An Army of The People

John McAuley Palmer

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An Army of the People

The Constitution of an Effective Force of Trained Citizens

By

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To

ANSON CONGER GOODYEAR

"We must depend in every time of national peril, in the future as in the past, not upon a standing army, nor yet upon a reserve army, but upon a citizenry trained and accustomed to arms. It will be right enough, right American policy based upon our accustomed principles and practices, to provide a system by which every citizen who will volunteer for the training may be made familiar with the use of modern arms, the rudiments of drill and maneuver, and the maintenance and sanitation of camps. We should encourage such training and make it a means of discipline which our young men will learn to value."

(*From the President's Message, December 8th, 1914.*)

PREFACE

In this little book I have attempted to give a detailed description of a National Military System for the United States. I trust that this Military System will be found to meet the requirements of adequate military strength, under forms that are in full harmony with American political traditions and ideals.

In order to avoid a monotonous treatment of the many details of military organization in the form of a technical prospectus, I have attempted to present a graphic picture of the completed structure. For this purpose I have adopted the fiction that Congress is to pass *The National Defense Act* in the near future, and that I am simply writing a popular history of the American *Army of the People* as it stands complete a few years later.

THE AUTHOR.

FORT MILLS, CORREGIDOR, P. I.
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I.

PUBLIC OPINION AND THE NATIONAL DEFENSE

THE American National Defense Act received the President's approval on the 16th day of February, 1916. Considering the revolutionary character of this great piece of constructive legislation, it is still astonishing that so elaborate a system should occupy the attention of Congress for little more than five weeks.

The advocates of an effective National Military System expected a long period of preliminary agitation with a gradual development of public opinion. But when a few courageous leaders frankly presented the

issue of National Security to the commonsense of the people, the response was overwhelming and immediate. This condition of the public mind materially simplified the legislative problem. That our military institutions were antiquated, expensive and inadequate, was the general consensus of public opinion. That the public intelligence demanded a sound, sufficient, and businesslike solution of the problem of National Defense was equally apparent. Under these circumstances it was only necessary for Congress to crystallize the public will into the form of law.

It thus happened that before the military committees began to write the provisions of the National Defense Bill, certain general guiding principles had come to be universally accepted. These may be stated briefly as follows:

1. Our military system should be based on the idea of meeting national requirements in a great war. In such a con-

tingency, raw levies organized after the outbreak of war would be hopelessly ineffective no matter how numerous they might be. Improvised forces of volunteers such as were employed in the Civil War are, therefore, excluded from consideration.

2. A sufficient force should be trained and organized in time of peace to assure victory at the outbreak of war.
3. The exact strength of this force was variously estimated, but the general public sentiment was frequently expressed in the saying: "In a great war we should be able to mobilize an army of a million men."
4. To expand the existing professional regular army into a force of such dimensions was universally accepted to be both impracticable and undesirable.
5. Public sentiment still adhered to a national war army composed principally of non-professional citizen soldiers, but it was universally accepted that this

army must be trained and organized in time of peace.

6. It was generally conceded that the peace training of the War Army should be under a uniform national control; that the Constitution makes the Federal Government the national *war-making* power, and that efficiency demands that the *war-making power* must also be the *war-preparing power;* that the preparation of a force for war includes training it, disciplining it, and providing it with competent officers of adequate training; that as the Federal Government is specifically denied these essential powers with reference to the Militia, it follows that no body of citizen soldiers having the constitutional status of militia can be welded into an effective fighting team for war purposes under modern conditions.

7. It was therefore the consensus of opinion that our main reliance in war should be a national force of citizen soldiers organized and trained in peace under

the constitutional power "to raise and support armies"; that the officers and enlisted men of the organized militia should be encouraged to transfer to the new national force and should thereby become its nucleus and leaven of training and efficiency. It was a notable fact that this view was accepted by a large number of the more intelligent officers of the Organized Militia who, through their experience, had come to see the hopelessness of attempting to combine the functions of a State constabulary and a national war force under the same organization.

II.

THE SWISS MILITARY SYSTEM

THE solution of the problem of National Defense was materially advanced by the general acceptance of the idea of a great national army of trained citizenry. But there was still much difference of opinion with reference to the details of organization. Among the first concrete propositions to attract the public mind was the suggestion that we should organize a force like the National Army of Switzerland.

Under the Swiss system all able-bodied young men are required to undergo a short but thorough course of military training. In every canton, summer camps of military instruction are established, and every young Swiss is required to attend one of these camps after he leaves school and before he enters

business life. Here he is thoroughly trained by expert military instructors furnished by the Federal Government. At the conclusion of the summer camp of instruction, the trained recruits of the year are absorbed into the National Field Army and attend maneuvers with their fellow citizen-soldiers who have already received their recruit training in preceding summers. Thus each young Swiss gives one full summer to recruit training, and after that he is mobilized with the National Field Army for a short maneuver period each year. After several years' service with the Field Army, he passes to the Reserve and his active military training is concluded unless he qualifies for further service as an officer or non-commissioned officer. It thus appears that in Switzerland a trained and completely organized army is ready at any time to spring from the body of the people, and yet in time of peace this great war force is only embodied as an actual military force for a short period of about two weeks at the end of the summer. For two

or three months before the annual mobilization, the recruits of the year are receiving their initial training. During the rest of the year, all of the army is absorbed in the mass of the people, and engaged in the pursuits of peace, except a small corps of trained officers and non-commissioned officers who constitute the permanent staff required to provide for the enrollment, training, supply, and mobilization of the war force.

The benefits of such a system, both to the nation and the individual, are apparent. From the standpoint of economy, nothing could be more satisfactory. Such an army requires no barracks or quarters or permanent military posts. When it assembles, it assembles in the field, and knows no life except the real soldier's life in the open air. Practically all of the money expended upon it goes for arms and ammunition and necessary clothing and equipment. Practically no money goes for unproductive supplies or plant. Considering the entire force, it is a charge upon the nation for only two weeks

in the year. For the remaining fifty weeks, it is practically non-existent as a financial burden. And yet it is embodied long enough to give a substantial return in military power. Its recruits are thoroughly trained to march and shoot and live in the open. Its mobilization plans each year receive the practical test of concentration for maneuvers. Its fighting organizations actually exist and function in peace, and are in the field long enough each year to test the troop-leading abilities of the higher commanders and their staffs.

Such a military system is equally well adapted to the requirements of industrial life. It concentrates the training of the individual citizen into a period where his economic value is a minimum. It does not divert the schoolboy from his studies, nor the business man from his occupation, for the recruit period of intensive military training comes in a summer vacation that naturally marks the interval between school and business life. And even the subsequent

summers on the active list, though they demand a short maneuver period, are passed before the citizen is absorbed in the cares and responsibilities of industrial and family life. Indeed while the system takes little or nothing from the productive period of the citizen's life, it adds enormously to his industrial and civic value, for after his military training he goes into business with better conceptions of discipline, organization, and civic responsibility, and a stronger and more vigorous physique.

In short, the Swiss system tends to produce the maximum number of trained soldiers in war with the minimum number of professional soldiers in peace. For while the Swiss Army comprises all of the young manhood of the nation, the permanent peace establishment in Switzerland is limited to the small corps of specially trained experts who are necessary to maintain the machinery for training, organization, and mobilization.

It was not surprising that popular interest in the Swiss military system should soon

crystallize into proposals for a definite national policy. Early in the history of the discussion an American adaptation of the Swiss system was thus outlined in the editorial columns of one of our greatest newspapers:

"Let us give all of our able-bodied young men a short but thorough military training like that given to the young men of the Swiss Republic. For this purpose let us organize a summer camp of military instruction in every congressional district. Let us employ the best officers and non-commissioned officers of the regular army as instructors in these schools and thus transmit the best traditions of West Point and the army to the great war host of citizen soldiers. Let us then organize our trained youth into divisions and field armies under uniform and definite National control and let us count on this mighty force as our main defense in war, our main insurance of peace.

"This being the National War Army, we may then safely restrict the regular army to

those military functions which are exclusively appropriate for professional soldiers. The regular army will still be required to garrison our outlying possessions and to defend great naval bases like Panama and Pearl Harbor from sudden attack. Sufficient reserves of regulars will also be required for expeditionary forces in small wars, for temporary occupations of foreign territory, and for other sudden emergencies. And further, as suggested above, the professional military expert in the regular army will find a new, and indeed his greatest, field of usefulness in training and organizing the great war army of citizen soldiers."

III.

THE AMERICAN SYSTEM

THE economical and political advantages of the Swiss military system are so great that it is not surprising that the first concrete demand for an American National Army should take the form of a proposition to adopt the Swiss model in toto. But practical men hesitated before espousing the cause of universal military service. They conceded that universal manhood service is the cheapest, fairest, and most democratic method of distributing the burden of military preparation. They were ready to admit that universal military training would carry with it universal educational advantages for civic and industrial good in peace as well as for efficiency in war. But they did not believe that the American people were ready for conscrip-

tion. And they were justified in their estimate of the situation. For the discussion of the Swiss military system bade fair to degenerate into a fruitless discussion of compulsory service. The average man was prepared to admit the need of a better military establishment, but when the Swiss model was mentioned he thought only of the compulsory service feature and rejected the whole idea because he rejected conscription. It was true that compulsory service might be good for the people, but it was equally true that the people did not want it. Under these circumstances the agitation for the Swiss model soon encountered serious difficulties. Its many advantages were recognized, but no practical politician could run the risk of proposing what was virtually a draft act in time of peace.

At this stage of the discussion, Senator Straightedge made his remarkable speech on our military policy, from which we quote the following illuminating passages:

"Mr. President," said the Senator, "I do

not profess to be a military expert. But I am a man of business and I believe that many questions of military policy can be approached to advantage from a common-sense business standpoint. I believe that we need an army or we do not need it. If we do not need it, the existing force should be abolished and not another cent expended upon it. If we do need an army we should make it sufficient in strength and effective in equipment and training, and it should be conducted on sound business principles. To continue to maintain it ineffectively organized and at a notoriously inadequate strength, to my mind, is incomprehensibly absurd.

"I have been very much impressed by the economical and democratic military system developed by our sister republic in the Alps. I find many things in her solution of the military problem that seem worthy of study by us. But of late, when the Swiss National Army is mentioned, I find it condemned because the phrase 'Swiss System' has come to be taken as a synonym for conscription.

"Mr. President, I have recently taken pains to make a study of the Swiss National Army, and I find that conscription is not at all its essential feature. Indeed I am convinced that it would be possible for us to adopt all of the virtues of the Helvetian National Army without adopting the principle of conscription at all. The real characteristic of the Swiss System lies in its facilities for military training in summer camps of instruction. The effect of the law of compulsory service is simply to insure the maximum number of students. If they maintained their training system and did not have conscription, they would still have the material for a national army precisely the same in kind. It would simply be smaller. Now Switzerland, from her insecure position amid the great warlike nations of Europe, must have the greatest possible military force. She must have the maximum number of students in her summer military schools and therefore, through the law of compulsory service, she takes *all* of the able-

bodied young men in the country. In other words, conscription is not a part of her system of training or of organization, it is simply the necessary means of securing the maximum enrollment. If she should abolish conscription, her military forces would still be the same in kind. They would simply be smaller.

"Now suppose we had adopted the Swiss System years ago, and that at the same time we had adopted the principle of universal service. Our population is so much greater than Switzerland's that we would now have a first line of army of more than five million men, or a war force, including reserves, of more than eight million men. We do not need such an enormous force, therefore we do not need the device which Switzerland employs in order to draw an adequate military force from her meager population. It is not necessary for us to compel the attendance of every young man. If we should train only one in every eight under the Swiss system we would have a first line army of nearly seven hundred thou-

sand and a trained war establishment of more than a million men. If we should adopt the principle of universal service and at the same time limit the strength of our military forces to our reasonable needs, we would be in the singular position of enrolling all of our young men, only to discharge seven out of every eight before commencing the season's training. In short, Mr. President, compulsory military service is a necessary part of the Swiss Military System as applied to Swiss conditions, but it is not a necessary part of that system as applied to conditions in the United States.

"Mr. President, the rational application of the Swiss System to American conditions is not a conscript army at all. It is simply the logical development of our traditional army of volunteers. Let us give our young men a chance to volunteer for training in peace. Let us provide adequate facilities for such training in every part of the land. Let us organize the young men so trained in military units that can be speedily mobilized

in war, and let us rely upon this great organized host of citizen soldiers to defend our national interests. It is my conviction that the youth of America will respond to this call. They ask you only for the opportunity. If they are not ready now, it is for lack of that opportunity. I believe that enough and more than enough will join the standard. And until you have demonstrated that they will not come there can be no practical argument for conscription."

This logical development of our traditional national army of volunteers to meet the requirements of modern war became the central idea of the National Defense Act. The law was approved by the President on February 16th, and on February 22d he issued his proclamation extending the privileges of free military instruction to all of the young men in the United States.

IV.

THE GREAT ENROLLMENT

THE President's proclamation received the widest possible publicity through the press of the country, but it was also published formally, as prescribed in the statute itself, by being posted in all of the post-offices in the land.

The Proclamation contained the full text of the Act of Congress with the Special Regulations prescribed by the President governing applications for attendance at the camps of military instruction to be established during the coming summer. It was announced that one or more such camps would be established in each State, the number to depend upon the total enrollment and the distribution of applicants in each State.

Applicants were advised that blank forms

and descriptive lists could be obtained from the Postmaster to be filled in and signed by the applicant and returned to the Postmaster not later than April 1st, for transmission through the Post Office Department to the proper military authorities. These blank forms were accompanied by a prospectus or circular giving full information as to the objects of the proposed summer camp, its courses of instruction in general terms, and the proposed formation of the graduates of the school into a field army of volunteers. The prospectus described the duties and characteristics of the several branches of the military service and encouraged the applicant to express a preference for that arm which most attracted him, or for which he was especially qualified by aptitude or training. It also recited the provisions of the law which embodied the general principle that all necessary expenses for transportation, shelter, subsistence, clothing, and equipment incurred in attendance at the summer schools, or in connection with any of the duties imposed

upon officers or enlisted men of the volunteer forces, would be met by the United States.

As these circulars gave to the individual applicant all of the information necessary for him in making his decision, so the blank form or descriptive list furnished him by the Postmaster enabled him to give the military authorities all of the personal information necessary to enable them to enroll, clothe, and equip him in the summer camps, and subsequently in the National Volunteer Army. The blank form was filled in and signed by the applicant and attested by two taxpayers of his neighborhood who vouched for the general accuracy of the applicant's entries and also for certain general information relative to his character and history. In the case of a minor applicant the signature of the consenting parent or guardian was also entered. The entire document was concluded with an affirmation of obligation to serve the United States in the event of any war which might occur within three years, after the conclusion of the summer camps.

A special form was prepared for applicants for service in the cavalry, field artillery, and other branches of the mounted service. Under the terms of the National Defense Act, special inducements were offered to young horsemen who were able to provide themselves with horses suitable for cavalry or artillery. In the case of such volunteers, the Government engaged itself to transport their private mounts to and from the camps and maneuvers, to purchase them at a stipulated valuation in the event of war, and to pay to the owner a cash allowance in commutation of forage for the full period of his service. In short, the Government called for mounted volunteers, and in turn it undertook the "keep" of their horses. This provision was in full harmony with the general objects of the statute. It proposed to create a great army of volunteers and to train them in peace. It therefore proposed to take its cavalry and other mounted soldiers from the great mass of young men who are already natural horsemen and who know the horse and how to care

for him. For this purpose the postmaster distributed a special circular giving the specifications for cavalry and artillery horses and applicants for the mounted service were required to give certain additional information on their application blanks. In connection with the provisions of the law relating to the mounted services, it may be said that the Government protected itself from unnecessary expense and inconvenience in rail transportation by declining to accept cavalry recruits in any community unless there were a sufficient number in the local group to justify the shipment of its horses in car-load lots. In order to meet this requirement, it was necessary for candidates for the mounted service to organize themselves into groups of at least ten men residing within one day's march of a common shipping point.

The widespread interest aroused by the President's proclamation has scarcely ever been equalled by any event in time of peace. From the day of its publication in the post

office it was the main topic of conversation in every village in the land. The great problem of national defense, from being a vague and intangible thing, was brought home to every family. Many young men were ready to file their application papers with the postmaster at once, but in most cases they were checked by the cautious restraint of cool-headed fathers and mothers. There was a burst of enthusiasm at first and then a period of that careful deliberation which is characteristic of our people in facing great public issues. In each community men gathered together and listened to the veterans who, more than fifty years ago, had enrolled for a great war and who had gone to the front untrained, unorganized, and unled.

The speech of one of these old soldiers found its way into the papers and has been preserved as characteristic of the period of the first enrollment.

"Boys," said he, "you have asked me to talk to you about this new volunteer law and

to advise you about enlisting. When I first heard about it, I didn't like it. It wasn't like the kind of enlisting we did here in this village fifty-five years ago. I was twenty years old then, and I enlisted. We were not enlisting for a war that hadn't come yet. We were enlisting for *the* war. It was already here. We raised a company here in the county and less than a third of them ever came back again. Some of them were killed in action. Some of them died of wounds. Most of them died of preventable camp diseases. Many of those who died might have gone on fighting to the end if our officers had known their business. I know because I was an officer myself. The day we enlisted, we elected the best fellow in our company as our captain. He wasn't fit to post a corporal's guard, but how could we know it then? One man in our ranks became a famous soldier. He came out of the war a brigadier-general of volunteers. But he marched away from here in the rear rank and I was surprised when they made him a corporal.

"I hope to God we'll never have a war again, and that you will never see it. If I thought keeping out of this new volunteer army would keep you out of war, I'd say don't enlist. But it won't keep you out if war comes. When the call comes you'll volunteer as we did nearly sixty years ago. The only question is whether you are going green and unprepared as we went, or whether you will go with some knowledge of discipline and a soldier's business. I'm not arguing that these Government camps will make you veterans in one summer. They can't do that. The best instructors from the regular army can't do that, but they can turn you from raw recruits into pretty good, self-reliant soldiers. We had to get that training and be shot at at the same time. It was a good thing the fellows on the other side were as raw as we were. That was the only thing that saved us.

"But if you ever go to a war it will not be the kind of a war that we went to. You can put it down that if Uncle Sam ever goes to

war again, it will not be to fight raw volunteers, but trained soldiers.

"But I won't advise you. This is to be a volunteer army and each man must decide for himself. But I will say this, that three of my grandsons are going and I am glad of it, and if their granddaddy wasn't a little beyond the age limit he'd go himself."

For a time there was the same hesitation to enter the new volunteers that has interfered with the development of the organized militia. Many young men seemed to have the idea that the new force, like the militia, was to be a sort of constabulary to be called out to support the police power of the several States in periods of local disorder. This bade fair for a time to discourage enlistment, until it became apparent from the terms of the law that the new force could not be used for that purpose. The statute expressly prescribed that the national volunteers could not be mobilized except when war was imminent or in other grave emergency specifically proclaimed by Congress. Disorders

within the borders of a State were to be met by such police or constabulary forces as each State might, in its wisdom, provide. And if any State should call upon the Federal Government for the aid authorized by the Constitution, this aid was to be furnished from the paid regular army. In short, the National Volunteers were to be trained to defend the country in war and could be used only for war. In time of peace its members would be lost in the body of the people, but on the threat of war, each man would have his appointed place in the great organized war host of the nation, which would spring into being and begin to move toward the point of danger within twenty-four hours of the first alarm.

But how many would enroll? As the first of April approached, that question attracted widespread interest not only throughout the country but especially in the War Department, where plans were being made for the first summer camps. Must the Government provide for fifty thousand volunteer

students or a million? This question was the subject of much interesting speculation as the following quotation from one of our popular weeklies will show.

"In the year 1915 over nine hundred thousand American boys entered their nineteenth year. In the same year there were about nine million American young men between the ages of eighteen and thirty. It is to this host of potential citizen soldiery that the National Defense Act extends its invitation. At the first passage of the law we were skeptical as to its prospects. We feared that not enough would come to assure the success of the new American Volunteer System. But as the enrollment progresses, as occasional unofficial returns slip in from various communities, a fear of another kind arises. Will the Government be able to provide facilities for the education and training of so vast a school? If one young man in nine should respond, we would have one million recruits to train.

"But while the movement is widely popular

and a successful enrollment seems assured, a careful analysis of population statistics tends to justify a much lower estimate. The system makes its largest appeal to the boy who is just out of school and who is not yet burdened with the cares of business or family life. Most men of twenty-nine or thirty years, though they are eligible under the new law and though many of them will want to enroll, will be restrained by other obligations. We shall therefore probably find that the enrollment will be a maximum for young men of the minimum age of nineteen and that it will fall off for each succeeding year of age, at first gradually and then rapidly. Some older men will enroll but they will be men whose natural military tastes have been confirmed by prior military service and who therefore enter the volunteer army as the logical candidates for positions as officers and non-commissioned officers. And this is as it should be, for it is the young unmarried man in the first vigor of adventurous youth who should first stand ready for national defense."

It was not until the tenth of April that all of the applications were received and classified by the War Department. It was then found that the full enrollment for the first summer's encampments were as follows:

Volunteers for Infantry	204,337
Volunteers for Cavalry	27,163
Volunteers for Field Artillery	34,364
Volunteers for Engineers	7,136
Volunteers for Signal Corps (including aëroplane service)	6,723
Volunteers for Hospital Corps	15,573
Volunteers for Service Corps (including automobile and motor-truck service)	11,427
Total	306,723

In addition to the above enrollment for the National Volunteer Field Army, there were 27,023 applicants for enrollment in the summer camps for Coast Artillery. Candidates were enrolled according to their preference as to arm of service, but, in order to

assure a proper balance, the Government reserved the right to transfer volunteers from one arm to the other as special aptitude should be demonstrated in the camps of instruction.

V.

THE CALL FOR OFFICERS

THE enrollment described in the preceding chapter was the general enrollment for service as enlisted men in the new volunteer army. But as the National Defense Act was based on the idea of utilizing all of the potential military resources of the nation, it was necessary to make special arrangements to meet the requirements of those citizens who were already more or less prepared for service as commissioned officers. Under the terms of the Act, such specially prepared citizens were invited to attend the summer camps of instruction with a view to qualifying for commissions in the National Volunteers. This great and important body of potential officer material was widely scattered throughout the country and in-

cluded the following important special classes:

1. Former officers of the regular army or volunteers, now in civil life after honorable discharge from the service.
2. Graduates of West Point in civil life.
3. Officers of the Organized Militia, subject to the consent of their proper State authorities.
4. Former officers of the Organized Militia.
5. Graduates of accredited military schools and of universities and colleges having military departments officially recognized by the War Department.
6. Persons who have successfully passed the examinations for qualification for commission in the volunteer service as heretofore provided by law.
7. Honorably discharged non-commissioned officers of the regular army, subject to proper educational tests.
8. Honorably discharged enlisted men

of the regular army who during their military service had passed the prescribed examination for commission.

9. Electrical, mechanical, and mining engineers specially qualified for commission in the volunteer coast artillery, signal corps, and engineers.

10. Physicians and surgeons desiring commissioned service in the volunteer medical corps:

It was provided in the Act that accepted applicants from the above described classes should be received at the first summer camps as student officers of volunteers, and that they should be available for duty as assistant instructors and drill masters of enlisted personnel, under the supervision of the regular army officers in charge of the camps.

It was also provided that the body of student officers in each camp should be formed into a school of application for practical training in the field duties of commissioned officers. This school of application was to

be divided into appropriate classes depending upon the provisional military rank of the students and their respective arms of the service. It was announced as prescribed by the National Defense Act that, at the conclusion of the first summer's camps the enlisted men completing the course would be organized into the formal military units of the National Volunteer Army, and that the officers for these units would be appointed by the President according to their qualifications as determined in the summer camps and the schools of application. It was also provided that in appointments in any grade, qualified officers of the same grade in the organized militia or of former volunteer organizations should, so far as practicable, be appointed to the same grade in the new volunteer service, provided that such appointee should reside in the territorial limits actually occupied by the enlisted men of his command, and provided that such appointment in the case of militia officers should be accepted with the formal consent of the State

authorities. It was also provided that after the appointment and assignment of the officers entitled to higher rank by virtue of prior commissioned service, the remaining officers of the National Volunteer force should be selected from the remainder of the student officers and the most proficient enlisted recruits according to their qualifications as determined in the summer camps and schools of application.

The spirit of the law governing the appointment of National Volunteer officers was simply this: As in our past military history, the highest military rank should be open to the American Volunteer Officer, but no man should be intrusted with the command of American Volunteers unless he has prepared himself for that responsibility in time of peace. The law very properly recognized the claims of officers who had already exercised military command, and accepted them as presumptively entitled to a similar rank in the new force. But qualification to command a particular military unit is a question

of fact which can be determined as any other question of fact. Whether an alleged major of infantry is a major of infantry *in fact*, can be determined with absolute precision. A major of infantry *in fact* is an officer who can command and lead a battalion of infantry in the varied situations of the field; a man who is qualified to instruct, train, and command the respect of all the officers and men who compose a battalion of infantry. Whether a man can handle a battalion of infantry can therefore be determined just as easily as whether he can ride a horse or run a motor boat or an automobile, and in precisely the same way—that is, by letting him try it in the presence of competent judges. And so in the case of Major X. of the Kansas Militia Infantry the law was just both to the Major and to the higher military interests of the nation. It invited Major X. to come and be tested as a Major of Infantry. It did not propose to make this test offhand and without time for practice and reasonable preparation. It invited the Major to

attend a summer military camp to be held on the Fort Riley Military Reservation. It accepted him as a student officer with the provisional rank of major given him by his State. It gave him practice as an assistant instructor in training the young Kansas recruits assembled in the camp. It received him into a field officer's school of application, similar to the Field Officer's School provided at Fort Leavenworth for the training of field officers of the regular army. It gave him practical exercises on map and ground through which he was able to train his tactical judgment and his capacity to make the decisions and issue the field orders appropriate to his rank. And at the end of the summer he was given an opportunity to handle a battalion of his arm at drill, on the march, in camp, and in a series of typical combat situations. At the end of this test the umpires knew, the officers and men of the battalion knew, and Major X. himself knew whether he was in fact a major of infantry of sufficient skill, training, and moral force to be intrusted with

the command of six hundred young Kansans who were volunteering to risk their lives, if need be, in defense of their country. If he qualified in this test, it did not follow that Major X. had mastered every element of the military art. There was still a great field for further endeavor before he could feel himself fully qualified for the final test of battle, but if he failed in this simple and obvious peace test, it was conclusively shown that he could not but fail in the more exacting test of war. And so if he qualified he was invited to enter the National Volunteer Field Army as a major of infantry, and if he failed he made way for some other student officer who had been measured and not found wanting. Thus the Government recognized the Major's presumptive claim to the command of a battalion of infantry, but it balanced this claim against the more imperative claim of the six hundred young Americans in the battalion who had a right to expect trained leadership in war.

The President's regulations, issued pursuant to provisions of the National Defense Act, provided that, so far as practicable, each tactical unit of the National Volunteers should be officered by qualified officers residing within the territorial limits actually containing the homes of the members of the force. If, for example, one of the counties inhabited by the members of an Illinois National Volunteer regiment should also be the home of a colonel of the Illinois National Guard who had qualified as a colonel of National Volunteers, then that colonel was the logical appointee as colonel of the regiment. But if no qualified colonel resided in, or conveniently near, the regimental district, the President was authorized by law to detail the army officer acting as regimental inspector-instructor on temporary duty as colonel, until such time as the normal course of training of the regiment should develop a qualified officer for that grade and responsibility. The intent of the law was primarily to meet the first requirement of military efficiency,

that competent leaders must be provided for all organized tactical units. But it was the policy of the law, with certain necessary exceptions in time of peace, to open the avenues of promotion freely to qualified volunteer officers. The historical tradition that the highest command must be open to citizen soldiers of energy, ability, and genius was carefully preserved. These two necessary conditions were met by the clauses permitting the appointment of selected regular officers to command newly organized units until, after a reasonable period of training, competent leaders should be developed within the organization itself.

The enrollment of authorized student officers for the first summer's camps and school of application resulted as follows:

Former officers of the regular army or volunteers	787
Graduates from West Point in civil life	97

Officers of the Organized Militia.....	3,427
Former officers of the Organized Militia.....	3,423
Graduates of accredited military schools.....	8,270
Persons qualified by law for volunteer commissions.....	23
Honorably discharged non-commissioned officers of the regular army.....	943
Qualified enlisted candidates for commission.....	37
Practical railroad men, candidates for commission in the volunteer railway corps.....	423
Physicians and surgeons, candidates for commission in the volunteer medical corps.....	2,243
Civil, electrical, and mining engineers, candidates for commission in the volunteer signal corps.....	423
Similar technical experts, candidates for commission in the volunteer coast artillery corps.....	847

Similar technical experts, candidates for commission in the volunteer engineers	627
Total	21,570

VI.

THE WAR DEPARTMENT AT WORK

THE passage of the National Defense Act placed an enormous responsibility upon the War Department. In enacting the new law Congress had already done its share. It had created the legal powers necessary to carry the new military policy into effect, and had conferred these powers upon the executive branch of the Government. The success of the National Volunteer System now depended upon the success of the first summer's encampments, and that must necessarily depend upon the wisdom of the preparatory measures adopted by the War Department.

The methods adopted for the first enrollment of officers and enlisted men have already been described. This enrollment alone involved preliminary work of no small magni-

tude. It was necessary first to place the fullest information in the hands of the young men of the country and to receive back the individual enrollment blanks and descriptive lists in time to locate, organize, and equip the instruction camps before the beginning of summer.

THE CURRICULUM OF THE SUMMER SCHOOLS

While the enrollment was in progress, a board of officers was detailed by the Secretary of War to prepare standardized courses of instruction for the summer schools and to prepare regulations for their government and discipline. Fortunately it was recognized that this was one of the most important tasks ever assigned a body of American Army Officers. It was not merely a military problem of far reaching importance. It was one of the greatest educational enterprises ever undertaken.

The Government had engaged to open a school for more than three hundred thousand young men on the first day of July. The

success of this school and the future of the American Volunteer System to a large extent depended upon the wisdom of this board. The problem was to prescribe the maximum amount of practical military instruction that is possible in a ninety-days course of training. It must involve the drill of the several arms, the practical arts of camping, marching, and cooking in the field. It must involve instruction in personal hygiene and field sanitation. It must involve practical training in the care and use of the soldier's arms and equipments. For the infantry and cavalry it must include target practice and fire discipline. For the infantry it must include further practice in the control of collective rifle fire. For the cavalry and field artillery it must include the training and care of the horse as well as the man, and for the field artillery it must include target practice with field guns of the modern quick-firing type. For all arms it must include tactical and combat exercises on varied ground, including reconnaissance, security, and exercises in attack

and defense. All of these and much more must be imparted to the troops within the brief period of one summer, while special courses in tactics, troop leading, and field administration must be provided for the officers' schools of application. In addition to these courses for the combatant arms, similar courses of instruction must also be provided for the supply corps, the sanitary service, and other non-combatants.

It was recognized that the limited time available for instruction should be entirely consumed in instruction, and that every detail of organization and method should be perfected and standardized before the recruits were assembled. Definite schedules of work must be provided for each arm of the service. In order to cover the necessary field in the limited time, there must be a progressive program of strenuous and exacting work, but through variety and the use of the most practical methods it must be made interesting to all young men possessing the true soldier spirit. Nor were the requirements of

amusement and recreation to be omitted in this comprehensive educational program. The volunteer recruit was to be given an honest day's work each day. But after the day's work he was to be given every facility for athletics and open-air sports. This idea was to receive special consideration in the selection of camp sites in attractive regions so that the nation's students could combine their military duty with the benefits of a summer's outing.

METHODS OF DISCIPLINE

It was apparent at once that the methods of discipline appropriate for summer schools for volunteers must be quite different from those developed in the garrison life of the regular army. There is a discipline of prohibition and a discipline of strenuous occupation. Where men are busy from morning until night in useful and absorbing work, the problem of discipline solves itself. Where men must have many hours of idleness or

must find their employment in an oft repeated routine of perfunctory drills, the psychological stimulus of progressive interest is lacking both to officers and men. In the one case discipline is inherent in the work and grows with it, in the other case it does not develop in the work but must be imposed upon it. Officers of the regular army are all familiar with the difference in the conduct of men in the field and the conduct of the same men in a monotonous garrison. When the hike is on with something new and vital to see and do, there is little business for the court-martial. The proper discipline for the national volunteers was therefore recognized to be the natural discipline of active strenuous field training. Given a body of young men who volunteer to learn a useful art, a corps of competent officers to lead them, and a varied and absorbing course of instruction, no elaborate system of coercion or punishment is necessary. Discipline becomes the necessary by-product of such a course. It grows on the drill ground and on the

march, in the striving for skill and in manly pride in the daily test of endurance, and above all in the true soldier's confidence in a wise and capable leader.

Among a large number of volunteers some misfits must be expected. In every camp there would be some weaklings and milksops, some dullards incapable of subordination, some natural Ishmaelites who cannot keep in step in any team. There would also be some hopelessly vicious and perverted characters. With these the camp authorities would have no time to deal. Ninety days is too short a time for developing either a nursery or a reformatory. Prompt and simple disciplinary measures must be provided, particularly to check first offenses, but, as a general rule, "quitters" would simply be allowed to quit and carry their record of failure home with them. No young American who is worth the cost of training would be willing to take a discharge like that.

Discharge without honor was thus accepted as the sufficient basis of the system of punish-

ment. The corresponding principle of reward lay in a just and sensible system of promotion. For even the highest military rank lay open to citizen soldiers of character and ability. This was one of the underlying principles of the National Defense Act.

THE SELECTION OF INSPECTOR–INSTRUCTORS FROM THE REGULAR ARMY

While the curriculum board was dealing with the courses of instruction and discipline, another board of officers was engaged on the equally important task of investigating the qualifications of army officers for detail with the new force of volunteers. In some respects this task was of even greater practical importance than the preparation of a sound curriculum and system of discipline.

A good policy is of great importance, but even the best policy must fail in the hands of incompetent or unsympathetic agents. It was therefore recognized that only officers of the highest character, ability, and industry

should be detailed for duty with the volunteers, and that details for any particular duty with the volunteers should be restricted to officers of recognized qualification and aptitude for that particular duty. It was apparent that a corps of competent instructors and staff officers could be found among the officers of the army, but it was quite obvious that all army officers were not adapted for all of the numerous tasks to be performed in the volunteer service.

The board of officers was therefore directed to examine the efficiency records of all army officers with special reference to their qualifications and aptitudes for volunteer service. It was instructed, in the case of each officer, to specify what duties, if any, he was qualified to perform, and for each class of duties to construct a list of officers certified to be eligible and competent to perform those duties. The labors of this board would thus result in preparing eligibility lists to be used by the President in the selection of the first corps of officers and instructors for the new volun-

teer army. This task, though of great importance, was not difficult when approached by common-sense methods. For example, it was known that the volunteers would require an inspector-instructor for each infantry battalion. As a first step the board found no difficulty in defining the qualifications necessary in such an officer. He must be an expert in infantry drill and in modern infantry tactics; he must be qualified to instruct and lead each and all of the officers and men comprising a war strength battalion of infantry. He must possess the soldierly character and moral qualities that would enable him to lead through the power of example. He must be qualified in every way to command and lead a battalion of infantry in peace or war. Having established a measure of the task in this way, the board of officers then prepared a list of officers certified by them to be qualified for the task. In each list the names were arranged in the order of army rank, with brief references to their special qualifications in each case.

Similar lists were prepared for inspector-instructors of infantry regiments and brigades and for corresponding details in the cavalry, artillery, and all other branches of the service.

VII.

THE VOLUNTEER ARMY—GENERAL ORDERS NO. I

On the tenth day of April, 1916, the first year's enrollment was completed. It comprised the names of 333,746 recruits and 21,570 candidates for commission. By classification of the enrollment blanks these men were easily grouped by arm of the service and their geographical distribution was fully revealed.

On May 1st the President, as Commander-in-Chief, published General Orders No. 1, of the National Volunteer Army. In this order, as authorized in the National Defense Act, he organized the new force into fifteen infantry divisions, three cavalry divisions, and a volunteer coast artillery corps of 216 companies, provisionally organized for assign-

ment of officers into six brigades of three regiments each.

For each division of the field army he selected a division commander and division staff from specially qualified officers of the regular army. He also detailed a regular officer as inspector-instructor for each battalion, squadron, regiment, and brigade of the field army, and for each provisional battalion, regiment, and brigade of the coast artillery. Under the terms of the National Defense Act the detail of this corps of army officers[1] to the volunteers created a corresponding number of vacancies in the regular army.

The order also prescribed, as specified by law, that inspector-instructors assigned to volunteer organizations should command such organizations during the first summer's encampment and until competent volunteer officers should qualify for command. After the qualification and appointment of com-

[1] This detail comprised 801 inspector-instructors for battalions and squadrons, 219 for regiments, and 75 for brigades.

manding officers from the volunteers, the detailed inspector-instructors, under supervision of division commanders, were still to be responsible for the peace administration and inspection of their respective units, the preservation and accountability of its property and equipment, the perfection of mobilization and concentration plans, and the conduct of the winter correspondence schools to be provided for the higher military training of officers and non-commissioned officers.

This was in full harmony with the policy of the Government to develop commanders of volunteers from among the volunteers. But it was recognized that there are certain necessary functions of administration, preparation, and inspection that cannot be performed with certainty by busy civilians in time of peace. These duties were therefore assigned to the division commander, assisted by his staff and the corps of inspector-instructors assigned to his division. By this arrangement precision of preparation, mobilization, and concentration were assured,

and the volunteer officer, being relieved from the burden of routine peace administration and property accountability was enabled to devote all of his available time to preparation for his more important duties as a troop leader in war.

In addition to the corps of officers detailed for duty with the volunteers, the order also provided for the assignment of selected non-commissioned officers to serve as assistants for the inspector-instructors. The number so assigned depended upon the arm of the service and the requirements of each tactical unit. In order to provide available non-commissioned officers for this purpose, the National Defense Act had authorized the corresponding increase in the enlisted strength of the army.

After publishing the organization of the volunteer army, the territorial location of the several divisions, and the assignment of the necessary personnel from the regular army, General Orders No. 1 concluded with the general instructions of the Commander-in-

Chief. These were based upon the principle of decentralization. It was recognized that the great policy of forming a national army must necessarily break down under centralized control in the War Department. Each division commander was therefore made the responsible agent of the President and was fully clothed by him with the necessary legal powers. He was given the enrollment cards of the officers and enlisted men of his command. He was provided with a corps of competent assistants, he was allotted his *pro rata* share of the funds appropriated by Congress, and he was given the policy of the Government as embodied in the regulations for the training and discipline of American volunteers. The further orders of the President may be summed up in this brief phrase: "General, there is your division, go and organize it and train it."

VIII.

AMONG THE VOLUNTEERS—EXTRACTS FROM LIEUTENANT BURR'S DIARY

A FULL description of the detailed organization of the National Volunteer Army would fill a volume. About eleven hundred instructor-inspectors were now busily engaged in preparing for the summer camps. Each of these officers had his peculiar problem, peculiar to the requirements of his arm of the service, and peculiar to the varying conditions throughout the country. As an example of the work done by these officers, we will quote the following extracts from the diary of First Lieutenant Milford Burr, 6th Cavalry, who was detailed for duty as a Squadron Inspector-Instructor in the Third Volunteer Cavalry Division.

"*May* 2d.—Have just read the morning

paper giving the organization of the new Volunteer Army and see that I am detailed as Squadron Inspector-Instructor with the Third Volunteer Cavalry Division. It gives me the Volunteer rank of Major of Cavalry without increased pay.

"Have read the order again and find that the Third Cavalry Division is scattered from Texas to California. Some dispersion I should say. Can we ever get them together? I wonder where my squadron is.

. . . . . .

"*May* 3d.—Have just received telegraphic orders to report to the Division Commander at Fort Worth, Texas, without delay. Busy packing up. Will take the San Antonio express to-morrow morning.

. . . . . .

"*May* 4th—*En route.* Have been reading the new regulations for the volunteers and find that I have my work cut out for me. I suppose there are four hundred cowboys out there in the desert somewhere waiting for me.

I am to round them up and make four troops of cavalry out of them in ninety days. I concede that the squadron has a good major. But where are the other officers? May be General Blunt will tell me. I hope so.

. . . . . .

"*May* 6th.—*En route* again. Got to Fort Worth at eight o'clock yesterday morning. Reported to the Division Commander and hit the road again at five in the afternoon. I found that I had met General Blunt before. He used to be one of my math. instructors at West Point. He was a good instructor then and he looks like a real general now. When I reported, he shot off his orders right away: 'Glad to see you, Burr. You draw the First Squadron, 32d Cavalry, Headquarters, Tucson, Arizona. Here are the descriptive lists of all your men. They are scattered along the Southern Pacific from Deming to Tucson, and along the El Paso and Southwestern from Deming to Bisbee. You know the country, don't you? Fact is, I know you

do, because that's the reason you were given that territory. The Division Adjutant will give you your order and a copy of the regulations governing the training of volunteer cavalry. You'll find your work pretty well doped out for you and your common sense will do the rest. Two sergeants and three corporals from the 5th Cavalry will report to you at Deming.'

"I asked the General where the summer camps would be. 'Don't know yet,' he replied. 'We only got started here day before yesterday. But you'll have orders in plenty of time. You get the men ready for camp and we'll do the rest.' The General picked up a pencil and glanced at a map that lay on his desk. As I got up he said: 'Going? Well good-bye, Burr. I'll be down to see you when you get your men rounded up.'

"At any rate I don't have to worry any more because the Third Cavalry Division is scattered from the Brazos to the Grand Canyon. That is General Blunt's job and mine is just the little slice of country south

of the Gila. I'm glad that two sergeants and three corporals are to report to me. That is a little start toward having a squadron of cavalry. We'll have to find the rest of them out in the chapparal.

. . . . . .

"*May* 7th.—*En route.* I have been looking over the descriptive lists of my squadron of mesquite dragoons. It's not so bad after all. There are 414 recruits and they are pretty well bunched in groups of fifteen or more along the railroad. Many of them live back in the country, but they are tied together into railroad-station groups. There are forty-seven recruits near one town alone and only twenty-one groups altogether. And then there's some trained material. I was surprised at the statements of former service. There are forty-four men with honorable discharges from the army who have settled down in the cattle country. Ten of them were discharged as non-commissioned officers. There are thirty-six

youngsters who have served in the militia. Among the candidates for the officers' schools, there are two veterans of the Spanish-American War and two have seen Philippine service. There is a graduate from West Point who resigned and went into the cattle business, and here is a young mining engineer who, after two years at West Point, graduated from Cornell. There is one young lawyer who graduated from the Virginia Military Institute. Two cattlemen who graduated from the University of Illinois state that they had four years' military training at college and one of them became a captain in the university regiment. There are seven other graduates of military schools. It doesn't look like organizing this cavalry squadron would be entirely a game of solitaire after all. Under the regulations, I find that I am authorized to appoint provisional officers and to assign them to troops. With this power and after some personal knowledge of these men I should be able to have a provisional organization of the squadron before

we go to the camp. When I first looked at this proposition I thought I would have to go out into the mesquite and yell for my cavalry squadron, but already the outlines of order begin to appear. Perhaps it is because men are naturally organizing animals and are bound to organize rightly or wrongly whenever we bring them together. If so, it is only necessary to point out the right way.

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"*May* 8th—DEMING, NEW MEXICO.—As I got off the train yesterday I realized that I was just entering my territory and decided to make some inquiries about the volunteer cavalry personnel in the neighborhood. But I found the personnel waiting for me. Thirty-three mounted men were lined up south of the station to meet me. They were all well mounted and their control of their spirited horses, all more or less excited by the railroad noises, was a pretty sight. As I walked along the platform somebody recognized me, for a tall cavalier in front of the center turned

and roared a command, and I immediately received one of the most unusual and significant military salutes on record. At the word of command each horseman drew a yellow emblem from his hip pocket and stood at 'Present,' with a copy of the 'Cavalry Drill Regulations' in front of his chin.

"As I returned the salute there was another command which brought the yellow books back to the hip pockets. Another command and the little troop wheeled by fours and moved in column down the street at a walk, a moment later it broke into a trot for a hundred yards or so, then wheeled about by fours and returned, breaking from trot to gallop as it passed the extemporized reviewing stand. After going two hundred yards beyond me there was a shout and my cavalry troop was gone. In a moment the street was full of rollicking cowboys engaged in an extemporized wild-west show. There were all of the usual stunts, bucking ponies, vaulting horsemen, whirling lariats, and sombreros picked from the ground. But while the scurry

was at its height my tall troop commander fired his pistol in the air and immediately his horse men galloped toward him and re-formed their line. Again he shouted his command for a salute, and once more thirty-three copies of the Cavalry Drill Regulations were presented to the Inspector-Instructor of the First Squadron, 32d U. S. Volunteer Cavalry.

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"*May* 9th.—*En route.* When I first saw the commander of the Deming troop I thought there was something familiar about him. It turned out to be Jim Hurley, my roommate for two years at West Point. He was one of the most popular men of my class and undoubtedly the best horseman. He was 'found' in Analytical Geometry and Calculus, and strange to say he has always blamed old Blunt, our new Division Commander, for his discomfiture After leaving West Point he studied mining at Cornell, and later became a prosperous mining engineer and ore buyer with headquarters at

Deming. When the National Defense Act was passed, he immediately became the principal promoter of the volunteer movement in Arizona and New Mexico. His business interests carried him all over the region from Yuma to Denver, and wherever he went he talked to the local groups of young men and developed the basis of military order by organizing them, under the leadership of older men of former military service. Hurley of course enrolled for the Cavalry, and his principal work lay in organizing the personnel that was embodied later in the First Squadron of the 32d Cavalry. But as a promoter he worked in a wider field. He helped to promote the enrollment of the Second Squadron of his regiment which lies grouped along the Santa Fé line from Trinidad to Needles. He and his ever increasing circle of assistants developed the personnel of the 132d Volunteer Infantry in the same territory. They also got together three batteries of horse artillery, one centered at El Paso, one at Tucson, and one in the Phœnix region. He also encour-

aged the enrollment of mountain ore freighters as field army teamsters and thus laid the foundation for the ammunition and supply columns of the First Volunteer Cavalry Division. Wherever he went he found interest, and his natural instinct for organization molded interest in the direction of aptitude and initial training. Under his guidance miners and railroad men enrolled as sappers and miners in the engineer service, and most of the young doctors in the mining region began collecting personnel for field hospitals and ambulance companies. If there are other men like Hurley in the rest of the country, our volunteer army is sure to succeed. It seems that his celebration in my honor at Deming was more or less spontaneous. When he heard of my assignment, he wired Fort Worth and found that I was already well on the way. 'I had only time to bring in the men from the neighborhood,' said he. 'If I had had time to call in the boys from Cook's Peak and Silver City you'd have seen all of Troop 'A' at the station.

"I very frankly expressed to Hurley my admiration for his work and predicted that he would soon be in command of the squadron, or, better, of the regiment. 'Time enough for that,' he said. 'That isn't the game that I am playing. The nation is building up a great institution and I want to help build it to last forever. I am working as a citizen and not merely as a soldier. If I thought of my own interest I'd buy ore this summer and not bother with a summer camp. This isn't merely a question of individualism, it's a question of organization, of standardizing. You're the Government's standardizing agent down here. You have one of the biggest jobs an American citizen ever had to do. I am simply here to help, not you, but the success of the job. You are to use me where the job needs me most. I'll serve wherever you put me, from troop commander down to farrier sergeant. No, I am not disinterested. I am playing a big game and not a little one, and you'll see that the stakes I play are worth having.'"

IX.

PREPARING FOR CAMP—LIEUTENANT BURR'S DIARY CONTINUED

"TUCSON, *June* 1st.—Have just returned from a visit to all of my stations. In some cases all of the men of the local group rode in from their outlying ranches and were there at the railroad station to meet me. Generally, however, the leader of the group would meet me with the information I had previously written for. In most cases I found him to be an old soldier of the Army or the National Guard. Sometimes he was a college man with military-school experience. I always found him to be inspired by Hurley's point of view. Hurley's influence and imagination extended over three States, while the local leader's influence was generally restricted to the limits of his own canyon or mountain prairie.

"At Benson I met one Daniel Blane, a San Pedro Valley farmer who rode in twenty-five miles with his two sons and twelve other boys of his neighborhood. He was an honorably discharged first sergeant, about forty-four years old. He had formerly served with the cavalry at Fort Grant. 'Yes,' said he, 'I'm too old to come as a recruit, so I enrolled as a student officer. The boys wanted to come, and they wanted me to come with them, and it didn't take much urging. I'll go through the summer camp as a candidate for a commission because I want the summer camp. If I don't get the commission I'll go back home just as happy. In the meantime I remember enough of the cavalry business to help break in recruits. I was going to use these boys to help me dig a new irrigation ditch this summer, but we have decided to put it off till fall. It won't hurt the boys, and it won't hurt me, and it won't hurt the ditch when we come to dig it.'

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"TUCSON, *June* 10th.—My office is open and we are all busy. I have appointed my five regular non-commissioned officers 'Mobilization Sergeants' as provided in the new law. After the summer's camp, one will go to each troop center and one will remain with me at squadron headquarters. For the present I am keeping them with me. They are all trained army clerks and I have them busy with paper work. My requisitions for clothing, ammunition, arms, accouterments, horse equipments, tentage, kitchen and field wagons are all in. When you realize that the supply departments are receiving requisitions from seven or eight hundred other organizations more or less like mine, you see there is a big job before them. But if they can do it in war, they can do it in peace, and everything indicates that every cup and cartridge will be in the hands of the men within three hours after they reach their first camps. The organization of the first squadron is so far advanced that I have decided to issue the clothing and equipments

before we take the train. The men are anxious to leave home looking like soldiers.

"The work has been running smoothly because it was all standardized last winter in Washington. Take requisitions, for example: instead of having eight hundred battalion inspector-instructors wasting gray matter on the problem of equipment, each one of us has his standard 'table of allowances and model requisitions.' After a little study of local requirements I can turn most of the paper work over to my clerks. It is well too, for I have been studying the courses of instruction for the Cavalry Summer Schools, and I find that I must brush up everything I ever knew in order to keep ahead of the officers and men of the First Squadron. The school work is also standardized and I am making requisition now for books, manuals, and maps.

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"TUCSON, *June* 15th.—I have completed my squadron organization and tentative as-

signment of provisional officers. My Squadron Adjutant is Marshall, a young lawyer here in Tucson, who graduated from the Virginia Military Institute. My Squadron Quartermaster, Williams, is also from Tucson. He served in the Philippines as a youngster and became a regimental quartermaster sergeant. I have slated Hurley as Captain of Troop 'A,' to be formed in the Deming country. Davis, a ranchman and former captain of the organized militia, is to have his tryout as Captain of Troop 'B,' to be formed at Lordsburg. Moseley, another militia officer, is to be intrusted with the formation of 'C' Troop, from Bisbee and the Sulphur Springs Valley. Finally my friend, former first sergeant Daniel Blane, is to be Captain of Troop 'D,' which lies scattered from the San Pedro to Tucson. . . . I have also two extra captains and three extra lieutenants from the organized militia, whom I am attaching to troops for the Summer School of Application and the autumn tryout.

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"My Battalion Sergeant-Major is a well educated youngster who served an enlistment in the regular army, where he became a regimental clerk. My first sergeants are all old soldiers, and my sergeants have all had some military training. In most cases I have considered the recommendations of the local leaders in selecting my corporals. They have not had much training, but most of them are fine intelligent youngsters, and of course all of them are good horsemen and know the horse.

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"TUCSON, *June* 16th.—The orders for the summer camp have come. In order to give the troops of the several arms a chance to observe each other, several camps are to be established within marching distance of each other in northern New Mexico. The 44th Infantry Brigade, with a battalion of the 29th Field Artillery, a field hospital, and an ambulance company, is to come from the Fifteenth Infantry Division. The Third

Cavalry Division is to be represented by our regiment of cavalry, the 2d Battalion of the 33d Field Artillery (Horse), a mounted engineer company, and a field company and aëro detachment from the Signal Corps.

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"TUCSON, *June* 26th.—All arrangements have been made for the start. Uniforms are to be issued just before the entrainment. The stock cars are to be picked up as the trains approach Deming, where we take on the rest of the baggage and consolidate the squadron train. Everything is scheduled to arrive at Albuquerque the morning of July 1st. I find that most of my officers know the Field Service Regulations chapter on 'Railroad Transportation' better than I do. The arrangements and train schedules have all been made up by Colonel Wilson, the newly appointed Railroad Quartermaster of the Fifteenth Infantry Division. He is a Colonel in our new Volunteer Army. In civil life he is a division traffic manager on the

Southern Pacific. This illustrates one of the underlying principles of the new Volunteer Army. Technical experts in civil life are selected for corresponding military specialties.

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"*June* 30th.—*En route.* While we were at Deming, one of Captain Blane's dragoon mountain boys met some old or new friends and came rolling back to the platform more like a jovial cowboy than a model volunteer soldier. The Captain sent for the offender. When he came up defiantly in the custody of the First Sergeant, the Captain looked at him a moment and said: 'Sergeant Sullivan, you can take off Private Riggs's belts and uniform and let him wear that new, blue fatigue suit of his. Then you can rig up a guard house in the baggage car for Private Riggs's benefit and keep him there.' I noticed the beginning of a gesture of resentment on Riggs's part. He looked about the crowded platform but did not discover a sympathetic

public opinion. He knew Captain Blane and he knew Sergeant Sullivan.

"The next morning as we were *en route* between Rincon and Albuquerque I happened to be in the 'D' Troop car when Captain Blane sent for Private Riggs. As nearly as I can recall them the Captain's remarks were as follows: 'Riggs, this trip of ours is not a booze party. The Summer School Regulations of the Volunteer Army are against it and "D" Troop is going to stick to the Regulations. I explained that regulation to all of you boys before we left Benson. I am not going to take a drink until we get home, because I am going to obey the law up to the limit. Now I want you to understand that I am Captain of this troop. You have just begun soldiering, so you may not know what the word "Captain" means. But you do know what the word "Boss" means, and you can put it down that the two words mean just the same thing. Now while I am the Boss of this troop, no man stays on this job who does not obey orders. If you don't

like the job, you can ask for your time and go home. What do you think about it?'

" 'I don't want to go home,' said Riggs. 'If you will give me another chance, I'll stick.'

" 'Sergeant Sullivan,' said the Captain, 'you can release Private Riggs from arrest.'"

X.

THE VOLUNTEERS IN CAMP—FURTHER EXTRACTS FROM LIEUTENANT BURR'S DIARY

"CAMP KIT CARSON, *July* 1st.—We are in camp after a strenuous day. We arrived at the camp siding at eight o'clock this morning. The horses were on their picket lines by ten o'clock and by eleven the baggage was unloaded. At noon we marched into a permanent camp of conical tents prepared by the regular cavalry detachment from El Paso. The regulars came up to give us a welcome and a good start in a model camp, but they leave us this evening at six o'clock and from now on we will be on our own resources. I have just assembled the troop commanders to give them the list of camp calls and some necessary sanitary orders. The men are

busy getting their tents in order. I can hear Sergeant Sullivan now telling the men of his troop how they used to do it in the old Third Cavalry. I will inspect them after stables. Reveille to-morrow morning at five o'clock. The summer's course of instruction opens at half past six with 'Military Calisthenics and the School of the Soldier.' The first week the men are to work only six hours a day including stables. The Officers' School begins to-morrow afternoon with the first quiz on Cavalry Drill Regulations and a lecture on camp sanitation.

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"CAMP KIT CARSON, *July* 10th.—General Blunt has been here to inspect the progress of the cavalry recruits. After retreat last night he assembled the inspector-instructors and gave us his views of the summer's progress.

" 'Three months,' said he, 'is a short time for training a squadron of cavalry. But you have the finest natural cavalry material in

the world, and if you can teach these western horsemen as fast as they can learn you will do great things by autumn. The best practical rule for cavalry training that I know is not found in the military text-books at all. I got it from the Book of Common Prayer.

"'It is simply this: "Do those things that you ought to do, and leave undone the things that you ought not to do." If you neglect that rule there will be no health in you, spiritual, tactical, or any other kind.

"'So teach these cowboys the plain cavalry business and don't teach them cavalry fads. Teach them to march and scout and fight. I'll excuse you from polo games and horse-show stunts until some other summer. You will not have time to polish them up as Cossacks or Uhlans or Household lancers and curassiers, but you can go a long way toward making the plain "made in America" brand that Ashby developed under Stonewall Jackson; the homespun, serviceable fighting horsemen that rediscovered the Napoleonic cavalry

rôle under Stuart and Forrest and Sheridan and Wilson.'

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"CAMP KIT CARSON, *July* 20th.—As I sat by the camp fire last night the Corporal of the Guard was inspecting a sentinel within earshot of my tent. The sentinel was apparently not precise in some parts of his guard catechism and the Corporal's criticisms and corrections were delivered in such a rich and forceful Irish brogue that I moved toward them under the shadow of my tent.

"'I asked ye for all of your gineral orders and not for a racy synopsis of them,' said the Corporal. 'The night's young and I'm not very busy so just repate them agin.'

"The sentinel repeated them again and several times again until the Corporal's passion for thoroughness was satisfied. As the Corporal finally moved away and the sentinel resumed his beat, I was able to recognize them. Private Burton, a good-look-

ing youngster of nineteen, is the son of one of the richest cattlemen in Arizona. Corporal Casey's father is a range foreman on the Burton ranch.

"I record this little scene because it is so typical of the democracy of this camp. Burton scarcely knew Casey when they came down here. But they rode boot to boot at the first drills and I notice lately that they always ride together when they go on pass. If you should meet them on the prairie you would not know the rich man from the poor man There is a little yellow stripe on the Corporal's arm that marks him as one who is being tried as a leader of other men. He is proud to wear it, and Burton respects it. Otherwise they wear the same khaki uniform and both have learned to mend it and keep it neat and clean and to wear it like soldiers. They sleep on the same blankets, eat the same daily ration, and do the same daily grist of work. They have precisely the same financial status here, for Casey does not need any money and Burton could not use it if he

had it. They are both at the charge of their even-handed Uncle Sam.

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"CAMP KIT CARSON, *July* 31st.—July, 1916, has been the most strenuous month of my life. If anything it was busier than Plebe Camp at West Point. We are well along though in school of the troop. The men are beginning to have the set-up of the soldier, and each troop is well grounded in drill. Of course it was only possible because the men were horsemen to begin with and the officers had enough initial training to act as instructors from the start. Every morning we had drills and practical training in the care of arms, equipment, and clothing. Each morning's work was scheduled in advance so that the officers and non-commissioned officers could prepare for their duties as instructors. In the afternoons we had the officers' schools, with gallery practice and other preliminary target work for the men. There was plenty to do apparently and yet there was energy enough

left to organize a baseball league in the squadron with a team in each troop and a rattling game every evening after stables.

"It is a great college of the open air, and I find my job as College President a very busy one. But it is only a college after all. For scattered around our camps are other colleges of infantry, field artillery, and the auxiliary services, all bound together in a great summer university of National Service.

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"But we have had some losses in personnel. Some of the men have found soldiering too hard, just as they will find everything too hard that requires strenuous effort. They have gone home. Many more wanted to go home at first, but were ashamed to be quitters in the eyes of old comrades. Now they have got the pace and are glad they stayed. Some of our student officers have left us. It is a hard grind for anybody but a true soldier, and no other should hold a commission. Those who expected the glitter

and fuss of a prolonged militia camp, half parade and half spree, have learned that wearing a uniform is not all of an officer's business. I recognized some of this type when we started, but their elimination has been prompt and automatic. To test them as officers, it is only necessary to give them an officer's job and make them do it up to the handle every day. Even the cleverest four-flushers can't play that game long. In a little while they tender their resignations on account of the pressure of private business, and their resignations are always accepted. For every such vacancy I have a dozen understudies who are ready to fill it.

"But these are not the only losses. Poor old Timpkins of my old regiment has been relieved from duty as the regular Inspector-Instructor of the 2d Squadron. He is a good garrison officer but he doesn't fit into this Volunteer Educational scheme. There was friction from the first in his squadron. He could not see that discipline was only a means to an end, and that where leading is sufficient

and men are eager to follow, it isn't necessary to browbeat and drive. General Blunt saw the unsatisfactory situation in the 2d Squadron at his first inspection and fortunately had full power to correct it. He relieved Timpkins at once and gave him an administrative job on the Quartermaster staff of the Division. He is sure to make good there for he is able and energetic, but he was a square plug in a round hole when it came to teaching volunteers.

"Most of the selections of regular officers as volunteer instructors have been satisfactory. But some army officers fail to get into the game. The volunteers are eager and willing but they are typical intelligent young Americans and want 'to be shown.' This is no place for the pompous martinet who thinks he can dogmatize because he is a professional soldier. In his good-bye conference, General Blunt gave us some plain talk on this subject. He said: 'You must get over the narrow point of view of the old army. Remember that military education is one

thing and professional training is another. Most of you young gentlemen have been educated to death, but your professional practice is just beginning. Graduation from West Point no more qualifies you for high command, than graduation from the Harvard Law School would qualify you for the Supreme Bench. Each school is simply a favored gateway into a great profession. But the gateway brings you only to the threshold. And remember that there are humbler gateways into both professions. Lincoln never went to a law school at all. He borrowed his Blackstone and conned it by a tallow dip. Forrest misspelled the simplest words in his tactical messages, but he is a professional model for all of us as American cavalrymen. So go about your duties here with humility. Remember that Cromwell was a country gentleman like some of your student officers, and that he never thought of the profession of arms until he was forty years old. And yet he founded and led the most irresistible cavalry the world has ever seen. Indeed we

will miss the real spirit of the American Volunteer System if we imagine that we are sent here to advance our personal military ambitions. We are founding a great National Institution. There is latent military genius among the young men of these camps. It is for us to find it and prepare it and make it available for the nation.'

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"CAMP IN THE MOUNTAINS, *August* 3d.—It is certainly a relief to be up here in the hills after last month's grind. The men took the hardships of the practice march as a frolic. They had their first bivouac in shelter tents last night, and as a result of their formal drills in tent pitching they went into camp like veterans. The end of the second day's march brought us to this valley among the pines. I am authorized to stay here three days and give the squadron an outing. After performing their necessary camp and stable duties, the men will be free to fish and swim and to ride over the foothills. I am even

granting hunting leaves and some of the younger officers are taking their platoons on long hikes toward the higher mountains. The only condition is that they must march like bodies of cavalry and bring back a reconnaissance map and report of the trip.

"On the way up I limited the instruction to the duties of the march. Officers and non-commissioned officers had already been grounded in that part of the Field Service Regulations and I exacted the most rigid march discipline. My men could ride, but they had still to learn the practical art of marching. On the way down we will make three marches instead of two and, without relaxing the march discipline, we will begin our practice in advance cavalry reconnaissance.

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"CAMP KIT CARSON, *August* 23d.—My four troops are on the target range finishing their record practice. To most of the men this is the most interesting part of the season.

Shooting is good sport in itself and the element of competition adds a double zest. But in the target work I have encountered the first serious opposition to my will as a commander. I scheduled range practice for eight hours a day and immediately found active, organized dissent all along the line. From Captain Hurley of Troop 'A' down to Musician Rafferty of Troop 'D,' officers and men insist that shooting should begin with the first clear light of dawn and last until the targets disappear in the evening twilight. It may have been weakness to change my mind, but I yielded to the spirit of protest. We literally shoot all day and snatch odd moments for eating, grooming, and policing camp. I am afraid that there is even a gambling spirit growing. I have been unofficially informed that every troop is betting that it will beat every other troop, that every platoon is betting that it will beat every other platoon, and that every corporal is betting that he will qualify more marksmen than any other corporal. The baseball

games scheduled for the rest of the month have been cancelled.

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"CAMP KIT CARSON, *August* 28th.—The troops of my squadron are to have their field firing tests next week, so I rode down to see the infantry work this morning. In these days when battle targets are generally invisible, individual marksmanship is only a minor factor in the fire fight. The fire of organized masses of men must be controlled by their officers and delivered so as to sweep areas of the opposing front. This imposes an immense task on the infantry officer, probably the most important and the most difficult thing in the whole range of practical military art. It involves fire discipline for the squad, fire control for the platoons, and fire direction and adjustment for the companies and battalion. A perfect organization is necessary and one so simple that it will not break down in the moral stress of the battle. We have the same problem in

our cavalry for it will be our chief business to dismount and fight on foot, but we have other duties and cannot specialize in this as the infantry must. On the field range to-day, I saw the proficiency test of a company of the 132d Volunteer Infantry. The company was aligned behind a low ridge. The umpire peeping over the crest told the captain that somewhere on the crest nearly a mile away there was reported to be a hostile trench hidden among the mesquite bushes. I searched the ground with my field glasses as the captain did. After a time I saw a silhouette khaki target dimly outlining a man lying down between the mesquite bushes. Presently I saw another and then another vaguely outlining a front of perhaps a hundred yards. The other targets, if any, were concealed in the brush. The captain's problem was to determine the range and divide that invisible target into sectors for his platoons so that all of their fire should be distributed over it. He must overcome the psychological tendency for individual marks-

men to concentrate their fire on one or two conspicuous points. To gain fire superiority he must deliver a sudden and effective burst over that entire line and he must make his arrangements so that neither he nor his men should be exposed to view until all of their rifles should crash out into action.

"The captain, peering over the crest with his field glasses, summoned his lieutenants and platoon sergeants. They, as they crawled to a place beside him, directed their field glasses toward the indicated line and after finding it each received a part of the whole target as the special target of his platoon. Each platoon leader then in the same way led his squad leaders to the crest and each squad leader received the slice of the target for his seven men. It was to be surprise fire and there was time for this deliberation. In the meantime the five best trained estimators in the company were each estimating the range to be averaged by the captain as the initial range for the company team. Then and not till then did the company advance.

At the signal each private soldier crawled noiselessly to his position on the crest as marked by the line of corporals and soon each man had his objective and his sight setting inspected. As his squad was inspected and found ready each corporal signalled his platoon chief, and each platoon chief likewise signalled his readiness to the captain.

"Not till all were ready, did the captain give the signal, and then at a blast from his whistle the whole line flashed forth in a rapid burst of fire that spattered the sandy neighborhood of the vague target from flank to flank. The distribution seemed perfect but too many spurts of dust fell short of the target. So with a shrill whistle to attract attention and one finger pointed up, the captain signalled a hundred-yard increase of range first to one platoon and then to the other. The message was quickly flashed from platoon leader to the expectant corporals, and in an instant the center line of the puffs of dust crawled closer toward the target. This is one of the simplest exercises in modern field firing, but

it illustrates the difficulties of the modern infantry problem. For perfection in this work the summer camps are all too short, but fortunately it is the peculiar work of officers and non-commissioned officers and therefore we can do much to develop it in the winter correspondence schools.

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"CAMP KIT CARSON, *September* 4th.—As we came in from a tactical march this morning, we passed over Brown Mesa and I halted the squadron where we could overlook the camps of the other troops down in the valley. It was a splendid picture. On the plain beneath us we could see the 44th Infantry Brigade marching in review. Of course nothing in the Volunteer Army can touch my squadron, but as I saw those solid lines of men moving along like some mighty machine, I realized that the 'dough boys' have been working too. Behind a low hill to the left I saw the guns of the light artillery battalion booming away at target practice, while on

the right we could see the long column of the horse artillery moving at a trot along the winding road by the river. At the far river bend the engineers were just finishing a pontoon bridge, and the ambulance company and the field hospital stood halted at the bridge head, apparently waiting to cross. From the foothills beyond the valley heliograph signals were flashing, and on the mesa beside us a field wireless station was clattering a message to some partner buried in the hills. To cap it all, just as we resumed the march the two volunteer biplanes of the Third Cavalry Division came roaring over us, to startle our horses and break our march column for an instant.

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"CAMP KIT CARSON, *September* 8th—We have finished our course in the School of the Regiment and are preparing for the maneuvers which will terminate this summer's camps. The maneuver this year is to be the march of our force of all arms, under the command of Brigadier-General Gideon Buckles,

U. S. Volunteers, the Inspector-Instructor of the 44th Infantry Brigade. The War Department has very wisely limited us this year to the three weeks' tactical march of a force of all arms with one-sided maneuvers in deployments for attack and defense and practical outpost and advance guard problems. We have made fine progress this summer, better than anybody expected, but each arm has been working up its own specialty and we are not developed far enough yet for combined maneuvers. We are therefore to have two weeks of the drill of a reinforced brigade on varied ground and under a progressive tactical situation in which the enemy will be imaginary. It will test our skill in marching and camping, and lay the foundations for three weeks of tactical maneuvers next year. During the winter the officers' correspondence schools will include tactical problems under the applicatory system, with the view of preparing all officers for regular two-sided maneuvers.

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"*September* 29th.—*En route*, The great march is over and we are entrained for the homeward journey. The field tests for provisional officers were made by the inspector-instructors under General Buckles during the march. Captain Hurley and Captain Blane both qualified as volunteer Majors of Cavalry so I presume that my immediate command of the First Squadron will soon terminate. I would like to feel that I could lead these men if we should be suddenly called in the field, but under the Volunteer Army Regulations there is plenty of work for me to do. I must still supervise the Government's scheme of military education within the squadron and I will be busy all winter with the correspondence schools for officers and non-commissioned officers. I must check up the arms and equipments of the squadron and restore them to perfect condition for a sudden call to arms. I must perfect the mobilization plans of my squadron and devise means of communication with every man so that we can form for the front on twenty-four hours'

notice. I must prepare for the mobilization of horses as well as men and am responsible for the proper disbursement of the annual forage allowance. I must prepare car schedules and arrange with the railway people for any sudden concentration by rail. Next spring the new year's enrollment for recruits will be under my charge, and in addition I must keep up my general professional studies in order to prepare for next summer's camps and the first great maneuver season next autumn. We have done well this year for beginners. Next year we mean to do still better.

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"*September* 30th.—*En route*, Before I left Deming this morning I congratulated Hurley on his pending promotion. 'Not yet,' he said; 'I am on the records as eligible, but I have declined the nomination. So has Blane. Maybe I'll change my mind some day and decide to be a major or perhaps even a brigadier-general. But I have decided to go to

your school as a captain this winter anyway. If we have a war this year we're going under you. After we pump you dry, perhaps Blane or I will take your job.[1] No, this isn't generosity to you nor disinterestedness either. It's simply a square deal to the Government, to the American Volunteer System, and the men of the squadron. In the meantime I'm going to take off my uniform and get right down to the ore-buying business.'

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"TUCSON, *October* 2d.—A week ago to-day I was marching at the head of a war strength

[1] The Volunteer Army Register for 1921 carries James Hurley as a Colonel of Cavalry, Major Daniel Blane commands the First Squadron of Colonel Hurley's Regiment.

Captain Milford Burr of the regular army is borne on the Volunteer Army Eligibility Lists as follows: "Squadron Inspector-Instructor, July 1, 1916. Assigned as Regimental Inspector-Instructor, Jan. 1, 1917. Qualified as Brigade Inspector-Instructor of Cavalry, Sept. 15, 1917. Qualified for the General Staff with Troops, Sept. 15, 1918. Especially recommended as General Staff Officer with Cavalry Divisions or higher commands."

Captain Burr completed his tour of duty with the Volunteer Army, June 30, 1920. He is now serving a tour of foreign service with the Panama Canal Zone Division of the regular army.—*Editor.*

cavalry squadron fully armed and in the military service of the United States. To-day as I sit in my office comparing property returns with my mobilization sergeants, I realize that only we six remain on that squadron's active list. Officers and men are back at work on their ranches and farms.

"As I look from my window toward the railroad siding I see Captain Daniel Blane and his two sons in overalls and straw hats unloading a carload of contractors' plows and scrapers. Corporal Samuel Riggs, booted and spurred and covered with a wide Mexican sombrero, has just dismounted from his pinto cow pony and is lending the captain a hand."

XI.

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST SUMMER—SOME SECRETS OF SUCCESS

LIEUTENANT BURR's diary has given us a picture of the first year's work of the new cavalry volunteers in a remote region of the continent. But a similar work was going on for every arm and in every part of the country. Lieutenant Burr was but one of eleven hundred inspector-instructors who, under the supervision of the Division Commanders, formed the first faculty of the National Military Schools. On September 30, 1916, this great National University celebrated its first "Commencement Day." On that day a completely organized volunteer field army of over three hundred thousand men was arrayed under arms beneath the national colors. On the same day a volun-

teer coast artillery corps of some twenty-seven thousand men stood at the guns of our seacoast forts and completed its first year's target practice. On October 1st this mighty force had disappeared. The citizen soldier had returned to industrial and business life. Nothing remained of the organized volunteer army save a small corps of professional military experts who were necessary to maintain its system of training and organization, and to keep it ready for mobilization.

THE EDUCATIONAL IDEAL

The success of the first year's work was the natural result of adherence to certain fundamental principles of organization. In the first place the War Department clearly recognized the mission of the summer schools and the volunteer army to be primarily educational. It was to be a great school of public service for the whole people. Having accepted the supremacy of the educational mission, all details of administration were subordinated to it and all methods of instruc-

tion and discipline were standardized for the whole force and for each arm of the service before the summer work began.

Having established the curriculum for the summer's university, the War Department then selected its instructors from the regular army on the basis of positive educational qualification to instruct in one or more of these standardized courses. No army officer was eligible unless his record showed affirmatively his qualification to teach American volunteers both by precept and example. And no officer was assigned to teach in any one of the standardized courses unless he was specially qualified for that particular course. Other things being equal, qualified officers were assigned on the basis of army seniority, but seniority was not permitted to justify the assignment of any officer to any task for which he was not specially qualified. This rule worked an apparent hardship at first, for in many cases army efficiency records are negative in character, and the routine of a garrison army furnishes

little basis for determining real professional efficiency. For this reason some most competent officers complained that they were unjustly excluded from certain of the more important eligibility lists. To these the War Department replied: "It will be the policy of the Government to give you an opportunity to qualify for any task in the training service of the volunteer army. Establish your qualification and you will be assigned accordingly." One officer who was assigned as a Battalion Inspector-Instructor of Infantry considered himself slighted because he was not intrusted with the instruction of an infantry regiment as were several of his brother officers of junior grade. But being a man of good sense and real professional ability, he accepted his school of the battalion and conducted it with such conspicuous success that on the first readjustment he was intrusted with an infantry brigade.

There was a tendency at first among certain ambitious army officers to seek desirable volunteer assignments through political in-

trigue. In this they were apparently justified by many precedents in our past history. But conditions had changed. A great and earnest public sentiment had espoused the cause of the new volunteer army, and the President's sensible efforts in behalf of efficiency were supported by an alert and sympathetic public opinion.

DECENTRALIZATION—THE DIVISION COMMANDER

The successful administration and supervision of the widely scattered volunteer organization were assured by the system of decentralization authorized by the National Defense Act. In selecting the ablest officers of the regular army as division commanders of volunteers and in making these the responsible legatees of his military authority, the constitutional Commander-in-Chief established the new volunteer army on the basis of assured success.

The national military doctrine and the national war plans, as prepared in the General Staff and approved by the Secretary

of War and the President, thus passed directly to the division commander and from him through the inspector-instructors to every officer and man in the force. The division commander was at once the commander, the supervising instructor, the inspector, and the administrative head of the team of all arms assigned to his control. He was responsible to the President for its peace training and its immediate preparedness for war. As the whole system of administration, training, and mobilization rested upon these officers, their appointment in time of peace was restricted by law to selection from the professional soldiers of the regular army.

The sound military basis for this restriction lies in the peculiar function of the division as the fundamental army unit in which the several arms are combined as a co-ordinated fighting team. The division is a little army complete in itself in which the infantry is trained to use the support of cavalry, artillery, engineers, and other auxiliaries, and in which the special arms are trained to support

the efforts of the great primary arm. A single division is therefore a little army and a large army is simply an aggregation of divisions. A leader or instructor of a division must therefore be more than a one-arm expert, he must be familiar with the interplay of all the components of the modern fighting team.

On the other hand, companies, troops, and batteries; battalions, squadrons, regiments, and brigades, are homogeneous units, and therefore the duties of captains, majors, colonels, and brigadier-generals of the same arm differ only in magnitude and not in kind. The citizen soldier who can become a good captain has only to keep on growing in order to become a good colonel or brigadier-general. But while a busy volunteer officer from civil life might expect to become a good regimental or brigade commander, it was quite another thing to expect him to become an expert in the combined tactics of all arms.

It was therefore the policy of the Government under the National Defense Act to select the commanders of divisions and higher

military units from the best professional talent in the regular army. This was the guiding rule for the educational and administrative system in time of peace and during the first strategic deployment for war. In time of peace, therefore, the citizen soldier could not rise above the grade of brigadier-general, but in actual war every avenue to promotion lay open before him and he was free to rise as high as his military genius and success might carry him. Thus in the American Volunteer Army as in the old Republican Army of France, every recruit was encouraged to feel that he carried a Field Marshal's baton in his knapsack.

THE CLASSIFICATION OF RECRUITS—APTITUDE AND TRAINING

Another fundamental principle of scientific organization was applied in the assignment of recruits and student officers to the several arms of the service. Branches of the volunteer service having special technical duties were recruited from those men who

perform corresponding technical duties in civil life.

We have seen how the cavalry and other branches of the mounted service were recruited from men who are already practical horsemen. To make a cavalryman out of a practical horseman it is only necessary to teach him the military applications of an art he already knows. It is true that modern military science makes all other sciences auxiliary to it and that the service of the modern army requires a great variety of technical experts to back the efforts of the plain fighting man. But under a scientific system of organization, the technical expert is the easiest recruit to find and the quickest to train for war. It is true that he requires an elaborate training, but he has already received the bulk of that training in civil life.

The man who runs an electric motor in a modern machine shop can soon learn to operate the most elaborate ammunition hoist. The machinist who can operate and repair a power crane in the locomotive works will

soon master the mechanism of a disappearing gun. The trained expert who can use logarithms and work a slide rule will find no mystery in the precise readings of a coast artillery plotting board. The engineer who directs the electric current in a city lighting plant will find nothing startling in the fortress power room or the mining casemate. For every task in the harbor forts of New York Harbor, there are scores of skilled artisans in the neighboring city who are already ninety per cent. trained to man it in war. These potential fortress soldiers are already living, working, and sleeping within two or three hours of their logical war positions. And so throughout the military service. The surgeon in civil life practices the same profession as the army surgeon under slightly different conditions. The trained hospital corps that treats the wounded in a railroad wreck or an industrial accident is all but ready for the wounded on the battlefield. The doctor who makes the sanitary survey of a modern city can soon prepare himself for the sanitary

service of a modern camp. The drug clerk in the corner drug store is compounding the same pills as the hospital sergeant is compounding in the dispensary tent. The chauffeur of the auto-ambulance in the city is almost ready for the military evacuation service. Every young man who drives an automobile for pleasure or business in civil life, can do the same thing for the auto-machine gun, the ammunition column, or the reconnaissance officer of the General Staff. And the young man who rides his aëroplane for sport needs little more than a formal enrollment to place him in the aëro-corps in war.

The country is full of technical experts for every branch of the military service. To utilize them in war it is only necessary to show each one his place in the organization of the volunteer army, and to coach him more or less in the military applications of his chosen art. Indeed, as a general rule with few exceptions, the more we require of scientific technique in the modern soldier, the less we require of purely tactical training.

But the infantry soldier cannot be borrowed half made from the industrial arts and trades. This plain, slow-moving fighting man, upon whom the decision of all wars must rest, is the product of military training and of military training only. His rifle and his bayonet he carries in his hands as he struggles forward on the ground. Modern science provides no magical mode of locomotion and no artifice of security for him. He marches as he marched in the days of Hannibal, and he wins the modern battle with the final clash of naked steel as he did in the days of Julius Cæsar. Advance he must if there is to be victory for us, and he must advance and endure grievous losses with nothing to aid him but confidence in his officers and the habit of discipline and training. He is not burdened with technical devices for delivering indirect fire from behind the hill, nor does he enjoy the moral comfort of such a method. He must fight his battle out in the open where the shrapnel is bursting, and he must win the decisive fire fight by

shooting at what he sees and against an enemy who generally sees him. This truth was in Napoleon's mind when he pronounced the dictum that "in war the moral is to the material as three to one." This he found to be true at Marengo and Austerlitz. It was still true at Chancellorsville and Vicksburg. It is truer than ever to-day in the prolonged and exhausting nervous strain of the modern battle. The success of the volunteer army as an organic whole was largely due to a recognition of these fundamental principles. All branches of the service were organized and trained and advanced to substantially the same standard of efficiency. But the training of each special or technical branch rested upon an initial basis of aptitude or industrial training which its recruits brought with them from civil life. It is remarkable that, until the passage of the National Defense Act, this first principle of correct organization had always been completely ignored in our military legislation.

VACANCIES IN THE REGULAR ARMY

We have seen that the organization of the volunteer army required the detail of a large number of inspector-instructors to the volunteer service. These officers passed to the detached service list of the regular army and when the resulting vacancies were filled by the promotion of existing officers there remained many vacancies in the grade of second lieutenant. Under ordinary circumstances the selection of proper candidates to fill these vacancies would be a serious problem. But through the provision of the summer camps and the schools of application for student officers, the new volunteer army was soon prepared to return to the regular army as many officers as it had borrowed. After promoting the West Point class and the usual number of qualified enlisted men from the regular army, the remaining vacancies were filled by the "civil appointment" of educated young men who had qualified for commission in the summer camps. All

of these appointees took the usual educational tests required by law, and all were indorsed by their regimental and battalion inspector-instructors and division commanders as specially qualified in character, aptitude, and training for a place in the National Officer Corps. In short, the summer school of application furnished a continuous test of efficiency and character extending over a period of three months, and was therefore the best examination for appointment from civil life that we have ever had in our military history.

XII.

THE WINTER'S WORK AND THE NEW ENROLLMENT—THE FINAL ORGANIZATION

AFTER the conclusion of the summer camps the great body of recruits returned to their places in civil life. No further military duties were to be expected of them until next year's autumn maneuvers. Until that time they were exempt from all military obligation or duty unless as impending war should call them to the colors. But effective arrangements were made to continue the military training of those members of the force who had accepted appointments as officers and non-commissioned officers. Correspondence schools for officers were organized in each division with the regular inspector-instructors acting as instructors under the coördinating control of the division commander.

The general outline of the work in these schools was standardized in the War Department and based upon the so-called applicatory method.

This practical method of military training appears to have been invented by Frederick the Great, and as finally perfected under von Moltke, has become the basis of tactical training in all modern armies. It is not an academic or theoretical method, but it is something like the modern practical "case method" of studying and teaching law. In the applicatory method the student is given a "military situation" and is required to solve it upon the map or the ground. In the "situation" he is given an assumed body of troops which he is supposed to command; the mission of his command is given or implied, and he is also given certain information with reference to the enemy. In short he is given precisely the same intellectual problem that is presented to a commander under war conditions in the field. The student's solution of the problem is not to be presented in

the form of a general essay on military art. He is simply required to write down his decision, to state his plan of action, and to write down the order which he would issue to his troops. In short it is a method of *practicing* the profession of arms in time of peace. It aims at cultivating tactical judgment and not merely tactical knowledge. The command of troops in war is for practical men and not for pedants. It thus appears that the applicatory method is more than an educational system, it is also a means of discovering and developing tactical capacity. In the hands of a competent instructor it becomes a tactical measuring rod and is an instrument of precision by means of which pretenders to the art of commanding troops can be detected in time of peace. Nor is the applicatory method only adapted for the use of higher commanders. In the hands of a competent instructor it can be employed to train or test a corporal in the conduct of a small patrol or a lieutenant-general in command of a field army. As this wonderful

educational method is peculiarly appropriate for correspondence schools, it was rightly made the basis of the winter schools for volunteer officers.

Each brigade was organized as a winter correspondence college of military art for the instruction of the volunteer officers commissioned in the brigade. In each of these brigade colleges the brigade inspector-instructor acted as College President and supervised a faculty consisting of the regular army officers attached to regiments and battalions. Similar schools were founded for volunteer officers of the auxiliary arms and supply corps. And finally the division commander, as president of the military university, coördinated the educational work of the whole division and thus laid the foundation for practical training in the combined tactics of the three arms.

But, while most of the winter school work was conducted by the correspondence method, there were frequent opportunities for personal contact between instructors and student

officers. The duties of the inspector-instructors in connection with mobilization and concentration plans required some official travel within their respective districts. When they visited any community for these purposes, the volunteer officers of the region were assembled for conferences, lectures, war games, and terrain exercises. Measures were thus provided for transmitting the nation's standardized military doctrine to every member of the officer corps. But this was not sufficient. The winter's training must also extend to non-commissioned officers and selected privates who were encouraged to volunteer as candidates for promotion. For this purpose non-commissioned officers' schools were established in each company and were conducted by the company officers under the supervision of the battalion inspector-instructor. The scope of these schools was also standardized and the courses were so arranged that as the company officer mastered any subject in his own schools, he transmitted the elements of

the same subject to his non-commissioned subordinates.

It will be seen from the above outline that the work of officers and non-commissioned officers was not restricted to the summer, and that spare moments each winter were devoted to systematic and progressive preparation for the approaching maneuver season. This program made considerable but not unreasonable demands upon their time. For ambitious officers the work was a pleasure. For officers of the other kind it unerringly pointed to elimination. But this was not a detriment to the service, for thousands of eager and ambitious young Americans were striving for promotion to the Officer Corps of the National Volunteer Army.

THE SKIMP RESOLUTION

The success of the first year's work established the new national army on a solid basis of popularity and it soon became apparent that there would be another great enrollment in 1917. Early in 1917 a movement

under Senator Skimp was organized with the view of limiting the further growth of the force. As its enlisted strength was now about 320,000 men he proposed that its maximum legal strength be placed at 420,000 men. In the course of a debate on this subject, the following remarks were made by Senator Straightedge:

"Mr. President, to place any limit on the strength of the Volunteer Army is to undermine the whole system. We have made it a part of the free school system of America. When you founded our modern scientific volunteer system, you rejected the principle of conscription and announced that hereafter America would intrust her defense to her army of trained volunteers. Shall we now apply the principle of conscription to the other end and say to our young men, 'We won't compel any of you to come to our national school, but we have decided to compel some of you to keep out? It is against our traditional policy to draft you into the military service, but we have de-

cided that we will have to draft you out of it.

"Mr. President, the Senator proposes to limit the force to 420,000 men. If we adopt his views we will be able to train only one hundred thousand recruits in the summer camps this year. But suppose three hundred thousand young men should volunteer. I am assured at the War Department that this is the probable number. In that event, under the terms of this resolution, we will have to reject more than two-thirds of them. We will have to disappoint more than two hundred thousand young Americans who ask you to complete their civic education by training them to serve you in war. I am informed, Mr. President, that the proposed restriction is on the ground of economy. But where is the economy? We have already demonstrated that the volunteer army is the most economical element of our whole national system. In time of peace it costs less to maintain a war-strength division in the volunteer army than it does to maintain a

single war-strength regiment in the regular establishment. We can maintain twenty men in the volunteer coast artillery for the cost of one man in the regular corps."

Senator Skimp's resolution found no favorable echo in national public opinion and it never reached a vote in Congress.

THE ENROLLMENT OF 1917

The second year's enrollment was much simpler than that of the first year. In the enrollment of 1916, it was necessary, as we have seen, to reach prospective candidates through the Post Office Department and much unavoidable confusion and error resulted. In the second year the inspector-instructors and the mobilization sergeants formed an organized recruiting service and the resulting descriptive lists and enlistment papers were prepared with accuracy and precision. The enrollment resulted in 314,266 recruits for the field army and 24,277 recruits for the volunteer coast artillery corps.

As a large number of National Guard

officers had failed to apply for permission to attend the special officers' schools in 1916, and as many of them now desired to qualify for commission in the volunteer service, it was decided to continue the officers' schools of application for one more year. But the rule was established that thereafter promotion within the national volunteers would be from the bottom, and that no original commissions for advanced rank would be issued. It was thus to be the future policy that ambitious citizens who aspired to command volunteers must come in at the bottom as young men, take the regular recruit course, and then work up according to seniority and demonstrated capacity. It was the spirit both of the law and of the President's regulations that no man should be promoted to any grade until he had affirmatively demonstrated his capacity to perform the duties of that grade, but that in any group of candidates so qualified the senior should first be entitled to promotion.

In 1917, 3423 officers of the National

Guard enrolled for the summer schools, and acted as recruit instructors under the regular inspector-instructors. After that year the assistant drillmasters for the recruit camps were drawn from the volunteer army itself. A sufficient corps for this purpose was formed from those young officers and non-commissioned officers who volunteered to serve through an additional summer camp in order to prepare themselves for promotion.

FINAL ORGANIZATION

The enrollment statistics of 1916 and 1917 when taken together gave some indication as to the probable normal enrollment in the future. In 1916, out of a total enrollment of 333,376 recruits, 198,273 were nineteen years old, or of the minimum age authorized by law. The remainder were older men of various ages within the maximum authorized age of thirty. In 1917 out of a total enrollment of 338,503 there were 201,873 recruits of the minimum age, that is young men who were too young to enroll in 1916. In other words,

the enrollments of these two years indicated an annual enrollment of about two hundred thousand young men just arriving at the age of military service. This estimate was confirmed by other and more detailed analysis of the statistics and by investigations made by the inspector-instructors in the various parts of the country.

This investigation had an important bearing on the future organization of the entire force, for the first two enrollments had already absorbed most of the older men who were free to enlist and in a few years practically all of the recruits enlisted would probably be young men of minimum age. Assuming this to be true, it was now possible to estimate the probable maximum number of men with the colors under normal conditions. This estimate is shown as follows:

Recruits in summer camps of instruction	200,000
Second-year men available for maneuvers	200,000

Third-year men vailable for maneuvers	200,000
Re-enlisted men serving as non-commissioned officers, technical experts, and other re-enlisted aspirants for promotion	120,000
Total strength of volunteer army	720,000

Taking 720,000 as the normal strength of the volunteer army for the next ten years, the ultimate organization was fixed as follows:

Fifteen army corps (enlisted strength per corps 41,000)	615,000
Six cavalry divisions (enlisted strength per division 8000)	48,000
Coast Artillery Corps	57,000
Total for volunteer army	720,000

Now as the enrollment for the field army was already 620,939 or nearly 94 per cent. of normal, as the enrollment of the coast artillery was already 51,351 or 90 per cent. of

normal, and as the shortage in both services would certainly be filled before the 1916 recruits should pass to the reserve, it was wisely decided to give the volunteer army its final organization and to test it in the maneuvers of 1917. As a result of this decision each of the fifteen divisions organized in 1916 was expanded into an army corps of two divisions, and the three cavalry divisions were formed into six divisions of six regiments each. It was expected that these organizations would reach full strength by 1919, and that after that year there would be a gradually increasing surplus corresponding to the normal increase in population. The War Department proposed to utilize this growing surplus in the formation of special auxiliaries assignable to field armies upon mobilization.

XIII.

THE NATIONAL VOLUNTEER ARMY TO-DAY (1921)

THE recent maneuvers of 1921 concluded the sixth year of the National Volunteer Army. These maneuvers are of special interest, because in addition to providing the usual field practice for troops and higher commanders, they involved a comprehensive test of the concentration plans developed by Major-General Shunt,[1] Chief of the U. S. Volunteer Railway Transportation Service. On September 15, 1921, the troops were operating as follows:

1. In New England, the I Army Corps, the 1st Cavalry Division, and the New England

[1] General Shunt is well known in civil life as the general manager of the Pennsylvania System, and as president of the National Traffic Managers' Association.—EDITOR.

Coast Artillery Corps were maneuvering in the coast defenses of Boston.

2. A field army, consisting of the II., III., IV. Army Corps and the 2d Cavalry Division, supported the harbor defenses of New York against an attack by a large detachment of the regular army expeditionary force, which landed on Long Island under the convoy of the Atlantic battle fleet.

3. The two divisions of the V. Army Corps operated against each other in the Shenandoah Valley under the observation of the corps commander who acted as chief umpire.

4. The VI. Army Corps was engaged in similar divisional maneuvers in the vicinity of Kenesaw Mountain and Marietta in northern Georgia.

5. A field army, consisting of the VIII. and IX. Army Corps and the 2d Cavalry Division based on South Bend, Indiana, defended the crossings of the Kalamazoo River against a superior force invading from the direction of Port Huron. The invading

army was represented by the VII., X. and XI. Army Corps, and the 3d Cavalry Division.

6. One division of the XII. Army Corps based on Grand Forks, North Dakota, defended the Red River Valley against the remainder of the corps and the 4th Cavalry Division which represented an enemy invading from the direction of Winnipeg.

7. The XIII. Army Corps, concentrated in the vicinity of Dallas, Texas, had divisional maneuvers similar to those described for the V. and VI. Army Corps in Virginia and northern Georgia.

8. As the XIV. Army Corps and the 5th Cavalry Division were widely dispersed over the Northwestern, Mountain and Pacific States it was impracticable to concentrate them for maneuvers in 1921. Brigade and regimental maneuvers were held, however, under the supervision of the division commanders and a considerable detachment of all arms was concentrated in the coast defenses of Puget Sound.

9. As the XV. Army Corps and the 6th

Cavalry Division also are widely dispersed throughout the Southwest, their autumn maneuvers were similar to those described for the Northwestern troops. In this case, however, the volunteer troops available for coast defense maneuvers were concentrated near San Francisco Bay where, reinforced by a part of the regular army garrison they defended the rear of the seacoast forts against a raiding party of regulars and sailors which landed north of Monterey under cover of the Pacific battle fleet.

At the annual inspections with which the maneuvers terminated, the enlisted strength of the Volunteer Field Army stood at 704,091, or 41,091 enlisted men in excess of the normal predicted strength of 663,000. On the same day the men of the volunteer coast artillery corps were inspected at their posts in our continental seacoast fortifications. Their enlisted strength was found to be 59,337, or 2,337 in excess of its normal predicted strength. These trained volunteers, all of whom resided near their war stations, were

sufficient with the regular coast artillery garrisons to form the full war-strength manning details of the national harbor defenses. The total enlisted strength of the first line of the Volunteer Army was thus seen to be 763,428 on September 30, 1921. But this does not represent the total trained volunteer personnel available for war. The men with the colors simply represent the undergraduates of the American University of National Defense. On September 30, 1921, the alumni or graduates of prior years numbered 721,086 exclusive of reserve officers. The total number of trained national citizenry is thus seen to be merely a million and a half.

While the enlisted men of the volunteer reserves are not required to attend the annual maneuvers, definite plans have been made for their employment in war. Upon the mobilization of the first line army, the reserves are to be assembled at depots near their homes. Under the plans for 1921, three hundred thousand will immediately be available to replace losses at the front, three

hundred thousand will immediately be formed into fifteen reserve divisions, and the force of trained reserve officers and non-commissioned officers will also be prepared to undertake the immediate training of a million war recruits. All of these arrangements are definitely organized and are to be supervised by those regular inspector-instructors who are not called to the front with the first-line army. While the enlisted reservists are not required to attend maneuvers, every reserve officer or non-commissioned officer is inspected each year and assigned to a specific task in the annual mobilization plan.

MILITARY TRAINING IN THE SCHOOLS

Another duty performed by the officer corps of the citizenry army is the conduct of elementary military training in the public schools. There are officers and non-commissioned officers of the national force residing in every school district, and in each school district one or more of them instruct their schoolboy neighbors in the mechanism of

drill and the practical art of rifle shooting. Indeed in many cases the schoolmaster is himself an officer in the national force.

Thus as time goes on the education of the citizen soldier is well begun before he is formally enrolled in the National Volunteer Army. In some States military drill in the public schools has been made compulsory, but this provision has been found unnecessary as public sentiment has established the conviction that education for self-respecting citizenship must include some preparation for national defense. Some young men evade this duty as they evade other civic obligations, but their attitude must become more and more apologetic in the face of a growing presumption that they are probably something less than able-bodied men.

THE MILITARY RAILWAY SERVICE

An interesting comment on the maneuvers of 1921 is contained in the following extract from General Shunt's report of the Volunteer Railway Service: "After several years of

practical experience we have gradually developed a scientific system for the movement of large bodies of troops by rail. In a country so vast as ours, the precision of these arrangements is of vast importance in any scheme of national defense. Our progress since 1916 is remarkable, and our success is due largely to the sensible arrangement through which practical railroad operators have been entrusted with organizing the military railway service. On the whole the operations of the service during the recent maneuvers have been satisfactory. We have found some defects and have already provided corrective measures. No doubt we will have something to improve every year.

"But the maneuvers have demonstrated that we have a highly organized military transportation service. I am now convinced that we can deploy three hundred thousand fully equipped troops at the various concentration points on the Atlantic seaboard within twenty-four hours after mobilization is completed, or within sixty hours after the

first mobilization notice. We can increase this force by one hundred thousand men every twenty-four hours thereafter until it reaches a total of six hundred thousand men, and by the end of the seventh day we can also deliver fifteen reserve divisions, three hundred thousand strong. We can deploy upon our northern or southern frontier in about the same time. On account of the wide area of sparsely settled country in the mountain and plain regions a full strategic concentration on the Pacific coast will take from three to four days longer than on the Atlantic seaboard."

In referring to the success of the joint army and navy maneuvers of 1921, a prominent foreign naval authority has recently made the following interesting comment: "A successful invasion of the United States, even if the American navy should lose command of the sea, must now be regarded as beyond the bounds of possibility. While the short-service American volunteers are not so highly trained as the regular soldiers of con-

tinental Europe or Japan, still they are formed and organized and capable of immediate combined action. Even the most powerful foreign army cannot exert its combined force in America at one time. Transoceanic invasion must come in successive waves, and each wave of invasion will be smothered by sheer weight of superior numbers before the next wave can come. Clausewitz has pointed out that even the best troops under a Frederick the Great or a Napoleon cannot overcome odds much more than two to one."

XIV.

AT LAST—AN AMERICAN MILITARY POLICY

THE successful organization of the American Volunteer Army has resulted in a solution of the whole problem of national defense. Even so late as 1915, there was no definite military policy and the several components of the defense system were uncoördinated and apparently indeterminate both in dimension and in form. This was found to be the natural result of attempting to build parts of the superstructure of a house before determining its plan and foundations. But with the formation of the National Volunteer Army this foundation was found to be established not only in substantial strength, but in the durable forms prescribed by national political tradition.

But a correct military organization has turned out to be something more than was

expected. Provision for the national defense was one of the specific objects of the national union as pronounced in the preamble to the Constitution of the United States. But for more than a century and a quarter the place for this stone had remained unfilled with resulting instability in the whole structure of our national polity. We have learned at last that sound military organization is simply a part of sound political organization, and that to neglect it is to neglect one of the principal objects for which governments are formed. With the successful organization of THE ARMY OF THE PEOPLE the foundations of our Government are now complete, and American diplomacy and American finance are erected upon a stable foundation. Our statesmen may now deal with instruments of precision. We have passed from the age of astrology to the age of astronomy.

THE REGULAR ARMY

The reorganization of the regular army was not completed until the spring of 1918.

With the final settlement of the principle that the national volunteers form our logical and sufficient defense against invasion, it was universally accepted that the regular army should be restricted to these special functions which cannot be performed by a citizen soldiery and which therefore must be met by an organized body of professional soldiers. This restriction of the regular army to certain specific and limited duties did not diminish its real importance in our national system. It simply defined the professional soldiers' proper mission in our national life and furnished the basis for a practical and definite organization.

So long as legislative proposals for the regular army were vague and chaotic; so long as its proper limits and aspirations were unmeasured or unknown; and so long as some of its advocates urged the necessity of a vast but undefined expansion in defiance of cherished political traditions, the problem of scientific military legislation was almost hopeless. But when the success of the great

volunteer army removed the last pretext for a large standing force, jealousy of the regular army as a political institution disappeared and Congress proceeded to ascertain its legitimate needs and to provide them by appropriate legislation. As a basis for legislative action, Congress was guided by the following general principles which were universally endorsed by public opinion:

1. The most important function of the regular army is to provide and develop the corps of highly trained professional experts who maintain the peace administration and training of the volunteer army and keep it prepared and equipped for prompt and orderly deployment in war. In providing for the detail of inspector-instructors and mobilization sergeants from the regular army, Congress had already recognized this principle in the National Defense Act of 1916.

2. The garrisons of all of our over-seas possessions must be composed of regular soldiers. As the naval situation may not permit the reinforcement of these garrisons

at the outbreak of war, they must be maintained at war strength in time of peace.

3. The Panama Canal Zone must be absolutely impregnably held not only by the forts at its terminals but by a regular mobile garrison of unquestioned capacity to defeat all land attacks.

4. All naval bases covering the approaches to the Panama Canal or necessary for the war operations of our fleet, must be impregnably held by regular garrisons at full war strength.

5. Our coast fortresses at home must be manned by a sufficient nucleus of professional coast artillerists to form the basis for the training, organization, and mobilization of the Volunteer Coast Artillery Corps.

6. There must also be a mobile reserve of regulars stationed in the United States and constantly ready to act as an expeditionary force. This force must be prepared to serve a peace warrant in disturbed regions within our sphere of influence, or to execute a temporary receivership under the Monroe

Doctrine without disturbing the calm of our internal affairs and without diverting the national war volunteers from their industrial occupations. At the outbreak of war this regular expeditionary force must be ready for immediate coöperation with the navy in sudden strategic enterprises, such as the establishment of advanced bases for our fleet, or the reduction and capture of hostile bases which may be used against us.

The Regular Army Act of 1918 was drawn with the view of providing the limited forces necessary for the performance of the above described functions. As these functions were specific and definite and as the personnel and armament necessary for each function could be calculated and verified with scientific precision, the legislative task was simple. The new law involved some moderate increases in the regular military establishment, but its main effect was a readjustment of the components of the old army, which had grown by gradual and ill-digested increments

and without the guidance of any accepted scheme of military policy.

But the success of the volunteer army not only determined the final form of the regular establishment. It gave it new ideals and a new opportunity for usefulness. The professional soldier no longer stands for something foreign to our political ideals. Through his work as a teacher and trained administrator, the volunteer army claims him as a part of itself. The army officer has thus found new opportunities for usefulness as a citizen as well as a soldier. He is no longer tempted to seek his best hope of promotion through the caprices of service legislation. His chief aim is to establish a high professional reputation, for in that way only can he obtain the coveted honor of service with the American volunteers.

THE NATIONAL GUARD—A RETROSPECT

A large number of officers and enlisted men of the Organized Militia transferred to the National Volunteer Army in the first

enrollment of 1916. During the winter of 1916–1917, the final opposition to the volunteer army disappeared and most States revised their militia laws to meet the new condition. Under these new laws the Federal Government was finally recognized as the *national war-preparing power* as well as the *national war-making power*. The States were therefore able to reduce their military establishments to meet their purely local requirements, and were released from any implied obligation to maintain expensive military contingents for national purposes. In some States a small and highly trained State constabulary replaced the old organized units. In others the old organized militia was reconstructed to meet the requirements of purely local defense. These arrangements were regarded as purely State affairs in which the Federal Government had no legitimate concern.

The National Guard, as organized under the so-called Dick Law, thus disappeared, but its trained personnel, released from the

discouragements and embarrassments of semi-constabulary service, passed into the new volunteer army and became the main source of its first contingent of officers and non-commissioned officers. As we look back on the national militia policy from 1900 to 1915, we are astonished that anything so absurd could ever have been taken seriously. Under the Dick Law, the States were induced to maintain more troops than they needed, with the prospect of losing all of them at the very time when they might be needed most; the Federal Government was expected to base its defense plans on forty-eight State contingents that it could not control, train, or discipline; and the young men of America who desired to volunteer for military training found no opportunity except in a force which was principally a State constabulary, frequently dominated by petty politics and intrigue.

But the patriotic young men of the National Guard are the real founders of the American army of trained citizenry. All

honor to them that they maintained the tradition of that great national ideal in spite of the burdens, disappointments, and neglects that characterized their service in the nondescript Dick Law army.

All parties are now agreed that Congress builded wisely when it erected the National Military System on the unrestricted "constitutional power" to raise and support armies. The abandonment of the constitutional militia as a part of the national war host was best for the nation, best for the States, and best for the patriotic personnel of the National Guard.

THE NAVY

The adoption of a definite organization and policy for our land forces has resulted in a corresponding settlement of our naval policy. No longer concerned for the security of our coasts, and assured of the inviolability of its military bases, the navy is able at last to concentrate all of its ability and all of its energy on preparation for its true war mis-

sion—that is, the protection of our foreign commerce and the strategic control of our sea communications. Organization has become definite because aims have become definite, and the sole aim of the navy and of the people for the navy is the maintenance of a fleet, not for the defense of localities but for freedom of action at sea. In this inventive age the tenure of sea power has become too uncertain and precarious to form the chief reliance of national defense, and so the navy has found its true military mission as the strategic advance guard of The Army of the People.

AT LAST

During the debates on the National Defense Bill of 1916, Senator Straightedge concluded one of his speeches as follows:

"I am a man of peace and I do not want war. I am a man of business and I do not want to spend money on warlike preparations. But as I look about me over an armed world, what do I find? I find that

ours is the only nation on earth that can make herself impregnable without an excessive financial burden. Is it sound statesmanship, is it good business, to neglect the cultivation of this God-given heritage?"

Only six years have passed and already the question has been answered. Our military policy is settled. An unassailable America stands at the gateway between the two oceans and repeats her old message of civilization and peace.

THE END