


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ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY

OF

THUCYDIDES.





BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY

OF

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AN

ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY

OF

THUCYDIDES.

WITH

A CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS;  
MONEY, DISTANCES, ETC. REDUCED TO ENGLISH TERMS;  
A SKELETON OUTLINE OF THE GEOGRAPHY;  
ABSTRACTS OF ALL THE SPEECHES, INDEX, ETC.

BY THE

AUTHOR OF "AN ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF HERODOTUS," ETC.

LONDON:

HENRY G. BOHN, YORK STREET, COVENT GARDEN.

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## PREFACE.

THE object of the present work is to assist the student in "getting up" the History of Thucydides, and it is compiled upon the same plan as the *Analysis and Summary of Herodotus*. It contains a Summary of the History, and a condensed paraphrase of the Speeches. Each Book of this Summary is separated into divisions, and each division into paragraphs; all of which have the Contents appended in a peculiar type: these Contents are also thrown together at the commencement of each Book, and thus form a comprehensive Analysis of the whole.

In addition to this Analytical Contents and Summary, the present work includes a Skeleton Outline of the Geography of Greece, and a Chronological Table of Principal Events. Every necessary reference has also been bracketed in the Text, to save the trouble of turning to an Index, and the Chronology has been inserted throughout, and the years divided, according to the arrangement of Thucydides, into summers and winters. The Greek weights, money, etc., have also been reduced into corresponding English terms, in round numbers; reckoning an obol at  $1\frac{1}{2}d.$ ; a drachma at  $9d.$ ; a mina at £4; a talent at £240; a stadium as a furlong, eight to the mile; etc.\*

The peculiarities in the History of Thucydides renders some such aid as the present indispensable. Even the hard-working student, who makes his own Analysis, may find it greatly assist in lightening his labours, and increasing his knowledge of the Historian; espe-

\* The more exact student will find complete tables with decimals at the end of the Dictionary of Antiquities edited by Dr. Smith. Round numbers have been thought most useful and suitable for the present work.

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cially as particular attention has been paid to the wants of those who are preparing for an University examination.

In carrying out the above design, the author has been also desirous of rendering the History of Thucydides intelligible to the mere English reader. He has sought to relate the facts in clear and concise language, in the exact order in which they were written; and to retain as far as possible the spirit of the speeches, and the peculiar opinions and reflections of the wise Athenian. At the same time, by the addition of Analytical Contents, the insertion of dates, and by clearness of typographical arrangement, he has endeavoured to make this intricate and thoughtful narrative as clear of comprehension as a modern history. How far he has been successful, it remains for the reader to judge; the difficulties of the task can only be known to the student of Thucydides.

The principal works which have been consulted in the progress of this volume are, the notes of Dr. Arnold, whose readings and interpretations have been generally followed throughout; the Histories of Greece by Thirlwall, Grote, Mitford, and Heeren; the translations of Hobbes, Smith, Bloomfield, and Dale; and the Oxford Atlas of Maps and Plans to Thucydides. In conclusion, the author must acknowledge his obligations to a gentleman who read through the whole of his proofs, and verified them with the text of Arnold, whilst passing through the press; and as no labour has been otherwise spared to render the whole as free from error as possible, he hopes that fewer mistakes will be found than ordinarily creep into similar compilations.

J. T. W.

Cambridge, Sept. 24, 1850.

## SKELETON OUTLINE

OF

# THE GEOGRAPHY OF GREECE.

### I. Description of Greece.

Origin of the term "Hellas."—Boundaries.—Physical character.—Waters of Greece: seas; gulfs; straits; lakes; and rivers.—Products: 1. Minerals. 2. Vegetables. 3. Animals.—Divisions.

### II. Northern Greece.

Divisions: 1. Thessaly. 2. Epirus.

### III. Central Greece, or Hellas.

Divisions: 1. Acarnania. 2. Ætolia. 3. Doris. 4. Locris. 5. Phocis. 6. Bœotia. 7. Attica. 8. Megaris.

### IV. Peloponnesus.

Divisions: 1. Corinth. 2. Sicyonia. 3. Phliasia. 4. Achaia. 5. Elis. 6. Messenia. 7. Laconia. 8. Argolis. 9. Arcadia.

### V. The Islands.

Divisions: 1. Islands off the coast. 2. Clusters in the Ægean Sea. 3. Separate Islands.

### VI. Greek Colonies.

Origin of the Colonies. 1. ÆOLIAN COLONIES. 2. IONIAN COLONIES. 3. DORIAN COLONIES: viz. 1st, On the western coast of Asia Minor; 2nd, In Lower Italy, or Magna Græcia; 3rd, In Sicily; 4th, On the Ionian Sea. 5th, On the Thracian coast. 4. ACHÆAN COLONIES IN LOWER ITALY. 5. CHALCIDIAN COLONIES: viz. 1st, On the Thracian coast; 2nd, In Lower Italy; 3rd, In Sicily. 6. COLONIES OF MILETUS: viz. 1st, On the Hellespont; 2nd, On the Propontis; 3rd, On the Pontus Euxinus. 7. PROCIAN COLONIES. 8. COLONIES OF ZACYNTHUS.



I. *Description of Greece.*

**Origin of the term Hellas.**—Greece in most remote times had no general name. HELLAS originally merely indicated the city of Hellas in Thessaly. Subsequently it comprehended the greater part of Thessaly; and afterwards it was applied to the whole of central Greece, which was called HELLAS PROPER, in contradistinction to the Peloponnesus. After the Persian war, it included Peloponnesus also, and at length, after the Macedonian war, it was understood as designating every country inhabited by HELLENES.

**Boundaries.**—Greece is bounded on the north by the Cambunian chain, which separates it from Macedonia; on the south and east by the Ægean Sea; on the west by the Ionian Sea.

**Physical character.**—Greece is 220 geographical miles in its greatest length from north to south, and 140 geographical miles in its greatest breadth from east to west. It was adapted to every branch of cultivation from its fertility and the mildness of the climate, between 37°–40° N. lat.; the number of small streams; and the qualities and variety of the soil. It possessed particular facilities for navigation and commerce, from being situated in the vicinity of the three quarters of the world, having three sides washed by the sea, and, as a consequence of its indented and irregular coast, abounding with commodious ports and havens.

**Waters of Greece: I. Seas.**—1. The ÆGEAN. 2. The MYRTOAN, between the Peloponnesus and Ægean Isles. 3. The IONIAN, whose currents meet those of the Myrtoan at the promontory of Malea, which was thus notorious for shipwrecks.

**II. Gulfs.**—1. The THERMAIC. 2. The PEGASÆAN and MALIAN BAYS. 3. The SARONIC. 4. The ARGOLIC. 5. The LAONIC. 6. The MESSENIAN. 7. The CORINTHIAN, with the Crisæan Bay. 8. The AMBRACIAN.

**III. Strait.**—The EUNIPUS, between Eubœa and Bœotia.

**IV. Lakes.**—1. ACHERUSIA in Epirus. 2. COPAIS.

**V. Rivers.**—1. The PENEUS, which falls into the Thermaic Gulf. 2. The ACHELOUS, which falls into the Ionian Sea. 3. The CERINUS, which falls into Lake Copais. 4. The ALPHEUS, which falls into the Ionian Sea. 5. The ECROTAS, which falls into the Laconic Gulf.

**Products: 1. Minerals.**—Gold, from the mines on Thasos and Siphnos; silver, from the mountains of Laurium in Attica; copper and iron, from the neighbourhood of Chalcis in Eubœa; marble, from Pentelicus and Paros.

**2. Vegetables.**—Barley was the most productive grain. Amongst the trees were, the silver poplar, the Greek cedar, the evergreen cypress, and the majestic plane. Besides an abundance of many varieties of fruit, were grapes, figs, and olives, the last especially in Attica.

**3. Animals.**—Bullocks, sheep, goats, hogs, and mules. Horses were reared with difficulty, because of the mountainous character of the country. Pigeons on Cythera, owls at Athens, bees especially on Mount Hymettus, fish, and dolphins. The country was much plagued by locusts.

**Divisions.**—1. NORTHERN GREECE, from the Cambunian chain to the Cæta and Pindus range; between the Ambracian Gulf west, and the Malian Gulf east. 2. CENTRAL GREECE, or HELLAS, from the Cæta range to the Isthmus of Corinth. 3. PELOPONNESUS, or southern Peninsula. 4. ISLANDS.

II. *Northern Greece.*

**Divisions.**—Northern Greece comprises two countries: 1. THESSALY, on the east. 2. EPIRUS, on the west.

**1. Thessaly.**—This is the largest district of Greece, and was the cradle of all the Greek tribes. It principally consists of two cauldron-shaped basins, the greater part of which was anciently a lake, [*Herod.* vii. 129,] until Ossa was separated from Olympus by an earthquake, and an outlet was made for the river Peneus, through the narrow vale of Tempe. The high mountains enclose a place well adapted for agriculture and the rearing of cattle.

**Rivers:** the Peneus, Apidanus, and numerous smaller streams. **Mountains:** Olympus, residence of the fabulous gods, and Ossa in the north; and the chain of Cæta, Othrys, and Pindus in the south.

**Division into five Provinces.** 1. HESTIÆOTIS. **Cities:** Gomphi, Azorus. 2. PELASGIOTIS. **Cities:** Larissa, Gormi, the vale of Tempe. 3. THESSALIOTIS. **Cities:** Pharsalus, etc. 4. PHTHIOTIS. **Cities:** Phæræ, etc. 5. The foreland of Magnesia, with a city of the same name. Other territories, such as Perrhæbia, derived their names from the non-Greek races who inhabited them.

**2. Epirus.**—The largest country in Greece, next to Thessaly, but the least cultivated. On account of its volcanic soil it was supposed to communicate with the infernal regions. It was inhabited by 14 distinct Pelasgic tribes, ranked as Greeks by Herodotus, but called Barbarians by Thucydides and every other writer: the most considerable of these tribes were the Chaouians, Thesprotians, and Molossians.

**Divisions.** 1. Molossis. **City:** Ambracia. 2. Thesprotia. **City:** Buthrotum. 3. Dodona, in the interior.

III. *Central Greece, or Hellas.*

**Divisions.**—Central Greece comprises eight countries, viz. 1. ACARNANIA; 2. ÆTOLIA; 3. DORIS; 4. LOCRIS; 5. PHOCIS; 6. BÆOTIA; 7. ATTICA; and 8. MEGARIS.

**1. Acarnania,** the most western country of Hellas. **River:** Achelous. **Cities:** Argos, Amphilochoium, and Stratus.

**2. Ætolia,** rather larger than Bœotia, but the least cultivated country of all. **River:** Achelous, which skirts Acarnania and the Evenus. **Cities:** Calydon and Thermus.

**3. Doris,** a rugged little state, the mother country of the Lacedæmonians (see page 38).

**4. Locris,** was divided into two districts, inhabited by three tribes. 1. EASTERN LOCRIS, the lesser of the two, bordering on the Eubœan Sea and Malian Gulf, inhabited by the *Opuntian Locrians*, capital—Opus; and northward, as far as Thermopylæ, by the *Epicnemidian*





*Locrians.* 2. **WESTERN LOCRI**, on the Corinthian Gulf, inhabited by the *Ozalian Locrians*. *Cities*: Naupactus on the sea, and Amphissa in the interior.

5. **Phocis**.—*River*: Cephissus. *Mountain*: Parnassus. *Cities*: DELPHI, on the south-western declivity of Parnassus, with the celebrated oracle of Apollo. 2. **Carsa**, with the harbour of Cirrha. 8. **Elatea**, in the valley of the Cephissus. Others insignificant.

6. **Bœotia**, a fertile basin, formed by the mountains of Parnassus, Helicon with its numerous springs, Cithæron, and the rugged chain of Parnes. Of all the Grecian countries, it contained the greatest number of cities, each having its own separate territory. The most considerable formed a confederacy under the Hegemony of Thebes. *Rivers*: Asopus, Ismeus, and several smaller streams. *Mountains*: Helicon, Cithæron, etc. *Lake*: Copais. *Cities*: Thebes, Orchomenus, Platea, Thespis, Tanagra, Haliartus, Coronea, Chæronea, Lebadea, and Leuctra.

7. **Attica**, a foreland extending towards the south-east, and gradually diminishing. *Rivers*: Ilissus, Cephissus. *Mountains*: Hymettus, Pentelicus, and the headland of Sunium. *City*: ATHENS, with the harbours Piræus, Phalerus, and Munychium. No other towns but hamlets, called *δῆμοι*, such as Marathon, Eleusis, Decelea, Phyle, etc.

8. **Megaris**, the smallest of the Grecian countries, and close to the isthmus of Corinth. *City*: Megara.

#### IV. Peloponnesus.

*Divisions*.—Peloponnesus comprises nine countries: viz. 1. CORINTH; 2. SICYONIA; 3. PHLIASIA; 4. ACHAIA; 5. ELIS; 6. MESSENIA; 7. LACONIA; 8. ARGOLIS; and 9. ARCADIA.

1. **Corinth**, a small territory adjoining the isthmus which connects the Peloponnesus with the main-land. Its situation rendered it an emporium of trade (see p. 9). *City*: CORINTH, with the ports of Lechæum on the Corinthian Gulf, and of Cenchræe on the Saronic.

2. **Sicyonia**, a small territory of the same size as Corinth. *City*: Sicyon.

3. **Phliasia**, with its city of Phlius, anciently formed a small independent state.

4. **Achaia**, originally Ionia, called likewise Ægialus, comprises the north coast. It contained 12 cities, of which Dyme, Patræ, and Pellene are the most important.

5. **Elis**, with the small territory of Triphylia, on the west of Peloponnesus. *Rivers*: Alpheus, Peneus, Sellis, and several smaller streams. *Cities*: in the north, Elis, Cyllene, and Pylus. On the Alpheus, Pisa and Olympia. In Triphylia, a third Pylus.

6. **Messenia**, a level and extremely fertile country, subject to the Spartans from b. c. 668. *City*: Messene. *Frontier places*: Ithome and Ira. *Other places*: Pylus and Methone are the most celebrated.

7. **Laconia**, a mountainous territory. *River*: Eurotas. *Mountains*: Taygetus, and the headlands Malea and Tenarium. *Cities*: SPARTA on the Eurotas; Amyclæ, Sellasia, and others of little importance.

8. **Argolis**, a foreland opposite Attica. *Cities*: ARGOS, ΜΥCENÆ,

and EPIDAUROS. *Smaller but remarkable places*: Nemea, Cynuria, and Træzen.

9. **Arcadia**, a mountainous territory in the centre of Peloponnesus, abounding in pastures. *Mountains*: Cyllene, Erymanthus, &c. *Rivers*: Alpheus, Erymanthus, and several smaller streams. *L*: Styx. *Cities*: Mantinea, Tegea, Orchomenus, Heræa, Psopis, subsequently Megalopolis, as a common capital.

#### V. The Islands.

*Divisions*.—The Greek islands may be divided into three classes, viz. 1st, Islands off the coasts. 2nd, Clusters in the Ægean Sea. 3rd, Separate islands.

1. **Islands off the coasts**.—*Off the west coast in the Ionian Sea*.—1. COACYRA, colonised from Corinth. *City*: Corcyra. 2. LEUCADIA, with the city and headland of Leucas. 3. CEPHALONIA. *City*: same name. 4. ITHACA. 5. ZACYNTHUS. *Off the south coast*.—6. CYNTHERA, at the entrance of the Laconic Gulf. *Off the east coast in the Ægean Sea*.—7. ÆGINA. 8. SALAMIS. 9. EUBŒA, separated from Bœotia and Attica by the Euripus. *Cities*: Oreus, with the headland of Artemisium, on the north; in the centre, Chalcis and Eretria. 10. SCYATHUS. 11. HALONESUS. 12. THASUS. 13. IMARUS. 14. SAMOTHRACE. 15. LEMNOS.

2nd, **Clusters in the Ægean Sea**.—These include the CYCLADES and SPORADES, the former of which comprise the western, the latter the eastern, islands of the Archipelago. The most important among them are ANDROS, DELOS, PAROS, NAXOS, and MELOS, all of which have cities bearing the same names.

3rd, **Separate Islands**.—1. CRETE. *Mountain*: Ida. *Cities*: Cydonia, Gortyna, and Cnossus. 2. CYPRUS. *Cities*: Salamis, Paphos, Citium, etc.

#### VI. Greek Colonies.

*Origin of the colonies*.—The Grecian colonies either originated in political motives, being founded by the express command or advice of an oracle, or else in commercial speculations. The former was the case when the settlement was made from the mother country; the latter, when it was made from such colonies as had already exalted themselves by their commerce.

1. **Æolian colonies**.—The Pelopidae migrated from the Peloponnesus, in company with the Bœotian Ætolians, to Mysia and Lydia, where they occupied a strip of land, hence called Æolis, and erected 12 cities, which afterwards fell into the hands of the Ionians; of these cities Cyme and Smyrna were most important. These colonists afterwards possessed the islands of Tenedos, the Hecatonnessi, and Lesbos, on which stood the celebrated city of Mitylene. In b. c. 470 they became tributary to Athens.

2. **Ionian colonies**.—The Ionians, when expelled from the Peloponnesus, withdrew to Attica, and afterwards migrated to the southern coast of Lydia and the northern shore of Caria, which were thus called Ionia; also Samos, Chios, and the Cyclades. They founded 12 cities on the continent, of which the most remarkable were Mi-



letus, Ephesus, and Phocæa. These states were all united by the bond of a common sanctuary, the Panionium at Mycale.

3. *Dorian Colonies*: 1st, *On the western coast of Asia Minor*.—The Dorians migrated from Megara, and different cities of the Peloponnesus, to southern Caria, and to Cos, Rhodes, and Crete. They founded a confederacy of six cities, two of which, Halicarnassus, the birth-place of Herodotus and Dionysius, and Cnidus, were on the main-land. Thera afterwards colonised Cyrene in Libya.

2nd, *In Lower Italy, or Magna Græcia*.—1. TARENTUM. 2. LOCRI EPIZEPHYRII, which was originally founded by the Ozolian or Opuntian Locrians, but afterwards re-settled by Messenian Dorians.

3rd, *In Sicily*.—1. SYRACUSE, founded by Archias, a Corinthian, on the island of Ortygia. 2. THE HYLLÆAN MEGARA. 3. GELA, with its daughter city Agrigentum. See also p. 243.

4th, *On the Ionian Sea*.—A chain of Corinthian settlements on the coast of the Ionian Sea, viz. LEUCAS, ANACTORIUM, AMBRACIA, APOLLONIA, EPIDAMNUS, and CORCYRA.

5th, *On the Thracian coast*.—1. POTIDÆA, founded by Corinth. 2. BYZANTIUM, founded by Megara. 3. CHALCEDON, on the Thracian Bosphorus.

4. *Achaean Colonies in Lower Italy*.—1. CROTON. 2. SYDARIS: after this settlement was destroyed by the Crotoniates, the Athenians founded another city named Thurii in the neighbourhood. The Sybarites founded Metapontium and Poseidon.

5. *Chalcidian Colonies*: 1st, *On the Thracian coast*.—The whole peninsula between the Thermaic and Strymonic Gulfs was named Chalcidice, and included 32 cities, Olynthus, Chalcis, etc., all of Chalcidian origin.

2nd, *In Lower Italy*.—1. CUMÆ or CYME, which was the most ancient of all the western Greek settlements, and the mother city of Neapolis. 2. Rhegium.

3rd, *In Sicily*.—1. NAXOS, with the daughter cities of Leontium and Catania. 2. ZANCLE, afterwards called Messana. 3. HIMERA. See p. 243.

6. *Colonies of Miletus*: 1st, *On the Hellespont*.—1. ABYDUS. 2. LAMPISACUS.

2nd, *On the Propontis*.—CYZICUS.

3rd, *On the Pontus Euxinus*.—1. SINOPE, with its daughter city TRAPEZUS. 2. PHASIS. 3. TANAIUS. 4. PANTICAPÆUM. 5. OLBIA. 6. TOMI, etc.

7. *Phocæan Colonies*.—1. ALERIA, on the island of Corsica. 2. MASSILIA, on the southern coast of Gallia.

8. *Colony of Zacynthus*.—SAOUNTUM, on the eastern coast of Spain. Amphipolis in Macedonia, and Thurii in Magna Græcia, were colonised by Athens.

## CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

OF THE

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II. *The Peloponnesian War.*

## ATHENIANS.

ALLIES: The islands Chios, Samos, Lesbos, all those of the Archipelago, (Thera and Melos excepted, which stood neutral,) Corcyra, Zacynthus; the Grecian colonies in Asia Minor, and on the coast of Thrace and Macedonia: in Greece itself the cities of Naupactus, Plataea, and those of Acarnania.

## LACEDÆMONIANS.

ALLIES: All the Peloponnesians except Argos and Achaia, which stood neutral, Megara, Loeris, Phocis, Bœotia, the cities of Ambracia and Anactorium, and the island of Leucas.

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## SUMMARY.

### I. *Introductory Sketch of the Early State of Greece, chap. 1—23.*

1 Thucydides, expecting an important war, compiles materials.—Thucydides began to write the history of the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians from its very outset, because he expected that it would prove more important than all preceding wars, as both sides were making great preparations, and all Greece joining one or the other.

Proves the importance of the war over preceding events.—To show the importance of the Peloponnesian war beyond all preceding events, Thucydides reviews the early state of Greece.

Unsettled state of Greece before the Trojan war.— 2 Hellas was not anciently peopled by fixed inhabitants, as one tribe would frequently force another to migrate. There was no commerce, and mutual fear prevented intercourse; whilst the people cultivated the land only for subsistence, and not for superfluities, for fear of invaders. The best lands were most subject to changes, such as Thessaly, Bœotia, and nearly all Peloponnesus, together with the most fertile parts of the rest of Greece, for there some men grew rich and created factions. Attica, from the poverty of its soil, was the longest free from faction, and always inhabited by the same people; and the most powerful men who were driven by sedition from other parts of Greece, retired to Athens, which city became so populous that Attica subsequently sent colonies to Ionia.

Origin of the names "Hellas" and "Hellenes."— 3 Before the Trojan war Greece had done nothing in common, nor did the name of HELLAS exist before the time of Hellen, son of Deucalion, but each tribe, especially the Pelasgian, was called by its own name. After Hellen and his sons had grown strong in Phthiotis, and aided other cities, separate communities were called HELLENES, but Homer proves that it was a long time before HELLENES became a general appellation, for though born long after the Trojan war, yet he mentions Danaans, Argives, and Achæans, and only calls those HELLENES who came with Achilles out of Phthiotis. The HELLENES in the different cities, through want of strength and mutual intercourse, did nothing as a body before the Trojan war, and they only united then because they had begun to make more use of the sea.

Minos the first that formed a navy.—Minos was the 4 first who formed a navy. He expelled the Carians from the Cyclades, which he colonized, and swept the pirates from the Grecian sea for the more secure conveyance of his revenues. For the ancient Greeks, and the Bar- 5



barians on the continental coasts, and the Islanders, had turned pirates and plundered unfortified towns, which trade was considered glorious instead of disgraceful, and the ancient poets presumed that men were not ashamed of it. Many Greeks contemporary with Thucydides, as the Loeri Ozolæ, Ætoliæ, Acarnanians, etc., still lived by piracy.

6 **Armour anciently worn: Athenians discontinue it.—**

Piracy obliged all the Greeks formerly to wear arms. The Athenians were the first who laid aside their armour, but then they became luxurious. Shortly before Thucydides' time, however, their elders ceased wearing linen tunics and binding up a knot of their hair with golden grasshoppers, though the Ionian elders still continued the fashion. The Lacedæmonians first introduced the moderate style prevalent in Thucydides' time, and they were the first who exercised naked in public, smeared with oil. Formerly the combatants in the Olympic games wore girdles; and amongst some Barbarians, particularly the Asiatic, the boxers and wrestlers wear them still, which, with other things, proves that the ancient Greeks lived similarly to the Barbarians contemporary with Thucydides.

7 **Sites of ancient and later cities compared.—**Ancient cities were built inland for fear of pirates, but the more recent ones were built, with walls, on the shores and on isthmuses for commerce and security.

8 **Carians and Phœnicians especially pirates.—**The Carians and Phœnicians who had colonized most of the islands were especially pirates, which is thus proved. When the Athenians purified Delos during the Peloponnesian war and broke open all the sepulchres, [iii. 104,] they found half the dead were Carians, from the fashion of their arms and manner of burial.

**Greece increases in power.—**When Minos had established a navy, expelled the pirates, and colonized the islands, sea communication increased, and the people on the coast, acquiring more wealth, led a more settled life and surrounded themselves with walls. The lower orders for gain soon submitted to be slaves to their betters, who were then enabled to subject the smaller cities.

**Cause of the Trojan war: rise of the Pelopidæ.—**9  
Thucydides believed that Agamemnon assembled the armament for the Trojan expedition, not because of the oaths which Helen's suitors had sworn to Tyndarus, but by his superior power. Pelops had brought great riches from Asia, and gave his name to Peloponnesus. His descendants increased in power beyond those of Perseus, for Eurystheus, son of the daughter of Pelops, before proceeding to Attica against the Heraclidæ, by whom he was killed, left Mycenæ and the kingdom to the care of his uncle Atreus. After the death of Eurystheus, Atreus reigned, and subsequently Agamemnon, who had a stronger navy than others, for he not only joined the Trojan expedition with the most ships, but also furnished ships for the Arcadians. Homer also, in speaking of Agamemnon, says that he "O'er numerous isles and o'er all Argos ruled;" which islands, as he lived on the mainland, he could not have mastered without a navy.

**Apparent insignificance of Mycenæ no argument** 10  
**against Agamemnon's superior force.—**Mycenæ may now appear a small city without our disbelieving the extent of Agamemnon's armament. For if the city of the Lacedæmonians was desolated all but its temples and foundations, posterity would disbelieve that their power had been in proportion to their fame, though they possessed two out of the five divisions of the Peloponnesus, and commanded the whole, as well as many allied states out of it; because the city was built after the old Greek fashion in villages, and the temples and public buildings were not sumptuous. But if Athens suffered the same fate, it would appear to have had double its actual strength.

**Extent and character of the Trojan expedition.—**It must therefore be concluded that the Trojan expedition was larger than all before, though inferior to those in Thucydides' time; for even according to the poetical, and therefore probably exaggerated, accounts of Homer, it appears to have been inferior to those of a later age. Homer makes it to consist of 1200 ships, those of the Bœotians carrying 120 men each, and those of Philœtetes 50; meaning to show perhaps the largest and the least. The



men on board the ships of Philoctetes were both rowers and bowmen. It is probable that ships carried no supernumeraries except kings or commanders, as they were merely to transport the munitions of war, and were not decked, but equipped like the old privateers. Calculating then the mean of the largest and smallest ships, the men were few

- 11 considering that they were sent from all Greece. But this was caused not from the scarcity of men, but the want of money; and they took a small army, that it might live in the country whilst carrying on the war.

**Want of money occasioned the lengthened siege.**—The Greeks on their first arrival at Troy were superior in battle, or they would not have fortified their camp; but they did not employ all their force, for many cultivated the Chersonesus, or engaged in piracy for provisions; and thus the Trojans, being a match for a part, were enabled to hold out for ten years. If the Greeks had gone with abundance of provisions, and carried on the war continuously in a body without foraging or agriculture, they would have easily defeated the Trojans and taken Troy; but want of money weakened both this and previous undertakings; and facts prove that though this was superior to all preceding expeditions, yet it was inferior to its fame and poetical report.

- 12 **Unsettled state of Greece after the Trojan war.**—After the Greeks returned from Troy they were still unsettled. Their long absence had caused revolutions, and factions arose and expelled many men, who founded other cities.

#### *Principal Migrations and Colonizations.*

**SIEGE OF TROY** B. C. 1184.

1. **BÆOTIANS** expelled from ARNE, by the THES-SALIANS, and settled in BÆOTIA, previously called CADMEIS, in the 60th year after the siege, viz. 1124.

A division of the Bæotians had previously settled in Cadmeis, some of whom had joined the Trojan expedition.

2. **DORLIANS AND HERACLIDÆ** took the PELOPONNESUS in the 80th year after the siege, viz. 1104.
3. **ATHENIANS** colonized Ionia and the islands.

4. **PELOPONNESIANS** colonized the greater part of Italy and Sicily, and some places in Greece.

**Navies formed: tyrannies substituted for monarchies.** 13  
—When Greece increased in power and riches, and the revenues became greater, tyrannies were established in the cities, for previously they had been ruled by hereditary kings with limited authority. Greece began now to build navies, and the Corinthians were the first who brought their navy nearly to the present fashion, and triremes were first built at Corinth.

**Corinthians the earliest shipwrights.**—Aminocles, a Corinthian, built four ships for the Samians, 300 years before the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war [i. e. B. C. 705]; and the first known sea-fight was fought between the Corinthians and Coreyræans, about 260 years before [i. e. B. C. 665].

**Causes of the richness of Corinth.**—As Corinth was on the isthmus, it was always an emporium, because the Greeks both within and without the Peloponnesus anciently trafficked more by land than by sea, and were therefore compelled to pass through the Corinthian territory: thus the old poets bestow on Corinth the epithet of “wealthy.” When the Greeks began to make voyages, the Corinthians having ships put down piracy, and thus increased the revenue of their city by rendering it an emporium both by land and sea.

**Ionian navy.**—The Ionians had a large navy in the time of Cyrus and Cambyses, and whilst at war with Cyrus they were a long time masters of the sea along their coasts. Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, having a strong fleet, subdued many islands in Cambyses’ time, among the rest Rhœnæa, which he dedicated to the Delian Apollo. The Phocæans also, whilst founding Massalia, defeated the Carthaginians by sea.

**Deficiencies in the early navies.**—The Ionians and 14  
Corinthians had thus the strongest navies, but they chiefly consisted of fifty-oared vessels and long boats, and but few triremes; and it was only shortly before the Median war and death of Darius that the tyrants of Sicily and Coreyra possessed any number of triremes.





These were the last Greek navies worth mentioning before the expedition of Xerxes, for the Æginetan and Athenian vessels were but few, and chiefly fifty-oared; and it was only in latter times, when the Athenians were at war with the Æginetans [Herod. v. 82—88] and expected Xerxes, that Themistocles persuaded them to build the very ships with which they defeated the Barbarians, and these were not decked completely over.

- 15 **Greeks obtained their power by sea, not by land.**—In spite of the deficiency of the Greek navies, those states who attended to their ships gained the greatest power and revenue, by subduing the larger islands, and no power was obtained by a land war, for the Greeks only fought their neighbours, and there were no cities dependent on the chief states, nor joint expeditions. The largest Greek alliances were formed in the old war between the Chalcidians and Eretrians.
- 16 **Ionian power subjected by the Persian.**—When the Ionian power had reached a high pitch, their continental cities were subdued by Cyrus after he had conquered Cræsus, and the territory from the Halys to the sea. Darius afterwards with the Phœnician fleet subdued the islands.
- 17 **Selfishness of tyrants.**—As the tyrants in the Greek cities cared only for themselves and families, they achieved nothing memorable except against bordering states; though those in Sicily advanced to high power.
- 18 **Tyrants deposed by Lacedæmon: Persian war commenced.**—The tyrants of Athens and those of the rest of Greece, which last had been even longer subjected to tyranny than the Athenians, were afterwards all, except those in Sicily, deposed by the Lacedæmonians. For Lacedæmon, after the settlement of the Dorians, though torn by factions for the longest known period, had enjoyed good laws, rested free from tyrants, and possessed the same form of government for 400 years before the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war; and thus being powerful, had settled matters in the other states. Not long after the above deposition of tyrants, the battle of Marathon was fought between the Medes and Athenians, [B. C. 490,] and in the tenth year after that [B. C.

480] the Barbarians came again with a great armament to enslave Greece.

The Lacedæmonians most powerful on land and the Athenians on sea: they quarrel.—The Lacedæmonians now headed the confederate Greeks, and the Athenians on the approach of the Medes left their city for their ships; and the two navies repulsed the Barbarians. Greece was divided amongst them, the Lacedæmonians being strongest on land, and the Athenians on sea. But the Lacedæmonians and Athenians soon quarrelled, and with their allies waged an intermittent war upon each other from the Persian to the Peloponnesian war; by which all parties were well prepared for fighting and improved in skill.

Difference in their conduct to their allies.—The Lacedæmonians had not treated their allies as tributaries, but insured their attachment by keeping them governed by oligarchies; but the Athenians had seized the ships of the states in their league, except the Chians and Lesbians, and made all tributary. The resources of the Athenians for the Peloponnesian war were therefore greater than when they were in their greatest vigour as a state, and enjoyed the most perfect harmony with their allies.

Truthful character of the foregoing review.—This sketch of the state of Greece from the earliest times, may include some incorrect facts, as men will receive the reports of past events without examination. For instance, the bulk of Athenians think that Hipparchus was tyrant at the time he was slain by Harmodius and Aristogiton, not knowing that Hippias was tyrant, as being the eldest of Pisistratus's sons, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were only his brothers. Harmodius and Aristogiton, suspecting that Hippias had been warned of their design, did not attack him, but finding Hipparchus near the Leocorium arranging the Panathenæic procession, they slew him [vi. 54]. Of many other things the Greeks have incorrect notions; as, that the Lacedæmonian kings have a double vote instead of a single one, and that they have a Pitaneian Lochus, which never existed.

Upon the whole, however, the foregoing sketch may be 21



credited more than the accounts of exaggerating poets, or those historians who sought for attractive language rather than truth, and it proves the assertion in the first chapter, that the Peloponnesian war was the most important that Greece had ever known before.

22 Truthful character of the following history of the Peloponnesian war.—In reporting the speeches Thucydides has not professed to write down the exact words, though he has adhered to the sense. He has also not stated facts on hearsay from chance informants, but only when he was present, or after due investigation if informed by others; which investigation was laborious, as spectators of the same event gave different accounts. The unfabulous character of this history may render it less agreeable, but if lovers of truth think it useful, that will be sufficient; as it is composed to be an everlasting possession, and not a mere prize task for the present moment.

23 Greater calamities and prodigies during the Peloponnesian war.—The Median war was the greatest of all former achievements, but was speedily decided after two battles on sea and two on land; but the Peloponnesian war was much longer, and Greece endured sufferings never equalled within a similar period. Never were so many cities taken and desolated, men banished, and blood shed; and never were such prodigies, earthquakes which shook nearly all the world, eclipses of the sun, droughts, famine, and above all there was the plague.

## II. Causes of the Peloponnesian War, chap. 23—88.

Real cause—jealousy of the Lacedæmonians.—The real cause of the Peloponnesian war was the jealousy of the Lacedæmonians of the growing power of Athens (c: 88—117); but the ostensible pretexts were, 1st, The interference of the Athenians in the affairs of Epidamnus, a Corcyræan colony, and *their fighting against the Peloponnesians in time of peace*; 2nd, Their conduct towards Potidæa, a Corinthian colony.

§ FIRST PRETEXT FOR THE WAR—the interference of the Athenians in the affairs of Epidamnus, a Corcyræan colony, and their fighting against the Peloponnesians in time of peace, chap. 24—55.

Epidamnus, a Corcyræan colony, gives it-  
self to Corinth, 435.—Epidamnus, a city on B. C. 435. 24  
the coast of Illyria, and bordering on the Barbarian Taulantii, was founded by a colony of Corcyræans, headed by Phalcius, a citizen of Corinth, the mother city of Corcyra. Some Corinthians and Dorians also joined the colony. Epidamnus was afterwards torn by factions, and the nobles, being banished by the commons, joined the neighbouring Barbarians in plundering the city by land and sea. The Epidamnian commons in the town then applied to their mother country, Corcyra, praying for assistance and mediation; but though the messengers sat down as suppliants in the temple of Juno, the Corcyræans sent them away without redress [B. C. 436].  
The Epidamnians now consulted the oracle at Delphi, and were advised to give up their city to the Corinthians, and apply to them for aid. The Corinthians then undertook their defence, 1st, From equity—thinking they had as much right to the colony as the Corcyræans. 2nd, From hatred—because the Corcyræans did not give them the customary privileges in their general religious ceremonies, due from colonists to their mother country. 3rd, From jealousy—because the Corcyræans were equal in wealth to the richest Greeks, and prided themselves on their fleet, (having 120 triremes at the commencement of the war,) and on the ancient occupation of Corcyra by the Phæaciens. 25

Corinthians garrison Epidamnus, which is then besieged by the Corcyræans.—The Corinthians now permitted any of their people to settle at Epidamnus, and sent a garrison of Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Corinthians, who marched by land to Apollonia, for fear of being intercepted on the sea by the Corcyræans, [and from thence on sea to Epidamnus, for fear of the Taulantii.] The exiled Epidamnian nobles had by this time reached Corcyra, and pointing out the sepulchres of their 26



ancestors and kindred, had prayed the Coreyræans to restore them to Epidamnus. The Coreyræans accordingly sent first 25 ships, and then another fleet,\* to Epidamnus to demand the recall of the exiles and dismissal of the Corinthian garrison; but these demands were disregarded. The Coreyræans then went with 40 ships and the exiled Epidamnians and Illyrians, and sitting down before the city, they proclaimed, but without effect, that all Epidamnians and strangers who chose might depart safely, and they then commenced the siege.

27 **Corinthians prepare for war with Coreyra.**—When the Corinthians heard of the siege, they proclaimed a new colony to Epidamnus, with equal privileges to all who chose to go, or who chose to subscribe 50 Corinthian drachmas, [i. e. the heavy or Æginetan drachmas, equal to about 83 Attic drachmas, or about £3..2..3.] Their force, with the assistance they obtained from their allies, was as follows:

Megareans	8 ships
Palians in Cephalaria	4 —
Epidaurians	5 —
Hermionians	1 —
Træzenians	2 —
Leucadians	10 —
Ambraciots	8 —
Eleans	7† — empty, and money.
Corinthians	30 — and 3000 heavy-armed.‡
Thebans and Phli- asians	money only.

75 ships.

Commanders on sea: Aristæus, Callierates, and Timanor.  
Commanders on land: Archetimus and Isarchidas, c. 29.

\* This second reinforcement must have consisted of 15 ships, which, with the first fleet of 25 ships, would make the 40 ships mentioned a line or two on.

† The number of Elean ships is not expressly mentioned, but the total, 75, is noticed in c. 29, which the 7 ships would just complete.

‡ Only 2000 Corinthian troops sailed, see c. 29.

**Coreyræans vainly try to settle the dispute by nego-** 28  
**tiation.**—When the Coreyræans heard of these preparations, they went to Corinth with Lacedæmonian and Sicyonian ambassadors, and charged the Corinthians to recall their new settlers and garrison from Epidamnus; offering, however, to submit the case for arbitration to such Peloponnesian states as both parties could agree on, or to the oracle of Delphi [which, however, had virtually decided in favour of Corinth, see c. 25]. They also declared themselves disinclined for war, also they would be forced to make very different friends from those they had at present, for the sake of their assistance. The Corinthians replied, "That if the Coreyræans would withdraw their fleet from Epidamnus, they would consult on the matter, as it was not right that the Epidamnians should be besieged whilst appealing to justice." The Coreyræans answered, that if the Corinthians would remove their force from Epidamnus, they would do the same; or they were content to let both parties remain under a treaty until the cause should be decided. The Corinthians, however, rejected all proposals, and having sent forward a herald to declare war against the Coreyræans, they weighed anchor with 75 ships, and 2000 heavy-armed men; the fleet under the command of Aristæus, Callierates, and Timanor, and the land forces under Archetimus and Isarchidas (c. 27). 29

**Coreyræans defeat the Corinthians, and take Epi-**  
**damnus the same day, 435.**—When the Corinthian fleet had reached Actium in Anactorium, the Coreyræans despatched a herald to forbid them to proceed; but at the same time they undergirded their old ships to render them sea-worthy, and equipped the rest. The herald returned without a peaceable answer, when the Coreyræans manned their 80 ships,\* formed a line, and defeated the Corinthian fleet, destroying 15 of their ships. The same day the 40 ships before Epidamnus forced it to surrender, on condition that the strangers [Ambraciots and Leucadians] should be sold, and the Corinthians be kept in prison until something were decided on.

\* The Coreyræans had 120 triremes in all, (c. 25,) but 40 were besieging Epidamnus (c. 26).



30 Erect a trophy and attack the Corinthian allies.—The Corcyraeans now erected a trophy on Leucimna, a promontory of Corcyra, and slew all their prisoners except the Corinthians, whom they kept in bonds. They then sailed to Leucas, a Corinthian colony, and wasted it; burnt Cyllene, the arsenal of the Eleans, for supplying Corinth with ships and money (c. 27); and being now masters of the sea, they continued to ravage the allies of Corinth until the next summer.

Corinthians encamp at Actium, and Corcyraeans at Leucimna, 434.—The Corinthians now stationed ships and an army at Actium and Chimerium in Thesprotis, to protect Leucas and other friendly states, whilst the Corcyraeans occupied an opposite station at Leucimna; and both parties remained all the summer without engaging, and retired homewards at the approach of winter.

31 Corinthians prepare a large fleet, 433, 432: Corcyraeans appeal to Athens, 433.—During the two years succeeding their defeat, the Corinthians prepared a larger armament, enticing rovers from the Peloponnesus and rest of Greece by high wages.\* This alarmed the Corcyraeans, who had no allies, and were neither in the league of the Athenians or Lacedaemonians; they therefore sent to obtain an alliance with the Athenians, but the Corinthians also sent an embassy to Athens to prevent the alliance, and the two parties then pleaded their cause before the Athenian assembly.

SPEECH OF THE CORCYRAEANS BEFORE THE  
ATHENIAN ASSEMBLY.

32 Reasons and excuses for asking assistance.—“It is but just, Athenians, as we have neither obliged you nor allied with you, that we should convince you, 1st, that what we ask is expedient, or at least not injurious to you; and 2nd, that we shall be always grateful for it. Now our former policy of never voluntarily allying with any party, must make our request appear inconsistent; and our seeming prudence in not allying with our neighbours lest we should join in their peril, turns out to be folly and weakness; but as this was an error of judgment, and not intentional, and as our present peril from the Corinthians is so

\* For the causes of Corinthian wealth, see chap. 13.

great, we must now appeal for succour both to you and every one else.

Compliance will be honourable and advantageous to the Athenians, and secure the gratitude of the Corcyraeans.—“Your compliance with our request will be, 1st, *honourable to you*, because you will be assisting men who are injured and not injuring. 2nd, *It will insure our lasting gratitude*, because as our lives and liberties are at stake, our preservation from such imminent peril will be the most enduring record of the obligation. 3rd, *It will be advantageous to you*, because we have the largest navy in Greece next to you, and thus the very power which you would have purchased with money and obligations is voluntarily offered you. And do not think that no war can arise in which we might be useful; the Lacedaemonians are jealous of your power and longing for war; the Corinthians are friendly to them and hostile to you, and are now subduing us, that they may afterwards in conjunction with the Lacedaemonians attack you.

No injustice in the Athenians allying with the revolted colonists of Corinth.—“Though Corinth is the mother country of Corcyra, yet a colony only honours its mother country if well treated, and not if wronged. Colonists are sent out to be equals, and not slaves; and that we are wronged is proved by the Corinthians refusing to refer the Epidamnian dispute to arbitration (c. 28, 29).

The Athenians will not break the 30 years' truce by receiving the Corcyraeans.—“Your treaty with Lacedaemon will not be broken by your receiving us, who are allies of neither party; for it is expressly stated in that treaty, that whichever Greek state is in alliance with no other, may join either side it pleases. And it is hard if the Corinthians are allowed to man their fleet both from the confederates, the rest of Greece, and especially from your own subjects, whilst they would exclude us from allying with you or receiving aid from any other quarter.

Advantages which would accrue to Athens by the alliance.—“If you reject us, you will not only fail in restraining the encroachments of your enemies, but see them gaining strength from your dominions, by your not stopping the mercenaries they draw from you and by not succouring us. The advantages which will accrue to you by receiving us openly are, 1st, Our both having the same enemies; 2nd, Ours being a naval and not a land alliance; 3rd, Our superior geographical position, Corcyra being in the course to Italy and Sicily, and thus able to hinder a fleet coming from thence to the Peloponnesus, or to help a navy on its way. Lastly, There are but three considerable Greek navies; yours, ours, and the Corinthians'. If you allow ours and the Corinthian's to combine, you will have to fight both us and the Peloponnesians; but if you receive us, your navy will be the largest.”





## CORINTHIAN AMBASSADORS' REPLY.

- 37 **Coreyraëans would not ally, because they wanted no witnesses to their oppressions.**—"It was not from prudence that the Corcyraëans would not ally with other nations, but that they might have no ally or witness of their unjust deeds; and the situation of their island makes them the only judges of the injuries they themselves commit.
- 38 **Their insolence to Corinth.**—"Although the Corcyraëans are our colonists, they have ever disowned their allegiance, and insulted us. Our other colonists honour and love us, and we could not have behaved unreasonably to Corcyra alone. Even if we were in the wrong, it would only have been honourable for them to have yielded to our humour; and then it would have been disgraceful in us to have pressed upon their moderation. They are proud and insolent through wealth; whilst Epidamnus was torn by faction they did not claim it, but when we went to its assistance they seized it by force and kept it.
- 39 **Ought to have offered arbitration before they besieged Epidamnus.**—"It is true that the Corcyraëans offered to submit the dispute to arbitration, but not until after they had besieged Epidamnus, and when they thought we should reject it; and now they come to ask you to join in their violence, and to beg you to receive them whilst they have rebelled from us; and they have come not whilst they are powerful, but when they have injured us and are in peril; and if you assist them now, you will share in the consequences of their crimes, though you never received their aid or participated in their guilt.
- 40 **Athenians ought to join the Corinthians, rather than the Corcyraëans.**—"According to the treaty, (c. 35,) a state not registered may join any side it pleases, but only if it needs protection, not if it involves their new ally in war; and you, Athenians, by joining them will become not only their auxiliaries, but our enemies. Neutrality is your best policy, but if you join either party, it should be us, with whom you are connected by treaty, and not with the Corcyraëans, with whom you never had even a truce. Should you receive the latter, you will establish a precedent, permitting us to receive those who are revolting from others, when many of your allies will join us. But when the Samians revolted from you, and the Peloponnesians were divided upon the question of assisting them, we maintained that each one should punish his own allies.
- 41 **Claims of the Corinthians.**—"The Corinthians have two claims upon your gratitude: 1st, By supplying 20 ships for your expedition against the Æginetæ (c. 14). 2nd, By prevailing on the Peloponnesians not to aid the revolted Samians.
- 42 **Uncertainty of a coming war.**—"Let not the approach of war (c. 33) frighten you into committing injustice, otherwise you will incur certain hatred from the Corinthians, whilst the war itself is uncertain. Moreover, it would be prudent now for you to remove our suspicions of your conduct at Megara (i. 103).

**Power of states to punish their own allies.**—"We call upon you, Athenians, to act now for us, as we did for you at Lacedæmon, when we maintained, by our vote, that each state should punish its own allies, and so prevented the Peloponnesians from interfering in your conduct towards Samos."

**Athenians form a defensive alliance with Corcyra.**—44  
The Athenians having heard both parties, held two assemblies. On the first day they leaned to the Corinthians, but on the second they determined to form an alliance with Corcyra, not *offensive*, for fear of breaking the treaty by being obliged to sail against Corinth, but *defensive*, that either state might succour the other. The Athenians foresaw the Peloponnesian war, and their policy was to let the large navies of Corinth and Corcyra wear each other out. The island of Corcyra also appeared to lie well in the line of voyages to Italy and Sicily (c. 36).

**Send 10 ships to Corcyra, 432.**—The Athenians now sent 10 ships to Corcyra under the command of Lacedæmonius, Diotimus, and Proteas, with orders not to engage with the Corinthians unless they attacked Corcyra or its dependencies. n. c. 432. 45

**Corinthians sail against Corcyra with 150 ships, 432.**—The Corinthians, having completed their preparations, sailed from Leucas against Corcyra with 150 ships; viz.

Corinthians	90 ships
Elcans	10 —
Megaraëans	12 —
Leucadians	10 —
Ambraciots	27 —
Anactorians	1 —

Total 150 ships.

Commanders of the Corinthian division: Xenocides, assisted by four others. The quotas from the allied cities had each their separate commanders.

**Anchor at Chimærium in Thesprotis.**—The Corinthians anchored at Chimærium in Thesprotis, where there is a harbour. Beyond it is the city Ephyre in the Elcan district of Thesprotis; and by it the Acherusian lake












empties itself into the sea, which lake is called after the river Acheron, which falls into it after flowing through Thesprotis. The river Thyamis flows parallel with the Acheron between Thesprotis and Cestrine. The point of Chimerium lies between the Acheron and Thyamis.

- 47 Preparations for the battle of Sybota.—The CORCYRÆANS now manned 110 ships under the command of Miciades, Æsimides, and Eurybates, and encamped with the 10 Athenian ships on one of the Sybota isles; their land force, including 1000 heavy-armed Zacynthians, being stationed on Cape Leucimna.

- The CORINTHIANS were assisted by many Barbarians on the continent, where the people had been always friendly; and having taken three days' provisions on board, they put out from Chimerium by night, and the Corcyræan ships approached next morning, and each party drew up in opposite lines.

#### LINE OF BATTLE OF THE TWO FLEETS.

CORCYRÆAN FLEET.		CORINTHIAN FLEET.	
Right wing.	{ Athenians.  Corcyræans. 	 Corinthians with their best ships.	Left wing.
Centre.	{ Corcyræans in three squadrons. each under	 Anactorians.  Elcans.  Leucadians.	Centre.
Left wing.	{ 1 of the 3 commanders. 	 Megarcans.  Ambraciots.	Right wing.

- 49 Battle of Sybota.—The signals being hoisted, the two fleets closed and engaged without breaking through each other's lines, and with more strength than science: for each side had many heavy-armed men on deck with bowmen and dartmen, who fought fiercely whilst their ships were stationary. During this disorderly battle, the

Athenians only came up to the Corcyræans when the latter were hard pressed, and thus awed the enemy without fighting. The Corinthian right wing was routed by 20 Corcyræan ships, and the Corcyræans pursued them to the continent, and landed, and burnt and plundered their tents. Meantime the Corcyræan fleet, being weakened by the loss of these 20 ships, was routed by the Corinthian left, upon which the Athenians began to assist the Corcyræans, and at length fairly charged the Corinthian vessels.

Corinthians kill the shipwrecked sailors, and take 50 their wrecks to Sybota.—The victorious left wing of the Corinthians, instead of towing off the ships they had damaged, began to butcher the shipwrecked men, and not being aware of the defeat of their own right wing, they killed many of their own side; and there was also much confusion of ships, *for more vessels were employed in this battle than in any previous engagement of Greeks against Greeks.* The Corinthians, having pursued the Corcyræans to the shore, took the wrecks and their own dead to Sybota, a desert port of Thesprotis, where their Barbarian allies were assembled.

Readvance against the Corcyræans, but retire before a reinforcement of 20 Athenian ships.—The Corinthians then again mustered and sailed against the Corcyræans, who fearing a descent on their island, sallied out to meet them with their remaining vessels and the 10 Athenian ships. It was now evening, and the Pæan had just been sung, when the Corinthians suddenly rowed astern on seeing 20 fresh Athenian ships sailing to the relief of Corcyra. The Corcyræans for some time did not ob- 51 serve this reinforcement, but on seeing it they retired to Leucimna, and the 20 vessels at length joined them, under the command of Glaucos and Andocides.

Refuse battle, but reproach the Athenians with 52 breaking the treaty.—Next day the 30 Athenian ships, with such of the Corcyræans as were sea-worthy, sailed to Sybota to see if the Corinthians would renew the fight. The latter declined, as their enemies were reinforced, and they could not refit their ships in so deserted a place.



But fearing that the Athenians, having come to blows, might consider the treaty broken, and not allow them to sail away, they sent some messengers in a skiff, saying, "You do wrong, Athenians, in beginning war and breaking treaty! If you wish to stop us from sailing to Corcyra, seize us here, and treat us as enemies!" The Corcyraean army then cried out, "Seize and slay them!" But the Athenians said to the messengers, "We are neither beginning war, Peloponnesians, nor breaking the treaty, but have come to assist our Corcyraean allies; and we shall not stop you, unless you sail against Corcyra or her dependencies."

54 **Corinthians and Corcyraeans erect trophies.**—The CORINTHIANS now prepared to voyage home, and erected a trophy at Sybota, on the continent, because, 1st, They had been victorious until night; 2nd, Had taken away their wrecks and dead bodies; 3rd, Had taken 1000 prisoners; and 4th, Had sunk 70 ships.

The CORCYRAEANS also erected a trophy at Sybota on the island, because, 1st, They had destroyed 30 ships; 2nd, Had recovered their wrecks and dead bodies after the arrival of the 20 Athenian ships; 3rd, The Corinthians had retreated on seeing the 20 ships; and 4th, The Corinthians would not afterwards oppose them.

55 **Corinthians take Anactorium and sell 800 prisoners.**—On their voyage home the Corinthians took by treachery Anactorium, a colony common to them and the Corcyraeans, and made it a Corinthian colony only. On returning home they sold 500 of their Corcyraean prisoners for slaves, but treated the 250 remaining with kindness, as they were the first men of Corcyra, and on returning there, might win the island over to them. *Continued at III. 69, 70.*

This was the first pretext for the Peloponnesian war, viz. that the Athenians had, in conjunction with the Corcyraeans, fought against the Corinthians in time of peace, AND THUS BROKEN THE THIRTY YEARS' TRUCE.

**SECOND PRETEXT FOR THE WAR**—the Athenians attack Potidæa, an ally, but a Corinthian colony, and the Peloponnesians persuade the Potidæans, who are allies of Athens, to revolt, chap. 56—88.

Athenians order the Potidæans to destroy their walls, and give hostages.—POTIDÆA was a Corinthian colony on the isthmus of Pallene, but a tributary ally of the Athenians; and whilst the Corinthians were meditating revenge upon the Athenians for their Corcyraean interference, Perdiccas, king of Macedon, tried to persuade Potidæa and the other Thrace-ward allies of the Athenians to revolt.

PERDICCAS had been previously a friend to the Athenians, but was now their enemy, because they had allied with his brother Philip and Derdas, who were acting jointly against him. He therefore sent to Lacedæmon to try and involve the Athenians in a Peloponnesian war, and he tried to win over the Corinthians, and to persuade the Thrace-ward Chalcidians and Bottiæans to join Potidæa in a revolt.

The ATHENIANS, being aware of these hostile intentions, ordered the Potidæans, 1st, To demolish their wall facing Pallene; 2nd, To dismiss and refuse to receive for the future the yearly magistrates which the Corinthians used to send them; and 3rd, To give hostages. They then sent 30 ships, and 1000 heavy-armed troops, under Archestratus with ten other generals, to act against Perdiccas, and to carry out the above requisitions, and keep a watchful eye on the neighbouring cities.

Potidæans send to Athens and Lacedæmon.—When the Potidæans received the above requisitions, they sent ambassadors to dissuade the Athenians from their purpose, but without success, and saw too that the ships sent to act against Perdiccas were also sailing against them. At the same time having, in conjunction with the Corinthians, sent an embassy to Lacedæmon, the Lacedæmonians promised to invade Attica if the Athenians attacked Potidæa.

Potidæans, Chalcidians, and Bottiæans revolt.—The Potidæans now leagued with the Chalcidians and



Bottiaans, and they all revolted; and Perdiceas persuaded the Chalcidians to throw down their cities on the coast, and remove inland to Olynthus, which they fortified and occupied, together with part of his territory around Lake Bolbe, which he abandoned to them until  
59 the conclusion of the war. When Archestratus and his fleet arrived at Potidæa they saw the revolt, and being unable to attack both Perdiceas and the revolted cities, they carried on the war with Macedonia only in conjunction with Philip and Derdas, who had invaded the country from the interior.

60 **Corinthians assist Potidæa.**—The Corinthians being now anxious for Potidæa, sent to relieve it 1600 heavy-armed and 400 light-armed troops, who were partly Corinthian volunteers and partly mercenaries from the rest of Peloponnesus, and under the command of Aristeus. This force reached Thraee on the 40th day of the revolt.

61 **Athenians send a second army against the revolted cities.**—When the news of the revolt and despatch of Aristens reached the Athenians, they sent out 2000 heavy-armed troops in 40 ships under Callias and four other generals against the revolted cities. On reaching Macedonia, they found that the 1000 troops under Archestratus had taken Therma and were besieging Pydna, and they accordingly joined them in the siege; but having prosecuted it for a short time in vain, they were obliged to make the best terms they could with Perdiceas, and proceed against Aristeus and Potidæa.

**Athenian united forces march from Pydna to Potidæa.**—The Athenian forces now amounted to 3000 heavy-armed troops of their own, beside many allies, and 600 Macedonian horse under Philip and Pausanias. These left Pydna by short marches to Gigonus, where they encamped, having made an unsuccessful attempt on Berœa on their way.\* A fleet of 70 ships accompanied them along the coast.

\* The natural route from Pydna to Potidæa lay along the coast, and Berœa was quite out of the way, at some distance to the westward, near the foot of the Bermian mountains. But the hope of surprising Berœa induced the Athenians to deviate from their direct line of march; then, after the failure of this treacherous attempt,

**Siege of Potidæa; Aristeus driven into Potidæa.**—62  
Meantime the Potidæans and Peloponnesians had encamped on the isthmus towards Olynthus, the infantry under Aristeus and the cavalry under Perdiceas, who had already broken terms with the Athenians, and left Iohus as commander in his place. Aristeus planned to keep his own force on the isthmus to watch the approach of the Athenians; whilst the Chalcidians and other allies beyond the isthmus, and the 200 cavalry with Perdiceas, remained at Olynthus, to enclose the Athenians if they advanced. Callias, general of the Athenians, defeated this design by despatching the Macedonian cavalry and a few of the allies to Olynthus to prevent a sally from thence, and then marched to Potidæa. An engagement followed in which the wing under Aristeus, which included picked Corinthian troops, routed and pursued the Athenian wing opposed to them; but the other wing of Potidæans and Peloponnesians was beaten by the Athenians, and fled within the wall. Aristeus, returning 63  
from the pursuit, found the rest of his army conquered, and doubted whether to retreat to Olynthus or Potidæa; at last resolving on the latter, he and his troops ran along the breakwater [under the sea wall] of Potidæa, and forced his way into the town, [at one of the gates on the inner front towards Pallene,] after sustaining some loss from the missiles thrown by the Athenian ships.

**No cavalry engaged.**—At the commencement of the battle the Potidæan auxiliaries at Olynthus, which was 60 stadia [about 7½ miles] from Potidæa, advanced to assist Aristeus, but were met by the Macedonian horse; but finding the Athenians victorious, both sides resumed their stations without fighting. The Athenians then erected a trophy, and restored their dead under a truce to the Potidæans, who lost 300 men. The Athenians lost 150 men and the general, Callias.

**Blockade of Potidæa.**—The Athenians now raised 64  
works against the side of the Potidæan wall which faced the isthmus, but not against the side which faced

[having just concluded a peace with Perdiceas,] they returned again to the sea-coast, and continued to follow it till they arrived at Gigonus.—Arnold.





Pallene, fearing to divide their forces. The Athenians at Athens hearing this, sent a reinforcement of 1600 heavy-armed troops under Phormio, who landed at Aphytis, and proceeded by short marches to Potidæa, ravaging the country on his way; and he then threw up works on the side facing Pallene. Thus Potidæa was blockaded on both sides, whilst the fleet besieged it from the sea.

65 **Aristeus escapes from Potidæa: war continued.**—Aristeus now advised that all except himself and 500 troops should sail from Potidæa that its provisions might hold out the longer, but this being rejected, he escaped from Potidæa to the Chalcidians, with whom he laid an ambush near Sernyle, and slew many Sernyilians. Phormio having completed the blockade of Potidæa, proceeded with his 1600 troops to ravage Chalcidice and Bottice.\* *Continued at II. 58.*

66 This was the second pretext for the Peloponnesian war, viz. 1st, The Corinthians, against the Athenians;—*because the Athenians had besieged Potidæa, which was a Corinthian colony, and contained Corinthians and Peloponnesians.* 2nd, The Athenians, against the Peloponnesians;—*because the Peloponnesians had caused the revolt of Potidæa, which was in alliance and tributary to the Athenians.*

67 **Corinthians appeal to the Lacedæmonians, who evoke an assembly.**—The Corinthians had hitherto acted on their own responsibility, but being now alarmed for Potidæa, they exhorted their allies to go to Lacedæmon, and went also themselves, complaining that the Athenians had broken the treaty and injured the Peloponnesians. The Æginetans also secretly fomented the war, saying that they were not independent according to the

\* Bottice, or Bottica, denotes the new country of the Botticæans, to the east of Potidæa and the Thermaic gulf, where they had settled after they had been driven out of their old country by the Macedonians (B. ii. c. 99). But Botticæa denotes their old country, situated much more to the westward, between the rivers Axius and Lydias, of which Herodotus speaks (B. vii. c. 123, 127). In the Thracian invasion Sitalces overran Bottica, but never penetrated as far as Botticæa (B. ii. c. 99—101).—See *Arnold*.

treaty. The Lacedæmonians then summoned their allies, who specified their complaints against the Athenians, especially the Megareans, who particularly urged that they were excluded from the Athenian ports and Attic market contrary to the treaty. The Corinthians spoke last as follows:

#### SPEECH OF THE CORINTHIANS.

Neglect of the Lacedæmonians and injustice of the Athenians.— 68  
 “Your own freedom from guile, Lacedæmonians, has made you distrustful of our accusations of others, and when we forewarned you of the injuries we were about to receive from the Athenians, you suspected us of speaking for our own interests. It is only now whilst we are actually suffering that you have summoned the allies, and we now complain of *being insulted by the Athenians, and neglected by you.* The Athenians are not an obscure people; they have already enslaved some of us, and are plotting against others, especially our allies; and they have been long prepared for war, or they would not have stolen Coreyra, which would have supplied the largest navy to the Peloponnesians, or besieged Potidæa, which lies most convenient for your Thrace-ward dominions.

Supineness of the Lacedæmonians at Athenian encroachments.— 69  
 “You permitted the Athenians to fortify Athens, and build the walls after the Median war, (c. 90, 91,) and you connived at their enslaving not only many other states, but also some of your own allies; and we have now assembled with difficulty and without any defined purpose, whilst our aggressors have come with ready-formed plans. We know how gradually the Athenians encroach. As long as they think you cannot perceive their designs, they are moderate; but when they are aware that you see, and do not oppose them, they presume on your supineness, and increase their aggressions. The Medes advanced from the ends of the earth to the Peloponnesus before your forces met them, and now you are overlooking the Athenians who are close at hand, and instead of invading them, you choose to wait until they invade you with augmented power; though you know that the Barbarian was himself the rock on which he split, and that we have ere this escaped from the Athenians more from their errors than by your assistance; and, indeed, many have been ruined through trusting you. But we now *expostulate* with you as friends, who are in error; we do not accuse you as enemies, who have been 70 unjust; and we have a right to expostulate whilst you seem unaware of the great differences that have arisen, and the character of the Athenians whom you have to oppose.

Contrast between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians.—“The Athenians are innovating and prompt to plan and to act; you



are content with what you have, and never plan, and never act all that is necessary. They are daring, adventurous, and sanguine; you undertake things beneath your power, distrust your own judgment, and are despairing. They are unhesitating; you are dilatory. They are fond of travelling; you, of staying at home. When they conquer, they push their advantages to the utmost, and when conquered are the least dispirited. They spend their lives for their country, and scheme for its good. When they cannot carry out their plans, they reckon they have lost a share of their own property; if they carry them out, they consider the acquisition small in comparison with further designs; if they are baffled, they form fresh plans. They are always toiling and always getting, and their character may be summed up by saying that they are made *neither to be quiet themselves, nor to suffer the rest of the world to be so.*

71 **Necessity for the Lacedæmonians invading Attica.**—"You deal justly, Lacedæmonians, on the principle of neither harming others, nor being harmed yourselves in defending yourselves. But this is an old-fashioned policy, and cannot be pursued towards such a state as Athens. At this point, then, cease your dilatoriness, assist us and the Potidæans by invading Attica, and oblige us not to seek for other allies; and we shall not break our oath by doing so, for treaties are not broken by those who from destitution apply to others, but by those who do not assist their confederates. If you will perform your part, we will stand by you; therefore deliberate well, and sustain that supremacy in the Peloponnesus which your fathers bequeathed to you."

72 **Athenian ambassadors decide upon replying.**—As an Athenian embassy had previously arrived at Lacedæmon, the ambassadors heard the speech of the Corinthians, and determined not to defend their country from the charges brought, but to prove that the Lacedæmonians ought not to deliberate in a hurry, and to show the power of Athens. So having obtained permission from the Lacedæmonian government to address the assembled people, they came forward.

#### REPLY OF THE ATHENIAN AMBASSADORS.

73 **Will not answer the charges.**—"Our embassy was sent not to dispute with your allies, but on particular business, and we have now come forward not to answer these charges, with you for our judges, but to prevent your forming rash and prejudicial resolutions, and to show you that our state is worthy of consideration.

**Services rendered by the Athenians.**—"It is needless and irksome for us to mention our deeds and services, but at Marathon we alone stood in the van of danger against the Barbarians, and at Salamis we embarked all our people, and effectually prevented the ravaging of the Peloponnesus. (Herod. vii. 139.) It was the Greek navy which saved Greece, and we contributed the three most important things to it, viz. 1st, The greatest number of ships—two parts of the whole; 2nd, The most able man as general—Themistocles; and 3rd, The most intrepid zeal, for with none to assist us on land, we abandoned our city and property, and faced the danger on board our ships.

Their dominion obtained by consent of the allies.—"We do not deserve then the odium of the Greeks for the empire we possess, as that empire we gained when you abandoned the allies, and they voluntarily begged us to be their leaders; and it is not safe to give it up whilst we are hated by the generality, and you are at variance with us.

The Lacedæmonians would have similarly acted in like circumstances.—"You, Lacedæmonians, have the supremacy in the Peloponnesus, and if your allies were disaffected like ours, you would rule them with a strong hand as we have done. We have not been the first who have done so, for the weaker have always been constrained by the stronger. And our moderation entitles us to praise, for the Athenians have been less tyrannical than others would have been.

Moderation of the Athenians has brought them into contempt.—"Our moderation has brought us into contempt, for even our subject cities, whom we have permitted to sue us openly and on equal footing in a court of justice, when we might have compelled them by force of arms, even these cities have charged us with being litigious, and proved that they would rather have been robbed by open violence than ruled by equal justice. And should you, Lacedæmonians, ever subdue us and possess our empire, you will surely lose the goodwill which our subject states have extended to you through their fear of us, if you exercise your power then as you did in the time of Pausanias.

Lacedæmonians must pause before commencing a doubtful war.—"Deliberate slowly before you engage in a war whose results are uncertain! Break not the treaty nor violate your oaths, but let our differences be judicially settled according to agreement."

**Lacedæmonians consult.**—The Lacedæmonians, having heard the charges of their allies and the replies of the Athenians, withdrew and consulted, when the majority thought that the Athenians had been unjust and a war ought to be immediately commenced. But Archidamnus their king came forward and spoke as follows:



## SPEECH OF ARCHIDAMUS.

- 80 Superiority of the Athenians in money, arms, ships, etc.—“ From the experience I have had in common with many of you, I consider that a war with the Athenians would not be a short one. When we are opposed to our neighbours our strength is similar, but the Athenians live at a distance, are most skilful by sea, have both public and private riches, and are well provided with ships, horses, heavy-armed troops, and a larger crowd of irregulars than any other Greek city, besides many allies who pay tribute. It cannot be right then to declare war rashly and unprepared. Our navy is inferior, and time must pass in practising and preparing to oppose them; and our public treasury is deficient, and we cannot readily contribute from our private funds.
- 81 No navy for invading Attica.—“ If from our superiority in heavy-armed troops we invaded Attica, yet they have other territories to which they could carry their supplies by sea. If we tempted their allies to revolt, we should have to assist the latter with ships, as they are chiefly islanders. If we do not defeat them by sea or obtain their revenues, we shall be the most damaged, and unable to make an honourable peace. We cannot end the war by invading Attica, but shall, I fear, bequeath it to our children; for the Athenians are not slaves to their lands, nor will they be panic-stricken by war.
- 82 Not to make war hastily.—“ I do not tell you to permit the Athenians to injure our allies or plot against us, but warn you from beginning war too eagerly. Let us first send and remonstrate; and in the mean time form as many fresh alliances as possible, and bring out our own resources; and then, if after two or three years they will not listen to our ambassadors, we can attack them with better chance of success, or perhaps they will yield before their lands are ravaged, when they see our preparations.
- 83 No cowardice in deliberating.—“ We show no want of courage by our delay, for war depends more on money than on arms. Let us provide ourselves with this, and not be excited by the 84 speeches of our allies, for the responsibility is ours. Heed not the charge of dilatoriness, for it is to our wise moderation that we are indebted for our long enjoyment of a glorious independence. We ought rather to glory in a policy which leads us to deliberate before undertaking an important affair, rather than be led by flattery or goaded by censure into acts of imprudence.
- 85 Necessity for delay, expostulation, and preparation.—“ These are the practices bequeathed us by our fathers; let us not then determine hurriedly, but send to the Athenians respecting Potidæa, and the complaints made by the allies, especially as they have offered to submit to arbitration. But at the same time prepare for war.”

## REPLY OF STHENELAIDAS, ONE OF THE EPIIORI.

Delay is injurious: vote for war!—“ I do not understand the 86 long speech of the Athenians. They have praised themselves, but do not deny having injured our allies and Peloponnesus. If they were good men against the Medes, they are now bad towards us, and deserve double punishment for having grown bad. We must not overlook the injuries done to our allies nor delay in assisting them; for whilst others may have riches, ships, and horses, we have good allies. We who are being wronged ought not to deliberate. Vote then for war, Lacedæmonians, with a spirit worthy of Sparta, and neither permit the Athenians to become greater nor betray our confederates.”

Lacedæmonians decide with Sthenelaidas.—Sthenelaidas, as ephor, now put the question to the Lacedæmonian assembly, when, as they decide by acclamation, and not by vote, he declared, that he could not distinguish which side shouted the loudest. Desiring now to instigate them the more to the war by the more open expression of their views, he pointed out a place for those to stand who thought the treaty had been broken, and another spot for those who thought otherwise; upon which a large majority decided that the treaty had been broken. The Lacedæmonians then called in the allies, informed them of their decision, and expressed their wish to summon the whole of the allies and put the question to them all.

They had thus voted that the treaty had been broken, 88 not because they were convinced by the arguments of their allies, but because they were alarmed at the growing power of Athens.\*

*The decision of the Lacedæmonian assembly that the treaty had been broken, was made in the 14th year from the commencement of the thirty years' truce which succeeded the war with Eubœa.*

Thirty years' truce was concluded in B. C. 445. Present date, B. C. 432.

\* The history of the war is continued at chap. 118.



II. *Rise and Growth of the Athenian Power,*  
chap. 89—118.\*

- 89 B. C. 479. Athenians return to Athens after the Persian war, 479.—After the battle of Mycale, and when the Greeks had conquered the Medes on land and sea, Leotychides, king of the Lacedæmonians, returned home with the Peloponnesian allies; whilst the Athenians, with the allies from Ionia and the Hellespont, who had now revolted from Xerxes, besieged and took Sestos, and then sailed to their several cities. (Herodotus, ix. 114—118.) The Athenians now re-transported their wives, children, and goods to Attica, and prepared to rebuild their city and its walls.
- 90 Lacedæmonians try to stop the rebuilding of their walls.—The Lacedæmonians, fearing the Athenian navy, artfully endeavoured to prevent the rebuilding of the walls, and sent an embassy to beg the Athenians not to build their walls, but rather to join them in throwing down those of the cities out of the Peloponnesus. They did not, however, betray their own jealous fears, but represented that the Barbarians in a fresh invasion would then be unable to advance from a stronghold as they had from Thebes, and that the Peloponnesus was a sufficient place to retreat to and sally from.
- 91 B. C. 478. Policy of Themistocles: walls rebuilt, 478.—After the Lacedæmonians had delivered their message, the Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, immediately dismissed them, saying that they would send an embassy to Lacedæmon upon the matter. They then sent Themistocles immediately to Lacedæmon, but other

\* The sketch of the affairs of Greece from the siege of Sestos to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, is a regular continuation of the history of Herodotus; and connects immediately with the 121st chapter of his last book. To follow the history in chronological order, a reader, after finishing Herodotus, should take up Thucydides at this 89th chapter, and read to the 117th inclusive; he should then go back to the 24th, and read on from thence to the 88th inclusive; after which he should proceed directly to the 118th. The digression about Pausanias and Themistocles, from chap. 128 to chap. 138, inclusive, synchronizes with chap. 95—98 of the general sketch.—*Arnold.*

ambassadors, who were to join him, were kept back until the walls were raised to a necessary height, and meantime the whole population of men, women, and children were employed upon the work. When Themistocles reached Lacedæmon, he excused himself from coming before the assembly, on the ground of waiting for his colleagues, and was believed, from the friendship the Lacedæmonians had for him. When reports came that the walls were building, he told them not to be led away by tales, but to send credible men to inspect them; and as his colleagues, Abronychus and Aristides, had by this time arrived, he sent secret directions to the Athenians to quietly detain the commissioners, whom the Lacedæmonians now sent, for fear himself and his colleagues should be detained at Lacedæmon. Themistocles then plainly told the Lacedæmonian assembly that Athens was now walled, and that if they wished to send any future embassy, they should send it as to men who knew their own as well as the general interests. That the Athenians had abandoned their city for their ships without consulting Lacedæmon, and in other things had shown themselves inferior to none in judgment; and they had now thought it expedient to wall their city, because no one without equal resources could give fair advice, and therefore all ought to join the confederacy without walls, or else the rebuilding of them was just and proper.

The Lacedæmonians, hearing this, would not show 92 their anger to the Athenians, so each embassy returned home without complaint.

Character of the walls.—The haste with which the 93 walls are built, is proved by the foundations being laid with a variety of stones, columns from tombs, and carved stones, etc., which in some places are not wrought together; for as the circuit of the city was enlarged, no time was lost in collecting materials.

Themistocles advises the Athenians to improve their navy, etc.—Themistocles also advised the Athenians to finish the walls of the Piræus, which he had commenced during the year he was archon, because it contained three natural harbours; and he had been the first to tell the Athenians that they must apply closely to naval mat-





*ters:* The walls of the Piræus were made broad enough to allow two waggons to pass each other,\* and the inside was not filled up with rubble or mortar, but composed of large square-cut stones, clamped together with iron and lead. They were not, however, made half as high as he designed, for he had intended them to be capable of protecting a few of the least efficient troops, whilst the rest were on board their ships, and he often advised the Athenians, in case they should ever be hard pressed on land, to retire into the Piræus, and defy the world with their navy.

94 **Pausanias generalissimo of Greece: deposed for tyranny, 478.**—Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, was now sent from Lacedæmon as general of the Greeks, with 20 ships from the Peloponnesus, accompanied by the Athenians with 30 ships, and numerous other allies. He subdued Cyprus and Byzantium, but acting tyrannically, he was summoned to Lacedæmon, and censured for his abuse of power, but acquitted of the heaviest charge, viz. an attachment to the Median interest, though it appeared to be most clearly established.

**Athenians take the command.**—At this very time the Asiatic Greeks and islanders, and the Greeks of the cities on the Thracian coast, being offended at the tyranny of Pausanias, begged the Athenians to become their leaders on the ground of their relationship, and to defend them from the violence of their general. The Athenians acceded to their wishes. The Lacedæmonians, having deposed Pausanias, sent Dorcis with some colleagues and a few troops to take his place, but the allies would not acknowledge them. The Lacedæmonians then sent no more, fearing lest those sent should also Medize; and moreover they were themselves tired of the Median war, and also thought that the Athenians were both well affected towards Lacedæmon, and competent to take the lead.

96 **Make the allies tributary: Athenian empire begins, 477.**—The Athenians now arranged which state should furnish money, and which should supply ships to ravage the Barbarians' territories. They then

\* This is Dr. Arnold's interpretation. The writer of the article "Murus," in the Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities, reads, "The stones which were so large that each was a cart-load," etc.

first established the office of Treasurers-of-Greece, and had their treasury at Delos, and held their meetings in the temple.\* The first tribute they levied amounted to 460 talents [about £110,400]. The allies were at first independent, and sat in the council, but between the Median and Peloponnesian wars, the Athenians greatly increased their supremacy. 97

**Thucydides' reasons for this digression.**—Thucydides makes this digression, because the subject has been omitted by all previous historians, who have either written the history of Greece prior to, or contemporary with, the Median war. Hellenicus, who alone touched upon it, is both brief and inaccurate in his dates; moreover, this digression will show how the Athenian empire was erected.

**Athenians under Cimon subdue the Medes and their own revolted allies, 476—466.**— 98 **The Athenians under Cimon, son of Miltiades, engaged in the following enterprises:**

1st, They took and enslaved Eion on the Strymon, which was held by the Medes.

2nd, They enslaved and colonized the isle of Seyros in the Ægean, which was peopled by Dolopes.

3rd, They took Carystus in Eubœa, which long resisted, though not supported by the rest of the Eubœans.

[B. C. 466.] 4th, They besieged and took Naxos, which had revolted, and was the first allied city that was enslaved contrary to agreement; and the rest soon shared its fate. Many refused to pay up their arrears of money and ships, or failed in their military service, and were quickly subjected; while others increased the power of the Athenian fleet by compounding for their personal services by payment in money. 99

5th, The Athenians and their allies, under Cimon, defeated the Medes by land and sea, at the mouth of the Eurymedon in Pamphylia, and destroyed 200 triremes of the Phœnicians. 100

**Thasians revolt: Athenians try to colonize Amphipolis, 465.**—The Thasians, having disputed with Athens for the ports on the opposite coast of Thrace and the gold mines, revolted, when Cimon defeated them by sea, and besieged them on land. About



this time the Athenians sent 10,000 settlers to the Strymon to colonize the Nine Ways, now called Amphipolis, which was then occupied by the Edonian Thracians. Having dislodged the Edones, the settlers advanced into the interior against the Edonian town of Drabescus, where they were attacked by the united forces of the Thracians and cut off to a man.

101 **Lacedæmonians prevented by the earthquake from aiding the Thasians, 464.**—The Thasians, being defeated and besieged by the Athenians, sent to the Lacedæmonians, who promised to assist them by invading Attica, but were prevented by the great earthquake. At this time also the Helots, Thurians, and Æthiæans amongst the Peræci,\* revolted from Lacedæmon and seized Ithome, upon which the Lacedæmonians commenced a war against Ithome. The Helots were chiefly descendants of the old Messenians, and for this reason they all were called Messenians. [This war lasted 10 years, viz. B. C. 464—455, and was called the third Messenian war.]

**Thasus taken by the Athenians, 463.**—The Thasians surrendered to the Athenians in the third year of the siege, throwing down their walls, surrendering their ships, ceding their continental territory and mines, paying a sum of money down, and agreeing to pay tribute in future.

102 **Lacedæmonians apply to Athens for aid against Ithome, 461.**—The Lacedæmonians finding their war against Ithome prolonged, send to their allies for aid, and amongst others to the Athenians, whom they considered to be skilful in conducting sieges. The first open enmity between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians broke out during this expedition. The Lacedæmonians grew jealous of the Athenians, and being afraid they would tamper with the rebels in Ithome, dis-

\* The Peræci were the old Achaian inhabitants of Laconia, who, after the Dorian conquest, submitted to the invaders on certain conditions, by which they retained their private rights or citizenship, and also the right of voting in the public assembly. These rights were however forfeited after an unsuccessful attempt to shake off the Dorian yoke. For a fuller account, see Dr. Arnold's note and Appendix 2.

missed them. The Athenians, thinking themselves aggrieved, broke off their league with Sparta, and allied with her old enemies, the Argives, and also with the Thessalians.

**Ithome taken, 455: Athenians receive the Messenians and Megareans.**—Ithome surrendered to the Lacedæmonians in the tenth year of the war, on condition that the besieged should leave the Peloponnesus and never enter it again, on pain of slavery. The Athenians then, from their hatred to the Lacedæmonians, received these Messenians, and settled them at Nunnactus, which Athens had lately taken from the Locri Ozolæ. The Megareans also, who had revolted from the Lacedæmonians, because the Corinthians pressed upon their frontier, were received by the Athenians, who built the long walls from Megara to Nisæa, and garrisoned Megara and the port of Pegæ. This excited the hatred of the Corinthians against the Athenians (c. 114).

**Assist the Egyptian revolt, 460—455.**—Inarus, king of some Libyan tribes bordering on Egypt, commenced hostilities against the Persians at Maræ, a city above Pharos [at the western extremity of the Delta]; and having seduced nearly all Egypt into revolting from Artaxerxes Longimanus, and been made leader, he invited the Athenians to his aid. At that time the Athenians were engaged against Cyprus with 200 ships, but they left the island and sailed up the Nile, where they mastered the river and two-thirds of Memphis, and attacked the remaining division, called the White Castle, where the Persians and Medes had fled with those Egyptians who had not joined the revolt. *Continued at chap. 109.*

**Hostilities between Athens and the Peloponnesians, 457.**—At this time the Athenians made a descent upon Halie,\* but were defeated by the united forces of the Corinthians and Epidaurians. They

\* A people who occupied the coast of Argolis, between Hermione and Træzen; they were probably the Peræci of the Dorian Argives, and maintained themselves by fishing, and perhaps by piracy. They lived in scattered villages, and are therefore spoken of only as a tribe, and not a city. See Arnold's note.



however, in their turn, defeated the Peloponnesians by sea, off Cecryphalæa.

**Siege of Ægina: defeat of the Corinthians.**—Under Leocrates the Athenians defeated the Æginetans and their allies by sea, took 70 ships, and, landing on the island, besieged Ægina. The Peloponnesians then sent 300 heavy-armed troops to the assistance of the Æginetæ, whilst the Corinthians thought to effect a diversion by seizing the heights of Geranea, and invading Megara, expecting that the Athenians, having a large force absent at Egypt and Ægina, would be unable to succour the Megareans without raising the siege of Ægina. But Myronides collected all the Athenians, old and young, who had been left in Athens, and, marching out, had an indecisive engagement with the Corinthians, but remained on the field and erected a trophy, whilst the Corinthians returned home. The latter being reproached at Corinth, marched out to set up a counter-trophy, but the Athenians, sallying from Megara, cut to pieces the party who were erecting it, and then defeated the main  
106 body. A division of the Corinthians missed their road in their flight, and rushed into a deep trench which enclosed a field, and could find no egress. The Athenians guarded the entry with their heavy-armed, and surrounded the trench with their light-armed troops, who then stoned the Corinthians to death.

107 **Long walls of Athens built.**—At this time the Athenians built their long walls to the sea, both the wall to Phalerum and that to Piræus.

**Spartans assist the Dorians.**—The Phocians having invaded Doris, the mother country of the Lacedæmonians, and taken one of her three towns,\* the Lacedæmonians sent 1500 heavy-armed of their own troops, and 10,000 of the allies, under Nicomedes, (Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, being a minor,) and compelled the Phocians to restore it. An obstacle prevented the Lacedæmonians from returning. The Athenians had sent a fleet to prevent their crossing the Crisæan Gulf, and vigilantly guarded the passes of Geranea on the Isthmus. Ni-

\* The three towns of Doris were Bœum, Cytinium, and Erineum.

comedes, therefore, encamped at Tanagra, in Bœotia, being also secretly urged by certain Athenians, who desired to stop the democracy and building of the long walls.

**Athenians defeated at Tanagra.**—The Athenians suspected these intrigues, and mustered their whole strength, which, with 1000 Argives and some other allies, amounted in all to 14,000 troops; and they were afterwards joined by 1000 Thessalian horse (c. 102). With this  
108 army they marched to Tanagra, where, after a bloody engagement, the Athenians were defeated, the Thessalian cavalry having gone over to the Peloponnesians in the midst of the action. The Lacedæmonians then entered Megara, cut down the fruit trees, and returned home across Geranea and the Isthmus.

**Subdue Bœotia and take Ægina, etc., 456.**

—Sixty-two days after the battle, the Athenians, under Myronides, defeated the Bœotians at Cnophyta, which made them masters of Bœotia and Phocis. They then razed the walls of Tanagra, took 100 of the richest men as hostages from the Opuntian Locrians, and finished their own long walls. Ægina now surrendered to the Athenians, agreeing to raze her walls, surrender her ships, and pay tribute.

**Attack the Peloponnesus, 455.**—The Athenians now sailed round the Peloponnesus, under  
109 Tolmides, and burnt the Lacedæmonian arsenal, took Chalcis from the Corinthians, and defeated the Sicyonians.

**Destruction of their force in Egypt.**—The Athenians and their allies were still in Egypt, and at first were successful; and Artaxerxes sent Megabazus to try and bribe the Lacedæmonians to invade Attica, but did not succeed. Artaxerxes then sent Megabyzus, son of Zopyrus, with a large force, who defeated the Egyptians and their allies, and drove the Greeks from Memphis, and besieged them in Prosopis, an island in the Nile, for 1 year and 6 months. They then drained off the stream between the island and the main-land, so that the Greek galleys were left aground, and the besiegers took the island on foot. The Greek cause was thus, 110



after a war of 6 years, [B. C. 460—455,] ruined in Egypt; a few escaped through Libya to Cyrene; but 50 triremes, having been sent by the Athenians and their allies to relieve their former force, entered the Mendesian branch of the Nile, ignorant of the recent disaster, and were all destroyed, with little exception, by a combined attack of the Persian land force and a Phœnician fleet. Inarus himself was taken by treachery, and crucified; and Egypt was again reduced to the Persian yoke, except a part of the Delta, where Amyrtæus was declared king; he being protected by the extent of the marshes and superior warlike spirit of the marsh-men.

111 **Invade Thessaly: defeat the Sicyonians, etc.,**  
 B. C. 454. 454.—Orestes, son of Echeeratidas, king of the Thessalians, being banished from Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to restore him, and they accordingly marched against Pharsalus with the Bœotians and Phocians, who were their allies; but the superiority of the Thessalian cavalry kept them in check, and they returned without accomplishing anything. Soon after, 1000 Athenians embarked at Pegæ under Pericles, and coasting along to Sicyon, they landed and routed the Sicyonian forces. They then took on board the Achæans, and sailed to Acarnania, where they besieged CEniadæ, but were unsuccessful.

112 **Expedition against Cyprus and Egypt, 450:**  
 B. C. 450. death of Cimon, 449.—After 3 years, a 5 years' truce [B. C. 450—445] was made between the Athenians and Peloponnesians. The Athenians then sailed against Cyprus with 200 ships under Cimon, and 60 being sent to Egypt to assist Amyrtæus, the rest besieged Citium. Cimon died B. C. 449, when provisions failing, the Athenians left Citium, and defeated the Phœnicians and Cilicians off the Cyprian Salamis, and gained another victory on land. They then returned with the 60 ships from Egypt. After this the Lacedæmonians waged the "sacred war," taking the temple at Delphi [from the Phocians] and restoring it to the Delphians;\* but the Athenians afterwards regained it for the Phocians.

\* The noble families of the Delphians who alone managed the

**Bœotians revolt and recover their independence, 447.** 113  
 —The Bœotian exiles obtained possession of Orchomenus, Chæronea, etc., when Tolmides, at the head of 1000 heavy-armed Athenians and some allies, entered Bœotia, and taking Chæronea he enslaved and garrisoned it. He then retired, but was attacked and defeated at Coronea by an army of Bœotian exiles from Orchomenus, of Locrians, and of exiles from Eubœa and other partisans. The Athenians then withdrew from Bœotia on recovering the men whom the enemy had taken prisoner.

**Eubœa and Megara revolt: Peloponnesians invade Attica, 445.**—Eubœa having revolted B. C. 445. 114  
 from Athens, Pericles crossed over with an army of Athenians, where he heard that Megara, with the assistance of the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Epidaurians, had also revolted, and slain all the Athenian garrison except such as escaped to Nisæa, and that the Peloponnesians were about to invade Attica (ii. 31). Pericles immediately returned with his army, when the Peloponnesians under Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, ravaged Attica as far as Eleusis and Thrium, and then returned home. Pericles then again crossed over to Eubœa with his army, subdued and settled the island, but expelled the Histiaians and colonized their territory.

**Thirty years' truce, May, 445.**—The Athenians now 115  
 concluded a thirty years' truce with the Lacedæmonians and their allies, restoring Nisæa, Pegæ, Troezen, and Achaia.

**Samian revolt, 440.** In the sixth year of B. C. 440.  
 the truce the Samians and Milesians went to war about Priene. The Milesians being vanquished appealed to Athens, and were seconded by a party of Samians who wished to overthrow the oligarchical government which subsisted in Samos. The Athenians then sailed to Samos with 40 ships, established a democracy, and took 100 Samian hostages—50 men and 50 boys, garrisoned the island, and deposited the hostages at Lemnos. Meanwhile some Samians who had fled to the continent on the approach of the Athenians, allied with Pissuthnes, satrap temple and oracle were of Dorian origin. See B. v. c. 18, and Arnold's notes.





of Sardis. They then raised 700 auxiliaries, crossed to Samos by night, and rising up against the commons, they secured most of them; and then having given up the Athenian garrison to Pissuthnes, they prepared to renew hostilities against Miletus, and the Byzantines joined them in the revolt.

116 **Subdued by Pericles.**—Directly the Athenians heard of the revolt, they sailed against Samos with 60 ships, of which 16 were sent away, some towards Caria, to look out for the Phœnician fleet, and others to Chios and Lesbos, for reinforcements. The remaining 44 ships, under Pericles and nine other commanders, met a Samian fleet of 70 ships including 20 transports, as it was returning from Miletus, and obtained a victory off the island of Tragia. The Athenian fleet was afterwards reinforced by 40 ships from Athens, and 25 ships from Chios and Lesbos, and disembarked their troops, who invested Samos with three walls, whilst the ships blockaded it by sea. The Samians then sent Stegagoras with 5 ships to fetch the Phœnician fleet, but Pericles went off towards Caunus and Caria, with 60 ships of the blockading squadron to meet it. During his absence the Samians sallied out, surprised the camp, destroyed the guard ships, and defeated all who opposed them, and mastered the sea along their coasts for 14 days, when Pericles returned and renewed the blockade. The Athenians were afterwards reinforced by 40 ships under Thucydides, Hagnon, and Phormio, and by 20 ships under Clepompus and Anticles, all from Athens; and also by 30 ships from Chios and Lesbos. The Samians, after venturing a short battle, surrendered in the ninth month of the siege, dismantling their walls, giving up their ships, and engaging to pay the cost of the siege by instalments. The submission of the Byzantines followed.

118 **Review of the foregoing period.**—All the things mentioned in the foregoing digression occurred in about 50 years, viz. from the retreat of Xerxes to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, viz. B. C. 480—431. During this period the Athenians had established and advanced their power unchecked, save for a short time by the Lacedæmonians, who were not quick at pro-

ceeding to hostilities, and were also impeded by intestine war.

IV. *Fresh pretexts for war found by both Peloponnesians and Athenians, chap. 118—146.*

**Lacedæmonians send to Delphi, 432.**—The Lacedæmonians now saw that the Athenian B. C. 432. power was encroaching on their confederacy, and that they must overthrow it. Having decided that the Athenians had broken the treaty, they consulted the oracle at Delphi, who promised them victory if they carried on the war vigorously, and assistance, whether called upon or not.

**Reassemble the allies.**—The Lacedæmonians then 119 again summoned their allies, when, each state having been previously canvassed by the Corinthians to vote for war, the majority accused the Athenians, and called for the declaration of hostilities. At last the Corinthians came forward and spoke :

#### SPEECH OF THE CORINTHIANS.

**Necessity for the inland states to defend the maritime.**—"We 120 can no longer blame the Lacedæmonians, now that they have resolved on war; and as leaders, it is their duty to provide for the interests of all. Inland states ought to know, that if they do not defend the coast towns, they will find great difficulty in exporting their produce or importing their necessities; and an attack on the maritime states will be followed by an invasion of the inland. It is prudent to remain quiet when uninjured; but we ought not to brook injury for the sake of peace, neither ought we to refrain from coming to an arrangement to cease hostilities, when a good opportunity offers. We are now 121 the injured, and when we have avenged ourselves, we will cease hostilities.

**Chances of success.**—"We think we shall have the advantage for the following reasons. In troops we are superior in numbers and experience, and we all equally obey orders. In our navy we are inferior, but we will equip one by private contributions and a loan raised from the treasuries of Delphi and Olympia; and by the offer of larger pay, we shall thus gain over the foreign seamen, who form the strength of the Athenian marine. If we gain one victory by sea, they are ruined; and if they hold out, we shall learn their tactics, whilst they never can acquire our courage. And we would rather contribute our money to be avenged on the Athenians, than suffer it



to be an instrument of their tyranny by submission. We can also excite their allies to revolt, and build strongholds in their territories; for war adopts such contrivances as suit the occasion.

122 **Necessity for union amongst the Peloponnesians.**—"The Athenians are a match for us all, and too strong for any single state to resist; unless then we jointly oppose them, they will subdue us all, one by one, for which we shall be charged with folly, cowardice, or carelessness.

123 **War to be commenced with spirit.**—"We must not regret the past, but labour for redress; for it is our hereditary custom to acquire honour by labour. We must commence the war with good courage, for the god has commanded it, and promised to protect us; and the rest of Greece will join us, either from fear or interest. Nor shall we be the first to break the treaty, but rather support it after it has been wronged.

124 **Necessity for assisting the Potidæans at once.**—"Since then we have good reasons for the war, let us at once assist the Potidæans, who are Dorians, and besieged by Ionians. Not terrified at the immediate danger, but setting our hearts upon the more lasting peace, which will result from the war; and considering that a tyrant state has erected itself in Greece, already ruling some, and designing to rule others, and that we must reduce it, that we may live free from future danger ourselves, and liberate the Greeks, who are now enslaved."

125 **Allies vote for war.**—The Lacedæmonians then put the question to the allies, and the majority voted for war; and it was resolved that each state should provide their several contingents without delay; but nearly a year elapsed before they invaded Attica.

126 **Athenians required to expiate the pollution of Minerva's temple.**—Meantime, the Lacedæmonians sent ambassadors with complaints to Athens, to get a good pretext for the war. They first called on the Athenians to expel those who had polluted the temple of Minerva.

Cir. B. C. 612. **Story of Cylon, cir. B. C. 612.**—Cylon was

a noble Athenian and victor at the Olympic games, who married the daughter of Theagenes, tyrant of Megara, and was told by the Delphian oracle to seize the Acropolis, during the high feast of Jupiter. Accordingly, being joined by his friends and some forces from Theagenes, he seized the Acropolis, with a view of establishing a tyranny, at the time the Olympic games were being celebrated in the Peloponnesus, without considering which feast was meant by the oracle; for the Athen-

ians keep also the Diasian festival, which is called the greatest feast of Jupiter Milichius, and is celebrated without the city, where all the people make offerings, not of victims, but country offerings.\* The Athenians from the fields now blockaded the Acropolis, but growing wearied, left the nine archons to keep guard. The besieged were soon distressed for provisions, and Cylon and his brother escaped; but the others, being pressed by famine, sat down as suppliants on the altar of the Acropolis. The archons then led them away under promise of safety, but killed them, together with some who had fled to the altars of the "Awful Goddesses" [i. e. Furies]. Those who committed this sacrilege were then expelled by the Athenians, and afterwards by Cleomenes the Lacedæmonian, in conjunction with an Athenian, who drove out the living, and disinterred and cast out the bones of those who had died, but the exiled afterwards returned, and their posterity still lived in Athens.

**Pericles descended from the sacrilegists.**—

B. C. 432.

127

The Lacedæmonians desired the expulsion of the sacrilegists, not to avenge the gods, but to obtain the banishment of Pericles, who was descended from the polluters by his mother's side, because, having taken the lead in the government, he had opposed the Lacedæmonians and prevented the Athenians from making concessions.

**Lacedæmonians required to expiate the pollution of Tanarus and Minerva.**—The Athenians retorted by requiring the Lacedæmonians to drive out the polluters of Tanarus, the Lacedæmonians having profaned the temple of Neptune there, by dragging away from it and slaying some Helot suppliants; for which the Spartans think they were themselves punished by the great earthquake (c. 101). The Athenians also required them to purge their city of the pollution of the temple of Minerva of the Brazen House, which was thus.

**Pausanias's treason.**—When Pausanias the Lacedæmonian was recalled from his command in the Hellespont, he was acquitted on his trial, but not

B. C. 478.

\* Images of living creatures, made of paste. Herod. ii. 47.



sent abroad again. He however procured an Hermonian trireme on his own private account and returned to the Hellespont, ostensibly to co-operate with the Greeks, but in reality to negotiate with the king [Xerxes], as he now aspired to the sovereignty of Greece.

**Causes for his previous recall from the Hellespont.**—

- Pausanias had previously obliged Xerxes by sending back some Persian prisoners, including some relations of the king taken at Byzantium. He gave out that the prisoners had escaped, but secretly sent them with Gongylus the Eretrian with a letter to Xerxes, offering to marry his daughter, and make Sparta and the rest of Greece subject to him. Xerxes in reply sent Artabazus to supersede Megabates in the satrapy of Dascylium, and to carry a letter to Pausanias, assuring him that his name was now registered as a benefactor of the royal house,\* and urging him to prosecute his designs and confer freely with Artabazus. Pausanias became exceedingly inflated after receiving this letter, and went from Byzantium through Thrace in a Median dress, and with a body-guard of Egyptians and Medes, and his table was served in the Persian manner. He also betrayed his purpose by trifling actions, and his insolence caused many of the confederates to leave the Athenians; and when the Lacedæmonians heard of his conduct they recalled him (c. 95).

- Ephors discover his treason and arrest him,**  
 B. C. 477—467.—When Pausanias went to the Hellespont this second time, (c. 128,) he was expelled from Byzantium by the Athenians, and then settled at Colonæ in the Troad, and intrigued with the Barbarians. The Lacedæmonians then sent a herald commanding him to return, which he complied with, wishing to avoid suspicion, and hoping to quash the charge by means of money. At first the ephors threw him in prison, but he got out and submitted to trial. The Spartans had not sufficient proof for punishing Pausanias, who was regent, being cousin and guardian of Pleistarchus, who was king and a minor; though they had suspicions of his dis-

\* The persons so registered were called "Orosangæ," or "benefactors" of the king. Herod. viii. 85. See also Esther, c. vi.

content. Besides his contempt of the laws and affectation of Barbarian customs, he had arrogantly had this inscription engraved on the tripod dedicated at Delphi as the first fruits of the spoil of the Medes; "Pausanias, general of the Greeks, when he had destroyed the army of the Medes, dedicated this memorial to Phœbus;" but the Lacedæmonians had it erased, and engraved the names of those cities who had joined in overthrowing the Medes and dedicating the offering. He had also tempted the Helots to insurrection by promises of freedom, but the ephors were still unwilling to accuse him. At length a man of Argilus, who had been a faithful messenger of Pausanias, was carrying his last letter to the king to Artabazus; when remembering that former messengers had never returned, the Argilian counterfeited the seal, opened the letter, and found written directions for his own death. He immediately informed against Pausanias, and then, at the request of the ephors, he fled to Tænarus, (c. 128,) and built a hut with two apartments, in one of which he received Pausanias, whilst the ephors were concealed in the other. The ephors then heard Pausanias ask the Argilian the reason of his being suppliant, when the man enumerated the secret services he had performed, and thus revealed the treason of Pausanias, whom he charged with ordering his death. Pausanias acknowledged the whole, promised him safety, and begged him not to impede his designs.

**Starved to death in the temple of Minerva**  
 of the Brazen House, 467.—The ephors now retired and prepared to arrest Pausanias in the streets of Sparta, but when they approached him, he was alarmed at the face of one of them, and receiving a secret nod from another, he flew to the temple of Minerva of the Brazen House, and entered a small building to avoid exposure to the air. The ephors followed, barricaded him in, and guarded the place until he was starved, when seeing him dying, they carried him into the temple, where he expired immediately. They were then going to throw him like a malefactor into the Cæadas pit, but afterwards buried him in the neighbourhood. Subsequently, by command of the Delphian oracle, the Lacedæmonians removed his tomb to the porch of the temple where he died; and



as what they had done was a pollution, the god also ordered them to give back two bodies instead of one to the goddess of the Brazen House, and they then dedicated two brazen statues to Minerva.

- 135 **Themistocles accused by the Lacedæmonians of being an accomplice, cir. 467.**—The Lacedæmonians having discovered in their examinations into the case of Pausanias that Themistocles was an accomplice in his Medizing, sent ambassadors to Athens to demand that Themistocles also should be punished. The Athenians complied, and sent messengers with the Lacedæmonians to apprehend him, for he had a residence at Argos, but often visited the rest of the Peloponnesus.
- 136 **Escapes to Ephesus, 466.**—Themistocles, n. c. 466. hearing of his danger, fled to the Corecyraens, who were under obligations to him, but they fearing to harbour him, carried him over to the main-land, where he was compelled to fly to the house of Admetus, king of the ~~Illyrians~~ <sup>Illyrians</sup>. Admetus was unfriendly and absent from home, but his wife instructed Themistocles to sit on the hearth with their child. When Admetus returned, he received Themistocles, and refused to give him up to his pursuers, but sent him by sea to Pydna in Macedonia. Here he embarked in a merchant vessel for Ionia, but was driven by a storm to Naxos, which was being blockaded by the Athenian fleet. Themistocles then discovered himself to the master of the vessel, threatening that if taken he would accuse him of carrying him off for money, but promising, if saved, to reward him; and advised him to suffer none of the crew to leave the vessel. The master consented, and landed at Ephesus, where Themistocles rewarded him, having received some money from his friends at Athens, and secretly saved some at Argos.
- Received by Artaxerxes, and dies.**—Themistocles now journeyed towards the interior, and wrote a letter to Artaxerxes, reminding him that though he had damaged the Persian cause, yet he had sent to Xerxes from Salamis information of the retreat of the Greeks, and prevented the destruction of the Hellespontine bridges, and that he purposed joining him in a year's time. Artaxerxes
- 138

approved of the proposal, and Themistocles, having learnt the Persian language and manners, went to court, where he acquired great influence from the strength of his natural genius, for without instruction, and upon the shortest deliberation, he was the best judge of present emergencies, and best conjecturer of future events; he could carry out that which he took in hand, and judge of that in which he was inexperienced. He died of disease, though some say he poisoned himself because he could not subject Greece to Artaxerxes, which he had promised. His monument is in Magnesia. The king had given him the government of Magnesia, which yielded him 50 talents [about £12,000] for bread, Lampsaecus supplied wine, and Myus the other provisions. His relations say that his bones were secretly laid in Attica, though it was unlawful to bury a traitor there.

**Athenians required to retire from Potidæa,** n. c. 432. 139 etc.—The Lacedæmonians now sent to require the Athenians to raise the siege of Potidæa, and restore Ægina to independence; and above all, they declared that there should be no war if the Athenians would repeal the decree which excluded the Megareans from the ports and markets of Attica. These proposals were rejected by the Athenians, who charged the Megareans with having cultivated the border territory which was sacred, and with harbouring their runaway slaves.

**Lacedæmonians send their final embassy.**—Finally, the Lacedæmonians sent three new envoys, Ramphias, Melesippus, and Agesander, saying, "The Lacedæmonians wish for peace, which there might be if the Athenians would leave the Greeks independent."

**Athenians hold an assembly.**—The Athenians then called an assembly, where some declared for war, and others advised that peace should be purchased by the rescinding of the decree against Megara. At last Pericles, son of Xanthippus, the first man in Athens, spoke as follows:





## SPEECH OF PERICLES.

140 Insolence of the Lacedæmonians; compliance would provoke further demands.—“I still adhere to my opinion, Athenians, not to give way to the Lacedæmonians, although I know that war may alter our temper, and results change our views. And as events are equally uncertain, I require you, if we miscarry, to aid whatever is decreed by common consent, and if we prosper, not to ascribe it to your own wisdom.

“The Lacedæmonians are violating the conditions of the truce, namely, that we should give and accept arbitration. They wish to clear themselves by war, rather than by words, and they come not to expostulate, but to command. They command us to depart from Potidæa, to restore Ægina to independence, and abdicate the decree against Megara; and they now come to command us to give liberty to all the Greeks. Now the demand concerning Megara is a trifle, in comparison with war; but this trifle is the test of your resolution. If you yield now, they will soon demand more; but a stout denial  
141 will prove to them that they must treat us as equals. For to yield to demands, whether great or small, prescribed by equals to their neighbours, previous to a judicial trial, amounts to an acknowledgment of subjection.

Advantages of the Athenians over the Peloponnesians.—“The Lacedæmonians live by their own labour, and are without private money or public funds; and being thus unable to absent themselves long from home, they are inexperienced in long wars or sea-fights. Thus, though the Peloponnesians and their allies could withstand all Greece in one battle, they could not maintain a war against those who have other preparations. Moreover, the Peloponnesian council is composed of a variety of races, each of whom has an equal vote, but a separate and  
142 particular interest. But their greatest hinderance will be their want of money.

Inability of Lacedæmon to injure them whilst they possessed a fleet.—“We need not fear the Peloponnesians by land or sea. Though they should garrison a fortress in Attica, and annoy us by excursions, they could not prevent us from sailing to their coasts, and ravaging their territories; a retaliation which would be more severely felt, because they have no other lands, whilst we have large tracts both in the islands and on the continent (c. 143). And they cannot become skilful at sea, for they are only agriculturists, and we shall perpetually stop their practising; moreover, we who have constantly exercised since the Median war, have not yet mastered the science.  
143 And if they should take the funds of Delphi and Olympia, and endeavour to seduce our foreign sailors by higher pay, it would not avail them; for our own native crews and steersmen are more numerous and skilful than those of all the rest of Greece; and no foreigner would leave his present residence

to join that side which stood the least chance of success, for the sake only of a few days' higher pay.

Athenians called upon to hold their lands cheap, but their lives dear.—“If we were islanders, we should be impregnable, and now we ought to regard our position as the same, and to lay aside the care of our fields and houses, and apply ourselves to guarding Athens and the sea. And we must not be goaded by our losses, to encounter the superior land force of the Peloponnesians; for if we should be victorious, we should have to fight as many more, and if we were defeated, our confederates would revolt. Moreover, we must not risk the lives of men for the sake of our lands and dwellings; rather I would persuade you to march out yourselves, and ravage your own territories, and show to the Peloponnesians that you will not submit for things like these.

Reply to be sent to Lacedæmon.—“Lastly, I see every reason  
144 to hope for the best issue of the war, provided you do not grasp at new acquisitions, whilst securing the old. But our own errors I shall enlarge upon during the prosecution of the war. Let us then dismiss the Lacedæmonian ambassadors with the following answers:

I. *‘That we will open our ports and market to the Megareans, if the Lacedæmonians will desist from expelling foreigners, whether ourselves or our allies, from their territories; for neither of these things are contrary to treaty.’*

II. *‘That we will restore our allies to independence, if that was their condition at the conclusion of the last treaty; and if the Lacedæmonians will give independence to their allies, and suffer them to use their freedom as they themselves shall think fit, and not as the Lacedæmonians may prescribe.’*

III. *‘That we will submit to arbitration, according to the treaty; and will not begin the war, but defend ourselves from those who do.’*

“Such answers are agreeable to justice, and becoming to our dignity. A war there must be, and the more willingly we embrace it, the more shall we damp the spirit of our enemies. The greatest dangers are ever the source of the greatest honours. It was thus our fathers withstood the Medes, and with inferior resources,—by resolution more than fortune, and by courage more than by strength,—they beat back the Barbarian, and advanced this state to its present power and grandeur. Nor will we degenerate, but bequeath this power to our posterity, unblemished and unimpaired.”



- 145 Athenians send back the Lacedæmonian ambassadors.—The Athenians then acted as Pericles advised, and sent back the ambassadors with the foregoing replies, and no embassies were sent afterwards.
- 146 Such were the disputes that led to the war between the Athenians and Peloponnesians; but they still carried on their mutual intercourse without heralds, though not without suspicions; for what had occurred had broken the treaty, and was a pretext for war.

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## BOOK II.

COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR, PLAGUE AT ATHENS, AND BATTLES IN THE CRISÆAN BAY, THRACIAN EXPEDITION INTO MACEDONIA, ETC.  
B. C. 431—429.

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### ANALYSIS.

#### I. Thebans fail in taking Plataea.

First year, B. C. 431—Summer. Hostilities begin.—Three hundred Thebans surprise Plataea.—Invite the Plataeans to join them.—Driven out by the Plataeans.—More Thebans arrive.—Plataeans kill their prisoners.—Athenians garrison Plataea.—Athenians and Peloponnesians prepare for war.—Allies on each side. Chap. 1—9.

#### II. First Invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians.

Peloponnesians assemble at the Isthmus. Chap. 10.

*Speech of Archidamus.*—Importance of the war: power of the Athenians. Chap. 11.

Archidamus sends Melesippus to Athens.—Pericles promises to give up his lands.—Advises the Athenians to leave the country and guard the city.—Funds of the Athenians.—Athenian forces.—Walls of Athens.—Athenians bring their wives, children, and property within the city.—Their ancient residence in burghs.—Early state of the town of Athens.—Reluctance of the Athenians to quit the country.—Crowded state of Athens.—Athenians fit out 100 ships.—Peloponnesians assault Cnœe.—Archidamus dilatory.—Ravages Eleusis and encamps at Acharnæ.—His design in encamping there.—Athenians reproach Pericles for not attacking the enemy.—Peloponnesians return home. Chap. 12—23.

#### III. Athenians retaliate upon Peloponnesus, and ally with Sitalces and Perdiccus.

One hundred Athenian ships sail to the Peloponnesus.—Athenians set apart 1000 talents and 100 triremes as a reserve.—Their fleet assault Methone, which is relieved by BRASIDAS.—Ravage Elis and take Pleia.—Thirty of their ships take Thronium.—Expel the Æginetans, who are then received by the Peloponnesians.—Eclipse of the sun, August 3rd, 431.—Athenians ally with Sitalces, king of Thrace, and Perdiccus, king of Macedonia.—The 100 Athenian ships take Solium, Astacus, and Cephalœnia.—Pericles invades Megara with the largest Athenian force.—Athenians fortify Atalanta. Chap. 23—32.

#### IV. Public Burial at Athens.

Winter.—Corinthians restore Evarchus to Astacus.—Athenians publicly bury their slain. Chap. 33, 34.

*Funeral Oration delivered by Pericles over the bodies of those slain in the 1st year of the war.*—Difficulty of making a suitable oration.—Valour of our ancestors and fathers.—Our democratic government and cheerful lives.—Our games and recreations.—Our openness and bravery in war.—Our economic tastes, healthy philosophy, political sagacity, and generosity.—Athens the School of Greece.—Reasons for praising Athens.—Her glory proves the worth of those who have fallen.—The survivors called upon to emulate the virtues of the deceased.—Consolation for the parents of the dead.—Address to the sons, brothers, and widows.—Conclusion. Chap. 35—46.

#### V. Second Invasion of Attica, and Plague at Athens.

Second year, B. C. 430—Summer.—Peloponnesians again invade Attica.—Plague breaks out at Athens.—Began in Ethiopia.—Peloponnesians suspected of poisoning the wells.—Thucydides attacked.—Symptoms of the disease.—Birds and beasts perished that fed on infected carcases.—Despair of those attacked.—Second attacks not fatal.—Crowded and lawless state of Athens.—An ambiguous prophecy expounded.—Peloponnesians ravage the country to Laurium.—Athenian navy again retaliated on Peloponnesus.—Peloponnesians leave Attica.—Athenians sail to Potidea: destroyed by the plague.—Outcries against Pericles. Chap. 47—59.

*Speech of Pericles.*—Interests of the nation to be preferred to those of individuals.—Not to let sober convictions be unsettled by private misfortunes.—The sovereignty of the sea superior to the loss of houses or lands.—Independence and confidence to be preserved.—No choice between empire and slavery.—To maintain by constancy the honour of their country. Chap. 60—64.

Athenians fine Pericles.—His death and character, B. C. 429. Chap. 65.

#### VI. Operations at Zacynthus, Argos, and Naupactus, and surrender of Potidea.

Lacedæmonians unsuccessfully attempt Zacynthus.—Peloponnesian



ambassadors seized by Sadocus and executed by the Athenians.—Ambraciots unsuccessfully attack Argos.

Winter.—Athenians station Phormio at Naupaetus.—Melesander slain in Lycia.—Potidæa surrenders through famine. Chap. 66—70.

#### VII. *Peloponnesians blockade Plataea.*

Third year, B. C. 429—Summer.—Peloponnesians march against Plataea. Chap. 71.

Conference between Archidamus and the Plataean ambassadors.—Plataeans beg Archidamus not to injure a city which Pausanias had declared free.—Archidamus requires the Plataeans to be neutral. Chap. 71, 72.

Plataeans send to Athens and prepare for resistance. Chap. 72—74.

Archidamus throws up a mound before Plataea.—Plataeans raise fresh walls and undermine the mound.—Peloponnesians unsuccessfully use battering-rams.—Fail in firing the town.—Siege converted to a blockade.—Garrison of Plataea. Chap. 75—78.

#### VIII. *Battles of Bottiæa, Stratus, and Crisæa.*

Athenians defeated at Bottiæa.—Lacedæmonians assist Ambraciots and Chaonians in conquering Acarnania.—United land forces march to Stratus.—Army of Cnemus.—Battle of Stratus: Cnemus retreats.—Advance of the Peloponnesian fleet.—1st battle in the Crisæan Bay: Peloponnesians defeated by Phormio.—Preparations for a fresh sea-fight.—Peloponnesians at Panormus: Athenians at Molycrium. Chap. 75—86.

Speech of Cnemus.—Reasons for the late defeat, and assurances of present victory. Chap. 87.

Athenians discouraged. Chap. 88.

Speech of Phormio.—Assurances of success. Chap. 89.

Second battle in the Crisæan Bay: Peloponnesians again defeated. Chap. 90—92.

#### IX. *Expedition of Sitalces against Perdiccas.*

Winter.—Peloponnesians attempt to surprise Piræus.—Thracian expedition against Macedonia and Chalcidice.—Army of Sitalces.—Empire of the Odrysian Thracians.—Sitalces musters his army at Doberus.—Empire of Macedonia.—Invasion of Macedonia.—Sitalces retires at the persuasion of Scuthes. Chap. 93—101.

Phormio's expedition to Acarnania.—Account of the Echinades.—Phormio returns to Athens. Chap. 102, 103.

## SUMMARY.

### I. *Thebans fail in taking Plataea, chap. 1—9.*

Hostilities begin.—The Peloponnesian war now began, and continued without intermission. Its history is written as the events happened, by summers and winters. 1  
1st Year,  
B. C. 431—  
Summer.

Three hundred Thebans surprise Plataea.—The first 2 open act of hostility occurred in the 15th year of the "Thirty years' Truce, concluded after the capture of Eubœa, and the 48th year of the priesthood of Chrysis in Argos; Ænesias being ephor at Sparta, and Pythodorus having still two months to be archon at Athens: in the 6th month after the battle of Potidæa, and in the beginning of spring.

At this time about 300 armed Thebans under Pythagelus and Diemporus, Bœotarchs, were admitted about the first watch of the night into Plataea, a city of Bœotia, but an ally of Athens, by Naucrides and his party, who were Plataeans. The Thebans had wished to take Plataea before the approaching war broke out. Eurymachus, a Theban, had therefore previously negotiated with Naucrides and his party, who hoped, with the assistance of the Thebans, to put to death their political opponents, and to break off the relation in which their city was standing to Athens, and transfer its allegiance to Thebes.

Invite the Plataeans to join them.—The 300 Thebans easily entered Plataea, as the gates were unguarded, when Naucrides and his party wished them first to massacre their political adversaries. This the Thebans refused, and desiring to secure the city by friendly means, they piled up their arms in the market-place, and proclaimed, that whoever wished to ally with them according to the hereditary principles of the Bœotians, should pile their arms beside theirs.

Driven out by the Plataeans.—The Plataeans, fancying 3 that the Theban force was stronger than it really was,



and seeing that it offered them no hostile treatment, accepted the terms. But having discovered, during their negotiations, that the number of the enemy was small, and might be easily overpowered, and having, in general, no wish to revolt from the Athenians, they communicated with each other through the party wall of their houses, that they might not be seen; and then, barricading the streets with waggons, they fell upon the

4 Thebans a little before day-break. The latter closed their ranks, and twice or thrice repulsed the assailants; but the Plataeans attacked them again with great clamour, which was increased by the shouts of the women and slaves, who showered bricks and tiles on them from their houses. A heavy rain falling amidst the darkness, increased the confusion, and the Thebans were at length seized by a panic, and took to flight. Being ignorant of their way, many were slain. The gate by which they had entered was closed and bolted with a spear, and no other was open. Some threw themselves over the wall and were killed; a few escaped by cutting through the bar of an unguarded gate with an axe given them by a woman; but the main body rushed into a large building adjoining the wall, having mistaken its gates for those of the city. The Plataeans at first thought of firing the building; but at length the men within surrendered at discretion, together with those who were still wandering through the streets.

5 More Thebans arrive: Plataeans kill their prisoners. —A reinforcement of Thebans ought to have reached Plataea during the night, as it was only 70 stadia [nearly 9 miles] from Thebes, but the heavy rain and swelling of the river Asopus delayed them until it was too late. They then designed to seize the Plataeans without the walls, as hostages for their friends; but the Plataeans, suspecting the design, sent a herald, complaining of the treacherous attack on their city, and threatening to kill the prisoners if any further aggression was offered, but promising to restore them if the Thebans retired. This, the Thebans say, the Plataeans *swore to do*; but the latter deny that they *swore*, or even promised the *immediate* discharge of the prisoners, who were reserved for terms

to be agreed on in a subsequent treaty. The Thebans, however, retired, without doing any injury, when the Plataeans transported their moveable property out of the country into the town, and killed all their prisoners—amounting to 180, and including Eurymachus, who had negotiated with the traitors (c. 2).

Athenians garrison Plataea. —When the Thebans 6 first entered Plataea a messenger had been sent to Athens with the intelligence, and the Athenians had immediately arrested all the Bœotians in Attica. After the victory the Plataeans sent another messenger, when the Athenians sent back a herald desiring that the prisoners might be kept for their disposal. But before this Athenian herald reached Plataea, the prisoners were slain, and the dead had been given up to the Thebans under a truce. The Athenians now garrisoned and provisioned Plataea, and removed the women and children, and all persons unfit for service in a siege. *Continued at chap. 71.*

Athenians and Peloponnesians prepare for war.— 7 The treaty was now clearly broken, and both the Athenians and Lacedæmonians and their allies prepared for war, and purposed sending embassies to the king [Artaxerxes Longimanus] and other Barbarian powers for assistance. The Lacedæmonians ordered their allies to build fresh ships in addition to those already on the spot in Sicily and Italy, so that the whole might amount to 500. (The allies were also required to furnish a sum of money, but to remain quiet for the present, and receive the Athenians if they only came in one ship at a time. The Athenians sent embassies to the states round Peloponnesus, Corcyra, Cephallenia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus, as their friendship would be most important in the coming war.

The eyes of all Greece were now turned on the rival 8 powers. The young men were eager for the war; prophecies were repeated and oracles sung both in the belligerent and neutral states; and the holy island of Delos was shaken by an earthquake, an event considered to be portentous, as it was hitherto unknown.\* Most of the

\* Herodotus says that Delos was shaken by an earthquake a little before the battle of Marathon.—*Herod. vi. 98.*





Greeks were best affected to the Lacedæmonians, who declared that they would be the "Liberators of Greece." Many were also passionately desirous of throwing off the Athenian yoke.

## 9 ALLIES ON EACH SIDE.

LACEDÆMON.	ATHENS.
<i>Within Peloponnesus</i> , all	Chians—navy.
except the Argives and	Lesbians—navy.
Achaïans; viz.	Coreyræans—navy.
Aræadians—infantry.	Plateans — infantry and
Lacedæmonians—infantry.	money.
Messenians—infantry.	Messenians at <i>Naupactus</i>
Corinthians—navy.	—ditto.
Sicyonians—navy.	Acarnanians—ditto.
Eleans—navy.	Zacynthians—ditto.
<i>Without Peloponnesus</i> ,	Carians—ditto.
the following:	Dorians—ditto.
Megareans—navy.	Ionians—ditto.
Ambraciots—navy.	Hellespontines—ditto.
Leucadians—navy.	Thracians—ditto.
Locrians—cavalry.	All the Cyclades, except
Bœotians—cavalry.	<i>Melos</i> and <i>Thera</i> —ditto.
Phocians—cavalry.	
Anactorians—infantry.	

II. *First Invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians*,  
chap. 10—23.

- 10 Peloponnesians assemble at the Isthmus.—Immediately after the attempt on Plataea, the Lacedæmonians sent round to their allies to prepare for an expedition against Attica. Two-thirds of the fighting men of every state then assembled at the Isthmus, and their principal officers were thus harangued by Archidamus.

## SPEECH OF ARCHIDAMUS.

- 11 Importance of the war: power of the Athenians.—"Peloponnesians and allies, though our fathers and ourselves have been engaged in many expeditions, yet they never have marched out with a larger force than this present one. But then we are proceeding against a most powerful state, and all Greece is wishing for our success through their hatred of the Athen-

ians; therefore we must show that our valour has not degenerated; and we must not relax our discipline through foolish confidence in our numbers. Moreover, order, caution, and discipline will be more necessary, when we consider the desperate resistance which the Athenians will make when we have ravaged their territory."

Sends Melesippus to Athens.—Archidamus then sent 12 Melesippus to Athens with fresh proposals. The Athenians refused to admit the envoy, for Pericles had advised that no herald should be received after the Lacedæmonians had left their frontiers. Melesippus was accordingly sent back escorted by a guard, and with a message that if the Lacedæmonians wished to send an ambassador they must first retire to their own territory. On reaching the frontier Melesippus said, "This day will be the beginning of great evils to the Greeks." Archidamus then entered Attica, whilst the Bœotians, having sent their quota of horse and foot to the Isthmus, ravaged the lands round Plataea with the remainder of their force.

Pericles promises to give up his lands.—Whilst the 13 Peloponnesians were assembling at the Isthmus, Pericles, who was commander of the Athenians with nine colleagues, feared that Archidamus from ancient friendship, or by order of the Lacedæmonians, might spare his estate, and thus make him suspected by the Athenians. He therefore declared in the public assembly, that his friendship for Archidamus should not be to the prejudice of the state; and that if the enemy spared his lands he would make them public property.

Advises the Athenians to leave the country and guard the city.—Pericles then advised the Athenians to bring their property from the country, and guard the city; to avoid a battle on land, but to prepare their fleet; and to keep a tight rein over their allies for the sake of the yearly tribute. He then encouraged them by a statement of their power and resources.



## FUNDS OF THE ATHENIANS.

	Talents	Sterling
Yearly tribute from allies	600	about £144,000
*Stored in the Acropolis	6000	£1,440,000
Uncoined gold and silver, offerings, sacred utensils, spoils, etc.	500	£120,000
Statue of Minerva, <i>gold</i>	40	†£109,440
<b>Total</b>	<b>7140</b>	<b>about £1,813,440</b>

## ATHENIAN FORCES.

Heavy-armed troops	13,000
Aged and very young men who guarded the city	16,000
Cavalry, including mounted bowmen	1200
Archers, infantry	1600

Total 31,800 men,  
and 300 triremes.

**Walls of Athens.**—Athens was surrounded by a wall, from which three long walls ran down to the sea, viz. a double wall to Piræus, and a single one to Phalerum.† The wall which surrounded Athens was guarded only to the extent of 43 stadia [about 5 miles]; for that part which came between the Piræic long walls and the Phaleric, was left unguarded. The Phaleric wall was 35 stadia long [about 4½ miles]; the Piræic walls, of which the outer one only was guarded, were 40 stadia long [about 5 miles]. The whole circumference of the Piræus, including Munychia, was 60 stadia [about 7½ miles]; but of this only one half was guarded [see i. 93].

\* The greatest sum ever stored in the Acropolis was 9700 talents, or about £2,328,000, but part of it was expended on the gates of the Acropolis, etc. and at Potidea.

† This is reckoning 912 oz. to each talent of gold, at £3 per oz.

‡ See Arnold's note. There are some differences between the first and later editions of Arnold, which are worthy of notice.

Athenians bring their wives, children, and property 14 into the city.—The Athenians, being persuaded by Pericles, then sent their sheep and cattle to Eubœa and the adjacent isles, and brought their wives, children, and furniture, and even the timber from their houses, into Athens.

Their ancient residence in burghs.—The Athenians 15 removed with reluctance, as from the earliest times they had lived more in the country than the other Greeks. From the time of Cecrops down to that of Theseus, the inhabitants of Attica had occupied their several townships, with separate magistrates for each; and they only appealed to the king when in fear of danger. Sometimes they waged war with him, as the Eleusinians, with Eumolpus, attacked Erectheus. But when Theseus came to the throne, he abolished the separate magistracies, and established one council-house at Athens, though the people continued to occupy their townships from this period; and the Athenians kept a festival to the goddess at the public expense, called ΣΥΝÆΙΑ [i. e. Feast of the Union].

Early state of the town of Athens.—At that time Athens only included the Acropolis and the parts to the south of it. For the Acropolis itself contains the temples of other gods besides Minerva, and those temples which are not in it are to be found on the southern side of it, as those of Jupiter Olympius, of Apollo Pythius, of Tellus, and of Bacchus in Limnæ, in whose honour the oldest Bacchana's were celebrated on the 12th day of the month Anthesterion, as the Ionians still observe it. Other ancient temples are in the same quarter, and the conduit called "Enneakrounos," or Nine Pipes, anciently called "Callirrhoe," was near. This water was preferred on sacred occasions, and is still used before marriages and other religious rites. Moreover, the Acropolis is still called "The city."\*

Reluctance of the Athenians to quit the country.— 16 Though Theseus had united the magistracies, yet the people still lived in the country, and were now reluctant

\* The more ancient parts of our own metropolis are similarly called.



to leave it, as they had but lately repaired their estates from the ravages of the Median war, and were distressed at leaving the temples which they had regarded as the places of their hereditary worship, and therefore the only ones in which they thought the gods would receive their prayers and sacrifices.

- 17 **Crowded state of Athens.**—On entering the city only a part found lodgings, others were received by friends or relations, but the great bulk dwelt in the temples and even in the Pelasgicon, below the Acropolis, though it was said at the end of a line in a Pythian oracle, "The Pelasgicon is best unoccupied." This oracle was fulfilled contrary to expectation, for the subsequent misfortunes which befell the city did not arise from the people inhabiting this spot, but from the war which obliged them to inhabit it. Others occupied the tower of the walls, and the Long Walls, and greater part of the Piræus.

**Athenians fit out 100 galleys.**—The Athenians now mustered their allies and fitted out 100 ships to attack Peloponncsus.

- 18 **Peloponnesians assault Cœnoe: Archidamus dilatory.**—The Peloponnesians now advanced to assault Cœnoe, a walled town on the frontiers of Attica and Bœotia, which the Athenians used as a garrisoned fort. Here they wasted much time whilst the Athenians were carrying in their property, and Archidamus their general was again censured. He had been previously blamed for his delay at the Isthmus, and his tardiness generally, which seemed to indicate a leaning to the Athenians; though he had really waited in expectation that the Athenians would give in before their land was ravaged.

- 19 **Archidamus ravages Eleusis, and encamps at Acharnæ.**—Archidamus being unable to take Cœnoe, and no herald coming from the Athenians, he led the Peloponnesians into Attica 80 days after the failure of the Thebans at Plataea. The corn was now just ripe, when his army ravaged Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, and routed a few Athenian horse near Rheiti, or "the Brooks." The Peloponnesians then keeping Mount Ægaleos on their right, marched through Cropæa to

Acharnæ, the largest deme [township] in Attica, where they formed an encampment and ravaged the neighbourhood.

**His design in waiting at Acharnæ.**—Archidamus 20 encamped at Acharnæ, wishing to provoke the Athenians to march out against him, or induce the Acharnians, who formed a large part of the state, and numbered 3000 heavy-armed, to stir up the whole army to an engagement. If this should not be done, he hoped that the Acharnians, having lost their own property, would not hazard their lives for other people's goods, and would thus occasion disunion in the Athenian counsels.

**Athenians reproach Pericles for not attacking the 21 enemy.**—The Athenians remembering that Pleistoanax had, 14 years previously, advanced to Eleusis and Thriasia, and then retired, hoped that Archidamus would do the same; though Pleistoanax was then suspected of having taken a bribe, and banished from Sparta. But when Archidamus advanced to Acharnæ, only 60 stadia [about 7½ miles] from Athens, and commenced ravaging the country, which had never been witnessed by the younger men before, and only by the elder during the Persian war; the people, especially the Acharnians, became greatly excited against Pericles for not leading them out against the enemy. Pericles, however, being 22 confident that his views were correct, would not convoke an assembly, but only provided for the defence of the city, and preservation of tranquillity.

**Skirmish between the Athenian and Bœotian horse.**—Pericles frequently sent out squadrons of cavalry to protect the neighbourhood of the city from the advanced guard of the enemy. At Phrygia, a troop of Athenian horse, supported by some Thessalians, engaged in a skirmish with the Bœotian cavalry, and at first had the advantage; but the Bœotians, being succoured by the heavy infantry, routed them, and some were slain; and on the next day the Peloponnesians erected a trophy. The Thessalians assisted the Athenians on account of an ancient alliance. They consisted of Larissæans, Pharsalians, [Parasians,] Cranonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians,



and Phææans. Of them the Larissæans were commanded by Polymedes and Aristonns; the Pharsalians by Menon.

- 23 Peloponnesians return home.—The Peloponnesians, being unable to draw out the Athenians, left Acharnæ in order to ravage the townships between Parnes and Mount Brilessus. The Peloponnesians having stayed in Attica until all their provisions were exhausted, retired through Bœotia by a different way from that by which they had come, and passing by Oropus they ravaged the Piræic territory occupied by the Oropians, who are subjects of Athens. On reaching the Peloponnesus the whole force disbanded, and returned to their several cities.

III. Athenians retaliate upon Peloponnesus,  
chap. 23—32.

Athenians send 100 ships to Peloponnesus.—Meanwhile the Athenians had sent 100 ships, with 1000 heavy-armed troops, and 400 bowmen, under Careinus, Proteas, and Socrates, to retaliate upon Peloponnesus.

- 24 Athenians set apart 1000 talents and 100 ships as a reserve.—When the Peloponnesians had retired, the Athenians stationed guards by land and sea. They then set aside 1000 talents, [about £240,000,] and 100 of their best triremes, yearly, to be used only in extreme peril, and they made it a capital offence for any one to propose using either money or ships in a different way.

- 25 Athenian fleet assault Methone, which is relieved by Brasidas.—Meantime the 100 Athenian ships sent to the Peloponnesians (c. 23) were joined by 50 Coreycæan ships and other allies, and ravaged the coast. They landed at Methone in Laconia, and assaulted the wall which was weak and ungarrisoned. BRASIDAS, son of Tellis, was in the neighbourhood, and hearing of the attack, he forced his way through the besiegers with 100 heavy-armed men, and threw himself into Methone. By this action Brasidas saved the city, and was the first who received praise at Sparta.

Ravage Elis and take Pheia.—The Athenian fleet, leaving Methone, landed at Pheia in Elis, ravaged the country for two days, and defeated 300 picked men from

the vale of Elis,\* and the immediate neighbourhood. A violent wind in a harbourless place then forced them to embark and sail round Cape Ichthys, and take shelter in the port of Pheia. The Messenians and others having been left behind in the hurry of embarkation, took Pheia whilst the fleet was doubling the cape. The fleet afterwards evacuated the place as the Eleans were coming up with their whole force. [Its operations are continued at c. 30.]

Thirty Athenian ships take Thronium.—The Athenians also sent 30 ships under Cleopompus, to cruise about 26 Loeris and guard Eubœa. They ravaged some places on the sea-coast, captured Thronium, and took hostages; and defeated the Locrians at Alope.

Athenians expel the Æginetans, who are then received by the Peloponnesians.—This summer the Athenians expelled the Æginetans from Ægina, charging them with being the authors of the war, (i. 139,) and thinking it safer to colonise Ægina themselves, as it lay so near the Peloponnesus. The Lacedæmonians then gave Thyrea, the debatable frontier between Laconia and Argolis, to the Æginetans to occupy; because they hated the Athenians, and were also mindful of the services of the Æginetans, during the great earthquake and Helot insurrection.†

Eclipse of the sun, August 3rd, 431.—The sun was 28 eclipsed at mid-day, on the first day of the lunar month, when only it seems possible. It assumed a crescent form, and some stars shone out, but it afterwards recovered its fulness.

Athenians ally with Sitalees, king of Thrace, and 29

\* Or the valley of the Peneus, in which Elis itself was situated. This was the richest part of the whole territory, and occupied by the conquering Ætolians, when they came in with the Dorians at the return of the Heraclidæ. The neighbourhood of Pheia, on the other hand, was occupied by the older people, who were conquered by the Ætolians, and now formed, as in so many Peloponnesian states, the subordinate class of *Peniæct*. See Arnold. Compare also with the notes to i. 101, 105.

† The Lacedæmonians thus revenged themselves on the Athenians, who had received the conquered Helots after the surrender of Ithome, and settled them at Naupactus (i. 103).





**Perdiccas, king of Macedonia.**—The Athenians wished to ally with Sitalces, king of Thrace, whose father, Teres, had founded the kingdom of the Odrysæ above the rest of Thrace. Many of the Thracians are independent. This Teres was no relation to Tereus, who married Procne, daughter of Pandion, an Athenian; for Tereus resided at Daulis, in Phocis, then inhabited by Thracians, where his son Itys was killed by Procne, and the poets still call the nightingale the Daulian bird.\* Pandion would have married his daughter to Tereus, at Daulis, for vicinity and mutual succour, and not to Teres, amongst the Odrysæ, which were several days' journey off.

The Athenians, thus wishing Sitalces to join them in conquering the Thraee-ward towns and Perdiccas, made Nymphodorus, whose sister had married Sitalces, their proxenus, at Abdera.† Nymphodorus then came to Athens, made his own son, Sadoeus, an Athenian citizen, and concluded the alliance with Sitalces, and undertook to persuade him to send a Thracian force of cavalry and targeteers. He also persuaded the Athenians to restore Therma to Perdiccas, king of Macedonia (see i. 61); and Perdiccas then joined the Athenians under Phornio, who were still ravaging Chalcidice (see i. 65).

30 **The 100 Athenian ships take Sollium, Astacus, and Cephallenia.**—The 100 Athenian ships who were still cruising round the Peloponnesus, (c. 25,) took Sollium from the Corinthians, and gave it to the Palirenses; stormed Astacus, and expelled its tyrant Evarchus; and then brought over the island of Cephallenia without fighting. Cephallenia lies opposite Leucas and Acarnania, and consists of four states, viz. the Paleans, Cranians, Samæans, and Pronæans. The fleet then returned to Athens.

\* Philomela was sister of Procne, and was forced by Tereus: see Ovid (*Met.* vi. 565) and Hyginus (*Fab.* xlv.). Procne then became a swallow, and Philomela a nightingale. See Dr. Smith's Dictionary of Biography.

† A proxenus was a kind of consul, who, however, discharged his duties gratuitously, and was always not a citizen of the state towards which he acted as proxenus, but of that in which he performed the duties of his office. His duties were to show hospitality to any of their citizens going to that country, and to look after their interests there. See Arnold's note, and the note to iii. 70.

**Pericles with the largest Athenian force invades Megara.**—In the autumn, Pericles invaded Megara with all the forces of Athenians and resident aliens; and was subsequently joined by the Athenians in the 100 ships. This was the largest army that Athens ever assembled, for she was in the height of her strength, and had not been thinned by the plague. Though the Athenians had still 3000 men at Potidæa, yet they here mustered 10,000 heavy-armed of their own citizens, and 3000 heavy-armed aliens, besides a large body of light-armed. After ravaging the territory, they returned, but afterwards made yearly incursions to Megara, (i. 114,) until Nisæa was taken (iv. 66).

**Athenians fortify Atalanta.**—This same autumn the 32 Athenians fortified Atalanta, an island near the Opuntian Locrians, to prevent the pirates from sailing out from Opus, and the rest of Locris to plunder Eubœa.

#### IV. *Public Burial at Athens, chap. 33—46.*

**Corinthians restore Evarchus to Astacus.**—<sup>Winter.</sup> 33 The following winter Evarchus, who had been expelled from Astacus, (c. 30,) hired some mercenaries and persuaded the Corinthians to reinstate him in the city. The Corinthians accordingly sailed to Astacus with 40 ships, 1500 heavy-armed troops under Euphamidas, Timoxenus, and Eumachus, and restored Evarchus. On their return they made some unsuccessful attempts upon some places on the Acarnanian coast, and then made a descent on the Cranian territory in Cephallenia, but lost several men from a sudden attack of the Cranians, and retired to their ships in confusion.

**Athenians publicly bury their slain.**—This winter the 34 Athenians, according to ancient custom, publicly buried them who had first fallen in the war. The bones of the dead were publicly laid out in a tent, whilst the relations brought funeral offerings. The remains were then laid in 10 coffins of cypress wood, according to their tribes, one coffin being prepared for each tribe; a bier was also spread for those whose corpses could not be found. These were all carried on cars to the public sepulchre in the Ceramicus, the fairest suburb of the city, where they had always buried



those who had fallen in war, excepting the heroes of Marathon, who, for their pre-eminent valour, were interred on the field of battle. Citizens and strangers joined in the procession, whilst the female relatives of the dead made loud wailings at the burial. After the interment, a man of the greatest talent and dignity was appointed to make an oration over the tomb, and these established customs were observed throughout the war. On the present occasion Pericles, son of Xanthippus, was appointed, who advanced from the sepulchre to a platform, and spoke to the following effect:

*Funeral Oration delivered by Pericles over the bodies of those slain in the first year of the war.*

- 35 **Difficulty of making a public oration.**—"It has been the custom for orators on similar occasions to praise the man who first instituted these funeral orations; but to me it appears sufficient that those who have distinguished themselves by action should be honoured by an action similar to this public sepulture, for the reputation of many ought not to depend upon the eloquence of one. Moreover, those who were acquainted with the virtues of the dead, will not believe that enough has been said in their honour, whilst the envious stranger will accuse the speaker of exaggeration. But this custom, which has been sanctioned by our ancestors, it is my duty to obey.
- 36 **Valour of our ancestors and fathers.**—"First, then, it is both just and becoming to mention our ancestors, who held this country by their valour, and transmitted it free and without change, through many generations, to our own time. And more to be praised are our immediate fathers, who augmented the empire which they inherited, and bequeathed it to us; whilst we ourselves, who are yet in the vigour of life, have still further enlarged this empire, and furnished our city for both peace and war. But I need not repeat the well-known tale of our victories over Barbarians and Greeks, but endeavour to show by what methods we attained our power, and by what polity we enlarged it, and then proceed to eulogize the deceased. Such a discussion will be profitable both to citizens and strangers.
- 37 **Our democratic government and cheerful lives.**—"Our government is not copied, though it has been a copy for others. It is called a democracy. Under its laws all are equal, and men are preferred to public honours not by party, but by merit; and poverty is no obstacle to preferment. In our private lives we are never censorious, discontented, or jealous of each other's pursuits; and we obey our magistrates and revere the laws, written and unwritten.

**Our games and recreations.**—"Our spirits are also recreated by the celebration of games and sacrifices throughout the year, and by the elegance of our private establishments; and we also enjoy all the good things throughout the world, which are all imported to our city.

**Our openness and bravery in war.**—"We prosecute war differently from our enemies. We never exclude strangers from our city, nor hide our resources; and we rely upon our own valour, and not upon secret preparations and stratagems. Our enemies educate their youth in laborious exercises, but we are equally as intrepid, though we live at ease. For the Lacedæmonians never march against us singly, but with the united strength of their confederates; though we can defeat our enemies whilst they are defending their own territory. Moreover no enemy yet ever encountered our whole force, for we employ many troops in our navy, and the remainder are engaged in different services; yet if the enemy defeat part of us, they boast of having routed all of us; and if part of us conquer them, they say that it was all of us who beat them. If then we are as brave as our rivals without having taken so much pains to become so, we gain the united advantages of escaping toil and hardship by anticipation, and of being equally daring when the trial comes.

**Our economic tastes, healthy philosophy, political sagacity, and generosity.**—"To our bravery in war we unite an economic taste and masculine philosophy. We use our riches as an occasion for action, and not as a vaunt in talking; whilst poverty is no disgrace, unless no exertions are made to avoid it. Again, as men can attend to both domestic concerns and public duties, and carry on their private business, and yet judge of political questions; we consider those useless who neglect state affairs. Having thus previously discussed our measures, we owe not our courage to our ignorance, but have this characteristic, that we are at the same time both courageous and calculating. In our beneficence also we differ from other men, for we make friendships by conferring and not receiving kindness; and we zealously benefit any one, not from calculating expediency, but with the confidence of liberality.

**Athens the "School of Greece."**—"In short, Athens is the 'School of Greece,' and every Athenian is qualified to act in every variety of scene with peculiar grace. This is no bravery of words, but actual truth, proved by the power of our city which these very qualifications have gained. Our enemies even are not mortified at being worsted by such opponents, nor do our subject states complain of being ruled by men unworthy of empire. But we require no Homer to praise us, no poet to set off our history with the charms of verse; for we have left everlasting monuments of our deeds upon every land and sea. It was for such a country that these men fought and fell; and every survivor may well, like them, suffer in such a cause.

**Reasons for praising Athens.**—"I have enlarged on our na- 42



tional characteristics for two reasons: 1st, To show you the greatness of the stake which we have in this war—2nd, to demonstrate the worth of these deceased men and such as these, by whose efforts our city has been raised to its present state.

Glory of Athens proves the worth of those who have fallen.—“The glorious death of these men is an evidence of their merit. Even the inferior virtue of some of them is screened by their patriotic valour; their good has wiped out their evil; for they did more service to the state than harm to individuals. None were made cowards by their wealth that they might enjoy it, or by their poverty that they might grow rich; but they all thought it more glorious to risk their lives for the sake of vengeance on their country’s foes than yield and live. They fled from the shame of cowardice, endured the brunt of battle, and fell in a doubtful charge, but with the hope of victory.

43 The survivors to emulate the virtues of the deceased.—“You that remain may pray for a better fate, but preserve the same spirit and courage; growing enamoured of the increasing grandeur of our city, and feeling that this grandeur was acquired by valour. Whilst the deceased have given their lives for their country, they have obtained a renown which will never grow old,—a sepulchre not only in the mouldering earth, but in the eternal memory of man; and their virtues shall be inscribed not only upon monumental stone, but also in the unwritten memorial of the heart. Vie, then, with these men; consider that happiness consists in freedom, and freedom in valour; and remember, that it is not only the unfortunate who should be most unsparing of their lives, but those who enjoy a prosperity which they may lose.

44 Consolation for the parents of the dead.—“To the parents of the dead I offer not condolence, but consolation. Their children have lived happily and died honourably, and have been removed from the reach of human calamities; but I know it is difficult to comfort those who have learned by experience to prize the blessings they have lost. Those who are young enough must hope for fresh offspring, and those who are too old must remember the happiness they have enjoyed, and comfort themselves with the reflection, that the short time they have yet to live will be brightened by the glory that their children have obtained.

45 Address to the sons, and brothers, and widows.—“The children and brethren of the deceased will find it difficult to compete with their departed relatives, as all men, from jealousy, praise the exploits of the dead beyond those of the living. The widows I will exhort not to fall short from the proper virtues of their sex, but to give the least occasion for conversation, either for praise or censure.

46 Conclusion.—“The tribute of words is now paid. That of deeds has been partly fulfilled by this public sepulture, and will be completed when the sons shall have been brought up to manhood at the country’s expense. These rewards are

wise as well as liberal, for where the greatest prizes are given for virtue the most virtuous citizens will be found. And now, having finished your lamentations, depart.”

### V. Second Invasion of Attica and Plague at Athens, chap. 47—65.

Peloponnesians again invade Attica.—Early in the summer two-thirds of the Peloponnesian forces under Archidamus invaded Attica a second time, encamped, and then ravaged the country. *Continued at 55.*

47

2nd Year,  
B. C. 430—  
Summer.

Plague breaks out at Athens.—A few days after the invasion, the plague first broke out at Athens, having previously lighted on many places about Lemnos and elsewhere. The mortality, even amongst the physicians, who were ignorant of the disease, was unprecedented; whilst supplications and divinations were found unavailing, and therefore given over.

Began in Ethiopia: Peloponnesians suspected of poisoning the wells.—It is said to have begun in Ethiopia, and after passing through Libya and the greatest part of the Persian dominions, it suddenly broke out in Athens, first attacking the men in the Piræus. Here it was reported that the Peloponnesians had poisoned the cisterns, for no wells had as yet been sunk there. The plague afterwards reached the upper city, and the mortality increased.

Thucydides attacked.—Thucydides leaves it to others to speak of its origin and causes, and will only describe its character, and explain such symptoms as may enable the disease to be recognised for the future, he having been attacked himself, and personally observed other sufferers.

Symptoms of the disease.—This year was more than usually free from other disorders, but previous sickness terminated in this plague. Persons in perfect health were first seized with violent heats in the head, and redness and inflammation in the eyes; whilst the throat and tongue assumed a bloody tinge, and emitted an unnaturally fetid breath. Sneezing and hoarseness then came on, and the pain soon descended to the chest with a violent cough. In-



effectual retchings generally followed, producing a violent spasm, which sometimes ceased quickly. The body externally was not pale, nor hot to the touch, but reddish, livid, and broken out in small pimples and ulcers; though the internal parts burnt to such a degree that the patient could bear no clothing or linen; whilst a continual restlessness banished his sleep, and an unquenchable thirst impelled many to throw themselves into the cisterns. The body did not waste during the height of the disease, but the patient generally died on the seventh or ninth day, from the internal burning. Sometimes the disease ulcerated the stomach, and produced an intense diarrhœa, when death ensued from weakness. The disorder thus first attacked the head and spread through the whole body; and those who survived, frequently lost their hands, feet, and eyes, and sometimes their recollection both of themselves and friends.

50 **Birds and beasts perished that fed on carcasses.**—The carrion birds and dogs either did not approach the unburied bodies, or died after feeding on them; indeed there was a marked disappearance of the birds during the plague.

51 **Despair of those attacked: second attacks not fatal.**—No general specific was found for the disorder, and no constitution seemed proof against it, either from strength or weakness. The most dreadful part of the whole calamity was the utter despair which attended the first attack; and as infection was communicated by their attendance on each other, many sufferers perished from being deserted. Those whose heroic virtue led them still to visit the sick, fell the most certain sacrifice; and the only alleviation of the general misery was, that those who had once recovered were not liable to a second attack, and these often thought themselves impervious to all other diseases.

52 **Crowded and lawless state of Athens.**—The crowded state of the city aggravated the evil. The new comers were living at this hot season in stifling cabins, and the mortality spread amongst them without restraint. Bodies were lying on one another in the agonies of death. Half-dead creatures rolled about the streets, or expired

round the fountains. The temples which had been occupied for shelter (see c. 17) were now crowded with corpses; for sacred and profane things were alike disregarded; and the funeral pile which had been raised for one, was often pre-occupied by the friends of another; or a strange corpse would be thrown upon a pile already burning. An unprecedented lawlessness existed throughout the city. Every one lived with a view to self-gratification, regarding their lives and riches as things of a day. Honour was set aside for immediate pleasure; the worship of the gods was neglected, as all seemed alike to be perishing; and the laws of man were disregarded, as no one expected to live until judgment could be enforced.

**An ambiguous prophecy expounded.**—The plague reminded the Athenians of this old prophetic line: 54

“A Dorian war shall come and a plague with it.”

But there was a dispute as to whether a plague (*λοιμός*) or a famine (*λιμός*) was the right word, though the fact of there being a plague inclined men to read (*λοιμός*). Others remembered that the god at Delphi had promised to assist the Lacedæmonians, (i. 118,) and considered that the plague was a fulfilment of the promise; for it came immediately after the invasion of Attica, and chiefly ravaged Athens and other large towns, without entering the Peloponnesus, in a way worth mentioning.

**Peloponnesians ravage the country to Laurium.**—55 The Peloponnesians having ravaged the plain [on the west and north side of Athens], advanced along the coast south of Athens into Paralus, to the mines of Laurium, first ravaging the side towards Peloponnesus, and then that towards Eubœa and Andrus.

**Athenian navy again retaliate on Peloponnesus.**—Pericles still refused to march against the enemy, but before the Peloponnesians had left the plain, he prepared 56 a fleet of 100 galleys, carrying 4000 heavy-armed Athenians, which was joined by 50 Chian and Lesbian ships; whilst 300 horse were embarked in transports, now, for the first time, formed out of old vessels. With this armament he left Attica, whilst the Peloponnesians were in





Paralus, and sailed to Epidaurus, wasted most of its territories, and made an unsuccessful attack on the town. He then ravaged the fields of Troezen, Halia, and Hermione, and from thence proceeded to the Laconian coast, and stormed and sacked Prasia, after which he returned home.

57 **Peloponnesians leave Attica.**—Meantime the plague was raging both in the city and on board the fleet, and the Peloponnesians were glad to leave Attica; having, however, ravaged the whole country, and stayed 40 days, which was the longest period of any of their invasions throughout the war.

58 **Athenians sail to Potidæa: destroyed by the plague.**—After the return of Pericles, his two colleagues, Hagnon and Cleopompus, took the army he had brought back, and proceeded against Potidæa and the Thracian Chalcidians (i. 65). The two generals made every effort to capture Potidæa, but their army was overpowered by the plague, which even affected the Athenian troops who had been previously stationed there. Phormio, who had left Chalcidice with his 1500 troops, escaped its ravages (i. 65); but Hagnon was compelled to return to Athens, and leave the same force he had found before Potidæa, having lost 1050 out of his 4000 heavy-armed in 40 days. *Continued at chap. 70.*

59 **Outcries against Pericles.**—After the second Peloponnesian invasion the Athenians were worn out by the plague and war. They sent an embassy to obtain peace from Lacedæmon, but were unsuccessful; and they made loud outcries against Pericles, who thereupon called an assembly, and addressed them in a soothing and encouraging speech.

#### SPEECH OF PERICLES.

60 **Interests of the nation to be preferred to those of individuals.**—“I expected your anger, and have now convened this assembly to reprove you, if you continue your unjust displeasure or succumb to your misfortunes. The happiness of a people is better secured by the prosperity of the state, than by the welfare of individuals; for even a wealthy citizen must share in the ruin of his country, whilst an unfortunate individual is more likely to improve his condition in a flourishing community.

All men ought therefore to support the state, and not, like you, neglect the public safety because of your domestic afflictions.

**Injustice of the Athenians in blaming him.**—“As for me, with whom you are angry, I am second to none of you in knowing what measures are required, in explaining these measures to others, or in my love for my country or public integrity. If, therefore, you listened to my persuasions for war, from your sense of my superior qualifications, you surely cannot charge me now with having injured you.

**Not to let sober convictions be unsettled by private misfortunes.** 61—“My opinion as to the necessity and expediency of the war is still unchanged; and you yourselves ought not to allow your own resolution to be changed by your private misfortunes, or your spirit to be broken by unforeseen disasters. You ought rather to show yourselves worthy of the greatness of your city; to forget your own sufferings in your anxiety for its honour and welfare; and to encounter the greatest misfortunes rather than sully your own reputation.

**The sovereignty of the sea superior to the loss of houses or lands.**—“Let my previous speeches on your many advantages and the greatness of your empire, allay all doubts of your ultimate success. I would also remind you, that whilst you think that you only govern your own subject allies, yet you are at the same time absolute masters of the sea, and no nation existing can prevent your sailing where you please. Compared with this, you may regard your houses and lands as the mere garden plot and embellishment of a rich man's estate.

**Independence and confidence to be preserved.**—“All that you have lost may be recovered so long as you preserve your independence, but without that no possessions are secure. And you should prove yourselves not inferior to your fathers, and meet your enemies with that high and confident spirit which is grounded upon a clear consciousness of your own superiority in forethought and presence of mind.

**No choice between empire and slavery.**—“It is but fair that 63 you should sustain that sovereignty on which you pride yourselves. At the same time, you should remember that you are not deciding between slavery and freedom, but between dominion and glory on the one hand, and on the other, a slavery made more galling by the hatred of your subject states. For your dominion has been a tyranny, which it may have been wrong to get, but which is now dangerous to give up; and you cannot therefore dream of securing an inglorious, unambitious, and unmolested repose.

**To maintain by constancy the honour of their country.**—“The 64 invasion of the enemy was a consequence which you foresaw before you resolved on war; the pestilence was an unexpected evil, which has somewhat biassed your feelings against me, though with little reason, unless you also will give me the credit when you meet with any unlooked-for success. Remember therefore that your country has had the first renown



for not yielding to misfortunes; that it is now the greatest power that ever existed; and that it will be famous for ever, because we have obtained the highest dominion in Greece, have carried on the most formidable wars, and have inhabited the richest and greatest city. And remember also that the envy which our power has excited must soon pass away, whilst our present splendour and future glory will be handed down to everlasting posterity. Then send no more heralds to the Lacedæmonians, and prove yourselves superior to your present misfortunes."

65 Athenians fine Pericles.—Whilst the Athenians were so far persuaded by this speech as not to send any more ambassadors to the Lacedæmonians, and to be more resolute in prosecuting the war, yet the private sufferings of the commons in losing their small resources, and of the rich in being deprived of their country estates and expensive establishments, induced the people to lay a fine upon Pericles; though the multitude soon afterwards made him commander-in-chief, and placed him at the head of their affairs, for he governed the state with moderation, and kept it in safety.

Death and character of Pericles, 429.—Pericles survived the commencement of the war only 2 years and 6 months, and died in the middle of the third year. His foresight in the war was best appreciated after his death; for he had said, that as long as the people kept quiet, and attended to their navy, without attempting fresh acquisitions of empire, they would do well. But after his death, they acted contrary to his advice. For from his high rank and talents, and his undoubted integrity, he could control the multitude without humouring them, and even contradict them without caring for their displeasure; he could alarm them if too confident, and reassure them if too despairing. But those who came after him, being more on a level with each other, and each aspiring to be chief, courted the favour of the people, by their measures, as well as their speeches. Amongst other blunders, was the expedition to Sicily, which was made more flagrant by the factious spirits, who subsequently refused to send supplies. But in spite of these losses and seditions, and though Cyrus supplied the Peloponnesians with money for a fleet, yet the Athenians held

out for three more years, [viz. from B. C. 407 to 404,] and then only succumbed because utterly ruined by their intestine feuds.

VI. *Operations at Zacynthus, Argos, and Naupactus, and surrender of Potidæa, chap. 66—70.*

Lacedæmonians unsuccessfully attempt Zacynthus.— 66 This summer the Lacedæmonians and allies sailed against Zacynthus with 1000 heavy-armed troops in 100 ships, under Cnemus, and ravaged the island; but being unable to take it, were obliged to return. The Zacynthians were a colony of the Achæians of Peloponnesus, and allies of the Athenians.

Peloponnesian ambassadors seized by Sadoeus, and 67 executed by the Athenians.—At the end of the summer, Aristeus, a Corinthian, (i. 59,) Aneristus, Nicolaus, and Stratodemus, Lacedæmonians, and Timagoras, a Tegean, went as ambassadors with Pollis, an Argive, in a private capacity, to prevail on the king of Persia to supply money, and join in the war. Passing first through Thrace, they tried to persuade Sitalces to abandon the Athenians and relieve Potidæa; but Learchus and Aminades, Athenian ambassadors, persuaded Sadoeus, son of Sitalces, (c. 29,) to seize them before they reached the Hellespont, and deliver them up. The Athenian ambassadors then carried them to Athens, where the people, fearing Aristeus, put them all to death without a trial, and threw them into pits, thus retaliating on the Lacedæmonians, who had practised the same cruelties on all the Athenian merchants, whom they had taken at sea, from the commencement of the war.

Ambraciots unsuccessfully attack Argos.—About the 68 same time the Ambraciots, in conjunction with some Barbarians, attacked Argos of Amphiloehia, but though they mastered the country, they were unable to take the city by assault, and returned home, and disbanded. Their enmity to the Argives first arose from this circumstance. Amphiloehus had founded Argos in his return from the Trojan war, and it became the largest and most powerful city in Amphiloehia. Long afterwards it declined, and the Argives called in the Ambraciots, who taught them



Greek, but subsequently expelled them. The Argives then gave themselves up to the Acarnanians, and called in the Athenians; and the latter sent Phormio with 30 ships, who took Argos, which was afterwards occupied by the Acarnanians and Amphiloehians, and enslaved the Ambraciots. (See c. 80.)

69. Athenians station Phormio at Naupactus: Winter. Melesander slain at Lycia.—This winter the Athenians sent Phormio with 20 ships to Naupactus, to prevent any one sailing from Coriuth, or in or out of the Crisæan Gulf. Melesander was also sent with 6 ships to Caria and Lycia, to levy contributions, and to protect the Phœnician trade of Athens from the Peloponnesian privateers. He landed in Lycia, but was defeated and slain.

70. Potidæa surrenders through famine.—The same winter the Potidæans (c. 58) having found that the Lacedæmonian invasion of Attica had not drawn off the besieging forces, and being compelled by famine to eat each other, at length capitulated to Xenophon, Histiodorus, and Phanomachus, the Athenian generals. The siege had already cost Athens 2000 talents, [about £480,000.] and the commanders, seeing their own army suffering, permitted the Potidæans, with their wives, children, and auxiliaries, to leave the city, with a fixed sum of money, and with one suit of clothes each, and the women with two. But at home the Athenians blamed their generals for having acted without consulting them. An Athenian colony was afterwards sent to settle in Potidæa.

VII. *Peloponnesians blockade Plataea, chap. 71—78.*

71. 3rd Year.  
B. C. 429—  
Summer. Peloponnesians march against Plataea.—Next summer the Peloponnesians, instead of invading Attica, marched against Plataea under Archidamus, who encamped, and was about to ravage the land, when some ambassadors arrived from the city.

CONFERENCES BETWEEN ARCHIDAMUS AND THE  
PLATEAN AMBASSADORS.

Platæans beg Archidamus not to injure a city which Pausanias had declared free.—*The Platæan ambassadors said:* "Lacedæmon-

ians! ye are acting unworthy of yourselves and your fathers. For after that glorious battle which secured the liberty of Greece, Pausanias, in the presence of the allied army, and in the public place of Plataea, where he had just sacrificed to Jupiter the Deliverer, in honour of the victory, formally reinstated the Platæans in the independent possession of their city and territory, which he placed for the future under the protection of all the allies. You are now about to violate this privilege and enslave Plataea, at the instigation of her bitterest enemies, the Thebans. But we adjure you by the gods, who witnessed the engagement of Pausanias, by the gods of Sparta and those of Plataea, not to injure our territory, or rob us of that independence which Pausanias has granted."

Archidamus requires the Platæans to be neutral.—*Archidamus* 72 *thus replied:* "Your speech is just, Platæans, but as ye are now enjoying independence yourselves, ye ought to assist in liberating other states from the tyranny of Athens. We shall, however, be content if you will remain neutral, and admit both parties to amicable intercourse without aiding either."

Platæans send to Athens, and prepare for resistance.—The Platæan ambassadors, having first consulted their citizens, replied, that they could do nothing without the concurrence of the Athenians, who had their wives and children; and they also feared that the Athenians or Thebans would seize their city, on the departure of the Lacedæmonians, if they complied with the suggestions of Archidamus. Archidamus met this objection with the following offer. "Let the Platæans," said he, "give up their dwellings and farms to our care, and retire where they please. We will cultivate the land and bring them the produce, and will restore the whole at the conclusion of the war." The Platæan ambassadors again consulted their citizens, who then obtained a truce, and despatched ambassadors to the Athenians, who sent them back with this message: "Platæans! the Athenians have never deserted you since you became their allies, and will now succour you to the best of their power: therefore remain steadfast to the alliance." The Platæans then resolved that whatever befell them they would adhere to Athens; and they suffered no more envoys to leave the city, but replied from the walls that they could not do as the Lacedæmonians required.

Archidamus throws up a mound before Plataea.—Archidamus now commenced the siege, after protesting



to the gods and heroes of Plataea that the Plataeans had first broken the agreement they had sworn to, before he invaded their land, and that they now rejected his proposals. Having invested the city with a palisade made of the fig and olive trees, which his troops cut down, he attempted to raise a mound to a level with the walls. It was piled up with earth, brushwood, stones, and rubbish, and guarded on either side by a strong lattice-work of timber cut from Cithæron. The troops, being divided into relief parties, worked continuously for 70 days and nights, being urged by the Lacedæmonians, who commanded the contingents of the allies.

**Plataeans raise fresh walls and undermine the mound.**—The Plataeans now surmounted that part of their wall opposite to the mound with a superstructure of brick taken from the adjacent houses, and secured in a frame of timber; whilst the workmen and their work were shielded from fiery missiles by curtains of raw hides and skins. Meantime the mound was rising, but the Plataeans made an opening in their wall, and scooped out and carried away the earth from the mound. The Peloponnesians counteracted this device, by repairing the breach with layers of stiff clay, rammed down on wattles of reed. The besiegers then, working by a rough estimate, dug a passage under ground as far as the mound, which they undermined; and for a long time the enemy could not conceive the cause of the continual sinking of their mound. The Plataeans at length, fearing that they would be overpowered by numbers, built a second wall, in the shape of a half-moon, behind the raised part of the old wall; thus securing a retreat if the old wall was taken, and obliging the enemy to throw up a second mound, whilst exposed to missiles on both their flanks.

**Peloponnesians unsuccessfully use battering-rams.**—The Peloponnesians now played upon the walls with battering engines, one of which shook down part of the superstructure in front of the half-moon. The Plataeans, however, broke off the heads of some rams by nooses, and others by heavy beams, suspended by chains from two levers placed on the wall.

**Fail in firing the town.**—The Peloponnesians now filled up the hollow between the mound and the wall, and all the space they could reach on the other side, with faggots steeped in sulphur and pitch, which were then set on fire. A flame was thus raised, which had perhaps never before been kindled by the art of man, and could only be compared to a burning forest. It penetrated far into the city, and made a large tract inaccessible; and if it had been seconded, as the besiegers hoped, by a favourable wind, it would probably have destroyed Plataea, but a heavy storm of thunder and rain is said to have quenched its fury.

**Siege converted into a blockade.**—The Peloponnesians now disbanded part of their troops, whilst the remainder raised a wall round the city, with a ditch on each side, out of which they made their bricks, the work being apportioned to the contingents of the confederates. The whole was finished about the rising of Arcturus, [i. e. autumnal equinox, Sept. 19th,] when the Peloponnesians left a garrison for one half of the wall, whilst the Bœotians garrisoned the other half. The remainder then returned to their several cities.

#### *Garrison of Plataea.*

Plataeans	400
Athenians	80
Women to make bread	110
	Total 590

The Plataeans, previous to the siege, had removed their wives, children, and old and unserviceable men to Athens (see c. 72). *Continued at iii. 20.*

#### VIII. *Battles of Bottiæa, Stratus, and Crisæa,* *chap. 79—92.*

**Athenians defeated at Bottiæa.**—The same summer, 79 the Athenians marched against Chalcidice and Bottiæa, with 2000 heavy infantry and 200 horse, under Xenophon and two colleagues. On reaching Spartolus, in Bottiæa, they destroyed the ripe corn, and expected that





town would surrender, through the intrigues of a party within. The opposite faction were, however, assisted by a body of heavy infantry and other troops from Olynthus, and made a sally; when the Athenians beat the Chalcidian heavy-armed, who retreated to Spartolus, whilst their own cavalry and light-armed were defeated by the Chalcidian cavalry and light-armed. During the battle, a few targeteers from Crusis joined the Chalcidians, and at its conclusion, others came from Olynthus. With this reinforcement, the enemy again attacked the Athenians, who retreated to the two divisions which they had left with their baggage. At last, being galled by the Chalcidian cavalry and archers, the Athenians were routed, and fled to Potidæa with the loss of 430 men and all their generals. The Athenians then recovered their dead, under a truce, and returned to Athens, whilst the Chalcidians and Bottiæans, having erected a trophy, separated to their several cities.

80 Lacedæmonians assist Ambraciots and Chaonians in conquering Acarnania.—Soon after this, the Ambraciots and Chaonians, (c. 68,) wishing to subdue all Acarnania, urged the Lacedæmonians to assist them with a fleet and land force of 1000 heavy-armed; persuading them, that with this united force they might easily, after subduing Acarnania, take Zacynthus, Cephallenia, and perhaps Naupactus, and thus stop the Athenians from circumnavigating the Peloponnesus. The Lacedæmonians immediately despatched their admiral, Cnemus, with 1000 heavy-armed, in a few galleys, to Leucas; and then sent orders to the Peloponnesian fleet to sail also to Leucas, where it would be joined by the squadrons of Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia; and this united armament was intended to prevent the maritime towns of Acarnania from assisting the interior against the land force of Cnemus. The Corinthians were anxious to assist the Ambraciots, who were their own colony; and Corinth and Sicyon had already prepared ships.

United land forces march to Stratus.—Cnemus, with his 1000 heavy-armed, reached Leucas unobserved by Phormio (c. 69); and without waiting for the Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth, he placed himself at the head

of the army collected for the invasion, marched through Argos, sacked Limnæa on his way, and arrived at Stratus, capital of Acarnania.

### *Army of Cnemus.*

#### I. GREEKS.

Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians. 1000 Peloponnesians.

*Perdiccas also secretly sent 1000 Macedonians, but they arrived too late to be of use.*

II. BARBARIANS [from the tribes of Epirus and the central islands].

1000 Chaonians. *Had no king, and were led by Phottius and Nicanor, two chiefs of a privileged race, holding a yearly command.*

Thesprotians. *Like the Chaonians.*

Molossians and Atintanians. *Led by Sabylinthus, a guardian of Tharypus, who was a minor.*

Paravæans. *Led by Orædus, their king.*

1000 Orestians. *Also led by Orædus, who was intrusted with the command by Antiochus, their king.*

Battle of Stratus: Cnemus retreats.—The Acarnanians, threatened at once by land and sea, were unable to unite their forces, and sent to beg succours from Phormio; who, however, could not leave Naupactus unprotected, whilst the enemy's fleet was expected from Corinth. The Peloponnesians advanced in three divisions, sometimes so far from each other as to be out of sight, and in the following order:

Left.	Centre.	Right.
Ambraciots and Peloponnesians with CNEMUS.	Chaonians and the other Barbarians.	Leucadians and Anactorians.

The Greeks marched in good order and with great caution until they should find a convenient encampment; but the Chaonians, who were confident in their own prowess and reputed to be the most warlike of the Barbarian tribes, led on the other Barbarians with blind



impetuosity, hoping to carry the place by the first assault, without the trouble of encamping. The Stratians, hearing of this disorderly approach, placed an ambuscade near the walls, and then boldly attacked the enemy in front, whilst the others took them in flank. The Chalcians were slaughtered in great numbers, and the other Barbarians, seeing them give way, fled back to their Greek allies, who had not till then heard of the disaster, but who now halted and united their separate columns into one corps. The Stratians, not being assisted by the rest of the Acarnanians, galled them only at a distance with slings, a species of warfare in which the Acarnanians generally excelled. At night Cnemus retreated to the river Anapus, 80 stadia [about 10 miles] from Stratus; and next day he recovered his dead under a truce, and then retired to Æniadæ, and disbanded his army, while the Stratians erected a trophy.

83 **Advance of the Peloponnesian fleet.**—Meantime the Peloponnesian fleet, consisting of 47 ships, whilst coasting out of the Crisæan Bay, were watched by Phormio and the 20 Athenian vessels stationed at Naupactus. The Peloponnesians did not expect a sea-fight, and were equipped more for the invasion of Acarmania; but on crossing from Patræ in Achaia, to the main-land opposite, they observed the Athenians sailing from Chalcis and the river Evenus to meet them. Machaon, Isocrates, and Agatharcidas commanded the Corinthian, but the contingents of the other Peloponnesian allies had separate commanders.

First battle in the Crisæan Bay: Peloponnesians defeated.—The Peloponnesians ranged their ships in a circle, the largest they could form without leaving any opening, the sterns turned inward. Within this circle they placed all the small craft that accompanied them, with five of their best sailors to strengthen any point

84 which the enemy might attack. The Athenians advanced in a single line, and sailing round the circle with threatening demonstrations, gradually reduced it to a narrow compass. But Phormio had ordered that none of his ships should begin the attack until he gave the signal; for he foresaw that the ships in the enemy's

circle must soon run foul of each other, and he expected that the wind, which usually blew from the gulf at sunrise, would complete their confusion. The morning breezes rose as Phormio anticipated. The Peloponnesian galleys, contracted into a smaller circle, ran foul of each other, and were thrown into confusion. The shouting and abuse of the various crews, as they endeavoured to keep off each other's vessels with poles, increased the general uproar, and drowned every word of command, whilst the rowers, from want of practice, were unable to use their oars in the swell of the sea, and the galleys no longer obeyed the rudder. In the midst of this disorder, Phormio gave the signal for attack. The Athenians sunk one of the enemy's flag-ships in the first attack, and quickly destroyed several others. The Peloponnesian vessels who escaped the onset, fled to Patræ and Dyme; but the Athenians gave chase, and captured 12 galleys, with the greater part of their crews. They then sailed to Molycrium, and erected a trophy at Rhium, dedicated a ship to Neptune, and then returned to Naupactus. The remnant of the Peloponnesian fleet coasted to the Elean arsenal of Cyllene, where they were joined by Cnemus and the squadron from Leucas.\*

Preparations for a fresh sea-fight.—The Lacedæmonians at Sparta were indignant at this disgraceful defeat, and not weighing their own naval experience against the long practice of the Athenians, they suspected their commanders of cowardice. They therefore sent Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron as counsellors, to Cnemus, to command him to fight a better battle, and not to permit himself to be driven off by a few ships. These commissioners, on arriving at Cyllene, joined Cnemus in refitting the ships and in sending to the several allies for reinforcements.

Meantime Phormio sent to Athens to announce his victory and the enemy's preparations, and to beg for the

\* Cnemus must have gone to Leucas, when the land force was disbanded at Æniadæ, in order to join the Leucadian, Ambraciot, and Anactorian contingents of ships which were already at Leucas waiting for the arrival of the fleet from Peloponnesus. See c. 80, 82.



largest reinforcement that could be spared. The Athenians only despatched 20 galleys, and even ordered these to go first to ravage Cydonia in Crete; for Nicias, a Cretan of Gortys, and proxenus\* of the Athenians, had persuaded them that he could reduce Cydonia to their power, though his only object was to oblige the Polichnitæ. This squadron having wasted Cydonia in conjunction with the Polichnitæ, was detained on the coast by contrary winds.

86 Peloponnesians at Panormus: Athenians at Molycrium.—The Peloponnesians at Cyllene, having equipped 77 galleys, coasted to the Achaean port of Panormus, where their land force had assembled to support them. Phormio, on the other hand, moved with his 20 ships towards Molycrium, and stationed himself on the western side of the northern Rhium, whilst the enemy was drawn up a little to the east of the southern Rhium, not far from Panormus. The channel between the two points is 7 stadia [nearly 1 mile] across, and forms the mouth of the Crisæan Gulf. For six or seven days the rival fleets lay practising and manœuvring opposite each other; the Peloponnesians being afraid of risking another battle on the open sea, and the Athenians being resolved to avoid fighting in the straits. At length the Spartan commanders, fearing the arrival of a reinforcement from Athens, determined on an immediate engagement, but first reassured their men, who were cowed by their recent defeat.

#### SPEECH OF CNEMUS.

87 Reasons for the late defeat, and assurances of present victory.—“Our recent failure, Peloponnesians, affords no just grounds for alarm; it is to be ascribed to our want of due preparation, and to our mischances and inexperience. As it was not then occasioned by cowardice, our spirits should not be crushed, but still defy the enemy; and though inferior in experience, be superior in daring. Remember then that you are superior in numbers; that you are about to engage off your own coasts in the presence of your own heavy-armed; and that you have learnt a lesson from former blunders. Let both sailors and steersmen do their duty with good courage, and without leaving their posts, whilst we, as commanders, will punish the cowardly, but reward the brave.”

\* See note p. 66.

Athenians discouraged.—Phormio now saw the courage of his men sink at the superior numbers of the enemy. He had often told them that they could face any fleet, and they had long resolved never to retire before any number of Peloponnesian ships; but Phormio now saw it was necessary to revive their former confidence.

#### SPEECH OF PHORMIO.

Assurances of success.—“There is nothing to be feared from the Peloponnesians, whom we have recently defeated. They have no better ground for their confidence than their experience in land-service, which is of no avail on sea. They betray their own misgivings by their anxiety to secure superiority in numbers, and they will be more dismayed when they find they do not daunt us. Many armies too have been overthrown by an inferior force. As for the battle, I shall take care to avoid fighting in a space too narrow for skilful evolutions, and therefore I mean to keep outside the gulf. Do you then remain silent and in good order, and be quick in receiving the word of command.”

2nd Battle in the Crisæan Bay: Peloponnesians again defeated.—The Peloponnesians now drew Phormio into the gulf by a stratagem. At day-break their fleet moved eastward along the shore, the right wing taking the lead, in a column of four ships abreast. Their object was to threaten Naupactus, and thus to draw Phormio round the Molyerian point, and then, suddenly facing about, to coop him in, and capture the whole Athenian squadron; and for fear any of his ships might get the start, and escape to Naupactus, 20 of the best Peloponnesian sailors were placed in advance of the column, to intercept the fugitives. As was expected, Phormio, alarmed for Naupactus, followed the enemy by a parallel movement along the opposite coast, supported by a Messenian land force. When the Peloponnesians saw that he had entered the gulf, and was coasting in a single file, they turned their column and hastily advanced in one line to the attack. Nine of the Athenian ships were driven ashore; one was taken with its whole company; the other crews who did not escape by swimming were slain; but all the empty ships would have been captured and towed off, had not the Messenians dashed



- 91 into the sea in their armour and rescued some. Meantime the Peloponnesian right wing of 20 fast sailers was briskly chasing the 11 Athenian ships who were making for Naupactus. The latter, all but one galley, outstripped their pursuers, and found time to face about and form a line opposite to the temple of Apollo, close to the port. The single galley in the rear was chased by a Leucadian vessel far in advance of the squadron, when its captain suddenly wheeled round a merchant vessel that happened to be riding at anchor, and struck the Leucadian amid-ships and sunk her. The Peloponnesians, who were coming up in disorder, and had already begun to raise the *Pæan*, were panic-stricken at this spectacle.
- 92 Some backed their oars, and others ran upon the shoals, when the Athenians took courage, and raising the shout of battle, rushed to the attack. The Peloponnesians, after a short resistance, fled to Panormus, but the Athenians pursued and took six of their nearest ships, and recovered all their own except the galley which the enemy had taken with its crew. Timocrates, the Spartan general, was on board the Leucadian vessel that was sunk, and killed himself; his body floated into the harbour of Naupactus. Both parties erected trophies, and the Peloponnesians recovered their dead and wrecks under a truce. The fleet of the latter, excepting the Leucadians, fearing a reinforcement from Athens, sailed away at night to the Crisæan Bay and port of Corinth; and soon after, the 20 ships from Crete joined Phormio at Naupactus (c. 85).

IX. *Expedition of Sitalces against Perdiccas,*  
chap. 93—103.

- 93 Winter. Peloponnesians attempt to surprise Piræus. —Before the dispersion of the Peloponnesian fleet, Cnemus, Brasidas, and their colleagues, at the suggestion of the Megareans, made an attempt upon Piræus, which the Athenians, relying on their naval superiority, had left unguarded. Each man then took his oar, seat-cushion, and tropoter,\* and marched from Corinth across

\* A loop or thong which kept the oar to the peg of the rowlock,

the Isthmus, and reached Megara at night. They then launched 40 galleys at Nisæa, but instead of sailing to Piræus, they proceeded to the headland of Salamis fronting Megara, stormed the fort of Budorum, and towed off three triremes stationed to guard the harbour. Meantime fire signals conveyed the alarm to Athens. Here it was thought that the enemy had sailed into Piræus, and at Piræus it was thought that Salamis had been taken. At day-break all the Athenians marched to Piræus, and whilst their land force kept guard there, the rest embarked and sailed to Salamis. The Peloponnesians, seeing them advance, and fearing that their own vessels were not sea-worthy, carried off their spoil and three prize ships to Nisæa, and from thence marched to Corinth. After this alarm the Athenians secured the Piræus with a boom, and used other precautions.

**Thracian expedition against Macedonia and Chalcidice.**—At this time Sitalces, son of Teres, and king of the Odrysian Thracians, marched against Perdiccas and the Thrace-ward Chalcidians; 1st, To punish Perdiccas, who had not performed the promises by which he had induced Sitalces to reconcile him to the Athenians and abandon the cause of his brother Philip (c. 29). 2nd, To fulfil the promises which he had himself made to the Athenians, to bring the war with the Thrace-ward Chalcidians to a successful issue. In this expedition Sitalces took with him Philip's son Amyntas, to place him on the throne of Macedonia; together with some Athenian envoys and Hagnon as general; for the Athenians were to join him at Chalcidice.

*Army of Sitalces.*

1. THE GETÆ and neighbouring tribes beyond Hæmus [the Balkan] and south of the Danube: these were all mounted bowmen, and equipped like the Scythians on whom they bordered.
2. THE THRACIANS between Hæmus and Rhodope to the sea-coast of the Euxine and Hellespont.
3. THE DII, or highland Thracians, who preserved their independence in the valley of Rhodope. These were and answered the same purpose as the *button* on the oars used on our Isis and Cam.





armed with swords, and were either volunteers or mercenaries.

4. THE AGRIANIANS, LACAEANS, and other PÆONIAN tribes who acknowledged his sway.

These last formed the boundary of the Thracian empire which terminated at the river Strymon, beyond which the Pæonians were independent. Towards the Tribulli, who were also independent, the Treres and Tilateans were the boundaries of the empire. They dwelt to the north of Mount Seombrus, and stretched westward as far as the river Osciis, which flows from the same extensive and uninhabited mountain range, joining unto Rhodope, as the Nestus and Hebrus.

97 Empire of the Odrysian Thracians.—The territory of the Odrysian Thracians thus extended from Abdera on the mouth of the Nestus, to the mouth of the Danube; a distance of four days' and nights' voyage with the wind steady astern; and almost eleven days' journey on foot for a quick traveller. Inland it extended from Byzantium to the upper course of the Strymon, about thirteen days' journey for a quick traveller. The revenue of this great tract, which included Barbarian tribes and Greek cities, amounted in the reign of Scuthes, successor to Sitalces, to about 400 talents [about £96,000] in money, and as much more in presents of gold and silver, besides those of clothing and other useful articles. The revenue and general prosperity of this empire was greater than that of any other European nation between the Ionian Gulf and Euxine Sea; and in military strength it was second only to the Scythians, who would, if united, be the most powerful nation in the world.

98 Sitalces musters his army at Doberus.—As Sitalces advanced to the borders of Macedonia, his army was augmented by bands of fresh volunteers attracted by the hope of plunder; and having crossed a desert mountain range called Cercine, by a road which he had himself cleared in a former expedition against the Pæonians, he halted near the Macedonian frontier, at Doberus. Here he found himself at the head of 150,000 men, of whom about one-third were cavalry, chiefly furnished by the Odrysians, and next to them by the Getæ. The most warlike of the infantry were the independent mountaineers

of Rhodope, who were armed with swords; the remainder were only formidable from their numbers.

Empire of Macedonia.—Under the name of Macedonia<sup>99</sup> were included the Lyncestæ, Eleniotæ, and other highland tribes, who were subject to the lowlanders, but had separate kingdoms of their own. Macedonia Proper was confined to the lower provinces near the sea, and was first acquired and governed by Alexander, father of Perdicas, and his ancestors, who were originally of the family of Temenus of Argos. These seized the following territories.

1. Pieria, from the Pierians, who afterwards settled at Phagres, under Mount Pangæus, beyond the Strymon, still called the Pierian Gulf.

2. Bottia, from the Botticeans, who now live on the confines of Chalcidice.

3. A narrow strip of Pæonia, stretching along the river Axios as far as Pella.

4. Mygdonia along the Axios to the Strymon, having expelled the Edonians.

5. Eordia, having driven out the Eordians, who chiefly perished, though a small division settled about Physca.

6. Almopia, from the Almopians.

7. Anthemus, Grestonia, Bisaltia, and much of the country that belonged to the original Macedonians.

The whole was called Macedonia, and Perdicas, son of Alexander, was king at the invasion of Sitalces.

Invasion of Macedonia.—The Macedonians, unable to<sup>100</sup> resist the enemy, fled at his approach to their fortifications and strongholds. These however were but few, for it was only at a later period that Archelaus, son of Perdicas, built those which still exist, cut straight roads, and made a better provision of horses and arms, than the eight kings who preceded him. The Thracians advancing from Doberus first overran the province which had belonged to Philip. They took Idomeia by storm; Gortynia, Atalanta, and some other places capitulated out of regard for Amyntas; but Europus successfully resisted. Sitalces then advanced on Lower Macedonia to the left of Pella and Cyrhus, and ravaged Mygdonia,



Grestonia, and Anthemus. Meanwhile, the Macedonians, unable to resist him with their infantry, had obtained a supply of cavalry from the interior, which, though well mounted and armed with breastplates, were compelled to yield to superior numbers, and at length kept quiet.

101 **Sitalces retires at the persuasion of Seuthes.**—Sitalces now sent part of his forces to ravage the Chalcidian and Bottiæan territory for eight days. Meantime the Thracians north of the Strymon, viz. the Panæi, Odomanti, Droi, and Dersæi, who were all independent, became alarmed; towards the south, the Thessalians, Magnesians, and Greeks as far as Thermopylæ, were also fearful lest the invaders should advance upon them; whilst even farther to the south the enemies of the Athenians felt insecure. But on entering Chalcidice, Sitalces found, not the Athenian fleet which was to have supported him, but envoys with presents. His army too was suffering from severe weather and want of provisions. At length was his favourite nephew Seuthes secretly won over by Perdicas, who promised Seuthes the hand of his sister Stratonice, with a large portion. Seuthes then persuaded Sitalces to return, which he did after remaining in the enemy's territory 30 days in all, including 8 in Chalcidice. Seuthes subsequently married the sister of Perdicas as promised.

102 **Phormio's expedition to Acarnania.**—The same winter, Phormio coasted from Naupactus to Astacus, and marched into the interior of Acarnania with 400 Athenians from the ships and 400 Messenians. Here he expelled certain disaffected persons from Stratus, Coronto, and other towns, and restored Cynes to Coronto. He then re-embarked, being unable to march against the Æniadæ, who were the only Acarnanians hostile to the Athenians, because of the lakes and pools formed in the winter by the river Achelous, which flows from Mount Pindus through Dolopia and the country of the Agræans and Amphiloehians, and then passing through the plain of Acarnania by Stratus, falls into the sea by Æniadæ.

**Account of the Echinades.**—Opposite to Æniadæ and close to the mouths of the Achelous, lie the uninhabited isles called Echinades, which are constantly enlarged by

the deposits of the Achelous, and some are even joined to the continent. It is reported, that when Alemæon, son of Amphiaræus, was wandering about after the murder of his mother, Apollo directed him by an oracle to inhabit a country which had not seen the sun or existed as land at the time of his mother's death. Alemæon then, seeing the nature of these islands, settled in the parts about Æniadæ, and, becoming powerful, left the name of the country from his son Acarnan.

**Phormio returns to Athens.**—Phormio, having reached Naupactus, returned to Athens at the beginning of spring, with the ships he had captured, and such of his prisoners as were freemen, who were afterwards exchanged.

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## BOOK III.

HISTORY OF THE REVOLT OF LESBOS, MASSACRE AT PLATÆA, FACTIONS AT CORCYRA, AND OPERATIONS IN SICILY, ÆTOLIA, ACARNANIA, AMPHILOCHIA, ETC. B. C. 428—426.

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### ANALYSIS.

#### I. *Revolt of Lesbos.*

**Fourth Year, B. C. 428—Summer.**—Third invasion of Attica.—Lesbos revolts from Athens.—Athenians send ambassadors, and then 40 galleys to Mytilene.—Mytilenæans send embassies to Athens and Lacedæmon.—Blockade of Mytilene by sea. Chap. 1—6.

§ Athenians send 30 ships to the Peloponnesus, under Asopius.

Chap. 7.

Mytilenæan ambassadors go to Olympia.

Chap. 8.

*Speech of the Mytilenæan ambassadors before the Lacedæmonian allies.* Not to be charged with a breach of faith, for our present revolt.—Fear of Athens obliged us to revolt.—Our revolting, when unprepared, a reason why you should aid us.—Favourable juncture for attacking Athens. Chap. 9—14.

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### II. 212 Plateans escape from Plataea.

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Speech of Cleon. Necessity of remaining steadfast to the first resolution—death and slavery.—Not to suffer eloquence to mislead the judgment.—Injuries inflicted by the Mytilenæans.—No hope of pardon to be held out. Chap. 37—40.

Reply of Diodotus. Orators not to be charged with interested motives.—Inefficiency of extreme penalties in preventing crime.—Inexpediency of punishing revolt by death.—Mytilenæan commons not to be punished with the aristocracy.—To bring the ringleaders to trial, and spare the rest. Chap. 41—48.

Motion of Diodotus carried: execution stayed at Lesbos.—Ringleaders slain at Athens: Mytilene dismantled, and soil forfeited. Chap. 49, 50.  
§ Athenians, under Nicias, take Minoa. Chap. 51.

### IV. Massacre of the Plateans.

Plateans surrender to the Lacedæmonians.—Five judges arrive from Sparta. Chap. 52.

Speech of the Plateans. We fear our fate is determined on, and our defence useless.—If you destroy us, it will be, 1st, UNGRATEFUL,—because we aided you against the Barbarians and Helots; 2nd, UNJUST,—because we applied to you before allying with Athens; 3rd, INCONSISTENT,—because we are now acting on the same principles which we exercised during the Median war; 4th, DISGRACEFUL to yourselves and impious towards the gods. Chap. 53—59.

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against the liberties of Greece, they have forfeited all claims for services against the Medes.—Reasons why we entered Plataea at night.—We call upon the Lacedæmonians for vengeance. Chap. 60—67.

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### VII. Expeditions of Demosthenes and Nicias.

Athenians send 30 ships under DEMOSTHENES and Procles to the Peloponnesus, and 60 ships under NICIAS to reduce Melos.—Nicias ravages Melos.—Descends on Bœotia, and defeats the Tanagraeans.—Lacedæmonians found the colony of Heraclea in Trachinia.—It fails, through Thesalian hostility. Chap. 91—93.

DEMOSTHENES and his 30 ships attack Leucas.—Persuaded by the Messenians to attack Ætolia.—Utterly defeated by the Ætolians. Chap. 94—98.

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### VIII. Operations at Naupactus, and Purification of Delos.

Peloponnesians under Eurylochus assist Ætolians against Naupactus.—Advance through the Locri Ozola, and ravage the Naupactian territory.—Acarnanians under DEMOSTHENES relieve Naupactus. Chap. 100—102.

§ Winter.—Sicily.—Athenians retire from Inessa: defeat the Locrians. Chap. 103.

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IX. *Expedition of Peloponnesians and Ambraciots defeated by Acarnanians, under Demosthenes.*

Ambraciots march against Amphiloehian Argos.—Joined at Olpæ by the Peloponnesians, under Eurylochus.—Athenian fleet reach Argos.—**DEMOSTHENES** general of the Acarnanians.—Two armies encamp at Olpæ.—Order of battle.—**BATTLE OF OLPÆ**.—Peloponnesians and Ambraciots defeated.—Demosthenes concludes a secret agreement with the Peloponnesians.—Prepares to cut off some Ambraciots.—Peloponnesians abandon the Ambraciots, and escape to Agræa.—Ambraciots cut off at Idomene.—Overwhelmed by their losses.—Acarnanians and Amphiloehians ally with the Ambraciots. Chap. 105—114.

§ Athenians prepare a larger fleet against Sicily.—Eruption of lava from *Ætna*. Chap. 115, 116.

## SUMMARY.

### I. *Revolt of Lesbos, chap. 1—19.*

- 1 4th Year,  
B. C. 428—  
Summer. **Third invasion of Attica.**—This summer, the Peloponnesians, under Archidamus, invaded and ravaged Attica as usual, but the Athenian cavalry prevented their light troops from advancing far from the camp and damaging the property near the city; and when their provisions were exhausted, they returned and disbanded.
- 2 **Lesbos revolts from Athens.**—Immediately after this invasion, all Lesbos, except Methymna, revolted from the Athenians, which they would have done before the war commenced, had not the Lacedæmonians rejected their offers. They had now intended to wait until they had completed the moles for the protection of their harbours, built walls and ships, and received archers and corn from Pontus; but their enemies the Tenedians, together with the Methymnæans, and some factious Mytilenæans, who were proxeni of the Athenians, sent a report to Athens that the Mytilenæans were forcibly bringing all Lesbos into a union with their city, and preparing for a revolt, with the co-operation of the Lacedæmonians and Bœotians, who were of the same race as themselves.

Athenians send ambassadors and then 40 galleys 3 to Mytilene.—The Athenians, afflicted by war and pestilence, were indisposed to believe these charges, and at first only sent ambassadors to beg the Mytilenæans to desist from their preparations and dissolve the union. The envoys returned just as Cleippides and two colleagues were about to sail against the Peloponnesus with 40 galleys, and brought word that the Mytilenæans refused compliance. The Athenians, hearing that the festival of the Malian Apollo was at hand, which was usually celebrated outside Mytilene by the whole population, immediately sent off Cleippides and the 40 galleys to surprise the city, with orders if he failed to command the Mytilenæans to surrender their ships and dismantle their walls, under pain of immediate hostilities; at the same time the Athenians detained 10 Mytilenæan galleys which had been sent as a reinforcement, and imprisoned their crews. But the Mytilenæans received timely notice of this expedition from a friend, who crossing from Athens to Eubœa, found a merchant vessel at Geræstus, and reached Mytilene the third day. The Mytilenæans now abstained from keeping the festival, and barricaded and guarded their half-finished walls. The Athenians soon arrived, 4 but their demands were rejected and they declared for war. The Mytilenæans sailed out with their fleet, but were driven back by the Athenian ships. They then requested an armistice, wishing to get the Athenian squadron recalled, which was granted, as the Athenians feared that their force was inadequate to carry on a war with all Lesbos.

Mytilenæans send embassies to Athens and Lacedæmon.—The Mytilenæans now sent one of their original secessors (c. 2) who had repented of his treachery, with other ambassadors, to persuade the Athenians that no innovation was meditated, and to induce them to recall their squadron. At the same time the Mytilenæans sent envoys to Lacedæmon in a trireme, which escaped the observation of the Athenian fleet anchoring off Malca, and reached the city in safety and negotiated for succours. The ambassadors returned from Athens without having 5 effected any thing, and the Mytilenæans, being joined





by all Lesbos except Methymna, sallied against the camp of the Athenians, who were reinforced by the Methymnians, Imbrians, Lemnians, and a few of the other allies. The Mytilenæans had a little the advantage, but afterwards retired to their walls to wait quietly for relief from Peloponnesus; for Meleas, a Lacedæmonian, and Hermæondas, a Theban, had been despatched to them before the revolt was declared, and had stealthily sailed to the town in a trireme after the battle, and induced them to send another galley with envoys to accompany them back to Sparta.

6 **Blockade of Mytilene by sea.**—The Athenians, being assured by the quiet of the Mytilenæans, summoned their allies, and bringing their ships round, they entrenched themselves in two encampments on the south side of the city, and blockaded the two harbours. But though the Mytilenæans were thus excluded from the sea, they were masters of all the land; whilst the Athenians only commanded a small extent round their camps, Malea serving them merely as a market, and as a station for their ships. *Continued at chap. 8.*

7 **Athenians send 30 ships to Peloponnesus under Asopius.**—This summer the Athenians despatched 30 ships to the Peloponnesus under Asopius, son of Phormio, the Acarnanians having requested that a son or kinsman of Phormio might be placed in command. Asopius ravaged the coasts of Laconia, and then sailed to Naupactus with only 12 ships, having sent the remainder home. He then sailed with his fleet by the Achelous to Æniadæ, whilst the whole Acarnanian land force wasted the country. The place refusing to surrender, he dismissed the land force, sailed to Leucas, and made a descent on Nericus, but was cut off with a part of his army on his return, by the inhabitants and a few guard troops. The Athenians recovered their dead under a truce, and then sailed away.

8 **Mytilenæan ambassadors go to Olympia.**—The first detachment of Mytilenæan ambassadors (c. 4) were told by the Lacedæmonians to go to Olympia, that the allies might hear and consult on their case. It was the Olympiad where Doricus the Rhodian gained his second victory, and after the festival the envoys spoke as follows:

SPEECH OF THE MYTILENÆAN AMBASSADORS BEFORE  
THE LACEDÆMONIAN ALLIES.

Not to be charged with a breach of faith for our present revolt. 9  
—“We know that when men have revolted from a former confederacy, the Greeks will receive them as long as they are benefited by them, but will still regard them as traitors. Now this would be a fair judgment, if both parties had had the same views and affections, with equal power and resources, and if no just ground for revolt had existed. But between us and the Athenians the case was different, and we will first address you on the justice of our cause, for we know that 10  
neither friendships nor alliances are lasting, unless both sides are convinced of each other's good faith, and are of congenial dispositions.

Fear of Athens obliged us to revolt.—“Our alliance with Athens, towards the conclusion of the Median war, was not to enslave Greece to the Athenians, but to deliver her from the Medes. When therefore we saw the Athenians bent upon bringing the allies under their yoke, we became alarmed; and as it was impossible for so many to join together for defence, they all became enslaved, except the Lesbians and Chians. Under these circumstances we could not but expect that a similar fate was designed for us; and indeed it was their policy to reserve us 11  
until all the rest were subdued, and we should have no confederates to aid us in struggling against them. Moreover, the fact of our supporting their enterprises whilst we were nominally independent seemed to imply our approbation of their justice; and our naval power made them think it unsafe to risk a premature attack on us. Thus we lived in mutual suspicion, restrained 12  
only by mutual fear. And as we were inferior to them in power, our only hope consisted in being able to anticipate them, and in revolting before all revolt was become desperate.

Our revolting when unprepared, a reason why you should aid us. 13  
—“We desired to revolt and ally with Lacedæmon before the war commenced; and now that the Bœotians have invited us, we have immediately listened to their proposals. But we have been forced to revolt whilst unprepared, and this is a reason why you should the sooner receive us as allies, and send us succour.

Favourable juncture for attacking Athens.—“Athens is now wasted by disease and distressed for money. Her ships are either cruising round your coasts or stationed against us. And if you would invade Attica a second time this summer by sea and land, the Athenians would either not oppose you by sea, or recall their squadron from Mytilene. Moreover, the war will not be decided in Attica, but in the quarter from whence she derives her revenue, and that revenue will be increased if she subdue us. But if you heartily assist us, you will add to your league a state possessed of a powerful navy,



and deprive Athens of her allies without incurring the charge  
 14 of having assisted them to revolt. In the name then of that Olympian Jupiter in whose temple we stand, aid us in our hour of need. We are facing the brunt of danger in our own persons, but our deliverance will benefit all Greece, whilst our failure will involve it in general ruin.”

15 Peloponnesians admit Lesbos into alliance; prepare to invade Attica.—The Lacedæmonians and confederates admitted the pleas of the Mytilenæans, and received them as allies. The confederates were then ordered to march with two-thirds of their forces to the Isthmus, whilst the Lacedæmonians went there first to prepare machines for transporting a fleet from the Corinthian to the Saronic Gulf, so as to attack Attica both by sea and land. The other allies were however slow in assembling, for they were engaged in gathering in their harvest and were sick of expeditions.

16 Athenians send 100 ships to Peloponnesus: Spartans return home.—The Athenians were now aroused by the enemy's supposition of their weakness, and without recalling their squadron from Lesbos, they equipped 100 galleys, and embarked their resident aliens, and all their citizens excepting the two highest classes, viz. the knights, and the pentacosio-medimni:\* and after a demonstration of their force at the Isthmus, they made descents on various parts of the Peloponnesian coast. The Lacedæmonians now thought that the representations of the Lesbians were false, and as their allies did not join them, and they heard also that the 30 Athenian ships under Asopius were ravaging Laconia, (c. 7,) they returned home; but afterwards they prepared a fleet to send to Lesbos and require the states to furnish 40 ships, and appointed Alcidas admiral. The Athenians, seeing the Lacedæmonians depart, returned also with their 100 ships.

\* Solon divided the Athenians into four classes or ranks, viz. I. The Πεντακοσιομεδίμνοι, whose lands brought in yearly 500 medimni in corn, wine, or oil. II. The Ἰππᾶδα τελοῦντες, whose lands brought in 300 medimni, and who were bound to serve in war as cavalry. III. The Ζευγίται, whose lands brought in 200 medimni, and who were unable to maintain a war-horse, but able to keep a yoke of oxen or mules to plough their land. IV. The Θῆτες, who included all the rest, and were incapable of bearing office under government, but had a vote in all public assemblies.

Greatness and expense of the Athenian navy.— 17  
 Whilst the 100 ships were at sea, the Athenians had one of the largest navies they had ever possessed in an effective condition; viz.—

	Galleys.
Round Attica, Eubœa, and Salamis . . . . .	100
About the Peloponnesus . . . . .	100
At Potidæa and other places . . . . .	50
	Total 250

It was this fleet and the siege of Potidæa that most exhausted their revenues. At Potidæa there were at first 3000 heavy-armed, and afterwards 1600, who each received two drachmæ [about 1s. 6d.] a day, one drachma for himself and one for his servant; and those on board the ships received the same pay.

Mytilenæans attack Methymna.—Whilst the Lacedæmonians were at the Isthmus, the Mytilenæans and their allies marched against Methymna, in the hope of its being betrayed to them. The enterprise failed, and they proceeded to Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus, and strengthened the walls, and secured the ascendancy of their partisans. When they had retired, the Methymnæans attacked Antissa, but were defeated in a sortie.

Blockade of Mytilene by land and sea.— 18  
 The Athenians, hearing that the Mytilenæans <sup>Winter.</sup> were thus masters by land, sent 1000 heavy-armed troops under Paches, who, on arriving at Mytilene, carried a wall across the land side of the city, and built forts in some of the strongest positions; so that Mytilene was completely blockaded by land and sea (c. 6). *Continued at chap. 25.*

Athenians raise money: Lysicles slain.—The Athenians 19  
 now wanted money for the siege, and having raised 200 talents [about £48,000] by a contribution amongst themselves, they sent 12 ships under Lysicles and four colleagues, to levy subsidies from the allies. After collecting money in various quarters, Lysicles advanced from Myus in Caria into the interior, and was slain with



many of his men in the vale of the Mæander, near the hill of Sandius, by a body of Carians and Anæitans.

II. *Two hundred and twelve Plataeans escape from Plataea, chap. 20—24.*

- 20 **Plataeans plan an escape across the enemy's lines.**—The same winter, the besieged Plataeans, (ii. 78,) being distressed for provisions, and despairing of aid from Attica, unanimously resolved, at the suggestion of Theænetus, a soothsayer, and Eupompidas, one of their generals, to force their way over the enemy's lines. Half of the besieged subsequently shrank from the danger, but 220 adhered to their resolution. Scaling-ladders of a sufficient height were the first requisite, and as the enemy's walls lay at no great distance from the town, and were but imperfectly whitewashed, their height was ascertained by having the layers of brick sedulously counted over and over again by different persons.
- 21 **Description of the Peloponnesians' wall.**—The enemy's wall consisted of two lines 16 feet apart, one against the Plataeans, and the other to prevent any attack from Athens. Between these two lines were the soldiers' quarters, which were built so continuously that the whole appeared like one thick wall, with battlements on each side. At every ten battlements was a tower, of the same breadth as the interval between the two lines; and in stormy and wet weather the guards left the battlements, and took shelter under the towers.
- 22 **The escape effected.**—On a stormy night of wind and rain, when there was no moon, the Plataeans issued forth under the guidance of the authors of the enterprise. Being lightly armed, and having only the left foot shod, to secure them from slipping in the mire, they crossed the ditch and reached the wall unperceived by the sentinels; being shrouded by the darkness, and the noise of their approach drowned by the wind, whilst they kept at a distance from each other, to prevent the clashing of their arms. First came a party carrying ladders, which they planted at a space between the towers. Ammias first mounted the ladders, at the head of 12

men armed only with breastplates and short swords, who then divided into two parties of six each, and proceeded to secure the two nearest towers. Next came another party with short spears, their shields being carried by their comrades behind them. When a considerable number had mounted, one of the Plataeans, in laying hold of the battlements, threw down a tile, and alarmed the besiegers, who immediately rushed to the wall; but the Plataeans in the city diverted them, by sallying forth and attacking the opposite side. The besiegers then remained at their posts, whilst 300 of their number, whose orders were to carry aid to any point where it might be needed, proceeded outside the wall in search of the cause of the alarm. The besiegers also raised fire signals of an attack towards Thebes, but the Plataeans in the city showed similar signals, so as to render it impossible for the Thebans to interpret those of the enemy.

Meantime the first scaling party had taken the two 23 towers, and, after slaying the sentinels, had guarded the passages leading through them; whilst others mounted by ladders to the roofs, and kept the enemy in check with missiles. The main body of the fugitives now scaled the wall between the two towers, planting more ladders, and throwing down the battlements; and as they crossed the outer ditch they formed upon its edge, and protected their comrades as they came over, with arrows and darts. Last of all, the Plataeans, who occupied the towers, descended with great difficulty, and waded through the ditch, which was covered with thin ice, and swollen so with the snow storm, that the men could scarcely hold their heads above water. The 300 Peloponnesians then came up with lighted torches, which however only served to render them an easier mark for the missiles of the Plataeans.

**Two hundred and twelve Plataeans reach Athens.**— 24 Leaving the ditch, the Plataeans took the road to Thebes, keeping the chapel of Androcrates on their right, whilst they saw the enemy carrying torches along the road to Cithæron and the Oak-heads, in the direction of Athens. After following the Theban road for 6 or 7 stadia, [nearly a mile,] they turned into that which leads by Erythræ



and Hysie to the mountains, and at length reached Athens, to the number of 212. Of the 220 that started, (c. 20,) one bowman was taken at the outer ditch, whilst others turned back before they passed over the wall. The latter reported to the Plataeans in the city, that every man had fallen; but at day-break, a herald was sent for the bodies, and the truth was revealed. *Continued at chap. 52.*

### III. *Suppression of the Revolt at Lesbos, chap. 25—51.*

- 25 **Salæthus encourages the Mytilenæans.**—At the close of the winter, Sakæthus, a Lacedæmonian, was sent in a trireme to Mytilene; and, having reached Pyrrha by sea, he proceeded overland, and contrived to make his way into Mytilene, through the Athenian lines, by ascending a dry water-course. He encouraged the Mytilenæans, by telling the magistrates that Attica was to be invaded, and that the ships would come which were to have assisted them previously; and that he himself had been despatched with the news, and to superintend their affairs.
- 26 **Fourth invasion of Attica; under Cleomenes.**  
5th Year,  
B. C. 427—  
Summer. —This summer, after the Peloponnesians had despatched their admiral, Alcidas, with 42 ships to Mytilene, they proceeded to invade Attica, under Cleomenes, who acted for his nephew, Pausanias, son of Pleistoanax, who was still a minor. Having ravaged the whole country, leaving no part untouched, in a manner only less destructive than the second invasion, they found their provisions failing; and, no news arriving from the fleet at Lesbos, they returned home and disbanded.
- 27 **Mytilenæans forced to surrender to the Athenians.**—Meantime, the Peloponnesian fleet had not reached Mytilene, and the provisions of the city were almost spent. At length, Salæthus determined on sallying out against the Athenians, and equipped the commons as heavy infantry. But as soon as the commons obtained weapons, they refused to obey their commanders; and collecting in armed groups, they declared that unless the public provision stores were opened and divided, they would make their own terms with the Athenians.
- 28 **Terms of the treaty.**—The members of government,

fearful of a capitulation, from which they would be excluded, made an agreement with Paches, that they would admit him and his army into the city, and send ambassadors to Athens to plead their cause; but that he should neither imprison, enslave, or execute a Mytilenæan, until the embassy returned.

**Paches reassures the Mytilenæans.**—When the Athenians entered Mytilene, those of the citizens who had communicated with the Lacedæmonians were so alarmed, that they seated themselves as suppliants by the altars. Paches reassured them by promises of safety, and removed them to Tenedos, to await the determination of the Athenians. He also sent some triremes, and took Antissa.

**Delays of the Peloponnesian fleet, under Alcidas.**— 29  
 Meantime, the 40 ships who ought to have joined the Mytilenæans, (c. 16,) loitered about the Peloponnesian coasts, and having touched at Delos, Alcidas landed at Icarus and Myconus, where he first heard of the capture of Mytilene. Wishing to know the exact truth, he proceeded to Embatus of Erythræ, where he learnt that 7 days had elapsed from the capture. A council of war was then held, and Teutiaplus, an Elean, spoke thus:

#### SPEECH OF TEUTIAPLUS TO THE PELOPONNESIAN ADMIRAL.

To recover Mytilene by a sudden attack.—“It is my opinion 30 that we should try to surprise Mytilene by a sudden attack, as the enemy, who have so recently taken it, are certainly off their guard by sea, and probably by land; and the proverbial ‘surprises of war’ are nothing more than similar chances.”

**Alcidas rejects the advice.**—Alcidas rejected the ad- 31  
 vice of Teutiaplus, as well as that of some Ionian and Lesbian refugees, who urged him to seize one of the Ionian cities, or else Cyme in Æolia, which might be made the centre of a general Ionian revolt from the Athenian rule; and added, that if they thus deprived the Athenians of the chief source of their revenue, and kept a fleet of observation, they might persuade Pissuthnes, a Persian satrap, to join them in the war.

**Executes his prisoners: reproved by Samians.**—Al-





cidas, having rejected all proposals, resolved to return to the Peloponnesus, and weighing from Embatus, he coasted to Myonnesus, near Teos, where he butchered most of the prisoners he had taken. These had approached his fleet, thinking it an Athenian one, and believing that no Peloponnesian ships could cross to Ionia whilst Athens was mistress of the sea. At Ephesus, Alcidas was met by envoys from the Samians of Anaxa, who told him that he was not liberating Greece by destroying men who were not hostile, but only forced by necessity to be allies of the Athenians: and they assured him that by such proceedings he would make but few friends of his enemies, though many enemies of his friends. Alcidas immediately released all the Chians and some of his other prisoners, and then left Ephesus: and as, whilst anchoring off Clarus, he was observed by the Salaminian and Paralus, two war-ships from Athens, he at once pushed across the open sea for the Peloponnesus.

**Pursued by Paches, but escapes to Patmos.**—But the two war-ships carried news of the enemy's fleet to Paches, who had already received intelligence from Erythræ and other quarters; for Ionia, having no fortified towns, had been alarmed lest Alcidas should assault and plunder her cities. Paches immediately set out in pursuit, and chased Alcidas to Patmos; but though he was obliged to return without success, yet he considered it fortunate that he had not overtaken the fleet near shore, and been compelled to give his forces the trouble of an encampment and blockade.

**31 Paches takes Notium.**—Paches on his return touched at Notium, a port town of Colophon, and about two miles from it. Colophon had been taken in the second year of the war, [B. C. 430,] by Itamenes and some Barbarians, who had been invited by a faction within the city. The other party then fled to Notium, where they settled, but again split into factions; one of which procured an auxiliary force of Arcadians and Barbarians from Pissuthnes, and occupied the fortified quarter of Notium, and allied with the Median party of Colophonians, who were settled in the upper city. The other factions being then forced into exile from Notium, called

in Paches, who obtained a parley with Hippias the Arcadian commander, by a promise of returning him in safety to the citadel. When Hippias came out, Paches arrested him, and then took the citadel by a sudden attack, slew the whole garrison, and leading Hippias, according to his perfidious promise, within the citadel, he treacherously shot him through. Paches then restored Notium to the party who had sought his aid; and the Athenians afterwards sent there, as colonists, all the Colophonian refugees that they could collect from various cities, to be governed according to Athenian laws.

**Sends Salæthus to Athens, where he is executed.**—35 On his return to Mytilene, Paches reduced Pyrrha and Eresus, and having seized Salæthus (c. 25, 27) in a city where he was hiding, despatched him to Athens, together with the Mytilenæans at Tenedos, (c. 28,) and others whom he thought implicated in the revolt. He also sent back most of his troops, but stayed with the remainder to settle the affairs of Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos. On reaching Athens, Salæthus was immediately put to death, though he promised, amongst other things, to induce the Peloponnesians to raise the siege of Platea.

**Athenians deliberate upon the punishment of the Mytilenæans.**—The Athenians resolved, upon the motion of Cleon, to put all the Mytilenæans to death that were of age, and to enslave all their women and children; for they were indignant that the Mytilenæans should have revolted without having been enslaved, (c. 10, 11,) whilst the crossing of the Peloponnesian fleet to Ionia proved the revolt to have been long premeditated. A trireme was at once sent to Paches with orders to carry out this cruel resolution without delay; but the next day many repented of this sweeping measure, and co-operating with the Mytilenæan ambassadors, got the presiding magistrates to call another assembly and put the question to the vote. Both sides having expressed their opinions, Cleon, who was the most violent of the citizens, and yet most influential with the commons, spoke as follows:



## SPEECH OF CLEON.

- 37 **Necessity of remaining steadfast to the first resolution.**—"I have often been convinced that a democracy is incapable of ruling an empire, and I am now confirmed in my belief by your change of purpose respecting the Mytilenæans. Having no fear of plots at home, you are unsuspecting of others; and you forget that your weakness is perilous to yourselves, whilst it confers no obligations on your allies; that you hold a tyrannical dominion over men who, being your involuntary subjects, are plotting against you; and who obey you not from gratitude, but from fear. And it is most dangerous if we cannot be steadfast to our resolutions, and take the laws as they stand; without yielding to those orators who wish to be wiser than the laws, and exhibit their wisdom by misleading our judgment.
- 38 **Net to suffer eloquence to mislead the judgment.**—"For my part, I am astonished at those who have proposed to discuss the case of the Mytilenæans a second time; and whoever endeavours to persuade the people to alter their decision, must either maintain a paradox to display his talents, or must be bribed to make the worse cause appear the better. But it is your own folly that gives these orators encouragement. Your passion for novelty, and your admiration of talent, tempts them to labour rather to gratify your craving for intellectual excitement, than to propose to you sound sense in simple language.
- 39 **Injuries inflicted by the Mytilenæans.**—"The Mytilenæans have done you the greatest injury. They have revolted without any provocation, whilst living in independence and experiencing our kindest regard; and as they were islanders, and possessed ships and fortifications, they could have repelled any attacks of our enemies. Undeterred by witnessing the calamities of their neighbours who have revolted, and unsatisfied with their present fortune, they have joined our implacable foes, and indulged in the wildest schemes of ambition. As the offence was aggravated, the punishment ought to be severe. The aristocracy and commonalty are all alike guilty; and their impunity will encourage others of your allies to revolt also, when they see that they risk but little if they fail, and gain their liberation if they succeed; whilst there would then be no end to the labours, dangers, and losses of the commonwealth, which would be involved in a series of contests, in which victory would be unprofitable, and defeat calamitous.
- 40 **No hope of pardon to be held out.**—"Let no pardon therefore be held out for those who revolt. Have no pity towards those who would be your enemies for ever, nor listen to the eloquence of specious orators, for which you would have to pay too great a penalty. Consider that justice and expediency alike call for

vengeance on the Mytilenæans; that if you decide otherwise, you pass sentence upon yourselves; for if they were right in revolting, you cannot maintain your empire; whilst by a wise and just severity, you would teach your allies the inevitable consequences of revolting from your dominion."

**Diodotus replies.**—Diodotus, who had opposed the 41 massacre of the Mytilenæans in the previous assembly, now rose to reply to Cleon.

## SPEECH OF DIODOTUS.

**Orators not to be charged with interested motives.**—"I neither 42 blame those who propose a second discussion, nor praise those who object to deliberation; for I think that the two things most opposed to good counsel are *haste*, which is generally allied to folly, and *passion*, which commonly belongs to a coarse and narrow mind. But most odious are those orators who charge their opponents with interested motives, which makes all men suspected, and intimidates those best able to advise; 43 which obliges a speaker to be careful how he addresses you, and which induces you to regard his words beforehand with suspicion, and to punish those who give you advice that proves unfortunate after it has been followed.

**Inefficiency of extreme penalties in preventing crime.**—"But I 44 come not to defend the Mytilenæans, or to be any man's accuser. The question is, not what would be just, but what would be expedient; and I contradict the assertion of Cleon, that if we inflict the penalty of death now, it will prevent the frequency of revolts for the future. For the penalty of death 45 has never put a stop to crimes. The hope of impunity has tempted men to run all hazards; whilst their passion and natural inclination to commit wrongs have ever defied the most stringent laws and heaviest punishments. And it is with states as with individuals: none ever attempted a revolt without what seemed to them a reasonable prospect of success.

**Inexpediency of punishing revolt by death.**—"But whilst the 46 punishment of death will not prevent your allies from revolting, it will make them desperate in their resistance when they have revolted. Every future war against a rebellious state would then be a struggle for life; and when we had recovered a city at a vast expense of blood and treasure, we should find, instead of useful subjects, a solitude and a ruin. But on the other hand, the hope of mercy might induce a state to come to terms whilst it yet had the means of refunding the expenses of the war, and of paying tribute for the future. Upon the whole, however, we shall find a far better security in the previous care and watchfulness of our government, than in the bloodiness of our after-punishments.

**Mytilenæan commons not to be punished with the aristocracy.** 47  
—"You will also greatly err in another respect if you follow



the advice of Cleon. At present the commons in all the states are well disposed towards us, and if ever compelled by the aristocracy to join in a revolt, they are at once opposed to the party who have so compelled them. If, therefore, you butcher the commons of Mytilene, who, when they had obtained arms, voluntarily surrendered the city, you will not only slay your benefactors, but produce exactly the result which the aristocracies generally desire, and estrange the affections of the only class which can be called our friends. It would be wiser indeed, even if they were culpable, to draw a veil over their offences.

48 To bring the ringleaders to trial, and spare the rest.—“My advice then is, that you bring those Mytilenæans whom Paches has sent us as guilty to a dispassionate trial, but to leave the rest in the possession of their city.”

49 Motion of Diodotus carried: execution stayed at Lesbos.—The amendment of Diodotus was carried by a small majority, and a trireme was immediately despatched to stay the execution. It was provided by the Mytilenæan envoys with wine and barley-cakes, and the rowers were stimulated by the promise of great rewards; and as the crew rowed without intermission, eating as they rowed, and sleeping by turns, they gained on the other galley, which had not hurried on its bloody errand. But the latter had had 24 hours' start, and reached Mytilene first, and Paches had already read the decree, and prepared to execute it, when the trireme arrived and prevented the butchery.

50 Ringleaders slain at Athens: Mytilene dismantled and soil forfeited.—The authors of the revolt who had been sent to Athens—upwards of 1000 men—were put to death as Cleon had proposed. The walls of Mytilene were dismantled, and her ships seized, but no tribute was exacted. All Lesbos except Methymna was divided into 3000 portions, of which 300 were consecrated to the gods, and the remainder allotted to Athenian citizens, who afterwards received two minæ (about £8) yearly for each portion from the Lesbians who farmed the soil. The Athenians also took possession of the continental towns which belonged to Mytilene.

51 Athenians under Nicias take Minoa.—After this the Athenians under Nicias made an expedition against Mi-

noa, an island off Megara, upon which the Megareans had built a tower. From Minoa Nicias wished the Athenians to keep watch over Nisæa, instead of from Budorum and Salamis, to prevent the Peloponnesian triremes and privateers from sailing out unobserved, and to see that nothing was imported by the Megareans. Having therefore with engines from the sea taken the two towers abutting upon Nisæa, Nicias deepened the channel between Minoa and the continent, and built a wall on the main-land to cut off communication from a bridge which had been constructed over a morass for carrying succours to Minoa. He then left a garrison and works on the island and retired.

#### IV. Massacre of the Plataeans, chap. 52—68.

Plataeans surrender to the Lacedæmonians.—The 52 Plataeans now, pressed by famine, surrendered to the Lacedæmonians. The latter had discovered by a feint attack that the garrison was unable to defend the walls, and sent a herald to propose that they should surrender, and that the Lacedæmonians should be their judges. The commanders had been instructed to do this, as it was expected that, in case of peace, *the conquests* on both sides would be restored, and they wished to preserve Plataea, which they could do if it voluntarily capitulated (v. 17).

Five judges arrive from Lacedæmon.—The Plataeans having accepted the terms, were fed by the Lacedæmonians for nine days, when five judges arrived from Lacedæmon, and merely asked them a single question: “*Had they done the Lacedæmonians or their allies any service during the present war?*” The Plataeans obtained permission to defend themselves at greater length, and deputed Astymachus and Lacon to speak for them.

#### SPEECH OF THE PLATAEANS.

We fear that our fate is determined on and our defence useless.— 53  
“We surrendered our city, Lacedæmonians, with the agreement that we should be judged by yourselves, and not subjected to such a trial as this. And now that you have brought no charge against us, but only ask us a concise question, which if we answer truly we are condemned, and if falsely, we are refuted, we have just reason for fearing that, through your



determination to gratify the Thebans, we are brought to a trial which is already decided against us. But we are compelled to say something at all risks, lest hereafter we may be tortured by the self-accusing thought that the words we had left unspoken might have saved us; and though we know that all we

54 can urge is known to you already, nevertheless, while we allege our claims to justice, we will remind you of our good deeds, and try to persuade you to mercy.

If you destroy us it will be, 1st, *Ungrateful: because we aided you against the Barbarians and Helots.*—"As to your question, 'whether we have rendered you any service in this present war?' we reply, 'If you ask us as enemies, we have not wronged you, though we have done you no good; if you regard us as friends, it is you who are in the wrong for having marched against us.' But if we appeal to what we did against the Medes, and during the peace, we can say, that we alone of all the Bœotians joined you in the deliverance of Greece; that though an inland people, yet we were engaged at Artemisium; that we stood by you and Pausanias in the battle fought upon our native land; and that when you, Lacedæmonians, were panic-stricken by an earthquake and threatened by your Helots, we aided you with the third of our forces.

55 2nd, *Unjust: because we applied to you before allying with Athens.*—"Our subsequent hostility was not our fault, but yours. When we requested your alliance and applied for aid against the violence of the Thebans, you recommended us to apply to the Athenians; and justice and honour alike forbade us to renounce a connexion which we had sought as a favour, and by which we had derived the greatest advantages and shared in the rights of Athenian citizenship.

56 3rd, *Inconsistent: because we are now acting on the same principles we exercised during the Median war.*—"The Thebans, beside other aggressions, seized our city in time of peace, (ii. 2,) and during a festival, and we were right in defending ourselves. It will not, therefore, be just for you to molest us on their account. If they seem to be useful to you now, you ought to remember how much more serviceable we and the other Greeks were in a time of greater danger, and when the Thebans were allied with the Barbarian. Our past merits ought to outweigh our present fault, for it was then a rare thing to find any Greeks who would oppose Xerxes. But though we then courageously preferred honour to interest, yet we are now ruined for exercising the same principles, and for preferring the side of the Athenians, from a sense of justice, rather than yours, from a regard for ourselves.

57 4th, *Disgraceful to yourselves, and impious towards the gods.*—"You ought to remember also, that at present you are accounted by all to be an example of justice; to consider how your glory must suffer, if you pass an unjust sentence upon us, and dedicate, in the temples common to all Greece, the spoils taken from her benefactors: and to know that you will have

destroyed a city whose name was inscribed by your fathers upon the tripod at Delphi; and that for the sake of the Thebans you have expunged that name from the Greek community. But such are the extreme calamities to which we are now reduced. We were ruined by the Medes, and now we are worsted by the Thebans. We were compelled by hunger to capitulate, and now we are tried for our lives. We, who were zealous beyond all in the cause of Greece, are now deserted and unassisted; and we fear that you, our only hope, are now determined to sacrifice us.

"But for the sake of the gods whom we have invoked in 58 common alliance, and for our own valour in the cause of Greece, we implore you not to disgrace yourselves for ever, by injustice towards us; for as you have received our free surrender, the law forbids you to slay us. Moreover, your fathers who fell by the Mede were interred here by Pausanias, as within a friendly earth; to their sepulchres we pay annual honours, and offer the first-fruits of our soil; regarding them as friends from a land we loved, and as comrades with whom we have fought! But if you slay us, and turn this Platean into Theban soil, you will leave your fathers amongst their murderers, in a hostile country, unhonoured by the gifts they now receive; you will enslave the land in which the Greeks won their freedom; and you will desolate the temples of the gods, to whom they prayed before vanquishing the Medes, and deprive them of our ancestral sacrifices.

"But such deeds, Lacedæmonians, were not to your honour. 59 We then conjure you by the gods of our common country, by the pledged oaths of your fathers, by their tombs, and by their departed spirits, not to sacrifice us to the rage of the Thebans. To them we never did surrender; sooner than that we would have perished by hunger; but we solemnly confided and capitulated to you. It ill becomes you then to deliver up to their bitterest foes men who relied upon your faith, and who have been most singularly zealous in the cause of our common country."

Thebans obtain leave to speak.—The Thebans, fearing that the Lacedæmonians would relent, begged to be allowed to speak, as the Plataeans had made a longer speech than the question required. Leave was then granted.

#### REPLY OF THE THEBANS.

Cause of our quarrel with the Plataeans.—"We should not have 61 asked permission to reply to the Plataeans if they had briefly answered your question, and not indulged in invective against us and panegyric upon themselves. We first quarrelled with them because, after we had occupied Bœotia, they refused to submit to us, and unite with the other Bœotians; and they





then called in the Athenians to aid them in resisting our authority.

- 62 They would have Medized if the Athenians had done so.—“The Plataeans abuse us, and pride themselves, because they were the only Bœotians who did not Medize. But we declare that the only reason that they did not join the Mede was, because the Athenians did not; and for the same reason, they only of the Bœotians have helped the Athenians to enslave Greece. Moreover, our alliance with Persia was not the fault of the nation, but of a cabal of a few individuals who exercised a despotic authority, and joined the Mede for the sake of preserving their power. But after the Mede was repulsed, and our city recovered its ancient polity, we showed our regard for the liberties of Greece, by our constant opposition to Athens; and we obtained the liberty of Bœotia on the field of Coronea, and have shown the utmost alacrity in furnishing cavalry and provisions beyond any of the allies, for the liberation of other states.
- 63 The Plataeans, in assisting Athens against the liberties of Greece, forfeited all claims for services against the Mede.—“But that you, Plataeans, have injured Greece, we will endeavour to show. You say you allied with the Athenians that they might assist you against us; but that was no reason why you should voluntarily assist them in all their ambitious attacks upon Greece, when you might have joined Lacedæmon; and though you say it was base to betray your benefactors, yet it was more base to betray all the Greeks to ruin. You have thus forfeited all claim to respect for your services against the Persians. As you have chosen the side of the Athenians, you must bear the brunt of the struggle with them. Refer not to the league, for you yourselves violated it, when you assisted in enslaving the Æginetæ and others who had joined it. And you rejected our proposal to preserve a neutrality.
- 65 Reasons why we entered Plataea at night.—“As for our late attempt to enter your city, we were invited by some of your chief citizens, who wished to unite you again, if possible, to the common confederacy of Bœotia; and we came in peace, and proclaimed that whoever was willing to have a constitution according to the hereditary institutions of the Bœotians, should join us. But you, after joining us, attacked us as enemies, in violation of your agreement; and the men whom you took prisoners in your city you afterwards, in spite of your solemn promise, treacherously murdered.
- 67 We call upon the Lacedæmonians for vengeance.—“We have entered thus largely into this matter, Lacedæmonians, that you may know that whilst you are right in condemning these men, we also are right in pursuing them to vengeance. Be not moved therefore by the recital of their ancient virtues, nor by their moanings over their forlorn condition, and appeals to your fathers' tombs. We more justly call upon you to avenge our young men whom they butchered, and whose fathers partly

fell at Coronea whilst delivering Bœotia from the Athenian yoke, whilst others are living through a lonely age with desolated homes. We therefore conjure you to punish these men, who have outraged every law, as they deserve; remember that they are not men who have held up their hands to you after battle, but who have surrendered on definite terms to take their trial; and teach both to them and the world, that plausible words are but a flimsy veil for unjust actions.”

Two hundred Plataeans slain: women enslaved: and 68 city given to the Thebans.—The Lacedæmonians having frequently desired the Plataeans to preserve a neutrality, according to the old treaty of Pausanias, after the Median war, considered its rejection as absolving them from all civil obligations. They therefore put the original question to each Plataean separately, viz. “*Whether he had done any service to the Lacedæmonians or their allies, during the present war?*” And on each one's answering in the negative, they were all slaughtered without a single exception, to the number of 200 Plataeans and 25 Athenians. The women were all sold as slaves, and the city and its territory were ceded to the Thebans. For a year, the latter permitted the town to be occupied by some Megarean exiles, and a remnant of the Plataeans, belonging to the Theban party; but afterwards they razed it to the ground, and with the roofs and doors of the houses they built an inn, near the temple of Juno, 200 feet square, with two stories of rooms all round. With the brass and iron furniture they made couches which they dedicated to Juno, and also built for her a stone chapel, 100 feet long. The territory was annexed to the Theban state lands, and let to private Thebans, on a term of 10 years.

The Lacedæmonians acted thus severely to gratify the Thebans, who they hoped would be useful to them in the war.

*Plataea thus fell in the 93rd year after its alliance with Athens.*

#### V. *Factions at Corcyra,\* chap. 69—85.*

Peloponnesian fleet sails to Coreyra.—The 40 ships 69 under Alcidas, having escaped from the coast of Ionia,

\* Continued from Book i. chap. 55.



(c. 33.) were dispersed by a storm off Crete, but again assembled at Cyllene, where Alcidas found 13 galleys of Leucadians and Ambraciots, under Brasidas. The Lacedæmonians, having failed in saving Lesbos, destined this fleet to act upon Corcyra, as that place was divided by faction, and the Athenians had only stationed 12 ships at Naupactus. *Continued at chap. 76.*

- 70 **State of Corcyra: aristocracy force the people to declare neutrality.**—In the sea-fights off Epidamnus, the Corinthians had taken 250 prisoners, who belonged to the Corcyraean aristocracy; but these were afterwards (i. 55) sent back on the nominal security of 800 talents [about £192,000] given by their proxeni; but, in truth, on the condition of undertaking to bring over Corcyra to the Corinthians. These men on their return to Corcyra intrigued amongst the citizens; and on the arrival of a ship from Athens, and another from Corinth, both with ambassadors, the Corcyraeans resolved to continue their alliance with the Athenians, but to be friends with the Peloponnesians. The aristocratic party, who were thus favourable to the Corinthians, charged Pithias, the leader of the democratic party, and a voluntary proxenus of Athens, with wishing to enslave Corcyra to the Athenians. Pithias was acquitted, but in return accused five of the richest aristocrats with having cut stakes on the ground sacred to Jupiter and Alcinous. The five were convicted, and condemned to pay one stater\* for every stake, and sat in the temple as suppliants that they might pay the fine by instalments. But Pithias, who was a member of the council, obtained the full enforcement of the law; when his adversaries combined together, and rushed into the senate-house with daggers, and killed him and 60 others, and only a few of his party escaped on board the Athenian trireme. The aristocrats, having thus got rid of their enemies, summoned the Corcyraeans to an assembly, and obliged them to declare that for the future they would receive neither of the rival powers excepting in a single ship, and to send ambassadors to Athens, to justify their revolution, and to induce the refugees there to refrain from opposition.

\* Probably the silver stater or tetradrachm, equal to 3s. 3d.

**Aristocracy defeated by the commons.**—The Athenians, however, arrested both the envoys and such of the Corcyraean exiles as had yielded to their persuasions, and sent them all in custody to Ægina. Meantime, the arrival of a Corinthian ship, with some Lacedæmonian envoys, encouraged the dominant party to attack the commonalty. The latter were defeated, but at night established themselves in the citadel and other eminences in the city, and in the Hyllæic harbour, whilst the aristocracy held the market-place and other harbour which adjoined it. The next day they had a few skirmishes, 73 and raised reinforcements. The slaves, whom each party invited by the promise of freedom, mostly joined the commonalty, whilst the aristocracy was reinforced by 800 auxiliaries from the continent. Next day the commons, 74 being strong in numbers and position, obtained the victory; whilst their women joined boldly in the battle, and threw tiles on the enemy. The oligarchy were routed by twilight, and fearing that the commons would carry the arsenal, and put them to the sword, they set fire to the houses round the market-place, which consumed much property, and nearly destroyed the city, but stopped the advance of their opponents. Both parties remained quiet during the night, but as the commons had gained the victory, the Corinthian ship and most of the auxiliaries made their escape.

**Nicostratus arrives and mediates: distrust arises.**—75 The following day Nicostratus arrived from Naupactus, with 12 Athenian ships and 500 heavy-armed Messenians, and persuaded both parties to bring to trial the ten chief authors of the sedition, but to live in peace with each other, and in alliance with the Athenians. The ten had however escaped, and Nicostratus was about to depart, when the leaders of the commons requested him to leave five of his galleys with them, and to take five which they would man for him instead. Nicostratus consented, and the commons prepared to place their enemies on board, who, however, fled as suppliants to the temple of the Dioscuri, and Nicostratus failed to re-assure them. The commons now alleged that this distrust arose from some treacherous design, and searched their houses for



arms, and would have killed those they met had not Nicostratus interposed. The rest of the aristocratic party, being upwards of 400, sat as suppliants in the temple of Juno, but the commons were so afraid of their numbers that they persuaded them to rise, and then removed them to an island [Ptychia] in front of the temple, and supplied them with provisions.

76 **Peloponnesian fleet arrives off Coreyra: Coreyraeans defeated.**—On the fourth or fifth day after this removal,

the Peloponnesian fleet of 53 ships, under Alcidas and Brasidas, (c. 69,) having left Cyllene and anchored at Sy-

77 bota, approached Coreyra. The Coreyraeans, in great confusion, equipped 60 ships, and sent them against the enemy as fast as manned; though the Athenians had advised that they themselves should go first, and that the Coreyraean fleet should follow afterwards all together.

On approaching the enemy, two of the Coreyraean ships deserted, and in others the crew began fighting one another. The Peloponnesians, seeing their disorder, advanced against the Coreyraeans with 20 ships, and with the remaining 33 encountered the 12 Athenian vessels, which included the two celebrated ships, Salamina and

78 Paralus (c. 33). The Coreyraeans, advancing in disorder, and by few at a time, were soon distressed; while the Athenians, avoiding the centre of the enemy's fleet from fear of being surrounded, bore down upon the extremity of their line and sunk one ship. The Peloponnesians then formed into a circle, and the Athenians, sailing round, would have thrown them into the same confusion as in the Crisæan Gulf (ii. 84); but the division opposed to the Coreyraeans came up, and the Athenians leisurely retired before the united fleet to give their allies time for retreating. Thus, about sun-set, the battle terminated, leaving the Peloponnesians masters of 13 Coreyraean vessels.

79 **Alcidas afraid to follow up his victory.**—The Coreyraeans were now afraid lest the Peloponnesians should advance upon their city, or carry off the 400 men from Ptychia, and therefore removed the latter back to the temple of Juno, and prepared for defence. But the Peloponnesians withdrew with their 13 prizes to Sybota,

and though, on the next day, Alcidas was advised by Brasidas, who was inferior to him in command, to advance upon the city, yet Alcidas preferred landing at Leucimne and ravaging the country. Meanwhile the 80 commons of Coreyra had negotiated with their adversaries for the preservation of their city and manned 30 ships; but the Peloponnesians sailed from Leucimne at mid-day. At night-fall, Alcidas learnt by night-signals from Leucas, that 60 Athenian vessels were approaching under Eurymedon, who had been despatched when the news of the Coreyraean sedition reached Athens. The 81 Peloponnesians now hastily coasted along, and hauling their ships over the Leucadian isthmus that they might not be seen doubling it, sailed back.

**Commons of Coreyra massacre their opponents for seven days.**—The commons of Coreyra, on learning the approach of the Athenian fleet, and retreat of the Peloponnesians, introduced the Messenians brought by Nicostratus (c. 75) for the first time into the city; and then ordering the 30 galleys they had manned to sail round into the Hyllæic harbour, they proceeded to kill all their opponents they met, and butchered all the oligarchs who had manned the galleys, as each one landed. They then tried to persuade the suppliants in the temple of Juno to submit to a trial. Fifty yielded and were condemned to death: the majority however refused, and seeing what was now done, destroyed themselves on the precincts, some hanging themselves on the trees. The massacre continued during the seven days of Eurymedon's stay; and though the murderers only accused those who had sought to overturn the democracy, yet they killed many from private enmity, or from owing them money. Every kind of atrocity was committed. Fathers slew sons; suppliants were dragged from the sanctuaries or slain within them; and some were even walled up in the temple of Bacchus, and thus perished.

**Horrors of the struggle between the aristocracy and democracy.**—The great atrocities committed during this sedition appear all the worse from being the earliest; but 82 subsequently all Greece became convulsed; and the democratic party, who desired to call in the Athenians, were



everywhere combating with the aristocratic party, who desired to call in the Lacedæmonians. During peace neither party would have had pretext or opportunity for inviting either of the rival powers. But now, whilst Sparta and Athens were engaged in a war, which induced them willingly to receive fresh allies, occasions for inviting either power frequently offered themselves to those of both aristocracy and commons, who desired a revolution. Many dreadful things befell the cities through this sedition; things which have been, and ever will be, as long as human nature remains the same, but modified and varied according to circumstances. For whilst both states and individuals are better disposed during peace and prosperity, yet war arouses their passions by necessity, and assimilates their temper to their condition.

**Virtue identified with party spirit.**—Thus were the Greek states torn by factions, and those harassed by later commotions, having heard of what had been done before, exhibited a marked superiority in the cunning of their plans and cruelty of their vengeance. Nay, the very meaning of words was changed. Reckless daring was regarded as staunch partisanship; prudent delay, as specious cowardice; moderation, as a cloak for pusillanimity; and wisdom, as sluggishness. Frantic passion was considered as a part of manliness; deliberation, as a pretence for declining the contest. The advocate of violence was trusted, whilst his opponent was suspected. A successful plotter was thought clever, but he who suspected a plot, still cleverer; whilst he who by prudent forethought needed neither to plot or counterplot, was regarded as one who broke up his party and feared his adversaries. In a word, that man was commended who circumvented his adversary in a plot, or tempted a man to join in one.

**Sanctions of religion, morality, and natural affection broken.**—The ties of party were held to be stronger than the ties of blood, because a partisan was more daring and unscrupulous than a relation; for party associations had nothing to do with any benefit derived from the laws, but were made in opposition to the laws, in a spirit of ambition and rapacity. Their mutual confidence was

not confirmed by religious obligation, but by community in crime. They would not trust the fair proposals of adversaries, if stronger than themselves, but kept a watchful eye on their actions. Revenge upon another was deemed of greater consequence than escape from injury. Oaths were only binding so long as the party who made them had no assistance from another quarter, but they were broken with the greatest pleasure if they had thrown an enemy off his guard, which pleasure arose partly from the safety of the plan, and partly from the glory of having cleverly overreached an adversary. Thus most men are ashamed of being called honest fools, but exult at being styled clever rogues.

**Lust of power an overruling passion.**—The source of all these evils was an ambitious and covetous desire to rule, and the consequent violence of party struggles. The leaders in the cities, whilst specially advocating *equal rights and privileges* on one side, and a *moderate aristocracy* on the other, sought only to advance themselves; and whilst straining every nerve to get the better of each other, they ventured upon the most horrible outrages, and wreaked their vengeance far more than was expedient for the state, in order to gratify their own party; and when they had the power, they were ever ready to gratify their present animosity by an unjust decree, or with their own hands. Piety was in fashion with neither party; but they who succeeded in effecting some odious purpose under fair pretences, were held in the highest esteem. Neutral citizens were destroyed by both factions, either because they would not join in the quarrel, or from envy that they should escape.

**General distrust engendered.**—Thus faction filled Greece with every kind of villany. That simple honest-heartedness, which is the chief ingredient in a generous nature, was laughed down and disappeared. Mutual opposition and continual distrust generally prevailed, for no promise could be believed, and no oath relied on. The more every one considered, the more they despaired of finding any thing trust-worthy; and they tried rather to avoid a mischief than to rely upon any man's faith.

**Moral power yielded to physical force.**—Persons of





meaner intellects had now generally the advantage, for fearing that they should be over-reached by words or subtle treacheries, they proceeded boldly to deeds; whilst their opponents, presuming upon always discovering evil designs beforehand, and thinking it unnecessary to seek by force what they could acquire by stratagem, were mostly destroyed when off their guard.

84 [\* Human nature mastered the laws.—It was at Corcyra that most of these evils were first committed: viz. 1st, Those evils which men retaliated upon their former tyrants, when an opportunity for vengeance arrived. 2nd, Those outrages which others might commit, who being poor passionately coveted their neighbours' goods. 3rd, Those cruelties which other men, who were on an equality with their adversaries, exercised not from vengeance or for plunder, but purely in the fury of party spirit. Thus the whole order of life was confounded in this city; and human nature, having mastered the law, triumphantly indulged its passions, defied all justice and superiority, preferring vengeance to religion, and gain to justice. And thus men in their violence abrogated those common laws of humanity, which alone protect parties in adversity, and to which they themselves may one day desire to appeal.]

85 Remnants of aristocrats seize continental ports, and ravage Corcyra.—Eurymedon and the Athenians now sailed from Corcyra, when 500 Coreyræan aristocrats, having escaped and seized some forts on the opposite coast, now mastered the Coreyræan territory on the continent, and distressed the island by sallies, until they produced a famine in the city. They also sent embassies to Lacedæmon and Corinth, for assistance in restoring them, but being unsuccessful, they obtained some boats and 600 auxiliaries. With these they crossed to the island, burnt their boats, and built a fort on Mount Istone; from whence they annoyed the citizens, and held the surrounding territory. *Continued at iv. 46.*

\* This chapter is now generally considered to be spurious, for though the matter is worthy of Thucydides, yet the style is only a caricature of his defects. See Arnold's note.

## VI. Athenians first interfere in Sicily, chap. 86—90.

Athenians support the Ionian states against Syracuse and the Dorian states.—At the close of the summer, the Athenians sent 20 ships to Sicily, under Laches and Charœades. The SYRACUSANS [originally a Corinthian colony] were in alliance with all the Dorian cities, except Camarina; and these cities had joined the Lacedæmonian confederacy, but had hitherto been neutral. The LEONTINES were in alliance with Camarina, and with all the Chalcidian cities [who were Ionian]. In Italy the SYRACUSANS [Dorian] were also joined by the Locrians, whilst the LEONTINES [Ionian] were joined by the Rhegians. The SYRACUSANS and LEONTINES were now at war with each other, and the LEONTINES, being hemmed in by land and sea, had sent for assistance to the Athenians, on the ground of a former alliance, and because they were both Ionians. The Athenians sent the 20 ships, and stationed them at Rhegium, in Italy; wishing, in reality, to prevent Sicily from exporting corn to the Peloponnesus, and to see if it were possible to conquer the island. *Continued at chap. 88.*

2nd attack of the plague at Athens.— Winter. 87  
The plague which attacked Athens in the second year of the war, lasted two years, and then abated for a twelvemonth. In the winter of the present [fifth] year it broke out again, and continued for a year, accompanied by earthquakes in Athens and Eubœa, and in Bœotia, especially at Orchomenus. There died by the plague, altogether, 4400 heavy infantry, 300 cavalry, and an unknown number of the lower classes.

Athenians at Rhegium attack the Æolian Isles.— 88  
This winter the Athenians and Rhegians with 30 galleys (c. 86) sailed against the islands of Æolus, which were impracticable in the summer from the shallowness of the water. These islands are inhabited by the Liparæans, a colony of Cnidians, who dwell in the one called Lipara, and cultivate the three others, viz. Didyme, Strongyle, and Hiera. The people there think that Vulcan works at Hiera, because it emits smoke by day and fire by night.



The four isles lie opposite the Sicels and Messanians, and were allies of the Syracusans. The Athenians ravaged their fields, but finding that they would not surrender, returned to Rhegium. *Continued at chap. 90.*

89 <sup>6th Year.</sup>  
<sup>B. C. 426—</sup> Peloponnesians deterred from invading Attica by an earthquake.—This summer the Peloponnesians and allies under Agis, son of Archidamus, advanced to the Isthmus for the invasion of Attica, but some earthquakes obliged them to return.

**Inundations.**—Whilst the earthquakes were prevalent, several inundations took place. 1st, At Orobæ in Eubœa, where the sea retired, and then returned with a great swell, overflowed most of the city, drowned many people, and only partially subsided. 2nd, At the isle of Atalanta, off the Opuntian Locri, which swept away part of the Athenian fort, and broke up one or two triremes which were drawn up on the shore. 3rd, At Peparethus the water rose, but without inundating the town, whilst an earthquake threw down part of the wall, and the Prytaneum, and some houses. Thucydides supposes these inundations were caused by the sea being violently driven back by the shock of the earthquake, and then suddenly returning.

90 **Operations in Sicily: Messina reduced.** The war still continued in Sicily, but Charœades (c. 86) was slain, and Laches became sole commander of the fleet. Laches in conjunction with the allies attacked Mylæ, which was at that time garrisoned by two companies of Messanians, who laid an ambush for the invaders. The Athenians and allies routed the ambuscade, and forced the citadel to surrender and join them against Messina, which capitulated and gave hostages and other securities on the approach of this united force. *Continued at chap. 99.*

VII. *Expeditions of Demosthenes and Nicias,*  
*chap. 91—98.*

91 **Athenians send 30 ships round Peloponnesus and 60 to Melos.**—The Athenians now sent 30 ships round the Peloponnesus under Demosthenes and Procles, and 60 ships and 2000 heavy-armed under Nicias to Melos. **Nicias ravages Melos.**—The Melians, though islanders,

had refused to submit or ally with the Athenians, and would not yield after Nicias had ravaged their land (v. 85.)

**Descends on Bœotia.**—The 60 Athenian ships then sailed to Oropus, where the 2000 heavy-armed disembarked at night, and marched to Tanagra in Bœotia. Here they were joined by an army from Athens under Hipponicus and Eurymedon, and the united force ravaged the Tanagraean territory by day, and bivouacked there the following night. The next day they defeated an army of Tanagraeans and Thebans, and erected a trophy, after which the army from Athens retired to their city, and Nicias with his 60 ships ravaged the coasts of Locris and then returned.

**Lacedæmonians found the colony of Heraclea.**—The 92 Melians form three tribes, viz. Paralians, Hierians, and Trachinians. Of these the Trachinians were much reduced by the bordering Cœtæans, and, fearing to trust in an Athenian alliance, they sent Tisamenus as ambassador to Lacedæmon. In this embassy the Dorians, the mother-state of the Lacedæmonians, also joined, as they too were distressed by the Cœtæans. The Lacedæmonians then, wishing to assist both the Trachinians and Dorians, determined on colonizing Heraclea in Trachinia, thinking also that that situation would prove advantageous in the war with Athens, as, 1st, A navy would have but a short passage from there to Eubœa; and 2nd, It would be convenient for marching to Thrace. Having therefore obtained the consent of the oracle at Delphi, they sent out colonists from themselves and the Periœci, with such Greeks as chose to accompany them, except Ionians, Chæans, and some others. The settlers were led by Leon, Alcidas, and Demagon, and built the city of Heraclea, 40 stadia [about 5 miles] from Thermopylæ, and 20 stadia [about 2½ miles] from the sea, and also raised docks by the pass of Thermopylæ.

**Colony fails from Thessalian hostility and Lacedæmonian tyranny.**—The Athenians were at first afraid that this settlement was directed chiefly against Eubœa, as the passage from Heraclea to Cenæum in Eubœa is but short. But the Thessalians continually harassed



and weakened the new settlers, fearing that they would become powerful neighbours, as at first they had been very numerous, from their confidence in Lacedæmon. And this war, combined with the harsh and tyrannical government of the Lacedæmonian officers, soon reduced the colony, and rendered it an easy prey to the neighbouring nations.

94 **Demosthenes and his 30 ships attack Leucas.**—Whilst Nicias and his 60 ships were at Melos, (c. 91,) the forces on board the 30 vessels cruising round the Peloponnesus, under Demosthenes and Procles, first cut off some garrison troops at Ellomenus in Leucadia by an ambuscade; and afterwards, being reinforced by 15 Corecyrean ships, and troops from Zacynthus and Cephallenia, they advanced against Leucas, where they were supported by the whole Acarnanian force except the people of Æniadæ. The Leucadians, being overpowered by numbers, kept close, whilst their territory was ravaged; and the Acarnanians pressed Demosthenes to invest the city with a wall, after which they might take it by storm, and crush their perpetual enemy. But at the same time Demosthenes was persuaded by the Messenians, that with so large an army it was a favourable moment to attack the Ætoli-ans, who were hostile to Naupactus; and that if they were subdued, the conquest of the neighbouring continent would be easy. They represented, moreover, that though the Ætoli-ans were numerous and warlike, yet they might be quickly reduced before they could unite, as they lived in un- walled villages far apart from each other, and wore but light armour. They advised him to attack, 1st, The Apodotians; 2nd, The Ophionæans; and 3rd, The Eurytanians, who form the largest division, speak the most barbarous dialect, and are cannibals: for if these were conquered the rest would surrender.

95 **Persuaded by the Messenians to attack Ætolia.**—Demosthenes yielded out of regard for the Messenians, especially as he thought that, without the Athenian forces, and with only the continental allies and the Ætoli-ans, he might invade Bœotia by land; going first through the Locri Ozolæ to Cytinium in Doris, and keeping Parnassus on his left hand until he reached the

Phocians, whom he thought would join him, from their friendship for Athens, or might be brought over by force.

**Utterly defeated by the Ætoli-ans.**—Demosthenes then left Leucas with all his force, and coasted to Sollium, where he communicated his plan to the Acarnanians, but they refused to support him. The 15 Corecyrean galleys also returned home, but Demosthenes advanced upon the Ætoli-ans with the Cephallenian, Messenian, and Zacynthian troops, and the 300 heavy-armed Athenians who served as marines on board his ships, and made Æneon in Locris his head-quarters. The Locri Ozolæ were allies of the Athenians, and were to join Demosthenes in the interior, and they were expected to be serviceable from their knowledge of the country, and because their arms and mode of fighting resembled those of their Ætoli-ian neighbours.

Having bivouacked at night with all his army in the precinct of the Nemean Jupiter, in which Hesiod is said 96 to have been killed, the next morning he marched into Ætolia. On the first day he took Potidanea; on the second, Crocyleum; and on the third, Tichium, where he halted, and sent off his booty to Eupalium in Locris; intending, when he had subdued the rest and returned to Naupactus, to make a second expedition against the Ophionians if they did not surrender. Meantime, the Ætoli-ans had been informed of his designs from the commencement, and were already on the march with their whole force, which even included the Ophionian tribes of Mount Ceta, the Bomienses, and Callienses, who dwelt towards the Melian Gulf. The Messenians now gave 97 Demosthenes the same advice as before, namely, that he should at once master each village in succession before the Ætoli-ans could unite and oppose him. Accordingly, without waiting for the Locri Ozolæ, and being in the greatest want of light-armed dart-men, he advanced and took Ægitium, the inhabitants of which posted themselves on the hills surrounding the town, which stood on an eminence about 80 stadia [10 miles] from the sea. But the whole Ætoli-ian force had by this time advanced on Ægitium, and running down the hills on different



sides, they assailed the Athenian army with darts, retreating when the latter advanced, but pressing on when they retired. The Athenians had rather the worst, but continued to resist as long as they saw that their archers had arrows, and could keep the Ætoliens in check. But at length the archers lost their leader and dispersed; and the heavy-armed infantry, being wearied out by the continual pursuing and retreating, fled before the darts of the Ætoliens. Their guide, Chromon, a Messenian, had however fallen, and many of them lost themselves and perished in pathless ravines and strange places. Many were killed in the pursuit by the light-armed and swift-footed Ætoliens; but the greater part marched into a forest which had no outlet, when the enemy fired the trees and they perished in the flames. Great numbers of the allies were slain, and 120 of the heavy-armed Athenians, including the general, Procles; and these last were the best men that fell during the war. The survivors having with great difficulty escaped to the sea and to Cœneon in Locris, recovered their dead under a truce, and retired to Naupactus, and shortly afterwards sailed with the fleet to Athens. But Demosthenes, dreading the displeasure of the people, remained behind at Naupactus. *Continued at chap. 102.*

99 Sicily and Italy. Athenians attack Locris.—At this time the Athenians at Sicily (c. 90) made a descent on Locris, defeated the Locrians, [Syracusan allies in Italy,] and took a guard fort on the river Halex. *Continued at chap. 103.*

VIII. *Operations at Naupactus, and Purification of Delos, chap. 100—104.*

100 Peloponnesians under Eurylochus assist Ætoliens against Naupactus.—Before the Athenians had invaded Ætolia, the Ætoliens had sent their envoys, viz. Tolophus, Boriades, and Tisander, to Lacedæmon and Corinth for an army to attack Naupactus; and about autumn, the Lacedæmonians despatched 3000 heavy-armed of their allies, including 500 from their new colony of Heraclea, (c. 92,) under Eurylochus, with Macarius and Menocæus as subordinate commanders.

Advance through the Locri Ozolæ and ravage Naupactian territory.—The army having assembled at Delphi, Eurylochus sent a herald to the Locri Ozolæ, whom he wished to detach from the Athenian alliance, and through whose territory his road lay to Naupactus. The Locrians of Amphissa, who feared the hostility of the Phocians, first gave hostages themselves, and then persuaded their neighbours to give the same security, and to join with them the invading army. First, the Myœneans, on whose side Locris was the most difficult of access, and then the Ipneans, Messapians, Tritæans, Chalcæans, Tolophonians, Iessians, and Cœantheans, followed the advice of the Amphissians. The Olpæans gave hostages but would not join the expedition, whilst the Hyæans did not give hostages before Polis, one of their cities, was taken. Eurylochus, having lodged the hostages at Cytinium in Doris, marched through the Locri, took Cœneon and Eupaleum, which refused to surrender, and being joined by the Ætoliens in the Naupactian territory, the united forces ravaged the country, mastered an unfortified suburb, and took Molycrium, a Corinthian colony, but subject to Athens.

Acarnanians under Demosthenes save Naupactus.—Meantime Demosthenes, on hearing of the approaching invasion, had gone to Acarnania, and with great difficulty prevailed on the Acarnanians (c. 94) to send 1000 heavy-armed troops with him to relieve Naupactus. This force entered the city and saved it, for the garrison was previously too small for the extensive walls. Eurylochus now saw that it was impossible to take Naupactus by assault, and withdrew to Calydon and Pleuron in ancient Æolis, and to Proschium in Ætolia. Here he stayed with his army until he should have to assist the Ambraciots, who had induced him to join them in an expedition against the Amphilochean Argos and Acarnania, persuading him that if he mastered these countries the whole of the continent would ally with the Lacedæmonian. *Continued at chap. 105.*

Sicily. Athenians retire from Inessa: defeat the Locrians.—The Athenians in Sicily, (c. 99,) with their Greek allies, and such Sicels as had

Winter.





revolted from Syracuse, attacked Inessa, where the Syracusans had garrisoned the citadel. Being unsuccessful they retired, and the garrison sallied out upon their allies who were in their rear, and routed a division and killed many men. Laches afterwards sailed with the Athenian fleet to Locris, made some descents by the river Cœcinus, and defeated 300 Locrians under Proxenus, and took away their arms. *Continued at chap. 115.*

104 **Athenians purify Delos.**—This winter the Athenians purified Delos in obedience to an oracle, for Pisistratus had only purified the land within sight of the temple (Herod. i. 64). They removed all the sepulchres, and ordered that, for the future, no one should either die or bear a child in the island, but that all who were near their time should be carried to Rhenea, an island so near to Delos, that Polyerates, tyrant of Samos, dedicated it to the Delian Apollo, by connecting it with Delos by a chain. The Athenians then instituted the Delian games, which were to be celebrated every fifth year (v. i).

**Ancient Delian festivals.**—The Ionians and neighbouring islanders had however held a festival at Delos from very early times, and assembled with their wives and children as the Ionians do at Ephesus, and held gymnastic and musical contests, and the different cities took up bands of dancers. This is proved by the following verses from Homer's hymn to Apollo:

"At other times, O Phœbus, thou takest thy chief delight in Delos,

Where in thy honour the tunic-trailing Ionians  
Gather to thy town with children and with wives;  
Where with boxing, and with dance and song,  
They, mindful, gladden thee when they set the games afoot."

There was a musical contest also, which is proved by the following verses from the same hymn:

"But well—propitious be Apollo and Diana, both;  
And farewell all; but yet he mindful of me  
In time to come, when some toil-worn stranger  
Of mortal men shall come and ask,  
'O damsels, who is he, most sweet of song,  
Who visits here, and in whom ye most delight;'

Then do ye all reply with kindly words,  
'The *blind* old man of Scios' rocky isle.'

Subsequently, though the Athenians and islanders sent bands of dancers with sacrifices, yet the games were abolished, probably through adversity, until the Athenians restored them and established horse-races in addition.

IX. *Expedition of Peloponnesians and Ambraciots defeated by Acarnanians and Demosthenes, chap. 105—114.*

**Ambraciots march against Amphilocheian Argos.**—105 The Ambraciots, in fulfilment of their compact with Eurylochus, (c. 102,) invaded Amphilocheia with 3000 heavy infantry, and occupied Olpæ, a stronghold on a hill near the sea, 25 stadia [nearly 3½ miles] from Argos, and anciently fortified by the Acarnanians as a national court of justice. A division of the Acarnanians then marched to the relief of Argos, whilst the Amphilocheians encamped at Crenæ [wells], to prevent the junction of Eurylochus with the Ambraciots. They also sent for Demosthenes to be their leader, and for the 20 Athenian ships that were cruising round the Peloponnesus under Aristoteles and Hierophon.


Joined at Olpæ by the Peloponnesians under Eurylochus.—The Ambraciots at Olpæ, fearing that the Peloponnesians would be intercepted, sent to Ambracia to request that the whole force of the city should march to their assistance. Meantime Eurylochus, starting from 106 Proschium in Ætolia, crossed the Achelous, and marched through Acarnania, finding the country drained for the relief of Argos. Having the Stratians on his right, he passed through Phytia, Medeon, and Limnæa, and reached Agræa, which is beyond the Acarnanian borders. He then crossed the uncultivated hill Thyamus, and entered the Argive territory by night; and passing Argos and the Acarnanian posts at Crenæ, he joined the Ambraciots at Olpæ by day-break, and the united armies encamped 107 at Metropolis.

**Athenians send 20 ships: Demosthenes general of the Acarnanians.**—Soon after, the 20 Athenian ships entered the Ambracian Gulf, and blockaded Motropolis



from the sea. Demosthenes also arrived with 200 heavy-armed Messenians and 60 Athenian archers; and the Acarnanians and those few Amphiloehians who were not detained by the invasion of their country, elected him commander-in-chief. The two armies encamped near Olpæ, separated by a ravine. For five days they remained quiet, but on the sixth they prepared for battle. Demosthenes found his army outflanked by the Peloponnesians, and fearful of being surrounded, he posted an ambuscade of 400 heavy and light-armed troops in a hollow way, covered with a thicket, who might take the enemy in the rear.

## ORDER OF BATTLE.



108 **Battle of Olpæ: Peloponnesians and Ambraciots defeated.**—The extreme left wing of the Peloponnesians turned the enemy's right, but was attacked in the rear by the ambuscade and completely routed, and Eurylochus was slain, and his bravest troops cut to pieces. The Ambraciots in the right wing were however victorious, and chased the enemy to Argos, but on returning from the pursuit, they fell in with the Acarnanians and reached Olpæ with difficulty. The main army of Eurylochus was panic-stricken, and took to flight, pursued by Demos-

thones and his Messenians, and they all made a disorderly retreat except the Mantineans.

Demosthenes concludes a secret agreement with the Peloponnesians.—The battle lasted until the evening, and the next day, as Eurylochus and Macarius were slain, Menedæus took the command; and as he feared that he could neither sustain a siege whilst blockaded by land and sea, (c. 107,) nor retreat in safety, he applied to Demosthenes and his Acarnanian colleagues for a truce, under which he might bury his dead and retire. The latter restored his dead and buried their own, about 300 in number, and erected a trophy; but they would not grant any truce for his whole army to retire, though they secretly permitted Menedæus and the Peloponnesians and Mantineans to depart, wishing to strip the Ambraciots and mercenaries of their allies, and to prejudice the Peloponnesians in those parts, by such an instance of their treachery.

Prepares to cut off some Ambraciots.—Demosthenes now heard that the Ambraciots, who had been sent for from Olpæ, (c. 105,) not having heard of the battle, were approaching. He therefore sent a division of his army to lie in ambush, and preoccupy the strong positions, whilst he advanced with the main body.

Peloponnesians abandon the Ambraciots, and escape to Agræa.—Meantime, the Mantineans and others, who were favoured by the truce, issued from the camp in small parties, under pretence of gathering fire-wood and pot-herbs, and quickening their pace as they proceeded, were soon discovered to be in full retreat. The Ambraciots, whom they had left behind, seeing this, immediately attempted to overtake them in a body; and the Acarnanians, whose generals alone were in the secret, at once started off in the pursuit. The Acarnanians, thinking that the enemy were all trying to escape without permission, fell upon both parties, and even threw one or two darts at their generals, who told them of the secret agreement, and who they thought were betraying them; but at length they singled out the Ambraciots only, and slew 200 of them, whilst the rest fled to Agræa, a bordering



territory, and were hospitably received by King Salynthius, who was their friend.

112 **Ambraciots cut off at Idomene.**—The Ambraciots from Ambracia (c. 110) had now reached Idomene, and encamped for the night on the lesser of its two summits; whilst the greater one, unknown to them, was occupied by the troops which Demosthenes had sent on before the main body. At the same time, Demosthenes himself had set out in the evening from Olpæ, and with half his army reached the pass between the two hills, whilst the other half proceeded over the mountains of Amphilochia. At day-break he fell upon the Ambraciots, who had not yet risen, and who took the assailants for allies; for Demosthenes had placed his Messenians in the van, with orders to deceive the out-posts, by accosting them in the Doric dialect. Most of the Ambraciots were slain on the spot, and the rest fled to the mountains; but being heavy-armed and ignorant of the country, whilst the Amphilochians were light-armed, and of course familiar with their own territory, they fell into ravines or upon the ambuscades, and some even swam out to sea, preferring to commit themselves to the mercy of the Athenian ships in the Gulf, rather than to their barbarous enemies the Amphilochians. Few of the Ambraciots therefore escaped home; whilst the Acarnanians, after spoiling the dead and setting up trophies, retired to Argos.

113 **Ambraciots overwhelmed by their losses.**—The next day a herald came to the Acarnanians from the Ambraciots at Agræa, to apply for the bodies of those who had fallen in the flight from Olpæ. Being ignorant of the disaster of the previous day, the herald was surprised at seeing the arms. Some one, supposing him to have come from the troops at Idomene, asked him, "Why he was surprised, and how many on his side had been slain?" He replied, "About 200." "These are the arms of more than 1000," said his questioner. "Then," said the herald, "they are not the arms of those who fought against us." "Indeed they are," said the other, "if, at least, you fought us yesterday at Idomene." "Nay," answered the herald, "we fought no one yesterday, but

the day before yesterday in the retreat." "Ay," rejoined the other, "but we fought yesterday also with the reinforcement, who were advancing to your assistance." When the herald heard this, he broke out into wailing, and returned without asking for the bodies. This was the heaviest loss that any one Greek city suffered in so short a time, throughout the war; and Thucydides does not record the numbers reported to be slain, only because they seem incredible in comparison with the size of Ambracia. He has no doubt also, but that if the Acarnanians and Ambraciots had complied with the advice of Demosthenes, they might have taken Ambracia at the first assault; but they feared that the Athenians, after possessing it, would prove worse neighbours than the Ambraciots.

A third of the spoils was then allotted to the Athenians, and the rest shared amongst the cities. The Athenian spoils were captured during their voyage home, and those in the Attic temples are the 300 suits of armour that were reserved for Demosthenes, and which he now carried to Athens as his last exploit, and atoned for his defeat in Ætolia (c. 98). 114

**Acarnanians and Amphilochians ally with the Ambraciots.**—After Demosthenes and the Athenians had departed, the Acarnanians and Amphilochians granted a truce, permitting the Ambraciots and Peloponnesians, who had now withdrawn from Agræa to Cœniadæ, to retire unmolested. They also made a treaty with the Ambraciots, to last 100 years, upon condition "that neither the Ambraciots should join with the Peloponnesians against the Acarnanians, nor the Acarnanians join the Athenians against the Ambraciots; but that they should mutually assist each other; and that the Ambraciots should restore all the hostages and territory they had wrested from the Amphilochians, and never assist Anactorium, which was hostile to the Acarnanians." The Corinthians afterwards sent 300 heavy infantry under Xenocleides to garrison Ambracia.

**Athenians prepare a larger fleet against Sicily.**—115 This winter the Athenians in Sicily (c. 103) made a descent upon Himera from their ships, whilst the Sicels ravaged its inland frontier. The Athenian fleet then



retired to Rhegium, where they found that Pythodorus had been sent to supersede Laches in the command. For the Athenian allies [Leontines] in Sicily had sent to Athens for more vessels, representing that though the Syracusans had mastered their territory, yet the latter only had a few ships with which to command the sea. The Athenians, wishing to bring the war to a conclusion, and practise their men, equipped 40 vessels, but first sent Pythodorus with a few ships to supersede Laches, intending afterwards to send out Sophocles and Eurymedon with a larger squadron. Pythodorus then sailed to the Locrian fort which Laches had taken, (c. 99,) but was defeated by the Locrians and returned. *Continued at iv. 1, 2.*

- 116 Eruption of lava from *Ætna*.—Towards spring the fire-flood issued from *Ætna* and destroyed part of the territory of the Catanæans, who dwell at the foot of the mount, which is the highest in Sicily. This eruption took place 50 years after the preceding one, and there have been three in all since the Greeks have inhabited Sicily.

## BOOK IV.

HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATION OF PYLUS, PACIFICATION OF SICILY, REVOLUTION OF MEGARA, CAMPAIGNS OF BRASIDAS, ATTEMPTED REVOLUTION IN BŒOTIA, AND ONE YEAR'S ARMISTICE.  
B. C. 425—423.

### ANALYSIS.

#### I. Operations in Sicily.

Seventh year, B. C. 425—Summer.—Messana revolts from Athens.—*Fifth invasion of Attica, under Agis*.—Athenians send 40 ships to Sicily.  
Chap. 1, 2.

#### II. Athenians occupy Pylus.

Demosthenes advises the fortification of Pylus.—Soldiers execute it from idleness.—Demosthenes left to guard it: Lacedæmonians delay.  
Chap. 3—6.

§ Simonides takes Eion, but abandons it.

Chap. 7.

Spartans prepare to attack Pylus by land and sea.—Blockade the harbour, and occupy Sphacteria.—Demosthenes prepares for defence.

Chap. 7—9.

*Speech of Demosthenes.* Everything depends upon keeping the enemy from landing.

Chap. 10.

Attack by sea: Brasidas distinguishes himself.—Defeat of the Peloponnesian fleet in the harbour of Pylus.—Athenians intercept the land force in Sphacteria.—Armistice concluded until an embassy should return from Athens.—Conditions.—Embassy despatched: 60 ships given up.

Chap. 11—16.

*Speech of the Lacedæmonian ambassadors.* We shall speak at length: hear us considerately.—Present opportunity most favourable for establishing your prosperity.—We invite you to conclude a lasting peace.—To be reconciled before an irreparable loss renders it impossible.

Chap. 17—20.

Athenians require the surrender of Sphacteria, and restoration of Nisæa, Pega, Træzen, and Achaia.—Ambassadors wish to confer with commissioners.—Hostilities renewed: Athenians will not destroy the 60 ships.

Chap. 21—23.

### III. Operations in Sicily.

Renewed attack on Rhegium.—Naval operations in the Strait, etc.—Messanians unsuccessfully attack Naxos.—Athenians attempt Messana.

Chap. 24, 25.

### IV. PYLUS. Athenians take Sphacteria.

Lacedæmonians secretly throw supplies into Sphacteria: Athenians distressed.—Cleon at Athens, imputes the delay to the generals.—Nicias offers the command to Cleon, who engages to take Sphacteria in 20 days.—Cleon joins with Demosthenes: wood in Sphacteria burnt.—Herald sent: 800 heavy-armed Athenians land on Sphacteria, and cut down the advanced guard.—Light infantry land and annoy the Lacedæmonians.—Lacedæmonians escape to the fort.—A Messenian conducts a party to the enemy's rear.—Lacedæmonians surrender.—Number of the slain.—Length of the blockade: Cleon's promise fulfilled.—Surprise of the Greeks at the surrender of the Lacedæmonians.—Prisoners carried to Athens: Pylus garrisoned.

Chap. 26—41.

### V. Expedition of Nicias to Corinth.

Nicias sent to Corinth with 80 ships.—Corinthians defeated in an obstinate battle.—Athenians re-embark.—Athenians sail to Crommyon and Epidaurus: garrison Methone.

Chap. 42—45.

### VI. Second Massacre at Coreyra.

Eurymedon and Sophocles storm Istone: aristocracy surrender.—Pride of the commons, and butchery of the aristocracy.

Chap. 46—48.

§ Anactorium taken and occupied by Acarnanians.

Chap. 49.





VII. *Intrigues with Persia.*

Winter.—Persian ambassador to Lacedæmon intercepted.—*Death of Artaxerxes, accession of Darius Nothus.* Chap. 50.

‡ Athenians oblige the Chians to dismantle their walls. Chap. 51.

VIII. *Nicias sails to Cythera and Thyrea.*

Eighth year, B. C. 424—Summer.—Eclipse of the sun.—[Lesbian exiles take Rhœtium and Antandros.]—Athenians under Nicias sail against Cythera.—Take and garrison the island, and ravage Laconia.—Panic at Lacedæmon.—Nicias takes Thyrea. Chap. 52—57.

IX. *General Pacification of Sicily.*

Congress of Sicilians at Gela. Chap. 58.

*Speech of Hierocrates.* No interested motive in recommending peace.—Not to consider our separate interests, but how to save all Sicily from the Athenians.—Necessity of union amongst ourselves.—Uncertainty of war.—In any case, ought not to call in the Athenians to arbitrate our quarrels.—Make mutual concessions by peace, and secure our national independence. Chap. 59—64.

Sicilians agree to a peace; Athenian commissioners punished. Chap. 65.

X. *Revolution at Megara.*

Leaders of the commons betray Megara to Athens.—Hippocrates and Demosthenes take the Long Walls.—Megarean treachery detected.—Athenians take Nisæa.—Brasidas advances to Megara.—Joined by the Bœotians; cavalry skirmish.—Athenians decline battle.—Brasidas enters Megara.—Oligarchy established: 100 commonalty slain. Chap. 66—74.

‡ Demodocus and Aristides take Antandros: Lamachus loses his fleet. Chap. 75.

XI. *Project for a Revolution in Bœotia.*

Intrigues in Bœotia.—Demosthenes sails to Naupactus to levy troops. Chap. 76, 77.

XII. *Expedition of Brasidas to Thrace.*

Brasidas marches through Thessaly with 1700 heavy-armed.—Reaches Perdiccas and the Chalcidians, who dread Athens.—Lacedæmonians had desired to employ their Helots.—Athenians declare war against Perdiccas.—Brasidas quarrels with Perdiccas about Arrhibæus.—Attempts Acanthus. Chap. 78—81.

*Speech of Brasidas to the Acanthians.* Surprised that you should not at once receive me as your deliverer.—My power and integrity not to be doubted, and I come not to exalt either party.—If you refuse my offers I must treat you as enemies. Chap. 85—87.

Acanthians become independent allies of Lacedæmon. Chap. 88.

XIII. *Failure of the Revolution in Bœotia.*

Winter.—Demosthenes fails at Siphæ: the two Athenian generals mistake the day.—Hippocrates fortifies Delium.—Bœotians assemble at Tanagra. Chap. 89—91.

*Speech of Pagondas to the Bœotian army.* The Athenians have invaded Bœotia and aim at its subjugation. Chap. 92.

Bœotians advance on the Athenians.—Order of the battle of Delium. Chap. 93, 94.

*Speech of Hippocrates.* Importance of the battle. Chap. 95.

Defeat of the Athenians.—Bœotians promise to restore the dead on the Athenians evacuating Delium.—Athenians refuse, as the sanctuary is theirs by conquest.—Bœotians refuse to restore the dead.—Take Delium with a singular engine.—Restore the dead: number of slain.—Demosthenes repulsed at Sicyon. Chap. 96—101.

XIV. *Thracian Campaign of Brasidas.*

Death of Sitalces.—Brasidas marches against Amphipolis: history of the colony.—Crosses the bridge of the Strymon.—Amphipolitians send to Thucydides for assistance.—Brasidas induces the Amphipolitians to surrender.—Thucydides reaches Eion and repulses Brasidas.—Myrcinus, Galepsus, and CEsyme join Brasidas.—Athenians alarmed at the revolting of the allies.—Send garrisons whilst Brasidas asks for reinforcements.—Megareans raze their long walls.—Brasidas marches against the Acte.—Takes Torone.—Athenians there escape to Lecythus.—Brasidas re-assures the Toronæans.—Attacks Lecythus and slays the garrison. Chap. 102—116.

XV. *One Year's Truce between Athens and Lacedæmon.*

Ninth year, B. C. 423—Summer.—Armistice for one year.—Articles of the truce framed at Sparta and agreed to by the Lacedæmonian allies.—Ratified by the people of Athens. Chap. 117—119.

XVI. *Continuation of the Campaign with Brasidas.*

Scione revolts to Brasidas.—Scionæans pay him the greatest honours.—News of the armistice arrives: Athenians prepare to recover Scione.—Mende revolts: Brasidas garrisons Scione and Mende.—Brasidas and Perdiccas defeat Arrhibæus.—Illyrians desert to Arrhibæus: Perdiccas retires.—Brasidas attempts an orderly retreat. Chap. 120—125.

*Speech of Brasidas.* Not to be disheartened at the desertion of your allies, or number of the Barbarians. Chap. 126.

Brasidas retreats and Illyrians fail to surround him.—Perdiccas alienated from the Peloponnesians.—Athenians take Mende, and blockade the citadel.—Invest Scione.—Perdiccas makes peace with Athens, and stops the reinforcements for Brasidas. Chap. 127—132.

Brasidas fails in an attempt on Potidæa, see chap. 135.

‡ Thebans demolish the walls of the Thespians.—Temple of Juno at Argos burnt. Chap. 133.

Winter.—Arcadia.—War between the Mantinæans and Tegeans. Chap. 134.



## SUMMARY.

I. *Operations in Sicily, chap. 1, 2.*

1 <sup>7th Year,  
B. C. 425—  
Summer.</sup> **Messana revolts from Athens.**—This summer, ten Syracusan and ten Locrian ships sailed and occupied Messana in Sicily, being invited by the Messanians, who had revolted from Athens. The Syracusans also saw that the place afforded an approach to Sicily, and feared lest the Athenians should make it their head-quarters; whilst the Locrians wished to attack Rhegium by sea as well as by land.\* Accordingly whilst the fleet was occupying Messana, the Locrians invaded Rhegium with all their forces, partly to prevent its aiding Messana, and partly to gratify some Rhegian exiles. Rhegium had been long harassed by faction, and was now unable to resist the Locrians, who after ravaging the country retired with the land forces, but their ships still remained to guard Messana, and others were being manned to join them in carrying on the war from thence. *Continued at chap. 24.*

2 **Fifth invasion of Attica.**—About the same time, the Peloponnesians and allies under Agis, son of Archidamus, invaded and ravaged Attica.

**Athenians send 40 ships to Sicily.**—The 40 ships which the Athenians had promised to the Leontines, (iii. 115,) now set sail under Eurymedon and Sophocles, with orders to attend on their way to the commons at Coreyra, who were being plundered by the exiles on the hill Istone (iii. 85); and accompanied by Demosthenes, who had lived privately since his return from Acarnania, (iii. 114,) but had now obtained leave to employ the fleet, if he wished, against the Peloponnesus. Sixty ships also sailed from the Peloponnesus to the relief of the exiles on Istone, thinking that, from the great famine in the city,

\* Meaning probably that the Locrians planned the seizure of Messana, in order that the fleet might afterwards attack Rhegium by sea, whilst they invaded it by land.—See *Dr. Bloomfield*.

they might easily master the government. *Continued at chap. 24.*

II. *Athenians occupy Pylus, chap. 3—23.*

**Demosthenes advises the fortification of Pylus.**—3 Whilst the Athenian squadron was off Laconia, news came that the Peloponnesian fleet had reached Coreyra. Eurymedon and Sophocles then wished to follow it, but Demosthenes requested them to touch first at Pylus, a rocky headland in the old Messenian territory, about 400 stadia [nearly 50 miles] from Sparta, and called by the Lacedæmonians, Coryphasium. Whilst they were objecting, a storm drove their ships to Pylus, when Demosthenes, pointing out abundance of wood and stone, urged them to fortify the place, which was strong and unoccupied. The two generals replied, that there were many other promontories in Peloponnesus which he might occupy if he wished to put the state to the expense. But Demosthenes considered that Pylus was most advantageous because of the adjacent harbour, and because also the Messenians, who were its ancient inhabitants, and spoke the same dialect as the Lacedæmonians, might be faithful guardians of the place, and injure the enemy by incursions from thence. Being however unable to convince the generals, Demosthenes applied to the inferior officers, but with the same ill success. 4

**Soldiers execute it from idleness.**—Stress of weather still obliging the fleet to remain at Pylus, the soldiers, tired of inaction, at length commenced the work. They had no iron tools, but picked up the stones and put them together as they might happen to fit, and supplied the place of hods for mortar with their hands; and they made haste to complete the most assailable points of the work before the Lacedæmonians could come up, but the greater part was naturally strong and needed no wall.

**Lacedæmonians delay. Demosthenes left to guard 5 Pylus.**—The Athenians fortified the parts facing the interior in six days, and then left Demosthenes with five ships to guard the place, and hastened on with the main fleet to Coreyra. Meantime the Lacedæmonians were celebrating a festival, and made light of this fortification,



but delayed attacking it as their army was in Attica (c. 2). When however this army heard of it, they hastened home, as the Lacedæmonians and their king, Agis, thought themselves closely affected by this occupation. Moreover, having invaded Attica whilst the corn was green, the troops wanted provisions, and were also distressed by unusually stormy weather. They quitted Attica after remaining only 15 days, being the shortest stay they made there during the war.

7 Simonides takes Eion, but abandons it.—About this time Simonides, an Athenian general, with some Athenians from the guard stations, and a large body of allies, took by treachery Eion in Thrace, a Mædæan colony hostile to Athens; but the Chalcidians and Bottiæans came up and beat him out, with the loss of many of his soldiers.

8 Spartans prepare to attack Pylus by land and sea.—Immediately on the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica, the Spartans and nearest Periæci marched to recover Pylus, but the other Lacedæmonians, who had but just returned from an expedition, proceeded more slowly. Orders were however despatched to all the allies in the Peloponnesus to bring their contingents to Pylus with all speed, and the 60 ships were summoned from Coreyra (c. 2). The latter escaped the observation of the Athenian fleet (under Eurymedon and Sophocles) which was then at Zacynthus, by being hauled over the Leucadian isthmus, and reached Pylus by the time the land forces had arrived. Meantime Demosthenes had sent two ships to request Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet at Zacynthus to join him immediately; but the Lacedæmonians now prepared to assault Pylus by land and sea.

**Blockade the harbour and occupy Sphacteria.**—The harbour of Pylus is formed by the little island of Sphacteria, which nearly closes its mouth and leaves two narrow entrances; of which the northern one, between the Athenian fortifications and the island, would admit only two ships abreast, whilst the southern one would admit eight or nine. Sphacteria is about 15 stadia (nearly two miles) long, and is woody and trackless. The Lacedæmonians

immediately occupied it with heavy-armed troops, which they first sent over in turns, but at last left there 420 heavy-armed, drawn by lot from all the Lochi,\* and attended by their Helots, under the command of Epitadas. The Lacedæmonians also posted some heavy-armed troops on the adjoining continent, and intended to bar the two entrances to the harbour with a close line of galleys with their heads outwards. Thus, as there was no other harbourage near Pylus, the Athenian fleet would have no station from whence to succour Demosthenes; and the Lacedæmonians might probably be able to storm the Athenian fortification without risking a sea-fight, as it was not provisioned, and had been occupied after but a short preparation.

**Demosthenes prepares for defence.**—Demosthenes, now seeing that the enemy was about to attack him by land and sea, hauled up his three remaining triremes and protected them by a stockade. He then armed the crews with some inferior shields, chiefly of osiers, for it was impossible to obtain a supply of arms in that lonely spot. These shields he obtained from a 30-oared Messenian privateer and cutter, which had joined him with 40 heavy-armed Messenians, whom he ranged with his other troops. He then posted the main body upon the strongest points to repel the enemy's land force, whilst he himself, with 60 picked heavy-armed troops and a few bowmen, proceeded outside the wall to the sea. Here the landing was difficult, but the enemy would find the fortification weak, as the Athenians had not expected to be beaten at sea, and considered that if a landing was once forced, the place would be easy to take. Demosthenes then encouraged his men as follows:

#### SPEECH OF DEMOSTHENES.

Every thing depends upon keeping the enemy from landing.— 10  
 "Fellow soldiers! do not calculate the danger, for our circumstances will not admit of it, but charge the enemy with a reckless confidence and a hope of success. We have advantages if we keep our ground and are not alarmed at the enemy's numbers. The landing is difficult, and is in our favour, whilst we stand here, but it will be easy enough if we retreat; and

\* See note on v. 68.



the enemy will be then more formidable even if we drive him back, from the difficulty of his re-embarking. We can easily repel them whilst they remain on board, and we need not fear their numbers, for they will be compelled to engage in small detachments, as many ships cannot be brought to at once. And you, Athenians, who know what a hostile disembarkation is, and that if a man can face a roaring surf and menacing vessels he cannot be driven back—I call upon you, to fight it out upon the very edge of the water, and save both yourselves and the fort."

- 11 **Attack by sea: Brasidas distinguishes himself.**—The Lacedæmonians now assaulted the fort at the same time by land and sea. Their fleet consisted of 43 ships under Thrasytelidas, who attacked the point where Demosthenes expected him. They were prevented by the nature of the shore from bringing up more than a few ships at a time, and were therefore divided into detachments, who made the attack in turns, cheering one another. Here Brasidas, who commanded a trireme, most eminently distinguished himself. Seeing that many captains and steersmen were deterred from attempting to land through fear of wrecking their vessels, he exclaimed against their being chary of timber, when their enemy had built a fort on their territory; and he bade them to shiver their ships and force a landing, and called upon the allies not to shrink from sacrificing their galleys for the Lacedæmonians, who had benefited them, but to run them ashore at all hazards, and master the place and garrison.
- 12 Brasidas then set the example, by compelling his steersman to run his own galley on the beach, and then advanced on the landing steps [i. e. gang-board]. But he was beaten back by the Athenians, and fainting away with his numerous wounds, he fell into his ship's bows, and his shield dropped into the sea, and was afterwards used as a trophy by the enemy. The rest were eager to land, but were prevented by the difficulty of the coast, and the firm front of the Athenians. Thus was fortune reversed. The Athenians, who gloried in their maritime power, were employing a land force against the Lacedæmonians on the coast of Laconia; whilst the Lacedæmonians, who were superior on land, were attacking the Athenians by sea.

**Defeat of the Peloponnesian fleet in the harbour of Pylus.**—The Lacedæmonians continued their attacks for two days, but on the third they desisted, and sent some ships to Asine to fetch timber for the construction of engines; intending to attempt the fort on the side of the harbour, where the landing was easier but the wall higher. Meantime the Athenian fleet arrived from Zæcynthus, and having been reinforced by four Chians and the guard-ships from Naupactus, it now consisted of 50 vessels. These seeing that the harbour of Pylus was occupied by the Lacedæmonian fleet, and that Sphacteria and the continent were crowded with the enemy's heavy-armed, anchored for the night at the neighbouring uninhabited island of Prote. Next morning they returned to give battle in the open sea, but the Peloponnesians would not sail out, and had not barred the entrances to the fort as they had intended, (c. 8,) but remained quietly manning their ships, and preparing, if the enemy entered, to give them battle in the extensive harbour. The Athenians then advanced by each entrance, and finding most of the Peloponnesian ships afloat and drawn up, they routed and chased them, disabled many and captured five vessels, one with its whole crew; others they disabled whilst being manned, and towed off some which had been forsaken by their crews.

**Athenians intercept the land force in Sphacteria.**—The Lacedæmonians now, fearing that their comrades at Sphacteria would be intercepted, rushed into the sea, and with great uproar succeeded in dragging away and effectually recovering all the empty vessels they had lost, except the five first taken. This was accomplished with much labour and many wounds, the Lacedæmonians being engaged in a sea-fight from land, whilst the victorious Athenians were fighting a land-battle from their ships. The Athenians then erected a trophy, gave back the slain, secured the wrecks, and cruised round Sphacteria, considering the men as prisoners; whilst the Peloponnesians on the continent, who had now been joined by the contingents from all their cities, remained stationary at Pylus.

Armistice concluded until an embassy could return 15





from Athens.—When the news of this great calamity reached Sparta, the ephors were sent to the camp at Pylus to consult upon the spot. There they saw that it was impossible to assist the troops in Sphacteria, who must either perish by famine or be overpowered by superior numbers; and they therefore obtained an armistice with the Athenians upon the following conditions, and sent ambassadors to Athens to negotiate a peace.

*Conditions of the Armistice.*

- 16 1. That the Lacedæmonians should give up their entire navy as a pledge to the Athenians.
2. That they should not attack the fort by land or sea.
3. That they should be permitted to send daily to each of the troops in Sphacteria, two Attic chœnixes [about 4 pints] of meal, two cotylæ \* [about 1 pint] of wine, and a piece of meat; and to each attendant [Helot] one half that quantity.
4. That these rations should be sent in the presence of the Athenians, and no vessel should sail to the island by stealth.
5. That the Athenians should continue to guard Sphacteria, but not land on it, nor attack the Lacedæmonians by land or sea.
6. That if either party broke these conditions the armistice should be void, but that otherwise it should be in force until the Lacedæmonian embassy returned from Athens.
7. That the Athenians should convey the embassy to and from Athens in a trireme.
8. That the armistice should end on the return of the embassy, and the ships be restored.

Embassy despatched to Athens: 60 ships given up.—Sixty Lacedæmonian ships were then given up to the Athenians, and the ambassadors from the ephors conducted to Athens.

\* Dr. Bloomfield estimates both the chœnix and cotyle as a pint. This is a mistake. The Attic chœnix was one fourth of a medimnus, or 1.9822 pint, whilst the cotyle is considered by Hesychius to be the same as the aryster, which was one fourth of the chœnix, or .4955 of a pint.—See *Hussey's Essay*.

SPEECH OF THE LACEDÆMONIAN AMBASSADORS.

We shall speak at length: hear us considerately.—“Athenians, 17 we have been sent by the Lacedæmonians on behalf of our troops in Sphacteria, to effect such an arrangement as may be advantageous to you, and creditable to us in our misfortunes. Nor will our speaking at length be a departure from our national practice, for though we only use a few words when a few are sufficient, yet we employ many when many are required. And we now beg you not to hear us in a hostile spirit, and not to receive our words as arrogant dictation, but as admonitory advice.

Present opportunity most favourable for establishing your prosperity.—“It is now in your power to secure your present advantages, and receive an accession of honour; and as your city, as well as ours, has experienced great changes of fortune, it ought to be most distrustful of prosperity. We, who have enjoyed the highest reputation in Greece, are now reduced to ask favour of you, merely through the failure of our plans, 18 whilst reckoning on our common resources, a thing which is incident to all; and you ought not to expect, because of the strength of your city and its appendages, that fortune will always be on your side. Therefore, now is a favourable opportunity for you to obtain a lasting reputation for power and wisdom.

We invite you to conclude a lasting peace.—“The Lacedæmonians now invite you to conclude a lasting treaty, offering you peace, alliance, and friendship, and only requiring in turn the restoration of the troops in Sphacteria. They think also that it would be better for both of us not to try the chances of war to the uttermost, for whilst no peace can be lasting which leaves in one of the parties a rankling sense of humiliation and injury, our perpetual friendship may be insured by your not abusing your present success. For men are disposed to make reciprocal concessions to those who voluntarily yield to them, but to hazard all against the overbearing and unrelenting.

To be reconciled before an irreparable loss renders it impossible.—“Let us also make peace before some irreparable loss leads us to regard you with private as well as public hatred, and whilst we can yet offer you glory and our friendship. You will thus obtain the gratitude of all the Greeks who have been harassed by the war without knowing who began it; you will receive the firm friendship of the Lacedæmonians by thus conferring a favour upon them at their own request; and then, if we act in union, the rest of Greece, conscious of inferior power, will pay us the highest honour and deference.” 20

Athenians require the surrender of Sphacteria, and 21 restoration of Nisæa, Pegæ, Trœzen, and Achaia.—The



Lacedæmonians thought that the Athenians, having previously desired a truce, would gladly accept it now it was offered. But the latter, looking upon the troops in Sphacteria as already their own, thought they could conclude a treaty whenever they chose, and aimed at greater advantages. Being especially urged by the influential demagogue, Cleon, they replied to the ambassadors, that the troops in Sphacteria must first surrender both themselves and their arms, and be conveyed to Athens; but that when the Lacedæmonians had restored Nisæa, Pega, Trœzen, and Achaia, which the Athenians had ceded to obtain the thirty years' truce, (i. 115,) they should be permitted to fetch away the prisoners, and conclude a peace for as long a period as both sides might think fit.

2. **Ambassadors wish to confer with commissioners.**—The ambassadors made no reply, but requested that commissioners might be chosen to treat with them in private. But Cleon violently attacked them for wishing to debate with a few individuals only, when, if their intentions were honest, they ought to declare them before all the people. The ambassadors now saw, that though it was best to make concessions, on account of their misfortune, yet they could not treat with the multitude, lest they should be censured by their allies for having made offers which were not accepted. And being convinced that the Athenians would not grant their proposals on moderate terms, they broke off the negotiation and returned to Pylos.

23 **Hostilities renewed: Athenians will not restore the 60 ships.**—The armistice was now at an end, but the Athenians refused to restore the 60 Lacedæmonian ships, (c. 16,) alleging that an attack had been made on their fort, contrary to the truce, (art. 2,) which (art. 6) declared, that if any article was violated, the whole should be null and void. The Lacedæmonians denied the charge, and accused the Athenians of injustice, and hostilities were renewed with the greatest vigour. The Athenian fleet had been reinforced by 20 ships from Athens, and now amounted to 70 vessels. Two of these perpetually cruised round Sphacteria all day in opposite directions, and at night they all moored round it, excepting when a rough wind prevented their anchoring on the side facing

the open sea. The Peloponnesians encamped on the continent, and frequently assailed the fort, but watched also for an opportunity to deliver their friends. *Continued at chap. 26.*

### III. Operations in Sicily, chap. 24, 25.

**Renewed attack on Rhegium.**—Meantime, the Syracusans and their Sicel allies, (c. 1, 2,) being urged by the Locrians, who hated the Rhegians, had reinforced the naval force at Messana, and wished to try the result of a sea-fight, before the Athenian fleet arrived (iii. 115); for the Athenians had then but few ships at Rhegium, and had employed their intended reinforcement upon the blockade of Sphaeteria. If the Syracusans were victorious by sea, they hoped to blockade Rhegium by their fleet and land force, and quickly reduce and secure it; for the strait between Rhegium and Messana is so narrow, that the Athenians would be unable to command it. This strait is formed where Sicily is least distant from the continent, and is the Charybdis through which Ulysses sailed; and as the Sicilian and Tuscan seas fall into it, through a narrow passage in opposite directions, the current is strong and dangerous.

**Naval operations in the strait, etc.**—In this strait, the Syracusans and allies, with more than 30 ships, were compelled to engage late in the day with 16 Athenian and 8 Rhegian vessels, about the passage of a boat. The Syracusans were defeated, and sailed to their naval camp at Messana, and the Locrians to theirs at Rhegium, with the loss of one ship. The Locrians afterwards left Rhegium. The united fleet of the Syracusans and their allies then anchored at Cape Pelorus, in Messana, and were joined by their land forces; and being attacked by the Athenians and Rhegians, they captured one of their vessels with an iron grapnel, but the crew escaped. They then towed their ships along shore to Messana, when the Athenians again attacked them, but lost another vessel, as the Syracusans got out into the open sea and charged first. The Syracusans then reached the port of Messana, and the Athenians sailed to Camarina, having heard that



Archias and his party were about to betray it to the Syracusans.

**Messanians unsuccessfully attack Naxos.**—Meantime the Messanians made an expedition by land and sea against their Chalcidian neighbour, Naxos. The first day, they drove the Naxians within the walls, and ravaged the territory; on the second, they sailed round and wasted the country about the river Acesines, whilst their land forces attacked the city. But the Sicel allies of the Naxians poured down from the highlands in great numbers, and the besieged, on seeing them, cheered themselves with the belief that the Leontines and other Greek allies were marching to their aid; and sallying from the town, they routed the Messanians, and slew more than 1000 men, whilst many of the remainder were cut off by the Barbarians during their retreat. The fleet at Messana soon afterwards dispersed to its several cities.

**Athenians attempt Messana.**—Whilst Messana was thus weakened, the Leontines and their allies attacked it by land, whilst the Athenian fleet attempted it on the side of the harbour. But the Messanians, and a small Locrian garrison, under Demoteles, made a sally, and routed the Leontines with great slaughter, when the Athenians landed from their ships, and drove the enemy back into the town, and, after erecting a trophy, returned to Rhegium. After this, the Greeks in Sicily made war upon each other by land, without the co-operation of the Athenians. *Continued at chap. 58.*

IV. PYLUS. *Athenians take Sphacteria, chap. 26—41.*

26 **Pylus. Lacedæmonians secretly throw supplies into Sphacteria: Athenians distressed.**—Meantime the Athenians were still blockading the Lacedæmonians in Sphacteria, but with great discouragements and distress. They suffered a great scarcity in victuals and water; for the fort of Pylus only contained one small spring, and many were obliged to drink the brackish water they obtained by digging in the beach. They were also greatly straitened from want of room and insufficient anchorage, which compelled the crews to go on shore for their meals

in turns. But they were most discouraged by the delay in the surrender of the island. For the Lacedæmonians had publicly promised to pay a high price for whatever ground corn, wine, cheese, or other provision could be carried into Sphacteria, and to give freedom to all Helots who succeeded in doing so; and great numbers were perpetually running the risk. Some, when the weather was rough, tried to land on the side of the island facing the sea, and as a liberal allowance was made for their boats, they would fearlessly drive them upon the beach; but all who ran the hazard in calm weather were taken by the Athenian cruisers. Others dived under water, on the side of the harbour, and dragged to the island skins full of poppy-seed mixed with honey, and bruised linseed; but precautions were afterwards taken against these divers.

**Cleon at Athens imputes the delay to the generals.**— 27 Reports of their circumstances soon reached Athens, where fears were entertained that the blockade would extend to the winter, when it would be impossible to carry provisions round the Peloponnesus to the fort, or to continue the blockade of so harbourless a country by sea; and the troops would then either escape from Sphacteria, from the recall of the guard, or watch for a storm, and sail out in the boats that brought in the provisions. Above all, the Athenians were afraid that it was the consciousness of some strong point which had prevented the Lacedæmonians from making other ventures, and they now regretted that they had not accepted the treaty. Cleon observing that he was suspected because of the obstacles he had thrown in the way of the convention, (c. 21,) at first denied the truth of the reports, but those who brought them requested that commissioners might be sent to inquire into their accuracy, and Cleon himself, with Theogenes, was appointed to this office. Cleon now saw that he would convict himself of slander if he gave a faithful report, and he proved a liar if he gave a false one. In this predicament he advised the Athenians not to waste time in sending commissioners, but if they believed the account, to sail at once against the place; and he pointedly alluded to Nicias the general,



whom he hated, by saying, "that if their commanders were but men, it would be easy for them to go and take the troops in the island, and that he would have done it himself if he had been in the command."

28 Nicias offers the command to Cleon, who engages to take Sphacteria in 20 days.—Nicias, feeling the taunt of Cleon, and seeing that his boast had excited the clamour of the assembly, answered, that "as far as the generals were concerned, Cleon might take what force he pleased and make the attempt." Cleon at first affected to accept the offer, but on finding that Nicias was in earnest, he drew back, and said, "that Nicias was general, and not he." Nicias then publicly resigned the command, and called upon the multitude to attest it; and the more Cleon shrank from the engagement, the more the people pressed him to fulfil it. At length Cleon saw he could evade his words no longer, and offered to set sail without a single Athenian, but with only such Lemnians and Imbrians as were at Athens, a body of targeteers, and 400 foreign bow-men; and he promised that with these and the troops at Pylus, he would within 20 days either bring the Lacedæmonians alive from Sphacteria, or kill them on the spot. The Athenians laughed at his bravado, but the more sensible were pleased, reckoning that they should now either get rid of Cleon, or take the Lacedæmonians.

29 Cleon joins with Demosthenes; wood in Sphacteria burnt.—The Athenians now voted Cleon to the command, who having heard that Demosthenes was meditating a descent on Sphacteria, chose him as colleague, and sailed to Pylus. Demosthenes had been induced to make the attempt from the distresses of his soldiers; and a recent accident had confirmed him in the resolve. Sphacteria was uninhabited, and covered with a pathless wood, which, as the experience of Demosthenes in the forests of Ætolia (iii. 89) had taught him, would enable the enemy to fall upon him unexpectedly at whatever point he pleased, and from an unseen position; whilst a small army with a knowledge of the country would have an advantage over superior forces, which might be cut to pieces in detail, without being able to see in what direc-

tion they could assist each other. Want of room, however, had compelled the Athenians to land on the extremities of the island in small parties, to take their dinners with a guard posted in advance; and shortly before Cleon's arrival one of these parties had accidentally set fire to the wood and burnt the whole. Demosthenes now saw that the Lacedæmonians were more numerous than he had imagined, and the island more easy of access; and he sent for troops from the nearest allies, and otherwise prepared for the attack, when Cleon, having previously notified his coming, arrived at Pylus with the required forces.

Herald sent: 800 heavy-armed Athenians land on Sphacteria, and cut down the advanced guard.—The two generals now sent a herald to the enemy's forces on the continent, to propose that they should desire the troops on the island to surrender themselves and their arms, on condition of being kept in mild custody until some treaty were concluded. This being rejected, one day was permitted to intervene, and the next night 800 heavy-armed Athenians embarked, and a little before day-break landed in two divisions on opposite sides of the island, both on that facing the sea and that facing the harbour. The main body of the Lacedæmonians, under Epitadas himself, occupied the central and most level part of Sphacteria; 30 heavy-armed formed an out-post; whilst a small division occupied the northern point facing Pylus, where the coast was rocky and precipitous, and the land side defended by an old rude fortification, which they considered might be useful if the main body were compelled to retreat. The 800 Athenians immediately surprised and cut to pieces the out-post of 30 heavy-armed, who were either starting from their beds or snatching up their arms, having considered the enemy's ships as merely approaching to their usual night stations (c. 23).

Light infantry land and annoy the Lacedæmonians.—At day-break the light-armed infantry disembarked, viz. all the crews of the 70 vessels, with their different equipments, except the lowest rank of rowers; 800 bowmen, and as many targeteers [peltastæ]; the Messenian reinforcements, and all the occupying force of Pylus,





except the garrison on the fortifications. These light troops Demosthenes, according to a previously arranged plan, posted on the surrounding heights, in bodies of about 200 men, to annoy the enemy from every side with their arrows, darts, and stones from their slings, and who could thus overcome whilst flying, and press on the  
 33 enemy if he retreated. Meantime, the main body under Epitadas, seeing their out-post cut off, closed their ranks, and advanced to meet the heavy-armed Athenians, who were coming slowly up to provoke, but not accept, a combat. But Epitadas and his little army soon found themselves assailed from every point by showers of missiles, and were unable to overtake their light-armed assailants from the roughness of the ground and encumbrances of their heavy armour.

34 Lacedæmonians escape to the fort.—At length the Lacedæmonians were unable to continue a vigorous resistance to their light-armed foes; and the latter were now emboldened by success and superior numbers, and having become accustomed to the sight of the enemy whom they had previously regarded with awe, they poured down upon him with a simultaneous charge and a deafening shout. The Lacedæmonians were bewildered by the clamour, which drowned their word of command; they were blinded and unable to use their weapons from the dust which arose from the ashes of the recently burnt wood, and they were impeded by the arrows and darts which pierced their armour [*πίλοι*] and left broken shafts  
 35 in it; and at last, forming themselves into a close body, they escaped to the fort, but being still more hotly pressed by the enemy, they lost many in their retreat.

A Messenian conducts a party to the enemy's rear.—The Lacedæmonians now took their stand with their comrades, on the side where the fort was most assailable, and the Athenians advanced in front, being unable to surround them from the natural strength of the place. Thus for the greater part of the day both sides suffered from the battle, dust, and sun, but the Lacedæmonians defended themselves the more easily as they could not  
 36 be taken in flank. At length the commander of the Messenian auxiliaries proposed to Cleon and Demos-

thenes, that if they would intrust him with a few bowmen and light infantry he would try and find a passage by which he could get to the rear of the enemy. Accordingly he started with the required forces from a point out of the enemy's sight, and climbing the heights which on account of their strength had been left unguarded, he suddenly appeared on the high ground in the rear of the Lacedæmonians, whom he struck with dismay, whilst he reassured the Athenians. The enemy now, like the Greeks at Thermopylæ, were exposed to missiles from all sides, and as moreover they were weak from want of food, they were unable to withstand superior numbers, and were forced to retreat, whilst the Athenians became masters of the approaches.

Lacedæmonians surrender.—Cleon and Demosthenes 37 were now afraid that the enemy would be cut to pieces, and suspended the combat; and as they wished to send them prisoners to Athens, they despatched a herald to call upon them to deliver up their arms and surrender at discretion. Most of the Lacedæmonians then lowered their shields and waved their hands in token of compliance. Their general Epitades was slain, and Hippagretas, the second in command, was on the point of death; but Styphon, who had been appointed according to Spartan usage to succeed if his superiors fell, held a conference with Cleon and Demosthenes. Styphon wished to send messengers to the Lacedæmonians on the continent, but the Athenians would not permit any of his men to leave the island, and they themselves sent for heralds from the Peloponnesian camp on the main-land. After two or three questions had been interchanged, the last man brought over the following message: "The Lacedæmonians direct you to provide for yourselves so long as you do nothing dishonourable." Styphon and his troops then, after consultation, delivered up their arms and surrendered; and the Athenians, after keeping them in custody that day and the following night, erected a trophy the next day, and distributed the prisoners amongst the captains of the various ships; whilst the Lacedæmonians sent a herald and recovered their dead.



## LOSS OF THE LACEDÆMONIANS.

Lacedæmonians killed . . . . .	128
Prisoners carried to Athens including 120 Spartans . . . . .	292
Total of the Lacedæmonian troops in Sphacteria	420

The Athenian loss was but trifling, as the battle was not fought hand to hand.

39 Length of the blockade: Cleon's promise fulfilled.—The whole length of the blockade, from the sea-fight (c. 14) to the taking of Sphacteria, was 72 days; for about 20 of which, whilst the ambassadors were gone to Athens, the besieged had been regularly provisioned, but during the remainder they were fed by stealth. Indeed, corn and other food was found on the island after it was taken, as Epitades had dealt it out more sparingly than was necessary. The Athenians and Peloponnesians then left Pylus for their several homes, and Cleon's mad promise of bringing the troops from Sphacteria to Athens within 20 days was fulfilled.\*

40 Surprise of the Greeks at the surrender of the Lacedæmonians.—This event excited more astonishment amongst the Greeks than any other throughout the war. They had believed that neither famine nor any other necessity would have induced Lacedæmonians to deliver up their arms, or prevented them from fighting until death. And they would not believe that the survivors were of the same stamp as the slain; though when one of them was afterwards insultingly asked by an Athenian ally at Athens, whether those who had fallen were of the true Spartan blood, he replied, "That the arrow would be precious indeed, if it could distinguish

\* Aristophanes, in "The Knights," represents Demosthenes charging Cleon, under a homely figure, with having purloined his laurels:

"*Demos.* 'Twas but the other day, when I had kneaded  
A Spartan cake at Pylus, that the knave  
Snatched it away by some mean, cheating trick,  
And offered it himself, though I had made it."

*Walsh's Translation.*

the brave;" meaning thereby, that those were slain whom the stone or arrow chanced to light on.

Lacedæmonians carried to Athens: Pylus garrisoned. 41  
The Athenians now carried their prisoners to Athens, and placed them in custody until some agreement should be made, but threatened to put them to death if the Peloponnesians again invaded Attica. The Messenians of Naupactus sent a garrison to Pylus, which was part of ancient Messenia; and this force plundered Laconia, and seriously annoyed the enemy from their common dialect (iii. 112). The Lacedæmonians were inexperienced in this predatory warfare; their Helots were deserting; and at length, fearing that their country would become revolutionized, they sent fresh ambassadors to Athens, but the demands of the enemy rose so high, that after several attempts the negotiation ceased.

## V. Expedition of Nicias to Corinth, chap. 42—45.

Nicias sent to Corinth with 80 ships.—The Athenians now sent 80 ships with 2000 heavy infantry, and 200 cavalry on board horse-transport, together with some Milesian, Andrian, and Carystian troops, to invade Corinth, under the command of Nicias and two colleagues. At day-break Nicias landed his troops on the beach, between Chersonesus and Rheitus, adjoining the Solygian hill, on which the Dorians established themselves in early times, and carried on war against the Corinthians, who were Æolians, and on which now stands the ancient village of Solygia. The beach is about 60 stadia [between 7 and 8 miles] from Corinth; 20 stadia [2½ miles] from the Isthmus; and 12 stadia [1½ mile] from Solygia. The Corinthians, having had previous intelligence from Argos of this expedition, had assembled all their forces at the Isthmus, except those who lived above it, and about 500 men who were garrisoning Ambracia and Leucadia. When they learnt from signals that the Athenians had effected a landing unobserved, they left half their forces at Cenchræ to protect Crommyon, and 43 Battus, with one battalion, marched to defend Solygia, which was unwallled, whilst Lycophon, the other Cor-



inthian general, proceeded to the beach, with the remaining forces.

Corinthians defeated in an obstinate battle.—The Corinthians reached the shore in time to attack the right wing of the enemy, which consisted of Athenians and Carystians, immediately after it had landed in front of Chersonesus, but afterwards charged the rest of the army. The battle was obstinate and fought hand to hand. The Athenian Right wing drove the Corinthians up the ascending shore, but the latter assailed the invaders from the eminence with stones, and singing the pæan, returned to the attack. A battalion now came up to the relief of the Corinthians' Left, and breaking the Athenian Right, pursued the Athenians and Carystians to the sea, but the latter made a stand at the ships and again drove their assailants back. Meantime the rest of the army on both sides was fighting without cessation. The Corinthian Right wing, which was commanded by Lycophron, was acting on the defensive against the Athenian Left, fearing  
44 that the latter would attempt Solygia. Neither party would yield, but at length the Athenians, being supported by cavalry, of which the Corinthians had none, forced the latter to retire to the hill, where they piled their arms and took up a position; but in this rout of the Corinthian Right, the greater number fell, including Lycophron, their general. The rest of the Corinthian army retreated in good order, and also took up a position on the higher ground, whilst the Athenians spoiled the enemy's dead, took up their own, and erected a trophy.

Athenians re-embark.—Meantime the division of the Corinthian army posted at Cenchræa had been prevented by the intervening ridge of Mount Oneus from seeing the battle, but being alarmed at the clouds of dust, they hastened to the scene of action, and the older Corinthians from the city did the same. The Athenians seeing them advance, supposed them to be succours from the neighbouring Peloponnesians, and retreated to their ships with their spoil, but leaving two of their slain behind. Having crossed over to the opposite islands, they sent a herald for the two corpses and recovered them under truce.

In this battle the Corinthians lost 212 men, and the Athenians rather less than 50.

Athenians ravage Crommyon and Epidaurus: gar- 45  
rison Methone.—The same day, the Athenians sailed from the islands to Crommyon, which is 120 stadia [15 miles] from Corinth. Here they ravaged the land and passed the night, and the next day coasted along Epidaurus, where they made a descent, and proceeded to Methone, between Epidaurus and Trœzen, and built a wall across the isthmus which connects Methone with the main-land. They then fortified the peninsula and left a garrison, which afterwards ravaged Epidaurus, Trœzen, and Ialix, and then returned home.

#### VI. *Second Massacre at Corcyra, chap.* 46—48.

Corcyra. Eurymedon and Sophocles storm Istone : 46  
aristocracy surrender.—Meantime Eurymedon and Sophocles, (c. 3, 5,) weighing from Pylus, reached Corcyra on their way to Sicily, and, assisted by the Corcyræans, they stormed and took Mount Istone, where the aristocratic party had intrenched themselves (iii. 85). The latter, however, escaped to a higher eminence, but surrendered on condition of giving up their auxiliaries and their arms, and submitting to the judgment of the Athenian people. The generals then carried them under truce to the island Ptychia, to be kept in custody until they could be sent to Athens, with the proviso that if one was found attempting to escape, the treaty would be void for all.

Perfidy of the commons, and butchery of the aristocracy.—The leaders of the commons were now afraid that the Athenians would not put the prisoners to death. They therefore secretly sent friends to persuade the latter to escape, promising to provide a vessel, and assuring them that the Athenian generals intended to give them up to the Corcyræan populace. This artifice was the more specious, and its contrivers felt more secure, as the Athenian generals were going on to Sicily, and had shown themselves unwilling that any one else should carry the prisoners to Athens, and obtain the credit of the transaction. The plot succeeded; the prisoners were 47



caught sailing away; the treaty was declared void, and the whole party were given up to the Corcyraëans. The populace lodged the whole in a large building, and led them out bound together, by 20 at a time, through two rows of heavy-armed soldiers, each of whom beat and stabbed such prisoners, in passing, as happened to be his personal enemies. None escaped; and whips were used  
48 to urge those victims who proceeded too slowly. Sixty men were thus slain whilst their friends in the building supposed they were only being removed to some other place; but when the survivors heard the truth, they called upon the Athenians to be their executioners, and declared they would neither leave the building nor permit any one to enter it. The Corcyraëans themselves were not disposed to force the doors, but climbing to the top, they broke through the roof, and threw tiles and discharged arrows on the prisoners below. Most of the latter now tried to despatch themselves, by thrusting the arrows into their throats, or hanging themselves with the cordage of some beds or strips of their own clothes; and this horrible tragedy lasted throughout the night. At day-break the Corcyraëans threw the corpses in layers on waggons, and carried them out of the city; and all the women taken in the fort were reduced to slavery. Thus were the Corcyraëans on the mountain cut off by the commons, and this violent sedition was terminated as far as concerns the present war; for none were left of the aristocratic party worth mentioning. The Athenian fleet then proceeded to Sicily.

49 **Anactorium taken and occupied by Acarnanians.**—At the close of this summer, the Athenians at Naupactus and the Acarnanians made an expedition against Anactorium, a Corinthian city at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf. The city was betrayed to them, and having turned out the Corinthians, it was occupied by Acarnanian settlers.

#### VII. *Intrigues with Persia, chap. 50.*

50 **Persian ambassador to Lacedæmon intercepted: Artaxerxes dies.**—This winter Aristedes, an Athenian commander who had been sent out to

levy contributions from the allies, (c. 75,) arrested Artaphernes, a Persian, as he was passing through Eion on the Strymon, on his way from king Artaxerxes to Lacedæmon. He was conveyed to Athens, and his despatches translated from the Assyrian and read. The substance of their contents, as far as they related to the Lacedæmonians, was, that the king could not understand what they wanted; that they had sent many ambassadors to him, but each with a different message; but that if they would speak plainly they might send new envoys back with Artaphernes. The Athenians then sent Artaphernes with some ambassadors in a trireme to Ephesus, where the envoys heard that Artaxerxes had lately died, and they therefore returned home.

**Athenians oblige the Chians to dismantle their walls.** 51  
—At this time the Athenians, suspecting that the Chians would form new designs against them, obliged them to dismantle their new walls, but gave them pledges and security that they would not alter their government.

#### VIII. *Nicias sails to Cythera and Thyrea, c. 52—57.*

**Eclipse of the sun.**—At the beginning of <sup>8th Year,</sup> the summer [March] there was an eclipse of <sup>B. C. 424—</sup> the sun, followed by an earthquake. <sup>Summer.\*</sup> 52

**Lesbian exiles take Rhæteum and Antandrus.**—About the same time some Mytilenæan and other Lesbian exiles set out from the continent, and having raised some troops in the neighbourhood, and hired others in the Peloponnesus, they took Rhæteum, but restored it on payment of 2000 Phocæan staters [about £1300].† They then

\* This year the Peloponnesians were deterred from their customary invasion of Attica, by the threat of the Athenians to retaliate on the prisoners of Sphacteria, c. 41. See *Bp. Thirheall*.

† Arnold says that nothing further is known of this coin than that it was of gold, and that silver coins were in circulation called *ἔκραι φωκαίδες*, that is, each being equal in value to one-sixth of the Phocæan stater. The writer of the article *Heete* in the Dictionary of Antiquities, seems to contradict this. He says that the hasty conjecture that these *ἔκραι* were of silver is corrected by Bœckh himself; and after an intricate but careful inquiry, he shows that the *ἔκραι φωκαίδες* were equal in *weight* to two obols of silver, but being of very base gold, were only equal in *value* to 16 obols, or





took Antandrus through the treachery of its inhabitants, (c. 75,) and designed to liberate the other Actæan towns, (situated on the Asiatic coast opposite to Lesbos,) formerly owned by the Mytilenæans, but now held by the Athenians; after which they might easily fortify Antandrus, and build ships with the timber from Ida, and both ravage Lesbos and subdue the Æolian towns on the main-land.

53 **Nicias sails against Cythera.**—This summer the Athenians sailed against Cythera with 60 ships, 2000 heavy-armed, and a few cavalry, together with some Milesians and other allies; the whole under the command of Nicias, Nicostratus, and Autocles. Cythera is an island lying off Malea, on the coast of Laconia, and is inhabited by Perioeci. The Spartans kept a garrison of heavy-armed there, and sent a governor over annually: for it was a landing-place for the merchant vessels from Egypt and Libya, and a guard against privateers, as all Laconia runs out into the Sicilian and Cretan seas.

54 **Takes and garrisons the island, and ravages Laconia.**—When the Athenian fleet had made the land, ten of their ships and 2000 heavy-armed Milesians took the coast town of Scandea; whilst the rest of their forces landed on the side opposite Malea, and advanced against the lower town of Cythera, where they found all the Cytherians encamped. After a short resistance, the Cytherians fled to the upper town, but threw themselves on the mercy of the Athenians, on condition that their lives were spared; indeed there had been a previous communication between Nicias and some of the Cytherians, otherwise the Athenians would have expelled the latter from the island, because they were Lacedæmonians, and Cythera was so near to Laconia. After the treaty, the Athenians took Scandea, garrisoned Cythera, and then sailed to Asine, Helus, and other coast towns of Laconia, and ravaged the country for seven days, passing the night on shore.

55 **Panic at Lacedæmon.**—The Lacedæmonians nowhere opposed the Athenians with their collected forces, but 2s. 2d. The *ἔκρη* being one-sixth of the *στραῖψ*, the Phœcean stater was worth about 13s. and weighed 2 drachmas.

sent garrisons of heavy-armed to different parts of the country; for they were fearful lest the occupation of Pylus and Cythera, and their being surrounded by hostilities, should create a revolution in their state. Against their custom, they raised 400 horse and some bowmen, and exhibited an unusual timidity; for they were compelled, contrary to their military institutions, to maintain a conflict at sea, and that with Athenians, who, in estimating their success, regarded as a failure all that they could not attempt. The Lacedæmonians also lost all confidence, and feared that some other disaster like that of Sphacteria would befall them. A garrison 56 near Cotyrta and Aphrodisia resisted a scattered crowd of the Athenian light-armed, but the latter being sustained by some heavy-armed, it was compelled to retreat with the loss of some men and arms, and the Athenians afterwards raised a trophy.

**Nicias takes Thyrea.**—After this the Athenian fleet returned to Cythera, and from thence sailed to the Limeran Epidaurus, and wasted its territory. They then proceeded to Thyrea, a place in Cynuria, on the confines of Argos and Laconia, which the Lacedæmonians had given to the Æginetan exiles, (ii. 27,) for their services after the earthquake and during the Helot insurrection. Whilst the Athenian fleet was approaching Thyrea, the 57 Æginetans abandoned the fortifications on the sea, which they were building, and retired to the upper city, which is 10 stadia [about 1½ mile] from the coast; but a garrison of Lacedæmonians who had assisted them in the works would not accompany them, but retired to the heights. The Athenians on landing took Thyrea, burnt and plundered the town, and carried the Æginetans who survived the assault to Athens, together with Tantalus, the Lacedæmonian commander, who was wounded; determining to put the Æginetans to death, and to place Tantalus in the same custody as his countrymen from Sphacteria. They also placed some of the Cytherians in the different Cyclades, and permitted the rest to inhabit their own country upon paying a tribute of four talents [about £960].



IX. *General Pacification of Sicily, chap. 58—65.*

58 **Congress of Sicilians at Gela.**—This summer, an armistice was concluded between Gela and Camarina, which was followed by a conference at Gela, to which all the Sicilian cities sent embassies. After many had expressed their opinions, stated their differences, or urged their claims, Hermocrates, a Syracusan of the greatest influence amongst them, spoke as follows:

## SPEECH OF HERMOCRATES.

59 **No interested motive in recommending peace.**—“It is not because my city is either inconsiderable or distressed that I now address you, but because I wish publicly to state what I consider to be the best policy for all Sicily. I need not prove that war is disastrous. No one engages in it from ignorance of its consequences, but because he imagines its gains are greater than its dangers; and no one is deterred from it by fear, if he chooses to encounter peril rather than suffer present loss. But if both parties should be acting unseasonably, exhortations to peace are very serviceable, and would be most advantageous to us now if we could but believe it. For at first we went to war to secure our several interests, and we are now endeavouring to come to terms by means of a conference; and unless each one departs with what is fair, we must again resort to arms.

60 **Not to consider our separate interests, but how to save all Sicily from the Athenians.**—“If we are wise, this congress will not only be held to consider our separate interests, but also to see how we can save all Sicily from the machinations of the Athenians. That nation has the greatest power in Greece; the Athenians are lying here with a few ships and watching our blunders; and under the pretext of alliance, are only waiting to turn our hostilities to their advantage. For when we have weakened ourselves and paved the way for their dominion here, they will attempt with a larger fleet to bring all these states into subjection.

61 **Necessity of union among ourselves.**—“Since then faction is most ruinous to Sicily, and we ought to unite man with man and city with city, let no one think that it is only the Dorians who are enemies of the Athenians, and that the Chalcidian race is secured by its Ionian connexion; for Athens cares nothing for distinctions of race amongst us, but is ambitious of conquering us all equally. And it is excusable that the Athenians should be thus covetous and scheming; and I blame not those who wish to reign, but those who are willing to be subjected, for human nature is disposed to rule those who submit, but to guard against those who attack. Knowing all this,

we ought to end our quarrels by peace; and then the Athenians, having no longer any pretence or footing in Sicily, will be compelled to abandon their designs.

**Uncertainty of war.**—“Such will be the advantage arising from pursuing pacific counsels respecting the Athenians; those attendant on peace are acknowledged by all. And if any one amongst you desire to advance some favourite object, or prosecute some plan of revenge, let him remember that the justice of a cause does not necessarily insure its success, nor are the most sanguine always the most fortunate; and that it is wiser to avoid the fatal losses of war than to trust to its deceitful prospects of success.

**War in our case cannot end well.**—“And now whilst we fear 63 an unknown future, and are alarmed by the presence of the Athenians, let us send away our enemy from our country and make peace for ever, or at any rate agree upon a truce and postpone our private differences. We shall then have each a free city, and be our own masters. But if through mutual distrust we hearken to other counsels and continue our mutual hostilities, we shall become subject to others and unable to avenge ourselves; and if our lot should be ever so fortunate, we shall be forced to become friends to our enemies, and enemies to those who ought to be our friends.

**Make mutual concessions and secure our national independence.**—For myself, although I represent a powerful city, and am more likely to be an assailant than the assailed, yet I think it right to make concessions, and not through a foolish animosity fancy that I can control my own plans and fortune itself. I call upon you all of your own free will to do the same; to remember that we are all neighbours, living in one country, and that an island; and all bearing the common name of Sicilians. If we go to war again, let us make peace amongst ourselves by mutual conferences, but always offer our united resistance to foreign invaders, and never for the future call in mediators or allies. We shall thus deliver Sicily both from the Athenians and from civil war, and for the time to come enjoy our freedom by ourselves uninterrupted by foreign machinations.”

**Sicilians agree to a peace: Athenian commanders 65 punished.**—The Sicilians then concluded a general peace according to the advice of Hermocrates, agreeing to retain their several possessions, only Syracuse was to cede Morgantina to the Camarinæans, who were to pay a sum of money for it. The Athenian generals expressed their assent to the peace, and the fleet left Sicily; but on reaching Athens, Pythodorus and Sophocles were banished, and Eurymedon was fined, on suspicion of having been bribed to leave Sicily when they might have conquered it. For the Athenians were so elated with their recent



good fortune, that they thought they could achieve alike what was possible or impossible, and with or without resources. *Continued at v. 4.*

*X. Revolution at Megara, chap. 66—74.*

66 **Leaders of the commons betray Megara to Athens.**—This summer the democratic Megareans who held the city were harassed by the Athenians, who invaded their territory twice a-year, (ii. 31,) and by their own exiles who possessed Pega, and ravaged the country. They therefore began to discuss the propriety of recalling the exiles, whose friends openly urged the measure; and the leaders of the democracy, seeing that the people could not endure their evils much longer, and fearing the return of their exiled enemies, entered into a secret communication with the Athenian generals, Hippocrates and Demosthenes, upon betraying the city. It was agreed that the Athenians should first take the Long Walls, 8 stadia [about 1 mile] in length, which ran from the city to the port of Nisæa, as this step would prevent the Peloponnesian garrison at Nisæa from interfering; and that the leaders of the democracy should then endeavour to deliver up the Upper Town, when the Megareans would be induced to surrender.

67 **Hippocrates and Demosthenes take the Long Walls.**—When the preparations were concluded, the two generals sailed to Minoa at night, and Hippocrates, with 600 heavy-armed, concealed himself in an excavation from whence bricks had been dug, near one of the Long Walls; whilst Demosthenes, with a body of light-armed Plateans and a second corps of Peripoli, [moveable garrison troops,] placed himself in ambuscade in a piece of ground consecrated to Mars, still nearer. For some time previously the Megarean traitors had obtained leave to carry a boat in a cart down to the sea along the trench on the outside of the wall, on pretence of nocturnal privateering; and to bring the boat back again the same way before it was morning; avoiding the harbour, in order to elude the observation of the Athenians. Accordingly, just before day-break the cart arrived at the gates of the Long Walls as usual, and whilst it was

preventing their being shut out, the Athenians rushed in from the ambuscade according to arrangement, and the Megareans despatched the guard. Demosthenes with his light-armed Plateans and Peripoli entered first, and having defeated some of the Peloponnesian garrison who came to the rescue, they secured the entrance for the Athenian heavy infantry under Hippocrates. The Athenians marched to the wall as they entered, whilst the Peloponnesian garrison, being terrified by the night attack, and thinking that all the Megareans had betrayed them, fled to Nisæa; for an Athenian herald had invited the Megareans to pile their arms with the Athenians.

**Megarean treachery detected.**—The Athenians now possessed the Long Walls, and next morning the democratic Megareans, who had negotiated with them, suggested to the others in the city that they ought to open the city gates, and give battle to the enemy. These democrats had previously arranged, that when the city gates were opened the Athenians should rush in; being by this time joined by 4000 Athenian heavy-armed and 600 horse, who had marched all night from Eleusis. The conspirators then anointed themselves with oil, that they might be distinguished from the rest, and were standing about the gates, when one of their associates betrayed their design to the opposite faction. The latter, without disclosing their knowledge of the plot, remonstrated upon the imprudence of marching out against a superior enemy and endangering the city, and declared, that if any one ventured to do so, they would fight it out in Megara; and as they maintained that they were giving the best advice, and kept the gates at the same time, it was impossible for the conspirators to carry out their intention.

**Athenians take Nisæa.**—The Athenian generals, finding that some obstacle had arisen, proceeded to invest Nisæa, thinking that if they could take it, Megara would surrender. Stone-masons and iron were quickly brought from Athens; stones and bricks from the suburbs were used for materials; fruit trees and timber were cut down for palisades; and the houses themselves, when provided



with battlements, formed a fortification. The whole army was divided amongst the trench and walls, and having continued to work the whole day, by the afternoon of the next they had all but completed a wall of circumvallation, which crossed the Long Walls, and ran down to the sea on both sides of Nisæa. The garrison of Nisæa, having hitherto had their daily provisions brought from Megara, were now in want of food; and despairing of aid from the Peloponnesus, and supposing the Megareans to be their enemies, they capitulated to the Athenians, on condition of being set at liberty after surrendering their arms, upon payment of a stated ransom, except the Spartan commander and other Lacedæmonians amongst them, who became prisoners at discretion. The Athenians then broke down the Long Walls where they abutted on Megara, and took possession of Nisæa.

70 **Brasidas advances to Megara.**—Meantime Brasidas was in the neighbourhood of Sicyon and Corinth preparing an army for the invasion of Thracæ, and hearing of the capture of the Walls, he marched to save Nisæa, with 2700 Corinthian heavy-armed, 400 Phliasiens, 600 Sicyonians, and all the levies he had himself raised. He also sent into Bœotia for succours, which were directed to meet him at Tripodiseus, a Megarean village under Mount Gerania. This village Brasidas reached at night, and there first heard of the capture of Nisæa; and before the Athenians were aware of his approach, he pushed forward to Megara with 300 picked men. Wishing above all to secure this city, he requested that his forces might be admitted, as he had good hopes of recovering Nisæa.

71 But both factions refused his request; the democrats fearing that he would recall their exiled enemies, whilst the aristocrats feared being attacked by the commons, which would expose the city to the Athenian besiegers. Each side also expected a battle between Brasidas and the Athenians, and deferred joining either until they saw who were victorious.

**Brasidas joined by the Bœotians: cavalry skirmish.**

72 —Brasidas now returned to his main army, and next morning was joined by the Bœotian reinforcement. The Bœotians had intended to assist Megara, and were in full

force at Platæa before they received the message from Brasidas; but his request further encouraged them, and they sent him 2200 heavy infantry and 700 horse, which raised his army to 6000 heavy-armed. The Athenian heavy infantry were drawn up in a line on the shore about Nisæa, but their light infantry were scattered over the plain. The Bœotian cavalry fell upon these light troops unexpectedly, and drove them down to the sea, but the Athenian horse charged in return, and a cavalry action ensued. The Bœotian commander was slain, and the Athenians rifled the dead bodies, which were afterwards restored under a truce, and erected a trophy; but neither party gained a decided advantage, though both claimed the victory.

**Athenians decline battle.**—Brasidas now moved nearer 73 to Megara and the sea, and drew up his army on an advantageous spot, and waited for the Athenians to advance; for he considered, that whether he should gain a victory, or the enemy should decline an engagement, the effect would be equally favourable to his cause at Megara. The Athenians were then drawn up by the Long Walls, and remained quiet also; for their generals did not care to risk a battle against superior numbers, when, if victorious, they could only take Megara, and if beaten, they would lose the flower of their heavy soldiery.

**Brasidas enters Megara.**—After waiting some time, the Athenians returned to Nisæa, and the Peloponnesians to their original position; when the friends of the Megarean exiles, thinking that Brasidas had proved his superior strength, whilst the Athenians had confessed their weakness, threw open their gates to his army, and confounded the commons who had negotiated with the Athenians.

**Oligarchy established: 100 commonalty slain.**—74 Brasidas now dismissed the allies, and went to Corinth to prepare for his Thracian expedition (c. 78). The Athenians also returned home, and the Megarean commons, who had been most active in negotiating with them, stole away; but the rest conferred with the friends of the aristocratic exiles, and restored the latter from Pegæ, binding them by solemn oaths to forget the past,





and advise what was best for the city. When, however, the aristocracy had been restored to power, they reviewed the army, and having picked out 100 of their enemies, they compelled the commons to condemn them openly, and then they put them to death. A thorough oligarchy was then established, which, though made by a few men, was of long continuance. *Continued at chap. 106.*

- 75 **Demodocus and Aristides take Antandrus: Lamachus loses his fleet.**—Demodocus, Aristides, and Lamachus were commanders of the ships sent by the Athenians to levy contributions from the allies, (c. 50,) but Lamachus sailed into the Euxine with 10 ships, whilst Demodocus and Aristides were at the Hellespont. These two generals saw that the Mytilenæans were going to fortify Antandrus, (c. 52,) and feared that the place would become what Anæa was to Samos; for the Samian exiles had established themselves in Anæa, and assisted the Peloponnesians by sending them pilots, and thrown Samos into confusion, and relieved her deserters. Demodocus and Aristides then collected forces from the allies, defeated the troops who came out from Antandrus, and recovered the place. Soon after, Lamachus lost his ships by a land-flood, whilst anchoring in the river Calix, but he led his troops by land through the Bithynian Thracians to Chalcedon, a Megarean colony, at the mouth of the Pontus.

XI. *Project for a Revolution in Bœotia, chap. 76, 77.*

- 76 **Intrigues in Bœotia.**—Immediately after his return from Megara, Demosthenes sailed with 40 ships to Naupactus; for both he and Hippocrates had carried on a correspondence with some Bœotians, who wished to change their own government for a democracy like that of Athens. These Bœotians had acted under the direction of Ptoædorus, a Theban exile; a party of them agreed to betray Siphæ, a port in the Thespian territory, on the Crisæan Bay; whilst Cheronæa, a frontier town of Bœotia, towards Phocis, was to be delivered up by a party within the place, who were also warmly assisted by the exiles from Orchomenus, (anciently Minyan, but now Bœotian,) to which city Chæronea belonged, which

exiles had raised mercenaries in the Peloponnesus, and a party of Phocians had also joined in the design. On the same day, the Athenians were on their part to seize and fortify the sanctuary of Apollo, called Delium, on the coast of the Tanagræan territory, opposite to Eubœa. By these simultaneous measures, it was expected that the Bœotians would be unable to offer a united resistance at Delium, whilst their own districts were in a state of revolution. Moreover, if the Athenians and their partisans succeeded in their attempts, they would have three rallying places, from whence to ravage the country, and thus, though they might not immediately succeed in overthrowing the Bœotian oligarchies, yet the latter must ultimately fall.

**Demosthenes sails to Naupactus, and levies troops.**—77 Hippocrates now raised a land force in Athens, and prepared to march into Bœotia; whilst Demosthenes was sent to Naupactus with the 40 ships, to levy an army of Acarnanians and other allies, with whom to sail to Siphæ; and a day was fixed upon which the two generals could simultaneously carry out their joint measures. Accordingly, Demosthenes, on reaching Naupactus, raised all the allied forces there, and found that all the Acarnanians had compelled Cœniadæ to join the Athenian confederacy. He then reduced Salynthius and the Agræans, and prepared to proceed to Siphæ. *Continued at chap. 89.*

XII. *Expedition of Brasidas to Thrace, chap. 78—88.*

**Brasidas marches through Thessaly with 1700 heavy-armed.**—Meantime Brasidas had set out on his expedition to Thrace, (c. 74,) with 1700 heavy-armed, and reached the Trachinian Heraclæa. Here he sent a messenger to his partisans in Pharsalus to request them to conduct his army through the country. Accordingly, Strophacus, the proxenus to the Chalcidians, and four others came to him at Melitia in Achaia, and he proceeded on his march; other Thessalians also conducted him, especially Niconidas, a friend of Perdicas. For it was difficult to march through Thessaly with an armed force, and without an escort, and the Greeks were always suspicious of those who passed through a neighbouring



country without obtaining its consent. Moreover, the Thessalians were, as a body, friendly to the Athenians, and had they not been under an oligarchy, Brasidas could never have made his way. As it was, some Thessalians tried to stop him at the river Enipeus, and expostulated with him upon his advancing without the national consent. But his conductors disclaimed escorting him against the will of their countrymen, and said they were only attending him as friends on his unexpected visit; and Brasidas himself added, that though he came as a friend to the Thessalians, and was marching against the Athenians only, and that though he knew of no treaty to prevent either Lacedæmonians or Thessalians from passing through each other's country, yet he would not advance against their will. The remonstrants then withdrew, and Brasidas, by the advice of his guides, pushed on before a larger body could assemble to stop him. On the same day that he left Melitia he reached Pharsalus, and encamped on the river Apidanus; from thence he proceeded to Placium, and from thence to Peræbia, where his Thessalian guides left him, but the Peræbians conducted him to Dium, a Macedonian town, lying under Mount Olympus, and subject to Perdiccas.

79 **Brasidas reaches Perdiccas and the Chalcidians, who dread Athens.**—Brasidas thus reached Perdiccas and Chalcidice, who, on hearing of the recent successes of the Athenians, had united in procuring him and his troops from the Peloponnesus. For the revolted Chalcidians feared that the Athenians would now attack them, and were secretly supported by the cities which had not revolted; whilst Perdiccas, though not an open enemy, was fearful of his ancient differences with Athens, and was also desirous of subduing Arrhibæus, king of the Lyncestians.

80 **Lacedæmonians had desired to employ their Helots.**—The Lacedæmonians, who were then being pressed by the Athenians, even in their own territory, readily granted this force. They hoped that by assisting the revolted allies of Athens, who would maintain an army so sent, they might create a diversion in their favour; and they also wanted to employ some of their Helots in foreign service, whom they feared would attempt a revolution,

now that Pylus was occupied by the enemy. At all times the Lacedæmonians had especially guarded against a Helot insurrection. They had previously promised liberty to those who had done the state most service, thinking that those who first claimed to be free would be the most dangerous; and having selected 2000 of their bravest Helots, they secretly butchered them. On the present occasion they sent 700 Helots as heavy-armed troops, the rest of the army being Peloponnesian mercenaries. Brasidas was sent out chiefly at his own desire, and the Chalcidians were also desirous of having a man of such reputed activity, and who, by his just and moderate conduct, had procured the revolt of many cities from the Athenians, and the betrayal of others. And subsequently, after the later events in Sicily, it was the remembrance of his probity and tact, that most inclined the Athenian allies to the Lacedæmonians.

**Athenians declare war against Perdiccas.**—When 82 the Athenians heard of the arrival of Brasidas in Thrace, they declared war against Perdiccas, and kept a closer watch over their allies.

**Brasidas quarrels with Perdiccas about Arrhibæus.**— 83 Perdiccas now led Brasidas and his army in conjunction with his own forces against Arrhibæus, king of the bordering Lyncestians, but on reaching the pass of Lynceus, Brasidas said that before hostilities commenced he should like to persuade Arrhibæus to ally with the Lacedæmonians. Arrhibæus had previously sent a herald to Brasidas, offering to leave the affair to his arbitration; and the Chalcidian envoys in the camp also advised Brasidas not to remove the dangers which threatened Perdiccas, as they might then be more secure of his hearty assistance. Moreover the ambassadors of Perdiccas had promised at Lacedæmon that their master would bring many of the surrounding nations into the Lacedæmonian alliance; so that Brasidas considered himself entitled to deal jointly with Perdiccas in the affair of Arrhibæus, rather than leave him to do as he pleased. Perdiccas however said that he had not brought Brasidas to arbitrate in his quarrels, but to fight his battles, and as he maintained half the troops of Brasidas, it was unjust



in him to confer with Arrhibæus. But Brasidas persisted in meeting Arrhibæus, who then persuaded him to withdraw his army from Lyceus; and Perdicas showed his displeasure by contributing for the future *one third* instead of *one half* towards the pay of his army.

84 **Brasidas attempts Acanthus.**—The same summer, a little before the vintage, Brasidas, accompanied by the Chalcidians, marched against the Andrian colony of Acanthus. The Acanthians were divided about receiving him. The oligarchical party, who had joined with the Chalcidians in inviting him, were in his favour; but the commons were opposed to him. However, the latter, through fear of their ungathered fruit, admitted him alone to a conference.

SPEECH OF BRASIDAS TO THE ACANTHIANS.

85 **Surprised that you should not at once receive me as your deliverer.**—"I and my army have been sent hither, Acanthians, for the same reason that the Lacedæmonians assigned for the commencement of hostilities, viz. to liberate Greece from the Athenians. We have been disappointed in the war, or we should have been here before, but we have taken the first opportunity of coming, and I am surprised that you do not at once receive us. We thought we were going to men who felt with us, and it will be hard if you refuse to admit us, after the dangerous and difficult march which, for your sake, we have accomplished. Others too, seeing you are a prudent people, and possess a considerable city, will follow your example; and I shall be charged with coming either with inadequate forces, or with some unjust design under pretence of liberty.

My power and integrity not to be doubted, and I come not to exalt either party.—"But with these same troops I relieved Nisæa, when the Athenians, though superior in numbers, refused to give me battle; and it is unlikely that they will send here an equal force by sea. As for myself, I come for the liberation of the Greeks only. I have bound the Lacedæmonian magistrates by the most solemn oaths, that every state whom I win over to our side shall become an independent ally; and therefore claim to have neither my integrity doubted, nor my power suspected. Above all, I come not to espouse the interests of either party; for if I disregarded your hereditary constitution, and brought you a doubtful liberty, by enslaving the many to the few, or the few to the many, it would be more grievous to you than foreign dominion, and deserve your hatred, and not your gratitude. It is for such conduct that we made war upon the Athenians, and it would be doubly odious in us to imitate it.

If you refuse my offers, I must treat you as enemies.—"But if you say in reply to my offers, that you have not the power to accept them,—that because of your good wishes you claim impunity for rejecting them,—that this freedom seems accompanied by danger,—and that whilst it is right to offer liberty to them who have the power to accept it, it is wrong to force it on any against their will; in that case I shall call the gods and heroes of your country to witness, that after coming for your benefit, I cannot prevail upon you to accept it, and will endeavour to coerce you by ravaging your country. I have two considerations which compel me: 1st, I cannot allow you to injure Lacedæmon by paying tribute to the Athenians; and 2ndly, I cannot permit you to stand in the way of the liberation of the Greeks. We aim not at dominion, but to stop others from acquiring it; and I therefore advise you to deliberate upon these things, and strive to be the beginners of liberty in Greece, and obtain eternal glory."

**Acanthians become independent allies of Lacedæmon.** 88

—The Acanthians, after much speaking, gave their votes upon the question secretly, and being tempted by the persuasive eloquence of Brasidas, and fearful of their fruit, the majority determined on revolting from the Athenians; but they first pledged him to the oath sworn by the Lacedæmonian magistrates, viz. "that the allies he won over should be independent," and they then admitted his army, and the Andrian colony of Stagirus joined them in the revolt. *Continued at chap. 102.*

XIII. *Failure of the Revolution in Bœotia, chap.*  
89—101.

**Demosthenes fails at Siphæ.**—At the beginning of the winter, when the Bœotian towns Winter. 89 (e. 77) were to be given up to Hippocrates and Demosthenes—Demosthenes to sail to Siphæ, and Hippocrates to march to Delium—a mistake occurred about the day, and Demosthenes sailed first to Siphæ with the Acarnanians and neighbouring allies. But his expedition failed. Hippocrates was not yet in the country to create a division, and Nicomachus, a Phocian of Phanoteus, betrayed the secret to the Lacedæmonians, and they told the Bœotians; and the latter secured Siphæ and Charonea with all their forces, and the malcontents, being aware of



the mistake, made no movement in the cities. *Continued at chap. 101.*

90 **Hippocrates fortifies Delium.**—After the Bœotians had returned from Siphæ, Hippocrates drew out the whole population of Athens, citizens, resident aliens, and sojourners, and marched to Delium and proceeded to fortify it. His army dug a ditch all round the sacred precinct and fane, and with the excavated earth they threw up a mound to serve as a wall. They then fixed stakes in the mound, and strengthened the palisade with stones and bricks from the neighbouring houses, and the vine trees that surrounded the sanctuary. They also erected wooden towers at intervals where the temple buildings had fallen; for on one side the ancient gallery had gone to ruin. The army commenced the work on the third day from leaving home, and finished the main part of it by dinner time on the fifth day. Hippocrates then stayed behind to arrange the guards and complete the remaining out-works, whilst the army went homeward 10 stadia [ $1\frac{1}{4}$  mile] from Delium, where the heavy-armed halted, and most of the light-armed proceeded to Attica.

91 **Bœotians assemble at Tanagra.**—Meantime the Bœotians had mustered at Tanagra, and found that the Athenians had halted just within the Oropian territory, which was Attic ground, and eleven of the Bœotarchs would not consent to a battle, as the enemy had left Bœotia. But Pagondas, who was Bœotarch of Thebes in conjunction with Arianthidas, and first in command, harangued the men in separate divisions to persuade them to advance upon the Athenians.


**SPEECH OF PAGONDAS TO THE BŒOTIAN ARMY.**

The Athenians have invaded Bœotia, and aim at its subjugation.—“Bœotians, these Athenians have invaded Bœotia, and built a fortress in it from whence to ravage us, and they are therefore our enemies wherever we may find them. It is our hereditary custom to repel a foreign force that invades us whether in or out of Bœotia, and we must carry this out especially against the present enemy, because they are both Athenians and borderers. They endeavour to subdue both neighbouring and distant states. We have an example of their conduct both in Eubœa and the greater part of Greece. And

with such dangerous neighbours, who fight not only for our boundary, but for the whole of our territory, it is necessary for us to strike the first blow, and win the same security for our country as we obtained at Coronœa. It is therefore for us to remember the deeds of our fathers, and not to disgrace their hereditary virtues; to trust in the gods, whose sanctuary these men have profaned: and to show the Athenians that though they may gain what they covet from men who will not fight, yet those who deem it noble to secure their own liberty and not to enslave that of others, will never suffer them to depart without a struggle.”

Bœotians advance on the Athenians.—Pagondas thus 93 persuaded the Bœotians to a battle, and as it was late in the day, he led his troops forward, and drew them up on a spot where a hill prevented the two armies from seeing each other. Hippocrates, who was at Delium, heard of his approach, and sending orders to his own troops to form into line, he soon afterwards joined them, leaving 300 horse to guard Delium and attack the enemy during the engagement. The Bœotians then posted a division to meet the charge of this body, and appearing over the hill, halted in the order of battle, to the number of about 7000 heavy-armed, more than 10,000 light-armed, 1000 horse, and 500 targeteers.

**ORDER OF THE BATTLE OF DELIUM.**







- 94 The Athenians had no light infantry, nor did the state ever raise any, and the multitude who had joined in the expedition were mostly unarmed, and had nearly all returned home (c. 90). When the armies were formed Hippocrates thus encouraged his troops :

SPEECH OF HIPPOCRATES.

- 95 Importance of the battle.—“ Do not consider that we are improperly running into danger in a foreign country, for the battle is of the greatest importance to our own. If we conquer, the Peloponnesians can never again invade us, for want of the Bœotian cavalry. Advance then against the enemy in a spirit worthy of that country which each of you boasts to be the first in Greece,—worthy of your fathers, who under Myronides conquered at Enophyta, and obtained Bœotia.”
- 96 Defeat of the Athenians.—Hippocrates was passing along the line whilst speaking to his men, and had just reached the centre, when the Bœotians, having been again exhorted by Pagondas, raised the Pœan and descended the hill. The Athenians advanced, running to meet them, and whilst the extremities of both lines were prevented by water-courses from engaging, the remainder met shield to shield. The Bœotian left wing was broken through by the Athenian right, who surrounded the Thespians, and killed many hand to hand, and in the confusion of surrounding, even slew some of their own men. But the Theban division, which formed the Bœotian right, gradually drove back the Athenian left, and Pagondas having secretly sent two squadrons of horse to support his own distressed left, the Athenians thought another army was approaching, and were seized with a panic. The Thebans now broke through the Athenian line, and the whole army took to flight, some to Delium, others to Oropus, and others to Mount Parnes. Many were slain in the pursuit, especially by the Bœotian cavalry, who were joined by a body of Locrian horse at the commencement of the rout, but the mass of fugitives escaped, under favour of the night.
- Bœotians promise to restore the dead, on the Athenians evacuating Delium.—Next day the Athenians at Oropus and Delium returned home by sea, after leaving
- 97 a garrison in the fort ; and the Bœotians, having erected

a trophy, taken up their own dead, and stripped those of the enemy, left a guard on the field of battle, and marched to Tanagra, and prepared to attack Delium. The Athenians then sent a herald, to ask for the restoration of their dead ; but he was turned back by a Bœotian herald, who told him his errand would be useless, until he himself had delivered a message to the Athenians. Accordingly, the Bœotian herald told the Athenians that they had violated the laws of Greece, in not having abstained from injuring the temple during their invasion ; that they had fortified Delium, and profaned it with all the acts of ordinary life, and applied the holy water to common uses ; and he called upon them, in the name of Apollo and the associated deities, to withdraw from the sanctuary.

Athenians refuse, as the sanctuary is theirs by con- 98  
quest.—The Athenians then sent their own herald to the Bœotians, to say, that they had not, nor would they wantonly damage the sanctuary, which they had only occupied to avenge themselves on those who had injured them. That according to the laws of Greece, the temples belonged to whoever possessed the district in which they stood, provided the possessors paid them such honours as they were able. That the Bœotians, when they conquered their present territory, had not scrupled to seize the temples which had belonged to the original inhabitants ; and that if the Athenians had mastered all Bœotia, they would likewise possess all the temples. By this same right, the Athenians held the sanctuary they now occupied. They had only used the water under the pressure of necessity, and trusted that the god would pardon the offence ; for the altars were the refuge of unintentional offenders, and transgressions were only imputed to those who had sinned without compulsion. It was the Bœotians who were impious in wishing to barter dead bodies for sanctuaries, and the Athenians begged them to restore the dead, not upon condition of their evacuating that part of Bœotia, which, as they now held it, must be considered as Attic soil, but on making a truce, according to ancient custom.

Bœotians refuse to restore the dead.—The Bœotians 99



considered that the territory of Oropus, in which the battle was fought, and in which the dead were lying, was subject to Athens, and yet that the Athenians could not obtain the dead without their permission. They therefore replied: "If the Athenians are in our country, let them evacuate it, and they may then recover their dead; but if they are in their own country, (as they pretend,) they can bury their dead without our permission; we are not inclined to grant a truce for any country belonging to Athens." Thus the Athenian herald returned without effecting his purpose.

100 **Take Delium with a singular engine.**—The Bœotians now sent for dart-men and slingers from the Malian Gulf; and having been reinforced since the battle with 2000 Corinthian heavy infantry, the Peloponnesian garrison which had evacuated Nisæa, (c. 69,) and some Megareans, they marched against Delium, and after many attempts took it with an engine of the following description. A great beam was sawn asunder, hollowed out, and then fitted together so as to form a pipe, and plated with iron. A caldron of lighted coals, sulphur, and pitch was then fastened to one end with chains, whilst in the other end was fixed an iron pipe inclining from the beam. The whole was carried on carts to that part of the wall which had been chiefly built of vines and timber, and whilst the caldron was applied to the wood, they introduced a great bellows into the iron pipe, which sent a blast through the beam into the caldron, and speedily created such a flame that the Athenians could not keep their posts, but took to flight. The Bœotians then seized the fortress, after slaying many of the garrison and taking 200 prisoners; the remainder escaped by sea.

101 **Restore the dead: number of slain.**—Delium was captured on the 17th day after the battle, and soon after, the Athenian herald, unaware of the loss, again applied and obtained the bodies. The Bœotians had lost nearly 500, but the Athenians had nearly 1000 slain, including Hippocrates their commander, beside a great number of light infantry and camp followers.

**Demosthenes repulsed at Sicyon.**—Soon after the battle of Delium, Demosthenes, who had failed at Siphæ,

having still on board some Acarnanian and Agræan troops with 400 Athenian heavy-armed, made a descent on Sicyon. But the Sicyonians routed the first division that landed, killed some, and took others prisoners, and having erected a trophy, restored the dead under a truce.

XVI. *Thracian campaign of Brasidas,*  
chap. 102—116.

**Death of Sitalees.**—About this time Sitalees, king of the Odryssæ, died, being defeated by the Triballi. He was succeeded by his nephew, Seuthes.

**Brasidas marches against Amphipolis: history of the colony.**—This winter, Brasidas with his Thracian allies (c. 88) marched against Amphipolis, an Athenian colony on the river Strymon. On the same site where the town now stands, a settlement had been formerly attempted by Aristagoras the Milesian, when flying from Darius. Aristagoras was driven away by the Edonians. Thirty-two years later, the Athenians sent 10,000 of their own citizens, with any who chose to join them, to settle there, but these were cut off by the Thracians at Drabescus. Twenty-nine years after that, the Athenians under Hagnon, son of Nicias, set out again from Eion, which they occupied themselves at the mouth of the river, 25 stadia (about 3 miles) from the present town; and having expelled the Edonians, they settled on this spot, formerly called "Nine-ways," but which Hagnon named Amphipolis,\* because as the Strymon ran on both sides of it, he joined one reach to the other by a wall, and made the town conspicuous towards both the land and sea.

**Crosses the bridge of the Strymon.**—Brasidas started 103 from Arnæ in Chalcidice, and reached Anlon and Bromiscus, where Lake Bolbe empties itself into the sea, about dusk. Having supped there he hurried on, as the night was wintry and the snow falling, to reach Amphipolis unperceived, except by those who were to betray it. These latter had been persuaded by Perdicas and the Chalcidians, but the most active amongst them were the Argilians, an Andrian colony, who were always

\* i. e. A city looking both ways. See Arnold's appendix to vol. ii.



suspected by the Athenians. Accordingly, when Brasidas reached Argilus, [a small town a little to the south of the Strymon,] the citizens received him, and revolted from the Athenians, and led him to the bridge which crossed the river. Amphipolis was at some distance from the bridge, and the walls did not reach to it as they do now, whilst only a small guard was posted there; and partly from the stormy weather, the surprise, and the disaffection amongst the guard, Brasidas easily drove in the latter, and at once mastered all the property and houses without the town.

104 **Amphipolitans send to THUCYDIDES for assistance.**

—Brasidas took several prisoners, and others fled within the walls, where the Amphipolitans, being suspicious of each other, were thrown into great confusion; and it is said that if Brasidas had not stayed to plunder, but had marched at once to the town, he might have taken it. Having thus overran the suburban district without any result, he remained quiet. Meantime the gates were unopened, as the Athenian party in Amphipolis were superior in numbers; and the latter, in conjunction with Eucles, the Athenian governor, sent to THUCYDIDES, son of Olorus, the other commander Thrace-ward, and writer of this History, to come to their relief. Thucydides was then at Thasos, an island colonized by the Parians, about half a day's sail from Amphipolis; and on receiving the summons, he immediately started with seven ships, wishing to reach Amphipolis before it surrendered, or at least to reach Eion.

105 **Brasidas induces the Amphipolitans to surrender.**—

Brasidas was now alarmed, for Thucydides held the right of working in the gold mines in that part of Thrace, and possessed great influence on the continent; and if he came, the Amphipolitan commons, in expectation of his levying forces from Thrace and the sea-coast, would refuse to yield. Brasidas then proclaimed, that all who pleased, whether Athenians or Amphipolitans, might remain in the town and retain their property under a fair and equal government; and the rest might leave it and take their property with them within five days. The  
106 people then accepted these proposals and delivered up

their city; for only a few of the Athenians were citizens, and therefore expected no relief, and thought themselves in great danger; many of those within the walls were also related to those without, whilst the rest of the multitude were reconciled on finding that they were neither to be deprived of franchise nor property.\*

**Thucydides reaches Eion and repulses Brasidas.**— 107

Thucydides reached Eion late in the same day that Brasidas took Amphipolis, and but for his arrival Brasidas would have taken Eion the next morning. Thucydides now prepared Eion for defence, and received the refugees who retired under treaty from Amphipolis. Next morning, Brasidas suddenly sailed down the river with numerous boats, and attempted to take the point of land which juts from the wall, and thus to command an entrance to the place, but he was beaten back, and was also unsuccessful in an attack by land.

**Myrcinus, Galepsus, and Cœsyme join Brasidas.**— Brasidas now arranged matters at Amphipolis, and was joined by Perdiccas. Myrcinus, an Edonian town, also came over to him, for its king, Pittacus, had been lately murdered by Brauro his wife and the sons of Goaxis; and soon after, Galepsus and Cœsyme, colonies of the Thasians, did the same.

**Athenians alarmed at the revolting of their allies.**— 108

The Athenians were now alarmed at the loss of Amphipolis, as it had hitherto paid revenue and supplied timber for ship-building. Moreover, though the Lacedæmonians, as long as they were permitted to pass through Thessaly, could reach the allies of Athens as far as the Strymon, yet if they had not taken the bridge of Amphipolis, they could have gone no farther, for the river in the neighbourhood of Eion was guarded by cruisers, and beyond Amphipolis it formed a large and impassable lake [Cercinitis]. The Athenians also feared that their allies would revolt, for Brasidas had showed great moderation, and everywhere declared that he was sent to liberate Greece. And indeed when the Athenian allies heard of the capture of Amphipolis, and the advantages

\* On account of his failure in saving Amphipolis, Thucydides became an exile for 20 years (v. 26).



it enjoyed under the mild conduct of Brasidas, they secretly invited him, and each desired to be the first to revolt. For they falsely estimated the power of Athens, and indulged in wild hopes; they knew that she had lately met with a heavy blow at Boeotia, and they believed in the deceitful assertion of Brasidas, that the Athenians had declined to fight his single force at Nisæa; and above all, seeing that the Lacedæmonians were zealous in their behalf, they were ready to run the risk.

Send garrisons, whilst Brasidas asks for reinforcements.—The Athenians now sent garrisons to the different states as quickly as the winter would permit them. Brasidas also sent to Lacedæmon for additional forces, and prepared to build triremes in the Strymon, but his wishes were not complied with, partly from envy, and partly from desire to recover the prisoners taken from Sphaacteria.

109 Megareans raze their Long Walls.—This winter the Megareans retook and razed the Long Walls which the Athenians had held in their country (c. 66—74).

Brasidas marches against the Acte.—After the surrender of Amphipolis, Brasidas marched against the territory called the Acte, the peninsula of Mount Athos, which stretches from the ditch dug by Xerxes into the Ægean Sea. [*Herod.* vii. 22, 23.] The peninsula contains the following towns: viz. Sane, an Andrian colony, close to the ditch; Thyssus, Cleonæ, Acrothoi, Olophyxus, and Dium. The population speak two languages, and are partly Chalcidian, but chiefly Pelasgian, a Tyrrhenian tribe, who once settled in Lemnos and Athens; together with Bisaltians, Crestonians, and Edonians. All these towns surrendered to Brasidas, except Sane and Dium, whose territory he then ravaged.

110 Takes Torone.—Brasidas now marched against Torone, in Chalcidice, which was held by the Athenians, but a small party within had offered to betray it. A little before day-break he reached the temple of the Dioscuri, about three stadia [nearly half a mile] from the town, unobserved by the Toronæans or Athenian garrison. Here a few of his own partisans received him, and proposed to introduce some of his men secretly into the city.

Twenty men were then selected, but of these only seven light-armed troops with daggers, under Lysistratus, dared the adventure. This small band passed through the seaward wall, slew the guard, which were posted on the top of the hill on which the city stood, and broke open the postern towards Canastræum. Brasidas, who had been 111 slowly advancing with his army, had sent forward 100 targeteers, who, upon a preconcerted fire-signal, were to rush in at the first gates which should be opened. These approached the town, and at length their Toronæan partisans introduced a body at the postern, and these, after cutting through the bar of the gates leading to the market-place, raised the signal, and admitted the rest. Brasidas and his army followed with a shout, which ap- 112 palled the whole town. Some burst in at the gates, and others over some scaffolding, which had been placed for raising stones to repair the walls; and whilst Brasidas and the main body were advancing to occupy the higher parts of the town, the rest of the multitude spread in every direction, and the conspirators now openly joined 113 Brasidas.

Athenians escape to Lecythus.—The 50 Athenian heavy-armed, who were sleeping in the market-place, had suffered some loss from being attacked at once in front and rear; but the remainder escaped, partly by land and partly in two guard-ships, to the forts of Lecythus, which stood on a point of land connected with the town by a narrow isthmus, and was held by an Athenian garrison. Here also such Toronæans fled as were still attached to the cause of Athens.

Brasidas re-assures the Toronæans.—When morning 114 arrived, and Brasidas was in secure possession of Torone, he proclaimed to the Toronæans who had fled with the Athenians, that they might return and enjoy their own property in security; and he sent a herald to require the Athenians to evacuate Lecythus with their property under truce, as the place belonged to the Chalcidians. The Athenians refused, but begged for one day to recover their dead. Brasidas granted two days, during which he fortified the neighbouring houses, and the Athenians strengthened their position. He also con-





vened an assembly of the Toroneans, to whom he made nearly the same speech as at Acanthus, (c. 85—87,) and added, "That they must not regard the men who had negotiated with him as traitors, for they had not sought to enslave the town, nor had they been bribed; but they had acted only for the public advantage and the public liberties. For himself, he had come to benefit them all, and therefore he had not condemned those who had adhered to the Athenians, but had invited them from Lecythus to reap the same benefits as their fellow-citizens. He had no doubt but that they would find Lacedæmon a better ally than Athens; and he exhorted them to show themselves staunch confederates, as from henceforth they must answer for their own misdeeds.

- 115 **Attacks Lecythus and slays the garrison.**—At the expiration of the two days' truce, Brasidas assaulted Lecythus, which, though imperfectly fortified, held out for one day. On the next, Brasidas brought up an engine for throwing fire on the wooden defences. Whilst he was looking out for the most assailable spot, the Athenian garrison stationed a wooden tower on the opposite wall, in which they placed a number of men with casks of water and large stones. The tower suddenly broke down with the weight; the Athenians who were near were more vexed than alarmed, but those at a distance thought that the place was taken, and fled to their ships.
- 116 **Brasidas, seeing them desert the battlements, rushed in and took the fort, and slew all he found, whilst those who reached the ships sailed to Pallene.** He had previously proclaimed, that whoever first scaled the wall should receive 30 silver minæ, [almost £120,] but, thinking that the place had not been captured by human means, he dedicated the money in the temple of Minerva in Lecythus, and razing the fort and town, he devoted the ground to the goddess. The rest of the winter he spent in settling the places in his possession, and planning against others. *Continued at chap. 120.*

XV. *One Year's Truce between Athens and Lacedæmon, chap. 117—119.*

**Armistice for one year.**—In the beginning of spring, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians concluded a treaty for one year; the Athenians desiring to check the conquests of Brasidas, and not disinclined to conclude a general peace; and the Lacedæmonians hoping that when the Athenians had tasted the blessings of peace, they would be inclined to restore the men taken at Sphaacteria, and make a treaty for a longer period.

*Articles of the Truce framed at Sparta and agreed to by the Lacedæmonian allies.*

- I. **Delphic temple and oracle.**—We agree that all who wish may have free access to the temple and oracle of the Pythian Apollo, according to the laws of their respective countries; and the Lacedæmonians will also send heralds to persuade the Bœotians and Phocians to agree to this.
- II. **Delphic treasures.**—We agree to do our best to discover any who have sacrilegiously meddled with the treasures of the god.
- III. **Territory and boundaries.**—We agree that we shall each hold the territory we at present possess, and remain within our boundaries. That the Athenian garrison in Coryphasium [Pylus] keep within Buphras and Tomeus, and have no communication with Cythera; that those in Nisæa and Minoa do not cross the road from the gates leading from the temple of Nisus to that of Neptune, and from the temple of Neptune to the bridge at Minoa, nor shall the Megareans and their allies cross it; that the Athenians shall retain the island they have taken, and their possessions in Træzen.
- IV. **Navigation.**—That either party shall be permitted to navigate their own coast or that of their allies, but that the Lacedæmonians shall not sail in a war-ship at all, but in any rowing vessel of not more than 500 talents [nearly 13 tons] burden.
- V. **Ambassadors, heralds, etc.**—That all heralds, ambassadors, and their attendants, who are employed in bringing the war to an ultimate conclusion, shall have free passage by land and sea between Athens and the Peloponnesus.
- VI. **Deserters and slaves.**—No deserters or fugitives, whether bond or free, shall be received by either state.
- VII. **Settlement of the Articles.**—That these points shall be mutually settled by both parties, without having recourse to hostilities: that they are agreed to by the Lacedæmonians and their allies; but if the Athenians think of anything else more fair or equitable, they are requested to send am-



bassadors with full powers to Sparta, where nothing that is just will be objected to.

THAT THIS TRUCE CONTINUE ONE YEAR.

#### RATIFIED BY THE PEOPLE OF ATHENS.

The tribe of ACAMANTIS\* had the Prytany; Phœnippus was Secretary; and NICIADES was President.

LACHES moved: "That they conclude the Armistice on the terms agreed to by the Lacedæmonians, and may it turn out for the good of the Athenians."

The Assembly of the People then agreed:

- I. That the Armistice commence on that very day, viz. the 14th of the month Elaphebolion, and last for one year, during which ambassadors and heralds may pass into each other's country, and discuss the terms for an ultimate termination of the war.
- II. That the Generals and Prytanes shall summon an Assembly of the people, when the Athenians shall first determine on the manner in which the negotiators from Lacedæmon shall be received.
- III. That the Ambassadors now present shall swear in the presence of the people, that they will abide by this Treaty, for the aforesaid year.

119 *Agreed to by the Lacedæmonians and their allies, and the Athenians and their allies, on the 12th day of the Spartan month Gerastius, and ratified by libations, through their respective envoys:*

LACEDÆMONIANS—through Taurus, Athenæus, and Philocaridas.

CORINTHIANS—through Æneas and Euphamidas.

SEYONIANS—through Damotimus and Onasimus.

MEGAREANS—through Nicasus and Menecrates.

EPIDAUURIANS—through Amphias.

ATHENIANS—through the following generals: Nicostratus, Nicias, and Autocles.

Throughout the whole armistice, conferences were held for a more general treaty.

\* i. e. It was the month in which the 50 counsellors of the tribe of Acamantis held the office of prytanes. Of these 50, 10 under the title of proedri were especially on duty for 7 days; the whole 50 thus coming into office in successive weeks, as the whole month, if so it may be called, consisted of 5 weeks or 35 days. Of these ten proedri, one in succession held the office of president, or epistates, day by day, being intrusted for that day with the keys of the citadel and of the treasury. The proedri presided at the assemblies of the people, convened them on extraordinary occasions, and put the question to the vote, if it were such as might be put legally. See Dr. Arnold's note, and Smith's Dictionary of Antiquities, under "Boule."

#### XVI. Continuation of the Campaign of Brasidas, chap. 120—134.

Scione revolts to Brasidas.—About this time, Scione, 120 a town in Pallene, revolted from the Athenians to Brasidas. These Scionæans say that they were Palleneans from the Peloponnesus, and that their ancestors, when sailing from Troy, were driven to this place by the storm which befell the Achæans, and there settled.

When Brasidas heard of the revolt, he crossed from Torone to Scione by night in a skiff, preceded by a trireme, which might enable him to resist or elude an enemy. He then convoked an assembly of Scionæans, and after addressing them, as he had done the Acanthians and Toronæans, he declared them to be deserving of all praise; for whilst the Athenians, by holding Potidæa, had converted Pallene into an island, and prevented them from receiving any succours by land, yet, in the face of all these perils, they had spontaneously thrown off the yoke, and proved themselves to be the most faithful allies of the Lacedæmonians.

Scionæans pay him the greatest honours.—The Scionæans were elated with the praises of Brasidas, and more inclined for the war. They decreed him a crown of gold as the "Deliverer of Greece," and decked him with garlands, and greeted him as a victorious athlete. He then left some guards and returned to Torone, but soon afterwards sent them a larger force in the hope of taking Mende and Potidæa, with which he had held some communication, before succours could arrive from Athens.

News of the armistice arrives: Athenians prepare 122 to recover Scione.—Meantime a trireme arrived with Aristonymus, an Athenian, and Athenæus, a Lacedæmonian, who had been appointed to announce the armistice. The troops then returned from Scione to Torone and informed Brasidas, and all the Lacedæmonian allies Thrace-ward assented to the treaty. Aristonymus allowed the latter to the Lacedæmonians, but finding that Scione had revolted after the date of the convention, he insisted upon its not being included. But Brasidas contended that the town had revolted before the truce was



made, and refused to give it up. Aristonymus reported the case to Athens, and the Athenians immediately prepared to send an expedition to Scione. The Lacedæmonians sent them envoys, saying that they were violating the truce, and claiming the town on the strength of the representations of Brasidas, but offering to submit the matter to arbitration. The Athenians however were enraged that islanders should revolt from them and trust in the Lacedæmonian power; and as the truth was rather on their side, for the Scioneans had actually revolted two days *after* the truce was signed, they at once, at the instigation of Cleon, decreed that they would reduce Scione and put its inhabitants to death.

123 **Mende revolts: Brasidas garrisons Scione and Mende.**—Meantime Mende, a city of Pallene and colony of Eretria, revolted, and Brasidas thought himself justified in receiving the Mendæans as allies, because they had come over spontaneously, and the Athenians had also infringed the treaty. The Mendæans had been emboldened by the kind disposition of Brasidas towards them, and his firmness in behalf of Scione; but the revolt was contrary to the wishes of the many, who were forced to it by a small party, who had contemplated it for a long time, and were now afraid of a discovery. The Athenians were doubly enraged at this new rebellion, and prepared to reduce both Mende and Scione; and Brasidas, expecting a speedy attack, conveyed the women and children of both cities to Olynthus, and sent over 500 Peloponnesian heavy infantry, and 300 Chalcidian targeteers, under Polydamidas, to garrison the towns.

124 **Brasidas and Perdicas defeat Arrhibæus.**—Meantime Brasidas and Perdicas made a second joint expedition against Arrhibæus (c. 83). Perdicas took with him his Macedonian forces and some heavy Greek infantry who resided within his territory; Brasidas took all his remaining Peloponnesians, with some Chalcidians and Acanthians. Their whole force of heavy Greek infantry amounted to 3000; the Macedonian and Chalcidian cavalry to nearly 1000, with a large multitude of Barbarians. On entering the country of Arrhibæus, they found the enemy posted on a hill, and immediately occupied an

eminence opposite. A plain intervened between the rival armies, and the battle commenced by the horse of both sides charging down their respective hills, and cogaging in a cavalry action. The Lyncestian heavy infantry were the first to follow their cavalry, but Perdicas and Brasidas immediately descended upon them and soon routed their forces, killing many, whilst the rest fled to the heights. Perdicas and Brasidas then erected a trophy and waited for a reinforcement of Illyrian mercenaries, who did not arrive; when Perdicas wished to attack the Lyncestian villages, whilst Brasidas, who was afraid that the Athenians would soon sail against Mende, was desirous of retreating.

**Illyrians desert to Arrhibæus: Perdicas retires.**—125 Meantime the Illyrians betrayed Perdicas and joined Arrhibæus, and both parties decided on retreating, but, in consequence of their variance, nothing was settled. During the night the Macedonians and Barbarians were panic-stricken and fled, and Perdicas was obliged to accompany them without communicating with Brasidas, who had encamped at some distance.

**Brasidas attempts an orderly retreat.**—Next morning Brasidas saw that the Macedonians had left him, and that the Illyrians with Arrhibæus were advancing. He then formed his heavy infantry into a square with the light troops in the centre, and appointed his younger men to sally out wherever the enemy should charge; whilst he himself selected 300 picked men as a rearguard to face the enemy and resist his first charge. He then animated his men with a short address.

#### SPEECH OF BRASIDAS.

Not to be disheartened at the desertion of your allies or number of the Barbarians.—“As you have been abandoned by your allies, and your adversaries are superior in numbers, I now address you a few words of advice and encouragement. You ought not to be disheartened at the desertion, for you have acquired your character for bravery not from the assistance of others, but by your own hereditary valour, and you have been accustomed to fear no number of enemies, for you come from states which have been established by the valour of the few, who thus obtained dominion over the many. As for the Barbarians, you have already had experience of the Lyncestians, and



the Illyrians will not prove more formidable. Though their great numbers, loud shouts, and brandishing of weapons, may strike terror as long as they are new to the eye and ear; yet they want order and discipline, and are not ashamed of retreating from any particular position. If therefore you sustain the first attack, and, when you have an opportunity, retire in good order, you will see that such a rabble will content themselves with threatening at a distance those who resist their first charge, though they would be ready enough to pursue those who yield."

127 **Brasidas retreats, and Illyrians fail to surround him.**

—Brasidas now began his retreat, when the Barbarians, thinking he was flying, fell upon his army with loud shouting and uproar. But his reserved companies met them wherever they charged, whilst he himself with his picked 300 received and repelled their first rush, and retired when the enemy withdrew. The Barbarians then ceased their attack, and left a small force to harass the rear of the Greeks, whilst the main body pushed forward against the flying Macedonians. Of these they slew all they could overtake, and hurrying on, they pre-occupied the pass [or gorge] between two hills, which was the only road by which Brasidas could retreat. When the latter approached with his army, the Barbarians proceeded to line the hills on both sides, and then to surround him by closing upon his rear. Part of their forces were already on the high ground, and more were ascending from the valley, when Brasidas ordered his band to advance at full speed and dislodge the party which had possession of one of the hills. This was accomplished, and the main force of the Greeks followed their victorious comrades. The Barbarians in their confusion refrained from attacking them, and Brasidas the same day reached Amissa, the first town in the dominions of Perdiccas.

Perdiccas alienated from the Peloponnesians.—The Greeks, enraged at being deserted by the Macedonians, slew such oxen and seized such baggage as they dropped in their retreat. From this time Perdiccas, notwithstanding his dislike to the Athenians, hated the Lacedæmonians, and regarded Brasidas as an enemy, and considered how he might soonest renew his alliance with Athens, and rid himself of the Peloponnesians.

**Athenians take Mende and blockade the citadel.**— 129  
On returning from Macedonia, Brasidas found that the Athenians had recovered Mende, and being unable to cross into Pallene to assist it, he kept watch at Torone.

During the Lyncestian campaign the Athenians had sent 50 ships, including 10 Chians, and carrying 1000 heavy infantry, 600 archers, 1000 Thracian mercenaries, and some targeteers, the whole under the command of Nicias and Nicostratus, and intended to reduce Mende and Scione. Advancing from Potidæa, they landed opposite the temple of Neptune and marched against Mende. The Mendæans, with 300 Scionæans and the Peloponnesian auxiliaries, amounting in all to 700 heavy infantry, were encamped on a strong hill outside the city, under their commander, Polydamidas. Nicias, with 120 light-armed Methonæans, 60 chosen Athenian heavy infantry, and all the archers, attempted to scale the hill, but he was wounded and repulsed; whilst Nicostratus, with the rest of the army, tried to ascend it from a more distant point, and by a different approach, but was beaten back. The whole Athenian force was thus nearly conquered, and retreated and encamped, whilst the Mendæans retired to their city. Next morning the Athenians sailed round to the side of Mende opposite Scione, and took the suburb and ravaged the country the whole day. A faction within the town prevented its making any resistance, and the following night the 300 Scionæans returned to their own city. The next day, Nicias with half the army ravaged the country to the borders of Scione, whilst Nicostratus with the remainder sat down before Mende, near the upper gates by the way to Potidæa. Here the arms of the Mendæans and their auxiliaries happened to be piled, and Polydamidas drew up the forces and exhorted them to march against the enemy. One of the democratic party replied that they would not go out, and did not want a war, and he was immediately dragged to Polydamidas, and roughly treated by the opposite faction. The commons now took up their arms and opened the gates to the Athenians; and then suddenly charging the Peloponnesians, they killed many, and forced the remainder to retire into the





citadel. Meantime Nicias having returned, all the Athenians rushed into Mende, and as the gates had not been opened on any terms of treaty, they sacked the town, and it was with difficulty that their generals succeeded in persuading them to refrain from butchering the inhabitants. The Mendæans were afterwards permitted to retain their civil rights, after having tried amongst themselves the originators of the revolt. The Athenians then blockaded the citadel, by a wall drawn down to the sea on each side of it, and stationed troops to guard it.

Invest Scione.—The Athenians, having recovered  
131 Mende, now proceeded against Scione. The Scionæans and Peloponnesians were posted on a strong hill before the city, and it was impossible for the Athenians to invest the town without occupying the hill. At length, by a vigorous attack, they dislodged the enemy, and encamped; and having erected a trophy, prepared for the circumvallation of the place. Soon after, the auxiliaries besieged in the citadel of Mende forced the guard by the sea-side, and made their way through the Athenian intrenchments, with some loss, and threw themselves into Scione.

132 Perdicas makes peace with Athens, and stops the reinforcements for Brasidas.—Whilst Scione was invested, Perdicas concluded a negotiation with the two Athenian generals, which he had commenced on his retreat from Lyncestis. Ischagoras was now marching with an army to the relief of Brasidas, and Nicias called upon Perdicas for a proof of his being a firm friend; whilst Perdicas himself wished that the Peloponnesians should never again enter his territory. Accordingly, he prevailed on the principal men in Thessaly to stop the passage of the reinforcements, without even trying the temper of the Thessalians generally. But Ischagoras, Ameinias, and Aristeus, who had been appointed by the Lacedæmonians to inspect the state of affairs, made their way to Brasidas, and took some young men to be governors of the cities, though this was contrary to the spirit of the Spartan laws; and Clearidas was made governor of Amphipolis, and Pasitelidas of Torone. *Continued at chap. 133, 134, and v. 32.*

Thebans demolish the walls of the Thespians.—This 133 summer the Thebans dismantled the walls of the Thespians, whom they charged with Atticism. They had always wished to do this, and now took advantage of the flower of the Thespians being cut off by the Athenians (c. 96).

Temple of Juno at Argos burnt.—This summer also the temple of Juno was burnt down; Chrysis, the priestess, having placed a lighted torch near the garlands and fallen asleep. Chrysis fled to Philius, her priesthood having embraced eight years of the war, and part of the ninth. Phæinis was made priestess in her room.

By the close of the summer Scione was entirely invested, and the Athenians left a guard and returned home.

Arcadia. War between the Mantineans and Winter. 134  
Tegeans.—This winter the Lacedæmonians and Athenians remained quiet in consequence of the armistice. But the Mantineans and Tegeans, with their respective allies, fought a doubtful battle at Laodicium, in the territory of Oresthis, for each side routed one of the opposite wings, erected trophies, and sent spoils to Delphi. Night only stayed the action, when the Tegeans bivouacked on the field, and erected a trophy immediately, but the Mantineans withdrew to Bucolion, and set up a counter-trophy afterwards.

Brasidas fails in an attempt on Potidæa.—Towards 135 the end of the winter, Brasidas went to Potidæa by night and placed a ladder against the wall unobserved, in the interval during the passing round of the bell, when the man who passed it had not returned to his post. But he was discovered immediately afterwards, and compelled to lead off his forces before day-break.



## BOOK V.

CONCLUSION OF THE WAR BY THE PEACE OF NICIAS, AND THE SUBSEQUENT JEALOUSY BETWEEN ATHENS AND LACEDÆMON, AND RESTLESS STATE OF GREECE. B. C. 422—416.

## ANALYSIS.

I. *Thracian Campaign of Brasidas concluded.*

Tenth year, B. C. 422—Summer.—Athenians expel Delians from Delos: *Truce expires*.—Cleon proceeds against the Thrace-ward revolters and takes Torone.—Embassy of Phœax from Athens to Sicily.—Cleon takes Galcypus and stays at Eion.—Brasidas at Cerdylum.—Cleon, urged by his army, advances against Amphipolis.—Brasidas enters Amphipolis. Chap. 1—8.

*Speech of Brasidas.* Encourages his army and explains his plan for attacking Cleon. Chap. 8.

Defeat of the Athenians: Brasidas and Cleon slain.—Public burial of Brasidas.—Number of the slain.—Lacedæmonian reinforcements reach Heraclea.

Winter.—The reinforcements advance to Pierius and then return. Chap. 9—13.

II. *Treaties of Peace between Athens and Peloponnesus.*

Athenians and Lacedæmonians desire peace.—Cleon and Brasidas, leaders of the respective war parties, dead.—Nicias and Pleistoanax eager for peace.

Eleventh year, B. C. 421—Summer.—Conferences concluded.

## Fifty Years' Truce, called the "Peace of Nicias."

Computation of the "Ten Years' War."—Lacedæmon the first to make restitution.—Her allies reject the treaty.—Treaty between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians.—Athenians restore the men from Sphacteria. Chap. 14—24.

III. *Restless Movements of the Greek States; Argos attempts to form a New Confederacy.*

Doubtful peace for 6 years and 10 months.—Thucydides notices his peculiar means of information.—Corinthians intrigue with the Argives.—Argives appoint 12 commissioners to form alliances.—Mantineans join Argos and are followed by other Peloponnesian states.—Lacedæmonians remonstrate with Corinth.—Eleans, Corinthians, and Thrace-ward Chal-

cidians join the Argive confederacy: Bœotians and Megareans remain quiet.—Athenians take Scione: restore the Delians.—Tegeans refuse to desert Lacedæmon: Corinthians alarmed.—Lacedæmonians ravage Parthrasia belonging to Mantinea.—Free Brasidas's Helots, and disfranchise the Sphacterian prisoners.—Growing suspicions between Athens and Lacedæmon.

Winter.—New ephors at Sparta opposed to Athens.—Cleobulus and Xenares intrigue with Bœotians for an alliance with Argos.—Bœotians reject the proposals by mistake.—Lacedæmonians privately ally with the Bœotians. Chap. 25—39.

IV. *Jealousy of the Athenians, and their Alliance with Argos.*

Twelfth year, B. C. 420—Summer.—Argives, in alarm, try to ally with Lacedæmon.—Basis of a treaty agreed on.—Athenians angry at the demolishing of Panactum, and alliance of Lacedæmon with Bœotia.—ARCHIDAMIDES persuades them to side with the Argives.—Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans send ambassadors to Athens.—Lacedæmonians also send ambassadors.—Alcibiades deceitfully convicts the Lacedæmonians of insincerity.—Athenians, in spite of Nicias, ally with the Argives, etc.

## Treaty for 100 Years between the Athenians, Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans.

Corinthians decline the treaty.—Lacedæmonians excluded by the Eleans from the Olympic games. Chap. 40—50.

Winter.—Heraclians defeated. Chap. 51.

V. *War and subsequent Treaty between Lacedæmon and Argos.*

Thirteenth year, B. C. 419—Summer.—Bœotians take Heraclea.—Alcibiades enters the Peloponnesus.—Argives prepare to invade Epidaurus.—Carnean festival prevents Lacedæmon from assisting Epidaurus.—Fruitless congress at Mantinea. Chap. 52—55.

Winter.—Athenians garrison Pylus.—War between Argives and Epidaurians. Chap. 56.

Fourteenth year, B. C. 418—Summer.—Lacedæmonians invade Argos.—Cut off the Argives from Argos.—Thrasylus and Alciphron obtain four months' truce with Agis.—Argives give up the truce: take Orchomenus.—Resolve to attack Tegea.—Lacedæmonians appoint a council of ten.—Relieve Tegea, and invade Mantinea.—Agis draws the enemy into the plain.—Preparations.—Line of battle.—Number and composition of the Lacedæmonian army.—Commanders address their troops.—Battle of Mantinea: Lacedæmonians completely victorious.—Number of the slain.—Effect of the victory. Chap. 57—75.

Winter.—Lacedæmonians offer peace.—Treaty offered to the Argives by the Lacedæmonian assembly.—Argives break off their alliance with Athens.

## Treaty between the Lacedæmonians and Argives for 50 years.

—Argives and Lacedæmonians send to Perdiccas.—Athenians evacuate Epidaurus.—Mantineans join Lacedæmon.—Democracies at Sicyon and Argos overthrown. Chap. 76—81.



VI. *Second Alliance of Argos with Athens, and Capture of Melos.*

Fifteenth year, B. C. 417—Summer.—Argives regain their democracy, and ally with Athens. Chap. 82.

Winter.—Lacedæmonians take the long walls of Argos.—Athenians break with Perdiccas. Chap. 83.

Sixteenth year, B. C. 416—Summer.—Alcibiades sails to Argos.—Athenian expedition to Melos.—Conference between the ambassadors of Athens and the magistrates and oligarchs of Melos.—Melians refuse to submit to Athens.—Athenians reply: blockade Melos.—Reprisals between Athenians and Lacedæmonians. Chap. 84—115.

Winter.—Melians surrender and are barbarously treated. Chap. 116.

## SUMMARY.

I. *Thracian Campaign of Brasidas concluded, chap. 1—13.*

1 <sup>10th Year.</sup> Athenians expel Delians from Delos; truce <sup>B. C. 422—</sup> expires.—The armistice for a year lasted until <sup>Summer.</sup> the Pythian games.\* During its continuance,

the Athenians expelled the Delians from Delos, thinking that, though consecrated, they were still polluted by some ancient crime; and that this was wanting to complete the former purification, when the sepulchres only were removed (iii. 104). The exiles found a residence at Atramyttium in Asia, which was given to them by Pharnaces.

2 Cleon proceeds against the Thrace-ward revoltors, and takes Torone.—On the expiration of the armistice, Cleon persuaded the Athenians to send him to Thrace, with 1200 heavy infantry, 300 cavalry, a still larger force of allies, and 30 ships. Having touched at Scione, and taken on board some heavy infantry from the besieging force, (iv. 131,) he sailed to the Colophonian fort, near Torone, where he learnt from deserters, that Brasidas was not in Torone, and had left an inadequate

\* The truce expired in the spring of B. C. 422; but hostilities were suspended and negotiation carried on some months longer.—*Bp. Thirlwall.* See also *Arnold's Appendix.*

garrison. He then sent 10 ships to surprise the city on the side of the harbour, whilst he himself marched against it with his land forces. He first assaulted the new wall by which Brasidas had enclosed a part of the suburb; and nearly drove in Pasitolidas and his little garrison, 3 (iv. 132,) who tried to resist him. The 10 Athenian ships now entered the harbour, and Pasitolidas was compelled to abandon the wall and return to the city. But the Athenians had already disembarked and taken Torone, whilst the land force broke through the unguarded wall, and, after slaying some Peloponnesians and Toronians, took Pasitolidas and others prisoners. Brasidas was marching to relieve the town, but when 40 stadia [5 miles] off, he heard of its capture, and retreated. Cleon erected two trophies, one by the harbour, and one by the fortifications. He sold the women and children as slaves, and sent all the surviving men, amounting to 700, as prisoners to Athens. Some were released in the subsequent treaty, and in an exchange with the Olynthians. Cleon then garrisoned Torone, and sailed round Athos to Amphipolis. About the same time, the Bœotians took the Athenian border fort of Panactum by treachery.

Embassy of Phœax from Athens to Sicily.—About 4 this time, the Athenians sent 2 ships with Phœax and two colleagues as ambassadors to Italy and Sicily.

When the Athenians had left Sicily, (iv. 65,) the Leontines had admitted many new citizens, and the commons were thinking of a re-partition of land. The aristocracy then called in the Syracusans, expelled the commons, wasted Leontium, and lived at Syracuse, with the rights of citizenship. Afterwards some of them were dissatisfied, and left Syracuse, and occupied a quarter of Leontium called Phocœæ, and a stronghold named Bricinnia. Here they were joined by the majority of the commons, who assisted them in carrying on war from the fortifications.

The Athenians, hearing this, sent Phœax to persuade their allies and the rest of the Sicilians to join in attacking Syracuse, and thus save the Leontine commons. Phœax prevailed on the Camarinæans and Agrigentines, but met with such opposition at Gela, that he returned



to Catania, stopping at Bricinnia on his route, and animating the Leontines. He then left Sicily, but both on his voyage there and on his return he communicated with several Greek cities in Italy. Some Locrian exiles also offered him terms. These Locrians, after the pacification of Italy, (iv. 65,) had been sent to Messana, at the request of a Messanian faction, but had been subsequently expelled. They were the only allies who had refused to join in the peace with Athens, but were now forced to do so by a war with two of their colonies, the Itonians and Melæans. *Continued at vi. 1.*

6 Cleon takes Galepsus, and stays at Eion.—Cleon was now proceeding against Amphipolis, (c. 3,) and made Eion his head quarters. He failed in assaulting Stagirus, an Andrian colony, but took Galepsus, a Thasian colony, by storm. He then sent to Perdiccas for reinforcements, and to Polles, king of the Odontian Thracians, for mercenaries, and remained at Eion.

Brasidas at Cerdylum.—Brasidas was now, with 1500 of his men, posted at Cerdylum, an eminence on the bank of the Strymon opposite Amphipolis, from whence he could watch Cleon. He had left Clearidas and his remaining forces in Amphipolis. He had in all 2000 heavy infantry and 300 cavalry, and was also getting ready 1500 Thracian mercenaries, some Edonian targeteers and cavalry, and 1000 Myrcinian and Chalcidian targeteers.

7 Cleon urged by his army advances against Amphipolis.—The army of Cleon, who had unwillingly accompanied him from Athens, now murmured at his delay, and he was induced to approach Amphipolis, as Brasidas had expected. He intended to master the city by dint of numbers, and surround it on all sides when his reinforcement came up; and he now halted on a hill before it, and proceeded to reconnoitre the lake formed by the Strymon, and the position of Amphipolis on the side of Thrace. He expected to be able to retire without fighting, but seeing no one guarding the walls or passing the gates, he thought he might have taken the city if he had brought engines.

8 Brasidas enters Amphipolis.—Brasidas now left Cerdylum and entered Amphipolis, but made no sally, for

he knew that his troops, though equal in numbers, were inferior in quality to the enemy's forces, which were composed of the flower of the Athenians and the best of the Imbrians and Lemnians. He then prepared to defeat the Athenians by stratagem, and without inspiring them with contempt by a sight of his numbers and equipment. He selected 150 men, and placed the rest under Clearidas, in order to fall upon Cleon before his succours arrived; but he first encouraged his soldiers.

#### SPEECH OF BRASIDAS.

Encourages his army and explains his plan of attack.—“Peloponnesians, I need say but little; your bravery has always kept your country free, and you are Dorians opposed to Ionians, over whom you have always prevailed. Do not be discouraged because we attack the enemy in small divisions and with an appearance of weakness; for it is through their contempt for us that they now occupy their present position and are looking about them without any order. Those stratagems are the most famous which enable one to deceive enemies and benefit friends. Whilst therefore the enemy are thus unprepared and irresolute, I will endeavour to surprise them by taking my division and charging at full speed upon their centre. Then you, Clearidas, with your division of Amphipolitans and allies, must suddenly open the gates and rush out upon them; and thus you will alarm them the most, for the force which follows up an attack is the most terrible. You will act like a brave man, for you are a Spartan; and do you, allies, follow courageously, considering that it is the proof of good soldiership to be zealous for the service, alive to shame, and obedient to your commanders; and remember that on this day it remains for you to be allies of the Lacedæmonians or slaves of the Athenians.”

Defeat of the Athenians: Brasidas and Cleon slain.—10  
Brasidas now prepared for sallying from the city with his 150 men, and posted Clearidas and the remaining troops at the Thracian gates. His descent from Cerdylum, and his sacrificing in the temple of Minerva, had been observed by the Athenians, and it was announced to Cleon that the enemy's whole force was visible in the city, and that under the gates might be seen many hoofs of horses and feet of men preparing for a sally. Cleon immediately advanced and ascertained the truth, and not wishing to risk a battle before his reinforcements arrived, he drew off his army towards Eion with orders to move by





the left wing, which was the only practicable way. But he soon became uneasy at the slowness of the retreat, and ordered his right wing to move off towards the left, thus exposing its unshielded side to the enemy.\* Brasidas now cried out, "The men show by the motion of their spears and heads that they will not wait for us;" and ordering the gates to be opened, he sallied forth with his picked men, near the stockade and through the first gate in the long wall, which was then standing; and running up the hill, he charged the centre of the Athenians and put them to rout. Clearidas followed through the Thracian gates, and fell upon the Athenian right wing. The enemy were now thrown into confusion. The left wing, which was some distance in advance towards Eion, broke away and fled; the centre was routed by the first charge of Brasidas; but the right wing stood its ground, and Brasidas, when proceeding to attack it, was wounded and fell, and was carried off the field unperceived by the Athenians. Cleon had taken to flight, and was overtaken and killed by a Myrcinian targeteer, but his heavy-armed right wing had retreated in a close body to the hill, and repulsed the charge of Clearidas twice or thrice, and was only routed on being surrounded by the targeteers and Myrcinian and Chalcidian cavalry. The Athenian army then fled with great difficulty through different roads over the mountains to Eion. Brasidas was carried breathing to the city, and only lived to hear that his troops were victorious, and then expired. Clearidas, on returning from the pursuit, stripped the dead, and erected a trophy.

- 11 Public burial of Brasidas.—Brasidas was then interred in the market-place, at the public expense, all the allies attending in armour. The Amphipolitans afterwards enclosed his tomb with a fence, sacrificed to him as a hero, and honoured him with games and annual sacrifices. Moreover they conferred on him the honours of a "Founder," which they had hitherto paid to Hagnon,

\* Cleon ought to have directed his right wing to maintain its original position, and continue to face the enemy, in order to check pursuit till the other part of his army was on its march towards Eion.

(iv. 102,) whose monuments they now destroyed; for they considered Brasidas as their preserver, and they courted the Lacedæmonian confederacy; whilst their hatred to the Athenians rendered it neither agreeable nor profitable to continue to honour Hagnon.

Number of the slain.—The dead were restored to the Athenians, who lost 600 men, whilst only seven of the victors were slain. The remains of the Athenian army sailed home, whilst Clearidas proceeded to settle affairs in Amphipolis.

Lacedæmonian reinforcements reach Heracles.—12  
About this time, 900 heavy infantry were sent to reinforce the Thrace-ward towns, under Ramphias, Autocharidas, and Epicydidas, who were Lacedæmonians; but they were detained to settle affairs in Heraclea in Trachis, until after the battle of Amphipolis was fought.

Advance to Pierius and then return.—The 13  
next winter, Ramphias and his companions <sup>Winter.</sup> penetrated to Pierius, in Thessaly, but the Thessalians forbade their further advance, and as Brasidas was dead and the Athenians had departed, they returned home, especially as they knew that the Lacedæmonians desired peace.

## II. *Treaties of Peace between Athens and the Peloponnesus, chap. 14—24.*

Athenians and Lacedæmonians desire peace.—14  
Immediately after the battle of Amphipolis, and retreat of Ramphias, both parties desired peace. The Athenians were dispirited by their losses at Delium and Amphipolis; they were fearful that their allies would revolt; and they lamented not having come to terms after their successes at Pylus. On the other hand, the Lacedæmonians were disappointed in not having long before reduced the Athenian power; they had met with an unprecedented disaster, in having their country ravaged from Pylus and Sphaacteria; they feared an insurrection of the Helots; and, moreover, their "thirty years'" truce with Argos was on the point of expiring, and the Argives would not renew it, unless Cynuria were restored; and it seemed impossible for them to maintain a war against both the



Athenians and the Argives, and they suspected that some of the Peloponnesian states would go over to Argos, which, indeed, afterwards happened. Thus both parties desired peace, especially the Lacedæmonians, who wished to recover the prisoners taken at Sphacteria, who were persons of the first rank in Sparta. They had begun to negotiate for this restoration immediately after the capture; but the Athenians, at first, had refused to treat on equal terms; after, however, the latter had been defeated at Delium, (iv. 96,) the armistice for a year was agreed to, for the sake of concluding a lasting treaty.

16 Cleon and Brasidas, leaders of the respective war parties, dead.—In the subsequent defeat of the Athenians at Amphipolis, Cleon and Brasidas, who on each side had been the most opposed to peace, were both slain. Brasidas had opposed it from the honour and success he had derived from the war, and Cleon, because he feared that his mal-practices would be detected, and his calumnies disbelieved, in a season of tranquillity.

Nicias and Pleistoanax eager for peace.—Pleistoanax, king of Lacedæmon, and Nicias, the most successful Athenian general, were now, on each side, the most anxious for peace: Nicias, because he wished to preserve his present fortune, and secure his future reputation; and Pleistoanax, because he wished to escape from the calumny of his enemies, who attributed every calamity that befell the state to his restoration. For this restoration was considered to be illegal. Pleistoanax was charged with having, in concert with his brother Aristocles, prevailed on the prophetess of Delphi to tell the Lacedæmonians, when they went to consult the oracle, "that they should bring back the seed of the demi-god, son of Jove, from a foreign country; or else that they should plough with a silver ploughshare;"\* and by these arts the Lacedæmonians were induced to reinstate Pleistoanax in the 19th year of his banishment, with the same dances and sacrifices as when they first inaugurated their kings, after he had spent his exile at Lycaum, with half his house within the sanctuary of Jupiter.

\* i. e. have to buy their provisions as dearly as if the ploughshare were made of silver.

Conferences concluded.—During this winter the rival parties held conferences respecting peace; and at the commencement of spring, after the Lacedæmonians had intimidated the Athenians by a show of preparation for a fresh invasion of Attica, and by a threat of erecting a fort in its territory, the basis of a treaty was settled, on the footing of a mutual restitution of the conquests made in the war. And as the Thebans would not admit that Plataea was a conquest, on the ground that it had freely surrendered, (iii. 52,) it was stipulated that the Athenians should keep Nisæa, which they had obtained by similar means. The Lacedæmonians then convened their allies, who all voted for a peace, except the Bœotians, Corinthians, Eleans, and Megareans, and made a treaty to the following effect.

*Fifty Years' Truce, called the "Peace of Nicias."* 18

Sworn to by the Lacedæmonians and Athenians and their respective allies, State by State.

- I. *Temples.*—That the temples common to Greece shall be open to all who wish to sacrifice, or consult the oracle, or attend the games, according to their respective hereditary customs.
- II. *Delphi.*—That the temple and fane of Apollo, and the Delphians, shall be independent, self-taxed, and self-judged, both themselves and their territory, according to hereditary usage.
- III. *Period of the treaty.*—That the treaty shall be in force between the Athenians and their allies, and the Lacedæmonians and their allies, for FIFTY YEARS, by land and sea, without evasion.
- IV. *Future settlement of differences.*—That neither party shall take up arms to the detriment of the other, but disputes shall be settled by appeals to justice and oaths.
- V. *Cities to be restored by Lacedæmon.*—(1.) That the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall restore Amphipolis to the Athenians. (2.) That the inhabitants of any cities which the Lacedæmonians may deliver up shall be permitted to take their property and go where they please. (3.) That such cities shall be independent on paying the tribute rated in the time of Aristides. (4.) That the Athenians and their allies shall not take up arms against such cities after the conclusion of the treaty. (5.) That these cities are—Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. (6.)



That these cities shall not be considered as allies of either party, though they may of their own free will become allies of the Athenians. (7.) That the Mecenæans, Sanæans, and Singæans, shall inhabit their own cities, upon the same conditions as the Olynthians and Acanthians [i. e. paying the assessment of Aristides]; but that the Lacedæmonians shall restore Panaetum to the Athenians.

VI. *Cities and prisoners to be restored by Athens.*—That the Athenians shall restore to the Lacedæmonians Coryphasium [i. e. Pylus], Cythera, Methone, Pteleum, and Atalanta; and all the Lacedæmonians and their allies who may be prisoners within the Athenian dominions, or who are being besieged in Scione.

VII. *Prisoners to be restored by Lacedæmon.*—That the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall likewise restore all the Athenians and their allies whom they may have taken prisoners.

VIII. *Scionæans, Toronæans, Sermlyians, etc.*—That the Athenians may act as they think fit towards the Scionæans, Toronæans, and Sermlyians, and any other city they may possess.

IX. *Manner of taking oaths and erecting pillars.*—(1.) That the Athenians shall make oath to the Lacedæmonians and their allies, state by state, and every man shall swear by the most solemn oath of his respective country, saying, "I will abide by these covenants and articles of the treaty, honestly, and without evasion." (2.) That the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall make oath to the Athenians in the same way. (3.) That the oath shall be renewed yearly on both sides. (4.) That the contracting parties shall erect pillars at Olympia, Pythia, and the Isthmus, and at Athens in the citadel, and at Lacedæmon in the temple of Apollo at Amyclæ. (5.) That if anything be forgotten on either side, it shall be consistent with the oaths to make an alteration after a fair conference.

19 This treaty commences from the ephorality of Pleistolas, on the 27th of the month Artemisium, and from the archonship of Alcæus at Athens, on the 25th of the month Elaphebolion.

#### SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED,

On the part of the Lacedæmonians, by

PLEISTOANAX,  
AOIS,  
PLEISTOLAS,  
DAMAGETUS,  
CHRONIS,  
METAOENES,  
ACANTHUS,  
DAITHUS,

On the part of the Athenians,  
by  
LAMPON,  
ISTHMIONICUS,  
NICIAS,  
LACHES,  
EUTHYDEMUS,  
PROCLEUS,  
PYTHODORUS,  
HAONON,

ISCHAGORAS,  
PHILOCHARIDAS,  
ZEUXIDAS,  
ANTIPPUS,  
TELLIS,  
ALCINIDAS,  
EMPEDIAS,  
MENAS,  
LAPHILUS.

MYRTILUS,  
THRASYCLES,  
THEOGLINES,  
ARISTOCRATES,  
IOLCIUS,  
TIMOCRATES,  
LEON,  
LAMACHUS,  
DEMOSTHENES.

Computation of the 10 years' war.—The treaty was 20 concluded at the commencement of spring, just 10 years from the first invasion of Attica. This period ought to be reckoned by *times*, and not by the names of those who were in office; and if any one compute by summers and winters as they have been here recorded, he will find that there were ten winters and ten summers in this first war.

Lacedæmonians the first to make restitution.—It was 21 decided by lot that the Lacedæmonians should be the first to make restitution. They therefore liberated their prisoners, and sent Ischagoras, Menas, and Philocharidas to order Clearidas to deliver up Amphipolis, and to enjoin their Thrace-ward allies to receive the treaty. But these allies considered it unfavourable to them, and refused to comply; and Clearidas, wishing to oblige the Chalcidians, refused to restore Amphipolis, declaring that he could not do it against their wills. He then hastened to Lacedæmon to defend his conduct and see if the treaty could not be altered; but he found that this was secured, and he was sent back with orders to withdraw the Peloponnesian garrison if he could not give up the place.

Allies reject the treaty.—The allies happened to be 22 at Lacedæmon, and were again pressed to accept the treaty, but they refused as before; and as also the Argives refused to renew the thirty years' truce, the Lacedæmonians formed a defensive alliance with Athens, thinking that the Argives, unsupported by the Athenians, would not be formidable, and hoping that the Peloponnesus could be thus kept quiet. Ambassadors then came from Athens, a conference was held, an agreement made, and oaths were taken; and this alliance was concluded as follows:



*Treaty between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians.*

- 23 I. That the Lacedæmonians shall be allies of the Athenians for 50 years.  
 II. That the Athenians shall assist the Lacedæmonians to repel invaders and to punish the invading state; and both shall simultaneously make peace with the enemy,  
 III. That the Lacedæmonians shall do the same for the Athenians.  
 IV. That upon the occasion of an insurrection of slaves, the Athenians shall assist the Lacedæmonians.  
 V. (1.) That these articles shall be sworn to by the same parties that swore to the previous treaty. (2.) That they shall be renewed every year, by the Lacedæmonians going to Athens at the Dionysian festival; and by the Athenians going to Lacedæmon at the Hyacinthian. (3.) That they shall each erect a pillar; that at Lacedæmon to be near the statue of Apollo, in the Amyclæum, and that at Athens to be near the statue of Minerva, in the citadel. (4.) That both parties shall be at liberty to alter these terms.
- 24 Sworn to by the same persons that subscribed the previous treaty (c. 19).

**Athenians restore the men from Sphacteria.**—This alliance was concluded soon after the previous treaty, and then the Athenians restored the prisoners taken at Sphacteria.

*III. Restless Movements of the Greek States: Argos attempts to form a new Confederacy, chap. 25—39.*

- 25 **Doubtful peace for 6 years and 10 months.**—The Corinthians and other Peloponnesian states now tried to overthrow what had been done, and other disturbances arose amongst the Lacedæmonian allies. Moreover the Lacedæmonians themselves suspected the Athenians of not performing the articles agreed upon; and though the rival states abstained for 6 years and 10 months from marching into each other's territory, yet during that doubtful suspension of arms, they did each other the greatest possible damage; and at length proceeded to open war.
- 26 **Thucydides notices his peculiar means of information.**—Thucydides wrote these transactions in order, by summers and winters, until the Lacedæmonians put an end to the sovereignty of Athens; and took the Long Walls

and Piræus. The whole war lasted 27 years and some few days over, including the intervening time, which cannot be considered a state of peace; as neither party received or surrendered what they had agreed, and offences were committed on both sides, such as the Mantinean and Epidaurian wars, etc.; whilst the Thrace-ward allies were as much at war as ever, and the Bœotians had only a truce terminable at ten days' notice. Thus amongst the oracles published at the outbreak of hostilities, only one proved true, and that predicted that the war would last thrice 9 years. Thucydides lived through the whole of it; and being banished after commanding at Amphipolis, (iv. 107,) he was present at the transactions of both parties, particularly at those of the Peloponnesians, and was thus enabled to obtain a perfect acquaintance with the events as they occurred.

**Corinthians intrigue with the Argives.**—When the 27 peace was concluded, and the allies retired from the Peloponnesus, the Corinthians went to Argos, and communicated with the chief men in office there; and it was agreed, that as the Lacedæmonians had allied with the Athenians, who were the bitterest enemies of the Peloponnesus, every independent Greek state that was willing should be invited to enter into a defensive alliance with Argos, and that, for the sake of secrecy, a select number of commissioners should be appointed, with full powers to treat with any Greek state that should offer itself.

**Argives appoint 12 commissioners to form alliances.** 28  
 —The Argives then chose 12 commissioners with whom any Greek state might conclude an alliance, except the Athenians and Lacedæmonians; who were not to be admitted into the confederacy without the express consent of the Argive people. These proposals were the more readily embraced by the Argives, because they saw that they should soon have to go to war with Lacedæmon, as their treaty was on the point of expiring (c. 14); and they hoped also to gain the supremacy in the Peloponnesus, as Lacedæmon had fallen into contempt from her recent disasters in the war; whilst they themselves were in a





flourishing state, from having been enabled to preserve a neutrality.

29 **Mantineans join Argos, and are followed by other Peloponnesian states.**—The Mantineans and their allies were the first to join Argos. During the war the Mantineans had subdued part of Arcadia, and as they considered that Lacedæmon would now have leisure to interfere with their sovereignty, they gladly went over to Argos, which was a powerful state, always at enmity with the Lacedæmonians, and governed by a democracy similar to their own. The rest of the Peloponnesians were now in a ferment. They were extremely angry that it should have been inserted in the treaty, that the Lacedæmonians and Athenians alone should have the power to alter any of its conditions, without referring the matter to the allies; and they suspected that the Lacedæmonians and Athenians in concert were desirous of reducing them to slavery.

30 **Lacedæmonians remonstrate with Corinth.**—The Lacedæmonians, hearing what had taken place, sent envoys to the Corinthians, charging them with having caused the commotion, and urging them not to join Argos, or they would violate the oath which they had sworn, viz. "That the decision of the majority of the allies should be binding, *unless there should be some hinderance on the part of gods or heroes.*" The Corinthians replied, in the presence of all the allies who, like themselves, had not acceded to the treaty. They did not state their real grievance, viz. that they had not recovered Sollium or Anaetorium from the Athenians; but they pleaded that they had bound themselves, by repeated oaths, not to betray their Thrace-ward allies, and that this was such a "*hinderance*" as the oath contemplated. As to the alliance with Argos, they should consult their friends, and do whatever was right. The Lacedæmonian envoys then returned home, and some Argive ambassadors, who happened then to be at Corinth, urged the Corinthians to join the new confederacy without delay.

31 **Eleans, Corinthians, and Thrace-ward Chalcidians join the Argive confederacy.**—Immediately after, an embassy from the Eleans arrived at Corinth, and having

made an alliance with the Corinthians, they proceeded to Argos, and joined the Argive confederacy. The Eleans were then at variance with the Lacedæmonians, for the following reason. In a war between the Lepreans and Arcadians, the Lepreans had called in the aid of the Eleans, agreeing to repay them with half their territory. At the conclusion of the war, the Eleans permitted the Lepreans to redeem the territory by the annual payment of a talent [£240] to the temple of the Olympian Jupiter. The Lepreans regularly paid the talent until the Attic war, which they made a pretext for discontinuing it; and when the Eleans proceeded to compel them, they applied to the Lacedæmonians. The Eleans refused to submit to this arbitration, and wasted the Leprean territory, but the Lacedæmonians declared the Lepreans independent, and garrisoned Lepreum with heavy-armed troops. For this treatment the Eleans joined the Argives.

The Corinthians and Thrace-ward Chalcidians allied with Argos immediately afterwards; but the Bœotians and Megareans, though slighted by the Lacedæmonians, remained quiet, as the constitution of Lacedæmon better suited their oligarchical government than the democracy of the Argives.

**Athenians take Scione: restore the Delians.**—This 32 summer, the Athenians took Scione, (iv. 131,) slew all the men, sold the women and children into slavery, and gave their land to the Plateans. They also restored the Delians to Delos, (c. 1,) being commanded by the oracle at Delphi, and alarmed at their recent disasters.

The Phocians and Locrians went to war with each other about this time.

**Tegeans refuse to desert Lacedæmon: Corinthians alarmed.**—The Corinthians and Argives, now seeing that Tegea formed a considerable part of the Peloponnesus, sent envoys there to procure its revolt from Lacedæmon. The Tegeans however refused, and the Corinthians began to be discouraged, but then proceeded to the Bœotians, and requested them to join the Argive confederacy, but they also declined. The Corinthians then requested the Bœotians to obtain for them the same truce with the Athenians which Athens had granted to



Bœotia, at the commencement of the peace, and which was renewable every 10 days. The Bœotians then went to Athens, but were told that the Corinthians, being allies of Lacedæmon, were already included in the fifty years' treaty, and therefore did not need any separate truce with the Athenians. The Corinthians then strongly urged the Bœotians to renounce their 10 days' truce, but they refused. The Athenians, however, granted an armistice to the Corinthians, but without ratification by oaths.\*

33 Lacedæmonians ravage Parrhasia belonging to Mantinea.—The same summer, all the Lacedæmonian forces under Pleistoanax marched into Parrhasia in Arcadia, which was subject to Mantinea. Here the Mantineans had garrisoned and fortified Cypsela to annoy the district of Sciritis in Laconia. The Lacedæmonians then ravaged Parrhasia, and the Mantineans, having intrusted their own capital to an Argive garrison, came out to oppose Pleistoanax, but were compelled to retire; and the Lacedæmonians demolished Cypsela and the Parrhasian towns, and made the Parrhasians independent.

34 Free Brasidas's Helots and disfranchise the Sphacterian prisoners.—The troops of Brasidas now returned from Thrace under Clearidas, and the Lacedæmonians declared that the Helots who had fought under Brasidas should be free, and soon after settled them at Lepreum with the Neodamodes.† The Lacedæmonians then feared that the prisoners who surrendered at Sphacteria and were liberated by the treaty, would now consider themselves degraded, and attempt a revolution. They therefore disfranchised the whole, which rendered them incapable of taking office, and of buying or selling. This decree was subsequently reversed.

35 Growing suspicions between Athens and Lacedæmon.—At this time the Dians took Thyssus on the peninsula of Athos, a colony of the Athenians (c: 82). Throughout the whole of the summer, intercourse was kept up between the Athenians and Peloponnesians, but from

\* The Greeks considered the breach of their word as very different from the breach of their oath.

† Probably the sons of enfranchised Helots. See *Arnold's note*.

the conclusion of the treaty suspicions arose from their not having mutually restored the places agreed on. The Lacedæmonians, on whom the lot had fallen to have first restored Amphipolis and other towns, had not done so; nor had they made their Thrace-ward allies and the Bœotians and Corinthians accede to the treaty, though they frequently declared their intention of compelling them. The Athenians therefore grew suspicious, and retained Pylus and other places, and regretted having restored the prisoners taken at Sphacteria. The Lacedæmonians then said that they had done all that was possible; that they had restored the Athenian prisoners, and recalled the troops from Thrace; that they could not give up Amphipolis, as they were not masters of it; and that they would endeavour to bring over the Bœotians and Corinthians to the treaty, and persuade them to restore Panaetum and the Athenian prisoners in Bœotia. But they desired that Pylus should be given up, or, at any rate, that the Messenians and Helots should be withdrawn. After many conferences the Athenians ceded this last point to the Lacedæmonians, and the Messenians and Helots from Pylus were settled at Cranii in Cephallenia.

New ephors at Sparta opposed to Athens. Winter. 36

—Next winter, the ephors at Lacedæmon, by whom the treaties had been concluded, went out of office, and some of their successors were opposed to the peace with Athens. A congress was held between embassies from the confederacy and the Athenians, Bœotians, and Corinthians that were at Sparta, without any result.

Cleobulus and Xenares intrigue with Bœotians for an alliance with Argos.—Cleobulus and Xenares, the two ephors most opposed to the treaty, then held a private conference with the Bœotians and Corinthians, and advised the Bœotians to avoid acceding to the Attic treaty, and to ally with Argos, and then bring over the Argives to ally with the Lacedæmonians. They added that the Lacedæmonians would risk a rupture with Athens to gain an alliance with the Argives, as they could then more easily conduct the war out of the Peloponnesus; but they begged the Bœotians to restore Panaetum in exchange for Pylus.



- 37 **Bœotians reject the proposals by mistake.**—As the Bœotian and Corinthian envoys were returning home, they were met by two of the chief magistrates of Argos, who made similar proposals for the Bœotians to unite with the Corinthians, Mantineans, and Eleans, in their league with Argos; and the Bœotians being pleased with these overtures, the Argive magistrates promised to send ambassadors to Bœotia. When the Bœotian envoys reached home and reported the double proposals, the Bœotarchs accepted them, and welcomed the embassy which soon after came from Argos, and promised to send one thither to conclude a treaty. Meantime it was agreed by the Bœotarchs, Corinthians, Megareans, and ambassadors from Thrace, that they should bind themselves to mutually assist each other when necessary; and that Bœotia and Megara should then ally with Argos. But before the oaths were taken, it was necessary that these resolutions should be ratified by the four councils of the Bœotians, who, being ignorant that Cleobulus and Xenares, with other Lacedæmonians, had advised them first to ally with the Argives and Corinthians, were now afraid of displeasing Lacedæmon, and rejected the measure; and the Bœotarchs would not now bring the Argive question before the councils or send ambassadors to Argos. Thus the whole business was neglected and put off.
- 38 The same winter the Olynthians took Mceyberna, a town in Thrace, garrisoned by Athenians.

**Lacedæmonians privately ally with the Bœotians.**—Conferences were now being continually held between Athens and Lacedæmon concerning the places which were to have been given up. At length the Lacedæmonians sent an embassy to request the Bœotians to deliver up Panactum and the Athenian prisoners, that they might recover Pylus. The Bœotians refused unless Lacedæmon would form a separate alliance with them, as they had made with Athens. This was contrary to the treaty, but as the Lacedæmonians wished to recover Pylus, and had a party amongst them opposed to peace with Athens, they ultimately allied with the Bœotians, who then demolished Panactum.

#### IV. *Jealousy of the Athenians, and their alliance with Argos, chap. 40—50.*

**Argives in alarm try to ally with Lacedæmon.**—Early this spring the Argives found that the Bœotian envoys did not arrive, but that Panactum was being demolished, and that Bœotia had allied with Lacedæmon. They were now afraid of being abandoned by the whole confederacy, and supposing that Bœotia had acceded to the treaty between Athens and Lacedæmon, they considered that they had lost all power of allying themselves with the Athenians, which they had hoped to have done if their truce with the Lacedæmonians did not continue. They now feared that they would be at once opposed by the confederacy of Lacedæmonians, Bœotians, Athenians, and Tegæans, and therefore sent Eustrophus and Æson in haste to Lacedæmon with overtures of peace (c. 27).

**Basis of a treaty agreed on.**—The two Argive envoys, in their first proposals to Lacedæmon, required that the dispute concerning the border territory of Cynuria, which contained Thyrea and Anthene, and was occupied by the Lacedæmonians, should be referred to arbitration. The Lacedæmonians desired that this might not be mentioned, and offered to make a treaty as before; but at length the Argives induced them to agree to the following conditions: "That a treaty should be made for 50 years, during which if there was neither plague nor war in Lacedæmon or Argos, it should be lawful for the two parties to settle the right to the territory by a battle,\* but the fugitives were not to be pursued beyond the frontiers of Cynuria." The Lacedæmonians considered this condition to be absurd, but yielded from their desire of being friendly with Argos, and the treaty was written out; but they requested the envoys to return to Argos and get it sanctioned by the people, and then, if it was

\* According to ancient legends, the Lacedæmonians and Argives had formerly tried to settle a dispute concerning the same territory, by a battle between 300 of each nation; when only three survived, Alcenor and Chromius, the Argives, and Othryades, the Spartan.—See *Herod.* i. 82.



approved, to come back again at the Hyacinthia and take the oaths.

42 Athenians angry at the demolishing of Panactum, and alliance of Lacedæmon with Bœotia.—During this negotiation with Argos, Andromedes, Phædinus, and Antimenidas, the three Lacedæmonian commissioners, had been sent to receive Panactum and the Athenian prisoners from the Bœotians and deliver them up to Athens. They now found that the Bœotians had demolished Panactum, (c. 39,) on the pretext that they had formerly exchanged an oath with the Athenians that neither party should inhabit the place, but that they should graze it in common. Andromedes and his colleagues then conveyed the prisoners to Athens, and tried to demonstrate to the Athenians that the demolition of Panactum was equivalent to its restitution, as no enemy of theirs could occupy it for the future. But the Athenians were greatly indignant, and dismissed the commissioners with an angry reply, for they had heard of the treaty which Lacedæmon had concluded with Bœotia, and considered themselves overreached in other points.

43 Alcibiades persuades them to side with the Argives.—The party at Athens who were against the treaty now pressed on their design. Amongst these was Alcibiades, son of Clinias, who, though young in years, was honoured for his noble descent. He really considered it better to side with the Argives, but he also opposed the treaty with the Lacedæmonians, because they had negotiated it through Nicias and Laches, overlooking him on account of his youth, and in spite of the old connexion of his family as their proxeni, which, though renounced by his grandfather, he had himself renewed by showing attention to the prisoners brought from Sphacteria. He had carried on this opposition from the first, and declared that the Lacedæmonians were only making a treaty to deprive Athens of the Argives; and when this difference arose, he privately sent to urge the Argives to come at once with proposals for an alliance in company with the Mantineans and Eleans.

44 Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans send ambassadors to Athens.—The Argives now discovered that the Lacedæ-

dæmonians, instead of having acted in concert with the Athenians, were involved in a serious quarrel with them; and deeming it best to ally with an ancient friend who was governed by a democracy like themselves, and possessed the command; they thought no more of sending to Lacedæmon, but despatched ambassadors to Athens, who were accompanied by envoys from the Eleans and Mantineans.

Lacedæmonians also send ambassadors.—The Lacedæmonians now sent Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius, who were friendly with the Athenians, to plead that the Bœotian alliance had not been intended to injure Athens, and to obtain Pylus in exchange for Panactum.

Alcibiades deceitfully convicts the Lacedæmonians 45 of insincerity.—The Lacedæmonian ambassadors having announced in the council [of five hundred] that they were come with full powers to settle disputes, Alcibiades was afraid that if they talked in the same strain to the popular assembly, the multitude would be won over, and the Argive alliance rejected. He therefore solemnly assured them that he would obtain the restitution of Pylus, and settle other differences; if they would acknowledge in the popular assembly that they had not come with full powers. He hoped by these means to detach them from the influence of Nicias, and, by accusing them before the people of insincerity, to obtain an alliance with the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans. The ambassadors acted as Alcibiades had advised, and were immediately charged by him with having deceitfully stated one thing to the council and another to the people; and the Athenians were then ready to ally at once with the Argives, but the assembly was adjourned in consequence of an earthquake.

Athenians, in spite of Nicias, ally with the Argives, 46 etc.—Although Nicias himself had been deceived by the stratagem of Alcibiades, yet the next day he contended that the Athenians ought to be friendly with the Lacedæmonians, and to ascertain their real intentions before they allied with Argos. He also represented that whilst the position of Athens was so glorious, and that of Lacedæmon so discreditable, it was advisable to defer the





war; and that the Athenians ought to preserve their prosperity as long as possible, though the Lacedæmonians would hazard everything to retrieve their misfortunes. His arguments prevailed on the Athenians to send him with other ambassadors to Lacedæmon, to demand the restitution of Amphipolis, the rebuilding of Panæctum, and the dissolution of the alliance with the Bœotians, unless the latter acceded to the Attic treaty. Nicias and his colleagues, having delivered their message, declared that, unless their demand respecting the Bœotian alliance was at once fulfilled, the Athenians would ally with Argos. But the Lacedæmonians were persuaded by Xenares and his party not to renounce the Bœotian alliance; though at the request of Nicias, who was afraid of being censured on his return, they renewed the oaths of the 50 years' treaty with Athens (c. 23). On the return of the embassy, the Athenians were enraged with Lacedæmon, and murmured at Nicias as the author of the 50 years' peace. Alcibiades then introduced the Argives and their allies; and the following treaty was immediately concluded.

47 *Treaty for 100 Years between the Athenians, Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans; to be observed without fraud or injury on land or sea.*

I. *Peace for 100 years.*—That for 100 years it shall not be lawful for the Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, or their allies, to take up arms with a mischievous intent against the Athenians and their allies; nor for the Athenians and their allies to take up arms against the Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, and their allies.

II. *Mutual assistance.*—(1.) That in case of an enemy invading the territory of the Athenians, the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans shall send such succours as the Athenians may desire, in the most effective manner, and to the utmost of their power. (2.) That in case of such invaders having ravaged the Athenian territory and departed, their state shall be considered as an enemy to the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, and be exposed to their united vengeance. (3.) That no one party shall terminate hostilities with that state until all are agreed. (4.) That the Athenians on their part shall assist the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans in a similar way, according to the three foregoing clauses.

III. *Passage of armed troops.*—That armed troops for hostile

purposes shall not be allowed to pass through the territory of either the Athenians, Argives, Eleans, or Mantineans, nor to cross the sea, unless they all have agreed to allow the passage.

IV. *Pay and provisioning of succours.*—That troops sent as succours shall be provisioned by the state which sends them, for 30 days after their arrival in the state which demanded their services, and on their march home in a like manner; if, however, their services be required for a longer period than 30 days, the state which sent for them shall provision them at the rate of three Æginetan oboli [about 6d.] per day for a heavy-armed soldier, a light-armed, or a bowman, and one Æginetan drachma [about 1s.] for a horseman.

V. *Order of command.*—The state which sent for succours shall have the command whilst the war is in its own territory; but if the states make a joint expedition, each shall have an equal share of the command.

VI. *Oaths.*—(1.) That the Athenians shall swear to this treaty for themselves and their allies; but the Argives, Mantineans, Eleans, and their allies, shall swear by separate states. (2.) That each shall swear the oath which is most binding in his respective country, over full-grown victims, saying, "I will abide by this alliance, according to its several covenants, honestly, without injury, and without guile, and I will not violate it by any fraud or subterfuge." (3.) That this oath be taken at Athens by the Council and Home Magistrates, and administered by the Prytanes; \* at Argos by the Council, the Eighty, and the Artynæ, and be administered by the Eighty; at Mantinea by the Demiurgi, the Council, and the other Magistrates, and be administered by the Theori and Polemarchs; at Elis by the Demiurgi, the Magistrates, and the Six Hundred, and be administered by the Demiurgi and the Thesmophylaces.† (4.) That this oath shall be renewed by the Athenians, who shall go to Elis, Mantinea, and Argos, thirty days before the Olympic festival; and by the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, who shall go to Athens ten days before the great Panathenæic festival.

VII. *Pillars.*—That the covenants of this Treaty of alliance, and the oaths of ratification, shall be inscribed on a stone pillar by the Athenians in the citadel; by the Argives in the market-place, within the temple of Apollo; by the Mantineans in the market-place within the temple of Jupiter; and that a brazen pillar shall be erected at their joint expense, at the forthcoming festival of Olympia.

VIII. *Alteration of Clauses.*—That these states, by holding a common deliberation, may alter or add to the foregoing articles, which additions or alterations shall be binding.

\* See note to iv. 18.

† See Arneld's note.



- 48 **Corinthians decline the treaty.**—This treaty did not put an end to the one which subsisted between Athens and Lacedæmon, and the Corinthians, though allies of Argos, would not enter into it; indeed they had previously refused joining in an offensive and defensive alliance with Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, contending that the former defensive alliance was sufficient. Thus they began to withdraw from their allies, and to lean again towards Lacedæmon.
- 49 **Lacedæmonians excluded by the Eleans from the Olympic games.**—The [90th] Olympic festival was held this summer, at which Androsthenes, an Arcadian, was victor in the Pancratium for the first time. The Lacedæmonians were excluded by the Eleans from sacrificing or contending for the prizes; because they had not paid the fine of 2000 minæ, [about £8000,] being two minæ [about £8] for every heavy-armed soldier; which fine the Eleans, according to Olympic law, had imposed upon the Lacedæmonians, because the latter had attacked Phyræus, and sent a body of heavy-armed into Lepreum during the sacred Olympic truce. The Lacedæmonians contended that the troops had been sent off before the truce was proclaimed. The Eleans replied, that the truce had already commenced, (for it is proclaimed in Elis first,) and that they were then attacked by surprise. The Lacedæmonians then said, that if the Eleans had considered them guilty of injustice, they need not have subsequently proclaimed the truce in Lacedæmon. The Eleans still maintained that they were injured, but offered, if the Lacedæmonians would restore Lepreum, to remit such of the fine as was due to them, and pay themselves that which was due to the god. The Lacedæmonians rejected the offer, when the Eleans said that they would waive the restoration of Lepreum, but if the Lacedæmonians desired to have access to the temple, they must go up to the altar of the Olympian Jupiter, and swear in the presence of the Greeks, that they would subsequently pay the fine. The Lacedæmonians again refused, and were excluded from the temple, sacrifices, and games, and obliged to sacrifice at home. But the Eleans, fearing
- 50

that they would make a forcible entry, kept a guard of their heavy-armed young men with 1000 Argives, 1000 Mantineans, and some Athenian cavalry. During the games, Lichas, a Lacedæmonian, sent a chariot to contend for the prize, but on account of the ban, he entered it as belonging to the Bœotian people. His horses won, and the Bœotian confederacy was proclaimed victor, but Lichas came forward and showed the chariot to be his by crowning the charioteer, and was then scourged by the victors (viii. 43). This excited greater alarm, but the Lacedæmonians did not appear.

After the festival, the Argives and their allies repaired to Corinth, to entreat the Corinthians to join their confederacy; but some Lacedæmonian ambassadors were there, and the debate was broken up by an earthquake before anything was concluded.

**Heracleans defeated.**—This winter the Heracleans in Trachinia were defeated, and Xenares, the Lacedæmonian, was slain in a battle with the neighbouring tribes of Ænians, Dolopians, Maleans, and some Thessalians, who had harassed the city from its first settlement (iii. 92). 51

*V. War and subsequent Treaty between Lacedæmon and Argos, chap. 52.*

**Bœotians take Heraclea.**—In the beginning of the summer, the Bœotians seized on Heraclea, which was miserably reduced by the battle, and sent away Hegesippidas, the Lacedæmonian governor, on a charge of misgovernment; and they then occupied the place, lest the Athenians should take it whilst the Lacedæmonians were engaged in the Peloponnesus; but the latter were offended at the interference. 52

**Alcibiades enters the Peloponnesus.**—This summer, Alcibiades, with the co-operation of the Argives, marched into the Peloponnesus with a few Athenian heavy infantry and some bowmen; and being joined by some troops of the allies, he settled some matters connected with the alliance, persuaded the Patreans to carry their walls to the sea, and intended building another wall at



the Achæan Rhium, but was prevented by the advance of a large force of Corinthians and Sicyonians.

53 **Argives prepare to invade Epidaurus.**—A war now arose between the Epidaurians and Argives. The latter had the chief management of the temple of Apollo Pythæus, to whom the Epidaurians had failed to furnish the periodical sacrifice by which they held the river pastures. But independently of this pretext, Alcibiades and the Argives desired to possess Epidaurus, to insure the neutrality of Corinth, and secure a shorter passage for Athenian succours from Ægina than that round Scylæum.

54 **Carnean festival prevents Lacedæmon from assisting Epidaurus.**—At the same time, the Lacedæmonians, with all their forces, under Agis, marched to Leuctra, opposite to Mount Lycæum, on a secret expedition; but the sacrifices proving inauspicious, they returned, sending notices to their allies to prepare to take the field after the next month, Carneus, which was held sacred by the Dorians. On their departure, the Argives marched out on the 26th of the month preceding Carneus, and wasted the Epidaurian territory. The Epidaurians implored the aid of their allies, but some excused themselves on account of the sacred month, whilst others advanced only to the frontiers and remained there inactive.

55 **Fruitless congress at Mantinea.**—At this time the Athenians invited the states to a congress at Mantinea; but at the beginning of the debate, Euphamidas the Corinthian remarked, that their words did not agree with their deeds, for the Argives and Epidaurians were at war, whilst the allies were conferring about peace. By his suggestion deputies were then sent, who withdrew the Argive troops from Epidaurus. Another congress was afterwards held, but without any result; and the Argives again invaded Epidaurus, and wasted a third of the territory. The Lacedæmonians marched to the frontier at Caryæ, but returned, as the omens were unfavourable; and Alcibiades, who had marched with 1000 heavy infantry to support the Argives, turned back when he heard of the retreat of the Lacedæmonians.

**Athenians garrison Pylus.**—The Lacedæmonians now eluded the vigilance of the Athenians, by sending 300 garrison troops by sea to Epidaurus, under the command of Agesippidas. The Argives sent to remonstrate with the Athenians for having suffered an enemy to cross the sea contrary to treaty, (c. 47,) and required them to make reprisals by replacing the Messenians and Helots in Pylus. The Athenians were then persuaded by Alcibiades to inscribe on the bottom of the Laconian pillar, that the Lacedæmonians had not adhered to their covenant, and to carry the Helots from Cranii to Pylus.

**War between Argives and Epidaurians.**—A desultory war continued between the Argives and Epidaurians. No pitched battle was fought, but the Argives made an unsuccessful attempt to take Epidaurus by an escalade.

**Lacedæmonians invade Argos.**—In the middle of the summer, the Lacedæmonians, seeing that the Epidaurians were in distress, and the smaller Peloponnesian states revolting, marched against Argos with all their forces, under king Agis, and accompanied by the Tegeans and such Arcadians as were allies. The other allies, in Peloponnesus and out of it, assembled at Phlius, consisting of the Bœotians, with 5000 heavy infantry, 5000 light infantry, 500 cavalry, and 500 hamippi;\* the Corinthians, with 2000 heavy infantry; the rest of the allies as might happen; and the Phliasiens in full force, as the army was assembled in their country.

**Cut off the Argives from Argos.**—The Argives had early intelligence of this expedition, and being reinforced by the Mantineans and their allies, and 3000 Eleans, they proceeded to intercept the Lacedæmonian army, before it should reach Phlius, and came up with it at Methydrium, in Arcadia, where each army occupied a hill. The Argives then hoped to engage the Lacedæmonians, but Agis, breaking up his army in the night, eluded the enemy, and joined his allies at Phlius. Next morning, the Argives discovered his departure, and marched first to

\* Foot-soldiers, interspersed among the cavalry, and armed with missiles.



Argos, and then to the road running through Nemea, by which they expected the Lacedæmonians and their allies would descend into Argolis. But Agis divided his army into three divisions. 1st, The Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, and Epidaurians, under himself, entered the plain of Argos by another and more difficult route. 2nd, The Corinthians, Pellenians, and Phliasians reached it by another steep pass. 3rd, The Bœotians, Megareans, and Sicyonians were ordered to take the road through Nemea, where the Argives were posted, in order to harass the rear of the enemy and employ their cavalry with effect, if the Argives should attack those already in the plain. Agis and his first division then proceeded to ravage

59 Saminthus and other places, upon which the Argives advanced and fell in with the second division, and slew many of the Phliasians, but had more of their own troops slain by the Corinthians. The third division of Bœotians, Megareans, and Sicyonians, now approached Nemea, and found that the Argives had departed. The latter were now drawn up in order of battle against the first division under Agis, but were soon hemmed in on every side. The Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, and Epidaurians cut them off from the city; the Corinthians, Phliasians, and Pellenians occupied the eminence on their flank; and the Bœotians, Megareans, and Sicyonians were following on their rear. Moreover, the Argives had no cavalry, for the Athenians, who were to have brought a squadron, had not arrived.

60 Thrasylus and Alciphron obtain four months' truce with Agis.—The body of the Argives were, however, unaware of their danger, and considered that their army and city were hemming in the Lacedæmonians. But before the engagement, Thrasylus, one of the five Argive generals, and Alciphron, the proxenus of the Lacedæmonians, on their own authority alone, went to Agis and proposed, on the part of the Argives, to submit all disputes to an arbitration, and to make a treaty of peace. Agis accepted these proposals after communicating them to only one of his officers, granted a truce for four months, and led back his army without explanation. The Lacedæmonians followed him from respect to the law,

but blamed him exceedingly. For they had hemmed in the enemy on all sides with the finest Greek army that had ever been assembled; all consisting entirely of picked men from their respective nations, who considered themselves a match for two such confederacies as that of Argos. But the Argives were still more angry with Thrasylus and Alciphron, for they considered that the Lacedæmonians had been entirely in their power; and on their return they stoned Thrasylus in the bed of the Charadrus, where they try all causes which may arise during an expedition, before the troops enter the city. Thrasylus saved his life by flying to an altar, but his goods were confiscated.

Argives give up the truce: take Orchomenus.— 61  
After this the Athenian reinforcement arrived, consisting of 1000 heavy infantry and 300 cavalry, under Laches and Nicrostratus, accompanied by Alcibiades as ambassador. The Argives, being unwilling to break their four months' truce with the Lacedæmonians, commanded them to return, but were at length persuaded by the Mantineans and Eleans to grant a public audience. Alcibiades then said that they ought not to have made the truce without the consent of the other allies, and since the present force had come so opportunely, they ought to proceed to hostilities. The allies were persuaded by his arguments, and immediately marched against Orchomenus in Arcadia, though the Argives at first stayed behind, but afterwards joined them. They desired to take the place, because the Lacedæmonians had there deposited some Arcadian prisoners; and the Orchomenians, being soon alarmed at the weakness of their wall and the enemy's number, surrendered on condition of being received as allies, of giving hostages to the Mantineans, and of delivering up those left with them by the Lacedæmonians.

Resolve to attack Tegea.—A consultation was then 62  
held, when the Eleans proposed that they should attack Lepreum, and the Mantineans advised an attack on Tegea. The Athenians and Argives concurred with the Mantineans, upon which the Eleans retired in anger. The remaining allies then prepared at Mantinea to march





against Tegea, which some of the Tegeans were ready to deliver up.

63 **Lacedæmonians appoint a council of Ten.**—The indignation of the Lacedæmonians was increased against Agis when they heard of the capture of Orchomenus, and they resolved to demolish his house and fine him 10,000 drachmas [about £400]. But Agis pledged himself to atone for his fault in his next campaign, and the Lacedæmonians contented themselves with electing a council of Ten Spartans, without whose sanction he was no longer at liberty to take the field.

64 **Relieve Tegea and invade Mantinea.**—The Lacedæmonians now heard that unless they immediately relieved Tegea, it would revolt to the Argives; and they immediately set out with their whole force, directing their Arcadian allies to join them at Tegea. On reaching Orestheum in Mænalia, they sent back one-sixth of their army, consisting\* of the very old and very young, to keep guard at home, and then proceeded to Tegea, and their Arcadian allies came up soon after. They also sent to the Corinthians, Bœotians, Phocians, and Locrians, to join them at Mantinea; but it was a short notice, as those states were obliged to wait for each other in order to cross the enemy's country in a body. Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians and Arcadians invaded Mantinea, and having encamped near the temple of Hercules, they wasted the land.

65 **Agis draws the enemy into the plain.**—The Argives and allies now occupied a strong position, and drew up for action. The Lacedæmonians advanced to within a stone's throw, or arrow-shot, when one of the elders called to Agis, "that he was aiming to cure evil with evil," meaning that he was employing censurable eagerness to retrieve his culpable retreat. Struck by the exclamation, or by a sudden thought of his own, Agis led his army back into the Tegean plain, and diverted a water-course over the Mantinean territory, concerning which the Tegeans and Mantineans had been at continual war, as the water was injurious wherever it fell. Agis thus hoped to draw the Argives from their strong position into the plain. The Argives and allies were at

first amazed at his sudden retreat, and then blamed their generals for not pursuing the enemy, considering themselves betrayed, as they thought themselves to have been when before Argos (c. 59, 60). The confused generals then descended from their position and encamped upon the plain, and the next day the Argives and allies formed their line. 66

**Preparations.**—The Lacedæmonians now returned from the water-course to the temple of Hercules, and were in an unprecedented consternation at seeing the enemy in battle-array. They hurriedly fell into their ranks, their king Agis giving the orders according to the law. The king communicates to the Polemarchs, they to the Lochagi, those to the Penteconters, those again to the Enomotarchs, and finally those to their Enomotia (c. 68). Thus the orders quickly pass to the troops, for nearly all the Lacedæmonian army consists of officers over officers.

		LINE OF BATTLE.		
		LACEDÆMONIANS,		ARGIVES.
		Lacedæmonian cavalry.	□	} Mantineans, because the battle was fought in their country. } Right wing.
Left wing.	{	Sciritæ,* 600 men.	□	} Arcadian allies.
		Neodamodes, and old troops of Brasidas.	□	} 1000 select Argives.
		Lacedæmonians.	□	} Other Argives.
		Arcadians of Heræa.	□	} Cleonæans and Orneans. } Left wing.
		Mænaliæans.	□	} Athenians. }
Right wing.	{	Tegeans.	□	} Athenian cavalry.
		Lacedæmonian cavalry.	□	

\* Originally inhabitants of the district Sciritis, on the extreme frontier of Laconia towards Parrhasia. In battle they were always  
q 2



- 68 **Number and composition of the Lacedæmonian army.**—The Lacedæmonian army appeared to be the larger of the two, but the numbers of either cannot be ascertained with accuracy, from the secrecy of the Lacedæmonians and the tendency of the others to boasting. In the Lacedæmonian army however seven Lochi\* were engaged exclusive of the 600 Sciritæ; in each Lochus there were four Pentecostyes, in each Pentecosty four Enomotiæ, and in the first rank of the Enomotiæ there were four fighting men. In depth they were not drawn up alike, but averaged eight deep. Thus the first rank along the whole line consisted of 448 men exclusive of the Sciritæ.
- 69 **Commanders address their troops.**—When the armies were on the point of engaging, the generals of the Argive confederacy admonished their troops. They told the Mantineans that the battle was for their country, and for empire or slavery; the Argives, that it was for their ancient supremacy in the Peloponnesus; and the Athenians, that by defeating the enemy in the Peloponnesus, the Lacedæmonians would be disabled from again invading Attica. On the other hand, the Lacedæmonians incited each other by mutual exhortations and national war songs.
- 70 **Battle of Mantinea; Lacedæmonians completely victorious.**—The Argives and allies rushed impetuously to the charge; but the Lacedæmonians advanced slowly, stepping in time to the music of flutes, so as to preserve an unbroken front. But all armies extend too much on their right wing, until it outflanks the enemy's left. Each man endeavours to keep close to his right-hand neighbour, for the protection of his own unshielded side;

stationed in the extreme left of the line, and during a campaign were always employed in advance of the army, or in any service of peculiar danger.

\* The *regular* complement of the Enomotia was 24 men besides its captain: the Pentecosty was composed of two Enomotiæ, and the Lochus of two Pentecostyes. The Lochus then ordinarily consisted of 100 men, under the command of a Lochagus. The Lochus of Thucydides is supposed to be the same as the Mora of Xenophon. Compare Arnold's note with the article "*Exercitus*," in the Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities.

whilst the first soldier in the right wing endeavours as far as possible to remove his undefended right side beyond the extremity of the enemy's line. On this occasion the Mantineans stretched far beyond the Sciritæ, whilst the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans outflanked the Athenians. Agis, fearing that his left would be surrounded, ordered the Sciritæ and Brasideans to break away from the main body, and move toward the left; and directed Hipponoidas and Aristoteles, two of the Polemarchs, to draw off their Lochi from the right wing, and fill up the vacant space. But Aristoteles and Hipponoidas did not obey, for which they were subsequently banished from Sparta. The left wing of the Sciritæ and Brasideans was thus insulated and unable to return, and was routed by the Mantineans and allies and the 1000 picked Argives, and driven with much slaughter to the baggage waggons. But the rest of the Lacedæmonian army was victorious, especially the centre; where king Agis with his 300 Horsemen, as they are called, fell upon the veterans of the Argives, the five Lochi, and the Cleonæans, the Orneans, and neighbouring Athenians, and put them to flight; but the majority of the enemy fled on the approach of the Lacedæmonians, and some were even trodden under-foot in their haste. At the same time the right wing of the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans outflanked the Athenians on the enemy's left, and took them in the rear. Here the enemy would have suffered the greatest loss, but were saved by the Athenian cavalry and by the precaution of Agis, who ordered his whole forces to move to the relief of his distressed left wing. The victorious Mantineans and allies, seeing their friends vanquished and the main body of Lacedæmonians advancing, took to flight; and meanwhile the Athenians had leisure to effect their retreat. Many of the Mantineans were slain, though most of the picked Argives escaped; for the Lacedæmonians, according to their usage, made no long pursuit.

**Number of slain.**—This was the most memorable battle that had occurred among the Greeks for a long time, and was fought by the most considerable states. The Lacedæmonians, after piling their arms in front of the



enemy's dead, erected a trophy, and stripped the slain; and carrying their own to Tegea for interment, they restored the enemy's under a truce. The Argives, Orneans, and Cleoneans lost 700 men; the Mantineans, 200; and the Athenians, including the Æginetans, 200 and their generals. The loss of the Lacedæmonians is not accurately known, but is supposed to have been about 300 men.

75 **Effect of the victory.**—Just before the battle Ploistoanax, the other king of Sparta, had advanced to assist Agis with the men above and under the military age, but at Tegea he heard of the victory and returned. The allies also who were advancing from Corinth, and beyond the Isthmus, turned back; and the Lacedæmonians then dismissed the allies who had fought in the battle, and returned to celebrate the Carnean festival at Lacedæmon. By this victory the Lacedæmonians wiped off the charges of cowardice, which the Greeks had brought against them because of their losses at Sphacteria, and their tardiness and want of judgment in other things.

**Argive confederacy attack Epidaurus.**—The day before the battle, the Epidaurians had invaded Argolis, and slew many whom the Argives had left as a guard after the battle; the Argives and their allies were reinforced by 3000 Elean heavy infantry and 1000 Athenians, and immediately marched against Epidaurus, whilst the Lacedæmonians kept the Carnean. Dividing the work between them, they began to invest Epidaurus with a wall. The Athenians soon completed the part assigned to them by fortifying the promontory called the Heræum, but the other allies abandoned the work. The whole then joined in garrisoning the Heræum, and then returned home.

76 **Lacedæmonians offer peace.**—At the beginning of winter the Lacedæmonians marched to Tegea, and sent pacificatory proposals to Argos. There was a party at Argos, who wished first to conclude a treaty with the Lacedæmonians, then to form an alliance with them, and finally to put down the Argive democracy; and their influence with their countrymen had been much increased by the recent battle. Accordingly the Lacedæmonians sent Lichas, the proxenus of the Argives, to Argos, with two proposals, one for peace and the other for war; and though Alcibiades was present, yet the party who were favourable to Lacedæmon prevailed on the Argives to accept the proposal for peace.

77 **Treaty offered to the Argives by the Lacedæmonian Assembly.**

- I. That the Argives shall restore the children to the Orchomenians, the men to the Mænaliens, and the men at Mantinea to the Lacedæmonians. [All of whom were hostages, see c. 61.]
- II. That the Argives shall evacuate Epidaurus, and demolish the fortification; and that if the Athenians do not likewise withdraw from Epidaurus, they shall be treated as enemies by the Argives and Lacedæmonians and their respective allies.
- III. That the Lacedæmonians shall restore any children they may have in their custody to their respective states.
- IV. That with respect to the offering to the god, (c. 53.) the Epidaurians shall be at liberty to take an oath on the subject, and be permitted by the Argives to do so.
- V. That all the Peloponnesian states, both small and great, shall be independent, according to the institutions of their ancestors.
- VI. That if any states without the Peloponnesus shall invade its territory, the Peloponnesian states shall unite in repelling the invader.
- VII. That those states without the Peloponnesus, which are allies of Lacedæmon, shall be on the same footing as the allies of the Lacedæmonians and Argives, each retaining its own territory.
- VIII. That this treaty be communicated to the allies of each of the contracting parties, but that it shall not depend upon their sanction.

**Argives break off their alliance with Athens.**—The Argives accepted this proposal, and the Lacedæmonians returned from Tegea, and, soon afterwards, the same party in Argos who had negotiated with the Lacedæmonians, prevailed on the Argives to abandon their alliance with the Mantineans, Eleans, and Athenians, and to form one with the Lacedæmonians.



79 *Treaty between the Lacedæmonians and Argives for Fifty Years.*

- I. That their differences shall be settled by a fair and equal judicial decision, according to the institutions of their ancestors.
- II. That the other Peloponnesian states shall be comprehended in this treaty and alliance as free and self-governed, retaining what they have, and affording similar judicial decisions, according to their several institutions.
- III. That the allies of the Lacedæmonians without the Peloponnesus shall be on the same footing as the Lacedæmonians, and that the allies of Argos shall be on the same footing as the Argives, retaining their own possessions.
- IV. That if it be necessary to send a common expedition to any quarter, the Lacedæmonians and Argives shall consult upon it, and decide upon that which shall be most just for the allies.
- V. That any point of dispute, whether concerning boundaries or anything else, which shall arise between any states, either in or out of the Peloponnesus, shall be settled by judicial decision.
- VI. That if either of the allied states quarrel with another, the parties shall submit the matter to the arbitration of a third state, which may be thought by both to be impartial.
- VII. That the citizens of each particular state shall have their causes tried according to the institutions of their fathers.

80 *Argives and Lacedæmonians send to Perdiccas.*—The two nations now agreed to receive no herald or embassy from the Athenians until the latter had evacuated all their forts in the Peloponnesus; and neither to make peace nor war, excepting in conjunction with one another. They also sent ambassadors to persuade Perdiccas to join their league; and though he did not abandon the Athenians immediately, yet he proposed doing so, as he himself had originally come from Argos. [See *Herod.* viii. 137.] They likewise renewed their former oaths with the Chalcidians, and made new ones.

*Athenians evacuate Epidaurus.*—The Argives also sent to require the Athenians to evacuate Epidaurus (c. 75). The Athenians, knowing that they could not keep it against the will of the states which furnished the majority of the garrison, sent Demosthenes to bring their men away; but he enticed the other troops out of the place under pretence of a gymnastic spectacle, and shut

the gates upon them. Afterwards the Athenians renewed their treaty with the Epidaurians, and restored the fortress.

*Mantineans join Lacedæmon.*—The withdrawal of 81 Argos from the confederacy obliged the Mantineans, after a stout resistance, to join the Lacedæmonians, and relinquish their sovereignty over their subject cities.

*Democracies at Sicyon and Argos overthrown.*—The Lacedæmonians and Argives now took the field, each 1000 strong. The 1000 Lacedæmonians changed the democracy of Sicyon for an oligarchy, and then in conjunction with the 1000 Argives made a similar change at Argos.

VI. *Second Alliance of Argos with Athens, and Capture of Melos, chap. 82—116.*

*Argives regain their democracy, and ally with Athens.*—This summer the Dicæans in 15th Year. 82  
Athos revolted from the Athenians to the Chal-  
cidians, and the Lacedæmonians settled the affairs of  
Achaia. B. C. 417—  
Summer.

The Argive commons, having now combined and recovered heart, attacked the oligarchy during the Lacedæmonian Gymnopædiæ, and gained the victory, slaying some and banishing others. The oligarchs had previously sent to the Lacedæmonians for assistance, but the latter had delayed setting out. At length, having adjourned the Gymnopædiæ, they marched to Tegea, where they heard of the defeat, and in spite of the entreaties of some Argive exiles they returned home. Ambassadors from both the oligarchs and commons afterwards came to Lacedæmon, and after a long debate in the presence of the allies, it was agreed to march against the Argive commons. But much procrastination ensued, and meantime the Argive commons again courted and concluded an alliance with Athens, and began to build long walls to the shore, that in case of emergency they might be able to communicate with the Athenians by the sea. The whole Argive population, including men, women, and slaves, were engaged upon these walls, being assisted by carpenters and masons





from Athens; and many of the Peloponnesian cities were privy to the undertaking.

83 <sup>Winter.</sup> **Lacedæmonians take the long walls of Argos.**—When the Lacedæmonians heard that the Argives were raising walls, they marched under Agis against Argos with all their allies except the Corinthians. Agis had held some communication with a party within the city, but derived no advantage from it. He however took and demolished the long walls, took Hysie, and his army put to death all the freemen who fell into their hands, and then returned. The Argives in their turn ravaged Phliasia because it had received their exiles (vi. 7).

**Athenians break with Perdicas.**—This winter the Athenians shut up Perdicas in Macedonia from the use of the sea, because he had leagued with the Argives and Lacedæmonians, (c. 80,) and had thus caused the breaking up of an expedition of the Athenians and their allies under Nicias against Amphipolis and the Thrace-ward Chalcidians.

84 <sup>16th Year.  
B. C. 416—  
Summer.</sup> **Alcibiades sails to Argos.**—This summer Alcibiades sailed to Argos with 20 ships, and seized 300 persons who were suspected of favouring the Lacedæmonian cause, and deposited them in some neighbouring islands.

**Athenian expedition to Melos.**—The Athenians now sailed to the island of Melos, (iii. 91,) with 30 Athenian ships, six Chians, and two Lesbians, carrying 1200 heavy-armed Athenians, 300 archers, 20 mounted archers, and 1500 heavy-armed of the allies; the whole being commanded by Cleomedes and Tisias. The Melians were a colony of Lacedæmonians, who, unlike the other islanders, would not submit to the Athenians. At first they were neutral, but when their country was ravaged by the Athenians [under Nicias, see iii. 91], they had gone openly to war. The two generals now encamped in the island, and sent ambassadors before injuring the country; but the Melians would not admit the envoys to the popular assembly, but desired them to state their mission to the magistrates, and the few [members of the oligarchy].

*Conference between the Ambassadors of Athens and the Magistrates and Oligarchs of Melos.*

**Athenians.** "Since we are not permitted to address the 85 multitude, lest they should be persuaded by hearing our irrefutable arguments in one continuous oration; we beg of you not to reserve your objections for one deliberate reply, but to canvass our words as they are spoken, whenever they seem opposed to your interests."

**Melians.** "The fairness of such leisurely debate cannot be 86 denied, though it is inconsistent with your hostile preparations. For we see that you are come as judges of the conference, and if we submit not to your arguments, the result will be war, whilst if we yield we shall be enslaved."

**Athenians.** "Nay, if you have met to retail your suspicions 87 of what may be, or for any other purpose than to consult for the preservation of your country from present dangers, we had better be silent; but otherwise we will speak."

**Melians.** "It is natural and pardonable for men in our cir- 88 cumstances, both to speak and think of different things; but as this discussion is held for our safety, let it proceed as you propose."

**Athenians.** "We shall not then pretend that our empire is 89 lawful, because we overthrew the Medes, or that we have come against you, because you have injured us; nor do we want you to try and persuade us, by saying, that you did not join the Lacedæmonians, though you were their colony, and that you never did us any injury. But we advise you to think only of getting what you can, and not what you have a right to. For we both know that right is only to be considered between parties of equal power; and that the stronger exact all they can, and the weaker must submit."

**Melians.** "Since then we must speak of what is expedient 90 in the place of what is right, we declare that it is expedient for you not to destroy a common benefit, but to let every man be treated rightly and justly. Otherwise, if you should miscarry, you will risk the heaviest vengeance, and have taught your enemies how you should be treated."

**Athenians.** "If our empire were terminated, we need not 91 fear rulers like the Lacedæmonians, but our own revolted subjects. But let the danger be left us. We are here now to enlarge our dominion, and to save your city; and we would rule you to our mutual advantage."

**Melians.** "How can it be as advantageous for us to serve 92 as for you to govern?"

**Athenians.** "Because you, by submitting, would save your- 93 selves from extremity, and we should be gainers by not destroying you."

**Melians.** "But would you not permit us to remain quiet, 94



- and become your friends instead of your enemies, and ally with neither side?"
- 95 Athenians. "No! for your friendship would be an argument to our subjects of our weakness, as your enmity is of our power."
- 96 Melians. "Then do your subjects have such notions of equity, as to place neutral states on the same footing as your revolted colonies?"
- 97 Athenians. "Why not? They think that neither of us wants an argument to justify us, and that those who escape owe it to their power, and it is fear that prevents our assailing them. So that by subduing you, we shall secure as well as extend our dominion; especially as you islanders, and insignificant islanders too, have not escaped the will of us who are masters of the sea."
- 98 Melians. "But will you not, by such a course, make enemies of all neutral states, who will think that their turn must soon come?"
- 99 Athenians. "We do not fear those continental states, who, owing to the liberty they enjoy, will long delay taking precautions against us; but those islanders, like yourselves, whom we have not subdued, and those who are most exasperated at the severity of our rule. For these, by giving way to reckless daring, would hurry both themselves and us into manifest danger."
- 100 Melians. "If then you run such risks to retain your empire, and your subject states would hazard so much to be released from it, it would be base and cowardly of us, who have been hitherto independent, not to encounter every peril and extremity, rather than endure it."
- 101 Athenians. "No! for you are not contending for honour upon equal terms, but deliberating for your safety from those who are stronger."
- 102 Melians. "But the result of war does not always depend upon superiority in numbers. And if we submit, we lose all hope; but if we act with vigour, we may keep ourselves up."
- 103 Athenians. "Hope is the solace of danger, and when entertained by those who have abundant means, may injure but cannot ruin them; but those who risk all they have upon a cast, are only convinced of their delusion when they are ruined. Do not then suffer this to be your case, nor resemble the multitude, who, after they might have been saved by human means, will, when all visible hopes have failed them, resort to such as are invisible, divinations, oracles, and such other things—which lead men to destruction."
- 104 Melians. "We are well assured of the difficulty of contending against your power and fortune; but for fortune we rely upon the gods, for we are standing up in a righteous cause against unjust opponents; and for power we rely upon our

Lacedæmonian allies, who must aid us for the sake of our consanguinity and their own honour."

Athenians. "As to divine favour, we trust that it will not be wanting to us, since we are neither requiring nor doing anything inconsistent with religious belief or human nature. We believe that the gods maintain rule; but we know that men, by an irresistible instinct, assume dominion wherever they are the stronger. We neither enacted this law, nor were the first to follow it when it was enacted. But as we found this law in force, and as we shall leave it behind us in the same force as ever, we have availed ourselves of it, knowing that you and others would do the same if possessed of the same power. As to your opinion, that the Lacedæmonians will assist you from a sense of shame, we bless your simplicity, but commend not your folly. The Lacedæmonians are most just in their dealings among themselves and in their public institutions; but in their conduct to others they consider whatever is agreeable to be honourable, and whatever is expedient to be just; and this does not favour your unreasonable hopes for safety."

Melians. "It is on this ground of interest that we believe that the Lacedæmonians will not betray us who are their own colonists; for they would thus forfeit the confidence of the Greeks, and benefit their own enemies."

Athenians. "Then you do not think that their interest is connected with security, but you suppose that what is just should be performed, although attended with danger, a course which the Lacedæmonians are least likely to venture on."

Melians. "Nay! but we think they would incur unusual dangers for our sake more than for others, because we lie so near the Peloponnesus, and are more to be trusted from our close relationship."

Athenians. "But men do not take part in a quarrel because of the good-will of those who desire their aid, but from their own consciousness of superior strength, a maxim to which the Lacedæmonians especially adhere. It is through distrust of their own power that they take many confederates with them when they attack others; so that it is unlikely that they will cross to an island whilst we are masters of the sea."

Melians. "Yes! but they have confederates that they can send; and the Cretan Sea is so wide, that it would be more difficult for you to stop them than for them to cross over. Moreover, if they failed, they might invade your own territory or allied states."

Athenians. "Whatever might occur, you would find that the Athenians never retreated from a single siege for fear of an attack from others. But be that as it may, throughout this long discussion you have advanced nothing upon which men might trust for safety; your strongest arguments are only vain hopes, and your present force is totally unequal to that of your opponents. You will therefore show the utmost folly if you do not adopt some more prudent counsel after dismissing us.



You must not be afraid of the word 'disgrace,' but consider that it is not discredit to submit to the most powerful state, which offers you fair terms, viz. that you should become tributary allies, and retain the enjoyment of your country. Remember then, after we have retired, that you are consulting whether your country shall be preserved or destroyed."

- 112 **Melians refuse to submit to Athens.**—The Athenians then withdrew, and the Melians, after a short consultation, returned the following answer:—

"We think the same as before, Athenians, that we will not in a moment rob a city of its liberty which has been peopled for 700 years. Relying on that fortune which has hitherto preserved us, and on the help of the Lacedæmonians, we will endeavour to save ourselves. But we will propose to you to be your friends, and the enemies of neither party, and that you should retire from our territory after the ratification of such a treaty as we shall reciprocally agree upon."

- 113 **Athenians reply.**—The Athenians then broke up the conference with this remark:—

"You appear to be the only persons who account the future as more certain than what is seen, and regard what is unseen and uncertain as already occurring; and as you have relied on such things as the Lacedæmonians, and fortune, and hopes, you will be wholly deceived and utterly undone."

- 114 **Blockade Melos.**—The ambassadors then returned to the camp, and the generals built walls of circumvallation round the city, dividing the work between the different states. They then left a part of their forces to besiege the place and returned home.

- 115 **Reprisals between Athenians and Lacedæmonians.**—About this time the Argives invaded Phliasia, and lost 80 men in an ambuscade. The Athenians also at Pylus plundered the Lacedæmonians, who would not, however, renounce the treaty, but only proclaimed that any of their people might rob the Athenians. The Corinthians too made war on the Athenians, on account of some private differences, but the rest of the Peloponnesians remained quiet. The Melians also carried that part of the Athenian fortification which fronted their market in a night sally, and brought in some corn and necessaries.

- 116 **Melians surrender, and are barbarously treated.**—This winter the Lacedæmonians prepared to invade the Argive territory, but returned, as

the border sacrifices were unpropitious; upon which the Argives seized some suspected persons.

About this time the Melians carried another part of the Athenian works, after which a reinforcement under Philocrates reached the besiegers from Athens. The city was then vigorously blockaded, and after some treachery from within, the Melians surrendered at discretion. The Athenians slew all the adult males, enslaved the women and children, and sent 500 colonists to occupy the country.

#### Resumé of the History of Affairs in Sicily in Thucydides, I.—V.

- I. The Athenians in the fifth year of the war sent 20 ships to Sicily under pretence of assisting the Leontines, but really to prevent its sending corn to the Peloponnesus, and to ascertain the possibility of subduing the island. III. 36.  
 II. Charædes was slain in Sicily in the sixth year of the war.—The Athenians under Laches took Mylæ, and compelled the Messanians to give hostages. III. 99.  
 III. Athenians, whilst cruising round Sicily, defeat the Locrians, and take a fort on the river Halæx. III. 99.  
 IV. Athenians assaulted Inessa, but without success.—Laches afterwards defeated 300 Locrians by the river Cæclinus. III. 103.  
 V. Athenians made a descent on Himera.—Laches was superseded by Pythodorus. III. 115.  
 VI. An eruption from Ætna destroyed part of the Catanæan territory. III. 116.  
 VII. Messina revolted from the Athenians.—The Locrians ravaged Rhegium. IV. 1.  
 VIII. Athenians defeat the Syracusans in the Charybdis strait between Messina and Rhegium. IV. 24.  
 IX. Syracusans defeat the Athenians and Rhegians off Cape Pelorus.—Messanians sail against Naxos, and lose 1060 men.—Athenians and Leontines attempt to take Messina. IV. 25.  
 X. General pacification of Sicily brought about by Hermocrates.—Athenians take Sicily, and their commanders were afterwards punished at Athens. IV. 58—65.  
 XI. Revolution in Leontium.—Phœax was sent from Athens as an ambassador to Italy and Sicily, and prevailed on Camarina and Agrigentum to make war on Syracuse, but was so opposed by the Geloans that he returned home. V. 4.  
 XII. Phœax on his way, some Locrian exiles offered him terms. V. 5.

## BOOK VI.

HISTORY OF THE EXPEDITION TO SICILY UNTIL THE ARRIVAL OF GYLIPPUS. B. C. 416—414.

### ANALYSIS.

#### I. Description of Sicily and the Embassy from Segesta.

Sixteenth year, B. C. 416—Winter, continued.—Athenians project the conquest of Sicily.—Its compass.—Ancient inhabitants.—Greek towns



and their founders.—Athenians instigated by the Segestans.—Send ambassadors to Segesta. Chap. 1—6.

§ Lacedæmonians invade Argolis.—Argives raze Orncæ.—Athenians ravage Macedonia. Chap. 7.

## II. Discussion at Athens on an Expedition to Sicily.

Seventeenth year. B. C. 416—Summer.—Athenian ambassadors return from Sicily.—Athenians vote to send 60 ships. Chap. 8.

*Speech of Nicias.*—The expedition itself is ill-timed, and its objects impracticable.—It is ill-timed, from the present insecure state of Greece.—Undesirable to conquer Sicily, and impracticable to retain it.—Our recruited strength should not be expended on exiles, nor to gratify the ambition of Alcibiades.—Let the Siceliots be as they are.—Informality of re-putting the voto not to be considered. Chap. 9—14.

ALCIBIADES most anxious for the expedition: his character. Chap. 15.

*Speech of Alcibiades.*—My private conduct ought to reflect honour on our country.—My management of public affairs.—Weakness of Sicily, and inability of your enemies in Greece.—How then can we decline assisting our allies?—The expedition is necessary to the existence of our empire. Chap. 16—18.

Athenians eager for the expedition. Chap. 19.

*Speech of Nicias.* Numbers and resources of the Sicilian states.—Necessity of equipping a large armament; and carrying heavy-armed infantry, archers, slingers, corn, and money.—With all this our success is doubtful. Chap. 20—23.

## III. Preparations for the Expedition.

Athenians more determined on the expedition.—Nicias specifies the necessary forces.—Generals invested with full powers.—Alcibiades suspected of mutilating the Mercuries.—He claims an immediate trial, but it is deferred.—Armament to assemble at Coreyra: Athenians embark at Piræus. Chap. 24—32.

## IV. Effect of the Report at Sicily.

The tidings reach Syracuse. Chap. 32.

*Speech of Hermocrates.* The Athenians are coming, and we must prepare: their failure would make us glorious.—Let us apply everywhere for aid, and wait for them at Tarentum. Chap. 33, 34.

Syracusans disbelieve the report or defy the Athenians. Chap. 35.

*Speech of Athenagoras.* Absurdity of thinking that the Athenians would attack Sicily.—If they come their destruction is certain.—The whole is an idle rumour of Syracusan oligarchs.—Let us uphold our demo-

cracy.—If the Athenians come, the state will defeat them without sacrificing its liberties. Chap. 36—40.

A general stops the debate. Chap. 41.

## V. Operations of the Athenian Fleet before attacking Syracuse.

Athenians at Coreyra form into three divisions.—Cross the Ionian Gulf.—Amount of forces.—Reach Rhegium.—Rhegians refuse to join them.—Syracusans prepare for defence.—The three Athenian ships return from Segesta.—Nicias proposes to obtain peace from the Selinuntines and then return.—Alcibiades advises an attack on Selinus and Syracuse.—Lamachus urges an instant attack on Syracuse, and seizure of Megara.—Lamachus yields to Alcibiades.—Athenians received at Naxos, and reconnoitre Syracuse.—Catana becomes an ally.—Camarina refuses to receive them: skirmish near Syracuse.—Alcibiades recalled: fears at Athens of an oligarchy or tyranny.

*True account of the age of the sons of Pisistratus, and conspiracy of Harmodius and Aristogiton.*

An informer accuses many of having mutilated the Mercuries.—Increased suspicions of Alcibiades.—He escapes to Peloponnesus.—Minor operations of the Athenians in Sicily. Chap. 42—63.

## VI. Operations and Preparations during the Winter.

Winter. Syracusans emboldened.—Athenians by an artifice land their army at Syracuse.—Fortify their position.—Order of battle. Chap. 64—67.

*Nicias exhorts the Athenians.* A fine Athenian force opposed to a rabble. Chap. 68.

Defeat of the Syracusans.—Losses.—Athenians winter at Naxos and Catana.—Syracusans hold an assembly: encouraged by Hermocrates.—Follow Hermocrates' advice, and send to Corinth and Lacedæmon.—Athenians fail in taking Messana.—Syracusans strengthen their defences, ravage Catana, and send to Camarina. Chap. 69—75.

## CAMARINEAN ASSEMBLY.

*Speech of Hermocrates.* Inconsistency of the Athenians in professing to protect the Leontines.—Folly of the Siceliots if they listen to them.—The quarrel is not for the Syracusans only, but for all Sicily.—Camarineans ought especially to join zealously in the defence.—Not to attempt to remain neutral. Chap. 76—80.

*Reply of Euphemus.* Self-defence against the Dorians obliged the Athenians to acquire dominion.—Our interest that you should be independent.—Expediency the ruling motive.—Turn our interference to your own account. Chap. 81—87.

Camarineans remain neutral.—Athenians gain over some Sicels: send to Carthage and Tyrrhenia.—Syracusans reach Corinth and proceed to Sparta.—Assisted by Alcibiades. Chap. 88.





*Speech of Alcibiades.* I was your enemy because you preferred my enemies.—I upheld my democratic principles because they belonged to my country.—Athens intends Sicily as a stepping-stone to the Peloponnesus.—Send heavy-armed to Syracuse under a Spartan, and fortify Decelea in Attica.—Strange counsel from me, but Athens is no more my country. Chap. 89—92.

Lacedæmonians follow Alcibiades and send Gylippus to Sicily.—Ship from the fleet at Sicily obtains supplies from Athens. Chap. 92, 93.

#### VII. Successful Operations of the Athenians before Syracuse.

Eighteenth Year, B. C. 414.—Summer. Petty operations of the Athenians in Sicily.—War between Lacedæmon and Argos.—Failure of a revolution at Thebes.—Syracusans guard Epipolæ.—Athenians surprise Epipolæ.—Athenians commence the circumvallation: Syracusans' defeat.—Syracusans raise a counter-work and palisade.—Again defeated.—A third defeat, but Lamachus slain.—Syracusans try to take Epipolæ.—Athenians circumvallate Syracuse, which treats for peace.—Movements of Gylippus. Chap. 94—104.

‡ Athenians ravage Laconian coast: treaty broken. Chap. 105.

### SUMMARY.

#### I. Description of Sicily and the Embassy from Segesta, chap. 1—7.

- 1 Athenians project the conquest of Sicily.—  
16th Year.  
B. C. 416—  
Winter,  
continued. This same winter the Athenians resolved to invade Sicily with a larger force than that under Laches and Eurymedon (iii. 115); though most of them were ignorant of the size of the island and the number of its inhabitants, which included both Greeks and Barbarians; and they were therefore unaware that they were undertaking a war scarcely inferior to the Peloponnesian.

Compass of Sicily.—Sicily is eight days' voyage of a merchant vessel in circumference, but only 20 stadia [about 2½ miles] from the main-land.

- 2 Ancient inhabitants.—The earliest people said to have lived in Sicily were the CYCLOPES and LÆSTRY-  
 GONES; but Thucydides was unacquainted with their history, and leaves it to poets and general tradition.

The following races appear to have successively settled there:

I. The SICANIANS, who think themselves aborigines, but are an Iberian tribe, who were driven from the river Sicanus in Iberia by the Ligyans, and still inhabit the western districts of Sicily. From them the island was called Sicania, having been previously named Trinacria.

II. The ELYMIANS, consisting of some Trojans, who, after the capture of Troy, escaped in some vessels to Sicily, and settled near the Sicanians in two cities, Eryx and Segesta. With them were some Phœnicians, who, in returning from Troy, were driven first to Libya and then to Sicily.

III. The SICELS, who crossed from Italy to Sicily on rafts whilst flying from the Opicans: many of them still occupy Italy, which is so called from "Italus," one of their kings. The Sicels defeated the Sicanians and drove them to the southern and western parts of the island, which they now called Sicily; and they themselves held the best districts for nearly 300 years before any Greeks reached Sicily, and still retain the northern and central territory.

IV. The PHŒNICIANS, who occupied several points on the Sicilian coast and some neighbouring islets, for the sake of traffic with the Sicels. But when the Greeks subsequently sailed to Sicily in great numbers, the Phœnicians evacuated most of these settlements, and occupied Motya, Solois, and Panormus, because they considered in an alliance with the neighbouring Elymians, and this quarter was the nearest to Carthage.

Greek towns and their founders.—The Greeks colonized Sicily in the following order:

1. NAXOS, B. C. 734.—Founded by CHALCIDIANS under THUCLES, who also built the altar to Apollo Archegetes without the city, on which the Theori, or those publicly sent to consult the oracle, sacrifice previous to their departure.

2. SYRACUSE, B. C. 733.—Founded by CORINTHIANS under Archias, who expelled the Sicels from the island, on which, though no longer surrounded by water, the inner city stands. Subsequently the outer city was enclosed within the wall and became populous.



Syracuse. The Camarinæans afterwards revolted from the Syracusans, who expelled them; but Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, having received their territory as a ransom for some Syracusan prisoners, resettled Camarina. It was again depopulated by Gela, but settled a third time by the Geloans.

**Athenians instigated by the Segestans.**—The Athenians designed the total reduction of Sicily, but their pretext for the expedition was to succour their kinsmen and allies. Some Segestan envoys had earnestly invoked their aid against the bordering Selinuntines. The Selinuntines had warred with the Segestans, concerning some marriage contracts and debateable territory, and with the assistance of the Syracusans had pressed them by land and sea. The Segestan ambassadors now reminded the Athenians of the former alliance with the Leontines, (iv. 86,) and requested the assistance of an Athenian fleet; and summed up these and other arguments by saying, "That if the Syracusans should go unpunished after expelling the Leontines, and should destroy the other Athenian allies in Sicily, and thus obtain dominion over the whole island, there would be danger of their subsequently assisting the Peloponnesians, on account of their relationship as Dorians, and thus co-operate in destroying the Athenian power; and it would thus be prudent of the Athenians to resist the Syracusans in concert with Sicilian allies, especially as the Segestans would furnish sufficient money for the war."

Send ambassadors to Segesta.—The Athenians then sent ambassadors to Segesta, to see if the money was deposited in the treasury and temples, and to learn the state of the war with the Selinuntines.

**Lacedæmonians invade Argolis.**—This winter, the Lacedæmonians and their allies, except the Corinthians, invaded Argolis, ravaged part of the land, and carried off some corn (v. 83). They also lodged the Argive exiles at Orneæ, with a few of their own troops, and made a truce for the Orneatæ and Argives, not to injure each others' land.

**Argives raze Orneæ.**—The Athenians arrived soon after, with 30 ships and 600 heavy-armed, and, in conjunction with the Argives, besieged Orneæ for one day,

3. **LEONTINI**, B. C. 728.—Re-settled by **CHALCIDIANS** under **THUCLES**, from **NAXOS**, after expelling the **Sicels**, five years after the foundation of **Syracuse**.

4. **CATANA**.—By the same **Chalchidians** from **Naxos**, who chose **Evarchus** as their leader.

5. **TROTILUS**, **THAPSUS**, and **HYBLEAN MEGARA**, B. C. 727 or 726.—**MEGARIANS** under **LAMIS** first settled at **TROTILUS**, beyond the river **Pantacyas**. They first united with the **Chalchidian Leontines**, who afterwards drove them out, upon which **LAMIS** founded **Thapsus**, and then died. Subsequently these **Megarians** were expelled from **Thapsus**, upon which **Hyblo**, a **Sicel king**, gave them the **HYBLEAN MEGARA** for a settlement. They were expelled 245 years afterwards, [about B. C. 480,] by **Gelo**, tyrant of **Syracuse**.

6. **SELINUS**, B. C. 627 or 626.—Founded by some **HYBLEAN MEGARIANS**, under **PAMILUS**, 100 years after the settlement in **Hyblean Megara**.

7. **GELA**, B. C. 688.—Founded by a joint colony under **ANTIPHEMUS** from **Rhodes**, and **ENTIMUS** from **Crete**, 45 years after the founding of **Syracuse**. Its name was taken from the river **Gelas**, but its present site, which was first fortified, is called **Lindii** [*Herod.* vii. 163]. Its institutions were **Dorian**.

8. **ACRAGAS**, or **AGRIGENTUM**, B. C. 580.—Re-peopled by **Geloans**, under **Aristonous** and **Pystilus**, 108 years after their own settlement. It was named after the river **Acragas**, and its institutions were **Geloan**.

9. **ZANCLE**, or **MESSANA**.—Colonised by some pirates from **Cuma**, the **Chalchidian city** in **Opicia**, and afterwards strengthened by a body from **Chalcis** and the rest of **Eubœa**. Its founders, **Periees** and **Cratæmenes**, came, one from **Cuma**, and the other from **Chalcis**. Its site resembles a reaping-hook, and it was called by the **Sicels** "**Zancle**," from their word *zanclo*, a sickle. These settlers were afterwards expelled by some **Samians** and **Ionians**, who fled from the **Medes**, but they in their turn were driven out by **Anaxilas**, tyrant of **Rhegium**, who colonised the city with a mixed race, and called it **Messana**.

5 10. **HIMERA**.—Founded by some **Chalchidian colonists** and **Syracusan exiles**, called **Mylætidæ**, from **Zancle**, under **Euclydes**, **Simus**, and **Saco**. Their language was a mixture of **Chalchidian** and **Dorian**, but the **Chalchidian institutions** prevailed.

11. **ACRÆ**, B. C. 663.—Founded by the **Syracusans**, 70 years after the founding of **Syracuse**.

12. **CASMENÆ**, B. C. 643.—Founded by the **Syracusans**, 20 years after the founding of **ACRÆ**.

13. **CAMARINA**, B. C. 598.—Founded by the **Syracusans**, under **Dascon** and **Menecolus**, 135 years after the building of



but at night the Orneatæ escaped. Next day, the Argives razed Orneæ, and the Athenians returned. *Continued at chap. 95.*

**Athenians ravage Macedonia.**—The Athenians now carried a body of cavalry and some Macedonian exiles to Methone, which borders on Macedonia, and ravaged the territory of Perdiccas. The Lacedæmonians then sent to request the Chalcidians Thrace-ward, who had a truce with the Athenians, renewable every 10 days, to assist Perdiccas, but they refused.

II. *Discussion at Athens on an Expedition to Sicily, chap. 8—23.*

8 **Athenian ambassadors return from Sicily.**  
17th Year.  
 B. C. 415—  
 Summer. —Early this summer, the Athenian ambassadors returned from Sicily, accompanied by some Segestans, who brought 60 talents of uncoined silver, [about £14,400,] as a month's pay for 60 ships,\* which they requested might be sent.

**Athenians vote to send 60 ships.**—The Athenians now held an assembly, and having heard from the Segestans and their own ambassadors seductive accounts of the money in Segesta, voted to send 60 ships, under Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus, with full powers to assist the Segestans, restore the Leontines, and do what seemed best for the Athenian interests in Sicily. Five days afterwards, the Athenians held another assembly, to consider how best to expedite the equipment of the fleet; when Nicias, who had been appointed to the command against his will, and considered that the state was ill-advised to aim at the conquest of all Sicily, on so trifling a pretext, thus addressed the meeting.

SPEECH OF NICIAS.

9 The expedition itself is ill-timed, and its object impracticable.—“Although this assembly is held to decide upon the details of an expedition, I still think we ought to consider whether we should send out our ships at all, and not upon such slight deliberation, and at the instigation of foreigners, engage in a

\* This supposes the payment of a drachma [about 9d.] per day to every seaman of a crew of 200 men. For  $200 \times 30 = 6000$ , that is to say, 6000 drachmæ, or one talent. See Arnold's note.

war with which we have nothing to do. For my part I shall derive honour from the expedition, and no one has less fears for his personal safety; though, as the life and property of every man depends upon the state, I hold him to be an equally good citizen who is duly careful of both. But I have never sacrificed my convictions to my interests, nor will I now, but speak as I think. And though I should be unable to dissuade you from risking your present possessions for uncertain acquisitions, yet I will point out to you the unreasonableness and the difficulties of your ill-timed enterprise.

It is ill-timed from the present insecure state of Greece.—“I 10 say then, that by sailing to Sicily you will be leaving enemies behind, and bringing fresh ones here. You fancy you can depend upon the treaty, and as long as you remain quiet, it will be a treaty in name; but directly you are defeated, your enemies will organize a fresh attack; for, in the first place, they were forced by their misfortunes to accede to discreditible conditions; and secondly, in this very arrangement, many of the articles are still open to debate. Moreover, some of the most powerful states have not yet acceded to the treaty. Part of them are at open war with us, and the others are only restrained by ten-day truces; and if we should divide our forces, they would attack us in conjunction with the Siceliots. Why should we then grasp after another empire before we have secured the one we have, and succour our allies the Segestans, forsooth, because they have been injured; when, at the same time, the Thrace-ward Chalcidians, after years of revolt, are still unsubdued, and others on the continent yield but a doubtful obedience.

Undesirable to conquer Sicily, and impracticable to retain it.— 11  
 “If we subdued the revolted Chalcidians, we might keep them in subjection, but if we conquered the Siceliots, they are too distant and numerous for us to govern them. As for the dominion of the Syracusans over all the Siceliots, with which the Segestans wish to alarm us, I consider it would be favourable to our interests; for though the Siceliots might singly be induced by the Lacedæmonians to attack us, yet if the Syracusans were masters, the latter would not be likely to assist in overthrowing our empire, which would then rest on similar foundations to their own. The Greeks in Sicily would fear us most at a distance, or if we retired after making a short demonstration of our power; but if we met with any reverse, they would soon despise us and join our enemies. It is this feeling which now leads you, Athenians, to undervalue the power of the Lacedæmonians, and seek the conquest of Sicily; but you ought not to be elated at their disasters, or imagine that they are doing anything but considering how to retrieve their past misfortunes and reputation for bravery. We ought not then to labour for the Segestans, who are Barbarians, but guard against a state which plots our ruin by the spread of her oligarchical principles.



12 Our recruited strength should not be expended on exiles.—“ We have but lately recruited our persons and property from the ravages of pestilence and war, and ought to expend our recruited strength on national objects, not upon fugitive exiles, whose interest it is to tell specious falsehoods, and who, after their friends have borne the danger, will show them no gratitude if they succeed, but involve them in ruin if they fail.

Nor to gratify the ambition of Alcibiades.—“ And if there be a man amongst you, who, being too young for office, is elated at being appointed to command, that he may be admired for his sumptuous horse-keeping, and obtain some means of supporting his extravagance; I say, suffer not such a one to exhibit his splendour at the peril of the state; but be assured that such men injure the public interests whilst they consume their private fortune, and that this business is too important to be planned and rashly executed by one so young.

13 Let the Siceliotis be as they are.—“ Notwithstanding the partisans of like age and character whom I now see sitting around this man, I call upon the elders of the assembly to speak freely, and not to suppose that any will be accounted cowards for having voted against the war. I call upon them at this critical moment to vote, 1st, That the Siceliotis keep to their present boundaries, the Ionian and Sicilian seas, and thus enjoy their own territories, and settle their own differences; 2nd, That we tell the Segestans, that as they went to war with the Selinuntines without consulting Athens, so they may conclude a peace without our interference; and 3rd, That we engage in no future alliance with states who will claim assistance in their distress, but can afford none when we require it.

14 Informality of re-putting the vote not to be considered.—“ And you, Prytanis, will show yourself a good citizen by taking a second time the opinion of the Athenians. You can incur no censure for violating the law with so many abettors, but will thus act the part of a physician to your ill-advised country.”

15 Alcibiades most anxious for the expedition: his character.—Most of the Athenians advised the expedition, though some opposed it. But Alcibiades most earnestly pressed it, 1st, From a desire to thwart Nicias, who was against him in politics, and had spoken of him disparagingly; and 2nd, From his anxiety to take the command, by which he hoped to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and promote his own fame and fortune. He had been held in high repute by the citizens, but his horses and other expenses were beyond his means, and subsequently

contributed to the downfall of the Athenian state. For the bulk of the people becoming alarmed at his deviation from the laws, and his personal character, suspected him of aiming at tyranny; and though he conducted public affairs with ability, yet they committed the administration to others, who brought the country to ruin (c. 27). He now came forward and spoke as follows:

#### SPEECH OF ALCIBIADES.

My private conduct ought to reflect honour on our country.— 16  
“ Since Nicias has denied my fitness for the command, I must declare that it belongs of right to me, and that the things for which I am so loudly censured have conferred glory on my ancestors and myself, and benefit on my country. The Greeks, who had considered our state as exhausted by the war, have now rated it beyond its actual power, through the splendour of my display as its deputy at Olympia. I entered seven chariots, which no private individual had done before; I obtained the first, second, and fourth prizes, and maintained a figure which did not detract from the splendour of my victory. And according to the customs of Greece, such things reflect honour, and create an idea of power. Again, my exhibitions of choruses at home may be envied by my fellow-citizens, but strike foreigners with a notion of our greatness. And surely that is no useless folly by which a person benefits both himself and the state at his own expense. But I know that all persons of surpassing endowments are disliked whilst living; though after-generations are ambitious of claiming them as kindred, and their own country will glory in their honourable fame.

My management of public affairs.—“ Since, then, I have been celebrated in my private capacity, let it be inquired whether I have been inferior in the management of public affairs. Without any danger or expense to you, I united the most powerful states of the Peloponnesus; I obliged the Lacedæmonians to risk their all in a single day's struggle at Mantinea, and though they were victorious, they have never regained their confidence. These were the achievements of my youth, and of what is called my monstrous folly. Then fear not now, whilst Nicias is still fortunate and I am yet in the flower of this youth and folly.

Weakness of Sicily, and inability of your enemies in Greece.—“ As to this expedition to Sicily, do not change your determination from an idea that it would be attacking a formidable power. Its cities swarm with a mixed rabble, who are torn by faction, ripe for change, and are neither furnished with arms nor with resources; but each one supposes he can obtain his ends from the people by oratory or sedition. Such men are therefore neither attached to their country, nor able to unite for its defence; and the number of their heavy-armed troops is much





18 exaggerated, in the same way that the forces of Greece have been falsely estimated, and were scarcely sufficient during the recent war. Many Barbarians in Sicily will also join us, from their hatred to the Syracusans. Nor need we fear our enemies at home, for in spite of these very enemies, and the Medes to boot, our ancestors acquired by their naval superiority the empire which we now enjoy. And besides, the Peloponnesians were never less disposed to attack us, and at the worst could only invade Attica by land, which they might do whether we went to Sicily or not; but they can do us no harm by sea in either case, for we shall leave behind a sufficient naval force to defend our country.

How then can we decline assisting our allies?—"We have therefore no excuse for not assisting the Segestans. We allied with them, not that they might assist us, but that they might annoy our enemies in Sicily, and prevent their coming here. Our empire has been won by our readily assisting all Barbarians or Greeks who asked our aid, and thus became instruments of our aggrandizement. And as it is impossible for us to mark out the limits of our dominion, and as our policy compels us to continue to plan the reduction of others, let us make this expedition, and thus prostrate the pride of the Peloponnesians by showing that we care not for the present peace; and at any rate humble the Syracusans, if we do not afterwards by these means extend our rule over the whole of Greece.

The expedition is necessary to the existence of our empire.—"Whilst our fleet is a match for the whole marine of Sicily, it will enable us to return or remain with safety. And let not Nicias, by setting the elder citizens against the younger, divert you from your purpose; for the fire of youth is no less required in the public counsels than the sobriety of age; and my decided opinion is, that our state, which is accustomed to full employment, would soon be ruined by inactivity, and that those people live in the greatest security who deviate the least from their existing habits and institutions."

19 Athenians eager for the expedition.—After this speech of Alcibiades, the Segestans and some Leontine exiles reminded the Athenians of their oaths, and they became more eager for the expedition. Nicias, however, again tried to dissuade them by representing the magnitude of the required force.

#### SPEECH OF NICIAS.

20 Numbers and resources of the Sicilian states.—"The Sicilian cities are numerous, great, and independent, and neither require a change, nor would be likely to prefer our dominion to their present freedom. I hope that Naxos and Catania will side with us on account of their connexion with the Leontines, but there are seven others [on whose opposition we may calcu-

late; viz. Syracuse, Selinus, Gela, Agrigentum, Messana, Himera, and Camarina]. All these are equipped in a style corresponding to our own, especially Selinus and Syracuse. They possess many heavy infantry, archers, and dart-men; numerous triremes with crowds to man them; money in private funds and temples at Selinus; whilst some of the Barbarians pay their first-fruits to the Syracusans. But they chiefly excel us in the abundance of horses and native corn.

Necessity of equipping a large armament.—"Against such a power we shall require not only a fleet, but a large land force, to prevent their cavalry from hindering our landing, especially if all the Sicilians except the Segestans unite to oppose us. We must also carry ample supplies of provisions; for the present expedition is not like one to a neighbouring country, where supplies and reinforcements can be received in a few days; we are going to a land so distant, that in the winter season four months might elapse before despatches from the army could reach Athens.

And carrying heavy-armed, archers, slingers, corn, and money. 22—"We ought to take a strong body of heavy-armed infantry, both of our own and of our allies, and such Peloponnesians as we can induce by persuasion or pay; also plenty of archers and slingers to check the enemy's cavalry; and a fleet that will insure our superiority on the sea, and carry all necessary provisions. We must also take our corn, viz. wheat and parched barley, in merchant vessels, and press bakers from the mills, lest we should be detained on our way by stress of weather. And above all, we must take as much money as possible, and not trust to the vaunted riches of the Segestans, which will probably prove to be mere words.

With all this our success is doubtful.—"But even with a superiority in all points we shall find it difficult to subdue Sicily. We must consider that we are like men about to found a colony amongst foreigners and enemies, where, unless we master the country the first day we land, we shall find the whole island in arms against us. With all these precautions we shall have great need of good fortune, though I consider it the best for the state, and the safest for us, to secure ourselves by these preparations. But if any one present think otherwise, I readily resign the command to him."

#### III. Preparations for the Expedition, chap. 24—32.

Athenians more determined on the expedition.—The 24 Athenians, instead of being daunted by the speech of Nicias, were now more eager, and considered the magnitude of his measures as an abundant assurance of success. All ages and ranks were alike seized with a desire to go. The elder felt certain of conquest, and feared



no disaster to so large a force; those in the prime of life desired foreign sights and spectacles, and hoped to return in safety; whilst the mass of people and soldiery reckoned upon a gainful campaign and a conquest which would yield an inexhaustible revenue. So that the few who did not approve of the measure were afraid to vote against the majority, lest they should appear disaffected to the state.

25 **Nicias specifies the necessary forces.**—An Athenian then called on Nicias to state at once the forces he judged necessary. He complied with reluctance, saying, that he must consult at leisure with his colleagues, but that, as far as he could see at present, they would require 100 triremes, besides transports, and 5000 heavy infantry, with archers and slingers in proportion, from both Athens and Crete.

26 **Generals invested with full powers.**—The Athenians then voted that the generals should be invested with full powers to arrange the expedition and number of troops. A summons was then sent to all the allies, and the muster-rolls were drawn up at home, and, as Athens had recovered herself from the war and plague, and was rich in money and young men, the needful supplies were easily provided.

27 **Alcibiades suspected of mutilating the Mercuries.**—Meantime, the well-known square stone Mercuries, which are numerous in the porches of both the temples and private houses throughout Athens, were all mutilated in one night. Great rewards were immediately offered for the discovery of the perpetrators, and all, whether citizens, foreigners, or slaves, were invited, by a promise of impunity, to reveal any other act of impiety which had come to their knowledge. Indeed the matter was treated more seriously at this time than it would at any other juncture, and was considered to be either an ill omen of the expedition, or the act of a conspiracy for overthrowing the democracy. Upon this many slaves and naturalized foreigners gave information of the defacement of other statues by young men in drunken and wanton moods, and of mock celebrations of the mysteries in private houses. In this charge they implicated Alcibiades,

and it was immediately taken up by the party who wished to supplant him in his position as leader of the people. They raised an outcry, and declared that the mocking of the mysteries and defacement of the Mercuries had been done to overthrow the democracy, and had been participated in by Alcibiades, and that this was proved by the irregularities of his life and conduct.

He claims an immediate trial, but it is deferred.— 29  
The preparations for the expedition were now completed, and Alcibiades offered to submit to an immediate trial, that, if found guilty, he might be punished, and if acquitted, take the command. He conjured them not to listen to slanders in his absence, but to put him to death at once, if he were guilty, and not send him out with such a charge hanging over him. But his enemies feared his present popularity with the army and the people, and wished also to get up graver charges against him in his absence. They therefore set on other orators to urge the immediate departure of the expedition, and that Alcibiades should take his trial within a certain number of days after his return.

**Armament to assemble at Corcyra: Athenians em-** 30  
**bark at Piræus.**—Most of the allies, with the corn-transports and smaller craft, were ordered to rendezvous at Corcyra, in order to cross the Ionian Gulf to the Iapygian foreland; and on an appointed day, in the middle of the summer, the Athenians and such of their allies as were present went down to the Piræus at sun-rise to embark. Almost the whole population of Athens, citizens and foreigners, accompanied them to the water-side; the citizens with hopes of their success, but feeling more than ever the perils of the undertaking and the length of the voyage, though cheered by the sight of so mighty an armament, which struck the foreigners with admiration and amazement. For this fleet was the most splendid and costly that had ever before issued from a single state with a Grecian force. Though that with which Pericles sailed against Epidaurus, (ii. 31,) and which was afterwards, under Hagnon, employed against Potidæa, (ii. 58,) was not inferior in numbers, for it included 4000 heavy-armed Athenians, 300 cavalry, 100 triremes, and 31



50 Lesbian and Chian ships; yet it was sent on a short voyage, and with a slender preparation; whereas the present armament was elaborately fitted out, and far surpassed the former in the care and cost of its equipment, which corresponded to the probable duration, and to the various objects, of the expedition. The state supplied empty vessels, 60 first sailers and 40 transports, and gave one drachma [9*d.*] a day to each seaman; but the captains furnished the equipments, and vied with each other, both in these and in expensive ensigns, and in obtaining the best crews, by giving additional pay to the Thranitæ, or highest rank of rowers, and the petty officers. The land forces were also selected from the muster-rolls, and emulated each other in their arms and accoutrements. Indeed, the general rivalry suggested to the other Greeks that it was rather a display of power than a hostile armament. If any one could calculate the whole cost to the city, including the public expenditure and money sent out with the generals; the outlay of individuals upon their equipments, and of captains upon their vessels; in addition to what each one provided for emergencies, beyond their pay, and what each soldier or trader carried out for exchange;—the whole would amount to a considerable number of talents. Indeed, this expedition was as much celebrated for its smartness and splendour as for its superiority over the enemy, and because it was about to undertake the longest voyage from home that had ever been made, and excited the greatest hope of future acquisition in addition to present possession.

32 When the ships were manned and everything on board, silence was proclaimed by the sound of the trumpet, and the usual prayers were offered, not ship by ship, but pronounced by a herald, and repeated simultaneously throughout the fleet, and joined by the multitude of citizens and friendly foreigners from the shore. At the same time, in every ship libations were poured both by officers and men from vessels of gold and silver. They then, after singing the Pæan, weighed anchor, and sailed out in a column, and then raced each other to Ægina, and thus hastened to Corcyra.

#### IV. *Effect of the Report at Sicily, chap. 32—41.*

The tidings reach Syracuse.—The news was carried to Syracuse from different quarters, but was long discredited. An assembly, however, was held, and many speeches were delivered from believers and disbelievers in the report, when Hermocrates, having received accurate information, spoke thus:

#### SPEECH OF HERMOCRATES.

Athenians are coming and we must prepare; their failure would make us glorious.—“I can assure you, though it appears incredible, that the Athenians are advancing against us with a large force, under pretence of assisting the Segestans and resettling the Leontines, but really to subdue Sicily; beginning with Syracuse. It is therefore necessary to consider how best to repel them; but let us neither despise them nor fear them. The greatness of their armament will induce the Siceliots to join our alliance, and then defeat or repulse will redound to our glory. And few large fleets, whether Greeks or Barbarians, have succeeded in distant expeditions; because the inhabitants of the country against which they are directed all league together through fear; and if the invaders fail through want of provisions, or even through their own fault, they will make those glorious whom they hoped to conquer. It was thus that these very Athenians gained the largest share in the honour of repelling the Medæ, because they were the parties principally threatened.

Let us apply everywhere for aid, and wait for them at Tarentum. 34 —“Let us then make our preparations here, and send to the Sicels, to strengthen the attachments of some, and to form alliances with others. Let us despatch envoys to all the Sicilian states to apprise them of the common danger, and others to Italy to make a league with the Italiots, or at least to prevent their siding with the Athenians. I think it would be also advisable to apply to Carthage, who has always feared an attack from the Athenians, and may be roused to interfere when she sees them threatening a neighbouring island; and no state has greater treasures, or more ability to assist us. We would also send to Lacedæmon and Corinth for succours, and urge them to renew hostilities with Athens.

“But above all I would advise that we fit out the strongest fleet we can collect with the aid of our Sicilian allies, lay in ten months' provisions, and go and meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the Iapygian foreland, and show them that they must fight a passage across the Ionian Gulf before they combat for Sicily. We should thus strike the enemy with the greatest terror, who might be easily attacked, as with so large



a force they must approach slowly and in small divisions. If they attack us with their fast sailers in a close body, we can fall upon them when they are wearied with their oars. Or we might retire to Tarentum, whilst they would soon be reduced from want of provisions, or compelled to proceed along the coast and leave behind the heavier laden vessels and transports. But I think it more probable that they will stay at Corcyra, deliberating and collecting information, until the winter has arrived, or break up the expedition altogether, especially as the most experienced of their generals has taken the command against his will, and would gladly seize an excuse for returning. It is also most probable that the Athenians, who had expected to find us an unresisting prey, because we did not assist the Lacedæmonians to destroy them, will, on discovering their delusion, be filled with astonishment and terror."

- 35 **Syracusans disbelieve the report, or defy the Athenians.**—But few of the Syracusans believed Hermocrates or adopted his views. The majority either disbelieved the report or made a jest of it; whilst others, supposing it well-founded, could see no danger. At length Athenagoras, who was then an influential popular leader, came forward and spoke thus:

SPEECH OF ATHENAGORAS.

- 36 **Absurdity of thinking that the Athenians would attack Sicily.**—“Whoever does not wish that the Athenians would be so senseless as to come here and be subdued, must be either a coward or ill-affected towards his country. But I wonder at the folly of those who bring such tidings and expect to be believed, and who throw the whole city into consternation in order to overshadow their own terror.

“These reports are fabricated by a mischievous faction here; but you are able to judge what talented and experienced men, as the Athenians are, are likely to do; and whether it is probable they would invade Sicily whilst the Peloponnesian war is still unfinished, and when they know that we shall not invade them.

- 37 **If they come their destruction is certain.**—“If they should come, the Sicilians are more able to terminate the war than the Peloponnesians, and Syracuse alone is stronger than the armament said to be prepared. The Athenians cannot bring cavalry or get any here, except a few from the Segestans, nor can they transport a force of heavy infantry equal to ours; and their ships will have enough to do to get to Sicily at all, and carry the necessary stores. Indeed I think that if they commanded a city as large as Syracuse, and in its neighbour-

hood, they would hardly escape utter destruction; but surely their case would be hopeless with all Sicily hostile, and an army dependent on their ships, and prevented by our cavalry from leaving their wretched tents and poor equipments. In short, I do not think they will ever effect a landing.

The whole is an idle rumour of Syracusan oligarchs.—“But the Athenians are too well acquainted with these matters not to be content for the present with preserving what they have got. It is a faction here who are terrifying the populace with lying tales, in order to gain an ascendancy in the state. And indeed at times I am afraid they will succeed, for our city has often more conflicts within itself than with the enemy, and sometimes falls under tyrannic rule and unprincipled cabal. But I will endeavour to prevent these evils from occurring in our day. I will watch, warn, and reprove the oligarchs.

Let us uphold our democracy.—“And you, young men, what is it you require? The law will not permit you to bear rule yet, and it cannot be just that you should not be subject to the same laws as the multitude. You will say that a democracy is neither wise nor equitable, and that the wealthy are the most fitted to govern. But I say that democracy is the name of the whole, and oligarchy of a part; that though the rich are the best guardians of the treasury, yet the intelligent are the best counsellors, and the mass of the people the best judges. Under a democracy all have equal privileges; whilst an oligarchy permits the many to share the dangers but retains all the advantages. And this is what the rich and young require: a thing impossible to be attained in a great city.

If the Athenians come, the state will defeat them without sacrificing its liberties.—“And now you are the greatest fools in Greece, if you do not know that you are coveting evil things, and the greatest knaves if you know it and still persist in it. I say then, either know better or else change your purpose, and thus advance the common interests of the city. Be content with the privileges you enjoy, lest by striving for all you lose what you have. And away with these rumours, which are discovered and will not be allowed. If the Athenians come, the state can defeat them; and if they do not, it will not be so paralysed by your false reports as to sacrifice its liberties by choosing you for its rulers.”

**A general stops the debate.**—One of the generals now rose and stopped the debate, saying:

“It is neither prudent for parties to calumniate each other, nor for the hearers to admit the slander. We ought to prepare against the invaders, for if the alarm proved groundless there could be no harm in furnishing the state with horses, arms, and equipments. I and my colleagues will send round to the cities to ascertain and provide what is necessary.”

The assembly then broke up.





V. *Operations of the Athenian Fleet before attacking Syracuse, chap. 42—63.*

42 Athenians at Corcyra form into three divisions.—

The Athenians and allies had now assembled at Corcyra, and after the three generals had reviewed the whole fleet a second time, they divided it into three squadrons, allotting one to each, the more easily to preserve order, and to find shelter and entertainment on the passage. They then sent forward three ships to Italy and Sicily to ascertain which of the cities would receive them, and with orders to return, that the commanders might know where to land.

43 Cross the Ionian Gulf: amount of forces.—The Athenians now proceeded to cross from Corcyra to Sicily with the following force:

SHIPS.		
Athenian triremes, 60 fast sailers, and the rest troop-ships	. . . . .	100
Triremes of the Chians and other allies	. . . . .	34
Rhodian 50-oared galleys	. . . . .	2
Provision ships, etc.	. . . . .	30
Impressed boats	. . . . .	100
Horse transport carrying 30 horses	. . . . .	1
	Vessels	267
Many other boats and ships of burden also accompanied the fleet for the purposes of commerce.		
MEN.		
Athenian heavy-armed	. . . . . 1500	} 2200
*Thetes (heavy-armed marines)	. . . . . 700	
Heavy-armed allies	. . . . .	
	Total heavy-armed.	5100
Athenian archers	. . . . .	400
Cretan archers	. . . . .	80
Rhodian slingers	. . . . .	700
Megarean exiles, light-armed	. . . . .	120
Athenian cavalry	. . . . .	30
	Total number of troops	6430

\* See note on Book iii. 16.

Reach Rhegium: Rhegians refuse to join them.— 44

The whole armament crossed the Ionian Gulf, and reached the promontory of Iapygia and Tarentum, and from thence coasted along the Italian shore. None of the cities by which they passed would open their gates to the troops nor afford them a market, but would only allow them water and an anchorage, and even these were denied at Tarentum and Locri. At Rhegium they encamped in the sanctuary of Diana without the city, and were permitted a market; and they remained quietly there until the three ships returned from Segesta. But the Rhegians, though Chalcidians, refused to join them in assisting the Chalcidian Leontines, declaring that they would be neutral until the other Italiots had determined what to do.

Syracusans prepare for defence.—The Syracusans now heard from all quarters and their own spies, that the Athenians were at Rhegium, and applied themselves earnestly to prepare for their defence. They sent guards to some of the Sicels, and ambassadors to others, and garrisoned the stations of the Peripoli; and they examined their own arms and horses, and prepared for immediate war.

The three Athenian ships return from Segesta.—The three Athenian ships (c. 42) now returned to the fleet at Rhegium, with the news that the Segestans could only send 30 talents [about £7200]. This, with the refusal of the Rhegians to join them, reduced the Athenian generals to great despondency, though Nicias had expected the tidings from Segesta. The Segestans had deceived the first Athenian envoys, (c. 8,) by showing them the bowls, wine-ladles, censers, and other articles in the temple of Venus on Mount Eryx; but as these were of silver, their value was not so great as their display was splendid. In their private receptions also they exhibited great quantities of gold and silver plate, which they borrowed from each other and from the neighbouring cities, and which were all brought to every entertainment.

Nicias proposes that they obtain peace from the Selinuntines and then return.—The three generals



now conferred with one another, when Nicias proposed that they should at once sail to Selinus, and call upon the Segestans to supply pay, if not for the whole armament, at least for the 60 ships which they had asked for. That on this condition they should remain until they had brought the Selinuntines to terms; but that afterwards they should only make a demonstration of the Athenian power along the coast and then return home, unless some opportunity offered of assisting the Leontines or of gaining any other ally among the Sicilian cities.

48 Alcibiades advises an attack on Selinus and Syracuse.

—Alcibiades represented the disgrace of so large a force returning home without effecting its purpose, and proposed that they should open negotiations with all the Sicilian towns except Selinus and Syracuse, and endeavour first to win over Messina, which possessed a harbour and was a suitable station for observing the enemy. They should also excite some of the Sicels to revolt from Syracuse, and persuade others to aid them with troops and corn; and having then ascertained the allies on whom they could reckon, should attack Syracuse if it would not permit them to re-settle the Leontines, and Selinus if it would not come to terms with Segesta.

49 Lamachus urges an instant attack on Syracuse, and seizure of Megara.

—Lamachus recommended that, before the terror excited by their first appearance had subsided, they should sail to Syracuse and endeavour to draw the enemy into a battle, before he had collected his strength and courage. The rest of the Siceliot would then shrink from allying with the Syracusans, and join the Athenians; and they might establish a naval station at Megara, which was uninhabited, and near to Syracuse both by sea and land.

50 Lamachus yields to Alcibiades: Athenians received at Naxos: reconnoitre Syracuse.

—Lamachus soon yielded to the plan of Alcibiades, who then sailed to Messina, but could only prevail on the Messanians to afford him a market without their walls. After his return to Rhegium, the generals manned and provisioned 60 ships, with which, after leaving the rest under the care of one of their number, [probably Nicias,] Alcibiades and

the other coasted to Naxos, which received them within its walls. They then passed into Catana, which refused to admit them, and they proceeded to moor for the night at the river Terias. Next morning the squadron moved in a column towards Syracuse, having sent 10 ships forward to sail into the great harbour and see if the enemy had launched a fleet, and to proclaim that the Athenians were come to reinstate their allies and kinsmen the Leontines, and to invite those of them who were residing in Syracuse to join the fleet of their friends and benefactors. The 10 galleys then reconnoitred the city and harbours, and the neighbourhood which was likely to be the theatre of war, and the whole squadron returned to Catana.

Catana becomes an ally.—The Catanæans now held 51 an assembly, and refused to admit the fleet, but invited the generals to enter and state their wishes. Whilst Alcibiades was speaking and all the citizens listening, a body of Athenian soldiers broke through an ill-built postern, and proceeded unobserved to the market-place. The Catanæans in the Syracusan interest then secretly fled with alarm, whilst the rest voted an alliance with Athens, and invited the generals to transfer their camp to Catana, and the whole armament was then brought from Rhegium.

Camarina refuses to receive them: skirmish near 52 Syracuse.—Whilst the Athenians were at Catana, news was brought that Camarina would join them, and that Syracuse was manning a fleet. The whole Athenian force then coasted to Syracuse, and finding no navy preparing, proceeded to Camarina; but the inhabitants refused to receive more than one Athenian ship at a time, unless they sent for more. The Athenians then returned and made a descent upon the Syracusan territory, but were repulsed by some cavalry, with the loss of some light-armed stragglers.

Alcibiades recalled: fears at Athens of an oligarchy 53 or tyranny.—The Athenians then returned to Catana, where they found that the ship Salaminia had arrived, with orders to convey Alcibiades and some of his soldiers to Athens, to take their trial for mutilating the Mercuries



and profaning the mysteries. For after the armament had left Athens, investigations had been carried on in a suspicious spirit, and without testing the credibility of the informers. Many excellent citizens were thrown into prison on the accusations of unprincipled men, for the commons feared a renewal of the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons, and knew that it had been overthrown by the Lacedæmonians, and not by themselves and Harmodius.

*True Account of the Age of the Sons of Pisistratus, and Conspiracy of Harmodius and Aristogiton.* B. C. 514.

54 Theydides here relates the conspiracy of Aristogiton and Harmodius at large, in order to correct some popular errors of the Athenians.

Pisistratus having died at an advanced age, was succeeded in the tyranny by his eldest son Hippias, and not by Hipparchus, as is commonly reported. At this time, Aristogiton, a citizen of middle rank, was closely intimate with Harmodius, a youth distinguished by the comeliness of his person. Harmodius was grossly insulted by Hipparchus, and not only refused to listen to him, but also complained to Aristogiton, who, fearing lest the outrage should be aggravated, immediately designed the overthrow of the tyranny. Hipparchus was irritated at the conduct of Harmodius, yet would not proceed to open violence, but determined on secret revenge. Indeed, his government was mild and incited no envy nor hatred; and the sons of Pisistratus generally evinced both virtue and ability; and whilst they exacted only a twentieth part of the income of the Athenians, they beautified the city, carried on the wars, and provided the sacrifices; but though they governed Athens according to its ancient laws, yet they retained the offices in their own family.

56 Hipparchus now summoned the sister of Harmodius to bear a basket in a certain procession, hut on presenting herself, she was rejected, and told that she could not have been summoned, as she was unworthy of the honour. Harmodius was then exceedingly indignant, and Aristogiton more exasperated than ever. They consulted with but a few conspirators, for security's sake, but they hoped to be joined by numbers after striking the first blow; and they fixed on the great Panathenæa as the best day for their purpose, as on that festival the citizens carried their arms in the procession. The Panathenæa having arrived, Hippias, attended by his body-guard, was in the Ceramicus, without the walls, arranging the procession; when the two friends approached, armed with daggers, and saw one of their accomplices familiarly conversing with him, and thought themselves betrayed. They immediately de-

termined on avenging themselves on <sup>1</sup> man who had most aggrieved them, and rushing into the city, they met Hipparchus by the Leocorium, and quickly despatched him. Aristogiton at first escaped through the crowd, but was afterwards taken. Harmodius was slain on the spot. When Hippias heard the 58 news, he did not proceed to the scene of his brother's murder, but advanced with a composed countenance to the armed procession, and desired the men to leave their arms and retire to a certain spot. He then ordered his guards to remove the weapons, and picked out all the persons whom he suspected, and all who carried a concealed dagger, as shields and spears only were used in the procession.

The tyranny then became more severe than ever, and Hippias turned his eye to foreign states, to secure himself a retreat in case of a revolution. Though an Athenian, he married his daughter Archedice to Æantides, son of the tyrant of Lampsacus, because he saw that the Lampsacenes had great influence with Darius. There is a monument to Archedice, at Lampsacus, with this inscription:

“The bravest man of all his time in Greece,  
Hippias, has his daughter Archedice covered by this dust:  
Who, though her father, husband, brothers, sons, were kings,  
Yet was not puffed up to pride of heart.”

Hippias himself only retained the tyranny three years longer. In the fourth year he was deposed by the Lacedæmonians and the banished Alcæonidæ, and went under treaty to Sigeum, then to Æantides at Lampsacus, and from thence to Darius. Twenty years afterwards, when he was an old man, he accompanied the Medes, and was present at Marathon. Whilst he 54 was tyrant, his son Pisistratus, named after his grandfather, was archon; and, whilst in office, dedicated the altar of the twelve gods in the market-place, and also the altar in the temple of Apollo Pythius. The Athenians afterwards lengthened the altar in the market-place, and obliterated the inscription, but the letters on that in the Pythium, though faint, are still visible:

“This record of his rule, Pisistratus, son of Hippias,  
Set up in Pythian Apollo's sacred ground.”

That Hippias was the eldest son of Pisistratus, and succeeded 55 him in the tyranny, is thus proved. 1st, It was natural that the eldest should marry first, and he alone, of his legitimate brethren, appears to have had children. This is shown by the altar, and by the pillar set up in the Athenian citadel to commemorate the wrongs committed by the tyrants, which bears the name of no child of Thessalus or Hipparchus, but five sons of Hippias, who were born to him of Myrrhine. 2nd, Hippias is first mentioned on the pillar after his father. 3rd, Hippias could not have continued the tyranny if he had had to suc-



ceed to it and establish it on the same day that Hipparchus was killed. But by his habit of awing the citizens and attending to his mercenaries, he retained his sway with redoubled security, and was not like a younger brother unaccustomed to power; whilst Hipparchus, being remembered by his calamity, was afterwards reputed to have enjoyed the tyranny.

60 **An informer accuses many of having mutilated the Mercuris.**—The Athenians, remembering the acts of the Pisistratidæ, were suspicious of the mock celebration of the mysteries, and ascribed the late sacrileges to a conspiracy for establishing a tyranny or an oligarchy. Public severity and the number of arrests were increasing daily, when one of the prisoners who was most suspected was induced by another to make a confession, whether true or not is unknown; being persuaded that it was better to gain a certain pardon, and liberate the city from its present suspicion by his information, than to run the chances of a trial. Accordingly, he accused both himself and others of having mutilated the Mercuries, and the Athenians, rejoicing at having discovered what they thought to be the truth, immediately released the informer and the prisoners whom he had not accused, but brought those whom he had charged to trial, and executed all whom they seized, and offered a reward to whoever should kill those who had escaped.

61 **Increased suspicions of Alcibiades.**—The Athenians, having ascertained the fact concerning the Mercuries, now considered that the mock celebration of the mysteries in which Alcibiades was implicated was similarly connected with an intended overthrow of the democracy. At this time too a small Lacedæmonian force advanced to the isthmus in pursuance of some scheme with the Bœotians; but the Athenians attributed it to Alcibiades, and considered that if they had not obtained previous information, and arrested the party impeached, the latter would have betrayed the city to the enemy; and on one night the whole people slept in arms in the temple of Theseus within the walls. Moreover, the friends of Alcibiades at Argos were suspected of designing the overthrow of the Argive democracy; and the Athenians gave up those Argives whom they had deposited in the

islands (c. 8.) as a security for the democracy, and the Argive commons put them to death.

**Alcibiades escapes to the Peloponnesus.**—The Athenians thus sent the ship *Salaminia* to bring Alcibiades and others who were accused to Athens, with orders not to arrest him for fear of raising a commotion amongst the soldiers, but only to charge him to accompany the vessel home, and plead his defence. Alcibiades sailed away in his own ship with the other accused, and accompanied by the *Salaminia*; but on reaching *Thurii*, he and his companions went on shore and concealed themselves, fearing to take their trial whilst such prejudices existed against them. The crew of the *Salaminia*, after vainly searching for them, returned to Athens, and Alcibiades crossed from *Thurii* to the Peloponnesus, and sentence of death was passed at Athens upon him and those with him (c. 88).

**Minor operations of the Athenians in Sicily.**—After 62 the departure of Alcibiades, *Nicias* and *Lamachus* divided the armament into two squadrons, and one being given by lot to each general, the whole fleet sailed from head quarters at *Catana* to *Selinus* and *Segesta*. The generals wished to know whether the *Segestans* would pay the promised money, and to inspect the condition of the *Selinuntines*, and state of their differences with the *Segestans*. Keeping the land on their left, they coasted to *Himera*, the only Greek city in that part of Sicily, but not being received, they proceeded to *Hyccara*, a Sicilian town and petty sea-port, which was at war with the *Segestans*. Having taken *Hyccara*, they gave it to the *Segestans*, whose cavalry had now joined them, but they enslaved the inhabitants, with whom their fleet sailed back to *Catana*, whilst the army returned by land through the country of the *Sicels*. *Nicias* however coasted to *Segesta*, where he received only 30 talents [about £7200], but the slaves produced 120 talents [about £28,800]. The Athenians then sailed to their *Sicel* allies to urge them to send troops; and with half their forces they attempted to take *Hybla* in *Gela*, but failed.





VI. *Operations and Preparations during the Winter, chap. 63—93.*


63 <sup>Winter.</sup> **Syracusans emboldened.**—The Athenians now prepared to attack Syracuse, whilst the Syracusans set about marching against them. The first alarm of the Syracusans had given way to contempt, when they saw that the Athenians were moving to the more distant parts of Sicily, and had been repulsed at Hybla. They called upon their generals to lead them against Catana, since the enemy would not come to them; and their parties of horse who were sent to watch the Athenians would ride up to their camp, and insultingly ask them whether they had not come to settle themselves, rather than to reinstate the Leontines.

64 **Athenians by an artifice land their army at Syracuse.**—The Athenians now desired to draw the whole force of Syracusans from Syracuse, that they might then sail to the city by night, and take up a position there without being opposed by the enemy's cavalry. They had been informed of a situation near the Olympieum, which they afterwards occupied by some Syracusan exiles, and their generals now devised the following stratagem. They sent a Catanian, whom they knew to be faithful, but whom the Syracusans considered to be in their interest, to tell the latter that some of their partisans in Catana had formed a plan for destroying the Athenian armament. That the Athenians took up their night quarters within the city, and that if the Syracusans would march with their whole force so as to reach Catana by day-break, their Catanæan friends would shut the gates on the Athenian troops, and fire their ships, so that the Syracusans might easily master the camp and armament. The Syracusan generals believed this messenger, fixed a day for the march, and assembled the whole force of Syracusans and their allies—Selinuntines and others—who had come up; and they then set out for Catana, bivouacking on the river Symæthus in the Leontine territory. Meantime, the Athenians, learning their approach, had embarked all their forces, and sailing by night had reached Syracuse and landed oppo-

sito the Olympieum, about the same time in the morning that the Syracusan cavalry had ridden forward to Catana and discovered the stratagem. And whilst the cavalry rode back and informed the infantry, and the whole army were returning to Syracuse, the Athenians were enabled to pitch their camp in a favourable position, where they could commence an engagement when they pleased, and where they would be most protected from the enemy's horse.

**Fortify their position.**—The Athenians were flanked on one side by walls, houses, trees, and a marsh; and on the other by cliffs. They felled the trees, and made a palisade for their ships; erected a fort with rude stones at Dascon, which was their weakest point; and broke down the bridge of the Anapus. They were not interrupted in their preparations by any forces from the city; but at length the enemy's army returned, and first the Syracusan cavalry, and then the infantry, advanced near the Athenian camp; but as the Athenians did not go out, they withdrew and crossed the road, and bivouacked at Helorus for the night.

**Order of battle.**—The next day the Athenians prepared for battle, and the rival armies drew up in the following order:



Half the Athenian force was posted in advance, drawn up eight deep: the other half in a hollow square eight deep by the tents, with the camp following in the centre; and with orders to act as a reserve.

The Syracusans drew up their heavy infantry 16 deep. They had been chiefly reinforced by the Selinuntines, 200 Geloan cavalry, and 20 horse and 50 archers from Camarina.



## NICIAS EXHORTS THE ATHENIANS.

- 68 A fine Athenian force opposed to a rabble.—“What need is there for long exhortation? Our army will inspire more courage than words. For whilst we have Argives, Mantineans, Athenians, and the flower of the islanders, we ought to be certain of victory; especially as we are opposed to a promiscuous crowd of Siceliots, who may despise but cannot withstand us, for their skill is inferior to their courage. Remember however, that we are far from any friendly country except such as we may gain by our swords, and if we do not conquer, our retreat will be cut off by the enemy’s numerous cavalry.”
- 69 Defeat of the Syracusans.—Nicias now led on his army suddenly to the attack. Many of the Syracusans, not expecting an immediate engagement, had gone to the city, and in their hurried return were compelled to join any corps they came up with. For the Syracusans wanted neither daring nor zeal, but being deficient in skill they unwillingly lost their resolution. They now quickly advanced on the Athenians, and after a prelusive skirmish amongst the stone-throwers, slingers, and archers, which is usual with the light troops, the soothsayers brought forward the accustomed victims, and the trumpeters roused the heavy-armed to the charge. The Syracusans fought for their country, their personal safety, and future freedom; the Athenians for the territory of their enemies, knowing that their own would be weakened by defeat. The Argives and independent allies assisted the Athenians, that they might revisit their own country after victory; and the subject allies were zealous both for their immediate safety, which was hopeless unless they conquered, and with the expectation of serving on easier terms after aiding the Athenians in subjugating  
70 others. For a long time the rival armies withstood each other in close combat, but the Syracusans were fighting their first battle, and a heavy storm of rain, with thunder and lightning, served to disconcert them. The Argives drove in the Syracusans’ left wing, and the Athenians then repulsed their centre, the rest of the Syracusan army was broken and fled. But the Athenians were checked in the pursuit by the enemy’s horse, and returned and erected a trophy; whilst the Syracusans rallied

on the Helaine causeway, and sent a garrison to the Olympicum to guard the treasures.

Losses: Athenians winter at Naxos and Catana.— 71  
The Athenians did not assault the temple, but laying their dead on pyres they bivouacked on the ground. The next day the Syracusans recovered their dead—260—under a truce, and the Athenians collected the bones of their own slain, amounting to 50 men. The Athenians then sailed to Catana with their spoils, for it was now winter, and impossible to carry on the war with Syracuse without fresh cavalry from Athens and their Sicilian allies. They also wished to collect more money, and bring over some of the cities, and provide themselves with corn and necessaries for Syracuse in the spring; 72 and therefore wintered at Naxos and Catana.

Syracusans hold an assembly: encouraged by Hermocrates.—The Syracusans, after burying their dead, held an assembly; when Hermocrates, a man second to no one in wisdom, experienced in war, and of undoubted bravery, came forward and encouraged them. “It was not their spirit,” he said, “that had been vanquished, but their want of discipline that had done the mischief.” They had not been so inferior to the enemy as he had expected, considering that they were mere raw bunglers against consummate workmen. They had been much injured by having had fifteen generals, a multiplicity of orders, and insubordinate troops; but if they would only elect fewer generals, and prepare and drill their heavy-armed throughout the winter, they would be likely to vanquish the enemy. For they possessed courage, and might thus acquire discipline; and their courage would grow bolder when accompanied by discipline, and their discipline be increased by being practised in the midst of danger. Having then chosen a few generals, they should invest them with absolute authority, and swear to follow them; for thus secret measures might be concealed, and stores and equipments promptly furnished.

Follow Hermocrates, and send to Corinth and Lacedæmon.—The Syracusans then voted according to this advice, and chose three generals, viz. Hermocrates himself, 73



Heraclides, and Sicanus. They also sent envoys to Corinth and Lacedæmon to obtain succours and induce them to carry on more decided and open war with Athens, that she might be obliged either to withdraw her army from Sicily, or to refrain from sending fresh supplies.

74 Athenians fail in taking Messana.—The Athenians at Catana now sailed to Messana, (c. 50,) expecting it would be betrayed by a party within; but Alcibiades had treacherously divulged the attempt to the Syracusan party in Messana, who then put the accused to death, and prevented the Athenians from entering. The latter, after thirteen days of rough weather, found their provisions failing, and returned to Naxos, where they palisaded their camp and wintered, sending a trireme to Athens for money and cavalry.

75 Syracusans strengthen their defences, ravage Catana, and send to Camarina.—The Syracusans now, to prevent their being easily circumvallated in case of a defeat, raised a more extended city wall, fronting the whole way towards Epipolæ, and enclosing the Temenites. They also fortified Megara and Olympieum, and palisaded the sea-coast at all the landing-places. They then marched and ravaged Catana, and burnt the Athenian tents and encampments, and hearing that the Athenians had sent Euphemus and others to Camarina to win it over on the strength of the alliance concluded in the time of Laches, (c. 52, and iii. 86,) they sent a counter-embassy also, including Hermoerates. For they suspected the Camarinæans from their want of zeal in sending succours, and hoped, now that the Athenians had been victorious, that they would readily join them. An assembly of Camarinæans was then convened, and the rival ambassadors spoke thus:

SPEECH OF HERMOCRATES BEFORE THE CAMARINÆAN ASSEMBLY.

76 Inconsistency of the Athenians in professing to protect the Leontines.—“We are not come, Camarinæans, because we feared lest the Athenian forces should terrify you, but lest their words should seduce you. You have heard their pretext, but we all suspect their intention; and I believe they come not to

restore the Leontines, but to eject us. It is not consistent that they should subvert the cities in Greece, but re-settle those in Sicily; that they should enslave the Chalcidians in Eubœa, and yet care for the Chalcidian Leontines here. But they are attempting the same policy here by which they gained dominion there. For after these Athenians had been chosen leaders of the Ionians in Greece and Asia for defence against the Medæ, they subdued all their confederates, by charging some with having failed in military service, others with having indulged in mutual hostilities, and the remainder with any specious crimination they could devise. So that the Athenians did not withstand the Medæ to preserve the liberties of Greece, but to enslave it; whilst the Ionians only got a new master, and one more wise for evil.

Folly of the Siceliots if they listen to them.—“But we are not come to tell you how often Athens has committed injustice, for that you know already; but to blame ourselves, who, though we see the Greeks that have been enslaved for want of assisting each other, and the Athenians coming with similar sophistry of re-settling their Leontine kinsmen, and succouring their Segestan allies, in order to enslave us,—yet do not unite together, and show them that we are neither Ionians, Hellespontines, or islanders, who are always enslaved by the Medæ or some one else, but are free Dorians, from the independent Peloponnesus, inhabiting Sicily. Do we wait until we have been subdued, city by city, knowing, as we do, that thus only are we conquerable; and seeing them trying to set some of us at variance by words, others of us at war through hope of their alliance, and injuring others of us by cajoling speeches? Do we think that when our distant fellow-countrymen are destroyed, the danger will not reach us?”

The quarrel is not for the Syracusans only, but for all Sicily.—78  
“If any one thinks that the Syracusans alone are hostile to the Athenians, and that it is a hardship to incur danger for us, let him reflect, that he will fight for himself as well as for us, and with greater safety now that he has us for allies than after we have been ruined; and let him consider, that the Athenians do not so much care to chastise our enmity as to reduce the power of every state in the island, so that none shall have any alternative but to be the faithful ally of Athens. Moreover, if any man here, through envy, wishes Syracuse to be humbled, that it may learn moderation, but not utterly ruined, lest it should be unable to protect him, that man is wishing for a thing that is impossible. For he cannot be certain that fortune will accomplish his wishes, and may soon have to lament his own misfortunes, and wish that he could once again envy our prosperity; which will be impossible, if he refuse to join us in meeting a common danger; and whilst nominally preserving our power, he is, in reality, securing his own safety.

Camarinæans ought especially to join zealously in the defence.—“And you, Camarinæans, who, living on our borders, will



be the next to incur the danger, ought, instead of assisting us so coldly, to have come to us, and have aided us as you would wish us to have aided you, if the Athenians had first invaded

79 Camarina. Perhaps, however, through cowardice, you will pretend to act with fairness, and say that there is an alliance between you and the Athenians. But you did not conclude that alliance to hurt your friends, but to repel invaders. By it you are bound to help the Athenians when they are invaded, but not when they are the invaders. Even the Rhegians, although they are Chalcidians, have refused to join the Athenians in re-settling the Chalcidian Leontines; and it is strange if they can be wise from suspicion only, whilst you, with a reasonable pretext, choose to assist your natural enemies against your natural friends. You ought to stand by us, and if we all band together the Athenians will cease to be formidable. It is only our divisions that render them dangerous, and these it is their study to promote.

80 Not to attempt to remain neutral.—“You ought to join us more heartily, as succours will soon arrive from the Peloponnesus. Lay aside then the pretext of neutrality, for if the sufferer is ruined, you will, by standing aloof, have promoted injustice. It will be honourable for you to assist your kinsmen, guard the common interest of Sicily, and hinder the Athenians, your friends, forsooth, from doing wrong. But in short, we Syracusans say, that it is useless to tell you what you already know; but, if we fail to persuade you, we protest that we are plotted against by our perpetual enemies the Ionians, and are betrayed by you Dorians. And if the Athenians conquer us by your means, they alone will have the glory, and you will be rewarded by being made their slaves; whilst if we are conquerors, we shall punish you as the authors of our dangers, and exercise an enmity which shall not easily be appeased.”

81 REPLY OF EUPHEMUS, THE ATHENIAN.

82 Self-defence against the Dorians obliged the Athenians to acquire dominion.—“We came here to renew our former alliance, but as the Syracusan orator has attacked our right of dominion, we must prove to you that we hold it justly. Of this he has himself mentioned the greatest proof, when he asserted that the Ionians have always been hostile to the Dorians. Such is the case; and we as Ionians have always considered how best to free ourselves from subjection to the Dorians in Peloponnesus, who are superior to us in numbers. After the Median war we were in possession of a fleet, and threw off this supremacy, and being elected leaders of those Ionian states which had previously belonged to the Median king, we continued to retain our power, as we should thereby be least likely to fall under the Peloponnesians. Thus we have not unjustly subdued the Ionians and islanders whom the Syracusans say we enslaved in spite of their relationship; for they came against

us their parent state in company with the Medæ, and did not revolt and sacrifice their property as we did, but chose to be slaves themselves and bring slavery upon us. Therefore we are worthy of the empire we enjoy, because we supplied the largest fleet, and showed uncompromising zeal in the cause of Greece; and because our subject states had previously injured us, and we desired to gain strength against the Peloponnesians. We make no professions of justly enjoying our dominion because we overthrew the Barbarian, or faced danger for the liberty of the Ionians before that of ourselves and of all Greece. But it is right to provide for our own safety, and having come hither for our own security, we find that our interest in Sicily will be advantageous for you.

Our interest that you should be independent.—“We will then prove that our mutual interests will be the same, in spite of what the Syracusans said against us [viz. that the Athenians pretended to aid the Leontines, whilst their real object was the subjugation of all Sicily]. Such language may beguile you for a moment, but when you come to act you will follow your real interests. We have said that we hold our dominion through fear [of the Peloponnesian Dorians], and we are come here not to enslave any, but to prevent our friends [the Chalcidian Leontines] from being enslaved [by Syracusans, who are Dorians]. And let no one be suspicious of us because we seem so anxious to assist you; since he must know, that as long as you are preserved and enabled to resist the Syracusans, you will prevent their aiding the Peloponnesians against us. It is thus reasonable that we should re-settle the Leontines, not like their kinsmen in Eubœa, but in as powerful a condition as possible, that they may annoy the Syracusans, on whose territory they border. But at home we are ourselves a full match for our enemies, and it is best for us to keep the Chalcidians in Eubœa without an armament, but oblige them to furnish money.

Expediency the ruling motive.—“To kings or governments nothing is inconsistent that is profitable, and no one is a kinsman who cannot be relied on; friend or foe you must be according to circumstances. Here it is our interest to strengthen our friends against our enemies; and we govern our allies according as they are useful. We permit the Chians and Methymnæans to be independent on condition of furnishing ships; others we oblige to furnish money; some we allow to be at complete liberty though they are islanders, and easily to be reduced, because they are favourably situated round the Peloponnesus. We wish to act on the same principle in Sicily and to check the power of the Syracusans, who wish you to unite with them in repelling us, that after we are gone, they may obtain dominion over you. The ground on which you urged us to assist you before was, that if we suffered you to fall under the Syracusans, we ourselves should be in danger. You ought then to be persuaded by the same argument by





which you tried to persuade us, and to mistrust these men. You need not be suspicious of our large armament, for we could not remain here without your support; and if we were base enough to subjugate you, the length of the voyage, and the difficulty of keeping guard over great cities well provided, would prevent our keeping you under dominion. On the other hand, the Syracusans possess a great city with a larger force than our present armament, and are always plotting against you, letting no opportunity slip, as in the case of the Leontines. And now they treat you as fools, and exasperate you against us, who have hitherto preserved Sicily from their clutches. But we beg you not to betray our mutual interests, and to consider that they without allies have always a ready access to you, while you will be rarely able to defend yourselves with so large an auxiliary force, of which, should you suffer it to depart without effect, you will one day wish to see the smallest portion, when its coming could do you no good.

87 Turn our interference to your own account.—“We have now told you the whole truth. We exercise dominion in Greece to prevent our being enslaved, and we vindicate liberty in Sicily that we may not be injured. We are compelled to meddle in many things because we have to guard against many things, but we only come now as before, after being invited. Do not attempt then to divert us from our purpose, but rather turn our intermeddling to your own advantage, and believe that it is even beneficial to the majerity of the Greeks; for it has often deterred the unjust from acts of encroachment by the fear of our vengeance, and supported the injured with the hope of our assistance. Do not therefore reject this security, but unite with us, and instead of always watching the Syracusans, take your turn in plotting against them.”

88 Camarinæans remain neutral.—The Camarinæans were well disposed towards the Athenians, and only dreaded their subjugation of Sicily; whilst they had always hated the Syracusans in the spirit of borderers. Being however most afraid of the Syracusans, they had at the first only sent them a small body of horse, and resolved to aid them for the future as little as possible. On the present occasion, not wishing to offend the victorious Athenians, they replied; that “since there was a war between their allies, they thought it most consistent with their oaths to aid neither party.”

Athenians gain over some Sicels: send to Carthage and Tyrrhenia.—The Athenians at Naxos now negotiated with the Sicels. The tribes in the plains were

subject to the Syracusans, and kept aloof, but those in the interior were independent, and mostly joined the Athenians, who brought corn and money. The Athenians then forced some of the Sicels in the plains to join them, but the Syracusans sent garrisons to protect the rest. During the winter they moved from Naxos to Catania, and re-erected their camp which the Syracusans had burnt (c. 75). They also sent a trireme to Carthage with proposals of friendship, and another to Tyrrhenia, where some cities had offered to join in the war.

Syracusans reach Corinth and proceed to Sparta.—The Syracusan ambassadors, (c. 73,) having endeavoured as they coasted along to persuade the Italian-Greeks to espouse their cause, at length reach Corinth. Here they delivered an address, when the Corinthians voted to send them most zealous assistance, and despatched envoys with them to Lacedæmon.

Assisted by Alcibiades.—Meantime Alcibiades and his fellow-exiles, (c. 61,) having crossed from Thuria to Cyllene in Elis, proceeded to Lacedæmon under treaty, as he was afraid of his share in the Mantinean business, (v. 45,) and now joined in the request of the Corinthian and Syracusan envoys. The ephors and authorities then determined upon sending ambassadors to urge the Syracusans to make no terms with Athens, but declined sending succours, when Alcibiades exasperated and stimulated them by the following address :

#### SPEECH OF ALCIBIADES.

I was your enemy because you preferred my enemies.—“I must remove your suspicions of me, that they may not prejudice my counsels. My ancestors having ceased to be your Proxeni, I wished to resume the office, and paid you many attentions, especially in the affair at Pylus, (v. 43,) but you negotiated your peace with Athens, through my enemies, and brought dishonour upon me (v. 18, 19, 23, 24). It was therefore a just revenge when I turned to the Mantineans and Argives, and opposed you; and let those who suffered then and were angry with me, now see the matter in its true light.

Upheld democratic principles because they belonged to my country.—“You may also suspect me because I have espoused the cause of democracy, but my family have ever been foes to tyrants, and those who are opposed to a dominant faction are



called democrats, whence it is that we have become the leaders of the people. Besides, the Athenian state was a democracy, and it was generally necessary for us to follow its institutions. But we have endeavoured to moderate the intemperate spirit of the people, though there were others who have hurried them into the worst measures, and who brought about my banishment. We however thought it right to preserve the established form of government, under which Athens was most great and free, though all of us who had any sense knew what democracy was, and I myself perhaps better than any one. But of an acknowledged absurdity nothing new could be said, and yet it would have been dangerous to have changed it whilst you were arrayed against us.

90 Athens intends Sicily as a stepping-stone to the Peloponnesus.—“But now to the subject of our deliberation. We sailed to Sicily in the first place to subdue the Siceliot, then the Italiot, and then Carthage and her territories. If all or most of these schemes proved successful, we then purposed to bring hither all our forces there, and take many Iberians and others, who are the most warlike Barbarians of the present day, into our pay. We should also have built many additional triremes, as Italy contains abundance of timber, and then blockade the Peloponnesus with our fleet, whilst our army invaded it at the Isthmus. And thus, after taking some cities and walling others, we hoped to reduce the whole, and enjoy the sovereignty of Greece; whilst our recent conquests would have afforded an amply supply of money and provisions, independent of our present revenues.

91 Send heavy-armed to Syracuse under a Spartan, and fortify Decelea in Attica.—“You have now heard the real objects of the Sicilian expedition, from the man who knows them most accurately, and the remaining generals will carry them out if they can. The Sicilian states will be unable to oppose the Athenians unless you assist them; for whilst the Siceliot, though untrained, might be victorious if united, yet the Syracusans alone, defeated as they have already been, and hemmed in by sea, will be unable to hold out. If Syracuse is taken, the whole of Sicily will be reduced and Italy must follow; and the danger mentioned will then fall upon you. You are not then deliberating about Sicily alone, but about the Peloponnesus also, unless you speedily send a body of heavy-armed troops to Sicily, with a Spartan commander to discipline her present forces, and compel those who are unwilling to serve. You will thus encourage your friends and bring over those who are wavering. You must also carry on most decided hostilities here, that the Syracusans may be assured of your interest, and offer the greater resistance, and Athens be unable to send reinforcements. For this purpose you must fortify Decelea in Attica, a blow which the Athenians most dread, and the only one they have not experienced in the present war. The chief advantages of this measure will be, that the live and dead stock

of the country will fall into your hands, and you will deprive the Athenians of their revenues from the Laurium silver mines, their land taxes, and their judicial fines, and their allies will be more dilatory in paying up their revenues when they see that you are vigorously prosecuting the war.

Strange counsel from me, but Athens is no more my country.—92  
“I now beg, Lacedæmonians, that you will not suspect my sincerity, because, though once a patriot, I am now attacking my country, for, though an exile, I have not been banished from your service. I am not hostile to you who only hurt your enemies, but to them who made enemies of their friends I am endeavouring to make my country such as that I may again return to it, and such a one I consider to be a true patriot. I entreat you then fearlessly to command my services, knowing that if as an enemy I did you great injury, as a friend I can do you great good, for I know the plans of the Athenians whilst I can only guess yours. And I beg you, feeling that you are consulting your greatest interests, not to shrink from the expedition both against Sicily and Attica, and whilst you thus preserve the states of Sicily, and overthrow the present and future power of Athens, you will establish your own security, and enjoy a supremacy over all Greece, founded not on force, but on affection.”

Lacedæmonians follow Alcibiades; send Gylippus to 93  
Sicily.—The Lacedæmonians had previously determined on taking the field against Athens, but were yet hesitating when Alcibiades reanimated them with these authentic particulars. They now turned their thoughts to fortifying Decelea, and succouring Syracuse. They appointed Gylippus, son of Cleandridas, commander-in-chief of the Syracusans, with directions to consult both with the Syracusan and the Corinthian ambassadors upon the speedy transportation of a large auxiliary force to Sicily. Gylippus then desired the Corinthians to send 2 ships to Asine, on the Messenian coast, and to equip the rest as soon as possible.

Ship from Sicily obtains supplies from Athens.—Meantime the trireme which the Athenian generals in Sicily had sent for money and cavalry, (c. 74,) reached Athens, and the Athenians resolved on sending the required supplies.



VII. *Successful Operations of the Athenians before Syracuse, chap. 94—105.*

94 <sup>18th Year.</sup>  
<sup>B. C. 414—</sup>  
<sup>Summer.</sup> **Petty operations of the Athenians in Sicily.**—In the beginning of spring, the Athenians in

Sicily coasted from Catana towards the Sicilian Megara, whose inhabitants the Syracusans had expelled [B. C. 480] in the time of Gelo, 245 years after the establishment of the colony (c. 4). The Athenians now ravaged the country and attacked a Syracusan fort, but without success. They then proceeded with their land and sea forces to the river Terias, and wasted the plain of the Leontines, and fired their corn; and after defeating a small body of Syracusans, they erected a trophy, and sailed back to Catana. Here they took provisions, and marched in full force against the Sicel town of Centoripa, which capitulated; and having burnt the corn of the Inessæans and Hyblæans, they returned to Catana, where they found that 250 cavalry, 30 horsebowmen, and 300 silver talents [£72,000] had arrived from Athens, but the men had been sent without horses, which were to be procured in Sicily.

95 **War between Lacedæmon and Argos.**—This summer the Lacedæmonians marched against Argos, as far as Cleonæ, but retired on account of an earthquake (c. 7). The Argives then invaded the bordering territory of Thyrea, and took booty from the Lacedæmonians, which sold for 25 talents [£6000].

**Failure of revolution at Thespiæ.**—This summer the Thespiæans attacked those in office, but some Theban succours, having arrived, took some prisoners, and others fled to Athens.

96 **Syracusans guard Epipolæ.**—Meantime the Syracusans heard that the Athenians had been reinforced by cavalry, and were about to march against them. They were now aware that the Athenians could not easily circumvallate Syracuse, even if victorious in battle, unless they took Epipolæ, a precipitous height, immediately above Syracuse. Accordingly, the Syracusans prepared to guard the approaches, by which alone the enemy could gain the heights without observation, for the side facing

the city slopes down to it, and is always visible. Hermodrates and his two colleagues then held a review of the Syracusan heavy-armed in the meadow, on the banks of the Anapus, and selected 600 under the command of Diomilus, an Andrian exile, to guard Epipolæ.

**Athenians surprise Epipolæ.**—But the same day of 97 this review, the Athenians also were reviewing their troops on the shore, west of Thapsus. For on the previous night they had coasted from Catana with all their armament, and landed their forces opposite to Leon, about 6 or 7 stadia [nearly a mile] from Epipolæ, and anchored their ships at the neighbouring peninsula of Thapsus, protecting the fleet by throwing a stockade across the narrow isthmus. The Athenian land forces, therefore, hastened to Epipolæ, and ascended it on the side of Eurycles, before the Syracusans, in the meadow, perceived their approach. On leaving it, the latter, including Diomilus and his 600 men, hurried against them, but Epipolæ was 25 stadia [more than 3 miles] from the meadow, and on reaching the enemy in great disorder they were defeated, and returned to Syracuse with the loss of Diomilus and 300 of his troops. The Athenians erected a trophy and restored the Syracusans their dead under a truce, and the next day marched against Syracuse; but the enemy not coming out, they retired and built a fort on Labdalum, on the highest point of Epipolæ, looking towards Megara, to be a magazine for their baggage and treasures.

**Athenians commence the circumvallation: defeat 98 Syracusans.**—Soon after, the Athenians were reinforced by 300 cavalry from Segesta, and 100 from the Sicels, Naxians, and others; and having received some horses from Segesta and Catana, and purchased others for the 250 horsemen from Athens, they mustered altogether 650 cavalry. They then garrisoned Labdalum and advanced to Syca, and commenced the central point of their wall of circumvallation. The Syracusans, dismayed at the rapidity of the building, marched out to give them battle, but when the two armies were drawn up, the Syracusan generals saw that their forces did not fall well into line, and led them back to the city. They, however, left



behind a body of horse, who prevented the Athenians from bringing up their stones, until a charge of all the Athenian cavalry and one tribe of heavy infantry routed the party, and afterwards erected a trophy.

99 **Syracusans raise a counter-work and palisade.**—Next day part of the Athenians were building the wall to the north of the central point, whilst others collected stones and timber, and laid them along the line of its intended course, which was to connect by the shortest compass the Great Harbour with the Trogilian Port. Meanwhile the Syracusans, by the advice of Hermocrates, would not risk another engagement, but determined on building a wall, which should cross the Athenian works. They thus hoped to interrupt the enemy's lines, and if the Athenians ceased from the work and attacked them in full force, they could send out one division to meet them, and employ the other in palisading the approaches. They accordingly erected a cross wall below the Athenian lines, and built wooden towers with olive-trees which they cut in the sacred grove; and as they still commanded the sea-shore, the Athenians were compelled to obtain their provisions by land from Thapsus.

100 **Again defeated by the Athenians.**—The Athenians however did not interfere in the erection, but hurried to complete their own wall of circumvallation. When the Syracusans had carried their wall and palisade as far as they considered necessary, they left one tribe to guard them and returned into the city. Meantime the Athenians had cut off the pipes which supplied Syracuse with water; and now seeing that the main body of the Syracusan guard were in their tents at noon, and those posted at the palisade were keeping but a careless look-out, they appointed 300 chosen troops and some picked light infantry armed for the purpose, to surprise the counter-works, whilst their main army advanced in two divisions, one under one general to prevent a rescue from the city, and the other under the other general to hasten to the stockade which covered the postern gate [opening into the newly enclosed quarter of Apollo Temenites, (c. 75,) and to which the guard at the counter-works would probably run if defeated by the 300 troops]. Accordingly

the 300 picked men assaulted and took the counter-works, whilst the guard rushed into the stockade round the postern of the Temenites, (c. 75,) followed in by their pursuers and second division of the main army,\* but the latter were driven out again by the Syracusans with the loss of a few Athenians and Argives. The whole Athenian army then returned, threw down the enemy's counter-wall, and tore up the palisades and transferred them to their own lines.

**Syracusans again defeated: Lamachus slain.**—The 101 next day the Athenians set out from the part of their line they had completed on Epipolæ, and began to work at the cliffs beyond the marsh looking towards the Great Harbour. Meantime the Syracusans began again to interrupt their line by carrying a palisade and a ditch across the marsh and nearer the shore, to prevent the Athenians from carrying their wall to the sea. But when the Athenians had completed their works on the cliff, they ordered their fleet to sail from Thapsus into the Great Harbour, whilst they themselves descended at day-break from Epipolæ, and crossed the marsh on planks and doors laid where the mud was firmest, and in the morning carried the ditch and nearly all the palisade, and afterwards took the remaining portion. A battle ensued, in which the Athenians were victorious, the Syracusan right wing flying to the city, and the left taking to the river Anapus. The 300 chosen Athenians then pressed on to the bridge to intercept the passage of the flying left, who however closed on the 300 and drove them back on the Athenian right wing, throwing the tribe posted first on the wing, into a panic. Lamachus, who was in the left wing, then came to the assistance of the right with the Argives and a few archers, but having crossed a ditch in advance, he was surrounded and slain, with five or six of his followers. The Syracusans immediately snatched up their bodies and escaped over the river, for the rest of the Athenians were coming up.

**Syracusans try to take Epipolæ.**—Meantime the Syra- 102 cusan right wing, which had fled to the city, rallied, and drawing up its forces sent off a detachment to attempt to

\* See Arnold's note.





take the unguarded Athenian lines on Epipolæ. The detachment took and destroyed an outwork 10 plethra [about 1000 feet] long, but Nicias, who had been left behind from illness, saved the lines themselves, by ordering the camp followers to set fire to the engines and timber in the intervening space. The flames stopped the advance of the Syracusans, and a reinforcement of the Athenians having repulsed the enemy below, came up to save the lines; whilst at the same time the Athenian fleet entered the Great Harbour from Thapsus, and the whole Syracusan forces above and below were compelled to retire to the city. The Athenians then erected a trophy, returned the enemy's dead under a truce, and received back Lamachus and those who had fallen with him.

103

**Athenians circumvallate Syracuse, which treats for peace.**—The Athenians with all their forces, army and navy, then circumvallated Syracuse down to the sea with a double wall. They now received provisions from all parts of Italy, and many of the Sicels came over as allies, and they were also joined by three fifty-oared galleys from Tyrrhenia. On the other hand, the Syracusans despaired of receiving assistance from the Peloponnesus, and began to propose terms of capitulation to Nicias; but nothing was concluded, for they had suspicions amongst themselves; and ascribing their reverses to the treachery or bad fortune of their generals, they deposed them, and chose Heraclides, Euclides, and Tellias in their room.

104 **Movements of Gylippus.**—Meantime Gylippus, having manned two Laconian ships at Asine, (c. 93,) was joined by two others from Corinth, under Pythen. With these he sailed to Leucas, where he heard false rumours that Syracuse was entirely circumvallated. Gylippus then despaired of saving Sicily, but wishing to preserve Italy, he and Pythen sailed with their four vessels to Tarentum, whilst the Corinthians fitted out ten of their own galleys, two Leucadians, and three from Ambracia. From Tarentum Gylippus went to Thuria, which he hoped to bring over, as his father had been a citizen; but having failed, he departed, and coasted along Italy. When opposite the Tarentine Gulf, a storm carried him out to sea, and he reached Tarentum with difficulty, and there

refitted his ships. Nicias, like the Thurians, despised the smallness of the squadron of Gylippus, and, looking upon it as a piratical expedition, he kept no watch on its movements.

**Athenians ravage Laconian coast: treaty broken.**—105 About the same time the Lacedæmonians and their allies invaded and ravaged Argolis, when the Athenians sent 30 ships to assist the Argives as their allies, which broke the treaty in a most decisive manner. The Athenians had previously joined the Argives and Mantineans in plundering expeditions from Pylus, and had landed on the Peloponnesian coasts without touching Laconia; but they now, under the command of Pythodorus, Laspodias, and Demaratus, ravaged Epidaurus, Limera, Præsia, and other places, thus furnishing the Lacedæmonians with a more plausible reason for going to war. When the 30 Athenian ships had sailed home, and the Lacedæmonians left Argolis, the Argives invaded and ravaged Phliasia, and slew many of the inhabitants.

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## BOOK VII.

DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENTS IN SICILY. B. C. 414, 413.

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### ANALYSIS.

#### I. *Successes of the Athenians checked by Gylippus.*

**Eighteenth year, B. C. 414—Summer, continued.**—Gylippus arrives at Sicily.—News reaches Syracuse.—Gylippus ascends Epipolæ.—Summons Athenians to evacuate Sicily, and takes Labdalum.—Syracusans commence a new counter-work.—Nicias occupies Plemyrion, and sends to intercept the Corinthian fleet.—Gylippus defeated, but blames himself.—Syracusans victorious, and intercept the Athenian lines.—Reinforced, and prepare for a naval fight.—Nicias sends to Athens. Chap. 1—8.


§ Athenians fail in retaking Amphipolis.

Chap. 9.

#### II. *Both sides send for Reinforcements.*

Winter.—Nicias's despatches reach Athens.

Chap. 10.



*Letter of Nicias to the Athenians.* Gylippus has completely changed our position.—The Syracusans are being reinforced, whilst our ships are leaky and crews wasting.—You must either recall or reinforce us.—I must resign the command. Chap. 11—15.

Athenians refuse to recall Nicias: vote fresh supplies of forces and money.—Athenians and Corinthians fit out counter-squadrons.—Lacedæmonians prepare to invade Attica, and to fortify Decelea. Chap. 16—18.

### III. Losses of the Athenians before the arrival of Demosthenes.

Nineteenth year, B. C. 413—Summer.—Peloponnesians occupy Decelea.—Send troops to Sicily.—Athenians send 30 ships to Peloponnesus.—Second Sicilian expedition, under Demosthenes.—Gylippus and Hermocrates urge the Syracusans to a sea-fight.—Syracusans take Plemyrion, but are defeated by sea.—Athenians inconvenienced by the loss of Plemyrion.—Agathareus sent out from Syracuse.—Athenians attempt to destroy the Syracusan stockade.—Syracusans send for succour before Eurymedon arrives.—Demosthenes occupies a port in Laconia.—Thracian mercenaries reach Athens, but sent back: energy of the Athenians.—Thracians surprise and sack Mycælessus.—Overtaken by the Thebans.—Operations of Demosthenes: joined by Eurymedon.—Reinforcement proceeding to Syracuse loses 800 out of 2300 men.—Other reinforcements reach Syracuse.—Demosthenes and Eurymedon reach Thurium.—Drawn battle between the Athenian and Corinthian fleet.—Demosthenes and Eurymedon advance to Rhegium.—Syracusans improve their ships: attack the Athenians by land and sea.—A drawn battle.—Athenian fleet defeated.—Demosthenes and Eurymedon reach Syracuse. Chap. 19—42.

### IV. Gradual Destruction of the Athenian Armaments.

Athenians resolve to attack Epipolæ.—Grand night attack: Athenians at first successful, but are at length repulsed with great slaughter.—Syracusans send for fresh reinforcements.—Athenians distressed; Demosthenes urges a retreat.—Opposed by Nicias.—Demosthenes and Eurymedon unwillingly give way.—Syracusans prepare for an attack: Athenians would retreat, but stopped by an eclipse.—General attack by the Syracusans; repulsed by land, but victorious at sea: Eurymedon slain.—Utter dependency of the Athenians.—Syracusans prepare to cut off the retreat of the Athenians.—Number of the allies on each side.—Syracusans close the Great Harbour.—Athenians prepare to force a passage. Chap. 43—60.

*Speech of Nicias to his army.* We must not be disheartened.—We have introduced various new contrivances to insure a victory.—Both soldiers and seamen to do their duty.—Allies to remember the honour and benefits they have derived from us.—Athenians to remember that their all is at stake to-day. Chap. 61—64.

Syracusans counteract the Athenian inventions. Chap. 65.

*Speech of Gylippus and the Syracusan generals to their soldiers.* Our past victories an earnest of our present success.—We have provided ourselves against their new devices.—Fight then for vengeance, and secure freedom for Sicily. Chap. 66—68.

Nicias commits the fleet to Demosthenes, and remains on the shore with the land forces.—Obstinate and decisive battle in the Great Harbour: Athenians totally defeated.—Refuse to make another attempt by sea.—Stratagem of Hermocrates to prevent their retreating by land.—Athenians delay their retreat: Syracusans block up the roads.—Athenians commence their retreat.—Energy of Nicias. Chap. 69—76.

*Speech of Nicias to his afflicted army.* We may yet be saved by firmness and activity in our retreat. Chap. 77.

Athenians harassed by the Syracusans, who occupy a position in front.—Athenians fail to force the position.—Athenians steal a night march and reach Erineus.—Syracusans overtake the division under Demosthenes.—Division under Demosthenes lay down their arms.—Nicias refuses to capitulate.—Dreadful slaughter by the Assinarus.—Nicias surrenders.—Nicias and Demosthenes executed.—Sufferings of the Athenian prisoners in the quarries. Chap. 78—87.

## SUMMARY.

### I. Successes of the Athenians checked by Gylippus, chap. 1—9.

**Gylippus reaches Sicily.**—Gylippus and Pythen, after refitting their ships at Tarentum, coasted to Loeri Epizephyrii, and there learnt that Syracuse was not completely circumvalated, (vi. 104,) and that it was still possible for an army to enter it on the side of Epipolæ. They then deliberated whether they should make directly for Syracuse, or should sail to Himera, and then proceed by land with such Himeraeans and others as chose to join them. They decided on the latter course, but meantime Nicias, hearing they were at Loeri, had sent 4 galleys to arrest their progress. But before this squadron reached Rhegium, Gylippus and Pythen touched at Rhegium and Messana, and arrived at Himera. Here they left their ships, and prevailed on the Himeraeans to furnish arms for the crews and to join in the expedition. They also directed the Selinuntines to meet them at an appointed place with all their forces. The Geloans and many of

18th Year.  
B. C. 414—  
Summer,  
continued.



the Sicel tribes were also ready to join them, especially as the Sicel king, Archonidas, who was a friend to the Athenians, had recently died, and Gylippus had come from Lacedæmon in a zealous spirit. The forces of Gylippus now included 700 seamen and Epibata; [i. e. armed marines,] 1000 heavy and light Himeræan infantry, and 100 cavalry, some Selinuntine cavalry and light infantry, a few Geloans, and 1000 Sicels, and with these he marched against Syracuse.

2 **News reaches Syracuse: Gylippus ascends Epipolæ.**—Meantime the Corinthian ships had left Leucas, (vi. 104,) and one of their commanders, Gongylus, whose vessel was the last that put to sea, reached Syracuse first. Gongylus found the Syracusans about to hold an assembly for terminating the war, but he reassured them with news of the approach of the fleet and coming of Gylippus. The Syracusans then went out in full force to meet Gylippus, who, on his way, had taken Jetæ, a Sicel fortress, and drawing up his troops for battle, had reached Epipolæ, mounting on the side of Euryelus (vi. 97). He now, in company with the Syracusans, advanced against the Athenian lines. The moment was critical, for the Athenians had finished a double wall, 7 or 8 stadia long, [nearly a mile,] which almost reached the Great Harbour, and had laid stones nearly all the way on the other side to Trogilus, so that some points were completed and others half finished.

3 **Summons Athenians to evacuate Sicily and takes Labdalum.**—The Athenians were at first in consternation, but quickly drew up for battle. But Gylippus halted near, and sent a herald to offer them permission to leave Sicily within five days with all their baggage and property. The Athenians sent no reply, and Gylippus, seeing the Syracusans in confusion, drew off his forces into more open ground; but as the Athenians did not advance from their own wall, he retired to the Temenites for the night. Next morning he drew up the greater part of his forces in front of the Athenian walls, to prevent the enemy from relieving any other quarter, and then sent a detachment against Labdalum, who took the fort, which was not within view of the Athenian intrenchments, and

slew all the garrison. The same day the Syracusans took an Athenic trireme, as it lay off their port.

**Syracusans commence a new counter-work.**—The 4 Syracusans and allies now commenced building a single wall running from their city along Epipolæ, in a cross direction, to interrupt the progress of the Athenian circumvallation, for the Athenians, having completed their wall to the sea, were now proceeding upwards. Gylippus also marched by night against a weak point in the enemy's lines, but the Athenians who were bivouacking on the outside advanced to meet him, and he retired. The Athenians then raised the wall higher, guarded this point, and manned the rest of the works.

**Nicias occupies Plemyrion, and sends to intercept the Corinthian fleet.**—Nicias now determined to fortify Plemyrion, a headland opposite to Syracuse, which narrows the mouth of the Great Harbour on the south side. He thus hoped to obtain supplies and blockade the Great Harbour with more ease. Accordingly he crossed over with his ships and part of his troops, and erected three forts on Plemyrion, in which he deposited most of his stores. Here he also anchored his large transports and fast sailers, but his crews being obliged to go to a distance for their wood and water, were continually being cut off by the enemy's horse, a third part of the Syracusan cavalry being posted at Olympieum. Meanwhile Nicias sent 20 vessels to lie in wait for the rest of the Corinthian fleet\* about Loeri, Rhegium, and the approaches to Sicily (c. 2).

**Gylippus defeated, but blames himself.**—Gylippus 5 still continued the counter-wall across Epipolæ, using the stones which the Athenians had prepared for their own circumvallation, and covering the workmen by continually presenting a line of battle to the enemy. At length he commenced an attack, but the rival armies fought between the walls, where the Syracusan cavalry was useless. He was thus defeated, and obtained his dead under a truce, whilst the Athenians erected a trophy; but he

\* Now consisting of 12 ships (c. 7): 15 ships had been prepared (vi. 104); of these Gylippus had 2, (vi. 104,) and Gongylus had 1 (vii. 2).



collected his army, and said that "the fault was his and not theirs, for he had chosen a spot where their cavalry and dart-men could not act, but that he would lead them again to the charge." And he begged them to be assured of their superiority, and not, Peloponnesians and Dorians as they were, to suffer Ionians, islanders, and a mixed rabble of men to drive them out of the country.

6 **Syracusans victorious and intercept the Athenian lines.**—Gylippus at length chose an opportunity for again offering battle, and as the Syracusan counter-works had all but passed the Athenian lines, Nicias advanced to meet him. Gylippus now led his heavy-armed farther beyond the walls than before, and engaged the Athenians after posting his cavalry and dart-men in an open space on their flank. His cavalry charged and routed the left wing of the Athenians, whose whole army was then defeated and driven within their lines. Next night the Syracusans carried their counter-wall beyond the enemy's works, and thus prevented the Athenians from completing the circumvallation even if masters of the field.

7 **Reinforced, and prepare for a naval fight.**—After this the 12 remaining ships of the Corinthians, Leucadians, and Ambraciots, (c. 4,) under Erasimides a Corinthian, eluded the Athenian guard force, (c. 4,) and sailed into the harbour and joined the Syracusans in finishing their counter-works. Gylippus then set out to the rest of Sicily to raise fresh forces for land and sea, and to bring over such cities as had been neutral or inactive. And as the Athenians were sending home for reinforcements, Syracusan and Corinthian ambassadors were also despatched to Corinth and Lacedæmon to request that another army might be transported to Sicily. The Syracusans too began to man and practise a fleet.

8 **Nicias sends to Athens.**—Nicias now, seeing the enemy's strength and his own difficulties increasing, sent to Athens, thinking that there was no hope for safety unless his army was either recalled or very largely reinforced. He had frequently sent messengers before, but fearing that through incapacity of speaking, deficiency in sense, or a desire to please the multitude, they had not reported

the whole facts of the case, he now despatched a letter, and engaged himself in precautionary measures.

**Athenians fail in retaking Amphipolis.**—At the close 9 of the summer, Evetion, an Athenian general, in concert with Perdiceas, attempted to take Amphipolis with a large body of Thracians, but failed. He then blockaded the city from the river by bringing some triremes into the Strymon.

## II. *Both sides send for Reinforcements, chap. 10—18.*

**Nicias's despatches reach Athens.**—The 10 messengers from Nicias now reached Athens, <sup>Winter.</sup> and after stating what they had been ordered, and answering questions, they delivered the letter, which the secretary of state then read.


### LETTER OF NICIAS TO THE ATHENIANS.

11

Gylippus has completely changed our position. — "You have been informed of our former operations, Athenians, but now it is especially seasonable that you should know our present position.

"After we had frequently defeated the Syracusans and built our walls, Gylippus arrived here with an army of Peloponnesians and Siceliots, and though he was beaten back in the first battle, yet the next day we were driven to our walls by numerous cavalry and dart-men. We are now forced to cease from our works, and are lying still, for the guarding of our lines has exhausted our heavy-armed; whilst the enemy has carried a single wall past us, and we cannot invest him unless we have a large force and take his counter-work. We are thus the besieged rather than besiegers, as the enemy's cavalry prevent our going far into the country.

The Syracusans are being reinforced, whilst our ships are leaky 12 and crews wasting.—"The Syracusans have sent ambassadors to the Peloponnesians for reinforcements, and Gylippus is gone to the cities of Sicily to raise fresh forces for their army and navy, as they intend to attempt our walls by land, and attack us also by sea. This last may appear incredible, but they are aware that our crews are wasted, and that our ships, though at first in fine condition, are now become leaky from long service. Nor can we careen our vessels, for the enemy, who is equal or superior to us in numbers and in constant training, is continually threatening us with an attack; and thus, whilst they can advance upon us when they please, and can easily dry their own ships from their not having to watch ours, we dare not haul up our own, but are compelled 13 to keep guard with our whole force, lest our supplies of neces-





saries should be cut off. As it is, these supplies are obtained at the cost of our crews; for as our seamen have to fetch wood, forage, and water from some distance, they are frequently cut off by the enemy's cavalry (c. 4); our servants also, being brought to an equality with us, are deserting; the foreigners whom we pressed are likewise departing to their several cities; and those who were allured to us by high pay and hopes of plunder, seeing the enemy's resistance, are now either going over to the Syracusans, or escaping into the interior of Sicily; whilst others have undermined our navy by persuading their captains to take on board Hlyccaric slaves in their stead, whilst they themselves are engaged in traffic; and moreover, you know that an armament remains only a short time in the height of vigour, and that there are few who can get a ship under weigh or keep time in rowing.

14 "But the worst thing of all is, that I, their general, cannot stop their abuses, for Athenian tempers are difficult to command; and that we cannot recruit our crews, which the enemy are doing from many quarters, whilst both what we keep and what we expend must be taken from what we brought with us. Our allies, Naxos and Catana, are powerless; and if the Italian cities, which at present supply us with provisions, should go over to the enemy, we should be starved into surrendering, and the war would be concluded without another battle.

You must either recall or reinforce us; I must resign.—"I might have found matter more agreeable to you, but none more necessary for you to know; and I am also aware, that whilst you like to hear flattering reports, yet if they are afterwards 15 belied by events you impeach the relaters. And now be assured, that though neither your troops nor your generals have become inadequate to the *original* objects of the expedition, yet now all Sicily is united against us, and a fresh force is expected from the Peloponnesus. You must therefore determine either to recall us, or else to send another armament not inferior in naval or military strength to the present, and no small amount of money, as well as a new commander in my room. A nephritic disorder prevents me from continuing at my post, and my past services when in health claim some consideration. But whatever you mean to do must be done at the very beginning of spring, for the enemy will soon receive succours from Sicily, and it will require all your vigilance and alertness to stop or get the start of those which are coming from the Peloponnesus."

16 Athenians refuse to recall Nicias: vote fresh forces and money.—The Athenians, after hearing the letter, refused to recall Nicias, but appointed two of his officers, Menander and Euthydemus, to assist him until fresh commanders could reach Sicily. They then voted a naval and military reinforcement, and elected Demosthenes

and Eurymedon as colleagues of Nicias, and despatched Eurymedon: immediately to Sicily about the winter solstice, with 10 ships and 120 talents, [about £288,000,] and with the promise of more ample succours.

Athenians and Corinthians fit out counter-squadrons. 17  
—Meantime Demosthenes stayed at Athens to levy troops from the allies, and prepare money, ships, and heavy-armed. The Athenians also sent 20 ships to cruise round Peloponnesus to prevent its sending any reinforcements to Sicily; for the Corinthians, having received a favourable report from Syraeuse, (c. 7,) were preparing to send heavy infantry to Sicily in vessels of burden, and the Lacedæmonians were doing the same. The Corinthians also manned 25 triremes to attack the Athenian squadron at Naupactus, and to prevent its hindering the passage of their transports.

Lacedæmonians prepare to invade Attica and to 18 fortify Decelea. — The Lacedæmonians now prepared to invade Attica, and thus to hinder Athens from sending her intended reinforcements to Sicily; and they were also urged by Alcibiades to fortify Decelea and carry on the war with spirit. They had now gained confidence, 1st, Because as Athens was carrying on a war both with them and with the Sicelioti, she would be the more easily subdued; and 2ndly, Because they now considered that the Athenians had first broken the truce. In the former war they had attributed their misfortune at Pylus, and other disasters, to their having sanctioned the Thebans in attacking Plataea in time of peace, (iii. 52, 68,) and to their having refused to refer the dispute with Athens to arbitration, (i. 145,) though it had been expressly specified in the Thirty Years' Truce, that neither party should resort to arms, but should submit to a judicial decision (i. 23, and 115). But now, when the Athenians had set out for Argos with 30 ships, and ravaged part of Epidaurus, Prasia, and other places, and had also made devastating excursions from Pylus, and had refused the judicial decision to which Lacedæmon had appealed, according to the treaty, (v. 18,) then indeed the Lacedæmonians considered that the Athenians were the transgressors, and were eager for hostilities. Accordingly



during the winter they sent to their allies for iron, and prepared tools for fortifying Decelea; and they also raised supplies, and compelled the other Peloponnesians to do the same, for sending succours to Sicily on board the transports.

III. *Losses of the Athenians in Sicily before the arrival of Demosthenes, chap. 19—42.*

19 <sup>19th Year.</sup> Peloponnesians occupy Decelea.—At the <sup>B. C. 413—</sup>very commencement of Spring the Lacedæmonians and their allies invaded Attica under king Agis, and after ravaging the plain proceeded to fortify Decelea, dividing the work amongst the contingents of the various states. Decelea is situated in the plain and is visible from Athens, being distant from the city about 120 stadia [15 miles], and about the same from Bœotia.

Send troops to Sicily.—Meantime the Peloponnesians were sending off heavy-armed troops in the transports to Sicily. The Lacedæmonians sent 700 picked Helots and Neodamodes under Eceritus, a Spartan, who with 300 heavy-armed Bœotians under Xeno and Neco, Thebans, and Hegesander, a Thespian, sailed out amongst the first from Tænarus in Laconia into the open sea. Soon after, Corinth despatched 500 heavy-armed Corinthians and hired Arcadians under Alexarchus, and Sicyon sent 200 heavy-armed Sicyonians under Sargeus. Meantime the 25 Corinthian triremes which had been manned in the Winter (c. 17) were stationed at Naupactus, to engage the attention of the 20 Athenian guard-ships there until the transports had left the Peloponnesus.

20 Athenians send 30 ships to Peloponnesus.—Whilst Decelea was being fortified, the Athenians sent 30 ships under Charicles to cruise round the Peloponnesus, and to go to Argos and call for a contingent of heavy-armed, according to the alliance (v. 17).

Second Sicilian expedition under Demosthenes.—At the same time, the Athenians despatched Demosthenes to Sicily with 60 Athenian ships, 5 Chian ships, 1200 Athenian heavy-armed, as many islanders as they could

procure, and as many serviceable troops as they could obtain from their subject allies. Demosthenes was instructed to join Charicles in cruising round the Peloponnesus, and therefore, after sailing to Ægina, he waited for such ships as were left behind, and for the return of Charicles with levies from Argos.

Gylippus and Hermocrates urge the Syracusans to a 21 sea-fight.—Meantime Gylippus had returned to Syracuse, (c. 7,) bringing with him all the troops he could raise in the Sicilian cities; and having called the Syracusans together, he proposed that they should man as many ships as possible, and attack the Athenians by sea. This proposition was powerfully seconded by Hermocrates, who declared that the Athenians had no more enjoyed an hereditary and perpetual experience at sea than the Syracusans, but had been even more an inland power than Syracuse, and had only been compelled to be seamen by the Medes; that to men of a daring character like the Athenians, a daring opposition would appear most formidable; and that the Syracusans, by offering an unexpected resistance to the Athenian navy, would gain more advantage by the surprise, than injury from their want of skill. Accordingly the Syracusans resolved on a sea-fight, and prepared to man their ships.

Syracusans take Plemyrion, but defeated by sea.— 22 Gylippus now prepared the fleet of 80 ships for action. He then marched with the whole army by night, to attack the Plemyrion forts by land, whilst 35 of the Syracusan triremes sailed from the Great Harbour, and 45 from the Little Harbour, where their arsenal was situated, to effect a junction, and then to make a simultaneous attack on Plemyrion by sea. The Athenians then hastily manned 60 vessels to oppose them; 25 attacked the 35 in the Great Harbour, and the remaining 35 went out to meet the 45 sailing from the Little Harbour. The action at the mouth of the Great Harbour lasted long, and whilst the Athenians at Plemyrion were watching it, Gylippus surprised them by suddenly storming at day-break the largest of the three forts. The garrison fled to the shore and escaped to their camp in boats and transports with much difficulty, as the 35 Syracusan ships in the



Great Harbour were victorious, and sent a trireme to give them chase. When the garrisons of the two smaller forts saw the larger one taken, they likewise fled to their boats and escaped with more ease, for by this time the 45 Syracusan ships from the Lesser Harbour had forced their way through the Athenians into the Great Harbour, but had got entangled with each other, and their united forces were routed. Eleven of their galleys were sunk by the Athenians, who killed most of the men, excepting those of the crews whom they took prisoners. The Athenians only lost three vessels, and having hauled up the Syracusan wrecks, they erected a trophy on the small island fronting Plemyrium, and withdrew to their own encampment.

24 Athenians inconvenienced by losing Plemyrium.—

The Syracusans, however, remained masters of the Plemyrium forts, and erected three trophies. One of the smaller forts they demolished, but repaired and garrisoned the other two. They had slain many of the Athenian garrisons, taken many prisoners, and seized a large amount of corn and property belonging to merchants and captains of vessels, including masts and equipments for 40 triremes, and their galleys which had been hauled on the shore; for the enemy had used these forts for a magazine. Indeed, the loss of Plemyrium was the chief cause of the ruin of the Athenian expedition, for it not only depressed the troops, but prevented their getting any provisions without a battle, as the Syracusans now blockaded the mouth of the harbour.


25 Agatharchus sent out from Syracuse.—After this the Syracusans sent out Agatharchus with 12 ships, one of which proceeded with ambassadors to the Peloponnesus, to urge the prosecution of the war, whilst the remaining 11 intercepted and destroyed some vessels coming from Italy with treasures for the Athenians, and afterwards burnt some timber which had been collected for the enemy in the Caulonian territory. The 11 vessels then anchored at Locri, and took on board a body of heavy infantry from Thespiæ, which had just arrived in one of the Peloponnesian transports. On their passage home they were met by 20 ships, which Nicias had sent to intercept them,

but they escaped to Syracuse with the loss of one ship and its crew.

Athenians attempt to destroy the Syracusan stockade.—Meantime the Athenians attacked the piles in the Great Harbour, which the Syracusans had driven down in front of the old dock to protect their ships from the enemy. The Athenians brought a vessel of 10,000 talents [about 250 tons] burden, fitted up with wooden towers and screens; and whilst the troops from these towers, and the Syracusans from the docks, discharged missiles at each other, other Athenians approached in boats and removed most of the piles, either by fastening ropes to them and wrenching them up with a windlass, or by sending down divers to saw them in two. The divers also, for a reward, descended and sawed off some piles which were beneath the surface of the water, and therefore most dangerous to approach; but the Syracusans made a fresh stockade, though, from the proximity of the rival armaments, many contrivances were employed against each other, and many skirmishes ensued.

Syracusans send for succours before Eurymedon arrives.—The Syracusans also sent Corinthian, Ambraciot, and Lacedæmonian ambassadors to the Sicilian cities to report the capture of Plemyrium, and represent in their true light the causes of the defeat at sea; and particularly to request fresh succours before the expected reinforcement under Eurymedon should reach the Athenians.

Demosthenes occupies a post in Laconia.—Meantime 26 Demosthenes had left Ægina (c. 20) and reached Peloponnesus; and having effected a junction with Charicles and the 30 Athenian ships there, and taken on board some heavy-armed Argives, he sailed to Laconia. Having first ravaged a part of Epidaurus Limeræ, he landed on the Laconian coast, opposite Cythera, where stands the temple of Apollo, and fortified a point of land, to be, like Pylus, a refuge for runaway Helots, and a rallying place for marauding parties. Demosthenes then coasted to Corcyra to take on board some of the allies there, and to proceed with all speed to Sicily; whilst



Charicles stayed to complete the fortification and garrison the place, and then returned home with his 30 ships and the Argives.

- 27 Thracian mercenaries reach Athens, but sent back: energy of the Athenians.—This summer 1300 Thracian Dii, armed with long swords, (ii. 96,) arrived at Athens. They were to have accompanied Demosthenes to Sicily, but were too late, and the Athenians, thinking it would be too expensive to employ them against the enemy at Decelea, (c. 19,) as their pay was one drachma [9¼d.] per day, determined on sending them back to Thrace. For the fortification of Decelea by the whole Peloponnesian army, and its subsequent occupation by successive garrisons, had greatly contributed to the ruin of the Athenian interests by the destruction of property and the loss of men. The previous invasions of Attica had been of short duration, but now the enemy was continually making incursions either with a large force or with the regular garrison; whilst king Agis himself was present, and made this point of war of no secondary importance. The Athenians were thus deprived of their whole country; 20,000 of their slaves, many of them artisans, deserted; all their sheep and beasts of burden were lost; whilst their horses were lamed, worn down, or disabled by the continual operations of the cavalry on the rocky ground round Decelea. Provisions from Eubœa, instead of being quickly carried by land from Oropus and through Decelea, were now obliged to be expensively conveyed round Sunium by sea. Indeed all necessaries had to be imported, and Athens, instead of a city, became a fortress. All the Athenians had to keep guard in succession by day, and all except the cavalry by night; and what was the hardest of all, they were engaged in two wars at once; yet at the same time they had arrived at a pitch of obstinate animosity which no one could have believed had they heard it before it occurred. For who would have credited, that whilst some thought the Athenians would have yielded in the first, second, or third year of the war, if invaded by the Peloponnesians, now, in the *seventeenth year* after the first invasion, they should have entered upon another
- 28

war, the Sicilian, not less important than the Peloponnesian; and afterwards, whilst besieged from Decelea, they should not have withdrawn from Sicily, but have proceeded in their turn to besiege Syracuse, a city quite as considerable as Athens itself. It was these things that straitened the Athenians for money, and they now, instead of the tribute, imposed an *ad valorem* duty of 5 per cent. on all commodities carried by sea to or from any port within the Athenian dominion.

Thracians surprise and sack Mycalessus.—Diitrephes 29 was then appointed to convey the Thracians home through the Euripus, with orders to annoy the enemy as much as possible during the voyage along shore. Accordingly he first landed them at Tanagra, where they hurriedly carried off some plunder; and in the evening he sailed from Chalcis across the Euripus and landed in Bœotia, and led them against Mycalessus. During the night he bivouacked near the temple of Mercury, about 16 stadia [2 miles] from Mycalessus, and in the morning fell upon the city, which was a small one, and took it, as the wall was weak, the gates open, and the inhabitants unprepared. The Thracians, having burst in, plundered the houses and temples and butchered everything living that came in their way, including women, children, and draught cattle, for, like all barbarous tribes, they are most blood-thirsty when most secure. Every form of slaughter was exhibited, and the children who were at that time assembled in the largest boy's school in the place were all massacred.

Overtaken by the Thebans.—When the Thebans heard 30 of the attack they proceeded to the rescue, and having overtaken the Thracians and recovered the spoil, they pursued them to the Euripus, and killed many, who could not swim, as they endeavoured to reach their boats, which had been moored by the crews out of bow-shot. The Thracians lost 250 in all, but had made a good defence on their retreat, sallying forward on the Theban horse, and forming into a dense body, according to their custom; and they killed about 20 of the enemy's horse and heavy infantry, including Scirphondas, a Theban Bœotarch.





- 31 **Operations of Demosthenes: joined by Eurymedon.**—Demosthenes was now coasting to Corcyra, (c. 26,) and at Phea in Elis he met and destroyed a ship of burden carrying some heavy-armed Corinthians to Sicily, but the troops escaped and proceeded in another vessel. After this he took on board a body of heavy-armed at Zacynthus and Cephallenia, and sent for some of the Messenians from Naupactus. He then crossed over to Alyzia and Anactorium on the opposite coast of Acarnania, and there met Eurymedon (c. 16) on his return from Sicily, who informed him of the loss of Plemyrion. Here Conon, the governor of Naupactus, came to state that his own 18 vessels were unable to cope with the 25 Corinthian ships, (c. 17,) and he was reinforced by the 10 best sailers in the united fleet. Eurymedon and Demosthenes then prepared to muster their forces, Eurymedon sailing to Corcyra, and urging the Coreyræans to man 15 vessels, and collecting some heavy-armed, and Demosthenes raising some slingers and dart-men in Acarnania.
- 32 **Reinforcement proceeding to Syracuse loses 800 out of 2300 men.**—Meantime the Syracusan ambassadors (c. 25) had prevailed on the other Sicilian cities to furnish a reinforcement, and indeed *all the Greek cities in Sicily, except Agrigentum, which was neutral, were now opposed to Athens* (c. 33). The ambassadors were about sending off the reinforcement, when Nicias heard of it; and knowing that the Aeragentines would not grant them a passage, and that the Sicel allies of Athens occupied the only other passes, he prevailed on the latter, namely, the Centoripes, Alicyræans, and others, to lay three ambuscades, who cut off 800 of the enemy's force, and all the ambassadors except one, the Corinthian, who then led the remainder, 1500, to Syracuse.
- 33 **Other reinforcements reach Syracuse.**—About the same time, 500 heavy infantry, 300 dart-men, and 300 archers reached Syracuse from Camarina, whilst the Geloans sent 5 ships, 400 dart-men, and 200 horse; but the Syracusans did not immediately renew any offensive operations against the Athenians, in consequence of their recent disaster amongst the Sicels.
- Demosthenes and Eurymedon reach Thurium.**—De-

mosthenes and Eurymedon had now got their armament ready at Corcyra, (c. 31,) and crossed the Ionian Gulf with their whole force to the Iapygian foreland, and then touched at the Chærades isles. Here they renewed an old friendship with Artas, a Messapian chief, through whose means they obtained 150 Iapygian dart-men of the Messapian tribe. They then proceeded to Metapontium, where they procured 300 dart-men and two triremes; and from thence they coasted to Thurium, where they found that the anti-Athenian party had been recently expelled, and they determined to wait awhile to muster and review their armament, and persuade the Thurians to co-operate zealously in the expedition.

**Drawn battle between the Athenian and Corinthian 34 fleet at Naupactus.**—About the same time the Peloponnesians in the 25 ships stationed against Naupactus manned some more vessels, and were then but little inferior to the Athenian force (c. 31). They posted themselves off Erineus in Achaia, in the territory of Rhypha. The coast being in the form of a crescent, the land forces of the Corinthians and allies occupied the two headlands, whilst the ships ranged along the intervening space and blocked up the entrance, under the command of Polynthes. The Athenians then sailed out from Naupactus with 33 ships under Daphilus. The Corinthians were at first stationary, but at length raised the signal, and engaged the Athenians. Three of the Corinthian vessels were sunk, but none of the Athenian ships went down, though seven were disabled, the Corinthians having provided their prows with stronger epotides, [two beams projecting from a ship's head, on each side of her beak, from which the anchors are suspended,] which stove in the Athenian bows. After an undecided battle the two fleets separated. The Athenians recovered their wrecks, which were driven out to sea, and the Corinthians made no pursuit; and no prisoners were taken on either side, for the crews in the three sunken Corinthian ships easily escaped to shore. After the Athenians had returned to Naupactus, the Corinthians erected a trophy, because they had disabled so many of the enemy's vessels, and because they had come off without a defeat, which they considered to be



equivalent to a victory. The Athenians viewed the event in the same light, but when the Peloponnesians had sailed off and land force dispersed, they also erected a trophy in Achaia, about 20 stadia [ $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles] from Erineus.

35 Demosthenes and Eurymedon advance to Rhegium. —The Thurians joined Demosthenes and Eurymedon with 700 heavy infantry and 300 dart-men, and the two generals then ordered the fleet to coast to Croton, whilst they themselves reviewed the land forces at the river Sybaris, and led them through Thuria. But on reaching the river Hylis, the Crotoniates sent to forbid their marching through their territory; and the Athenians then proceeded to the mouth of the river, where they met their ships and embarked, and coasted to Petra in Rhegium, touching at all the cities excepting Locri.

36 Syracuseans improve their ships: attack the Athenians by land and sea.—The Syracuseans now determined on making a second attack on the Athenians by land and sea, before the arrival of Demosthenes and Eurymedon. They equipped their vessels in the way which the Corinthians had found so serviceable off Erineus. They cut down their ships' prows and made them unusually firm by fixing stout epotides to them. They supported these epotides for the length of 6 cubits, [9 feet,] either from their inner extremity or from the prow, by a set of spars attached to the ship's sides, both inside and out. They thus hoped to stave in the Athenian prows, which were but slightly built, as the Athenians were accustomed to bear down broadside on an enemy after taking a circuit. Moreover, the Syracuseans calculated that the Athenians in their narrow room in the harbour, would be unable to strike their enemy obliquely or on the broadside, and would be forced to meet them prow to prow, as they themselves, through the imperfection of their seamanship, had always been used to fight. They would also have the advantage of commanding the greater part of the harbour for their own backward movements, as well as its entrance, which was but small; whilst the Athenians, fighting in a small space, would be unable to back water without falling into irreparable disorder.

A drawn battle.—Gylippus now led the Syracusean 37 land forces against that part of the Athenian wall [between Epipolæ and the Great Harbour], whilst the garrison of Olympieum, (c. 4,) both cavalry and heavy and light infantry, attacked it from the opposite side, and immediately afterwards the Syracusean fleet sailed out. The Athenians, who at first thought it was only a land affair, were now thrown into alarm. Some were preparing to meet the attack of Gylippus; others marched out against the Olympieum garrison, whilst others ran down to the beach to man the ships. The Athenians now put out 75 vessels, whilst the Syracusean fleet consisted of 80. Most of the day was spent in advancing and retiring 38 upon each other, but neither party gained a decided advantage, only the Syracuseans sank one or two of the Athenian vessels. Next day the Syracuseans remained quiet, but Nicias, expecting a fresh attack, compelled the Athenian captains to right such of their ships as were injured; and he stationed a line of merchant vessels at intervals of 200 feet, in front of the stockade, which had been formed as an inner haven for the reception of his fleet. The space thus enclosed was to serve as a retreat for any vessel which might be hard pressed.

Athenian fleet defeated.—Next day the Syracuseans 39 engaged the Athenian fleet at an earlier hour by sea and land, but for a great part of the day both parties contented themselves with making the same attempts as before. At length Aristo, a Corinthian, persuaded the Syracusean naval commanders to send to those in the city, who had the direction of such matters, to force all the market people to bring their provisions to the sea-side, so that the seamen might land and take their dinner immediately, and then make an unexpected attack on the Athenians. The Syracuseans then backed water and took 40 their dinners, whilst the Athenians, thinking they were worsted, leisurely went ashore and began to prepare their own meal. Suddenly the Syracuseans manned their fleet and advanced upon the Athenians, who were thus unprepared, and mostly unrefreshed, and got on board in great disorder and with considerable difficulty. Both parties kept on their guard, and abstained from bearing down on



each other. At last, the Athenians, fearful of being worn out by fatigue, advanced with a cheer, and commenced the action. The Syracusans met them beak to beak, and the solidity of their bows stove in those of the Athenians; whilst the light troops, on their decks, galled the enemy with their missiles. Other Syracusan dartmen likewise assailed the Athenians from a multitude of small boats, and impeded the action of the oars, and 41 picked off the seamen. The Syracusans at length gained the victory, and the Athenians fled through the merchantmen to their own station. The enemy's pursuit was stopped by long beams with heavy weights, shaped like dolphins, attached to them, which were hung between the merchantmen. Two Syracusan ships, however, attempted to break through and were destroyed, one being captured with its crew. The Syracusans now retired, having sunk 7 Athenian ships, disabled many more, killed several, and taken many prisoners; and they now erected two trophies for the two victories, confidently hoping that they were superior on sea, and that they should be victorious on land.

IV. *Gradual Destruction of the Athenian Armament,*  
chap. 42—87.

42 Demosthenes and Eurymedon reach Syracuse.—Demosthenes and Eurymedon now arrived at Athens with 73 ships, including foreign vessels, 5000 heavy-armed, a few Greek and Barbarian dart-men, and a considerable number of slingers and archers. The Syracusans were then in consternation at the apparent power of Athens, who, in spite of the fortification of Declea, thus sent a second armament to Sicily, equal to the first. They concluded that her power was inexhaustible, whilst the troops of Nicias were proportionately elated.

Athenians resolve to attack Epipolæ.—Demosthenes now determined to avoid the injurious delays of Nicias, who, on his first arrival in Sicily, had wintered at Catania instead of attacking Syracuse and immediately investing the city, which would have at once convinced the Syracusans of his own superiority, and have prevented the succours from the Peloponnesus being of much service.

Demosthenes therefore proposed to avail himself of the present dismay of the enemy, by immediately attempting to recover Epipolæ, and dislodging the Syracusans from their counter-wall, so that the circumvallation might be resumed and completed; and thus he would at once bring the war to a conclusion, either by taking the city or by drawing off the armament before it was exhausted. The Athenians, however, first ravaged the valley of the Anapus, and showed their superiority in force both by land and sea, being only opposed by the cavalry and dart-men from the Olympieum.

Grand night attack: Athenians at first successful.— 43 Demosthenes now first resolved to attack the Syracusan counter-wall with engines, but these were burnt by the enemy from the wall, who also repulsed the Athenians from many quarters. Demosthenes then prevailed on Nicias and his other colleagues to accede to his plan for attempting Epipolæ. By day-light it seemed impossible to gain the ascent unobserved; Demosthenes therefore ordered the troops to take five days' provision, and commanded the stone-masons and carpenters to be in readiness with their tools; and then he himself with Eurymedon and Menander left Nicias behind in the lines, and after the first watch of the night, led the whole force against Epipolæ. This height was guarded by three distinct camps, one of Syracusans, another of Siceliot, and the third of allies. These were stationed near the city; a body of 600 men was posted higher up the slope; and a fort was constructed still nearer to the summit. The Athenians mounted as before on the side of Eurymedon, (vi. 97,) unobserved by the guard, and took the fort, and slew many of the garrison, but the greater part fled towards the city, and gave the alarm to the guard of 600 and the three camps. The corps of 600 advanced to meet the enemy, but were routed after a spirited resistance. The main body of Athenians then eagerly pressed forward to take the three camps, whilst a detachment stormed the cross-wall and began to pull it down. Gylippus and his division, with the Syracusans and their allies, now sallied from the outworks to the rescue, but being still in alarm at the night attack, they were at first



compelled to retreat. The Athenians now pressed forward as victors, but in great confusion, to disperse the enemy's whole force and prevent a rally, but they were then charged by the Bœotians, who broke their lines, and forced them to retreat.

- 44 Athenians repulsed with great slaughter.—The Athenians were now in great disorder, but it is difficult to ascertain how each event occurred, as it was a night engagement, and the only one which occurred between great armies during the war; and though the moon was shining, yet it was impossible to distinguish friend from foe, and there were a large number of heavy infantry engaged on each side. Some of the Athenians were already defeated, but others were marching up unconquered to their first attack. Many of them had only just ascended; others were still ascending, ignorant on what point to advance; whilst the front was all in confusion, and it was difficult to distinguish any orders amidst the uproar which arose from the Syracusans and allies, who cheered each other with loud shouts whenever they gained an advantage. The Athenians were also unable to distinguish their flying comrades from the prisoners. Being perpetually demanding the watchword of each other, it at length became known to the enemy, and served to protect those who fell in with a superior Athenian force; but the Syracusans themselves, by keeping closer together, did not betray their own. But what occasioned the greatest confusion was the perpetual sounding of Pæans; for in the Athenian army were many bands of Dorian race, such as the Corecyræans and Argives, whose Pæans exactly resembled that of the enemy, and struck the ear of their allies as a hostile note. Hence arose repeated conflicts, in which they turned their arms against each other. At length the Athenians were driven down the narrow pass by which they had ascended Epipolæ; many were forced over the cliffs and perished; and numbers of those who at length reached the plain, having come with the second armament, and being ignorant of the localities, lost their way, and wandered about the country until morning, when  
45 they were cut off by the Syracusan horse. Next day

the Syracusans erected two trophies, one on Epipolæ, and the other on the spot where the Bœotians first withstood the enemy. The Athenians fetched away their dead under a truce, having lost many men, but more arms, as their light troops abandoned their shields when forced down the precipices, and some escaped.

Syracusans send for fresh reinforcements.—The confidence of the Syracusans was now restored. They sent Sicæus with 15 ships to Agrigentum, which was then torn by faction, to induce it to join their alliance; whilst Gylippus set out by land to procure fresh reinforcements from the other Sicilian cities, with the hope of taking the Athenian lines by storm.

Athenians distressed: Demosthenes urges a retreat. 47  
—Meantime the Athenian commanders held a council of war, for they saw that their troops were tired of staying in Sicily, being fully aware of the desperate condition of their affairs, and suffering sickness, both from the unhealthy season of the year, [August,] and from the marshy position of their camp. Demosthenes plainly gave his vote for departing at once, whilst the sea was yet open and their fleet commanded it; especially as their forces would be more advantageously employed against the enemy at Decelea than against the Syracusans, whom it was difficult to subdue, and a waste of money to besiege.

Opposed by Nicias.—On the other hand, Nicias, 48 though he considered circumstances to be bad, did not wish to expose the weakness of the Athenians to the enemy by openly voting for the retreat before the many [i. e. before the Taxiarchs and Trierarchs who attended the regular councils of war]. By continuing the siege he thought they might also exhaust the finances of the Syracusans, especially as the Athenian fleet still commanded the sea; and a party in Syracuse who wished to surrender the city had sent to beg him not to raise the siege. However, in the speech which he made in open council, he said that he refused to withdraw the army because, 1st, The Athenians would resent such a measure unless authorized by a decree from themselves; 2nd, Those who had to judge their conduct would not have seen the facts, but would be persuaded by the invectives





or calumnies of any clever speaker; 3rd. Most of the soldiers who were now clamouring for a retreat would on returning to Athens raise an opposite outcry, and charge their generals with having betrayed them for money. "For himself," he added, "knowing as he did the Athenian temper, he preferred meeting his fate at the hands of the enemy to dying under a dishonourable charge and by an unjust sentence at home. The Syracusan affairs were in a worse condition than theirs. On their mercenaries, guard posts, and navy they had already expended 2000 talents, [£480,000,] and contracted considerable debts in addition; and if they should lose any of their present forces through want of supplies, their cause would be ruined. The Athenians must therefore continue the siege, and not be beaten in funds, wherein they had the decided advantage."

49 Demosthenes and Eurymedon unwillingly give way.

—Demosthenes would not listen to the proposal for continuing the siege, but insisted that if they were to wait for a decree from Athens, they ought to remove to Thapsus or Catana, where they could support themselves by ravaging their enemy's territory, and at the same time fight their naval battles on the open sea, where their naval skill would find more play. This view was supported by Eurymedon. Nicias however still objected to it, and his colleagues then suspected that he might be so positive from knowing more than he expressed; and the Athenians therefore remained where they were.

50 Syracusans prepare for an attack: Athenians would retreat, but stopped by an eclipse.—Meantime Gylippus and Sicannus had returned to Syracuse. Sicannus had failed in winning Agrigentum, as the party friendly to the Syracusans had been driven out whilst he was yet at Gela. But Gylippus came with another considerable army raised in Sicily, and at Selinus found the heavy infantry which had been sent from the Peloponnesus in the Spring (c. 19). The latter had been driven by stress of weather to the Libyan coast, and obtained two triremes and pilots from Cyrene; and after assisting the Eucesperitæ, who were being besieged by the Libyans, they reached Neapolis, a Carthaginian emporium only

two days' sail from Sicily, from whence they crossed to Selinus.

Immediately on the arrival of their forces, the Syracusans again prepared to attack the Athenians by land and sea. The Athenian generals now saw that their enemy was reinforced, and their own circumstances daily getting worse; and being especially depressed by the sickness of their men, they repented not having retreated. Even Nicias did not oppose the measure, except to beg them not to speak openly on the question in a council of war. Accordingly secret orders were issued to prepare for the departure of the fleet, when an eclipse of the moon took place, [August 27th,] and part of the troops urged the generals to stop; and Nicias, who was over-superstitious, declared he would not even consider of a retreat until he had waited thrice nine days as the soothsayers had directed.

General attack by the Syracusans: repulsed by 51 land but victorious at sea: Eurymedon slain.—When the Syracusans heard that the Athenians meditated sailing away, they were encouraged by this tacit acknowledgment of inferiority, and were more stimulated not to relax in their efforts. They were also determined to force them to a sea-fight at once, especially as they did not wish the enemy to settle in any other part of Sicily where they might find a more advantageous position. Accordingly, having manned their ships and exercised their crews, they on the first day attempted to storm the Athenian lines, and intercepted and routed a small division of the enemy's cavalry and heavy infantry, who had sallied from certain posterns, and cut off 70 horses and some heavy-armed. On the next day, the Syracusans 52 sailed out with 76 ships, whilst their troops marched against the walls. The Athenians advanced with their fleet of 86 ships, and an engagement commenced. Eurymedon, who commanded the Athenian right wing, wishing to surround the enemy's ships, had drawn away too much towards the shore. But the Syracusans, being victorious in the centre, intercepted him in the bottom and farthest recess in the harbour, and both killed him and destroyed his ships, and then pursued and drove



- 53 ashore the remainder of the Athenian vessels. Gylippus then hastened with part of his army to the break-water, to cut off the Athenians as they landed, and to aid the Syracusans in towing off their prizes, which had run aground. But his troops advanced in disorder, and the Tyrrhenians, who were keeping guard at this point, fell upon and routed their van, and drove them into the Lysimelian marsh. The Syracusans then came up in greater numbers, but the Athenians being roused by the danger of their fleet, advanced and routed the enemy, and saved all their ships except 18. These were captured, and the crews slain, and the Syracusans also sent a fire-ship amongst the rescued vessels, but the Athenians contrived to check
- 54 and extinguish it. The Syracusans then erected a trophy for the sea-fight, and for the interception of the enemy's cavalry and heavy infantry, (c. 51,) and the Athenians did the same for the victory of the Tyrrhenians, and for what they had themselves effected.
- 55 Utter despondency of the Athenians.—The Athenians were now utterly dejected, but most of all they bitterly regretted having ever undertaken the expedition. For these were the only states with similar institutions to themselves which they had hitherto attacked; and as they lived under the same democracy, and possessed, like themselves, ships, horses, and power, the Athenians had been unable to create any dissensions in their government, and had, moreover, failed even with superior forces, and had been beaten at sea.
- 56 Syracusans prepare to cut off the retreat of the Athenians.—The Syracusans were now again masters of the harbour, and determined to close its mouth. They had no longer to attend to their own preservation, but to prevent the enemy's escape. They thought, as was the fact, that with their present resources they were decidedly the stronger, and that if they could but conquer the Athenians by land and sea their cause would appear most glorious, from their having liberated the Greeks; whilst the remaining power of Athens would be unable to cope with the war that would afterwards be waged against her, and they themselves would be held in admiration by the rest of the world, and by future

generations. And the cause was indeed worth encountering, because they were conquering not only the Athenians, but the many other allies; and whilst they had taken the lead with the Lacedæmonians and Corinthians, their own city had stood the first brunt of danger, and paved the way for their naval success.

Number of the allies on each side.—Never were so many nations brought together as at this single city, excepting the whole sum of the confederates assembled together at Athens or at Lacedæmon.

## SYRACUSAN ALLIES.

58

<i>I. Independent Dorian Greeks in Sicily.</i>	
CAMARINÆANS. GEOLOANS. SELINUNTINES. HIMEREANS.	} Side of Sicily opposite Libya. Towards the Tyrrhenian sea, where they are the only Greeks and the only auxiliaries of Syracuse.
<i>II. Barbarians.</i>	
SICELS.	Those who had not joined the Athenians.
<i>III. Greeks without Sicily.</i>	
LACEDÆMONIANS.	Supplied a Spartan leader with Neodamodes and Helots.
CORINTHIANS.	These alone joined with both sea and land forces.
LEUCADIANS. AMERACIOTS. ARCADIANS. SICYONIANS. BÆOTIANS.	} Joined for the sake of their kindred with Corinth. Mercenaries sent by Corinth. Pressed into the expedition.

The Siceliots, being powerful states, furnished the greatest number of troops, including heavy infantry, ships, horses, and a large crowd of light-armed irregulars. The Syracusans themselves furnished the most numerous levies, from the greatness of their city and imminency of their peril.



## ATHENIAN ALLIES.

I. *Athenian Colonists.*

LEMNIANS.  
IMBRIANS.  
ÆGINETANS.  
HESTIEANS.

Occupying Ægina.  
From Hestiera in Bœotia.

II. *Subject and Tributary States.*

ERETRIANS.  
CHALCIDIANS.  
STYRIANS.  
CARYSTIANS.  
CEANS.  
ANDRIANS.  
TENIANS.  
MILESIANS.  
SAMIANS.  
CHIANS.  
METHYMNEANS.  
TENEDIANS.  
ÆNIANS.

All Ionians from Eubœa, except the Carystians, who were Dryopes.

Ionians from the islands.

Ionians from Ionia. The Chians were independent allies, not tributary, but supplied ships.

Ælians. Supplied ships but not tribute.

Æolian tributaries.

These, though Ælians, thus fought by compulsion against the Bœotians, who were also Ælians and their founders.

PLATEANS. Bœotians. Fought Bœotians through hatred.

RUODIANS. Argive Dorians. Compelled to fight Syracusan Dorians and their own colony of Geloans.

CYTHERIANS. Dorians, and Lacedæmonian colonists.

CEPHALLENIANS. } Independent allies, but constrained on account of being islanders.

ZACYNTHIANS. } Dorians and Corinthians.

CORCYRÆANS. From Naupactus and Pylus.

MESSENIANS. Exiles fighting against the Selinuntine Megareans.

MEGAREANS.

III. *Volunteers and Mercenaries.*

ARGIVES. Dorians. Fought against Dorians chiefly for their own interest, and from hatred to Lacedæmon.

MANTINEANS. Mercenaries from Arcadia. Fought only for pay.

CRETANS. } Mercenaries.

ÆTOLIANS. } Served from interest and from being allies.

ACARNANIANS. } Italiots.

THURIANS. } Siceliots.

METAPONTINES. } Barbarians.

NAXIANS. } Had quarreled with the Syracusans.

CATANIANS. } Mercenaries.

SEGESTANS. } Mercenaries.

SICELS. } Mercenaries.

TYRRHENIANS. } Mercenaries.

IAPYGIANS. } Mercenaries.

Syracusans close the Great Harbour.—The Syracusans now began to close up the Great Harbour. Its mouth was 8 stadia [1 mile] wide, and they proceeded to range a line of triremes, merchant-men, and smaller craft across it, with their broadsides to the sea; whilst they made preparations for another sea-fight.

Athenians prepare to force a passage.—The Athenian generals now called a council of their principal officers. They were in immediate want of provisions, for previously, when they had expected to sail away, they had sent to Catana to desire that no more supplies might be despatched, and this order had never been revoked, and now all communication with the sea was cut off. They determined therefore to abandon the upper part of their lines, and enclose and garrison a space close by their naval station just sufficient to hold their stores and the sick, and then to man all their ships, and endeavour to force their way out of the harbour, and, if successful, to sail to Catana; but if defeated, to burn their ships and retreat over-land to some friendly town, either Barbarian or Grecian. Accordingly they manned 110 ships, and obliged all to go on board, embarking even a number of archers and dartmen from the Acarnanian and other mercenaries, and made such other preparations as they could. Nicias then, seeing that his soldiers were disheartened by their recent decided defeat, and being anxious from the scarcity of provisions to hazard a battle as quickly as possible, assembled them all together, and spoke as follows:

## SPEECH OF NICIAS TO HIS ARMY.

We must not be disheartened.—“Athenians and auxiliaries, 61 the preservation of ourselves and our country depends upon the coming struggle; but if we gain a victory with our fleet, each one may again see his native city, wherever it may be. Yet you must not, like raw recruits, be disheartened because prostrated in your first attempts; but both you who are Athenians, and you, allies, who have ever joined us in our expeditions, must call to mind the unexpected results that occur in warfare, and prepare for the encounter, with the hope that fortune may yet side with us, and in a manner worthy of your numbers.

We have introduced various new contrivances to insure a victory.—“We have prepared whatever we thought would be 62 advantageous amidst the narrowness of the port and the



crowd of ships, and against the enemy's disposition of troops on their decks. We shall take on board great numbers of archers and dart-men, which would have interfered with our display of skill upon the open sea, but will be useful in the *land fight* we must now maintain from our ships. We shall also use grappling irons, to prevent their ships from retiring after charging us with their heavy epotides. We are thus obliged to maintain a land fight on board our ships, and must not retire, as the shore is occupied by the enemy.

63 Both soldiers and seamen to do their duty.—“Remember then, both soldiers and sailors, that you must fight on as long as you can, and if a ship closes with you, you must not separate until you have swept off the troops from your enemy's deck; for we are even now superior in soldiers, and have superior resources on our decks, and the greatest number of ships.

Allies to remember the honours and benefits they have derived from us.—“You who, though aliens in blood, have been considered as Athenians, from your knowledge of our language and imitation of our manners, must consider that you have thus obtained the admiration of Greece; and have shared with us the benefits of our empire and the fear of our subjects, and so been secured from injuries. You cannot then, as just men, betray this empire, but, despising the Corinthians, whom you have often vanquished, and the Siceliots, who dared not withstand us whilst our fleet was unimpaired, repel the enemy, and show that even under weakness and calamity your skill is superior to their strength and fortune.

64 Athenians to remember that their all is at stake to-day.—“You that are Athenians I must remind, that you have no more such ships, nor so fine a body of troops at home; that if aught befall you but victory, the Syracusans will immediately sail thither, and the remainder of your countrymen will be unable to withstand their enemies in Attica and those who will join them; thus at the same time you will be at the mercy of the Syracusans, and those at home will be subject to the Lacedaemonians. Fight then bravely now, if you ever did; reflect that your armament represents both the Athenian army and navy, and all that is left of your country, and the great name of Athens; and that no better occasion can be offered for any man to exercise his science or display his courage.”

65 Syracusans counteract the Athenian inventions.—Nicias now ordered his troops to man their ships. Mean-time Gylippus and the Syracusans had perceived their preparations and device of grappling irons, and had covered their prows with hides, so that the grapnels might slip off without holding; and when every thing was ready, their generals and Gylippus exhorted the army as follows:


SPEECH OF GYLIPPUS AND THE SYRACUSAN  
GENERALS TO THEIR SOLDIERS.

Our past victories an earnest of our present success.—“That 66 our former achievements have been glorious, and that the present struggle will lead to glorious results, you seem most of you to be aware, or you would not have undertaken it with such alacrity. But if any one is not so sensible of it as he ought to be, we will prove it to him. When the Athenians came here to subdue Sicily, and then Peloponnesus and the rest of Greece, and when they possessed the largest empire ever enjoyed by any Greeks past or present, you were the first men in the world who ever withstood their navy, and have already conquered them in some sea-fights, and will in all probability conquer them in the present. For when men have been worsted in that in which they thought they excelled, their self-opinion is lower than if they had never thought so highly of themselves, and their disappointment makes them fall short in the exercise of their real strength.

We have provided ourselves against their new devices.—“But 67 on our side that daring which we possessed when inferior in skill is now confirmed, and each man's hope is doubled by the thought that we must be the best seamen in the world, since we have conquered the best. Again, those points in which the enemy are imitating our equipments are those which are most familiar to us. For, contrary to their custom, they are crowding their decks with soldiers and dart-men who are mere land-lubbers; whilst the Aenranians amongst them, who can scarcely discharge their weapons whilst stationary, will be unable to avoid falling into confusion, from the swaying of the vessels. Neither will the Athenians derive any advantage from the superior number of their ships, for many vessels in a small space are the most likely to be injured. But be assured that it is their miseries and distresses which force them to make the present desperate effort to sail out or afterwards retreat by land, and not any confidence in their resources.

Fight then for vengeance, and secure freedom for Sicily.—“It is 68 then most lawful for us to turn to advantage the confusion and bad fortune of our bitterest enemies, and take vengeance on our aggressors. For they came to enslave our country, and to impose what is most painful on our men, what is most dishonourable on our wives and children, and what is most degrading on our city. Therefore let us not relent, but punish these men, and secure, by a glorious victory, liberty for all Sicily.”

Nicias commits the fleet to Demosthenes, and re- 69 mains on the shore with the land forces.—The Syracusans now manned their vessels, seeing the Athenians doing the same. Nicias then, full of anxiety, addressed





the Trierarchs separately by their fathers' names, their own names, and those of their tribes. He begged each one not to sacrifice any previous distinction which he might enjoy, nor tarnish the hereditary virtues for which his forefathers were eminent. He reminded them of their country—the most free in the world, and of its power, which was subject to no man's dictation. He even brought forward old and hackneyed topics, and appealed to their wives, children, and country's gods, which he thought might sound in their ears in the present alarming emergency. He then led the troops down to the beach and spread them over the largest possible space, to confirm the courage of those on board the ships; whilst Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus took the command of the Athenian fleet, and sailed to the mouth of the harbour to force a passage.

70 **Obstinate and decisive battle in the Great Harbour: Athenians totally defeated.**—The Syracusans and allies had previously weighed anchor with about the same number of ships as before, and proceeded to guard the passage out, and to station some vessels round the harbour, that they might fall upon the Athenians from all sides at once, and their troops were posted to aid such ships as might put in shore. The Syracusan fleet was commanded by Sicanus and Agatharchus, who each occupied a wing, whilst Pythen and the Corinthians maintained the centre.

The Athenians in the first charge overpowered the ships stationed at the boom, and tried to break the fastenings; upon which the Syracusans and allies bore down from all quarters and the battle soon spread throughout the harbour. It was more obstinate than any of the previous engagements. The seamen on both sides exhibited great eagerness when the command was given, and there was much counter-manceuvring and rivalry on the part of the captains. The soldiers during the collisions were anxious not to be outdone by the skill of the sailors, and every one at his post strained every nerve to appear the best man. But these were the two largest fleets ever known, including together little short of 200 ships, that ever engaged in so small a compass; and the attacks

made by beaks were but few, as there were no means of backing water or cutting through the enemy's line, though chance collisions in flying or pursuing were frequent. Whilst any ship advanced upon another, the soldiers on both the decks threw javelins, stones, and arrows at each other, but when they came to close quarters, the heavy-armed marines fought hand to hand and endeavoured to board each other's vessels. It often happened too, that from the narrowness of the space the ships on either side would assail each other, and friends and foes be entangled in inextricable disorder, whilst the great din arising from the collisions spread dismay and drowned the boatswains' orders. The officers on both sides were shouting either in the discharge of their duty or in the ardour of rivalry. Those of the Athenians called upon their men to force a passage out and zealously strive for a safe return to their country; those of the Syracusans and allies cried out that it would be a glorious achievement to hinder the enemy's escape, and would reflect honour on their respective countries. Moreover, if any of the commanders saw a captain unnecessarily rowing astern they would shout out to him. The Athenians would ask him whether he retreated because he considered the hostile shore more their own than the sea which they had won with such arduous struggles; the Syracusans would ask whether he was flying from the flying Athenians, who he knew were anxious to escape by any way they could. Meantime 71 the land forces which lined the beach were enduring the utmost excitement and agony of mind. The Syracusans were eager for more honour; the Athenians afraid of new disasters. The Athenians had staked their all on the fleet, and their anxiety for the future was unparalleled; whilst from the unequal nature of the battle they could only take an unequal view of it from the beach. As the scene was close at hand, they did not all look upon the same part at once; if any saw their own side prevailing in any quarter, they would take courage and invoke the gods for safety; whilst those who saw their friends defeated would burst into lamentations, and be more agitated by the sight than those engaged in action.



Others again, looking upon a doubtful part of the engagement, would make gestures corresponding to their fears, and pass the interval in a torment of suspense. Whilst the battle was yet undecided, one might hear in the Athenian army all sounds at once, shouting and wailing—"They conquer," or "They are conquered," and other exclamations which a great army in extreme peril might be forced to utter. At length the Syracusans and allies decidedly routed the Athenians, and drove them with shouting and cheering to the shore. The forces of such ships as were not taken landed at different places, and rushed towards the camp; whilst the Athenian army with one impulse bewailed the catastrophe. Some of the Athenian land forces then went to succour the ships, others to guard the remainder of the wall, whilst others began to think how they might best provide for their own preservation. Indeed the consternation of the Athenians has never been exceeded, and they now experienced nearly the same thing that they had inflicted on the Lacedæmonians at Pylus, (iv. 14, 38,) who lost their ships and also their men at Sphacteria: and now escape by land seemed hopeless to the Athenians.

72 **Athenians refuse to make another attempt by sea.**—The Syracusans then took up their wrecks and dead, and sailed off to the city and erected a trophy. But the Athenians were so overwhelmed by their misfortunes, that they never thought of their wrecks or dead, but wished to retreat immediately during the night. Demosthenes however proposed to Nicias that they should man their remaining ships and make another attempt to force a passage out in the morning, alleging that they had still 60 ships fit for service remaining, whilst the Syracusans had but 50. Nicias consented, but the seamen were so dismayed at their retreat, that they refused to embark; and they all now determined to retreat by land.

73 **Stratagem of Hermocrates to prevent their retreat by land.**—Hermocrates, the Syracusan, suspected the intention of the Athenians, and feared lest they should escape and settle in Sicily and renew the war. Accordingly he urged the government to call out their whole

force to block up the roads and guard the narrow passes. The magistrates acceded to the wisdom of his proposal; but all the Syracusans were reposing themselves after the toils of the day, and the majority were deep in drinking and revelry, under the double pretext of celebrating the victory and a festival of Hercules, which happened to coincide with it; and it was expected that they would obey them in anything rather than in taking up their arms and marching out. Hermocrates, thus unable to prevail on the magistrates, resorted to the following expedient. Being afraid that the Athenians would get the start and quietly pass through the most difficult parts of the country by night, he sent some of his own friends, as soon as it grew dark, with a party of horse to the Athenian lines. These rode up within hearing and called certain individuals as though they had been friends of the Athenians, for there were some in Syracuse who carried to Nicias tidings of what passed within the city. Accordingly the present party sent a message to Nicias to bid him beware of leading off his army by night, as the Syracusans were guarding the roads, but to retreat leisurely by day after making due preparations. This message was then reported to the Athenian generals, who, considering 74 it to be true, stopped for the night.

**Athenians delay their retreat: Syracusans block up the roads.**—Next day, the Athenians stayed also to allow time for the men to pack up their most useful articles. Meantime Gylippus and the Syracusans blocked up the passes and guarded the fords; and their fleet sailed up to the Athenian station. Here some of the ships had been burnt by the Athenians themselves; the remainder were now towed off by the Syracusans, and conveyed to their city.

**Athenians commence their retreat.**—On the third 75 day after their defeat by sea, Nicias and Demosthenes began to retreat with the army. The scene was wretched. They were retreating after having lost all their ships, and whilst both themselves and their country were in peril. They saw the dead bodies of their friends lying unburied around, but the wounded and sick, whom they were compelled to leave behind, were a still more pitious



spectacle. These unhappy men, with entreaties and wailings, begged to be taken away. They appealed to their friends and kinsmen, and hung upon their departing comrades, and then dragged along in the rear of the army until they dropt down from fatigue, and could only follow it with cries of lamentation and despair. The whole army was thus dissolved in tears, and could with difficulty depart, even from an enemy's country. Moreover, there was a deep dejection and depreciation of their own strength, and though their whole multitude was not less than 40,000, yet they resembled a city reduced by a siege and attempting its escape. Their servants had nearly all deserted, and those that remained were not trustworthy, and thus the soldiers, and even the heavy infantry and cavalry, were compelled to carry their own provisions, which, therefore, soon failed them. Neither did the fact of each one's misery being participated in by all form any alleviation of their sufferings, especially when they considered the original pride and splendour of their expedition. For this was the greatest reverse that ever befell a Greek army. They came to enslave others, but they departed under the fear of being enslaved themselves; and they had left home by sea, with hymns and prayers, but they were now returning by land, under the most contrary omens.

- 76 **Energy of Nicias.**—Nicias, seeing that his army were dejected by their reverses, encouraged and cheered them as much as circumstances would permit; and as he passed along the line, he raised his voice to the loudest pitch, that none might lose such comfort as he could bestow.

SPEECH OF NICIAS TO HIS AFFLICTED ARMY.

- 77 "We may yet be saved by firmness and activity in our retreat.—"We must still cherish hope, Athenians, for some have been saved under greater peril; nor must you blame yourselves for your misfortunes, for they are beyond your desert. You see how I have been reduced by sickness, yet in my private life and otherwise I consider myself second to none, for I have lived with devotion towards the gods, and my actions have been just and irreproachable towards men. My hope is therefore strong for the future, for our enemies have enjoyed sufficient good fortune, and if the gods were angry at our expedition, we have been sufficiently punished, and may well expect

a mitigation of their wrath. Moreover, our ranks are still numerous and experienced, and we may consider ourselves as at once a city, wherever we may settle, and that there is no other in Sicily that could either resist our attack or expel us from a settlement. You must see that your march is safe and orderly, considering that on whatever spot on which you may be compelled to fight that will be your country and fortress if you are victorious. Our scarcity of provisions will oblige us to hurry on both by day and night, and if we can but reach some friendly town of the Sicels, we may consider ourselves out of danger, for they are still true to us, from their fear of the Syracusans; and a message has already been sent forward to direct them to meet us with a fresh supply of provisions. In short, it will be necessary for you to act like brave men, for there is no place to which you can flee if you behave like cowards. And if you escape now, you will again see all that you most desire, and the Athenians will recover the power of their city, which rests on men, and not on unmanned walls and ships."

Athenians harassed by the Syracusans, who occupy 78 a position in front.—Nicias then brought the straggling troops to their post, and Demosthenes did the same, and made another exhortation to the men. The Athenian army marched in the form of a hollow square, enclosing the baggage and followers of the camp. Nicias led the van, Demosthenes the rear. On reaching the ford of the river Anapus, they found a body of Syracusans and allies drawn up to oppose them. These they routed and gained the passage, but as they pursued their march they were harassed by charges of the Syracusan cavalry, and missiles of the light infantry, and advanced only 40 stadia [5 miles] that day, and then halted on a hill. Next day they advanced only half the distance, and encamped in a level plain, to procure some eatables from the houses, and provide themselves with water, which was scarce in the direction they were to go. Meantime the Syracusans had gone before and blocked up the pass in advance, which was a steep hill, called the *Acraem Lepas*, between two precipitous ravines. Next day the Athenians pursued their march, but were so galled by the enemy's cavalry and dart-men, as to be compelled to fall back upon the plain where they had encamped the previous night, but the Syracusan horse prevented their obtaining provisions as before.



- 79 Athenians fail to force the position.—Early next morning the Athenians again marched to the hill, but found that the enemy had fortified it, and drawn up his infantry many ranks deep, for the defence of the wall. The Athenians then charged and assaulted the wall, but a large body on the hill discharged their missiles with all the advantages of being on higher ground, and again compelled them to retreat, whilst a thunder-storm increased their despondency. Gylippus and the Syracusans then sent a body of troops to block up the road by which they had come with another wall; but this design was frustrated by a detachment of Athenian troops, whose whole army then once more encamped in the plain. Next morning the Athenians again marched forward, but were attacked on every side by the Syracusans, who advanced as they retreated, and retreated as they advanced, and after some resistance they were again obliged to halt in the plain, about 5 or 6 stadia [ $\frac{1}{2}$  of a mile] from their last encampment.
- 80 Athenians steal a night march and reach Erineus.—During the night the Athenians were greatly distressed by their wounds and want of provisions, and Nicias and Demosthenes determined to kindle numerous fires, and lead off the army in an opposite direction, not towards Catania, but to Camarina, Gela, and the cities on the other side of Sicily. Accordingly they lit many fires, and commenced their retreat; but, as is often the case whilst marching by night through an enemy's country, they were seized with a panic, and the division under Nicias got far in advance, whilst that under Demosthenes was separated from it, and proceeded in disorder. However, at day-break they arrived at the sea-coast, and entering into the Helorus road, they reached the river Cacyparis, and intended to march along its banks into the interior, where they expected the Sicels would meet them. Here they found a Syracusan guard by the river, who had blocked up the passage with a wall and palisade; but they forced the guard and marched on to the river Erineus, as their guides had directed them.
- 81 Syracusans overtake the division under Demosthenes.—Meantime the Syracusans and allies had found at day-

break that the Athenians had departed, and charged Gylippus with having knowingly suffered them to escape: but they had no difficulty in finding the route taken, and by pursuing it with all speed they overtook the division under Demosthenes about dinner-time. This division had lagged behind in disorder, on account of the panic, and was quickly surrounded by the Syracusan horse. Nicias was now 50 stadia [ $6\frac{1}{2}$  miles] in advance, and thus the division under Demosthenes was separated and driven into a certain spot, enclosed by a wall, and in which olive-trees were growing. Then the Syracusans assailed them with missiles from every quarter, not wishing to come to close combat with men rendered desperate by despair.

Division under Demosthenes lay down their arms.— 82.

At length Gylippus, with the Syracusans and allies, proclaimed that any of the islanders might retain their liberty by coming over to him; and a few states accepted the offer. Afterwards all the troops under Demosthenes, amounting to 6000, surrendered their arms, on condition that no one should be put to death, either by violence, imprisonment, or starvation, and they gave up all their money, which filled four shields. These prisoners were then led to Syracuse, whilst Nicias crossed the banks of the Erineus with his division the same day, and posted it on high ground.

Nicias refuses to capitulate.—Next day Nicias was 83 overtaken by the Syracusans, who informed him of the surrender of Demosthenes, and invited him to do the same. At first he was incredulous, but having been permitted to despatch a horseman, and ascertained the fact, he sent a herald to Gylippus, offering, on the part of the Athenians, to indemnify Syracuse for the whole cost of the war, on condition of being permitted to retreat, and, meanwhile, to give one man as hostage for every talent of the stipulated sum. The Syracusans and Gylippus rejected the offer, and fell upon his division, surrounded it on all sides, and assailed him with missiles until the evening. In the quiet of the night, though nearly exhausted from want of food, the Athenians again took up their arms to pursue their march, when the Syracusans





perceived them and sounded the Pæan; and they again laid down their arms, all but 300 men, who forced their way through the guards, and made off as they could.

84 **Dreadful slaughter by the Assinarius.**—At day-break Nicias again led his troops forward, whilst they were harassed upon every side by the missiles and javelins of the enemy. They hurried on to the river Assinarius, both to slake their raging thirst, and to gain a shelter on the opposite side from the Syracusans; but on reaching the banks they rushed to the stream in a dense body and without any regard for order, and fell upon and trampled upon each other. Some died immediately upon the javelins, others fell over the baggage, and many got entangled together and were carried down the stream. Meantime the Syracusans, who lined the precipitous bank, discharged their missiles upon the confused mass, who were eagerly drinking in the hollow bed of the river; and many Peloponnesians descended and butchered their unresisting foes, who were struggling with each other for a draught of the muddy and blood-stained water.

85 **Nicias surrenders.**—At length, after many corpses were heaped up in the river, and the Athenians were being massacred in the stream, or cut off by the enemy's cavalry whilst striving to escape, Nicias surrendered to Gylippus, placing more confidence in him than in the Syracusans, and desiring him to stop the carnage. Gylippus then gave orders "to make prisoners;" and collected all that were alive, and sent a party to pursue the 300. The number of prisoners collected for the state was not large, but a very great many were secreted by their captors, and privately sold. A large proportion were slain, for this was the greatest slaughter that occurred throughout the Sicilian war; many also had fallen in the various attacks during the retreat. A considerable number, however, effected their escape either then or from their subsequent slavery, and found a refuge at Catania.

86 **Nicias and Demosthenes executed.**—The Syracusans then returned to their city with their spoils, and as many prisoners as they could, and sent the rest of their captives to the quarries; but they executed Nicias and Demosthenes, contrary to the wish of Gylippus. The latter

had thought it would have been a glorious achievement to have taken the enemy's generals to Lacedæmon, where Demosthenes was regarded as a most inveterate enemy for his conduct at Sphacteria and Pylus, (iv. 38,) whilst Nicias was more favourably considered from having persuaded the Athenians to conclude the treaty (v. 18, 24). But the Syracusan partisans of Nicias were afraid that, if put to the torture, he would betray them, whilst others, especially the Corinthians, feared that, as he was rich, he might escape through bribery, and again commit mischief; and both parties therefore prevailed on the allies to put him to death. Thus Nicias was executed, being, of all the Greeks, in the time of Thucydides, the least deserving of such a fate; for his whole life was devoted to the practice of every virtue.

**Sufferings of the Athenian prisoners in the quarries.**—The Athenians in the stone quarries were at first cruelly treated by the Syracusans. They were crowded within a small compass in a hollow place, and being unsheltered, they were at first distressed by the suffocating closeness and heat of the sun, and afterwards by the cold of the autumnal nights. From their want of room they were obliged to do everything in the same place, whilst the corpses of those who died from sickness or wounds were piled up together, and emitted an intolerable stench. They were also tormented with hunger and thirst, for during eight months they received daily only a cotyle [about half a pint] of water, and two of corn; and, in short, there was no misery which men could experience in such a place that did not fall to their lot. For 70 days they were thus immured together, and then they were all sold except the Athenians, Siceliots, and Italiots. The total number of prisoners was 7000.

This was the greatest exploit during the war, and in the opinion of Thucydides was, of all Greek achievements, the most splendid for the conquerors, and most disastrous for the conquered; for the latter were totally defeated in all points, and their fleet and army utterly destroyed.



## BOOK VIII.

HISTORY OF THE REVOLT OF THE ATHENIAN ALLIES, THE TREATIES BETWEEN LACEDÆMON AND PERSIA, RECALL OF ALCIBIADES, OLIOARCHICAL REVOLUTION AND ITS OVERTHROW AT ATHENS, REVOLT OF EUBŒA, AND BATTLE OF CYNOS-SEMA. B. C. 413—411.

## ANALYSIS.

I. *Athenian Allies revolt, and are assisted by the Peloponnesians, who ally with Tissaphernes.*

Nineteenth year, B. C. 413—Summer, continued.—Great consternation at Athens: determination not to yield. Chap. 1.

Winter.—General feeling against Athens: its allies revolt.—Lacedæmonians determine to bring the war to a conclusion.—Collect money and build 100 ships.—Athenians prepare a fleet and fortify Sunium.—Athenian allies apply to Lacedæmon for aid in revolting: 1st, The Eubœans; 2nd, The Lesbians; 3rd, The Chians and Erythræans; 4th, The Hellespontines. Chap. 2—6.

Twentieth year, B. C. 412—Summer.—A Peloponnesian fleet prepared at the Isthmus to assist Chios.—Resolved, after Chios has been secured to sail to Lesbos and the Hellespont.—Athenians obtain seven Chian vessels.—Athenians drive the enemy's 21 ships into Piræus.—Lacedæmonians disheartened.—Alcibiades and Chalcidæus despatched with 5 ships.—The 16 Peloponnesian ships return from Sicily.—Chios, Erythræ, and Clazomenæ revolt.—Athenians use the money set aside for emergency.—Tegs joins in the revolt.—Miletus follows.—Alliance between Lacedæmon and Persia.—*First treaty between King Darius and the Peloponnesians.*—Athenian fleet defeats the Chians: Lebedos and Ere revolt.—Peloponnesian fleet at Piræus breaks through the blockade.—Revolution at Samos: it is secured to Athens.—Methymna and Mytilene revolt.—Astyochns reaches Chios.—Athenians recover Lesbos and Clazomenæ.—Athenians make a descent on Miletus.—Leon and Diomedon defeat the Chians and ravage Chios.—Athenians defeat the Milesians, and prepare to besiege Miletus.—A Peloponnesian and Sicilian fleet prepares to relieve Miletus.—Athenians retire to Samos.—Peloponnesians and Tissaphernes take Iasus and Amorges, and occupy Miletus. Chap. 7—25.

II. *Disagreements between the Peloponnesians and Tissaphernes.*

Winter.—Disputes between Tissaphernes and the Lacedæmonians.—Athenians at Samos determine to attack Chios and watch Miletus.—Astyochns fails to retake Pteleum and Clazomenæ.—Lesbians apply to

him for assistance in another revolt.—Astyochns takes the command of the grand Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus.—An Athenian squadron driven to Chios.—Peloponnesian squadron captured off Triopium.—Miletus: *Second Treaty between King Darius and the Peloponnesians.*—Athenians reduce the Chians to great distress: Astyochns refuses relief.—Peloponnesian fleet sent to aid the revolt of the Hellespontine cities.—Eleven commissioners sent from Sparta to the fleet at Miletus.—Chians again apply to Astyochns, who sails to join ships at Caunus.—Defeat 20 Athenian ships and reaches Caunus.—The eleven commissioners dispute with Tissaphernes.—Revolt of Rhodes; Peloponnesian fleet sails there.

Chap. 29—44.

III. *Alcibiades flies to Tissaphernes, and sets on foot an oligarchical Conspiracy at Samos.*

Alcibiades leaves the Peloponnesians and flies to Tissaphernes.—Counsels him to keep the balance between the rival powers.—Intrigues with some Athenian oligarchs at Samos.—Progress of a conspiracy at Samos: opposed by Phrynichus.—Conspirators send a deputation to Athens.—Phrynichus informs Astyochns, who tells Alcibiades, who writes to the Athenians.—Phrynichus saves himself by an artifice.—Alcibiades tries to win over Tissaphernes to Athens.—Conspirators reach Athens: propose an oligarchy and the recall of Alcibiades.—Athenians send ten deputies to Tissaphernes: Phrynichus recalled.—Pisander exhorts the clubs.—Athenian fleet attacks Rhodes: its successes at Chios.—Pisander goes to Tissaphernes: negotiations broken off through the extravagant demands of Alcibiades.—Tissaphernes renews his connexion with the Peloponnesians.—*Third Treaty between Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians.*—Tissaphernes professes to prepare to bring up the Phœnician fleet.—Bœotians take Oropus: Peloponnesian fleet sails to Miletus, and Athenian to Samos. Chap. 45—60.

IV. *Oligarchical Revolution at Athens, and Counter-revolution at Samos.*

Twenty-first year, B. C. 411—Summer.—Dercylidas sent from Miletus to the Hellespont.—Indecisive battle off Chios.—Dercylidas procures the revolt of Abydus and Lampascus: Athenians recover Lampascus.—Astyochns advances to Chios.—Progress of the oligarchical conspiracy.—Democracy of Thasos overthrown: it revolts to Lacedæmon.—Oligarchical principles furthered at Athens by the clubs.—New constitution of a council of Four Hundred, and Assembly of Five Thousand.—Names and character of the principal revolutionists: viz. 1st, Antiphon; 2nd, Phrynichus; 3rd, Theramenes.—Council of Five Hundred dissolved.—The Four Hundred installed: try to negotiate with Agis.—Agis tries to seize Athens, but is repulsed: negotiations for peace recommenced.—The Four Hundred send envoys to Sparta, and a deputation to Samos.—Oligarchical revolution attempted at Samos, but fails.—The Paralus despatched with the news to Athens, and seized by the Four Hundred.—Athenian fleet and Samians unite against the oligarchy.—New officers appointed: the fleet determines to oppose the oligarchy at Athens, and enemy at Miletus.—The Ten deputies from Athens remain at Delos.—Peloponnesian fleet murmurs against Astyochns.—Indecisive movements of the rival armaments.—Peloponnesians send a squadron to the



Hellespont: revolt of Byzantium.—Alcibiades recalled: encourages the Athenians at Samos with hopes of aid from Tissaphernes.—Elected general, and goes to Tissaphernes.—Increased discontent between the Peloponnesians, Tissaphernes, and Astyochus.—Astyochus succeeded by Mindarus.—Ambassadors from the Four Hundred reach Samos.—Tissaphernes goes to Aspendus: opinions as to his motives.—Alcibiades joins him at Aspendus. Chap. 61—68.

#### V. Overthrow of the Oligarchy at Athens.

Revolutionary party at Athens quarrel on receiving the message of Alcibiades.—Violent oligarchs sent to Sparta, and fortify Ectionea.—The-ramenes denounces the fort: Peloponnesians appear in the Saronic Gulf.—Phrynichus assassinated, the fort pulled down, end suppression of the Four Hundred called for: tumult in the Piræus.—Accommodation between the two parties: points at issue reserved for a popular assembly.—Peloponnesian fleet appears: Athenians sail out.—Athenians defeated, and all Eubœa, except Oreus, revolts.—Consternation at Athens.—Athenians man 20 ships, and establish the Five Thousand.—Violent oligarchs fly to Dcelea: Cœnoe taken. Chap. 89—98.

#### VI. Athens encouraged by the Victory of Cynos-sema.

Grand Peloponnesian fleet moves from Miletus towards the Hellespont.—Athenian fleet leaves Samos, and stops at Lesbos, to recover Ereus.—Peloponnesian fleet leaves Chios for the Hellespont.—Surprises 18 Athenian ships at Sestos, which escape with difficulty.—Grand Athenian fleet leaves Ereus for the Hellespont.—Battle of Cynos-sema in the Hellespont: Athenians victorious.—Moral effect of the victory on the Athenians.—Athenians recover Cyzicus: Peloponnesians send for the fleet from Eubœa.—Alcibiades returns from Aspendus to Samos.—Antandrians expel their governor, Arsaces.—Tissaphernes goes to the Hellespont to try and reconcile himself to the Peloponnesians. Chap. 99—109.

## SUMMARY.

### I. Athenian Allies revolt, and are assisted by the Peloponnesians, who ally with Tissaphernes, chap. 1—28.

Great consternation at Athens: determination not to yield.—When the tidings of the disaster in Sicily reached Athens, it was disbelieved, and even the most respectable of the soldiery who had escaped were discredited. When, however, the Athenians had ascertained the fact, they were exasperated against the orators who had promoted the expedition, and against the soothsayers and oracle-

19th Year.  
n. c. 413.—  
Summer.  
continued.

mongers, who had inspired them with hopes of success. They were at once weighed down by their individual losses, and by those of the state, and saw that they had no such troops left as the heavy infantry, the cavalry, and the numbers in the flower of youth who had been destroyed; and knowing also that they had neither enough ships, money, nor stores, nor crews to man their vessels, they despaired of saving themselves. They expected that their enemies in Sicily would immediately sail against the Piræus, and that their foes at home would co-operate with their revolted allies, and attack them at once by land and sea. Nevertheless, they determined not to give way, but to procure timber and money from every possible quarter, and equip a fleet; to secure the alliance of their confederates, especially Eubœa; and to curtail their state expenses, and elect a council of elders to deliberate on all measures before they were proposed to the people.

General feeling against Athens: its allies revolt.—This winter all the Greeks were on the alert in consequence of the overthrow of the Athenians in Sicily. Those who had been neutral thought they ought now to join against Athens, and share in the glory of the war, which they expected would soon be terminated; especially as they considered that they themselves would have been next attacked, if the Athenians had succeeded in their designs on Sicily. The allies of Lacedæmon were now anxious to conclude the labours of the war. Those of Athens were eager to revolt, and still more sanguine that the Athenians would be unable to hold out another summer.

Lacedæmonians determine to bring the war to a conclusion.—Meantime the Lacedæmonians were encouraged by these favourable circumstances, especially as they expected a large reinforcement from their Sicilian allies in the ensuing spring. They therefore resolved to devote themselves with alacrity to conclude the war, and, by subduing the Athenians, both obtain the supremacy of Greece, and be released from all future dangers; such as those which would have surrounded them if Sicily had been annexed to the Athenian empire.



3 **Collect money and build 100 ships.**—Agis, their king, immediately set out with an army from Decelea, and collected money from the allies for the formation of a navy. He then turned towards the Malian Gulf, and carried off a large booty from the Ceteans, for which they had to pay a considerable ransom. He also, in spite of a protest on the part of the Thessalians, compelled the Achæans of Phthiotis and other dependants of Thessaly to give hostages and money; and he deposited the hostages at Corinth, and tried to bring over their countrymen to the Peloponnesian confederacy. The Lacedæmonians also sent a requisition to their allies to fit out 100 ships, each state to furnish the following number:—

	Ships
LACEDÆMONIANS	25
BÆOTIANS	25
PHOCIANS and LOCRIANS	15
CORINTHIANS	15
ARCADIANS, PELLENIANS, and SICYONIANS	10
MEGAREANS, TRÆZENIANS, EPIDAUURIANS, and HERMIONIANS	10
Total	100

They also made every preparation for beginning the war early in the spring.

4 **Athenians prepare a fleet and fortify Sunium.**—Meantime the Athenians began to build a fleet, and fortified Sunium to protect their corn-ships. They also evacuated the fort they had erected in Laconia, (vii. 26,) and retrenched their expenses, and carefully watched their allies.

5 **Athenian allies apply to Lacedæmon for aid in revolting.**—Whilst both parties were thus engaged, the allies of Athens meditated on revolting.

1st, The Eubœans sent ambassadors to Agis to treat of a revolt, and he accepted their proposals, and sent for Alcarnenes and Melanthus from Sparta to take the command in Eubœa; and these two then came to Agis at Decelea with 300 Neodamodes.

2nd, The Lesbians in the mean time made similar over-

tures, and being supported by the Bœotians, Agis was induced to drop the expedition to Eubœa, and to resolve on sending Alcarnenes to Lesbos with 20 ships, supplying half himself, and the remainder to be furnished by the Bœotians.

These affairs were transacted by Agis without the authority of the state, for whilst he was at Decelea with his forces he could send troops where he pleased, and levy soldiers and money; and the allies paid more obedience to him than to the Lacedæmonians, on account of his powerful army.

3rd, The Chians and Erythræans made a proposal of revolt, not to Agis, but to Sparta, and their envoys were accompanied by an ambassador from TISSAPHERNES, the satrap of the maritime provinces [in the south-west of Asia Minor, including Lydia and Caria], under Darius, son of Artaxerxes. Tissaphernes was inviting the Lacedæmonians to co-operate with him, and engaged to furnish them with supplies, because, 1st, He wished to reduce the power of the Athenians, who prevented his collecting the tribute from the Greek cities, and occasioned his falling into arrears; 2nd, He wished to obtain an alliance with Lacedæmon for the King; and 3rd, He had been ordered by Darius to seize or slay Amorges, the natural son of Pissuthnes, who had rebelled in Caria.

4th, The Hellespontine cities.—At the same time 6 two exiles, Calligitus, a Megarcan, and Timagoras, a Cyziene, who had been residing at the court of Pharnabazus, [the hereditary satrap of the provinces near the Hellespont,] arrived at Lacedæmon from Pharnabazus to procure a fleet and bring it to the Hellespont. This satrap had the same objects in view as Tissaphernes, viz. to collect his tribute by persuading the Athenian cities in his satrapy to revolt; and to obtain an alliance with the Lacedæmonians.

The Chians preferred through Alcibiades.—There was now great competition at Lacedæmon between the emissaries and parties of the rival satraps, to get an army and navy first. But the suit of the Chians and Tissaphernes was backed by Alcibiades, who was the hered-





itary friend of Endius, an Ephor, and whose family had a Lacedæmonian name, Endius\* being called the son of Alcibiades. The application was therefore decidedly preferred by the Lacedæmonians, but they first sent Phrynus, one of the Periæci, to Chios, to see whether it possessed as many ships, and was as powerful a state, as the envoys had represented. Phrynus brought word back that these representations were true, and the Lacedæmonians then admitted the Chians and Erythræans into their alliance, and resolved to send them 40 ships, as they already possessed 60 vessels. Of these 40 ships, the Lacedæmonians first intended to send 10 themselves under Melaneridas, their high admiral, but being alarmed by an earthquake, they equipped only five in Laconia, and sent them under Chalcidæus.

7 **A fleet prepared at the Isthmus for Chios.—**

20th Year  
B. C. 412—  
Summer.

In the following summer the Chians urged the despatch of the fleet, lest the Athenians should learn their measures. The Lacedæmonians then sent three Spartans to Corinth, with orders that all the ships there, 39 in all, and including those which Agis had prepared against Lesbos, should be at once hauled over the Isthmus into the Saronic Gulf, and sail to Chios. Calligitus and Timagoras, on the part of Pharnabazus, would not join in the Chian expedition, nor give the 25 talents [£6000] they had brought, but designed to go afterwards with another fleet by themselves. Agis on the contrary offered no opposition to the expedition.

Resolved, after Chios has been secured, to sail to Lesbos and Hellespont.—The allies held a congress at Corinth, and resolved first to sail to Chios, under Chalcidæus, then to Lesbos, under Alcamenes, (c. 5,) and then to the Hellespont under Clearchus; and to transport only half the fleet over the Isthmus at first, which detachment should set sail immediately, to divide the attention of the Athenians. They then brought the first division, including 21 ships, over the Isthmus, having formed such an

\* "That is, Alcibiades was the distinguishing family name of this Endius, borne by the members of his house in every alternate generation; so that Alcibiades was the surname to every Endius, and Endius the surname to every Alcibiades." *Dr. Arnold.*

opinion of the weakness of Athens as not to expect any resistance.

**Athenians obtain 7 Chian vessels.—**The Corinthians, however, were unwilling to sail before the celebration of the Isthmian festival, and Agis offered to make the expedition himself. But the Corinthians refused, and meantime the Athenians learnt the designs of the Chians, and sent Aristocrates, a general, to Chios to charge them with the fact, and, on their denying it, to demand some ships as a pledge of their fidelity. The majority of the Chians were ignorant of the negotiations, and 7 ships were sent; the few who were acquainted with them being unwilling to incur the enmity of the commons, especially as they now despaired of succours from the Peloponnesus.

**Athenians drive the enemy's 21 ships into Piræus.—** 10

Meanwhile the Isthmian games were celebrated, and as the sacred truce was proclaimed, the Athenians attended them, and saw more evidently into the designs of the Chians. On their return they prepared to stop the 21 ships which were to sail from Cenchreæ, and which soon set out for Chios under Alcamenes. The Athenians at first advanced against them with an equal number of ships, and then drew off into the open sea, but the enemy only followed them a little way and then returned. The Athenians then drew into port, for they had the 7 Chian vessels, which they could not trust, with them; but they afterwards increased their fleet to 37 ships, and chased the Peloponnesians, who were coasting along, into Piræus, a desert harbour on the confines of the Corinthian and Epidaurian territories. The Peloponnesians lost 1 ship, but brought the remaining 20 to anchor; when the Athenians attacked them both by sea and land, disabled most of their ships, and killed Alcamenes, their commander. The Athenians then posted a competent force to blockade the enemy's ships, and with the rest they anchored off a neighbouring island, and sent to Athens for a reinforcement. The next day the Corinthians and others in the neighbourhood came to succour the 21 ships. but finding it difficult to guard them in that desert place, they at first thought to burn the ships, but after-



wards hauled them up on the shore, and guarded them with land forces until some opportunity of escape should present itself. *Continued at chap. 20.*

**Lacedæmonians disheartened.**—When Agis heard of this disaster, he sent Thernon, a Spartan, to assist the Peloponnesians. Meantime news had been carried to Lacedæmon that the fleet had put to sea from the Isthmus, and the Lacedæmonians had just resolved to send the 5 ships, under Chalceides and Alcibiades, to join it, when tidings of the disaster reached them. They were then disheartened at having failed in the first operation in the Ionian war, and were more disposed to recall some of the ships that had already sailed.

12 **Alcibiades and Chalceides despatched with 5 ships.**

—Alcibiades now again persuaded Endius and the other ephors not to abandon the voyage, and assured them that the 5 ships could reach Chios before their disaster was known there; and that when he had once reached Ionia he could easily persuade the cities to revolt, by representing the weakness of the Athenians, and the zeal of the Lacedæmonians, in which he would be more credited than others. To Endius he privately represented the honour which would result to his administration if he should cause the revolt of Ionia, and bring King Darius into alliance with Lacedæmon, an honour which would otherwise be earned by Agis, with whom he was at variance (c. 48). Alcibiades having thus persuaded Endius and the other ephors, then set sail with Chalceides and the 5 ships for Chios.

13 **The 16 Peloponnesian ships return from Sicily.**—

About this time the 16 Peloponnesian vessels, which had co-operated with Gylippus in Sicily, reached Corinth with the loss of one galley, after having been roughly handled near Leucadia by 27 Athenian ships under Hippocles.

14 **Chios, Erythræ, and Clazomenæ revolt.**—

Chalceides and Alcibiades now pursued their voyage, seizing all vessels that came in their way, to prevent any news of their approach being carried before them. Them they dismissed at Corycus, where they held an interview with some of their Chian partisans, who advised them to sail immediately to Chios. They complied, and their sudden

arrival threw the many into amazement, whilst the few had arranged that a council should be then sitting. Alcibiades and Chalceides then said that many other ships were on their way, and withheld all mention of the blockade in the Piræus. The Chians accordingly revolted from Athens, and were immediately joined by the Erythræans. They then sailed in 3 vessels to Clazomenæ, which was also induced to revolt; and the Clazomenians fortified Polychne, on the continent, as a retreat in case of necessity.

**Athenians use the money set aside for emergency.**— 15

When the Athenians heard of the revolt of Chios they were greatly alarmed, and considered that the other allies would now be actuated by a similar spirit. They therefore decreed to use the 1000 talents, [£240,000,] which had been set aside from the commencement of the war, (ii. 24,) and equip a navy, rescinding the penal clause, which forbade the proposing to employ the money. Eight ships under Strombichides had been detached from the blockading squadron at Piræus, and had pursued Chalceides without success. These had now returned, and the Athenians sent them to Chios; afterwards withdrew 12 more ships from the same blockade, and sent them, under Thrasyclus, to reinforce the others. The Athenians also removed the 7 Chian vessels from the blockading fleet, and freed all the slaves on board, and put the freemen into bonds. They then manned other ships to fill up the places of those taken from the blockade, and resolved to fit out 30 others.

**Teos joins in the revolt.**—

Meantime Strombichides 16 with his 8 ships reached Samos, and having added one Samian galley to his squadron, he sailed to Teos, and begged it to keep quiet. But Chalceides sailed from Chios to Teos with 23 vessels, whilst the land forces of the Clazomenians and Erythræans marched along the shore. Strombichides weighed anchor, and was chased to Samos; whilst the Teians, being deprived of his support, received the enemy's land forces. The latter, after waiting in vain for the return of Chalceides, began, with the assistance of a few Barbarians under Otages, an officer of



Tissaphernes, to demolish a fortification which the Athenians had erected on the land side of the city.

- 17 **Miletus follows.**—After Chalcideus and Alcibiades had pursued Strombichides to Samos, they armed the crews on board their 5 Laconian vessels, and left them at Chios, filling up their places with Chians. With these 5, and 20 Chian ships, they sailed to Miletus; for Alcibiades was friendly with the principal Milesians, and desirous of bringing over this city, and as many others as possible, before any other Peloponnesian ships could arrive. They reached the island just before Strombichides and Thrasyacles came up with 19 Athenian ships; and as they at once prevailed on Miletus to revolt, the Athenians were refused admittance and compelled to anchor at Lade.

**Alliance between Lacedæmon and Persia.**—Immediately after the revolt of Miletus, the first alliance between the Lacedæmonians and the king of Persia was concluded by Tissaphernes and Chalcideus.

- 18 **First Treaty between King Darius and the Peloponnesians.**

I. All the territory and cities held by the king or his ancestors are to be considered as his.

II. All tribute or supplies hitherto paid by these cities to the Athenians to be stopped by the king, and by the Lacedæmonians and their allies.

III. The war against the Athenians to be jointly carried on by the king and the Lacedæmonians and their allies, and not to be concluded unless with the consent of both parties.

IV. Those who revolt from the king, and those who revolt from the Lacedæmonians and their allies, are to be considered as enemies alike of both parties.

- 19 **Athenian fleet defeats the Chian: Lebedos and Eræ revolt.**—Immediately after this the Chians fitted out 10 triremes, and sailed to Anæa to obtain news from Miletus, and draw in fresh cities. But Chalcideus sent word to them that Amorges was coming upon them with a land force, and ordered them back, and they sailed to the temple of Jupiter. There they descried a fresh squadron of Athenian ships approaching under Diomedon, and took to flight, 1 ship to Ephesus, and all the rest to Teos, except 4, which the Athenians captured, but the crews escaped.

Diomedon then sailed to Samos, whilst the Chians proceeded with their remaining ships, and accompanied by a land force, brought over Lebedos and Eræ to revolt.

**Peloponnesian fleet at Piræus breaks through the 20 blockade.**—About this time the 20 Peloponnesian ships at Piræus (c. 11) sallied out against the Athenian squadron, captured 4 ships, and sailed back to Cenchreæ, where they were joined by Astyochnus, who had been sent from Lacedæmon to be High Admiral. They then again prepared to sail to Chios and Ionia. Meantime the land forces had left Teos (c. 16). Tissaphernes marched thither with an army and completed the destruction of the wall, and then returned. But soon after his departure Diomedon arrived there with 10 ships from Athens, and the Teians consented to receive the Athenians on the same terms as the Peloponnesians. Diomedon then coasted to Eræ, and after making an unsuccessful attack on it retired.

**Revolution in Samos: it is secured to Athens.**— 21 About this time there was an insurrection in Samos (i. 117) (assisted by 3 Athenian ships) of the Samian commons, who were then against the nobles. The commons put 200 of the aristocracy to death, banished 400 others, and seized their land and houses. The Athenians then declared Samos to be independent, and regarded it as a trusty ally. From henceforth the commons held the government by themselves, and forbade any intermarrying with the aristocracy.

**Methymna and Mytilene revolt.**— After this, the 22 Chians wishing to bring over as many cities to revolt as possible, without assistance from Peloponnesus, proceeded with 13 ships to Lesbos, (c. 8,) whilst the land forces of the Peloponnesians and allies moved along the coast towards Clazomenæ and Cuma; the fleet under Diniadas, one of the Periæci, and the army under Eevalas, a Spartan. The ships sailed first to Methymna and induced it to revolt, and then, after leaving 4 vessels there, they proceeded to Mytilene, which revolted also.

**Astyochnus reaches Chios: Athenians recover Lesbos 23 and Clazomenæ.**—Astyochnus, the Spartan High Admiral, had now left Cenchreæ with 4 ships, and reached Chios. The third day after his arrival, 25 Athenian ships under Diomedon and Leon reached Lesbos; Leon having re-



cently brought 10 ships from Athens. The same evening Astyoehus added 1 Chian vessel to his 4 ships and sailed to Lesbos, and after touching at Pyrrha he proceeded to Eresus, where he heard that the Athenians had taken Mytilene, after suddenly entering the harbour and defeating the Chian fleet. This intelligence was confirmed by Eubulus, who had escaped from Methymna with three of the four vessels left there by the Chians. Astyoehus now stopped at Eresus, and induced it to revolt, and then armed the people, and sent them with the heavy-armed in his own fleet to Antissa and Methymna, under Eteoniceus, whilst he himself coasted along with his own ships and the three Chians, hoping to encourage the Methymnæans to persevere in their revolt. Finding, however, nothing but disappointment at Lesbos, he took his own forces on board and sailed back to Chios, whilst the land forces, (c. 22,) which were to have then proceeded to the Hellespont, separated to their various cities. Six Peloponnesian vessels afterwards came to Astyoehus at Chios, from Cenchrææ. The Athenians, having re-established their former supremacy at Lesbos, took Polichna, which the Clazomenians had fortified on the main-land, (c. 14,) and conveyed them all back to the island except the authors of the revolt, and thus recovered Clazomenæ.


24 Athenians make a descent on Miletus.—This summer the Athenians, in the 20 ships at Lade, (c. 17,) made a descent at Panormus, in the Milesian territory, slew Chalceideus, who had advanced against them with a small party, and erected a trophy three days after, which the Milesians destroyed, as the Athenians had not mastered the country.

Leon and Diomedon defeat the Chians and ravage Chios.—Leon and Diomedon, with the Athenian fleet from Lesbos, now advanced from the CEnussæ isles, and from the fortresses of Sidussa and Pteleum in Erythraæ, and carried on a war against Chios from their ships, having pressed some of the heavy-armed to serve as epibatæ or marines. Having landed at Cardamyle and Bolissus, they defeated the Chians and ravaged the places in the neighbourhood. They then overcame them again at Phanæ, and a third time at Leuconium, after which the

Chians kept within their walls, whilst the Athenians plundered and ravaged their rich country, which had been uninjured since the Median war. Indeed the Chians were the only nation (the Lacedæmonians excepted) whose prudence kept pace with their prosperity, and were the more attentive to their security as they increased in greatness; and they would never have ventured upon the present revolt had not many strong allies been ready to run the same risk, and the Athenians been so utterly reduced by their disaster in Sicily. Being now excluded from the sea, and ravaged by land, a party of them attempted to bring the city over to the Athenians. But the magistrates detected their design, and having sent for Astyoehus, who came with four ships from Erythraæ, they debated on what would be the mildest way of stopping the conspiracy.

Athenians defeat the Milesians, and prepare to besiege Miletus.—Late in the summer 48 ships sailed from Athens, including some transports, carrying 1000 heavy-armed Athenians, 1500 Argives, and 1000 allies, and arrived at Samos, under Phryniehus, Onomacles, and Scironides, and then crossed over and encamped in Miletus. The Peloponnesians who had come with Chalceideus, with some mercenaries under Tissaphernes, who himself brought a body of cavalry into the field, supported 800 heavy-armed Milesians, and engaged with the Athenians. The Argives advanced too far from their line, through their contempt for the enemy, and were defeated with the loss of 300 men. But the Athenians, having defeated the Peloponnesians, routed the Barbarians and others without engaging the Milesians, who had retreated into the city. The Athenians then encamped close to Miletus, and after erecting a trophy proceeded to invest it. In this battle the Ionians on both sides conquered the Dorians, for the Athenians defeated the Peloponnesians, and the Milesians the Argives.

A Peloponnesian and Sicilian fleet prepares to relieve Miletus.—On the evening of the same day the Athenians heard that 55 Peloponnesian and Sicilian ships were approaching. The Siceliot, chiefly at the instigation of Hermocrates, had sent 20 Syracusan ships and two Selinuntine vessels; and those which the Pelopon-





nesians had been preparing, (c. 6,) were now completed; and the united squadron had been committed to Theramenes to deliver up to Astyocheus. They first touched at Lerus, and on learning that the Athenians were at Miletus they sailed into the Iasic gulf to gain further information. They then encamped for the night at Tichiussa, where they were visited by Alcibiades, who acquainted them with the recent battle, in which he had taken part with the Milesians and Tissaphernes, and he pressed them, if they wished to save Ionia, to go at once to the relief of Miletus.

27 Athenians retire to Samos.—Theramenes then determined to relieve Miletus in the morning, but meantime Phrynichus, the Athenian commander, contrary to the wishes of his colleagues, refused to hazard a conflict; not choosing to expose the commonwealth to the risk of a battle after its recent misfortunes, especially as it might hereafter be easy to engage the enemy's fleet after having ascertained its strength and made due preparations. He then advised that they should embark their wounded with their stores and land forces, leaving behind their plunder in order to lighten their ships, and then sail to Samos, where they might collect all their forces and attack the enemy as occasion might offer. Phrynichus then acted as he had advised, and for this and subsequent transactions he was esteemed a wise man. The Athenians thus retired after an incomplete victory; and subsequently the Argives, mortified by their defeat, returned home from Samos.

28 Peloponnesians and Tissaphernes take Iasus and Amorges, and occupy Miletus.—Next morning the Peloponnesians left Tichiussa and entered Miletus, and after one day's stay they sailed back with the 20 Chian galleys which Chalcideus had commanded, (c. 17,) to fetch the stores which they left at Tichiussa. Here Tissaphernes met them with his land forces, and persuaded them to sail against Iasus, where Amorges was residing. At Iasus they were mistaken for Athenians, and easily took the place, the Syracusans greatly distinguishing themselves in the action. The Peloponnesians took Amorges and gave him up to Tissaphernes, and

sacked the town, and obtained great treasures, the fruits of long prosperity. The mercenaries of Amorges, who were chiefly Peloponnesians, they added to their own ranks, and delivered the town and all the captives to Tissaphernes, who paid one Daric stater [16s. 3d.] for each. They then returned to Miletus, and appointed Philippus to remain as governor; whilst Pedaritus, who had been sent by the Lacedæmonians to be governor of Chios, was despatched by land to Erythrae with the mercenaries taken from Amorges.

## II. Disagreement between the Peloponnesians and Tissaphernes, chap. 29—44.

Disputes between Tissaphernes and the Lacedæmonians.—This winter Tissaphernes, <sup>Winter.</sup> 29 having garrisoned Iasus, proceeded to Miletus, and distributed a month's pay, one drachma [9d.] a man per day, throughout all the ships, according to his agreement (c. 5); but for the future he wished to give only three oboli [or half a drachma] until he had consulted the King. Hermocrates, the Syracusan commander, remonstrated, but Theramenes, being only commissioned to conduct the fleet to Astyocheus, did not interfere. However it was at length agreed that Tissaphernes should pay at the rate of three talents [£720] a month for every five ships.

Athenians at Samos determine to attack Chios and watch Miletus.—The Athenians at Samos were now reinforced by 35 ships under Charminus, Strombichides, and Euctemon, and they determined to blockade Miletus with their navy, and to send a fleet and army against Chios. Accordingly, having drawn lots, Strombichides, Onomacles, and Euctemon sailed against Chios with 30 ships and some transports, conveying part of the 1000 heavy infantry which had gone to Miletus the preceding summer (c. 25); whilst the 74 remaining ships stayed at Samos to command the sea and carry on the war against Miletus.

Astyocheus fails to re-take Pteleum and Clazomenæ. 31  
—Astyocheus was now taking hostages at Chios on account of the conspiracy, (c. 24,) but desisted on hearing



that Theramenes had arrived with a fleet, and that the affairs of the confederacy were improving. He then took ten Peloponnesian and ten Chian ships, and after assaulting Pteleum without taking it, sailed to Clazomenæ, and commanded the Athenian party there to remove inland to Daphnus; and Tamos, the sub-satrap of Ionia, united in this command. The party however refused, and Astyochns assaulted the city, which was unwallèd, but without success. He then sailed before a hard gale to Phocæa and Cuma, whilst the rest of his ships put in at Marathussa, Pele, and Drymussa, islands off Clazomena. Here the latter were kept wind-bound for eight days, during which they either ravaged or consumed the property of the Clazomenians which had been secretly stowed there; and they then proceeded to Phocæa and Cuma to join Astyochns.

32 Lesbians apply to Astyochns for assistance in another revolt.—The Lesbians now sent ambassadors to Astyochns at Cuma to concert measures for another revolt. Astyochns himself consented; but the Corinthians and other allies being indisposed to co-operate with him, he sailed to Chios, where he was soon joined by his ships, which had been dispersed by a storm. Soon after, Pedaritus (c. 28) arrived at Erythræ, and then crossed to Chios, where he found the 500 soldiers with arms and armour left by Chalcidens (c. 17). At Chios some Lesbians again make offers of revolt, and Astyochns urged Pedaritus and the Chians to go to Lesbos and effect one, but they refused.

33 Astyochns takes the command of the grand Peloponnesian fleet.—Astyochns now declared that he would never help the Chians again, and sailed for Miletus with five Corinthian ships, one from Megara, and another from Hermione, to take the command of High Admiral. Having touched at Corycus in Erythræ, he stayed there for the night, whilst the Athenians, who were proceeding from Samos to Chios, (c. 30,) were only separated from him by a hill; but each party escaped the other's notice. In the night Astyochns received a letter from Pedaritus, saying, that some Erythræan captives had been dismissed from Samos on condition of betraying Erythræ. He

immediately sailed to Erythræ, and was joined there by Pedaritus; but upon investigating the case, they found that the seeming traitors had only used this pretence to obtain their liberation, and therefore acquitted them. Pedaritus then returned to Chios, whilst Astyochns sailed to Miletus.

An Athenian squadron driven to Chios.—Meantime, 54 the Athenian ships which were coasting round Corycus to act against Chios (c. 30) gave chase to three Chian vessels off Arginum, when a violent storm arose, and the Chians with difficulty gained the harbour. The three Athenians foremost in the pursuit were wrecked near Chios, and their crews taken prisoners or slain; the others took refuge in the harbour called Phœnicus, under Mount Mimas, and afterwards got to Lesbos and prepared to fortify Delphinium (c. 38).

Peloponnesian squadron captured off Triopium.— 35 This winter Hippocrates, the Lacedæmonian, sailed from Peloponnesus with 10 Thurian ships under Dorieus and 2 others, and with 1 Laconian and 1 Syracusan vessel, and reached Cnidus, which had revolted at the instigation of Tissaphernes. The Peloponnesian generals at Miletus then ordered half the ships to guard Cnidus, and the other half to cruise round the Triopian foreland for merchant vessels coming from Egypt. But the Athenian fleet, sailing from Samos, captured the 6 vessels off Triopium, but the crews escaped; and they nearly succeeded in storming Cnidus, which was unfortified. The next day they made a second assault on the city, but with still less success, for during the night the inhabitants had been reinforced by the six crews from Triopium, and made better defences. The Athenians then ravaged the Cnidian territory and sailed back to Samos.

Miletus: 2nd treaty between the Peloponnesians 36 and the King.—When Astyochns reached Miletus, he found that the Peloponnesians received a large amount of pay and had obtained great wealth by the plunder of Iasus, and that the Milesians carried on the war with spirit. But the former treaty made by Chalcidens with Tissaphernes (c. 18) was considered to be defective, and whilst Theramenes was yet there, another was concluded.



37 *Second Treaty between King Darius and the Peloponnesians.*

- I. That the Lacedæmonians or their allies shall not make war upon, nor injure, nor exact tribute from, any of the cities or territories belonging to King Darius or to his ancestors.
- II. That neither King Darius nor any of his subject states shall be permitted to make war upon or injure the Lacedæmonians or their allies.
- III. That the Lacedæmonians and their allies, and the King, shall assist each other in cases of need, according to mutual agreement.
- IV. That both parties shall jointly carry on the war against the Athenians and their allies, and when it be concluded shall make peace in common.
- V. *That the King shall maintain whatever forces he may send for, as long as they remain in his dominions.*
- VI. That if any of the states which concluded this convention with the King invade the King's territory, the rest shall hinder them to the utmost of their power.
- VII. That if any of the King's subjects invade the territory of the Lacedæmonians or their allies, the King shall hinder them to the utmost of his power.

38 Athenians reduce the Chians to great distress: Astyochus refuses relief.—After the conclusion of the treaty, Theramenes delivered the fleet to Astyochus, and sailing away in a small vessel was lost at sea. The Athenians at Lesbos (c. 34) had now crossed over to Chios, and were masters of both land and sea, and proceeded to fortify Delphinium, a place not far from the city, and which was naturally strong on the land side, and commanded several harbours. The Chians were dispirited by past defeats and distrustful of each other, for Tydeus and his adherents had been put to death by Pedaritus for Atticizing, and the whole city kept in awe by an oligarchy. They therefore remained quiet, thinking neither themselves nor the auxiliaries under Pedaritus (c. 28) a match for the enemy; but they sent to Astyochus for aid, who refused, (c. 33,) and Pedaritus complained of his conduct in a letter to Lacedæmon. Whilst affairs at Chios remained in this state, the Athenians at Samos still made cruises against the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus, but the enemy would not leave the harbour.

Peloponnesian fleet sent to aid the revolt of the 39 Hellespontine cities.—This winter the Lacedæmonians had equipped 27 ships for the service of Pharnabazus, at the instance of Calligetus and Timagoras (c. 6). These sailed from the Peloponnesus for Ionia, under Antisthenes the Spartan.

Eleven Spartan commissioners sent from Sparta to the fleet at Miletus.—The Lacedæmonians also sent out eleven Spartans, including Lichas, (v. 50,) to be counsellors to Astyochus. These eleven on arriving at Miletus were to co-operate with Astyochus, and to send off as many vessels as they thought proper under Clearchus to join Pharnabazus at the Hellespont; and they were also empowered to depose Astyochus, if they judged it expedient, and appoint Antisthenes in his place, as the letter of Pedaritus had made the home government suspicious. This squadron sailed from Malea and touched at Melos, where they fell in with 10 Athenian ships, and took 3 and burnt them. Fearing then that the remaining 7 might carry the news of their approach to the Athenians at Samos, they sailed to Crete, and protracting their voyage proceeded to Caunus, whence they sent to the fleet at Miletus for a convoy.

Chians again apply to Astyochus, who sails to join 40 the ships at Caunus.—The Chians now again sent to request Astyochus to succour them with his whole fleet. Their many slaves, the largest body in any one city except Sparta, had been punished for offences more severely on account of their numbers, and had now nearly all deserted to the Athenians, who had established themselves in Delphinium. The Chians therefore urged that he ought to help them, before the fortification of Delphinium was completed; and Astyochus, seeing that the allies were anxious for their relief, determined to succour them. But meantime he heard from Caunus of the arrival of 41 the 27 Lacedæmonian ships, and thought it more important to convoy the squadron, and thus both obtain the command of the sea, and secure the safe passage of the eleven commissioners appointed to inspect his conduct. He therefore sailed to Caunus, and whilst coasting along by Cos Meropeis, which had been reduced to ruins by the



most violent earthquake that Thucydides could remember, he sacked the town and plundered all the country, but spared the free population.

**Defeats 20 Athenian ships, and reaches Caunus.—**

From Cos Astyocheus sailed by night to Cnidus, but was advised by the Cnidians not to land, but to sail at once after 20 Athenian ships under Charminus, who had been sent from Samos against the 27 Peloponnesian ships, and was now on the look-out about Syme, Chalce, Rhodes, and Lycia. Astyocheus immediately sailed to Syme, but his ships got separated in a dark and rainy night; and in the morning his left wing was in sight of the Athenians, whilst his other vessels were dispersed round the island. Charminus then bore down on their left wing with only a part of his squadron, thinking it was the fleet from Caunus. He sunk 3 vessels and disabled others, and obtained the advantage until the remainder of the enemy's vessels hove in sight and surrounded him. He then fled with the loss of six ships to the island of Teutlussa, and thence to Halicarnassus. Astyocheus then proceeded to Caunus and effected a junction with the 27 Peloponnesian ships; and the united fleet erected a trophy at Syme, and reached Cnidus.

43 The Athenians at Samos on hearing of the battle sailed with all their ships from Samos to Syme, and after taking up their naval stores which were there, they touched at Lorymi and returned.

**The 11 commissioners dispute with Tissaphernes.—**

The Peloponnesian ships at Cnidus were now refitted, and the 11 commissioners held a conference with Tissaphernes, both to remonstrate on some past proceedings, and to represent their views as to the future conduct of the war. Lichas, especially, scrutinized most closely what had been done, and declared that neither the treaty of Chalcideus (c. 18) nor that of Theramenes (c. 37) had been fairly drawn up; that it would be a hard condition if the king should claim all the countries over which he and his ancestors had formerly ruled, for he would then be at liberty to re-subdue not only all the islands in the Ægean, but also Thessaly, Locris, and Bœotia; and the Lacedæmonians, instead of liberating

the Greeks, would be enslaving them to the Medes. He then said that another and a better treaty must be concluded, for the Lacedæmonians would not receive pay on such conditions. But Tissaphernes departed in a rage, and nothing was settled.

**Revolt of Rhodes: Peloponnesian fleet sails there.—** 44

Overtures having arrived from some of the principal men at Rhodes, the Peloponnesian fleet sailed there from Cnidus, with 94 ships, hoping to bring over so strong an island, and maintain their fleet from their own confederacy without applying to Tissaphernes for pay. On reaching Camirus the people were frightened and fled, as their town was unfortified. The Lacedæmonians however assembled these and the inhabitants of Lindus and Iclysus, and prevailed on the Rhodians to revolt from Athens. The Athenians heard of their design and sailed from Samos, but were too late. They then sailed to Chalce, and from thence to Samos; and afterwards made cruises from Chalce, Cos, and Samos, and carried on hostilities against Rhodes. The Peloponnesians levied 32 talents (£7680) from the Rhodians, and hauled up their ships on the shore for 80 days.

III. *Alcibiades flies to Tissaphernes, and sets on foot an oligarchical conspiracy at Samos, chap. 45—60.*

Alcibiades leaves the Peloponnesians and flies to Tissaphernes.—Meantime, or even before the Rhodian revolt, the following took place. After the death of Chalcideus (c. 24) the Peloponnesians began to suspect Alcibiades, who was a personal enemy of Agis (c. 12); and Astyocheus received instructions from Lacedæmon to put him to death. Alcibiades then fled to Tissaphernes, and did his utmost to harm the Peloponnesians. He advised Tissaphernes to lower their pay (c. 29) from 1 drachma (9*d.*) to 3 obols, (4½*d.*), and bade him say that the Athenians only gave 3 obols, and that not through poverty, but to prevent their seamen from becoming insolent or less able-bodied, or too much inclined to leave their ships. He also instructed him how to bribe the trierarchs and generals to concede to him, and Democrates, the Syracusan commander, was the only one who





did not give way. As for the states that asked for money, Alcibiades repulsed them himself on the part of Tissaphernes. To the Chians he said, that it was shameful that they, the wealthiest of the Greeks, should expect others to risk lives and expend money for their freedom. To the other states he said, that they ought to contribute as much, if not more, for their own interests, as they had previously paid to the Athenians. He also represented that Tissaphernes was obliged to use a strict economy, as he was now carrying on the war at his own expense; but if ever funds came from the King, he would give them full pay and proper assistance.

- 46 **Counsels him to keep the balance between the rival powers.**—Alcibiades also advised Tissaphernes not to be too hasty in bringing the war to a conclusion, nor to bring up the Phœnician fleet, nor take more Greeks into his pay, so as to permit one party to obtain the ascendancy by land and sea. But he recommended that the two rival powers should each hold sway, so that the King could always bring one party against another if it annoyed him; and that it was also both cheaper and safer to let the Greeks wear each other out. He also said that the Athenians were more fit to share the empire with the King than the Lacedæmonians. Athens was chiefly desirous of establishing her maritime dominion, and would join with him in subjugating the Asiatic Greeks, whilst Lacedæmon was desirous of liberating them. He therefore urged Tissaphernes to cut down the power of the Athenians as much as possible, and then to rid himself of the Peloponnesians.

Tissaphernes seems to have adopted these views. He supplied them with scanty funds, and would not suffer them to fight by sea; but, by promising that the Phœnician fleet should join them, he injured their cause and abated the vigour of their navy.

- 47 **Intrigues with some Athenian oligarchs at Samos.**—Alcibiades gave this advice to Tissaphernes because he wished to obtain his own restoration to Athens, and this he thought might be best effected by making it appear that Tissaphernes was his friend. This indeed came to pass. The Athenians at Samos saw the great influence he had

with Tissaphernes, and the most influential persons amongst them received messages from Alcibiades begging to be remembered to the more respectable sort, and saying that, if they would adopt an oligarchy instead of the evil democracy which had banished him, he should like to make Tissaphernes their friend, and return to enjoy his citizenship with them. Then the trierarchs and the most powerful Athenians became desirous of abolishing the democracy.

**Progress of a conspiracy at Samos: opposed by Phrynichus.**—The Athenians at Samos now sent a deputation to confer with Alcibiades, who held out hopes that if they would change their government he would first make Tissaphernes their friend, and afterwards the King. When the members of the deputation returned to Samos, they mustered their friends, and then publicly announced that the King would be their ally and supply them with money, on the recall of Alcibiades and change in their constitution. The body of the fleet were displeas'd at the negotiations, but silenced by the hope of pay; whilst the advocates for an oligarchy held a meeting amongst themselves to consider more maturely the proposals of Alcibiades. But Phrynichus, who was still general, believed, and truly, that Alcibiades cared no more for oligarchy than democracy, nor for anything but for that which would lead to his recall. "It seemed incredible," he said, "that the King could ever be persuaded to incur the enmity of the Peloponnesians, whose naval strength now balanced that of Athens, and who possessed several important cities in his dominions, for the sake of the Athenians, whom he could not trust. As to the plan of establishing oligarchies in the allied states, it would neither allure back those who had revolted nor confirm those who remained true; for they care more for liberty and independence than for either oligarchy or democracy. Indeed the oligarchs are more oppressive than the commons; they invented and introduced measures which benefited themselves at the public expense; whilst the commons moderated the spirit of the other party and protected the people from their violence. Moreover, he was well assured that the states held this opinion,



founded as it is on their own experience; and he could not therefore approve of any of the schemes which Alcibiades has proposed."

- 49 **Conspirators send a deputation to Athens.**—Those however of the assembly who approved of the present proposals, prepared to send Pisander and others as an embassy to Athens, to treat for the recall of Alcibiades, the abolition of the democracy, and the means of procuring the friendship of Tissaphernes.
- 50 **Phrynichus informs Astyochus, who tells Alcibiades, who writes to the Athenians.**—Phrynichus now feared the consequences of having opposed Alcibiades, and secretly sent a letter to Astyochus, who was still at Miletus, informing him that Alcibiades was negotiating a friendship between Tissaphernes and the Athenians, and remarking that it was excusable in him to devise evil against a bitter enemy, even to the detriment of the state. Astyochus then went to Magnesia, and betrayed this information to Alcibiades and Tissaphernes, and appears to have sold himself to the latter. Alcibiades then wrote to the colleagues of Phrynichus at Samos, acquainting them with his treachery, and requiring that he should be put to death. Phrynichus then, in great consternation, sent to reproach him for not having kept the previous communication secret, and offered to betray the whole Athenian armament at Samos, which was unfortified, into his hands, pleading that it was better to do this or anything else, rather than fall a sacrifice to his bitterest foes.
- 51 **Phrynichus saves himself by an artifice.**—Phrynichus afterwards learnt that Astyochus had again betrayed him, and that another letter exposing his treason was on its way from Alcibiades. He therefore announced to his army, that as Samos was unfortified, and all the ships were not moored in the harbour, the enemy were about to make an attack, and of this he had received certain intelligence; and he added, that no time should be lost in fortifying Samos, and putting everything else in a posture of defence; and he immediately gave his orders, as general, to the same effect. Accordingly, when the letters arrived from Alcibiades, they confirmed

the intelligence of Phrynichus, and seemed to prove that the charges arose from the personal enmity of Alcibiades.

**Alcibiades tries to win over Tissaphernes to Athens.** 52—After this Alcibiades laboured to persuade Tissaphernes to be a friend to the Athenians, and the latter, though afraid of the naval superiority of the Peloponnesians, was disposed to yield, especially after the dissension at Cnidus about the treaty, (c. 43,) where Lichas had verified the observation of Alcibiades concerning the Lacedæmonians liberating the cities.

**Conspirators reach Athens: propose an oligarchy and the recall of Alcibiades.** 53—Pisander and his colleagues (c. 49) had now reached Athens, and addressed the people, most especially urging, that if they would recall Alcibiades and abolish their democracy, they might have the King for their ally, and defeat the Peloponnesians. This was opposed by the friends of democracy and the enemies of Alcibiades, who exclaimed, that the recall of Alcibiades would be a violation of the laws; and the Eumolpidæ and Ceryces, [the great priestly families who enjoyed the hereditary right of ministering at the mysteries of Ceres,] testified against him for having profaned the mysteries, (vi. 53,) and appealed to the gods against his being restored. Pisander, however, took each of his opponents aside, and asked him how he hoped to save the state whilst the Peloponnesians had as many ships as Athens, more cities in their alliance, and were supplied with money by the King and Tissaphernes; unless the King could be brought over to be an ally. None ventured to reply, and Pisander then said, "The only way of gaining this ally is to modify our constitution, and place our government in the hands of a few, that the King may be able to trust us. This is not a time to discuss forms of government, but to preserve the state; and we shall have power hereafter to alter anything which may not please us. Moreover, Alcibiades must be restored, as he is the only man able to accomplish the object for which these changes are to be made."

**Athenians send 10 deputies to Tissaphernes: Phrynichus recalled.**—The Athenians were at first indignant



at the mention of an oligarchy, but being convinced that there was no other means of preservation, they determined to send Pisander with ten commissioners to negotiate the matter with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades. Pisander also falsely accused Phrynichus of having betrayed Iasus and Amorges (c. 27, 28). The people deposed him and his colleague Scironides from the command, and sent Diomedon and Leon to be generals in their room.

Pisander exhorts the clubs.—Pisander also visited all the clubs which existed in the city for mutual support in law-suits and elections to offices, and exhorted them to unite for the overthrow of democracy. He then proceeded with the ten commissioners to Tissaphernes.

- 55 Athenian fleet attacks Rhodes: its successes at Chios.—This winter Diomedon and Leon reached the Athenian fleet and sailed against Rhodes. They found the Peloponnesian ships still hauled up, (c. 44,) and, landing on the island, they defeated a body of Rhodians, and then withdrew to Chalce, which was more convenient than Cos for observing the movement of the enemy's fleet. Meantime Xenophantidas, a Lacedæmonian, arrived at Rhodes from Pedaritus at Chios, saying that the Athenian wall (c. 40) was now completed, and that Chios could only be saved by the immediate succour of the whole Peloponnesian armament. Before, however, it could sail to the relief of the place, Pedaritus with his Chians and mercenaries assaulted the wall round the Athenian camp, and seized some of the vessels, but the Athenians came up and routed his forces, and he himself was slain. The siege now became closer than ever both by land and sea, and a great famine commenced.

- 56 Pisander goes to Tissaphernes: negotiations broken off through his extravagant demands.—Meantime Pisander and his ten fellow-ambassadors arrived from Athens and held conferences with Tissaphernes, who was now more afraid of the Peloponnesians, and wished, as Alcibiades had at first proposed, to let the two rival powers wear each other out. Alcibiades then saw that he could not persuade him to an alliance, and wishing to save the credit of his influence with Tissaphernes, he

determined to force the Athenians themselves to break off the negotiations by making demands which it was impossible for them to grant. Alcibiades himself then spoke for Tissaphernes, who was also present. For a long time Pisander and the deputies acceded to whatever he asked, even when he exacted the cession of the whole of Ionia and of the adjacent islands. At length, in a third interview, he required that the King should be at liberty to build ships, and sail along his own coasts wherever and with as many vessels as he pleased. The Athenian deputies then refused to make any further concessions, and considering that they had been deceived by Alcibiades, they departed in a rage to Samos.

Tissaphernes renews his connexion with the Pe- 57  
loponnesians. — Immediately afterwards, Tissaphernes wished to bring the Peloponnesians back to Miletus, and therefore repaired to Caunus. He was either afraid that their want of supplies would drive them to risk a battle with the Athenians, in which they might be defeated, or by their ships being deserted by the crews the Athenians might gain their ends without his assistance; and he also feared lest they should ravage the continent to satisfy their wants. He therefore determined to help the Greeks still on an equality, and sending for the Lacedæmonians he gave them pay and concluded a third treaty.

*Third Treaty between Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians.* 58

Concluded in the 13th year of the reign of King Darius, in the plain of Mæander, between the Lacedæmonians and their allies on the one part, and Tissaphernes, Hieramenes, and the sons of Pharnaces on the other part, concerning the affairs of the King and those of the Lacedæmonians and their allies.

- I. That the King's territory, as far as it lies in Asia, shall belong to him still, and he shall rule it as he pleases.
- II. That the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall not invade the King's territory to injure it, nor the King invade that of the Lacedæmonians and their allies.
- III. That if any of the Lacedæmonians and their allies invade the King's territory to injure it, the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall prevent them; and if any from the



King's territory should invade that of the Lacedæmonians, the King shall prevent them.

IV. That Tissaphernes shall supply the pay for the present fleet according to the rate agreed upon, until the King's fleet shall arrive, but that then the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall be at liberty to support their own fleet if they wish it, otherwise Tissaphernes shall do so, and be repaid at the conclusion of the war.

V. That on the arrival of the King's fleet, the war shall be carried on jointly by the King and the Lacedæmonians and their allies, according as both parties shall think fit.

VI. That if they conclude the war, both parties shall treat with the Athenians in conjunction with each other.

59 Tissaphernes professes to prepare to bring up the Phœnician fleet.—Tissaphernes now prepared to bring up the Phœnician fleet, and then perform the other things which he had promised; or at least he desired to appear to be thus preparing.

60 Bœotians take Oropus: Peloponnesian fleet sails to Miletus, and Athenian to Samos.—At the close of this winter the Bœotians took Oropus by the treachery of its Athenian garrison, and with the co-operation of some of the Oropians and Eretrians who were plotting the revolt of Eubœa. For Oropus was just opposite to Eretria, and as long as the Athenians held it it annoyed both Eretria and the rest of Eubœa. The Eretrians, being now in possession of Oropus, went to Rhodes to invite the Peloponnesians into Eubœa. The latter were however more inclined to succour Chios, to which they sailed with the whole of their fleet; but whilst off Triopium, they deserted the Athenian fleet sailing from Chalcæ. Neither fleet however advanced against the other, but the Athenian sailed to Samos and the Peloponnesian to Miletus, for the latter saw that they could not relieve Chios without hazarding a battle.

IV. *Oligarchical Revolution at Athens, and Counter-revolution at Samos, chap. 61—83.*

61 Dercylidas sent to the Hellespont.—Dercylidas the Spartan was now sent [from Miletus] to the Hellespont with a small land force, to effect the revolt of Abydus, a Milesian colony.

Indecisive naval battle off Chios.—After the death of

Pedaritus, and whilst Astyochus was still at Rhodes Leon the Spartan was sent to Miletus, accompanied by Antisthenes, to be commander at Chios in the room of Pedaritus. From Miletus Leon was sent to Chios with 12 ships which had been on guard there, viz. 5 Thurian, 4 Syracusan, 1 Anæan, 1 Milesian, and 1 belonging to himself. The Chians then manned 36 vessels, and engaged in an obstinate battle with the Athenian fleet of 32 ships, and retired at night-fall, having had by no means the worst in the action.

Dercylidas procures the revolt of Abydus and 62 Lampsacus: Athenians recover Lampsacus.—After this, Dercylidas having reached the Hellespont, Abydus revolted to him and Pharnabazus, and Lampsacus followed two days after. Strombichides, hearing this, sailed from Chios to the rescue, with 24 Athenian ships, including some transports carrying heavy-armed troops. Having defeated the Lampsacenes he took their city, which was unfortified, at the first assault, and seized the slaves and moveable property, but restored the free inhabitants. He then proceeded against Abydus, which refused to surrender; and being unable to take it, he garrisoned the opposite town of Sestus as a defence for the whole of the Hellespont.

Astyochus advances to Chios.—Meantime Astyochus 63 at Miletus heard of the battle between the Chians and Athenians, and that Strombichides had left Chios. He then coasted to that island with two ships, and after taking the fleet from thence, he advanced with his whole force against Samos; but the Athenians, being suspicious of each other, declined to meet him, and he returned to Miletus.

Progress of the oligarchical conspiracy.—Pisander and his fellow-ambassadors had now returned from Tissaphernes to Samos, (c. 56,) and both strengthened their influence in the army, and formed a new oligarchical party amongst the Samians, who had so recently overpowered their own nobility (c. 21). At the same time their Athenian partisans at Samos determined to renounce Alcibiades, as he would not join them, and was unfit to become a member of an oligarchy; and they determined





for the future to rely upon themselves, and to sustain the war from their own private resources.

- 64 **Democracy at Thasos overthrown: it revolts to Lacedæmon.**—The Athenian oligarchical party at Samos then sent Pisander and half of the ambassadors to Athens, with orders to establish oligarchies in the subject cities on their way; and despatched the other half to different dependant states. They also sent Diotrophes, who was now at Chios, and had been appointed to command on the coast of Thrace, with similar instructions. Accordingly, on arriving at Thasos, he abolished the democracy, but in two months after his departure the Thasians fortified their city, and looked daily for liberty from the Lacedæmonians. Indeed a party of Thasian exiles in the Peloponnesus had been concerting measures with their friends in Thasos for bringing in ships and inducing the city to revolt, and they now found that their greatest obstacle, the democracy, was removed without danger to themselves. On the other hand, the Athenian oligarchical party found a different result from what they had expected; for the revolution was considered only as a step towards independence and absolute liberty.
- 65 **Oligarchical principles furthered at Athens by the clubs.**—Meanwhile Pisander and his fellow-ambassadors coasted to Athens, having abolished some democracies on their way and taken some heavy-armed troops from different places. On their arrival they found their objects nearly accomplished by their partisans. Several of the young men had united together and assassinated Androcles, wishing to destroy his influence as leader of the commons, and desiring to gratify Alcibiades, whose banishment he had greatly promoted. Other obnoxious individuals had shared his fate. A proposal had also been set on foot that no pay ought to be allowed for any but military service, and that only 5000 persons ought to have a share in the government, and that these should be chosen for their property or personal qualifications. The
- 66 **popular assembly and the council of Five Hundred, however, still met, though the speakers and measures were alike those of the oligarchical party.** Indeed no one opposed them, because of the extent of the conspiracy, or

through fear of assassination, in which last case no search was made for the murderer, nor were any judicial measures taken against those who were suspected. Ignorance of each other's opinions also rendered it impossible for men to complain to each other, or unite for mutual defence, and contributed to the greatest distrust amongst the *many*, and promoted the security of the *few*.

**New constitution of a Council of Four Hundred, and 67  
Assembly of Five Thousand.**—Pisander and his colleagues, having arrived at this juncture, convened an assembly, and moved a resolution for appointing ten commissioners with full powers to frame a new constitution, to be laid before the people on a certain day. When the day came, a second assembly was held at Colonus, a temple of Poseidon, about 10 stadia [ $1\frac{1}{4}$  mile] from Athens. The commissioners, however, only proposed that any Athenian might express whatever opinion he pleased, and that severe penalties should be imposed upon any who attempted to restrain him. At length it was plainly declared that no one should any longer hold office or receive pay according to the present constitution; that they should elect five Proedri, or presidents, who should choose 100 others. Each of the 100 should then elect three for himself, and the whole, amounting to Four Hundred, should go into the council-chamber and govern with full powers, and assemble the Five Thousand whenever they pleased.

**Names and character of the principal Revolu- 68  
tionists: 1st, Antiphon.**—Though Pisander took the most open part in abolishing the democracy, yet the revolution was chiefly devised and brought about by ANTIPHON, a man of signal virtue and approved ability. He did not come forward in the assembly, or willingly join in public debate, as he was suspected on account of his talent and eloquence; but he was most able to assist with his counsels all such as had any suits in the courts of justice, or before the popular assembly. Afterwards, on the downfall of the Four Hundred, and when severely treated by the democracy, he made the best defence that Thucydides had ever known.

**2nd, Phrynichus**—was beyond all others the most



zealously active in establishing an oligarchy, through his fear of Alcibiades, who was in possession of his treasonable correspondence with Astyochus, and who he hoped would never be recalled by an oligarchical state.

3rd, Theramenes,—as a leader of the oligarchical party, was a man of considerable intellect and eloquence.

It was therefore no wonder that a plot managed by such able men should have succeeded, though it was an arduous undertaking to deprive the Athenians of their liberty in the 100th year after the expulsion of the tyrants, and when they had not only been subject to none, but for more than half that period had been accustomed to rule over others.

69 Council of Five Hundred dissolved.—The Four Hundred now entered the council of Five Hundred in the following manner: The Athenians were all still under arms, as the enemy continued at Decælea, (vii. 28,) but on that day those who were not in the plot were permitted [after a sort of morning parade] to pile their arms and return home as usual; whilst the adherents of the oligarchy were directed to withdraw only a short distance from the arms, and to seize them in case of any opposition; and these last were reinforced by some Andrians, Tenians, Æginetan colonists, and 300 Carystians. The Four Hundred then armed themselves with concealed daggers, and being escorted by 120 of the younger conspirators, whom they selected as a permanent guard, they proceeded to the council-chamber where the Five Hundred were all assembled. The Four Hundred then bade them depart, and, on their silently obeying, gave to each one his pay for the remainder of the year as he left the door.

70 Four Hundred installed: try to negotiate with Agis.—The rest of the citizens were equally passive with the deposed council, and the Four Hundred elected Prytanes by lot, and quietly installed themselves with the usual prayers and sacrifices. Subsequently they widely deviated from the democratic administration. They did not indeed recall the exiles, because of Alcibiades, but they ruled the city by force, and executed many and banished others. They also sent overtures of peace to

Agis, who was at Decælea, and urged their claim to his confidence as an oligarchical power.

Agis tries to seize Athens, but is repulsed: negotiations for peace re-commenced.—Agis, however, considered that Athens was still unsettled, and that the people would neither immediately give up their ancient liberty nor remain quiet, if he approached with a large force. He therefore returned an unconciliatory reply, and having sent for and received a large reinforcement from the Peloponnesus, he united it with the garrison at Decælea, and led the whole to the very walls of Athens. He hoped that the city, being thrown into confusion, would submit on his own terms, or that owing to the disorder both within and without he might at least be able to take the Long Walls, which would be unmanned. But as Agis approached Athens, all was tranquil within the city, whilst the Athenians sent out a body of cavalry and a division of heavy and light infantry and archers, who cut down some of his troops, and seized some arms and kept possession of the slain. Agis then returned to Decælea, and sent back the reinforcement. He then received a subsequent embassy from the Four Hundred with more favour; and by his advice the Four Hundred sent envoys to Lacedæmon to negotiate a treaty.

The Four Hundred send envoys to Sparta, and a deputation to Samos.—The Four Hundred also sent ten persons to Samos to state that the oligarchy had been established for the safety of the state, and not to the injury of the city; and that the government was held, not by the Four Hundred only, but by Five Thousand also; a greater number indeed than the Athenians had ever assembled to deliberate on foreign affairs in wartime. Other instructions were also sent, and the ten deputies were despatched immediately, lest the mob of seamen there should refuse to accept the oligarchy and be the means of deposing it.

Oligarchical revolution attempted at Samos, but fails.—Whilst these events were occurring at Athens, the oligarchical party at Samos (c. 63) to the number of 300 had bound themselves by oaths to attack the adherents of democracy. Being countenanced by several Athenians, and Charminus, one of the generals, they



put to death Hyberbolus, a base Athenian, who had been ostracised, not from any fear of his influence, but for being a disgrace to the city. They also determined on attacking the democratic party, but the latter discovered their design and revealed it to Leon and Diomedon, two of the generals, who had submitted to the oligarchy against their will, and to Thrasybulus, a trierarch, and to Thrasyllus, an officer in the heavy infantry. These four immediately urged the soldiers to resist the threatened attack, and especially the crew of the *Paralus*, who were all Athenians and freemen, and most bitter against the oligarchy; and Leon and Diomedon also left some ships as a guard for the democracy, whenever they went on a cruise. At length the 300 partisans of the oligarchy attacked the Samian democrats, who, being assisted by the seamen, and especially by the crew of the *Paralus*, got the best of the struggle, and slew 30 of the oligarchs, imprisoned three, and pardoned the rest, on condition of their living for the future under a democracy.

74 The *Paralus* despatched with the news to Athens, and seized by the Four Hundred.—Chæreas was now sent with the ship *Paralus* to carry the news to Athens, but arrived there after the Four Hundred had obtained the government. The ship was seized, two or three of the crew were thrown into prison, and the remainder were placed in a guard ship, and appointed to keep watch round Eubœa. Chæreas, however, concealed himself and escaped to Samos, where he gave an exaggerated account of the tyranny of the Athenian oligarchy. He declared that it was punishing all with stripes, and would not suffer a word to be spoken against the government; that it was outraging the wives and families of the citizens, and purposed arresting the relatives of those who were serving at Samos, and of keeping them as hostages, to be put to death if the fleet refused to submit.

75 Athenian fleet and Samians unite against the oligarchy.—The multitude in the fleet were now strongly inclined to attack the authors of the oligarchy, and were only restrained by those of moderate views, who pointed out the danger of a tumult whilst the enemy was so near. Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus then bound over all the soldiers, and especially the oligarchical party, to

maintain a democratic government and live in concord, and to zealously persevere in the war against the Peloponnesians, and in an implacable hatred against the Four Hundred. All the Samians of ripe age took the same oath, and were henceforth united with the Athenians of the fleet, by a sense of common danger from the Four Hundred at Athens and the enemy at Miletus.

New officers appointed: fleet determines to oppose 76  
the oligarchy at Athens and enemy at Miletus.—The army now held an assembly, and deposed those of the trierarchs and generals, whom they suspected of disaffection, and elected others in their place, of whom Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus were two. They then exhorted each other not to be disheartened because the city had revolted from them, for as they had the whole of the navy, they could compel the subject states to contribute money, whilst Samos—once a formidable rival of Athens—would now be to them what Athens had been. Moreover, it was only their position at Samos that had secured to the Athenians at home the command of the entrance to the Piræus; and if Athens did not quickly restore the democracy, she would soon be reduced to the greatest straits. Indeed Athens would be of little use in assisting them to defeat the enemy. She was unable to send them money or give them good counsel, and had shown how inferior her wisdom was to that of the fleet, by abrogating her hereditary constitution, which they were determined to restore. The recall of Alcibiades would also procure them an alliance with the King. But if all other resources failed, the possession of so large an armament would enable them to reach numerous retreats, where they should find both cities and lands. Having thus encouraged each other, they proceeded to prepare vigorously for the war. 77

Ten deputies from Athens remain at Delos.—The ten deputies sent to Samos by the Four Hundred, (c. 72,) now heard of these proceedings in the fleet, and remained quiet at Delos (c. 86).

Peloponnesian fleet murmurs against Astyochus.—78  
Meantime the soldiers in the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus were clamouring against Astyochus and Tissa-



phernes: against Astyochus, because he would neither engage the Athenians before, when he had the strongest fleet, nor now, when they were divided by sedition, but submitted to be worn out by delay, on the idle pretence of waiting for the Phœnician fleet; against Tissaphernes, because he had neither brought up the Phœnician fleet nor supplied the stipulated pay regularly or in full. They therefore, especially the Syracusans, urged an immediate battle.

79 **Indecisive movements of the rival armaments.**—At length Astyochus and the allies heard the murmurs and resolved on an engagement. They weighed anchor at Miletus with all their ships, amounting to 112, and sailed to Mycale, whilst the Milesian land forces were ordered to march to the same place. The Athenians with 82 ships were at this time lying off Glaucæ, a point on the coast at the foot of Mycale, divided by a narrow channel from Samos; and perceiving the Peloponnesians approaching with a force too strong for them to encounter, they retired to Samos, for they had heard from Miletus of the enemy's desire for an engagement, and had sent to the Hellespont for Strombichides to reinforce them with the ships gone from Chios to Abydus (c. 63). The Peloponnesians then put in and encamped at Mycale, and the next day were about to advance against Samos, when they heard that Strombichides had joined the Athenians with the squadron from the Hellespont, and sailed back to Miletus. The Athenians then advanced with 108 ships against Miletus, but as the Peloponnesians did not leave the harbour they sailed back to Samos.

80 **Peloponnesians send a squadron to the Hellespont: revolt of Byzantium.**—After this the Peloponnesians were distressed for money, as the supplies from Tissaphernes were but scanty. They therefore sent Clearchus with 40 ships to Pharnabazus, (c. 51,) who had offered to furnish supplies (c. 6, 8). Byzantium had also sent to treat of a revolt. Clearchus accordingly put out into the open sea to escape the notice of the Athenians, but was overtaken by a storm, and with most of his ships ran into Delos, and afterwards returned to Miletus, and then proceeded to the Hellespont by land, whilst only ten galleys

out of the squadron reached the Hellespont under Hælixus, and effected the revolt of Byzantium. The Athenians then sent a small squadron from Samos to oppose the enemy at the Hellespont, and a petty sea-fight took place between eight ships on each side.

**Alcibiades recalled: encourages the Athenians with hopes of aid from Tissaphernes.**—Meantime Thrasybulus and his colleagues at Samos had all along desired to effect the restoration of Alcibiades, and at length having persuaded an assembly to decree the recall, Thrasybulus sailed to Tissaphernes and brought Alcibiades to Samos. A meeting was then held, and Alcibiades, having deplored his own exile, raised the hopes of his hearers. He magnified his own influence with Tissaphernes, to alarm the oligarchy at Athens, excite the respect of the fleet, and increase the hatred of the Peloponnesians against the satrap. He boasted that Tissaphernes had solemnly assured him, that, if he could but rely upon the Athenians, they should never want supplies so long as a remnant of his property remained; that he would bring up the Phœnician fleet from Aspendus to join them instead of the Peloponnesians; but that he could only rely upon them after they had recalled Alcibiades to be their security.

**Elected general and goes to Tissaphernes.**—The Athenians then created Alcibiades a general, and intrusted him with the management of their affairs, and being elated with his representations, they desired to sail at once to the Piræus and obtain vengeance on the Four Hundred. Alcibiades however checked this spirit, and stated that as general he ought to go to Tissaphernes, and treat with him about finishing the war. Accordingly he set off at once, to show his intimacy with Tissaphernes to the Athenians, and to exhibit his Athenian command to Tissaphernes, and thus awe the Athenians by Tissaphernes, and Tissaphernes by the Athenians.

**Increased discontent between the Peloponnesians, Tissaphernes, and Astyochus.**—When the Peloponnesians at Miletus heard of the recall of Alcibiades, they were more disgusted with Tissaphernes than ever. The latter had grown tired of giving them pay after they had de-





clined giving battle to the Athenians, (c. 79,) and also disliked them more on account of Alcibiades. Accordingly the soldiers, and even people of higher station at Miletus, began to count their grievances; viz. that they had not received their full pay, whilst what they did receive was irregularly furnished; and threatening that unless a decisive battle was fought, or they were placed where they could receive supplies, they would abandon the ships; adding that Astyochus was to blame for having sold himself to Tissaphernes. At this time the Syracusan and Thurian seamen boldly applied to Astyochus, and demanded their pay. He replied haughtily, and with threats, and even raised his baton against their commander, Dorieus. The multitude of sailors then rushed upon Astyochus, who escaped by flying to an altar. The Milesians also attacked and took a fort built by Tissaphernes at Miletus, and expelled the garrison. The rest of the allies, especially the Syracusans, approved of these proceedings; but Lichas was displeased, and said that the Milesians and those in the King's dominions ought to pay all respect to Tissaphernes until the conclusion of the war. This speech so offended the Milesians, that on the death of Lichas they would not permit him to be buried where the Lacedæmonians wished.

85 **Astyochus succeeded by Mindarus.**—Just at this juncture Mindarus arrived at Lacedæmon to succeed Astyochus, who then sailed home, accompanied by Gaulites, a Carian, who spoke two languages. Gaulites was sent by Tissaphernes to accuse the Milesians of having demolished his fort, and to apologize for himself, for he knew that many of the Milesians in company with Hermocrates were also going to Lacedæmon, to accuse him of duplicity. Hermocrates had always been at enmity with Tissaphernes about the paying of his forces, and when he was banished from Syracuse, and Potamis, Myseon, and Demarchus had been sent to command the Syracusan squadron at Miletus, Tissaphernes inveighed more bitterly against the exile, and charged him with having displayed his enmity, because he had once asked for money and been refused.

86 **Ambassadors from the Four Hundred reach Samos.**—

Alcibiades now returned to Samos, and the deputies from the Four Hundred also arrived there from Delos, (c. 77,) and an assembly was convened. For some time the soldiers refused to listen to them, and threatened the subverters of the democracy with death; but at length a hearing was obtained. The deputies then said that the recent changes had been made for the preservation of the state, and not for its destruction; that the Four Hundred never intended to betray Athens to the enemy, or they would have done so when Agis attacked it (c. 71); that all in turn would share the privileges of the Five Thousand; and that their families were not outraged as Chareas had slanderously reported, (c. 74,) but were still enjoying their possessions. But the assembly was still opposed to the deputies, and the multitude recommended that they should at once sail to the Piræus. Alcibiades however interposed his personal influence to prevent this measure, which would have left Ionia and the Hellespont in the enemy's power; and he alone at that time would have been able to restrain the people. After silencing the most angry individuals, he dismissed the envoys himself, saying, that he did not object to the Five Thousand, but that they must depose the Four Hundred and reinstate the Five Hundred. He also commended any effort which they had made to retrench public expenditure, and urged them not to submit to the enemy, as, if either the party at Athens or that at Samos were destroyed, no reconciliation could possibly be effected. The Argives also sent some ambassadors to Samos, to offer their assistance to the democratic party; and Alcibiades dismissed them with thanks. These envoys were accompanied by the crew of the Paralus, who had been appointed to cruise round Eubœa in a guard ship (c. 74); but having been employed by the Four Hundred to convey three ambassadors to Lacedæmon, they stopped at Argos, and leaving the envoys in custody sailed with Argive ambassadors to Samos, in the trireme they were in.

**Tissaphernes goes to Aspendus: opinions as to his motives.**—Whilst the Peloponnesians could see that Tissaphernes was evidently Atticizing, the latter, with the apparent intention of clearing himself, proceeded to As-



pendus to bring up the Phœnician fleet; and he wished Lichas to accompany him, saying that he would appoint Tamos as his lieutenant, to supply the pay during his absence. This matter however is variously related, nor is it easy to say why Tissaphernes went to Aspendus, and yet did not bring away the fleet. That 147 Phœnician ships were at Aspendus is clearly known, but the reason why they were never brought up is variously conjectured. Some thought it was in accordance with his design of wearing out the Peloponnesians, and certainly during his absence Tamos furnished the supplies even worse than he had done. Others thought that he wished to extort money from the Phœnicians for discharging them. Others, that he wished to silence the clamorous accusations of the Peloponnesians, which had even reached Lacedæmon. But Thucydides thinks that he wished to wear out the Greeks by holding them in suspense, and to keep a balance between the rival powers. It is evident that he might have brought the war to a conclusion if he had wished; and he betrayed his purpose by excusing himself from bringing up the ships, because they were fewer than the king had ordered to be collected. To Aspendus, however, he went, and communicated with the Phœnicians, and by his desire the Peloponnesians sent Philippus with two triremes to fetch the fleet.

V. *Overthrow of the Oligarchy at Athens, chap.*  
88—98.

- 88 **Alcibiades joins him at Aspendus.**—When Alcibiades heard that Tissaphernes had gone to Aspendus, he himself sailed there with 13 ships, promising the Athenians that he would either bring the Phœnician fleet to them, or prevent its joining the Peloponnesians. He probably knew that Tissaphernes never intended bringing up the fleet, and therefore endeavoured to prejudice him in the eyes of the Peloponnesians, and compel him to join the Athenians, and he accordingly sailed straight for Phaselis and Caunus.
- 89 **Revolutionary party at Athens quarrel on receiving the message of Alcibiades.**—The envoys sent by the Four Hundred now returned from Samos, and delivered

the message of Alcibiades, (c. 86,) which infused fresh courage into those of the oligarchical party, who were already weary of the revolution. Accordingly the latter, having some of the most influential generals, and those in office, as their leaders, including even Theramenes and Aristocrates, who were the heads of the oligarchy, began to cabal against the new order of things. They urged the necessity of coming to terms with Alcibiades and the fleet; and they feared lest the embassy which they had sent to Lacedæmon should injure the state. They therefore declared that they wished to establish the Five Thousand in reality. But this was merely profession. Most of them through private ambition had fallen upon that course by which an oligarchy, when it follows a democracy, is most certain to be overturned. For they all claimed not only to be equal, but every one the first man; whilst under a democracy a man more easily submits to the result, because he does not consider himself to have been beaten on equal terms. But they were most encouraged by the thought that the oligarchy could not be permanent because of the powerful interest of Alcibiades; and therefore each strove to see who should be the first to take the lead of the commons.

**Violent oligarchs sent to Sparta, and fortify Eetionia.** 90  
—But those of the Four Hundred who were leaders of the oligarchical party, and the most bitter against democracy, and who included Phrynichus, (c. 50, 68,) Aristarchus, Pisander, Antiphon, and others, had previously sent ambassadors of their own party to Lacedæmon to treat for peace, and had also erected a fort on Eetionia. After the return of their envoys from Samos, and when they found that the majority of the people were changing their views, they sent Antiphon and Phrynichus with ten colleagues to obtain a peace with Lacedæmon upon any terms that would be tolerable. They also worked with greater activity at the fort at Eetionia, which was intended, as they professed, to guard against an attack from the armament at Samos, but which was, in reality, to enable them to admit the Peloponnesians both by land and sea. Eetionia was a mole which formed one side of the outer entrance of Piræus. It was now fortified with a tower at



its extreme point by the harbour's mouth, and a wall which ran from this point along the shore of the harbour. This tower connected the new wall with an old one, which protected Piræus on the land side, and thus a few men could command the entrance of the port. Within this fortification the oligarchs also erected a very large building, in which they compelled all the corn-dealers and importers to deposit their grain, and to take it and sell it from thence.

- 91 Theramenes denounces the fort: Peloponnesians appear in the Saronic Gulf.—Theramenes had long murmured against this fortification, but when the envoys returned from Lacedæmon without success, he declared that it endangered the safety of the city. At this time 42 ships from the Peloponnesus, including some Italian and Sicilian vessels from Tarentum and Locri, were lying off Las in Laconia, under the command of Agesandridas the Spartan, and preparing to sail to the assistance of the Eubœans, who had begged for aid. Theramenes now represented that this squadron was not intended to aid Eubœa, but to assist those who were fortifying Eetionia. There was really some ground for this charge, for it was the object of the oligarchical party to rule the allies with an oligarchical government; or, if that failed, to preserve their independence by retaining possession of the ships and walls; and, if this were impracticable, to resign the ships and fortifications to the enemy, and hold the government of Athens upon any terms consistent with their own personal security, rather than perish under a restored democracy. With this view the oligarchs raised this fortification, and provided it with posterns and passages, adapted for the clandestine admission of troops.

92 Phrynichus assassinated, the fort pulled down, and suppression of the Four Hundred called for.—These suspicions had been hitherto confined to private circles, but Phrynichus, on his return from the embassy to Lacedæmon, was assassinated in the full market by a man who served in the Peripoli; and he fell down dead upon the spot, at a short distance from the council-chamber which he had just quitted. The assassin escaped, but his accomplice, who was an Argive, was seized and tortured

by the Four Hundred, but would not reveal the names of the instigators of the plot, except that he knew of sundry meetings which had been held and numerous attended, both in the house of the commander of the Peripoli and in other private dwellings. No disturbances arising from this event, Theramenes and his partisans were encouraged to prosecute their measures. The Peloponnesian squadron had now left Las, and ravaged Ægina, and anchored at Epidaurus; upon which Theramenes said that it was not likely that ships sailing to Eubœa would run into the Saronic gulf, and be lying off Epidaurus, unless they had been invited to come for the purposes which he had denounced, and that it was impossible to be passive any longer under such practices. After many more seditious speeches, his partisans fell to work in earnest. A body of heavy infantry were employed in building at Eetionia; it included the corps commanded by Aristocrates, but Alexicles, an oligarchical general, superintended the work. These men, assisted by others, and especially by Hermon, a commander of the Peripoli stationed at Munychia, seized Alexicles and confined him in a house, and the bulk of the army approved of what they did. When the news reached the Four Hundred, they all, except the democratic party, proceeded to arm themselves, and uttered threats against Theramenes and his adherents. Theramenes however asserted his innocence, and obtained leave to go with another general, one of his own partisans, to the Piræus to rescue Alexicles. Aristarchus also, and some of the younger cavalry, set out to assist him.

An alarming tumult now ensued. Those in the city thought that the Piræus was taken and Alexicles slain; whilst those in the Piræus expected an immediate attack from the city; and the two parties were with difficulty restrained from taking up arms by the persuasions of the elder citizens, and those of Thucydides, a native, and Proxenus of Pharsalus, who called upon them not to ruin their country by fighting whilst the enemy was so near at hand. Meantime Theramenes went to the Piræus, and, so far as shouting went, expressed his anger at the soldiers; but Aristarchus and the oligarchs were



in a violent rage. The soldiers then appealed to Theramenes, whether the fortification was built for the public good, or whether it had better be demolished. He replied, that if they thought it had better be demolished he agreed with them. Upon this both the soldiers and many of the inhabitants of the Piræus began to pull down the works, and the watchword to the people was, that whoever wished the Five Thousand to rule in the place of the Four Hundred must join in the task. But the democratic party still veiled their design under the name of the Five Thousand, lest they should offend any of that body if it really existed—a fact which the Four Hundred kept involved in mystery; for to admit so many into a share of the government would be a downright democracy, whilst leaving the matter in suspense struck every one with fear of his neighbour.

93 Accommodation between the two parties: points at issue reserved for a popular assembly.—On the following day the Four Hundred assembled in the council-chamber. The soldiers in the Piræus had now released Alexicles, and demolished the fortification; and after holding an assembly in the temple of Bacchus near Munyehia, they marched to the city and piled their arms in the Anaceum, the sanctuary of the Twins. Here deputies from the Four Hundred came and addressed them individually, and persuaded those of more moderate views to remain quiet and restrain the rest. They also assured them that they would publish the names of the Five Thousand, from whom the Four Hundred should be chosen as the Five Thousand should think fit. The body of soldiery then became pacified, and more alarmed for the safety of the state against the enemy from without; and they consented to hold an assembly at the temple of Bacchus on an appointed day, to treat of a reconciliation.

94 Peloponnesian fleet appears: Athenians sail out.—On the very day appointed for the assembly, news arrived that the 42 Peloponnesian ships, under Agesandridas, (c. 91,) were advancing from Megara along the coast of Salamis. The suspicions which Theramenes had expressed concerning the sort of Eetonia were now con-

firmed; and indeed it may have been by appointment that Agesandridas had cruised about Epidaurus, though it is possible that he stayed in consequence of the present sedition at Athens. The Athenians now ran down to the Piræus, and some got on board the ships that were already afloat, whilst others launched additional vessels, or hastened to defend the walls and entrance to the harbour.

Athenians defeated, and all Eubœa except Oreus re- 95  
volts.—The Peloponnesian squadron doubled Sunium, and anchored between Thorieus and Prasiæ, and subsequently reached Oropus. The Athenians were now obliged to hurry out to sea with untrained crews, for Eubœa was their most important possession, now that Attica was closed to them (vii. 28). Thymochares was sent with 36 ships to Eubœa, and was immediately forced into an engagement, for Agesandridas, having dined, left Oropus, which is only 60 stadia [ $7\frac{1}{2}$  miles] from Eretria by sea, and advanced against him. The Eretrians had obliged the Athenian seamen to purchase their provisions in the outskirts of the town, at some distance from the ships, and had then raised a signal for those at Oropus to advance. The Athenians now put out in great disorder, and fought a battle in the mouth of the harbour of Eretria, but were soon put to flight by Agesandridas. Some fled to Eretria and were butchered; others to a fort in the Eretrian territory, which was held by the Athenians, and were saved, as were all the ships that reached Chalcis. The Peloponnesians took 22 ships, and either killed the crews or took them prisoners, and then erected a trophy. Soon after, all Eubœa revolted, except Oreus, which was held by the Athenians.

Consternation at Athens.—The Athenians at home, 96  
on hearing of this revolt, were in a greater consternation than even that which followed the Sicilian disaster. Their army at Samos had revolted, their city was in a state of sedition, and they had now lost Eubœa, from which they had derived more advantages than from Attica; whilst they were in more immediate fear that the Peloponnesians would be induced by their recent victory to sail at once into Piræus, while it had no ships to pro-





fect it. Indeed, had Agesandridas taken advantage of this opportunity, he might either by lying near Athens have thrown it into a state of greater dissension, or by blockading it have compelled the Athenian fleet to return from Ionia to the rescue of the city, in spite of its opposition to the oligarchy; and meantime the whole empire of Athens, including Ionia, Hellespont, and the islands, would have merged into the Lacedæmonian confederacy. But it was not on this occasion only that the Lacedæmonians showed themselves most convenient enemies to the Athenians. For being totally different in disposition—tardy, whilst the Athenians were quick, and unadventurous, whilst the Athenians were enterprising, they presented many advantages to the enemy in the establishing of his naval empire. This was proved by the Syracusans, who being most similar to the Athenians, defeated them with the greatest success.

97 Athenians man 20 ships and establish the Five Thousand.—The Athenians now however equipped 20 ships, and called an assembly in the Pnyx, where they had often met in ancient times. Here they deposed the Four Hundred, and placed the government in the hands of the Five Thousand, into which body were admissible all who could furnish themselves with heavy arms; and they declared him to be accursed who should receive any pay from his office. They subsequently held other assemblies, in which they appointed certain persons to draw up a code of laws, and frame a government; and during the first period of this constitution, the Athenians appear to have enjoyed the best government that they had ever experienced, at least in the time of Thucydides; for there was a happy blending of oligarchy and democracy, which first contributed to raise Athens after its recent disasters. They also decreed the recall of Alcibiades and those in exile with him, and sent to exhort the army at Samos to prosecute the war with vigour.


98 Violent oligarchs fly to Decelea: CEnoe taken.—The partisans of Pisander and Alexicles, together with the more devoted oligarchs, now secretly withdrew to Decelea, whilst Aristarchus alone, happening to be a general, proceeded with a few Barbarian archers to CEnoe, an

Athenian fortress on the borders of Bœotia. The Athenian garrison at CEnoe had cut off some Corinthian troops who were returning home from Decelea, and were now being besieged by the Corinthians and Bœotians. After communicating with the besiegers, Aristarchus deceived the garrison by saying that the Athenians had surrendered to the Lacedæmonians, and that they must therefore give up the place to the Bœotians. Being an Athenian general he was believed, and the garrison evacuated the fort under a truce, and CEnoe was taken and occupied by the Bœotians. Thus ceased the oligarchy and sedition at Athens.

VI. *Athens encouraged by the Victory of Cynos-sema, chap. 99—109.*

Grand Peloponnesian fleet moved from Miletus to- 99  
wards the Hellespont.—About the same time the Peloponnesians at Miletus received no further pay from Tamos (c. 87); Tissaphernes had neither brought up the Phœnician fleet, nor returned from Aspendus; and Philippus, who had been sent with him, and Hippocrates a Spartan, who was at Phaselis, wrote to Mindarus the Peloponnesian High Admiral, to say that the Phœnician ships would not join them, and that they were being totally deceived and wronged by Tissaphernes. Meantime Pharnabazus (c. 80) had continually urged Mindarus to bring up the Peloponnesian fleet to the Hellespont, and offered to induce the remaining cities in his own government to revolt from Athens. Accordingly, Mindarus gave sudden orders to his fleet, that the Athenians at Samos might not discover his design, and left Miletus with 73 ships for the Hellespont, 16 of his vessels having sailed there earlier in the summer, and ravaged the Chersonesus; in his way he was compelled by a storm to put in at Icarus, where he remained five or six days, and then sailed to Chios.

Athenian fleet leaves Samos and stops at Lesbos to 100  
recover Eresus.—When the news reached the Athenian fleet, Thrasyllus left Samos with 55 ships to intercept Mindarus, but finding him staying at Chios, he posted scouts at Lesbos and the opposite continent, to



watch the enemy's movements. Thrasyllus then coasted to Methymna, and ordered meal and other necessaries to be prepared, as he purposed advancing from Lesbos to attack the Peloponnesians at Chios. At the same time he wished to recover Eresus in Lesbos, for some Methymnæan exiles had carried over 300 troops from Cuma, under Alexander a Theban, including 50 heavy infantry and some continental mercenaries, and had attacked Methymna, and on being beaten back by an Athenian garrison from Mytilene, had proceeded over the mountain and procured the revolt of Eresus. Thrasyllus now sailed against Eresus with all his ships, and was joined there by Thrasybulus and 5 ships, which had been sent forward from Samos on the first news of the danger, but arrived too late. Two more ships from the Hellespont and some Methymnæan vessels also joined the Athenian fleet, which, with these additions, amounted to 67 ships; and preparations were then made for taking Eresus by storm.

101 Peloponnesian fleet leaves Chios for the Hellespont.—Meantime Mindarus, having victualled his fleet at Chios, and received three Chian tessaracostes for each man, left the island and proceeded northward between Lesbos and the continent, to avoid the Athenian fleet at Eresus. Having touched at the port of Carteria in Phœcæa, and dined there, he coasted along Cuma, and supped at Argennusæ, which is on the main-land opposite Mytilene. He then still coasted on though it was late at night, and reached Harmatus, opposite to Methymna, and dined there, and then passing rapidly by Leetum, Larisa, and Hamaxitus, he arrived at Rhœteum on the Hellespont a little before midnight, but some of his ships brought to at Sigeum and other neighbouring places.

102 Surprises 18 Athenian ships at Sestos, which escape with difficulty.—An Athenian squadron of 18 ships was at this time lying at Sestos, and was now apprized by fire-signals from their friends, and by fires along the hostile shore, that the Peloponnesians were entering the Hellespont. The same night they sailed out close under the shore of the Chersonesus towards Elæus, in order to escape into the open sea, and they eluded the 16 Peloponnesian ships at Abydus, although the latter had been

expressly commanded to guard against their escape. But at day-break they came within view of the Peloponnesian armament, and were immediately chased. The greater part escaped to Imbros and Lemnos, but four were captured near Elæus; one being stranded opposite the temple of Protesilaus, and taken with its crew, two taken without their crews, and the remaining one being burnt after it had been deserted and left on the shore of Imbros. Mindarus then, being joined by the 16 vessels 103 from Abydus, besieged Elæus for one day with his whole fleet, which now amounted to 86 vessels, but on its not surrendering he returned to Abydus.

Grand Athenian fleet leaves Eresus for the Hellespont.—Meantime the great Athenian fleet had been leisurely besieging Eresus, under the conviction that Mindarus and the Peloponnesians would never be able to leave Chios (c. 101) unobserved; but, on hearing the news, they hastened to the defence of the Hellespont. On their way they captured 2 Peloponnesian ships, and the next day anchored at Elæus; and bringing in from Imbros the vessels which had escaped there, (c. 102,) they employed five days in preparing for a battle.

Battle of Cynos-sema in the Hellespont: Athenians 104 victorious.—The battle was thus fought. The Athenians, to the number of 76 vessels, moved in a single column along the shore toward Sestos, whilst the Peloponnesians, to the number of 86 vessels, put out from Abydus. The two fleets then extended their lines; the Athenians along the Chersonesus, from Idæus to Arrhiana; the Peloponnesians opposite, from Abydus to Dardanus. The Athenian left wing was commanded by Thrasyllus, the right wing by Thrasybulus, whilst the other commanders were posted as might happen. The Peloponnesian right wing was held by the Syracusans, and the left by Mindarus with the fastest sailing ships. The Peloponnesians were most eager to begin. They had two objects in view; to outflank the Athenian right wing with their left, and thus to prevent them from issuing out of the straits, and to drive the Athenian centre on to the shore. The Athenians, aware of this, extended their right wing where the enemy intended to hem them in, whilst their left wing



had now passed Cape Cynos-sema; but their centre was thus necessarily formed with a weak line of scattered ships, and their two wings were hidden from each other by the  
 105 Cape. The Peloponnesians then fell upon their centre, drove their ships aground, and landed to follow up their victory on shore. Meantime Thrasybulus on the right could not assist the centre, from the superior numbers of the left wing under Mindarus, which was opposed to him; neither could Thrasybulus on the left, for the centre was concealed from him by the headland of Cynos-sema, and the Syracusans were opposed to him with no inferior numbers. This partial success of the Peloponnesians, however, at length threw them into confusion. Thrasybulus then ceased to extend his line, and fell upon the enemy, who were striving to outflank him, and having put them to flight, attacked their disordered but victorious centre, and threw them into a panic. The Syracusans had by this time given way to Thrasybulus and his left wing, and now took to flight on seeing the rest routed.

106 **Moral effect of the victory on the Athenians.**—The Peloponnesians fled to the mouth of the river Midius, and then to Abydus, and though the Athenians made but few captures because of the narrowness of the Hellespont, yet the victory was most seasonable. They had been previously afraid of the Peloponnesians because of their gradual losses, and their disaster in Sicily; but they now ceased to disparage themselves, or exaggerate their enemy's ability at sea. They took 21 vessels in all, viz. eight Chians, five Corinthians, two Ambracians, two Bœotians, one Leucadian, one Lacedæmonian, one Syracusan, and one Pellenian. They lost 15 vessels. Having erected a trophy on Cynos-sema, they secured the wrecks, restored the enemy's dead under a truce, and despatched a trireme to announce their victory at Athens, where the news raised the spirits of the people, who had sunk under their misfortunes at Eubœa, and the consequences of their own sedition.

107 **Athenians recover Cyzicus: Peloponnesians send for the fleet from Eubœa.**—On the fourth day after the battle, the Athenians at Sestos, having hastily refitted their ships, sailed to Cyzicus, which had revolted; and

deserting at Harpægium and Priapus the eight ships laying at anchor at Byzantium, (c. 80,) they captured them all, after defeating those who came to aid them on land. They afterwards compelled Cyzicus, which was unfortified, to submit and pay a sum of money. Meantime the Peloponnesians sailed from Abydus to Blæus, and recovered such of their ships as had not been burnt by the people of Elaëus, and sent off Hippocrates and Epicles to bring the fleet from Eubœa (c. 95).

**Alcibiades returns from Aspendus to Samos.**—About 108 this time Alcibiades returned to Samos with his 13 ships from Caunus and Phaselis, declaring that he had prevented the Phœnician fleet from joining the Peloponnesian, and had made Tissaphernes a still greater friend than ever to the Athenians. He then equipped nine additional ships, and levied large contributions from the Halicarnassians, fortified Cos, and appointed a governor there, and returned to Samos in the autumn. Meantime Tissaphernes, on hearing that the Peloponnesians had left Miletus for the Hellespont, (c. 101,) returned from Aspendus to Ionia.

**Antandrians expel their governor Arsaces.**—Whilst the Peloponnesians were at the Hellespont, the Æolians of Antandrus, being oppressed by Arsaces, the lieutenant of Tissaphernes, fetched troops from Abydus by land over Mount Ida into their city. Arsaces had previously drawn out some of the best Delian troops settled at Atramyntium, (v. 1,) as auxiliaries in a pretended expedition, and then surrounded them with his troops whilst at dinner, and shot them to death. The Antandrians now expected a similar outrage on themselves, and with the assistance of these Peloponnesian heavy-armed from Abydus, they expelled his garrison from their citadel.

**Tissaphernes goes to the Hellespont to try and recon- 109 cile himself to the Peloponnesians.**—When Tissaphernes heard of this affair, and that his garrisons had been driven out from Miletus and Cnidus also, he feared lest the Peloponnesians should hinder him still further, and was chagrined to think that Pharnabazus, having received them, would be more successful against the Athenians than himself, and that too with a less cost of time or



money. He therefore determined to go to the Hellespont, to complain of the Antandrians, and defend his conduct respecting the Phœnician fleet. On his way he stopt at Ephesus and sacrificed to Diana.

[When the winter following this summer shall be ended, the 21st year of the war will be completed likewise.]

THE END.

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


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
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