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Anglo - German Rivalry
— *As a Cause of* —
THE GREAT WAR

By OSCAR A. MARTI

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO



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**THE ANGLO-GERMAN COMMERCIAL AND
COLONIAL RIVALRY AS A CAUSE OF
THE GREAT WAR**



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The Anglo-German Commercial *and* Colonial Rivalry as a Cause of The Great War

A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE DEPART-
MENT OF HISTORY, UNIVERSITY OF
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES

By OSCAR ALBERT MARTI, M.A.





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
THE STRATFORD COMPANY, Publishers

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The STRATFORD CO., Publishers
Boston, Mass.

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The Alpine Press, Boston, Mass., U. S. A.

Contents

| | PAGE |
|------------------------|------|
| INTRODUCTORY | ix |

CHAPTER I

THE COLONIAL ASCENDENCY OF GREAT BRITAIN

The Anglophile's and the Anglophobe's different views of the world civilizing mission of England. — Britain's slow growth and present prepondering influence. — Germany's rapid growth and threatening attitude. — England's tardiness on the Colonial field and reasons for it. — Elizabeth's reign marks the beginning of British expansion. — The second and third phases of that expansion. — The century and a quarter rivalry between England and France. — Three fold British policy since 1815. — Maritime supremacy and the attitude of Germany regarding it. — Neutrality of Belgium. — Strategic importance of the Low Countries. — Theory of a balance of power. — Germany really hostile to that policy. — Her desire to overthrow the world empire of England due to economic expansion. — Treitschke's disparaging views of the British supremacy. — England's counter arguments. — England's policies called for peace not war. 1

CHAPTER II

THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF IMPERIAL GERMANY

Beginning of the Modern Germans. — Charlemagne's Empire. — Abortive attempts of German rulers

CONTENTS

for world domain. — German political individualism. — Rise of the Prussian hegemony. — Part played by Bismarck. — Union consummated in 1871. — Bismarck's economic program: his attitude. — Result of Germany's political consolidation on her economic progress. — Germany the real enemy of England. — The issue between Germany and England shifted to the quarrels of smaller states. — Rise of the German merchant marine. — Clash between Germany and England due to the former's search for colonial possessions. — England's preoccupation of the field. — Extent of Germany's colonial possessions. — Their doubtful economic value 19

CHAPTER III

PAN-GERMANISM AND THE *Weltpolitik*

Nature and object of Pan-Germanism. — Origin of the movement. — France regarded as an object in the way for its realization. — Success of its propagators. — Political unity not necessarily aimed at. — Extent of the field of Pan-Germanism. — Quotations that convince of its existence. — Development of the *Weltpolitik* ideal. — Reasons for its rapid spread. — German disparagement of other races. — The real aim of Pan-Germanism and *Weltpolitik* the acquisition of a colonial preponderance. 35

CHAPTER IV

THE MOROCCAN CRISIS

Diligence of William II in prosecuting his designs for colonial domain. — Economic and strategic im-

CONTENTS

| | |
|--|----|
| portance of Morocco. — The Anglo-French agreement. — Theatrical entrance of William II into Tangier. — Results in England and in France; the Kaiser's real aim in the matter. — The Conference at Algeciras. — Continued aggression of France in Morocco. — Revolution at Fez; France gains the preponderance in Morocco. — Germany's protest; she sends the gunboat Panther to Agadir; her demands. — Sir Edward Grey's warning to Germany. — The Triple Entente greatly handicapped at the time. — The German-French understanding. — The Kaiser's designs concerning Agadir. — The affair reveals the financial dependence of Germany on the other powers. — Aftermath of the Agadir incident | 44 |
|--|----|

CHAPTER V

THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA

| | |
|--|----|
| Attitude of the powers concerning Mohammedan states still independent. — German interests in Persia not vital yet real. — Persian manifesto to their sultan; the revolution at Teheran. — A new constitution promulgated. — The action of Russia and England. — The Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907. — Persia long the scene of a struggle for commercial ascendancy; its economic importance. — Germany considers Persia a legitimate field for expansion; her attitude toward the Anglo-Russian agreement. — Russia and England take action in Persia to secure certain loans formerly made. — The Shuster affair. — Persian independence made void by the interference of England and Russia. — Germany's colonial ambitions again foiled . . . | 57 |
|--|----|

CONTENTS

CHAPTER VI

THE BAGHDAD RAILWAY PROJECT

The "*Drang nach Osten*" and its significance. — Early attempts of England to project a trans-Asiatic railroad. — Germany's great prospect in Asiatic Turkey. — The Cretan affair 1897-98; Germany's bargain with the sultan. — The proposed route and extent of the grant made to the Kaiser. — The Ismidt-Angora-Konia branch. — The German Anatolia Railway Company's proposal, estimated cost of the road. — Great Britain's misgivings. — Part played by Pan-Germanism; an all-rail-all-German route from the Persian Gulf to the North Sea. — Reason for England's indifference toward financial co-operation in the project. — Denial by Germany of designs for political aggression in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. — Great Britain wide awake to Germany's designs. — Steps taken to intercept Germany. — Germany foiled by the agreement of Koweit. — She uneasily awaited the "day of reckoning with England" 65

CONCLUSION 77

BIBLIOGRAPHY 79

Introductory

THE following extract from the vision of the late Tolstoi is highly prophetic of the grave disaster which at this time threatens to involve the whole civilized world — the European war. The prophecy written in 1910, and sent by this Russian novelist and socialist to the Emperors of Russia and Germany, and also to the King of England, runs as follows: "I see floating upon the surface of the sea of human fate the huge silhouette of a nude woman. She is in her beauty, her poise, her smiles, her jewels — a super-Venus. Nations rush madly after her, each eager to attract her especially. But she . . . flirts with all. In her hair ornaments of diamonds and rubies is engraved her name *Commercialism!* . . . much destruction follows in her wake . . . her looks of greed are so much poison to the nations who fall victims to her charms. And behold! she has three gigantic arms with three torches of universal corruption in her hands. The first torch represents the flame of war that the beautiful courtesan carries from city to city and from country to country."¹

Time and again certain sections of the world have been deluged with the blood of victims sacrificed in wars over religious tenets, over racial prejudices, over dynastic controversies and jealousies; but we are safe

¹Shiep, "Handbook of the European War," p. 1.

INTRODUCTORY

in asserting that wars caused by commercial and provincial rivalries have been the bitterest and the most sanguine of them all. No one will doubt this who has witnessed the events of the past thirty dark months when he is shown that the causes of the war are due to the commercial and colonial rivalries of the greater and the lesser powers of Europe.

That the present war is not due to religious differences on the part of the combatants is evident from the fact that Protestant England is in alliance with Catholic (Greek) Russia, and Catholic (Roman) Portugal; and the Christian and the Infidel are brothers in arms, fighting each other's battles in the armies of the Central powers. In the same manner racial animosities and ties are annulled in the fact that German is arrayed against German and Slav against Slav in the deadly conflict. That dynastic considerations had no influence in precipitating the war is also manifest in the fact that Germany and England, whose royal houses are intimately related through marital ties, are the sorest enemies.

A recent writer has summed up the situation in words like these: "All modern wars are essentially commercial, and war is, in fact, an inevitable concomitant of trade expansion."² The Phoenicians who were the first in the field of thalassic colonial expansion succeeded in keeping out competitors by holding their trade routes a profound secret; this was in an-

²Johnson, "International Conciliation," April, 1914, p. 4.

INTRODUCTORY

cient times. During the period of the Crusades the trade of the Levant animated the mutual hatred of the Italian cities; but not to the extent of open war. It has remained for the writers of modern history to record the dire effects brought about through wars over commerce. Immediately after the discovery of the New World by Columbus a papal line of demarcation saved the Spaniard and the Portugese from a clash of arms; but by the middle of the seventeenth century, the English and the Dutch sprang at one another's throats after a protracted wrangle over the herring fisheries of the North Sea, the whale fishery of the Arctic Ocean, the West Indian market, and the continental cloth trade. The Dutch having been worsted in the conflict, the struggle was resumed by the English and the French, who carried it on until the opening of the nineteenth century. This rivalry embraced four distinct fields; namely, India, the West Coast of Africa, the West Indies, and North America. The struggle was prosecuted with such vehemence that one writer was forced to say that the herring and the clove had caused more bloodshed than anything save the Christian religion. Likewise it has been said, "A most interesting essay might be written on the education of the European palate for foreign foods and drinks such as tea, coffee, sugar, and rum, in moulding the fate of races and of empires."³

³Channing, "History of the United States," II, p. 281.

INTRODUCTORY

A case in point is the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713). This struggle was carried on to prevent the crowns of France and Spain being placed on the head of a single heir of the house of Bourbon. At that time Spain controlled, and was attempting to maintain the monopoly on the trade of the New World. The English and the Dutch traders were encroaching on this monopoly by smuggling. These merchants saw that if Spain and France were brought under a single political head enough force could be brought to bear to intercept their illicit trade. Hence it was the commercial interests that brought influence to bear in bringing about the war.⁴ To bear out the fact that most of the modern wars were brought about largely by a desire for commercial and territorial expansion, one has merely to look into the causes of some of the recent wars. The Crimean war, the Boer war, the Russian-Japanese war, the Turco-Italian war, the Balkan wars, all savor strongly of these elements.⁵ A very vivid example of these was the recent Russo-Japanese war;⁶ but the present great conflict in Europe is a still more obvious result of colonial expansion and contention over trading rights.

Mr. W. J. Bryan in a convincing "peace" speech delivered at Los Angeles in September, 1915, spoke of the present conflict as the great causeless war. Cold

⁴Robinson and Beard, "The Development of Modern Europe," I, p. 38.

⁵International Conciliation, April, 1914, p. 3.

⁶Robinson and Beard, "The Development of Modern Europe," II, p. 350.

INTRODUCTORY

facts, however, will convince the close observer, when he once looks into and weighs them, that there is a very serious and a real cause for this great world battle. That cause above all others was the colonial and commercial rivalries of the several nations of Europe as they center, in their interests, around England and Germany⁷ who stand at the head of the Triple Entente, and the Triple Alliance respectively. "It has long been evident to students of world politics that there is only one international situation which threatens the peace of the civilized world. That is the rivalry between England and Germany. There is no other rivalry, dispute, or misunderstanding between nations that could not be settled peacefully and quickly if this Anglo-German problem did not, directly or indirectly, retard such a settlement. German and British policies on four continents are determined or conditioned by

⁷"England with her long history of successful aggression, with her marvelous conviction that in pursuing her interests she is spreading light among nations dwelling in darkness, and Germany, bone of the same bone, blood of the same blood, with a lesser force but perhaps a keener intelligence, compete in every corner of the globe. In the Transvaal, at the Cape, in Central Africa, in India and the East, in the islands of the South Sea, and in the far Northwest, wherever — and where has it not? — the flag has followed the Bible, there the German bagman is struggling with the English pedlar. Is there a mine to exploit, a railroad to build, a native to convert, from breadfruit to tinned meat, from temperance to trade gin, the German and the Englishman is struggling to be first. A million petty disputes build up the greatest cause of war the world has ever seen. If Germany were extinguished tomorrow there is not an Englishman in the world who would not be richer. Nations have fought for years over a city or right of succession. Must they not fight for two hundred fifty million pounds of commerce." — Rohrbach, "German World Policies," p. 180. Quoted from the "Saturday Review," September, 1897.

INTRODUCTORY

the mutual enmity and fear of these two powers. Because British policies and interests clash with German policies and interests, Europe is divided into two great groupings of nations, which during the past half decade have almost evenly balanced the military strength of the continent, and it has been the fear of disturbing this balance that has prevented the settlement of more than one grave political and economic and social question.''⁸ The balance spoken of here was greatly agitated in the attempt of the Entente powers to isolate Germany and to thwart her in her designs on the colonial field of the world. The event at Serajevo on June 29, 1914, was merely a hair thrown on the already trembling scale that now threatens to the uttermost that equipoise.

⁸ "Review of Reviews," XLV, p. 281.

CHAPTER I

The Colonial Ascendency of Great Britain

THE tendency of the political development of the English People according to her own historians, and Anglophiles in general, has been one steady trend towards liberty and democracy. The English speaking people have regarded themselves as the torchbearers of that civilization which the world, at the first decade of the twentieth century, realized it had attained. From the standpoint of the Germans, however, England is viewed as the great robber state that, having taken advantage of the misfortunes of the other nations, gobbled up one-fifth of the land area of the habitable world and insists on holding possession, not by virtue of her power to defend, but by reason of her ability to bluff. Germany, also, regards herself as the heir presumptive to the colonial kingdom of the world. To her, England is a colossus with feet of iron mixed with miry clay; while Germany is the stone destined to smite the image on the feet, to its utter destruction, and eventually to become the great mountain that will fill the whole earth. She scores against England, in her boast as the torchbearer, the point that

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

her policy towards the native races of some of her possessions has been characterized by negligence and inefficiency of administration. Instead of elevating such subject races to the educational and religious ideals she herself possesses, she has left them wrapped in their original ignorance and superstition; and the liberty and democracy of which England boasts is wholly unable to adapt itself to native conditions; hence it is inferior, false, and should be superseded by a better.

However this may be, it is a vivid fact that England has succeeded, through several centuries past, in building up a mammoth colonial empire; and has especially for the last one hundred years predominated in international politics. There has also come, within the last half century, out of a cluster of independent states closely associated by racial ties, the consolidation of an empire in central Europe which has gravely threatened, and has by dint of economic efficiency seriously competed with the commercial ascendancy that England has enjoyed so long in virtue of her vast possessions and undisputed supremacy. That empire is Germany; which now menaces the colonial empire of Great Britain. In the present chapter and the one which is to follow, we shall attempt to trace the rise and the colonial fortunes of these two empires; and also to show how a trade rivalry between them was in evidence; and finally in the remaining chapters of this thesis we will point

THE COLONIAL ASCENDENCY OF GREAT BRITAIN

out how this rivalry, in which other nations of Europe participated, led up to the present armed conflict.

England in her time, just like Germany at a later period in history, was late in her entrance into the colonial field. This was due to various reasons. At the time when Columbus discovered America and opened that great and effectual door for discovery exploration, and colonization into which Spain and Portugal immediately stepped, a penurious king was on the throne of England. This king, Henry VII, pursued also a policy that was mostly domestic and hence very little encouragement was given to over sea expansion. As a consequence nothing outside of the voyage of the Cabots was accomplished. During the next three-quarters of a century the Reformation in England engaged the undivided attention of both the king and the people to affairs mainly within the realm, so that little if anything was accomplished in the way of expansion until the latter half of the sixteenth century. Thus while Spain and Portugal, the leading maritime nations of the time, were coming into possession of large tracts of territories and colonial holdings both in the East and the West. England did nothing that was worth while in the way of trans-oceanic expansion.

It was in the reign of Queen Elizabeth that England began a process of expansion into Greater Britain that has never been discontinued since. This

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

was inaugurated by such men as John Hawkins and Francis Drake, daring sea rovers, who by practical onslaughts broke through the Spanish monopoly of the West Indies and South America; and in this way pioneered the way for British commerce and enterprise to all parts of the world. The maritime supremacy of Spain was irretrievably shattered by the destruction of the Invincible Armada in 1588. "This event marks the moment when the period of the maritime supremacy of England begins and a time when her naval apprenticeship closes. It is also a time when the internal condition of the nation has been righted. Up to this time also, England had looked to the continent of Europe as the only possible and feasible field for her territorial growth; but now she begins to look towards the ocean and the New World as a possible field of expansion. From this time on England becomes industrial and maritime."

Another step towards British colonial supremacy is marked by the Revolution of 1648. Here we have the beginning of the British naval power as organized by Blake and Vane under the Commonwealth. It was at this time that England awakened as she never had before to the strategic importance of her geographical position in that her isolation from the Continent shut her off from fear of any attack by a neighboring state. The triumphs of the armies of Cromwell, his policy of making England a military state, and his successful

*See Seeley, "Expansion of England," Lecture VII, 144 ff.

THE COLONIAL ASCENDENCY OF GREAT BRITAIN

expedition against the West Indies in which he wrested Jamaica from the Spanish Empire added to the confidence and prestige of the British people; and gave them a taste for maritime supremacy which henceforth developed at a remarkable rate.

The next phase towards colonial and maritime supremacy on the part of England is the naval duel she fought with Holland in the first half of the reign of Charles II. This was the culmination of that prolonged rivalry between the two nations for the herring fisheries, the whale fisheries, the cloth trade, and the East Indian market. It had its beginning really with the massacre of Amboyna in 1623, when the Dutch destroyed an English trading settlement on the island of Amboyna in the East Indies. It ended in 1674, when Charles II withdrew from a proposed attack on Holland, which he had designed in combination with Louis XIV. This series of wars between the English and the Dutch marks the end of the supremacy of the latter on the ocean.

It was with the French that the English experienced the most protracted and the bitterest struggle for maritime and colonial ascendancy. This began in 1680 and had its ending, practically, in 1815, at the close of the Napoleonic Wars. The rivalry embraced four fields of activity which were widely separated from each other; namely, India, West

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

Africa, the West Indies and North America.¹⁰ It had its turning point, however, in the Seven Years War, known in America as the French and Indian War. In this struggle, which ended in 1763, the British were everywhere successful; and when the rivalry came to an end in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, it left the British colonial empire the same, with few exceptions, as we find it today. It now embraces, roughly speaking, parts of Africa, India, Canada, Australia, Jamaica with other portions of the West Indies, British Guiana, British Honduras, and numerous islands in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. In the Mediterranean, also, England holds such strategic points as Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus and Suez; which practically give her the control of that sea, and insure her route to India. Her possessions in various parts of the earth place her in control of points of such strategic significance as to make her the mistress of the ocean.

For years it has been the determination of England to pursue a three fold policy from which she thinks her best interests will never permit her to deviate; and over which she and her allies are now engaged in a life and death struggle with Germany. This policy is the neutrality of the Low Countries, especially Belgium;¹¹ the balance of power in Europe; and her

¹⁰ Andrews, Anglo-French Commercial Rivalry, "American Historical Reviews," XX, pp. 539-556.

¹¹ The neutralization of Belgium dates from the treaty of November 15, 1831; but on April 19, 1839, the five great powers of Europe

THE COLONIAL ASCENDENCY OF GREAT BRITAIN

own supremacy on the ocean. No other people like the English realize so fully the meaning of the words of the German Emperor, speaking to his own people, when he said: "Imperial power means sea power, and imperial power and sea power are complementary; the one cannot exist without the other,"¹² they think, however, that these words apply to their own situation. This has been the burning cause for the race for armaments that has characterized the policies of Germany and Great Britain during the past decade and a half. There has been a cry in Germany that her future lies on the sea, and England knows full well that if such a dream is ever realized by the Germans her own future is seriously at stake. The alienation that exists between England and Germany grew out of the naval policy of the latter, and this policy in turn sprung out of Germany's commercial and colonial aggression due, primarily, to her economic expansion. When the present war broke out Germany was England's chief competitor in the commercial field. She desired the right to carry on her trade side by side with Great Britain; and to build and maintain a navy equal to that of her rival. This policy England thought to be not only unfair, but actually

signed the Quintuple Treaty in which the independence and neutrality of Belgium was guaranteed by the contracting parties. On August 9, 1870, near the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war, a treaty was signed at London between Great Britain and Prussia in which the guarantee of the treaty of 1839 was acknowledged by Prussia.

¹²Dawson, "The Evolution of Modern Germany," p. 349.

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

suicidal; since, owing to Germany's keen competitive instinct, the very ability that would bring her to an equality with the mistress of the seas would soon manifest itself in a complete maritime supremacy.

Again it was a matter of stern reality that England should regard the maintenance of her maritime supremacy as a thing absolutely essential to her very existence as a nation. That country is fundamentally an industrial and commercial nation; and her forty-five millions of people, if thrown for a few months only on the mere resources of that which the island alone affords, would be utterly helpless. It is her lot to devise and to perpetuate the means by which she may be enabled to hold open the markets of the world for her own manufactured products, and for the bringing to her own shores the raw materials for her factories and the food for her workers. Stripped of the protection of an adequate fleet, and menaced by a hostile army and navy, the English people could be brought to submission within a few weeks without the firing of a single shot.

Germany, on the other hand, also contends that a strong navy is vital to her national existence; as the following extract from General Bernhardt's book, "Germany and the Next War,"¹³ will show. "'Germany's future lies on the sea'. A proud saying which contains a great truth. If the German people wish to attain a great future . . . they must adopt a world

¹³Bernhardt, "Germany and the Next War," p. 226.

policy and act as a world power. This task cannot be done unless they are supported by an adequate sea power. Our fleet must be strong enough at least, that a war with us involves such danger even to the strongest opponent, that the losses that might be expected, would endanger his position as a world power." This is evidently directed against England, who is the "strongest opponent" with whom Germany has had to deal. Again the same author says:¹⁴ "Now we can only stake our forces safely on a world policy if our political and military superiority on the continent of Europe be immovably established. This goal must be our first objective. We must take steps to develop by sea also a power which is sufficient for our pretensions. To guard our coasts and repel over sea attacks is necessary for the security of our continental position. It is an economic necessity for us to protect the freedom of the seas, since our people depend for a livelihood on the export industry, and this in turn requires a large import trade." Now if this is true of Germany, with a short strip of sea coast to defend, and we are sure that it is true of her to large extent under present international conditions; how much more can it be applied to England, which is accessible from all points by the sea.

"Hand in hand with a strong German navy is the necessity for a strong army, large enough and efficient enough to intimidate France and Russia from pre-

¹⁴Ibid.

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

cipitating war."¹⁵ Though the army is Germany's great defensive machine, taking in her behalf the place of the English Channel, the Alps and the Pyrenees, it was still meant as was shown in the opening of the great war, to take the offensive. The Germans aimed that the army be large enough in case of war to invade England,¹⁶ and at the same time keep Russia and France at bay.¹⁷ For years past there has been propagated in Germany the theory of Pan-Germanism explained elsewhere in this paper.¹⁸ In this ideal there was embraced the hope of a union, through ties of race, between Germany and her two neighbors, Belgium and Holland. The position of these two countries, together with their wealth and their traditions in European policies had led all the nations of Europe to attach great importance to them. Germany needed the strategic points that these two countries controlled, especially since the Netherlands would furnish her with a suitable naval base from which she could command the Channel. From such a point Germany could contest the control of the Channel by England, or intimidate the English fleet to permitting German ships the freedom of passage. From Holland too, the German army could invade England to the best advantage, and from Belgium

¹⁵Usher, "Pan-Germanism," p. 102.

¹⁶The army of the first line is enough to crush France, even though a portion of it must be detached against England. — "German Newspaper."

¹⁷Usher, "Pan-Germanism," p. 103.

¹⁸ Below, Chapter III, p. 35.

THE COLONIAL ASCENDENCY OF GREAT BRITAIN

she could most easily invade France and reach Paris. Such a position held by a strong power would jeopardize, and even be fatal to the Triple Entente. It was to the advantage of England that inferior powers occupy these points, and therefore she has always been very decided in her policy to keep these Low Countries neutral in case of an European war. England is fully aware of the fact that the efficiency of Germany's industrial organization is so superior that if she once got possession of such an advantage as the city of Antwerp, for instance, which in its position rivals London, she would not only invade every field of the colonial world for their markets; but she would insist on acquiring the political control of those fields, and thus jeopardize England's commercial empire. Germany, on the other hand, is fully cognizant of the fact that the only barrier in the way of realizing her commercial dreams, is England; and it has been against her, primarily, that she has been directing her thrust.

The idea of a balance of power among the several states of Europe had its rise as far back as the treaty of Westphalia in 1648. At that time it was first seen that a number of states in Europe of various sizes, interests and resources must exist side by side in some manner or other. This doctrine of a balance of power has been maintained with a greater or lesser degree of success ever since. Though some unfortunate states, like Poland and Turkey, have been preyed on and dismembered through "inadvertant"

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

circumstances, there have been in the main few deviations from this policy. One of its staunchest champions has been England. However, there has seemed to be a degree of inconsistency in England's attitude regarding an equilibrium, as outside of Europe, in the colonial field, she has maintained the balance wholly in her favor. Nevertheless, during the Napoleonic wars, England fought hard and well that the rights of some of the weaker nations of Europe be respected. In the Partition Treaties of 1698 and 1700, England intervened so as to prevent the Western Mediterranean from becoming a French lake. She lent her subsidies to Frederick the Great during the Seven Years War (1756-1763), lest the growing power of Prussia should be crushed and the Bourbons or the Hapsburgs gobble up Central Europe. Her motives, of course, have always been those of self interest, for she feared any power that might gain the ascendancy in Europe and thus threaten her own. Now that the Germans were aiming at nothing short of the domination of Europe, and even of the whole world, by the Germanic races; and were not attempting at all to disguise their design, it seemed only natural that England should step in and attempt to intercept Germany's advance. As has been said, German aggression has for years been the vital factor in the international situation; she has been determined to expand her territories and increase her wealth and power at the expense of her weaker neighbors. She had already

THE COLONIAL ASCENDENCY OF GREAT BRITAIN

attained her territorial bounds; she repudiated Bismarck's doctrine of a "satiated state" and entered on a policy of imperialism; and the consequent aggression meant the acquisition of that owned by other nations. Her population was growing at such a rapid rate that it was almost impossible for even the efficient, well trained men to get employment; in spite of the fact that her industry also was increasing at an astonishing rate. Unless some outlet could be found for her surplus population, and new and more extensive markets found for her surplus production, bankruptcy would be inevitable. Expansion was therefore an economic necessity for Germany; but that expansion could be made only at the expense, directly or indirectly, of England. Germany would either make an attack on the colonial empire of England, or she would crush France or Belgium or Turkey; any one of which would turn the balance to her advantage. England has thus far by alliances, and by her own naval strength sought to avoid such a contingency.

Though the present world situation was brought about by a desire on the part of Germany to overthrow the world empire of Great Britain as a result of the economic progress of the past half century, fuel has been added to the flames continually by the propaganda of the agitators, and the flames fanned by the teachings in the schools. Treitschke, the German historian, more than anyone else is responsible for

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

the anti-English sentiment which reigns throughout German society, and which shows itself in the German press. He was ever diligent in pointing his nation forward to the war with England which would result in the destruction of that power's supremacy on the sea. This, according to him, was to be the means by which Germany was to burst into the path of glory in the way of world dominion. He was especially chagrined by the British world dominance, because he attributed England's success to Germany's misfortunes. Had it not been for the fact that Germany was absorbed for centuries in civil and religious strife she might have made the Danube a German river, and established a German preponderance over the Bosphorus to the Indies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; and thus be able by this time to far outstrip her rival. The cavalry general, Bernhardi, has taken it upon himself to perpetuate the teachings of Treitschke. The strongest motive, however, for the aggression of the Germans lies in the fact that they consider England's world preponderance wholly out of proportion to her real strength. It is, they say, a detestation and a sham, wholly rotten; and it may endure for a time, but cannot endure forever.¹⁹

Germany regards England as being in her way in attaining the most efficient results in an economic way,

¹⁹“For Treitschke it is not genius, it is not valor, it is not even great policy as in the case of Venice, which has built up the British Empire; but the hazard of her geographical situation, the supineness of other nations, the measureless duplicity of her min-

THE COLONIAL ASCENDENCY OF GREAT BRITAIN

even in the times of peace. "The English Channel as the only available passageway for her fleets marks England as the greatest obstacle in the way of Germany's commercial growth. The voyage around the north is long, and in the winter dangerous even to steamships. Natural conditions, therefore, by compelling Germany to use the Channel, force her to expose her commerce to the assaults of England's fleet so long as England controls the Channel. Even if she should acquire colonies she cannot really possess them without first acquiring a highway to them safe from the attack of her enemies. Short of conquering England and France, she can never free her commerce from actual danger. Without a great fleet in the North Sea strong enough to terrify England into inaction, she cannot even be assured of the continuance of her present freedom of passage."²⁰

"What stands in the way of these desires and aspirations? Germany has but one enemy, one nation that blocks the way — England. Thirty years ago this answer was vague; but since that period it has steadily grown more distinct; and since 1898 and the organization of the navy league; since the South African war, and the outbursts of political and personal hatred to England at that time, it has grown still more

isters, and the natural and innate hypocrisy of the nation as a whole. These have left this monstrous empire grow — a colossus with feet of clay. . . 'Old England,' old indeed, and corrupt and rotten through and through." — Cramb, "Germany and England," lecture III, pt. VI, p. 105.

²⁰Usher, "Pan-Germanism," p. 9. Published Feb., 1913.

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

precise. England bars the way to the realization of all that is highest in German life."²¹

Furthermore, Germany regards the English as the unlawful possessors of the colonial field. "These men — Treitschke, Bernhardi, etc., as a justification of this 'nachste krieg' point to the broad fact that the English race is the possessor by theft of one fifth of the habitable earth. By what right? By the right first of craft, then of violence, German indignation then takes the place of German analysis. Cooped up between the North Sea and the Danube, the Rhine, and the plains of Poland, conscious of our strength, exerting an ever increasing pressure on our frontiers — can we, or ought we to acquiesce to England's possession of one fifth of the globe? Ought the patriotic German submit to seeing his nation depleted year by year? Can he under these circumstances retain his manhood? Is it all right for England to protest that she has no aggressive designs upon Germany? England's mere existence as an empire is a continuous aggression. So long as England, the great robber state retains her booty, the spoils of the world, what right has she to expect peace? Germany possesses nothing and could do everything. What edict, human or divine, enjoins us to sit still? What are England's title deeds, and by what rights does she justify her possession? By the law of violence."²² Such

²¹Cramb, "Germany and England," Lecture I, pt. II, pp. 14-15.

²²Ibid.

THE COLONIAL ASCENDENCY OF GREAT BRITAIN

sentiments as these on the part of Germany give the trumpet no uncertain sound and the Germans had been preparing themselves for the battle.

The English justify their attitude of intercepting the German advance in the arguments that self-preservation is the first law of life, and that possession is nine points in the law. What "squatter" who has pioneered the way to the western prairies in the United States, for instance, would think for a single moment of relinquishing his homestead rights, and turning over his possessions, for which he has made sacrifices, at the clamor of any chance new comer? Again the English regard the Germans as a people with no natural genius for empire either in the way of colonization or of imperial policy. With all their great antiquity, and traditions as a race, they had failed to consolidate into imperial unity until an extremely late period in history. They have also failed as the governing power, to assimilate the French provinces, Alsace and Lorraine, or even what is known as German Poland. With the native races of the lands which they have acquired they are forever at variance, having had recourse to the sword even to the extent of massacre. In the lands to which he emigrates the German does not retain his individuality; for in Russia he soon loses his nationality, and in America only a few years are required to effect a complete political conversion, for in the second generation he

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

becomes American in sympathy, in habit, and in intellectual outlook.

England, with the present political status of her colonial empire, did not want war. At the opening of the twentieth century she was just in the place where all her policies called for peace.²³ She had been developing in the past by outward expansion, due to war; the future called for development along the line of internal organization which could be furthered only by peace. Her task was to establish an imperially representative government that would bind her colonial empire into one solid political unit. Thus far the war has revealed that even in her present political status the British Empire is not a colossus with feet of clay. Her integral colonial units have loyally hastened to the support of the home government. With France crushed and Russia reconciled, Germany, it seems would still have a colossal task before her in disintegrating the British Empire. As it is Germany's will to power has come athwart England's desire for peace; the power of Germany is by no means insignificant, and the future alone will determine the outcome.

²³Cramb, "Germany and England," p. 143.

CHAPTER II

The Rise and Progress of Imperial Germany

THE beginning of the modern Germans as a separate people, has its date immediately after the breakup of the empire of Charlemagne in 843 A. D. The extensive empire founded by Charles the Great in 800 A. D. embraced the present states of France, Northern Italy, Switzerland, most of Germany, Austria and the Netherlands;²⁴ nations which represented the Gallic and Germanic races. Before Europe became civilized these two peoples occupied adjoining tracts on either side of the Rhine; but in the subsequent national development that took place each of these two races retained its peculiar characteristics. The Gallic peoples were welded into the solid French nation; while the Germanic peoples refused to give up their separate existence and clan-nish individualism, a tendency that seemed to prevail among them far up into the nineteenth century. For over thirty years of his reign, Charlemagne hurled attack after attack upon these pagan Saxons that dwelt across the Rhine; and when he at last succeeded in bringing into submission their most warlike chief,

²⁴See map in "Robinson's History of Western Europe," p. 82.

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

many showed a determination to remain independent still by fleeing the country to Scandinavia to man the Viking ships of later times.²⁵

These trans-Rhenish territories were incorporated into the empire of Charlemagne, who thus laid the foundation of modern Germany, together with that group of nations which later rose in Western Europe. After the death of Charlemagne his empire, in 843, was partitioned among his three grandsons. To Charles was given France, Lewis was awarded Germany and Lothaire was to possess Italy, with a narrow strip extending northward between the territories of the other two. From this time on the history of the Germans as a separate people has its beginning. Though united for a short time under Charles the Fat, in 887 the integral parts of Charlemagne's empire rent asunder forever, and the portion on the east bank of the Rhine from that time on was known as the Teutonic Kingdom. Charles had failed in his attempt to establish a world empire.

In the latter part of the tenth century, Otto the Great, having subjugated a number of neighboring races, conceived the idea of restoring once more the old Roman Empire.²⁶ This was a second attempt on the part of a German prince to establish a universal empire; a dream that has been revived again and again in German history, and the one that has finally hurled

²⁵Myers, "Mediaeval and Modern History," III.

²⁶See Bryce, "The Holy Roman Empire," pp. 130-142.

THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF IMPERIAL GERMANY

all Europe into the present world catastrophe. It was this same impractical project on the part of German Emperors that kept Germany disunited up until the last half of the nineteenth century. In attempting to grasp too much they succeeded in acquiring nothing. In their attempt to acquire foreign dominion they ceased, in the end, to be even rulers of Germany, and the result was provincialism, disintegration and ruin.²⁷ The vassals of the Emperor, while he was engaged in external affairs, increased their powers in their respective provinces, and thus could assert much independence. Unlike England and France, where the sovereigns succeeded in consolidating the political power of the nation into a single unit, the king, whose throne was hereditary by primogeniture, Germany fell into the political anomaly of numerous provinces, each a political unit, and the sovereignty of which did not fall to the eldest son; but as in the case of Charlemagne's empire, was separated among the heirs. As a result, Germany became a disconnected, war-ridden aggregation of petty principalities which was known in history up to the time of the first Napoleon as the Holy Roman Empire. Even such a powerful monarch as Charles V could not bring these stubborn, independent, German princelings under an absolute sway. With no state powerful enough to take the hegemony, and to concert the several racial and religious interests into any sort of a solid political unit, Germany,

²⁷Myers, "Mediaeval and Modern History," pp. 325-326.

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

for decades at a time, became a war scathed arena, the bloody battleground of all Europe.²⁸

This state of things continued with no signs of a change until the rise of the Hohenzollern line of kings, and the Prussian hegemony, which had its beginning in the first half of the seventeenth century. Frederick the Great (1740-1786), the third king in the line of this family, by a series of successful wars, was instrumental in winning great prestige for the Prussian state. He elevated her power even to an equality with that of Austria, and thus laid the foundation for the union of the German states which had failed to concentrate about Austria; but which from this time on began to lean towards the leadership of the dynasty founded by the House of Brandenburg. From this time on until the unification of 1871, the history of the Germans centers about the rivalry between Austria and Prussia with their respective satellite group of neighboring states, joined to them through political and religious motives. Prussia progressive, liberal and Protestant was pitted against Austria reactionary, despotic and Catholic. Each was jealous of the other, and each desired to gain power and prestige at the expense of the other. At last things began to turn in Prussia's favor,²⁹ liberal ideals began to prevail, German literature was commanding increasing respect

²⁸For a single instance of the evil effects of the lack of unity and cooperation among the several German states see Henderson's "Short History of Germany," Vol. I, p. 496.

²⁹Priest, "Germany since 1740," pp. 55-65.

after the death of Goethe in 1832 when his name was on every tongue;³⁰ but in spite of the fact that the spirit of nationalism rose higher and higher there was still no national unity.

Finally there arose in Germany a man of large vision and extraordinary powers. This was Otto von Bismarck³¹ who first entered public life in 1847, and began his diplomatic career in 1859. This keen statesman planned for Prussia a great and brilliant future by making her the dominant power in Germany through a policy of blood and iron. In 1862 he became the prime minister of William I, and from that time on he was bent on a single purpose — the hegemony of Prussia. For this purpose he determined to use the national revenues in creating an efficient army; a policy which he closely pursued, in spite of all opposition. The end justified the means, was his argument, and his end was to make Prussia great by any means. In 1864, in conjunction with Austria, he culminated a war against Denmark and acquired Holstein for Austria and Schleswig for Prussia. He next picked a quarrel with Austria, at that time one of the strongest states in Europe, and after a quick decisive campaign of six weeks' duration, wrested Holstein from her grasp. He then turned upon France which at this time was in a state of internal disorganization, and after a brief campaign, the Prussian armies were in

³⁰Ibid, p. 89.

³¹Collier, "Germany and the Germans," pp. 88-104.

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

Paris. These magnificent triumphs of Prussian arms aroused all Germany to admiration. The Germans had at last found a leader and they decided to follow wherever Prussia might lead. Thus on November 12, 1870, a parliament of the north German states voted to request the king of Prussia to become Emperor of a united Germany. This request was granted and on January 18, 1871, at Versailles, in the midst of great demonstration, William I of Prussia was solemnly proclaimed Emperor of Germany.

Bismarck had succeeded in binding Germany together with sinews of iron; he next determined that there should be built in her ribs of gold. He had succeeded in attaining the political unity of the several German states, his next step was a determination on making her a great commercial and industrial state, which sustained on a basis of militarism, he aimed ~~should some day burst through her present bounds;~~ and by the veritable force of the impact expand in Europe. Germany had always been more or less inclined to the pursuits of trade; for she was the home of that mediaeval organization, the Hanseatic League; and the later Zollverein,²² another league for commercial betterment, which did much to bring about the political union of the nineteenth century. Now, how-

²²The Zollverein was a custom union formed between a number of the German states in 1818, and culminating in the union of 1871. Its object was to relieve the oppressive tariffs between the several German states, which were a great hindrance to the internal commerce of the times.

THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF IMPERIAL GERMANY

ever, with her political unity accomplished, Germany entered on a commercial and industrial career that has had no precedent in the history of any other nation. But Bismarck was never wholly led over to the side of that class of agitators that advocated over sea expansion, notwithstanding the fact that he was instrumental in adding to the Fatherland a number of small islands in the South Pacific and several considerable tracts on the African coasts. He was never much of an imperialist,³³ and in most of the colonial acquisitions made under his ministry his hand had almost to be forced by the sentiment created by the agitators. In one of the Congresses he made the remark that the whole question of the Orient was not worth the finger bone of a Pomeranian grenadier. He displayed a total unconcern in the Balkan question, and utterly failed to realize how vital was the nationalization of these states to the future of the Germany he was building.³⁴ He was tireless, however, in directing his great intellect to the development of the internal resources of the new empire and was fully determined to maintain the military power and prestige of Germany. He also sought, for the security of the Empire, the alliance of other powers, and when the power of the Socialists threatened to undermine the administration he stole their thunder by the adoption of state socialism and a system of paternalism.³⁵

³³Dawson, "The Evolution of Modern Germany," p. 334.

³⁴Gibbons, "The New Map of Europe," p. 45.

³⁵Robinson and Beard, "The Development of Modern Europe," Vol. II, p. 137.

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

The impetus given by the consolidation of Germany to her industrial prosperity caused her to begin to look to outside markets for the surplus products of her factories. But while she sought to extend her markets she desired also that these markets should be under her own flag and subject only to her own political influences. Unfortunately, as has been said, Germany like Italy, entered at an extremely recent date the field of colonial activity; so that most of the available portions of the earth had already been acquired by England, France, and Russia. This fact has been the source of untold trouble in diplomatic circles; and it has been one of the most exasperating causes of the present world conflict. As is natural, England is the one nation that is more concerned about the disposition of what little available colonial territory is left. Her interests demand that none of her possessions be menaced or any of her commerce be hampered by any nation which takes over lands or islands adjacent to hers. Her most dangerous rivals very naturally would be France, Russia and Germany; and were the economic interests of each of these in the same relation as those of Germany and England, the colonial empire of the latter power would be in serious danger. As it is, Germany only is to be regarded as a menace. England does not fear France, first, because that nation itself is threatened by Germany on the east and for that reason must seek alliances to assure her very existence. Again, so long as the growth of the popula-

THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF IMPERIAL GERMANY

tion of France is at a standstill, there will be little demand on her part for colonial territory. England does not fear Russia so long as that great empire is land-locked, and continues in her failure to find an ice free port. Germany, on the other hand, is the one power that England fears above all others. The increase of her population that reaches near the million mark each year,³⁶ the backing of her colonial aspirations by the building of a powerful navy, and the outstripping of Great Britain herself in the industrial and commercial domain, make Germany a real menace to the British ascendency.

The colonial and commercial rivalry between Great Britain and Germany during the last quarter of a century has been very sharp and interesting. In fact, it has several times before the fatal August, 1914, brought Europe on the verge of war. As it happened the diplomats succeeded in shifting the conflict to the interests of some of the smaller states, and the results have been such issues as the Turco-Italian war and the Balkan Crises. The commercial ascendency of the Germans is due to several causes. In the first place protection was given to the German manufacturers by the Government through prohibitive import duties. At first Bismarck had favored a policy of free trade; but almost forced by the position of some of the other countries in the issue, he suddenly shifted

³⁶See Dawson, "The Evolution of Modern Germany," p. 336.

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

to the advocacy of protection.³⁷ Thus in 1878 a program of tariff revision, which involved two points, was presented in the Reichstag: (1) protective duties designed to give German industries the advantage over foreign products; and (2) a reduction of duties on raw materials not produced in the empire. This really opened a new era in the economic career of Germany; for in adopting this new system of tariff laws a policy was inaugurated that has made Germany one of the greatest manufacturing countries in the world.

The unparalleled development of German industries and commerce has been accomplished by scientific methods and organization. It has not been due so much to the quality of the German goods; for they themselves refer to them as "schlecht und billig".³⁸ Yet, in spite of the fact that they are recognized as "cheap and nasty" as the English translate it, the latter also saw within a few years their own manufacturers outstripped in every market.³⁹ To protect themselves, as

³⁷ "Both France and America have completely forsaken free trade; Austria, instead of reducing her protective duties has increased them; Russia has done the same. . . . Therefore no one can expect Germany to remain permanently the victim of its sincere belief in the theory of free trade. Hitherto we have thrown open our doors to foreign goods, and so we have become the dumping ground for all over production of other countries. Let us close our door and erect the somewhat higher barriers that are proposed, and let us see to it that we secure the German market for German manufacturers." — Bismarck, Speech in the Reichstag, see Robinson and Beard, "The Development of Modern Europe," Vol. II, p. 142.

³⁸ "Poor and cheap."

³⁹ "Germany's industrial expansion is best illustrated by the statistics of foreign trades. It is estimated that the imports of Germany in 1860 amounted to £54,750,000; exports £70,000,000. In

THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF IMPERIAL GERMANY

they thought, against the goods of their rivals, Parliament passed an act requiring all German goods sold within the British Empire, to be labeled "Made in Germany"; but soon even her own people bought the goods so marked in preference to those of her own producers. The Germans made it a point to make their goods attractive both as to their appearance and their price. They resorted to show window methods in marketing, whereas the English thinking themselves secure in the fact that their goods were of a better quality, left them done up in brown paper on the shelf. The result was that while the English goods were really of a much better quality, they remained on the shelf for lack of a demand. English conservatism would neither take the goods from the shelf or remove the brown paper.⁴⁰ Germany maintained a monopoly in the manufactured compounds used in dyeing, medicine and photography which places the world today in a humiliating place of dependence. In 1897, Germany imported \$3,200,000 worth of indigo; ten years later she exported \$2,000,000 worth of indigo. This reversal of the market was due solely to the invention of the method of making

1880 Germany's total imports for home consumption were £141,000,000 and her imports of manufactured goods for home consumption were £30,100,000; its total exports of native products were £144,800,000; and its exports of manufactured goods of native origin were £83,500,000. The value of its imports in 1907 was £356,000,000. The value of the imports for industrial purposes increased from 1895 to 1905, from £90,250,000 to £172,850,000." — Dawson, "The Evolution of Modern Germany."

⁴⁰See Whitman, "Imperial Germany," Ch. XII, p. 263.

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

indigo artificially. Large corps of chemists were kept at work from year to year at a great expense until it was worked out. It cost one company \$4,000,000 before they got any returns but it finally paid. German commercial leaders have more accurate information about the natural resources and trade possibilities of some of the countries they aim to invade commercially than the rulers of those countries themselves. Germans abroad, too, are constantly on the lookout for new markets for their manufactures.

It is a German theory that their foreign trade can succeed only if it is carried in German ships. As a result they have developed within a few years a merchant marine that has astonished the whole world; and although Germany is still outstripped by the increase in the British merchant marine, she is considered as a serious menace to the British superiority.

Thus as a result of scientific management applied to manufacture, salesmanship and administration, Germany has made greater strides and proportionate gains in wealth than any other country with the exception of the United States. And it is this very thing that has led to German imperialism. Seeking new markets in countries where she could exercise also a political sway, she was seeking, in reality, new colonial possessions. Her economic expansion demanded these new markets, they were her crying need; but the field having been almost wholly occupied it was evident that Germany was preparing to take posses-

THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF IMPERIAL GERMANY

sion of a colonial field at the expense of some other nation. Seeking new markets in a colonial field already occupied by England, France and Russia her interests were bound to conflict with the interests of these powers, especially with those of England who held the lion's share in that she controlled one fifth of the habitable land area of the globe.

Thus by every force of circumstances, Germany, Austria, and Italy who came late to their political majority, threatened by their neighbors who looked with jealous eyes upon their consolidation and consequent commercial expansion, formed in 1882 a defensive alliance to promote their mutual interests. This, the Triple Alliance as it was called, has sought to promote the common aims and ambitions of these three powers against their three more formidable rivals who had been annexing the better parts of the African and Asiatic continents while they had been engaged with internal problems. England, France and Russia, on the other hand, have formed what is known as the Triple Entente whose object, they claim, is to maintain the necessary European equilibrium. The fact is that while they have seemed bent on sustaining this European equipoise they have also determined to secure an extra-European balance wholly in their own favor. In other words, England, France, and Russia, the three great imperial powers, have united to keep Germany out of the colonial field where her expanding commerce has been forcing her. This has been the

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

cause of so much unrest in Europe, also of German militarism, and the menacing naval policy that brought on the war.

That Germany has succeeded in gaining colonial possessions in various parts of the world, in spite of the fact that it had been already mostly occupied is due to her spirit of enterprise and daring. It has been due also to a propaganda carried on at home, coupled with the support of the Government. In 1878 an African society was established for the purpose of carrying on exploration and educating public opinion in favor of colonial expansion. Trading posts were built and government protection was urged. In 1884 a German protectorate was formed over Togoland and Kamerun on the west coast of Africa. In the same year Angra Pequena was obtained. In 1890, for a consideration of one million dollars a strip on the east coast of Africa, opposite Zanzibar, 600 miles in length, was obtained. At this period also Germany came into the possession of Kaiser Wilhelm's Land in New Guinea, the Caroline Islands except Guam, and a part of the Solomon group.

In 1907, not wishing to be outdone by England, France and Russia in the Far East, Germany seized the port of Kiaochow on the Shangtung peninsula, opposite Korea. It was when the expedition to this port was undertaken by his brother, Prince Henry, that the Emperor exhorted him, whenever German

rights were assailed, to use the mailed fist.⁴¹ Outside of these Germany has held no lands under her direct political dominance. There have been other colonizing schemes, but these have been merely for opening new markets or for accommodating her superfluous population. These are the Trans-Caucasian agricultural settlements established by some Wurttemberg farmers. In Palestine there are the Good Templar colonies on the coast, which have prospered so well as to arouse the resentment of the natives. The Baghdad Railway has turned Germany's attention to the fertile region of Anatolia and Mesopotamia for commerce rather than for possession. In South America there are the various German settlements; but here the interests also are economic more than political. Thus far the colonial acquisitions of the German people are of doubtful value; many of them are wholly unsuited for settlement by German emigrants; and there has been a growing expense attached to their maintenance. Even before they were taken away in the present war most of them could be regarded merely as coaling stations and naval bases;

⁴¹ "And may our countrymen out there cherish the firm conviction, whether they are priests or merchants or whatever profession they follow, that the protection of the German Empire as exemplified in the Emperor's ships will continuously be granted them! But if anyone should undertake to insult us in our rights or wish to harm us, then drive in with the mailed fist and, as God wills, bind about your young brow the laurels which no one in the entire German Empire will begrudge you!" — Gauss, "The German Emperor," p. 120.

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

and no doubt they were regarded by the Germans as the stepping stones to greater things, places from which they might be enabled to strike and operate when once they were ready to carry out the project of the *Weltpolitik*.

CHAPTER III

Pan-Germanism and the *Weltpolitik*

HAND in hand with that desire of Germany to expand her territorial limits and the establishment of a great world empire, go the propaganda of Pan-Germanism and that of the *Weltpolitik*; a twin scheme, long harbored in the German mind, to make a "Deutschland über alles". The doctrine of Pan-Germanism, briefly, is a dream of the restoration of the empire of Charlemagne, built up and directed, it would seem, under the sway of the present House of Hohenzollern. When this dream of an all German union should once be realized, the next step would be the sudden disruption of France, and the utter destruction of the British Empire, and lastly the final domination of the whole world by a German civilization. Their connotation of the word German has led the people of Germany itself to think of all the territories outside of their own immediate political and geographical confines, that have been historically or racially associated with the German Empire of days gone by, as essentially and rightfully theirs; and the Germans who dwell therein as their co-heirs in a proposed great world state; and that these will eventually join their interests with those of the present German Empire. These territories include such

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

states as Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Holland and even the Scandinavian country Denmark. Taken in a broader sense also, Pan-Germanism is an attempt to strengthen "Deutschthum" throughout the world by binding all Germans to the Fatherland through ties of patriotism and race.

The movement had its origin, or at least it was given a mighty stimulus, as early as the sixties of the last century when a large number of books and pamphlets first appeared. In 1861, for instance, in an atlas published by a leading German scholar, a map was shown with the title; "France as Germany would like to see it." This represented Alsace and Lorraine, with other portions of near Germany, as German territory. The "Classical Atlas" of a certain Herr Stieler, published in 1869, went a great deal farther by setting forth Belgium, Holland, Switzerland and Denmark all as German lands. This was done notwithstanding the fact that these had been for a long time well established and independent governments. The Germans realized, however, that the desired expansion could never be accomplished as long as France remained as a great power. It was a stock phrase of the Pan-Germanists that many millions of Germans would be "lost" to the Empire if large tracts of French territory were not annexed, and in addition, it was certain that France would always strenuously oppose the expansion of Germany into such a country with a strategic significance like Belgium. Therefore

the fulfillment of the dream, for empire was made to depend on the extinction, or at least the disabling of France.⁴² Just as they used to say in Rome: "Delenda est Carthago", so they were now saying in Germany: "France must be destroyed."⁴³ At any rate, so at least the geographers candidly expressed it, France was primarily a small kingdom born of the dismemberment of Charlemagne's Empire, and has expanded only at the expense of Germany. This idea became so fixed in the mind of the German people that they felt fully justified in putting France out of the way, a fact that was fully proven at the outbreak of the present war when as a first move Germany attempted a death drive to the very heart of that republic.

So industrious were the Germans in propagating this theory that they succeeded in spreading this delusion among certain classes in England, America, Russia and even France itself. By ceaseless suggestion; by insinuations in lectures, in magazines, in text books, in pamphlets the German people were wholly convinced of the decadence of France; and at the same time they were always stimulated to the belief of Germany's portentous future. They were always taught the necessity of insuring this future by every possible means; by the spread of the German "Kul-

⁴²Cramb, "Germany and England," Lecture III, pt. VI, p. 103.

⁴³Beveridge, German thought back of the war, "Colliers," May 8, 1915, p. 8.

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

tur'', by the expansion of German commerce, and even by dint of military power.

To the Germans, Pan-Germanism meant self preservation; a determination to preserve and to strengthen the life of a great people. If it has not been, primarily, their intention to unite the Germanic nations by a tie of political unity; it has been, at least, a project to bind them together through racial and economic interests; either of which if successfully accomplished would make the Teutonic element the preponderating one in Europe, and hence a menace to the other nations. Pan-Slavism is an offset to this contingency, and the Triple Entente is a guarantee against it. Germany has been conscious of her growing strength and of her growing needs, one of which is a larger domain. Of late years the enormous growth and increasing energy of the German Empire has driven her to fresh expansion over sea; and a part of the mission of Pan-Germanism is to link up her scattered colonial elements, and by maintaining in them the sentiments of their nationality, preserve them as instruments of "Deutschthum".⁴⁴

The Pan-Germanic sphere of influence is thus practically world wide. It covers Europe — Scandinavia, Denmark, the Baltic provinces, Bohemia, Austria, the Tyrol, parts of Hungary, the Balkan states, Turkey in Europe, Switzerland, Holland and Belgium. Besides this there is a Pan-German propaganda in Asia Minor,

⁴⁴Colquhoun, "The Whirlpool of Europe," Chapter XII, 252.

and among the Boers in South Africa. In North America it seeks to preserve the national sentiments in the individual where he is so easily and so rapidly assimilated, as in the United States. In South America that sentiment is also being preserved in whole communities of German colonies, as in Brazil and Argentina. And throughout the whole world, wherever German citizens are engaged in commerce, in education, or in religious work, the spirit of Pan-Germanism is at work. The Emperor himself is deeply interested in the movement, and has often given it official sanction in his speeches.⁴⁵

In connection with Pan-Germanism, one of the most potent causes of the present world conflict is the ideal known as the *Weltpolitik* of the Germans. It has been the most vital and burning question with which diplomats in recent years have had to deal. This hallucination of the German idealists, but recently conceived in the minds of the German people, has so developed that it is the engrossing thought of the whole German nation. When the Germans took up arms at the opening of the present conflict they took them up with the glowing hope that the culmination of the war

⁴⁵ "Out of the German Empire a world empire has arisen. Everywhere and in all parts of the world thousands of our countrymen reside. German riches, German knowledge, German activity, make their way across the ocean. The value of German possessions over the sea is some thousands of millions. Gentlemen, the serious duty devolves on you to link up this greater German Empire by helping me in complete unity to fulfill my duty towards Germans in foreign parts." — Colquhoun, "The Whirlpool of Europe," p. 253.

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

would open up the way for the realization of this ideal. Pan-Germanism aims to bring the Germans of all nations under a civilization whose standard is the "Kultur"; the *Weltpolitik* aims at the spreading of that civilization over the whole earth. It is a pipe-dream to the effect that the German race will one day predominate the earth in a great world empire in which the German "Kultur"⁴⁶ will pre-eminently flourish.

The spread of the *Weltpolitik* is not merely the result of the propaganda of a party, or of a society, or of any small clique of over-enthusiastic idealists; but it has been greatly encouraged by the Government itself, and it has been seconded by the hearty support of the people. It may have had its origin in the doctrines of such teachers as the historian Treitschke; but it seemed so inherent in, so constitutional with the German people that they absorb it; its spread is spontaneous, and its existence now is a sober fact, pervading all classes of German society from the Kaiser down to the workingman. It has been preached from the pulpit, heralded by the newspaper, taught in the schools, incorporated into the text-books, and

⁴⁶The German "Kultur" according to Professor Harnack embraces three attitudes for aspirations of the mind and heart. First, thoroughness, the wish to get at the bottom of things. Second, altruism — the opposite of selfishness, we wish to form a union as high as human life, and as deep as human misery. Third, the wish to see all temporal things in an eternal light; the desire to connect all our thoughts and actions with the everlasting purpose and prayer to be co-workers with God in making ourselves and our fellowmen better and happier.

PAN-GERMANISM AND THE *Weltpolitik*

vitalized by the novelists until it has become the one grand pulsating thought of the whole German nation.

A few quotations set forth by Herbert Adams Gibbons from the works of some of Germany's greatest thinkers will convince the most sceptical that the teaching not only exists, but they will also show how outspoken and unequivocal these writers are in pronouncing the doctrine. These men are individual Germans but they voice the sentiment of the whole German people when they flaunt before them first of all, the belief in the superiority of the German race and its world civilizing mission. The anthropologist Wortman looking from the viewpoint of biologists says: "The German is a superior type of the species homo sapiens from the physical as well as the intellectual point of view."⁴⁷ Werth says: "The world owes its civilization to the German alone,"⁴⁸ and, "The time is near when the world will inevitably be conquered by the Germans."⁴⁹ Paulson writes: "Humanity is aware of and admires the German omniscience."⁵⁰ Even the world-character, Goethe, long before the consolidation of the German Empire, said: "The German alone is to make the habitable world worth living in."⁵¹ Over a century ago Fichte also said to the Germans: "Be patriots and we shall not cease to be cosmopolitan."⁵²

Not only have the Germans magnified their own

⁴⁷Gibbons, "The New Map of Europe," pp. 21-57.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ibid.

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

race; but they did not cease to slur and minimize the men of other races. "Frenchmen are monkeys, and the best and strongest element in the French race is German by blood,"⁵³ is a statement of Hummel; also, "The Russians are slaves as their name implies."⁵⁴ Treitschke wrote of the British that "Among them the love of money has killed all sentiments of honor and all distinction of just and unjust."⁵⁵ Such statements as these not only sound a note of disparagement towards other races; but clearly indicate that the German thinks he outclasses, mentally, morally and physically, all other peoples. The world must for its own sake be Germanized is only another way of saying that the German culture is the highest in the world; that Germany is looking for a wider field for her genius to expand, and is merely making this an excuse for her aggression. The vast military and naval preparations that Germany has been making during the last quarter of a century do not encourage the world to believe that Germany aimed to fulfill her mission by means of the pen alone. The world has never been slow to recognize that which excels, be it in the way of moral, intellectual, or physical culture. The German culture as such has never come into general notice, but has so bristled with militarism as scarcely to be recognized outside of that guise. Deep down in the hearts of the men, the Krupp-Kaiser-Kultur-Klique, who at this time direct the destinies of

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Ibid.

PAN-GERMANISM AND THE *Weltpolitik*

Germany, behind the assertion of a superior culture and the protestation for the necessity of its defence is the desire for the colonial ascendancy of the German people for commercial ends.

Pan-Germanism is a defensive movement for self preservation against the pressure of France and Russia who, the Germans think, are determined on their destruction; the *Weltpolitik* is an offensive movement directed, primarily, against England, its ultimate object being the acquisition of the English possessions in various parts of the world. In this way Germany expects to get an outlet and a broader field for her expanding industry and commerce. To it is due, largely, the militarism of Germany and her menacing naval program that has long threatened the peace of Europe. To it is due also the attitude of England towards Germany in the Morocco affair, in the Persian episode, and in the extending of the Baghdad Railway. As long as Germany exhibits the spirit of building an empire at the expense of other empires, England will refuse to give her leeway.

CHAPTER IV

The Moroccan Crisis

WHenever he thought an opening presented itself William II, the present Emperor of Germany, made every arrangement to give the *Weltpolitik* a free course. He was especially diligent in directing his attention to those backward countries of the old World whose internal wealth appealed to his commercial ambitions and whose political governments he thought disorganized. He was one of the main instigators in, and made due preparations for the partition of China;⁵⁶ but he had to abandon the enterprise.⁵⁷ He also attempted to support the Boers in their war with England, that he might step into a chance open door in South Africa;⁵⁸ but his better judgment soon caused him to desist. This he did not do, however, until after he had sent a telegram of encouragement to Paul Kruger, the Boer leader,⁵⁹ an incident that caused quite a stir for a time in diplomatic circles. He tried to get a footing in South America by sending a fleet to Venezuela that he might

⁵⁶See Krausse, "The Far East, Its History and Its Questions," pp. 169 and 244.

⁵⁷The Chinese situation was adjusted by a conference of the Powers at Peking in a Protocol issued and signed September 7, 1901.

⁵⁸Rose, "The Origin of the War," Appendix II, p. 190.

⁵⁹The Kruger telegram was sent on January 3, 1896, after the successful repulse of the Jameson raid.

THE MOROCCAN CRISIS

demand, at the cannon's mouth the payment of debts owed to some Germans; but in this incident he was intercepted by the Monroe Doctrine.⁶⁰ As a final venture he thought of opening Morocco to the trade and enterprise of Germany, and to secure for her a commanding naval base ostensibly Agadir, on the western coast of Africa.

In order to understand the tangled Moroccan situation at this time, it will be necessary to review and to keep in mind a few incidents of international significance that occurred there since the opening of the twentieth century. Morocco is one of those backward nations of Africa whose strategic value is great; since it flanks the whole southern shore of the Mediterranean opposite Gibraltar, and extends southward far down the west coast of Africa. Its economic importance too is by no means insignificant, as it is especially rich in mineral wealth, and possesses a fertile soil, and is capable of almost infinite development. In area it is equal to Germany; and in many ways it presented an admirable field for German colonization. In this country France had already succeeded in gaining a slight foothold. Its importance to her lay in the fact that it bordered on the east the French possessions of Algeria; and its eastern border had for two generations been subjected to a peaceful penetration by France.

⁶⁰German warships were sent to Venezuela in December, 1902.

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

In the month of April, 1904, the two governments of France and Great Britain came to a general understanding with regard to their possessions and spheres of influence in North Africa. By this agreement, later to be known as the Anglo-French *Entente Cordiale*,⁶¹ the two countries separated their respective colonial empires on the Dark Continent by certain well-defined lines. France agreed that Egypt should be under British control, and England announced that as far as she was concerned, Morocco was henceforth to be French. Later at a convention held in Madrid a Franco-Spanish program in regard to Morocco was agreed to. This was a mutual promise to defend each other in the protection of their respective interests in Morocco; but no actual agreement was made to carry out this defense beyond the exercise of diplomatic pressure. These accords were secret, and their exact terms were not known until the later incident at Agadir, in 1911, made necessary their publication.

Almost immediately after this the German Government found a favorable moment to express its dissatisfaction with this agreement that it surmised these governments had made. Russia had been defeated by Japan and was so disorganized as to render her part of the Russo-French Entente nil.⁶² Great Britain also had not yet recovered from the disaster of her mil-

⁶¹Oxford Faculty, "Why we are at War," p. 51.

⁶²The Russo-French Entente of 1896 was a step taken by these two governments to counteract the growing menace of German militarism. Since 1886 the utmost efforts of France had succeeded

THE MOROCCAN CRISIS

itary campaigns in South Africa and, at the same time, her domestic politics were in a chaotic state. It was a case where Germany, so at least she thought, could make the extremity of the Triple Entente her opportunity; so the Kaiser took the occasion to make that sensational visit to Tangier, which brought France and Germany on the verge of war. On the last day of March, 1905, Emperor William entered the Harbor of Tangier, Morocco, on his private yacht, the Hohenzollern, and to a mixed assembly of German residents and native dignitaries he made a flaming speech in which he greeted the representatives of the Sultan as those of an independent sovereign; and vouched to maintain the integrity and independence of that state. In this speech he said, in part: "I am happy to recognize in you, devoted pioneers of German industry and commerce, who are helping me in the task of always upbuilding in a free land the interests of the mother country. The sovereignty and integrity of Morocco will be maintained. In an independent country such as Morocco, commerce must be free. I will do my best to maintain its politico-economic equity."⁶³

The result of this visit of the German Kaiser was electrical in England and in France. The Germans

in raising her peace establishment to 545,000, and her total strength to 4,000,000 against Germany's peace footing of 800,000 and total strength of 5,400,000. Her alliance with Russia was only a way of counter-balancing the numerical superiority of the German army.

⁶³Progress of the world, in "Review of Reviews," XXXI, p. 530.

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

already possessed vast economic interests in Morocco, one fifth of the export trade of the country was controlled by them, and this was a direct challenge on the part of the German Government for a share in shaping the political affairs of Morocco. As it developed later it was also a stroke towards obtaining a "say so" in any future international situation that might come up. It was an answer also to the Anglo-French accord in which Germany had been utterly ignored. Under the circumstances England was in no position to stand back of France; German pressure was brought to bear more and more; M. Delcasse, the French foreign minister was forced to resign; and Europe decided to settle the Morocco situation in a general conference of the nations interested.⁶⁴

In January, 1906, according to an understanding previously agreed to, thirteen delegates representing Morocco, the several European powers involved, and the United States, met in a conference held in Algiers, a small town in southeastern Spain, to settle, if possible, the dispute over Morocco and to decide the international status of the North African province. The German representatives maintained the complete independence of Morocco, and the sovereignty of her Sultan. The British delegates took the point of view that Morocco was purely a French problem, and steadily supported this point. They sustained the French interests insistently. On April 5, Chancellor von

⁶⁴Rose, "The Origins of the War," pp. 75-77.

THE MOROCCAN CRISIS

Bülow declared in the Reichstag that the time had come when German interests in the remaining independent portions of Africa and Asia must be considered by Europe. On April 7, the convention was signed by all the delegates and agreed to by the Sultan later in July. Finally on December 31, 1906, the ratification by all the powers was deposited in Madrid. The agreement was to hold good for five years. It provided for a Moorish police force to patrol the province. This force was to be commanded by Moors, who were to be assisted by French and Spanish officers and supervised by a Swiss Inspector General. A state bank was also provided for, and censors appointed by the several governments interested. Later (in 1909) a separate agreement was made that defined the peculiar interests of Germany and France in Morocco. In going to Tangier, and in forcing the conference of Algceiras, Germany laid down the principle that henceforth there must be equal opportunities for Germans in the countries that were still independent; and she took the opportunity to declare to the world that she was prepared to enforce the principle. Germany's remarkable growth in population, and in industrial and maritime enterprise was seeking to be recognized as having a proper place in the colonial field.

France, however, was determined not to give up her dream of a vast colonial empire in North Africa that would include Morocco also. To accomplish this the downfall of the Sultan's authority was a necessary

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

step. She therefore winked at the anarchy on the Algerian frontier, and permitted it to go on unchecked; in this way inviting interference and making military measures justifiable. At the same time the German colonists were doing their best to stir up things in such a way as to bring on intervention by Germany. Late in the year 1909 an attack upon some railroad workers near Tangier resulted in the death of five Spanish subjects. Civil war also broke out in Morocco, and after a successful revolt by Mulai Hafid, the latter was proclaimed sultan in 1907 and later was recognized by the powers with the understanding that he recognize the agreement made at Algeciras.

Finally the Sultan besieged in his capital, Fez, by an army of rebels, called upon the French Government to rescue him. The Berber tribes had risen in revolt and were actually attacking the city where some European residents were in danger. This was the hour that the French had long looked for; and a relief column of native troops, but officered by Frenchmen, immediately proceeded to the gates of the capital and took possession of the city. The Europeans in the city were safe enough; but Mulai Hafid's brother had set himself up as pretender to the throne, so that the Sultan, unable to retain his power, was forced to place himself under the protection of the French army. By this step Morocco lost her independence. Thus was skillfully terminated the long pursued design of a French preponderance over Morocco.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ "Review of Reviews," Vol. 36, pp. 63, 102, 273, 407; also Vol. 45, p. 671.

THE MOROCCAN CRISIS

As soon as Germany saw that she had been outwitted in Morocco, a protest was at once sent by the Government that the action of the French was in direct violation of the Algeciras agreement. The French, however, persisted in their course. Their ally Great Britain, was unembarrassed at this time by South African troubles, and the German Government, seeing its plight, shifted its position by asking what compensation France would give Germany for a free hand in Morocco. The pourparlers dragged on through several weeks in June; but France refused to recognize any grounds for compensation to Germany, and firmly maintained that the recent action in Morocco had been at the request of the Sultan, and that it was purely a matter between that prince and France.

Germany saw that a bold stroke was necessary. On July 1, the Berlin Foreign Office expressed its dissatisfaction with the course of the Paris Government by despatching the gunboat Panther to the port of Agadir. The pretext for this step was the protection of Europeans at that point; but the real object of the interference was to prevent Great Britain and France from monopolizing Morocco without the consent of Germany. Her object was to enforce the right which had been conceded her at Algeciras; namely, to have a say as to the disposition of the extra-European territories still independent. On the same day that the Panther was sent the German ambassador notified Sir Edward Grey that the warship had been despatched

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

to Agadir; and explained that Germany considered the question of Morocco re-opened by the French occupation of Fez. He thought too that it would be possible to make an agreement with Spain and France for the partition of Morocco. Germany demanded also a new agreement which would recognize her obvious interests in Morocco and to which she would be a party. In case that France refused to concede such interests in Morocco as Germany's own interests made desirable, she demanded a cession to her by France of a small district in the French Congo which she deemed important as a strategical position.

Sir Edward Grey, after a consultation with the Cabinet, announced that Great Britain could recognize no change in Morocco without first consulting France, with whom she was bound by treaty. The ambassador then explained that the matter in the whole affair lay directly between Germany and France, and that the notification made to the British Government had been merely in the nature of a friendly explanation. It was right at this point that Germany believed that the hands of the British Cabinet were tied by the pending political crisis in Great Britain, and that England was in no place to back France in the latter's assertion of preponderance in Morocco. This situation is what led the Berlin Office to propose to France the concession of certain territories in Central Africa in lieu of giving Germany a free hand in

THE MOROCCAN CRISIS

Morocco. The Kaiser felt that the moment was well chosen and that there was every hope of success.

The fact, however, that British solidarity was not threatened as was thought, led Lloyd George to warn Germany of the danger of pressing too far her claims on France. This was in July. Throughout August and September, as it happened, Germany, cognizant of Russia's predicament in regard to her treaty relations with the United States over some Jewish passports; also of her threatening revolution within; and of her embarrassment regarding the Shuster affair in Persia, saw fit to make some demonstration and to try to force the issue with France. Thus it was that France, uncertain of the support of Russia and by mistake not too confident that aid would be forthcoming from England, was influenced to treat with Germany on the Morocco question. As a result a French protectorate was established in Morocco on March 30, 1912. The Sultan signed away his independence by the treaty of Fez. Germany waived her own right to take part in the negotiations concerning the Moroccan spheres of influence between Spain and France. France agreed to maintain an open door in Morocco and not to hinder the extension of German industry and commerce in that province. France also ceded to Germany certain territories in the Kameruns, and Agadir was abandoned by the Germans.

The attempt of the Kaiser to gain possession of the port of Agadir was a well defined scheme to control

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

much of the world's market and colonial field. The reason for this strenuous attempt was two fold. First, it was a point from which she could command and increase the colonial possessions already acquired, and further those enterprises already inaugurated; secondly, Agadir was an excellent point to develop the daring scheme to get possession of the lion's share of the South American trade which was at that time largely controlled by Great Britain. It was within easy reach of Brazil, and moreover it commanded the British ocean routes to South Africa, India, and Australia. This is one of the facts that explains the interest of the British in the affair; since Agadir could be transformed into a naval base of much strength, and hence be a menace to the British supremacy.

There was a secret purpose also involved in the movement upon Morocco. Germany had long been aware of a secret alliance between England and France, but had been unable to learn the exact terms. She desired to learn what the real strength of this alliance was, and consequently raised the issue with France when the opportunity arose. This would promptly reveal the question whether England would aid France in a matter in which the former had no direct concern. She desired to learn the real strength of the Anglo-French Entente; and in this way she might compel one or the other to divulge its terms. Germany had much to gain, in this way and others,

THE MOROCCAN CRISIS

in an aggressive movement upon Agadir; and it did not appear that she had anything to lose by it.

Again, the financial dependence of Germany on the other powers was brought out by the incident. In Germany the feeling in favor of war ran high. The Junkers succeeded in impressing the Kaiser with the idea that, if it did not come to open war, at least a demonstration should be made with the intention of discovering the rapidity with which the French army could mobilize. This was done; and the Government attempted to procure at Berlin the ready money to enable the mobilization of the German army. Then a fact which astonished the German nation became manifest. German business was being transacted by money borrowed from abroad; and German financiers had extended their borrowing operations to the extent that ninety per cent of the current business transactions depended on time or call loans secured in Paris and in London. By a concerted action of the financiers, when the step of the German Government became known, these loans were called in. Germany immediately found herself embarrassed and on the verge of a financial panic. Banks were about to suspend specie payment, and were almost bankrupt. Germany found herself without money with which to carry on war. When she called on the great banking houses of Paris and London the Emperor was informed that no money out of these places would be forthcoming without an agreement, signed in the Kaiser's own handwriting,

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

that the money would not be used for military purposes. Of course this was refused, and she then turned to the American financiers for aid, by whom she was accosted with the same demands. Thus was revealed to the German Government, and to the world, not only its dependence on foreign finance, but also the fact that there was a secret understanding between the Entente powers and the United States.⁶⁶

The result of the Morocco crisis in France and Germany was to increase the naval and military armaments of the two nations and the spirit of tension which has so long existed between them. It has led Germany, also, to brace herself for the inevitable conflict between herself and Great Britain, whom the affair revealed to have wedded her colonial interests with those of France.

⁶⁶Usher, "Pan-Germanism," p. 163.

CHAPTER V

The Strangling of Persia

THE Mohammedan countries of Africa and Asia, still independent, seem to have been during the first decade of the twentieth century a special field of contention for the colonial and commercial aspirations of some of the nations of Europe. The exploitation of the Ottoman Empire, and the attempted seizure of Morocco for a similar purpose has brought Germany into conflict with England and France on account of a friction of interests; in like manner, the fortunes of Persia, the third, and last independent Mohammedan country, as they affect Germany on the one hand and England with Russia on the other, have done much to precipitate the present disastrous world war.

Though the interests of Germany in Persia were, in a way, largely prospective, and hence not quite so vital as those in Turkey and Morocco, they were nevertheless real. Germany had not yet made her commercial invasion into Persia so extensive as to be able to demand a dictum in the political disposition of that nation; but her interests in a contiguous territory, Asiatic Turkey, were of such a nature as to make her a factor in the controversy. And she did not hesitate to make her influence felt. In this chapter we

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

shall endeavor to follow the fortunes of the Persian people since the opening of the twentieth century, showing how they affect the present crisis in Europe.

In the middle of December 1905, the Persian parliament issued a manifesto indicting the reigning Shah with political and administrative incompetency. It declared that as a consequence anarchy prevailed throughout the Persian state; and that the only remedy was the establishment of a constitutional form of government.⁶⁷ Discontent showed itself also among the people in open rioting; and finally, in July 1906, between fourteen and fifteen thousand citizens, declaring themselves secessionists from the Persian autocratic rule, placed themselves under the protection of the British legation at Teheran. The Constitutional party were members of influential families who had studied in Europe, and who had imbibed deeply the spirit of the French Revolution. This fact, together with the demonstration at Teheran, led the Shah to convoke a National Convention known as the medjliss, a committee of notables gathered out of those provinces nearest the capital. This quasi-representative body drew up a constitution which it forced the Shah, now dying, to recognize and sign; so that on New Year's day 1907, this new constitution of Persia was promulgated.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ "The Outlook," Vol. 87, p. 884.

⁶⁸ "The Outlook," Vol. 85, p. 111; "Review of Reviews," Vol. 35, p. 155.

THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA

In the very same month that this new constitution went into effect the old Shah died and was succeeded by his son, who signified that he was willing to adhere to the instrument acknowledged by his father. This he failed to do, however, until the following October; and he further postponed the taking of the oath of fidelity until the following November. This procrastination led some to believe that their ruler was attempting a reactionary movement, and the result for a time was confusion. The suspicions were well founded; for the new Shah, Mohammed Ali Mirza, proved to be a reactionary of the worst type,⁸⁹ and a second revolt followed. In this revolution the Nationalists were again successful, and Ali Mirza was forced to acknowledge the validity of the constitution. In his objections to the constitution the Shah had no personal motives; he merely voiced the decision of the clergy who held that such a form of government was contrary to the laws of Islam.

Simultaneously with the publication of the Persian manifesto, but altogether independent of that event, Great Britain and Russia decided to take action in Persian affairs. This unhappy country had the misfortune to lie across the path of Russia in her aggression towards the Persian Gulf, and in her long contemplated designs on India. Russia had already absorbed Turkestan into her imperial domain, and now Persia only lay in her way. Though Constantinople

⁸⁹ "The Outlook," Vol. 90, p. 806.

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

was her ultimate goal, Russia had seen for some time that the longest way around was the quickest means of reaching her destination; she would strangle and swallow up Persia, and then advance to the Turkish capital through the latter's unprotected Asiatic possessions. Shut up in the Baltic, thwarted in her designs on the Pacific, and icebound for most of the year in the north, Russia's only hope of obtaining a warm water port lay towards the south, and of this hope she was very jealous. Her interests in this direction, therefore, were bound up in the disposition that might be made of the Persian state.

But Russia had a wary contestant to deal with here in the south, the destinies of a part of whose colonial empire would be greatly effected by any possible disposal of Persia. This was Great Britain, who had already extended her political sway over all the territory between Persia and her own Indian empire by virtually absorbing Baluchistan. The Muscovite has always been the hereditary enemy of England, in spite of cordial and entente understandings, and she does not intend to permit the Russian to gain access to open water on the Indian Ocean or on the Persian Gulf. Russia, however, now took advantage of the fact that Germany's hostile attitude in the Moroccan affair made Great Britain desirous of a free hand; so she took this occasion as an opportunity for action in Persia, and the result was the Anglo-Russian agree-

THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA

ment of 1907.⁷⁰ According to this understanding, Persia was divided into three sections; a Russian sphere of influence in the north, an English sphere of influence in the south, and a neutral zone in the center. This neutral zone, it must be understood, faced the Persian Gulf so as to shut Russia out of a warm water port on that body of water. In the agreement it was specified that the two powers respect the independence and vouch for the integrity of the Persian state. Future events will indicate that they utterly failed to do this, hence the Anglo-Russian agreement marks the passing to the political dependence that is now her lot; a condition that is far more humiliating than that of Morocco; for she was consigned to a single master, while Persia has to endure two.

For years Persia, though comparatively remote from the chief center of interest, has been the scene of a long struggle for commercial ascendancy, by the leading powers of Europe; namely, Russia, England, and Germany. The country is of considerable economic importance; in territorial extent it is only a little smaller than France, Germany, and Austria-Hungary combined; it contains about 10,000,000 inhabitants; and is rich in mineral wealth. Much of it is desert; but about one third of it is under cultivation, and its soil is very rich. But most important of all is its strategic position. Its boundaries are contiguous to those of Asia Minor; and flank the Baghdad Railway along the

⁷⁰See Browne, "The Persian Revolution of 1905 to 1909," pp. 172-195.

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

rich Tigris-Euphrates valley, upon which England has long had designs. It controls also the northern coast of the Persian Gulf, and likewise the coast road to India. From the military point of view, that power which could control its harbors would have a base from which to command the route to India. In it, at the head of the Persian Gulf opposite Koweit, could be made the terminus of the Baghdad Railway. The roads to the Black and Caspian sea from India, the Persian Gulf, and Southwestern Asia all pass through Persia; which makes it of great consequence to Russia. Its vital importance to both England and Russia was a factor in its not being reduced to the absolute control of either in the accord of 1907; hence it would be fatal to permit it to fall under the influence of any power whose interests were at variance with theirs.

For years past German merchants had looked upon Persia, as they had also looked on Turkey and Morocco, as a legitimate field for their commercial expansion, which with them was always coupled with intention of political predominance. It was another of those possible locations for settling Germany's surplus population, and for gaining that much coveted place in the sun. But just about the time when a wider opening seemed possible, the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907 was a door shut in Germany's face which she has been unable to reopen. She tried in two ways to gain access to and influence the convention that formulated the agreement; first, she argued that her inter-

THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA

ests in Asiatic Turkey demanded that she have a voice in regard to the disposition of so close a neighbor as Persia; and secondly, she sent her agents among the Nationalists who pointed out to them that Great Britain and Russia were merely conspiring against Persian independence. But all her efforts were in vain; for in the latter case she failed because at this time Russia and England had not yet forfeited the confidence of the Persians. Thus the Entente powers succeeded in utterly thwarting Germany in this part of the Near East; and the incident Germany could neither forgive or forget. The victory in Morocco; the clear evidence that Germany's financial situation made war impossible; suggested to the Triple Entente the expediency of immediate action in Persia, where matters had been progressing steadily in a direction favorable to Germany's plans.

It was to secure the loans made by British and Russian financiers that partly brought about the agreement of 1907. These loans were made in 1900 and amounted at this time to \$12,000,000. Persia was fully cognizant of the fact that to reassure her independence these loans must be paid; and accordingly she determined on a complete reorganization of her finances. Notwithstanding the protest of Russia and Great Britain made at that time, the Persian parliament in March, 1911, voted to appeal to the United States and ask the Government at Washington to choose five American experts to undertake the reor-

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

ganization of the financial system of the Persian Government. The American State Department selected W. Morgan Shuster as Treasurer General. Mr. Shuster undertook the financial reform and succeeded. He failed, however, to recognize that the Anglo-Russian accord of 1907 was valid or seriously backed by those two Governments. In attempting to ignore that there were two spheres of influence, coercion on the part of the two powers forced the dismissal of the Treasurer General by the Persian medjliss. Russian cossacks and British troops crossed over the Persian borders simultaneously to put down revolution; and the authority of the two guardian nations was by all means asserted. A too efficient government in Persia was found to be a menace to the interests of the two powers; and Persian independence was taken away in that an independent state was not permitted to manage its own affairs. England feared that to recognize the new state, and withdraw her representatives, would simply be throwing Persia up to Russian occupation; this was the justification for her interference. In the occupation of Persia by Russia and England, the colonial ambitions of Germany were again foiled, and she still more uneasily awaited the day of reckoning with Britain.

CHAPTER VI

The Bagdad Railway Project

THE onswEEP to the East of German imperialism has had its boldest stroke and its greatest disappointment in a venture of German capitalists, backed by the German Government, known as the Bagdadbahn.⁷¹ This venture, in its narrower and more open sense, is the commercial and industrial development of Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, and other portions of Asiatic Turkey; but in its wider and more secret intent, it is a scheme to connect the Persian Gulf with the North Sea by a series of railroads, either owned and operated, or at least controlled by Germans; and to build a great German empire in these long neglected seats of ancient civilizations. In the prosecution of this design on the part of the German capitalists, and the interference offered to it by Great Britain, we have a real reason of Germany's hatred of England, and of England's deep seated fear of the commercial aggression of Germany. It adds another cause to that race for armaments that has characterized the policies of both those nations of late. And finally we see in it the reason why the power of Turkey in Europe is still intact.

⁷¹Rose, "The Origins of the War," pp. 82-90.

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

Early in the seventies a select committee of the House of Commons already had occasion to examine an English project for the construction of a railroad in Asia Minor which was to run from Alexandretta via Aleppo to Koweit; thus connecting the northeastern corner of the Mediterranean with the Persian Gulf. Expert evidence taken at that time showed that this line would render enormous service to the British Empire as a second and more expeditious route to India; and as opening access to untold mineral and agricultural wealth. Could the project have been carried out at this time, it would have been the means of avoiding much of that strife, bitterness, and jealousy between England and Germany that finally resulted in the Great War. But private enterprise was unable to meet the expense of such a vast undertaking, the Government did not seem fit to back it, and consequently the matter was dropped.⁷²

It has been said that the real interpretation of modern history is to be sought in economic facts. Not only Germany's history during the past quarter century has seemed to have been determined by the possibility of her commercial expansion; but her destiny in the future seems to be determined by the same means. In her development of the *Weltpolitik*,⁷³ no greater possibilities seemed to offer themselves to Germany than the economic penetration of Asiatic Turkey. That vast

⁷²Dillon in the "Contemporary Review," May, 1903, p. 732.

⁷³See above, Chapter III, p. 34.

THE BAGHDAD RAILWAY PROJECT

Empire had long been on the wane and threatened with political disintegration; a fact that has made it especially vulnerable to exploitation by an outside power. Side by side with this political incoherence there was a religious unity in that the Sultan, its sovereign, was the spiritual head of the whole Moslem world. Its capital, Constantinople, offered an ideal location for a center in which the development of the *Weltpolitik* ideal could be carried out. By a fusion of Pan-Germanism and Pan-Islamism (a thing not thought impossible by the Germans) by an alliance between the Kaiser and the Khalif, Germany would be in a place to be very influential in the whole Moslem world — Turkey, Egypt, India, North Africa, and Persia. Moreover the exploitation of the Sultan's vast domains offered great opportunity for German commercial and industrial enterprise. The Mesopotamian valley could, if watered by the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, be made into one great field of cotton for the German factories. The whole region is rich in minerals and abounds in other natural resources.

The occasion by which the German Kaiser took to gain the undying friendship of the Sultan was the Cretan affair of 1897-98. The insurrection which took place then was fed and fanned by the great powers of Europe. The island of Crete is of unusual strategic importance to the nations of Europe into whose possession it might fall. It has one harbor especially which might be made the base for striking at the Dar-

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

danelles, the Straits of Messina, and the Suez Canal. When the powers of Europe threatened to resort to the international occupation of this island, at that time claimed by Turkey, Germany alone stood aloof. Her attitude on this occasion was due to an agreement between the Kaiser and the Sultan brought about in the following way. Early in the year 1897 the Kaiser made an extended trip throughout the Hither Orient. He visited Palestine, and laid in Jerusalem the cornerstone of a German church. At Haifa he addressed a great assemblage of German colonists. At Stamboul he was met by Abdul Hamid, the Sultan of Turkey, and it was there and then that the bargain was closed.

The agreement gave the German Emperor the concession to build a railway line from Scutari, a terminal point on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus opposite Constantinople, through Anatolia, over the Taurus Mountains to Adana and Aleppo, thence passing through the southern part of Kurdistan to Mosul, near the site of ancient Nineveh; along the Tigris to Baghdad, where it crossed over to the Euphrates through Babylon southward to Bossora, and thence to its proposed terminus, Koweit, on the Persian Gulf. This was one of the most gigantic commercial concessions in all history; for it included not only the right of way for the railroad itself over a stretch of more than 1500 miles in extent; but to the concessionaires was given in perpetuity the grant of 6.2 miles on each side of the proposed route. This would include an area of 18,000

THE BAGHDAD RAILWAY PROJECT

square miles in all, together with the right to navigate the rivers; build quays at Baghdad, Bossora, and on the Gulf; and colonize the zone. This was the price that the Sultan paid to the Kaiser for refraining to interfere in the affairs of Crete.⁷⁴

Before this time, however, in 1888, a group of financiers, backed by the Deutsche Bank, an institution that has been greatly instrumental in the development of Turkey and Asia Minor, asked for and received a concession for a railway line from Ismid to Angora, which was later to extend eastward to Kaiserieh; and also for a branch southward to Konia. The extension to Kaiserieh was never made, as the Germans did not desire to go in that direction; so the spur to Konia became the main line. In 1900, the German Antolia Railway Company headed by Dr. Seiman, a distinguished German banker at this time head of the Deutsche Bank, drew up an agreement with the Turkish Government by which it undertook to build and have ready for operation within a period of eight years, a standard gauge road from Konia to Bosra via Baghdad. This was an extension of the Angora-Konia line, and its estimated cost was to be \$120,000,000. Before this project was completed, however, international complications set in, and the road was never finished; although a section of it was opened to traffic in 1904.

Great Britain had always watched this proposed

⁷⁴Powell, in "Everybody's Magazine," July 1909, pp. 1-12.

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

scheme with fear and trembling. This was quite natural; since the line when completed would bring Central Europe, dominated by her invincible commercial rival, Germany, with her dreams of Pan-Germanism; into dangerous proximity to Great Britain's Indian Empire. This danger was magnified by the fact that Pan-Germanism with its interests in Turkey, the Balkans, and Central Europe, would control, perhaps a series of railways extending not only from the Bosphorus to the Persian Gulf, but from the Persian Gulf to the English Channel. This would place Germany into closer communication with India than England herself. The fact that British interests had been shifted largely from the Dardanelles to the Suez zone, and that German interests were now predominating in the lands of the Sultan, making the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus in a way really German straits, did not tend to ease the anxiety of Great Britain regarding a Calais-Koweit Railway prospect as a parallel, and a somewhat quicker, route to India than that by way of the Suez Canal.

In the execution of Pan-Germanism, the Balkans have always been held before Austria by Germany, as the price for the latter's allegiance to the cause. This bait, too, has always appealed to Austria, since her expansion to the east has been cut off by Russia, and to the west she is shut off by the Alps. This has left as the only feasible field for her expansion the great plains of the Lower Danube and the Black Sea region,

THE BAGHDAD RAILWAY PROJECT

down through the valleys of Servia to the Aegean, and southwest to the Adriatic. The Balkans once in possession, the next step of Pan-Germanism would be the reorganization of Turkey; and Turkey once under their political domination, the bridge for Pan-Germanism between Europe and Asia would be secured. That being the case, there would then be in their possession not only an all-rail-all-German route from the Persian Gulf to the North Sea, situated as to cope with its Suez all-water parallel; but a base also would have been procured from which the Germans could strike at Suez itself.

The English were desirous that, if the railway be built at all, it should be cosmopolitan in its management, and not be an enterprise predominately German. That the Germans were contemplating an absolute, or at least a controlling interest in the scheme they thought was quite evident for the following reasons. The Kaiser's own interest in the enterprise was second only to that in his fleet. This was shown by the fact that his ambassadors were straining every nerve to promote the scheme, and that the grant had been secured at his own personal and pressing solicitation. The German Government was also involved up to its eyes in the project. The German slogan, "Penetrate to the Persian Gulf", had been preached for decades by the prophets of Pan-Germanism. Long before the Baghdad Railway had reached so advanced a stage the thought of staking out claims in Asia Minor had been

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

a fascinating one for the Germans. Shut out also from their designs on Africa and South America by the treaty of Great Britain with Portugal, the Germans would spare no means to make this project; which was ultimately designed to connect Koweit with Calais; and which penetrated an independent and backward country, rich in natural resources, a purely Pan-Germanic enterprise.

Futhermore, that the Germans aimed to be the controlling factor was manifest in the fact that German bondholders held 35% of the stock; a situation which would elect eleven directors out of the thirty who composed the board. The "Swiss" element also, which was in alliance with the Deutsche Bank, came in with three directors and ten shares. Besides this a strong Austrian element represented railway interests in the Balkans, which were already under the influence of the Deutsche Bank; and this would contrive to control the traffic on this side of the Bosphorus, as the others would that beyond the straits. Thus the German, Swiss, and Austrian interests would form a solid German block, controlling one half the capital stock, and electing fourteen directors to eight English and eight French. If the French and the English failed to unite their interests; a thing that could easily be expected, especially if the railway succeeded in handling the traffic of Central and Western Europe; the German factor would easily be the ascendant one.⁷⁵

⁷⁵Courtney in "The Fortnightly Review," May 1, 1903, pp. 809-826.

THE BAGHDAD RAILWAY PROJECT

But even if the British financiers could acquire a controlling interest, as the opportunity ostensibly was given them in 1903 by the promoters of the project, not one sound argument could be advanced for their participation in the scheme. In the first place, the line would be so manipulated in Central Europe as to promote the best interests of Britain's competitors there. Then as a parallel to the Suez Canal route, though it would be a shorter way to England's Indian Empire, it would take away the traffic; and what is much worse, it would take away to a great extent the strategic significance of that point; since it was clear that Germany was aiming at the political dominance of Turkey, and that secured she would possess a base from which to strike at Suez in case of an European war.⁷⁰ Finally, the motive in the minds of the promoters was not altogether commercial, but to a great degree political. Germany desired to be brought down to the Persian Gulf before that important body of water could be reached by Russia; and once in control of a port there; and backed by a railway in touch with Central Europe, which was subject to German control;

⁷⁰ "While the aspiring Great Powers of the Far East cannot at present directly influence our policy, Turkey — the predominant Power in the Near East — is of paramount importance to us. She is our natural ally; it is emphatically to our interests that we keep in close touch with her. . . . Turkey also is the only Power which can threaten England's position in Egypt, and thus menace the short sea route and land communication to India. We ought to spare no sacrifices to secure this country as an ally for the eventuality of a war with England and Russia. Turkey's interests are ours. — Bernhardt, "Germany and the next War," p. 100.

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

such a port could soon be made into a strong naval base which would thus put Germany well on the way to the mastery of the Indian Ocean.⁷⁷

The Germans, on the other hand, have continually denied that their invasion of Asia Minor and the great Tigris Euphrates basin has been motivated by anything save commercial considerations. They steadily insist that the opening up of these large territories for Germany is simply an enterprise by means of which it may be possible to open up for German capital and trade a new field of industry. They assert that the German promoters did their best to induce the English and the French capitalists to co-operate in the building of the line. They deem it ridiculous that German policy should be reproached with the indictment that it has sought a footing in Asia Minor to the injury of other foreign interests. Like in other parts of the world, they were seeking in Asiatic Turkey new markets for their exports and a new sphere of investment for their capital. The fact that Germany did not

⁷⁷ "From the Turk could be secured the railway concessions which should join Constantinople with the Persian Gulf, whose existence would alone repay Germany and her allies for all expenditures and risks. It would be adequately protected by the new Turkish army and fleet. To insure its safety from an attack by Russia, Persia would be reorganized as an independent nation under German aegis. Thus also would be secured the coast road along the Persian Gulf to India, and the navigation of the Gulf itself. Both would put into her hands invaluable points. She would be led by the coast road into the valley of the Indus behind the great defences of Quetta; in the rear of the British position. A fleet entering the Indian Ocean from the Gulf would emerge behind the English naval defences, and see all India lying before her undefended. — Usher, "Pan-Germanism," p. 113.

THE BAGHDAD RAILWAY PROJECT

oppose but rather invited international co-operation was proof enough of her sincerity and good faith.

Russia did not seem to realize the danger of Germany's influence at Constantinople, nor the outcome of the latter's peaceful penetration of the Near East. She was too much occupied with her affairs in the Far East, and desired too much the good will of both Germany and Austria, to interfere or to protest even if she did see a serious menace to her interests in the south by the movements of Germany. The situation, however, was much different with England. That Government was quick to realize the menace of a German approach to the Persian Gulf, and she was also quick to act. At this particular time also her hands were free, since her attention had not yet been seriously directed to the South African trouble. Thus it was that while the German engineers were busy in the survey of their proposed route to India, English diplomats suddenly began to busy themselves to thwart Germany's designs.

An examination of the map of Western Asia will reveal the fact that the boundary line between Persia and Asiatic Turkey extends northward from the head of the Persian Gulf. Koweit is the only feasible terminus for a railway on the Turkish side of the line. In 1899 the Sheik of Koweit, who is under the authority of the Sultan of Turkey and yet in a way independent of him, signed a secret agreement with Colonel Meade, the English resident agent of the Persian Gulf, which

THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR

assured the Sheik the special protection of the British Government if he would make no concessions of territory to any foreign power without the knowledge and consent of the Government. Thus it was that in the following year, when a German commission arrived at Koweit to arrange for the terminus of the Baghdad Railway, they discovered that they had come too late. When a Turkish vessel, sent in 1901 to coerce the Sheik, appeared at Koweit it was immediately confronted by British warships sent to uphold the independence of Koweit. The situation did not change at the insurrection of the Young Turks in 1908. Koweit still remains independent, and Germany up to the beginning of the war remained blocked. International complications had set in to check the progress of the Baghdad Railway; and Germany began to chafe more and more uneasily as she nervously awaited the day of reckoning with England.

Conclusion

WE have endeavored to show in the preceding chapters that a colonial and commercial rivalry between Great Britain and Germany was in evidence during the last quarter of the nineteenth century and continued in the present century up to the beginning of the Great War. We have also essayed to point out that this rivalry manifested itself in such issues and crises as the Baghdad Railway Project, the Morocco Incident, the Persian Affair, Pan-Germanism and the *Weltpolitik*. These issues complicated and strained the diplomatic relations, directly and indirectly, of these two powers until the final break in 1914.

The contest for trade and colonies had by no means been peculiar to the period mentioned above, but it has occurred again and again in the history of modern times. The East India trade was responsible in a large degree for the struggle between Spain and the Netherlands. In the seventeenth century the cruel war between the English and the Dutch was virtually a trade war. Commercial competition kept England and France in arms for the space of a whole century and more (1702-1815). Trade rivalries play an important part in bringing about the Napoleonic Wars. So also in the Crimean war, the Russo-Japanese war, and even in the Spanish-American war the trading motives may be seen.⁷⁸

⁷⁸Johnson, Commerce and War, "International Conciliation," pp. 3-4.

CONCLUSION

The present war in Europe, which has come to be known as the Great War, was due largely to a protracted friction between Germany and England in which the latter, seconded by her allies of the Triple Entente, attempted to shut Germany out of the available colonial field of the world, in which field Germany was seeking an outlet for her increasing population and expanding trade. To just what extent these two elements (the colonial and commercial) were responsible in bringing on the present struggle the historian of the future can better determine in the light of a retrospective view and fuller sources of information. We are not willing to take the stand with them who say that trade is naturally bound up with war and as a consequence the wars of the future will be more calamitous than those of the past. We rather take the view that, as the commercial relations between nations become closer and closer as they do from year to year, international trade will be one of the most potent influences toward universal peace. We can see no reason why interstate commerce with the widely varying interests of the several states, should tend toward peace and unity while international trade should tend toward war, unless it is for the fact that the international statesmen are still blind to the truth that a single principle should underlie trade between individuals, between states, and between nations, namely the principle of a fair deal.

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
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