


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**AMERICA'S AIMS
AND
ASIA'S ASPIRATIONS**





Photograph by Signal Corps, U. S. A.

Orlando

Lloyd-George

Clemenceau

Wilson

Col. Sir Maurice Hankey

Lt. Mantoux

PRESIDENT WILSON IN "THE ROOM OF THE FLIRT"


AMERICA'S AIMS
AND
ASIA'S ASPIRATIONS

BY

PATRICK GALLAGHER

Correspondent of "*The New York Herald*" at the
Conference of Paris, 1919

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TO
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

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He has a right to criticize who has a heart to help.

—ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

Men today are blessed with a new curiosity about their governments. Everywhere, they are demanding that the doors behind which secret policies have been incubated be thrown open and kept open henceforth. The doors that do not respond to the keys the people hold will be battered down.—WOODROW WILSON.

Secret negotiations, a piece of business privately carried to completion and made public only when finished, suited well with the President's temper and way of action. A man naturally secretive, naturally fond, not of concealments, but of quiet and subtile management, not insincere, but indirect in his ways of approach, he relished statecraft of this sort, and no doubt liked the . . . business all the better because it seemed to demand, in its very nature, a delicate and private handling. The Senate rejected the treaty by the very decisive vote of 16 to 35, men of both parties alike deeply irritated that the President should spring this weighty matter upon the country in such a fashion, taking no counsel beforehand, save such as he chose to take.—WOODROW WILSON'S criticism of President Tyler's secret diplomacy in the negotiation of the Texas annexation treaty (1844), from "A History of the American People," Vol. IV, p. 102.

If I could but tear off their masks, expose these people naked to the world, tell what impulses brought each one here; reveal the inner truth, the awakening desires, the intrigue, the low greed, the sterility of their minds, the poverty of their hearts! Ah!—GEORGES CLEMENCEAU in "The Strongest."

These were the results of the only organized method that civilized nations have ever attempted or established to settle disputes among each other. . . . Surely it is time that a saner plan for settling disputes between peoples should be established. . . . If we attempt it, the attempt will be a success.—DAVID LLOYD-GEORGE, seconding the motion to establish a League of Nations, Paris, January 25, 1919.

PREFACE

“AMERICA’S AIMS AND ASIA’S ASPIRATIONS” is an attempt to tell the most important story of our time in the spirit of our nation and in the everyday language of our people. The author believes that the will to be not merely just, but generous, is instinctive in Americans. To this high motive has been due our failures as well as our successful achievements in Asia. Our intentions have ever been honest. Americans don’t have to apologize for America.

Our position on the globe has cast us for the most important part in the meeting of East and West. Admitting all the errors that may be charged against us, our record sustains our geographical right to play that part, and it justifies the hope that, ultimately, we may play it well. We have neither selfish interest to serve nor any desire to arouse suspicion in Asia, either among any of the Asiatic peoples themselves or among European peoples whose presence and objects in Asia conform to the necessities and favorably react to the tests of modern civilization.

Such being the case, there is every reason to expect that American intelligence will survive the shocks of selfish and intemperate special pleading, however and wherever originating. Our friends—and they are universal—will assist us to overcome the wiles of those who would divorce from us the spouse of our national soul, the grateful spirit of Asia. All the Asiatic peoples are our friends. To the Japanese, the Chinese, and the Filipinos we have extended a generous, friendly, helping hand, and one cannot go all the way with all one’s friends unless each friend is willing to go all the way with the others. Friendship requires honorable concessions based upon justice and prudence.

Life in its simplest form is a complex thing. No man among the billions who have lived has succeeded in understanding himself. How much more difficult it is to understand others! And nations being man multiplied, sometimes by many millions, how vastly more difficult it must be to weigh and measure their varying and contradictory moods and tenses! How dangerous to attempt snap judgments even with the aid of an unbiased mind!

The problems of Asia reach down to the roots, ascend to the highest and most remote branches, and touch the tenderest fibers of our physical, our political, and our spiritual life. There is no species of knowledge or speculation that has not its root in the aged soil of Asia. From our belief in God to our facility in the manufacture and the employment of gunpowder, Asia has been the world's teacher. In the numbers of her people, their ingenuity, and their matchless industry, prudence will recognize a huge force that justice may utilize and injustice dare not, and cannot, destroy. Therefore are we fortunate in our unreserved, impartial Asiatic friendships, and thus comes the strongest impulse to conserve our Asiatic good-will, remembering always that neither individual man nor race among men can know the goal or the road marked out for us by the Maker of all the continents.

Sincere, unreserved friendship for Asia ought not to blind us against a proper sense of American needs or to poison our minds against any European people, even when their aims and views vis-à-vis Asia fail to measure up with American-Asiatic standards. There is always a happy mean between weak and ignoble assent and offensive, impertinent condemnation and, with all due deference to the covenant of Paris, mankind has yet to find a satisfactory, absolute standard of political right and wrong. A wholesome and prudent respect for the rights and the opinions of all other peoples and a healthy absence of hypocritical hectoring will add weight to our words, which can be frank and ought always to be friendly.

The map and statistics indicating actual sovereignty in Asia

and Oceania are not to be construed as forming a blanket indictment against European eminent domain in Asia and the Pacific. While the author has visited French and Dutch Asiatic possessions, he prefers to withhold expression of opinion regarding the character and tendencies of their administration until some future time when his knowledge of the French and Dutch East Indies may enable him to speak with more authority. As to England's part in Asia, he does not hesitate to say that, admitting defects and deficiencies, the firm hand of British law and order has been as unquestionable a boon to Asia as the brief period of Roman rule was undoubtedly helpful to England. It would be impossible to conceive of a greater tragedy for India, for Asia, or for the world, than any present weakening or the withdrawal of British restraint from that ancient empire, which well repays friendly American interest and absolutely requires the stabilizing force of British sovereignty.

Still, the central fact remains that actual Asiatic sovereignty covers less than two per cent. of the soil, and less than nine per cent. of the population of Asia and Oceania, and Asia is not Africa or ante-Columbian America. Asia, the living-light of our oldest civilization, will not consent to be snuffed out. Asia, the home of the nine hundred and more millions comprising the majority of mankind, cannot permanently be menaced by a jealously divided minority. Nor can Asia regain and retain her lost or impaired sovereignty by wailing or wishbone. It will require Asiatic backbone; sound, patriotic, Asiatic political sense; and a healthy communion of Asiatic aims and interests, in order to revive once more the golden age of Asia.

The author admits a sincere sympathy with the aspiration, "Asia for the Asiatics." Possibly, this may be partly due to the fact that while he cherishes a profound respect for all sincere religious beliefs and believers, his own faith is confined to God and America. He may be wrong, but often he is inclined to think that the fathers of this commonwealth builded much better than Solomon, Buddha, or Paul; and the thought

will obtrude that it is just possible the temple of American ideals may still be found standing intact on its solid foundations when all other earthly temples shall have crumbled into dust. Be that as it may, truth is ever wholesome, and spiritual suggestion is the salt of political progress. If the spiritual heart of Asia is rotten, the political body of Asia cannot be saved either by force or by suasion. If the spiritual heart of Asia is sound, and the author believes that it is, then certainly the spiritual force that has refined and tempered the physical force of this commonwealth, and the vast majority of the governing sons of Japhet, will not be wasted if expended even more generously in Asia.

The central problem of Asia is China. That problem cannot be solved by casting the dead-weight of China's four hundred millions upon any conceivable League of Nations. It cannot be solved in accordance with American ideals and wishes, if American efforts culminate in encouragement of Chinese weakness and intrigue, and neglect of courageous constructive measures, because of a policy based upon positive, general, and unjustified opposition to Japan. It cannot be solved by meddling, impertinent, and impracticable interference with the legitimate aims and acts of friendly European nations, who are as sensible as we can be of the necessities of the case presented in Asia.

In the matter of "AMERICA'S AIMS AND ASIA'S ASPIRATIONS," we turned a sharp corner at Paris. Whatever our will, we cannot retrace our steps. Each and every past act of man or nation becomes flesh and bone of the present and part parent of the future. In larger measure than is usually recognized, those things that we have done determine the things that we can and shall do.

It is well that our people know the character of the corner that we turned at Paris and the precise manner in which we turned it. Such knowledge being necessary for our own safety and well-being, the author gladly availed himself of the invitation of an old Far-Eastern friend, a steady American Asiatic

hand, the Honorable William Morgan Shuster, president of The Century Company, to present it in this "log" of our mud-scow on the Seine. "An open confession," we are told, "is good for the soul." So, just among ourselves, let us cheerfully confess our sins. We manned the mud-scow of the Quai d'Orsay—the impudent, snubbing mud-scow, bumping against the craft of all nations, taking up more than our share of the swift, mid-channel, getting in everybody's way, and getting nowhere ourselves. To The Century Company's inspiration and generous, sympathetic coöperation publication of this work is due. To the editors of "The Century" magazine; to Mr. Louis D. Froelick, publisher of "Asia" magazine; and to Mr. J. Kingsley Ohl, last, but not least, among the great editors of "The New York Herald," acknowledgment is gratefully made not merely for permission to utilize such portions of this volume as appeared in their publications, but for the opportunity that they afforded the author to see the inside workings of the Conference of Paris as their Far-Eastern representative. To Asiatic, European, and American notables who were good enough to confide in him the author expresses the hope that he has not carried his love of "open covenants" any further than good taste sanctions and the public weal demands. The imperfections of treatment stand out "like quills upon the fretful porcupine"; this book is not all that it ought to be,—no book ever is,—still, possibly it may possess at least one virtue that will assure it a friendly hearing among the author's own people and among all who like to know unhyphenated American points of view. "AMERICA'S AIMS AND ASIA'S ASPIRATIONS" is written without an unfriendly thought toward any person, group, or state, by one who has no partizan affiliations of any sort, and whose sole desire is to play an honest, friendly part in the perpetuation of American-Asiatic traditions as established by Shaw, Perry, Cass, Seward, Marcy, Townsend Harris, Anson Burlingame, McKinley, and Hay.

Though doubtless it may be, the form of the work ought not to be criticized any more than the form of man. Providence

has permitted us to laugh as well as condemned us to occasional tears. In the capital of France, on the very eve of his epochal Adriatic pronouncement and the consequent exodus of the Italians, President Wilson laughed his fill and cracked jokes with Arthur Balfour during the performance of "Hullo, Paris!" at the New National Theater on the rue Mogador. So the author has taken into account the fact that most people prefer to laugh rather than to cry, and also that even the silly things actually said by the great actors (and the walking gentlemen) in the play may prove important as well as readable matters of history. The most trivial anecdote included is as authentic as the secret state papers, and these are presented for the first time, word for word as they were submitted to the Big Three.

PATRICK GALLAGHER.

Washington, D. C., March 1, 1920.

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BOOK I

PAGANS AND PROPHETS

AMERICA'S AIMS AND ASIA'S ASPIRATIONS

CHAPTER I

AT "THE HOUSE OF THE FLIRT"

IT was an American diplomat of the older generation who told me the story of "The House of the Flirt." We had motored up the Champs-Élysées, made a sharp detour to the left near Etoile, and slowed down as we entered the parked seclusion of the Place des États-Unis, with its suggestion of numerous nooks and angles and—peace.

"That is the President's house," said my friend, indicating a substantial, neutral-tinted villa on the opposite side of the green sod. A gendarme and a French staff officer saluted us politely. Two young American gentlemen in khaki, spick and span, service rifles at the correct shoulder angle, guarded the approach to Mr. Wilson's Paris home. Except our own quiet conversation, only the sweet twittering of the little birds welcoming the glad green shoots of May sent subtle sounds into a silence that suggested the secrecy of the sacrosanct. Yet with scant ceremony we had driven our car almost under the nose of majesty—the master of mankind. The thought itself was significant and suggestive. So, too, was the story of the house we had come to see.

A good many years ago, when the nice, grandfatherly old gentlemen of to-day were gay young blades with warm response for a sparkling eye and a Malibran shoulder, the dashing, daring Mamie Paine was the talk and the toast of Paris.

That is merely another way of saying that Mamie was where every woman since Lilith or Mother Eve has loved and longed to be—on the topmost limb of the tree of masculine adulation. She was the adored of young men and old. She was, they tell me, these gallants of dead decades, as pretty as a picture by David, and fully as tantalizing as the lady who was looked upon by another and still earlier David in circumstances quite disapproved by the nonconformist conscience and Mrs. Grundy. Mamie was *très chic*, and, unless I am misinformed, she had very expensive taste in clothes.

It was in the self-same little room where Mamie tried on her "pretties," and worried the originating soul of the older M. Worth, that Mr. Woodrow Wilson tried to put together the broken fragments of a world smashed to smithereens, in a political, social, and economical sense, by William Hohenzollern, who was a youngster with a very vicious temper when Mistress Paine smashed hearts in Paris. William was the identical bad boy, as Busch tells us, who caused his nursery governess to spank him and to observe:

"This hurts me more than it does you."

Upon which William gave the world a good laugh by saying:

"But not in the same place."

The young American beauty, Mamie Paine, after playing havoc with more than her fair share of young hearts and old, accepted the trembling old hand and experienced affections of the retired banker and *sous-maire* Bischoffen. And that was how, after the civil and the ring ceremony, the playing of the wedding march, the reception, and the inspection of gifts, costly and meaningless, and simple, but tear-bringing—all those things that women deem indispensable to the giving of themselves unto marriage—Mamie came to live and to hold her captivating court in the house at 11, Place des Etats-Unis. But it was not thus called in that time.

When Mamie was the most magnificent *mariposa* of all the fair butterflies on the world's poly-present, sharp-toothed wheels, America was not America, in the mind of Europe, so

to speak. That was long before Mr. Elihu Root's memorable instruction to our diplomats abroad to set up "American embassy," "American legation," and "American consulate" shingles.

The United States' legation in Paris was a "two-pair back," tucked away on a side street of little dignity and no importance, until Mr. Levi P. Morton became our minister to France. Mr. Morton leased a fine graystone mansion just a block on the north side of Mamie's obedient husband's house, and then the Parisians discovered America. The frugal Frenchmen who were in the "inner circle" of the government of Paris, and participants in the profits accruing from foresight in metropolitan real-estate investments, interpreted the Morton lease as a soothing shadow of an agreeable coming event. At last those dollar-decked Americans were going to act like real Europeans and buy an embassy building! To help the good work along, they called the peaceful parked prospect the Place des Etats-Unis. It is not without significance that Congress failed fully to appreciate the compliment. To this day we do not own an embassy building in Paris. Our ambassadors are "renters" in the French diplomatic circle, "unhindered and unhampered" by any act of congressional munificence.

It was by the merest accident, I am told, that the President came to live in "The House of the Flirt." When he made his first appearance in Paris, he went to the Hôtel Murat. The Hôtel Murat was not available when he planned his second trip, so "the House of the Flirt" was hired to witness the work of making a new world out of a badly battered, gibbering, grinning, gasping, ghastly globe. It may have been as significant as it was accidental.

The President went to Paris to make peace, and the Place des Etats-Unis is a peaceful spot. He returned to France "unhindered and unhampered" by earlier aspirations for "open covenants of peace, openly arrived at." Secrecy set its sentinels on every silent sod of the squared sylvan circle.

Even the cute little sparrows, a family of birds as notorious for impertinence and irreverence as regularly trained American reporters, seemed to sense the all-pervading presence of the very spirit of secrecy itself. The young leaves on the nodding trees whispered their warning, "Hush!" All the gables were decently dignified and as perfectly proper-looking as if Mamie had never blown a coquettish kiss in their direction. Mamie was dead. The carved fireplace in the little room which heard her swear when a new corset pinched her pretty pulchritude, which smelt the sweet violets sent by Monsieur A—— or the Comte de V——, which saw her snap her fair fingers at jealous and protesting Mme. D——, and a good many things which no lady would forgive me for putting in print—that elegant fireplace was to hear, smell, and see many things that are destined to remain buried in a secrecy far more impenetrable than some of Mamie's most sacred secrets. What happened in that room was to go far to prove that modern diplomacy is still as close-mouthed as the grave and often as pleasant to the nose; no more so. What happened within the four walls that saw more of Mamie than did Colonel L—— (who mixed prussic acid with his absinthe when the *belle dame* said him "Nay") was to teach us all that flirtation is not confined to women merely.

It was in that room of "The House of the Flirt" that Woodrow Wilson is now charged with having played with the hearts of one out of every four of the inhabitants of the earth, crumpled up his "Fourteen Points" and cast them into the waste-basket. Mamie's boudoir was the scene of the Shantung surrender, of the actual peacemaking of sorts, of the mangling of the Monroe Doctrine, and the levitations of the league. Which goes to show that, after all, it is not a far cry from a corset to a covenant. You can buy either if you have the inclination and the price, and even if you have not the price, it is always possible to take it from those who may have it.

"Sometimes in the evening," says Mr. Ray Stannard Baker, "I used to find him in the study of his house: a dark, richly furnished

room looking out upon a little patch of walled garden with an American sentinel pacing up and down the passageway. A prisoner could not have been more watchfully guarded! But the prison-cell itself was a charming place. The French owner of the house had been an art lover and there hung in this room a number of rare old pictures: an interesting Rembrandt, a Delacroix, an Hobbema, several Goyas. I wondered sometimes what Rembrandt would have made of 'A Sitting of the Four' if he had been there to paint it! It was a curious room, this study, seeming to have only one entrance, but one day I saw the President step to the back of the room and open and go through what appeared to be a solid, well-filled book-case into a passageway leading to his bedroom beyond. It was a concealed door cunningly painted to look like a case filled with books.

Mrs. Wilson's sitting room was opposite the President's study, with a small reception room between, and her sunny window opened also on the little grassy court; and above the wall, across the street, one could look into the upper windows of the house occupied by Mr. Lloyd George. Some day there will be written an account of the incalculable help and comfort that Mrs. Wilson was to the President in these trying days. In every difficult situation in Europe Mrs. Wilson comported herself with fine dignity and with genuine simplicity and graciousness of manner."¹

The use of the terms, "Paris Conference," and "Conference of Paris," suggests correction of a popular error that ought to be excised from the columns of our newspapers and the public mind. The peace conference was the Conference of Paris. It was a conference confined to the Allied and Associated victor nations.² The ritual reserved for the defeated Germans billeted in the Trianon Palace Hôtel at Versailles was that of a drumhead court-martial, as was fit and proper. Nothing less would have satisfied Foch and the French. Fittingly and properly, the Paris conference respected the feelings of the outraged nation in whose capital the map of the new world was being charted. The Austrian affair at St.-

¹ "What Wilson Did at Paris," p. 92.

² "So, Messieurs, I leave you to your grave deliberation, and I declare open the Conference of Paris."—Last words uttered by President Poincaré in his speech formally opening the peace conference in the Hall of the Clock at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, January 18, 1919.

Germain-en-Laye was an inquest, sometimes solemn, sometimes comic, sometimes almost joyful. I cannot testify as to the other "side-shows," because they did not begin until after I left Paris. Relations with the Germans were restricted to exchange of notes between the German delegation in Versailles and the Allies and Associates in Paris. I really think that M. Clemenceau enjoyed his task, as president of the conference, of replying to Brockdorf-Rantzau and the tall, sallow count's successors. Usually, in each sharp sentence, you could feel the bite of "the Tiger's" teeth.

Bathed in the bright Paris sunshine, with the cheers of the Paris poor ringing in their ears, the President and Mrs. Wilson entered "The House of the Flirt" for the first time on March 14, 1919, just in time for a late lunch. President Poincaré and all the foreign notables had united in giving them a brilliant welcome in the carpeted court of honor at the Gare Invalides. Mr. Wilson alone knows whether by that time he had learned to discriminate between real and artificial enthusiasm. As he helped Mrs. Wilson out of their pullman and shook hands with Poincaré, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Foch, I caught a twinkle in the Presidential eye and a satisfied set of the Presidential jaws. The combination led me to believe he was taking the correct measure of his surroundings. He barely acknowledged the salute of Foch's pet troops, but he was quick to note and to lift his hat to a poor old basket-woman who fought her way through the soldiers and, with arms and basket waving in the air and big teardrops streaming from her red eyelids, called upon God to bless "the great American." The welcome of the Paris poor was honest, hearty, intensely real; the greeting of the great folk was mostly hollow pretense, crafty stage-play, a deliberate, carefully calculated appeal to the Presidential ego.

It was within his first hour's residence at "The House of the Flirt" that Woodrow Wilson decided to play the part of Atlas and put his shoulders under all the world and its troubles. With hands clasped and clenched behind his back, jaws

set and chin thrust forward, he paced up and down in front of Mamie's ornamental fireplace, formulating, revising, and discarding plans, and telling himself what he thought of the men he had left in charge of his peacemaking work in Paris.

Just a month before, to a day and almost to an hour, he had started home from Paris with the skeleton for his pet child, the League of Nations. His critics in the American Senate and American statesmen of note out of office, but much in the public eye, had rattled the bones of this fragile skeleton and broken some of them. He came back to Paris, forced unwillingly to attach a Monroe Doctrine bone, a withdrawal bone, and to add and subtract other bones of contention. He had committed himself to the British to leave the bulldog his bone of naval supremacy, to abjure "freedom of the seas," and to deny the Japanese their bone of racial equality, because Mr. Hughes of Australia threatened secession rather than bite at or swallow that bone. Wilson landed once more in France confident of his ability to surmount these difficulties, and his surprise and anger may be imagined when he found that his own "rubber stamps" had removed them by joining with Mr. Balfour in pitching his pet skeleton out of the treaty and out of the conference.

At "The House of the Flirt" they told him what Mr. Balfour had done to him a brief few days before his return to the scene on the eve of the momentous Ides of March. In the Council of Ten Mr. Balfour had carried a resolution divorcing the league from the treaty. Worse still, Mr. Lansing had delivered a speech in Paris publicly sustaining the plea for "immediate peace," that is, peace without the league.

At "The House of the Flirt" it was mentioned to the President how the British were getting tired of Colonel House's flirtations with the Sinn Fein faction, just then planning a St. Patrick's Day demonstration right under the nose of the conference. That was very bad. For cheer, the President turned to one of Lord Northcliffe's many newspapers, and his keen eye caught a flaming editorial—"Wilson or

Lenin?"¹ That was the choice. The President took his courage in his hands, called for his car, and rode down the Champs-Élysées to the Crillon.

We watched him ascend to Colonel House's parlor. Nobody has ever told what took place in that room. We saw Clemenceau and his secretary, Lieutenant Mantoux, hurry in and upward a few minutes later; then Lloyd George and Sir Maurice Hankey; and afterward Mr. Orlando with his thick, upstanding, white thatch of hair. We saw Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda come and go. We knew that something big was happening, but nobody outside that little room guessed just what was taking place.

What happened was this: Mr. Wilson, accepting the "Daily Mail's" invitation, assumed the rôle of Atlas. He took upon his shoulders the burdens of the world, and bowled Balfour and Lansing out of the conference. That was the first meeting of the Council of Four, with Woodrow Wilson as the "Big One," "boss" of the Paris conference—in fancy, but not in fact.

Mr. Wilson trumped Balfour's trick by a public announcement, pointing out that on January 25, at the second plenary session, the conference had already made the League of Nations an integral part of the peace treaty. That act could not be set aside by the Council of Ten, or by any other organ of the conference, without first securing the assent of a plenary session. Mr. Wilson well knew that his friends, the small nations, would back him as a solid unit on an issue of that sort. And the thimblerriggers of the Quai d'Orsay and Whitehall laughed up their sleeves, because at last they had Mr. Wilson just where they wanted him.

Mr. Wilson committed hari-kiri when he created the Council of Four and transferred the actual peacemaking from the Hall of the Clock to "The House of the Flirt." He did just what M. Clemenceau and Mr. Balfour wanted him to do—Clemenceau, the Bismarck of the conference, and Arthur

¹ The Paris "Daily Mail," March 8, 1919.

James, its Beaconsfield. It was Mr. Lloyd George, prompted by Balfour and Curzon, who harped upon the advantage of "getting along" with a few men "who could talk and understand English." Why not a supreme council of premiers? That, of course, relieved the President of an embarrassment. It was M. Clemenceau who suggested that Lieutenant Mantoux, a limber linguist, could be called in when interpretation became necessary.

"Hankey is a remarkable shorthand reporter. I find him invaluable," said the Welsh premier.

Sir Maurice became the official recorder of the "Big Four," and I can well believe that Mr. Lloyd George found that dapper young man absolutely "invaluable." David had his witness. Clemenceau had his witness. Wilson had his brief victory over Balfour, his snub to Lansing, and no witness.

I noted at the time that the Marquis Saionji, although the chief representative in Paris of one of the great allies (and no less than five times actually prime minister of Japan), was not included in the new Supreme Council. There were explanations that did not explain. The Japanese accepted these in good part. After the sessions got into full swing at "the House of the Flirt" stories, since confirmed, came to me, and I began to take my hat off to that "most superior person," George Nathaniel, Earl Curzon.

Lord Curzon gave the Paris proceedings a wide berth. He was even less in evidence than Winston Churchill or Alfred, Lord Milner, the cold-blooded protégé of Joseph Chamberlain, of whom Labouchère was wont to say, "he has no feelings and no failings." Milner is a sort of iceberg carved into the semblance of a human being. Balfour is a bland boa constrictor with a deadly, dangerous hug. Curzon is a roaring furnace, sputtering forth sparks against his pet aversions—the Japanese and the plain people.

"Why is n't Curzon here?" I asked a British friend who counts each tick tocked off by the British imperial clock.

"Oh," said my friend; "he did not want to come. He

would have had to wash his hands too often, and he wants to save his skin."

Curzon always washes his hands most carefully after shaking, very gingerly, with an ordinary human being. He believes that it takes at least ten generations to make a gentleman. He is not in favor of making the world safe for either democrats or republicans. He is in favor of "putting Japan in a tight box."

One afternoon at "The House of the Flirt," Mr. Wilson, I am told, broached Pacific problems to Lloyd George. David was very receptive. Quite as if on the spur of the moment, he suggested the concentration of American and British warships in the Pacific.

"We can avoid trouble there by forethought," said Lloyd George.

I am not in a position to state what connection there is or is not between this conversation at "The House of the Flirt" and the decree of Josephus sending the American fleet through the canal into Pacific waters. Still, I was told in Paris that Lord Curzon and Admiral Jellicoe, with the indorsement of Winston Churchill, put this idea into the head of Lloyd George. Whether or not the decision was made a matter of record by Sir Maurice Hankey, it is of course impossible to say. Lloyd George had his witness. Mr. Wilson was his own witness.

It was at "The House of the Flirt" that the Monroe Doctrine was made to walk the plank by Woodrow Wilson. The circumstances belong to history.

The President has been compared to many historical personages: to Alexander I, a smug lunatic, author of the Holy Alliance and the chief contributing cause of the promulgation of Monroe's Doctrine, and to James I, a learned, but bad-tempered bigot. Curiously enough, the gentlemen (and ladies) who spent so much time in digging up from the biographies caricature counterparts of Mr. Wilson have so far failed to note the striking resemblances between the salient

defects of Monroe and those of Wilson. Adams, and not Monroe, wrote the Monroe Doctrine. Monroe was eager enough to take the credit for our most daring adventure in foreign affairs, *after the successful event*. The story of American advocacy of a League of Nations suggests a deadly parallel. A century ago the vengeful spirit of Allied absolutism menaced popular governments, just as Bolshevism menaced all orderly government during the proceedings of the Council of Four. Monroe's hesitancy, his timorous temperament, the unwillingness with which he was drawn along by the logic of events and the bolder and more experienced hand of his secretary of state, John Quincy Adams, lend piquancy to the fact that the attempted assassination of his doctrine was reserved for the hand of one whom the late Mr. Roosevelt assailed for identically similar weaknesses of character.

Mr. Wilson propounded the Pan-American doctrine as the Wilson doctrine.¹ The event was carefully noted in the London foreign office, which does not forget earlier American unwillingness to participate in the Congress of Panama, or to associate Latin-American or European support with the pronouncement or maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine was always supposed to be strictly United States policy until Mr. Wilson proposed his Pan-American doctrine, and later sat in secret conclave with European old masters at "The House of the Flirt." The United States Senate, backed by overwhelming American opinion, forced Mr. Wilson to put a specific Monroe Doctrine bone on his League of Nations' skeleton. The proposition, from any angle, was absurd. To mention the doctrine at all in the body of the covenant was to do the very thing that a long succession of American administrations had flatly refused to do. Sage senators, no wiser than Mr. Wilson, missed the point of the jest. The careful British, who are supposed to lack a sense of humor, caught the funny-bone by the knuckle and turned it into the very best joke of the conference.

¹ See Appendix "A."

Mr. Wilson breathed his Monroe-Doctrine difficulty into the wide-open ear of Lord Robert Cecil. Lord Robert, long and loose-jointed, posed his patrician personality in an attitude of deep sympathy. It was necessary to head off opposition within the League of Nations' commission, where Léon Bourgeois, Baron Makino, and other delegates were pushing amendments contrary to the Wilson-Cecil concordat.

"Leave that to me, Mr. President," said Lord Robert. The President very gladly did that little thing. Lord Robert engineered through the commission a very select drafting committee to "mull over" contentious motions, including Mr. Wilson's own Monroe Doctrine clause. Later this committee presented to the full commission of nineteen a small scrap of paper containing the following words:

Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine for securing the maintenance of peace.

M. Bourgeois asked for the paper. It was handed to him. The whiskered savant of France poised his pince-nez on the tip of his broad nose. He ruffled his hair. He scratched his left cheek. He pulled at his beard. He read the thirty-two words twice over, aloud.

"But what does it mean?" he asked smiling Mr. Wilson.

Lord Robert yawned, stretched his six-feet-six, and observed with the nearest thing to a grin:

"Oddly enough, it means just what it says."

A few days later a communiqué issued privately by the British delegation to the British press volunteered the following interpretation:

"*Article XXI* makes it clear that the Covenant is not intended to abrogate or weaken any other agreements, so long as they are consistent with its own terms, into which the Members of the League may have entered, or may enter hereafter, for the further assurance of peace. Such agreements include special treaties for compulsory

arbitration, and military conventions that are purely defensive. *In so far as the Monroe Doctrine tends to the same end, whatever validity it possesses cannot be affected by the Covenant.*

The Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed in 1813¹ in order to prevent the extension of European absolutist principles to South America, but while it forbids interference by individual European States in American affairs, *it can never be invoked to limit the action of the League of Nations, which is in its nature world-wide, and therefore no more European than American.* The principles of the League as expressed in Article X, are in fact the extension to the whole world of the principles of President Monroe; while, should any dispute as to the meaning of the latter ever arise between American and European Powers, *the League is there to settle it.*

Who wrote the Monroe-Doctrine clause inserted in the league covenant?

Lord Curzon.

George Nathaniel drew the clause, Lord Robert Cecil trimmed it, Mr. Balfour inserted an important word.

Mr. Wilson "OK'd" it at "The House of the Flirt."

¹ The Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed in the President's Message to Congress, December 2, 1823.

CHAPTER II

TOO PROUD TO PREPARE

THE character and consequences of America's peace-making in Paris drew form and color from the policies and performances of the administration before and during our entry into the war. Mr. Wilson took to Paris the selfsame aloof, self-sufficient atmosphere that he had created for himself and his official family in Washington. When that fact is grasped, things that were said and done on the Seine, the Tiber, and the Thames become more easily understood.

It will be recalled that, after we began to make war in earnest, critics and friends of the administration urged that steps be taken to prepare for peace. The war had to end some time; it could not go on forever. As we had been caught unprepared for war, it was feared that we would be caught unprepared for peace.

To my personal regret, I was detained in Washington virtually throughout our participation in the war. Realizing the importance of the history that was being made, I tried to watch each move as closely as possible. Always an ardent admirer of the President, I was and still am firmly convinced that his one desire was, and is, to rise to the highest possible ideals for the world and for his own people. I may be wrong, but to my mind the most striking difference between Mr. Wilson and the heads of the Allied and the enemy governments is that the President stands first for human welfare at large, while the statesmen of these other countries are first, last, and all the time for their own people. Exceptions have to be made, of course. For instance, Mr. David Lloyd

George ("Our Davy" of the Welsh), is first for David, and after that for the British Empire. M. Clemenceau is all the way through for France, and he does not care who knows it. Some people might say "more power to his elbow!"

One afternoon during a critical hour for the Paris conference I was walking along the Rue Royale with a great American poet who is also a profound American thinker. Some poets think with their feet. They get the habit, I suppose, from reducing thought to feet. Rebellious nature seeks mirth in reverse processes. This poet vented his wrath upon Mr. Wilson.

"He is the most dangerous man on earth," he insisted.

"Why?" I asked.

"He is the world's arch-internationalist, the high priest of disorder, the—" All sorts of awful things he called the President.

I tried to bring the angry poet back to earth, and did succeed in convincing him that Mr. Wilson at least deserves some credit for consistency as the great American internationalist.

After the President realized that "force, and still more force" would be required to win the war, a party of industrial and financial leaders called at the White House and talked with the living successor of Washington and Lincoln. They came to inform the President as to certain steps they thought ought to be taken in order to secure for our people a fair share of the world's markets after war should give way to peace. Reference to the newspaper files will disclose how these practical American gentlemen were politely "shooed" out of the executive mansion. Mr. George Creel saw to it that the story was properly circulated East, North, and South, as well as in the money-trust woofing West. We had been "too proud to fight" and "proud of our unpreparedness for war." Whether we willed it or not, we were to be made proud, or sorry, because of unpreparedness for peace.

Under the censored surface of things, and behind the scenes

in Washington, a "little war" arose over this decision of the Almightyest. Among others friendly to the administration who pointed out the folly of carrying idealism to the extreme of asininity were one or two Americans who realized that something had to be done, in justice to our overseas friends as well as to ourselves, in order to ascertain where we were at in the Far East. Every Allied nation was getting ready, making sure what they needed, what they wanted, and what they could get. We alone borrowed the neck of the giraffe and sought to bathe our whiskers in the clouds of abstract internationalism. The result of the "little war," I regret to say, was the "House Committee," not a committee of the House of Representatives, but an emanation from the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, a sort of long-haired annex to the peregrinating Maximus Domus of Colonel George Harvey, the vaulted-domed other colonel, Edward M. House. At every turning of the road of our war-making and peace-making one ran full tilt into Colonel House. That was why some of the gentlemen on Fleet Street came to call him the American "King Charles's head"; he would keep "turning up" at unexpected places. The French, too, loved to banter us about him.

M. Clemenceau may not have said it, but on the boulevards in May, 1919, they insisted that he did when somebody mentioned House. This was the way it was put:

"Christ entered Jerusalem on an ass. Colonel House preceded the President to Paris."

The "House Committee" that consumed so much midnight oil, current (or currency) in Washington, was so well posted on Far Eastern matters of vital account to America that when Major Willard Straight was able to turn from his army work to his old American-Asiatic pursuits, he was almost driven frantic by the extent of our unpreparedness for Far Eastern peace. Straight's death in Paris from pneumonia was undoubtedly indirectly the result of his vain endeavor to get into the handsome head of House a glimmering

of the delicate technical details that had to be grasped if we were to avoid precisely what was due to happen. The story is well known to the friends of the great young American banker, business man, and diplomat, Willard Straight. I had hoped to join him in Paris, to compare notes with him, to renew a friendship that began when we were both Far Eastern striplings. I learned of his sudden death while I was making my arrangements to sail for France. If ever a soldier died on the firing-line, Straight did. The flippant lines that were written of him who "tried to hustle the East" might be changed and applied to Straight's attempt to make a sort of second-hand Sinologue of Edward M. House.

The extent of our unpreparedness for peacemaking at Paris must have been sufficient to satisfy even Mr. Newton Baker. It was ghastly, as we shall see when we enter the Hôtel Crillon, confer with "the Ossified Four," commune with "the Feeble Five," sit around Mamie's fireplace with "the Big Three," and take a last, lingering look at "the Lonely One." We must listen to the tales of woe of the technical experts housed in "cat" de la Concorde, that labyrinthine prison chosen for the staff of the American peace mission because, of course, Americans are all famous poker-players, and those winding stairways and trap-doors that worried the memory and vexed the soul of many an elderly Ph. D. were purposely put there to provide "getaways" when officers of the law interrupted the music of roulette-wheel and the gold scooped in by the croupier's rake. No. 4, Place de la Concorde (cheek by jowl with Maxim's celebrated restaurant on the Rue Royale), was at one time the most notorious gaming palace in Paris. Trust the French, even in their darkest, shell-shocked hour, to see a joke and to turn it.

CHAPTER III

A SWORD AND THE "FOURTEEN POINTS"

ON the afternoon of October 23, 1918, Mr. Wilson was sitting in his study in the White House when a Japanese visitor was announced. The President was in his best and most buoyant mood. He had just revised and OK'd his reply to the official German appeal for peace, based upon his "Fourteen Points." He felt satisfied with that reply, as well he might. He was compelling the abdication of the German Emperor, and in a manner that would help history to record his ascent to a pinnacle of power over mankind incomparably higher than that attained by any other man of his own or preceding times.

The historian in him knew that, at least, posterity, more analytic and more impartial than contemporary judgment, would concede that his type-writer had proved more potent, more powerful, than the sword of Foch. That was neither a displeasing nor an unworthy thought. To the victor belongs the victor's meed, and it requires the sweets of triumph to console and to compensate for the sour and bitter drafts that statesmen and soldiers must sip ere they achieve success. The visit of the Japanese gentleman, previously arranged, was doubly welcome, and most curiously was it appropriate to the hour and to the event.

Mr. Yasujiro Ishikawa, editor of "Yorodzu-Choho," of Tokio, called to present to the President of the United States as fine a Japanese sword as ever was wielded by any great lord of Nippon. An hour or so before that I held it in my hand and coaxed the shining blade from its beautifully carved and embellished scabbard. The *tsuba*, or guard, was of rare

and famous workmanship. Hilt and blade were forged and tempered and engraved to the devout prayers of the deft smith of Kamakura, which is as famous for its swords as Nikko is for its shrines.

The President received Mr. Ishikawa with captivating smile and glad hand. The Japanese editor was delighted, and proudly he opened the box that he had brought with him, took out the sword, and handed it to Mr. Wilson. Mr. Wilson has an eye for rare and beautiful things. Also, he does know how to do the right thing in the right way, when he permits himself to be himself. The President grasped the sword by the hilt, drew it forth, and waved it with a boyish flourish that charmed the Tokio editor, and almost caused him to forget the little speech he had prepared for the occasion. Mr. Ishikawa managed to make his speech, explaining among other things that the presentation of a sword is the highest compliment that one Japanese gentleman can pay to another, and that he had been chosen by the owner of "Yorodzu-Choho," a famous collector of ancient Japanese weapons, to carry this sword to the President, along with other swords which were to be given to the King of England, the French President, the King of Italy, and the King of the Belgians. I have wondered since if Mr. Wilson did or did not chuckle at the thought that neither David Lloyd George nor Georges Clemenceau would have the pleasure of waving one of these beautiful Japanese swords. Be that as it may, when Mr. Ishikawa said his little say, Mr. Wilson uttered a word or two of thanks, and, to be sure, he had his little joke.

At that moment the whole world was awaiting with breathless anxiety what Mr. Wilson would tell the Germans. They had appealed to him in person for terms. Was it to be peace or a continuance of the war? Would he bowl the German Emperor from his throne?

Mr. Wilson, in thanking Mr. Ishikawa for his gift and his tribute to the great part played by the President during the war, said: "My dear Mr. Ishikawa, I am merely a president

and ephemeral, but your sovereign is an emperor of a dynasty eternal!"

It was a Parthian shot, and Mr. Ishikawa, a very able reporter, left the White House for the nearest telegraph office and cabled to his newspaper that the President had replied to Germany in a message that would be certain to mean the downfall of the Kaiser.

The American commonwealth, whatever we may think or say about it, is the highest form of constitutional government. Mr. Wilson is the highest authority upon earth on constitutional government. His admirable works deservedly rank among the most lucid and most accurate presentation of a fundamentally important subject. How clearly he demonstrates the importance of government in strict accordance with the law, and how admirably he reproves some famous predecessors in the Presidency for their contraventions of constitutional limitations! "Old Hickory," Tyler, and Polk are properly castigated for their infringements upon the rights of the coördinate governing body, the Senate. Presidential aspirants ought never to write books—about politics, that is. The printed word has an unpleasant, if sometimes useful, habit of reappearing over the shoulder of the Presidential author, as the ghosts of *Banquo*, *Duncan*, and his sons appeared at the festive board of *Macbeth*.

On November 18, 1918, President Wilson announced that he would go to Paris at the head of the American mission to negotiate peace. While this announcement had been anticipated by political friends and foes of the President, it displeased many of the President's friends, and was greedily seized upon by the President's political foes as one more act of usurpation, and a violation of sacred precedent and custom. The President remained unmoved by this clamor. Not merely did he sail for Paris on December 4, 1918, but he named his associates on the Peace mission without consulting or inviting the approval of the Senate.

When it suited his purposes, he had informed the country

that "politics is adjourned," and immediately afterward he had projected himself into the 1918 campaign as a partizan leader of his own political party. Rebuked by the voters of the United States, he went his way unmoved, so far as one could judge from his speeches and his actions.

History will decide whether or not the President was right, or wise, in challenging the animosity of his Republican political opponents. The fact remains that the President did throw down his gage to the Republicans, and the consequence was that Mr. Wilson went to Paris leaving in his wake a hostile and angry Senate. The circumstance that, under the Constitution, the newly elected senators would not take their seats until the opening of the next session did not materially affect the situation; because senators are properly proud of their place under the Constitution, in the government of the United States, and senatorial Democrats were just as displeased as senatorial Republicans, because of the affront which Mr. Wilson had offered to their august body. The Constitution ordains that treaties shall be made "by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate." It was quite obvious that Mr. Wilson *did not* intend to invite "the advice" of the Senate, and that he *did* intend to compel "the consent of the Senate," to a peace of his own making.

The President in October and November and December, 1918, was bent upon a peace in accordance with the "Fourteen Points," the Mount Vernon challenge to autocratic imperialism and subsequent declarations. The Germans eagerly accepted the Fourteen Points.¹ Our Allies were not in a mood to accept them or in a position to reject them; so they made faces at Mr. Wilson's tar-water, pretended to swallow the dose he poured down their throats, and upon the first convenient opportunity spewed it up.

¹ See Appendix "S."

CHAPTER IV

FOREDOOMED TO FAILURE

NOT merely from the American point of view, but from the point of view of world welfare, the Paris Conference was foredoomed to failure. History will surely place the responsibility for this failure, and, after making every allowance for his undoubtedly admirable intentions, it will call Mr. Wilson as a personal witness to the fact that he was primarily responsible.

We know, now, how complete was the collapse of the enemy military plans. Many factors of a military and political character contributed to that collapse. The outstanding feature in October, November, and December, 1918, was that Foch was in a position to annihilate the armies opposed to him, and that from the middle of August the Germans knew their weakness and our strength.

The President is to be praised for his splendid desire to avert further bloodshed. The President deserves credit for the foresight with which he visualized the dangers to peace that would become multiplied as soon as the Allies crossed the Rhine. He is to be condemned for not recognizing that the necessity called for two distinct and widely separated stages in the peace-making, the military stage and the political stage. Mixing the two together was bound to pile troubles upon his own head. Now, that was what he did.

Mr. Wilson was not the only one to blame. He was wrong in not leaving to Foch and to the Allied and Associated military chiefs the unhampered decision and direction of the military terms to be imposed upon the enemy. The French and the English were wrong in causing the peace conference to

meet in Paris. The political, constructive, peace conference should have been held in Washington after the military peace was concluded between the Allied and Associated and the enemy military chiefs.

The disadvantage of holding the peace conference in Paris was speedily apparent. Although the French may not yet realize it, Paris placed them at a very serious disadvantage. The French could have secured far better terms in Washington than in their own capital, where their friends were often handicapped by the fact that France was naturally laboring under a terrible nervous strain. Paris became the center of a vicious maelstrom of propaganda, which sorely tried the admirably electric Parisian temperament.

Mr. Wilson placed himself at a very serious disadvantage by going to Paris, where he was surrounded by men who lost no opportunity to weaken his faith in his own principles.

He was met by M. Clemenceau's famous and subsequently effective negation of the "Fourteen Points." M. Clemenceau's speech to the Chamber of Deputies, in December, served notice upon the President that "the Tiger" was sharpening his claws and lashing his tail and preparing to chew upon each separate principle of Wilsonian peace incompatible with the tenets of the old diplomacy.

The French premier said :

There is an old system of alliances called the "balance of power." It seems to be condemned nowadays; but if such a balance had preceded the war—if England, the United States, France, and Italy, say, had agreed that whoever attacked one of them attacked the whole, the war would not have occurred. The system of alliances, which I do not renounce, will be my guiding thought at the peace conference.

Mr. Wilson immediately retorted at Manchester: ¹

If the future had nothing for us but a new attempt to keep the world at a right poise by a balance of power, the United States

¹ December 30, 1918.

would take no interest in it; because *she will join no combination of powers which is not a combination of all of us.*

Before many months were over, the President was doomed to make public confession of his defeat at the hands of the French premier.

To placate M. Clemenceau, and in a vain endeavor to save his "Fourteen Points," the President began his preliminaries of peace by widening the breach between him and Marshal Foch. M. Clemenceau needed constant support in the French Chamber, and the President permitted himself at least to seem to be drawn into French politics on the side of Clemenceau, and in opposition to the marshal. This did not help Mr. Wilson, nor did it help France. That is really what was at the bottom of the crisis of February 9, when the lid blew off, and the sensation was sprung by Rear-Admiral Doctor Cary T. Grayson that Mr. Wilson was seriously contemplating withdrawal from the Conference of Paris and starting a conference of his own at Geneva. It was an undignified proceeding, in connection with which the participants added nothing to their reputations for statesmanship. M. Clemenceau did justify anger on the part of the President because of his ill advised statement, made over the head of the President, to the Associated Press, just as ten weeks later Mr. Wilson astounded and inflamed the Italians by his Adriatic statement.

It ought not to be forgotten that the holding of the peace conference in Paris was an advantage to the Bolsheviki, because it put them in a position to point the finger of scorn at the old diplomats who were controlling the work of the conference.

Thus, step by step, little by little, the authority of the conference was weakened until, without a doubt, it had little or no authority left over the masses of the people of Europe when, on the afternoon of April 23, Mr. Wilson gave to the press his Adriatic doctrine, restored the faith of the masses outside Italy, and drove the Italians out of the conference. Most,

if not all, of these ugly situations and set-backs might have been avoided had the conference met in Washington instead of in Paris, because, prejudiced opinion notwithstanding, the masses of all the world had faith in America and they had no faith whatsoever in the old diplomats. Had the conference been held in Washington, the shocking weakness of the American delegation could, and I think would, have been repaired. The unrepresentative character of the American delegation would not have been permitted to obtrude between us all and an American peace. The world needed, and still needs, an American peace. Without that, it cannot restore itself, regain normal equilibrium and adequately profit from the experiences of the war.

Our mission to Paris comprised Woodrow Wilson of New Jersey, Robert Lansing of New York, Edward M. House of New York and formerly of Texas, Henry White of Maryland, and General Tasker H. Bliss of Pennsylvania. What does that suggest? Does it suggest a grain of Western, or middle-Western information or opinion? Does it suggest any special interest in Pacific problems? I hope I am not offending any of my distinguished friends, the American peace plenipotentiaries, when I say that, excepting General Bliss, whose time and thought were monopolized by the military questions, their entire knowledge of the fundamental facts of Far Eastern problems could have been compressed into a very small pill-box. Messrs. Wilson, Lansing and House did not know even the rudiments of the issues; and consequently we ought not to be surprised that they blundered so badly.

The expedition was shockingly organized. Let me give a few facts that will illustrate the peculiar methods that were followed.

A capable cartographer was appointed to direct the map-making for the American mission. Maps, of course, are very essential in the making of treaties that are going to re-make the map of the world. I know it to be a fact that this distinguished cartographer was refused the funds necessary to

provide his division of the American mission with the requisite base-maps.

A famous authority on history and international law, sufficiently distinguished to head his department at Harvard University and to be chosen as one of the leading experts of the American mission to negotiate peace, was refused funds wherewith to purchase books that were vitally necessary in order to provide our peace plenipotentiaries with essential data.

The United States Senate was compelled to vent its fury upon the Shantung articles of the peace treaty. That might not have been necessary had the peace conference been held in Washington, because the conditions under which the American Far Eastern experts were obliged to labor in Paris would not have been tolerated by the American people.

CHAPTER V

THE CONSCIENTIOUS COWARDS

AT a time when implicit confidence in America was of peculiar importance to the American peace delegation, the Paris edition of the London "Daily Mail" printed a scathing editorial attack upon what it described as Mr. Wilson's "tenderness for the Hun."¹ French editors joined in the charge. At various times and in important places I found an apparently deep-rooted disposition to regard the American President as "a pro-German pacifist." That was unfair to, and unfortunate for, Mr. Wilson and for America.

The President was not a pro-German pacifist. I believe him to be above reproach—in his heart.

One night in Paris M. Clemenceau was sipping his bouillon at home. They tell me that he virtually lives upon a specially nourishing soup made for him by an adoring woman cook, who never fails to accompany her famous master when he goes abroad. An old-time friend was the only guest of the president of the council of the French Republic. He asked the fine old "Tiger" to express his real opinion of Mr. Wilson. M. Clemenceau frowned, then smiled.

"Just between ourselves, your frank opinion?" coaxed the inquiring friend. Still M. Clemenceau hesitated.

After repeated persuasion, France's grand old man consented to answer the question. "But," he warned his guest, "you must never whisper it."

"I quite understand. These things are sometimes embarrassing."

M. Clemenceau nodded, and toyed with his spoon.

"What is your frank impression, now?" The guest of the

¹ The Paris "Daily Mail," April 11, 1919.

premier was on the tiptoe of excited expectation. "Is Mr. Wilson all that is said about him?"

"He has a heart of gold," replied the "Tiger," with unaffected enthusiasm.

"Yes—and?"

"A head of wood."

The jaws snapped shut, and a grim smile wreathed the face of M. Clemenceau as he turned the conversation into safer and more impersonal channels.

M. Clemenceau is an intense admirer of Woodrow Wilson, and nobody who knows him needs to be told that his reference to the head-master's head implied no question of the Presidential brains. Mr. Wilson is unquestionably one of the most remarkable thinking-machines the world has ever known. M. Clemenceau is as wise as he is witty, and as honest as a man can be. The French idolized the real head of their nation to an extent that would not be likely if to his other fine traits the great man had not added an honest appreciation of the true measure of other men.

The "Tiger" meant Mr. Wilson's unapproached stubbornness, his wooden-headed way of retaining opinions after hard facts have literally blown them to atoms.

Mr. Wilson's opinion of Mr. Newton D. Baker is well known. Our pacifist Secretary of War was known in France, as he is known in Washington, by the familiar title, "The President's Pet." In the army they called the "conchies"—the yellow-striped, white-livered, look-like-men "slackers"—"Baker's Pets."

My voyage to France was made on that wayward tub, the good ship *Chicago*. The hold was full of young Poles going over to fight under Haller for the fair land of Poland. The first-class decks were too full of those who were "too proud to fight," but who were not lacking in shameless impertinence to travel in high state and in the special "C. O." gray "slacker" uniform of a great and good and splendidly directed American welfare organization, and inflict their unwelcome presence

upon a nation of men and women who have never been too proud to bare their breasts to the whistling bullet, the shrieking shell, or indigestible cold steel.¹

The presence of these shameless "slackers" in France was an unpardonable offense, beyond explanation or apology. It will ever remain one of those things that the American soldier and his Allied comrade never can forgive. I have heard French and American officers of high rank voice their amazement and vent their indignation in language of a sort that might possibly penetrate even Newton Baker. What had France done to earn such a contemptible insult? Trying to

¹ As a matter of fairness to others, and particularly in justice to men who gave their time and their money and fine leadership to a great humanitarian organization that has labored earnestly and well toward lessening the horrors of war (which Mr. Lloyd George pithily epitomized as "organized savagery"), the author thinks it well to state here that he realizes fully the problem of religious liberty that was presented to our Government when we entered the war. This problem has been put to the author in the following way:

"As you know, the Quakers are opposed to war and to the killing of human kind. They are very genuine in this attitude, and it has for some centuries been recognized by nearly all governments under which they have lived. When the United States became involved in war with Germany, the Quakers (through their leaders in Pennsylvania) raised the question of their objections and asked the government to recognize the genuineness of their attitude. To show their good faith and their sympathy, they formed a unit of men who went to France and did manual labor on the French front. I . . . met several of the leaders of the Quaker Church and found them very fine men, entirely sincere and entirely worthy. They were not cowards and they were not bad Americans. They certainly were not traitors to the cause. They honestly and earnestly believed that it was wrong to kill, and the War Department, as I recall the matter, recognized their objections and specified the kind of work that they might do in lieu of fighting."

The author is not unfamiliar with the interesting and important stories of the lives of Fox and Penn and, if he may say it, he respects the religious scruples of all men. It is in sympathy with zealous people who abhor war, and who have the courage to act in accordance with their convictions and protestations, that he has drawn attention to inevitable consequences of fundamentally hostile spiritual tendencies. See Chapters XXXIX ("Warmakers and Their Work") and XL ("Lords of the Brute Creation").

make the best of a disgrace put upon our own nation, as well as upon France, I suggested to a properly resentful French gentlewoman that "possibly Mr. Baker thought the vigorous Gallic air would put the spark of manhood into the she-hes in pants." The lady sniffed and then laughed, bringing a dash of red into her pale cheeks. She was in deep mourning. She had given her father and three brothers, her sweetheart and I cannot say how many other near and dear real men, to the greedy battle-fields, and her mother had died after the youngest boy, a mere child, was torn to bits by a shell.

The French could not understand things that walked like men and seemed to be able to stand erect, without an ounce or an inch of backbone or as much heart as a lizard.

Aboard the *Chicago*, and more than six months later, returning home on the *Patria*, I made a special study of "Baker's Pets." Not a "slacker" among them but would have looked well with a gun on his shoulder. Indeed, as a rule, they were bigger, healthier-looking specimens—I almost wrote of "humanity"—than one usually sees in a day's walk. Four of them were over six feet in height and almost as broad as so many bulls.

One of these shameless "she-hes" told me that he was a Western banker and gave me his card. He crossed my path afterward in France, and again on the Boulogne-Folkstone packet. He was very busy in Europe. It was his sort of business at Bern and other places and the presence of such undesirables in the "chosen home of chivalry and garden of romance," not to speak of the comings and goings of Mr. Pacifist Secretary Baker, that caused many of our best friends firmly to believe our President to be "a pro-German pacifist." That was one of the handicaps that preceded Mr. Wilson to France.

He who is unwilling to serve his country as a soldier is unfit to help govern his country as a citizen.

The nation that mollicoddles the "conscientious objector" is digging its own grave.

CHAPTER VI

FOR PEACE OR FOR WAR?

WHEN, during the last two weeks of 1918 and the first two weeks of 1919, the delegations chosen to negotiate peace in the interest of civilization, which is organized humanity, presented themselves in Paris, they came into an atmosphere suggesting few things that they were committed to maintain and many things that they were desired to destroy. That was natural and inevitable.

Clouded skies, muddy pavements, mist, rain, and the swollen Seine—even the beautiful capital of France must perforce pay tribute to the most unpleasant time of the year. Dark were these days, while wisdom and worth sought light to rebuild where so much had been destroyed. Dark and ugly were the captured German cannon, parked on the Place de la Concorde. Dark, but beautiful, were the widow's weeds worn by the wives of those who had bought victory with their lives. The scars were still fresh on stately, aged façades of the Boulevard St. Germain, and boarded-off debris in many places told where shell and bomb had struck while the heart of France was being scorched and stabbed by the ruthless foe. Soldiers, the uniforms of many nations, were everywhere. The armistice was uncompleted, unfulfilled, unrenewed. Ashes of war that had not time to cool shot sparks into the faces of the peacemakers, and irritated some of them. That, too, was natural and inevitable.

Still, as light shines most brightly in the midst of darkness, the mere fact that France, standing at arms alongside a brutal, prone assailant, could turn her justly angry eyes from her own wounds so as to see and to think for others as well as

for herself, was as a star of hope to those who had come from afar to build for peace, and not again for war. Out of every nook and cranny of this congress of the nations the fact stood revealed that we were at work for peace, or for war in Asia. That grim truth shouted its way by day and by night up and down the Seine.

Europe was comparatively safe, and France, primarily, had saved it. Sore spots in Europe had involved most of the world in war, and these scars were perpetuated, where they were not originated, by the bad surgery of the old diplomacy. Who could walk the streets of war-wreathed Paris, more winsome and more glorious than ever in its sublime, smiling sadness, and not feel aware of the crime that would be committed if, here of all places in the world, and in these dark days of all days, the new surgery should prove itself as barren in art and as bankrupt in worth as that of Vienna and Berlin, and the running sores of the Far East be permitted to reproduce the havoc and the horror wrought by far less serious ulcers in the Near East?

European and American acquired interests and responsibilities, the manifest disproportion between the military and potential strength of Japan and China, the feverish scramble for new markets, the necessity that had arisen for the conservation of raw materials and the prevention of monopolies that would be bound to lead to trouble, the democratic trend in China and the anti-social blight in Russia, the young Malay nation that is growing up in the Philippines—these were high lights, but they were not the highest of all. Above and beyond all of them was the sudden awakening in the chancelleries of the West to a question previously apparent only to a few—the one, signal, solemn question that has been staring out of Asia since Japan made the Muscovite reel at Moukden. While world power still rests in the hands of the West, must the lines of history be so drawn in the East as to encourage or provoke united action by the East against a possibly disunited West?

This was the central problem from which all other issues and opinions must radiate. Alongside this ghost at the congress table, other disconcerting shades seemed as mere minor *marids* dancing attendance upon the monstrous King of the Jinn. When this truth was duly sensed, many facts and circumstances of the congress would become self-explanatory. It was unthinkable that any statesman in the conclave of world-wide talent and experience would deliberately do aught to plunge the world into another, and possibly worse, catastrophe.

Yet common sense, some knowledge of conflicting national aspirations and of the weaknesses of human will,—the danger that lurks in the pride of victory itself,—to say nothing of the too general ignorance of the bearing of the most ordinary affairs of industrial and social local growths upon politics of international magnitude,—the California school cases, the right of Japanese or Chinese to acquire land in the Philippines, for example,—compelled one to give pause before leaping to the assumption that even notably able representatives of the more orderly communities of the earth had, each and all, learned fully the great lesson of the war—the world's dire need of some practicable, common and uniform check upon individual national rapacity. Close to the congress, that was unfortunately manifest. And in order to balance probabilities, it was deemed well to note it down and set it off against more idealist generalities, such as the acceptance, in principle merely, of a League of Nations. Civilization, as Marquis Okuma has pointed out, like water, will maintain its own level. Humanity may be inspired by a theory higher than its own will, but it cannot be controlled by a theory that is weaker than the will to traverse it. Also, if the strength of a nation is still to be measured by the length of its bayonet, there seemed very little disposition in Paris to turn these death-dealing instruments into agricultural implements. That was the impression one gathered with the aid of good eyesight, active ears, and an open mind.

There was a correlative impression that ought also to be

noted. It is not always necessary to use the bayonet. The methods of Welhelm Hohenzollern during the Bosnian-Herzegovinian crisis still appeared to serve. Results could be obtained by merely brandishing the bayonet. That fact was driven home while the question of representation was being decided. Japan was given five delegates; China only two. Japan was seated in important preliminary conferences; China was kept out in the cold exterior darkness. When her allotment was made, to use a figure of speech that will be appreciated by "old China hands," China's delegation was relegated to the "Hall of Tributary Nations." She paired off with Great Britain's dominions and colonies, brave Belgium, gallant Greece, and other admirable, small nations. Very good company, it is true.

Paris in December was not itself at all. It was like a proud child whose toys have been taken away. It choked back its sobs and with half-swimming eyes, dark with sullen discontent, pouted its silent defiance as it went unwillingly to bed, angry, but still beautiful. Paris could never be ugly, no matter how hard it might try.

It was late in the evening when we arrived at the Gare du Quai d'Orsay and drove through the dusk over the Pont Royale to the Hôtel Wagram on the Rue de Rivoli. After we had registered, inspected our rooms, rinsed the cinders from our faces and hands, and assembled for our first promenade, the city of cities was pitch dark. We picked our way to the Rue de Castiglione, recognized the Vendôme Column, a spectral finger pointing upward into the black night, and walked up the Rue de la Paix to the opera-house and back to the hotel, after a shadowy glimpse of the Madeleine and a saunter along the Boulevard des Capucines. The world's playhouse was as silent as the grave.

The tall French windows of my room opened upon a broad veranda, high up on the Rivoli front of the hotel, and I managed to get ahead of the crowing cock to see Paris cast off

the misty mantle of night and arise out of the shadows like some wonderful princess of fairy land whose beauty has baffled the black ogre and bade him begone. The gardens of the Tuileries lay almost beneath my feet. In front was the silver Seine and the southern part of the city. On my left hand was the majestic Louvre and on my right a good view of the Place de la Concorde and the great Arc de Triomphe at the head of the Champs-Élysées. One by one the dome of the Invalides, the big wheel, the Eiffel Tower, Notre Dame, and the quaint top of the Tour St.-Jacques revealed themselves; and bronze and silver bells, great and small, sang their anthems to the morn. Often afterward these first sights and sounds of Paris were destined to come back and to cheer me when the peace-making on the Quai d'Orsay and up at Place des États-Unis was as dark and as dismal as my first Paris night.

We had entered Paris by way of Bordeaux, and on the railway journey we saw detachments of the troops of all the nations that had combined to defeat the Germans. They were of every imaginable size, shape, color, and age. We saw the great terminal buildings and railway constructed by our army engineers with a speed and efficiency that had amazed the Europeans. At Bordeaux we had reason to feel proud of our contribution to the winning of the war. Then in Paris and elsewhere we began to take note of the innumerable uniforms, the persistent prevalence of the American officer, the dark garb of the girls and the old women, and the beardless boys and grizzled veterans in the ill-cut horizon blue of France.

There was a suggestion of sickly yellow in the brown on the American pass that was given me to admit me to the Crillon. The British pass was crimson, white, and gold. And the pass of the French was black and white, the mourning colors for the old and for the young. They do these things so delicately in France.

Nobody sang, nobody danced, among the French. After we had visited the battle-fields and walked through whole

towns reduced to powdered brick and mortar, and given up counting the cripples, the widows, and the orphans, we began to understand why, but not thoroughly. It was only when we heard hard words about the French that the whole truth flashed upon us, without as much as a murmur from the French. We had saved France. Yes; but at what terrible cost to the French! Not merely the precious million and a third of the bravest and best, mostly in young and middle manhood; not the age-honored shrines and cities destroyed by the Germans. The price that France was called upon to pay could not be measured in dead or in ducats. Her breast had to offer itself to the boots of millions of alien men in arms that the France we idealize might arise once more and live on for us all.

Purposely, I asked Mr. Percy Mitchel, the director of the Paris office of "The New York Herald," to secure for me a room in some plain workaday home, where I might live among French people uninfluenced by the least knowledge of our own language. Mr. Mitchel saw that my wish was gratified. I crossed the river to old Lutetia—the most ancient part of Paris. There, in the heart of the Students' Quarter, I lived during my attendance at the peace conference. I murdered the melodious French language on the top floor of 27, Rue de l'Abbé-Grégoire, and a dear old lady mothered me from the first, just as though I were her own son, a sweet young Frenchwoman sistered me, and all the neighbors showered me with kindness. Nothing was left undone to make me feel absolutely at home. It wrenched the heart to part from them when the time came to pack up and to go. Great tears streamed down the old lady's cheeks, and little children brought me flowers that they had walked far to pick for me with their little hands.

I have gone into these seemingly trivial details, because they suggest some things that were overlooked by our distinguished peacemakers in Paris. If our truly great President could only have got a little closer to the real heart of France, much shorter and smoother would have been the way to peace; and,

instead of a gigantic "paper peace," he might have brought back a peace written deep in the heart of our friends and in the brains of our enemies—a real, durable, universal peace. That was not to be.

CHAPTER VII

THE "BIG THREE"

THEY were three. Newspapers and the people of a large part of the world spoke of the "Big Four." There might have been more. Still, the fact remains that they were three, Woodrow Wilson, Georges Clemenceau, and David Lloyd George. I have named them in the order of merit and actual importance.

His foes and critics notwithstanding, Woodrow Wilson was by far the ablest among the participants in the Conference of Paris. He towered over them all. As an idealist, he was the soul of the Conference. From the purely intellectual point of view, he could hold his own with the best of them, and there were one or two intellectual giants in other delegations,—Bourgeois for the French; Balfour for the British,—but only one other at the top of his own "pile," Venizelos, the great Greek. When Mr. Wilson gave his mind and his soul and his heart a chance, he was the master of the Paris Conference. He did not always elect to do that; hence, his failures in detail, because, though deemed disastrous in their sum, they were, after all, merely failures in detail. He wanted a League of Nations. He got it—at least, on paper. His answers to senators on August 19, 1919, confessed failure in detail.

Georges Clemenceau is a droll figure of a man, and a little giant in his own way. Standing alongside Mr. Wilson, Clemenceau instantly suggested "Little Jeff" to the President's "Mutt." I never saw him without the inseparable dark gray suède gloves. He wore them always when presiding over the plenary sessions. He would sit for long spells with clasped hands, and his head cocked over a humped shoul-

der, with ear trained upon the speaker of the moment. Then, perhaps, he would wrinkle his large forehead, shake his head up and down, turn it around, and glare at the gentleman who was taking up the time that stood between France and peace. France wanted peace in a hurry and with a fanfare. Clemenceau, as the political incarnation of France, wanted peace at a pen-stroke. I think we all like his loyalty to his own people. That was the real secret of his hold upon Allied affections in Paris. He was so frank in his zeal for France! He tore everything else out of his path, just like a big cat springing to save her young ones.

Clemenceau is a great French editor. Now, it must be confessed that the French press has still far to go before it can take its place with the British and American press as a dependable, honest force in the formation of democratic public opinion. The majority of the Paris newspapers are sadly corrupt and lax in their methods of news-gathering and news presentation. Georges Clemenceau is a working journalist, with a high sense of the mission of the newspaper. Apparently, he has strong opinions about some of the tendencies of French reporters. Certainly, he disfavored any attempt to open up the real proceedings of the conference to the reporters present from all parts of the world.

"Where shall we put the photographers?" an Allied intermediary asked, when press arrangements were being considered.

"Put them in the donjon," snapped "the Tiger."

Just before the dramatic Italian "walkout," Signor Orlando was pleading Italy's claims to Fiume before his colleagues of the Council of Four, at "The House of the Flirt."

He was addressing his remarks particularly to Mr. Wilson. Mr. Lloyd George was sitting back in his chair, in a "brown study." Mr. Wilson was leaning forward, listening patiently. M. Clemenceau, leaning back, was listening impatiently.

"See," exclaimed the Italian premier, waving his arms and shivering his silvery crop; "the press of France is unari-

mously in our favor. Every newspaper echoes our desire—'Italy should have Italian Fiume!'

Clemenceau tapped Orlando on the arm, cupped his gloved left hand over his lips, and roared into the left ear of the impassioned Roman, in a "stage whisper":

"Would you like me to tell the President how much money it cost?"

Never another word said Orlando. He swore under his breath as he took his defeated departure.

The covenant of the League of Nations was never voted upon by the Paris Conference. "The Tiger" got tired of listening to too many and too long speeches. When he decided that patience was no longer a virtue, he stood up and waved down a member of one of the minor delegations.

"There being no objection," said the great, little man, "I declare President Wilson's motion adopted unanimously."

Those who understood French laughed enjoyment of "the Tiger's" jest. Others wondered what had happened, because Lieutenant Mantoux had no time to translate the "cloture." M. Clemenceau had given Mr. Barnes his cue, and the British labor leader was promptly on his feet and well into his speech, moving an amendment to the international labor protocol.

I was close to Clemenceau's home when the neurotic devil-dreamer, Cottin, sought to end the life of the French premier on the morning of February 19, 1919. A sob shook France within the ensuing hour. The outrage further endeared "the Tiger" to his own people. Of course it made us, Associates and Allies, more susceptible to the influence of his personal magnetism, which was at all times a powerful factor. I think the general attitude of potentates and public toward the French member of "the Big Three" can best be summed up in the phrase, we all liked Clemenceau.

What were his views about the Far East?

He expressed them to Dr. Wellington Koo of the Chinese delegation.

"I should like to help China," he said; "but I feel bound by the pledge given to Japan by my predecessor."

He meant the note of M. Briand, forwarded to Tokio at the end of February and delivered to Viscount Motono on March 1, 1917, promising to support Japan's desires regarding Kiaochau. M. Clemenceau most undoubtedly took his Far Eastern views, ready-made, from M. Stéphen Pichon, his foreign minister and a former French minister at Peking. M. Pichon's views are largely those of the directors of the French Bank of Commerce and Industry and the Indo-Chinese Bank. There is not much altruism about the Chinese policy of the Quai d'Orsay. It would be better for France, and much easier for her friends to admire French statesmanship, were the department directed during the Paris conference by the admirable M. Gout divorced from its unfortunate financial ramifications.

M. Clemenceau and Marquis Saionji, we were told, met as old friends, with many recollections in common and many ideas in common. The marquis, like "the Tiger," has an inseparable companion of the opposite sex who adores her favorite statesman. Many of the Japanese newspapers were more interested in chronicling *bons mots* about the lovely O-Hanasan than in speculating upon Shantung or the "race question." The marquis put up at the Meurice when he arrived in Paris from Marseilles, March 1, 1919. As soon as possible (in the fatal last week of April), he moved to a charming house, 50 Rue Bassano. I know beyond the shadow of a doubt that one of his purposes in taking that house was in order that he might be able to receive his friend M. Clemenceau with more privacy and comfort. The Meurice is a magnificent hotel, superbly conducted, but obviously the house on the Rue Bassano provided a far better meeting-place for two diplomats, old and wise in the arts of the game.

I cabled "The New York Herald" the news that Saionji and Clemenceau were negotiating a Franco-Japanese alliance

before as much as a whisper of this important development had got to the ears of anyone beyond the very limited French and Japanese circle admitted to the secret. My information came first-hand from one in a position to know the truth and whom I could depend upon to tell me only the truth. The secret was well kept, as political secrets go. That I found out what was doing is merely an illustration of the fact that nothing could be kept secret in the circumstances that governed the Conference of Paris.

There was nothing sinister in this Franco-Japanese proposition, which may or may not become an actual part of the Far Eastern series of alliances. There was no anti-American or anti-Chinese taint in the proceedings. There was no basis whatsoever for sensational anti-Japanese and anti-French assertions woven out of the simple statement of fact contained in my "Herald" cablegram. That the usually well informed "Temps" permitted itself to be drawn into a discussion of "an Anglo-French-Japanese Triple Alliance for the partition of Asia" was one of the amusing features of the Shantung controversy. The "partition" feature was a weird dream from the brain-pans of practised dreamers.

I had not seen David Lloyd George for almost twenty years when I shook hands with him in Paris. I found him much changed and apparently for the better. Time had mellowed the once incoherent Welshman. The Lloyd George who supported Mr. Wilson's eloquent oration for a league of peace in the Hall of the Clock was a much finer figure than the obscure Welsh member who mobilized the "nonconformist conscience" under the Liberal leadership of the jocular Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. His periods were more rounded, his rhetoric less flamboyant. Also, he was much better barbered and groomed. Some premiers feel it desirable to keep up appearances.

Lloyd George had indisputable claims upon American good-will. He is a self-made man. He began as a small town attorney and Little Bethel lay preacher. He felt his way

carefully over the shoulders of his Welsh miners, uttered orthodox nonconformist views until, "with the nonconformist conscience in the hollow of his fiercely clenched hand," he climbed upon the treasury bench, which is to say, the government of the British Empire.

In height and general appearance Lloyd George suggested a compromise between his American and French associates in the management of the Conference. Usually, there was a subtle message in the twinkling eye and the ingratiating smile that greeted the reporter or newspaper photographer as a man and a brother. "Our Davy" was never too tired or too teased to please the crowd. He proved himself by far the best politician and tactician at the Paris Conference.

Wilson's mind was fenced about by fixed notions, postulates, principles. Clemenceau's clarity of vision was at times obscured by cynical selfishness. His ideas, always practical and pointed to protect France, came like stout logs carried downstream under the fierce force of a torrential rainstorm. He would cough and spit blood and relapse into sudden silence. Lloyd George, with no principles to bother him, thinking and talking one day one way and the next waxing even more eloquent in an opposite direction, leaped the hurdles of Wilson's conscientious scruples and dodged the logs of "the Tiger's" logic not at all through force of sheer ability,—he was the least able of the three,—but simply because of his native and acquired nimbleness, his ability and his willingness to take orders from the British brains that employed him as a speaking-trumpet.

Like Mr. Wilson, Lloyd George worked under a severe strain, and one eye was always trained upon the French villa of Lord Northcliffe. The famous Irish newspaper king is England's political Warwick of to-day. and well did David know that the axe employed to decapitate the Asquith ministry was bright and sharp and ready to tumble a new head into the yawning basket of the head-hunter of Carmelite House and Printing House Square.

An American of high standing ventured the opinion that "Lloyd George is not a great man."

"Is that so?" retorted one who knows the British leader well and loves him not at all. "Well, you just try to take his job away from him. Then you will see how great he is."

Lloyd George knows very little about the Far East. He confessed his ignorance—a sign of real greatness. He took the advice of the British experts—a sign of great common sense. He was cordial to both Chinese and Japanese. That was very proper and very sensible. Americans anxious to see in operation a real alliance of the English-thinking peoples, and therefore eager to welcome an end to the long-continued feud between the English and the Irish nations, very strongly disapprove of the unfortunate way in which Lloyd George has played with the Irish question. It is a black smudge on the Welshman's record. So, when it is said that no Allied leader came out of the Paris Conference with anything like the horn of plenty that David took with him to London and his own people, there need be no suspicion that undue partiality is father to the thought. The British delegation won its victories very largely because of the leadership of Lloyd George, who was quite content to play the cards that more expert technicians put into his hands every time that he put on his hat to drive over to Mr. Wilson's "House of the Flirt."

Before leaving to attend the critical conclave with the much-troubled Chinese, after lunch on April 22, "Our David" had a long and earnest conference with Mr. Balfour and Mr. Ronald Macleay. He listened very carefully to the fundamentals of the Chinese-Japanese controversy, and particularly to the points of vital British policy involved. He asked few questions. They were not necessary. He was relying upon the knowledge and judgment of his foreign secretary and chief expert on Far Eastern matters. Lloyd George, like Wilson, was hotly criticized, because British experts complained that he paid too little attention to their wishes. Be that as it may,

I have reason to know that the British premier followed implicitly the British leads given to him regarding England and the Far East. He made no mistakes, from the purely British point of view. An incident that occurred on April 23 illustrates this fact.

The Chinese spokesmen, Mr. Lou and Dr. Koo, were urging the nullification of the treaties and notes of May, 1915, charging that they were secured by the Japanese by means of duress.

"How about the agreements of 1918?" asked Mr. David Lloyd George.

This was very awkward for the Chinese, and the discussion that followed paved the way for the proposal then put to the Chinese by the British member of the peace triumvirate. He asked them to say whether they would prefer to be bound by the German contracts of 1898, *et seq.*, or by the Japanese contracts of 1915-18?

The Chinese protested respectfully that from their point of view the alternative proposed was hardly a fair one.

Mr. Lloyd George nodded in a sympathetic way.

"No," he said; "possibly it would hardly be fair to ask you to commit yourself in that way."

Mr. Wilson was the tallest of "The Big Three," from the base to the top of his brain, as well as from head to heel. At times he was superb. That is the tragedy of the Paris Conference, from his own and the American point of view. If he had told Clemenceau and Lloyd George that they could take or leave the sort of peace that it was his duty to America and to the world to carry back with him to Washington, he could have got that kind of peace. He had the public opinion of the whole world at his back. In a weak moment, induced undoubtedly by the terrible strain he had imposed upon himself and intensified by the barriers he had built between himself and the public, he threw down his hand, and Clemenceau and Lloyd George snatched the victory from him and gave it to their old diplomats and the rump of imperialism.

Still, for all that, there is one scene among many during

the Conference of Paris that I love to look back upon, for there I see Woodrow Wilson, the ideal American statesman, at his best, in his greatest moment of the conference; I think he would say himself, the proudest moment of his life. Let me describe him here, as I drew the picture that day (January 25, 1919), for "Asia" magazine:

It was my good fortune to be one of that favored audience before whom Woodrow Wilson read the "riot act" to Old Diplomacy in the Salon of the Clock at the Quai d'Orsay. I had the luck to secure one of the best available seats, just a little bit in front and to the left of the President. Listening to him, watching the play of his face and hands, my thoughts went back to quite another scene, in England, nineteen years ago. The stage was that of the Empire Theater in Oldham, Lancashire. The speaker was Joseph Chamberlain. It was that great night during the Khaki election when Chamberlain, supporting the candidature of Winston Churchill, hurled his defiance at the Kaiser. "What I have said, I have said." Chamberlain, expressing truly the Anglo-Saxon mind of that period, said, "We are all imperialists, *now*." It was a Parthian shot at the Majuba policy of his former chief, Gladstone. Also, it had in mind the American entry into the Philippines and Asia.

Now, here in the Salon of the Clock was the archangel of anti-imperialism smashing into fragments the Chamberlain idea of Anglo-Saxon development. Chamberlain was a true friend of America; he was a great democrat and the personification of British imperialism, at the same time. He was also in platform appearance, manner, and sometimes in speech, Wilson's double. The strong, yet delicate, gentle face. The fine eyes and brow and the lips of the born elocutionist, talking even while silent and in repose. The freedom from unnecessary gesture, yet telling sweep of the hand, as when the President almost pointed at M. Clemenceau, while he reminded the Conference that this is to be a peoples' peace and not a peace of governments. Take one glass from Wilson and insert a white orchid in the lapel of the frockcoat and you have Chamberlain—his political opposite, nineteen years ago. It would be well to write a book on the text of that curious resemblance, and it would be well to write it in Japanese. It would show that the world has really gained something out of the horrible tragedy inflicted upon it by Germany's vaulting ambition. It would assert that were Chamberlain alive and in his prime today, he would be on the President's side. And he would be on the side of Wang and Koo and their Chinese policy

and a redoubtable opponent of the Japanese Korean policy toward China, which has nothing to offer Japan except unhatched hell in some hour of the world's tomorrow.

Much water, clear and foul, has gone under the Far Eastern bridges since that was written. Yet it would serve no good purpose to alter a word of it. It was true at the time. It remains true. The world must choose between enlightened liberalism and national greed. There is no other choice. Glossed over though it be, the unpleasant fact remains that "the Big Three" chose greedy imperialism and put themselves in a position where any decision of the Shantung question other than that written into the treaty of peace would have been as laughable and inconsistent with their governing policy as the motives back of the decision were unsavory and weak.

CHAPTER VIII

“THE OSSIFIED FOUR”

THE American press delegation was housed at 4, Place de la Concorde. At first, Major O'Brien, a capable army officer, was in evidence, but about the time that criticism was aroused in the United States and in France because of unnecessary and improper army censorship interference with the work of the American peace conference reporters, Major O'Brien was transferred to another detail, and our relations with the American officials were conducted directly through our own press committee and Mr. Ray Standard Baker, the American official press representative. Mr. Baker was assisted by Mr. Albert Sweetzer, a hard-working, cool-headed, and clever young publicist; and by Miss Katharine Groth, a very charming young lady, a cultivated linguist, and an expert stenographer.

Major O'Brien secured my American and French passes for me. Armed with these cards of identity, I walked over to the Hôtel Crillon with Florence O'Neil, of the Pittsburgh "Dispatch." I was just in time to attend a seance with "the Ossified Four."

I am not sure that it was Mr. William Allen White of Kansas who first bestowed this title upon Mr. Wilson's associates with the rank of plenipotentiary in the American mission to negotiate peace. The term, however, was the one most popular among the newspaper writers, particularly after an exasperating hour torn from a grueling, busy day, and wasted upon unsuccessful efforts to extract anything like news from the four excellent gentlemen supposed to be coöperating with the President in the conduct of our business in Paris.

These matutinal sessions took place on the first floor of the Crillon. The conference room was spacious, with furnishings that were necessarily an agreeable compromise between a business office and a drawing-room. We filed into the chamber, after proper identification by a clerk and a secret-service man, and then stood in a row, like so many "Brown's cows," usually welcomed by Mr. Kirke, Mr. Lansing's private secretary, and by Lieutenant Condon, who assisted Mr. Henry White. Then the four statesmen would enter from a side door communicating with Mr. Lansing's private office, followed by Mr. Sweet, Mr. Lansing's confidential secretary, who usually stood just within the door, with a formidable official portfolio tucked under his arm. General Bliss, as a rule, helped himself to the most convenient, comfortable chair and welcomed us with a cheerful Rooseveltian "good morning," much as he was wont to do to some of us at the Estado Mayor, or Fort Pilar, years before, while on overseas service on the opposite side of the globe. Mr. White and Colonel House remained in the background. Mr. Lansing stood in front, obviously nervous and boyishly bashful, trying to appear as cheerful as possible, but knowing just as well as any of us that it was all a woeful waste of time and trouble. Seldom, if ever, did we learn anything worth while.

And as the conference got into its stride, one by one the plenipotentiaries began to drop out, until at last only Mr. White was left. Then our own morning conference became a class in diplomacy. Under Mr. White we developed a closer acquaintance with the arts and ways of old diplomacy, learned much about *de jure* and *de facto* governments, and how the Empress Eugénie took the fall of the Second Empire and her departure from France. Mr. White is a gentleman, a scholar, an accomplished diplomat, and one hundred per cent. American. I must say that he proved himself to be a loyal Republican, as well as a loyal American in Paris. He scrupulously abstained from meddling with the purely administration performances of the President. Not merely that, but he

gave Mr. Wilson an example of diplomatic propriety which the President might well have followed.

When early in February Mr. Sean T. O'Ceallaigh (O'Kelly) burst upon Paris with the green-and-golden glow of Sinn Fein, Mr. White acted in accordance with the precepts laid down by Sir Ernest Satow and the French nobleman who represented the Grande Monarque in the making of the Peace of Westphalia, and then wrote about it for the proper instruction of the diplomatic neophyte. Diplomacy is the art of good usage in the relations between nations.

Mr. White religiously kept hands off the Irish question. As will be seen, he was right in preserving his diplomatic neutrality, while Mr. Wilson and Colonel House were wrong in meddling with a matter that they could not touch without destroying their usefulness to the American people.

Mr. White's presence in Paris was very useful to Mr. Wilson. It soon became clear that the President was one of the chief opponents of "open diplomacy" in the making of the peace. When the American newspaper men outwitted Mr. Wilson and the other managers of the peace conference and forced them to open the plenary sessions to the press, Mr. Wilson took a leading part in withdrawing the real business of the conference from the fourscore delegates and the eyes and ears of the public and keeping it behind numerous closed doors. It is a matter of record that Mr. Wilson continuously withheld knowledge of the most vital matters from the associated American plenipotentiaries, particularly Mr. White. So Mr. White, knowing little or nothing of what was going on, could not tell anything to the reporters with whom he always preserved the most pleasant relations.¹

The managers of mankind acted very foolishly in trying to make the Paris Conference a secret conference. Manifestly, that was a physical impossibility. There were over

¹ So true is this, that the first information of important acts and several vital official documents were obtained from the personal notes and files of the author during and after the Paris proceedings.—P. G.

eighty delegates and twenty-eight allied and associated delegations. There were numerous and sharp differences of opinion, even within the delegations. At no time did I experience any difficulty in securing sufficiently exact information regarding anything that I wanted to know. The only difficulty was how far one could go in utilizing information without endangering the work of the conference and American interests or getting an official friend into hot water.

These foolish attempts at secrecy invited trouble. Any reporter could have warned the President that this would be so, and doubtless Mr. Wilson was warned by his newspaper friends. Which suggests a little story worth telling. It illustrates one of the possible causes of Mr. Wilson's asserted failure in Paris.

One day Mr. Wilson and Mr. Balfour were discussing some matter upon which the British had agreed to be guided by the decision of the President. Mr. Balfour has a very plausible manner of explaining away difficulties. Many years spent upon the front treasury bench of the British House of Commons, especially during “Questions time,” has taught Mr. Balfour how to smooth out political wrinkles. He proved himself the most polished and successful explainer in Paris, and there were several efficient explainers.

Mr. Wilson was not in the best of temper. Something had soured either upon his stomach or upon his mind. Before Mr. Balfour was quite through with his explanation, Mr. Wilson interjected:

“I don't agree. I don't agree with you at all.”

“But your experts do, Mr. President,” said Mr. Balfour, smiling that bland, beatific smile.

Mr. Wilson impressed us as peculiarly disdainful of expert advice. The records of the conference contain confirmation of the assertion that so surely as experts would recommend a certain course to the President, he could always be depended upon to pursue the opposite course, which certainly did not improve some expert tempers.

In justice to the President, however, I must say that Mr. David Lloyd George was charged by British experts with being tarred with the same peculiar stick. One day I was lunching with a party of British and American experts, and we were comparing the respective heads of our delegations and their peculiarities. We all agreed that David and Woodrow were apparently united upon one thing; namely, the minor value of expert opinion. We offered various explanations. A famous British authority contributed the one that was accepted unanimously without further discussion. Said he:

“Mr. Wilson knows too much, and ‘L. G.’ too little about experts.”

That is true. Mr. Wilson is a scholar and a scientist. Mr. Lloyd George has little scholarship and no science except that of parliamentary politics.

I do not wish to convey the impression that “the Ossified Four” were in any manner lacking in proper response to their duty toward the press and to the public. At all times, it was a pleasure to approach them—separately. They were not to blame for the impossible conditions under which they were compelled to play not always dignified parts in the conduct of the people’s business.

Colonel House was the first to play truant from the seances of “the Ossified Four.” He organized a counter-attraction of his own, confined to a more limited audience, which was offered every evening at six o’clock. We called these the “House Conferences.” Colonel House did not talk diplomacy. He lived up to at least one sentence of his biographer, the author of “The Real Colonel House”; that is to say, “he talked airy generalities,” and I am sorry to have to record that he often made statements that were, unintentionally, of course, misleading. He was always quite sincere. Colonel House is a very charming gentleman who tries to do the very best that he can. Sometimes he tried to do too much. He tried to settle the Irish question. He tried to settle the Shantung question. He made a horrible mess of both.

One evening an American reporter asked him :

“How about the Shantung question?”

“Oh,” retorted Colonel House, “there won’t be any trouble about that. I can settle it in ten minutes.”

He did, but in such manner as to break the hearts of the Chinese people and to put the Japanese in a very difficult position, not to speak of the storm that was due to follow in Congress and throughout the country.

CHAPTER IX

“THE FEEBLE FIVE”

THE Ides of March, 1919, found the Conference of Paris under the fingers and thumbs of “the Big Three.” Signor Orlando, whose temporary presence gave to this superior cabinet its formal title, the Council of Four, made a brave show of importance. He was never really important. He was content to seem important. There were in Paris other Allied and Associated statesmen who were more concerned with being important than in “putting up a front.” Mr. Balfour, for instance. Baron Makino and Sidney Sonnino were equally determined that they should have something to say in the actual writing of the peace.

From the afternoon of March 14, Paris buzzed with sensational gossip. Resignations and withdrawals were in the air. Even the most discreet statesman can be driven into speech, and Mr. Wilson’s act in vaulting suddenly into the part of Atlas sent more than one foreign minister into a roaring, raging temper. Thus started the stories about Mr. Lansing’s letter of resignation and M. Pichon’s protest of indignation. To silence this gossip, to save their own “face,” but more particularly to keep Arthur James Balfour sufficiently busy so that he would have less time in which to hatch more mischief for “the Biggest One,” the Council of Four gave birth to “the Feeble Five.”

The name was simply irresistible. It came pat to the tongue of its own volition. It was snappier by far than the official term, the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Stéphen Pichon was president of “the Feeble Five.” Baron Makino was the only Asiatic member. Mr. Robert Lansing

was liberated to an extent from the machinations of Colonel House, who was left foot-loose as the understudy of “the Emperor.” Balfour, Makino, and Sonnino monopolized the brain-power of “the Feeble Five.”

Arthur Balfour had the professional “age” on all those present at the peacemaking. He alone could boast—but Balfour is British, and a British gentleman never boasts—that he had sat around the green baize of the Berlin Congress. Yes, he was there with his uncle, the marquis, in 1878; with Salisbury and with Disraeli, with Gortchakoff and with Bismarck. He had his slender, delicate finger in that pie, as the secretary of the marquis who played second fiddle to “Sidonia,” the most brilliant Jew among several in the making of the British Empire.

The story of British success and American failure in Paris could best be written from the diary of Arthur Balfour. He represented in his own person all that the American delegation lacked—knowledge, experience, expert efficiency, tact, profound plausibility. Arthur James is the most plausible thing on two feet. Only once did he lose his temper, and even then it was lost so politely we felt the fact that it was tossed aside in our interest.

The Hall of the Clock is handsome, but not hygienic. Once it became so surcharged with the bad breaths of all nations that the atmosphere was simply insufferable. Arthur James, with his pink skull and cheeks and thin white hair,—remnants of the famous “mutton chops” of years gone by,—stood the air pressure just as long as was humanly possible. He struggled to keep his seat, looking anxiously over the shoulder of Lloyd George at the black skullecrap of Georges Clemenceau. Surely, M. Clemenceau must sense the abominable odor of foul air and would order the windows opened! Old Georges was not thinking about fresh air. He was swearing under his breath at hot air—the endless, aimless succession of speeches. Balfour yawned behind the back of his fine hand, stretched himself, got up, and examined the nearest window. He

whispered a request in his excellent French to one of the Quai d'Orsay attendants. There was the inevitable shrugging of shoulders and outthrusting of French hands. The British minister for foreign affairs braced himself and tried to open the window. Impossible! He returned to his chair in quite evident disgust.

Leaning over to Sir Robert Borden, he said:

"I don't believe those windows were ever opened since the death of Louis Philippe. I can smell his breath, can't you?"

Americans are good sportsmen. Mr. Balfour's many American friends hold no grudge against him for the able way in which he put the orange peels of the Carlton Club under Mr. Wilson's oxfords at Paris. It was admirably done. He did what he intended to do when he accepted his Paris portfolio.

Said one of our experts, one day:

"It is more painful to be upheld by Mr. Lansing than to be reversed by Mr. Balfour. Mr. Lansing's bad temper is as proverbial as the Englishman's carefully cultivated good humor."

"It is quite a pleasure to be turned down by Mr. Balfour," said another American official friend; "he has such a delightful way of saying 'No.'"

That is a fact with a reservation.

Most people know the story about the diplomat and the lady. When a lady says "No," she means "Perhaps"; when she says "Perhaps," she means "Yes"; if she says "Yes," she's no lady. When a diplomat says "Yes," he means "Perhaps"; if he says "Perhaps," he means "No"; if he says "No," he's no diplomat. Mr. Balfour avoids using the word "No." Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lansing employed it several times in Paris, more than once with quite unnecessary curttness.

It was Mr. Lansing's lack of tact and a gross breach of faith on the part of an American magazine writer at one of the private Crillon newspaper conferences that gave the old diplomats a good excuse that was employed to turn the Con-

ference of Paris into a conglomeration of secret cabinets. Mr. Lansing questioned the veracity of a statement attributed to Marshal Foch. The magazine writer not merely broke faith with his colleagues and the American peace mission by divulging what was said in the Crillon, but he wrote an account of the affair for “L’Humanité,” just then engaged in the pleasant task of seeking the political head of the French premier. It was a melancholy incident. The press conferences were suspended while the case was being dealt with by the very efficient committee of trained and experienced American reporters. This committee guarded against a recurrence of disloyalty, but of course it could not censor Mr. Lansing or Mr. Wilson in their conversation with other plenipotentiaries. That, too, was unfortunate.

Mr. Balfour was England’s ace in Paris, and England played with a full pack of face cards. We had one ace and four deuces. The British utilized the panel system, and drew cards to suit the openings of the game. Thus, all the brains of the British Empire were mobilized for the task in hand.

The panel system, adopted at the opening of the conference, permitted each duly qualified delegation to put a fresh pitcher in the box whenever it became necessary to do so. We could have availed ourselves of the same advantage, if only Mr. Wilson had not been obsessed by the delusion that he carried in his own head all the wisdom of America. There was work in Paris for Mr. Root, Mr. Taft, Dr. David Jayne Hill, and Mr. Lodge. There was very important work for other able Americans. Mr. Wilson did not realize that fact, and that settled it, him, and us.

The British “played up” Arthur Balfour, just as we might have “played up” Elihu Root. If to be able to own up to ignorance is a sign of greatness, then David Lloyd George is a very great man. Said David once: “I never heard of the Teschen mines until Arthur told me about them.”

At another time during the brief life of the Council of Ten, Marshal Foch was demonstrating the importance of the

Rhine as the natural frontier of France. The marshal illustrated his arguments on a war map. Somebody hazarded the opinion that, to make assurance doubly sure, the new frontier should run down to the source of the river.

"Where is the source of the Rhine?" asked the quick-witted, innocent(?) Welshman.

The question "stumped" several of the great statesmen. Arthur James, as always, came to the rescue. He put his pink finger on the map.

"The only difficulty, there," he said very quietly; "is that we would have to violate the sovereignty of Switzerland."

Then he relapsed into dreamy silence.

Lloyd George tapped the President on the arm.

"Great head for facts," said the Welshman in Wilson's ear; "wonderful chap, Balfour. I don't know what in the world I would do without him."

It was not all "play-acting." Balfour was great; he has ever been great.

When I was a little boy in Cork, Mr. Balfour was very much in the public eye. He was then Chief Secretary for Ireland, applying his stated policy of "twenty years of resolute government," and I remember the ballad made to the meter and tune of "Little Tom Tiddler's Dogs" which put out of Corkonian popularity "The Peeler and the Goat." One of the verses went like this:

But Little Tom's dog is dead, alas!
And the dogs we now meet are a different class,
Scouring the hills and climbing the rocks,
After Mr. Gilhooley and Mr. Cox—
"Bow, wow, wow! Whose dog art thou?"
"Arthur James Balfour's dog,
"Bow, wow, wow!"

Mr. Balfour entered the peace conference with the British case properly tabulated and docketed in the back of his splendid head. He could look back upon a well-rounded half-century of important national and international accomplish-

ments. He had filled many exacting offices with marked ability and success. He was prime minister of England when Mr. Wilson was still an obscure professorial theorist, but little known outside a very limited circle. He was a war premier twenty years before he acted as the brains of the British delegation in Paris. Old parliamentary hands like Gladstone and Harcourt, bitter debaters like Chamberlain, Sexton, and Healy, had taught him a nimbleness of wit and speech on his feet which our own sedentary system denies an executive officer. Balfour epitomized England's chief strength and our chief weakness in Paris and at all times. In the British Empire, the public service is the leading profession. With us, it is the rich man's hobby or the “graft” of some Little Brother of Malefactors of Great Wealth or the equally slavish creature of some subversive “cause.”

For twenty-eight years the late William Woodville Rockhill gave his talent and his time to the thankless task of serving these United States. Mr. Wilson, as soon as he became President, dismissed Mr. Rockhill from our diplomatic corps. Mr. Rockhill died in Honolulu, broken-hearted, the employee of Yuan Sh'ih-kai. He might possibly have been alive to save Mr. Wilson from “coming the cropper” that Hay foresaw in 1900. The ingratitude of his own Government killed him. Of course he could not understand why he should be cast aside to make room for “a deserving Democrat.”

Balfour and Makino had many things in common. Both are philosophers as well as statesmen. Both are interested in the sublime miracle of belief. Although the fact is not generally known, even in his own country, Baron Makino is a profound student of those hidden springs of human emotion that water the roots of human progress and move mountains.

Makino shuns any display of emotion, but he was really one of the most warm-hearted men in the conference. His rôle was the hardest of all.

Racial equality is his paramount policy. He longs to see the day when people will rise above artificial barriers and

enter into a genuine brotherhood of man. Coldness and suspicion confronted his pleas to the peacemakers simply because only one other delegation understood the problem, and self-interest clouded the brains of that mission, the British at the Majestic and Astoria.

Makino and Balfour watched the Kiaochau moves from opposite angles of thought, but with mutual knowledge of the technical position. Makino deprecated the whole controversy and did his best to bring about peace. Balfour was not insensible to the fact that the more Mr. Wilson tied himself in a knot on Fiume and Kiaochau and similar issues of principle, the less was it possible for the President to detect and to prevent those diplomatic deals by which the British foreign secretary manipulated the treaty-making along purely British lines. Balfour had instructed Sir William Conyngham Greene to make the pledge to Motono. He felt personally bound to fulfil the contract, and to do so suited his conception of British Far Eastern policy. Therefore, when Mr. Lansing invited his confrères of "the Feeble Five" to approve a clause taking Kiaochau from Germany and vesting the German rights temporarily in an Allied trusteeship, Makino had merely to point out that the question was in the hands of "the Four."

"That is so," said Mr. Balfour.

And it was so ordered.

CHAPTER X

MARQUIS SAIONJI MOVES

ONE afternoon in Potsdam, about thirty years ago, Kaiser Wilhelm was chatting with the Japanese minister, a young diplomat of aristocratic lineage and very pronounced liberal views. Japan had adopted a constitutional form of government, and the kaiser was having trouble with the German liberals who were demanding parliamentary control, which Wilhelm and his chancellor were determined not to concede. News had just reached the palace that the new Japanese parliament-house had been destroyed by fire.

"It is the will of heaven," said the kaiser to the Japanese minister. "Providence has interposed against a parliament in Japan."

The Japanese minister smiled. He had founded and edited in his island homeland a newspaper, "La Liberté," in which he propagated democratic doctrines imbibed during his student days in France. The Japanese parliament was one of the fruits of the liberal movement he had helped to sustain. Of course the kaiser knew all about that, and the Japanese minister knew that the ambitious young autocrat of Germany was talking with a set purpose. So he replied with equal candor:

"Your Majesty may be right. Still, possibly there might be another explanation. If the gods are angry, it may be because they did not approve the style of the building."

The kaiser flushed and frowned. The answer had been overheard, and there was a sound suspiciously like suppressed laughter. The diplomat from the old East had turned a good joke on the All Highest; because, you see, the Japanese building that had burned down was designed by a German architect.

The author of this famous rebuke to the personification of dangerous pride was the most noble Marquis Saionji, who in the third month of 1919 came to Paris as the chief plenipotentiary of the Empire of the Rising Sun. At noon on March 20 I was received by the marquis in his suite at the Hôtel Meurice on the rue de Rivoli. Saionji is seventy years young.

A little earlier in the day I had called upon Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka at Japanese headquarters, the Hôtel Bristol. Mr. Matsuoka had succeeded in arranging for me a personal interview with the marquis despite the fact that it had been found necessary to lay down a rule confining inquisitive conference reporters to the excellent statements prepared for the venerable statesman at the press bureau in the Place Vendôme. Exception was made in my case and in that of Mr. H. Wickham Steed, who had just become chief editor of the London "Times" and who is one of the oldest European friends of Saionji. A delightful man is Mr. Steed, a great journalist, a great Englishman, a great liberal. I met him often in Paris, and he made a deep, pleasant impression.

Mr. Matsuoka and I walked the short distance from the Bristol to the Meurice, ascended to the marquis's suite and, while we were being announced, chatted with the former premier's adopted son and heir, a younger brother of Prince Ito Mori. Now, that reminds me of a curious, interesting fact, illustrating the passing of the old Japan and Saionji's personal part in molding new Japan.

For many centuries it has been a fixed rule in the Saionji family that the head of the house must not marry. That condemned this great statesman to bachelorhood, but while unwilling to break the house rule in his own favor, he has abolished it in the interest of those who will carry on the ancient dignities of his name. He played Cupid toward his heir, arranging a happy marriage in keeping with the spirit of newer, better times. The future head of the Saionji house is a thoroughly informed man of affairs. We were getting along very



MARQUIS SAIONJI



THE JAPANESE PRESS BUREAU



DR. WANG, MRS. WANG, MRS. T. C. QUO AND MR. DZAU IN
THE GARDENS OF VERSAILLES

nically when a servant returned with word that the marquis awaited us in his sitting-room.

We followed the servant, a door was thrown open, and Mr. Matsuoka requested me to precede him. Immediately I entered the room, I saw near one of the fine French windows a slender man of average Japanese height, dressed in a plain, close-fitting dark-brown woolen walking-suit. Saionji was looking out of the window, deeply intent upon something that was happening down in the street. I had a brief glimpse of a very erect little man, with fine white hair, standing with one hand thrusting aside a lace curtain, when, quick as a flash, he wheeled around and breezed boyishly forward, welcoming me by name and giving me a hearty handshake. Tucking his arm within mine, he led me from the sitting-room into his study. I said to myself, "When I am seventy, I hope I shall be as husky as this Japanese marquis."

He indicated a chair in front of a little table upon which reposed the marquis's cigarette-box and ash-tray, both of Japanese workmanship. Waving Mr. Matsuoka into a second chair a little to my left, Saionji seated himself in a similar chair on the other side of the table and offered us cigarettes. While he was handing around the cigarettes, I noted his large, luminous, and very expressive eyes and absolutely unwrinkled skin. The silken, snowy hair seemed the only suggestion of his ripe old age. I think he caught me studying him as he blew a smoke ring very cleverly and made a remark in Japanese to Mr. Matsuoka, who was to interpret for us.

Mr. Matsuoka satisfied my curiosity.

"He says you, too, look very young. You have been writing so long about the Far East, he expected to meet a much older-looking man."

I expressed my appreciation of the compliment and explained that it was sort of a family gift or infliction, but that I scarcely hoped to compete with his wonderful victory over old Father Time. That led Saionji to talk about two mutual friends, Mr. Steed and the Japanese premier, Mr. Hara, also

a famous editor, who insist upon retaining their youth despite the fact that their hair turned white quite early in life. Saionji startled me by saying in exquisite English that newspaper work must keep men young.

"Perhaps," said he; "you have not time to grow old-looking?"

I had been led to believe that the marquis neither understood nor spoke English. Saionji enjoyed my surprise. Mr. Matsuoka came to the rescue.

"The marquis," he said, "speaks so little English that he seldom uses it for fear of doing the language an injustice."

Saionji told me that he enjoyed hearing our language, which he found very musical, direct, and expressive.

"In a way I should not be surprised," I said, "because that is one of the great advantages Japan possesses over the entire West, and particularly over our own American people. Your leading statesmen can talk to us in our language, but not one of our leading statesmen can talk in any of the Oriental languages. Mr. Taft, the only front-rank American statesman who has anything like a real knowledge of Asia, understands neither Chinese nor Japanese."

"Mr. Taft," said Saionji, "understands *us*. That is the important thing. You are rich in great statesmen who are well respected in Japan, among others, President Wilson."

I had written out a few questions, and, according to custom, the answers had been taken down in the Japanese text, with an English translation, and both versions were given to me by Mr. Matsuoka.

"Mr. Patrick Gallagher, Correspondent of the "New York Herald."

"Do you think the Peace Conference will be able to do anything practical about the solution of the Far Eastern question? What briefly is Japan's idea as to the things the Congress should do in order to stabilise peace in the Far East?"

To these questions, Marquis Saionji, the head of the Japanese Delegation to the Peace Conference, replied:

“In recent years, there have been two sets of causes of trouble in the Far East: the menace from the West and the internal troubles of China. Japan had to take up arms, even risking her national existence, against Russian aggression in 1904, and again in 1914 against German menace in the Far East. Now that there is little likelihood of another Western menace to the general peace of the Far East and now that the League of Nations’ plan is fast crystallizing itself into a tangible reality, all that we feel any anxiety about in the Far East is China’s internal troubles.

“It is in line with the general policy of Japan, and it is surely in the interests as much of Japan as of China and the Far East in general, that her immediate neighbour should be politically and socially pacified and unified and be set on a fair way toward general and genuine reconstruction and development. It is to be earnestly hoped that the patriotic statesmen of China, both of North and South, may yet find it possible to crown with success the movement for conciliation which they recently initiated at Shanghai.

“Japan has always been, and will always be, ready to support any Chinese in authority who has at heart the peace and security of his country, who has a clear vision of the future destinies of the Far East. Japan would not grudge anything reasonable to China. She is ready to indorse any righteous claim of her awakening neighbour.

“Whatever Japan proposes at the Peace Conference is actuated solely by such spirit and is in accordance with such general principle.

“I am sure the proposed League of Nations will be a potent factor in consolidating the peace of the Extreme Orient. The spirit of justice, fairness and humanity in which the League of Nations is conceived will in itself prove a remedy for many international discords and misunderstandings in the Far East, as elsewhere.”

The marquis asked me if I was satisfied with his statement, and I told him that I was. We discussed the general situation for the better part of an hour. Saionji convinced me that he is a good, intelligent friend of China. Makino, Chinda, and Ijuin gave me the same impression. However, that did not alter the fact that a suit was already pending within the conference in which China appeared as plaintiff and Japan was joined as defendant. The Chinese delegation filed briefs in support of China's claim for direct restoration of Kiaochau from Germany and also for the abrogation of the 1915 treaties and notes. In fairness to the Chinese it ought to be stated that this course was taken with the knowledge and approval of the American delegation. In fairness to the British, it should be stated that this course was discouraged and disapproved by the British delegation.

Japan drove the Germans out of Kiaochau in 1914, with the cooperation of her British ally. After the successful conclusion of the Kiaochau campaign, there naturally enough developed differences of opinion and policies in Japan, in Great Britain, and among the British and other Allies in the Far East. Many of these differences were as marked as they were quite explainable, but nobody in high official standing in any of the countries concerned cared to take the responsibility of making a full and frank explanation. It is not fair to charge the Japanese with selfishness in the conduct of their war policy. They might be charged with foresight and with a constant attention to legitimate Japanese political and material interests; while, on the other hand, British subjects in the Far East were not unreasonable in resenting Japanese political and material advancement in Asia at the cost of British prestige and profit, the threatened loss of a Far Eastern trade built up in long years of enterprise and of sacrifice. Both England and America had serious cause of complaint because of the manner in which the Okuma administration had taken advantage of the Tsingtao surrender to try to steal a march upon every other treaty power in China between October, 1914,

and May, 1915. I am glad to say that nobody regrets more the injustice and the miserable deception practised by the Okuma administration in the matter of the Twenty-one Demands than do the leading statesmen of Japan, without exception. They realize now that trickery is a costly weapon. Japan's worst handicap in her relations with China and with the civilized world is the fact that in the spring of 1915 her officials did deceive, and they were caught in the act of attempting deception.

While this is so true that it is absolutely idle, and actually injurious to Japan, to deny it or to dispute it, Japan's enemies are hardly in a position to fashion from it a blanket indictment against the Japanese Government or people, or to set themselves up as the moral mentors of the Japanese Empire. Are the Japanese the only people who in pursuit of their policies have played tricks with the truth? Has the West given an example to Japan of unassailable justice and precise propriety? When Perry and Townsend Harris were teaching the Japanese officials of their day the advantage of Western political science, when Bingham and Dennison were doing all that men could do to help Japan safely through the necessary period of political transformation, what was the attitude of the European powers toward the Japanese empire-builders? That it was brutal, that it was selfish, that it was dishonest, the official records prove. Even so admirable a man as Sir Harry Parkes was compelled to play a part in the Tokio Conference in 1882 that in its turn forced the Japanese to resort to the armor of guile in order that their empire might not pass the way of the neighboring Dragon Empire. Japan had to be tricky in order to be strong. In one of my talks with Baron Makino, at the Hôtel Bristol, on the Place Vendôme, he discussed this phase of Japan's growth with a frankness and justice that well became the man who is now by far the most vigorous and powerful figure in Japanese politics. The handling of the Yokohama cases by The Hague Court was not calculated to impress the Japanese with a high

opinion of Western morality or justice. Consequently, the European statesmen at the Paris conference were in no moral position to pick holes in Japan because of Okuma's mishandling of Japan's Chinese policy. How about ourselves?

Between 1784 and 1898 our record in the Far East was as clean as a whistle. In 1898, whatever our desires and intentions, we did begin to wobble regarding that point in our basic Far Eastern policy which debarred us from taking territory in Asia. Senators who have been bellowing against certain provisions of the treaty, who talk wildly and foolishly about war with Japan, would do well to read over the volumes of the Congressional Record containing the speeches made against another product of a conference of Paris, the Spanish treaty. Senator Lodge, in particular, would do very well to recall the Philippics of his venerable Massachusetts colleague, the late Senator Hoar. A shot fired by an angry Filipino at twilight on the bridge of San Juan del Monte kept us in the Philippines. That was the beginning of the Philippine insurrection and of our Philippine war, as well as the cause of the ratification of the treaty with Spain by the United States Senate, in February, 1899. The United States did not regard with favor the proceedings of any of the powers concerned in the "battle of concessions" of 1898. It did what it could to protect and to save China, and the "open door"; and Mr. Wilson, it was, who, by this Philippine legislation, restored our Far Eastern policy to that unselfish level that it had maintained from 1784 to the Spanish War.

Mr. Wilson, as President, formally protested the proceedings of the Okuma administration in China in 1915. Mr. Wilson, as President, came to the relief of the Chinese Government during 1916 and 1917. In November of 1917 Mr. Wilson, as President, approved the negotiations and agreement between Mr. Lansing and Viscount Ishii. China was not consulted during these negotiations, and China formally protested the Lansing-Ishii agreement. Did the Lansing-Ishii agreement menace China?

Chinese in Paris answered this question in the affirmative. They did not, however, file a brief with the peace conference asking for annulment and abrogation of the Lansing-Ishii agreement. Why did they not raise the question of the contradictory interpretations put upon the Lansing-Ishii agreement by Viscount Motono, on the one hand, and by Mr. Lansing, on the other? I am in a position to answer this question, authoritatively. The Chinese delegates resisted powerful pressure from unofficial, anti-administration American as well as from other sources, urging them to test the validity of the Lansing-Ishii agreement in the peace conference. They did not want to embarrass their good friend, Mr. Woodrow Wilson. Mr. Wilson had them under his wing.

Indeed, so anxious were they to please the President and not to embarrass their friends, the American delegates, that they refrained from appointing an American political adviser to the Chinese delegation about the time that Dr. George E. Morrison, China's British adviser, left Peking for Paris.

I trust that I have not given the impression that there was anything improper or intentionally offensive to Japan in the attitude or action of the American mission toward the Chinese. By no means. Everything that was done was quite open and above-board, and the Japanese were fully aware of all that happened. They took care that nothing missed them; for which they are to be complimented, and not condemned. Diplomacy is the very biggest of big business, and it ought to be conducted with efficiency.

Late at night, on April 11, Mr. Wilson presided at a meeting of about a score of gentlemen of various shapes, sizes, and peculiarities of complexion, in the room of Colonel House, on the third floor of the Hôtel Crillon. House was at the elbow of the President. Baron Makino and Léon Bourgeois urged their suggested amendments to the great covenant. The President's Monroe Doctrine amendment and the selection of Geneva as the first seat of the League of Nations were alike

adopted by majority votes. Makino made a remarkable plea for some sort of recognition along the lines of racial and national equality. He trimmed down his amendment so that it merely recorded "acceptance of the principle of the equality of nations and the just treatment of their nationals."

Every nation represented at the meeting, with the exception of the United States and Great Britain, Greece, Poland, and Czecho-Slovakia, supported Makino's amendment through their spokesmen on the commission for the League of Nations. I notice frequent assertion in the newspapers that Makino's amendment was "defeated by a narrow majority." That is utterly incorrect. It was carried by a sweeping majority, including China. Dr. Koo very properly made one of the best speeches supporting the Japanese baron. Racial and national equality suffered defeat at the hands of Woodrow Wilson, at the behest of Lord Robert Cecil. After everybody had spoken, Baron Makino asked the President if his amendment was adopted.

The President said:

"No. That requires unanimity."

In plain words, Baron Makino and the Japanese were tricked out of their just rights and a sweeping victory in the commission on the League of Nations. The Japanese were seriously annoyed. The younger Japanese newspaper men, who were present in Paris in strong force, were openly angry. I talked with several of them, and they complained very bitterly that Makino was too gentle and too nice in his attitude toward "the Big Three." Even some of the older and wiser Japanese journalists thought that Japan might well mark her resentment of this mistreatment by some bold dramatic act.

On April 22, in Mamie's room at "The House of the Flirt," Mr. Lou and Dr. Wellington Koo were sitting with Mr. Wilson, M. Clemenceau, and Mr. Lloyd George, grouped around the fireplace, discussing China's side of the case made at the peace conference by China against Japan. Dr. Koo was at-

tempting to show how these 1918 contracts grew out of the "Twenty-one Demands."¹

Mr. Lloyd George ejaculated:

"The twenty-one demands! What do you mean by that?"

President Wilson came to the rescue of Dr. Koo and the British premier and explained to Mr. Lloyd George the nature and circumstances of the Sino-Japanese crisis of 1915. After the explanation, Mr. Lloyd George told Dr. Koo that he would willingly do all he could to help China, "but," he pointed out, "England is bound by her obligations to Japan. I will not be a party to making 'scraps of paper' of British treaties."

Mr. Lloyd George was referring to the pledges exchanged between Japan and her allies in February and March, 1917, before we entered the war.²

It was on April 23, 1919, that Mr. Wilson pronounced his famous Adriatic doctrine, which restored the authority of the Paris conference and thrust out the Italian delegation. In the course of his statement, the President said that the Jugo-Slavs are to be among the smaller states whose interests are henceforth to be as scrupulously safeguarded as the interests of the most powerful states.

"The war was ended, moreover," said the President, "by proposing to Germany an armistice and peace which should be founded on certain clearly defined principles which should set up a new order of right and justice. Upon these principles, the peace with Germany has been not only conceived, but formulated. Upon those principles, it will be executed. . . . Interest is not now in question, but the rights of peoples, of states, new and old, of liberated peoples, and peoples whose rulers have never accounted them worthy of right; above all, the right of the world to peace and to such settlements of interest as shall make peace secure. These, and these only, are

¹ See Appendix "C."

² See Chapter XVIII and Appendix "D."

the principles upon which she can consent to make peace."

Every word uttered, every gesture made by the President in the Villa of Bischoffen, on the afternoon of April 22, justified the Chinese in believing that the President was with them to the last ditch. The Japanese were not present. They had been heard that forenoon. Both Chinese and Japanese read the President's Adriatic pronouncement with the deepest interest. It was a clarion-call for the rights of man as against the special interests of powerful nations. The Chinese were jubilant. I sat with Dr. Wang, and we read over the statement, sentence by sentence. I met a member of the Japanese delegation, and he admitted to me that particularly remembering Wilson's words in presenting the draft covenant at the plenary on February 14, it looked as if President Wilson was determined to secure assent to the Chinese claims. That night, Mr. Wilson's fame and his power climbed higher than those of any other man in the world's history. He was the Paris conference. Not merely had he dared to challenge the basic principle of imperialism, but he was in effect offering himself to the peoples of the more chaotic parts of Europe as their leader in the desperate struggle against the other dangerous extreme, Bolshevism.

The Japanese delegates were not disturbed. They never worried unnecessarily. They kept themselves thoroughly and completely informed, and they acted promptly upon exact information. The Japanese and the British delegations acted upon definite formulæ and established facts. The American delegation was guided by sentiment and stampeded by foolish gossip. Let me prove these assertions.

I do not wish to be unfair to our President or to any of our officials. They all did what they believed to be their best. But have we not a right to know where we are going in the Far East? Have not our friends a right to know that? What warrant has our government to attempt the application of foreign policies without the knowledge and approval of the American people? These are questions that ought to be

put to our government and to our people. Every American worthy of his salt will join Viscount Ishii in condemning loose talk about war between America and Japan. Yet I sometimes fear that the governments of America and Japan are permitting themselves to drift into positions which might eventuate in war. We all know that where the anger of peoples is cleverly and deliberately aroused, a match will suffice to blow up the powder-barrel. Take the present situation in China as an example.

Is the American government desirous of acting the part of the peacemaker between China and Japan? Is the British government using its offices to strengthen accord between Japan and America? Are we justifying the Chinese in expectations that if they precipitate a military situation in Shantung or Manchuria that might cause the Japanese government to act hastily or harshly, American troops will fight the battles of the Chinese Republic? These are questions to which our government should give thought.

Here is a brief snap-shot of the dominant political conditions in the Far East:

The Chinese are angry because they think Mr. Wilson betrayed them in Paris. Many of them are in a mood to fight Japan. They have as much chance in a war with Japan as Santo Domingo or Honduras would have in a war with America. It would be largely a matter of moving forward troops and taking possession. The Japanese would move the troops and take possession. The Chinese would do most of the dying. I mean no reflection upon the Chinese people. Their weakness is the result of pacifist leadership and the shackles forced upon them by the aggressive West, ourselves included.¹

The Japanese are furious because of the way in which we

¹ Among the "secret treaties" signed by Mr. Wilson at "The House of the Flirt" was one (May 26, 1919) forbidding the importation of arms into China. Apart from the element of secrecy, I think it was a very sensible prohibition.

have wounded their pride by formal and public denial of their racial and national equality. They are determined to press their point until they have carried it. The British and French subscribe to Japan's general Far Eastern policy. Early in January, I learned that the British and French had faith in Japan's capacity successfully to apply a definite policy in the Far East, and that neither of these nations had any faith whatever in our American Far Eastern policy. Friendly responsible European officials challenged me in the most charming way to state truly if I myself had any faith in our ability to formulate a Far Eastern policy and to stick to it, having in mind our checkered record of the last twenty-one years. I had no answer to make. If there is a single American who takes pride in our record in China between 1898 and 1919 I should like to meet him. We are drifting very dangerously there, just as we drifted on to the rocks in Paris, and for very similar reasons. Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, our minister at Peking, attempted to apply a forward policy in China. But that was not at all consistent with the policy of "scuttle" that seemingly dominated Mr. Wilson's ultimate decisions in Paris. Mr. Wilson has invited Congress to cut loose the Philippines without much regard for the real interests of the Filipino people or their ability to stand upon their own feet. Mr. Maximo M. Kalaw, the able Filipino historian, is urging immediate independence, yet apparently he wants America to protect the Philippines against Japanese immigration. The two things, of course, are incompatible. The Philippines cannot be independent and dependent at the same time, nor can President Wilson defend the Philippines and the anti-Japanese campaign and indorse the decision of "the Big Three" in the matter of the Northern Pacific islands.

The Chinese say that all they need is to be left alone; but the world will not do that. The best that can be done is to try to induce the Chinese and Japanese to shake hands and get along together. We are not doing that. We are capitalizing, continuing, and multiplying Sino-Japanese discord. If

the lid blows off, will our people thank Mr. Wilson if he calls upon our mothers to send their sons to fight the battles of Chinese in China, because the war, if it ever happens, will be over there, and not over here? I should like to put this question to Senator Borah as well as to President Wilson. I should also like to ask Senator Lodge, Senator Norris, and Senator Borah if they really intend to back up their bold speeches by blows. The war has taught thoughtful people that statesmen and nations, like little boys, cannot call names without being prepared to take off their coats and back up their boasting.

There is a large measure of British, French, and Japanese public opinion that would serve to sustain the United States, if we had an honest, consistent, courageous Far Eastern policy. Let me suggest what I mean. People in other nations are just as honest and just as well meaning as most Americans. We have no monopoly of virtue or decency; we have a monopoly sometimes of super-idealism.

Philippine independence has been pledged by our Congress, and liberal opinion in Europe or in Asia desires neither to kick us out of the Philippines nor to keep us there against our will. But we cannot get out of the Philippines, hastily or heedlessly, without endangering the entire Far Eastern situation; and we cannot base upon a "scuttle" Philippine policy a general Far Eastern policy that will be sustained by any of our allies. This is a fact. I have discussed this matter with men in a position to talk authoritatively for Europe and Asia, and I have discussed it as one on record for many years in favor of real Philippine independence. The reason why it is not feasible to turn the Philippines adrift at this moment is because that cannot be done without setting up reactions all the way from Calcutta to Chemulpoo, from Siningfu to Sandakau. We do not encourage or justify Japanese or British coöperation when we multiply their difficulties in India, in Ireland, or in Korea.

If only we can make up our minds that we are going some-

where in Asia, and call to the aid of our government the best technical talent to apply that policy, we can apply it. Our European and Asiatic friends will help us to do so, but only if it is based upon a recognition of the fact that India is the proudest jewel of the British Empire and must not be menaced; that Korea is an integral part of the Japanese Empire and is not a fit subject for American sectarian political propaganda; that Japan has her eye upon certain things that she needs and which she can obtain without inflicting any particular wrong upon China; that China will never have any chance to get upon her feet until her sovereignty is fully restored by European powers, as well as by Japan; that it is foolish to talk about (and dangerous to carry out), constructive railway plans in China until the Chinese frontiers' question is fearlessly and honestly faced, and the powers, ourselves included, remove every foreign guard from Chinese soil.

To return to Paris. The British and the French and the Japanese delegations listened to Mr. Wilson and then they talked these matters over among themselves; and they came to the conclusion that our delegation was not very learned or very practical, at the top, in the matter of the Chinese question. They decided that among themselves they could play ball, good profitable ball, and they played it. Now, it is curious upon what droll circumstances great historic happenings are oftentimes built. I am afraid that I have been very serious, very dreary, in trying to unravel the tangled skein of the Paris conference. So let us all laugh, as the Japanese laughed on the night of April 30.

On the forenoon of April 24, a young Japanese newspaper man of no importance (and with less knowledge of what was actually happening at Japanese headquarters, the Hôtel Bristol, than some of his American confrères) typhooned into 4, Place de la Concorde and whispered the news to one of the most admittedly brilliant American special correspondents, "The Japanese delegation is packing up." The great Amer-

ican reporter whisked his Japanese friend away from the press-room, and together they hurried to the Hôtel Bristol, where, surely enough, they found boxes and boxes and more boxes, and trunks and trunks and more trunks, piled one upon the other, in the hotel courtyard. Moving silently and stealthily, like melodramatic villains, the representatives of East and West fourth estate sallied forth once more. This time their destination was the Hôtel Meurice, where Marquis Saionji, Baron Makino, and Mr. Ijuin had their suites. Again, Japanese trunks and more trunks, Japanese boxes and more boxes, great crates of the marquis's favorite fish plucked from the placid waters of Lake Chusendji, and dried according to a special and ancient receipt; handsome steamer trunks with brass and rawhide knobs; trunks to the right and trunks to the left; and bell-hops and valets scurrying hither and yon. The bright reporters rushed to the Bourse, and the news was flashed all over the world that the Japanese delegation was packing up; that Mr. Ijuin, the Japanese ambassador at Rome, had called upon Baron Sonnino, the Italian foreign minister, and pledged Japan's support to the Italian Adriatic position; that the conference was collapsing, because Wilson would not give Italy Fiume, or Japan Kiaochau, or acknowledge the racial and national equality of the Japanese.

Within the same hour, Mr. Odagiri, the famous Japanese banker, mentioned casually to Mr. Thomas W. Lamont that there was more than one side to the Chinese financial consortium plans being pushed by the American government, and that it would be difficult for the Japanese to come in, if Japan should leave the peace conference defeated on all points. Upon the same day, Lord Robert Cecil told Colonel House that, while Baron Makino was loyally eager to aid a League of Nations, it was becoming increasingly difficult to assure Japanese support on account of the general attitude of the conference toward Japan. A few minutes later Colonel House learned about the trunks and the boxes and the expected exodus of the Japanese delegation from Paris. He

got in touch with the President at once. Somebody confirmed the wild rumors. The President immediately reversed himself in the matter of Kiaochau, shut himself away from his Far-Eastern advisers and the Chinese, and assented to Baron Makino's solution. I am in a position to know that the Japanese conceded nothing, nor did they bargain their racial amendment for the Shantung articles. They won upon their own terms and upon facts. Mr. Wilson lost all the tricks, upon silly gossip.

The trunks and boxes at the Hôtel Bristol and the Hôtel Meurice were piled one upon the other in preparation for transfer to the magnificent villa at 50, Rue de Bassano, that had just been leased for the Marquis Saionji.

The marquis was not moving out.

He was moving in.

BOOK TWO
ISLES AND ISLANDERS

CHAPTER XI

MANDATES AND MADAME

A LITTLE mite of a man, who once worked with his hands in a Welsh coal-mine, played a very notable part in the Conference of Paris. William Morris Hughes, war premier of Australia, was the stormy petrel of the British delegation. In January and in April, 1919, he almost caused the collapse of the conference. He lost his first January duel with President Wilson; but, at the moment in April when the Italians walked out, this tiny plenipotentiary of the world's largest island compelled the President to throw up the sponge.

Hughes is almost stone deaf. Only one person can make him hear, his large and lovely wife. Mrs. Hughes is as tall as her husband is small. They are still sweethearts, though married some years.

I lunched with this happy couple at the Hôtel Majestic on February 7. The Majestic, as imposing as its name, and within bowshot of the Arc de Triomphe, was the home of the British plenipotentiaries. We had a large round table on the sunny side of the huge dining-room. Our party included the premier's military and naval aides, his secretary, and the leading Australian peace-conference reporter, Mr. Keith A. Murdock, of the Sydney "Sun." I was placed between Mr. and Mrs. Hughes, the little statesman on my left and the lady on my right.

"His right ear is best," explained our charming hostess.

"Yes," said Mr. Hughes; "you won't mind if I ask you to talk loudly. My hearing is not very good."

That was putting it quite mildly. After repeated experi-

ments, I let Mrs. Hughes do my talking for me, and she did it so well that I made up my mind to win a wife like Australia's first lady before trying my hand at diplomacy. One of the few things proved by the Conference at Paris is that he is a wise man who listens only to his wife.

Mr. Wilson tried to make himself heard by Mr. Hughes. That was an amusing incident of the January duel over the mandatory principle. The President talked very earnestly about the duty that civilized nations owe to themselves and to backward peoples. There must be no more Kongos or Putumayos in the new era under the League of Nations; and so forth.

Hughes stood with his right hand cupped over his right ear, his left fingers playing fretfully with his Australian gold watch-chain.

"Hey!" he interrupted. "League of Nations! All fiddle! Don't believe in it."

The President tried another tack—the wonderful things that Australians have done to make the world safe for democracy.

Mr. Hughes agreed that Australians are deeply interested in making the world safe for Australians.

The lecture was not a success. Mr. Wilson admitted this later. Explaining his discomfiture to a friend, he laughed and said:

"What can you do with a man who can't hear and won't read?"

Mrs. Hughes saves her husband's eyesight by reading for him. I cannot say whether or not the little premier listened to the following explanation of the mandatory principle, approved by Mr. Wilson:

The mandatory principle embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations, so far as it affects both the treatment of the native peoples and the "Open Door" for the outside world, has been in operation in two important instances for years. The details are, however, not well known.

In 1884, an international conference met at Berlin to deal with some of the problems of the Kongo Basin. The British delegate was instructed by his government that commercial interests should not be looked upon as the exclusive subject of deliberation and that the welfare of the natives should not be neglected, for "to them it would be no benefit, but the reverse, if freedom of commerce, unchecked by reasonable control, should degenerate into license." Though supported by the representative of the United States, Mr. John A. Kasson, the British delegate was not able to induce the Conference to deal with the two crying evils of tropical Africa, the slave-trade and the liquor traffic. The British government did not, however, give up the attempt, and, in 1890, the Brussels Conference, convened at their request, dealt with these fundamental questions. Elaborate international agreements have since been worked out to control traffic in arms, slaves, and alcohol, and to check diseases such as sleeping sickness.

It was not only in Africa that the welfare of the native populations was especially safeguarded. In 1884, after many years of insistence on the part of the Australian colonies, the London government finally permitted the British Flag to be hoisted over the southeastern part of New Guinea. Three years later, in 1887, the Colonial Conference at London, discussing the future government of this area, determined that it should be entrusted to Queensland, one of the Australasian colonies, on the following conditions:

1. No purchase of land to be allowed to be made by private persons, except from the government or purchasers from it.

2. No deportation of natives to be allowed either from one part of the Territory to another or to places beyond the Territory, except under Ordinances reserved for Her Majesty's assent and assented to by Her Majesty.

3. Trading with the natives in arms, ammunitions, explosives and intoxicants to be prohibited, except under Ordinances reserved and assented to in like manner.

4. No differential duties to be imposed in favor of any of the guaranteeing Colonies, or any other Colony or country.

5. The foregoing four Articles to be embodied in the Letters Patent as part of the Constitution of the Territory.

After the Australian colonies had united to form the Commonwealth, the administration of British New Guinea, or Papua, as it was then called, was taken over subject to the terms of this mandate which were incorporated in the Papua Act of 1905. This act reserved for the prior assent of the Governor-General of Australia, who is appointed by Great Britain, all ordinances dealing with the

granting or disposal of public lands, with the sale or disposition of native lands, and with native labor, as well as any ordinances relating to the supply of arms, ammunition, explosives, intoxicants, or opium to the natives. The Act further contained provisions prohibiting the supply of intoxicating liquor to the natives. These principles have been carried out in practise by the Australian administrators.

Mr. Hughes was more interested in providing to meet future dangers than in poking his nose into history. He is quite honest about his educational shortcomings. He admitted to me very frankly that there are many things in the history of Australia of which he knows nothing at all. Still, he has helped to make history in Australia and in Europe, and he went to Paris with one object fixed firmly in his mind. His modest five million people, occupying a vast territory of almost three million square miles (fewer than two people for every square mile) gave very nearly half a million fighting men to win the war. Everybody admitted that the Australians fought like tigers and died like heroes. Mr. Hughes told me that he felt bound to stand up for his dead, no matter what others might say or think. He made no pretense at being a diplomat; but, following his motions, it was quite easy to see how he has climbed to leadership of the husky young commonwealth of the Southern Pacific. He is a natural-born fighter, all grit and gunpowder.

On January 12 the Conference of Paris was organized as a very close corporation of the big Allied victors. It was organized deliberately by the French, British, and Italian foreign offices to divide "the skin of the beast"—each inch of territory taken from the Germans. Sir Robert Borden, the Canadian leader, who sought no spoils of war, publicly protested against the exclusion of the smaller powers.¹ M. Clemenceau retorted as publicly that the big powers had won the war and they had the right to dictate the peace. To clinch his argument, the French premier pointed to the armies en-

¹ See *Protocol, Preliminaries of Peace*, Second Plenary Session, January 25, 1919.

forcing the armistice. It was going to be a peace of power, or there could be no peace. Mr. Hughes was of the same mind as the French "Bismarck." Mr. Wilson pleaded in vain for his principles. In effect, Mr. Lloyd George said to him:

"Draw your pen through the 'freedom of the seas' and keep Daniels and Creel from spouting about a 'biggest navy,' and I'll see what I can do to handle Hughes and put over your mandatory principle."

In effect, M. Clemenceau said to the President:

"Must you have the mandatory principle? Then forget about 'Open Covenants.' Leave me to edit those troublesome reporters. I know them better than you do. They are easy enough to manage when you stroke them the right way. You don't understand them. I do, and they know it. I am of their own fraternity. I shall win my point by making them think they have won their point, and I shall bring M. Simon¹ around to the mandatory principle."

Mr. Wilson agreed to the bargain.

"What about the 'freedom of the seas?'" a "Herald" reporter asked the President when Mr. Wilson was explaining the great charter he was about to take home with him, two hours before his departure from Paris on February 14.

"The freedom of the seas?" said the happy Mr. Wilson. "Oh, that was a good joke on me. Under the League of Nations, of course, there can be no question of naval rivalry. All strength is pooled, and 'the freedom of the seas' is guaranteed by the extension of the Monroe Doctrine so that it covers all the world."

It was still easier to dispose of "Open Covenants, *openly arrived at*," through the expert reasoning of M. Clemenceau. What inquisitive reporter could quarrel with the decision of that "Tiger" among the lions or lambs of the press who had boldly exclaimed in "The Strongest":

¹ The French Colonial Minister.

If I could but tear off their masks, expose these people naked to the world, tell what impulses brought each one here; reveal the inner truth, the awakening desires, the intrigue, the low greed, the sterility of their minds, the poverty of their hearts! Ah!

If only the Georges of but a few years earlier could have been spared from the peace table and been turned, foot-loose, upon the trail of "old diplomat" and "amateur outsider," what revelations might not have been served up with our *café au lait* to strike off the shackles of "the Man in Chains!" M. Clemenceau devoted himself with skill and vigor to the task of smothering the protests of the newspaper rebels—the American reporters and the Northcliffe and one or two other independent British correspondents. Virtually all the French accredited reporters and the majority of the British journalists in Paris were docile servants of their governments. They were content to write what they were told to write. Several of them were members of the British secret service, devoting most of their time to finding out and reporting important information for the British delegation. It was quite different at 4, Place de la Concorde, where the American newspaper "soviet" held stormy sessions and told the Terrible Ten a thing or two. William Allen White presided at the most memorable of the meetings when the last losing stand was made for "Open Covenants." Mark Sullivan and Berton Braley of "Collier's" and Laurence Hills of "The Sun" carried a "no surrender" motion, recorded by one of the fair reporterettes who acted as secretary. M. Clemenceau was as good as his word to Mr. Wilson. He gave the American correspondents a brief appearance of victory. They were admitted to the picturesque pantomime of the Hall of the Clock, where their presence could do no harm, but they were "shoed" away from the meetings where actual business was done. It was M. Clemenceau who dictated the final word to the press, pronounced by the Supreme Council as follows:

The proceedings of a peace conference are far more analogous to the meetings of a cabinet than to those of a legislature. Nobody

has even suggested that cabinet meetings should be held in public, and if they were so held, the work of government would become impossible.

That saved Mr. Wilson's "face" and it shut up the newspaper rebels; but nobody could shut up Mr. Hughes.

On January 28 the British war cabinet accepted and approved the mandatory principle. Next forenoon the British Empire delegation was summoned to meet at Mr. Lloyd George's rooms in the villa at 23, rue Nitot. In addition to the British premier there were present: Mr. George N. Barnes, labor member of the cabinet; Sir Robert Borden and Sir George Foster for Canada; Mr. Hughes for Australia; General Smuts of South Africa; Mr. Massey and Sir Joseph Ward for New Zealand; Sir William Lloyd for Newfoundland; Mr. E. Montagu, the secretary for India, the Maharajah of Bikamir, Lord Sinha, Sir Maurice Hankey, and three subordinate secretaries. The meeting was opened about eleven-thirty, dangerously close to "tiffin-time." Mr. Lloyd George explained the reasons why the war cabinet had decided to accept the mandatory principle. All was going nicely when Mr. Hughes got upon his feet. What he said, I am told, blistered the ceiling of the Villa Nitot.

It was all very well for Mr. Wilson to breathe fine phrases about mandataries and Utopia, but was that to be Australia's recompense for bleeding herself white in defense of the empire? The prime minister asked Australia and New Zealand to consent to suicide. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was being favored at the expense of the safety of the empire. Japan was being brought to their shores, under cover of the alliance, and they¹ were not to be permitted to fortify the islands reluctantly given them and then snatched out of their hands under the ghostly paw of an Utopian experiment!

That was the substance of the Australian's argument. Mr. Hughes was angry, and when this little man is angry he can talk the hind legs off any donkey.

¹ The Australians.

Mr. Massey and Sir Joseph Ward supported Mr. Hughes, but Mr. Lloyd George insisted that he had no choice in the matter. If the British Empire delegation could not see its way to sustain the war cabinet, that of course would create a situation which he would be bound to lay before others. Mr. Wilson was insistent. He had felt it necessary to concede this point to the President; and, after all, it was only a question of shadow and not a question of substance.

Mr. Hughes had been listening with both hands cupped over his best right ear. He caught the word "shadow." Jumping to his feet, he drew a lurid picture of "Yellow Shadows in the South Seas." Again, he charged that Australia's and New Zealand's interests were being sacrificed at the command of Japan. Every time Japan was mentioned, Premier Hughes "saw red."

Mr. Lloyd George snatched victory and compelled British assent to the secret Balfour-Motono compact by his hint at the danger of collapse of the coalition cabinet. Mr. Hughes was defeated, and that made him more defiant. He set out to oppose the Japanese all along the line, and to lift Mr. Wilson's scalp and hang it on his very yellow watch-chain. The Northcliffe newspapers, although friendly to the Japanese, extended a kindly ear to the stormy petrel of the Pacific. The Paris correspondent of "The Times" summarized the situation as follows:

Australians do not view with any satisfaction the approach of Japan to their shores, and while they have been pleased by the great and successful effort of the Imperial government to obtain adequate representation of the Dominions in the Conference, they feel that in this matter European opinion does not properly appreciate their point of view. In accordance with the arrangement come to between Great Britain and Japan, the Equator would form the limit of Japanese extension to the South. This would therefore confirm the Japanese in their possession and administration of the Marshall and Caroline Islands. These islands, several hundred in number, consist for the main part, of little coral atolls, and are a sort of dust of the Pacific Ocean, and what advantage, asks Australia, can Japan

be seeking in the possession of territories where there is practically no Japanese population—no population at all to make them desirable as a market and which produce but very little for export purposes? The strategic importance of these two groups of islands has, with the growth and possible development of the submarine, become very considerable indeed.

The American point of view—and America is concerned because of her interest both in the Panama Canal and the Philippines—is that the Imperial Government should take over the whole of the German colonies in the Pacific and administer them under the League of Nations.

The attitude of Great Britain would seem to be that she is more or less bound by agreements with Japan to hand over to Japan the Caroline and the Marshall Islands, and that the rest of the German Colonies should become the direct possessions of the Dominions.

This despatch was filed before Paris was apprised of the decision of the war cabinet. That was announced immediately after the meeting of the British Empire delegation, and the "Daily Mail" of January 30 painted the storm-clouds in purple ink. The "Mail" declared that the war cabinet's acceptance of Mr. Wilson's theory

Involves an admission that the treaties made with Japan regarding her retention of the North Pacific Islands, with the Arabs regarding Syria, and the understanding with the French regarding the Cameroons, must be arbitrarily modified if not torn up.

General Botha was outspoken in predicting a dangerous encouragement of rebellion in South Africa. The Italians began to fume about Fiume. The Japanese stood upon the letter of the secret treaties. Borden spoke up for the President and said very quietly, "Canada has no secret treaties."

These were the circumstances in which Baron Makino, the Japanese leader, asked the conference and the world to set aside all out-of-date prejudices, "including race prejudice." He proposed his article for the covenant intended to guarantee all aliens against unjust discrimination. Mr. Hughes vetoed it. To prevent a rupture in February, Mr. Wilson had to drop his covenant article protecting religious minorities.

Baron Makino very cleverly had tacked the racial rampart to the religious safeguard. Both had to be adopted or dropped.

On the morning that the draft covenant was ready for the plenary session of the conference, and while Mr. Wilson was polishing off his speech and getting ready to leave for home and Mr. Lodge, Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda dropped in at the Crillon for a friendly chat with Colonel House. While Makino was talking with the colonel, Chinda ran his eyes over the freshly printed covenant. He missed the racial-religious clause.

"It is not there," he said. "Perhaps it is a printer's error?"

House sighed with deep sympathy.

"I'm sorry," he said. "It was dropped out at the last moment."

The baron and viscount took their defeat gracefully. They continued to preach the gospel of racial and national equality.¹ Mr. Hughes kept up his campaign, "Australia for Australians, and keep your eye skinned for the Jap!"

When Mr. Wilson returned in the middle of March, the Pacific petrel was flapping his wings in great shape. Everything was in a muddle. French, Belgians, and Italians drove "the Big Three"—Wilson, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George—to the verge of despair. The covenant had to be hurried, or there would be no covenant. The great race between Wilson and Lenin and the old diplomats was neck and neck in the straightaway for the finish. The President was carrying weight on his badly winded Shantung griffin, Kiaochau. He had to break a leg or lose the League stakes. Makino, on Racial Equality; and Hughes, on "Slap the Jap," bored the President to the rails. When they were almost under the wire, the fiery Orlando bolted clear across the track, forcing the President to jump or quit. Wilson took the leap amidst wild Chinese cheers. It looked as if Kiaochau would come clean

¹ See the author's interview with Baron Makino, outlining the Japanese position on racial equality, New York "Herald," February 16, 1919.

out of the mix-up. The old griffin snorted in mid-air, kicking out in all directions, and then hit the turf with a horrible thud. The President was safely under the wire, picking himself up and rubbing his bruised elbows. Kiaochau lay where she fell, with Racial Equality crushed under her broken back, and Hughes on "Slap the Jap" atop of all, uninjured and as fresh as ever. The Australian entry and the Japanese second favorite, Secret Treaties, divided the money, because you can't weigh in on a dead horse.

The covenant that Mr. Wilson offered to Mr. Lodge and the American people was a dead horse. It was killed under the wire by Hughes. Now, the little Australian beat his opponents like a gentleman. He trimmed the President to the king's taste. This was how he did it:

He never forgot the way in which David Lloyd George forced his Australian hand on January 29. So the Pacific petrel had a bone to pick with David as well as with Wilson. Like his pet aversion, the Japanese baron, he bided his time. Every now and then, just to show that he was alive and kicking, he took a quiet fling at the "Japanese peril." Germany being a dead issue, "Slap the Jap" was already the vogue. Makino and Chinda had two strings to their bow, racial equality and Kiaochau (pledged to Japan by England, France, Russia, and Italy). They insisted upon keeping the two subjects apart. They saw themselves defeated on the mandatory principle and on compulsory reduction of armaments. The President's attitude on Fiume presaged a similar attitude on Kiaochau. The same principle was at stake, with these two important distinctions: Kiaochau is a port in China, an Ally, even though, as alleged, "a lame duck Ally," and the Japanese had captured Kiaochau from the Germans. Fiume was in enemy territory. It was an Allied conquest, not an Italian conquest. Kiaochau had not been captured by the Chinese, who had gone to war among themselves instead of helping to defeat the Germans. The Japanese held Kiaochau and insisted upon doing business with China directly. Obviously,

if the conference was to demand of Japan the surrender of Kiaochau to China, there must be some attempt to meet the Japanese in a spirit of justice. The racial equality proposal offered the only opportunity. Peacemakers friendly to all sides endeavored to hammer that into the hard heads of American delegates. It was the one particular move from the mere suggestion of which the Japanese shied. They were wise enough to know that it would place them at an immediate disadvantage. Mr. Hughes saw the approach of danger.

The Pacific petrel flapped his wings and flew over to the African and Anglo-Indian experts. He taught them to crow his own "Slap the Jap" songs to the morn. With this coalition behind him, he delivered his ultimatum to Lloyd George:

"If you consent to Japanese equality, I leave the conference, and the other dominions will follow me."

Lloyd George was driven into a corner. The Japanese were permitted to be defeated on racial equality on April 11. Two weeks later the Italians screamed themselves out of the conference. The Japanese demanded a show-down on Kiaochau. Were they to be defeated on everything?

"No Japanese Government could stand up under such humiliation," said Viscount Chinda to one of the American delegates. The Hara cabinet was already tottering under the pressure of adverse news from Paris.

Mr. Lloyd George told Mr. Wilson that he would not oppose Hughes or break the British agreements with Japan. If he could have patched up a peace with Hughes, he might have arranged a satisfactory compromise with Makino. If the Japanese and Australians, or either of them, left the conference, there would be only one thing for England to do. England, imperial sovereign of Australia, must stand by her Pacific commonwealth; England must stand by her Ally, Japan. The President sighed, and threw up the Kiaochau sponge. Little Mr. Hughes won the final bout.

It was late afternoon in a long, narrow salon of the Quai d'Orsay, not the Hall of the Clock, but a more modern room.



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MR. AND MRS. WM. MORRIS HUGHES



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SIR ROBERT LAIRD BORDEN



Photograph by Signal Corps, U. S. A.

Ray Stannard Baker
(U. S. Official Rep.)

Major Fink
(Am. Hist. Asso.)

Constance Drexel
(Chicago Tribune)

Rich. Y. Oulahan
(N. Y. Times)

Patrick Gallagher
(N. Y. Herald)

Mrs. Wilson Faith Hope Dodge
(Baltimore Times)

La Freusa

AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS AT THE GRILLON

The day was Monday, April 28. The League of Nations was being born, without a racial or national equality hair on its head. Mr. Wilson had made public confession of the fact that it was the proudest and happiest moment of his life. Clemenceau was sitting back in his chair, grinning like an aged imp of mischief. Mr. Balfour was endeavoring not to look bored. Lord Robert Cecil was shaking hands with very common persons. Baron Makino, dignified, debonaire, agreeable, arose and glanced over at the empty places left vacant by the angry Romans who had crossed their Rubicon and returned to the Tiber. The baron bowed to M. Clemenceau and the President, and in delicate, carefully chosen English sentences told the conference of Paris that it had outraged the honor of Japan. The speech was one of the shortest and most memorable of the great congress. It made a profound impression. The rest of the proceedings was tedious and perfunctory, with a picturesque exception.

William Morris Hughes, premier of Australia, got up from his chair. In one hand he had a handsome morocco-bound book, in the other a gold fountain pen made in the U.S.A. He strolled down the table until he was just behind Marquis Saionji and Baron Makino. He whispered something to the baron, extending the book and pen. Makino smiled and bowed low with true Japanese courtesy. He spoke in Japanese to Saionji, took the book and the pen from Hughes and set them in front of the marquis. The marquis beamed upon the leading "Jap slapper" in Paris, took the pen in his hand, and signed "Saionji" in the book. Makino added his autograph, and passed pen and book to Chinda, Matsui, Ijuin, and General Nara. All the Japanese signed their names, and bowed to the South Sea statesman. Each bow was a low, court courtesy of the Meiji period. William Morris bent his back until his spine creaked, returning bow for bow. He went to his chair, happy as a boy just out of school, and glanced proudly at the pages of the little book.

Mrs. Hughes wanted the Japanese signatures for her auto-

graph-book. She got them. She can get anything under the sun from her "own little man," the petrel of the Pacific, and she is the one person in the world who can.

CHAPTER XII

IRELAND'S DREAM REPUBLIC

NOT by an Irishman, but by an American, is this written. The Irish, I do believe, make the best Americans—until necessity compels them to think not as Americans, but as Irishmen. Because, as Whiteside testified, the Irish are capable of the strongest feelings, the boldest actions; they can be as grave a danger as undoubtedly they are a great bulwark to the American Commonwealth.

The citizen, whether native-born or foreign-born, who really loves his country ought not to hesitate to speak out boldly truths that he believes beneficial to the state, even though he knows them to be unpopular and their expression by him certain to bring down upon his head the acrid animadversions of narrow and prejudiced minds. Indeed, there is little credit in offering thoughts that you know to be popular. They are not likely to be new or useful.

When Colonel Roosevelt raised his great voice against the hyphen, he merely echoed, with that sonorous tone that was his own, warnings breathed many years before by the gentle and scholarly Dr. Strong in his book, "Our Country." Dr. Strong fearlessly attacked every element that he believed to be subversive of good American citizenship.

The fervor of patriotism that warmed the pulse of our people during the war sustained Colonel Roosevelt's own unmatched strength in his assaults upon the hyphen. Now, Roosevelt is dead, and the war is over; and the hyphen once more comes galloping forth from its caves. It is not just for politicians who aspire to the rank and power of statesmanship to abuse

a thing one day, and the next day to utilize it for their own ends. That is a wilful capitalization of evil.

Ireland's dream republic confronted Mr. Wilson with one of the most dangerous and most delicate American problems arising out of the war. Let us try to look at this problem and to examine it as Washington, as Jefferson, as Franklin, as Lincoln might have looked upon it and examined it. Americans will have to face this problem, even if Mr. Wilson, or if England, does not.

Man-made history of the world, like the French wit and the policeman, invariably seeks to place responsibility for all that is evil upon some woman. There is always a Lilith or an Eve for an Adam, a Helen for a Paris, a Cleopatra for an Antony, a Mrs. O'Leary's (not Mr. O'Leary's) cow for a Chicago fire, or a Sophie Chotek for a Wilhelm Hohenzollern and a World War. The Aspasiases of our Pericleses get the bottom of the page or a foot-note. Posterity or the historians will not be able to blame the great peace upon a woman.

There were all sorts and sizes and colors of men, but no woman, among the fourscore plenipotentiaries at the Allied and Associated council-table. The Ethiopian, the Arab, and the Indian were there; the Irish and women were not.

The Irish question is attributed to a woman. In the latter part of the twelfth century, Dairmid MacMurragh, King of Leinster, proceeded one night to the bower of the bride of O'Ruarc, Prince of Breffny, and left with the lady. Opinions differ as to whether Mrs. O'Ruarc went willingly or not. The immediate sequel, however, was very disastrous for Ireland. O'Ruarc took the field against the King of Leinster, and MacMurragh summoned to his aid the English Earl of Pembroke, popularly known as "Strongbow." They say he was a dead shot. Be that as it may, he was certainly a wide-awake English prospector, because no sooner had he set foot in Ireland, with his archers and his men-at-arms, than he sent such a favorable report to King Henry II. that it caused the British monarch to establish the British rule of one-way political

trips. A large part of Leinster became the English "Pale."

Now, it should be recalled that the Irish had proved themselves to possess heads too hard to be cracked by either voyaging Roman or venturesome Dane. The Roman kept his distance. The Dane was not so discreet, and his invading army was destroyed by the celebrated Brian Boru on the green sod of Clontarf. By the merest accident, I was born under the shade of the poplar-tree where, tradition says, Brian hung out his standard.

The Irish of the "Pale" period of history repeated upon the English the failure they had inflicted upon the invading Dane, but in a different way. The Englishman is shrewd; he is plausible; and he will not give ground. Pluck is born with him and in him. The Irish found themselves to be inferior to the English in the technique and matériel of what was then modern warfare, though most undoubtedly they were far superior to the English in the finer arts of peace. That is a curious fact, because the Firbolg, Tuatha-dhe-Dhanan, and Milesian peoples, who comprised the Irish nation in the Middle Ages, were all first-class fighting men. They loved to listen to harper and piper. "The Piper that Played Before Moses" was Irish, even if he may not have played "The Tune That the Old Cow Died Of"; and no missals in all the Christian world compare with those ancient illuminated tomes of the Irish monks.

Still, the Irish found that the one-way traveling Englishmen would not consent to be scared or killed off; so they married them to their women, and, as the historian tells us, "the English became more Irish than the Irish themselves." The Irish settled their English problem by a healthy Irish birth-rate. As in China, Japan, and India, race suicide has never been a menace in Ireland.

At the identical time when England followed Columbus in the discovery of America, the first of the Stuart kings gave his approval to a new plan for the British conquest of Ireland. The "plantation" plan was put into operation under the self-

same charters and the selfsame management that developed the original British colonies in America. The Ulster town of Derry became Londonderry, and Draperstown was built by the men sent over by the London Guild of Drapers. Americans should always remember this, in justice and in fairness toward the Ulster Covenanters. They may be, and doubtless they are a troublesome and often mischievous element in Irish politics, but they come of the same breed that went to build up much that is best in the American commonwealth. The Scotch, like the Irish, the Chinese, and the Jews, decline to be absorbed by any other racial element. They insist upon doing the absorption themselves. Consequently, the method that the Irish had successfully utilized to defeat English purposes in Leinster, and in a small portion of Munster, did not, and could not, succeed in the northeast corner of Ireland, where the Scotch Covenanters established themselves under the "plantation" system and British guns.

The test came at the Battle of the Boyne on the twelfth of July, 1690. The Honorable Philip Stanhope, after visiting Ireland more than twenty years ago, said to me, "There never will be peace in this country, my young man, until you Irish fight the Battle of the Boyne over again." Stanhope was right. The quickest and best solution of the Irish question would be England's, and the world's, consent that the Irish and the Scotch-Irish be given a chance to fight out the battle in their own way. I say this, as an American. I have no thought that is not American.

The Scotch-Irish in the northeast corner of Ireland are not all or always, politically speaking, on their own side of the Boyne. Some of the most heroic chapters in the history of Ireland, a nation, are written around Scotch names like those of Russell and Henry Joy McCracken. Joy Street, in Belfast, is called after the patriot's kinsman. The United Irishmen in 1798 were heroic manifestations of the same Scotch-Irish soul. Neither by race nor by religion were they divided from

the adherents of Sir Edward Carson. They were the ancestors of the Ulster Covenanters of to-day.

Nor should it be forgotten that when the fathers of our country reluctantly severed the bonds that had hitherto bound the American colonies to the British crown, Franklin's original draft of the Articles of Confederation for our commonwealth announced the new nation as "The United States of America, the West Indies, and Ireland."¹ It was because of the gamble taken by Patrick Henry, Franklin, the Adamses, Carroll, and other courageous associates of George Washington in rebellion that the panic-stricken British Government of the time grudgingly conceded to Ireland Grattan's Parliament. The same hand that gave recognition to Ireland, a nation, took it away "by bribery, forgery, coercion, and fraud." The present English House of Lords is fat with coronets drunkenly got in the debauch that preceded the enactment of the union. The Act of Union was written on parchment. It has remained a union on parchment. It never became a union, in fact. To-day Ireland is more severed from England in a political, spiritual, and social sense than ever before in the history of the two countries. Seven-eighths of the people, especially the young men and the best men in Ireland, loathe and detest England, politically.

"They hate us. It is heart-rending," a British general said to me in Dublin.

It was quite true. I could see how the average Irishman shot looks of rage and scorn upon the uniform of "the stranger."

¹ For a very interesting and informative discussion of this American aspect of the Irish Question, see "The Administration of Dependencies" by Alpheus H. Snow, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1902, pp. 351, 498-9, 500-501.

CHAPTER XIII

FROM AN AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW

DURING a lull in the Conference of Paris I visited Ireland to see my mother, who was very ill. I had not set my foot on Irish soil for twenty years. I am not going to set down here the impressions that crowded upon me, one after the other, in Ireland. One look at the wreck and ruin that was once lovely O'Connell street, one of the most magnificent thoroughfares in the whole world, was enough. The Irish question screams at everything that is liberal and decent and American. The Irish have shed their blood upon every field of liberty since the stirring times when, as the poet tells us

. . . King Conor MacNesa went forth
To punish the clansmen of Connacht
Who dared to take spoil from the North.

We were visiting the Château at Versailles, one day—Mr. Sean T. O'Kelly, the speaker of the Irish Republican Parliament; Mr. Frank P. Walsh; ex-Governor Dunne; Mr. Michael P. Ryan; and also Mr. Lincoln Steffens, who, of course, belongs to every rebellious cause and manages to get into most revolutions. There were also among the visitors an English lord or two, and several of the most celebrated scribes and pharisees of Fleet Street. In my desire to be perfectly impartial, I divided my time between the Irish and the English groups, and we got along very well together—separately. We came to the magnificent Hall of Battles, along the walls of which the glory that is France is painted by the greatest

masters of the fine art militant. The French are always charming. The French never miss an opportunity to make a hit. Sometimes, however, their hits are made on a better target than that aimed at. I was with the group of titled Englishmen when the obliging French guide formed us up in line in front of Horace Vernet's superb picture of the Battle of Fontenoy. With one eye covertly scanning a little piece of paper half-concealed within his right palm, our French friend recited

“On Ramillies bloody field,
 “When baffled France was forced to yield,
 “The victor Saxon, turning, reeled
 “Before the charge of Clare's dragoons.”

I am afraid I scandalized the company by letting out a good Indian war-whoop. The astonished Englishmen were frozen in their tracks. Here was a Frenchman stopping them in front of a picture which portrayed to the life that glorious scene of smoke, blood, fire, and fine fighting, when the Irish Lord Clare routed the picked troops of Lord Hay and old England! The Frenchman had got his parties mixed. He thought he was showing around Mr. O'Kelly and the “rebel” Irish visitors.

The British military officers who were in Ireland during the war are loudest in their praise of the way in which the manhood of Ireland volunteered to fight for human liberty. It is upon the best possible British military authority that I make the statement that England got from Ireland every fighting man worth taking. They went of their own accord. Who won the war? “The First Hundred Thousand?” It would have been all over but the shouting if the men who gave their lives so gallantly and so willingly around Mons and Cambrai had not been fighters from head to heels. They were pitifully few, but, how they fought! They were mostly Irish and Scotch. Had it not been for the Irish and the Scotch and the gallant Welsh, King George would be able to carry his empire in his waistcoat-pocket.

The Irish do not have to apologize for the part that they played in the Great War, and our English friends do not improve the standing of England in America when they calumniate the fighting race and endeavor to suggest that the Irish "went to bed with the Germans." That is false, and England knows it.

It is quite true that Irishmen in Ireland and in America did plot with the Germans for what they foolishly believed would lead to the liberation of Erin from English misrule. England has misruled Ireland, and is misruling Ireland at the present moment. It is quite true that Irish rebels did provide German submarine bases in out-of-the-way inlets on the picturesque Irish coast. Lying never does any cause any good, and there has been too much deliberate lying on all sides of the Irish question.

One of the strongest points that was made to me by Sinn Fein leaders in Ireland and in Paris was this: that Ireland deliberately abstained from the least pro-German act from the moment when America cast off the shackles of neutrality and jumped into the war on two hundred and twenty million feet. Let us be fair, and American, in our discussion of foreign matters, such as the Irish question. From an American point of view, as well as from an Irish point of view, the Irish rebels would only have been acting within their legitimate rights as rebels had they formed an alliance with either the Akound of Swat, the Sultan of Turkey, the devil incarnate, or the German Kaiser.

In not altogether dissimilar circumstances, our forebears allied our rebellious commonwealth with England's enemies. If Casement was a traitor, why, so too was Washington, and every British subject who took the field with Washington for America. They were so regarded by the English Government of the time; by the bulk of the English people of that time; and they are still regarded as rebels by Carlton Club Tories, who love neither our nation, its great fathers, nor its popular institutions.

It is this fact that makes the Irish question dangerous in America. One cannot be an American and against liberty. One cannot be an American and against Irish liberty. One cannot laud Lincoln and denounce Irish rebellion. Lincoln's speech on the "Spots Resolution," in which he assailed the Mexican policy and actions of President Polk, was a stirring advocacy of revolution as one of the cardinal principles of true Americanism. It is worthy of note that Mr. Wilson, in his "History of the American People," joins Lincoln in criticizing the conduct of Polk. As President of the United States, Mr. Wilson has beamed upon some revolutions and frowned upon others. I think, however, that Mr. Wilson will agree with me when I say that Irish rebels have a peculiarly strong and valid claim upon the indulgence of the American people, if not upon that of the American Government. Now, here is where Mr. Wilson should have drawn a sharp distinction.

One of two courses was honorably open to us in approaching the Irish question *as a government*. If Mr. Wilson felt himself morally bound to sustain the Irish rebels, then, before going to Paris, it was his duty to notify the British Government of that fact. Did he do that?

It is proper to remember that Mr. Wilson took part in the peace conference not merely as President of the United States, but as our chief plenipotentiary, "acting in his own name and by his own proper authority." His status was that of a diplomat, and Mr. Wilson does not have to be told what is entailed by that status. Not only custom and good usage, but common sense, required that relations between the several Allied embassies had to be open and aboveboard. Tricks were inadmissible. To run with the hare and to hunt with the hounds is repugnant to American, as well as to British nature. Why, then, did Mr. Wilson attempt to run with the Sinn Fein hare and to hunt with the British hounds? That was what he did, both personally and through the nimble assistance of Colonel House. He sought to play with Mr. O'Kelly and with Mr. Walsh on the one hand, and with Mr. Lloyd George and

Mr. Balfour on the other. When Mr. Wilson can succeed in bringing these four gentlemen to the same point of view on the Irish question, to use an Irish phrase, "there will be two moons in the sky."

I had numerous talks with Messrs. O'Kelly, Walsh, and the other Irish spokesmen, as well as with British officials, and I must confess that both the Irish and the English are amply justified in charging Mr. Wilson with having acted in bad faith and in exceedingly bad taste.

This fact ought not to be overlooked. The English did not overlook it. I am in a position to know that the British delegation, and quite legitimately, took advantage of our meddling and unsuccessful interference in a matter classified by them as "British domestic politics" and used this as a club with which they succeeded in defeating Mr. Wilson's plans in regard to Shantung and other matters legitimately within the scope of American foreign affairs. The English at no time attempted to walk up-stairs and down-stairs at one and the same moment. They left such feats, impossible of performance, to Mr. Wilson.

At first, the British were merely resentful because of American meddling with the Irish question. Then, resentment gave place to satisfaction. Mr. Lloyd George was quick to see that every additional Irish difficulty made for him by Woodrow Wilson added a fresh strand to the rope which at the right time he could wrap around the elegant legs of the President and compel him to assist England in the solution of British domestic difficulties. He twisted the strands carefully, fashioned the rope, and twirled it around the President's shins to such good purpose that when it was clearly evident that something ought to be done to support Baron Makino on the race question, Mr. Wilson was not in a position to give that support without risking an open breach with the British delegates. Experts pointed out to the President that Baron Makino's racial equality amendment was in line with American policy, and not at all contrary to American needs, but Mr. Wilson was

told by the British delegates that they were not in a position to accept the Makino amendment. Thus came the shameful Shantung surrender, and the Shantung squabble in the Senate and throughout the United States. Mr. Wilson could have made Ireland his business and our business. He might have warned Lloyd George that he felt bound to do something for Ireland. So far as we know, he did not do that. He put himself, his Government, and his people in a false position. Mr. Wilson did not help Ireland and he injured himself and America by meddling in a matter that, under the limitations he had placed upon himself, was not his concern as a diplomat acting for America, "in his own name and by his own proper authority"; while, undoubtedly, it is the legitimate interest of every individual American who cares to take a stand upon one side or upon the other. And it can be made the business of the United States of America if the American people say the word. The word may be said by Americans. It should not be said by men who claim the privilege of being Americans in the morning and Irishmen at night.

CHAPTER XIV

THE KEYS OF THE WORLD

THE new Philippine campaign for independence calls for friendly, intelligent consideration, untingered by partizanship, selfishness, or simpering sentimentality. In Paris we learned many things, among others the meaning of the Hindu fable:

A fat frog leaped upon a heap of dirt, looked about him with a learned air, and then jumped back among his fellows.

"I have climbed to the top of the Himalayas," said the frog, pleased with himself and his own importance, "and I have looked down upon the Vale of Cashmir."

That is all there is to the story.

We leaped to Paris on the stilts of the Fourteen Points. We thought they were good props. Figuratively speaking, like the Hindu's fat frog, we imagined that we had climbed to the top of our Himalayas, and from the stately and somber Hall of the Clock we believed that we were gazing at last upon the New Freedom. A little later, in the Hall of Mirrors of the Château of Versailles, we found that we had been standing on a dirt-heap, and that what we had fancied to be the New Freedom was merely the Old Despotism frisking about in mask and domino. The awakening was rude and painful.

The Filipinos were not in Paris. They were barred from the peace conference. Senate President Manuel L. Quezon and an expectant party of Filipinos left their islands with the intention of seeking seats at the Quai d'Orsay. They got as far as Washington. They talked with Mr. Newton Baker,

secretary of war. Mr. Baker read them a message from President Wilson and told them privately to go home and keep up the good work of establishing the stable government mentioned in the Jones Act, carried through Congress by a political party whose popular emblem is the jackass. The Filipinos went home.

We were then engaged in the impossible task of coaxing a living League of Nations from the unwilling womb of a world insane and intoxicated after four and a half years of death and devastation. To friends on the Seine I expressed deep regret that the Filipinos were kept away from Paris.

"Why do you want them here?" one of our delegates desired to know.

"That," I said, "is what the barons asked King Henry VII. Henry Tudor was the wisest man that ever sat upon the English throne. When some English rebels in Ireland induced two little Dublin potboys, Perkin Warbeck and his chum Lambert Simnel, to pretend to be the little princes smothered in the Tower of London by Richard of Glo'ester and Shakspeare, Henry had the lads and their Irish dupes arrested and brought to Windsor Castle. Hume and Lingard and the others tell us how the boys were put to work as turnspits. The English servants in the castle went on strike and carried their grievance to their walking delegates, the barons, and the barons took their protest to the king.

"Your Majesty," said the ranking baron, "the royal servants feel insulted that these Irish *kerens* should be put to work alongside them in the royal kitchen. That is too much for self-respecting British blood and bone. Why do you want them here?"

"Humph and heigho!" said the king who introduced the currency system, weights and measures, taxes and other modern improvements. "Now listen to me, ye barons, and I'll tell you something that you can pass on to those varlets of mine. I brought those Irish to Windsor to let them see a real king; because, by Hengist and by Horsa, if these Irish

did n't see a real king, they would make a monkey their king! Go tell them that!

“Now,” I said to the American plenipotentiary, “one reason why I am sorry the President asked the Filipinos to turn the back-seams of their socks toward France is because they have a far better right to membership in the League of Nations than the excellent but unself-governing people represented here by my Lord Sinha or the two lads with the ornamental top-hamper sitting, talking, and voting for the King of the Hedjaz. Do you get that? But the other reason is far more important to the Philippines, America, and this wonderful old world. I know Mr. Quezon and some of the people with him. I am deeply interested in the Filipinos and their problems. I think it would do them much good if they could see for themselves what is going on here. I doubt if ever in our time there will be such a chance of looking this world straight in the eye and seeing it just as it is—its meanness, its wickedness, its utter contempt for small nations and right and justice and the Fourteen Points. I think that if Manuel Quezon and his people got one good look at the inside of the Conference of Paris, they would beat it back home by aeroplane or the first available transportation and start a howling campaign for permanent annexation to the United States of America. I think Mr. Wilson has made a fearful Philippine blunder.”

That was my opinion, all through the Conference of Paris, from the moment, during the second week in January, when adroit Mr. Balfour, the only actor in the celebrated seance who had been among those present at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, cut the painter of pitiless publicity and divorced Mr. Wilson from his one visible means of support—humanity at large. From that hour, as I wrote at the time to the New York “Herald,” the President was doomed to failure, the world to disappointment, and the conference damned for all eternity. When “open covenants” was hung at the yard-arm by Arthur James, his uncle the marquis tickled the left rib of

Bismarck, patted Ben "Dizzy" on the back, shouted in the deaf ear of Gortchakóff, and called upon the shades of Andrassy, Metternich, Nesselrode, Talleyrand and the suicide Castlereagh, to witness the latest triumph of "the lordly Cecils" and this Paris improvement upon the methods of the old masters of Aix, of Troppau, of Chaumont, Vienna, Verona, and Berlin. The "New Freedom" walked the plank, while pink-cheeked Mr. Balfour lay back in his chair and ruminated among long-forgotten jokes that were cracked in 1878, when he was secretary to his uncle, and bluff old Salisbury played second-fiddle to the parvenu Jew who managed to teach even Bismarck a thing or two about the world's biggest business, diplomacy.

Until the mask is torn from old diplomacy, and it stands exposed as the last surviving enemy of amicable international progress, to prate of justice, of right, of common decency in the relations between organized states, is dangerous nonsense. Even Mr. Wilson, the optimist of the Conference of Paris, was compelled to admit on May 31 that present-day world relations rest upon power and not upon principle. Mr. Wilson wore himself out, mentally and physically, in his splendid effort to change the temper of the powers. He lost his fight, and returned to the White House a sadly disillusioned and disappointed man. In November, 1919, he was at death's door. I am told that he did not want to live, and I can quite believe that, for I saw him often and talked with him while he was making his fight for humanity in Paris. He gave much thought to the Philippines, and one of the reasons why he forced his European associates to yield him "the scaffolding" for a League of Nations was because he believed that therein lay the solution of Philippine problems.

The Filipinos have a perfect right to desire and to demand independence. Congress may decide to turn them loose. Afterwards, the Filipinos may be sorry. Afterwards, Americans may be sorry. It is not easy to say just what is best to do, confronting the world as it really is to-day.

America is a great nation, the greatest that God has seen fit to permit in what Mr. George Bernard Shaw calls "the insane asylum for all other planets." It is a mad and a bad world, my Philippine masters. We found that out while we were endeavoring to explain to Mr. Hughes of Australia the principle of the mandatory system. The mandatory system is a modern device by which the hardtack of human slavery is coated with the frosted sugar manufactured by frozen-faced old diplomats, and then set in the window of the New Freedom and called the cake of kindness. In Africa and New Guinea, it has been served with satisfactory results to the cooks, if not to the consumers. There was much talk in Paris about the mandatory system, and some talk of its application to the Philippines.

No nation can give another nation independence. No nation can be independent and dependent at the same time. Great as is America, America cannot give the Philippines independence.

The Philippines, thanks to the war and submarine development, have become the keys of the world. They now assume new importance in the major strategy of war and peace. That is a consideration binding upon the American and the Filipino people. It has a direct bearing upon any discussion of Philippine independence.

A promise is a sacred thing. An act of the American Congress is not a "scrap of paper." Filipinos who are splitting hairs in interpretation of the term "stable government," despite the Democratic donkey, are wasting their time. The American people may be depended upon not to split hairs or to expend their energy in theorizing about the Philippines. Filipinos and Americans have wit enough to address themselves to the practical questions.

The capability of the Filipinos to govern themselves is not in question. There are honest differences of opinion as to whether the Filipinos have made the most of the opportunities created for them during twenty-one years of unselfish Ameri-

can comradeship. General McIntyre's¹ forthcoming report, based upon his personal observation of conditions in the archipelago, will be carefully read by seriously interested Americans, Europeans, and Asiatics. It is certain to be free from bias. Its abstract interest will be based chiefly upon the question whether an Oriental and tropical people can absorb and recreate for themselves an imported civilization, within one generation. The civilization of Spain ran along contrary lines to the Anglo-Saxon idea planted in the Philippines by Americans. Spanish civilization cultivated and utilized the cacique. The cacique has been expunged wherever the spirit of the freeborn franklin has succeeded in creating and maintaining an atmosphere of democracy. Has that hard fact of Anglo-Saxon history penetrated the Filipinos within one generation? If it has, the Filipinos are greatly to be praised. If it has not, that is their loss, but it is no reason why they should be condemned as inept or incapable. The Filipino is capable, mentally and physically.

The Filipino possesses one of the chief titles to national independence. He is not merely willing to die for it; he is willing to fight for it. Only fighting races are capable of independence. The "dying" races must be satisfied to tag along at the tail-end of the modern procession. They are liabilities, not assets, of a rough-and-tumble civilization which calls for draft laws and universal military service. Mother did not raise her boy to be some slacker nation's sucker.

The Filipino has another strong claim to national independence. He is a Malay. In the modern meeting of East and West, there ought to be room for the Malay. The last of the distinct types to enter the international arena as a national entity, the Malay will contribute the enthusiasm of youth. No man can prophesy the ultimate effect that might follow accidental American intrusion in the Orient, if a self-

¹ Major-General Frank McIntyre, chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department, was returning from a tour of inspection of the Philippines while this volume was in the press.—P. G.

governing, self-sustaining Malay commonwealth gets off to the right start.

The Filipino has a third essential qualification for national independence. He possesses a strong spiritual tendency. He owes his predominant faith to Europe, to Fra Urdaneta and to Rome, but *not his faith in faith*. He got that direct from the spirit of his Creator. The old Filipino beliefs have always interested serious students. They attained a high altitude and were possible only among a naturally devout and decent people. The Russian debacle shouts forth the importance to civilization of the spiritual part in national and racial entity. It is not so much the dogma that counts as it is the desire that demands and defends the dogma. Spiritually, the Filipino is a robust asset.

The Filipino is certain of complete independence, because

1. America's word is America's bond;
2. The Filipino can be depended upon to fight for his rights;
3. In granting to the Filipino untrammelled opportunity to work out his own national problems, the United States of America will be teaching Old Diplomacy a much needed lesson and preparing the world for a real new freedom;
4. The Filipino can light the lamp of a new soul in Asia.

The obstacles to Filipino independence are serious, and they may, for the time being, prove insuperable. The first obstacle is the annexing tendency of the greater powers.

The Treaty of Versailles has created so many artificial barriers and staked out so many undeveloped claims that serious doubts have arisen whether its provision can be, or ought to be, enforced. Sheer accident permitted many of the stipulations that may supply the one rotten knot-hole necessary for a catastrophe. They were drawn for purposes of trade and were not intended to be final, but they slipped into print by oversight. The huge document was too long. No human brain could digest its contents during the brief time avail-

able after it was patched together and before it was slapped in front of Count Brockdorf-Rantzau by Georges Clemenceau of the tight black skullcap and the dark gray gloves. I spent two nights and two days in Paris reading the pages and studying the maps, trying to master the peace puzzle, while it was hot off the Quai d'Orsay oven, and, although I had followed the conference move by move, I knew that I was missing some of the choicest morsels of international chicanery. The official draftsmen tossed coins to decide some of the adopted translations. That is a historical curiosity of the conference, but I am told by an ancient ambassador that the same thing happened in the Middle Ages. In diplomacy there is always a precedent for everything. Possibly that is why all the famous congresses of Europe have left such a bad smell. The eggs that they cooked were preserved in the charnel-houses of their dead past. Death, not life, held the pen that wrote the Treaty of Versailles, defying the warning of President Poincaré of France,¹ who opened the proceedings with a beautiful appeal for principle and then resigned the chair to M. Clemenceau, who has as much respect for principle as a dog has for his father. "Well, we put out the lights of heaven," said Monsieur Georges after the curtain was rung down on "bell, book, and candle." The president of the Conference of Paris is the world's most celebrated cynic. He gave the world a cynical peace.

Unless I am greatly mistaken, he hurled a huge rock into the road of Philippine independence. That remains to be seen. The larger part of the world is now holding on by the skin of its teeth. Neither in England, in France, in Italy, nor in Spain, is there assurance against internal troubles that might easily send the Treaty of Versailles to the scrap-heap. Instead of a false peace, a contradictory jumble of unnatural and impossible bargains, tied together by the rotten string of a still-born league of vain notions, liberal-minded humanity

¹ See the closing paragraph of President Poincaré's speech, *Protocolo of the Preliminaries of Peace*, Paris, January 18, 1919.

may demand and secure a new and honest world order. Experience teaches us that periods like the present rumble and burst into new wars, largely because of the burdens left over by a war that ended in a false peace. Would that seem a fair start for the much-to-be desired Filipino republic?

Who owns the trading powers of the Philippines? Have the Filipinos gained command of their own natural and developed resources? General McIntyre will give us some interesting facts and figures about the international economics of the Philippines, whether the tendency is toward swift Filipinization of Philippine economic energy, whether sufficient time has elapsed to produce the result intended when Major McKinley directed Mr. Taft to set up a civil government that would conserve "the Philippines for the Filipinos." Political independence, without economic independence, would seriously endanger a Filipino republic. No matter how justifiable its industrial or commercial legislation, foreign interests might denounce purely protective measures as "confiscation." The strong arm of the American government sustains the Philippine government during the present transitory period. The American government would not be justified in continuing to protect an Asiatic government no longer under its control.

In this connection, the Philippine problem touches upon one of the most vital questions of to-day—the operation of laws intended to exclude Asiatic immigrants and to prohibit certain aliens from owning or leasing land. During the course of the Rizal Day celebration in Washington, D. C. (December 31, 1919), a former congressman who is helping to promote the campaign for Philippine independence charged the State Department with being responsible for friction between Japanese and Filipinos, because, he said, Mr. Lansing would not permit the Philippine legislature to pass "reciprocal land legislation." Now, the simple fact of the matter is that, under the sheltering wing of the much-abused American State De-

partment, the Filipinos have placed upon their statute-books a law that prevents Japanese from enjoying equal treatment with other foreigners in the Philippines. The law became effective in November, President Wilson having failed to veto it, which he might have done under the Jones Act. Could an independent Filipino Government get away with such legislation? I am inclined to think that an act of that sort, if perpetrated by an independent Philippines, would precipitate an international situation of the first magnitude.

During General Adna R. Chaffee's military governorship of the Philippines, the United States exclusion laws were applied in the islands under a general order that was sustained in the courts, much to the anger of the Chinese. In the organic act of 1902, exclusion was extended specifically to the Philippines. Protection was continued in the Jones Act. An independent Filipino Government would have to face this question on its own feet.

It is a delicate question. The Filipinos need protection for their land and for the racial character of their population. They are assured ample protection under the American flag, and the Japanese and Chinese have been very reasonable in their attitude toward the barbed-wire fence that we have erected around the Philippines for the benefit, not of Americans, but of Filipinos. When dollar-seeking Americans endeavored to secure the admission of Chinese coolies, the American people and the American Government said: "No! The Philippines are for the Filipinos."

President McKinley declared:

The Philippines are ours, not to exploit, but to develop, to civilize, to educate, to train in the science of self-government. This is the path of duty, which we must follow or be recreant to a mighty trust committed to us.

How well we have fulfilled that trust is known best to the Filipinos, but their sense of gratitude might possibly be sharp-

ened if only Mr. Wilson had taken Mr. Quezon with him to Paris. Mr. Quezon is a good, shrewd observer. He has an eloquent tongue. He could have taken back to his people a lurid picture of the chamber of horrors into which, with unquestioned sincerity, his associates are now asking them to enter, waving over their heads the *ignes fatui* of the great abortion, alluring them to their doom.

It is not merely a question of whether the Filipinos are advanced enough to govern themselves, or strong enough to protect themselves. There is a very serious question before the Filipino and the American people, and it is one that can be answered only by naval and military experts.

Submarine warfare has invested with new importance the chain of islands that links the coast of Asia and the coast of Australasia. From the Straits of Malacca to New Zealand, these islands command maritime routes of vast importance. Naval experts in Paris called them the keys of the world, and the Philippines the master keys. The army and navy joint board alone is competent to advise Congress and the President whether, under ruling international conditions, we would be morally justified in handing over to an inexperienced, but very promising, Filipino bantling nation, the keys of the world?

The Filipinos owe us gratitude for the past and present, and confidence for their future; we owe them, and we owe ourselves, complete fulfilment of our solemn pledge; and Filipinos as well as Americans owe the world, especially Japan, a guarantee that the keys of the world, and particularly of Asia, shall not fall into the lap of some adventurous non-Asiatic power.

If the United States should decide to abandon the Filipinos to the risky experiment of premature independence, a very serious problem would be pitched in the path of Japan. The Japanese regard American protection of the Philippines, when not abused, as a material protection of Japan. The case would be altered if the Filipinos break out of their political

swaddling-clothes under a basic policy that concedes rights to all Europeans and denies them only to Japanese, despite the nice silver-foil of sophistry used by the insular congress to screen the insulting aroma of their "Manila."

BOOK THREE
HIGH LIGHTS OF HISTORY

CHAPTER XV

THE STORY OF KIAOCHAU

ONE evening, in Berlin, in 1887, about five or six months before the death of William I, three German gentlemen sat in a small room around a little table, the platters and glasses upon which told the story of a good dinner, to which ample justice had evidently been done in agreeable preparation for the kummel and bismarck and black mocha, and the story being told by the host. There was a pleasant atmosphere of tobacco-smoke and contentment. The guest nearest the one window, with flushed forehead and unbuttoned military tunic, was Prince William of Prussia, afterward William II and ultimately William Hohenzollern, a dethroned, disgraced, and discredited fugitive.

The host was a man of about sixty years or thereabout, with the spectacles and beard of the typical German professor. As a matter of fact, he was an able and distinguished German scientist, with a passion for mineralogical research, for travel, and for a Greater Germany. He had just returned from China, and at the suggestion of the third member of the company, the prince's ex-tutor and friend, he had invited the heir presumptive to dine with him and to hear what he had to say about the wonderful wealth of China, particularly the mineral treasures awaiting the practical touch of German modern development in the Province of Shantung.

Young William listened with very deep attention. After awhile he asked a number of pertinent questions, which the Herr professor answered with ease and avidity. The prince made some notes, and requested his host to write out a de-

tailed report that might be of service to the state and its friends. Thus began an intrigue the serious sequel to which was to seize American public opinion by the throat and to threaten the peace of America in the Pacific.

In that smoke-filled Berlin room was written by Prince William the first chapter of the story of Kiaochau, although, I am told, the word, "Kiaochau," was not mentioned by the professor or by the prince or by the former tutor, who merely sat, listened, smoked, and sipped his coffee and cordial. Some years were to elapse before Kiaochau should be rescued from seeping silt and centuries of oblivion. That came about in this way.

The Prince of Prussia had become William II and had "dropped the pilot," Prince Bismarck. Nicholas Romanoff, last of the czars, was crowned, fawned upon by Muscovite and parasite and was host to the German Kaiser, his cousin and chief rival in point of power within the kings' union. The self-styled "admiral of the Atlantic" was visiting his dupe, "the admiral of the Pacific." To glut the autocratic cravings for evanescent glory, through long hours that day thousands of human beings had sweated in stiff and heavy harness and had been put through their paces on the parade-park of Peterhof. Czar and Kaiser were seated together, alone, in the imperial carriage, driving at a brisk pace into what was then St. Petersburg. The sharp *click-a-clack* of the horses' iron-shod hoofs and the jingling of the accoutrements of the escort sang soothing songs of militant might into the two pairs of imperial ears. The setting sun painted rubies and sapphires and emeralds on the windows of the palace of the Singers' Bridge.¹ William shook himself out of a nap, yawned, and said to Nicholas in English, lest guardsman or outrider might be within earshot:

"I want you to do me a favor, Nicky."

Nicholas, whose thoughts had been far away, answered in

¹ Imperial Russian Foreign Office.

English that nothing gave him more pleasure than doing favors for his friends.

"I know that," said William the Practical; "and you are in the happy position of being able to serve your friends. Others are suspicious of me, but I know that you are not. We understand each other."

"Yes, of course," agreed Nicholas; "we have a perfect understanding. You know you can ask me anything."

"Good!" said the Kaiser. "Now, tell me frankly, would you mind already if I should lease Kiaochau?"

"*Cow-what?*" asked the Czar.

"*Kiaochau*," repeated the Kaiser, spelling out the Anglicized Chinese name. "Would you object to my leasing Kiaochau, in China?"

"Not at all," said his cousin, the Czar.

Later in the evening, Nicholas asked the Russian foreign minister, Muravief:

"What and where is Kiaochau?"

Muravief repeated the name several times, and then said he thought it was "some place in Africa."

"No," said the Czar; "the Kaiser tells me it's in China. He intends leasing it."

"Oh!" ejaculated the son of the "butcher of Poland," smelling a live-sized rodent. "Let us look it up, Sire."

They sent for a large map of China and, with the aid of a gazetteer, bent over it and began to "look it up." They worried over their task for more than half an hour without success. A subordinate located the obsolete Shantung port, and then, too late, responsible ministers (who had their own Far Eastern fish to fry) began worrying the Czar with doleful reminders of his folly in hastily giving assent to the German war lord's ambitious Chinese scheme.

Dr. E. J. Dillon, whose personal knowledge of international events goes much wider and deeper than his unrivaled recollections of Romanoff misgovernment, tells the most vital part of this story in "The Eclipse of Russia." He was in a

position to know the facts, to get them first hand, and to test the authenticity of stories that came to be table-talk during my own early days in the Far East. There were elements of truth in most of these stories that the Russians told their friends before Togo and Yamagata punctured the great Muscovite illusion sixteen years ago. It was not, however, until the justly famous correspondent of the London "Daily Telegraph," and friend and associate of Sergius Witte, put into print his invaluable account of the decline and fall of the czardom that even vitally interested persons and governments scented a tithe of the deceptions, petty and big, that went to make up the theft of Kiaochau.

It was about 1903 that I learned from purely German sources how the Kaiser had begun to interest himself in Shantung during the lifetime of his grandfather. He had a scheme, like a true money-grubbing Hohenzollern, for the development of Chinese mines. Owing to the suspicious sensitiveness of his father, Crown Prince Frederick, and the scruples of his grandfather, the old Emperor William, he was at that time kept merely on the fringe of German statecraft. Still, I was told, he undertook to capitalize such influence as he possessed both as heir presumptive and as a sort of imperial supernumerary among the Bismarcks and the Hatsfeldts and Rantzaus, while others were to put up the marks to see the scheme through to execution. That he never lost sight of his Chinese dreams can be proved from the cautious official admissions permitted to be printed from time to time after his accession to the throne.

In order to obtain an impartial impression of the international evidence now of vital importance, because the story of Kiaochau is being utilized as a possible cause of an undoubtedly possible American war, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that the Kaiser had his eye upon the wealth of Shantung long before Japan was conceded national autonomy, much less recognized as a power in world politics or regarded with suspicion by any government or responsible, impartial



SKETCH MAP OF SHANTUNG

Showing Tsingtao for whose reduction Japan landed her troops at the port of Lungkow—150 miles away to the North.

The British force which co-operated with Japanese troops in the attack on Tsingtao—garrisoned by 5250 German and Austrian regulars and reservists—was landed at Laoshan Bay inside the leased territory of Kiaochow (not shown in the map). The trans-Shantung railway is also indicated in the map, connecting Tsingtao with the important inland city of Weihshien and the provincial capital Chinan (Tsinan).



SKETCH MAP

Showing Peking in the North and the two trunk lines, the Peking-Hankow railway and the Tientsin-Pukow railway with the projected "two lines of railway"—one running from Kaomi on the trans-Shantung railway to Hsuechow on the Tientsin-Pukow railway and the other from Tsinan (Chinan) to Shunte on the Peking-Hankow railway. Note that the Tientsin-Pukow line connects the national capital, Peking, with Shanghai, the great commercial capital of the country, via Nanking; and that the Peking-Hankow line is also linking up Peking with Canton by its extension southward from Hankow now under construction.

person. Japan was then as dependent upon "the annexing powers," to quote Perry's language, as China is to-day. Japan was weak, but watchful and quietly nursing her own national strength so that she might be strong and independent. She was an international beggar at the gates of the mighty, as China is to-day. She had only one friend then, China's friend, America. Every other power upon earth was wronging and insulting Japan. For their own sake, and for our sake, too, the Chinese people would do well to remember that. Our friendship for the people of Asia was basically impartial and unselfish. The spirit of Anson Burlingame was the spirit of Townsend Harris. The hand that stretched itself across the Pacific Ocean to lift up the head of the first independent Malay nation was the same hand that declined to back the Anglo-French pirates of the Arrow War and that welcomed with the sincere clasp of brotherhood the two-sworded Japanese gentlemen who came with Iwakura to plead for Japanese independence and equality.

The next fact that ought to be borne in mind is that the Kaiser had picked out Kiaochau as a German base in China before the Chinese had provided him with an excuse to take it by force. Desire for German empire in China came (1887-96) before the killing of two German missionaries in Shantung (1897), the landing of German marines, the coercion of the mandarins, and the Kiaochau concession of 1898. Dr. Dillon's testimony is conclusive proof of a fact long known, but unrecognized, that the killing of the missionaries followed and did not precede the hatching of the Kiaochau plot.

The third fact of primary importance is that the Russian official Far Eastern group had already (September, 1895), "earmarked" Kiaochau in the ninth clause of the scandalous Cassini Convention. Russia was about to seize both Kiaochau and Port Arthur when Germany, undoubtedly aware of the piratical features of that "secret treaty," anticipated the Muscovite move.

The fourth fact demonstrated by Dr. Dillon is even more

important. It explains very clearly motives of Japanese policy that deserve friendly appreciation on the part of Chinese and Americans, and of all our allies who were really sincere in what they said about German manners, German methods, and German policy while they were seeking international sympathy during the war.

In 1894, despite the friendly offices of the United States Government, China and Japan engaged in war over their relative pretensions in Korea. The relation of both the Japanese and Chinese governments of the time toward the somnolent and bad-tempered Hermit Kingdom was that of two leopards toward a sheep with the mange. The Japanese leopard, while the younger and smaller of the two, proved possession of the longer and sharper claws, and began the process of swallowing Korea, a pleasure that Li Hung-chang and Yuan Shih-kai had reserved for the Chinese leopard. One night, a good many years ago in China, I listened to the late Chang Chih-tung's version of that war, which the United States government assisted to terminate. Neither the Korean war nor its aftermath reflected any credit upon any of the parties concerned. To the Western powers, however, was reserved the larger measure of meanness, trickery, and shame.

Dr. Dillon sheds new light upon the European plot to rob both China and Japan, executed by great powers who tricked each other at each move in the game. The Japanese had gained military possession of the nasal extremity of Manchuria, as well as actual possession of Korea. Li signed the Peace of Shimonoseki, which ceded the Liaotung littoral to Japan. When this news reached Count Witte, he hurried to Nicholas and said to him:

"We cannot allow Japan to quit her islands and get a firm foothold upon the Asiatic mainland. That would effectually block our Far Eastern policy of peaceful penetration."

Li was looking to Witte, the Russian finance minister, to raise a loan for China to cover the money indemnity claimed by Japan. Witte was looking for his commission—for Rus-

sia, of course, not for himself. The Count, although an old diplomat dyed in the wool and up to all the tricks of his trade, was personally honest and honorable. His faults were the faults of his class. Witte, well aware of the Kaiser's Chinese schemes and of William's haughty hatred of the Japanese, played his cards so that the Kaiser's minister at Tokyo presented to Japan an ultimatum requiring the Japanese to withdraw from Port Arthur. Japan was to be pushed off the Asiatic mainland, and China was to be required to pay for the music played by the European fiddlers.

On the morning of April 23, 1895, Japanese newsboys were selling "extras" detailing the terms of the peace treaty with China. Flags were out over every house, just as American flags fluttered in honor of American victory over Germany. National pride rode high in Nippon. "*Banzai!*" was on every lip.

The German, Russian, and French ministers got into their sedan-chairs and went in full state to the Japanese foreign office. Nothing was omitted that could lend importance to their mission. The Japanese officials, who expected congratulations from these "friendly" envoys, listened to the reading of official notes depriving Japan of the fruits of conquest. Says Mr. K. K. Kawakami:

The German "advice" was of the most peremptory nature, and the masterful, overbearing manner in which it was handed to the Foreign Department by the Kaiser's convoy is still the topic of occasional conversation—angry and constant resentment would be more accurate¹—among the Japanese. The German minister brought two copies of the advice, one in German, the other in the Japanese language transcribed in Roman letters.

The note was very brief and bluntly stated that the Japanese occupation of the Liaotung peninsula was a menace to the Chinese capital and would jeopardize the peace of the Far East. "Therefore," it concluded, "the German government advises the Japanese government to abandon the idea of occupying the territory."

The original note even contained such a threatening phrase as this—"Japan is weak, Germany is strong; the outcome of an armed conflict between the two countries is obvious."

¹ Author's comment.—P. G.

It was. The Russo-German-French Triple Alliance against Japan compelled the Japanese to accept a substantial addition to the Chinese monetary indemnity, which suited the Europeans, because, as will be seen, China was to be forced to pay more than the taels (ounces of silver), and to write the incident down in the doomsday book of Nippon in letters of red that could be erased only by German blood. Nineteen years later, at Tsingtau, Japan balanced her account with the Kaiser and noted with satisfaction a reasonable amount of profit. It is better to benefit than to brag.

Count Witte was what might be called "an honest broker." He believed in taking "spot" profits. Outwardly suave, he beat down the crafty Li Hung-chang for the last possible shekel of political and monetary interest. China, through Li, paid through the nose for Russian intervention in 1895. Three years later, when Germany snapped shut the Kiaochau trap, the Peking mandarins remembered how Witte had made them salmon to Russia's sharp hook and they warned the Son of Heaven to have nothing to do with any of the suggested schemes of Western intervention. Experience teaches even a Peking mandarin, if not always and not much.

Witte got Li's signature to the Cassini¹ Convention and the Lobanof Alliance which permitted Russia to cut through Chinese sovereignty and make it a huge joke by means of the Chinese extension of the Russian Eastern Railway, the Russian fortification of Port Arthur, and Witte's clever charter for the Russo-Asiatic Bank. The Kaiser, too, was out for his price as the willing tool of Russia. The Berlin and St. Petersburg foreign offices secretly agreed that the bank, which under the charter controlled the railway, was to be a Russo-German joint enterprise. The French, tricked by both international jackals, were to be permitted to put up the francs for the Chinese indemnity and the proposed Russo-German secret raid upon the integrity and actual resources of China. The following is

¹ Count Cassini (still later Russian ambassador at Washington) was minister at Peking during and after the China Japanese War (1894-95).

Dr. Dillon's masterly summary of this "dog-eat-dog" transaction between so-called great powers. It furnishes one of the numerous reasons why some plain, unwashed people in Europe have decided that whatever rascality is to be done in the name of government can be done most pleasantly by themselves and *for themselves*. The old *noblesse* took to stealing from the international chicken-coop; so, now, regular chicken-thieves, like Lenin and Trotsky, have taken over the golden chairs of government, rubbed off the gilt, torn away the mask, signed up the light-fingered fraternity in full membership of the kings' union, and quartered the dark-lantern on the crown, the jimmy on the orb, and the blackjack on the scepter.

Truth and loyalty were so often eschewed in these transactions that the historian who is acquainted with the subject takes their absence as a matter of course. At the close of the China-Japanese campaign, immediately after the treaty of Shimonoseki became known, another illuminating instance of unscrupulous dealing occurred in which, however, as the Russian saying puts it, "the scythe came upon the rock," and Germany received a coin from her own mint. Witte told me that the idea of depriving Japan of the main fruits of her victory had sprung up in his own brain and was executed without opposition because, although he was only Minister of Finance at the time, his influence over all Russia's public business was still paramount. By the Shimonoseki treaty, Japan obtained Chinese territory on the mainland, and this was destructive of Witte's scheme of peaceful penetration, which presupposed the integrity of China. Accordingly, he requested Germany and France to join him in compelling the Tokio government to let go of its foothold there. Germany regarded the arrangement as a business transaction and was determined to charge both China and Russia a reasonable price for the service rendered. When, therefore, the Tsar's government contemplated the opening of a Russo-Chinese bank, which, it was anticipated, would acquire the control of the principal economic and financial resources of the Celestial Empire, Germany insisted upon going halves with her neighbor and supplying a proportionate part of the capital. Negotiations were consequently opened with the Russian Foreign Office which gave the proposal its "careful and favorable consideration." But while terms were being solemnly discussed between Petersburg and Berlin, and suasion was

apparently making a breach in Russia's opposition, it was suddenly announced that the Russian Ministry of Finance had on its own initiative furnished the entire capital and was no longer open to any offers on the subject. That was one of the results of the "autonomy" of the State Departments. The Foreign Office was not, of course, responsible for thus leaving Germany out in the cold; with finances Count Lamsdorff had nothing to do, and against an accomplished fact there was no appeal. That was the gist of the explanations given. But the German government was not to be thus cheaply fed on fiction. It was resolved to bide its time and have its innings before the match was over. And the "leasing" of Kiaochau was the result. Driven from the open gate of diplomacy, it sought and found an entrance at another door.

I am able to add from my own Far Eastern notes an important link in the devious chain of trickery which Dr. Dillon is in a position to verify, and will, I am sure, appreciate. While the Berlin-St. Petersburg negotiations were ostensibly proceeding with mutual frankness, both governments were secretly plotting against each other in Peking. Like *Bombardos* and *Epataque* in the "Pepita" of that day, the Russian and German ministers were kissing each other in public, making faces behind each other's back, and making marvelous "copy" for Putnam Weale and reporters less able and candid than the author of those "Indiscreet Letters from Peking." Their public and official "sweethearting" was almost as amusing and as fatal as their clandestine, contrary intrigues with the oily and timorous and double-dealing mandarins who composed the Tsung-li yamen and grossly mismanaged the foreign affairs of the Middle Kingdom. Through the inevitable Chinese "leak," it came to the knowledge of the Russian diplomat that his German colleague was pushing with persistence a "request" for "cession or lease of a port in North China." It was this interesting information that encouraged and confirmed M. Witte in his always intended purpose to double-cross Berlin, and so deliberately. And, as Dr. Dillon discloses, Berlin replied by forcing China to deliver the lease.

Then began the memorable "Battle for Concessions"; Port Arthur and Dalny (to Russia) Wei-hai-wei and Kowloon (to England) and Kwangchow Bay (to France); the mandarins wept and twisted their queues, and the Chinese millions raged and swore strange oaths, while the West stole their Bostons and their Baltimores and their New Yorks from November, 1897, to June, 1898. And during the most critical month of all—May, 1898—our flag went up in the Philippines. What was a poor "heathen Chinese" (!) or "Pagan Jap" (!) to think or say of the voracious "foreign devils" from the West? It was Shantung that made answer. Germany, pulled by the strings of Russia, had kicked the Japanese out of Manchuria. The Japanese were not saying anything. They were nursing their grievance and biding their time. But the savage Prince Tuan and the ignorant masses of Shantung and all China demanded something more sanguinary than the tearful memorials of the mandarins to the throne. The semi-barbarian Tzu Hsi, Empress-Dowager by way of lust of the flesh and lust for blood, determined upon and exacted a terrible revenge, in which the innocent foreigners, women more than men, were to pay in death and in torture for the trickery and greed of the West's old diplomats. The Red Summer of 1900, the Boxer Terror, was China's answer to the German rape of Kiaochau, the English theft of Wei-hai-wei and Kowloon, and the French theft of Kwanchow Bay.

Shantung inaugurated the bloody orgy. The record is written by our own officials, with numerous and pathetic quotations from the Chinese state papers, in many pages of close print, bound in red cloth, known as *The Foreign Relations of the United States*, and neither read, known, nor understood by most of the eminent American statesmen who during the Senate debates of 1919 made themselves ridiculous and their country a source of pity and amusement to foreigners who do take the trouble to understand the Shantung question. Public policy is never safe when in the hands of ignorant

men. Nicholas and Muravief were as ignorant as Dr. Dillon's story paints them; yet they were not more ignorant of their country's vital concerns than are some of our own American statesmen. To some United States senators, it would seem, Kiaochau is a subject that can best be discussed much as they might handle a cow *couchant* over a jar of mixed pickles, on a field *sangre*. The name is irresistible, and it rolls from the senatorial lips as the heads of the helpless ones rolled from the knives of the Boxers. Anger, foolishly and unjustly placed, recoils upon and smites its author. China paid, unjustly and terribly, for the Boxer madness. Japan, be it noted, first participated in the bloody work of the civilized West as a contributor to the Punitive Expedition led in its latter end by Field-Marshal von Waldersee against the Boxer "Fists of Righteous Harmony." Japan entered "the glorious galaxy of the powers" nominally under the baton of a Hun, "whose wife is an American lady," as the blood-lusting kaiser wrote to the American President.

During the forenoon and afternoon of Wednesday, August 6, 1919, I sat in the hearing-room of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and listened to the examination of Mr. Robert E. Lansing, Secretary of State of the United States of America. The volume of gross ignorance unfolded by the senators who questioned and the charming gentleman who answered, in behalf of coördinate branches of our Government, was pathetic and ominous to one knowing the facts under discussion. Facts, seemingly, were of absolutely no importance. A Seward or a Hay or a Root would have made political mince-meat of the pettifogging partizans who heckled the mediocre successor of John Jay. A Seward in the Senate, a Clay or a Calhoun, would have confined examination to matters of fact and not afforded "aid and comfort to the Germans," so quick upon the pen-scratching at Versailles, by nimbly mouthing, even at Chinese anti-Japanese prompting, German ghost-dreams of "Japanese treason to the Allies," as did the gentlemen who seemed to be more inter-

ested in picking up hyphenated and vicious votes than they were desirous of serving the state and upholding our American policy of friendship toward all the people of Asia.

CHAPTER XVI

THE GERMANS IN KIAOCHAU

THE Kiaochau Convention, under which Germany acquired title to her concessions in Shantung, was signed on March 6, 1898, by Baron Von Heyking, German minister at Peking, for Germany; and by Li Hung-chang, imperial Chinese grand secretary, and Weng Tung-ho, a member of the council of state, for China. The Marquis Li, of course, was at that time the right hand of the Empress-Dowager Tzu Hsi, and the dominant figure in the foreign policies of China. He was president of the Tsung-li yamen, or board of foreign affairs, and *de facto* premier and minister of foreign affairs in China. Until May 8, 1911, five months before the Rebellion, China had no cabinet. Prince Ching, grandfather of the late Mrs. Wellington Koo, was premier of the first Chinese cabinet. The empire was ruled through the medium of a number of boards in Peking, which provided court parasites with numerous sinecures, to the sorrow and to the injury of China.

The preamble of the convention recited that

The incidents connected with the Mission in the Prefecture of Tsochowfu, in Shantung, being now closed, the Imperial Chinese Government consider it advisable to give a special proof of their grateful appreciation of the assistance rendered to them by Germany. The Imperial German and the Imperial Chinese Governments, therefore, inspired by the equal and mutual wish to strengthen the bonds of friendship which unite the two countries, and to develop the commercial relations between the subjects of the two States, have concluded the following separate Convention:

In view of the fact that some of our distinguished commentators, official and otherwise, have apparently swallowed

as sincere these and other grotesque protestations of mutual love, sympathy, and gratitude, it is well to point out that while most, if not all, of the nations of the earth resort to the verbiage of hypocrisy, often of deliberate deceit, in the drafting of treaties, the Manchu mandarins were past masters in this art, and Li was second to none of them in that respect. This we shall see. The convention was divided into three sections. The first covered the lease of Kiaochau; the second empowered Germany to construct two railways, and specified extensions, in Shantung and to develop mining properties along the railway lines; while the third erected a German sphere of influence covering the whole of the province of Shantung.

Under the first article, the Imperial government of China permitted Germany to make of the entire bay of Kiaochau, to all intents and purposes, a German gulf on the coast of China, and so situated that it might become a controlling factor in shaping the politics of the Orient as a whole. To simplify the description as much as possible, so that the Chinese and international position thus created may be readily understood, what Germany did was to take a sharp pencil and with it mark out the best natural harbor within the bay, and there plot on the map a section of land comprising one hundred and twenty-three square miles, while with the same sharp pencil she marked all around the bay, including the islands outside of the bay, a continuous strip about thirty miles broad within which China covenanted

To permit the free passage of German troops within this zone at any time, and also in taking any measures, or issuing any ordinances therein, to previously consult and secure the agreement of the German Government, and especially to place no obstacle in the way of any regulation of the water-courses which may prove to be necessary.

Article I ended with the "face-saving" clause that

His Majesty the Emperor of China, at the same time, reserves to himself the right to station troops within this zone, in agreement with the German Government, and to take other military measures.

That this was meaningless, both Chinese and Germans well knew. It was merely the polite protest of a proud, inefficient mandarin; the wriggling of the Chinese paper dragon. As an actual fact, China was forbidden to exercise her sovereignty or to station any troops without German consent. This so-called "neutral zone" alienated Chinese sovereignty during the term of the lease, which was to run for ninety-nine years. Germany was permitted to fortify her concession and the entrance to the harbor. Chinese warships and merchant ships were restricted within the limitations placed upon the ships of foreign nations on friendly terms with Germany.

Article 5 covenanted that

Should Germany at some future time express the wish to return Kiaocho Bay to China before the expiration of the lease, China engages to refund to Germany the expenditure she has incurred at Kiaocho and convey to Germany a more suitable place.

The concluding paragraph bound the two nations to come to an agreement regarding the reestablishment of Chinese customs stations. The wording, as will be seen from the text, was very indefinite, and it was the ambiguity of the language in this paragraph, and fears as to Russian intentions at Port Arthur and French intentions at Kwangchanwan, that precipitated the correspondence leading up to the pronouncement of the Hay doctrine eighteen months later.

The first article of the second section specified two lines of railways and branches to be constructed in Shantung. One of these lines is the Tsingtau-Tsinanfu Railway, about which there has been so much controversy. The railway and mining articles, taken together, gave Germany a strangle-hold not merely upon the alluring Province of Shantung, but upon a large and rich empire extending far into the heart of China; this by reason of the fact that the Kiaochau concession was undisguisedly a means to an end, and Far Eastern history proves that while she did undoubtedly vary her methods of reaching it, Germany never lost sight of that end.

It must be remembered that immediately after the two German Catholic missionaries had been murdered near the birth-place of Confucius, Tsaochowfu, German warships had steamed into the bay and taken possession of it, and that without giving Chinese officials a chance to draw breath, the Germans, on November 30, 1897, posted a proclamation that the territory so wrested from China would be administered under the laws of Germany.

To add all the pomp possible to this display of the German mailed fist, Prince Henry of Prussia, a brother of the Kaiser, appeared on the scene in command of a German battleship squadron.

These were the circumstances in which Germany took possession of Kiaochau.

It should also be borne in mind that the German missionaries were undoubtedly provocative agents in the employment of the German government; that their behavior in Shantung was calculated to lead to a breach of the peace, and that they were murdered not by the people of Tsaochowfu, not by or with Chinese official sanction, but by armed robbers who murdered and robbed the Chinese at the same time. My reason for stressing this point is because some so-called friends of the Chinese, in their eagerness to make it appear that Japan, and only Japan, menaces China, have gone to the length of distorting the history of China in 1897 and 1898 and have not hesitated to assert that China was a willing partner with Germany in the wrong of Kiaochau. That, of course, is as false and mischievous as the absurd suggestion that England welcomed Germany's act. That the British Foreign Office resented and deplored the scramble of 1898 is a matter well known to all who were familiar with the doings of that day. Among others, I was cognizant of the feelings of responsible British statesmen and it is not fair to England that she should be put in the position of willingly partnering the brace of pirates, Russia and Germany, who were mutually responsible for the 1897-98 attempt to partition China. The French,

while aiding and abetting the Russian policy, and profiting by it with deliberation and with callous disregard of the rights of China, were none too pleased at the sudden entrance of Germany into the Orient. It disturbed the whole situation. As will be seen, it stung Japan into action. A glance at the map suffices to show how Germany's possession of Kiaochau pointed a sword at the heart of Japan, as well as at the heart of China.

It is important to recall that the Kiaochau sensation was sprung at a moment when the international atmosphere was surcharged with dangerous war gases. England and France were watchful and jealous of each other in Africa; the Fashoda incident had brought these two "annexing powers" to the verge of war; England was already preparing for the contest that was certain to come with the Boer states of South Africa. Her responsible officials, anticipating war with the Transvaal republic, had approached our ambassador with the request that we should take charge of British interests within the enemy territory, which, upon the advice and at the request of John Hay, we did protect during the continuance of the Boer War. We were on the eve of war with Spain. In the course of our war with Spain, we came into possession of the Philippines, and it is a historical fact that our flag went up over Manila to the relief and joy of the English and the Japanese, and to the disgust and the anger of the Germans. Japan saw in our occupation of the Philippines a possible friend in need, in the event that Germany should utilize Kiaochau to Japan's injury or disadvantage; and Japan had good reason to anticipate injury and disadvantage from Germany's occupation of Kiaochau.

To return to the convention, Section III contains the following provision:

If within the Province of Shantung any matters are undertaken for which foreign assistance, whether in personnel, or in capital, or in material, is invited, China agrees that the German merchants con-

cerned shall first be asked whether they wish to undertake the works and provide the materials.

In case the German merchants do not wish to undertake the said works and provide the materials, then as a matter of fairness China will be free to make such other arrangement as suits her convenience.

This was a German adoption of the French precedent in South China. The purpose was to put all Shantung developments under the hard heel of German finance. To sum up, Germany forced China to alienate one of her best bays, to connive at the erection of a German fortress commanding the seaward approach to her own capital, to place in German hands a German strategic railway pointed at her capital, to present Germany with the rich Shantung mines along the course of the railway lines, and to offer Shantung as a field for exclusively German exploitation.

Germany's position was stated with brutal frankness by the chancellor, Prince von Bülow, in the Reichstag, on April 29, 1898. He said:

"We should certainly not take the initiative in a partition of China. All that we did was to see in good time that, whatever happened, we should not draw a blank. The moment when the train starts does not always depend on the will of the passenger; it is his business to see that he does not miss the train. The devil take the hindmost."

Germany immediately began to develop Kiaochau as a *point d'appui* for her commercial interests in Shantung and as a base in Far Eastern waters for her navy. On March 13, 1898, the whole of Shantung province was declared within her sphere of influence, and on April 27 the Kiaochau district was declared by imperial edict to be an imperial protectorate. The Reichstag promptly voted eight million marks for the development of the "colony" and in June, 1899, the Shantung Eissenbaum Gessellschaft was organized with a capital of fifty-four million marks for the development of railroad and mining facilities, thus putting to an end similar negotiations with

British and American financiers. Large sums were spent in laying out the port of Tsingtao on a thoroughly modern German basis, and the harbor was made the best between Dairen and Shanghai by building a splendid breakwater, a system of granite wharves, and a large dry-dock.

Trade increased by leaps and bounds, the imports from 11,078,000 marks in 1902 to 114,938,000 in 1911 and the exports from 4,865,880 marks in 1902 to 80,295,000 marks in 1911. Germany's policy, at first very aggressive and intolerant, soon changed, and in 1905 her railroad guards were called in and the postal system along the railroad abandoned. Nevertheless, but 3806 Germans had settled there up to 1913 and the local receipts were far behind the sums appropriated for the colony by the Reichstag.

The tomb of Confucius, near Tsianfu, on Tai-shan, the "Great Mountain," is reached by a narrow path, with here and there sharp ascents, worn by the feet and the floods of centuries. On each side are tablets and more or less decaying temples and shrines. Beside the temple at the summit of the hill is a tall tablet marking "the place where Confucius stood and felt the smallness of the world below."

To understand the Chinese feelings in this matter of Kiaochau, it is proper to remember the place which Confucius still holds in the life of the Chinese. It was undoubtedly the German assault upon the sentiment as well as upon the sovereignty of China in the acquisition of Kiaochau that provoked the Boxer Rebellion, and this, despite the fact that the Germans were careful not to intrude upon the Chinese "sacred places" in Shantung or to include them within their "leased territory."

The ancient Chinese port city of Kiaochau, while well outside the limits of this forcibly seized German concession, is within the so-called "neutral," but actually "forbidden" zone. For many centuries before the stirring times of the pirate Koxinga, Kiaochau was a thriving port. Thither came much of the trade to and from the adjacent provinces. Fear of Koxinga and his roving ships caused temporary abandon-

ment of the exposed shore-line, and silt and the wayward habit of Chinese estuaries closed the port permanently. About six miles of mud intervene between tidewater and the old town that has given its name to the inlet of the China Sea and this international controversy. It is about forty-five miles, on the railway, from Tsingtau to Kiaochau.

The German-Chinese railway agreement, provided for in the Kiaochau Convention, was signed on March 21, 1900. The signatories were Yuan Shih-kai, then governor of Shantung, with General Yin Chang, for the government of China; and H. Hildebrand, "a royal inspector of Prussian railways," for the Shantung Railway Company of Berlin and Tsingtau, a company then on paper only, created by the German government for the purpose of developing the railway rights. The preamble specifically reserved to the Berlin directors the power to make the railway regulations "between the boundaries of the German leased territory and Tsinanfu," the capital of Shantung. While Article 1 provided for the issuance of shares to Chinese as well as to Germans, it also stipulated that "this company shall for the present be under German management." Then came this German pledge, in the light of after-events a rich German joke:

It [the company] shall half-yearly notify the Chiao-Se-Chuo at Tsinanfu of the number of shares purchased by Chinese. As soon as the amount of such shares has reached Taels (Chinese ounces of silver) 100,000, the Governor of the province of Shantung shall delegate a Chinese official for coöperation at the seat of the company.

It never became necessary to take that trouble. The German management and German ownership remained intact until the Japanese conquest of Tsingtau, in November, 1914.

Article 3 provided that

Officials or respectable citizens shall be consulted upon the location of the railway, in order to take as far as possible into consideration the interests of the population.

The line was prospected, surveyed, and built without the

least regard for the wishes or the feelings of the people of Shantung. The conduct of the German soldiers and civilians was deliberately provocative and brutally cruel. "To kick or cuff a Chinese has become a regular part of the day's work of the pioneer Germans in Shantung," wrote an impartial British observer in 1902. The line was built to the music of German machine-guns, and many poor Chinese lost their lives under the jocular Article 3. These things happened in flagrant and direct violation of Article 26, which is as follows :

Should the Railway Company apply for soldiers to protect the preparatory work, the construction or the traffic of the railway, the Governor of the province of Shantung shall at once consider the circumstances and comply with such application. The amount to be contributed by the company for the troops dispatched shall be the subject of a further understanding.

In this connection, and because even President Wilson and former president Taft, not to speak of less influential participants in the Shantung controversy, have seriously erred in their well-intentioned efforts to state the facts, it is desirable to quote the text of Articles 16 and 17. They are as follows :

Article 16.—If troops are needed, outside of 100 li [50 kilometer] zone, they shall be dispatched by the Governor of the province of Shantung. No foreign troops may be employed for this purpose.

The Governor of the province of Shantung binds himself to take effective measures during the period of surveying as well as when the railway is under construction or opened for traffic, to prevent any damage being done to it by the mob or by rebels.

Article 17.—This railway, having for its sole purpose the development of commerce, shall not, outside the 100 li zone, be permitted to transport foreign troops and war materials employed by them. In case there should be war between China and a foreign power and the railway should at the time still be managed by the said Company, then the Company must continue to observe the provision aforementioned. In case certain sections are occupied by the enemy and the Company should lose its power of management, then the provincial authorities shall not be responsible for the protection [of the railway].

The Germans, following the Russian precedent in Man-

churia, tried hard to secure Chinese consent to a provision authorizing the use of German troops along the railway line and within the railway zone. The Chinese, because of their rude Russian lesson in Manchuria, refused assent to this. The presence of Japanese soldier guards along the lines of the Shantung railways was without legal warrant and, as will be seen, Mr. Wilson, not knowing the facts in the case, assumed as a Japanese right, inherited, as he seems to have thought, from this Chinese-German compact, what was clearly an act of Japanese usurpation.

The line from Tsingtau to Tsinanfu was completed in 1904. On November 28, 1905, China and Germany came to an agreement for the withdrawal of troops from Kaomi and the other points where barracks had been erected and troops stationed in violation of the previous agreement. China was permitted to purchase the barracks and other buildings at the German price. All troops were then withdrawn to the fortress of Tsingtau, built by the Germans. The policy of conciliation had been inaugurated by the Germans for their own purposes. Tsingtau was now "a little corner of Germany in the East," to quote German guide-books. A magnificent city had been carved and fashioned out of rock and mud. Conservative estimates valued the German government holdings at considerably over \$60,000,000, apart altogether from the railway, the mines and the military value of "the Gibraltar of the Far East."

The German mining concessions in Shantung were defined and delimited in an agreement executed on July 24, 1911.¹ The German consul-general at Tsinanfu and the German manager of the company (only nominally "The China-German Mining Co.") signed this contract with Commissioners Su and

¹ In this connection, it is proper to state that Viscount Chinda, of the Japanese delegation, informed the late George Louis Beer, of the American delegation, that the Shantung articles dealing with these disputed properties were drawn merely with a view of protecting Japan's right of succession to provable German state properties at Kiaochau.

Yu, acting for China. This, also, is an important fact, because one of the questions in controversy is whether the Shantung railways and mines are German state-owned or privately owned properties.

CHAPTER XVII

THE HIGH COST OF GREED

AMONG the beggars at the gate of the Conference of Paris, and they were numerous and of many sorts, there was one group that stood apart from all the rest, because its members found themselves regarded as being neither among the elect of the Allies nor yet among the damned, or enemy persons. They suggested those gloomy spirits that Dante found hitherside "the woful tide of Acheron,"

The wretched souls of those, who lived
Without praise or blame, with that ill band
Of angels mixed, who nor rebellious proved,
Nor yet were true to God, but for themselves
Were only. From his bounds, heaven drove them forth,
Not to impair his lustre; nor the depth
Of Hell receives them, lest the accursed tribe
Should glory thence with exultation vain.¹

These were the refugee Russian royalists, *les émigrés* of the fallen autocracy, the ambassadors and ex-ministers of state who sought by every means within their power to induce their allies to recognize them as constituting "the government of Russia." In all the ruling circumstances, that of course was impossible.

These Russian gentlemen included several sturdy and loyal friends of the Entente, notably Mr. Sazanof, their leader. It was quite natural that the French should sympathize, and very strongly, with those Russians who, like Mr. Sazanof, had remained loyal to France to the very end. Thrift is the

¹ Inferno, canto 111.

chief characteristic of the people of France. French savings had gone to make up the milliards that were declared swept away by the Bolsheviki masters of Russia under eclipse. The French could scarcely be blamed for vowing vengeance upon the Bolsheviki and upon their policy of shameless bankruptcy: yet it was inevitable that less interested observers should hark back to 1793 and "The Terror." France under Marat and Carriere and "Mademoiselle Guillotine," presented as ghastly and as gloomy a picture as has Russia under Lenin and Trotsky; and Mr. Sazanof and his friends were in identically the same position as that held by the Bourbon *émigrés* who successfully campaigned from the Hapsburg court of Schönbrunn.

I pointed this out to a member of the French cabinet, who shrugged his shoulders and smiled as he said:

"This is 1919, not 1793; and France is not Russia. There is no comparison between the people of France and these savages."

That is always the trouble; comparisons are ever odious. Always we are civilized, while our pet aversion must be savages. Still, the event proved that the world had moved at least a step or two between the Vienna of 1793 and the Paris of 1919. Despite the powerful influence of the rue Scribe and the Quai d'Orsay, the Russian ministers were kept outside the doors of the Conference of Paris. Mr. Sazanof had his "day in court" before the Supreme Council, but that was merely a part of the concerted opposition to what had come to be called the Prinkipo policy. Russia remained a black cloud on the eastern horizon, warning the peacemakers that they build carefully lest they build vainly.

Among the Russians was the late Mr. Izwolsky, a former foreign minister. It was Mr. Izwolsky who opposed Mr. Taft's efforts to secure Russian recognition of American passports issued to Jewish citizens formerly subjects of the Russian autocracy, and Mr. Knox's proposals to neutralize the Manchurian railways. I talked with Mr. Izwolsky about these

and kindred matters, and he and other Russians in Paris frankly confessed that Russia made one mistake after another throughout her international relations from Alexander I to Nicholas the Last. It is just to the better element among the Russians to recognize that they seem to realize these mistakes, now. It may be a healthy sign. At last, after many years, it is possible to trace the modern Far Eastern question to its source—the corrupt greed of Romanof Russia.

As we have already seen, the German seizure of Kiaochau was made possible by the ambitious schemes of Russian ministers of state and the sublime ignorance of the Emperor Nicholas. Now, it appears that the secret sequel to the Cassini convention, as developed by Li Hung-chang, Lobanof-Rostofsky, and Nicholas II in person, was not a mere economic agreement of however dubious equity, but an alliance in fact, and *an anti-Japanese alliance*, at that. While Mr. Lou Tseng-tsiang, who headed the Chinese delegation in Paris, received his accolade as a member of Li's celebrated suite, in Moscow, the only Chinese who witnessed the conversations and transactions between the mandarin Marquis and the Czar and his ministers was old Li's son, Li Chung-fang. Consequently, hitherto it has not been possible to get a connected, authentic account of the Russo-Chinese proceedings from any Chinese source. Young Li occasionally contradicted certain Russian assertions. He never told what happened. Neither did the Chinese foreign office. Until the fall of the Romanof it was equally impossible to ascertain the truth from responsible Russian sources. Now the documents are available, and they are conclusive.

Czar Nicholas told Li that "China could not be sure that England and Japan would not brew trouble for her very soon, but she could at least enable Russia to come to her assistance."

This statement is quoted by Li in his dispatch to the Chinese foreign office (Tsung-li yamen) of April 24, 1896. On the next day Li dined with Lobanof. Mr. Witte was a member of

the party. Li, reporting to his Manchu masters, telegraphs that

Witte thinks that if China solicited the despatch of Russian troops, it is she [China] who should undertake to provide them with food. If China were in straits, Russia should come to her assistance, and *vice versa*. But the cardinal point was that railway connection should be made through Manchuria, and the convention once ratified, a secret treaty might then be concluded.

Another telegram, May 2, 1896, quotes Li as urging upon the Chinese grand council the necessity of concluding the Russian secret treaty. He describes Russia's motive as "being a desire to establish friendly relations with China," and he says, "If we refuse it, Russia's dissatisfaction will be deep and our interests will suffer in consequence." This telegram explains why, despite Russian promises to the German foreign office, Germany was excluded from participating in the Russo-Chinese bank scheme (1897). Li tells his masters, or, rather, his mistress, the old dowager, that the draft contract with the Russo-Chinese company sets out "that the capital must be Russian and Chinese only, the merchants of other countries being eliminated from the list of subscribers."

The documents demonstrate incontestably

1. That in 1896 China and Russia formed an alliance, aimed chiefly against Japan and England.¹

2. That the Manchurian extension of the Trans-Siberian railway was conceived as a Russo-Chinese military weapon, aimed at Japan;

3. That the provision for Russian military railway guards on Chinese soil was, and deliberately, an anti-Japanese war provision; and

4. That China became a consenting party to a Russian policy opposed to what is now known as the "open door" policy.

Li, of course, was smarting under his diplomatic defeat ad-

¹ See Appendix "B."

ministered by Prince Ito at Shimonoseki. His intention, undoubtedly, was to protect China, but the fact remains that he was offering Manchuria and the chief northern Chinese naval base as a Russian battle-ground and battery for the exaction of Chinese vengeance upon Japan. In the spring of 1898, the series of assaults committed upon the integrity of China warned some of the mandarins that Li was playing with edged tools. Instead of protecting China, the Russian alliance was threatening the dismemberment of China. When, at the invitation of the young Emperor Kwang-Hsu, Liang Chih-chao accompanied Kang Yu-wei to Peking, he advised the "Son of Heaven" to substitute for the Russian alliance, which had brought such sorrow in its train to China, an alliance with Japan. Before that could be consummated, Yuan Shih-Kai betrayed the Reformers and imprisoned the Emperor, and the anti-Japanese policy was continued by the court. Then came the Boxer outbreak and the Russian descent upon Manchuria, which led directly to the Russo-Japanese War.

Baron Rosen tells us how, as Russian minister at Tokyo, in March, 1898, he submitted to his foreign office a Japanese plan to adjust outstanding difficulties with Russia. Japan was content to develop her opportunities in Korea if Russia would limit herself similarly in Manchuria. The Russians flouted the Japanese proposal. The Japanese foreign office then attempted to make peace with China—a real peace and not the paper peace of Shimonoseki. Our minister in Peking cabled to the State Department the information that certain Japanese and Chinese officials were discussing a Chinese-Japanese alliance. It is a matter of record, as well as within the knowledge of many living statesmen, that the entire weight of the Western legations in Peking was thrown into the scale against the proposed Chinese-Japanese alliance. The Russian minister assumed a threatening attitude. The Tsung-li yamen took fright. Viceroy Alexief began to administer Manchuria as a Russian province; the Russian flag went up over the Chinese customs station at Niewchwang; Harbin was laid out

as a Russian town; England and the United States supported the Japanese diplomatic protests.

Defeated in their attempt to come to a friendly understanding and alliance with China, the Japanese statesmen sought and secured an alliance with England. Russia was menacing England and India, as well as Japan and China. The alliance was signed January 31, 1902. In 1903, Mr. Roosevelt, then President, delivered his memorable San Francisco speech, in the course of which he said

The extension in the area of our domain has been immense; the extension in the area of our influence even greater. America's geographical position on the Pacific is such as to ensure peaceful domination of its waters in the future, if we only grasp with sufficient resolution the advantages of that position.

Mr. Roosevelt was inclined to back Japan against Russia, and the "Rough Rider" was not the man to indulge idle threats. Unfortunately, however, American policy in the Philippines was causing an exodus of Americans from the Far East; our adventure in benevolent imperialism had failed to arouse enthusiasm within our own broad acres. Americans were not going into the Far East. They were getting out of the Far East; and, to his regret, Mr. Roosevelt found that the spirit of the American people did not favor an American-Japanese war with Russia. Lamsdorf, well aware of this fact, took full advantage of the situation; and Mr. Roosevelt's representative was repeatedly snubbed and flouted by the practised performers of the Singers' Bridge. The Russian ambassador at Washington was compelled to mislead and to play with Mr. Hay and the President. Mr. Hay swore, and the President gnashed his teeth. England would very willingly have joined us and the Japanese in a combination against Russia, but, as Mr. Hay said, "that would have given the Irish the jimjams; and the German hyphenates, fits." The German, as usual, was playing both ends against the middle, but with a marked tendency to precipitate war between Rus-

sia and Japan, for the German purpose of weakening both empires. The upshot was that, in 1904, Japan took her fortune between her own teeth and made war upon the Russians, driving them across the Yalu, out of South Manchuria, and to ultimate disaster at Moukden. Once more, Japan came into possession of Port Arthur, thus writing off the debit balance created by the anti-Japanesce Western combination of 1895-98. On August 12, 1905, just a week after President Roosevelt brought the Russian and Japanese delegates together on the deck of the *Mayflower*, and while there seemed very little chance of writing a peace treaty acceptable to both Russia and Japan, England renewed the Japanese alliance. That was significant. While Kaiser William of Germany was acting as go between for Czar Nicholas with President Roosevelt, the English were doing all that they could to support the Japanese. This explains certain passages in the letters and statements of Mr. Roosevelt. The British government and British bankers were ready to assist Japan to continue the war, while the German government was straining every nerve to assist Russia to the most dignified peace possible. Dr. Dillon and members of the Russian government of that time have confirmed the fact that Russia, in 1905, was on the edge of the precipice of Bolshevism. What happened twelve years later would probably have followed the Duma revolution, if Mr. Roosevelt had not succeeded in bringing about peace.

It is, of course, impossible to say just what might have happened had the Conference of Portsmouth failed to bring about peace for Russia and Japan. It is merely possible to state the preparations that were made by various powers to meet an accepted crisis. Kaiser William had deliberately spurred Nicholas into his mad adventure, the war with Japan. He expected an expensive Russian victory that would cripple both Japan and Russia, while turning the Russian pressure from the West to the East. It did not suit William's purpose that the Japanese should blast altogether the fiction of "white" political predominance in Asia, nor did it suit him at all that

Russia should break up into separate socialist political elements. Consequently, very willingly, but at the last moment, he came to the assistance of Nicholas, and once more upon his own terms. - He made the czar's necessities serve the purposes of his major world policies. Nicholas was induced to sign the secret treaty of 1905,¹ which William held in reserve, intending to flash it in the face of France, immediately peace was restored in the Far East. But the French and British got wind of this treaty, and that was the chief reason why the Anglo-Japanese alliance was hurriedly renewed and strengthened. Nicholas was depending upon William to come to his assistance, in the event that Japan's minimum terms proved inadmissible. It was known in the Far East that Kiaochau was being prepared for possible employment as a naval base against the Japanese. It was known in the Far East that the Germans sought a combination to dislodge Japan a second time from Port Arthur. England, Japan and France prepared to face the music that was being secretly rehearsed for them by the *meister-singers* of Wilhelmstrasse.

These were the circumstances under which Witte and Rosen, and Komura and Takahira, assisted by the good offices of Mr. Roosevelt, made peace at Portsmouth, and these were the reasons why the Nobel peace prize was conferred upon Mr. Roosevelt. The Nobel prize was conferred upon Mr. Roosevelt by "the Czar's Scandinavian harlot," to quote the language to me of a very great American statesman. Mr. Roosevelt, were he alive to-day, would be the first to declare that Hay was right and he was wrong in his visualization of the Far Eastern question and its European entanglements in 1905. "I would rather be the dupe of China than the chum of the kaiser," said Hay as, worn out, sick, and with the finger of death already upon his brow, he left the State Department for the last time a couple of months before his death, July 1, 1905.

Mr. Roosevelt was sincerity itself. He was the friend of Japan. His sympathies were with the Japanese, and not at

¹ Bjorke, July, 1905.

all with the Russians; but Le did not fully understand the situation and unconsciously he permitted himself to be used as the catspaw of the Kaiser. In after life there was nothing that made him more furious than the recollections of what he was induced to do for Russia and Germany in the autumn of 1905.

It must also be remembered that the Russo-Japanese War changed the whole political face of the world. For the first time in the history of Asia, an Asiatic power, Japan, had defeated one of the great Western powers,—*the* Western power most feared in Asia,—and compelled the white man to sue for peace. That was one factor. It revived throughout Asia hopes and dreams of ultimate relief from the aggressions of the annexing powers; but while the greater part of Asia was hoping and dreaming, the Western powers were busily at work from the Persian Gulf to the Amur and the Yangtze. Colonel Younghusband had returned from Lhasa; the Chumbi Valley agreement was signed; the French were tightening their hold upon one side of Siam, and the British on the other. Russia, very unwisely, neglected her howling internal problems for fresh adventures in Persia, the Bokhara, and Mongolia. In 1911 China drew one of her practical Russo-Japanese war dividends in the dethronement of the Manchus. Immediately, Russia proceeded to take advantage of the Chinese situation. Mongolia was denied by Russia the right of admission to the Chinese republic. The Russian Government, by golden chains and blandishments, drew the Huk-tukhtu to Petrograd and proceeded to annex the ancient empire of Mongolia. Between 1911 and 1915 Russia continued pressing Mongolian demands and divorcing the Mongolian khans from fealty to Peking. The British, following Russia's lead, hastened their absorption of Thibet. In his last important speech on international relations, before the lid blew off the political pot and war broke out in 1914, Lord Grey shook his fist at China over the matter of Thibet.

“If,” said the British foreign minister; “China does not

sign" [the proposed new Thibetan convention] "but resorts to an aggressive policy, the consequences must be disastrous for China. There certainly will be grave trouble on the Indian frontier, which will require Great Britain to take up the matter seriously with the government of China."

Great Britain's Thibetan demands were far-reaching. They were calculated to make the "roof of the world" a purely British preserve, which for all practical purposes it is to-day. Specifically, the ten demands were as follows:

1. The right of a concession for a railway leading from India up to Thibet.
2. China shall borrow money from England for the expenses of political reforms in Thibet.
3. China shall recognize the validity of the Anglo-Thibetan treaty.
4. British shall be permitted to aid in the industrial development of Thibet.
5. The Chinese government shall be responsible for the redemption of Great Britain's loans to Thibet.
6. Chinese troops shall not be permitted to enter Thibet without adequate reasons.
7. The appointment of government officials in Thibet shall be made after consultation with Great Britain.
8. A postal and telegraphic system shall be introduced.
9. No rights in Thibet shall be conceded to any third country.
10. Mines in Thibet shall be worked in the form of joint enterprises between British and the natives.

In sum, primarily because of Romanof greed, secondarily because of German intrigue, thirdly because of the Anglo-French annexation habit, and fourthly and most largely because of the weakness, the duplicity, and the stubbornness of China, an Asiatic stench was thrust under the nostrils of Japan. With one foot on the Asiatic mainland and the other in the Sea of Japan, Dai Nippon had ample warrant to "watch her step" when the war-drums beat over Europe in August, 1914.

CHAPTER XVIII

JAPAN'S WAR RECORD

ON August 3, 1914, the British ambassador at Tokyo, Sir William Conyngham Greene, received an urgent despatch from Sir Edward (afterward Viscount) Grey, instructing him to call upon Baron (later Viscount) Kato, the Japanese foreign minister, and ascertain whether England could rely upon Japanese assistance in safeguarding British interests in the Far East. The die was already cast. England was about to enter the war on the side of France and Russia. British diplomats in all parts of the world were acting under instructions to safeguard British interests. Japan, England's ally, was certain to be a powerful factor in deciding the worldwide struggle into which England entered formally the next day. Kato's response was very friendly and quite satisfactory. Sir William cabled to London that Japan could be relied upon.

Baron Kato saw the Japanese premier, Count (afterward Marquis) Okuma, immediately, and the cabinet and privy council met and approved the following statement, which was issued by the foreign office on August 4:

The Imperial Government cannot help entertaining much anxiety with regard to the political and economic situation brought about by the latest developments of European politics. Needless to say, the Imperial Government sincerely desires that the present trouble should find the earliest possible solution and that peace be quickly restored. In case the present war should continue, the Imperial Government wishes to have it not extending to the countries not yet involved, and that this country may maintain an attitude of strict neutrality.

It is necessary that the closest attention be paid to the future developments of the situation. In the event of Great Britain becoming involved in war and the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance

being affected, Japan may take necessary measures for discharging her obligations under the treaty. It is impossible at present to say whether such an event will occur; and the Imperial Government sincerely trusts, indeed, that this contingency may never occur; but this Government is paying the most careful attention to the situation.

On August 7, Ambassador Greene called once more upon Baron Kato and, on the part of England, invited Japan to enter the war, without delay. Baron Kato discussed with Sir William certain proposals and suggestions made by the British foreign office and consented to lay these before the cabinet. It was understood that the British desired naval coöperation to protect the British base at Hongkong and the transport route from Australia and New Zealand through the Straits of Malacca. A report gained currency that both Russia and England desired to monopolize the operations that would be necessary to isolate and capture the German base at Tsingtau. In addition to her ships of war, Germany had a garrison of over 4000 soldiers and marines manning the guns at Tsingtau. I think it may be accepted as beyond either speculation or contradiction that the Japanese decided to enter the war, at once, and to take charge of the operations against Germany in the Far East, *in order to anticipate either Russian or British conquest of Tsingtau*. On August 15, the Emperor returned from Nikko to the capital and presided over a meeting of the council of ministers and the Genro. Baron Kato had drawn up a note to Germany, modeled upon the notorious German ultimatum to Japan of 1895. With one or two slight changes, the note was approved, and within an hour of the close of this momentous council, very late on the evening of August 15, it was handed to the German ambassador and cabled by seven different routes, to insure safe and quick delivery, to Baron Funakoshi, Japanese chargé at Berlin. The note stated that

Considering it highly important and necessary, in the present situation, to take measures to remove all causes of disturbance to the peace of the Far East and to safeguard the general interests

contemplated by the Agreement of Alliance between Japan and Great Britain, in order to secure a firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, the establishment of which is the aim of the said Agreement, the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believe it their duty to give advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions:—

1. To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be so withdrawn.

2. To deliver on a date not later than September 15, 1914, to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiaochau, with a view to eventual restoration of the same to China.

The Imperial Japanese government announce at the same time, that, in the event of their not receiving by noon, August 23, 1914, the answer of the imperial German Government signifying an unconditional acceptance of the advice offered by the Imperial Japanese Government, they will be compelled to take such action as they may deem necessary to meet the situation.

General Erich von Ludendorff, in his account of the war (1919) says that

It had been a bitter disappointment that our diplomacy had not succeeded in keeping Japan from joining our enemies. That was the result of our unfortunate policy of pulling the chestnuts out of the fire for Russia after the peace of Shimonoseki in 1895, and preventing Japan from seizing Port Arthur.

Russia never gave us any thanks for this, and it did us infinite harm with Japan. She naturally could not understand what interest we had in weakening her position.

The ultimatum handed to us by the Japanese government in August, 1914, is said to have corresponded, word for word, with our ultimatum of 1895. We spoke at that time of the restoration of Port Arthur; now Japan spoke of the restoration of Kiaochau. The Japanese knows how to take his revenge.

The ultimatum reached Berlin at night on August 16. It was presented to the German foreign minister on the morning of August 17, and on August 23, Wilhelmstrasse sent a verbal message to the Japanese chargé that there would be no reply. The messenger handed the chargé his passports. On

August 27 the Austrian ambassador at Tokyo informed Baron Kato that he had been instructed to request his passports and to leave Japan. He was given his passports, and the Japanese ambassador at Vienna was withdrawn to Rome. In the meantime (August 23) an imperial rescript was issued declaring war against Germany. The language of this rescript is interesting and important. It stated that

The action of Germany has at length compelled Great Britain, Our Ally, to open hostilities against that country; and Germany is, at Kiaochau, its leased territory in China, busy with warlike preparations; while its armed vessels, cruising the seas of Eastern Asia, are threatening Our commerce and that of Our Ally. The peace of the Far East is thus in jeopardy. Accordingly, Our Government and that of His Britannic Majesty, after a full and frank communication with each other, agreed to take such measures as may be necessary for the protection of the general interests contemplated in the Agreement of Alliance, and We, on Our part, being desirous to attain that object by peaceful means, commanded Our Government to offer with sincerity of heart advice to the Imperial German Government. By the last day appointed for the purpose, however, Our Government failed to receive an answer accepting their advice.

It is with profound regret that We, in spite of Our ardent devotion to the cause of peace, are thus compelled to declare war, especially at this early period of Our reign and while We are still in mourning for Our lamented Mother.

On August 26, Commander Kato of the second Japanese squadron declared Kiaochau Bay in a state of blockade. The blockade was made effective, but in the meantime the *Emden* had escaped to begin her fame as the most daring and most gallant of German raiders. On September 2 a landing was made at Lungkow, Shantung, under cover of the fleet. A British force landed on the shore of Laoshan Bay on September 23, and established communication with the Japanese line of investment. On September 26, the Japanese and British advanced against Tsingtau. On October 12, the German governor, Meyer-Waldeck, was warned to remove from the city the non-combatants and neutrals in order that they might escape the bombardment, then inevitable.

The Japanese, debouching inland from Lungkow, cut the Shantung railway and occupied the line as far as Tsinanfu, the inland capital of Shantung. The Germans were hemmed in, both on land and on sea. The Japanese campaign was conducted without a hitch, so much so that military men in Japan smilingly spoke of it as "the autumn manœuvres." After twice demanding the surrender of the Germans, so as to save needless loss of life, at dawn of November 7, the attack began all along the line. Immediately, the white flag went up on the flagpole above the residence of Governor Meyer-Waldeck. On November 11, the Japanese entered Tsingtau as victors. About 30,000 Japanese troops of all ranks took part in the land operations; and 3 battle-ships, 5 battle-cruisers, 21 cruisers, and 5 destroyers, comprised the naval force. The total casualties were 12 officers killed and 40 wounded, and 1472 soldiers killed or wounded. The naval casualties were 280 officers and men who went down with the cruiser, *Takachiho*, torpedoed by the enemy, and 40 other men killed and wounded. The British contingent lost 3 killed and had 9 wounded. The prisoners of war numbered 4,648, including 221 officers, in addition to Governor Meyer-Waldeck. They were interned at various camps established in Japan and undoubtedly were given courteous and considerate treatment. In addition to the cruiser *Takachiho*, the Japanese fleet lost 1 destroyer, 1 torpedo-boat and 3 trawlers. The German naval loss was 1 cruiser, 5 gunboats, and 2 destroyers.

On October 6, a Japanese squadron appeared off Jaluit and began the occupation of the Marianna, Marshall, and Caroline Islands in the Pacific. A German survey ship was captured. Yap Island, occupied by the Japanese, was subsequently relinquished to an Australian landing force.

The cost of the operations was given as yen 65,000,000. It was estimated that the value of the prizes of war was yen 70,000,000, as follows: Tsingtau harbor improvements, yen 15,000,000; Shantung railways and mines, yen 30,000,000; coins, arms, coal, etc., yen 3,000,000; sunken ships, yen 2,-

000,000; German state property in the Pacific Islands, yen 20,000,000.

Japan entered the war against Germany, suspected by friend and foe. Questions asked in the English House of Commons provoked questions in the Japanese Diet and inspired German propagandists in every neutral country, including the United States. Among the British in China, feeling against the Japanese was exceedingly bitter. It was quite evident to all that Baron Kato and Sir Edward Grey differed regarding both objects and measures. The tension was increased because of the subordinate rôle played by the British force under General Bernardison, who left the Far East for England fuming against and furious with his Japanese Allies. This situation, however distressing, was inevitable. The British, pioneers in China, could not be expected to cheer with joy as they saw pass to Japan the prestige and the power and the opportunities earned by a century and a half devoted to the opening up of China and the sacrifices of blood and treasure incurred to that end. "The North China Daily News" and other influential newspapers in China and English newspapers like the Manchester "Guardian" and the London "Morning Post" began to train their batteries upon the Japanese. Tension was already acute when on January 18, 1915, Dr. Eki Hioki visited Yuan Shih-kai in the former imperial palace at Peking and presented to him the since notorious twenty-one demands. The object of the twenty-one demands was to clinch the Japanese military and naval victories at Tsingtau by a political victory over Yuan and Germany, not to mention the Western powers. Japan could not be expected to forget 1895, 1896, 1898, and 1905. To have awaited, before acting, the upshot of the war in Europe would have been the very height of Japanese folly. Kato was determined not to wait an instant. Tsingtau had come into Japanese hands on November 11. On December 3, Kato delivered the Japanese demands to Mr. Hioki, with instructions to present them at the first available opportunity. Undoubtedly, the anti-Jap-

anese tendencies of Yuan Shih-kai, and the intrigue that was being openly conducted by the German and Austrian legations in Peking, influenced the Japanese foreign office in measuring out the dose it was determined that Yuan and Germany should swallow. Nevertheless, it was a gigantic Japanese blunder, and the manner in which the thing was done gave Japan a black eye throughout the whole world. Worst of all, it justified Chinese resentment against Japan.

Both privately and publicly, the premier, Count Okuma, had declared the benevolence of Japan's intentions; and when the frightened Chinese revealed the existence and character of the twenty-one demands, Japanese statesmen did not hesitate to make false statements. Now, in fairness to these Japanese statesmen, it must be admitted that diplomacy, from the time of Machiavelli to this very hour, seems to represent the art of lying carried to the point of extreme fineness. Japan, however, was foolish to attempt diplomatic mendacity in the matter of the twenty-one demands, because she was bound to be caught lying. That is one of the things that old diplomacy never forgives. You may lie like a gentleman, as did Talleyrand, Pitt, and Metternich, or like a trooper, as Bismarck did at Ems, but you must be careful not to be caught lying. The mask was torn away when, on May 7, within an hour or two of the torpedoing of the *Lusitania*, Japan presented an ultimatum to China, and China was compelled to sign the treaties and notes of May 25, 1915. Mr. Wilson, in response to the wave of indignation and condemnation that swept from coast to coast of the United States, instructed Mr. Bryan, then secretary of state, to file a formal *caveat* in Peking and in Tokyo. Mr. Bryan did so. From that moment America became a party to China's protest against the Shantung settlement contained in the 1915 Chinese-Japanese treaties and notes.

Nowhere in the world was the diplomacy of Kato criticized and condemned more severely than in Japan. Some of the very ablest men in Japan denounced the proceedings "as a

manifestation of diplomatic brigandage." The resignation of Kato was demanded in the Diet. Baron (now Viscount) Ishii, Japanese minister at Paris, was recalled to Tokyo to take over the portfolio of foreign affairs. On October 13, Ishii was announced as foreign minister. On his way from Paris to Japan, Ishii held an important conference with the British foreign minister. This conference improved the relations between Japan and her allies, and it was in consequence of what took place in London that on October 19 the Japanese foreign office announced Japan's participation in the Allied agreement not to make a separate peace with Germany. The Okuma cabinet struggled along until October 4 of the following year (1916), when it resigned in a body. In the meantime Baron (later Viscount) Motono carried through the Russo-Japanese alliance, which was signed on June 8, 1916. The Russo-Japanese alliance was the logical outcome of Japan's policy after the treaty of Portsmouth. This policy, formulated by Prince Ito and Marquis Komura, was admirably developed by Viscount Motono as Japanese ambassador to Russia during the ten years from 1906 to 1916. Viscount Motono joined the Terauchi ministry, succeeding the Okuma cabinet, as foreign minister. Motono favored active Japanese participation in the war.

One result of the British and American criticism of Japan, occasioned by Kato's blunders in dealing with China, was to strengthen pro-German sentiment in Japan and to weaken unofficial Japanese sympathies with England and France. It was impossible for the Japanese people to close their eyes to the fact that the English and the French, the Russians and the Italians, were safeguarding their own interests by means of secret agreements as well as by "dangerous side shows" that seriously weakened the military operations against the Central powers, while Japan apparently was expected to make sacrifices without any assurance of practical Japanese gains. The wise men of Japan watched the progress of the war, move by move, and awaited the opportunity that was certain to come when Japan could insist upon equal treatment.

The opportunity came in the middle of January, 1917, when Germany prepared to bottle-up England and destroy the Allied military and economic power by recourse to unrestricted submarine warfare.

The British war cabinet was in session when a message from the foreign office announced the German intention. Without a second's delay, the war cabinet directed the mobilization of every remaining ounce of British resistance. Each separate department was called upon for every man, every minute, and every grain of material at its disposal. The Admiralty, of course, was the first and last line of defense. With a full sense of his responsibility, the first lord of the Admiralty notified the war cabinet that nothing more could be done. Help must be obtained from somewhere, and immediate help. In this crisis, with starvation, defeat, and dishonor staring England in the face, Foreign Minister Balfour sent urgent instructions to Sir Cecil Spring-Rice at Washington and Sir William Conyngham Greene at Tokio, directing them to lay the facts before the American and Japanese governments. The Japanese responded with alacrity. We hesitated; we were still neutral, Ambassador Bernstorff was still intriguing from his house on Thomas Circle, Washington, D. C. Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, I am told, felt constrained to warn Mr. Balfour that it would be dangerous to rely upon American aid. Ambassador Greene in Tokio was able to report that Japanese support would be instant and effective. The Japanese navy was ready to steam at once to European points of contact with the Allied ships getting ready to repulse German undersea frightfulness. All that Japan asked was that her Allies should support her at the eventual peace conference. This was the way in which the secret agreements between Japan and England, France and Russia, with the verbal approval of Italy, came about in February and March, 1917.¹ The correspondence began before we broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, and was concluded on March 23, before

¹ See Appendix "E."

we declared war against Germany. A fleet of Japanese destroyers sailed for the Mediterranean in February, and thenceforward the Japanese navy formed a material factor in defeating the German undersea peril all along the allied maritime routes, and particularly in protecting the troopship lanes between Australia and New Zealand and the French and English ports. Between February, 1917, and the end of the war, the coöperation of Japan with her Allies was cordial and complete.

CHAPTER XIX

CHINA IN THE WAR

IN Paris and in Washington attempt was made to paint China's participation in the war as that of an intended belligerent whose entrance on the side of the Allies had been delayed by Japan. China, we were told, was eagerly straining against the leash with which Japan, an Ally, held her, first, in ineffective neutrality, and, later, in impotent nominal belligerency. Those who made the charge most vociferously knew it to be untrue.

China's war record was due to many causes, only one of which originated in Tokio. Some of these causes were purely Chinese, but most of them were foreign and European. Until it suited their own Chinese interests, and very properly, no Chinese statesman advocated war against Germany. If America had not entered the war, nothing is more certain than that China would have remained nominally neutral. China's neutrality was a farce. China's "belligerency" was a tragedy. The responsibility and the shame must be shared by the Chinese and the treaty powers who, for their own purposes, have kept China without a government during the last sixty years.

In the mind of the vast majority of China's millions who held or expressed any opinion regarding the great upheaval, the war was a Western war. It was a conflict between aggressors of China not one among whom had earned anything but dislike and disfavor in China. Germany, Russia, France, and England were copartners in guilt, in the eyes of the vast majority of the people of China; and Yuan and his clique were

consolidating a new tyranny and attempting to found a new dynasty upon the mud and grit of animosity toward Japan.

The war benefited China by abating somewhat the British pressure in Thibet, the French pressure on the borders of Yunnan and Kwangsi, and the Muscovite advance across Mongolia. The Germans—beyond all doubt because they had already determined upon war in Europe—were sedulously cultivating the friendship of the Chinese. They were posing as friends of China and of Yuan Shih-kai. They had a warm admirer in Li Yuan-hung, the prisoner vice-president, and they were well served in other more active quarters, civil and military, official and commercial. The policy of penetration by blandishment begun with the Pukow-railway agreement (1905) was moving forward under a full head of Teutonic steam when the news came to China that Europe was ablaze with war. The first Chinese sensation was one of relief, tempered by fear of Japan. Yuan had capitalized the fact that he sought Europe's favor and detested Japan.

A curious combination of medieval passions and modern opportunism was Yuan Shih-kai. He had strong and good qualities; otherwise, he could not have gone so far toward achieving his ambitious aims. He was careful to capitalize his good qualities, and his most inveterate Chinese enemy, Hwang Hsing, told me that "Yuan had deliberately chosen honesty and gratitude for his own fell ends." That, of course, was unfair to the Honanese adventurer. In the handling of funds, Yuan was conspicuously honest among a herd of dishonest Manchu and Chinese officials. Yuan was ever grateful for services rendered, in favorable contrast with mandarins whose ingratitude was notorious. Yuan was Chinese, and his family had rendered good service to the state. He had cultivated the friendship of British and American officials, merchants and missionaries. He had learned how to use them while seeking to be of use to them. He was a contributory cause of the war with Japan. That must be remembered.

His industrious usefulness to General Ma and the many-sided Li Hung-chang had made him at two-and-twenty years, Chinese Resident in Korea.¹ He was thus the very center of the complicated intrigue of Seoul, and he never forgot the circumstances under which he hurried out of Korea on the outbreak of the China-Japanese War. He had a score to settle with Japan, and Japan knew his inmost thoughts.

Thus was Chinese relief, because of fancied security from immediate European aggression, tempered in August, 1914, by Chinese fear of Japan. Yuan had China by the throat. Japan, strong and united, had good reason to dislike and to suspect Yuan.

It is well to bear in mind the circumstances in which China became the huge plaything of Yuan Shih-kai. It is but fair to the Chinese to weigh these circumstances in the favor of China.

Step by step, for services rendered the Manchu house between 1894 and 1908, Yuan rose to predominance in Chinese politics. The death of the Empress-Dowager, Tzu-Hsi, and of the Emperor Kwang-Hsu, placed the actual reins of government in his hands. While Prince Ch'un, the father of Pu-Yi (honorific name, Hsuan-Tung)—the baby emperor chosen by the "Old Buddha," Tzu-Hsi—was named regent, Yuan was senior guardian (*kung-pao*), and the real power between the Dragon Throne and the people. Prince Ch'un feared Yuan, probably with cause, and speedily degraded him and banished him to his home in Honan.² Yuan had ability.

¹ The office of Chinese Resident at Seoul carried with it the power and prestige of a super-ambassador and quasi-censor of Korean affairs.

² While he was dying, the Emperor Kwang-Hsi, elder brother of Prince Ch'un, scrawled a testament with the imperial vermilion pencil, commanding Ch'un, who was to become regent, and the Manchu princes to "kill and degrade Yuan." Kwang-Hsi was so weak that he could scarcely hold the pencil in his emaciated, trembling hand; "the pencil dropped twice, and a terrible look of pain and anger came over the prisoner-emperor's face, but he managed to make his meaning clear by tracing the characters for Yuan's 'spite-name' among the Manchu princes and by drawing his poor fingers across his throat and making

Ch'un lacked ability. The rebellion against the Manchus that had been brewing for more than half a century boiled over at Wuchang in October, 1911, and Prince Ch'un was compelled to seek help from Yuan, whom he had insulted and driven from office just two years earlier. Yuan reëntered Peking, not as a servant of the Manchus, but as their master.

Had Yuan been a loyal servant of the Manchus, he might have saved them in 1911 and 1912. Undoubtedly, it would have been a misfortune for humanity to have perpetuated the Ta-Ching dynasty. Still, it is a notorious fact, and the proofs are numerous, that European money and arms would have been furnished very willingly to sustain the Dragon Throne. Yuan did not want to sustain it, because he planned to sit upon it. He had his own score to settle with the Manchu father of the baby emperor, whom he had sworn to guard. So he ended the civil war by swearing by all his gods that he was a good republican. "I have always believed in the republic," he told a friend of mine, in proof of which admirable sentiment he accepted the Chinese presidency and began at once to conspire against the life of the Chinese Republic. His arbitrary acts provoked the civil war of 1913. He succeeded in suppressing both the rebellion and the republic, but his rule over China was merely that of a military dictator, supported by foreign finance, foreign intrigue, and fear of foreign invasion. The real Chinese republicans were organizing to drive him out of power and Peking, when the war broke out in Europe. Yuan employed all his wits to utilize the European catastrophe for his own ends.

He had no personal knowledge of the West;—Seoul was the farthest he had ever been from his Honan home or Peking,—yet it must be admitted that he had made marvelous

noises as if choking. Then came the death-rattle, and Kwang-Hsü was at peace with his great ancestors." That is the story as told to me by one of Kwang-Hsü's friends. The emperor always blamed Yuan for having blighted his efforts to give China progressive, constitutional government.

use of his limited opportunities for assimilating a smattering of Western facts, feelings, and failings. He thought Germany would win, but he was not so positive as General Li Yuan-hung and other German-trained Chinese military men. Being Chinese, he could not be expected to pray for the victory of France or England. He believed in the power of the British navy and in the British habit of gaining even out of a losing war. I am merely summarizing the expressed views of Yuan Shih-kai about the time when the Prussian military machine was seemingly crushing Allied oppositions in the early weeks of the war. The Allies did not want Yuan in the war, and Yuan had no desire to enter the war, upon one side or the other. That was in 1914. Later, when the tide of fortune seemed to be turning, and the Russian offensive, and British heroism and grim, dogged creation of a great field force, heartened Allied hopes, Yuan was anxious to get into the war on his own terms.

Yuan Shih-kai was quite willing to barter Chinese support for recognition of his spurious empire. That is a fact of history. He sounded the British and French and he sounded the Japanese. His negotiations failed. His sole support came from Germany, Austria, and American bootlickers and concession-hunters. His empire collapsed after one hundred days of medieval folly, and he passed off the Peking stage, June 6, 1916, after a brief, but painful, illness. He died, condemning his own acts of usurpation and leaving China in a sad state of confusion and conflict.

He was succeeded by the mediocre accident of fortune, Li Yuan-hung, a confirmed pro-German. That was not China's fault. It was China's misfortune. Foreigners, without exception, were largely responsible for the turmoil that continued in China after the death of Yuan Shih-kai. Honest, high-minded Chinese of North and South struggled in vain to save China and the republic. The odds were against them, chiefly because foreign influence was for sale in Peking. Government by loan at thirty days' sight was imposed upon

a people numbering four hundred millions, blundering magnificently for principle and for progress. It is a tragic fact that the government of Japan permitted itself to be sadly involved in clandestine financial transactions with the government of China; but as it was an American professor, Dr. Frank Johnson Goodnow, who had acted as the imperialist tool of the usurper Yuan, so it was American official financial policy that was instrumental in instigating the Japanese to corrupt the too easily corruptible Peking officials. President Hsu Shih-chang owed his spurious election to Japanese gold. "Little Hsu" (General Hsu Shu-cheng), Tuan Chi-jui, and Tsao Ju-lin invited the very "bargain-shop" agreements of 1918 that were so roundly denounced by the Chinese in Paris and Washington in 1919. Viscount Motono and Baron Goto merely took advantage of the Chinese situation, as had Europeans and Americans before them. It was all very miserable and very mean, and it made a tragedy of China's belligerency.

The German propagandists were most active in China in the latter part of 1916. The restless Paul von Hintze was German minister, the same Hintze who had carried Dewey's "ultimatum" to the German admiral in Manila Bay in 1898, and who subsequently served the Kaiser as his last minister for foreign affairs. Hintze, of course, was fishing in troubled waters. He moved about Peking like a hen on a hot griddle—Peking, a foreign city in China, controlled by foreign guns, foreign envoys, and foreign banks. The battle royal between this redoubtable servant of Wilhelm and the Allied ministers seriously hampered Chinese efforts to bring about a Chinese peace in China. Yet some progress had been made when President Wilson's peace proposals of December 19, 1916, precipitated a crisis at the foreign office and in the cabinet. China's official answer, delivered on January 8, showed a marked disposition to follow the lead of the United States. In view of what happened afterward at the Quai d'Orsay and the Hôtel Crillon in Paris, one phrase in this answer stands out somewhat significantly. China declared her eagerness

When the war is over, by all proper means to assure the respect of the principle of *the equality of nations*, whatever their power may be, and to relieve them of the peril of wrong and violence.

On February 4, the United States communicated to China its determination to sever diplomatic relations with Germany unless Germany withdrew her threat of unrestricted submarine warfare. Five days later, China associated herself with the United States in this proceeding. On March 10, the proposal to sever relations with Germany was approved in the Chinese House of Representatives, 330 members voting in favor to 87 votes against the government. Next day, the Senate cast 158 votes for the "break" and only 37 against dismissing Hintze. On March 25, Hintze left China. Then arose the question, Should China declare war? As soon as the American Congress declared war (April 6), the Peking Government, the Parliament, and Chinese political parties divided into pro-war and anti-war groups, each of which declared that "the existence of China as a nation depends upon what she does now in this matter." Dr. C. T. Wang was a strong and sincere advocate of immediate and effective participation in the war.

The views of the greater number of the pro-war groups were thus expressed by the Peking "Kuo Min Kung Pao":

Interest demands that China should associate herself with the Entente, which represents the group of powers who will control the destinies of the world. Germany can not help her nor harm her. If China is not with the Entente, she will be isolated. Not only that, but *she will have no voice in the peace conference*, which will adjust international interests in this country as well as in other parts of the world. Without representation in the peace conference, China may suffer further humiliation and perhaps spoliation. Fortunately, our statesmen are beginning to realize this, and their action should be indorsed by all real patriots who understand the military situation in Europe.

On March 3, "The New York Times," under the caption "China on Verge of Joining Allies," printed the following

despatches, that from Peking being sent by Mr. Fraser, the well informed correspondent of the London "Times," and that from Washington being the Associated Press summary of the situation:

Peking, March 2.—The Allied ministers have presented a memorandum to the Chinese government expressing sympathy with the attitude taken by China in regard to Germany and promising favorable consideration of the questions of suspension during the war of the Boxer indemnity payments and the revision of the tariff in the event of China's effectively severing relations with Germany and Austria. Delay in the expected development of the German-American relations and the absence hitherto of any collective intimation on the part of the Allies that China would be welcomed among them have caused the Chinese to hesitate regarding their future action.

The Germans, needless to say, have been doing their utmost among the officers of the army to establish a party opposed to a rupture. The timely action of the Allied ministers seems likely to have the desired result.

Washington, March 2.—Negotiations looking to China's entrance into the war against the Central Powers now are in progress at Peking and in all the Entente capitals, it was learned here today, and their success depends only upon the harmonizing of the rewards to be given to China with the amount of coöperation demanded of her. It is regarded as practically certain that China will sever relations with Germany, and declaration of war probably will follow if the Entente will guarantee satisfactory relaxation of the restrictions imposed upon the Eastern Empire by the world powers after the Boxer troubles.

Facts learned today from official and diplomatic circles serve to clear up much of the obscurity which has overhung events in the Far East in the last month. Occasional vague dispatches from China and reference in the Reichstag to "China's abandonment of neutrality" have thrown only dim light upon Germany's endeavor to keep China out of the struggle, the Entente's moves to bring her in, and China's reluctance to change her present state of peace without adequate guarantees.

China desires to obtain the complete remission of the Boxer indemnities, which exceed \$30,000,000 a year, and continue until 1940. If she entered the war, the part of the indemnity which otherwise would be paid to Austria and Germany could be repudiated. Information here indicates that the Entente already has agreed to postpone payments in case China begins hostilities, but does not cor-

roborate Tientsin advices that France and Belgium, in behalf of the powers, have offered complete remission.

The sum involved is such an appreciable part of China's total expenses that a satisfactory agreement might well remove the financial difficulties of the Government.

China also desires consent of the powers to increase her import duties, which under the existing treaty not only cannot exceed 5 per cent ad valorem, but are based on the average prices of 1897, 1898, and 1899. The United States has long urged this on the other sixteen signatory powers, but thus far only Japan and Great Britain have given full consent. Others have consented under varying extreme restrictions.

The Entente powers, on their part, are anxious to have China in the war, not only as a reservoir of men, but as the biggest open trade market after the war. Already, under agreement with local syndicates, headed by French and British residents, more than 100,000 Chinese laborers and agriculturists have gone to increase the Entente's man power, the great majority to France. It has been the drowning of many of these laborers on their way to France on such boats as the liner *Athos*, for instance, that first made China's protest to Germany against submarine warfare an actual threat of severance of relations.

There are about 3,000 Germans in China who would be placed in concentration camps if war were declared.

On May 1, the cabinet, led by Premier Tuan Chi-jui, declared for war; on May 7 it was reported that President Li was in agreement with Tuan, and Parliament was asked to vote its approval. Next day, the parliamentary wrangle began in earnest. It was charged that Tuan "had entered into secret treaties with a neighboring country" (Japan). On May 19, Parliament passed a resolution refusing to consider any form of declaration of war until a new cabinet was placed in office. Both President Li and the parliamentary majority suspected Premier Tuan, who was ambitious to take the place of his dead patron, Yuan, in Chinese politics. Tuan was the "friend" of anti-Japanese Americans and the tool of anti-American Japanese at the same time. As the leader of the Chinese militarists, he dominated the cabinet and browbeat the President. From May 19, the peace or war question be-

came a test of strength between Parliament and the premier. The military governors, directed by Tuan, demanded the dissolution of Parliament. President Li refused, lectured the military "bosses," and reminded them that until the new constitution was passed by the Parliament, he had no power to dissolve that body. Let it be remembered that Yuan began his monarchical movement by suppressing the Parliament in November, 1913, and it was this same Parliament, returned to Peking after four years of turmoil and intrigue, that Tuan's clique now sought to eliminate. Parliament replied by immediately adopting articles of a Chinese constitution providing for the dismissal of a cabinet after a vote of lack of confidence.

By May 21, all the cabinet ministers except Tuan had tendered their resignation. On May 23, President Li dismissed Tuan. Dr. Wu Ting-fang, former minister to the United States, was named as head of the new cabinet. The leaders of the military clique retired from the capital, openly boasting that they would overthrow the Government. They mobilized their troops for this purpose along the railway line between Tientsin and the capital, under cover of asserted foreign favor and certain foreign countenance.

It was due to American political persuasion that this new crisis had come about in the internal affairs of China. On June 4 the United States Government addressed to China the following note, which was presented to the foreign office in Peking on June 5:

The Government of the United States learns with the most profound regret of the dissension in China and desires to express the most sincere desire that tranquillity and political co-ordination may be forthwith re-established.

The entry of China into war with Germany—or the continuance of the *status quo* of her relations with that government—are matters of secondary consideration.

The principal necessity for China is to resume and continue her political entity, to proceed along the road of national development on which she had made such marked progress.

With the form of Government in China or the personnel which administers that Government, the United States has an interest only in so far as its friendship impels it to be of service to China. But in the maintenance by China of one Central United and alone responsible Government, the United States is deeply interested, and now expresses the very sincere hope that China, in her own interest and in that of the world, will immediately set aside her factional political disputes, and that all parties and persons will work for the re-establishment of a co-ordinate Government and the assumption of that place among the Powers of the World to which China is so justly entitled, but the full attainment of which is impossible in the midst of internal discord.

This note was not approved by the Allied powers. It was too late to serve any useful purpose in China. Its only effect was to widen the breach in China between America and the Allies. The Chinese vice-president, Feng Kuo-chang, resigned; President Li sought to dissolve the Parliament and make peace with the militarists; Dr. Wu refused to countersign the order, which formality was necessary under the organic law; President Li accepted Wu's resignation and appointed a "stop-gap" premier, Chiang Chao-tsung; Chiang signed the order of dissolution; the Parliament fled in haste; and civil war was resumed. This was the situation on June 13. On July 1, in the pink dawn of morning, the old Manchu bannerman, Chang-Hsun, entered Peking at the head of his pig-tailed personal army and proclaimed the restoration of the boy emperor, Hsuan-Tung, whose abdication had been forced upon the Manchus on February 12, 1912. President Li was imprisoned by the Manchu monarchist rebels. On July 3, Li escaped to the Japanese legation, re-appointed Tuan as premier, and requested Feng Kuo-chang, who had already resigned the vice-presidency, to officiate as acting president. On July 5, Tuan's forces defeated the outposts of the Manchu rebels; on July 9, Chang-Hsun was cooped up in Peking and \$50,000 set as the (Tuan) militarist market price for his head; on July 12, Tuan's soldiers captured the capital, the pig-tailed soldiers of the Manchu rebel surrendering after a

last stand in the Temple of Heaven. Chang-Hsun of course escaped. Feng Kuo-chang took office as temporary president, sustained by the swords of Tuan and the Northern militarists. The Peking government of Tuan and Feng, without any legal mandate from the Chinese Republic, declared war against Germany and Austria by presidential proclamation on August 14, 1917. Now, this was the declaration of war, with its formal abrogation of German and Austrian treaties, that was set up as a vital part of China's ~~legal case~~ for direct restitution of Kiao-chau.¹ The act itself was in flagrant violation of the laws of China. Under the laws of China the Flowery Republic has been without a government since the dissolution of the Parliament in June, 1917.

After declaring war, Tuan's faction proceeded to consolidate control over the organs of government. Along lines similar to those followed by Yuan in 1913-16, a bogus council was formed, and the bogus council convened a bogus parliament. The bogus parliament, bribed by Tuan Chi-jui, elected Hsu Shih-chang as President of China. The money was obtained through the medium of Kameio Nishihara, a very remarkable Japanese financial diplomat. The consideration was Chinese official assent to the Japanese plans for dealing with Germany's forfeited rights in the peace conference.

¹ See Dr. W. W. Willoughby's monograph on the states of government in China, China Year Book, 1919.

BOOK FOUR

AMATEURS AND EXPERTS

CHAPTER XX

HUMILIATION AND HOPE

ON October 12, 1918, the Chinese Constitutionalist Government at Canton declared war on the Peking President, Mr. Hsu Shih-chang; issued a dignified, temperate statement of reasons and aims for the information and benefit of the Western world; and despatched to America a commission of three to seek recognition from our government.

The commission comprised Dr. C. T. Wang, Mr. T. C. Quo, and Mr. Eugene Chen. Dr. Wang and Mr. Quo were accompanied by their wives, two charming Chinese ladies. Mr. and Mrs. Quo occupied my Washington apartment when I went to Paris and until they also proceeded to France to join the Chinese delegation.

So the armistice and the actual end of the war, November 11, 1918, found China with two governments, if any, and consequently two groups of officials seeking favor, one possessing, and the other desiring, formal recognition on the part of the powers. This situation worried Washington considerably, and it worried our minister, Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, in Peking. Persuasion and warnings were utilized to induce the Cantonese and Pekingese parties to get together.

On October 1 Dr. Koo, speaking at the Altar of Liberty in New York, had declared:

When the American government broke off diplomatic relations with Germany and called upon other neutral powers to consider their course of action, China was ready and proud to be the first to respond. . . . China has entered the world conflict with no desire for

material gain. The only stronghold which Germany possessed in China has already been taken from her, and China has the promise of Japan, her associate in the war, to restore it to her.

Although China had broken off diplomatic relations with Germany on March 14, 1917, and declared war on August 14, it was not until October 12 that the Peking newspapers published the regulations for the internment and general treatment of enemy aliens. Five months later, in March, 1919, we learned in Paris that in certain parts of China efforts were being made to enforce these paper pronouncements.

On October 17, "The New York Times" printed a special despatch from its correspondent in Peking, filed on the afternoon that Mr. Hsu was quietly, almost secretly, inducted into the office of president. For the first time since the proclamation of the republic, the presence of foreigners was neither invited nor apparently desired. The "Times" despatch is worth quoting, because it throws a luminous glow upon the Stygian darkness in which the Peking camarilla was confusing and confounding the interests and opportunities of China:

Yesterday, Parliament assembled for the election of a vice-president, but there was no quorum and the Speaker drove to the Zoological Gardens where a party of members were dining; but the latter, warned of the impending visit, decamped. ~~Votes are quoted at \$300 each.~~ There were lively scenes at the banks, the party leaders having stopped payment on checks issued, because the election failed.

In Peking and in Canton Americans were at the ear and the elbow of the Chinese leaders; in fact not a move was made by the Chinese, north or south of the Yangtze, without consulting their official and unofficial American friends. Americans were generously retained to assist both the Constitutionalist and the internationally official (Peking) government.

In Paris, I was given a piquant description of the scene within the old Peking palace when the armistice news got to

the Forbidden City. The leaders of the camarilla met suddenly and secretly, and each had a plan of his own; but first of all, as usual, money was necessary, and whoever supplied the money would, of course, expect to control the delegation. There is no use in mincing words in the necessary narrative of what happened. The privilege and pleasure of sustaining the Chinese delegation in Paris was up for auction, and Japan and America were the bidders. The Japanese offered a million yen, spot cash, and more if necessary; but, as reported by the Peking correspondent of "The New York Times" on December 9, the International Banking Corporation anticipated this offer by advancing \$600,000, with the promise of more to come. Dr. Reinsch, I am told, secured this advance for his good Chinese friends.

On November 2, the British Minister to China, with the concurrence of the other Allied legations, handed informally to the Chinese foreign office "a memorandum concerning matters in which China is regarded as having been remiss as an ally." A despatch to "The New York Herald," printed on November 6, stated that among the instances of Chinese "naughtiness" mentioned by the Allied ministers were the following:

The wasting in party quarrels of the Boxer indemnity, remitted for the purpose of fostering industries to enable participation in the war.

Lack of results by the Chinese War Participation Bureau and the diversion of Chinese troops to civil warfare in the South.

The appointment of a papal minister without consultation, creating an impression of friendship with the enemy.

Failure to confiscate enemy property, to impose restrictions on enemy enterprises and to impose penalties for trading with enemy subjects.

Refusal to censure the Governor-General of Heino for supporting the enemy and the Bolsheviki, in spite of the protests of the Allies.

Failure to imprison intriguing enemy subjects.

Failure to permit Allied consuls to witness the trial of arrested spies.

I telegraphed the "Herald" from Washington the infor-

mation that our minister in Peking was not a party to this protest. I was so informed by responsible officials of the State Department. The "Herald," on November 10, under the caption, "China—A 'Lame Duck' Ally," said:

Washington dispatches assert that the United States did not join in the protest lodged by the Allied governments with the Foreign Office at Peking, alleging remissness on the part of China as an ally. American aloofness, however, can hardly be due to any lack of agreement with the counts contained in the indictment presented by Sir John Jordan to China's Minister for Foreign Affairs.

There can be no question that the persons entrusted with the government of China must plead guilty to all, or almost all, these sins of omission and of commission. Those officials have used the nation's proclaimed belligerency as a means to strengthen their own hold on office, and this in utter disregard of the injury their action has done to their country and might do to the cause of the Allies.

If the United States has not joined in the protest to the government of China it should lose no time in doing so.

Subsequently, it was cautiously intimated by an official of the State Department that Dr. Reinsch participated in the "Lame Duck" proceedings, whether willingly or unwillingly was not disclosed. These incidents may seem trivial to those but superficially informed or interested in American and international Far Eastern relations, but they are in fact of the very meat of the cocoon. Hot upon the Allied protest to the Peking government, in which of course Mr. Torikichi Obata was a star performer (the deservedly respected Doyen of the corps, Sir John Jordan, keeping as far in the background as was humanly possible), "Little Hsu" (General Hsu Shu-cheng), hopped over to Tokyo, ostensibly to attend the Japanese autumn manœuvres, but really to consummate a Chinese-Japanese alliance.

On November 16, the Peking correspondent of the Associated Press cabled the cabinet's announcement of the appointment of Foreign Minister Lou Tseng-tsiang as envoy extraordinary to the Peace Conference. "Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, Minister to the United States, and most of the min-

isters to the European countries will act as delegates," said the despatch.

Dr. Koo received orders to go to Paris as diplomatic adviser to the Chinese peace delegation. He lost no time in complying with this instruction. While it was then generally thought that each nation represented in the peace conference would be allotted five delegates, this was mere speculation, and although announcements were made in America that Dr. Koo, Mr. Hu Wei-teh, and Mr. Alfred Sze were to be delegates, there was no official warrant for this report.

There was, of course, considerable competition among foreign-trained Chinese officials for the honor of representing their nation in the making of the great peace. Not merely were there two governments and therefore two sets of aspirants, but there was the group of professional diplomats, the members of which did their best to hold themselves aloof from the Peking-Canton controversy. Thus, in Washington, Dr. Koo, the Chinese minister, and Dr. Wang, the chief commissioner from Canton, preserved previous friendly relations. They were on good terms with each other, personally; although, officially, they were supposed to be "at daggers drawn," and to the credit of each, be it said, they lived up to their official obligations. Mr. Koliang Yeh, now Chinese consul at Vancouver, was a very great help to the minister and the Cantonese commissioner in meeting this peculiar situation.

Dr. Koo, from Washington, and Mr. Sze, from London, reached Paris on December 18. First, they conferred with each other and with Minister Hu at the legation in the rue de Babylone, and then with the American peace mission at the Hôtel Crillon.

On December 13, thanks to the good offices of the American minister in Peking and Mr. Lansing and Mr. Ransford S. Miller of the Far Eastern Bureau in Washington; Peking and Canton arrived at an armistice of their own, decided to call a peace conference at Shanghai, and appointed Dr. C. T. Wang

to act with Mr. Lou in Paris. A working arrangement permitted Mr. Wei, former minister to Holland and now minister to Belgium, to join the delegation, nominally as a Southern representative, but actually as the spokesman for the military *tuchuns*, while Dr. Koo and Mr. Alfred Sze were included through motives of prudence and regard for the special position of China, vis-à-vis America and England.

On January 8, President Wilson, after his return from Italy, began the real work of the peace conference in a long consultation with M. Clemenceau and Lord Robert Cecil. On January 9, the names of the French delegation were announced. A protocol, suggesting method of procedure, etc., was submitted by the French officials. This protocol discriminated between the representation to be allotted large powers and small powers and effective and non-effective belligerents. It is important to draw special attention to this fact. French officials and irresponsible British wire-pullers in Paris did all that they could to create the impression that the Japanese concocted the arrangement by which China was restricted to two delegates and deliberately humiliated. The French protocol had several French objects in mind, and one of these was to humiliate the Chinese and to court the favor of the Japanese delegation. Documents on file at the Quai d'Orsay, and documents in the possession of other governments, sustain this statement.

On January 9, Mr. Lloyd George was detained in London, reorganizing his cabinet. The new cabinet was announced on the following day, and on Saturday, January 11, the British delegates left London for Paris, Mr. Bonar Law, the Conservative leader, flying over the channel in a military aéroplane. The Chinese delegates, Mr. Lou, Dr. Wang and Mr. Wei, with their secretaries and military and civil attachés, also reached Paris on Saturday, January 11, and formal announcement was made of the temporary peace between Northern and Southern China.

After lunch on January 11, I walked down the Boulevard

St. Germain to the Quai d'Orsay and remained for a while within the religiously guarded, spike-railed inclosure, talking with a French official friend. With the solitary exception of the proverbially discourteous French passport officials, notably those of the prefecture in the Cité, I always found the French, both military and civil, as kind and considerate as one would desire or could expect. In fact, often they went out of their way to be particularly nice to us.

I had made several valuable friends among the French foreign office staff, one in particular who knew much about the Orient and who sympathized very deeply with my desire to see France pursue a more liberal and more generous policy in the Far East. I was comparing notes with this official when a motor-car dashed through the gates and drew up in front of the entrance to M. Pichon's official residence. Mr. Matsui, the Japanese ambassador in Paris, alighted, and bowed to us beamingly as he entered the building. Before I left the Quai d'Orsay, I learned that Mr. Matsui went over the draft program for the peace conference with the French foreign minister, and that he left the Quai d'Orsay to return to his embassy, where he cabled Viscount Chinda to leave London at once for Paris to attend a meeting of the Allied and Associated powers that was to be held the following Monday.

I transmitted this information to "The New York Herald," and afterwards called upon Mr. Lansing. I told Mr. Lansing of the French plan to penalize China for causing the recall of their minister, Mr. Conty, for resisting aggressions in the matter of the Tientsin concession and because of the old-standing grudge nursed by the French against the Chinese. France is the only great power that has ever suffered military defeat at the hands of a Chinese army. I assured our secretary that the hints being printed in usually conservative Paris papers, like "Le Temps" and "Le Matin," were founded upon absolute fact, and that Mr. Matsui had sent for Viscount Chinda, at the suggestion of M. Pichon, so that the Japanese

plenipotentiaries would have an opportunity of passing upon the rules regarding representation. I said to Mr. Lansing that, as President Wilson was to have a conference next day with the European Allied chiefs, it would be well to safeguard China's representation before the Japanese came in on Monday. I was frankly suspicious of the Japanese. I knew that the Chinese, by putting themselves under the wing of America, had invited the hostility of dangerous and influential elements in Tokio, and that from the purely Japanese point of view there could be only one course that Mr. Matsui and Viscount Chinda could pursue.

Mr. Lansing thanked me for the information and assured me that he would bring it to the immediate attention of the President.

Next afternoon, I was told that the President had received my suggestion and had acted upon it. That turned out to be incorrect. Mr. Wilson either failed to receive or failed to act upon the suggestion, and he will pardon me for saying that thus he lost the first trick in the game that, consciously or unconsciously, he was playing, with the hearts and hopes of more than half a billion of humanity as his chips. Let us be fair to the President and remember here that he had much to think about—too much. Although he looked fit and went about his work with almost boyish cheerfulness, already he was permitting himself to be overburdened by a mountainous mass of detail that no human brain could contain. Something had to break or to burst.

Although I have made diligent efforts to discover just what steps, if any, were taken by our delegation in this matter, I must confess that I have not been able to satisfy myself that anything was done. All the ascertainable facts seem to point to the conclusion that Mr. Wilson, while undertaking to protect Chinese interests, found himself so overwhelmed by other "causes" and cares closer to the atmosphere of Paris that his responsibilities toward China became lost in the shuffle.

On Sunday, January 12, occurred the historic meeting in M. Pichon's private suite at the Quai d'Orsay, the French foreign minister presiding, and those present including President Wilson, Secretary Lansing, and General Bliss; M. Clemenceau, Marshal Foch, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Balfour, and General Wilson. This was the first meeting of the Conference of Paris, and it ended almost in a riot. Marshal Foch strode through the folding-doors and called for his chief aide, General Wiegand.

"Hup! Hup!" Foch almost growled as he dashed down the steps, his eyes flashing fire. M. Clemenceau also burst out of the conference-room, literally flinging himself into his overcoat, his frown as dark as the leaden sky that was glooming over snow-girt Paris.

The President had a terrible battle to fight, that way, as we are told by Mr. Ray Stannard Baker,¹ but that does not alter the fact that the American peace delegation, having taken China under its wing, should have seen to it, on Sunday, January 12, that the Chinese were assured "the consideration and treatment due to a great nation."

Next afternoon, it was announced that the armistice would be renewed on January 17 and that the peace conference would open Saturday, January 18. We saw the Hall of the Clock, that morning, and wondered whether we would see it when the conference was sitting. A fierce struggle then began for the freedom of the press in the matter of reporting the Conference of Paris. Here again, it must be said that the President failed himself and humanity. He permitted his wonderfully clear mind and his undoubtedly great soul to be carried by storm under the polished persuasions of politely proficient Mr. Balfour. He cast overboard "open covenants of peace, openly arrived at," which put his opponents, the old diplomats, in instant possession of the peace conference citadel. They had isolated Mr. Wilson from his source of strength—humanity at large.

¹ What Wilson Did at Paris.

Mr. Ray Baker is quite correct when he says that the President came into the conference with principles, while the English and the French were always there with the practical propositions. This was the case in the matter of relative representation and in the matter of publicity. The French, assisted by the British, arranged the representation to suit themselves. The British saw to it that the dominions and India were treated "with the consideration due to great nations." Consequently, on Tuesday, January 14, formal announcement was made that while Brazil was allotted three seats, Belgium, Serbia, and China, among others, were permitted only two.

As soon as I confirmed this information, I hurried over to the Hôtel Lutetia and interviewed several of the Chinese delegates. Of course, they were thunderstruck. They had not yet received an official notification, but while I was in the Lutetia, Mr. Lou returned from a visit to the Quai d'Orsay, and one of the delegates informed me that the Chinese chief plenipotentiary had learned the unpalatable truth from M. Pichon. M. Pichon had been very nice to him. Nobody could be anything but nice to Mr. Lou. He is a most lovable man, a perfect gentleman, and one who has always tried to do his best for his country as he saw the light. I remained on the second floor of the Lutetia while the Chinese went into conference and agreed upon a protest which was forwarded to each of the Allied governments. The only Government that acknowledged this communication was England. The British peace mission immediately responded in a formal note, saying that "the matter was receiving consideration." This, of course, was letting China down as gently as possible. It will abbreviate and clarify the record, if we say here that the English were careful always to do that. They never missed an opportunity of letting the Chinese down as softly as possible; always, of course, taking care that some third party reminded the mission in the "Students' Quarter" that "it was too bad the 'States boys' could not secure better recognition."



VISCOUNT CHINDA



VISCOUNT MOTONO



MR. MATSUI



MR. IJUIN

The British well knew that, if the Chinese delegation in Paris once lost "face" in China; Koo, Wang, Sze, and the others would be doomed, and there would be no fear of a China awakened under the direction of returned Chinese students, educated in America.

On Friday, January 17, the Supreme Peace Council announced that ~~Belgium and Serbia had been granted a third seat~~, and that the King of the Hedjaz, the Arab protégé of Great Britain, had been allowed two delegates. No reference was made to China. No notice was taken of the dignified and proper Chinese protest.

When Viscount Chinda and Mr. Matsui sat in with the European Allied and American Associated premiers and foreign ministers and took up the question of representation, it was a foregone conclusion that what did happen would happen. China, as we have seen, was allotted merely two delegates, while Japan and the other great powers allotted themselves five each. The careful British, who never missed a trick, with admirable foresight actually possessed themselves of thirteen seated delegates beyond others whom, in an emergency, they could control. Thus at the outset it was made clear that the Paris Conference was to be based upon ~~power~~ rather than upon principle, upon militarism more than upon mere morality. Yet another thing was made manifest.

When people wearied of worrying over what all had come to call the World War, they began to speculate upon what they were pleased to call the World's Peace Conference. The conference managers rebuked this hasty conclusion by keeping the power within their own hands. I am not quarreling with their decision, but merely stating it as it happened.

The Chinese delegation formally and informally protested against the decree which deprived them of three seats at the peace table. Their formal protest, addressed to M. Clemenceau, was dignified and, I think, convincing. Their informal protests were just as strong, and not stronger than the occasion merited. The conference managers as such ignored

both formal and informal protests. Belgium, Serbia, and Hedjaz were given a hearing and redress; China was refused both hearing and redress.

Direct responsibility for this mistreatment of China cannot be charged against Japan or against any of Japan's representatives. It was Colonel Edward M. House who advised the President to make the Japanese parties to the decision upon representation, which was based "upon the relative importance of the various nations to be represented at the Conference." The words quoted comprise the official explanation made to the press. Official or semi-official explanations seldom explain. In this case, the explanation, it must be confessed, was adding insult to injury.

I sought out General Tasker H. Bliss, the only member of the American peace delegation who had ever set foot in the Far East and a very old personal friend. I asked the General to tell me why Japan was allotted five delegates and China only two.

"Japan," said the General, "is a great power."

"Yes," I said, "and?"

"Japan has ambassadors. China has ministers."

"That is so, too," I said. "Also?"

"Japan has an army in France," responded the highest American military authority in Europe and the military expert of the American peace mission.

I told the general that he must be joking, but he insisted that he was quite serious, and advised me to consult the French *Maison de la Presse*, "where I could receive confirmation" of what he said. I replied that such a story was manifestly ludicrous, but that, to make assurance doubly sure, I would act upon his suggestion.

I did inquire at the *Maison de la Presse*; also, I went out to the Avenue Hoche and asked the secretary of the Japanese embassy if Japan at any time during the war had an army in France. The Japanese officials laughed very heartily, and I joined in the laugh; but China did not.

At no time had Japan as much as a file of soldiers in France. Japan, as we have seen, was a very material military factor in the war, when we were merely interested bystanders. The Japanese did not originate, nor did they circulate, this fiction about a phantom Japanese army in France. It was merely one of the grim jests of the Conference of Paris, successfully played upon our well-meaning, blandly innocent delegates. I am so fond of General Bliss that I would not tell this story but that I feel bound to state all the facts in the case. General Bliss is a great American soldier, a great administrator, whose record and reputation can stand the shock. He is one of the greatest Americans I have ever known, and he was, from the strictly American point of view, one of our best plenipotentiaries in Paris. No one can know everything—not even Mr. Woodrow Wilson. It was Mr. Wilson's fault that the organization of our peace mission in France was so lamentably weak and inefficient that at no time while I was in Paris was there intelligence, coöperation, or precision in the conduct of the American people's business.

Had we any American business in Europe?

Repeatedly, with a monotonous iteration that became painfully wearisome to many of us, our plenipotentiaries harped on the string, "America wants nothing, America asks nothing." Several times I protested against such foolish assertions. I told our plenipotentiaries that both European and Asiatic friends were heartily sick of hearing and reading such statements; "because," I said, "they are false, and you are dealing with worldly-wise people who are naturally inclined to suspect everything that you say, be it true or false. This assertion, they know to be false."

Our delegates insisted that their position was quite right. They said, "All we want is peace."

I reminded them that "peace" was what every European thought, quite sincerely, he or she wanted, too. "But," I asked, "is it not a fact that the President wants a League of Nations?"

“Yes,” it was admitted; “but that is merely to preserve peace.”

“Oh, come! come!” I objected. “The French want the Saar Valley, the left bank of the Rhine, and bridgeheads, to preserve peace; and the English want the mastery of the seas and other things, to preserve peace. We make a very great mistake when we put ourselves in a position which justifies European and Asiatic complaint that we are adopting a ‘holier-than-thou’ attitude.”

Our peace mission, with the sincerity of super-simplicity, seemed neither to see nor to understand this.

The Shantung squabble would never have reached the United States Senate—it could have been checked and avoided in Paris—but for the fact that our peace mission seemed to be dominated by the will to prefer ignorance to knowledge.

Colonel House confessed to one of the leading Asiatic plenipotentiaries in Paris that he was not well informed as to Far Eastern matters. That was four months after Colonel House made the initial misplay for Woodrow Wilson, and it is natural to suppose that during these four months Colonel House had learned something about American-Asiatic politics. I am quite sure that the Colonel was always anxious to do the best that he could for America, but all along the line it seemed to be his misfortune to put his foot into every hole in an undoubtedly dark and dangerous road that demanded much knowledge and experience in order to avoid pitfalls.

Mr. Lou and Dr. Wang attended the opening of the conference on Saturday, January 18. It was precisely at 4:24 P. M., as I noted by my watch, that M. Clemenceau undertook to entomb old diplomacy. The newly-elected president of the conference announced that the ceremony of exchanging cards and calls would be dispensed with. This, of course, was Greek to most of the American, and many of the European, journalists present, but really it might have been momentous. Those who knew about the Berlin incident of Prince Gortchakoff's carriage, not to speak of the way in which the Conference of

Münster and so many other European congresses were held up while plenipotentiaries defended their dignity and asserted and complied with rules regarding precedence, began to hope that the Conference of Paris was going to establish new precedents for common sense, for courage, and for the common welfare. The noble language with which President Poincaré had closed his really great inaugural address encouraged hope. He had said:

This very day, forty-eight years ago, on January 18, 1871, the German Empire was proclaimed by an army of invasion in the Château of Versailles. It was consecrated by the theft of two French provinces. It was thus vitiated from its origin and by the fault of its founders.

Born in injustice, it has ended in opprobrium. You are assembled in order to repair the evil that it has done and to prevent a recurrence of it. You hold in your hands the future of the world.

A little incident, after the formal adjournment of the first session and just before the delegates and their audience left the Hall of the Clock, heartened the Chinese very much.

The President, with Mrs. Wilson on his arm, circulated around the u-shaped peace tables, shaking hands with the various delegates in turn, and chatting briefly with each. He reached Mr. Lou and Dr. Wang. Mr. Wilson has known Dr. Wang since the time when he was president of Princeton University and Dr. Wang was a very famous Chinese student at Yale. Dr. Wang presented Mr. Lou to the President, who was very glad to meet the Chinese foreign minister. Beaming upon Dr. Wang in the best Wilsonian manner, he said:

“Dr. Koo—he will be here, will he not?”

“Oh, yes,” said Mr. Wang. “Dr. Koo is a member of the delegation; but, you see, China has only two seats, so we shall take turns in attending the various sessions.”

“Good,” said the President; “that is very good.”

Beyond any question, China entered the peace conference under the wing of the United States, and Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese minister in Washington, enjoyed the special favor of Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States.

CHAPTER XXI

WOODROW WILSON AND THE OLD DIPLOMATS

THE cruel feature of the Shantung case is the fact that Mr. Wilson did constitute himself the advocate-in-chief for the Chinese. He had made it necessary for him to do that.

From the outset of his administration, he had championed the cause of Chinese democracy. In messages that rang with the melodious music of truth, he breathed courage and cheer across the Pacific to all the Chinese republicans from 1913 to 1919. It was the right thing to do. He was living up to the very best traditions of America in Asia, since 1784. Who in all the world followed with closest and deepest interest the victories of Washington in the field and in the Continental Congress? The Chinese.

It was Major Samuel Shaw, in his letters to John Jay, who told how the Chinese had faith in our infant republic. Well might they have faith in it, because they could look back over the screen of centuries to the golden age of Yau and Shun, when China was a very sensibly governed democracy, indeed.

When the impertinent and impenitent Bernstorff was gloating over the murder of the innocents of the *Lusitania*, when Mr. Wilson, in common with all real Americans, confronted the question, War or Peace? the President of the United States took his mind off his own troubles so that he might give thought and cheer to the Chinese. The blundering Okuma Cabinet had precipitated a desperate situation in the Far East. China, weak and misgoverned, was compelled to sign treaties and notes that bereft her of both sovereignty and

substance. Mr. Wilson caused the State Department to enter a solemn *caveat* against these Chinese-Japanese agreements. Also, he caused the intimation to be conveyed to the Chinese "to be patient and mark time." The war would have to end some day, and then there would be a peace conference, and the validity of these treaties could be questioned at the peace conference.

Other official and unofficial communications to China strengthened this impression, which was not permitted to be destroyed by the Lansing-Ishii agreement.¹

¹ "The United States was the only great power who could intervene to preserve the *status quo*. The American Government, however, after being fully informed as to the nature of the demands, wisely took the stand that the action of Japan was one that concerned the interests of *all* the treaty powers, and decided upon the definite policy of postponing consideration of Far Eastern issues until the termination of the war, and then, either at the Peace Conference or a special international convention to be called for that purpose, to have the status of China definitely determined for all time. This policy was communicated unofficially to the Chinese minister at Washington for the information of his government."—"The Breakdown of American Diplomacy in the Far East," by George Bronson Rea.

Also (quoted by Mr. Rea, p. 70) :

"The Washington Post' of September 17, 1916, very concisely placed on record the set policy of the administration in the following words:

"A demand for a full and complete statement of the intention of Japan in her latest demands on China will be the only action taken by the United States at this time. The State Department has decided that, under present conditions, this is the only diplomatic course open to this country, and that it is necessary that the Japanese government be placed on record for the benefit of future negotiations.

"No protest or aggressive action against the Japanese acts or policy in China will be made by the United States at this time. The State Department is unwilling to begin a serious controversy in the Far East while Europe is seething with war and while this country is involved in the numerous difficulties growing out of that struggle. For this reason, there will be no diplomatic protest against Japanese aggressions in China until the European war has ended and its international complications have been resolved.

"The United States will content itself with securing from the Mikado's government a full and clear statement of the intention of the Japanese toward China, particularly toward the 'open door' policy, and of the effect of the recent demands made on China.

"WITH THIS STATEMENT ON THE DIPLOMATIC RECORD, THE STATE DE-

Still, the question will obtrude, Should there have been any contest?

One of the very ablest Far-Eastern experts in Paris was Mr. James William Ronald Macleay, C.M.G., chief adviser upon these matters to the British delegation. Mr. Macleay has lived in Asia. He has a complete grasp of all the problems. He has an impartial mind and the large heart that seems to be one of the national heritages of the Scots.

Mr. Macleay was very helpful to me in covering the news

PARTMENT WILL WAIT UNTIL THE END OF THE WAR. THEN IT IS PLANNED TO TAKE UP THE QUESTION OF JAPANESE AGGRESSIONS IN CHINA WITH ALL OF THE WORLD POWERS WHO ARE ACTUALLY OR TACITLY COMMITTED TO THE 'OPEN DOOR' POLICY. STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT IN THIS WAY AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF MEETING THE CHINESE SITUATION CAN BE EVOLVED WITHOUT COMPLICATING THE ISSUE."

"On October 18, the State Department again placed squarely on record that it was determined to avoid all possibility of precipitating a Far Eastern crisis at this time, no matter what conditions may arise in China. The following Washington news dispatch to the press of the country tells the story:

"Washington, Oct. 18.—The State Department to-day ordered an informal investigation of conditions surrounding recent protests entered by the Japanese and Russian governments in China against activities of American capital in railroad and canal construction in northern China. The United States legation at Peking was asked to forward a report on the Russian and Japanese protests, without making any formal communication to the Chinese government, or taking any official step in the matter.

"THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS DETERMINED TO AVOID ALL POSSIBILITY OF PRECIPITATING A FAR EASTERN CRISIS AT THIS TIME, NO MATTER WHAT CONDITIONS MAY ARISE IN CHINA. FOLLOWING THIS LINE THE DEPARTMENT WILL NOT TAKE UP FORMALLY ANY OF THE VARIOUS CHINESE-JAPANESE OR CHINESE-RUSSIAN SITUATIONS FOR DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL THE END OF THE EUROPEAN WAR. This attitude has resulted in the postponement of all the negotiations in connection with recent Japanese and Russian demands on China for commercial and political concessions in Northern China and has prevented any American protests against encroachments on Chinese territory.

"The investigation ordered to-day contemplates merely the collection of information to provide a complete record for diplomatic use when these questions are raised at the end of the war. According to State Department officials, it does not forecast any immediate diplomatic action in support of American investors in China or against any other nation operating in the northern Chinese provinces."

for the "Herald." A very zealous and painstaking official, he realized and appreciated my anxiety to help the world by telling the truth. All our talks were, of course, confidential, although everything that was said, if printed, would do good and not harm. A far-seeing, honest man is Ronald Macleay.

I am going to violate his confidence for a good purpose. It is just to our European friends to recognize that if our peace mission could not see beyond its nose, other missions could. Before the issue was joined, Mr. Macleay pointed out to me the absurdity of expecting that a conference of Allies, summoned to deliberate upon terms of peace with an enemy, could constitute itself a court for the trial of one or more of its members. Mr. Macleay was right, of course. It was foolish, it was worse, to ask the Allied peace conference to try the case of China *versus* Japan.

The Shantung controversy was one of the grotesque features of the Conference of Paris. The conference was conceived in an atmosphere of nebulous political theories, very few of which offered even atomic elements of practicability. The true business of the Paris conference was swept to one side, and inevitably, when the Allies began quarreling among one another over a division of the spoils. The immediate business of the conference was to dictate terms of peace for a defeated, but unrepentant and ever-resentful, enemy. Practical statesmanship urged that, first, Germany be stripped of military power; then, that her territorial, political, and financial penance be determined *en bloc*, her delegates be summoned and compelled to sign the articles of peace. After that dismissal of the enemy was the time when the Allies might without danger adjudicate any question arising among themselves. In that way the conference would have preserved its authority, vis-à-vis Germany and Bolshevism. Instead of pursuing this wise course, the masters of mankind preferred the road of folly and disunion, and always Mr. Wilson was utilized to shake the tree for the old diplomats while they remained with their feet on the ground and picked up the fruit.

I am very anxious to tell all that can reasonably and properly be told about the Far Eastern performances of the Paris Conference. In common with the other American correspondents in Paris, I went on record for an open conference. Let the world know the truth, and the whole truth! That was the American point of view. But, as will be seen, Mr. Wilson and the other masters of mankind were unanimously against us, the public, and the truth. They dared not face the truth; neither Woodrow Wilson, Georges Clemenceau, David Lloyd George, Signor Orlando, nor the more practised and proficient diplomatic thimblerriggers who, sitting in the background, actually controlled their decisions.

Americans must understand that, to diplomats of the school of Mr. Balfour, M. Stephen Pichon, or the Marquis Imperiali, the very idea of permitting the plain people to know what they were actually doing seemed little short of rank blasphemy.

I had frequent discussions on this subject with representative spokesmen for the old diplomacy, and in fairness to them it must be said that this terrible convulsion that has made scrap of so many preconceived prejudices has actually left them unchanged, unmoved. One of the reasons why Bolshevism has made such startling strides in all parts of Europe, without exception, is because too many old diplomats are still roosting in the chimney-pots of a pestilential political past, recognized as defunct by all in the world, themselves alone excepted. You do not destroy a danger by running away from it, or by denying its existence. The masses of mankind, largely because of Mr. Wilson's powerful preachment of his New Freedom, did believe in the "Fourteen Points," while they could not quote them and they did not understand them. The war had opened their eyes to the horrors and the follies of imperialism, and they had revolted against it. Speaking broadly, they neither understood nor did they care about mere theories of politics or high moral principles. They did not reason so much as they felt, because feeling came natural

to them, and *the old diplomacy did not cultivate their reasoning capacity*. They accepted Mr. Wilson as their leader in much the same spirit as Crusaders of an earlier time followed Peter the Hermit. These people of 1919 knew nothing and cared less about Peter the Hermit. Few of them probably ever read the Covenant of the League of Nations. In fact, though it may seem a jest, I know it to be true that many of these people did confound Mr. Wilson's covenant with "the ark of the covenant." The priest had familiarized them with the phrase, "ark of the covenant," and though the priest had less hold upon them in 1919 than he had only a few years ago, still there was a familiar ring about this new charter. They were not at all interested in a League of Nations, which they were not capable of grasping within their minds, but *the need of rations stared them straight in the face*.

Getting right down to brass tacks, the masses of Europe had gained one thing out of the war—the little mustard seed of intelligent self-interest, which, as the Saxon franklin's fearless espousal of his own cause ultimately led to our own political development, may yet take them by the hand and carry them safely forth into the clear air of enlightened democracy.

Excesses of ignorant masses are not pleasant, but who will deny that the tyranny of a mob is not preferable to the tyranny of a few? The one is an unconsciously progressive and necessarily temporary force; the other, an essentially reactionary and usually too tenacious force. When, during a particularly dark hour of the Paris conference, our French friends were roaring at the Russian Bolsheviki like so many bulls of Bashan, I reminded them that Paris and Nantes had known pronounced and protracted spells of French Bolshevism. There had to be the St. Justs, the Marats, and the Carrieres, in order that France might know liberty. Nor have the English-thinking people come into possession of democracy as a free gift from Providence. We have had to pay for it, as all must pay for it, with blood and with tears, with

wrong and with bitter and painful experiences, as Mr. Wilson so admirably explained when he was teaching political science at Princeton. The man who attempts to indict a nation questions his own intelligence.

I have said that the masses had gained at least one thing out of the war. That was the exact difference between the masses and their *bête noire*, old diplomacy. These old diplomats, courtly gentlemen of lineage and letters, are our Bourbons of to-day, who have forgotten nothing and learned nothing. Yet they took Mr. Wilson into their fold, and they broke him on their wheel.

CHAPTER XXII

AMERICANS AT THE CRILLON

IN view of the fact that there has been considerable confusion in Europe and in Asia, as well as in the United States, both as to who were the "American Far Eastern experts" at the peace conference and what were their views, a little light in answer to these questions will doubtless be appreciated. There are a number of people who enjoy being called "Far Eastern experts." There are others who have given the greater part of their lives to personal and intimate study of Asiatic matters who abhor that title, yet have it thrust upon them. To call a man an expert is to put him in a pillory of disadvantage. It is almost as reasonable to call one a "world expert" as to dub him an "expert on the Far East," for it is impossible to put a finger upon a single phase of life which is divorced from and has not its important reactions upon Asia and Asia's advanced post, the Far East. Asia is the ancient ancestor of enlightened mankind. All nice, civilized folk are Asiatics. Senator Johnson and Senator Borah are very highly developed Asiatic gentlemen.¹

In this connection two good Americans are entitled to particular sympathy, two officials who have played disinterested and useful parts in assisting the American people to maintain an attitude of healthy influence in the affairs of Asia. Mr. Edward T. Williams, formerly of the State Department, now a professor at the University of California; and Mr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, formerly a professor at the University of Wisconsin, now of the staff of the United States Tariff Com-

¹ See page 344.

mission, were the "American Far Eastern experts" at the Conference of Paris. As explained elsewhere, Mr. George Louis Beer,¹ the specialist on dependencies, exercised a valuable coördinate influence. At the outset, these three gentlemen occupied offices *en suite* in the congeries of erstwhile private dining-rooms above Maxim's which, taken as an annex to the great ex-palace, ex-gambling club at the juncture of the Place de la Concorde and the Rue Royale, sheltered, and almost hid, the initial official activities of the American specialists. Later, all three, along with others from the "labyrinth," were moved to offices as close as possible to their beds in the Hôtel Crillon.

Every hour, during night or day, was working time for the American specialists. Always, they were accessible. As will be seen from the course of events narrated in other chapters, Mr. Williams, Mr. Hornbeck, and Mr. Beer received me even in the small hours of the morning when I came bent on matters of public interest. I found all of our American specialists similarly approachable and good-natured about losing even substantial portions of the mind's best tonic, sleep.

The American specialists prepared at the outset accounts of outstanding questions that needed attention in their respective areas. They classified these questions according to their relative importance and urgency, explained their nature and the factors involved, and made recommendations as to the order in which, and the methods by which, they might be dealt with. That was the specified routine. Mr. Williams and Mr. Hornbeck did all that and much more.

Each was designated in the organization of the American commission a "chief of division"; Mr. Williams, a trained diplomat of long experience, in the section of political and diplomatic correspondence; and Mr. Hornbeck, a specialist in in-

¹ Mr. Beer, one of the very greatest Americans of our time, died while this volume was in the press. A courageous pioneer in the field of American governmental evolution, it is an unfortunate fact that his death will probably deprive us of an American history of the Peace Conference. He, alone, was in a position to tell the whole inside story with real personal knowledge and an experienced, impartial pen.—P. G.

ternational law and politics, in the section of territorial, political, and economic intelligence. In the official lists of the conference, Mr. Williams was described as "technical delegate and councilor" and Mr. Hornbeck as "technical expert." In addition to his conference work, Mr. Williams had to give much time to State Department matters that were being handled in Paris, which was then the clearing-house of diplomacy and the actual capital of the civilized world. Mr. Hornbeck, also, was called upon to do a good deal of important work in connection with economic problems that had no direct relation with the Far East.

Both men had lived in the Far East and both had traveled extensively in Asia, studying the political, social, and economic conditions of Far Eastern countries, especially those of Japan and China. Professor Williams is the highest living American authority on matters Chinese. He talks the Chinese language like a mandarin. Mr. Beer insisted that he "looks like a Chinese mandarin."

"That Far Eastern atmosphere must be a wonderful thing," said Mr. Beer. "Look over there at Williams! Look at Hornbeck! If he goes again to China, when he gets back, we'll be likely to mistake him for a mandarin."

Mr. Beer likes to have his little joke. Williams and Hornbeck were chockful of their subject, eminently well fitted to advise our mission as to what to do and what not to do in peace-making for the Far East. Their knowledge and their good judgment were respected in the Asiatic and the European delegations. They held the confidence of the few Americans in Paris who possessed knowledge of and interest in the Far Eastern angles. So they were able to get, sift, and utilize those scraps of information that flitted about on the wings of Parisian gossip. Unlike some of their official superiors, their heads were proof against subtly "dangerous thoughts."

Edward Thomas Williams has lived twenty-six years of his life in China. For thirty-three years he has given his best thoughts to Far Eastern matters. For more than four years

he was head of the Far Eastern division of the State Department, and before that he was chargé of the legation at Peking. He worked his way up from the bottom to the top, thanks to his clear mind, his loyalty, his honesty, and his industry. His chief characteristic is modest reticence. He shuns notoriety of any sort. He is a scholar and a diplomat, not a "lime-lighter." His testimony before the senate committee, unlike much in that extraordinary record, was reluctantly given. Recognizing the vast interests at stake, Mr. Williams was not the type of man to jump to half-cocked conclusions or to step one inch outside the bounds of propriety. He has never been interested in picking upon Japan nor in casting upon Japan the sins of the world in China. Nevertheless, Mr. Williams is a very pronounced friend of China; and because China is weak and he has grown up among Chinese who have stubbed their toes on the rocks that block China's pathway to progress, this famous and upright American Sinologue is not to be condemned if he leans, as I think he does, towards the purely Chinese view upon some of the more important questions. The very fineness of his nature makes it impossible for him to do otherwise.

Born in Columbus, Ohio, on October 17, 1854, Mr. Williams went from the high school of that city to Bethany College, West Virginia, where he was graduated with honors, and entered the ministry. He went to China as a missionary in 1887. He mastered the language with unusual facility and was induced to leave the missionary field for the post of translator at the Kiangnan arsenal at Shanghai. In 1896, he entered the service of the United States as interpreter to the consulate at Shanghai. A year later he became vice-consul-general at Shanghai, resigning in the latter part of 1898 to serve the Chinese Government as translator. In 1901 he returned to our service as Chinese secretary at the Peking legation, and in 1908 he became consul-general at Tientsin. He was promoted to assistant chief of the Far Eastern Bureau at Washington in 1909, and in 1911 he returned to China as sec-



PROFESSOR EDWARD T. WILLIAMS



DR. STANLEY K. HORNBECK



MR. GEORGE LOUIS BEER
(Born 1872, Died 1920)



MR. YOSUKE MATSUOKA

retary of the Peking legation. On the recall of Minister Calhoun, he remained in charge of the legation until the new minister, Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, relieved him. On the last day of 1913, he returned to Washington as head of the Far Eastern division of the State Department, retaining that position until October 1, 1919, when he retired from the government service to accept the chair of Oriental languages and letters in the University of California at Berkeley. While chargé at Peking, it was Mr. Williams who, on the part of the American Government and people, recognized and greeted the Flowery Republic. He listened to Yuan's eulogy of the "flowers" of Oriental democracy. That was in 1913, when Yuan suggested to his henchman, Liang Shih-yi, that just a little of the oil Liang had accumulated through bank and railroad might turn these "flowers" into a nice, appetizing imperial salad. Liang made the salad, and Yuan tried to eat it, but a Yunnanese thistle stuck in his throat, and he died from imperial indigestion in 1916.

Mr. Williams was arranging his courses for the students at Berkeley when, on December 3, he received a telegram from Mr. Lansing telling him that he was needed at the peace conference. He obtained leave, went to Paris, and remained at the conference until his work was done. There was not a word of truth in the resignation story, circulated by foolish gossips. I knew that Mr. Williams was returning to his professorship weeks in advance of the Shantung decision and "hindsighted" turmoil. His leave had expired, his work was done; it was necessary for him to secure transportation in advance and get back to California as soon as possible. There never was any secret about his plans or engagements.

Mr. Williams had the advantage of age. With him, age was an advantage, because of his habitual energy and never-failing fund of enthusiasm. He possessed the necessary background and experience of matters and men. With Macleay, Addis, Morrison, Pichon, Gout, and others, he was merely "carrying on" from the days when they had worked together in Peking

on the same never-solved problems. The Chinese looked up to him as their fathers before them had looked up to Burlingame, and with greater reason. With Burlingame, sympathy had to build upon more or less superficial comprehension; with Williams, sympathy was the flower and the fruit of actual, personal knowledge.

Mr. Hornbeck had the advantage of youth. With him, youth was an advantage, because of his brilliant mind and scholarly attainments. Study either sobers or intoxicates a man. Stanley Hornbeck carries a very old head on stout, young shoulders. His youth and health enabled him to stand up in Paris under a pressure of work that would have sent two or three ordinarily strong men into hospital. One of the ablest public servants of our time, he has been a credit to American brains in Europe, in Asia, and at home. Before going to China, Mr. Hornbeck had specialized in American and European politics. He had been first Rhodes Scholar from the State of Colorado. At Oxford, in England, and on the continent of Europe he had obtained a substantial introduction to the modern and contemporary history of Europe. He then went to the University of Wisconsin as graduate student and fellow in political science. At the moment when he was finishing his work for the Ph. D. degree, he was offered a position as professor of history and political science in the provincial college of Chehkiang, China. He went to China in the summer of 1909. The Chehkiang provincial college is located at Hangchow, one of the most famous cities in the annals of central east China. As Chinese literature has it, "Above is Heaven's blue; below are Hang (chow) and Soo (chow)," meaning that Hangchow and Soochow are of Paradise quality among the cities of the earth. Hangchow was at one time the capital of the Southern Sung. Marco Polo visited it (c. 1300) and described it as the "most magnificent of cities." It has been for centuries a center of literature, education, and art; it is also in the center of the best silk-growing and weaving, and tea-producing areas of China.

Having gone to China to spend one year, Mr. Hornbeck was invited and decided to stay a second, then a third, then a fourth, and finally a part of a fifth year. He left Hangchow only when the provincial college closed, in 1913, as a consequence of the revolution, but he went from there to the Fengtien Law School, at Moukden, and this move brought him into intimate contact with developments in Manchuria. He was thus in China before, during, and after the revolution of 1911 and the rebellion of 1913. He was on close terms with numerous Chinese officials; he played an interesting part in the fight which the Chehkiang government made on the importation of opium and the growing of native opium; he traveled extensively not only in China, but in Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Siberia.

In the autumn of 1913 he was called to the department of political science of the University of Wisconsin. In 1917 he joined the staff of the United States Tariff Commission for special work in the field of international relations. As lecturer and writer, he has devoted himself largely to Far Eastern relations. He once wrote part of a well known book on Oxford; he later wrote all of a monograph on the most-favored nation clause; in 1916 he produced one of the best books we have in his special field, "Contemporary Politics in the Far East"; he has contributed extensively to American and to foreign periodicals; and he has put some of his best efforts into government reports.

The summer of 1918 saw Mr. Hornbeck in uniform, a captain in the United States Army. When, a few months later, the American delegation was being made up for the peace conference, various specialists were selected for the technical work which was anticipated. Mr. Hornbeck was ordered to Paris, and was thus of the party which sailed with the President from New York on December 4, 1918, on the U.S.S. *George Washington*.

Mr. Williams and Mr. Hornbeck were friends of long standing. They once traveled half-way around the world together.

With very different backgrounds and temperament, they saw essentially eye to eye on Far Eastern affairs. Mr. Hornbeck had the broader training in international politics in the large; Mr. Williams had the accumulated skill, conservatism, and *savoir* of thirty years of diplomatic experience, he was intimately familiar with the history and problems of the Far East, and he was in a position to be the more influential because of his years and his official record and connections. These two worked independently, but in the closest coöperation. Most of their memoranda were prepared jointly. They were together from the beginning of the conference to the middle of May, two weeks after the Council of Three had handed down the Shantung decision. At no time did they disagree as to policy or in the substance of a recommendation. It is my impression that after the Shantung decision was handed down, Mr. Hornbeck offered further advice to the delegation. Be that as it may, after Mr. Williams left, on May 17, Mr. Hornbeck carried on the functions of both, and was with the commission for three months more.

In the middle of August, Mr. Hornbeck was sent to America as a member of Major-General James G. Harbord's mission. He made investigations in Turkey and Transcaucasia. By that time the Austrian treaty had been submitted, and there were no longer before the conference outstanding questions with regard to Far Eastern Affairs. Upon the return of this mission to Paris, Mr. Hornbeck resumed his work with the peace commission, and as soon as he came back to the United States he was again retained by the Tariff Commission.

So much for the men who were officially our Far Eastern experts in Paris. Now, how did they approach their problems? How did they respond to the opportunities and the responsibilities that came to them?

They labored, as we shall see, under unnecessary and utterly inexcusable difficulties. In one respect, they failed. Neither Mr. Williams nor Mr. Hornbeck, nor any American official in Paris, saw the Far Eastern problem as it really is. If not

now, I think that one day they will agree with this criticism. The day is certain to come when the real issue will be plain to all men. Again and again, I begged all the Americans whom I knew in Paris to take a serious and forcefully sympathetic attitude toward Japan's plea for racial and national equality. Not until after the Shantung decision was virtually reached, and just before it was pronounced, was the soundness of my contention realized. With this reservation, it must be said that Mr. Williams and Mr. Hornbeck rendered admirable and, in all respects, faithful service.

But their best efforts were wasted. They went to work handicapped from the start. Our Far Eastern battery should have been mobilized as soon as possible after we entered the war, in April, 1917. Again and again, during 1917 and 1918, I urged in Washington that this be done. It was not done. During and since the peace conference, efforts have been made to convince me that the necessary work had been undertaken by Colonel House's "Inquiry." That the preliminary work was woefully mismanaged is proved by the fact that it had to be done in Paris while the conference was well under way. In the matter of the Far East, as in all other matters that came under my observation, we took no practical program to Paris. All that we carried to Paris was the set of "paramount" principles pasted inside Mr. Wilson's hat, and that was no program at all.

Mr. Williams and Mr. Hornbeck knew very well the strong points and the weak points of our Far Eastern policy, allowing for the reservation already made. It was not the fault of our experts that they had to waste precious time in Paris doing virtually necessary work that should have been done months before in Washington. It would have been a simple matter to have requested Mr. Taft, Judge James F. Smith, Mr. William Morgan Shuster, or some other among the very few qualified Americans of note, long before the armistice, to head a Far Eastern preparedness commission, competent to cooperate at the American end of the peacemaking. This com-

mission could have done all the preparatory work before being moved to the scene of the conference. Prudence demanded that at least one front-rank American statesman, not necessarily a Democrat, should have been included among the five plenipotentiaries. In an article printed in the Washington "Post" while the President was considering men for his commission, I drew attention to the general desire among American "Asiatics" that Mr. Taft be commandeered. In a subsequent story, printed on December 1, 1918, under the caption, "Peril Seen in Orient," the problems were summarized with sufficient citations to clinch this argument. Now, the fact of the matter is this: Mr. Wilson knew it all, and he did not want any one with him who would have talked back at the schoolmaster.

On the journey to France, as soon as he got his sea legs under him, the President called a meeting of the American plenipotentiaries and experts. He talked to them like a father. He told them what they would get up against when they came to grips with the old masters of the Quai d'Orsay the Quirinal, and Whitehall. It was a class in diplomacy, after the best manner of Princeton.

"Tell me about that class on the *George Washington?*" I teased Mr. Hornbeck, unsuccessfully, one day in Paris.

Mr. Hornbeck has not studied history and politics, and laws and tariffs, and diplomacy and things, for nothing. Without descending to actual prevarication, he tried to convince me that somebody had been "spoofing" me. Nevertheless, I know that the class did meet under the professor, and arrived in Paris greatly benefited, I have no doubt. But the "black books" were late in going to press. These *aide-memoires* for American peacemakers were not available when the conference locked horns on the Far Eastern question on January 27. So Mr. Williams and Mr. Hornbeck worked like beavers,—all the specialists were "doing it,"—got up all the necessary data in shape, "sent it up," and the good Lord and Colonel House only know what happened to most of it.

“The Colonel” had his own personal cabinet. As a rule, the experts never knew what was done with their recommendations. I know that in several instances officious members of the “inner circle” denatured memoranda, with the best intentions, of course, so that the powder was extracted and only empty or dead shells retained. That was pretty bad. There was worse than that.

On April 9, Mr. Williams prepared a memorandum calling attention to the fact that in our treaty with China of 1858 we pledged her to use our good offices in case any nation acted unjustly toward her. Mr. Williams suggested the desirability of drawing up a clause providing for the direct cession of the German rights to China. This was given to the commission by Mr. Lansing. On the following day, Mr. Williams received instructions to draft such a clause and to submit it to Dr. James Brown Scott, the chief international law expert. He followed these instructions. The sequel is told in the testimony given by Mr. Williams to the foreign relations committee of the Senate on August 22, 1919. This testimony is so important that it is necessary to quote it as it stands in the official report of the proceedings:

Dr. Scott suggested as an alternative that instead of transferring the rights directly to China they might be transferred to the five powers, in trust for China. That that might be a compromise that would be satisfactory to Japan.

This was discussed but I do not know how much, by the council. At any rate I heard nothing definite until the 22d of April, in the evening, when I received a telephone message that the President would like to see me.

I went up, and President Wilson was in conference with some one. I was waiting only a few minutes, however. He came in and said that he wanted me to consult with the other Far Eastern experts of the British and French delegations as to which of two alternatives would be the least injurious to China, whether it would be less injurious to China to transfer to Japan all the rights and privileges formerly enjoyed by Germany in the Province of Shantung, or to insist upon the execution of the convention of May 25, 1915.

While in conversation with President Wilson he said to me that

unfortunately the British and French were bound by certain engagements which they had entered into with Japan to support Japan's claim for the transfer of these rights to herself directly, and that Lloyd George said he was bound only to support the transfer of the rights enjoyed by Germany but no others—not the transfer of anything else; and he said that the war seemed to have been fought to establish the sanctity of treaties, and that while some treaties were unconscionable, at the same time it looked as though they would have to be observed.

Senator Knox: Lloyd George said this?

Professor Williams: No; President Wilson said that to me. I said "Well, Mr. President, do you think that a treaty which has been extorted from China by force and by threats of military operation ought to have any binding force?"

He said, "Well, perhaps, the Japanese would not admit that it was obtained in that way."

I suggested that the published documents seemed to indicate that it had been in that way, and he said, "Of course if the documents show it, then the Japanese would not deny it," but he asked me, however, to go and consult these experts about the question which he had raised.

I asked if I might suggest an alternative solution, and he said "certainly," and I suggested that we might adopt a blanket article in the treaty covering all German properties in China, saying that Germany renounced all rights and title to those government properties in China and that they reverted automatically to China, but since the port of Tsingtao and the railways and mines in the Province of Shantung had been taken from Germany by Japan with the aid of Great Britain, and were now in the possession of Japan, that in so far as these government properties in Shantung were concerned they would be transferred to China by Japan within one year after the signing of the peace treaty.

He said that he had not considered it from that angle, and would like me to write it out, which I promised to do.

This was the 22d, the next day was the 23d. The next day there appeared in the papers the appeal which President Wilson made to the Italian people with regard to Fiume and the Dalmatian coast, which raised considerable stir in Paris, and on the 24th the Far Eastern expert for Great Britain and the Far Eastern expert for France and myself met and signed a statement which was sent to the council of three, President Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau, with a signed statement in which we said that in our opinion it would be less injurious to China to transfer all the rights formerly enjoyed by

Germany in the Province of Shantung than it would be to insist upon the observance of the convention of 1915, and I told these two gentlemen representing the British and French delegates that I was going to send an independent statement trying to point out that neither alternative ought to be adopted; that we ought neither to insist upon the enforcement of the treaty of 1915 nor the transfer of these rights, that I would make an argument against it. At first Mr. Macleay, of the British delegation, said that he would not be able to do anything in that line, but afterwards he changed his mind and he also sent a statement—I never saw it, and I do not know just what he said, but I believe it was along those lines—that we were not shut up to these alternatives.

I sent a statement to President Wilson, in which I begged to call attention to this fact. I cannot recall the argument which I made at the time, so that I cannot say definitely what I said except that I must have pointed out that the convention of 1915 was extorted by force; that Japan had already two divisions of troops in China and had just transferred two more, and gave the Chinese Government 51 hours in which to reply to the ultimatum, failing which she would take such measures as to her seemed desirable in the premises, and that therefore a convention of that sort did not seem to me to have any binding force. I must have pointed that out, because afterwards—if you will allow me, I will quote a statement here.

Just to return a moment to the interview with President Wilson of the day before, I asked President Wilson if the settlement proposed transferring these rights directly to Japan or insisting upon the execution of the convention of 1915, was not contrary to the fourteen points laid down as a basis of peace. He said unfortunately he did not think there was anything in the fourteen points that exactly covered the case. But on looking over the addresses of President Wilson and the statement made by Secretary Lansing to the German government with regard to the basis of peace, I found this (reading)

THE UNQUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE BY THE PRESENT GERMAN GOVERNMENT AND BY A LARGE MAJORITY OF THE GERMAN REICHSTAG OF THE TERMS LAID DOWN BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE 8TH OF JANUARY, 1918, AND IN HIS SUBSEQUENT ADDRESSES, JUSTIFIES THE PRESIDENT IN MAKING A FRANK AND DIRECT STATEMENT OF HIS DECISION WITH REGARD TO THE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT OF THE 8TH AND 12TH OF OCTOBER, 1918.

Now as to the subsequent addresses, although there is nothing directly bearing upon the question of the fourteen points mentioned

in the address of January 8, one of the subsequent addresses was that on the 4th of July at Washington's Tomb at Mount Vernon in which he said:

NO HALFWAY DECISION IS CONCEIVABLE. THESE ARE THE ENDS FOR WHICH THE ASSOCIATED PEOPLES OF THE WORLD ARE FIGHTING AND WHICH MUST BE CONCEDED THEM BEFORE THERE CAN BE PEACE.

Then he mentions, one, "the destruction of any arbitrary power anywhere," and so on, and two is the one to which I want to call attention (reading)

THE SETTLEMENT OF EVERY QUESTION, WHETHER OF TERRITORY, OF SOVEREIGNTY, OF ECONOMIC ARRANGEMENT, OR OF POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP, UPON THE BASIS OF THE FREE ACCEPTANCE OF THAT SETTLEMENT BY THE PEOPLE IMMEDIATELY CONCERNED AND NOT UPON THE BASIS OF THE MATERIAL INTEREST OR ADVANTAGE OF ANY OTHER NATION OR PEOPLE WHICH MAY DESIRE A DIFFERENT SETTLEMENT FOR THE SAKE OF ITS OWN EXTERIOR INFLUENCE OR MASTERY.

It was in this memorandum to the President that I called attention to this statement and said that my understanding was that all the powers who entered into the agreement for the negotiation of peace after the armistice of November 11 practically accepted the bases of peace as laid down by the American Government and that this was one of the bases of peace, and that no exception, no reservation, had been made to this by any of the powers, by Great Britain, France, or Japan, although Great Britain did make reservations with regard to some other things, and that therefore it seemed to me that any prior arrangement such as these secret treaties between Great Britain and Japan and between France and Japan ought not to be held any longer in force because they were really abrogated by the acceptance of these bases of peace.

Senator Johnson of California: Was there any response given you in that regard?

Professor Williams: I received only a note from the President's secretary thanking me for the memorandum.

Senator Johnson of California: Proceed, then, Doctor. After you had reached a certain date—

Professor Williams: On the 30th of April I was informed that the question had been decided; it had been determined to transfer all the property formerly belonging to Germany and all the rights and privileges belonging to Germany in the Province of Shantung unconditionally to Japan.

Senator Johnson of California: Did you have any further connection with the matter?

Professor Williams: No, nothing further.

What happened to Mr. Williams's suggestion of April 9, revised by Dr. Scott on April 11? The clause transferring Kiaochau from Germany to the Five Allies and one Associate was presented to the Council of Foreign Ministers on or about April 19. It was ruled out by Baron Makino and Mr. Balfour, supported by the other two members, M. Pichon and Baron Sonnino. One reason why it was easily killed was because the inevitable Colonel House, unknown to the two Far Eastern specialists, had been quietly and steadily blundering on his own hook.

The official files contain the following illuminating proofs of how Colonel House put his busy finger in the Kiaochau pie. The first extract is from "Supplementary Agreement No. 1" of "The President's Plan" for a League of Nations:

In respect of the peoples and territories which formerly belonged to Austria-Hungary, and to Turkey, and in respect of the colonies formerly under the dominion of the German Empire; the League of Nations shall be regarded as the residuary trustee with sovereign right of ultimate disposal or of continued administration in accordance with certain fundamental principles hereinafter set forth; and this reversion and control shall exclude all rights or privileges of annexation on the part of any Power.

The second extract is the comment of Messrs. David Hunter Miller and Gordon Auchincloss, Colonel House's own experts upon everything under the sun (and "son-in-law"):

*Attention is called to the fact that one of the German colonies is Kiaochau, which, according to reports, Japan is willing to give up to China.*¹

The suggestion therefore is that the language shall not apply to Austria-Hungary, and that *an exception to the general language regarding the German Colonies should be made as to Kiaochau.*¹

The third extract is the sapient suggestion of the "House" secret experts, amending "The President's Plan":

In respect of the peoples and territories which belonged to Turkey,

¹ Author's italics.

and in respect of the colonies formerly under the dominion of the German Empire (*except Kiaochau*)¹ the League of Nations shall be regarded as the residuary trustee with sovereign right of ultimate disposal or of continued administration in accordance with certain fundamental principles hereinafter set forth; and this reversion and control shall exclude all rights or privileges of annexation on the part of any power.

Mr. Williams and Mr. Hornbeck knew nothing about those secret performances of the House cabinet. They were working in the dark. They were working like Trojans. And all the while, the ground was being cut from under their feet by men whose abysmal ignorance of Asiatic matters was pitiful, but was not beheld.

Mr. Ray Stannard Baker and others have quite honestly and sincerely asserted that the President "constantly consulted the experts." Mr. Wilson may have consulted (and I don't doubt that he did consult) some experts. Still, I know that he only talked once with Mr. Williams, and that was after the jig was up, defeat inevitable; and he neither consulted nor talked with Mr. Hornbeck until a month after Shantung had been disposed of. Towards the author, he was always most courteous, most appreciative, most kind. I am quite sure that he did his level best, and it lacerates my own feelings to say, as I am bound to say, that the heresies of House had more weight with Mr. Wilson than the combined knowledge and experience of his two Far Eastern specialists, Mr. Williams and Mr. Hornbeck.

¹ Author's italics.

CHAPTER XXIII

BORDEN AND BRITISH FRIENDS

THE British were our friends when we arrived in Paris. Blood is thicker than water, and the ties that bind the English-thinking people are stouter by far than the arguments of anti-English malcontents. After almost twenty years' absence from Europe, I was glad to meet again some good English friends whom I had grown to like very well while I was a hard-to-manage "cub" reporter and a very young editor in England. When I called at the Majestic and the Astoria, the latch-string was hanging out. I had merely to open the door, step in, and make myself at home. Nothing could have been finer than the way in which the British officials, without exception, opened their minds and their hearts to the American correspondents. They held no aces up their sleeves. They wanted to play with us, not against us. Unfortunately, however, their good intentions were handicapped by the fact that Mr. Lloyd George was governed by the one element in British politics that cannot understand us or act with us, the Tory remnant. Thus came the wrong decisions between January 9 and January 29, when Mr. Wilson conceded point after point in order to work harmoniously with Mr. Balfour. During this period and up to the hour of reactionary triumph on the last day of April, the majority of the British liberals stood loyally by the President, despite the fact that many of them knew that the President was not standing by himself.

Until some days after his return to Paris on March 14, the British dissociated the President from the offensive liaison established by the Irish Sinn Feiners with Colonel House and

Mr. Lansing. In justice to Mr. Lansing, it should be stated that there is every reason to believe that Colonel House forced his hand in favor of the Irish republicans. British officials were unwilling to hold Mr. Wilson responsible for these outrageous proceedings until he himself accepted responsibility for and perpetuated the Sinn Fein intrigue. That lost us the good will of the majority of the British. They were furiously angry, yet they were prudent even in their anger. With one or two vulgar and irresponsible exceptions, they were very nice about it. At all times, one great Briton stood forth as the loyal friend of the American President and the faithful exponent of American principles. I am not sure, but I think it was Lord Northcliffe who said in friendly jest, "Borden is the best American delegate in Paris."

Now, that is a fact. Sir Robert Laird Borden proved himself a better representative of American opinion than any of the American plenipotentiaries except General Bliss and Mr. Henry White. General Bliss, although burdened by his military responsibilities at Versailles, made only one mistake in Paris. Sir Robert Borden made no mistakes, so far as I know; and, of course, he was hampered by his high Tory surroundings.

The British played the "great game" in a sportsmanlike way; the Tories because they are gentlemen and cannot help conforming to "good form"; the Liberals because they are warm-hearted and clear-sighted and desire a lasting peace, policed by the power of the English-thinking peoples. We talk almost the same language.

On November 29, 1918, the day that the White House "court circular" announced the names of the American peace plenipotentiaries, Borden made this plea at the annual Thanksgiving dinner of the American Society in London:

Let us have a league of nations, if it can be realized, but at least let us have that understanding and unity of purpose and action between the two world-wide English-speaking commonwealths, which will save humanity in years to come from the unbearable horror,

suffering and sacrifice of a war such as this. United by ties of race, language, literature and tradition, the nations of the Britannic Commonwealth and the States composing the great American Republic can command the peace of the world. They therefore stand answerable to the world for the responsibilities imposed upon them.

Sir Robert never veered by as much as a hair's breadth from that position. He wanted, most of all, a peace that would bring his commonwealth and our commonwealth closer together, and not drive us apart. Therefore, he wanted a peace that would be approved by the American people, that would safeguard Canadian and British interests without outraging American sense of justice. That was possible.

On my journey to France I had several very interesting companions. Our own inimitable William Allen White was one. Norman Angell was another. There were several snappy debates between White and Angell, the author of "The Great Illusion" and the most famous English disciple of the ancient Chinese pacifists, Wang Sun-ki and Mo-ti. It was Mr. Angell who proved the absurdity of war, just before the outbreak of the greatest war. He had all the facts and figures. Persons like the Kaiser and Bernhardi held other views and, in "The Great Catastrophe," they poured the best blood of Europe over the pages of "The Great Illusion." Nevertheless, this little, sandy-haired man, quick on his toes, quick on the intellectual trigger, has commanded a considerable audience. He is sincere.

Mr. Angell had just produced a new book, dealing with Allied peace problems and warmly supporting Mr. Wilson's principles and the League of Nations. One day, as we were nearing the French Coast, I asked him:

"What bearing has the project of a League of Nations upon the problem of Europe's relation to the Far East?"

"This," responded Mr. Angell, talking as rapidly as we were walking up and down the deck. "If the Western nations are destined in the future to repeat their past history and be riven by bitter rivalries among themselves, then obviously they

will be incapable of common action in such areas as China, and they will have neither the material power nor the moral unity to meet the problem that assuredly the Asiatic populations are soon destined to present.

“If each Western nation must normally in the future, as in the past, depend for its security and prosperity mainly upon its own strength and resources, then it will be compelled to enter into competition for those things with its neighbors; and that competition will prevent common action. Each power will be, covertly or overtly, the rival of the others. The sum total of the forces of the Western nations will be ‘canceled out,’ because turned against one another. If, however, we prove ourselves capable of creating a society of nations in which, as within the state, the security of each rests upon the strength of the whole, we remove the need for competition for power, and make possible a union of forces for the support of a common policy.”

“And you think that common policy is indispensable, if we are to avoid disaster in our future relations with Asia?”

“Yes. Note certain facts. We have been led to give great emphasis to the fact that this is a war for democracy; for equality of right, that is, for all men. That emphasis has not been lost upon the non-European races. The Japanese, some of the populations of India, to say nothing of certain African peoples, have been welcomed as allies. The position of Japan has been transformed. Even if any of the Western nations had desired to challenge Japanese preponderance in the East, the demands of the war would have made it impossible to do so. The circumstances of the war have not merely given what is very nearly a free hand to Japan in China, but have placed us in the position of alliance with Japan against Europeans—Bolsheviks. Japanese troops are upon the soil of what was yesterday a European nation. This is no reflection upon the complete loyalty of Japan; it is a mere citation of fact. Imagine the possibilities of the development of such a situation; if Japanese, Chinese, Indians, and other Asiatics

were to interpret our ideals of democracy as entitling them to a real equality of treatment. We may be within measurable distance of a unified Eastern, and a disunited Western, world. Those who would regard a League of Nations, the unity of the Western world, as a chimera would do well to reflect upon just what that means.

“The power of separate national states that are incapable of union will be inadequate to meet that situation. That power could be effective, only if combined. The only means of combination is a League of Nations, of some sort. The re-establishment of a balance of power, especially if coupled with the policy of spheres of influence, means a divided Western world.”

“Granting all that, would a League of Nations benefit Asia?”

“Yes,” said the author; “it would. A League of Nations, even though its initiating nucleus should be merely the four powers of the Alliance, standing by the principle of the equality of opportunity for all in China, would be on the road to avoid not only a great cause of dissension among themselves, but those features of exploitation of extra-European territory which, if continued, will make peace between the Western and the Eastern world impossible.”

“Could that be attained, in view of existing alliances?”

“If there is to be a really new orientation of policy, the old alliances will, of course, go into the melting-pot. Their *raison d'être* will have disappeared, in any case. The Triple Alliance, the Franco-Russian Alliance—all that is ancient history.”

“And the Anglo-Japanese Alliance?”

“The conditions which gave birth to it no longer exist. And President Wilson, like every other exponent of a League of Nations, has made it clear that special alliances within the league will be incompatible with its success. Friends and advocates not alone of the League of Nations, but of the British Empire, will pray that we shall hear nothing of secret, or

even 'special' arrangements. Those who look to the British Empire to show the world an example of the successful working of a group of independent states, which the British Empire is mainly, will do well to consider the effect upon Australian, and even Canadian, opinion, of rumors of special and secret arrangements with Japan. Those familiar with Australian and Canadian opinion know the dangers to the British Empire, itself, that would arise from suspicions of that kind.

"One point more. Those of us who regard the spirit of imperialism as the enemy of mankind at this moment do not view such tasks as England's in India as 'Imperialism.' If such work were for the exclusive profit of England at the expense of India and mankind, that might fitly be called 'imperialism.' But so long as such work is honestly done as a trust for civilization, and carried on with the aim of fitting a people ultimately for democracy, no friend of a League of Nations would want to interfere with it. Indeed, the general policy of equal opportunity for the world in her Asiatic empire, which Britain has pursued in the past, is the very policy which a League of Nations would generalize and render secure. A League of Nations would codify and protect against misunderstandings—misunderstandings which might be disastrous—the real intentions of the best of Great Britain's empire-builders."

Many British liberals were talking in the same strain, at that time. People on both sides of the Atlantic were thinking about the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and some people remembered that in April, 1917, the more wide-awake British and American newspapers carried stories reporting the results of an important British colonial conference at London. It was then announced with satisfaction that a complete understanding had been reached between the British Imperial Government, the Dominions, and Japan, regarding the future of Germany's former possessions in the Pacific. It was intimated that the Japanese navy was coöperating with the Allied European navies in meeting the undersea menace. The "tinfish" was on

all men's tongues, in all men's thoughts, in April, 1917. I pointed out the significance of this news to officials in Washington. It was obvious that there was a secret agreement between Japan and her European Allies. The dispatches from Tokio, London, Paris, and Rome, left no room for doubt upon that point.

"We have a perfect understanding with our Allies," a Japanese statesman informed me, early in 1917.

We were not an "ally"; we were an "associate." The White House and the State Department very carefully emphasized this distinction. So, when Americans shake their heads and their fingers at Mr. Balfour and charge him with having concealed from our Government the secret pledges made by him just a little while before he came over to see Mr. Wilson, we do not advertise either our intelligence or our honesty. There was nothing to prevent Mr. Wilson or Mr. Lansing from asking Mr. Balfour, "How about those Japanese notes?" He need not have put it just that way, of course. Now, Hay or McKinley, or Roosevelt or Webster, would have placed Mr. Balfour on the carpet and got a satisfactory show-down. Our officials were asleep at the switch; that is the meat of the matter. They did not know; they would not be told. They did not know, because there were too many ornaments and too few adepts attached to the Washington pay-roll.

On January 28, 1919, at the Quai d'Orsay, the clandestine compacts' "cat" came out of the diplomatic bag; and during the first days of February the reality of the menacing character of these treaties dawned upon a few Americans in Paris who wanted China to win and Japan to lose. That was the size of it. "Japan was to be put into a tight box." Wiser men, like Williams, Hornbeck, and Beer, were frankly worried. I cabled to the "Herald" a résumé of the agreements and the prediction that unless Mr. Wilson took the bull by the horns,—meaning "J.B.," of course,—he was certain to come a Kiaochau "cropper." It was plain as a pikestaff.

On February 7, after a very serious talk with Mr. Hornbeck

and Mr. Beer, I walked up the Champs-Élysées and called upon Sir Robert Borden at the Hôtel Majestic. I put this question to him:

"Sir Robert, don't you think that the time has come when the principle so advantageously applied in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, that private contracts should give way to public welfare, might very well be invoked as a rule of international procedure?"

"You are quite right," replied Premier Borden, without a moment's hesitation. "I am strongly of opinion that there should be no secret treaties. The people of each self-governing nation are absolutely entitled to full information respecting all treaties into which their governments have entered. As to any understandings to which their governments may have committed them, apart from formal treaties or conventions, the people are entitled to equally full information. It is perfectly true that negotiations must frequently be conducted under the seal of confidence, as otherwise they would be ineffective, but this is entirely consistent with the principle that the conclusions reached through such negotiations must be publicly announced. Moreover, nearly all treaties and conventions must receive the final approval of the people, through their representatives in parliament, before the nation as a whole can be committed."

After a brief pause Sir Robert said to me, with a significant smile:

"Canada has no secret treaties."

I asked him about Canada's interest in the Pacific—for the "Herald" readers, of course.

"Our country, like yours," said Borden, "fronts not only on the Atlantic, which hitherto has been the main theater of world activities; but also upon the Pacific, which in the future will become more and more a predominant center of those activities. We are, therefore, directly and even vitally interested in the Pacific. The creation of a great world highway connecting the two oceans has lent a new importance to our

interest ; which will become more and more intense as the population of our Western provinces, and especially the province of British Columbia, increases. Our point of view on both the Atlantic and the Pacific is much the same as that of the United States, with whom we hope to act in cordial coöperation with respect to all matters affecting the common interest of the North American continent."

Elsewhere I have made reference to the brilliant and friendly work done by Mr. Ronald Macleay, the British Far Eastern expert. Mr. Macleay's section was always up-to-date in its information. The wheels of the London Foreign Office are ever working, and they worked very well during the Conference of Paris. They worked toward a definite Far Eastern purpose.

In January, the Chinese and the American delegations were laboring hard upon many Far Eastern problems, such as railways, extraterritorial jurisdiction, abolition of foreign concessions, extinction of spheres of influence, the special Manchurian and Eastern Inner Mongolian issues, etc. That was in line with Mr. Wilson's specifically pronounced Chinese policy. The Chinese question was to be considered, *as a whole*, at the conference. Talking with Mr. Macleay, one day, I learned how this American and Chinese plan of procedure was worrying the British. I found the same situation at the Quai d'Orsay, among French officials friendly to China. France had called from the Far East every proconsul and other Oriental expert that could be spared from the field. The Quai d'Orsay was running no risks of making an error in French decisions regarding Asia. A former French minister at Peking told me that were he in the shoes of Mr. Lou, he would not try to introduce matters that would entitle some other delegation to put the question :

"What has this got to do with a treaty of peace between the Allies and Germany?"

The British took pains to throw out friendly hints in the same direction, but these well-meant suggestions fell upon deaf

ears. Consequently, the valuable time of Mr. Williams and Mr. Hornbeck was wasted. They were kept occupied, developing numerous matters of undoubted importance, but which never had as much as a ghost of a chance of coming before the conference.

We did not listen to our British friends. We would not be helped by them, nor would we help them. We preferred always to do business with the Tories.

After the tragedy of April 30, I suggested to one of the President's immediate friends that Mr. Wilson should send for the Chinese delegates and tell them personally what he was trying to do for them. Had he taken that step, I am certain in my own mind that the Chinese would have accepted his version of the decision in good faith and would have followed his leadership, even to the extent of signing the treaty. Mr. Wilson would not do that. He would not even direct his Secretary of State to see the Chinese and talk matters over with them. Instead, he permitted himself to be beguiled by British Tories, and he chose Mr. Arthur James Balfour to make the explanation to the Chinese. That was a fatal error. On Mr. Balfour's technically trained tongue, the explanation missed no Tory opportunity to make the Chinese realize what a terrible blunder they had committed when they put themselves under Mr. Wilson's wing. I noted this fact at the time, but it was not until later that I secured definite and conclusive evidence of how skilfully the Tories were working to shatter Chinese confidence in America and restore England to pre-eminence in Chinese esteem. Lord Eustace Percy, who was acting as a secretarial aide to the British foreign minister, managed to make several palpable hits. For one of my Chinese friends, he painted a very clever picture of American diplomacy in China. He put his finger upon each and all of the American-Chinese breaches of promise from Burlingame to Wilson: the Chinese-American Alliance of 1858-68 and the anti-Chinese exclusion policy of 1866-76; the Hay pledges of 1898 and the betrayal of China in the Canton-*Hangkow* rail-

way concession two years later; the Wilson 1915 note (impugning the Japanese negotiations) and the contradictory Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1917; Mr. Wilson's protestations and his proceedings during the first months of the conference and his assent to the Japanese argument on April 30. The Tories did not permit the Chinese to overlook the strange discrepancy between American promises and American performances. They sprinkled salt upon the gaping wounds of China, and they rubbed it in.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE JAPANESE AT THE PLACE VENDÔME

THE Japanese had one of the most perfectly organized delegations in Paris. From top to bottom, it indicated the care that had been taken by the Hara administration to assure Japan adequate representation in the making of peace. Every man chosen was an expert in his own line. Now, for that very reason, there was a healthy difference of opinion among the civilians and soldiers and sailors who conducted the business of Nippon at the Hôtel Bristol, on the Place Vendôme.

The Place Vendôme is said to be the finest square in all the world. The Hôtel Bristol commands a complete view of the square, as you look northward toward the Rue de la Paix. The Ritz reposes on your left hand, facing the famous column, which revealed not a sign of the damage that was done when it fell a victim to the rude hands and bad manners of the Communists. The Bristol, before the war, was a sort of caravansary of the kings. It was patronized by King Edward and other crowned heads, and adorned and equipped to suit a king's taste. Fine were the surroundings of the Japanese delegation, and big was the banner that hung out on high over the pavement—a great red ball on its spotless white field, the Risen Sun of Japan.

There were young men and old men, among the Japanese, and the younger men were determined to be heard. They were frankly suspicious of "the sabers," as they call those veterans who did so much in their day to make Japan safe for Japanese democrats. These younger men vexed the souls

of the old masters of the Bristol, and they grew bolder and more openly hostile when they found Saionji and Makino on their side of the argument.

It is a sort of legend among the majority of Western people that Japanese policy moves with the precision of a well-regulated watch. It is supposed that decisions are reached by some sort of secret legerdemain, and that then every Japanese does just as he is told to do. That is no truer of Japan than it is true of the United States, France, or England. At no time in the history of Japan has that been the case; at no time was it less true than to-day, when popular government is enjoying in Japan the fruits of its first triumphs. Very shortly after the Japanese got down to work at the Bristol, I began to notice numerous evidences that Fuji was in eruption.

Among the younger men in the delegation were several brilliant students of international affairs who have had special opportunities of studying the Chinese question. They scented certain trouble ahead of them. They did not want to see Japan placed seemingly in the position of dictating terms to China. They wanted a comradely line-up with their Chinese cousins on the race question, and a straight-from-the-shoulder show-down from all the Western powers. Their stand was sturdily supported by the majority of the numerous Japanese reporters on the Seine, including the three ablest journalists in the corps.

One of the leaders of "The Bristol Revolt" was quite caustic in his references to a very conservative ambassador, who was at all times opposed to anything like open diplomacy. This younger statesman pointed to the fact that the Chinese were being deluded into sacrificing their real interests for the benefit of outsiders who would not move a finger to put China on her feet.

"The irony of the situation is this," he said. "Japan lends money to China, and China spends the money on propaganda against Japan. It is as pitiful as it is grotesque."

He was quite right.

There were three major crises within the Japanese delegation. Each was significant in its way. The first came in the course of the "Battle of the Propagandists."

Cables from the Far East had begun to agitate the Kiaochau controversy. Japanese officials in Tokio and in Peking were charged with attempting to intimidate the Chinese delegation in Paris. An "indiscreet" interview with one of the Japanese delegates, printed in a leading Paris newspaper, aroused the ire of the Chinese and the disapproval of some of Japan's American and European friends. It went just a trifle too far. Mr. Matsui, Japanese ambassador in Paris, put his foot down. He insisted that the interview be repudiated. That was done. A pamphlet written by a European, purporting to state Japan's case, was withdrawn from circulation. Through the ability and energy of the director of the Japanese Press Bureau, Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, the information service was placed upon a clean and successful level. Mr. Matsuoka, an American-trained diplomat with an unusually liberal Chinese background, knew what to say and how to say it; and he had a remarkably fine staff, including Mr. Saito of the London embassy and Viscount Motono, the gifted son of the great statesman who secured the Russian alliance and the Allied pledges that were to clinch Japan's Kiaochau victory.

Matsuoka and Motono were all for peace. They have numerous Chinese friends and they are heartily fond of the Chinese people. They favored liberal concessions in the interest of peace. Instead of peace, a red-hot row developed in the press. All that the Japanese Press Bureau could do was to issue soothing statements of fact. They did that, very well.

In the meantime the news from Japan and China grew more ominous. During the critical middle of March, despatches began to assert strained relations between Japan and America. The Hara cabinet was reported in troubled waters. The Japanese "radicals" in Paris organized a concerted attack upon

the "Old Guard" within the delegation. Baron Makino exercised his statesmanship to restore peace. And, just at that minute, gossip was busy with the assertion that Mr. Wilson had come back to Paris with his mind made up that the Japanese would have little to say in the actual writing of the peace. I think it was this impression, and the appearances seemingly sustaining it, that brought on the second crisis at the Bristol.

One of the Younger Statesmen proposed that an offer be made to the Chinese, naming a time within which the Kiaochau leased territory would be restored to China. He argued that, as there was really nothing in dispute between the Government of Japan and the Government of China, it was injurious to both countries to have "a European washing of Chinese-Japanese dirty linen." He received strong support within and without official ranks. An ambassador objected that this would not be keeping faith with the conference. The Chinese had originated the dispute, and the Supreme Council had taken cognizance of the Chinese assertions. The issue, however unfortunate, had to be faced. It would not do to give an appearance of weakness.

"Appearances do not matter," retorted the Younger Statesman. "What is desired is a peaceful understanding with the Chinese."

The delegation locked horns on that issue. There were all sorts of sensational reports, some going so far as to suggest that the Marquis Saionji, despairing of securing a peace that would satisfy the Japanese, was contemplating suicide. As a matter of fact, I understand, the vulnerable marquis was contemplating paying a suicidal price for a French painting, which he may or may not have intended for (or presented) to the Emperor. The storm died down about the beginning of April. A more serious typhoon followed.

Competent Japanese experts raised serious objection to the mandatory principle. They were not satisfied with assurances that the principle would not saddle Japan with impossible handicaps in administering her new South Sea islands. Mr.

Wilson's apparent determination to make an issue of the 1915-18 compacts was taken quite seriously by a good many Japanese officials and more than one of the plenipotentiaries. Previous differences were revived when Baron Makino toned down the racial amendment so that it asked merely "equality of treatment among nations and *just treatment* of their nationals."

Within the Japanese delegation there was bitter debate over that word "just."

"It is absolutely meaningless," said one angry protestant. "Stick to equality or nothing. Let us be honest with those who oppose us, even if they fear to be honest with us."

Baron Makino defended his course with admirable grace. Nevertheless, the opposition insisted that it was "a miserable compromise."

It proved fruitless. Racial and national equality went down to defeat on the night of April 11. Then the more aggressive spirits at the Hôtel Bristol threatened open revolt. The cables to Tokio were burning with fiery despatches. Japan was being defeated all along the line; her delegates were too old; they lacked steam and subtlety; they were not so nimble as Mr. Lloyd George; they did not talk like wonderful Mr. Wilson, they did not threaten like Mr. Hughes! So wrote the Japanese reporters at Paris. The situation in Japan became really critical. The delegation received a long cablegram that caused Saionji to summon a hurried meeting of the plenipotentiaries. Just at that moment, the news was passed around that both the Italians and the Belgians were framing up an ultimatum. Next morning, word came to the Hôtel Bristol that Mr. Lansing was preparing to transfer the Kiaochau dispute to the League of Nations. The Japanese "insurgents" at once demanded some dramatic proof that Japan was alive and kicking.

"Better to walk out than to be booted out," said one Japanese to me. "We are going to make these old men do something."

How much all this had to do with the notice presented by Baron Makino to Mr. Wilson and the Supreme Council, on the morning of April 22, I am not in a position to say. Probably, it had a good deal to do with the polite intimation that Tokio had directed the Japanese delegates not to sign, if the conference sustained the Chinese. Undoubtedly, that was the substance of the cablegram, though I think there were reservations. The League covenant, while it was completed by the commission, was not yet presented to the conference. Up to April 28, there was opportunity for an amicable arrangement of all questions. After April 28, the Japanese had to snatch a Kiaochau victory or to acknowledge defeat on every Japanese proposal. As I cabled to the "Herald" on April 23, such defeat would have swept Hara's cabinet out of office and plunged Japan into very deep political waters. The "Herald" of April 24 spread the despatch across the first page, giving it precedence over Mr. Wilson's Adriatic ukase, as the news of the day. As this cablegram tells the story just as the Asiatic issue had attained its peak of excitement and uncertainty, it may be as well to reproduce it here:—

FATE OF TOKYO CABINET RESTS ON SHANTUNG.

Collapse of Ministry Predicted if Peace Conference Refuses Japanese Demand.

President Believed to be Antagonistic.

Far Eastern Expert Cites Dangers in Situation as it Affects Americans.

Paris, Wednesday.—No Japanese government could stand defeat on the Kiaochau issue, Baron Nebuaki Makino, head of Japan's peace conference delegation, told President Wilson, Premier David Lloyd George and Premier Georges Clemenceau, yesterday. His declaration was accepted literally, with the belief that the government of Premier Hara would be certain to fall as soon as it was officially announced that Japan could not get the one-time German leasehold and rights in China.

Meanwhile, high Japanese here admitted the Hara government already was tottering and its collapse would cause no surprise.

It was said Viscount Kikujiro Ishii, Japanese Ambassador to the United States and one-time foreign minister who is returning to Tokio very soon, probably will be on the ground when the great cabinet crisis comes. It was declared he probably will participate in the formation of the new Cabinet.

President Wilson's Adriatic statement issued today greatly strengthens the belief here that he will stand firm in refusing to approve the passing of Kiaochau and other German rights in China to Japan, and that he will declare that it is essential the port must be restored to China as an integral part of her and in order to effect a just peace.

The President continued his efforts today to solve the Kiaochau tangle. A decision with regard to it may be forthcoming tomorrow.

Yesterday afternoon, the President summoned Edward T. Williams, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department, and with him reviewed again, point by point, the argument, of both the Chinese and Japanese envoys in connection with these problems. His efforts were to get at every fact of the case.

There has been talk here for a week of what the Japanese would do, if Kiaochau were denied them. Today, when I asked one of the Japanese delegates if it were true, they were threatening to leave the peace conference, he said that "If the conference decides against us, it may happen." However, nowhere are reports of a possible Japanese withdrawal from the Conference taken seriously by conference leaders, who I am told are more interested in the manifest eagerness of the Japanese to have all Far Eastern questions settled before the German plenipotentiaries arrive at Versailles. . . .

When viewed from every angle, the Shantung and Fiume questions can only appear as the things over which President Wilson is battling to break all secret pledges. Meanwhile Premier Lloyd George and Premier Clemenceau are standing as champions of these war covenants.

This was made evident, yesterday, which may be called Asia's Day at the "Paris White House." After hearing Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda "The Big Three" sent for the Chinese envoys. C. T. Wang had a meeting with the Committee on Regulations of Ports, Waterways and Railways, of which he is a member. Lou Tseng-tsiang and Wellington Koo at once motored to President Wilson's house in the Place des Etats-Unis. They told President Wilson, Premier Lloyd George, and Premier Clemenceau that China's rights should not be subordinated to "a secret grab agreement."

Mr. Lloyd George said England insists that China's place as a sovereign nation be fully recognized and that Japan be restricted to those rights in China, which Germany formerly possessed.

Nevertheless he could not make a British war agreement merely a "scrap of paper."

In this, Premier Clemenceau, speaking for France, concurred.

Mr. Koo insisted that Japan's claims rest upon the twenty-one demands she forced upon China in May, 1915, and that these demands are hostile to the interests of all Japan's allies.

Mr. Lloyd George confessed ignorance regarding these twenty-one demands.

Then President Wilson read extracts from the famous Sino-Japanese documents.

It was after this meeting that the President called upon Mr. Williams yesterday. It is understood in well-informed circles here that Mr. Williams at this meeting demonstrated to the President the serious aspects of the Shantung situation as it affects Americans.

I am confident that the President is trying desperately to save the situation without causing Japan to feel she has been slighted.

The statement by Mr. Lloyd George was considered very significant and to indicate that England would not support what was declared an attempt by Japan to absorb a Chinese economic empire beyond the one-time German Kiaochau holdings. This, it was alleged, Japan was attempting to do under cover of war pledges.

Last Saturday night Baron Rempei Kondo, President of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha and Japan's shipping king, tried to take the Shantung question out of the peace conference. It was at a dinner at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel to Mr. Lou, Mr. Koo, Mr. Sze and other leading Chinese here. The Chinese declined to nibble at the bait. Immediately thereafter, Baron Makino, who had objected to the "Little Five" discussing the Sino-Japanese problems when he, Robert Lansing, Arthur J. Balfour, Stephen Pichon, and Baron Sidney Sonnino were considering the proposed draft of the treaty articles, interviewed the conference leaders and arranged for Asia Day.

In view of the fact that the Chinese were not present yesterday morning when the Japanese presented their side of the case, the "Big Three" ruled that the Japanese should not be present when the Chinese envoys were heard.

Even if China loses Kiaochau, the peace treaty articles already completed insert the first wedge to restore her tariff rights, she being free to place on German goods such tariff as she pleases. Also the opium fight which America led for China, is won, the convention binding on all nations, being specifically affirmed in the peace pact.

There is great significance in the efforts by young Chinese trained in the United States to break the hammerlock in Paris, inasmuch as if they succeed they certainly will win the direction of the Chinese government in China.

I was particularly interested to know how the folk at the Bristol were behaving under the clouds that lowered over them. They were answering their helm wonderfully well.

I had dinner with one of the Japanese statesmen on the most dismal night of all. It was a hurried meal. Neither of us had much time to spare. My Japanese friend was quite composed. He was not worrying about Japan.

"If you are defeated," I said, "will you walk out, like the Italians?"

He smiled, and his face was all amusement as he replied:

"What do *you* think? We cross bridges when we come to them. It is a good rule, is it not?"

I agreed that it was a very good rule, and I ventured the belief that the Japanese would indulge no theatrical displays.

"We are not worrying," he assured me. "We are quite satisfied with the situation, except in one respect."

"You mean—"

"Yes," he said very seriously, "I mean all this foolish and dangerous talk, making it appear that your country and my country are at opposite ends of the peace table. As you know, I am sincerely fond of America. I have a host of real American friends. I do not like to see the United States being pushed into the position in which Russia stood immediately before the Russo-Japanese War."

I told him that I felt the same way, and I was quite sure the American people would feel that way about it, if they only knew the truth.

"The Chinese are not to blame," I said. "They are the victims."

"You are quite right there. It is all very unfortunate. It need not have happened."

That is the fact. The cards were stacked on both the

Chinese and the Japanese. The delegation at the Bristol, like the delegation at the Lutetia, had to play out their hands the best way that they could.

CHAPTER XXV

THE CHINESE IN OLD LUTETIA

DR. KOO, upon his arrival in Paris, secured a comfortable apartment at 5 Rue Charles Lamoureux, near the Bois de Boulogne. Mr. Sze lived on the avenue du President Wilson. For the other members of the delegation, who arrived later, and as official headquarters, several floors of the Hôtel Lutetia, on the Boulevard Raspail, were requisitioned.

The Hôtel Lutetia is in the heart of the Students' Quarter of Paris. That was very appropriate. Of course, the real reason why the Hôtel Lutetia was chosen was because it offered the most commodious and most comfortable accommodation procurable, as near as possible to the Chinese legation on the Rue de Babylone. Still, the Students' Quarter is the Students' Quarter, and Mr. Lou and his associates will probably smilingly confirm my statement that the Chinese, in Paris, were destined to pass through a strenuous course of Western political study that will never be effaced from their memory.

The suites of Mr. Lou and Dr. Wang and their secretaries, as well as the principal conference-rooms, were on the second floor. I was a constant visitor on the second floor of the Hôtel Lutetia, and I shall never forget the unfailing kindness of the statesmen of China, particularly in the very difficult circumstances that confronted them. At times, the Chinese were compelled to be reluctant in giving out information. The great powers had relegated them to the "Hall of Tributary Nations." "The Big Three" had merely admitted China and the other lesser powers on ~~sufferance~~ ^{sufferance}, so to speak. Therefore, the Chinese, the Greeks, and other representatives of

ancient and once powerful nations had to be careful and watch their steps. Knowing me to be their friend, the Chinese trusted me, and such confidence should not be abused.

For China's sake, it is necessary to tell just what happened in Paris. A history ought to be as truthful and as complete a record as possible. You don't tell the truth unless you tell all the truth. I am glad to say that a friend of China need not hesitate in telling all that occurred under the roof of the Hôtel Lutetia in Paris.

I think the Chinese themselves would say that I probably saw and heard as much of what happened as any one unattached to their mission, and I did not see, nor did I hear, a good many things asserted by some Americans who were in Paris for merely a very brief period and who, so far as I could observe, paid only a few visits to the Hôtel Lutetia. I was there, day after day, sometimes for hours at a time, closeted with members of the Chinese delegation or being entertained by them and their wives. It is necessary to say this, because there would be less controversy about these matters if those who write or speak about them were a little more careful to confine themselves within the facts.

The Chinese, through no fault of their own, but primarily because of the barren quality of Occidental statesmanship at Peking, carried with them to Paris dangerous differences of opinion. The delegation itself was a Chinese compromise along the old-established lines. The official members of the delegation had, each in his separate train, supporters and spies. Thus, it is a fact that immediately upon the appointment by Peking of Dr. Wang, Dr. Wu Ting-fang sent post-haste from Canton one of his most trusted personal henchmen to watch Dr. Wang. In the same way, General Tuan Chi-jiu, Mr. Tsao Ju-lin, and "Little Hsu" saw to it that Mr. Liang Chih-chao was sent to France at the head of an informal commission, ostensibly for purposes of propaganda.

It is fair to all sides to say that these methods employed by the Chinese were not so foolish as they might seem. The

peculiar position of China, the pathetic fact that China is, after all, the greatest individual nation on earth, yet one of the smallest of small powers, -because of explainable circumstances and their inevitable consequences, compelled to put twentieth-century clothes on a body politic still to a large extent back in the days of Kang-hi, has made it possible for a group of predatory powers to tear the heart out of China and place her conscience in pawn.

It is not too much to say that no nation on earth has proved possession of the vitality demonstrated by the Chinese in preserving, under adverse circumstances, some measure of dignity and pathetic pretense of sovereignty. It was natural that Dr. Wang should be relied upon to give the necessary progressive punch to the Chinese delegation. His friends, Chinese and American, expected that. The conditions required it. It was natural that Dr. Wellington Koo should be picked to formulate and express the technical lines of China's case, and it was natural that Mr. Lou should be counted upon to soften the efforts of these younger men under the mellowing influence of his more mature experience.

Mr. Lou, an eternal compromise between the bowing and scraping of the Li Hung-chang period and the democratic demands of to-day, strove to satisfy everybody in Paris, with the inevitable result that he left most, if not all of his friends dissatisfied. It was not his fault. I think Dr. Wang, Dr. Koo, and Mr. Sze would say that.

The morning that the Chinese delegates arrived, I saw each of them in turn before they went into a preliminary conference, and I remained with Dr. Wang for some time after the conference was over. They made a good beginning. Among themselves there was to be open diplomacy and a strong pull together, all for China. All went merrily as a marriage bell until one of the English newspapers in Paris printed a despatch asserting that Mr. Lou had promised the Japanese "to work in harmony with them."

I went over to the Hôtel Lutetia to interview Mr. Lou and

to see what he had to say in reference to this report. Mr. Lou very carefully avoided me. I saw Dr. Wang. One look at him told me that Dr. Wang was furious about something.

“How about this report as to Mr. Lou?” I asked Dr. Wang. “I must send the truth to the ‘Herald.’ I should like very much to see him and hear what he has to say.”

Dr. Wang, to his credit, defended his nominal chief, without committing himself to any misstatements; but knowing very well this admirable leader of young China, I could not help reading, from his very apparent attempts to make the best of a bad situation, his own conviction that Mr. Lou had compromised himself in some way or another, while in Tokio.

I left the Lutetia, and went over to Dr. Koo's house and explained to him that it was incumbent upon Mr. Lou personally to admit or deny this asserted understanding with Japan. Dr. Koo, like Dr. Wang, assured me that there was no truth in it; but within an hour I learned that in Tokyo Mr. Lou had taken a position that was at complete variance with the belligerent attitude adopted by the Chinese delegation in Paris. I cabled a brief statement of the facts to the “Herald,” but it was not until later that I learned the whole story, and how nearly it came to wrecking the Chinese peace delegation.

In the course of the contest for control of the Chinese delegation—whether it should go to Paris under American or Japanese auspices—the Chinese foreign office received from Dr. Yen at Copenhagen a detailed memorandum, specifying the points for which China should press in making peace with Germany. Dr. Yen, whose alma mater is Columbia, was minister to Germany when China broke off diplomatic relations on March 14, 1917. Dr. Yen, of course, quite properly was very willing to be a member of the Chinese peace delegation. The Chinese foreign office, with this memorandum before them, prepared the outline of proposals to be urged and sent a copy of this to Dr. Reinsch at the American legation.

Dr. Reinsch, with the assistance of Mr. Tenney and other American officials, went over these proposals, disapproved the

majority of them, and, I am informed, advised the Chinese to concentrate upon direct restoration of Kiaochau and nullification of the treaties and notes of May, 1915. The officials in the foreign office, amenable to American influence, accepted the American suggestions, and Dr. Reinsch was informed that Mr. Lou would be assisted in Paris by Dr. Koo, who had participated in the Chinese-Japanese negotiations of May, 1915.

The Japanese minister, Mr. Torikichi Obata, was secretly informed of these subterranean proceedings, step by step, and quite legitimately the Japanese proceeded to meet intrigue by intrigue. Before leaving Peking to catch his steamer at Yokohama that would take him to the United States, en route to France, Mr. Lou was invited to Tokio, and the official residence of the minister for home affairs was placed at his disposal. He accepted this invitation.

The Chinese President, Mr. Hsu Shih-chang, in a cablegram to Viscount Uchida, Japanese minister for foreign affairs, referred to the harmony existing between China and Japan. In response to this message, Viscount Uchida gave assurance to the Chinese President that Japan would return Kiaochau to China.

Passing through Manchuria, Mr. Lou announced a sudden attack of illness and begged to be excused from going to Tokio. Japanese assert, and the evidence supports their assertion, that Dr. Reinsch advised the Chinese foreign office that Mr. Lou should not go to Tokio or have any discussion with the Japanese Government.¹ Be that as it may, Mr. Lou went into retirement at Yokohama and it was only after Mr. Chang, the Chinese minister at Tokyo, exercised his persuasive talents that Mr. Lou went to the Japanese capital. He was suitably entertained and he had friendly conversations with Viscount Uchida and with Baron Makino, who was later to play such an important part in Paris.

¹ It is quite unnecessary to point out that the incident in no way reflects discredit upon Minister Reinsch, a loyal, upright and unusually capable public servant of the American people. He acted in exact accordance with the policy of his chief, President Wilson.—P. G.

Out of more than twenty versions of what took place in these interviews, truth seemed to repose in the following picturesque summary:

Viscount Uchida: "It shall be our pleasure to work together in harmony?"

Mr. Lou: "Yes, yes, of course. Yes, yes."

Viscount Uchida: "We shall do all that we possibly can to improve our present pleasant and harmonious relations?"

Mr. Lou: "Yes, yes. Yes, yes."

And more to the same purpose.

I do not wish to make Mr. Lou seem foolish in unfriendly eyes. Nobody could know him and do that; but nobody who knows him will question my statement that Mr. Lou could not say "no" to anybody. He does not know how.

Mr. Lou and his suite sailed out of the harbor of Yokohama for Seattle on the *Suwa Maru* of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha Line on December 10. The blasts from the siren of the *Suwa Maru* were saluted by brays from the siren of the *Tenyo Maru* of the Toyo Kisen Kaisha, on the promenade-deck of which Baron Makino, General Nara, and Admiral Takeshita were taking a last look at their home port. The ships drew apart as they passed from the fairway into the open sea. The Japanese and Chinese parties did not meet again until they reached Paris.

As soon as the Chinese landed at Seattle, the inevitable interview furnished smoke for the battle that was due to come. Japanese officials have told me that they noticed a strange discrepancy in these interviews. Those coming directly from Mr. Lou suggested that "everything would be settled amicably between Japan and China," whereas other interviews, not so direct, indicated that "the Chinese regarded Japan's position in Kiaochau as that of a trustee of the Allied powers."

A Japanese official in Paris said to me, "It was impossible not to recognize an intention in certain quarters to strike ahead of us while passing through your country, pitting them-

selves against us and putting you in a position of being, as it were, against us."

Baron Makino and his suite reached Paris on January 18, just in time to attend the opening of the peace conference.

Mr. Ijuin, the Japanese ambassador to Italy and former minister in Peking, a leading Japanese authority on Chinese affairs and a member of the Japanese peace delegation, did not join his colleagues until February 14. Mr. Ijuin, being an old personal friend of Mr. Lou, called upon him at the Hôtel Lutetia. Mr. Lou returned the call, but simply left his card and did not wait to see Mr. Ijuin, although undoubtedly he knew that the Japanese plenipotentiary was at home. Why was that?

It is necessary to explain.

Viscount Uchida's speech to the Japanese Diet on January 21, together with the despatch already referred to, asserting a Japanese-Chinese concordat, came up for discussion at an executive meeting of the Chinese delegation. Mr. Lou was asked to explain. He did his best to tell what had happened in Tokio. Another version, which did not quite tally with Mr. Lou's recital, was given by a member of the Chinese conference. Dr. Wang insisted that the situation should be made clear by a statement to the public. Mr. Lou demurred. Thereupon Dr. Wang expressed his opinion of Mr. Lou. It must be remembered that Dr. Wang had to fight for leadership or lose for China. Somebody had to lead, and nobody expected leadership from Mr. Lou. He is a very zealous and personally honorable servant of China, but he is not, nor has he ever been, a leader.

"You are a man-of no fixed principles, of no moral strength of character, easily moved this way or that way," said Dr. Wang. "Always, it has been the same. You were a republican, when it suited your convenience. You were a monarchist, when it suited your purpose. Always, you have been the thing that it was easiest and most prudent to be."

Mr. Lou sat with bowed head, listening to Dr. Wang, who,

when talking on his feet on the spur of the moment, is probably the most impressive living Chinese; a born orator who draws you away out of yourself and just precisely where he wants to put you.

Mr. Lou arose, stroked his long, thin, black wisp of a beard, and, trembling in every joint, said:

"I have been in the service of our country for many years. I served the Ta-Ching house to the best of my ability and faithfully as I could. Upon the change in the form of government [Kuo-ti] I did the best I could in the service of the state. For years, I have done my best all the time. Never before have I listened to language like that."

He left the room. It required much persuasion and good sense upon both sides to prevent a serious break within the Chinese delegation, that night.

Less than forty-eight hours before he spoke to the Council of Ten, showing cause why Kiaochau should be restored directly to China and not to Japan, Dr. Wellington Koo learned for the first time about the secret Chinese-Japanese Shantung agreements of September 24, 1918. Dr. Wang received the information at the same time. It was another confession of duplicity on the part of the Peking camarilla and of weakness and secrecy on the part of Mr. Lou. That, of course, precipitated further trouble.

The Japanese have good memories. So, too, have the Chinese, and, without in any way reflecting upon the sincerity or the honesty of Mr. Lou, it was inevitable that both Chinese and Japanese would recall the strongly pro-Japanese utterances of Mr. Lou, particularly in the latter part of 1915, when Yuan was seeking to make himself Emperor and was thrusting a gilded dukedom upon the brow of Mr. Lou.

Considerably less than a year after the Chinese-Japanese crisis of 1915, Mr. Lou, who was then Chinese premier and foreign minister,¹ contributed an article to the Tokyo "Asahi"

¹ He was Secretary of State of "The Hundred Days" of burlesque under Yuan.—P. G.

dealing with the relationship of Japan and China, in the course of which he said:

No words of mine are needed to demonstrate the fact that Japan and China should be inseparably linked together by a strong bond of friendship. I observe signs of an increase of mutual friendship. I have been stationed for long at Petrograd and The Hague, as Chinese Minister, and am personally acquainted with Baron Ishii, the Japanese Foreign Minister, and with Baron Motono, the Japanese Ambassador to Russia. In Europe, I was favored with the acquaintance of many of the Japanese Ambassadors and found them all well disposed toward my country.

There are various ways in which the two peoples might be brought into better harmony. One of the best would be to promote industrial cooperation which could be achieved through enterprises under Sino-Japanese joint management. Some time ago a party of Japanese business men, headed by Baron Kondo, the President of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, was in China, followed by a party led by Baron Shibusawa, and, subsequently, by Baron Okura. More recently, Mr. Fujiyama, the President of the Dai Nippon Sugar Company, has favored China with a visit. These distinguished business men have seen China with their own eyes, and have afforded the Chinese a valuable opportunity to come into contact with representative business men. This, I believe, has done a good deal towards bringing home to Chinese the necessity of effecting a closer union between the two nations. I firmly believe that if Chinese business men follow in the footsteps of the Japanese business men mentioned, the double purpose will be attained of promoting Sino-Japanese trade and of dispelling misunderstandings on the part of both peoples.

We need the help of the press, so valuable for removing national misunderstandings. The press represents public opinion, and often sways the Government. If the papers in Japan and China, therefore, have a correct understanding of each nation, and direct and guide the peoples at the point of a just and equitable pen, relations between Japan and China, which are bound to become intimate, will not fail to be placed on an unshakable basis of lasting amity.

China is to return to monarchism in accordance with the popular desire. I think it necessary that Japan and China, as the only two large empires in the Orient, should endeavor to promote mutual friendship, and that China should take lessons from Japan in imperial administration. By perusing the *Kaikoku Gojunen Shi* [History of Fifty Years' Development Since the Opening of Japan] by Count Okuma, I have learned with inexpressible feelings of reverence

toward the Japanese Empire of the remarkable development Japan has achieved in various directions during the last fifty years. The present condition of China closely resembles that in which Japan stood just after the Restoration. I most keenly feel the necessity for China to learn from Japan.

Chinese in Paris, in 1919, recalled many things in the record of Mr. Lou that worried them and widened the breach between the conservatives and radicals at the Hôtel Lutetia.

CHAPTER XXVI

RECRIMINATION AND RESIGNATION

ON February 10, Mr. Lou cabled his resignation to President Hsu Shih-chang. Matters had reached a crisis, largely because of mischievous cablegrams from the Far East printed in Paris and in London. These cablegrams lost nothing in bitterness or in spitefulness when served up to their readers by the paragraphers of the French press. At that time, particularly, the French press, especially newspapers known to be controlled by the Quai d'Orsay, manifested hostility toward the Chinese mission. It must be remembered that the French, especially M. Clemenceau and his immediate associates, were impatient of anything that seemed to suggest purposes or objects for the Conference of Paris outside French purposes and French objects. The French, with some notable exceptions, could see nothing but their own troubles and their own fears and their own interests. Outside, as well as inside, the Chinese delegation, there were not lacking sinister influences.

The Japanese had reason for not understanding or appreciating the discrepancy between the attitude of belligerency assumed by the Chinese delegation in Paris and Mr. Lou's and President Hsu's protestations of good-will and desire for harmony. It was necessary to the Japanese that they should come to an understanding with the Chinese delegation, one way or the other. Was it to be peace or war? Harmony or conflict?

Mr. Ijuin, whose friendship for China would not be challenged by any well informed Chinese; and Yosuke Matsuoka, a pronounced Chinophile; both to my knowledge went out of

their way to reach an honorable and open understanding with their Chinese friends. Mr. Matsuoka, upon his arrival in Paris, called upon each of the Chinese delegates, in turn. His long residence in China, in Shanghai as well as in Peking, and his personal as well as official friendships dating back through a considerable period, gave him of course a particularly favorable entrée to the Chinese delegation. The Chinese, I think, like Mr. Matsuoka, and he is one Japanese official whom I have never heard express a single idea or utter a word to which any Chinese or American could take exception. Mr. Ijuin, Mr. Matsuoka's former chief in Peking, is also liked by the Chinese, and in Paris he was their friend. On the other hand, the Japanese regarded Dr. Wang with considerable favor and respect, and, naturally, they looked to Mr. Lou to exercise a soothing influence upon his younger and less experienced colleagues. I do not think that many, if any, of the Japanese regarded Dr. Koo as being amenable to reasonable or friendly suggestion.

The issue that was created by the Chinese claim for direct restoration of Kiaochau simmered down to an attack upon the validity of the Chinese-Japanese notes and treaties of May, 1915. It is to be remembered that Mr. Lou was the Chinese foreign minister who conducted the Chinese side of the 1915 negotiations with Japan, and that Dr. Koo won his political spurs as Mr. Lou's most redoubtable lieutenant. Nominally, Mr. Tsao Ju-lin, who was vice-minister for foreign affairs at the time, was next in rank to Minister Lou, but actually it was young Wellington Koo, Ph. D., of Columbia, and English secretary to Yuan Shih-Kai, who sharpened the legal pencils and strengthened the briefs for China. It is a fact that Dr. Koo, in his zeal for his own country, displeased some of the Japanese who were dictating terms of peace in Peking, in 1915.

Dr. Eki Hioki is a gentleman and a scholar and a polished diplomat, but Mr. Torikichi Obata undoubtedly behaved himself in a boorish, churlish manner toward the younger Chinese, particularly Dr. Koo. He was as bombastic as the law allowed.

The Chinese editors christened him the "table-thumper," and the name has stuck to the present day. I am told that it was Mr. Obata, in 1919 Japanese minister in Peking, who in 1915 had Dr. Koo ordered from the room in which the Chinese-Japanese conferences were being held. So, of course, it was not surprising that the Japanese in Paris should attribute to Dr. Koo a desire to give them a Paris Roland for their Peking Oliver. When the American newspapers announced that Mr. Lou and Dr. Koo would lead the Chinese delegation in Paris, the Cantonese opponents of Peking referred to them slightly as "the Vanquished Victims."

The attitude of the American delegation, the known policy of the American President, and the outgivings of the Chinese in Paris and Washington, warranted the Japanese in coming to the conclusion that they were in danger of being isolated at the peace table. It might be possible for President Wilson to force M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George to break the secret bargain, of 1917. In these circumstances, the Japanese delegation in Paris, the Japanese minister for foreign affairs in Tokio, and the Japanese minister in Peking concerted in efforts to arrive at an understanding with the Chinese.

The Japanese minister at Peking was instructed to call upon the Chinese acting foreign minister and lay the situation before him. This call on the part of Mr. Obata, and passages that occurred at the same time in Tokio with minister Chang, aroused fresh bitterness. Chinese press reports claimed that Mr. Obata had threatened the Peking government with the employment of force and, what was not less cogent, the withdrawal of funds.

I think it is an established fact that the Japanese did seek to induce the Peking government to bring some sort of paternal suasion to bear upon the Chinese delegation in Paris, while the Chinese delegates, who were eager to fight the battle out with Japan "by peaceful means," appealed to Peking to remain firm and leave everything in the hands of Wang and Koo.

Viscount Chinda made a statement to "Le Temps," alleging a perfect understanding with the Chinese and denying the existence of any secret arrangements with China. The Chinese delegation replied by denying the Viscount's assertions.

It is necessary to keep constantly in our minds the fact that all through the period of the Paris conference, China had two peace conferences on her hands. The Chinese were struggling to make two separate peace arrangements; one, as an Allied associate, with the foreign enemy, and the other with the enemies under her own roof-tree. The peace conference between North and South China began sitting in Shanghai on February 20, 1919, with Mr. Chu Chi-chien as leading delegate from Peking, and Mr. Tany Shao-yi (father-in-law of Dr. Wellington Koo), chief plenipotentiary for the Canton Constitutionalists. The very matters at issue between China and Japan in Paris pivoted upon the vital differences between North and South China. For instance, both in France and in China, rumors and charges, asserting all sorts of secret Chinese-Japanese treaties, filled the air. The Cantonese Constitutionalists were attacking the Peking Government very largely through these charges, asserting official corruption. The fact that some of these charges were known to be well-founded made the situation more critical.

On January 28, in Paris, Baron Makino rebutted Dr. Koo's argument by referring to existing arrangements between Japan and China and between Japan and her allies. As I have already stated, Dr. Koo and Dr. Wang, as well as other members of the Chinese delegation, were kept in ignorance of these secret Chinese-Japanese arrangements until less than forty-eight hours before the meeting of the Council of Ten.

An Associated Press despatch from Tokio, dated February 4, quoted the "Hochi Shimbun" and the "Nichi-Nichi Shimbun" as stating in articles, apparently inspired, that "The Japanese government has instructed Baron Makino to reveal confidentially to the Great Powers the treaties between Japan and China."

This Tokio despatch was delayed in transmission to New York, where it was published on February 10 and transmitted the same day to Paris. It appeared in "Le Temps" on February 11. It was this despatch that provoked the following disclaimer, printed in the Paris correspondence of the London "Morning Post" of February 14:

The statement published here this morning in the form of a cable from Tokio to the effect that the Japanese government "has given orders to reveal confidentially to the Powers the secret treaty between Japan and China" has caused both surprise and indignation to the Japanese representatives at the Peace Conference, who deny that there is the slightest ground for such a statement, for the simple reason that no such secret treaty exists. Mr. Matsuoka, secretary of the Japanese Peace delegation, whom I saw this morning, stated categorically that the contents of every treaty between China and Japan had already been published. "The only two things not officially published," he said, "were two notes exchanged between China and Japan last September, referring to proposed loans in connection with a railway in the province of Shantung, where Kiaochau is situated, and to the withdrawal of the Japanese civil administration from Shantung. These were kept private as between China and Japan at the request, if I remember correctly, of the Chinese minister at Tokio. This, in fact, would be the invariable course in the case of preliminary documents such as these, which concerned proposed loans as to which agreements had not been signed.

"There is so little secrecy about these notes, however, that the terms were published in the Chinese newspapers some time ago, and you can state on the authority of Baron Makino himself that both the treaties and agreements of 1915 and 1918 have been laid before the Powers at the Peace Conference with all their clauses and provisions."

On February 12, the newspaper contained despatches from Peking, dated February 3, to the following effect: "The Japanese government informed the Chinese minister at Tokio on January 30, that it wishes to see the Chinese delegates at Paris modify their attitude at the Peace Conference."

On February 1, these Peking despatches asserted that the Japanese minister at Peking had made an identical declaration, announcing that "his government desires that China will consent not to reveal to the Peace Conference the secret agree-

ments existing between China and Japan." "The Chinese delegates to the Peace Conference," said he, "ought to work in most perfect harmony with the Japanese delegates on all the questions submitted to the Conference. China now finds herself in a position in which she must choose between the friendship and enmity of Japan."

"The military party at Peking," we were told, "on one occasion brought much pressure upon the presidential staff, so as to make the Japanese view prevail. The determination of Japan to keep permanently the privileges, seized from the Chinese military party during the European war, astonishes every Chinese, especially when one remembers that a part of the Japanese government was opposed to the use of physical force against China."

On the same day, London and Paris newspapers printed a Peking despatch, alleging that the Japanese government had requested China to consent to the publication of an agreement relating to the Shantung railways, signed during September, 1918, but not ratified, by which Japan advanced twenty million yen for the extension of the Kiaochau railway.

"This money," declared the Peking correspondent, "has been spent in the unsuccessful military operations which aim at the conquest of South China. China has consented to publication."

It was this series of despatches which called forth the following statement by Ambassador Chinda, printed in "Le Temps" of February 12, and circulated by the Havas Agency:

There has not been exercised any pressure, nor formulated any menace, nor concluded any secret treaty, nor made any bargaining on the subject of the province of Shantung, or any other Chinese territory; there has not been sought any right of control over China. It has not been desired in any way to represent China at the Peace Conference. Furthermore, our relations with the president of China and his cabinet are the most cordial.

Viscount Chinda's statement was flatly contradicted in individual and informal statements made by members of the Chi-

nese delegation, but not by Mr. Lou. Mr. Lou was sick. If my recollection serves me aright, he did not attend the secret conference of the Chinese delegation held that afternoon; but at a subsequent conference, convened to consider the draft statement of the Chinese claim for the direct restoration of Kiaochau, Mr. Lou was present, and there was another conflict of opinion between the radicals and the conservatives. Mr. Lou did not like some of the suggestions put forward by aggressive younger men. Mr. Lou did not want to concentrate Chinese fire upon Japan. His proposal was that the Chinese delegation should form a combination with Greece and other small powers and so bring pressure to bear upon the masters and managers of the Paris Conference. Mr. Lou, Dr. Koo, and other members of the Chinese delegation did coöperate with the Greeks, Poles, and other ancient and abused nations who, like the Chinese, objected to the term "small powers" and employed instead the terms "secondary" or "intermediate" powers. It was because of this working agreement that China had won her representation upon the commission of the League of Nations and upon the commission for ports, waterways, and railways, at the meeting held at the Quai d'Orsay on January 27.

It was also because of China's coöperation with Greece, Tzecho-Slovakia, Poland, and Rumania that each of these nations secured representation on the ~~commission~~ of the League of Nations, announcement of which fact was made in the official communiqué of February 6.

It was because of this combination, undoubtedly, that the supreme council of the peace conference gave a respectful hearing to Mr. Venizelos on February 4. When the great Greek made his argument regarding Greek territorial interests in Asia Minor, the "small," "secondary," or "intermediate" powers were chafing under the restrictions imposed upon them, so the official communiqué of February 4 announced the adoption of the following resolution:

It is agreed:

That the questions raised in the statement of M. Venizelos on the Greek territorial interests in the Peace Settlement shall be referred for examination in the first instance to an expert Committee composed of two representatives each of the United States of America, the British Empire, France and Italy.

It shall be the duty of this Committee to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits and make recommendations for a just settlement.

The Committee is authorized to consult representatives of the peoples concerned.

It was announced that the Tzecho-Slovak delegates would be given a hearing next day, and arrangements were made to give other small nations their "day in court" before the Council of Ten. Superficially, the "rebellion" of the small powers seemed to be making an impression upon the masters of the peace conference, and certainly their remonstrances did not lack space in the French and English press.

Dr. C. T. Wang and Mr. Alfred Sze questioned the prudence and propriety of some, if not all, of these proceedings, and within the Chinese delegation there was sharp criticism of "the manner in which the diplomatic fences of China were being neglected."

Spurred by this criticism, Mr. Sze, Chinese minister to Great Britain, had a talk with Mr. Macleay; and, a little later, Mr. Lou and Mr. Sze were invited to dine with the British premier at No. 3, Rue Nitot. At the dinner, Mr. Lou sat on the right hand of Mr. Lloyd George. Mr. Lou speaks very little-English. Mr. Lloyd George is master of neither Chinese nor French. So the conversation was what Professor Ladd would classify as "interesting, but unimportant."

For instance:

Mr. Lou: "Do you know Sir Richard Dane?"

Mr. Lloyd George: "No, who is he?"

Mr. Lou: "Do you know Sir Robert Bredon?"

Mr. Lloyd George: "No, I am sorry to say I do not. Who is Sir Robert Bredon?"

The dinner did not accomplish much, if anything, for China.

While this controversy was proceeding, there arrived in Paris Mr. Liang Chih-chao, scholar and editor—and opportunist. Mr. Liang's Chinese political record is interesting and illuminating. Before 1898, he supported the republican idea. In 1898, when opportunity presented him a chance for office about the person of the dreaming emperor, Kwang-Hsu, he supported the Manchu monarchy. When the reform movement was overthrown and he saved his neck by a narrow margin, Liang, exiled with a Manchu price on his head, again supported the republican idea. About 1903 or 1904, discouraged at the seeming lack of success of the republican movement in China, Liang again became a monarchist. After Wuchang and the apparent republican triumph in 1911, he was an enthusiastic supporter of Chinese democracy. In 1913, when Yuan was doing his best to destroy the republic and when the Honanese adventurer offered him official preferment, Liang favored the dissolution of parliament. When Yuan, afraid of his scholarly ability, endeavored to suppress him in the course of his promotion of the monarchical movement in 1916, Liang once more supported the constitution and the republic. In the constitutional crisis of 1917, Liang, finding his stock low among genuine republicans, again advocated the dissolution of parliament. Mr. Liang Chih-chao is a Chinese literary prodigy. He has more words and phrases at his finger-tips than any other man in Chinese public life since the venerable Chang Chih-tung, who was the most notable Hanlin Optimus of his day.

Mr. Liang and his staff, which included Mr. Liu Chung-chieh, a master of the Japanese language and a witness of the asserted understanding between Mr. Lou and Viscount Uchida and Baron Makino, entered Paris and occupied a suite in the Grande Hôtel on that evening of tempests, February 12.

The Japanese newspapermen in Paris made much of Mr. Liang. There was quite a Sino-Japanese stream of callers between the fifth floor of the Grande and the third floor of the Hôtel Bristol, Japanese headquarters. I called upon Mr.

Liang and talked over the situation with him, and I cabled to "The New York Herald" the information that there was a movement on foot, apparently backed by Mr. Tsao Ju-lin and his Japanese associates, to put Mr. Liang in command of the Chinese delegation.

This innocent and perfectly accurate despatch created a political thunder-storm in Peking and in Shanghai. The acting minister of foreign affairs in Peking cabled to the Chinese delegation in Paris, inquiring the source of the "Herald's" information. The Peking cabinet was seeking to deny my despatch that Mr. Lou had resigned, and Mr. Tsao, of course, was trying to cover up his flank movement against Dr. Wang and the radicals among the Chinese in Paris.

On February 23, the Chinese delegation approved the draft brief setting forth Chinese claims for Kiaochau, largely the work of Dr. Koo, Dr. Wang, and their immediate staffs, with, of course, the friendly assistance of American experts. Mr. Lou did not approve this brief, it being inconsistent with the position he had taken on the general situation, but neither did he emphasize his disapproval. When the English copy of the statement of claim was delivered to Mr. Dutasta, secretary-general of the conference, he immediately tossed it back to the Hôtel Lutetia, and somewhat abruptly informed the Chinese that it could not be accepted unless accompanied by a French copy. All the time, of course, the French were making their forlorn fight to maintain the ancient custom, and now shattered modern fiction, of conducting international affairs in the "language of diplomacy," the French language. Mr. Dutasta was a vigorous champion of this obsolete cause, which is one reason why M. Clemenceau had him named as secretary-general of the Peace conference. Preparing the French copy of the brief consumed about a week or ten days.

On February 28, the Havas Agency circulated a statement which appeared in "Le Temps" of the same day, quoting Viscount Chinda as authority for the assertion that the Chinese Government was an assenting party to Japanese claims in

Shantung. Baron Makino, the Japanese leader in Paris, had already made statements of Japan's position to the Associated Press, and to me as the representative of "The New York Herald."

The Chinese were furious when they read some of the things attributed to Viscount Chinda by the Havas reporter. They were particularly furious at the following declaration which placed Mr. Lou in a most awkward position :

We have no reason to suppose that the Chinese government in Peking is unfriendly, or that they are in opposition to the plans of Japan for coöperation with China in the future.

We have made no threats, the Ambassador continued; we have made no demands and while unofficial reports here have credited the Chinese delegates with an attitude of antagonism to Japan, we have not believed that the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs now in Paris, as a delegate, has changed his attitude towards Japan since he called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Baron Makino in Tokyo some sixty days ago and voluntarily gave us assurances of friendly and helpful coöperation in Paris.

On March 2, the Chinese issued the following press communiqué :

The "Havas" Agency circulated a statement which appeared in "Le Temps" of February 28, purporting to have been issued by the Japanese Government in connection with the latter's claims to succession to the German system of preferential rights, interests and privileges throughout the Chinese province of Shantung.

It will be recalled that Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda, members of the Japanese Peace Delegation, are identified with this statement, which specifically names them as unequivocally declaring that none of the documents textually quoted therein contained any provisions violating the territorial integrity of China in Shantung or attacking her prestige.

As the statement was documented in a sense implying that China had been a voluntary party to a transaction, represented as innocuous and involving no violation of her territorial integrity and no assault on her prestige, the Chinese Peace Delegation have had under preparation an explanatory note showing the reverse to be the truth.

For the present, the publication of this note is being withheld in

view of the denial by the Japanese Embassy in Paris, appearing in "Le Temps" of the 2nd inst., that the statement in question had been issued by the Japanese Government.

The Chinese gave a house-warming on March 4, inviting the newspaper folk, men and women, of all nations accredited to the peace conference. It was a delightful affair, as Chinese entertainments always are, with an abundance of exquisite Chinese tea and inimitable Chinese pastry. Mr. Lou opened the proceedings with noncommittal words of welcome. Dr. Wang delivered an address which threw down the gauntlet to the Japanese in Paris.

On March 8, Mr. Liang Chih-chao passed out of Paris to make a tour of the battle-fields. On March 10, Mr. Lou left very quietly for Switzerland. He cabled again to Peking, pressing for acceptance to his resignation, saying that he was sick and was unworthy of the great honor and responsibility reluctantly reposing upon his shoulders. The Peking president cabled back, urging Mr. Lou to return to Paris and to continue at the head of the Chinese delegation.

In Peking, the camarilla was hard at work. In Paris, Mr. Liang's wire-pullers were hard at work. Associates of Mr. Liang, with the coöperation of Japanese journalistic friends, arranged a dinner in his honor, which took place at the International Press Club, Maison Dufayal, 80 Champs-Élysées, on the night of March 19. As I cabled to "The New York Herald," this dinner was undoubtedly intended to be the final fanfare in the booming of Mr. Liang for leadership of the Chinese delegation. Dr. Wang, Dr. Koo, Minister Hu Weiteh, and most of the Chinese, very many of the Japanese, and [with the exception of Mr. Ronald Macleay], virtually all of the American, British, and French Far Eastern specialists, accepted invitations. We had a notable gathering, including Professor Edward T. Williams and China's McAdoo, Mr. Yeh Kung-cho, at the table to which I was assigned. Mr. Liang delivered an oration that began full of promise, but all of a sudden it seemed to get lost somewhere in the ambient ether

and arrived nowhere. Dr. Wang made a speech that was cheered heartily by the auditors of all nations, particularly the Japanese. Mr. Liang did not at any time become a member of the Chinese delegation in Paris.

Mr. Lou, on April 5, consented to return from Switzerland to Paris on the condition that thenceforth, in his official relations with the Chinese delegation, he should be represented by his friend, Mr. Wang Kwang-chi, Chinese minister to Italy and not at all unlike Mr. Lou in ideas and in appearance, even to the thin, black beard and the very polite Peking manners. The Chinese called him affectionately, "the near-foreign minister"; he is a very agreeable man.

The unity of the Chinese delegation was saved, by a narrow margin, it is true. The Chinese certainly deserve credit for preserving an outward aspect of harmony, taking into consideration all the circumstances in the case.

BOOK FIVE
THE CAUSE CELEBRE

In Re Kiaochau,

CHINA *versus* JAPAN, EX PARTE
W. WILSON

CHAPTER XXVII

THE SKIN OF THE BEAST

OUR Allied associates in the war entered the Conference of Paris with a deliberate purpose in view, a cut-and-dried program, and definite ideas as to the best available means of attaining their own particular ends. Each Allied power was self-seeking and sometimes avowedly so. The huntsmen had crossed the Rhine. The German boar was slain. The moment had come in which the masters of the hunt might revel in the pastime of removing the tusks and tallow and skinning the beast. No human being could gaze upon the ruins of northern France or think upon the innocent dead in the cold, damp tomb of the seas, and close his heart against the cry for "reparations" that was warm and shrill on the tongues of the French and the English. The Allied demand that the German must pay in territory as well as in money was an insistent demand. From the French, and from the British point of view, it was a reasonable demand. It was inconsistent with Mr. Wilson's "peace of justice," and that was at the root of the chief causes of conflict between the American President and the European premiers in Paris. Mr. Wilson, with praiseworthy stubbornness, stood upon the giddy heights of enlightened liberalism; while M. Clemenceau, Mr. Lloyd George, and Mr. Orlando were quite content to wade knee-deep in the mire of unrepentant imperialism. Yet, curiously enough, more than once it was an Englishman or a Frenchman who essayed the part of advocate for the defeated Germans.

One afternoon, a commission of technical experts was considering certain draft clauses proposed for insertion in the

treaty. Among the French experts was a well known contributor to the scientific periodicals. He got up and ruffled his hair and shook his fist in the face of one of the American experts.

"I object," he screamed. "I object! If you do this, I shall most vehemently protest. I shall write an article in—and say you were unfair to the Germans."

The Americans grinned and said never a word. As a matter of fact, they had nothing whatsoever to do with the cause of commotion. Actually, I am told, it originated in the Quai d'Orsay. The incident illustrates one of the lamentable facts of the Conference of Paris. Rightly or wrongly, like the boy in one of Mark Twain's stories, we were always to blame. The French and the British never spared the knife as they skinned the boar, but they took equal care in seeing to it that we should be made to shoulder the responsibility for what Mr. Lloyd George called "those terrible terms."

With a very minute exception, our peace mission sought none of the skin. Mr. Wilson tells us that he did make an exception in the case of Yap Island. In the most secret manner, with his French and English colleagues of "the Big Three," he admits that he made a "secret treaty" regarding Yap Island. Those who know the American value of Yap Island in the commercial and political strategy of the Pacific will approve his action, if not his methods. We need Yap, which, while small, is not to be sneezed at.¹

It was in the process of skinning the beast that the masters of the Conference of Paris raised the Kiaochau question. This

¹ The barbed-wire entanglements of secret treaties tripped Mr. Wilson at Paris. He had condemned President Tyler's secret negotiation of the Texas Treaty, rejected by the United States Senate. His position regarding Fiume, Kiaochau, and other cardinal matters was in direct opposition to secret treaties. Yet, while he was denouncing secret treaties, he was making secret treaties at "The House of the Flirt" and, when he was signing the Yap agreement, he was eating every word of his memorable Mobile prophecy: "I want to take this occasion to say that the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest." (See Appendix "A.")

fact is very important. Kiaochau came into the Paris conference, not as a Chinese, but as a German, possession, and *with the Japanese in possession*.

During the first weeks of January most of the best people in Paris were reading and discussing General Smuts's book on the League of Nations. His exposition of the mandatory system was regarded as particularly important. True liberals were quick to see that a star of hope shone in the Boer hero's proposition that the people made subject to the mandate should have the right to choose or, upon sustained appeal, to change the mandatory power. That would mark an advance in the government of backward peoples along the rough road to self-determination.

The Smuts plan was as gall and wormwood to the British and French missions, saturated as they were with the imperialist spirit. They regarded self-determination as a device conceived by the devil of internationalism, except when it could be employed to serve some purpose of their own.

"Self-determination," said a famous French "Immortal," to the author, one evening, while we were dining at the magnificent home of one of the chief French plenipotentiaries, "it is to amuse! Is it to be applied with or without limitations? If without limitations, government becomes impossible. If with limitations, where shall we draw the line? Here we are tearing up the map of the world, to do what? To recreate the old nations that have been blotted out, trampled over. Magnificent! It is worthy, indeed, of your great Mr. Wilson, the Moses of our time. But, look you, where are we going? Who have absolute rights? Who were the first inhabitants? Ah, my friend, when you come right down to it, none but the monkeys have absolute rights."

"And they are up a tree, Monsieur?"

"Precisely. And so are we."

Elsewhere¹ the Pacific islands and the mandatory system are

¹ See Chapters XI and XIV.

dealt with in detail. Here it is merely necessary to mention the fact that the skinning of the boar was rushed to the front at the beginning of the Conference of Paris: that all the overseas possessions of Germany, those in Africa as well as those in Asia, formed the most tangible and desirable part of the skin; that the Allies had already secretly divided the skin, in the darkest hour of the war and before we came into the war; and that the Smuts plan threatened to make hash of this secret partition, which had divided the skin among the hunters *before the beast was slain*.

Officially, on January 19, 1919, Mr. Wilson knew nothing about the secret Allied understanding of February-March, 1917. He went into the conference blind upon many points. It is fair to the President, however, to note the fact that he stood out for a liberal League of Nations and for a mandatory system that would protect backward peoples before cruel facts pointed to the Smuts plan as the one hope of saving the Fourteen and additional points and of avoiding an American and Chinese defeat on the Kiaochau question. Kiaochau being a German colony on the coast of China, under the Smuts plan the Chinese would have walked away with the right to name the mandatory power. I pointed this out to Dr. C. T. Wang, and the Chinese delegate was quick to grasp opportunity by the nose. His own delegation overruled his better judgment.

At the first plenary session on January 18, the actual treaty-making functions of the conference were seized upon by the representatives of the great powers. A week later, when it became evident that the lesser nations were determined to make a fight for justice, the great powers made their usurpation absolute. Not merely did the rules and resolutions of January 18 and 25 turn the Chinese, the Greeks, the Belgians, and all the other small nations into *petitioners* before the mighty Council of Ten, but these petitioners were told that they must be as secret as the grave. Seated upon sufferance, they might be banned and banished altogether for the least "indiscretion."

“What does this mean?” I asked a courtly old diplomat in the train of “the Terrible Ten.”

“It means talk, and be damned to you,” said he. “That ’s what it means.”

He was quite right. That was how, on the boulevards, they came to call the lesser members of the Conference of Paris “~~Georges Clemenceau’s trained troupe of performing dogs.~~” The “Tiger” knew how to take the bark and the bite from them.

The mandatory question came up first at one of the informal meetings just before the conference was organized. On January 20, it was warmly debated by the Supreme Council. On January 24, it came within a hair of breaking up the conference altogether. That was Friday. The better part of the next day was consumed by the plenary session, when the steam-roller was put into high gear. On Monday afternoon, January 27, in M. Pichon’s room at the Quai d’Orsay, the Council of Ten met formally to consider the disposition of “all the German overseas possessions.” Those present included the representatives of all the British dominions; French cabinet ministers, vice-ministers, and experts; Professor Edward T. Williams and Mr. George Louis Beer, two of the American experts; Mr. James William Ronald Macleay and other British experts; and two of the Chinese delegates, Mr. Lou Tseng-tsiang and Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, with their secretaries.

Except the Americans, everybody wanted some “skin.” Except the Americans, nobody wanted the mandatory system. Claims were put in for every inch of the former German possessions. Some of the claims overlapped, as in the case of Mr. Hughes and the Japanese. After considerable talking and reference to maps and papers, Mr. Lou asked if he might say something.

“You will be given a hearing, later,” said M. Clemenceau; “we are now dealing with other matters, in addition to Kiao-chau.”

Next morning, the Paris edition of "The New York Herald," and important French newspapers, published an interview with Baron Makino. Undoubtedly, the intention of the Japanese delegation was to pour oil upon troubled waters. While the Chinese at the Hôtel Lutetia were discussing the necessity and propriety of replying to them, they received a summons to attend another meeting of the Ten at the Quai d'Orsay. Mr. Lou and Dr. Koo went to that meeting in a troubled state of mind.

Dr. Koo had prepared an argument in support of China's case, in blissful ignorance of the Chinese-Japanese secret agreements of September 24 and 28, 1918. While it is true that these documents were signed in Tokio by Baron Goto and the Chinese minister, Mr. T. H. Chang, I have the highest possible Chinese authority for saying that they were approved by Mr. Lou, as foreign minister, and by the Chinese President and his cabinet. They were not thrust upon China. No coercion was employed. Mr. Hsu Shih-chang was reaching out for the Chinese presidency; he was the candidate of the camarilla. To elect him, to purchase corrupt votes of a bogus parliament that was sitting in defiance of the only legal parliament, to hold in arms against China mercenary coolie armies, Tuan and Tsao and "Little Hsu" sold out to Nishihara and Goto. They wanted money, at any price. They got the money from Japan, and Japan got a friendly settlement of the Kiaochau controversy that sustained her Shantung position all along the line. On January 26, Mr. Lou confessed what had been done in Peking and in Tokio. The Chinese decided that Dr. Koo should do the talking before the Ten. Foolishly, however, instead of demanding that Mr. Lou get out of Paris and the delegation by the first available transportation, they permitted the Chinese foreign minister to remain as their nominal leader and to be present, *as a witness against them*, upon each occasion that the issue came up in the conference.

That was one reason why one of the best American friends of China, then in Paris, came away from a Chinese official



I. E. Hori

BARON MAKINO

dinner with the remark: "How pathetic! How futile!"

The council meeting of January 28 was China's first day, and Asia's first day, at the conference. Dr. Koo made an admirable speech, much after the style of his thesis, "The Status of Aliens in China," keeping carefully on the high ground of moral justice and international welfare and still seeking to convince the hard-headed, practical old diplomats, whose decision was written in advance, that the law of nations sustained China's claim to all German rights from the moment that China entered the war.

Baron Makino traversed this contention. To clinch the matter, he confronted Dr. Koo with the agreements of the previous September.

"In these agreements," said Baron Makino, "the whole matter has been amicably arranged between China and Japan."

The Baron read extracts from the agreements, and of course they sustained his objection.

The most interested listener to the argument was the President of the United States. He had followed with sympathetic attention every word uttered by Dr. Koo, occasionally nodding his head and otherwise indicating his unqualified approval. He was tracing figures or faces on a pad of paper but with eye, ear, and brain concentrated upon the Japanese Baron, when Makino mentioned the secret agreements. He bent forward and addressed Makino directly.

"Baron," said the President, "you will, of course, give us these agreements. I am sure that the council would like to examine them."

Mr. Lloyd George said:

"Yes, of course."

Mr. Balfour, true to the teachings of old diplomacy, sat still as the Sphinx. The first maxim of old diplomacy is never to allow yourself to be surprised into an unnecessary admission. Mr. Balfour knew that the first duty of Japan's ally, England, apart altogether from his own secret agreement with

Japan, was to sit still, say nothing, and leave the admissions or denials to the Japanese members of the council, Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda. He did that little thing with his own inimitable charm and grace.

Baron Makino answered, without hesitation: "Yes." Then he added, and quite properly, "Before doing so, I must, of course, communicate with my government."

That was understood. The reservation was a necessary precaution, because, while Baron Makino was at all times the active leader of the Japanese in Paris, he was not the official head of the delegation, and it was not until a month later that his titular chief, the Marquis Saionji, arrived on the Seine. To be sure, there was Japanese politics, Chinese-Japanese politics, and Japanese-European politics in Makino's qualifying amendment. Japan was playing for big stakes, as were all her European allies. And each one of them had special difficulties to surmount, and all these difficulties were stimulated by Mr. Wilson's principles and policies. With the French, Siam and Syria, and an intensified colonial program, sharpened the edges of the Franco-American issues regarding the armistice, the Saar valley, and the bridgeheads of the German side of the Rhine. With the British, Mr. Wilson had got off to a bad start on the "freedom of the seas." Self-determination, however, was the *pons asinorum* of the diplomatic position, East and West. As was to be justified, the British suspected the President's "flirting with the Irish vote"; and the ancient Egyptians were uniting their prayers to Isis, Osiris and Wilson. Pharaoh's children, in the darkest hour of their travail, with one accord turned to the Moses of the moment, and, with tears that flooded old Nile, besought him to lead them forth from "captivity." Japan had Korea, as well as China, on her hands. In Korea, as in China, the Japanese traced the trouble to American intrigue. All the Allies were in the same boat, and the Italian imperialists were purposely rocking the boat. Knowing the game that they were playing, and hating the Wilson principles and policies as a properly

brought-up cat does mustard, they opposed any division of the German "skin" that did not include an Italian slice of Austrian "skin," Fiume and an Italian empire in Dalmatia, transforming the Adriatic into an Italian lake. Japan had to be cautious, and China (in Paris) had to be bold; but, as it were, bashfully.

Immediately after he left the Quai d'Orsay, on January 28, I talked with Baron Makino in Viscount Chinda's study at the Hôtel Bristol. We were by ourselves, and I took the liberty of saying some tart, friendly things to the very able Japanese statesman. I could well afford to do that without fear of misconception, because, while my sympathies were with the Chinese, the Japanese respected the fact that it was honest sympathy, untingered by the least taint of hostility toward them in any manner, shape, or form. Quite the contrary, it was in friendship and not in enmity that I pointed out their mistakes in dealing with the Chinese, and with the cordial indorsement and example of many of the best minds in Japan. They liked the way in which I supported their just pleas for absolute racial and national equality. So I was in a fairly good position to talk plainly to Baron Makino, and he talked plainly to me. I left Viscount Chinda's room with a very high opinion of the Satsuma leader, but with gloomy forebodings as to the future.

As a newspaper writer should, I always strive hard to tell the whole truth even when it hurts my own feelings. Some years as a foreign correspondent, and concentration upon foreign politics in intimate relations with great statesmen of many lands, converted me to the necessity of open diplomacy long before it became a catch-cry of fad leadership and fool following. Only the truth can serve. Only the truth can save. And half the truth, as we are told, is a whole lie. I left the Hôtel Bristol, angry and irritated with the Japanese. I tramped through the snow of the Place Vendôme and crossed the flooded Seine by the Pont Royale, welcoming the chill, white flakes that laughingly lashed my face. I wanted to cool

off. I was red hot inside, furious clean through with the Japanese, and more angry because I was so angry. Newspaper readers sometimes fail to give credit to the real craving of the average American reporter to keep the faith absolutely with his idol paper and his ultimate master, the public. The American people will never know their debt to the men and the women who were their best representatives at the Conference of Paris. It was a pleasure and a privilege to work in comradeship with clever and honest women like pretty and prudent Margaret Sangster and deliciously daring and dainty Mrs. Kirtland and with great journalists like Frank Simonds, William Allen White, Herbert Adams Gibbons, Richard Oulahan, Laurence Hills, Truman H. Talley, and Herbert Swope. Hit or miss, it was America first with the American press delegation; first of all America, then our newspapers, and after that the comradeship of our calling. A happy family of American Bohemians crowded the press-room at 4, Place de la Concorde, "torpedoed" Ray Baker and Albert Sweetzer for the always-to-be-desired "inside information," laid votive offerings of flowers and candy on the busy desk of charming and clever Miss Groth, and wasted valuable hours attending the diurnal conferences at the Crillon. John Nevin, who, I think, kept nearest to the thoughts and intentions of the President, was among the first to abandon the Crillon conferences as a waste of good time. Time was valuable, but the truth was the most valuable of all. Now, I am sure that each sought to write the truth in his or her own way. I know I did, and that is why I am telling this little story, because the point is against myself.

I left Baron Makino in no frame of mind to write a newspaper story, simply because I knew a good deal of the pathetic "inside" of the Chinese situation and I could not understand how the Japanese could be so blind to their own real interests, as most undoubtedly they were. The Conference of Paris presented them with "an opportunity in a thousand years."

~~Here was the chance for Asia to get together and stick together,~~ Siam, China, and Japan, with Japan the avowed leader of all the Asiatic races. By right of her own wonderful accomplishments, Japan is the leader of Asia. Asia, the new Asia of to-day, has "so much to do, so little done";¹ and the hope of Asia is enlightened, liberal Japanese leadership. I desired to see Baron Makino and his colleagues acting in Paris as the champions of the ill-treated, badly advised Chinese. I told him so during our conversation early on the afternoon of January 28.

I said to him, "Baron, there is not an honest American who knows the history of the Far East who is not well disposed toward your people. Still, here is the position. Our interest in the welfare of China is older than the interest of modern Japan in China. We recognize the greatness of Japan and the natural bond that should unite the interests of China and Japan. During all of our one hundred and thirty-five years' association with the Far East, we have had only one object in mind, the welfare of Asia. Will you not do something to help China to release herself from her troubles? Here you have the opportunity in Kiaochau. I am very anxious to send to my own people, through the 'Herald,' a message of hope that will be founded upon fact. Will you return to China the substance as well as the shadow of what was wrongfully taken from her by the Germans?"

Baron Makino listened with friendly sympathy while I spoke briefly of American services to Japan between 1854 and 1894.

"We desire," I told him, "that you deal with China as we dealt with you in the days of Japan's weakness. Americans are very strongly opposed to any intrigue against Japan in China. All we seek is to help bring you both together in peace, in friendship, and in justice."

Then, I repeated my question as to returning the "sub-

¹ The last words and the epitaph of Cecil Rhodes.—P. G.

stance" as well as the "shadow" of Kiaochau to China, particularly specifying the port, the Shantung railways, and the mines.

"As to the spirit of your question," said Baron Makino, who, I could see, was thinking both deeply and swiftly. "I should say most earnestly, 'yes.' Japan will be not merely just, but generous, to China. It is Japan's desire to help China."

The Baron pointed out to me the difficulty that lay in the way of a more specific answer. He had just come from the Quai d'Orsay, and it was against the rules of the Supreme Council to discuss matters being adjudicated by the Ten. The Japanese always kept within this rule, and so did the Chinese, often to the injury of their cause. So we had to follow the ancient plan, and "seek direction by indirection."

"Japan," said Makino, "after fifty years' effort and sacrifices that had to be borne,—we were compelled to fight two wars to protect China,—is now strong. During our period of weakness undoubtedly we made mistakes. Yet, if I may be permitted to say so,"—this with a slight inclination of the head, after the manner of the late Lord Dufferin,—"we were fortunate to have leaders who manifested much wisdom. Now that we are strong, considering our position in Asia and, if I may be permitted to say it, in the world, we must of course act in a gentlemanly spirit. I think that our government has a high sense of its responsibilities in that regard and will not fall short of its opportunities.

"Now, vis-à-vis China. Japan, of course, has special responsibilities and interests there. We are neighbors, and should be good friends. We are deeply interested in the restoration and continuance of order in China, in the development of the great resources of China, and in the maintenance of equal opportunity and the open door."

"And the protection of China's sovereignty?"

"Yes, we desire to protect China," said the Baron, without hesitation. He reminded me that a new spirit of justice and

liberality is aiding mankind. "Japan is moving in harmony with this spirit," he declared, and he pointed to the administration of Mr. Hara, the first commoner premier of Japan, as a significant sign of the times.

Still, the fact remained that the Chinese, almost within that hour, had begun their pleading for direct restitution of Kiao-chau, and upon Baron Makino, as the chief representative of Japan in Paris, had devolved the task of opposing the Chinese plea.

I thought it unfortunate that the Asiatic leader at the conference should be aligned against a struggling Asiatic state—a state that has set its own mark throughout the length and breadth of Asia. I had in mind the part that Japan was certain to play as the proponent of equal treatment among nations, irrespective of East or West, and I knew that Japan's position on the Shantung question would be certain to weaken her championship of racial and national equality. It was distressing, to say the least. So the baron's conciliatory words seemed to me inadequate and beside the real point. Thinking along those lines made me angry, as it would any one who knows the true genius of the Japanese people and their unsurpassed capacity for doing great and noble things.

On my way home to Lutetia, I passed one of those shops in the Students' Quarter where very strange meats are exposed for sale. The butcher was busy skinning a cat that had just entered into her tenth and ultimate life. He was admiring the skin, and doubtless appraising the selling value of this side-line as he pulled out the pink paws of poor pussy. I sniffed, walked hurriedly onward, and forgot the incident until several months later. Yet it symbolized the situation that day in the Conference of Paris.

All the Allies were after "skin." Japan rightly or wrongly, had made up her mind that the Far Eastern "skin" of Germany belonged to her share and must come to her hands direct. Later, perhaps, she might dispose of part, or all of it, as a by-product of her businesslike diplomacy. We

shall see whether Japan acted wisely and justly, or foolishly and wrongfully, in following that course. The pleadings for China and for Japan will help us to appreciate the subsequent moves in the play that brought about the Shantung decision.

CHAPTER XXVIII

CHINA TALKS TO THE TEN

THE brief presented in February by the Chinese to the Council of Ten was entitled, "The claim of China for direct restitution to herself of the leased territory of Kiaochau, the Tsingtau-Tsinan Railway, and other German rights in respect to Shantung Province." The opening pages were devoted to the history of the Shantung problem since its origin in the German aggression of 1897. While admitting the Chinese-Japanese Agreement of September 24, 1918, the Chinese pleaded in extenuation the Chinese resentment against the Japanese because of the twenty-one demands of 1915 and the continued presence in Shantung of Japanese troops and "The establishment of . . . Japanese Bureaux of Civil Administration aiming, in the view of the Chinese people, at the permanent occupation of that province."

The Chinese asserted that

The leased territory of Kiaochau, including the bay and islands therein is and has always been an integral part of Chinese territory. The nationality has never been in question. On the contrary, the sovereignty of China over the territory is reserved in the Lease Convention. Besides, the lease to Germany in 1898 originated in an act of aggression on her part, and was granted by China only under coercion. . . . The railway and mining rights which Germany possessed in Shantung Province before the war were part of the same grant. Restitution to China of these rights and the leased territory would, therefore, be a mere act of justice to her in consonance with the accepted principle of territorial integrity and of nationality, while return of the same to Germany, or their transfer to any third power, would be to deny justice to China.

The Province of Shantung, of which the leased territory of

Kiaochau is a part, and in which the German-built railway, now in Japanese occupation, stretches from Tsingtao to the interior over a distance of 254 miles, contains 38 million inhabitants, who are proud and intensely patriotic. They are part and parcel of the homogeneous Chinese race. They speak and write the same Chinese language, and believe in the same Confucian religion as the Chinese people in the other provinces of China. They meet every requirement of the principle of nationality: they are indeed the very embodiment of the principle itself. Nor is there any doubt of their earnest desire to free their own province from the menace of Germany, or of any other Power.

Historically, Shantung is the birthplace of China's two greatest sages, Confucius and Mencius, and the cradle of Chinese civilization. It is, in fact, the Holy Land of the Chinese people. Every year, thousands of Chinese scholars, pilgrims of Confucianism, travel to Choufu, in the heart of the province, to do homage to the revered memory of the illustrious sages. The eyes of the entire Chinese people are focused on this province, which has always played and still plays a very important part in the development of China.

The dense population in Shantung province creates a keen economic competition. To earn a livelihood is a difficult thing for 38,347,000 inhabitants limited to the resources of agriculture in a province of 35,976 square miles. The population is almost equal to that of France, with a territory, however, only one quarter as large. It is evident, therefore, that there is no room for the inflow of the surplus population of any foreign Power. The creation of a special sphere of influence or special interests therein could lead only to the unjustified exploitation of the Chinese inhabitants.

Besides, Shantung province possesses all the elements for the economic domination of North China. Its large population provides a growing market for foreign merchandise, while its rich mineral resources and abundance of raw materials are conducive to the development of industries. More important than these, however, is the fact that the Bay of Kiaochau is destined to be at once the chief outlet for the products of North China and the principal port entrance for foreign goods destined for the same regions. Kiaochau has indeed been the principal port of Shantung for many centuries. Thither the products of the province were brought down in a canal built in the year 1200 and connected with Weih sien, the most important market of the interior. Though Kiaochau itself has ceased to be a maritime town after the torrents which emptied into the

bay had gradually filled the northern part, yet Shantung now possesses the port of Tsingtau which occupies a point on the coast corresponding to the port of Kiaochau. Reinforced by new arteries of trade, including the Tsingtau-Kiaochau-Weihsien-Tsinan railway, which is connected at the last-mentioned city with the Peking-Tientsin-Nanking-Shanghai system of railways, and being situated on the brink of the Kiaochau Bay which, unlike the Peiho of Tiensin, never freezes, but is well sheltered from the winter winds, the new emporium is in a position to tap the trade of the whole of North China. Nowhere, therefore, is the building up of a foreign sphere of influence more dangerous to international trade and industries; nowhere can the open door policy be upheld with greater advantage to the common interests of all foreign Powers, than in the province of Shantung; and no country is in a better position to uphold it than China herself.

Strategically, the Bay of Kiaochau commands one of the gateways of North China. By the existence of the Tsingtau-Tsinan railway, which is connected at the latter mentioned terminal with the railway of Tientsin and Peking, it controls, too, one of the quickest approaches from the sea to the capital of the Chinese Republic, one other being the line of railway commencing from Port Arthur and Dalny to Moukden and thence to Peking. In the interest of her national defence and security, no less than on other grounds, the Chinese Government have wished to terminate the German occupation of Tsingtau and Kiaochau Bay, and now that, thanks to the Anglo-Japanese Allied force, Germany has been expelled therefrom, China earnestly desires to retain these strategically vital points in her own hands.

Examined from various points of view, the question of the leased territory of Kiaochau with its appurtenant rights is susceptible of only one satisfactory solution. By restoring it to China, together with the railway and other rights, the Peace Conference would be not only redressing a wrong which has been wantonly committed by Germany, but also serving the common interests of all nations in the Far East. The people of Shantung province are a sensitive people, they resent any foreign penetration looking to political or economic domination of their province, and they do not always hesitate to manifest their resentment. They resented bitterly the German occupation of the Kiaochau Bay and the German penetration into the province of Shantung. They resent even the present temporary occupation of the leased territory and the railway by a friendly associate and partner in the War, as evidenced in the protests of the Provincial Legislature, of the gentry and of the Chamber of Com-

merce. And their feeling is shared by the people in the other provinces of China. The difficulty with which the Chinese government have restrained them from manifesting their opposition in a more energetic way than making protests is indicative of their profound feelings on the question. It is felt that non-restitution might give cause to friction not only between China and any foreign power which was to hold the leased territory, the railway and other rights of Germany, but more particularly between the people of Shantung and the nationals of such a power. It would be difficult to reconcile it with the declared purpose of the attack on Tsingtau, which was "to secure a firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia"; nor would it be consonant with the objects of the alliance between Japan and Great Britain, one of which was stated to be "the preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire, and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China."

The Chinese then proceeded to their argument "Why restitution should be direct." This argument, also, deserves to be quoted in full:

In dwelling upon the ground justifying complete restitution to China of the leased territory of Kiaochau, the Tsingtau-Tsinan railway and other appurtenant rights, the Chinese government is far from suggesting, still less from apprehending that Japan, in claiming from Germany the unconditional surrender of the leasehold and the railway rights, would not return the same to China after she had obtained them. On the contrary, China has every confidence in Japan's assurances to her. If emphasis has been laid on the point of complete restoration to China, it has been done only for the purpose of focusing attention on the fundamental justice of such a step.

But of this restoration there are two possible modes, direct restitution to China, and indirect restitution through Japan; and of the two, the Chinese government prefers the first course, because, among other reasons, it is a simpler procedure and less likely to give rise to complications. It is preferable to take one step than two, if it leads to the same point of destination. Moreover, the fact that China, participating in the glorious victory of the Allies and Associates, received direct from Germany the restitution of Tsingtau and other rights of Shantung, will comport to her national dignity and serve to illustrate further the principle of right and

justice for which the Allies and Associates have fought the common enemy.

In asking for direct restitution, the Chinese government is not unaware of the sacrifices which Japan has made in dislodging Germany from Tsingtau, nor of the losses she has sustained in life and treasure. For this act of neighborly service so nobly performed by her brave army and navy, the government and people of China feel sincerely grateful. They feel indebted also to Great Britain for having coöperated in this task at a time of great peril to herself in Europe. Nor are they forgetful of their indebtedness to the troops of the other Allied and Associated powers who held in check an enemy who might otherwise have easily sent reinforcements to the East, thereby prolonging hostilities there. China appreciates those services all the more keenly because her own people in Shantung have suffered and been obliged to undergo sacrifices in connection with the military operations of the Allied forces for the capture of Tsingtau. But grateful as China is, she does not feel justified in admitting that her territorial rights could be affected *ipso facto* by a war between other powers, she not having then entered the War. Furthermore, the sacrifices of Japan could receive no greater or more substantial compensation than in the full attainment of her declared object in the War, namely, the elimination of the German menace to the peace of the Far East.

Nor are the Chinese government oblivious of the fact that Japan has been for four years a military occupant of the leased territory, the railway and other rights. But military occupation pending the termination of a war, it is submitted, does not of itself give title to the territory or property occupied. It is in any case only temporary, and subject to confirmation or termination at the Peace Conference, where the general interests of all the Allied and Associated powers in the war are to be considered. In the present case, Japan's military occupation of the leased territory and the railway has, from the day of China's declaration of war on Germany and Austria-Hungary, been against the rights of China, as Associate and partner in the War, and, in the case of the railway, has been against her protest from the very beginning.

It is true that on May 25, 1915, China concluded with Japan a treaty in relation to Shantung province, the first article of which reads:

The Chinese government agrees to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese government may hereafter agree with the German government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests, and concessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the province of Shantung.

It is to be recalled, however, that this treaty, together with another in relation to Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia and a number of exchanges of notes, was the outcome of the 21 demands imposed on China by Japan on January 18, 1915, without the least provocation. China reluctantly agreed to it only after having received an ultimatum from Japan, calling for a satisfactory reply within forty-eight hours.

Apart from the circumstances under which the treaty was made—circumstances which were most painful to China—it was in the view of the Chinese government at best merely a temporary arrangement subject to final revision by the Peace Conference, because it dealt primarily with a question which had arisen from the War, and which, therefore, could not be satisfactorily settled, except at the final Peace Conference. The same view applies to the agreement made more recently in respect of the Kiaochau-Tsinan railway and other railway concessions formerly granted to Germany.

Moreover, careful examination of the article above-mentioned will reveal the fact that it does not confer on Japan any claim to the leased territory, the railway or the other German rights in Shantung; it merely gives her an assurance of China's assent to all matters relating to the disposition of Germany's rights, interests and concessions which may eventually be agreed on between Japan and Germany. This assurance was clearly subject, however, to the implied condition that China remained neutral throughout the war, and therefore, would be unable to participate in the final Peace Conference. Any other interpretation of this article would have to attribute to Japan an intention which she could not have entertained consistently with her express declaration, as for instance, in her treaty of alliance with Great Britain, of her desire to insure, among other things, the independence of China. For to have denied China the right to declare war, to sit in the Peace Conference and defend her own rights and interests, would have meant the denial to her of an essential right accruing from her political independence. China's entry into the war so vitally changed the situation contemplated in the treaty that on the principle of *rebus sic stantibus*, it ceased to be applicable.

Furthermore, since China had expressly stated in her declaration of war that all treaties, agreements and conventions, heretofore concluded between China and Germany were abrogated by the existence of the state of war between them, the Lease Convention of March 6, 1898, under which Germany had held the leased territory, the railway and other rights, was necessarily included in the act of abrogation; and all the leasehold rights of Germany might be therefore con-

sidered to have reverted in law to the territorial sovereign and original lessor state. In other words, Germany has lost her leasehold rights and now possesses no rights in relation to Shantung which she can surrender to another power. If it be contended that the war had not conclusively abrogated the Lease Convention, then Germany, because of an express prohibition in the Convention, would be no more competent to transfer the leased territory to a third power. As regards the railway, the right is expressly reserved to China in the Railway Agreement of March 21, 1900, to buy the line back, implying a prohibition against transfer to a third power.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Chinese government earnestly trust that the Peace Conference will find their claim for direct restitution to China of the leased territory of Kiaochau, the Tsingtau-Tsinan railway and other German rights in relation to Shantung province, as one well-founded in law and justice. Full recognition of this claim, they believe, will cause the government and people of China to feel deeply indebted to the Powers, especially to Japan, for their sense of justice and their spirit of altruism. It will serve at once to strengthen the political independence and territorial integrity of China which, the Chinese government believe Japan and other friendly Powers are sincerely desirous of upholding, and to secure, by a new guarantee, the permanent peace of the Far East.

Summarized, China's plea for restitution rested upon these claims:

1. The leased territory is an integral part of Chinese territory;
2. China never relinquished Chinese sovereignty over the territory;
3. The native inhabitants are entirely Chinese in race, in language, and in religion;
4. Shantung is the cradle of Chinese civilization and the Holy Land of the Chinese people;
5. Foreign penetration will mean injurious exploitation of the Chinese inhabitants;
6. A foreign sphere of influence in Shantung will lead to the economic domination of North China and threaten "the open door";

7. The leased territory and the railways are of strategic importance to China; and

8. Restitution is essential to durable peace in the Far East. *Direct* restitution was claimed by the Chinese because

1. "The procedure is simpler and less likely to cause complications."

2. China appreciates the Allied sacrifices, but cannot abandon territorial rights;

3. Military occupation, being temporary, gives no title as against the rights of China, an associate in the war.

4. The Shantung agreement of September 24, 1918, a corollary to the twenty-one demands, is subject to revision by the peace conference; and

5. China's declaration of war expressly abrogates the lease convention, with consequent reversion of the leasehold rights. "Anyhow, the convention expressly denies to Germany the right of transfer to a third power."

The Chinese international lawyers made a very good argument out of hopelessly bad material. Japan, to be sure, had invited Germany to evacuate Kiaochau in 1914; but the Japanese had not considered German wishes or the legality of Germany's title, when they occupied Kiaochau. They took it from Germany, as they had taken Port Arthur and Dalny from Russia.

The brief was careful to pay a pretty compliment to the British, but was equally careful not to include among the printed exhibits the letter of British chargé Beilby Alston,¹ acknowledging China's declaration of war and abrogation of the German and Austrian treaties. In the White Book issued by the Chinese ministry for foreign affairs, printed in Peking and utilized by the Chinese peace delegation in Paris, entitled "Official Documents Relating to the War (for the Year 1917)," Mr. Alston's letter is printed on page 19 as Document No. 17, as follows:

¹ In 1920, successor to Sir John Jordan as British minister at Peking.

The British Chargé d'Affaires at Peking to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

PEKING, Aug. 14, 1917.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of to-day in which you were good enough to inform me that as there is no hope of the Central European Powers modifying their submarine warfare—a policy so contrary to international law and the principles of humanity—the Chinese Government have therefore declared a state of war to exist between China and Germany and between China and Austria-Hungary simultaneously as from 10 A. M. to-day.

Your Excellency further records that all treaties of whatever nature between China and Germany, and between China and Austria-Hungary, are abrogated, as also all such provisions of the Protocol of September 7, 1901, and other similar international agreements as only concern China and Germany, and China and Austria-Hungary. The Chinese Government declare, however, that they will conform to the provisions of The Hague Conventions and other international agreements respecting the humane conduct of war.

In accordance with Your Excellency's request, I have not failed immediately to inform my Government of the momentous decision come to by the Chinese Government and I do not doubt that they will learn with the liveliest satisfaction of the action taken and of the high motives that have inspired Your Excellency's Government. This step will, I trust, mark the inception of an era of even closer friendship between our two countries.

I have the honor to state, for the information of the Chinese Government, that *His Britannic Majesty's government have pleasure in assuring them of their solidarity, of their friendship, and of their support. His Majesty's Government will do all that rests with them to ensure that China shall enjoy in her international relations the position and the regard due to a great country.*

I avail, etc.

(sd) B. ALSTON.

Of course, Mr. Alston knew nothing about Mr. Balfour's secret agreement with Viscount Motono on February 16, 1917. Mr. Alston, named to succeed Sir John Jordan as minister to China in the latter part of 1919, is a man of unblemished honor and a warm friend of China. As British chargé he com-

mitted the British government to support China, just six months after his chief, Foreign Minister Balfour, had committed the British Government to support Japan. The Chinese were in no position to agitate this actual, but, I am bound to say, unintended, British deception. As it turned out, they were in no position to agitate anything. Their case depended for victory upon the preponderance of lofty idealism and the will to ignore hard facts. The facts did not improve upon examination. The appeal to the public law made matters worse. Thus, China sprang from the pinnacle of a principle to the thorn of a technicality, with consequences that might have been foreseen.

CHAPTER XXIX

JAPAN'S ANSWER TO CHINA

THE Council of Ten had become the Council of Four when, on April 22, the conclusive series of Kiaochau hearings began. Within twenty-four hours, Mr. Orlando withdrew, leaving the "Big Three" to formulate and write the decision. Japan's answer to the Chinese brief was made to the "Big Three." It has never been printed.

The Japanese declared that the Chinese version of the origin and extent of Japan's military occupation in Shantung "seems to be intended to bring an accusation against Japan." "Statements of facts," said the Japanese, "are in some cases incorrect, while important points are often purposely omitted in such manner as to lead to a mistaken judgment of the case."

The Chinese in their brief had asserted that

The Chinese Government intimated their desire to join in the contemplated course of action in regard to the leased territory of Kiaochau, and ceased to urge it only when they found it was not favorably entertained.

The Japanese answered by remarking that it was not quite clear

to what specific demarches such allusion is made.

It is doubtful whether China really intended, during the initial stage of the war, to enter the list of Powers arrayed against Germany, whose feelings she neither intended nor dared to wound in any manner whatever.

There was a rumor in certain circles that President Yuan Shih-kai proposed to certain Allied Powers to declare war against Germany on the condition that he be recognized as the Chinese Emperor.

Be that as it may, when in 1917, Japan and the Allied European Powers suggested to China to align herself on their side, the Chinese Parliament strongly opposed that course, acting in the main under the influence of Southern politicians, and, in order to enable themselves to declare war, the Peking government were compelled first to dissolve the chamber.

Thenceforward, the antagonism between the North (Government) and the South (Parliamentary Majority) has become more marked, the Southern party remaining in reality persistent in its opposition to China's active participation in the war.

After the declaration of war which was forthcoming only upon a definite assurance on several conditions in her favor, China found herself just as incapable as before of taking effective action, military or otherwise. She has not been able to fulfil entirely even her negative engagements, and from the moment she declared war until the conclusion of the armistice in November last, the Allied Powers have been compelled, on several occasions, to remonstrate strongly with China. This can easily be understood when one notes that China has always remained a hotbed of German propaganda.

Such being the real situation, one can but question the value of the observation contained in the Chinese Memorandum and cited above.

The Chinese had laid emphasis upon their claim that the Japanese had deliberately utilized the war as an excuse and opportunity for aggression upon China. The Chinese brief contained this assertion:

The first contingent of Japanese troops, 20,000 strong, despatched to attack Tsingtau, unexpectedly selected for the purpose of disembarkation, the port of Lungkow which is situated on the northern coast of Shantung Province, 150 miles north of Tsingtau. They landed on September 3 (2) . . . The British force which coöperated with the Japanese troops in the attack, was landed on the other hand at Laoshan Bay, inside the German leased territory, on September 23; and owing to the fact that the distance which separated Laoshan Bay from Tsingtau was much shorter and the natural obstacles fewer than what the Japanese troops had to encounter in their preliminary advances, it arrived on the scene in time to participate in the first engagement with the Germans.

The Chinese had attributed their establishment of the war zone (September 3, 1914) to the presence of Japanese troops

at Lungkow. The Japanese accepted these statements as an insinuation that Japan had intentionally selected a point too far removed from Tsingtau and that Japan had deliberately violated Chinese neutrality. Their official answer traversed the Chinese statement of facts as being "partial and incomplete." The Japanese declared:

First of all, the landing at Lungkow is justified by geographical and military considerations.

Previous to the landing of the Japanese troops, negotiations had been started at Peking, as early as August 20, with a view to establishing a war zone east of the Hoang-Ho River. China had asked that the war zone should be limited in the west at Wehsien. While China's declaration as to the war zone was made on September 3, the day after the initial landing of the Japanese troops, an understanding as to the principle of establishing that zone (outside the 50 kilometer radius around Tsingtau) together with a more or less definite idea as to its extent, had existed before the landing. Previously to the landing, the Chinese government had even intimated to the Japanese legation at Peking that they might formally protest in writing against the violation of the neutrality of China resulting from that landing, but that, if they did so, it would only be for the purpose of relieving them from all responsibility towards Germany. They also gave notice that, in order to facilitate the operations of the Japanese troops, and to avoid all chances of collision between the Japanese and Chinese troops, they had already ordered the latter to withdraw from the garrison stations near the landing point.

If the facts are appreciated in their right bearing, and as a whole, it would be impossible to infer that Japan had any intention to commit an act of hostility against China or to impair in any manner whatever the interests of that country or its subjects.

As to the imputation brought against the Japanese troops in paragraph 2, it will suffice to state that, true to its traditions and ever eager to live up to its reputation, the Imperial Army has never failed scrupulously to observe the rules of International Law in time of war.

The Chinese brief asserted as a grievance that the Japanese troops took possession of the whole railway line from Tsingtau to Tsinanfu despite Chinese protests, compelled the withdrawal of Chinese forces stationed on the line; and replaced

the Chinese employees by Japanese subjects. The Japanese answer to these complaints was specific. It visualized the Shantung railway as an important and dangerous German instrument of war. The Japanese rejoinder said:

Built in Chinese territory, the Shantung railway was, at the outset of the hostilities, under the absolute control of Germany in law and in fact and entirely outside that of China. Connecting Tsingtau, the military base of Germany, with the inland supplying her with all materials needed, the railway necessarily constituted in time of war a military asset of the greatest importance to Germany. Hence the absolute impossibility of recognizing its neutral character.

Germany did not fail to use it for military purposes. By this means, the crew of the Austrian warship *Kaiserin-Elisabeth* was brought from Tientsin to Tsingtau to man the forts; war materials reached the defenders of the fortress by the same route. Not only China did nothing to stop these practices, but even rendered assistance, in spite of Japan's protests. Under these conditions, it is not very clear on what ground the Chinese government are complaining against Japan's seizure of the railway.

Let it be added that, until the occupation of the line, all the employees were under the direction and influence of German authorities, and that, therefore, they offered no security whatever to the Japanese authorities. Such was the reason for which they were replaced.

The Chinese troops stationed along the railway were, by force of circumstances, under the indirect authority of Germany, on behalf of which Power they guarded the line. Hence, the demand for their withdrawal.

The Chinese had complained that after the surrender of Tsingtau by the Germans the Japanese Government had failed to recall Japanese troops from the interior of Shantung to Tsingtau, that they did not remove the light railway from Lungkow to Chantien, and the special wires set up on the Chinese telegraph poles within the Shantung theater of war. It was also claimed by the Chinese that the Japanese troops, and their Government, had manifested extreme dissatisfaction with the revocation by China of her declaration as to the war zone.

The Japanese contended, and reasonably, that the military

occupation by Japan of the Shantung railway, in view of the character of the railway and of the causes of its seizure, could not be abandoned immediately upon the fall of Tsingtau. "On the contrary," said the Japanese, "it should continue until peace is signed by Germany."

The Japanese made the point, as indicating consideration for China, that the light railway from Lungkow to Kaomi, and the military telegraph wires between the same points, had been removed immediately when they ceased to be necessary. In the matter of the suppression of the war zone, the Japanese reminded the Council of Three that the zone had formed the subject of pourparlers between the two governments. They asserted, and I think that history is with them, that there were negotiations going on between Japan and China when the latter suddenly informed the Japanese Government that the war zone was suppressed on China's own authority. The Japanese delegation said:

Japan under these conditions, had no alternative but to show her disapproval of the attitude of China and to state that she could not consider herself bound by that simple declaration at least for the time being.

The Chinese brief complained that the Japanese had seized possession of the Tsingtau customs stations, established by China in accordance with the German-Chinese agreement of April 17, 1899. The Japanese answer to that was as follows:

On the strength of the agreement to which the memorandum alludes, the Tsingtau Customs were in fact in the hands of the Germans. The posts of Chief Commissioner and other foreign officials were to be filled by German subjects. The military occupation necessarily entailed the dismissal of those officials and the exercise of surveillance under which they were placed. In these circumstances, Japan had perforce momentarily to take over that administration, which later was handed back to the Chinese government in accordance with an agreement between Japan and China.

The Chinese complaint that Japan had established civil ad-

ministration bureaux in Shantung was answered by the Japanese by the contention that this was a part of the military occupation. The Japanese asserted that

The fact that the authority in the occupied zone was entrusted to a civilian or military agency does not alter in the least the legitimacy of the occupation which, it may be added, is being exercised according to the rules and principles generally admitted.

The Chinese in their guarded reference to their "Achilles heel" (the Shantung agreement of September 24, 1918) had admitted that "an advance of twenty million yen was made," but naïvely added that "the final agreement has not to date been signed." This, of course, was too much for the Japanese. One could have readily imagined the amusement with which the statesmen of the Hôtel Bristol sat down to elucidate for the "Big Three" the tortuous proceedings of 1918. To their credit be it said, the Japanese did not utilize the deadly ammunition at the moment in their possession. It must be remembered that they were in a position to challenge the bona fides of the Chinese delegation, because the Chinese were in the unfortunate position of trying to make a case for themselves by attacking the legality of acts perpetrated by the very government by whom they were commissioned. They could not proceed against Japan without contesting the settlement of September 24, 1918, and they could not contest that settlement without impugning their own government and their leader in Paris, Mr. Lou.

It was not the business of the Japanese to wash in the conference-room of "The House of the Flirt" the soiled linen of the so-called government of China. Neither the Japanese nor the Chinese told the story of the real origin of the 1918 secret compacts. As we have seen, the sources were sordid and mean, and not to the credit of anybody concerned in the transactions. The Japanese had their eyes and their minds concentrated upon the practical realities, and they seized upon the loophole presented to them by the Chinese, and through

this loophole they shot into the record Paragraph 9 of their own brief, which, as was intended, subsequently served to establish the validity of the 1915 treaties and notes as well as the 1918 subsidiary Shantung settlement, and to estop the Chinese from any future appeal. The paragraph is as follows:

The [Chinese] Memorandum alleges that public opinion in China and especially in Shantung became alarmed at the continual presence of the Japanese troops along the railway and at the establishment of Japanese civil administration. It is further observed that to put an end to such agitation and for no other reason, the Chinese government had decided to enter into an agreement dated September 24, 1918, concerning:

1. A loan with Japanese capitalists for the construction of the railway junction lines connecting the Tsingtau-Tsinan railway with the Tientsin-Pukow and Peking-Hankow lines (in other words, for the construction of lines from Tsinan to Shunteh, and from Kaomi to Hsuchow).
2. The withdrawal to Tsingtau of the Japanese troops stationed along the Tsingtao-Tsinan railway, except a contingent stationed at Tsinan.
3. The abolition of the existing Japanese civil administration bureau in Shantung.
4. The advance of 20,000,000 yen.

To complete the above statement, it is necessary to point out some provisions which are ignored by the [Chinese] Memorandum, but which are contained in Paragraph 6 of the Note dated September 24, 1918. They refer to a phase of Sino-Japanese coöperation as regards the Tsingtau-Tsinan railway. On the other hand, the [Chinese] Memorandum seems to insinuate that the arrangements made on September 24, 1918, are only of a provisional character and of a temporary validity, pending the decision of the Peace Conference.

The agreement of 1918 evidently presupposes in the minds of the signatories the existence of the Treaty of May 25, 1915. If it is hard to understand how China can plead the nullity of the latter, it is no less unaccountable how she can dispute the validity of the agreement of 1918 which was entered into one year after her declaration of war on Germany. It will be further observed that the provisions of the agreement of 1918 had in themselves little of a provisional character, the advance of twenty million yen, that the

Chinese Government asked for and actually received, being a most salient proof of it.

The Chinese had followed up their demand for direct restoration of Kiaochau with a demand for "abrogation by the peace conference of the treaties and notes made in exchange by and between China and Japan on May 25, 1915, as a transaction arising out of and connected with the war between the Allied and Associated States and the Central Powers." The quoted words are taken from the title of the brief submitted under this head, immediately before the Japanese made their rejoinder. This brief went fully into the celebrated twenty-one demands and quoted liberally from the equally celebrated Russian revelations, the documents very fortunately revealed by the Bolshevik ragamuffins for the disillusionment and enlightenment of a much too innocent world. The Chinese cited precedents and conference rulings which they claimed justified the peacemakers of Paris in reviewing and nullifying the Chinese-Japanese treaties and notes of 1915. They said:

The Congress of Berlin is an instance of the Great Powers, acting as a whole and collectively, revising a treaty concluded between two states, i.e., Russia and Turkey, for a variety of reasons but mainly because the settlement dictated by Russia at San Stefano was deemed ultimately to endanger the peace of Europe.

It is urged that the settlement dictated by Japan at Peking in 1915 endangers directly the peace of Far Asia and, ultimately, the peace of the world.

There are two other arguments against the validity of the Treaties of 1915. One is based on a ruling of the Conference and the other on the lack of finality affecting the Treaties.

By article 1 of the "Treaty Respecting the Province of Shantung"—which embodies the first of the Twenty-one Demands—the Chinese government engage to recognize any agreement concluded between Japan and Germany respecting the disposition of the latter's "rights, interests, and concessions" in the province; and in the notes exchanged, regarding Kiaochau, Japan subjects the restoration of the leased territory to the condition *inter alia*, that "a concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan [is] to be established at a place designated by the Japanese Government."

As regards this article 1 of the Treaty, it is important to emphasize the point that Japan is debarred from negotiating separately with Germany in respect of the latter's system in Shantung owing to the decision of the Conference to deal with German "territories and cessions" without consulting Germany.

On this view, it is plain that Japan is not in a position to agree with Germany regarding the "free disposal" of Kiaochau and that the article in question should be deemed inoperative.

The same objection applies to the notes exchanged. And even if this were not so, the illusory character of the restoration of Kiaochau contemplated in them would be a proper matter for the consideration of the Peace Conference in deciding on Japan's claim for the unconditional cession of Kiaochau and the rest of the German system in Shantung.

The chief value of Kiaochau lies partly in the harbor of Tsingtau and partly in an area dominating the finest anchorage of that harbor which has been delimited by the Japanese government and is already reserved for exclusive Japanese occupation under Japanese jurisdiction, no other than Japanese being permitted to hold land within its boundaries.

This delimited area, presumably, is the "place to be designated by the Japanese Government" as "a concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan." The restoration of Kiaochau to China, with retention by Japan of the area dominating it, would be the restoration of the "shadow" of this "place in the sun" and the retention of its substance by Japan.

Since the date of the Treaties of 1915, even Japan has acted on the assumption that they are lacking in finality.

It is evident that the scheme worked out in the Twenty-one Demands and in the Treaties of 1915 demanded for its permanence the assent of the Great Powers with whom Japan was and is under agreement guaranteeing the independence and integrity of China.

As we have seen, Paragraph 9 of the Japanese rejoinder took the wind out of the sails of this ill-starred Chinese junk. Paragraph 9, very carefully written, put the best face possible upon the inherited weakness of the Japanese case; namely, the lamentable proceedings of 1915. The "Big Three" were told that

The Chinese memorandum alleges that the treaties and other agreements that were the outcome of the Sino-Japanese negotiations of 1915 were imposed by Japan upon China by recourse to an

ultimatum. It adds that the Chinese government signed the treaty of 1915, since they had the conviction that the final settlement of the question embodied in the Treaty could only be made at the Peace Conference. It is difficult to share such a view. It would not be useless to give here an idea of the contents of the note alluded to and the circumstances under which it was presented.

The negotiations, initiated on January 19, 1915, had already lasted over three months when, after the 24th interview, Japan, without for one moment losing sight of the importance of an amicable settlement, handed to China, on April 26, a totally revised project in which the arguments presented by China during the preceding conferences were to a very large extent taken into consideration. This conciliatory attitude of Japan was apparently mistaken by China for a sign of weakness and her answer was of a quite unexpected nature. The Chinese Government went even so far as to retrace their steps and go back on a number of questions already settled. In utter disregard of the spirit in which Japan proposed to restore to China the leased territory of Kiaochau, the capture of which entailed on Japan sacrifices in blood not to say in treasure, China demanded this restitution to be made unconditionally and that Japan add to this restitution a payment of indemnities for the losses and damages caused by the military operations in Kiaochau. She demanded at the same time the right to participate in the peace negotiations eventually to be held between Japan and Germany and declared that her answer was definite and decisive. These were the circumstances in which the so-called ultimatum was presented to China.

As regards the principle itself of the restitution of Kiaochau, the Japanese memorandum advised the "Big Three" that there was no disagreement between the Government of Japan and the government of China, "since Japan is herself disposed to effect this restitution." Coming, however, to the Chinese argument for "direct restitution to China," instead of indirect restitution through the intermediary of Japan, the Japanese said very truly that here "we meet with the main and real issue of the question, as what precedes is after all but a long introduction."

The Chinese argument that the procedure of direct restitution "is simpler and less likely to raise complication," the Japanese contended could hardly be taken seriously. Against

this argument stood the hurdle fashioned by the series of Chinese-Japanese agreements (1915-18) covering (1) the question of the lease, (2) the railway questions, and (3) the other rights that belonged to Germany in Shantung province. The Japanese declared:

The procedure which is simplest and least likely to raise complications is assuredly that which takes these arrangements into account. The [Chinese] Memorandum states that it is preferable to take one step than two if it leads to the same point of destination. But to call in question the agreements already concluded would be to take many steps backwards and moving away from the point of destination with a prospect of never reaching it.

The second reason adduced by the Chinese was the real reason. The Chinese wanted direct restitution because, to their minds, such procedure "*comports with China's national dignity and serves to illustrate further the principle of right and justice in the interest of which the Allies have waged war.*" Here we got down to brass tacks. The Chinese peace delegation illustrated, as "The New York Herald" said editorially at the time, "the pathetic plight of a proud, but pacifistic, nation." China, as always, was standing upon her dignity, despite the fact that the Western powers had left her with no dignity upon which either to stand or sit. So the Japanese, regarding this reason as "more sentimental than legal," might be excused for failing to see "on what ground China's national dignity could be impaired," or

Why the principle of right and justice could be obscured by the fact that Kiaochau, captured by the Japanese armies, is handed back by the Japanese government to China, who had not been able to recover it herself; who, instead of facilitating, rather hindered the military operations and who, even after the declaration of war against Germany, has not completely rid herself of her passive attitude.

The question of honor, of national dignity, of national sentiment, was the crucial problem. The Chinese, with the undisguised approval of their American advisers and friends, had

come into the conference challenging the honor and the dignity of the government and people of Japan. So, said the Japanese:

If the questions of national dignity and sentiment are to be brought forth, those of the Japanese people must also be considered. This leads to a subject to which Japan had preferred not to allude. The Chinese Memorandum compels us to do so.

At the end of the Sino-Japanese war, in 1895, China, after having ceded the Liaotung peninsula to Japan, asked Germany to intervene with the Tokio government in order to force them to renounce that territory. Thereupon, negotiations were inaugurated by Germany, jointly with Russia and France. As regards France, her own disinterestedness has never been questioned and that unfortunate incident has left no trace upon the subsequent relations between that country and Japan. The diplomatic history never had to record such a document as the German note, which has since remained an extremely bitter memory in the mind of the Japanese. They are led to believe, whatever may have been said to the contrary, that the lease of Kiaochau was the price of Germany's intervention and they regard it as an instance of the most flagrant acts of injustice committed unblushingly in international relations. The Japanese people saw in the capture of that territory from Germany, not an act of revenge but of just reparation for the great wrong done to their patriotism twenty-five years before. It is impossible for the Japanese Government in this connection to disregard the sentiments of the nation.

The national dignity of a sovereign and independent state is safeguarded by respecting the treaty engagements rather than by seeking in subtle and ill-founded arguments a means of evading the consequence of solemn promises.

Turning to the third reason urged by the Chinese, that the agreements between China and Japan must be considered as void, the Japanese directed their reply to the following four Chinese subsidiary arguments:

1st.—China does not feel justified in admitting that her territorial rights could be affected *ipso facto* by a war between other powers, she not having then entered the war.

2nd.—The Treaty of May 25, 1915, and the agreement of September 24, 1918, had but a provisional character and should be revised by the Peace Conference.

3rd.—The treaty stipulating the lease of Kiaochau is abrogated by China's Declaration of War.

4th.—The transfer of Germany's rights to a third Power is forbidden by the Lease Convention.

Each and every one of these arguments, declared the Japanese, are "prompted by the desire of China to evade her obligations toward Japan."

The Japanese rose to the issue with alacrity and with confidence. It must be borne in mind that upon no point vital to the interest of Japan could the trial court of the "Big Three" find adversely to Japan. Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau were both bound hand and foot, the former by the pledge of his foreign minister, Mr. Balfour, and the latter by the similar pledge of his predecessor, M. Briand. Mr. Wilson might think or feel as he liked, but he could do nothing unless he was prepared to break with his colleagues, Lloyd George and Clemenceau, and take the issue to the higher court of humanity. He might have done that. Be that as it may, the Japanese rejoinder accepted the issue as it was presented to them by the Chinese and the Americans. Thus, they said:

If it is proved that the agreements concluded between the governments of Tokio and Peking retain their validity, the whole argumentation of the Chinese Memorandum falls to ground.

The Chinese Memorandum alleges that the fact of a war between other Powers cannot affect her territorial sovereignty: nobody would contest this principle. But the Chinese government seem to forget that the matter under discussion is not the Chinese territorial sovereignty in Shantung, but the rights which belonged to Germany in that province.

Precisely because China had no part in the war between Japan and Germany, she had no other means of asserting her rights than by negotiating with Japan who held Kiaochau *de facto* after overcoming the German forces that defended the territory. In other words, the question of Kiaochau had to be solved between Japan and Germany, and China could not pretend to the restitution of a territory which she had done nothing to free from German domination, until after she had come to an agreement on the subject with the government of Tokyo.

"The sacrifices of Japan," says the Chinese Memorandum, "could receive no greater or more substantial compensation than in the full attainment of her declared object in the War, namely, the elimination of the German menace to the peace of the Far East."

Japan does not dispute that assertion. However, she believes that the sacrifices she has made in order to drive the Germans out of Shantung, justify the compensation to which China has agreed in exchange of the restitution of the territories wrested from Germany by Japanese force.

The Chinese Memorandum claims setting aside the Treaty of May 25, 1915, under the pretext that this treaty was signed under an implied condition that China would remain neutral until the end of the war and, consequently, that she would not sit at the Peace Conference. It adds that the whole situation was altered when China declared war on Germany and that in consequence of that step the Treaty of May 25, 1915, has lost all its value.

If in consequence of China's declaration of war on Germany, the Treaty of May 25, 1915, could have been nullified, the declaration could not, in any case, have the slightest effect upon the validity of the agreement of September 24, 1918, subsequent to that declaration. But that agreement itself would be inexplicable if one considered as null and void the Treaty of May 25, 1915, of which it is a sequel. By concluding the agreement of September 24, 1918, China bound herself not to contest the validity of the Treaty of May 25, 1915. Moreover, she has thereby impaired none of her rights, for had she not concluded the agreement of 1918, the validity of the Treaty of May 25, 1915, would be none the less indisputable.

Indeed, the declaration of war by China on Germany could neither alter the fact that the Germans had been driven out of Tsingtau by the Japanese forces previously to that step nor cancel the obligations that China assumed towards Japan in a situation entirely unaffected by the subsequent declaration of war.

The Chinese Memorandum invokes the clause *rebus sic stantibus*. Is it intended to imply that the changed situation has rendered conditions valueless because it has annulled them or because it has made their execution materially impossible?

Jurists justly observe that the clause *rebus sic stantibus* may only be invoked with an extreme caution, lest it should at once reduce treaties into mere scraps of paper. The conditions of life states are constantly changing, and to avail oneself of any modification in order to get rid of stipulations which no longer please one of the contracting parties would be to render all conventions vain. It would introduce a régime of perpetual instability into the inter-

pretation and application of treaties whose object it is precisely to establish fixed rules and points in the ever-changing realm of international relations. The clause *rebus sic stantibus* can only be invoked when all the essential elements which had prompted the agreement having changed, it becomes evident that the terms of that agreement and the obligations which proceed therefrom do not correspond in any way whatsoever to the intentions and anticipations of the signatories. This is evidently not the case of the agreements under discussion.

The sum and substance of these agreements is that Japan, which has conquered Kiaochau by force of arms, promises China to restitute that territory, in exchange for which China will concede Japan certain privileges.

China's declaration of war on Germany has not altered in any way the situation in connection with which the agreements between Japan and China were concluded. It has not altered the fact that Japan has wrested Kiaochau from Germany, and that Japan has precedence over any other power to exercise her rights of conquest. In these circumstances, how can China possibly excuse herself from fulfilling the obligations she has assumed? If the declaration of war had such results it would, while made on Germany, in fact only injure Japan.

Does the Chinese Memorandum imply that a change in the situation brought about by China's Declaration of War on Germany, while not cancelling the agreements entered into by China and Japan, makes it materially impossible to put them into execution? In that case, it would suffice to draw attention to the fact that the presence of China at the Peace Conference does not in any way hinder the pursuance of the procedure agreed upon with Japan. It would seem that China wishes to take advantage of the presence of her delegates in Paris to evade, without any plausible reason, the fulfilment of the agreements already concluded. The Chinese Memorandum claims that China having, in her declaration of war against Germany, denounced all treaties, agreements and conventions concluded between China and Germany, the Lease Convention of March 6, 1898, was necessarily included in that denunciation; that accordingly all the lease hold rights of Germany might be considered as having in law reverted to the territorial sovereign, namely to China.

It is, however, more than doubtful whether a declaration of war can put an end to a lease treaty. Such a treaty differs from a treaty of cession pure and simple only in that it confers for a certain period of time the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, whereas a

treaty of cession pure and simple transfers it without any limitation of time. And it is universally recognized that a declaration of war does not abrogate treaties fixing the frontiers and the territorial status of the belligerent powers. Moreover, in our particular case, there is no need to appeal to this juridical theory, for, if war abrogates certain treaties between belligerents, never does it abolish treaties between co-belligerents, that is to say, between allies.

"If it be contended," declared the Chinese Memorandum, "that the war had not conclusively abrogated the Lease Convention, then Germany, because of an express prohibition in the Convention, would be no more competent to transfer the leased territory to a third Power. As regards the railway, the right is expressly reserved to China in the Railway Agreement of March 21, 1900, to buy the line back, implying a prohibition against transfer to a third Power."

To this argument Japan replied:

"China, by undertaking to recognize all the agreements between Japan and Germany, as regards the rights granted to the latter in relation to Shantung, has thereby denied herself the right to invoke the prohibition against Japan or against the agreements to be made between Japan and Germany. China has always been free to raise the prohibition stipulated in her own interest; she had taken advantage of that freedom for the benefit of Japan in the Treaty of May 25, 1915. As regards the railway, it is to be remarked that the right of repurchase mentioned in the agreement concluded on March 21, 1900, between China and the German company, could not be enforced against the will of Germany, who was the original grantee.

If, however, China means to claim in earnest that her right of repurchasing the line entitles her to oppose the transfer to a third Power, it will be sufficient to refer her to the very text of the Sino-German Agreement relating to the Shantung railway. Properly speaking that agreement does not mention any repurchasing right in favor of China. Article 28, Paragraph 1, reads:

"It shall be the subject of further agreements when and under what conditions the imperial Chinese government may, in future, take over the railway."

It was, at most, but a vague promise and if the Chinese Government entertained on that account sanguine hopes, they must have been singularly ill-advised. By referring to the Concession Act of June 1, 1899, it will be found that according to Article 12, it is not to China, but to Germany, that the right of repurchase after a period of 60 years was reserved.

The impression derived from the examination of the Chinese Memorandum is that Japan must bear the burden of all sacrifices, whilst China reaps all the benefits.

That was Japan's case. That was Japan's answer to China. That was Japan's prudently polite challenge to the conference at Paris. As we shall see, the Shantung decision sustained the Japanese position all along the line.

CHAPTER XXX

THE CONFERENCE IN ERUPTION

ON the afternoon of April 25, there was a jostling of elbows and a babbling of tongues at the Hôtel Edouard VII. The Italians were leaving Paris. They were not "walking out"; they were roaring out of the conference. Saturnine Sidney Sonnino was listening to the damnation of Woodrow Wilson in several living and some dead languages. The Italian foreign minister who had made the issue, "~~Fiume or Fiasco~~," was at home to friends and sympathizers and to delegates and others who called simply because it was the polite and the agreeable thing to do.

Phya Bibadh Kosha, who, with the Prince Charoon, represented the Kingdom of Siam at the peace table, bowed to Sonnino and said:

"I'm very sorry you are going, Baron; very sorry, indeed!"

Baron Sonnino struck his most impressive attitude and expressed his appreciation.

"Yes," continued Dr. Kosha; "I'm truly sorry you are leaving, but I'd rather see you go than the Americans."

Sonnino stared. Several Italian military men glared. A group of French officials tittered. A dignified Briton lost temporary control over his monocle and almost murmured, "My word!"

Dr. Kosha was the only member of the crowded company at his ease. Absolutely unabashed, he turned to a mixed group of officials representing many nations, including France and England, and said quite boldly:

"Yes, and you would, too. You know you would, even if you don't care to say so. You would rather see anybody, or everybody, leave before the Americans."

Nobody contradicted the man from Siam, because he spoke the truth. From first to last, the great fear among all nations in Paris was that Mr. Wilson might pack up and go. At all times he was the master of the Conference of Paris, "The Biggest One."

Many of the delegations in Paris were living off the bounty of the American commonwealth. The American treasury warrant was awaited with more eager longing (and sometimes painful anxiety) than the official communiqué of the "Bureau." Mr. King, of Liberia, was not the only man in the city of highest cost who was constantly worried about his hotel bills. Diplomacy would have had to shut up shop if Uncle Sam had strolled forth, taking his almighty dollars along with him.

Five minutes before he issued his *Fiumi furioso* against Mr. Wilson, Premier Orlando signed a letter asking the American President for five or six more millions of real money. The humor of the situation was away over all their heads. They were as selfish and as unreasoning as little children sometimes are when candy and cakes get between them and their best behavior. Mr. Wilson did not crack the whip of credit. He was a gentle and generous "Biggest One."

Like the scum on the boiling broth, all the vexed issues came to the top at the moment when the judgment of Paris was rendered in the suit, China *versus* Japan, in the matter of Kiaochau. The case had been held in suspense, from the afternoon of January 28 until the morning of April 22. In the meantime, acts of the conference as well as remarkably able Japanese diplomacy had established for the Japanese an exceedingly strong position.

The Japanese entered the conference fortified by the secret Allied understanding of February-March, 1917, and the secret agreement with China of September 24, 1918. The conference had failed to quash secret agreements, and the secret character of the principal proceedings was a material factor in keeping these compacts alive. Then the Supreme Council defeated the

Japanese on the mandatory question. That was on January 29. Mr. Wilson and America, of course, shouldered the blame for this defeat. In February and in April the Japanese went down to defeat on the question of racial equality. In March and in April the Japanese were defeated on the questions of disarmament and the international regulation of labor. Responsibility for each and all of these defeats was attributed to the Americans. The American press, after being asleep at the switch while agitation would have helped, began to make an American issue of Kiaochau.

Foch was furious because the Americans stood out against French annexation of the left bank of the Rhine. Bourgeois was raging because his plan for an international general staff, with Foch as generalissimo, thus taking the marshal out of French presidential politics, was dismissed as impracticable. General Bliss was blamed for that. Bliss was quite right. From every sensible point of view, the Bourgeois plan was fatally foolish. Clemenceau was weary and disgusted. His wound was paining him. Sometimes, he spat blood. As he awakened each morning he addressed himself thus:

“Georges Clemenceau, you *do* believe in the League of Nations!”

Then, he would grin as he shaved for the daily fray, donned his black skullcap and gray suède gloves, and hopped out to “The House of the Flirt.”

One evening, after two long and bitter sessions, he returned to his flat to find several leaders of the Chamber awaiting him.

“The people want peace,” they told him; “France cannot understand this delay. Immediate peace is necessary, and the people desire you to be swift.”

“So,” said Clemenceau; “they think I do not get on with the peace! Ha! My people they do not understand. See with whom I have to deal, to humor, to coax around like that.” A quick flourish of the fingers. “What am I to do to get on,

when one man thinks he 's Napoleon and the other believes he 's Jesus Christ? Go tell them that!"

Clemenceau relieved his quick temper by saying sharp things. Believing in nothing except his beloved France, he was really afraid of nobody. To Mr. Wilson he pretended fear of Foch and the "Reds." To Foch and the "Reds," he simulated fear of the President's plans.

About the middle of April, after some conversation with British and French friends, I ascertained that the Chinese assault upon the 1915-18 treaties and notes, taken in conjunction with the Korean agitation (attributed to Chinese and American influences) was materially strengthening Japan's technical position. I sought out Mr. Hornbeck and Mr. Beer, and told them what I had learned. Mr. Beer was one of the few Americans at the Crillon who made it a point to be polite and friendly to the Japanese.¹ A diplomat to the manner born, a deep thinker and a great scholar, the author of "The English-Speaking People" had that invariable gentleness and kindness reserved by nature for her own favored ones. At no time a partizan, Mr. Beer was quick to see that only evil could come of the attempts that were being made to single out the Japanese for special treatment.

Throughout the period of opportunity while the covenant of the League of Nations was being framed, I had done my best to sustain the reasonable Japanese desires for fair treatment. While Mr. Beer had no official connection with the league commission, his position as colonial expert and the colonial character of the German Far Eastern possessions brought him into the Asiatic controversy. Thus we had many talks about racial and national equality and the special political troubles of the Japanese mission, and Mr. Beer was good enough to arrange a lunch party at the Crillon at which I had

¹ These references to Mr. Beer and his work were written for this volume several months before his unexpected death from pneumonia, March 15, 1920.—P. G.

the opportunity to demonstrate the reality and reasonableness of the Japanese claim. Walter Weyl, who died in the latter part of 1919, joined us toward the close of the discussion and capped one or two of my arguments from his own impressions of the Orient. He had just contracted the cold that was ultimately to prove fatal. We left the hotel together and walked along the rue Rivoli. I said to him:

"Beer is one of our very best men in Paris."

"Yes," said Weyl, "he is, but he might as well be in New York. It is very distressing."

It was.

The covenant of the league was hurried to completion after midnight on April 11. The manner in which the Japanese were cheated out of what was actually a sweeping Japanese victory on the race question immediately reacted against the Chinese Kiaochau case for the following reasons: (1) Their cause was just or the league, in any form, was folly; (2) It was sustained by an overwhelming majority of the league commission, including the combined Asiatic vote; (3) The French and Belgians were defeated, and by the same hands; (4) Colonel House, at the instigation of "Son-in-law" Auchincloss (we called him "The Crown Prince") had excluded Kiaochau from consideration as a German possession, subject to mandatory action, on the ground that "Japan has promised to return it to China." This, as we have seen,¹ is a matter of record.

These were the governing circumstances under which Mr. Edward T. Williams sought to save the day for the American delegation and China. A Chinese victory had become impossible. President Wilson was still adamant, but the technical position of the conference was against him. Storms were rising upon every hand.

On April 19, after Mr. Lansing in "The Little Five" sought unsuccessfully to put through a draft article, according to which Germany ceded all her overseas possessions, *including Kiaochau*, to the Allied and Associated powers, to be

¹ See page 208.

dealt with under the League of Nations, the Japanese delegation requested the conference leaders to set a time for the presentation of certain matters relating to Kiaochau. The Council of Four had just reached the first stage of the Adriatic crisis. Orlando, threatening to quit, took to his room and kept away from "The House of the Flirt." If my memory serves me, he was not present at the meeting on Monday, April 21, when the Japanese request was acted upon and next morning set aside for the Japanese delegates. Possibly, "The Big Three," thenceforward all that was left of the Conference of Paris, were glad enough to turn from the Scylla of Fiume to the Charybdis of Kiaochau. Be that as it may, peace was in deadly peril when Asia again took the center of the stage.

Italy was breaking away, Belgium was threatening to bolt, Foch was fuming, Bourgeois and Gauvain were getting as unmanageable as "L'Humanite" and the "Echo de Paris"; the Poles were seeking safety in dangerous alliances damned by the league covenant, the Greeks were ready to start a new Balkan war, the Russians were at their very worst; Hungary was hipped by the Bolshevik plague, and Mr. Hughes was running a little war of his own, within the ranks of the six British delegations. Hell was popping in Paris, and the cute, gay Parisians were playing it up for all they were worth, by direct advice of the Quai d'Orsay. It was quite evident that there was a concerted effort to stampede the President. The Japanese had nothing to do with these manipulations. They simply took legitimate advantage of an opportune situation.

On the morning of April 22 [a fine, bracing Tuesday morning], Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda joined "The Big Three" in the famous "Room of the Flirt." After the usual salutations, Baron Makino said very quietly that it might simplify matters if he mentioned, first, that the Japanese delegation had just received instructions not to sign the treaty unless the conference sustained their position as to Kiaochau. Taking everything into consideration, that was a jolt. Mr.

Wilson was very gracious, but equally firm. In the course of the discussion that followed, the issue narrowed down to the validification or nullification of the 1915 treaties and notes and the subsequent secret compacts (between Japan and the Allies and between Japan and the Chinese government from whom the Chinese delegates derived their commissions).¹ Both Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda urged the desire of their Government to smooth over the situation as agreeably as might be accomplished, but the treaties must not be touched. M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George sustained their point of view. The President made it quite clear that he was anxious to uphold the dignity of Japan, but he had to consider the pathetic plight of China. He balked at the 1915 treaties and notes, which, it should be remembered, had been formally protested at the time by his secretary of state, Mr. Lansing. The Japanese delegates accepted this in good part, but they remained firm. They pointed out that they had not raised the issue, neither could they run away from it. The honor of Japan was at stake.

I met Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda as they left the President's house. We walked across the little Place des Etats-Unis together and had a very pleasant talk, carefully avoiding the momentous morning session. I was still hopeful that the critical state of the Kiaochau controversy would induce the conference leaders to retrieve their blunder in the matter of racial and national equality. The Japanese delegates were very serious and very quiet. I left them with the realization that only a miracle could save the Chinese from defeat.

After lunch, the Chinese were summoned. Mr. Lou and Dr. Koo responded. It was at this meeting that Mr. Lloyd George asked for enlightenment about the "twenty-one demands," and Mr. Wilson explained their part in Asia's war history. Mr. Lloyd George also asked about the Chinese-Japanese Shantung agreement of September 24, 1918.² Dr. Koo

¹ See Appendices "D" and "E."

² See Appendix "D."

endeavored to explain that celebrated "Peking Puzzle." The British premier could not repress a friendly grimace. He told the Chinese that, as the representative of the British government, he could not be a party to the scrapping of a British treaty, however unfortunate that might be. He felt bound by the Allied understanding of February-March, 1917. England had promised Japan that she should succeed to Germany's rights in China. That promise was binding and must be fulfilled. Beyond it, he would do anything within his power for China. M. Clemenceau spoke in similar terms. France was bound by M. Briand's pledge. That swept the ground from under the feet of the Chinese—unless Mr. Wilson could build a bridge to carry them safely over the chasm. He seemed more eager than ever to do that. His cheerfulness encouraged them. A question put by Mr. Lloyd George dismayed them.

The British Premier asked the Chinese whether they would prefer to be bound by the terms of the German convention and subsidiary agreements or by the treaties and notes with Japan.

Dr. Koo pointed out that this was a hard choice to offer China. He did not see how they could answer that.

"No," agreed Mr. Lloyd George; "I don't suppose you could be expected to do that. Still, *we* may have to find the answer in that way."

The Chinese left the President's house shortly before four o'clock. About an hour later, Mr. Wilson summoned Mr. Edward T. Williams and asked the American expert to consult with Mr. Macleay, the British expert, and M. Gout, the French expert, and answer the question put to the Chinese by the British Prime Minister. The experts favored the German terms as the lesser of two evil solutions, and Mr. Macleay followed Mr. Williams' lead in presenting an additional memorandum disapproving both of them as unjust and dangerous. These separate expert opinions were completed late on the evening of April 23. On the morning of

April 24, the Paris edition of the New York "Herald" (underneath the sensation of the hour, "Italy Has Withdrawn from the Peace Conference"), printed a New York cablegram headed, "U. S. Mobilizes in Orient against Japanese Menace."¹ Alongside this anti-Japanese despatch was the President's Adriatic statement, which both Chinese and Japanese interpreted as a forecast of Mr. Wilson's ultimate stand on Kiaochau. The impression gained ground that the United States government was "determined to have it out with Japan."

¹ From the European edition of the New York "Herald," Paris, April 24, 1919:—

"U. S. MOBILIZES IN ORIENT AGAINST JAPANESE MENACE

———
 "(Special to the "Herald.")

"New York, Wednesday.—Following recent affrays between Americans and Japanese in China and Korea, the War Department has ordered the mobilization of an army of 10,000 men to reinforce the American garrisons in China, the Philippines, Hawaii and the Canal Zone on the isthmus of Panama."

CHAPTER XXXI

UNITED ASIA ASKS NATIONAL EQUALITY

THE Japanese delegates went to Paris with a mandate from the Japanese government, press, and people to present to the conference a claim for the recognition of racial and national equality. Mr. Wilson went to Paris pledged to recognize and protect racial and religious minorities. The Japanese invited Chinese and other Asiatic support of their proposal in a dignified and proper way. American and British expressed public opinion, where not undisguisedly hostile, was significantly cold. American newspapers, with one or two laudable exceptions, had neither time nor thought for any Asiatic matter. They were too busy pursuing the international wills-o'-the-wisp, whose dancing lights had caught their fancy and their favor during the progress of the war.

There was one man in Paris who had a plan and a purpose, and energy and determination to back them, in opposition to the Japanese equalization proposals. That man was Mr. William Morris Hughes, premier of Australia, the largest island on the face of the globe, having a superficial area of 2,974,581 square miles and a population merely amounting to 4,455,005.¹ Mr. Hughes had a mandate from his own people to protect and preserve a "white Australia." He was supported vigorously by Mr. W. F. Massey of New Zealand and by British African experts. Sir Robert Borden, the Canadian leader, was equally eager and determined to safeguard the legitimate interests

¹ The Australian census (1911) gave these figures as the population of Australia, including Tasmania (area 26,215 square miles; population 191,211). The population of Australia (4,895,894) and of Tasmania (197,337) was estimated as 5,093,231 on June 30, 1917.

of his Canadian people and to meet the Japanese in a just and dignified manner. Mr. E. S. Montagu, the secretary for India, was inclined to take a liberal view of the matter, but his hands were tied by cabinet colleagues and officials of the India Office, who regarded the Japanese proposal as a dangerous bugbear.

At the plenary session of January 25, a commission was appointed to draft the covenant for a League of Nations. The commission was to be composed of ~~fifteen members~~, no fewer than ~~ten being~~ appointees of the five great powers. The nineteen small nations were permitted to name ~~five members~~; and, on January 27, they awarded these places on the commission to China, Belgium, Brazil, Portugal, and Serbia. At the meeting of the small powers on January 27, an earnest and respectful protest was made through M. Jules Cambon, the able and distinguished French diplomat who had been named to preside over them and keep them in order, demanding representation for Greece, Poland, Rumania, and the Tzecho-Slovak Republic. Between January 27 and February 6, it began to dawn upon certain shrewd British officials that Japan was making good headway in her campaign for equality. Taking advantage of the fact that the small powers were up in arms against the usurpation of power that had already been accomplished by the forceful five states¹ who had exclusive control of the Bureau; Greece, Poland, Rumania, and the Tzecho-Slovak Republic were given representation on the commission for the League of Nations on the afternoon of February 6. Between the end of January and February 14, the League commission, presided over by Mr. Wilson, met ten times. The American members were the President and Colonel Edward M. House; the British representatives, Lord Robert Cecil and General Smuts; the French representatives, M. Leon Bourgeois—the father of European peace league propaganda—and M. Larnaude, dean of the faculty of law of the College of Paris; the Japanese representatives, Baron Makino and Viscount

¹ The five Great Allies and Associated Powers.

Chinda; and the Chinese, Dr. Wellington Koo. Mr. Venizelos, the Greek premier, was an influential member of the commission. The original American plan for the League of Nations, known as "~~the President's draft~~," contained the following "supplementary agreements, number six and seven":

VI—The League of Nations shall require all new states to bind themselves as a condition precedent to their recognition as independent or autonomous states, to accord to all racial or national minorities within their several jurisdictions exactly the same treatment and security, both in law and in fact, that is accorded the racial or national majority of their people.

VII—Recognizing religious persecution and intolerance as fertile sources of war, the Contracting Powers agree, and the League shall exact from all new states and all states seeking admission to it the promise that they will make no law prohibiting or interfering with the free exercises of religion, and that they will in no way discriminate, either in law or in fact, against those who practice any particular creed, religion, or belief whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals.

These proposals, of course, immediately opened up the batteries at the disposal of the new states, while at the same time evoking a counter-fire on the part of the racial and religious minorities,¹ all of whom conducted more or less active lobbies in Paris. Mr. Gordon Auchincloss and Mr. David Hunter Miller, who were attached to Colonel House as his special team of "international legal advisers," or deputy grand vizirs, objected to the proposed supplementary agreement number six, and noted their reasons as follows:

The purpose of this article is beneficent, but it is submitted that general treatment is impossible. Doubtless, equal religious and cultural privileges should be accorded in all cases, but it is impossible

¹ While this volume was in the press, Dr. E. J. Dillon's excellent "Inside Story of the Peace Conference" appeared from the press of Messrs. Harper & Bros. The serious student of the Paris proceedings will find some interesting and important Balkan sidelights to the racial controversy in Dr. Dillon's charming chapters on "Japan" and "Minorities."—P. G.

to suppose that all racial minorities can be entitled, for example, to have their languages used in official records. In the case of several small minorities in one country this would be impracticable, even locally.

While no change in the Article is suggested, the thought is that it should be followed by additional and more specific provisions varying according to the conditions, not only in new states, but in some of the older ones, of which Bulgaria is an example.

On the evening of February 13, Baron Makino presented the following amendment to be included in or substituted for the original agreements number six and seven :

The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord, as soon as possible, to all aliens, nationals of states, members of the League equal and just treatment in every respect, making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality."

In offering his proposal, the Japanese leader said that the race question being a standing grievance which might become acute and dangerous at any moment, it was desirable that a provision dealing with the subject should be made in the covenant.

"I do not lose sight of the many and various difficulties standing in the way of a full realization of this principle," said Baron Makino, "but they are not insurmountable, if sufficient importance be attached to the consideration of serious misunderstanding between different peoples which might grow to an uncontrollable degree. Such an opportunity as the present, when what was hitherto deemed impossible is now about to be accomplished, certainly, I think, encourages the hope that this matter will be given the thought and generous deliberation that it deserves. You will permit me to say, for the sake of clearness, that the question being of a very delicate and complicated nature, involving the play of a deep human passion, the immediate realization of the ideal equality is not proposed. The clause presented to the commission enunciates only the principle, leaving to the different governments con-

cerned the actual working out of the practice to be followed. In other words, the proposal is intended as an invitation to the governments and the peoples, who are to be associated in this great league, to examine the question more closely and seriously and to devise in a fair and accommodating spirit means to meet it."

Baron Makino called attention to the fact that the league being, as it were, a world organization of insurance against war; that, in cases of aggression, nations suitably placed must be prepared to defend the territorial integrity and political independence of a fellow member; that this means that a national of a state member must be ready to share military expenditure for the common cause and, if needs be, sacrifice his own person.

"In view of these new duties," declared Baron Makino, "arising before him, as a result of his country entering the league, each national would feel, and in fact demand, that he be placed upon an equal footing with the people whom he undertakes to defend, even with his own life."

The Baron made a very favorable impression upon his distinguished audience. M. Bourgeois and Mr. Orlando supported him very warmly. Much interest was evident when the Chinese representative, Dr. Koo, got up to speak. Dr. Koo was opposing Baron Makino before the council of the conference. Would he be with, or against, the Japanese in the organization of the League of Nations?

Dr. Koo supported Makino. He pointed out that the proposal did not assert the principle of "equal races" but of "equal nationals."

"I realize fully," said Dr. Koo; "that the principle embodied involves a great number of questions, social and economic among others, which can be solved only in the fullness of time; but as a principle, I would like to see it given some recognition in this covenant."

The Chinese diplomat expressed the hope that there would be no serious opposition to Baron Makino's motion, and he

asked that his own declaration be recorded in favor of the proposal.

Dr. Koo told me in Paris that he had received letters and cablegrams from Chinese in all parts of the world, including the large cities of the United States (New York, San Francisco, Chicago, Boston, etc.), from Java, South Africa, and Australia, urging him to support the Japanese proposal. The British, Polish, Rumanian, Greek, and Tzecho-Slovak representatives opposed the proposal. The Poles, Tzecho-Slovaks, Greeks, and Rumanians had been added to the commission in the foreknowledge that they would contest agreements number six and seven and the Japanese amendment. Mr. Wilson spoke in general terms of sympathy and hope for future toleration, although the American delegation did not go on record in favor of the Japanese article. There was no vote, but eleven¹ of the nineteen members of the commission declared themselves in favor of racial and national equality. Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda left the Hôtel Crillon feeling and looking quite happy. They had every reason to believe that their cause was won. I heard at the time, but this was later denied, that an official despatch was sent to Tokio reporting victory. The covenant was to be presented to a plenary session at the Quai d'Orsay, the next day.

On the morning of February 14, Colonel House informed one of the Japanese delegates that the proposed supplementary agreements, with the Japanese amendment, had been dropped altogether. They did not appear in the draft covenant, printed and circulated just before the conference went into session on that day. When the draft covenant was reported to the peace conference, without the insertion of the Japanese amendment, Baron Makino, while expressing "Japan's whole-hearted sympathy and readiness to contribute her utmost to any and every attempt to found and secure an enduring peace of the world," entered a reservation notifying all concerned "that Japan

¹ Either eleven or twelve. The exact number has been in doubt since this secret session.—P. G.

would again submit her proposition for the consideration of the conference, at the earliest opportunity." This was the situation when Mr. Wilson returned to the United States "to get the American people behind the covenant."

On February 15 I had an interesting talk with Baron Makino in the course of which he said to me:

"Japan is in full sympathy with other nations. She has been doing and will continue to do her utmost in the way of coöperation with the other nations to obtain an enduring peace—a peace founded on the basis of equality and justice, and which will bring into being genuine good-will among all races and nations.

"With this end in view, all people must be prepared to do a little hard thinking, and to have enough courage to part with many prejudices we have inherited from our ancestors, among which are racial prejudices."

The Baron spoke as the leader of the Japanese movement for the abolition of racial discrimination. All over Japan, at that moment, meetings were being held, protesting against the badge of shame imposed by the so-called "white" upon the so-called "colored" races. The day before our conversation, while the Paris conference was denying racial or national equality by ignoring the problem, the Lower House of the Japanese Diet was the scene of a significant demonstration against further submission to "a Western abuse." Makino, who is a pronounced pacifist of the right caliber,—not a mollycoddle, but a statesman who does desire peace with honor,—was worried by the popular excitement in Japan, and he said so very earnestly.

CHAPTER XXXII

BRITISH TORIES DEFEAT ENGLAND'S ALLY, JAPAN

WHILE the President was in America, strong pressure was exercised by the British delegation to get the Japanese proposal out of the way. Mr. Hughes insisted upon this "protection against the Japanese advance," and Mr. Lloyd George was not disposed to oppose the Australian, especially as Mr. Balfour and all the Tories at the Majestic stood pat for "a white Australia." Technical experts at the Astoria contended that questions of this kind could better be arranged outside the conference.

Among others with whom I talked was Mr. Loring C. Christie, legal adviser of the department of external affairs of Canada. Mr. Christie gave me a very interesting explanation of the manner in which the British dominions and dependencies were handling this matter, among themselves and with England. The following is Resolution XXI adopted by the imperial war conference of 1918:

RECIPROCITY OF TREATMENT BETWEEN INDIA AND THE DOMINIONS

The Imperial War Conference is of opinion that effect should now be given to the principle of reciprocity approved by Resolution XXI, of the Imperial War Conference, 1917. In pursuance of that Resolution it is agreed that:

(1) It is an inherent function of the governments of the several communities of the British Commonwealth, including India, that each should enjoy complete control of the composition of its own population by means of restriction on immigration from any of the other communities.

(2) British citizens domiciled in any British country, including India, should be admitted into any other country for visits, for the purpose of pleasure or commerce, including temporary residence

for the purpose of education. The conditions of such visits should be regulated on the principle of reciprocity, as follows:

(a) The right of the government of India is recognized to enact laws which shall have the effect of subjecting British citizens domiciled in any other British country to the same conditions in visiting India as those imposed on Indians desiring to visit such country.

(b) Such right of visit or temporary residence shall, in each individual case, be embodied in a passport or written permit issued by the country of domicile and subject to vise there by an officer appointed by, and acting on behalf of, the country to be visited, if such country so desires.

(c) Such right shall not extend to a visit or temporary residence for labor purposes or to permanent settlement.

(3) Indians already permanently domiciled in the other British countries should be allowed to bring in their wives and minor children on condition (a) that not more than one wife and her children shall be admitted for each such Indian and (b) that each individual so admitted shall be certified by the Government of India as being the lawful wife or child of such Indian.

(4) The Conference recommends the other questions covered by the memoranda presented this year and last year to the Conference by the representatives of India in so far as not dealt with in the foregoing paragraphs of this resolution to the various Governments concerned with a view to early consideration.

That was on the line of least resistance. That was the best to be obtained from the British. It is fair to remember that the situation was complicated for them by the critical character of some South African differences and a very strong wave of anti-Hindu prejudice just then agitating the British in East Africa and Nigeria. This made matters rather difficult for the British and for the India Office, as I was to learn a little later while I was in London. The native Indian point of view was thus expressed by Mr. Montagu, the secretary of state, in presenting the Indian budget to the House of Commons: ¹

If we consider only the position of India vis-à-vis the great nations of the world the situation is a bright one. As a result of the part

¹ May 22, 1919.

India has played in the war, she has won her place in international discussion equal to that of the British Dominions. Not only is she represented at the Peace Conference, not only have her representatives received from the King power to sign peace with his Majesty's enemies, but as a member of the British Empire she has had a share in concerting the policy of the Empire. I can only say on my own behalf and on that of my colleagues that we have devoted ourselves in Paris with all the more concentration to the interests of the Indian Empire because we realized that we were the representatives of *peoples who are not yet, unfortunately, self-governed*.

It must have been a satisfaction to the House of Commons to learn that India was to be an original member of the League of Nations. These things, together with the place occupied by Lord Sinha in the House of Lords, are only justifiable if you raise India to the position of a sister nation in the British Empire, and are *wholly inconsistent with the position of the subordination of India*. I say to our colleagues representing the great Dominions that the position of equality which they have given to the representatives of India is wholly inconsistent with the treatment of the citizens of India in British Dominions, which *puts them lower than the citizens of any other part of the Empire*.

When it is remembered that just at that moment an actual state of war obtained between India and Afghanistan, it will be realized how quickly the British might see danger in an agitation for racial equality, especially when conducted under Asiatic auspices.

Among the representatives of neutral states in Paris was Professor William E. Rappard, a member of the faculty of the University of Geneva and of the International Committee of the Red Cross, as well as the special delegate from the Swiss government, observing the organization of the League of Nations. Geneva desired to be the "first capital of the world state." We became very good friends, largely through the kindness of Mr. Beer, who brought us together because Mr. Rappard has a plan which he thinks would remove the immigration horn of the racial dilemma. Geneva was chosen as the seat of the League on the night of April 11, and I was with Mr. Rappard when President Wilson very gracefully congratulated him upon his victory. The Belgians, of course,

thought that Brussels should be chosen, and the Dutch had an aggressive lobby advocating the claims of The Hague.

Mr. Rappard's idea is that the League of Nations should establish the principle that "It should not be deemed inconsistent with the spirit of international amity that immigration between member states may be restricted or suspended by a member state until the percentage of its nationals already resident in the state from which immigration is restricted or suspended equals the percentage of all nations of that state resident in the state restricting or suspending immigration."

This is a slightly different proposal than the Dillingham-Gulick percentage plan that has been considered and rejected by the American Congress. So far as the United States is concerned, the effect, of course, would be to stop Japanese and Chinese immigration altogether, without recourse to obnoxious discriminatory exclusion laws. Of course, as I pointed out to our delegates and the others in Paris who were interested, the Japanese proposal had nothing to do with immigration. Americans, as a rule, are unalterably opposed to Asiatic immigration, believing it to be both unwise and unnecessary, and I certainly should not have supported the Japanese proposal against the interests of California and our Pacific coast. The proposal was in the interests of California, the Pacific coast, and the United States as a whole, because it was directed, and very properly, against a monstrous anti-American abuse. Alien ownership of land and of other natural and developed resources is bad for America or for any other country. The Japanese know that, because they provided against it immediately their eyes were opened by foreign abuse of extritorial privileges. The Japanese proposal sought to protect the rights of aliens properly domiciled in America and in other countries, and its adoption, even in a modified form, would have compelled our government, and all other governments, to discriminate against all aliens or none. This was why the British, and especially the Canadians, were up in arms against Makino's amendment. Had it got into the covenant and been

made binding upon the United States, many British subjects doing business in the large office buildings of the Pacific coast would have been suddenly obsessed by a consuming desire to become American citizens, and undoubtedly they would make very good citizens, indeed.

Hostility to Japan, barefaced and unashamed, inspired news stories confounding racial and national equality with the immigration and Asiatic exclusion problems. To dispose of the bugaboo, Viscount Ishii, the Japanese ambassador at Washington, thus expressed himself, while speaking to the Japan Society in New York, on March 14, the day that President Wilson returned to Paris:

In this world war, Asiatics have fought side by side with Anglo-Saxons, Latins and Slavs, against the common foe, Teutons, Turks, Bulgars. The single and unmingled object of this war was the maintenance of international justice and the establishment of a durable peace. No consideration of racial feeling entered on the supreme decision for sacrifices of blood and treasure on the part of any of the Allied and associated powers. And now when this war for international justice is about to come to a happy termination and when a world league for permanent peace is being contrived, why should this question of race prejudice, of race discrimination, of race humiliation be left unremedied?

It may be added, in order to avoid a possible misunderstanding, that this question of straightening out the existing injustice of racial discrimination should be considered independently of the question of labor or immigration: one is principally economic in nature, while the other is essentially a question of sentiment, of legitimate pride and of self-respect.

It may be feared that this stipulation introduced in the League Covenant for the prohibition of any discriminatory treatment on account of racial differences would necessarily bring about labor difficulties or economic troubles, but this would be singularly overlooking the actual facts of international intercourse. The existing treaty between Japan and America guarantees to the Japanese people the right of freely entering and residing in the United States. In spite of this express stipulation, my government invariably stick to the policy of strict restrictions of emigration into America. It is because the Japanese government and people understand that the labor question in America constitutes an exceptional circumstance

which even a treaty cannot stipulate away in a sweeping manner.

While, therefore, they must not be expected to be content with the present situation; you can depend upon the wise patience of the Japanese nation, who calmly, though anxiously, await the time when by the gradual process of evolution, this difficult matter may be finally cured and settled to the mutual satisfaction of the two countries. In the meantime, Japan, in faithful adherence to the spirit of what is called the "Gentleman's Agreement," will continue a policy of strict self-imposed restriction in this delicate matter of labor emigration, notwithstanding their treaty right. This fixed policy of Japan is abundantly attested by past records and will, I hope, disarm any alarmistic and unwarranted views pointing to a probability of Japan's taking advantage of the proposed article in the League constitution against race discrimination, with the consequent relaxation in policy of emigration.

The neutral states were heard on March 20 and 21. On March 22, the commission proceeded to revise the draft covenant. Among the chief questions around which differences arose were: the Monroe Doctrine clause, upon which the United States Senate and general American opinion insisted; the seat of the league, which the Belgians demanded; an international general staff and police force, the pet scheme of M. Bourgeois; and the Japanese amendment. In order to make it easy for the British and Americans, and especially to invite the support of Mr. Wilson, the Japanese pared down their proposal to a mere aspiration which they desired to write into the preamble. They asked for "equality of nations and just treatment of their nationals," instead of "*equal treatment of their nationals.*" As we have seen in chapter XXIV, this provoked a storm within the Japanese delegation, where it was denounced as "a miserable compromise." Notwithstanding the conciliatory spirit manifested by the Japanese; the British, Polish, and Tzecho-Slovak representatives would not consider their proposal. On the surface, at least, the President and Colonel House were very friendly, and the Japanese were told that, "if they could weaken the British opposition, their revised plan would go through." Just at this juncture, the Monroe Doctrine clause was carried by the slim majority of

one. I cabled the fact to "The New York Herald," despite officious official denials. To carry his Monroe Doctrine clause in the teeth of almost united "great-power opposition" and the strong disapproval of several of the smaller states, Mr. Wilson was forced to let Lord Robert Cecil and Lord Curzon write the clause for him. The clause was written, partly at Lord Robert Cecil's residence, and partly at the London foreign office. One or two words were changed by the President himself, but its limitations to a "regional understanding" ("improperly arrived at") was insisted upon and compelled by the British. The Tories turned the trick on Mr. Wilson. Consequently, when Colonel House advised the Japanese to concentrate upon the British delegation in order to get through their revised and denatured equalization proposal, he was offering Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda little more than a "God bless you!" after the manner of Mr. Bryan. He had nothing else to offer, the British being complete masters of the situation.

On the night of April 11, the commission of the League of Nations began its final session, which lasted until twenty minutes to one o'clock on the morning of April 12. Baron Makino presented his compromise amendment to the preamble. He was supported by Messrs. Bourgeois and Larnaude (France), Orlando and Scialoja (Italy), Hymans (Belgium), Epitacio Pessao (Brazil), Dr. Koo (China), Jayme Batalha-Reis (Portugal), Vesnitch (Serbia), and Kiamandy (Rumania). The British expressed polite opposition. Mr. Venizelos (Greece), Mr. Roman Dmowski (Poland), and Mr. Charles Kramer (Tzecho-Slovak Republic), demurred. Mr. Wilson, who presided, was non-committal. Colonel House remained smilingly silent. Either eleven or twelve delegates, I am not sure which, supported the Japanese amendment on the night of April 11, and five were recorded against. Strictly speaking, except in the case of the selection of Geneva as the seat of the league, I was informed that no votes were taken, "the idea being to

“mull over the difficulties and try to reach unanimous conclusions.”

Baron Makino, bearing in mind the fact that the Monroe Doctrine clause was adopted by a bare majority of one, asked politely if his motion was accepted. Colonel House looked at the President. The President looked at Lord Robert Cecil, and then he beamed upon Baron Makino as he said:

“No, Baron; that requires unanimity.”

Between April 12 and April 28, when the covenant was printed in its final form and submitted to the conference in plenary session, the Japanese did all that was humanly possible to secure correction of this injustice. They were unsuccessful. Consequently, after Mr. Wilson presented to the conference the report of the commission and his motion for the adoption of the covenant, Baron Makino registered a polite and friendly protest. Among other things he said:

At the meeting of the Commission on the 11th of April I proposed the insertion in the preamble of the Covenant a phrase endorsing the principle of equality of nations and the just treatment of their nationals. But this proposal again failed to be adopted by unanimity, although it obtained, may I be permitted to say, a clear majority in its favor.

This modified form of amendment did not, as I had occasion to state to the Commission, fully meet our wishes, but it was the outcome of an attempt to conciliate the view-points of different nations.

Now that it has been decided by the Commission that our amendment, even in its modified form, would not be included in the draft Covenant, I feel constrained to revert to our original proposal and to avail myself of this occasion to declare clearly our position in regard to this matter.

The principle we desire to see acted upon in the future relationship between nations was set forth in our original amendment.

Baron Makino read the amendment¹ and proceeded:

It is our firm conviction that the enduring success of this great undertaking will depend much more on the hearty espousal and

¹ See p. 300.

loyal adherence that the various peoples concerned would give to the noble ideals underlying the organization, than on the acts of the respective governments that may change from time to time. In an age of democracy, peoples themselves must feel that they are the trustees of this work; and to feel so, they must first have a sure basis of close harmony and mutual confidence.

If just and equal treatment is denied to certain nationals, it would have the significance of a certain reflection on their quality and status. Their faith in the justice and righteousness which are to be the guiding spirit of the future international intercourse between the members of the League may be shaken; and such a frame of mind, I am afraid, would be most detrimental to that harmony and coöperation upon which foundation alone can the League now contemplated be securely built. It was solely and purely from our desire to see the League established on a sound and firm basis of good-will, justice and reason, that we have been compelled to make our proposal. We will not, however, press for the adoption of our proposal, at this moment.

In closing, I feel it my duty to declare clearly on this occasion that the Japanese government and people feel poignant regret at the failure of the Commission to approve of their just demand for laying down a principle aiming at the adjustment of this long-standing grievance, a demand that is based upon a deep-rooted national conviction. They will continue in their insistence for the adoption of this principle by the League, in future.

That the Japanese were deeply and sincerely disappointed is true. They had reason to be both disappointed and disgusted. The morality of the Conference of Paris did not attain a high level on April 11 or April 28, despite the flamboyant pronouncements of too self-confident creators of what would have been, after all, but a lop-sided and top-heavy "world state."

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE SHANTUNG DECISION

IT was the custom of the American reporters accredited to the American peace mission to meet every evening about six o'clock in the press-room at 4, Place de la Concorde. Thither came Mr. Ray Stannard Baker, head of the American official press bureau, immediately after his evening talk with Mr. Wilson and his conference with the official reporters of the Allied powers. We were fortunate in the fact that Mr. Baker was chosen to administer the sopas to our Cerberus, grown lean and hungry through the amusing attempts at secrecy practised by the Big Three. A very popular member of our craft, with a modestly boyish manner that well became his task, he sympathized heartily with our sometimes hectic efforts to pry loose the news from the masters of mankind, and remained suave and serene even when the relentless "Larry" Hills of "The Sun" used his intellectual forceps to draw teeth that the Big Three sought to conceal within their own jaws. Usually, these were very bad teeth. Sometimes—not always—we got a look at them. Once or twice, we succeeded in extracting them. For three whole days, some of us far into the night, we were busy trying to extract the very much decayed Kiaochau tooth of the Big Three. Part of it came out in broken bits, thanks to Mr. Baker's friendly assistance, on the evening of April 30. The stump is still in the stiff jaw of the triple-headed Sphinx, but we managed to secure a sufficiently clear X-ray impression of it.

The primary reason why the President was so anxious to explain his Kiaochau contribution to the "just peace" may be traced to the fact that his explanations began in an unfortu-

nate, though doubtless well-intended, effort to put the best possible face upon a very ugly matter. Now, we know that what was told to us that evening in the busy room of what was once the most notorious gambling-place in Paris was, to say the least, very misleading.

This was the statement made to us:

All rights in Kiaochau and the Shantung province formerly belonging to Germany are to be transferred without reservation to Japan. Japan voluntarily engages to hand back the Shantung peninsula in full sovereignty to China, retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany and the right to establish a settlement at Tsingtau. Owners of railroads will use special police only to ensure security for traffic; the police force will be composed of Chinese, and such Japanese instructors as the directors of the railways may select, will be appointed by the Chinese government. The Japanese military forces are to be withdrawn, at the earliest possible moment.

Japan thus gets only such rights as an economic concessionaire as are possessed by one or two other great powers in China, and the whole future relationships between the two countries fall at once under the guarantee of the League of Nations of territorial integrity and political independence.

Naturally, it immediately occurred to me to ask if Japan had made a specific pledge embodying this stated compromise to the Big Three.

"Yes," I was told; "Japan has made this pledge."

"Is it in writing?"

"Yes, it is in writing."

"Signed?"

"I believe so; yes, it 's signed."

If true, that was very important. After sending my despatch to the "Herald," telling the story of the decision, I hurried over to the Hôtel Bristol, the headquarters of the Japanese delegation, and confirmed my previous suspicion that the reported compromise and pledge were non-existent in fact. President Wilson had capitulated to Baron Makino.

Earlier in the day I had cabled to the "Herald" as follows:

Japan is to get Kiaochau. That much has been settled by the Council of Three. . . . Japan has scored a momentous Far Eastern victory.

Presumably President Wilson will try to obtain from Japan some sort of pledge that she will restore Kiaochau to China, ultimately. On the other hand, I am informed in high circles that Japan has gained all she desired—the port site, the railways, and the mines.

Japan's victory was complete. She had made no promises, participated in no bargains. From the Bourse I drove over to the Hôtel Lutetia, and was immediately received by the Chinese delegates. Their disappointment was pathetic. They had followed American leadership to overwhelming defeat.

Dr. Wang and Dr. Koo managed to control their feelings. They were both very pale and worn out with anxiety, but on the surface they were quite calm and cool. One had to admire their dignified poise. Dr. Wang said to me:

“Well, Pat, we have had a rude awakening, but we are still in the ring.”

“Good for you!” I replied. “Now, what shall I cable to America?”

“You can say,” said Dr. Wang, “that I cannot believe this news to be true. We have had no word at all from the Council of Three, and we have no reason to suppose that President Wilson could indorse such an unjust decision. You can say that I have complete faith in the loyalty to principle of the American President and the American people. China trusts America, and she knows that she is not reposing her trust in vain.”

While we were talking together, Mr. Ray Stannard Baker was announced. Earlier in the evening Mr. Baker had requested me to break the news to the Chinese, but I told him that I thought he had better do that himself. He did it wonderfully well, as he did so many things that were difficult in Paris. Mr. Baker came in smiling, and he cheered the Chinese by his genuine sincerity and his unconquerable loyalty to Mr. Wilson. He emphasized the importance of bringing Japan

and China together into the League of Nations and the hope of the President that present issues would all be smoothed out as soon as the league could get to work.

Mr. Baker, all kindness, loyalty, and sympathy, did his best with wonderful words to make bitter defeat taste as sweet as victory. He sat back in the roomy easy-chair and talked, and Dr. Wang and Dr. Koo sat back in their chairs and listened. It was a terrible hour for America. We had pushed the Chinese into a ditch. Would we leave them there? Would they rise up themselves, rub their shins, and seek wiser and more practical friends?

Mr. Baker got up, said, "Good night," cheerfully, and stepped from Dr. Wang's sitting-room, radiating courage and smiles. The young Chinese leaders sat silently staring at one another. The room seemed as dark and cold as a tomb. It was the tomb of a dead Chinese-American hope.

I talked for a while with Dr. and Mrs. Wang, and then I accompanied Dr. Koo into his room and discussed with the Chinese minister at Washington the probable effects of the decision.

"What will you do now?" I asked him.

"As soon as we get the formal decision," he told me; "we shall, of course, enter a firm protest."

"I think you will find," I said, "that there will be protests a-plenty within the American delegation. I am going over to the Crillon now, and I am going to ask some of our people to make a vigorous protest to the President."

I did go over to the Crillon, and I found most of our officials feeling even more downcast than the Chinese. They were ashamed, and properly so. Japan had beaten them to the ropes. They agreed with me that the decision should not be accepted without telling the President with firm friendliness precisely what he was doing. That was done.

It is untrue that there was no protest in the American delegation against the Shantung decision. There was no confer-



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DR. C. T. WANG



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DR. V. K. WELLINGTON KOO



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MR. LOU TSENG-TSIANG

ence with the American newspapermen on May 1. The peace commissioners, with comprehensible and commendable frankness, admitted privately that they were very glad to take advantage of the May Day holiday and officially see as little as possible of the American members of the fourth estate. One of our commissioners said to me, but not for publication:

“It is appalling. Of course, the President must feel that he has strong reason on his side, but he is building up difficulties for himself and the treaty in the Senate and the country.”

The only man who was quite pleased with what was done was the ever-smiling Colonel House.

The President consented to meet the commissioners, and he did meet them on the morning of May 1 and heard their opinions of the Shantung decision. It was at this meeting that General Bliss gave the President specific reasons which, at the President's request, were embodied in a formal letter that was signed by Mr. Lansing and Mr. Henry White. Professor Williams made several important suggestions that were inserted by the General in his letter. Both Professor Williams and Captain Hornbeck wrote opinions, which may or may not have reached the President, between May 1 and the approval of the Shantung articles as they appeared in the treaty four days later. These articles were changed several times before assuming their final shape.

On May 3, I secured the French text as drafted in the bureau by a Japanese technical expert (I believe Mr. H. Nagaoka, counselor of the Paris embassy). I had this translated and cabled to “The New York Herald.” It was printed in the “Herald” on Monday, May 5, and was the first public indication of the actual text of the treaty. As will be seen, there were but two articles, originally, as follows:

ARTICLE I

Germany renounces in favor of Japan all rights, titles and privileges—concerning especially the leased territory of Kiaochau,

the railways, the mines and the submarine cables—which she had acquired by virtue of the treaty concluded between her and China of March 6, 1898, and of all other agreements affecting the province of Shantung.

All the German rights in the Tsingtau-Tsinanfu railway, including branch lines, together with its appurtenances of whatever character, stations, shops, fixed and rolling stock, mines, equipment and machinery of the mines, are and shall be yielded to Japan, together with all rights and privileges which attach thereto.

The submarine cables of the German state, from Tsingtau to Shanghai and from Tsingtau to Chefoo, together with all the rights, privileges and properties which attach thereto, are likewise yielded to Japan, freely and without compensation.

ARTICLE II

The rights to property, both movable and immovable, which the German state possesses in the territory of Kiaochau together with all the rights which it might enforce as a consequence of works or improvements executed or of outlays which it has made, directly or indirectly, and affecting this territory, are and shall remain yielded to Japan, freely and without compensation.

To return to May 1. The French had worked up a successful Bolshevik bogey, and May Day dawned with "alarums and excursions" on the part of the military, the gendarmerie, and the Reds. Early in the morning, I walked over from Rue Abbé Grégoire to the Crillon. The Boulevard St. Germain resounded to the tramp of battalion after battalion of *poilus* fully accoutred and weighted down by the none-too-light French pack. These soldiers accepted the Planquetan performance with Gallic cheerfulness. They paraded around the Chamber of Deputies, across the Pont and Place de la Concorde, and up the Rue Royale to the Madeleine. Nothing much happened during the morning, except the arrest of a too boisterous boy or girl, sporting the defiant red ribbon. I remained at the Crillon as the lunch guest of Mr. Beer, and we had an interesting party, including one of the most gifted and entertaining members of the British mission. Just as we were finishing lunch, a crowd of Reds broke through the military

cordon on the south side of the river and came running across the Place de la Concorde. Mounted French troops immediately galloped to the assault, and swords were used upon a couple of hundred boys and girls who would have been easily dispersed by a platoon of American police. One boy had a couple of fingers severed from his hand. We assisted him to first aid, and then Mr. Beer and I sallied forth to see the sights of Paris enjoying one of her "counter-revolutions." At the corner of the Rue Royale we were joined by the veteran British journalist, Sir John Foster Fraser. We found the excitement around Maxim's somewhat too tame, so we passed through the cordon of cavalry and infantry and walked up the Rue Royale. We had the thoroughfare virtually to ourselves, and possibly provided some gossip and speculation for the huge crowds of men, women and children backed around the Madeleine and well up into the Boulevard des Capucines. There was little to see except soldiers and people looking at one another from different angles, and each doubtless enjoying a good laugh at the expense of those Americans who insisted upon taking a serious view of the Red May Day pantomime. There was nothing serious about the demonstration. It was purely political. It was intended by the French government to strengthen the hands of M. Clemenceau, and it did assist the "Tiger" in his dealings with Mr. Wilson. The French are a very remarkable people. They taught us a good many things in Paris. That May Day, they taught some of us the practical value of the theatrical temperament, which is most highly developed among the people of France.

Just about the time when Mr. Beer and I were making our tour of "The Barricades" (which were not) a message arrived at the Hôtel Lutetia from Mr. Arthur James Balfour, the British minister for foreign affairs, inviting the Chinese delegates to call upon him at four o'clock. Mr. Balfour lived with Premier Lloyd George on the Rue Nitot, near the Place de Etats-Unis. I was aware that Mr. Wilson had suggested to Mr. Lloyd George that Mr. Balfour make the formal official

explanation of the Shantung decision to the Chinese on the part of the Council of Three. As Mr. Wilson had reason to know, Mr. Balfour is the most polished explainer on the surface of the globe. The appointment was for four o'clock. Mr. Lou Tseng-tsiang, the nominal head of the Chinese delegation, and Mr. Alfred Sze, the Chinese minister at London, answered the invitation. Mr. Balfour received them with studied cordiality and kindness. He explained the decision, which he had dictated, in part, himself. Of course he did not tell the Chinese that. He spoke mostly of the future and the necessity of making the best of a bad situation. Mr. Lou and Mr. Sze returned to the Lutetia and reported to their delegation. Dr. Wang and Dr. Koo were not impressed. They were receiving Chinese cablegrams from Peking to Patagonia urging them to remain firm and congratulating them upon their work. They had asked M. Pichon and M. Dutasta for an official copy of the actual decision, so that they might communicate the treaty terms to their government and take the advice of the Peking cabinet—and, of course, the Canton cabinet. They were refused all information in the possession of the bureau.

On the evening of May 3, Dr. Wen Pin Wei, in charge of the Chinese press bureau, called at 4 Place de la Concorde and gave out the following statement:

New light on the settlement of the Kiaochau-Shantung question has made the Chinese delegation indignant. A member of the delegation states that though three days have elapsed since the settlement by the Council of Three was announced, no official written communication of the details of the settlement has yet reached the delegation. While still waiting in suspense, the delegation has learned with surprise that the clauses to be inserted in the Peace Treaty relating to the Shantung question go further than what was even suspected. Japan is given everything Germany obtained from China by aggression, and more.

Japan is given all the rights, titles or privileges—concerning especially the territory of Kiaochau, the railways, the mines and the submarine cables—which Germany acquired by virtue of treaty con-

cluded by her with China, March 6, 1898, and all other acts concerning the Province of Shantung.

Japan is given all German rights in the Tsingtau-Tsinan railway including its branches, and the mines thereto attached.

Japan is given the German submarine cables from Tsingtau to Shanghai and from Tsingtau to Chefoo.

Japan is given all German public property rights, movable and immovable in the territory of Kiaochau.

Although China has the best title to those rights, which are all in Chinese territory, not a word is said in the draft clauses as to what rights China may expect to recover for herself. It is left entirely to Japan to say what she will be pleased to return to China and what to retain for her own enjoyment. The important fact seems to be altogether ignored that Shantung is a Chinese province—the territory of a partner in the war on the side of the Allied and Associated powers.

The Tsingtau-Tsinan railway was built with Chinese and German private capital. The whole line of 280 miles lies entirely in Chinese territory. To substitute Japan for Germany in the rights of the railway is to greatly endanger the welfare and security of the Chinese Republic, because Japan is much nearer to China than Germany and because she already claims a sphere of influence in Manchuria close to the north of Shantung.

Reading the draft clauses together with the outline of the Council's proposed settlement, it is clear that the Council makes China lose both ways: It has given Japan not only more than Germany had in Shantung, but also more than Japan claims from China in the treaty of 1915 and the notes of 1918. The Council's proposed settlement seems to sanction, for example, the policing of the Shantung railway, privileges which Germany did not exercise or claim; and, it is apprehended, substitutes a permanent Japanese settlement under Japanese control and administration for a German leasehold limited to a fixed period of years. Again, by transferring to Japan all German rights in Shantung, as stated in the draft clauses, it also appears to give Japan preferential rights which she did not claim from China, such as the supply of capital, material or technical experts in Shantung.

The more the Chinese delegation studies the proposed settlement the less it understands its meaning and purposes and the more it feels aggrieved. It will be difficult to explain to the Chinese people what the Peace Conference really means by justice.

On May 4, the following protest was sent to the president of the conference, M. Clemenceau:

PARIS, May 4, 1919.

Sir:

The Rt. Hon. Arthur J. Balfour,¹ on behalf of the Council of Three, verbally informed the Chinese delegates on May 1, 1919, of the settlement arrived at by the Council in regard to the Kiaochau-Shantung question. They were given to understand that the clause to be inserted in the Peace Treaty would be very general, to the effect that Germany should renounce all her rights in Kiaochau-Shantung to Japan; that the conclusion reached by the Council of Three regarding Kiaochau-Shantung was that all political rights formerly enjoyed by Germany were to be restored to China; and to Japan were to be given only the economic rights such as a settlement at Tsingtau, the railway already built (Tsingtau-Tsinan railway), the mines connected therewith, and two other railways to be built.

They were given to understand further that Japan had given explicit assurance to the Council that in exercising the rights thus given her, she would strictly observe the principle of the Open Door in letter and spirit; that she had announced to the Council that her policy was to restore full sovereignty in the Shantung peninsula to China, and that she would not make any exclusive economic use of the port of Tsingtau or any discriminatory rates, rules or regulations for the railways. Japan had also stated to the Council that she would at the earliest possible moment hand back all the political rights to China and withdraw all Japanese troops from Shantung. In the arrangement of this settlement everything had been made so clear that no undesirable inferences could be drawn therefrom by Japan in regard to her position in the affairs of the Far East.

After listening to the outline of the proposed settlement communicated to them by Mr. Balfour, the Chinese delegates expressed their disappointment, and requested him to be good enough to ask the Council of Three to send them at their earliest convenience a copy of the draft clause to be inserted in the Peace Treaty and the records of the proceedings of the Council bearing on the Kiaochau-Shantung question.

The Chinese delegation have carefully considered the above outline on the proposed settlement. They would have waited for the complete records before expressing their view of it but for reasons of urgency. Assuming that the above is a correct summary of what Mr. Balfour explained to them, the Chinese delegation feel constrained to express their keen disappointment, which will be

¹ The author was reliably informed that Mr. Balfour questioned the accuracy of this summary of his statement to the Chinese delegation.
—P. G.

shared in all its intensity by the Chinese nation and enter a formal protest in the name of justice.

The declaration of war by China against Germany and Austria-Hungary, on August 14, 1917, expressly abrogated all treaties, agreements and conventions between China and those powers, a fact which was officially notified to, and taken cognizance of, by the Allied and associated powers. By this declaration, the rights and privileges formerly enjoyed in the province of Shantung became null and void and China as the sovereign power in that province, became automatically revested of them. It is difficult to see on what ground these rights can be taken from China and transferred to Japan.

Japan has presumably based her claim on the agreements of 1915 and on the notes of 1918 with China. The 1915 agreements were however concluded by China under the coercion of a Japanese ultimatum threatening war. The Chinese government were obliged to exchange the 1918 notes because the continued presence of the Japanese troops in the interior of Shantung and the unauthorized establishment of Japanese administrative bureaux which attempted to govern Shantung as Japanese territory, aroused such popular indignation and opposition that no other course seemed open to the Chinese government to rid the province of their presence.

If the Shantung peninsula is to be restored in full sovereignty, according to the proposed settlement, to China, the reason does not appear clear why recourse should be had to two steps instead of one, why the initial transfer should be made to Japan and then leave it to her to "voluntarily engage" to restore it to China.

Notwithstanding the proposed division of political and economic rights, the substitution of Japan for Germany in Shantung so entrenches Japanese influence in this province as to expose China to a greater menace than before, because Japan is nearer to China than Germany.

China, in coming to the peace conference, has relied on the Fourteen Points set forth by President Wilson in his address to Congress on the 8th of January, 1918, and the principles laid down in his subsequent addresses, and formally adopted by the Powers associated against Germany. She has relied on the spirit of honorable relationship between states which was to open a new era in the world and inaugurate the League of Nations. She has relied, above all, on the justice and equity of her case. The result has been to her a grievous disappointment.

The Chinese delegation feel it to be their duty to register a formal

protest with the Council of Three against the proposed settlement of the Kiaochau-Shantung question.

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

(Signed) LOU TSENG-TSIANG.

To the President,

The Council of Three,

Peace Conference, Paris.

I saw Dr. Koo and Dr. Wang, as well as Mr. Sze, later that night, and they were still up in the air regarding their position. I told Dr. Koo that I had cabled the text of the Shantung articles to the "Herald," but it was not possible to give him a copy. He told me that they had already secured a copy of the draft text, although not officially. It was urgently important, of course, for the Chinese to know the precise language to be employed in the articles so that they might continue their fight upon every available technical point. They never saw the Shantung articles until they received their copy of the printed treaty at the secret plenary session on the afternoon of May 6.

On the forenoon of May 5, Mr. Matsuoka informed me that Baron Makino had assented to my request for a statement to "The New York Herald." The Baron, in the course of this statement, explained Japan's position in reference to the Shantung decision in the following words:

The policy of Japan is to hand back the Shantung peninsula in full sovereignty to China, retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany and the right to establish a settlement under the usual conditions at Tsingtau.

Regarding the railway, which is to become a Chinese-Japanese joint undertaking, the Baron further stated "that the owners of the railway will use special police only to insure security for traffic; that they will be used for no other purpose; and that the police force will be composed of Chinese, and such Japanese instructors as the directors of the railway may

select will be appointed by the Chinese Government."

That evening, one of the Paris newspapers notable for the accuracy of its Quai d'Orsay news printed a brief paragraph stating that only a selected group of the Allied delegations would witness the presentation of the treaty to the Germans two days later at Versailles. No mention of any such arrangement had been made at the evening conference between the American correspondents and Colonel House. Several weeks before that, a French official had advised me privately that the intention was to restrict the treaty transactions with the Germans to the great Allies.

"The Japanese," another European official told me, "do not want the Chinese to be present. You will see that the arrangements, now in the hands of the French foreign office, will fall in with the Japanese wishes."

I checked up this prediction at the time with a personal friend at the Japanese delegation, and he assured me that no such suggestion had been made to the French by any member of his mission. He was in a position to know the Japanese proposals and performances, and his statements were at all times reliable.

As soon as I saw the paragraph in the Paris newspapers, I went to a high American official at the Crillon and asked him if the American delegation had approved a scheme to bar the Chinese from the Versailles ceremonies.

"Most certainly not," was his answer. I told him the French report. He insisted that it was "all a mistake." He was perfectly sincere.

I had a dinner engagement with a diplomat whose house was far away from American peace headquarters. Toward the close of the dinner, I learned that the French report was correct. I excused myself and hurried away, eager to cable this news to the "Herald" and to find out what the American delegation intended to do about it. Outside my friend's house, I found bare and silent boulevards. Not a taxi was to be had for love or money; the Nord-Sud and the Metro and the

surface cars were taking a night off. Transportation was tied up.

I walked the long distance to the Bourse, where I filed my cable, saying that

Despite a strong, dignified, pathetic appeal by Wellington Koo in a personal letter to President Wilson—written as an American-taught Chinese and friend—China had been placed in the category of small, ineffective allies and barred from the historic meeting at Versailles the day after tomorrow, when the peace treaty will be presented to the Germans. The Chinese feel this is adding insult to injury and that it is the logical sequence of a series of unfriendly acts against Peking in the Far Eastern fiasco of the Paris peace conference.

From the Bourse, I hastened to the Hôtel Crillon, ascended to the fifth floor, and rapped upon the door of Captain Hornbeck. The author of "Contemporary Politics in the Far East" was still at his desk, working on some official papers, when I entered and told him the news. He agreed with my suggestion that the matter should be brought to the knowledge of our commissioners, without a moment's delay. It was then about half past one o'clock in the morning.

I left Captain Hornbeck and walked down the crimson-carpeted stairs to the room of Mr. Williams on the second floor. Mr. Williams, too, was up. He was in his pajamas, just about to call it a day and seek some well-earned rest. He was very deeply affected by the news, and swift in action, as he always is. Mr. Williams communicated with Mr. Lansing, and General Bliss supported the prompt remonstrance of the secretary of state.

Not merely was China to be excluded, but each and every one of our small American protectorates, Cuba, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Haiti, Panama, Liberia, and Honduras. Even Siam, where the elephants had hauled out the spruce to make British aeroplanes, was to be kept out in the cold, while every lesser British delegation, including the two picturesque, turbaned representatives of the King of the Hedjaz, would take

part in the historic event. The British had looked after themselves. It was not their business to look after us, or China. We had taken China under our wing, and advertised the fact.

I imply no criticism of the British. All through the peace-making in Paris—and I was permitted to see much of the inside of their work—I found them honest, friendly, straightforward, fair, and always intelligent, playing the game according to the rules as they have learned them through centuries of practical experience.

Dr. Wellington Koo, the Chinese minister at Washington, had also verified the report that China was to be left in the exterior darkness. What this would mean in China can be realized only by those who are familiar with the dread importance of "face" (prestige) in the Flowery Republic. The disgrace that would thus be put upon China's delegation would have been fatal. In his study at No. 5 Rue Charles Lamoureux, out near the Bois de Boulogne, Dr. Koo sat down and penned a pathetic, dignified personal letter to Mr. Wilson, not as minister to President, but as friend and scholar to friend and professor.

It would hardly be proper to go too deeply into the sequel. Suffice it to say that next day the plan was "knocked into a cocked hat." I think that is the correct Princetonian expression. China and our own South American satellites (but not Hawaii or the Philippines) were seated at Versailles when Count Brockdorf-Rantzau, pale as a sheet of white paper and shaking like an aspen, received the treaty from Premier Clemenceau.

Who was responsible for this unfortunate incident? I made it my business to endeavor to find out. I was convinced that Colonel Edward M. House was responsible. He was, it seems, asleep at the switch. I was assured that he signified his approval of the proposed plan.

Who originated it? Did the Japanese try to "put one over" China and America? That impression was sedu-

lously circulated. I am glad to say that the Japanese had nothing to do with it. So far as I could ascertain,—and, frankly, I was suspicious,—they had not moved a finger in the matter.

We were all the guests of the splendid French, and of course the French foreign office had the initiative in all arrangements of this nature. Then it was up to the other great Allies and their American associate to suggest improvements and amendments or approve the plans as proposed by the French. The British availed themselves of their right to see that Canada, India, etc. (not forgetting Mr. Hughes of Australia and the Hedjaz member of the King's union) received all the favored treatment that the traffic would bear. We had an open door and equal opportunity, but we were too busy minding other people's business to attend to our own.

Within the conference, French and British "conservatives" had fought tooth and nail against permitting the representatives of the minor powers to know what was in the treaty until the Germans consented to sign their doom. With good reason the old diplomats feared that the Germans might intrigue to get better terms or break up the conference. It was just possible that Count Brockdorf-Rantzau might successfully invoke the methods that Talleyrand had employed at Vienna in 1814. Therefore, from the evening of April 25, when the vanguard of the German delegation reached Versailles, until the morning of May 6, when the minor powers carried their point, it was a vexed question whether there would be any plenary session in advance of the presentation of terms to the Germans on May 7. On April 28, officials of the Quai d'Orsay blocked a proposal to have the session on the following day, before the treaty was ready. It is interesting to recall these facts, because they point unerringly to the true explanation why the huge document ultimately invited and justified condemnation. The Germans were permitted to come to Versailles too soon. They were permitted to come ahead of the bureau schedule "for reasons of high diplomacy." The con-

ference leaders were afraid of themselves and of every jarring atom in the atmosphere from Lenin to Lou. Wilson's prestige was impaired by cablegrams from the United States exaggerating the importance of the Senate revolt. Undoubtedly, the President could have done better in Paris, if the Republican majority had sustained him instead of kicking the props from under his Paris platform. Now, both Clemenceau and Lloyd George were quick to employ the American political controversy for their own ends. Clemenceau was governing France with a suspicious Chamber, and Foch riding him for French political ends. The Marshal was the "Tiger's" "Old Man of the Sea."

Foch sat in the Conference of Paris not by right, but by courtesy. He was not a member of the French delegation. Still, he sat with the delegation, to the right of the Americans. He was given his seat as generalissimo of the Allies.

On the afternoon of May 6, behind the carefully closed doors of the Quai d'Orsay, all the delegates assembled; the representatives of the minor powers in expectation tempered by fear and trembling. In my despatch to the "Herald" that evening I said:

Marshal Foch's fervid declaration that the peace treaty failed to protect or to adequately reparate France came as a thrilling close to the otherwise dull and strained atmosphere of the secret plenary session of the peace conference to-day.

After Andre Tardieu had read a long summary of the treaty, Portugal, China, Italy, and France in turn entered reservations—Portugal because of inadequate compensation awarded her; China because the treaty violates her territorial integrity in defiance of the basic principles of the peace conference; Italy because it infringes on her compacts with the Allies, and France because Marshal Foch contended that the treaty left her in peril of her German enemy.

"Give me bridgeheads," roared Foch; "and I will give you peace!"

Foch was talking for France, for posterity, for his own people of Finistère and—for politics. The Marshal was right

in utilizing his opportunity to protect France. From the French point of view it was a dangerous peace. The event alone can prove whether or not French fears were justified. That night, the Quai d'Orsay effervesced with indignant declarations that Foch had abused his position in the conference to hurl a javelin at M. Clemenceau.

It was in these circumstances that Mr. Lou Tseng-tsiang, who, with Dr. C. T. Wang, represented China at the secret plenary, arose in his place at the foot of the "hollow parallelogram" of peace and read slowly and in low, clear tones, the following:

Reservation in respect of the special provision in the draft treaty of peace with Germany relating to the disposal of German rights in Kiao-chau-Shantung:

The Chinese delegation beg to express their deep disappointment at the settlement proposed by the Council of the Prime Ministers of the Kiao-chau-Shantung question, upon which settlement alone the clauses in this draft treaty of peace with Germany relating to the disposal of German rights in the said Chinese province seem to be based. They feel certain that their disappointment will be shared in all its intensity by the Chinese nation. The proposed settlement appears to have been made without giving due regard to the consideration of right, justice and the national security of China—consideration which the Chinese delegation emphasized time and again in their hearings before the Council of the prime ministers and secretaries of foreign affairs and the Council of the prime ministers. They have registered a formal protest with the Council of the prime ministers against the proposed settlement in the hope of having it revised, and if such revision cannot be had, they deem it their duty to make a reservation on the said clauses, now.

The glittering crystal chandeliers cast flickering lights upon a gloomy body of statesmen during the solemn rite in the Hall of the Clock. "The scene suggested a funeral," an ambassador told me. "The atmosphere was decidedly oppressive." At fifteen minutes past five o'clock, Clemenceau rose from his chair, and the delegates departed from the Quai d'Orsay.

CHAPTER XXXIV

CHINA DID NOT SIGN

WHEN M. Clemenceau took his seat in the Hall of Mirrors, on June 28, and settled himself to receive the unwilling signatures of the German delegates, a Quai d'Orsay messenger handed the president of the peace conference a sealed letter. The "Tiger" thrust his gray-gloved finger under the flap, opened the envelope, glanced at the missive, and, crumpling envelope and letter, tossed them both at his feet.

After the celebrated pen-scratching of Versailles, a friend of mine rescued the envelope. He was just too late to salvage the letter, but he saw it in the hands of the lucky finder, who has kept it as a souvenir of the signing of the peace treaty. The crumpled paper, discarded with a growl by the "Tiger," was a note from one of the Chinese delegates regretting the circumstances that made it impossible for China to put her "chop" on the longest and most famous contract in the history of the human family.

The incident illustrates the actual attitude of the Conference of Paris towards the few surviving really ancient nations. The Chinese were not alone in maltreatment. India came under the wire as a vassal state. Lord Sinha was a sort of higher caste riksha coolie for Mr. Lloyd George. Ireland, a member of the Council of Constance (November, 1414), was ignored as a rebel British military possession during the Conference of Paris (1919). The ancient Egyptians had less chance of signing than the Sphinx. The Greeks could and did sign as a sovereign nation, but with that second-class treatment reserved for supposedly second-rate people with a past.

Homer's harp would have burst its strings in rage could the instrument of the blind bard have been touched by a tithe of the indignity heaped upon chivalrous Mr. Venizelos, who made us all believe that Byron did not sing or drown in vain.

The Chinese paid in full for the proud blunders of dead Manchu masters who, in their paper-dragon period, had pinched the corns of Lords Macartney, Amherst, Napier, and Elgin. The only references to China in the Shantung articles are such as one makes to the horse in a horse trade. The horse is not a party to the bargain in a horse trade, although he is *the* part of the bargain.

The text as it appears in the Treaty of Versailles is as follows:

SECTION VIII

SHANTUNG

ARTICLE 156

Germany renounces, in favor of Japan, all her rights, title and privileges—particularly those concerning the territory of Kiaochau, railways, mines and submarine cables—which she acquired in virtue of the Treaty concluded by her with China on March 6, 1898, and of all other arrangements relative to the Province of Shantung.

All German rights in the Tsingtau-Tsinanfu Railway, including its branch lines, together with its subsidiary property of all kinds, stations, shops, fixed and rolling stock, mines, plant and material for the exploitation of the mines, are and remain acquired by Japan, together with all rights and privileges attaching thereto.

The German State submarine cables from Tsingtau to Shanghai and from Tsingtau to Chefoo, with all the rights, privileges and properties attaching thereto, are similarly acquired by Japan, free and clear of all charges and encumbrances.

ARTICLE 157

The movable and immovable property owned by the German State in the territory of Kiaochau, as well as all the rights, which Germany might claim in consequence of the works or improvements made or of the expenses incurred by her, directly or indirectly, in connection with this territory, are and remain acquired by Japan free and clear of all charges and encumbrances.

ARTICLE 158

Germany shall hand over to Japan within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the archives, registers, plans, title-deeds and documents of every kind, wherever they may be, relating to the administration, whether civil, military, financial, judicial or other, of the territory of Kiaochau.

Within the same period Germany shall give particulars to Japan of all treaties, arrangements or agreements relating to the rights, title or privileges referred to in the two preceding Articles.

Mr. Lou and Dr. Wang rode out to Versailles and took part in the presentation of the treaty to the Germans, on May 7, just four years to the minute after Yuan had received the Japanese ultimatum from Dr. Hioki. It was a magnificent day.

I shall never forget my impressions of the noble old château and its stately park, the colorful scenery of St.-Cloud, the police barriers and the staring suburbanites, and the representation of all the races within our own inclosure from the garden gates to the palace portals. Versailles is one of the most beautiful spots on earth, on any day. On a fine May day, it is a masterpiece of God and his civilized creature, man. Our day was just warm enough to be pleasant; a delightful breeze, laden with the scent of fragrant flowers, kissing the sparkling sunshine and making it behave; because, you see, we had quite a number of lady reporters and lady diplomats (and lady spies), and they did not want to powder their noses too often or, still less, have them glisten in rivalry with the famous fountains and Mrs. Diana's (or was it La Maintenon's or La Vallière's?) bath.

"Some tub!" was the disrespectful comment of one of Mr. Hearst's young men. An English dowager sniffed disdainful disapproval.

That bath, or the artificial lakes, could not have contained the unshed tears of China. To her credit, China faced the situation with dry eyes and a stiff upper lip. I dropped in upon Dr. Wang after he had returned to his suite from the presentation ceremony.

"Are you going to sign?" I asked him.

"No, indeed," he answered firmly and without the least hesitation. "Peking is supporting our stand, I am glad to say."

"It may do good in China," I said.

"Yes," agreed Dr. Wang. "We have learned a rude lesson, Pat; a rude lesson, indeed!"

"It puts you in a delicate and difficult position?"

"It does. Here, we have been telling our people: 'Follow the example and advice of the friendly Western powers! Look to the friendly West for help!' Can you blame those of our people who may say, 'Well, we took your advice, and we followed your leadership, and see what the "friendly" West has done for us'? The hopes of the Chinese people for a new world order have received a shocking rebuff."

Dr. Koo was packing up his papers at 5, Rue Charles Lamoureux when I called upon him that afternoon.

"You are leaving?" I asked him.

"Yes," he replied; "there is nothing more that I can do here."

"Of course, you could not accept the Kiaochau decision?"

"No, of course not. I am opposed to the Kiaochau decision; and, if necessary, I would rather not sign the treaty at all than be forced to accept this disposition of Chinese rights to Japan by attaching to it the signature of the Chinese delegates."

He told me that he had engaged passage for himself and his assistants on the *Savoie*, which was due to sail about the end of the month. Later, under instructions from Peking, Dr. Koo remained in Paris, and the steamship reservations were canceled. Dr. Koo said:

"You know, Gallagher, I am as much concerned for America as for China, because my studies, my ideas, are as much American as Chinese. It worries me to think what the consequences may be, because it will be hard for our people to understand how this could have come about."

The Chinese delegates, immediately they confirmed the character of the decision, had held a meeting and cabled their resignations to Peking. In the quaint old manner of "Middle Kingdom" official etiquette, they told their government that they had failed "because of their unworthiness" and asked to be punished. Peking cabled back to them to stand pat, that they had done well and were not to blame. On May 6, the Peking cabinet instructed them not to sign a peace treaty assigning the German rights in Shantung to Japan.

This cablegram reached the Hôtel Lutetia on May 9, coincident with a message from Canton to the same purport. The Paris newspapers published fiery despatches, detailing the excitement in the Far East. Five thousand Chinese students had marched in a body to the legation quarter in Peking, intending to ask the Western diplomats to intercede for China with the Big Three. A foreign policeman stopped them at the gate. The students then paraded to one of the numerous houses of the intriguing minister for communications, Tsao Ju-lin, the author of much of the trouble with Japan, and set it on fire. After it was burned down, the crowd turned its attention to Chang Tsung-hsiang, minister to Tokio, who was in Peking for consultation with the cabinet. The students beat up Chang, who with Tsao and Lu Chung-yu, another member of the camarilla, resigned and went into hiding.

We had known for some time that steps were to be taken to revive the Chinese financial consortium under a new plan prepared by Dr. Reinsch, with the approval of the American state department, and submitted to China and the Allies at the end of July, 1918. The state department, our legation in Peking, American and foreign experts in Chinese financial and economic problems, and the foreign offices of England, France, and Japan were engaged in negotiations on this matter, between August and May. As the old six-power group expired under limitation on June 18, it was necessary to get the new organization started before that date. Immediately after the announcement of the Shantung decision (April 30) I had been

advised confidentially by American officials that a meeting would be held in Paris about May 15. Alarming reports from the Far East were stated to be the reason why the meeting was hurriedly advanced to May 12, when Mr. Thomas W. Lamont (of J. P. Morgan & Co.), Sir Charles Addis (representing the English group), M. Simon (for the French group), and Mr. Odagiri (for the Japanese bankers) went into session and "approved in principle the new Chinese financial consortium." Mr. Lamont insisted to me, next day, that the American plan had been accepted by his European and Japanese confrères. I told him that my information did not go that far. Our European and Japanese friends had merely approved "in principle," just like the "Fourteen Points." The American proposal had lain on the Allied tables for several months before the English or the French government acknowledged its existence. The Japanese were very keen for American participation in plans for Chinese reconstruction, but I was well aware of certain serious objections that had been raised by British and French experts, and by Japanese experts, too. Our proposals were regarded as too ideal to be practicable; and, as will be seen later, there was a huge rock in the road—the stand we were taking along the line of the Taft-Knox precedents in the matter of the Manchurian railways. I cabled to the "Herald" that the new consortium was launched in most inauspicious circumstances. In the first place, while officials at the Crillon were heralding it forth as a sort of *amende propre* to China (a pill intended to remove the indigestible matter that had been rammed down China's throat on April 30), the American and Allied governments had failed to extend to China the courtesy of recognition as a party at interest in the new financial octopus. There were, just then, at the Hôtel Lutetia, Chinese experts of note, Mr. C. C. Wang, Mr. Yeh Kung-cho, and others. I lunched with Mr. Wang and Mr. Yeh, on May 12, and they knew absolutely nothing about what was being done by Mr. Lamont, Sir Charles, and their associates. That was an unpardonable blunder. I said

so to Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, an able and sensible member of the American delegation. Mr. Baruch was quick to see the point. He told me that he wished the mistake had not happened. There was no reason for barring the Chinese from the meeting of May 12, particularly if the intention was to soothe the injured feelings of China. Japanese officials sustained my criticism. They recognized the blunder, and were frank enough to regret it, openly.

Certain of the provisions inserted in the American plan were not likely to expedite operations. China's need was, and is, immediate relief, and that could not be obtained by casting upon the body of purely business projects huge rocks of vexed Far Eastern higher politics. It was a foregone conclusion that England and France, as well as Japan, would fight shy of proposals that sought much from them and offered no adequate return; and this, despite the unquestioned honesty and idealism of the American plan.

On May 17 Viscount Uchida issued the following statement:

The recent development of the international situation has given rise to numerous diplomatic questions of great moment, the satisfactory settlement of which can only be arrived at in an atmosphere of good will and mutual confidence among the powers concerned.

To attain this desirable end, each nation should be guided by calm and unbiased judgment in its estimate of the conduct of foreign nations. While careful not to lose sight of its own standpoint, it should not forget to appreciate the standpoint of other peoples and to seek to adjust and harmonize the special positions from which these questions are viewed by each party.

Suspicion or prejudice not warranted by the actual facts, or a display of selfishness without due weight being accorded to the interests of others is deplorable in any case, and is doubly dangerous at the present moment, when the whole structure of international relations is in process of reorganization looking to the establishment of a solid and lasting peace.

My attention has recently been called to certain articles in the press, both at home and abroad, which viewed in this light, are much to be regretted. Grave charges, for instance have from time to time been made in some of the Japanese papers against the attitude of friendly nations in China, Siberia or Korea, without any

evidence in support of those allegations and without regard to the serious consequences which may follow them, compromising the position of this country.

It is not denied, on the other hand, that certain sections of foreign journalists in China have equally been disseminating mischievous reports in misapprehension or misrepresentation of the true aims of Japan. Some of them have even gone so far as to level at Japan the preposterous reproach that she had contemplated the conclusion of a secret alliance with Germany while the war was in progress.

There is, however, no reason why we should follow their ill-advised example and indulge ourselves in similar proceedings calculated to create international mistrust and estrangement.

If concrete facts are shown justifying apprehension that our legitimate rights and interests are being disregarded by any foreign power, the only effective means of defending those rights and interests is to communicate with the power in question fairly and frankly, pointing out the actual facts of the case which may thus have engaged our attention. Certainly no such ground of apprehension is at present anywhere to be discovered, but should it ever happen to exist the government will always be found ready to proceed to necessary measures on the lines above laid down.

Turning to our relations with China, I learn with as much regret as surprise that in certain quarters serious misgivings are entertained as to our true and genuine intention and that we are even credited with the design to modify our avowed policy of restitution to China of the territory of Kiaochau.

I can only indorse and reaffirm the statement issued to the press by Baron Makino at Paris on May 4 defining Japan's position in reference to the Shantung question. Japan will keep every word which she has passed. The Shantung peninsula will be handed back to China in full sovereignty and all arrangements made to promote the mutual benefit of the two nations will be loyally observed.

It will be remembered that China by joining in the present war has secured from the associated powers a suspension of the payment of the Boxer indemnity and the raising of the Chinese Customs tariff to an effective five per cent. She will secure from Germany terms of much value to her by the forthcoming treaty of peace. We have gladly given our support to the legitimate aspirations of China in all these matters, and we will faithfully hold to the policy which was announced at the last session of the Imperial diet with a view to placing our relations with China upon a basis of justice and mutual helpfulness.

On the same day (May 17) it was announced in Paris that the Russian political conference had entered a protest against revision of the Russo-Chinese treaties and conventions. This protest was signed by Mr. Sazanof, president of the Paris council of Russian ministers, and was in the following terms:

Welcoming the regeneration of China, and admitting in principle the utility of revising in the future agreements which have become out of date, the Russian Conference insists that no revision of treaties is admissible without the participation of the Russian national government.

On May 22, after a consultation between members of the Chinese delegation and officials of the American delegation, the Chinese notified M. Clemenceau of China's willingness to sign the treaty with reservations.

In view of what happened later in Washington, it is interesting to recall the fact, within the personal knowledge of many persons, that the American delegation was then unhesitatingly in favor of reservations. We had entered a strong and dignified reservation, embodied in the protocols, against the decision regarding the trial and punishment of the Kaiser and other heads of enemy states, although our Mr. Lansing presided over the deliberations of that particular commission. Japan and other nations had filed reservations. On May 23, the Washington Bureau of the Associated Press sent out the following despatch:

The reservation under which the treaty will be signed [by the Chinese] is regarded here as ample to insure the Chinese government opportunity to bring before the Council of the League of Nations their claim to the absolute and unqualified restoration of the whole of the Shantung peninsula, notwithstanding the efforts made by the Japanese delegates to have this matter of title declared *res adjudicata*. It was pointed out in Chinese circles, today, that by signing the treaty the Chinese delegates would prevent China from being excluded from the League of Nations, and would insure the protection of the League against unjust treatment.

During the next few days we learned how the Peking Cabi-

net ministers had resigned in a body, but the President refused to accept their resignation; how the anti-Japanese boycott was spreading, and American and British missionaries, merchants, and others were supporting the Chinese protest; how all the Chinese students in Peking and other cities had gone on strike; and how Senator Lodge, "The New York Herald" and "The New York Times" condemned the Shantung decision, the Republican leader being quoted as declaring that the Senate would never approve the Big Three's Shantung award.

Until Mr. Wilson had read the Root proposals and the Knox resolution, and the Paris atmosphere became charged with premonitions of American senatorial determination to "cut the heart out of the treaty" by means of reservations, the Chinese were supported in their stand for reservations by the American delegation. On May 25, Mr. Henry Wales of the Chicago "Tribune" cabled to his newspaper that the Crillon was still for a Chinese reservation. About the beginning of June, the Chinese crisis became acute. The Shanghai peace conference had come to an end on receipt of the news from Paris, and the Canton politicians were venting their spleen upon the heads of the Northern militarists, whom they blamed for China's disappointment. The Japanese authorities gave a friendly warning to the Chinese government to exercise some restraint upon the anti-Japanese agitators who, it was asserted, with American and European connivance, were instigating the anti-Japanese boycott. It was a matter of comment that an American official in China was one of the signatories and prime movers in Chinese protests closely identified with the anti-Japanese boycott machine. On June 14, President Hsu Shih-chang, being between the devil and the deep sea, offered his resignation. He was prevailed upon to continue functioning. On June 26, M. Pichon informed Mr. Lou that the Chinese delegation would not be permitted to sign with a reservation. Immediately this message reached the Hôtel Lutetia, the Chinese went into conference. It was decided by

the Chinese to ask permission to sign with a declaration of their objections. A letter requesting permission to do this was delivered at the Quai d'Orsay. On the following afternoon an answer was returned, denying the Chinese petition. M. Pichon's letter was curt. Strong efforts had been made by the Chinese to induce Mr. Wilson to take up the cudgels for them. At first Mr. Wilson supported them, but, about June 26, he swung around to the French and British point of view, and he concurred in the decision against reservations. At the last moment, the President was induced to make a final appeal for his Chinese friends. He succeeded in extracting the concession that the Chinese might make a declaration of their position, *after*, but *not before*, signing. The Chinese considered this suggestion and rejected it. They knew it would not protect their attack upon the 1915-18 conventions. They remained in session until the small hours of the morning of June 28, anxiously awaiting word from Peking. To sign or not to sign? The Peking cablegram telling them not to sign did not reach Paris until after Mr. Lou had sent to M. Clemenceau China's last word, before the signing of the treaty in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. About three hours before peace was signed, with the Chinese seats vacant and a vacancy on the page prepared for China's "chop," the following letter was carried by a Chinese secretary to the Quai d'Orsay:

PARIS, June 28, 1919.

His Excellency, Georges Clemenceau,
President of the Peace Conference:

In proceeding to sign the treaty of peace with Germany today, the undersigned, plenipotentiaries of the Republic of China, considering as unjust Articles 156, 157, and 158, therein, which purport to transfer German rights in the Chinese province of Shantung to Japan instead of restoring them to China, the rightful sovereign over the territory and a loyal co-partner in war on the side of the allied and associated powers, hereby declare in the name and on behalf of their Government, that their signing of the treaty is not to be understood as precluding China from demanding at a suitable moment the reconsideration of the Shantung question, to the end

that the injustice to China may be rectified in the interest of permanent peace in the Far East.

LOU TSENG-TSIANG.

CHEN-TING THOMAS WANG.

It was M. Dutasta who delivered the reply, by word of mouth; that the Big Three would not permit China to sign with that declaration a matter of official record.

Peace was signed on the fifth anniversary of the murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the incident that had precipitated the World War. Millions of men, women, and children, and billions of property were destroyed, because of the assassination of a mediocre junior member of the kings' union. While the proposed Chinese declaration was barred, General Smuts lodged a written protest with his signature. The Boer delegate declared that the peace was unsatisfactory; the indemnities stipulated could not be accepted without grave danger to the industrial revival of Europe; the territorial arrangements required revision, and the guarantees demanded were too drastic and out of harmony with the pacific temperament necessary for a real peace. Now, it was notable that the man who had conceived the one plan to enforce peace that the Conference of Paris deemed practicable was the one protesting delegate when the peace was signed. American newspapers on the morning of June 28 carried the following Associated Press Washington despatch:

Until very recently it was thought possible, here, that the Chinese might sign the treaty, in view of private assurances, said to have been given her representatives, that Japan's tenure of Shantung would not be long. China, it also had been believed, would probably assent to the treaty and leave the Shantung question to be worked out by the League.

The Chinese decision is believed here to be based on these points:

First: That the delegation was unable to obtain definite assurances that Japan would give up the Shantung provinces within a short time, and that the Japanese tenure would not be permitted to run to the remainder of the 99-year period under which Germany held the territory.

Second: That assurances were lacking that Japan would relinquish control of the railroad from Tsingtau to Tsinanfu, the Tsingtau-Chefoo-Shanghai cables, and facilities at the port of Tsingtau.

Failure of China to sign the treaty, officials say, will probably exclude her from the League of Nations, including certain rights of redress under that covenant, as well as work to her detriment in the resumption of trade.

It is an important part of the record that, when it became apparent that the Chinese could not be coaxed or bludgeoned into signing the treaty, the attitude of most of the Western officials, including the ranking Americans, became nasty. From their point of view, China was a nuisance. Indeed, they could not pronounce the word "China" without losing some expert tempers. On the evening of June 28, the Chinese delegation made the following statement to the press:

After failing in all earnest attempts at conciliation, and after seeing every honorable compromise rejected, the Chinese delegation had no course open save to adhere to the path of duty to their country.

Rather than accept by their signatures the Shantung articles in the treaty, against which their sense of right and justice militated, they refrained from signing the treaty altogether. The Chinese plenipotentiaries regret having to take a course which appears to mar the solidarity of the allied and associated powers, but they are firmly of the opinion, however, that responsibility for this rests not with themselves, who had no other honorable course, but rather with those who, it is felt, unjustly and unnecessarily deprived them of the right of making a declaration to safeguard against any interpretation which might preclude China from asking for reconsideration of the Shantung question at a suitable moment in the future, in the hope that the injustice to China might be rectified later in the interest of permanent peace in the Far East.

The Peace Conference having denied China justice in the settlement of the Shantung question, and having today, in effect, prevented the delegation from signing the treaty without sacrificing their sense of right, justice, and patriotic duty, the Chinese delegates submit their case to the impartial judgment of the world.

On August 11, the Peking Parliament (of sorts) declared

that "a state of war no longer exists between China and Germany." Toward midnight on September 15, despite warnings against this course, President Hsu-Shih-chang issued a mandate declaring peace with Germany—a separate peace—and bestowing the grand order of merit upon General Tuan Chi-jui, who as premier brought China into the war and then, by his maladministration of the war participation bureau, justified the powers in labeling China "a lame-duck ally." The mandate said among other things:

Although, owing to our disapproval of the three articles concerning Shantung, we have refused to sign the treaty with Germany, yet we recognize all the other articles, *as do our Allies*. Now that the war is ended, we as one of the Allied nations, shall henceforth regard ourselves as in the same position as our Allies.

In other words, while repudiating the Shantung articles, the careful mandarins, with bland Peking naïveté, scrupulously put out their hands to grasp those clauses in the treaty that benefited China. They were not to be blamed for that—or, indeed, for anything. "China's weakness," once more had "~~invited insult~~." So the Chinese did the best that they could do. Their blunders, as well as their woes, were made in Europe, in America, and in Japan. None of the Allies could afford to throw stones at the gentlemen inhabiting glass houses nigh the Peiho.

BOOK SIX
UNFINISHED BUSINESS

CHAPTER XXXV

THE FAR EASTERN QUESTION

THE Far Eastern question, reduced to plain language, is as follows, Are the Asiatic peoples entitled to self-development and full sovereignty over their own soil, or is it the will of the Western nations that Asia must follow Africa into bondage, and America and Australia into a change of life, in which the natives of the soil can hope to have little or no part?

In considering this question, it will be well to remember that the human element must be the decisive factor. European conquest of the greater part of the world has not been accidental. The finer and more adventurous branches of our parent (Asiatic) tree stretched themselves forth, matured and blossomed, and dropped their fruit on soil that gave to the seed rich germs of a new vitality; and to the young trees that reared themselves upon crag and peak and marsh and fen, new forms and a finer flare for accomplishment. Whenever it has become a question of the survival of the fittest, the migratory peoples have always conquered the stationary peoples. Movement imparted strength. Resting and rutting begat rotteness. The exceptions to this rule are those of nomadic races that lacked the power of shedding their primitive handicaps,—fruit from branches that were cast out because they were tainted,—and stationary races that conserved their strength by heroic means. The American Indians were migratory, and achieved their own extinction. The vigorous, restless, ambitious new Japan is the child of almost three centuries of self-consumption. Japan kept fit, mentally and physically and spiritually, by “fierce wars and faithful loves” under the Japanese roof-tree.

Asia is a vast graveyard of civilizations, some of which are older than the legends and traditions brought into Europe and Africa by prehistoric pioneers. Admirably has Lord Curzon epitomized the mighty meaning of Asia:

It has been the cradle of our race, the birthplace of our language, the hearthstone of our religion, the fountain-head of the best of our ideas. Wide as is the chasm that now severs us, with its philosophy our thought is still interpenetrated. The Asian continent has supplied a scene for the principal events, and a stage for the most famous figures in history. Of Asian parentage is that force which, more than any other influence, has transformed and glorified mankind—viz., the belief in a single deity. Five of the six greatest moral teachers that the world has seen—Buddha, Moses, Confucius, Jesus and Mohammed—were born of Asian parents, and lived upon Asian soil. Roughly speaking, their creeds may be said to have divided the conquest of the universe. The most famous or the wisest of kings—Solomon, Nebuchadnezzar, Cyrus, Timur, Baber, Akbar—have sat upon Asian thrones. . . . The three most populous existing empires—Great Britain, Russia, and China—are Asian empires; and it is because they are not merely European but Asian, that the two former are included in the category. From Asia also sprung the most terrible phenomena by which humanity has ever been scourged—the Turki Nadir Shah, the Mongol Jinghiz Khan.—“Problems of the Far East,” 1894.

In 1246, the Mongol conqueror thus made answer to Pope Innocent IV:

The series of your letters contained that we ought to be baptized and to become Christians; we briefly reply, that we do not understand why we ought to do so. As to what is mentioned in your letters, that you wonder at the slaughter of men, and chiefly of Christians, especially Hungarians, Poles and Moravians, we shortly answer, that this too we do not understand. Nevertheless, lest we should seem to pass it over in silence, we think proper to reply as follows: It is because they have not obeyed the precept of God and of Genghis Khan, and, holding bad counsel, have slain our messengers;¹ wherefore God has ordered them to be destroyed, and delivered them into our hands. But if God had not done it, what

¹ Allusion is here made to Tatar ambassadors, whom the Russians murdered before the Battle of Khalka.

could man have done to man? But you, inhabitants of the West, believe that you only are Christians, and despise others; but how do you know on whom He may choose to bestow His favor? We adore God, and in His strength, will overwhelm the whole earth from the east to the west. But if we men were not strengthened by God, what could we do?—"The Status of Aliens in China," V. K. Wellington Koo, p. 16.

From the most ancient times, Manchuria has been the spawning-ground of the major Asiatic questions. The Valley of the Liao and the slopes of the "Ever-White Mountains" share with the fruitful regions between the Euphrates and the Tigris and "The Wall of God" towering over India, the distinction of dominating the destiny of mankind. These are the two definite starting points of all history; and, as modern Western civilization may be said to be the harvest garnered from the "Garden of Eden," so, too, modern Eastern civilization is the crop that has been raised from the "Garden of the Gods." As our fathers told us of a woman and an apple, so their fathers told them of "the women and the red fruit." The Liao goddesses ate the fruit and conceived, and thus, the chroniclers say, they sent forth the hardy adventurers who have peopled and ruled Japan, founded Korea, and reigned over China, Russia, Thibet, and the greater part of the Old World. Always, these active human streams have collided with and been absorbed by the huge, passive bulk of China; the stalwart, stubborn sons of Han, very ancient, very civilized, very proud, very patient, and the most conservative among all the races of mankind.

The modern evolution of the Far Eastern question dates from the first half of the sixteenth century, when (in 1537) the Portuguese established a trading-post at Macao. The maritime struggle between Portugal, Spain, Holland, and Great Britain is written deep into the history of the Asiatic coast. As the contest developed, leaving England predominant and the French (and later for a time the Germans) ultimate heirs of the original European continental aspirants for power,

prestige and profit on the China seaboard, Russia pushed her hordes east and south.

The spirit in which Russia advanced to take away the land of the Asiatic was thus expressed by Mr. Menshikof in the "Novoe Vremya," April, 1912:

Our time-honored policy, from the days of the Variags down to the reign of the Emperor Alexander III, was founded on the axiom that Russia needs territorial expansion at the expense of her neighbors.—Bland, "Recent Events and Present Policies in China," p. 342.

It was in sheer lust for more land that the Cossacks swept across Siberia, and by 1637, stood on the shores of the Pacific at the Sea of Okhotsk. The late General John W. Foster, one-time secretary of state of the United States, says that

The Amur river had become a part of the (Russo-Chinese) boundary, and Mongolia and Manchuria touched the Russian frontier. The aggressive spirit of the Czar's representatives soon brought them into conflict with the Chinese, resulting in a state of war, in which the Russians were worsted and sought for a peaceful adjustment. This brought about the treaty of Nipehu or Neverchinsk, signed in 1689; and . . . it was the first treaty negotiated by the Emperor of China upon terms of equality with a European power.—"American Diplomacy in the Orient," p. 17.

The signing of this treaty was witnessed by Father Gerbillon, who tells how the envoys

Rising together and holding each the copies of the treaty of peace, swore in the name of their masters to observe them faithfully, taking Almighty God, the sovereign Lord of all things, to witness the sincerity of their intentions.

Neither party was sincere. The Russians were suspicious and avaricious; the Chinese were suspicious and steeped in the stubborn and foolish belief that they could save themselves by prancing behind the stone wall of a supposed racial superiority. General Foster tells that

The treaty of 1689 did not secure satisfactory results, and in 1719

another ambassador, Ismailoff, was sent to Peking to secure better trade facilities. When his train reached the frontier, a curious incident occurred, illustrative of an oriental peculiarity. Some of the Russians had brought their wives with them. "We have enough women in Peking," the Chinese official said. Appeal was made to the emperor, many weeks were lost, and at the end the women had to be sent back.

In order to understand the hidden irony of the treatment meted out to the Chinese delegates in Paris, it is necessary to know that the Chinese officials of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries omitted no act or word that they believed would humiliate the "Western foreign devil." They insulted the Western ambassadors. Describing the experience of Lord Macartney's fruitless embassy to the Emperor K'ien Lung in 1793, a member of the party says:

We entered Peking like paupers; we remained in it like prisoners; and we quitted it like vagrants. Anderson, "Narrative of British Embassy," p. 237.

On April 22, 1834, the British East India Company ceased to exercise monopoly of British trade with China. An act of parliament authorized William IV to name a commission to regulate that trade. Lord Napier was made chief commissioner, and he arrived with a suitable suite in Canton on June 25. His lordship forwarded King William's commission to the governor of Canton. The governor did his best to insult Lord Napier out of the Canton River, but the British peer stuck to his guns. Then the governor insisted that the British King's letter must be described as a "pin" (that is, petition from a "person of abject inferiority") and he wrote forthwith to the emperor that a "barbarian eye" (superintendent) had dared to offer him an envelope "on which there was absurdly written the characters, *Great English Nation*." That, according to the Chinese official, was insufferable impudence; so he sent a messenger with this answer to Lord Napier:

This nation has its laws. Even England has its laws. How much

more the Celestial Empire! How flaming bright are its great laws and ordinances, more terrible than the awful thunderbolts! Under this whole bright heaven, none dares to disobey them. Under its shelter are the four seas. Subject to its soothing care are ten thousand kingdoms. The said barbarian *eye* [Lord Napier] having come over a sea of several myriads of miles in extent to examine and have superintendence of barbarian affairs, he must be a man thoroughly acquainted with the principles of high dignity.

The poor, proud Chinese paper-dragon was lashing its silly tail, inviting the "gunboat policy" that the English and French applied to bring The Middle Kingdom to a true sense of the actual international proportions.

Despite the fact that from our earliest intercourse with China, in 1784, we had gone out of our way to lavish upon them abundant proofs of unselfish friendship, it cannot be said that the Chinese mandarins of the first half of the nineteenth century paid us in coin from our own mint. To secure a treaty with China, a President of the United States violated our fundamental laws and created the one and only "Count of the American Commonwealth," "Count" Caleb Cushing, a Yankee lawyer, belongs to history as our House of Lords, and all of it. This is the letter that "Count" Cushing carried out to the Emperor of China, in 1834-43:

I, John Tyler, President of the United States of America—which states are [here follows a list of the then twenty-six states]—send you this letter of peace and friendship, signed by my own hand.

I hope your health is good. China is a great empire, extending over a great part of the earth. The Chinese are numerous. You have millions and millions of subjects. The twenty-six United States are as large as China(!) though our people are not so numerous. The rising sun looks upon the great mountains and rivers of China. When he sets, he looks upon rivers and mountains equally large in the United States. . . . Now my words are, that the governments of two such great countries should be at peace. It is proper, and according to the will of Heaven, that we should respect each other, and act wisely. I, therefore send to you Count Caleb Cushing, one of the wise and learned men of this country. On his arrival in your country, he will inquire for your health. . . . Our minister is authorized to make a treaty to regulate trade. Let it be just. Let there be

no unfair advantage on either side. And so may your health be good, and may peace reign.—Senate Document, 138, pp. 1-8, 28th Congress, 2nd session.

After much mandarin rigmarole, "Count" Cushing managed to get the treaty since then associated with his name. It was signed in a Chinese temple at Wanghiya, near Macao, on July 3, 1844. Nevertheless, the mandarins of The Middle Kingdom were still unwilling to have anything to do with "barbarian eyes."

Commissioner Marshall wrote to the department of state that

"The Chinese government . . . concedes justice only in the presence of a force able and willing to exact it."

Commissioner McLane declared that

"Diplomatic intercourse can only be had with this [the Chinese] government at the cannon's mouth."

"The peaceful Dr. [Peter] Parker was so aroused by the many indignities shown to his government that he strongly favored an alliance of the United States with Great Britain in the ["Arrow"] War."—"American Diplomacy in the Orient," p. 225.

Dr. Parker, an American missionary who was secretary of the Cushing embassy and later United States commissioner in China, proposed a "temporary" partition of the empire.

His plan was that France should take possession of Korea, Great Britain of Chusan, and the United States of the island of Formosa, and *hold them as hostages till a satisfactory settlement of all questions was attained.*—"American Diplomacy in the Orient," p. 229.

To these belligerent proposals, Secretary of State William L. Marcy replied by stating America's policy in Asia in words that have become memorable:

The British government evidently have objects beyond those contemplated by the United States, and we ought not to be drawn along with it, however anxious it may be for our coöperation.

Lord Elgin expected American support in the Anglo-French

war with China (1856-60). It was during that campaign that the American Commodore Tattnall, who was escorting to Peking our second minister to China, Mr. John E. Ward, went to the assistance of the British naval commander, Admiral Hope, and defended his conduct with the famous phrase, "blood is thicker than water." Tattnall's acts and words were contrary to the wishes and instructions of President Buchanan, who had declined a formal invitation to make common cause with the English and the French against China. Buchanan continued the friendly, coaxing policy of Franklin Pierce, and it was his secretary of state, Lewis Cass, who outlined for the first time in definite and clear terms our general policy in China. He said that

The policy of the United States is one of peace; it has no political views connected with the Chinese Empire; and, owing to the differences in manners and traits of national character, true wisdom seems to dictate moderation, discretion and the work of time in the attempt to open China to trade and intercourse.

Nevertheless, our good intentions did not dent the false pride of the mandarins. They wanted Minister Ward first to kowtow, and after he refused to do that, to bow on one knee to his celestial majesty. Mr. Ward refused, saying, "I kneel only to God and woman." "The Emperor," replied the mandarin, "is the same as God." "Not so you could notice it," said Mr. Ward, who retired from the field of Oriental diplomacy a sadder and a wiser man. General Foster declared:

His treatment at Peking was an affront to himself and his country, but one which he could not well have anticipated, and through which he bore himself with dignity and self-possession. It was a part of the policy adopted by his government even to accept affronts with forbearance and exercise patience towards a people with very different traits of national character and education.

A fundamental element, a menacing element, in the Far Eastern question is the stubborn pride of the Chinese people. Yet from a purely contemplative point of view its astounding

vitality is one of the wonderful facts of China. There is little, if anything, to warrant the conclusion that Chinese pride has abated a single jot since the Anglo-French Allies shelled their way into Peking, burned and plundered the imperial palace, and frightened the Son of Heaven into the famous flight to Jehol in 1860.

“Since then,” said Dr. Koo to me in Paris, “China has never been given a single chance. If it was not Japan, it was Russia or Germany or England and France.”

That is true, and it will be well for all Western people to remember that before China spurned their diplomats and relegated them to “halls of the tributary nations,” rough master mariners and their ruder crews, and intriguing spies wearing the mantle of the Master, gave the Chinese and the Japanese good cause to call them “Western foreign devils” and to suspect and repel “barbarian eyes.”

CHAPTER XXXVI

RACIAL AND NATIONAL EQUALITY

AMERICANS often ask, What do the Japanese mean when they plead for racial and national equality? Almost invariably, they are bewildered or offended by the Japanese or American answers. Now, obviously, not all these answers can be born out of a desire to malign or to injure the Japanese. They are not interested in injuring themselves.

In their earlier days the people of San Francisco and our Pacific coast saw in the awakening of the Orient a star of hope beckoning them onward over the ocean to vast trading possibilities. It would be absurd to assume that the Americans of the Pacific slope have so degenerated in intelligence that they would deliberately cut the throat of their own trading opportunities. Trade requiring amicable relations and a peaceful prospect, men like Mr. Hiram Johnson or Mr. Phelan would not willingly hamstring the trading future of their state merely to satisfy some selfish spite. Now, this is written with some knowledge and a whole-hearted indorsement of the Californian desire to put a stop to Japanese colonization in that great State. Japanese segregation and competition in California have developed into a dangerous menace to America and to Japan. It must be removed. Because we shall have to cut this cancer out of our system, no people are more interested than are the Californians themselves in knowing just what the Japanese mean when they ask for racial and national equality.

Is it in our own interest or against our own interest to support or to oppose the Japanese demand for racial and national

equality? It is not good American doctrine to espouse the cause of any foreign nation against the interests of even the least of our States. Beyond the constitutional rights of a State, above the responsibility that rests upon the federal power to protect the people of each and every one of the States; apart from motives of prudence that ought not to be lightly disregarded, there is a moral obligation commanding the President and his executive officers to protect the people of a sovereign State, *even against the acts of Congress itself*. The President alone directly represents all the States. He is the embodiment of the federal power; his office, the cornerstone of the commonwealth.

In the case of President Wilson, California had a special title to protection. The Bear State, by its thirteen electoral votes in 1916, continued him in the White House for a second term. It would be unthinkable to assume that Mr. Wilson, a man with an acutely sensitive regard for political morality, could be so ungrateful as to use his power deliberately against the interests of the Californians who retained him in the Presidency. Yet Mr. Wilson's failure to understand this Japanese question did lead him to support a foreign interest against the interests of California and of the United States. I think he himself would say so, if he knew the facts. And he would be entitled to say that he is not to be condemned, because the Californians did not help him to sustain their interests by putting him in possession of the facts. Did they seek to know them?

Take a map of the United States and mark well our Pacific coast. It belongs to us. In a special sense, it belongs to our people of the Pacific coast. It did not come into our possession by accident. Our fathers stretched out their hands and took it. In taking it, they defied the raiding Russians, whose autocrat, Alexander I, sought to take it away from us. It was the fixed intention of Czar Alexander to destroy democracy in the New World, as his Holy Alliance was at that time destroying the offspring of our democracy in the Old World.

Alexander was determined to make the world safe for autocracy. He said so, and most of the victorious reactionaries of Europe supported him. Confronted with this danger (and it was a real, deadly danger), our secretary of state, John Quincy Adams, coaxed President Monroe into declaring the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine conserved for us our Pacific coast. It prevented Russia from stealing it. That was in 1823. England, for purely British reasons,—to protect her growing trade with the infant South American states then in rebellion against Spain,—offered to support us against Russia. England desired us to make a joint pronouncement against Russia. We declined to do that. The Monroe Doctrine was solely United States doctrine; we held aloof from the Panama Congress, because we would not permit the South American states to join us as parties to the Monroe Doctrine. The record is quite clear.¹

Thirty years later, in 1853, we had grown in power and in importance. Along the Pacific coast, we were reaping the fruits of our forethought. We induced the Japanese to break out of a seclusion that had been adopted as a Japanese means of self-defense. Why did the Japanese close their doors in the first half of the seventeenth century? Because Europeans were beginning the partition of Asia, and the Japanese were determined that Japan should not be annexed by any European power. Why did the Japanese assent to our request that they should join the family of modern nations? Because we had convinced great and powerful minds in Japan that we were opposed to the European "gunboat policy" in Asia, and heartily in favor of Japan's determination not to be annexed by any European power.

Just at that time, the English and the French took the part of the Turk against Russia; in their own interest, of course. Russia was defeated in the Crimean War. Then, as later (1877-78), she was turned back from her adventure to the warm waters of southern Europe. The Indian Mutiny that

¹ See Appendix "A."

followed the Crimean War (1856-57) placed the crown of the Mogul Empire on the head of Victoria, and confronted Russia with a strong, persistent rival in Asia. In the "Arrow" war that followed, the British, joined by the French, carried consternation and defeat into China. Russia, pretending to be China's friend, came to the assistance of the Chinese Emperor, Hsien-Feng, who had fled with his court from Peking to Jehol. The price paid by China was Russian annexation of the Amursk regions. Thus came Russia into forcible possession of Asiatic lands, which she utilized thenceforward to menace the very existence of Japan. The facts are not in dispute. Prevented by us from seizing American Pacific coast territory, Russia, aided by weak and foolish China, stole Asiatic Pacific coast territory.

Still, it will be said, Russia supported Lincoln and the North in the Civil War. That is true. What was the reason? A hatred of England that is beyond even hyphenate Irish-American comprehension. The English, with some notable exceptions, very foolishly let cotton conquer their usual prudence. They supported the South. A division of the United States was in line with short-sighted English Tory policy. It seemed to offer the removal of any possibility that a strong republican commonwealth south of 54° 40' might "fight" for possession of the British North American Territory, as it was then called. It suggested the hope, too often expressed in England, that the republic might fail, and all the "rebels" return to the crown. Russia had an interest opposed to that. She desired a strong United States; not too strong, but strong enough to intimidate and to weaken England, her pet enemy. That, and that alone, was the secret of Russia's "sympathy" during the Civil War. She longed to see England humiliated and punished for the capture of Sebastopol and the defeats of the Alma, Inkerman and Balaclava.

In 1868, the Japanese had a very successful revolution. The modern empire was born. One of the first acts of the new Japanese Empire was to send an embassy to the Western

powers, requesting international admission and acceptance of racial and national equality. The embassy sailed from Japan (1870) under American auspices, aboard an American warship, and got its first glimpse of the Western world at the Golden Gate of San Francisco. One of the chief objects sought was that the Japanese should "have the right to govern aliens on *their* soil." It is important to Californians to note this: the Japanese conception of racial and national equality has always recognized "the right to govern aliens"—California's right, America's right, Japan's right. The Japanese campaign all over the world for racial and national equality was begun in America, and it was based upon the fundamental national right to govern aliens. America alone encouraged and supported the Japanese in their just plea. Not one European nation gave ear to the Japanese plaint. Iwakura, Ito, and their companions went back to Japan; and then began Japan's titanic battle against European eminent domain in Asia.

Here I desire to draw attention to a fact of cardinal importance at this time. *The Japanese did not ask us to fight their battle.* All they asked of us was that we should be true to our own stated policy, which opposed the application of European eminent domain in Asia, as in America. They were ready and willing to do their own fighting. They did do their own fighting. They fought and defeated Russia.

Our Philippine policy has ever been opposed to the extension of European eminent domain in Asia. The Japanese have recognized that fact. They were very glad to see us put Spain out of the Philippines and prevent Germany from taking the Philippines. Our acts were in line with Japan's Asiatic and general policy. We declared our object to be "the Philippines for the Filipinos." That tends to conserve "Asia for the Asiatics," the governing note of Japan's policy.

Is "Asia for the Asiatics" a just and reasonable policy? Is it a practical and prudent policy?

Its justice and its reasonableness can be denied only on the

assumption that human needs and public policy require the suppression or extinction of the Asiatic nations. Let it be conceded that the land of the world and the seas of the world, and the air of the world and the wealth of the world, belong to those who make the best use of them. People who prove that they cannot govern themselves must be governed by others. Human welfare and purely practical considerations compel that. India, under British rule, is much better off than her people would be under native misrule. England can do much for world progress in India. Still, if it is lawful, reasonable, and wholesome for a European power to govern Asiatic people, it cannot be unlawful, unreasonable, and unwholesome for an Asiatic power to govern Asiatic people, unless the Asiatic power is convicted of unfitness to govern any people, its own included.

There are about 57,255,000 square miles of land on the earth, inhabited by about 1,600,000,000 people, almost 900,000,000 of whom are Asiatics. These 900,000,000 Asiatics are confronted by the fact that a relatively small minority of the world's population has already annexed to European domination or European settlement Africa, Australia, a large slice of Asia, and the entire American continent, from the north pole to Cape Horn. India is a vassal state. Siam is within the jaws of the Anglo-French nutcracker. The islands south of India are in European possession, and the Russians are in occupation of the northern Asiatic seaboard. Most dangerous of all, China, the largest human and territorial factor in Asia, is overrun by European encroachment and intrigue. Russia will revive. Asia has no guaranty that the new Russia will be one whit less an Asiatic menace than the old Russia. Defense must come from within Asia if Asia is to be saved.¹

¹ Mr. George Bronson Rea, publisher of the "Far Eastern Review," who has been a valuable pioneer in the discussion of the more important Asiatic problems, deserves recognition for the fact that he led the way in pointing out to Americans, and particularly to Californians, the seri-

We do not desire to annex any part of Asia. We do not approve of the further partition of China or Siam. We do desire that the Asiatics may work out their own problems on their own soil, because sad experience has taught us that we cannot assimilate Asiatic immigrants. Consequently, self-interest justifies our policy of "Asia for the Asiatics," formally pronounced in 1852 and 1857, long after we had begun to apply it in 1784. We want to keep the Asiatics in Asia, on their side of the Pacific, and all that strengthens them to withstand the pressure of European eminent domain assists us to keep the big race fight on the right side of the Pacific Ocean, the Asiatic side, where it belongs.

Prestige is an integral part of power. There is only one Asiatic power in Asia. It is doubtful whether for many cen-

ousness of the Russian menace in Asia and its reactions upon American-Japanese questions. In "The Breakdown of American Diplomacy in the Far East" (pp. 131-132) Mr. Rea says:

Forced back upon herself by the policies of the white nations in the Pacific, facing the desperate struggle for existence, for room to expand in, for the assurance of a stable and sufficient food supply, Japan has one of two choices. She may remain at home, create industries and sell the products of her mills abroad in competition with the other great manufacturing nations, to obtain the money with which to buy the food necessary for her industrial population. In this case, she must adopt the policy deemed essential to the life of Great Britain. She must build up a huge navy to be assured that her food supply will never be cut off in the event of war. She must become a great maritime and naval power, and, in due course of time, will take what is now denied to her. Or she must be permitted unobstructed access to the granaries of the mainland, in lands contiguous to her own territory. This source of an ample food supply may be found only in Manchuria, within the confines of the republic of China. In the event of hostilities Japan can never rely upon China to supply her with food, nor can she be sure that Russia will not step in and cut her line of communications in Manchuria. If Russia hesitated, past experience tells the Japanese that China would again offer inducements to her old enemy to re-enter South Manchuria. If we accept the Japanese point of view, then the world must admit her right to the possession of a large navy, or she must be permitted free access to the granaries of Manchuria under guarantees that will safe-guard her existence against the "come-back" of Russia and the treachery of the present rulers of China.

Up to the outbreak of the Great War, the world stood in awe of the

turies there has been more than one Asiatic power in Asia. Students of Asiatic history are inclining more and more to the opinion that the national weakness of China is older and deeper than her friends care to admit. There has always been strength in Japan, and consequently a proper sense of dignity. Therefore is it that the Japanese have made up their minds not to submit tamely to insult from anybody, even their oldest friends, the good people of California.

These are the four points of the Japanese racial and national equality question:

1. Japanese colonists are not wanted in California or in any part of America;
2. To save our Pacific coast from the grasping hand of Russia, we pronounced and upheld our Monroe Doctrine;
3. With Russia in the vanguard, European powers have seized huge slices of Asia and now occupy strategic points of Asia's Pacific coast;
4. Japan alone has defeated European attempts to place the yoke of European vassalage upon her neck, and the Japanese will not permit any nation to tag them as an inferior people.

armies of the Czar. Up to that time, Russia had been feverishly pushing ahead her plans for a war of revenge, forcing Japan, in turn, to make superhuman efforts to increase her military establishment in order to defend her precarious independence. Naturally, the Russians and their apologists, like Dr. Nansen, endeavored to create the impression that they were on the defensive; that little Japan with her 55,000,000 inhabitants was preparing to extinguish the national existence of the 180,000,000 docile and pacific Russians, that the Japanese would combine with the millions of China and conquer Europe. While all this time, Japan was straining her resources to the utmost, staggering patriotically under a heart-breaking burden of taxation in order to keep an army on a war footing that would be ready the moment the Bear started to move. "Prussianism" it is called. Prussian piffle! Japan's "Prussianism" was thrust upon her by the exigencies of the military situation in Asia and the cowardice of China, who could not and dared not defend herself against the menace of Russia. Instead of assisting Japan to withstand the pressure of Russia and win back her lost provinces and re-establish her authority, China did everything possible to bring Russia in a more favorable position to crush Japan. She was Russia's silent partner.

These four points must be considered in their relations to the Far Eastern question, our interest and our time-honored policy, and our record during the modern development of that question. We are obliged to remember that we pledged Japan our friendship when we induced her to come out into the world in 1854, and that we always supported her until the Portsmouth conference. During the Portsmouth conference we permitted ourselves to be drawn along by anti-Japanese and anti-American interests. We acted with the very best intentions, but we did not act with knowledge or prudence. We did not sense the fact that justice, as well as American self-interest, requires us to conserve Asiatic strength to the end that a contest thrust upon Asia by encroaching Europeans may be fought out on Asiatic battle-fields *taken from the Asiatic peoples by invading Europeans*.

What do the Californian people want? Do they desire not merely a cessation of Japanese immigration, but a gradual and sufficiently substantial exodus of Japanese colonists from California? There are influential Japanese who are very strongly in favor of friendly representation to the government and people of Japan toward the end that Japanese colonization in California may become a mere memory. It is a dangerous sore, just as the Yokohama and other alien leases are very dangerous sores in Japan. There is opportunity for a trade, there, an honorable and sensible trade. The Hague court decision, fastening upon Japan an insult, denying to the government of Japan an important part of "the right to govern aliens," remains as a blot upon the escutcheon of Western civilization. If the Californian people desire an American solution of their own question, they hold the cards in their own hands, and American public opinion would back them in compelling our Federal government to play these Californian "aces" so that they might win the game. The leads should come from California.

At the Conference of Paris the Chinese supported the Jap-

anese attempt to insert in the covenant of the League of Nations a clause recognizing racial and national equality. The Chinese believe in "Asia for the Asiatics," and deep down in their hearts they recognize the justice of Japan's general policy. Unfortunately, however, instead of being an Asiatic power, China is the chief Asiatic weakness and, naturally enough, sensitive because of her national sickness. It hurts Chinese pride to be compelled to play second-fiddle to Japan. Does it help Californian or American self-interest to encourage Chinese jealousy of Japan, which weakens Asiatic power to resist the pressure of European aggression? Does it help China? It injures us, it injures China, it weakens Asia. It might help to thrust millions of Asiatics out of Asia. And where could they go? They cannot go to Australia, where five million white men hold 2,974,581 square miles of land. Are we to be so foolish as to assist anti-Japanese Europeans to dump them in the Americas? Do we think that these Asiatics will consent to drown themselves in the Pacific or to become wanderers on that ocean, without an inch of soil upon which they can set foot?

I think I have made it clear that this race problem is of the very essence of the Far Eastern question. It is the Far Eastern question.

Objection will be taken on the ground that racial and national equality would prevent California or any other civilized state from discriminating against Japanese who seek to own land. It would, and very properly, prevent all such improper and unnecessarily insulting discrimination. It would compel us to reach out and seize hold of the noxious weed that has grown up and flourished in many of our States, choking the flowers and fruits of our national well-being, and it would urge us to pluck that weed forth by the roots.

No alien, as such, has a right to own an inch of American land. Alien ownership of natural or developed resources is evil. We learned that during the war. Long before the war

came to teach us that lesson, there were one or two Americans who tried to convince our people that alien ownership, alien influence, and alien points of view are bad bedfellows.

The British recognize this danger. They have just begun to apply a new British company law in China, requiring that the officers of all companies registered as British must be British subjects. That is a sensible law. We ought to legislate in the same fashion.

Our British and Canadian friends can materially assist a British-thinking understanding if they will only do their part toward cutting out this Californian and Pacific slope racial cancer. A remedy can be found and applied without inflicting unnecessary injury upon any of the parties to the arrangement; but—and this truth ought not to be dodged—it must be a bona-fide, open, and aboveboard cure, recognized as wholesome by Japan and by all Asia, and susceptible of beneficial application *in Asia*. That point, too, is important.

It is necessary to recognize that British, including Canadian, aliens form the real stumbling-block that has retarded a settlement, and that has solidified the seriousness of this Japanese-American difficulty. It is just to these aliens, to our admirable Canadian neighbors, and to our British kindred in Great Britain to recognize that they have special rights, entitling them to special consideration. It is merely just to ourselves to protect them in these rights, because we welcome them and we can assimilate them; but their rights ought to be regularized in a way that will not be deemed unfriendly or unfair to other nations. "Regional understandings" have become necessary to meet modern international conditions. We cannot, and we ought not to, claim a right to anything that we are not prepared to concede to others.

The time is drawing nigh when, despite Mr. Wilson's ill-considered declarations, the stern logic of events will compel us to raise our flag over the territory that remains between us and the Panama Canal. That fact is written so clearly in the sands of Mexican and Central American misrule that it is

idle to ignore or dispute the beckoning of the hand of destiny. We have got to clean up Mexico; and, to do that as it ought to be done, we shall have to take Mexico under our wing. We would have preferred a different sort of development on our southern border. We are not hankering after territory. It is simply this—and some of our Latin-American cousins will do well to take the lesson to heart—we must have orderly and respectable neighbors.

The same rule applies to the advantage of the sturdy commonwealths of South America. We must throw all our weight on the side of sensible and successful South American nations such as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. The New Freedom means much better opportunity for the big fish to eat the little fish. One of the reasons for that is because big problems, like this racial problem, are shouting out to us to hurry along some workable form of international copartnership for peace, and the sprats get in the way of an alliance among the salmon.

A "regional understanding" that would conserve Canadian alien rights without courting further international trouble requires favorable conditions on our southern border, because we cannot hope to solve this problem by any oblique discrimination. We cannot leave the southern door open for the admission of fresh mischief. When we settle this southern question, it ought to be possible to pass a general alien law that would properly guarantee neighbor rights, north and south, and that may serve as a model for similar application in Asia and elsewhere.

It is necessary to say here that the alien problem should be kept distinct from the immigration problem. The immigration problem is a simple one, or it would be if we had the proper sort of general alien law to prevent abuses that will continue under the most horse-high, hog-tight, bull-strong immigration law.

The object is to confine new arrivals to welcome visitors and desirable citizens and, at the same time not unnecessarily

to tread upon anybody's toes. We should start by recognizing the danger of alien colonization and alien control of American necessities, and the advantage of protecting neighbor aliens. We pass a general alien act recognizing this "regional understanding," north and south, based upon legitimate American rights and interests. With that in application, we should pass an immigration law stipulating that immigration into the United States is confined to applicants for American citizenship, properly listed, accepted, and certified by our consular officials in all countries. It would be the duty of the state and federal officers within the States to report to the proper authority in Washington the fluctuating demand for labor as it may arise. It would be the duty of the department of immigration and labor, as it should be called, to feed these reports to the department of foreign affairs, our state department requiring a top-to-bottom overhauling, and it might be as well to make a clean start under the older and more appropriate name. It would be the duty of the department of foreign affairs to notify our consuls of the rise or fall in the demand for Swiss craftsmen, Danish farmers, Scotch engineers, Irish servants (and politicians), and marriageable English earls, etc. The application of the law would be in American hands, and we could exercise our own discretion without advertising our impertinence and incompetence. No immigrant would be accepted by any consul unless desirable as a citizen. That would stop the "Red" as well as the "Yellow." No immigrant would be certified until he swore out his intention to become an American citizen just as soon as Uncle Sam permits. Each new arrival should be required to report at intervals to the proper authorities and to show reasonable progress in Americanization. That would help to melt what we put into the melting-pot, instead of melting the pot, as we are doing right up to the present moment. America would be for Americans *only*, as it ought to be.

The Japanese "gentlemen's" (and "ladies' ") agreement has been a rank failure, as I predicted it would be on the day

that it was announced. It was born in folly, in ignorance, and in cowardice. That was not Japan's fault. Its failure has not been the fault of the Japanese government. It failed because we dumped our own problem onto the shoulders of a foreign government, a friendly government that did its level best to shoulder the responsibility and that has been paid by intensified American suspicion and dislike and the inevitable resentment and abuse of its own subjects who chafed under artificial control. The general unpopularity of this agreement in Japan has been the natural growth of American agitation, and that agitation was the misbegotten son of American incompetence in dealing with a major problem of American foreign politics. As you sow, so shall you reap.

CHAPTER XXXVII

ACUTE JAPANESE-AMERICAN ANGLES

ONE of the strong points made by Californians who denounce the penetration of their state by land-seeking Japanese is that "eighty-five per cent. of the vegetables and fruits sold to-day in the retail markets of Los Angeles is raised by Japanese gardeners." In an article covering more than a page of "The New York Times" of January 25, 1920, Mr. Charles A. Selden, who reported for that newspaper the Shantung controversy in Paris, gives a vivid account of the "Japanese Settler Problem," including the quoted statement. Now, Mr. Selden tells us, and I have received personal confirmation of his information, that the Californian vegetable and fruit-growers purpose to meet Japanese competition not merely by new and more drastic anti-Japanese state legislation, but by importing a millón or more Chinese laborers. In other words, at the very moment when the Japanese Government shows a disposition to assist us in handling this problem by banning the very objectionable traffic in "picture brides," the Californians are being misled into the creation of new difficulties, and they are placing themselves in a position that would justify Japanese *and Americans* in seriously questioning their motives. Not merely are they assuming the right to discriminate deliberately against Japanese; they purpose to cap that blunder by discriminating in *favor* of Chinese. It is admitted that a hundred thousand or fewer Japanese in California constitute a menace to California and the United States. Therefore, we are invited to meet this Oriental menace by multiplying it tenfold and more. Is not that a heavy tax upon intelligence?

Burlingame's great work in China was blasted by Kearney and the "Sand-lots" anti-Chinese agitation, which dragooned a cowardly Congress into adopting hastily-drawn exclusion laws. It was proper and needful to protect the Pacific coast against Asiatic penetration, but the task was botched from start to finish. In his "Roughing It," Mark Twain has left us a picture that hurts of the victims of Bret Harte's Parthian pen. The sketch was taken from life on the Slope, while the pioneers were booting out the meek Asiatic after he had served their turn and was attempting to make an honest dollar or two on his own account.

Of course there was a large Chinese population in Virginia¹—it is the case with every town and city on the Pacific Coast. They are a harmless race when white men either let them alone or treat them no worse than dogs; in fact, they are almost entirely harmless anyhow, for they seldom think of resenting the vilest insults or the cruelest injuries. They are quiet, peaceable, tractable, free from drunkenness, and they are as industrious as the day is long. A disorderly Chinaman is rare, and a lazy one does not exist. So long as a Chinaman has strength to use his hands he needs no support from anybody; white men often complain of want of work, but a Chinaman offers no such complaint; he always manages to find something to do. He is a great convenience to everybody—even to the worst class of white men, for he bears the most of their sins, suffering fines for their petty thefts, imprisonment for their robberies, and death for their murders. Any white man can swear a Chinaman's life away in the courts, but no Chinaman can testify against a white man. Ours is the "land of the free"—nobody denies that—nobody challenges it. (Maybe it is because we don't let other people testify.) As I write, news comes that in broad daylight in San Francisco, some boys have stoned an inoffensive Chinaman to death, and that although a large crowd witnessed the shameful deed, no one interfered.

It is well to remember that when Mark Twain and Bret Harte were writing for their and our posterity, approximately the same number of Chinese were on the slope as there are Japanese to-day. Our early empire-builders loved and utilized the Chinese; the next generation stoned them to

¹ Virginia City, Nevada.

death and kicked them out with every added insult that the traffic would bear. Through motives of sordid gain, white men being too lazy or too proud to work, Japanese were imported to fill Chinese shoes. Now the pendulum has swung back; we are asked to "Slap the Jap" and take the Chinese to our bosoms (or our Californian fields) and welcome him back to the "land of the free" as a man and a brother. There are some interesting and dangerous international angles to this extraordinary proposal. They are acute Japanese-American angles.

In May, 1905, The Hague Arbitration Court denied the Japanese government the right to tax or touch in any way the alien holders of perpetual leases in Japan. The white man's tribunal adopted the policy of "Slap the Jap," begun by the Russians, and continued by the Germans in the quarantine scandal, which was roundly denounced by an American eyewitness, General U. S. Grant. Now, this was done at the instigation of Kaiser Wilhelm, who painted the picture of "The Yellow Peril," incited Czar Nicholas into the Russian war with Japan, and brought about the Great War. The texts of The Hague Court's decision and the Willy-Nicky letters tell the tale. The insult was cast upon Japan while she was battling against long odds and European eminent domain in Asia. In Japan's ledger account with the Western nations the following entry appears alongside that item:

"It constitutes a last blot on the escutcheon of Japanese juridical autonomy and is therefore regarded with much vexation by both the government and general public."

The next item on the ledger, the second acute angle, is the clause in the Portsmouth Treaty inserted through the powerful influence of Mr. Rockhill and Mr. Roosevelt, by which we sought to save the Manchus from paying the penalty due for their crimes against Japan in Manchuria. The famous fourth clause, often referred to by my very good friend, Mr. John Foord, has been a dead letter from the moment it was writ-

ten. If there is such a thing as international justice, then the Li-Lobanof¹ Alliance, in which China permitted herself to be allied with Russia against Japan, entitled Japan to sit tight upon that part of Manchuria dyed red with the blood of her dead. As Russia, Germany, and France had conspired to rob Japan of the fruits of her victories in the very same fields ten years before that, so in 1905 we allowed ourselves to "take up the white man's burden" and do Europe's dirty work. As "the chum of the Kaiser" (I am quoting John Hay) and "the dupe of China" (also *vide* Mr. Hay) we began, in 1905, to "Slap the Jap." Katsura and Komura put their heads together; they talked the matter over with Ito, and then began the disreputable story of our huge Manchurian failure. We lost every trick in the game, from 1905 to the present hour. Our motives were magnificent, but we did not understand the problems; and we took up the Far Eastern fight at the point where Russia quit after the battle of Moukden and the peace of Portsmouth. Japan and Russia went into partnership against us.

A year later (1906) after the earthquake and fire, Japanese were excluded from the San Francisco schools. There was no room for them, and there were valid objections against them. There was also an unnecessary amount of unintelligent agitation. America and Japan began to lock horns. England and Japan tightened their bonds, while Britons in the Far East raged against their own Government because they saw their own interests threatened. A little later, Canada and Australia adopted measures to shut out the Japanese. In 1908, Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Root, and Mr. Takahira, alarmed at the growth of Californian agitation against the Japanese, arrived at the "gentlemen's agreement," an impossible arrangement, putting upon Japanese officials a burden of responsibility that could not be sustained. Like the Manchurian "jokers" of the Portsmouth Treaty, the "gentlemen's agreement" was

¹ See Appendix "B."

foredoomed to failure. No honest attempt was made to face a serious, but simple, problem.

After we had occupied the Philippines, we proceeded to exclude the Chinese from the islands. If we had not done so, we would have been confronted with certain failure in applying the McKinley policy, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." Nevertheless, all the millions of Chinese, many Filipinos, and some Americans protested against the exclusion laws. There were thousands of Chinese men and women and children in the islands. Many of these Chinese were wealthy merchants, many of them married to Filipinos. Chinese mestizos are plentiful and powerful in the Philippines. Mr. Wu Ting-fang, Chinese minister at Washington, made numerous protests against our treatment of his people, and our breach of faith in the matter of the Canton railway concession intensified Chinese resentment against us. The year 1908 opened with storm-clouds in Asia and an anti-American Chinese boycott crippling our trade in China. Amoy was a hotbed of agitation against America, a large number of the Philippine Chinese being Amoy men.

On January 1, 1908, "The New York Herald" printed the following despatch from its Berlin correspondent:

In a long article, headed "The United States Army," evidently from the pen of an expert, the "Post" says:

"The political barometer for the last summer indicated to the world the forthcoming struggle between the United States and Japan for the political and commercial supremacy of the Pacific. President Roosevelt's cleverness rendered possible a temporary postponement of the question, but in the meantime an imposing fleet left for the Far East to demonstrate that the United States is not defenseless and will on no account submit to Japan's demands."

After citing the details of America's 1908 shipbuilding program, making her the second maritime power in the world, the "Post" continues:—

"The dilatory diplomatic negotiations of points of difference between Japan and America are not only intended to admit the carrying through of the naval program upon extensive lines, but also to

develop the strength of the land forces. A strong army is a necessity upon which President Roosevelt's last message lays stress."

Under instructions from the German foreign office, the German newspapers began to predict and agitate war between the United States and Japan. The proofs are matters of record. Germans were sent to Japan to conspire against us. Germans were sent to the United States with special instructions to stir up American feeling against the Japanese. Our "chum," the Kaiser, had picked us to fight his "Yellow Peril" battles with Japan.

On February 7 a Japanese steamer, the *Tatsu Maru II*, was seized by Chinese warships in the Great West Channel of the Chukiang (Canton River) and the Japanese flag was hauled down by Captain Wu King-yung, "a Chinese educated in America." There was momentary exultation from Macao to Manchouli. Young Wu, "the American-trained Chinese," was the hero of the hour. The Americans in China, fretting under the boycott, saw an opportunity and made the most of it.

The *Tatus Maru II* was loaded with arms. She had cleared from Kobe for Macao. The Japanese asserted, and the Portuguese supported their claim, that the arms and ammunition were intended for the Portuguese forces at Macao. The Chinese naval authorities convoyed the seized ship to Canton. They enjoyed the short-lived triumph. Without an instant's delay, the Japanese government demanded the release of the ship, an apology, and satisfaction. On March 16, the *Tatsu Maru II* was released, China was compelled to punish all her officials concerned in the seizure (particularly young Wu, "educated in America"), and she was made to send her warships to stand by and fire a salute while a dapper young Japanese naval man hoisted on the *Tatsu* the banner of Nippon. Yuan Shih-kai signed the agreement with Baron Hayashi. China gnashed her teeth.

As the news of the fiasco swept through China's millions,

there was swift work in certain commercial circles along the China coast. The anti-American boycott became an anti-Japanese boycott. That was the definite turning of the tide in the relations between Japan and America. Thenceforward "traditional friendship" was hoist at the yard-arm of international rivalry on the China seaboard and in the "Panhandle" of the three eastern provinces. There was little scruple on either side, and little that is printable on either side. Japanese began to earn American enmity, but we made the first balls and fired them.

On October 14, 1919, Mr. Lodge delivered a prepared speech in the United States Senate in the course of which he went to great pains to outrage the feelings of the Japanese government and people. Mr. Lodge has been on the trail of the Japanese for many years. He extended the Monroe Doctrine against them in 1912, and the Japanese wrote down the item carefully in their ledger. That is their invariable rule. They wrote in their ledger something like this:

1912—To Magdalena Bay Episode, One Lodge (American Senate) Resolution.

A couple of years later, they wrote with a smile right opposite that entry:

1914—By Santua Episode, Vetoed One Schwab (American) Contract.

I have a filing cabinet in which I try to follow the entries of the Japanese ledger, and sometimes I wonder just what sort of auditing is going to be done, when the busy bookkeepers come to the end of the page. Japan and America have furnished many items for this ledger account since it was opened during the Portsmouth Conference.

In the Far East, I followed the Japanese bookkeeping while Russia was inviting Japanese war in Manchuria. From the Li-Lobanof alliance and the Port Arthur lease to the Yalu timber swindle, Russia walked straight into the war. Every

unjust Russian act was carefully entered up. Inevitably, the bill was presented in 1904.

In 1895, Kaiser Wilhelm compelled the Japanese to make a reluctant entry in the Japanese-German ledger. In 1914, the balance was struck and a substantial profit noted at Tsingtau. Like the Russian last entry, the Tsingtau surplus was a red-ink entry; it was written with human blood.

Bearing that in mind, we shall be well advised if we give some heed to the things that we do to justify Japanese resentment. Cheap abuse is an expensive luxury. Mr. Lodge was doubtless absolutely sincere when he spoke on October 14, 1919, but his oration smacked auspiciously of the ferocious flavor of a weird Kiangsu dish, which was cooked up for naïve American consumption by some very timid persons in the Student's Quarter of Paris. You could hear the clamorous clicking of the chop-sticks and smell the sickening odor of the punk.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

AN AMERICAN ANSWER

OUR deep interest in China is no longer merely a matter of friendly sympathy with those Chinese who are sensible of their nation's needs and misfortunes. We have got to do something that will really help China to help herself, or shame and failure confront us in Asia. In Chapter XIV direct reference is made to our Philippine problem—our promise to the Filipinos and the utter impossibility of fulfilling that promise under present conditions. The solution of the Philippine problem lies in the salvation of China. If we are incapable of inducing the Chinese to coöperate with us in the application of practicable measures for the strengthening of China, we may as well confess that our Philippine adventure was a gross blunder, and face the gloomy prospect of "scuttling" from the Philippines in circumstances that will be a lasting blot upon our honor as an intelligent people. The President has given some of his best friends grave reason to suspect that he would like to run away from the Philippine problem, very much after the manner in which he ran away from his self-undertaken Chinese responsibilities in Paris. With him, does the appearance of a thing count more than the reality? It is to be hoped not, but he offers those Americans who are really interested in the Filipino people little to inspire confidence and much to arouse distrust.

His encouragement of Filipino agitation for immediate independence, transmitted by Mr. Newton Baker while the Old World was still ranting and reeling in the delirium tremens of imperialist greed, was a very poor return for the affection and the confidence lavished upon him by deserving far away islanders. Would it not have been more honest to have told them

the truth—that the world is not ready for Philippine independence?

If Mr. Wilson encouraged the Filipinos to ask Congress to cut them loose from our sovereignty, then why did he deny the Philippines a charter membership in his League of Nations? They are self-governing.¹ They are civilized. They are deserving of honorable treatment. Why did the President bar the Filipinos from Paris? Why did he discriminate against them and in favor of British subjects who do not govern themselves—the people of India? It is not necessary to say that no reflection upon the admission of India is intended. The British are to be praised for honorably rewarding loyal Hindus. Are loyal Filipinos of less account?

In Paris, Mr. Wilson ignored the Filipinos. In Paris Mr. Wilson denatured the Monroe Doctrine into a “regional understanding,” *improperly arrived at*. Still, with a Bryanesque “God bless you,” he tells the Filipinos to get their walking-papers from Congress. It will be well to mark down the net product of these two Presidential decisions, and to note its bearing upon the Far Eastern question as a whole.

If the President intends to keep his word to the Filipinos and to act within the reservation he put upon the Monroe Doctrine, then how can he justify Mr. Lansing’s public repudiation of Japan’s request to sanction a similar doctrine in Asia? If the Monroe Doctrine is a “regional understanding,” and we retire from the Philippines, we would then cease to have any right to interfere in the politics of Asia.

When Mr. Wilson announced his intention to employ American armies “to make the world safe for democracy,” Colonel George Harvey characterized it as “an infamous proposal.” The President stuck to his guns and declared war upon “every arbitrary power, anywhere.” Colonel Harvey insisted that such a preposterous crusade was essentially immoral.

¹ As has been seen previously the British secretary of state for India admitted that India is not self-governing, yet India is a charter member of Mr. Wilson’s League of Nations.—P. G.

Of course, we did not go to war "to make the world safe for democracy." We entered, reluctantly, into the war with Germany to make the world safe for America. The war was thrust upon us, as it was thrust upon the English, because Germany violated neutrality. The British, to their credit, punished Germany for violating the neutrality of Belgium, guaranteed by Germany, England, and the other powers. We punished Germany for violating our own neutrality, and with special reference to the foul attempt to plunge us into war with Japan.

Belgium, in defense of her neutrality, became a state without a country. She remained a kingdom, while her king and her army were forced by overwhelming odds to abandon their country to the iron heel of a perjured assailant.

What chance of maintaining its neutrality would a baby Filipino republic have under existing doubtful conditions? Why is Gibraltar in British hands? Mr. George Bronson Rea, who was a military attaché in Madrid during the war and whose ability as a friendly student of Spanish affairs would not be questioned, tells us that the people of Spain feel very keenly the humiliation necessarily caused by the alienation of their far-famed "rock." Yet friendly England dare not trust the key of the Mediterranean in weak or unfriendly hands. Why does England continue to occupy Hongkong? Why does France strengthen her hold upon Morocco? Why is it that we keep such a watchful eye upon the keys of the Panama Canal? Why did Japan watch her step before restoring Kiaochau to China?

The answer to each and all of these questions is this: Strong hands must hold the keys, because they cannot be trusted in weak hands. If one strong hand drops a key, self-preservation will compel another strong hand to pick up the key "and leave the discussion to Congress." It is hard doctrine, but it is a hard world that makes the hard doctrine.

Had space permitted, I should have liked to cite the correspondence that passed between the government of China

and the government of Germany regarding violations of Chinese neutrality which the Chinese were too weak to prevent. The way in which the Allies violated the neutrality of the Chinese Eastern Railway (while China was still in friendly diplomatic relations with Germany) was one of the pathetic Far Eastern facts of the war. It caused Mr. Sun Pao-chih, Chinese minister for foreign affairs and a former Chinese minister at Berlin, to roll his eyes and shed numerous tears. China was impotent to defend her national dignity.

Is it possible to help China onto her feet? Let us look at the question in a liberal American way. What is the basic cause of all this trouble between China and Japan? It is contained in a very old story, an amusing story.

Long years ago, in the third century after Christ, a Chinese emperor learned that a Japanese recluse had discovered the "Philosopher's Stone." The Chinese emperor sent an embassy to get the stone, and from that day to this there has been trouble between China and Japan. Jealousy is at the bottom of the trouble—a jealousy that has proved expensive both to China and to Japan.

Have we any moral right to propound upon our side of the Pacific a Monroe Doctrine based upon our own form of government and to deny to a friendly power on the other side of the Pacific the same identical right? The most ardent friend of the Flowery Republic might be inclined to question the morality of such a proceeding. Can such a policy be sustained, confronted, as it is, by the opposition of the two strongest powers in Asia?

I am not suggesting that either Japan or England harbors any ill will towards the Chinese republic. At the same time, it cannot be denied that we approach the Chinese problem by the most difficult route when our policy is based upon a questionable friendship for China and advertised enmity towards Japan. Japan must, and will, seek friends. If we spurn her friendship, necessity compels her to look elsewhere for sympathy and support. She will not look in vain.

Neither in Paris, while the treaty was being drawn, nor in Washington, while it was being denounced, defended, and defeated in the Senate, was there evidence of any serious desire to assist Japan and China to compose their differences and to unite in measures made necessary by the minatory acts of Western powers in Asia. Our own failure was the more deplorable, because in our previous history we had laid a solid foundation upon which we might have stood as the peacemaker in the Far East. We had frowned upon all aggressions; we had gone still further in our Philippine policy and set an example of chivalrous generosity that was not lost upon the age-old mind of Asia; we were raising up in Asia a new self-governing nation, giving the Malayan people their first national opportunity, their first place as a national entity in the warm sun of Asia.

Now, the chief cause of our failure was ignorance. We presumed to sit in judgment without full knowledge of the facts. We were very sincere, very determined, very vituperative, and sublimely foolish. We made much ado about things of relatively small importance, and gave no heed to the one thing of major importance.

The one thing of major importance in Asia is the White Peril in Asia. Is Asia to be granted or denied the right of Asiatic self-development? Is Asia to continue under the haunting fear that all her broad acres are destined to follow those of Africa under the heavy hand and heel of European eminent domain? Is that to be Asia's only prospect? Certainly, with one exception—the Filipinos—the Asiatic people could reasonably claim justifiable fear of the White Peril. And the Conference of Paris failed to remove that fear.

Asia's fear of the White Peril could have been banished only by complete recognition on the part of the Western powers of Asia's primary interest in Asiatic independence and of equal rights, in law and in fact, for all nations *and nationals*. That could, and should, have been accomplished. Instead of seeking world peace in that direction, China was

utilized to concentrate and to hurl upon Japan all the left-over animosities boiled in the German warpot and still bubbling and brimming over when the peace was signed. So, in the end and inevitably, the bill was presented to China; and China had to pay in pride, in principle, in property. The Shantung decision was unjustifiable and inexcusable, but not at all because of the arguments adduced by the Chinese or their special advocates.

The decision was born in a spirit of injustice to all Asia. The wrong perpetrated upon Japan was even more despicable than the wrong committed upon ill-used China; because, in the sacred name of justice and international morality, it marshaled all the cohorts of sanctimonious hypocrisy and racial enmity against the one Asiatic nation that has withstood and defeated Western aggression. Now, it is not to be supposed that clear-headed European statesmen overlooked or underestimated the European advantages to be derived from utilizing Japan to defeat China in the peace conference. In successfully supporting Japan against China, and American championship of the Chinese claims; England and France sustained their own aggressive policies in Asia; they intensified Chinese antagonism against everything Japanese, including Japanese trade;¹ they presented Japan to Asia as an Asiatic menace to other Asiatic nations; and they blasted American prestige from one end of Asia to the other. That was not all. They reasoned that the more the Chinese lamented and appealed to "the impartial judgment of mankind," the more American indignation and abuse focused the limelight on the vulnerable Shantung articles, the less thought and damning publicity would there be for the "swag" that was packed away in their own pockets. Events justified their calculations and expectations, temporarily at least.

To their credit, it must be said that the English and the French played their cards with intelligence and with a prudent regard for their own interests. They could always say

¹ See Appendix "F."

that they disapproved making an issue of Shantung. They permitted the issue to be made, *after taking the measure of the American delegation*. They did not need to examine the Chinese case. They knew all its weaknesses, beforehand. Mr. Lloyd George had neither ideas nor knowledge of the Far East. That was an advantage. On these and other matters he was merely the speaking-trumpet of Mr. Balfour, Lord Curzon, and Lord Milner. He was careful to do what he was told to do by the real dictators of British foreign policy. Let us set down here the fundamental facts of the controversy.

The Chinese sought direct restitution of Kiaochau

1. Because on declaring war upon Germany they had abrogated all German treaties.
2. Because any foreign possession of the concessions acquired by Germany through a scandalous act of international piracy menaces China and hampers her efforts at reconstruction.

The Chinese demanded the nullification of the Japanese treaties and notes of 1915 and 1918

1. Because the 1915 transactions were extorted by a Japanese ultimatum.
2. Because the 1918 agreements were the fruits of the 1915 forced treaties.

The 1915-18 Chinese-Japanese agreements assented to Japan's succession to the former German rights. China could not succeed, unless the peace conference consented to nullify these agreements. In passing upon the Chinese pleadings, the conference was confronted by the following facts:

1. Of the three judges (Wilson, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George) one (Wilson) was pledged to support the Chinese and two (Clemenceau and Lloyd George) were pledged to support the Japanese. Wilson's pledge was moral and indefinite; the Clemenceau-Lloyd George pledge was legal and definite.
2. The 1915 agreements were extorted under duress.
3. The 1918 agreements (more specific and accepting the validity

of the 1915 transactions) were the voluntary acts of the internationally recognized Chinese government from which the Chinese delegates derived their credentials.

4. The leader of the Chinese delegation in Paris signed the 1915 agreements and countersigned the 1918 agreements.

5. The consideration paid for the 1918 agreements (\$20,000,000) had been spent mostly to elect and sustain in power the Chinese President, whose delegates asked the peace conference to repudiate the deal, the acts of their own Government, and official acts of their own leader in Paris and in the council-chamber of the Three.

The pledges that bound Clemenceau and Lloyd George were secret agreements arranged between the Allies (February-March, 1917), before America entered the war. England, France, Russia, Italy, and Japan were all parties to the bargain. America was not bound to indorse the secret compacts. They might have been overcome by Mr. Wilson. The Chinese made that possibility of no importance when their internationally recognized government "sold out" in the compacts of 1918, which accepted the decision as written into the Treaty of Versailles.

The Chinese erred in asserting that they might have wrested Kiaochau from Germany if Japan had permitted them to enter the war earlier than August, 1917. That assertion reminded the Allies of how Yuan had attempted to ascend the Dragon Throne with the active help of the German and Austrian legations and banks. The Chinese erred in basing their legal title to succession of the German concessions upon a formal declaration of war, the legality of which had been denied by a large part [possibly the larger part] of the Chinese people. That drew attention to the danger of offending a strong and efficiently governed state for the sake of pleasing a weak and disordered state. The French and the English were both determined to do everything within their power to prevent the revival of German influence in China. Japan could be depended upon to act in concert with them, on this policy. They were not so sure about the Chinese. Technically, the Chinese case was flea-bitten. Yet, there was

strength as well as weakness on their side, as there was weakness as well as strength on the Japanese side.

China ought to possess every scrap of property whatsoever created by the Germans under the rape of 1898. This, notwithstanding the fact that the Chinese did nothing to build or to develop the city and port of Tsingtau or the railway and mining improvements; this, despite the fact that the Chinese never moved a foot or a hand, much less lost life or limb, to eject the Germans from Kiaochau; this, although the Japanese, with a small British supporting column, captured Kiaochau as an act of war. The Japanese recognize China's rights and they manifest a splendid willingness to meet their great, but troubled, neighbor in a spirit of fairness and justice. Japanese promises to China have been written and uttered with due deliberation and the utmost care. Americans who sneer at these promises, where they are sincere, lack knowledge of the facts and the true nature of the moves that are steadily going forward on the political chess-board of the Orient.

Every great power, the United States included, has annexed territory as the result of war. In 1894 China and Japan engaged in war over Korea. Japan won the war and was in possession of Korea and South Manchuria at the end of the war, in 1895. China assented to the Russo-German-French combination that forced Japan to retire from Manchuria, the cradle of both the Manchu and Japanese peoples and never a part of China proper. In the following year, at Moscow, China and Russia entered into an alliance¹ aimed against Japan and England. The principle feature of that anti-Japanese alliance was the foolish and wicked contract by which China permitted Russia to carry a strategic railway through Manchuria to Port Arthur and to fortify Port Arthur against Japan. Thus began the intrigue that led to the German seizure of Kiaochau and the war between Japan and Russia (1904-05), the recapture of a large part of

¹ See Appendix "B."

Manchuria by Japan, and the Peace of Portsmouth, which compelled Japan to divide the Manchurian spoils with Russia.

“Manchuria is consecrated to Japan by the blood of dead Japanese soldiers.” That statement was made to me by a great Japanese statesman who is a firm friend of the Chinese people. It is an honest statement of fact. Chinese and Americans may wail or shout until the cows come home, but that will not affect the following facts:

1. The Japanese are solidly entrenched in Manchuria.
2. They are there by legitimate right of conquest.
3. They do not propose to relinquish their rights.
4. There is no valid reason why they should do so.
5. The solution of the Kiaochau controversy is an honorable, open, and aboveboard rectification of China's frontiers, China to regain complete possession of all leases, etc., hampering her sovereignty over China proper, in return for which China shall recognize Japan's sovereignty over those parts of Manchuria necessary for a true frontier line, pay a fair price for the German public properties captured by Japan,¹ and coöperate with British plans for the development of orderly modern government in Thibet.

China has everything to gain by a sensible agreement in this matter. It would satisfy Japan. It would meet with the approval of England. It would provide the political basis to support the new Chinese financial consortium. It would encourage the Chinese to get together and develop an orderly, modern, representative government. It is the one possible way to a Far Eastern peace with honor. Only through a friendly understanding with Japan can China hope for a real chance to get upon her feet.

¹The value of these properties, I understand, is approximately the same as the unpaid balance of the German Boxer indemnities remitted to China under article 128 of the Treaty of Versailles.

CHAPTER XXXIX

WAR-MAKERS AND THEIR WORK

MR. FREDERICK BOYD STEVENSON presented in "The Brooklyn Eagle" a list of twenty-three wars "still raging," a few days before Senator William E. Borah of Idaho enlivened the senatorial "shadow-boxing on Shantung" by inviting the American Government and people, in defense of 400,000,000 Chinese, to make war upon Japan.¹ The debate in the Senate on July 15, 1919, attained the peak of absurdity. There was little to choose between Mr. John Sharp Williams's angry attempts to defend the President's surrender in Paris and the wild appeals to mob clamor uttered by Mr. Borah and Mr. Lodge. Said Mr. Williams:

"Japan will not give up Shantung, except by war. Are we ready to send our fleet to the Pacific and our troops to that coast?"

Mr. Borah jumped to his feet, his black mane wagging fierce defiance. First, he discounted the fear of war with Japan. Then he said:

"If war is the only alternative, I am ready to face it, and we might as well settle it, now."

So the American fleet was sent into the Pacific, and the war talk waxed stronger and stronger. In vain, "The New York

¹ Mr. Borah is one of the ablest members of the Senate. He is one of the finest Americans I have ever known. In these Far Eastern controversies, he can accomplish much for his state and for the commonwealth at large—and he will doubtless do so—when the undiluted, untinctured facts have been presented to him. It was the business of the Executive branch of our government to lay these facts fully and impartially before the Senate. This, the Executive failed to do.—P. G.

Herald" protested against the indignity being put upon the American nation by foolish public servants who would not take the trouble to examine the facts. "The Herald" brought the responsibility right up to the doors of the White House, where the war-whisperers were busy. "Why make a bad matter worse?" "The Herald" asked on July 19. It was a remarkably able editorial, written undoubtedly by the editor of "The Herald," Mr. Josiah Kingsley Ohl, an American authority on Far Eastern matters who always has been correct and fair in his statements and just and wholesome in his criticisms. Unlike Mr. Borah, Mr. Lodge, and the majority of those who entered the lists on one side or the other, while the controversy raged through its course, Mr. Ohl wrote with full knowledge of his subject and an unbiased American mind. He had made a wide and deep study of the Far Eastern question while he was earning the reputation that he carried home with him from Asia. Years of steady, hard work, seeking facts for "The Herald" as Mr. Bennett's chief representative in the Orient, justified the opinion often expressed to me by Chinese and Japanese that Mr. Ohl is the keenest and fairest reporter ever sent to Asia by any American newspaper. These were the wise words with which this gifted editor of a powerful journal began his rebuke to the war-makers:

"In the Senate and out of it there is a recrudescence of the mischievous talk about war between the United States and Japan. There is nothing in the situation created by the controversy over Shantung to warrant the assumption that the United States would go to war with Japan over China, no matter what may happen in or to that Asiatic republic; and there is no warrant for the assumption that Japan would make war upon the United States, even should the Senate express, in some form, its disapproval of a settlement that gives Japan a stronger position in Shantung than Germany ever had there."

While the course of anti-Japanese calumny was as torrential as it was contemptible, the alliances formed to manufacture the parent streams of abuse were weird and strange, in-

deed. One of the gentlemen who helped the good work along in Washington and New York, had been a sort of Far Eastern shadow of Colonel House and a meditative mandarin-coat for the President, in Paris. Others known to be on good terms with Mr. Wilson were active and quite unsparing in their denunciation of the Japanese. The President's talks with Senators, secret and public, warranted popular opinion that Mr. Wilson was shedding no tears because of the rough handling meted out to the Japanese. His attempt to correct Viscount Uchida's statement of August 3¹ left a very bad impression in the mind of the few who knew what had happened in Paris. Mr. Lansing's testimony openly advertised the anti-Japanese character of the Wilson administration. And the President's ill-advised Republican assailants, swallowing whole the partisan propaganda poured upon their desks, had neither the wisdom nor the grace to see that they were helping Mr. Wilson to make his escape under the legs and behind the back of Makino. On his Western tour, the President tried to beat an undignified retreat, made a terrible mess of it, and then took refuge in sullen silence. Lord Grey's letter to "The Times" of London made him furious. He had not a word to say in rebuke of the Chinese diplomat who introduced to his senatorial opposition a deputation of Chinese delegates that came to Washington to condemn his work in France.

The entire performance might have been laughable but for certain serious facts. One fact is our unpardonable failure to do anything practical to help our poor dupes, the Chinese millions. Another fact is our deliberate and despicable provocation of Japan. The third and most serious fact is the opening that we presented to dangerous enemies, inside and outside our own house, who do seek a war between the United States and Japan.

There are war-makers on both sides of the Pacific. There are war-makers on both sides of the Atlantic. There are in

¹ See Appendix "G."

the United States, in Japan, in China, and in Great Britain honest, high-minded, unintentional war-makers and dishonest, deliberate war-makers. Now, while the crape of the Great War is still upon thousands of our doors, while billions of dollars are being collected in taxation to pay our share of the cost of the war, it may be worth while to take an impartial glance at these Asiatic war-makers, their work, and their motives. In doing so, it will be well to marshal merely provable facts, remembering, of course, that so long as the world's biggest business—the relations between nations—is conducted *to any extent* under cover of secrecy, the first maxim of old diplomacy will continue to rule; that is to say, it is ever to the interest of some nation that there shall be suspicion and ill-will between some other nations. "Divide and conquer" was not eliminated from statecraft by the "Big Three" at "The House of the Flirt."

Only two great powers emerged from the war financially unhipped, Japan and America. Considering this fact as a cold-blooded proposition, and it has been so considered quite openly by conservative Europeans, it rubs salt into the wounds of the European states that bore the brunt of the war. It irritates the British and the French and the Germans and Austrians, and all Europeans, who cannot be blamed for contrasting their own serious situation with the relatively favorable American and Japanese situation. Modern war is costly business; so costly, indeed, that to-day only Japan and America could purchase the luxury of a first-class modern war without committing financial suicide. War between Japan and America would equalize matters. It would compel Japan and America to return to Europe financial and commercial predominance. That view is held, and is being acted upon, in very powerful European circles. It is fact No. 1.

Fact No. 2 is the bitter prejudice against Japan, merely because many Europeans think that the time is drawing near when Asia as a whole may recognize the leadership and emulate the courage and efficiency of the Japanese. "Asia for the

Asiatics" is very unpopular in all imperialist quarters in Europe. It spells the elimination of European eminent domain, and answers the very serious questions put by Mr. Herbert Adams Gibbons in "The New Map of Asia."

Fact No. 3 is the probable relation of Japan to any adjustment of the Russian problem. In France, as well as in England and the Scandinavian countries, all Baltic policies visualize the propulsion of Russian pressure eastward, and not westward or southward. The weakening of Japan would assist all these policies.

Fact No. 4 is illustrated by the sensational anti-Japanese campaign of Admiral Viscount Jellicoe, Premier Hughes of Australia, and other prominent British officials who do not hesitate to utilize anti-Asiatic race prejudice in order that popular British support may be gained for costly measures of imperial defense. It is merely fair to say that these powerful British imperialists believe that the empire may be endangered if the people in the British Isles do not court the self-interest of the dominions. As an integral part of that campaign, Lord Jellicoe and his friends would like to see Japan dislodged from the Pacific islands. Premier Hughes tells the people of his own country to beware, that they are "surrounded by jealous nations!" In Paris, he made many speeches of that sort. Also, in Paris, after he had rendered yeoman service to Lord Curzon by taking the lead in opposition to Japan's demand for racial and national equality, when he had accomplished his object, Mr. Hughes sought to make it appear to the Japanese that he was Japan's friend and that Mr. Wilson and America were Japan's deadly enemies. He said these things to Japanese reporters, and his statements were cabled to Japan and printed in the Japanese newspapers, many of whose readers still think that America was responsible for Japan's defeat on a delicate question of honor.

Fact No. 5 is the astounding Asiatic commercial triumph of Japan. The basis of British agitation against Japan, conducted chiefly in the United States [because the majority of

the British newspapers have refused to join in the clamor], is Japan's wonderful conquest of the China piece-goods trade, the selling of cotton drills, sheetings, etc. Here are some sensational figures, showing the growth of Japanese cotton trade in China since the beginning of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902:

GRAY SHEETINGS:

Figures show percentages of total trade.

	1902	1913	1917
Japan	2.8	57.6	92.2
Great Britain	16.4	3.3	3.0
United States	69.0	35.3	2.4

COTTON DRILLS:

	1902	1913	1917
Japan	2.6	70.6	97.0
Great Britain	10.3	2.0	.6
United States	76.2	23.0	.1

PIECE GOODS:

	1902	1913	1917
Japan	2.8	19.0	53.0
Great Britain	56.0	52.0	31.0
United States	27.2	7.0	.4

The complete statistics will be found in Appendix "F." The five very interesting tables were prepared for me by an impartial examiner. They explain why Lord Emmot and "The Manchester Guardian" regard with concern Japanese competition in China. In England, and in the United States, cotton is making ammunition for an undesirable and unnecessary, and not impossible, American-Japanese war.

In 1868, the total foreign trade of Japan was \$13,123,000. In 1919, it exceeded \$2,000,000,000, representing a net gain for that year of \$250,000,000 over the returns for 1918. America is Japan's best customer, China ranking second-best. This fact is important, because it illustrates the practical side to Japan's insistent assertions of friendship toward the American

people.¹ Japanese toy-makers have captured a large part of the former German toy trade with the United States. Other Japanese inroads upon German competition explain one of the sources of renewed German exploitation of Japanese-American war scares.²

Fact No. 6 is the very strong body of Pacific coast opposition to competing Japanese residents. A legitimate sentiment against Japanese economic pressure has undoubtedly encouraged the promotion of anti-Japanese political campaigns in this country and of anti-American campaigns in Japan. Neither side seems to realize that the general interests of Japan and America favor a solution that would be fair and advantageous to both groups of war-makers, and both these groups are very dangerous because they permit themselves to become clay in the hands of selfish and less sturdy potters.

¹ The spirit in which Japanese officials accepted indiscriminate American denunciation of Japan was illustrated by one of the speeches of Mr. Katsuji Debuchi, who was chargé at Washington, during the most tempestuous period of the controversy. Addressing a gathering of American and Japanese silk manufacturers and traders, in New York city, Mr. Debuchi said:—

“The policy of Japan is to do justice at all times and in all places. I wish and hope the Americans will trust Japan. However Japan may be criticized by thoughtless or malicious newspapers and public speakers, the traditional bonds of friendship between the United States and Japan, whose fabric may be likened to these beautiful silken threads, will remain unbroken forever.

“Gentlemen! As I stand here, I feel I can hear the music of Pater-son’s weaving machines and the song of the reeling mills in Japan, echoing to each other across the waters of the Pacific. Weaving and reeling are complementary in the silk industry; each is necessary to the other, as lips are to teeth or wheels to the cart. The finished product of this international combination, which is so beautiful and useful, is symbolical of a still greater fruition which might come in every respect from sincere, frank and friendly coöperation between the United States and Japan. In conclusion, I shall quote a few words from Viscount Ishii’s speech at Fair Haven last July:

“We trust you (Americans), we love you, and, if you will let us, we will walk at your side in loyal good fellowship down all the coming years.’”

² See *Japan: Trade During the War*, U. S. Tariff Commission’s Special Report (1919).

Fact No. 7 might be called the pathetic portion, the acute angle of the American-Asiatic triangle. It deserves gentle and charitable treatment, because there are many extenuating circumstances that should be taken into account. This is the Chinese-Korean pacifist fact.

There are four hundred million Chinese, which is as much as to say that there are more sorts of Chinese than there are sorts of other people. The Chinese possess so many sterling virtues that they may be forgiven a few faults. There are so many noble and generous Chinese, that the nation ought not to be indicted because a few of its unmanly sons would, if they could, put a yellow smudge on the escutcheon of China. I know many Chinese leaders who are fine, manly friends of America; I know several who are honest friends of Japan. There are others who are neither the friends of Japan nor America's friends, nor safe leaders for China. The war has taught them nothing. The peace has taught them nothing. Their feet follow in the tracks of Li, the poor dupe of Cassini, Lobanof, and Russia, China's senior enemy. Educated in American schools, they do not seem to understand that the average American has very little patience with people who are unwilling to fight their own battles.

The Korean intrigue has been promoted by a small and unrepresentative group of immature Chinese students, notable for much wishbone, but not for any backbone. Korea might be called the Yellow Streak of the Orient. While the Japanese have seriously injured themselves by the way in which they gained possession of Korea, the history of the Yellow Streak justifies Japanese possession. Strong nations control weak nations.

The Korean intrigue was the Achilles' heel of the Chinese case at Paris. It offended the Sinn Feiners as much as it did the British, the French, the Italians, and the Japanese. When Colonel House drew Mr. Wilson into his unfortunate relations with Mr. O'Kelly and Mr. Walsh, when the adept Irish politicians manœvered the American delegation into direct

diplomatic relations with a "government" in active rebellion against the British empire, the President and his associates lost the good-will and the confidence of each and all of the great Allies. There were "Irish" skeletons in all their cupboards.

The Korean intrigue was the last straw. Its Chinese and American inspiration was obvious and well known. It was in flagrant violation of the pledge under which America induced Japan to become a great power. The following is an extract from the letter of President Fillmore to the Emperor of Japan, presented by Commodore Perry to the Shogun:

The constitution and laws of the United States forbid all interference with the religious or political concerns of other nations. I have particularly charged Commodore Perry to abstain from every act which could possibly disturb the tranquillity of your imperial majesty's dominions.¹

That assurance gave Perry his peaceful victory. It enabled our missionaries to enter Japan and to accomplish noble work in the Japanese empire. The activities of important missionary bodies in the promotion of anti-Japanese intrigue in Korea and in China, and in fomenting ill-will toward Japan in America, develop war-making of a dangerous and deplorable character indeed. That many, although not all, of the anti-Japanese missionary leaders are inspired by lofty motives renders their work doubly dangerous. To their cloth's sacred shield, they add the prestige that comes from deserved distinction in their own legitimate field. So, when American missionaries take the lead in agitating Korean hyphenism in America [and especially during the administration of a President known to be very strongly imbued with the missionary spirit and personally interested in the good work of the foreign missions] they thrust before their American and Japanese friends a question of the first magnitude. Does the New Freedom mean the right of one nation to force its

¹ See Appendix "C."

own religious beliefs down the unwilling throat of another nation?

Several of the reverend gentlemen who were active in the muck-raking of Japan during the 1919-20 "shadow-boxing on Shantung" were just as active four and five years earlier in defending Japanese Jingoos at the expense of China and the truth. Why this sudden and most peculiar *volte-face*? The answer can be briefly stated: it is a vitally important part of the Far Eastern record.

The utterly scandalous character of the Chinese-Japanese proceedings, carried to a ruthless completion by the Okuma administration, in 1915, giving Japanese diplomacy a black eye all over the world, brought about a change of government in Japan. The martinet, Marshal Count Terauchi, became premier. In Japan and in Korea, Count Terauchi applied measures that hampered the operation of foreign missionary schools. American missionaries resented and opposed this tendency of the Japanese government. It pinched their sensitive corns. They deliberated, investigated, acted. The Chinese and Korean views upon the larger Oriental political questions gained important converts in missionary circles. Conversion was very quick; and, strangely enough, it synchronized with a welcome and laudable change of the Japanese official heart toward Chinese and Korean problems. Nevertheless, let us assume that it was an honest and thorough conversion. Converts, as good missionaries know, are notoriously bigoted. They delight in the flaming statement. Thus Japan became "the Prussia of the Far East" in the minds and upon the lips of men who insisted that Japan was a sucking dove when Okuma, with American missionary assistance, sank his beak and talons in the neck of China. The "twenty-one demands," advertised in all their naked ugliness at Paris and at Washington, were pooh-poohed and denied in 1915 by the very men who poured them into the Senate record in 1919. What, in 1915, was at worst, "a piece of innocent meriment" became, in 1919, the Asiatic "Scarlet Letter."

Sweet inconsistency, oh, la! Far worse than the devil quoting scripture is the parson when he indulges in profanity. Then, the most hardened sinner is compelled to cover his ears. It is an important and interesting fact that, while our clergymen were cursing Japan up and down the scale of reverend irreverence, a commission of refined Asiatic "pagans" was quietly investigating the character of Christianity in the United States.

Big, fundamental questions are knocking at all our doors. The terrible tragedy of Russia is but one among many solemn warnings that have been given the world, calling upon its people to take spiritual things seriously, and to face their sometimes terrifying questions boldly. Martin Luther was not afraid to nail his theses to the church-door of Wittenberg. Are his successors, the heirs of his honesty, less courageous, less honest? The spiritual vaccine did not "take" in Russia, because it lacked something. Let the reverend gentlemen ponder upon what it was that it lacked.

Glance upon the tragedy of Asia, where God first lighted His spiritual lamp! There, Rachel is weeping for her children, and why? Why is Asia the foot-stool of European eminent domain? Because the West has accepted the Word merely in the same manner as the Old Diplomats accepted the Wilsonian principles. The Old Diplomats accepted the Wilsonian principles only to trample upon them at the first available opportunity. Is the record of Western Christianity any better?

Let us get down to brass tacks and see just where we are when, in the name of the Master, reverend gentlemen promote this new crusade against a civilized people for the propagation of the doctrine, because that is the chief inspiration, the secret motive. "Japan," they whisper, "is a pagan power and dangerous to Christianity."

In Chapter V, I ventured to say one or two things that will doubtless arouse wide and sweeping criticism. There are so many people who do not care to be reminded about

the thousands of slackers who fled across the border into Mexico, and the other thousands who had a sudden hankering for Hymen or draft-proof government jobs, or anything rather than to take a man's chance on the western front! Freedom of religious liberty is a fine thing, and war is a detestable thing at best. Still, between complete assurance of peace and the certainty of the possibility of war, there is no possible compromise. The choice at Paris was a super-state and fool-proof assurance against war or the certainty of some future war. Upon that point, privately, there was no difference of opinion. That was M. Bourgeois's strong card. Grant the possibility of war, and prudence dictates a public policy that will conserve the soldierly instincts of all citizens.

Asia weeps to-day because the majority of her children became conscientious objectors; unlike Christ among the Western Christians, Buddha and Mo-ti did not preach in vain. I am an ardent admirer of the Christian missionary. He has done good work in Asia; he has worked so well that it would be a great pity if, after so many years, he should split his head upon the rock that shattered the Asiatic missions of the pioneer friars and caused both China and Japan to ban and bar the missionary as a political pestilence. That might happen. It would be very awkward for an American President if the Emperor of Japan should take it into his head to send to the White House an ornate facsimile of the Fillmore letter. Are we willing to consider that historic document as "a scrap of paper?" I do not think so. Still, in view of all the circumstances, it would be well for our erudite President to re-read the Fillmore letter and the letter of Jhinghis Khan, cited in Chapter XXXV.

In preaching pacifism in Asia, are we not "carrying coals to Newcastle?" Are we not straining beyond the bounds of good-nature Chinese and Korean capacity for self-deception? Is it our desire that the vast bulk of the Asiatic people shall remain stuck in the mire of passive resistance until the last acre of Asia has passed under the hard heel of European

eminent domain? If that is not the answer, there may be food for wholesome thought in the quaint epistle of the Tatar to the Pope.

All who have any doubts about the menace of "passive resistance" would do well to see Asia for themselves; or, if it is not possible for them to do that, let them put to themselves this question: Why is it that four hundred millions of people are begging the world for help against sixty millions of people who are so small in stature that the four hundred millions sneer at them as "dwarfs"?

The Chinese question is the most terrifying question of today. It nails its theses upon every church-door in the Western world. It strips the world bare, and lashes modern civilization to the stake. Must China be crucified because the children of Mo-ti began to practise the pacifism of Christ many centuries before a Western Christian missionary planted foot or cross on China's soil, and several centuries before there was a single Christian cross in Europe?

Deep is my sympathy, and strong my love, for the Chinese people; and that is why I sometimes wonder whether, after all, the West is capable of giving profitable leadership to the Chinese people.

Once I listened to an elderly Chinese priest telling an old Asiatic legend about the Child of Bethlehem. It went something like this:

Three Chinese princes were at war when a good man, whose ancestor had adopted and transmitted the doctrines of Mo-ti and Confucius, rebuked them for their bad behavior and made them feel very sorry. So they resolved to give up waging wars and to commit their people into the care of wise elders, and they travelled together as pilgrims, carrying the good news to all, "God loves all men," and "Do unto others as you would have others do unto you."

They visited many lands, teaching as they went, and *they taught a child who, in his turn, became a great Teacher.* So, many strangers came to love God and to love one another, because God likes that.

That great American missionary, the late Bishop James W.

Bashford, who devoted a memorable life to the service and the study of the Chinese, paid this remarkable tribute to Mo-ti:

He comes the nearest of any ancient philosopher to the discovery of the scientific test of truth; and he devoted all his energies to promoting that doctrine of love which later was revealed and embodied by Jesus Christ.¹

Asia's weeping millions, Mo-ti's message from the dead past of twenty-five slumbering centuries, too many accidental Americans who are very willing to vote, but most unwilling to fight, and reverend gentlemen who preach pacifism in Asia and beat the devil's tattoo on anti-Japanese war-drums in the United States—these are the jarring, jangling notes of the Chinese question as they ring in American ears.

¹ "China: An Interpretation."

CHAPTER XL

LORDS OF THE BRUTE CREATION

ST. AUGUSTINE ridiculed the pagans of his time who satirized in their theaters the very gods they worshiped in their temples. Borrowers of the pagan's theater and temple, we have made both subservient to the book. The Bible, we are taught, is the way and the life; and he is damned who exclaims against its manifest contradictions and absurdities. Still, confronted by the realities, the temptations, the opportunities of existence; organized Christianity temporizes and, as the vicegerent of the Almighty, gladly accepts sovereignty over one day out of the seven. Six days in the week may you break the law if, upon the seventh, you tuck your Bible under your arm and wend your way to church. And, even at that, it is the appearance of the thing that is important. Modern Christianity consists in putting up a "Christian" front, one day, or even part of a day, in the week.

To this sad state of spiritual degradation has descended the undoubtedly civilizing force whose preacher among preachers, Paul, expressed the most marvelous truth of all time: "What doth it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?"

What, indeed? Paul, at least, had the courage of his convictions. He would not insult his God by holding Him forth to the people as a one-day-in-the-week lord of common-clay compromise. His God demanded all or nothing. A true man's God cannot be satisfied with less. Who gave all, deserves all, and must demand all.

Through his games (the blood spilled in the amphitheater)

the Roman, as Lecky tells us, "could lull his moral feelings to repose." We do better than that. We drug our moral feelings in our books; as in our books we satirize our belief in *the Book*. "The Brook Kerith" of Mr. George Moore commands more intelligent appreciation among the elect than the Acts of the Apostles, and sober reviewers make the point that the style is as fine and the matter more moral than parts of the Old Testament, which they quote. The spiritual sustenance of a nation cannot safely be drawn from wells poisoned by compromise and the injection of injurious foreign elements, stimulating the nausea of unbelief. A nation that ceases to believe in its beliefs is lost. Russia is merely the modern example of what happened to Judah, to Babylon, to Egypt, to Greece, and to Rome; to the Califate, Mogul and Mongol power, and the China of Yau and Shun. To-day, Chinese and Occidental Christian civilization are confronted by the same problem: How to preserve and perpetuate beliefs laughed to scorn by the hard facts of human existence?

Christ and Mo-ti taught the same doctrines of brotherly love and passive resistance; and, throughout the greater part of their history during the last two thousand four hundred years, the majority of the Chinese people have lived up to these doctrines, seven days in the week. To that fact must be traced most of their troubles.

Said the Chinese sage, "Make not swords of the best iron or soldiers of your favorite sons!" This, to people who believe that "Eighteen Lohan daughters [that is, 'the eighteen beautiful companions of Buddha'] are not equal to a boy with a limp."

The Chinese placed more faith in the Wilsonian principles and the League of Nations than did all others in the world combined. Sense that, and one can glimpse the tragedy of the Paris Conference. From the Chinese standpoint, after many cycles of Cathay, we were "catching up with China." It was a Chinese and "foreign devil" delusion.

On May 31, 1919, speaking in the Conference of Paris and

attempting to justify the triumph of power over principle (then assailed by Roumanian, Pole, and Serb) President Wilson said:

“It is necessary always to remember that it is force which is the ultimate guarantee of the public peace.”

That was a definite descent from the demand, cheered at Mount Vernon, July 4, 1918, for

“A mutual trust established upon the handsome foundation of a mutual respect for right.”

Because it is inevitable that there must be numerous and varying reactions from the disillusionment of the great war and the “terrible peace,” the fact itself demands consideration from those who seriously address themselves to national and international problems. Merely moral, political, social, or material direction cannot suffice. Man demands the stimulus and the support of the spiritual motive, and the spiritual motive must be capable of welding the real with convincing solidarity to the ideal. Our ideals must at least seem tangible things, drawing us willingly upward from the ground of our grosser selves.

Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, our own gentle and admirable Harvey O'Higgins, and others who sense (even if they do not satisfy) the need of the hour, have followed Sir Oliver Lodge and the pagans into the ghost land of our childhood dreams. No sooner did the severely modern schools slay Santa Claus and Cinderella, coldly callous to the teardrops in the big young eyes, than the most redoubtable philosophers of them all rallied to the side of spook and specter. Thomas Child, favorite pupil and successor of Sir Alfred Russell Wallace, says in his masterpiece, “Root-Principles”;

What is certain is that since mental and physical are conjoined in the brain, both for the production and the reception of the feeling, they must also be conjoined in its transmission; thus that, the facts being witness, there can be no communication of mental states without a mental sphere any more than there can be a communication of physical states without a physical sphere: the two must be main-

tained throughout; and the conclusion indicated is that this mental or spiritual sphere or environment constitutes, by necessity of its very place and meaning, a common sphere of all souls, *the spiritual world* in other words, within the physical and acting in correspondence with it, yet not subject to its laws; as the mind or soul is within the body and in correspondence with it, though neither physical nor interpretable by the laws of matter.

As facts pointed for long to the existence of an ether, the source of light, within gross matter, till it became no longer an hypothesis but a reality accepted and proved, so do facts otherwise inexplicable point to the hypothesis of a spiritual world within the natural as the ultimate explanation of the origin, existence and sustenance of mind, and to the true disclosure of the nature of man. The existence of an all-permeating sphere of spiritual substance within the physical, and using all its degrees of Aura, Ether, and Air for spiritual ends, satisfies the facts of mind and life down to their physical relations, and shows the means by which feeling and thought are intercommunicated, even here, by a spiritual environment in this world, and in that, and lifts our sight to a wide outlook upon otherwise intangible, inscrutable phenomena which are as wide as the world and as old as man and his interior, significant emotions. For minds, even in this world, do not and cannot come into the physical atmosphere; they are, in strictness, not *here* at all—like light, in space without being of it or in any manner its subjects. If they were, they would be as much under physical force—gravitation and its fellows—as are physical objects themselves; and that conception of things reduces even thinking itself to the absurd.

Mr. Lloyd George called modern war “organized savagery.” His speech, following Mr. Wilson on January 25, 1919, was an inspiring and convincing indictment of the ghastly failure of modern civilization. He had just returned from a visit to the British battle-fields, the graves of so many fine Britons. We cheered him with damp eyes, world-weary and skeptical though many of us were. Be it remembered that he was seconding the President’s resolution to create a League of Nations as a fundamental part of the treaty of peace. This was what he said:

Had I the slightest doubt in my mind as to the wisdom of this scheme, it would have vanished before the irresistible appeal made

to me by the spectacle I witnessed, last Sunday. I visited a region which but a few years ago was one of the fairest in an exceptionally fair land. I found it a ruin, and a desolation. I drove for hours through a country which did not appear like the habitation of living men and women and children, but like the excavation of a buried province—shattered, torn, rent. I went to one city where I witnessed a scene of devastation that no indemnity can ever repair—one of the beautiful things of the world, disfigured and defaced beyond repair. And one of the cruellest features, to my mind, was what I could see had happened—that Frenchmen, who love their land almost beyond any nation, in order to establish the justice of their cause, had to assist a cruel enemy in demolishing their own homes, and I felt: these are the results—only part of the results. Had I been there months ago I would have witnessed something that I dare not describe. But I saw acres of graves of the fallen. And these were the results of the only method, the only organized method—the only organized method that civilized nations have ever attempted or established to settle disputes amongst each other. And my feeling was: surely it is time, surely it is time that a saner plan for settling disputes between peoples should be established than this organized savagery. I don't know whether this will succeed. But if we attempt it, the attempt will be a success, and for that reason I second the proposal.

Are we no better than organized savages? Is our vaunted civilization merely a thin veneer of blasphemous hypocrisy, a sanctimonious vestment to be cast off and thrown aside, once in every little while, when we grow tired of the mockery of pretense and seek self-expression in naked realities and the crude joy of killing? After all, sing "Onward, Christian Soldiers" until our throats grow hoarse and our voices crack with the strain, are we anything more than lords of the brute creation, with a smell superior to that of the yak or the skunk, and morals a stage or two above those of the monkeys? Do we really pine for right and justice, and practise salvation by sacrifice? A people starts with a serious handicap when it preaches something that it does not intend to practise.

I trust that I have not conveyed the impression that to my mind Christianity is a fake and a failure. That would be very far from my purpose. These are things that Christians

will have to reason out and solve for themselves, or others will surely take the solution into their own hands. You do not solve problems by running away from them or by closing your eyes to them. If you attempt to run away from a really healthy, sound, and sensible problem, it will run after you, catch up with you, and trip you for your pains. If you close your eyes to it, you are due to receive a good, sharp mental bump. And this is the greatest problem in the world to-day. A minority of humanity, styling itself the salt of the earth, seeks to thrust upon an awakening majority a spiritual system which it is merely willing to preach and most unwilling to practise.

Once in the East I met a reformed Thug. We conversed about Bowanee, the goddess whom he had served faithfully and throatfully with his thin and taut bowstring. He was a gentlemanly strangler and, from his own account, a very efficient and successful one. Of course, he had strong views as to British rule over his country. The British habit of enforcing law and order, even in out of the way places, had seriously interfered with his devotion to Mrs. Bowanee. That was how he became a reformed Thug. He was reformed merely from the skin outward, and to protect his skin, a reasonable consideration, it being the only skin likely to come into his possession. He gave me a very vivid description of how it feels to throttle a squirming, kicking, "unburnt offering" to the dread deity of Thuggee. There was one "case" in particular about which he spoke with becoming pride—a tough tribesman of the hills who took from midday until sundown between his first wobble and his final wriggle.

"He was most unwilling to proceed," said my friend, the reformed Thug, as he smoked with placid content, a smile of self-satisfaction wreathing his ruminative countenance.

"Naturally enough," I said; just to make conversation. I could feel the bowstring around my own throat.

"Very natural," agreed Mr. Thug.

It is very natural among the lords of the brute creation to

object to measures that restrict their desire to go on breathing and finding breathing spaces. Aggressive races seek new breathing-spaces *successfully*. They push the non-aggressive, or in some manner weaker people, out of their way, or walk over their dead bodies. We pushed the Indians into the wilderness, and when we desired to turn the wilderness into gardens and towns and the greater part of a great civilized commonwealth, *we walked over dead Indians*. It had to be, and we do not have to apologize for our pathfinders or for their red story. They were men; sons of manly races, fathers of a manly nation. They were mostly Christian, God-fearing men. They had faith in their beliefs. The God of their fathers was with them when the tomahawk and the scalping-knife and consuming fire confronted them with the red man's death by torture. If they had not believed, and, believing, died, the United States of America would not have been possible.

Mr. Lloyd George, giving a leg to all that was left of the "Fourteen Points," epitomized the best efforts of modern civilization as "organized savagery," and then hopped over to London and informed his own particular lords of the brute creation that he, their Napoleon, had added 800,000 square miles of territory to the British domain. I am reliably informed that his estimate was more modest than his actual achievement. Still, 800,000 square miles are not to be sneezed at in this day of paper mandatories and jealously covetous mandataries. The lion got away with the lion's share, which was all very fit and proper; and, smilingly reproving the laughter caused by his cautious reference to the League of Nations, "I pray you take it seriously," besought the British premier. The league was the lion's own league, to protect the lion's spoils.

CHAPTER XLI

THE LONELY ONE

WE have come to the end of the road. What lies in front of us, none can say. The shadows are too deep, and the lamp has gone out, yet something within us forbids despair. A little while, and the moon will come up; and, if we tarry for him, the sun. Wisdom whispers to wait for the sun; it is dangerous to walk the jungle by moonlight.

We need a new guide. If we are patient, he will come to us,—he always does,—and he will walk bravely ahead and beat a pathway for our feet. We shall know him by his simplicity, his cheerfulness and courage, and his humble faith in God. While we are waiting for him in the darkness, let us sit down on our own importance, and keep one another company by telling stories. It will help to chase the shadows away, and lift the load from our hearts.

Once upon a time, there came into the world a man who hoarded power. He amassed so much power, and with so little labor, that at last the idea came to him to announce his partnership with God. He did this, without consulting God. Now, God became angry with this man, and He said, I shall smite him as I smote Lucifer, son of the morning. I shall raise up a Michael to destroy this man who has mocked Me through the gifts that I have committed to his keeping. And God raised up one who looked like a Michael and who humbled the pride of the usurper of His own majesty.

But this man who looked like a Michael forgot that he was common clay, like other men; and he, too, became drunk with

power. So God took the power away from him, that all men might know themselves as clay and Him *only* as God.

There are many other stories. That is *the* story. Let no man reject its lesson.

Poor, strayed asses of a greater than Kish, how pitiful, after all, are the greatest among men! "How weak a thing is man, how poor his works!" Yet how wonderful, under God's goodness! He might have made us cockroaches or blind worms. He was not compelled to give us heads and hearts, or so-called white skins. If we deem ourselves His chosen people, why, then let us make good our boast, and with fear and gentleness employ the power He placed within our hands. His was the mold and the paint-brush, we but the dust under His feet.

Often, during the Conference of Paris, I wandered alone by the banks of the Seine, wondering in my own mind what God thought of it all: the base deception, the mean hypocrisy, the awful chasm between opportunity and the acts of the Three! Looking around at stately old buildings that have seen kings come and go and the more beautiful wood and water that man could not make, comfort always came. There is a reason for all things, even for human failure.

So I cannot close this book without giving a parting thought to one who, with all his human frailty, proved himself to the last so much greater than the others, mere puppets in the play. Perhaps that is the explanation of his failure, the reason why so many great men fail—the suffocating incense that comes from too certain a perception of differing degrees of clay. The curs that barked at the heels of Wilson were, mentally speaking, mostly mongrels of very mean mud.

History will be kinder to him than were most of his foreign friends. Ca-canny were some of the nationalist "internationalists," and most curious their American affiliations. The Wall Street-Whitehall Alliance knew how to employ the brass monkeys on wooden sticks that served their turn at Bern and Battersea, and in Greenwich Village. And the bile they

spilled when Wilson spurned their worthless promissory notes—Allied paper backed by the resources of the United States—was as welcome as wine to ranting Republicans.

Our own posterity will not forget that, after all, he was President of the United States; that his triumph was our triumph; and his failure, our failure, too. For the cause of his failure is also the rock upon which we may come to grief. If he was chosen to warn us of our danger, his personal tragedy may not be in vain.

He was so lonely in Paris, so very lonely; and he is lonely, now. Success seemed always so near; how cruel it must have been to awaken at last to the truth of the pact of death! Had it not been for that headache, that moment of physical weakness, that blundering subordinate, that wrong move, that foolish pretense of strength, and stubbornness in folly! How much better it would have been to have taken counsel of Lodge, of Knox, of Roosevelt! They, at least, were Americans. They might have understood.

What a pity it was he permitted himself to go to Paris, at all! Why not have left the military peace to military men in France, and have insisted upon our Allied debtors and our defeated foes coming to Washington, where a peace of justice would have been possible! That was never possible in Paris. It was courting disaster to leave the American end of the peace during the most vital month of all in the feeble hands of Lansing and the hollow head of House. The last two weeks of February and the first two weeks of March completed the wreck begun by the President himself on January 12, when he turned his back upon the people and his principles and gazed too long upon the polished perturbation, golden care of power.

Still, with it all, he was great. Snap at his shins though his critics may, Woodrow Wilson held the center of the stage from first to last during the Conference of Paris. Secretly, in their hearts, though they sought to make game of him, card-indexed his least eccentricity, and made a bold show of defying

his authority; they bowed and scraped before him and sought favors at his generous hand. He was the Emperor; Balfour, the trained courtier; and the Marquis Imperiali, snob by birth and profession, were creatures that bent their backs if he merely nodded upon them. Even the "Tiger" had to be careful when he felt like lashing his tail, and he thought it best to wait for the coming of the Emperor, that lovely day when the birds sang so merrily in the gardens of St.-Germain, and the Austrians filed through the servants' entrance of the old, ivy-clad chateau to hear the Hapsburg's fate. Mr. Wilson was the Emperor, and of course he had his court fool.

Only Molière could have done justice to "The Magnificent Mouse" who was always so near the cheese. Furtively peeping out of his crack in the Crillon, nibbling at the gorgonzola, trying his best to look important; the mouse will find his hole in history. He came near losing his tender tail when the Irish terrier, Walsh, got on to his tricks. Foolish "Mouse," to think he could play with a terrier!

Mr. Wilson's sin was his super-self-confidence, his self-deception. He sought to do too much, himself. If he could not trust other statesmen of his own country, what faith could he repose in men who had never breathed the pure air of freedom, who were either groping in the dark for light or else hiding the light that they might continue to transgress under cover of their Stygian darkness!

Before Congress, in January, 1918, and six months later beside Washington's tomb at Mount Vernon, the President climbed to the top of the mountain. As Satan, with diabolical intent, had tempted Christ; so Mr. Wilson, with the noblest purpose, tempted credulous mankind; pointing to the wonders below his feet, the new dawn, the New Freedom! And then, in Paris, face to face with grim realities, the fires and fumes, created by his own incantations, sickened his soul and sapped his strength. He had no stomach for the task he had attempted. The reality of Europe was a phantasmagoria far more dreadful than the worst conceptions of his cloistered

mind. So, shuddering from the spectacle, he slipped and fell from the precipice of his principles; and, when he crashed down and was crushed to atoms, his New World toppled over, tottered and crumbled into dust. It was only a world of tempting theories, after all. The New Freedom was merely an *intermezzo* in the Old Bondage.

What a pity he had no program! He was forever borrowing other people's programs. Mr. Balfour, the bashful British boa, always had a program to spare. Still, I don't think it was wise to use Mr. Balfour's programs. You never could tell what was really in them until after the play was over. Sometimes; Mr. Balfour wrote them with his own practised hand.

One day, quite early in January, Mr. Balfour was sitting in his study at the Villa Nitot. He had his glasses on, and his eyes were trained upon a Quai d'Orsay manuscript.

"No," he said to himself; "that is the wrong way to begin."

So he took up pen and paper and began writing a nice new program. A caller was announced.

"Let him come in," said Mr. Balfour, resigned, as he invariably is, to interruption. The caller breezed in. He was an old American friend, one among many. Arthur Balfour has a real fondness for Americans. They always interest, and sometimes they amuse, him.

"We rely upon your friendly help," said the American.

"That is nice of you," said Mr. B——. "You may be sure I shall do all that I can."

Upon an impulse he showed his American "cousin" the lines he had written for his draft program, thus:

"Conférence des préliminaires de paix.

"Première Partie.

"Composition de la Conférence.

"(This comes first.)

"Etats-Unis D'Amérique.

"Le Président des Etats-Unis

"etc."

Mr. Wilson signed first. The others toddled along after him, on the world's most historic document. The President took precedence over the kings, because an ambassador carries in his person the prestige and the dignity of his sovereign. Mr. Wilson signed first. Now, that was a good one on old John Tyler, criticized by the Princeton historian—old John who could do no better than create one "Count of the American Commonwealth!"


Nevertheless, Mr. Wilson was great. There are fools and fools. There have been wise men who were great fools. Even Solomon made an awful spectacle of himself, and his reputation for wisdom seems to have survived the shock. Famous fools irresistibly suggest the "pure fool," *Parsifal*; but we must not mention him, because he was a German. Yet he had a wonderful influence over *Kundry* and others in the story. His heart was so honest!

Mr. Wilson has been called many hard names. Among other things, I think it was George Harvey or Edward P. Mitchell, Dana's delightful heir in "The Sun," who first discovered that Mr. Wilson was a purely intellectual phenomenon, sans heart, plus liver and some lights. Now, nature is nowhere more extraordinary than in the skilful way in which she has wedded the heart to the mind. No scientist has yet discovered how to divorce heart and mind, or how to marry heart or mind (or find one) in a widowed state. It is the one indissoluble union. Even the Pope of Rome is powerless to separate the organ of love from the source of thought. This unity in life is the mark of man's mortality and the cause of our consciousness of immortality. The mind is the sentinel of the soul, and the heart is true consort of the mind.

A gentle heart is consort of the brilliant mind of Woodrow Wilson. Those who know him best doubt not his heart, which is as warm as his mind is cold. Clear, still waters are most easily frozen. It was very cold in Paris, January, 1919. The ice was slippery on and about the Champs-Élysées. Not all the ice was under foot.

If chance so rules it that one must play the fool, it is better to be a great fool than a little fool. That is some satisfaction. Every delegation at the Paris conference had its fool. Most of them will not get as much as a footnote in history.

Criticism is cheap. It is so easy to criticize, except when you are smashing an idol that has become a part of your own flesh and blood. Then, the hand loses its cunning and the argument its force. The old idol smiles serenely up at you, daring you to deem it but painted clay. So you cast away the hammer and the hatchet, and you are glad—and sorry—to leave the fallen idol all alone; glad, because prudence bids you seek first your own peace of mind; and sorry, because you want to go back to your idol and, with tender hands, help it once more onto its pedestal.



ASIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND PACIFIC POWER

- A** Asiatic sovereignty preserved. (Note: Strictly speaking, no Asiatic state has fully preserved its sovereign power, a decision of the Hague court having denied to Japan the right of eminent domain over certain parcels of Japan's land.)
- B** Sovereignty impaired by treaty or penetration. (Note: Despite Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo's skilful reasoning in *The Status of Aliens in China*, as a matter of law as well as of fact, China is a sovereign state merely by courtesy of the great powers who have invaded China's sovereign rights, in more than one instance with the concurrence of the government of the United States. As an illustration, see the correspondence between our minister at Peking and the State Department regarding consular exequatur, Port Arthur, etc., among other dispatches the following from Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay: "Since these ports have practically passed from the control of an uncivilized people to civilized," etc., *Foreign Relations of the U. S.*, (1899) : p. 385.)
- C** American possessions. (Note: The Filipinos are pledged independence by the U. S. Congress (Jones Act, August 29, 1916) and now make and administer their own laws.)
- D** Japanese occupation.
- E** British control or actual annexation.
- F** Russian control or actual annexation.
- G** Ceded to France.
- H** Dutch possessions.
- I** Portuguese possession.
- J** International control.
- K** After the defeat of Napoleon, Czar Alexander I declared his intention "to make the world safe for autocracy," formed the Holy Alliance and attempted to alienate our American Pacific coast along the Oregon country, as it was called, to what is now San Francisco Bay. To save our Pacific coast, we promulgated the Monroe Doctrine in 1823.

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THE FORMER GERMAN POSSESSIONS IN ASIA AND OCEANIA ARE
SHOWN ON THE MAP BY NUMERALS, AS FOLLOWS:

Territory	When acquired	Area in sq. miles	Native population	Present possessor under the Treaty of Versailles
1 Kiaochau	1898	200	192,000	Japan
Pacific Islands:				
2 German New Guinea (Kaiser Wilhelm's Land)	1885-6	70,000	350,000	Australia
3 Bismarck archipelago	1885	15,570	450,000	Australia
4 Caroline Islands	1899	4,000	Japan
5 Palau or Pelew Islands	1899	560	3,000	Japan
6 Marianne Islands	1899	250	2,600	Japan
7 Solomon Islands	1886	4,200	17,000	Japan
8 Marshall Islands	1886	150	15,000	Australia
9 Samoan Islands:				
Savaii	1899	660	41,128	Japan
Upolu	1899	600		New Zealand
10 Narau	1885	New Zealand
11 Yap	1899	7,155	Great Britain ? to U. S. A.

On May 7, 1919, the Supreme Council of the Conference of Paris issued an official communiqué, announcing (temporary) mandates for these islands in Oceania, under the League of Nations, as follows:

“The German Samoan Islands—the mandate shall be held by New Zealand.

“The other German Pacific possessions, South of the Equator, excluding the German Samoan Islands and Narau (10)—the mandate shall be held by Australia.

“Narau (Pleasant Island) (10)—the mandate shall be given to the British Empire.

“The German Pacific Islands, North of the Equator—the mandate shall be held by Japan.”

This arrangement followed the secret agreement between Japan and England, France, Russia and Italy. In the course of his answers to U. S. Senators at the White House, Washington, D. C., August 19, 1919, President Wilson let it be known that the United States desires possession of Yap Island for a radiograph base.

ACTUAL SOVEREIGNTY OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Sovereign Power	Area in square miles	Population
Russian (European Russia: Area: 1,- 867,737; Pop. 131,700,800)	7,805,714	31,277,820
British (Excluding Arabia and the Near East) (Great Britain and Ire- land: Area: 121,683; Pop. 45,- 516,259)	6,716,395	357,528,837

Sovereign Power	Area in square miles	Population
French (France: Area: 207,054; Pop. 39,602,258)	275,390	17,339,031
Anglo-French (Under special agreement) New Hebrides	5,100	70,000
(Under tacit understanding) Siam..	195,000	8,827,000
Dutch (The Netherlands: Area: 12,582; Pop. 6,724,663)	735,129	37,718,177
Portuguese (Portugal: Area: 34,254; Pop. 5,545,505)	8,972	1,001,153
American (Continental U. S. A. (Excluding Alaska) Area: 2,973,890; Pop. (about) 100,000,000).....	121,776	9,272,521
International (By treaty and by threat)		
China	2,202,000	386,886,000
Actual Asiatic Sovereignty Japan....	353,191	82,944,482
Land area and population of Asia and the Pacific Islands	18,418,666	932,865,021

RUSSIA IN ASIA

A Russian View of Russian Penetration.—“Our time-honored policy, from the days of the Variags down to the reign of the Emperor Alexander III, was founded on the axiom that Russia needs territorial expansion at the expense of her neighbors.”—M. Menshikof in the *Novoe Vremya*, April, 1912.

An Intelligent British Conclusion.—“It is not to be denied that, ever since the splendid adventures of Khabarof on the Amur in the seventeenth century, and the exploits of Muravief Amursky in the nineteenth, the dream of a Far Eastern Empire has permanently possessed the imagination of the Russian bureaucracy and of many Slav ‘intellectuals.’”—J. O. P. Bland, in *Recent Events and Present Policies in China*, p. 338.

SIBERIA

Territory	Area in square miles	Population
Amur	154,795	261,500
Irkutsk	280,429	821,800
Kamchatka	502,424	41,400
Primorskoya	266,486	631,600
Sakhalien	14,668	34,000
Tobolsk	535,739	2,085,700

440 AMERICA'S AIMS AND ASIA'S ASPIRATIONS

Territory	Area in square miles	Population
Tomsk	327,175	4,053,700
Transbaikalia	238,308	971,700
Yakutsk	1,530,253	332,600
Yeniseisk	981,607	1,143,900
Totals:		10,377,900

STEPPE PROVINCES

Territory	Area in square miles	Population
Akmolinsk	225,074	1,546,500
Semipalatinsk	178,320	874,900
Turgai	169,832	706,200
Uralsk	137,679	889,600
Totals:		4,017,020

TURKESTAN PROVINCES

Territory	Area in square miles	Population
Fenghana	55,483	2,169,600
Samarcand	26,627	1,207,400
Syr-Daria	194,147	2,026,100
Semiryechensk	144,550	1,281,300
Totals:		6,684,400

TRANS-CASPIAN PROVINCE

Territory	Area in square miles	Population
Western Turkestan	235,120	552,500
Totals:		552,500

DEPENDENCIES

Territory	Area in square miles	Population
Bokhara	83,000	1,250,000
Khiva	24,000	646,000
Totals:		1,896,000

RECENT PENETRATION
(1900-1917)

Territory	Area in square miles	Population
Manchuria (Part of 363,700 sq. miles and of estimated population, 17,- 000,000)	200,000	5,000,000
Mongolia (Part of 1,367,953 sq. miles and of estimated population, 2,- 600,000)	1,000,000	1,250,000
Eastern Turkestan (Part of 550,579 sq. miles and of estimated popula- tion, 2,500,000)	300,000	1,500,000
Totals:	1,500,000	7,750,000

RECAPITULATION

Territory	Area in square miles	Population
Siberia	4,831,882	10,377,900
Steppes	710,905	4,017,020
Turkestan	420,807	6,684,400
Trans-Caspia	235,120	552,500
Dependencies	107,000	1,896,000
Recent Penetration	1,500,000	7,750,000
Russia in Asia:	7,805,714	31,277,820

THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN ASIA AND OCEANIA

Territory	Area in square miles	Population
Indian Empire	1,802,699	315,156,396
Ceylon	25,481	4,632,400
Andaman Islands	2,260	17,324
Nicobar Islands	635	8,118
Laccadive Islands	10,600
British Malaysia (Straits Settlements and Malay States)	54,076	2,863,000
British North Borneo	31,106	208,183
Brunei	4,000	30,000
Sarawak	42,000	600,000
Annexed and leased territory in China: Hongkong (island 29 sq. miles) and Kowloon extension.....	391	535,000
Weihaiwei	285	150,000

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Dependencies or protectorates:

Territory	Area in square miles	Population
Baluchistan	134,638	834,703
Afghanistan	245,000	6,380,500
Sikkim	2,818	87,920
Thibet	463,320	6,500,000
Persia	628,000	about 12,000,000
Australia (including Tasmania).....	2,974,581	4,981,565
New Zealand	104,751	1,170,000
Papua (Br. New Guinea)	90,540	201,000
Fiji	7,083	166,000
Pacific Islands:		
Tonga (Friendly Is.)	250	24,000
Ducie, Gilbert and Elise isles....	200	31,000
British Solomon Islands	11,000	150,000
Former German possessions acquired under the Treaty of Versailles:		
Samoan Islands (Savaii and Upolu)	1,260	41,128
German New Guinea and adjacent islands	90,020	750,000
British Empire in Asia and Oceania..	6,716,394	357,528,837

FRANCE IN ASIA AND OCEANIA

Territory	Area in square miles	Population
French India:		
Pondicherry, etc.	196	266,917
Indo-China:		
Cochin-China	20,000	3,050,785
Annam	52,100	5,200,000
Cambodia	45,000	1,634,252
Battambang-Sisophon	4,310	176,395
Tonking	46,400	6,119,720
Laos Territory	98,000	640,877
Kwangchauwan	190	168,000
Australasia and Oceania:		
New Caledonia and dependencies.....	7,650	50,608
Society Isles, Marquesas, Leeward Islands, etc.	1,544	31,477
France in Asia and Oceania:	275,390	17,339,031

HOLLAND IN ASIA AND OCEANIA

Territory	Area in square miles	Population
Java and Madura	50,557	30,098,008
Sumatra	159,739	4,029,805
Borneo	212,737	1,233,655
Celebes	72,070	852,405
Molucca, etc.	240,026	1,504,304
<hr/>		
Holland in Asia and Oceania:	735,129	37,718,177

PORTUGAL IN ASIA

Territory	Area in square miles	Population
Portuguese India:		
Goa	1,469	515,772
Danao and Diu	169	32,700
Timor	7,330	377,815
Portuguese China:		
Macao	4	74,886
<hr/>		
Portugal in Asia:	8,972	1,001,153

AMERICAN PACIFIC POSSESSIONS

Territory	Area in square miles	Population
Philippine Islands	115,000	9,000,000
Hawaii	6,449	250,627
American Samoa (Tutuila)	102	7,550
Guam	225	14,344
<hr/>		
American Pacific Possessions:	121,776	9,272,521

NOTE: The Philippines have been pledged independence. The United States possesses a number of smaller islands in the Pacific, such as Midway and Wake islands and it is understood that Yap is to become an American possession.

THE JAPANESE EMPIRE

Territory	Area in square miles	Population
Japan Proper	148,756	56,550,348
Korea	84,738	16,998,191
Formosa	13,944	3,650,047
Pescadores	47	...
Japanese Sakhalien	13,253	68,207

444 AMERICA'S AIMS AND ASIA'S ASPIRATIONS

Leased territories:

Liaotung	1,300	488,089
Kiaochau	193	165,000

Under mandate (The Treaty of Versailles):

North Pacific Island	960	24,600
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Under actual Japanese Control:

South Manchuria and part of Eastern Inner Mongolia	90,000	about 5,000,000
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The Japanese Empire:	353,191	82,944,482
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THE CHINESE REPUBLIC

Territory	Area in square miles	Population
China Proper (Eighteen provinces) ..	1,532,000	377,636,000
Manchuria (part of)	70,000	about 7,000,000
Mongolia (part of)	350,000	about 1,250,000
Sinkiang (part of) (Eastern Turkestan)	250,000	1,000,000
* The Chinese Republic:	2,202,000	386,886,000

NOTE: China is a sovereign power in name only. The legation quarter in Peking is a foreign military camp. The inland waters of China are patrolled by foreign gunboats. The railways connecting the capital and the coast (under foreign control) are guarded by foreign garrisons. Troops of foreign nations are stationed in inland cities. China's chief ports are owned or controlled by foreign powers. The customs, salt internal revenue, wine and spirit revenue and the post and telegraph service are controlled by foreigners. China is pock-marked by foreign concessions and pierced by foreign jurisdiction; and steadily China's domain is dwindling under the relentless pressure of alien penetration.

THE KINGDOM OF SIAM

Territory	Area in square miles	Population
Muang-Thai ("The Kingdom of the Free")	195,000	8,827,000

NOTE: A vivid description of the deadly operation of the Anglo-French "nutcracker" and the paring down of Siam is given by Mr. Herbert Adams Gibbons in *The New Map of Asia*, pp. 75-94. The land of the fabulous "white elephant" is completely under the control of the foreign offices of England and France.

APPENDICES

AMERICA'S AIMS AND ASIA'S ASPIRATIONS

- A—Monroe Doctrine analysis.
- B—The Li-Lobanoff Alliance.
- C—President Fillmore's letter to the Emperor of Japan.
- D—China-Japanese treaties and notes.
- E—The secret Allied-Japanese Pledges.
- F—Japan's Chinese trade-conquest tables.
- G—Japan's Kiaochau pledge.

APPENDIX A

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

TEXT OF THE DOCTRINE, FROM THE ANNUAL MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT MONROE TO CONGRESS, DECEMBER 2, 1823:

WE OWE IT, THEREFORE, TO CANDOR AND TO THE AMICABLE RELATIONS EXISTING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THOSE POWERS, TO DECLARE THAT WE SHOULD CONSIDER ANY ATTEMPT ON THEIR PART TO EXTEND THEIR SYSTEM TO ANY PORTION OF THIS HEMISPHERE AS DANGEROUS TO OUR PEACE AND SAFETY. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But *with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it*, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view *any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them*, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power IN ANY OTHER LIGHT THAN AS THE MANIFESTATION OF AN UNFRIENDLY DISPOSITION TOWARD THE UNITED STATES.

THE ORIGIN OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

(From Henderson's "American Diplomatic Questions," pp. 331-333.)

"In the early part of the century, an American exploring expedition had descended the Columbia River to its mouth, and visiting the coastal regions of Oregon, had established over a very considerable, though ill-defined region of territory, an American claim of title. Spain also had territorial claims along the Pacific coast, as far north as Vancouver Island, which, however, she yielded to the United States (north of 42°) by treaty of 1819. English claims in the northwest were exceedingly indefinite, but all cause of friction between England and the United States, arising from disputed boundary lines on the Pacific coast, was removed by the agreement of 1818, leaving for a term of years the territory claimed by both parties free and open to the subjects of each. Far to the north and west, an immense and vaguely bounded territory belonged to Russia. Even in those early days, some trade relations existed between citizens of the United States and the native Alaskan Indians. Misunderstandings arose, and *Russia took occasion*, in a correspondence which followed, *to make known her claims along the Pacific coast of North America*, from Bering Straits to the mouth of the Columbia

River. In 1816, a Russian chartered company made settlements and established a regular trading post near San Francisco. This advance of the Russians, far to the south, caused some dissatisfaction in Washington; but so doubtful were all territorial titles along the Pacific coast, in those early days, that no positive stand was made against this Russian advance. In 1821, however, *Alexander, Emperor of Russia, issued an ukase, in which he announced his claim to the northwest coast of America, down to the 51st degree of latitude, and forbade the approach within one hundred miles of his shores of any foreign vessel.* This extraordinary assumption of marine jurisdiction met with instant protests from both Washington and London. Mr. Adams bestirred himself to gather arguments to disprove this exaggerated claim of Russia which Mr. Poletica, the Russian Minister in Washington, sought to defend upon the grounds 'of first discovery, first occupation, and upon that which results from a peaceable and uncontested possession of more than half a century.' Mr. Poletica was succeeded by Baron Tuyll, who brought the discussion to a close by asking that the matter be settled in St. Petersburg by negotiations with Mr. Middleton, the American minister at that capital. Mr. Adams, in July, 1823, told Baron Tuyll 'that *we should contest the right of Russia to any territorial establishments on this continent, and that we should assume distinctly the principle that American continents are no longer subjects for any European colonial establishments.*' He then instructed Mr. Middleton that:

"There can, perhaps be no better time for saying frankly and explicitly, to the Russian Government, that the future peace of the world, and the interest of Russia herself, cannot be promoted by Russian settlements upon any part of the American continent. With the exception of the British establishments north of the United States, the remainder of both the American continents must henceforth be left to the management of American hands. It cannot possibly be the purpose of Russia to form extensive colonial establishments in America. The new American republics will be as impatient of a Russian neighbor as the United States; and the claim of Russia to territorial possession, extending to 51st parallel of north latitude, is equally incompatible with British pretensions.'

"The very same day he wrote to Mr. Rush, acquainting him with the latest phases of the north-west-territory dispute. He said:—

"A necessary consequence of this state of things (independence of the Spanish American colonies) will be, that the American continents, henceforth, will no longer be subjects of colonization. Occupied by civilized independent nations, they will be accessible to Europeans and to each other on that footing alone, and the Pacific Ocean in every part

of it will remain open to the navigation of all nations in like manner with the Atlantic.

“Incidental to the condition of national independence and sovereignty, the rights of anterior navigation of their rivers will belong to each of the American nations within its own territories.

“The application of colonial principles of exclusion, therefore, cannot be admitted by the United States as lawful upon any part of the northwest coast of America, or as belonging to any European nation.’

“In the treaty of 1824, Russia accepted the parallel of 54° 40’ as the southern limit of her American territory.

“The statement of Mr. Adams, that the American continents would no longer be subject to colonization, was seized upon by President Monroe. It dovetailed perfectly with the policy he and his cabinet had determined upon as a check against the Holy Alliance.

“The words of the annual message of December 2, 1823, which constitute the ‘Monroe Doctrine’ are as follows,—those aimed at Russia coming first:—

“At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable negotiation the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal has been made by His Imperial Majesty to the Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to. The government of the United States has been desirous by this friendly proceeding of manifesting the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the Emperor and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his government. In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate *the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.’*”

(Then follows the text of the Doctrine as given on page 447.)

THE LODGE EXTENSION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

Magdalena Bay Episode (1912) ¹

“A new variation of the American Doctrine was suggested by a supposed effort of Japan, in 1912, to get control of territory on Magdalena Bay, in the Mexican territory of Southern California. The attention of Congress was called to it, and Secretary Knox denied that either the Japanese government or any Japanese company had bought land on Magdalena Bay. Senator Lodge, whose interest in

¹ Hart, A. B., “The Monroe Doctrine,” p. 235.

this subject had been shown in the controversy of 1895, felt sure that the Japanese had designs on Mexican territory with a view of getting a permanent footing, and he introduced a resolution into the Senate which was adopted:

“Resolved, That when any harbor or other place in the American continents is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communication or the safety of the United States, the Government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbor or other place by any corporation or association which has such a relation to another Government, not American, as to give that Government practical power or control for naval or military purposes.”

“Thereby, the Senate, as far as it had authority, added the Asiatic to the European powers in the list of those which must not interfere with the Latin-American states or introduce their political system.”

WILSON'S PAN-AMERICAN DOCTRINE,

Pronounced in the presence of Latin-American representatives at Mobile, Alabama, October 26, 1913:

“The future, ladies and gentlemen, is going to be very different for this hemisphere from the past. These States lying to the south of us, which have always been our neighbors, will now be drawn closer to us by innumerable ties, and, I hope, chief of all, by the tie of a common understanding of each other.

“We must prove ourselves their friends and champions upon terms of equality and honor. *You cannot be friends upon any other terms than upon the terms of equality. You cannot be friends at all except upon the terms of honor.* We must show ourselves friends by comprehending their interest whether it squares with our own interest or not.

“I want to take this occasion to say that the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest.

“Our real relationship with the rest of American is the relationship of a family of mankind devoted to the development of true constitutional liberty. America is a name which sounds in the ears of men everywhere as a synonym with individual opportunity because a synonym of individual liberty. I would rather belong to a poor nation that was free than to a rich nation that had ceased to be in love with liberty.

“There is one peculiarity about the history of the Latin American states which I am sure they are keenly aware of. You hear of ‘concessions’ to foreign capitalists in Latin America. You do not hear of concessions to foreign capitalists in the United States. They

are not granted concessions. They are invited to make investments. The work is ours, though they are welcome to invest in it. We do not ask them to supply the capital and do the work. It is an invitation, not a privilege; and states that are obliged, because their territory does not lie with the main field of modern enterprise and action, to grant concessions are in this condition, that foreign interests are apt to dominate their domestic affairs: a condition of affairs always dangerous and apt to become intolerable. What these states are going to see, therefore, is an emancipation from the subordination which has been inevitable, to foreign enterprise and an assertion of the splendid character which, in spite of these difficulties, they have again and again, been able to demonstrate. The dignity, the courage, the self-possession, the self-respect of the Latin American States, their achievements in the face of all these adverse circumstances, deserve nothing but the admiration and applause of the world. They have had harder bargains driven with them in the matter of loans than any other peoples in the world. Interest has been exacted of them that was not exacted of anybody else, because the risk was said to be greater; and then securities were taken that destroyed the risk, an admirable arrangement for those who were forcing the terms. I rejoice in nothing so much as in the prospect that they will now be emancipated from these conditions, and we ought to be the first to take part in assisting in that emancipation.

"We have seen material interests threaten constitutional freedom in the United States. Therefore, we will now know how to sympathize with those in the rest of America who have to contend with such powers not only within their borders but from outside their borders also. I know what the response of the thought and heart of America will be to the programme I have outlined, because America was created to realize a programme like that."

AS OTHERS SAW IT

Title-page and introduction of pamphlet circulated broadcast by Pan-American organizations during 1914

"THE WILSON DOCTRINE

"HOW THE SPEECH OF PRESIDENT WILSON AT MOBILE, ALA., HAS BEEN INTERPRETED BY THE LATIN-AMERICAN COUNTRIES

"By

"POLICARPO BONILLA

"Ex-President of Honduras, C. A.

"New York,

"March, 1914.

"The thought and the heart of America have answered President Wilson. . . . The new doctrine, according to the intention of its author, will have as a basis, the legal equality of all the sovereign nations of this continent, their mutual understanding, that will foment real friendship, having as a basis honor, and as an end justice. It will mean that America is for the Americans, but in the sense that this continent shall not be considered as the African continent, a field where the Powers have disputed the share that each of them wants, conquest being barred from it, even if it is only *a foot of territory*, for the nations of the old continent as well as for those of the new world; and it will mean that *America is for mankind*, a field destined to the free exercise of *individual activity* a synonym of *individual* liberty. It will mean that America must tend to *emancipate itself from subordination to material interest, especially foreign interest*, and to accomplish that end, the United States will help those *nations less favored by fortune*; the most efficacious means being that its Department of State, should give a good example to the world powers, by not sustaining diplomatically any unjust or immoderate claim, refusing even to accept it as a basis of discussion without a previous and conscientious study, and that it will never give the form of ultimatum to the violent exactions that were used formerly on account of that kind of claims; and as a consequence of that policy, America will not permit other nations the same privileges.

"The new doctrine should be named as we have named at the head of this article, the WILSON DOCTRINE; but as a tribute to the memory of its generous creator of the original doctrine, it should be called the Monroe Wilson Doctrine. With that distinction it will be separated from the counterfeits that have been made of the Monroe Doctrine, and thus it will be well received by Latin America; until it is accepted as a principle of International Law in America, either by inserting it in special treaties or by having it accepted in the next Pan-American Conference that will take place at Santiago de Chile. The legal points that it will embrace are well defined in the President's speech, and it only remains to give them the concrete form of a diplomatic document."

WILSON'S DEFENSE

Extract from the President's Speech at the Opera-House, Helena, Montana, September 11, 1919:

"Then they are anxious about the Monroe doctrine. The covenant says in so many words that nothing in that document shall be taken

as invalidating the Monroe doctrine. I do not see what more you could say. While the matter was under debate in what was called the commission on the league of nations, the body that drew the covenant up, in which were representatives of 14 nations, I tried to think of some other language that could state it more unqualifiedly and I could not think of any other. Can you? Nothing in that document should be taken as invalidating the Monroe doctrine—I can not say it any plainer than that—and yet by a peculiar particularity of anxiety these gentlemen can not believe their eyes; and from one point of view it is not strange, my fellow citizens. The rest of the world always looked askance on the Monroe doctrine. It is true, though some people have forgotten it, that President Monroe uttered that doctrine at the suggestion of the British cabinet and in its initiation, its birth, it came from Mr. Canning, who was prime minister of England and who wanted the aid of the United States in checking the ambition of some of the European countries to establish their power in South America. Notwithstanding that, Great Britain did not like the Monroe doctrine as we grew so big. It was one thing to have our assistance and another thing for us not to need her assistance. And the rest of the world had studiously avoided on all sorts of interesting occasions anything that could be interpreted as an acknowledgment of the Monroe doctrine. So, I am not altogether surprised that these gentlemen cannot believe their eyes. Here the nations of Europe say that they are entering into an arrangement no part of which shall be interpreted as invalidating the Monroe doctrine. I do not have to say anything more about that. To my mind, that is eminently satisfactory, and as long as I am President I shall feel an added freedom in applying, when I think fit, the Monroe doctrine. I am very much interested in it, and I foresee occasions when it might be appropriately applied.”

[See also speeches at San Francisco, September 17, and at Cheyenne, Wyo., September 24, 1919.]

EMASCULATION AND RESTRICTION

The Covenant of the League of Nations, adopted at a special plenary session of the Peace Conference (April 28, 1919) and incorporated in the Treaty of Versailles (signed, June 28, 1919) contained the following (Article XXI): “Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine for securing the maintenance of peace.”

QUALIFICATION AND ASPHYXIATION

When the revised text of the Covenant, including this so-called Monroe Doctrine clause, was issued to the press in Paris, in April, 1919, the British delegation circulated privately among the British correspondents an explanatory memorandum, questioning the validity of the Monroe Doctrine, misstating the nature and time of its origin, declaring the power of the league to pass upon any dispute concerning its application, and asserting that "it can never be invoked to limit the action of the League of Nations."¹

THE NOTE TO SALVADOR

On March 1, 1920, the State Department issued a statement, announcing the nature of its response to the Government of Salvador, which had sought an official United States interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine prior to seeking admission as a member of the League of Nations. The department's note to Salvador, responding to this request, quoted President Wilson's Pan-American speech at Washington, D. C., January 6, 1916, explaining "the use which the United States intended to make of her power on this side of the Atlantic" and declaring that the United States "must establish the foundations of amity so that no one will hereafter doubt them." The President then goes on to say that, "It will be accomplished, in the first place," he said, "by the states of America uniting in guaranteeing to one another absolutely political independence and territorial integrity. In the second place, and as a necessary corollary to that, guaranteeing the agreement to settle all pending boundary disputes as soon as possible and by amicable process; by agreeing that all disputes among themselves, should they unhappily arise, will be handled by patient, impartial investigation, and settled by arbitration, and the agreement necessary to the peace of the Americas; that no state of either continent will permit revolutionary expeditions against another state to be fitted out on its territory, and that they will prohibit the exportation of munitions of war for the purpose of supplying revolutionists against neighboring governments."

RESURRECTION BY RESERVATION

President Wilson submitted the treaty in person to the United States Senate on July 10. On November 15, 1919, the Lodge reservation protecting the Monroe Doctrine as an American policy was adopted by the Senate, yeas, 55; nays, 33; nine Democratic Sena-

¹ Note: The author possesses the text of the British statement and the matter quoted is taken direct from the British text.

tors voting with the Republican majority. On November 19, 1919, the treaty failed by the Senate vote of 41 to 51. On March 2, 1920, by the vote of 58 to 22, the Senate adopted the Lodge reservation, as follows:

“The United States will not submit to arbitration or to inquiry by the Assembly or by the Council of the League of Nations, provided for in said Treaty of Peace, any questions which in the judgment of the United States depend upon or relate to its long-established policy, commonly known as the Monroe Doctrine; said doctrine is to be interpreted by the United States alone and is hereby declared to be wholly outside the jurisdiction of said League of Nations and entirely unaffected by any provision contained in the said Treaty of Peace with Germany.”

The Treaty finally failed of acceptance in the Senate (under the two thirds majority rule) March 19, 1920, the vote being 49 to 35.

APPENDIX B

TEXT OF THE (LI-LOBANOFF) RUSSO-CHINESE ALLIANCE

While attending the coronation ceremonies of Emperor Nicholas at Moscow, in May, 1896, Li Hung-Chang concluded with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Prince Lobanoff-Rostovsky) a secret treaty of alliance. The following is an English translation of the French text:

“ARTICLE I.—Every aggression directed by Japan, whether against Russian territory in Eastern Asia, or against the territory of China or that of Korea, shall be regarded as necessarily bringing about the immediate application of the present treaty.

“In this case the two High Contracting Parties engage to support each other reciprocally by all the land and sea forces of which they can dispose at that moment, and to assist each other as much as possible for the victualling of their respective forces.

“ARTICLE II.—As soon as the two High Contracting Parties shall be engaged in common action no treaty of peace with the adverse party can be concluded by one of them without the assent of the other.

“ARTICLE III.—During the military operations all the ports of China shall, in case of necessity, be open to Russian warships, which shall find there on the part of the Chinese authorities all the assistance of which they may stand in need.

“ARTICLE IV.—In order to facilitate the access of the Russian land troops to the menaced points, and to ensure their means of subsistence, the Chinese Government consents to the construction of a railway line across the Chinese province of Amour (i.e. Heilungkiang) and of Guirin (Kirin) in the direction of Vladivostok. The junction of this railway with the Russian railway shall not serve as a pretext for any encroachment on Chinese territory nor for any infringement of the rights of sovereignty of his Majesty the Emperor of China. The construction and exploitation of this railway shall be accorded to the Russo-Chinese Bank, and the clauses of the Contract which shall be concluded for this purpose shall be duly discussed between the Chinese Minister in St. Petersburg and the Russo-Chinese Bank.

“ARTICLE V.—It is understood that in time of war, as indicated in Article I, Russia shall have the free use of the railway mentioned in Article IV, for the transport and provisioning of her troops. In time of peace Russia shall have the same right for the transit of her troops and stores with stoppages, which shall not be justified by any other motive than the needs of the transport service.

“ARTICLE VI.—The present treaty shall come into force on the day when the contract stipulated in Article IV, shall have been confirmed by his Majesty the Emperor of China. It shall have from then force and value for a period of fifteen years. Six months before the expiration of this term the two High Contracting Parties shall deliberate concerning the prolongation of this treaty.”

APPENDIX C

PRESIDENT FILLMORE'S LETTER TO THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN

MILLARD FILLMORE, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
TO HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY, THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN

GREAT AND GOOD FRIEND: I send you this public letter by Commodore Matthew C. Perry, an officer of the highest rank in the navy of the United States, and commander of the squadron now visiting your imperial majesty's dominions.

I have directed Commodore Perry to assure your imperial majesty that I entertain the kindest feelings towards your majesty's person and government, and that I have no other object in sending him to Japan but to propose to your imperial majesty that the United States and Japan should live in friendship and have commercial intercourse with each other.

The Constitution and laws of the United States forbid all interference with the religious or political concerns of other nations. I have particularly charged Commodore Perry to abstain from every act which could possibly disturb the tranquillity of your imperial majesty's dominion.

The United States of America reach from ocean to ocean, and our Territory of Oregon and State of California lie directly opposite to the dominions of your imperial majesty. Our steamships can go from California to Japan in eighteen days.

Our great State of California produces about sixty millions of dollars in gold every year, besides silver, quicksilver, precious stones, and many other valuable articles. Japan is also a rich and fertile country, and produces many very valuable articles. Your imperial majesty's subjects are skilled in many of the arts. I am desirous that our two countries should trade with each other, for the benefit both of Japan and the United States.

We know that the ancient laws of your imperial majesty's government do not allow of foreign trade, except with the Chinese and the Dutch; but as the state of the world changes and new governments are formed, it seems to be wise, from time to time, to make new laws. There was a time when the ancient laws of your imperial majesty's government were first made.

About the same time America, which is sometimes called the New World, was first discovered and settled by the Europeans. For a long time there were but a few people, and they were poor. They have now become quite numerous; their commerce is very extensive; and they think that if your imperial majesty were so far to change the ancient laws as to allow a free trade between the two countries it would be extremely beneficial to both.

If your imperial majesty is not satisfied that it would be safe altogether to abrogate the ancient laws which forbid foreign trade, they might be suspended for five or ten years, so as to try the experiment. If it does not prove as beneficial as was hoped, the ancient laws can be restored. The United States often limit their treaties with foreign States to a few years, and then renew them or not, as they please.

I have directed Commodore Perry to mention another thing to your imperial majesty. Many of our ships pass every year from California to China, and great numbers of our people pursue the whale fishery near the shores of Japan. It sometimes happens, in stormy weather that one of our ships is wrecked on your majesty's shores. In all such cases we ask, and expect, that our unfortunate people should be treated with kindness, and that their property should be protected, till we can send a vessel and bring them away. We are very much in earnest in this.

Commodore Perry is also directed by me to represent to your imperial majesty that we understand there is a great abundance of coal and provisions in the Empire of Japan. Our steamships, in crossing the great ocean, burn a great deal of coal, and it is not convenient to bring it all the way from America. We wish that our steamships and other vessels should be allowed to stop in Japan and supply themselves with coal, provisions, and water. They will pay for them in money, or anything else your imperial majesty's subjects may prefer; and we request your imperial majesty to appoint a convenient port, in the southern part of the Empire, where our vessels may stop for this purpose. We are very desirous of this.

These are the only objects for which I sent Commodore Perry, with a powerful squadron, to pay a visit to your imperial majesty's renowned city of Yedo; friendship, commerce, a supply of coal and provisions, and protection for our shipwrecked people.

We have directed Commodore Perry to beg your imperial majesty's acceptance of a few presents. They are of no great value in themselves; but some of them may serve as specimens of the articles manufactured in the United States, and they are intended as tokens of our sincere and respectful friendship.

May the Almighty have your imperial majesty in His great and holy keeping!

In witness whereof, I have caused the great seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed, and have subscribed the same with my name, at the city of Washington, in America, the seat of my government, on the thirteenth day of the month of November, in the year one thousand eight hundred and fifty-two.

(Seal attached)

Your good friend,

MILLARD FILLMORE.

EDWARD EVERETT,

Secretary of State.

By the President:

APPENDIX D

TREATY AND NOTES EXCHANGED BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA MAY 25, 1915—SEPTEMBER 24, 1918

TREATY RESPECTING THE PROVINCE OF SHANTUNG

(Signed at Peking, May 25, 1915)

His majesty the Emperor of Japan and His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, being desirous to maintain the general peace of the far East and to further strengthen the relations of amity and good neighbourhood existing between the two countries, have resolved to conclude a treaty for the purpose and to the end have named their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:—

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Mr. Eki Hioki, Jushii, second class of the Imperial order of the Sacred Treasure, His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Republic of China; and

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, Mr. Lu-Cheng-hsiang, Chung-Ching, first class of the order of Chia-Ro, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China;

Who, after having communicated to each other their respectful powers, which were found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:—

ARTICLE I.—The Chinese government engage to recognize all matters that may be agreed upon between the Japanese government and the German government respecting the disposition of all the rights, interests and concession, which, in virtue of treaties or otherwise, Germany possesses vis-à-vis China in relation to the province of Shantung.

ARTICLE II. The Chinese Government engage that in case they undertake the construction of a railway connecting Chefoo or Lungkow with the Kiaochau-Tsianan Railway, they shall, in the event of Germany's surrendering her right of providing capital for the Chefoo Weishlen Railway line, enter into negotiations with Japanese capitalists for the purposes of financing the said undertaking.

ARTICLE III. The Chinese government engage to open, of their own accord, as early as possible, suitable cities and towns in the province of Shantung for the residence and trade of foreigners.

ARTICLE IV. The present treaty shall take effect on the day of its signature.

The present treaty shall be ratified by His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and by His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, and the ratification thereof shall be exchanged at Tokyo as soon as possible.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty made in duplicate, in Japanese and in Chinese and have hereunto affixed their seals.

Done at Peking the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year at Taisho, corresponding to the 25th day of the 5th month of the 4th year of inauguration of the Republic of China.

(Signed) EKI HIOKI (*seal*)
&c., &c., &c.

(Signed) LU-CHENG-HSIANG (*seal*)
&c., &c., &c.

NOTE FROM THE JAPANESE MINISTER TO THE CHINESE MINISTER FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Peking, May 25, 1915.

Monsieur le Ministre,

In the name of the Imperial Government, I have the honour to make the following declaration to Your Excellency's government:—

If, upon the conclusion of the present war, the Japanese government should be given an absolutely free disposal of the leased territory of Kiaochau Bay, they will return the said leased territory to China subject to the following conditions:—

1. Opening of the whole of Kiaochau as commercial port;
2. Establishment of a Japanese settlement in the locality to be designated by the Japanese government;
3. Establishment, if desired by the Powers, of an international settlement;
4. Arrangement to be made, before the return of the said territory is effected, between the Japanese and Chinese governments, with respect to the disposal of German public establishments and properties and with regard to the other conditions and procedures.

I avail, etc.

(Signed) EKI HIOKI,
Etc., etc., etc.

His Excellency,
Mr. Lu-Cheng-hsiang.

NOTE FROM THE CHINESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE
JAPANESE MINISTER AT PEKING

Peking, May 25, 1915.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of today's date, in which, in the name of your government, you make the following declaration to my government:

[Repeats verbatim the contents of Dr. Hioki's note.]

In reply I beg to state that I have taken note of this declaration. I avail, etc.

(Signed) LU-CHENG-HSIANG.
&c., &c.

His Excellency,
Mr. Eki Hioki.

NOTES EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF JAPAN AND THE MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY OF CHINA
SEPTEMBER 24, 1918, RELATIVE TO SHANTUNG PROVINCE

(1) *Note from Baron Goto to the Chinese Minister.*

Tokyo, September 24, 1918.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to inform you that the Imperial government, in view of the feeling of good neighbourhood existing between our two countries, and in the spirit of mutual accommodation, have deemed it fitting, and have accordingly decided to propose to your Government, to settle various questions relating to the Province of Shantung in manners as below set forth.

1. To concentrate at Tsingtau all the Japanese troops stationed along the Tsingtau-Tsinan Railway, excepting a contingent to be left at Tsinan.

2. The Chinese Government to provide for guarding the Tsingtau-Tsinan Railway and to organize a police force for the purpose.

3. The Tsingtau-Tsinan Railway to contribute an appropriate sum of money towards defraying the expenses of such police force.

4. Japanese to be employed at the headquarters of the police force, the principal railway stations and the training stations of police forces.

5. Chinese to be employed on the Tsingtau-Tsinan Railway.

6. Upon determination of the ownership of the Tsingtau-Tsinan Railway, to run it as a joint Chino-Japanese undertaking.

7. The civil administration now in force to be withdrawn.

In acquainting you with the above, the Japanese government de-

sires to be advised of the disposition of your government regarding the proposals.

Accept, etc., etc., etc.

(Signed) SHIMPEI GOTO.

His Excellency,
MR. TSUNG-HSIANG CHANG.
Etc., etc., etc.

(2) *Mr. Tsung-hsiang Chang to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs*

Tokyo, Sept. 24, 1918.

Sir:

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note stating:

The Japanese government, mindful of the amiable relationship between our two countries and out of a spirit of friendly cooperation proposes to adjust all the questions relating to Shantung in accordance with the following articles:

1. Japanese troops along the Kiaochau-Tsinanfu Railway, except a contingent of them to be stationed at Tsinanfu, shall be withdrawn to Tsingtao.
2. The Chinese government may organize a police force to undertake the policing of the Kiaochau-Tsinanfu Railway.
3. The Kiaochau-Tsinanfu Railway is to provide a reasonable amount to defray the expense of the maintenance of the above-mentioned police force.
4. Japanese are to be employed at the headquarters of the above-mentioned police force, at the principal railway stations and at the police training school.
5. Chinese citizens shall be employed by the Kiaochau-Tsinanfu Railway as part of its staff.
6. The Kiaochau-Tsinanfu Railway, after its ownership is definitely determined, is to be made a China-Japanese joint enterprise.
7. The civil administration established by Japan existing now is to be abolished.

In reply, I have the honour to state that the Chinese government is pleased to agree to the above-mentioned articles proposed by the Japanese government.

(Signed) TSUNG-HSIANG CHANG.

His Excellency,
BARON SHIMPEI GOTO,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Tokyo.

(3) Note from the Chinese Minister to Baron Goto

Tokyo, September 24, 1918.

Monsieur le Ministre,

The Chinese government have decided to obtain loans from Japanese capitalists and to proceed speedily to build the railways connecting points as below set forth. Having received an authorisation from my government, I have the honour herewith to communicate the same to your government.

1. Between Tsinan and Shunch;
2. Between Kaomi and Hsuchow.

However, in case the aforementioned two lines are deemed to be disadvantageous from the point of railway management other suitable lines will be decided upon by consultation.

Should there be no objection to the above propositions, it is requested that your government will lose no time in taking necessary steps to cause the capitalists of your country to agree to enter negotiations for loans on the same.

Reply to the above is awaited and will be appreciated.

I avail, etc., etc., etc.

(Signed) TSUNG-HSIANG CHANG.

His Excellency,
 BARON GOTO,
 Etc., etc., etc.

(4) Note from Baron Goto to Chinese Minister

Tokyo, September 24, 1918.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's note of this day, intimating that your government have decided speedily to build, with loans secured from Japanese capitalists, the railways connecting points as below set forth.

(Cites items 1-2 as given in the Chinese Minister's note.)

The Japanese government, while noting with much pleasure the communication of the Chinese government, beg to state in reply that they will lose no time in taking necessary steps to cause Japanese capitalists to enter negotiations for loans on the same.

I avail, etc., etc., etc.

(Signed) SHIMPEI GOTO.

His Excellency,
 MR. TSUNG-HSIANG CHANG.
 Etc., etc., etc.

(Translation)

NOTES EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN AND THE MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY OF CHINA, SEPTEMBER 24, 1918, RELATIVE TO THE LOANS FOR RAILWAY PROJECTS IN MANCHURIA AND MONGOLIA, AND TEXTS OF THE CONTRACTS.

(1) *Note from the Chinese Minister to Baron Goto*

Tokyo, Sept. 24, 1918.

Monsieur le Ministre,

The Chinese government have decided to obtain loans from Japanese capitalists and to proceed speedily to build the railways connecting points as below set forth. Having received an authorization from my government, I have the honour herewith to communicate the same to your government.

1. Between Kaiyuan, Hailung and Kirin;
2. Between Changhun and Taonan;
3. Between Taonan and Jehol;
4. From a point Taonan and Jehol to some sea port (this line to be determined subject to a future investigation).

Should there be no objection to the above propositions it is requested that your government will lose no time in taking necessary steps to cause the capitalists of your country to agree to enter negotiations for loans on the same.

Reply to the above is awaited and will be appreciated.

I avail, etc., etc., etc.

(Signed) TSUNG-HSIANG CHANG.

His Excellency,

BARON SHIMPEI GOTO,

Etc., etc., etc.

(2) *Note from Baron Goto to the Chinese Minister*

Tokyo, September 24, 1918.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's note of this date, intimating that your government have decided speedily to build, with loans secured from Japanese capitalists, the railways connecting points as below set forth.

(Cites items 1-4 contained in the note of the Chinese Minister.)

The imperial government, while noting with much pleasure the communication of the Chinese government beg to state in reply

that they will lose no time in taking necessary steps to cause Japanese capitalists to enter negotiations for loans on the same.

I avail, etc., etc., etc.

(Signed) SHIMPEI GOTO.

His Excellency,
MR. TSUNG-HSIANG CHANG,
Etc., etc., etc.

(3) *Preliminary Contract Concerning Tsinan-Shunth and Kaomi-Hsuchow Railways signed September 24, 1918. Translation from Chinese Text.*

The full text of the preliminary contract for the Tsinan-Shunth railways construction loan is as follows:

For the construction of two railways—one from Tsinan in the province of Shantung to Shunth in the Province of Chili, the other from Kaomi in the province of Shantung to Hsuchow in the province of Kiangsu (hereafter called the two railways)—the government of the republic of China (hereafter called the government) of the first part, and the Japanese Shinyeh Banking Corporation representing the Formosa Banking Corporation and the Korea Banking Corporation (hereafter called the banks) of the second part, hereby make the following preliminary contract as a basis for a formal contract of a loan.

ARTICLE I. The government agrees that to meet all the expenses necessary for the construction of the railway from Chinan, in the province of Shantung, to Shunth, in the province of Chili, and that from Kaomi, in the province of Shantung, to Hsuchow, in the province of Kiangsu, the banks shall issue to the Chinese government Tsinan-Shunth railway gold and Kaomi-Hsuchow Railway gold bonds (hereafter called bonds of the two railways). But to protect the Tsinan-Shunth and Kaomi-Hsuchow lines, if the railway enterprise should be found to be not profitable, the government may arrange with the banks to change the lines.

ARTICLE II. The government will soon determine the amount required for the construction and all other necessary expenses, and secure concurrence of the banks therefore.

ARTICLE III. The period of the bonds of the two railways shall be 40 years dating from the date of issue. Repayment shall begin from the eleventh year and be made in yearly installments.

ARTICLE IV. As soon as the formal contract shall have been made, the construction work shall begin so that the railroads may be completed in a short time.

ARTICLE V. The government pledges the following as security for repayment of the principal and interest on the bonds of the two railways.

Without the consent of the banks, the government shall not pledge away to any other party any part of the property on the income which at present belongs, or will, in future, belong to Tsinan-Shunth and Kaomi-Hsuehow railways.

ARTICLE VI. The face value of the railway bonds, the interest thereon, and the actual amount to be received by the government shall be agreed upon according to the circumstances at the time of issue with a view to benefiting the government.

ARTICLE VII. Provisions which have not been stipulated in the preceding articles shall be made by the government and the banks together.

ARTICLE VIII. A formal contract for the Tsinan-Shunth and Kaomi-Hsuehow Railway loan shall be based on this preliminary contract, and be made within four months from the date of this contract.

ARTICLE IX. On the consummation of this preliminary contract the banks will advance to the government 20,000,000 yen in the full amount without any discount whatsoever.

ARTICLE X. The rate of interest on the said advancement shall be eight per cent per annum, that is to say, every one hundred yen shall bear a yearly interest of eight yen.

ARTICLE XI. The said advancement shall be paid for by national treasury notes issued by the government, according to their actual cash value.

ARTICLE XII. The national treasury notes referred to in the preceding article shall be renewed every six months, and upon each renewal, the interest thereon for the six months shall be paid to the banks.

ARTICLE XIII. After a formal contract for the Tsinan-Shunth and Kaomi-Hsuehow railway loan has been made, the government shall appropriate the proceeds realized from the sale of the above-said bonds in payment of the above advancement by priority, and without delay.

ARTICLE XIV. The payment of the said advancement and of the interest thereon, its repayment, and all other transactions connected therewith, shall be made at Tokyo, Japan. This preliminary contract is made in two Japanese copies, and two Chinese copies, the government and Banks each shall keep one copy of each language.

In case of doubt in interpretation, the Japanese text shall prevail.
The 24th day, 9th month, 7th year of the Republic of China.

(Signed) TSUNG-HSIANG CHANG,
Chinese Minister.

A. ONO,
Vice-president of Hsin-yei
banking corporation.

(4) *Preliminary Contract for Loans to Build Four Railroads in Manchuria and Mongolia.*

The Chinese government (hereafter called the government) for the purpose of building four railroads:

1. from Jehol to Taonan,
2. from Changohun to Taonan,
3. from Kirin via Hailung to Kaiyuan,
4. from a point between Jehol and Taonan to some sea port (the said four roads to be hereafter mentioned as four roads in Manchuria and Mongolia), and as a preparatory measure for a formal contract, hereby concludes with the syndicate represented by the Japanese Industrial Bank and composed of:

1. The Japanese Industrial Bank,
2. The Taiwan Bank,
3. The Chosen Bank,

(hereafter mentioned as the Banks) the following preliminary contract.

ARTICLE I. The government authorizes the afore-mentioned Japanese Banking Syndicate to issue:

1. Chinese government Jehol Taonan R. R. gold currency bonds,
2. Chinese government Changchun-Taonan R. R. gold currency bonds,
3. Chinese government Kirin-Kaiyuan R. R. gold currency bonds,
4. Chinese government R. R. (names to be determined) gold currency bonds,

to cover the constructing expenses of the above-mentioned four R. R.

The government shall consult the Banks to determine the point on the Jehol-Taonan R. R. to be connected to some sea port and the route to be taken by the R. R. connecting said point with said sea port.

ARTICLE II. The government shall determine as soon as possible the constructing and other expenses needed by the four R. R. and shall obtain agreement of the Banks in respect thereof.

ARTICLE III. The gold currency bonds of the four R. R. shall ex-

pire at the end of forty years, counting from the date of issue of said bonds.

Beginning with the eleventh year from said issue, the capital of said bonds shall commence to be paid back in accordance with the annual partial payment method.

ARTICLE IV. When the Formal contract for loans to build the Four R. R. is concluded, the Chinese government shall consult the Banks to draw up an engineering program and shall begin construction with a view to the speedy completion of the said R. R.

ARTICLE V. As guarantee for the capital and interest of the gold currency bonds, the government shall pledge to the Banks the present and future property and income of the four R. R.

Unless with the consent of the Banks the government shall not pledge the above-mentioned property and income as guarantee on Security to any other party.

ARTICLE VI. The price, the rate of interest and the actual percentage of the receipts to be received by the government in respect of the gold currency bonds shall be determined in accordance with conditions at the time of issue of said bonds to the best interests of the government.

ARTICLE VII. The government shall consult the banks in deciding matters not covered by the above articles.

ARTICLE VIII. The present preliminary contract shall form the basis for a formal contract which shall be made within four months from the conclusion of the present preliminary contract.

ARTICLE IX. The banks, after the conclusion of the preliminary contract, shall advance to the government Yen 20,000,000 to be paid in full and without discount.

ARTICLE X. The interest of the above-mentioned advance shall be eight per cent per annum, to wit, for every one hundred yen there shall be eight yen as interest every year.

ARTICLE XI. The above-mentioned advance shall be paid against the delivery of the National Treasury notes issued by the government at their actual value.

ARTICLE XII. Said National Treasury notes shall be renewed every six months, each time with the payment of six months' interest.

ARTICLE XIII. When the formal contract for loans to build the four R. R. is concluded, the advance shall first be repaid from the proceeds of the gold currency bonds.

ARTICLE XIV. The payment of both the interest and capital of the advance and other transactions shall take place in Tokyo.

Copies of the preliminary contract shall be prepared in both

Chinese and Japanese language, two copies in each language. The government and the banks shall each be furnished with two copies, one in each language.

In case of disagreement in the interpretation of the preliminary contract the Japanese shall prevail.

Done this twenty-eighth day of ninth month of the seventh year of the Republic of China,

this twenty-eighth day of ninth month on the seventh year of the reign of Taisho of the Imperial government of Japan,

TSUNG-TSIANG CHANG,

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
of the Republic of China to Japan.

A. ONO,

Vice-president of the Japanese industrial bank.

APPENDIX E

DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE ALLIED POWERS AS TO THE DISPOSAL OF GERMAN RIGHTS IN RESPECT OF SHANTUNG PROVINCE AND THE SOUTH SEA ISLANDS NORTH OF THE EQUATOR.

(1) *Note from the British Ambassador at Tokyo to the Japanese Foreign Minister*

British Embassy, Tokyo, 16th February, 1917.

Monsieur le Ministre,

With reference to the subject of our conversation of the 27th ultimo when your Excellency informed me of the desire of the Imperial Government to receive an assurance that, on the occasion of a Peace conference, His Britannic Majesty's Government will support the claims of Japan in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in the Islands north of the Equator, I have the honour, under instructions received from His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to communicate to your Excellency the following message from His Britannic Majesty's Government:—

His Majesty's government accede with pleasure to request of Japanese government for an assurance that they will support Japan's claims in regard to disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in Islands north of equator on occasion of peace conference, it being understood that Japanese government will, in eventual peace settlement, treat in same spirit Great Britain's claims to German Islands south of Equator.

I avail myself of this opportunity, Monsieur le Ministre, to renew to your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) CONYNGHAM GREENE,
H. B. M. Ambassador.

His Excellency,

VISCOUNT ICHIRO MOTONO,

H. I. J. M. Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Etc., etc., etc.

(2) *Note from the Japanese Foreign Minister to the British Ambassador at Tokyo.*

Tokyo, February 21, 1917.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's note of the 16th instant, giving assurance that His Britannic Majesty's government will support the claims to be advanced by the Imperial government in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in Islands north of Equator on occasion of Peace Conference.

The Japanese government are deeply appreciative of the friendly spirit in which your government have given the assurance and are happy to note it as a fresh proof of the close ties that unite the two allied powers. I take pleasure in stating that the Japanese government, on their part, are fully prepared to support in the same spirit the claims which may be put forward at Peace Conference by His Britannic Majesty's government in regard to German possessions in Islands south of Equator.

I avail myself of this opportunity, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, to renew to your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) I. MOTONO,
etc., etc., etc.

His Excellency,

SIR CONYNGHAM GREENE,
Etc., etc., etc.

(3) *Note from the Japanese Foreign Minister to the Russian and French Ambassadors at Tokyo.*

(Translation)

The Imperial Government has not yet formally entered into pour-parlers with the powers of the Entente on the subject of the conditions of peace that it proposes to present to Germany, guided by the thought that such questions ought to be decided in concert between Japan and the said powers at the moment when peace negotiations are opened.

Nevertheless, in view of the development of the general situation and the particular arrangements concerning the conditions of peace, such as the arrangement relative to the disposition of the Bosphorus, of Constantinople, and the Dardanelles having already been begun by the interested powers, the Imperial government considers that the moment has arrived for it to express likewise its desiderata relative to certain conditions of peace essential for Japan, in order to

submit them to the consideration of the government of Russia (of the French Republic).

The government of Russia (of the republic) is perfectly cognizant of all the efforts that the Imperial government has made in a general way to accomplish its task in the present war and particularly with a view of guaranteeing for the future the peace of eastern Asia and the security of the Empire for which it is absolutely necessary to strip Germany of its bases of political, military, and economic activity in the Extreme Orient.

Under these circumstances the Imperial government has the intention of asking of the German government, at the time of the negotiations of peace, the cession of the territorial rights and of the special interests which Germany possessed before the war in Shantung, and in the Islands belonging to it situated north of the equator in the Pacific Ocean.

The Imperial government entertains the hope that the government of Russia (of the French republic) will be pleased, the legitimacy of the demands being granted, to give it the assurance that, the occasion arising, the Imperial government may count on its full support in that question.

It goes without saying that the reparation of damages caused to the lives and the property of the Japanese people by the unjustifiable attacks of the enemy, as well as the other conditions of peace which may have a common character to all the powers of the Entente, are totally excluded from the consideration of the present question.

Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Tokyo, February 19, 1917.

(4) *Note from the French Ambassador to the Japanese Foreign Minister.*

(Translation)

Tokyo, March 1, 1917.

The government of the republic is disposed to give to the Japanese government its support for settling at the time of the negotiations of peace, the essential questions for Japan of Shantung and the German Islands of the Pacific, situated north of the equator. It is equally disposed to support the demands of the Imperial government relative to the cession of the rights which Germany possessed before the war in the Chinese province and on the islands.

Mr. Briand requests on the other hand that the Japanese government give its support in order to obtain from China the rupture of its diplomatic relation with Germany, and that it give to that act

the desired projection. The consequences would be, according to him

1. The return of the passports to the German diplomatic and consular agents.

2. The obligation for German residents to leave Chinese territory.

3. The sequestration of German vessels in the ports and the subsequent requisition of these vessels in order to place them, according to the example of Italy and Portugal, at the disposition of the Allies. According to information received by the French government, there are fifteen German vessels in Chinese ports of a total tonnage of about 40,000 tons.

4. The sequestration of German commercial houses established in China.

5. The termination of the rights of Germany in the concessions that she possessed in China.

(5) Note from the Japanese Foreign Minister to the French Ambassador at Tokyo.

(Translation)

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the note of the French Embassy dated March 1st, 1917, informing him that the French government is disposed to give to the Imperial Government its support for the settlement at the time of the peace negotiations of the questions essential to Japan in Shantung and the German islands situated to the north of the equator and that it is in accord for supporting the demands of the Imperial government applicable to the session of the rights which Germany possessed before the war, in Shantung and in the above-mentioned islands.

The Imperial government has noted this communication with profound gratitude for the friendly sentiment which has inspired the French government to give its full assent to the desiderata of the Imperial government.

The above-mentioned note has likewise expressed the desire of his Excellency, Mr. Briand, to secure the support of the Imperial government with a view to obtaining of China the breaking off of [its] diplomatic relations with Germany, including the desired consequences. To this end the imperial government has not failed from the beginning to use all its efforts, as the French government has been constantly informed. As a consequence the Imperial government has only to confirm here its intention of giving its entire support to the desire expressed by Mr. Briand in accord with the

allies to arrive at the consequences enumerated in the above-mentioned note.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Tokyo, March 6, 1917.

(6) *Note from the Russian Ambassador at Tokyo to the Japanese Foreign Minister.*

(Translation)

The Embassy of Russia:

In reply to the notice of the ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, dated February 19 last, the Embassy of Russia is directed to give the Japanese government the assurance that it may count on the entire support of the Imperial government of Russia relative to its desiderata concerning the eventual cession to Japan of the rights belonging to Germany in Shantung and the German islands occupied by the Japanese forces in the Pacific ocean to the north of the equator.

Tokyo, February 20. March 5, 1917.

(7) *Note from the Japanese Foreign Minister to the Russian Ambassador at Tokyo.*

(Translation)

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has the honor to acknowledge receipt of the Note of the Russian Embassy dated March 5, 1917 in reply to the Note of the Ministry dated February 19 of the same year.

In the said Note, the Russian Embassy has kindly declared that it is directed to give to the Japanese government the assurance that it may count absolutely on the support of the government of Russia in connection with its desiderata concerning the eventual cession to Japan of the rights belonging to Germany in Shantung and the German islands of the Pacific, situated north of the Equator.

The government of Japan takes note of that communication with profound gratitude for the sentiment which has inspired the government of Russia in giving its entire assent to the desiderata of the government of Japan.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Tokyo, March 8, 1917.

(8) *Note from the Japanese Ambassador at Rome to the Italian Foreign Minister.*

(Translation)

Embassy of Japan in Italy:

The Imperial government of Japan has the intention of asking of the German government, at the time of the peace negotiations, the cession of the territorial rights and of the special interests which Germany possessed before the war in Shantung and on the German islands of the Pacific situated north of the equator.

In view of the present phase of events, the Imperial government has thought that it ought to assure itself from now on, of the entire support of the English, French, and Russian governments in case the above-mentioned demands should be presented to Germany at the time of the peace negotiations.

In bringing to the attention of the royal government of Italy in the form of very confidential information the fact that an arrangement has recently been reached between the Imperial government on the one part, and the British, French and Russian governments on the other, relative to the foregoing, the Imperial government has the firmest conviction that the royal government of Italy, inspired by the sentiments of friendship which animate the two countries, and in consideration of the necessity of mutual aid for the triumph of the common cause in the present war, will accept with satisfaction the conclusion of the above-mentioned arrangement.

Rome, March 23, 1917.

(Upon reading the foregoing note, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs said to the Japanese Ambassador that the Italian Government had no objection regarding the matter.)

APPENDIX H

FROM THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

(p. 64)

PART IV

GERMAN RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OUTSIDE GERMANY

SECTION II.

CHINA

ARTICLE 128

Germany renounces in favour of China all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final Protocol signed at Peking on September 7, 1901, and from all annexes, notes and documents supplementary thereto. She likewise renounces in favour of China any claim to indemnities accruing thereunder subsequent to March 14, 1917.

ARTICLE 129

From the coming into force of the present Treaty the High Contracting Parties shall apply, in so far as concerns them respectively:

(1) The Arrangement of August 29, 1902, regarding the new Chinese customs tariff;

(2) The Arrangement of September 27, 1905, regarding Whang-Poo, and the provisional supplementary Arrangement of April 4, 1912.

China, however, will no longer be bound to grant to Germany the advantages or privileges which she allowed Germany under these Arrangements.

ARTICLE 130

Subject to the provisions of Section VIII of this Part, Germany cedes to China all the buildings, wharves and pontoons, barracks, forts, arms and munitions of war, vessels of all kinds, wireless telegraphy installations and other public property belonging to the German Government, which are situated or may be in the German Concessions at Tientsin and Hankow or elsewhere in Chinese territory.

It is understood, however, that premises used as diplomatic or consular residences or offices are not included in the above cession, and, furthermore, that no steps shall be taken by the Chinese Government

to dispose of the German public and private property situated within the so-called Legation Quarter at Peking without the consent of the Diplomatic Representatives of the Powers which, on the coming into force of the present Treaty, remain Parties to the Final Protocol of September 7, 1901.

ARTICLE 131

Germany undertakes to restore to China within twelve months from the coming into force of the present Treaty all the astronomical instruments which her troops in 1900-1901 carried away from China, and to defray all expenses which may be incurred in effecting such restoration, including the expenses of dismounting, packing, transporting, insurance and installation in Peking.

ARTICLE 132

Germany agrees to the abrogation of the leases from the Chinese Government under which the German Concessions at Hankow and Tientsin are now held.

China, restored to the full exercise of her sovereign rights in the above areas, declares her intention of opening them to international residence and trade. She further declares that the abrogation of the leases under which these concessions are now held shall not affect the property rights of nationals of Allied and Associated Powers who are holders of lots in these concessions.

ARTICLE 133

Germany waives all claims against the Chinese Government or against any Allied or Associated Government arising out of the internment of German nationals in China and their repatriation. She equally renounces all claims arising out of the capture and condemnation of German ships in China, or the liquidation, sequestration or control of German properties, rights and interests in that country since August 14, 1917. This provision, however, shall not affect the rights of the parties interested in the proceeds of any such liquidation, which shall be governed by the provisions of Part X (Economic Clauses) of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 134

Germany renounces in favour of the Government of His Britannic Majesty the German State property in the British Concession at Shameen at Canton. She renounces in favor of the French and Chinese governments conjointly the property of the German school situated in the French concession at Shanghai.

APPENDIX F

JAPANESE TRADE WITH CHINA SINCE THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

FIVE SIGNIFICANT TABLES

(Note: "tls" means Haikuan taels, or Chinese customs ounces of silver; "pcs" means pieces; "pls" means piculs.)

VALUE OF COTTON PIECE GOODS IMPORTED INTO CHINA FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES, 1902-1917

	1902		1913		1917	
	1000 tls.	Per-cent	1000 tls.	Per-cent	1000 tls.	Per-cent
Hongkong	6,112	8.3%	11,363	9.0%	10,852	10.0%
India	129	.2%	460	4.0%	277	2.0%
Japan	2,057	2.8%	22,592	19.0%	53,505	53.0%
Great Britain	41,456	56.0%	59,592	52.0%	31,384	31.0%
United States	20,111	27.2%	8,933	7.0%	430	.4%
Other countries	4,111	5.5%	11,454	9.0%	3,676	3.6%
Total	73,963	100%	114,394	100	100,124	100

GREY SHEETING

	1902		1913		1917	
	1000 pcs.	1000 tls.	1000 pcs.	1000 tls.	1000 pcs.	1000 tls.
Hongkong	18	57	0.4	1
Percentage		0.3%				.01%
India	5	19	1.0	4
Percentage		0.1%				.04%
Japan	172	497	3,356	9,331	2,610.0	9,487
Percentage		2.8%		57.6%		92.20%
Great Britain	862	2,897	128	532	68.0	303
Percentage		16.4%		3.3%		3.00%
United States	3,833	12,197	1,559	5,722	65.0	249
Percentage		69.0%		35.3%		2.40%
All other countries	657	2,002	176	623	67.0	246
Percentage		11.4%		3.8%		2.35%
Total	5,547	17,669	5,219	16,208	2,811.4	10,290
 Total		100		100		100

GREY SHEETING

	1902		1913		1917	
	1000 pes.	1000 tls.	1000 pes.	1000 tls.	1000 pes.	1000 tls.
Hongkong	41	153	41	204	21	114
Percentage		2.3%		2.3%		2.0%
India	3	8	6	31	1	6
Percentage01%		.4%		.1%
Japan	43	177	1,667	6,261	1,438	5,499
Percentage		2.6%		70.6%		97.0%
Great Britain	204	696	45	183	6	36
Percentage		10.3%		2.0%		.6%
United States	1,506	5,147	507	2,033	2	9
Percentage		76.2%		23.0%		.1%
All other countries ..	173	574	34	152	4	12
Percentage		8.6%		1.7%		.2%
Total	1,970	6,755	2,300	8,864	1,472	5,678
Percentage		100		100		100

COTTON YARN

	1902		1913		1917	
	1000 pls.	1000 tls.	1000 pls.	1000 tls.	1000 pls.	1000 tls.
Hongkong	991	21,554	689	18,478	512	18,243
Percentage		39.3%		25.8%		28.9%
India	908	19,943	657	18,437	553	16,150
Percentage		36.3%		25.8%		25.6%
Japan	517	11,962	1,273	32,128	1,014	27,807
Percentage		21.8%		45.0%		44.1%
Great Britain	25	823	5	199
Percentage		11.5%		.3%	
All other countries	34	592	76	2,227	25	885
Percentage		1.1%		3.1%		1.4%
Total	2,475	54,884	2,700	71,469	2,104	63,055
Total		100		100		100

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STATISTICS REGARDING CHINA'S TOTAL IMPORTS 1902-1917

Unit—1000 Hk. taels.

	1902		1913		1917	
	Value	Per- cent	Value	Per- cent	Value	Per- cent
Cotton piece goods ...	73,963	26.4%	114,394	21.6%	100,124	18.4%
Cotton yarns	54,884	19.6%	71,461	13.5%	63,054	11.6%
Woolen goods	4,082	1.5%	29,156	1.6%	25,138	1.1%
Metals	10,574	3.8%	29,156	5.5%	25,138	4.6%
Sundries	136,403	48.7%	305,788	57.8%	348,823	64.3%
* Total	279,906	100	529,140	100	543,277	100

* Excluding opium.

APPENDIX G

JAPAN'S KIAOCHAU PLEDGE

On April 30, in Paris, President Wilson's personal representative informed the American correspondents that the Japanese delegates had made a written pledge regarding the restoration of Kiaochau to China, which was asserted to be a fundamental part of the Shantung decision. That assertion was denied to me by the Japanese delegation. The asserted "new Kiaochau pledge" was merely a repetition of the pledge made in the Chinese-Japanese notes contested by the Chinese.

On May 5, Baron Makino made a statement to the New York "Herald," quoted in Chapter XXXIII, reaffirming Japan's determination to live up to these engagements. Twelve days later, in Tokyo, the Japanese foreign minister, Viscount Uchida, indorsed and repeated Baron Makino's declaration. A few days before I left Paris (June 7, 1919) a member of the Japanese delegation explained to me the nature of an important recommendation that was being made to Tokyo by Japan's peace mission. He said:

"To return the Kiaochau lease to China and retain an exclusive Japanese settlement, while within our rights, does not seem to be the best course to pursue. We want to prove to our Chinese neighbors that we intend to be not merely just but generous. Consequently, we are recommending an improved form of settlement—an international settlement, not a Japanese settlement; a model Chinese, rather than a foreign concession. That is our plan."

This promise, made exclusively through "The New York Herald," was later confirmed by the Japanese foreign office. On Sunday, August 3, 1919, Viscount Uchida made the following statement:

It appears that, in spite of the official statement which the Japanese Delegation at Paris issued on May 5 last, and which I fully stated in an interview with the representatives of the press on May 17, Japan's policy respecting the Shantung question is little understood or appreciated abroad.

It will be remembered that in the ultimatum which the Japanese Government addressed to the German Government on Aug. 15, 1914, they demanded of Germany to deliver, on a date not later than Sept. 15,

1914, to the imperial authorities, without condition of compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiaochau with a view to eventual restoration of the same to China. The terms of that demand have never elicited any protest on the part of China or any other allied or associated Powers.

Following the same line of policy, Japan now claims as one of the essential conditions of peace that the leased territory of Kiaochau should be surrendered to her without condition or compensation. At the same time abiding faithfully by the pledge which she gave to China in 1915, she is quite willing to restore to China the whole territory in question and to enter upon negotiations with the Government at Peking as to the arrangement necessary to give effect to that pledge as soon as possible after the treaty of Versailles shall have been ratified by Japan.

Nor has she any intention to retain or to claim any rights which affect the territorial sovereignty of China in the province of Shantung. The significance of the clause appearing in Baron Makino's statement of May 5, that the policy of Japan is to hand back the Shantung peninsula in full sovereignty to China, retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany, must be clear to all.

Upon arrangement being arrived at between Japan and China for the restitution of Kiaochau, the Japanese troops at present guarding that territory and the Kiao-Chau-Tsinanfu Railway will be completely withdrawn.

The Kiao-chau-Tsinanfu Railway is intended to be operated as a joint Sino-Japanese enterprise without any discrimination in treatment against the people of any nation.

The Japanese Government have, moreover, under contemplation proposals for the re-establishment in Tsing-tao of a general foreign settlement, instead of the exclusive Japanese settlement which by the agreement of 1915 with China they are entitled to claim.

On August 6, the following statement made by President Wilson was issued from the White House:

The government of the United States has noted with the greatest interest the frank statement made by Viscount Uchida with regard to Japan's future policy respecting Shantung. The statement ought to serve to remove many of the misunderstandings which had begun to accumulate about this question. But there are references in the statement to an agreement entered into between Japan and China in 1915 which might be misleading, if not commented upon in the light of what occurred in Paris when the clauses of the Treaty affecting Shantung were under discussion. I therefore take the liberty of supplementing Viscount Uchida's statement with the following:

In the conference of the thirtieth of April last, when this matter was brought to a conclusion among the heads of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, the Japanese delegates, Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda, in reply to a question put by myself, declared that:

"The policy of Japan is to hand back the Shantung Peninsula in full sovereignty to China, retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany, and the right to establish a settlement under the usual conditions at Tsingtao.

"The owners of the railway will use special police only to insure security for traffic. They will be used for no other purpose.

"The police forces will be composed of Chinese, and such Japanese instructors as the Directors of the Railways may select will be appointed by the Chinese Government."

No reference was made to this policy being in any way dependent upon the execution of the Agreement of 1915 to which Count Uchida appears to have referred. Indeed, I felt it my duty to say that nothing that I agreed to must be construed as an acquiescence on the part of the Government of the United States in the policy of the notes exchanged between China and Japan in 1915 and 1918 and reference was made in the discussion to the enforcement of the Agreements of 1915 and 1918 only in case China failed to coöperate fully in carrying out the policy outlined in the statement of Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda.

I have, of course, no doubt that Viscount Uchida had been apprised of all the particulars of the discussion in Paris, and I am not making this statement with the idea of correcting his, but only to throw a fuller light of clarification upon a situation which ought to be relieved of every shadow of obscurity or misapprehension.

WOODROW WILSON.

Addressing the Diet, on the reassembling of the Japanese parliament, January 21, 1920, Premier Hara said:

"As to the final disposition of Kiaochau since the Japanese treaty of 1915, the statements made last year by our delegates to the peace conference and repeated announcements made by myself amply testify to the fact that this country has from the outset been determined to restore it to China. The so-called Shantung question comprises in the main questions pertaining to the leased territory of Kiaochau and the Shantung railway.

"The former is to be restored to China, while the other is to be worked under a joint enterprise of both countries in accordance with the terms of the Sino-Japanese agreement of 1918.

"It is a matter of regret that there are some foreign critics who remain under the erroneous impression that the whole province of Shantung is involved in the so-called Shantung question. I am happy to assure you that the determination of the Japanese government to abide by their plighted word to restore the leased territory to China

and to work the railway as a joint enterprise of the two countries has never been shaken.

“With the coming into force of the peace treaty the former German rights in the leased territory and the railway have been completely transferred to our possessions. The government is now taking the necessary steps to translate their often declared determination into actual acts.”

On January 31, the Japanese embassy at Washington announced the opening of negotiations between Japan and China in redemption of the Japanese pledge. At the same time demand was made upon Germany to deliver the title deeds, etc., specified in the Shantung articles of the Treaty of Versailles. In order to expedite the proceedings at Berlin, Mr. Katsuji Debuchi, counsellor of the Japanese embassy at Washington and a leading Japanese authority on Chinese affairs, was transferred to the German capital as chargé.

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