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
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J.H. 1827

AN EXPLANATION
OF
THE GREEK ARTICLE,
IN THREE PARTS;

CONTAINING,

- I. ANALYSIS AND REFUTATION OF DR. MIDDLETON'S
THEORY.**
- II. AN ANALYSIS OF MATTHIÆ'S DISSERTATION.**
- III. AN APPLICATION OF THE ARTICLE TO OBSCURE
PASSAGES IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.**

By JOHN JONES, LL.D. M.R.S.L.

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1827.

187.



W T 3, T 2, T 1, T 0

1. The first step is to identify the problem. This involves understanding the current situation and the goals that need to be achieved.

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THIS little volume cannot boast of much previous preparation: the design of it was hastily conceived; and, doubtless, marks of haste will appear in the execution. Nevertheless my idea of the Greek Article has long been fixed; and I was able at any time to carry such a work into effect.

The article is a word of constant recurrence; and yet in very many places its use is doubtful and controverted. The most effectual way to ascertain its true signification, seems to me to bring in review before the reader the mistakes of those who have written on the subject. The theory of Dr. Middleton and the Dissertation of Matthiæ, prefixed to the second volume of his learned Grammar, are highly esteemed and in general use. The estimation in which these writers are held, render an examination of them the more necessary: for if their speculations be erroneous or defective or obscure, they not only mislead the generality of readers, but dispose them by their high authority to acquiesce in wrong notions with the confidence of truth. In this work I am a mere directing-post, warning the student against the mistakes into which

these learned men would plunge him, and pointing out a path that may lead him out of a wilderness otherwise inextricable.

Neither Dr. Middleton nor Matthiæ has translated the passages quoted by them from the original authors. This omission confines the benefit of their labours to those who have already made great progress in Greek. I have removed this inconvenience by rendering into English as many examples as I have thought fit to select for animadversion. This places my little book on a level with the mere learner, for whose use I intend it.

The repetitions which recur in the course of the work were unavoidable; as I had to go over the same or similar grounds in two different authors. If my views be correct, they will be the better for being repeated; as they will leave a fuller and deeper impression on the mind of the scholar.

The doctrine and illustrations which present themselves in this small publication, will be found new; and if they be also just, they have a fair claim on the public favour. Defects and errors will doubtless be found in it; but the candid will overlook these, as accidental or trivial, if upon the whole the work prove useful and instructive.

Jan. 1st, 1827.

AN EXPLANATION
OF
THE GREEK ARTICLE.

PART I.

*Analysis and refutation of Dr. Middleton's theory on the
Greek Article.*

SECTION 1.

MUCH of late years has been written on the Greek Article : nevertheless a rational account of it appears to me still a desideratum. The voluminous work of Dr. Middleton is known to the public, and has been received with that credit which is due to learning and talents directed to an useful object. But this able writer will appear to have encumbered his subject with an useless hypothesis. Hence his explanations, even when right in the main, are rendered obscure and circuitous by a theory foreign to the question. I propose to examine this theory, and place the passages explained by virtue of it in a much more clear and simple light without it. If my purpose be answered, I cannot fail to benefit the student in Greek by removing one great difficulty in the cultivation of that noble language.

In the first chapter our author briefly states the different notions entertained by grammarians respecting the Article in

Greek ; and in the second he thus states his own : " The Greek Prepositive Article is the Pronoun Relative δ , so employed that its relation is supposed to be more or less obscure : which relation therefore is explained in some adjunct annexed to the Article by the Participle of existence expressed or understood." —"Hence the article," continues he, " may be considered as the subject, and its adjunct as the predicate of a Proposition, differing from ordinary Propositions, only as assumption differs from assertion." The adjunct annexed to the article he calls its predicate.

This definition is grounded on the use of the Greek article in Homer, to whom as an article it is supposed to have been unknown, what is strictly so called being the invention of later times. This is the opinion of Heyne, whose words, as quoted by our author, are to this effect : " That Homer knew nothing of the article, and that δ with him is equivalent to $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$ or $\epsilon\kappa\epsilon\iota\upsilon\omicron\varsigma$ has been repeatedly remarked : and the remark has been confirmed by the inquiries of many learned men, especially of Wolf and Kœppen." To this Dr. M. assents ; and expresses his wonder that what has been acknowledged to hold true partially, should not be perceived to hold true universally.

Accordingly he infers, that as the article of Homer is a pronoun, the article of other Greek writers must be the same pronoun. This conclusion he fortifies by the authority of the Stoics, who called the pronoun a *defined article*, when no adjunct was requisite to explain the object of its relation ; and an *undefined article*, when, for the sake of perspicuity, an adjunct is annexed. (see p. 19.) Of the pronominal or *defined* use of the article without an adjunct, frequent instances, he observes, are found in the Ionic writers, such as Herodotus ; and by the Dorians ; and adds—" By the Attic writers it is so employed under certain restrictions ; as after prepositions, in joining together persons or things, the names of which are suppressed ; in partition and opposition ; and where it is followed by the subjunctive article $\delta\varsigma$. (p. 20.)

In explaining the uncertain sense of a word or in determining its nature, the first object of inquiry should be by means of

etymology to ascertain its *origin*, and through that its *primary* signification; and then to trace its different applications, by the assistance of those analogies which direct the mind in forming and associating its ideas. If this were adequately done, the result in every instance would be plain and simple, soon comprehended, and easily retained by every person of ordinary capacity at all versed in the question of language. I will subject the Greek Article to this investigation; and all the obscurity which our author has found upon it, and the still greater obscurity in which he has involved it, immediately disappears. The Greek article *ὁ, ἡ, το* is the Hebrew article *ה* (*he* or *ho*), and this is an abbreviation of *הָ* (*hea* or *hoa*), preserved in the Chaldean, and signifying *behold*,—*en, ecce*. The primary power of it then is to direct the attention to an object already expressed or known by implication, and thus bring it a second time within the notice of the reader. If the object of its relation be already expressed, its reference is *retrospective*, and the article takes the nature of the relative pronoun. Let us illustrate this by one or two of Dr. M.'s own examples: *ὁ γὰρ βασιλῆϊ χολωθεῖς* (Il. α. 9.)—‘for *he* being angry with the king.’ Here the article is expressed by our personal pronoun: but this is an accommodation for the sake of brevity; for *ὁ* points to *Διὸς υἱὸς* immediately preceding, and should be repeated to make the sense complete: *ὁ γὰρ Διὸς υἱὸς*—‘the son of Jupiter being angry with the king.’ Here, though the article appears to be a pronoun, it does in reality still retain its own use and character, and is only a substitute for a pronoun by way of convenience. That it is not a personal pronoun is evident, because the noun referred to could not then be repeated without the pronoun itself being displaced. Again, *ὁ γὰρ ἦλθθῃ*, meaning *ὁ γὰρ Χρυσῆς*, mentioned in the preceding verse.

As the article in instances like these is only a substitute for a pronoun, it is equivalent either to a pronoun personal, or relative, or demonstrative, and might be rendered in English either by *he, who, this* or *that*; the context always suggesting which of these is most convenient to render the sense of the original intelligible. Thus in ver. 73, *ἣν διαμαντοσυνην*,

την οἱ πορε Φοῖβος Απόλλων.—την here is evidently for ἤν—‘on account of his skill in divination, which Phœbus gave him.’ So again in Il. 2. 271. Πεπλον δ’ ὅσις τοι χαριεσάτος...τον θες, &c.—τον for τοῦτον—‘Place this,’ &c. And so in all other places the context suggests the nature of the pronoun for which the article is substituted.

But the natural use of the article as meaning *to behold*, supposes the attention to be directed *forward* to some person or thing. Hence the reference of the article in its true character is always *prospective*; and the position of the noun either immediately succeeding it or at no great distance, together with the corresponding variation of gender and termination, holds forth, without any suspense whatever, the object intended to be brought within view. The article points out the name; and we recognise that name either as a new character necessary to be explained, or as an object already known and familiar, but necessary to be repeated in the progress of discourse. The article then in all cases *defines*; but its definitive power solely arises from the direction which it gives to the mind, and from the mind instantly recognising the object which it serves to point out.

A pronoun is a substitute for a noun going before; and a reference to this noun renders the succeeding pronoun sufficiently definite. The article, we have seen, is capable of such retrospective reference. Its application in this capacity was found too vague to answer the purposes of speech: it was therefore deemed expedient to divide it into two distinct words, by adding *ς*—ὅς, the common termination of adjectives and nouns in Greek. Hence the affinity in sound and sense between ὅς and ὁ, the former bearing a retrospective reference and constituting the relative pronoun, the latter prospective and forming the article.

The article then is a definitive; and its various powers in answering the purpose of definition may all be classed under the following heads.

1. The names of things being the names of whole classes; such as the names *of species* comprehending individuals, or *of*

kinds comprehending species. The article is used to express one individual in opposition to other individuals of the same class.

2. As the classes of things are very numerous, though not infinite like individuals, the article is frequently used to express one class or description, in contradistinction to other classes or descriptions of things. This may be called the *specific* or *generic* sense of the article; and though this sense is not unknown to the corresponding English article *the*, the Greek article in most instances of this sort can be expressed only by circumlocution.

3. Proper names, or the names of individuals, such as those of *men*, of *gods*, *countries*, *towns*, *mountains* and *rivers*, being already as definite as they can be, have no need of the article before them. Nevertheless, proper names of every description have it frequently prefixed, to define or to render prominent the common name *understood*.

4. Patronymic and Gentile names, being names of whole classes, more commonly admit the article for the purpose of distinction.

5. The names of individuals have their office or character, also their Patronymic or Gentile names, succeeding them with the article in order to distinguish them from others of the same name: as *Ιωαννης ο βαπτιστης*, 'John who baptized' or 'John the baptist,' to distinguish him from any other John: *Ιησους ο Ναζαραιος*, 'Jesus the Nazarene, Jesus of Nazareth,' and not any other of the same name.

6. When a person is known in a particular character, the article is prefixed to his proper name to mark him as a person already known under that character. Thus Solon was known as a *legislator*, Socrates as a *philosopher*, Nestor as an *orator*, Homer or Æschylus as a *poet*: the article, therefore, is often prefixed to their names to distinguish or render them prominent under their known attributes.

7. The article is often repeated after the noun to which it belongs, to supply its place, or to connect with it some peculiar quality, some circumstances of time, place or possession.

8. The article is often prefixed to neuter adjectives or par-

ticiples, also to verbs in the infinitive mood, converting them by this into *abstract nouns*, and marking them as such.

9. The article is prefixed to a present or past participle to express in connexion with it the agent of an action. Thus ὁ γράφων, 'he who writes—the writer:' ὁ γραψάμενος, 'he who accused—the accuser.'

10. Things possessed can only be defined by connecting them with the persons to which they belong. The article in such instances is but a connective, and can be expressed in English only by the possessives *my, thy, his, her, our, your, their*.

These applications of the Greek article all arise from its primary power; and they will be illustrated by such examples as present themselves in the sequel. Had it been a pronoun, its reference must necessarily be retrospective. Dr. Middleton assumes this as a fact; and he is necessitated to prove that the object of its relation is *future*. This is self-evident to every one acquainted with the first principles of the language; and the necessity of such a proof is a sufficient evidence that the whole theory is erroneous.

"It is evident," says he (p. 22), "that the reference is sometimes proleptical or anticipative: and this circumstance, added to the generical agreement, induces a suspicion that it will always bear, if not always require, to be so explained. Let us observe: On opening the *Anab.* of Xenophon at hazard, I find (Book iii. not far from the beginning) the following passage: Ὁ μὲντοι Ξενοφῶν, ἀναγνούς τὴν ἐπιστολὴν, ἀνακοινοῦται Σωκράτει τῷ Ἀθηναίῳ περὶ τῆς πορείας. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ὑποπτεύσας, μὴ τι πρὸς τῆς πόλεως οἱ ὑπαιτίον εἴη, Κυρίῳ φίλον γενεσθαι, ὅτι ἐδοκεῖ ὁ Κῦρος προθυμῶς τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, &c*. Throughout

* Xenophon is here accounting for his joining the famous expedition under Cyrus. Proxenus one of his generals was a friend of Xenophon, who writes to him inviting him to join the army, and offering his intercession with Cyrus for his favourable reception and promotion. Xenophon shows the letter to Socrates his master and friend, who with his characteristic good sense and caution expressed his apprehension that, as Cyrus was known to favour the Lacedæmonians, he might incur the jealousy or suspicion of his own people if he openly joined a prince devoted to the interest of their rivals.

this passage let us attend to the reference of the article, as often as it is used :—ὁ μὲντοι, Who ? The reference must not here be considered as retrospective ; for since Xenophon was last mentioned, mention had been made both of Cyrus and Proxenus : if therefore the reference be to Xenophon, it is distinguishable only by the addition of his name. To what does *την* refer in *αναγνους την επισολην* ? The last feminine substantive is *πατριδος*, and *επισολη* has not yet occurred : the reference is to *επισολην* subjoined, which alone the writer could have in view. *Σωκρατει τῷ Αθηναιω* : here the reference is not to *Σωκρατει* generally and absolutely, because such a reference would be useless ; but it is to that distinguishing attribute of Socrates which is annexed, viz. his being an Athenian. *Τῆς πορειας* is similar to *την επισολην*.—*Και ὁ Σωκρατης* : here it may be said that the article may refer to Socrates just mentioned. Certainly it may : but the writer did not think this reference sufficiently marked, or he needed not have attempted to make it plainer by repeating the name. *Τῆς πολεως*, similar to *την επισολην*. *Ὁ Κυρος* is similar to *ὁ Σωκρατης*. *Τοῖς Λακεδαιμονιοις* : no plural substantive has yet occurred : *τοῖς* is evidently an anticipation of *Λακεδαιμονιοις*. In the same manner we might proceed, and with the same result, to the end of the volume."

The theory which our author would illustrate and establish by these examples is simply this : The article being a pronoun has a retrospective reference ; but as this is obscure or ambiguous, the object is again repeated, and is then said to be an *anticipation* of its object. But this I conceive is an abuse of language, entirely arising from an erroneous system. The article does nothing beyond pointing to an object succeeding it : whether that object is known as soon as the eye reaches it, depends upon the object itself, or upon its name ; and this circumstance further depends upon the previous train of the discourse. If I pointed the attention of the person I address to something at hand, this act on my part is not an anticipation of the object seen, nor is it otherwise connected with it than as it leads to the result ; namely, the seeing of it, and recognising it as a renewed impression, or one entirely new. This

is precisely the case with the article. It marks out the noun succeeding it; and the concurrence of both serves to recall in the mind of the reader the corresponding idea as already known; and under that definite character he again repeats it, in order to continue the discourse. A few remarks on the above examples will at once prove the truth of this statement, and the fallacy of the theory before me.

In the sentence preceding the above extract, Xenophon, Cyrus, and Socrates, are mentioned for the first time without the article; but when in the paragraph the notice of them is renewed, the same proper names have each the article prefixed — ὁ Ξενοφῶν, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὁ Κῦρος. The article then marks them under their respective names not only as men, but as men already mentioned, and the mention of whom is again renewed for the purpose of further information. Dr. M. was aware of this use: and he presently adds (p. 24), "If in ὁ Σωκράτης above it be said that ὁ will naturally refer to Σωκράτης in the preceding period, it must also be granted that Σωκράτης annexed is needlessly introduced, and is absolutely without meaning." The definitive force of the article arises from its power of recalling past associations; but it possesses this power only by its concurrence with the noun defined: the name Σωκράτης is not therefore unnecessarily introduced; and so far from having no meaning, the article without its noun would leave the clause without any meaning at all. It is further to be observed, that the article in the above instances is placed immediately before the defined noun. Thus Σωκράτης τῷ Ἀθηναίῳ, 'Socrates the Athenian.' Here is defined, not Socrates, but the Gentile name of the people of Athens; and the article thus marks him out as Socrates, who was one of those citizens, in opposition to any other man of the same name. The noun Λακεδαιμονίοις is not noticed before; yet it has the article prefixed. Its use here therefore is not to intimate a renewed mention, but to hold forth the people of Lacedæmon as a class of citizens, in contradistinction to those of Athens designated in the same clause.

It is to be observed further, that the power in the article of

exciting past associations is not limited to the previous notice of the noun defined by it, but in many cases extends to circumstances obviously implied or closely connected with the train of the discourse. Thus Xenophon describes himself and Socrates as men of *Athens*; and in the same connexion he writes *προς τῆς πόλεως*; meaning not, as Dr. M. asserts, the city of Athens by way of eminence, but Athens as the city to which those men belonged. Moreover, Xenophon says that he communicated the proposal of Proxenus to Socrates, who was at Athens. This communication was then made by means of a *letter*. The writer therefore marks the name with *την* the article, as of implied notoriety. The same remark holds with regard to *τῆς πορείας*: the *expedition* was the very subject of the letter, and could not but be recognised as known, though not actually expressed.

Our author supposes that the repetition of the defined noun is the consequence in many instances of *extreme caution* on the part of the writer against obscurity. "Of this extreme caution," says he, "there are some remarkable instances in *Ælian*. I will adduce one of these, in which the predicate of the article assumes an unusual form, while it strongly supports the doctrine that such predicate is the object of a relation supposed to be obscure. The passage will be found Var. Hist. lib. i. c. 30. Ὁ μὲν ἰππευε συν τῷ βασιλεὶ τὸ μειρακίον. Now only two persons, the king and the youth, had been mentioned; and the king seems by the context to be excluded from answering to *ὁ*, which of course will therefore relate to the youth. The writer, however, has subjoined *τὸ μειρακίον*; a convincing proof that he considered such an addition as explanatory of the relation intended in the pronoun: for else it has no meaning at all." (p. 25.)

This is a striking proof that our author did not fully comprehend the sense of the article which he undertook to explain. Ὁ δὲ means *ὁ δὲ ἐρωμενός* previously mentioned by *Ælian*—'the person loved by the king—the favourite': and this is as clear, as free from all doubt and ambiguity, as that *ὁ γὰρ*, in Il. α. 9. means *ὁ γὰρ Διὸς υἱός*. What then was the object of the writer in subjoining *τὸ μειρακίον*? because the article holds him forth

as one that was a youth, and yet, though a youth, having the honour to ride with the king, which was hardly consistent with his usual habits and pomp, or even with decorum*.

The ancient grammarians, though native Greeks, had no clearer notion of the article than Dr. Middleton. Apollonius, speaking of the relation of the article, has the following words, as quoted by our author: "Sometimes the relation is to some person whom we *anticipate*; where the article appears to be *indefinite*: as when we say, 'Let him who hath slain a tyrant be honoured;' for here the article refers to a *future* person." (p. 21.) The same grammarian, as quoted in p. 32, again says, that the article is sometimes employed *indefinitely*, as in ὁ τυραννοκτονήσας τιμασθῶ, being applied not only to *defined* persons, but also to that which in its nature is most *undefined*; as in ὁ περιπατῶν κινεῖται, which is the same with εἰ τις περιπατεῖ. On this Dr. M. remarks: "These instances and this admission of the great grammarian are alone sufficient to excite a surmise that the reference of the article is very different from that which is commonly supposed: for surely nothing can be more improbable than that any thing, in its nature one and the same, should be subservient to purposes diametrically opposite. Either the article marking *definiteness* must be essentially different from that used to signify *indefiniteness*, or else its reference must be of such a nature as, properly understood, to combine and unite in one form these contradictory appearances. Sound philosophy offers us only these alternatives."

* Our author quotes also three other passages in Latin, as instances of extreme caution against obscurity: one is from Cicero; the other two from Cæsar. "Bellum tantum, quo bello omnes premebantur, Pompeius confecit." Cic. "Ultra eum locum, quo in loco Germani consederant." Cæs. "Diem instare, quo die, frumentum militibus metiri oporteret." Cæs. Dr. M. equally mistakes the object of these passages:—Cicero does not repeat *bello* for the sake of perspicuity, which was altogether unnecessary, but for the sake of emphasis or fuller impression; as if he had thus written, "Pompey brought to an end so great a war—a war in which all were oppressed." Cæsar had a similar end in repeating *loco* and *die*. "Beyond that place—the very place in which the Germans rested."—"The day was at hand—that day in which the corn ought to have been measured out to the soldiers."

Sound philosophy, as applied to language, comprehends the plain and simple light of common sense : and if the writer confined himself to the surface of things instead of plunging in fruitless speculation, he would have detected the fallacy of Apollonius's doctrine. The article in such instances is not *indefinite*: it defines as usual, though not an individual in contradistinction to others, yet the *subject* of the verb, and is in this case to be rendered as a personal pronoun. Thus ὁ τυραννοκτονήσας, 'he having slain a tyrant,' or 'he who hath slain a tyrant.' Here ὁ, coalescing with the participle annexed, gives the mind a full idea of an agent of that class, and being a complete description of such an agent is synonymous with it—'he who hath killed a tyrant'—'a tyrant-killer.' Thus defined, not indeed by the article alone but by its union with the participle, the agent becomes a fit subject of the attribute predicated in the verb, 'a tyrant-killer should be honoured.' So again in the proposition ὁ περιπατῶν κινεῖται, 'he walking—one that walks—a person walking,—moves himself.' In these examples the definitive power of the article has one object, and it affects that object, which is the defining a *class* of agents of whom such and such an action is affirmed. The argument of our author is, that as the article here does not define an *individual*, it does not define at all. One from this might infer that Dr. M. knew nothing of the generic sense of the article : but the inference would not be altogether true, though he evidently has no clear notion of it, nor was he aware of the extent of its application. The power of the article with its adjunct to recall past associations, and its generic sense, being overlooked by this writer, he constructs a very strange and complicated machinery to account for these phænomena. "The reference of the article we have seen is *anticipation*." And he adds (p.35), "It becomes important to ascertain the *limits* of this anticipation :—is the speaker always at liberty to anticipate an adjunct? Assuredly not; for then the article might be used without necessity or meaning. The limits however are plainly deducible from the principles already laid down. We have seen that the article and its predicate together constitute what I have de-

nominated an assumptive proposition: the question is only, What are the cases in which an assumptive proposition may be employed? Evidently it can be employed only where the assumption contained in it is admissible from its being the assumption of that which will immediately be recognised in consequence of something which had preceded; or else, where it is only conditional, the subsequent assertion not being intended to apply in any greater extent than is conceded to the assumption. Now the legitimacy of the former kind of assumption will be manifest, if we consider that in making it we do nothing more than assume of a pronoun those attributes or properties which, either from previous mention or from some other implied cause, are immediately understood to belong to the person or thing which the pronoun represents. Thus, if I have been speaking of a horse or of any thing in which the presence of a horse is implied, *εωρακα τον ιππον* will be a legitimate assumption; otherwise it will not: for the assumption will not be admitted, not being intelligible."

From this example it is clear that the assumption here meant is the retrospective reference of the article, and its power in connexion with the context to recall past ideas, which the purpose of further communication renders necessary to be repeated, and consequently then limited and known. Here indeed our author acknowledges the defining power of the article: but he presently adds (p. 36), "Still however the article is not in its nature a definitive: for then what is usually called its *indefinite* sense could not have existence: it answers the purpose of a definitive merely *κατα συμπεληκως*: in strict truth its adjunct has a better claim to the title, being, as we have seen, added to the pronoun to ascertain its relation.—Of the other kind of assumption, the case is somewhat different; it has no retrospective reference or effect: and in order to render it legitimate, nothing more is necessary than that the assertion connected with it be bounded in its extent by the limits of the assumption: thus *ο περιπατων κινειται* is asserted of every one who *walks about*, and of no other, whether such persons be infinite in number, or finite, or none at all. So *Aristot. de Mor.*

Nicom. lib. iv. c. 2. *Αγαπῶσι τὰ αὐτῶν ἐργα, οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταί.* Here we find two sets of persons assumed, the one comprehending a very large proportion of the human race, and the other only a few individuals: yet since the extent of the assertion is in each case exactly commensurate with that of the assumption, the assumption is perfectly allowable. So also Aristotle (ibid.) has said, *πλουτεῖν οὐ ῥαδίον τὸν ἐλευθερόν.* This assumption is also legitimate, whatever be the degree of liberality existing among mankind: the proposition is only that, *supposing* a man to be liberal, it is difficult for such an one to grow rich."

The generic sense of the article sets aside this reasoning, and the system which it is intended to illustrate, as altogether nugatory—*οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταί*, 'the parent and the poet love their own offspring—such as are parents, such as are poets'—in contradistinction to other beings who are not in the same predicament—'love their own.' So again in the last instance, 'It is not easy for *the* liberal to become rich'—'for *him* that is liberal, or *one* that is liberal'—in opposition to the selfish and stingy—'to become so.'

In the fifth and last section of this chapter (p. 38), the author states the subintellection of the participle of existence, as a copula between the article and its predicate. "If," says he, "it be admitted on the proofs already given, that the article is no other than a pronoun, the subintellection of the participle (*ων*) becomes a necessary consequence: for else between the pronoun and its predicate there will be no more connexion than if they concurred in different propositions. 'Ὁ ἀνὴρ must signify, He or the man *being* or *assumed* to be a man; or else the pronoun and the substantive have no common medium, no principle of union, by which they can be brought to act together in developing the ideas of the speaker. The conclusion will be the same, though the reasoning will be somewhat different, if we suppose the predicate of the article to be an adjective. Thus in the proposition 'Ὁ ἀγαθὸς Σωκράτης φιλοσοφεί,—ὁ ἀγαθὸς is equivalent to ὁ *ὦν* ἀγαθός, as Gaza indeed admits." Gaza is but poor authority against common sense. What our author

here ascribes to the *copula* between the article and its predicate understood, is really the effect of *juxtaposition* : for such is the law of association, that when one idea is placed by the side of another, they coalesce as belonging to each other, and any foreign word interposed would be an incumbrance interrupting rather than promoting their union. "The good Socrates philosophizes." Is there any medium wanting to connect these words besides their collocation ? The words belonging to each other are at the side of each other ; and the mind immediately recognises their affinity and dependence. On this supposition all is natural and simple. But Dr. Middleton's system is a complex and heterogeneous mass of things scarcely intelligible. The reference of the article is anticipation ; the noun defined a predicate ; the participle of existence understood being a *copula* between them ; both together an assumption, and the assertion connected with it, bounded in its extent by the limits of the assumption. Upon this principle every proposition however simple, if it have a defined noun for its subject or object, is a complex proposition virtually containing another, and perhaps still another in itself. How different from this is the great law of association on which all the phænomena of language are constructed. This theory nevertheless has nothing to support it but the application of passages evidently mistaken : and yet this is the criterion by which the author wishes it to be tried.

SECTION 2.

In the third chapter, p. 45, the writer proposes to show that his theory is capable of solving the principal phænomena, or account for the most remarkable peculiarities in the usage of the article. He observes, that the insertions of the article are reduced to two kinds, arising out of one property, viz. its anticipative reference ; for the anticipation must be either of what is known, or of that which is unknown : in the former case, the article with its predicate is subservient to the purpose of retrospective reference, in the latter to that of hypothesis. Of the former class, which he calls *renewed mention*, he gives the three

following examples. Xen. Mem. 3. 13. Κολεσαντος δε τινος ισχυρως ακολουθον, ηρετο τι χαλεπαινοι τῷ Σεραποντι, 'seeing a certain person severely punishing an attendant, Socrates asked why he should be so outrageous to the servant.' On this Dr. M. remarks, "In the first we almost anticipate ακολουθῶ; and on finding the synonymous word Σεραποντι, we of course have no difficulty in perceiving that the article and its predicate form a renewed mention of ακολουθος above." Here we have evidence that in this instance our author mistakes the article altogether, and grounds his explanation of it on a palpable error, into which I wonder so sagacious a writer should have fallen. The noun ακολουθος is used only by Xenophon, to account for the question put by Socrates to the severe master, and therefore could not have been referred to in the phrase τῷ Σεραποντι, used by the philosopher. The import of the question stated in the original is simply this, "why he was so outrageous towards one that waited upon him, and therefore was entitled to his indulgence." The article and its noun, therefore, is not an instance of renewed mention, but the description of a character, which places the cruelty of the master in a strong light towards one, who by serving him had daily claims on his gratitude and compassion*.

The next example is, (Æschin. cont. Ctes. § 56.) 'Ουτος προδους τοῖς πολεμιοις Νυμφαιον φυγας εγενετο, την κρισιν ουκ υπομεινας. 'He (Demosthenes) having betrayed the chapel to the enemy, made his escape, not having sustained the trial.' I must here remind my reader of a remark already made, that the union of the article and its adjunct serves by association to recall a previous idea, whether directly expressed or not. Thus την κρισιν excite anew the notion of treachery implied in προδους; and its literal meaning 'the trial,' is but an abbreviation of 'the trial of his treachery.' So again (§ 54), 'Οταν τι ψευδονται αοριστα και ασαφῇ πειρῶνται λεγειν, φοβουμενοι τον ελεγχον.

* Professor Dunbar, in the latter end of his Exercises on the Greek Syntax, has given a brief view of Dr. Middleton's Theory; and from his quoting this very instance he appears to have overlooked the blunder committed by the author. See Exercises, p. 274.

‘When they (faithless statesmen) lie, they endeavour to say things vague and indistinct, fearing *the* refutation.’ The premised verb *ψευδονται*, supplies the refutation of what?—the refutation of their lies. Thus in every instance of this kind, the article and its adjunct, by referring to some preceding word, serve to recall some notion which, as being obvious, is omitted in the original, but which should be supplied to avoid abruptness in a translation. To do our author justice, he is not far from a right explanation of the last two instances; and if he had been versed in the law of association, he would have placed them at once in a simple and tangible light.

He gives (Thuc. lib. 2. §. 59.) *ἡ νόσος επεκειτο αἶμα και ὁ πολεμος*, as an instance of the article being used *κατ’ ἐξοχην*, by way of eminence; and he thus renders the clause *the celebrated plague, and the Peloponnesian war*. But this I apprehend is not the case: the object of the writer is in distinct and emphatic terms to represent the plague and the war both as concurring in oppressing the Athenians; as if he had said, “destruction by pestilence and destruction by war, at one and the same time, bore them down.” An intended emphasis or contrast of this sort acts most frequently in calling forth the use of the article—*ἡ νόσος*, ‘the plague,’ in contradistinction to *ὁ πολεμος*, ‘the war.’ “Very nearly allied,” says he (p. 50), “to the use last mentioned, is that of the article prefixed to *monadic nouns*; that is, persons or things which exist singly, or of which, if there be several, only one from the nature of the case can be the subject of discourse. The first example given is, I conceive, little to the purpose: Lysias Orat. Gr. vol. v. p. 139. *εκκοψας τας θυρας εισῆλθεν εις την γυναικωνῆτιν*. Many nouns comprehending innumerable individuals of the same class are yet limited by the circumstances of the case to a definite number. In such cases the article is necessarily used to mark the intended limitation. Having wrenched *the doors*—what doors? of course the doors of the place spoken of. The article *τας* therefore is used before *θυρας*, while the second article, *την*, is used to mark the chamber of the women in contradistinction to that of the men. Under the same division may be classed the numerous

examples in which the article has the sense of a possessive pronoun." (p. 50.) Dem. de Cor. § 59. *Ηγειτο ἕκαστος αὐτῶν, οὐχι τῷ πατρὶ, καὶ τῇ μητρὶ μόνον γεγενῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ πατριδί.* 'Each of them thought that he was not born alone for *the* father and *the* mother, but for *the* country.' The clauses 'each of them—the father—the mother—the country,' coexisting in the mind, suggest by their proximity that they belong to each other. The idiom of the English requires the original article to be supplied by the possessive *his*: 'Each of them thought that he was not born for *his* father and *his* mother, but also for *his* country.' Thus also, Theo. Idyll. 3. 92. *ἀλγῶ ταν κεφαλαν,* 'I ache in the head.' Here *κεφαλῇ* coalesces with *ἐγώ* implied in the verb, and the words must be rendered 'I ache in *my* head—*my* head aches.' So moreover in the third example (Plato Theæt. vol. ii. p. 169), *προσχεῖ τον νοῦν,* 'apply *the* mind.' The last words coalescing with *συ* understood, are equivalent to 'apply *thy* mind.' The language then of our author, that the article has the sense of a possessive pronoun, is not correct; and he should have said that the coalition of certain ideas simultaneous in the mind rendered it expedient to express by a possessive pronoun in English a relation expressed by the article in Greek. This expediency takes place, though the possessive and the article have no affinity in themselves.

Our author adds (§ 5. p. 51), "The same kind of reference will serve also to explain the article, as we usually find it prefixed to the names of the great objects of nature. Dem. de Fals. Leg. vol. i. 426. *Ουτε τον ἥλιον ησχυνοντο οἱ ταῦτα ποιουντες, ουτε την γην, &c.* 'Those who do these things feel no shame either in the face of *the* sun or of *the* earth.' The article is here used not because the sun and the earth are among the great objects of nature, but because they stand in contrast with each other. The use of the article raises them as it were from the page, and makes them prominent as objects, in the presence of which such agents ought to feel ashamed. A connumeration of objects necessary to be distinguished, and calculated to fill the mind with awe or magnificence, with desire or aversion, must necessarily have the article in Greek. Thus

Acts xiv. 15. Ἀπο τούτων τῶν ματαιῶν ἐπιστρέφειν ἐπὶ τὸν Θεὸν τὸν ζῶντα, ὃς ἐποίησε τὸν οὐρανὸν, καὶ τὴν γῆν, καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς. 'From these vain idols to turn to God the living one, who made the heaven, and the earth, and the sea, and all things that are in them.' "

" § 6. Moreover the article is frequently prefixed to adjectives of the neuter gender, where they are used to indicate some attribute or quality in its general or abstract quality:" as in Hippol. 431. τὸ σωφρον ὡς ἀπανταχοῦ καλόν. Plato, vol. i. p. 11. λέγει δὴ τι φῆς τὸ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνοσίον. On these examples our author remarks, "In all these cases the reference of the article is more *obscure* than in the case of *renewed mention* strictly so called; but yet is explicable on the same principle: for in all of them it is something which is easily recognised, though not hitherto particularly mentioned." (p. 52.)

This remark appears to me quite foreign to the question: nor can I believe that our author would have made it, if he really understood the true force of the article in instances like these: for the article prefixed to a neuter adjective so describes a quality as to become independent of the subject to which it belongs, and to place it in direct contrast with its opposite. Thus τὸ σωφρον, 'that which is temperate or chaste,'—temperance or chastity, in opposition to intemperance or unchastity; τὸ ὅσιον, 'that which is holy or pure,' in opposition to impurity. These undoubtedly are abstract qualities: but they are only so far abstract as to be independent of any subject to which they belong; and if they have any reference, they refer only to that quality to which they respectively stand opposed. It is this opposition that renders the idea prominent, and gives to the article its proper force.

" § 7, p. 52. Correlatives are words in regimen, having a mutual reference, and consequently so circumstanced that if the first relate to the second, the second must relate to the first. The Greek writers mark the relation in the *second*, wherever it is necessary to mark it in the first. In other words, where the first has the article, the second has it likewise." Plato Theæt. vol. ii. p. 126. ἡ τοῦ γεωργοῦ δοξα, ἀλλὰ οὐ καθαριστοῦ κυρία.

Socrates in the dialogue says, 'If the question were, What wine would prove sweet and what rough? the opinion of the husbandman not of the harper would have most weight.' Here the article has a generic sense, and serves to mark one of a class of men employed in dressing the vineyard, τοῦ γεωργου, 'the husbandman.' The same is true of τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ, 'the harper.' The article characterizes the men thus employed as opposed to each other; and this is the only relation between them. They are correlatives only as they are contrasted; and as both sustain this contrast, the article is properly put before each.

"§ 8, p. 55. The reason is similar in the case of *partitives*, between which and their respective *wholes* the same mutual relation subsists." He should have said the same mutual *opposition*: but even then the author would be chargeable with inaccuracy and want of discrimination. A partitive expresses a *part*, in contradistinction to the *whole*. The word expressive of this part, such as adjectives in the comparative and superlative degrees, requires the article to mark the intended distinction: but the term which expresses the whole has the article, not because it stands opposed to its part, but to another class of things. Thus in τα μεγαῖς τῶν αἰσχροῦν, τα marks that portion of base actions which are pre-eminently so implied in αἰσχροῦν: but τῶν is used before this, not as related to τα μεγαῖς, but as bearing a tacit reference to τα καλὰ, 'things fair and honourable.' Thus again in Plato, πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν, the first has no article, because no opposition between the many and the few is intended; while τῶν is prefixed to σοφῶν because it expresses the wise and learned, in contradistinction to οἱ ἰδιῶται, 'the vulgar and uneducated.'

In the second section (p. 57) our author shows that the article is subservient to the purpose of *hypothesis*, and is the representative of something of which, whether known or unknown, an assumption is to be made. Of this we have examples from Dem. de Cor. § 71. ὁ συκοφαντής, 'the informer;' from § 94, τὸν εὐνοῦν πολίτην, 'the well-disposed citizen;' from Xen. Mem. 3. 1. τὸν εὐστρατηγήσοντα, 'him who is about to conduct

an army successfully;’ from Arist. de Mor. Nic. 3. 6. ὁ σοφιστής, ‘the good’ or ‘the well-informed.’ “In these instances,” says he, “the article is used, according to the grammarians, indefinitely: and this circumstance, combined with the general notion of the defining power of the article, is one of the causes which have led to the opinion that its uses can never be determined with certainty. If, however, the article be a pronoun, the subject of a proposition of which the adjunct is the assumptive predicate, it is evident that the pretended ambiguity has no existence: for the object of the article’s relation is equally defined whether that object (as in the case of *renewed mention*) be the person who has been spoken of in the preceding sentence, or whether it be some person or character now introduced for the first time. In both cases the article is clearly explained by its predicate: that predicate, indeed, may require to be understood with greater or less latitude, the degree of which the context and the general tenour of the argument will decide with sufficient exactness. Thus in the example from Demosthenes, if σοφοφάντης had recently been mentioned, we should immediately infer that ὁ σοφοφάντης was the renewed mention of the same person. As the context stands, we clearly perceive that ὁ σοφοφάντης mean every person of whom σοφοφάντης can be predicated.” The term σοφοφάντης designates that whole class or description of persons who are employed as informers or false accusers; and ὁ σοφοφάντης in this instance must mean, not every person of whom σοφοφάντης can be predicated, but any person who comes under that description. The article is used here, as in the other examples, in its generic sense—‘he who is an informer,—the man who sustains that character, whoever he be, is base.’ Classes of things in the most philosophical sense are numerically individuals: and hence they sometimes require the article to distinguish them from each other as much as things that are absolutely so.

Dr. M. was not unacquainted with the generic use of the article to a certain extent: for he adds (p. 58), “In the same manner the article is employed *plurally* to denote whole *classes* and descriptions of persons and things.” But why limit this

use of it to the *plural* number? If it be used *plurally* to denote *classes*, no reason can be assigned why it should not be used in the singular to express one class. The theory of Dr. M. is formed to account for the difficulties arising from this unphilosophical limitation: for the generic use of the article in its full extent, will account for its use in all cases where it is thought to be superfluous or arbitrary. After noticing that the hypothetical as well as the other use of the article was known to Homer, he subjoins (p. 60), "To some one of these heads we may refer every insertion of the article of which the Greek writers supply examples; and every such insertion will be explicable in one of the two ways proposed; either that the article with its predicate denotes a relation immediately recognised by the hearer; or else, when no such relation can be recognised, they serve conjointly to indicate an *hypothesis*. The article itself is in each case the same, the object of its relation being known to the speaker, though unknown to the hearer, till it is explained by the predicate."

This statement will be found true if we set aside his peculiar system, and substitute in the room the generic sense of the article. In each instance the use of it serves to recall an idea already presented to the mind, or to describe some class or classes of things in opposition to others. In every case, therefore, the article is the same—a definitive with its adjunct, and not a pronoun with its predicate. This distinction is not merely verbal. Our author's hypothesis wraps up the article in a cloud of unmeaning words; and the opposition implied in it cannot be seen. On the contrary, its generic signification places the contrast, which it is intended to mark, and which constitutes its force and propriety, in a clear and simple light.

In section 3. p. 60—71. our author enumerates the cases where the article is omitted. But I shall not follow him in this discussion, as promising little advantage to my readers; contenting myself with one general remark, that wherever a subject or quality does not require limitation, where the writer did not feel it necessary to render it prominent and emphatic or to contrast it with its opposite, there the article is always omitted.

In section 4, p. 71. he notices two cases of insertion and omission combined. One case is that of the *subject* and *predicate* of propositions, in which the subject is generally found *with* the article, and the predicate *without* it. Of this, the first example is Arist. Anal. Post. 2. 3. *οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιτεδόν σχῆμα, οὐδὲ τὸ σχῆμα ἐπιτεδόν*, 'the surface—that which is surface, is not figure; nor is that figure—that which is figure, surface.' Here *σχῆμα* used as a predicate in the first clause is without the article, but has it as the subject in the next; and the reasonableness of this will appear, if we consider that as a predicate it only expresses a property, or the negation of a property, of the subject, without any reference to something else: whereas *τὸ σχῆμα*, generically taken, means precisely the same thing as *σχῆμα*; with this difference, that the article holds it forth as surface, in contradistinction to another thing which might be supposed to be surface.

The second example is Arist. de Interp. c. 11. 'Ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἐστὶν ἰσως καὶ ζῶον, καὶ διπρὺν καὶ ἡμέρον. Here *ὁ* prefixed to *ἀνθρώπος* marks man out as a genus—'he who is man,'—man, or mankind, in opposition to other kinds,—'is an animal two-footed and domesticated.' Therefore *ὁ ἀνθρώπος* is the subject of the proposition: but *ζῶον* and *διπρὺν* and *ἡμέρον* attach to the subject, as its distinguishing attributes: accordingly, they form the predicate without the article, as presenting no opposition or reference to any other attribute which might render its application necessary. The third is (Plut. de Aud. Poet. c. 11.) *Ζωγραφία μὲν φθεγγομένη ἐστὶ ἡ ποιησις, ποιησις δὲ σιγῶσα ἡ ζωγραφία*. In this example, *ἡ ποιησις* does not mean a renewed impression of some particular poetry, but generically, 'that which is poetry—the art of poetry.' The predicate *ζωγραφία* means painting in its fullest extent, but is limited by *φθεγγομένη* to a species of painting. The same thing is true of the next clause: *ἡ ζωγραφία* is painting generically, and *ποιησις*, which means poetry in the same extensive sense with *ἡ ποιησις*, is here limited by *σιγῶσα*.—'The art of poetry is vocal painting, and the art of painting silent poetry.'

Our author illustrates these examples on false grounds, and

is therefore, as it appears to me, circuitous, indistinct, and in some things erroneous ; yet I will here copy his illustration of the first example, as my readers may possibly see in it more than I can. "The point to be examined," says he, "is, How comes it that this insertion and this omission should be necessary to the propositions ? Now it is to be considered that these are conversant not about *particular*, but about *universal* truths. But universal truths can be declared only by making the subject of the declaration universal : and this is effected by means of the article in its hypothetic and inclusive use. Thus in the first example, *το επιπεδον* signifies the thing (being) surface, in every thing of which surface can be predicated, or surface universally : so also *το σχῆμα* in the second clause, is figure in its most comprehensive and extended acceptation. But let us attend to *σχῆμα* without the article, as it is found in the first clause. Is it there true that the writer speaks of figure universally ? *Certainly not* : for to say that *surface* in its most comprehensive sense was not figure in its most comprehensive sense would indeed be true, but it would fall very short of the meaning of the proposition. Aristotle plainly intends to say that what is surface is not figure *at all* ; which is saying much more : for that which is not figure generally and abstractedly, may yet be figure particularly. Thus a triangle is a figure ; but the definition of figure comprehends much more than the definition of triangle : consequently the proposition that surface universally is not figure universally, would comprehend much less than that which says surface is not figure at all."

Here the writer proceeds on one palpable mistake ; namely, that the predicate without the article is not of equal comprehension with the same noun, as when a subject it has the article : whereas it is equally the same in both cases, the article serving not to give it extension or universality, but to mark its adjunct as the subject of the proposition, and to hold it forth as one whole description of things in contradistinction to some other description.

But cases not uncommonly occur in which the predicate as well as the subject has the article. Thus Plut. de Plac. Philos.

3. I. *ἐστὶ δὲ ὁ Θεὸς ὁ νοῦς*. Here as the subject and predicate are alike marked with the article: they are known as such by the order. The first article holds its adjunct forth as god in opposition to *man*, or any other class of beings: the second characterizes the predicate, as *mind* or intelligence, in contradistinction to any other thing, and as being that thing alone, and nothing else. The proposition, therefore, is precisely this in English—"The divinity is pure intelligence."

Let us suppose the predicate of the same proposition to be without the article and with it, and the difference will be the more sensibly felt. Thus Plato *Theat.* vol. i. p. 157, *Οὐκ ἂν ποτε δοξείεν ὁ Θεαίτητος ἐστὶ Θεόδωρος*. Here the article is prefixed to *Θεαίτητος*, though a proper name, to mark him the more distinctly as a man, and as the subject of the proposition. 'No one would think that he who is Theætetus—the man Theætetus—is Theodorus.' Next let the article be prefixed also to the predicate, *ὅτι ὁ Θεαίτητος ἐστὶ ὁ Θεόδωρος*. In this case *Θεόδωρος* in point of prominence, emphasis, or contrast, is placed precisely on a level with the subject—"that he who is Theætetus is he who is Theodorus," or "that the man Theætetus is the man Theodorus." But according to Dr. M. (see p. 76.) the meaning of the last is, 'Socrates could never imagine Theætetus and Theodorus to be the same person.' But this sense cannot be extracted without evident violence to the original. His reasoning is not worth quoting. Thus again, *ἡ ἡδονὴ ἐστὶ ἀγαθόν*, 'the pleasure—that which is pleasure—is good.' This may be true: but put *ἡ ἡδονὴ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν*, what then is the sense? *τὸ ἀγαθόν* is literally 'that which is good,'—good, in opposition to *τὸ κακόν*, 'that which is evil.' Good in itself, without any mixture of evil, is the *highest* good. Accordingly the Latins interpret *τὸ ἀγαθόν* by *summum bonum*, or the supreme ideal good as discussed by the philosophers. The above proposition then is, "pleasure is the highest good," which is evidently false.

The propositions in which the predicate as well as the subject has the article are by our author called *convertible* or *reciprocal* propositions. I apprehend this distinction to be no more than a cloak to disguise the want of clear ideas on the subject, though

it is but fair to say that in many such cases the subject and predicate are but two different names of the same person or thing, and therefore commutable without any material change in the sense.

Dr. M. next adverts (p. 79) to the following canon introduced by Sharp and Wordsworth: "When two or more attributives joined by a copulative or copulatives are *assumed* of the same person or thing, before the first attributive the article is inserted, before the remaining ones it is omitted." This our author endeavours to confirm: and he gives the following as one of many examples in illustration. Plut. Vit. Cic. Ed. Basil. p. 68. *Ῥωσκιος ὁ υἱὸς καὶ κληρονομὸς τοῦ τεθνηκοτος ἠγανανκτε*. Here the article is used before *υἱος*, but not repeated before *κληρονομος*. "The reason of this usage," says he, "if the nature of the article has been rightly explained, it will not be difficult to discover. In the first example, *ὁ* is the subject of an assumptive proposition, of which *υἱὸς καὶ κληρονομος* is the predicate, *ων* being as usual understood; and the meaning is, that he (Roscius) being both son and heir of the deceased &c. But what will happen supposing the article prefixed? We shall then have two assumptive propositions, and two subjects coupled together: i. e. *υἱος* and *κληρονομος* will then be assumed respectively of two distinct persons: they cannot be assumed of one and the same, if the article be a pronoun; because two articles coupled together and yet having reference to the same person involve the absurdity of joining an individual to himself."

This absurdity follows only on the supposed truth of a theory which is itself absurd: and the principle is thus easily explained. It is a known principle in Greek and in Latin, that an adjective qualifying one noun must be extended or repeated to qualify other nouns, if any such succeed it. Thus, *αἰεὶ γὰρ τοὶ ἐριστὲ φίλη, πολεμοὶ τε, μαχαι τε*, Il. α. 178; that is, *τοὶ ἐριστὲ φίλη, πολεμοὶ τε φίλοι, μαχαι τε φίλαι*. The article being itself an adjective, follows the genius of other adjectives in this respect; and accordingly in the above instance it virtually affects *κληρονομος* as well as *υἱος*, and is, in point of sense, as if it

had been written 'Ρωσκιος ὁ υἱος καὶ ὁ κληρονομος. This indeed the writer would have done, if he wished to render the last relation as distinct and prominent as the first—'Roscius the son and the heir', &c. This is precisely the effect of the article in English, and it is no other in Greek. If the two nouns were names of two different persons, the article was more likely to be repeated; because being in themselves distinct subjects, the writer must have felt desirous to convey that impression to his readers: but even this he often left to their own good sense, unless he had a forcible reason for the repetition. Thus ἀπέστειλαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς τὸν Πέτρον καὶ Ἰωάννην. Acts. viii. 15. But in chap. xiii. 50, the sacred writer repeats the article, καὶ ἐπηγείραν διωγμὸν ἐπὶ τὸν Παῦλον καὶ τὸν Βαρναβάν. The reason of the repetition is, that Luke wished to render Barnabas no less than Paul a prominent object of the persecution. He felt that himself, and he wished his reader to have the same impression.

We have a similar instance in John ii. 22. καὶ ἐπιστευσαν τῇ γραφῇ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ὃν εἶπεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς. 'They believed the Scripture, and the word which Jesus said.' Here the article is repeated for two reasons: one was, that the Evangelist wished to fix the attention upon the word which Jesus said, as well as upon the prophecy from the Jewish Scriptures, as objects of their belief. The disciples then understood the one, as well as the other; and they believed both. The other reason was, that the article τῇ before γραφῇ could not be carried forward, as would be necessary if omitted, without changing its termination, which would be abrupt and disagreeable. And here I am to point out a circumstance of some importance which pervades Greek compositions, yet which has escaped the notice of Dr. Middleton. It is this: When two nouns of the same gender and number are joined by a copulative, and consequently placed in the same case close by each other, the last is affected by the article prefixed to the first with the same invariable subintellection as two quantities in algebra with a vinculum over them, the copula supplying the place of *plus* or *minus*. I will illustrate this with examples taken from our author. Dem. de Cor. § 27. ὁ συμβουλος καὶ ῥήτωρ ἐγώ, for ὁ ῥήτωρ. Æschin.

cont. Ctes. § 81. τον Αλεξανδρον και Φιλιππον, for τον Φιλιππον. Plato, vol. xi. p. 31. την απειριαν και απαιδευσιαν, for την απαιδευσιαν. Arist. Eth. ad Eudem. i. 8. το προτερον και υστερον, for το υστερον. Plat. Theæt. vol. ii. 134. μεταξυ του παιουντος και πασχοντος, for του πασχοντος: as we should say in English ‘between the agent and patient,’ instead of ‘the agent and the patient.’ The same practice holds of course in the plural number: thus Thucydides, in init. των Πελοποννησιων και Αθηναιων, for των Αθηναιων. Xen. Œcon. p. 481. τους τραγωδους τε και κωμωδους, for τους κωμωδους.

This canon applies to the N. T. in strict conformity with the usage of Greek writers, and with the syntax of the Greek tongue. Thus Ephes. v. 5. εν τη βασιλεια του Χριστου και Θεου, for του Θεου. Hence this omission is properly marked in our common version by supplying *of*—‘in the kingdom of Christ and of God.’ Again, Tit. ii. 13. του μεγαλου Θεου και Σωτηρος ημων Ιησου Χριστου, for του Σωτηρος, ‘of the great God and of our Saviour Jesus Christ.’ This part of Dr. Middleton’s work, though elaborate, is altogether tedious and nugatory, and seems beyond any other part calculated to bring into disrepute his judgement as a sound critic. In every instance of words thus conjoined, whether they mean the same or two different persons or things, the reader must depend not on the use of the *article*, but upon the exercise of common sense, which he is supposed to possess.

SECTION 3.

In Chap. IV. p. 95, our author considers the use of the article before proper names. “On what occasions,” says he, “the Greeks prefixed the article to proper names, is among the most curious enquiries connected with Greek literature.—Apolonius has said that *proper names*, on account of their inherent peculiarity, require not the article so much as do nouns which express only common ideas: and indeed, if they had originally taken the article to define and limit their meaning, it might well be urged that they needed no such assistance. Harris appears to have felt the force of this objection; which could

not but occur to him, since he supposes the article to be something distinct from the pronoun, and that its use is only to define. 'Upon these principles,' says Harris, 'we see the reason why it is absurd to say *ὁ ἐγώ*, or *ὁ σύ*, because nothing can make these pronouns more definite than they are. The same may be asserted of *proper names*: and though the Greeks say *ὁ Σωκράτης*, *ἡ Ξαντίππη*, and the like; yet the article is a mere pleonasm, unless perhaps it serves to distinguish *sexes*."

Dr. Middleton's theory is simply this: The article being a pronoun has an obscure reference, and the proper name of the object referred to is subjoined, to remove that obscurity. "It is a common practice with Homer," says he, "when he has occasion to attribute any act to his gods or heroes, to defer the mention of their names to the conclusion of the sentence, and first to ascribe such act to persons obscurely referred to in the corresponding article placed at the beginning." Thus *Il. α. 488. Αὐτὰρ ὁ μνηιὲ νηυσὶ παρημενὸς ὠκυπόροισι, Διογενὴς Πηλεΐδης υἱὸς πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς*,—that is, *ὁ Διογενὴς υἱὸς &c.* Again, *οἱ δὲ ἔκκηλοι τερπόνται Κυπρίσ τε καὶ ἀργυροτόξος Ἀπολλων*.—*Il. δ. 20. αἱ δὲ ἐπεμύξαν Ἀθηναίη τε καὶ Ἥρη*. "In all these examples it is observable," says he, "that the writer is in no haste to declare the name of the person whom he has in view; but that his mind is intent rather on the act to be attributed to him, of whom the article at the beginning of the sentence is the temporary representative. . . . But examples occur in which the article and proper name are brought nearer to each other. *Αὐτὰρ ὁ αὐτὲ Πέλοψ δῶκε Ἀτρεΐ, ποιμενὶ λαῶν Ἀτρεὺς δὲ θνησκῶν ἐλίπε πολυαρνὶ Θυέσῃ. Αὐτὰρ ὁ αὐτὲ Θυέσῃ Ἀγαμέμνονι λείπε φορῆναι*."

"In these instances we find the writer using the article with less appearance of utility than in the former examples; because here we have merely a particle, by which the mind is kept by little or no suspense: and unquestionably, if he had written simply *Πέλοψ*, as in the next line he has written *Ἀτρεὺς*, the sense would have been sufficiently clear, though that the Pelops here spoken of was the same with the one just mentioned, would not have been marked with equal distinctness. Or if

the pronoun *be* employed, the proper name might be more safely omitted than in most of the preceding examples, since δ would be supposed to refer to Πελοπι in the preceding verse, and the addition of the name is an exercise of that *extreme caution*, instances of which have been already noticed."

It is scarcely credible that a man of sense and learning, such as Dr. M. undoubtedly was, should thus trifle with himself and his readers. The adjective in Greek and Latin admits of being separated from the noun it qualifies, without any obscurity or suspense; the similarity of termination, of case, gender and number, serving to point out their mutual relation. The article follows the analogy of adjectives in this respect: and though by a word or two, or even a whole clause, it anticipates its adjunct, the separation can create no possible suspense or obscurity: for the reader, if competent, recognises the anticipated noun *as instantaneously as a glance of the eye*. Why then is the article prefixed to proper names? Assuredly to define the common name implied; to bring that name forward without a formal use of it, and render it prominent to the reader, or to renew the impression of a name known as already noticed. Thus in the above example, Il. β. 105. δ Πελοψ, the *man* Pelops, already mentioned in the preceding verse. On the same principle δ Θυεση, in verse 107, is but a renewed mention of Θυεση in 106. It is here to be remembered that when the article marks a proper name, it does not mark it as one bearing that name, but as an agent or object designated by some common appellative. It is the character which it bears under this appellative that alone entitles it to notice: and the article relates to the proper name only so far as they both coalesce in describing one of a kind without its generic denomination. Poetry, it is well known, allows a greater latitude of inversion than prose compositions; and though Homer, as a poet, avails himself whenever necessary of this privilege, he never exceeds the bounds of perspicuity. Dr. M. asks the question (p. 100), "Does Homer ever place the article *immediately* before a proper name: and in this case what are the circumstances?" The obvious answer is, he does so, whenever the

metre allowed it; and he does otherwise only when necessity required. Our author goes on, "On the celebrated passage (Il. α. 11.) *ὄννεκα τὸν Χρυσὴν ἡτίμησ' ἀργήτρα*, Heyne, after observing that the article, especially as prefixed to proper names, was confessedly unknown to Homer, and after giving some conjectural emendations of preceding critics, concludes, '*nihil expediti potest*;' whilst Wolf declares, '*nihil dubito quin τῷ Χρυσῶν poeta dixerit, ut personam fama celebrem et auditoribus jam tum, quum primum ejus nomen audirent, notissimam.*' It is certainly a difficulty that Chryses was now for the first time mentioned; but whether this difficulty be so great, that we must introduce *δὴ* or *τοὶ* into the place of *τὸν*, without any authority from Editt. or MSS. deserves not merely for the sake of this passage, to be carefully considered." After a long discussion of no importance, he concludes that the solution given by Wolf will be the true one, if understood with some modifications. "That Homer meant to intimate that Chryses was well known is of itself too vague an assertion: Chryses was not, independently of the circumstances which precede the mention of his name, better known than most of the persons spoken of in the poem: but as having caused the pestilence just mentioned, he must have occupied the thoughts of the speaker, and his notoriety in that particular view, the hearer would readily recognize." The difficulty here, however, is all imaginary: and if the German critics on Homer, with Middleton in the number, possessed on this occasion a ray of common sense, they would have dissipated it at one breath. The article occupies the position in the verse which the laws of metre assigned to it, and is intended by the poet to define *ἀργήτρα*—*Χρυσὴν τὸν ἀργήτρα*—'the son of Jove raised through the host a destructive pestilence; because Chryses his priest was dishonoured by Atrides.' Homer, so far from supposing Chryses known to fame, supposes him not known at all; and therefore after giving his name describes him as a priest, and that the priest of Apollo.

In p. 105 our author justly observes, "It is of the character and essence of poetry to disregard minute relations and de-

pendences : and in proportion as it departs from the style of narration and indulges in lofty flights, it is negligent of perspicuity : for which reason, in Pindar and in the chorusses of the Tragedians, the article more rarely occurs. Homer's style, it is true, is less artificial, and approaches nearer to the narrative kind : but even in Homer it was not to be expected that it should be regularly employed on every occasion in which writers of prose would deem it necessary. . . It will happen therefore that, though Homer never uses the article before proper names without reason, he commonly omits it without scruple : and consequently, in the instances in which it immediately precedes the name, being so very few, nothing like a rule on the subject can be deducible from his practice."

For this reason he would willingly look to the prose writers, such as Demosthenes and Xenophon, for detecting the laws by which the article, as it respects proper names, is inserted or omitted. But in their works instances occur in which the article has been added or omitted from ignorance of editors or the carelessness of transcribers ; and on consulting different MSS. of the same Greek prose writer, there is more disagreement than on any other point whatever. Accordingly he appeals to Aristophanes, whose language except in the chorusses is most simple and unaffected, while his metres have generally protected him from the critics. On his authority then he lays down this law,—that the article is put before proper names only when the same person has been recently mentioned ; or when the person is from some cause or other of such *notoriety*, that even without previous mention he may be recognised by the hearer. (See p. 109.)

Now if we consult common sense, we may infer that some misconception has taken place with regard to the second case : for if a person be of such notoriety as to be recognised as soon as mentioned, what need was there to place the article before his name to define him or make him known ? The truth is, that such persons were each known under some pre-eminent character ; and the use of the article in such circumstances, is to bring forward to view the character by which he stands distin-

guished. Thus κατ' Αισχυλον or κατ' Όμηρον, means simply—according to Æschylus or 'Homer': but these men were pre-eminent *as poets*. Aristophanes, Aves 807. says, κατα τον Αισχυλον—910. κατα τον Όμηρον, 'according to the poet Æschylus—according to the poet Homer.' In a similar way Solon was known as a *legislator*, and Socrates as a *philosopher*. A writer therefore might say ο Σολων or ο Σωκρατης, though not previously mentioned, as tacitly referring to their known character, and thus rendering them prominent. (See Nub. 144, 1188.) But our author is mistaken in regard to Nestor, in verse 1055—τον Νεσσορ' αγορητην: for this is an instance of the transposition of the article on account of the metre, similar to that in Il. α. 11.—Νεσορα τον αγορητην, 'Nestor the haranguer.'

"Sometimes proper names become a species of common names, and then more naturally admit the article. The name of a Play is usually derived from the leading character in it. Thus ο Πηλευσ, ο Αιολος, ο Μελεαγρος, ο Τηλεφος were dramas composed by Euripides, and mentioned in Ran. 863. In such instances the article, as Dr. M. observes, is never omitted.

"The names of Deities and Heroes have also very frequently the article prefixed. Thus, η Αφροδιτη means η Θεα Αφροδιτη; ο Ζευς, ο Θεος Ζευς; ο Πηλευσ, ο ήρως Πηλευσ. (See p. 110.)

"Lastly, proper names of *places*, whether countries, cities, mountains, &c. commonly, but not always, take the article;" as η Αιγινα for η νησος Αιγινα; η Λιβυη for η γη or χωρη Λιβυη; η Αινος, η πολις Αινος; ο Έβρος, ο ποταμος Έβρος. But it should be observed, as I believe it generally true, that when the common name is expressed, the article is dropped; as η Αινος is equivalent to Αινος πολις; ο Έβρος to ποταμος Έβρος. (See Herod. 7. 57, 58.) It should further be observed, that in some cases the gender of the proper name differs from that of the common name: thus ο Αθως or η Παρνης, the names of mountains, the generic term of which is το ορος.

SECTION 4.

In Chap. V. our author considers the use of the article before *abstract nouns*, or the names of attributes and qualities; a subject, he observes, of greater difficulty than any other which belongs to the inquiry. "It is to be premised," says he, "that nouns of this class are capable of being employed in two different ways: though they always express abstract ideas, they may be used in a more or in a less abstract sense. *Αδικια* for example will signify injustice *generally*, but it will also express every particular act of injustice, by the contemplation of which we form the more abstract idea: and in this latter use these nouns in Greek admit the plural, or, which is equivalent, they are in the singular capable of being joined with words indicating their possible plurality. It is true that instances of this kind do not very frequently occur: but their occurrence, however rare, sufficiently proves that the names of attributes and qualities may be of particular, as well as of general application: and consequently that an expedient, by which they may be known to be employed in their most general meaning, is not without its use. This, if I mistake not, is the force of the article in very many passages in which a superficial observer might regard it as being a mere expletive: and we shall farther perceive, that where the sense of these nouns is meant to be limited, the article is invariably omitted." So upon this doctrine, the article, instead of defining, extends the meaning of a term, and limits it by its omission. Following this novel idea, Dr. M. reduces the rules for inserting the article before the names of attributes to the four following. 1. When the noun is used in its most abstract sense. 2. When the attribute is personified. 3. When the article is used in the sense of a possessive pronoun. 4. When there is reference either retrospective or anticipative.

From Plato (vol. iv. p. 68.) we have an example of the first case,—*ἡ ἀδικία καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία μεγίστων τῶν ὄντων κακῶν ἐστίν*, 'Injustice and intemperance are the greatest of all existing

evils.' Now according to our author's theory, the article is put before *αδίκη* to mark it in its most comprehensive signification. "In the same manner," says he, "as *οι αδικοι* will signify all who are unjust, so *ἡ ἀδίκη* will mean every act, of which injustice can be assumed." But may not *ἡ ἀδίκη* mean also some particular act of injustice? in other words, may it not have a reference retrospective or anticipative? The article then prefixed to the names of qualities, has a *particular* and *general* application. These constitute the first and fourth cases laid down by our theorist: and they are manifestly not only inconsistent with each other, but they completely neutralize each other. For in the first case, the article is prefixed to *generalize* the idea, in the last to circumscribe and recall it by a renewed mention.

But let us bring the question to the standard of truth and common sense, and we shall immediately perceive the use of the article. *Αδίκη* means injustice in its most comprehensive sense; *ἡ ἀδίκη* may either mean any particular unjust action, or generically injustice in general, contrasted with the principle of justice: and this intended contrast or opposition constitutes the force of the article.

According to the second case, the article is prefixed to the names of attributes personified. "The reason of this practice," says he, "seems to be founded in the *notoriety* of these imaginary persons. (p. 125.) How can this be? Personifications are arbitrary creations of the fancy, invested with forms new, and, until then, unknown to the reader. Besides, when the name of an attribute is personified, it becomes, as far as the personification goes, a *proper name*, and as to a proper name the article is prefixed to it. Thus *ἡ Κακία* and *ἡ Ἀρετή*, alluded to in Xenophon (see Mem. lib. 2. c. 1. §. 22.), mean 'the woman Kakia, the woman Arete.' These therefore have the article put before them, not because they are personified ideas, but because they are represented as individual beings belonging to a whole class.

"The use of the article before imaginary persons," he adds, "may farther be explained from the *perfect abstractedness* with

which attributes must be regarded, before they admit personification. The mind cannot form the idea of ἡ Ἀρετή, a *person*, till it has learned to comprise under one general notion all the various acts which can be denominated virtuous." This is much as to say, that a man can never become a fine poet unless he be a minute philosopher. Nothing is so adverse to the power of fancy as the dwelling upon the subtle distinctions and relations of abstract ideas. The investing inanimate objects with life and motion, which personification implies, is the soul of poetry, and the soul of poetry is the being free from the trammels of logic and metaphysics. This corresponds to the fact: Homer in personifying Νίκη (victory) in Il. ζ. 339, avoids the article as an incumbrance on his imagination. In Il. ι. 500, he personifies Ἀτὴ, also without the article; though in the next line, having occasion to renew his notice of it, he uses the article before ατὴ: and even Plato (vol. iv. p. 76), speaking poetry in prosaic numbers, places φιλοσοφία as a real being with Alcibiades and Clinius without the insertion of the article.

In speaking of Homer Dr. M. observes, that that poet rarely makes use of abstract terms, and still more rarely, if ever, does he employ them in their most abstract and general sense. Some persons perhaps who have read the Iliad will be surprised to learn that ὀργή, αἰσχυρή, φύσις, ἐλευθερία, παιδεία, εὐδαιμονία, δικαιοσύνη, ὑγίεια, ἐπισήμη, and many others of the same kind, are words which do not occur in the whole poem. Σιγῇ, σιωπῇ, τύχῃ, δίκῃ, τεχνῇ, are found only in the dative, indicating merely the *manner* in which some act is performed. This may be denominated the *adverbial* use of abstract nouns, and in this use of them, they are always *anarthrous*. Instances however occur in which Homer employs the article just as it is used in other Greek authors. The Il. λ. 762. αὐτὰρ Αἰχιλλεύς οἷος τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀπονήσεται. 'but Achilles will enjoy the virtue alone—will confine to his own benefit the virtue *peculiar to him*,—his own pre-eminent prowess.' If we draw forth the full meaning of Nestor, the contrast at which the article points is this, 'Achilles is willing to suffer the Greeks to have the full benefit of his resentment, by refusing to join them; but he envies them

the benefit of his own superior valour"—τῆς ἀρετῆς in opposition to τοῦ χολοῦ implied and tacitly censured. Telemachus charges the suitors with devouring his goods, and ruining his house: one of them answers, ἡμεῖς δ' αὖ ποῶιδεγμενοι ἡμᾶτα πάντα ἔνεκα τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐριδαινομεν. (Od. β. 205.) 'On the contrary we contend for pre-eminence, waiting here every day; that is, 'we stay here contending with each other, hoping to win thy mother, as the prize of skill and valour to be conferred on the best'—περι τῆς ἀρετῆς, 'to exhibit a trial of pre-eminent virtue, and not for the less honourable end imputed to them by the son *.'

In section 2nd he considers the omission of the article before abstract nouns, the cases of which he reduces under the following description. "Where abstract nouns are the predicates of propositions not intended to be reciprocating, the article is omitted."—In propositions which merely assert or deny existence.—After verbs nuncupative, where the noun in question is the name, by which any thing is said to be called. Plato, vol. iv. p. 37. καλῶ το κεφαλαῖον, κολακειαν, not τὴν κολακειαν, because the article would then hold up 'flattery' in contrast with something else to which it stands opposed. Το κεφαλαῖον is elliptical for κατὰ το κεφαλαῖον: 'I call it flattery by that which is summary—by a summary name.' "It is omitted in exclusive propositions. Dem. vol. i. p. 529, οὐδεν ὕβρεως ἀφορητοτερον, i. e. 'than any kind of insult.' Had the article been used in this place, the meaning would have been 'more intolerable than *all* insult.'" All this assuredly is erroneous, and Dr. M. would not have thought of such an explanation, if it were not necessary to prop up his system: τῆς

* Dr. M. in remarking on Homer has the following note in p. 123: "We find indeed in the Odyssey β. 206. ἔνεκα τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐριδαινομεν" which Damm, the excellent Lexicographer, renders by 'propter talem præstantiam,' explaining τῆς by ταυτῆς or τινος. Yet Apollonius, p. 112, classes this example with ὡς ἡ βίμβα θιουσα: his interpretation therefore supposes τῆς to be not in concord with ἀρετῆς, but dependent on it: and this is conformable with the context. On τῆς ἀρετῆς in the Iliad Λ. 762. Bentley has conjectured *ne* with the Digamma."

ὕβρεως would either mean a renewed impression of some insulting act already stated, or generically 'insult' in contradistinction to any other species of injustice. It is this contrast in the mind of the writer, or the absence of it, that is the sole cause of the annexed abstract noun being anarthrous or otherwise. Why for instance has Plato declined the use of the article in such phrases as these, ὁ μὴ ἐχὼν κακίαν, ὁ ἐχὼν ἀδικίαν? assuredly not because the use of the article is inconsistent with verbs signifying to *have*, to *obtain*, or to *partake*; but because he uses these nouns in their general acceptation, without contrasting them with their opposite virtues.

"On the same principle it is," says he (p. 129), "that in the common phrases ἀνοίαν, αἰσχυρήν, &c. οφλισκανεῖν, δικήν διδόναι, ἡσυχίαν ἀγειν, and many more, the article is invariably omitted. Since in many of these phrases two words are employed to convey the meaning of one, and in all of them a single verb may be imagined, which expresses the meaning, I shall consider this as an *Hendiadys*, and shall hereafter refer to what is here said of all such phrases under that appellation."

"In the same manner we may account for the anarthrous use of abstract nouns, when they are employed in the dative case *adverbially*. In this sense they are of very common occurrence; and are sometimes so joined with real adverbs, that their import cannot be mistaken." Thus Orestes acknowledges that he murdered his mother, δικὴ δὲ, καλῶς μὲν οὐ. And Demosthenes (p. 41), φύσει δ' ὑπάρχει τοῖς παροῦσι ταῦν ἀπόντων, 'The things of the absent (from their duty or from the field) by nature belong to those who are present.' Φύσει is here anarthrous, because it is used generally without an intended opposition to, or contrast with, any thing else, and it may be rendered by the adverbial form, 'naturally.'

But the article with an abstract noun in the dative or ablative is of common occurrence. Dr. M. was aware of this, and it was necessary that his system should undergo another twist to account for it. "In these examples," says he, "it is to be observed, that the manner in which any thing is said to happen or to be done, is not spoken of with reference to any particular

subject, to which such manner is more especially attributable. But the case *may* be otherwise: the manner may be adverted to as being the attribute more especially of the subject in question: and then the article will be prefixed, and will, as in the instances already mentioned, have the force of a possessive pronoun."

Thus (Arist. Rhet. lib. ii. c. 15.) ζῶσι τῇ μνήμῃ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐλπίδι, 'They live by *the* memory more than by *the* hope.' Here the clause τῇ μνήμῃ stands in immediate contrast with τῇ ἐλπίδι, the former being a character of the aged, who hang on the recollection of the past, the other that of the young, who dwell on the future. Each coalesces with the personal pronoun implied in ζῶσι, and in our own tongue the possessive *their* becomes a substitute for the article—'They live by *their* recollection more than by *their* hope.'

Thucyd. 5. 72. τῇ ἐμπειρίᾳ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐλασσωθέντες τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ εἰδείξαν οὐχ ἥσσον περιγενομένοι, 'The Lacedæmonians though at this time inferior in skill, showed themselves not less superior in bravery.' On this passage Dr. M. has the following note. "In this passage, it may be supposed that both ἐμπειρία and ἀνδρεία should, according to what has been advanced above, be anarthrous. Bauer, however, in his excellent edition of Thucydides, has shown that τῇ ἐμπειρίᾳ must be rendered *per artem hostium*, and by τῇ we must plainly understand, by the bravery of the Spartans. The articles therefore are necessary, the nouns not being employed in the adverbial sense, but with reference to particular subjects.'" (See p. 131, note.)

How the articles became necessary, because the nouns not being employed in the adverbial sense, but with reference to particular subjects, is what I do not comprehend. Dr. M. seems here puzzled, because the articles cannot take the sense of the possessive without an evident absurdity. But had he attended to the order of the words the difficulty would have vanished. The writer had mentioned τοὺς πολέμους in the preceding sentence, and in consequence of his arrangement, τῇ ἐμπειρίᾳ coalesces with them, and not with Λακεδαιμόνιοι which suc-

ceeds. Had the historian thus said, *Λακεδαιμονιοι τῇ ἐμπειρίᾳ*, the sentence would have been solecistical: but as it is, *τῇ ἐμπειρίᾳ* belongs to the enemy, and *τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ* to the Spartans. Each noun has the article, because they stand in direct opposition one to another, and the sense may be expressed by the possessive *their*. I invite the attention of my reader to this passage, as exhibiting a remarkable instance of the latent power of association, and of the precision with which the writers of Greece obeyed its dictates, though possibly they were strangers to it as a theory.

In Chap. VII. p. 136. he considers the construction of the article with *πᾶς*, or *ἅπας*, *ὅλος*, *ὅυτος*. With respect to the first, the rule which he lays down is this: "When *πᾶς* in the singular number is used to signify that the whole of the thing implied by the substantive with which it is joined, is intended, the substantive has the article; but when it is employed to denote that every individual of that species is spoken of, then the substantive is anarthrous." For this rule, which I believe has no other foundation than the theory of our author, I would substitute the following remarks, as more intelligible and instructive.

1. The article is generally put before the noun, and not before *πᾶς* or *ἅπας*; and its use is quite independent of these. Thus (Dem. de Cor. § 59.) *πάντα τον αἰωνα διετετελεκε*, 'he finished the life all of it—he spent all his life,' or 'the whole of his life,' where the article has the sense of our possessive *his*. Herod. lib. ix. p. 328. *ἡ ἵππος ἀπᾶσα*, 'the cavalry all of it—the whole cavalry.' Thuc. 2. 57. *την γην πᾶσαν εἰεμον*, 'they cut up the country all of it—the whole country.' Xen. Hell. lib. iii. p. 292. *ἅπαν το στρατευμα*, 'the armament all of it together—the whole armament.'

2. This same principle, as is reasonable to expect, obtains in the plural as well as in the singular. *Και περι πασας τας κατηγορίας σκεπτεον*. (Arist. Rhet. lib. ii. c. 9.) 'We must consider concerning the categories all of them—all the well known categories.' Dem. vol. i. p. 706. *παρα παντας τους νομους*,

'against the laws all of them—against all the laws.' Ibid. p. 759. ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς πολίταις, 'upon all the citizens.'

3. Sometimes the article is put before πᾶς rather than its adjunct, merely to avoid cacophony and to obtain a more agreeable sound, without any alteration in the sense. Thus, ὁ πᾶς ὁμιλος, 'the whole band,' instead of πᾶς ὁ ὁμιλος, which would be attended with a disagreeable hiatus. Thus also, ἡ πᾶσα ἐξουσία is, on the same principle, preferable to πᾶσα ἡ ἐξουσία, 'all the authority' or 'the whole power.' In Lysias c. Agorat. vol. v. p. 514, we read, τοῖς πᾶσι ἀνθρώποις δοξετε δίκαια ψηφισασθαι, 'you will appear to all the human race to enact righteous decrees,' πᾶσι being inserted between τοῖς ἀνθρώποις to please the ear by more varied terminations.

It must however be observed, that when the article is put before πᾶς, whether in the singular or plural, it is intended to place the collective sense of the adjunct in a more prominent view. Thus Herod. lib. ix. p. 336. τῷ ἅπαντι στρατοπέδῳ νικᾶν, 'to conquer with the whole army,' that is, 'in every part of it, in both wings, as well as in the middle.' Xen. Cyrop. lib. vii. p. 111. οὐδ' ἂν οἱ πάντες σφενδονηταὶ μείνειαν πανυ ολιγούς, 'the slingers—all of them together, all in a body—would sustain but very few heavy-armed infantry.'

4. The noun is often omitted, and the article is used with πᾶς alone. Thus (Arist. Rhet. lib. ii. c. 2.) τοῖς πᾶσι ὀργίζεται, 'he is angry with all,' that is, ἀνθρώποις. Xen. Cyrop. lib. viii. p. 132. σωφροσύνην τοῖς πᾶσι ἐμποιεῖ, 'he generates modesty in all,' i. e. all men.

Similar observations might be made respecting ὅλος, ὅτος, ὅδε, ἐκεῖνος. The article is never placed before them, and its use therefore is independent of them. Its application where these definitives occur is to be discovered from the context, and its usual acceptance will be sufficient to account for it.

Thus (in Demosth. p. 709.) ὅλην τὴν πόλιν, 'the whole city:' the city is definite, and therefore has the article; ὅλην marks the city altogether, and not a part of it. So also (in Arist. Rhet. lib. ii. c. 4.) περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον, 'about their whole life.' When the

noun is indefinite it is of course anarthrous, and that independently of ὅλος. Demosth. p. 762. ενιαυτον ὅλον, 'a whole year.' Had the year meant been one determinate year, the original would have then been τον ενιαυτον ὅλον. "When ὅλος," says Dr. M., "is used in the sense of *wholly* or *altogether*, its substantive is anarthrous; as in Demosth. vol. ii. 1110. πλασμα ὅλον εἰν ἡ διαθηκα. Here πλασμα is anarthrous, not because ὅλος has this or that sense, but because it is the predicate of the proposition. 'The treaty is a complete fiction.'"

When either of the definitives οὗτος, ὅδε, ἐκεῖνος and the article affect the same adjunct, each of them has its proper force, the latter holding it forth *generically* contrasted with its opposite or some other kind, the former as the immediate subject of discourse. Thus in ταῦτα τα θηρια, the article marks θηρια as *irrational beings* or *beasts*, in opposition to *us* or *men*, mentioned in the context: ταῦτα holds forth the same term as *beasts* which had been just noticed, and therefore immediate objects of attention, 'these beasts—these animals which are irrational.' (See Plato Lach. vol. v. p. 199.) Thus again, (Xen. Econ. 8, 2.) εἰ μεν γαρ πενια αὕτη σαφης, το δεομενον τινος μη εχειν χρῆσθαι· αλυποτερα δε αὕτη ἡ ενδεια το μη δυνασθαι ζητοῦντα λαβεῖν, 'that poverty is certain, when a person being in need of a thing, has not whereby to use it; but this want is less grievous, when a person cannot find it on seeking *it as being misplaced*.' The first αὕτη πενια has not the article, because it means want that is absolute, and uncontrasted with its opposite. On the other hand it is placed before ενδεια because it denotes a want that is specific, and is contrasted with the object which supplies it.

The distinct use of the definitive and the article in the following instance is most obvious. A person had his eye struck out by a man that had but one eye; the sufferer threatened to put in force the law of retaliation, 'an eye for an eye.' Απειλῆσαι τις λεγεται εχθρῳ ενα εχοντι οφθαλμον, οτι αυτοῦ εκκοψει τοῦτον τον ενα, 'to strike out this which was one—this single one.' (Demosth. vol. i. p. 744.) "This usage," says Dr. M., "though it be uniform in the best prose writers, was unknown

to Homer, in both of whose poems, *ὄντος ἀνὴρ* and similar phrases are sufficiently common. The article therefore in this instance, as in some others, was not originally deemed necessary. It is however not difficult to account for its insertion at a period when all nouns employed definitely came to have the article prefixed to them : for they are never more restricted in sense, than they unavoidably must be, whenever they are joined with *ὄντος*." (See p. 142.) Homer avoided the usage of *ὄντος ἀνὴρ* and the like, not because he was unacquainted with it, but because as a poet he was raised above the minute distinction which is implied in it, and which a prose writer found it necessary to mark.

In Chap. VIII. our author subjoins a few remarks on the position of the article in the concord of the substantive and the adjective. With regard to the position of the article, common sense requires that it should be placed immediately before the word it is intended to define. If it define a noun, it is prefixed to that noun ; if an adjective, it precedes that adjective. Thus (Dem. de Cor. § 55.) *ὅσα προσῆκε τον αγαθον πολιτην*. If in this sentence the orator meant to hold out some man as a citizen, in opposition to others who had not that privilege, he would have said *αγαθον τον πολιτην* ; but as he designates *the good citizen*, in contradistinction to one of a contrary character, he puts the article before *αγαθον*.

Xenophon observes of Cyrus, that, though he spoke much and vehemently while a boy, he used fewer words and a gentler tone of voice, as he grew older. *Τοῖς μὲν λόγοις βραχυτέροις ἐχρήτο και τῇ φωνῇ ἡσυχαιτέρα*. The words which the writer wished here to render marked and prominent, are *λόγοις* and *φωνῇ* ; he therefore distinguishes each by prefixing the article. Had he put the article before *βραχυτέροις* and *ἡσυχαιτέρα*, the sense indeed would have been the same ; but the prominence and contrast, intended between the nouns, would have been sunk out of sight.

Now let us see what the author makes of this plain and simple principle when viewing it through the medium of his own dark and confused system. "The article," says he, "as

every one knows, is found very commonly prefixed to adjectives; but adjectives are not, strictly speaking, the predicates of the assumptive propositions, of which the articles are the subjects. In *ὁ δίκαιος ἀνὴρ* the construction is *ὁ ὡν δίκαιος ἀνὴρ*, and in *ὁ δίκαιος* alone there is no other difference than that *ἀνὴρ* is understood. This is sufficiently evident from what has been already shown. The predicate therefore in such cases is always the substantive expressed or understood, conjointly with its adjective, the two together being considered as forming one whole. Of these two, however, the substantive is the more important; since it may alone be the predicate of the article, which the adjective cannot. In the adjective some substantive, if not expressed, will be understood; and what is here said respecting adjectives will apply equally to participles. On these grounds we may account for the *position*, which the Greek usage has presented to the article in immediate concord, where one article only is employed, and also for the order of the substantive and the adjective, where the article is repeated." "In concord then, where the attribute is assumed of the substantive, supposing one article only to be employed, it must be placed immediately before the adjective."

He illustrates this by an example from Herodotus: *δορυαλω-
του εὐσεύης τῆς Ἀττικῆς χωρῆς*, 'the land of Attica being thus taken by the enemy;' the object of the writer was to specify it in contradistinction to other lands; and this he does by means of the adjective *Ἀττικῆς*, which is rendered still more prominent and distinctive by means of the article prefixed. Had however the historian thus arranged the clause, the sense would have been the same—*δορυαλωτου εὐσεύης τῆς χωρῆς Ἀττικῆς*. On the position, as it stands in Herodotus, our author observes, "The reason of this position is plain. If, for example, we had read *εὐσεύης τῆς χωρῆς*, the sense would have been complete; the mind of the reader would be satisfied: the article would have a sufficient predicate in *χωρῆς*, and we should look no further. When *Ἀττικῆς* precedes *χωρῆς*, this does not happen; *χωρῆς* or *γῆς* or something similar is expected." (p. 146.)

"We are next to consider what will happen, where both the

PART II.

Analysis of Matthiæ's account of the Greek Article.

DIVISION 262.—See vol. ii. p. 382. **THIS** learned grammarian thus properly defines the article.—“It serves to signify that the noun with which it stands, indicates either a determinate object amongst several, which are comprehended under the same idea, or the whole species.” He next observes that Homer and other old poets use it in the sense of the demonstrative pronoun—*this*. Thus, in Il. *α.* 12. *ὁ* means ‘this person,’ supposing that the poet points to *Χρυσης*, and *ταῖς ἀποιναῖς* (v. 20.) ‘this ransom.’ This however is not correct; *ὁ* is an abbreviation for *ὁ Χρυσης*, to be repeated from the preceding clause, and *τα* marks *ἀποινα* as the things which composed the ransom—the ransom money. ‘Deliver the girl to me and take the things which I bring for redeeming her—take the price of her redemption.’

These poets, he observes, never use the article before *proper names*. But he limits this observation by remarking, that there are several passages where the article is put according to the Attic idiom, even in those poets in proper names, *where it appears to signify a designation*, e. g. Il. *α.* 11. *τον Χρυσην ηγίμην ἀρητῆρα*. What the learned author here means, I do not know; but he seems not to have been aware that *τον*, placed where it is on account of the verse, in reality qualifies *ἀρητῆρα*, as has already been observed. ‘He dishonoured Chryses *his* priest.’

Our author seems not to have been aware that a patronymic name comprehends a whole *class*, and therefore naturally admits the article to distinguish one from any other of the same name. Thus, *Αἰαντι δὲ μάλιστ' αἰΐφρονι θυμῷ οἶνε τῷ Τελα-*

ἐμὴ last, because he wished to render prominent, not so much the measure which secured success, as the circumstance of that measure having been proposed by himself.

“Apollonius has remarked that *ἐμὸς ὁ πατήρ* is not equivalent to *ὁ ἐμὸς πατήρ*: the difference is, that in the former position of the article, the verb *εἶμι* is to be supplied between *ἐμὸς* and *πατήρ*: and the sense is ‘mine is the father;’ whilst in the latter something is to be affirmed or denied of one, who is already assumed to be my father.” (p. 145.) This remark is hypercritical. If I had to say simply that my father is dead, I should have written *ὁ ἐμὸς πατήρ ἀπεθάνε*: but suppose I had to say that my father was dead, and that in opposition to one, whose father was *not* dead, I should then detach the possessive from the article, and make it prominent by placing it first or last: thus, *ἐμὸς ὁ πατήρ* or *ὁ πατήρ ἐμὸς ἀπεθάνε*, ‘my father is dead,’ though his father be alive.

μυνιάδῃ, 'he raised in particular the mind of Ajax the Telamonion—*him* who was the son of Telamon,' to distinguish him from Ajax Oileus. On this principle may be explained, ὁ Τυδείδης κρατερός Διομήδης, i. e. Διομήδης ὁ Τυδείδης, Diomedes the son of Tydeus, or rather Διομήδης Τυδείδης ὁ κρατερός, 'Diomedes the brave son of Tydeus : ' so again, (Od. λ. 518.) τὸν Τηλεφίδην ἥρωα Εὐρυπύλον is the same with Εὐρυπύλον Τηλεφίδην τὸν ἥρωα, 'Eurypulus son of Telephus *the hero*—the heroic son.' 'Ὁ Βριαρεὺς μεγαθυμὸς means, Βριαρεὺς ὁ μεγαθυμὸς, 'Briareus the magnanimous.' (Hesiod. θ. 734.) In these instances the article is transposed for the sake of the metre ; and of this Matthiæ seems not to have been aware.

The following passages he says approach very near to the Attic idiom. This remark proves that in many places at least he did not know the true force of the article, and conceals his want of knowledge under technical phrases. Il. σ. 74. τὸ Πηλεΐδαο ἐελδωρ is Πηλεΐδαο τὸ ἐελδωρ. In ρ. 122. τὰ τεύχεα means *his* arms, the article marking τεύχεα as coalescing with Πατρόκλος.

Matthiæ was acquainted with the theory of Middleton, though he does not mention him. His remark is, "With these we must not class those passages, where Homer, as it were, prepares us for a proper name by means of the article, and the two are separated by two or more words : " see Il. α. 409 ; δ. 20. and Hes. θ. 632, where we read μαρναντο—οἱ μὲν ἀφ' ὑψηλῆς Ὀθρυος Τιτῆνες ἀγαυοὶ οἱ δ' ἀρ' Οὐλυμποιο θεοί, 'they fought—the Titans from the lofty Othrys, the gods from Olympus.' The article here has its usual signification, but is separated from its adjunct for the sake of the verse, or of that pleasing variety of termination which the arrangement in Greek admits. The succeeding remark is equally erroneous. "In these passages the article is put for the *demonstrative* pronoun, and the proper name following is put in apposition as a more exact designation of the pronoun." This is the doctrine of the German critics : but it must be classed among the dreams of learned men. Heyne makes a similar remark on the beginning of the fourth book of the Iliad, where the poet by means of

the article marks the gods in contradistinction to the men, whose narrative closes the preceding book.

DIVISION 263.—"When the subject of the discourse is indefinite, the Greeks do not use the article, e. g. Herod. 7. 97. ἵππος ἔτεκε λαγόν, 'a horse brought forth a hare,' or supplies its place by τις: as γυνή τις, 'a certain woman had a hen.' Thus αγαθόν is 'a good, any good thing;' τὸ αγαθόν or τὰγαθόν, 'good by itself.' This he illustrates from Lucian. D. Mort. xiii. 5. ἐπαινῶν ἀρτί μιν ἐς τὸ καλλός, ὥς καὶ τοῦτο μέρος τοῦ τὰγαθοῦ, ἀρτί δ' ἐς τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὸν πλοῦτον. Here τὸ αγαθόν does not mean good by itself or good absolutely, but the predicament good opposed to that of evil as discussed by the philosophers. The speaker is Alexander lashing Aristotle for his meanness and adulation. The article before καλλός, πράξει, and πλοῦτον, as coalescing with με understood after ἐπαινῶν, conveys the sense of the possessive *my*—'he praising *me* one while in regard to *my* beauty, as this also is a part of the good'—the supreme or chief good sought out by Aristotle—'one while *my* actions and *my* wealth.'

The prevailing fault of this grammarian is that he seldom has clear ideas, and in consequence he huddles things together the most irrelevant under a cloud of words. "In English," says he, "the indefinite article is often used, although the noun of the proposition expresses a definite person or object;" in this case also the article is put in Greek: e. g. he is a wise man, σοφός γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ. (Plato. Repub. 1. p. 156.)" He might have spared himself the trouble of this remark, if he gave a literal version of the Greek '*the* man is wise,' meaning Simonides. Here the article has its usual and appropriate sense, and it is little to the purpose that the same thing could be expressed differently in English or in German.

We have already seen that the subject of a proposition as being definite generally has the article, while the predicate as serving only to define the subject, without any reference to something different from itself, is as generally without it. "In other cases," says our grammarian, "if the predicate be a definite object, of which it is affirmed that it belongs to the ge-

general idea on the subject, then the predicate has the article: e.g. (Philem. ap. Stob. Floril. Grot. p. 211.) εἰρηνὴ ἐστὶ τἀγαθόν, 'peace generally (no particular or definite peace) is the abstract good.' The article is here placed before the predicate, because it holds it forth as the predicament good, opposed to τὸ κακόν evil; and this is the pure or perfect good spoken of by the philosophers—'a state of peace is the highest good—comprehends in itself every thing that is good.' The predicate has the article in the following example, because it is a representative of the possessive pronoun: τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἡ κόλασις ἐστὶ, τὸ διψῆν μου τὴν ψυχὴν ὡς σῶμα, οὔσαν. Luc. D. Mort. xvii. not 'this is just the punishment of which we speak,' but 'this very thing is *my* punishment, that my soul, as if a real body, is subject to thirst.' The next example occurs in xiii. 1. τοῦτι τὸ κρανίον ἡ Ἑλλενὴ ἐστὶ, 'this skull is the Helen whom thou seekest.' This is not the sense: the article here marks the generic term γυνή understood—'this skull is *that woman* of known celebrity, viz. Helen,' or 'this bare skull is Helen, a woman once so celebrated for her beauty.'

DIVISION 264.—"According to this definition the article is also put, where in English it is never found."

"1. With the demonstrative pronouns, οὗτος, ὅδε, ἐκεῖνος, in order to express the designation more strongly." Herod. vi. 45. οὐ δὲ πρότερον, ἀπάνεσθ' ἐκ τῶν χωρῶν τούτων Μαρδόνιος πρὶν ἡ σφεας ὑποχειρίους ἐποιήσατο. Here it is to be observed, regard must be always had to the position which in prose the article occupies immediately before its adjunct: this it affects without influencing any other word in the clause; and as it is not placed before these pronouns, it has nothing to do with them more than any other word, but has its usual signification quite independent of them. Thus, in the example from Herodotus, τῶν coalesces with the Βρυγῶι just mentioned, and must therefore be represented by the possessive pronoun.—'Mardonius did not remove from these *their* places, till he made them subject to him.'

The same remark holds with regard to πᾶς and the pronominal adjectives ἐμός, σός, ἡμέτερος &c. Πάντες ἀνθρώποι mean

'all men generally ;' *παντες δι' ανθρωποι* 'the men all of them' pointing to some men known, or generically all such beings as men, or all rational creatures, in contradistinction to those who are not rational. Moreover *υιος σου* is 'a son of thine'—a son whether an only son or one of several ; but *ο σος υιος* marks him as a son of the person addressed, in contradistinction to any other that might be supposed to be his father—'a son that is thine—thy own son.'

In following this learned grammarian, a sensible reader often feels that he expresses his meaning circuitously and indistinctly when, if he had adequate conceptions, he would have expressed himself in direct, few, and intelligible terms. "The article," adds he, "is omitted when a still nearer definition follows : e.g. (*Æschyl. Prom. 627.*) *σον, Ιοϊ, ταῖσδε ὑπουργησαι χαριν*, where *σον εργον* constitutes the predicate, and the nearer definition lies in what word follows—but not if the nearer definition is included in the substantive *εργον*—*νυν ἡμετερον το εργον*." In the first instance, *ταῖσδε ὑπουργησαι χαριν* is the subject, and *σον εργον* is the predicate, as he states, the connecting verb being understood—'to administer favour to these nymphs is thy business.' This is the reason why the article is not prefixed. There must be a strange confusion in the ideas of that man, who calls the subject a *definition* of the predicate. On the contrary, in the example from Herodotus, *το εργον* is the subject, and therefore has the article prefixed ; whereas *ἡμετερον* is the predicate, and for this reason is without it—'the work—the fulfilment of the prophecy just mentioned—is our part.'

"With the interrogative pronouns *ποῖος, τις*, but only with reference to something preceding, the fuller explanation of which the question is to produce. Eur. *Phæn. 718.* *ἀ δ' ἐμποδων μαλιστα ταῦθ' ἤκω φρασων.* ET. *τα ποῖα ταῦτα*, 'What things are mostly in the way, these I come about to tell.' The answer is, as if given thus, *ποῖα ταῦτα τα ἡκεις φρασων*, 'of what sort are these, which thou art come about to tell'—*τα* in the sense of the relative *ᾧ*. Prometheus tells the Chorus (1. 248.) that he withheld mortals from foreseeing death : the Chorus asks in return, *το ποῖον εὐρων τῇσδε φαρμακον νοσου.* which is

to this effect, *ποῖον ἐστὶ φάρμακον τῇσδε νόσου, τὸ εὗρες*, "What is the remedy of this malady, which thou hast discovered." So the question *το τι* (Aristoph. Pac. 696.) means *τοῦτο τι*, What is this? and in line 693 *τα τι* is equivalent to *τι ταῦτα*.

"The article is sometimes used with *ἐκαστος*." Thuc. 5. 49. *κατὰ τὸν ὀπλιτὴν ἐκαστον*. Here *ἐκαστον* means each of the heavy-armed infantry mentioned in the preceding sentence, and has no connexion with the article, which is here used to mark *ὀπλιτὴν* as a renewed mention in the singular number of *ὀπλίτας* in the plural. Thus again, 6. 63. *κατὰ τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκαστὴν, προΐουσαν ἀνεθάρσουν*. The Syracusians, on hearing of the expedition intended by the Athenians, were at first filled with consternation, but they recovered their courage as the time of their arrival each day advanced. It is curious that Matthiæ here omitted *προΐουσαν*, on which the propriety of the article depends: for it marks not simply 'each day,' but the advancement of each day till the fleet actually appeared. Without *προΐουσαν*, the writer would have said *κατ' ἡμέραν ἐκαστὴν*. Xenoph. Anab. 7. 4. 11. *καὶ ἡγεμῶν μὲν ἦν ὁ δεσποτῆς ἐκαστῆς τῆς οἰκίας*. Here *τῆς* before *οἰκίας* expresses its coalition with *ὁ δεσποτῆς* as his possession—"the master of the house, each one—the master of every individual house—was a guide."

DIVISION 265.—"The article is put especially, even where otherwise it would not be put, when it is to be expressed, that the substantive to which it belongs has been already mentioned or is something commonly known." The meaning of this verbose and intricate sentence is, that the article repeated supplies the place of a noun preceding it, or serves to recall the notice of a noun already mentioned. Thus, *Χαλκιδεὲς τὰς ἐπ' Ἀρτεμισίῳ εἰκοσὶ πᾶρεχόμενοι*. (Herod. 8. 46.)—*τὰς* supposes *νεᾶς* before mentioned, and the passage should be rendered 'the Chalcidians supplying twenty ships those (sent) against Artemisium,' the article in such cases taking the sense of the personal pronoun. *τῶν εἰκοσὶ νέων* occurring in Thuc. 1. 49. is a correct example of *renewed mention*. In Lucian D. Mort. 4. 1. is a dialogue between Mercury and Charon. The former says, in settling their accounts, that he had bought for him an anchor

for five drachmæ, *Αγκυραν εντειλαμενω εκομισα πεντε δραχμων*. This appeared to Charon a high price; he replies with an oath, *των πεντε ωνησαμην*, 'I bought it for the five;' that is, 'I gave full five for it, as I have mentioned.' The writer might have repeated *πεντε δραχμων*; but the repetition would be too bald, and he substitutes *των* in the room.

He next refers to the *Lys.* of Plato, vol. v. p. 212, as an example of renewed mention, which is not to the purpose. Hippothates standing in conversation with a group of men, and seeing Socrates passing by, calls to him to step aside and join them: *Δευρο δη ευθυς ημων ου παραβαλλεις*; 'Will you not strike aside towards this place, and straightly join *us*?' Socrates replies, *Ποι λεγεις, και παρα τινας τους υμας*; literally, 'Whither do you mean, and to whom those you?' that is, 'whom do you mean by those you call *you*, and whom you wish me to join.' Here *τους* stands for the relative *ους*. The passage is very elliptical—*τινες εισι, ους λεγεις υμας και παρ' ους καλεις με παραβαλλειν*; A similar instance of the article prefixed to a personal pronoun occurs in the *Philebus*, vol. iv. 227. *Δεινον μεν τοιουν επι προσδοκᾱν ουδεν δεῖ τον εμε, επειδη τουθ' ουτως ειπες*, 'Since you say this, it behoves *the* me—such an one as you describe me—to apprehend nothing formidable.' Here *τον εμε* is equivalent to *εμε τοιουτον οντα*, or *εμε προς τον ουτως ειπες*,—'me whom you thus accost.'

The instances which follow are all widely mistaken. "In the same manner," says he, "when in the form *οσις εσι* *quisquis sit*, the preceding word is repeated, it is accompanied by the article. Hom. H. in Merc. 276. *μητε τινα αλλον οπωπα βοων κλοπον υμετεραων, αντινες αι βοες εισι*. Apollo charges Mercury with stealing his cattle, when a mere boy: this he denies, saying that he neither stole them himself, nor saw any other that did it; thus evading the charge by limiting it to the cattle, and this he does by means of the article—"I never stole such things of yours as are cattle," meaning that he only stole his quiver or other things belonging to Apollo. Horace alludes to this passage, and represents Mercury as having stolen the cows as well as the quiver.

He next quotes the Orestes 412, and there follows the mistake of *Professor Porson*, δουλευομεν θεοῖς, ὅτι ποτ' εἰσι οἱ θεοί. Orestes justifies the murder of his mother by saying, that he was commanded so to do by Apollo; and then remarks, 'We are slaves to the gods, whatever the gods may be.' Θεοῖς in the first clause means the gods in general, and is therefore without the article; while οἱ θεοί signifies the gods in their own nature or mode of existence, in contradistinction to men or other beings. This contrast is expressed by the article. The nature and existence of the gods were points discussed by the philosophers, to which discussion Euripides, who was himself a philosopher as well as a poet, alludes in the clause 'whatever the gods are.' According to Porson and Matthiæ the article here answers to the Latin pronoun *ille, iste*—'those gods,' that is, 'those gods I have just mentioned:' a limitation altogether puerile as quite unnecessary. Our grammarian is not more successful in his last example. "In the same manner in the predicate, Plat. Apol. S. vol. i. p. 42. οὗτοι ὡ ἀνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οἱ ταυτην την φημην κατασκευασαντες, οἱ δεινοί εἰσι μου κατηγοροί." The enemies of Socrates had for a long time been spreading reports calculated to impeach and vilify him. These attempts were made behind his back; and he hardly knew either the defamation or its authors. If he knew the authors and their charges, he could easily meet and refute them: but as, like assassins, they accused him only in the dark, he deemed them far more terrible than those who faced him in the court of justice. 'Such as these are my terrible enemies, and not those who meet me in this open court, and whose calumnies being specified I am able to refute;'—οἱ prefixed to δεινοί marks the contrast which Socrates intended between those who thus calumniated him in secret, and those who stood before him accusing him to his face: and in this consist the beauty and force of his argument. The explanation of Matthiæ is merely this—'graves *illi* accusatores.'

DIVISION 266.—"Sometimes the article seems to be put in an indefinite sense: but for the most part, even in this case, a

definite relation may be traced, though not in every point, yet with reference to the context." This he illustrates from Plato, Rep. 1. p. 151. Ἀλλὰ τοῦ Θεμιστοκλέους εὐ εἶχει, ὃ τῷ Σεριφίῳ λοιδορουμένῳ καὶ λεγόντι, ὅτι οὐ οἶ' αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν πόλιν εὐδοκίμοι ἀπεκρίνατο, ὅτι, οὐτ' αὖν αὐτὸς Σεριφίος ὢν, οὐκ ἄλλος ἐγενετο, οὐτ' ἐκεῖνος, Ἀθηναῖος, 'The saying of Themistocles is happy, who to the Seriphian upbraiding him, and saying that not on his own account, but on account of the city, he was illustrious, answered, that neither himself being a Seriphian would have become a man of name, nor he an Athenian.' The explanation of Matthiæ is, "The article is put in this, because it was a story well known in Athens; the celebrated Seriphian." The fact is quite otherwise: Σεριφίος and Ἀθηναῖος are gentile appellatives, comprehending two large classes of men; and the use of the article here is to mark a person belonging to one class in opposition to the other, τῷ Σεριφίῳ, 'to the Seriphian'—one that was a Seriphian, or a native of Seriphus, to distinguish him from another that was a citizen of Athens.

He is equally mistaken with regard to the instances from the Charmides of Plato, vol. v. p. 111. ἐπὶ τοῦ καλοῦ παιδός, &c., 'of that beautiful boy,' as if the speaker alluded to some boy known or already spoken of; whereas the article being placed before καλοῦ, and not παιδός, designates him as one that was beautiful, in opposition to one ugly; and in the last taken from the Phædrus, vol. x. p. 282. ἀπαντήσας δὲ Φαῖδρος τῷ νοσοῦντι περὶ λόγων ἀκοήν—ἦσθη, 'Phædrus was delighted in having met one infected with the love of hearing discourses;' meaning Socrates, who, like himself, had caught the mania for eloquent and learned orations. This our grammarian renders 'that passionate lover of orations Socrates.' The truth is, the article placed before νοσοῦντι marks Socrates not as a man known, but as one infected with passionate admiration of Lysias. "This takes place especially with the participle, when a person or thing only designated generally, is yet in some measure defined by the action which belongs to it,

where in Latin *qui*, with the subjunct is put; *e.g.* in the phrase *εἰσιν οἱ λεγοντες.*" This observation he endeavours to illustrate by a long string of examples, which, if reduced to sense, means this, that the Greeks used the article with a participle present, past, or future, to express the agent or subject of discourse, as giving a more adequate description than the common name. Thus *οἱ λεγοντες*, 'those who speak—such as speak,' equivalent to 'speakers,' but more to the purpose of the writer, as more fully discussing or contrasting them in that character. Thus also *τοὺς πολεμησοντας Φιλιππῳ*, 'such as would war with Philip.' Dem. p. 14. 4. Plat. Menex. p. 278. *τον ερωῦντα*, 'one that was to plead.' Xen. H. G. 7. 5. 24. *τοὺς εθελησοντας μενειν*, 'such as would be willing to remain.' Anab. 2. 4. 5. *ὁ ἡγησομενος*, 'he that is to lead.' Isocrates Areop. p. 144. D. *χαλεποτερον ἦεν ἐκείνοις τοῖς χρόνοις εὗρεῖν τοὺς βουλομενους αρχειν, ἢ νυν τοὺς μηδεν δεομενους.* 'In those times it was more difficult to find *such as wished* to govern, than now *such as* in the least solicit it.'

"Another case is where after verbs signifying 'to call' the predicate substantive is accompanied by the article." Thus Xen. Cyr. 3. 3. 4. *ὁ δ' Ἀρμενιος συμπροπεμπε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ἀνθρώποι, ἀνακαλοῦντες τὸν εὐεργετὴν, τὸν ἀνδρὰ τὸν ἀγαθόν,* 'But the Armenian accompanied him and all the other men, calling him one that was a benefactor, a man that was good.' Anab. 6. 6. 7. *οἱ δ' ἄλλοι οἱ παρόντες ἐπιχειροῦσι βαλλειν τὸν Δεξιππὸν ἀνακαλοῦντες τὸν προδοτὴν,* 'And the rest of the soldiers who were present attempted to pelt Dexippus, calling him one that was a traitor.' From the language of Matthiæ, the reader would conclude that the article used in these and similar instances has some secret affinity to the participle *ἀνακαλοῦντες*; whereas it is quite independent of it, as serving in the first instance to hold out Cyrus as a benefactor, *and not a destroyer as other warriors were*; and in the second, as supposing Dexippus to be "a betrayer," and not a faithful friend of the army he commanded.

This application of the Greek article occurs in Æschylus,

where Mercury first accosts Prometheus, v. 952, now hanging in chains :

Σε, τὸν σοφιστὴν, τὸν πικρῶς ὑπερπικρὸν
τὸν ἐξαμαρτῶντα εἰς θεοὺς, τὸν εἰς ἡμέρας
πυρροντα τιμᾶς, τὸν πυρὸς κλεπτὴν λέγω.

'I address thee *one that art a sophist, one that art exceedingly bitter against the Gods, one that hast offended against them—one that conferrest honours on ephemeral mortals—one that hast stolen fire.*' The use of the article here is to mark Prometheus as sustaining the character implied in the succeeding adjuncts, and not its opposite which the sufferer might claim. The reader can understand Matthiæ only from his examples; and his referring to some obscure and vague principles in his mind shows clearly that, though he has taken so much pains to explain the article, he was himself utterly unacquainted with its use, even where it is obvious and simple.

DIVISION 267. — "The article is not only put with substantives, but also with adjectives, and participles without a substantive, and with the infinitive; to all which it gives the sense of substantives." An adjective in the neuter termination often expresses an abstract quality; the use of it without the noun to which it belongs, leads the reader without an effort to consider its signification as independent of the subject it qualifies, and this is the very nature of an abstract idea. An attributive thus becomes an abstract noun without the assistance of the article; though it has its use in marking the abstract quality as distinct from the subject in which it is found, or from some other quality with which it combines in its concrete state, or from that to which it stands opposed. But, as I have already observed, the article and its corresponding attributive are to be regarded rather as combining to give a description of an abstract idea than to form that idea in itself: thus τὸ εὐτυχές, 'that which is fortunate,' and may be considered in a general way as synonymous with εὐτυχία, though not strictly such. So τὸ πιστόν, 'that which is to be trusted,' is the same with ἡ πίστις, Eur. Phœn. 275. τὸ ἀναί-

θητον ὑμων, 'that which is stupid in you,' with ἡ ἀναισθησια, 'your stupidity,' Thuc. 1. 69. το εμον προθυμον, 'that which is willing in me,' with ἡ προθυμια, 'my willingness,' Eur. Med. 178. 'In like manner το ὑμετερον is put for ὑμεις, το εμον or τα εμα for εγω, Eur. Troad. 355. Similar to this is the union of the article with interrogatives and pronouns, το τι, 'the substance;' το ποῖον, 'the quality;' το ποσον, 'the quantity,' Aristot. Ethic. 1. 6. Plat. Epist. vii. p. 133. "Adjectives in ικος are used in the neuter with the article and without the substantives, in two different senses:—in the singular they express generally a whole, το πολιτικον, (Herod. 7. 103.) 'the citizens'—πολῖται, considered collectively as a body. In the plural they signify any circumstance determinable by the context, in which the radical noun is concerned, or the history of the people; as τα Τρωϊκα, (Thuc. 1. 3.) 'the Trojan war;' τα Ἑλληκα, 'the Grecian history.'"

Nothing can be more simple and obvious than the facts here stated: and our grammarian would not have expressed them in this manner had not his ideas been naturally confused and indistinct. In such expressions as το Ἑλληνικον a noun is understood, which the sense or the context obviously suggests; as in Thuc. 1. 1. το φυλον or εθνος, 'the other Grecian tribes, the rest of the Grecian nation:' so το Δωρικον or το βαρβαρικον supposes the same intellection: so το πολιτικον means not the citizens collectively, but the body of the citizens capable of bearing arms, and constituting the power of the state, such a word as τέλος, or συνταγμα, or σιφος, being obviously understood. This is the case in the phrases το ἵππικον, το ὀπλιτικον, 'the cavalry' or 'the infantry:' το ἐναντιον means μέρος, 'the adverse party—the enemy or adversary.' Thuc. 7. 44. το κοινον scil. αγαθον, 'the common good,—the common weal.' το ὑπηκοον scil. μέρος, 'that part of the state which is subject to the ruling party, the subjects of the state.' As to the plural form, τα Τρωϊκα, the noun πραγματα is obviously implied—'the Trojans' affairs.'

DIVISION 268.—The Grammarian observes that the article prefixed to certain adjectives or pronouns changes their peculiar

signification ; as *ἄλλοι*, 'others ;' *οἱ ἄλλοι*, 'the rest ;' *ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλάς*, 'the rest of Greece,' Thuc. 1. 77.—*πολλοί*, 'many,' *οἱ πολλοί*, 'the many, the multitude ;' *πλείους*, 'several, more ;' *οἱ πλείους*, 'the most.' *Ὡς δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι οἱ πλείους* (Ion. for *πλείονες*) *ἀπῆσαν* (Ion. for *ἀφῆσαν*) *τοὺς τυράννους*, 'as others the greater number—as most others,—dismissed the tyrants'—*αὐτός*, 'himself,' *ipse*, but *ὁ αὐτός*, 'the same *idem*—rather *αὐτός* the same, *ὁ αὐτός*, 'the self same, the very same'—*πάντες*, 'all ;' *οἱ πάντες*, the whole, all together. *βασίλευσας τὰ πάντα ἔτα ἕξ τε καὶ τριήκοντα ἀπέθανε*. (Herod. 7. 4.) 'having reigned six-and-thirty years in all he died :—*ὀλίγοι*, 'few,' *οἱ ὀλίγοι*, 'the few.'

In the commencement of this division our author observes, that the article prefixed to adjectives gives them the sense of substantives. This he illustrates by *οἱ θνητοί*, 'the mortals.' Neither the principle nor the example is correct ; *οἱ θνητοί* means 'such as are mortal,' in opposition to the gods who never die. The fact is, that adjectives with the article often describe classes of men or things, when held forth in contrast with their opposites ; but this is quite foreign to the question.

DIVISION 269.—In division 266, our author has virtually considered the case of the article with participles supplying the place of agents. To this he again recurs in the present division as if it formed a distinct subject ; as *οἱ κολακευόντες*, 'such as flatter' or they who flatter, for flatterers ; *οἱ φιλοσοφούντες*, 'they who philosophize,' for philosophers.

The article is sometimes used with neuter participles active or passive in describing things ; as *τὸ φέρον*, 'that which carries away—fate ;' *τὸ φατιζόμενον*, 'that which is said, a saying or maxim,' Œd. Col. *τῆς πόλεως τὸ τιμωμένον*, scil. *τὸ μέρος*, 'that portion of the state entrusted with honourable offices—the dignitaries of the state or simply the dignity of the state,' for *ἡ τιμή*, which Matthiæ too loosely renders 'the estimation in which the city stands.'

He further observes that in such cases the article is sometimes omitted. This might be expected in the poets, as in Pindar. Olym. 13. 24. A similar omission occurs in Plato. Leg.

vii. p. 384. διαφέρει δε παμπόλυ μαθων μη μαθοντος, και δ γεγυμνασμενος τοῦ μη γεγυμνασμενου, 'he who has learnt differs widely from him who has not learnt, and the disciplined from the undisciplined,' μαθων—μαθοντος for δ μαθων—τοῦ μαθοντος.

"The neuter of the participle is often put in a collective sense as an adjective." Thus in Herod. 1. 97. το επιφοιτεον is equivalent to οι επιφοιτουντες, 'they who collect or frequent.' But in fact πλῆθος (a multitude) is here understood, which Matthiæ should have specified, that the learner might see the thing to the bottom. On the same principle is to be explained το ὑπομενον for τοῦς ὑπομενοντας, Herod. 7. 239. and τι βουλομενον for τινες βουλομενοι, in Thuc. 7. 48.

Another leading fault of this grammarian is, that he never seeks a general principle intelligible and edifying, as founded in common sense, but has occasionally recourse to vague technical terms, seemingly for no other end than to conceal his own want of discernment under the appearance of profound erudition. Here we have a striking example of this affectation. "The use of the participle in the masculine and feminine for the substantive is *idiomatic*; the participle with the article is the same as the Latin *is qui*, and the finite verb: in Hom. II. ψ. 325. τον προυχοντα δοκευει, 'he has his eye on the one that keeps before him, or on him who keeps before him.' Xen. Cyr. 2. 2. 20. αισχρον αντιλεγειν, μη ουχι τον πλεῖστα και πονουντα και ωφελουντα το κοινον, τούτον και μεγαλων αξιοῦσθαι, 'It is dishonourable to gainsay, but that the one who labours most, and most benefits the state, is deserving of the highest reward.'" This, it is evident, though formally distinguished here, is no new application of the article, but is the very same with what we have seen above.

DIVISION 270.—"The article with a substantive expressed or to be understood from the context is often joined to adverbs and prepositions with their *case*, to which it gives the signification of adjectives." This is in his usual style of mysticism. The purpose of language is not only to convey our ideas, but to convey them with the utmost brevity and dispatch. Hence

when in a phrase or sentence a word or two can be omitted without prejudice to the sense, the omission takes place. This is the foundation of the frequent ellipses which occur in Greek, and more or less in all other languages. Thus in the case of the article, ἡ ἀνω πόλις is ἡ ἀνω οὖσα πόλις or πόλις ἡ ἀνω οὖσα, 'the city which is above—the upper city :' οἱ τότε ἀνθρώποι, scil. οντες, 'the men existing then,' or merely οἱ τότε, 'they then, the men of that time.' Herod. 8. 8. Καδμου τοῦ παλαιᾶ τροφή, for τοῦ οντος παλαι, 'new brood of Cadmus, him existing anciently'—'young offspring of ancient Cadmus.' Thuc. 8. 1. οἱ πανυ των στρατιωτων, not 'the best soldiers' as Matthiæ translates the phrase, but 'such as were altogether soldiers,' that is, entirely of that profession, and not citizens or merchants. The very soldiers who had been engaged in the battle but escaped by flight, attested the defeat : yet the Athenians for a time disbelieved these very men who had the strongest motive to circulate a contrary report. οἱ ἐγγυτάτω γενεους for οἱ οντες, 'who being nearest of kin—the nearest relations.' The article is joined to prepositions with their case; as τα εἰς τον πολεμον. (Xen. Cyr. 6. 4. 5.) 'the things for the war—warlike stores,' χρεματα being obviously implied. τα κατὰ Πausανιαν. (Thuc. 1. 138.) scil. πραγματα, 'the affairs respecting Pausanias. οἱ καθ' ἡμας is for οἱ οντες καθ' ἡμας, 'those even with us'—even in age—'our contemporaries,' distinct says the grammarian from καθ' ἡμας without the article. This distinction respects a passage in Aristotle's Poetics, 2. 1. μιμουνται οἱ μιμουμενοι βελτιονας η καθ' ἡμας, 'those who imitate, imitate better characters than even with us—even with our times—imitate better characters than among us or among our contemporaries.' There exists therefore no such distinction, excepting in the imagination of this grammarian. εν τῷ προ τοῦ χρονου, for εν τῷ χρονῳ οντι προ τουτου χρονου, 'in the time existing before this,' Demost. p. 1250. Μιλτιαδην τον εν Μαραθῶνι εἰς το βαρθρον εμβαλεῖν εψηφισαντο, 'Miltiades, him at Marathon, they decreed to cast into the pit,' that is τον μαχησαμενον, as the context evidently supposes. (See Plat. Gorg. p. 150.)

DIVISION 271.—"Under this head come the phrases *οἱ ἀμφὶ* or *περὶ* with a proper name, which indicate the person signified by the proper name with his companions, followers," &c. Herod. 1. 62. *οἱ ἀμφὶ Πισιστρατον*, that is, *οἱ οντες ἀμφὶ Πισιστρατον*, 'those around Pisistratus—those of whom Pisistratus is the centre or chief—Pisistratus and his followers.' *οἱ περὶ Θρασυβουλων*, 'those around Thrasybulus—Thrasybulus and his soldiers.' *οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφεα*, (Plat. Cratyl. p. 264.) 'those around Orpheus—Orpheus and his disciples.' *Οἱ περὶ Κεκροπα*, 'those around Cecrops—Cecrops and his assessors in judgement.' Xen. Mem. 3. 5. 10.

This periphrasis is intended to represent a person as a man of consequence followed and attended upon by others, though possibly no more than the individual may be meant. (See Herod. 3. 76. Plat. Epist. ix. p. 165. Il. γ. 146. Hipp. Maj. p. 5. Xen. H. G. 7. 5. 12.)

But this phraseology is not confined to proper names: it is sometimes used to express the object which persons concur in pursuing; as *οἱ περὶ φιλοσοφίαν*, scil. *οντες*, 'those about philosophy—who study it;' *οἱ περὶ τὴν θήραν*, 'those about hunting—huntsmen;' *τα ἀμφὶ πόλεμον*, scil. *πραγματα* or *χρηματα*, 'the things about the war,'—equivalent to *τα πολεμικά*, 'warlike affairs,' or 'military stores;' *τα περὶ Θηβαίους*, 'the affairs about Thebes—the history or constitution of Thebes.' Isocr. ad Phil. p. 92.

DIVISION 272.—"The article also stands before several words together which collectively have an adjective sense." It is not easy to say what the learned grammarian means by this sage remark, nor can I infer his meaning from the example adduced by him, though the sense of the article be obvious in that example. It is this, *Διορισαί, ποτερως λεγεις τον αρχοντα τε και τον κρειττονα, τον, ως επος ειπειν, η τον ακριβει λογω—τον τῷ ακριβεσας, εφη, λογω αρχοντα οντα*, (Plat. de Rep. vol. vi. 175.) 'Define to me, whether you mean by the ruler, and the man superior to the subjects, (that is, the man in power over them,) him who is so, as designated in one word, (that is, in a vague and general language,) or in a strict logical sense—

him, he answers, who is really a ruler in the strictest sense—τον *αρχοντα*, 'the ruler' generically—one that is a ruler, opposed to those who are ruled.

DIVISION 273.—“If a word be added to a substantive, without a copula to define it more accurately (*apposition*), this word is put with the article. This is either a substantive or an adjective, participle, adverb, or preposition with its *case*.”

Our author loves to be circuitous and general, where he ought to be direct and specific: and it is difficult not to believe that he often affects mystery to give his readers a notion of his profundity. The proposition here laid down is neither more nor less than this:—When a person's name is mentioned for the first time, it is necessary to subjoin his parentage or the name of the place or nation to which he belongs, or his character and office, to define him, or to distinguish him from any other of the same name. The word thus subjoined, as meaning the same person, must agree with the preceding by apposition; and as its object is to distinguish one from others, it must also have the article before it. Thus, *Κυαξαρης ὁ τοῦ Αἰσναγους παῖς*. ‘*Εκαταῖος ὁ λογοποιος*, ‘Hecataeus the historian.’ *Βίας ὁ Πριηνεὺς*, ‘Bias the Prienean.’ It is however to be observed, that the article is not always used before the name which designates the parents or the place or the nation to which the said individual belongs: as, *Ἡρόδοτος Ἀλικαρνασσεύς*; *Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος*; *Φαλῖος Ἐρατοκλείδου*. The omission of the article in such cases as these, proceeds on the supposition that the word subjoined to the proper name is of itself sufficient to define it.

When a proper name is introduced, it is often followed not by another single word to distinguish it, but by a whole clause to express some circumstance or quality characteristic of it, and most worthy of notice as peculiar and prominent. This comprises the next division, and our grammarian expresses it in the following manner.

DIVISION 274.—“If a participle or adjective be added for the sake of definition, it has regularly the article, as also the substantive to be defined, if it be not a *pronoun personal*. This takes place in adverbs and prepositions.” Herod. vi. 47. *Μακροῦ*

ἦν τῶν μεταλλῶν θαυμασιωτάτα, τὰ οἱ Φοινίκες ἀνεῦρον οἱ μετὰ
Θάσου κτισάντες τὴν νῆσον ταυτὴν, 'The most surprising by far
of these mines were those which the Phœnicians found out—
those of them who with Thasus colonized this island'—οἱ κτι-
σάντες to limit the persons who found them to that portion of
the Phœnicians who colonized the island. Æsch. Agam. 181.
Ζῆνα δὲ τις προφρονῶς ἐπινικία κλαζών, τεύξεταί φρενῶν τὸ πᾶν,
τὸν φρονεῖν βροτοὺς ὁδῶσαντα, τὸν παθὴ μαθὸς θέντα κυρίως εἶχειν.
'He shall fully reap the fruits of a wise mind, who in the exer-
cise of wisdom addresses songs of triumph to Jupiter—him who
directed mortals in the path of wisdom—him who authorised
sufferings to convey instruction.'

It is not necessary that the subject thus described should
always be a proper name, but may be a personal pronoun.
Thus the amiable Polyxene in the Hecuba, 364. εἴπειτ' ἴσως ἀν-
δρῶν ὡμῶν φρενὰς τυχοίμ' ἀν, ὅστις ἀργυροῦ μ' ὠνησέται τὴν
'Ἑκτορος κασιν, 'Perhaps I might have some cruel-minded
master who will purchase me for himself for money—me one
that is a sister of Hector, or me who am,' &c. So also Her-
cules now dying, in the Trachiniae 1103. νῦν δ' ὡδ' ἀναρθρὸς καὶ
κατεβράκωμενος τυφλῆς ὑπ' αἰτῆς ἐκπεπορθῆναι τὰς αἰτῆς ἀρίστης
μητρός ὠνομασμένος, ὁ τοῦ κατ' ἀσρα Ζῆνος ἀνδρείου γόνος,
'But now thus enervated, and torn to rags by a secret fiend,
am stormed like a city after a siege—I miserable one that is
named from the noblest of mothers—one that is said to be the
offspring of Jupiter above the stars—ὁ pointing to ἐγὼ implied
in ἐκπεπορθῆναι.

DIVISION 275.—"This apposition in the pronoun personal
often serves to express indignation and irony." It may ex-
press any thing else, as well as indignation and irony; but
what it expresses depends not on the article, but on the sense
of the term it defines. Such remarks as these are quite puerile,
and a whole volume might be filled with them on the Greek
article, without one word in it expressive of the peculiar sense
of the article. Take the following example from Sophocles,
Elect. 300, where Electra speaks of her mother and Ægisthus
her gallant: ξὺν δ' ἐποτρυνεῖ πελάς ὁ κλεινὸς αὐτῇ ταῦτα νυμφίος

παρων, ὁ παντ' ἀναλκις οὗτος, ἡ πᾶσα βλαξ, ὁ συν γυναιξὶ τὰς μάχας ποιοῦμενος, 'With her the bridegroom being at hand, instigates these things—this *one* that in every respect is impotent—*one* that is a complete pest—*one* that makes war on women.'

DIVISION 276.—“Every designation which is adjoined to a noun by a participle, an adjective, an adverb, or a preposition with its case (whether the noun conveys a perfect idea of itself, independently of this designation, as in the proper apposition, or not, but requires this designation to make it complete), the Greeks place either before the noun or after it: in the first of which cases it stands between the article and the noun belonging to the article; but in the other succeeds it with the article repeated.”

The meaning of this in plain and direct terms is, that the article, when used to define or connect, is placed before the word it immediately affects, and not before the subject on which that word depends. Thus Thuc. 7. 54. τῆς τε ναυμαχίας τροπαίῳ ἐσησαν, καὶ τῆς ἀνω τῆς πρὸς τῷ τειχεὶ ἀπολήψεως τῶν ὁπλιτῶν, 'The Syracusans erected a trophy both of the naval engagement, and of the capture of the infantry on land—that at the fortification.' Here the second τῆς is intended to connect ἀπολήψεως, the capture of the infantry, with the spot where it occurred; it is therefore placed before πρὸς τῷ τειχεὶ, as immediately connecting it. Μιλτιάδην οἱ ἐχθροὶ ὑπὸ δικαστηρίῳ ἀγαγοντες ἐδιώξαν τυραννίδος τῆς ἐν Χερσονήσῳ, (Herod. vi. 104.) 'His enemies dragging Miltiades before the tribunal expelled him from the government—that in Chersonesus'—τῆς, connecting the government with the place where it stood, is therefore placed between them—'the government which was in Chersonesus.' Isocr. ad Demon. p. 5. τὰς ἡδονὰς ἐθηρεύη τὰς μετὰ δόξης, 'he pursued pleasures—those with glory.' ad Nic. p. 18. πρέπει καὶ συμφέρει τὴν τῶν βασιλευν γνῶμην ἀμετακινήτως εἶναι περὶ τῶν δικαίων, ὥσπερ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς καλῶς κειμένους, 'It is becoming and expedient that the judgement of rulers should be immoveable respecting the rights of their subjects, as are all well enacted laws.' Here the first τοῦς, serving to mark

the laws, in contradistinction to those rulers who administered them, is placed before it; while the second τοῦς precedes καλῶς κειµένους, as defining laws founded in eternal justice, opposed to such as are fickle, as depending on the caprice of tyrants. Thuc. i. 108. τὰ τειχὴ τὰ ἑαυτῶν τὰ μακρὰ ἀπέτελεσαν. Here the first article defines τειχὴ to mean that species of buildings called walls; the second limits those walls as belonging to themselves, namely, to the Athenians; the third specifies what walls they were—‘the long walls,’ walls so called at Athens in contradistinction to other walls often spoken of. viii. 77. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων πεμφθέντες εἰς τὴν Σάμον, οἱ δὲκα πρέσβευται—ἡσύχαζον. It is manifest that the clause οἱ δὲκα πρέσβευται is introduced as a further description of the general expression, ‘those sent to Samos;’ and in English should have viz. or namely before it—‘Those sent by the four hundred to Samos, namely, the ten delegates;’ or it might be expressed thus more naturally: ‘The ten delegates—those sent, or who were sent, to Samos by the four hundred—remained quiet.’

DIVISION 277.—“In like manner genitives are placed either between the noun by which they are governed and the accompanying article, or with the article repeated after the noun.”

What benefit the learner may derive from this remark respecting the position of the article, I am at a loss to know; but if he be blessed with sagacity to trace things to their elements, which Matthiæ never attempts, he can learn much from the examples subjoined to it. Plato Phædr. p. 369. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὴν τοῦ τῷ ὄντι ῥητορικοῦ τε καὶ πιθανοῦ τεχνὴν πῶς καὶ ποθεν ἀν τις δυνατὸ πορίσασθαι. ‘The art of him who is truly oratorical and persuasive how and from whence one may be able to supply it for himself.’

The article, and indeed adjectives and participles being declined like nouns, have terminations similar to nouns. This is always the case when they are of the same declension, which, as is well known, is very common. Now to avoid the monotony or sameness of sounds arising from the similarity of termination, it is the practice of the Greek and also of the Latin writers to separate the adjective from the noun it qualifies, by introducing

a word, a circumstance, or a clause between them, thus producing a pleasing variety in the final syllables of the sentence. Thus Plato in the above sentence has separated *την* from *τεχνην* by inserting *τοῦ ῥητορικοῦ τε καὶ πιθανοῦ*; and he has again diversified this monotonous clause by reading *τοῦ τῷ ὄντι ῥητορικοῦ*. Nothing would have been more disagreeable to a Grecian ear, or indeed any cultivated ear, than the monotony of this sentence, if the words had been arranged exactly as they depend on each other.

"The genitive," says he, "stands very frequently before the article and the noun, e. g. Xen. Cyr. 6. 3. 8. *συνεκαλεσε καὶ ἵππων καὶ πέζων καὶ ἄρματων τοὺς ἡγεμονας καὶ τῶν μηχανῶν καὶ τῶν σκυοφορων τοὺς ἀρχοντας καὶ τῶν ἄρμαμαξῶν*." In this example most of the words end in *ων*, the genitive plural. The historian was aware of the disagreeable monotony likely to rise from their continued recurrence; and to prevent this, he puts the genitive, dependent on *τοὺς ἡγεμονας*, before these words, while he divides those which depend on *τοὺς ἀρχοντας*, placing some before and others after them, thus producing the greatest variety of sounds which the construction admitted. But this has no more to do with the article than with any other word in the sentence. He adds, "This takes place particularly in the participle and article, where the proper name accompanies them. e. g. Thuc. i. 105. *Περσῶν καὶ Μηδων οἱ καταφυγοντες καὶ Αἰγυπτίων οἱ μὴ ξυναποσαντες*. 'Those of the Persians and Medes who deserted, and of the Egyptians who did not revolt with them.' " The proper names here are put before the article and participle, not on account of some mystical virtue in the article, but merely to avoid cacophony. This would be felt if the order were changed; as *οἱ καταφυγοντες Περσῶν καὶ Μηδων τε καὶ Αἰγυπτίων*, &c.

The position of the article in the following instances arises entirely from its use as a connective, and for the reason, if reason it can be called, stated by our grammarian: Herod. v. 50. *ἀπὸ θαλασσοῦς τῆς Ἰωνων*, 'from the sea—that of the Ionians—the Ionian sea;' *ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων*, 'the people—that of the Athenians—the Athenian state or community.'

The cases contained in the *Observations* are quite irrelevant, as the repetition of the article proceeds upon a principle unconnected with the question of its position. Plat. Apol. S. vol. i. p. 70. *οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἡ ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τ' ἀλλὰ τὰγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα.* 'Virtue does not spring from wealth, but wealth springs from virtue, and all other things which are good among men'—τα ἀλλὰ, other things, in contradistinction to χρήματα; τα ἀγαθὰ determining those things to be good, as co-ordinate with τα κακά. From Plato Polit. p. 332, he alleges το ταύτον, 'identity,' contrasted with το διατερον, 'diversity,' its opposite; and remarks on account of the intimate union of the article with its noun by *crasis*, it seems to have been seldom considered that there was an article in the composition. Certainly διατερον is το ἕτερον coalescing into one word: the article being thus absorbed is again repeated. The same may have been the case with ταυτο: but I rather think that ταυτο is the neuter of αὐτος, by the same analogy that τουτο is of ὅτος; and it favours this idea, that the abstract ταυτοτης 'identity' supposes ταυτο or ταυτος to have been in existence.

DIVISION 278.—"Sometimes in Ionic writers, particularly, e. g. Herodotus, the article is separated from its noun by the governing word or by another." Thus τῶν τις στρατιωτῶν, Herod. v. 101. τῶν τινὰς δορυφορῶν, vii. 146. ἐς τοῦ χωρίου ἰδιωτοῦ—του for τινος. The article is separated from its adjunct in these and similar instances, evidently to avoid the concurrence of similar terminations so disagreeable to the ear.

"Sometimes the article is separated from the word to which it belongs by an independent proposition." Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ ἀποπαύσας τοῦ, ὅποτε βουλοιντο ἕκαστοι, γυναῖκα ἀγεσθαι, ἐτάξεν ἐν ἀκμαίᾳ τῶν σωμάτων τοὺς γαμοὺς ποιῆσθαι, (Xen. R. L. 1. 6.) 'He (Lycurgus) besides these things, having restrained each, when they severally wished, from leading home a wife to himself, ordained that they should contract marriage in the vigour of their bodies.' The order of construction is ἀποπαύσας ἕκαστον τοῦ ἀγεσθαι γυναῖκα, ὅταν ἕκαστοι βουλοιντο, ἐτάξεν, &c.

DIVISION 279.—"The article often stands in the neuter be-

fore entire propositions, which are to be united with the rest of the proposition, or are quotations, if they are determined in the construction by other verbs or prepositions, or are followed by a verb as a predicate; also by single words which have to be explained."

The meaning of this in plain language is, When a writer affirms or declares a thing to render the subject of his affirmation prominent, he marks it by premising *το* in the sense of *that*, *namely*, or the like. Thus Plato Leg. vi. p. 305. *και μεν και ποιητικος ὑπερ αὐτων λόγος ὑμνείται, το, χαλκα και σιδηρᾷ εἶναι τα τειχη μᾶλλον η γηϊνα.* 'The poetical language concerning them is justly celebrated, *namely*, that the walls ought to be of brass or iron rather than of earth.'

This same particle is made use of to specify sayings or quotations. *το τοῦ Ὁμηρου, ουδ' εγω απο δρυος ουδ' απο πετρας πεφυκα αλλ' εξ ανθρωπων,* (Apol. S. p. 80.) 'that of Homer, neither am I made of oak nor of rock but of men'—*το*, for *το ῥημα*, 'that saying.' *ὑπερβας το, και εαν ἀλῶ φόνου, και το αν δοξη απεκτονειναι, και το, δικας ὑπερχετω τοῦ φόνου, και το, τας τιμωριας εἶναι κατ' αὐτου τας αυτας—και παντα, οσα εστι δικαγια, ὑπερβας γεγραφε,* (Demosth. in Aristocr. p. 893.) 'Having passed over *that*, 'and if he should be convicted of slaughter,' and *that*, if he should appear to have slain, and *that*, let him undergo the trial of murder, and *that* the very same punishment should be inflicted on him *which is inflicted on others*—having omitted these and other things, which were just to mention, he wrote the indictment.' In this passage *το* is equivalent to 'that clause.'

Single words when explained or quoted have generally *το* before them; as Dem. pro Cor. p. 255. *το δ' ὑμεις οταν ειπω, την πολιν λεγω το ονομα ὑμεις.* 'When I mention you, I mean the state.' But when a word is introduced grammatically instead of *το*, it has the gender which the grammar assigns to it as a part of speech; as *ἡ δια*, meaning *προθεσις*, 'the preposition *δια*;' *ἡ εγω*, scil. *αντωνυμια*, 'the pronoun *εγω*;' *ὁ επει*, scil. *συνδεσμος*, 'the conjunction *επει*.' This is precisely on the principle that, when the article is prefixed to proper names, it affects the common name understood.

When the article marks the subject of an affirmation, it may be in the genitive, dative, or accusative, as well as in the nominative; as *εἰπερ αὖ ἐν ἀλλῇ πόλει ἢ αὐτῇ δοξά ἐνεσιν τοῖς τε ἀρχουσι καὶ ἀρχομένοις, περὶ τοῦ, ὅσιν αὖς δεῖ ἀρχεῖν, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ ἂν τοῦτο εἴη ἐνόν*, (Plat. Rep. iv. p. 351.) ‘But if in another city the same opinion subsisted in those who govern and in the governed, concerning *that*, who ought to govern, in the same city this should subsist.’ *Phædon*. p. 232. *οὐδε γὰρ αὖ ὑπὸ Φαιδῶνος ὑπερεχέσθαι τὸν Σιμμίαν ὁμολογεῖς τῷ, ὅτι Φαιδῶν ὁ Φαιδῶν ἐστὶ, ἀλλὰ ὅτι μέγεθος ἔχει ὁ Φαιδῶν πρὸς τὴν Σιμμίου σμικροτήτα*, ‘You allow that Simmias is surpassed in bulk by Phædon, not in *that*, because Phædon is Phædon, but because Phædon has magnitude in comparison with the diminutiveness of Simmias.’

This use of the article is not unfrequent in the New Testament. Thus, *ὁ δὲ Ἰησοῦς εἶπεν αὐτῷ τὸ εἰ δύνασθαι πιστεῦσαι, πάντα δύνατα τῷ πιστευόντι*, (Mark ix. 23.) ‘Jesus said unto him *that*, if thou art able, all things are possible to him that believes.’ Jesus said *that thing*, ‘If thou art able to believe, scil. *that I am able to do it*.’ *Καὶ εἰ τις ἕτερα ἐντολὴ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ἀνακεφαλαιούται, ἐν τῷ, Ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον ὡς ἑαυτόν*, (Rom. xiii. 9.) ‘And if there be any other commandment, it is comprehended in this saying, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself’—*ἐν τῷ*, in this, namely, Thou shalt love, &c.

DIVISION 280.—The article is properly in the gender which the noun belonging to it requires; but with feminines in the dual the article is often put in the masculine, e. g. *τῶ χεῖρε*, ‘the two hands,’ Xen. M. S. 2. 3. 18; *τῶ ἡμέρα*, ‘the two days,’ Cyr. 1. 2. 11; *τῶ γυναῖκε*, ‘the two women;’ *τῶ πόλει*, ‘the two cities,’ Thuc. v. 23. The reason of this seeming anomaly is, that the dual number is used to express the number *two*, or pairs, which generally consists of male and female, and therefore takes the gender of the leading noun. This practice having once prevailed, it extended in time to *dyads* that are both feminine.

DIVISION 281.—“The article often stands before a noun belonging to it. When a noun which has just preceded is to be

repeated once again, the article belonging to it stands alone." Isocr. ad Nicocl. p. 15. οἱ τυράννοι πεποίηκασι ὥς πολλοὺς ἀμφισβῆτειν, ποτέρου ἐστὶν ἀξίον ἐλεσθαι τὸν βίον τῶν ἰδιωτευόντων μὲν, ἐπιεικῶς δὲ πραττόντων, ἢ τὸν τῶν τυραννευόντων. 'Tyrants have so acted that many have doubted, whether it is better to choose the life of men who lead a private life, but act justly, or that of men in absolute power.' Here βίον being previously expressed, τὸν supplies its place in the succeeding clause: nor does its omission occasion any doubt or obscurity. But the general principle under which this and the succeeding examples should be classed, has already been noticed. See *Division* 265.

The following instance, however, is attended with some obscurity: ἀφείς το εἰς τὴν Χίον, ἐπλεῖ εἰς τὴν Καύνον. Here it may be doubted to what το refers; but as Chios was his first object, and having relinquished this, he sailed afterwards to Caunus, the reference must be to πλεῖν understood, 'Having given up his intention of sailing to the former, he sailed to the latter island.'

"The article often stands without the noun, and has the genitive of a collective noun following it; as οἱ τοῦ δήμου, Thuc. 8. 66." The article, like pronouns and adjectives, is often used partitively, and this is the case here—'those of the people,' εἰς expressing the part, and δήμου, the whole, of which the men (ἄνθρωποι) intended, formed a part.

"The article also, without the noun, when the speaker is doubtful how he shall designate something." Dem. pro Cor. p. 231. 21. ἢ τῶν ἀλλῶν, εἴτε χρηκακίαν, εἴτε ἀγνοίαν, εἴτε ταῦτα ἀμφοτέρω εἰπεῖν. Here the speaker was going to say ἢ κακία; but before he comes to the noun, a doubt arises what to call the motive which actuated the other Greeks, and in expressing this doubt, he throws the noun to which the article points, into another form, making it dependent on εἰπεῖν in the accusative. The genius of the English requires the noun to be first expressed, and then again repeated. "The baseness of the other Greeks, whether it be fit to call it baseness or ignorance or both these."

A noun is often understood, being omitted for the sake of

brevity, when the nature or termination of the adjective qualifying it, or the drift of the sentence makes it evident what noun is intended. In the same manner the termination of the article not unfrequently supplies the absence of its adjunct, without any prejudice to the sense; as in Herod. 6. 15. *εις την ἐαυτων*, meaning evidently *γῆν*—*ἡ ἡμετέρα* scil. *γῆ*. So also in Plato Phil. p. 2. *κατα γε την εμην*, that is, *εμην γνωμην*, ‘according to my opinion.’ Thus too *ἡ αὐριον*, ‘the morrow,’ supposes *ἡ ἡμερα αὐριον*, ‘the day of tomorrow;’ while the context makes it clear that in such examples as the following, *ὁδος* is intended: *Æschin. Socr. 3. 3. ὡς δὲ θᾶττον την παρα τείχος ηειμεν*, ‘as soon as we had gone the way along the wall:’ so *την ταχισην*, when fully written, is *κατα την ταχισην ὁδον*. In the same manner *ὁδον* is obviously implied in *την ευθειαν*, Herod. 3. 134. ‘the right road—straight on.’

“The noun also is omitted when the speaker thinks proper to avoid mentioning it from any cause.” Plat. Epist. iv. p. 85. *αναμιμνησκειν δε ὁμως δεῖ ἡμᾶς αὐτους ὅτι προσηκει πλεον, η παιδων, τῶν αλλων ανθρωπων διαφερειν, τοῦς οισθα δηπου*. Plato in this place seems to have been entirely mistaken by our learned grammarian; for the writer does not mean certain persons whom he had some reason for not mentioning, but all other men who came within the knowledge of the person addressed; and the article therefore is in the sense of the relative. “Yet it behoves us ourselves to bear in mind, that it is our duty to excel more than children other men whom you may chance to know.”

“To this class belong the phrases, *μα τον, μα την, νη τον*, when the name of the deity, by whom the person swears, is omitted through reverence.” Plat. Gorg. p. 44. Arist. Ran. 1374.

DIVISION 282.—The substance of this division is, that the neuter article is found prefixed to adverbs and prepositions, with their cases, to mark portions of time and place; as *το παρος*, ‘the time before, hitherto;’ *το προσω*, ‘forward;’ *το παλαι*, ‘of old;’ *το πριν*, ‘formerly;’ *το αυτικαι*, ‘immediately;’ *τανῦν*, ‘now;’ *τα μαλιστα* (*maxime*), ‘mostly;’ *τα πανπαν*, ‘entirely.’

"In the same manner the article is put with adverbs in the genitive : " ἐκ τοῦ παρὰχρῆμα, 'on the instant.' Also with an infinitive following : το νῦν εἶναι, 'the passing now—now ;' το τημερον εἶναι, 'the passing to-day—to-day.'

The following are instances with prepositions : το ἀπο τῶν (Ajax 1376.) 'henceforth—for the future ;' το προτούτου, 'before this, hitherto,' Thuc. 2. 15 ; το ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ὅτ τῷ ἐπὶ τῷ, 'hereupon,' Plat. Gorg. p. 142 ; το καθ' ἑαυτον, (Xen. Anab. 6. 23.) 'individually—by himself.'

The article is redundant in such passages as the following : τα δε κατα την αλλην Κρητην, Plat. Min. p. 139, for κατα δε τη, &c. ; το μεν δε φρονησεως τε και ηδονης περι, Phil. p. 307. The following are elliptical : το ἐπ' ἐμε, for κατα μέρος το ἐπ' ἐμε, 'as far as lies in me ;' το ἐπὶ σε or τούτῳ σε, 'what depends on you,' Eur. Hec. 518 ; το εἰς ἐμε, 'what concerns me,' Eur. Iphig. T. 697 ; θαρσει το τουδ' γ' ανδρος, Soph. Œd. C. 649, 'be confident as far as concerns this man.'

"The article is also put adverbially in the neuter with adjectives and substantives ;" as το πρῶτον and τα πρῶτα, 'at first ;' το πολυ or ὡς το πολυ, 'for the most part ;' το λοιπον, 'for the future.' The article and its adjunct are often combined into one word, τοπαρος, τοπαλαι, τοπριν ; το ἐπὶ, τούτῳ.

DIVISION 283.—"As the article is used in the neuter with adverbs and prepositions as a parenthetical expression, so it frequently occurs also with participles or with its noun in the genitive as a shorter parenthesis. The most common phrase of this kind is το λεγομενον, 'that which is said—the saying,' for ὡςπερ λεγεται. Plato Sophist. p. 291. σχολῇ που, το κατα την προομιαν λεγομενον, ὅγε τοιούτος αν ποτε ελοι πολιν, 'hardly, that which is said according to the proverb, such an one as this would never capture a city,'—we should say, 'According to the proverb—to use a proverbial saying.' Of this sort are the following words of Sophocles, Œd. C. 140. φωνῇ γαρ ὄρω το φατιζομενον, 'I see with my voice as the saying is,' where κατα is understood—κατα το φατιζομενον, 'according to what is said,' or 'according to the proverb.'

The phrase το τοῦ κωμωδοποιου is somewhat different, and

means *κατὰ τὸ ῥῆμα*, 'according to the saying of the comedian.' (See Plat. Alcibiad. vol. v. 41.) Precisely similar is the expression *τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου* already considered, another instance of which occurs in the Theat. p. 138. To this may be added *τὸ τῶν παιζόντων*, 'the saying of those who joke,—as one says in joke.' Rep. iv. p. 332.

"This kind of phrase," says the grammarian, "seems to have arisen from the idiom in § 273, and the article appears to stand in the accusative as if in apposition to the whole proposition." This may be admitted in cases where the governing verb in the sentence is transitive; as in this instance, *καὶ σὺ, τὸ τῶν Σκυθῶν*, *ἰππεῶν περὶ λῆγεις*, Lach. vol. v. p. 187; where *τὸ τῶν Σκυθῶν* is the object of *λῆγεις*, 'you tell the case of the Scythian horsemen,' or 'you tell of horsemen, what is said of the Scythian;' where, if this be right, *τὸ* is equivalent to *ὃ*, and is the nominative to *λεγεται*. The simplest way of accounting for it is to suppose the subintellection of *κατὰ*; or *τὸ* may be taken for the relative *ὃ*—*ὃ ἐστὶ λεγόμενον*, 'which is that said.' This is evidently the way to account for *τὸ κεφαλαῖον*, in Plato Theat. p. 151, 'what is summary, summarily, principally:' or *τὸ μεγιστον*, Thuc. 2. 65, 'what is the greatest;' *τὸ δ' ἐσχάτον*, Plat. Epist. 8. p. 160, 'what is the lowest or worst;' *τὰ δὲ πάντων σχετλιωτάτον*, 'the most wretched of all.' Isocrat. Pac. 170.

DIVISION 284.—"The neuter of the article is often put absolutely with the genitive of a substantive, and in that case signifies; First, every thing to which the substantive which is put in the genitive, refers." Thus, in the Phœnissæ of Euripides, v. 414, Jocaste asks her son whether the friends and guests of his father had not obliged him? To which he replies, *εὖ πράσσει, τὰ φίλων δ' οὐδέν, ἢν τις δυστυχῇ*, 'bless you, the concern of friends is nothing if one be unfortunate,'—*τὰ φίλων* for *τὰ πραγματὰ φίλων*, and this a poetic circumlocution for *φίλοι*—'friends have little concern for one who is in adversity.' So in line 393. *τὰ τῶν θεῶν* is but an ellipsis for *τὰ πραγματὰ τῶν θεῶν*, 'the transactions, the visitations of the gods;' and in Supp. 78, *τὰ τῶν φθιτῶν*, 'the concerns or rites of the dead—

the honours of the dead.' Hence the expression *τα τῶν Ἀθηναίων φρονεῖν*, (Herod. 8. 75.) 'to favour the affairs of the Athenians—to favour their interests—to be on their side.'

Secondly, "it signifies particularly that which any one has done, is wont to do, or has befallen him; in which case the article is in the singular." This circuitous and mystical description might have been spared, if the grammarian had observed that verbs intransitive often have after them the corresponding abstract noun; and that the place of this abstract is not unfrequently supplied by the neuter article. Thus, *καίτοι δοκῶ μοι τοῦ Ἰβυκείου ἵππου πεπονθέναι*, Plat. Parmen. p. 93, that is, *το παθήμα πεπονθέναι*, 'to have suffered the suffering—to have experienced the fate of the horse of Ibycus.' Ὅμως δὲ μοι δοκεῖς συ τε καὶ Σιμμίας δέδιναι το τῶν παιδῶν, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἀνεμὸς τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκβαίνουσιν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος διαφύσας, Phædon. p. 176, that is, *δέδιναι το δέῖμα*. 'Yet you and Simmias seem to me to fear the fear—entertain the fear of children, lest the wind should really blow away and disperse their souls, when coming out of their bodies.'

DIVISION 285.—"This is a periphrasis merely of the substantive in the genitive case; as *τα τῆς οργῆς*, Thuc. 2. 60, or *το οργῆς* Plut. Brut. 21, for *ἡ οργή*." This remark should have been above, and then the preceding Division and this should have been comprehended under one. It should however be remembered, that this species of circumlocution is not without its effect; and the writer has adopted it for the purpose of leaving a fuller impression on the reader: and in many instances the sense is not the same. Thus in the above example from Thucydides, *καὶ προσδεχόμενῳ μοι τα τῆς οργῆς ὑμῶν ἐς ἐμὲ γεγενῆται*, 'the effects of your anger towards me have happened to me expecting them,'—'the measures dictated by your resentment towards me have not overtaken me unawares.' A translator might doubtless without much prejudice to the sense say, 'your anger has not overtaken me unawares:' but this does not come up to the full import of the original. So also *τα τῆς ἐμπειρίας* mean, not simply 'skill or experience,' but the effects or fruits of their skill, Thuc. 7. 49.

Nor is the example in Euripides, (Iphig. A. 33.) *τα θεων ουτω νομισμαι*, purely periphrastical—'the decrees of the gods have been so enacted'—*τα νομισματα*, or *θεσφατα*, which in regard to the sense is the same as if he had written *οι θεοι ουτω βουλονται*.

Instances however of circumlocution often occur, especially in the poets, which have no other object but ornament or novelty, or emphasis, with little or no variation in sense from the simple language. "The Greeks add to this periphrasis the adjective and participle, in the gender of the word which is the subject of the periphrasis, and in the case of the article." That is, the adjective or participle succeeding the periphrasis agrees with the case, gender, and number of the noun depending on the neuter article, as if it had been simply used without it. Thus, Philoctetes 497. *τα των διακωνων τουμον εν σμικρω μερει ποιουμενοι τον οικαδ' ηπειγον σολον*—*τα των διακωνων*, for *οι διακονοι*, which is implied in *ποιουμενοι*—'the messengers holding my request (a message sent to his father) in little regard, pursue their voyage homeward' (without fulfilling it). *Τους μεν σωφρονας που και ο παροιμιαζομενος επισχει λογος εκασοτε, το μηδεν αγαν παρακελευομενος, ω πειθονται, το δε των αφρονων τε και υβριςων μεκρι μανιας η σφοδρα ηδονη κατεχουσα περιζοητους απεργαζεται*, Plat. Phileb. 279. 'The proverbial saying ever restrains the temperate who obey its dictate, to pursue 'nothing too much;' but excessive pleasure taking possession of the unwise and the wanton, even to madness renders them notorious'—*το των αφρονων τε και υβριςων* for *τους αφρονας τε και υβριςας*, which form is supposed in *περιζοητους*.

"In the same manner the possessive pronouns are put with the article instead of the personal pronoun: e. g. *το ημετερον* for *οιμεις*, Herod. 8. 140; *ταμα* for *εγω*, Eurip. Androm. 235; *το εμον* for *εμε*, Plat. Theat. p. 90."

"Both senses are united, Eurip. Troad. 27. *νοσει τα των θεων, ουδε τιμασθαι θελει*, where *τα των θεων* joined with *νοσει* signifies, 'the reverence towards the gods,' but with *ου τιμασθαι θελει*, are instead of *οι θεοι*."

DIVISION 286.—In this and the following sections, our grammarian treats of the article in the sense of a *pronoun*, on which he touched in the beginning. “The Homeric idiom,” says he, “is preserved with what is called the Attic idiom chiefly in Herodotus, and other Ionic and Doric writers. This use of the article is found also in the Attic writers, though more rarely. Soph. Elect. 49. ὁ γὰρ μεγίστος αὐτοῖς τυγχάνει δορυξενῶν.” I have already remarked that the article in instances like this is an abbreviation; Φαινοτεὺς, just preceding it, might be repeated, but is omitted for the sake of brevity, as not inconsistent with perspicuity—ὁ γὰρ Φαινοτεὺς, ‘the man Phænoteus was to the house of Atreus, a guest the greatest among them’—αὐτοῖς, that is, ἐν αὐτοῖς Φωκεῦσι. In Plato Epist. vii. p. 105. τὸ is for τοῦτο—τὸ δ’ εἶχε δὴ πῶς, ‘how this was.’

To this belongs the expression *πρὸ τοῦ* for *πρὸ τουτοῦ χρόνου*, ‘before this time—heretofore;’ *τον καὶ τον*, ‘this and that man.’ Plat. de Leg. vi. p. 316.—*τὸ καὶ τὸ*, ‘this thing and that thing.’ Dem. pro Cor. p. 308.

DIVISION 287.—The Attics use the article for the pronoun before the relatives ὅς, ὅσος, ὅιος. Thus in Homer, Il. ρ. 171. ἦτ’ ἐφάμην σε περὶ ἐμμεναι ἀλλῶν, τῶν ὅσοι Λυκίην ἐριζώλακκα γαιεταοῦσι, ‘Assuredly I thought thee in mind above others as many of whom as inhabit the rich-soiled Lycia.’ It is true that the article is used as a pronoun relative or demonstrative in connexion with ὅς, ὅσος, ὅιος, but its use is independent of these, and is neither affected nor determined by them. The article is capable of such and such senses, and the context alone suggests the true signification which it must have in that connexion. Thus, Od. β. 118. ἐπιστᾶσθαι κερδεᾶ, οἷα οὐπω τιν’ ἀκουόμεν οὐδὲ παλαιῶν, τῶν, αἱ παρὸς ἦσαν εὐπλοκαμίδες Ἀχαιοί. Here τῶν has no adjunct, and cannot have the strict sense of the article; but supposes εὐπλοκαμίδων Ἀχαιῶν, which succeeding αἱ are attracted by it to be the same case with itself, ‘She (Penelope) knows those winning devices, such as we hear no one of the ancients—those well-curled Grecian women who were before’—‘well-curled Grecian women,’ that is noble, or such as from their birth and rank

paid attention to their hair, as an ornament or badge of freedom and independence. Dem. in Androt. p. 613. *σωζειν ὑμῖν τοὺς τοιοῦτους, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, προσήκει καὶ μισεῖν τοὺς, οἷσπερ οὗτος*, 'It behoves you, men of Athens, to protect those of this character, and to hate such an one as this.'

DIVISION 288.—"The use of the article for the pronoun takes place in a division, where *ὁ μὲν, ὁ δέ; οἱ μὲν, οἱ δέ*, are opposed to each other, 'the one, the other,' *hi, illi*: e. g. *οἱ μὲν ἐκηρυσσον, τοὶ δ' ἡγείροντο μάλ' ὤκα*, Il. β. 52. *οἱ μὲν*, 'the former,' meaning the heralds; *τοὶ δέ* (for *οἱ δέ*) 'the latter,' meaning the people—"those (*illi*) proclaimed—these (*hi*) quickly assembled.' The indefinite *τις* is used, if *ὁ μὲν, ὁ δέ* do not refer to determinate nouns which have gone before. Thus in Euripides, Helen 1617, *ὁ μὲν τις*, 'some one'—*ὁ δέ*, that is, *ὁ δέ τις*, 'some other.' Diogenes, in hades, laughs at Hercules for supposing that his soul was in heaven, while his shade was among the dead, and his body reduced to ashes on mount *Æte*, thus making himself three; *εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν τις ἐν οὐρανῳ, ὁ δέ παρ' ἡμῖν, σὺ το εἰδῶλον, το δέ σῶμα ἐν Οἰτῇ κονίς ἤδη γεγενῆται, τρία δὲ ταῦτα γινεται*, Luc. D. Mort. 16. 5. 'For if a certain part be in heaven, another a mere phantom be with us, while thy body has already become ashes on *Æte*, these things surely are three.'

Our grammarian observes that, if the word thus divided be a noun singular, *ὁ μὲν* and *ὁ δέ* are translated 'the one and the other.' Thus Plato Phædr. p. 339. *τοῦ ῥεύματος ἐκείνου πηγή, πολλὰς φερομένη πρὸς τὸν ἐρασὴν—ἡ μὲν εἰς αὐτὸν εἰσὶν, ἡ δέ ἀπομεινόμενου, ἐξῷ ἀπορρεῖ*, 'the fountain of that stream abundantly flowing to the lover enters one part into him, and from him being filled, the other part flows abroad.' Demosth. in Phœn. p. 1040. 25, *ὁ δέ ἀπεκρίνατο, ὅτι, ὁ μὲν πεπραμένος εἰς τοῦ σίτου, ὁ δέ ἐνδὸν ἀποκειμένος*, 'he answered that the corn in part was sold, and part of it lay stored within.'

These are examples of the same thing divided into parts, and the article is used to mark the partition. This use of it is more frequently in the neuter gender, *το μὲν, το δέ*; or in the plural, *τα μὲν, τα δέ*, 'partly, in part.' Thus (Herod. 1. 173.) *νομοῖσι*

τα μεν Κρητικοῖσι, τα δε Καρικοῖσι χρεωνται, 'they use laws, partly Cretan, partly Carian.' Here τα is elliptical, and stands for τινα—κατα τα μεν πραγματα, 'in some things they use Cretan laws, in others Carian.' Xen. Anab. 4. 1. 15. και ταυτην μεν την ημεραν ουτως επορευθησαν, τα μεν τι μαχομενοι, τα δε και αναπαυομενοι, 'thus they marched that day, partly somewhat fighting, partly also resting.' Here again τα μεν means κατα τινα χωρια, 'in some places,' and τι is adverbial 'to a certain degree, somewhat.' He observes that Herodotus and others for τα μεν, τα δε, use τουτο μεν, τουτο δε. (See Isocrat. p. 44. D. Demosth. Sept. p. 474. 25.)

When a preposition governs the article, the particles μεν and δε succeed the preposition not the article; εν μεν αρα της συμφωνουμεν, εν δε τοις ου, Isocrat. Areopag. p. 141. 'in some things we agree, in others not.'

One of these is frequently omitted. Il. χ. 157. τη βα παραδραμετην, φευγων, ο δ' οπισθε διωκων. Here φευγων is for ο με φευγων, 'they ran by this way, the one flying, the other pursuing.' The omission is natural in poetry, where the writer has no leisure for observing minute distinctions; and where the context supplies the defect. See also Eurip. Iphig. T. 1361. Plat. Phil. p. 260.

"Οι μεν is used also in antithesis;" αοιδους—οι τε σονοεσσαν αοιδην, οι μεν αρ' εθρηνεον, επι δε στεναχοντο γυναικες. Here οι μεν is superfluous as to the sense and syntax, but are introduced to mark the apposition between the bards and the women in the next clause—οι μεν αοιδοι—γυναικες δε, 'they placed by them the bards, who caused to resound the mournful dirge—' they, I say, thus began, while the women sighed responsively.' Either the grammarian has expressed himself very imperfectly, or the above is another instance of his attempts to conceal under technical terms the want of clear views.

It is well known even to Tyros, that μεν and δε are commonly used antithetically, to mark one clause in opposition to the other. This is their force in the example which our author next subjoins, Od. α. 115. ισσομενος πατερ' εσθλον ενι φρεσι, ει ποθεν ελθων, μηγσηρων των μεν σκεδασιν, κατα δωματα θειη

—τιμην δ' αὐτὸς ἐχχοι. Here *μνηστῆρων μὲν σκεδασιν* and *τιμην δ' αὐτὸς* are antithetical. 'Having his brave father in the mind's eye, if having come from any where he should cause from his house the dispersion of the suitors, and acquire renown for himself.'

"Instead of one or both, the name itself is also put." See Herod. 5. 94. Plat. Charm. p. 122. Thuc. 1. 48. The passage from Il. ω. 721, adduced to illustrate the preceding head, is in reality an illustration of this. Il. π. 317.—*Νεσσοριδαι, ὃ μὲν Ἀντιλοχος—Θρασυμηδης δ'*, line 321. See also Thuc. 7. 86; 2. 29. Plat. Gorg. p. 117.

"Οἱ μὲν—ὃ δὲ are not always opposed to each other, but instead of one of them another word is often put." e. g. Thuc. 7. 73. *Καὶ οἱ μὲν εἰπόντες ἀπῆλθον, καὶ οἱ ἀκουσάντες διηγγέλαν τοῖς στρατηγοῖς τῶν Ἀθηναίων*, 'They on speaking thus departed, and they who heard announced it to the Athenian generals.' The antithesis here lies between *οἱ μὲν εἰπόντες* and *καὶ οἱ ἀκουσάντες*, where the historian uses *καὶ οἱ* instead of *οἱ δὲ*, and the remark proper for the grammarian to make was, that *δὲ* may sometimes be omitted in the antithetic clause without any detriment to the sense. An omission of the *μὲν* is still more common.

The first division *ὃ μὲν* may be followed, in the room of *ὃ δὲ*, by *ἄλλος δὲ*. See Plato Leg. II. p. 69. or Rep. II. p. 231. In the plural *οἱ μὲν* for *ἐνιοί* 'some,' is followed by *ἄλλοι δὲ* or *ἕτεροι δὲ* 'others.' The relative *ὃς* is used not uncommonly to express the like antithesis—*οὗς*, 'some men,' *οὗς δὲ*, 'others.' Dem. pro Cor. p. 248. *πολεῖς Ἑλληνίδας ἃς μὲν ἀναιρῶν, εἰς ἃς δὲ τοὺς φυγάδας καταγων*, 'demolishing some of the Grecian cities, restoring the fugitives to others of them.'

DIVISION 289.—"The article also seems to be used as a pronoun in the phrase *ἐν τοῖς*, which mostly stand with superlatives; in modern writers also with *σφοδρά, μάλα, πανν*, the superlative being in the masculine, feminine, or neuter, and which with superlatives answers to the Latin *omnium, longe, multo*. The superlative does not stand in the case of *τοῖς*, but in the case of the noun to which it properly belongs."

Among the vast heaps of jargon which swell this voluminous Grammar, nothing shows more clearly than this division, the natural inaptitude of the author to analyse and trace certain forms of speech to their elements in the very language on which he has engaged to write, and thus to benefit his readers by placing the analysis before them in plain and direct terms. I will explain a few of the examples quoted by him, to which I shall subjoin his view of them.

I observe then, *εν τοῖς* is an abbreviation or an ellipsis which supposes some word or circumstance understood; that circumstance is to be supplied, the context rendering it evident what it is. Thus Thuc. 1. 6. *εν τοῖς πρώτοι δε Αθηναῖοι τον σιδηρον κατεθεντο*. In the preceding sentence the historian states that all the Hellenes or Greeks had the common practice of going about with arms for their defence; in this he adds, "Of these or among these the Athenians were the first who laid aside the use of iron weapons." Supply then *Ἑλληνες*, and we have *εν τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν*, an equivalent to *πρώτοι τῶν Ἑλληνων*.

Thus again, Thuc. 3. 1. 7. *εν τοῖς πλεισται δη νῆες αὐμοις ενεργοι καλλει εγενοντο*. Here nothing precedes in the context to which *εν τοῖς* can refer; we must therefore look for the root of the abbreviation in the sentence itself. And as the sole object of the writer is to place before his readers the extraordinary things done at this crisis by the Athenians, it is obvious that the verb *εγενοντο* used by him on this occasion is the word which supplies the ellipsis—*εν τοῖς*, i. e. *εν τοις γενομενοις*, 'Among the things now done, the greatest number of ships (they ever had) were made—and made effective by their beauty and complete equipment.'

Moreover, Thuc. 3. 81. *δυτως ωμη σασις προυχωρησε, και εδοξε μαλλον, διοτι εν τοῖς πρωτη εγενετο*. In *εδοξε* is implied *αυτοις*, and to this, understood, *εν τοῖς* refers; thus, 'the commotion proceeded in a savage manner, and it appeared the more—appeared to them the more savage—because it was the first among them.'

In section 71 of the same historian, we further read, *μεγιστον δε και εν τοῖς πρωτον εκακωσε το στρατευμα τῶν Αθηναίων η*

τοῦ Πλημμυρίου λήψις. The supply of the ellipsis is suggested by *εκακωσε—εν τοῖς κακωσασι*—‘among the things which afflicted the Athenian army, the greatest and the first was the capture of the Plemmyrium.’ Thuc. 7.71. *εν τοῖς χαλεπωτατα διηγον*—*εν τοῖς χαλεποῖς χαλεπωτατα διηγον*, equivalent to *των χαλεπων χαλεπωτατα*, ‘they lead the most wretched of wretched lives.’ *Ανηρ εν τοις μαλιστα εναντιος τῷ ἡμῳ—εν τοις ουσιν εναντιοις*, ‘among those adverse to the people, he was the most so.’ Plat. Criton. p. 101. *Λεγοντες οτι εν τοῖς μαλιστα Αθηναιων εγω αυτοις ὁμολογηκως τυγχανω ταυτην την ὁμολογίαν—εν τοῖς Αθηναιων μαλιστα ὁμολογοῦσι*, ‘among such of the Athenians as most agree with these, I profess that agreement.’ Plato Epist. x. p. 166. *ακουω Διωνος εν τοῖς μαλιστα ἑταῖρον εἶναι σε—εν τοις ἑταιροις*, ‘I hear that among the associates of Dion, you are the chief.’ Herod. 7. 137. *τοῦτο μοι εν τοῖσι θειοτατον φαινεται γιγενεσθαι—εν τοῖς θειοις*—‘among extraordinary things, this appears to me the most extraordinary.’

It is but fair to quote what our author says in reference to these examples; and to do him justice he appears, after having groped long in the dark, to have stumbled at length on something like the truth. “From these combinations it is clear; 1. that the formula *εν τοῖς* stands by itself, and is not to be joined with the superlative following, since the combination *εν τοῖς πρωτοις*, *εν τοῖς πλεισται*, is at variance with this explanation; 2. that *τοῖς* is neuter, because the superlative in the feminine is put with it. Hardly any explanation of this phrase can be given to suit all passages, since the idiom of the language, apparently, has given to it by degrees a greater extension than it originally had. Thus originally in *εν τοῖς* it appears either to be necessary to supply the adjective or participle in the same case, and in the neuter, as (Plato Cratyl. p. 320.) *ὁ δε δοκει εν τοῖς μεγαῖσις μεγαῖον εἶναι*, or that *εν τοῖς* should be the same with *εν τούτοις*, when it seems to be used after several things previously mentioned, the most important of which is to be thus distinguished.—This explanation suits particularly the passage in Plato Euthyd. p. 71, and Herod vii. 139. In time it became

merely a phrase to strengthen the superlative. A different origin, though it has a similar signification, may be assigned to ὅμοια τοῖς μεγιστοῖς (Herod. 3. 8.)—σεβόνται δ' Ἀραῖοι πίσις ἀνθρωπῶν ὅμοια τοῖς μαλιστα. Here ὅμοια is adverbial; ἀνθρωπῶν depends on μαλιστα, and ἐν τοῖς supposes σεβόμενοις. 'the Arabs reverence oaths (πίσις for πίσις) like those who most reverence them—they are amongst those who pay the greatest reverence to oaths.' Our learned grammarian has here hit upon the true solution; and if he had been at all habituated to an analysis of the Greek language, he would have discovered a general principle which solves every passage of the kind with the greatest ease and simplicity, the ellipsis which ἐν τοῖς implies, being suggested by one of the leading words in the same clause. I will subjoin one example more, Demosth. Epist. p. 1473. 12. εὐρήσετε με ευνουν τῷ πληθει τῷ ὑμετέρῳ τοῖς μαλιστα ὁμοίως—τοῖς μαλιστα ευνούσι, depending on ὁμοίως, 'you will find me well-disposed to your people, like or equal to those who are most so—you will find me as well disposed to your community, as your greatest friends.'

"The oblique cases of the article are often used absolutely as demonstrative pronouns." Thus τῷ 'for this reason,' *idcirco*, (see Il. β. 250, and Plato Theæt. p. 129.)—'then—in that case,' (Il. δ. 290, ο. 51, π. 723, ψ. 527.)

Thus also in the feminine, τῇ 'here or there,' for which τῇδε is put elsewhere. This supposes ὁδῷ understood—'in this way or that way.' This is the sense in Hesiod, ε. 206. τῇ ὁ εἶς, ἥ σ' ἀν ἐγὼ περ ἀγω—'you go in the way in which I would have led you.' Οὐδὲ χαλκὸς καὶ σιδηρὸς ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς πολεως, οὐδὲ τὰλλα δύο ἢ τρία μιᾷ πολεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τῇ, τὸ δὲ τῇ, Xen. R. A. 2. 12.—'Nor are brass and iron from the self same state; nor has one state more than two or three things differing in kind; but one state has one, another has another.' Here τῇ supposes πολεῖ borrowed from the preceding clause; and the grammarian is not correct in classing its use here with the other instances, where it occurs in an adverbial form.

In the following passage (Eur. Orest. 350.) its use is dis-

tributive, τῇ μὲν—τῇ δὲ—‘on the one hand—on the other,’ rather ‘partly one—partly another,’ ὡς δῶμα τῇ μὲν σ’ ἡδέως προσδερχομαι Τροιαθεν ελθων, τῇ δ’ ἰδων κατασενω, ‘having come from Troy, I behold thee, O house, in one respect with pleasure, in another seeing thee I lament.’ Our author might have added the following words of Jocaste in *CEd. T.* 857. ὥς τε οὐχι μαντείας γ’ ἀν οὐτε τῇδ’ ἐγὼ βλεψαίμι ἀν οὐνεκ’, οὐτε τῇ ἀν ὕστρον, ‘So that as to myself, I would not for the future look to the oracle neither in this way, nor in that way—regard it in no respect as worthy of notice.’ The neuter τοῦτο is used in Homer and in him alone for δια το, and this for δια τοῦτο, ‘on this account, for this reason.’ See *Il. p.* 404.

DIVISION 291.—The article is very often put in Ionic and Doric writers for the pronoun relative ὃς ἤ, ὅ. Thus τα μὲν means ἃ μὲν in *Il. a.* 125, while in the next clause it stands for ταῦτα. *Herod. 5. 37.* Ἀρισταγόρης καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀλλῇ Ἰωνίῃ τῷτο (Ionic contraction of τοαυτο) τοῦτο ἐποίησε, τοὺς μὲν ἐξελαυνὼν τῶν τυραννῶν, τοὺς δ’ ἐλάβε τυραννοὺς—τουτοὺς ἐξεδίδου, ‘Aristagores did the very same thing in the rest of Ionia, expelling the usurpers; but what usurpers he captured—these he delivered up to their several states,’—τοὺς δὲ, for οὓς δὲ.

“Of Attic writers, the tragedians only use it in this sense, not the comic and prose authors.” *Æschyl. Agam. 535.* ἀλλ’ εὖ νιν ἀσπασασθε—Τροίαν κατασκαψάντα τοῦ δικηφοροῦ Διὸς μακελλῇ, τῇ κατεργασαί πεδον, ‘receive him graciously after having dug up Troy with the spade of justice-bearing Jupiter, with which he overturned its soil,’—τῇ for ἣ, *quo sarculo.* *CEd. T. 1379,* δαίμονων ἀγαλμαθ’, τῶν δ’ παντλημῶν ἐγὼ—ἀπέστρεψ’ ἐμαυτὸν, ‘the statues of the gods, of which I all-miserable deprived myself,’—τῶν for ὧν. *Eur. Iphig. A. 1351.* φεύγω τὸν Ἀχιλλεῖα τὸν ἰδεῖν αἰσχυνομαι—τον for ὃν, ‘I shun Achilles whom I am ashamed to see.’

PART III.

The force of the Article explained as applied in the New Testament.

THE Second Part of Dr. Middleton's volume is occupied in explaining the omission, or illustrating the propriety of the Article, when used in various passages of the Christian Scriptures. This is worthy of a scholar and a divine : and it must be allowed, even by those who differ from him, that his remarks are learned, liberal and ingenious ; though it be evident that, if he proceeded on an erroneous notion of the article, he can throw but little light on the subjects which come under his consideration.

The use of the article in various parts of the New Testament has been a source of much doubt and controversy among learned men ; and the hope that I may throw much light on this controversy, if not entirely decide it, is my motive for taking up the question ; and if I be not disappointed, I shall exhibit to the theological student many passages of the Scriptures in a point of view altogether new and interesting. In order to accomplish this purpose, I have to premise two things, which I wish to impress on my readers : First, that the article not only defines one individual or individuals in opposition to others of the same class, but taking the kinds or classes of things as themselves individuals, marks these in contradistinction to each other : Secondly, that the writings of the New Testament beyond any other writings grow out of local and peculiar circumstances, and must therefore derive their interpretation from a full knowledge of those circumstances ; that they are drawn up with studied brevity ; that in consequence

of the brevity and locality which thus characterize them, more is meant than is expressed; that what is thus expressed points to something analogous lurking in the context, founded on associations familiar to our Lord and his Apostles, and sometimes more generally to the whole Jewish nation; and finally, that the article is an index pointing to this latent sense, and thus serving to bring it to light. This is all the previous instruction necessary to qualify the reader for following me, and I will endeavour to conduct him from beginning to end with all possible satisfaction and brevity. I beg, however, to remind him, that it is not my intention to point out every instance in which the article is obscure or uncertain in the N. T.: I purpose to select only the most striking; and so many of these as will be sufficient to illustrate its force, and enable the reader in every doubtful place to discover its appropriate signification.

MATTHEW.

Chap. III. 9. *δυναται ὁ Θεος ἐκ τῶν λίθων τούτων ἐγείραι τέκνα τῷ Ἀβρααμ.*—ὁ Θεος and not Θεος, 'God,' in opposition to man: 'though this be impossible to man, the Almighty can raise even from these stones children to Abraham.' John pointed, it is probable, to those present, whom the Pharisees branded as publicans and sinners. The metaphor is founded on the analogy between *ben*, 'a son,' 'child,' and *aben*, 'a stone,' in the vernacular tongue used by the Baptist.

12. *καὶ συναξει τὸν σιτὸν αὐτοῦ εἰς τὴν ἀποθηκὴν.*—τὴν ἀποθηκὴν, 'the granary of him,' which coalescing with the personal pronoun *αυτος* implied in *συναξει*, may be rendered 'his granary.'

13. *ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰορδάνην,*—τὸν defining ποταμὸν, or a substitute for it,—'to the Jordan.'

17. *οὗτος ἐστὶν ὁ υἱὸς μου ὁ ἀγαπητός.* The people present expected John himself to be the Messiah. Against this expectation the clause *ὁ υἱὸς* is levelled: as if the heavenly voice had said, 'John is only my servant, the forerunner of the Messiah. This (pointing to Jesus) is the Messiah, who sustains a character and title as superior to him, as an only son

and heir of a family bears to one of the domestics'.—"This is my son—my beloved son—in whom I am well pleased."

Chap. IV. 1. Τότε ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἀνελθὼν εἰς τὴν ἐρημον, &c. "Not into a desert," says Michaelis, "but into the desert; a phrase which must suggest to the mind of the reader the Great Desert of Arabia, in which the Israelites wandered so many years, and in which Mount Sinai is situated, or on the way to that mountain; see Exod. xxxiv. 28. 1 Kings xix. 8. The instant we imagine ourselves in this Desert, the whole history, including both the artifices of Satan and the answer of our Lord, receives extraordinary light." I confess I do not see this extraordinary light; but see clearly from the language, that the evangelist did not mean any particular desert:—for εἰς τὴν ἐρημον means εἰς τὴν χωρὰν ἐρημον, or without the article εἰς χωρὰν ἐρημον, 'a place that was solitary' or not frequented by men, and therefore fit for meditation. Jesus retired to a lonely, unfrequented, spot, in order to consider in which way he could carry into effect, most conformably to the will of God, the great commission now imparted to him. It was of no consequence what the retired spot might be, provided its retreat rendered it fit for the purpose: and this is all that the sacred writer means when he says that Jesus was led to a place that was solitary.

3. εἰ υἱὸς εἶ τοῦ Θεοῦ,—τοῦ Θεοῦ, and not Θεοῦ, as referring to the declaration of God proclaiming Jesus to be his son from heaven—"If thou art really the son of God, as thou hast recently been announced by God himself." The reference is lost, if, with Campbell and Wakefield, we translate the clause "a son of God."

4. οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῷ μόνῳ ζήσεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος. The article is here wanting in the common editions; but Griesbach has properly restored it, so as to be uniform with the parallel passage in Luke: and it marks ἄνθρωπος, not as one of the kind, nor yet the whole kind, as Winer supposes; but *man* as a rational being, having a soul, as well as a body, to feed. 'As an heir of immortality, man cannot live on bread alone, but on every word coming from the mouth of God.'

20. αἱ δ' εὐθὺς ἀφέντες τὰ δίχτυα,—'the nets belonging

to them—their nets :—so in ver. 21. ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ, ‘ in the ship known to be theirs—their ship.’

24. Καὶ προσήνεγκαν αὐτῷ πάντας τοὺς κακῶς ἐχοντας, ‘ They brought to him all those diseased, such as were diseased :’ the article and the participle equivalent to a noun—‘ all invalids.’ Observe τοὺς is to be repeated in the next clause—τοὺς τε ποικίλαις νοσοῖς καὶ βασανοῖς συνεχομένους, &c. ‘ and such as were oppressed with divers disorders and torments,’ &c.

Chap. V. 1. ἀνέβη εἰς τὸ ὄρος,—not to any particular mountain, but that which was a mount or a hill. ‘ He ascended to an eminence.’ Jesus in beginning to announce the Gospel, led his hearers to an elevated spot, as an emblem of that moral eminence to which he raised them as his disciples.

3. Μακάριοι οἱ πτωχοὶ τῷ πνεύματι ‘ blessed are the poor—such as are poor.’ The higher classes of the Jews expecting the Messiah’s kingdom to be of a temporal nature, claimed the privileges of it for themselves. Against this arrogance, the language of Jesus is levelled : ‘ The poor are blessed and happy, because the kingdom of heaven belongs to them, as well as to the rich, the great, and the mighty.’ Poverty, however, has no blessing in itself, but often insures this beatitude by its happy effect on the mind ; by the virtues to which it inures the mind, it is more favourable than wealth and power,—humility, submission to the divine will, contrition for sin, a sense of one’s own unworthiness, and a dependence on God. This is what our Lord meant when he added, ‘ such as are poor in the spirit’—in a spiritual sense, in opposition to literal or external poverty. Luke in the parallel passage, chap. vi. 20, uses οἱ πτωχοὶ without this limitation.

5. Μακάριοι οἱ πραεῖς ὅτι αὐτοὶ κληρονομήσουσι τὴν γῆν. ‘ Blessed are the meek—such as are meek,’ in opposition to the angry, the haughty, and the revengeful.—‘ Happy those who bear opposition with meekness ; who receive provocation without anger ; who suffer injuries without retaliation,—for they shall inherit the land—the land of promise, of which the land of Canaan is but the shadow. This land was taken possession of and inherited by such weapons as the angry and selfish pas-

sions supplied; but the celestial land to which I point, shall be possessed by those alone whose only armour is meekness, gentleness, and peace.'

8. Μακαριοι οἱ καθαροὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ, 'blessed are the pure,—the clean in *the* heart,' in opposition to those hypocrites who, while full of moral or inward impurities, are studious of external ablations and cleanliness.

9. Μακαριοι οἱ εἰρηνοποιοὶ ὅτι αὐτοὶ υἱοὶ Θεοῦ κληθήσονται—'Happy those who love peace rather than war.' The great among the Jews looked up to promotion and lofty titles, while fighting under the standard of a triumphant prince, who by war and devastation should subjugate the nations of the earth. This is the pernicious error against which the language of Jesus is directed. 'Blessed are the peace-makers, for they shall be called sons of God.—This glorious title shall be conferred not on those who hope to distinguish themselves under the banners of a victorious deliverer, but on those who love peace rather than war, who study to preserve it among themselves and to promote it among others.'

12. Χαίρετε καὶ ἀγαλλιᾶσθε ὅτι ὁ μισθὸς ὑμῶν πολὺς ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς· οὕτω γὰρ εἰώξαν τοὺς προφῆτας τοὺς πρὸ ὑμῶν.—Ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, in opposition to ἐν τῇ γῇ, 'though your only reward in this world will be persecution, you will be rewarded in heaven, and there your reward will be great. But your case is not singular, they thus persecuted the prophets before you.' Here the last τοὺς is a connective in the sense of the demonstrative pronoun—'They persecuted *the* prophets, *those* before you.' As a connective the article may be rendered by *he* or *who* with a verb, as in the following example, ver. 48. ἐσεσθε οὖν ὑμεῖς τέλειοι, ὥσπερ ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς τέλειος ἐστίν. 'Be ye perfect, as your Father, *he* in heaven—*who* is in heaven, is perfect.'

13. Ὑμεῖς ἐστε τὸ ἅλας τῆς γῆς.—'Ye are the salt of the earth;' —τῆς γῆς 'the habitable globe' (see γαῖα in my Greek and English Lexicon) opposed to the land of Judea, to which the instructions of the prophets were confined: God raised the prophets to be the salt of the Jews only, but the Apostles of

Jesus were to become 'the salt of the whole world.' This contrast is intended also in the clause, ὑμεῖς εἴσε το φῶς τοῦ κόσμου. 'The prophets shed a light, and that comparatively a faint light, on one favoured country; you are destined to illumine the whole world, and that with a light bright as the sun.' Εαν δε το ἅλας μαρανθῇ, ἐν τινὶ ἀλισθησεται; εἰς οὐδὲν ἰσχύει ἐτι, εἰ μὴ βληθῆναι ἐξω, καὶ καταπατεῖσθαι ὑπο τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Wakefield shows from Schoetgen upon this place, that this is meant of bituminous or Sodomitic salt commonly used in Judea, and especially in *sacrifice* to make it sweeter and burn better; that it was easily rendered vapid, and of no other use but to be spread on a part of the temple, to prevent slipping in wet weather. This doubtless is the salt literally meant. But our Lord applying it by analogy to his disciples, meant salt in a *moral sense*, offered to all mankind as preachers of the Gospel. If it lost its savour, it was to be cast away and trodden of men, ὑπο τῶν ἀνθρώπων, men as rational beings and destined for immortality; and therefore having the article, to distinguish them from creatures that are irrational and perishable. The blessed Jesus having now a full and certain knowledge of a future state, looked upon mankind in a new light; and he constantly uses the article to mark them as moral agents, as raised above other animals by viewing them in the mild lustre of his own Gospel. Thus in ver. 16 he commands them 'to let their light shine before men,' ἐμπροσθεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων,—not definitely any set of men, not Jews or Gentiles exclusively, but before all mankind, all that are possessed of reason, and therefore capable of distinguishing fair and honourable deeds from those of a contrary character, and thus disposed to receive the Gospel, and to glorify their common Father by producing its happy fruits in their lives and conversation. See also ver. 19; and chap. vi. 1, 14, 18.

15. Οὐδε καιουσι λυχνον, καὶ τιθεασιν αὐτον ὑπο τον μοδιον, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὴν λυχνίαν,—'They do not light a candle and put it under *that which covers it*, but on *that which holds it*.' μοδιον and λυχνίαν being contrasted, have each the article to mark their mutual opposition. "Campbell," says Dr. Middleton, "vindicates the article in this place, by considering the bushel and the candlestick to be what I have denominated *monadic nouns*; one

only of each would probably be found in a house." This vindication is nugatory. The bushel by being turned upside down, was convenient to secure or to hide anything under it: hence it became a convenient name for a *covering*: the article *τῷ* marks it as an instrument to answer this purpose; while *τῇ* marks *λυχνίαν* as a stand to hold the candle to view. A similar contrast, with a similar use of the article, will be found in ver. 17, between *τὸν νόμον* and *τοὺς προφῆτας*, 'the law and the prophets.'

21. Ὅς δ' ἂν φονευσῇ, ἐνόχος ἐστί τῇ κρίσει. Here *τῇ κρίσει* coalesces with the crime implied in *φονευσῇ*, and means therefore *τῇ κρίσει τοῦ φόνου*, 'Whoever murders, shall be liable to the trial of murder,'—the murderer will be subject to prosecution and punishment. The note which Dr. Middleton has on this clause, shows how far he and other learned men were from having a clear idea of the article. "English version," says he, "'to the judgement,' which to the unlearned may seem to signify the punishment of a future state. Campbell says, 'to the Judges.' There can be no doubt that by *τῇ κρίσει* is meant some court of judicature, but not the Sanhedrim. Schleusner makes it to be the court of Seven established in every principal town to decide petty causes. Wetstein understands it of the court of Twenty-three. Between these two opinions there is probably no real difference."

The next verse presents a similar association: *πᾶς ὁ ὀργιζόμενος τῷ ἀδελφῷ αὐτοῦ εἰκῇ, ἐνόχος ἐστί τῇ κρίσει.—τῇ κρίσει, renewing the impression made by ὀργιζόμενος, supposes τῇ κρίσει τῆς ὀργῆς*, 'Every man that is angry with his own brother without cause, shall be liable to be judged and punished for it:—τῷ ἀδελφῷ αὐτοῦ should be rendered 'one that is his own brother,' as more adequate and emphatic. The article has a similar emphasis in ver. 43, *Ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου, καὶ μισήσεις τὸν ἐχθρὸν σου*, 'Thou shalt love him near thee, and hate him that is thy enemy,—Thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thy enemy.'

Chap. VI. 5. Ὅι ὑποκριταί, 'the hypocrites—such as are hypocrites,' or those who in religion act a part or character that is not their own, as actors under a mask on the stage.

11. Τον ἄρτον ἡμῶν τον ἐπιουσιον δος ἡμῖν σημερον, 'Give us this day *the bread necessary for us, that which is essential to us.*' This precept was peculiarly adapted to the case of men who, as engaged in the service of God, and encouraged to rely for support on his especial providence, were prohibited to lay up treasures on earth, or to make any provision for the morrow. The purpose of it, as applied to the Apostles, is to this effect, 'Give us each day, as thou didst manna to our fathers in the wilderness, the bread necessary to support us as men : give us more especially that divine bread, of which the manna was the emblem, which is necessary to support us as ministers of the Gospel, and is essential to our nature as immortal beings.' Without regard to this food of the soul, the prayer would have been defective : and it would have been as beneath the character, as it was opposite to the practice, of our Lord, to teach his disciples, whom he commands not to be anxious about what they should eat or drink, to pray for daily bread, without even glancing at that bread from heaven, which supports eternal life, and which was ever uppermost in his mind, as the most important object of his mission. Thus he virtually repeats the maxim already used by him, that man as an immortal being cannot live alone on that bread which feeds the body. (See *ἐπιουσιος* in my Greek and English Lexicon.)

12. Ὡς και ἡμεῖς ἀφιμεν τοῖς ὀφειλεταις ἡμῶν. 'As we forgive *such as are debtors* to us.'

13. Και μη εἰσενεγκῆς ἡμᾶς εἰς πειρασμον, ἀλλὰ ῥῦσαι ἡμᾶς ἀπο τοῦ πονηροῦ ὅτι σου ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεια, και ἡ δυναμις, και ἡ δόξα εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνάς.—Απο τοῦ πονηροῦ, 'from the Evil One,' from the Tempter mentioned in chap. iv. as having tempted, and having made this very promise to, our Lord himself. The petition therefore has an immediate reference to the situation of those who were qualified by supernatural endowments to preach the Gospel. When the Apostles became endowed with divine power, their feelings as men must have necessarily exposed them to the temptation of employing it for the purpose of aggrandizing or enriching themselves. The Tempter was sure to come and make to them the false offer, which he had made to their Divine Master before them, 'The kingdom, the glory of it I will give

unto you, if ye fall down and worship me.' The petition *then* is immediately levelled against this insinuation : ' Deliver us from the Evil One, for *thine*, and not *his*, is the kingdom.' Now the clause deliver us from evil or the Evil One, if generally taken, is a request to be defended from the evils of life, or for strength of mind to support them, and as such forms a proper subject of supplication to all Christians : but by connecting it with the subsequent verse, ' for thine is the kingdom, the power, and the glory,' the whole petition is necessarily limited to the case of the Apostles, who, as being endowed with miraculous power, and as the servants of a temporal prince, expecting to share in the administration of a temporal kingdom, might feel temptation to use that power, to gratify the ends of avarice and ambition. Matthew, therefore, who wrote his Gospel early, and wrote it among the Jews, has recorded the prayer in the state in which it was adapted by its Divine Author to the peculiar situation of the Apostles. But Luke, writing at a later period, and writing too amongst Gentile converts, where the petition in its original application might be misunderstood or misapplied, generalized it by omitting the clause which limited it to the first followers of Jesus in Judea, *i. e.* by omitting the *doxology*.

17. Ἀμην λεγω ὑμῖν ὅτι ἀπεχουσι τον μισθον αὐτῶν.—τον μισθον αὐτῶν, ' that which is a reward peculiar or due to them.' —' These hypocrites, like actors, play a feigned part on the stage of society, and they receive the wages of their hypocrisy in the plaudits and false estimate of the spectators.' " Mr. Wakefield," says Dr. M. " concludes his note on this passage (see ver. 3) with a remark that the article prefixed to *μισθον* by the Evangelist, *the* or *this* reward, proves in his opinion that human applause, ὅπως δοξασθῶσιν, was intended. But the article in this place is not to be rendered by *the* or *this*; it is used because of *αὐτῶν* following : for when a pronoun depends on a noun, the article of that noun is generally inserted. Of these insertions the N. T. will furnish probably a thousand examples : in the Lord's Prayer six occur. Such fanciful interpretations do much harm to the cause of criticism : from a professed scholar like Mr. W. they were not to be expected."

Mr. Wakefield here assuredly mistook the force of the article ; and notwithstanding the censure passed upon him, Dr. M. is equally wide of the truth. For the article in every instance is independent of the pronoun, and a reason can always be assigned for its application ;—τον before μισθον has a latent reference to their hypocrisy, the supplying of which renders the whole obvious.

22. Ὁ λυχνος τοῦ σώματος ἐστὶν ὁ οφθαλμος. Here is an instance where the predicate, as well as the subject, of the proposition has the article ; and the reason is obvious : for *the eye* is exclusively the light of the body : ὁ therefore marks οφθαλμος as such, in contradistinction to the other parts of it.

25. In this verse, τῇ ψυχῇ stands in contrast with τῷ σώματι : each therefore has the article to mark their mutual reference. But it is not always necessary to prefix the article to both : its application to one of them is on many occasions thought sufficient. Thus in ver. 19, ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς is in opposition to ἐν οὐρανῷ in the next, without the article. This is the case too in ver. 10, ὡς ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, ‘on *the* earth,’ emphatically, the great object of our Lord’s mission being to render the will of the Father known and practised over the whole habitable globe.

34. Εἰς τὴν αὐριον supposes ἡμέραν, ‘for the day of tomorrow—for the morrow ;’ and ταῦτα ἐαυτῆς implies χρηματα or πραγματα, ‘its own affairs or events.’ A similar ellipsis occurs in ver. 18, ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ—ἐν τῷ φανερῷ, namely, χωρῷ, ‘in that place which is secret—He who sees in every secret place, will reward thee in that place which is open—will reward thee openly.’

Chap. VII. 6. Μὴ δῶτε τὸ ἅγιον τοῖς κυσὶ, ‘Do not give that which is holy or pure to animals that are impure, such as dogs.’ Here the article before κυσὶ and χοίρων is generical, marking classes of animals, which stand in direct contrast to τὸ ἅγιον.

15. Προσεχετε δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ψευδοπροφητῶν, ‘Beware of such prophets or teachers as are false,’—in opposition to the true and faithful teachers of the Gospel. This is the contrast intimated by the article. Ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιγνώσεσθε

αυτους, 'Ye shall know them, *not* from their profession, *not* from their fair appearance, *not* from the honours and titles they will pretend to confer on me, but from *their fruits*.' The article before καρπῶν holds forth the fruits of their conduct, and *no other principle*, as the standard by which they should be tried.

17. Το δε σαπρον δενδρον καρπους πονηρους ποιει. The English version is, 'a corrupt tree.' "This," says Dr. M. "is the sense; yet the article is not without meaning in the Greek, but is equivalent to πᾶν in the preceding clause. The version might have been, *every* corrupt tree." This learned author was ignorant of the force of the article here, as in most other places. Its use is generical, meaning that class of trees which are corrupt or bad, in opposition to trees that are sound and good. It is surprising that so obvious a sense of the article should escape the notice of a man who professedly wrote on the Greek article. But in truth he was completely blinded by his own dark and intricate system.

23. Αποχωρεῖτε ἀπ' ἐμοῦ οἱ εργαζόμενοι τὴν ανομιαν, 'Depart from me, ye who work *that which is iniquity—that which is contrary* to the law of God and to my Gospel;—τὴν ανομιαν opposed to τὸν νομον καὶ τοὺς προφητας, which these impostors sought to lay aside, as inspired by the Creator whom they affected to consider as imperfect and evil.

25. Τεθεμελιωτο ἐπὶ τὴν πέτραν. 'It had been founded on *that which was rock*,' and therefore affording a firm and solid foundation, in opposition to ἐπὶ τὴν ἀμμον, 'on the sand,' which was swept away by the flood. See Middleton's note, which shows how he and others were bewildered on the most obvious application of the article.

Chap. VIII. 4. Σεαυτον δεῖξον τῷ ἱερεῖ, 'Show thyself to him that is the priest—to the officiating priest, whoever he might be.' The article has a similar use in ver. 9, Καὶ λέγω τῷ δουλῷ μου, Ποιησον τοῦτο, καὶ ποιει, 'And I say to him that is my servant—to *a* servant, not definitely any individual servant, but a person in the capacity of a servant.' And the centurion intimates that Jesus had the same authority over the demons, which he had over his slaves.

12. Οἱ δὲ υἱοὶ τῆς βασιλείας ἐκβλήθησονται εἰς τὸ σκοτὸς τὸ ἐξωτερὸν· ἐκεῖ ἔσαι ὁ κλαυθμὸς καὶ ὁ βρυγμὸς τῶν ὀδόντων. This verse contains an allusion to a feast celebrated by night, in a splendid palace illumined by brilliant lamps, where innumerable guests are invited from every quarter of the globe. The sons of the kingdom, the Jewish nation, will seek admission, but they will be excluded and driven back εἰς τὸ σκοτὸς, ‘into the darkness;’—τὸ ἐξωτερὸν, ‘the outer darkness,’—the surrounding darkness which is heightened and rendered more intense by a contrast with the illumination enjoyed by the guests within. In that dreary situation, though the heirs of the kingdom, their portion will be ὁ κλαυθμὸς, ‘lamentation,’ in opposition to the rejoicing which would have been their happy fate had they not been excluded by their vices; καὶ ὁ βρυγμὸς τῶν ὀδόντων, ‘and the gnashing of the teeth,’ instead of the joyful use which they would have made of them, if allowed to sit at table with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of heaven.—Here the article occurs no less than *five* times, and has in each case its full force in expressing the contrast intended by the speaker. But let us hear Dr. M. “This is another of the passages which might induce an English reader, but superficially acquainted with the Greek language, to suppose that its article may be inserted *ad libitum*. The expression occurs in the N. T. seven times, and always in the same form: the usage therefore cannot be supposed to be arbitrary: and the reason why the articles are inserted is plain. The weeping and gnashing of teeth spoken of, is that of the persons last mentioned; and the sense is, ‘there shall *they* weep and gnash *their* teeth.’ Without the articles the proposition would have asserted only, that *some persons* should there weep, which falls short of the real meaning.” This is not more satisfactory than Bengel’s observation, which Dr. M. sets aside as nugatory: *Articulus insignis: in hac vita dolor nondum est dolor*.

20. Καὶ λέγει αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰησοῦς· αἱ ἀλωπεκεὶς φωλεοὺς ἐχούσι, καὶ τὰ πετεῖνα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ κατασκηνώσεις, ὁ δὲ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐκ ἔχει πού την κεφαλὴν κλινῇ. When the Scribes and Phari-

sees saw that our Lord healed all manner of diseases, some of them naturally concluded that he had intercourse with evil spirits. The magicians who professed to maintain such an intercourse, frequented subterraneous holes or caves, where the darkness of the place formed concealment and imposture. An instance is here given of a Scribe who appears to have imagined that Jesus had a retreat of this kind, where he hoped to accompany him, to be initiated in the knowledge of his mysteries, and to share in those treasures which his power must have earned from the people, and his prudence accumulated in his favourite haunt; "Master, I will follow thee, whithersoever thou goest. And Jesus saith unto him, The foxes have holes, and the birds of the air have roosts; but the son of man hath not where to rest his head." Which is to this effect: 'The deceitful and impure have indeed their holes or dens, which they frequent for the purpose of deception or impurity. But I have no such place of resort; nor have I any hidden treasure, in which my followers may partake.'—*οἱ αἰωπῆκες*, 'the foxes' generically, as symbols of cunning men who deceived others by their magical impostures. Here it is observable that our Lord for the first time calls himself *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, 'the son of the man;' which is a Jewish phrase to express a real man, or one possessing the nature and constitution of man. The propriety of the phraseology here consists in this: The Scribe who addressed him, supposed that he was of a nature different from other human beings, as being a god in a human shape, or having some demon or divinity within him. Jesus negatives this supposition by representing himself as one of the human race.

Chap. X. 17. *Προσεχετε δε ἀπο τῶν ἀνθρώπων*,—not any particular men. Jesus had just told his disciples that he should send them forth—*ὡς πρόβατα ἐν μέσῳ λύκων*: he therefore inserts the article before *ἀνθρώπων*, in order to insinuate that the *wolves*, against which they ought to be on their guard, were their *own race*. 'Beware of your own kind, who, while they ought to have a fellow-feeling for you, and to be grateful for the blessing you offer to their acceptance, will evince the

fury of wolves in tearing you to pieces.' Dr. Middleton justly rejects the supposition of Markland, that τῶν ἀνθρώπων here means the *Jews*: but he very honestly leaves the phrase where he found it—in uncertainty and obscurity. "And generally, I think," adds he, "the word ἀνθρώποι takes the article even where no particular men are meant, but only men indiscriminately, unless some of the alleged causes interfere." In ver. 32, 33, ἐμπροσθεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, and ἐμπροσθεν τοῦ πατρὸς, merely because they stand in mutual opposition.

23. Ὅταν δε διωκῶσιν ὑμᾶς ἐν τῇ πόλει ταυτῇ, φευγετε εἰς τὴν ἄλλην. When our Lord said, ἐν τῇ πόλει ταυτῇ, he probably pointed to a city within his view; and the next clause means not 'the other,' supposing some *two* to be intended, but 'one that is another.'—'When they persecute you in this city, flee to that which is different,' or 'When they persecute you in one city, flee to another.'

36. Καὶ ἐχθροὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οἱ οἰκιακοὶ αὐτοῦ. Here ἀνθρώπου has the article, as meaning a rational being, to whom the Gospel was to be addressed. 'The man who becomes a convert to my religion, will find his enemies, not as usual, in wild beasts, not in strangers; but in his very domestics, who have most reason to love and obey him.' This is a quotation from Micah vii. 6. as interpreted by the 70 translators. See Dr. Middleton's note.

Chap. XI. 2. Ὁ δε Ἰωάννης ἀκουσας ἐν τῷ δεσμοτηρίῳ τὰ ἔργα τοῦ Χριστοῦ, 'When John heard in prison the works of the Christ.' The English version is "the works of Christ," by which the peculiar force of the passage is lost. The meaning is, 'When John in prison heard that Jesus was doing such things as he and all the Jewish nation expected the Christ would do when he should appear.' Mr. Wakefield has properly retained the article, and in his commentary given the following pertinent note: "This is, I believe, the only place in which our Lord is denominated *the Christ* by the Evangelist speaking in his own person. In other places, he calls him only *Jesus*. And he appears to me to have used the characteristic appellation of our Saviour on this occasion, with a peculiar re-

ference to the doubts and misconceptions of *John the Baptist* upon this subject." It is not however correct to say that the Evangelist speaking in his own person calls Jesus *the Christ* in this place: he uses it only as a title in the mouth of John and his disciples, and applicable to Jesus, not immediately and absolutely, but in consequence of the works which were universally expected to be the works of the Christ, whoever he might be, and whenever he should come.

29. Καὶ εὕρετε ἀναπαύσιν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὑμῶν. 'And ye shall find rest to *your souls*,' not to your bodies. Our Lord it seems thus accosted some people that were busily engaged in gathering corn. And the whole of the context furnishes striking instances of that metaphorical language suggested by association from the objects around him. The articles mark a similar contrast between *ψυχή* and *σῶμα*, in chap. x. 28, and vi. 25, and in many other places.

Chap. XII. 7. Οὐκ ἀν κατεδίκασατε τοὺς ἀναιτίους. 'You would not have accused *the innocent—such as are innocent or blameless*,' in opposition to the guilty. The force of the article here, as in most other places, was unknown to Dr. M., whose words on the occasion are; "Without the article the proposition would have been exclusive, and would thus have denied more than the circumstances required. The guiltless persons meant, are only Christ and his apostles." But *τοὺς ἀναιτίους*, though including Christ and his followers, is not confined to them, but means a whole class,—'all such as were not deserving of accusation or blame.' The Pharisees, under the influence of the same prejudice, and to answer a similar end, would have been equally ready to blame any other person, however innocent: and our Lord here imputes it to them as a crime, that from selfish views they censured not those deserving of censure, but such as were entirely free from fault.

29. Πῶς δύναται τις εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν τοῦ ἰσχυροῦ, 'How can any one enter the house of the strong one—of one that is strong;' that is, one that has strength to repel the assailant and defend his house. Here the article has a generic sense, *one that is strong*, in opposition to one that is weak.

This is what Dr. M. calls *hypothetic*: and he is here right, though Wakefield is also right in supposing that it has reference to *Satan*. ὁ ἀγαθός, ὁ κακός, are used by Homer II. ρ. ver. 279, 284, as denoting, not individuals, but two whole classes,—‘the brave, the coward.’ The same application is familiar to all the Greek authors. We have it in ver. 35 of this chapter.

32. Ὅς δ’ ἂν εἰπῇ κατὰ τοῦ Πνεύματος τοῦ Ἁγίου. Here the article is repeated to hold forth the spirit of God under the influence of which Jesus acted, in opposition to an ‘impure spirit,’ such as that of Beelzebub, to which the Scribes and Pharisees imputed his works. ‘To speak against the holy spirit,’ means perversely and wilfully to ascribe to an evil spirit, works which they knew from unquestionable evidence had proceeded from God alone. This is the sin against the Holy Ghost which Jesus imputes to his enemies, and which implies such a degree of depravity as rendered them unfit objects of divine forgiveness either in that or the subsequent age.

35. Ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος . . . ἐκβάλλει τὰ ἀγαθὰ . . . ὁ πονηρὸς ἐκβάλλει πονήρα. ‘The good man’ generically, in opposition to ὁ πονηρὸς ‘the bad,’—τὰ ἀγαθὰ, ‘things that are good,’ in contradistinction to τὰ πονήρα. But in the last instance the article is omitted, πονήρα for τὰ πονήρα. It has already been observed that, when two words stand in mutual contrast, the article is often prefixed to *one*; and to both only when the writer wishes to render the contrast or opposition particularly emphatic or prominent. Here the omission is without prejudice to the sense. See Dr. Middleton’s note, which shows how much he and others were in the dark on the subject.

43. Ὅταν δὲ τὸ ἀκαθάρτον πνεῦμα ἐξέλθῃ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ‘When the evil spirit goeth out of *the* man;’ not any particular man, but man contrasted with a spirit that is evil or impure. The article before each places them in mutual opposition, as distinct persons or things; and when the evil spirit is gone,—when his system of evil habits, or predominant passions, supposed to have been engendered by a demon, are separated

from him,—man then remains what he was made by his great Creator, a *rational being*, restored to the image of his Maker. The article in this place characterizes him as such.

Chap. XIII. 44. *Εν τῷ ἀγρῷ*, 'in a spot which was a field,' in opposition to a garden or inclosure. The parable is founded on the state of morals at the time in Judea. The person who found the treasure would have thought it a direct act of *dishonesty* to take it away, as belonging to another. He therefore compounds with his conscience by going and buying the field, without apprising the owner of the treasure it contains. "The article," says Dr. M., "seems to have been originally inserted from the frequent use of *ἀγρος* in the sense of 'the country,' and not from its being necessary in this place : here it must signify an *estate* or *farm*, as is evident from *τον ἀγρον ἐκεῖνον* following." Our Lord supposes 'a field,' because it would have been more difficult or impracticable to buy a house or a garden or some other inclosure, and therefore the machinery of the parable would seem less probable. We have a similar use of the article in *τα κρινα τοῦ ἀγροῦ*, 'the lilies of the field,' chap. vi. 28. that is, 'wild lilies,' which grow of themselves, without care or cultivation, in opposition to flowers and plants reared with care in a garden or nursery.

Chap. XIV. 33. *Οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ ἐλθόντες προσεκύνησαν αὐτῷ λέγοντες, ἀληθῶς Θεοῦ υἱός εἶ.* The men in the ship, who made this confession, must have heard of the wonderful things done by our Lord ; they also must have heard that at his baptism he was signalized by a voice from Heaven, declaring him to be the son of God ; that is, declaring him to have been sent by God, and that consequently the power he displayed was derived from God, and from no other source. The truth of this report seems to have been the principal thing which the mariners doubted. They doubted not his miracles ; but they apprehended that he performed these by intercourse with demons or evil spirits. The power even of Beelzebub their chief, though able to do things far above human power, was yet supposed to be limited. Jesus on entering the vessel displayed a power, an authority which he could have derived only from

the Almighty, having stilled the wind and the waves by his mere command. The result filled the mariners with instant conviction, that the report of his having received a commission from Heaven, and been marked out by a heavenly voice that he was the son of God, was perfectly true. "Hence they exclaimed, Truly thou art the son of God." Dr. M. justly observes that the adverb *αληθῶς* is expressive both of their former doubt and their present conviction. This writer, however, seems to have missed the principal point, as he did not discover that the men alluded to the scene which took place at his baptism; thus acknowledging that Jesus acted in the name and with the authority of God, and was not an agent in the hand of Satan. But the words *Θεοῦ υἱός* are anarthrous: In the declaration from Heaven, 'This is my beloved son,' &c. the article is put before *υἱός*: and when the Tempter presently alludes to the same declaration, he uses the article before *Θεοῦ*. But why did not the mariners adopt the same usage, if they alluded to the same event? This is the plain reason: The heavenly voice holds forth Jesus as 'the Son of God,' in opposition to John who was but his *herald*, though supposed himself to be the Messiah by the people. The language of the Tempter is without this reference to the Baptist: *υἱός* therefore, in his mouth, is without the article; but *υἱός τοῦ Θεοῦ* is a renewed mention of what was already known, and for this reason required the article. But these minute distinctions were unknown to the mariners, and accordingly they assert the same fact in general terms, without any contrast or opposition.

This is capable of being illustrated by another singular incident. In chap. xvi. 15, the people perceiving the miracles of Jesus, supposed him to be either John the Baptist, or one of the prophets: but Peter, on being asked his opinion, answers, *Σὺ εἶ ὁ Χριστὸς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ζῶντος*, 'Thou art the Christ the son of the living God.' This answer is supposed to have been revealed to Peter on this occasion. The supposition is absurd; because it implies a *miracle* where there was no occasion for it; and because it is an established fact, that the Universal Father made no communication whatever to the

Apostles, but through the intervention of his Son. Peter saw the erroneous notions entertained by the people; and in order to make himself sure of being right, he recalls to his memory the scene of Christ's baptism, and makes use of the language of God himself on that occasion. The sagacity, the sound and sober sense, which Peter showed at this juncture, filled the blessed Jesus with delight, and drew forth from him the extraordinary language which he uses in the sequel. Peter, it is observable, does not state the fact which was the foundation of his opinion: but our Lord knew it, and thus himself repeats it; "Blessed art thou Simon Bar-jonas, for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father who is in heaven." Here it is further to be observed, that the Apostle uses the article before both nouns; and he did it for this plain reason,—that the declaration which he makes is opposed to the several opinions entertained by the people. Thus the phrases *ὁ υἱος Θεοῦ* and *ὁ υἱος τοῦ Θεοῦ* or *ὁ υἱος τοῦ Θεοῦ* mean exactly the same thing; with this difference, that when anarthrous, the words convey a general assertion, but when limited by the article, they imply an emphasis, or opposition to something else.

Chap. XVIII. 3. *Και γενησθε ὡς τα παιδιά*, 'as little children' generically,—such as children in general are,—docile, humble, free from pride, ambition, revenge and cunning. The pride and ambition which the disciples displayed, when they now found Jesus confessing that he was the Christ, were the passions which distinguished the *Gnostic teachers*. This circumstance appears to have led our Lord to animadvert on the conduct of those impostors on this occasion; and the obstacles thrown in the way of his Gospel by their artful doctrines and vices are the offences, *τα σκανδαλα*, mentioned in ver. 7, which Dr. M., following Noesselt and Schleusner, erroneously takes to mean the calamities and persecutions which awaited the Christian Church.

Chap. XXVI. 26. *Εσθιοντων δε αὐτῶν, λαβων ὁ Ἰησοῦς τον ἄρτον, και ευλογησας, εκλασε, &c.—τον ἄρτον*, 'the loaf,' a particular loaf prepared for the occasion. It was necessary it should be *one*, because it was designed to be an emblem of

one thing; namely, the body of our Lord. To this Paul alludes, as Campbell has pertinently observed,—*εἰς ἄρτος, ἐν σῶμα*, 1 Cor. x. 17.

Our Lord appears to have had a peculiar method of cutting the loaf; and it was by this circumstance that he became known to the two disciples at Emmaus. The loaf was not distributed, till *after* the disciples had finished their regular meal: for their Divine Master cut the loaf and blessed it while they were yet eating.—The article before *ἄρτον* as used by Matthew is proper, not only because it means *one* loaf, but because it stands contrasted with *το ποτήριον*, which succeeds it. Yet Mark and Luke in the parallel passages have omitted the article, and *ἄρτον* in them is to be rendered by *bread*: and all that is lost by this omission is the contrast between it and *το ποτήριον*: for the *unity* of the loaf is implied in the saying, ‘This is my body,’ preserved by both the Evangelists.

MARK.

Chap. I. 1. *Ἀρχὴ τοῦ Ευαγγελίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ*. As this Evangelist has no reference to the expectation of the people that John was the Messiah, *υἱος* is without the article: but as he refers to the declaration from Heaven announcing Jesus to be the son of God, he inserts it before *Θεοῦ*, as a renewed impression of what was already known. Dr. M. saw nothing of this, and his note is as follows: “Here Markland conjectures that we should read *τοῦ υἱοῦ*, and he thinks that the article has been lost by the homœoteleuton of *Χρ.* preceding. Titles however in apposition frequently want the article. It is to the full as probable that *τοῦ* before *Θεοῦ* ought to be omitted, as in the Vat. 1209.”

Chap. XII. 27. *Οὐκ ἐστὶ ὁ Θεὸς νεκρῶν, ἀλλὰ Θεὸς ζωντῶν*.—*ὁ Θεὸς* emphatically, ‘he who is God—the being that is God.’ The construction is elliptical, *ὁ Θεὸς οὐκ ἐστὶ Θεὸς νεκρῶν*, ‘He who is God is not God of the dead.’

Chap. XIII. 11. *Οὐ γὰρ ἐσε ὑμεῖς οἱ λαλοῦντές, ἀλλὰ τὸ Πνεῦμα τοῦ Ἁγίου*, ‘the holy spirit’ communicated to the Apostles after the ascension of their Divine Master, to enable them to

work miracles, and to speak with unknown tongues in attestation of that fact. The article repeated holds forth this spirit as holy or pure, in opposition to demons or unclean spirits which were thought sometimes to take possession of men for dwelling in them; and which some believed, or affected to believe, to have been the case with Christ and his followers.

28. *Απο δε τῆς συκῆς μαθετε την παραβολην*, literally 'From the fig-tree learn the parable:' which is elliptical. 'Learn the moral lesson which the case of this fig-tree, by means of a parable or comparison, suggests to you.' "The article," says Dr. M., "is not without its use, as a superficial reader might conclude: a particular similitude is founded on a particular tree." I do not know how a reader that is not superficial might become wiser by this remark.

Chap. XIV. 10. *Ὁ Ἰουδας ὁ Ἰσκαριωτης, εἰς τῶν δωδεκα.* "The first article," says Dr. M., "in a great many MSS. is wanting: and Griesbach prefixes to it the mark of probable spuriousness. Judas had never been mentioned by this Evangelist excepting once in chap. iii. which is so far back, that the use of the article would hardly be justifiable on the grounds of previous mention: and when it is subjoined that the Judas here spoken of was one of the twelve, the spuriousness of the article is fully established. The second article also is absent from a few MSS., and probably should have been omitted in all."

In opposition to this I hesitate not to say that, if there be a place where the article is appropriate and even necessary more than any other, it is this. In those passages, where Matthew, Mark and Luke, give the names of the disciples, the article before *Ἰουδας* is omitted,—and for this reason; because it is a case of simple enumeration, without any contrast or opposition whatever. But *here* the matter is quite different. Judas is brought forward not merely as a person distinguished by this name, but as a *moral agent* acting on circumstances every one of which required to be distinctly marked: *ὁ Ἰουδας... ἀπελθε προς τοὺς ἀρχιερεῖς ἵνα παραδῷ αὐτὸν αὐτοῖς.* 'The man Judas,' *ὁ ἀνὴρ Ἰουδας*, or *ὁ λεγόμενος Ἰουδας*, 'He called Judas' did thus. It appears that another of the disciples was called Judas. This

rendered it necessary to add his Gentile name in the most emphatic manner,—ὁ Ἰουδᾶς ὁ Ἰσκαριώτης, 'Judas he that was Iscariot.' This man, thus designated, acted this treacherous part though εἰς τῶν δώδεκα, 'one of the twelve—though one of the constant companions and the confidential friends of Jesus.'

36. Καὶ ελεγεν, Ἀββᾶ ὁ πατήρ. On this Mr. Wakefield observes, "Every reader of sensibility would rejoice at the suppression of ὁ πατήρ as in the Arabic and Persian versions." This proceeds on the supposition that ὁ πατήρ was used by our Lord in addition to Ἀββᾶ, which is most absurd: the word is inserted by the Evangelist as explanatory of the Syriac term: as if he had written, 'And Jesus said, *Abba*, which means *the father*.' The article ὁ is prefixed to render prominent what we on such an occasion should express by the possessive *my*—'Abba, *my* Father.'

69. ἡ παιδισκη, "The article in this place," says Dr. M., "as Biblical scholars well know, has been a source of great embarrassment. St. Matthew relating the same transaction, has, instead of ἡ παιδισκη, ('the maid' recently mentioned) ἄλλη, 'another maid.' To get rid of this difficulty, Michaelis had proposed to read simply παιδισκη. Rosenmüller with less apparent temerity has recourse to the common expedient of making ἡ παιδισκη equivalent to παιδισκη τις, *quo modo interdum sumi articulum certum est*; than which nothing is more absurd in theory, or more false in practice. The whole difficulty, however, has arisen from the vain expectation that the Evangelists must always agree with each other in the most minute and trivial particulars: as if the credibility of our religion rests on such agreement, or any reasonable scheme of inspiration required this exact correspondence."

This is a liberal concession from one who believed the inspiration of the Scriptures; but it is misplaced. Matthew and Mark relate the exact truth, though each relates it but partially. From both these Evangelists it appears that there were more than *one* maid present, when the charge was brought against Peter. And the affair stood thus: While he was warming himself, one of the maids of the chief priest, who knew him,

accompanied with another, came up and accused him of being one of Jesus's companions: having denied it, he withdrew to the porch on the outside. The young woman, who had hitherto been silent, followed to see where he went, and joined him to tell the persons there present that he was a follower of Jesus. Matthew takes up the narrative with her who first brought the charge; and then gives an account of the other young woman who followed him without, and who renewed the accusation after she had joined him and others in the porch, "And when he was gone out into the porch, *another* maid saw him; and said unto them that were there, This man was also with Jesus of Nazareth."

The first young woman, as soon as Peter had left in consequence of the charge, staid a little behind, explaining and confirming the fact, that he was one of Jesus's companions. Having done this to their conviction, she and a party of them then followed him to the spot where he was, and where the charge had been repeated by her fellow-servant; and she again renews the accusation. Mark has taken no notice of the intermediate part acted by the second maid, but confined his narrative to the principal. "And the maid saw him again, and began to say to them that stood by, This is one of them." This is the damsel who first brought the charge: hence Mark calls her ἡ παιδίσκη. The whole of this is quite in character. The person who made the deepest impression on Peter, was the maid that first and last had accused him: and as Mark wrote under his direction, it was natural that he should not have noticed the other, as is done by Matthew.

JOHN.

Chap. I. 4. Καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἦν τὸ φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, 'And the life was the light of the men—of the human race.' The light of the sun belongs to all beings, irrational as well as rational: the life promised in the Gospel is the light of men, or of rational beings only. The article marks this contrast.

21. Ὁ προφητὴς εἶ συ; 'art thou the prophet?' not any known prophet, but generically, 'Dost thou sustain the prophetic character?'—'art thou one that is a prophet?' So in

chap. iii. 10. Σὺ εἶ ὁ διδασκαλὸς τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ, 'Dost thou sustain the character of a teacher?—art thou one that is a teacher in Israel?'

To show the darkness that hangs over the article in instances of this sort, I will here quote the words of Dr. Middleton. "To determine the precise meaning of the appellative (διδασκαλὸς) is a task which I believe no commentator pretends to have accomplished. We know that Nicodemus was a person of high consideration, and a member of the Sanhedrim: and some suppose him, and not without reason, to be the same Nicodemus who is frequently mentioned in the *Talmud*, in which case he was not in wealth and consequence inferior to any Jew of that time. Still it will be asked, why did our Saviour say to Nicodemus, 'Art thou the teacher of Israel?' I have only conjecture to offer; but even this may be tolerated, where nothing certain is known, and where even conjecture has scarcely been attempted. It has been observed that the Jews gave their Doctors high and sounding titles; in the same manner probably as among the Schoolmen in the middle ages, one was called the *Angelic Doctor*, another the *Admirable*, and a third the *Irrefragable*. Might not then Nicodemus have been styled by his followers ὁ διδασκαλὸς τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ? On this supposition nothing is more probable than that our Saviour should have taken occasion to reprove the folly of those who conferred the appellation, and the vanity of him who accepted it: and no occasion could have been more opportune than the present, when Nicodemus betrayed his ignorance on a very important subject." I quote this passage to show that Dr. Middleton, though he wrote upon it, had but an imperfect notion of the generic force of the article, and that he plunged himself and his readers in idle conjecture, instead of seizing the signification which lay on the surface of the Greek text.

31. Δια τοῦτο ἦλθον ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι βαπτίζων, "In this water," says Mr. Wakefield, "pointing at the same time to the river just by." This critic, like others, did not comprehend the generic power of the article. John inculcates his subordination to our Lord by showing, that he baptized with an in-

ferior element—*ἐν τῷ ὕδατι*, ‘water’ contrasted with *το πνεῦμα ἅγιον*, ‘the more divine and efficacious element, which the true Messiah was to administer to his followers.’ Wakefield frequently translates the article very improperly by *this* or *that*, by that means setting aside the contrast which it bears in the sentence. Thus in chap. i. 9, 10. “He was not that light, but came to bear testimony of that light; that true light which cometh into the world to enlighten every man.” Here *το φῶς* means not *this* or *that* light, but light, in opposition to *ἡ σκοτία*, ‘darkness.’ It is synonymous with the *Logos*, now communicated to the man Jesus, which makes God what he is, a rational all-perfect Being—all light, and in whom there is no darkness: *το φῶς το ἀληθινον*, ‘the light that is the true or real light’—that moral and intellectual light, of which even the light of the sun is but a *shadow* and an *emblem*.’

Chap. IV. 37. *Ὁ γὰρ τοῦτο ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ ὁ ἀληθινός, ὅτι ἄλλος ἐστὶ ὁ σπειρων, καὶ ἄλλος ὁ περιζων.* “Beza,” says Dr. M., “remarks on this place, that every person moderately acquainted with Greek, must perceive that the article here is inadmissible. A few MSS. indeed are without it: but as Matthæi well observes, *et abesse et adesse potest*. If we render, In this instance the saying is true, the article must be omitted: but if, In this is exemplified the true saying, the article is absolutely necessary, as in the Evangelist, i. 9; vi. 32; xv. 1. Markland refers us in behalf of the article to 2 Pet. ii. 22, which has nothing to do with the question; for there the adjective *precedes* the substantive, instead of following it. I cannot but observe of Matthæi, that he is the most accurate Greek scholar who ever edited the N. T.—Griesbach prefixes to the article the mark of possible spuriousness. In this instance, however, the great majority of the MSS. ought, I think, to prevail: they are at least as fifty to one.”

Our Lord uses this maxim in regard to his going down to Samaria, and thus preparing the Samaritans, by what he should say and do there, for receiving the Gospel, when a few years after Philip, Peter and John, should preach it in that country. If Jesus meant to say simply that the proverb was fulfilled in that

sense, he would have said, *εν τούτῳ ὁ λογος ἐστὶ ἀληθης*, but he says *ὁ ἀληθινος* ; which signifies two things very different from each other ; namely, that the saying is true, and also that it is verified in a metaphorical sense, as superior to the literal fulfilment of it as a substance is to its shadow, or the reality to its type or symbol. Our Lord marked this last sense solely by the use of the article. See the interpretation of *ἀληθινος* in my *Lexicon*.

Chap. II. 25. *Και ὅτι οὐ χρείαν εἶχεν ἵνα τις μαρτυρήσῃ περὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, αὐτος γὰρ ἐγινώσκε τι ἦν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.* Wakefield has miserably perverted this passage, which he thus renders. "But Jesus did not trust himself unto them, *because all knew him* : and because he needed not that any should testify of man, for he knew what was in man." The clause 'because all knew him' should be rendered, 'because he knew them all ;' that is, he knew their mistaken views of his kingdom, and that in consequence they would abandon him in the hour of trial ; he therefore did not put himself in their power, but kept them at a distance. The article is used in the original, *περὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*—*ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ*. And he thus adds in his notes, "I own, however, that I do not at all understand the passage ; and am confident that no man can give any account of the propriety of the article consistently with the common version. Some false reading, which I see no method of correcting, undoubtedly obscures the text." The sense of the article is generic, and the contrast expressed by it is to this effect : 'Jesus did not trust himself to them, because he knew them all ; and because he did not need that any should bear testimony to him concerning what is in man, for of himself he knew the nature of man.' 'Mankind required his testimony respecting God, but Jesus did not require the testimony of any concerning man ; for of himself, without such testimony or information, he was thoroughly acquainted with human nature.' The contrast is between *περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ* implied, and *περὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου* expressed.

Chap. V. 35. *Εκεῖνος ἦν ὁ λυχνος ὁ καιομενος καὶ φαινων.* On this Dr. M. observes, "Campbell objects to our version, 'a burning and shining light,' on the ground that the article indicates some-

thing more. So far I agree with him : but I do not believe that in this place there is any reference to the LXX, Psalm cxxxi. 17. I suppose rather that the allusion is to some phrase then in vogue among the Jews, to signify a wise and enlightened teacher : and on turning to Lightfoot, one of the best illustrators of the N. T., I find that a person famous for *light* and knowledge was called a *candle* : hence the title given to the Rabbins, *the candle of the law, the lamp of the law*. I conclude therefore that our Saviour meant to say, 'John was' (to use your own phrase) 'the burning and shining light.' Allusions of this kind are much in our Saviour's manner."

This is *toto cælo* wide of the truth. In the first place, the common version is not true to the original : this literally is, 'That man was the lamp, the burning one, and manifesting (*φαινων* in a transitive sense, and not *φαινομενος*) the object being understood and meaning our Lord himself—'making manifest whom he was sent to manifest.' The attention of Jesus was fixed on the late scene of his baptism. There we have seen that God himself marked out to the surrounding multitude the blessed Jesus as *ὁ υἱος*, 'his beloved son,' in opposition to the Baptist, who was but a *domestic* or *herald*. A contrast to this effect our Lord now had in his mind. "He was but a lamp shining in the midst of surrounding darkness, in whose light you exulted during the few hours of night, like those who riot at the festive board. These hours soon ended ; and the glimmering light of John, like that of a lamp, became extinct, and the luminary, of which the light of the sun is but a faint emblem, rose above the horizon of the moral world'—*ὁ λυχνος*, one that is but a lamp, opposed to *το φῶς τοῦ κοσμου*. Our Lord in the sequel continues his allusion to the testimony which the Father himself gave him on that occasion.

Chap. VIII. 31. *Εαν ὑμεῖς μείνητε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ ἐμῷ, ἀληθῶς μαθηταὶ μου ἐστέ*. 'If ye persevere in the doctrine which is mine.' This alludes to the false doctrine which the Gnostics would soon substitute for the genuine Gospel. Our Lord foresaw the wide prevalence of the Gnostic system in every place, but especially in Jerusalem, where it was formed by his enemies.

Many of those whom Jesus now addressed became the victims of this delusion, and he forewarns them: 'If ye continue in *my* doctrine, ye are truly my disciples—in *my* doctrine, and not be led astray by the specious doctrine of certain impostors.'

44. Ὅταν λαλή το ψεύδους, the abstract for the concrete—'When the liar speaks, or When one that is a liar speaks, he speaks of his own, for he is a liar, as also is his father.'

Chap. IX. 24. Δος δόξαν τῷ Θεῷ 'Give glory to God;' that is, to God and not to this man, for he is a sinner—τῷ Θεῷ, ἀλλὰ οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ τούτῳ.

Chap. XII. 24. Εὰν μὴ ὁ κόκκος τοῦ σίτου πεσῶν εἰς τὴν γῆν ἀποθάνῃ, 'unless the grain of wheat—that which is a grain of wheat—having fallen to the ground, dies.' Our Lord considered the grain of wheat put in the ground, after dying and producing much fruit, as a symbol of his own death and resurrection, causing many to believe in him. Mr. Wakefield renders ὁ κόκκος, 'this grain,' and adds, "an elegant designation of himself; on which circumstance the elegance and beauty of the article depends in this place." On this Dr. M. remarks, "This is not the only instance in which Mr. W. has confounded ὁ with οὗτος: he might as well have said that ἡ γυνή, xvi. 21, is an elegant designation of some particular woman; whereas nothing can be more remote from the sense: he did not perceive that the article may be used *hypothetically*." The hypothetical use of the article is not very intelligible; but the reader will easily understand, when told that the article before κόκκος marks it not as some known grain, but as a thing which, being put in the ground, having died there and sprung up again, produces much fruit, was a symbol of the death and resurrection of our Lord, and the consequent diffusion of his Gospel.

Chap. XIII. 13. Ὑμεῖς φωνεῖτε με, ὁ Διδασκαλὸς καὶ ὁ Κύριος, καὶ καλῶς λεγετέ· εἰμι γάρ. Mr. Wakefield considers the article here as the sign of the vocative, and thus very improperly renders the verse: "You say unto me, O teacher, and O master; and ye say well, for so I am."

This is the consequence of interpreting an ancient author without knowing the facts upon which his language is founded:

for this is most emphatically levelled against the Gnostic impostors, who, though they pretended to extol Christ beyond the nature of man, uniformly denied any obligation on their part to consider him as *their Lord and Master*. This information is given us by Irenæus in words the most unequivocal. Their motive for refusing to acknowledge Jesus as their Lord and Master, was to evade the obligation which they would be otherwise under, to obey his divine precepts and imitate his pure and spotless example. Now Jesus caused this verse to be on record, in order to hold it forth to the world, that all his followers, if they were such in sincerity and truth, must and would acknowledge him under these relations. The sense of the verse then is, ‘You accost me as one that is your Master and your Lord—as one who sustains both these characters toward you; and ye call me so rightly, for so I am.’

There is another thing observable here—the repetition of the article before *Κυριος*, which might be avoided. But it was the object of our Lord to render both titles, the last as well as the first, prominent and emphatic; and its repetition was then unavoidable. But hear Dr. M., who in this instance was determined to sacrifice his good sense to the support of a system, at the expense of truth. “The editt. of Erasm. Colin. and Bogard, omit the latter article, I suppose, from a belief that it interferes with the usage which has lately been defended by Granville Sharp. No MS. however warrants the omission; nor is it at all necessary: for though both titles are meant to be applied to our Saviour, they are not spoken of as being applied *at the same time*, but distinctly and independently, as if our Saviour had said, One of you calls me *ὁ Διδασκαλος*, another *ὁ Κυριος*. The article then is necessary to each of the nouns, as must be evident on considering the reason of the rule. Part I. Chap. iii. Sect. iv.” This is not interpreting the words of Jesus, but putting in his mouth words different from his own.

Chap. XVI. 13. *Ὅταν δε ελθῇ ἐκεῖνος, τὸ Πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας, ὁδηγήσει ὑμᾶς εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν ἀληθειαν*. ‘When he, the spirit of truth, shall come, he will lead you into all the truth.’ This language is pointedly levelled against the Gnostic impostors: they

maintained that the Apostles were illiterate, and that for this reason Christ did not communicate to them all the mysteries of the Gospel. In opposition to this, their Divine Master assures them, that the spirit they were to receive after his departure, would reveal to them all the important truths which constitute his Gospel, and which they had to preach to the world. The article here twice put before *αληθεια*, characterizes the doctrine which the Apostles were to preach as *true*, in opposition to the monstrous falsehoods and fictions which the deceivers pretended to be the true Gospel.

The Evangelist John explains this very passage in his Epistle. After noticing those who denied the Father and the Son, and calling them *liars* and *antichrist*, 1 Epist. ii. 22, he adds: "These things I have written concerning those who deceive you." The deception consisted in their pretending that they were acquainted with certain sublime truths beyond the knowledge of the Apostles, which rendered it necessary that the converts should be taught anew by them. Hear now what the Apostle says in regard to this pretension. "As to you the endowment (of the Holy Spirit) which ye have received from him remains in you, and ye have no need that any one should teach you; and as the same divine endowment which teaches you in all things, is true and not a lie; as then it hath taught you, remain in it." ver. 29.

Chap. XVII. 3. 'Αυτὴ δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ αἰώνιος ζωὴ, ἵνα γινώσκωσι σὲ τὸν μόνον ἀληθινὸν Θεόν, καὶ ὃν ἀπεστείλας Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν.

The authors of Gnosticism were Epicurean Jews, and real, though disguised atheists. In defiance of the evidence from nature and revelation, they rejected the all-mighty and all-wise Creator, as an evil imperfect being; and without any evidence from either, they pretended to reveal a supreme deity of their own fancy, which from eternity had lived in unruffled ease and inaccessible solitude. By this artifice they attempted to dig up the very foundation of natural religion. Their next attempt was to undermine revelation; and this they endeavoured to do by saying that the Christ was not the man Jesus, but a God dwelling in him for a season. This God, they pretended, did

not come from Jehovah ; but, on the contrary, he came to destroy his works ; and thus they denied Jesus to be the son of God, or, according to the language of John, 1 Epist. ii. 22, "They denied the Father and the Son." To these two artful and malignant dogmas, the language of our Lord is directly levelled. "This is life eternal, to know thee the only true God, and whom thou hast sent, Jesus Christ,"—τον αληθινον, 'him that exists in reality and truth, as evinced in his word and in his works,' in opposition to the feigned supreme divinity which the deceivers affected to have revealed. Be it observed, that this is the only place in which our Lord calls himself *Jesus Christ*. The reason is, that he here directs his language against those who divided him, as if he were two separate or independent beings.

The author of this gospel, who was a competent judge, has used this very passage in his Epistle, against the impostors, and thus determines its primary application ; for at the close he thus writes : "We know that the Son of God is come ; and he hath given us discernment to know the true God (τον αληθινον) ; and we are in the true God (εν τῷ αληθινῷ) by means of his son, Jesus Christ. This is the true God (ὁ αληθινος Θεος), and the life eternal." He then concludes : τεκνια, φυλαξατε εαυτους απο των ειδωλων, "Dear children, guard yourselves from idols," literally 'from the idols—from such things as are idols,' in opposition to ὁ αληθινος Θεος, thrice mentioned in the preceding verse. The chief of these idols was the unknown God, which the Gnostics pretended to have brought to light. "This God," says the Apostle, "the Creator and Governor of the world, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, is the true God, and not the unknown God which antichrist holds forth as an object of worship."

ACTS.

Chap. II. 47. 'Ο δε Κυριος προσετιθει τους σωζομενους καθ' ημεραν τῇ εκκλησια. 'And the Lord daily added to the church those saved—such as are saved—such as preserve themselves sincere and faithful members of it,' in opposition to those sons

of destruction (οἱ ἀπολλυμένοι), who, after joining the church for a season, yielded to false shame and persecution, or followed after those impostors, who immediately set up a false Gospel to defeat the end of the true one.

The distresses which assailed the early converts were so great, as to be utterly inconceivable to those who have little or no knowledge of the state of things at that period. Wherever a Christian church was established, the Adversary made every effort to destroy or scatter its members. These members therefore, like faithful soldiers, were required to be constantly under arms—to be steeled as it were with fixed purpose and unshaken conviction—to keep their ranks in a firm compact body like a phalanx, when the foe was preparing to run them down or scatter them abroad. To this state of things the author of the Acts alludes in the above verse, and still more expressly in the following: “And the Gentiles who heard rejoiced, and magnified the doctrine of the Lord; and they believed, *as many as arranged themselves* (under its banners) for eternal life.” Acts xiii. 48. Ὅσοι ἦσαν τεταγμένοι—in a reflex sense, as is very common with the perfect and pluperfect passive—‘as many as put themselves in battle array.’ The use of the pluperfect here supposes that the believers, as soon as they had enlisted themselves under the banners of Christ, were for some time drilled and trained in the new doctrine, before they were enabled, as it were, with all the advantages of discipline, to sustain the attacks of the enemy. See Ephes. vi. 13. The Calvinists, I perceive, make use of this verse as a powerful weapon in their favour. Dr. M. was anti-calvinistic; and he endeavours to wrest from them the verse, by giving the following vapid interpretation of it: “They believed as many as felt a *longing after immortality*.”

Chap. V. 4. Οὐκ ἐψευσω ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ τῷ Θεῷ, “Thou hast committed this falsehood not against men, but against God.” Dr. Middleton’s comment is the following. “From a comparison of this verse with the preceding one, as well as from other passages, theologians have in all ages inferred that the Holy Ghost is God.” The opinions of the Fathers may be seen in

Suicer, vol. ii. p. 769. Wetstein, indeed, has remarked, that $\delta \Theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ with the article is always confined to *God the Father*. I have however already shown that no such distinction is observed: $\delta \Theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ and $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ are used indiscriminately, except where grammatical rules interfere. In this place $\Theta\epsilon\tilde{\omega}$ and $\tau\tilde{\omega} \Theta\epsilon\tilde{\omega}$ would have been equivalent: thus we have in this chapter, ver. 29, $\pi\epsilon\iota\theta\alpha\rho\chi\epsilon\iota\nu \Theta\epsilon\tilde{\omega} \mu\tilde{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu \eta \alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\iota\varsigma$. If, however, the article had been wanting in the present passage, we should probably have been told that the Holy Spirit is God only in an inferior sense."

If Dr. M. had discovered the real object of the awful scene here recorded, he would hardly have penned the above criticism. When Peter and John cured the lame man, the people present had no idea of the source of the power with which they acted: the natural conclusion for them to draw was, that they acted *in their own names*, having immediate communication with some unknown demon, and being *principals* in the wonderful affair. The mistake thus committed by the spectators, is placed beyond all doubt by the language of Peter. "Men of Israel, why wonder ye at this, or Why fix ye your attention on us, as if by our own power or godliness we caused this man to walk." chap. iii. 12. He then explicitly informs them, that the source of their power was the Holy Spirit of God, communicated to them in the name, and through the medium of the Lord Jesus, who had ascended to the right hand of the Father, and who thence delegated this holy spirit of power to substantiate, before the whole world, the great facts, that he indeed had ascended there, and would again return to raise the dead and lead his faithful followers into glory. This explanation was given again and again:—finding it so remote from their established prejudices, and being withal very improbable in itself, the people were unable to believe it. Ananias and his wife appear to have been of this number. They sold their property and gave it to the church, with a view to share in the common stock, but sequestered a part: this act they apprehended affected the heads of the church only, and had no reference to the spirit of God. But the Almighty immediately

took the affair into his own hands ; and to show to all present, and to all in Jerusalem, that it was against his holy spirit the offence was really committed, he recalled the breath which he had given ; and Ananias and Sapphira fell dead at the feet of the Apostles. This awful lesson decided the question : Peter foretells their fate, and the prediction was instantly verified ; thus showing that the Holy Spirit had doubly instructed him to penetrate the secret designs of those at the time absent from him, and moreover to foresee the consequence that was to ensue.

Here, then, we see the full force of the Apostle's words to Ananias : " Thou hast committed this lie not against men, but against God"—τῷ Θεῷ, contrasted with the preceding ἀνθρώποις—emphatically against God, as one whom Ananias supposes not to be concerned in the miracle, and therefore one whom he could not have offended by this act of fraud.

13. Τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς ἐτόλμα κολλᾶσθαι αὐτοῖς· ἀλλ' ἐμεγάλυνεν αὐτοὺς ὁ λαός, ' No one of the rest dared to adhere to them (that is to the Apostles), but the people magnified them ;' which means ' No one after the case of Ananias joined the Apostles as *principals* in this new and wonderful scheme ; yet, though they acted only a subordinate part, such were their integrity, zeal, and disinterestedness, that all the people loved, honoured, and extolled them.'

14. Μᾶλλον δὲ προσετίθεντο πιστευόντες τῷ Κυρίῳ, πληθὴ ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ γυναικῶν· " Multitudes of both men and women were over and above added to the church, believing rather in the Lord."—τῷ Κυρίῳ, in Jesus as their Lord, and no longer in the Apostles as the supreme heads of the church.

Chap. VII. 20. Καὶ ἦν αἰεὶς τῷ Θεῷ, ' and he was comely to God.' Maschleff, I believe, was the first who interpreted this language as conveying a superlative idea of Moses's beauty. Mr. Wakefield, after him, translates it "divinely beautiful : " as if Stephen, now in the act of dying, with his mind fixed on the awful scene before him, had leisure or inclination to compliment Moses for his infantine beauty. Learned men sometimes seem to have thought that when they became biblical critics, they should leave common sense as far behind them as possible.

"Moses indeed was known to have been very handsome. This doubtless was a recommendation to him with men, and especially with the daughter of Pharaoh. This is the circumstance on which the language of *Stephen* is founded. 'He was beautiful to men, he was also beautiful to God.' While he possessed those personal qualities which rendered him beautiful in the sight of men, he possessed also those mental qualities which made him beautiful in the sight of God." The article marks this contrast, and serves to bring it to light.

52. Καὶ ἀπεκτείναν τοὺς προκαταγγειλάντας περὶ τῆς ἐλευσεως τοῦ δικαίου, ὃν νυν ὑμεῖς προδοταὶ καὶ φονεῖς γεγενήσθε. 'And they slew those who fore-announced the advent of the Just One, of whom ye became betrayers and murderers.' "This term," says Dr. M. (ὁ δίκαιος) "is evidently used κατ' ἐξοχὴν to signify Christ:" and then he shows in an elaborate note that he had been predicted under this title. This may be true, because he was predicted as a suffering Messiah, and one that would suffer *unjustly*. This was the leading idea in the mind of Stephen on this occasion: he calls his Divine Master τὸν δίκαιον 'one that was just,—one who did not merit the cruel treatment which he had received from his enemies;' his claims as the Son of God being fully justified. He suffered indeed, but he suffered an innocent and righteous man. Those therefore who put him to death, as a malefactor and blasphemer, were betrayers and murderers."

On this principle the following verse of Luke, chap. xxiii. 47, receives an easy and obvious explanation. ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ ἑκατονταρχὸς τὸ γενομένον, ἐδοξάσε τὸν Θεόν, λέγων, Ὀντως ὁ ἀνθρώπος οὗτος δίκαιος ἦν. 'The centurion having seen what came to pass, glorified God, saying, Most truly this man was just.' If we examine these words in connection with the awful scene that called them forth, we cannot possibly mistake their import. The centurion might hitherto have been doubtful as to the claims of Jesus. He had heard that God himself on a solemn occasion proclaimed him by a voice from heaven as his Beloved Son; but now he saw the sentence of an ignominious death passed and executed upon him: at the close of the scene, the Almighty

interposes, and heaven and earth bear testimony to the innocence, to the righteous claims of the sufferer. This is the proposition which the centurion here asserts and enforces. The sufferer was a righteous man, and ought not to have been put to death,—he was certainly so—*οὕτως* ‘in truth,’ or ‘in reality;’ thus acknowledging and correcting his former doubt. At this moment “Jesus,” it is said, “cried with a loud voice, saying, Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit; and having thus spoken he expired.” This address had a powerful effect on the centurion. Jesus, while he lived, professed to be *the Son of God*, to have derived his power and authority from him; and now, in the very face of death and amidst the agonies of crucifixion, he addresses the Almighty as his *Father*, solemnly and without hesitation recommending his spirit to his hands. This the centurion thought could not be the conduct of one that was himself deceived, or that wished to deceive others; and he considered it as a decisive proof of sincerity and truth. He therefore “glorified God,” glorified him as the Father of the innocent sufferer,—as the sole cause of the awful events which he had just witnessed, and as the only source of the power by which Jesus performed his miracles, but which his enemies imputed to an evil spirit.

The impression which the last words of the Saviour to his Heavenly Father had on the mind of the centurion, is more faithfully preserved in the narrative of Mark, chap. xv. 39, “When the centurion who stood near, and directly opposite, saw that Jesus, on having thus cried, expired, he said, Of a truth this man is the Son of God;” meaning that his recommending himself to God as his Father in this last and trying moment, proved beyond all doubt that he really was as he professed, the son of God. The *αληθως* of Mark is the same with *οὕτως* of Luke; and both adverbs suppose that the centurion now fully believed the claims of Christ, which he before doubted. It is further observable, that the clause “This is a just man” in the latter Evangelist, is of equal import with “This is the Son of God” in the former: because if Jesus were just, he must have been just and true in the character which he professed to sustain; and this was the son of God. Being in

this respect just, he was most unjustly put to death as a blasphemer.

Chap. XIV. 13. Ὁ δὲ ἱερεὺς τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸ τῆς πόλεως αὐτῶν, &c. 'And the priest of Jupiter which was before their city.' "Valckenaer," says Dr. M., "in his Adnot. Crit. in N. T. would here read ὁ ἱερεὺς τοῦ τοῦ Διὸς. He says that the interpreters suppose that a statue of Jupiter was placed before the gate of the city; but that statues of the Gods standing thus in the open air, and encompassed with a ἔρκος or περίβολος, certainly had no priests allotted them. He contends therefore that the *Temple* of Jupiter is here to be understood, and that consequently we must read as above; so that the first τοῦ may mark an ellipsis of ἱεροῦ: and he commends Casaubon for having similarly corrected a passage of Plato." Dr. M. justly rejects this emendation, but has failed to give the true sense of the passage. Valckenaer indeed is a great name in Greek literature; but his criticism here places him, as a biblical critic, in no enviable light. A passage of Pausanias, completely mistaken by Dr. M., clears up the difficulty. Thus, Μαντικλος δὲ καὶ τὸ ἱερόν Μεσσηνίοις τοῦ Ἑρακλεους ἐποίησε, καὶ ἐστὶν ἐκτὸς τειχους ὁ θεὸς ἰδρυμένος,—which means that "Manticlus built for the Messenians a temple of Hercules; and (*while this was within the city*), a statue of the god was erected also on the outside of the wall;" doubtless as an emblem of his being the guardian god of the place. See Paus. lib. iv. p. 337. Edit. Kühn.

This was the case at *Lystra*. The temple of the tutelary divinity was erected *within*, while a statue symbolical of his office lay *without* the walls. Luke had been a spectator of the transaction; and his narrative exhibits the usual characteristics of truth,—apparent incongruity on the surface, and real harmony at the bottom.

Chap. XV. 11. Ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς χάριτος Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ πιστευομεν σωθῆναι, καθ' ὃν τρόπον ἡκεῖνοι.

In this verse Peter decides the question which broke out at Antioch, and now much agitated in Jerusalem, Whether the Gentile converts were to be saved by complying with the rites

of the Mosaic law, and especially by the rite of circumcision ; or by embracing the Gospel as a free gift of God through Jesus Christ. The Judaizing zealots insisted on the former ; the Apostles on the latter. Peter's argument is conclusive, " We (Jews) believe that we shall be saved by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ—by his Gospel, a free gift from God through Jesus Christ to the human race : in the same manner they (the Gentile converts) must be saved. Circumcision then is useless ; and why impose it as an unnecessary burthen on their necks ?" The article marks the contrast with circumcision—*δια τῆς χάριτος, καὶ οὐ δια περιτομῆς πιστευομεν σωθῆναι*.

Chap. XVIII. 27. *Ὁς παραγενομενος συνεβλετο πολὺ τοῖς πεπιστευοσιν δια τῆς χάριτος*, 'Who having arrived, greatly assisted those who believed through the grace,' that is, those who embraced the Gospel, which proclaimed the free pardon of all past sins to the penitent without the ceremonies of the law, or as the Jewish zealots designated them 'the works of the law ;' *δια τῆς χάριτος*, in opposition to *δια ἐργων νομου*.

Chap. XX. 28. *Ποιμαίνειν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἣν περιποιήσατο δια τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος*, "To feed the church of God, which he (namely, Jesus) secured around by his own blood." This I doubt not is the true reading, notwithstanding Griesbach and others have attempted to set it aside as false. The apostle Paul has used the phrase 'church of God' eleven times in his Epistles, to mean an assembly of people dedicated to God by the exercise of faith and virtue. The noun *ἐκκλησία*, 'church,' was commonly used in the Grecian republics to denote 'an assembly of the people : ' and hence when Christianity was introduced, the term was borrowed to denote an assembly of men in a peculiar manner devoted to God—*ἐκκλησία τοῦ Θεοῦ*, the article being necessary to mark the difference between such an assembly and one collected for secular purposes. In illustration of this I will quote one passage of Origen against Celsus, p. 128, 129 ; see also Lardner, vol. viii. p. 49. "As God sent Jesus, having defeated all the artifices of demons, he has so ordered it, that the Gospel of Jesus should prevail every where, for reforming mankind ; and that there

should be every where leaders, governed by law different from the churches of superstitious, intemperate, and unrighteous men. For such are the manners of most of those who belong to the *churches of the cities*. But the *churches of God* instructed by Christ, compared with the *churches of the people* among whom they live, are as lights in the world. And who is there that must not acknowledge, that the worst of those who are in the *church* though inferior to the rest, are better than most of those, who are in the *churches of the people*? For instance, the *church of God* at Athens, is quiet, mild, and well-behaved, being desirous to approve itself to God, who is over all. But the church of the Athenians is turbulent, and by no means comparable to the *church of God* there. The same you must also acknowledge of the *church of God* at Corinth, and the church of the people of the Corinthians; as you must also allow of the *church of God* at Alexandria, and the churches of the people of the Alexandrians. Every one who is candid, and diligently attends to those things with a mind open to conviction, will admire him who formed this design, and has accomplished it,—that there should be every where *churches of God*, dwelling with the churches of the people in every city. And if you will observe the senate of the *churches of God*, and the senate in every city, you will find some senators of the *church* worthy to govern in the city of God all over the world, if such a city there were. And on the other hand, you will find that the senators of the cities have nothing in their behaviour to render them worthy of the distinction allotted them. And if you compare the presidents of the *churches of God* with the presidents of the people in cities, you will find the governors and senators of the churches, though some may be inferior to others, who are most perfect: nevertheless you will find them to excel in virtue the senators and governors of the cities."

The Apostle asserts a doctrine which is the fundamental principle of the Gospel,—the actual death of the Lord Jesus; and this he asserts in opposition to the Gnostic teachers, to whom he alludes and calls "grievous wolves" in the next

verse. These impostors endeavoured to set aside his death, by denying that he had flesh and blood, or a real human body; and maintaining in consequence that he suffered, rose from the dead, and ascended to heaven, *in appearance only*. This doctrine, if received into the church of God, at once levelled it with the ground, the foundations of which the Apostle was most anxious to establish. "To feed the church of God which Jesus secured for himself with his blood." The original is *περιτοιμασας*, a verb literally taken, which signifies to cause one thing to surround another, such as to make a hedge round a field, a wall round a town, a furrow or trench round a piece of land marked out for building. Hence it denotes to *procure*, to *fence*, *protect*, *adopt*. The allusion under which the term is here used, has been borrowed from the custom of marking out by a furrow or some other means, those spots of land which were destined for building. The ground on which holy men assembled to form a church to God, was it seems inclosed and sanctified by the blood of Jesus.

In these words are included three things; namely, that Christ was not without *flesh and blood*, as was maintained by the antichristian teachers; that, in order as it were to lay the foundation, to consecrate the ground, to form the cement, to fence around the church of God, his servant Jesus did in reality shed his blood, that is, suffered in fact as well as in appearance; and lastly, that the death of Christ formed the great line of distinction between the true and false believers. The former, like an innocent and peaceful flock, are inclosed on every side within its benign circumference; the latter are excluded, and kept without like beasts of prey, seeking to break down the great barrier of their faith, and to seize the unsuspecting victims of their baseness and violence.

The passage however, though genuine, and obvious as to its meaning, is in a grammatical view inaccurate. But this is an inaccuracy which may be justified and illustrated by other passages in the N. T. and by what happens in common discourse with people of every country. For in speaking and in writing it is not unusual with all men, to omit the agent or

principal subject of discourse, if it be necessarily known who that agent is, if the frequent recurrence of his name cannot fail to recall the idea of him even in circumstances where he is only alluded to. The Pythagoreans said and wrote, *αυτος εφη*, *he said it*. It was not necessary on any occasion to say that *αυτος* (*he*) meant Pythagoras. The speaker or writer, the subject of discourse, the constant reference which his disciples made to him as the highest authority, were sufficient to answer the purpose of defining him. In the same manner, it was a notorious fact that Jesus had shed his blood for the benefit of mankind; and the Apostles were constantly speaking of the generous sacrifice which he made of himself in this respect. On the notoriety of this fact, as sufficient to explain his meaning, the Apostle depended, when, carried away by the current of his ideas, without any suspicion of a grammatical incorrectness, he said, "Feed the church of God, which *he*—*he*, who as we all know died on the cross—secured with his blood."

The writers of the Christian Scriptures were plain men, little studious of grammatical propriety, when they knew their meaning to be such as could not well be misunderstood. I will give in illustration of this disputed text, an example or two of their carelessness in regard to what is called *the nominative case*. John xix. 5. "Jesus therefore went out bearing the crown of thorns and the purple robe; and *he* said, Behold the man." If we insisted on the grammatical construction, the italic *he* must mean *Jesus*, whereas the sense or context makes it to signify *Pilate* mentioned in the preceding verse. Acts vii. 1. "And the chief priest spoke, if these things were so; and *he* said" &c. And again in ver. 4. "And the God of glory appeared unto our father Abraham—and he left the land of the Chaldeans" &c. In strictness, *he* should be a substitute for *God*; but the context shows that the writer meant *Abraham*.

My conclusion then is, that no argument against a verse or a reading in the N. T. can be drawn from a grammatical inaccuracy, if similar inaccuracies occur, and frequently occur, in the writings of the same authors.

ROMANS.

On the clause *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* (chap. i. 17.) Dr. M. has this comment. "It may be right in this place to apprise the reader, that the style of St. Paul in respect to the article, as well as otherwise, somewhat differs from that of the Evangelists. It was to be expected from the general vehemence and quickness of his manner, that he would in the use of the article adopt a mode of expression the most remote from precision and formality, which the Greek idiom admits." This remark is plausible; but a correct examination would warrant me in saying that it has no foundation in truth, the omission and the adoption of the article being founded with him on the same principles which regulate the use of it in the other Evangelical writers. Thus he uses *ὁῖος*, *θεός*, *δουλος*, *κύριος*, *νόμος*, frequently without the article; and this because he uses such words without the emphasis or contrast which the presence of the article implies. On the other hand, when such opposition is intended, Paul never omits the article. Thus in chap. iii. 18. *φοβος Θεοῦ* means 'the fear of God' generally, without any contrast: had he written *ὁ φοβος τοῦ Θεοῦ*, the words would denote also 'the fear of God;' but 'the fear of God' in opposition to 'the fear of man.' In chap. ii. 11. Paul writes *Οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ προσωπολήψια παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ*: had he written *παρὰ Θεῷ*, the sense would have been this: 'for there is no respect of person with God;' but the article carries a reference to *τοῖς ἀνθρώποις*; and the sense when fully drawn out amounts to the following; '*While there is a respect of person with men, there is no respect of person with God.*'

Thus also in the 13th verse, *Οὐ γὰρ οἱ ἀκροαταὶ τοῦ νόμου δίκαιοι παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ, ἀλλ' οἱ ποιηταὶ τοῦ νόμου δικαιοῦνται*. 'For it is not the hearers of the law that are just before God; but the doers of the law shall be justified with him.' Here *οἱ ἀκροαταὶ*, and *οἱ ποιηταὶ* stand in opposition, and therefore have each the article;—not such as have a theoretic knowledge of the law, but such as carry that knowledge into practice—are just with God, *παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ*, though men may pronounce otherwise.

Paul often expresses by *νομος* without the article not law in general, but particularly the Mosaic law : on the other hand, we here see *ὁ νομος* meaning not only the law of Moses, but every institution or custom of a moral nature which is deemed law, whether human or divine—‘that which is law.’ Dr. M. asserts that the variety of senses which this word bears in the writings of Paul, is calculated to produce great perplexity to the reader : I think quite otherwise ; as there is not a passage in all the Epistles where the context fails to supply an unerring clue to ascertain its extent or true signification.

The Scribes and Pharisees who caused the death of our Lord, finding all open opposition to the Gospel ineffectual, endeavoured to undermine it by substituting in the room a Gospel of their own contrivance, better adapted to the depraved passions and prejudices of the Jews and Gentiles. A leading feature of this new Gospel was the perpetuity of the Levitical code : and in conformity to this principle they maintained, that justification or acceptance with God was to be obtained, not by repentance towards God, and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ, but by strictly observing the rite of circumcision and other ceremonies of the Mosaic law. In insisting on these ceremonies they had two main objects in view ; one was, to put an end to the prevalence of the Gospel among the Heathens by incumbering it with the rite of circumcision, which was most repulsive and odious, and which even the Apostles deemed a heavy yoke ; the second was, to supersede the purifying influence of the Gospel, by substituting, as the means of divine acceptance, an external ordinance which had no connection whatever with the duties of piety and morality. This was one leading point in the system of the Jewish Gnostics : it was fabricated at Jerusalem, and conveyed thence into the churches established by the Apostles, by means of their agents or missionaries. Hence it forms the chief ground of the dispute observable in the Epistles of Paul, especially in those to the Romans, the Galatians, and the Philippians.

The Pharisaical teachers dignified their system with the title “Works of the law.” To this the Apostles opposed the Gospel

of Christ, as offering to mankind the true means of acceptance with God. This they called *ἡ χάρις*, 'grace,' or 'favour,' as holding forth the free pardon of sin, and the hope of immortality to the sincerely penitent; or *ἡ πίσις*, 'faith,' meaning such an influential belief in Christ, as striking its root in the heart produces in the conduct the fruits of righteousness. Thus, chap. iii. 30. *Ἐπειπερ εἰς ὁ Θεός, ὃς δικαιοῦσιν περιτομὴν ἐκ πίστεως, καὶ ἀκροβυστιαν, διὰ τῆς πίστεως.* In this verse the abstract nouns *περιτομὴν* and *ἀκροβυστιαν* are used for the concrete; and the clause *ἐκ πίστεως*, 'of faith,' or 'them that believe,' belongs to both:—'Since God is one, who will justify the circumcised and the uncircumcised that believe, by means of faith,'—*τῆς* before *πίστεως* serving to characterize *faith*, in opposition to the rites of the law, as the means of justification with God.

Here Paul asserts the true ground of divine forgiveness: in ver. 20. he sets aside the false ground occupied by the Judaizing zealots. *Διότι ἐξ ἔργων νομοῦ οὐ δικαιοῦσεται πᾶσα σὰρξ ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ,* 'Wherefore by the works of the law no flesh shall be justified in his sight.' We have already seen that when two nouns stand in opposition, the article is frequently put only before one of them. This is the case here, *νομοῦ*, though meaning the Mosaic law, is anarthrous, it being sufficient to prefix it to *πίσις*, with which it is contrasted. The same practice occurs in ver. 31. *Νομον οὖν καταργοῦμεν διὰ τῆς πίστεως; μὴ γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ νομον ἰσχύμεν,* 'Do we then render the law of no effect by our faith in Christ? by no means, but we confirm the law.'—'We confirm the law, because by the law we have been made sensible of sin, and by faith in Christ we obtain the forgiveness of it. Further, the law consists of certain ordinances which are types of Christ; these types are fulfilled in him, and hence received their validity or confirmation. Their end being thus answered, they are of course set aside, as no longer useful or necessary.' Mr. Wakefield thus renders the verse: "Do we then destroy law by this faith? by no means; we rather establish law." Dr. M. here

observes, that "*νομος* without the article must be taken in the sense of *moral obedience*, as is plain from the context: for it is opposed to *faith*. Few texts of scripture rightly understood are more important. Our own version, from a cause which has been already noticed, does not place in the clearest light the truth herein taught." This note, the substance of which the author learnt in the school of Macknight, is assuredly erroneous. *Moral obedience* is what the law could not produce: instead of being antecedent to faith in Christ, it necessarily follows it as its effect. The will of God more fully revealed in the Gospel; the example and precepts of Jesus which call upon all men to repent and amend their lives, the promise of divine grace to support the penitent and the virtuous in the face of danger and in the hour of tribulation; and above all, the death, the resurrection and ascension of our Divine Master, pointing thereby to a happy immortality for the righteous;—these lofty and glorious truths contain the only motives sufficiently powerful to change the nature and secure the moral obedience of sinful men.

Chap. II. 17. Ἰδε συ Ἰουδαῖος ἐπινομαζῇ, καὶ ἐπαναπαυγῇ τῷ νόμῳ. Here the article is essential, though Griesbach has excluded it as spurious. This Jew not only confided in the law of Moses, but confided in it as the means of being justified with God, in opposition to the Gospel which proclaimed the forgiveness of sins on the sole terms of repentance and reformation. The conduct of this Jew furnishes a striking illustration of the fact, that the mode of justification for which he and his brethren pleaded, had no connection with the moral virtues. For while he reposed in the law for this end, he was guilty of theft, adultery, and robbing the temple. Josephus has subjoined a short account of him to the testimony which he bears to Jesus Christ; and that historian stigmatizes him as wicked in every respect. Paulina, a lady of rank, the wife of Saturninus, and an intimate friend of the emperor, became a convert to Christianity, and made through this Jew a splendid present to the temple at Jerusalem. This he sequestered, appropriating it to

his own use. This is the meaning of the apostle, when apostrophizing him, he asks, "Thou that hatest idols, dost thou profanely rob the temple *?"

The Apostle in apostrophizing this wicked Jew, ver. 17, prefixes the article to *νομῷ*, because he contrasts the law with the Gospel mentioned in the preceding verse: but in ver. 25, where no such contrast is intended, it is used anarthrous: *Περιτομή μὲν γὰρ ὠφελεῖ, εἰν νόμον πρᾶσσης· εἰν ὁ παραβατὴς νόμου ᾧς, ἡ περιτομή σου ἀκροβυστία γέγονεν*. 'Circumcision will avail thee, if thou wilt carry the law into effect; but if thou be a transgressor of the law, thy circumcision becomes uncircumcision.' Here *νόμος*, though without the article, plainly means the law of

* The account which Josephus gives in his *Jewish Antiquities*, B. xviii. c. 3, 5, is to this effect. "A Jew resided at Rome, who having been accused of transgressing the laws, fled from his country to avoid the punishment which threatened him. He was wicked in every respect. During his residence at Rome, he pretended to unfold the wisdom of the Law of Moses, in conjunction with three other men, who in every way resembled himself. With these associated *Fulvia* (or *Paulina*), a woman of rank that had become a convert to the Jewish religion, and whom they prevailed upon to send for the temple at Jerusalem presents of purple and gold. These they received, and converted to their own use."

Now there is reason to believe that this wicked Jew was one of the Gnostic teachers at Rome. He pretended to teach or unfold the wisdom or philosophy of Moses. The religion of Jesus was the religion of Moses developed and carried to perfection. All the Jewish believers considered and spoke of the Gospel as the wisdom or philosophy of Moses. Josephus subjoins the character of this man to that of Christ: and his object assuredly was to wipe off the disgrace which his misconduct had brought on the fair name of Jesus and his religion. The Apostle Paul in his letter expostulates with this Jew, telling him, "Thou gloriest in the law, and yet dishonourest God by transgressing his law; for the name of God is evil spoken of through you among the Gentiles," chap. ii. 23. The associates of this impostor were the magicians to whom Tiberius was devoted. They represented to the emperor that Jesus was one of the pagan Gods; and they prevailed upon him to propose his deification, and to place him with the Gods of Rome in the Pantheon. This fact is laid open in *Jones's Ecclesiastical Researches*, chap. x. p. 248; and also more fully in a small volume, entitled *A Series of important Facts demonstrating the Truth of the Christian Religion*, chap. viii. p. 72.

Moses, because *circumcision* is a part of it, which formed part of no other law.

Chap. IV. 19, 20. Και μη ασθενήσας τῇ πίσει, οὐ κατένευτο τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ σώμα ἤδη νεκρωμένον, ἑκατονταετῆς που ὑπάρχον, καὶ τὴν νεκρώσιν τῆς μητρὸς Σαρρᾶς· εἰς δὲ τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐ διεκριβή τῇ ἀπιστίᾳ, ἀλλ' ἐνεδυναμώθη τῇ πίσει, δούς δόξαν τῷ Θεῷ. Here the article abounds, because the nouns affected by it stand in contrast with each other: 'not weak in faith' τῇ πίσει, *though weak in body*, being about a hundred years old — 'he hesitated not in regard to the promise of God through the want of faith; but became more powerful in faith, *though weaker in body*, giving the glory to God,'—ascribing the fulfilment of the promise, not to his own natural vigour, but to the miraculous interposition of God.

Chap. V. 13. Ἀχρὶ γὰρ νόμου ἁμαρτία ἦν ἐν κόσμῳ· ἁμαρτία δὲ οὐκ ἐλλογεῖται μὴ ὄντος νόμου. The Apostle having the term νόμος so often on his tongue, divests it of the article without prejudice to the sense, unless some contrast or intended opposition rendered it necessary. Its use in such cases became anarthrous, on the same principle that titles of men in office or of rank are so. This could create no uncertainty or confusion; because it was the language of a Jew addressing Jews, who by 'law' could readily think of no other law than the law of Moses. Paul reasoned with the Jewish zealots on their own principles; and he felt himself restricted to the very sense of ritual observances which the Jews of that period usually attached to it. On the clause ἀχρὶ νόμου, Dr. M. observes, "Here is an instance already noticed on ii. 13. νόμου is equivalent to τοῦ νόμου, but the article is omitted on account of the preposition." This is puerile.

V. 20. Νόμος δὲ παρεισήλθεν. Dr. M. proceeds: "Locke, Rosenmüller, Schleusner and Michaelis, and indeed most of the commentators, understand this of the law of Moses: in which case it must be admitted that the rejection of the article is not here authorised by any of the canons. Macknight, however, has a different explanation of the passage. He well contends that παρεισήλθεν cannot be said of the law, since it signifies

entered *privily*, as in Gal. ii. 4, the only instance besides the present in which the word occurs in the N. T. So also the similarly compounded words, *παρεισαγω*, 2 Pet. ii. 2; *παρεισακτους*, Gal. ii. 4; *παρεισδύω*, Jude 4. But the Mosaic law was ushered into the world with all possible pomp and notoriety. Macknight therefore understands *νομος* of the *Law of Nature*." Dr. M. then quotes his note, subjoining to it the following remark. "Perhaps, however, in such cases *νομος* had best been rendered a *Rule of Life*: this exactly accords with Macknight's notion; for in his Commentary he says, Law secretly entered into the world as the rule of man's conduct: and such a rendering would be more generally intelligible than the term *law*, to which the English reader annexes no very precise idea."

The compound *παρεισῆλθεν* literally means 'entered in at the side,' and does not necessarily signify 'entered *privily*,' unless a *church* or a *house* be the object, where the door is the only lawful entrance, and where to enter by the side would be to enter *privily* or *unlawfully*. Change the object of allusion, and the sense of the verb is also changed. The law of Moses did not form the first link in the great chain of providence, which was to introduce the Christian Dispensation. It stood at a great distance from the loss of Paradise; there it waited at the time and place appointed for it, till the march of events came up to it, and then, as it were, fell in with the procession, taking its station at the side, and thus proceeding forward till its temporary end was answered in the advent of the Messiah, and the final establishment of his Gospel. Taken in this point of view, the Apostle used it as the most appropriate verb which the Greek language could supply: and it appears to me surprising that any critic could be found so infatuated, as to suppose it can signify the Law of Nature, which existed from the beginning, and which the Creator himself has interwoven with the very frame and condition of man. No wonder that the Apostle Paul should be thought obscure and perplexed, when critics take the liberty, often in support of their own system, to pervert his words in so shameful a manner.

Chap. VII. 21. Εὕρισκω ἀρα τὸν νομὸν τῷ θελοντί μοι ποιεῖν

το καλον, ὅτι ἐμοὶ το κακον παρακειται. This verse is widely mistaken by all the translators and commentators. The construction is this: Εὕρισκω ἀρα ὅτι το κακον ἐμοὶ παρακειται—ἐμοὶ τῷ θελοντι κατὰ τον νομον ποιεῖν το καλον. 'I find therefore that evil is present to me—to me when I wish according to the law to do that which is good.' Here the object of εὕρισκω is ὅτι ἐμοὶ το κακον παρακειται,—ἐμοὶ is repeated on account of its remoteness in the first clause from this verb on which it depends, and τον νομον is elliptical for κατὰ τον νομον.

The Pharisaical teachers, or rather the wicked Jew, their representative in the church at Rome, while they confided in the law for justification with God, indulged in the grossest sin, it is therefore a main point with the Apostle to hold forth the law as making known the existence and evil nature of sin, and thus to condemn the impostors as sinful on the very principle by which they claimed acceptance with God.

This Jew, as Josephus informs us, associated with men like himself, wicked in every respect: these were the Egyptian priests and Chaldean astrologers, to whom Tiberius, though a fatalist, had been exceedingly devoted. These men maintained that the Creator was an evil being, and that the Law which he delivered by Moses was arbitrary and unjust. Clement of Alexandria has recorded the sentiments which were afterwards taught in Egypt by these men and their followers: and Theodoret, in his Commentary on this very place, furnishes us with a specimen of the manner in which they blasphemed the Almighty Creator. "Those," writes he, "who live in indolence (meaning the Gnostic monks of Egypt) and are averse to the painful toils of virtue, blame the Lord God for having given (Adam) the commandment. For if, say they, he knew not what would come to pass, how can he be God who is ignorant of the things to come. But if, while he foresaw the transgression he laid down the commandment, he is himself the cause of its violation."

These impious sentiments were among the fundamental principles of the Gnostic system; and they appear to have been introduced into the Roman church even before the Apostle wrote this Epistle. Hence we feel the force and drift of his argument

in chap. vii. 7. "What then shall we say? Is the law sin? by no means; but I knew not sin excepting through the law—so that the law is holy, and the commandment holy, just, and good. Did then that which is good (the law) prove death to me? By no means: but sin, that it might appear sin, working death in me through that which is good; that sin by means of the commandment might become exceedingly sinful."

Dr. Middleton's criticism on *τον νομον* is the following. "The article here is anticipative of what is subjoined: the law or principle which the Apostle is about to describe as impelling him to evil, even when he is endeavouring to practise virtue. *Hemsterhuis* (ap. *Wetstein*) would expunge *το καλον*, so as to make *τον νομον* dependent on *ποιειν*. This reading would understand *τον νομον* of the Mosaic Law, a sense which accords not with the argument." So *νομος*, which, according to Dr. M., elsewhere means the *Law of Nature, Moral Obedience, Rule of Life*, here denotes a *principle impelling us to evil*. This is a monstrous position, from a distinguished biblical critic, and this in the very face of the Apostle, who maintains that the Law was holy and good, as pointing out sin against certain impostors who arraigned it as *evil*.

As Paul was an Apostle of the Gentiles and pleaded their cause, some of them might infer that he was averse, or at least indifferent, to the welfare of his brethren the Jews. This inference the Apostle was anxious to preclude; and he thus asserts his heartfelt grief for their obstinacy and degraded state: "I speak the truth in Christ, I lie not, my conscience also bearing me witness in the Holy Spirit, that I have great grief and continued sorrow of heart on account of my brethren, my kindred according to the flesh: for I too (I as they now do) *once* gloried in being an anathema from Christ," chap. ix. 1—4.

The Egyptian Gnostics disputed the privileges which had hitherto distinguished the Jews as the chosen people of God. Abraham, they might say, was a *Chaldean*, Joseph an *Egyptian*, the Christ, as being a God, did not belong to the Israelites according to the flesh. They blasphemed even Jehovah as an imperfect evil Being, and pretended to have revealed a god of

their own, who was perfect and supreme over all. These positions of the impostors; Paul proceeds thus to set aside, ver. 4, 5. 'Οτινες εσιν Ισραηλῖται, ΩΝ ἡ ἐκδοσία, καὶ ἡ δόξα, καὶ αἱ διαθήκαι, καὶ ἡ νομοθεσία, καὶ ἡ λαοκρατία, καὶ αὐτοὶ πατέρες, ΩΝ ὁ Χριστὸς το κατὰ σάρκα, ὁ ὢν ἐν ὧν ἡ Θεὸς ἐνδοξαίτης ἐκ τῶν αἰώνων. 'Who are Israelites; of whom is the adoption, and the glory; and the covenants, and the giving of the law, and the service, and the promises; whom are the fathers, and of whom is Christ according to the flesh, who is the great reality, God over all to be blessed for ever. Here occurs a remarkable ellipsis, though an ellipsis well justified by a similar practice in all Greek writers. The Apostle would have written ὡς ὁ ὢν, &c.; but perceiving the tautophony this would have occasioned, he omitted ὡς, and let the reader to supply the omission from the preceding clause, where it occurs three times. The sentiment it contains is,—that the God of Israel is the only supreme God, and not the God whom the Gnostics pretended to have revealed: as if he said, 'This holy and all-perfect Being is worthy to be praised and blessed, and not to be blasphemed as he is by the antichristian teachers.' This seems to be the true solution of a passage which beyond any other has occasioned dispute and perplexity among divines *.

* The impostors called their unknown Supreme God *Buthos* or *Bathos*; and the Apostle mentions by name this fictitious being at the close of the preceding chapter. "For I am persuaded that neither Death, nor Life, nor Angels, nor Principalities, nor Powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor Height (*Hypsoma*), nor Depth (*Bathos*), nor any other being, will be able to separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord." That the deceivers called their Supreme God *Bathos*, we learn from Irenæus, p. 7. In the Excerpta of Clemens Alexandrinus, he is styled *Bathos*. 'Ἡ Συγή (the female mate of *Bathos*) μητὴρ οὖσα τῶν πάντων προβαλίσσεται ἐκ τοῦ *Bathos*. This *Bathos* they represented as higher than the Creator of the world; ὑψίστην τι καὶ μῆζον τοῦ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀκροηκόμενων Θεῶν. In reference to a representation like this, the Apostle here gives it the name of *ὑψωμα*. That he adverts to the Gnostic notions, and that the names used in this place are copied from the Gnostic school, will appear evident, if we attend to the accounts given by Irenæus and

their own who were perfect and superior over all. These positions of the impostors, I have placed thus to set aside.

1 CORINTHIANS.

Chap. XV. 8. Ὁσπερ ἐν τῷ ἐκτρώματι, ὠφθη καὶ ἡμεῖς. Here Dr. M. observes, "There is no passage in the N. T. which has given rise to more dispute on the subject of the article than has the present. Some critics will have the article here to be a Hebraism: others affirm that it is the enclitic τῷ for τῷ; and a third class thinks that τῷ ἐκτρώματι is used κατ' ἐξοχήν." But the greatest difficulty here is to ascertain the true sense of ἐκτρώμα, as applicable to the case of the Apostle: and this may be soon done by recurring to its origin, it being the verb τρώω, another form of τραύω, 'I wound,' 'I bruise'; ἐκτρώμα then is an abstract noun applied to the *fœtus*, which makes its appearance prematurely, in consequence of a *wound*, *bruise*, or some violence received by the mother—an *untimely birth*, *abortion*. This is its usual acceptation: but it bears no analogy to the circumstances of Paul. Yet we may deduce from the same etymology a meaning natural enough, which is exactly applicable to him: ἐκτρώμα may mean the *fœtus* whose birth is protracted by some obstruction, and which at length is brought to light by extraordinary means, that is, by making a wound or incision on the parent. The Cæsarean operation was then well known in the medical world, and the Apostle seems to allude to it. This acceptation meets the case of his conversion with great exactness. He did not receive his moral birth from the beginning, and it was at last effected by an extraordinary interposition of Providence. Even then it was brought about not without violence, being made blind for a season; and a thorn

joined to his side. See Epiphanius on the subject. The fables and endless genealogies (1 Tim. i. 3.) which they invented, had no other object than to seduce the converts from the love of the Universal Father. The primary links in that chain of fictitious beings, were βύβλος, νοῦς, λόγος, φρονησις, σοφία, δυναμις, ἀρχαὶ, ἀγγέλαι. See Epiph. p. 69. Of the impostors who taught these fictions, he thus speaks near the close: "I beseech you, brethren, mark those who make divisions, and bring offences contrary to the doctrine ye have learnt; for such men are not servants of our Lord Jesus Christ, but slaves of their own belly."

fixed in his flesh, that is, a wound inflicted on him, which he bore through life, as a standing memorial of the scene that produced his conversion. The article here is soon explained; 'He also showed himself to us, ὡς περὶ τῷ ἐκτρωματι,' as one whose birth is protracted beyond its due season—as one that is brought to light by incision or extraordinary means.' Here the article is generic, and marks the Apostle in a metaphorical sense, as one of that class of things. It is singular that Dr. M. did not see this, especially as he refers to the following words of Luke, xviii. 13. ὁ Θεὸς; ἰλασθήητι μοι τῷ ἁμαρτωλῷ, 'God be merciful to me *one that is a sinner*;' that is, one of that class who have transgressed thy law. So again in 2 Cor. xii. 18. καὶ συναπεστείλα τον ἀδελφον, 'I have sent with him *one that is a brother*—one bearing the relation of brother—a brother;' see Rom. xiv. 10. where a similar sense of τον ἀδελφον occurs. It is on this principle that we are to explain such passages as the following; ὁ ἀγαπῶν τον ἕτερον, νομον πεπλήρωκε, 'he who loves *one that is another*, and not merely himself—' one who loves others as well as himself—hath fulfilled the law.' Thus in the next verse ἀγαπήσεις τον πλησιον σου ὡς ἑαυτον, 'thou shalt love *one that is near thee*—thy neighbour—as thyself.'

2 CORINTHIANS.

Chap. VII. 11. Ἐν παντι συνεσησάτε ἑαυτοὺς ἄγνους εἶναι ἐν τῷ πραγματι. Winer, who has published an useful and elaborate Greek Grammar for the N. T. alone, explains τῷ πραγματι to mean *some known fact*, "which you well recollect." No, this is not its meaning; it is here, as usual, antithetical, pointing to τῷ λόγῳ, 'you have made yourselves pure in all things, *in deed as well as in profession*.' See a translation into English of this work by Moses Stuart, p. 51.

Chap. VIII. 18. Συνεπεμψάμεν δὲ μετ' αὐτοῦ τον ἀδελφον, ὅν δ' ἐπαινος ἐν τῷ ευαγγελίῳ διὰ πᾶσων τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν. Here τῷ conjoining with τον ἀδελφον, suggests by association that the Gospel meant belonged to him. Moreover, ἐν in this verse signifies 'by means of,' a sense which it often has elsewhere—

We have sent with him the brother, whose praise by means of his Gospel is in all the churches.' The brother here meant is Luke, whom Paul calls a fellow-traveller in the next verse.

The extraordinary interest which the fame of Jesus excited throughout the world, called forth many spurious narratives respecting him and his works. The misrepresentations and falsehoods thus circulated, caused Luke early to compose a faithful memoir of his Divine Master : and as he had long been the coadjutor and faithful companion of the Apostle Paul in establishing the churches, it became a precaution absolutely necessary to deliver a copy of this genuine Gospel to each church, as they were leaving it. This was to be a safeguard against the false gospels which were sure to gain admission after their departure. And here we are very incidentally furnished with a happy testimony to the early existence of the Gospel of Luke ; to its reception as genuine in all the churches ; and to the estimation in which the author of it was universally held for fidelity and truth. The passages are very numerous in the N. T. where the article, as in the present instance, is to be rendered by the possessive pronoun. For example, 1 Cor. xv. 24. *ὅταν παραδῶ τὴν βασιλειαν τῷ Θεῷ καὶ Πατρὶ*, 'when he shall deliver up the kingdom to the God and Father,' that is, 'to his God and Father,' which in the common version is improperly rendered 'to God even the Father.'

PHILIPPIANS.

Chap. III. 2. *Βλέπετε τοὺς κύναις, βλέπετε τοὺς κακοὺς ἐργα-
τας, βλέπετε τὴν κατατομὴν*. 'Beware of the dogs,—of such as are dogs ;—beware of such as practise evil ; beware of their mauling you.' Wherever the Apostles established a church, the Pharisees of Jerusalem, by means of their missionaries, caused the Gnostic system speedily to be introduced into it. These emissaries, while they pretended to be brethren, and to teach the Gospel, were the bitterest enemies of the Apostles and their cause, and the secret instigators of all the persecutions they endured. They entered as shepherds of the flock ; but they were soon found, as our Lord forewarned his disciples, to

be wolves in sheep's clothing. This is the circumstance which unfolds the propriety of the Apostle's advice, 'Beware of the dogs; beware of their mauling you.' Philo, in the account which he gives of the followers of Jesus in Judea, has noticed the sufferings which they thus endured. "This effect," says he, "is evinced by the many powerful men who rose against these holy men in their own country. Some of the persecutors being eager to surpass the fierceness of untamed beasts, omit no measure that may gratify their cruelty; and they cease not to sacrifice whole flocks of those within their power; or like butchers, to tear their limbs in pieces, until themselves are brought to that justice, which superintends the affairs of men. Others of these persecutors cause their snarling fury to assume a different form. Indulging a spirit of unrelenting severity, they address their victims with gentleness, display their intolerant spirit in affecting mildness of speech, thus resembling dogs when going to inflict envenomed wounds. By these means they occasion irremediable evils, and leave behind them throughout whole communities, monuments of their impiety in the ever memorable calamities of the sufferers. Yet not one of those persecutors, *whether open or disguised*, have been able to substantiate any accusation against this band of holy men." This is taken from a book of Philo entitled *Παντα σπουδαιον είναι ελευθερον*, vol. ii. 445, p. 865. See also *Jones's Eccles. Researches*, chap. iv.

The Apostle further admonishes the Philippians to beware of the same, *as men who practised evil deeds*. These impostors indeed were not only immoral in the extreme, but they reduced immorality to a system, and openly gloried in the most shameful actions. Yet they pretended to be free from guilt, and to enjoy the divine favour in consequence of the privileges secured to them by the law. To show the worthlessness of those immunities, Paul enumerates them, and maintains that he had equal right to rely on them, if they had any value. "For we are the true circumcision, who pay a religious service to God in the mind; and boast in Christ Jesus, and have no confidence in the flesh: for if any one may presume to have con-

fidence in the flesh, I have still more; I was circumcised the eighth day, of the race of Israel; of the tribe of Benjamin; a Hebrew from Hebrews; with respect to the law, a Pharisee; with respect to zeal, a persecutor of the church; according to the righteousness of the law, blameless. But these things which were gain, I count but loss in respect to Christ. Nay, indeed, I count all things but loss in respect to the excellence of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord." Here we see enumerated those *works of the Law* in which the deceivers confided, and on which they affected to found their hope of salvation. From these privileges they held themselves righteous in the sight of God; while in a moral view, they gloried in their shame; resembling those dogs, which were prompted by fury to bite men, and by hunger to devour the grossest filth.

Chap. IV. 6. Τα αιτήματα ὑμῶν γνωρίζεσθω πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, 'Let your supplications be made known to God,' that is, *to God, and not to men.* The Apostle here gently rebukes that ostentatious display of prayer which generally prevailed among the Pharisees. These hypocrites prayed in the most public places, that they might have glory of men. See Matt. vi. 5. The antithesis to this clause is given in the preceding verse; το ἐπίεικας ὑμῶν γνωσθήτω πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, 'let your equity, meekness, forbearance, clemency, and moderation be known to men:' these are the proper virtues which as Christians you should display before the world. God is the only object of prayer, and to him all prayers should be directed; and if from ostentation you pray in public, you become hypocrites.

On Ephes. V. 5. Dr. M. has a very long note, the object of which is to justify the Canon introduced by *Granville Sharpe*. This renders it necessary to take a short review of that Canon, though its merits have been cursorily discussed in page 25, &c. The Canon is thus stated by Dr. M. in p. 79. "When two or more attributives, joined by a copulative or copulatives, are assumed of the *same* person or thing; before the first attributive the article is inserted; before the remaining ones it is omitted."

Mr. Cogan, an accomplished Greek scholar, in a Journal

called *The Monthly Repository*, (see the Number for November 1824, p. 649) has discussed this question, and allows the *Canon* to be generally true. When I consider that Mr. Cogan, though himself a man of superior intellect, seems always to have a high reverence for authority, this concession cannot surprise me. But in truth the Canon itself is mere rubbish, without any foundation in truth, and grounded on a power that is really foreign to the article, and to the purpose for which it is applied. This will appear from the three following remarks.

First. It is the usual practice with Greek and also with Latin writers, that when two or more nouns are connected by a copulative, the adjective qualifying the first, and limited to it by its position, is supposed to be carried forward, so as to qualify the succeeding nouns, in order to render the sense complete. The article, partaking of the nature of adjectives, admits of the same extension. Hence when it marks an attributive but omitted before another conjoined to it, the omission is to be supplied by the reader, in order to render the construction, and even the meaning of the writer, complete. This has already been illustrated by examples; but I will repeat a few. Thus *Ῥωσκιος ὁ υἱος καὶ κληρονομος*, 'Roscius the son and heir,' for *Ῥωσκιος ὁ υἱος καὶ ὁ κληρονομος*, 'Roscius the son and the heir;' *Ὁ συμβουλος καὶ ῥητωρ ἐγώ*, for *καὶ ὁ ῥητωρ*. *Ὁ συκοφαντὴς καὶ περιεργὸς Δημοσθενὴς*, for *ὁ συκοφαντὴς καὶ ὁ περιεργός*. But why, it may be asked, has the writer omitted the article before the second attributive, if its repetition be necessary to complete the sense or the construction? If he wished to make the second attributive *prominent* or *emphatic*, he would have supplied it; but as he had no emphasis or contrast to mark, he has left it to be supplied by the reader.

Secondly. This omission takes place even when the persons or characters are different, or when the attributives characterize different persons or things. This practice is not rare or casual, but pervades every Greek writer. Thus, *τὸν Ἀλεξάνδρον καὶ Φίλιππον*, for *καὶ τὸν Φίλιππον*. *Ἀπέστειλαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς τὸν Πέτρον καὶ Ἰωάννην*, (Acts viii. 14,) for *καὶ τὸν Ἰωάννην*. So in the beginning of Thucydides; *τὸν πόλεμον Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων*, for *τῶν Ἀθηναίων*.

The omission of the article is still more common before abstract nouns or attributives. Xen. Mem. lib. ii. c. 1. οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ δυνατοὶ τοὺς ἀνδράς καὶ ἀδυνατοὺς, for οἱ δυνατοὶ—τοὺς ἀδυνατοὺς. Arist. Eth. lib. i. c. 8. τὸ προτερον καὶ ὑστερον, for τὸ ὑστερον. Plato Theæt. vol. ii. p. 134. μεταξύ τοῦ ποιούντος καὶ πασχόντος, for τοῦ πασχόντος, 'between the agent and the patient.' Gorg. vol. iv. p. 32. τὸ ἀρτίον καὶ περιττον, for τὸ περιττον: τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἀδίκον, for τὸ ἀδίκον.

The reason of the omission in these and in innumerable other instances is, that the correlative term is not intended to convey an emphasis or contrast. The use of the corresponding English article in all such cases is precisely similar. Thus, "The king and queen," for "the king and *the* queen." "The husband and wife," for "the husband and *the* wife." "The son and heir," for "the son and *the* heir." "The first and last," for "the *first* and *the* last." Here in Greek and in English the omission and the repetition of the article are founded on the same principle.

Thirdly. When two different persons are conjoined by a copulative, or two different attributives are annexed to the same person, the article is repeated by the writer, if it be his object to render the last emphatic and prominent like the first. Thus, Acts xiii. 50, καὶ ἐπηγεῖραν διωγμὸν ἐπὶ τὸν Παῦλον καὶ τὸν Βαρναβάν; as Luke wished to hold forth Barnabas no less than Paul as an object of persecution, he repeats the article. This would be done more adequately in English by repeating the preposition; 'They raised a persecution against Paul and *against* Barnabas.' Without a repetition of the article in Greek and of the preposition in English, the notice given of Barnabas would leave a feebler impression on the reader. See another example from John ii. 22, in page 26. John xiii. 13. ὑμεῖς φωνεῖτε με, ὁ διδασκαλὸς καὶ ὁ κύριος, 'You address me as the Master and the Lord—as *your* Master and *your* Lord.' In this example too the Evangelist felt himself called upon to render the last title as prominent as the first: he therefore repeats the article, though both are attributives of one and the same person. Again, xiv. 6. λέγει αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰησοῦς, ἐγώ εἰμι ἡ ὁδὸς, καὶ ἡ ἀλή-

θεια, και ἡ ζωη, 'Jesus says unto him, I am *the way*, and *the truth* and *the life*,' the article being repeated before 'truth' and 'life' to show emphatically that these attributives belonged to Jesus as well as 'way.'

The repetition of the article answers the same end without the conjunction. See 951—955 of the *Prometheus* quoted above, page 56. To the same effect *Callirhoe*, in the beautiful novel of Chariton, thus pathetically describes the several relations which Chreias bore to her—τον πολιτην, τον ερασην, τον ερωμενον, τον νυμφιον, 'my fellow-citizen, my lover, my beloved, my spouse,' as being more emphatical and impressive than τον πολιτην, ερασην, ερωμενον, νυμφιον, 'my fellow citizen, lover, beloved, spouse.'

It remains now to explain on this principle a few of the passages which may be supposed to illustrate and confirm the Canon, for which Mr. Saarp and Dr. M. contend. 1 Cor. xv. 24, όταν παραδῶ την βασιλειαν τῷ Θεῷ και πατρι, 'When he shall deliver up the kingdom to *his* God and father.' Had the Apostle thought fit to render πατρι emphatic, he would have said τῷ πατρι, 'to *his* God and *his* father.' Ephes. v. 5, εν τῇ βασιλειᾳ τοῦ Χριστοῦ και Θεοῦ, elliptically for τοῦ Θεοῦ, or τοῦ Θεοῦ πατρος, 'in the kingdom of Christ, and of God *his* father.' 1 Tim. v. 21. ενωπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ, και Κυριου Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ, 'before God, and the Lord Jesus Christ,' elliptically for ενωπιον τοῦ Κυριου Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ, 'before God and *before* the Lord Jesus.' See also 2 Tim. iv. 1. Titus ii. 13, προσδεχομενοι την μακαριαν ελπιδα, και επιφανειαν τῆς δοξης τοῦ μεγαλου Θεοῦ και σωτηρος ἡμῶν Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ. In this verse are two ellipses of the article; την μακαριαν ελπιδα, και την επιφανειαν—τοῦ μεγαλου Θεοῦ και τοῦ σωτηρος, &c. 'expecting the blessed hope, and *the* glorious appearance of the great God and of Jesus Christ *the* Saviour of us—and of our Saviour Jesus Christ.' 2 Pet. i. 1, εν δικαιοσυνη τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν, και σωτηρος Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ. Here is an ellipsis of τοῦ and ἡμῶν—και τοῦ σωτηρος ἡμῶν Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ, 'in the righteousness of our God, and of *our* Saviour Jesus Christ.' A similar ellipsis occurs in ver. 11. τοῦ Κυριου ἡμῶν και σωτηρος Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ, for και τοῦ σωτηρος ἡμῶν.

During the ministry of our blessed Lord, his only designation was that of *Jesus*. This is his usual name in the *four Gospels*. But after his resurrection he is called by several names, such as *Jesus Christ*, or *our Lord Jesus Christ*. This is the manner in which he is designated in the Book of the Acts, and in the Epistles. The reason of the change is to be found in the introduction and prevalence of the Gnostic system. The authors of that imposture separated the Christ from the man Jesus, making the former a god dwelling in Jesus for a season, but entirely distinct from, and independent of, him. To set aside this artifice, the Apostles always join the two appellatives as expressive of one and the same person. Further, the Gnostics, though they affected to extol Christ, uniformly refused to acknowledge him as their *Lord and Master*. This is said by Irenæus in express terms, p. 9; and the reason was, that by declining to acknowledge Jesus as their Lord, they evaded the obligation of being like him in virtue and holiness, and secured to themselves a license for the gross immoralities to which they were abandoned. The sincere followers of Christ were anxious to mark the difference which, in this respect, subsisted between them and the impostors. With this view the Apostles, in their discourses and in their writings, annex *Κυριος* or *Κυριος ἡμῶν* to the usual designations of their Divine Master, thus declaring that they considered him as *their Lord*, while the false teachers rejected him under that character. Thus Rom. xvi. 18, οἱ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι τῷ Κυρίῳ ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ οὐ δουλεύουσιν, 'for such men as these are not servants to our Lord Jesus Christ.' This language is peculiarly appropriate when considered in connexion with the fact attested by Irenæus. "They own not themselves the servants of him whom we acknowledge as our Lord, and imitate as our pattern." This formula constantly recurs in the Epistles; and it must have had some end to answer, and that of an important nature. See verses 20, 24, of this chapter. See also Rom. vi. 1. 1 Cor. i. 2. 3. 7. 8. 9. 10.

The First Epistle to the Thessalonians was the first of those written by Paul; and as it was sent to that church soon after its establishment, it appears to have preceded the introduction

of Gnosticism. But the emissaries of that system lost no time in introducing it; and to secure a temporary success to their imposture, they presented to the church a letter which they had forged, as if they had received it from Paul himself. See 2 Thess. ii. 2. This came to the knowledge of the Apostle, and was the means under Providence of calling forth the Second Epistle to the Thessalonians. The manner in which he concludes this letter is memorable: "The salutation is by the hand of me Paul, which is my mark in every Epistle, thus I write: *The favour of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all.*"

Now the question is, how such a mark could secure this or any other letter of Paul from interpolation or forgery. The doctrine taught by the impostors furnishes the true answer to this question. They maintained that the Christ was a god different from the man Jesus; and though they extolled him as divine, they denied his claim as a *Lord* to be obeyed and imitated by them. The mark then lay in the *sentiment*, which the deceivers would not avow, and not in the *writing*, which they could easily imitate or forge. Here then we have a remarkable fact: The wisdom of Providence had so ordained it, that the very signature which established the authenticity of the Epistles of Paul with the churches to which, at the time, they were addressed, should become a pledge to us and to all nations, that those Epistles had been written in opposition to men who taught certain erroneous notions respecting Christ, as the means of subverting his Gospel.

THE END.









