affect non-religious social relations. The interaction is constant. The practice of occasional or life-long religious chastity by men and women has been extremely helpful in the development of social standards of sexual control. Manu<sup>41</sup> and St. Paul<sup>42</sup> are certainly responsible for untold human misery, but they may also be credited with helping to give a religious sanction to social control of sexuality.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>39</sup> *The Religious System of China*, Vol. II, pp. 608, 609.

<sup>40</sup> Dulaure, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

<sup>41</sup> "There is no sin in . . . carnal intercourse, for that is the natural way of created beings, but abstinence brings great rewards." (*The Laws of Manu*, Vol. V, p. 56; "Books of the East" series.)

<sup>42</sup> "Art thou loosed from a wife? Seek not a wife. But and if thou marry, thou hast not sinned; and if a virgin marry, she hath not sinned. Nevertheless such shall have trouble in the flesh." (1 Cor. 7: 27, 28.)

<sup>43</sup> It is interesting to note that the religious sanction for chastity may develop even in phallic worship. Cicero writes that from the Vestal Virgins women may learn that the purest chastity constitutes the perfection of their nature ("sentiant mulieres in illis, naturam feminarum omnem castitatem pati," *De Legibus*, II, 12). The Peruvian Sun-god, like all Sun-deities, had a phallic character. The



As the chattel character of women begins to disappear, the original cause and safeguard of female chastity and conjugal fidelity—i. e., male ownership—likewise begins to disappear. At this point, the religious sanction which had already been developed under the system of male ownership is an important factor in developing an appreciation of chastity and conjugal fidelity *per se*. This is only one of the many cases in which religion seems to safeguard the products of a social means that is outgrown.

In following out the evolutionary relations between the blood-sacrifice of virgins, the lifelong dedication of women to the sexual service of gods, the dedication of perpetual virginity to deity, the practice of occasional sexual abstinence as a sacrificial rite, the attribution of a religious sanction to both male and female chastity, we discover one of the many impressive series of social factors which have contributed so richly to the development of human personality.

original character of phallicism as a fertility worship must, to be sure, become considerably effaced to allow of the attachment of a sanction to chastity in its connection. Enhanced reproduction was always the object of pure phallicism. (Note, for example, in this connection, that the priestesses of Priapus in Colophon were all *married* women: Dulaure, *op. cit.*, p. 121.) Hence the dedication of women to non-phallic deities would be more apt to lead, or, at any rate, would lead more quickly, to religious celibacy, than the dedication of women to primarily phallic deities.

## SOCIOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION LINES. IV

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### SECTION VII. IS SOCIOLOGY METAPHYSICAL?<sup>1</sup>

If social phenomena are psychic, is sociology therefore metaphysical? Are these phenomena too inaccessible to observation to be successfully studied by the methods of science without aid from those of metaphysics? This question, having been raised and emphasized,<sup>2</sup> stands at this point across our path.

Dr. Fogel asserts that for adequate study of social phenomena there is required some other method of approach than those known to natural science; and he says:

The other and more direct mode of approach is through appreciation. By appreciation I mean a sympathetic identification of the subject or individual with the world in which the individual sees himself as an agent realizing his world in an experience which is individual for himself. He thinks himself as part of the stream of the world-process, and so looks at the rest of this stream as like himself in that it can be realized by him just as he realizes his own experience; or, in other words, he is at fellowship with the world, so that the distinction between subject and object is no longer an absolute one.<sup>3</sup>

This use of the word "appreciation" is based upon the metaphysical doctrine of Professor Royce—the doctrine, namely, that there is in ultimate truth but one consciousness, and what we call conscious individuals are, in reality, waves of one vast sea. Or, to employ a figure of Professor Royce's, souls are like monads, which may indeed have no windows, but which also have no roofs, and but one sky into which all look up and see each other reflected there. Consciousness, then, is not a strictly individual phenomenon, but each finite self is so much of the absolute self as comes to

<sup>1</sup> This topic absorbs the present section. Discussion of the other questions raised at the close of sec. vi will follow immediately.

<sup>2</sup> Philip H. Fogel, "Metaphysical Elements in Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, November, 1904, and January, 1905.

<sup>3</sup> *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, p. 356.

accentuated consciousness in one succession of localized experience. As breathing the air in my room I breathe of the air that surrounds the planet, so in living my life I share in the life of the universe, and in knowing myself I know both God and all men; and this direct knowledge is "appreciation." Thus "we, seemingly isolated and momentary beings, do share in the organic life of the one Self."<sup>4</sup> My friend "is real to me by virtue of our organic unity in the one Self."<sup>5</sup> The appreciations of the one spirit "are indeed his own, for he is alone, and there is none beside him. Yet in them we all share, for that fact is what binds us together."<sup>6</sup> "A and B are in their actual and appreciable relations, by virtue of the part they both play, in the inner self-consciousness of the organic and inclusive self."<sup>7</sup>

We are told that certain essential spiritual realities, with which sociology must deal, can be known only by this method of appreciation. Says Dr. Fogel: "When we get to the real study of social phenomena and want to get the inner springs of sociality, we must go to appreciation," for the essential objects of such study "are beyond the sphere of description."<sup>8</sup>

Accordingly, these essential realities, which are revealed by "appreciation," are said to be inaccessible to the methods of unmetaphysical science because those methods can deal only with what is "*describable*," "*permanent*," and "*public*."<sup>9</sup> And the appreciable realities are not "*describable*," because they do not appear in the categories of description, such as space, time, similarity, difference, and causality. Especially they are not caused, in the scientific sense; their only cause is "justification" to self-consciousness. Their categories are categories of interest, worth, and purpose, and such categories do not make description possible. They are not "*permanent*," because appreciation is a fleeting experience that cannot be recalled at will, and remembered in terms of unchanging and universally valid categories of experience, as can the objects which science successfully handles. Nor are they "*public*" in the sense, essential to science, of being open

<sup>4</sup> Royce, *Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 407.      <sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 409.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 412.

<sup>8</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 374.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 413.

<sup>9</sup> Royce, *op. cit.*, pp. 383-92.



alike to all normal observers under like conditions, but the knowledge gained by "appreciation" is peculiar to the individual, essentially private and incommunicable.

The aim of this section is to show that all the phenomena treated by sociology are accessible to purely scientific methods, and that it is entirely unnecessary to the purposes of sociology that light should be shed on these phenomena by any metaphysical doctrine.

The question whether the category of causality applies to social phenomena will meet us in a later section, and therefore may be treated lightly here. And we will defer to the latter part of this section the inquiry whether the teleological nature of sociology, its dealing with valuations and ideals, requires that scientific method shall at least be supplemented by a "philosophic method." For the present clearness will be promoted by confining our attention to the question whether any of the phenomena essential to sociology are inaccessible to observation and description, and whether the necessary appreciation of human experience-values is at all dependent upon any metaphysical doctrine of their ultimate reality, whether such appreciation deals with anything but phenomena — as distinguished from the metaphysical realities that may be conceived to underlie phenomena, or requires any "other mode of approach" than observation and the logical processes familiar to pure science. By answering in the negative this whole group of questions we shall maintain that it only produces confusion of thought to speak of "metaphysical elements in sociology."

We should have expected it of a metaphysician that he would hold that *all sciences equally*, and all explanation, rest back finally upon metaphysical conceptions, and also that he would avoid even implying a contrast between scientific and metaphysical methods, and claim rather that metaphysics does but push the scientific methods — and no others — to yield their last drop of implication about the realities that are beyond phenomena.

Let us set out by re-emphasizing the importance to sociology of emotions and motives, of the affective phase of human experi-

ence. And let us heartily admit that emotions are not "describable" in just the same way as things, or as ideas, concepts and deeds. But we are told that emotions are not describable *at all*, because they do not appear in the categories of description. It is true they have no spatial dimensions, but neither do differentiation, correlation, chemical affinity, ether, gravitation, and other concepts of which natural science makes use, and which are public and describable objects of thought; and we need not hasten to admit that emotions are without identifiable resemblances and differences, or that they do not exist in the categories of time and causality, meaning by the last *conditioning*, being conditioned and also conditioning effects. We are told also that emotions are not "permanent," and it is true that they are transient and unreturning experiences. They do not return, yet others of the same kind may be experienced, and a *kind* of emotion is a distinct and permanent concept in the only essential sense, for it *can be recognized* whenever it occurs in our own consciousness; otherwise the word "anger" or "fear" would be meaningless except when the speaker is consciously angry or afraid. We are told, finally, that emotions are not "public," but private. And it is true that they are individual and in one sense incommunicable. But human beings are so similar that they have the same kinds of emotions. Moreover, our knowledge that our associates have emotions like our own is not due to metaphysical insight, but is a direct inference from observable phenomena. We and our associates are individuals of one species, products of a common evolution, inheriting capacities for the same types of subjective experience; and we manifest our experiences by conduct that is common to the individuals of our kind, which each beholder understands because it has been the familiar accompaniment of his own emotions, and accepts as evidence of similar emotions in his associates. And it is thus that we become convinced that our neighbor is angry, or afraid, or possessed by any of the numerous varieties of feeling that we learn to distinguish in ourselves and recognize in others, when by their overt conduct men display the various emotions that are characteristic of man.

The publicity and scientific tractability of emotional phe-

nomena are dependent on the inferred similarity of the experience of different individuals. But it is no more dependent upon it than all "description." "Red" is the name of a subjective experience (referred to an objective cause). Descriptive words like "long" and "true" are as really names of subjective experience as words like "angry" and "afraid." Concepts and propositions exist only in consciousness, and *all description, indeed all language*, is based upon the supposed similarity of human experience—similarity of perception and conception in case of the objective, similarity of conscious states in case of the emotional or appreciative. If it were still objected that the attempt to communicate knowledge of emotions is more liable to misunderstanding than other description, because we differ more in our feelings than in our cognitive processes, we could afford to admit, if necessary, that there is a difference of *degree*; but any difference on this account is only in degree, and may not be even that. Color-blindness that invalidates the universality and publicity of sense-perception may be as common as any equally wide departure from the normal in the great common human emotions. To assume uniformity of conception with reference to the supposedly public, scientific, and purely cognitive, even among experts in description and argument, may occasion serious misunderstanding as often as it does to attribute to men emotional similarity. Indeed, when men are looked at in broad classes in a way to suit the purposes of sociology, individual emotional idiosyncrasies may become negligible. It is not necessary that emotions of different individuals should be identical, any more than it is elsewhere essential to the purposes of science that specimens of the same species should be identical. The botanist does not despair because specimens of the same variety of plant are not identical, though no two leaves in all June be quite alike. And in interpreting the observable evidence, even of nice emotional differences between individual associates, we have acquired amazing skill that warns us how far to trust our inference of the emotional similarity of man, by virtue of which the motives and emotions that characterize social classes become public, as revealed in overt signs. The metaphysicians do not claim that we are especially liable to error when we take the



emotional similarity of man as a major premise for all our interpretation of the emotional meanings of his speech and conduct. Instead, they claim that this similarity is reliable. And if we are right in adding that all the "publicity" of other knowledge is equally dependent on the subjective similarity of man, then where is the need of anything more metaphysical in our appreciation of each other's emotions than in our communication of the description of a tree or a fish? We can describe to each other a tree or an emotion, because of the similarity of our sense-perceptions in the one case, and of our emotions in the other. In both cases alike the "publicity" is based on the similarity. The known similarity is no more essential and no more metaphysical in the one case than in the other. And in neither case is our knowledge of the reliable similarity metaphysically derived, nor due to metaphysical contributions to thought, nor peculiar to metaphysicians, but common to all normal men.

It is true the five senses give us no direct access to an objective psychic world. We cannot smell our neighbor's emotion, nor touch his thought with our fingers, nor taste with our tongues his interests; eyes and ears are affected only by material stimuli. We are in direct contact with the psychic only in our own consciousness. Yet we know the psychic states of our neighbors, because we witness the overt manifestations of their psychic states, and know what they mean because we know what we should mean by similar manifestations. We make use of these signs as expressions of our own subjective states, and we know by the responses we elicit that our own subjective states have been correctly apprehended by those to whom these signs have been addressed.

Each self has an insensible psychic half and a sensible physical half. Selves touch and overlap and mingle in their sensible activities, though their psychic halves are isolated. Each *understands* the sensible activities that are his own, as related to his own psychic self. Each *interprets* the sensible activities of another, as similarly related to the other's self. Our notion of the other is correct in proportion as this inference of similarity is correct. Though this inference is correct in the main, yet we are not identical. Though representatives of one species and the offspring

of a common physical evolution, we differ somewhat in temperament, and as products of social evolution we differ more. And if two persons are products of alien societies, then they do not share common conventionalities of self-expression and "communication." Yet even then there is a universal language of visible expression and conduct. Even within the same nation and the same town there are differences of social development, and within the same family differences of biological inheritance; but the similarities are great and conspicuous, and the differences likely to be subtle and comparatively minute. However, there are many persons too unlike wholly to understand each other. The most prized experiences of some cannot be apprehended by other some, and that which we most hate we may never wholly comprehend, unless we hate it having disapproved it as present or possible within ourselves.

In the process of human intercourse we have developed to a wonderful degree the art of communication so as to be able to express shades of difference, and have acquired skill in interpreting, in terms of our own natures, experiences that never would have been original to ourselves. Man has an insatiable interest in the psychic activities of his associates, both for the satisfaction he takes in contemplating, analyzing, criticising, and appreciating them, and also for the practical necessity of understanding this most active, helpful or harmful, portion of his environment. Where interest is strong, there intellectual power and skill develop; and the skill of men in understanding each other is perhaps the highest everyday manifestation of intelligence. It may be that it is not only an individual skill, but also an instinct developed by the social necessities of the race. Desires and purposes are not only divined from the subtlest signs, but also foretold before they are formed. And even when men deliberately lie and pretend, employing generally understood symbols in order to deceive, their fellow-men are skilled to discover not only the meaning which the deceiver intends to convey, but also the presence of deception and the motives of the fraud. It is true this skill in reading one another breeds corresponding skill in dissimulation, but both forms of skill are tributes to the subtlety with

which we understand each other, and interpret not merely words and other conventional symbols, and deeds that are intentionally overt, but also subtle revealers of emotions, moods, and traits which their owners never meant to reveal, but endeavored to conceal. At the same time, the too frequent success of lying and dissimulation indicates that we have not direct access to the conscious states of our associates, and cannot rest back upon an assumption of the metaphysical identity of our natures, but depend for our knowledge of each other's conscious life upon our interpretations of sensible tokens.

A great portion of the world's literature exhibits the success with which the emotional phase of human experience can be "described." Conventionality is a vast monument to the fact of the communication of psychic meanings by physical signs. And many of the signals from the inner life which we learn so accurately to read are far too subtle to be conventionalized. Smiles, frowns, tones, and changes of the facial muscles, too minute to be described, are interpreted unerringly. One reads a passage full of subtle suggestion, and by his reading proves that he has felt the suggestion, and looking up he sees in the face of his listening friend that the friend has felt it too. This is communion of spirits—author, reader, and friend. Expressions of voice, countenance, and bearing, numberless and fleeting, are included in the seemingly inexhaustible signal code that reveals the rich variety of human feeling. They are mediums for the admonishing or cheering influence of the parent, friend, and lover, and instruments of the power of the man of prestige, the orator, and the commander. Not tears and sighs alone, but the slight movement of the eyelid and the almost insensible tension of the person thrill the heart of the observer, and awaken trust or suspicion, love or hate, fascination or contempt, as they signal the presence of affective experiences which the observer is prompt to recognize and estimate in terms of his own subjectivity.

Signs which we have learned to recognize as tokens of admirable or despicable traits in an associate may arouse strong feelings before we have formed definite notions of the traits of the individual in question. We may suspect and dislike, or incline to



trust and admire, a person whose qualities we have not named. This may be because the same sign can indicate a whole class of hateful or admirable traits, and we recognize the presence of the class, amiable or hateful, but have not yet learned what species of the class confronts us; or it may be because we have genuine instincts, like those that tell the animals what to shun and what to seek, but do not tell them why. Instinct might well survive longest to guide the actions that deal with the element in our environment which is both most important to our welfare and most difficult to analyze and understand, namely, our associates.

We know, then, the affective experiences of our associates by their observable and describable manifestations, interpreted by our knowledge of what similar expressions and conduct of our own have meant emotionally. These manifestations are both the intended and the unintentional; both the larger expressions which we call conduct and the minuter ones to which reference has been made. Of course, the speculator, if he likes, is at liberty to hold that phenomena in general are nothing real, in the sense in which emotions have true reality, and that the two orders of appearance and reality are not woven into one network of the conditioning and the conditioned. But the scientist must proceed as if the observable were the real, and the cure for error were more and better observation; and *so* proceeding, he will say that some things make men angry and that others make them glad, and that anger and gladness make men behave in different ways; in other words, that we can observe the vividly contrasting effects of men's emotions, of avarice, generosity, pride, humility, courage, fear, and that a trustworthy sociological maxim is: "By their fruits ye shall know them." And if we know emotions by their effects, they are as public, describable, and open to the scientific method as is electricity, which we know by its effects and by these alone. Proceeding as a scientist must proceed, we know the emotions of others by the same process of observation and inference by which we get other scientific knowledge. If this process did not include the inference of the similarity of individuals of the same species and the same society, then we should know them, not as emotions, but only as we know ether and electricity—that is, as the conditions of certain effects.

The metaphysician may add that we know them *also* by "appreciation." We do know them by appreciation of *our own* affective states, and so know by direct consciousness such examples of this class of phenomena as our own experience affords, and we can observe introspectively. These experiences are not less true *phenomena* because they are subjective. Rather than imply that the subjective is not phenomenal, it would be far truer to say that all phenomena are subjective. All phenomena, all manifestations or appearances, exist primarily in consciousness. Not only "red" and "long" are names for subjective experiences, but all the data for every science exist first in consciousness, and the question how science gets its grip on the external world is by so much harder than the question how it gets hold of the subjective activities and experiences of which it has both direct and indirect knowledge. That we can know such phenomena by both methods certainly does not make our knowledge of them less, but more, scientific. It is an erroneous assumption to treat psychic phenomena as metaphysical realities. All realities *as realities* are metaphysical, but all phenomena *as phenomena* are matter for science. This is the true distinction. Of course, sociological facts, like all others, may run back into the metaphysical, and this is no evidence that more than others they are inaccessible to science, nor any escape from the scientific duty, here as elsewhere, to trudge the path of knowledge, by observation and inference, just as far as we can before taking to the wings of metaphysical speculation. In inferring that other members of our species, whose expressions and behavior we observe, feel as we felt when under like conditions we acted as we see them do, we are simply comparing and inferring — that is, we are applying methods of science. And our knowledge of the emotions of others is, in fact, a result of this procedure without the addition of any metaphysical assumption. Appreciation of the experiences of associates is in no sense confined to metaphysicians, still less to the school of metaphysicians who teach "appreciation" as based upon the doctrine of the all-inclusive consciousness, and their doctrine cannot compel the admission of metaphysical elements into sociology. The sociologist, as a sociologist, must study

emotional phenomena, in so far as such phenomena are accessible to the methods of observation and inference.

If Dr. Fogel succeeds, as he believes he does, in convicting any sociologist of holding "that the only sort of really causal energy in social phenomena is purely physical energy,"<sup>10</sup> may not this merely indicate, either that this particular sociologist has not set forth clearly the relation of sociology to metaphysical concepts, or possibly that Dr. Fogel has not so perfectly apprehended the sociologist's position as to avoid misunderstanding? Misunderstanding would be invited, or perhaps a misconception might be evinced, by a sociologist who should say that physical forces and social forces are one. But, on the other hand, might not the expressions, which are said to imply this, in reality mean precisely what the metaphysical monist means when he asserts that there is but one causal energy in all the universe, whose operations appear both in physical and psychic phenomena? If so, then sociologist and metaphysician will agree that the sociologist has not to recognize any causal energy other than that which is operative in the physical world. As the biologist no longer makes reference to a "vital force," so *the sociologist need make no reference to a social force.* (This requires to be read in the light of what was said in sec. v.) The notion of a purely scientific sociology that has been here set forth is not open to this line of attack by the objector who would insist upon the admission of metaphysical elements into sociology. For we hold that sociology does not need to teach anything about any causal energy whatever, but only about phenomena and the conditioning relations among them, and no phenomena, as phenomena, are metaphysical elements, neither are relations among phenomena. That psychic phenomena are true phenomena has been maintained. That they are like other phenomena in that each psychic phenomenon is conditioned by other phenomena, and a condition of other phenomena, we shall endeavor to maintain in a later section.

Dr. Fogel argues, with special elaboration, that "consciousness of kind" involves appreciation. Let us admit it; what we deny is that appreciation involves anything more metaphysical than

<sup>10</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 502.



observation of conduct like our own and inference of experience like that of which we are conscious. Even the self-consciousness involved is not metaphysical, but — as argued above — is as true a phenomenon as any sense-percept. Self-consciousness for the scientist is a *phenomenon* of which he is aware without the intervention of the senses; it is both the awareness and the phenomenon, which are one. With the metaphysical nature of the phenomenon, as a scientist, he has nothing to do; and his knowledge of it no more implies a metaphysical *method* than his awareness of the external, by aid of sensation. *Introspection is a variety of observation.* Moreover, the trustworthy conviction of the similarity of human experience is not dependent on any metaphysical doctrine of “our organic unity in the one Self;” it is not peculiar to those who hold that doctrine, but common to all normal men, the trustworthiness of the conviction being sufficiently authenticated without aid from any metaphysical element. Even the strongest sympathy which aids our understanding of an associate is adequately explained by the unmetaphysical process that has been traced, supplemented by the fact that our knowledge of another’s situation arouses feelings in us like those which we believe are going on in him, since an imagined, remembered, or anticipated situation can arouse feelings as truly as an actual one.

Neither can it be maintained that “ejective” interpretation of another’s experience involves a metaphysical element. “Ejective” interpretation is called into being by our inability to secure knowledge of another’s affective states by any metaphysical shortcut. That we form “ejective” interpretation of the experience of others means that we do not understand the experience of another until we have had the like (in the only sphere open to our direct appreciation, that is) in our own consciousness; and thereafter, when we see another in similar conditions, and manifesting activities similar to those which accompanied our own experience, we infer that he is having an experience like the one we had when we were in such conditions and acting as he does; or, in other words, we eject our knowledge of our own previous experience as an explanatory element, into our notion of him. If he is stung by a wasp, and the spot grows swollen and red with a white center,

and he jumps up and down, and cries out, and says it smarts fearfully, we infer that he feels as we felt when we were stung by such an insect, showed such symptoms, and acted in a similar way. This does not require a metaphysician. By similar comparison and inference are interpreted the signs of hope, fear, anger, love, cowardice, enthusiasm, greed, and benevolence that are intelligible to all who in themselves have known the like, without aid from any more mysterious means of communion than the most unmetaphysical sociologist admits.

We accept the analysis of "consciousness of kind" and "ejective" interpretation of others which seems to Dr. Fogel to imply metaphysical elements, but question whether that seeming would appear to one who had no predilection for discovery of metaphysical elements. We heartily agree with the statement that "understanding others by reading my own experience into them is indispensable;"<sup>11</sup> but what a leap to the conclusion that follows in the next sentences:

Consequently, to get at societary facts it is a necessary preliminary that the subject connect himself vitally with the world of his investigation, so that he feels himself a part of that world as having fellowship with it. And here we are beyond doubt in the world of appreciation, and so in the preserves of metaphysics.

Dr. Fogel also argues that "imitation" requires "appreciation" as metaphysically conceived. But is it not enough for the imitator to see the outer act and its observable consequences? To see the overt act affords the idea of the act, the *ideo-motor* suggestion which alone is essential to the simpler form of imitation. To see the act and its desirable objective consequences — the nut cracked by the blow, the weight lifted by the lever — is enough to afford the idea of the act as a means, and appeal to motives for intelligent imitation. To appreciate *our own* experience in situations of a given sort is enough to afford motives to imitate one who creates such situations. For example, the applauded orator. Not only the simpler *ideo-motor* form of imitation, but also its higher forms, do not require that we metaphysically "appreciate" the experience of the person imitated by recognizing our "organic

<sup>11</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 371.

unity in the one Self." On the contrary, according to the theory of "ejective" interpretation, approved by metaphysicians, before we can appreciate the experience of the person imitated, we must first by imitation make the experience our own; after that we attribute to the one imitated experience like that which we have secured by imitating him, and so for the first time comprehend the inward feel of that which we imitated as an outward act, either for the sake of the outward act, for the sake of the outward consequences of the act, or for the sake of inward experiences which we inferred from *our own* previous experience would accompany the outward conditions imitated.

To summarize: We have frankly admitted the important differences between the phenomena of consciousness and other phenomena. We have admitted, moreover, the differences between the affective, and the cognitive and volitional, elements in experience, and that there is a sense in which affective experience is neither describable, permanent, nor public; that the affective phase of experience is simply *our own* appreciation of *our own* states of consciousness, and that the emotional quality of social phenomena would never be known by a being who himself had never felt emotion. But we *do* feel emotions of our own, and are therefore qualified to recognize the same varieties of emotion as evinced by others. And the self-knowledge that arises introspectively in our own consciousness is as truly matter of observation as, and no more metaphysical (in the sense of non-scientific) than, the knowledge that gets into consciousness through the medium of sensation. And the emotional life of the society to which we belong—its patriotism, its enthusiasms and aversions—constitute a part of what we justly call the objective psychic world, though it may be the subtlest part, least easy to discern. For purposes of science, socially prevalent varieties of emotion are, first, "*describable*," inasmuch as they exist in time, can be identified and named, and to all appearance (and the scientist has to do only with appearance, and his business is to describe the phenomena which appear in their apparent relations) they arise out of observable conditions and issue in observable effects; and, second, they are "*permanent*," inasmuch as emotion, though it be



one's own transient experience, and in a sense incapable of being remembered, is nevertheless remembered in this sense, that one recalls the time of his emotion, his own place at the time, the *fact* that he had an emotion of a kind which he conceives, names, and identifies whenever the like occurs, and also recalls the conditions that appear to him to have occasioned his emotion (and at the remembrance of them a like emotion may return, sometimes even more intense), and one recalls the conduct which appeared, and still appears, to him to have resulted from the emotion; and, third, since one can so far describe his own or another's emotions as to convey by language all this which one keeps in remembrance, can indeed convey all this just as well as what we call the description of a percept can be conveyed, therefore descriptions do, in this sense, make emotional phenomena "*public*" by similarity of testimony, as well as that result is accomplished by the kind of remembrance and description which applies to material things, especially since the apparent conditions and effects of emotion are open to the concurrent observation of the members of a society. It is true that an observer with no subjective experience like that of man could conceive or describe man's subjectivity only in terms of its time, place, occasions, and effects, and the affective quality of it would escape him. He would not know how men feel. But we infer that other individuals of our species feel as we should have to, in order to act as they do under their conditions; that they experience the varieties of feeling that we have experienced and can conceive. Consequently, description conveys to us the same kind of knowledge of their emotions that we have of our own past emotions. And this knowledge is often reinforced by the fact that our imagination of their situation arouses actual present emotion in us, like that which we believe was theirs. The description of emotions is dependent upon the inference of subjective similarity in man; but no whit more so than is that other description which conveys knowledge from one mind to another mind because both minds are capable of similar cognitive states, and assign to words similar meanings. Moreover, our knowledge of this similarity is not due to any mystic, metaphysical insight, but is a true inference from the premises, including the biological

unity of the human species. This inference is reinforced experimentally; that is, the validity of the interpretations based upon it are continually tested in practice, as when we let our associates know how we have understood their conduct, and they testify that we have correctly apprehended their emotional states; and when we know by the responses that we elicit that our signaling of our own feelings has been understood; and when, in order to produce changes in human conduct, we form judgments as to the motives from which such conduct issues, and the motives that will prompt conduct desired, and, by providing the conditions which we infer will affect human motives, find it possible to interrupt conduct which we desire to terminate, and to evoke conduct the motives for which we have supplied. In all this there is nothing involved but phenomena, including the phenomena of our own consciousness and the apparent relations of phenomena, and therefore nothing metaphysical, and no question of the absolute reality which underlies these appearances.

Near the opening of this section we dismissed for the time two of the three questions that are raised by examining sociology from the metaphysician's point of view. We have now discussed the question: Must social phenomena be studied by any non-scientific metaphysical method of approach, or can they be studied satisfactorily by the scientific methods of observation, comparison, and inference? The second question, Are social phenomena caused? has received only incidental attention, and will meet us again hereafter. The third question demands the remainder of this section, namely: Does the teleological nature of sociology, its dealing with valuations and ideals, require us to resort to a non-scientific "philosophic method"? We are told that what *is* is matter for science, but what ought to be is matter for philosophy; that phenomena we can see and describe, but "meanings" and "values" we can only appreciate; therefore they are not matters of science, but of philosophy or metaphysics.

Upon this third question the position here offered for consideration is as follows: Our views of the "meanings" and "values" of things are not to be deduced from our metaphysical

theory of the nature of the absolute reality which expresses itself in phenomena; but it is to be derived inductively from the phenomena themselves, the phenomena "I-value-this" and "This-means-much-to-me" being as true phenomena as any. From observing such phenomena, as we are conscious of them in ourselves and aware of them as revealed by others, we are to arrive at our general statements about "meanings" and "values," and not by deduction from our view concerning "the final goal" of the universe "reduced to unity."<sup>12</sup> If anyone is able by some other process than observation and comparison of phenomena—that is, by other than scientific method—to arrive at a verifiable view of the final goal of creation from which he can deduce teachings concerning the values and valuations involved in human life, then we are glad to have him do so. But as sociologists we cannot do so; nor so long as the method of observation is open to us do we propose to depend on deductions from merely speculative views of the goal of being. We admit that our results will apply only within the sphere of human observation; but as human beings, not to say as sociologists, we are content to understand the worth and meaning of things to human beings, and within the realm of human observation and experience, and not to stretch out after the meanings involved in the total unity of creation in which human experience plays a part.

The values and valuations that are disclosed to human comprehension in human experience are nothing but *valuings*, unless we include also the phenomena which men value. The valuing is an appreciation of experience, they are phenomena of consciousness, and as true *phenomena*, and so as really matter for science, as the objective things that men value. Whether the things valued are objective things, or thoughts, volitions, or other phenomena of consciousness, it is not the things valued, but the valuing, that are in this connection the significant phenomena.

Valuing is a phase or element or quality in every state of consciousness which man can pronounce good. Such valuing is perhaps the most significant of social phenomena. Like other social phenomena, they are psychic. Like other psychic phe-

<sup>12</sup> *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, p. 355.



nomena, they are not only known in consciousness as subjective, but are also known as objective, being revealed by associates to associates by all the methods of self-revelation that have been mentioned in this section.

Accordingly, the question, "What is of worth?" is answered empirically by answering the question, "What do men value?" and the relative value of different experiences is determined by the concurrent testimony of the competent, as questions are answered about other phenomena that are public and describable.

It is true that the only competent witnesses concerning the value of a given kind of experience are those who have had such experience, but it is equally true that the only competent witnesses concerning a kind of external phenomena are those who have observed them. No single individual is a competent witness concerning external phenomena that he has not observed, any more than concerning valuings that he has not experienced. A witness can tell how a given experience that he has had compares in value with other experiences that he has had. Man is the measure of all things—that is, of all experience—only when he has had all kinds of experience. But each can observe his own valuings and—in the sense explained above—he can describe them. Some kinds of valuings are so universal that practically all men are competent to testify concerning them. Other kinds of valuings are less nearly universal, yet those who have experienced them can sufficiently describe them so that others, who have never had the like, can desire them and be taught to seek them. Those are the most competent witnesses concerning human valuings whose experience has been richest, especially in those types of worth-experience which are higher than others by common consent of those who have had these particular types of experience together with the widest range of other worth-experiences with which to compare them.

It is true, as above set forth, that the affective element in valuation cannot be described in the same way as external phenomena. But it can be named, and its presence and its kind can therefore be expressed in the form of a judgment, and the affective element is regularly *an element in* an experience all of which

can be described except the affective element, and then the affective element may be said to have been made intelligible to all who have had a similar total experience; for it is inferred that the affective element, in case of the person describing, was similar to that which had been known by the listener when the listener had the similar experience. The degree of error to which we are liable in this inference of similarity, when the description of experiences and naming of emotions are supplemented by all the subtle means of self-revelation, has been sufficiently discussed above.

What in human experience is of worth? is a great scientific question. There are numerous kinds of worth, and an adequate conception of them involves the concept of a proportioned harmony of these elements into a whole thought of the worth of life. To arrive at such a thought of life is an intellectual achievement. The method of the achievement is not deduction from a concept of the "final goal of creation reduced to an absolute unity," but is induction from much knowledge of human valuings. Indeed, a concept of the goal of creation cannot be arrived at by any other method than such an induction, whether it be the unconscious induction from a narrow range of experience, which may be only prejudice, however high-sounding the phrases in which it is arrayed, or whether it be a conscious induction from a wide range of human experience, which is as much as to say, a fruit of scientific method.

If specific valuings are experiences, and all our standards and judgments concerning values, and our concept of the whole and harmonious life, are fruits of experience, then, *a fortiori*, our judgments concerning overt acts are empirically derived. That conduct is good which is the condition of experience that is valuable, and, "What conduct is it that leads to experience that is valuable?" is a question that can be answered only by experience. That conduct is good which, "on the whole," and "as far as we can see," and "taking into account all the interests affected," augments the value of experience. And that conduct is bad which, thus broadly considered, appears to make the value of experience less than it would be made by other conduct.

Only a few are able to form judgments of such broad and

far-sighted expediency — judgments which neither unreasonably discount the future and the unintended result, nor excessively regard the clamorous interests of the immediate actors, and which are so general in their application as to forearm man to meet the vicissitudes in which he must play his part. Only the few are able to make any valuable contribution toward the equipment of duty-judgments prevalent in the society of which they are members. After these judgments of the wisest, most far-sighted and constructive minds have become traditionally accepted rules of duty, they are enforced by priests, potentates, and teachers of a lesser caliber. These enforce the traditionally accepted duty-code of their society by appeal to every conceivable sanction natural and supernatural, enforce them by the smiles and frowns that greet the earliest choices and impulsive acts of childhood, enforce them by the continuous pressure of the social approvals and disapprovals in which we are immersed as in an atmosphere, enforce them by the self-approval and remorse that turn in upon ourselves the judgments which we have learned to pass upon others, and enforce them, and at the same time explain them after the manner of the prescientific metaphysical stage of thought, by calling them instincts of our nature, finger-marks of God, corollaries deduced from the nature of the absolute. There is a true sense in which every broad and far-sighted judgment of expediency is a corollary of the nature of things, even though man has derived his knowledge of that law of conduct experimentally from his own failures and successes, and not from antecedent knowledge of the absolute nor from implanted instinct. It is the business of sociology, not to bar the path of investigation with a metaphysical abstraction, with a big word instead of an explanation, a stone offered to the hunger of the mind, but to investigate, that is, to apply the methods of science to answering the question: Whence come the traditionally accepted and socially enforced judgments of conduct; why do they differ in different eras and in different societies; and how, from having first prescribed duties only toward the members of the group within which they arose, leaving liberty to steal with a clear conscience, or even with a sense of merit, the property or the wife or the head of any member of another group, do they finally



extend in scope till they inculcate the universal brotherhood of man? And sociology must approach in the scientific spirit not only the question: Have existing moral judgments a natural history, and, if so, how can it be traced? but also the further question: Do these existing moral requirements actually prescribe the wisest judgments of expediency; and, if not, can they be amended so as better to reveal the method of more complete and harmonious experience within the conditions of actual society? If the prevailing judgments of value have a natural history, it is a history of social evolution; if progress in the formation of such judgments is still possible, what else can that progress be than the discovery of the method of the conditioning of experience, all of which is socially conditioned, and all of which in turn constitutes the social conditions?

Everyone admits that hypothetical imperatives are inductions from experience. The sociologist has nothing to do with any but hypothetical imperatives. And he should proceed upon the hypothesis that all the rational imperatives governing human action, when thoroughly understood, will be seen to be hypothetically justified; that is, they will be seen to prescribe the means to an end that is worth while—an end the worth of which can be apprehended by men, value to be realized in human experience. Either this is true, or human life is necessarily a sacrifice to a world-end outside of man; or else it has no rational end, and life is a nightmare, and the search for a reasoned law of conduct is vain. No one is justified in adopting the pessimistic conclusion that the conscious life of man has no rational end, nor the semi-pessimistic conclusion that man's earthly experience has no end in itself, and no meaning save as a part of a larger world-order that is beyond the scope of human observation, until the attempt to discover the end *in* human experience has been exhausted and has failed. No one shall warn us off from that attempt.

Moreover, even though there be *also* an end attained by human life which is not *in* human life, certain it is that there are *values in* human experience. If they do not constitute the whole of the rational end of human action, they are at least a definite and highly important class of phenomena, the complex and peculiar

conditioning of which can be investigated. This justifies the existence of a special science of human valuings to study their rise, to compare them with each other, to formulate out of the elements furnished by experience a more and more adequate concept of them in their harmony and completeness, and in the light of experience to distinguish those forms of conduct which are promotive of human values from those that destroy, disorganize, and degrade life by preventing the realization of such value-phenomena.

If the laws of conduct thus derived were subject to higher laws involved in a nature-of-things not revealed in human experience, then, if anybody could by any possibility get at the content of such absolute laws, they would be superior to the laws prescribing the conduct conducive to human experience-values. The latter would be only laws for the attainment of a part which is subject to the greater whole, just as the so-called laws of political economy, in so far as they are guides to conduct, are subject to ethical laws. As economics is a science of a part, so the science of human experience-values would then be a science of a part, yet a true science, since human experience-values are a distinct kind of phenomena rising from a special complexus of conditioning. And we do not admit that any other values of which they can be a part is discoverable to human intelligence, but maintain that the whole harmony of values realizable in human experience is the highest and largest end that can be formulated by human intelligence for the guidance of human action; that ethics is the formulation of that concept and discovery of the method of the conditioning of those values.

If this be true, or even if it be true that the human experience-values, though subordinate to some world-end, are yet proper objects of science, and our knowledge of them founded upon observation and inference, then any trustworthy concept of possible values must be an induction from knowledge of that which already has been, though the induction may outrun all that ever was in any single instance, gathering elements from the widest observation, and inferring the possibility of new combinations from knowledge of fragmentary realizations. The thought of the

values of human experience in their completeness and harmony is an object of scientific quest, and likewise the laws of conduct tending toward that end are as much so as the laws of conditioning of any other phenomena. Such conduct and experience must be social conduct and experience; its conditioning must be social conditioning; such life must be socially realized; such science must be sociology—science in the sense which these papers try to explain. Though it is true that the logical processes are the same in all science, yet the application of them must be adapted to the nature of the phenomena investigated. The sciences of the psychic can never enter upon the *Blütezeit*, prophesied by Wundt and Haeckel, until sociologists cease merely to carry over the mental habits developed by studies of the non-psychic, and to test the scientific character of their work merely by comparing it with the work of physicists and biologists. Forgetting those things that are behind, yet remembering all things that are behind, they must press toward the mark of a higher calling. They must avoid the strabismus that is due to looking with one eye at the physical while they look with the other at the psychic, focus attention upon psychic phenomena, find in them their problems and see what these phenomena *are*, not what they resemble, what courses of investigation they require, not how far the devices of investigation developed by other sciences can be applied to them. Then ethics, the study of life, may pass, as the study of material phenomena has passed, from the metaphysical into the scientific stage. Who would obstruct the endeavor to speed the day, or despair before the effort has been fairly made?

Motives to right conduct deduced from notions of the absolute have only a speculative foundation save as the name "absolute" is given to doctrines derived by induction from experience of life. It may be true, as we are warned, that sanctions of authority are crumbling away. If so, we must hope that the demands of authority will be reaffirmed or replaced by the motives of enlightenment.

[To be continued]



## NOTES ON EDUCATION FOR SOCIAL EFFICIENCY

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We are hearing much in our day about the "anti-social" traits of the child. We are told that when he comes among us he is fitted out with profound instincts of selfishness, anger, envy, deception, and the like, which were exceedingly prominent in his primitive ancestors. Granting the truth of this general proposition, it is equally true that the child brings with him from afar marked social as well as anti-social impulses. He early manifests social hunger. He craves personal association, which is shown strikingly in his joyful expressions when he is in the presence of people, and his lamentations when he is separated from them, which expressions do not occur with reference to things as contrasted with persons. Early in his career he displays a well-nigh irresistible tendency to share his experiences, whatever they may be, with his parents and teachers and playmates. He apparently does not thoroughly appreciate or enjoy any experience unless he can find others to enjoy it with him, or at least to whom he may communicate the experience. Nothing continues to be of genuine worth for him unless it has been approved by the social environment; unless it has social worth, that is to say. If the people about him show no interest in what he makes or discovers, or the feats he performs, his own interest therein will surely decline sooner or later. It is not long before he is governed in all his activities by the manifestations of the people who are always present as vitally interested spectators; present either in the flesh or in the child's imagination, as we say. The child's consciousness is at all times a social one to a greater or less degree; he is continually communing with people, either actually or in representation. Every act probably has reference, directly or indirectly, to persons. Thus the ego is never completely dissociated from the alter; the latter is always present in consciousness, either focally

or marginally. So egoism and altruism are not two absolutely antagonistic attitudes; an egoistic act must at the same time have altruistic reference in some way or other. Again, egoism, for the most part at any rate, can realize itself only through *service*. But an individual may strive for mean, unworthy, material ends, though he has an altruistic aim of some sort constantly in view in his striving, as when he takes advantage of a rival in business for the benefit of his wife or children. Or one may take hold on the highest things in life, as the respect and good-will of all men, in the attainment of which the really vital needs of the alter must be ministered to. The business of education must be, for one thing, to teach the child what the alter esteems as of supreme worth, and to impress upon him that in the long run the broadest kind of egoistic-altruistic action will bring the richest rewards for self.

The child's first actions, viewed from his own standpoint, cannot be said to be ethical or evil, social or anti-social. That is right which he instinctively wants to do; and there is no wrong in his conduct. In his activities at the outset he takes no account of the desires or needs of the social environment; but by the close of the first year he shows in his inhibitions, and to some extent in his positive actions, a slight regard at least for the feelings and wishes of the alter. He begins now to appreciate that certain actions affecting persons bring him discomfort in one way or another, while others bring him pleasure; and his distinctions between right and wrong take their origin from this appreciation. That is right which father, mother, and others approve and encourage; that is wrong which they frown upon and attach penalties to. Gradually, as a result of instinct clashing with social demands, there is established a self, let us say, reflecting the requirements of the social environment, and this from its most primitive beginnings makes unceasing war upon the lower self, motivated by original, narrowly egoistic impulses. With development this ideal or social self gains continually in breadth and strength, and it also becomes more and more generalized, until particular experiences, persons, rules, principles, are merged into tendencies to action in given directions; or perhaps one should

say that this social self comes in time to consist of moods or sentiments, the generalizations of early concrete social experiences. Of course, the extent to which the social self develops must depend upon individual circumstances, and also upon the extent to which the society in which the child lives has developed. But its function in any case is to coerce the individual to act in harmony with social demands, as he understands them; if he does not, this social self will cause more or less serious disturbance. Failing to get itself realized, it will create tension, unrest, discontent. One can observe in his children how, as the years pass, the social demands, consolidated more or less completely into feelings of duty, gain ever greater control over primordial impulses. Out of such experience, as I have indicated, arises very slowly the consciousness of ought or duty; conscience and ethical sentiment grow right out of the child's experiments in social adaptation in his daily life.

What we must strive to accomplish in education, then, is to give the pupil opportunity to get into his consciousness as models or guides many persons who embody in their conduct the highest social ideals. His social self, with its motivations of duty and conscience, will be constructed from the personal copies that are set before him. It should be added that vital, give-and-take relations with persons are essential in order that their characteristics may be apprehended, and that they may be accepted as models. One's hero determines his conduct very largely. Good literature comes next to concrete personality in its influence upon conduct; it is in a way a substitute for actual social situations. The drama, too, is powerful for good or ill in social training. The question as to whether children should see evil characters exploited on the stage is too complex to be answered categorically; but in general it may be said that one is benefited if on beholding such types his antagonism toward them is aroused and sustained; while he will be injured if he approves of their conduct. It should be remembered that for the most part evil in modern life represents actions once universally practiced and passed on to the young as instinctive tendencies, and it is therefore easy to drop back into them. This it is that makes evil persons so dangerous to youth.



So the first requirement in social education is to get children to *live* together in a *vital* way, in order that they may come to understand one another, and respect each other's rights. Learning maxims about human nature or ethical conduct or right or duty or brotherly love will be of little avail without a vast amount of significant social experience. Many adults have good theories about social relations, but their practice is very bad; they have not had enough of vital give-and-take relations with their fellows to be disciplined into decent behavior. The "only child" is usually very poorly prepared for the best sort of social life, because he has not been molded into social form at the hands of his fellows. Hard knocks are essential to the most effective learning in social matters. The child must learn, not so much by being told it as by discovering it experientially, that on the whole it pays to play the game fair. We are beginning today, it seems, to appreciate the soundness of these principles, for we are devising ways of bringing children together under wholesome influences, and helping them to gain meaningful social experience. The good, old-fashioned method of isolation is passing—such a method as Dickens spent himself in trying to get abolished.

The situation in the ordinary public school, however, is still far from what we could wish. The typical school is modeled on the static plan. Children learn their lessons and recite them, largely in isolation. Spatial nearness does not imply social experience. Children may sit in adjoining seats, and not come to know one another, except in external appearance, or learn how to give and to receive aid of genuine merit. Children must *work* together, not simply sit near each other. The idea is at least partially realized in the kindergarten. But the kindergarten attempts too much in too abstruse a way. The young child's social training should be concerned wholly with his immediate relations with his parents, brothers and sisters, and playmates. He should not be lectured to about social conduct in the abstract, or about his responsibility to humanity in general.

The playground, rightly conducted, furnishes an excellent opportunity for social training. It affords children a chance to come into vital contact with one another, where the lesson of

good-will and co-operation may be learned in an effective way. The child who does not play with his fellows will not be likely to gain the sort of experience that counts for much in social education. Play of the character indicated is not only of social value in the narrow sense; it is of tremendous importance also in intellectual training and physical development. Wholesome play tends to preserve a sound mind in a sound body. The playground lessons crime, too, since it affords an opportunity for the energies of youth to be expressed in legitimate ways. Boys who have no chance to work off superfluous energy in games and plays will be likely to revert to primitive modes of preying upon their social environment. Experts testify that wherever a playground is established in the crowded quarters of a city juvenile crime is decreased by at least one-half. So the playground is not to be considered as valuable principally for recreation, though it serves this end admirably.

When children are brought together under wholesome conditions, and given opportunity to work and play together, they will train themselves in the fundamental social virtues better than most adults can do it for them. Adults are often suspected by children as hostile to their chief interests, and their counsels are neither gladly received nor readily followed. The great teacher, however, will make himself one of the group, perhaps the most experienced and resourceful one of all, but not essentially different from the rest of the group. Then he can influence the group through his suggestions; otherwise his leadership will be constantly threatened and often rejected. The teacher who is looked upon as a mere outsider, or disciplinarian, perhaps, can never have much peace or prosperity in training the young. He who antagonizes the group will have an unending fight on his hands.

In group-life the strong, those possessing the qualities of leadership, will come to the front, and the weak must and should reap the consequences of their weakness; though a child may be a follower in one activity and a leader in another. In the great social game the competent lead, while the others follow; and this régime should prevail in child-life, too. In the long run, this will result best for all concerned. We should not permit our sym-

pathies to interfere too greatly with the natural course of events in group-life. If we hold back those richly endowed by nature, we do them a greater injustice than could possibly be done the weak child by permitting him to occupy the position for which his talents fit him. We adults are liable anyway to project our own feelings into the lives of those children who stand at the foot of the class; and in this we are almost certain to commit an error. It is probable that nature does not usually combine in the same individual very mediocre talents with very lively ambitions, and a keen sense of humiliation when he cannot attain to the first place in the group.

Again, the group can very effectually discipline ill-behaved, refractory members—better than the teacher working alone can do it. The individual cannot endure the reproaches of his own kind; his deepest instinct is to keep on good terms with his fellows. So, if we would reform the individual, we must work through the group. It will avail little to try to cure a boy of some fault, when it is freely practiced by his set. For this reason the community and the school should be organized so that children can be dealt with uniformly as a whole; the isolated home or school cannot accomplish a great deal, if it works in opposition to the sentiment and custom of the community.

Locke, Rosseau, Spencer, and their disciples have taught us that the most effective way to dissuade a child from wrong-doing is to cause him to suffer the consequences thereof. He must discover in this way that it is worth while to do right. Without doubt this method is capable of accomplishing great good. For one thing, it trains the individual in the way of noting the outcome of his actions, and being guided accordingly, than which there can be nothing of greater importance in human life. But the method of natural consequences has marked limitations. Very young children cannot discern the connection between wrong action and natural penalty, unless the latter follows the former very directly. Punishment by natural consequences is more appropriate for, and will be more effective with, the youth than the child. Besides, a child should have some experience in *obeying authority* because this authority is



wiser than he, and is responsible for his protection and guidance. The parent and teacher in a sense represent the child in the world, and then the child must put his faith in them and follow their bidding. But this is not an argument for much chastisement. Indeed, the more pain we administer, the more likely we are to do the child injury. Pleasure is upbuilding, while pain kills, and should be used only sparingly as a curative agency when other remedies fail. The rod is becoming less and less prominent as a means of moral training, and to the great advantage of the whole life of the child. But we are probably not ready to abandon it altogether. It would be better for a child to be whipped soundly once than to be scolded for wrongdoing day after day. Especially would it be more advisable for the child to suffer acutely for a short period in childhood, in breaking up some noxious habit or curtailing some instinct, than to carry the habit or instinct into maturity, and bear the ills of it there continuously. Then, when punishment is clearly deserved, and the child realizes it, it is probable he does not feel the humiliation of it so much as we adults sometimes imagine he does, but that in the end he feels the stronger and happier for it.

Locke would whip a child for nothing except obstinacy. But it is important to distinguish between a refusal to obey authority for the sake merely of opposition, and a desire to carry out one's own enterprises, in which case the question of obedience does not really enter at all. Most of our troubles in disciplining the young arise from bad methods in infancy, when we often encourage the very traits which later we have to cudgel out of a child. Obstinacy in the infant is amusing, but in the ten-year-old it is a monstrous thing.

If the teacher were a true leader, he would have comparatively little need for the rod. But in the past, and it is true still in some places, the school has been the stronghold of dolts and dullards who did not have sufficient force of intellect or character to maintain a place in the world of affairs. Consequently they could not lead the young, and so they tried to drive them. The typical pedagogue of literature is a blunderer and tyrant whose hands "drip with infant's blood." We realize today, however, that we

must not let into the teaching profession anyone who is not intellectually fit; and we are just beginning to see that we ought to have some method of barring the personally unfit from the schoolroom. There are signs that we shall soon devise some method of examining personal characteristics in certificating teachers. We will take account of the voice, for one thing, since this exerts upon children a very subtle influence for good or for ill. Possibly the intellectually strong, who are in a general way selected out by our present methods of certificating, are also personally strong; but it is probable that this is not always the case, at any rate. Then good stature is of supreme importance in the classroom. A leader must suggest physical strength, among other things. Presence, in all this means, counts for a vast deal. The features are of greater consequence in determining leadership in the schoolroom than all the rules a teacher could construct.

Youth is the most vital period in social training. Most people appreciate this in a general way; even savage tribes have special ceremonies at this time. Rapid metamorphosis is the order during this epoch, and this is most marked in the emotional life. There is a birth of new emotions and interests, all of social reference. The birth of the tender passion marks the beginning of an entirely new epoch in the life of the individual. Most of his activities for a time bear some sort of relation to it, either directly or remotely. All the developments of this period probably have their place in a well-rounded character; and in education we must guide and direct, not suppress them. It seems that every power is in the beginning crude and misshapen in the light of present-day needs; but this is at once the opportunity and the justification of education.

The problems of training youth in the social virtues in the small town demand the serious attention of parents and educators. The bill-boards in these places are a source of mischief. Scenes they depict often nourish coarseness and rascality. The absence of ideals is the bane of the town, for the adolescent boy especially. There is little to awaken his higher ambitions; and the homes, on the whole, are devoid of inspiring influences, so the boy takes to the street. But the models which are presented to him here are

very apt to be vicious. The saloon, the livery stable, and the railway station in the small town are strongholds of vulgarity and vice. The worst feature of the case is that boys have nothing of consequence to do in the town, and under such circumstances they degenerate rapidly. This suggests the great opportunity and function of the school in the town. It should be the center of the life of the community. It should in every way appeal to the interests of the young, and win them to wholesome occupations and amusements. As the school exists in the majority of towns today, however, it is doing little which appeals to the spontaneous interests of young people, which influence their extra-school activities. The church is even more derelict in its duty. If it realized its opportunity, it would minister in wholesome ways to the natural tendencies of the young, and not stand apart from active life as it now does.



## INCREASED USE OF PUBLIC-SCHOOL PROPERTY

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Like many of our educational ideas, the plan of using public-school buildings and grounds after regular school hours and during vacation months seems to have originated in New England. But it was soon put into operation in the Middle Atlantic states, and has reached its highest development and greatest differentiation in New York city. Such increased use of school property has taken the form of evening schools, free lectures, evening recreation centers, and playgrounds. The magnitude of this movement marks it as significant. During the school year of 1902-3, in the city of New York, there were registered in the evening and vacation schools almost one-fourth as many students as were registered in the day schools, and almost one-seventh as many teachers were employed; while an aggregate of two and one-half million people were reached by more than one thousand lecturers and instructors at the recreation centers, playgrounds, and lecture-halls. Chicago is far behind the first city of America in the absolute and relative extent of the increased use of public-school property; but even there, as in all the other great cities of the country, this method of school extension has become very important.

So great a movement must have vital causes and the promise of good things. Its less direct causes are found in certain general tendencies. The experience of American communities has demonstrated that the education of the youth cannot be left entirely to the home; for there it is often neglected, sometimes degraded, and usually incomplete. This same experience has proved that education cannot be intrusted alone or freely to the church. Acting on an eminent interest in their future welfare, the American states provide a free public-school system with compulsory attendance, and exercise a regulative control over private

and church schools. The assumption of such a prerogative creates the obligation to provide the best education for as many people as possible. The increased use of public-school property is the logical implication of the policy of free public education.

The movement is the actualization of some of the implications of the industrial spirit and methods of the age that have taken so many activities from the home to public places, to shops and factories. If the education of the children has been taken from the home to the school, the mother has not been left behind; her interests go with her children. Women have become the school-teachers. If the canning and preserving of fruits have been taken from the home, the women have tended to follow them. If weaving and sewing are now done in shops and factories, there the weavers and sewers are found. Other things have less evidently, though no less certainly, been taken from the home by this publicizing tendency. Machino-facture has greatly accelerated concentration of capital and industries, and congestion of population. These have taken women from their homes, and have crowded families into smaller quarters. The dwelling whence the mother goes for work, and where she spends only her tired hours, has become less a home. Social life and play have been taken away. And the public that has taken them away must return them to these people. The public playgrounds, the recreation centers, and the schoolhouse as a social center are the community's conscious effort to supplement the changed home.

As a corollary of the above should be mentioned the conviction that has taken hold of many men, that the large amount of untaxed property represented by the school buildings, grounds, and apparatus was not being used in anything like the degree in which the successful business man uses his property. The argument took the form: either tax the property or put it to larger use.

Among the less direct causes of this movement should be mentioned also the educational philosophy now prevailing in this country—a philosophy that may not inaptly be called that of the integral self. Time was when an educated man was one who knew a great many things, who studied so hard that he was weak

in body, and who had perhaps been so engaged in intellectual pursuits that his emotional, æsthetic, and religious life was scarcely alive. Today no third of a man passes for a whole man. Man is not conceived as *having* a body, a mind, and a spirit; as having an intellect, feelings, and a will; but man *is* one being, manifesting under his several needs of experience now a physical, now a mental, and now a spiritual interest, or now a cognitive, now an affective, and now a volitional aspect. Or, better still, man is one being, a unitary life which as experiencer knows itself immediately only as a unit self, and which may through the activities of memory and imagination, of reflection, *separate* its experience into cognitive, affective, and volitional acts. Man is a bipartite or a tripartite being only to the observing mind, to the observer; he is one unitary self to himself as experiencer. This conception of man, that makes his body dignified, and that exalts all that he is, has much to do with the recent increased attention to the health and training of the body. Recreation centers and playgrounds are part of the means for securing such a development, while this same philosophy demands that our system of education provide more adequately for the social and æsthetic culture of our people. Hence the social uses of the schoolhouses.

The opening of public-school property for increased use is a further realization of the implications of democracy. Centralization and public control are consistent with democracy only when they secure greater universality and equality of opportunity. Powers and practices of a genuine democracy are institutionalized, are delegated to public authority, only when larger aggregates and juster proportions of the health, wealth sociability, knowledge, beauty, and rightness satisfactions are thereby secured to all members of the state. To regard all men as equal means to provide equal opportunities for all men, so far as public ministrations are concerned. The implication of the privileges and duties of a citizen is an education that prepares one for citizenship. These two implications of democracy—viz., that powers and practices are delegated to public authority, that larger aggregates and juster proportions of goods may be secured to each delegate, and that the practices of citizenship



imply opportunity for learning how to become the best citizen—these are finding better realization through the phase of school extension under consideration.

These, then, are among the less direct or immediate causes of the use of public-school property after regular school hours and during vacation months: the logic of a free public-school system, the industrial spirit and methods of the age, the ascendant philosophy of education, and the implications of democracy. Three more direct or immediate causes have united to bring about this same result. The first of these was the demand of two classes of people for the privilege of free schools. The first class were the industrially less favored boys and girls who had been compelled to leave school for the shop, factory, or office. This ambitious army was reinforced by a large number of adult foreigners seeking the opportunity to learn the English language and enough of the rudiments of an education to make them of higher economic efficiency.

Of the 10,000 people enrolled in twenty-two evening schools in Chicago (1903-4), about 70 per cent. were foreign-born or native-born of foreign parents. In seven schools alone there were enrolled 6,140 such foreigners, representing forty different nationalities. Mature men come night after night, crowd themselves into small desks, and sit for an hour and a half, poring over simple English words and first-reader stories, in the cherished ambition to become able to read an American newspaper. Some have progressed far enough to read their trade papers, or to learn for themselves from the printed page something of the privileges of American citizenship, or the claims of labor. These ambitious foreigners, and the factory boys and girls, knocking at the closed doors of many school buildings, should find more doors opening to them.

A second immediate demand for the further use of the school-house arose from the side of need. To the children in the crowded parts of great cities, vacation does not mean grass and trees and hills and streams, open fields and summer sunshine; but long hours on hot, busy, bare streets or alleys lined with unsightly garbage cans, truancy from home, stolen rides, and stolen fruits:

To the child so situated the close of school is a time of peril. As there are those who seek to improve the condition of the less-favored children through statutory regulations of hours of employment, safety, and sanitation, so there are those who strive to improve the condition of these children of the street through higher ideals and more wholesome surroundings. Long observation of these children has discovered that they are lacking in the appreciation of the beauty of nature, and of the cleanliness of self and surroundings; that they have no development of manual power or constructive genius. Observation has likewise shown that the instinct of beauty and of workmanship only needs the opportunity of gratification and cultivation. To supply these needs, the schoolhouses are being opened during the summer months.

There is another demand made upon the public-school buildings. The social-settlement idea has become contagious until, on the encouragement of public-spirited individuals and clubs, the people are asking that the schoolhouse be made the social as well as the educational center of the neighborhood. A knowledge of some districts of the great cities discloses a sad need of a wholesome social center. There are ten nationalities in one small group in a certain neighborhood in Chicago. There is no common tongue, there are no common traditions, no sympathies, no comradeship. The impersonality and namelessness of their lives rest like a weight on all their social instincts. Within the dull-brown houses are a few small rooms of bare walls and uncovered floors. Through the smoke- and dust-covered windows scarcely enough light struggles to reveal in one case a babe of one year and its caretaker, a girl of five, asleep in rags. From many of these homes the mother is gone from seven o'clock in the morning until evening. The minds and hearts of these people are as poverty-stricken as are their unfurnished homes. These are the homes of many a young woman who yearns in her heart for the companionship of other young people. Having seen other homes that are more attractive, she is ashamed of her own. Many a young woman who dresses fairly well, and who works in some shop or store, will contrive many a scheme to prevent an acquaint-

ance from seeing the poverty of her home. Where shall these young people meet in wholesome ways? Where shall these families gratify their longing for neighborliness? Where shall the social life of these people find expression? Where shall contentment, happiness, sympathy, solidarity, neighborhood pride, and civic interest — the very possibilities of morality and democracy — be fostered?

There are those who know well enough the social instincts of a people, and who through ministering to these appetites in unwholesome ways, degrade and make poor in purse and spirit those whom our public welfare demands we should elevate. In the neighborhood referred to above there is not a place of public assembly except some saloon and the dance-hall connected with it. There the young men and women go; there the families go. There these people meet; but oh, the cost of it! Lost virtue, debauched mind, body, and heart, defeated ambition, sickening and failing sensibilities, impoverished and often wrecked homes; companionship with vice in the natural effort to gratify a worthy instinct of fellowship; going downward through ugliness, viciousness, and error, when the instincts that lead them on are those that God designed should most richly bless their lives; consorting with all that is mean and ugly and hateful, when all that is good and beautiful and happy should be their constant delight!

There are those who believe that the public-school houses, with their large assembly halls, brightly lighted rooms, and tastily decorated walls, should be opened to the social life of such people.

When one looks at the need for increased use of public-school property, there seems to be no reason why the property is not thus increasingly used. But are there some difficulties? Are there some practical reasons why the buildings are not opened more for night schools, and for concerts, lectures, and social evenings? During the school year of 1902-3 the evening schools, the vacation schools, the summer playgrounds, and the recreation centers increased the taxes about \$733,000 in New York city, while similar extension in Chicago added \$105,000 to the cost of the school system. The tax-paying public and the school boards of the great cities must be educated to the appreciation of the needs



and value of the proposed extension, before the latter will recommend the increased levy, or the former support it. In some cities the school board has not the authority to appropriate funds for most of these forms of extension.

For the evening schools it has been found that a specially qualified list of teachers is demanded, that special kinds of courses and methods must be devised. All this means increased equipment. There are other difficulties, such as irregular attendance, fatigue, and short terms. Most of the things that are in the way can be overcome by a wise campaign of education of and by public-spirited men and women, public-spirited clubs and associations, school officials and tax-payers. In this educational rôle is found the work of some of the most important clubs and associations in the large cities, while the social settlements are accomplishing much in this same direction. There are thus united a large number of people in providing for the foreigners whom we welcome, and the boys and girls whose school days have been foreshortened by industrial demands, the opportunities of a free public-school system; united in an effort to discover for the industrial shut-ins of our crowded quarters some place for social life under wholesome conditions. They are characterized by a commendable zeal, believing their work is the logical implication of a free public-school system, recognizing it as necessitated by and natural to the changed industrial life of the age and our people, inspired by the educational ideal of a complete manhood and womanhood, and fearless to go the full length of democracy. They are in earnest, for, in addition to opening summer schools for the children of the street, giving a new chance to young people who have had to leave school too early, encouraging the ambitious foreigners who desire to learn the English language, and providing a social center for the neighborhood, these promoters of the increased use of public-school property have ambitions that through these efforts they may bring parents and children closer together, promote local and racial assimilation, overcome opposition to our public-school system on the part of some foreigners and certain religionists, provide classes and studies in civic relations and duties; and thus further the educa-

tion of children and youth, enlarge the opportunities and souls of our people, elevate the moral tone of the community, promote good citizenship, guarantee larger homogeneity, sympathy, and stability, and foster respect and support for American institutions and ideals.

## INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY. XVIII

### PART III. GENERAL STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY

#### CHAPTER VII. THE SOCIAL FRONTIERS (CONTINUED)

##### SECTION VIII. THE DECLINE OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE AND THE FORMATION OF THE FEUDAL RÉGIME (CONTINUED)

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The historians have observed that this partition was distinguished from earlier partitions of the Frankish empire by the fact that it took account in part of ethnic and topographical affinities, but the conclusions which they have attempted to draw in favor of so-called natural political frontiers are false. It was no more the thought of Charlemagne than of Pepin to set up obstacles between the hereditary portions, but rather to assure co-operation and the necessity of an understanding between their successors; when they adopted mountains or rivers as *indicating* the boundaries of each portion, these mountains and rivers were only outlines easier of recognition, and their effort was, on the contrary, to assure relationships among their heirs.

In this Charlemagne imitated his father; that which pre-occupied his mind was the security of the whole patrimony. It was for this reason that he came to give to his eldest son the most extensive, if not the richest, portion, including the valley of the Aosta, one of the gates of Italy, and even added to Aquitaine the valley of Susa. Thus the two kingdoms had access to Italy, and could aid it in case of need.

As to the third empire, the Byzantine, its frontiers were being continually displaced. At the beginning of the seventh century the Persians took from it Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia; it succeeded in retaking them, but only to see them again taken by the Arabs. The Mussulman conquest reached successively Armenia, Cyprus, Rhodes, and Crete. Three times repelled, the Mussulmans arrived under the walls of Constantinople. Egypt,



already conquered by the Persians, was taken by the Arabs. By the end of the seventh century all of Byzantine Africa had fallen into their hands; in the eight, the whole of Spain; to which was added, from the eighth to the tenth century, the Balearics, Sicily, and Sardinia.

The Lombards made an irruption into Italy in the seventh century. The frontier of the Danube gave way under the pressure of the Slavs; the Croats established themselves in Dalmatia and in Pannonia; the Serbs, in Upper Mœsia, in Dacia, and in Dardania; still other Slavs, in Lower Mœsia, in Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly. Toward the end of the seventh century the Bulgarian Finns founded south of the Danube a powerful kingdom, which dominated the Slavic tribes and extended as far as Rhodope and Albania. From the eighth to the tenth century there was a return of Byzantine power in Asia as well as in Europe; the Bulgarian kingdom was itself annihilated under the combined efforts of Byzantium, the Hungarians, the Russians, etc. At the beginning of the eleventh century the Empire of the East was almost as extensive as at the time of Justinian, but it contained the most extraordinary mixture of populations, differing both in origin and in language. Religion was their only common bond. By military force it united them, while it restrained, oppressed, and held them down. Religion spread even beyond the military frontiers; it bore the influence of Byzantium, by means of the Greek friars and of economic relations, among the Slavs of Moravia, among the Croats, the Serbs, and the Bulgarians. The Khazars were converted in the ninth century. Russia passed to the Orthodox Greek church in the following century.

As throughout western Europe during the Middle Ages, the military structure gathered strength at the center and at the extremities. In the Byzantine Empire, starting with the middle of the seventh century, the old provinces were fused into governments more and more extensive from a territorial point of view, but at the same time more and more centralized in the hands of military commanders. The provinces were called *themes*—a word which denotes at once the territory and the body of troops

which was stationed there under a commander who retained at the same time with the military also the civil power. During the following centuries the themes multiplied, especially at the frontiers. Toward the middle of the tenth, the empire comprised thirty-one, each with a *strategus*—a commander with arbitrary powers, who was directly responsible only to the emperor. Everywhere were social forces with their essentially military structure—forces which triturated and combined societies, with their groupings and boundaries, without much regard to differences either ethnic or physical. About the time when Charlemagne re-established the imperial unity in the Gallic and Germanic West, England was becoming unified under the hegemony of the kingdom of Wessex. This kingdom included all the southern coast of England, the frontier which faced the continent and was the most exposed, the most military, and hence destined to become a center for conquest, the cradle of a great power. This kingdom had already annexed the peninsula of Cornwall, after having put itself at the head of all the other Saxon principalities. These latter had finally formed three kingdoms (Wessex, Sussex, Essex), of which the first had become predominant. Kent had been colonized by the Jutes; to the north the Angles formed three kingdoms beyond the Humber—Northumberland, East Anglia, and Mercia.

All these populations were Germanic, and their political unity was realized from the first half of the tenth century. The country of Wales, containing three small kingdoms, was made subject to England only in 1282. In Scotland the Picts had been subjugated by the Scots from 842. In the following century their domination extended over the kingdom of Sutherland toward the South, territory where the Picts and the Britons had already mixed.

Great Britain is made up of three distinct regions. Masses of mountains separate them. The southeast of England is a country of plains and low hills. The inhabitants of this region remained naturally for a long time separated from the neighboring regions by their interests, their customs, and their history. To the west and the south, the long mountainous peninsula of Cornwall projects into the ocean; and to its north, the country of Wales,

separated from it by the Bristol Channel, forms likewise a mountainous double peninsula clearly separated from the rest of the country by deep indentations of the sea, and by rivers and mountains. In the north, beyond the Humber and the Mersey, there rises the mountainous portion of England proper. The land grows narrower and narrower between the North and the Irish Seas. There is then a fourth distinct region, as well from the point of view of geography and geology as from that of history. To the north of this region another narrowing of the land is produced by the penetration of the Solway Firth and the mountain walls which from one sea to the other separate the north of England from Scotland. From these high plateaus one descends to the low plains of the Firth and of the Clyde, which form new geographical divisions. From the plain one ascends new mountains, those of the Scotch Highlands, with their innumerable valleys.

The Romans after the conquest still further strengthened these natural divisions by walls and towers intended to stop the incursions of the Highlanders. Mountains are not in reality barriers; mountaineer populations always tend to occupy both slopes and to descend into the plain, just as the inhabitants of the plain tend to ascend toward the heights. These are sociological movements, of which geographical conditions are only particular factors. Ireland, likewise, although less elongated and more massive than the island east of it, is also divided by groups of mountains into distinct regions; hence its long historic dissensions and conflicts. However, its divisions constitute, in general, less of a geographical unity, and are more strongly geological.

The Scotch Highlands were to remain longest outside the general movement of civilization. On the other hand, the low part of England, especially at the south, where it faces the continent, was to be the line of contact rather than of separation, where the first peaceful relations would be established. There civilization was to develop most rapidly; there, too, the capital turned toward continental Europe would be fixed.

It was only after the discovery of America, and the consequent industrial development, that great centers were formed in



the west of England, Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool. In the meantime, as we have seen, the kingdom of Wessex, which occupied exactly the strip of coast facing the continent, was the military center, adapted both to the internal social structure of the British Isles and to the relations with the outside world.

One favorable physical condition, in the midst of all the others which were temporarily unfavorable to the unification of the British Isles, was the climate. These islands are maritime, and hence have a very even and moderate temperature. Ireland, in 50° of latitude, has as high a temperature as the United States at 38°; that is to say, more than three hundred leagues to the south. It results from this uniformity of temperature that acclimatization in passing either from Scotland to England, or vice versa, was much easier than it was in France for the inhabitants of the north and south.<sup>1</sup>

Although derived from many diverse races, the present population of the British Isles has been fused into one in England and in the Scotch Lowlands. At the time of Cæsar the mass of the population were Celts, closely related to those of Gaul. In the South, however, there had already been immigrations of Belgæ; that is, of Germanic elements. Later, at the time of the great migrations of the period of the Roman decadence, other tribes, leaving the north of Germany, established themselves in England, massacring or subjugating the earlier inhabitants. The south of England, and not the sea, ought to be regarded as the true frontier zone; for it was there that the conflicts and the mingling occurred. Frisians and Saxons occupied particularly the basin of the Thames and the coasts. The Angles, who came from the south of the Cimbric Peninsula, conquered from the Britons the center and the north of England. Later there came to mingle with these, Danes and Northmen from Scandinavia; and later still other Northmen, first transformed by French influence. This was the last violent conquest from without (1066). Later there were still other immigrations, as the result of the religious persecutions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, of fugitives from Flanders, from Saintonge, from Cevennes, and from the

<sup>1</sup> *Elisée Reclus, Géographie universelle.*

Vaudois valleys. They also mingled with the original elements. Today peaceful immigration still continues, introducing new elements, already strongly mixed themselves, of Germans, Poles, and Russians. If in western Ireland, in a part of the Scotch Highlands, in the mountains of Wales, and in Cornwall the old Celtic type still predominates, while on the eastern coast the Angles, Saxons, Frisians, and Jutes are dominant; if, farther inland from Hertford above London to Durham south of Newcastle, the Scandinavian element is very considerable, can one seriously attempt to trace at the present time the frontiers based upon the ethnic characters of different populations, or indeed upon the geographical divisions of territory, when the whole history of civilization in the British Isles has evolved through the leveling of geographical divisions, and the fusion of all the ethnic varieties? Military conquest, with its odious and violent phases, notably in Ireland, was only the gross manifestation of this sociological law of progress which, after having permitted the human race to colonize the planet through ethnic differentiations, now completes its work by weakening these differentiations, and yet at the same time multiplying them still more extensively through the mingling of all the varieties and subvarieties of the human species, and especially by the increasing division of social tasks—a division which becomes more and more the positive basis of collective groupings, from the smallest to the most considerable, but all equally, and better and better, co-ordinated and fused together. Here is to be found the law of progress, and not in the vain and reactionary attempts at the reconstitution of old ethnical groupings, whether in relation or not to certain geographical frontiers.

They deceive themselves who are continually talking about the isolation of England within her island. This isolation existed, if it ever existed, in prehistoric times. On the contrary, through its situation, England placed herself in the vanguard of Europe; and, better still, from the Middle Ages she was the meeting-place, the mart, of all the Continental Occident. There, too, broke the winds and waves from America; ships had only to follow the direction from southwest to northeast on the return voyage; just as in going to America they had only to let themselves be carried

by the trade winds and the equatorial current. London, as was very truly remarked by the illustrious J. Herschell, is not far from the geometric center of all the continental masses. There, too, all the lines of navigation of the world converge, just as formerly London was the natural half-way station between the Mediterranean and North Cape. Nothing proves better than the example of England that neither mountains nor water-courses, neither seas nor oceans, are natural frontiers, capable of serving as the basis for a theory, and still less for practice. They are, at the most, temporary obstacles, the material marks of social divisions in periods of history which are still primitive. The whole course of evolution, on the contrary, has resulted in making the island which we have made the type of the most complete isolation, in spite of its frontiers so clearly defined by the sea, in reality the geographical territory, the best adapted to the most complete social life. In this connection the evolution of Japan, that England of the Far East, has the same significance.

SECTION IX. THE EVOLUTION OF FRONTIERS TO THE END OF THE MIDDLE AGES, AND TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE NEW WORLD, AND THE PASSAGE AROUND THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE

The Middle Ages were characterized, from the point of view of frontiers, by a continual displacement; states were formed and broken down again without regard to geographical or ethnic conditions. In 711, Spain was wrested from the Visigoths by the Arabs; the peninsula became a province of the empire of the caliph of Damascus! From the year 756 it became an emirate or separate caliphate, that of Cordova, until the year 1031. This caliphate included at first Septimania beyond the Pyrenees, but it was lost in the year 759. The caliphate never succeeded in extending itself into the Asturian and Cantabrian mountain region in the northwest. There an independent Christian kingdom was established by the most energetic mountaineers and refugees. Successively Galicia and the whole coast as far as the Douro were annexed by the Mussulmans and then the whole basin of the Douro. The two powers were for the moment delimited, but not separated, by the ranges of the Sierra de Gredos and the



Sierra de Guadarrama. The true frontier was of another sort; between the two states Alfonso I created a desert, a *military march* of the most absolute sort, without even colonization. In spite of this, the Mussulmans were able to assume the offensive and to maintain themselves upon the left bank of the Douro until the eleventh century. There was, moreover, in Spain at the beginning of the tenth century, the kingdom of Navarre, which formed a true independent *march*, and also the Frankish march of Spain. Enlarging itself, it became in 1162 the kingdom of Aragon, independent of France. Both Navarre and Spain ought naturally, in a military organization of society, to become important centers for political states.

As to the Frankish empire, it continued, like its landed estates, to oscillate between unification and dismemberment, according to the rules of law governing inheritances. In the year 839 the division enacted at the Diet of Worms reserved Bavaria for the second son of Charlemagne, and the remainder fell, in almost equal portions, to the lot of the eldest and the youngest. The latter had almost all the territory comprising present France, together with the greater part of Belgium at the north, and the Spanish march in the south. This kingdom thus included all the populations of ancient Gaul, whether Romanized or not, as well as Germanic populations. The portion given to Lothair included all of the Germanic populations, except those of Flanders and of Bavaria, but also the Romance populations of Switzerland and of Italy.

A new partition of territory was signed in 843 at Verdun. "They took less account," we are told in the historical atlas of Schrader, "of the richness and equality in point of area of the portions, than of their proximity and convenience of location." But are not these elements taken into consideration in all the partitions? There was already, however, a tendency toward a change; the bond between those who shared in the division was no longer so close as formerly; the treaty proclaimed the absolute independence of each of the three corecipients. Lothair the German received also in his portion a large strip of Gallic territory extending from the mouths of the Rhine to those of the Rhone,

and inhabited in very large part by people of Romance tongue. This was to be the point of departure for all the later attempts to establish an *intermediate zone* between Germany and Gaul. For the moment this zone was still an integral part of the Lotharingian kingdom, but it was soon to form the kingdoms of Lorraine and of Arles or Burgundy, which, long united to the Germanic empire, was to incline toward separation from it. Intermediate zones form a stage in the evolution of frontiers. They are established between states which are independent, fortified, or even hostile, and they introduce into their reciprocal relations an element favorable to the maintenance of peace. They are buffers destined to soften conflicts; but, unfortunately, they are also destined, in a period essentially military, to serve as the field of battle for great states. Later, a system of neutrality for the intermediate states was to coincide with fresh attempts at a political equilibration — attempts, however, always precarious, so long as the internal equilibration of the states should not permit the establishment of a peaceful civilization founded no longer upon merely political, but upon really social, changes.

The unity of the Carolingian empire was again re-established for a moment by Charles the Fat, who from 876 to 887, the year when he was deposed by his subjects, either inherited or took possession by fraud or violence of all the territories situated outside of his own kingdom. But the empire, after his reign, was again dismembered into five kingdoms; France was formed once more within the limits of the treaty of Verdun, and the kingdom of Germany expanded toward the west.

While political sovereignty tended continually, under the feudal régime, to follow the same course as feudal proprietorship, now expanding and now being divided up, and continually erecting frontiers which were no sooner fixed than removed, and yet submitting Europe to a really uniform régime within a true common structure, the Roman church, which was also a political state, with political frontiers bounding the domains of the papacy, spread over almost all the old Empire of the West, even into Ireland, Germany, Bohemia, and Moravia. It passed even the military marches which were established beyond the Elbe; the

Danish march, the Saxon march, and, still more remote, that of the Billungs, a military possession of the dukes of Saxony, the most precarious of all. Bishoprics were erected in the middle of the tenth century at Oldenburg, at Havelberg, and at Brandenburg. From Germany Christianity was propagated first among the Slavs in the North and then among those in the South. At the end of the same century it had spread from the marches of the Elbe over Poland and Hungary. From the commencement of the eleventh century, it was the official religion of the Scandinavian states.

The Greek church continued to hold a predominant place in the Empire of the East, in the south of Italy, and in Bulgaria. The religion of Islam ruled from the Indus to Spain, in Sicily, and in Crete. Judaism since the eighth century had been the official religion of the Khazars, a people of Turkish race to the north of the Black Sea as far as the Caspian; but it had spread everywhere in Europe, in Asia, and in Africa. Finally, religious forms and beliefs, from the most rude and simple ones up to pagan polytheism, still persisted for a certain length of time in Poland, in Hungary, and in Scandinavia. After the conversion of these countries, they held out among the Finnish populations, among the Slavs of the Baltic—Pomeranians, Prussians, Lithuanians—and finally among the people of Turkish race in the south-east of Europe, Petchenegs and Comans, and among the Bachkirs. All of these beliefs, without distinction, while setting limits to one another, took no account of either physical or ethnic barriers; they all overstepped the different political frontiers, and the different races, as well as rivers, mountains, and seas.

No political state at this time, any more than at any time before or since, has been occupied by a race entirely free from mixture, or to the exclusion of other races. The Celts spread into Ireland, Scotland, Cornwall, and Wales, and into the peninsula of Armorica. France, Spain, Lorraine and Burgundy in part, Italy, Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily, the coasts of Dalmatia, and Transylvania were Romanized. The Basques spread over the kingdom of Navarre, Alava, Biscay, Guipuzcoa, the kingdom of Leon, and into a part of Gascony. The Scandinavians occupied



Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, and many archipelagos to the north of Scotland. Like the Germans, they colonized England. The Germans were by no means held within the kingdom of Germany, but were found as far as the southern Crimea. The Slavs extended from the Baltic to the Adriatic; at the beginning of the tenth century they had just been cut in two by the Hungarian invasion. They still peopled the marches of the Elbe, Pomerania, Prussia proper, Lithuania, the greater part of the grand duchy of Russia, Poland, White Croatia, Moravia, and Bohemia. In the south they occupied Carinthia and Carniola in the German kingdom, and Croatia, Servia, and the kingdom of Bulgaria besides. Turkish populations occupied the southeast of Europe; and the Ugrians, Finnish populations, the northeast; the latter were joined by the Livonians, the Mordvins, etc., and other Hunno-Ugrian peoples, such as the Hungarians and the Bachkirs. Finally, in the midst of a considerable number of superimposed or mingled racial elements, the Greeks were dominant in the part of the Balkan peninsula which had remained in the power of the emperors of the East, but they were spread over almost the whole circumference of the Mediterranean, in Europe, in Asia, and in Africa.

But nowhere, in no political grouping, does the race confuse its frontiers with those of the state; everywhere also there is a tendency toward the juxtaposition and the fusion of races. Add to this that the characters which constitute a race are characters acquired by differentiation, selection, and adaptation; characters transmitted by heredity, not original, but, on the contrary, derived; how then can one think of establishing political and artificial, and above all final, groupings upon such a fragile basis? This is no more serious than to wish to bound societies by mountains, rivers, and basins. A society is something more complex than its purely ethnic factor, or than its purely physical factor; society is a combination of these two factors, giving birth to a new phenomenon, the social phenomenon. This is the result of their *combination*, and not of their simple addition; for they are different materials which it is as impossible to add as it is pears and apples. And that is the reason why it is impossible, and will

remain impossible, at any moment of history to bring about the existence of a political group embracing exclusively one single race, and the whole of this race within a territory which is physically delimited. I add that all attempts of this sort are reactionary, since progress is realized above all by the increasing multiplication of the differentiations, the only natural process which permits the fusion of all the social parts with the least correlative and parallel intensity of strain as between these parts. The true and the noblest aim of social science is to lead the different varieties of the human species not to take up positions apart from one another, but to live together, and that without any sacrifice of either their individual or collective characteristics with their greater or less degrees of originality, which, far from hindering the unification of the race, is in reality the only thing which makes it possible. It is through variability and selection that the species has better and better adapted itself to the planet, and that the planet has better and better adapted itself to humanity. Such is the natural process to which it is necessary to conform, and which even military societies have followed, in a violent and rude fashion, in the determination of their political frontiers. It is impossible to interpret their evolution otherwise; at least, to accept the hypothesis which consists in regarding as irrational and contrary to nature all that was accomplished before the epoch in which we have the exceptional advantage of living and thinking wisely.

Among all the races which we have mentioned, the Romance populations, at this time the most civilized, were also the most mixed. As to religions, we have already seen that they are more widely extended than races, or than geographic and political divisions. Neither was feudal law contained within the limits of a single state; it had become uniform in its main lines in all the social groups equally evolved. This law itself corresponded to an economic structure, whose characteristics I have explained elsewhere. The external frontiers of each political group corresponded then at this time not only to the mode of sovereignty, but both corresponded to the whole of the internal organization of the group in relation with the same external elements. Thus the

feudal régime—a régime not only national, but international—constituted, during a certain period, a static state, an equilibrium, but an unstable one, as all organic, and especially social, equilibria are.

In the tenth century alterations in the political map of Europe continued. In the south the kingdom of France extended to the west of the Rhone to the detriment of Provence, which was ceded in 932 to Burgundy; this kingdom or that of Arles was itself annexed to the kingdom of Germany in 1032; the latter, moreover, recovered Lorraine which for a moment had been lost. The *Austrian march* was overthrown by the Hungarian invasion; but on the northeast there were organized the *marches of the Elbe*, which had been taken from the Slavs, and the duchy of Bohemia passed under the suzerainty of the empire. In 967 the kingdom of Italy was reunited to the kingdom of Germany, and to the Empire of the West under Otto the Great in 962. In the tenth century the Empire of the West passed to the north of the Eider, where the *Danish march* was established. The Empire of the East, after having lost Crete and almost all of Sicily, extended its boundaries in the south of Italy. On the other hand, the kingdoms of Bulgaria, Croatia, and Servia were formed at its expense. In northeast Europe, in the middle of the ninth century, the duchy of Poland and the grand duchy of Russia were set up. The Norwegians formed in Iceland a colony independent of their kingdom. Danish pirates founded the duchy of Normandy about the year 912. While the frontiers were mobile, the populations became more and more settled in the territories which they occupied.

At the accession of Hugo Capet in 987, the old division of Gaul into *pagi*, such as existed under the Merovingians, who themselves had found them in Roman Gaul, still persisted, but they were henceforth nothing more than administrative districts. In the regions where Germanic customs prevailed, the *pagi* multiplied through the parceling out of the cities or primitive *pagi*. The count was at once the administrative, judicial, and military chief of the *pagus*; from the eighth century the name of *comitatus*, county, tended to be substituted for that of *pagus*. In the



course of the establishment of hereditary fiefs, these counties gave birth to the hereditary counties of feudalism. Thus the internal organization of feudal society, itself founded upon the régime of proprietorship, conformed more and more to the general political régime. In the most Romanized part of Gaul the names of the greater part of the *pagi* were borrowed from those of their chief places. In the north, on the contrary, where the conquering element predominated, the name is often that of the principal water-course of the district: Aargau, Breisgau, Oscheret, Orcrois. The conquerors had established themselves along the water-courses, but, as always, upon both banks in such a way that the water-course did not bound the *pagus*, but crossed it.

Before the accession of Hugo Capet, France comprised nine large principal fiefs: Flanders, Normandy, France, Burgundy, Guienne, Gascony, Toulouse, the march of Gothia, and the Spanish march. Among these there was the private domain of the Carolingian kings. This lay to the north of the Seine; it comprised the county of Laon, and the royal towns in the basin of the Oise. It was surrounded on all sides by the possessions of the count of Vermandois, and those of the other lords of the same race. Hugo Capet, before becoming king, had his duchy of France. This duchy had itself sprung from a military command held in the time of Charlemagne and his immediate successors in this region, which was then called the duchy of Mans, or the march of Brittany. The military march had created the military function, the *dux*, and the latter the duchy, which became hereditary. The duchy of Brittany was itself divided, in 911, by the creation of the duchy of Normandy—a creation indicating that from this time the march had become useless.

Hugo, upon becoming king, possessed accordingly his duchy of France, the private domain of the Carolingians: Paris, Orleans, Etamps, Dreux, Senlis, Montreuil-sur-Mer, important abbeys such as those of St. Martin-de-Tours, St. Germain-des-Prés, St. Denis. He had for direct vassals the counts of Blois, of Anjou, and of Maine. Among his rear-vassals figured the Breton counts of Rennes and of Nantes. These possessions embraced several basins, but only in part, and had no physical or natural frontier.

This was the center around which the other parts of what we call the French nationality successively attached themselves. This center was necessarily more stable than these outer portions. They continued to fluctuate in various directions.

In 1032 the kingdom of Burgundy was attached to the German Empire. Lorraine, instead of two duchies, formed henceforth only one. About the same period it also became German. The duchy of Burgundy, at first attached to the crown of France, was again detached from it in favor of the younger brother of the king. Even from the political point of view, the feudal régime was always at bottom a demesial organization of property, according to a hierarchical order whose divisions were very intricate, like those of landed estates themselves. The seigneurial domains, although united under a common ownership, might be situated at a distance from one another; for some of them one might be vassal, and for others lord paramount. And this was the situation even in the case of kings. There were also ecclesiastical, episcopal, and abbatial seignories, where spiritual power was confused with temporal sovereignty. None of these divisions had water-courses or mountains for boundaries. The ecclesiastical divisions of France, moreover, had no direct relation to the seignories of the bishops and the abbots. From the time of Charlemagne there had been eighteen of these divisions; in general, they corresponded to the Roman provinces of the time of Theodoric and of Honorius. Even the greater part of the dioceses were identical in point of territory with the *cities* of the fourth century, whose names they had preserved.

In the twelfth century the royal domain was augmented; new territories and populations attached themselves to the central skeleton, increasing the fixity and the solidity of the structure. The domain was carried to the northeast as far as the Epte, to the south to Cher; toward the southeast it extended into the basins of the Loing and the Yonne. This extension was brought about oftenest by purchase, inheritance, and marriage. The alienations, on the other hand, were rare and of little importance. At the accession of Henry Plantagenet to the throne of England in 1154, the situation was of the highest sociological interest, and shows

us that the whole political organization of the time, notably its whole system of frontiers, rested upon a certain economic constitution of property, itself derived, however, as I think I have proved elsewhere, from still more general forms of traffic. All the great fiefs of the west of France found themselves regularly in the possession of the king of England. On the other hand, the boundaries of the kingdom had been extended in the direction of Lyons by the accession of the county of Forez formerly attached to the German empire, but far distant from the center of action of that empire. It had gradually made itself independent before attaching itself to France. At this time France was approaching the Rhone, but did not yet touch it.

There were still other modifications in the political geography of the great fiefs and of the territories of the empire. We will note only the augmentation of the county of Maurienne, which spread successively over Chablais, the county of Aosta, Tarentaise, Bugey and Savoy, the marquisate of Susa and of Piedmont; this development occurred, like all the others, by succession, marriage, fraud, or violence. A military state was formed there which was destined to grow into a general military structure. The title count of Savoy little by little came to be substituted for that of count of Maurienne. From its highlands the county commanded the entrance to Italy in the direction of the plains of Lombardy, where it extended itself as far as Turin. This intermediate zone was thus the cradle of a military power which formed itself upon the frontiers, in the least stable parts, at the points of passage, as in the case of a true march. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries the feudal system was at its apogee; the fiefs were subject to numerous changes all resulting from usurpations, conquests, marriages, inheritances, or exchanges. The boundaries became multiplied and complicated, as well as the ties of the feudal contract. Thus the county of Champagne, at the time of its greatest extent, in the twelfth century, comprising countries held in fief by it, or held in fief of it, included not less than sixteen territorial groups, or principal islets. It was dependent upon ten different suzerains, from the emperor of Germany, the king of France, and the duke of Burgundy, to two archbishops, four bishops, and an



abbé, he of St. Denis. All these territories included only parts of the basins of the Loire and of the Seine or their tributaries.

Let the theorists who proclaim that nationalities are constituted by river basins, or marked off by water-courses or mountains, try to apply their systems to the feudal régime! Is it not evident that the whole external organization of states during this important period, including the organization of their frontiers, was related to the internal organization of their society, and that their political frontiers, like all their other boundaries, were only their social frontiers?

And this applies not only to feudal France. In Germany and in Italy we see that the Teutonic kingdom which resulted at the commencement of the tenth century from the fusion of the kingdom of the eastern Franks with Bavaria, Saxony, and Alemania, did not have precise boundaries, and did not correspond to any geographical reality. On the east the *regnum Teutonicum* bordered upon the Slavs and the Hungarians; but it no more had natural frontiers than it had as yet, differing from France, a center of gravity. Four great groups alone were to be distinguished: Saxony, extending from the Elbe to near the Rhine; the Frisians, along the North Sea, and the peoples of Thuringia remained in part independent; the Franconians were upon both banks of the Maine and in the lower valley of the Neckar; Bavaria, victorious over the Hungarians, had extended her domination over Carinthia and the eastern part of Franconia. Carinthia, however, was to detach itself and form a new duchy. Alemania or Swabia, separated from Bavaria by the Lech, reclined on the south upon the Alps, and on the west upon the Vosges, from the time of the annexation of Alsace in 911. In short, the territories occupied by the Franconians and Swabians did not possess physical boundaries; they were to be constantly partitioned; they were to hold to particularism, both on account of their geographical complication and by reason of social causes. Saxony and Bavaria represented rather natural regions. The first occupied the Germanic portion of the depressed lands lying along the interior seas which separate central from northern Europe, yet it had no natural frontier toward the east, where it

became confused with the Wendic plain, nor to the west, where it joined the oceanic depression of Gaul. As to Bavaria between the Lech and the Ems, which were purely indicative frontiers, and the forest of Bohemia and the Alps always passable, and indeed penetrated, it corresponded in large measure to the upper basin of the Danube forming a plateau, in contrast with low Germany in this respect. It is thus that Saxony and Bavaria were often opposed to one another in politics also, and in customs, in law, and in religion. Even Bavarian socialism was to differ from that of Bebel; but in reality this division did not constitute an absolute line of demarkation, any more than did the physical divisions; on the contrary, it represented a differentiation favorable to the extension of socialism and to its adaptation to regions of Germany which are distinct, but not separate.

## THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY<sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, D. C., February, 1906.

At a conference recently held in Baltimore for the purpose of discussing the wisdom of forming a national association of sociologists designed to perform for sociology services similar to those rendered political economy by the American Economic Association, about forty specialists in sociology—representing twenty-one educational institutions and a dozen organizations engaged in practical sociological work—decided to form such an association at once and to invite all persons interested in the scientific and philosophical study of society to become members. Among those who attended the conference, as well as among the sixty other sociologists who expressed their views by letter, there was an almost unanimous opinion that regular annual meetings of those interested in the promotion of sociological studies would advance the science and benefit those who are devoting themselves to it.

Several European nations already possess sociological associations which are accomplishing good results. What has succeeded elsewhere ought also to be possible in the United States, where there is certainly as deep, as widespread, and as truly scientific an interest in sociology as in any other country.

Quite as much as the economists, who formed a national association twenty years ago, our sociologists are in need of the stimulus, the encouragement, and the mutual criticism which would come from an organization that is national, permanent, and scientific in character. Theoretical sociology has thus far been built up mainly through the work of one-idea thinkers who have developed their own views to the neglect of much that is valuable in the work of others. Moreover, the relation between the various aspects of sociology—historical or descriptive, analytical or theoretical, and ameliorative or practical—has too often been overlooked. "Practical sociologists" have sometimes known little and cared less for the theoretical and general aspects of the subject. To bring these several groups together would, it was felt, help them all, and at

<sup>1</sup>This is a copy of the circular lately issued by the society. We publish it in order to assist the officers in completing the membership as rapidly as possible.



the same time exalt sociology in the eyes of the general public. The new society, therefore, has been founded with the hope of securing the active co-operation of scientific philanthropists as well as of persons engaged in academic instruction, of sociological writers as well as of sociological workers—of all those who recognize the importance of the scientific aspects of sociology.

The membership fee is three dollars a year, or fifty dollars for life membership. Each member will receive a copy of the current publications of the society. You are cordially invited to join by filling out the inclosed [appended] blank and sending it to

PROFESSOR C. W. A. VEDITZ,  
GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, Washington, D. C.

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1906

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY:

DEAR SIR: I desire to become a member of the AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY. Inclosed please find three dollars in payment of the dues for the year ending December 31, 1906.

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1906

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY:

DEAR SIR: I desire to become a life member of the AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY. Inclosed please find fifty dollars in payment of dues for same.

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### ERRATUM

In the January number of the *Journal*, in the article on "The Literary Interests of Chicago," page 516, line 19 from top should read:

as sole proprietor, the *Dial* has grown in prestige until today, in

## REVIEWS

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*Government Regulation of Railway Rates: A Study of the Experience of the United States, Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Australia.* By HUGO RICHARD MEYER, Assistant Professor of Political Economy in the University of Chicago. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1905. Pp. xxvii + 486.<sup>1</sup>

The author is a decided opponent of state railway systems, and of all regulation of railways and railway tariffs by the government: "for it is the verdict of all experience that governments will not, and cannot, make railway rates that will meet the needs of expanding trade and industry" (p. xvii)—a most emphatic and very harsh verdict, which this professor (care should be taken not to confound him with Professor Balthasar H. Meyer, now railway commissioner of Wisconsin) attempts to prove from the experiences which Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Russia, and Australia have had with government-made freight tariffs, and the United States with company-made tariffs. According to our author, we find, on the one hand, in the countries in which the state influences the tariffs, heavy shadows, dense mediæval darkness; while, on the other hand, the privately made tariffs of the United States reflect nothing but clear light, sparkling sunshine, which would beam still more brightly if the error had not been made in the United States of restricting the freedom of the exemplary railways through the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act and the institution of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Part I of Professor Meyer's book, composed of eight chapters (pp. 1-203), depicts the pernicious effect of state railway tariffs, while Part II (pp. 203-473), portrays the magnificent, overwhelming economic results of the far-sighted tariff policy of the railways of the United States.

This is undoubtedly an entirely new conception—new not only to the German, but also to the American reader. It is seldom that

<sup>1</sup> Translation of a review by Dr. Alfred von der Leyen, of the Prussian ministry of public works, Berlin; published in the *Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen* for January-February, 1906.

an American has the opportunity of reading such a spirited song of praise regarding his own railways, and such a hard, depreciative judgment with respect to the work of the Interstate Commerce Commission, which is charged with the supervision of rates affecting interstate traffic by the Interstate Commerce Act of February 4, 1887.

It is a different question whether the author has succeeded in proving his case. This question is of greater interest to American than to German readers. During the winter of 1905 President Roosevelt himself launched a movement against the existing tariff policy of the American railways. The President has expressed the opinion that the tariff policy affects the common interests unfavorably; he regards it necessary that the federal government exercise a more effective supervision of these tariffs, and that the Interstate Commerce Commission receive enlarged powers over the railways. A bill embodying these views passed the House of Representatives, but not the Senate. In May and June, 1905, the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce had extended hearings on the subject, and the testimony is published in five large volumes. The message to Congress of December, 1904, again called the attention of that body, in still more emphatic words, to the necessity of controlling railway tariffs through public authority. Whether the President will succeed remains to be seen. At all events, he has succeeded in greatly arousing public opinion, and has created anxiety on the part of the powerful railway managements. A rescuer has arisen for these railways in the person of Mr. Meyer, who, equipped with what has the appearance of a mighty scientific armament, attempts to show how objectionable the efforts of the government of his fatherland have been.

However, the first part of his book was written and published before President Roosevelt had advanced his views. Meyer's studies concerning state railway tariffs in European states and in Australia appeared between July 10 and October 9, 1903, in that excellent American publication, the *Railway Age*; also the chapter on Prussian tariff policy, concerning which the author deems it prudent to remain silent in his preface (p. ix). The short chapter on France (pp. 123-36) is new. If the author did not resolve until later to oppose the railway policy of his government, he naturally could make good use of these articles. In his testimony before the Senate committee, on May 4 and 5, 1905 (Vol. II, pp.



1552 ff. of the report), the author repeated much of what he had theretofore written in these articles.

If in the following review I enter upon details, more than would be necessary for German readers, regarding Professor Meyer's utterance with respect to state railway rate policy, I do so in the hope that these lines may also come under the observation of American readers. In my estimation it cannot be a matter of indifference to us that views like these, presented with great confidence and apparently resting upon thorough investigations, should take root in the United States. The railway questions which at present are agitating America have only academic interest for us.

Let us see upon what the author bases his derogatory verdict regarding the freight tariffs of the Prussian state railways. Not by the method of presenting to Americans the German tariff system, German basal rates, etc., and then attempting to prove that this system is an erroneous one; that rates are incorrectly established; that trade and industry generally suffer from these rates, and are incapable of adequate development, etc. Rather he contents himself with saying in two pages (pp. 3-5) that our freight rates are composed of two parts, terminal charges and movement expenses. The remainder of his discussion is intended to show, on the basis of a few examples taken from German, partially very prejudiced sources, that under such a system it is impossible to avoid conflicts between different branches of industry and industrial sections, and that the effective competition of railways with waterways is thereby prevented. The fundamental defect of Prussian rates, according to the author, is their lack of elasticity, that they are not constructed on a falling scale, and that they cannot be thus constructed in accordance with the accepted principles. However, on the same page on which the author advances this bold assertion he has the misfortune to cite Special Tariff III, *which is constructed on a falling scale*. In addition to these regular tariffs, as is well known, piece-goods rates and express-piece-goods rates are tapering rates; and there lies before me a compilation which shows that in May last there were not less than sixty-one commodity rates, including those for the most important bulky goods (wood, all kinds of raw material, fertilizers, ores, etc.), which were constructed on the falling scale; and carload rates on live stock are tapering rates. It is therefore a gross misrepresentation of facts when the author says:

And today in Prussia their introduction is opposed by two powerful forces. One of these is the Prussian government's fear of temporary or permanent loss of revenue; the other, the jealousy of the sectional interests and trade interests that are concerned about the preservation of the established course of trade and industry.

Among the examples of erroneous tariff construction which Meyer recites, the first is the cancellation of the tapering rates on grain, which were withdrawn in the year 1894 in order to make possible the ratification of the Russian treaty of commerce of that time. This example is chosen not without skill, since uncertainty existed then, and even today opinions differ with respect to the correctness of this procedure. But it proves nothing with respect to the inability of the state to make railway tariffs, because in cases where such complications of economic policy did not exist the older tapering grain rates were maintained (such as the graded mileage rates of the Prussian Eastern Railway); indeed, new tapering rates for the export of grain were introduced, which fact, however, was known to Professor Meyer. The second illustration he claims to find in the export rates on sugar. It is true that their adoption was preceded by extensive investigations, but nevertheless they were finally introduced, as he himself states on p. 15. And with this all his preceding assertions fall to the ground. On p. 16 he claims that the restriction on workmen's return tickets is connected with this question. Herein lies a remarkable misunderstanding. Meyer confuses the return tickets of laborers with the reductions in party tickets for the so-called season laborers who, it is true, are attracted in part by beet culture. But in both cases the question is one of beets. The reduced rates for the so-called season laborers have never been canceled. They exist today.

Then Professor Meyer takes up the question of the ore tariffs from Lorraine-Luxemburg to Westphalia. Before their introduction, too, difficulties had to be overcome, and the question was investigated very thoroughly; but finally, on June 1, 1901, they were introduced, *and this Mr. Meyer conceals*. And with this the entire edifice, constructed from material brought together from many sources, collapses. The author in his statements has confused fact and fiction to such an extent that it would require considerably more space to uncover his errors in detail than these through-and-through confused statements themselves occupy, and out of all of which only this remains true, that there are in Prussia, as in all

parts of the world, people who are dissatisfied with certain rates and desire reductions.

The second chapter is devoted chiefly to a discussion of the competition of railways and waterways. Professor Meyer considers it the duty of the railways to maintain the strongest possible competition with waterways. That this competition is not directed more strenuously against the Rhine, the Elbe, or the Oder meets with his disapproval; and he cannot understand why the railways should permit the natural waterways to carry an increasing tonnage; it is their duty, according to his views, to adjust their tariffs in such a manner that all freight is hauled by the railways and the waterways lie waste. Furthermore, the author cannot understand why the Prussian government does not favor the Prussian port of Stettin, by means of railway tariffs, in such a manner that it can compete more effectually than heretofore with Hamburg. On p. 45 he states:

While the Prussian government and the German people generally believe it a patriotic act to cut railway rates against foreign cities, such as Rotterdam, they would not approve any departure from their uniform system of rates for the purpose of strengthening one German city as against another.

Naturally, Meyer considers it equally absurd to construct a canal between Stettin and Berlin. It is entirely incomprehensible to him why the state railways did not prevent the deflection of a large part of the petroleum trade of Bremen to the waterways. It is not enough for him that low commodity rates on petroleum are in force from Bremen to southern and western Germany; although even these low rates are frequently met by the tank-ships via Rotterdam and the Rhine. This struggle for the petroleum trade should have led to the reduction of rates by rail also to the east, to Berlin, and to Magdeburg! In consequence of this mistaken rate policy the oil trade has been driven from Bremen to Hamburg.

That with such views Professor Meyer is a still more pronounced opponent of artificial waterways and of canal construction is not surprising. In the fourth chapter a short summary is given of the various attempts to carry a canal bill through the Prussian parliament during the last few years. He advances the same objections to the first two canal bills which were urged by opponents of canals with us. The fate of the last canal bill is not mentioned. No mention is made of the fact that in the elaboration



of this bill an attempt was made to overcome the objections of the opponents to the canal, and to incorporate provisions whereby the co-operation of rail and waterways was to be assured in the future for the general welfare. All these difficult questions have been thoroughly and exhaustively discussed within the last few years, in parliament as well as in the daily and technical press. Nor are they unknown to the American public. I need only to recall the fight for the improvement of the Erie Canal, the competition of the railways with the Great Lakes, and the plans for an artificial waterway from the Great Lakes to the Mississippi. In Germany and in Prussia this question has long been viewed from a higher plane, even during the time in which private railways still existed. The opinion has always obtained that the natural waterways had a right to exist alongside the railways. The interests of traffic in general have been rated higher than the exclusive financial interests of the railways. Whether or not the waterways have occasionally been favored too much is a question which I do not desire to discuss on this occasion. At all events, the railway traffic has developed substantially alongside the waterways; and, to put it mildly, it is gross exaggeration on the part of Professor Meyer when he maintains that the Prussian railways have been degraded into mere feeders for the waterways. But this question also is certainly not connected with the assumed inferiority of the state in making rates as compared with private enterprise! The illustration of the commodity rates on sugar which Professor Meyer presents proves exactly the opposite. Furthermore, the fierce wars of the American trunk lines for the grain trade on the Erie Canal are by no means a glorious page in the history of American railway tariffs.

The third chapter of Meyer's book deals with the financial policy of the Prussian railways, which are accused, by means of arguments well known here and amply refuted, of being operated too much in the interests of the state treasury. In this attempt—which is again highly characteristic of his entire method of proof—he joins the economic crisis of 1873 with the alleged mistaken financial policy of the year 1891 and following. He claims that, instead of obtaining great surplus earnings from the railways, it should have been the object of the administration to reduce rates, to extend the system, to increase the number of cars, and especially to purchase larger cars. Here we meet all the well-known asser-

tions which have occasionally been made by a few of our magnates, from whose arsenal Mr. Meyer secured his weapons. Professor Meyer passes in silence over the proof, brought forward time and time again in parliament and elsewhere, how greatly these charges have been exaggerated. Altho'gh otherwise apparently a diligent reader of the *Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen*, Professor Meyer has seen fit utterly to disregard the article published in the January number of the preceding year, on the development of the freight tariffs of the Prussian-Hessian state railways, in which these very questions were treated with great thoroughness, supported by a wealth of illustrative material.

These, in the main, are the arguments by means of which Professor Meyer attempts to prove the premises set forth in the opening chapter of his book. They are directed less against the tariffs than against the system of state railways as such. The author seems to occupy an entirely different viewpoint from ours, and it would be entirely superfluous were I in this place to take up with him the discussion of the question of the justification of the state railway system in Germany. For a long time there has been no difference of opinion in Germany that a state railway system deserves the preference over private railway systems. Professor Meyer apparently cannot realize that it is the duty of the state to administer the great monopolies of transportation as a unified system in accordance with the principle of the welfare of the great masses. The professor continually moves about in contradictions, declaring on one page that the state can make tariffs only with the yard-stick, and on the next criticising it for making certain exceptions. He also confuses his readers continually by rehearsing the difficulties which are encountered in adjusting certain tariffs in such a manner that they will be beneficial on the one hand, and not injurious on the other, and then carefully omitting to tell how the state has succeeded, in nearly every case cited by him, in arriving at a satisfactory solution—to be sure, only after a very careful investigation of all the circumstances entering into the situation. And whether this method of procedure, which may sometimes be a little tedious, deserves the preference over the practice obtaining in America, according to which the great railways judge economic questions chiefly by their own subjective estimates, and from the viewpoint of their own interest or that of favored shippers, is a matter with respect to which no German—and, I am convinced, not all American traffic men—are in the least in doubt.

The American reader may possibly be impressed with the many source-references and figures cited by Professor Meyer. One would think him, in consequence of this, uncommonly well read and an expert of a high order. But this appearance is deceiving. In the illustrations which have been given above I have been able to show how superficially Professor Meyer has done his reading. Here I may add a few further examples, picked up at random. On pp. 26 and 27 he states that the Society of German Railway Administrations is a union of officials of the various German state railways! Everybody knows that this society embraces all German, Austria-Hungarian, and several neighboring state railways as well as private railways. On p. 148 he asserts that Posen is a port situated on the Oder near the Galician border. The statement, on p. 358, that a Prussian minister, angered over certain transportation difficulties, had recently uttered the words, "Commerce be hanged," is simply a fabrication of the author.

In closing this review, I will take up the following example, which is especially characteristic of the method of work of this author. On p. 158 Professor Meyer states:

And within the city limits of Berlin one can count, and smell, upward of 14,000 cows, kept there to supply the population with milk that the railways are not allowed to bring from a distance.

The assertion is repeated in the following words on p. 387, after the author has described how the railways supply New York with milk and cream:

And in the year of our Lord 1902 the firm of Von Bolle was stabling within the city of Berlin 14,000 milch cows, which supplied milk to 50,000 families. In addition, there were in the suburbs of Berlin hundreds of dairies, each one stabling a considerable number of milch cows.

In the last citation the source from which Meyer claims to have taken his statement is given. It is the *Zeitung des Vereins deutscher Eisenbahnverwaltungen* of October 29, 1902. Now let us see what that paper says:

*It is reported* that the well-known dairy of Bolle in Berlin has a supply of 14,000 cows, which furnish daily about 85,000 liters of fresh milk to meet the demand of 50,000 households. Besides this, there are in the suburbs several hundred larger dairies which send their milk wagons into Berlin.

Up to this point Professor Meyer has copied with tolerable accuracy, except that he states as a fact that which his reference merely states as a report. But his reference continues:



But this is not nearly enough. Millions of liters of milk are brought in from the open country, some of it from a great distance, principally by the railways.

Then follows a detailed description of the facilities which the railways have provided for bringing in milk, such as low rates, fast trains, convenient train schedules, reductions for sending back empties, etc.; and from these facts the conclusion is drawn that in this manner the public as well as the railways receive their just dues. *Yet all this Professor Meyer omits, although he certainly must have read this article.* He would have his readers believe that all Berlin is dependent on the milk produced in Bolle's dairies. It is his purpose to give a very striking illustration of the backwardness of Prussian freight rates. Having this in mind, it does not suit his convenience that just in this matter the Prussian railways have performed splendid service; and since the evidence does not support his line of argument, *he suppresses the facts which do not suit him.* As a matter of fact, of the 250,000,000 liters of milk which were consumed in Berlin in the year 1902, 44,700,000 were produced in Berlin, 25,400,000 were brought into the city on wagons, and 180,000,000 were brought in by rail. (*Statistical Year-Book of the City of Berlin, 1903, p. 314.*) We are also enabled to state more exactly the figures representing the number of dairy cows than the source from which Professor Meyer quotes. According to a special census, there were in 1902 in Berlin, Charlottenburg, Schöneberg, and Rixdorf together (not in Berlin alone) only 11,431 (not 14,000) milch cows, which produced the above mentioned 44,700,000 liters. The milk that came by rail originated at 216 stations, of which 108 are in the province of Brandenburg, 11 in the province of Saxony, etc. Further details Professor Meyer may read in the official statistics of the city of Berlin, Vol. I, 1903. According to these statistics, he has turned the facts upside down, deliberately, in order to cause hilarity among his readers, if he has read the article; or he read only the first sentence of his reference. In either case this is a method of procedure which one has a right not to expect in a *scientific* book.

I can pass over more lightly the following chapters. The French tariffs are faulty, according to Professor Meyer, because they make energetic competition against the waterways impossible. He claims that it is the duty of the railways of Austria-Hungary and of the regions of the lower Danube to transport agricultural

products of the east to Germany by means of low graded mileage rates. These railways, like the Russian, especially the Siberian Railway, ought to follow the example of the American railways; then the agriculture of the Danubian provinces and Siberia would blossom forth like that of the great American west (p. 177). In this Meyer overlooks the fact that eastern Europe and the German Empire are not a unified economic domain; and that European states still maintain, what is to him an entirely antiquated point of view, that the policy of customs duties and the freight-rate policy shall not negative each other. Professor Meyer, of course, maintains the direct contrary, when in another place (p. 340 ff.) he considers it utterly false that the Interstate Commerce Commission does not regard as permissible railroad rates which render nugatory the federal tariff legislation. It is unnecessary for me to point out that a comparison of Siberia with the Far West of the United States is ludicrous, except that I wish to use this as an example of Meyer's method. He claims that the Russian government has impeded the development of the grain industry in Siberia by a faulty policy of its state tariffs. On p. 178 he says:

Therefore it is worth while to recount what the Siberian peasant has been made to do under the incentive of gain, in the single instance in which the railways are free to co-operate with men of enterprise and capital in the development of Siberia's resources.

This, he claims, was the result of lower rates for the exportation of butter. Hence this same Siberian Railway is at one time an irrational state railway, and at another an intelligently operated private railway! And the best part of it all is that it was just the Russian government that has always promoted the dairy interests and the exportation of butter from Siberia in every way possible.

(The remainder of von der Leyen's review is devoted chiefly to Professor Meyer's comments on American conditions, closing with the following paragraph:)

I should regret it exceedingly if the very one-sided and, so far as our railway conditions come into consideration, often absolutely untruthful representations of Meyer's book should interfere with what seems to me a very wholesome movement on the part of the American government with respect to railway policy, and possibly to thwart the strivings of the President of the Union.

DR. A. V. D. LEYEN.

BERLIN.

*Source Book of the History of Education for the Greek and Roman Period.* By PAUL MONROE. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1901. Pp. 515.

*A Text-Book in the History of Education.* By PAUL MONROE. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1905. Pp. 772.

These two volumes supply a long-felt need in the teaching of the history of education. The *Source Book*, which was the first to appear (1901), covers the Greek and Roman period, and is the first of a series of such source-books intended to supplement the *Text-Book*, which has just appeared (1905).

The *Source Book*, without attempting a definition either of history or of education, presents the most important selections from the literary sources relating to education "in the accepted historic meaning of the term—that of a definitely organized institutional attempt to realize in individuals the ideals controlling a given people."

This volume is designed as a text; hence the sources are classified into periods, in order to afford the student aid in their interpretation, and each group of sources is accompanied by a brief introductory sketch indicating the general setting of the period to which it belongs and the main principles of interpretation to be followed. These introductory chapters furnish little more than a syllabus for study; the interpretation is purposely left in a large degree to the student.

Greek education is divided into four main periods or phases: old Greek education, for which the sources are Plutarch, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Plato; new Greek education, with selections from Aristophanes, Isocrates, and Plato; the Greek educational theorists—Socrates, Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle—representing the historical, the philosophical, and the scientific views (with selections from the *Cyropædia* of Xenophon, the *Republic* and the *Laws* of Plato, and the *Politics* of Aristotle); and later cosmopolitan Greek education, for which the sources are the Decrees of the Athenian Senate and the Athenian Assembly, the *Panegyric on St. Basil* by Gregory Nazienzen, and the *Morals* of Plutarch.

Roman education is treated in three periods: "Early Roman Education in General," "The Second Period of Early Roman Education," and "The Third Period or Hellenized Roman Education." For the early period we have selections from the laws of the Twelve Tables and from the *De Oratore* of Cicero. For the



second the *Lives* of Suetonius furnishes the sources. Two chapters are devoted to a "Contrast Between the Earlier and the Later Periods of Roman Education" and to the "Survival of Early Roman Educational Ideals in the Later Period." Plautus and Tacitus in the first, and Cornelius Nepos, Suetonius, Tacitus, and Marcus Aurelius in the latter instance, are the sources. The sources for the third period of Hellenized Roman education are the *Satires* and *Epistles* of Horace, the *Epigrams* of Martial, the *Epistles* of Seneca, the *Lives of the Twelve Caesars* by Suetonius, Musonius, the *Letters* of Pliny the Younger, and the *Satires* of Juvenal. This period concludes the volume with a chapter on the "The Orator as the Ideal of Roman Education" (with Cicero's dialogue *On Oratory* as the source), and a chapter on the "Scientific Exposition of Roman Education" (with selections from the *Institutes* of Quintilian).

Of the other work the author gives the following succinct account:

Professedly a text-book, this volume, while not pretending to be an exhaustive history of the subject, aims to give more than a superficial outline containing a summary of trite generalizations. The merits which the author has sought to incorporate are (1) to furnish a body of historical facts sufficient to give the student concrete material from which to form generalizations; (2) to suggest, chiefly by classification of this material, interpretations such as will not consist merely in unsupported generalizations; (3) to give, to some degree, a flavor of the original sources of information; (4) to make evident the relation between educational development and other aspects of the history of civilization; (5) to deal with educational tendencies rather than with men; (6) to show the connection between educational theory and actual school work in its historical development; (7) to suggest relations with present educational work.

The book, in other words, aims to meet the needs of the average student of the history of education—needs which involve, on the one hand, a widening and deepening of the general background of knowledge of human culture, as achieved in the successive efforts of the race toward self-instruction, and, on the other hand, a more definite conception of the meaning, nature, process, and purpose of education which will "lift him above the narrow prejudices, the restricted outlook, the foibles, and the petty trials of the average schoolroom, and afford him the fundamentals of an everlasting faith as broad as human nature and as deep as the life of the race."

Carefully selected bibliographies and lists of topics for further study are appended to each chapter, both of which will be of great help to student and teacher. There are also placed at the beginning of the discussion of the leading periods condensed chronological tables of the chief political events and personages, literary men and scientists, religious events and personages, educators, educational writings, and leading educational events. These enable the student by a glance to gain a survey of the whole field, and to correct errors of perspective to which he is liable in a study of this sort.

Very suggestive and helpful, in the reviewer's opinion, is the treatment of education as adjustment, and an interpretation of the history of educational practice and theory from this point of view. In this aspect education appears as a progressive bringing to consciousness by man of his own ways or methods of doing things, his own unconscious and instinctive reactions to his physical and social environment. Education is the most advanced phase of evolutionary process, its most controlled stage. It is the conscious self-adaptation of humanity to the conditions of its life and growth. "With this stage of evolution the institutional aspect of environment is most important, and social selection of greater functional significance than natural." Yet even this conscious and social selection has been for the most part a stumbling and uncertain guide. That is, "since the social consciousness rather seeks to prevent change, social progress has resulted for the most part through the conscious effort of the individual to secure for himself some advantage which is not permitted or, at least, not consciously given by society." The highest form of social selection is attained when society becomes conscious of its aim in terms of a method, and grasps the meaning of the process of adjustment and readjustment by which the individual and the social are evolved together. "The great positive method developed by modern society for effecting these purposes is public education. Education thus becomes for the social world what natural selection is for the sub-human world—the chief factor in the process of evolution."

Employing this conception, Professor Monroe traces educational practice and educational theory through its successive phases. Primitive man exhibits education as non-progressive adjustment, since here behavior is in accordance with definite and rigidly prescribed customs and habits. Oriental peoples, of which China is taken as the type, illustrate education as recapitulation. Among

the Greeks for the first time we find the idea of liberal education—education as conscious progressive adjustment. In the Middle Ages the ideal of education is discipline—mysticism and monasticism furnishing the type of discipline on the spiritual side, chivalry on the social side, and scholasticism on the intellectual side. In the humanistic ideal of the Renaissance we have a revival of the idea of liberal education, which, however, in turn, becomes narrowed by its too restricted adherence to the literary content of the curriculum. The Reformation and Counter-Reformation illustrate the religious conception of education. Realistic tendencies follow—humanistic realism, social realism and sense realism. The modern disciplinary conception of education is considered in connection with Locke's educational writings. The naturalistic tendency is illustrated in Rousseau; the psychological tendency, in Pestalozzi, Herbart, and Froebel; the scientific tendency, in Spencer and Huxley; and the sociological tendency, by many recent writers. The present period, the author says, is one of eclecticism; and doubtless in a sense this is true. But every period is a "fusion" of existing or earlier tendencies, and an attempt at "harmonization" of conflicting theories. Is there not reason to think that this is as progressive and constructive a period as any that has preceded in the history of education?

The permanent problem, says Professor Monroe, is to transmit to each succeeding generation the elements of culture and of institutional life that have been found to be of value in the past, and that additional increment of culture which the existing generation has succeeded in working out for itself; to do this, and also to give to each individual the fullest liberty in formulating his own purposes in life and in shaping these to his own activities. The problem of the educator is to make the selection of this material that is essential in the life of the individual and essential to the perpetuity and progress of society, to construct it into a curriculum, to organize an institution to carry on this great process, and to formulate the rules and principles of the procedure which actually accomplish the result. The problem of the school is to take the material selected by the educator, to incorporate it into the life of each member of the coming generation so as to fit him into the social life of the times, to enable him to contribute to it and to better it, and to develop in him that highest of all personal possessions and that essential of a life satisfactory to his fellows and happy in itself, which we term character.

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*The Police Power—Public Policy and Constitutional Rights.* By ERNST FREUND, Professor of Jurisprudence and Public Law in the University of Chicago. Chicago: Callaghan & Co., 1904. Pp. xcii+819.

Until the appearance of Professor Freund's book, the discussion of the police power was confined to two distinct classes of treatises; on the one hand, the legal textbooks intended to guide the practicing lawyer in the conduct of litigation; on the other hand, the general treatises on political science. The legal works dealing with this subject show but few differences in method of treatment. With the increase of adjudicated cases, there has been corresponding increases in the bulk of these volumes, but they have all failed to give us a broad treatment of the subject.

In the general treatises on political science we find the police power occupying a position of increasing importance. Burgess, in his work on *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law* makes the police power the central feature of his discussion of individual liberty.

Students of this subject have realized for some time past that the most fruitful discussion of the police power would come with the combination of the distinctly legal and the broader political methods of treatment. Dr. Freund has accomplished this difficult task with a degree of success which places us in possession of a work indispensable alike to the student of political science and to the practicing lawyer.

No other principle in constitutional law has played so important a part as the police power. Through it the courts have been able to adapt our federal and state constitutions to the changing economic and political needs of the country. It has made possible such adjustment without the necessity of constitutional amendments. The courts have furthermore used this doctrine to protect the people against the shortsightedness or extravagance of their own representative assemblies. Its most important function, however, has been to prevent the injurious assertion of private rights as against public welfare. Through its influence the courts have been able to counteract to a certain degree the strong individualistic tendencies of our American communities. In fact, the history of the police power in the United States mirrors with a considerable degree of accuracy the gradual curbing of the intense individualism

characteristic of our American communities. Dr. Freund's method of treatment makes this tendency clearly evident.

In examining any treatise on the police power, one naturally turns to the author's discussion of the quasi-public industries as a test of the author's method of treatment. In chap. 17, entitled "Business Effected with a Public Interest," Dr. Freund has given us an admirable treatment of the subject. It is to be hoped in some future edition of the work Dr. Freund will extend his discussion to include the street railways, gas and electric-light, and water services.

The appearance of this work will undoubtedly contribute much toward giving the police power a more definite place in the curriculum of our American universities. With this work in hand, interest in the police power need no longer be confined to our law schools, but can readily find place among the general courses in political science. Students of law and politics are under deep obligations to Dr. Freund for having placed them in possession of a real guide in the study of this important subject.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

L. S. ROWE.

*The Negro: The Southerner's Problem.* By THOMAS NELSON PAGE. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Pp. xii + 316.

This book is dedicated "to all those who truly wish to help solve the race problem," and it is a pleasure to commend it to all such. It is a collection of essays, some of which have been previously published, upon the relations of the negroes and the whites in the South and the solution of present difficulties. Like all that Mr. Page has written on the negro problem, these essays are characterized by a sanity of spirit and a painstaking thoroughness. Though Mr. Page is primarily a literary man, he has to a remarkable degree that openness of mind and impartiality of judgment which make up so largely the scientific attitude, and which go so far in the scientific treatment of any social question. However, his lack of scientific training leads him to make occasional blunders, as when he predicts (p. 288) that "before the end of the century there may be between sixty and eighty millions of negroes in this country."

The general trend and spirit of the book may perhaps be best shown by a few quotations:

The alleged danger of the educated negro becoming a greater menace to the white than the uneducated is a bugaboo which will not stand the test of

light. That this might be true if the white is allowed to remain uneducated, may be readily admitted (p. 301).

There are only two ways to solve the negro problem in the South. One is to remove him; the other is to elevate him. The former is apparently out of the question. The only method, then, is to improve him (p. 305).

This education should be of the kind best adapted to the great body of those for whom it is provided. . . . The true principle should be elementary education for all, including in the term "industrial education," and special, that is, higher education of a proper kind for the special individuals who may give proof of their fitness to receive and profit by it (p. 309).

Finally, and as the only sound foundation for the whole system of education, the negro must be taught the great elementary truths of morality and duty. Until he is so established in these that he claims to be on this ground the equal of the white, he can never be his equal on any other ground. When he is the equal of the white, it will make itself known. Until then, he is fighting, not the white race, but a law of nature, universal and inexorable—that races rise or fall according to their character (p. 310).

If Mr. Page truly represents the mass of intelligent southern whites in these ideas, it is safe to say that the negro problem will soon be in a fair way to solution.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD.

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

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*Democracy in the South before the Civil War.* By G. W. DYER.  
Nashville: Publishing House, M. E. Church, South.

Mr. Dyer, who is instructor in economics and sociology in Vanderbilt University, has prepared a syllabus of a proposed larger work on the condition of democracy in the South before the Civil War. It is a strong protest against the theory usually advocated by our historians, that affairs in the South in ante-bellum times were largely controlled by an oligarchy of slaveholders, who kept down the average white man, who made labor disdained, who kept the South agricultural, while the great mass of the people were idle, illiterate, and lazy. By reference to census reports and similar material Mr. Dyer quite effectively disproves statements of historians, which he quotes as texts for his argument, and by some comparisons between certain of the southern and northern states before 1860 he draws conclusions by no means unfavorable to the former. The syllabus suggests a most interesting line of work, which, if carried out without prejudice or passion, of which unfortunately there are traces, ought to yield results of great value to the student of American social and economic history.

J. W. SHEPARDSON.



*Condorcet: Guide de la Révolution française, théoricien du droit constitutionnel et précurseur de la science sociale.* By FRANCK ALENGRY. Paris: V. Girard et E. Brière. Pp. xxiii + 891. Fr. 14.

This work has all the appearances of a thesis for the doctorate. It may be said that it constitutes a definitive study on Condorcet, from the historical and sociological points of view. Unless new manuscripts of the eminent philosopher are discovered, it certainly seems that nothing can be said now that M. Alengry has not said already.

This very stout volume is rather dry reading, because of the great number of quotations, and the abundance and minuteness of details. What we consider a fault, from the literary point of view, is an advantage, if we consider the book from the student's standpoint, as being a work to consult for documents, facts, and arguments. M. Alengry studies Condorcet from the political, the constitutional, and the sociological points of view. The study is precise, minute, and based upon the most reliable sources—the unpublished papers left by the great thinker. The author has read all that was published by and on Condorcet, his book thus being a complete bibliography.

Book I treats the political side of Condorcet before, during, and after the Revolution: before the Revolution, he prepares it; during it, he directs and organizes it; after it, his memory is the rallying sign for the republican opposition and the parties of the vanguard from the Consulate to this day. Book II reveals a thinker no less unknown than the politician—a true theorist of constitutional law whose object, method, problems, and solutions have been indicated with a power and an authority which, according to M. Alengry, have never been surpassed, and whose influence is still felt among us, either in doctrine or in action. Book III deals with Condorcet as economist, moralist, and sociologist. Book IV investigates the originality of Condorcet and his historical influence, studying him successively as a man of action—republican, observer, utopist—and finally showing all that contemporaneous democracy owes to him.

*Condorcet* is a book which the philosopher, the sociologist, and the historian must read. They will find in it original chapters, as well as unedited and new particulars on the part played by Thomas Paine and David William on August 10, on the election of Danton,

on the feminism of Condorcet, etc. As regards the French Revolution, one may consider this volume as an unedited chapter of its history. It is studied here in its inner and philosophical life.

The erudition of the author is enormous. He is thoroughly master of his subject; but he does not seem to have condensed it enough. His work is too full. In spite of its analytical table of contents, it is not easy to consult. There ought to have been an alphabetical table as well.

The very title of his book shows that M. Alengry considers Condorcet the guide of the French Revolution, almost its chief and promoter. He attempts to prove this in the course of his study. But it is rather an exaggeration, because in a movement like the French Revolution there is no proper guide or chief. There are some who may think themselves such, but in reality they are not. They are themselves guided by the collectivity, the events, and the circumstances more than they guide them. Apart from this, we cannot praise M. Alengry enough for having written *Condorcet*. Such a work is sure to last, and for many years to come to be profitably consulted by students.

*Seize ans en Sibérie.* By LÉO DEUTSCH. Paris: Librairie Universelle, 1905. Pp. 349. Fr. 3.50.

Leo Deutsch, a Russian revolutionary, took part in an attempt against a traitor, twenty years ago. Being arrested, he made his escape and fled abroad. He was caught in Germany and delivered to the Russian authorities. He was again incarcerated, sent from one prison to another, and at last tried and condemned to exile to Siberia. There he was shut up in the prison of Kara. After thirteen long years of imprisonment, he was granted semi-liberty, still in Siberia. Finally he made his escape via Vladivostok and Japan, and returned to Europe by way of Oceanica and North America, after having passed sixteen years in Siberia. It is about his life in Siberia that the author tells us in a simple, easy, and attractive style, which the translator, M. Charles Raymond, has well rendered into French. The story is as interesting as a novel. The volume is an excellent contribution to the history of the movement of emancipation of Russian thought. The facts it contains may be advantageously consulted by the criminologist who wishes to study the life and customs of Russian prisoners; by the psychologist who is anxious to penetrate the soul of the Russian revolutionist, of those who endure martyrdom for their ideal; and by the sociologist who

wishes to know Russian functionaries and the Russian government. It has its place next to *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*, by Kropotkin, and *La Russie souterraine*, by Stepnyak, etc. It completes them.

*Souvenirs de Tunisie et d'Algérie.* By G. SAINT PAUL. With a Preface by TH. RIBOT. Paris: Charles Lavauzelle, 1904. Pp. 360.

The title is unpretentious. It hides but too well the sociological and psychological interest of Dr. Saint Paul, the author of the well-known work, *Le langage intérieur et les paraphrasies (la fonction endophasique)*. Taken as a whole, the *Souvenirs* are ethnological and sociological studies in the interest of practical acquaintance with the types described. The author is well read and has a philosophical mind, and his work abounds in subtle and suggestive remarks. The subjects treated are various: scenes of Tunisian life; impressions and notes on Bizerte, Tunis, and Algiers; the habits of a few animals of North Africa (sloughi, gazelle, dromedary, horse, donkey, etc.); reflections on the state and the future of the populations of Algeria and Tunis; on the customs and the character of the natives; colonists and colonization in Tunisia. In spite of this diversity, the author, who is a fine observer and who applies a scientific method, has been able to study and explain his subjects with great skill. It is a book that the ethnologist, the psychologist, and the economist may read with profit.

*Les retraites des travailleurs.* By PAUL IMBERT. Paris: Perrin, 1905. Pp. 327. Fr. 3.50.

This volume, written by an engineer of the government factories, is preceded by a short preface by M. Paul Deschanel, a deputy. The author is already known to those interested in social questions. Indeed, he has published a book of real value, *Rapport entre patrons et ouvriers dans la grande industrie*. The present work is well fortified with facts, and abundantly furnished with statistics and figures. The author's examination of the question from the historical point of view, both in France and abroad, constitutes an excellent part of the book, and is quite complete. The keen critical sense of the author may be seen in the remarks he makes on the different systems employed in Belgium, in Italy, and in Germany. He suggests a system that may be open to criticism, but is perhaps



preferable to that proposed in the French Parliament. This is a practical book, dealing with one of the most important questions of the day. It is worth consulting as a contribution to the problem of the relations between the proletarians and the capitalists.

*L'évolution religieuse et les légendes du christianisme.* By G. L. DUPRAT. Paris, 1904. Pp. 76.

The author has only drawn here the outline of a more complete work. He argues that every religion is a natural fact subject to the laws of natural evolution. He contests Spencer's conception that religions are derived forms of the exercise of political power. But his arguments are not conclusive. The first part of M. Duprat's work is not clear. One must read it several times to catch the meaning of the author, and even then one is not quite sure to understand exactly his thought. The second part, regarding the legends of Christianity, is much clearer. After having rapidly studied the religious feeling in Christianity, he examines the account of Jesus and Mary, and lastly primitive Christianity. In this last chapter he treats carefully the question of the persecutions under Nero, and concludes that tradition is inaccurate; the citations of Tacitus, for example, are mere interpolations. In short, this little volume is an interesting contribution to religious sociology.

A. AND H. HAMON.

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*The American Family: A Sociological Problem.* By FRANK N. HAGAR. New York: The University Publishing Society, 1905. Pp. 196.

The author brings to his task the special training of a lawyer and considerable reading in the history of institutions. He discusses sex, theories of primitive and historical forms of domestic life, the decadence of the Yankees, occupations of women, matrimonial law, divorce, free love, education, industrial influences, democracy. It is a serious work with a conservative purpose. Perhaps the most useful and instructive parts are the discussions of the decadence in the Yankee stock, the danger of foreign inundation, and the law of property affecting husband and wife. Even here we must turn to Howard for adequate information about the law. The dithyrambic passages in praise of romantic love, which the author calls "intervals of literary rests and elucidations that may appeal to the artistic sense," are precisely the hardest passages

for an academic audience to understand, though they may be pleasing in certain hours when one yearns to hear about things ineffable. But the student wishes the solid facts of the discussion might be bound by themselves without the interruption of the "literary rests" which really fatigue. The definition of "love" given by Felix Adler in his remarkable little volume on *Marriage and Divorce* is more satisfactory; although Mr. Hagar's earnest treatment commands respect. We should like to have him develop more fully his argument in chaps. 13, 14, and 21, where court practice would yield valuable illustrations. The volume illustrates the fact that men with legal training can render a valuable service to sociology by calling attention to the obstacles to progress which the law itself presents when it is no longer fitted to contemporary conditions.

C. R. HENDERSON.

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*Benevolent Institutions, 1904:* Special Report of Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce and Labor. Washington: Government Printing Office.

This report treats of the operation of benevolent institutions, including the movement of institutional population during 1904 and financial statistics for 1903. The investigation was directed by Mr. John Koven, expert special agent, with valuable labor in collecting and arranging materials by Mr. W. A. King and Mr. J. H. Garber. This statement guarantees the highest possible accuracy in method of inquiry and arrangement of results.

The data were collected from the institutions themselves, and no effort was made to take personal schedules of inmates. Five classes of institutions were presented: (1) orphanages, children's homes, and nurseries; (2) hospitals and dispensaries; (3) permanent homes for adults, or adults and children; (4) temporary homes for adults and children; (5) schools and homes for the deaf and blind. Almshouses, public and private hospitals for the insane, and schools for the feeble-minded are not included, but will be discussed in special reports. No attempt was made to collect statistics of outdoor relief.

The quality of this work is so excellent that all students and administrators are uniting to urge Congress to extend the scope

of the inquiry and to secure biennial investigations, so that the various movements and tendencies may be closely watched and studied. Bills are now before Congress with this purpose in view, and they deserve the interest of all citizens and legislators.

C. R. H.

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*The Charity Organization Society of the City of New York.*  
Twenty-third Annual Report, to September 30, 1905.

This report deserves particular attention and study, for it reveals the structure and activities of one of the best equipped and administered philanthropic agencies in the civilized world. In addition to the accounts of the ordinary life of a charity organization society, we discover the evidences of an immense creative and inventive enterprise which brings philanthropy into touch with all the scientific and reformatory efforts of the age; as, "A Study of Case Records," by Miss Brandt; "Purchase and Management of Food by the Poor;" "Philanthropic Education;" "Prevention of Tuberculosis;" "Tenement-House Reform."

One should mention in this connection the report from the Associated Charities of Boston for 1905, which is always rich in suggestions for friendly visitors, and the Buffalo Reports which describe the union of churches in district work for poor families. In general, the charity organization movement is characterized by fertility of resource and inventiveness.

C. R. H.

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*L'Office du Travail de 1895 à 1905.* Ministère de l'Industrie et du Travail, Royaume de Belgique. Bruxelles, 1905.

This admirable volume, edited by the director general of the Department of Labor of Belgium, M. Jean Dubois, was prepared for the Liège Exposition of 1905. It celebrates the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the department. The first section is devoted to the analysis of the organization of the office. The larger part of the discussion is given to the work of the office and its results; statistics of labor; agencies of conciliation; factory inspection; insurance against accidents; agencies of thrift; trade unions; laws regulative of industry. The third section describes the supreme council of labor, the commission on fraternal societies, and the commission on accidents. The volume contains statistical diagrams and photographic illustrations of mechanical devices.

C. R. H.



*Generalbericht über die Tätigkeit des deutschen Vereins für Armenpflege und Wohltätigkeit, 1880-1905.* Von EMIL MÜNSTERBERG. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1905.

This important summary of German relief, by the director of the Berlin city system and secretary of the German Conference of Charities, is worth special notice. The most significant discussions of a quarter of a century are here analyzed and their main principles interpreted. The first part gives a sketch of the rise and activity of the union of relief administrators; the second contains a chronological list of the papers and of their authors; the third is a systematic survey of the contents of the reports and discussions, relating to relief and welfare work. Dr. Münsterberg remarks that recent discussions tend to lay more stress on preventive measures, as care of children and of the sick. The workingmen's insurance laws have modified relief methods at many points. The book is more than a report of proceedings; it is a real contribution to the scientific treatment of the whole subject of charity.

C. R. H.

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*The Saloon Problem and Social Reform.* By JOHN MARSHALL BARKER. Boston: The Everett Press, 1905.

The author's argument is in the form of a direct plea for local-option legislation. He would evidently have absolute prohibition, if such a law could be enforced. For purposes of persuasion the arrangement of the discussion is effective, but the absence of references makes it impossible for the critical reader to verify many very important statements.

C. R. H.

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*Family Monographs.* By ESA G. HERZFELD. New York: The James Kempter Printing Co., 1905. Pp. 150.

This is an interesting study of twenty-four families living in the middle West Side of New York City. The economic facts are given, but in subordination to the manifestations of beliefs, ideals, interests, amusements, superstitions. Fragmentary as the study is, it is an authentic document by a shrewd observer and interpreter of social motives.

C. R. H.

*Efficiency and Relief: A Programme of Social Work.* By EDWARD T. DEVINE, Ph.D., LL.D., Schiff Professor of Social Economy in Columbia University. New York: The Columbia University Press, 1906.

Dr. Devine defines the field of the new department of study by saying: "The social economist is the modern organizer of knowledge for the practical good of man. . . . Social work, social legislation, and social thought are the three main branches of an adequately equipped school of social economy." In this inaugural address we see the outlines of a growing system of principles which are adapted to control the most efficient social conduct. From the fruitful labors of the author in the past we may confidently expect still more important contributions to this field; whether it be called "social economy," or "social technology" or "practical sociology" is of minor consequence.

C. R. H.

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*Marriage and Divorce.* By JAMES BRYCE, D.C.L. Oxford University Press, New York and London. Pp. 80.

This able essay is already well known as a part of the work *Studies in History and Jurisprudence* (1901), and the separate publication should give it a wide reading among those who are giving special attention to problems of the family.

C. R. H.

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## NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

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**Sociology as Culture.**—The conspicuous trend of elections in this and other universities toward social studies—whether these be called history, philosophy, economics, sociology, or what not—suggests interesting speculations as to what may be the meaning of it, as to how this trend may be related to the general state of thought. Only a small part of these elections are made for technical reasons; they do not, on the whole, express the tendency to specialization with a view to a career. They express, beyond doubt, a search for something in the nature of culture: students look to these studies for breadth, for a richer and more comprehending life.

Somebody has said that culture is the rise of the individual into the life of the race; and, if this is true, a social character must always have belonged to studies that yielded real culture. Why was Greek the word of culture from the early part of the fourteenth century to the latter part of the nineteenth? Evidently because it was the ark in which was preserved so much of the higher life of the race; in mastering it a man passed from the narrow confines of mediæval thought into something glad, free, and open; it was like being let out of prison. Perhaps the classics still have more of this function to perform than we realize. It would be nonsense to assert that we have assimilated what is best in ancient culture, and it is quite possible that the decline we witness is in some degree transient. But, however this may be, it is clear that the classics flourished because they gave the individual a fuller membership in the life of mankind, and that social studies are now in vogue because they are believed to serve the same end.

The fact that the study of society may be culture is somewhat obscured perhaps by a certain technical character that the word "culture" has taken on in popular usage. Like all words that relate to the higher life, it tends to become incrustated with special associations that are not at all of its essence. Just as religion, to many people, means going to church and joining in the rites and formulæ of certain traditional societies, so culture is bound up in a way almost as mechanical with a study, too often formal and uncomprehending, of languages and the fine arts. Because of the prevalence of this idea, and the shrewd perception of plain people that such acquirements often have little meaning for real life, "culture" is regarded with some suspicion as an intellectual or æsthetic exercise having no necessary connection with generous personal development.

This suggests a consideration that goes far to explain the decline of many of the older instruments of culture and the rise of newer humanities; namely, that culture in our day must be democratic, in the sense that the higher life which it embodies must not be the life of a privileged upper class shutting itself off from the common lot to cherish a private enjoyment, but something which makes for unity of spirit, excluding no one who has intrinsic fitness to receive it. It is partly because the art and literature of the schools are in a measure bound up with outworn ideals of society that young people find them somewhat unreal and unsatisfying, not expressive of the deeper facts of life as they feel them. Literature and fine art must always have a large part in culture, but is it not true that new types of them must arise before they can regain the commanding place which, it would seem, properly belongs to them? We have some voices of men crying in the wilderness—Walt Whitman, Tolstoi, Wagner, and others—prophesying something of this sort, but not yet the adequate art and literature, still less the incorporation of these into education.

In the meantime an increasing number turn to studies which, however deficient in form and hilarity, do really aim to explore human life; and in order not to speak of things which I know only at secondhand, I will leave others to expound the culture values of history, social philosophy, ethics, economics, and the rest, and point out what, from this point of view, the student seems to be looking for in sociology.

He seeks, for one thing, to get a better notion of the social order as a living whole, and of the relation of particular functions to this whole. He finds the main interest of popular thought to be social discussion of a somewhat confused sort. All kinds of theories and claims are vehemently urged, and one would wish to see at least the outline, if possible, of a rational adjustment of these conflicting ideas. To give this in the largest way is perhaps the function of philosophy, but the student wishes to define and enrich his philosophy by a somewhat detailed study of the actual working of human life.

He wishes in particular to make out his own relation to the system, to find out what the energy and aspiration he feels within him may mean in terms of the general life, to get a material out of which he may form ideals of his own career. I will give for what it may be worth the statement sometimes made by students that this is the first subject that they have taken up that seems to have anything to do with the individual.

Again he wishes very earnestly to find out what is right with reference to the less fortunate members of society, and how he can help to make this right prevail. A variety of causes are working together to reanimate the sentiment of human brotherhood and to give it hands and feet in the conduct of life. This movement the student feels, and he desires to be actively and intelligently in it.

Such aims as these are aims of culture; they look not to a private or technical advantage, but to a larger membership in the life of the race; they are distinctly humanities, and it is as such that they appeal to the youth of our time. The decline of culture is like the decline of religion; that is to say, it does not exist, it only appears to exist to those whose eyes are so fixed upon old forms that they do not see that the spirit which is disappearing from these has made for itself new ones.

I wish to add a word as to how sociology may most effectively be made a means of culture. One of the great drawbacks to the traditional culture studies is the difficulty of keeping up an interest when one passes from the atmosphere of an institution of learning into a world which has lost almost all conscious relation to them. Greek, for instance, would be a great thing if we did anything with it, but it is notorious that scarcely anyone does, and the reason is largely in the fact that there is no emulation or sympathy outside of the colleges to give it that social reality without which a thing can hardly seem real to the individual.

The truth is that a culture study should be one that is bound up on one side with the actual interests of men, and, on the other, leads those interests out to a universal scope. Sociology, at the present time, is such a study. It is rooted in real interests, social, political, industrial, philanthropic, which no system of culture can ignore without becoming futile, and yet it aims to make these things the doorway to the most spacious apartments of the human mind.

Understanding, then, that culture consists in finding the ideal in the practical, and *vice versa*, let the student, while at the university, extend to the utmost his general view of human affairs in their historical, psychological, economic, and other aspects; let him try to get a rational view of things as a whole; but let him not fail at the same time to take up the investigation of some particular practical question which he is likely to have an opportunity to pursue after he leaves. It is precisely because it affords so many such questions of living interest, because it offers, in the world at large, such constant incitement to find the ideal in the practical, that sociology is culture. Public opinion, leadership, social classes, competition, combination, the great institutions of religion, government, and the family, poverty, crime, race problems, the mixture of nationalities by migration, overcrowding, slums, saloons, popular amusements, the exploitation of women and children in industry — facts of this sort, and the questions growing out of them, are to be found in every city, village, and rural township in the country. They are full of human interest and open, to one who approaches them with preparation and in a right spirit, the richest opportunities to take part in the higher life of the race.

The proof that this is real culture is to know people who, protected from narrowness and fanaticism by a broad training, are giving a part of their energy to disinterested social activity. That they commonly get breadth of view, a



quicken sympathy and a great deal of the joy of life out of it is pleasantly evident. If one wants a kind of culture that does not require money; that will foster in him the sense of union with humanity; that will keep him young by identification with something more enduring than his narrower self; that educates thought, feeling, and action; that will give meaning and outlook to the commonest relations, he may hope to find it by occupying himself, both reflectively and practically, with some phase of the life of the community in which he lives.—  
 PROFESSOR C. H. COOLEY, in *The Inlander*, Michigan University, March, 1905.

**Women and Crime in Japan.**—The *Chuokoron* publishes an article on "Women and Crime in Japan," by Mr. T. Yokoyama, the chief points of which we give below. The attention of sociologists has for some time past been drawn to this subject, and novelists have ever been wont to make women's crimes a leading feature in their stories.

1. *The number of female criminals.*—The women guilty of grave offenses number far less than the men. The figures given by recent official statistics are men, 2,834; women, 341. Among these the men convicted of committing murder numbered 438, and the women 192. Thus we see that the proportion of murders to the total number of grave offenses committed by women is 56 per cent.; whereas in the case of men it is only 15 per cent. As to minor crimes there is not much difference between men and women.

2. *Adultery.*—Taking the average of the last ten years, the women convicted of adultery have amounted to 323 per year, against precisely the same number of men. The following figures give the number of convictions for each year between 1892 and 1901: 1892, 250 men and 246 women; 1893, 312 men and 310 women; 1894, 266 men and 274 women; 1895, 295 men and 301 women; 1896, 328 men and 332 women; 1897, 349 men and 347 women; 1898, 329 men and 334 women; 1899, 273 men and 272 women; 1900, 239 men and 238 women; 1901, 232 men and 235 women. Taking the total average, the number of men is 287, against 289 women.

3. *Education and crime.*—Though some writers on crime have asserted that it is largely the result of want of education, Japanese statistics do not bear out this idea in the case of men, but in that of women they support it. Taking the three years from 1899 to 1901, the partially educated men convicted of adultery were about equal to the non-educated; but among the women there were 80 uneducated to 12 partly educated.

4. *Adultery and poverty.*—Adultery is comparatively rare among the poorest classes; that is, the number of convictions is comparatively small among these classes.

5. *Crimes that originate with adultery.*—In this country the practice of killing the wife who is caught committing adultery together with her paramour is very common, having come down from Tokugawa days, when the law sanctioned a husband's taking the law into his own hands in emergencies of this kind. But the killing of the husband either by the wife or by her lover in order to get him out of the way is almost equally common. The crimes which have been caused by adultery during the past ten years are recorded as follows: setting fire to the houses of their wives' paramours by husbands, 17 cases; setting fire to wives' houses by their paramours, 14 cases; setting fire to houses belonging to husbands by their wives' paramours, 5 cases; setting fire to the houses of paramours by wives, 6 cases; setting fire to husbands' houses by unfaithful wives, 4 cases; unfaithful wives killed by their husbands, 41; paramours and wives killed together by husbands, 18 cases; husbands killed by adulterous wives, 38 cases; adulteresses killed by their lovers, 23; husbands killed by wives and their paramours in collusion, 7; paramours killed by adulterous wives, 3; unfaithful wives and their lovers wounded by wronged husbands, 73. Mr. Yokoyama observes that, considering the population of Japan, the cases of proved adultery are comparatively few; but he goes on to say that there are a large number of instances in which the crime though committed cannot be brought home to the persons concerned.—  
*Japan Mail.*



**Industrial Alcoholism.**—There is a traditional belief, more or less prevalent, to the effect that the primary and most serious factor in intemperance is convivial excess. It is often assumed that the amount of drunkenness, or even the number of arrests for drunkenness, in a community furnishes a reliable guide to the extent to which alcoholism prevails. That this is far indeed from the truth is easily apparent from an inspection of the statistics of drunkenness, on the one hand, and of the characteristic effects of alcoholism, such as cirrhosis of the liver and attempts to commit suicide, on the other.

Arranging the English counties, with North and South Wales, in the order of their addiction to drunkenness, we find that the list is headed by the chief mining districts—Durham, Northumberland, and South Wales. But if we look at the place of these districts in the list of alcoholism, the result is entirely different. Durham—a long way the most drunken county in England—has an alcoholic death-rate which ranks it with the sober agricultural districts; while South Wales, third highest in the list of drunkenness, is the lowest but three in the list of alcoholism.

Drunkenness reaches its maximum in the mining districts, but in these same districts the frequency of the specially alcoholic offenses is relatively low. The reason for this is, of course, simply that in the mining districts we have to do with practically pure convivial excess; the conditions of the coal-miner's work to a large extent exclude the possibility of his drinking during the hours of work—that is, of industrial drinking; while, on the other hand, his relative prosperity and low standard of culture are extremely favorable to convivial indulgence. In the manufacturing towns, on the contrary, and still more in the seaports, the conditions of labor, especially among the unskilled workers, are of a kind greatly to further industrial drinking.

The conclusion, therefore, to be drawn from the statistical evidence is clearly that the connection of chronic alcoholism is with industrial drinking and not with convivial drunkenness, and that accordingly the latter phenomenon, however regrettable as a proof of a low standard of manners, is not of very great account in the causation of the worst evils of intemperance, at all events under the prevailing conditions in this country.

Allusion has already been made to the importance of occupation in determining the drinking habits of workmen. The character of the nervous and muscular effort which the work demands is unquestionably the chief influence of this sort. The cause of industrial drinking lies, of course, in the power that alcohol has of giving a sense, albeit an illusory sense, of increased strength and efficiency. While this feeling is largely subjective, it is nevertheless very real to the drinker; and, accordingly, in proportion as his work is of a kind to cause exhaustion and depression, he will tend to seek relief in alcohol, so long at least as its agreeable action is not outweighed by obvious and immediate disadvantages.

In labor that demands only coarse muscular effort, these conditions are best realized; the sense of fatigue is relieved by the pseudo-stimulant action of alcohol, while the real loss in keenness of perception and accuracy of muscular adjustment produced by the drug is here relatively unimportant. The more skilled occupations require a steadiness and quickness of hand which is quite incompatible with the constant use of alcohol.

Next in importance to the nature of the muscular and nervous effort required in an occupation, comes the facility of access to alcohol during working hours. It is, in fact, from the interaction of this factor with the character of the muscular and nervous strain that the drinking tradition of an industry is mainly formed. Since the effect of alcohol is transitory and is followed by reaction, it is essential for its industrial use that the dose be repeated at short intervals. If the intervals are so long that the period of depression overshadows that of increased well-being, the disadvantages of the drug will be sufficiently evident to the workers to exclude its use. Breaking the continuity of the intoxication compels the worker to realize by actual experience that the sense of increased energy which he gets from alcohol is a very brief illusion.

Employers are thus in a position to do much toward mitigating the effects of alcoholism by the character of the shop rules enforced. Many altogether prohibit the introduction of alcohol into their factories, and some go farther and, by starting temperance canteens, encourage the use of hygienic substitutes.—W. C. SULLIVAN, in *Economic Review*, April, 1905.

E. B. W.

**Ethnic Factors in Education.**—The efficiency of our educational system depends upon a clear apprehension of the relation of the contributory sciences of biology, psychology, sociology, and anthropology to pedagogy. The purpose of this paper is to examine anthropological facts and conditions which are vital in the development of the American system of public education.

The aim of all education should be at once individual, social, and ethnic; for individualization and socialization proceed simultaneously by like processes, and both are conditioned by the type of ethnic experience which forms, as it were, the pedagogical background. It is a trite saying that "the teacher must understand human nature," but we do not always consider the vast significance of that requirement. It presupposes a knowledge not only of man as an individual, but of the effect of meteorologic and dietic, of social and physiographic influences which have dominated human life. In primitive society the individual was a cipher; he lived, worked, thought, prayed, as did his tribe. Nature's chief product was an ethnic mind, an ethnic character, a race of men.

The American teacher whose pupils represent half a score of different sets of ethno-psychic characteristics, is confronted by no simple task in the effort to inculcate our best ideals of personal and civic righteousness, and to eradicate as far as possible ideals which are adverse to our own. What seems to us criminal tendency may be but a survival of a custom which, in the view of a more primitive race, was a strictly moral act. Thus countless perplexing problems of the teacher root in ethnic mind, and can be solved only when the ethnic factors in the equation are duly considered, and the inheritance from savagery or foreign national life is given its proper value.

The forces that have molded racial character are largely age-long, environmental influences. Dr. Edwin G. Dexter has shown, in his "Study of Tusayan Ritual," *Smithsonian Report*, 1905, the influence of definite meteorological conditions on mental states. Whenever, as in the case described, the very existence of a tribe is dependent upon slender natural resources and capricious conditions of rain and weather, there will grow up rituals to prevent their failure and insure a harvest. "The cults of a primitive people are products of their necessities."

The persistence of ingrained racial traits even under an artificial environment of civilization is a circumstance which must not be lost sight of. With a race a thousand years are as yesterday with an individual. Nature will not be hurried. Such facts are particularly applicable to our national task of educating alien races, such as the Indian, the negro, and the Filipino. In the case of the first of these races, I know of no persistent attempt on the part of the government or philanthropy to develop the inherent Indian character by stimulating him to the perfection of his own arts, his own social institutions, his own religion, his own literature.

A similar problem confronts us in the Philippines; here many ethnic groups, each with customs, morals, ideals, and modes of reasoning centuries old and almost unknown to us, are coming under our influence. We propose to prepare them for self-government, and to that end have placed over them, in slightly modified form, our highly specialized American public-school system, our only guide to the efficacy of this, when imposed upon other races, being the results of our experience with the American Indians. I do not wish to be understood as being opposed to an educational policy for the Philippine Islands, but I do regard it as premature and wasteful to establish there a public-school system in advance of any considerable scientific knowledge of the mind and character of the Malay race.

Among the conclusions to be drawn from this study are the following:

1. The development of a race must be from within; a civilization imposed from without is usually harmful, often destructive, and always undesirable.
2. Normal schools and other institutions for the training of teachers should give a prominent place to anthropological sciences.
3. Our national educational interests so greatly increased by our endeavors to develop alien races, call for the organization of an executive Department of Education, in place of our present wasteful and inefficient distribution of educational functions among unrelated departments.—EDGAR L. HEWITT, in *American Anthropologist*, January-March, 1905.

E. B. W.



**City and Country in the Life-Process of the Race.**—To gain an insight into the measure and degree of the conditions and dependencies of the dying off, propagation, displacement, and changes in quality of peoples, it is necessary to study a network of factors. In separating the environmental factor, city, the investigation of different countries and regions has made an inevitable coefficient of mistakes. Yet there remains a final impression as the result of this sketch. It is the fact that only few persons get the full benefit of the culture of which the upper urban strata must be considered as the bearers.

As intellectual activity diminishes the assimilation of food with the upper strata of the city population, which are especially active intellectually, the rhythm of life is retarded. And while in these upper classes culture renders the life of the individual more splendid, yet the blossoms of culture, being poor in seed, seem to devour themselves. The lower strata, growing up neglected, spread out more and more, and with them physical and psychological evils. Although the economic importance of a city population in the intensive life for gain shows itself with all its power in comparison with that of the country life, one sees that with gradually growing prosperity the number of children diminishes. At the same time, a general qualitative improvement is by no means to be expected, both on account of the change of strata and the elimination, as they take place in the city in contrast with the country. But cities procure the sifting of those who attain to the leading positions in all branches of cultural activity. The faster the process of citification drags population with itself, the more quickly the alleged changes must appear. There is no backward course in the current of this development. If with us the signs of a moving downward from the culmination point of the curve appear only in embryo, yet the thousandfold experiences from history teach that the most splendid culture perishes when the men who created it, or were able to propagate it, lose their energy. A fatal rôle seems to have been given to the life of cities from olden times.

However, one will have to ask how far the consequences of city life are infallibly connected with cultural development, and how far our time succeeds in making advantageous use of the knowledge of holding together by virtue of our superior domination over nature. The measure for the full flower of a community is in the coincidence of the maxima of its (1) economic-political, (2) cultural, and (3) highest race (i. e., long life, favorable percentage of propagation, and quality) developments. Usually, with the curves showing race-history, the first line to incline downward is that for race-development; later the economic-political line falls, and last also the cultural line runs down. The longer a family, clan, tribe, or nation with a common culture (that is, a psycho-physical group) is able to preserve in a harmonious manner, on the best possible level, the three mentioned maxima, the higher will be the cultural, vital power, and the more excellent the human type that its members represent. Every time and every nation, when it has arrived at its apex, must ask anew how far it is able to do something with its means of power against this race-destroying factor of cultural development which becomes most evident in the contrast between city and country; to what extent, by virtue of its social organization and by virtue of its recognition of the connection between the factors, it can influence that process of sifting on which the cultural future depends.—DR. RICHARD THURNWALD, in *Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschafts-Biologie*, November-December, 1904. H. E. F.

**Documents on Charity and Conditions.**—Especially worthy of notice are certain public documents which have come to hand. The *Report of the Reformatory Commission of Connecticut*—A. Garvin, president—January, 1905, is valuable as an argument for a reformatory for young men. A *Prison Commission Report* (Indiana) is an able and convincing plea for the abolition of the county jail as a place of punishment, for a system of state district workhouses, and for rational employment of youth in the reformatory. *Criminal Statistics*, appendix to the report of the minister of agriculture for the year 1903, shows the recent facts of crime in Canada.

**“Report on the Growth of Industry in New York”**—(Albany: The Argus Co., 1904; State Department of Labor).—This is another valuable presentation of the present condition of industry of a great state with its historical background. The various industries are analyzed and their development traced during the nineteenth century.



**Ex-Prisoners' Rescue Home.**—We have received from Mr. Taneaki Hara the Eighth Annual Report of his work done in the way of protecting and assisting criminals who have completed their terms of service in prison. He began his labors in this line of work in 1897, when so many prisoners, released on account of the death of the empress dowager, were wandering about Tokyo without work or friends. Something of what has been accomplished may be seen from the following statistics taken out of his report:

Total number of prisoners taken in: 653 (613 men and 40 women).

Crimes committed:

Burglary .....	528
Killing or wounding .....	44
Incendiarism .....	34
Counterfeiting .....	4
Gambling .....	8
Prostitution .....	35

Degree of offense:

First offense .....	203
Second offense .....	163
Third to fifth offense .....	160
Fifth to tenth offense .....	50
Tenth to twentieth offense .....	64
Scores of offenses (women) .....	12
More than hundredth offense (women) .....	1

Results of protection:

	Men	Women	Total
1. Under watch-care .....	38	9	47
2. Living in Tokyo .....	153	7	160
3. Living in the country .....	177	6	183
4. Dead .....	55	...	55
5. Whereabouts unknown .....	103	5	108
6. Ran away .....	34	7	41
7. Committed crimes after leaving the home ....	53	6	59
Total .....	613	40	653

If Nos. 5, 6, 7 be considered failures, they amount to only 30 per cent., so that 70 per cent. are saved. Among those who are living either in Tokyo or in country districts, 235 are married and have 121 children.

The main office of Mr. Hara's establishment has been removed to government land in Moto Yanagiwara Machi, Kanda District, Tokyo, and here the women are kept. The men have been put into temporary quarters in Izumi Cho, Kanda District, though some of them are boarding with their employers. The main building was erected by men who had been protected in the establishment and are now engaged in lawful employments in Tokyo. They included carpenters, bricklayers and many other kinds of workmen, who contributed gratuitously either materials or labor. In this way they showed, with great pleasure, their appreciation of what had been done for them in their great need.—E. W. CLEMENT, in the *Japan Evangelist*, January, 1905.

**The Heart of Mr. Spencer's Ethics.**—Many readers of his *Autobiography* must have asked: Was Spencer's mind supremely interested in evolution, in the mystery of creative power, or in the problem of human conduct conceived as man's conscious adaptation to the conditions of his existence? The answer here offered is that he regarded the formulation of a system of scientific ethics as the crowning achievement of intellectual effort. His *Autobiography* shows he was ready to make any sacrifice to square his acts with his system.

In a conversation I had with him in the summer of 1896, he expressed keen regret that he had misled readers with his term "the Unknowable." But he expressed a keener regret over the revival of militarism throughout the civilized world.

I am now satisfied that there was a conflict between his philosophy and his

feeling about the modern situation. The postulate of evolution, according to Mr. Spencer, is the *equilibration* of energy. He must have seen that the extension of communication from the nations having a balance of power to the weak races would precipitate transformations unprecedented; that science and invention used in exploitation of natural resources must revive struggles between economic classes; and finally, that only when these gigantic *equilibrations* shall be completed can there be peace, a final disappearance of militarism with its correlated type of character. Seeing this, Mr. Spencer's inability to look upon the process without bitterness is a crowning proof of the intensity of his abhorrence of all aggression.—FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS, in *International Journal of Ethics*, July, 1904.  
H. E. F.

**The Government Prison Settlement at Waiotapu, New Zealand — an Experiment in the Utilization of Prison Labor.**—Off the main coach-road through the North Island of New Zealand, in a trackless volcanic plain covered with manuka scrub and steaming hot springs, stands a cluster of white huts. These buildings are the scene of an experiment, philanthropic or social, which from its novelty alone is of unique interest. The writer visited the prison camp on January 31, 1903. That was just two years after its opening.

The real work of the prisoners is tree-planting. The settlement area is 1,280 acres. The government owns this. The soil is made of volcanic ash, from four inches to two feet deep. The government forester had found that pines suitable for timber would grow there. More than 200 acres are already under cultivation. Everything is done by prison labor. The men work in parties of twelve, under an unarmed warder.

The prisoners are almost all men convicted of felonies, on charges such as forgery and embezzlement. Many are gentlemen by birth and education. No attempts to escape have been made. Only prisoners of the class working for good marks are sent there. Four live together in each of the fifteen box-like houses. The men's health is excellent, high level, climate, natural hot baths, and outdoor work being the causes. The experiment has not been expensive, comparing per capita cost for that at ordinary prisons. Two similar settlements are now proposed.

In forming prison settlements, the government in no way intends to supersede the convict labor used in road-making. It intends: (1) to discriminate between classes of prisoners, to humanize the conditions of life for those not criminals by disposition, and to prevent the herding of hardened criminals and first offenders; (2) not to interfere with free labor, as no government could afford to carry out such a scheme of tree-planting on waste land except by prison labor.  
— CONSTANCE A. BARNICOAT, in *International Journal of Ethics*, July, 1904.

H. E. F.

**Crime in England.**—For some years prison reformers have referred to England as the one country where crime was decreasing; but the tide of statistics has at last turned, and has risen so high as to awaken some concern. The increase in the number of commitments to 100,000 of the population has been most conspicuous within the last three or four years, rising from 460 in 1901 to 535 per 100,000 in 1903.

Inquiry reveals four probable causes for the increase: (1) Greater activity on the part of the police has resulted, in some districts, in the more rigid enforcement of law with regard to drunkenness, immorality, and vagrancy. Thus progress toward a better enforcement of the law in a community makes it compare unfavorably as to prison population with less well-regulated districts. (2) Growth of vagrancy and of offenses against workhouse regulations by men who prefer prison to workhouse life has helped to swell the number of commitments. This condition raises the question whether labor colonies on the Belgian model might not be established to advantage, where the professional tramp, who now goes from prison to prison, may be detained for a long period of time. (3) The return of soldiers from South Africa seems to have added slightly to the number of commitments for assault and drunkenness. (4) A considerable rise in the number of prisoners committed for debt is evident in all parts of the country.

It was anticipated that the more rigorous treatment of debtors in prison, which was one of the results of the Prison Act of 1898, would lead to a smaller number of debtors coming to prison. This expectation, however, has not been fulfilled; the number of debtors has increased.

In two directions English prison authorities are proceeding on rational lines. They are devoting their attention to the professional or habitual criminal, on the one side, and to the juvenile offender, on the other. The detention of habitual offenders for long periods on the basis of their known character, rather than of their last illegal act, is the only rational way of dealing with them. In spite of the many industrial schools in England, it is still a matter of surprise to note the large number of boys who are committed to prison for trivial offenses; during the last ten years 192,279 juvenile offenders under twenty-one years of age have been committed to prisons where mature criminals are confined. The gratifying fact of the increasing number of offenders upon whom sentence is suspended under the First Offender's Act and under the Summary Jurisdiction Act could be made still more encouraging by the introduction of a system of probation officers, and of juvenile courts.—SAMUEL L. BARROWS, in *International Journal of Ethics*, January, 1904.  
E. B. W.



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## SCIENCE AND CITIZENSHIP<sup>1</sup>

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I. An eminent sociologist has recently spoken of the "bankruptcy of science as to any choice of ideals of life," and we are told that "sociology, no more than mechanics or chemistry, has any policy." That doubtless is the prevalent view in these reactionary time when apostasis from science is almost a fashion. The object of this paper is to maintain the contrary view. The logic of its argument may be open to revision; but the normal principle from which it starts will not be gainsaid. It is embodied in the well-established maxim: "If a lion gets in your path, kick it." There are those who believe that the way out of the present tangle of sectionalisms is to be found, not by turning back, but by pressing on. If science cannot direct us, we must direct science. All life is growth, and science understood as a spiritual phase of racial life, a mood of humanity, may, like other spiritual growths, be trained and guided, within limits. Here as elsewhere the essential condition of guidance is the presence of an ideal and moral impulse toward it. It is the contention of this paper that the ideals of science, always implicit, are now actually in process of being explicitly formulated, and that these ideals give promise of a policy of civic development. And once to see and feel this movement of science is to participate in it, to forward and to direct it.

<sup>1</sup>A popular lecture given to the Manchester Sociological Society, Nov. 13, 1905.

II. In a first and rough approximation, it may be taken that the middle term between science and policy is potency. The conception of potency presents itself to us with a reality and force proportional to the frequency and intensity of our first-hand, immediate, and direct contact with nature. The conception doubtless reaches a vanishing-point in the mind of that urban breed of domesticated animals which is cut off from nature by the continuous confinement in the cages called town houses. This variety of animal degenerates into a sort of city subnatural species, with supernatural cravings. The city in its evolution is, of course, a natural phenomenon. But within the city the barriers between man and nature are numerous and formidable. Among the dwellers in the cities it is probable that the only persons who are in habitual contact with nature are mothers and poets. To the mother the infant is an embodiment and epitome of all the potencies of nature. The baby, as has been well said, is a bundle of potencies. Its development through adolescence to maturity is the realization of its potency for evolution or for degeneration. The process of growth is, in the proper sense of the word, the education of the child; that is to say, the drawing-out of its potencies. In its training and education the primary factors are three. These are the hereditary predispositions of the child, the resources available for its education, and finally the ideals of the mother. It is the last which is perhaps the most important for the progress of culture; for, of the three factors, the ideal of the mother is the most variable, the most modifiable, and therefore the most subject to control and guidance. The mother's ideal is a compound of types of humanity that have most appealed to her in actual life, in romance, and in history. In other words, it is, whether she knows it or not, the historic or racial imagination of the mother that determines her ideals. She directs the education of her child toward her personal ideals of strength, of health, and wealth; toward her personal ideals of beauty in person, of wisdom in thought, of goodness in deed. And in proportion as these different aspects of the mother's ideal of manhood and womanhood harmonize into an imaginative unity, a synthetic reality, in that

proportion she has an educational policy for her child. Policy is but a name for a system of dealing with one's resources for a definite purpose. In short, a policy is a scheme for the development of potencies in the direction of an ideal realization.

III. What is the relevance of all this for science? There are two dominant moods or manifestations of science: the cosmic, naturalistic, or geographical mood, on the one hand, and, on the other, the humanist, the historical, the idealist mood. In the former, the cosmic mood, the scientist feels a relatively slight interest in the human race and its doings. There are so many more impressive phenomena in the field of observation. Are there not one hundred thousand species of beetles, compared with a single species of man? The entomologist bulks larger in science than the sociologist, simply because the boy is father to the man. The scientist in his cosmic mood is a stereotyped, a perpetual boy. The curiosity of the boy about the wonders of nature ceases for the moment, when his collection of curiosities fills the last of his pockets. But the pockets of the scientist take the form of extensible museums; and hence the temptation to go on collecting, until the habit determines his life, and in course of time he finds himself unable to feel either the cosmic or the human emotion.

As the boy sometimes grows into the man, the cosmic scientist may grow into the humanist one. He no longer observes the phenomena of nature as a mere series of sequences and coexistences following each other in endless succession. He looks upon nature as a reservoir of resources for the use of man. He seeks out the potencies of nature, foresees their possible developments and conceives his ideals of human life in terms of the optimum expression of known potencies. In Bacon's phrase, man controls nature by obeying her. In this respect science is just the ordered and growing knowledge of the ways of nature leading to human evolution. Science, in its pure and applied forms, here stands for the collective resources of the race available for the maintenance and advancement of human life. Science is thus—in terms of the illustration used above—a sort of generalized mother of men, as it were a race-mother. And if the policy and ideals of



science for her children are slow of formulation, that is because of the slow evolution of science itself. Arrested at the cosmic stage of thought, the majority of scientists do not recapitulate, with sufficient completeness, the racial evolution of the group to which they belong. Such racial recapitulation is, as has been well said, nature's way of preparing for a fresh start. And unless, therefore, the individual scientist, in his own personal development, passes on from the cosmic, physical, or naturalist phase, to the humanist and idealist phase, he does not undergo the preparation necessary to enable him to contribute to the advancement of science in its proper historical evolution. In this arrestment of the development of most individual scientists is doubtless to be found an explanation of the slow evolution of the humanist or sociologist sciences.

If we understand by spiritual power a set of established beliefs—like Mohammedanism, Romanism, journalism—influencing conduct and determining the mode of life, then we must say of science that it is an incipient rather than an actual spiritual power. In this sense there are sciences, but no science. If we look around us among our contemporaries, we should, most of us, have to search far before finding an individual whose life and conduct are unified by science. Notable examples are, to be sure, numerous in history—such as Lavoisier and Condorcet, Helmholtz and Pasteur, Darwin and Clifford; and, if it is permissible to cite living scientists, Berthelot and Haeckel, Francis Galton and Karl Pearson. Similar, though less notable, contemporary instances are not common; though in all probability they are more numerous in the obscure annals of university and academy, museum and library, than most of us imagine. There are many whose lives are unified by religion, still more by marriage, and not a few by Monte Carlo. But the truth is that as yet science has afforded no rounded doctrine of humanity sufficiently simple and facile for the comprehension of the artisan, the rustic, and the cabinet minister. The difficulty of that achievement lies mainly in the natural-history fact that the scientific habit of mind in the observation of social phenomena, though

it is universal in children, yet persists in few adults. It survives adolescence in a certain number of social investigators—like anthropologists, folklorists, economists, historians, psychologists, etc.—most of whom are so highly specialized as to have lost the instinct we desire for a general doctrine of social evolution. It survives also in a limited number of sociologists, many of whom are reluctant to be labeled with that title. Thus the dispersion and isolation of the sociologists, and the ignorance and unpopularity of the name, are due not so much to the hardness of the word, or the difficulty of the doctrine, as to the prevailing inability of the folk-mind to distinguish between science and socialism, between science and skepticism.

IV. Thus, owing mainly to the incompleteness and sterility of the social sciences, the unification of science is very far from being a visible reality, and consequently the influence of the scientific party is relatively slight in every country of the occidental world and least of all, perhaps, in Great Britain, with the possible exception of Spain and Venezuela. It was but the other day that the only high-level meteorological observatory of Great Britain was closed and the staff dispersed, the records ignored—even unexamined—and the apparatus offered for public sale—all because the influence of the scientific party was not equal to securing for its support about £500 out of the 140 odd million pounds which constitute the annual national budget. In laudable over-estimate of the desire of other European governments to possess meteorologists, the government of the Argentine Republic cabled to secure the staff of the Ben Nevis Observatory; and, as they were in this partly successful, it may be that what has been lost to the British Empire by this calamitous misadventure is to be preserved for science. A measure of the relative weight exercised in the councils of the nation by the scientific and militarist parties is seen in the annual grant made by the central government to the collective university chests of Great Britain and Ireland. This grant is about £100,000 per annum. That is about the sum expended in keeping in commission, for a year, a single first-class battleship. And if we add to this an allowance for de-

preciation and certain necessary incidental expenses, the annual cost of a first-class battleship would probably reach to three times the university grant; for a first-class battleship costs about a million sterling to build, and is not effective for much more than a decade; and the addition of each one to the fleet necessitates for its full efficiency an increase of dockyard and harbor accommodation, the cost of which, if it were known, would probably be found to run into hundreds of thousands of pounds. A final illustration: An eminent astronomer, who had spent a long life alternately in the observatory and as professor in university classrooms, recently retired. That his salary had been little more than the earnings of a successful artisan need be no ground of reproach to the good scientist; but the rigid application of official regulation, framed for a somewhat dissimilar purpose, resulted in the allocation of a pension which was entirely insufficient to provide for the few and simple wants of the aged astronomer in his retirement. Representations were made to the central government and a complacent officialdom awarded an increase of the pension at the amount and rate of two shillings and sixpence per week!

If we assume that at present there is no science, but sciences—unclassified, and therefore ungeneralized—it would seem to follow that there is no scientific ideal, but only scientific ideals—unharmonized; and no scientific policy, but only scientific policies—uncoordinated. The scientific party—or what would be the scientific party if there was a common doctrine to give it cohesion—is broken up into disparate groups, most of which do not speak each other's language. For instance, the mathematician and the physiologist are separated from each other by a wide arc in the circle of the sciences; but they have this in common that each holds it an article of faith that he would fall short of his scientific duty if he did not acquire the language of France, Germany, and Italy, as well as of England. But if it should happen that here and there a mathematician or physiologist takes the pains of learning the language of comparative ethics, folklore, economics, or any other sociological field, he will be held by his brother-mathemati-



cians and physiologists to be doing what is at best a work of super-erogation, at worst an act of reprehensible wastefulness. The scientist of the physical or biological group regards it as much and as little a matter of scientific obligation to acquire the language of the sociological group as that of the Hottentots. What, then, amid this apparent confusion and disruptiveness of science, is the inquiring citizen to do, if he wishes to know the bearing of science on citizenship? The answer of science, as of every other spiritual power, is that there is only one way to know the doctrine, and that is to lead the life.

V. The scientific quality of citizenship can be apprehended only through the scientific conception of the city. And the first question which science asks about the city is: What is it?

What is a city? Legal and political definitions we have, but seemingly no scientific ones as yet. Now, legal and political definitions, whether of cities or of other social phenomena, are, as it were, ready-made articles of common usage, alike popular and recondite. To the majority of scientists—that is to say, those arrested at the mechanical stage of scientific thought—such definitions are alternately meaningless mysteries to be scoffed at, or shibboleths naïvely adopted by these scientists themselves, whenever social action is unavoidable or social thought demanded. On the other hand, there is a small, but ever-increasing number of scientists who push on through the world of form with which the mathematical sciences deal, onward through the world of matter with which the physical sciences deal, and thence through the world of organic life with which the biological sciences deal; and finally attempt to explore, in a scientific spirit and with scientific methods, the world of mind and society with which the psychological and social sciences deal. And this, as already stated, is the normal progress of the mind. We see it exemplified by most of the great leaders. We see it, for instance, in Helmholtz, who began his career as a mathematician, passed through that to physiology whence it was but a single step into psychology: and in the later period of his life he interested himself most in education and social questions. The same tendency

is seen in Darwin's transition from the *Origin of Species* to the *Descent of Man*. We have been told that the sociologist is an individual who has failed to make a career in one of the preliminary sciences, just as, according to Disraeli, the critic is a person who has failed in literature. In point of fact, this doubtless is often true; but the contrary proposition still more widely holds, that the successful mathematician, physicist, or naturalist is just an arrested sociologist.

Returning to the question of legal and political definitions, we have to note that these are to the psychologist and sociologist an essential part of the raw material upon which he has to work. They are points of departure in his observations, and often supply valuable clues in his researches. What definitions of the "city" are available for the purpose? They differ, of course, from country to country; but whether propounded by a lawyer, by a politician, or by the man in the street, they belong, in the eyes of the comparative psychologist, to the folklore of their country. In short, they are pre-scientific. In England, the legal definition of a "city" is, as everyone knows, a place which is or has been the seat of a bishopric. In other words, a city is essentially a cathedral city. To this we must return later, merely noting it now as for the sociologist a great "pointer fact" (in the phrase of Tylor). In the United States of America the conception of a city is, in appearance at least, of a more material kind. In that country there is no lack of resources of observation, for it is a place where a crop of new cities is grown annually. The progress of city-making may be seen as a matter of almost daily observation in new and rapidly developing states of the Union, like Oklahoma and Alaska.

VI. There is perhaps no more representative type of American civilization, and also therefore of the dominant phase of the contemporary western world, than the American railway engineer. He is the true Viking of the times, and is already on the way to plant his forges, and open his lines of communication, all around the margin of the Pacific Ocean. What is the conception of a city in the mind of the American engineer? Direct items of evi-

dence may be gathered from almost any of the innumerable reports on new railway enterprises which are common documents, not only in the great cities of America, but also in the capitals of western Europe. The following extract is taken from a typical document of this sort. An eminent engineer is reporting on a proposed railway from Oklahoma into Indian Territory. He records and surveys centers of population, actual, incipient, or prospective, along the route of the projected line, taking one center after another in the following fashion :

*Chickasaw* is the recording town of the Nineteenth District. Population claimed, 8,000. The town site has an area of 1,246.19 acres, and is located in the valley of the Washita River, surrounded by rich farming lands, where corn, wheat, oats, rye, potatoes, and all kinds of vegetables, fruit, and berries grow in abundance. Horses, mules, and cattle are raised.

It is an incorporated city with a city government, and is the recognized jobbing center of the southwestern section. Contains, among others, the following industries :

Chickasha Cotton Oil Co.; capacity, 120 tons per day.

Chickasha Milling Co.; capacity, 800 barrels of flour per day.

Two elevators; capacity, 100,000 bushels.

Chickasha Iron works.

Choctaw Mill and Elevator Co.

Traders' Compress Co.; about 30,000 bales.

Electric planing mill.

Steam brick plant.

Wholesale grocery, hardware, furniture, saddlery, and harness stores, and general merchandising.

The city is provided with electric-light plant, ice plant, two telephone exchanges, water-works and sewerage, gas plant (under construction).

It will be noticed that this engineering conception of the city does not envisage a single culture institute—not even a church or public house. This, however, is an omission rectified in a document issued by the Seward Chamber of Commerce in August, 1905, descriptive of the growing towns and cities of Alaska. Of Seward itself the document says :

Although but one year old, it contains general stores of every kind, hotels, ten saloons, a bank capitalized at \$50,000, a daily newspaper, four churches, a flourishing public school, an electric-light plant, and a telephone exchange.

Of a place called Fairbanks we are told :

The city had a population of 7,500 on July 1, 1905, and was equipped with every modern convenience, such as telephone, electric light, water-works,



churches, public schools, and a daily paper receiving a full telegraphic report of the world's news.

It is clear that what the American railway reformer understands by a city is not a city at all, but a town; i.e., in the admirably direct and concrete phraseology cited, it is a "jobbing center." To the list of the urban "conveniences" the chamber of commerce standard adds churches, schools, newspapers, and saloons. And the progress in civic ideals is signal; for churches, schools, newspapers, and saloons are institutes of culture, which are seen to be the lower institutes of culture only when contrasted with cathedral, university, scientific society, and art museum as the higher ones.

VII. A visitor to any of the goods stations of the railways running into London from the North will see any day of the year, but more particularly in the autumn, vast numbers of coal-laden trucks awaiting delivery. It may be said of at least two of the northern railway systems that they exist for the purpose of carrying coal to London. The traveler who is carried, in about two hours, from St. Pancras to Nottingham in a luxurious restaurant car may imagine that the Midland Railway is designed and administered for his benefit and comfort. But that is an illusion of the unreflecting citizen. The truth is that the luxurious restaurant car is itself a by-product of the coal traffic. In the eyes of the representative railway engineer the cities of England are primarily just the terminal yards of the collieries, and the citizens themselves, according to his ethical scheme, rank in status and civic worth in proportion to the capacity of their respective factory furnaces. With literal and historical accuracy, the typical railway engineer sees the modern locomotive as just an elaborated pit-pump engine placed on wheels, and engaged all day in hauling coal-laden trollies from the pit mouth to the cities, and all night in hauling them back empty. To the railway engineer science is a means of transmuting the energy of coal into cities and citizens. It follows that his policy of city development—or, as one should rather say, urban expansion—leans to the erection and multiplication of lofty chimney stacks. The ideal citizens, pictured in

the carbonaceous logic of his occupation, are stokers and chimney-sweeps. It requires little observation and less historic insight to verify the affirmation that urban expansion in the nineteenth century was largely determined by the unavowed but real ideals of a coal civilization.

The archæologists who are so industriously deciphering the buried histories of cities have found the accumulated survivals of seventeen different cities in Rome. And so for other historic cities, the successive phases of city formations are marked by layers of superimposed debris, like geological strata, with which indeed they are in direct continuity. Each successive civic formation is characterized by the impressions and the marks of its contemporary inhabitants, which survive in respective material structures like so many sociological fossils. Looked at from this point of view, the coal-laden trucks and the factory chimney stack with all their associated structures, economic and æsthetic, are actual or incipient sociological fossils of the coal cities of the nineteenth century.

To the dwellers in these coal towns—for cities in the proper sense they, most of them, were not—science presents itself as a kind of inverted philosopher's stone. The accumulated applications of science in the coal civilizations did not end with the production of gold, but rather began with it, more particularly that which came from Australia and California about mid-century. Given a possession or control of sufficient quantity of the precious metal, the citizen finds himself able to initiate a cycle of transmutations and to carry it on up to a certain point, after which it appears that the cycle completes itself automatically. This sort of scientific magic transformed coal into power to make cheap goods for the consumption of cheap laborers, and the cheap labor thus applied itself to produce more power to make more cheap goods for the consumption of still cheaper laborers; and so on indefinitely. This ever-extending series of transformations evidently reaches its culmination in the growth of an ideal city like East London which so magnificently surpasses all other cities in its accumulated reservoir of cheap labor. Such are the ideals of

civic policy which tend to work themselves out in fact and history, if not in word and theory, when city development gets arrested at the town stage.

VIII. Unfair as it would be to English, not less would it be to American civilization, as a whole, to impute to it the conception of civic status restricted to the limitations of the railway engineer, or even of the chamber of commerce. The United States is not only the country of railway cities and railway kings; it is also the country, *par excellence*, of schools, universities, and educationists. The American "schoolmarm" balances the American Viking, and the world trembles in the hope and expectation that some day she may succeed in taming and domesticating him. In no other way, probably, can his disforestings and devastations be effectually stopped, and his destructive energies converted to more constructive ideals.

If we define a "university" as a degree-granting institution, then there are over seven hundred universities in America. It is the aspiration of every American city to possess its own university. The university is, in a sense, the cathedral—a somewhat truncated one, doubtless—of the American city, and every citizen is unhappy until his city gets what he conceives to be its full complement of culture, in the possession of a university. Here as elsewhere the principle holds, *Cujus regio, ejus religio*; and we may agree with Herder's saying that "the school is the workshop of the spirit of God," provided we are allowed the proviso of defining the divine artificer as the God of that region. Minerva is building again her temples over the land, and nowhere more assiduously than in the United States.

These 700 to 800 American universities are, it is true, reduced to more modest dimensions in the impartial list of the *Minerva Jahrbuch*. The German Compilers of this annual census of the academic world admit only 70 universities in the United States. This number compares with a list of 21 universities in Germany, 16 in France, 18 in Great Britain, 78 in the rest of Europe, and for the whole world 236.

How far may we accept a certain vague popular sentiment



which attributes city rank to a town that possesses a university? That, to be sure, would be a criterion of civic status unrecognized by, and unknown to, the lawyer and the politician. But universities are not institutions that appeal to juristic and political minds. In Russia the state corrects academic exuberance by occasional application of the military musket and the police baton; in India, by proscribing progressive literature; in England, by the more subtle processes of financial starvation. There is in the normal undergraduate mind a youthful ardor which is highly resistant to the juristic ideals which lawyers and politicians call stability, and physiologists call ossification. Is, then, this popular conception of the civic importance of the university a useful starting-point for the sociological investigator? In any case, it is a well-recognized truth that popular conceptions are, for science, more convenient points of departure than culture ones, since they are nearer to that naked and unadorned order of nature to which the scientist must constantly return for the verification of his thought.

IX. Assuming, then, as a provisional criterion, the possession of a university as a determinant of civic status, we have in the university cities of the world 236 objects which actually exist in time and space. Here is an abundance of concrete objects for observation, without which the scientific investigator, whether of cities or of other phenomena, cannot get to work at all. His methods, as he is apt somewhat wearisomely to remind us, are those of observation and classification, by comparison, generalization, prediction, and verification by return to the concrete. To put it most briefly, the method of science differs from the method of other orders of thought in the necessity for arranging the various stages of investigation in such a way that two possibilities are always open. In the first place, it must be possible for every member of the scientific fraternity, present and future, to retrace and repeat every vital step in any and every investigation, from simple concrete observation right up to the largest generalization. In the second place, it must be possible to return from the largest generalization, the loftiest aspiration, back to the concrete facts

of nature, by a continuous series of steps, by an unbroken chain of evidence. This is the sacred way of science. In most, if not all, great religions of the East, a peculiar sanctity attaches to the conception of the "way." That a mystic flavor should cling to methodology will not therefore be surprising to those who hold that science is a culture form of natural religion.

X. Having provisionally agreed upon our scientific criterions, we have 236 definitive objects that exist in space and time under the designation of "city." From this proposition, it follows that, by taking adequate precautions, cities can be seen. It is true that to see even a single city is a feat which few of us ever achieve. Few of us ever succeed in seeing even our own city, let alone others. Hence the widespread illusion that cities consist of shops, factories, and dwellings, with public houses at the corners—these being the objects presented to the eye as one passes along the open tunnels called streets. But there are certain animals, like birds, butterflies, and some human beings, that have the habit of viewing terrestrial objects from a height. And it is obvious that it is in vertical perspective only that a city can be visualized. The habit of viewing objects both terrestrial and celestial from a height was apparently much commoner among the human species in former than in the present times. Otherwise how explain the wide occurrence of special facilities for the purpose? The mounds, the pyramids, the towers of many kinds which past civilizations have erected in such abundance have doubtless various origins. But when facilities occur, as they generally do, for reaching the summits and thence making observations, we are bound to infer that we are dealing with real observatories, and deliberately planned for that purpose; whatever other purposes, religious, ceremonial, commemorative, æsthetic, these constructions may also have served. Our recent and contemporary civilizations continue to adorn or supplement our buildings with towers as inevitably, and one is inclined to say as automatically, as the beavers build their dams and the bees their hives. But more often than not we do not provide a stairway to the summit; or, if we add that, how seldom are facilities provided for observation from the summits! Even

to the old church and castle towers that survive, with their stairway and their observing platform, access is generally made difficult or impossible to obtain. We lock them up, and if that does not guard them against the curiosity of the citizen and tourist alike, there are other well-known modes of generating indifference. There is the custom of charging an entrance fee, which represents a considerable slice out of the worker's day. And if all these precautions shall fail, there is the final and frequent recourse of losing the key. Assuredly the gods first blind those whom they wish to destroy.

The Imperial Institute in London, which commemorates the jubilee of Queen Victoria, is adorned with a handsome and commodious tower of many stories. In each story there is a large chamber. A visitor in the early days of the institute asked permission to enter and ascend the tower. The officer in charge was complaisant and offered to conduct the visitor over the tower. The key could not be found, and the visitor said he would return another day. On his next visit he was told that the key had been found, but it was not considered advisable to use it, for the structure of the tower was defective! Is any further explanation needed of the admitted failure of the institute in the first decade of its existence? Happily it has now been reorganized and has entered on a more useful phase.

XI. In order to see our cities as they really are, we must first of all see them in geographical perspective; and in order to do this, we must recover the use of existing towers. We must also begin building new ones designed and equipped to aid us in seeing with the eye of the geographer. In the scientific vision, the first element is the vision of the geographer. Or, putting it in another way, in the complex chord which we call science, the first note is a geographical one. This vision of the geographer, what is it? Whence comes it? How may we ordinary citizens acquire it? What use would it be to us if we did acquire it?

Our school initiation into geography acquaints us with a certain scheme of form and color symbolism which we call a map. The impression which intimate familiarity with the maps of our child-



hood leaves on the mind is apt to be a picture of the country called France, which is little more than an octagonal red patch; of Spain, a square brown patch; of Scandinavia, an oblong green patch; of the Rhine, a blue line running from a dark patch called Switzerland, to a blue patch called the German Ocean. The experience of reading, observation, and travel doubtless supplements and corrects these crude pictorial impressions. And in proportion to the fulness of such later experience, we approximate more nearly to the vision of the geographer, who sees our globe as it really is, has been, and is becoming, in space and time. The geographer sees the land in its varying relief from seashore, over plain and plateau, valley and height, up to mountain summit. He sees below the surface of the waters, noting the space and level of river-bed, of lake and sea bottom. He sees the crust of the earth everywhere in section, from the lowest and oldest rocks up through the superimposed geological strata, to the superficial deposits which wind and rain, storm and sunshine, snow and frost disintegrate for the making of soil, on which the flora of the world fixes itself and feeds, region by region, and across which the fauna of the world moves and makes its tiny marks and scratches. He sees the surface of the globe, changing from day to day, season to season, age to age, epoch to epoch. And these changes he sees to be brought about in part by the place of the globe in space, and its relation to other celestial bodies, and in part by the very shape, form, and character of the surface and configurations themselves. Thus to the geographer the phantasmagoria of visible things presents itself as a drama—a great cosmic drama in which the part allotted to the human species is both insignificant and predetermined in all essential respects. The operations of man on the planets are, from this point of view, limited and conditioned by inexorable cosmic forces. The roads and railways, by which man connects his cities, are seen to be the merest scratches on the surface of the globe, wholly comparable in their significance to the tracks which the elephants make through the forest or the buffalo across the prairie. The cities themselves are but temporary encampments of herding groups of animals, determined or condi-

tioned by such natural features as a river or a plain, an estuary or a mountain, a coal bed or a forest. How relatively slight a geographical disturbance is made by the building of a city—even a modern capital city—may be realized by recalling that practically the whole of the new town of Edinburgh is built out of a local sandstone quarry, so small that its floor would not afford camping space to a traveling circus.

XII. The foregoing account is intended to suggest the geographer's vision such as he sees it in his naturalist or cosmic mood. But the geographer is himself a man and a citizen, and as geographer he still has his humanist or idealist mood. Viewed in his humanist or idealist mood, the world-drama undergoes for the geographer a profound change. The perspective changes from the cosmic to the human focus. The typical river valley, which is the essential regional unit of the geographer, is no longer a mere fold of the earth's crust, in its endless and aimless cycle of changes, but is conceived as the realization of a great purpose. The long geological history of the river valley is seen as the preliminary preparation to fit it to be the scene of the exploits and aspirations of a god-like race of beings, such as has been suggested and foreshadowed by the noblest type of the human species. The designing and the making of a suitable theater on which the human play may develop, is a thought which gives a new orientation to the geographical conception of the river valley. Now the soil and the vegetation which cover its floor, the beds of coal, iron, sand, and limestone which underlie its surface, the forests which clothe its slopes and shelter its animal world, the metaliferous deposits of its mountain sides, the river which from source to sea invites to locomotion—all these are seen to be but energies and instruments, awaiting for their orchestration the tuning hand and the idealizing mind of man. And the city—the city which embanks and strides the river, which stretches across the plain and juts into the ocean, which ascends the hill-slopes or penetrates the mountains—what is the part and place of this city in the vision of the humanist geographer?

When we think of the river valley as the regional unit of geo-

graphical science, we have to remember that it is like the ovum of biology—a developing unit containing the potency of a great realization. What, to the geographer in his humanist mood, is the city, but the effort of this regional unit to realize its own potency for evolution? City development is thus, for the geographer, no isolated phenomenon, but a normal stage—the culminating one—in a long sequence of events and processes. It is the ceaselessly renewed attempt to make for each region here and now its own Eden—its own Utopia.

XIII. It may be taken as a postulate of social geography that every region contains the potency of a city or cities which shall be for that region, here and now, its heaven or its hell. And in the complexity of causes that lead to evolution toward the ideal city, or toward its negation, there is a geographical factor awaiting discernment, analysis, comparison with the other factors, and resynthesis into a synthetic conception. The traditional *civitas*, the *urbs solis*, and other similar utopist visions, have thus their necessary geographical aspect, unless they are to be completely divorced from reality. To the traveler (who is, of course, an incipient geographer) one aspect at least of the geographical factor is necessarily known. The hard experience of the desert is, to the traveler, a geographical prerequisite of the good time that awaits him in Damascus. And if, dispensing with the geographical prerequisite, he attempts to make his Damascus a perpetual Elysium, what happens? He is not long in discovering the reality of the phenomenon known in archaic phrase as the fall, and he quickly discovers a vital connection between geography and theology. Geography indeed, like every other science, has its element to contribute to the reinterpretation and revitalizing of religious phenomena. If it may be allowed to a modest geographer to revise the judgment of so great a theologian as St. Augustine, it would be to point out the tenuity of his geographical experience. Had St. Augustine been more of a traveler, he would doubtless have avoided the geographico-historical blunder of believing that it is predetermined once for all which are the cities of God and which are the cities of Satan. One of



the truths revealed to us by social geography is that every city is engaged from moment to moment, from day to day, in determining for itself how far and to what extent, here and now, it is, and will become the city of God, and how far it is, here and now, and will become, a city of Satan. In other words, predestination is a recurring, and not a stationary phenomenon.

XIV. It may be objected by some traitorous professors of the science that the humanist note has extremely little part and place in geography, and the idealist one none at all. But it is always open to us to choose our standards of geography from the great founders of the science, rather than from the bookworms parasitic on *Petermann's Mitteilungen*. And, in any case, to the determinist geographer, whose skepticism refuses to see the idealist side of the shield, we may reply in the words of Turner to the critic who protested that he could see nothing in nature like one of the artist's pictures: "Don't you wish you could?" The father of history, Herodotus himself, in passing to humanist studies by way of geography, made a step which, in the normal growth of the geographical mind, does not stop short of the loftiest social and civic idealism. This tendency is abundantly illustrated in the lives of the great founders of modern geography. It is seen in Alexander von Humboldt, who continued and completed his geographical career as counselor of state, and coadjutor, with his more humanist brother, Wilhelm, in the organization of educational institutions. It is seen in Karl Ritter, who, as he progressed in writing his great work, was driven more and more to an emphasis of the historical factor. But it is seen most of all in the life and work of Elisée Reclus, whose recent loss we deplore, and whose place in the history of the science it is too soon to estimate; but there are those who believe it will be a culminating one. The eighteen massive volumes of his *Géographie universelle* were but the preliminary training and preparation for his *magnum opus*, his *Social Geography*, happily completed before his death, though as yet unpublished. But the general character of the work may be foretold by those who were familiar with his riper thoughts. It is safe to assert that his

*Social Geography* will more fully than ever before demonstrate the continuity and correlation between, on the one hand, the destructive action of man on the surface of the planet, and, on the other, the historical and the contemporary facts of human degeneration and civic degradation. But it will also, unless the work belies the character of its author, demonstrate with unique experience and conviction a continuity of ascent from geographical science to the loftiest aspirations of social idealism.

XV. The geographer's vision of the city as the realization of regional potency is a faculty not of the professed scientists only. It is possessed also, in varying degrees of fulness and clearness, by every wise and active citizen, or at least by every citizen not altogether dehumanized by the machinery of education and affairs, or, as Mr. Wells says, "birched into scholarship and sterility." It was the geographer's vision that prompted the city fathers of Glasgow to transform the shallow estuary of the Clyde into one of the great highways of world-commerce. It was the absence of the geographer's vision that prompted Philip II of Spain to cut off the national capital from access to the sea, by removing it to the arid central plateau. It has been the geographer's vision which has inspired so many German municipalities to purchase and allocate to the commonweal large tracts of suburban territory; and, wanting the geographer's vision, our own municipalities have too often allowed the immediate environs of our cities to become the prey of the jerry-builder and the land speculator. These are obvious and conspicuous examples. But the influence of geographical foresight, or its absence, is to be traced into every ramification of civic policy, into every department of civic activity. To draw upon the resources of geographical science for the construction and criticism of civic policy is a manifest obligation, or, as it ought to be, privilege and pleasure of the city fathers, who are immediately responsible for civic policy, and for the body of citizens who are mediately responsible for the same. But are there not also whole bodies of the citizens, into whose occupation and livelihood the application of geographical knowledge so largely enters that they might almost be called applied geographers?

Is this not true of all those classes engaged in the organization of facilities for travel and communication, from the railway manager to the station porter, from the pilot to the bargeman, from the hotel-keeper to the cabman, from the road-surveyor to the crossing-sweeper? And, in less degree, is it not true likewise of the whole trading class, whose business consists in shifting goods from the place of growth and production to their destination in the hands of consumers? For all these, from the city fathers to the crossing-sweeper, the question is: Does each one utilize to the fullest such resources as contemporary geographical science can and should supply? The president of the Royal Geographical Society is the servant of the crossing-sweeper who has the knowledge and the imagination to use him.

XVI. What are the sources of geographical science? Where are they to be found? How may the inquiring citizen utilize them? How may the crossing-sweeper utilize the president of the Royal Geographical Society? If the inquiring citizen was fortunate enough in his youth to commence a career of travel and exploration, by frequent truancy from school, then doubtless he acquired habits of observation which later on became disciplined into a scientific temperament. Doubtless, in that happy case, he is thoroughly familiar with the resources of geography. But most of us grew up into respectable citizens uninspired by that fear of the schoolmaster which is the beginning of science. And if we have our scientific education still in front of us, we cannot do better than begin it by buying a copy of the admirable annual called the *Science Year Book*, issued by Messrs. King, Sell & Olden, of Chancery Lane.

Of the seven or eight sections into which the contents of this publication are divided, there is one called "Scientific and Technical Institutions." A first glance at the contents of this section might lead one to suppose that the book is of a humorous and satirical kind, for its list of scientific and technical institutions begins with an enumeration of "Government Offices." Saving this lapse, the book is to be taken as a serious manual. It enumerates, and briefly indicates the functions of, ninety-nine



organizations in Great Britain called "Scientific and Learned Societies." These include small new groups, such as the thirty oceanographers who constitute the Challenger Society, and who meet once a quarter in the rooms of the Royal Society in London, and periodically issue a series of oceanographic charts. But among the purely scientific societies, that which attains to the largest membership is the Royal Geographical, with its 4,180 members. The functional activities of the Geographical Society are described as follows in the *Science Year Book*:

1. *Meetings*.—Weekly, November to June, evening; anniversary, fourth Monday in May.
2. *Publications*.—The *Geographical Journal*, monthly; *Year-Book* and *Record*; and various special publications.
3. *Miscellaneous*.—Medals: Two royal gold medals, the Founder's and the Patron's, awarded annually; and the Victoria medal at intervals. Money grants are also made from trust funds. A fine library of upward of 37,000 books and pamphlets is maintained, and a map-room. The latter receives a government grant of £500 per annum, on condition that the public shall have access to the collection.

Now, the monthly *Geographical Journal*, the chief organ of the society, is an invaluable publication, but the only person who, in all probability, reads it through is its own editor; and that is as it should be. Life is too short to read the *Journal* of the Geographical or any other scientific society. But what everyone should do is to utilize the spiritual organization whose visible organs are the whole series of scientific periodicals. To do this we must know how to consult the files of these periodicals; in other words, how to put, and answer, questions through their pages. All these learned periodicals would be more popular, were the common and obvious fact known to editors and proprietors of newspapers—as conceivably some day it may be—that the most abstruse and recondite of scientific journals is nothing but a variety of the familiar publication known as *Notes and Queries* in its higher form, and in its lower forms *Tit Bits* and *Answers*. It would, indeed, introduce an agreeable and useful uniformity in periodical nomenclature if there could be one generic name, with adjectival differentiations, such, for instance, as the *Zeit-*

*schrift für Socialwissenschaft* calling itself *Social Notes and Queries*, and the *Archiv für Rassen-und Gesellschafts-Biologie* calling itself *Race Notes and Queries*, and so forth. That the analogy between the popular and scientific variety is real, and not fanciful, will further be recognized when it is observed that what are called conundrums and solutions in the one are called memoirs and hypotheses in the other. And, moreover, the successful contributors are, it will be seen by reference to the above description of the Royal Geographical Society, rewarded, if not by participation in a guinea prize, yet by one or other of "the two royal gold medals which are awarded annually" and "the Victoria medals which are awarded at intervals."

XVII. The *Journal* of the Royal Geographical Society consists of two parts. There is in each month's *Journal* a bundle of maps and a budget of letterpress. In order to utilize the resources of the society, which function through its *Journal* and other publications, one must learn the interpretation of the symbolism and notation of the maps, and one must acquire familiarity with the few technical formulæ which occasionally break through the ordinary and simple language of its letterpress. There are simple, easy, and pleasant ways of achieving both these ends—in fact, short-cuts by which one may penetrate right into the heart of geographical science. To master the symbolism and notation of cartography, all one has to do is to compare the best contour maps (that is to say, those of the Ordnance Survey) with what one sees with naked eye, with field-glass, or with telescope, when one ascends all the high points of vantage in one's own region. These high points of vantage are, of course, for the towns and cities, their towers such as they may be, and for the surrounding country whatever mound, hilltop, or mountain summit one's excursions and explorations may discover. The primary problem of the cartographer is to show, by symbolic notation on a flat surface, all the varying heights and shapes assumed by, or imposed on, the earth's surface above or below sea-level. What the ideal geographer, as cartographer, first of all tries to do is to devise a notation by which he and his fellow-

geographers, by the inspection of a map of a given region, may get a simultaneous vision of the terrestrial phenomena which all the explorers and observers of that region have collectively seen. Now, it must always be that, however minutely observed and explored a region—even the most inhabited—may be, there is always something new to be observed, even in the shape and configuration of the surface, for these are always changing; while the things and events, natural and human, which are continuously happening (for these also have to be mapped down), open up an endless vista for the future development of cartographic science. Hence there is no more easy and natural individual progress than for the schoolboy beginner to pass onward from simple observation of recorded phenomena to discovery of new ones. Once begin in the right way and acquire—which is so easily done—the right habits, and then the position of discoverer will be reached by a normal and natural, an insensible and inevitable, growth. As elsewhere, it is the first step which costs, and here it costs two shillings—that being the price of a “Bartholomew” pocket tourist map for your own region. It will be on a scale of two miles to the inch, if you are fortunate enough to be a Scotsman; and four miles to the inch, if you happen to have the disadvantage of living in England. These maps you carry with you on your walks, your bicycle rides, your river excursions; and when you get back to the town or city of your region, you go to the free or other library where the largest ordnance maps are kept, and you observe how the things you have seen are noted, or are not noted on these ordnance maps. And if they are not noted, there and then you begin your apprenticeship in scientific research, in seeking out other maps which record different varieties of regional phenomena; for example, the kind, the quantity, and the distribution of its fauna and flora; its rainfall and its sunshine; the statistics of its population; its routes and communications, and so forth indefinitely. The problems which the young geographer finds in front of him grow rapidly in number and complexity, but his interest in facing, in investigating, and in solving them will be found to grow



still faster. The explorations in the open air, alternating with research in library and study and map-room, will very soon whet an insatiable appetite for an understanding of the ever-changing phenomena of his region. The pleasures of observation, which, unlike other sensual pleasures, do not pall with usage, are themselves succeeded by the still keener pleasure and intenser joy of generalization and interpretation. In brief, the outlook on the visible phenomena of one's region itself evokes and inspires a craving for insight into the larger world, into which our own region extends on all sides by insensible gradation, and to which it is felt to be linked by innumerable bonds. It is just here, where the margin of his own region melts into that of the surrounding world, that the student requires, and may readily utilize, the full resources of the whole science of geography. His previous reading will have been of the best geological and geographical accounts of his own region, and the comparison of these with what he has seen with his own eyes. This preliminary study will have insensibly familiarized him with the technical phrases and formulæ which are necessary for getting into touch with his brother-geographers elsewhere over the globe, and utilizing the observations, the thought, the interpretation of these, as well as the accumulated writings of their forerunners, in the concerted effort of the whole past and present race of geographers to visualize and to understand what passes on the surface of the globe.

XVIII. To realize the magnitude of what might be called the geographical group in Britain, we must add to the 4,150 members of the society located in London the members of various local societies, such as those in Manchester and Liverpool, and also the considerable number of unattached map-makers and geographical observers and writers. And again to these have to be added the corresponding group in Scotland, of which the Royal Scottish Geographical Society is the nucleus, with its 1,100 members, its monthly *Journal* and other publications issued from its headquarters in Edinburgh; there being associated societies in Glasgow, Aberdeen, and Dundee. And, furthermore, every capital in Europe, and many of the larger of the provincial towns,

contain similar groups of professed geographers with similar organizations, journals, and other publications. The New World also has its geographical societies, and with the formation of one in Japan they are penetrating the Orient. Here, then, is no national, or even international, but a world-wide phenomenon—a universal brotherhood. It is a real fraternity in which the individual members and the several groups are linked together by a highly organized system of intercommunications, by common aims and purposes, by a common method of thought and observation, by a common symbolism and system of formulæ, by common beliefs about the world and men's place therein. To imagine the resources of geographical science, we must think not only of its accumulated documents, instruments, and aptitudes, but also in a still higher degree of the spiritual forces that pervade and animate this universal organization, this world-extensive community of similar minds. And anyone who is learned enough to master the symbolism of geography, to consult the files of the periodical publications, is, if not a full brother, yet a novitiate of this universal fraternity. And to be a member of this community, what does it mean? It means much or little, in proportion to the impulse and knowledge to utilize the collective resources of the community.

XIX. It is the boast—and a real and justifiable boast—of the Catholic church that its pope is a servant of every member of the church down to the most insignificant—that he is, in name and fact, *servus servorum*. Now, in the scientific community there is no pope, but there are many high-priests. The scientific community is a democratic organization, not a hierarchic one. Its high-priests are just those members of the community who have themselves done most to forward the progress of their science. Every high-priest of geography, as of every science, is, in quite a literal sense, a slave of every investigator who is working in that particular field, or a related one. The organization of research, and the system of intercommunications, are so arranged that the tasks that are beyond the strength, and the problems beyond the power, of the ordinary members of the community, are continually being collected and automatically delivered at the

workshop of this or that high-priest. His workshop is usually a small room with a few books and maps. Here, without fee or charge, he completes the unfinished tasks, and solves the harder problems; and hence he delivers the finished goods as a free gift to the community at large. He is fortunate indeed if he escapes without having himself to pay the cost of delivery. The reward of his office is harder work, less pay, and more criticism than that of the ordinary brothers. The high-priest of geography, as of other science, is not differentiated by sartorial insignia, by definitive status, or by obsequious designation, but is generally recognizable by certain personal characteristics—by the world-light that shines from his eyes, by the nobility of his countenance, by his threadbare coat, and usually, it must be confessed, by the baldness of his head. In the common phrase of everyday life, he is known as an "eminent scientist." In the jargon of his profession, he is "an authority."

It is the real, though unexpressed, ambition of every young scientist to become "an authority." In the many graduated stages toward this consummation there is one of special significance. If the young observer steadily continues his observations and interpretations, and faithfully compares his results with the records of science, he will find that he steadily progresses toward a climax. He will some day catch a moment or a mood, a phase or a happening, in the fleeting movement of things, which will thrill him with an emotion intenser than any he has before experienced. He will instinctively feel that one of the secrets of the universe has been revealed to him and to him alone. Under the mysterious glow of unforgettable enthusiasm, he will feel his personality expand, until the self of his ego meets and touches, in a sublime union, the self of the world. In other words, he has been initiated into the fraternity of science, and for the first time he is, and feels himself to be, no novice, but a full brother of the community.

It is clear we are here in the presence of a psychological phenomenon known in another walk of life as "conversion." In science it is known as the discovery of a new truth. It may be a truth which is of the most trifling importance in relation to the



total body of ordered knowledge, which we call science. But the event is, in the life-history of the individual scientist, one of most profound significance. It is, if not a turning in his career, yet an experience which will not be without its effect upon his whole future life. As is the way of the older spiritual communities, the event here, too, is celebrated by a particular ceremony of initiation. The scientific ritual of initiation has two well-marked stages. The first consists in the contribution of a memoir to the proceedings of the relevant society. The second consists of a copious baptism in the form of a cold-water douche of criticism, from his brother scientists.

XX. If the foregoing analysis has suggested a fanciful analogy between religion and scientific experience, it has entirely failed in its purpose. The intention has been, not to suggest an analogy, but to indicate an essential similarity, indeed a partial identity, of type. In the language, not of psychology, but of sociology, the contention is that the scientific and religious groups are vitally related in their social origins and functions. Addressing an audience of biologists, one would probably convey the intended impression by saying that science and religion are social organs which are in part both homologous and analogous. But the rightly discredited usage of biological terminology in social science prohibits recourse to that language. The argument is that science has its social as well as its logical and psychological aspects, and that, from the former point of view, a scientific society is manifestly to be classed among the social institutions; and that, moreover, in the wide and varied range of social institutions, the place of a scientific society is alongside of the church. The characteristics possessed in common by the religious and scientific community can be traced out in detail. If, for instance, the scientist resorts to a public library to read the journal of his particular society, he is obviously paralleling the tendency of the laxer churchman to escape the monthly collection for what in certain nonconformist churches is called the sustentation fund. But minute detail and formal aspect apart, what is it that constitutes the essential similarity of type in the religious and scientific group?

The immense multiplication of religious sects in the present day, and in history, is popularly accounted one of the least creditable features of civilization. The skeptics deprecate it as a bad habit, like alcoholism and immorality, into which the uncultivated man is prone to fall. But in itself, and apart from its secondary effects, the mere proliferation of sectionally religious bodies is simply an expression of spiritual freedom. In joining this, that, or the other church, in remaining within its fold or in leaving it, the individual believes himself to be actuated by non-material motives. He believes that he is uninfluenced alike by the parliaments that make laws, the bureaucracies that administer them, and the judges that interpret, or misinterpret, them. He believes that his religious life is unconditioned by the policeman visible at the street corner, by the sovereign invisible on his throne, and the soldiers that display his royal uniform. In brief, the member of a religious community believes himself to have risen into a world of spiritual freedom, untrammelled by the prohibition and compulsion which in civil history are called law and politics; in natural history, tooth and claw. How far this belief in a life of spiritual freedom is real, and how far it is illusory, matters not for the moment. The point of insistence is that the members of a religious community are bound together by similarity of ideas and feelings, and not by bonds which rest upon a potential recourse to physical force. In other words, the social influences immediately operative upon and among a religious community are mental, moral, and æsthetic. They are not legal and political. And in this respect, at least, it is sufficiently manifest that the scientific community resembles a religious one.

XXI. It is one of the merits of Comte to have aided the progress of thought by generalizing under the one conception of spiritual powers all those agencies and institutions which influence men by mental, moral, and æsthetic considerations. His corresponding conception of temporal powers generalizes agencies and institutions which operate on, or influence, conduct by an actual or potential recourse to physical force. The spiritual powers thus seek to substantiate or to modify belief—using that

term in its broadest sense—using as their instruments ideas and emotions. Temporal powers seek to determine conduct by using material rewards as impulse, and physical fear as deterrents.

The popular distinction between state and church may be regarded as a particular case of the wider popular distinction between the law and the gospel; and this again is a particular case of the larger scientific generalization of temporal and spiritual powers. There are, of course, practical advantages which prompt the popular mind to extend its widening circles of general concepts, which again are further refined and developed by science. The general concept is to a mere collection of facts what regimentation is to a mob of men. It enables one to neglect individual eccentricities, and predict the collective behavior of the group, whether the group consists of items called facts or items called men. The inducement to widen the generalization is, that the larger its scope, the broader are the limits of prediction. The assumption made is that the process of generalization is a gradual one, and that the steps from the concrete facts up to the largest generalization are all traceable without a break. In other words, a generalization must be of a kind which in science is called verifiable, that is to say, the prediction based upon it must refer to a course of future events, which must either happen or not happen at a given place and within a given and finite time. And this proviso of verifiability gives a definiteness and fixity to scientific generalizations which is often absent from those alike of the popular mind or of the poetic imagination.

XXII. There are those who tell us that there is no proper science of society, because there are no known sociological laws. Others go still farther and say that the nature of human society is such that no social laws are discoverable; that there is no science of human society; that sociology not only does not, but never will, exist. This is a mode of argument well known to historians of scientific thought. It has been used at every epochal advance, by the obscurantists, to justify their ignorance and soothe their vanity. It belongs, in fact, to the self-protective devices so common everywhere throughout the organic world, and especially among the higher animals. Probably the most



effective reply to this sort of criticism is for the scientific observer to ignore it, and to continue without interruption his observations and generalizations of them. If those who tell us there are no laws in social science would say instead that they themselves do not know any such laws, we might be happy to agree with them. And if those who say there never can be any such laws would say instead that they themselves are determined never to know any such laws, we might extend to them our compassion and recommend a course of medical treatment.

In point of fact, what generalizations, in the nature of scientific law, are there at the disposal of the sociologist who wishes to predict the future of an incipient spiritual power? A full stock-taking of resources would here disclose a considerable number of working formulæ, which resume a vast mass of experience as to the origin, growth, and decay of various forms of spiritual power.

But for the present purpose the following generalizations especially serve, viz :

1. That spiritual powers, in the course of their historical development, gradually conceive and formulate a social ideal, and this social ideal tends to be in conflict with the existing temporal power.

2. That each spiritual power tends to develop two types of organized community—a type predominantly passive and contemplative, and a type predominantly active and militant.

3. That the active type of spiritual community endeavors to generate a congruent form of temporal power as the material embodiment and mundane expression of its particular social ideal.

4. That in this endeavor various institutions are developed, which help to determine each era of city government both in respect of buildings and of civic policy.

XXIII. The conflict and interaction between temporal and spiritual ideals in the history of western Europe during the Christian period is, of course, one of the commonplaces of social discussion. But the detailed influences and reactions, especially on city development, of the respective ideals of the law and the

gospel, have not been sufficiently worked out. The system of feudal law, which still incrusts occidental civilization, has its animating principle in the mediæval maxim, *Nul terre sans seigneur*, which might be conveniently translated as, in the social sense, "No spot without its despot," and in the civil sense, "No foot of soil without its functionary." The contrast of these ideals with that of Christian ethics—"the kingdom of God is within you"—is sufficiently obvious. But what the student of city development has to do is to trace the expression and interaction of these conflicting ideals in each successive phase of civic architecture and civic policy. Thus, for instance, in the case of London, the sociologist is to see how the Tower and Windsor Castle are the expression and embodiment of certain political ideals, and he is to trace throughout the history of London the influences and ramifications of the Tower and the castle and follow their line of direct descent down to the existing institutions which are their heir, and their functional analogue—these presumably being the contemporary functionary factories of Whitehall. In the same way, he is to see how Westminster Abbey and St. Paul's are the culminating expression and embodiment of certain spiritual ideals; and their influence and reaction on civic life and architecture are likewise also to be traced through successive stages of city development; and the analogous types of institutions today have to be discovered and described alike in their structural and functional aspects. And every city has for the sociologist its corresponding problems of factual observation, of historical analysis, and of scientific interpretation. All these again, to be sure, assume their place as specialist researches within the larger problems of general sociology.

Now, if we apply the fourfold sociological formulæ above indicated to the present and future phases of science considered as a spiritual power, what inferences may we legitimately draw? The existing groups of science, whether or not organized in definite societies, are comparable, we have seen, to the various sects of the religious community. Now, these numerous and various sects, like their more archaic religious types, have their

rivalries, jealousies, feuds, and bickerings. The mathematicians, for instance, are apt to form an exclusive caste apart, holding no converse with groups which know not their particular shibboleths. Again, the spectacle might have been seen, at a recent meeting of the British Association, of rival biological factions warmly anathematizing each other. A momentous and historic instance of scientific sectionalism is seen in the work now in progress, which is probably the largest co-operative enterprise yet undertaken by modern scientists. A few years ago the Royal Society convened in London a great gathering—a sort of Council of Trent—of scientific fathers, representing all the leading academies and societies of Europe and America. The purpose of this great gathering was to decide upon an authorized canon of the sacred texts. A momentous decision was reached. It was concluded that a sufficient degree of traditional sanctity did not attach to the writings of the economists, the psychologists, the sociologists, and some other orders. The writings of these were accordingly omitted from that authorized canon, which is now in course of actual compilation under the title of *The International Catalogue of Scientific Papers*. It is clear from these evidences of internal disruptiveness that science, as a whole, does not at the present moment possess that cohesiveness and unity of aim which are vital to a period of demiurgic spiritual effort.

XXIV. On the evidence of internal disintegration one would infer that science has either passed, or has not yet reached, its constructive synthetic era. But are there not signs around us which point to a coming and then incipient period, in which science will develop its doctrine of human life as a great spiritual power? The clearest notes in this scientific chord which is beginning to sound are perhaps the geographical and the biological ones.

We have seen how the geographer, no longer merely interpreting the present by the aid of the past, is beginning to have visions of the future. In seeing the city as the realization of regional potencies, he cannot but feel also an ideal impulse toward organizing the city as an optimum adaptation of the



regional environment to human life. The geographer's social ideal is, indeed, in process of explicit formulation, and that on many sides. And in its application to a particular city, the most notable perhaps of these formulations may be found in one of the books indicated for reading in connection with this paper. It is Professor Geddes' *City Development*. Here, indeed, the ideal of city development is by no means confined to that of the geographer, but the civic policy there enunciated has its definite starting-point in the geographer's vision of the city. And other similar initiatives are visible in many different directions. The Garden City movement is essentially geographical in its point of departure from traditional civic policies. And the same may be said of Mr. H. G. Wells's *Civic Utopia*, and indeed of all those utopist writings in which the biological note is also sounded which advocate a certain ruralization of the city, whether by the development of parks and gardens, or by other means. However much all these differ from one another in other points, they agree in their emphasis and insistence on a better regional adaptation to city life. It is clear, in fact, that we are here in the presence of a movement toward an applied geography. The division of science into *pure* and *applied* is a familiar one up to a certain point, but it should help us to realize its significance, if we understand it as comparable to the distinction between the regular and secular orders in religious communities. Like the regular orders, the cultivators of pure science concern themselves mainly with doctrine; while the applied scientists, like the secular orders, have their main interest in the application of doctrine to the needs of daily life.

XXV. Among existing groups of scientists, which are the seculars, which the regulars? In the physical sciences it is easy to recognize actual or incipient regular orders in mathematicians, in students of heat, light, electricity, chemistry, etc. On the practical side there is the great body of engineers, with its numerous subdivisions; there are manufacturing chemists, the brewers, the opticians, etc. Are these the secular orders in the physical group? Before answering that question, we must discriminate. The differences of type are very great. It is, for

instance, a far cry from the stoker, or even the driver, of a coal engine at the one end of the scale, to, at the other, the active partner in the firm of White & Co., electricians and instrument-makers; for the active partner in that firm is, or was, Lord Kelvin. It will be urged that Lord Kelvin as instrument-maker and electrical engineer is merged and sunk in Lord Kelvin the professor, the investigator, the theorist. But the opposite interpretation would be equally true, and equally false. The essential point is to see that it is the very coincidence and alternation of theory and practice, of science and art, of thought and action, that above all differentiates and marks off the seculars of science from those of other varieties of spiritual power, And, applying this distinction, we readily recognize that the great majority of engineering occupations do not really belong to science at all, in the proper sense, but are persistent survivals of a pre-scientific age. The empirical rule-of-thumb types of engineer are still predominant, but they essentially belong to a pre-scientific order that has been well called paleo-technic. They do not possess the physicist's vision of the world; still less, therefore, do they seek to apply it to life. The physical scientist in his cosmic mood sees the world as an automatic system of energies, with a tendency to run down, and without a discoverable means of winding it up again, while as to the why and wherefore of its being originally set going the data of his science give him no clue. Looking at the same phenomena in his humanist mood, he sees the flux and transformation of forces take on and assume a definite design and purpose, which the very logic of his science compels him to postulate as an inherent potency in the very system of energies. He sees every form of energy a potential slave of man. He sees the cities scattered over the face of the globe, as the supreme, the collective, the ceaseless effort of the race to realize this potency of energy, to harness it in the service of man. The type of physical scientist in whom the cosmic mood is habitual and dominant is the actual or incipient regular. But where the grand and inspiring ideal of realizing for man the potency of world-energies animates the physical scientist, there clearly we have the possibility of great secular

orders. And that such orders are everywhere incipient and rapidly developing, there are many evidences to show. These evidences are vividly depicted in the sociological writings of Mr. H. G. Wells, who more than anyone else, perhaps, in the English-speaking world has seen, or at least expressed for us in literature, the incipient changes in city development which are being effected by these new secular orders of applied physical science.

The new type of engineer is tending more and more to assume control of the communications of our cities, their factories and workshops, the great public works of water supply, lighting, drainage, etc. And thus gradually determining for us the material conditions of life, the new engineer acquires social status and prestige. And, in pursuance of the well-known sociological law that those who have social power tend also to get civil and political power, we are bound to assume that the engineer types, as they are already tending to control civic policy, will sooner or later seek to control national and even world-policy. That these higher aspirations are already well on the way toward achievement is seen in the influence now being exercised by the railway kings of America, not only in their own country, but also in world-politics. With the advantages brought about by the activities of these new secular orders, there are, of course, corresponding disadvantages. The conception of a city held by the railway engineer is, we have already seen, not that of a city at all, but that of a town. And this limitation applies throughout the whole sphere of thought and action belonging to this phase of life. It manifests itself even in Mr. Wells's utopist pictures of the cities of the future, for in these idealist cities is it not the case that the inhabitants, notwithstanding their manifold cultural activities, have still their main interests in the material aspects and conditions of things? Are they not, in fact, townsmen first, and citizens only thereafter?

XXVI. If the foregoing criticism is a just one, the cause of the limitation is doubtless to be sought in some arrestment of normal scientific development. The physical scientist who remains such falls a long way short of repeating and resuming his normal racial development. For above and beyond the physical



group of sciences, the race has conquered, or is conquering, for science higher domains. Immediately above the physical sciences is the biological group. Here, who are the regulars and who are the seculars? It is not difficult to see the regular type in anatomist and taxonomist, in physiologist and ecologist, in embryologist and paleontologist, in ontologist and phylogonist. These, or some of them, are doubtless strange names, unfamiliar to the public, even to that small section of the public which enjoys a classical culture. But the groups of scientists thus characterized nevertheless exist, and that, moreover, in growing numbers and influence, all over the western world. They are organized into bodies which are essentially regular orders of an incipient spiritual power; and as such they are silently preparing a great moral revolution. Where are we to look for the secular orders that will be their active instruments of temporal change? The occupations concerned with the biological or organic side of civilization are, of course, those of peasant and farmer, of gardener and stock-raiser, along with medical doctors and surgeons, not to mention the herbalists and the nurses, the barbers and the hairdressers, the gymnasts, and all the lower and older groups of occupations, from and through which the medical profession has risen to its present summit. Which among all these are the secular orders of science, and which the empirical survivals of a pre-scientific age? To answer that, we must first ask what is the special vision of the world which animates the biologist; and, further, we must ask what militant groups are there which this vision stimulates into practical activity. The biologist, like other scientists, has his cosmic and his humanist mood. In the former he sees an endless chain of developing life, beginning he knows not how or why, and tending he knows not whither. In his humanist mood, he sees the same unbroken chain that links together the whole series of organic beings; but now sees in it evidence at every point, from lowest to highest, of a promise and a potency of a supreme culmination. And in the most beautiful and noblest of human beings he sees a norm which, by taking thought, the whole race may reach and surpass. To the biologist the city is thus no mass of mere inorganic structures, but a group

of organic beings, which individually passes away, but racially abides, continues, and develops toward a definite ideal, or degenerates to its opposite. The ideal of the city is therefore to the biologist the full realization of racial potency. Who among biologists are stimulated into activity by this vision of civic potency? Increasingly large numbers of the medical profession are animated by the ambition of preventing rather than curing diseases. The noblest instances of missionary enterprise are paralleled by the self-sacrificing adventures and exploits which daily engage the lives of the enthusiasts of the newer medicine. The missions that go out from the Pasteur Institute in Paris to study, say, typhoid fever in Brazil, or from the Institute of Tropical Medicine in Liverpool to investigate, say, yellow fever in New Orleans, are merely conspicuous instances of a heroic activity that is normal in that increasing wing of the medical profession beginning to be called the hygienists. Of these many are already organized into large and well-established secular orders, such as the various institutes of public health, sanitation, etc., to be found in every large city. Others less directly, but still more vitally, are beginning to influence both civic and national policy through great institutions of the more regular type of order, such as the Pasteur Institute, and similar organizations incipient elsewhere.

XXVII. A new secular order of biologists is beginning to appear in the eugenists, who seek to develop and apply Mr. Francis Galton's doctrine of eugenics. It belongs to this doctrine to rescue the "perfect man" from the lumber of archaic survivals, and restore it, not as an idol of a golden past, but as a legitimate ideal of the future. Taken over from theology by political philosophers of the eighteenth century, the idea of the fall of man from a state of primordial perfection became a powerful solvent of economic and political institutions. An abortive and premature attempt was then made by early biologists and sociologists to use the doctrine as a constructive ideal, by transforming it into the conception of a future perfectibility of type. But in the generation which witnessed the classic demonstration of organic evolution by Spencer and Darwin, by

Haeckel, Wallace, and Galton, the very idea of perfectibility was discredited. Nevertheless, the language of the fall persisted, and of necessity had its unconscious influence on thought. It was therefore quite natural, if not inevitable, that the place of man in the animal series should be worked out in terms of descent and not ascent. But the idea of potency latent in organic evolution was bound to manifest itself.

It was Francis Galton who first, and most fully, made the change from the cosmic and naturalist to the humanist and idealist mood in organic evolution. His doctrine of eugenics shifts the center of interest in man's pedigree from the past to the future. Actually and in point of fact the worst-bred of animals, man has become so because he of all animals has the highest potency for degeneration or for evolution. That is one of the truths revealed to us by evolutionary biology. The other is the legitimacy of aspiration toward a future ideal. But the ideal of evolutionary biology markedly differs from its pre-scientific anticipations. It is an ideal definable as starting from a known potency, and approximately realizable within finite space and time, and to be reached by ascertainable processes, operating within discoverable limits. In short, the ideal of eugenics has the scientific character of being a verifiable ideal, and not an illusory one. It postulates an ideal type, toward which we can definitely steer, and certainly move, with assured hope of approximately, but never actually, reaching it. For the ideal itself undergoes evolution, the very increase of evolutionary potencies and processes being itself the warrant of higher aspirations. Mathematicians express the relation of two paths always converging, but never meeting, by the word "asymptotic." Originating outside the systems of professed philosophers, evolutionary idealism has yet its necessary relations to traditional doctrines of idealism and realism. Its place and correlation with these have yet to be worked out and defined. But meantime it may help toward establishing a point of contact with existing systems of philosophy to say that evolutionary ideals express an asymptotic reality.

XXVIII. The favorite recourse of the ill-informed mem-



bers of a community, to escape the penalties of nescience, is to normalize their own defects and to postulate a universal ignorance. This protective device of the cunning animal is nowhere more frequent than in discussions of the problem of heredity. It is frequently asserted that we know nothing at all of heredity with precision and certainty. It is quite true that the biologists and psychologists have a great deal still to learn about heredity. But it is equally true that they have a great deal to teach. And the citizen as well as the student can escape the charge of hopeless obscurantism only by promptly putting himself to this school. One of the first things he will learn is the deep significance and the practical importance of the distinction between what is called organic inheritance and what is called social inheritance. The former is concerned with the heritage that comes to us in organic descent from our family stock, i.e., the prenatal influences which condition our life. The latter is concerned with the qualities and aptitudes that come to us through training and education, through tradition and experience; in a word through the potential, and therefore social, influences that condition our life. Small or great as may be the ordered and verified knowledge accumulated by the students of organic inheritance, there can be no question of the mere massiveness and quantity of our knowledge of social inheritance and social variation—in a word, of social evolution. Where is all the knowledge to be found? Who are its guardians and continuators? Are they not called historians and economists, political philosophers and comparative jurists, anthropologists and folklorists, psychologists and æstheticists, students of ethics and of comparative religion? Are not all the foregoing of the nature of regular orders engaged in studying the various aspects of our social heritage of industry and commerce, of law and morals, of religion and art, of language and literature, of science and philosophy? But the question for us is: Are these the regulars of social science? If they are not, who and where are the regulars of social science? who and where the seculars? Occupied on the practical side of our social life are the merchants and the manufacturers, the politicians and the lawyers, the journalists and orators, the artists and literary men,

the teachers and professors, the moralists and priests. Which among all these are the seculars of social science? which the persistent survivals of the pre-scientific age?

XXIX. To answer these questions, we must ask: What vision is seen by psychologist and sociologist in their cosmic or naturalist mood, and what in their humanist mood? What potencies do they see in social evolution, in city development? What groups, if any, of more militant type are inspired by these visions of social potency, to work toward the realization of the corresponding ideals? In reply, little can be said at the close of an already prolonged paper. The sociologist in his naturalist mood sees the city as successive strata of wreckage and survivals of past phases in the endlessly changing antics of a building and hibernating mammalian species. In his humanist mood he sees—somewhat dimly, it must be confessed—the city, as the culminating and continuous effort of the race to determine the mastery of its fate, to achieve a spiritual theater for the free play of the highest racial ideals. In short, the cities of the world are in this view but processes of realizing the spiritual potency of the human race. They are the true homes of humanity. And it is just here, where science—whose mission it is to fulfil, and not to destroy—reveals to us the germ of truth in the popular sentiment, which insists that the essential characteristic of the city resides in the university and the cathedral. The truth, to be sure, is that it is the presence of functional institutions of the highest spiritual type, whether or not we call them university and cathedral, that differentiates the city from the town. It follows that the civic policy of our secular sociologists—if we have any—must be concerned with the city as itself a cultural potency, and with the whole body of citizens as individuals responsive to the creative influences of the spiritual ideals, active or latent in drama and poetry, in art and music, in history and science, in philosophy and religion. The most comprehensive abstract and general statement of culture policy from the sociological standpoint still probably remains that made more than half a century ago by Comte in the *Positive Polity*—which was really the utopia of his later thought, educated and matured by the preliminary preparation of the

*Positive Philosophy*. Fortunately, the four massive volumes of his *Positive Polity* were condensed and summarized by Comte himself, and the contentious elements for the most part omitted, in the single small and cheap volume translated by Dr. Bridges, as a *General View of Positivism*. Ranking with Comte's statement of culture policy in its comprehensiveness of outlook and far-sighted vision, but written from the standpoint of contemporary science, and therefore appropriately detailed and concrete in reference, here and now, in plan and section and perspective, to a particular city, is Professor Geddes' recent book *City Development*, already cited for its geographical vision, and now for its sociological ideals. These two books, from their different but correlated standpoints, express a doctrine whose isolated elements are everywhere recognizable. It is evident, therefore, that the life out of which the doctrine is fermenting is in active growth. If, then, they are not already here, we may be sure the sociological friars are coming.

## LIST OF BOOKS FOR READING AND REFERENCE

## I

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3. T. R. Marr. *Housing Conditions of Manchester and Salford*. (Manchester.)
4. T. C. Horsfall. *The Example of Germany*. (Manchester University Press.)

## II

1. H. G. Wells. *Anticipation*.
2. H. G. Wells. *Mankind in the Making*.
3. H. G. Wells. *A Modern Utopia*.
4. Ebenezer Howard. *Tomorrow: A Scheme of Garden Cities*.
5. Patrick Geddes. *City Development*. (St. George Press, Bournville.)

## III

1. A. Comte. *General View of Positivism*. (Reeves & Turner.) Translated by Dr. Bridges.

## IV. PERIODICALS

1. *La science sociale*. Edited by E. Demolins.
2. *Sociological Papers*, published annually by Macmillan for the Sociological Society, 5 Old Queen Street, Westminster, S. W. ( *Vide* especially Vols. I and II, articles on eugenics by Mr. Francis Galton, and on civics by Professor Geddes.)



## A DECADE OF OFFICIAL POOR-RELIEF IN INDIANA

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The Board of State Charities of Indiana was organized in 1889, and one of its first undertakings, in conformity to the statutory instruction to "investigate the whole system of public charities,"<sup>1</sup> was an effort to obtain data relating to the relief of the poor by township trustees.

Then, as now, the ninety-two counties of the state were divided into townships, of which there were 1,016 in all.<sup>2</sup> The chief official of each, outside cities and incorporated towns, is the township trustee. In addition to his duties in connection with the roads, ditches, schools, and elections of his township, he serves as overseer of the poor, *ex officio*, and as such his authority extends over all the township, including cities and towns. Those in need of assistance from the public treasury look to him for relief.

In the administration of the poor-funds of the townships the trustees were acting under a law which was approved June 9, 1852, and became operative May 6, 1853.<sup>3</sup> This gave them the oversight of all poor persons in their respective townships, and required them to see that those in need were properly cared for. What was proper care was left entirely to the judgment of the trustees, and according to their decision some were sent to the county poor asylum, some were granted aid in their own homes, some were given transportation to the next township. The bills were presented to the board of county commissioners, and as a rule paid without question. There was practically no supervision of any kind.

<sup>1</sup> Law creating Board of State Charities, *Acts of 1889*, chap. 37, p. 51.

<sup>2</sup> The number of townships varies occasionally, as a new township is formed or two old ones are combined.

<sup>3</sup> *Revised Statutes*, 1881, chap. 95.

The boards of county commissioners were also permitted, in their discretion, to make annual allowances, "not exceeding the cost of their maintenance in the ordinary mode," to persons of mature years and sound mind, and to the parents of idiots and of children otherwise helpless, if the parents were unable to provide proper care. In addition to this, the employment of physicians to give medical treatment to the poor, including those in the county charitable and correctional institutions, was in the hands of the county commissioners.

As was to be expected, a very serious abuse had grown up under this system. The trustee's office was filled by popular election. He came to the work untrained, inexperienced. Other duties of the office were pressing. He was poorly paid and without assistance, as a rule, in carrying on the work. It was easier to give applicants what they wanted than to take the time or incur the expense necessary to make a careful investigation into their condition and actual needs. A trustee who was inclined to conduct his office in a more business-like manner was often met with political pressure, or the importunities of friends or relatives of the poor. When an applicant for aid failed to get what he wanted from the overseer, he applied to the county commissioners, frequently with success. Occasionally there was a deliberate misuse of the public funds.

In addition to the waste of money, another aspect of the matter was to be considered. In its report for the year 1891 the Board of State Charities said:

Of all forms of public charity, outdoor relief is most liable to abuse and excess. There are very few inmates of our county poor asylums who are not proper subjects for the county's charity; few persons will voluntarily choose a residence in the asylum, if they are able to live outside. But for outdoor relief there is constant demand from many who can get along very well without it, if it is not to be had. It is not alone the immediate waste of public money that is to be deplored, serious as that is; but still more serious are the future consequences to be apprehended in the spread of pauperism and the degradation of the poor, and especially in the growing up of a new generation of dependents.<sup>4</sup>

That there was waste of money was shown conclusively by

<sup>4</sup> *Annual Report, Board of State Charities, 1891, p. 114.*

reports from county auditors on the expense of outdoor poor-relief. On November 1, 1889, the board sent blank forms to each trustee in the state, requesting information as to the number and classes of persons receiving temporary relief. Only about one-third of the whole number of trustees returned the blanks, and of these less than one-half were intelligently filled, so that the effort to obtain statistics from that source was fruitless. From the county auditors, to whom a different blank was sent later, it was learned that for the year ending May 31, 1890, relief by the township trustees amounted to \$478,739.91 and medical relief to \$81,492.74, a total of \$560,232.65.<sup>5</sup> A portion of the medical relief was properly chargeable to the county institutions; still the figures indicated more than half a million dollars expended to relieve the poor not in institutions.

In its report for 1891 the board published further reports from county auditors, showing a total of \$560,012.35 for poor-relief and medical aid for the year ending May 31, 1891.<sup>6</sup> In the same report was given a careful analysis of the figures, showing the relative cost of outdoor relief to population in the different counties of the state. According to this table the per capita cost of aid to the poor varied from 5 cents in Crawford County to 84 cents in Warren County. Communities rich in opportunity for self-support were shown to be spending more money proportionately than much poorer counties. Adjoining counties, with practically identical conditions, varied greatly in their expenditures for the poor. The conclusion was inevitable that the amount expended was governed more by the methods of the trustees than by the actual needs of the citizens.

Statistics collected in 1893, and published in the board's report for that year, showed a decrease in the cost of trustees' and medical relief from 1891 amounting to \$48,509, the total expense for the year being \$511,503.35.<sup>7</sup> The same wide range in the per capita expense among the different counties was noted. In

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 1890, p. 60.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 1891, p. 138. These figures were corrected in the *Report* for 1893, p. 85, to read \$560,265.95.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 1893, pp. 85, 89.



1894 the county auditors' reports showed trustees' and medical relief amounting to \$586,232.27,<sup>8</sup> and in 1895, to \$630,168.79.<sup>9</sup>

In all these years no statistics relating to the use of this great sum could be obtained, other than the actual amounts paid out in the different counties. No method of accounting was in general use, to show who received the money or why it was given, whether the money was being spent dishonestly or merely unwisely.

As a result of its studies of the situation the Board of State Charities embodied in its report for 1894<sup>10</sup> a recommendation to the legislature that a law be enacted requiring overseers of the poor, and all persons who administered relief from public funds to the poor not inmates of charitable institutions, to keep a record which should contain the full name and the age of every person to whom relief was given, and the date of giving relief in each separate instance, together with its kind and amount, a copy of this record to be filed with the board of county commissioners, who should be prohibited from allowing any payment for the expense of relief until such record had been filed. It was further recommended that a true copy of each report of relief should be transmitted to the Board of State Charities as often as once every three months. This recommendation was adopted by the legislature of 1895 and enacted into law.<sup>11</sup>

Under this law of 1895 the Board of State Charities at once began receiving reports of township poor-relief. The form used by the trustees throughout the state gives the name, age, sex, color, nationality, mental and physical condition of the applicant, together with other facts concerning each individual who is a member of the family aided, the cause for asking relief, the date, character, and value of the aid each time relief is given, the length of time the applicant has lived in the township, where he came from, the names of relatives, etc.

The twelve months ending August 31, 1896, comprised the

<sup>8</sup> *Annual Report*, 1894, p. 90.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 1895, p. 50.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 1894, p. 7.

<sup>11</sup> *Acts of 1895*, chap. 120.

first full year after the law went into effect. The statistics collated from the reports for that period showed an expense for outdoor aid amounting to \$355,255.29, this being shared by 71,414 persons. These and other facts gleaned from the records filed were published by the board in its 1896 report, and were a revelation to the people of the state.<sup>12</sup> The number reported as receiving relief was equal to one in every 31 of the state's inhabitants, according to the census of 1890. It was found that the proportion in the different counties ranged from one in 13 to one in 208. In some of the richest counties in the state the number reported as having been aided from the public funds was equal to one in 16, one in 18, and one in 20. In one township it was one in 8. The same striking variation was found in the proportionate number aided in counties of similar conditions as had previously been noted in the per-capita cost of relief.

Startling as was this information, this first set of reports was not satisfactory because incomplete. The trustees had not fully understood what was required of them; no record was filed with the Board of State Charities of the families pensioned by county commissioners; practically no medical relief was reported. Therefore, though the reports filed showed a total of 71,414 persons aided, it could only be said that at least that many received public assistance.

Shortly after this report was made public, the General Assembly of 1897 met, and another reform measure was passed.<sup>13</sup> It shifted to the townships the burden of caring for their own poor not in public institutions. Prior to that time all bills for outdoor poor-relief had been paid from the county treasury, and all the townships in a county were taxed alike for the expenses incurred. Under the new law the auditor in each county was required to report to the county commissioners on the first day of the regular September term of the board the amount advanced to each township during the preceding year for poor-relief and medical attendance, and the trustee was required to make a levy against the property in his township, to reimburse the county for

<sup>12</sup> *Annual Report*, Board of State Charities, 1896, p. 76.

<sup>13</sup> *Acts of 1897*, p. 230.

the money paid out, the taxes to be collected as other township taxes were collected, and paid into the county treasury. The effect of this law was to make the trustee responsible directly to his constituency for his management of the poor funds of his township.

The statistics gathered under the operation of the new law proved most interesting and valuable. In 1898 it was found that in 64 of the 1,014 townships in the state no levy was required; in 515 the levy was under 5 cents, while in 435 it ranged from 5 to 30 cents on \$100.<sup>14</sup> It is obvious that in some of the more sparsely settled communities, where land is not valuable, the tax levy will be higher than in the more prosperous districts. The reports, however, brought out the fact that some of the highest levies were made in the richest townships; for example, Portage in St. Joseph County, containing the city of South Bend; Troy in Fountain County, containing the city of Covington. In many of the townships the levy found necessary was more than double the ordinary state levy.

A full report of the conditions found to be existing was made by the Board of State Charities in its report for 1898. Attention was also called to the facts gathered from the reports of township trustees, which by that time were far more satisfactory. Poor-relief and medical aid in 1897 amounted to \$388,343.67<sup>15</sup> and in 1898 to \$375,206.92.<sup>16</sup> The number of persons aided in 1897 was reported as 82,235; in 1898, 75,119.

The conditions were brought forcibly to the attention of the people of the state. The more business-like trustees, the State Board of Commerce, and many citizens in different parts of the state were becoming actively interested. A township trustee, the secretary of a charity-organization society, a former secretary and the then secretary of the Board of State Charities, formed a committee to draft a bill for presentation to the legislature, to correct some of the evils. A carefully drawn bill was submitted to the General Assembly of 1899; it was received with favor and

<sup>14</sup> *Annual Report*, Board of State Charities, 1898, p. 110.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 1897, p. 62.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 1898, p. 99.



became a law,<sup>17</sup> and experts said it was the most advanced piece of legislation for official poor-relief on the statute-books of any state. It was the first instance of the enactment of charity-organization principles into law and of their application to an entire state. It provided for the investigation of each case; for securing the help of friends and relatives of the poor; for giving transportation to no one unless sick, aged, injured, or crippled, and then only in the direction of his legal residence, if he was unable to show that he could be cared for elsewhere; for co-operation with existing relief societies; and for a report to the board of county commissioners when the aid given a person or family reached \$15, or when relief, irrespective of the amount, extended over a period of three months, in order that the approval of the board might be had before additional relief was given.

A significant provision of this law of 1899 required that whenever a board of county commissioners desired to make an allowance to poor persons, as permitted under the law of 1852, it could do so only by entering an order requiring the overseer of the poor to furnish the relief needed, and the overseer was directed to enter upon his record a report of all relief so furnished. However, there was passed, at a later date of the same session of the legislature, a "county reform act,"<sup>18</sup> one clause of which prohibited the board of county commissioners granting relief to any person not an inmate of some county institution. This was interpreted in many counties as not permitting the board of commissioners to make to the township trustees the advancement of funds required by them as overseers of the poor. Several local courts ruled on the question, all of them against the contention. To prevent any further misunderstanding, the legislature of 1901 specifically made it the duty of the county council to appropriate, and the board of county commissioners to advance, the money necessary for the relief of the poor in the several townships of each county.

One provision of the 1899 law, that which limited the aid a trustee might give without the consent of the county commissioners was quite generally misunderstood, many trustees inter-

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 354.

<sup>17</sup> *Acts of 1899*, p. 121.

preting it to mean that they could not give above \$15 to any one family or person in the course of a quarter, or in some cases a year. The result of this and of the clause mentioned above was a surprising reduction in the amount of aid given. From \$320,667.53 in 1899, it decreased to \$209,956.22 in 1900.<sup>19</sup> The number of persons reported as sharing in the relief decreased proportionately—from 64,468 in 1889 to 43,369 in 1900. Another element entered into the reduction in 1900. It was the last year of the four-year term of the trustees then in office, and many desired to make a record for economy. A reaction came in later years, some few townships going to the other extreme in the giving of relief.

In 1901 a bill, indorsed by the Board of State Charities, was presented to and passed by the General Assembly, codifying the state's poor-laws.<sup>20</sup> The good features of the old laws were retained, and some important changes were made. The clause requiring the trustees to secure the consent of county commissioners before giving relief beyond a period of three months was eliminated, and the \$15 limit was made to apply only to ordinary relief, exclusive of aid on account of sickness, burials, and supplies for school children. This law is in force at the present time, and is regarded as highly satisfactory in all parts of the state.

In a summary of the results achieved under this series of reform measures, the great reduction in the amount of poor-relief is probably the most striking. When the attention of the Board of State Charities was directed to the subject in 1890, the total relief in that year was found to be \$560,232.65, as reported by the county auditors. From 1890 to 1895, both inclusive, the amount paid out by the overseers of the poor averaged more than \$550,000 annually. From 1897 to 1900, inclusive, the first four-year term after the original reform laws were passed, the annual average expenditure for poor-relief was \$323,543.58; in the next four-year term, \$257,613.16. The highest and the lowest amounts reported for any one year from 1890 to 1905, inclusive, were \$630,168.79 in 1895, and \$209,956.22 in 1900—

<sup>19</sup> *Annual Report*, Board of State Charities, 1900, p. 178.

<sup>20</sup> Acts of 1901, Chapter 147.






a difference of \$420,212.57. The counties which had been most extravagant, and which therefore contributed most largely to the reduction, were found to be St. Joseph, Elkhart, Grant, Allen, Cass, Bartholomew, and Porter. These are among the most populous and the wealthiest in the state.

A means of showing the reduction in the cost of poor-relief more effective than a statement of the amount by dollars and cents, is the two maps, numbered 1 and 2, found herewith, which give the relative cost to population of the different counties. One shows the condition in 1895, the last year before the enactment of the first reform law; the other is for 1905. In 1895 the cost of poor-relief was 29 cents to each inhabitant of the state. The lowest per capita were 6 cents in Crawford County, and 7 cents in Ripley County. The highest were 68 cents in Lagrange, 66 cents in Henry, and 64 cents in St. Joseph. In two counties the per capita was below 10 cents; in thirty-five it was above 30 cents. In 1905 the cost of poor-relief was 10 cents to each inhabitant of the state. The lowest per capita were 3 cents each in Washington, Ripley, and Floyd Counties; the highest were 29 cents in Montgomery County, 24 in Wayne, and 23 in Morgan. In forty-nine counties the per capita was below 10 cents; not a single county reached as high as 30 cents. The difference between these two sets of figures is more readily grasped in the following tabulated statement:

	1895	1905
Cost of relief to each inhabitant of the state.....	\$0.29	\$0.10
Highest per-capita cost .....	0.68	0.29
Lowest per-capita cost.....	0.06	0.03
Number of counties in which the per-capita cost was below 10 cents .....	2	49
Number of counties in which the per-capita cost was above 30 cents .....	35	0

Another means of measuring the reduction in the cost of poor-relief is afforded by the rate of taxation for each \$100 in each township. The following table is self-explanatory and needs no comment:



MAP 2

Year	No Levy	Under 5 Cents	5 Cents and Over	No. of Townships
1898.....	64	515	435	1,014
1899.....	50	607	357	1,014
1900.....	146	644	226	1,016
1901.....	154	620	240	1,014
1902.....	181	611	223	1,015
1903.....	233	617	165	1,015
1904.....	224	649	144	1,017
1905.....	289	581	146	1,016


The number of persons aided and its relation to the population of the state form an equally interesting study. In former years there was no means of collecting such statistics, but the law of 1895 filled that need. As mentioned above, the first set of reports under that law was for 1896 and indicated a total of 71,414 persons aided. Because of their incompleteness, these reports were not satisfactory. The number reported for 1897 was 82,235. This was equal to 3.2 per cent. of the population of the state (2,516,462 by the census of 1900), or one in every thirty-one inhabitants. In 1898 the number was reduced to 75,119, and in 1899 to 64,468. From that year to 1905, inclusive, the number helped annually averaged 46,561. In 1905 the number reported as receiving the aid given was 45,331. This was equal to 1.8 per cent. of the population of the state, or one in every fifty-six inhabitants.

The conditions in 1897 and in 1905 are shown graphically in the shaded maps numbered 3 and 4, herewith given. The counties shaded black are those in which the number aided was equal to one in twenty-nine or less inhabitants of the county. Thirty-eight counties are so shaded in the 1897 map; one, Montgomery, in the 1905 map.

In this connection it is fitting to call attention to conditions existing in the county poor asylums in the state in the years under consideration. A census of the inmates for August 31, 1891, gave 3,253 as the number of persons present on that day. This was equal to 14.8 in each 10,000 of the state's population.<sup>21</sup> When the General Assembly of 1899 passed a law restricting the

<sup>21</sup> *Annual Report*, Board of State Charities, 1891, p. 128.





MAP 3

amount of outdoor aid the township trustees might give, there was much real anxiety in different parts of the state as to the adequacy of the county poor asylums to receive the number who, it was felt, would of necessity be sent there. The poor-asylum census for August 31, 1899, was 3,133.<sup>22</sup> In more than one county the officials seriously contemplated enlarging their asylums for the care of the expected additional applicants, but in every case they were advised by the Board of State Charities, which expected no such need to arise, to wait for further developments. In 1900, under the operation of the new law, official outdoor relief dropped from \$320,667.53 to \$209,956.22, a decrease of 34 per cent. Instead of the expected increase in poor-asylum population, there was a decrease, both relative and actual. The census for August 31, 1900, showed 3,096 in those institutions.<sup>23</sup> From year to year as the administration of outdoor relief grew more business-like, there was a corresponding decrease in the population of the county poor asylums. The number present in such institutions on August 31, 1905, was 3,115, or 12.4 in every 10,000 of the state's population.<sup>24</sup> The population of the state, as shown by the United States census, increased 14 per cent. from 1890 to 1900. The population of the county poor asylums decreased 4 per cent. from 1891 to 1905. Had the same proportion of inmates to state population continued, the poor asylums at the present time would be caring for 650 more inmates, and this number, on the very conservative estimate of \$85 annually per capita for maintenance, would have meant an additional yearly expense of \$55,000.


These are the tangible proofs of better conditions in the administration of the poor funds—the reduction in the cost of relief, in the number of persons receiving aid, and in the population of the county poor asylums. But there is abundant reason to believe that, along with and because of these improvements from the standpoint of the taxpayer, has come a better condition for the poor themselves. The old system encouraged dependence on the public, and the giving of aid to one family frequently had the result of infecting the whole community with the blight of pau-

<sup>22</sup> *Annual Report*, 1899, p. 51.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 1905, p. 82.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 1900, p. 78.





MAP 4



perism. With public support cut off, except in cases of absolute necessity, the only alternative was self-support, and this benefited both the citizen and the state.

The administration of the new law has not been perfect. There have been abuses. Some overseers of the poor have not conformed to the law. Excessive amounts have been spent in some communities. In some counties the commissioners have not given the proper supervision, and some county attorneys have misinterpreted the law. Yet there has been an average annual decrease of 29,865 in the number who shared in the relief, and of \$337,192.09 in the expenditures; and, according to the general testimony, the poor in the state have never been looked after so well as since this law went into effect.

The outlook for the future is promising. The trustees now in office have made an excellent record for the first year of their incumbency. Within thirty days after the close of the year, every report from every overseer was on file in the office of the Board of State Charities. The records indicate that many have made notable improvement.

Since it has been shown that the persons deprived of their weekly pittance from the trustee's office did not avail themselves of the opportunity offered of public support in the county poor asylums, the question will naturally be asked: What became of them? It is not known, positively. Probably some of them left the state. Yet it is not difficult to believe that the majority remained in their respective communities, since from one township after another comes the word that able-bodied men and women who have heretofore been supported almost wholly by the public are, either by their own efforts or by the help of relatives, supporting themselves. The country's prosperity in recent years has undoubtedly participated to some extent in the results achieved under the reform laws, but not nearly to the extent that some would suppose. No one who works among paupers fails soon to learn that "good times" do not greatly affect that class of people. Real pauper families, such as were being manufactured at an alarming rate in Indiana in former years, depend upon charity, be the times good or bad.

As a further illustration of the fact that pauperism flourishes, and even grows, during times of prosperity, reference may be had to the address of Mr. J. Mack Tanner, secretary of the Illinois Board of Commissioners of Public Charities, at the State Conference of Charities 1903.<sup>25</sup>

One hundred and two counties in Illinois in 1899 paid out \$760,445 in outdoor relief. The average per-capita cost to the people of the state was 16 cents, varying from one-half mill in Edwards County to 53 cents in Adams County. It is to be noted that the sixteen counties paying more than double the average (from 32 to 53 cents) are all in the great, rich farming district of Illinois. Possibly the general prosperity of this section encourages the poor to make their home here. . . . That much of our so-called charity is responsible for the increase of pauperism does not admit of a doubt. This criticism applies with peculiar force to our present system of out relief. Experience has shown that the increase and degree of indigence and misery bear a close relation to the assistance given to the poor from public funds. The plain intent of the law is that out relief shall be given in emergency cases and covering a brief period. By a laxity of administration, which seems inseparable from the system, what was intended as an exception has become the rule, until in some of the counties of this state from 40 to 60 per cent. of the county revenue is thus expended. . . . Statistics from the official records of LaSalle County show that for the decade from 1890 to 1900 the increase in the expenses of out relief had assumed alarming proportions, notably in the larger cities and towns. The annual expenditure for this purpose increased from \$6,500 in 1890 to \$40,000 in 1896. The percentage of increase was 416 in Ottawa, 345 in LaSalle, 668 in Streator, and 270 in Peru. It was also found that the supervisors of several of these towns were paying out more for out relief alone than the total amount of their county taxes for all purposes, leaving the rural towns to support all the other county institutions.

The point may be raised that the cutting-off of so large an amount of public aid would create a demand for private charity. If such had been the case, it is felt that information to that effect would have been received from the different charity-organization societies, of which there are several in the smaller cities of the state. No such reports have been received, and it is believed that no notable increase of aid from private sources followed the remarkable reduction in public aid above noted.

The results achieved under the operation of these laws may be summarized as follows:

<sup>25</sup> *Proceedings, Illinois Conference of Charities, 1903, p. 81.*

1. A reduction of nearly 50 per cent. in the number of persons receiving public aid.
2. An average annual reduction of \$337,192.09 in the expenditures on account of official poor-relief.
3. A general lessening in the rate of taxation for poor purposes.
4. Notwithstanding all this, a decrease in the population of the county poor asylums.
5. Better and more intelligent care of worthy persons actually in need of help.

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## THE LITERARY INTERESTS OF CHICAGO. V

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### V. ÆSTHETIC PERIODICALS OF THE WORLD'S FAIR CITY 1890-1900

"All this time there had been building the beautiful city of white palaces on the lake, and it was now open for the world to see what Chicago had dreamed and created. Although it had made me impatient to have Mr. Droun spend on it his energy that was needed in his own business, now that it was accomplished, in all its beauty and grandeur, it filled me with admiration.

"There were few hours that I could spend in its enjoyment, but I remember one evening after my return from the East, when we had a family party at the Fair. May and Will were spending their vacation with us during the hot weather, and the four of us, having had our dinner, took an electric launch and glided through the lagoons beneath the lofty peristyle out to the lake, which was as quiet as a pond. The long lines of white buildings were ablaze with countless lights; the music from the bands scattered over the grounds floated softly out upon the water; all else was silent and dark. In that lovely hour, soft and gentle as was ever a summer night, the toil and trouble of men, the fear that was gripping men's hearts in the market, fell away from me, and in its place came Faith. The people who could dream this vision and make it real, those people from all parts of the land who thronged here day after day—their sturdy wills and strong hearts would rise above failure, would press on to greater victories than this triumph of beauty—victories greater than the world had yet witnessed!" E. V. Harrington, packer, in *The Memoirs of an American Citizen*, by Robert Herrick, 1905.

Basking in a new light reflected over their trade city by the "White City" of the World's Columbian Exposition, the men attempting to publish periodicals at Chicago during the nineties opened their eyes to many new influences. First they adopted the appeal of pictorial art. The World's Fair was a magnificent picture. Graphic presentation was the form used to attract æsthetic interest in several journals begun just before, during, and after 1893. The copper-plate half-tone did not come into

general commercial use until that year. The cheapening of this process started the wave of popular illustrated magazines from other centers, which has since become an inundation. But in Chicago this turn toward emphasis on illustrations was quickened by the Fair, which even prosaic visitors from western prairie soil likened to the "heavenly vision." Men ambitious to be publishers went into ecstasies over its suggestions. In imagination they saw heaps of gold as the reward for publishing pictures, supplemented with literary material.

Besides the effect of the panorama, there was the finer influence from the exhibitions of the fine arts. The subtleties of architectural decoration, even though done in ephemeral staff; the grace of form from the hands of the great sculptors, although the statues were but casts; and, above all, the original paintings from the brushes of Old and New World masters, hanging in hall after hall of the Fine Arts Building, revealed to the people of Chicago and the West the beauty of universal art. Foreign members of the artist group inspired in their Chicago hosts enthusiasm for art in all of its manifestations; and the judging for awards stimulated the habit of criticism on the basis of merit, tending to suppress praise from local pride. Magazines devoted to the fine arts, and literary magazines edited in the spirit of the artist class, followed the Fair.

The World's Columbian Exposition also brought historic perspective to the new and still crude western metropolis. On one bright day during that summer the vessels from Chicago harbors were, as usual, marking the sky-line of the lake to the east with their clouds of smoke, the pennants of commerce. Three caravels, picturesque imitations of those in which Columbus had sailed to America in 1492, and, like those of the discoverer, having come slowly over from old Spain, moved past the lake craft and into the Jackson Park lagoon, where they still stand moored today. These caravels, and the exposition in nearly all its sections, gave to the people of the new western market-metropolis the vivid impression that the life of their community is but a chapter in the epic of world-wide civilization. Nearly all the general literary and

pictorial magazines established in Chicago during the Fair decade showed the effect of this impression.

Finally, for a season the World's Fair transformed Chicago the inland center into Chicago the cosmopolitan center. This city, being far from a seaport, normally cannot have in it a kaleidoscopic company of transients from all the world, such as assembles daily in New York, London, and Paris. But for the one brief summer the down-town streets and the wide ways at the Fair grounds were thronged with visitors, not merely from many localities of the United States, but from all countries. On the Midway Plaisance, a boulevard of the nations and races, bordered for a mile by groups of the natives of Europe and of the Orient in settings from their distant towns and villages, thousands of men and women from everywhere touched shoulders in one common interest. Not one of the seventy periodicals of æsthetic character undertaken in Chicago during the decade of this cosmopolitan gathering contained the word "western" in its title. In every period before this there had been "western" literary journals attempted at Chicago. But the World's Fair made for a breadth of view which repressed the western spirit. All types of literary and artistic periodicals became more cosmopolitan in their outlook, and in some of the general literary magazines of the decade unique efforts at the world-wide character were made. During the thirteen years since the exposition was a reality, the tradition of it has had a vital influence on Chicago. But, as with reading a novel, the effects are most vivid while one is going through its pages and just after the book is closed, so the enlarging influence of the World's Fair was felt most forcibly by Chicago publishers during the year of the Fair and immediately after the closing of its gates.

Illustrated journals, in form though not in periodicity like *Harper's Weekly*, were the most conspicuous of the mushroom periodicals at Chicago in the first few years of the World's Fair decade. In most publications illustrations are used to supplement literary features. In these journals material in printed form designed to give literary entertainment was used as an auxiliary



to the illustrations. The most important of these periodicals were *Halligan's Illustrated World's Fair*, *Campbell's Illustrated Columbian*, and the *Graphic*.

The first number of *Halligan's Illustrated World's Fair*, put out for promotion, appeared in 1890. Mr. Jewell Halligan, its originator, came to Chicago from Denver, and in this advance issue announced plans for a most pretentious publication. The second number was published in August of the next year, and the periodical was issued monthly until December, 1893.

"To carry the undeniable news of the eye to the ends of the earth," was one phase of the publishing policy announced by Halligan's paper. Its pages were of unusually large size. Most of them were filled with half-tone illustrations. An advertisement, in 1893, said that the magazine was "the first to exclude all other forms of picture save photographs on copper called half-tones." Undeniably the illustrations, done by the new process and printed on extra-fine paper, were well executed. The journal's pictorial record of the Fair was so complete that two editions of extra copies were printed for sale in bound volumes. In this form the magazines made such an attractive World's Fair picture-book that one set was added to the collection of volumes in the art-room of the Chicago Public Library.

A distinct literary flavor was to be found in the printed material on the pages containing the smaller illustrations. This was due to the fact that Mr. John McGovern was the editor. Of an ebullient, imaginative turn of mind, a reader who has roamed over many fields of world-lore and literature, Mr. McGovern was spurred to most characteristic endeavors by the spirit of the World's Fair times, when all the currents of thought ran large. Having graduated into newspaper work and letters from the printer's case, he had written ten volumes of essays, poems, and novels. All of these had been published at Chicago. And some of the exposition directors who had been patrons of these productions had urged him to take the editorship of *Halligan's Illustrated World's Fair*. Always an advocate of "western literature," he spoke of editor and publisher as "western men," and

announced that they would "strive to do their work in their own way, aping no fashion of any other region." Declaring that "original literature is original literature," and that "the fleeting, capricious thoughts of a creator lie between him and the Great Creator," Mr. McGovern made the following signed statement concerning the contributions literary men might send him: "I will not edit their copy. This pledge I kept sacred in *The Current*; it will not be more difficult to make it more sacred in maturer years." Although asking for "a pleasant godspeed for Western Literature," Mr. McGovern voiced the larger outlook, calling attention to the fact that the Fair was not Chicago's, but the world's, and declaring that the journal was to have dignity and "to perfect a proper subjective."

Literary material of more interest from the ideas in the subject-matter than from form of presentation was the result of this policy. An excellent little poem on some theme suggested by thoughts of Christopher Columbus appeared in nearly every number. For instance, "A Mother's Song in Spain, A. D. 1493," was contributed by William S. Lord, an Evanston business man who has done some writing and independent publishing from time to time. E. Hough, Ernest McGaffey, and Charles Eugene Banks were among those who wrote Columbus verses for the *Illustrated World's Fair*. Opie Read, of whom Mr. McGovern is an intimate friend, contributed a sketch entitled "Old Billy at the World's Fair." The literary ministers, David Swing, Robert McIntyre, and W. T. Meloy, wrote many essays for the journal, and Colonel Robert G. Ingersoll supplied an article captioned "The Effect of the World's Fair on Human Progress." A total of ninety-nine contributors was listed. While many were Chicago men, not a few in the list were residents of other places in America, and some, including Alphonse Daudet, of distant countries. In all the contributions and editorials the western element was illuminated with league-like leaps of the imagination, showing appreciation of historic perspective.

A general world's magazine was expected to be the outgrowth of *Halligan's Illustrated World's Fair*. In the Decem-

ber, 1893, number the publisher announced that the name of the magazine would thereafter be the *Illustrated World*, to be a literary journal containing "the larger views of the earth's surface." But that number was the last. Mr. Halligan lost some \$30,000 in the *Illustrated World's Fair* venture. The cost of the extra-large half-tones was too great to be easily met with receipts from subscriptions at \$2.50 a year, and the expense for the half-tones used in the advertising pages was so heavy that every increase in advertising meant an increase in the net loss. The republication of the numbers for sale in bound volumes did not meet with a large demand. Special patronage in some form was needed.

A fight for special support from the exposition directorate was lost by Mr. Halligan. Unfortunately for him, between 1890, when his promotion number, copyrighted as *Halligan's Illustrated World's Fair*, made its appearance, and the opening of the Fair in 1893, the official name adopted for it was "World's Columbian Exposition" instead of "World's Fair," the name originally contemplated. Hence, although the exposition was generally spoken of as the "World's Fair," the name of his magazine would not have been correct for an official organ.

In the meantime, a monthly designated the *World's Columbian Exposition Illustrated* was started, in February, 1891, by Mr. James B. Campbell, a Chicago man in the printing business. A collection of old copies of the Historical Society library shows that this, too, was an excellent illustrated journal, although not so large nor so artistic as Halligan's. But Mr. Campbell succeeded in securing official support. His paper became the organ of the exposition directors, publishing official documents. It was consequently profitable to the publisher. The magazine also was declared to be the prize history of the exposition and was awarded a first premium.

Besides stating that he proposed to make the *World's Columbian Exposition Illustrated* a "complete encyclopedia of the great enterprise," the editor and publisher said: "In addition we will devote a proper amount of space to the art and literature of



the day." A standing sub-line to the title made the same promise. The journal's pages, however, contained nothing of æsthetic interest except the pictorial display. The *World's Columbian Exposition Illustrated* ran as such until February, 1894.

Out of it grew an illustrated monthly magazine which has endured until the present day. This is called *Campbell's Illustrated Journal*. In the number before its change of name an announcement said that in the future the magazine would devote much space to art. In it, however, chief attention has been paid to the various expositions which have followed that of 1893 in America and abroad. In 1900 Mr. Campbell received a gold medal at the Paris exposition. Today his journal is advertised as a high-class illustrated magazine for home reading. But it has never been given a strong literary character, although it has been so conducted as to be a successful business enterprise.

The *Graphic*, which rose on the World's Fair wave, was broader in scope, and higher in artistic and literary quality, than either of the illustrated papers nominated as exposition journals. It was published by Mr. G. P. Engelhard, who is today a successful publisher of medical books. During two of the years of its existence it was edited by Mr. J. A. Spencer Dickerson, now publisher of the Baptist paper, the *Standard*.

Although the *Graphic* was a national news and general literary weekly, it grew out of a local suburban newspaper owned by Mr. Engelhard. This paper was published in Hyde Park, the suburb in which the grounds for the then projected fair were located. When Hyde Park was annexed to Chicago in 1890, Mr. Engelhard converted his paper for local items into a national illustrated weekly of most general character. At one long jump this change was made, in the hope that, from a start which illustrating the World's Fair was expected to give the *Graphic*, a permanent foothold for a nation-wide circulation would be secured. When, in 1892, the *Graphic* absorbed *America*, which on its part had absorbed the *Current*, the new journal possessed whatever remnants of strength there were left from all the

last preceding ephemeral periodicals of merit published in Chicago.

While the *Graphic* was a general newspaper, containing editorial reviews of independent Republican leaning, literary material of interest because of its form made up a considerable share of its contents. There was serial and briefer fiction, also some poetry, in every week's issue. Mary Hartwell Catherwood, whose romances have received general recognition, contributed a continued story of Canadian life entitled "The Children of Ha Ha Bay." The first ambitious work of Vance Thompson whose character sketches have made his name well known to magazine readers, was done for the *Graphic*. Florence Wilkinson, who writes verses for the leading magazines, had her first experience in writing for a periodical while serving as one of its editors. Thus, like other short-lived literary journals in Chicago, the *Graphic* was a training-ground for some of those entering the literary lists.

This bringing-out of local talent was even more marked in reference to illustrators. The illustrations of the *Graphic* were not confined, like those of the avowedly World's Fair journals, to reproductions of photographs. Every piece of fiction was enlivened with original illustrations. Decorative borders illuminated the pages. T. Dart Walker and Henry Reuterdaahl, illustrators now in New York, did some of their initial magazine work for the *Graphic*. Will Bradley, an artist also now of New York, did borders and headpieces for it. Others who later went from Chicago to "Gotham" were discovered by this Chicago illustrated periodical.

For the reproductions of photographs which were a stable feature of the *Graphic*, at first zinc etchings, showing only lines, were used. But in 1893 the new half-tones, capable of making shadings show in printer's ink by means of etching the dotted surfaces of copper plates were adopted. They were especially good for picturing the white buildings and dark crowds of the fair. But the process was then expensive. Mr. Engelhard had to pay 40 cents a square inch for half-tones—a high price compared with the 12½ cents charged today.

The yearly subscription price was put at \$4. Nevertheless, the magazine attained a *bona fide* circulation of 13,000; the advertisers' annuals quoted it at 40,000; and advertising was received in such amounts that for one twelve-month period the *Graphic's* books showed a profit of \$10,000, although that was not enough to offset the losses of earlier years.

Then came the panic of 1893, which during the height of the Fair business men had felt to be impending. The circulation of the *Graphic* dropped 50 per cent., throwing what had been a favorable balance to the other side. Its publication was soon after suspended. Interviewed for this historical sketch, Mr. Engelhard said:

The *Graphic* would have lived through this reverse if it had been started in New York, for two reasons: First, because New York is the home of great successes in higher-class journalism. With a showing like that which the *Graphic* had made here, if made there, scores of men of wealth would have been ready to step in and keep it going as a business investment. Second, because of the aggregation of art talent and literary talent in New York. All we had here was what we discovered and created. The thing that makes the New York magazines today is not that the people of the country care particularly to patronize New York, but that the talent is there. New York is distinctly the utilitarian art center, just as Battle Creek is the national center for sanitarium and health foods, and Detroit for medical supplies. When certain interests once secure lodgment in a locality, they find a natural development along easiest lines in that place. Men of talent for illustrating, discovered by the Art Institute, daily newspapers, and short-lived magazines of Chicago, naturally migrate to New York. It was so with those who did work for the *Graphic*.

The names of two other illustrated periodicals, recorded as having originated in 1892, the year in which it was first intended the World's Fair should be opened, appear in the newspaper annual lists of Chicago. One was the *Illustrated Sun*, a weekly appearing on Saturdays for a year. The other was the *American Illustrated*, a monthly of magazine form, devoted to literature and education. Its name appeared in the annuals as late as 1901, when it announced a sworn circulation of 100,000.

*Puck*, one of the well-established New York humorous weeklies, was published at the Columbian Exposition grounds in Chicago from May 1 to October 1, 1893. It bore the name *World's*



*Fair Puck*, and also a Chicago post-office entry for thirty-six numbers, but its nature was not changed. There was merely a summer's variation in the subject-matter. The scenes and characters for the illustrated jokes and sketches were taken from the Fair. A frequent trick of the caricaturists and cartoonists for the *World's Fair Puck* was to make the exposition statutory appear animated. Incidentally, through receiving visitors at a temporary Puck Building at the Fair, the publishers pushed their circulation.

A weekly printed for the most part from plates prepared by a syndicate of New York men interested in *Life*, was issued in Chicago beginning in 1890. *Figaro* was its name. A sketch of "Figaro en Masque"—a satanic figure in pen and ink, a photograph of some Chicago society leader, and a border in brilliant red ink combine to awaken interest in the cover of each of the numbers to be found in a file at the Newberry Library. In the contents the plate matter from *Life* was supplemented with original material concerning the drama, society, and local affairs in Chicago, as satirically seen through a monocle like *Life's*. After the first year the general jokes from New York were dropped out. By 1893 the many functions for visiting princes afforded more society news than there had been in Chicago before, and although a few tales were published in the paper, it became distinctly a society weekly. After several changes in management, with the issue of December 21, 1893, *Figaro* vanished from the periodical stage in Chicago.

Titles with Columbian Exposition connotation were given to two ephemeral weeklies of the literary class. One called *Columbia*, a Saturday paper listed in the newspaper directories as "literary," lasted for a year or so in 1890 and 1891. The *Columbian*, catalogued as a periodical devoted to fiction, lived as brief a time in 1892 and 1893.

A creditable quarterly designated the *Queen Isabella Journal*, and intended to be but ephemeral, was published in 1893 by the Queen Isabella Association to promote the interests of women at the World's Fair.

The creation of several art magazines for general readers

was one of the direct results of the exaltation of the fine arts in Chicago and the Middle West by the World's Columbian Exposition. They grew out of the general increase in attention to the so-called fine arts—the expressions of beauty in the graphic and plastic media—which was given a much greater impetus by the Exposition than was activity in other forms of expressing the æsthetic interest. This attention was not ended with the passing of the rich collection of paintings, drawings, and sculpture in the Art Building of staff at the Fair grounds. There was a permanent result more influential locally, and from which art magazines emanated more directly. The impressive and beautiful structure of the Art Institute of Chicago, standing on the Lake Front border of the city's business maelstrom, was erected in 1892. The World's Fair commissioners and the Art Institute trustees built it and gave it to the municipality. It was temporarily used for Columbian Exposition congresses. But the monumental structure of blue-gray stone, its architecture of the Italian Renaissance style, with details in classic Ionic and Corinthian, was erected on such a scale as would fit it to stand as a permanent shrine, where worshipers of the fine arts might gather in its museums and grow in appreciation of beauty, and where those with creative ability might assemble in its studios and learn technique. The art magazines which accompanied the general interest in fine arts awakened by the exposition, and the permanent establishment of this institution of art, did not depend primarily on literary form for their appeal to the æsthetic interest. But since the art of letters is furthered by the parallel increase of interest in painting and sculpture, the growth in this phase of the æsthetic interest, and the magazines which went with it, are to be considered in giving an account of the literary interests of Chicago.

*Brush and Pencil* is the name which two artistic magazines started at the Art Institute have borne, one of them, a general art magazine which has broken the local bounds, being still published regularly. In October, 1892, the first magazine of that name was attempted at the Institute. It lived but a short time, and was soon absorbed by *Arts for America*.

This more lasting magazine—*Arts for America*—was also established in 1892, but with offices outside of the Art Institute. It was broader in its scope, and more directly the result of the general interest in fine arts created by the Exposition exhibits. One of its early objects was announced to be the reproduction of the pictures at the World's Fair. Devoted exclusively to information about the fine arts, it was an attractive monthly, dignified in tone, and, from its illustrations, beautiful in appearance. It was the organ of the Central Art Association, and was continued for nine years. Later numbers announced that one of its objects was the promotion of national art education. In 1899, from an office of publication in the Auditorium tower, the magazine went out to 15,000 readers, largely in the north central states. Mrs. T. Vernetta Morse was its editor.

The *Brush and Pencil*, which has been continued monthly to the present time, was begun in 1897. It was started as a magazine "devoted to the interests of the students of the Art Institute." In the initial number the editor of *Arts for America* was thanked for the permission to revive the name *Brush and Pencil*. Charles Francis Browne, the painter, a member of the Art Institute corps of teachers, was the first editor of the journal. In tone it was at the beginning very much like any school or college paper.

In 1900 *Brush and Pencil* became a general art magazine, the local elements being eliminated. During that year it was purchased by Mr. Frederick W. Morton, a former Unitarian minister, who for five months in 1899 had attempted, at Chicago, the publication of *Friday*, "a weekly journal of views, reviews, and piquant comment." Mr. Morton became sole editor and publisher of *Brush and Pencil*. For several years the office of publication was in the McClurg Building.

The character of the magazine, as a portrayer of contemporary work in the fine arts, has been excellent. The reproductions of the best of the paintings, mural decoration, and sculpture of America, Europe, and Japan, printed in its pages, have been well done. Mr. Morton holds that at no city can engraving and printing of high quality be secured more economically than in Chicago. The magazine's articles on art subjects have also been uniformly good.



*Brush and Pencil* has had a circulation of 10,000, the subscribers being scattered through all the states. But Mr. Morton complains that the people of Chicago are not yet interested in art in general, that their art interest is confined to supporting the Art Institute. The magazine has not enjoyed a very prosperous business career. From July to December, 1904, its publication was temporarily discontinued, but thereafter resumed. To secure advertising, on May 1, 1905, the main office of the periodical was removed to New York, although the Chicago post-office entry has been retained and the mechanical work continued here. Mr. Morton says:

New York is the magazine center of the country. Any Chicago magazine that has made good its foothold has gone to New York. In New York in five days I secured \$2,400 worth of cash advertising. In Chicago I could not get that much for *Brush and Pencil* in five weeks.

*Great Pictures*, a monthly filled with reproductions of paintings by world-masters, was brought out regularly during the year 1899. Its contents were confined to copies of the nude. Its file shows that it was plainly erotic, and that the periodical was designed for a perverted use of the art interests. It was published by "The White City Art Company," and was a medium for advertising the sale of single copies of the pictures reproduced in its pages.

*Nature and Art*, a children's monthly of æsthetic interest derived from illustrations well executed in printed colors, was begun in 1897 as *Birds in Natural Colors*, and continued until 1901.

*Child Garden of Story, Song and Play*, a monthly magazine for children of the age for primers, was established in 1892 and is still published. It is a kindergarten magazine in which the attractiveness of stories, rhymes, and pictures is utilized to educate little ones without the appearance of didactic effort, according to the principles of the "new education." It is published at the Pestalozzi-Froebel Press in Chicago, and has a circulation of 10,000.

A unique order of literary periodicals, toned to the temper of the artist, whatever his working medium, flourished in Chi-

icago during the years immediately following the World's Fair. The presence of a growing group of professional artists and literary workers—an artist class—and an increase in the number of dilettantes account, in part, for the interest in this type of literary medium at Chicago. Enthusiasm for individual expression, and contempt for the inartistic, gave a tone to these miniature magazines. The *Chap-Book*, whose history has significance in a certain line of literary and periodical publishing development for the entire country, east as well as west, was the first and most notable of this class of literary media. Others at Chicago in the nineties were *Four O'Clock*, the *Blue Sky*, and the *Scroll*.

Before being transplanted to Chicago, in August, 1894, the *Chap-Book* had been issued for three months at Cambridge, Mass. Mr. Herbert S. Stone, a Harvard college man from Chicago, the son of Mr. Melville E. Stone, the journalist, was the chief originator and principal editor and publisher of the *Chap-Book* until its hundredth and last number appeared July 15, 1898. As an undergraduate he had been editor of the *Harvard Crimson*, had contributed sketches to the *Lampoon*, and had prepared a serious work of *First Editions of American Authors*, designed for collectors. In the autumn of his senior year, 1893-94, at Cambridge, Mr. Stone had, with H. I. Kimball, established the firm of Stone & Kimball, for carrying on a small book-publishing business, which was later continued in New York by Mr. Kimball.

The periodical was put out to be an adjunct to this business. The ambitious undergraduate book-publishers needed a circular with which to advertise the books of fiction and verse bearing their imprint, and economy was to be exercised in having it circulated as second-class mail matter. Choosing a name which originated in the literary developments of England in the seventeenth century, when small tracts or booklets containing ballads and stories of heroes, hobgoblins, and witches were issued intermittently, and were sold cheap, by chapmen or peddlers, they called their circular the *Chap-Book*—a name which proved admirably pat for the Cambridge-Chicago publication. This was

the first chap-book to appear at stated intervals. Coming out semi-monthly, it was sold at five cents a copy and one dollar a year. It was very small and of the bibelot shape, something new at the time, and a means of emphasizing its unique character.

But for this "miscellany and review of belles-lettres" to fulfil the post-office regulations, reading-matter containing general information was required, and the title-page, which, like every other of its pages, was odd from being printed in red as well as black ink, contained these words:

The Chap-Book, Being a miscellany of curious and interesting songs, ballads, tales, histories, etc.; adorned with a variety of pictures and very delightful to read, newly composed by MANY CELEBRATED WRITERS; to which is annexed a large collection of notices of books.

In the character creation, during the first two months of the periodical, Mr. Stone was assisted by Bliss Carman, the poet. Together they wrote some original notes and essays, and edited the contributions. Sharp remarks about new books, reviews containing views framed solely from the feelings of the one who happened to write each critique, gave the *Chap-Book* its keynote. All of the notes were in the first person and signed. The essays, stories, and poems published, were marked by the most distinct individuality and originality. In making their bow, the chapmen of 1894 had added a word that contributions from writers "unknown" as well as from those "wellknown" would be printed. Both men who had written before and men who had never written for publication, but thought that they could do so, at once saw in the *Chap-Book* a medium for their freest expression. They soared in freedom from the commercial chains of the established publishers who judge literary output by the standard of the conventional demands made by the book- and magazine-buying public. The independence of the *Chap-Book* was emphasized by the fact that Mr. Stone and Mr. Kimball continued their publishing despite a threat from the Harvard faculty that if it was not discontinued they could not be graduated.

This new periodical, so novel in character, leaped into instant popularity with its first numbers. Such a reception took



the young publishers by surprise. It seemed to them an accident. They, however, grasped the situation and pushed their effort with enthusiasm. Before the three months of its publication at Cambridge had ended, the *Chap-Book* had found an audience and was to be seen regularly on the news-stands not only of Boston and the East, but throughout the country.

The local situation was not very encouraging for the *Chap-Book*, when in the summer of 1894 its publishing headquarters were removed to Chicago. It became a Chicago publication for the greater part of its existence chiefly through the accident that Mr. Stone's home was here, and that for personal and social reasons he decided, upon graduation from college, to carry on a professional and business career as a publisher in this city. Mr. Harrison Garfield Rhodes, a Cleveland man, came with him to be associate editor of the *Chap-Book*. Mr. Stone found the residents of Chicago suffering under a reaction which came after the World's Fair. Mr. Stone says that an avalanche of criticism from discerning visitors here the year before to see the "White City" had temporarily overwhelmed the thinking people of the smoke-covered, overgrown business town, which stood out unfavorably by contrast with the beautiful Fair. But he was nevertheless firm in the belief that an essentially cosmopolitan magazine could be published successfully in Chicago and the West.

Attention to new and curious developments in foreign artistic groups, particularly among the men of letters in England, which had been one of the unique features of the *Chap-Book* in its earliest issues, was continued and increased. Mr. Stone was in close touch with Aubrey Beardsley and the "Yellow Book" coterie of London, and from time to time made trips to London and Paris in quest of manuscripts. In a partial summary of authors who sent contributions from abroad, the following were listed:

From England: William Sharp, Edmund Gosse, Kenneth Grahame, I. Zangwill, John Davidson, "Q", William Ernest Henley, Robert Louis Stevenson, H. B. Marriott Watson, William Canton, Norman Gale, Max Beerbohm, F. Frankfort Moore, Arthur Morrison, H. G. Wells, S. Levett Yeats, Katherine Tynan Hinkson, W. B. Yeats, Thomas Hardy, E. F. Benson, William Watson, Henry Newbolt, and Andrew Lang. From France: Paul Verlaine, among others.

Among American contributors were :

Thomas Bailey Aldrich, Alice Brown, Gertrude Hall, Richard Hovey, Louise Chandler Moulton, Gilbert Parker, Charles G. D. Roberts, Clinton Scollard, Louise Imogen Guiney, Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Maria Louise Pool, Richard Henry Stoddard, Richard Burton, Madison Cawein, Eugene Field, Julian Hawthorne, H. H. Boyesen, Clyde Fitch, Wallace Rice, Hamlin Garland, Hamilton Wright Mabie, Maurice Thompson, John Vance Cheney, Lillian Bell, John Burroughs, Stephen Crane, John Fox, Jr., Henry James, Clinton Ross, Charles F. Lummis, Edmund Clarence Stedman, George W. Cable, Alice Morse Earle, Brander Matthews, Octave Thanet, Tudor Jenks, Joseph Pennell, Kate Douglas Wiggin, Paul Laurence Dunbar, J. J. Piatt, Ruth McEnery Stuart, George Edward Woodberry, R. W. Chambers, L. E. Gates, John Jay Chapman, Norman Hapgood, Gerald Stanley Lee, John Kendrick Bangs, and Joel Chandler Harris.

That their writings would find place alongside of those of such a company from America and England was a spur to ambitious young writers in Chicago and the West, who found in the *Chap-Book* a medium which was suited to the virility and independence of their westernism, but at the same time was so cosmopolitan an exponent of literary expression from various parts of the world as to make for the broadening of their striving toward artistic expression. Among the Americans listed above not a few did some of their first work for the *Chap-Book*. In Chicago Mr. Stone solicited manuscripts not only from amateur literary workers, such as Edith Wyatt then was, but also asked newspaper men to write for the *Chap-Book* with special attention to form of expression. Among others of whom he asked manuscripts were George Ade and Finley Peter Dunne. Wallace Rice wrote many clever critiques for the periodical.

The artists and literary workers of Chicago, who had grown to be quite a group, well defined through World's Fair influences, were soon rallied around the *Chap-Book*. A series of "*Chap-Book* teas" drew them to Mr. Stone's publishing-office, to look at originals of drawings and manuscripts, to talk shop, and in general to promote sociability in the professional literary and art crowd. Incidentally the "*Chap-Book* teas," which were followed by meetings of the "Attic Club," set the copy for the meetings of the "Little Room," an organization of creative

writers, artists, and musicians who at present gather fortnightly at a studio in the Fine Arts Building, and by the very coming together of the artist class for a social hour or two foster professional literary and artistic endeavor.

"*Chap-Book* posters" were one of the unique artistic products put out by the publisher of this unique magazine. These posters were sent to the news-stands, and influenced buyers of periodicals so that sales ran up as high as 50,000, and averaged 20,000. The posters were so artistic and so fantastic that they became very popular on their own account. *Harper's* posters, by Penfield, had previously attracted attention. But there was a rage for *Chap-Book* posters, and prospective readers often competed in keen bidding for them without buying the periodical they were intended to advertise. Through making many of these posters, Will Bradley helped himself toward achieving a national reputation.

But in a short time the *Chap-Book* no longer stood out as a unique literary periodical. The force of imitation was soon manifest. Mr. Stone says that at one time there were twenty-six imitators of it at the news-stalls. A disinterested investigator, Frederick Winthrop Faxon, of the *Bulletin of Bibliography*, Boston, compiled "A Bibliography of Modern Chap-Books and Their Imitators," which was first published in the journal with which he is connected, and republished in 1903 as a pamphlet under the title *Ephemeral Bibelots*. He lists 200 such periodicals, and in his introduction says, in part:

The small artistically printed periodicals variously called Chap-Books, Ephemerals, Bibelots, Brownie Magazines, Fadazines, Magazettes, Freak Magazines, owe their origin probably to the success of *The Chap-Book*, which was at once in such great demand that the early numbers were soon out of print and were in demand by collectors at from twenty to fifty times their original price. All sorts of "little magazines" were soon on the news-stands, competing for a part of *The Chap-Book's* favor. They were, with few exceptions, easily distinguishable by their appearance as well as by their names, which were apparently carefully chosen to indicate the ephemeral character of the publication.

The motive of publication of the genuine chap-books is hard to discover. They sprang up in the most out-of-the-way spots and died young in most



cases. Of the first generation we still have with us only the *Little Journeys* (December, 1894), now in its second form; *Bibelot* (January, 1895); *Philistine* (June, 1895); and the *Philosopher* (January, 1897), now in its third size.

Many of these bibelots seem to have resulted from the desire of ambitious, unknown writers to reach a supposedly large waiting public, which could not be reached through the established magazines, either because the author could not get his manuscript accepted, or because the readers he wished to reach were not among the subscribers to the older monthlies and quarterlies. This is but our humble guess as to cause of birth; but lack of support, or unwillingness on the part of the editor to be the only support, caused the untimely (?) death of the majority. In 1898 the race had almost all died off.

The *Chap-Book*, in a valedictory review of its career and influence, said:

Its habits of free speech produced a curious movement among the young writers of the country. There was scarcely a village or town which did not have its little individualistic pamphlet frankly imitating the form and tone of the *Chap-Book*.

Many moves toward getting the *Chap-Book* out of the class of ephemerals and into that of magazines firmly established on a sound business basis were made by Mr. Stone after settling down to his life-work as a publisher in Chicago. One such, made January 15, 1897, was the abandonment of its small form, for the regulation  $7\frac{1}{2} \times 4\frac{3}{4}$  inch magazine size. This change robbed the magazine of an appearance which had previously attracted attention to it when it was unique, and also proclaimed the fact that the proprietor was laying more emphasis on the commercialization than on the editing of the periodical. This change did not help sales and circulation. Furthermore, by this time the *Chap-Book* had said so many scorching things about books brought out by every leading publishing house in America that the publishers, from whom such a journal, containing literary critiques, should naturally have received its principal advertising patronage, tabooed it. As a bid for advertisements from general magazine advertisers, still another experimental change in form was made, February 15, 1898. The pages were enlarged to the  $12 \times 8\frac{1}{2}$  inch illustrated weekly size, and extra

smooth paper, suitable for advertisements containing half-tones, was used. But the *Chap-Book* did not secure much general advertising. Mr. Stone says one reason is that it was published too far from the seat of the advertising business—New York. But a more important reason is that no effort to secure a list of annual subscribers was made. "If we had secured such a list, the *Chap-Book* would be alive today," says Mr. Stone. "News-stand sales fluctuate. A list is needed in order to get advertising in off-years."

The *Chap-Book* died July 15, 1898. On that date those of its readers who were regular subscribers received a folio of farewell. This *finis* notice said in part:

It was not felt necessary to continue the *Chap-Book* longer to demonstrate that a good literary magazine could be published in the West and meet the critical approval of the country. The *Chap-Book* has never depended in any special way upon the West for support; indeed, it is probable that, in proportion to its size, Chicago had fewer subscribers than any other large city. But the editors believe that the critical standards of their paper have been kept as high as would have been possible either East or West. They believe that they have been consistently honest in trying to give to their public what seemed to them the best writing they could procure, whether it came from new or well-known authors. They believe, furthermore, that the *Chap-Book* has been the strongest protest we have had in America against the habit of promiscuous overpraise which is threatening to make the whole body of American criticism useless and stultifying.

Instead of the July 15 issue of the *Chap-Book*, the subscribers will receive the issue of the *Dial* for the same date. To this latter journal, upon an offer from its proprietors, have been transferred the subscription list, the right to the name, and the good-will of the *Chap-Book*. It has been consistently maintained by the *Chap-Book* that the *Dial* is in many ways the best purely critical journal in America, and it is hoped that subscribers will be pleased that their subscriptions are to be filled out in this manner.

William Morton Payne, a regular writer for the *Dial*, says the *Chap-Book* was a fad which ran its course, and that the *Dial* then absorbed what was left of it. He also gives the authoritative opinion that the *Chap-Book* was superior to any of its imitators.

Having profited by experience with the *Chap-Book*, Mr. Stone has been successful in publishing and editing the *House*

*Beautiful*. This attractive monthly was one of the first meritorious periodicals currently published at Chicago, and not a trade paper, to become established on a business footing. One reason given for the suspension of the *Chap-Book* was that from a business point of view the time and energy which it took could be spent more profitably in attention to the other interests of Herbert S. Stone & Co., this firm being engaged in bringing out novels and other works, and doing general publishing. In this connection Mr. Stone's firm had taken up, in September, 1897, the work of publishing the *House Beautiful*, which however, as from the date of its beginning in December, 1896, was then edited by Eugene Clapp, a civil engineer. When Mr. Clapp went to Cuba as a lieutenant of volunteers in the summer of 1898, Mr. Stone became the editor. In 1900 he sold his book-publishing interests to Mr. Melville E. Stone, Jr., his brother, and has since conducted the *House Beautiful* as an individual enterprise.

Avoiding the *Chap-Book* pitfall, the first effort of Mr. Stone has been to secure a large list of annual subscribers. In 1900 the *House Beautiful* had 3,000 regular subscribers, and the news-stand sales averaged 4,000. In 1905 the monthly circulation claimed was 40,000, and but a small percentage of the copies went to others than regular subscribers. To offset the difficulty in securing income from advertising which arises because 75 per cent. of all general advertising is placed by agencies in New York, the subscription price has been raised from \$1 to \$2 per year. In 1904 the size of the pages was enlarged to 9×12 inches so as to provide more advertising space next to single columns of reading-matter in the back part.

The art of interior decoration in the homes of those who, while having annual incomes of \$8,000, yet are so located that they cannot often visit the metropolitan stores, the art of landscape gardening, and architecture for country houses are the topics of æsthetic interest to which the *House Beautiful* is devoted. It contains little or no fiction, and Mr. Stone's society proclivities show results in its character. But since he writes or rewrites much of its contents, the periodical is marked by literary touches reminiscent of the ear-marks of the *Chap-Book*.



In mentioning ephemeral imitators of the *Chap-Book* appearing in the nineties, Mr. Faxon, in the pamphlet heretofore quoted, says:

*The Debutante, The Little Cyclist, The Mermaid, and The Night-Cap* were advertised to appear in Chicago, the first in April, 1895, the others in March and May, 1896, but were probably never issued.

With a suggestion in its name of the bright give-and-take of afternoon teas, *Four O'Clock* was conspicuous among the original magazines expressing the attitude of certain literary workers, pen-and-ink artists, and dabblers in art at Chicago in the late nineties. Its descriptive subtitle proclaimed it to be "a monthly magazine of original writings," and its motto was "Sincerity, beauty, ease, cleverness." Most of its contents were from Chicago writers. Not all were so original and clever, nor so marked by ease and beauty of style, as to be of special literary value, though some had a degree of merit. The "sincerity" was its expression of that vague spiritual quality known as the artist soul. In illustrations, however, the periodical was original and specially attractive. The reproductions of drawings, done so as to give them the effect of originals, appeared on leaves of special texture, pasted into the magazine. This device gave the periodical distinctive æsthetic values. Young artists, a majority of them students at the Art Institute, did most of this illustrating. Among the illustrators was Carl Werntz, who is now the head of the Art Academy, an independent art school in Chicago. *Four O'Clock* was started some time after the *Chap-Book* had reached the height of its career in Chicago. No. 1 was dated February, 1897. With the seventy-first number, December 1902, *Four O'Clock* was merged in *Muse*, another of the art-spirit literary periodicals, which had grown out of still another called *Philharmonic*. Literary workers who recall these magazines characterize them as dilettante ephemerals.

The *Blue Sky Magazine*, a dainty monthly booklet of letters, came regularly from a Chicago shop from August, 1899, until April, 1902. In both make-up and contents it was beautiful and quaint. This little magazine was a literary exponent of the new arts-and-crafts movement. It was printed at "the house of the Blue Sky Press," 4732 Kenwood Avenue, and, like the books

which the "Skytes," as the publishers called themselves, brought out from time to time, it was hand-set and printed by hand, exquisite in workmanship. Most of the numbers were the size of a book easily slipped into a coat pocket. It was printed on deckle-edge paper, and each paragraph was indicated with a reversed P. Thomas Wood Stevens and Alden Charles Noble, poetic souls who had been schooled in the mechanical part of their craft at Armour Institute of Technology, were the *Blue Sky Magazine* publishers, editors, and chief contributors.

"Happy is the man who ever sees the blue sky"—so their adopted motto ran. In an announcement of back volumes of the magazine, books bound in antique boards, they gave this quotation from "The Summer Sky":

So let us mould the Spirit of our book: to bring sometimes the sound of an old chivalric song over star-strewn waters tuning the Elder elemental note to the sweetest harmonies of the New.

Throughout, the contents showed evidence of editing and writing in this spirit. Verse, short stories, mostly on archaic themes, and two departments designated "Stray Clouds" and "The Devil, His Stuff," being made up of clever literary gossip by the young editors, filled the pages. In the verse some "Formal Measures" by Mr. Stevens, and a series of stately child rhymes by Mr. Noble, received the favor of critics. Dr. Frank W. Gunsaulus, the imaginative pulpit orator who is president of the institute which the *Blue Sky Magazine* editors had attended, contributed some of his poetry. Among the tales was one by James Lane Allen, entitled "The Extraordinary." An essay on "The Poetry of William Morris," by Wallace Rice, and a few lines in meter, entitled "Brothers," by Mrs. Elia W. Peattie, were written for the April, 1902, number, which proved to be the last. Each of the five volumes, except the first, was beautifully illustrated with symbolic pen-and-ink drawings and hazy wash-work. Walter J. Enright and Grace M. McClure, and other Chicago artists who were then students at the Art Institute, did most of the illustrating for the periodical. Although so attractive in its way, the *Blue Sky Magazine* found its constituency limited to a small cult. The publishers saw "glim-

merings of prosperity" the second year, but the magazine was merged with another short-lived Chicago periodical, *Rubric*, "a magazine *de luxe*," which the "Skytes" said in their adieu was "the only purely literary and artistic magazine whose policy was sufficiently consistent with that of the *Blue Sky* to allow a reasonable fusion."

The *Scroll* was the name of another periodical, evidently of this general artist-dilettante group, which was listed as "literary" in the newspaper annuals of 1902 and 1903, when its founding date was given as 1899; but from the collections of files and the recollections of literary workers no further information about it is attainable.

All of these magazines, with the line of artist-class sentiment woven into their literary texture, may possibly be characterized in a general way as examples of *l'Art Nouveau* in letters.

The cosmopolitan outlook given to Chicago by the World's Columbian Exposition stood out in five or six general magazines attempted in the latter part of the nineties. In them this aspect of the social influences left by the Fair was to be seen more clearly than in the illustrated and artistic journals which were the chief crop of the period. They show that the western cosmopolitanism mentioned in the introductory paragraphs of the first in this series of papers on literary interests had been reached. The spirit of westernism retained potency, but the current idea was that cosmopolitan products could and should come out of this western center.

A title of purely cosmopolitan connotation had been given to no periodical started in Chicago in a previous decade. The most typical and significant of those with the enlarged point of view was first issued in 1896, and was named the *International*. It was published much longer than a majority of the ephemeral magazines of Chicago.

The first rôle which the *International* took on the publishing stage made it unquestionably a cosmopolite. Its pages were filled with translations—described by the magazine as "Englished"—of stories which had been published in the contemporary literary periodicals of France, Spain, Italy, Ger-



many, Russia, Hungary, and Japan. The theory of the publisher was that the American reading public, while made familiar with the politics, crime, and superficial events of the foreign countries through the daily newspapers, has no means of knowing the literature of the nations as it grows from month to month. As the Worlds' Fair had spread before American eyes the products of the industrial arts of all peoples, so the *International* was to lay before them regularly the typical literary productions of the times. It was printed in regular 7×10 inch covered magazine form, and on supercalendered instead of coated paper, thus giving a medium for exceptional half-tone illustrations.

A successful organizer of an industrial trust, Mr. A. T. H. Brower, was the founder, editor, and publisher of the *International*. Mr. Brower had been a prosperous business man in the printing-press and type-founders' trade at Chicago for many years, and in 1892, during the first period of the industrial consolidations, had been the promoter of the American Type-Founders' Company, which includes all the leading type-founding concerns in the country. He was its secretary and manager until 1894, when he retired from active participation in its affairs, though retaining a place on the directorate. As a mature business man of the captain-of-industry type, going into magazine-publishing at Chicago, he stands out in contrast with the many young men who, without business experience and capital have undertaken to establish periodicals here. Being well supplied with capital, Mr. Brower went into the venture confident that he was prepared to see it through on a business basis. But his ambition was also spiced with local pride. A man of general culture, born in New York, but proud of his place as a Chicagoan, Mr. Brower then said, as he repeats today:

Chicago is called "Porkopolis." But there is as much culture in proportion to population here as anywhere. Chicago as well as New York ought to have successful literary magazines.

One experiment after another was tried by him in the determination to make the *International* successful. An entire year was taken for preliminary preparations for No. 1 of Vol. I. To

secure the stories from the various nations, Mr. Brower carried on a correspondence with magazine-publishers all over the world, made arrangements under the various copyright regulations, and secured the services of skilled translators residing at different places in America. He estimated that the market for the *International's* presentation of foreign literary products should be found among 50,000 cultured people of this country. But only 1,500 became interested enough to send annual subscriptions to the magazine. A lack of support from Chicago and the Mississippi valley was particularly discouraging to the publisher, since Dr. Albert Shaw, editor of the *Review of Reviews*, had told him that two-thirds of that magazine's constituency was in this section. The unique character of the *International* called out a sporadic circulation in nineteen nations. But that did not help much. After a year and a half the translations were discontinued. An "International Register" of Americans going abroad was next introduced as a leading feature of the magazine. This was a list of names of travelers and tourists classified by states. But the pains required for compiling it were too great to make this experiment anything but costly. Then after the Spanish-American War, when there were signs of interest in the Spanish tongue, a novel scheme for teaching modern languages was undertaken. Lesson in Spanish were outlined in the magazine. Graphophones and cylinders for use in a sort of mechanical conversational method of self-education were offered for sale to subscribers. But few of them, however, took interest in graphophone Spanish, and contemplated magazine lessons in German and French were not given by the *International*. Travel-letters written by American visitors to out-of-the-way places, and general travel-notes by the editor, were published in all stages of the experiments with the magazine. Toward its end, when the price per copy had been reduced to ten cents, Mr. Brower, in the hope of alluring the masses, inserted trashy, popular stories of a kind in which he had no personal interest.

In seeking advertising this Chicago business man found that other Chicago business men had the same sentiment he had about a Chicago magazine, but that they did not have advertising to

place in such a medium—at least until he could show a circulation of 15,000. At one time in the first eighteen months the magazine was nearly self-supporting, and it is conceivable that if the original character derived from the translations had been maintained the *International* might have found a permanent place for itself. Mr. Brower sunk \$10,000 a year in it for six years, and in July, 1901, discontinued experimenting. Today he says:

To publish a literary magazine, three things are needed: business sense, literary sense, and money—and the business sense must be that of the publishing business.

The influence of the University of Chicago upon the literary interests of the city, during the fifteen years in which the university has been one of the institutions of the community, has grown to be great. At the present time it is to be seen in many directions, and is recognized as specially direct in one of the general magazines published in the city. From the day the university opened its doors, its potential influences were regarded by men down-town as including a new force for development of literary activity. In 1893, when the professors and students on its quadrangles were living in a university atmosphere vibrant with the noise of natives of foreign lands which came to the campus from beyond the fence of the Midway Plaisance, the university's unofficial sanction was sought for *Current Topics*, a magazine begun in that year by a promoter of certain business schemes named David Wever, who had a publishing office for the periodicals in the Masonic Temple. Mr. Wever, as both editor and publisher, endeavored to give—and, judging from the recollections of down-town literary workers, and also from those of some members of the faculties, succeeded in giving—the impression that the magazine had some sort of University of Chicago sanction. The publishing of contributions from the professors and students of the university was the method followed in giving this impression. These were articles in the more serious vein of literary criticism, and helped greatly to fill the eighty-four pages in the rather solid-appearing journal printed in the regular magazine form, and bound in a heavy blue cover. Not only contributions written especially for it, but also papers pre-



pared for other purposes, were solicited for the magazine. One of the most notable contributions was an article on Taine by Professor Paul Shorey, Ph.D., head of the department of the Greek language and literature at the University. For a time, Dr. Edwin H. Lewis, now professor of literature at Lewis Institute, then an assistant in rhetoric on the University of Chicago faculty in the department of English, was active, not only in contributing to *Current Topics*, but in securing contributions for the magazine from other university men. Soon, however, it was discovered that the publisher did not carry out his agreements to pay for the contributions he readily accepted, and that the university men were being used to give prestige to a magazine which was part of an advertising device for selling pianos. The university authors discontinued contributing, and it is alleged that the man who was a magazine-publisher for a time still owes some of them for the serious work they did for his periodical. The name of the magazine was changed to the *Chicago Magazine of Current Topics*, and later to *Chicago Magazine*. It went out of existence in 1895, having been published for about two years. Dr. Lewis is of the opinion that the history of *Current Topics* has no more significance in the consideration of the literary interests of Chicago than any advertising scheme has. It appears to have been an example of the engraftment of interests, with a considerable element of plain graft involved.

A University of Chicago student from the West, Frank Burlingame Harris, who became a Chicago newspaper man, undertook the establishing of a general magazine in 1898. Mr. Harris was a friend of Opie Read, Forrest Crissey, and other literary workers in the Press Club ranks. He rejected the name *Romantic Life*, suggested to him for the periodical by Mr. Read, and christened it, after the lake at the southern border of the city, the *Calumet*, thus giving the journal a name intended to connote the western romantic sentiment. Mr. Harris started by inserting more essays than stories. But two numbers were published. Mr. Harris had undertaken the enterprise almost without capital—a lack which literary sentiment could hardly offset.

*Carter's Monthly* was a general story magazine begun in

1898 by a printer named John Carter, who came to Chicago from Streator, Ill. An advertisement of *Carter's Monthly*, appearing in *Arts for America*, announced one policy in keeping with a trend in publishing during the World's Columbian Exposition decade; namely, that the magazine would contain reproductions of 192 paintings by famous masters. Opie Read permitted the use of his name as editor. A serial by John McGovern was extensively advertised. Within a few months, however, Carter dropped the stories and devoted the bulk of his space to laudatory articles concerning some of the department stores. Mr. Read says that he then endeavored to have his name removed from the head of the page containing the table of contents in the periodical, but in vain. By the end of a year, however, the local write-ups had brought *Carter's Monthly* to a deserved death.

Literary efforts and temperance news were used in concoction of an oddity among the periodicals put out at Chicago in the nineties. This queer paper was named the *Banner of Gold*. It was started with the support of several of the "old guard" of literary newspaper men belonging to the Press Club—"good fellows" who in more ways than that of writing had unfortunately followed the example of "Bobbie" Burns. Having been at Dwight, Ill., under the care of Dr. Leslie E. Keeley, some of these men were enrolled as members of "The Bichloride of Gold Club of America." They conceived the idea that the reading world should be informed on the merits of Dr. Keeley's uses for bichloride of gold, and that news along this line could be best set off with sparkling gems of new literature, fresh and pure as prairie dewdrops. Further, it was expected that the journal would prove to be an outlet for the excitements of renewed literary activity. When the first weekly number appeared, February 10, 1892, Charles Eugene Banks, a newspaper writer and poet, who has written a great deal of verse, some of which touches the heart like that of Riley, and also is marked by beauty in the use of word and meter, was the editor. An outpouring of rhymed enthusiasm from his pen, appearing at the top of the first column in the first number, contained the following:

Then down with the grinning old skull of despair;  
In the army of hope we're enrolled.  
From ice-berg to palm-tree fling free to the air  
The banner "Bichloride of Gold."

For some time the periodical was chiefly literary, and was a medium for stories and verse used by a considerable group of Chicago men engaged in a fair order of literary endeavor. Among the contributors to early numbers were Opie Read, Stanley Waterloo, George Horton, John McGovern, and William Lightfoot Visscher; and the paper secured a following among readers interested only in the part of its contents which were of a literary nature. But after a few months some of the writers who had been members of the "Bichloride of Gold Club" surrendered their membership, and the periodical, which is still published as a monthly organ for the gold-cure, lost entirely its literary admixture.

In 1893, when socio-economic congresses were held in connection with the World's Fair, a magazine designed to give a popular presentation of social and political questions, but in such a form as compared with newspaper-writing that it was rated as literary, was begun. It bore the name *New Occasions*. The first editor, B. F. Underwood, was succeeded by Frederick Upham Adams, who is today a general magazine and newspaper syndicate writer on these subjects. In 1897 *New Occasions* was merged in *New Time*, of which Mr. Adams, at Chicago, and B. O. Flower, at Boston, were the joint editors. Mr. Flower was the founder of the *Arena*, and had a large personal following. The July, 1897, number said "Chicago-Boston" in its imprint, and mentioned a union of West and East. But in April, 1898, Mr. Flower sent his valedictory, in which he said: "For some time I have felt it impossible to perform the duties of senior editor in a manner satisfactory to myself, while living 1,000 miles from the office of publication." Mr. Adams continued editing the magazine and writing for it, particularly in opposition to the existing money system, declaring that it was his ambition "to aid in the founding of a magazine on the rock of economic truth." In June, 1898, he complained that only about



\$3,200 in small amounts, received from all over the United States, had been paid in for capital stock, and pleaded for public subscriptions, not only for the periodical, but also for its stock. However, a file in the Chicago Public Library shows no copies of a date later than the one containing that appeal.

*Self-Culture* and *Progress*, both brought out at Chicago in 1895, were two literary magazines of the home-study type, which will be given further mention in the part of the next paper tracing one of the lines of development incidentally influential in leading to the establishment of *The World To-Day*, the most important of the Chicago magazines of the present decade.

An unusual use of the story form in a periodical with a slight educational bias was made in *Historia*, a monthly magazine published in Chicago for two years prior to the financial crash of 1893. Accounts from the histories of the leading nations, re-written in romantic style for boys and girls between the ages of twelve and twenty, were printed in this periodical. Using ten *noms de plume*, Fred B. Cozzens, a young man who as a student at Northwestern University had been specially interested in history, and who had also done some editorial page work for an afternoon daily, performed single-handed all of the duties of contributor, editor, and publisher. There is no doubt that the general interest in history aroused by plans for the exposition commemorating the discovery of America had some influence in leading Mr. Cozzens to undertake *Historia*. His magazine was illustrated with zinc-etching reproductions of pictures from old histories not copyrighted, and with some sketches by John T. McCutcheon, the cartoonist. At one time *Historia* had a circulation of 8,000 including many subscribers among school children who used the magazine for supplementary reading. But Mr. Cozzens possessed little capital, although he is now the proprietor of a successful type-setting business, and his credit was taken away with the failure of a bank which had backed him in the *Historia* venture. He turned the magazine over to a mail-order jeweler, who soon got into trouble with the postoffice department by publishing his entire catalogue in the advertising pages of the periodical.

A visit to the World's Columbian Exposition led Claude King, the editor and publisher of *Sports Afield*, an interesting magazine which he had built up at Denver from a small beginning with a sportsmen's newspaper, founded in 1887, to remove his headquarters to Chicago in 1893. As a New York printer who had learned his trade while an apprentice of the Harper firm, Mr. King, ever since moving to the West, had been a faithful reader of the *New York Sun*. From that paper's pungent paragraphs he had gained the impression that Chicago and its World's Fair were jokes. But Mr. King, who still publishes his magazine for a constituency of about 300,000 subscribers, says that seeing Chicago and the "White City" so impressed him that he at once decided to move from a center of influence for a part of the West to the metropolis of the entire section known as the West. *Sports Afield*, of which half the contents are short stories of outdoor experiences designed to be purely entertaining, and half are articles on natural history and scientific subjects intended to be instructive, is a magazine well calculated to interest typical western men and boys in the towns and villages and sparsely settled localities. Although of but mediocre literary quality, its written contents, supplemented by illustrations, are of direct appeal to the æsthetic interest. Two-thirds of the magazine's revenues are derived from subscriptions, which is unusual. The circulation was built up in the old-fashioned way of personal visits by the editor. In largest part, the magazine goes to the Northwest. Mr. King makes the comment that the people of the Southwest, while having a like interest in its contents to that of those in the Northwest, are not "businessfied," are reluctant to subscribe, and when they do give subscription orders forget to remit payments.

Besides the phases of periodical publishing at Chicago in the nineties, shown in this paper, there was also a large increase in the number of papers in the mail-order grade of so-called literary periodicals. As practically all of these "family-story" papers started in the nineties still prosper, this development in that period will be treated in the paper which is to follow on the periodicals of the present decade.

The statistics compiled for this series of papers show that 70 of the 306 literary periodicals of all types started in Chicago were begun in the World's Fair decade. Of this number, 23 per cent. were illustrated; 11 per cent. were devoted to the fine arts; 9 per cent. were of the quaint and curious artist-class literary type; 19 per cent., of the unqualified literary type; 7 per cent., of the literary information variety; and 23 per cent., of the family-story grade. The percentages for those of other types were small. Twenty-nine per cent. belonged to more than one classification, especially those classed as illustrated. Those published monthly numbered 56, and the weeklies but 9, in contrast with 41 monthlies and 25 weeklies in the eighties. But many of the monthlies were in journal form, the total of weeklies and monthlies in this form being 47, while 20 appeared in regulation magazine form. Twenty-seven of the 70 lived but a year or less, and only 9 of the number begun in the nineties are still published.



## MUNICIPAL ACTIVITY IN BRITAIN

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I spent the summer of 1904 in my native country, England, after an absence of about thirteen years. One who returns thus, after a considerable interval, is perhaps in a better position to appreciate the progress of affairs than a total stranger, on the one hand, or a permanent resident on the other. It gives one a curious sensation to walk the streets, and realize that the boys and girls now on their way to school were not even born when one last passed that way. Yet the old familiar scenes have not lost their character, and some of the older men seem hardly to have changed. England is England still, and yet——

In those bygone days, the ghosts of which so strangely mingle with the present, we used to assemble in the little hall—originally a stable—at Kelmscott House, overlooking the Thames at Hammersmith. Every Sunday evening the Socialist League met there, and a small audience listened while William Morris, Bernard Shaw, or some other ardent radical set forth the promise of a new and better time. I remember very well the arrival of Stepniak from Russia, and the amusement we got out of the hysterical leader one of the daily papers published thereupon. A strange man with a large beard, sitting quietly in the audience, was pointed out one evening—it was none other than Kropotkin. Then John Burns came down, and explained to us that, physically speaking, it was better to go to prison than to the workhouse. There was the veteran Craig, the hero of Ralahine, who could not refrain from expounding his views of phrenology, which interested us much less than his Irish experiences. There was Sparling, and Tochatti, and Mordhurst; and occasionally we saw Walter Crane or Edward Carpenter; while Emery Walker, the secretary, was always present and helped, not talking so much as some, but getting things done.

Today the place is shut up. Morris is dead; Bernard Shaw, they tell me, has become positively respectable; Burns may at any moment become a cabinet minister;<sup>1</sup> and, in short, the game is played out, so far as superficial appearances show. There is practically no socialist propaganda in London today, I am told; and as for the *Clarion*, the weekly socialist paper, it seems to be a success, but it is a pallid thing compared with our little *Commonweal*, which I used to sell for a penny at street corners and political meetings. Well, it could not have been otherwise. A rose does not bloom forever, and he who would sow seed must be content to lose sight of it for a while.

What, then, is the most vital, aggressive movement in this present-day England? It is, I think, this same socialism, only under a different form. The old idea of changing everything by means of a sudden revolution was finally given up, even by Morris himself; and while there may yet come revolts and bloodshed, it is wonderful to see the progress that has been made, and is likely to be made, quietly, rationally, and, as it seems to me, with astonishingly little friction.

Having freely confessed my leanings in this matter, I am glad to be able to support my statements from the other side. The *Times*, in the latter part of 1902, published a series of articles by an anonymous writer, and republished them as a pamphlet, with the title *Municipal Socialism*. This pamphlet ("6d. a copy, 30s. a hundred, £ 12. 10s. a thousand") is intended to be spread broadcast, as an awful warning. It is to be recommended especially to Americans, who have a point of view just sufficiently different to enable them to enjoy the joke. It appears that the dreadful socialists have even begun to convert the children, and at Glasgow there is a Socialist Sunday School Union, which brings out a halfpenny monthly magazine, called the *Young Socialist*.

The *Times* writer, after stating that the socialists plan to capture the various administrative bodies of the country, goes on to say:

<sup>1</sup>This prophecy, lately fulfilled, was penned before the downfall of the Balfour cabinet.—Ed.

No one can fail to be convinced of the last-mentioned fact who contemplates the long list of duties, responsibilities, and enterprises already undertaken by local governing bodies, coupled with the rage that some among them show for municipalizing practically everything that they can get within their grasp. Many of these duties and responsibilities, though hardly coming within the range of local government pure and simple, may in themselves be most excellent and praiseworthy. But they nevertheless indicate a marked tendency to take over obligations, trades, and industries exactly on the socialistic lines; . . . they represent, collectively, a rapid drifting toward the full and complete realization of the socialist idea.

There is no doubt that the *Times* writer has allowed his fervor to carry him a little beyond the limits of exact truth; but he is correct in regard to the direction of the movement, if not as to its amount or purely socialistic character. The municipal management of street-cars, water-works, gas, gardens, and even houses has become commonplace, but that is not nearly all.

The idea of providing sterilized milk for babes was started at St. Helens a few years ago, the corporation supplying not only the milk, but feeding-bottles as well, while to each purchaser there were given two nipples, which she was required to bring at intervals to the corporation milk-store, so that they could be tested as to their cleanliness. Liverpool, Dukinfield, York, Ashton-under-Lyne, Belfast, and other towns have since adopted the system, notwithstanding protests which have been raised in certain quarters that the corporations were competing unfairly with the large firms of milk-dealers.

It has even been proposed that the milk supply for adults should also be municipalized, and this "may follow in due course." The municipalization of the liquor traffic is being much discussed, and *The Case for Municipal Drink* is excellently set forth in a little book published in 1904, written by Edward R. Pease. This question of drink is such a large one that it deserves a separate article; but it is worth while to note here that much has already been accomplished by private or semi-public agencies, working in the interests of the public. Mr. Pease thus describes the origin of the Public House Trust Companies:

The origin of this most influential movement was dramatic. In 1900 Earl Grey, the owner of Broomhall, a mining village in Northumberland, applied for an additional license for that village at the desire of its inhabitants. When it was granted, he was forthwith offered £10,000 for what he had acquired "without spending a single sixpence." Struck by the iniquity



of this transaction, Earl Grey took up the matter with extraordinary vigor. Not content with organizing a trust company for Northumberland to take over this and other licenses, and manage them for the public benefit, he has created a network of county and other companies already covering almost every county of England and parts of Scotland, Wales, and Ireland. . . . The companies themselves, already formed on a semi-official basis, will no doubt gladly transfer their undertakings to any elected authority authorized by Parliament to accept them. The public spirit which animated the founder, Earl Grey, will assuredly continue to actuate his followers.

The consideration of the above case, and others like it, shows very well that the fundamental difference between public and private ownership is rather one of motive on the one hand, and benefit on the other, than of mere legal definition. For example, if certain money or property, legally and nominally belonging to the public, is really used for the private gain of a political ring, there is no real public ownership. Or again, if money and property, legally and nominally belonging to some individual, are used for the benefit of the public, they become, at least while so used, public property in a very true sense. No socialist, even, can suppose that at any time all public property will be literally controlled equally by all the citizens; on the contrary, many things, such as machines, will have to be placed in the hands of experts, who will have special authority concerning them, just exactly as if they owned them in the ordinary sense. This is so far true that public and private ownership may be looked on as not at all incompatible, when ownership is considered to be the power to use, not that to barter away or destroy.<sup>2</sup> From this standpoint, in certain communities, a legally private ownership might be the only means of bringing about a genuine public ownership; for example, suppose that in a certain city a man had a valuable collection of some sort, which he desired to give to the public, but he knew that the city was controlled at that time by a corrupt ring which would undoubtedly place an incompetent curator in charge, and generally let the collection go to ruin. The wise would-be donor, in such a case, would undoubtedly

<sup>2</sup> Use-ownership and exchange-ownership (or use-rights and exchange-rights) should be regarded separately, just as are use-value and exchange-value. In this connection it is interesting to recall that we consider it criminal voluntarily to part with our lives, though they are our own.

place his collection in the hands of a board of his own selection, or retain it in his own hands, in order that it might be properly cared for, and really serviceable to the public. In the light of these considerations, many of the differences between apparently opposite policies may be found to disappear. The promoters of municipal ownership should make it clear that they are after the substance rather than the legal shadow of it; and, in reply to examples of municipal corruption, should answer that these result, not from public ownership, but from the failure of the public to own that to which it had a legal right. Miss Octavia Hill has shown what a "private" landlord may do in London, if entirely devoted to the interests of the tenants. Superficially, her results might be held to constitute an argument for the private ownership of tenements; but, as a matter of fact, she has acted as a very honest and efficient public servant. No doubt even the socialist state could not do better than retain the services of such "landlords," actuated by such motives!

The problem of municipal housing is naturally one of the most pressing in the large cities. The London County Council has been and is active in this matter, and no doubt intends to proceed until there is not a slum within its jurisdiction. I was much pleased to find stately municipal buildings overlooking the former site of Millbank Prison, while the large open space between the buildings and the river was occupied by a beautiful flower-garden and a picture-gallery. That garden is one of many such recently established in London, and is typical of the aims of the reformers. When I met Mr. John Burns later, he asked me if I had seen that garden, and showed by his manner that he thought it not one of the least useful things he had helped into being. It struck me as highly significant that even in the sordid city so much emphasis should be placed on the æsthetic side of things.

It must not be supposed that the building operations of the London County Council have gone forward without opposition; nor can it be said that all the objections raised are meaningless. The very buildings just referred to are objected to on two grounds: they are too tall, and otherwise criticisable in respect to

architecture; while they do not house the poorer people who were dispossessed, because these cannot afford to live in them. The only thing that can be said about the architectural features is that the law at present requires the new houses to find room for as many people as inhabited the old, and the only way to do this and avoid overcrowding is to make tall buildings. It is admitted by those who are supporters of municipal building that the time will probably come when the present structures will be replaced by different and more desirable ones. In the meanwhile it does seem to me that the London County Council has done well, considering the legal restrictions, and the difficulty and expense of securing much land. With regard to the dispossessed poor, it is argued that if superior accommodations are provided for the better class of workers, they will vacate other premises, and so there will be a general move upward all along the line. This is no doubt a valid argument, up to a certain point; but the slum difficulty will not be overcome without more radical action than the council is empowered to take, and it is evidently unreasonable to expect so great an evil to be removed at once.

Mr. Bernard Shaw deals with the housing question at some length in his excellent little book, *The Common Sense of Municipal Trading*. He compares the disadvantages of a municipality, under the present law, with the freedom of private enterprise, and the specific instances he gives are worth citing:

If the obligation to rehouse were imposed on private and municipal enterprise alike, municipal housing would be at no disadvantage on this point. But commercial enterprise is practically exempt from such social obligations. Within recent years Chelsea has been transfigured by the building operations of Lord Cadogan. Hundreds of acres of poor dwellings have been demolished and replaced by fashionable streets and "gardens." The politics of Chelsea, once turbulently Radical, are now effusively Conservative. The sites voluntarily set aside by Lord Cadogan for working-class dwellings on uncommercial principles of public spirit and personal honor have not undone the inevitable effects of the transfiguration of the whole neighborhood. The displaced have solved the rehousing problem by crossing the river into Battersea. Thus Lord Cadogan is more powerful than the Chelsea Borough Council. He can drive the poorer inhabitants out of the borough; the council cannot. He can replace them with rich inhabitants; the council cannot. He can build what kind of house pays him best—mansion, shop, stable or pile of



flats; the council cannot. Under such circumstances comparison between the results of his enterprise and the council's is idle. The remedy is either to curtail Lord Cadogan's freedom until it is no greater than the council's, or else to make the council as free as Lord Cadogan. As the former alternative would end in nothing being done at all, and rendering impossible such great improvements as have been made both in Chelsea and Battersea by Lord Cadogan's enterprise, the second alternative—that of untying the hands of the ratepayer—is obviously the sensible one.

Mr. Bernard Shaw arrives at the conclusion that the housing problem cannot be satisfactorily solved until the municipality owns all the land within its boundaries, and is as free to deal with it as our ground landlords are at present. In the *Times* pamphlet, already referred to, the following passage is interesting:

At the conference of the municipal representatives held at Glasgow in September, 1901, to discuss the housing question one of the speakers said: "We don't want to house everybody;" whereupon someone else called out: "Why not?" These two words sum up the whole situation as the socialists see it.

The street-car or tramway traffic has been taken up all over the country by municipalities, with great success. I looked with astonishment on the great suburban cars running out of London, usually crowded with passengers; and at Southampton and elsewhere I rode in municipal trams. Of course, even these do not fail to meet with opposition, particularly since they must inevitably interfere with the local railroad traffic, and with various interests along the line. For example, it has been found that when the tramways were extended into certain neighborhoods close to great cities, people who formerly traded at the local stores would get on the cars and do their shopping in the large city establishments, where there was greater variety of choice, and very likely better prices. This sort of difficulty, which is undoubtedly far from imaginary, is gravely cited as something inherent in municipal enterprise, as if it did not result from private commercial enterprise everywhere! I knew a storekeeper in New Mexico who vigorously opposed the coming of the railroad, and quite rightly so far as his own personal interests were concerned.

The Glasgow tramways have often been cited as especially successful, and hence they are singled out by the *Times* writer for detailed criticism. He ends his remarks with gloomy prophecy as follows :

When, in due course, heavy charges for renewals in connection with the tramways have to be met, and the reserve funds are found to be inadequate to meet them, because the "profits" have been given to the tramway users in the form of reduced fares, it is at the risk of these very ratepayers that the further sums required will have to be raised. The whole enterprise is a case of "heads, the tramway patrons win; tails, the ratepayers lose."

The writer of the article cited is much exercised because the "profits" of the tramway traffic do not compare with those he supposes a private company might have made, but he complains bitterly that the surplus money obtained was devoted to improving the service and reducing the fares. This, he says, is favoring the tramway patrons at the expense of the other ratepayers; but it does not occur to him that whatever money was made above running expenses came straight out of the tramway patron's pockets. As to whether the sums set aside to meet various contingencies are sufficient, time alone can show; but the article cited was published in 1902, and I am indebted to Mr. John Burns for a copy of the report of the Glasgow tramways for the year ending May 31, 1903, showing things to be in an ever more flourishing condition than heretofore.

It must not be supposed that municipal management completely does away with labor disputes; nor would it, I think, be desirable that employees should always be ready meekly to take what was given to them. Last summer there was a sort of conspiracy among certain tramway employees in the London area, to offer to strike on the eve of a bank holiday, when they well understood that their services could not be dispensed with without heavy loss to the London County Council and great inconvenience to the public. They accordingly drew up a list of grievances, some of them not unreasonable, and sent it in when the sittings of the Council were over, and the members were dispersed everywhere taking their holidays. This came to the knowledge of Mr. John Burns, and he spent two whole days riding about

on the cars, not saying much, but dropping a hint here and there, and effectually preventing the projected strike. The fact was that the men were in the wrong, and they knew it; they knew also, that whatever complaints they made would be fairly considered when the council met. Under such circumstances it required only a judicious man of known integrity to restore peace; but it would have been very different if instead of the county council there had been a private company acting on purely "business" principles. It may also be added that the existence of such men as Mr. Burns and many of his colleagues on the council shows that public service is capable of attracting ability no less than private enterprise. In England such service brings credit and approval, and if it also brings abuse, it cannot be said at the present day that riches obtained by dubious means bring less. Putting the thing on the plane of the merest self-interest and self-gratification, I do not think John Burns would exchange places with any millionaire.

The opponents of municipal enterprises often make the criticism that the councils grant conditions to their employees which are better than those given by private concerns, and thereby rob the ratepayers in general for the benefit of a limited class. The *Times* critic presents the following instance:

A firm of brass-founders and iron-workers were invited by a local body to tender for a certain article. It was intimated to them, however, that it would be of no use for them to do so unless they were paying to the men employed in making the article the trade-union wage of 35s. a week. In point of fact, they were not employing men on the work at all, but youths and girls, who were perfectly well able to do it, but got a wage considerably lower than that specified. The firm could thus have afforded to send in a low tender, but, in the circumstances, they thought it useless to send in any at all; and the presumption is that the local authority in question accepted a tender based on the higher wage, and thus had to pay a good deal more for the article than the real market price.

The answer to this sort of criticism is, of course, perfectly obvious. If the ratepayers, through their agents, see fit to treat their employees decently, merely as a matter of local honor and pride, they are surely not to be blamed for doing so, even though a minority may object. But, after all, why should it be assumed



that the lowest rate of wages is the just one; is it not possible, to say the least, that a low wage might be the means of fleecing a certain section of employees (and ratepayers) for the financial gain of the rest? For this sort of injustice our critic has no condemnation, because it is done everywhere in the course of business. Finally, from a wholly "business" point of view, it may pay a municipality very well to pay its employees good wages, when it would not pay a private establishment. This is because, as Bernard Shaw well points out, the municipality has to take care of all its inhabitants, from the cradle to the grave; and if they fail and get into difficulties, it has to provide poor-houses and prisons, police and courts, and whatever other agencies are necessary. It also suffers from the ill-effects of one person on another; and, in fact, it is quite impossible to say where the advantages or disadvantages arising from any particular action cease. The municipality is like a man who cannot afford to overeat himself or get drunk, because he will have to suffer the consequences; but the private trader can tickle his palate to any extent, as it were, because the stomach which will be outraged is none of his.

The public-school idea is as yet inadequately developed in England, and some of the things which seem like innovations in that country, we take as a matter of course. The *Times* writer says with horror in his tones:

The children [of a certain London district] have hitherto been cared for in some good schools at West Ham, but fresh schools are being put up for them at Shenfield, Essex, at a cost of over £200,000. There they will have swimming-baths, gymnasium, farm, and other attractions of which even an ordinary first-class boarding-school could not boast, so that the children of the poor will be far better off than the children of most of the ratepayers who will bear the cost.

When I was staying at a place called River, near Dover, I was struck by the contrast between the English school, which I formerly accepted as a matter of course, and that to which I had grown accustomed in America. The whole place had the air of poverty, and the children were dirty and seemed ill cared for. They were, of course, the children of the "poor;" the well-to-do

people on the neighboring hill sent their sons and daughters to boarding establishments for "young gentlemen" and "young ladies." It seemed to me that the American public school recognized everywhere as a general means of education, and willingly supported even by the least progressive communities, marked an advance in civilization the purport of which could hardly be exaggerated. England will have to get over being scandalized at attempts made to provide the best education for the children of the "poor," no matter what pockets are turned inside out to find the money.

The London County Council has just taken over the whole educational system of London; and since the schools are excessively numerous and greatly lacking in common standards, the task of unifying everything and bringing it into line with modern requirements is a gigantic one. It is too soon, as yet, to say much about results; but what is to be said in anticipation will be found in a little book by Mr. Sidney Webb, published, I think, last year.

The technical schools of the London County Council have been in operation for some time, and have met with considerable success. My brother, Mr. Douglas Cockerell, has charge of the bookbinding classes, and from him I was able to learn much about the aims and scope of the schools. In bookbinding, as in other trades, mechanical appliances are tending to take the place of hand-work, and while the production of books is thereby increased, the skilled worker is becoming gradually extinct. With the abandonment of the old system of apprentices, the worker ceases to obtain a broad knowledge of his trade, and the final outcome is, as William Morris stated, that even those who would have good things cannot get them at any price. In the county council workshops, however, an attempt is made to give a broader training, and to preserve the individuality of the worker. In this way it is hoped that the artistic crafts, and those requiring much individual initiative, will be preserved, and by degrees the public may be so educated as to prefer good quality and variety to cheapness and monotony. There is a fallacy in the doctrine that supply always follows demand; on the contrary,

demand is usually the outcome of supply in the first instance. Our needs are the fruit of past advantages, not merely the prophecy of future hunger. There is danger in the extinction of the arts, lest they should be wholly forgotten and undemanded.

While the technical schools thus render an inestimable service, I fear that their ends may be defeated to a considerable extent by commercialism.<sup>3</sup> It remains to be seen how far the movement can be carried with economic success; and while the "trade" has already been influenced by it, it is hardly to be hoped that there will never be a reciprocal detrimental effect. Such considerations will not, of course, prevent the work from being carried forward with zeal, and all who value the arts should lend their support. As Morris always insisted, in the long run it becomes a question of the freedom of the worker, and this is equally true in all fields of intellectual effort. It is here that the socialist and the individualist are one.

There is much outcry in certain quarters at the great increase of municipal debt. It is hardly necessary in this article to discuss this question at length, but the following from Bernard Shaw is worth quoting:

According to the popular view, the thrifty course is to pay as you go, and not add to "the burden of municipal debt." The correct financial theory is undoubtedly the reverse: all expenditure on public works should be treated as capital expenditure. The capital should be raised in the cheapest market, and the rates used to pay the interest and sinking-fund. When a municipality which can borrow at less than 4 per cent. deliberately extorts capital for public works from tradesmen who have to raise it at from 10 to 40 per cent., or even more, it is clearly imposing the grossest unthrift on its unfortunate constituents. In practice everything depends on the duration of the work.

<sup>3</sup> Whether the influence comes directly from the masters or the men, its origin is the same. I read in the *Bookbinding Trades Journal*, 1904, p. 48, "The technical classes, as at present arranged, are not of much use to the apprentices of our trade, and the action of the London County Council in instituting classes to teach women bookbinding is likely to be resented by our union. Already the employers have moved in the matter, and a joint conference between the secretaries of the London societies of bookbinders and the committee of federated employers has been held and adjourned. To my mind, nothing but strenuous resistance to the London County Council's plans, in conjunction with other trades, can avert a calamity.—Arthur J. Carter.



It would be absurd to pay for an electric-lighting plant out of the half-year's revenue. It would be silly to raise a loan to clear away a snowfall.

The practical identity of the so-called "debt" with what is called "capital" in private business is well shown by a concrete illustration taken from *Does Municipal Management Pay?* by R. B. Suthers (1902):

In Manchester the corporation [i. e., municipality] own the gas-works; in Liverpool a private company owns the gas-works. Up to 1897 Manchester had spent £1,833,000 on its works; Liverpool had spent £1,918,000. The £1,833,000 spent by Manchester is called "debt," but the £1,918,000 spent by Liverpool is called "capital." What is the difference? There is no difference except in name. The Manchester "debt" is just as much "capital" as the other. How was the Liverpool capital raised? It was subscribed in sums of different amounts by individuals. How was the Manchester "debt" raised? In exactly the same way. The Manchester corporation issue "stock." Private individuals apply for the stock. The Liverpool Gas Company issue "shares," which bear dividends according to the profits made. The "stock" of the Manchester corporation bears a fixed interest or dividend. Any surplus profit goes into the pockets of the citizens.

Of other municipal enterprises it is not necessary now to write. The main purpose of this article has been to direct attention to a movement of the greatest importance, too little understood or appreciated in this country. Whatever may be thought of the idealism that is at the bottom of so much of it, it must be admitted that we in America should be better off and more progressive if we had clearer ideals of civic life—things to work and hope for. The "What's the use?" feeling paralyzes the efforts of our good citizens, who go nowhere because they see no road.

And, after all, has not something come out of that stable at Hammersmith?

# AMERICAN DRIFT TOWARD EDUCATIONAL UNITY

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## I. COMPETITION IN EDUCATION (EDUCATIONAL DIFFERENTIATION)

President James B. Angell, of Michigan University, in his address at the quarter-centennial celebration of Kansas University, said:

My own conviction is that it would be better for the cause of higher education if not another college were established east of the Rocky Mountains for at least a generation to come.

He was speaking for the Middle West, that great school-ridden section of our country, where the denominational college is making the fight of its life against the state university.

Actual conditions more than justified this statement. In New England religious denominations are few, and state universities are practically unknown. Hence the church college there is a venerable, strong, and well-established institution. But in the West denominations are extremely numerous; and often, by a process of division and subdivision, they multiply their number and divide their resources. Among the commoner denominations are these: Baptists, Methodists, Presbyterians, Cumberland Presbyterians, United Presbyterians, Christians, Swedish Lutherans, Norwegian Lutherans, German Lutherans, Friends, Congregationalists, United Brethren, Catholics, Seventh-Day Adventists, Episcopalians, Mennonites, etc. Partly as a matter of denominational pride, and partly to secure trained leadership in its own church, each sect must have its own college. This multiplication of sectarian colleges in the face of the state university differentiates the West from the East. We may cite Iowa as a typical state of the Middle West. Here are twenty denominational colleges. One sect has six. Still the state is maintaining at public

expense a thorough and efficient system of schools for higher education. In Kansas there are eighteen of these so-called colleges. Others are being planned. And so throughout all this new country the spread of denominational colleges (not *academies*) is remarkable. What is true of one state is true of all. The story of these schools that have failed has never been written, but their name is legion. To maintain many of the feebler ones now is a desperate matter. These schools are doing a good work, it is admitted. But that is not enough. The good is enemy to the best. There is abundant reason for the conviction which President Angell expressed.

That the competition between weak colleges is costly and destructive is obvious. That a wiser course is possible few are ready to admit. The Jews teach us a lesson in point. True to their keen intuitions in things economic and intellectual, they erect no new colleges, but patronize the best already provided.

Let us examine briefly four of the most significant phases of competition, before discussing the remedy.

1. This species of warfare is peculiarly unfortunate in the educational world. Too often the smaller religious school is tempted not to "play fair." Damning reports are spread concerning its big rival, the state university. It is called godless, irreligious, and even anti-Christian. In other words, the churches withdraw from the state university, as fully as possible, both their presence and moral support—do their utmost, in fact, to secularize it—and then anathematize it as being un-Christian.

2. Financially, competition is one-sided. For the state university has back of it federal land grants and all the taxable resources of the state. It is dependent on the gifts of no man or sect. It is an integral part of the state and is predestined to grow as the state grows. It is democratic, and is free and unfettered in the search for truth and the promulgation thereof. That vexing question of gifts from the predatory rich is eliminated. The modern state universities are spending annually from two hundred thousand to a million dollars apiece, and this outlay is increasing yearly by leaps and bounds. One plant of this kind in a state is enough, and is too costly to be duplicated.



And it is an unpardonable wrong to compel the boys and girls to attend the school whose equipment is inferior to the best in the state.

3. Then there is the question of size. This is more than a question of mere bigness. As a general rule, the larger the university, the more costly and efficient are its plant and equipment. In the number of students in attendance the state university is rapidly overshadowing its competitors. The late President Adams of Wisconsin, published figures showing that from 1885 to 1895, in the eight independent New England colleges—Amherst, Bowdoin, Brown, Dartmouth, Harvard, Williams, Wesleyan, and Yale—the increase in attendance was 20 per cent. In eight representative denominational colleges of the North Central states the increase for the same period was but 14 per cent. In eight representative state universities the increase was 320 per cent.

In 1904 the eight New England colleges mentioned above had 11,740 students; the eight state universities, 23,451; and the eight denominational colleges, 8,700. From the standpoint of the age of these schools, all is in favor of the independent and denominational colleges for they were here first. Yet the youngest school—that is, the state university—is already the largest. Its day of probation is over. It has come to stay.

4. "But size does not count," says the friend of the denominational college; "I would rather send my boy or girl to the smaller school because of the better atmosphere." This strikes at the root of the matter, for this places the issue at once on a moral basis. If we examine this claim, we again discover that the evidence is in favor of the state university.

Whence come the crowd of students who throng the state universities? Considering the number of denominational colleges granting degrees, it would seem that only the wicked and ungodly are left for the state university. Here again facts are instructive. In 1897, when a census was taken by F. W. Kelsey, the Presbyterian church had more students, by actual count, in seventeen state universities than in all the Presbyterian colleges of the

whole United States. The University of Nebraska in 1900 had 1,800 students. Omitting the smaller denominations, these students represented church membership as follows:

155 Baptists	102 Protestant Episcopalians
60 Catholics	70 Lutherans
109 Christians	302 Presbyterians
220 Congregationalists	458 Methodists

The 458 Methodist students in attendance exceed in number the Methodist students of college grade in the Nebraska Wesleyan, the old well-established Methodist college of the state.

In the University of North Dakota a religious census was taken in 1905, showing the following church relationships:

78 Lutherans	20 Baptists
64 Methodists	7 Episcopalians
54 Presbyterians	3 Christian Scientists
42 no church	3 Spiritualists
37 Catholics	1 Unitarian
28 Congregationalists	

That is,  $87\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the students were church members, and only  $12\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. belonged to no church. In Nebraska University in 1900, 53 per cent. of the men and 74 per cent. of the women were church members. Others reported themselves as church *adherents* (41 per cent. of the men; 24 per cent. of the women). According to Professor Kelsey's figures in 1897, representing sixteen important state universities,  $57\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the students were church members, and 31 per cent. church adherents. Only 12 per cent. had no definite church connections or preferences. This is higher than the percentage outside. In the half-century ending in 1894, according to Professor Kelsey, Michigan University had sent out 301 clergymen and missionaries—that is, an average of six for each graduating class. Many theological schools can scarcely equal this record.

Faculties, like student bodies, are as God-fearing and religious as individuals in other walks of life. In the University of North Dakota, for example, in 1905 the faculty had church relations as follows:

11	Presbyterians	2	Catholics
8	Methodists	1	Congregationalist
3	Baptists	1	Christian
3	Episcopalians	1	no church
3	Lutherans		

Those familiar with life in a state university will readily call to mind the vigorous expression of healthy Christian life on the part of the students, as manifested in the Young Men's Christian Association, the Young Women's Christian Association, the Mission Study Classes, the Student's Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, the "Morning Watch" prayer-meetings, the numerous Bible classes conducted by students, the annual sending of student delegates to the Bible conference at Lake Geneva and similar Christian gatherings, etc.

The conclusion is forced upon us that state universities, while non-denominational, are yet strictly Christian. Thus, even on its peculiar field, the denominational college has no real advantage in comparison with the state university. What reason remains, therefore, for continuing this wasteful and misguided war of competition? Is there no settlement possible, offering peace with honor and advantage to both sides?

## II. CO-OPERATION IN EDUCATION (EDUCATIONAL INTEGRATION)

There is a better way than competition, and that is co-operation between church college and state university. This plan is now past the experimental stage; it has been thoroughly tested. What is being done now is vitally interesting and instructive. Co-operation of some kind and degree is in full effect in various places in the United States and Canada. Let us review some of the best examples, and then pronounce judgment on the evidence before us.

## III. LESSONS FROM CANADA

If we do not shut our eyes in sweet self-complacency, we can learn some valuable lessons from our prosperous northern neighbor. Canada has had many years of experience in this form of co-operation. The state university at Toronto is the best-known example, and we will examine it first.



This university has a magnificent plant, and an equipment and endowment representing some four or five million dollars. It has a faculty of fifty-eight instructors, covering the fields of arts, science, medicine, engineering, dentistry, and pharmacy. Grouped about this central university, and using its libraries and laboratories, are five denominational colleges—namely, Methodist, Presbyterian, Catholic, Church of England, and Low Anglican. Three of these maintain only theological schools; the other two—the Methodists and Church of England—offer a full arts course in addition to theology. They maintain the arts course, they say, because they believe this course offers “those subjects which influence more largely the formation of character and the style of the man.”

Discipline and government of the university are in the hands of a senate, in which all the faculties as well as graduates of the university are represented. This is the legislative authority of the university. The executive control is in the hands of an executive council, in which the various colleges are represented, which deals with all cases of discipline of an intercollegiate nature, as well as the arrangement of time-tables for lectures, and other matters which effect the harmonious working of the institution. Each college attends to the discipline and supervision of its own students, and is, in all matters of internal economy, entirely independent. Each preserves its own complete identity. Victoria College (Methodist) reports but one case of discipline in twelve years. President Burwash writes:

The moral and religious tone of our students have given us great satisfaction. We think our system gives us all the advantages to be derived from denominational colleges, with comparative freedom from the narrowing influence of a small and sectarian institution. It does not make the necessary educational work unduly burdensome to the church, while it furnishes the sons and daughters of the church with the best educational advantages that the country can afford. At the same time it surrounds the state university with the moral and religious influences of the churches as represented by their colleges.

Many Methodists of Canada strenuously opposed this movement when the proposal came up some dozen years ago to remove their school from Cobourg to Toronto. “The principle is being

fully vindicated," says Dr. Burwash, "and you could not induce our church to go back. We are planting all our new colleges in the West—Manitoba, Alberta, and British Columbia—on the same basis." The church's educational and financial secretary for Canada, Rev. Dr. John Potts, one of the best-known Methodists on this continent, writes, concerning co-operation :

We have had sufficient time to test the value of the relationship. I think there is but one opinion now as to the importance of it. We gain distinct financial benefit by having all the expensive part of the university, such as sciences, etc., without any cost to us, and we have at the same time the opportunity and privilege of moral influence over the students, and the privilege also of exerting a moral influence over the university.

Dr. A. H. Reynar, dean of the faculty of arts, Victoria College, thinks that, when the church cannot supply all the latest and best requirements of university work, it is the course of "policy and honesty to work, if possible, in co-operation with a state university."

In regard to loss of identity, Dean F. H. Wallace, of the faculty of theology, says :

We have gained for our students the advantages of the equipment and the wider courses and the prestige of the degrees of the University of Toronto. At the same time we have retained almost intact the individuality and autonomy of our own college life. Our students are very loyal to their own college, and maintain its societies and traditions, even its own sports.

And, touching the religious atmosphere, he continues :

And, above all, we find no loss of religious life. The spiritual side of our work was never stronger and more satisfactory than today. Indeed, our removal to Toronto and association with a large university have made it more possible than formerly to come under the influence of great religious leaders and movements, such as the International Committee of the Y. M. C. A., the Students' Missionary Volunteers' conventions, John R. Mott, R. E. Speer, etc.

There is no question about the success of the Victoria College experiment. Similar reports come from all the other federated colleges.

William MacLaren, of Knox College (Presbyterian), says : "We have had many years' experience with this arrangement, and are satisfied with it."

Principal J. P. Sheraton, of Wycliffe College (Low Anglican), speaks in these words of the Toronto plan:

The plan followed here has worked very successfully. We secure for our students all the advantages of the university—the broadening of view and enlarging of sympathy which come from contact with some two thousand students in arts, medicine, and theology, . . . the equipment in arts and all the facilities which a great university like that of Toronto is able to give.

The Catholics find the Toronto plan as satisfactory as do the Protestants. Rev. D. Cushing, of St. Michael's College (Catholic), says:

I believe the Catholic students of this province who have made, or are making, a university course in Toronto, are pleased with the plan of affiliation adopted here. If you are contemplating any arrangement of this kind, I should advise you not to drop the project too hastily on account of any apparent difficulties. I do not at all consider it a hindrance to us to be located so close to other denominational colleges.

The Toronto plan is clearly a demonstrated success, financially, educationally, and morally. The same plan is being carried out in Montreal, Winnipeg, and in the other provinces. In Montreal there are four affiliated denominational colleges. William Peterson (of Oxford University), principal of McGill University, Montreal, pronounces the Canadian idea of co-operation "quite a success." "For myself," he says, "I am all for consolidation." From the Atlantic to the Pacific this idea of friendly solution of the problem of higher education prevails in Canada.

#### IV. BEGINNINGS IN THE UNITED STATES

Beginnings of co-operation have at last been made in the United States, although we have been slow about it. Thomas Jefferson was father of the idea of co-operation between church and state university. In his letter to Dr. Cooper, November 2, 1822, concerning the University of Virginia, he advocated the establishment of schools of theology in connection with this institution. His idea was that each religious denomination of the state should be encouraged to "establish a professorship of its own . . . , preserving, however, independence of the university and of each other." He made this recommendation in order to



counteract an "idea that this [the University of Virginia] is an institution, not only of no religion, but against all religions," and in order to overcome what people pointed out as a "defect in an institution professing to give instruction in *all* useful sciences."

But not till our own day has this idea of the far-seeing Jefferson been carried out. Now co-operation in some form is in successful operation at the universities of seven states—namely, California, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Oregon, West Virginia, and Wyoming.

The Disciples' denomination was the first in the United States to demonstrate the success of co-operation. This church has maintained the Ann Arbor Bible chairs at Michigan University since 1893, the purpose being to provide instruction of a university grade in the Bible. The equipment consists of one building and a small but thoroughly trained faculty. More than seventeen hundred students have already taken work in one or more of the Bible chair courses. The church considers the work a gratifying success, and will soon enlarge the faculty. President Angell, of the university, says: "We feel under obligations to the Bible chairs for the help they have rendered in religious work among the students." This church has a similar Bible chair at the University of Kansas (established in 1901), and theological seminaries at the University of California, Oregon, and Missouri. Students and professors familiar with the work pronounce it a surprising success.

The Episcopal church has guild halls—species of student club houses—in Michigan, West Virginia, and Wyoming. The Baptist church also has guild halls in Michigan and West Virginia. Courses of lectures are provided here during the year.

About the University of California at Berkeley the Congregationalists, Christians, Baptists, Methodists, and Unitarians have all either erected buildings and begun work, or have partially completed their preparations for co-operation in some form.

What has been done in the United States is clearly only a beginning. In the cases cited above work done in the university counts toward a degree in the church school, but, on the other

hand, work done in the church school or "Bible chair" does not count toward a degree in the university. And herein is the wide gulf between the American and the Canadian plan; and herein is, in the opinion of the writer, the weakness of the American plan. But a change is coming—has come, in fact. And North Dakota furnishes the example.

#### V. NORTH DAKOTA MOVEMENT

The Methodist college of North Dakota was located by its founders in an isolated village, where chance of success was very precarious. A struggle was made for years to keep the school alive, but the results were wholly incommensurate with the labor and money expended. The question of removal and co-operation with the university at Grand Forks was broached. The presidents of both institutions favored it. Other men of considerable influence opposed the movement. Some ridiculed the idea of a "prayer annex" to the state university. A memorandum signed by both presidents, and given to the press, set forth a tentative plan of co-operation as follows:

1. That the Methodist church change the name of its institution from Red River Valley University to Wesley College.

2. That a building or buildings be erected in near proximity to the state university, but on a separate campus, to include a guild hall, such recitation rooms as may be required for the work proposed, possibly dormitories for young women and young men, and a president's house.

3. That the course of study may be: (a) Bible and church history, English Bible, New Testament, Greek, Hebrew, theism, and such other subjects as the college may elect in pursuance of its purposes. (b) A brief course that may be designated as a Bible normal course, intended especially to fit students to become efficient Sunday-school teachers and lay workers, and upon the completion of which certificates of recognition may be granted. (c) Instruction in music and elocution may be given if desired, and appropriate certificates granted. (d) Guild-hall lectures.

4. That the state university grant for work done in subjects included under (a) above such credit towards the B.A. degree as it gives for technical work done in its own professional schools and for work done in other colleges of reputable standing. Likewise, Wesley College shall give credit for work done in the state university, in similar manner, as preparation for any degree or certificate it may offer.

This "merger" proposition was adopted by the trustees of the

Methodist college, and also sanctioned by the regents of the state university, and is now in process of being carried out. The building of the "Red River Valley University" was sold to the state for a school of science. This movement toward educational unity is the Toronto plan modified to fit American conditions. So far as the United States is concerned, it is a great innovation. It is confidently believed that the Baptists and the Presbyterians of North Dakota will soon follow the step taken by the Methodists, and that the movement will spread to other states. There is much evidence to confirm this belief.

#### VI. PROPOSED MOVEMENT IN OTHER STATES

For years this movement has been in the air. It is just now taking tangible form, as expressions on every side show.

An official committee of Baptists in the state of Washington makes this report:

It is proposed to establish by the side of the state university a Christian institution, federated with it, and under the auspices of the Baptist denomination. . . . The scope to be . . . to provide lecture courses to be filled by the most eminent talent available. The president, with other instructors as the situation may require, to teach those branches of learning essential to a finished education upon which the state does not enter, or enters in an incomplete way. To enlarge the curriculum until every gap in full university work—occasioned by the nature of the state university—is filled. To found scholarships.

This is the way the Congregational church as a whole sees the opportunity. At the triennial council of this church, held at Portland, Maine, in 1901, the following resolution was adopted:

*Resolved,* That this council regards with favor the project of establishing foundations of a religious character in connection with our great state universities, whose purpose shall be to provide pastoral care, religious instruction, and helpful Christian influence to the students there assembled, and we heartily commend this enterprise to those of generous spirit as in the highest degree worthy of their sympathy and their gifts.

In Missouri the Northern and Southern Presbyterians and the Episcopalians have the matter under advisement. In Nebraska the Episcopalians have land for a building, and the Lutherans and the Presbyterians are working to the same end. In Illinois the Presbyterians, through their synod, are perfecting a



plan of reaching the Presbyterian students of that university, and contemplate ultimately the establishment of some form of theological seminary or college.

The Methodists of Illinois—and herein is a remarkable coincidence—hit upon the same plan of co-operation as the Methodists of North Dakota, and at the same time, and this, too, absolutely without any communication. Three prominent Methodists of Urbana, Ill., were working out a “tentative plan” for their state, while at the same time, but unknown to either group, two college presidents in North Dakota were working out the same plan for their state. The statement published by the Illinois Methodists is in substance as follows:

There are now over seven hundred Methodist students in the University of Illinois. They are here rather than in the Methodist colleges because they find here the best educational facilities of the state. Still the state university does not, and in fact cannot, provide systematic religious instruction. Certain inherent difficulties prevent the local churches from doing the most effective work among these students. The need is overwhelming that something be done to enable the church to perform its full duty toward these young people. To help solve this problem, the following suggestions are made:

That a college be established in Urbana, in close proximity to the state university, under the auspices of the Methodist church of Illinois; that this institution be known as “Wesley College;” that suitable buildings be erected; that students of the college take their instruction in the University of Illinois in all those subjects for which the university adequately provides; that instruction be given in religious subjects, including the English Bible, Christian evidences, church history, etc., and such other subjects, like ethics and philosophy for example, as may not be provided for in the university to the desired extent.

It is apparent that the existence of such a college in the heart of the university community would be a standing reminder to professors and students alike of the importance of the spiritual and religious elements in higher education. It would be a standing incentive to the young people to give attention to this important subject. There is little doubt that for the high-grade instruction given by the college the university would allow credit toward a degree. The possibilities of such an institution are great. The ablest men in the whole church could be brought in to impress the young people. Methodist resources could be devoted, *in toto*, to systematic religious work, leaving the state to provide for the expense of ordinary education. It would prove a strategic point for the church to reach the future leaders of

agriculture, business, commerce, industry, education, any, even of the church itself.

Here is offered the possibility of a true spiritual union of church and state in the work of education, which would have all the advantages, and none of the disadvantages, of that political union which is opposed alike to the judgment and feelings of the American people.

#### VII. CONCLUSIONS

Since the state university is the university of all the people, and is a great civic institution to train citizens for actual life, it is hoped that churches will co-operate heartily with it. They support it with their taxes. There is no such thing as Methodist political economy, Baptist mathematics, Congregational physics, or Presbyterian chemistry. The future workers of the church must also be citizens of the state. The religious man must also be the civic man. Cannot these two systems of training, the religious and the civic, be harmoniously co-ordinated by the simple process of friendly co-operation between denominational college and state university? Such co-operation has within itself the potentialities of magnificent fruition. It is the movement of the future, and, as such, deserves our interest, our sympathy, and our support.

## REVIEWS

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*Sex and Character.* By OTTO WEININGER. Authorized Translation from the Sixth German Edition. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1906. Pp. xxii+349.

No men who really think deeply about women retain a high opinion of them; men either despise women or they have never thought seriously about them. (P. 236.)

Woman is neither high-minded nor low-minded, strong-minded nor weak-minded. She is the opposite of all these. Mind cannot be predicated of her at all; she is mindless. (P. 253.)

Women have no existence and no essence; they are not, they are nothing. Mankind occurs as male or female, as something or nothing. Woman has no share in ontological reality, no relation to the thing-in-itself, which in the deepest interpretation is the absolute, is God. Man in his highest form, the genius, has such a relation, and for him the absolute is either the conception of the highest worth of existence, in which case he is a philosopher; or it is the wonderful fairyland of dreams, the kingdom of absolute beauty, and then he is an artist. Both views mean the same. Woman has no relation to the idea, she neither affirms nor denies it; she is neither moral nor anti-moral; mathematically speaking, she has no sign; she is purposeless, neither good nor bad, neither angel nor devil, never egotistical (and therefore has often been said to be altruistic); she is as non-moral as she is non-logical. But all existence is moral and logical existence. So woman has no existence. (P. 286.)

The woman of the highest standard is immeasurably beneath the man of the lowest standard. (P. 302.)

I have shown that logical and ethical phenomena come together in the conception of truth as the ultimate good, and posit the existence of an intelligible ego or soul, as a form of being of the highest super-empirical reality. In such a being as the absolute female there are no logical and ethical phenomena, and, therefore, the ground for the assumption of a soul is absent. The absolute female knows neither the logical nor the moral imperative, and the words law and duty, duty toward herself, are words which are least familiar to her. The inference that she is lacking in supersensual personality is fully justified. The absolute female has no ego. (P. 186.)

A psychological proof that the power of making judgments is a masculine trait lies in the fact that woman recognizes it as such, and that it acts on her as a tertiary sexual character of the male. A woman always expects definite



convictions in a man, and appropriates them; she has no understanding of indecision in a man. She always expects a man to talk, and a man's speech is to her a sign of his manliness. It is true that woman has the gift of speech, but she has not the art of talking; she converses (flirts) or chatters, but she does not talk. She is most dangerous, however, when she is dumb, for men are only too inclined to take her quiescence for silence. (P. 195.)

The absolute female, then, is devoid not only of the logical rules, but of the function of making concepts and judgments which depend on them. As the very nature of the conceptual faculty consists in posing subject against object, and as the subject takes its fullest and deepest meaning from its power of forming judgments on its objects, it is clear that woman cannot be recognized as possessing even the subject. (P. 195.)

I must add to the exposition of the non-logical nature of the female some statements as to her non-moral nature. The profound falseness of woman, the result of the want in her of a permanent relation to the idea of truth or the idea of value, would prove a subject of discussion so exhaustive that I must go to work another way. There are such endless imitations of ethics, such confusing copies of morality, that women are often said to be on a moral plane higher than man. I have already pointed out the need to distinguish between the non-moral and immoral, and I now repeat that with regard to women we can talk only of the non-moral, or the complete absence of a moral sense. . . . I am not arguing that woman is evil and anti-moral; I state that she cannot be really evil; *she is merely non-moral*. (Pp. 195-97.)

A mother makes no difference in arranging a marriage for her own daughter and for any other girl, and is just as glad to do it for the latter if it does not interfere with the interests of her own family; it is the same thing, match-making throughout, and there is no psychological difference in making a match for her own daughter and doing the same thing for a stranger. I would even go so far as to say that a mother is not inconsolable if a stranger, however common and undesirable, desires and seduces her daughter. (P. 255.)

We may now give with certainty a conclusive answer to the question as to the giftedness of the sexes: there are women with undoubted traits of genius, but there is no female genius, and there never has been one (not even amongst the masculine women of history which were dealt with in the first part) *and there never can be one*. . . . How could a soulless being possess genius? The possession of genius is identical with profundity; and if anyone were to try to combine woman and profundity as subject and predicate, he would be contradicted on all sides. A female genius is a contradiction in terms, for genius is simply intensified, perfectly developed, universally conscientious maleness. (P. 189.)

Mr. Weininger's serious and ambitious study is the most remarkable jumble of insane babble and brilliant suggestion that it has been

my fortune to consider seriously. The author takes himself and his subject seriously, and while he is obviously prepared for his work neither on the psychological, biological, nor yet the ethnological side, yet he is almost prepared in all of these fields, and brings to the subject a most astonishing originality. There is exhibited the most acute and subtle mental play throughout, but the whole argument is characterized by downright unreasonableness. The man (he was almost a boy) was a genius, a German genius, and the volume is remarkable, not as a contribution to science but as a work of the imagination, and an exhibition of what fantastic antics the human mind is capable of. The form also is as bizarre as the content. There are parts so poor, obscure, illogical, and stupid that they would not be accepted in a college boy's essay, and other parts worthy of Kant or Schopenhauer.

We almost feel that such a mind is detached from its environment and is creating a world of its own, but that this is not and cannot be so is shown in a most interesting manner by the fact that in the concrete illustrations which he uses to illustrate the traits of woman-kind in general (as he thinks) he is really speaking always of German Gretchen or her mother. He falls into the same error as Karl Vogt who some years ago, in a description of the mental traits of women students at Zurich, denied woman in general the ability to understand certain subjects in which American university women were already confessedly conspicuously proficient. So Weininger reflects—vaguely, indeed, and fantastically, as a dream reflects reality—the character of the German woman. The American woman, however, is quite a different thing, and presents characters the very opposite of what Weininger claims are and must be the characters of woman universally and in perpetuity. It has not even, seemingly, occurred to him that the status of woman, as of the lower races, is in a measure dependent on the run of habit in her group and the limited range of her attention.

But impossible and extra-phenomenal as the book certainly is, it is yet worth the while. Jevons has remarked that the greatest inventor is the one whose mind is visited by the largest number of random guesses. Anything which brings more points of view into the case is valuable, and this book is rich in this respect. That no one is either completely male or completely female is for instance, a good thesis, and the bearing of this view on the phenomena of sexual inversion is very suggestively stated and argued. And two

other of the writer's main propositions amount essentially to this, namely, that the male is more highly differentiated than the female, and that the female is more completely sexually saturated and her interests more sexually limited than in the case of male. These are probably truths, though not new ones, and it would have been fortunate if he had substituted a simple and sane exposition of them for such extravagant statements as I have quoted above.

W. I. THOMAS.

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*Some Ethical Gains through Legislation.* By FLORENCE KELLY.  
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1905. Pp. 341.

The titles of the chapters indicate the scope of the volume: the right to childhood; the child, the state, and the nation; the right to leisure; judicial interpretations of the right to leisure; the right of women to the ballot; the rights of purchasers, and the courts. In the appendix are reprinted several of the most important decisions bearing on the subjects.

One marked distinction of Mrs. Kelley's discussions is the vividness of the concrete images used to enforce the argument, and these illustrations are not borrowed from books; they come from personal observations as factory inspector, special agent of the Bureau of Statistics of Illinois, resident of Hull House and of the Nurses' Settlement, New York, during thirteen years; and secretary of the National Consumers' League since 1899.

This is a fine example of the kind of ethical discussion which really grips the modern conscience. That which Professor Small has declared to be the demand upon ethics is here actually done for certain definite problems. The exact situation is analyzed and the significant facts are laid bare, and a judgment is asked in view of the contradiction between the requirements of life and the actual conditions and the existing law. There is no escape from the issue save in refusal to read. Moral umbrellas will not shed this rain of fire, and no citizen can escape; all are participants in the evil, and all suffer, most of all the innocent.

One of the author's indictments falls heavily on those forms of philanthropy which train girls only to sew when the needle trades are already at the bottom of the scale of wages, and then send out the poor wretches to a labor market which is packed to the doors with hungry competitors.



Another instance of cogent appeal to enlightened conscience is the analysis of the results of a failure to give legal redress in the lawlessness of workingmen; as in Colorado when the legislature refused relief after having sworn to give it by accepting office under the constitution.

No one has more clearly demonstrated the idea that the individual is secure in his rights only when all are protected by law; and that no citizen can perform his duty without association of efforts. The anarchistic doctrine that government is a "necessary evil" is refuted by fact, and the lofty moral mission of law is enforced.

In view of the humiliating and discouraging decisions of some courts which set aside laws made to meet contemporary conditions by appeals to precedents drawn from ancient history, the author shows the necessity for introducing social science into law schools, although she does not mention this solution.

How can courts be enlightened and instructed concerning conditions as they exist? This is the burning question which confronts both the purchasers and the wage-earners in all those cases in which the health of the community is affected in ways less conspicuous than epidemic smallpox. How can the gradual, cumulative effect of working conditions, and of living conditions, upon the public health, be made obvious to the minds of the judges composing the courts of last resort?

This is the last topic of the book, and no answer is attempted. So long as young lawyers are told by the highest and worthiest of their teachers that "the law library is the laboratory of the student," what can we expect afterward? Every beneficent change in legislation comes from a fresh study of social conditions and of social ends, and from some rejection of obsolete law to make room for a rule which fits the new facts. One can hardly escape from the conclusion that a lawyer who has not studied economics and sociology is very apt to become a public enemy; and many a good judge would be hurtful if he did not get through newspapers and magazines a diluted kind of sociology which saves him from bondage to mere precedent. Reformation does not come from a law library, which has its useful function in conservatism; it comes from a complete mastery of the real world, and a moral judgment as to what ought to be and is not yet. The "moral philosophy" and "ethics" of the past generation did something to deliver the legal profession from bondage to the letter of leather-covered texts; but those social sciences which at once interpret the meaning, the values, the forces of national life,

and bring all essential considerations to the help of judgment, and reveal the concrete methods of action for realizing the social ends in largest measure, are already in position to give a lawyer a better equipment for that profession which above all others should be devoted to the right ordering of human conduct. Without this study of sociology and economics we may have acute interpreters of legal phraseology, shrewd money-getters, advisers of corporations; but we cannot have the best type of leaders of social progress. The legal profession has already rendered service which we gladly recognize and honor; but, on the other hand, many of its best-trained men, lacking the vision for the principle that "new occasions teach new duties," obstruct the way with barricades of dead precedents. Some very disheartening illustrations are given in this book.

C. R. HENDERSON.

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*Egoism: A Study in the Social Premises of Religion.* By LOUIS WALLIS. The University of Chicago Press. Pp. xiv+121. \$1.

The author of this little book is not a clergyman, and he has never held an academic position. The title is not likely to attract the attention of those who should be most interested in the contents. The argument plunges at once into dubious regions, and it does not guard itself by much provision for conciliating the type of readers to whom it is addressed. It counts on getting a hearing as a result of shock.

In spite of these disadvantages, the book is well worth consideration, both by sociologists and by every one who has either historical or religious interest in the Old Testament. On the one hand, it is an essay in the use of the Old Testament as a sociological "case-book"; on the other hand, it is an attempt to account for the religion of Israel psycho-genetically rather than miraculously. This being the case, it throws down the gauntlet at once both to traditional interpreters and to the innovating higher critics. To the former it says, "You do not explain at all;" to the latter, "You do not explain enough."

The argument deserves respectful attention both from biblical scholars and from sociologists. The author has needlessly handicapped himself by stating his position in terms which saddle upon him the load of confusion between "egoism" in its psychological and its

moral sense. It is no more and no less true of religion than of art, or science, or government, or industry, that it is "rooted in egoism" (p. 1). The sense in which it is true primarily of "all human conduct," however, is not the sense that is ordinarily contrasted with altruism. It is rather the same sense in which we may say that "all human conduct is rooted in *attention*." Attention is a condition alike of love and hate, of loyalty and treachery, of generosity and greed. So far, attention is merely a psychological process. It is not a moral attitude. When we attribute moral qualities to "attention," and call it "good" or "bad," it is something very much more complex than the psychological activity that is common to all conduct.

Precisely the same thing is true of "egoism." In the one sense we may say that "altruism" is rooted in "egoism." We cannot with equal truth say that all "egoism" is rooted in "altruism." "Altruism" presupposes one "egoism"; it abhors the other "egoism."

In the present state of things the people who ought to read this book are not sufficiently outfitted with these distinctions to assume them and weigh the subsequent argument without distraction. That argument is, in substance, first, that the process through which Israel got its religious receptivity was simply an episode in the social process that goes on, earlier or later, wherever there are people. The argument is specifically a thesis as to the precise reaction of interests which accounts for the history of Israel. Since the author does not present himself with the prestige of assured position among scholars, it will be easy for those who are not interested in critical research to ignore him. No one who is seriously working upon the history of Israel can afford to treat his thesis contemptuously. If he has not hit upon the ultimate hypothesis, he has made it sufficiently evident that no one else has, and that the psycho-sociological interpretation of the material is still an open question.

We add a brief notice of the book from the view-point of the Old Testament scholar.

A. W. SMALL.

The book is an effort to illustrate by means of the peculiarly adequate data of Old Testament history the author's thesis that egoism is at the basis of all human activity and thought. A somewhat modified view of egoism is adopted, but of this the editor himself will speak. From the present writer's point of view, the position seems to be that Old Testament history presents a field for the constant clash of human interests, and that the Bible tells of the survival



of the fittest. Of many paragraphs that set forth the idea, the following may be selected.

We find it [the demand for goodness] in all societies at all periods of history. We are, therefore, assured at the outset that the prophets of Israel had no patent on the cry for righteousness. It surrounded them like the atmosphere. The simple fact is that Israel was in a situation that lent itself historically to this universal demand upon the others for good. Every man, at one time or another, has a case against somebody; most people have chronic cases against the world; and here, for the first time in history, a large number of men were able to make a plausible claim that God (*Elohim*) was on their side against the others. The prophetic movement gave expression to this demand. In Israel we must recognize the universal as taking on a particular form which has commended itself to future ages. (Pp. 97, 98.)

The author presupposes the results of the more progressive biblical science of our time. For twenty-five years or so biblical theology in America has been in the antithetical swing of the pendulum, and many of our foremost scholars have denied the fundamental postulates of the older theology on account of facts observed in the biblical literature. The thesis from which these scholars have turned maintained the transcendent operation of God in the gift of a revelation external to the mind of man; the antithesis is that the truths of the Bible have proceeded from the human mind by purely natural means. The latter has been presented in our day with great power, and the evidence has been collected with marvelous skill, so that few theological circles remain in which the so-called modern conclusions are not accepted either wholly or in part. It has been observed, however, by more than one lover of the Bible and of men that the new phases of truth are not paralleled in the church by that careful attention and enthusiastic interest which alone can make the new views effective in the production of character. The people have not assimilated them. They appear indifferent to them. It would seem that a synthesis of the opposing views must be made, before the Old Testament can have vital interest for men; and many scholars are endeavoring to effect the synthesis. At last, a young sociologist arises from the laity and declares that we have failed to notice the movements of society in the Old Testament times, that these are well marked, and, when exposed to view, will aid in establishing the development of the Old Testament religion as no other discipline has done.

It must be recognized that historical criticism thus far has done little more for the popular mind than to demonstrate facts in the

biblical domain which must be considered by all lovers of truth, and that a decided readjustment of theology is demanded, although critical scholars have talked for years about the prophet's special reference to the men of his own time, and his use of language applicable to that time, and they have written valuable books descriptive of the various epochs involved. It may be that it is reserved for pure sociology to make real for us the relation of the social forces of the past, so that we may understand and appreciate the human side of those innumerable ideas that conditioned the growth of the Hebrew people and the development of their theology. In the hope that this may be so, the reviewer reaches out his hand to the author. It must be understood, of course, and would be recognized by the author, that the theologian must have the last word, just as he has had with the evolutionists, and he will be glad to show that all the natural movements of the ages are the workings of spiritual forces called out by the ultimate power in the universe, the immanent God, of whom the Bible tells.

For the better understanding of this book, the author's *Examination of Society* (1903), and his *Seminary Studies in Old Testament History* (1904), should be read, as well as his (unpublished) *Provisional Outline of a Course in Biblical Introduction to Sociology*.

CHARLES RUFUS BROWN.

NEWTON CENTER, MASS.

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*The Menace of Privilege: A Study of the Dangers to the Republic from the Existence of a Favored Class.* By HENRY GEORGE, JR. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1905. Pp. ix+421.

There are two bitter enemies in American society. A war is in progress between them. They are Privilege and Labor. The cause of the contest is not production of wealth, but its distribution. Mr. George investigates these enemies and their struggle. He studies first the princes of privileges—their habits of life, amusements, dissipations, marital relations, and aristocratic tendencies. Here is a fund of information about the lives of our princes of wealth. The other opponent is the victim of privilege; he is the laborer. A study is made of his physical, mental, and moral deterioration, together with his efforts for defense in the labor unions. A chapter is devoted to the dangers of unionism. The wealthy class enjoys extraordinary privileges or "weapons" in the battle. Among these weapons are

the use of the courts, government by injunction, the use of the federal army in strikes, corruption of state and national politics, the influencing of public opinion by purchase or intimidation of the press, and by gifts to the university and pulpit. All this is seen to result in a centralization of government and a directing of public notice away from real conditions at home to a policy of foreign aggression. A parallelism is noted with preceding nations which now are in ruin.

Eight chapters are devoted to the investigation, and one to the remedy. Coming from Mr. George, the remedy can be surmised: (1) stop taxation evils and immunities by taxing land monopoly to death, (2) take all public highway functions into public hands. Mr. George's investigations are valuable in supplying a rich collection of current material on important questions. The book is a veritable mine of information. One merit of his investigation is concrete illustrations of his statements and definite references to substantiate his arguments. Particularly interesting are his discussions of government by injunction, and gifts by the wealthy to the missionary societies, universities, and churches. He justly distinguishes between capital and privilege, recording the fact that privilege is sometimes miscalled capital. He nevertheless fails to credit capital sufficiently for the part it has performed in our industrial advancement. Another merit is the absence of pessimism. Nowhere does Mr. George lose faith in the masses, the princes of privileges, our industrial order, or system of government; but he is hopeful for improvement.

While Mr. George has investigated extensively and accurately, the reader feels that he is more than an investigator, he has a solution. One feels he has a theory to prove. Can a man be a successful investigator and propagandist at the same time, without allowing the investigation to be prejudiced in its bearing? Most men cannot perform both these rôles at the same time. However, one chapter only in the nine is given to the remedy, and yet many insinuations and suggestions as to the remedy are found throughout the investigation. His repeated references to the early industrial conditions of our country add nothing to his argument, because the advancement has been so great.

The book is clear in presentation and logical arrangement. It is a valuable contribution to the study of our social and industrial problems—a book of unusual merit and interest.

SCOTT E. W. BEDFORD.



*L'assistance familiale*. Fifteenth year, 1906. Rédacteur-en-chef,  
DR. A. MARIE, Médecin de l'Asile de Villegrief (Seine).

This magazine deserves special attention as the organ of the movement in favor of family care of the insane which has recently made progress in Belgium, France, Scotland, and to some extent in the United States. Dr. Marie holds that a human being, even if in ill-health, feels more at home in a family than in a large congregate institution; and he carries this principle into various fields. The homeless child should be placed in an adopted home; the sick should be cared for in their own homes, if possible; the delinquent youth is helped best in a family group; the aged dependents should be in cottages, rather than in huge barracks; the tuberculous patients should not be assembled in vast buildings.

The magazine publishes articles relating to the care of the insane and kindred topics from all parts of the world. To the student of charitable relief the volumes furnish valuable materials.

C. R. H.

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*Les classes pauvres*. Par ALFREDO NICEFORO. Paris: V.  
Giard et E. Brière, 1905. Pp. 344.

The basis of this work is a study of 3,147 boys and girls of various social classes in Lausanne. These school children were classified by sex and age, and examined to discover their physical differences in respect to height, weight, chest, respiration, strength, resistance to fatigue, capacity of skull, anomalies of face and physiognomy. From this personal study the author advances to the evidence collected by many investigators in many countries. His conclusion is that the poorer members of society are inferior to those in comfortable circumstances both physically and psychically. The method resembles that employed by Lombroso and his followers in the study of the traits of criminals. The causes of inferiority are sought in the physical conditions of habitations, workshop, and the lack of suitable nutrition. The author does not discuss methods of amelioration. The most distinct contribution is the study of the Lausanne children, but the materials gathered from other sources are skilfully arranged.

C. R. H.

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## NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

**The Field for the American Society of Municipal Improvement.**—It is true, as the president states in his paper on the American Society of Municipal Improvement, that this society has a right to exist because it is doing a work for municipal engineering which no other society attempts to do; but it has a greater right in that it is doing equally good work for other technical departments of the city government, which is not done by any other society. There are many members of the society who would not wish to see its field restricted to that of municipal engineering, and the best interests of all the members, as well as of society at large, demand that the field of the society be as broad as its name, and that it cover all kinds of municipal improvements.

There has been in the past a very salutary effort to restrict the number of questions to be discussed at convention to those practical problems actually covered by the title, leaving theoretical and political questions to other associations; and this restriction has greatly aided in strengthening and enlarging the society. It seems, however, that this selection has proceeded far enough, and that the society should in the future, as it has in the past, serve all the various departments represented in its membership, and offer inducements in the way of fact and discussion for workers in all these departments in the cities of the continent to become members.—Editorial in *Municipal Engineering*, October, 1905. H. W.

**American Society of Municipal Improvements.**—Eleven years ago the American Society of Municipal Improvements was organized in Buffalo with sixty members. Its good work has continued, and the society has maintained a high reputation for earnest endeavor, which it is to be hoped it will continue to deserve.

If there is a certain area in the field of municipal advancement which is peculiarly our own—and I firmly believe there is—then our best work will result from a study of its nature and confining our energies within its boundaries.

As stated by our constitution, the object of this society is "to disseminate information and experience upon, and to promote the best methods to be employed in, the management of municipal departments and in the construction of municipal works." The National Municipal League is largely composed of citizens as such only, who consider "political, administrative, and educational phases of the municipal problem." In the League of American Municipalities are gathered the mayors and other officials of our cities to study "all questions pertaining to municipal administration." The purpose of the American Civic Association is "the cultivation of higher ideals of civic life and beauty in America."

The first two consider chiefly municipal administration as a whole and the methods of co-ordinating various municipal departments, but in only a minor degree the details of the management of individual departments; while this last would seem to be explicitly stated as one of the objects of this society, and one worthy of our earnest consideration.

At first thought, it might seem that the field of engineering was already more than covered by existing societies. An examination of the work done by these, however, will show that this is not the case. The municipal engineers of Greater New York have recently formed a society which has a most promising future, but its membership is limited to that corporation. There is a place, then, for a society which will do for all the other and smaller cities of the country what this last society does for New York. One division of municipal engineering, namely, water supply, is cared for by several societies, notably the American Water Works Association and the New England Water Works Association. But street-paving, cleaning and general maintenance, refuse collection and disposal, sewerage and

sanitation, except as the latter is treated from the physicians' point of view by the American Public Health Association, and many other avenues for municipal improvement, await the assistance of this society in their development.

The above considerations might give the impression that there is left for us only details of administration and construction; but such is far from being the case. We may treat as experts of the broad subject of the relative values of various utilities to a modern city which are essential, and which nonessential, to its most profitable growth. We shall be doing a better work in persuading a city to adopt proper sanitary garbage-disposal than in designing the details of its plant. To demonstrate and convince of the sanitary superiority and greater economy of a sewerage system over cesspools is as important as to build the system.

To a certain extent it is a weakness, but to a much greater extent should it be a strength, that our membership is not composed of one class only of officials, but that mayors, aldermen, engineers, and street and other superintendents all meet here to exchange ideas and learn each other's point of view, and our discussions should be, and to a large extent are, demonstrations of the value of this.—A. P. Folwell, *Municipal Engineering*, October, 1905. H. W.

**The Municipalization of Street Railways in Rome.**—The tramway company ought to be paying 400,000 lire to the municipality instead of the 290,000 lire which it is now paying. [A lira is 100 centesimi, equivalent to *ca.* \$0.20.] The tramways are, however, more than a source of income; they are a public necessity.

The Società Romana dei Tramways-Omnibus points out that its stocks are quoted very low, and that the company is losing money. Such statements show the intention of the company not to share its gains with the municipality, and justify the proposition often made to municipalize this service. Judging by the statements of the officers of the company, it would seem that the stockholders ought to welcome municipalization; instead of which, they are its bitterest opponents. This fact itself naturally tends to increase the number of those who favor municipal ownership.

It may be well, considering the question on its own merits, apart from the statements made by the company, to compare conditions in Rome with those in Milan, where the street railways are semi-municipalized. In Milan the municipality owns and maintains the roadbed, having absolute jurisdiction of the lines, with power to extend them or discontinue the use of them at will. The Società Edison, the operating company, provides the service, namely: the erection and maintenance of the wires, the generation and distribution of power, the acquisition and maintenance of rolling-stock, and the employing of the operating force.

The gross earnings are divided between the municipality, as owner of the lines, and the operating company. The municipality received (1) 4,500 lire per kilometer of single track—to meet the cost of construction, including interest and amortization, and maintenance of the track—and (2) a fixed sum of 125,000 lire for the maintenance of the streets in which street-railway lines are operated. The Edison Company receives a payment to cover the cost of operation calculated on a basis of 26.38 centesimi per car-kilometer, divided as follows: traction expenses (power, etc.), 15.13 cent.; maintenance, 1.17 cent.; maintenance of rolling-stock, 2.65 cent.; general expenses, 3.12 cent.; amortization (i. e., sinking fund, or other means of retiring the debt), 4.31 cent. The surplus is divided, 60 per cent. going to the municipality and 40 per cent. to the operating company. In 1903 Milan received, according to this arrangement, 1,390,000 lire, a sum equal to 20 per cent. of the gross receipts.

The tramway company of Rome, on the other hand, pays to the municipality only 9.6 per cent. of its gross earnings, although its receipts average 68 centesimi per car-kilometer, as against 44.03 cent. in Milan. It is evident that the street-railway service of Rome could be more productive, and that—whatever the stockholders of the company may say—the share of the municipality in the net profits could be greater.

We do not believe, however, that it is absolutely necessary to municipalize the service in order to attain this result. If we follow the example of Milan and



inaugurate a similar relationship between the municipality and the street-railway company, then the municipality of Rome should also receive 20 per cent. of the gross receipts.

It is frequently repeated that the fares are higher in Rome than in any other Italian city; that the number of cars is insufficient for the needs of the people, who are often kept waiting at the stopping-places, and not infrequently are left standing there; and that the cars themselves are not properly cared for, and are not suited to the needs of the capital city.

Today the street-railway service, especially in large cities, is a public service, in the real sense of the term; and since we should insist on excluding from this category those functions which frequently are mistakenly included, so we should likewise insist on the most careful oversight by the municipality in those cases in which, as in the present one, the character of a public service is plainly recognizable. The council ought to provide for the functioning of the tramway service in such way as to make it serve the needs of the citizens. For this result no control would be too strict.

However, as we have already said, it is not at all necessary, in order to accomplish this purpose, to municipalize the service. Municipal ownership would not be certainly harmful, but it could permit the continuance of the inconveniences which we now suffer, unless the administration holds by the firm intention of attaining, at all costs, the public welfare.

Without municipalizing the service, a new form of control could be introduced; such, for example, as the issue of tickets to the street-railway company by the municipality, as is done in Milan. We ought, also, to develop the suburbs, extending the lines to the city limits (*le barriere daziarie*), and reducing the fares during the morning and evening hours for the accommodation of workmen.

Conditions can be secured without upsetting present arrangements with the company. To maintain that municipal ownership is the only means of effecting an improvement is to interfere with a condition of affairs that can be bettered with the greatest facility. For there are contracts with the street-railway company which are to conserve the interests of the citizens, and it is the duty of the municipal government to enforce them; or, if there are no such contracts, it is the duty of the municipality to insist upon the company's making them.

Semi-municipalization, under such conditions as are found in Milan, would yield to the municipality the sum of 611,600 lire; whereas complete municipal ownership would yield 20,470 lire more. Without claiming absolute exactness in these figures, it is, nevertheless, evident that a municipalized tramway service would yield to the municipality a very slightly greater profit than would a semi-municipalized service patterned after that of Milan.

It seems evident from this discussion that, financially speaking, the advantages of an eventual municipalization—granting that there are advantages—are not great enough to make immediate municipal ownership an indispensable necessity. Before such action it is possible to try other expedients which will, in the meantime, serve to show the exact earning power of the street railways—and which, nevertheless, will not prevent subsequent municipalization at any time that it may appear advisable. Such an experiment as semi-municipalization [i. e., municipal ownership, but not municipal operation, as in Milan], or else municipal regulation, as advocated in this paper, would not, by any means, be lacking in instructive value.—Luigi Nina, "La municipalizzazione del servizio tramviario nella Capitale," *Giornale degli Economisti*, September, 1905. H. W.

**The Ethics of Corporal Punishment.**—For an exposure of the futility of "flogging" the reader is referred to Mr. Collinson's pamphlet *Facts About Flogging*. The theme of this article is the immorality of flogging as a means of punishing offenders.

What explains the intense dislike of this practice, which in some quarters is still lauded? It is degrading to those who administer it and to those who receive it. It is the substance of personal tyranny. The ethical objection is that such punishment is supreme negation of free thinking—the symbol of the slavery of

the mind. In spite of this and a recognition of its cruelty, why is the practice approved and advocated by so many healthy-minded people?

It is explained by the fact of the prevalence of flogging in the schools. If a well-educated man's sons are flogged at Eton, it is no disgrace to the lower order to be birched by a policeman or a schoolmaster. Corporal punishment in the English schools is responsible for this servile and tyrannical tone of mind which applauds flogging because they and their children are hardened to its practice in the schools. It is a discipline. In this matter the instinct of the English working classes regarding corporal punishment as a disgrace is truer and less morbid than those "hardened" to it in the schools, i. e., their so-called superiors. The punishment of the young seems to be the clue to an understanding of the ethics of corporal punishment as a whole. Yet it is unpleasant to record an increase in the past few years of the practice of flogging the young. For example, the National Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children promoted a bill in 1900 (fortunately defeated) for the wholesale whipping of juvenile offenders at the discretion of the magistrate.

Turning to adult offenders, we find the same cry for the infliction of bodily pain on hooligans, wife-beaters, dynamiters, train-wreckers, ill-users of children and animals. Some English judges have of late shown a tendency to prescribe the prison birch to "rogues and vagabonds" under the infamous vagrancy acts once obsolete. The argument favoring such procedure, that these scoundrels cannot be disgraced, because already degraded in crime, is false; any living being, no matter how low, is not beyond human sympathy and aid.

The arguments against the brutality of the lash are futile and amusing; one of the silliest being more concerned in protecting the criminal than the victim of the crime. The most plausible sophism in favor of corporal punishment is contrasting the evils of imprisonment with the pretended beneficence of the lash. One thing can be said in favor of flogging: it "saves time." Like all short-cuts, "more haste, less speed."

To conclude: Corporal punishment, the antithesis of moral suasion, is an outrage on the supremacy of the human mind and dignity of the human body. All physical violence cannot be dispensed with, but this the most barbarous was uprooted.—Henry S. Salt, in *International Journal of Ethics*, October, 1905.

S. E. W. B.

**Development of Labor Organizations in the United States.**—The earliest labor classes brought their forms from England, and the first distinctions were social, as between gentlemen and goodmen, or rich and poor. In the middle of the eighteenth century the wage question was first raised, but rather as a political than an economic one. After the War of Independence these organizations broke loose from the mother country, and in 1806 the tailors formed a separate union, followed by the hatters and others.

The years 1825-61 bring to the front labor agitation. Questions of wage and length of day were prominent, but the significance of organization as a means of leading contending classes to a better understanding of each other was not recognized. The movements of this period were under high-minded leaders, such as Owen, Brisbane, Dana, and Greeley; but they formed rather a politico-ethical sect than a party. In 1848 a great flood of immigrants of socialistic and revolutionary tendencies, stimulated class consciousness. Certain popular movements in England also found sympathy here. Mystical orders, such as "Knights of Labor," took rise. The air was charged with the spirit of Henry George and Bellamy, and the Congress of 1850 at Chicago raised the labor reaction to a triumphant place.

The first organized labor group which in the third decade of last century demanded shorter hours and higher wage was the builders, especially ship-builders, who after vain attempts to lead their employers to an open discussion of the question whether a ten-hour day would be a benefit, instituted a strike. In Boston employers organized to withstand the laborers and agreed not to employ organized labor. The boycott was recognized as a legitimate means of struggle. Labor continued to organize more highly and compactly. By 1853



almost all skilled labor trades had obtained at least the eleven-hour day, and shipbuilders the eight-hour day, and some success had been reached in the organization of the unskilled and of women.

The special feature of the period 1861-86 was the rapid growth of the half-mystical, half-practical orders. Knights of Labor reached a membership of 700,000. They were followed by Daughters of the Knights of Labor, who made political demands, such as referendum, weekly wage, and shorter hours. In this period between thirty and forty national unions arose. The socialistic spirit broadened out, but did not fully comprehend itself. In the last twenty years economic development has been great, through the application of machinery. Labor has specialized. No labor party has been successfully organized, but laborers have perfected economic organizations, and have defined and clearly set forth their problem. The real conflict now is between the unions and the non-unionist, just as the capitalist has to fight the underseller and the price-cutter. There are at least two and one-half millions of laborers in 116 national and international (Canada and Mexico) unions, made up of 27,000 local unions; there are also 33 state organizations. The unit of representation in the annual congress is the local union. The Federation attempts to influence politics and legislation. There is, in spite of the spirit of individualism, large co-operation in the Federation. The leaders have the confidence of the membership and yet suspicion of personal or political ends is never entirely absent.

Relations of the unions to employers are varied. The trusts and the labor leaders are not unconditioned opponents of each other. Only menacing forms of monopoly and financial encroachment are openly opposed. The small trusts are much more opposed to labor organizations than the larger. The contention between the two classes is less one of principle than of expediency. Sometimes by joint agreement the laborers and capitalists have been able to combine against the consumer, and this they have not been slow to do.

Arbitration is fast gaining ground, and strikes are becoming rarer, due to the great expense involved in them as well to the better control of the local unions by the Federation. In twenty-two states there are arbitration officers or boards, provided for by the state.

The two questions of importance to the unions are wage and kind of labor. They are not a unit on the question of piece-work; some favor, some oppose. On the whole, there is a disinclination to the *akkord* pay, because the employer has a tendency to make the ability of the best worker the basis of wage. Among piece-workers there is opposition to the extra-high wage; many local unions punish those who labor over the time set by the union; others have rules limiting the quantity of product for a day's work.

The eight-hour day has been gained by coal-miners and most builders' groups. In most other groups the day is still ten hours, and in some cases more. Applicants for membership to the unions must have followed their trade a certain length of time, varying from two to five years. Apprentices are limited to a certain proportion of the membership of the union, ranging from 1:5 to 1:15. Others limit yearly recruits to the demand for labor.

The unions recognize that their largest problem is relation to the unorganized and assimilation of the immigrant. This first problem is especially acute in times of strike. Thus they try to get all laborers to join some union, so that they will not steal their jobs. The struggle for the closed shop is the peculiar task of the unions at the present time.

Naturally the unions are in favor of restriction of immigration. Leopold von Wiese, "Skizze der Entwicklung der Arbeiterorganisationen in den Vereinigten Staaten von America," *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich*.  
D. E. T.

**Hygiene of Lodging-Houses.**—The hygiene of workingmen's families is a social problem. That governments can, if they wish, enact hygiene laws is shown by England. In spite of inherent conditions favoring it, they have been able to reduce tuberculosis in the last thirty years. No laws of health will reach the



case when the lodgings are unsanitary. The poor must live, and that in places that are open to them. The hygiene of the working families is necessary; the future depends on it. For the normal development of family life, for the rearing of children without weaknesses, for the prevention of tuberculosis, the lodging-houses must be sanitary. Those who most need protection by health laws are not able, on account of scanty wage, to pay the rent necessary to secure the better houses.

A proper co-operation of those interested could overcome the difficulties, as follows: first, by recognizing their real duty toward the poor; second, by the investment, on the part of public-spirited citizens, in well-located and scientifically constructed lodging-houses, of capital which will pay clear interest at the rate of  $2\frac{1}{2}$ -3 per cent., instead of  $4\frac{1}{2}$ -5 per cent.; third, by the proper equipment of the tenement-houses. Some requirements are: (a) washable walls and ceilings, good painting, water-tight floors, and plenty of wash water; (b) large windows for light and air; (c) plenty of water on all floors; (d) a cellar for provisions, wash-houses, and drying-rooms.—L. Chaptal. "L'Hygiène du logement et les petits budgets ouvriers," *Réforme sociale*, November 1, 1905.

The "Office central des œuvres de bienfaisance," of France, has made an investigation of the home conditions of the indigent population of Paris. Out of 2,636 homes visited, 2,327, or 88.3 per cent., were classed as "bad;" 245, or 9.3 per cent., as "mediocre," and only 64, or 2.4 per cent., as "good." After making a study of such conditions, the investigators came to the following conclusions: There are two sorts of causes: those inherent in the dwellings, and those found in the tenants. Among the former are small rooms with low ceilings, providing a volume of air less than 14 cubic meters per individual, humidity, darkness, insufficient supply of water, and improper disposition of refuse. Seventy-five per cent. of the lodgments violated these tenement requirements. Unsanitary conditions furnished by the tenants are four: overpopulation, poor provisions for sleeping apartments, care of rooms, and drying of linen in the living-rooms. At least 75 per cent. of the places visited violated the requirements along this line.

The commission propose three ways to aid in the remedy: (1) more rigorous application of sanitary legislation; (2) cheaper rents and more modern lodging-houses; and (3) popularization of elementary and fundamental laws of hygiene.—G. Durangle, "Une enquête sur l'insalubrité des logements d'indigents," *Réforme sociale*, October 16, 1905. D. E. T.

**America and the Americans.**—Here are some impressions from late books dealing with above subject. M. Jules Huret, in his book *In America*, finds much to criticise, but also much to admire. He confesses to a sort of terror, inspired by the prodigious activity of Americans. Other traits are their incredible power of absorption and organization, their astonishing confidence in themselves, and the abundance of life among all classes, rich and poor. He has also very interesting chapters on American education, the negro problem, the great West, especially its cities, the common schools, hospitals, settlements, and the large and well-organized charitable societies. He finds in New Orleans representatives of the old French families.

Frazer, an Englishman, in *America at Work*, finds one of our chief causes of success in our remarkable organization of work. He saw not a single idle workingman in the course of all his travels. The young mechanics were seeking entrance into Carnegie's shops, even though entrance conditions were hard, for they knew that he pays his intelligent and ingenious workmen well, and if they could only distinguish themselves, their future would be secure. He was surprised at the wonderful development of machinery and the use of electricity, the great demand for technical education, the intelligence and aptitude of American youth in mechanics, and the organization of transportation.

Abbé Klein, in *Au pays de la vie intense*, was also impressed with the

energy and the desire for progress among Americans, but he studied principally social and religious conditions. He says the state is frankly Christian in that it considers the ideas of the gospel to be both the expression and the guarantee of civilization itself. The Americans, if they are "utilitarian," recognize and proclaim the social merits of religion, and assert that civilization rests essentially on the general contributions of Christianity, which is held to be a source of national prosperity. In this belief and teaching the President is a leader. Abbé Klein is also pleased with the large tolerance existing between Christians of diverse confessions. Catholics and Protestants work side by side in philanthropic undertakings, emphasizing their unity and forgetting their differences.

In his little volume Price Collier notices the strenuousness of America, but views it from its more unfavorable side, remarking its harmful influences on the political, social, moral, and religious life, and its tendency to retard æsthetic development. The American does not cease his wild scramble for gold when he has become materially independent, but continues to absorb himself in professional and commercial engagements; he does not wish to be found with spare time on his hands, and does not take recreation, even when it is easily available. Responsibility on the part of the rich and powerful is not developed, and, in spite of democratic appearances, Collier has not found among any other people in the world the barrier between rich and poor, master and servant, the man who works with his hands and the one who does not, so rudely marked.

Andrew Carnegie's book, *Democracy Triumphant*, brings to light much that is of interest from the years 1830-50; but on the whole, he is too enthusiastic, too excessively patriotic. He insists on the education of the masses, and shows how the United States has in this regard greatly excelled the world. Social and religious progress has been as great; also in national homogeneity we excel, for we have already a common literature, common interests, and a common patriotism. In the same optimistic strain he follows out America's material progress.

M. Anadoli has returned from America with the conviction that it will play an ever-increasing rôle in the destinies of the world. He entitles his book *The Empire of Affairs*. The secret of superiority in American institutions is the fact that the two currents which traverse every political edifice here perfectly balance each other. These are the spirit of conservatism and liberalism, order and liberty, authority and the individual. He believes that the centralizing influences are so strong that no centrifugal forces will be sufficient to overcome them and cause division. Imperialism seems to be the most menacing danger.—George Blondel, "L'Amérique et les Américains d'après de nouveaux ouvrages," *Réforme sociale*, November 1, 1905. D. E. T.

**The Problem of Poverty.**—Two classes of persons give time and thought to the poor problem: those of the leisured class who give, but do not know the real conditions; then those who have thrown themselves into the midst of the fight. Corresponding to these two classes are two diverse ways of looking at the same thing: those who think all the problems can be reduced to a law and are content to solve the problem by a general reference to the law; and, secondly, those discovering by the actual contact with the problem that the law is not adequate.

In turn, these elements enter to explain and complicate the problem. The "reign of economic law," environment, heredity, education—all are stock words; yet the problem defies solution. What is the rock upon which so many good vessels have made a shipwreck? The answer is: human character. This is the unknown quantity in every problem. We take the following steps, but seem to make no advance: (1) the idea of invariableness and universality of law; (2) we abandon all idea of law; (3) freedom within limits. Heredity, environment, etc., are forces, without which man could not advance at all, and yet he holds his destiny in his own hands.

The failure of the economic law may teach us a lesson. The state cannot



by law give work to provide for the improvident. However, it is the duty of the state to give relief, and that well planned, to the epileptic, the blind, and mentally afflicted who swell the ranks of the suffering poor. Germany sets the example in this respect.

If those who constantly encourage the poor to look to the state to remedy social conditions would frankly recognize that the question is far more moral than either political or economic, they would save much disappointment. Let them preach reformation from within, rather than assistance from without.—C. Baumgarten, in *Economic Review*, October, 1905. S. E. W. B.

**Dangerous Trades.**—The International Conference on Dangerous Trades this year, at Berne, where a plan for protective legislation for all workers in dangerous trades was brought within the range of practical politics, suggests this paper. There are two kinds of industrial dangers: (1) risk of accident; (2) peril, because of unwholesome conditions, involving use of poisonous materials.

Take the first class. The annual tale of industrial accidents is appalling. The willingness of the manufacturer to accept official counsel is an encouragement. The number of accidents would be reduced by three remedies: (1) providing dangerous machinery with effective guards; (2) maintaining proper fencing about the machinery; (3) limiting the hours of labor. Age is an element in reckoning the number of accidents; young girls and children are allowed to manipulate dangerous machinery. Risk of accident is the chief peril in bottling of beer and aerated waters. This can be remedied by wearing of masks and guards; but employers are not always careful in noting breaches of these special rules.

Passing to the second class, trades less visibly perilous, we find occupations inducing or predisposing to disease, undermining health, and thus affecting the future of the race. Pre-eminent are the "dusty" trades; e. g., miners, lead-workers, chimney-sweeps, etc. The remedy for reducing disease and death is special rules, intelligently and conscientiously put into practice. Witness the nearly complete victory over necrosis in match-making factories; the lessening number of cases of plumbism among workers in lead. Rules for protection is not enough; we must seek ways to render the trades harmless. Let science eliminate the injurious materials used in manufacture. France is showing England the way in this respect. Of course, the special rules are limited by conditions. The faithful observance of every rule in a set is necessary if the set achieve a purpose.

Besides these dangerous trades, there are also trades—e. g., the hatters trade, vulcanizing of india rubber; lifting excessive weights, and extreme specialization—which expose to infection by anthrax spores. Steaming is the remedy.

In conclusion, two reflections: First, where regulation of dangerous trades is attempted, the regulations should be real. The second points to an extension of legislation also. Ought not sufferers of diseases from occupation to be eligible for compensation? But more important than compensation is preservation. Let science make wholesome the hitherto injurious occupations.—Constance Smith, in *Economic Review*, October, 1905. S. E. W. B.

**The Unemployed.**—In dealing with the problem of the unemployed advances should be made along the following lines: (1) Restore the land to its proper use by a constructive policy of home colonization; (2) attempt to solve the problem of the physical deterioration of town children, by better safeguarding the life of the child both before and after birth, by medical examination on entering school, and supervision throughout school life, and by feeding the necessitous school children; (3) raise the minimum age of employment, abolish child vagrancy, continue compulsory education by evening classes till the age of sixteen or seventeen; (4) a more equitable system of taxation and rating; (5) reduction of the hours of labor; (6) the discouragement of the breeding of the unfit; (7) the diminution of the temptations to drunkenness and betting.—G. P. Gouch, in *Contemporary Review*, March, 1906. S. E. W. B.














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