American Planning and Civic Annual

AMERICAN PLANNING AND CIVIC ANNUAL

AMERICAN PLANNING AND CIVIC ANNUAL

A RECORD OF RECENT CIVIC ADVANCE IN THE FIELDS OF PLANNING, PARKS, HOUSING, AND NEIGHBORHOOD IMPROVEMENT, INCLUDING THE ADDRESSES AND DISCUSSIONS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PLANNING, HELD AT INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA, MAY 25–27, 1942, AND THE ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE ON WARTIME USES OF STATE PARKS, HELD AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, SEPTEMBER 23–24, 1942.

EDITED BY
HARLEAN JAMES

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QUARTERLY, PLANNING AND CIVIC COMMENT

The purpose of the American Planning and Civic Association is the education of the American people to an understanding and appreciation of: local, state, regional and national planning for the best use of urban and rural land, and of water and of other natural resources; the safeguarding and planned use of local and national parks; the conservation of natural scenery; the advancement of higher ideals of civic life and beauty in America; the improvement of living conditions and the fostering of wider educational facilities in schools and colleges along these lines.

The purpose of the National Conference on State Parks is to inform the public through a central clearing house of information, publications, conferences, courses of training in schools and colleges, and by other educational means, of the value of state parks, historic sites, forests and preserves, suitable for recreation, study of natural history and science, preservation of wildlife and conservation of natural scenery, by the development within the States of well-balanced state park systems; to the end that every citizen of the United States shall have easy access to state recreation areas and appreciate their value as a recognized form of land use.

PREFACE

THE year 1942—the year which followed Pearl Harbor—will long be remembered by the American people. During that year, the entire country went on an all-out war basis to participate in the greatest World War of all history.

The AMERICAN PLANNING AND CIVIC ANNUAL for 1942 carries on every page accounts of how those concerned with planning and conservation have earnestly endeavored to meet the impact of wartime conditions. In the haste to mobilize our military and civil forces, blunders have been made, but, generally, they are blunders which have resulted from too much rather than too little zeal. If there had been a wider understanding and appreciation of the function of planning on each of the governmental levels by those who were charged with the selection of sites and the construction of war industries and housing, some of the errors could have been avoided. Furtunately, this better understanding and appreciation is becoming every day more apparent. A part of the trouble, no doubt, came from the weakness, or entire absence, of local planning commissions.

There is now every indication that the course of public demand for planning in the United States will follow the pattern already set in England, where national and local planning are becoming dinner-table subjects of conversation. We are due for a great popularization of planning objectives and practices. This accession of interest can be seen in the pages of this 1942 ANNUAL. We predict that it will be even more apparent in the ANNUAL for 1943 and others in the future.

With a better understanding for the need of planning to win the war coupled with a bitter regret for our failure to plan fully for the war in advance, has come, also, a better understanding of the need of planning for the postwar period. The people are coming to realize that we need not repeat the unpreparedness which marked the postwar period of the twenties and the great depression of the thirties. A new world of opportunity lies before us. We believe now that we need not endure slums and blighted areas. We know that there is plenty of useful work to be done to occupy fully the man- and woman-power of America.

The pages of this ANNUAL point to postwar planning.

Many of the addresses and discussions included in the ANNUAL took place at The National Conference on Planning, held at Indianapolis, May 25–27, 1942.

The four organizations participating in the Conference were:

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General Conference Chairman: Lee J. Ninde, Fort Wayne, Ind.

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One section of the ANNUAL is given over to a condensed record of the discussions which took place at the Round Table Conference on Wartime Uses of State Parks, held at Chicago on September 23–24, 1942.

In the papers and discussions of these conferences and in the sections of the ANNUAL prepared especially for the volume, the theme is wartime planning and conservation and the need for postwar plans to make full use of the man- and woman-power of the United States to the end of creating an environment of which we can all be proud.

HARLEAN JAMES, *Editor*

Washington, D. C.

THE NATION

NATIONAL PLANNING

Planning for the Future While Producing Victory

DAVID C. PRINCE, Vice-President, General Electric Company, Schenectady, N. Y.

SHORTLY after the fall of France in 1940, when it became obvious that there was at least some possibility of the United States becoming involved in a shooting war, Mr. Charles E. Wilson, President of General Electric, appointed two special committees. The first committee, known as the War Projects Committee, was given responsibility for organizing the activities of the company for war production. The work of this committee, under the leadership of its Chairman, Vice-President Chester H. Lang, is reflected in an increase in employment from 70,000 at the beginning of 1940 to 123,000 in December 1941. Almost 100 per cent of the Company's output is now directly geared to war production of one kind or another, and the output of civilian products has all but ceased.

The second of these special committees appointed by Mr. Wilson was termed the Special Planning Committee. This committee, under the leadership of David C. Prince, Vice-President in charge of Commercial Engineering, has been assigned responsibility for planning what General Electric is to do after the war. It is composed of representatives from Research, Engineering, Manufacturing, Commercial and Accounting departments and therefore includes all of the broad activities of the Company. All told, there are twelve members of this committee, but of these only three spend a substantial amount of their time, and even then not their entire time, on matters concerned with postwar planning. The remaining nine members contribute advisory services on the special types of company activities with which they are most familiar.

With industry being geared to ever-increasing objectives in the production of armaments, and with the problem of winning the war uppermost in the minds of most people, it is hardly surprising that there are many who believe that the present is not an appropriate time at which to give much thought to the future which lies after the war.

Most people recognize that an important, if not the principal problem, involved in winning the war is that of planning the Nation's productive efforts so that American soldiers and sailors go into battle better equipped, better prepared, and better able to withstand continuous effort than the men of any other country. However, when it is suggested that similar planning might be applied to the future problems of peace, many people are inclined to look upon such suggestions with disfavor. To many Americans economic planning denotes totalitarianism. They vis-

ualize an economic system in which individuals and corporations would follow the dictates of a super economic bureau, and they therefore quite properly suspect it because it is opposed to their ideas of personal liberty.

Actually, it is doubtful whether totalitarianism could build a peacetime economy which would be able to compete with a system run by a free people. It is not calculated to bring out the latent possibilities of the individual and therefore automatically limits its own progress to the ingenuity of a few top officials.

There is ample evidence, however, that the means are now available for building a postwar economy of opportunity and abundance in this country, and that the necessary tools have been developed whereby the individual units in industry, trade and other activities can measure what their contributions should be to the total national output. Such yardsticks can be applied in an entirely democratic manner and this paper is therefore principally concerned with a description of how one company has approached the problem of postwar planning through applying the necessary yardsticks to its own business.

As a starting point, an attempt should probably be made to state the objectives of postwar planning. What sort of world should the postwar world be? The Atlantic Charter states that opportunity is to be afforded to the people of all countries to develop their own economies. Development implies expansion and when a country's facilities and trade are expanding, it follows that there is going to be opportunity for its people to work, to prosper and to advance. If such conditions are to obtain throughout the countries of the world, it follows that there must be an America in which there will be opportunity for men to obtain work, to start companies, to build for the future, and to "climb to the top" as their increased experience fits them for more responsible positions.

It may be argued that these were the conditions which the so-called "Free Enterprise System" was supposed to provide and that it failed to provide them. But what is a definition of a free enterprise system? Mortimer F. Sayre of Union College, Schenectady, has proposed the interesting definition that a free enterprise system is a system in which free men show enterprise.

The following discussion refers to the work of the Special Planning Committee, a group of men in the General Electric Company who have attempted to exhibit enterprise concerning the future planning of the company's activities. The basic training of most of the Committee's members has been engineering, and for this reason the committee has approached its problem engineer fashion. The problem has therefore been reduced to a series of charts, and these represent the facts which the committee has obtained and illustrate its approach to the various aspects of postwar planning.

Components of Gross National Output

The committee first considered some broad questions relating to national economics. As Chart 1 shows, the gross national output of goods and services in the year 1940 amounted to $82 billions. (This term "gross national output" is only slightly different from the more usual term "gross national income" in that it includes allowances for goods

CHART 1

Components of Gross National Output
(Billions of Dollars)



and services produced which are not purchased out of the incomes of individuals but are paid for out of income retained in the form of depreciation reserves and undistributed earnings.)

About $55 billions of this total was produced in the form of food, clothing, rent, and articles required in household operation such as light and heat, cleaning compounds, fuel, etc. An additional $8.3 billions was produced in the form of consumers' durable goods, principally automobiles, household furniture and electric appliances.

The total of these two items, namely $63 billions, represents the production of consumers' goods and services. The remainder, amounting to almost $19 billions, represents production of producers' goods, and residential construction.

$5.5 billions were produced through the construction of homes and public works such as highways, grade crossing eliminations, sewage treatment plants and conservation of national resources; $9.2 billions were for plant, equipment, and inventories for industry.

The final item, amounting to $4 billions, covers what is termed national security. In 1940 $2.7 billions was spent in this country on our own armed forces and $1.3 billions represented net claims against foreign countries.

This total of $82 billions was produced by 47 billion people working an average of 39 hours a week, thus generating a total of 94 billion man hours of work.

The gross national output estimated for the year 1943 amounts to $115 billions. This figure was arrived at by estimating the possible increase in civilian employment, the prospective increase in the armed forces, and the possibilities of lengthening the work week. Employment will reach a total of 61 million in 1943.

The number of manhours generated should be almost 40 per cent greater than in 1940, and should thus permit production of goods and services to the value of $115 billion. All figures on this chart have been expressed in terms of 1940 prices so that the columns represent a direct comparison of physical output rather than money value.

It is estimated that war production will amount to $61 billions in 1943 leaving but $54 billions for civilian production. As is obvious, expenditures for food, clothing and household operations will be lower: production of automobiles, refrigerators and furniture must be severely curtailed and so must civilian construction. Private producers' plant and equipment must be produced to the extent of about 4 billions to keep some peacetime industries operating if civilians are to have food to eat and clothes to wear.

This great national effort will prove that the gross national output can be raised to a higher figure than ever before—$115 billions. It will also provide the productive capacity for basic materials, for power, and for transportation facilities, needed not only to sustain such a high level

of output, but also needed to provide full employment for everyone willing and able to work after the war. The physical capacity to provide full employment will be an important asset developed during the war period, for in 1940 the country not only lacked the capital formation needed to achieve full employment, but also the physical plant capacity required for full employment.

In considering the problems of a postwar year, the Committee believed that its efforts should be directed first at a period after the necessary readjustments from wartime to peacetime have been effected in order to determine what our ultimate objective should be. The problems to be faced at the conclusions of hostilities, such as demobilization of men from the armed forces, the maintenance of employment and the changeover of industry to peacetime pursuits are well recognized. With a clear picture of objectives, it should then be possible to face the immediate problem of conversion from all-out war production to the desired level of peacetime production with the least possible delay.

Without in any way disregarding these problems therefore, the Committee decided to give its first attention to a year some time after the end of actual fighting and agreed to call this year "V plus 2," V to represent the year victory is achieved and the 2, two years later.

It is found that full employment relative to the normal labor force after World War II will mean total employment of 57 or 58 million people. This represents a drop of 3 or 4 million from the wartime peak of 61 million, brought about by a reduction in emergency wartime employment. Thus, as a major objective, there is the creation of a level of business which will employ 58 million people. Translating this much employment into the physical output produced by a 40-hour week, and taking into account probable improvements in productive efficiency the objective should be a gross national output of about $110 billions for the year "V + 2."

How could such an output be created and put to use? First, national security must be maintained after the war is over. Naturally, it is not known just how much this will cost but the best available figures show that it might cost $7 billions a year. This expenditure, great as it is, will be a sound investment if it means that peace can be maintained in the world and that there is opportunity for free enterprise systems to flourish.

In addition to this output to maintain national security, there will be a desire to continue the good neighbor policy with the South American and other foreign countries. About three billion is allowed for net foreign balances which would be used for helping other countries to develop their own ability to produce.

There is, therefore, a balance of $100 billions left out of the total of $110 billions. Since the objectives are to maintain full employment and create a higher standard of living, a proper balance must be maintained

between the production of those goods and services which people use, such as food, clothing, and automobiles, and the production of those goods which provide the means for raising the standard of living—such as machinery, residences, and public works. In other words, it is necessary to set up a budget of national production in which the balance between investment and living standards is based on what past experience has shown during periods of full employment.

Data on this subject are now much more complete than they were even five years ago and show that in order to realize full employment, over one-fifth of the total potential output of the labor force should be expended for permanent structures—such as factories, machinery, homes, roads, etc. This is what some economists term capital formation. It is therefore estimated that in a postwar year, about $23 billions of the gross national output should be devoted to capital formation and that this would permit a total production of consumers' goods amounting to $77 billions. This would compare with $63 billions for the year 1940, and would comprise production of food, clothing, and other necessities and luxuries to the amount of $64 billions, and production of consumers' durable goods (such as automobiles, household furniture, and electric appliances) amounting to $13 billions.

The total capital formation of $23 billions would be divided as follows: about $13 billions for private producers' plant equipment and inventories, and $10 billions for the construction of new homes and public works. Of the producers' plant and equipment, $3.5 billions would be for the expansion of existing plants and for new processes, $1.5 billions for increase inventories, and $8 billions to maintain the industrial machine at a high level of efficiency. Of the total for construction, $6 billions would be produced through the erection of 1½ million new homes each year, and about $4 billions for public works.

It will be noted that of the total, $19 billions constitutes commitments by private industry or individuals — $13 billions by industry for plant, equipment and inventories and $6 billions by individuals for new homes. This $19 billions represents the private works reserve of industry and individuals. The remaining $4 billions, or only 17 per cent of the total, constitutes the public works reserve. In other words, for every dollar that the Federal and state governments spend in trying to keep up employment, private individuals or corporations together should spend nearly 5 dollars.

The determination of these components of gross national output is possible because of the recent work of several outstanding economists, including George Terborogh of the Federal Reserve Bank, Simon Kuznets of the University of Pennsylvania and Lowell J. Chawner of the Department of Commerce. In addition the reports of the Temporary National Economic Committee, represent a major contribution to the study of economic engineering problems.

ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY'S CONTRIBUTION TO GROSS NATIONAL OUTPUT

In order to determine the electrical industry's problems more specifically, the General Electric Planning Committee examined the relationships between the various components of gross national output of electrical manufacturers. It was found that such relationships were fairly definite and that if the size of the various components of national output were known then it could be determined how much business there would be in heavy electric equipment, in appliances, in lamps and other products which the electrical industry makes.

The results of these calculations are shown on Chart 2. The total amounts to over $3,800,000,000. Of this total, there is a part which General Electric does not make. The remainder represents the market in which General Electric can compete and providing that technical progress is maintained the portion of this total that the Company is

CHART 2



likely to obtain can be estimated from past records. These studies showed that some parts of the Company's business would be greater in a post-war year than during 1941, other parts would be smaller and in some

CHART 3



cases there would be relatively little change. However a general picture built up on statistical projections was hardly sufficient. General Electric, like other large companies, is organized into departments. The contribution which the company can make to postwar planning is therefore a summation of the contributions which each department, and the individuals in each department, can make to the problem.

The Problem of Department A: The committee, therefore, decided to carry its project further. It was found that each type of electric equip-

ment represented a reasonably constant percentage of the total output. For example, the type of equipment represented by Department "A" on chart 3 had been about 8 per cent of the total output of apparatus. This would give a total market for the products made by Department A of about $90 million. However, special conditions during the year "V+2" might cause the business to be greater or smaller than the amount shown by the statistical projection. It was realized, therefore, that the judgment of the businessman must be added to the knowledge obtained by statistical methods in order to arrive at a figure which would stand up under the possible criticism of men familiar with the particular problems of the department.

CHART 4



The problem was therefore discussed with the Management Committee composed of the sales manager, the engineer, and a representative of the manufacturing department. The management committee were asked to give their estimate of the available business in a postwar year under conditions where 57 to 58 million people would be employed and when expenditures for private producers, plant and equipment, would amount to about $13 billions. In this case Management's estimate happened to agree with the Planning Committee's projection—namely $90,000,000.

This department normally obtains 25 per cent of the going business which would amount to $22 millions. But war expansion has built up facilities to the point where output is $30 millions. Therefore, there is an excess capacity, in this case, of $8 millions which happens to represent the work of about 11 hundred people. The problem to be faced by Department A, is, therefore, can it provide work for an additional 11 hundred people through expanding its field of operation by new products, by lowering prices, or by improving its sales or manufacturing methods?

The Problem of Department B: While Department A has a problem of finding more business, Department B, Chart 4, has a problem of expanding its facilities. This Department estimated that it would obtain 15 per cent of a total business of $225 millions, but its facilities are only large enough to produce $17 millions; therefore, it must double its capacity and double its number of employees when the war is over.

Estimated Employment by Department and by Works

The Planning Committee has now completed its survey of all the Management Committees. There are over 70 of them, and estimates of employment by departments are shown on Chart 5. For convenience these have been consolidated by groups of products, but it will be noted in general that the group termed "producers goods" will require less employees in the year "V + 2" than were required in the year 1941. On the other hand, the group termed "consumers goods" will require more employees. For the Company as a whole, total employment will be about the same as in 1941.

It is now possible to summarize the results, not only by departments, but also by Works. For example, Chart 6 shows the estimated changes in employment in the principal General Electric Works unless production can be balanced between the various factories. In the interests of wartime censorship fictitious names have been used and the figures have been changed but this does not alter the problem.

As can be seen from this chart, a serious reduction in employment is likely to occur in the "electricity" works, the "volt" works and the "ampere" works. On the other hand, the "horsepower" works and the "candlepower" works will require more employees after the war is

over than they had in January of 1942. The "ohm" works represents no problem and the others are mostly smaller factories.

The Future Problems of the Committee

A major problem which the committee must face, is this problem of employment. It must determine whether some of the work normally produced at "horsepower" and "candlepower" can be shifted into the "electricity" and "volt" works so as to even out the employment between these four places.

CHART 5

ESTIMATED G-E EMPLOYMENT AND FACILITIES—JAN., 1942, AND V + 2

DEPARTMENT	NO. OF EMPLOYEES		FLOOR SPACE (Thous. of Sq. Ft.)	
	Jan., 1942	V + 2	Jan., 1942	V + 2
Producers' Goods				
1	25,000	14,000	6,010	4,970
2	20,000	18,500	4,510	3,880
3	7,800	7,200	2,440	1,890
4	9,750	8,900	2,720	2,380
5	6,800	4,300	1,480	1,350
6	11,400	9,400	1,440	1,290
7	9,800	9,700	1,000	1,000
Total Producers' Goods	90,550	72,000	19,600	16,760
Consumers' Goods				
1	4,600	9,200	1,170	1,600
2	600	3,800	240	600
3	2,600	6,400	560	1,390
4	1,950	1,970	850	650
5	13,250	13,900	5,430	6,000
6	8,700	14,000	2,700	1,600
7	750	1,100	200	300
Total Consumers' Goods	32,450	50,370	11,150	12,140
Grand Total	123,000	122,370	30,750	28,900

Another aspect of the employment problem is that of special wartime employment. As of December, 1941, General Electric had a total of 123,000 employees; about the same number will be required in the year "V + 2" but by the peak of the war effort, many more will be employed. It is not expected that all of these additional people will necessarily be retained. Many of them have come to us from civilian industries which have been curtailed. Others were automobile mechanics, appliance salesmen, and others whose means of livelihood has been cut off by the necessities of war. Many are women who have sought employment for patriotic reasons. The committee must determine how many of these additional employees expect or would like to stay with General Electric and how many expect to return to other activities.

A second problem to be considered is how to change back production facilities from a war economy to a peace economy. The estimates of the management committee show that shipments of heavy equipment and communication equipment in the year "V + 2" will be less than at the war peak, but they will be about the same as they were in 1941.

CHART 6



Domestic appliances and construction materials will increase compared with 1941 because of the expansion in sales of consumer's durable goods and the expansion in home construction. Lamps, as might be supposed, will stay on an even keel.

This change-over problem is obviously not simple. It involves making plans so that the change can be made with as little dislocation as possible. The ideal would be for men to leave work in one department on Friday and resume work in a new department on Monday. However, this can probably only be realized in very few cases. Starting new operations usually involves changing over machinery and breaking in a skeleton crew who can be used to instruct the others who come later.

In addition to planning how to change over facilities, plans must also be made to have products available for the market. The various management committees have indicated that there are about 150 major developments which they feel should be kept going, even during wartime, if the company is to be in a position to offer the public better

and lesse xpensive products. Very little can be done about these developments at the present time because the engineers are devoting their full efforts to war projects. But a time will come when America is finally tooled up and at that time, it might be possible to spare a few of our expert designers to devote their time to postwar product development.

Adequate preparation in advance is clearly of major importance to a rapid change-over from war production to full-scale peace production. Lack of sufficient developmental designs seriously slowed down the growth of American war production. It takes many months to pass from experimental models to large-scale production. Thus the country should profit from its recent war experience, by giving some attention to the design problems of postwar products in the not too distant future.

A third problem is that of determining how much of the private works reserve should be contributed by General Electric. If private producers in total are to spend $13 billions, how much should General Electric spend? This study has just been completed. The amount to be spent is impressive, but well within the financial resources of the Company.

General Electric Cannot Do the Job Alone

General Electric's contribution to the success of any postwar program is necessarily confined to what it can do with its own operations. Since the General Electric Company will account for somewhat less than 1 per cent of the Gross National Output for the year "V + 2," it is obvious that its planning can effect the overall picture only to a very limited extent.

It should also be emphasized that although the maintenance of General Electric's competitive position in the electrical industry is a matter of concern to the men in the company, this is secondary to the development of a postwar program which will maintain production and employment for the electrical industry and the Nation as a whole. General Electric and other industrial companies have far more to gain from a successful program to achieve full employment than from any gains in competitive position in the industry.

Therefore, there must be developed a coöperation of industry and others if full use of the Nation's manpower and resources is to be realized. In what way can others contribute?

The contribution of other industrial concerns is perhaps fairly obvious. They can examine their own problems and determine their part in the total national output. Sources of information and the data used in General Electric's study are readily available and details of the methods used will be gladly reviewed with any concerns that may be interested in following a similar line of investigation.

CHART 7

Estimated Changes in Employment
(In Millions)



Employment and Capital Formation

In considering the contributions that groups other than industrial concerns might make, we must discuss the effect of this program on

postwar employment, and the relation of capital formation to employment.

It will be recalled that in Chart 1 it was pointed out that the year "V + 2" should see employment at 57 or 58 million and that capital formation should be of the order of 26 billions. Chart 7 shows the shifts in employment which will be necessary in the change-over to war production and back again to normal peacetime activities. Civilian employment is expected to increase by 6 millions between 1940 and 1943 and the number of men in the armed forces by eight million. Thus total employment will be 61 millions by 1943, or 14 millions more than in 1940, when it was 47 millions. Allowing two millions for those changing employment, this will give a total wartime labor force of 63 millions or about 6 millions more than what is termed the normal

CHART 8



labor force as defined by the National Industrial Conference Board. Thus it is going to be necessary to call upon the "emergency" labor supply, that is, youths, pensioners, and women to a total of about six million persons, even after allowing for shrinkages which will occur in trade, agriculture, and civilian construction.

This point is an important one because it answers the question of what is to happen to the men who return from the armed forces after the war. As the chart shows, the shrinkage in the armed forces amounts to seven millions. These men will be used to build up the various peacetime activities sacrificed during the war. The emergency labor force will return to their former mode of living; that is, retirement, back to school, or housekeeping.

Other changes in employment which are significant for the year "V + 2" are of course the increased number absorbed in trade, distribution, and finance, and in construction, and the decrease in the number employed in manufacture from the war peak of 18 million to a peacetime level of 14.5 million. It will be noted, however, that the number in manufacture is about 40 per cent greater than for the year 1940. This is in line with the previous statement concerning the increased facilities of the industrial plant, constructed during the war, and which should be regarded as an asset since it provides the means for obtaining full employment.

Labor Force Employment and Capital Formation: Chart 8 shows the growth in the labor force, the number employed and capital formation expressed as a per cent of national output. During the 1920's capital formation was about 21 per cent of national output and employment was within 3 per cent of the available labor force. During the 1930's capital formation averaged only 19 per cent of national output and many workers were looking for jobs. The conclusion is obvious. High capital formation and a high level of employment go hand in hand. Capital employs skilled labor such as tool makers, mechanics, and construction men. If these men are out of work, other employees who serve their needs are automatically also without employment.

Components of Capital Formation: In order to determine the steps needed to produce enough capital formation to maintain full employment in the year "V + 2," two factors of considerable importance must be considered. (1) Why was capital formation at a low level during the 1930's compared with the 1920's? (2) Are there enough worthwhile projects to produce the required level of capital formation in the postwar era?

A comparison between the components of capital formation in the 1920's, the 1930's and the "V + 2" era is shown on Chart 9. These may be reviewed in order starting with the item Plant and Equipment. Capital for expenditure on plant equipment is supplied partly from the internal reserves of corporations and partly from private savings.

According to the reports of the T.N.E.C., about three quarters of these funds are supplied internally, but the source of these funds is probably less important than the factors which induce capital expenditures. In

CHART 9



either case, these funds are in the hands of officers of corporations who are dealing not with their own money but with money belonging to stock holders, policy holders, or depositors. Corporation officials prefer to use such funds profitably by putting them to work on useful projects, but they must have some assurance that the money invested will be returned within a reasonable time. In brief, they must be able to show a profit.

In order to realize a large volume of capital expenditures, there must be a large reserve of worthwhile projects in which funds can be invested. Industrial research is now carried on by all leading companies and is one of the principal sources of new projects in which such funds can be invested. But in addition, corporation officials must give careful consideration to external factors. Profit calculations can be greatly upset by sudden changes in fiscal, monetary, or labor policies. In general, the record shows that businessmen have been willing to take reasonable chances if costs, taxes, and the continued availability of borrowed money can be relied upon. This does not mean that labor rates or taxes are expected to remain static, but there must be confidence built up that such changes will be gradual enough so that business can successfully adapt its operations to the changes.

One of the greatest differences between conditions in the 1920's and the 1930's so far as the businessman was concerned, was that in the 1920's fiscal, monetary, and labor policies were reasonably stable but in the 1930's were subject to rapid changes. It would therefore appear that labor leaders, bankers, and legislators can make a substantial contribution to postwar planning by carefully examining and then implementing the conditions which make for business stability. Fortunately, there are growing evidences that these conditions are being carefully studied, and if sound solutions can be reached, then there are good reasons for hoping that conditions favorable to capital investment and to stability of employment will be set up in the postwar era.

Assuming that such stability can be obtained, what evidence is there that private producers should invest $11.5 billion in one year on plant and equipment? In 1929, by spending over $10 billions on plant and equipment, private producers helped to maintain the employment of 48 million people. In 1925, when business conditions were, if anything, sounder than they were in 1929 and total employment amounted to 44 millions, private producers spent over $8 billion on plant and equipment. There seems little doubt that in the year "V + 2" private producers will need to invest $11.5 billions on plant and equipment in order to realize an employment of 57 or 58 million people.

The next category of capital formation, namely, inventories, may be dealt with briefly. Businessmen do not increase inventories when business conditions are poor, but keep them down as much as possible. If, however, the year "V + 2" is a year of expanding business, past

records indicate that about $1.5 billions will be invested in inventory expansion in the normal course of business.

The third category of capital formation, housing, is understandable in terms of employment. Houses are built when people are willing to assume long-term debt, but they cannot borrow from banks when they are unemployed. Nor can insurance companies and other financial agencies justify the expenditure of policy holders' money on housing developments unless there are people with jobs to work at who can pay rent for the space that is to be occupied.

Contrasting the level of residential construction in the 1930's with that of the 1920's, it is readily seen that the unemployment of the 1930's was what accounted for the low level of construction. Economists most familiar with the construction field all agree that the United States can build between 1,200,000 and 1,500,000 new homes each year. If these are estimated as costing an average of $4000 to $5000 each, an admittedly low figure compared with the past, a total residential construction volume of $6 billions is entirely within reason.

The fourth item of capital formation is public works. These were larger in the 1930's than in the 1920's but in spite of the large expenditures of public money, they were insufficient to absorb the skilled men who were unemployed. It was common experience that government should not make plans fast enough to put into effect all the worthwhile projects which were found to exist. There is no question that such projects should continue, for although many public projects were completed during the 1930's it is now known that many worthwhile outlets for public funds were neglected. For example, insufficient attention was given to conservation of natural resources, as exemplified by such well-known examples as the dust bowl, bad soil erosion in the Carolinas, lack of sewage treatment in various parts of the country, and others.

With a well-planned program of public works, such as has been laid out by the National Resources Planning Board, there is every reason to believe that Federal and state governments could successfully spend $4 billions in one year on worthwhile public projects from which the community as a whole would benefit.

Conclusion

Reviewing the all-important problem of capital formation, about $26 billions (including foreign investments) must be invested if full employment of our national resources is to be realized in the postwar period.

The most important factors necessary to the success of this program are:

(1) Development by industry of adequate plans for converting war plants back to peacetime production with as little delay as possible.

(2) Development by industry of plans to utilize new materials, new processes, and new products created during the war.

(3) Development by industry, in coöperation with labor, financial, and government agencies, of conditions favorable to investment after the war so that industry will be induced to make its full contribution to capital formation.

(4) Development by banks, insurance companies, and Federal, state, and local government agencies, of a balanced program for expending residential and public works construction.

(5) Development by those industries especially interested, and by the Federal Government, of a long-term program of investment in undeveloped foreign countries.

Two general conditions may be stated in conclusion. First, America can produce. It is being proved every day, through the setting of higher and higher production records. Second, America's needs have never yet been satisfied. How many American families are there who are in a position to have all the things that they need?

Common sense dictates that it should be possible to effect a union between ability to produce and ability to consume; but that union will not be easy. These conditions that have been outlined will not come about merely because some men in General Electric prepared some interesting-looking charts. Full employment and full enjoyment of America's heritage will come about only through the formation of a new partnership of Management, Labor, Capital, and Government, a running team in which each partner thoroughly understands his own function and directs his energies wholeheartedly to one end. That end is a constantly rising standard of living for all people!

The free peoples of this world, after a late and slow start, are now beginning to out-produce the Axis slaves. Free men with enterprise will win the war; and only by free enterprise can we hope to win the kind of peace for which free men are fighting.

Industrial Location and the Problem of Conversion After the War

RALPH J. WATKINS, Chairman, Energy Resources Committee, and
GLENN E. McLAUGHLIN, Chief, Industrial Location and Transportation Section,
National Resources Planning Board, Washington, D. C.

THE war production program has now progressed far enough for us to see the main influences of new plant expansions on the regional distribution of manufacturing activity. The extent to which the geographic pattern of industry will be modified as a result of the war, however, depends not only on the distribution of war production facilities, but also on the degree to which these facilities can be converted to other forms of productive activity after the war.

So far as the geographic distribution is concerned, the construction of war production facilities has gone through several stages. Most of the early defense plants were located at or near existing manufacturing establishments. Thus, there were early expansions in the capacity for building aircraft in southern California, ships on the West Coast and the North Atlantic Coast, guns and other ordnance facilities in southern New England and the Middle Atlantic States, and machinery in the same northeast sections as well as in the Great Lakes district. During the first part of 1941, many war plants were located in the Southeast and in the upper Mississippi Valley. Moreover, as the war program expanded, a series of large aircraft assembly plants was placed in the Great Plains cities extending south from Omaha. These plants were followed by a series of powder, explosives, and related chemical plants in the same section, in the Tennessee Valley, in the Gulf Southwest, and to a lesser extent in the lower Missouri Valley. With the declaration of war and the conversion of the automobile and other durable consumer goods industries, again many large war production jobs were assigned to the older manufacturing areas, notably in southeastern Michigan and northern Indiana. As it became clear that the resources of these areas would be inadequate for the tasks already scheduled, important new industrial facilities have been located in the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Louis, Kansas City, and Minneapolis areas and in certain communities in the West and Southwest.

Unusually high percentage gains in manufacturing employment have occurred, or will occur when new plants are in full operation, in the three Pacific Coast States, mid-Atlantic shipbuilding centers, the Texas-Louisiana Gulf Coast area, southern Michigan-northern Indiana, the Connecticut Valley; and at scattered places, including St. Louis, Wichita, Evansville, and Mobile. Most of these gains have been confined to large metropolitan centers. In terms of number of workers, the war expansion probably has been greatest in southern California, and in southeastern Michigan. In the main, the war program has made little

use of the industrial resources of eastern Massachusetts, New York City, the Pennsylvania anthracite district, the Piedmont, Kentucky, the upper Missouri Valley, and the smaller cities of the South and the Central West. New war facilities are being considered for some of these areas, although they may be dropped because of limitations on constructing additional industrial capacities.

In many respects, the heavier concentrations of war production facilities are in line with recent trends. The war has simply accelerated the industrialization of certain comparatively young manufacturing areas. Major instances are the Tennessee Valley, southern California, and the Texas Gulf coast. Despite the establishment of a strategic inland zone for war production, industry has continued to grow at high rates around the border zones of the country. The unusual expansion in shipbuilding has, of course, been a major factor. Nonetheless, there have been significant industrial developments in the interior of the country, both in many older industrial areas which had gained little in manufacturing activity in recent years and in other newer areas previously devoted mainly to trade and other services. Some of the latter have become major production centers, at least for the duration of the war. Among the older inland areas now getting a new lease on life are St. Louis, Indianapolis, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh. The major inland trade centers acquiring large industrial plants for the first time are Atlanta, Dallas, Fort Worth, Oklahoma City, Tulsa, Omaha, Kansas City, Denver, and Salt Lake City. Just as the overflow from Detroit and other automobile centers is stimulating industrial expansion in Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, and even States farther west, so also the overflow from Los Angeles and other west-coast centers has led to new facilities in Phoenix, Salt Lake City, and even Denver, Wichita, and other inland centers. Although these developments are generally in line with prewar tendencies, entirely new types of production are being established in some areas, and in most areas the war expansion is being concentrated in a very few branches of manufacturing and in large cities.

The impact of the postwar readjustment on an industrial area will depend in part on whether war plants can be successfully converted to postwar use; whether the Federal Government will decide to maintain them in operation for defense purpose; or whether the facilities will have to be abandoned. For some new war production facilities, peacetime use would require only relatively minor changes in the type of product. For others, the change may be great. Most aircraft and shipbuilding facilities, for example, can be used for civilian needs without much reconditioning. Of course, the extent to which they are used will depend on the postwar requirements of the domestic economy, both civilian and defense, as well as on foreign demands. Government assistance and subsidies to the aircraft and marine transportation industries will, naturally, play a part in these decisions.

Questions of postwar civilian demand, including prewar markets as well as markets to be gained or lost to other industries, will play a large part in determining whether new facilities can make a successful transition to a peacetime economy. There is grave concern in many raw material industries whether the new capacities created during the war will not have to be closed down. Perhaps the problem will be more difficult in older industries in which there was little upward trend in production before the war. An outstanding example is the steel industry. There will, no doubt, be other raw material industries which will find the transition a difficult one, even though there is no problem of converting physical equipment in these industries to an unfamiliar type of product, as there will be in end-product industries. Copper, aluminum, and magnesium may be mentioned.

The highly specialized powder and TNT plants probably present little possibility for conversion; they are likely to be for defense purposes or dismantled. Powder and explosives plants, together with loading units, are not adaptable to normal industrial operations, and even though certain of these establishments are retained in operating condition, there is little likelihood of any significant local employment in these plants during peacetime. Somewhat the same consideration will apply to the new chemical warfare and ordnance arsenals established over the country. Almost all of the munitions plants are in small communities which had little or no industrial activity before the war, and where the population has now increased tremendously. The certainty of great reduction in employment presents a very special problem in postwar readjustment. Moreover, even some of the chemical plants producing such products as ammonia and methanol will be difficult to adapt to normal civilian requirements because of the large excess capacity which will exist in these industries. The expanding requirements for fertilizers and plastics, however, may offer a profitable outlet. In some industries, the Federal Government may have to subsidize operations which on a world basis might be uneconomic, in order to maintain self-sufficiency, *e.g.*, synthetic rubber and tin smelting.

The adaptation of a plant to the production of an entirely different product presents both engineering and economic problems. An industrialist must consider not only the choice of a product for which his equipment is more or less suitable and the costs of conversion, but also how many other war industries are likely to convert to the product he has in mind and what the postwar demand for the product is likely to be. Here, clearly, is a field for coöperative planning by the agencies of government and the groups composing American industry. Some plants have been constructed with a particular substitute product in mind, but in the main the new plants have simply been built as war industrial facilities. Adaptation of war production facilities for peacetime purposes appears likely in such industries as automobiles, railroad equip-

ment, petroleum products, plastics, fertilizers, many other chemicals, radio equipment and precision instruments.

The regional effect of the conversion of war industry will depend not only on the type of plants located in a particular area, but also on the cost position of the area in the converted peacetime industry. Thus, the aircraft plants which will be used in a postwar period presumably will be the plants most capable of meeting the necessary production and distribution requirements and at the lowest costs. In some industries it is clear that the war expansion program has gone so far as to lead to the establishment of plants in districts where it is comparatively difficult to obtain adequate supplies of materials and other production factors. If the regional differences in cost do not appear to be very large, differences in the modernization of plant equipment will be crucial in the selections made by private producers among the industrial facilities available for peacetime production. Government policy, however, is likely to favor the retention of certain types of industrial facilities in each major region of the country in the interests of economic balance, even if there is a considerable handicap in certain areas. Thus, government contracts for ships to service postwar trade are likely to be placed with yards on the West Coast and the Gulf Coast as well as in the older established East Coast yards.

The ability of a local area to maintain manufacturing operations after the war will also depend on the type of available factory buildings. Probably the war plants constructed after the spring of 1942 will be of such a temporary, and in some cases inferior, nature as to be undesirable for long-run peacetime use. Owing to the scarcity of steel and other materials, these plants have been constructed in a simplified and often temporary form. Some of them, however, can be made more permanent by minor alterations. Even many of the better-constructed war buildings may have to be altered materially in order to fit the requirements of a peacetime industry to which they are converted.

In some areas the possibility of conversion is conditioned by the fact that new facilities have been restricted to one or two industries. In California, for example, practically all new plants as well as supply contracts have been for aircraft and ships. The problem of postwar industrial production in this State will depend largely on these two industries or on substitute types of production which can be carried on in aircraft plants or shipyards. On the surface, the conversion of facilities would appear to be easier in such States as Wisconsin and Michigan where there have been more diversified types of war expansion. It is not certain, however, that a district with miscellaneous new facilities will be in a better position to convert to peacetime use than an area devoted mainly to aircraft, because the aircraft plants are of modern construction and can be used for a variety of purposes, whereas the conversion of shipbuilding would appear to be definitely limited.

A carefully planned program for the location of war factories, had time and foresight made this possible, would not only have speeded the production of war goods, but would also have facilitated the postwar use of these plants. Unfortunately, the magnitude of the war production program with its repeated upward revisions has resulted in undue concentration of new facilities in a few major centers and the extensive conversion of existing facilities in these same centers. As a result of this uneven distribution of war production activity throughout the country, shortages of labor, housing, water and other community services have developed in some areas concurrently with increasing surpluses elsewhere.

Even with farsighted planning it would have been impossible to avoid uneven pressure on industrial resources in the several parts of the country and among communities of various size. Some areas clearly possess more of the facilities and skills needed in the war effort. Other industrial areas, New York City and the anthracite area, for example, have not been sufficiently used in the war effort because of their exposed position, the lack of sites for large construction, or the insufficient background in heavy mechanical industries. A careful scheduling of both primary and secondary contracts, however, could have done much, and may still do something, to remedy a situation, such as that in the New York City region, where there is a large surplus of unemployed workers inside the metropolis, in contrast with a severe shortage of workers in surrounding areas. Another unfortunate result of the uneven distribution of war contracts and new facilities is the neglect of most small cities, particularly those outside the industrial Northeast. A wider distribution of new plants throughout the country not only would have avoided the construction of extensive housing, transportation, and other facilities, but would have facilitated the adaptation of the new plants to the needs of the postwar economy. The industrial possibilities of the postwar era will not be confined to the large industrial centers which have boomed as a result of the war.

A special problem is arising in these war areas, because the large plants have usually been located on the periphery of the city. While many of these plants can and will be used for peacetime production, their conversion is likely to lead to the abandonment of some older plant facilities inside the city, unless total industrial production can be maintained at a high level. Thus, the problem will involve not only the search for ways of using the new war facilities, but also efforts to employ the older plants built before the war. A metropolitan community is certain to be concerned about the abandonment of an older manufacturing district and the subsequent movement of the working population to the periphery of the area. These problems will be more serious in older manufacturing areas such as Buffalo and Philadelphia than in newer manufacturing areas such as Los Angeles and Houston

where the industrial sections were already located well outside the center.

Opportunities still exist for planning the location of some further war production facilities with the combined aim of accelerating the war program, minimizing local dislocations, and facilitating postwar conversion. Some new facilities will be necessary as the war program is enlarged and modified, but the major phase of new plant construction is clearly passed. Much work still remains, however, in the form of efforts to select the correct plants for further conversion to war needs and to shift essential civilian production and even less urgent war production out of congested areas. By such efforts it may be possible to avoid extensive rebuilding of municipal services and to speed the war effort. A machine center's industrial resources must be used for high priority military needs. For this reason, some manufacturing must be moved out of the more congested centers. These shifts present difficult decisions as to the best use to be made of local resources in congested areas and as to satisfactory places for the production jobs.

From now on, efforts to place industrial capacity in relation to the necessary resources will be confined mainly to the rearrangement of facilities which are incorrectly located for present needs or which may be improperly distributed for the needs of a changed economy. The tasks include, first, the present redistribution of certain war facilities, and second, the postwar conversion of those plants which are adaptable to peacetime needs. Both of these jobs involve careful planning of a high order, involving intimate participation by both governmental agencies and the industries concerned. In fact, it is likely to be far more difficult to plan for the relocation and conversion of industries than it was to select locations in the first place. In the war expansion program, speed of performance was crucial; whereas, in the postwar period cost considerations and a broad range of social factors will have to be taken into account.

In Conclusion: The major geographic influences of the war program have been the concentration of production in large metropolitan districts and a significant growth of manufacturing in interior sections of the country, especially in trade centers in the South and Central West. At the same time, however, shipbuilding and aircraft centers along the coasts have also boomed. In most parts of the country, the smaller communities and rural areas have been forced to give up labor to the larger cities.

The problems of converting war production capacities to peacetime use will vary with the nature of the industrial process and with the location of the plant. Some facilities cannot be converted, and others will have estimated costs of operation too high to make conversion attractive. In many industries, capacities probably will be far in excess of market requirements. Consequently, severe competition may arise among producers, both old and new. The ability of central,

western, and southern areas to hold the industrial positions achieved during the war will be conditioned by the attempts of areas in other parts of the country to maintain or expand their volume of production. Likewise, the efforts of large cities to use existing factory buildings and equipment are likely to run up against the promotional plans of smaller communities. Conversion will not be an easy process. Yet, undoubtedly the communities now obtaining large manufacturing units for the first time will strive to use their new plant facilities, managements, and labor skills as the basis of continued industrial operations.

It will be clear, we think, that the problems of postwar conversion and redistribution of industrial activity cannot be successfully solved unless the agencies of government are prepared to assume the initiative.

Discussion

WALTER FRISBIE, Secretary-Treasurer, Indiana State Industrial Union Council

WE LISTENED with enjoyment to the remarks of Mr. Prince of the General Electric Company. We do not wish to be unfair to Mr. Prince but in order to illustrate our point, we probably will have to over-emphasize and over-simplify, which may have the result of being somewhat unfair.

Carlyle once said that *laissez-faire* was "anarchy plus a constable." Mr. Prince's suggestions as to the means of modifying the impact of the war and the changed conditions due to the war and flowing out from the peace are modified *laissez-faire*. We would classify them as anarchy plus two constables. Although the policies of the General Electric Company as outlined by Mr. Prince are undoubtedly progressive, legally speaking, and would tend to ameliorate conditions, there are no assurances, there can be no assurances that the policies adopted by the General Electric Company would be followed out by our other great companies even by a small number of them, and if there were assurances that they would be carried out, there still is no assurance at all that they would effectively do the job that has to be done. Mr. Prince's proposal envisages a return to the *status quo ante* with the considerable unemployment that already existed and still does exist even with boom conditions. Such a picture as Mr. Prince has painted is not particularly encouraging because we feel that out of this war must come plans for something better.

Mr. Watkins' monograph can scarcely be improved. It does not encourage us. Obviously the dislocations and changes brought about by our present conversion program, the reconversion program after the war and the strategic location of industries away from the seaboards are going to create serious problems. These we must face and solve if we expect the peace that follows the great war which we, are now fighting for our lives, to be a lasting and sound peace.

Planning in its essence is involved, difficult and multifarious, but planning with all its facets, diversities and viewpoints becomes relatively simple when we have our goal clear in mind. We of the organized labor movement have our goal clearly in mind. We know what kind of a world we want to live in. We know what kind of a world will be good, not only for us but for all, and our approach to planning is predicated on this type of world. Stated most simply, we are fighting for a free world, a world of which Vice-President of the United States Wallace spoke in his great speech May 8th, "Men and women cannot be really free until they have plenty to eat and time and ability to read and think and talk things over." It has taken 20,000 years of civilization and progress to enable man thus simply in the language of ordinary people to state the meaning of freedom and the dream of the fight for freedom. If we keep this picture of a free world firmly in our minds as we turn our energies and ingenuities toward planning the world that we want, everything else becomes simple. We have to recognize our problems and solve them one by one with the goal ever before us. The war has accelerated certain trends and temporarily slowed up others. The war has temporarily solved certain problems and temporarily complicated others. The problem facing this specific session, that of industrial location and conversion during and after the war, has had wide-reaching complications.

A tendency which has long been visible of the movement of industries nearer the sources of raw materials, nearer centers of transportation and away from our coasts has been vastly accelerated. The rural Middle West has rapidly become and is ever more rapidly becoming the industrial Middle West. Towns and villages which have never seen the smoke of industry are being converted overnight into thriving little war production centers. The result is that serious unemployment problems are created in our coastal areas in certain areas where shutdowns and limitations of production have occurred, while various social problems are growing up in our boom towns. It is easy to picture what is happening when we realize that Indiana alone, a typical Middle Western State which already has employed in production industries 37,000 more people than were listed as available for work in the 1940 census, and which by the end of 1943 will require 315,490 more workers. The problems of housing, sanitation, health, education, entertainment, morale, transportation to and from work, are becoming acute. The problem of regulating the growth of these new industrial communities so that the workers may be maintained on the jobs and in health, their children educated, must be solved by these communities, but at the same time these communities face the problem, face the grim fact that after the war is over many of the war industries, as Mr. Watkins points out, will be incapable of reconversion and some of our new industrial cities, if we do not plan properly, soundly and now, become ghost cities. There is little doubt that part of the trend away from our coastal and metropolitan areas

in the location of plants will be permanent. Many of our great cities already have vast blighted areas which strain their resources. There is a strong possibility that these will spread.

In spite of our all-out war effort there are still many millions unemployed. Although the increasing needs of our armed forces and the increasing need of industry will undoubtedly absolve many of these, some of the problem remains. We must take it into account in our planning. When the war and the reconversion of our great industries, particularly the auto industry, radio industry, farm equipment industry commences, there will be a period of indefinite duration when literally millions upon millions of men and women will be unemployed. This is a problem our planning must take into account.

Under the duress of war certain of our civil liberties have been abridged. Our planning with the object a free world must insure that this abridgement is temporary and that the rights of men and women for freedom of speech and the press, freedom to assemble, freedom to exercise their collective bargaining rights, must be protected. The problem which has had a cancerous effect on our system, the problem of discrimination because of race, color or creed, must also be solved once and for all during this period of war and the period to follow the war. Otherwise much of our fighting, much of our sacrifice will have been in vain. We believe that there must be more and more controls. We believe that our government must more and more assume an initiative. The old ways and the old forms have become incapable of dealing with the problems that face us. Township, county and state rights no longer truly divide our political structure. We must regard our country as a collection of geographical areas rather than a collection of political subdivisions. Planning cannot be confined to state lines. Obviously then the national government must more and more exercise its authority. When we speak of government control, of course we mean democratic government, government truly representing the people. We feel that there should be a National Planning Board representative of our country's geographical areas which should have central control of planning and the power to carry out plans that are democratically made.

This planning board, of course, should be representative of labor, management and the farmer. Naturally the central board should have subordinate to it, but as part of it, regional boards under which in turn there should be local boards so that we would have wholly integrated yet coördinated national planning organism. It is not possible, of course, to draw a blueprint for the society of the future. But if we set our eyes firmly on the goal of the four freedoms for ourselves and our families, and since we cannot in this present day isolate ourselves from all the peoples of the world; if we make our dream a free people in a free world and build our plans accordingly, maybe our children or their children will catch a glimpse of the great light that has been denied us.

Reporter's Summary

FRANCIS A. PITKIN, Executive Director, Pennsylvania State Planning Board, Harrisburg, Pa.

IT MUST be recognized that industrial location and the success of planned industrial conversion after the war will be major factors in determining all future planning programs.

This session was very well balanced with the presentation of the views of government, industry and labor as well as with the concentration of one speaker on wartime location of industry, while the other main speaker devoted most of his attention to the problem of postwar industrial conversion.

In opening the meeting, Chairman George Soule made an important contribution to planning vocabulary in identifying the disease of those who will not recognize the possibility of a postwar problem as "Allergicus Ad Post-bellum," explaining that this disease should not be confused with "Allergicus Ad Bellum" which usually shows up only in a Selective Service medical examination.

Mr. David C. Prince, Vice-President of the General Electric Company, gave a very fine talk on "Planning for the future while producing for Victory." It is impossible effectually to summarize his talk in the time allotted, so I earnestly recommend that the full text of his paper be given careful study.

As early as 1940 the General Electric Company recognized that American industry was faced with two challenging tasks—first, quickly and effectively to convert its production facilities to the manufacture of war material and second, while producing that war material, to plan for the reconversion back to peacetime production. Special committees were established to carry out these two jobs. Mr. Prince's talk related mainly to the work of the committee for postwar planning, of which he is Chairman. In undertaking its task this committee, believing that a first necessity was the determination of our ultimate objective, directed its attention to a year which they call "V + 2,"—that is two years after the year in which victory is achieved.

Charts projected on a screen, during Mr. Prince's talk, showed how the gross national output for 1940, amounting to $82 billion, was distributed by types of production or service. A similar distribution for 1943 was shown, with an estimated total of $115 billion, of which $61 billions were for war production. The same sort of estimate was made for the year "V + 2" for which a gross national output of $110 billion was selected as an attainable objective, which would provide full employment for the 57 million workers who, the committee believes, will then be in the labor market. The various components of such a gross national output were considered and were subdivided to the point where he probable participation of the General Electric Company in such an

output could be determined. This probable or desirable future output was still further subdivided to determine its effects on production and employment in each of the 70 departments of the General Electric Company. Mr. Prince estimated that this General Electric employment in the year "V + 2" would just about equal General Electric employment of December 1941, or 123,000.

A second problem being considered by the committee is how to change back production facilities from war production to the peace production. This change-over problem is obviously not simple.

The paper presented by Dr. Ralph J. Watkins, Assistant Director of the National Resources Planning Board, in the preparation of which Dr. Glenn E. McLaughlin collaborated, was mainly devoted to the subject of industrial location during the war. After describing in general terms the locations of different types of new war industries, Dr. Watkins pointed out how the necessities of the war program have accentuated and accelerated the unbalance of our industrial pattern, as well as that of our population pattern. Although most of these developments have been in line with past tendencies, still there are some big new plants which are not. As examples of these latter he mentioned the powder plants and TNT plants, which have been located in rural areas, necessitating the relocation of large numbers of workers. Such plants would have little peacetime use as powder or TNT plants and are not readily convertable to other types of manufacture. Possibly the demand for fertilizers and plastics may help in some cases.

Dr. Watkins mentioned as one major problem that of trying to utilize our increased capacity for producing raw materials such as copper, aluminum, magnesium and steel. He said further that while the task of building up war production may seem difficult, the problem of converting our war industries back to peacetime production is appallingly difficult. In this connection he pointed out that the locations of various plants with respect to markets and relative costs of production will be major determinants.

Dr. Watkins felt that the problem of reconversion can be solved only through the coöperative efforts of Federal, state and local governments working with industry, labor and agriculture.

He also felt that emergency controls would have to be continued for some time, tapering off as the conversion to peacetime operation is accomplished.

In discussing the talks by Mr. Prince and Dr. Watkins, Mr. Boris Shishkin, Economist for the American Federation of Labor, expressed his feeling that such planning by the General Electric Company and by the Federal Government is not enough to solve the postwar problem. He regretted that most other companies are not as far-sighted as General Electric.

He felt that integration of government planning and industrial

planning is essential and that even more important, the industrial planning must be by all industries, from the roots up.

Mr. Shishkin stressed the importance of time in the war effort—on both the military and on the production fronts. He reported that the A. F. of L. is studying the allocation of war contracts both geographically and by types of industry as the first step in determining the location and extent of postwar problems. He said that it is encouraging to find that the War Department is aware of the demobilization problem.

Mr. Frisbee of the Indiana CIO, in discussing the talks by Mr. Prince and Dr. Watkins, pointed out that General Electric is just one company, that few companies are able to follow its example and that planning by our old industries is not enough since many of our new industries will close down at the end of the war. He stated that even now during our war effort we have 5,000,000 unemployed.

Mr. Frisbee expressed his feeling that the wartime trend of industry toward the Central States will not be reversed at the close of the war. Among the problems to be faced is that of permanent unemployment in some industries which have been adversely affected by wartime priorities, giving as one example the tin-can industry which may never regain its old markets. He urged that a permanent economic planning board be established with authority to carry out its plans.

Mr. Jacob Baker suggested that one great difficulty in industrial planning is in the determination of available markets. He pointed out that in the coöperative movement the size of available market is known since the market is composed of the members of the coöperative. He expressed his feeling that the coöperative movement has much to offer and should be well considered in making our plans for the future.

Mr. Harold Buttenheim in commending the type of industrial planning being done by the General Electric Company expressed the feeling that it might be necessary for the government to guarantee to take up the employment load which could not be carried by the industries.

Mr. Ben H. Kizer highly commended the type of industrial planning being done by the General Electric Company and stressed the need for careful analysis of problems for every community with complete coöperation between industry, local government and all of the other factors involved. This local planning must be carefully coördinated with state and Federal planning but in the last analysis the community and each industry must provide its own shock absorber.

Mr. Russel Black inquired as to the proportion of total employment which might be affected by the industrial planning being done by the General Electric. Mr. Prince explained that the General Electric Company represented approximately 1 per cent of the Nation's total output.

Miss Grace Evans, representing the National Association of Colored Women, stressed the importance of recognizing the need of employment opportunities for colored workers in preparing postwar plans.

Mr. A. P. Greensfelder, St. Louis, raised a question as to the adequacy of capital to handle the enormous cost of postwar conversion. Mr. Prince felt that there would be no difficulty on that score since adequate investment funds are available from banks as well as from the defense savings of individuals.

Mrs. Maria Burkett of the Indianapolis Citizens Housing Committee expressed the feeling that all of the planning done should not be directed toward the postwar period, pointing out that there are many problems, particularly those connected with housing, which require immediate attention.

Captain Richard L. Reiss in speaking of the British experience with planned demobilization after the first world war pointed out that while a very logical plan for demobilization had been developed whereby soldiers would have been released only as jobs were available for them, this plan broke down because the soldiers insisted on immediate release regardless of the availability of jobs. He also pointed out that the problems to be faced after this war will be much more serious because of the much larger percentage of our populations which will be involved in the reconversion.

Mr. George F. Emery of Detroit raised the question of the problems within the metropolitan areas which are being caused by the location of new industries in remote portions of the region thus complicating the difficulties faced by the central portion of the region. Mr. Buttenheim suggested as one solution the establishment of taxing regions covering the entire metropolitan area which would lessen the difficulty caused by migration to suburbs and would permit the redevelopment of the central areas.

Chairman Soule pointed out that this problem of decentralization was not only one of movement to the suburbs of metropolitan areas but also a movement to remote areas entirely outside the metropolitan region. He also suggested that as long as we admit that we will have an expanding economy we can do some real regional planning in an effort to control these problems.

Mr. Oscar A. Ahlgren of Hammond, Indiana, made a plea for consideration of the international aspects of industrial location, citing as one example the difficulties now being caused in our South American relations by lack of coöperation in the past.

Mr. L. Segoe of Cincinnati stressed the need for rationalizing the urban pattern in the development of our postwar plan, feeling that we must change from the policy of indiscriminate industrial promotion to a policy of selective development, considering complimentary relationships in an effort to avoid cyclical variations in employment. Reconversion should be so done as to secure better balance for our cities and regions.

Postwar Planning

CHARLES E. MERRIAM, Vice-Chairman, National Resources Planning Board, Chicago, Ill.

PRESIDENT Roosevelt declares that "We are going to win the war and we are going to win the peace that follows."

To win the War, American energies are now directed toward the development of a vast production program, toward the mobilization as swiftly as possible of all the resources of the Nation, in materials and personnel, and toward aid for the democracies of the world in our joint struggle against aggression.

To win the Peace, we must prepare now—even while we are concentrating on winning the war. In a very real sense the clarification of the objectives in the onward march of freedom-loving people is an essential of our war effort. We are intent on winning this war to safeguard our lives and our liberties and to make possible the "pursuit of happiness,"—the full fruition of our hopes and plans for progress and development. We must fight the despotisms and all their forces, not only with greater force, but with ideas and faith. We must develop and hold out to the enslaved people now under the heel of the dictators, a better way of life than we or they have had.

One thing is sure—we are not going back to where we were. One of the few certainties in the world is inevitable change. We could not stop the march of progress if we wanted to. We are going forward with restored confidence in the democracy and liberty which underlie our civilization. But we can do something about the direction of the changes that will follow victory. For that reason we propose to plan ahead.

In November, 1940, the President requested the Board to undertake a study of what was then called post-defense planning. Later (January 4, 1941) the President wrote: "I am glad to know that the Board is proceeding with the development of plans and proposals for the post-defense period. These plans will, of course, involve many Federal agencies and coöperation with state and local governments and private citizens, and I hope all executive agencies of the Government will assist you in collating proposals for my consideration."

In this work, the Board recognizes the principle recently stated by Governor Leverett Saltonstall, of Massachusetts, who, on appointing a Post-Defense Stabilization Board for his State, said "Although the most pressing job at present is speeding up production of defense materials and strengthening our armed forces, it is imperative to begin planning for the tremendous economic and social readjustments which must be made after the war. Knowledge that careful plans are being laid for the future will have an important bearing on defense work itself because there is nothing like confidence of security for strengthening morale, and thus giving renewed energy to wartime production."

New Objectives

We look forward to securing, through planning and coöperative action, a greater freedom for the American people. Great changes have come in our century with the industrial revolution, the rapid settlement of the continent, the development of technology, the acceleration of transportation and communication, the growth of modern capitalism, and rise of the national state with its economic programs. Too few corresponding adjustments have been made in our provisions for human freedom. In spite of all these changes, that great manifesto, the Bill of Rights, has stood unshaken a hundred and fifty years. And now to the old freedoms we must add new freedoms and restate our objectives in modern terms, preserving our great gains and adding to the heritage we received from our forefathers.

Freedom of speech and expression, freedom to worship, freedom from want, and *freedom from fear,* these are the universals of human life.

The translation of freedom into modern terms applicable to the people of the United States includes, as the NRPB sees it, the following declaration of rights:

"1. *The right to work,* usefully and creatively through the productive years;

2. *The right to fair pay,* adequate to command the necessities and amenities of life in exchange for work, ideas, thrift, and other socially valuable service;

3. *The right to adequate food, clothing, shelter,* and *medical care;*

4. *The right to security,* with freedom from fear of old age, want, dependency, sickness, unemployment, and accident;

5. *The right to live in a system of free enterprise,* free from compulsory labor, irresponsible private power, arbitrary public authority, and unregulated monopolies;

6. *The right to come and go, to speak or to be silent,* free from the spyings of secret political police;

7. *The right to equality before the law,* with equal access to justice in fact;

8. *The right to education,* for work, for citizenship, and for personal growth and happiness; and

9. *The right to rest,* recreation, and adventure; the opportunity to enjoy life and take part in an advancing civilization."

These rights and opportunities we want for ourselves and for our children now and when this war is over. They go beyond the political forms and freedoms for which our ancestors fought and which they handed on to us. They are adapted to a new world in which the central problems arise from new kinds of pressures of power, production, and population, of a kind which our forefathers did not face.

Their problem was freedom and the production of wealth, the building of a great section of this continent with its farms, industries, transporta-

tion, and power. Ours is for *greater productivity and more democratic distribution of abundance.* But in formulating these new rights, we are not blind to the obligations which go with every right, obligations of the individual to use well his rights and to insist on the same rights for others, and obligations of the community to support and protect the institutions which make these rights actual. We believe that the American people are ready to assume these obligations and to take the private and the public action they impose.

From time to time our Board will address itself to the task of making good each of these propositions in concrete and practical ways.

Preliminary Objectives

The central objectives of our postwar planning may be summarized as follows:

"1. We must plan for full employment, for maintaining the national income at 100 billion dollars a year, at least, rather than to let it slip back to 80, or 70, or 60 billion dollars again. In other words, we shall plan to balance our national production-consumption budget at a high level with full employment, not at a low level with mass unemployment.

"2. We must plan to do this without requiring work from youth who should be in school, the aged who should be relieved if they wish it, and women who choose to make their contribution in the home, and without asking anyone to work regularly in mines, factories, transportation or offices more than 40 hours a week or 50 weeks a year, or to sacrifice the wage standards which have been set.

"3. We must plan to decentralize post-emergency activities as far as possible; to use to the utmost our system of modified free enterprise with its voluntary employment, its special reward for effort, imagination, and improvement, its elasticity and competition; and to advance coöperatively under national and governmental leadership.

"4. We must plan to enable every human being within our boundaries to realize progressively the promise of American life in food, shelter, clothing, medical care, education, work, rest, home life, opportunity to advance, adventure, and the basic freedoms.

"5. We must plan to make Up-Building America the keynote of the postwar program, including both development of our national resources adding to the National Estate, and service activities, which will increase the vitality, health, skill, productivity, knowledge, and happiness of the American people, and thus together end unemployment and add to our wealth and well-being."

Full employment is a key to national prosperity as well as individual welfare in the modern world of power, machinery, labor specialization and technology. The full employment we Americans seek must be, at the same time, free employment, unless we are to accept a new kind of economic slavery and lose those freedoms without which even material

prosperity is not worth the price to men who cherish freedom and the dignity of man.

In this time of crisis, when we are fighting to defend our freedoms and our rights, our way of life, and our scale of values, we must not fail to take stock of the problems of full employment which we shall face again when this world war is over and we can turn once more from defense to peace, confident of our national security.

With total war we are building up our production to unprecedented heights. Already we have more men and women at work, more wheels turning, more power being used, more freight moving, more shipways full, more goods being turned out, more workers in training and getting jobs, more commodities being purchased than ever before in our national history. In spite of awkward blockages here and there arising from the hasty and unbalanced character of this advance, we shall go on along these same lines, building up our total production until the Axis collapses and the threat of aggression against us is ended.

Plans and Programs

In discharge of its responsibility, the National Resources Planning Board serves as a clearing house to gather ideas and plans to stimulate appropriate independent action by other public and private agencies, to bring together individuals who are interested in harmonizing their views, and to furnish the President with information and assistance on the formulation of policies on these matters.

The elected representatives of the people will, of course, make the decisions on policies and methods for meeting the problems of the post-defense period. The Congress has already provided appropriations for the inauguration of needed studies by this Board and for the preparation of postwar plans by various other agencies in the Executive Branch. With full public discussion and appraisal, the Congress will determine the appropriate policies and how they shall be put into action.

It is the established policy of the National Resources Planning Board to carry on its work in coöperation with Federal and other agencies having operating responsibilities. This is not in any sense duplication of the work done by others, but putting the various plans and pieces together and of course filling in many gaps.

The Board will not attempt to make plans for other agencies within their field of independent responsibility. It will seek, as in the past, to persuade other agencies to prepare plans and to draw these plans together. The Board needs and requests help and coöperation of official and unofficial agencies and bodies in assembling the plans for dealing with the needs of the post-defense period.

In fields where no formal interdepartmental committee has been established, the staff of the Board maintains close relations with all interested agencies. Wherever possible, major studies are performed

directly by the appropriate agency rather than by the Board's own staff. In addition to the coöperative relations existing in specific fields of interest, the Board and its staff is keeping in close touch with postwar planning work throughout the Government and by private agencies.

Method of Operation

There is a wide range of programs and the NRPB has Dr. Luther Gulick as coördinator of these various planning efforts.

Plans for Demobilization: The demobilization of the armed forces of the Nation must be as carefully planned as their recruitment. The Selective Service Act of 1940 directed that arrangements be made for the return to previous employment of all men called for service with the armed forces of the government. A re-employment Division in the Selective Service System directs the work of Re-employment Committees in various localities who coöperate in replacing selectees released from service. This division is planning for the future demobilization of armed forces and also is studying potential employment demands in the postwar period.

Much more thought will be given to the problem of the way of demobilization than has been hitherto thought necessary. The defense and war programs have involved tremendous efforts to develop new skills and trained personnel for a great variety of industrial activities. The same procedures might be adapted to preparing men, while still in the armed forces, to assume jobs in industry when they are released from the Army or Navy. Perhaps the idea of a "dismissal wage or allowance" for those employed in industry is also applicable to demobilized men from the armed forces.

This time we will not be in such haste as in 1918. Our total war effort now will loom much larger in the national economy than it did in 1918. Any hasty curtailment of war production may have severe repercussions throughout our entire economy. Indeed, it is conceivable that it would be less wasteful to continue some war production even after the immediate demand is ended rather than to halt precipitately that production. If we are going to retrain men from the armed forces or from defense industries for peacetime jobs, we might appropriately consider retooling or converting our machines and plans to produce peacetime goods.

Not alone would the immediate worker in war industries thrown out of work be affected by hasty industrial demobilization, but transportation workers and the suppliers of raw materials for war production would also be affected. Their income would drop and hence their consumer demands be lessened. While we may want to give priority in the postwar period to consumer goods rather than defense goods, industrial demobilization might still proceed gradually.

Studies are being made by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of de-

mobilization experience after November 11, 1918; of trends in productivity per man-hour and of the size, age and composition of the labor force. Data collected by the Bureau on labor force requirements for various kinds of work will be useful in projecting training and vocational needs in the postwar economy.

The Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce of the Department of Commerce is giving special attention to shifts in productive activity occasioned by the war and defense programs and the possible transitional requirements in both consumer and producer goods. The possible extent of a "back-log" of consumer demand following the immediate cessation of the defense program is being examined.

The mobilization of our resources has involved the establishment of government controls over allocations of materials, prices, and priorities to meet war problems. The demobilization of our war effort and the shift from full employment on defense to full employment in peace will involve some of the same kinds of problems. The adaptation of the government controls to these ends must be planned ahead.

Plans can be laid now in order that we may have an orderly and economical procedure for demobilization. Even as the attention of a large number of Army officers and civilians should in peacetime be given to the problems of wartime industrial mobilization, so in time of war production we may think about demobilization for peacetime.

Public Works: The timing of public activities to reduce the intensity of booms and depressions has long been advocated by economists. In 1931 Congress adopted the policy "of arranging the construction of public works as far as possible in such a manner as would assist in the stabilization of industry and employment through proper timing of such construction."

The President has stated repeatedly that we must slow down on expenditures for development projects which are not related to defense in order that our full national energy can be concentrated on the war effort, but he has also pointed out that now is the time to prepare the plans so that the projects which are temporarily "put on the shelf" or in "the pantry closet" can be ready when our energies can again be used for the development of our national resources and of our standard of living.

The National Resources Planning Board is responsible under the law for bringing together the Six-year Programs of Federal Agencies and the current record of those programs has been duly made public. In addition, a Public Works Reserve is being developed now. This will include programs of useful public work projects and public services planned by state and local governments.

To make these programs and projects useful and effective at short notice the Board last year put forward eight recommendations—one of which has reached the point of action by the Congress. For the advance

preparation of needed surveys and investigations, programs and comprehensive plans, engineering plans and specifications and legal studies—appropriations are needed under an amended form of the Employment Stabilization Act. (H. R. 5638 and S. 1617). This step has already been taken in New York State, where systematic and energetic steps are being taken to prepare a notable postwar program of works.

But there are many broader opportunities than individual public works.

Urban Conservation and Development: After the war we can rebuild our housing facilities and really get at the job of eradicating the slum and blighted area from our cities—great and small. A unit of the Board's staff is developing materials on needed steps in government procedures, metropolitan coöperation, land acquisition, etc., to implement a new action program, and in this work is building on the previous reports of the Board. (See: "Our Cities"—Urban Government, Urban Planning and Land Policies, Housing—the Continuing Problem, Federal Aids to Local Planning, and Public Land Acquisition—Urban.) Procedures are now being worked out for the progressive planning of the many facilities which are required for modern urban living. The objectives in Charles Ascher's recent report on this problem point the way to important advances.

"1. Seek the widest and soundest economic base for the city, so that the city dweller is afforded the maximum opportunity for full employment and the highest possible real income.

"2. Plan for city rebuilding by the square mile, not by the square block. Create neighborhoods for living, for young and old, for the free mingling of all groups in a democratic society.

"3. Deal with the whole urban community; be not limited by artificial municipal boundary lines, either in rebuilding or in meeting the costs of metropolitan services.

"4. Make the resources of the city and countryside more freely available to urban and rural dwellers alike.

"5. Urban land now loaded with outworn structures and with unrealizable claims—of past debts and taxes and hoped-for profits—must be made free again, so that it can be fitted into the pattern of the future.

"6. Bring to bear more powerfully the sovereign powers of government: make public land acquisition more effective, use taxation as an incentive to city rebuilding, devise more creative controls of land through the police power.

"7. Bring together at the earliest possible moment in each community available facts and sound judgments to outline the directions and forms of community development. Organize the thought and the programs of local, state and Federal officials and of citizens and civic groups for the continuous improvement of this pattern. Provide the necessary coördination of planning locally, regionally, nationally.

"8. Make the construction industry truly free enterprise: release it from monopolies, restrictions, and disorganization, so that it can undertake city rebuilding at low costs and with steady employment at reasonable wages, on a scale hitherto unknown.

"9. Study new methods of building, new community patterns; train men and women with new skills for city rebuilding, both in the government and at research and training centers throughout the country.

"10. Recognize the national interest in the well-being of the more than half the people who live in cities; realize the limitations upon city resources to overcome the errors of past generations; establish the bases or Federal aids to city rebuilding.

"11. Set as one of the aims for which a free people will fight the remaking of American cities in our generation as places to live, work, play, and worship worthy of a democratic society."

Rural Works and Land Use: In rural areas there are corresponding opportunities for new enterprise—conserving our soil, rebuilding and operating our forest resources, developing the range, and opening recreational developments. The Land Committee of the Board has developed statements of criteria to assist in the evaluation of public work proposals. The Committee's staff is at work measuring the extent of changes in agricultural land-use and acreage requirements in order to provide our population with an adequate nutritious diet.

The Secretary of Agriculture has created an Interbureau Coördinating Committee on Post-Defense Programs with representatives from various agencies within the Department of Agriculture. A subcommittee on agricultural-industrial relations is concerned with the influence of future industrial activity upon agricultural production and welfare. Another is studying the problems of maintenance of desired levels of income for agriculture in relation to high levels of domestic consumption and industrial use of farm products.

A second subcommittee within the Department of Agriculture is concerned with the development of a shelf of public works projects to meet the needs of rural areas. For one thing, increased attention will be given to the restoration and development of the physical resources upon which agriculture depends. Soil conservation, flood control, reforestation, irrigation are all required phases of a program to enable the Nation to pass on to future generations not a depleted but an enriched soil base. In the second place there is a need for many new and improved public facilities for people in rural areas—public schools, hospitals, and sanitation and recreational facilities. Thirdly, much remains to be done in bringing electric power to the Nation's farms and in improving rural housing standards.

In addition to the Interbureau Coördinating Committee in Washington, the Secretary of Agriculture has set up nine regional committees throughout the United States made up of representatives from various

agencies of the department. These regional committees will carry on the same kind of work for the region as the national committee and will serve as a link between Washington and state and local planning bodies.

Industrial Development: The success of the Tennessee Valley Authority in building private business in the area which it serves, naturally suggests similar programs for other drainage basins to provide multiple purpose development of their resources. Such programs may provide a way of stimulating both the social and economic progress of industries and areas in the United States. Many plans already exist for such development and others are in the making. But they need to be tied together and put in orderly programs if they are to be effectuated promptly upon the return of peace. The undeveloped resources of the United States provide material for vast increases in our national income and for significant changes in the growth of industries and of areas.

Transportation: There will be major developments in the transportation field after the war in order to provide a main-spring for other kinds of developmental work throughout the Nation. The forthcoming report of the Board on National Transportation Policies provides a basis for further postwar transportation plans. New rail facilities—particularly terminals, new highways, new airways and airports, new shipping facilities, will all be required with new equipment and operating techniques fitted to the rapid advances in technology.

Many agencies in the government are directly concerned with these postwar transportation plans. The Public Roads Administration is at work on Interregional highway studies and other projects; the Interstate Commerce Commission has many responsibilities in the field. The United States Maritime Commission, which has enlarged its ten-year-old program for the construction of some 500 merchant vessels, is planning to make various studies of the demobilization of emergency shipping construction and the possible place of the United States in international shipping in the postwar world.

Services: But the Public Works programs alone are not likely to be sufficient to meet a postwar crisis. There is a wide variety of service activities for the direct benefit and welfare of citizens which must and can be expanded if we are to realize the standards of living and well-being that we desire and that our national income makes possible.

Health, Nutrition, and Medical Care: Increasingly in the last few years the United States has come to realize that one of its greatest resources is a healthy people. The medical examination of young men for service in the armed forces has indicated many gaps in our program. In the first place, a healthy nation depends upon a proper diet of adequate nutritional standards. Because of the war emergency special efforts have been launched by the Office of Defense, Health, Welfare and Selected Activities to inform our people about dietary needs. The

Surplus Marketing Administration has been broadening its efforts to bring nutritional foods to low-income and needy families. We must plan to make sure that every person in the United States has the proper amount and kind of food.

Our advances in preventive medicine technique have already done much to eliminate the sources of infectious disease and to prevent the spread of contagious disease. The United States Public Health Service, in coöperation with state and local government health departments, has led the way. Nonetheless, there remains much to be done to provide adequate health education and to bring about a more completely satisfactory preventive practice. Moreover, a number of recent inquiries under both public and private auspices have revealed that large portions of our population do not receive proper medical and dental care. We must plan to insure that every person in the United States receives the medical attention he requires in order to maintain bodily health.

Education: The goal for our educational efforts must be the 100 per cent provision of training for every child and youth, the kind best adapted to his abilities and in the amount calculated to develop his maximum usefulness to himself, his community, and society. We know that we are yet far short of reaching that 100 per cent goal. Educational opportunities are not equal in the United States but vary greatly between regions and even within States. And curricula have not always been adapted to the needs of the individual student. We expect our educational system to impart to all a sense of our cultural heritage and of responsibility for participation in our democratic society. In the second place, education should prepare each person to take his proper place in productive effort. And either through the educational system of otherwise, youth must be given an opportunity to participate in and contribute to social accomplishment. The future of our democracy depends in no small part upon the provision we make for training youth in the ways and needs of our society.

A unit of the Board's staff on Youth and Educational Problems has been created to assist in the preparation of desirable plans in this part of the broad area of the social services in coöperation with other agencies of the government.

Especially must we plan to bridge over more successfully than we do now the gulf between youth and maturity, at all the numerous and difficult points where adjustment is most severe. Youth as it enters the zone of maturity with all the doubts and fears of the novitiate should be able to see stretching out before it the minimum securities as well as the adventures of human life. Youth should not look into a future dominated by fear—in an atmosphere of brutal hazing, so to speak—but look forward with confident expectation to social justice, liberty, fair participation in the gains of our common life, in the common good

of our time—to a job, to status, to recognition dependent on ability and intentions and will, not on the prestige of others. I am not able at this time to do more than outline an item on the agenda of democracy, and to indicate the wide-ranging importance of this problem. Much more serious consideration of this problem is urgent, and indeed, is under way. Various types of approach are of great significance—the CCC, the NYA, the army training, the summer and work camps, our vast educational and formal training systems. We may reasonably look forward toward and diligently plan for important modifications in the transition from the status of youth to the status of maturity and full participation in the duties and responsibilities and opportunities of American life.

Recreation: Today our society accepts the forty-hour working week as the standard length of time for a man's productive efforts. During the war period this may have to be lengthened, although the basic 40 hours remains. Our present knowledge of fatigue indicates that short working days may often be more productive per worker than long ones. In the postwar period doubtlessly we shall return to the forty-hour work week, and even look forward to the time when increasing production and technological improvements will make possible shorter hours. But this is not the only reason why we must be concerned about ample recreational facilities for men's leisure-time activities. We cannot expect youth to grow into useful, productive citizens of our society unless they have had satisfactory recreational opportunities. We must build our facilities, both within and near our great urban centers. Also, we must provide competent recreational leadership. We know today that recreation is a matter of more than part space and play equipment —it is participation in group enjoyment and group activity, development of handicrafts and hobbies, community enterprises, dancing, organized athletic events, etc. The desire of all to enjoy and use natural locations of scenic beauty alone or in company must be recognized and satisfied. We have made a beginning, especially in recent years, toward achieving these ends. In the postwar period we shall have new opportunities to bring recreational facilities and services to all, within our national income limits.

Other Service Activities must also be planned. With increasing leisure and advancing standards of living there will unquestionably be greater demands for library services. Our modern civilization has already taken important steps toward making art, music, and the theatre a part of the life of all citizens, instead of a luxury for a few. We must promote the development of our artistic resources and their universal enjoyment.

Finally, research is one of our very greatest natural resources. The use of our special skills in scientific and specialized investigation has already contributed notably to our technological advancement. Our hopes for ever higher standards of living depend in no small part upon

the continued support of scientific research and free inquiry. At the end of the war we shall have more skilled workers than ever and we shall know who and where they are. It will be possible, accordingly, to intensify and develop science and technology even more notably than in the past. The special research reports of the Board, and the Technical Roster set up by the Board and the Civil Service Commission, are important steps in this direction. The Manpower Board will be able to take a broader view of our scientific personnel than has ever before been possible.

Plans for Security: Personal insecurity has gone hand in hand with an insecure and troubled world that has led to war. In the peace we seek after the present hostilities, we must plan to give to the individual in society the sense of security he has lacked. When full employment which we propose is established, many of the problems of insecurity disappear. But not all, for there will still be many gaps in that continuity of income which is essential to security. In recent years this country has taken important steps toward providing certain reassurances to persons unable by the force of circumstance to provide adequately for themselves. Compensation schemes for injury and death arising out of a man's occupation have been in force in nearly every State for a number of years. In the last few years we have added unemployment compensation, old age and survivor's insurance, and care for the blind, the handicapped, and dependent children, and special aid for dependents of those in the armed services. These schemes of social security need expansion and improvement. Work relief, general relief, and old-age assistance have been our answer to the challenge of dependency.

We propose to plan our national activities so that they will ensure the maximum utilization of our most important resource of all—our manpower. If we do so, we may look forward to a minimum of dependency upon general public welfare measures. We wish to use all who are capable of and available for work in our national productive effort.

There will continue to be some unemployment in view of technological development bringing us higher levels of output. The immediate labor displacement will have to be carried by the community until it can be re-absorbed elsewhere in our productive activity. There will be periods of movement from one kind of employment to another, and seasonal fluctuations in the level of employment. We must see to it that we have an adequate system of security for all persons affected by such changes.

Whether employed, partially employed, or unemployed, every family is in need of certain indispensable requirements of food, shelter, clothing, and other comforts. We shall be able to provide them in the postwar period. We plan to do so. The forthcoming report of the Board's

Committee on Long-Range Work and Relief policies will provide a basing point for the further development of welfare plans.

The Administrator of the Federal Security Agency in July, 1941, appointed an intra-agency committee on long-range planning. This committee has begun the preparation of long term programs for the development of community services in the fields of education and youth welfare, health, nutrition, recreation, and public welfare. Much of the work in the preparation of these plans is done within constituent organizations of the Federal Security Agency and then cleared through the Agency.

A subcommittee within the Department of Agriculture is concerned with the adequate provision of welfare services to the rural population. Methods for raising the general standard of living of farm people are under consideration, as well as programs for providing adequate nutrition, education, and medical care.

Participation in planning by various governments: In the development of postwar programs, the wide range of participation is sought. There is need for plans and action programs not only on the national level, but also by States, communities, private citizens, local enterprises and professional groups. Each area can look ahead to participation in the national post-defense effort previously outlined; new housing, power and rural electrification, expanded highway, railroad and airport facilities, reclamation and conservation projects, new industries, adequate educational, health, welfare, nutritional, recreation and cultural facilities and services. What postwar developments each area can undertake will depend on its needs and the ingenuity and foresight with which it places the use of its resources to provide for them. For my part, I look forward to notable developments in many sections of the United States, hitherto relatively underdeveloped. We have just begun the optimum use of many of our potential resources.

For many years the State Planning Boards and numerous city and county planning agencies have inventoried the resources of their areas and studied the problems involved in their more effective use to increasing living standards and provide full employment. A vast amount of research has also been done for specific areas by other governmental agencies, Federal, state and local. Plans and action programs have been prepared by all these agencies. Correlation of available information and plans for the development of each part of the country with due regard to resources and manpower will produce a substantial back-log of postwar plans for up-building the Nation.

Each city and county can contribute to postwar reconstruction by starting now with the preparation of plans for the material development and service activities which are needed to make it a prosperous community. The National Resources Planning Board therefore urges the appointment of official planning agencies or groups, where these do not exist,

to undertake this task. Through regional and state planning agencies, and through the field offices of the Board, assistance can be had in relating local planning activities to state, regional and national programs. Special advice can be obtained from various Federal and state agencies concerned with technical problems. It is hoped that each local area will prepare plans for postwar developments, including: (1) reconstruction of blighted areas and new housing, (2) highways, airports, rail and bus terminal facilities, (3) industrial development, (4) conservation and improved use of land, and (5) health, educational and recreational facilities and services.

There are those who find in any policy of public work or publicly supplied services only a form of waste and spending. Sound planning is not spending but saving. Sound planning of natural resources conserves and develops them. Sound planning of human resources likewise conserves and develops human effort. Soil and oil, coal and timber, do not suffer from planning but from the lack of it. Attention given to education, to health, to recreation is not spending but investment in human resources. Full employment and continuing income are not forms of national waste which must be cut down, but forms of national saving of our basic resources.

An individual, a city or a nation is penny-wise and pound foolish, if it does not look to the conservation of assets, and the most prudent forms of their development. Of those who sincerely attempt to economize by eliminating all planning, we can merely say in scriptural language: "Forgive them, for they know not what they do."

In all of the feverish activities of our American governments—Federal, state and local, acting through their various branches, many new agencies, procedures and practices are necessarily developing. I may say in passing that only recently, in studying some of the early planning developments in our country, I came across an account of the first alphabetical agency—SUM. Alexander Hamilton was a strong advocate of the SUM—"Society for Useful Manufactures." This was an organization for the promotion of industry on a considerable scale and was actually incorporated in the State of New Jersey.

SUM led the way.

What agencies and instrumentalities will be best adapted to the emerging need of the postwar period is a problem of basic importance and one which we must begin to consider now. The NRPB has already instituted such an inquiry, even while the instrumentalities and controls are being set up—after all, the best time is it not? Analyses of these tendencies and suggestions for the most useful organization of postwar activities will be prepared and presented from time to time as a basis for discussion and action.

Great concentrations of authority have been made and at the same time, great experiments in decentralization are going on, such as the

local draft, the local rationing plans, the local air-raid protection agencies. Much is to be learned from observation and reflection upon these actions, that will be useful for the purposes of postwar planning.

Plans in the International Scene: From this point on the American people will never again make the mistake of believing that we can have prosperity while the rest of the world collapses; or peace while the rest of the world is at war; or freedom while the rest of the world is being enslaved. It is therefore assumed that after the war our international policy will conform to our desires for peace and the elevation of human dignity everywhere.

The Department of State, the Bureau of Economic Warfare, the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, are agencies primarily concerned with the international postwar economic collaboration. These groups are at work collecting and analyzing data on postwar international conditions and relations, and forecasting alternative plans for appropriate action. Other peoples are at work on postwar plans, and the International Labor Office has set up a special division on this subject under the direction of Dr. Lindsay Rogers.

The broad range of discussion on postwar plans in England growing out of many months of war experience has been admirably summarized by Dr. Luther Gulick who was sent to England last summer for that purpose. New material is constantly appearing such as the program of the Labor Party under discussion at this very time, also the Conservative and Unionist Party Organization and the Liberal, Industrial and Social Reconstruction Committee; the Archbishop of York's "Social Justice and Economic Reconstruction." Another document of interest is Richard Acland's "What Will it be Like?"

The new journal, *Agenda*, provides a quarterly review of planning developments which I commend to your consideration. It is to be expected and to be hoped that within a short time there will appear in this country many plans and projects for the postwar period. *Planning* (PEP) also contains significant material on postwar efforts.

Private Enterprise and Planning: Postwar planning is by no means the task of governments alone, but also the opportunity and the responsibility of private enterprise. How to shift from the war expenditure of some 56 billions to a peace economy without upsetting the apple-cart is a job that will require the joint coöperative efforts of industry and government, of labor and of agriculture.

The NRPB has undertaken to stimulate interest and activity in postwar planning by agencies and individuals outside as well as inside the governmental circle, beginning a year ago. Mr. George Galloway in his recent publication on Postwar Planning in the U. S. issued by the Twentieth Century Foundation gives an impressive list of postwar planning efforts, and this list is constantly being enlarged.

Many business leaders have been active in this field, notably Mr.

Charles E. Wilson of the General Electric. Mr. Prince's discussion upon this subject has had wide circulation throughout the country. The National Planning Association is now devoting special attention to the business aspects of the postwar problem and an elaborate program of inquiry and action has been set up.

The Department of Commerce has organized a special committee for the consideration especially of the business aspects of the problem of conversion, and important results may be expected from this undertaking.

The groups of organized labor are showing deep interest in what is coming after the war and the status of the vast army of industrial workers in the coming period of reorganization and readjustment. The same is true of the farmers. The activities of the Department of Agriculture and of Labor in this area have already been noted.

It cannot be too strongly stated, or too often, that government alone can no more win the peace than it can win the war alone. The shifting of the national income from one-half war expenditure or even more; the shifting of millions of war workers, the conversion of many industries; the shifts of capital; the re-orientation of many communities from a war to a peace basis—these vast undertakings require the fullest coöperation, the broadest good will, the keenest intelligence and the soundest judgment of the Nation. Without this, colossal mistakes may be made which will offset many of the gains of the war. War will bring us freedom from brutal aggression—and peace should bring not only the cessation of war but the inauguration of an era of prosperity—containing gains in national production and continual and corresponding gains in the standard of living and in the satisfaction of the higher values of human life.

We may look forward to broad zones of industrial development in the postwar period, once our attention and energies are fully applied to our overlooked opportunities for broader productivity. The present war crisis is releasing unexpected possibilities in the form of new uses of natural resources and in new types of inventiveness and skills. No such impressive demonstration of the American industrial potential has ever been made—a revelation in which human skills and natural resources are happily blended. Wisely utilized in the postwar period, these new developments, typical of American industrial genius, will be of incalculable and lasting value.

Democracy can plan. I am not unaware that there are those who maintain that however valuable planning may be, democracies are constitutionally incapable of planning anything important. That only autocrats and despots can plan is a "lie that has become a legend." The truth is at the opposite extreme. Democracies can plan most successfully for the interest of the commonwealth. The best plans are not made by command and executed with the lash. The basis of planning

is not violence but reason, and the condition of most successful operation is not force but persuasion—coöperation—common participation in an effort for a common goal. The more complex the operations of society, the more difficult does it become to direct men by threats, blows, prisons and death. Both modern technology and modern knowledge of organization look with contempt on the whip and the firing squad as accelerators of production.

That a democracy cannot see well, cannot learn well, cannot plan or execute anything well is only one of these ancient survivals which label the man who utters them as either ignorant or unfriendly to the democratic system itself. The truth is that a coöperative society in which the consent of the governed is the ruling principle and practice is able to plan more successfully than any competing political form.

There are those who contend that we should not plan now, but should wait until the end of the war and then begin to plan. To wait until the war is over will be to wait until it is too late. When the war ends, *56 billions* of war expenditures must be diverted into peace channels; when the war ends, *30 million* war workers must be brought back again to tasks of peace. Great industries must be reorganized and reconverted. Many communities with war industries must be reorganized. Vast dislocations of men, materials, capital, must be resettled.

Of course the claims of men and materials for victory should and must have priority, but there is still room and need for careful preconsideration of the problems that are certain to come with peace, before the armistice brings that battling to a close. Labor, business, agriculture, instinctively recognize this as true and begin to make their preparations. All countries in the world recognize this and are making their various kinds of plans for the after-the-war period.

Postwar preparation is not Utopian planning. The real Utopians are those who refuse to recognize the necessity of taking thought in advance, who foolishly believe that somehow the 30 million workers will automatically fit into some perfect pattern of employment, in some great miracle of performance. This is a free country where men may think as they like and express views, but as for me, I prefer to take thought in advance of the hour when trouble will descend upon us.

Alas, how true it is that nations have been ready to prepare a little at least for war, but not to prepare for peace; and hence have often lost the gains of war in the aftermath of peace! Others may say: "How can you know, in view of the uncertainty of world affairs, about the time and terms of peace—how can you know what to plan for?" The answer given by any general staff in time of war or peace must be that we plan for a variety of contingencies and hope to be ready to meet whatever comes. We do not know when the war will end or where the treaty of peace will be signed, or what its terms will be. We do know, however, many of the conditions we must face, no matter what the out-

come of the struggle or when. We know that the national income must be drawn back again into the channels of peace—in terms of military and civilian demobilization, in terms of industrial conversion—in terms of very extensive reorganization of industries and areas and interests of many kinds. This cannot be scoffed away. We know that it is possible to maintain a national income of around 100 billions, and to establish standards of living in accordance with this national level of productivity. We know that the propositions set forth in our bill of rights and more specifically in the five objectives can be made first charges on the national income in times of peace and can be achieved within the limits of our national income and within a free society.

The state of the world at large is difficult to prognosticate, I admit, but we count upon a jural order of the world from which the shadow of aggression will be removed. We reckon that the United Nations and others may live in peace with each other for an indefinite period.

But in any case it is unlikely that we shall continue to spend half of the national income—56 billions—for war purposes. Very important readjustments must certainly be made and preparations made in advance for the readjustment. This is "elementary, Watson."

What We Are Fighting About: Let planners make no mistake about the nature of this titanic world-enveloping struggle. It is not merely a war of words, or of empires, but a fundamental battle over the ideals of civilization. The many and the few are again at grips, determining whether an aristocratic or a democratic, fraternal view of life shall prevail. Free government is at the bar and on the firing line.

Free society is flexible society. If it contains within itself the seeds of destruction, it also contains the renewing and reconstructing power of human intelligence, the human fraternal spirit. The regenerating democratic qualities are stronger in last analysis than the dark powers of fear, hate, cruelty, ignorance. Intelligence and idealism are not weak, but strong and expansive, creative in the real sense of the term.

On the program of democracy is the forward and upward look, the vision of what man might attain by human invention and adjustment in the modern world—the standards of living, the intellectual advantages, the sense of security, the cultural and spiritual gains, the flowering of personalities too often crushed down in the mad rush, the fraternal sense of participation in a world from which the many have been thrust out or forgotten on its outer fringes.

If all this seems revolutionary or even fantastic, we may reply that it may be revolutionary but it is not fabulous or fantastic. Within the framework of our resources, democratic ideals and institutions may be made to flower now. Before us lies, not some unrealistic Utopia, but a common-sense world of struggle in which human and material resources have been organized for the joint purpose of (1) maximum productivity and (2) fair diffusion of the resulting gains.

Planning the Best Use of Manpower

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THE whole is not the sum of its parts without planning. An airplane is designed to weigh 50,000 pounds. That is the upper limit. The parts are designed and made and the sum of the parts is 65,000 pounds. Weight control engineering must be applied.

The manpower problem is like that today. When the wants of Army, Navy, Government, institutions, war production, agriculture, and civil production are added, the total exceeds the supply. Manpower control must be exercised to meet the situation. This is troubling the Nation and is behind the appointment of the War Manpower Commission and the personnel supply boards of Army, Navy, and War Production. They are all busy with the questions: How many men do we need? How must they be trained? Where will we get them? How many will we get?

Of course, we are all familiar with the corresponding problem in war production, and the fact that you can have ultimately only as many tanks or airplanes as you produce. Likewise, you can have only as many men as you can train—and there are many bottlenecks you can't break. Men available in small communities may not be able to meet a shortage in urban or suburban war plants, for example.

Appointment of manpower bodies shows that we have reached the bottleneck stage. This indicates real progress. Until bottlenecks are encountered, programs are certainly inadequate. The bottleneck is a symptom of achievement. Removal of one bottleneck gives increased capacity and uncovers the next one.

As an engineer I like to break a problem into parts in order to look at it. To help understand the manpower problem, I suggest a chart or schedule with five columns. They are:

1. Dates.
2. The manpower we have.
3. What we use these people for.
4. The manpower we need and what for.
5. Bottlenecks and solutions.

Of course, it is easy to criticize this approach. It assumes that you know or can estimate the numbers to fill it out. In some items this is not so. In defense, it may be said that an enlightened guess represents real knowledge. Without such guesses, made every day, no business would succeed. Another weakness is the failure to show psychological factors; for example, the reluctance of many industrial employers to use woman employees for jobs formerly done by men. To such criticisms, I reply that supplementary charts can take account of such problems and that much valuable general thinking can be done with only a

primary chart. Its very simplicity permits concentration on the main problem. Detail can be added as rapidly as needed.

Column 1 of the chart is the time control. Present needs and uses of manpower change in three months, six months, or a year to new needs and rises. The need at a given date is only a single frame of the motion picture representing the continual development. It is sufficient to put down a few critical dates.

In Column 2, list the manpower we have. From a total population of about 134,000,000 people, we have at present a national labor force of 54,000,000. In the combat age group of the population, 20–44, we have 25,500,000 men and 26,000,000 women. In the preferred combat age group, 20–30, we have 14,500,000 men. About 1,250,000 men and the same number of women reach age 18 each year just now. The number will be less in a few years.

In Column 3, note the uses made of our labor resources. Armed forces (now), 2,000,000 or 3,000,000; war industries (now), 6,000,000 or 7,000,000; agriculture, 9,000,000; civilian industries, 27,000,000; self-employed, 6,000,000; unemployed, 3,500,000. A special group of interest is the 11,000,000 or 12,000,000 women at work, of whom 25 or 30 per cent are married. Also, the number in manufacturing industries was about 9,000,000 in 1940. American genius continually reduces this number for a given output of goods. The rate is 2 per cent to 3 per cent per year and is accelerated in depression times. This ability to increase output per worker is vital to victory. One major defense industry has cut the number of man-hours per unit produced by 50 per cent in sixteen or eighteen months. Of course it is still going down.

In Column 4, we list the estimated needs. This is where the sum of the parts is greater than the whole. Arguments can be made for increasing every use listed in Column 3. Obviously, the armed forces will increase rapidly. They have the right-of-way. But war production must provide for them and in part for the armies of the Allied Nations. The numbers in war industries must increase by perhaps 8,000,000 or 10,000,000 in 1942. Women employees must increase at a greater rate than men. Several workers at home are necessary for one man at the front. The ratio must be kept small by maximum production per worker —lots of machinery and highly planned operations.

Numerous governmental activities are suffering through loss of trained men. Cities are losing firemen and policemen through selective service and otherwise. Their needs have actually increased for such help. Civilian needs generally will be difficult to meet. Consumer goods will be made of substitutes in rising proportions, now that metals, rubber, and many raw materials are not available. For at least 90 per cent of the population maintenance of civilization at a tolerable level is the assignment. Labor needs may actually rise with falling standards of living. Several million people who have been not "gainfully" employed

must go to work. In some areas, inability to house workers while industry increases its labor rolls may require partial drafting of the local housewives for war and other essential jobs.

In Column 5, we have bottlenecks and solutions. For example, we note that England, with one-third of our population, has 5,000,000 women in war production. This gives an indication of what a highly developed program can achieve. In the professions, there are critical conditions for physicians, dentists, physicists, engineers, etc. The annual increment to the national force of about 300,000 engineers is 15,000. The need for war industry alone in 1942 has been reported as 80,000 or more.

Adjusting supply to needs of professional men calls for use at maximum technical level of every professional man and assignment of simpler duties, customarily performed by him, to subordinates with much less training. In peacetimes, the young engineer works several years after graduation on break-in jobs at the apprentice level. This is too great a luxury for wartime. Spreading of professional level jobs is like spreading of war contracts, difficult to initiate but very effective when accomplished.

Finally, as one studies such a chart, and puts in the figures, he is impressed by the overwhelming mechanization of the war effort. Production, transport, and war operations are a succession of mechanical assemblies, producing and consuming mineral, chemical, electrical, agricultural, and mechanical products. Every fighting unit exemplifies the principle of mass production; that is, maximum use of equipment with minimum of manpower. Five to ten men in a long-range heavy bomber now conduct an operation which was once too great for a regiment or a battleship. Without the men and materials to keep the machine going, the crew is just a few men. With maintenance and supply, it produces the effect of a thousand men.

Wisely used, our chart suggests general principles, each of which must be examined for flaws before adoption. Sub-charts showing distribution of need and supply geographically or by special training must be used by operating agencies. But I command the simple chart method to planners. It is a framework to which one may attach the figures that control the manpower plan. There is no more vital need than the master plan for manpower use of the Nation.

The Coming Crisis in Manpower—English Experience

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THE *New York Times* reported, the other day, that sound trucks were touring England exhorting women not yet in employment to make themselves available, if only for part-time jobs. So acute is the present labor shortage in Great Britain that it is no longer possible for the authorities to neglect the potential contributions of the old, the lame, or the domestically preoccupied. Not since the end of the last war has England had so few people on the unemployment register and never has she had so many in service, in industry and in the armed forces.

It is interesting to contrast the present state of affairs in Great Britain with that which prevailed on the first anniversary of the war. At that time the government was not straining to use all available manpower and many men and women, suffering from the dislocation of war, were unable to find employment and were drawing unemployment benefits.

There is no reason to assume that conditions in the United States will parallel the developments in Great Britain, but neither is there reason to believe that the forces which impinged upon the British war economy, and for that matter upon the German, will not develop in this country.

We have not yet been in the war for six months and the optimists tell us that the war will be over before the first year rolls by. We hope they are right, but we cannot plan in these terms. To do so, and to have our optimism prove false, would result in serious dereliction of duty.

The title of this paper—The Coming Crisis in Manpower—postulates therefore, that no matter how long the war lasts we must plan to use all of our resources, human and material, and use them efficiently, if the struggle is to be brought to a successful conclusion. In making this all-out effort, there is no doubt that we will run into increasing difficulties because of shortages in the quantity and quality of manpower. I use the term manpower, generically; women are of course included. Moreover, our ability to surmount these difficulties will depend upon the steps which we take to plan efficiently the current and potential use of our human resources.

Efficient use of manpower for the war effort can best be discussed under three heads:

1. The allocation of the available supply among the competing users —the Army, the Navy, war industry, and civilian activities. That is one part of the allocation problem. But there is another, that which relates to the best matching of men and jobs in each sector.

2. Increasing the available supply.

3. Improving the quality of the supply through training, so that people can do their jobs more efficiently once they are assigned.

What steps is the United States taking at the present moment to insure that its man and woman power is being efficiently allocated; what is being done to increase the supply of available workers; and what are the ramifications of the training program which seeks to improve the quality of the supply? In discussing these three issues, I plan to draw on the English experience, not so much to suggest that we ought to follow the British in any and every particular, but rather to underline the various problems which the British faced as the war progressed, and to review the steps which they took to alleviate their difficulties. Progress by analogy is fraught with danger, but progress in the dark is even worse.

As regards allocation! The Army is obtaining its manpower through Selective Service System and to some small degree through volunteering. The Navy, benefiting from the coercive powers of the draft, continues to rely on volunteers. War industry and the civilian branches keep what the Army and the Navy do not want. In crucial instances they are aided in retaining certain highly trained persons by the directives which advise local boards not to induct men who are essential to the war effort.

Clearly, we are not yet viewing our manpower as an entity and therefore are failing to allocate men of different skills to the armed services, war industry, and civilian activities according to the urgency of need.

This is well illustrated by the experiences of a large industrial corporation actively engaged in war work. This firm had many chemists and skilled technicians in its employ, a large number of whom were in the draft ages. Except in one situation the requests of the firm for the deferment of these essential men were readily acquiesced to by the Selective Service Boards. Unfortunately a very large number of essential men were registered with the one local board that failed to coöperate. What the official who told me the story forgot was that this board, by virtue of the heavy registration of skilled men in its district, had no option in filling its quota, but to dig down into the essential men. Until the Selective Service System is amended so that quotas are made more flexible, such dislocations will recur.

Other draft boards erred for less good reasons. Badly informed about local and national needs for specialized ability, they failed to grant occupational deferments except in the rarest instances.

Steps to remedy this situation were taken recently by Mr. McNutt when he laid plans for closer liaison between the Selective Service System and the Federal Employment Service. Hereafter, the Boards will have the benefit of guidance from the Employment Service about the present and potential trends in the labor market.

Cognizant of her experience during the first World War, England established, at the outset of present hostilities, a uniform system for obtaining the requisite manpower for the armed services and for war industry. The entire job was placed under the control of the Ministry of Labour and National Service. This Ministry publishes, from time to time, for the guidance of the Joint Recruiting Boards, a *Schedule of Reserved Occupations and Protected Work;* the revision of April, 1941 ran to 145 pages. This schedule contains a detailed occupational breakdown, and specifies the ages at which men of differing skills become available for induction into the armed services. In addition to a man's occupation and age, the question is now raised as to where he is working: an engineer in a munitions plant is reserved at a lower age than one working for a firm manufacturing cloth for export.

It is interesting that despite the English attempt to view the labor supply as an entity, and to plan its use accordingly, the military authorities apparently exercised a disproportionate influence on the decision-making during the early months of the war. This had the unfortunate result of taking skilled men into the armed services in such large numbers that certain groups had to be released later on to insure that essential production was not curtailed because of labor shortages. Coal miners are a case in point.

There is a second phase to this allocation problem—the correct matching of men and jobs, in whatever area the manpower is being used. It would be too much to expect the armed services to put every man in a post where he could make a maximum contribution, but that does not mean that the present system could not be substantially improved. I had occasion to complete, recently, a study of a thousand selectees. Although there were extenuating circumstances, the findings revealed that 35 per cent of the mechanical and electrical workers, 60 per cent of the construction workers, 33 per cent of the drivers, 25 per cent of the restaurant workers failed to receive assignments in the Army which enabled them to use their specific skills.

There is nothing gained, and much lost, when cooks have to be trained as truck drivers and truck drivers have to be trained as cooks. There is, of course, much that is admirable about the Army's ability to discover, train, and use the aptitudes, talents, and experiences of its men. There is reason to believe, however, that if more use were made of the objective data such as are contained in the new occupational questionnaire, assignments could be improved. For military reasons, men must, however, be assigned to specific companies, but to the extent that it were possible for the Army to view its manpower as a tool, reassignments would be facilitated. And these reassignments might lead to a heightened utilization of a man's specific training or aptitude.

So long as the leaders of the Army fail to reckon seriously with a prospective shortage in manpower, there is little likelihood that either

they, or their subordinates, will strain to make a maximum use of the manpower which the Army now has.

Nor must one forget the Navy which has always had a selective personnel policy. Many men fare admirably, but the Navy has nonetheless been spendthrift in its assignments. To illustrate: College boys who sign up in their freshmen year for V-1 in the Navy, and who fail to achieve satisfactory grades at the end of their sophomore year, are taken out of college and put into the Navy as apprentice seamen.

But it would surely be wrong to think that it is only in the armed services that the matching of men and jobs could be improved. There would be no great difficulty in culling hundreds of examples from all phases of civilian life in which men with specialized capacities are failing to make a maximum contribution to the war effort. And in many instances their work has nothing whatever to do with the winning of the war.

That faulty allocation can have serious consequences is easily demonstrated. The British, in reviewing their reverses in the Libyan campaign, discovered that their forces had been severely handicapped by a shortage of skilled repairmen. This shortage took place despite the fact that there were a sufficient number of men in the Army with the required skills. But these men had not been properly assigned. Under the chairmanship of Sir William Beveridge, the distinguished authority on labor, the British have established a Committee on Skilled Men, which is charged with the responsibility for allocating quotas among the several competing users, and for reviewing the efficiency with which each user puts its men to work.

This Committee, chaired by a civilian in order to withstand the pressure of the armed services, seeks to reduce the wasteful competition among the services and industry for the limited supply of trained personnel. Recently, the Army and the Navy were receiving only 60 per cent of their essential needs, because of the great shortages.

It is encouraging that first steps have recently been taken in this country to reduce competitive bidding by working out a quota system between the Army and the Navy in their recruitment of officer personnel among college students.

But even perfect allocation will never lead to a maximum utilization of human resources for the war. The supply must be increased, and this can be done by getting the unemployed back to work and bringing new people, especially women, into the labor market.

There is no doubt that this country still has a substantial number of unemployed persons—true, no two experts would agree as to the number—but there are several million, and many in this group will probably not return to employment unless special efforts are made to help them. One of the reasons why they are still unemployed is the fact that they live in regions which are not experiencing a major war boom. Special

steps will have to be taken to increase the occupational and geographic mobility of these persons.

England, even before the outbreak of war, had an integrated system of employment exchanges which had much experience in moving men from regions where there was little demand to regions where there was great demand. Aside from a recruitment and placement job, the British government contributed to the expenses of household removals, of train fares, of extra rent,—all for the purpose of speeding transferences. We have far to go along these lines, for we begin with so little, but we had better start if we are serious about making a maximum effort.

An even larger labor reserve than the unemployed is represented by women not currently in the labor market. There is good reason for believing that we are moving much too slowly in the matter of woman power. The registration of women has been postponed until some indefinite date and there are other straws in the wind which suggest that the importance of this large reserve is not yet fully appreciated.

This parallels all too closely the experience of the British during the early months of the war, when they likewise made no special efforts to utilize their woman power to the full. However, when the strain on their labor resources became acute, their attitude changed radically.

The British organized large women auxiliaries for the armed services. The A.T.S., the Auxiliary Territorial Service; the W.R.N.S., the Women's Royal Naval Service; the W.A.A.F., the Women's Auxiliary Air Force have recruited many tens of thousands—by now probably hundreds of thousands—of women between the ages of 18 and 50 to serve in the auxiliary branches of the armed services. It was found, once the trial was made, that women were competent to work as telephonists, drivers, range finders, signallers, plotters, repair hands—sometimes even more competent than men. Within a short time now, the Royal Navy hopes to staff its entire shore force with women.

Then there are at least fourteen other women's organizations actively involved in war work, either on a voluntary or paid basis. Aside from the Women's Voluntary Services, with a membership of about 1,000,000, note should be taken of the Women's Land Army, the Mechanized Transport Service, the Civil Nursing Reserve.

Most important, perhaps, are the vastly increased numbers of women in the British war industry. Until the pressure became very great, employers were convinced that there were all sorts of jobs for which women were unsuited, but when these theories were put to the test, they were found wanting. Aside from a few jobs which demanded great physical strength, there were practically no operations which women were unable to master. A recent analysis by the Federal Employment Service suggests that women can fill about 80 per cent of all posts in American industry.

More than any other war, this is a war of the specialist, and that

implies a concern with the quality of the labor supply as well as with its quantity. We have had a large industrial training program under way for some time now, and there is reason to believe that it is accomplishing its objective of training large numbers of persons for rather simple machine operations.

The acute shortages, however, are in the higher levels—in the tool-makers, the foremen, the subprofessional groups, and in many of the professions. The problem of increasing the numbers of trained people in these areas is much more difficult, especially if one conceives the job as training from the bottom up. But that is hardly necessary. Intensive training can do much to heighten the applicability of a person's specialized skills to war work: A pretty good tool-maker can become a good one under intensive instruction; certain skilled workers can be turned into foremen; and foremen can be trained to take over minor managerial responsibility.

In the higher realms—such as physics—one must fan out from the field in which the shortage is most acute, and find individuals who have had some of the basic training of physicists. There is a shortage of economists but it would not be too difficult to turn some historians and political scientists into economists. There is the further problem of insuring that the basic sources of supply remain adequate, which means that students must be encouraged to continue with their schooling if they have special aptitudes or capacities.

In peacetime, the best of our high school seniors fail to go on to college for economic reasons. Only one in four of our best students continues with his studies. President Conant, of Harvard, has been crying in the wilderness these last months, for a large-scale subsidized program to enable the best of our high school seniors to go on to college, and thereby contribute not only to the war effort, but to the long-run improvement of our democracy.

The British, who entered the war with a noticeably more undemocratic educational system than ours, took steps to subsidize the education of able pupils. They also expanded their training facilities for the upgrading of skilled laborers, and are catering to the vocational aptitudes of the young men and women who are first entering the labor market. The number of Governmental Training Centers has been noticeably increased and many Emergency Training Establishments have been organized. The courses vary from two to six months; most of the students are non-local; they receive graduated pay increases as they pass periodic examinations which attest to their increasing competence.

Special attention should be called to the fact that this country has one very important trained labor reserve which is being sadly neglected. I refer, of course, to the very large number of college-trained women. Recent estimates which I have prepared show that there are 350,000 women between the ages of 22 and 45 who specialized in subjects in

which there are at present acute shortages, and that there are another 100,000 who specialized in fields closely allied to fields in which shortages now exist.

Large numbers of these women are not now in employment, or are employed in work which has little or no relation to the war. With educational facilities available, refresher courses should be started. It is seldom realized that the number of women in this country receiving higher degrees in any one year exceeds the total number of university students in Germany.

In this outline, I have only touched a few of the salient points connected with improving the allocation, increasing the supply, and raising the quality of the human resources—steps which must be taken if this country is to make an all-out war effort. In planning the use of natural resources one need not concern oneself with the reaction of the resources to the plan. Not so in the planning of human resources. In dealing with people, the problem of motivation is always crucial.

War means coercion. Coercion for its own sake is meaningless, in fact worse than meaningless, but when and where it is needed, it ought to be applied. During the early stages of the war, the English were very much frightened about using a system of assignment in allocating labor. They relied on volunteering, but volunteering just did not work speedily and efficiently. When the authorities reluctantly went over to a system of assignment, they were amazed to find that the public did not fuss and fume but coöperated whole-heartedly. Today young women are not only conscripted for work, but are forced to leave certain types of employment, such as retailing, in order to accept jobs more closely allied to the war effort. It behooves our own officialdom not to be too timid.

Volunteering presents an interesting dilemma. There is no doubt that there are certain tasks, both in peace and in war, that are performed best by men who want to do them. There are very good reasons why the armed services insist that they be permitted to rely on volunteers, especially when seeking personnel for particularly hazardous undertakings. But volunteering can be foolish, and there is no reason why it should not be interfered with when it leads to waste. The English have in fact taken steps to stop wasteful volunteering. For a trained physicist to leave his laboratory and become a field officer, simply because he wants the smoke of battle in his nostrils, is wasteful and should be prevented. We have had more than our fair share of this type of volunteering. It is not easy to stop, but every effort should be made to impress the community, and thereby its menfolk, that patriotism in this war is not solely a question of a uniform.

Money has less meaning in war than in peace, but it still has considerable importance. The British learned that higher wages and bonuses were potent factors in accelerating the recruitment, and in facilitating

the allocation of workers to tasks that would otherwise not have appealed to them. Mobile demolition squads and stevedores are illustrations. There is little reason to fear that we would overlook the power of money. But we have, until very recently, been party to a fantastic scheme, one in which monetary rewards were inversely related to the dangers and the difficulties of the job. I refer, of course, to the very large differential which existed, and which still exists, between the pay of the men in the Army and those in the factories.

In peacetime, many people of talent and capacity are unable to secure adequate training. These people simply do not have the wherewithal to obtain an education and to improve themselves. The blistering depression of the thirties emphasized what happened to the untrained and its moral has not been forgotten. But in wartime one has in opportunities for training, a very powerful weapon in directing the labor force. Many of the underprivileged will strain not to let this opportunity pass, if only it is offered them.

Nothing is worse in peace, but even more so in war, than isolation—non-participation in what the group is engaged upon. We have surely underestimated the desire of all people to participate, and to participate actively. When all is said and done, neither coercion nor volunteering, neither higher wages nor the opportunities for special training have potentialities for moving people such as are inherent in people's own desire to be moved.

War is costly and wasteful in the extreme, but it need not be all waste. The problem of manpower is a case in point. For 150 years and more, industrial capitalism has striven to become more efficient and it has largely succeeded in its efforts. But during this period, both men of affairs and men of thought have devoted their attention almost exclusively to improving the use of natural resources. It took a holocaust such as the present war to remind us, of what we always knew if only we had taken time to remember, that the most important of all natural resources are human beings. Let us hope that we will not forget this costly lesson when peace comes.

Manpower Problems in the Civilian Public Service

SUMMARY OF REMARKS

JAMES M. MITCHELL, Director of the Civil Service Assembly of the United States and Canada

MAINTENANCE of the essential services of government at all levels is vital to the success of the war effort. To maintain these services at a high level is becoming increasingly difficult as the limited supply of professional, scientific, and skilled persons is drawn upon by the armed services and by expanding war industry. The manpower problems faced by all levels of government are similar in most respects,

with this distinction: The Federal service is concerned primarily with expanding its personnel, whereas the States and cities are concerned with maintaining existing staffs in the face of encroachments from several quarters.

In an effort to maintain their services on as high a level as possible, state and local governments have taken a number of positive steps. There have been general increases in salaries in some jurisdictions through bonuses or flat percentage increases; in others, increases have come after a comprehensive revision of the basic pay plan. An increasing number of women are being employed in positions formerly held by men. Positive recruiting, the actual seeking out of applicants, is a general policy for many positions. In a few jurisdictions, longer hours of work per day and per week have been instituted. In state and local governments having formal personnel systems, examinations are being held more frequently, and open continuous eligible registers have been established for many positions; a census of the skills possessed by all employees has been taken by several municipal personnel agencies; residence requirements are being waived for many positions; and a great many jurisdictions have initiated formal training programs for new employees and for the upgrading of present employees.

The problems faced by the Federal government are similar to those faced by the state and local governments, with one noteworthy exception. It is expected that the over-all number of employees and the services rendered by States, counties, and cities will not change materially during the war. Some few functions, such as public health and fire protection, may expand somewhat, but they will probably be offset by the scaling down and suspension of other functions. However, the services performed by the Federal government, and consequently the number of employees, will greatly increase during wartime. A few figures will show the tremendous expansion now taking place at the Federal level. In 1940, approximately 100,000 additional persons were employed by the Federal government. In 1941, the total number of new employees for the year was over 500,000. In 1942, the increase has been still more rapid, with approximately 150,000 new employees coming into the Federal service *each month*.

Numerous steps have been taken by the United States Civil Service Commission, the central personnel agency of the Federal government, to meet this unprecedented expansion. Many of the steps are those already mentioned as having been taken by the state and local governments. An increasing number of women are being employed, a census of skills of present employees has been taken, and positive recruiting is now one of the major activities of the Commission. Open continuous registers have been established for many types of work, and in cases where the demand for qualified persons exceeds the supply, examinations are being given on a "pass-or-fail" basis. The National Roster

of Scientific and Specialized Personnel now has on file over 500,000 names of specialists in a wide variety of occupations, and more are coming in daily. The lists of eligibles established as the result of examinations held by state and local personnel agencies have been used by the United States Civil Service Commission in filling Federal positions. A priorities plan, to facilitate the transfer of Federal employees to agencies directly concerned with the war effort, classifies all Federal agencies in five groups in descending order of importance to the war effort. Employees may be transferred up this priorities ladder without the approval of the releasing agency. Additional steps to adjust the Federal personnel program to wartime conditions are being taken as they are needed.

All of the steps that have been taken, and all of the changes in methods and procedures which have been made, however, are *relatively* minor adjustments. Additional major changes in the approach to the manpower problem in the civilian public service must be made if the most effective utilization of our national manpower is to be assured. The recently established War Manpower Commission will recognize, I am sure, that the civilian public services must be maintained, as our war industries and our armed services expand, if the home front is to be held.

Reporter's Summary

E. JOHNSTON COIL, Director, National Planning Association, Washington, D. C.

MR. B. M. WOODS spoke on the engineer's approach to the problem of manpower mobilization. Taking as the theme the mathematical maxim that "the sum of the parts can not be greater than the whole," Dr. Woods pointed out that the manpower requirements for war production, plus military demands, plus civilian production and service add to a total which is greater than the available manpower. In other words, as regards manpower we have come to a bottleneck—a bottleneck which is challenging evidence that we in this country are not yet doing the total job required of us.

Dr. Woods, by citing illustrations from the aviation industry, showed that bottlenecks can be considered as a healthy sign, provided we take the steps to analyze the reasons for their appearance and to devise the ways of removing them.

The first step must be that of preparing a control chart. In this instance a control chart would have four columns: the first indicating a date; second, the manpower we have as of that date; third, what we are doing with the manpower we have; and fourth, what we wish to do. The task of filling in these columns is one of the hardest jobs in the world.

"It is a commonplace saying," stated Dr. Woods, "that it requires 17 men at work for the man behind the gun." Clearly there cannot be that many people for an army of 6 million men, as this would indicate 102

million people at work, which is in excess of our total adult population. Citing the field of engineering, Dr. Woods stated that estimates indicate that 80 thousand engineers will be needed this year, whereas the output normally is 14 thousand. We must, therefore, attempt to supply this demand by rapid training and by moving people into new activities.

Another approach to the solution of the manpower deficiencies is that of getting more production per man per day. We have already cut by one half the number of man-hours required to build an airplane, and every such improvement in productivity increases the usefulness of our existing labor force. On the average we gained during the 1920's about 3 per cent per year in output per man per day. During the 1930's we accelerated this a bit and the tempo is stepping up tremendously at present. The extent to which we can make one man do the job of two can be clearly grasped when we consider the transformation that is happening on the firing line. Today one long-range bomber, with a crew of seven, can possibly do as much destructive work as a regiment fifty years ago.

Mr. James M. Mitchell spoke on the manpower problem in civilian public service. While not as obvious as the manpower problem in industry, there is a major difficulty in finding personnel for local, state, and Federal governments. In state and local governments we are faced, stated Mr. Mitchell, with a real crisis in hiring and maintaining competent staffs. Employees in these arms of government are tending to move to Federal jobs, and there is likewise a tremendous loss to war industry and to the armed forces. In view of the general higher levels of Federal pay there is a necessity for increased salaries in the state and local governments in order to maintain their staffs.

Such governments are also engaged in positive recruitment and in the making of every effort to obtain qualified people. In many areas a continuous registering of applicants is maintained. The employment of women is now on a very much greater scale than ever before, and such employment will increase tremendously. The Chicago park district now has women guards and women to patrol school crossings, and transit companies are beginning to use women conductors and even drivers. The Federal Government is not only seeking out applicants employing women but is taking a national census of specialized personnel. The Civil Service Commission has adjusted its procedure to facilitate employment and transfers. In such a tremendous expansion at all levels of government, it is inevitable that there be a lowering of standards, but such lowerings should be controlled if possible in service training programs, and there should be upgrading as rapidly as training permits.

Dr. Eli Ginzberg of Columbia University brought to bear on the problem his recent experience in studying the mobilization of manpower for the war effort in Great Britain. He pointed out that there are three immediate aspects to the problem. The first is that of allocation of

supplies among competing employers, the second is the increase of the supplies, and the third is the increase of the quality so that more people could do a maximum job.

The United States at present is not handling its allocation of the labor supply efficiently. The Army is obtaining its manpower through the Selective Service System, but the system is not coördinated with industry's needs. The Navy is continuing to obtain its manpower through volunteering. Industry gets what the Army and Navy do not want. Thus we are not conserving of our manpower as a pool of resources from which people would be assigned in terms of their specialized capacity, with the function of the job determining who does what.

Dr. Ginzberg pointed out that some steps are being taken to remedy this situation by putting labor market information at the disposal of the local selective services.

Through failure to use persons according to their specialized training, the British and we have both suffered. In a recent sample study in this country it was found that 35 per cent of the mechanics and electrical workers and 33 per cent of truck drivers were not receiving assignments in the Army which enabled them to use their specific skills. In order to increase the over-all supply, Dr. Ginzberg pointed out that it would be necessary to bring unemployed or under-employed persons from certain regions of the country to those areas in greatest need of labor. In order to assist people to make such a move, it will probably be necessary to provide for some of the costs of transfer.

It was Dr. Ginzberg's opinion that we are not moving fast enough in this country as regards mobilizing our womanpower. The registration of women has been postponed and there seem to be some who do not take seriously the need for such registration. The English now have over one hundred thousand women actively in the armed forces, and even the British navy, with its strong traditions, is placing women in shore coasts. It is the British experience that 80 per cent of all tasks in industry can be handled well by women.

We are, in particular, failing to utilize the large American supply of college-trained women. We have half a million women between the ages of 22 and 45 who have specialized in college in subjects where shortages are now acute. Little effort has been made to tap this group, or to take the large number of high school students and by paying their costs of education give them advanced college training. Dr. Ginzberg estimated we are losing 75 per cent of our best potential manpower because they cannot afford to continue their training.

We must recognize that war means coercion. It should be applied in industry and wherever else it is necessary. The English were very frightened to use coercion during the early stages of the war. They relied on volunteering, which did not work, and were amazed to find the public did not object but coöperated when coercion was applied. Government

should be less timid in grappling with the manpower mobilization problem and should recognize that while rate of pay is an important motivating factor, it is secondary in time of war.

The fourth and last speaker was Mr. Louis Levine of the United States Employment Service. Mr. Levine indicated that our manpower problem is particularly acute at this time because for ten years we have been in a state of depression, with little attention being given by industry or the government to the training of skilled labor. As this is not a war of professional soldiers, but a total and mechanized war, it demands a high proportion of skilled labor. It is a war of vast transportation, communication and supply problems, and much of what we did in the last war will not suffice now.

The basic difficulty of the Selective Service program is that it is founded entirely on the experience of the last war and is not geared to the needs and requirements of a total mechanized war.

Mr. Levine referred to the statements of the previous speakers as regards the use of women in industry and agreed that they can be employed in almost every occupation except those requiring heavy manual labor. This does not mean, however, that all American women between the ages of 20 and 45 can easily enter the labor market.

It is important for the operation of the country as a whole that household activities be carried forward, and we do not have the community facilities for taking care of the children of women who might wish to work. It is, therefore, important to distinguish between population and workers. We have enough human beings to produce what is required; we do not have enough trained labor supply.

Most of our labor supply problems today reflect our failure to plan, and our neglect of our human resources during the past decade. We went haltingly about the task of converting from civilian to war production, and we are even more hesitant in going about the task of converting our labor supply. In some cases, it has been found that one company is hiring workers away from other companies which make parts, for itself. Other concerns are hoarding labor by keeping skilled workers at unskilled labor tasks in the hope that they will be needed in the future. The situation has even reached the state where one employer was found to be hiring his own workers for different jobs at higher rates of pay. According to some recent questionnaires the majority of employers are still prejudiced against hiring women and have race discriminations.

Mr. Levine stressed the fact that as regards coercion, he hoped that labor market controls would come by way of legislation in accordance with the traditional democratic process. It is important, however, that there be greater understanding on the part of both labor and management—which in total war means the public—as to the labor market. It will only be through the joint understanding of management and labor, under the leadership of government, that the problem can be met.

National Parks in Wartime—A Review of the Year

NEWTON B. DRURY, Director, National Park Service

WAR has altered the immediate work of the National Park Service. Construction programs have ended, personnel has been reduced, and the services extended to the public have been curtailed. On the other hand, primary functions as trustee for many of the great things of America have not been changed. Actually, under the stress of war, the custodial responsibility of the National Park Service has been given new meaning. The primitive wilderness characteristics which give the scenic national parks their real significance are being given new appraisal and increased protection, and the historical and archeological areas of the National Park System are receiving added study and care.

The wartime program of custodial work recognizes that these areas cannot be closed and left to themselves for the duration. Heavy investments have been made in physical developments in the National Parks and Monuments. These Federal investments will be protected; maintenance programs must continue whether or not the facilities find heavy public use. Even more important is the duty of preserving the natural and historic park values of such fundamental importance in the American scene. These values are fragile things. Major problems in physical, geological, biological and historical sciences are encountered and solved in the process of preserving them. The knowledge and experience of administrators, technicians and specialists are correlated and brought to bear upon the varied questions that must be answered. Many of these problems press themselves upon the administrator whether or not visitors are in the National Parks and Monuments. They are with us in war as in peace.

We face the necessity of protecting the natural and historical values of the National Parks and Monuments from impairment that may be brought about by enthusiastic promoters of wartime use of the areas and their resources. Timber, minerals, forage and water may be demanded as contributions to the Nation's production program. Most of the demands come from well-meaning citizens; others may be the culmination of planned raids. All must be studied and appraised. Requests for use of park and monument areas for military camps, maneuver grounds, bombing ranges, training areas or defense installations have been weighed in the light of national need. When it has been demonstrated that contributions in certain park areas should be made to the victory program it continues to be necessary to give technical supervision or administrative direction to the emergency activities.

These new and increased responsibilities have come to the National Park Service as a result of the war. Because its trusteeship in administering the national parks, national monuments, and national historic sites involves vigilance in preserving values and characteristics which have made those areas of Nationwide significance, the Service, shortly after the declaration of war, made an intensive study and re-evaluation of its objectives, as a foundation upon which to build a logical program of wartime protection and cooperation in the military program. The result was a re-affirmation of the policy that the first principle of national park administration is to insure preservation of rare and irreplaceable areas and objects, in line with fundamental law and policies. These areas are an important segment of the national wealth which, were it dissipated at this time, would have no appreciable effect upon the outcome of the conflict now raging, but their loss would have a material and adverse effect upon the national life of the future.

The National Park Service took this position with full realization of the fact that it must and will contribute to the winning of the war in every practicable way, and must make whatever sacrifice necessity demands. Any compromise affecting intrinsic park values, however, must be justified on the ground of critical necessity, with no alternative available.

The Service is contributing in many ways to the war program while holding firm to its protective policies. For instance, several hundred permits have been issued to the War and Navy Departments for the use of Service lands, buildings, and facilities. Frequently the Service has been able to suggest, and aid in carrying out, alternative programs outside of park boundaries. The War and Navy Departments and other war agencies have recognized the soundness of the policies to which the National Park Service is adhering and have coöperated fully in studies of alternative locations for certain uses detrimental to park values.

Permits for military purposes range from the installation of direction finders along the coastal areas to the complete assignment, for the period of the war, of Cabrillo National Monument, California, and Fort Pulaski National Monument, Georgia. Rest camps for members of the armed forces have been provided and areas made available for overnight bivouacking and for Army maneuvers, drills, and studies. Equipment has been turned over to the armed services, such as boats, tractors, and other heavy machinery. In many small towns and isolated areas, Service buildings have been used as headquarters by the Selective Service System, Office of Civilian Defense, Aircraft Warning Service, rationing boards, and other public organizations. Assistance also has been given in strategic areas outside of national park boundaries, in such important activities as the locating and camouflaging of gun emplacements. Special surveys have been made for the War Production

Board and other agencies as requested and as available personnel permitted.

Possibilities of use of park areas and facilities for the rehabilitation of those returned from the war zones and for other convalescent care of members of the armed forces now are under discussion of Service officials, the operators of park accommodations, and representatives of the Army and Navy. Other military uses may be worked out, similar to that of Mount Rainier National Park, Washington, where, during the past two winters the park has served as a training ground for mountain troops.

In addition to strictly military requests proposals have come to open the national parks to lumbering, mining, water-power projects, grazing, and other commercial exploitation. The Service has recognized its duty to maintain a coöperative and open-minded attitude toward all such proposals. Each has been given careful study to determine its relation to the public interest, its degree of importance to the war program, the extent of the resource involved, and the least destructive method of obtaining and using the resource if the necessities of war require that the proposal be approved.

Among the most critical problems of this type now facing the National Park Service is the urgent demand for Sitka spruce to meet the requirements of the aircraft production program. This constitutes a direct threat to the Olympic National Park, Washington, in which the Nation has preserved a representative remnant of the vast virgin forests that once were the pride of the Pacific Northwest. The Service is cooperating with the Western Log and Lumber Administration of the War Production Board by modifying the taking lines of the authorized coastal strip and Queets Corridor Parkway adjoining Olympic National Park, so as to make available as much Sitka spruce as possible, at the same time retaining a scenic strip along the route of the highway. It is hoped that the need for airplane material can be met by the use of this spruce and that from State and private lands. It is recognized, however, that if winning the war requires the cutting of trees within the park, this sacrifice must be made.

An interesting example of emergency coöperation in the use of natural resources occurred in Death Valley National Monument, California. On May 14, 1942, the Secretary of the Interior, upon recommendation of the Service, authorized the Defense Plant Corporation to extract salt from the monument for a period of three months in connection with the production of manganese at Nevada's Las Vegas plant. The permit was given with the understanding that the operating company, Basic Magnesium, Inc., would develop a suitable supply of salt elsewhere as soon as possible. By August 9, about 18,000 tons of salt had been extracted when the operation was halted by a cloudburst that washed out the roads. On August 14, the Secretary of the Interior extended the permit to December 31, 1942. The roads were repaired by

October 19, but no salt has been hauled since. It is now understood that Basic Magnesium has located available salt supplies elsewhere and will not apply for renewal of the permit. While in some degree the natural landscape features of the monument were impaired, this damage was slight and is not irreparable.

Another typical case was the study of a tungsten deposit on the north boundary of Yosemite National Park conducted early in August by the Geological Survey, at the request of the Park Service and in collaboration with its geologists. The results of the study have been made available to the War Production Board. The deposit is relatively small but of high grade. Upon the advice of that Board, arrangements are being made with the Metals Reserve Company to extract the ore of this critically scarce mineral at an early date.

Use of specific areas for purposes not conforming to national park policy or intent has not been the only threat facing the National Park Service. Actual danger of sabotage and incendiarism have increased the normal protection problem on all public lands, and especially in the national parks where the protective force has been seriously reduced by the abolition of the Civilian Conservation Corps, the loss of trained men to the armed forces and to war industry, and the retrenchments in appropriations for personnel.

While forests in the national parks, measured in terms of acres, represent a relatively small part of the forested areas of the United States and its territories, they are nevertheless of great importance to the Nation, both for their esthetic value and for their strategic location. Situated primarily on mountain slopes and in high country, their preservation is essential to the protection of watersheds vital to water supply projects, agriculture, and power.

The National Park Service, as custodian of these park forests and watersheds, is charged with a dual responsibility concerning them—that to the Nation as a whole of protecting irreplaceable national scenic assets, and to neighboring communities of conserving the sources of water supply upon which rest their present and future economic stability.

Most severely curtailed of Service activities were those in the field of construction and development, virtually all of which were halted for the duration of the war. The suspension of construction has afforded an opportunity for careful formulation of plans for future work. A nucleus professional staff has been retained to perform essential maintenance work and to analyze and study proposals for emergency use of the parks. As other duties permitted, a modest amount of planning has been done for postwar construction. This should assure mature plans for certain future programs of development and should be an important element in any accelerated building program that may be decided upon to take up the slack in employment that may well be anticipated at the end of the war.

Travel to the national parks felt the impact of all the changing conditions and presented an interesting study, reflecting with some degree of accuracy the changing war and economic pictures. Prior to December 7, 1941, comparative travel statistics showed constantly mounting increases over previous years, with definite indications that had not war intervened the number of visitors during 1942 would have been greater than ever before.

The psychological effect of the war was reflected in December 1941 and January 1942 travel; and soon thereafter the gasoline and rubber shortages developed. With gasoline rationing in the East, travel, which surprised Service officials by reaching over a million in the one month of June 1942, declined in July and August, normally the most popular vacation months. The rate of decrease as compared with 1941 was approximately stationary from that time until December 1, 1942, when nation-wide rationing became effective. Travel immediately slumped again and it is impossible to foretell at this time what public use will be made of the national parks in 1943.

During the travel year extending from October 1, 1941, to September 30, 1942, over 10,000,000 persons visited the various units of the National Park System. This was a decrease of slightly more than 50 percent under the 1941 high, and about 30 percent under the preceding five-year average. It was greater, however, than the total national park travel for 1936. Included in the 1942 totals were nearly 900,000 members of the armed forces of the United States.

The scenic national parks and other units of the System, with the exception of a few areas directly affected by war operations, remained open to the public. Minimum accommodations for visitors were maintained. An interesting feature of national park visitation was that in certain comparatively accessible parks—such as Yosemite in California and Mount Rainier in Washington—decline in admittances was but slightly reflected in use of visitors' facilities. People fortunate enough to visit the parks stayed longer, as a rule, than in previous years.

Notable progress was made during the year toward the establishment of several national park and monument projects. The State of Texas, at a cost of $1,500,000, acquired all but 13,316 acres of the lands in the Big Bend National Park Project on the Rio Grande River. This proposed park will include approximately 780,000 acres on the American side of the river. When the Big Bend National Park is established, it is anticipated that the Republic of Mexico will acquire a comparable area on the Mexican side and that the two will form an international park.

During the past few years the States of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia have appropriated $150,000, $75,000, and $75,000, respectively, to purchase land for the Cumberland Gap National Historical Park Project. At various times during the past year the Service collaborated with representatives of the three states in formulating the land purchase

program. It is anticipated that the $300,000 appropriated by the three states will be sufficient to purchase the essential lands in the vicinity of the historic Cumberland Gap.

The Service coöperated with Governor Holland of Florida in formulating plans for the acquisition of necessary lands in the Everglades National Park Project, Florida. Distinct progress has been made toward the establishment of this park. A substantial reduction in project boundaries may be necessary in order to bring about its early establishment, but the essential features of the Everglades region will be preserved.

One new area was added to the National Park System during the year—the Andrew Johnson National Monument, Tennessee. In it are the Andrew Johnson Tailor Shop at Greenville, donated by the State; the Andrew Johnson Cemetery, transferred from the War Department; and the Andrew Johnson Homestead.

Liquidation of the CCC after nine years of activity brought about vast reduction in National Park Service operations, withdrawing from the development, protection, and maintenance of park units not only the services of enrollees, but also important supervisory, facilitating, and technical personnel.

All of the CCC camps in national park areas were terminated by the end of July, bringing to a close a coöperative program of distinct value in park development and protection, and especially in forest protection.

New location of the Director's Office. After functioning as a Federal agency in Washington, D. C., for over a quarter of a century, the headquarters of the National Park Service late in August were moved to Chicago, Illinois, for the duration of the war. The transfer was part of a broad program to make additional office and housing space available to the various war agencies in the National Capital, and has been looked upon by the Service as one phase of its coöperation in the war program.

The office is now functioning well in its new location, and is gradually overcoming the handicaps that inevitably beset its initial operations so far from the seat of government. Its activities are so integrated with those of other bureaus in the Department of the Interior, of many agencies in Washington and of committees in the Congress that it is not always possible to handle policy and legislative matters as expeditiously as formerly. Continuous effort is being made, however, to reduce delays to a minimum and to effect a cohesive, smooth-running organization. A small liaison office is maintained in Washington, headed by Associate Director A. E. Demaray. In the main that office handles matters affecting the National Capital Parks, the District of Columbia Zoning Commission, and the National Capital Park and Planning Commission. National park matters other than those affecting the National Capital are referred to the Director's Office in Chicago.

Taken as a whole, 1942 may well prove to be one of the crucial years in

national-park annals. The Service has endeavored to handle each emergency as it arose with long-range objectivity, to the end that no decisions of this year may needlessly affect national park preservation and use.

Two questions must be answered in the immediate future:

1. Can the manpower problem of the National Parks and Monuments be reconciled with the manpower problem of the war program?

It would seem that the answer may be made in affirmative. No deferments have been asked for and nearly 1000 employees of the National Park Service are in the armed forces or engaged in the work of war agencies, but a fair backlog of experienced employees remains. This nucleus should suffice to give stability and continuity to the essential administrative and protective work to be done in field areas and the central offices of the Service. Recruits from among older men not needed in the fighting forces or in industry, under the guidance of experienced Service employees, can be relied upon to replace a part of the depleted protective staff.

2. Will the Service be able to conduct the work necessary for adequate protection of the Service areas?

Again, the answer may be "yes." Through the Congress the Service has been charged with responsibility for the preservation of these public treasures and the people expect that this responsibility will be fulfilled. The functions of the Service have a direct bearing upon the morale of the people. Even though citizens cannot visit the parks as they have in the past they expect the parks and their offerings to be held intact. They are to be regarded as the embodiment of much that the Nation is fighting for.

During the trying years that lie ahead, the National Park Service will, more than ever before, need the support of conservationists and civic agencies. It will continue to welcome constructive suggestions so that the consensus of the best minds of the country engaged in park and conservation work may serve as a guide to policies and actions. We feel that thus we can best meet the new responsibilities placed upon us by the war.

National Parks in the Postwar Period

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EDITOR'S NOTE.—Many of the areas mentioned specifically in this article were presented in pictures in the four issues of the quarterly—PLANNING AND CIVIC COMMENT—for the year 1942. Readers who will refer to these pictures will have no doubt that the areas should be included in the National Park System.

NOW that the use of many of the national parks is curtailed by rationed transportation, it is a good thing to take stock and see what the postwar period should see in the way of national parks and parkways. No Nation ever had a larger or more valuable heritage in transcendently inspiring natural scenery than the United States of America. In the colonial era and the early days of the Republic beautiful scenery, like standing forests, seemed a drug on the market. No matter how much was exploited for commercial purposes, it was thought, there would always be plenty left. We can be thankful today for those early conservationists who made possible Yellowstone National Park and consequently all the others in the system. And yet, for every far-seeing conservationist there have been scores or hundreds of short-sighted practical persons who thought that we should be satisfied with a small number of areas which in narrow boundaries preserved specific scenes or wonders of nature. They lost sight of the need for spacious areas, if the wilderness, with its endownment of plant and animal life, is really to be preserved as more than a museum piece. We have certainly long since abandoned the concept of the national park system as a collection of museum exhibits. We know now that we desire extensive wilderness areas in which human beings may enjoy physical exertion and spiritual grace without being obliged to travel in great droves. A wilderness is no longer a wilderness when it is occupied by closely packed crowds of mankind.

In 1916, when the American Civic Association was working for the establishment of the National Park Service, about twenty-five well-known scenic and historic areas in the United States were then being widely advocated for national park and monument status. In the intervening years, only about half of the areas in that original program have been established as national parks, national monuments or state parks. Land planning studies and historic sites studies of the National Park Service should be vigorously pushed after the war in order that the most eligible areas and sites in the United States may be properly identified and classified, and sufficient facts concerning them assembled for the consideration of Congress and the President. Further delay leads only to the loss of irreplaceable assets.

In 1936, in the 20th Anniversary National Park Supplement to PLANNING AND CIVIC COMMENT, sixteen areas, then in Federal ownership,

were listed on the basis of a report prepared by the National Park Service for the National Resources Board, as containing features suitable for inclusion in the National Park System. Since then the Olympic and Kings Canyon National Parks have been created. But the other areas are still outside the system—still remain potentialities. In that 1936 Supplement we suggested seven areas in private ownership that deserved investigation as containing features suitable for inclusion in the National Park System. Of these not one has been acquired.

In the old days, when time elapsed to delay the acquisition of a national park or monument, we could pretty well count on it that the area would still be there when we got around to acquiring it. Today, with the more extensive occupation of our land and water resources for commercial purposes, we cannot expect to take our time and still find the areas undamaged when we are ready to bring them into the system.

We have, therefore, plenty of unfinished business to transact in the postwar period—some of it in the nature of pressing business. Among the pending projects we might call to the attention of our readers the possibilities of the postwar period.

Grand Teton National Park: The proposal to add Jackson Hole to Grand Teton National Park is a project which has stood as unfinished business for many years. Mr. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., at a personal cost of $1,500,000, purchased most of the necessary lands in the Valley with the express purpose of donating the area to the Federal Government for addition to the Park. The addition has not been consummated, because no solution to the local tax problem has been worked out.

It is suggested that an equitable solution, not only to this problem, but to others like it, would be the enactment of the Hayden-Robinson bills (S. 257–H.R. 2301), which were introduced into the 77th Congress, to authorize the payment of 25 percent of national park revenues to the States in which the parks and monuments are situated. Practically all other categories of public lands do return a portion of their revenues to the States. National park conservation is continually hampered because the national parks are the outstanding exception to this general practice in public land management. Wyoming's share of the Yellowstone-Teton revenues would exceed Teton County's loss of taxes by several hundred percent if such legislation were enacted and Jackson Hole were added to Grand Teton National Park.

The Teton project, like the Porcupine Mountains and the Tensas River proposals, cannot wait until after the war. They are all measures which should be taken immediately and which can be taken without impeding the prosecution of the war in any important manner. If such action were taken, the development of these areas would be logical steps in postwar work.

Big Bend: The State of Texas has acquired all but 13,316 acres of the Big Bend National Park project and expects to convey the land to

the Federal Government early in 1943. The State, through land exchanges and other means, expects to reduce materially the remaining area of private holdings within the park project in the near future. This part of the project may be completed within the period of the war; but the National Park Service will be confronted with making the area available to those who wish to explore it.

Also, when the Big Bend National Park is established, it is anticipated that the Republic of Mexico will acquire a comparable area on the Mexican side of the Rio Grande River and that an international park will eventually be established comprising the two units.

Everglades: The proposed Everglades National Park has been pending about twenty years. On May 30, 1934, Congress authorized establishment of the park when the lands are donated to the Federal Government. The State of Florida owns approximately 550,000 acres of land within the project area, in addition to the submerged land under Florida Bay. The State also has passed legislation authorizing the exchange of state lands owned outside the project for private lands within the project area, but thus far no land exchanges have been consummated and no funds have been raised for the purchase of private lands. During the last session of the Florida legislature, legislation was enacted authorizing the exemption of park project lands from the Everglades Drainage District Bond Issue in the event that the bond issue should be refinanced. The bond issue was financed this last year through the RFC, and the bond holders now have no further lien on the park project lands.

Consideration at present is being given to the possibility of reducing the boundaries of the park project to a line which would have the general support of the State and which would make possible the acquisition of all the private lands therein for donation to the Federal Government for establishment of the Everglades National Park.

Governor Holland is anxious to bring about the establishment of the park during his term of office, and it is fervently hoped that he will succeed. The establishment of the Everglades National Park, as with the establishment of the Big Bend National Park, will make possible the postwar development of the park for use by the public, and will introduce the public to two unique wilderness areas.

Certainly those who, like Ernest Coe, have worked in season and out of season to bring about the acquisition of this unique national park, seem about to be rewarded for their unselfish devotion to the public good.

Cumberland Gap: The States of Kentucky, Tennessee and Virginia have appropriated $150,000, $75,000 and $75,000 respectively, a total of $300,000, to purchase land for the Cumberland Gap National Historical Park Project. It is believed that this fund will be sufficient to purchase the essential lands in order that the park may be established in the not distant future. Congressman Flannagan introduced a bill in

the closing days of the 77th Congress to amend the Act authorizing the establishment of the park in such manner that the area can be established when approximately 6,000 acres of land, including and surrounding the historic Cumberland Gap have been accepted and donated to the Federal government. This bill probably will be pressed for enactment in the 78th Congress.

Effigy Mounds: Public-spirited citizens in Iowa have purchased approximately 1,000 acres of land along the scenic bluffs of the Mississippi River in the vicinity of McGregor, Iowa, containing extraordinary, prehistoric Indian effigy mounds, for donation to the Federal government as the Effigy Mounds National Monument. The land acquisition to date does not quite comprise the area considered essential for the establishment of the monument, but it is hoped that the State will be able to complete purchase of the relatively small remainder in order that the monument may be established and be adequately protected and developed after the war.

This region of the upper Mississippi River is one of the grand scenic areas of the United States. It is wholly different from the spectacular mountain parks which have been established in the West, but it is considered to be the finest of Mississippi River scenery and the area is rich in historical associations. The possibilities of establishing a national park of perhaps 100,000 acres involving both sides of the river, should be explored after the war.

A similar possibility is believed to exist in the vicinity of Richardson's Landing not far from Memphis, Tennessee, on the lower Mississippi River. Some study of the potentialities of these two areas already has been conducted by the National Park Service, and it is believed that the studies should be completed as soon as possible after the war.

Archeological Area, New Mexico: The State of New Mexico, through an appropriation of $12,000, has acquired lands and Indian allotments in an area of approximately 46,000 acres in New Mexico and Arizona, close to the town of Manuelito, for establishment as an archeological national monument. Certain Federal and state lands are also included. It is anticipated that the State will have completed acquisition of the Indian land within the near future, and when these lands and the state lands have been conveyed to the Federal government, that the monument will be established and will be eligible for postwar development.

Porcupine Mountains Forest: The Hook-Brown bills (H.R. 3793–S.-1131) of the 77th Congress were designed to authorize the purchase of 1,300,000 acres of forested lands in northern Michigan and Wisconsin. The Department of the Interior, in reporting upon the bill, recommended, with the concurrence of the Department of Agriculture, that the bill be amended to authorize establishment of the Porcupine Mountains National Monument, not to exceed 75,000 acres. Thirty thousand acres were to have been purchased out of the funds authorized by the bill.

Since the virgin hardwood forest of the Porcupine Mountains area is the finest remnant of that type of forest which once covered an extensive area in the Great Lakes region, it is anticipated that legislation will be introduced in the 78th Congress to accomplish the same results. Because logging is being conducted so rapidly in the Porcupine Mountains area there is little hope of saving any remnant of the forest unless action is taken in the near future. This area is the type of park project that cannot wait until after the war, unless the area is to be lost.

Tensas River Forest: Less than twenty sections of the best of the Tensas River forest now remains uncut. The Chicago Mill and Lumber Company is logging in this area at a rapid rate. Legislation should be introduced in the 78th Congress immediately to authorize an appropriation to purchase this remnant.

The Tensas River Forest is the finest remnant of the Mississippi River bottomland type of forest. The area is also probably the last haunt of the almost extinct ivory-billed woodpecker, and is the habitat of several other very rare species of animals. If this area is permitted to be destroyed, nothing like it can be preserved for future generations.

Cape Hatteras: Several years ago, Congress authorized establishment of the Cape Hatteras National Seashore, extending for approximately 100 miles along the outer banks of North Carolina, when the lands shall be donated to the United States. Little progress has been made in land acquisition to date. In the meantime, several miles of the most accessible beach have been built up with summer homes, resorts and business establishments.

If this great national seashore project is to be eligible for early development in the postwar period, the necessary lands for the project should be acquired at an early date. It is hoped that the North Carolina State Legislature will appropriate a substantial sum at its current session for the purchase of the seashore lands.

Delaware-Maryland Coast: During the 77th Congress, there was a bill (H.R. 16) to authorize the establishment of a national seashore, extending from Rehoboth, Delaware, to Chincoteague, Virginia, including a sixty-five-mile barrier island strip of ocean beach. The major part of this beach is still undeveloped. Its acquisition and development for public enjoyment would make it more accessible to the six million people living around Chesapeake Bay and to many millions more who live within a day's drive. The area and the unspoiled nine-mile stretch of beach north of Barnegat Inlet, New Jersey, are postwar park projects of high priority.

Rocky Mountain National Park: Legislation has been pending for several years to authorize the purchase of land and the construction of a parkway entrance to Rocky Mountain National Park, leading from the town of Estes Park to the National Park boundary. An unplanned, unsightly, heterogeneous cluster of buildings and structures of almost

every variety has grown up along this important park entrance, totally destroying the fine quality of the park approach. Congressional hearings have been held on the matter both in Washington and in Estes Park; necessary studies have been made by the Public Roads Administration and the National Park Service, and the project is now ready for consideration by the Congress. It is important that the parkway be authorized and the land purchased before further damage is done. If this legislation is enacted, actual construction of the Parkway can be accomplished as a postwar project.

Blue Ridge Parkway: Following the war, it is expected that studies will be made of the possibility of extending the Parkway northward through Maryland and Pennsylvania, perhaps as far as the Delaware Water Gap in New Jersey, and southward, possibly as far as Atlanta, Georgia. Already the Parkway shows tremendous potentialities for public use, and, as the new scars of construction recede with the years, it will become one of the great scenic driveways of the country.

Colonial National Historical Park: The Federal Government is consummating the land purchase in the vicinity of Jamestown Island, which will make possible the completion of the Parkway connecting Yorktown, Williamsburg and Jamestown Island, after the war. Acquisition of additional land at Yorktown has still to be accomplished before proper restoration and development can be completed there.

National Park Land Purchase Legislation: One of the most urgent postwar legislative projects should be the passage of a bill authorizing a continuing and orderly land purchase program for national park projects authorized by Congress. More than sixty million dollars have been expended under the Weeks Act for the purchase of national forest lands. Duck stamp money is available annually for the purchase of migratory waterfowl refuge lands. But, year after year, Congress authorizes establishment of a national park or a national monument with the stipulation that no Federal money shall be spent in the acquisition of any lands for the authorized project. An outstanding area, such as the Everglades, is permitted to deteriorate for nearly a decade after such authorization; yet, Congress by its act of authorization has designated the area as of national importance and suitable for Federal administration. There is no apparent reason why national park establishment should be thus discriminated against.

A bill to relieve this unjustifiable situation should also include authorization to purchase private holdings in established national parks and monuments, since parasitic and unwise developments on such private holdings impair and jeopardize the public investment in the national parks and monuments.

I have listed here only projects on which some progress has been made, or for which there have been pending bills, which were introduced into the 77th Congress. There are a score of proposals which have been seriously

listed but on which no progress has been made and for which no legislation has been introduced into Congress. If the steps recommended in these specific instances are taken, there will be an extensive postwar program in the national park extension field, as well as in reintroducing the public to the excellent National Park System already in existence. The question may be raised as to whether the system should be extended. I maintain that, so long as there are suitable areas which meet all of the rigid qualifications for national parks and national monuments, we should not hesitate to enlarge the system. It has already been found that parks like Yosemite Valley, the rim of the Grand Canyon and others easily accessible, are often overcrowded. As the American people advance in appreciation of their national parks, there is increased patronage. Who can doubt that with the return of peace and automobiles there will be a great revival of travel into the national parks? I venture to say that if all the areas seriously considered for national parks and monuments, after detailed study found to meet all of the qualifications, were actually to be incorporated in the system, we should not have too many national parks to visit, but still too few.

In the postwar period we may lift our eyes to larger horizons and with the natural resources we shall still have at our disposal and the vast man and woman power which will be available we can accomplish tasks which have hitherto seemed too big for us. I have no doubt that the National Park System of the postwar period will far exceed the plans of today.

Great Britain's Program for Housing, Present and Future

CAPTAIN RICHARD L. REISS, Vice-Chairman, Welwyn Garden Cities, Inc., and Special Representative, British Ministry of Health

IN GREAT BRITAIN, we have concentrated mainly upon planning the war. Our postwar planning is regarded as taking second place to our war planning. This, however, does not mean that there are not important official groups who are considering very carefully broad scale postwar planning, particularly in relation to industrial location and housing.

At the outset of the war, certain vital steps were taken by our legislature and our administration. General powers were given by Parliament to the Cabinet, which enabled them to exercise control both of persons and of property in-so-far as it was necessary to advance the war effort and therefore to win the war as early as possible. The immediate steps taken, apart from the progressive drafting of men into the services, were as follows:

1. The rents of all houses other than the very largest were frozen at the prewar rental level. Houses which were not rented when the war broke out had their rents based upon their assessment for local taxation. This freezing of rents applied all over the country and not merely in defense areas.

2. No tenant of a house could be evicted by his landlord, provided that he paid his rent and observed his tenancy agreement. Owners of houses were not allowed to evict tenants in order that they might sell the houses.

3. Power was given to the central department, who delegated that power to the local city officials, to commandeer all empty houses and buildings when necessary for the housing of war workers or of evacuees.

4. Power was also given to billeting both evacuees from our vulnerable cities and also war workers in houses where the occupiers were not using all their rooms. As far as possible, this power was exercised only when necessary, every effort being made to secure this billeting by voluntary arrangement.

5. Where there was an acute shortage of accommodations for transferred workers, power was exercised to move educational institutions from one place to another in order to set free accommodations.

These steps enabled both the central and local governments to make sure that all existing accommodations were used to the full, as it was known that building labor and materials would be in short supply and that new construction would have to be confined to those areas where it was absolutely necessary.

Bearing this in mind, the Ministry of Health, which is the central department concerned with housing, took the following steps with regard to new construction:

1. In the case of all houses which had been commenced before the war broke out, and which were nearing completion, the necessary labor and material was allocated so that the houses could be finished. In the case of those houses which had only just been commenced, they were only allowed to be finished in those areas where the shortage of houses was acute. The result was that in the first year of the war 125,000 family homes were completed as compared with the 300,000 that were completed in the year before the war. Most of those that were completed, however, had been commenced before the war.

2. The elimination of slums, which had been proceeding at a rapid rate before the war, was stopped altogether, and no new houses were commenced except where most urgently needed.

3. In the last year and a half, only 15,000 family dwelling units have been completed, and new construction has been concentrated on the building of dormitories so as to use to the best advantage the very limited amount of building materials and labor which was available after providing for essential war production plants and for the repair of houses damaged as a result of enemy action.

So much for the planning of shelter accommodations. It is now necessary to say a few words about the control of man and woman power, as this is closely linked up with the question of war production and the provision of the necessary accommodations for transferred workers.

We have tried to avoid transferring workers except where this is necessary, as it has been in the case of many hundreds of thousands. Where possible, men with families have been put into essential work in their own town rather than moving them elsewhere, and those without families have been chosen for transfer. The fullest use is being made of womanpower, and there again the married woman has found work as near home as possible, and it is the single woman who has mostly been transferred. It is important to emphasize that the government now has complete control over man and womanpower. Neither man nor woman can leave an essential war industry without the consent of the Ministry of Labor nor can the employer dismiss them without such consent.

As regards postwar planning, the most important feature is the growing recognition of the necessity for a national planning authority with executive power, which will be able to decide as to the location of industry after the war and the relation of house building to such location. There is a growing opinion that industry and population must remain decentralized from our over-crowded large cities. The fact that there has been a large migration from such cities as London renders this easier to bring into effect. The population of the London County area

is now thirty percent lower than it was when the war broke out. The view is gaining ground that the best condition of life for the workers is to live in cities and towns of moderate size where they are within easy reach of their work and also of the open country, and where they can have gardens attached to their houses rather than living in tenement dwellings.

I am also convinced that there will be considerable control over industry and the whole economic system by Parliament and the government in the years following the war. Only in this way shall we avoid the many mistakes we made after the last war. There is no doubt whatever that the continuance of our slum elimination program, which was cut short by the war, will be a principal feature of our reconstruction. We have found that slum elimination and the provision of low-rent public housing to rehouse those displaced has improved our standard of health and has not in any way interfered with the interests of real estate or of private building.

Postwar Planning in England

Quoted from *Town and Country Planning*

During 1942 there has been much writing on postwar planning. The British Government has concerned itself with a program. In the autumn quarterly, *Town and Country Planning*, the Barlow, Scott and Uthwatt Reports are compared and discussed. We quote:

The Scott and Uthwatt Reports have appeared. The latter much advances thought, but raises fresh problems of machinery. Mr. Churchill has added his great personal authority to the view that preparations for Reconstruction must proceed now, and has referred the whole matter of the machinery of Physical Planning to Sir William Jowitt for energetic consideration. . . . Sir William Jowitt's task is formidable, but the status and terms of reference given to him do make it possible to tackle it systematically. . . .

The present situation is that the Government has accepted the view of the Barlow Commission that planning is a matter needing an adequate central authority. . . . The Uthwatt Committee on Compensation and Betterment was in fact set up as the result of a specific recommendation by the Royal Commission, which began, but did not feel itself constituted to complete, the study of the financial implications of a decentralization and green-belt policy. The Scott Committee was given the specific work of considering the rural repercussions of that policy. The three reports must therefore be read together as a body of carefully considered thought and opinion derived from the pooled experience of all organizations and persons concerned with the vast range of town and country planning issues. . . .

Though the three Reports do hang together and do clearly provide intellectual and moral authority for vital decisions, their literal inspiration need not be claimed. . . . There are those—*The Economist* is an example—who may be said to be disposed to accept the Barlow and Uthwatt Reports as the Old and New Testaments of Planning, but to regard the Scott Report as a sort of Apocrapha.

The final Report of the Uthwatt Committee not only accepts, but specifically endorses, the main recommendation of the Barlow Commission for a Central Planning Authority, the redevelopment of congested urban areas, decentralization of industries and population, and a more balanced and diversified regional development.

"The advance towards a new conception of planning under positive central direction

crystallized in these recommendations of the Barlow Commission marks a turning point in the history of planning in this country. . . . It must, as it seems to us, be accepted from these recommendations that the character and situation of all future development, whether domestic or industrial, must ultimately be governed by considerations such as the distribution of the population, the problems of defense and communications, and the claims of agriculture. And from this it follows that private and local initiative must be subjected to State control. This necessary conclusion does not involve the suppression of individual initiative and enterprise, but it does involve acceptance of the view that the State must determine the areas in which they may operate." *Uthwatt Report, paragraph 15.*

We think it well to reiterate that unless the long-term national policy includes a drastic opening-out of overcrowded areas, the restoration to the people of the possibility of living in one-family homes with gardens, within reasonable distance of work, and the introduction of ample recreation space in such areas, it stands no chance of enlisting wholehearted popular support, and still less chance of arousing enthusiasm. Home-idealism mounts to high intensity during the family separation caused by war. And, quite simply, men will tell you that they are not fighting a war for freedom in order to be herded after it into tenement flats, or to be asked to be contented in crowded and gardenless byelaw streets.

If the cities are to be opened out, there are only two alternative policies. One is that which was followed after the last war, of meeting the family home demand by building suburbs and extending city transportation services. The other is to limit the growth of towns by country belts, and to couple the rebuilding of crowded areas on a more open standard with provision for the "spillover" of population and industry in new towns and extensions of small towns and villages. . . . The Barlow Commission's acceptance of the principle of decentralization was not a weak gesture to conciliate a few passionate idealists. They were led to it, as we were ourselves, by a cool and thorough study of the whole urban situation. The decent rebuilding of old cities and the creation of new garden cities are bound together, and we must energetically pursue both unless we are to resume the suburban drift.

Hitherto, the main obstacle to the acceptance of a national planning policy on these lines has been the absence of a clear solution to the problem of Compensation and Betterment. . . .

The Committee (Uthwatt) reject complete nationalization as a matter of immediate policy, and of the three reasons they give, two appear to us to be of great weight. . . . The solution proposed is the purchase by the State of the "Development Rights" in all undeveloped land (with minor exceptions), extensive purchases by local planning authorities of built-up areas needing redevelopment, and a periodic levy on increases in site values. Proposals are made for simplifying the procedure for public acquisition of land, and for extending the right of compulsory purchase.

The principle of fair compensation is fully upheld, but modifications are proposed which limit the compensation, after a period of notice, for reduced density or change of use, and exclude the effect of public demand from the calculations. The method of computation of the price for the purchase of development rights is in essence fair to the public, and to landowners as a group. . . .

The Uthwatt Report works out the details of these proposals so completely that they could almost be transcribed into a Parliamentary Bill, and this is a service for which the very able Committee can never be sufficiently thanked. . . .

We are not convinced (however) of the necessity, political practicability or administrative advantages of putting statutory planning in the hands of a Commission, a proposal made rather perfunctorily in view of its implications, in somewhat different forms in both the Uthwatt and Scott Reports. Neither Committee invited evidence on this topic, and it appears to us that there are factors which they have overlooked in considering it. . . . The two Reports do carry us considerably further, and give the Government the data for the major decisions which we now anxiously await.

Wartime Housing in the United States

IN ORDER to assess progress—or lack of progress—in providing housing for the wartime demands for war production, we must examine the amount and kind of housing with which we entered the war period. During the years of the late lamented Depression we provided less than normal amounts of housing. Although the rate of our population increase had definitely slowed down, we still had an increase, and the 1940 Census indicated a flow of rural dwellers into the cities and towns. So that, during this period when housing provision lagged, we had a definitely increasing urban population, and, in our Eastern cities at least, a decided aging of many outworn or obsolete dwellings. And so we started the war with an accumulated housing shortage, especially in the lower-cost class.

If it had not been for the various Federal housing agencies which promoted privately financed as well as public housing, the situation would have been much worse. Unfortunately, the authorized slum-reclamation program had hardly had a chance to get under way. From the time of Jacob Riis and the transformation of Mulberry Bend, we have talked about replacing our slums, but the slums have continued to grow and fester. They have not been much of a contribution to the war effort. And the wartime pressure has resulted in a cessation of the exceedingly modest slum-reclamation program under way.

The year 1942 saw the consolidation of sixteen Federal housing agencies into the National Housing Agency, under the direction of John B. Blandford, with three principal arms: *The Federal Home Loan Bank Administration*, consisting in turn of the Federal Home Loan Bank System, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation and the Home Owners' Loan Corporation; the *Federal Housing Administration*, with its increased authorization to insure war housing loans under Title VI, and its function as agent for the War Production Board in processing applications for private housing priority orders; and the *Federal Public Housing Authority*, into which were consolidated all the Government agencies then engaged in providing public housing, except the rural projects undertaken by the Farm Security Administration. The FPHA has been charged with the duty of handling all public housing essential to the war, covering the entire field from site planning through construction and management. These functions are exercised directly or by delegation.

Just as this consolidated Federal housing agency was getting under way, the shortage of essential war materials and labor occasioned new and more drastic priority schedules and manpower allocations. Therefore, a housing program, already lagging far behind critical needs, has suffered crippling curtailments and modifications.

The War Manpower Commission has estimated that from June 30, 1942 to June 30, 1943, there will be a minimum of 1,600,000 war production workers—with and without their families—moving into industrial centers.

It is too late to inquire, as many have, why war production plants were located where they were, often in places where neither resident labor nor existing housing for migrant labor was to be found and more often than not in places not approved by the local planning commissions. In October, 1942 issue of *Fortune*, a vivid picture of the great migrations to the war production centers is depicted. In passing, Washington itself, might be mentioned, with over 200,000 additional residents since the 1940 Census, not to mention the nearby regions in Maryland and Virginia. The newspapers and magazines abound with articles on the sprawling Hampton Roads expansions and congestions and the great war industries and concentrations on the Pacific Coast, where, in one plant alone, 46,000 out of 50,000 employees must drive to work in automobiles. *Fortune* particularly mentioned 750 war-production plants in Michigan, employing over half of the entire State's industrial workers. According to *Fortune*, three-fourths of these employees came to work in their cars; fifty-one plants, with over 65,000 workers, were entirely dependent on private cars. If, as is predicted, the tires of most of these private cars give out during 1943, it may well be that the housing which is now used to shelter war workers in a wide radius around the war industries will no longer be useful. No doubt some swapping of employees who now pass each other in reaching their respective plants, may minimize this transportation *impasse*.

As horrible examples, *Fortune* presented the plight of Mobile, Alabama, which, by reason of war agencies, has increased its inhabitants from 115,000 in 1940 to an estimated 180,000 or 190,000, going on 200,000 soon, and the difficulties of Wichita, Kansas, which has grown from 127,000 in 1940 to 170,000 in August of 1942 and an estimated 245,000 by May of 1943.

To meet these unprecedented housing demands, the USHA has estimated that a total of 1,320,000 accommodations of various types of houses will be needed. The housing officials plan to provide 650,000 of these living units through more intensive use of existing structures. Mr. Blanford believes that the balance must be new construction. The program calls for 195,000 units for single persons and two-person families, in dormitories and apartments of the dormitory type, to be built by the Government. Some 475,000 family accommodations will be necessary, of which 275,000 are expected to be privately financed. The remaining 205,000 family units will be public construction, temporary and permanent. But Mr. Blandford stresses the fact that the emphasis is on temporary construction, both for speed and for economy of labor, materials and money.

There are those who doubt whether either private or public housing can *get by* the War Production Board and the Manpower Czar to produce this entire housing program promptly. The housing officials are straining every effort to do so.

Director Ormond E. Loomis, of the Conversion Division, Homes Use Service, National Housing Agency, estimated in November of 1942 that over the past twenty-seven months new housing construction for war workers and the civilian public in non-farm areas, totalled 1,287,000 family units and 2,700 dormitory apartments. In addition, 208,000 family units and 13,000 dormitory apartments were then under construction. Mr. Loomis pointed out that since the appointment of a Coördinator of Defense Housing in July, 1940, 92 percent, or more than 1,157,000 units were financed by private capital, and, further that this represents a higher annual production than for any corresponding period since 1930.

According to *Victory*, the Official Bulletin of the Office of War Information, from July 1, 1940 to November of 1942, 500,000 war housing units, at a cost of $2,000,000 of Government and private funds, were completed and made available at rentals or sales prices within the reach of war workers, and were located within reasonable commuting distance of war activities. Of this total, private industry had built 355,000 family units at an estimated cost of $1,400,000,000. As quoted in *Victory*, private builders also completed in war production areas during this period some 470,000 dwelling units that are not classed as war housing because of their location or cost. These structures, it is stated, were started before the present strict limitations on construction were imposed. All of this private construction of both kinds is estimated to have cost $3,750,000,000. In addition, private builders have under construction for war workers an estimated 76,000 dwellings, valued in excess of $300,000,000 and priority orders were granted for 111,000 more.

The Federal Housing Administration has played an important part in making this privately constructed housing possible. On December 26, 1942, Federal Housing Commissioner Abner Ferguson reported that during 1942 the principal accomplishments under the FHA program were:

1. Construction of approximately 160,000 new dwelling units started by private builders under FHA inspection and in conformity with FHA minimum construction requirements. Of these about 150,000 were located in the critical war housing districts.

2. Loans of some $155,000,000 involving 435,000 individual properties were insured under Title I of the National Housing Act. These loans financed essential repairs and maintenance of existing houses, remodeling of existing structures to provide additional living quarters for war workers, and fuel conservation through oil burner conversion and installation of insulation.

3. Loans totaling approximately $1,125,000,000, representing all types authorized under the National Housing Act, were insured during the year. Of these, about $770,000,000 financed new dwelling construction, substantially

all for occupancy by war workers, and about $200,000,000 represented mortgages on sound existing home properties. The balance were insured under Title I.

4. On behalf of the War Production Board, FHA field offices received, processed, and forwarded to the WPB more than 60,000 applications for WPB preference rating orders on over 430,000 dwelling units in proposed privately financed projects for war workers.

The $1,125,000,000 in loan insurance written by the FHA in 1942 compared with $1,185,852,709 in 1941, the record high in the agency's eight-year history. This relatively small decline reflects the completion of projects started before material shortage became as acute as it did in the latter part of 1942, as well as the fact that a substantially greater proportion of private building was financed under the FHA program in 1942 than in 1941.

It should be particularly interesting to Federal taxpayers to note that the private funds mobilized for war housing and other essential purposes under the FHA program have been advanced without any outlay by the Federal Government and that fees and insurance premiums paid on FHA-insured loans have been sufficient to pay all FHA operating expenses and to provide substantial reserves against possible future losses.

Mr. Blandford estimated the public housing program for the period July 1, 1940 until November of 1942, to cover 141,690 units, completed at a cost of about $525,000,000. This is divided into 116,169 family units of various types, 15,027 dormitory accommodations for single workers, and 152 dormitory, or war, apartments for two-person families, as well as 10,342 trailers, used as a stop-gap only until standard accommodations can be finished.

In November of 1942, public housing under construction or contract included 129,078 family units, 21,248 dormitory units, 13,078 dormitory apartments, and 547 trailers.

It should be explained that these figures do not include a substantial number of units completed during the period, as shown above, in communities which were not war production areas.

In comparison with the constantly increasing demands for war housing, production is bound to lag; but in comparison with actual past production in any emergency period, the activities of public officials and private enterprise are creditable.

With the tightening pressure on materials and labor, no one realizes better than the housing officials that the construction program must be supplemented. The National Housing Agency, therefore, in the autumn of 1942 took its problem directly to the people and appealed to the home and other property owners of America to permit the Government for the wartime period to lease their homes if they are suitable for conversion to provide additional living units. In the critical areas, many householders had already opened their homes to rent rooms to war workers.

In many cities the zoning restrictions against roomers in one-family districts have been liberalized for the duration, and it is the announced intention of NHA to promote the "War Guest" program. But, at best, these accommodations are principally for single workers. It is hoped that the conversion program under way at the end of 1942 will provide additional accommodations for small families.

The conversion program during the year encountered both pressure for, and opposition to, remodeling large houses in restricted one-family districts. Most planners have urged that the conversion program be applied in areas already zoned for multi-family structures, so that, after the war, the apartments may be available in districts zoned for apartments. In Washington, as described in the Federal City article in this ANNUAL, the Planning Commission has drawn up maps for the use of the National Housing Agency, showing the districts in Washington where the conversion program can be applied under existing zoning regulations. Certainly in most cities, there are ample opportunities for such conversion without invading the restricted single-family districts with structural changes which would have to be junked after the war or which would operate to change the zoning pattern of the community.

In an official release by the General Counsel for NHA, it is stated: "The conversions should conform to local building, health and zoning regulations. In the absence of such regulations, standard Government principles covering war housing should apply. Where local regulations appear unnecessarily to block or impair the conversion program, every effort should be made to have them waived or modified."

Under the plan, the National Housing Agency would in some 75 cities acquire by voluntary lease for the duration of the war and a reasonable period thereafter such privately owned dwellings as can be made suitable for war workers by alterations and repairs. The Agency would assume responsibility for carrying charges and would meet them out of the rents paid by the war-worker occupants. The cost of the improvements would be advanced initially by NHA and repaid from rents paid by the new occupants. During the leasehold by the Government, the owner would receive a fair rental from NHA, this rent also would be drawn from the revenues of the property. After the emergency, the house would be returned to the owner in its remodeled state. Meantime, the owner would be permitted to live in one unit of the structure if he so desires, paying a fair rental. Before the lease is signed, plans for the remodeling would be submitted to the owner for his approval. The program is being carried out by the Homes Use Service of NHA, through its Conversion Division. In its production of additional housing, the Conversion Division utilizes the services of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, which negotiates leases with property owners on behalf of the Government, supervises the alterations, rents the space provided and manages the properties subsequently.

The funds for the conversion program come from the Lanham Act which does not provide for subsidized housing. The Government, therefore, expects to receive a full principal return on its investment in connection with permanent housing converted into family units for small families. According to the General Counsel of NHA, it is not the intention to high-pressure owners into subsidizing war workers by absorbing or risking ultimate loss through the conversion plan. While home owners are asked to act patriotically, there is no policy of the Congress to permit home owners to be taxed by the conversion program (with or without their consent) to pay for war housing. Counsel warns that care should be taken that structures are not made unadaptable to future use by their owners.

It has taken a few months to get this program under way and past the many obstacles which it had to clear. The negotiation of leases on individual, separate properties is necessarily not a mass production program. Nevertheless, with reasonable success, the aggregate contribution to the Nation's critical war housing program should be considerable.

Postwar Housing and Living Conditions

The record of Housing and Living Conditions for the year 1942 would be incomplete without mention of the postwar plans for more and better housing. Not only may we expect the consolidated governmental housing agencies united in the National Housing Agency to be in a position to resume their active programs for private and public housing and slum reclamation, with the active coöperation of the local Housing Authorities, but we may expect a continuation and intensification of the present tendency for closer collaboration between the local planning commission and the Federal, state and local housing officials. For we now know that it is not enough to proceed with housing plans unrelated to the other elements of the planned community.

The Year 1942 may be remembered for its broad urban redevelopment proposals. One reason why these various plans for postwar urban rebuilding have caught the popular imagination is that most previous plans have been "little" or so far in the uncertain future that no one now living could hope to see them accomplished. But here come "big" plans with proposed implementation for prompt realization.

In the October PLANNING AND CIVIC COMMENT, Charles T. Stewart, Director of the Urban Land Institute, presented the various plans which have been published in *The Handbook on Urban Redevelopment for Cities in the United States*, prepared by the Federal Housing Administration; *Urban Redevelopment and Housing*, published by The National Planning Association and containing the plan of Messrs. Greer and Hansen of the Federal Reserve System; and *A Proposal for Rebuilding Blighted City Areas*, put out by the Urban Land Institute. Any discussion of the proposals of 1942 should include, also Charles Ascher's *Better Cities*, published by the National Resources Planning Board.

Practically every city in the United States has by this time developed blighted districts of buildings, sometimes used for sub-standard housing and sometimes occupied by vanishing business concerns and occasionally left empty to hasten their disintegration. These areas are a tax under the city's utilities and street frontage. In many cities, these blighted areas still pay—actually or theoretically—taxes beyond any present use value or any sound future rehabilitated use value. It is generally recognized that the districts cannot be redeemed building by building. This means that some method must be found for assembling the property so that it can be replanned and rebuilt in accordance with a comprehensive plan which will articulate with the rest of the city. There are financial and legal problems in assembling the property, in adjusting fair prices for compensation with fair future values based on new uses. There are problems of whether to hold the land in public ownership and allow its future use to be by private enterprise on a leasehold basis or

whether to permit it to pass back to individual owners with sufficient safeguards to prevent a repetition of the processes which have brought the properties to their present low estate. An effort has been made to define the kind of contribution the Federal Government could properly make, the possible contribution of the State and the undoubted responsibility of the local community. But these problems, now that they are recognized, are not insoluble, and there are several alternative proposals before the public.

It is evident to most thoughtful persons that there will be a vast army of demobilized men and women from the military forces and war industries. They will need jobs and they will be fired with a desire to make peacetime America worth the prodigious effort and sacrifice of wartime America. We shall have the man and woman power. If we have the plans and the necessary legislation, together with sound methods of financing the projects, we should be able to capture the energy and high aspiration of our people to remake our cities into places where we live by choice rather than compulsion.

There are many other phases of postwar planning which have been put forth for the consideration of the American people; but not one of them in any field has so fired the imagination as the prospect that our American cities might be rebuilt with comfortable, sanitary housing for all and with amenities which we have come to desire as an integral part of satisfactory living.

In 1941 New York and Illinois passed urban redevelopment corporation laws and Michigan passed such a law applicable to the City of Detroit. Already some cities are at work on surveys and plans which will put them in a position to coöperate with state and Federal Governments in rehabilitation programs. Carl Feiss, as Planning Consultant to the Denver Planning Commission, under the able leadership of L. F. Eppich, is working on rehabilitation plans. Mayor Howard W. Jackson, of Baltimore, has appointed a Committee on Postwar Planning to minimize the difficulties in the readjustment of industry after the war. The Committee is headed by John D. Steel, Chairman of the City Plan Commission and will contain a score or more of business and civic leaders.

The use of Federal funds for state and local postwar planning was proposed in H. R. 7782, introduced on November 16, 1942 into the 77th Congress by Congressman Beiter of New York. Under this bill, a sum not to exceed $75,000,000 could be advanced by the President through an appropriate Federal agency to state or local agencies for plan preparation. Requests for such assistance would be submitted to a designated appropriate Federal agency for its comments and recommendations. Funds advanced for architectural and engineering plans, specifications, examinations, surveys, and investigations relating to specific projects would be repaid to the Treasury of the United States if

and when funds became available by appropriation, grant, gift or loan to the state or local agency for the undertaking of public works and improvements so planned. States or local agencies would be required to contribute twenty-five percent of the cost of preparing comprehensive plans and programs, general examinations, surveys, and investigations for which the Federal funds would be advanced. This contribution could be in funds, services, or materials to be used in such plan preparation.

No doubt some such proposal will be reintroduced into the 78th Congress with a good chance of becoming law. For, while movements such as comprehensive urban rehabilitation often need the spur of Federal style-setting, there is every indication that many of the States and cities will face the postwar period with substantial reserves, instead of heavy bonded indebtedness for public works already outworn or outmoded. The past decade has seen many of these indebtednesses lifted. The financial situation of the cities should be conducive to undertaking new expenditures for public works which would enhance their capital wealth and stabilize their future incomes, as well as transform their housing and living conditions.

In a statement issued in December, 1942, by the National Resources Planning Board on *The Role of the Housebuilding Industry*, Miles L. Colean predicted that the annual potential housing market after the war would be 900,000 to 1,200,000 new dwellings. Mr. Colean believes that this should be attainable in terms of national income, particularly with full employment, but it depends upon the removal of many present obstacles to large scale housing production which now interfere with it reaching a broad geographic or broad economic market. These obstacles include:

1. Difficulties in securing an ample supply of cheap and suitably located land. Concentration of activities in outlying suburban areas often involves a wasteful duplication of community facilities and utilities.
2. Liberal financial arrangements have been confined to sales housing in large metropolitan areas to the detriment of rental housing and smaller communities.
3. The restricted market provided by sales housing in large metropolitan areas for upper-income groups has resulted in small scale operations with weak and dispersed management. This in turn has led to price fixing agreements, rigid rules of practice and various similar obstacles to efficient operation.

Mr. Colean believes that major cost reductions necessary to reach a mass market depend upon simplification, standardization, and mechanization of housing construction and upon volume production using factory methods and under central managerial control. He believes that a new land policy should include more exacting regulation of land subdivision, the accumulation of municipally owned land reserves, public aid in the reassembly of scattered ownerships in blighted areas, slums and similar districts and restrictions upon unlimited trading in land.

Federal housing officials have been forced to think of the postwar period even while they were straining to meet the demands of all-out war. In an address made in November of 1942, Commissioner Abner H. Ferguson of the Federal Housing Administration predicted that when the war is over we shall find a country with trade prospects in unheard of amounts. He visions a country with a welled-up demand for peacetime products of all kinds, with thousands and thousands of houses needing deferred repairs, and with a backlog of new houses variously estimated at from 900,000 to 2,000,000 a year for ten years. Mr. Ferguson stressed the need for planning. "We cannot continue," he said, "to build houses piece by piece, as shoes were made a hundred or more years ago, if we expect to get the price of houses down to a point where they will appeal to the mass market." Mr. Ferguson defined the three broad areas for postwar housing operations as the production of improved houses for sale at prices substantially below those previously prevailing, the development of improved methods for building and financing rental housing for that section of the population which prefers to rent rather than to buy their living quarters, and resumption of slum clearance combined with the rehabilitation of blighted city areas. He also foresaw intensified planning in the postwar housing market, both as to neighborhood developments and on a city-wide basis.

There seems to be substantial agreement as to objectives and not too much disagreement as to methods. The main difficulty will be to mobilize public opinion to the point where consolidated effort will be exerted to bring about the necessary legislation and the essential dynamic action which will ensure the formation of adequate plans and the efficient execution of comprehensive projects.

Let us hope that we shall be equal to the task.

Washington in Wartime

SINCE Pearl Harbor, 81,000 persons have been added to the Government payrolls in Washington. Another 35,000 will be enrolled, it is estimated, before June 30, 1943. The population of Washington, which stood at 486,000 in 1930 and 663,000 in 1940 has increased to an estimated 875,000 in the autumn of 1942. In the Washington Metropolitan Area, where there were 906,000 people in 1940 there were in October of 1942 an estimated 1,240,000. In the suburbans the increase in the two and one-half years has been 40 percent.

Such increases have had a far-reaching effect on the plan of the National Capital, offering, on the one hand, unparalleled opportunities for realizing certain long-time plans and applying planning techniques, and on the other hand, demonstrating where action was taken contrary to the plan, the weakness in present planning organization for controlling and directing the growth of Washington and its environs.

Late in 1942 it was announced that there were 281,423 government employees working in the Washington Area, as compared to 117,760 on November 11, 1918, the highest previous peak. We presented an article in the October, 1941 PLANNING AND CIVIC COMMENT showing the growth and decline of government employees. Probably most readers of that article thought that the prediction of 196,000 government employees by December 31, 1941 was overdrawn. As a matter of fact the projection of the curve shown in the charts at that time took an even sharper upturn for 1942 than the 1940 and 1941 increases indicated, due to the change from defense to a war basis.

It was manifest that Washington did not have public or private office space to accommodate the new and expanding governmental agencies. Even during the defense period, apartment houses had been acquired and converted into offices. This was robbing Peter to pay Paul, for finding living quarters for the growing population of Washington was daily becoming a more aggravated problem.

Much to the disappointment of those who were seeking to aid the planning and housing program in Washington, the District of Columbia was not included in the various housing and facility acts; but, finally a Lanham Act for Washington, introduced in December of 1941 and approved in April of 1942, did authorize $30,000,000 for housing and $20,000,000 for public works, including hospitals. When, however, appropriations were made in June for $32,500,000, it was found that much of the program could not be carried out because of restrictions on the use of critical materials.

One of the sorest spots in the war-congested areas of the country at large has been the all-too-frequent neglect of local planning agencies

by the Federal officials who made the decisions for plant and housing location. In Washington, office space for government employees is in effect plant provision. Let us see how in the Federal City the National Capital Park and Planning Commission attempted to function and advance the war effort constructively.

At its meeting, on December 19, 1941, the National Capital Park and Planning Commission adopted a resolution:

> That during the present national emergency, the Commission believes that any necessary additional temporary Federal office buildings should be constructed in outlying locations so distributed that concentration shall normally not exceed 2,500 employees in any one location, with a possible maximum of 5,000 employees; that locations be selected, so far as possible, with due regard to the zoning plan for those areas, with careful consideration and study as to the adequacy of sewers, water supply and transportation facilities and with regard to proximity of suitable housing for employees; that the program for the location of these buildings should also be coördinated with pending plans for the reconstruction of defense housing under public, semi-public, and private auspices; and that, in general, the Commission would like to see a sizable proportion of defense housing units located on the Virginia side of the river to house employees of the proposed new War Department building.

It should be remembered that the Planning Commission had already perfected a public buildings plan for Washington which would spread the public buildings along a wide swath, four miles long, reaching from the Potomac to the Anacostia; that one unit of the proposed War Department buildings to be located in the Northwest rectangle, had already been completed according to plan. This plan, as presented in the October, 1941 PLANNING AND CIVIC COMMENT, would ultimately have been capable of providing for 166,000 government employees working in permanent public buildings. It would normally release the private office buildings leased by the Federal Government. It would sharply reduce the number of government employees working near the congested central business district and would so disperse the public and private transportation along the streets and diagonal avenues of Washington that it could easily be spread out and sifted into the four-mile strip of public buildings east and west of the Capitol.

Failure to acquire the land in advance, for carrying out this orderly plan, made it impractical for sudden and urgent wartime needs. Consequently it was decided to construct the Pentagon Building in Arlington County, Virginia, to house upwards of 40,000 employees of the War Department. The inconvenience and delay of a location remote from other Government agencies, especially the Navy Department, argue strongly against the Pentagon Building as a permanent home for the War Department. No doubt, therefore, after the war when the Pentagon Building is assigned to the uses directed by the President, *i.e.* quartermaster stores and files, the plan for public buildings in Washington, as drawn up by the National Capital Park and Planning Commission, will be adhered to.



NH 45094 R. 12/42

Public War Housing in Washington

KEY TO MAP

	Project Name	*Units*	*Agency*
1B	James Creek (DC-1-3)	278	ADA
1C	Spyhax Houses (DC-49036)	146	ADA
1D	Anthony Bowen Houses (DC-49055)	86	ADA
1E	Canal St. Houses (DC-49059)	20	ADA
1F	West Potomac Park (DC-49041)	1,891	PBA
1G	East Potomac Park (DC-49048)	2,716	PBA

	Project Name	*Units*	*Agency*
2A	McLean Gardens (DC-49022)	720	DHC
2B	McLean Gardens (DC-49021)	1,341	DHC
2C	35th St. Houses (DC-49038)	75	ADA
2D	Bryant St. Houses (DC-49053)	32	ADA
2E	Georgia Ave. Houses (DC-49060)	200	ADA
2F	Meridian Hill (DC-49018)	718	DHC
2G	3d & U Streets (DC-49025)	319	DHC
2H	2nd & Elm Streets (DC-49035)	200	DHC
3A	Monroe St. Houses (DC-49040)	90	ADA
3B	21st St. Houses (DC-49044)	36	ADA
3C	Langston-Stadium (DC-49047)	1,014	PBA
4A	Stadium (DC-49042)	684	PBA
5A	Parkside Dwellings (DC-1-11)	373	ADA
5B	Foote St. Houses (DC-49039)	168	ADA
5C	Lily Ponds Houses (DC-49054)	500	ADA
6A	Dupont Dwellings Add. (DC-1-12)	64	ADA
6B	Stoddert Dwellings (DC-49012)	200	ADA
6C	Benning Rd. Houses (DC-49037)	138	ADA
6D	Naylor Gardens (DC-49024)	750	DHC
6E	Knox Hill Dwellings (DC-49016)	250	USHA/ADA
6F	Stanton Rd. Dwellings (DC-1-6)	302	ADA
6G	Barry Farm Dwellings (DC-1-9)	442	ADA
6H	Bolling Field (DC-49014,5)	70	NAVY
6I	Highland Dwellings (DC-49017)	350	ADA
7A	Bellevue (DC-49011)	600	NAVY
8A	Suitland (MD-18084)	698	PBA
8B	Phillips Houses (MD-18086)	333	ADA
8C	Carry Houses (MD-18083)	315	ADA
8D	Cheltenham (MD-18081)	25	NAVY
9A	Calvert Houses (MD-18211)	500	ADA
9B	Greenbelt Homes (MD-18111,2)	1,000	FSA/FPHA
10A	Fairway Houses (MD-18085)	238	ADA
10B	Forest Glen (MD-18121)	70	FPHA
11A	Cabin John Gardens (MD-18131)	100	FPHA
11B	Seven Locks (MD-18132)	20	FPHA
12A	Arlington Farms (VA-44013,4)	7,220	PBA
12B	Memorial View Apts. (VA-44011)	35	PBA/WAR
12C	Columbia Pike Houses (VA-44018)	500	FPHA
12D	Jeff Davis Site (VA-44231)	680	FPHA
12E	Glebe Road Site (VA-44019)	820	FPHA
12F	Fairlington (VA-44012)	3,460	DHC
13A	Ramsay Homes (VA-44133)	15	USHA/LHA
13B	Chinquapin Village (VA-44131)	300	NAVY/LHA
13C	Cameron Valley Homes (VA-44132,5,6)	341	DDH/LHA
14A	Lee Village (VA-44134)	110	USHA/WAR
15A	Hillwood Square (VA-44137)	160	FPHA
15B	Experimental Units (VA-44138)	12	DHC
Not shown on map:			
	Fort Drive Houses (DC-49056)	123	ADA
	Tunlaw Road (DC-49067)	200	ADA
	Dormitories (DC-49031)	777	PBA
	Dormitories (VA-44221)	60	WAR

In the meantime, the location of the Pentagon Building in Arlington County has entailed the construction of an elaborate network of access highways, with twenty-one grade separations, one on three levels, and many thousand new housing units. The congestion over the Key, Arlington Memorial and Highway Bridges is still a problem. A study by the Public Roads Administration disclosed 118,000 movements of vehicles per day over the three bridges, with more congestion to come. Forced to face the untoward situation, the Planning Commission and the Public Roads Administration have made a notable contribution in designing a highway access system to the Pentagon Building. One of the complications not yet solved is that, under the general legislation these roads would, on completion by the Public Roads Administration, be turned over to the State of Virginia, thus raising a question of conflicting jurisdiction for policing and traffic control.

Contrary to the proposals for decentralization of temporary public buildings, a string of close-ranked temporary structures has been erected in the Mall and West Potomac Park. There are now two bridges connecting some of these buildings across the once-beautiful reflecting basin. The 200,000 government employees working in these and other downtown buildings have placed a heavy load on the public transportation lines. The drastic gas rationing of the latter months of 1942 has added to this burden but has acted to mitigate the excessive congestion of private cars in the business and temporary office building areas.

The use of park land for temporary buildings for offices and (more recently) for dormitories has reduced recreational facilities in the central city to such an extent that money had to be allocated by FWA to develop recreational facilities on land owned but not yet developed in outlying sections. In fact, these so-called solutions which create new problems even more serious than the original ones are no solutions at all. They are merely palliatives which add to the difficulties of effecting a permanent cure.

These decisions for the erection of temporary buildings in the downtown area, to which the Planning Commission reluctantly agreed under the pressure of defense needs, were expanded after Pearl Harbor to add to the congestion of the central business area. The resolution adopted by the Planning Commission in December of 1941 was in line with an effort to mitigate an intolerable situation. The Commission followed the resolution by a study of available sites and presented a list for consideration of the authorities. Unfortunately, not many of the sites have been used. The decision to erect an office building at Suitland, Maryland, southeast of the District, quite far out from the business center, poorly served by highways and public transportation and with housing, in an area then outside the jurisdiction of the Maryland National Capital Park and Planning Commission, has necessitated the erection of 648 temporary public housing units and temporary dormitories for 698 workers and

stimulated uncontrolled private development at the fringes. Many of those transferred to Suitland have protested bitterly and the future development of the adjacent area in the south and east is still unprotected by local zoning or subdivision regulations.

There have been developed a few conveniently located decentralized sites for temporary office buildings, such as the one in the Stadium site at the end of East Capitol Street and the one under construction on the McLean Estate on Wisconsin Avenue. The permanent Naval Hospital Center out on the Frederick Road in Maryland, planned several years ago, has taken one group out of Washington.

On the whole, therefore, the recommendation of the Planning Commission has been more honored in the breach than the observance, and the congestion which has resulted from the concentration of office buildings in the center of town and across the Potomac River is exactly what might have been expected. If permanent office buildings could have conformed to the plan and more temporary office buildings located on sites recommended by the Planning Commission, much of the existing confusion could have been avoided. But the nervous tension of the Federal officials to push forward the Army, Navy and Air Corps defense and war programs often led to decisions without benefit of planning technicians. In this respect Washington has suffered very much as other war centers have suffered.

In spite of the large number of government agencies moved out of Washington and the consequent transference of about 30,000 government employees to New York, Philadelphia, Richmond, Chicago and other places, the number of government employees in the District of Columbia has grown to unprecedented proportions.

In the matter of war housing, the Planning Commission, starting early, has been able to render a signal service which will be reflected in postwar Washington. On page 98 is a map prepared jointly by the National Housing Agency and the National Capital Park and Planning Commission, which, with the accompanying table, shows the location, type, size and agency concerned for the entire Public War Housing Program for Washington and vicinity.

McLean Gardens, under construction by the Defense Homes Corporation at the end of 1942 will provide 720 permanent houses and 1341 permanent dormitory-type rooms, well laid out, and with protection of adjacent wooded valley land which will ultimately become part of the park system of Washington.

According to the table, the Alley Dwelling Authority is responsible for the construction of 1,471 permanent housing units, for some 2,000 demountable houses and for 1,200 demolishable houses in the District and nearby Maryland.

The Public Buildings Administration has a program of temporary dormitories for 7220 at Arlington, near the Pentagon Building, for 4607


ROCK CREEK PARK
SOLDIERS HOME
N. E.
N. W.
S. W.
S. E.
POTOMAC RIVER
ANACOSTIA RIVER
ALEXANDRIA
N
W
E
S
AREAS WITHIN WHICH PROPERTIES ARE ELIGIBLE FOR CONSIDERATION UNDER THE N. H. A. HOME-LEASING AND CONVERSION PROGRAM.
PREPARED BY
OCT. 1940

in East and West Potomac Park, for 1014 at Langston for colored workers, 684 at the Stadium site and 698 at Suitland, Maryland, making a total of 14,223.

On all these projects, the Planning Commission has worked closely with the National Housing Agency, the Alley Dwelling Authority and Public Buildings Administration.

In March of 1942, the Chairman of Region II of the National Resources Planning Board held a meeting with representatives of the National Capital Park and Planning Commission and with the Maryland and Virginia State Planning Boards and the several Federal housing agencies to devise ways and means whereby they might coöperate in developing a planning program for defense housing. As a result of this and other consultations, a series of maps was prepared by the Planning Commission for the Washington Metropolitan Area showing:

(1) Areas served by Water Supply and Sanitary Sewerage Systems;
(2) Transit, Transportation and Time Zones;
(3) Availability of Electric Service;
(4) Availability of Gas Service;
(5) Schools, Hospitals and Recreational Facilities for White People;
(6) Schools, Hospitals and Recreational Facilities for Colored People;
(7) Land Use—Existing Commercial Development.

There was held a series of conferences with representations of local agencies in each jurisdiction in the Washington area—District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia, together with representatives of the Federal housing agencies and the Federal Works Agency. The FWA created a Vital Area within the city, similar to that at Hampton Roads, with an Advisory Board on which the Planning Commission was represented.

The information on these maps has been of the utmost value when the war housing program, with all the handicaps of priorities and competition with other war demands, came to the point where it had to be pressed forward.

Between July of 1941 and November of 1942, priorities were given to private companies for building 31,823 family units. Up to June of 1942 these were coming on the market at the rate of 500 a month, after that at the rate of 1,000 a month. These houses are listed at the War Housing Center, with preference given to incoming war workers. These privately built houses may not rent for over $50 a unit or sell for over $6,000 a dwelling. Recent directives of the WPB and NHA which affect housing location with respect to sewer and water facilities and travel time have been mapped by the Planning Commission to guide the FHA in processing housing projects. In the Washington Metropolitan Area no new houses will be built where more than two hours' travel is required daily to and from the principal government buildings


POTOMAC
RIVER
ALEXANDRIA
N
NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING COMMISSION
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA
SCALE OF MILES
DECEMBER 1942

in the central area, or in Arlington County, Virginia, to reach the Pentagon War Department building. Such housing must be built within or immediately contiguous to areas already served by water mains and sanitary sewers.

In all, according to the Washington Housing Association, private industry will provide accommodation for about 110,000 persons, allowing four persons to the family and public housing will provide for about 50,000 more persons in permanent, demountable and demolishable dwellings. About 20,000 persons will be housed in dormitories. It is estimated that about 100,000 live in 12,000 rooming and boarding houses within the District of Columbia. Since it is estimated that there are about 360,000 newcomers in Washington and its environs since January, 1940, even these provisions would seem to fall short by some 80,000.

And so a program of conversion of existing houses into suitable accommodations for families has been started. In many cities there have been bitter fights as to whether these structurally converted houses should be allowed in districts zoned for single family detached dwellings. The Planning Commission has been able so far to forestall such proposals in Washington. A map has been prepared (see page 102) showing the areas within which properties are eligible for consideration under the National Housing Agency's Home Leasing and Conversion Program. Houses legally may be converted within the eleven districts shown on the map. After the war these converted houses will all be in districts now zoned for multi-family dwellings and so will cause no postwar complications. On December 10, 1942, the Federal Government signed its first lease under the housing conversion program after it had previously approved architect's plans for a nine-room house on M Street. The red brick house, built in 1870, is leased for seven years to the government, with a three-year renewal clause, but in no event will the government continue to lease the place more than two years after the President declares the war ended. The government will pay the costs of remodeling the place to create three separate apartments each containing a bathroom.

The Planning Commission is now preparing a map of the Washington Metropolitan Area for use by the National Housing Agency in locating future public housing projects. The NHA is requesting the preparation of similar maps by planning commissions where future housing projects are contemplated. (See page 104.)

And so, for all the earlier mistakes, similar to those in other war-congested areas, plans of procedure are being worked out which should hold future permanent developments to the Washington Plan, make possible the development of temporary or emergency housing which will make the most of existing facilities and involve the least drain on critical materials, and generally leave postwar Washington with a minimum of permanent war scars.

Reorganization of the National Capital Park and Planning Commission and the Situation in Montgomery County, Maryland

Last year we reported on the pending study of the National Capital Park and Planning Commission which was being made by the Bureau of the Budget at the request of the President. This report has not yet been made public; but on September 17, 1942, Brig. General U. S. Grant, 3d, was administered the oath of office as a member of the National Capital Park and Planning Commission, to succeed Hon. Frederic A. Delano, who with General Grant (then Colonel) was a member of the original Commission appointed by President Coolidge in 1926. For seven years, from 1926 to 1933, General Grant, as Director of Public Buildings and Public Parks, served the Commission as Executive Officer. For sixteen years, Mr. Delano served the Commission as one of the four citizens to be appointed by the President, during most of that time as Chairman of the Commission. General Grant has now been elected Chairman of the Commission. Arthur E. Demaray, Associate Director of the National Park Service, is now acting as Vice-Chairman and Executive Officer. Charles W. Eliot served the Commission as Director of Planning from 1926–1933 when he was succeeded by John Nolen, Jr. No doubt the Report of the Bureau of the Budget will be made public early in 1943.

Following the Report of the Brookings Institution on The Government of Montgomery County, Maryland, recommending a new charter, a charter committee was authorized at the November elections to prepare and submit to the people a proposed reorganization of Montgomery County. Without prejudice to the principal proposals in the Report, the American Planning and Civic Association, in its April, 1942 PLANNING AND CIVIC COMMENT, took exception to the proposals for the planning set-up. The Maryland National Capital Park and Planning Commission, covering the part of the Washington Metropolitan Area which lies in Montgomery and Prince Georges Counties, Maryland, has cooperated closely with the National Capital Park and Planning Commission to effect a coördinated Metropolitan Plan, and, under the Capper-Cramton Act has developed park and parkways extensions of District parks and parkways which are a distinct credit to the Metropolitan Area. It is the opinion of the Board of Directors of the American Planning and Civic Association that some responsible, adequately financed planning agency should serve the Metropolitan District of Washington which lies in Maryland. When the new charter is prepared, it is hoped that such provision will be made.

IN THE STATES

STATE PLANNING

Postwar Planning from the State Viewpoint

JAMES J. HARRISON, Chairman Arkansas State Planning Board; State Director, Office of Government Reports, Little Rock, Ark.

IN APRIL of 1941 I attended at Memphis a meeting of eleven Southern States called by the Office of Production Management to discuss sub-contracting and distribution of war industries. Fortified with Jonathan Daniels' article in *McCall's*, illustrated with a chart showing the war expenditures all piled up in the highly industrial regions of the Nation, we emotional Southerners put our traditional courtesy in the ice-box and tore into the visiting brasshats with the enthusiasm of participants in a Beale Street pleasure fight on Saturday night.

We were not polite and we were in deadly earnest. We pointed with pride to the South's comparative record in furnishing volunteers for the armed forces. But we made it clear we were not only going to furnish more than our quota of fighting men, we were going to fight for a chance to furnish some of the machines of war.

Three days after that meeting, OPM adopted formally the statement of policy which had been incubating for many weeks, providing for distribution throughout the Nation of scores of new units in the arsenal of democracy. Today, my home city of Little Rock, the capital of Arkansas, sits in the center of a circle of great military activity. Within a radius of thirty-five miles there are five major war industries and an army replacement center for 25,000 troops. The final capital outlay for the war effort within this small but vital area will probably total $250,000,000.

This concentration of war industry in our State has been influenced by many factors. Probably chief among them has been the attitude of a new governor who was doubtless familiar with the story of the pious old darky who greatly wanted a turkey for Thanksgiving. He earnestly prayed the Lord to send him a turkey but there was no evidence of divine interest in his petition. Faith was faltering when, two nights before Thanksgiving, he hit upon a new approach to his problem. "Oh Lord," he prayed, "I'se been asking you to send me a turkey every night for a week and nothin' ain't happened. If there ain't a turkey in the coop in the morning, please send this ole nigger *after* a turkey."

Governor Adkins and our entire Congressional delegation, working as a team, have led an aggressive, intelligent, fact-fortified campaign to convince responsible officials that adequate resources of manpower, materials and electric energy are available in our State to guarantee a

substantial contribution to the war effort. The key idea in the Arkansas approach has not been merely, "What can we get?" but "How can we help win the war?"

High in the governor's confidence has been the State Planning Board and its Engineer-Director, L. A. Henry, a man with an orderly mind and a passion for accurate and adequate data. The existence in the Planning Board and other agencies of the state government of a reservoir of essential data required by the army and the War Production Board increased manyfold our chances for favorable consideration as the general staff set in motion its program of decentralizing war industry. Unlike the ill-favored crap-shooter who complained of his luck, that if it rained soup he would be caught without a spoon, Arkansas was prepared when Hitler began remaking the industrial map of America.

I am told that when Gen. Marshall looked at the prospectus prepared under our Planning Board's direction for the first proposed army camp in Arkansas he remarked that it was the most complete and the freest from non-essential material that he had then examined.

At the Memphis conference the refrain of the Southerners was "Give us a share in the production of war materials with all the benefits and all the headaches such a program will bring in its wake." Well, we are getting a goodly number of industries in Arkansas and we are already beginning to think what our problems and opportunities will be when those "bluebirds are over the White Cliffs of Dover."

In April of 1942, 15 past presidents of the Little Rock Chamber of Commerce were organized into a postwar planning council for the new industrial area with a 35-mile radius to which I have referred. On the day of the organization of this committee the County Judge of Pulaski County, our chief administrative official at the county level, without knowledge of the steps we were taking at the Chamber of Commerce, was making a trip through one of the new war plants. A day later he wrote the State Planning Board the following letter:

> Dear Mr. Henry:
>
> I traversed the inner area of our Jacksonville Ordnance Plant yesterday, in company with our local health officials, and my most instant reaction was one of speculation as to what use can be made of those remarkable facilities after the present war ends. One particular province of our planning boards is to apply intelligent thinking to the problem presented by such situations as the one at Jacksonville.
>
> Of course, this is no new thought to you, but I am suggesting that we try to pierce the veil of the future and foresee what logical thing may be done in salvaging such gigantic outlay in energy and wealth. For instance, more than one hundred miles of beautiful black-top roads interlace this area, about thirty-five miles of railroad trackage, many thousands of lineal feet of pipe, hundreds of buildings, etc. My one object in writing you is merely to emphasize this impending problem.

No publicity on these thoughts is necessary or timely, but perhaps a session or two of our planning boards, jointly convened, might start something, thus early. I will be glad to discuss this with you soon.

Fraternally,

C. P. Newton

But a more significant incident was related to me in May of 1942 by a Little Rock business man. An aggressive, energetic chap has a contract to haul garbage from Camp Joseph T. Robinson. His disposal plant is his farm where he raises hogs. Every day he drives past this big thirty-million-dollar ordnance plant described by the County Judge. He said to the business man:

"Mr. Lyons, what are we going to do with that big Jacksonville plant when we knock the ears off Hitler?"

"I don't know, Bill, but a lot of men are thinking about the same thing. Have you got any ideas?"

"Well," said Bill reflectively, "it would make one heluva hog ranch."

I submit that Bill's attitude is the priceless ingredient in any realistic approach to postwar planning and action. Bill looks as audacious as Gen. Brehon Somervell, another native son of Little Rock, and the top logistics expert in the army, when seen against the background of our Chamber of Commerce meeting.

There the discussion turned almost at once to plans for getting the workers in the war plants out of town as soon as the war ends. Here in an organization which has devoted years of effort and thousands of dollars to increasing population and payrolls were able and public-spirited men with the sterile idea that the way to meet the challenge of the postwar world is to send everybody back to the place from whence he came as soon as the war ends.

It would not be fair to the business leadership of Little Rock to stop here. The demobilizers who are looking for a sound formula to reduce the population and payrolls in our industrial centers when the war ends may be nearer the core of reality than some of us are willing to concede. But also in our Little Rock council are men who even now are considering the audacious idea of recapturing our highly respected Chief of Engineers, Maj. Gen. Eugene Reybold, at the war's end and returning him to our Capital City, which was his last station before he was called to the general staff. This group of planners would make Gen. Reybold our peacetime industrial chief of staff in Arkansas. We know the job would make a strong appeal to him for the double reason that he has so many warm friends there and he knows, as William Allen White has said:

Arkansas is the State of this generation and the next. . . . Here is Tomorrow in the rough. Your forests, your healing springs, your minerals, your agriculture are bound to expand into a new beauty and happiness for the generation now coming into its own.

My discussion is based on certain assumptions. The first, of course, is complete military victory for the United Nations. Defeat is unthinkable and a stalemate completely unacceptable to victory-hungry free men in all nations. I assume that victory will be sealed with a peace treaty of realistic idealism. I hold with Fosdick that the sentimentalists are the unrealistic hard-heads who put their faith in the vindictive creed of "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." In my book, the realists are the men who have discovered the sound economic and political principles embraced in the idealism of the Golden Rule: "Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so to them." I am impressed and encouraged by the statement of this point of view by Vice-President Wallace in his recent New York speech.

In the next place I hold that isolationism is as dead as slavery; that further great and unpredictable shifts are coming in the balance of economic and political power; that the inescapable destiny of the United States is a very high place in a council of nations which must restore order in the world, with freedom. I reject the honest skepticism of President Hutchins that "the reason why we have no chance to help humanity if we go into this war is that we are unprepared—morally and intellectually unprepared—to execute the moral mission to which the President calls us."

Finally I hold that our staunch domestic economy having withstood the extremes of unparalleled idleness and activity within this decade, can make the transition from a war to a peace economy without the necessity of a depression. True, I hear voices raised in support of the idea that a terrific tailspin is inevitable but that we can survive it because of our proved capacity to travel by roller coaster. Some even support the program of letting nature take its course, probably acting on the theory of the country doctor who was an unusual specialist. When confronted by a baffling condition he always sought to produce convulsions in the patient because as he put it, "I can always cure fits."

The fundamental test of planning at any level is integrity. This is a noble word with an honorable lineage. Integrity comes from a word associated with our childhood study of arithmetic: Integer, a whole number; a number that is not a fraction.

The problems that loom ahead cannot be handled with a fraction of our imagination, courage and driving power. The decade ahead is not one to reward half-hearted men nor half-baked ideas. It will require our total audacity, devotion and staying power if we justify the bitter price paid by gallant men for our freedom to plan and build a society worthy of their sacrifices.

No one can speak too confidently about the mental and spiritual temper of our postwar world but I believe we will all agree that John Citizen is going to examine our plans for his welfare with a cool and calculating eye. The men who come home from a great crusade in

distant lands are not going to be easy marks for slogans, and no one is going to have any luck trying to push them around.

The test of integrity automatically sets up certain minimum standards by which to gauge public acceptance of our plans for a postwar America. The first of these standards is utility. Our citizens are not going to be interested in building pyramids. And it will be difficult to harness young men, who for months have been rising up on wings as eagles, to dull, unimaginative boon-doggles, the sole justification of which is to provide meal tickets for the unemployed. Our program for full employment must have an eye to the quality of that employment and to the public usefulness and need of the work done.

In the hard years ahead of us we must fight without ceasing for every man's right to a job at which he can earn an honest wage and educate his children. Idleness can be more destructive than war. It not only destroys God-given energies, it destroys the spirits of men. The man-hours of productive labor lost during the depression of the thirties cost the Nation more than the war bill will likely run. Following the war, idleness will again be the arch enemy of the Nation and our people will not want to fight this new war with rakes and wheelbarrows.

The first obligation of planners, public and private, at all levels from hemispheric to local, is to propose useful and needed programs. A decent respect for the dignity of labor and the worthiness of human personality places upon us the obligation to meet this hard test. We dare not fail.

A second standard by which the integrity of our planning will be judged is economy. Harry Hopkins' sound thesis of 1936 that "We spend to save" is already obsolete in 1942 in the furnace heat of war production. If we achieve and maintain full employment in the postwar period we shall again save to spend. However disappointed many of us may be with some of his inaccuracies and exaggerations there has arisen in the land another Prophet Harry—Sen. Harry E. Byrd—whose voice is heard with increasing approval by the people of this country because of his oft-repeated refrain: "Save or perish."

The instinct to save is written deep in human nature. It is stupid to ignore it. It is tied up with the strongest emotions of our lives. As Will Durant has said, "The basis of any economy that succeeds is a man's love for his children." Our plans for a bright, new world must be informed with the steady common sense of a business associate of mine who invariably poses two questions concerning every deal considered: "What will it cost?" and "Where will we get the money?"

I know that we New Dealers are said to lack respect for money, especially the other fellow's money. Indeed one of my Arkansas friends is fond of saying that we Liberals earned our label because of this vicarious generosity. But while I hold that this Nation has moved into an economy where a drop of honest sweat outweighs a dollar in our

war for survival, dollars are going to be respected in this country for a long time to come, and the ownership of a goodly supply of them is going to be a useful and pleasant experience.

Our planners, therefore, will be well advised to consider the steadily rising tide of public sentiment in this country for sound, justifiable, economical expenditures. I predict that this sentiment for public economy will continue rising in direct ratio to the increased tax burdens imposed on individual citizens.

Another standard we dare not ignore if we expect public acceptance of our plans is creative imagination, a combination of audacity and beauty. Framed on the wall of my office is the most satisfactory statement of this principle I have ever seen. It is Daniel Burnham's stirring admonition:

> Make no little plans. They have no magic to stir men's blood and probably themselves will not be realized. Make big plans. Aim high in hope and work, remembering that a noble logical diagram once recorded will never die but long after we are gone will be a living thing asserting itself with ever growing insistency. Remember that our sons and grandsons are going to do things that would stagger us. Let your watchword be order and your beacon beauty.

Young men who have sailed upon and under the seven seas, who have flown over the top of the world, who have faced death in the deadly breach will not be interested in building a drab social order.

How shall we overcome the emotional let-down, the war-weariness that follows war? Where shall we find a moral equivalent for war? The answer is suggested in a sentence from the mind of Horace Bushnell, now carved above the beautiful Memorial Auditorium in Hartford which bears his name: "Life is always insipid to those who have no great works in hand nor lofty aims to elevate their feelings."

Herein lies the critical test of all our future planning. We have all the raw materials out of which to build a good society. This generation can outlaw war. Profit is going out of war as it went out of slavery. It is not cynicism but the most practical realism to point out that when there is no longer any possible profit, the saints, the crusaders, the idealists can finish the job of outlawing war as they did slavery.

But men must fight. Have we the audacity, the creative imagination, the undiscourageable faith to turn the restless, soaring spirits of men to a crusade against war itself? Against corruption in public life? Against organized crime? Against ignorance? Against disease? Against poverty? Against the destructive acid of civilization—idleness?

Leaving out all the heroic phrases, how about turning loose just plain, homespun gumption on the problem of illiteracy or syphilis or malnutrition? Listen to the testimony of Sir John Orr, British Food Minister: "The trouble with you parents is that you raise your children not for profit but for love, and so you don't care about them. If you raised them like little hogs, you would build a marvelous human race."

I asked a thoughtful banker of my home city, a graduate of one of the great universities, if there is a moral equivalent for war. "I don't know the answer to that one," he replied, "but I am sure the people have the answer and that it is affirmative. They will give the answer to any leadership that commands their unreserved confidence, and no leadership will win nor deserve that confidence unless it has a blueprint for the future so clear, so beneficent, so sound that men understand it and greatly desire to see it translated into a program of action."

In testing the integrity of our plans for the postwar world there abideth utility, economy, audacity, these three, but the greatest of these is audacity. But let the moral philosophers remind us again that the only unexplored area for adventure is in the realm of doing good to men and not evil. There are no new sins. Babylon knew everything our most dissolute moderns know. If you want to get into unexplored country, it is in the realm of goodness. Hitler and the other Axis gangsters are reworking the old, dark, abysmal shafts of man's depravity. We must stake out a new claim. All I have said, if valid, applies with equal force to planning at every level from local to hemispheric. But it takes no account of the imperative matter of effective teamwork between private and public agencies.

In Arkansas where we brag on Wendell Willkie and vote for Franklin Roosevelt, I made the first Willkie speech I ever heard. I even beat Gen. Hugh Johnson to the nomination of Mr. Willkie by the Republicans. Before the Rotary Club of Little Rock early in 1940 I joined in debate with my warm friend and golf partner, the Republican National Committeeman Wallace Townsend, on the question of picking standard-bearers for the two great parties. Being in an expansive mood I not only chose F. D. R. as my champion but to the great discomfiture of my friendly adversary, who was devoted to Senator Taft, I picked Mr. Willkie to carry the Republican banner.

I was moved to admiration of Mr. Willkie by his candid, trenchant discussion of what later became the central theme of his interesting and nearly successful campaign: "Business and government must cooperate if we are to preserve our American system."

When we define business as a triangle embracing management, labor and consumers, that theme song is more vital, dynamic and imperative today than when Mr. Willkie first raised his unmusical but earnest voice in the Chicago stockyards in the summer of 1940.

As a matter of fact, under the compelling urgency of a war of survival we are today seeing the most effective teamwork between public officials and leaders of industry, labor and agriculture that our country has probably ever known. The matter is put this way by a brilliant Arkansas editor, C. F. Byrns of Ft. Smith, writing in the *Southwest Times-Record* of May 17:

People are too much inclined to believe there must be a great depression

after this war. They believe that chiefly because there always has been a depression after every war. But a lot of things we thought were so, aren't so. I think this "inevitable depression" idea is one of them. Management and government are working together now as never before, to achieve a common objective. Lessons of infinite value in coöperative effort are being learned. Those lessons can be carried over into the peace. The key to after-war prosperity is intelligent use of our opportunities. Bungling can bring depression, just as bungling can bring defeat. But intelligent use of our capacities can bring us victory in the peace just as it can bring us victory in the war.

Are public officials at the various levels of government making equal progress in teamwork? Is there a growing or diminishing anxiety regarding the invasion of state's rights? Is Federal interference endangering the public welfare?

It is well known to every one of us that plans, nobly conceived and meeting the fundamental test of integrity, depend for their successful execution upon what in the army is called "coördination of line and staff."

Going up to Albany in 1928 to the notification of Gov. Alfred E. Smith as Democratic nominee for the Presidency, I had an interesting talk with Gen. Henry T. Allen, who commanded the 90th Division in France. I had been on special duty with the Division for a short time while it was in training at San Antonio and had read with great pride that on the day the Armistice was signed a battalion of the 90th Division was the farthest advanced unit of the A. E. F. behind the German lines. I asked Gen. Allen what he regarded as the secret of his division's fine performance under fire. He replied:

It was coördination of line and staff. I determined at the beginning of our training that every officer in the division, whether in the Medical Corps, Signal Corps, Quartermaster's or wherever, should know the duties and dangers of the private soldier in the ranks. Battles, like football games, are won by a combination of sound strategy, superb physical condition, great fighting spirit and faultless teamwork. And the indispensable element is teamwork.

Here in the home State of the University of Notre Dame is a good place to be reminded of what Rockne once said when he thought his brilliant backfield, the Four Horsemen, were getting more than their share of head-lines for hard-won team victories. Said Rockne:

Don't overlook those seven mules in the line. They are up in front where the game is being played.

Well, gentlemen, it is going to take all the fire and spirit of the Federal horsemen and all the steadiness of the state mules to win World War III—the war against inflation and idleness.

As chairman of the Arkansas State Planning Board I pledge without reservation the diligent, continuous, self-examining, open-minded co-

ordination of our efforts with those of national, regional and local bodies because I so steadfastly believe with Henry Van Dyke that

> . . . the glory of the Present is to make the Future free,—
> We love our land for what she is and what she is to be.

State Planning in the Present Emergency

FREDERICK P. CLARK, Executive Director, New Hampshire State Planning and Development Commission

THERE are a total of over forty state planning agencies in the country ranging from very active to almost inactive. In discussing the contribution which these agencies can make in the present emergency, we must realize that it will vary largely from State to State depending upon its type of program, organization and staff. Many States have already been making very important contributions, but others are practically inactive and cannot be counted on.

As a background for my remarks I should like to describe the organization of the New Hampshire State Planning and Development Commission, which is different from agencies in other States. This agency combines the function of planning with that of economic promotion. In other words, we not only conduct research and develop plans, but also have a staff engaged in promoting actively the development of the State. Last fall both these activities were placed under the direction of the State Planning Director, in line with the feeling of our Commission that the only sound program of developing the resources of the State was the carrying out of a state plan.

Increasingly, the preparation of state-wide plans is preceding activities in promotion of New Hampshire's growth and development. In some States having a similar combination of functions, the planning activity has been subordinated to the promotional work and acts largely as a service agency to the economic development activity. This appears to be unfortunate, and something that time and further experience will change. Planning should be primarily creative in its nature, if progress is to result from its activity.

State planning in New Hampshire is adequately financed and has been integrated into the governmental structure of the State so that there is an increasing effective utilization of the planning agency's work.

Thus it was that when New Hampshire established a State Council of Defense, the Governor made the planning commission the planning arm of the Defense Council and included postwar planning as one of its chief assignments. By making the state planning commission the postwar planning agency of the State, not only is unwise duplication avoided but the state planning agency is recognized as the central planning group of the State making unnecessary the multitude of special planning agencies.

State planning is a function equally important in war and in peace. If anything, it is of greater importance in times of stress, since decisions are made more hurriedly and, for soundness, require background of all available facts and plans wherever possible. There is no question that state planning boards can contribute to the war effort. Since

the war is upon us, the type of contribution of any given state planning agency should largely be determined, however, by the type of work it is now doing and has been able to do successfully, and upon the type of practical working relationship it now has with the work of other state agencies. It is impractical to expect that any planning agency can, overnight, change into a different sort of organization and do a type of work different from what it has been up to now.

Emphasis should be laid on doing one or two things well, rather than spreading the planning staff thin and trying to be of help wherever any agency requests assistance. That there is constant pressure that this be done, we know from experience. The New Hampshire planning commission has a definite agreement with the State Council of Defense as to what it is expected to do and in which it will assist.

I am also firmly convinced that state planning will make no contribution in this emergency by merely doing the routine chores of State Defense Councils. Its contribution, if it is to be one, must be research and planning upon which the war program can better proceed.

The contribution of state planning agencies should include both assistance in meeting the immediate war effort, and planning for the postwar period. Let us take the immediate effort first. It is here that we must place our emphasis at the present. State planning agencies can help now in several ways: (1) Assemble and make available all useful data and plans on the resources of the State potentially useful to the war effort. (2) Aid in planning solutions to problems caused by the war—transportation, housing, recreation, sanitation, water supply and so forth. Planning agencies cannot afford to wait until asked for such information and assistance because most recently established war agencies have little conception of the existence of planning boards. Our Commission in New Hampshire found that one of the best ways of getting planning information used by Federal war agencies is to make it available through the National Resources Planning Board which usually has excellent contacts with such Federal agencies. When not already the case, state planning boards should obtain formal working agreements with their State Defense Councils, so that planning information and studies can be put to direct use at the state level.

To illustrate these types of planning board assistance to the war program, three specific activities of the New Hampshire planning commission may be mentioned. The first of these is the New Hampshire State Airways Plan. As part of our general state planning work we have been studying the transportation system of the State and had done some preliminary work on a state airways plan. With the general trend toward war becoming increasingly evident, the Commission saw the need for completing this portion of the State Plan and putting it in the hands of the Federal officials who would be determining the location for new airports throughout the country. This was done, with the coöperation

of our State Aeronautics Commission and made available to the Civil Aeronautics Authority, which incorporated it as the New Hampshire portion of their National Airports Plan. Today, every airport being built in connection with the war program in New Hampshire is in substantial accordance with the State Airways Plan, with the result that, when the war is over, these airports have been located in places where they will be proper and adequate for the civil air travel needs of our area. In this way, state planning has assisted in getting the emergency needs met in such a way as to contribute to the lasting benefit of the State.

Another example of state planning contribution to the present emergency is our research and planning relative to mineral resources and production. For many years the lack of knowledge as to our state's mineral resources was becoming increasingly evident. Our state planning commission made a survey and study of the present economic value of the state's mineral resources. This was done with the coöperation of the staffs of our State University and Dartmouth College. Much information was secured which is the basis of present war production of essential minerals in New Hampshire. Mica, most of which has previously come from India and which now is largely cut off by Japanese conquest in Burma, is found in great quantity in New Hampshire, and fine new supplies were disclosed by our investigations. By virtue of forward-looking on the part of our Commission, information was available which permitted getting into war production of mica, beryl, and related minerals without loss of precious time in basic investigations. Of course, some States have mining bureaus which are doing this particular type of investigation, but this illustrates the type of timely work most state planning agencies are in a position to contribute. A third example of New Hampshire planning activity related to the war effort is in connection with our surveys of industrial resources and facilities. Because our agency has for some time concerned itself with the economic resources of our State as a basic part of our work, we had made a rather complete inventory of our plants available for war work, and of the products of the State needed by the armed forces. This information was made available in the very beginning to the OPM and later to the WPB so that, by virtue of having the facts on hand and having a staff ready to help in using the facts, we have been able to put our resources to greater use in behalf of the war effort than would otherwise be possible.

Throughout the country many communities are being rapidly expanded to provide for war production workers, or to meet needs of nearby army or navy establishments. The confusion, waste, and problems arising out of such situations have become a familiar story. Without proper planning, time, effort and money essential to the war effort are wasted. In addition, lack of planning lays the groundwork for serious postwar difficulties. Adequately staffed and financed local planning

agencies can help meet this problem in a considerable number of areas, but in many important regions no such local planning agency exists. In those areas, the state planning agency can be of invaluable assistance, as has been evidenced in many cities throughout the country.

The New Hampshire planning commission has provided effective aid in three war centers of our State. In the state's primary defense area, surrounding the Portsmouth Navy Yard, our commission completed a regional plan late in December 1941. The study is concerned with both the present problems of the region and the postwar opportunities and needs for development. This is now in use by Federal, state and local agencies concerned in various ways in the military and civil problems of the area. The National Resources Planning Board provided consulting and other assistance in this defense area study, which was sponsored by the regional association covering that part of the State. (This is one of five organized and operating in New Hampshire.)

In two other defense areas, assistance has been provided in making studies of defense housing problems, and plans for adequately meeting these situations have been used in avoiding difficulties and in securing the best development, from the standpoint of both Federal and local officials.

Among other things, these city planning studies showed the availability of unused streets, water mains, sewers, schools, recreational and other public facilities, which could be used in developing new housing. In these communities the provision of housing is being expedited, and critical materials needed for the war effort are not being used needlessly for new streets, water mains, sewer systems, schools and other similar facilities. The communities assisted recognize that this planning assistance has saved them many thousands of dollars, as well as financial difficulty after the war when boom populations deflate.

Although our main emphasis must be on aiding the war effort, state planning should also give attention *now* to providing the basis for postwar readjustment and progress. A possible outline for such consideration might be as follows:

1. Ways in which facilities built for the war effort can fit into normal civilian needs after the war. The industrial facilities which have been built and are still being built should be quite carefully examined to determine those which have a potential use in civilian production after the war. Many should probably be considered temporary only and abandoned, but others should be converted to peacetime production. The effect of permanent change in distribution of working population should, however, be thoroughly analyzed in this connection. Military airports and other emergency transportation facilities will, in many cases, have permanent value. Where state airport and other transportation plans have been a basis of such development, such future use is assured.

2. Ways in which available labor can be effectively used, both during the readjustment period and later. This involves both the problems of amount and location of labor supply to be readjusted to peacetime production. Not only has a great proportion of labor changed to other than normal *types* of production, but a great proportion has shifted to new *places* of work and residence for the duration of the war. Study must be given to the question of whether the new distribution of population and production is to be retained, merely shifting to peacetime products, or whether an effort is to be made to return to the prewar distribution of population and industry. Undoubtedly, both these forces will be in operation. There is a great need for state and local planning agencies to carefully study the advantages and disadvantages of holding to the new distribution of labor and industry in each section of the country. The industrial location studies which the National Resources Planning Board has had under way for some time should be of definite value as soon as they can be made available.

In New Hampshire as well as other States, workers have been siphoned out of certain communities, which do not have war industries, and some nonwar industries are being forced out of business for the duration, with often a question whether they will resume after the war. Such communities are in danger of becoming economically stranded and considerable study and assistance need to be given these places. Our New Hampshire planning commission has been making a study and is determining the areas of declining available manpower and the industries which have gone or expect to go out of business for lack of materials, markets or manpower. This is giving our commission a picture of the areas which require primary assistance from our industrial division.

Our commission is also completing a survey of all war contracts and sub-contracts in the State to determine the change from civilian to war production, so that we will have some idea of the amount, type, and location of reconversion or conversion which will be necessary after the war.

On the other hand, New Hampshire, like many other States, has areas of increased concentration of workers, many from other sections of the country. Our primary area, around the Portsmouth Navy Yard, has already been referred to. Many thousands of very skilled workers have been gathered here from all over the United States. We have been giving preliminary consideration to the possibility and desirability of retaining at least a portion of this manpower in the area, when it is released from war production. Of course, many of these workers will want to return to their home communities, others are not of a type which the region would benefit in keeping. But we are studying plans for new peacetime industrial activity which will permit employment of those who desire to stay. Tentative studies are being made for an "industrial estate," developed as a private venture, in the general region of the

Navy Yard, so as to continue use of the additional housing and other public facilities which have been constructed. Types of industry in the "estate" will be based on skills of workers likely to be released from the Navy Yard, and on natural resources or markets available.

3. Plans for constructive use of manpower and wise development of state and regions. To meet unemployment resulting during the transition period, a well-planned public works program is essential. State planning boards should be concerning themselves with state programs and coöperating at the local level of government with the work of the local Programming Section of the NRPB. In New Hampshire, our commission has coöperated with the Governor and Legislature in instituting a state capital budget and six-year public works program. This was adopted in 1941 and we are now working on the revision of the capital program for submission to the 1943 Legislature.

We are making a detailed study of state institutional building needs as part of this work and are completing our state plan for public recreational area development which will serve as a guide at the Federal, state and local levels in New Hampshire. Our state plan for airport and airways development also fits into this program, as does our series of regional development plans now in progress. The regional development plans are being prepared under the sponsorship of our state's regional development associations. The technical planning staff is being made available from our commission, and each regional plan will fit into our comprehensive state plan. The staff is made available to the regional organizations without any strings attached, on a basis similar to that of the NRPB when it first stimulated the organization of state planning by furnishing consultants. We have, as mentioned previously, completed one regional plan; the report has been published and is now being used by that regional organization.

4. Needed research. Another way in which state planning can contribute to postwar planning, readjustment and development is by research into uses of the state's resources. Our New Hampshire planning commission has a small revolving fund provided by our Legislature and matched by private contributions for research into utilization of the wood-waste resulting from use of one of our state's principal natural resources—forests. This research is in the direction of plastics, and is proving successful. Patents have been applied for. Fees received from licensing use of these patents, now and after the war, will be put into further research to benefit the State. The State of Washington has provided a similar type of fund to its state planning board, although larger and available for use on a broader basis than our fund.

A critical evaluation of state planning is needed. State planning agencies are helping increasingly during the war emergency. However, more of this help should be in the nature of distinct *planning* contributions and less of work which could really be done by other state agencies.

In closing I would like to urge that now might be a good time to make an impartial critical evaluation of the state planning which has been under way these past several years, perhaps under the auspices of an agency such as the ASPO. Each of the state planning boards has been largely feeling its own way during this time, developing its own conception of what state planning is, or should be. Many reports have been issued as to what these agencies were doing and they sound impressive. But what work of actual value and use is being done, is sometimes another story. Certainly appropriations to planning boards throughout the country do not reflect a belief on the part of Legislatures that state planning boards are as useful as they might be.

Through such critical evaluation the best experience of each board could be made available to all the States, and each would, I am sure, be able to prepare and conduct a much more effective program. This should be done at the earliest possible moment. It will not help state planning in this moment's emergency, but it would aid in more effective planning in the vital years ahead. We can't afford to mark time in state planning.

WILLIAM D. PRICE, Executive Director, Tennessee State Planning Commission

IN THE present emergency, planning has succeeded brilliantly, and it has failed dismally. Production planning has made an outstanding record. Military planning has, on occasion, met with great success. Planning, as we at this conference conventionally think of it, has also had its moments. On the other hand, we planners have failed, in many respects, to shoulder our full responsibilities and make the most of our opportunities.

I presume that state planning means what state planners and state planning boards or commissions do. So far as I know, no one has yet delimited exactly the functions of state planning at any time—much less when it is confronted with rapidly changing emergency conditions. Certainly, the recent circular of the National Resources Planning Board dealing with current programs of work of state planning boards shows considerable variation in the activities of the different States. Hence, my remarks will largely deal with state planning in the present emergency as practiced in Tennessee.

One word of explanation, however, may be advisable. This is probably my last planning conference for some time. I expect to serve in the armed forces of the U. S. I hope to return to the field of state planning when the war is over, because I am firmly convinced of the indispensability of the planning process. But, paraphrasing the poet Robert Burns, "the plans of men go aft agley," and I am going to take this opportunity to make a few observations about planning in general.

A year ago in Philadelphia I had the pleasure of participating in a panel discussion of "State and Local Planning Boards and Defense." Two of the other speakers here today also participated in that session. We could merely bring our papers of the Philadelphia session up-to-date and present them here today. Because, as defense changed to war, defense planning changed to war planning. The change has been one of intensity rather than of type.

The Tennessee State Planning Commission, along with most other state planning agencies, has continued to serve in various staff capacities to the state defense council. It helped to set up the rationing program in Tennessee and actually carried on the program until the State Rationing Administrator's office could be established and staffed. We have furnished data on resources to various war production agencies, assisted in the selection of sites for military training areas, and performed many similar functions. In all of these activities state planning agencies have rendered a distinct service to their States and to the Nation. Since our experience in Tennessee along these lines has probably differed little from that of other States, I will omit a detailed discussion. Instead, I propose to tell you something of our community planning program in defense areas.

In all of our work in Tennessee, we have not been able to see state planning as a distinct field from national planning or community planning. Instead we feel that activities at all three levels of government should be correlated and integrated. The State is, in reality, the sum of its communities—and effective state plans must be based on the adjusted total of community plans. We operate, therefore, on the theory that state plans, because of their extensiveness, must necessarily be carried out in small chunks over a long period of time. We are preparing the way for larger, over-all state plans by injecting as much planning technique into as many local groups as we can.

This we are doing not by a mere propaganda program but rather by demonstration—direct technical assistance to city and county planning commissions. It is in the communities that we have grappled hand to hand with the war effort—sometimes after unsound mushroom developments have taken place, sometimes when defense projects are first announced, sometimes before any public knowledge of the war project. During the present emergency, our most noteworthy contribution has been in the field of community planning.

There are fifteen major defense areas in Tennessee. All but four of them have access to and are using the tools of planning to adjust themselves to the impact of war activities. Eight areas have been assisted directly by our staff of community planners—sometimes alone, and other times in coöperation with the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Federal Housing Administration. Arrangements are now being worked out for assistance to other areas. Two of our large metropolitan

areas—Memphis and Nashville—have able and active city and county planning commissions which are handling their problems alone.

Only two defense areas in Tennessee have actually thumbed their noses at planning to seek unimpeded their conjured visions of overnight million-dollar profits. The bad conditions in both those areas have now received nation-wide publicity.

In most areas neither the communities nor our planners had sufficient foreknowledge of the defense projects. As a result, the influx of defense workers and their families usually beat our planners to the scene and considerably handicapped their efforts to do a logical community planning job. In one exceptional instance, however, we got there first. At Clarksville, Tennessee, a city of 12,000, we were able to get in on the ground floor. Clarksville in 1940 worked out with the Tennessee State Planning Commission arrangements for the preparation of a comprehensive plan at the initiation of a continuing planning program. At that time, Clarksville was untouched by the defense effort, and the desire for planning had come from other causes.

With technical assistance furnished by the State Planning Commission, basic surveys and studies were made. As is usual, a zoning ordinance was the first instrument of planning enacted. Immediately after the zoning ordinance became effective, it was announced that a 40,000-man army cantonment, designed for an ultimate 75,000, would be located about ten miles from Clarksville. The local planning commission accelerated its work. A major street plan, subdivision rules, trailer and bunkhouse regulations, a plan for locating new public buildings, suggested sites for defense housing units—all were completed before significant construction at the camp got under way.

These plans were of great assistance when the Defense Public Works, the USO, the Army Engineers, the State and city started to buy land and make plans for the new health clinic, camp access roads, and expanding water and sewer facilities. The task of all such agencies was made lighter and decisions were more quickly reached.

I have not attempted to make a complete survey, but I haven't heard of a single locality in the United States that has been as well prepared for the impact of war activities as Clarksville. Our experience in this city furnishes convincing proof of the value of a continuing planning agency in municipal government for both normal and emergency conditions.

On the other hand, the area outside Clarksville immediately adjoining the new camp was not so well prepared. As soon as the camp location was announced, a county planning commission was formed. To help prevent shoe-string developments along the main highway, a defense housing site incorporating a shopping center was selected. The site was removed from the highway but within walking distance of the camp. A master plan has been prepared for New Providence—the

village nearest to the camp. Subdivision rules and a major road plan for the entire county were adopted. A zoning resolution was prepared but failed to pass the county legislative body.

The reasons for this failure typify many of the obstacles which local planning programs are bucking. First is the reluctance of many of the local people to drop petty politics. The opposition arose, not because of hostility to the principle of zoning itself, but because of the man who supported the zoning resolution.

Another typical obstacle is the inability of rural-minded communities to grasp the significance of the tremendous changes taking place and the wisdom of preparing for these changes. As an example, the county legislative body, which failed to adopt zoning, set next year's tax rate at the same figure as this year's. Yet, they were fully aware that the area purchased for the camp site has already decreased the total assessed valuation in the county by approximately a million and a half dollars. And, incidentally, this tax rate which has been maintained for several years has produced a deficit each year varying from $3,000 to $18,000.

Another obstacle which entered into the failure of county zoning in this case is lack of interest on the part of the army. After laboring two or three months with the technical preparation for zoning and in building public opinion to the point of accepting zoning, we asked the army to write a forceful letter to the county legislative body, urging the passage of the zoning resolution. The resolution incorporated the army's desire for stringent regulations regarding the location of "honky-tonks" and similar uses which considerably reduce the effectiveness of the Military Police. The local people were willing to make a real financial sacrifice to better conditions surrounding the army camp. However, the support given by the army was less than nothing. The forceful letter we had requested was not addressed to the Montgomery County Court but a weak-kneed letter was finally sent to the Tennessee State Planning Commission in Nashville. The wishy-washy tone of the letter is best expressed by its last sentence. I quote, "My congratulations and best wishes in the complete adoption of your proposed zoning regulations."

The situation at Clarksville where hundreds of new residents appear overnight to seek living accommodations, is the familiar type of problem encountered by most of the defense-affected communities in Tennessee. However, there is another type of problem which we have confronted that is directly opposite in character. This is the situation where no defense contracts or training centers have been awarded a locality. As a result, the community's population is siphoned away. In Johnson City, Tennessee, this trend became apparent and the city planning commission, to which we are furnishing technical assistance, made the first move toward combatting the problem by appointing a special committee to study the situation and to report on the economic picture.

This committee was formed jointly with the Chamber of Commerce

and was named the War Adjustment Committee. Its duties were to study and to suggest those adjustments which local business and industry must necessarily make as the Nation's economy shifted from peace production to war effort. The principal finding of the committee was that industrial employment was decreasing because few of the major industries had war contracts. Its recommendation, which is now being carried out, called for active participation on the part of the community in getting new industries established to permit Johnson City to play a part in meeting this country's war needs. The possibility of a metal industry is being investigated. This industry would refine raw materials, cast the metals in local foundries, then machine the parts in local machine shops, and ship the final parts to the aircraft assembly plants.

The Johnson City planning commission worked out suggestions for improving the business section to better its competitive position. A needed street extension was the first major improvement to be studied. The study has been completed, and maps and a report have been turned over to the city legislative body for action.

The third type of defense-affected community with which we have dealt are those within the flooding zone of TVA reservoirs. While the Douglas Dam controversy was being aired in the Nation's press, careful preparations were going forward to save the town of Dandridge from flooding. When the dam was finally given the "go sign," Dandridge was ready with its program which was accepted by the Tennessee Valley Authority. Two other communities near Knoxville will likewise be flooded. Local planning commissions have become accepted in the TVA areas as the logical bodies for handling the relocation problem.

Most of the problems which our community planning program has encountered in the present emergency fall into one of the three foregoing categories. We have been able to meet them with varying degrees of success, and we feel that the cause of planning has been greatly advanced in Tennessee. At the same time, we have been able to make a contribution to the war effort by helping to bring about the necessary adjustments in community life with the least possible disruption.

The present emergency furnishes a golden opportunity for state planning boards to sponsor local planning. Developments are taking place so rapidly that the general public can see plans made, see them carried out, and see the effects of not having them carried out. It is now that concrete results, previously so difficult for the planner to point to, replace the written reports which have never dented the public's skull.

But I believe we are failing to make the most of our opportunity because of the lack of effective planning leadership in the national government. Much of our work on the state and local levels of planning is made exceedingly difficult, and in some cases impossible, because of the lack of "down-to-earth" national planning.

On none of the defense projects in Tennessee does there seem to have been any over-all planning on a broad scale. Each agency responsible for a part of the work has apparently tried to do a good job, but there has been no coördinated planning. A training camp is hurriedly constructed with "honky-tonks" and "juke joints" springing up without control throughout the surrounding territory. Then, after the soldiers have been moved in, there is much hurrying and scurrying about, because bad conditions are hurting the morale and physical efficiency of the men. A little forethought would have gone a long way toward avoiding such conditions in the first place.

Again, an excellent sewerage disposal plant and water system is designed for the camp, but no consideration is given to the water and sewerage problems of the nearby community which are greatly aggravated by the influx of population. And, by the time we in the States learn that the projects are to be constructed, it is too late to do much about it. We have no foreknowledge of the projects until they are publicly announced, and planning has to sneak in the back door to try to do the best it can.

I do not lay the blame on the army or the constructing agencies. They have a job to do in a hurry and they are doing it well. I think the planners are at fault for not having sold themselves sufficiently to get in on the ground floor and see that a comprehensive view is taken of the whole project. And I believe part of this failure has been due to the unwillingness of the planners to take off their gloves and go to work. In their abhorrence of becoming involved in administration they have retreated to an ivory advisory tower. It is small wonder that they are not called in when there's work to be done.

And when we in the States and localities are swamped by the vastness of the defense projects and send out an SOS for help, we are offered a few days of consulting services. If there was ever a time when we need workers instead of high-powered advisers, it is now. I am quite sure that the planning profession would have made much more rapid strides had the NRPB evolved a program for giving technical, working assistance to the States.

Closely related with this same situation has been an apparent unwillingness of the planners to mingle with the politicians. Why, I do not know. It is from the politicians that we must get our bread and butter, and it is the politicians who must take the necessary action to put our plans into effect—that is, unless we are making plans for the shelf. No one dislikes petty politics more than I, but on the whole we have found the politicians a pretty decent sort and anxious to work for the betterment of their communities when they are shown the light of day.

Finally, I think that, for planning to take its rightful place in our governmental structure, it will have to be correlated and integrated at

all levels. We need a national planning board to coördinate the plans of the States and to give technical assistance to the state planning agencies. We need state planning boards to correlate the plans of the communities and give technical assistance to community planning agencies. And we need community planning agencies—assisted by state and national governments—to carry out planning on the ground.

We need Federal-state-local financial coöperation for planning, just as we need it for health, education, welfare, highways, and agriculture. And until we recognize that need and fight for it, we will not be in position to make the most of our opportunities during war or peace.

This valedictory tirade arises from a genuine interest in the planning process and a deep concern for its future. I think we have come a long way in a short time. But we still have much distance to cover. And we will never make the grade unless we sell planning by actually demonstrating its value. And to sell planning we must have national leadership and assistance.

GEORGE G. ROSS, Director, Michigan Planning Commission

THE vital problem of the State today is what beneficial service the State can give to assist the Federal government in winning the war.

With monthly Federal defense expenditures at three billion dollars, and with a total sale of bonds to date at less than six billion dollars, and with an anticipated deficit of 49 billion, the State realizes that its most urgent job is relieving the Federal government from all possible expenditures within the State, by paying its own way. That the State may play this important role, it is also necessary for all local governments within the State to realize the importance of relieving the State from all possible local expenditures.

Many cities find themselves in the unusual position of being, through no intent of their own, the foster-father of some gigantic war industry. Many of these cities, realizing that such harassing developments falling upon them is virtually the sting of Hitler's War upon their community, have accepted it in preference to enemy bombs. Few of these cities and villages have accepted their responsibility to expand their services at their own expense. Some have purchased building and airport sites and donated properties to the war projects.

Other cities affected by war production are holding the War Department as responsible for the development and expecting the War Department to remodel their towns to meet the new demands. In many cases, this may be justified to a certain extent. However, a majority of individuals have not reached the true import of "all-out defense."

Mohammed said, "If I had two coats, I would sell one and buy white hyacinths for my soul." The chances are that he phrased that thought

during a peaceful era. In war, Mohammed would no doubt sell the last coat for the good of his body. The earlier we as an entire people realize that we too must sacrifice our coats for the preservation of our soul and body, the better will be the service as of individuals, business and municipalities to our State and our Federal government in the prosecution of the war.

Another service of as great import as that of winning the war, which the State may render, is the fiscal planning against the danger of postwar inflation through the curtailment of all avoidable expenditures, reduction of employees, reduction in purchase of supplies, and minimum maintenance. To insure against inflation, the State must retain the present tax rate, pay all debts and create a reserve.

No matter how many Mohammeds' coats are sold, or how tightly we buckle the belt, the State will be required to subsidize certain local wartime developments, in which the State Planning Commission should play a far-sighted course.

During the past year industry has exemplified the patriotism of America in conversion from competitive commercial production to full war production. By way of a simple example of this gigantic industrial transition, the piston rod of a Cadillac car requires 25 operations as against 93 operations of an airplane piston rod. To close the production triangle with labor, there must be provided protected housing and guaranteed transportation.

Michigan Defense Councils are providing all-out protection, and the execution of their tasks of organization under the stress of abnormal domestic and business adjustments stands as another merit and noble example of democracy. Location of new war production plants in Michigan has created the usual state and local problems as in other sections of the United States—problems such as housing, utilities, transportation, schools and recreation.

The location of the Willow Run Bomber Plant has caused the greatest concern chiefly because of its enormous requirements as to labor and labor facilities. The plant roofs 67 acres and now employs 13,000 with an anticipated increase to 40,000 by January and a further increase possibly totaling 100,000 employees; a plant in which some employees walk one mile to the cafeteria within the plant; a plant housing one of the most modern hospitals yet built.

Planning services for this area not only concern this undetermined total number of employees, but projections are fraught with complications as to the percentage of single male workers, of women workers, and of workers who may remain in their present dwellings.

Supplementing these problems with diminishing auto transportation and the limited possibility of rail or bus transportation, we find definite answers impossible. With absolute necessity that all possible services be given, the State Highway Department with Federal assistance is con-

structing super-highways and access roads between Detroit and the plant.

The Planning Commission has furnished Federal Housing offices with regional maps of the area for site selection of public housing projects, and plans are well under way for public construction of 15,000 dwelling units in the approximate vicinity of the plant. The near-by town of Ypsilanti is saturated in its limited capacity to house workers of the plant. It is anticipated that Ann Arbor will be saturated before Federal housing is constructed to supply any part of the demand. The Village of Wayne has doubled its population from 4,000 to 8,000 during the past eight months. To provide for any additional housing, new and costly water mains, sewer systems and school services will be required.

Looking to a postwar period, the vast area developments will require the control of effective regional planning not only for its own sake but as a protection against maladjustment of land use and general state economy as allied to tax-reverted lands. There are now in the possession of the State, 4,360,669 acres of reverted lands plus an additional 446,184 platted lots, urban parcels and unclassified parcels. Of the area of Michigan, 36,294,080 acres, 4,785,453 acres (approximately one acre out of eight) are under the jurisdiction of the Conservation Department and the State Land Office Board. The Detroit Metropolitan Area contains 100,000 tax-reverted lots—50 percent of which have utilities.

With the school problems in the bomber plant area, the Planning Commission is assisting the State Department of Public Instruction. The Commission is assisting on township and county zoning in the area. The Commission is assisting Ypsilanti with the projection of an inner traffic plan with by-passes intercepting new plant access roads. The Commission is sponsoring plat and zoning amendatory legislation in view of economic community postwar development.

Also in view of future construction, the Commission is mapping all state-owned lands. A section of this program, coördinated with the Department of Building and Construction, is concerned with a physical inventory of all state institutions as basic to long-range programming of budget and postwar construction of all state institutions.

Other items under consideration for postwar activities are: surveys of Michigan streams and rivers with regard to drainage control; completion of county boundary surveys and monument establishments; surveys of potential recreational airport camp sites in anticipation of a new phase of recreational demand; assistance in land use surveys to the Michigan Land-Use Committee of Michigan State College; assistance in mapping county recreation facilities, camps and services and the preparation of guide maps.

Our WPA project which for several years has been mapping and tabulating subdivided areas and tax-reverted properties in the Detroit Metropolitan Areas is closing its work for definite defense activities.

Coincident with the possibility of air attack, there is a necessity of surveying all tourist and recreational camps and facilities in the State, which may provide housing in case Michigan cities face evacuation.

Abraham Lincoln used to tell the story about his neighbor who fished for eels in the Illinois River. When this fellow caught but one eel he could manage to keep him in the boat, but when he caught three the complications in holding three eels and rowing the boat usually resulted in the loss of the entire catch.

Planning Commissions must work with many problems of the "eel" type. The National Resources Planning Board has extended invaluable assistance to our planning commission and we are seeking their further comradeship in working with the more intense problems ahead.

What the giant industries and their accessory industries will build after the war?

What conversion problems will result?

What demand on the natural resources of the State will there be?

What will be the major labor problems?

What housing adjustments will be required?

Will private housing be resumed?

What revolution will take place in transportation and recreation due to aviation?

As a basic concept to the above questions, we must first forestall any marked degree of inflation, and secondly we must consider the employment of our vast armies and materials to the policing and rebuilding program of many countries of an extended postwar period.

Governor Van Wagoner is gravely concerned and has made every effort to place the State on full wartime operations, and the Planning Commission is offering all possible assistance to emergency operations. The future will demand a collective state planning program based upon collective industrial regional planning of the country as a whole.

WILLIS H. MILLER, Acting Executive Secretary
California State Planning Board

EMERGENCIES are to planning what Vitamin B_1 is to potatoes. The more serious the emergency, the more widespread is the appreciation of the need for planning. It will be remembered that state planning as we know it today grew like Jack's famous beanstalk during the dark days of the late but not lamented depression. Unfortunately, it also must be remembered that, with the gradual revival of business conditions, came a gradual decline in the number and the influence of state planning agencies.

War always has been regarded as Exhibit A of man's ability to create emergencies. As long ago as the last century, General Sherman clinched his place in the hall of fame by saying that "war is hell." That is still true, but modern technology has made it hell on wheels and hell on wings. The United States now is an active participant in the most widespread and vicious war of history. Now, as never before, we are in an emergency. Now, as never before, people expect planning to chart the way through.

War is essentially an enterprise of the Federal government. The role of the States in war is and will remain relatively small. Small as this role may be, however, it is important. Under our Federal system of government there is a considerable field within which the powers of the States are supreme. States also can coöperate with and in various ways assist in the war efforts of both Federal and local agencies.

Solving state problems occasioned by war is not exclusively the function of the state planning agency. War affects virtually all phases of human life and activity. Many agencies of state government are qualified to handle war matters falling within their respective fields of specialization. In addition, most States now have State Councils of Defense established with broad powers to deal with civilian defense and related questions.

Although state war planning is not its responsibility alone, the planning agency certainly should present a broad, comprehensive review of the war situation, encourage and assist other state agencies to make their maximum contribution, and perform certain necessary work not within the province of other state departments. A brief review of the war planning activities and proposed war program of the California State Planning Board may be used as an example.

Army Camp Site Reports: Nearly two years ago, the California State Planning Board was requested by headquarters of the Ninth Corps Area to furnish information about suitable tracts of land ranging in size from 5,000 acres to 50,000 acres which might be available for the establishment of new Army camps. Within about six weeks seventeen reports were submitted on tracts which seemed worthy of detailed investigation

by Army officials. The Army described these reports as being of "inestimable value." Subsequently three major camps out of six built were located on or close to the areas proposed.

War Industries Reports: More than a year ago it became evident that the Los Angeles, San Francisco and San Diego areas were becoming primary war production centers. Accordingly, the State Planning Board, in coöperation with the Regional Office of the National Resources Planning Board, undertook regional industrial surveys of these communities. The purpose of these studies was to ascertain the impact of the defense boom, to determine what industrial facilities and resources might be more intensively used or developed, what problems were emerging, and how these problems might best be solved. Before this series of reports was finished, war came and the situation changed so rapidly that substantial revisions were necessary. They are now completed.

War Community Planning: The development of huge Army camps and the mushrooming of war industries have resulted in increases of population, traffic, and many types of activity in certain smaller communities of California. In some instances, local facilities and organizations are taxed to capacity by these new conditions. The State Planning Board has responded to requests for assistance from local officials in several areas. New planning commissions have been established, and the State Board, in coöperation with the Regional Office of the National Resources Planning Board, has provided limited consulting and advisory services to these new agencies, and also to some activated older ones. Among the communities thus assisted may be mentioned San Bernardino, Sausalito, San Luis Obispo, Paso Robles and Marysville.

War Housing Site Reports: War activities have resulted in quick increases in the population of many cities. As a result, it has been necessary for Federal agencies to provide thousands of units of permanent or temporary housing. In each case, decisions regarding sites and layouts had to be made quickly and some consideration given the relationship of the project to the community of which it is a part. The first major war housing in California was Kearny Mesa, near San Diego. Because that 3,000-unit facility early showed undesirable characteristics resulting largely from "remote control" Washington designing, the State Planning Board was asked by local authorities to assist in securing changes before construction was begun. Some desirable modifications were arranged, but it was clearly demonstrated that, to be effective, local recommendations about emergency housing projects must be made during the short period while plans are in a formative state. Subsequently the State Board, in coöperation with the Regional Office of the National Resources Planning Board, has prepared and submitted to appropriate Federal authorities reports on proposed new war housing

developments near Vallejo and Benicia. Work now has started on a 3,000-unit project for Mare Island Navy Yard workers on one of the recommended sites near Vallejo.

Defense Council Organization: As in most of the States, the California State Council of Defense was established prior to the outbreak of war. It is, therefore, not surprising that this prewar organization has been operating with some difficulty under present conditions. Recognizing this situation, the Governor recently asked the State Planning Board to recommend an improved functional organization for that agency. In its report on this subject, the Board outlined procedures for coordinating work of the Council with that of the several operating agencies of state government, for streamlining relationships between the Council, its committees and subcommittees, and its staff, and for more effective coördination with the office of Civilian Defense.

Proposed Activities: To assist the California State Planning Board develop an action program giving maximum assistance to the war effort, the staff prepared a memorandum entitled "War and Postwar Planning in California." The first half of this document outlines in some detail types of war studies which properly might be made by the state planning agency.

As a first step it is recommended that the Board make a series of authoritative reports of limited scope reviewing and appraising California's war production with special reference to the adequacy of essential information, to resources and facilities presently unemployed, to handicaps and limitations subject to state control, and to plans and proposals for the increase of production. Each report would define the particular problem, indicate the present situation, describe and evaluate measures already under way, and, if appropriate, recommend further action by the State or some other responsible agency.

Planning for the period following the war is, in the last analysis, a part of the war effort. It is a responsibility and a task for which some of the skills and resources of both public and private agencies must be devoted. The men who are carrying the tremendous load of war have little time to speculate on the shape of things to come. They are entitled to assurances that a determined effort is being made to clarify the uncertainties of the future. Failure to understand postwar problems and failure to be ready with readjustment plans may cause us to lose, after victory has been attained, the very things for which we have been fighting.

It should be frankly recognized, however, that in many circles postwar planning is considered one of the "trouser cuffs" which, perhaps with some regret, must be eliminated in an "all-out" war effort. With this philosophy I do not agree for the reasons stated above. Still, unless the war suddenly takes a turn for the better, I predict the virtual scuttling of every significant postwar planning program for the duration.

From a long-range point of view—and what other can a planner take —this would be a very serious backward step.

The over-shadowing problem of the postwar period, stated in the most simple terms, will be that of providing useful employment for those who should work, and a decent standard of living for every good citizen. Fundamentally these are problems of planning. To a considerable extent planning for postwar prosperity depends on policies of the Federal Government, but the role of the States here is far greater than in war planning. Postwar planning is the kind of work we all are used to doing. True, it may be on a larger scale, more indefinite as to outline, and farther in the future, but it is concerned with and limited only by the resources, needs and problems of our several States. In this field we know how to work and how to relate our activities to those of other agencies, state, Federal, local and private.

The California Board is devoting the decreasing amount of time available for postwar planning to studies of the facilities and means for providing sustained employment. Like many other States, we are developing a long-term public works program which could be prosecuted faster than normally expected if, during the postwar period, an expanded public works program should be needed to maintain employment.

Another major activity is the preparaton of a state plan for airports and airways. This study is but one of several which the Board contemplates dealing with public facilities having real significance in the stabilization of employment. It is obvious that the great airplane factories in California and elsewhere can maintain production at reasonable rates and provide continuing employment only if adequate ground facilities exist upon which to handle a vastly increased number of planes. Airport construction and improvement, like highway development, will have regenerative effects upon many fields of private enterprise.

Similarly, we are concerned with the recreational and tourist facilities of California, and with the opportunities for large-scale urban redevelopment. These and other planning projects, if done well, and in proper time, may have definite value in the postwar readjustment period. They will bring about improvement of the State while providing useful employment for our people.

The document, "War and Postwar Planning in California," mentioned above, outlines various types of inquiries and planning projects on employment, industrial opportunities, housing and relief which should be undertaken by the State officially if it is to help pave the way for postwar employment and prosperity.

Since its origin, state planning has been closely associated with the national planning agency. This is entirely proper, and should be regarded as essential for the development of coördinated programs. The National Resources Planning Board and its predecessors always have

been alert to coöperate with and help state planning boards in every way. Over the years we have come to appreciate these contacts. Without them we would find it almost impossible to relate our work to that of the many Federal agencies. Without them we would lack the prestige resulting from association with the Federal planning department.

During the current war emergency, and during the coming postwar period, the States will find contact with the National Resources Planning Board to be of increasing importance. Federal policies and Federal plans provide the broad framework within which we develop our state policies and plans. Now, as never before, the success of state planning depends upon the maintenance of a vigorous national planning agency.

It is, therefore, with dismay that I note that the Senate of the United States believes that the budget of the National Resources Planning Board should be reduced by more than half. In these days of uncertainty, when almost everyone recognizes the need for planning, such an attitude is incomprehensible. Surely it does not represent statesmanship of the type we associate with our highest elective body. Such a reduction in operating funds probably would mean the abandonment by the National Resources Planning Board of its Field Offices, and the end of its coöperation with state planning agencies. That would constitute the most serious blow yet struck at state planning. In our own self-interest we all should do everything possible to maintain at least the *status quo.*

Mr. Average Citizen expects much of his state planning agency. We either must stand and deliver, or publicly admit that we can not meet the challenge of this greatest of emergencies. All of us are doing our best, but to date the record of accomplishment is not encouraging. In the restricted field of state war planning, we are perhaps doing a reasonably satisfactory job. In the broad field of postwar planning, however, we are barely scratching the surface.

Far more than the future of state planning is at stake. Because war is a Federal function, the States today are at the lowest level of importance in history. The *look-to-Washington* trend has been accelerated to such a degree that we are fast approaching a national rather than Federal form of government. Reversal of this trend during the postwar period will be difficult. To regain positions of influence, the States must prove themselves competent to deal promptly and effectively with problems relating to employment, standards of living, conservation of basic resources, transportation and patterns of development. That will require state planning of a type and on a scale heretofore scarcely even contemplated.

The need is obvious. Ideas about what to do are not lacking. Our problem, then, is how to accomplish the task which confronts us—how to make state planning the vital thing everyone agrees it ought to be. Typical handicaps include political conflicts between governors and

legislatures, complaints that we are duplicating work of operating agencies, faulty working relationships with other state departments, boards which are ineffectual or which meet infrequently, a general distrust of "planning," and last but not least, inadequate funds and staffs.

These things are bad enough under ordinary circumstances, but during a war emergency they are impossible. There is much state planning to be done, and someone will have to do it. If the States are unable or unwilling to rise to the occasion, Federal agencies can be expected to take over to an even greater extent. The responsibility rests squarely on our shoulders. Certainly the National Resources Planning Board is more than generous in its policy of working with and through state planning boards.

However, no one can do good work without good tools. The California State Planning Board, for example, is unable to function properly with a two-and-a-half-man technical staff, and one stenographer. Every state planning agency immediately should outline a planning program adequate to meet present-day needs, and request the funds and personnel necessary for its implementation. Nothing else is worth considering. Either we should make state planning a potent, directive force, or we should abandon it as another "noble experiment," and devote our time and talents to more productive fields.

P. HETHERTON, Executive Officer, Washington State Planning Council

FOLLOWING December 7 all of us, I am sure, took stock of our work to determine if it fitted in with a Nation at war. We wondered whether the emphasis should be changed; what work should be dropped or what new work undertaken. At first, in my own thinking, I was inclined to feel that the war effort should come first to the exclusion of all else. But as I gave more thought to it I found it difficult to draw a clear line. Where did war work begin and where did planning or postwar planning leave off? In considering the location of a war industry, its postwar effect could not be overlooked. In studying community facilities required by war-affected towns, again postwar conditions could not be slighted. While much of our research program was directed to developing new sources of war materials, the effect of these discoveries on our postwar economy could not be ignored. Even our community studies had disclosed, and were disclosing, opportunities for increased output of agricultural and industrial materials greatly needed for waging war.

Actually, war has accelerated rather than retarded our planning council activities and those of the counties and cities where so much war work is concentrated. Planning commissions, in operation before the emergency, assumed greater and greater responsibilities as the war tempo increased. In the war-expanded communities where planning

commissions had been dormant, or had not been appointed, the need for them soon became apparent. The result today is that 12 counties and 13 towns, all in war-expanded areas, have active planning commissions studying the problems of their areas. In a number of these, zoning ordinances are in force and in others ordinances are about to be adopted. In the scenic Columbia Gorge, where the Bonneville Dam is located, the expectation of more war industries close to the dam has caused the people of Oregon and Washington to speed the protection of this area. In other words, no change of emphasis has occurred; rather we have just undertaken more work.

When I talked on this same subject at the Philadelphia Conference last year, the critical areas in the State were confined to the Puget Sound region. Because of the common problems a regional planning commission, drawing membership from twelve counties, had been created. This body continues to operate effectively with headquarters established at the University of Washington. Members of the faculty assist in various studies. Meetings are held at a different locality each month so that wider participation may be had in the discussion of common problems and the exchange of experiences. As the need for planning becomes more apparent, more counties and cities involved are creating planning commissions. We have been fortunate in having the services of a consultant from the National Resources Planning Board to assist in this effort. With his aid local problems exceeding the ability of the various communities to meet have been presented to state and Federal agencies.

In the meantime other critical areas were showing up, particularly Vancouver, Washington, where in addition to other war industries, the Henry Kaiser organization chose a site for one of its three shipyards in that area. The 1940 population of Vancouver was 17,700. The number of men to be employed in this one year is quickly reaching 30,000. The problems multiply.

When the military establishments decided to place war industries, training bases and other war facilities well back from the coast, eastern Washington soon felt the direct impact of war activities and three critical areas developed at Pasco-Kennewick on the Columbia River, at Walla Walla and in the Spokane area. To assist the Council, a second consultant was assigned from the National Resources Planning Board to cover this part of the State.

A real difficulty, common I am sure in all States to this phase of planning, is the uncertainty or utter lack of information of what is going to happen. True, that makes it the more exciting, but surely some method might be developed whereby local, or at least state—not to mention Federal—officials might not be taken by surprise. As recent as April 24 the morning papers announced that an Idaho Congressman, finding he could not hold a certain navy depot for his district,

let the newspapers know that it had gone to a small town in Washington. That is rather a sudden and peculiar way, even in war times, to announce a development which is going to cause a major upheaval in that town. It may be the best possible location, but state and Federal sources—well equipped to supply preliminary information—were not even consulted or given an opportunity to assist.

Last January, in an attempt to circumvent such happenings, the Bonneville Power Administration met with the Governors of Oregon and Washington to discuss further steps by which this region could go all-out in the war effort. Certain difficulties were recognized: distance from Washington, D. C., lack of a united front, no one authoritative group representing the Northwest. As a result, a combination of forces was made, consisting of the Chief of the Marketing Division of BPA, the Executive Secretary for the Governor of Oregon and the Executive Officer of the Washington State Planning Council. At our first meeting it was agreed that rather than wait for proposals or suggestions from the War Production Board we should immediately act as if we were a part of the WPB and transmit directly to it our own proposals, thereafter following them up if need be by personal calls.

Our first proposal was that pig iron should be produced in the Northwest by the electric furnace. The customary industrial report was prepared, but we were immediately met by the objection that no pig iron had been produced in this country by that method. That objection was finally overcome, but exchanges are still taking place. In a similar manner we have tackled electrolytic zinc, alcohol, synthetic rubber, stockpiling of hemlock bark for tannin, and wooden shipbuilding.

Because the alumina for our extensive pig aluminum production comes by rail from the South where it is obtained from foreign bauxite, we are concentrating on finding domestic sources. Samples of clays and alunite are being taken by technicians from likely deposits, and after analysis to determine that the Al_2O_3 content is high enough, they are sent to several laboratories to be tested for available alumina by the method now being developed in each laboratory. Under research projects of the Council, electric smelting and acid leaching are both being tried on our own clays.

And this leads me to another task of the Council which is particularly opportune under war conditions, but of equal value for postwar development. In addition to its regular budget, the legislature appropriated "From the General Fund for the State Planning Council: Research in connection with furthering development of industry within the State of Washington—$150,000.00."

This is rather a blanket appropriation and the Council is being most careful to see that the money is wisely spent. In appointing an advisory committee to assist in sifting projects, the Council adopted the following policy:

1. All projects shall have as their objective practical application within the present state biennium.

2. Immediate preference will be given to projects applying directly to the defense emergency.

3. Projects that apply to industries which, with or without change, can continue to supply employment after the emergency has passed.

4. The encouragement of new basic industries to broaden the state's industrial base.

5. The expansion of remanufacturing so that as much labor as possible may be applied within the State before the article is exported.

6. The finding of new uses for what are now waste materials of forests, fisheries, mines and agriculture.

7. The development of the State's sources of raw materials. (This may include field studies.)

8. The removal of bottlenecks now hindering industry. (For instance, solution of pollution problems.)

9. The determination by factual studies in specific industries of the advantages or disadvantages to be found in the State in comparison with other regions of the United States.

The Council also continues its long-established policy of seeking the coöperation of existing research agencies rather than of building or expanding its own organization. As a result the various projects operating under this appropriation are going forward at the State College of Washington, the University of Washington and the state departments of Fisheries, and Conservation and Development.

At the College, where methods of extracting alumina from clays are proceeding, the properties of magnesium alloys are being investigated, including the casting of magnesium and the manufacture of electrolytic manganese from Olympic Peninsula ores. Here also are being made analyses of magnesite specimens from a diamond drilling project close by, financed from research funds.

At the University the broad problem of logging waste is being minutely examined. Out of this study are appearing two likely results, namely, cork from Douglas fir bark and wood coke for use in the expanding metallurgical industries. Equipment to produce dense bricks of high-temperature-resistant-refractories from state deposits of olivine is on order. Soda ash for glass manufacture and other purposes has until recently been shipped in. Now, with priorities limiting these shipments, local deposits are being investigated to determine quantity and quality. Berries processed by canning or freezing have been rejected because of mold. What is the cause and how can it be averted, is the subject of the Department of Bacteriology. The oysters, both native and transplanted, are not fattening and are having other troubles, so the State Department of Fisheries is trying to find out the reasons.

These are some examples. The value of such a fund is in its flexibility.

The presence of some 15,000 Japanese citizens and aliens, largely in the Puget Sound area, created problems which my neighbor from California, Mr. Miller, has experienced. While recognizing that their evacuation was, and is, a matter of military necessity, Governor Langlie asked the Council to follow the proceedings in order that the Japanese interests might be fully protected and valuable farm lands, capable of producing much-needed crops, be kept in production. Were they allowed to remain idle, not only would food for war be curtailed, but adjoining communities seriously affected. Through the county agents and the state USDA War Boards, detailed information was obtained on each Japanese farm-acreage, crops, condition of machinery, number in family, plans to transfer or dispose of property and a sketch of the farm layout. This information later was found useful by the Civil Evacuation Authority. The evacuation also accentuates the lack of farm labor for such crops as sugar beets and hops where so much hand labor is necessary.

Within our own State the magnitude of the problem of postwar adjustments is fully recognized. Previous to the war the State's economy depended largely on forest products. With the development of Bonneville and Grand Coulee, electro-chemical and metallurgical industries sought the low-cost power. The advent of the first unit of the Aluminum Company of America was hailed as the beginning of a new epoch. No longer was the State to have all of its eggs in the lumber basket. But now we find that, because of such great blocks of low-cost power, the State is overwhelmed with pig aluminum capacity. Not only that, but it is largely controlled by the Aluminum Company of America which, in turn, controls the alumina sources. With the exception of a rolling mill—again controlled by the Aluminum Company of America—no fabricating facilities have so far been built. In Oregon and Washington over 30 percent of the Nation's pig aluminum capacity is now present and more coming. Because of military necessity, and the shortage of conductors, some of these plants have been built in rather disadvantageous locations. The question then is, how many can continue to operate after the war? Our first step in attempting to answer that question is to develop local sources of alumina. That work is under way, as I have already mentioned. A market study proposal is pending before the Council waiting the outcome of the first step.

On Puget Sound and the Columbia River, excluding the Puget Sound Navy Yard at Bremerton where over 20,000 men are employed, easily 100,000 men are engaged in shipbuilding. It is hardly likely that the yards will continue. At the Boeing Aircraft Company the output of plans will assuredly drop. But in common with many leading industrialists, the heads of some of these concerns have already taken steps to seek new manufacturing outlets. One asset which cannot be taken from us is the several million kilowatts of hydro-generating capacity interconnected by a statewide high tension transmission system.

The danger of a back-to-the-land movement as a means of taking up possible postwar employment slack is evident. Our old mistakes of assuming that, because land grows trees it can grow crops, may be repeated. We have the legal machinery to avoid such mistakes, but public opinion must be aroused.

In the Columbia Basin project in central Washington the State will have not only a great reservoir of public works, but well-planned farm units to replace eroded and submarginal farms in other parts of the State and Nation. Under the general leadership of the U. S. Bureau of Reclamation, the Columbia Basin Joint Investigations, covering 28 road problems, are drawing to a close. The Council has leadership in three of these problems.

At the state level, a well-developed program of public works will be ready to be presented by the Governor to the next session of the legislature meeting in January 1943, and at other levels of government this procedure is under way. The invaluable assistance of the National Resources Planning Board in this work is here recognized.

I am not one who expects an economic collapse immediately following peace. For a few years the contrary may be the case. But unless each State and each region is studying postwar problems, peacetime economic activity is liable to be very spotty. Nor can States and regions overlook national and international adjustment, and here the work of the National Resources Planning Board can be of outstanding help. While two excellent pamphlets have so far been issued by that Board, I am hoping that the Board will assume active and dynamic leadership, particularly to the state planning councils.

With all this welter of work which we are undertaking—and I have just touched upon our community surveys and not even mentioned our association with the State Defense Council—a feeling of futility remains. Our broad knowledge of resources and conditions is not being used by the War Production Board and the military forces in the establishment of industries and military facilities. Some instances beyond understanding have occurred. As recent as this March two engineers from WPB, whose names I have, after visiting Puget Sound, complained to officials in the adjoining State of Oregon that they had experienced difficulty in getting reliable information about iron ore deposits in Puget Sound. To my knowledge they did not get in touch with any Washington state officials, nor did they seek interviews with Bonneville Power Administration officials in Portland.

Contrasted to this was the procedure of a naval architect sent out by the White House to investigate facilities for wooden barge building. He made himself known, and in three days' time completed his report, a task which otherwise might have taken three weeks and then been incomplete.

What can be done about it? How can we be discovered by the War

Production Board? Cannot better lines of communication between WPB and the State Planning Councils be developed by the National Resources Planning Board? The difficulty may be great but surely not insurmountable.

REPORTER'S SUMMARY

L. A. HENRY, Engineer-Director, Arkansas State Planning Board

THE papers greatly represented the activities under way by the Boards with which the individual speakers were associated. Mr. Clark from New Hampshire represented the type of State Planning Board that has extended its activities into the field of development on the theory that a planning board should not only plan but follow through and see that the plans are understood and executed. Mr. Price represented the Board from Tennessee and the activities of the Board are typical of those found in several States which stick very closely to the original concept of planning in an advisory capacity expecting that other agencies will follow through as to development. Mr. Ross represented a conventional type of advisory planning commission. Mr. Hetherton, like Mr. Clark, represented the planning and development type of Board, while Mr. Miller from California represented the strictly advisory planning type of activity.

All the speakers drew on the experiences of their own state agencies and the papers were thus limited to the fields of action indulged in by each of the agencies. For example, Mr. Clark reported that in New Hampshire the planning agencies' contribution to the war effort is predicated on what they are organized to do. He felt it was not wise for the agency to spread itself too thin but to take a few greatly needed projects or programs and do them well. He did not feel that agencies should do the routine managerial functions of a Defense Council. It was developed later by other speakers that many Planning Boards had had varied experiences in contributing toward the operation of State Defense Councils.

Mr. Clark emphasized that planning agencies' first duty was in aiding the war effort through assembling and making available all data and information needed by military agencies; assisting communities in defense areas; preparing and making available intimate information on natural resources, particularly critical markets; assist in development plans for industrial site plants; prepare lists or inventories of specialty industries, such as plastic producers. He emphasized the duty of planning agencies to keep abreast with postwar planning programs, studying the possibility of converting "war babies." He felt that a plan should be developed to prevent immediate migration of labor from the regions of wartime plants immediately after the war. Clark mentioned the

decentralization of planning within the State, saying that New Hampshire had organized six regional planning groups each doing research within their specific areas. A fine suggestion in this paper was a proposed survey for evaluation of what is being done by State Planning Boards throughout the nation. A suggestion that a National Agency conduct this survey concluded his paper.

Mr. Price was in agreement with Mr. Clark on many points with respect to the field of planning agencies in the present emergency and also with respect to the great variety of work which planning boards found themselves called upon to undertake. The general theme of Mr. Price's discussion was meeting responsibility by planning agencies in developing local planning groups including technical assistance to city and county planning agencies. He felt that planning at the "grass roots" was most desirable and was mildly critical of National Resources Planning Board's inability to furnish more support to local planning agencies. Mr. Price also was critical of the failure to receive advance information on potential war plant locations. He had been handicapped in his State by not having time to develop planning for community facilities prior to the actual period of construction of several large camps and military facilities. One or two of the other speakers voiced this same complaint, although discussion developed that in some States this cooperation between military and state representatives had been very effective. It might be said that the theme of Mr. Price's paper concerned the opportunity afforded by war effort to planning agencies at all levels of government, and this idea was shared favorably by all speakers and discussers. Mr. Price's thought that greater contribution by the National Resources Planning Board to state and local planning agencies would be helpful was shared by other speakers.

Mr. Ross from Michigan represented the conventional type of planning commission and indicated that the greatest problems with which his Board had been dealing were tied up with the industrialization due to war. He was particularly concerned about the lack of finances available in cities and local governments to perform the absolutely necessary expansion of community facilities when industrial plants of great magnitude were built in or near the cities. He pointed out that the tax gathering agencies had no choice than to call for Federal aid because the demands for extra municipal equipment could not be met locally. A very popular suggestion was that local governments reduce to a very minimum the cost of operating state and local governments in order to build up, if possible, reserves for postwar expenditures. Another point well made by Mr. Ross were the great ramifications attending war industries of the magnitude of those plants located in the vicinity of Detroit, especially problems of transportation later intensified by rationing of rubber tires and the necessary expansion of community facilities in connection with the rehousing of vast numbers of workers. He spoke of the prob-

lems of tax reverted property and the possibility of using some of this property in housing projects. Mr. Ross mentioned many very valuable projects with which planning agencies should find time to give consideration, naming especially the mapping of state owned lands; the inventory of state institutions; the study of water control projects; boundary surveys and markers.

Mr. Miller, who followed Mr. Ross, greatly deplored the fact that Congress was not dealing kindly with the NRPB appropriations during the war emergency when the opportunities for planning were greatest and when the dislocations in the normal life of the people were at its most critical point. He felt that national planning should be accelerated at this time rather than cut down. One or two of the speakers pointed out the great handicap to future planning should State Legislature suspend this work for the duration, arguing that such suspension would result in the loss of contacts which would take time to renew, also the loss of personnel which would take considerable time to train. It was Mr. Miller's conviction that planning boards should contribute to the work of State Defense Councils, particularly should they design organization and functional outlines of procedure if not actually perform many of the functions of the Defense Council.

Mr. Hetherton represented the combination of planning and development board. He explained how his board had performed in the creation of Regional Planning Boards and had been accorded the coöperation of NRPB in furnishing personnel to each of his State's Regional Boards. He deplored the lack of information given by certain war agencies on industrial plant locations. Washington is one State which is very liberal in appropriations to its planning council, the current appropriation was reported as being $150,000 annually. Much of the money is used in developing studies of mineral resources and industrial research. Mr. Hetherton called attention to the problem of Japanese alien evacuation and the effect it would have on agriculture in the State of Washington. He indicated considerable concern for the future of the plants of the Aluminum Company of America which have vast capacity for aluminum production. The problem of using these plants after the war apparently is the major concern of this Board. He doubts the wisdom of those who would consider "back to the land movements" as an answer to unemployment problems when war material production is curtailed. This Council is engaged in the Public Works programming activities at the state level and is extending its help to local boards in this field. Mr. Hetherton was very emphatic in his commendation of National Resources Planning Board program and the need for adequate funds to maintain this coördinating facility.

The discussions which arose following the presentations of papers were quite divergent and interestingly presented by William Anderson, of Missouri, who felt that there should be no delay in defining more

precisely the field for state planning, and by Miss Elisabeth M. Herlihy who felt that policy making might well be suspended until the war was over in order that every ounce of energy may go into special detail planning such as her Board in Massachusetts is engaged in. She explained how the time of all her technical staff was devoted to straightening out the problems of mass transportation due to rubber shortage and other ramifications of impact on community life resulting from the greatly accelerated industrial program. She felt that time should be taken off only for keeping up contacts with postwar planning procedure and for the quick research to find the answer to current problems. Mr. O'Bannon of Corydon, Indiana, contributed a thought with respect to the importance of local planning in the social welfare field. He very skilfully brought out the value of dependence upon local planning for this purpose.

Mr. Lee S. Reynolds, Member of Legislature, Hagerstown, Indiana, joined in the discussion for the benefit of bringing out the variation in authorities of different State Boards represented by the members of the discussion panel. He was interested in the wide range of appropriations received by the various Boards and the kind of work they are performing.

The consensus of the session seemed to be that very generally planning boards had temporarily suspended much of the longer range function to make themselves as useful as possible in connection with the war effort. However, without exception the Boards were encouraging study of postwar programs. There was no lack of awareness that planning would play a very important part in the demobilization and reconstruction era which is inevitable when the "V" day arrives.

Indiana's Industry Takes the War Seriously

LOUIS RUTHENBURG, President, Indiana Chamber of Commerce

THE title of this address, "Indiana's Industry Takes the War Seriously," is a very pale understatement. Today most of us are motivated by the knowledge that our country faces the greatest crisis in her history. Today and tomorrow and until total victory is achieved every American worthy of the name will work and sacrifice to the limit of his capacity to achieve that victory.

There is no middle ground—no area for compromise. From this war we shall *probably* emerge as a free and united people, burdened by debt and confronted by the manifold problems and opportunities of reconstruction, but inspired, nevertheless, by the vision of a brilliant future. From this war we *may* emerge into hopeless slavery, bound in helpless servitude to the chariot wheels of our brutal conquerors. The alternatives are exactly those—clear-cut and inescapable.

Today is a time for thinking in terms of sheer realism. We cannot

afford the luxuries of wishful thinking, of sentimentality or of emotionalism. As a matter of hard common sense we know today that business or profession, property and income, standards of living, relationships with business associates, friends and families all may be completely dissolved and completely lost unless we immediately and effectively submerge all other interests in our efforts to win the war.

Recent conversations with many Hoosier industrial managers, factory superintendents, foremen and workmen have convinced me that these grim premises are very generally accepted by those responsible for industrial operations in this State.

This National Planning Conference is a stimulating and heartening event. Your willingness candidly to appraise current problems, to anticipate future problems without being appalled by their complexity and to plan their solution exemplifies the American attributes of courage, energy, optimism and ingenuity.

Before dealing specifically with Indiana's significant contribution to the war effort it may be worthwhile to think in terms of some of the broad general problems with which industry must deal in this fateful period of history. Today there is, of course, only one major industrial problem to which all others are secondary. That is the problem of bringing about industry's greatest possible contribution to the war effort in the shortest possible time. Today industry's war-engendered problems must not be discussed in terms of hardships imposed upon industrial employees, owners and distributive agencies, but rather in terms of removing obstacles in the way of winning the war and winning the peace. Past mistakes (we've all made lots of them) must be forgotten except as their future avoidance will contribute to winning the war and the peace.

Industry's war problems are the Nation's problems because we shall win neither the war nor the peace unless the enormous *potential* capacity of American industry can be quickly converted into *actual* striking power in the hands of well-organized, well-directed, strategically deployed armed forces. There are many indications that these important problems are being solved. Nevertheless, our industrial war problems are immediate and pressing. Donald Nelson tells us that one gun or one plane delivered today is worth more than ten a few months hence. Present production rates, encouraging as they are, must be doubled very quickly.

In the degree to which Americans in every walk of life will understand our industrial war problems they can help to solve them because the solution of these problems must take place not only upon the industrial front but in the homes and schools and ballot boxes of America.

May I now briefly sketch the changing environment in which industry has operated in the past decade and then comment upon current conditions controlling industry's war effort? At the moment American

industrial management must have great sympathy for the chameleon. You will recall the ancient legend about the researcher who had heard of the chameleon's remarkable ability to change his color to conform with any background upon which he might be placed. The experimenter first put the lizard on a piece of red silk, and gradually its color changed to red. Then the chameleon was put on a piece of green silk. His red color faded and turned to green. Then came the tragic finale! The chameleon died in his efforts to make good after he had been put on a piece of Scotch plaid!

But there is a much sounder appraisal of the strenuous workout to which American industrial management has been subjected during recent years. We have had to face and to deal with all manner of conditions without precedent. Ground rules have been changed frequently and with little or no warning. Emergencies have become normal experience. We have learned to adapt ourselves to changing conditions and to grapple with problems that are not in the textbooks. We have learned to regard abnormal conditions as those normal to our times.

From the strenuous workout of recent years it may be that industrial management has acquired greater adaptability, ingenuity and flexibility. Perhaps we are better prepared to meet the greatest test of all time than we should have been if our taskmasters in Washington had refrained from kicking hell out of us. It now appears likely that American industrial management either is so inherently tough or that it has been so well conditioned by recent experiences that it can succeed in its terrific task despite continuing obstacles.

Today there is no need to dwell on the problems of management that came with the great depression, the NRA, the Wagner Act and the resultant labor revolution, the recession of 1937, the Fair Labor Standards Act, fantastically increased taxes, unscientific tax laws, biased congressional investigations, governmental castigation and persecution.

American business has played the role of guinea pig to all manner of bureaucrats whose objectives seem to be a confused complex. Some of them seem to be primarily interested in social reform; others in social revolution. Fortunately, since December 7 an increasing number of them seem to be primarily interested in winning the war. If, among our bureaucratic masters, there are those who look upon the war as a golden opportunity to "make America over" into something that will abrogate the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, then public opinion must be so enlightened as to drive them from the temple.

America has seen no finer patriotism and self-sacrifice than that displayed by hundreds of business men who are working tirelessly with no thought other than to contribute to the preservation of our cherished institutions. Bernard Baruch, William Knudsen, Donald Nelson, William Batt, James Knowlson and hundreds of their kind should go down in history as great Americans who have made great sacrifices on

the altar of patriotism and who have contributed greatly to the preservation of our country.

Industrial management is now immersed in the task of conversion. Beating plowshares into swords was a less complex procedure than converting automobile plants to manufacture machine guns or than transforming refrigerator plants into arsenals. Nevertheless, the miracle is being accomplished, and one gains the impression from recent comments of the President and Donald Nelson that we have made a fair start toward meeting the schedules that seemed fantastic less than five short months ago.

How much we have lived during the year just past! A brief year ago all of us, including official Washington, were thinking more or less in terms of "business as usual." Now all production of automobiles has stopped, and no automatic refrigerators can be had for normal civilian requirements. Now we are busy beating plowshares into swords—transforming refrigerator plants into arsenals—all of us joined in the mad race against catastrophe—our *potential* industrial strength developing into *actual* offensive power so speedily that, according to a profound, internationally minded economist, history probably will record American industrial achievement as the greatest single development in the whole course of World War II.

All Americans read with gratification such typical editorial comment on the industrial war effort as the following from the *Evansville Courier* of last Saturday:

> American industry, it is generally agreed now, has shamed the pessimists and done the impossible.
>
> War goods to the amount of $20,000,000,000 were turned out last year. It was hoped to double that for this year. But so rapidly has output rolled up that, instead of $40,000,000,000 worth for 1942, the output is now expected to reach $58,000,000,000, nearly three times as great as last year.
>
> This country is beginning to produce war materials never matched even by the German war machine when concentrating the utmost effort of several countries on that job after years of preparation.

Surely that record, established in a time so brief, is proof positive of the efficacy of the free enterprise of America.

So much for general background. Now to get "back home again to Indiana."

As we consider the role Indiana industry is playing in the war effort, we must keep in mind a very important development which will have a profound effect not only on the prosecution of the war but in the solution of our postwar problems. Only very casual examination is required to convince one that the great war program in Indiana has been to a degree superimposed on the existing structure. An analysis of the war contracts which have been publicized indicates that the preponderance of money has been spent for items which have required new machinery to

meet the new and exacting tolerances and new factories to house greatly expanded production.

The creation of all these new facilities alongside the old means that Indiana will be called upon to serve in the dual capacity—as an arsenal for democracy and as the supplier of civilian needs. For many years the Nation has looked to Indiana as the State which has been the top-ranking producer of many canned goods—beans, pumpkin, tomatoes and condensed milk and a variety of other things, such as gloves and mittens, drugs and medicines, glass, furniture, distilled liquors and mineral wool, to name but a few of the leaders which still survive. Gone are such big industries as motor vehicles, agricultural implements, refrigerators and ice-making apparatus, radios, musical instruments and household appliances in which the State ranked second, third or fourth in the Nation.

Into the gaps thus created the war production records show that from the Calumet to Charlestown there arises from men and machines a battle hymn of victory as an accompaniment to the production of powder, shells and guns. Indiana's production facilities have been expanded to include virtually every item required by modern warfare. In addition to acquiring major national defense projects and contracts for war essentials from practically every member of the United Nations in fabulous quantities, the State is producing a host of less-publicized items such as tomato juice for the Army at Action in Marion County, parachutes for the Air Corps at Washington, and life boats for the Navy in a Kokomo stove factory.

Although we have grown accustomed to thinking in astronomical figures, a review of Indiana's major national defense projects, including the Wabash River Ordnance Works in Vermillion County, the Indiana Ordnance Works and its related bag loading plant at Charlestown, the Kingsbury Ordnance Works, the Jefferson Proving Ground near Madison, the Burns City Naval ammunition depot, the Indianapolis Naval Ordnance Works and Baer Field at Fort Wayne, show a total cost of $350,813,042, a figure which is more apt to confuse than to clarify one's idea of the size of these projects.

Figures are not available clearly to summarize the amounts which have been spent by the government and by private business in setting the war industry into motion. However, it is generally conceded that an estimate of $3,000,000,000 for Indiana alone is conservative.

Without exception these great projects have been located throughout the State by careful planning—but that planning has been based entirely upon war considerations. Strategic requirements have been paramount in every instance. The disposition of these great concentrations of men and materials will take a vastly different type of planning when their present need has ended.

In turning to a discussion of the role industry must play in the post-

war period as millions of men return from armed service and factories and machines which are geared for war must change back to peace, I wish that I could report the existence of a plan such as the "M Day" which was heralded before our recent experience with conversion. To my knowledge none exists. And that simply means that one must be created.

As I have indicated, there are many encouraging signs to guide us in the days to come. In the first place, Indiana's strategic location indicates that this State will be the focal point of activity in war or in peace.

In the field of civilian supply this State must continue its position of leadership. Insofar as civilian needs can be filled without withdrawing essential manpower or materials from the military, the civilian goods industry can provide an effective brake on inflationary tendencies by keeping up production. Here is a challenge for positive action to offset the spiraling price curve which attends every war.

In making its contribution to the war effort Indiana industry is acquiring a wealth of intangible values which are the raw materials for the great new world which lies beyond the present scene of armed conflict. No. 1 in this list is a vast supply of trained labor. Never again should this Nation let its workers become skill rusty—never again should it so handicap itself by not having people trained to do things with their hands. No. 2 is a rare advantage of having conclusively demonstrated that our American system of free enterprise can out-produce any other system in the world. No. 3 is a new appreciation for quality products and quality standards. Orders which call for millions of parts, none of which can vary in dimension more than a few tenths of thousandths, tolerances so close that the work-standards of World War I now seem childishly simple, are accepted as everyday commonplaces. Greater emphasis on precision and efficiency have set the pace, and American industry will never turn back. These factors are a few beacon lights in the brave new world for which you plan—a new world which must be very different from the one in which we have lived.

My home town has a great asset in Don Scism, editor of the *Evansville Courier*. His vision is clear. He writes courageously and forcefully. He has that uncommon thing called common sense. Recently he wrote the following significant paragraph:

> We can't go into the postwar period looking back to something that never is going to be reconstructed. We did that 22 years ago, instead of looking ahead with open minds, and with courage and determination to cash in on the fruits of victory in a permanent and constructive way.

I report to you that the shock of war has had a tonic effect on that portion of our society known as "industry." This has released great forces, helpful forces, which can be utilized in winning the peace as well as the war. Indiana industry is taking this war seriously. Indiana in-

dustry is harnessing its full production potentialities to produce an overwhelming force of arms, and that fact translated in Berlin and Tokio is bad news for the Axis powers. Indiana industry stands ready to answer the Nation's call with all-out production and to provide an exhibition of the multiplied strength of free men.

All of the constructive planning that all of us can do will not be amiss if we are to win this war, solve the problems and realize the opportunities of reconstruction. May we approach our postwar planning problems "with malice toward none; with charity for all." May we be inspired to accomplish the greatest good for the greatest number. Successful planning for the future cannot grow from the hot bed of political expediency. Future plans must gain acceptance through persuasion, through education, through constructive sales methods, through able leadership. Coercion has very limited scope in a land of the free.

May our future planning envision a generous land and the production and distribution of plenty, full utilization of our great productive machinery, the complete enlistment of our facilities for research, the whole-hearted coöperation of labor and the skill of our engineers and managers.

May the memory of this hour of our country's great peril save us forever from false doctrines of scarcity and class antipathy.

Wartime Uses of State Parks

EDITOR'S NOTE.—At the Round Table on Wartime Uses of State Parks, called by the National Conference on State Parks and held at the Palmer House, Chicago, on September 23–24, 1942, there was a very general participation in the discussions. A summary of these remarks is presented in the ANNUAL this year in the belief that the reports from the States and the opinions of the delegates will be of interest to all who are engaged in state park work or interested in the development and use of state parks. The address of the President, Harold S. Wagner, and the account of the business sessions of the meeting were presented in the October PLANNING AND CIVIC COMMENT. Some attempt has been made to arrange the comments under headings, but speakers often rise to refer to several points under discussion, and in some cases it has seemed better to keep these remarks intact than to break them up under the several topics.

REPORTS FROM THE STATES

Reports of current operations in sections of the United States, with special reference to maintenance problems, attendance by day, use of lodges, cabins and camps, were presented, and are summarized as follows:

I. D. Gray, Director of Conservation, West Virginia: Attendance at state parks in West Virginia generally is up 40 percent. We have not been able to accommodate those who wanted to come to state parks. We could handle only one in four of the requests for accommodations at camps. However, due to gas rationing, the attendance of those who came only for a few hours, daytime, and picnic use has fallen off about one half. For this use some approved form of public transportation is necessary.

Herbert Evison, Assistant Supervisor of Land Planning, National Park Service (reporting for the Northeast): In the vicinity of Washington, D. C., there has been a large increase in reservations at the parks. But in Connecticut the attendance at the state park beaches has dropped about 50 percent and camping has virtually disappeared due to the nightly blackout required along the coast. New Hampshire and Massachusetts have similar experiences, particularly at the seashore parks. New York's state park camping is about 35 percent of normal, also in Palisades Interstate Park system, but the Hudson River boats brought thousands to the park for a single day.

Edgar L. Gillett, Director of the Division of Parks and Recreation, Department of Conservation, in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, sent in a report on that State: We have operated on practically the same budget this year that we did last year, although we will probably have some funds to return to the State Treasury due to the fact that in some sections it was impossible to hire men at the rate that we are authorized to pay for short-time summer positions, because the war industries in those areas were, of course, paying a much higher rate of pay and the job would be for longer duration. This shortage of manpower did not

seriously interfere with the maintenance or operation of any of the areas, due to the reduced patronage. This was caused by the gas rationing. It was my personal observation in inspecting the different recreational areas throughout the State, particularly on Sundays, that a very large percentage of the cars in the parking areas had "A" stickers. There were a few "B" and "C" stickers to be seen and once in a while an "S" card. However, after the State Rationing Board inspectors made a surprise inspection to some of the heavier used areas and brought before the Board the owners of quite a number of "B," "C" and "S" cards, the attendance in these areas immediately dropped, one of the heavier used areas dropping to one-fifth of the previous Sunday's attendance. The attendance and also the receipts have dropped off so far this season from 25 to 75 percent, that is depending upon the nearness of the recreational areas to the larger centers of population.

There has been an added responsibility on most of our recreational areas where there is swimming available, due to the fact that many unattended children have used these areas, particularly during the week, coming in on bicycles and on foot.

It is my belief that the winter recreation attendance will be off about the same amount as the summer recreation, even if there are good snow conditions, except in the case of Beartown State Forest, where we are fortunate in having the railroad tracks with a station practically at the foot of the skiing trails. This place being particularly popular with New York and Connecticut skiers, it is expected, with good skiing conditions, that this particular area will be taxed to capacity.

Thomas W. Morse, Superintendent of State Parks, North Carolina: Gas rationing has cut attendance to one-third normal since we have very few cabins and have principally day-use parks. We have lost two parks to the Army for military use. We made some attempt to provide public conveyances to the parks. We tried to get the bus line extended, but the bus companies and the railroad companies are so busy that they are using all of their facilities for the regular runs. We have had difficulty in keeping park employees and have cut down on the operation of boating, pools, and restaurants and have omitted the entrance fee this year. Adequate maintenance is still possible, but operations of swimming, restaurants and boating have been cut down.

A. C. Altvater, Superintendent, Highland Hammocks State Park, Sebring, Florida: Florida is practically an armed camp; most state parks are heavily overloaded, funds for maintenance inadequate. I estimate that the usual tourist business, on which the park system depends for use and revenue, will be practically wiped out for the duration of the war. The uniformed service men do not pay the regular ten-cent admission, but their summer attendance has been so large that it has almost equaled the wintertime count of tourists in normal times. Thus we have a problem with this heavy use without the benefit of admission

charges. Unfortunately, also, our budget has been reduced about thirty percent with the prospect of still further reductions before the end of the fiscal year. Coupled with the reduction in budget, we have the factor of increased wages being paid outside the service and also a demand for increasing the wages and salaries of maintenance men. This has already caused the loss of several valuable maintenance men with very little hope of their replacement. One other problem is the fact that the parks have not been considered as contributing to the war effort so that it is practically impossible to get certain vital parts for repairing equipment or no equipment such as trucks and motors.

Darwin W. Tate, Chief, Division of Beaches and Parks, Department of Natural Resources, California, sent in his report: More than 30 California state parks are being utilized, wholly or in part, by all the major branches of the armed forces of the United States for aircraft warning centers, induction and training centers, coast defense patrol headquarters, large-scale maneuvers, bivouacs, rest camps, recreational facilities and specialized defense works. Civilians are prohibited within the parks or portions so occupied. State park employees advise and assist in maintaining the necessary utilities for the armed services in the parks. Buildings, services and utilities, normally used but three months during the summer, are now used intensively throughout the year. Trailer court facilities were enlarged and improved in three state parks to relieve overcrowded living conditions in nearby "defense" communities. Parks thus utilized provided a year-round income to supplement budget appropriations. Where inducted employees were not replaced, the houses they vacated were rented to defense workers.

Samuel H. Boardman, State Park Superintendent of Oregon, reported: The manipulations of war strategy have affected the Oregon State Park System, as I presume they have affected many other state parks. Having our front porch on the Pacific, many of the headlands and bays being state park recreational areas, it has been only natural that the war authorities have set up reception committees to receive the visiting firemen upon arrival. The greatest danger to the Northwest this year is sabotage within our forests. Some damage may accrue through war usage, but Nature is a wonderful healer when seasoned with the salt spray of breaking combers.

Nash Higgins, Superintendent of Recreation, Tampa, Florida: Army and Navy camps provide trucks to get their men to the state parks and other recreation areas. The men generally come from the Middle West and North and are being trained for tropical warfare.

Harold S. Wagner, Director-Secretary, Akron Metropolitan Park District, Akron, Ohio: We have experienced considerable trouble around Akron with forest fires, but we had the CCC to fight them. When the CCC passed out early in March we notified owners of lands adjacent to the parks that, if it were necessary for the park organization to fight

fire on their land, the private owners would be charged the expense. Forest fires have been much reduced as a result.

William M. Hay, Director of State Parks, Tennessee: This kind of meeting to review our experiences, get help or hints from someone who has met and whipped our problems is much better than past sessions which have failed to provide that service to the state park officials who were newer in the field and had not the long experience and broad background of state park ownership and operation which many of the members have.

Harold W. Lathrop, Director of State Parks, Minnesota: Minnesota state parks have had an exceedingly cold and rainy season which accounts for the drop in attendance to 66 percent before June 30. Later figures brought attendance up to 85 percent of last year. Fishing brought us up twenty points, boating the same. Cabin use is up 28 percent, camping dropped 42 percent, but the use of trailers has disappeared, though there are some tent campers. Organizations that previously visited the parks, using school buses, can no longer obtain them, due to restricted tires. We expect to close the golf courses, as golf was off 64 percent. Analyzing attendance in parks—even with the new gas rationing—we think that we shall be justified in planning for operation of park facilities next year. Many will not be able to have vacations in the far-distant wilderness areas, but they will save up gas tickets for visits to state parks. Some of our facilities may serve military purposes. We should ask whether recreation is a necessity to be included in the *musts* for next year.

Mrs. Addison Parker, Member, Iowa Conservation Commission: Iowa is essentially a rural State, many of the parks were in rural areas and rural people have not been able to enjoy much recreation during this past year. There is the farm-labor problem and people on farms have stayed close to home. We have no state parks that are particularly near to war industries, though some local parks are serving that end in certain communities. Sportsmen and fishermen have continued to use water facilities more than ever. We find that fishing licenses remained constant, or possibly increased, and there is every evidence that there will be a heavy hunting season. Mrs. Parker then introduced:

V. W. Flickinger, Chief, Division of Lands and Waters, Iowa Conservation Department: Attendance is down about 40 percent in Iowa's state parks due to unfavorable weather and the shortage of farm labor which makes it necessary for the people to stay at home and work. Iowa's cabin camp use is up about 30 percent, however, and more hunting and fishing licenses have been sold this year than usual. Many of the people who used the cabins are now making reservations for next year, though the gasoline rationing will probably have some effect. Group camping has fallen off, partly because we have not been able to get group leaders. Also the 4H girls and boys have been at home at work.

Charles A. DeTurk, Director, Indiana State Parks: State park attendance is down 36 percent. The losses were heavier in the earlier part of the year. Last week's attendance was down about 1,000 as compared to last year. Our total income was down 20 percent, but the cabin and hotel use has been 28 percent higher than in 1941, partly due to a greater number of accommodations at Turkey Run. There are two serious problems in Indiana. The first is the preservation of scenic areas, the second to provide recreation. We are dependent on our own income and we were able to do a pretty good job in looking after our better scenic and historic areas; but we have to scratch around to get enough money to preserve areas whether they are used or not. The *Indianapolis Star* has given us good editorial support and we think that the people will demand that the Legislature give us enough money to keep the parks up. In our staff we have had some turnover, but it might be worse.

Hugh Barnhart, Commissioner of Conservation for Indiana, William Bailey, Maintenance Superintendent, and Richard E. Bishop, Chief Architect, were introduced.

George W. Williams, Superintendent, Division of Parks, Illinois Department of Public Works and Buildings: Our situation is the same as that in Indiana. Visitors to Illinois state parks have been reduced about 22 percent, but lodge and cabin use have increased approximately 35 percent above 1941. In some areas control has been given to the Army.

W. J. Kingscott, Acting Chief, Parks Division, Michigan Conservation Department: The attendance in Michigan state parks is down about 25 percent. Nine of the 59 parks have been "locked up" because of lack of use and to reduce maintenance costs and about 50 percent of our force has been taken into industry and war services. We have not suffered so much as some of the Eastern States. There is a great deal of public camping—tent and trailer.

In reply to certain questions asked, various delegates presented their experiences.

How Shall the CCC Barracks Be Used?

Conrad Wirth: The law requires an offer of CCC barracks be made first to the military forces. After 60 days they may be offered to the state governments and later to local governments. The National Park Service has received requests from the Boy Scouts and others to use these facilities, but, on the whole, it appears there is only a remote chance that such requests can be granted.

Darwin W. Tate reported from California: The CCC barracks in our state parks have been dismantled and salvaged where no longer needed. They have been used to house relief clients working in the state parks. Some now are being used for headquarters for soldiers and state guards; others are to be used soon by the Navy as rest camps.

Is Special Transportation Needed to State Parks?

Howard B. Bloomer, Detroit: At the present time in the eastern part of the United States where gasoline is rationed, the holders of "B" and "C" cards are practically barred from state parks because their gasoline is intended to be used only for the business purpose for which the card was obtained. I suggest that holders of "B" and "C" cards be permitted to visit any park within a certain specified radius.

Conrad Wirth: Some method of mass transportation should be worked out to reach the state parks; either extend the rail lines to the parks or possibly take over private open areas now near existing tracks, such as golf courses, and use them for general recreation. The English found that by lengthening hours and cutting out recreation they were not getting as much work per man hour as they did when they gave some time off for recreation.

Charles DeTurk: Last summer, crowds of Chicago people carrying their lunch baskets came to the South Shore Electric to visit Indiana parks. Thousands were turned back. The Company would not provide extra service for the Sunday crowds.

Charles G. Sauers, General Superintendent, Cook County Preserve: The ODT cannot run excursion trains. I think use could be made of the I & M Canal if there were a train which dropped groups along the Canal and picked them up in the evening.

Colonel Richard Lieber, Indianapolis: There is a situation at Spring Mill State Park where the B & O Railroad goes through the northwest edge of the park, but trains cannot be stopped at that point and passengers must be hauled into Mitchell and then taken 2¾ miles back to the park. We know what the situation is. We claim that after work is done, the workers need all kinds of parks as much as medicine and sleep. We know the role of parks for recuperation and revitalization, but as parks seem to have no connection with the war effort, it appears to many that transportation to parks is not necessary. How can we make this clear to the officials in Washington who are forgetting parks? We should have a better distribution of mass travel to and from parks. We should ask the Federal officials to reconsider and declare outdoor recreation necessary to the war effort.

Howard B. Bloomer: Would it be feasible to limit the radius on "B" and "C" cards? We cannot work men over hours indefinitely without some rest unless we break the men. If the men in the factories are broken, the armies are defeated in the fields.

A. C. Altvater: In Florida "B" and "C" ration book holders were not supposed to use any of their mileage in visiting parks.

Mrs. Richard Lieber, Indianapolis: What would Hollywood do if patrons could not go to the moving picture houses? Some people prefer moving pictures to parks, but there are many who would prefer parks.

Cannot the Conservation and Park organizations be just as strong as Hollywood would be?

Harold S. Wagner: I think that the organizations are interested. I see some hope in the Baruch-Conant-Compton report which stated: "We do not believe in sacrifice for sacrifice's sake." I think this statement indicated that the members of the Committee did not think that the rubber shortage is such as to make it necessary to abandon the automobile.

Programs for Service Men and War Workers

Frank D. Quinn, Director, Texas State Parks Board: We have quite a number of army camps in Texas. In the parks which are near, business has increased 50 percent. Four parks not near have declined 50 percent. Twelve parks managed to hold their own. We have 15 percent increase in net receipts. We have three that charge admission. We find that every means we have tried for transportation has failed. The Texas Tire Ration regulations will not permit a bus to go one mile beyond the city limits of San Antonio to take soldiers or anybody else to San José Mission. I am afraid that we shall have to leave it to the people to find a way to get to the parks. The increase in the attendance at state parks near army camps has not been due to the soldiers but mainly to the families who come to visit their soldier relatives. The Department has made every effort to get the interest of the soldiers—even took the fees off for swimming and similar sports—but we were unable to induce the soldiers to come to the parks. They prefer the cities and the bright lights to the state-park type of recreation.

State Parks Commandeered for War Purposes

William Hay: Tennessee has been confronted with demands of the Army to use state park lands for training purposes. In one case the cavalry wanted to train their horses in swimming at a park lake and the request was granted since the permanent damage would be minor. In another case, however, the army wants to use a state park as a bombing area and permanent damage will be great.

J. Charles Poe, Commissioner of Conservation, Tennessee: Altogether the Army has requested the use of four state parks. I wish the Conference would intercede in Washington to help us head off unreasonable demands.

Conrad Wirth: The National Park Service possibly could help when furnished all the facts about a particular case. The Director on occasion has conferred with the Army about the necessity of using certain parks. A resolution of the Conference, directed to the President or other high officials, might ask that other alternatives be exhausted before taking over parks for such Army use as will cause lasting injury.

Karl E. Pfeiffer, Director of State Parks in Maryland sent in a warn-

ing to the effect: Before any areas are commandeered, great care should be exercised to find out if no other areas could be used, as it is very easy to say "Use the area, it is state owned," but irreparable and needless harm can be done by ill-advised hasty action.

Budgets, Personnel and Visitors

A. C. Altvater: There are many more problems than park attendance. We do not know where our funds will come from. Florida, more than most States, depends on revenues from gasoline and automobile taxes. The appropriations are made by the State on a two-year basis. We thought that we were in clover; but conditions have changed. The legislature meets next spring and we shall need more funds. Rationing in Florida has not been any great burden. We like to have it because we think we are helping to win the war. But we operate our parks on set appropriations and on receipts. The soldiers get "B" and "C" cards and 90 percent of the cars entering the parks are soldier cars. We think that civilians with "B" and "C" cards should be permitted in the parks. The war plant worker who gets additional gasoline to go to his work ("B" or "C" card) has the card issued to him on the understanding that he may use his car only for the purpose for which it is intended.

Conrad Wirth: As far as CCC barracks in parks are concerned, the Army and Navy have asked for all portable barracks they can secure. They are not so interested in the permanent type of barracks. The letter from the Boy Scouts referred to the use of buildings. Whether the Boy Scouts could get hold of Federal or state-owned land I do not know. Some barracks are on leased land. No land is being given away to anyone. Mr. West, in his letter on behalf of the Boy Scouts, construed the language of the last Act to mean that land pertains to the barracks. The Act provides that CCC equipment must be turned over to the Army, Navy and Civil Aeronautics within 60 days. If they do not want it, it then becomes available to any other Federal agency. If not, and there is no time limit, it becomes available to state agencies or political subdivisions. Then it can go to others.

Concerning transportation, I may say that, regardless of how we feel that transportation is important, the question of rationing rubber is in the hands of those fighting the war who are concentrating on getting equipment and men to the front.

When the Secretary of War writes that he wants certain lands necessary to the prosecution of the war, it is hard to say that we are not going to let park lands, for instance, be leased for grazing. And yet, frequently there are feasible alternatives.

Darwin W. Tate reported: Income has been increased—or the source substituted—by providing facilities for or housing defense workers; by leasing unused lands suitable for agriculture or grazing; by selling cer-

tain valued protective or ornamental crops such as olives; by closing parks little used or remote and removing whatever facilities possible to parks of more concentrated use. Expenses have been reduced automatically by wartime regulations such as priorities and rationing; and by replacing conscripted personnel only when absolutely necessary. Capital outlay has been decreased nearly 100 percent. By urging the visiting public to coöperate in keeping grounds and facilities clean, employees badly needed for more necessary functions have been able to use more advantageously their time and park equipment. The loss of experienced workers to the armed forces has been a distinct handicap, particularly in the larger parks, but not as yet affecting greatly the older personnel of the State Park System. Losses of personnel may result in the closing of many parks.

Frank D. Quinn: We should all concentrate on winning the war as quickly as we can. At Bastrop State Park we have 30,000 soldiers within three miles. Buses will carry the boys, but they prefer to go 30 miles to the bright lights of Austin. Soldiers are not particularly interested even in free swimming. I believe in charging for that, but our parks are available. The boys are welcome in the parks anywhere.

Charles DeTurk: In Indiana they must pay. When state park officials are asked to quarter soldiers in parks there may be an answer that the parks were not bought for military reservations but for conservation and recreation.

Mrs. Robert Work, Barrington, Ill.: One of the greatest dangers is that the Army may be allowed to take over state parks or other land reservations and use them in a way that will interfere with their preservation, when often other more suitable land is available.

I. D. Gray, Superintendent State Parks, West Virginia: Fortunately, in West Virginia we do not have any war problem. We do not have any big army camps. I would like to say that when I was in the army and had free time I did not think of a state park. My thoughts were turned in another direction—toward the bright lights. In many cases, however, the nervous strain under which the war workers must labor is greater than that of the soldier in camp. Those in the war industries are benefited by visits to the parks.

In answer to a question by *L. H. Weir* as to whether any of the States have programs especially for service men and war workers a reply was given by

William Hay: We have had a few experiences. We have had picnics for soldier groups through the USO, but not on a large scale. We have had few calls for encampments on state park areas. We have one park for Negroes where there is a lot of timber. The army wanted to swim the horses in the lake and do a little training. They camped out. We took care of that. On another request, they came in to the park and pitched their tents and wanted to plow a field and take over both house and

swimming pool. They wanted the country club for camping. They did not get it. These parks have value for hundreds of years. Many features could be permanently spoiled.

Charles G. Sauers: In times of stress many things happen. We are going to lose experienced workers. Some of our staff are wondering about these men's work. No one can ever be sure that he has sounded all the resources of his personnel. No one has found a limit to what a person can do. These are times to search into that and perhaps see what older men can do. I think that we shall find within our organizations men who can replace the ones who go into the armed forces or into war work.

On the question of budgets, I may say that we often find that if we can't get things, we can do without them temporarily when we could not continue to do so over a period of years.

Harold W. Lathrop: So many things are included in budgets that cannot be secured because of priorities. I do not see how I can spend all the money in this year's budget.

Charles G. Sauers: I think that it is up to all park administrators to watch their situation for two or three years. We shall find out how good our construction has been. This is a time for review.

Colonel Richard Lieber: Such testimonials of first-class construction will be welcome. If park use is designated as an essential war effort, then we shall have more say, also more wear and tear. If we have more wear and tear, then we must find a way to secure priorities.

Postwar Planning

Charles DeTurk: We do not have much of a parkway program yet. But we have some unofficial plans. Now is a time to plan. This is about the only time there is. When we went into CCC and WPA we tried to do construction and planning all at once. We made some pretty bad mistakes.

Conrad Wirth: Anent the closing of CCC, I find that we have had more time to think of planning than when we were busy on construction. I am wondering when the war is over what the program of recreation is going to be. I wonder whether our present plans and designs for well-constructed buildings, adequate areas for caring for the population, access roads and means of transportation from population to recreation areas will then be adequate. Are the best plans those of the last five or six years? What shall we need after the war is over? When the automobiles first came out they were all too high. The transportation problem may be in the stage of the early automobile. What about the airplane? After every war the people are taxed to the limit. After every war the inventions for the war can be converted to domestic use and enjoyment.

Concessions

Tom Wallace, Louisville: Kentucky had some difficulty in obtaining concessionaires when it became obvious that attendance in the parks would be seriously affected by war restrictions. The State decided to operate the facilities with salaried employees and it has been satisfactory.

Conrad Wirth: I suggest that a separate non-profit corporation could be formed to operate concessions as is done in Washington, D. C., and at Mammoth Cave.

Harold W. Lathrop: Minnesota operates all concessions except Douglas Lodge at Itaska State Park and expects to take that over for state operation when the present contract expires.

Frank Quinn: Texas is taking over all concessions as fast as contracts expire.

Harold S. Wagner: Any department planning to operate its own concessions may secure from the National Park Service a copy of the Washington, D. C., contract.

Public Information

Hugh A. Barnhart, Director of Conservation, Indiana: In Indiana, in order to secure adequate publicity for state parks we send information weekly to the papers.

Charles Poe: In Tennessee we seek favorable publicity by granting free lodging to newsmen, especially when facilities are not in use. We also furnish colored moving pictures to various group meetings. I sometimes doubt if the expense is justified. It may bring many more people to the parks, but if most of them never leave the lodge area and get out into the park, the benefit is doubtful.

John I. Rogers, Assistant Chief, State Park Division, Michigan Conservation Department: We send out some releases. A special training school for all employees, featuring nature study, is operated and the subject publicized with real success. The school is open to clubs and other organizations during the summer months.

Summary of the Conference

RICHARD LIEBER, Chairman of the Board

This meeting of ours called "A Round Table on Wartime Uses of State Parks" is reaching its pleasant and I hope fruitful conclusion.

At the request of many members, a request insisted on for a number of years, the conventional pattern of sessions with its set speeches in profusion, leaving little or no time for discussion, was changed by the program committee to a less formal manner. The making of that sort of program, which of course had to be done in advance, was not an easy matter. For its excellent balance the board of directors is indebted to

its member Robert Kingery, that master of detailed perfection. This program now makes it my duty to give you a summary of the conference.

Under the old order that sort of thing would have been simple enough; armed with a paste pot and scissors, samples of erudite oratory would be clipped from said speeches and interspersed with sapient observations on the cussedness of human conduct and the perverseness of inanimate matter. The sergeant at arms would have scoured the byways of wisdom, to wit the washrooms and sundry cantinas, drawing forth from them into the light of the forum those refractory members who had congregated in these remote and unlikely places for critical discussion. This done, your chairman would automatically be relieved of further effort by a motion unanimously supported to dispense with the reading of the record. And that's that!

Much more difficult is his present situation. There were no set speeches but we had a free and naturally sometimes a carefree discussion. Everyone spoke his own mind. There was practically none of the old division: Speakers and audience. Instead of that we either listened or spoke; were speakers as well as auditors. Of course in this imperfect world of ours there are still privileged characters among us—I for one am glad there are—our gifted presiding officer, for example, Tom Wallace, the battling Charles Poe or the ingenious Hugh Barnhart. Pillars of strength in park debates, they are enthusiastic park lovers who participate keenly in discussion and then go home to have the last word by writing a summary of their own no matter what noble intentions your chairman had on the subject.

I mention this circumstance because it brings out both the strength and weakness of our new device of holding a conference. The spoken word is both volatile and evanescent. To be of enduring value it must be recorded in writing or in print.

Under the conventional method every speaker knows beforehand that his remarks will become a matter of printed record. It makes him careful and not infrequently trite and hackneyed. I know that from personal experience, being of a shy and retiring disposition. Yet nothing gives us dispensers of eloquence such a soul-pervading feeling of contentment as the reading of it in the ANNUAL. I am not betraying any confidences when I let it out that our own is the first essay of importance we look for.

Alas, there will be no more of that. What then will become of the thoughts here expressed by us? Fleeting and fugacious as they are they must be apprehended as a record of our deliberations. That, by the foresight of our program committee, has been done. The Secretary as well as stenographers have followed the proceedings.

Far be it from me then to submit a summary of expressions before they are edited as they will be by a competent reporter. They need editing for all extemporaneous speeches in verbatim reproduction are

loose jointed, repetitious and a severe pain to the grammarian. Should I commit the social error repeating what you and I have said, there would be a robust motion for immediate adjournment *sine die*. We shall all be better served awaiting the presentation of the material by Robert Kingery.

In this fashion a permanent record will be established of a unique conference which for two days in effect sat as a committee of the whole, discussing our common interest and responsibility both private and public.

This adopted pattern lends itself perhaps best for much needed regional meetings. Whether many of those can be held depends entirely upon the healthy condition of our treasury, made so by the united effort of members and directors.

The great gain of this, our interesting and friendly round table session, spiced with give-and-take banter, as I see it, is the realization that none of us can any longer afford to remain part of a passive "audience" but must become active performers. He will get most out of the National Conference on State Parks as he does out of anything else worthwhile in life, who puts most into it.

Spiritual and material values are thrown into the uncertain scale of war. In this contest every one of us has had place and among other duties there is specifically ours to protect one of the great sources of national inspiration—our Parks.

Resolutions Adopted at the Round Table Conference on Wartime Uses of State Parks

The National Conference on State Parks, at its Round Table Meeting on Wartime Uses of State Parks, held in Chicago, September 23–24, after hearing reports of state park authorities from many States, declares it to be the sense of the meeting that state parks are an active agent in the prosecution of the War, inasmuch as they furnish the means for recreation of mind and body, so much needed to relieve the strain of these times.

Subject to such limitations as may be thought wise and necessary by the authorities in charge of prosecuting the war, we place ourselves on record in favor of making state parks easily accessible to near-by communities, including the Armed Forces, war workers and the civil population behind the war program. With revised rulings, school buses might be made available for transportation to parks without losing priority rating on tires. In some cases supplementary bus lines, or other mass transportation, connecting with existing public transportation, might make it possible for many to visit parks who cannot now do so. The Conference suggests that Sunday operation of week-day transportation might be used to transport persons to state parks, in view of reports that

in some places Sunday picnickers have been obliged to turn back because of curtailed Sunday service.

We condemn the practice in some eastern States of fining those with "B" and "C" cards whose cars are found in parks, especially in view of the fact that holders of "A" gas cards who might not be war workers at all, may visit parks freely within the limit of their mileage.

The park authorities present declared their willingness to take on for themselves and for their staffs all the extra work possible, due to depletion of staffs by military and other war service.

The Conference commends the action of those responsible for the protection of state parks, who, subject to park regulations, have agreed to use of parks by the military forces on condition that the areas be returned to the States in the condition in which they were found.

We protest, however, against use of state parks for any purpose which will injure natural scenery which it will be impossible to restore after intensive use, especially in view of the fact that in most or all cases there would be available land whose natural features would not be injured or could easily be restored.

County Land-Use Planning for Better Agriculture

EDWARD C. ELLIOTT, President, Purdue University, Lafayette, Ind.

"The land belongs to the living, not the dead."
—*Jefferson*
"The expert should be on tap, but not on top."
—*Laski*

THIS Nation of ours has long rated itself as the world center of opportunity for the individual. During the years of the century in which we are, this Nation, slowly and uncertainly, has become aware that, in addition to being a land of personal opportunity for the years of the present, it must also be a land of public obligation for the years of the future. The shift of attention from *opportunity* to *obligation* is at no point more dramatically evident than in our changing plans, policies and practices for dealing with our productive earth.

For the first hundred years the Nation was both land rich and land poor. The planners of those days saw clearly that national progress and prosperity were to be promoted by the settlement of the land through distribution into private ownership. Through the land there was to come the first and the principal realization of opportunities for the individual. At the same time there was another form of wise planning through recognizing that some portion of the land wealth must be utilized for the welfare of the whole of the people. Millions upon millions of acres of the public domain were thus dedicated as subsidies for education, for roads and for other public purposes.

This, of course, is neither the time nor the place to review and to assess the much discussed American land policy. It is timely, however, to remind ourselves that the maintenance of the worth and the fruitfulness of the good earth has today become a clear national obligation. The extent to which this obligation is to be fulfilled will be a measure of our capacity for effective planning for the years ahead.

Moreover, the American formula of the free life requires that land planning, and the execution of land planning, be accomplished by democratic means and methods. Here, as in many other points in the designs for the future, we detect fear and avoidance of the imposition of plans and authority from above; even when such plans and authority give promise of getting the job done. For the world has learned, and is today learning as never before, that while dictatorship plans with certainty, in the long run, it accomplishes little; and, while democracy plans clumsily, in the long run, its permanent gain is the greater.

I am merely the reporter upon the subject "County Land-Use Planning for Better Agriculture." Were it not for the generous assistance of my associates of the University staff—Professor J. C. Bottum, Professor J. B. Kohlmeyer and Mr. A. M. Nichter, it would have been

impossible for me to present this summary of the record of the experience in and philosophy of land-use planning in Indiana.

There is today a county land planning committee in every county of the State. These committees, comprising 3,877 farm men and women, are engaged in developing plans designed to improve the welfare of rural people. Serving without any remuneration, these committees are purely advisory in nature. They have no administrative responsibilities. It is my understanding that many other States have similar committees also engaged in this activity. In this State and in the Nation these committees comprise quite a formidable group. Consequently, their activities should be of special interest to all of those concerned with planning.

How did these committees come into being? Who gives them direction? What are they doing? What are their accomplishments? Land-use planning is a coöperative effort by representative farmers in each county and State, the agencies of the Department of Agriculture, the land-grant colleges, and other state and local agencies. Its purpose is to provide a democratic means for developing and continuously improving agricultural programs and policies. These plans help to tie together the various agricultural programs and related public activities and will increase their effectiveness in promoting long-time as well as emergency objectives in agriculture.

It is recognized, to be sure, that agricultural land-use planning reaches out into very broad fields. By the term "land-use planning" or "agricultural planning" it is not meant that such planning restricts itself to planning in any narrow sphere of effort, but rather deals with all problems which influence conditions under which rural people work and live. To begin with, the "human side" of agricultural problems is definitely within such planning. Land is used by people, and land-use cannot be planned without taking the people into account.

This type of planning touches, and ofttimes overlaps, other fields of interest—industrial, urban and others—with which other than the agricultural agencies of state and Federal Government are concerned. In these instances, provision is made for working as closely as possible with planners in the other fields, but meanwhile agriculture has its own job to do. Therefore, the Department of Agriculture and the land-grant colleges have accepted responsibility for helping farmers to plan.

Making plans is nothing new to a farmer. He is more of a planner, perhaps, than anybody else, if for no other reason than that the seasons force him to look months into the future for the fruits of his toil. He has to decide what to plant, how much to plant, and where his various crops are to be planted. He figures out his feed and livestock needs. That is individual planning for a particular farm. Then, too, the procedure for group planning with his neighbors is also familiar to him. By working together farmers have been able to begin group action in solving many of their problems, such as is possible through coöperative

marketing and purchasing associations, cow testing associations, cooperative credit organizations, threshing groups, etc. In all this planning, problems of production and marketing have been emphasized, which the individual acting alone or through small groups of neighbors could cope with successfully. The success of this kind of planning is due to the farmer or his group possessing a large degree of actual control over the factors that create, or that can alleviate, the conditions about which he is concerned.

But what about the problems that the individual farmer or the farmers in his neighborhood cannot control in this way? What about the problems such as soil erosion, drainage, flood control, and reforestation, which may require study on a large area basis? The solution of problems such as these, in many areas, is as closely related to the farmer's pocketbook as is a registered bull or hybrid seed corn. How can farmers work together with local government officials in controlling the migration of families into depleted and eroded areas with no opportunities for farming? What can they do collectively, with state and Federal aid, about soil erosion, reforestation and public land policies? What can they do about road and school costs, taxation, public drainage, and high costs of relief, and a multitude of other problems that affect the farm family, the community, the State, and the Nation? Problems such as these can only be attacked through a collective planning process such as land-use planning.

To do these things some machinery is needed. The land-use planning machinery starts with the organization and work of community and county committees of farmers. Generally community committees are made up entirely of farmers. On the county committees there is a definite majority of farmers with representatives of the various agencies operating in the county as ex-officio members. Having farmers participate in planning, of course, means a lot of work, and some people are asking why the Department of Agriculture or the land-grant colleges, for instance, should not send technicians into a county to figure out scientifically what the county's plans ought to be, and then just announce the results. The reasons are plain. In the first place, the "hand-me-down" idea of doing things is not the way of democracy and, secondly, this is simply not a job for technicians alone. It is one for the joint concern of farmers, technicians, and program administrators. And the key to success in the entire task is to obtain the benefit of local knowledge and opinions about local problems and conditions, together with local support and participation in planning programs and goals.

Land-use planning in Indiana, as such, is an outgrowth of agricultural program planning which was instituted by the United States Department of Agriculture in 1935 and carried on during 1936 and 1937. This program was instituted because of the feeling that local judgments were

needed on certain questions to assist in the formulation of national agricultural adjustment programs. In this program, county program planning committees were organized in every county in the State. These committees studied the present production of crops and livestock within their county and then made recommendations as to what adjustment in land-use and crop and livestock production was necessary to maintain soil fertility and control soil erosion. These were compiled into county reports, which in turn were summarized into reports for each type-of-farming area in the State.

Because of the wide variations within each county in respect to topography, soil types, drainage, erosion, type of farming and market outlets, it was considered that the entire county was too large an area to consider as a unit in developing the most effective land-use program. Thus, beginning with the fiscal year July 1, 1937, it was decided to determine, if possible, the various land-use areas within each county, based on topography, soil types, drainage, market opportunities, adaptability of the land for various crops and livestock, etc., and desires and aptitudes of the people.

Thus, during the year 1937–1938 planning committees were reorganized into land-use planning committees. In twenty counties these committees were assigned the task to develop a county land-use map on which were delineated the various land-use areas in the county. Furthermore, these committees made a study of the present use of the land in each area in respect to the percentage of land devoted to woods, permanent pasture and cropland, and the use of cropland. They then considered what adjustments in land-use in each area were necessary in order (1) to make the maximum income from the land, and (2) to maintain productivity of the land. Recommendations were made relative to the most desirable use of the land in each area and the desirable practices which should be adopted in conjunction with its operation or use. These studies and recommendations constitute the basis of a report which has been prepared by the county committee in each county.

This land-use classification and mapping work continued the next three years in other counties, and on July 1, 1941, all county maps and reports had been completed. Nine thousand five hundred and thirty-one farmers participated in this planning process.

In 1940, Park County was selected as a unified county and the county committee developed specific objectives and policies to obtain needed adjustments and solve specific problems. To this end specific recommendations were made to the Farm Security Administration, AAA, SCS, Extension Service, and other agencies regarding changes in their programs more adequately to fit local conditions. Also, special efforts were made in attempting to obtain agreements and decisions on the part of these agencies regarding specific lines of action that would contribute to the achievement of the objectives that were agreed upon. Very little

was accomplished along these lines and it soon became evident that if farmers were to make any real progress in planning, an impartial organization of rural people must be further effected to reach all farmers. This is necessary in order to get facts to and from farm people, which in turn will focus public consciousness on what the facts really are in regard to any given situation.

Starting in 1940 in counties in which land-use mapping was completed, planning committees listed some of their specific agricultural problems affecting the economic and social welfare of their rural people. One or more of these problems were selected for further analysis and study, and definite objectives were set up for the solution of these problems. Among these problems were such problems as soil erosion control, increased use of limestone, rural relief, local governmental costs, rural electrification, farm water supply, rural zoning, public drainage, reforestation and pasture improvement.

Some specific things which have been accomplished by the efforts of these committees should be mentioned. Newton and St. Joseph Counties today have rural zoning ordinances to regulate housing in rural areas based on health and sanitary standards. In ten other counties special committees have been set up to study the possibility of their counties adopting rural zoning ordinances somewhat patterned after the rural zoning ordinances of Newton and St. Joseph Counties. They have in mind preventing misdirected migration of people back on the land after the war, which would bring about unwise use of land and many other economic and social problems.

Noble, Newton, Greene, and Owen Counties have organized soil conservation districts for erosion control as a result of the activities of the county planning committees in these counties. Brown County has a rural electrification line extended from Jackson County. When this project was proposed it was turned down by the Washington office on the Rural Electrification Administration on the grounds that the United States Forest Service had classified much of the area as unsuited to farming. But due to factual evidence presented by the Brown County Land-Use Planning Committee relative to property valuations and incomes of the people in the area, the project was later approved. To reduce local governmental costs, Martin County has consolidated four townships into two townships. Also, in that county the county infirmary has been abandoned and its inmates transferred to the adjoining county.

The land-use planning committees rendered material assistance in the acquisition of the 60,000-acre proving grounds in Jefferson, Jennings and Ripley Counties. They assisted in developing methods for evaluation of disturbance costs. They also developed plans for local banks to finance clients until the Government paid them for their farms. Furthermore, these committees saw that lists of farms for sale throughout southeastern Indiana were made available to farmers who were forced

to sell their farms and who wanted to continue in farming. As a result of these efforts, six hundred families were relocated with a minimum of disturbance and a minimum of public expense.

Thirteen county committees have set up goals for increased use of agricultural limestone. These goals and plans for their achievement have been referred to the County Extension Service, AAA, and other agencies that have influenced a tremendous increase in tonnage applied in these counties. Plans for building new roads and schools are being influenced in several counties by the County Land-Use Planning Committees, which are pointing out population trends and the adaptability of the land to continuing agriculture. Likewise, in a number of counties the policy of credit agencies has been reshaped to conform with the recommendations of the county land-use planning committee.

This year in twenty counties of the State the county planning committees have undertaken a study of the problem of public drainage. These studies include (1) mapping all the public drains in the county, both open and tile, (2) appraisal of the condition of each drain, and the factors contributing to its condition, (3) determining the annual cost of maintenance of each drain, and (4) determining the extent of the annual crop damage along each drain. These studies are conducted in each township and then summarized into a county report. If, in the opinion of the committee, there is inadequate maintenance of their drains, recommendations for improvement of maintenance are being made. If these proposals do not come within the scope of our present state drainage laws, recommended changes in law are being proposed.

At the present time agricultural planning must focus most of its efforts on problems that directly concern the war effort. In each county land-use planning committees are working with the United States Employment Service to help meet the farm labor problem which is becoming acute in many counties this year, and will become more acute next year. In order that at least some of the expected postwar shocks and dislocations can be prevented, county planning committees throughout the State have given some study, developing policies and making specific recommendations on how to keep agriculture on a sound basis during and after the war. These recommendations are centered on finance, local government and taxes, land-use and conservation, relation of agriculture to industry and labor, and international trade. The publicity of these recommendations, through the press, has undoubtedly done much to stimulate thought among our people and to help crystallize public opinion on important issues.

Time will not permit a further recitation of accomplishments in land-use planning. They are numerous and various. The fundamental and important fact is that farm people, by proper analysis of problems confronting them, can develop policies and set up programs or guides for existing programs designed to solve them, whether they be economic,

social or governmental problems. And many of the things which have been done by the various land-use planning committees have reflected themselves in the many recommendations to the National Resources Planning Board.

It is in connection with the broad social and economic questions affecting our entire economy that agricultural planning breaks down unless it becomes a part of or is associated with an over-all planning group which carries the planning process to all groups of society. Many of the questions most vital to agriculture's welfare are of this nature, such as education; the freedom with which surplus agricultural youth may flow into the various industrial fields; price and production policies; transportation; taxation; credit; international trade; and many others. If planning is to be most effective in connection with these problems, they must be approached from the national rather than the group standpoint and the planning process carried to industry, labor and agriculture alike. More interplay between the groups must take place at various levels. Agricultural planning must be more and more coördinated with national planning.

As I recall studies and surveys of the soil of the State made under the direction of Purdue during the past two decades, as I scrutinize the maps showing the nature and variety of the land areas of the State, defining and determining in a large measure its agricultural possibilities, as the county and state progress reports of the state land-use committees come to my desk for examination, I have the clear conviction that here is planning that represents the altruism of democracy—an altruism based on the faith of the people in their land, an altruism that will remain dynamic as long as the experts remain on tap and not on top, an altruism that has determined that the land is a trust held for the living of each coming generation.

The Metropolitan Region as a Planning Unit

I

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IT SHOULD not be necessary in our time to make a case for metropolitan regional planning. The fact of the existence of the metropolis speaks eloquently enough. The problems of metropolitan government, economy, and society plead so insistently for rational treatment that no one who claims title to membership in the fraternity of planners can ignore them. Despite the abundance of facts to support the contention that the metropolitan region is not merely a figure of speech but a reality, and in the face of the urgent baffling problems which regional involvements pose for every city of metropolitan proportions, planning still proceeds largely as if the city rather than the metropolitan region were the appropriate planning area.

Forward-looking planners have, of course, for some years past recognized the imperious necessity of finding a planning unit approximating in scope an area congruent with the community to be planned. Some, however, have had no scruples about undertaking urban planning programs as if the region of which the city was a part were non-existent. Still others have been content, especially since their fees come from a municipal planning agency, to accept planning programs for the city and incidentally, as an afterthought or as part of the ritual, also to take account of the city's regional involvements. As a recent publication puts it:

> Almost every city has, outside its political boundaries, residential or commercial or manufacturing areas, large or small, which are economically a part of the central community, sharing its fortunes and needing to coöperate in its policies. The larger area, containing both the city proper and these outlying activities, must, therefore, for its best effectiveness, be planned as a unit. The municipal planning agency will recognize the fact that its study of the city area can be adequate only if it includes the larger metropolitan district of which it is a part. If there is an official regional or county planning agency, willing and able to undertake a coöperative study with the city planning agency, then the larger area could be more adequately studied.
>
> A city agency alone, partly because of legal limitations, partly because of difficulties in securing and spending city funds to study conditions beyond the city limits, may be severely handicapped at the present time. If it is impossible soon to eliminate such handicaps, the city planning agency must do the best it can to consider, in a broad way, the general aspects of the outer region and particularly those planning factors which have their effects both inside and outside the city boundaries.[1]

It is the thesis of this paper that just as no reputable physician would treat a case of scarlet fever by applying local plasters to the erupted

[1]Federal Housing Administration, *A Handbook on Urban Redevelopment for Cities in the United States* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941), pp. 15–16.

parts of the patient's anatomy, so a city planner is indulging in professional quackery by purporting to make a plan for a city which stops abruptly at the corporate limits. Most of the problems that call for the knowledge and skill of the planner in the first place are systemic or region-wide and are not at all or only in slight degree amenable to treatment on the scope of the legally defined municipality.

What, then, are the facts about metropolitan communities which dictate the appropriate planning area and what are the metropolitan problems the range of which must determine the scope of the city plan?

For some decades past we have been witnessing the emergence and rapid growth of a new type of urban community—the supercity, or the metropolitan region.[1] The concentration of business and industry in the larger urban centers has been accompanied by the outward movement of residents seeking more favorable places in which to live. The desire to escape from the disadvantages, the costs, and the civic responsibilities of urban living has also been shared by industries, which, while not wishing to deprive themselves of access to urban consumer and labor markets, have sought to benefit from the lower costs, especially land and labor costs, by establishing themselves outside the limits of the central cities and beyond the reach of their regulatory powers.

Except in cases where the cities themselves comprise vast areas and thus contain within their boundaries ample undeveloped territory for residential and industrial expansion, there has taken place during the last decade a significant shift in the distribution of urban residents. In general, the cities have grown much less rapidly than the counties in which they lie. Indeed, the outward movement of the city population has reached a point where nearly one-third of the cities of 100,000 or more inhabitants in 1940 and about one-fourth of the cities in the 25,000—100,000 size group actually lost population during the last decade.

The most dramatic expression of this trend is to be found in those urban complexes which the Census has designated as "Metropolitan Districts." Whereas the central cities, constituting the core of these metropolitan districts, have grown only 6.1 percent during the last decade, the outlying areas on the periphery of the central cities have grown 16.9 percent, as Table 1 indicates. Thus nearly one out of six Americans is a suburbanite, and there is one suburban dweller for every two inhabitants of a metropolitan city. That the flight from the central cities to the rims of the metropolitan areas is continuing is shown by the fact that while in 1930, 30 percent of the population of metropolitan districts lived outside the central cities, in 1940 there were 32 percent outside. For the 133 comparable districts, the centers grew 5.0 percent and the peripheries 15.8 percent. Of the 140 metropolitan districts, 36, or 25.7 percent, lost population in their central cities during the decade

[1]See Louis Wirth, "Urban Communities," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVII (May, 1942), 833 ff.

1930–1940 and only 7 gained as much or more in their central cities as in their outlying sections. The implications of this suburban trend for local government, the physical structure of cities, housing, industry,

TABLE 1

POPULATION OF METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS, 1940 AND 1930

	Population		Increase	
	1940	1930	Number	Per Cent
Total (140 districts)	62,965,773	57,602,865	5,362,908	9.3
In central cities	42,796,170	40,343,442	2,452,728	6.1
Outside central cities.	20,169,603	17,259,423	2,910,180	16.9

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940, Population: Number of Inhabitants, United States Summary* (1st ser.; Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941), p. 71.

taxation, real estate values, and ways of living are already becoming apparent. The fact that nearly half of the Nation's total population is concentrated into one hundred and forty metropolitan areas is in itself impressive, indicating that, although dispersion of the population and industries from the central cities is under way, this does not spell the end of urbanization but means, rather, a new type of decentralization within more inclusive metropolitan areas. The importance of dense concentrations of people and industries in a few urban areas is shown by the fact that the 33 "industrial areas" recognized by the Census of Manufactures comprising 97 counties with only 1.7 percent of the total land area and 35.4 percent of the total population of the United States accounted for 54.7 percent of the total number of wage earners in 1939.[1]

Nearly 60 percent of the 184,230 American manufacturing establishments producing in 1939 goods valued at 56.8 billion dollars were concentrated in these 33 industrial areas comprising the chief metropolitan cities of the country. Each of the 14 American cities with a population of over a half million is the center of an industrial area. Together they accounted for 26.1 percent of the value of all manufactured products produced in the United States. New York and Chicago together accounted for nearly half of this. Although the metropolitan areas seem to have lost something of the momentum of growth which they showed in the past, they still comprise the concentrated workshops and habitations of the Nation.

The serious problems which the flight of industry and people into the suburban fringe creates for the central cities can be more adequately appraised if the suburban trend is seen as operating in combination with the outward movement of residential and business districts within

[1]U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Manufactures, 1939. Distribution of Wage Earners in the United States by Counties* (Release, November, 1941).

cities themselves. The inner cores of the cities have been threatened by depopulation, blight, and decay.

Some of the major cities of the country have been faced with the problem of maintaining urban public services such as policing, fire protection, sanitation, education, and recreation at constant or increasing costs in the face of declining income from taxation, owing to a drop in the value of taxable property and increasing tax delinquency. The efforts that have been made by the public housing agencies to check blight and to construct low-cost housing in the slum sections near the centers of cities have not been on a sufficiently large scale to reverse the trend of migration toward the fringe of the cities and have not effectively halted the obsolescence of public facilities and private structures in the inner and older built-up areas of our cities. Commendable as the efforts to rehabilitate the deteriorated areas have been, they have to a large extent been offset by the activities of the lending agencies of the Federal government which have looked upon the older areas as poor risks and have favored the outward movement of new residential construction. Increasing traffic congestion at the city centers, coupled with increasing emphasis upon high-speed, through-traffic lanes to the outskirts and the suburbs, has accentuated the tendency to create residential vacuums at the hearts of cities.

One of the first problems which confronts the planner is the delineation of the area to be planned. Much as he would like, he cannot avoid formulating somewhere near the start of his procedure a definition of the scope of his activities, for unless he does this he will not even know how to limit the range of his observations and the ramifications of the factors and forces he seeks to analyze and control. It is a good rule here as elsewhere to start with the ideal of approximating the total situation. But it is a well-known fact that we can never approach the whole and always must content ourselves with a more or less incomplete and circumscribed part. As the poet put it:

> All things by immortal power
> Near or far,
> Hiddenly
> To each other linked are,
> That thou canst not stir a flower
> Without troubling of a star.
> —*Francis Thompson*

Even the planner must choose, but let us hope that he will choose as wisely as possible, and that in seeking to discover a practicable planning area he will consider both the range of interrelatedness of the problems with which he deals as well as the scope of potential control that is to be exercised.

It may be well at the outside to indicate that there are several distinct approaches to a region. First, we may conceive a metropolitan

region as an area containing a dominant central city exercising a progressively diminishing influence upon a territory the outer boundaries of which are indeterminate. Second, we may think of a metropolitan region as an area containing a central city exercising a dominant influence over a territory the periphery of which is marked by the zone where the dominance of another competing metropolitan region becomes apparent. Third, we may visualize metropolitan regions as more or less arbitrarily fixed areas into which the country as a whole has been divided for various administrative purposes.

The first type of region is largely determined by the size and importance of the city as an economic and social entity, the degree to which it is dependent for its life upon a hinterland, and the degree to which the life of the hinterland is dependent upon and integrated with the central city. Obviously this will vary for different functions. The boundaries of such a region may be conveniently drawn along a line where the central urban influences fade out and become indistinguishable. Beyond this area there may lie an indefinitely extended no-man's-land which is either distinctly rural or which at any rate is not the recognized domain of any other metropolitan region. Because until recently in many parts of our country there still existed vast wide-open spaces, the metropolitan regions have not been under the necessity of staking out their respective imperial domains.

The second type of metropolitan region is one which may be thought of as constituting a sort of socio-economic watershed the boundaries of which are drawn along a line in each direction where lines of interdependence flow more predominantly toward one rather than another metropolitan center. Such a line might be determined on the basis of the flow of trade, of newspaper circulation, of commutation, or of labor flow. Particularly in the highly urbanized sections of the Nation does this type of region emerge as an important unit.

The third type of region is the product largely of administrative controls, particularly Federal controls which have progressively become more important as the functions of our national government have multiplied. The administrative areas of which a given metropolitan city is the center may vary enormously, but by virtue of the establishment of such centers and the delineation of their regional domains the country as a whole is carved into significant regional units.

It would indeed be fortunate if each of these three types of areas were internally consistent and clearly defined, not to speak of being consistent with one another. Unhappily for the planners, however, this is far from true and poses a problem which taxes the ingenuity of the best of them. The sad fact is that cities and regions are products of growth rather than of design and what is more they are fluid rather than static. As a wise observer has said: "To ingenious attempts at explaining by the light of reason things that want the light of history to show their

meaning, much of the learned nonsense of the world has indeed been due."[1]

We should note, however, that we need not accept the chaos that we have inherited from history as an immutable and inflexible fact before which we can only stand in awe and reverence. The rationale of planning is that even if we must accept the past as given, and read its lessons, the future is ours to influence if not to make. If I may quote another poet: "All other things *must*, man is a being who wills." The way in which we conceive of the planning area may in itself become an important factor in the shaping of the cities, the regions, and the nation of the future.

You will ask, and you have a right to ask, whether there is an optimum planning region, one which better than all the others lends itself to the uses of the planner. Regretfully I must admit that life for the planner, as for all the rest of us, is full of compromises, but in planning, as in other fields, let us not make our compromises before the battle, during the battle, and after the battle again, for if we do we will have precious little left of what originally drove us to do battle with the enemy. If it is true that the perfect is the enemy of the good, the good is no less an enemy to the perfect.

The search for an all-purpose planning area may be as futile as the search for the Holy Grail, but the search for an approximation to such an area is the categorical imperative of the planner. Even if he does not reach it, the educative influence which the search for it is likely to bring will make his work more productive and more intelligent and will at the least lift him out of the level of quackery to the uncomfortable plane of the sciences.

Obviously the determination of the planning area depends in some measure upon what is to be planned. There may be purposes for which the corporate city, or even a subdivision thereof, may be quite adequate. For smaller towns and cities the county may be enough. And for some of the larger urban centers the areas which have been designated by the Census of Population as Metropolitan Districts, and the Census of Manufactures as Industrial Areas, may be quite adequate. If the planning is of a circumscribed, segmental character, the scope of the area may very properly be the scope of the function. But most planning is not, or should not be, unifunctional but comprehensive, and while there are certain interconnections between functions which express themselves in comparable areal scope, there is no assurance that a functional area that may be chosen by the planner on the basis of hunch or tradition will yield an adequate basis for comprehensive urban planning. If the planner must err, let him err on the side of taking in more rather than less of the periphery of the city. If he must map the planning area, let him touch his pencil lightly as he defines its outer rims, to remind him that as far as possible they should forever remain fluid. If he must be

[1]E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture* (London, 1871), p. 17.

specific, let him draw his lines of demarcation in such a way that they will represent the coincidence of the most vital zones of influence of the city upon its hinterland that he can ascertain after examining both what is and the fundamental factors that have brought it about and that are likely to change it.

Even the smallest hamlet tends to maintain itself and to grow, to take on structure and to metamorphose, because of forces not contained within itself. In any city of any size, and particularly in cities of metropolitan proportions, the lines of mutual influence between the city and the outside world are so complex as virtually to defy orderly statements. Nevertheless an attempt must be made at least to outline some of the principal criteria of interdependence and integration that should furnish a basis for the empirical determination of the metropolitan planning area.

Whatever else the city may be, in our kind of civilization it is first and foremost a human settlement resting upon an economic base with more or less widespread economic ramifications. If the planner therefore would delineate his planning area in such a way as to conform as nearly as possible with the definition of the region as an economic unit, he must take account of the interaction between the city and the outside world which flows from the fact that the city is not merely the dwelling place of man but the workshop and the center of interchange of goods and services.

Among the facts to be considered in delineating the boundaries of the planning region, therefore, are: the area from which the city draws the raw materials which it in turn processes, stores, and distributes. It may not be possible to do this for all of the basic raw materials which the city so uses, but it should be possible to do it for those which constitute the most important base for the city manufacturing activities. There is secondly the fact that the city ships its products to the outside world and is therefore dependent for its economic prosperity upon a market which may be regional, national, or world-wide. Obviously here again it would be impossible and impracticable to draw a line demarcating an area comprising all of the seller relationships that the city has to its market. It will be sufficient, however, to note the area over which the bulk of its most significant products are distributed. Two distinct areas of this sort are commonly noted: (a) *the retail trade area*, comprising the more or less immediately adjacent territory, the outlying boundaries of which are roughly determined by the area over which retailers advertise, over which a regular free delivery route is maintained, over which local newspapers circulate their retail ads, and over which the chain stores maintain approximately the same price. (b) *the wholesale area*, which has been fairly well sketched by the Census of Business for the larger communities, comprises of course a much wider area, delineated again by the territory over which the wholesale houses

maintain regular sales and delivery routes, maintain a common price structure, and maintain a dominance which another wholesale center would find it difficult to challenge.

Such interconnections of an economic sort as banking, particularly the delineation of the area over which outlying banks maintain depositories in central banks, must be taken account of. Since much of our economic life depends upon the circulation of news, the newspaper circulation area covered by the metropolitan press constitutes a significant orbit of influence. The same has lately come to be true of radio listening areas. One of the most important criteria for determining the metropolitan planning region, however, and one which can be easily ascertained on at least a sampling basis, is the area from which the urban community draws its labor supply. This is the area defined by the territory over which people living in the cities go to work and the area from outside of the city from which workers are drawn to urban establishments. The routes of automobile transport and the commutation zones may be found roughly to approximate this area.

There are in addition such factors as the extent of the local freight rate zone, the local switching area, the area over which local postal rates prevail, the area over which belt line railroads operate, the area served by urban public utilities, and the area of local telephone rates, which can be used to check on and to correct the boundaries of the metropolitan region arrived at by other criteria such as those mentioned above.

What has made the city the vital force in the national life that it is, however, is not merely the fact that it performs certain economic functions but also that it is enmeshed with a hinterland of varying scope in countless social activities. Among these are: the area over which such urban institutions as hospitals, schools, churches, theaters, and clubs are patronized by the people of the hinterland; the area over which the professional services which urbanites perform are sought by an outlying clientele; the area over which urbanites seek recreation in the form of golf clubs, forest preserves, and camp sites; and the area over which a substantial proportion of outlying residents maintain intimate social connections with people in the city. It may even be true that the area over which the inhabitants of the region think of themselves as belonging to or being a part of the city constitutes a crucial criterion for the definition of the planning area. This may be ascertained by their contributions to urban philanthropic activities and the interest they take, however slender, in civic affairs. It should be recognized, of course, that the area over which a given urban state of mind prevails is difficult to ascertain, although the circulation figures of the metropolitan newspaper may give us a rough index.

There are other more or less arbitrary criteria—the extent of urban land-uses, the area of continuous urban population density, and the area over which urban real estate firms operate subdivisions.

Although the planner will be cautious in accepting any arbitrarily laid-out or historically constituted governmental units as his planning area, he cannot fail to take account of the existence of these governmental and administrative units and their interrelationships. Besides the corporate entity which is the city, it will be necessary to take account of township and county lines, tax districts, police districts and judicial areas, voting districts, and similar administrative units. These will generally not cross state boundaries, and yet such services as sanitation, health services, fire services, and police services which the central city renders may frequently spill over not only local administrative lines but even state boundaries. Of late the areas over which contracts for joint services between different administrative units have been entered into have become increasingly important. That the outward movement of municipal boundaries does not keep pace with the actual spread of services is perhaps most dramatically illustrated by the extent to which extensive rural areas constituting the milk-shed of central cities have subjected themselves to the control of urban sanitary inspection. In not a few metropolitan areas, especially in those marginal regions where otherwise chaotic developments would take place on the peripheries of cities and of suburbs, the cities have even been able to obtain such concessions from their suburban neighbors as the power to control zoning of land-uses, the regulation of building construction, and even planning.

In recent years one of the most revolutionary developments in the structure of metropolitan regions has come through the expansion of the services of the Federal Government to local communities and the multiplication of Federal administrative authorities operating outside of Washington. The Federal Reserve districts, the army corps areas, the housing, works, and security agencies, by the very fact that they have set up district offices and divided the country into administrative regions, have brought about a certain degree of integration which a few years ago would have been considered as utopian. The National Resources Planning Board's report of a few years ago, on *Regional Factors in National Planning and Development*, listed well over a hundred such administrative areas into which the country was divided. Since that time these administrative units have multiplied enormously, and in recent months there have been added to them the numerous agencies connected with defense and war activities, such as the War Production Board areas, the defense areas as constituted by the defense, health, and welfare services, and the rent control and rationing areas with which we are just now becoming familiar. It is, of course, a regrettable fact that the Federal Government itself has apparently not been able or not been willing to adopt a more or less standardized set of areas the country over. Here one of the most colossal tasks of coördination on the Federal level remains to be undertaken. If this task can be adequately performed,

it might set an example to state and local authorities and contribute immensely to the progress of regional planning. One contribution, however, which particularly the Federal defense and war agencies have made in a number of instances, is to recognize metropolitan regions as distinct administrative areas separate from the States to which they belong and sometimes comprising sections of several States. This step may do much toward rationalizing metropolitan administration.

It should, of course, be recognized that not all of the criteria for delimiting a planning region sketched above are of equal importance. Nor does each stand as an isolated fact. It is one of the tasks of the planner, therefore, to evaluate the significance of these several criteria and to understand their interrelationships. In this way he may ultimately arrive at the point where the countless possible definitions of metropolitan regions can be reduced to a few, and by working out the approximate coincidence of these boundaries they may be actually further reduced to two: (1) the immediate planning area constituting the region of daily intimate and vital interrelation between the city, its suburbs, and periphery; and (2) the wider planning region which takes account of the city's and its surrounding areas' place in the national and world economy.

Just as gunpowder spelled the end of the walled medieval city, so the automobile, electricity, and the technology of modern industrial society has blasted the barriers of city charters and of the traditions and laws and grooves of thinking which have hitherto prevented a rational approach to city planning. We live in an era which dissolves boundaries, but the inertia of antiquarian lawyers and law makers, the predatory interest of local politicians, real estate men, and industrialists, the parochialism of suburbanites, and the myopic vision of planners have prevented us from a full recognition of the inescapable need for a new planning unit in the metropolitan region. As more and more of our services in everyday living become affected by the operations of government, as more of our governmental functions become managerial, it is becoming ever more necessary that the planning unit actually become the governmental unit.

It is not the planners who have invented the new leviathan. But it is for the planners to recognize the actuality of the new leviathan that has been created by the economic, social, and political forces of our time. It is of the utmost importance for the future of a democratic order that plans and decisions be made by those who have a stake in their effect. The area of control must be the area of interdependence, in which an aggregate of people have a common stake; but the area of local interdependence has grown ever larger, whereas the area of control has lagged behind. In determining the new area of local autonomy, therefore, it is well to remember that "In a national State, and especially in a democracy, it is of the highest importance that the necessary role of

local self government in matters that are really local should be protected and preserved."[1] This requires the invention of a new unit for planning which will make local autonomy in the enlarged regional sense possible.

As a young English writer reviewing the effect of war upon the communities of his country has said, "National Planning, even in the physical sense, will be impossible if we tolerate the existing definitions of Local Government and municipal boundaries."[2] We might add that without the recognition of the metropolitan region as a planning unit, it will be impossible to plan either the city or the country.

II

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THE Metropolitan Area cannot become a really effective planning unit until it gains public recognition as a separate social, physical, and economic entity.

In the absence of political unity, planning in the Metropolitan Area made up of parts of two or more States, several counties and a large number of municipalities of different sizes, involves a continuous search for a public to which metropolitan plans can be presented and agencies by which such plans can be carried out.

Organization for civilian protection in the New York area offers a current illustration of the lack of instinctive recognition of the Metropolitan Area as a planning unit. Those who organized the civilian defense program in 1940 thought along state and municipal lines. Over 100 defense councils sprang up in the New York Metropolitan Area almost overnight. In New Jersey each municipality is required to have a Defense Council. This means, for example, that the vital industrial area bounded by Paterson on the Passaic River and Edgewater on the Hudson and running to Perth Amboy on the Raritan—six minutes in a bomber—contains thirty independent local defense councils. Even with a state senator at the controls I doubt if an attacker could divide this area into thirty separate targets.

It seems abundantly clear, as a matter of common sense, and from the experience of England, that there must be a metropolitan area command to cope with incidents which develop into matters of more than local significance. As a matter of metropolitan area planning the issue is clear. Incidents—for example, fires or blockage of a highway—which can be handled locally should be so taken care of. Where more than local fire equipment is needed or traffic must be rerouted, a regional control is vital. In the New York area at least, lack of recognition of the

[1]Charles E. Merriam, "Urbanism," in *1126: A Decade of Social Science Research* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940), p. 32.

[2]Ritchie Calder, *Start Planning Britain Now: A Policy for Reconstruction*, The Democratic Order, No. 5 (London: Kegan Paul, 1941), pp. 33–34.

metropolitan area has blocked effective civilian defense planning on a metropolitan basis.

If other interstate areas are like New York, much effort is still necessary to achieve a comprehensive metropolitan plan for civilian protection. The Office of Civilian Defense is as yet a purely advisory agency with impotent regional offices which correspond to Army Corps Areas. The Port of New York Authority, an interstate organization, led in the formation of a Metropolitan Defense Transport Committee made up of Army and OCD representatives, state highway and other officials of New Jersey, New York and Connecticut, and New York City officials. This committee has done some excellent transportation planning but has no authority. The first real crisis in civil protection arising from the glare of shore lights has been met by making the entire East Coast a war area under the single command of the United States Army.

What steps can be taken to make the metropolitan area into a more effective planning unit?

In the first place, there must a continuous study of the metropolitan area as a physical and economic unit. This research should follow along two lines, urban reporting by the Federal Government on a basis which would make possible important comparisons between different Metropolitan Areas, and research by the state, county, and metropolitan area planning agencies into the problems of each particular metropolitan area. The recommendations of the National Resources Committee regarding Federal urban research, as published in *Our Cities*, are as valid today as five years ago when that report was made.

It seems to me that the official and unofficial planning agencies themselves could coöperate to a far greater extent than at present in coördinating their research programs so that, with improved Federal urban reporting, our combined efforts will produce a fund of knowledge about metropolitan areas without which we cannot expect to make them into effective planning units.

In the second place, research must be worked into reports at least some of which are of interest to the general public, and all of which are of use to anyone who is attempting to invest public or private funds in urban areas. For example, comparisons of trends of population, of employment, of living conditions as between cities and as between States and lately as between regions, fill the press and the magazines. The metropolitan area should—to borrow a word from the automobile engineers—be simplicated in order to achieve the recognition it needs as a planning unit. Because of lack of organization of known data into metropolitan unit patterns, however, the reading public is still generally unaware of the broader regional aspects of what are regarded as purely local problems.

In the third place, there must be continuous metropolitan area planning whether or not there is immediate evidence that a given plan

will be carried promptly into action. As has often been pointed out, a plan with basic logic back of it serves a useful purpose by its very existence, provided sufficient groundwork has been laid so that there is general public acceptance of that basic logic.

There is public acceptance, for example, of the need of a metropolitan highway system and plans which exist for such highway systems are, generally speaking, being carried out over a period of years. On the other hand, we recently have had an example in New York City of a master plan of land-use which was published without sufficient preliminary understanding of its nature and purposes. This document proved to be considerably ahead of its time. It raised issues which have not yet clearly been framed and upon which much public discussion is needed before the terms used achieve public understanding. Maps intended to illustrate general principles were confused with zoning maps. The net result was to purge certain words from public use in New York City and to create a cloud of confusion which will take some time to evaporate.

Despite apparent failure, however, this first attempt at an official master plan of land-use for an important section of the New York Metropolitan Area will serve as a starting point for planning by official agencies to achieve balance in metropolitan development.

Metropolitan area planning must develop in the last analysis by reason of practical achievement. Measured in terms of physical results, metropolitan plans involving water and transportation have been successful in finding a sponsoring agency. Development of water supply, pollution abatement, navigation, flood control, railroads, highways, parkways, and river crossings bring to mind at once a multitude of existing public and private agencies carrying out (within the limits of available funds and political or competitive circumstances) one specific function on a metropolitan basis. In the mind of the general public, the success of metropolitan area planning has been the achievement of these agencies.

In general, we seem to be reaching the end of the period of creation of new agencies of government or *ad hoc* commissions and authorities to develop metropolitan plans along functional lines. Recent additions to the special-function, semi-public agencies—housing authorities and urban redevelopment corporations—serve local rather than metropolitan functions. If central cities develop parking authorities, these agencies might serve a metropolitan need. There is evidence that some of the existing agencies will be consolidated as in the case of the various bridge and parkway agencies recently merged with the New York Triborough Bridge Authority. These agencies have been successful primarily for specific development purposes but are not suitable for the most urgent need of metropolitan area planning—namely the balanced development of land-use.

Land-use planning involves elements of control as well as of development. As every acre of ground within the metropolitan area competes to some extent with every other acre, each part of the central city, and each separate municipality in the metropolitan area have many competing interests. Different sectors of the metropolitan area also compete for residential population, commercial establishments or industry. Many specific functions compete with one another also. Bridge and tunnel authorities compete with each other and with ferry and rapid transit agencies.

As there once was an unfilled demand for agencies which could carry out plans for specific functions, there is now a need for a metropolitan-wide coördination of land-use development. Agencies designed to develop resources are not suited for the task, especially if their powers are based on interstate compact. Our inheritance of local governmental units, which tend to increase as new residential areas are developed, may some day be unified by annexation, consolidation, federation or metropolitan statehood. In the meantime, what forces are available to bring the metropolitan unity which balanced land-use development requires?

One's thoughts turn inevitably to the Federal Government as a possible coördinator of metropolitan development. The suggestion has been made that the Federal Government act directly in metropolitan areas. The interstate commerce clause is probably flexible enough to admit the Federal Government as the greatest single developer of transportation resources in metropolitan areas with powerful incidental control of other land-uses. Even if it were desirable, the political opposition to such a direct approach to the problem would probably equal if not exceed the difficulties of achieving a single metropolitan government.

The Federal Government might act as a unit of control to accomplish land-use planning for metropolitan areas through control of financing of capital improvements and other Federal spending in metropolitan areas. It is now clear that urban land cannot be successfully developed by private or public enterprise alone. British and American experience with public housing, for example, indicates that private capital is needed if there is to be real residential redevelopment in our cities. According to a statement of a recent visitor from London, in prewar England the ratio of private to public investment in housing was three to one. On the other hand, private capital will not be invested in urban areas unless public enterprise supplies essential investments in the streets, parks, schools and other services. With recognition of the fact that urban land development is of necessity a partnership between public and private capital, control of public investment through the capital budget provides an effective means of regulating land-use.

If the capital budget were merely an instrument of municipal finance,

the same lack of metropolitan unity which appears in the exercise of other instruments of local planning, would nullify its effectiveness for metropolitan area planning. Federal financing of urban improvements, however, promises to be a feature of the war and the immediate postwar period. If this proves to be the case, metropolitan land-use planning may have found its sponsor, provided suitable machinery is set up in administering loans and grants on a metropolitan area rather than an individual state or city basis. In connection with such control of Federal financing, which might be established in the National Resources Planning Board, metropolitan planning agencies should be established with representatives of different sections of each metropolitan area. In a number of metropolitan areas unofficial planning agencies now exist which could be of great assistance in furthering this effort.

National spending has profoundly affected metropolitan areas in fields as far apart in Washington as FHA lending policies on the one hand and WPA home relief differentials on the other. The former are charged with the unwise development of outlying sections of central cities, the latter with unwisely increasing the urban population of Negro unemployed. Probably neither policy was deliberately adopted to accomplish the results which occurred. The time is ripe for the Federal Government to recognize the metropolitan area as a planning unit and to organize its spending and investment policies in recognition of metropolitan problems.

In summary, the metropolitan area needs continuing research and reporting in order to help it gain the status of a planning unit backed by public support. Although the metropolitan area cannot achieve complete unity for planning purposes until the regional nature of its problems finds expression in some kind of political machinery, organization of Federal spending and loaning policy so as to take account of metropolitan boundaries, would be an important step in solving the most difficult problem of metropolitan planning today—balanced development of land-use.

DISCUSSION

FLOYD A. CARLSON, Executive Director, Harrisburg Area Regional Planning Commission

IT OCCURS to me that to relate our experience as an official regional planning commission quite briefly will be more apt to disclose a few points of interest to you than for me to attempt to discuss the papers of the preceding speakers.

The County Planning Act passed by the legislature of Pennsylvania in 1937 goes beyond setting up and empowering county planning commissions to provide that two or more counties or political subdivisions of counties may combine to create regional or joint planning commissions.

The official regional planning commission represents a rather advanced stage of organization for planning. Such a commission does have special problems in that it must deal with a large group of governing bodies each one of which has also the power to establish planning commissions of its own. The creation of such an official planning agency is very difficult because of the suspicions of existing planning agencies that its local interests might be endangered by joint action of representatives of other communities.

Such a new experiment, of course, required much preliminary effort. In 1938 the Harrisburg League for Civic Improvement sponsored a meeting of civic leaders at which time Earle S. Draper outlined methods for joint efforts in planning. Shortly thereafter a Harrisburg Area Regional Planning Committee was formed and engaged Malcolm H. Dill as resident regional planner and E. S. Draper Associates as consultants. Their planning activities and studies served as a basis for a report entitled *Planning for the Future of the Harrisburg Area.* This report is not in itself a Plan. It presented an analysis of planning factors and problems in the Harrisburg area. Emphasis was placed on the fact that no plan or plans, however well conceived, can be effective without continuous planning activity by trained personnel. Accordingly the major recommendation of the report stressed that an official regional planning commission be created for the Harrisburg area, adequately staffed, and supported by the various communities which make up the metropolitan city. The entire report was published in the Harrisburg *Patriot* and *The Evening News* as 52 news articles, in three separate series. Widespread interest in the published articles led to action by which 16 governmental units authorized official participation to create an official commission in 1941.

The full commission now consists of twenty members representing two counties, eight boroughs, City of Harrisburg, and six townships. The first duty of the Commission was to have prepared and to adopt a constitution and by-laws. This constitution provided for a name of the

organization, purpose, function and activities, geographical area, membership, terms of appointment of members, how they are selected and by whom, qualifications for membership, management of commission, meetings, budget and assessments of each participating unit of government. The full Commission meets quarterly while an executive committee, composed of seven (7) members, meets monthly. Representation on the Commission is confined solely to civil divisions which contribute tax money for support of activities of the Commission.

Now a word as to method of assessment of each participating unit. The original method was on a percentage basis of population, total local taxes levied and assessed valuation, tempered with good judgment. This is supplemented by a small contribution from a citizen's committee. The total budget adopted for 1942 was $10,300. The staff consists of an executive director, a planning technician and a secretary. Offices are furnished by the City Council of the City of Harrisburg. The Commission has functioned actively since November 1941. In the Harrisburg area are located many defense industries and Army and Navy establishments. All of our present work is related to the resulting problems due to influx of thousands of workers in this area.

1. *War Production Transportation:* The Commission recognized that the transportation problem in the Harrisburg region was of sufficient importance to warrant study back in December 1941. Our first efforts were devoted to educational programs to create favorable public opinion. For three weeks daily, articles were published in two local newspapers. As a result of this publicity, the president and executive director of the Commission were called into a conference with Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission and requested by them to prepare an agenda and to propose a plan for staggering of working hours at a public hearing to be held by the Public Utility Commission. At this hearing some sixty representatives of Army, Navy, industry, railroad, bus companies, business men and school officials were asked to testify as to need of some plan for traffic relief.

The plan proposed by the Regional Planning Commission suggested definite staggering of hours among the following groups: (1) The hours of work in war industry, Federal Government employees, and factories; (2) State employees and central business district office hours; (3) Retail shopping districts; (4) Measures to encourage earlier shopping hours and encourage recreational activities in the off-peak hours.

The plan also proposed group conservation of private automobiles to supplement mass transportation facilities, but this must follow, not precede, the staggering of working hours. The plan also proposed cooperation of railroads at least to furnish transportation for their own employees.

It was also recommended that a committee be established to work with Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission to place this plan in

effect and to act as a clearing house for changes and modifications which will be necessary as private automobile use is further restricted.

The above plan was presented to Mr. Joseph Eastman, Director of Defense Transportation of OPM. The entire plan received endorsement at the public hearing and by Mr. Eastman. The PUC is now preparing to place such a plan in effect.

2. *Defense Housing:* Two large depots for Army and Navy are being constructed in Cumberland County. The Regional Planning Commission secured conferences with the county commissioners and various borough officials stressing the needs of immediately creating planning and zoning commissions in municipalities located adjacent to these establishments. The services of the Regional Planning Commission were offered to aid in planning work. Planning commissions were immediately established and our efforts have been directed to securing data and maps to aid the Federal Defense Housing authorities in selecting sites. At the present time, three housing sites have been chosen and active field work is under way. We also initiated a home registration survey in various municipalities. To secure such data quickly, we enlisted aid of school authorities, and through their coöperation we had 119 senior high school students make a house-to-house canvass which was very successful.

3. *Zoning:* In the Harrisburg region, home registration surveys revealed the fact that only one percent vacancy existed, and these were substandard structures. With a tremendous influx of workers in this region, housing is a very acute problem. This has resulted in conversion of many structures in suburban communities into multiple-family structures, which is very disturbing. The Regional Planning Commission has been asked by three communities to make an appraisal and to suggest zoning ordinances and plans.

4. *Land Development:* With an acute housing shortage existing, there has been increased activity in subdivision of land. The laws of Pennsylvania do not specifically give planning commissions authority to regulate the size of building lots except through zoning ordinance. None of the units of government in the region has adopted land subdivision rules and regulations. Subdivision plats have been recently submitted to the City Planning Commission of Harrisburg, containing 25-foot building lots in areas where 100-foot lots now exist. The Regional Planning Commission is now working with FHA regional office in Philadelphia to prepare a standard set of rules and regulations. Through publicity and educational programs, the Commission will endeavor to have these adopted throughout the region.

5. *Experience of our Commission* has shown that there is a very surprising lack of knowledge in the Harrisburg region as to the objectives and purposes of planning agencies, both among elected officials and the general public.

Two of our local newspapers have assigned capable reporters who daily contact our office for news articles on planning. We endeavor to furnish them with leads dealing with local problems. Without such support, I personally feel that our efforts in regional planning would be very difficult. Planning in the State of Pennsylvania is very much in its infancy except in isolated cases, and much effort will have to be expended to convince elected officials that it is essential service of government.

WERNER RUCHTI, Regional Planner, Los Angeles County Regional Planning Commission

THE metropolitan district is a natural planning unit from the standpoint of both social and economic problems. Within such a district are many incorporated cities and unincorporated towns, and the best way to produce coördinated plans for all is to make a plan for the district as a whole.

Political subdivisions, as such, are in most cases neither natural geographic units nor essential economic units. Therefore, to be entirely successful, a plan of any city or town must be coördinated with plans of other cities and towns within this common metropolitan district. The parts of a plan, within a town or city, are usually not in themselves complete; they neither begin nor terminate within such town or city, but rather are only phases of the larger plan. It is these portions of the metropolitan plan that should be superimposed on the plans of the smaller units. In order that there may be a oneness, a completely coordinated unity of effort, the metropolitan district must be designed as a unit. Cities and towns in the metropolitan district are not self-contained economic units; therefore, the effectiveness of the plan necessarily depends upon how it fits into the larger scheme.

The effectiveness of such planning, however, depends chiefly on two things: (1) how these plans are made; (2) how these plans are made to operate and become part of the growing communities.

Plans which have regional or metropolitan district significance cannot be made by an official clique and then arbitrarily and instantly superimposed on any one of these towns or cities with much hope of effectiveness. Plans are, after all, made essentially for the people—for their benefit, for their convenience, and for their social betterment.

It follows, then, that good planning practice must carry the people along during the process of planning and when the plan is finished, it is *their* plan—not the proud possession of some planning commission and its brilliant staff. Planning commissions and staffs should always be conscious of the fact that they serve as a medium to accomplish the end—namely, making the plan live both on paper and on the ground, as our cities or districts change, grow, and develop.

The Regional Planning Commission of the County of Los Angeles has been quite successful in planning for the region as a whole, which includes 44 incorporated cities and over 40 unincorporated towns. The Commission has had little trouble in getting plans accepted, after careful preparation and coördination with the various cities and towns, but it has had less success in effectuating these plans, because of lack of personnel, both in its own staff and in the various city offices, to give the required time for guidance and help to officials and citizens of the various units of the district. The Commission feels, however, that the procedure will produce the results all planners strive to attain.

V. B. STANBERY, Counselor, Region VIII, National Resources Planning Board

TO DO better planning, we must continually enlarge and improve our methods and our technique for attacking planning problems, and particularly our understanding of the job to be done. We have rushed into action, trying to do a job that, in ideal terms, requires almost infinite knowledge and comprehension, before developing some of the technical procedures and methods which are the essentials of any profession. We have been trying to do city and metropolitan regional planning, but at the same time we have largely ignored the economic problems of the urban area, knowledge of which is a primary requirement for intelligent urban planning.

I believe that one of the primary purposes of urban planning is to increase the efficiency of the urban area for those who live there, both as a place in which to make a living and as a place in which to live.

The first requirement, then, is to understand the special economic problems of urban areas; to recognize that an urban economy of any appreciable size is a highly complex organism that can be studied and measured only in its manifestations such as income, employment, production, consumption; to remember that the economy is affected by activities in other areas as well as those within the area itself, and particularly that its organization is not static but is dynamic, changing continually through the influence of technological advances.

But, while the urban economy must be studied and measured in its separate manifestations and component parts, those planning for development and improvement of the economy must always keep in mind the overall aspects of the economic structure and the directions in which it is tending to change.

The urban planner must, therefore, assemble data and put them together as far as possible so that the interrelationship of each separate manifestation is clear and the information is integrated to show what is happening or will likely happen to the economy as a whole.

We must study and attack the economic development problem of the

urban area on a broad scale, just as the conventional city planner considers the various aspects of physical developments. We should recognize at the outset that we must deal with the economy as a whole, in all its principal manifestations—that we cannot solve the development problem by concentrating on one or two phases, such as manufacturing industries, and slighting other aspects and activities that may ultimately determine future growth or decline. One of the chief faults with many economic studies is that they consist largely of separate analyses that are insufficiently integrated to show clearly the directions of significant changes and recent shifts in patterns of employment and business.

To overcome this we must, therefore, first investigate and find out the nature and characteristics of the economy of the particular area as revealed by its overall patterns and trends, its relative efficiency in comparison with other urban areas, its economic deficiencies and needs and what can be done to fill them, especially the directions and fields in which the economy is expanding and those in which it is declining.

We need to assemble data and map out the economic patterns of the area just as we have been mapping physical patterns. As far as data are available, we must plot charts and curves showing the patterns and trends of population changes, of labor force and employment, of distribution of income, of production and consumption of commodities within the area, and of the economic position or trade balance of the area as shown by imports and exports and the flow of money and credit into and out of the community.

Next, we should analyze the basic resources of the urban area, such as water, power and fuels, to find out those in which the area is deficient either because they are not available in sufficient quantity or because the cost is high. We can then determine possibilities for increasing their availability or reducing their cost, and the opportunities for economic development that might be created thereby.

This should be followed by detailed analysis of each of the major fields of activity—manufacturing, construction, transportation, trade, and services—to determine what changes are taking place in particular industries and what further changes might be made that would overcome adverse trends. Such analysis might reveal shifts in type of production necessary for survival of certain industries.

Finally, planners should recognize the basic long-range trends affecting urban economies throughout the Nation and endeavor to appraise the effects of these trends on the area under study. Consideration should also be given to the contribution the particular urban area can make to regional or national economies and types of development in the area that would be helpful in stabilizing and expanding incomes and employment in the region of which the urban area is the economic center. Looking at the problem from the national point of view, how can each urban area contribute the most to national economic progress?

As I see it, one trouble with most economic studies of particular areas is that they treat each area as having a more or less independent economy, that they do not consider sufficiently the place and position of the area in the national economy, and the major readjustments that will be necessary to overcome the deep-seated difficulties that have grown up through past decades. I feel that such studies approach the problem from one direction only—the natural resources of the area—and that entirely too much emphasis is placed upon the resource base. As I understand what happened in England, the problems of depressed areas there were solved by bringing in new types of industry, some of which were not based upon local natural resources, or to which the local resources were only of incidental importance. Consideration of the urban areas from this larger viewpoint might throw some light on the kinds of development which would not only improve conditions within the area but also strengthen the national economy.

A master plan for physical development of a city is not a single plan or map, but a series of plans and maps which take into account at least to some extent the interrelationship of one pattern to the others. The land-use pattern affects the street and highway patterns and plans for adjustments in land-use are correlated with plans for street improvements. Likewise, in planning for economic development, patterns of income distribution and of employment are closely related, and recommendations for raising incomes may require corresponding changes in the pattern of employment.

We need a series of economic charts and curves, not only to understand the shape and structure of the economy of the area, not only so that we can compare it with the economies of similar size areas elsewhere, but also as frames of reference against which we can measure the probable effects of proposed new developments and impending changes to determine whether such effects would be beneficial or adverse, and if the latter, how the harmful consequences might be overcome or minimized.

If we are going to provide continuous full employment throughout the Nation, the urban planners will have to pitch in and help solve some of the economic problems of our urban areas.

Reporter's Summary

MALCOLM H. DILL, Engineer-Secretary, Hamilton County (Ohio) Regional Planning Commission

IT IS difficult to distill the essence from an exceptionally well-written paper without losing most of its flavor. Therefore, because the papers by Dr. Wirth and Mr. Norton are available for reading in full at your leisure, I have tried to relate something of their substance, together with the gist of statements by discussers and commentators, to what appear to be the main aspects of the subject under discussion.

No doubt all of us have fairly clear ideas as to what is meant by the term *metropolitan area.* The fundamental thing is the concept of a multiplicity of political subdivisions; of an urban constellation, as it were, whether it contains a dominant sun with its satellites (like Boston or Pittsburgh, for example), or several more or less heavenly bodies, without a dominating central city (such as the Scranton–Wilkes-Barre aggregation). Dr. Wirth noted various possible bases for defining the scope of a metropolitan area. (May I, for brevity's sake, suggest as an alternative term, the coined word *metroscope?*) Retail and wholesale trade area; the zones of labor supply and of professional and public utility services; recreation area; administrative services, were some of the criteria suggested. At any rate, Dr. Wirth urged that the metroscope used as the basis for planning should err on the side of overextension rather than constriction, and that it be elastic as to boundary. Its twofold character involves the area of direct urban and suburban influence, and the outlying tributary belt or hinterland.

That such metropolitan areas or metroscopes are of vital importance in the field of planning was shown by Dr. Wirth's statistics from the 1940 census. Although, like Mr. Segoe in subsequent discussion, we may feel that the metropolitan *district* as defined by the Bureau of the Census, is an arbitrary and unsatisfactory unit for planning purposes, based as it is on degrees of population density within adjacent political divisions, the statistical significance of the metropolitan district is not affected thereby. Dr. Wirth told us that nearly half of the Nation's total population is concentrated in the 140 metropolitan districts recognized by the 1940 census. Thirty-three industrial areas, comprising the chief metropolitan cities of the country, produced in 1939 nearly 60 percent of the American goods manufactured in that year. These figures demonstrate the vital significance of metropolitan areas in the national picture.

How are these metroscopes now recognized in the planning process? Without actual evidence at hand, it is probably safe to say that of the 140 metropolitan districts, not over 15 or 20 are being planned on a comprehensive basis. In only a handful of cases are there official agencies which have acknowledged jurisdiction over the entire constellation. In other instances, *unofficial* agencies are acting, no doubt with as great

effectiveness as if they were official. The latter group includes the regional planning agencies of New York, Chicago, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis, to mention those that come first to mind.

As one of the discussers, Mr. Carlson outlined procedure in the case of the recently organized official Harrisburg Area Regional Planning Commission. This agency is significant out of proportion to the population involved because of the fact that all political units within the area, including the central city, are represented by this single planning commission. Presumably the other one hundred and twenty-odd metropolitan areas are being planned, for the most part, without benefit of comprehensive study of the problems inherent in the number and diversity of local administrative and planning agencies.

Theoretically, how should we attempt to plan the metropolitan area? (May I suggest at this point serious consideration of use of the term *Metroplanning*.) Dr. Wirth recommended that we stop nowhere short of perfection, insisting that the administrative unit must become identical with the logical planning unit, that is, the entire metropolitan area; the area of control must coincide with the area of interdependence. Although Dr. Wirth made some very apt quotations, he omitted the pertinent lines from Omar Khayyam's Rubaiyat, "Could we but grasp this sorry scheme of things entire, would we not shatter it to bits, and mould it nearer to the heart's desire." Mr. Norton and some of the discussers felt, however, that planning commissions, as going concerns, must be somewhat less cosmic in their daily approaches to planning problems. Ideally perhaps, the planner must have his head among the stars but his feet should be upon the ground. This naturally involves sticking his neck out considerably, but that is a penalty that must be paid for combining imagination with practicality. Suggestions were made as to the desirability of taking various steps that might increase the effectiveness of mutual planning by several local commissions within a metropolitan area. Promotion of greater inter-activity among local planning commissions, and securing publicity for various local achievements and activities were among the suggestions of Mr. Norton. He, Mr. Bohn, and others suggested the possibility of using high standards of planning as a condition of Federal assistance in public works programs and in other possible instances of assistance involving Federal funds. Mr. Stanbery noted that the PRA has done this. He also felt that economic aspects of metropolitan problems receive insufficient attention from most planning commissions. Mr. Ruchti exhibited plans illustrating an effective graphic approach to some economic phases of planning.

Scarcely more than implied at this session was the possibility of utilizing in some permanent way, for purposes of planning in all its aspects, the civilian defense organizations that have been built up in many of our metropolitan areas, on the basis of a centralized command. Committees having to do with almost every conceivable aspect of metro-

politan existence have been created, including planning as well as administrative phases. In some cases these committees are all dressed up with no place to go, pending an actual emergency. What could be more logical than to suggest that while marking time, both thought and action be directed toward preparation for the tremendous task of postwar readjustment? Not everyone can be a member of a planning commission, but we can all be planners to some extent. In a book review in the last number of the "Planners' Journal," Mr. B. H. Kizer said, "Real city planning must spread, is spreading, beyond the activities of planning commissions. Every branch of city government must use planning methods if we are to have sound city planning." Planning, undoubtedly, will be done whether or not there is a planning commission. (I'm thinking of planning in the sense of applied foresight.) Where there are planning commissions, at least ones of metropolitan scope, there appears to be an unparalleled opportunity in the next few years for them to assume active leadership in the planning process.

An announcement was made yesterday afternoon of a $500 prize contest arranged by Mr. Greensfelder of St. Louis for submission of the best scheme for devising a "regional council." The desired function of such a council is understood to be the creation of a dynamic scheme for metropolitan planning in its broadest sense, including the implications of postwar readjustment. Probably no one at this planning session (and if not here, where else?) has the perfect answer to this question. Perhaps someone will have it by the time of the next Conference a year from now. Certainly we can all agree that the metropolitan area (or metroscope, if you please) is one of the most potent problems that faces the planning profession and others who are interested in the future of planning.

IN THE CITIES AND TOWNS

Impact of the War on Localities

HUGH R. POMEROY, Director, Virginia State Planning Board

HUGH R. Pomeroy: This place on the program was originally scheduled to be taken by Colonel Charles B. Borland, City Manager of Norfolk, who would be able to lead a vigorous discussion of the subject. By reason of the impact of the war on his own locality, however, Colonel Borland was unable to come to the Conference and Mr. Blucher picked me as a substitute, in the hope that I might be able to reflect some of the practical problems which confront local officials in war activity areas. Better than my own account, however, I bring you a statement which Colonel Borland himself was kind enough to prepare. In it you will get a glimpse of the way in which a capable municipal administrator is dealing with a tremendous overload of activity. Norfolk is the principal city of the Hampton Roads area. In this area there are nineteen war establishments; to it has come additional population by multiplied tens of thousands; nearly twenty thousand units of war housing were built in the area up to the end of last year, and twenty-four thousand more are under construction and scheduled for this year. Norfolk has abundantly felt the impact of the war, and Colonel Borland can tell you about it. Colonel Borland's statement follows:

Prior to 1920, Norfolk's area of approximately nine square miles, with a population of 115,677, was well provided with paved streets, water and sewer facilities. Since that time, an additional area of about twenty-nine square miles has been annexed. This annexed territory, coupled with the automobile, caused a spread of population accompanied by large demands for improvements such as paving, installation of water and sewer lines, et cetera, with a consequent drain on the city's treasury.

During the so-called "depression" years, the City of Norfolk had to meet the growing demands for various and sundry improvements as well as provide for a substantial relief roll. The city kept pace with all of those things during that period. And that brings me to the present—the critical World War II period.

Norfolk is a key city in one of the most vital defense areas in the country and there has been an unprecedented influx of people here in connection with the various defense activities. The Naval Operating Base has been enlarged an additional 1,800 acres, approximately, making the total area about 2,800 acres. It has, therefore, been necessary to provide for the families of the additional officers and enlisted men of the Navy who have moved in.

The Federal Government has constructed in the City of Norfolk three housing projects. One is known as Benmoreell, which was built by the Navy and is located on Government property; it consists of about 1,700 housing units. Another project is known as Merrimack Park, consisting of 500 units. This was built by the Housing Authority of the City of Norfolk, with funds obtained under the United States Housing Act, and is expected to have a life of sixty years. It is rented to the enlisted men of the Navy and the Coast Guard. The third is a 300-unit project known as Oak Leaf Park, which will be used by Negro

defense workers during the emergency, after which it will revert to a subsidized, low-rent project. The city, of course, receives from the Federal Government certain amounts to cover the minimum cost of providing essential services, such as garbage and trash collection, street cleaning, fire protection, and school facilities. Another housing project known as Roberts Park, consisting of 430 slum-clearance units, located in the Negro section of the city, is now under construction by the Housing Authority of Norfolk. By reason of the fact that this is strictly a slum-clearance project the city will receive nothing for municipal services rendered it.

Another type of housing, consisting of demountable units, is now being erected by the Federal Government in Norfolk and the surrounding territory. To date, plans call for 900 in the City of Norfolk and 3,000 in the adjacent county. These houses are only temporary structures. The disposition to be made of them after the war will have to be worked out at a later date.

In addition to the above projects, dozens of tracts of land are being subdivided into housing sites by private capital. For the period January through April, this year, building permits for private construction totaling over $4,000,000 were issued.

The city has been called upon to furnish water and sewer services and paving, curbing, and guttering, as well as underdrainage. The cost of initial sidewalks, under the state law, is an obligation of the abutting property owner. The city maintains sidewalks after they have been constructed. The developers of the various new subdivisions have defrayed the cost of lateral sewer lines within the confines of the tracts, the city the main lines.

While increased building has resulted in an increase in our assessed values, thus increasing our revenue, at the same time it must be borne in mind that the city is being called upon daily for expenditures in connection with these developments. Also, with the increase in our population, which increase for a twelve-month period has been estimated as high as 100,000, the city's existing facilities are being taxed to the utmost. For instance, we have had to double the capacity of our water supply system, at a cost of over $3,700,000. This has been accomplished in part by the help of the Federal Government in the form of a grant of $1,580,620.

The increased population has brought about demands for additional school facilities. An elementary school for Negroes, to serve the Oak Leaf Park housing project, will cost approximately $200,000, of which amount we have received a Federal grant of $130,000. An elementary school for white children, to take care of the children of the Merrimack Park project as well as other sections, is to be built entirely by the Government, at a cost of about $350,000.

Naturally, hospital facilities have been taxed to the breaking point. Two large private institutions have received grants from the Government covering sixty-bed additions each. The Norfolk Community Hospital, Inc., for Negroes, which is subsidized by the City of Norfolk, has received a grant of approximately $220,000 for a 70-bed addition. The city will put up $73,000, making the total cost $293,000. The Federal Government will also build a new 200-bed hospital here, which will be operated by an existing private hospital.

Provision has also had to be made for increased recreational facilities in connection with the thousands of service men and defense workers in this port. The city filed an application with the Government for a grant to help in the construction of an auditorium, which was approved, and construction is now under way under the supervision of the United States Army Engineers. The Federal Government will contribute $280,000 toward the cost of this structure, which will be used for the duration of the war for recreational purposes by the armed forces of the United States. After that, it will revert to the city. The City of Norfolk will bear the remaining cost of this building, which, with the land, is

estimated to cost close to a million dollars. This auditorium, which will replace the existing one, will meet a long-felt civic need.

Our traffic problem has become acute by reason of the increased number of automobiles. In an effort to alleviate existing conditions somewhat, therefore, we have filed applications for grants to help in connection with the widening and improving of several thoroughfares throughout the city. A plan for staggering working hours in all businesses and industries is now under way. In a further effort to help the situation, I recommended to the City Council that I be authorized to eliminate certain street-car stops which would speed up traffic further. I was given such authorization, and, as a result, the local traction company has eliminated 72 stops on the Naval Base line alone. A similar plan covering buses operating in the city is now being studied. All police cars have been equipped with two-way radio as against the old one-way type. Radio equipment has been placed on motorcycles and the number of motorcycles as well as police cars has been increased. I should like to mention that the National Safety Council awarded Norfolk third place in its population group in the 1941 national traffic safety contest in recognition of its safety efforts, which record, I feel, speaks for itself.

By reason of the importance of this whole section as a defense area, the city is utilizing its parks, its armories, and its municipal buildings to provide for the Army personnel. As an illustration, a new dairy barn recently built at the Prison Farm, located in what is known as the Welfare Center, consisting of hospitals for the treatment of tubercular and contagious disease cases and for the indigent, has been turned over to the Army for use during the emergency. At Lafayette Park, the largest in the city, a certain area has been turned over to the Army for the duration. Also, the Norfolk Municipal Airport, while not actually having been taken over by the Army, is used by it to a great extent. Use of all of the above-mentioned municipal facilities, it must be borne in mind, is had at practically no cost to the Federal Government, but at considerable cost to the city.

In conclusion, I should like to say that the city is more than willing to cooperate with the Federal Government in every way it can, as I realize that only by 100 percent coöperation can we hope to bring about a complete and lasting victory. We must lay the foundation today for tomorrow's peace.

With Colonel Borland's discussion of specific problems as a background, I can now undertake to deal with some of the more general aspects of the subject.

One effect of the war on localities directly affected by war activities has been the emphasizing of the need for planning. A community needs additional housing for war workers and their families, and is immediately faced by the necessity of determining where it should be located, how it should be designed (at least so far as site planning is concerned) and how it should be serviced. The answer must be found in terms of, first, the most efficient service of the housing to the war production program (and that involves not only the provision of satisfactory dwelling units, satisfactorily serviced, but considerations of transportation, use of materials and use of labor)—and second, in the circumstances resulting from the first consideration, the most satisfactory relation of the housing and its appurtenant facilities to the postwar community. Obviously, these answers can not be pulled out of thin air: planning—our kind of planning—is required. It is interesting that many communities which for years saw no need of planning because nothing much was happening

and they were getting along pretty well anyhow, are now so overwhelmed by activities resulting from the war program—activities requiring immediate and expedient decisions—that they profess to have no time for planning. Or, admitting the necessity for planning, they do no more than participate in a roundup of representatives of Federal and state agencies which have various responsibilities in relation to the locality aspects of some war activity, from which roundup comes a statement, in one place, of the obvious facts which seem to have a bearing on decisions which have to be made in a hurry. These coördinated locality reports which we are beginning to see are extremely valuable; they are necessary; they are infinitely better than uncoördinated action. But they are not planning. From a planning standpoint—our kind of planning—they exemplify the superficiality which Mr. Bettman deplored in the course of a recent Institute discussion.

With their obviously limited scope, and their obvious innocence of profundity, however, such reports may become the titillant which will begin to stir a consciousness of the need for what may honestly be called planning. This result is beginning to appear in a few places. Of tremendous value to the realization of the hope is the procedure which is being developed in the National Resources Planning Board through the work being done in the field which is rather formidably designated that of "urban conservation and development." I refer, of course, to the so-called "progressive planning" technique being worked out by Mr. Ascher and Mr. Mitchell. Here, indeed, is found the profundity called for by Mr. Bettman. Here is an approach, a method, through which can be found answers so much better than those given by the average so-called "comprehensive" city plan that the whole procedure can well be said to mark, if not the beginning of a new day, then at least a distinct advance, in both the science and the art of planning. That much, in passing, as one effect of the war on localities.

Among war impacts felt by all localities are (1) the loss of personnel from all segments of community life and activity to the armed forces; (2) the sharp reduction, or actual elimination, of WPA personnel available for various types of public work; (3) the necessity for marked adjustments in the work programs of public agencies for a variety of reasons, among which may be listed the two just mentioned, together with the requirements of civilian defense, especially in coastal areas or other sections deemed most subject to air attack, and the non-availability of materials, of new equipment, and of some kinds of supplies; and (4) the effects of increased and additional costs, without comparable increase in public revenues. Another general effect is the sharp reduction in automobile travel and the resulting effects on roadside business and on resorts. Maybe outdoor advertising along highways in the open country will for a time be less profitable, or, even better, not profitable at all, thus relieving some of the pressure of the billboard lobby on legislatures.

Most localities are experiencing various dislocations, public, civic and private, through the effects of the virtual cessation of the manufacture of durable goods on industry, related trade, tax revenues, and employment. In some localities dependent on such industry, where these negative effects are not balanced by war production, the result may be a localized economic depression.

It is the reverse of this, of course, that is usually meant when one speaks of the impact of the war on localities. Detroit, San Diego, Hampton Roads, Hartford and many other places come to mind. In these places, numbering now up to several hundred, the stepping up to maximum war production of existing defense production plants, the construction of new war production plants and the conversion of peacetime industries to war production, have necessitated large in-migrations of labor. Part of this movement has been that of normally mobile construction labor—not very many in the total labor force; most of it has required removal of workers from their communities of residence and relocation in the war production community. We know all too little about the flow-pattern of these migrations, the family composition of the migrant groups, even their occupational composition. In a more leisurely process, we would also note the lack of information as to cultural characteristics; and we would be interested in the selective forces, either definite or random, that move the migrants from their home communities. As it is, we know primarily that by the hundreds of thousands they have come, apparently in waves of ever-widening origin, to the focal points of war production.

The affected locality has little to do, voluntarily, with motivating the stream of migration or with influencing its quality. In one way only it can have any influence on its size, and that is through coöperative endeavors to bring about the maximum utilization of the resident labor force. This includes a relentless extirpation of racial discrimination in employment policies; it includes emergency-type training courses when necessary; it also includes enlarging the labor force by endeavoring to bring into it more men under 20, more of those over 45 and more women. Much of the accomplishment of these aims depends on Federal and state action; much can be done by local initiative; too little has thus far been done locally.

Whatever the size of the stream of migration, it brings immediate problems to the receiving locality. The most obvious one is that of housing the newcomers. The phases of this problem have been too often discussed to require other than saying that the first necessity is the maximum healthful utilization of existing housing. In this we have not done well. In many war production centers appalling overcrowding is occurring among those least able to pay for decent accommodations—if they exist—and it is occurring in the poorest of the housing. At the same time, spacious dwellings of the more privileged are making no

contribution to housing war workers. No other result was possible so long as the defense program of the Nation was only an incidental thing, —as it was in spite of the magnificent, and almost agonizing, efforts of the President to arouse the country to its peril. Maybe we are determined enough now about the war to use our resources to the maximum in its prosecution. Housing in war production areas is as critically needed as are the war plants themselves. Existing housing is a vital resource; to fail to utilize it, while using materials and labor to build more housing, is different only in degree from what we would be doing if we were to build a new shipyard while an existing one stood idle. We are certainly at the point now where any failure to attain the maximum required utilization of all available dwelling accommodations by voluntary means must be remedied by requisitioning—less palatably called billeting.

Why the emphasis on this point? For the reason that, apart from its importance to the war production program, it may be of major concern to the affected community. At least from here on out—and if this paper can have any value, it is only by offering some suggestions for the road ahead rather than recounting what has already happened—from here on out, the war housing that is to be built is less likely than heretofore to be suitable as a permanent part of the community. (And when we talk about it being less likely than some of what has been built heretofore, we don't start with very much to get less than.) We are now assuming that the community will have a need for the additional housing in the postwar period. If not, there is even more reason to avoid by every means possible the necessity for building new housing.

The whole question of permanent housing, demountables, dormitories, portables or trailers is beyond the scope of this paper. The immediate job is the provision of whatever amount of whatever kind of housing is necessary. Also beyond the scope of the paper is the question of Federal-local relations in the location, construction, servicing and, if it is public housing, the managing of the housing. But where the housing goes, and what it needs in the way of appurtenant facilities and community services are of vital concern to the locality. It is only to repeat the obvious to say that these questions can be approached intelligently only through planning—our kind of planning.

The direct impact of the war on localities receiving in-migrants, then, is reflected in the necessity for the provision of whatever housing is required, with suitable facilities and services, and with whatever further public services may be required in connection with increased trade and professional and other services resulting from the primary increase in population.

Looking beyond getting the best possible answers for immediate questions, planning is concerned with what that which is done now will do to the community in the long run. Is the new housing so located that

it will become a satisfactory part of the community—not merely in relation to the fitness of its street pattern, but in its density, its quality, its utility for the income group it is designed to serve, the fitness of that type of housing in that place? Obviously—but apparently not so obviously—those questions can be answered only in relation to an underlying land-use and population density plan—not a mere projecting of the existing land-use map prepared prefatory to zoning, but a plan determined according to considerations as profound as those suggested in the Ascher-Mitchell technique. An extension of the same question is whether the new housing will accentuate an unsound peripheral expansion while inner areas further decay. It is likely that much of it will, as illustrated by the scattered, unplanned location of much of the FHA Title VI housing in the Hampton Roads area.

Can the new housing be used after the war to replace existing slum housing? That, certainly, is a desirable objective. With 46 percent of the 94,000 dwelling units in the Hampton Roads area being classed as substandard according to 1940 Census data, it would seem that, in the event of a postwar surplus of housing, the sensible thing would be to remove some of the 46 percent rather than some of the more than 40,000 good houses built thus far in the defense-war program and scheduled during 1942. (Pardon me, I shouldn't have indicated that all 40,000 are good: I forgot what the Public Buildings Administration built, and some of the others, too.) Actually, very little of the defense-war housing can be used to replace substandard housing after the war. It is not so located that it can be so used; or it is not of suitable types; or it is not aimed at the right income groups—at least much of the private enterprise housing is not. Hampton Roads, almost a special case in many particulars, is not unique in this, but probably typical.

The problem of so locating and designing war housing that it will have permanent value is being made increasingly difficult by the sharp narrowing of the range of choice of location as a result of limitation of means of transportation. We may get some warped community patterns as a result, or the result may be a partial return to common sense from our habit of lavishly scattering developments as far as it is thought—or was thought—that people would drive to work. I am talking now about most of the United States, excluding New York City and a few other atypical places. If the transportation stringency lasts long enough, it might even result in more sensible prices for land which should remain agricultural, or otherwise open, but which all too frequently feels the impact of speculative urban expansion.

If a housing surplus exists after the war, how will it be eliminated? The demountables may not easily demount. We certainly don't want to tie our hands now—as Congress did in the last housing appropriation—with regard to postwar disposal of war housing.

Another question: What is the relation of the utility services pro-

vided for the new housing—and the possible enlargements of the whole system required as a result—to a desirable permanent structure of utilities? What is the effect of local financial obligations for additional facilities and services, in original cost, in operation during the emergency, in postwar maintenance? More specifically, what will the effect be on the ability of the community to finance deferred public works?

How much of the housing is required to serve permanent community needs? And here we pull up short. Thus far I have been suggesting questions for which the answers can be found. This question is not so easy. To be sure, it should be fairly easy to figure how much additional permanent housing, if any, will be needed for a small town in an agricultural area, near which is located an ordnance plant having no possibility of continuance after the war. Even there, however, we may be wrong, as I shall indicate shortly.

Cessation of war production in areas to which large numbers of migrants have come will leave these workers, their families, and secondary population increase, as surplus labor supply in the community. I am not talking now of those in the community who have transferred to war industry from peacetime industry in that community, but of those who have come in over and above the former resident labor supply. Some of them will hasten back to their former homes to join families which have been left behind. The extent to which familes have been left behind thus far has depended upon a variety of factors, among which are the identification of the family with the home community, the availability of housing—and of what kind—in the war production center, the size of the family. We need to know more about the characteristics of the in-migrants.

In a recent transportation survey of the Hampton Roads area, conducted by the State Highway Department, questionnaires were sent to the workers in all the major industrial establishments in the area. Two additional questions were included at the request of the State Planning Board: place of residence on April 1, 1940 (in order to get migration data which could be related to the 1940 Census), and size and present location of the family of the worker. The tabulations thus far completed show that when the family consists of two persons, *i.e.*, the worker and his wife, the wife is left in the home community in 16.7 percent of the cases. This percentage increases with the increase in family size, reaching approximately 40 percent for families of five or more persons.

Not all the migrants remain in the war production community to which they come. Some expect to bring in their families, but failing to find decent living accommodations, move out. They are joined by others who have brought their families and can not find decent homes. Labor turnover has become a serious problem in some communities.

As the tempo of war production moves up even beyond our magnifi-

cent but still insufficient accomplishment to date, and as the drive of greater emotional participation in the war program intensifies, we may look for less reaction to dissatisfactions, more of a willingness to put up with unsatisfactory conditions, and consequent greater stability of labor. And when, within the next six or eight months, we come to actual assignment of labor, we shall face a more stable war labor situation, with probably extensive separation of families, and dormitory housing for workers. Regardless of this, however, most war production communities can expect that after the war there will remain in the community considerable numbers of workers, most of them skilled, having their families with them, who will constitute an overload above pre-war employment levels plus those returned from the armed forces.

What will be done with them? Some can go back to employment in resumed pre-war industries. Some can go back to the farms. But who can deny that our war production techniques will tremendously step up per-man production, thus requiring fewer man hours for pre-war volumes of production? And much of the labor from the farms will have come out of our continuing surplus of farm population, accentuated after the war by the increasing efficiency of farm management which we shall have achieved in response to present shortages of farm labor. These are but two of the array of forces which interlace and overweave in presenting a postwar pattern of labor supply, appurtenant population, and distribution of plant capacity which is so markedly different from the prewar situation, and so vastly complex, that an individual locality has none of the more familiar points of orientation with respect to it.

Tremendous shifts in employment are being required to reach the war production goals of the Nation, estimated to require 50 percent of the total labor force. In 1940 there were 52,789,499 persons in the entire labor force of the country. Of these, approximately 86 percent, or 45,166,083, were employed in all gainful occupations. These were distributed as follows:

Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery	8,475,432	18.77 percent
Mining	913,000	2.02 percent
Construction	2,056,274	4.55 percent
Manufacturing	10,572,842	23.41 percent
Transportation, Communication and Other Public Utilities	3,113,353	6.89 percent
Wholesale and Retail Trade	7,538,768	16.69 percent
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate	1,467,597	3.25 percent
Business and Repair Services	864,254	1.91 percent
Personal Services	4,009,317	8.88 percent
Amusement, Recreation, and Related Services	395,342	0.88 percent
Professional and Related Services	3,317,581	7.35 percent
Government	1,753,487	3.88 percent
Industry not reported	688,836	1.53 percent

That was the employment pattern in 1940. In August of last year the National Resources Planning Board, in its pamphlet "After Defense, What?" estimated that by 1944 there would be 3.5 million persons in

military service, 23.5 million in defense industries, and 33 million in all other occupations, of a total labor force of 60 million, fully employed. Those figures were developed before we were at war. With greatly enlarged armed forces, and with war industry employment at about the NRPB figure, we arrive at the probable total of 50 percent of a labor force of 60 million to be employed in war activities.

Look back over the 1940 employment pattern and you will realize the extensive redistribution which will be required in order to reach maximum war production.

Redistribution of the labor force, in terms of employment categories, and in terms of location, reflects the redistribution of industry, both in stepped-up production or conversion of existing plants and in new plants. That picture does not need review; the story is told in shipbuilding, in the conversion of the automobile industry, in new airplane plants, in ordnance works, in the whole amazing process of getting our war production into full swing.

That is the wartime job. When peace comes, the process must be reversed. But it will not be a simple re-conversion. We can never go back to the inadequacies of pre-war "normalcy." The gigantic task of moving from our war employment to peacetime employment at a high level of national income was thrillingly indicated by Dr. Merriam (See page 34). Postwar full employment will be called for by an industrial production sufficient to provide the whole people with an adequate level of living; by urban redevelopment—and keeping our cities adequate; by modernizing our fantastically wasteful transportation systems; by development and maintenance of utility services consistent with our desired level of living; by soil and forest conservation; by coördinated programs for multiple use of various of our natural resources; by development of recreational facilities—vast open areas close-in to urban centers, great systems of parkways, ocean and lake and river front areas—not the pitiful, piddling bites we have been taking at the problem heretofore; by development of facilities for cultural satisfaction and advancement, greater than any we have known; by realizing the ideal of adequate education for all;—by these things whereby we prove that our defense of our way of life is justified and that our goal in the achievement of the four freedoms, "everywhere in the world," can be realized.

Fantastic goals? With Dr. Merriam I say no. Furthermore, any other course belies our profession of democracy and its aims; any other course renders unattainable the outlawing of war in our day; any other course makes easy the way to revolution.

To the course indicated, the dominant thought of the Nation is dedicated. To its attainment, we are immeasurably aided by the whole trend of technological advancement over more than a decade and by our wartime discovery of the richness of our untapped reserves of national energy, resourcefulness, and capacity for accomplishment.

Who can predict the future of the plastics industries, the potential development of alcohol-base fuels, a whole host of chemurgic industries? And who can predict the future of air transport, looking to a day in which much of our heavy freighting will be done by air and the individual airplane will be commonplace?

What of the locality in this array of generalities? Well, I think it is up to the localities to determine whether they will simply be focal points in national programs, or whether they will be vital entities, even within general frameworks which, in our economic interdependence, must be outlined nationally and regionally.

There is needed imaginative thinking on the part of localities which will measure up to the great challenges sounded by Dr. Merriam. Measure up to them? It must exceed them in the richness of what it expresses in the kinds of communities we seek to develop. We visionary planners need to dream dreams beyond our heretofore "big plans." We are not doing it. In ideas of urban redevelopment we take our cue from the real estate people. In our types of designs for housing projects we emulate what private developers first produced, and still argue as to the standard street pattern versus the cul-de-sac layout. In our zoning we did not dare to require off-street automobile parking space until private business establishments found it necessary. In our zoning for beauty, we were afraid to be called impractical, or long-haired, until clubwomen, civic leaders and others outside our profession demanded billboard control and other esthetic applications of the police power. We are still trying to catch up with the automobile—in a day that is witnessing advances in transportation beyond the automobile.

We have been making little plans—and they have no magic to stir men's souls.

We need a new approach. I suppose that such programs as the Public Work Reserve are good things—if we realize just how bad they are. I guess we need to list deferred public works; but we need to realize that in so doing we are doing a kind of management planning which we are in danger of confusing with the real thing, which is the determination of the kinds of communities we want and which will adequately serve human welfare.

Our world is wrenched to its foundations. The hand of the war is on every locality. I suggest that we undertake, as localities, to envision the kinds of communities that are called for by the goal of full employment at a high national income and a satisfactory level of living for all the people, and then make plans for those kinds of communities.

DISCUSSION

PHILIP M. KLUTZNICK, Special Representative of the Administrator, National Housing Agency

WHAT is the true nature of the war impact on localities? Generally speaking, and there are exceptions, it is both sudden and overwhelming. I have seen communities whose civic leaders have spent sleepless nights plotting, scheming, urging and conniving to secure a war plant or plants go into a state of shock when the announcement was made that the goal was reached. The exertion of energy left the locality exhausted when the reality of a war plant came along. It was too late to plan, it was too late to minimize the adverse effects within the framework of our mutually shared objective to win the war first. So I say, generally speaking, it is a sudden impact.

Then again, it is an overwhelming impact—overwhelming because people as a rule have not visualized the immensity of our war effort—the great size of our plants and the astronomical proportion of employment requirements. It's not like the old days when the Chamber of Commerce went after a shirt factory or even a Sears Roebuck plant. In the main, war industries start where these ended. They bring thousands of people where normal industry brought tens or hundreds. The assembly lines are figured in blocks rather than feet, and sites are computed in acres, not in hundreds of feet. So I say the impact is overwhelming as well as sudden.

Quite frequently this creates a state of confusion in the early days of the impact—at the very moment when sound planning and clear thinking are required of the locality. Rumors tend to multiply the already difficult problem and result quite frequently in Federal authorities taking over the job. Which brings me to some aspects of the physical impact which should concern us.

This failure to plan and to anticipate in the locality has given rise to a dangerous reversal in trends—a reversal which I hope is temporary. Just before the war the evolution of the thought that planning, housing, etc., are local responsibilities and best discharged in the locality was taking root. It was conceded, and properly so, that there was a Federal responsibility to advise, subsidize, and generally stimulate. Today, in many localities the reverse is true—the locality is consulted for advice and sometimes it is taken. Accordingly, the localities are the messenger boys of the Federal. Part of it is attributable to the need for speed, but a good portion of it is attributable to the lack of imagination and foresight on the part of the localities.

There is a general feeling that local people can not anticipate Federal plans. That is not true. They may not be able to anticipate the exact nature of a development, but they can prepare for development. Some of their preparations may not be needed, some may be impracticable, some may need to be revised, but they can prepare and *anticipate.*

Within one State I have witnessed classic examples of extreme opposites. (1) Hampton Roads—which should have known that a tremendous impact was inevitable from its experience in the last war—yet its preparations, its plans, and its thinking were totally inadequate to cope with the multitudinous problems. (2) Richmond—which, seeing the example of destruction in Norfolk and Portsmouth, did anticipate and did decide that if a development or tremendous movement came into its midst there were certain areas which could best absorb permanent developments and certain areas which could best be used for temporary developments; Richmond, which annexed boundary lands into its corporate limits so it could make its contribution to the war effort and yet perceive in some measure its future.

Many localities want to believe that the war plant which brings prosperity to its community will be permanent. I recall visiting a community not far distant from here. In a Star Chamber session with the officials and civic leaders of the community I was confidentially assured that they had inside information that the tremendous shell-loading plant occupying thousands of acres would remain permanently, even after the war. A few days later I read a clipping from the daily newspaper of a community some 400 miles distant announcing a similar plant and quoting the President of the Chamber of Commerce as saying he had assurance that the plant, which required a tremendous outlay of money, would be a permanent plant even though others would be dismantled. Obviously, such thinking does not make for sound planning. It is in the nature of wishful thinking.

The morning after I spoke with the leaders in the first community I met with the superintendent of the shell-loading plant. I told him of our conversation and he said, "They're crazy. When there is no shooting going on, rabbits will run across the acreage once again." He then asked me to come with him and he would show me what might remain. He took me to the machine shop—quite excellent—and to the power plant. Those, he said, could and undoubtedly would serve the community some years hence. The amazing thing about it all is that he told me that he had told the community leaders the same thing.

There is the other extreme in pessimistic and unreal thinking. There are those who see a modern up-to-the-minute aircraft plant built, and in their planning insist that there will be no need for the plant after the war. I have heard this said when the plant operators insisted that it was their program to operate the plant even if they had to abandon older plants located elsewhere. Their position is so real. Why abandon this modern up-to-the-minute plant with the latest and best devices for production? True, it may not operate at full capacity, but it is there to stay—a landmark which a sound planner must consider in his thoughts for tomorrow. Retrenchment is not altogether inevitable in every case—only loose thinking can create such conclusions.

P. L. BROCKWAY, Secretary, Wichita City Planning Commission

THE effect of impact of war industries on any locality must necessarily depend on the relation between the size and industrial activity of the neighborhood before the establishment of war industries and the size and type of the industry brought into the locality. Many of the older established industrial cities find it possible simply to convert to a very large degree the existing industry and personnel from peacetime industry to a war basis with very little effect, if any, on the operation of the community as a whole. Others at the other end of the scale, being actually very small prior to the war and with no industry whatever, have received into the neighborhood very large industry so obviously beyond any possibility of local management or control or governmental services that the Federal Government itself has necessarily had to take over practically all the governmental functions, in which event the impact on the local community is also relatively small in so far as governmental functions are concerned.

On the other hand, Wichita may be used as an example in which the population prior to the war industry was about 115,000, with an aircraft industry employing 700 or 800 which is under expansion during a period of two years to an air industry employing 7,000 or 8,000 and with an anticipated increase in population during the same period to an estimated 250,000 to 300,000. This brings about an almost unprecedented demand for shelter facilities and is probably typical of several scores of similar localities throughout the Nation.

As has already been defined by the previous speaker, a locality may be anything from a city block to the Nation as a whole. The impact of the war industry on the Nation as a whole has resulted in scarcity of many critical materials which are required not only in the construction of war material itself but also in the construction of industries in which the war materials may be assembled or manufactured, in the necessary housing or shelter facilities for the migrant population serving these industries, in the necessary facilities for air bases and cantonments, and for all of the implements of war. This shortage is aggravated by the fact that the Nation as a whole is trying to do what appears to be an impossible expansion in the limited time available. This impact on the Nation has resulted in a great multiplicity of Federal bureaus and boards and agencies of all kinds which send representatives to the localities with insufficient time to coördinate the plan as a whole so that the local administrator is instructed on procedure by conflicting cross orders and sometimes by personnel who have had so little training in the field that the local administrator must spend some time in instructing them on the fundamentals of the problem.

It has been stated in the very excellent paper by Mr. Pomeroy that the community which has had a plan which is alive will be able to bring

orderly development to a much greater degree than those communities which have had no plan or in which the plan has been dormant and ineffective. This ought to be true but unfortunately is not true in our own experience. The city of Wichita has been operating definitely along a specific plan which has been kept alive for the last twenty years. The location of the industry itself did not disturb the plan excepting that its extremely rapid expansion telescoped the time element in the development of the plan very materially. However, when it came to the location of private development under FHA and the reasonable necessity of filling in undeveloped areas which should first be considered, there were several apparently insurmountable difficulties. FHA urged builders to take advantage of the FHA insurance feature of the loans but placed so many restrictions and limitations on approval of the loans that it made it almost impossible for private builders to go into older territories even though there were sometimes fairly large-sized open tracts available. There were several contributing factors to this phase of filling in these areas, among which might be listed the following:

1. The owner had an exaggerated idea of the value of the tract which the builder could not meet in view of the fact that the development must be of moderate price.

2. Some of these tracts are held by estates and it is difficult to get clear title within a reasonable length of time.

3. Some of the tracts had gone to tax sales and the State Legislature had continued moratorium on tax deeds so long that the County could not give a merchantable title after foreclosure for delinquent taxes.

4. There were natural disadvantages of accessibility, drainage or other features.

5. FHA refused to make loans in older neighborhoods because of possibility of depreciated values.

6. The FHA Land Planning Division sometimes insisted on plats which were so out of line with the development of the neighborhood as a whole that the City Planning Commission refused to approve them.

The net result was that the builders were forced into the outer suburban or semi-suburban locations where there were no utilities in most instances. FHA seemed to be perfectly willing to approve them and even imposed lesser restrictions on almost rural areas than those which were closer in. The city commission took steps authorizing the administrative department to refuse to approve any extensions into areas which were so segregated that the cost of service to the community in these detached territories would be entirely beyond reason.

When the Federal Government came into the picture in the matter of direct construction of housing facilities, the Public Building Administration constructed the first unit. So far as I know, no Federal agency consulted any local agency which had any administrative or planning responsibility in connection with the selection of the site. The net result

was that the actual site selected and approved is right in line and between two high-class residential developments in which they constructed barrack type family units whose net result on that neighborhood was such that even FHA itself withdrew commitments in the immediate neighborhood. As a result of that, there are probably eighty acres of land in that neighborhood which should have been developed with a fairly high type of construction, which is blighted, which lies within the city, and which will probably remain so for an indefinite period.

FPHA followed with the next construction, and the officials connected with that have been very coöperative indeeed with local planning agencies and have done an excellent job. A site was selected for 2,300 units which is adjacent to facilities already in place including highways, utilities and accessibility. Work had been done by the governmental agency in preliminary development of the tract when the rubber famine suddenly came into the picture, and the necessity for transportation of workers compelled all agencies to abandon that site almost over night. The location has necessarily been removed entirely away from all facilities to get the workers' homes as near the plant as possible.

FSA then came in to install a 600-unit trailer camp. In spite of all that could be done by planning officials, they selected a site again immediately adjacent to fairly high-class residential development and with little regard to the transportation needs of the workers themselves.

The extreme shortage of materials and personnel and equipment necessary to construct highways has limited the improvement of highways to serve this satellite city, which may reach 30,000 or 40,000 people, to the barest necessity of highway development. Governmental agencies have approved the widening of some roads and the construction of an entirely new additional four-lane highway from the principal plants to the city limits but have insisted so far that the obligation of taking care of traffic in the city limits is a municipal function.

Coming to the effect of this impact on the fiscal situation of the city, the plants themselves, in which many million dollars are invested, are all located outside of the city and do not contribute in any way to the support of the city. While there are several thousand new moderate-priced homes, they do not add very rapidly to the assessed valuation. In percentages, the assessed valuation has been increased about 5 percent on which to make a tax base. Car registration has increased 75 percent and, except for the possibility of cars being put off the street, will increase still more. School population has increased 25 percent. The first 1,000 families in federally owned houses by actual count have 1,800 children of school age. Traffic has increased on the main highways 100 percent. The number of houses to be served by daily garbage collection has increased 25 percent and will increase probably that much more. The city is also at that point in population when the local govern-

mental function has about reached the limit with a rather simple administrative set-up. It is a well-known fact that the more complex set-ups make a greater per capita cost. Summing all these things up, the ordinary governmental services, if carried on on the same basis as before, will cost 30 to 40 percent more than formerly with about 5 percent increase in tax base rate to handle them and with the necessary increase in capital expenditure of about half as much as the present total bonded indebtedness of the community.

The fiscal problem resolves itself, therefore, into a very considerable question of possibility of financing as we go along together with a probability of a very severe decrease in industrial activity at the close of the war and with consequently a very considerable decrease in income to the community as a whole. It is more or less of a paradox that a city can multiply its industrial activity by two or three or four and actually as a governmental unit be poorer than before, and yet that seems to be the exact situation.

If one might draw some conclusions from the standpoint of the local governmental and planning agencies, it has appeared to us that the problem is not local, that it is national and that the extra cost of all services made necessary by this governmental industry, part of which is actually owned by the Federal government itself, should be borne in a larger degree by the government. Otherwise the city stands a real possibility of being bankrupted by the national effort. It is not assumed that this is an isolated case, and we realize that the impact on the Nation as a locality is so terrific that it is beyond human possibility for the governmental agencies themselves to handle all the situations which arise over the country.

REPORTER'S SUMMARY

JOHN M. PICTON, Senior Planning Technician, Region IV,
National Resources Planning Board

NO ONE could hope to do justice to the excellence of Hugh Pomeroy's paper upon this subject without quoting his remarks in full. The subject was well covered in his usual forceful, masterful style. Mr. Pomeroy skillfully painted an accurate word picture of the plight of localities where war industrial production or military activities are now directing attention to the difficulty of providing adequate community facilities and services. "One effect of the war upon localities directly affected by war activities has been the emphasizing of the need for planning," which according to Mr. Pomeroy should be *our* type of planning, with sufficient profundity to be realistic, as distinct from the so-called action-emergency planning now unfortunately so superficial in character. "Our kind of planning" obviously includes, among other

things, a program of accomplishment capable of acceleration during times of emergency—not little plans which have no magic to stir men's souls, but big plans based upon imaginative thinking, envisioning the kinds of communities we seek to develop and that are called for by our postwar goal of full employment at a level of high national income and with better accepted standards of living for all.

Mr. Pomeroy directed attention to present-day emergency problems and also to the need for local advance thinking and planning toward the postwar period of adjustment and redistribution of the labor force, stating that it is up to the localities to determine whether they will be focal points in national programs or vital entities within general frameworks which, in our national economic interdependence, must be outlined nationally and regionally.

Mr. Brownlow suggested that one of the results of the war should be a re-study of the word "locality." For some purposes, the locality is the entire world; for other purposes, it is a much smaller area than we have been accustomed to visualize. During most of our history, we have allocated functions to one of three governmental agencies—Federal, state, and local. Now when a new activity arises, we divide it into a different function at each level of government, assigning a part to the Federal Government, a part to the state government, and a part to the local government.

Mr. Brownlow called attention to the fact that for the first time in our history, one single governmental action affected every square mile and every person in the land; namely, the sugar rationing registration. This was a Federal job but was undertaken by a local governmental unit—the school district.

The locality is now a fixed geographic unit, according to Mr. Brownlow, but a very flexible unit and, dependent upon its function, may be the entire country, a large region or, for convenience, a county or city. He is convinced that the impact of war on localities will change our thoughts, so we will recognize the fact that the locality is as large or as small as the function may determine.

Mr. Klutznick stressed the fact that even when a locality has been aggressively seeking war industrial activities, the impact is characteristically sudden and overwhelming, frequently resulting in confusion which contributes to "muddling" and *post-mortem* thinking rather than real, effective planning. He felt that even when we do not have all the answers to the uncertainties of the future, such as Federal governmental policies and all other pertinent matters, an attempt should be made to anticipate future requirements and prepare a plan for orderly systematic development.

Mr. Klutznick defined the locality as the area of impact and noted that in some instances the failure to plan locally has resulted in a reversal of the usual trend of activities. In such cases, the Federal govern-

ment, to avoid any impediment to the war effort, has been forced to "carry the ball," thus leaving the locality in an advisory position. This indicates the necessity of definite coöperation between local, state, and Federal governments. In our present-day activities and in the future, planning must be recognized as vitally essential in the category of creative, imaginative thinking; planning must not become *post mortem*, static thinking. Rules established for one area may not of necessity be applied appropriately to another locality. Each critical locality needs adequate study and appraisal of its needs in order to have a plan for accomplishing the desired objectives.

Mr. Brockway felt that the effect of the impact depends upon the initial size of the community and its relationship to the magnitude of the war industrial activity. He cited the effects in Wichita, beginning with the first defense housing project constructed by PBA. This agency, apparently, did not consult local agencies, with the result that the housing project is poorly located with respect to community facilities, creating an adverse effect on the community by being adjacent to a high-class neighborhood, and containing an excessive population density. The next project was well planned and would have been well located with respect to community facilities and appropriately adjusted to local customs and traditions, but the plan had to be abandoned because of the distance of the site from the industrial area and the difficulty of providing transportation facilities. Mr. Brockway stated that previously Wichita was in an essentially agricultural area, but that the influx of approximately 60,000 workers will obviously change it to a predominantly industrial area with a consequent change in its inhabitants' way of thinking and living.

Comments by Mr. Brockway and Mr. Antonio C. Kayanan of Cleveland indicated the necessity of complete re-examination now of plans which have been prepared many years ago. It was the consensus of opinion that many zoning ordinances are unrealistic for the most economical utilization of our land today, even aside from present emergency conditions. Mr. Kayanan stressed the fact that we should not use old standards previously adopted when such standards are clearly incorrect for present-day usage; the plan should be adjusted (no matter how well done previously) to the needs of the people today and in the future and should be interpreted properly in the present emergency.

Questions raised by gentlemen from Denver, Cleveland, and Newport, Rhode Island, brought agreement that the issuance of temporary permits allowing unlimited population density in all residential areas is an extremely dangerous practice. In the latter community, apartments are now allowed in any residential district without limitation as to the number of families with precautionary regulations limiting building cubage, requiring adequate room cubage per occupant and allowing

no structural change in the exterior of existing buildings. In Detroit, for the duration of the war only, light manufacturing is allowed in B2 business districts with the understanding, guaranteed by bonds, that any such buildings erected or extended will be removed after the war. From other communities there were comments that such conversions are allowed only where it is evident that the districts are in a state of transition and the trends are appropriate.

Mr. Klaber commented that one of the worst impacts of the war might be termed social or spiritual—the fact that people coming into an area do not have a feeling of belonging there. This evidences a need for some means of renucleation to the new locality so they will feel at home, obviously bringing into play all social, recreational, spiritual and other activities possible.

In the Fort Leonard Wood locality, according to Mr. William Anderson, the Missouri State Planning Board, approximately a year and a half ago, had the "audacity" to prepare a master plan but was unable to get any of the Federal agencies to coöperate with its efforts except the National Resources Planning Board. Immediately, Mr. Pomeroy mentioned the marked change now apparent in the attitude of Federal agencies, especially the National Housing Agency which has recently consolidated sixteen separate agencies concerned with housing under one head, and spoke of the earnest desire on the part of Mr. Blandford to coöperate with all governmental agencies. He mentioned a report soon to be distributed by Mrs. Rosenman's committee which will recommend the assignment of a Federal representative, who will have definite authority with respect to other Federal agencies, to each major critical locality. Through this representative, the locality will have the opportunity to coöperate and to correlate its activities with those of representatives of all other defense-connected Federal agencies.

Mr. J. M. Albers called attention to the procedure in Wisconsin where zoning ordinances are being strengthened and their scope of influence extended, rather than any tendency of "letting down the bars" due to the present emergency.

Mr. John T. Howard of Cleveland made a plea for national planning as a guide to local planning activities; it is evident that better national leadership is needed—not the mere consulting with local persons on local problems that is now being done. No matter how well coördinated local plans are, there is a need for national plans as a guide for the location of industries, transportation facilities, and many other basic factors. It is apparent that during the war emergency, there is no such national plan prepared and, therefore, there is little opportunity for local people to protect themselves. National planning is, therefore, necessary as a guide for local planning, and all of our localities should be educated to do appropriate local planning.

War Housing and City Rebuilding After Victory

JOHN B. BLANDFORD, JR., National Housing Administrator

ALONG with such great social tasks as organizing our economy for full employment and for security, and for the equitable utilization of the resources of the world, the rebuilding of urban communities stands out as a monumental undertaking of greatest importance. To achieve reasonable satisfaction and efficiency in urban living, our cities must, in a large measure, be replanned and reconstructed. They were built hastily and, in the light of contemporary circumstances, illogically. Their rebuilding offers both a great opportunity for advance toward our social objectives and a great opportunity for postwar employment.

Accordingly, I am glad to submit a few thoughts to the group which takes the widest view of these problems—the National Planning Conference. Your far-sighted deliberations assist the work-a-day administrator to develop his program within the broadest framework of world problems, national problems, regional and community problems.

Housing will play a major role in postwar city rebuilding. However, for the time being, our only housing program is that intended to serve the war needs. It is our position that no new houses should be built now except only those absolutely required to accommodate essential in-migrant workers. In the congested localities, we must crowd existing housing full to the feasible limit, and build no more new houses than we can help. The labor-supply people and the plant managers tell us what in-migration of war workers is required to maintain production. The composition of the in-migration is also estimated in terms of single persons, men, women, couples, and families with children, and in terms of prospective income. Then we appraise the absorption capacity of existing accommodations and assign as many in-migrants as seems practicable to this available housing.

We don't want overcrowding to create a menace to the public health. We don't want the pressure on use of existing housing to endanger municipal zoning plans which have been painfully established over the past twenty years. We hope we will not have to resort to billeting, nor otherwise arbitrarily to invade people's homes. And we don't want to create social and moral problems more serious than the problems of securing building materials for new housing. These are all checks on the home utilization program. But, within this framework, we believe it is advisable and feasible to place into existing houses which are not now fully occupied, during the next twelve months or so, more than half a million single persons, and perhaps two hundred thousand families, the latter mostly in-migrant couples. Nevertheless, after making full allowance for packing people into presently available housing, there will still be a large number of in-migrant war workers for whom those

responsible for labor supply and for production demand that housing be provided.

For those in-migrant families who can pay ordinary commercial rates for their houses, in situations where the houses will be useful after the war, the most practicable method of securing houses at present is to utilize the large facilities of the private building industry. Thus, the major portion of the new housing is still being built by private builders with private financing. An increasing proportion of it takes out FHA Title VI mortgage insurance.

However, it is necessary now to direct private building much more closely to meet the current needs. Controls have to be exercised over location, design, rent and occupancy. Obviously, being unprecedented, this will also be difficult. But it seems clear that by this process, and in no other way, materials can be assured for private housing which qualifies by actually helping to meet the housing needs of in-migrant war workers.

In situations where private enterprise cannot meet the need, either because some or all of the workers receive incomes below the commercial rent paying level, or because the need is so temporary that private financing is not available, then government war housing has to be built.

It is hoped that a large proportion of the in-migrants will consist of single workers and couples. In so far as Uncle Sam has to provide new accommodations for them, temporary dormitories and dormitory apartments will be built. Much of the government war housing during the next year will be of these temporary types. For the essential families with children, which cannot be accommodated in existing or newly built private houses, the Government again will have to do the financing and building. The design of these family dwelling units will be adapted to the prevailing circumstances with reference to available materials, location of war plants, fire hazards, and utility services. The Federal Public Housing Authority will do its best to adapt projects to local and regional planning.

The upshot will be a large proportion of removable houses, built to serve as war housing but not as permanent housing, and a smaller proportion of structures designed for permanent use in order to meet a permanent need and to meet fire hazard and similar considerations, but designed also to use only materials which are available.

Now, very clearly, this is not a long-range housing program. Rather, it is an expedient to help win the war as quickly as possible. It cannot be considered as contributing in any very important way to the job of city rebuilding. The present circumstances require us to concentrate on this terribly urgent, relatively small, but difficult program of war housing.

The National Housing Agency and its housing programs can play their part in urban reconstruction far better when we have emerged

victorious from the blight of war; when we have time, materials, manpower, energy and plant capacity to devote to the world-wide postwar task. Then we want housing to take its place in an orderly process, along with the many other aspects of social and economic advance the world over.

Meanwhile, even in the haste of these wartime days, we can see some net gain out of the war housing effort. The housing agencies are doing all possible to arrange so that the dwelling accommodations built now will either be useful afterward or, in the case of the temporary construction, will be removed and leave no scars on our communities. War involves waste in a social sense, and war housing is partly waste in so far as helping on long-range housing is concerned. At least we believe it will do little or no permanent damage.

But, even so, we are learning something these days about a crucial matter in the housing field. We are learning more about how to work together. Peculiarly, housing has been a territory of controversy. Now, the creation of the National Housing Agency is an act of unification. It supplies a much-needed channel through which the total housing problem can be approached. Already, on war housing, we are gaining experience in collaboration, in tolerance, in formulating and carrying out overall total housing programs. This is a net gain which I consider of great value. Further, while NHA is set up as an agency of the Federal Government, it is a principle of our operation that the work to be done must be decentralized. We are pushing our regional offices out of Washington into regional centers where our people can work with the regionalized staff of other Federal agencies, and, more important, with the localities themselves and their public and private representatives. It is a difficult time to effect such decentralization, but we are tackling it. And we believe that we are building a structure which will serve well for the bigger postwar work.

When we are on top of the war housing job, we will join in the city rebuilding enterprise. Housing must play its major part, and we are constantly thinking of that and preparing for the great days of the peacetime program. Even today, we can see the outlines of the problems and of possible solutions.

DISCUSSION

FREDERICK BIGGER, Land Use Planner, Federal Housing Administration

FOR reasons which may be surmised and approved, the important paper which has been read to us touches only very incidentally, although hopefully, upon the topic assigned to this session of the Planning Conference. Under the circumstances, I shall not venture to explain the program which the Federal Housing Administration put forth

last November in the now well-known "Handbook on Urban Redevelopment for Cities in the United States." In his foreword to that document, FHA Commissioner Ferguson stated:

> The intention is not that public officials and interested citizens should accept this document without question or as if it were a complete, final and detailed book of instructions. Nor can they fail, on their own account, to study the problem of what their own urban community should become in the future, as a complex economic entity which, after all, must be properly related physically, economically and socially to its region and to the Nation.

Perhaps I shall be forgiven if I turn to several aspects of the environment within which we shall be working as we move forward toward the redesigning and rebuilding of our cities. Among our associates will be other technicians, city legislative bodies, administrators, groups with varied special interests (pressure groups, in many cases) representing divided and unformed public opinion.

The pattern of the current program suggests that the life of administrators, under pressure from all sides, is not always an enviable one. Perhaps the conflicting purposes which administrators have to reconsider or to balance will lead us into a postwar period with minds so prepared, policies so formulated, techniques so well thought through in advance, personnel so balanced in experience and judgment, that the National Housing Agency will evolve placidly and gracefully and ripely into its completely different role in the postwar period. I say *perhaps* that may happen. But so long as that remains only a pious wish, it is reasonable not to expect too much in actual results. This will be where the rest of us will be called upon to help—to work for the better ultimate results, to be alert and to have an understanding sympathy with the administrative compulsions of the present.

As we watch the practical compromises which the public administrator always has had to make, as the newer and more richly informed type of administrator multiplies throughout the country and takes the place of the old-fashioned type, let us remember the risks of error which such men must face. There is an amusing anecdote which in its final fillip implies that the only one of the three main actors in the story who was wrong was the compromiser!

There is possible a rather broad analogue between the general situation and the now appearing concept of military and naval operations in these days of aerial warfare. No matter how good the aerial photographic scouting may be, or how much needed knowledge it will produce, no matter what swift, long-range impacts the racing bomber can make upon the enemy, after all there is a discoverable correlation of pace with the ground forces as advances are made all along the line and on all fronts. Inseparable from the work of the observer of the distant view, is the seemingly dull and unthrilling activity of those who are essential producers of the day-by-day program and the step-by-step advance.

Here perhaps I may be allowed to say that the Federal Housing Administration has had such ideas in mind in producing and circularizing the redevelopment "Handbook" previously mentioned. The long-term, synthesized, and progressive program suggested in that document is the long view—although, quite possibly, not all of the long view; and interwoven with it is the allegedly tiresome and practical suggestion of how to do the work, how to advance all along the line.

Personally, I think there should be no apologies, no defensive attitudes, concerning that presentation, upon the part of those who sponsored or produced it. It is a way to do a necessary job. It is up to planners and administrators to participate in following that way, or in following a better way if it can be found. But, as I see it, there is no acceptable alternative to agreeing upon both our objectives and a way by which to achieve them.

GUY GREER, Senior Economist, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System

EDITOR'S NOTE.—Since there was a good deal of discussion of Mr. Greer's presentation, one or two speakers being severely critical, he has been asked to prepare a supplementary statement. In it he undertakes to clarify certain aspects of the proposal formulated by Professor Hansen and himself—aspects which, he believes, had not been adequately set forth in his brief address. The statement follows.

STATE AND FEDERAL AID FOR CITY REPLANNING

APART from the necessity of stirring up the citizens of the towns and cities to a realization of the seriousness of the problem confronting them—a task that is the peculiar responsibility of the planners—they must be made to see that, vast and overwhelming though the job of replanning and rebuilding may appear, it is not impossible of accomplishment. Once these ideas are widely disseminated and firmly grasped, it may be expected that the resulting pressure of public opinion will suffice to obtain the state and Federal legislation required.

Once the planners come to grips with their job, they will soon find that, in addition to the lack of adequate legal powers from the States, they are up against a financial and fiscal problem that is far beyond the capacity of most towns and cities to solve. It has to do with the blighted areas and slums. Essentially it is the problem of how to get rid of the *excess*, when the present valuations of the land and buildings in such areas are higher than the valuations that would be justified for the new use of the land in accordance with a sound master plan. Present valuations are the results of market prices (often of prices demanded but not offered), of mortgage loans outstanding, of decisions of the taxing authorities, of court decisions, and so on. Usually they are so high, frequently on account of previous over-zoning for business uses, that redevelopment by private or public enterprise for the best use in the interest of the community as a whole is out of the question. Moreover,

they are a serious obstacle in the way of a real solution of the problem of urban housing. The blighted areas are for the most part admirably located for residential use, and are needed for nothing else. But they must be so used at a much lower population density than before, if their future re-deterioration into blight is to be avoided; and this will be impossible until their excessive valuations are drastically lowered.

In the proposal outlined by Professor Alvin Hansen and myself, this prickly problem of land valuations is flatly asserted to be one which only society as a whole can cope with. We argue that the passage of laws radical enough to squeeze out quickly the whole of these excesses of valuation would be politically impossible, and of doubtful desirability even if possible. Society as a whole, we submit, is mainly responsible for the conditions existing, and society as a whole should pay the cost of cleaning them up so that a new fresh start can be made—even though in the process some individuals and institutions should get "bailed out" who do not deserve it.

This does not mean that reckless over-valuations should be allowed, either by the courts in condemnation proceedings or by the duly constituted agencies of the local governments in purchasing blighted and slum properties. On the contrary, every proper means should be employed, both in court actions and in bargaining with the owners, to acquire title to the land in question at prices as low as possible. In many if not most cases, already the actual market (where there is any—not merely the prices asked) does take account of the true conditions and prospects in the area; and certainly the valuations allowed should not be higher than the actual market. It would be difficult to justify forcing them lower, however, through action by the community as a whole in reallocating the use of a large portion of its entire land area; for it could be convincingly argued that this would be destroying values, in the public interest without just compensation.

If we assume that the land in the blighted and slum areas is bought up by the local governments—with such financial aid from the Federal Government as may be necessary—there can be no doubt that one of the greatest single obstacles to the eventual realization of a sound master plan would be removed. Such land could then be put to its best possible use in the interest of the whole community, without regard to the acquisition cost of any particular parcel. Some of it would be required, no doubt, for the development of the transportation and terminal system. Some would be needed for parks and playgrounds. The bulk of it, though, would probably be available for housing—for everything from high-priced apartments to very low-rent dwellings. And for such uses it could be offered for lease; on terms favorable enough to attract private developers or, if deemed desirable, to local public housing authorities. The ground rents would be based not on acquisition costs but on the value estimated to be realized from the new use.

Professor Hansen and I have proposed Federal financial aid, merely because we are convinced that, under existing conditions, most of the towns and cities would be unable to raise the money required. More specifically, we envisage a procedure somewhat as follows: For every town or city in the country—or for every group of contiguous municipalities—a long-range master plan would be completed in broad outline for the entire metropolitan area. And of course it would provide for its own subsequent revision to meet unforeseeable needs. It would be formally submitted to the appropriate Federal agency in connection with an application for financial aid in the acquisition of all the real property within a clearly defined slum or blighted area. For each such area and the immediate surroundings, the planning would have to be not only complete and in accordance with the master plan, but it should also be accompanied by the data necessary to justify all assumptions as to future changes. Definitely indicated would be the proposed u e of every square foot of the area, whether for public purposes or for le sing to private enterprise; and such use would be determined without regard to acquisition cost of the land. In other words, the acquisition would be a by-product of the job of clearing away the obstacles to redevelopment: in arriving at a decision as to its subsequent use, the land should be deemed to have cost nothing.

Decision as to acquisition, as well as to future kind of use, should be by the planning agency for the metropolitan area; not by the local housing authority, because the considerations involved would be broader than housing alone.

Upon approval by the appropriate agencies in Washington of all aspects of a proposal to acquire property, the Government would be prepared to advance funds, if need be, up to the entire cost of acquisition. Possibly repayment of the principal might be required, along with a share of the subsequent net proceeds from the property in lieu of interest. In view of the fiscal position of most municipalities, however, there are strong reasons for requiring them only to pay over, for 50 years or so, something like two-thirds of such sums as may be obtained from leasing the property, thus giving them a long breathing spell in which to undertake an overhauling of their tax structures. Of course, if they could accomplish tax reform at once, they might be able to finance the whole program out of their own resources and thus escape even the minimum of Federal supervision that would otherwise be unavoidable. And let me add here, parenthetically, that we envisage no centralized control over city planning. Every possible safeguard should be included in the underlying legislation (and in the accompanying discussion of the intent of the laws) against interference with the local community in planning any sort of town it wants, so long as a few indispensable and obvious standards are adhered to.

Demolition and rebuilding in the acquired areas, or rehabilitation

where this is feasible, would proceed as rapidly as all the attendant circumstances would permit. Meanwhile, public work activities of all kinds would be fitted into the larger program. Steady progress would be made, over the years, towards realization of the growing and developing master plan. Those of you who would like to read a more detailed version of the proposal, together with an analysis of the housing problem, will find it set forth in a pamphlet entitled "Urban Redevelopment and Housing" published by The National Planning Association, Washington, D. C.

REPORTER'S SUMMARY

ROBERT B. MITCHELL, Chief Urban Progressive Planning Project, National Resources Planning Board

AT THE beginning of the meeting Mr. Earle S. Draper, Assistant Commissioner, Federal Housing Administration, read a telegram from Administrator John B. Blandford, Jr., of the National Housing Agency, regretting his inability to attend the Conference and requesting that Mr. Draper read a paper which he had prepared.

After reading Mr. Blandford's paper Mr. Draper commented that in the past, while cities were increasing rapidly in size, blighted areas were frequently being rebuilt by change to a more intensive use, accompanied by a rise in land values; that now, with little likelihood of such expansion, the redevelopment of slum and blighted areas provides a postwar opportunity for employment. He added that after this war the development of the airplane may have a tendency even more to decentralize cities; but there are also counter currents discernible and a certain amount of decentralization may arise through a demand for living quarters near work.

Mr. Charles S. Ascher, Consultant in Charge of Urban Conservation and Development, National Resources Planning Board: We very much need "a new calculus" in approaching city rebuilding after the war. Unless we are willing to let our minds range as freely as people's minds are ranging now, it will be difficult to solve the problems ahead of us after victory. For example:

Relative values will be given close scrutiny as evidenced by the present proposal to use 40,000 tons of silver, which the government has stored in vaults, to replace copper for bus bars in generating plants. It is estimated that the silver is "worth" $1,300,000,000 and the copper $10,500,000, but in the present extreme need for copper real values are reversed.

A second example is that we have become accustomed to thinking of a limitation placed on optimum size of cities by increasing costs of administration and services. If we are going to have a full employment economy, people must have access to jobs that will keep them busy all

the time. They must have access to many jobs. Only a community of considerable size can readily afford that free opportunity for full employment. Perhaps it is the price of full employment economy that we have to live in large cities with their more expensive municipal services. Perhaps people who work 50 weeks a year would rather pay $70 per year for services than pay $35 and be employed half the time.

We have built tremendous new war plants and have accordingly redistributed a large population. We may or may not want this wartime pattern to continue; but it is probable that if it can be converted the new war plant with its efficient equipment is not going to be scrapped.

During the war we have built many "demountable" houses served by water mains, utilities and treatment plants which cannot be demounted. If we are looking forward to such mobility of dwelling, should not something be done about the possibility of new methods of, for instance, sewage treatment which will not require these elaborate installations?

Finally, another new approach for the future may be through the use of a new tool—the public opinion poll—which would give planners new light on the things people would like to have to make city life more desirable.

Mr. Frederick Bigger, Land Use Planner with the Federal Housing Administration: I have been impressed by much conversation about the ideals we are striving for and very little on how really to accomplish those ideals. It is now time to be specific. Just what do we mean when we talk about the cities of the future? We need more exploration, more vision of the direction in which we are going, and a recognition that there is both a likeness and a dissimilarity between the peacetime problem and some of the war problems faced by the administrators today. Right now those of us who are interested in this field are in the process of summing up the experience of twenty years or more—what we have learned about the causes of those conditions which we hope to remedy. We have tried to discover what better devices or procedures we might adopt. It is in that spirit that the FHA published a proposal last summer. This was an attempt to find a practical way of accomplishing our rather well-accepted ideals for the rebuilding of cities after the war.

We must find solutions which are positive. Sometimes the only completely wrong solution is a compromise. In working out practical methods of accomplishing our ideals we must recognize that administrators are men who are under pressure. They are called upon to interpret and define the policies which have been determined by others. There is needed a peculiar kind of mutual understanding between the administrator and the public so that the administrator may gauge just what the public wants when it votes for some rather general and indefinitely stated proposal.

I wish to refer to three general programs that contain specific proposals for urban redevelopment. These programs have been formulated by the Urban Land Institute, by the Federal Housing Administration, and by Mr. Greer and Professor Hansen. In working these out there must be greater distinction between the responsibility of the local community and that of the Federal Government. The local urban community must do as much of its own thinking and planning as possible and should recognize in the future that it can do many of the things some communities have expected the Federal Government to do for them. On the other hand, the Federal Government can contribute to the thinking by seeing the proper relationship of the local community to the national plan and the national distribution of industry and employment. It can also give certain kinds of financial assistance to urban rebuilding.

In preserving the vitality of local community action, I suggest that we should give consideration to two factors: (a) the extent to which decentralized Federal administration will have been forced to coöperate with local communities; (b) considerable pressure to release the heavy controls forced upon private enterprise during the war. We feel that there is a question whether these controls should be completely released or whether we shall be able to offer as a substitute that kind of broad control which allows a maximum of local autonomy within the general scope of over-all rules of operation.

Mr. Guy Greer, Senior Economist, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System: I stress the importance of the need for people in the cities to be excited about the possibility of replanning and rebuilding in the postwar period. Cities are like an immense farm which for one reason or another has been very badly run down; but at the moment we are so busy keeping from starving to death on that farm that we have not had time to go to work and clean up the mess that it has fallen into generally. The primary necessity is real city planning. The housing problem can never be solved if attacked directly as housing but it must be approached from a much broader point of view. The city and town must be largely replanned before we can solve the housing problem.

In most cases large blighted areas of cities will have to be redeveloped at a much lower population density than has been there in the past because one of the major reasons for blight has been overcrowding and congestion. This means that future use for land will not justify present valuations; and the elimination of this excess valuation is the problem involved in removing a great obstacle to redevelopment. Another great obstacle is cities' need of legal powers, which must come from States.

I believe that the present condition in the blighted areas of cities is the responsibility of society as a whole, not only of persons who happen to own that land. The reason has been a failure on the part of everybody in the community to foresee the consequences of the advent of the auto-

mobile, and the consequences of unplanned and uncontrolled development. If society as a whole is to benefit from redevelopment, it must expect to pay the cost of doing it, even though in the process here and there somebody might receive more for his land than he really should.

Once state authority has been granted to the cities, master plans have been made for towns and cities, particular blighted areas have been marked for redevelopment, and detailed plans have been made for the future use of these areas, then the Federal Government should make funds available to buy up the blighted areas in their entirety. This money should be returned to the Federal Government out of ground rents and there should be a firm agreement with the Government that the rent would be used only in accordance with the master plan and the detailed plan for the area. Some of the land so acquired could be leased to private enterprise, some used for parks, parking areas, some for public housing. If ground rents should prove enough to repay the Federal Government, —good! but if not, the Federal Government should forget the difference. If this work is to be done nationally within a reasonable time we cannot afford to wait for the local communities to wrestle with the problem. It must be tackled on a Federal basis.

Mrs. Samuel I. Rosenman, Chairman, National Committee on the Housing Emergency, Inc.: For some time to come our energies must go toward winning the war. Priorities on materials must be displaced by allocations. In some areas we must resort to billeting of war workers because we cannot service factories with people, without providing places for those people to live. We must start now to think of using every available bit of space in communities which are badly affected. In some areas it may be necessary even to move out people not importantly contributing to the pursuit of the war. There is much talk of temporary houses, but it is doubtful that we shall see much removal of temporary buildings. After the war people will stay where they are to the extent that we can find new uses for war plants.

Concerning Mr. Ascher's suggestion of a poll of public opinion to find out why people do or do not want to live in cities, it is difficult to find out what people in a locality want because in most cases they probably could not formulate an answer specifically. However, no plan which has been presented for the rebuilding of cities can be executed until city dwellers generally understand how individuals are affected by urban blight. These plans are of the stuff dreams are made of; and we have found out that in housing, if we dream long enough and work, the dreams come true. However, this requires much public talking and discussion and tenacity of purpose. First must come general understanding.

General Discussion: Discussion from the floor centered about Mr. Greer's proposal. In answer to questions he said that local planning authorities must be depended upon to determine the blighted areas. When asked what to do about taxes during the interim period between

the time land is taken and its redevelopment, Mr. Greer answered that in many instances during the interim period a city will receive revenue from leases equivalent to that which the land now produces from taxation. Asked what would be done with people now inhabiting blighted areas, Mr. Greer answered that in the program it will not be possible to tear down everything at once and certainly not until some place has been found for present inhabitants. Some, he thought, might be rehoused in the same area, and some might want to move elsewhere.

One point of view which was expressed held that under the Greer plan the Federal Government would be "bailing out" property owners. According to this opinion considerable investment has been lost in stocks and bonds. Society is no more to blame for the decline of values in the city than for lower values in stocks and bonds. It was answered that if the Federal Government does not absorb this difference we must wait until land drops in price, which may be too long. Also it was mentioned that the Federal Government's financing would not necessarily be an outright gift—much of it might be recovered. It was further pointed out in the discussion that there will be a difference between what is paid for this land and its probable future economic value. The difference must come from somewhere. It is better not to inject morals into the question of what is to be paid. Blame is of no account. An important consideration is: what standards of valuation are available to the public? A redevelopment plan may serve as evidence of an appropriate use. Under the law, land value is supposedly based on such appropriate use.

It was remarked that most plans for urban redevelopment now are in general agreement concerning the need for substantial aid from the Federal Government for two reasons: (1) to make useful employment; (2) to save cities from deterioration. If it is left to the cities to condemn land, the government absorbing whatever is the difference between land cost and future value, the result will be higher land costs. The actual land purchasing agency would not have an incentive to keep such costs down. As an alternative it was suggested that if the Federal Government should offer to cities the financing of land purchase (the total cost of such purchase to be returned to the government at the rate of 2 percent per annum for 50 years, amortizing that cost without interest) the objective of local control and responsibility would be met and the city would have an incentive to keep down the purchase price.

INFORMATION PLEASE

PRESIDING:

Robert Kingery, General Manager, Chicago Regional Planning Association.

Mr. Kingery: This program is a departure, in a measure, from those which have been held in previous years, the purpose being to have a forum which partakes of the character of the "Information Please" program on the air. We will give an opportunity to every person who can possibly crowd in a question—from any city, village, or incorporated town in Indiana, or from any other State,—to put his question to a group of three persons who for the want of a better title are called "experts." When the committee invited the three "experts" on each of the five subjects to serve, each one disclaimed the title. We know, of course, that these men who were selected by the committee of the National Conference on Planning have great experience.

There is no doubt whatever that, either by our knowledge of them or by their own admission, there are other experts throughout the room who might be equally capable of answering questions introduced by this group. They will have an opportunity, if there is time.

The manner in which the program will be conducted is this: The chairman will introduce briefly the subject upon which questions will be asked, giving a general idea of what it covers. Anyone on the floor may rise and ask a question. We would like to have each one asking a question give his or her name, city and town from which he or she comes. It will help for the record the Conference expects to keep.

RIGID ZONING ENFORCEMENT IN DEFENSE AREAS

EXPERTS:

FRED W. AMETER, Secretary-Engineer, Denver Board of Adjustment Zoning; BRYANT HALL, City Planning Analyst, Detroit City Plan Commission; EUGENE A. HOWARD, Supervising Engineer, Milwaukee County Regional Planning Department.

Mr. Kingery: Some cities, towns, and counties are being asked by many people to amend or vary their zoning requirements in the interest of war necessity. The zoning officials must decide where to draw the line between actual and alleged war necessity. They must consider the long-time results as well as the immediate necessity. Some of the cities and towns of Indiana and many in other parts of the country have had these problems. We have had a question put to us anonymously which may start the discussion:

In our single-family dwelling districts, some owners have sought to remodel a single-family dwelling into two or more apartments. Should this be authorized by the Zoning Board of Appeals or Adjustment, and should such a variation be made for a limited period, or should this be done at all?

Mr. Ameter: When I came to this Conference, I was pretty well sold on the idea of no variation in our Class A single-family residential districts, but since hearing Captain Reiss and other speakers this noon at luncheon, I have come to the conclusion that the ordinance itself should be amended by embodying in it some regulation for a temporary permit that would end at the end of the emergency.

Mr. Eppich, Denver: I take issue with our engineer. I think circumstances alter cases. I am firmly convinced, in spite of what has been said here today, that there is no justification for making a variation in Class A districts because you have other districts in which such multi-family uses are already allowed. You should not allow a Class A district to be changed in any respect. It is the bulwark of a zoning ordinance.

Mr. Waterfield, Fort Wayne: I would like to differ with the experts in that it is not fair in the Class A district, even at this time, to permit single-family residences to be converted into two-family residences. In fact, that is an injury to the value of the other property in that district.

Mr. Ameter: I think this depends greatly on the city in which the war industry is located. In a great many cities the problem is not acute, and it would probably be unwise to let down bars, but there are some cities—I have in mind Detroit, and some of the other larger industrial areas—where the need for space for war workers is acute, and some method might be worked out for a temporary permit during the emergency.

Mr. C. G. Baker, Indianapolis: If there should be any variation why should only Class A or single-family districts be protected? I happen to live in Class B, a two-family building zone. We should consider the closeness of the needed services; for instance, if a Class A residence section is close to a large industrial section, where room is needed, it should not be protected any more than Class B during the emergency. No particular group should be favored at this time. I wonder if our experts know of any place where Class A should be honored by this protection more than any other section?

Mr. Hall: If we think clearly on this subject, it will all resolve itself into two simple points. All of us are perfectly in accord that the war must be won, and we are agreed that zoning has reached its present state through a long, hard fight. Its identity must be maintained. The two things sound as if they might be at odds; then the only question that has to be determined is which is most important. First and foremost, we want to win the war. However, I should not make any distinction as to whether it happens to be Class A or B, but I should require a very strong burden of proof to be placed upon the applicant that the variation or change is really vitally necessary to win the war. If he can make that showing, then neither I nor any other person interested in zoning should

stand in his way. Sometimes it is difficult for the applicant to make that sort of definite showing. For example, a man who was making war munitions claimed they could not be made in any other location; but when asked to prove beyond question that he could not possibly produce them in any other place, he failed to do so, and the council refused to allow him to continue in that location.

Mr. George Herrold, St. Paul: Would not the area requirements in the zoning ordinance determine that matter in the very beginning? Is there any good reason for violating the area requirements of single-family residential districts?

Mr. Howard: I do not think the area requirements should be changed, but usually these requests are for greater density of population on an area than the ordinance now allows. A number of applications have come before the Milwaukee County Board of Zoning Appeals for changes. The applicants are not allowed to make these changes, and I think rightfully, until all other means have been exhausted. When an area is ripe for change it should be considered on that basis only, not on the basis of the expediency of the moment.

Mr. Epstein, New York: Is it not true that the largest number of available rooms for war workers will be found in Class A district?

Mr. Hall: Where the need is simply for rooms, there ought to be no difficulty for arranging for temporary permits. Most zoning ordinances permit a certain maximum number of rooms and boarders in the single-family districts. The real difficulty for zoners comes up when a structural alteration is wanted which it would be difficult to terminate after the war. After it is converted, the difficulty is to turn it back. Taking care of single roomers should not offer a problem to zoning authorities.

Mr. Horwitz, Duluth: Would it be helpful to give wide publicity to those areas in which multiple families are permitted so as to lead people there to think about converting their homes into multiple-family occupancy, which they could do within the ordinance provisions, thereby limiting the changes in the more highly restricted districts?

Mr. Kingery: Indications are that all of those who deal in zoning in their own communities know that many sections of the city or village are now available for two or more families per lot without the necessity of breaking the carefully drawn zoning ordinance with respect to single-family dwelling areas.

Mr. Waterfield, Fort Wayne: I have the highest regard for what the experts have said but want to call attention to the fact that my question has not been answered. I asked if the conversion of a single-family residence in an A district into two-family residences would not be an injury to the other single-family residences in that district.

Mr. Hall: Undoubtedly, you are quite right. We are not any of us in doubt that these various changes are harmful, but so also, unfortunately, are many results of the war. Most of our cities already have plenty of

land zoned for the multi-family use for which demands have come up. The possibilities in those zones should be exhausted before any harmful changes are allowed to take place, particularly in an A district.

Mr. Kingery: The answer is, harm is done to the surrounding single-family residence.

Mr. O'Bannon, Corydon, Indiana: Do those who are in charge of these forums know the extent of the zoning areas and are they satisfied with them? Is there any possibility or inclination to enlarge them? I live within thirty miles of Charlestown, Indiana, and the zoning area does not come close to my town.

Mr. Picton, Indianapolis: The town of Charlestown has a planning commission and has adopted an interim zoning ordinance but as yet no final zoning ordinance has been passed. Clarke County has adopted an interim zoning ordinance, but none of the other counties adjacent have evidenced any interest in or desire for such control.

Mr. Kingery: Your county, Harrison, and your city, Corydon, Mr. O'Bannon, have full authority to develop their own zoning ordinances and subdivision control, and we would suggest that you get busy and do so.

Mr. Pesman, Denver: Has any locality used the "roadside service zoning" that the American Automobile Association has advocated, and has its legality been tested? Such zoning differs from regular business zoning in that it would set aside a district along a highway especially for the service of the traveling public. It would take in filling stations, cottage camps, some repair shops for the use of the traveling public.

Mr. Kingery: The counties surrounding Chicago under the Illinois statute authorizing counties to zone have set up provisions for accommodating trailer camps in accordance with the rule that no more than one cabin or trailer unit may occupy less than 1,000 square feet of land. Some of them require 1,500 square feet. The State of Illinois through its Department of Health inspects and rates all of these camps. In many other States there is only county-wide zoning. Wisconsin has a special law providing for county-wide and township zoning as well. In Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin, we know of no zoning authority such as you describe.

Mr. Pesman: We have adopted a zoning resolution in the county of El Paso, Colorado, and we are ready for the test, so you might watch us on that particular phase. Has anyone tried to distinguish between two types of agricultural zoning and land-use zoning, namely the distinction between grazing on one side, in which case the land would not be broken up, and horticulture on the other side, where the land would be plowed?

Mr. Kingery: This is pretty much a prairie or plains country of which you speak and these experts are principally municipal zoning authorities. May we defer consideration of your questions?

Mr. Tom Wallace, Louisville: Does Mr. Ameter think it proper, in

view of the difficulty of getting materials and labor, that a person would invest in remodeling a single-family into a two-family home now unless he expected that after the war he could continue to use that investment by getting the temporary provision in his permit annulled?

Mr. Ameter: The regulations allowing him only a temporary permit would discourage application for conversion into two-family houses. Mr. Kingery said, "It is apparent the applicant in some cases is trying to get by with something that will be permanent instead of temporary."

Mr. Wallace: If he made a considerable investment, would it not be with the hope that it would be possible after the war to have a permanent permit?

Mr. Kingery: Very definitely, he does expect to get away with it permanently in most cases.

Mr. K. A. Reid, Chicago (referring again to Mr. Pesman's question about land zoning): In the State of Wisconsin within the last few years a similar problem, not directly concerned with grazing versus agriculture but with agriculture versus forestry, has been solved by zoning. It was brought to a crisis by a case where one isolated family required the county to keep up some three miles of road. The school law required them to supply school facilities; so the elder daughter of the family was the school teacher. The father ran the school bus, and the entire class was the school children of the same family. That, obviously, was poor land management and was extremely costly, so it was much cheaper for the State and county to buy up this land and to put it back in timber and recreational uses, saving the taxpayers' money. There is a very definite need now for classifying land as grazing land and agricultural land. The Soil Conservation Service is trying to do this.

Current Housing Problems

EXPERTS:

JOHN W. FERREE, M.D., Commissioner of Health, Indiana State Board of Health; KENNETH PARMELEE, Executive Director, Gary Housing Authority.

Mr. Kingery: Introducing the topic, we of course agree that it is not possible to cover the subject of housing in thirty or forty minutes. However, problems have undoubtedly arisen in some of your communities which can be put in the form of direct questions and which can be treated adequately so long as our allotment of time will permit. If any of you ask a question that must finally be answered by the National Housing Agency, it may be referred to a representative of that agency, if present.

Mr. Bartel, Muncie: Could the zoning board control the class, type, and price of houses in a subdivision outside of but adjacent to a city in order to prevent slums and bad housing conditions?

Mr. Parmelee: I am not entirely sure of the correct answer. If possible, yes, it should take jurisdiction.

Mr. Kingery: The question is, could the local zoning board of Muncie exercise control over the density and use of land adjacent to the city by zoning, and exercise a control over the price of the building? The answer to the last question is no. No zoning authority has ever been given legal authority to regulate the cost of building, so far as I know. In several different States certain limited zoning authority is given beyond the city limits but it is usually a "back-hand" authority. The Illinois law, in granting counties power to zone, granted the cities at the same time the right to protest against any undesirable zoning within one and a half miles of the city, in which case the original zoning or any amendment could not be passed by the board of county commissioners or supervisors except by a three-fourths favorable vote.

Mr. Parmelee: Indiana gives cities jurisdiction five miles beyond the city limits.

Professor Lommel and Mr. Hays, Fort Wayne: No.

Mr. J. R. Hays, Oxford, Indiana: There is no law which allows the city to exercise zoning control over any area outside. However, we have a county zoning law which does give county boards authority to do that.

Mr. W. P. Cottingham, Gary: The city planning commission's control is only over the platting of land and not over its use.

Mrs. Grace Evans, Terre Haute: I would like to find out how to go about getting a housing project, so that we can get rid of the rat holes and slums in which the Negroes of Terre Haute are living. We need a housing project.

Mr. Parmelee: The first step is to establish a housing authority. Indiana requires a resolution by the governing board of your city to make a determination of the need to bring a housing authority into existence. Your council must make a determination that there are slums in your community and not sufficient houses which are safe and sanitary for all persons. With the adoption of the resolution the mayor appoints five persons as members of the housing board, which then has full authority to proceed with the construction of homes.

Mr. Horwitz, Duluth: How satisfactory a substitute for sewer mains are septic tanks for houses on the edge of the city?

Dr. Ferree: The Indiana State Board of Health feels that housing outside the cities at the present time should be hooked up to some sort of unified sewerage system, not individual septic tank systems. Our approval on FHA homes from now on, for example, is going to require a centralized system rather than individual septic tanks.

Mrs. Beulah Lingle, Martinsville, Indiana: While it seems we are in danger of backward steps with regard to zoning in Class A districts, might we at this time make a forward step at the next meeting of our state legislature by unifying the situation through legislation that would make the solution to these problems the same for all smaller towns throughout the State? Sometimes in the smaller towns the ad-

ministration for various reasons does not handle the local zoning problems at all well.

Mr. Kingery: It is impossible to write into statutes the precise action for the board of appeals for each city or town to follow in making its decisions. The general custom is that the board of appeals makes findings of facts and then makes its decision, based on its findings of facts. On its knowledge of the facts depends its judgment in the question.

Mr. R. O. Koenig, Saginaw: Are trailer camps or cantonments better for single men and for families as a defense housing measure?

Dr. Ferree: We can safely say that had the cantonment plan been used from the beginning and been required as a development of defense areas, we would have been saved a great deal of trouble and would have had a much cheaper solution to the problem that has been created. The chief reason is that the barracks or similar quarters would have adequately taken care of both the construction employees and later the single employees among the operating forces that come to these plants.

Mr. Koenig: My question was about the mobility of these plans. There will be considerable mobility of housing after the emergency is over. Is it going to be cheaper to build and get rid of a cantonment camp than a trailer camp?

Dr. Ferree: No doubt it would be cheaper both to build and to demolish the cantonment type of construction. I am thinking of the social factors as well as some of the purely materialistic considerations when I say that.

Mr. Kingery: Does not someone have a question about the operation of Indiana housing authorities?

Mr. F. W. Keller, South Bend: What is the attitude toward building additional housing developments now through the United States Housing Authority?

Mr. Parmelee: There are at present no more funds with which to build any type of housing except defense housing. Federal money for slum clearance work has completely run out. Whatever the attitude may be in the future is in the hands of Congress.

Mrs. Evans: Will there be a possibility of getting assistance from the housing authority at Washington to help clear slum districts in Terre Haute? If Terre Haute should become a war area, what would be done with the colored people who would come there? I am quite sure it will be impossible for the Terre Haute authority to build a housing project such as you have in Indianapolis, Louisville, and Cincinnati. Does this mean we cannot get any assistance from Washington to provide better housing conditions for the colored people?

Mr. Kingery: Are you requesting Federal assistance?

Mrs. Evans: I want to know whether we can get Federal assistance and how.

Mr. Parmelee: At present the only funds available for housing are in the sites defined as defense areas. Funds would be allocated in Terre Haute only if the Federal agency is willing to assign them to your community for the period of the emergency and for war emergency housing only. Otherwise any relief will have to wait until after the war emergency is past. However, you do have within your own community the power to eliminate bad conditions in housing for your city authorities are willing to take such action.

Mr. Kingery: Is it possible for the Terre Haute housing authority to apply for housing projects, loans and grants?

Mr. Parmelee: No. The board of health and fire marshall, however, might condemn buildings and make owners bring them up to a certain standard. This is a local matter which must be handled between the owner of the house and the city government.

Mrs. Evans: Is there no form of Federal assistance toward proper housing of the Negroes in Terre Haute?

Mr. Parmelee: All Federal housing activity has completely ceased until the war emergency is over, except in connection with furnishing wartime housing in areas specifically classified as "defense areas" and where housing shortages are acute.

Mr. Kingery: Apparently no financial grants are available to meet your problem, Mrs. Evans, until new appropriations are made by Congress, and until that time it is a matter for city officials or private builders to meet within the current regulations as to priority of materials.

Dr. Ferree: As a planning conference, we are facing one of our most important public health problems in connection with housing. I am thinking not only of physical health but of the mental and social health of communities. That point has not been brought out here. I think it is something that bears considerable study by all of us if we are to answer many of the health questions in connection with housing. Public health officials all over the country are taking a much more active interest in housing problems than in the past. We hope that the health officials will take the lead in going ahead with housing problems and get these slums cleared up. The question resolves itself into whether we are willing to spend our money for some constructive material things such as good homes or whether we are going to spend it for lost social and health values, in criminal records and poor health. It seems to me that it would be much cheaper to take preventive action by building proper houses.

Abatement of Stream Pollution and Other Public Health Measures

Experts:

C. W. KLASSEN, Chief Sanitary Engineer, Illinois Department of Public Health; KENNETH A. REID, Executive Secretary, Izaak Walton League of America; DR. BURTON D. MYERS, Dean Emeritus, Indiana University Medical School.

Mr. Kingery: This subject has of course many facets but we want again to try to have specific, direct questions asked. As a public health

measure the pollution of streams must be ended. While this does not generally come under the heading of planning, we think it is a neglected item that should be elevated in importance. In many parts of the country the official planners are doing substantial work in this respect. One question has already been submitted: Has any State been successful in compelling a large industry to install facilities for treating its industrial waste?

Mr. Klassen: Yes, a number of States have been successful in compelling large industries to treat their wastes before emptying them into streams—not necessarily by taking legal action in the courts, but in a number of instances by having in the background the legal authority to take such action.

Mr. Kingery: Has there been any case where such legal authority of the State has been confirmed by a high court?

Mr. Klassen: We had one case in Illinois where we took a case into court. The case was actually called by the judge but the attorney called for a recess and settled out of court.

Mr. Kingery asked Dr. Myers if he had located any cases of this nature since he had been searching the record.

Dr. Myers: I tried to locate a case that had gone to court and had been taken up as a direct result of court action but I have not been able to find any such case. I referred this question to the engineer of the State Board of Health, Mr. Poole, and he could not locate such a case. Of course, we have obtained coöperation, and undoubtedly, as Mr. Klassen has said, this was because in the background there was a possibility of court procedure.

Mr. Kingery asked Mr. Klassen to describe briefly such a case in Peoria, Illinois.

Mr. Klassen: One of the outstanding cases of industries abating pollution and at the same time recovering a valuable by-product was at the Hiram Walker distilleries in Peoria. On the basis of action by the sanitary water board, this company instigated a research program which resulted in the development of a process for recovering distillery wastes and converting them into a cattle food. This was done at a very handsome profit. There is a definite financial consideration and also legal consideration in industrial-waste pollution cases. Industries do not desire to get into court over a case of stream pollution because experience has shown that if pollution does exist and the case is well presented, the complainant usually recovers. Also, if the State takes action against an industry and establishes the fact that pollution exists, there is always the possibility then of action by many downstream owners against that industry. Therefore the policy of industry in general is to avoid court and state stream-pollution-agency action.

Mr. Wallace: In what States has there been an appreciable statewide diminution of pollution through enforcement of state legislation?

Mr. Reid: State legislation has done a very good job in Illinois, but generally it has made little progress in real pollution abatement. In abatement in municipal sewage, yes; but in industrial waste correction, it has hardly scratched the surface for reasons that are obvious. I came from Pennsylvania originally, and I have often said it is rather a distinction to come from the worst polluted State in the Union. We worked very hard for ten years to get certain anti-pollution laws. We have a good one now—one of the best if not the best of any State. Does it operate? No. The same argument that licked us for eight years out of those ten years has licked the enforcement of that bill. It is claimed that to enforce this statute against industries would put them at a competitive disadvantage, forcing them to move into neighboring States and leave all their employees on relief.

Mr. Wallace: Do you have a list of States in which state legislation and its enforcement have appreciably reduced pollution on a state-wide basis?

Mr. Reid: Oklahoma has been the most successful in reducing oil pollution. This has been done by the threat of damage suits of downstream owners. The salt brines were put back into the earth and new wells were drilled to let the brine run back into the subsoil rather than into the surface waters. Coöperation has only been effected after the industries realized that they would otherwise get into a law suit.

Mr. Parmelee: Has every consideration been given to Federal legislation, and if so does it seem advisable to Mr. Reid?

Mr. Reid: Very definitely yes. The Izaak Walton League led the fight starting in December 1934 for a Federal act which provided for uniform control on a nation-wide basis to provide that uniformity so essential to control pollution effectively. Within two months after we had introduced that bill in 1936 there were seven other bills introduced into Congress under the title of anti-pollution bills, and every one of them provided for further study and research, but no actual control was given to any agency. These were flank attacks backed by the United States Chamber of Commerce and National Manufacturers Association. We finally had a showdown last year and in order to get some results we agreed to drop our bill and support the Barkley bill on the condition that the sponsors of that bill and the House Rivers and Harbors Committee would accept one little amendment providing that pollution should not cross state lines. This amendment would prevent new industries such as are bothering us right now from adding to the pollution load. Immediately that was adopted and passed by the House, all of the political and industrial organizations that had been supporting the Barkley bill sent out appeals to oppose it. There is no time when it is more vitally important that we have control of pollution than under present conditions, when new industries are adding to the pollution load and other industries are seizing on the emergency as a pretext for doing

nothing about their wastes; but I doubt if we can make any headway under present conditions.

Mr. Kingery: Does some other question arise as to the outlying areas beyond city limits, such as the installation of sewer systems and perhaps emptying those into small streams without treatment? Many outlying areas have this problem. This is different from the septic tank problem.

Mr. Klassen: The problem of sewerage collection and disposal in unincorporated areas usually centers around getting subdividers to install sewer systems and sewage treatment rather than utilizing individual units on each lot. The problems which present themselves in providing a centralized sewer system are (1) legal financing of such units, and (2) placing the responsibility for proper operation. Among the many types of permissible legislation in connection with sanitation in Illinois is a law which allows an unincorporated area to form what is known as a sanitary district which has for its sole purpose the construction of sewers and a sewage treatment works. This definitely legalizes the financing and places responsibility for operation. The State Sanitary Water Board requires a permit for all sewerage facilities which will serve fifteen persons or more and this allows the Board to "get into the picture" in advance of large problems. If a subdivider desires to install a sewer system, that system must be designed in accordance with good engineering practice, approved and inspected by the State with the idea that either a treatment plant be constructed or the sewage be discharged into a nearby sewer system. By having this one provision in our law, it immediately places some restrictions on the type of equipment used; also the bonding attorneys in Illinois, in reviewing the financial procedure immediately look to see whether a state permit has been issued. Financing is not in order without the permit. This is one of the really effective means we have had to prevent trouble in unincorporated areas.

Mr. Kingery: Dr. Myers, do you have any questions or comments on this subject?

Dr. Myers: I have no question, but I do have an attitude of optimism about this matter. Our topic is really pollution abatement. Abatement does not mean elimination. To eliminate pollution is next to impossible, but I do believe that the idea that sewage must not menace your neighbors downstream is gaining among the people and even in the government. We have down here in Charlestown the Dupont plant, and they, at the expense of many thousands of dollars, are treating their sewage so that when it goes into the stream the menace is very greatly reduced, and that is a growing situation. We have a conflict here: sewage goes into the stream. On one hand we do not want pollution; on the other hand, where else are you going to turn the sewage? (We cannot, as in Oklahoma, stick it all back in the ground.) Before the sewage reaches the lake or stream we have a right to demand that it be treated in such

manner that its menace to people shall be reduced to a minimum.

Mr. William Anderson, Missouri: Mr. Reid, has any standard been set for the condition of water above which it is safe for fish and wild life? We have made a very thorough study in Missouri and have been unable to find such a standard.

Mr. Reid: That standard varies according to the type of fish. I think the best answer is found in the publication of the United States Bureau of Fish and Wildlife. Carp and a few fish of that sort will take a greater load of pollution than will small mouth bass.

Mr. Picton: Could we hear from Mr. Poole or Dr. Ferree as to health measures in Indiana and whether they are as strong as they are in Illinois?

Mr. Poole: Indiana laws are quite similar to the Illinois laws. We are behind in Indiana and I think most of the other States are behind on industrial waste pollution. Over 75 percent of domestic sewage in Indiana is now being treated. More than that is being treated in Ohio, Michigan, Illinois and Wisconsin. It runs from 75 to 85 percent in those five States. That is some accomplishment.

Mr. Reid: When you say treated, do you mean complete treatment or primary treatment?

Mr. Poole: Adequate treatment, I think, depends upon type for necessity for treatment.

Mr. Reid: When we analyzed the Wisconsin report, the picture was not so rosy as shown in that report. It is true in all of those States that a small percentage of this 75 to 85 percent is going through old treatment plants, which we consider primary treatment only.

Mr. Poole: By and large that is not the case, however, because most of our sewage plants have been built by Public Works Administration since 1937 and are not obsolete plants. The majority of those plants will have adequate treatment.

Parks and Playgrounds—Roadside Improvement

Experts:

MRS. T. EUGENE BAILEY, President, Indiana Roadside Council, Inc.; PHILIP H. ELWOOD, Head, Department of Landscape Architecture, Iowa State College, Ames; S. HERBERT HARE, Landscape Architect, Kansas City, Missouri.

Mr. Kingery: Introducing the subject, let us adopt the basic principle that parks and playgrounds in municipalities are important to the community life because they provide open space and living trees and grass in an environment predominating with pavement and masonry buildings. Not only is there an esthetic value, but frequently there is an actual return on investment by reduction in other municipal problems. During the past decade much improvement has been made in the appearance of our state highways. Some have asked if those expenditures for trees, landscape type of grading, and efforts to control outdoor advertising are worthwhile.

Mr. Werner Ruchti, Los Angeles: In Los Angeles we are securing through dedication by subdividers some neighborhood recreation areas ranging between ten and fifteen acres in size. (1) Who should finance the development and maintenance of such an area—a local community and local area immediately surrounding, or the district as a whole? (2) What radius of territory reasonably should that playground serve, assuming the territory to be built up with single-family homes and possibly duplexes?

Mr. Hare: To treat that large question adequately will take some time. I think such dedications should be in accord with a master plan and should be a part of a park system, either county, city, or otherwise. Development should be financed through public funds of such county or city, either by appropriation or by assessment. If it is a small playground it should serve approximately a one-half-mile radius. However, if it is a playfield, with facilities such as baseball, it might serve a radius of one mile. A neighborhood park should be within approximately a mile of any person served. It is seldom you get a dedication for an area with a specific label on it.

Mr. Kingery: Any agency that requires in its subdivision regulations the dedication of tracts of land for parks or playgrounds should have a plan for the improvement and maintenance of the land, not only a physical plan but also a financial plan. The communities that ask subdividers to give land should have an appropriate scheme for using it after its dedication.

Mr. Koenig: In the case of newly established recreational areas for defense workers or enlarged areas for defense workers, what proportion of the expenditures planned for this area should be put in the class of recreation? What proportion of defense recreational areas should be devoted to passive recreation?

Mr. Elwood: This depends on several factors: (1) What is the defense area? (2) What is the age of the defense workers? (3) What are the types of facilities available?

Mr. Koenig: We want to provide facilities for these workers. Let us assume the area is made of the average kind of families that make up an area.

Mr. Elwood: I would say offhand that not more than one-fourth of the area should be devoted to passive recreation. Passive recreation requires larger areas in proportion to the number of people that can be accommodated. To put it on the basis of exact proportions is rather a difficult question to answer without exact knowledge of conditions. I would hesitate to specify definitely a fixed percentage. Perhaps Mr. Hare can step out more boldly and less timidly than I, and be more specific.

Mr. Hare: I do not believe it can be answered more precisely. You might take the general theory that 10 percent of the land area should be

devoted to parks and playgrounds. Much of the design depends on the nature of the project, density of use, and class of recreation involved.

Mr. Kingery: This question has been handed in: Does someone know of any specific instance where juvenile or other delinquency has been reduced by the introduction of parks and playgrounds in a city? I shall tell my own story about the city of Joliet. Juvenile delinquency in certain parts of the city was higher than in other sections. Two playgrounds, one of two acres and the other of about one and one-half acres, were established in those areas, which were adjacent to one another. After three years of operation of these play areas the police records in each of the areas were compared with the police records of the three preceding years. In the first district during the three years immediately before the establishment of the playground, delinquent cases had totaled 29 children; during the next three years there were 17, a 40 percent reduction. In the nearby area, whereas the first three years of delinquency records showed 35 cases, the number increased to 38 in the three years after the playground was established. Altogether there was a substantial reduction from 64 to 55, which the park authorities believed attributable to the introduction and operation of the playground facilities.

Mrs. Richard Lieber, Indianapolis: We here in Indianapolis could repeat what Mr. Kingery just cited. Until we have our children out of the streets and alleys, especially those children in the poorer homes, where there are no yards as evidenced in the Negro district, and supply them with playgrounds, we will not get rid of delinquency. We have found in Indianapolis that ever since the seventh of December our delinquency has increased very definitely, and we have found that the delinquents come largely but not exclusively from those districts where there is no playground and where the housing is very poor. Many of our women are now employed in the war munitions factories and their children are without supervision. Our schools, which are used only part of the time, might well provide continuous service for those children who are not supervised at home. Unless these boys and girls belong to Scout troops or similar groups, they should be compelled to attend continuous schools or be provided with some recreation facilities or we will never be rid of our problem of delinquents.

Mr. Elwood: I think we generally agree that playgrounds do reduce delinquency. We have not kept many records here but in England records have been kept for over a period of thirty years and it has been found that delinquency has been reduced by at least 50 percent in some cases. Also, the health of young people has been improved.

Mr. F. W. Knapp, Topeka: How general is it for boards of education to maintain supervised playgrounds during the summer season as we do in Topeka?

Mr. Hare: We do not have any statistics. The general answer is that

there is not nearly enough coöperation throughout the country between the school board and the park department. There is very often a cooperative arrangement with the park department whereby the school playground is supervised during the summer season. We do lack playground space and the school grounds very often supply that need.

Mr. Oris Parker, South Bend: St. Joseph County has a county planning commission. The planning commission reviews all new subdivision plats. On one plat of approximately eighty acres which is being platted into residential lots, about five acres are offered to be dedicated to the public as a playground. The planning commission has no major county plan for playground facilities. What should be the attitude of the commission on the acceptance of this plat?

Mr. Hare: Without a master plan I think the planning commission would have to use its own sound judgment as to whether or not such a park site would fit into such a plan, and whether the five acres can reasonably be expected to be useful. You should not let any good ground get away.

Mr. C. E. Arnt, Michigan City: I would like some explanation of the Joliet delinquency experience. As a general proposition playgrounds do reduce delinquency—you state delinquency increased; why?

Mr. Kingery: In the area served by the two-acre park delinquency did decrease. In the area served by the one and one-half acre park it increased. Records do not show why. Over a long period of years it might show differently. The two areas combined did show a reduction.

Mr. Arnt: We are advocating playgrounds with the idea of reducing delinquency. You positively state that one playground area increased delinquency. We must know the reason.

Mr. Kingery: The playground itself probably did not cause the increase in delinquency in one of the two areas, and the short recorded experience may not be long enough to give an accurate picture.

Mr. A. B. Horwitz, Duluth, Minnesota: Some two years ago we made a city-wide study of the effect of playgrounds in Duluth and among other things we developed a score card system by which we rated each playground as to its serviceability. In developing this score card study we gave 60 points for the quality of leadership and 40 to 50 points to the physical area itself.

Mr. Kingery: Therefore it is not merely the acreage of park land but the use to which it is put and the leadership that determines the good or bad results?

Mr. Horwitz: Yes, results depend on leadership. There may be the gangster type of boy or girl, who without some guidance can make the play area a bad influence rather than a good one.

Mr. Kingery: Mrs. Bailey, is there any good engineering basis for the grading and sodding of roadsides and the introduction of trees and shrubs along highways?

Mrs. Bailey: Seventy percent of the modern right-of-way must be held in place by vegetable cover on the shoulders, the banks of the ditches and the area near the fences. Sodding has the advantage of giving needed protection. It is the most expensive of such operations. Regular seeding and other planting operations assist in the erosion control, definitely reducing the cost of maintaining the roadside. If the roadside is not seeded or planted, the soil washes away and must be replaced, and the cost of replacing the soil is three times the original cost. Thus the economy of immediate protection is obvious. In one specific case on U. S. 14 near Huntington the state highway engineers state that for a cost of $1787 a condition was corrected by landscaping and sodding which had cost more than $10,000 in maintenance cost. Roadside improvement of this sound character is merely planning to reduce future costs by good initial design. Maintenance cost per mile in Indiana state highways has decreased since 1933 largely through this kind of roadside protection in spite of higher standards of maintenance and additional services demanded by the public.

Mr. Henry Schnitzius, Landscape Engineer, Indiana Highway Commission: The citizens of Indiana recognize there is a definite economy in certain phases of our work. More or less decorative phases will be at a minimum as long as the emergency exists, but we are setting our plans to go ahead after the emergency is over.

Mr. Kingery: Another question which has been handed us is this: Why is it that cities and villages should provide their people with their own municipal park land adjacent to or close to large county or state parks and why should not the state park fulfill all the park needs of such an area? Regarding this question, no one is more qualified to reply than Colonel Lieber, founder of the state park programs throughout our country and originator of the Indiana system.

Colonel Richard Lieber, Indianapolis: Emphatically no! Neither the state parks nor the large county preserves can possibly serve municipalities with their recreation facilities. State parks are large tracts for conservation of special scenic features, and are not to be filled with ball diamonds, playground apparatus and the like, which are needed within the cities.

Mr. Kingery: On the matter of municipal parks may we have a question?

Mrs. Lingle: Before the matter is closed, I would like to hear some comment on the possible effect of gas rationing on roadside advertising.

Mr. Kingery: This may be a purely hypothetical question and one that cannot be answered at this time. However, Mr. Elwood seems to want to take a shot at it.

Mr. Elwood: This gas rationing may be the greatest blessing in disguise this country has ever seen.

PROVIDING FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE OF AVIATION

EXPERTS:

WILLIAM ANDERSON, Engineer, State Planning Board of Missouri;
WILLIAM C. KNOEPFLE, Assistant Airport Engineer, Civil Aeronautics Administration

Mr. Kingery: Many of us believe that aviation is still in its infancy, that in numbers of pilots and air passengers, and in volume of air mail, express, and freight, the future will show tremendous increases. Certainly there are things to do about it. Planning commissions, municipal, county, and state officials need to have tangible advice as to their obligations.

Mr. Lawrence M. Orton, New York: As to the possibilities of mass handling of both freight and passengers: pilots will be available, but are the technicians able at this time to foresee the possibilty of handling such mass transportation by the air lines in safety?

Mr. Knoepfle: I believe they are. Just as unforeseen situations have developed in other times, there will be things that will have to be overcome. One of the big problems to be met is the establishment of a large number of airports. We are producing the planes, engines, mechanics and pilots. When the war is over these people will be available. The problem then will be to develop the airports. These will not be small landing fields with which we are acquainted but they will be larger airports capable of handling the large planes that will be used to carry freight.

Mr. Orton: I had intended to refer also to the mass operation of private planes.

Mr. Knoepfle: That problem has not faced us so much in the past but we can see that it is going to in the future. The time will come when private flying must be entirely segregated from transport flying. That will be necessary for many reasons. You cannot develop a large number of mile-square airports; it is just too expensive to expect such large airports at all the places where people might use them. The development of a few major airports and a much greater number of smaller airports to serve private flying seems to be the answer.

Mr. Kingery: Will transports and private flyers have to fly at different elevations?

Mr. Knoepfle: Yes, that is true now. Since last fall there has been a separation of all flying. Generally speaking, private flyers are allowed to fly up to 3500 feet; above 3500 feet is for air liners and military planes. The country is crossed by a series of airways provided with emergency landing fields and air navigation facilities. On those airways the traffic is restricted to certain elevations. On the airways the north and eastbound traffic will fly at the 1000, 3000, and 5000-foot levels, while south and westbound traffic will fly at the 2000 and 6000-foot levels.

Mr. G. F. Emery, Detroit: I am making a serious study of airports for Detroit. What will be the proper size of airports in view of present and

future requirements? How many airports will be needed, or even more important, how large will they need to be? Will the increase in air travel require larger fields than we can conceive of now? What will be the future adequacy of the sizes now required?

Mr. Anderson: You need first to determine what kinds of service you want to provide. In addition to ground space for major transport lines there is going to be a bigger need for airports to serve feeder lines. Already in Missouri a number of organizations have incorporated feeder air lines and have received certificates of convenience and necessity. The smaller feeder lines will not require such large planes. It is important to have a state-wide or region-wide plan to determine which ports should provide for major transport services and which should provide for feeder service and air mail pickup service. The standard we have used for the larger fields has been the Class 4, which requires runway lengths of 4500 feet with a possible expansion. In addition to Class 4 in the larger communities we have also suggested several smaller sized fields for private flying. The way we have approached this is to suggest the maximum size of field that can be ultimately expected. We have suggested that the entire area be tied up by purchase or option and only the portion of the field be developed which is justified at this time or which can be financed.

Mr. Knoepfle: This job of determining the precise sizes of airports is one of the nost difficult that the Civil Aeronautics Administration faces. Back about ten or twelve years ago the city of Chicago had 160 acres and at that time the city felt that was a pretty fair airport. Now it has approximately one square mile, or 600 acres, developed to full Class 4 runway lengths and a dual system of runways to accommodate take-offs and landings in each direction, and we feel that this size of airport is going to be about the maximum. This is because when you get an airport with two runways in each direction, the air space above the airport becomes the controlling factor rather than the ground space, especially in instrument weather conditions. In clear or contact weather it is not so essential, but when conditions are cloudy, then it is necessary that the pilot depend upon instruments, and the planes must be kept separate in landings and take-offs so that there is no danger of collision. That fact is definitely limiting the size of the larger fields and we feel the solution will be the establishment of more large airports adequately separated from each other, rather than expanding one airport to two or three times its size. Military flying is a field by itself, and has developed fields with runways 10,000 feet long. The bulk of the flying public is not going to use Class 4 fields but is going to be satisfied with the smaller field of about 160 acres, which may not be paved. Smaller users prefer sod surface, which is easier on tires.

Mr. Kingery: The Regional Planning Association, the Chicago Plan Commission, and the Chicago Association of Commerce have developed

a tentative plan for 12 large airports in the 50-mile radius around Chicago, each a Class 4 or larger size; 30 additional medium-sized secondary airports, with 2500-foot runways or less, and 30 additional minor airports, principally for private flying, 160 acres or less in area. Our plan now being carried forward contemplates 72 airports as described, all adequately separated.

Mr. Emery: The Civil Aeronautics Administration's book of standards calls for Class 4 airports to be one square mile in area, providing minimum 4500-foot-long runways. The statement is made in that book that the most important requirement in any airport is that it be capable of expansion. I find it difficult to reconcile that statement with Mr. Knoepfle's statement that one square mile will meet their requirement.

Mr. Knoepfle: The usual plan in any city developing an airport is that a certain piece of land should be acquired. Say the city is financially able to acquire one square mile. The initial development will be 160 acres; then when the times demand it and the money is available for a larger airport, the original site can be expanded to a Class 4 size, one square mile in area. We do not at this time contemplate expanding Class 4 airports. We feel that is about as large as one airport need be. But if we had to choose between two pieces of land each a mile square, one bounded by minor highways or unrestricted, and one bounded by major highways and railroad tracks, we would always take the one with the minor highways to be safe.

Mr. Hugh R. Pomeroy, Richmond: When we look back to the first major highways which were built after the auto began to replace the horse, and then look at the Pennsylvania Turnpike we realize the development the auto has caused. With all the foresight we can exercise we are probably going to be caught short. In the Richmond, Virginia, metropolitan area we are collaborating in a quickly developed regional plan in which we are proposing air terminals of the dual runway type. We are also proposing air terminals of not more than ten minutes' distance from the city. I am wondering beyond that whether we may not possibly look for some facility to be provided by the flight strip along thoroughfares. Can we be informed whether the flight strip idea might be expected to supplement the big airports?

Mr. Anderson: The current Federal highway appropriation contains provisions for 10 million dollars for flight strips. We do not think the flight strips should be located to compete with a possible future airport. We are anticipating that after the war there will be considerable private flying and most of these private planes will be small and will have to sit down frequently. Thus the "flight strips" near highways, we think, provide a suitable solution for emergency fields where the local community cannot finance the usual airport.

Mr. Knoepfle: I would like to agree with the idea of flight strips as supplementing airports, but the very name of flight strip would indicate

it is longer than wide. We still must land and take off into the wind. The usability of flight strips is practically zero for the light planes, particularly with a cross wind.

Mr. Pomeroy: A flight strip in each of two directions near a highway intersection might meet the problem in part.

Mr. Anderson: Two flight strips would then constitute a small airport.

Dr. Myers: We read about army planes that will carry fifty men with full equipment. Is it not possible that type of plane will be very common in a few years? Will this Class 4 field accommodate such planes?

Mr. Knoepfle: I do not know. The answer to this is almost as much a matter of economics as of aeronautics. You perhaps have seen pictures of the B–19 bomber, the largest plane built to date. Under certain operating conditions such a plane will take off in somewhat less distance than our standard airplanes. This resolves itself into a question of horsepower. There must be a larger horsepower to take off such a large plane, and as the ratio is greater, it will take off in shorter distances.

Mr. Emery: I would like to report our conclusions from studying the Detroit airport situation. We have recommended new airports for major transport service; the land required is 4 square miles in area, reserving a central square mile for a Class 4 airport and a half mile space outside that for future expansion. The space for residence areas beyond the airport would be controlled by approach zoning. Most airports are too small and inadequate, and it is impossible to expand them because of other developments which crowd them closely.

Mr. Anderson: I would like to comment on airport zoning. I think that is the answer to the future expansion of airports. Zoning is being advocated around airports, and I am wondering if that would not be classified as piecemeal zoning. A number of States have provisions for county zoning, and it seems a suitable zoning ordinance could be drawn to protect the area surrounding airports; and at such time in the future as it was necessary to expand that airport, there would be come control that would prevent the erection of a lot of expensive buildings.

Mr. Knoepfle: I believe a 4-square-mile area is very desirable; however, it again becomes a question of economics, especially near the large population centers. Where can you buy an area of 4 square miles at a cost that is not out of reason? We have gone along somewhat on the idea of getting a piece of land and then developing an airport in the center. We have done that with most small airports. We advocate getting 1 square mile and using the middle 160 acres for the initial development, so as to have full control of approach areas.

Mr. Ameter: What do they propose to do with the land around airports? Owners cannot pay taxes on that land and not be able to use it.

Mr. Anderson: We have no airport zoning in Missouri, I believe. However, the idea of airport zoning as I understand it is to control height

only and not the use of property. The limitation of height prevents erecting structures such as silos, towers, high water tanks and the like close to airport boundaries.

Mr. Ameter: Would that limit the building to one-story structures?

Mr. Kingery: In Cook County, Illinois, the county zoning ordinance introduces the airport approach zoning with respect to heights of buildings only. Restrictions cover 5000 feet from the airport boundary and allow buildings 20 feet high plus 5 feet for each 100 feet of distance from the airports. No hardship is created for any of the owners of adjacent property.

Mr. Ameter: We have this problem: Residences have been built around the airport. The land is not really suitable for residential development because of the noise of planes and activity in the airport. The owner has to pay taxes. What is he going to do with the land?

Mr. Kingery: We have found near several airports around Chicago that good residential areas crowd right up to the airport; within a half mile of the boundary new buildings are being erected all the time. In Glenview the airport of the large United States Navy Air Base is being expanded to the municipal limits, and in spite of that new homes are being built right adjacent, costing 12 to 20 thousand dollars each.

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