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THE LIBRARY

OF

THE UNIVERSITY

OF CALIFORNIA

LOS ANGELES

A N T I E N T

METAPHYSICS:

OR, THE

SCIENCE OF UNIVERSALS,

CONTAINING

A FURTHER EXAMINATION OF THE PRINCIPLES
OF SIR ISAAC NEWTON'S ASTRONOMY*

VOLUME SECOND.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR T.CADELL, IN THE STRAND;_AND J. BALFOUR AND CO. EDINBURGH^

M,DCC,LXXXII.

///

V /^

O N T E N T S.

BOOK I.

/^F the Diftindtion betwixt Mind and Body, and of the Properties
of each.

CHAP. I.

The Foundation of all Philofophy, that there are two Subftances in the Univerfe

Three Opinions upon this Subjcd — The Patrons of two of thefe— The laft revived
of late by Dr. Prieflley—Th^ Confequence cf this Opinion — The Philofophy of Me-
taphyfics not to be invented by any one Man— only to b« learned from anticnr
Books. Page ,

CHAP. IT.

ilf/Wand Body are each of them SubJJances- hW TW[n^^^ Subjlatices or Acidents—Sub-
Jlancn known to us only by their Operations— Definition given of £*^_)/ and of ^/W—
Advantages of thofe Definitions — Alind does not always move, nor is Body always
moved—hut the Definition is from the Power — Difficulty of defining iW/W acknow-
ledged by the Antients. p_ g

CHAP. III.

Properties of Body refulting from its Definition— ift, Having Parts, and being divifible
—2d, Occupying Space, or Extenfion — Extenfion not being the EfTence of Matter
fuppofes Matter not extended— 3d, Refifieme another Property of Body—i^\.\i, Impe-
netrability— 5th, Solidity— 6th, Continuity— Dr. Prieftley's Notions concerning Body
refuted — Laftly, Bodies ad upon one another by their Surfaces. p. 12

CHAP. IV,

Ol Mind, and its Qualities— yI//W only aaive—Bidy paffive— The Nature of ^J7/;«
and Paffwn-Of the Fis Inertia of Body— Of Jition and Reaction— Body does not pro-
perly move— Ths Cohefwn of Body produced by Mind— Mind not extended, figured, or
divifible, according to Dr. Clarh's Nouon—AIind, neverthelefs, exifts in Space, but
not as Body does — Infinite Space no Attribute of the Deity, p j g

A 2 G H A P

r«/i s;.^*:^

CONTENTS.
CHAP. V.

or space — Spaa a third thing in Nature befides Body and Mind, according to fome Phi-
lofophcrs — According to Epicurus, Space and Body the only two things in Nature —
Strange Confcquences from the Notion of Space being a thing exifting by itfelf—
Space maintained by the modern Theifts not to be a Subftance, but a Quality of Di-
vinity— Strange Confequenccs of this Notion — If it be true, intirely a modern Dif-
covery — If Space be any thing, it muft be either Subjlance or Accident — not Suhjiance
not Accident — not mere Capacity — which is nothing — Space fuch a Principle of Na-
ture as AriJlotWs Privation — Space has no Properties — Not extended therefore, nor,
properly fpeaking, meafured— Duration, Time, Eternity, no Properties of things,
though neceflary for their Exiftence. Page 25

CHAP. VI.

Proved that Body cannot move itfcif— Objeflions anfwcred from the Intelleftual Mind,
which can reflect upon itfelf — Two Authorities quoted for this Opinion ; one from
yirijiotle, and one from 77;^»///?;«i— If Matter moves itfelf, there muft be Intelligence
in Matter, as well as Self-Motion — If the Mover and moved be different, there cannot
be an infinite Series o( Movers, of Caufes, and EfFeiSls — Still lefs, if the Movement
be circular— If Body cannot aft, it cannot think — To think, therefore, contrary to
its Nature — Deficiency of Dr. C/ar^^'s Argument againft Matter moving itfelf, fup-
plied— Dr. Pric/r/ey's Notion of Matter ftill more extraordinary than the Notion of
thofe who fay that it moves itfelf — Of the Hypothefis of Body moving Body by other
Bodies interpofed — If Body is moved by a vis infita, it muft be intelligent — Body and
Mind petfe&\y difcriminated by the Definition given of them. p. 34

CHAP. VII.

Of the Immateriality of Mind — Difficulty to conceive an immaterial Subftance — This
to be done by the Method oi Abjlraiiion, as we conceive a Point, Line, Sic. ~ Power,
Energy, Activity, eflentlal Qualities of Alind — That Power beft feen in Motion —
therefore Mind defined by the Poiucr of moving — Confcquences of Mind being an im-
material Sub/lance— hz% no Parts — is indivifible, and immoveable — Another Confe-
quence is, that AIi?id moves Body in a Manner quite diftl-rent from that in which
Body moves Body — It moves unorganized Bodies in the fame Manner as it moves Ani-
mals and Plants — The Deity cannot be fuppofed to move Body in that Way — Reafon-

ing from Analogy on that Subjefl: Mind moves Body in a Manner quite different

6 from

CONTENTS.

from that in which Body moves Brdy — Confequences of that DifFerenct — We know,
therefore, in fome refpedl', how Alind moves Body. Page 43

BOOK ir.

Of the feveral Kinds of Mind.
CHAP. I.

As there are different Motions, Co there are different Minds Of the lovi'efl or elemen-
tal Afield — Proclus's Notion of that Mind — Of Gravitation, compared with other
motive Principles — Mind not always moving, nor Bo<ly always moved— Of the Rea-
lity of this motive Principle in Body — The feveral Opinions upon this Subjeft

Objedlion to theExiftence of this Mind SinCweted — The Vegetable Mind lefs abundant
than the Elemental — more abundant than the Senfttive — The Vegetable more artificial
than the Elemental — but lefs than the Senfttive — Laft of all, is the Intellecfual much
more excellent than any of the other three. p. cq

CHAP. II. -

Of the Difference betwixt Man and Brute — This only to be learned in anticnt Philofo-
phy — likewife another Diftindion, betwixt God znd- Nature — The Difficulty of dif"
tinguifliing Man and Brute arifes from the Progrefs of Nature, by Degrees, infen-
fible, from lower to higher Beings — The Diftinftion of Man and Brute depends upon
dirtinguifhing Ideas and Senfations — Thefe not confounded in antient Philofophy^
Confounded by Mr. Locke and by Mr. Hume — The Ufe of the Word Idea in antient
and modern Times — Some Ideas certainly not Senfations; fuch as the Ideas of Being,

Number, Beauty, Truth; — becaufe thefe cannot be apprehended by any Senfe This

is the Dodrine of Plato in the Theatetes — Difficulty of applying this Diftindion to
particular Subftances — This Difficulty folved, by recurring to the original Notion of
Idea — It denotes the inward Form of the Thing — That inward Form Mind — This
differently expreffed by Plato and Arijiotle — The Senfations arc the outxvard Aftear-
ances or Accidents of Things — This Diftin6tion betwixt the two, explained — General
Obfervations concerning Ideas— Of AbJlracl~of General Ideas — Ideas of Senf.ble
polities, as well as of Sub/lances— The Confequences of maintaining that Ideas are
Senfations — No Stability of Knowledge upon that Hypothefis— This the Doflrine of
Protagoras and Hcaclitus — fliould have been the Dodrinc of Mr. Hume — Difference

betwixt

CONTENTS.

betwixt the Ideas and Senfations oi particular SubJIances, explained — This Diftin£lion
applied to Animals, Vegetables, and unorganized Bodies— Opinion of Savage Nations
concerning the latter — Of the Diftinftion of Ideas and Senfations, in polities — fuch
as the Colour, IFhite — fuch as the Perception of Touch — ■iX'io the Perception of a par-
ticular Figure -0( the Idea of Figure in general— of Extoifmi— o^ Motion— To have
an Idea, even of a particular Thing, is to perceive the one in the }nany—A greater
ene perceived in general Ideas — Thefe mufl be ahjlraiied in order to be perfeft — The
Diftribution of Things into Genus and Species not artificial, but founded in Nature —
Both Uniformity and Variety neccflary for a SyJ1em—T\\t wonderful Variety and Uni-
formity in the Syftem oi Nature— Of out Idea of Mind— Th\s Idea acquired by Con-
fcioufnefs—0( ihe "Nnure o( Confioufnefs— It diftinguifiies us from the Brute more
than any Thing elfe — is the highefl Faculty belonging to the human Mind — is the
Foundation of all Certainty and Knowledge— "No Reafoning without Confcioufnnf —
From Confcioufnefs we have the firft Idea of Mind — Progrefs in that Idea from the
Mind that only moves, to the Supreme InteUeiiual Mind — Of the Final Caufe — Of the
Difference of our Perceptions and thofe of the Brute — Man deftined by Nature for
Purpofes quite different— The Progrefs of his Mindiicm lejfer to greater ones, till he
arrive at the greateji One in the Uni vcrfe.. Page 63

CHAP. HI.

ObjeStions anfwered — ift Objeilion, That the Intelle^ cannot operate without at leafl In*'
ternal Organs, fuch as the Brain — 2d Obje^ion, That the Brute has Scnfes, a Phan-
tafia, and Memory, es well as vje — 3d Objection, That the Brute knoius the Obje<3s,
that he has feen before, to be the fame; therefore he can r evievj ha ov/n Operations—
4lh Objeiiion, That the Brute compares as well as we do, and therefore reafons. p. 92

CHAP. IV.

Of the OreSiic Powen of Man and Br«/^— Thefe muft correfpond to the Gnojlic Powers
— The Gnojlic Power in the Brute only one, viz. Senfe — The Gnojlic Poiver in Man

twofold, Senfe and IntelleSi The Defires arifing from Serfe, Appetite and /Inger —

The Dcftre of the Inteilcilual Nature is the Defire of Knoivhdge — This diftinguifhes
Man from Brute. p, gn.

CHAP. V.

Of the Pleafures belonging to the Man and the Animal — Thefe Pleafures not eafily dif-
ting'ji(hed in Man, as he is an Animal as well as a Man — Of the Pleafures of the
At:imal~-Ths Brute has Pleafures of the Mind as well as Pleafures of the Body—

Pleafures

CONTENTS.

Plenfiires of the Man threefold — The Plenfures of Truth and Science, of the Fine Aris^

and oi Virtue — What diftinguiflies all thefe Pleafures from the Pleafures of Senfe—

The Obje£l of the IntelkSl being Knoiu'edge, the Pleafure of all the three mull be

Knowledge— K:iou}ledge pleafes, becaufe it is beautiful— Whi^t. Beauty is — It belongs to

the Category o( Relation ; — is that Relation of Things which forms a JVhole, or a

SyJlcTii — Beauty of this Kind in Propofitlons, and even in Ideas — Different Degrees of

Beauty, as the S.yftem is greater or lefs — Of the Reality and Utility of Logic, by

which we arrange the Syftems of Things — Of the Idea oi Good, and oiUfeful.

Page 102

CHAP. VI.

or the Pleifure of the Fine Arts^lt is Beauty which pleafes in them^-Their Beauty is
in the Piece; and the Piece muft be a Syjlem — The bed Critic is he that can beft com-
prehend the Syjlem — Of the Pleafure of Virtue — This alfo arifes from Beauty — Virtue
confidered both in Contemplation and Praliice — We contemplate it either in ourfelves or
others — In both Cafes we approve of it, becaufe it is beautiful — For the fame Reafon
we praSllce it — Benevolence not Virtue, without a certain Fltnefs or Propriety — Natural
Affection, GoodlVtll, and Jffefilon to our Kind, or to any Individual, are noX Virtue,
without a reflex Aft of the Mind — The feveral Relations that make Virtue a Syjlem—
confidered with relation to ourfelves, to others, and to God and Nature — The Virtue
of the Phllofopher takes in the whole Syftem of the Univerfe. p. Ill

CHAP. VII.

The Senfe of Beauty is the Source of every Adion and Affeftion that can be called Hu-
man—\x. produces the Principle of //aKuar — The Prevalence of that Principle among
all Nations, barbarous and civilized — Examples of it — The Nature of Honour con-
ne(3ed with the Unlverfal Paffion, the Deftre of Pralfe — From Plonour proceeds Anger—
Qi Revenge : — It operates differently upon different Charadters of Men — Love and
Frlendjhlp alfo proceed from a Senfe of the beautiful — The Connexion of Frlendjhlp
with Anger — Vanity alfo from the fame Source — Vanity oi two Kinds — £«t;_y neceflarily
connefted with Vanity — The Senfe of the Ridiculous is derived from the Senfe of what
is Beautiful — The fame is the Source of Ambition — alfo of Avarice — All our other Af-
feSllons and Paffions belong to our Animal Nature, not to our IntelleSlual — Beauty
pleafes becaufe it is Beauty— T\vz Final Caufe of that Pleafure— Kt^lon why Beauty
confifts in Syfiem — By the Exercifeof our Intelleif upon any Subjedl we are preparing
for the Exercife of it upon the greateft Subject, the Syfiem of the Univerfe. p. 124

BOOK

CONTENTS.

BOOK III.

Of the fcveral Minds In Mac, confidered as dlftind Subftances.

CHAP. I.

The InulUnual Mind, a diftinit Subftance from the Animal — Only two Opinions upon
the Subjeil — Things, to be diftinguiflied by their Properties — jiflive Beings, by their
Operations — The Operations of the Intelleif, and of the Animal Life, quite different —
Man operating by JntelleH, not a Senfttive Being — The Animal Nature, no Improve-
ment or Refinement of the Vegetable— ^o more is the Intelleilual an Improvement of
the Animal— The Vegetable Life exifls feparately from the Animal — therefore they arc
feparate Subftances — For the fame Reafon, the Intellef!ual?ini Animal Natures are fe-
parate Subftances — Our little World compofed of four Subftances — This the Te-
trailys of the Pythagoreans — Every Vegetable and y/n/CTo/ compounded of three different
Natures — This Dodtrine, of /Ar^^ diftindl Subftances in Man, the Doflrine of the

Peripatetic School, as explained by Philoponus — Obje£lion to this Dodlrine anfwercd.

Page 1J3

CHAP. II.

The Confequence of the Doflrine oi three diftin£t Suhflances in Man — Thefe Subjlances
cannot be iranfmuted into one another — nor will the DeflruUion of one be attended
with the DeflruBion of another — ^\^\\\ lefs will they be dejlroyed by the DeflruUion of
the Body — The IntelleSiual Subflance cannot be io deftroyed, as it operates without
Body — Nor the Animal or Vegetable Subftances, though they do not operate without
Body—T]\tk are not perifhable by their own Nature, being Immaterial Subftances —
Of ihe feparate Exiflences of thefe Minds — The IntelleSlual does fo exift— ^The Animal
and Vegetable Minds do not tx\fk feparately — Of the Dodlrine of Tranfmigration — How
to be underftood upon the Principles of this Philofophy— Into what Bodies the fe-
veral Alinds tranfmigrate — Whether the Human Mind tranfmigrates into the Brute—
No Tranfmigration of the Elemental Life — This Philofophy eftablifhes the feparate
Exiflence, and the Immortality of the Soul, upon the fureft Foundation — The Doflrine
of Lucretius and of Mr. Locke eafily refuted upon the Principles of this Philofophy —
Comparifon of the Human Saul to the Mafler of a Ship—Oi the Ufe of this Philofo-
phy in Theology. p. jog

CHAP.

CONTENTS.

CHAP. iir.

Whether there be not two Iiiti'hrtital SuhJIances within us — Diflinflions nccefTiry to be
ma<!e for refolving this Qucftion — ift, Diftindlion betwixt MerePowery or Capacity^
and Actuality — 2d, Diftiiiflion betwixt Form and Matter — i^d, Diftindion betwixt

Suhjiance and Accident Icc'ideuts are perceived by the Sen/es, biit Stihjlmee is an Idea

formed hy Intc'I/ecl —'Vhe Human Intelkci exifts only potentially— not o/ily in the Indi-
viduate but in the Sped s — The Progrcfs from Potential;!} to A^fuality flow in the /«-
elividuah of Civiii^ed Nations — very much flower among Savage Nations — Of the Na-
ture of the Fir/i Ideas formed by Savages^-The Form in them not fcparated from the
Matter — Prailical htelligcrce'm Civilized Nations^ not much different — Great Dift'e-
rence, in Point of Intel/igence, betwixt the Savages who fubfift by Indujiry, in the
PratSlice of certain Art--, and ihofe who live upon the Natural Fruits o( thi Earth —
The Savage does wotj'pecuhte — therefore has no Ideas of High Abjlraclion — is neither
Arithmetician nor Geometer — Whatliis Ideas oi Number &n6 Figure 'are — Of his Idea oi
Mind — does not make the Didinclion betwixt Natural Caufes and the Operations of
Mind — believes in fuperior Minds— 'Speculative Intelligence contrafted with PraSlical.

Page 150

CHAP. IV.

The Qiieftion ftated. Whether the PraSiical and Speculative InlelUn be the fame — They
are the fame — This the Opinion of Simplicius — Objeflions to this Opinion— ift. That
the OhjcSis of the two IntellcLls are different — zdo, The Authority of Arljiotk on the
other Side— Anfwer to the /r/? Objedion, that iht PraSlical InteUeif is a neceflary
Sjep in the Progrefs to the PerfeSf InielUn, and that the Objefls of Pra£?ica/ and Spe-
culative Inte/LSi are not more different than the Ideas of ferfeSi and imperfecl Inteltefl
muft be — Diftindion betwixt Praiiical Ideas and Senfations — Anfwer to the Autho-
rity of y/r//7a//t'— that, when he fpeaks of the Intel/ettf operating by the P/jantaJia, he
means the Praciical Intelkii — The fame when he fptaks of z pafftvc, incorruptible ^ In-

teller — The Interpretation of Simplicius of that Paflage, better than of Philoponus

This is evident from Ariftotle^ Words— No Philofopher ever thought more hinhlv of
the Human Soul— He makes Energy its Effence in a feparatc State— Jttme'd withthe
Body it muft be fometimes qtiiefcent^ as is Senfuive L//>— Difference, in this refpeiS,
betwixt the Senfuive and Vegetable Part of us— What Arijlotk means when he fays,
that the Soul, in 2. fepurate State, does not remetnber, rcafon, love, or hate — Wondur

that AriJIotle's Meaning fliould have been miftaken — The Reafon of the Mifl^ake

Obfervations on the DocSlrines of this Chapter — as to the Mind's intuitive Perception
in a ftpcn-ate State, and as to its conjlant Aciivity — the Mind's Sympathy with the

[A] Bcay

CONTENTS.

Body in this State— what AriJloiU means by the ^outi not hvhig or hating in iftparatt
Stait. Page 160

BOOK IV.

Of the Origin of our Ideas and the feveral Properties of Mind.

C H A P. I.

jirljiotle has faid nothing of the Origin of our Ideas — Different Opinions of his Com-
mentators upon the Subjeft — Mr. Lode's Difcoveries upon this Subje<9:— All our
IJi-js, according to him, derived from Corporeal Ohje£ls that are in perpetual Change—
This material Origin of our Ideas degrades the Human Mind — fuppofes that the Soul
had no ExiJIence before it came into this Body — All Ideas not derived from Mattery
particularly the Ideas of Mind — Our Mind, being after the Image of God, has fome
of thofe underived Ideas — All Ideas that arc not, originally. Perceptions of Senfe, can-
not be derived from Senfe — Examples of original Ideas in our Minds — The Idea of
Suljlance one of thefe — Mr, Locke's Notion of Suhjlance—'i^o Knowledge of any Thing
without the Idea of Subjlance — The Idea of Matter and Form^ another Example —
alfo of Caufe and EffeSi — Mr. Hume nrgued well, when he denied, upon the Prin-
ciples of Mr. Locke's Philofophy, that there was any Idea of Caufe and EffeH — alfo
the Ideaoi Beauty — Mr. Locke's imperfe£t Notion of Beauty — Alfo the Idea of Good,
not derived from Senfe ot Rejiefiion — Alfo the whole Clafs of Ideas of Relation — The
antient Divifion and Claflification of Ideas, different from Mr. Locke's — The new
Language, that Mr. Locke has introduced into Philofophy, not fo good as the an-
tient;— obfcure and complexed, compared with the antient — Two Reafons for infift-
ing fo much upon the Defefls of Mr. Locke's Philofophy, P- '73

CHAP. II.

The general Propofition maintained in this Chapter, That all Ideas are originally in the
Mind, is demondrated from the Nature of Ideas, and the Diftinftion betwixt them
and Senfations — All Ideas muft originate either from Mind or Body — The Ideas of Ex-
ternal Forms f\xi\. confidered — The Senfations which thefe Forms produce, not Ideas,
however much generalized or abftrafted they may be — Our 5^»/a/M«j not the Mate-
rials out of which Ideas can be made — Ideas refemble the Form of any Piece of Work-
manfhip, which is not from the Matter but from the Mind of the Artift — Without
Senfations we cannot have Ideas ; but Senfations, therefore, are not the Caufe of our
Ideas— 'They are excited by Stnfations — are lefs perfect at firft — more perfect after-
wards

CONTENTS.

wzrds — Some fo perfefl as not to exift at all in Matter — Of Ideas of RefteSlion — Every
individual Perception of the Operation of our Mind, is, according to Mr. Locke, ^a
Idea — Tliis not true — There muft be the Knowledge of the Nature of the Operation —
This cannot be without the Knowledge of the jigent — This Knowledge c&n only be de-
rived from Mind — The only Q^ieftion remaining is. Whether our Mind creates its
Jfleas — This cannot be conceived — Ideas cannot be difcovercd in the Objects in which
they are inherent, unlefs they be previoufly known — The Soul being a diftindl Sub-
Jlance, puts this Matter out of doubt — No Soul can be without Ideas — If it creates
Ideas, it creates it/elf— This impoflible— All our Ideas, as well as our Minds, are
from God — In his Mind the Ideas annot be abftra(Sled from Matter — This Origin of
our Ideas much nobler than that alTlgned by Mr. Locke — is the Confequcnce of our
being made after the Image of God — No innate Ideas in one Senfe — A previous State of
the Human Soul — The latent Ideas in us not called up by an A£l of the Mind, like
the Ideas we have already acquired. — That we have no Confcioufnefs of any Thing
in a State of pre-exiftence, no Proof that there was no fuch State — Mr, Locke's Error,
in confounding Confcioufnefs and Identity — The IntelleElual Part of us may be dormant
and quiefcent for fome time— This agreeable to the Analogy of Nature — Inflances of
fuch a State, both in the Vegetable and the Animal— O^x Intelltiluul Part fomctimes
quiefcent, even after we are grown up — Ideas even then lie dormant in our Minds for
Years. Page i86

CHAP. III.

Of the Difference of Minds — Great Errors proceed from not knowing accurately that
Difference— The Vegetable differs from the Elemental Life, as to the Lody moved— the
Motion — the Growth — and the Fi"al Caufe — Difference betwixt the At'imal and Vege~
fable — The Animal fen/itive— the Vegetable not — Reafon for this Difference — The A.vi-
mul has a Feeling of Pleafure and Pain — the Vegetable not — This Difference betwixt the
Animal and Vegetable proved by Experiment — The Vegetable propagated many more
ways than the Animal — The Vegetable Life fubfervient to the Anival — Rc-naikible
Inftance of this in the ConJlruSiion of the Vegetable Part of Animals — The Vegetable di'iiA
Animal Life come very near one another. p. 205

CHAP. IV.

The Importance of the Doftrine of Caufe: — Ariflotk\ Account of Caufes, full and
complete — Plato's Addition of two other Caufes, not neceflary— Abufe of the Term,
Caufe— Things faid to be Caufes, which are only the Removal of Impediments that
•hinder the real Caufe to operate — The Power of the Mind without the Organs of
Senfe, evident in Dreaming zni Night-walking, or when the Bot^ is affefted by certain

[A] 2 Difeafes

CONTENTS.

Difeafes— The Internal Organs, fuch as the Brain, not properly Caufes, any more
than the External— The Intellcilual Mind, not immediately conneaed at all with the
Body or its Organs— Hot and Cold, Moijl and Dry, no Caufes of Things— The con-
fidering fuch Things as Caufes, leads to great Errors — The common Diftinflion be-
twixt Firft and Second Caufes, not fufficiently attended to by our modern Philofophers,
particularly the Newtonians. p. 212

CHAP. V.

The Seat oi Dreams is iht Phantafia—Tht Phantafsa belongs to the jfnimal Nature, for
the Prefervation of which it is abfolutely neceflary — Diftinflion of the Human Imagi-
nation! into thofe of which we perceive the Delufion, and thofe which we believe to be
Realities — This Diftin£lion applied to our luaking Imaginciiions — Diilinflion of our
Imaginations into Voluntary and Involuntary — Of.this latter Kind, the Phantafms that
appeared to Bonnet^s old Alan — Another Inftance of the fame Kind — Oi waking Phan-
tafms, which we miftake for Realities — This the Cafe of the Madman — Difference hc-
tw'iKt Madiiefs and Folly — Difference betwixt a lively Imagination and A.'adnefs-Oi
our fleeping Phantafms, or Dreams — Ditfeience betwixt Dreaming and Nigbt-waUing
— Of the Authors who have written upon the Subjeft of Dreams — viz. Arijhtle, Sy-
nejius-, and Baxter — Fafts concerning Dreaming — The Dreamer is afleep — Diftinc-
tions hctw'ixt Jleepiag and waking made by Arijiotle — Diftinflion betwixt Z);y(7otj and

other Appearances in our Sleep Definition of Dreams — Certain PofKions laid down

coT\ceTn\ng Dreaming — Inquiry into the Philofophy of Dreaming, that is, the Ccz^\s of
it — ift-, The Opinions ftatcd of the three Philofophers above mentioned who have
written upon this Subject, beginning with Arijiotle— Wis Theory of Drcains — They
are, according to him, the Reli£ls of our Senfitions during the Day — Dreams not
prophetic, according to him, though there may be a fortuitous Concourfe of the
Event with the Dream — Objcdiions to Ari/lotle's Syftem of Dreaming — It can only
account for our Dreams of Things recent — It does not define the Phantafta nor a
Phantafm properly — General Obfervaiions upon his Philofophy — Of Synefius's Syftem
of Dreaming — Account of the Author — A great Believer in Divinationhy Dreams —
kept a Journal of his Dreams — The Seat of Dreams, according to him, is the Phan-
tafta— It contains the Forms of all Material Things, and is the Organ by which the
ylf/«fl' perceives them — In the Phantafa, fays Synsfius, are the Forms of all 7'hings
pajl, prefent, Tind future — Thefe the Materials of our Dreams — Our Dreams are of
two Kinds — plain and direSl — or myjlerious ^nd fymbolical — The latter .Kind the more
common — Thefe accounted for — Of the Art of interpreting them — No common Art
for interpreting all Dreams, but an Art peculiar to each Man, which he muft learn
by Experience — Objedlions to Syneftus's Syftem— Apology for Syncfius — Baxter's

I Opinion

1

CONTENTS.

Opinion concerning Dreams — The Author's Syftem upon the Subje£l— An Account
oi thz Phantafta, which is divided \nx.o retentive and active — diftinguifhed from Body —
from the Vegetable — from the Int^lIe,fJuaILi/e—he]oDg\pg therefore to the Animal Na-
ture— That Nature not to be divided into three Parts, but one Nature operating dif-
ferently— Neceffity of thefe different Operations — Progrefs of the Animal Nature in
Man — The P/jij/z^iT/M exceedingly imperfect at firft — Definition of the Phantafia —
The fame with the Common Sei:fc of Ariflctle — It has a Power of perceiving Likene'Jir
and Differences in Objeils of Senfe — This comparative Faculty is what is called the
Reafon of Brutes — Of the Hutnan Phantaf,a — An6, ift, Of cur Phantafia, when
waking — The Images in it exceed the Reality of Nature — Much iiifluenccd by the
Habit of the Body — By the Love of Beauty it is diftinguiflicd from the Phantafia of the
Animal — The Perception of Beauty in the Intellect — The Phantafia fubfervicnt to 7^2-
tdlc^, as the higher Pawvr -Difference betwixt Genius and Tafle — The Influence of
the Ridiculous upon the Imagination — Of other Difpofitions of Mind— The Influenca
of the Studies and the Purfuits of Life upon the Lnagination— Our v.aking Phantafia
under the Controul of our governing Power — but that Power not alfolute or unlimited
— Of our Sleeping Phantafms, as diftinguifhed from the Operations of our httelleSf in
Sleep — Thefe like wife under the Influence of jhe Habit of the Body— Of the Phantafms
in our Sleep confidered as difl:in(St from our Reafonings at that Time — Such Phantafms

muft neceflarily exifl Confequences of our Dreams being the Operation of our

Phantafia, and not our htelleSl — The JForld \n our Phantafia very much finer than
the Natural IVorld — Of the Dreams of Poets—ofPhihpphers—Of the Dreams of the
wicked — Thefe a great Addition to their Mifery — The Dreams rf the Generality of
Men, betwixt thefe two, neither happy nor miferable — No Order or Regularity in the
Phantafms of a vulgar Man, feeping or icu/t//?^— Otherwife in the Brute and the per'
feci Man — Baxter's Account of the Origin of Dreams refuted — Of Prophetic Dreams
1— Objedlions to Synefus's Syfl:em concerning them— All PrcpLtic Dreams plain and
direfl, and proceeding from Minds fuperior to ours— Such Minds may communicate
with ours, though embodied — The Revelation by Dreams in one of two Ways— .
Fafls concerning Z))Vi7wx— Particular Account of the Dreams of Ariflides during 13

Years — Cured of a Difeafe, that lafted fo long, by Advice that he got in Dreams

Delivered from other Dangers in that Way — Nothing incredible in the Narrative of
Ariflides — Reafons for believing it to be true — Objections anfwered, to the Tefti-
mony of Ariflides — The Authority of Synefius in favour of Dreams — His whole Life
ConduiSled by them — Of the Final Caufes of Dreams — The Philofophy of Human Na-
ture very imperfedt without the Knowledge of that Caufe— That Caufe the Happinefs
of Senfttive Intelligent Beings during their whole Lives — The virtuous happy in that
Way, as the vicious are miferable ~ Another End of Drea/ning, to convince us that

we

CONTENTS.

we are to exift in a Future State — The Final Caufe of Supernatural and Prophetic
Dreams is the Diredion of Human Life, which otherwife cannot be properly direfted.

Page 229

CHAP. VI.

Oi InfttnSf, and the Nature of it — different from every other Power of Mind hitherto
mentioned — It is (hown chiefly in the Generation and the Education of the Young —
Shown in Incubation -in the Flights of Birds of Pajage—Injlinii flrongcr in the Na-
tural State of the Animal, but wonderful Examples of it even in the Tame State —
This In/linH of Animals, fupcrior to Human Intelligence -What Injlinif Man had in
his Natural State — Not fo much ncceflary to him as to other Animals in that State —
His prefent State is dire£led by Intelligence, inftead of In/lin£f —That not fufScient to
make Men happy, without the Affiftance oi Superior Powers — This the Origin of Re-
ligion. P- 294

CHAP. VII.

A wonderful Quality of Mind not hitherto mentioned — It exifts in no particular 7/w^ or
Place —is not in the Body, as in a Fejel which contains it — It is, however, fomeivheie,
and in/ome Time— It is in Space and Time, but not as Body is — is converfint with Ob-
■ie£ls diftant in Time and Place — therefore muft exift in thofe diftant Times a.id Places

Difference betwixt us and the Brutes in this refped — In what Stnfe the Alind is

confined to the Body — Anfwer to the Objection of our feeing Things at grcu Dif-

tances D.ff.rence betwixt our yl/(Wand the Divine in this refped— The Study of

-our own Minds may give us fome Conception even of the Ubiquity of the Deity — Oi
the Knowledge of the Future — not fo different from the Knowledge of the P^Jl as is
commonly imagined — The Brutes have it in their natural State as far as is nereffary
for the Oeconomy of their Lives— they have it even in the domejllcated State— h FaifV
concerning the Hanoverian Boy — Alteration made, as to the Divining Power of the
Human Mind, by Society ind Civilization — ^ hat Aittration ftiil greater in the dgene-
rate ctate of Socitt) — Of the Difference betwixt the M'.nusoi Savages a;;d ^f Civilized
Nations i ifference betwixt the Animal znA IntelUnual Afmds and the Vegetable — Ne-
ceffity that the Vegetable Part of the Anmal fhould be alwajs atV/w, and lievcr abroad
— Thefe M.nds have no Situation in any Part of the Body. p. 303

BOOK

CONTENTS.

BOOK V.

Of the Principles of Sir Ifaac Newton's Aftronomy.

CHAP. I.

Of J/ironomy, and the DifFerence betwixt it and Philofopljy—Sir Ifaac Newton's Princi'
pia aWoric of Ajironomy, not Philofophy — Sir Ifaac, however, has philofophifed con-
cerning the Beginning and Continuation of Motion —If he is in an Error in this Philo-
fophy, it belongs to this Work to taice Notice of it — Short Account of Sir Ifaac' s

Syjiem — The Motion of the Planets compofed of Projeiiion anJ Gravitation both thefe

Powers a£ling in Right Lines— Their Eliiptical Motion, therefore, to be analyfed into
a Polygon of an infinite Number of Sides — ji> ^at thought that both the Motions
were produced by Bodily Impulfe —Re if ons for aflerting this to be his Opinion — Sir
Ifaac, when he wrote his Principia, did not thinkof Af/'Was a /Moving Power ■ — two
Reafons for that — Therefore made a Machine of the Heavens— Has laid it down that
Body is indifferent to a State of Motion or ReJ}—TW\s fubverfive of the antient Philo-
fophy of the Diftin£lion betwixt Mind and Body — Dangerous alfo to the Syflem of
Tbcifm, by denying the Providence of God over the Works of Nature — The Alecha-
nical Syflem cannot be confined to the Heavens, but muft defcend to the Earth— rrwxfk.
go even the Length of Dr. Pricf ley's Philofophy — But Sir Ifaac's Machine of the
Heavens, not a perfect Machine — liable to two Defers, which even Human Machi-
nery may be free of. p, ,16

CHAP. II.

Comparifon betwixt the antient and modern Materialifls — Sir Ifaac's Firji Law of Mo-
tion, the Foundation of all the Mechanical Philofophy of modern Times— Ought there-
fore to be moft carefully examined — That this Axiom fhould not be known to the
Antients, extraordinary — To judge of the Truth of it, belongs to the Firfi Philo-
fophy— Of the Nature of Motion ; — a Thing of conftant Change and Succejfon Refl,

the oppofite of Motion — Improper, to apply the fame Terms, and draw the fame
Conclufions, concerning Oppofites — Other Improprieties of Expreflion by which
moving and being moved are confounded, and Vis Inertia applied to Body in a Stateof
ReJ} and in Motion— Of the feveral Ways in which the Motion can be fuppofcd to. be
carried on after the Impulfe has ceafed — Thefe are four — It is generally underflood
by the Newtonians to go on by virtue of one of thefe, viz. Impulfe— If fo. Sir Ifaac's

Term

CONTENTS.

Term of Vis Infita unnccclTary and improper ;— not to be underftood of Miml—T\\K
Firjl Laiv o( Motion not a general Propofition, bccaufe not app'icablc to Motion begun
by -WW— only to Motion begun by £w/j— nor to all Motion of that Kind— only to
Piilfion~'D\ii\nQ\on betwixt Pulfion and Trufioti—T vro Kinds of Trufion alfo to be
diflinguiflied- Similarity hG\.w\xi Ahtion by Mind, and Motion by 7j«//w- Objec-
tion, that there can be no Motion by Trufion in Vacuo, anfwered. Page 333

CHAP. III.

The fimple State of the Queftion— The ftrange Confequences of this Axiom— It cannot
be proved by Experiment — muft necefTarily be proved, a priori, by Metaphyftcal Rta-
foning — The Falfehood of it proved from three Principles, that cannot be contto-
verled — Motion not one, but >?i(iny, as many as there are Changes of Place— It is only
Continuity that makes one of many Motions — Of Communication of Motion — The.New-
tonians have erred in this Matter from not confidering two Things, viz. the Nature
of Motion, and the Doctrine oi Firjl and Second Caufes — The Newtonians ought not
to be angry that the Metaphyfical Principle, upon which Sir Ifaac has built his Aflro-
jiomy, has been fo freely examined — Authorities in Support of the Author's Opinion
— Antient Authorities — Authority of /iriJ?otle—Moiieri\ Authorities — Leibnitz —
Dr. Clarke— T)r. HcrJIey— Sir Ifaac himfelf — True Account of the Continuation
of the Motion of a Body impelled is by Mind — This according to the Analogy of
Nature, as Nature is defined by Arifotle ~ Other Motions o{ iht fame Kind in Nature,
fuch as the Motions of Jnimals, Vegetables, and the Loadjhne and Iron — The Impulfe
iiot the Caufe properly of the Alotion, but the Occafan — Of the Duration of the
Motion by Impulfe — It decays by Degrees — This likewife agreeable to the Analogy
of Nature. p. 347

CHAP. IV.

An Inquiry concerning the Principle oi Alotion oi the Celeflial Bodies, not concerning the
Laws of their Motions — The Q^ieftion ftatcd concerning the Eternity of the JVorld —
We can only judge of the Motions in the Ueavj^ns by thofe on Earth — Thofe can
only be produced in one or other of three Ways — The frjl is by the Body moving itfef
— This Hypothcfis examined — fliown that it confounds all Diflinfiion between Alind
and Body, and has a Tendency to downright Atheifm—id Hypothefis, That Bodies
here are moved by other Bodies — This Movement either by Trufion or Impulfe — Gra-
vitation net to be accounted for in either of thefe Ways — Of /ttraSlion, and the
Abufe of that Word — Of the Motion of the Tides — not to be accounted for by Pro-
je£}ion i>r\ii Gravitation, nor otherwife, except hy Alind— Oi the third Motive Power

on

CONTENTS.

on Earth, viz- Mind — All Animal Motion of thid Kind mediately or immtdiatdj — The
Manner of Mind moving Body — The Motions of Bodies towards one another mutual.

Page 3&7
CHAP. V.

A Conformity betwixt the Motions on Earth and the Motions in the Celejlial Regions

That Conformity will go no farther than the Nature of Things requires — The Ce-
Itflial Bodies not moved by Inipulfe oi o\.\\tt Bodies, as the Bodies on Earth are — nor by

Trufion — The Suppofitions of all fuch Bodies, only fet Mind z\. z greater Diftance

No Motion of Body by Body in the Heavens — The Reafoii of the Difference, in this
refpedV, betwixt Heaven and Earth — So far as the Amotions on Earth are by Mind
there mufl be a Conformity betwixt them and the Afotions of the Heavens — Some oeneral
Things in which thcfe Afotions agree. — The Queflion concerning the Compofition of
the Aiotion of the Celeflial Eodies — This Queftion conned^ed with the other Queftion
concerning the Eirfl Lazv of A'lotion — If that Law be true, the Alot'm of our Bodies
is neceflarily compounded : But, if it b* not true, no NeceJJiiy for any rtich Compofition
— Proved from Confcioufnefs, that Mind may move Body in a Curve Line, without any
Compofition of the Motion— This demonftrated likewife a prioriy from the Nature of
Motion by Mind — The Queftion examined. Whether the Aiotion of the Planets
though produced by Af.nd, may not be compounded — General Pofitions concerning
Sinip'e and Compounded Motion — Simple Motion defined — Three Kinds of Compounded
Aiotion — Firfl, When the Compofition is by the Aflion of different Bodies upon the
Body in Motion — Secundo, By the Anion both of Body and AJind upon it — Tertio, By
the Action of two or more Atllnds upon it, in different Directions— The two firft
Kinds of Compofition cannot apply to the Planets — The laft, therefore, only can be
applied — If the Planets be fo moved, it is a Motion without Example — All the Mo-
tions, we know, hy Alind, are fimple and compounded — ObjeCiion, that the C;Vc»/(?r
or Elliptical Motion is iTCceffarily compounded — Anfwer to this Objection The Ar-
gument for the Compofition of the Motion of the Planets from the fuppofed Compofition
of the Motion of Projei^iles, anfwered — One Difference betwixt the two Motions is,
that the Motion of the Projeililes is begun by Impulfe — not fo the Motion of the Planets
—Another is, that the Planets have not the fame Tendency to their Centre that Projec-
tiles have to the Centre of the Earth— Thit the Planets have fuch a Tendency, not
proved by any juft Argument from Analogy, nor from Final Caufes — But even the
Motion of the Projeiiile not compounded — This proved from the Nature of the Mo-
tion—Oh]zQ^ion anfwered, that the ProjeSiiU Motion may be divided — If the Projeiiile
Motion be not compounded^ neither is the Motion of the Planets; but it is ^ftmple Mo-
tion by Mind, p. 381

[B2 C H A P.

CONTENTS.

CHAP. VI.

Proved in the preceding Chapters, that Mind is the only Caufe of Motion m the Hea-
vens Minti very properly typified by i^;V^— Proved alfo that the Motion of the Celef-

tial Bodies is not compounded h\xi /mple — The Purpofe of this Chapter to fliow that
Sir Ifaac's Syftem of Aftronomy can be fupported without arbitrary or impofftble Sup-
fo/itions— Prejudice removed that may arife from the Author's not being learned in
Geometry or Mechanics — No inferior Science demonftratcs its own Principles — Thefe
to be found only in Metaphy/tcs, or the Firji Philofaphy— Euclid's Geometry an Ex-
ample of this — The fame is true of Sir Tfaac Newton's Aftronomy — The Laws of the
Planetary Motion difcovered by Sir Ifaac Newton — Before him Aftronomy no Science,
but only a Colledion of Fails— h curious FaiSt difcovered by Kepler, concerning the
Proportions betwixt the Periods and Dijlances of the Planets— T^\% he knew only as a
Fa£i ; but Sir Ifaac has made a Science of it — No Science of any Thing, if an eflential
Property be not known, from which all its other Properties can be deduced — The
Nature and Eflence of every Motion confifts of two Things, the Motive Force and
the Direaion — The Dire^ion of the Planetary Motion is a Fadl that is known— No-
thing can be difcovered of the Planetary Morion, or of any Thing in Nature, except
from Fails — The Bufinefs of Aftronomy is not to inquire into the Caufe of the Pla-
netary Motion, but to calculr.te that Motion, and to difcover i's Laws — This the No-
tion which Sir Ifaac himfelf had of this Science — Diftinflion betwixt Metaphyfics,
Phyfics, and Ajironomy— Forces or Powers are latent Things, to be difcovered only by
their EffeSis — The EfFedl of a Moving Force is Vehcity — That not abfolute, but re-
lative to two Things, Time and Space— \i the Motion be equable in a Straight Line,
and the Time of it be known, the Law of the Motion is obvious — But if the Motion
be in a Curve and not equable, though the Time be knoiun, the Lawoflhe AJotion not
eafy to be difcovered ~T\\e Force muft be eftimated by a Motion in a Straight Line, one
or rr.orc — But how apply Motion in a Straight Line to a Curve? — This impoflible to be
done, if no Straight Line could be difcovered neceflarily refulting from the Nature of
the Motion — But fuch a Straight Line has been obferved in the Defcent of the Planet
from its Tangent — This Line obferved with refped to the Moon's Defcent from her
Tantjent— The Length of this Line known — The fame as if the Moon had dcfcended
direftly from the Tangential Point — The Law of this Motion of Defcent would be
known, if the Motion was equable — but the Motion is unequable — For difcovering the
Lawr of \\\\% unequable Motion, recourfe muft be had to a fimilar Motion on Earth, the
Motion of the Projciiile — Ttie Law of the Defcent of the Projefled Body afcertained,
firft by Galileo's Difcoveries, and then by Sir Ifaac's — Sir Ifaac firft difcovered that
the D'-fcent of falling Bodies was both begun and accelerated in the Ratio of the Dif-
tatice from the Centre inverfely— This could not have been difcovered by Fait and

Obfervation

CONTENTS.

Objirvation here on Earth, but it was inferred from the Dcfcent of the Moon The

Theory of Gravitation in this Way generalized by Sir Ifaac, and its Law difcovered
—How the Theory of Gravitation, thus made general, is to be applied to the Planets —
The Motion of the Planets fuppofed by Sir Ifaac to be compounded, as he fuppofed
that of ProjecTi!es to be — The two Motions are, the one in the Line of Proje£tion, the
other in the Line of Gravitation — The Motion of the Planets not actually combined, but
only fuppofed to be fo for the Sake of Demonftration — A fimple uncompounded Motion
of the Planets is, by its Nature, poflible — If fo, all the Properties of the Motion arc
from thence deducible, though we may not be able to make the Dedudlion — Better to
acknowledge our Ignorance, than makeftrange and improbable Suppofuions — Our Ig-
norance muft be acknowledged in many other Things, of which we can make no Syflem
— But Sir Ifaac has made a Syftem of Aftronomy — This Syftem to be fupported with-
out the aftual Compofition of the Planetary Motion — The Hypothefis of fuch aCom-
pofition fufficient — This Hypothefis moft natural— It is according to the Method of
Science, and particularly according to Euclid's Method — If the Hypothefis of a Cen-
tripetal Force be admitted, the Hypothefis of a Projectile Force in the Line of the Tan-
gent abfolutely necefTary — The neceflary Conne£fie» betwixt thefe two Motions, and
their Dependency upon one another — The one being given, therefore the other is given —
The Moving Force in the Line of Projeflion is fhewn to have a relation to the Diftancc
from the Centre, as well as the Centripetal Motion — What that Relation is — The
Dedudion from any Hypothefis, if that Hypothefis be granted, as certain from the
Reality — Example of the like Deduftion from an Hypothefis not fo obvious and na-
tural, in the Cafe of the Compofition of Alotion — From that Example the Argument of
the Newtonians anfwered, that the fame Fjff'e^ muft be always produced by the fame
Caufe. Page 405

CHAP. VII.

The Advantage of thus Amplifying the AJlronomy of Sir Ifaac Newton — Firji, It difin-
cumbers the Syftem of the Hypothefis of the Planets being moved by Bodily Impulfe—
The Confequences of fuch an Hypothefis — ido. Of the Notion of a Perpetuity of
Motion begun by Bodily Impulfe— 2,tio, Of Body attrafling or impelling Body at a Dif-
tance — ^to. Of the Compofition of the Planetary Motion — Such a Compofition irrccon-
cileable with the Simplicity of Nature — ^to. Of the Hypothefis of the Planets all fall-
ing into their Centres, if their Motions were to be flopped — La/lly, Of a Centrifugal
Forte fuppofed in the Planetary Motion — The Confequence of this Hypothefis down-
right Alaterialifm — Inapplicable to the Motion of the Planets, whether that Alotion be
by Alind or Body — The Centrifugal Force of the Stone and Sling explained— The Ori~
^in of the Notion of a Centrifugal Force. p. 428

CHAP.

CONTENTS.
C II A P. VIII.

Dfiiniflion betwixt Philofopby and Jjlrommy — Much Injuflice done to St'n Ijaac Newtoiiy
in fuppo'ing that he philofophifed concerning the Caufe of the Motion of the Celejiial
Bodies, and had difcovered that Caufe to be Atirankn — Abfurd Ways of Thinicing

and Speaking thence arifing — Every Mot'mi made to be produced by Juration

The Motion of a Stone falling to the Ground- Of the Aioon—oi the Tides— oi the
Afagnet, &c. — This Syftem of Aitraciion may be more fimplified than it is — Attrac-
tion carried through the whole Univerfe ; and different Syftems made to attraff one
another — Attraclion faid to be ejfential to Matter — Dr. Priejlley's Notion of AtiraHion —
Two Sources of this Error concerning A'tiraSiicf!— The Notion of the Planets being
moved by Impulfe of other Bodies, may be an Hypothefis likewife — Reafons for fuch
Hypothefis, and for other Hypothefes made by Sir Ifaac — The Difcoveries of Sir
Jfaac, now they are made, appear fo natural and obvious, that it feems wonderful
they were not fuoner made— The Refemblance betwixt the Planetary Alotion and the
Motion of ProjeSliles, has led the Nn'jtonians into Errors ; i;w. To fuppofe that the
Planetary Motion was begun by Impulfe, as well as that by Proje£liles \. — 2do, That it^
it was compounded, as they fuppofed that of Proje£liles to be ; -ifio. That the Planet, if
not carried on in the ElUpfe, would fall down to the Centre like a Projeiiile — The Er-
rors not only (hown, but the Caufes of thofe Errors — This ought to give perfect Sa-
tisfadlion — The Conclufions of the Xewtinian AJlronomy may be true, and yet the
Principles falfe — The only Confequence of which is, that the Newtonians teach their
Syftem in an improper Way — Inftance of a true Conclufion froni falfe Premifes. —
This applied to the Newtonians. Page 435

C H A P. IX.

Recapitulation of the Contents of the preceding Chapters — The Diftindlion betwixt
Mind zni Body, and the different Natures of each, the Foundation both of Theology
and Natural Philofopby— the one active, the other pa Jive — This the moft antient Phi-
lofopby known in the World — The Foundation of Matcrialifm, that Body is both
eSfive and pajfive — Materialifm, the Philofophy of the Senfes — Jrijlodemus's Converfa-
tion with Socrates — The Materialiji, if he reafon confequentially, will not admit that
his own Body is nooved by his Mind — Dr. Priejlley^ in denying this, reafons confe-
quentially— He a perfeft Materialiji ; others but Demi- Materiali/ls—Of the difficulty
in conceiving Invlfible Pozvers — All Powers invifible — Mr, Lode's Philofophy, of
the Poflibility of Alatter thinking, has laid the Foundation of all our Materialifm —
The great Progrcfs of Materialifm of late Years — This owing to Experiments without
2 Pbilofophj^

CONTENTS.

Phllofophy — The firfl: Experimenters in Europe not Materialijls, becaufe they were
PhUofopbers—The Tto^tn^iiy of our Phllofophy to Mechanifm, accounts for the fa-
vourable Reception both of Des Cartes's Syftem and Sir I/aac Newton s — The latter
can ftand its Ground without the Afliftance of the A^echankal Phihfophy — All the
Opinions enumerated, that can poflibly be concerning the Motion of the Celejlial
Bodies — Firjl Opinion, that Body moves itfelf — This the Dodtrine of the /fntient
■Materialijls and Jihnjh— The mod fimple of all the Hypothefes concerning the Mo-
tion of the Cekjiial Bodies, irreconcileable with the Compofition of their Motion fup-
pofed by the Newtonians — Second Hypothtiis, that the Planets are moved by Mind
only — This Hypothefis as fimple as the Nature of Things will permit — It admits,
however, of fome Variety — TA/V^ Hypothefis, that Body is the only Movino- Power
— admits of great Variety — i/?. It may be fuppofed that the Body in the Centre is the
Caufe of the Motion of the Planet — This, if true, a great Difcovery of modern
Times — ido. It may be fuppofed that the Planet is moved by Pulfton, both in the
Proje^ile &nd Centripetal Line—This Suppofition has fome Simplicity and Uniformity
in it — 2^ly, It may be fuppofed that the Planet is moved by Pulfion in the one Line,
and Trufion in the other — This Suppofition not fo fimple as the preceding — The
fourth Hypothefis, that the Planet is moved both by Body and Mind — This, too,
admits of confiderabie Variety — Thefe arc all the Opinions poflible concerning the
Planetary Motion — Of thefe the Reader may choofe what he likes beft. — Conclufion
of the Book— Summary of what the Author thinks he has proved concerning iW/W
and Body—'S>\K I/aac Newton's Principia, though not a Philofophical Work, furniflies
ample matter to ^ PhUofopber. Page ..c

PREFACE.

IPrefent here to the Public the Second Part of this great
antient Syflem of Philofophy — great at leaft in its profef-
fions, pretending to embrace the Univerfe, to explain the
nature and operations of that grand Principle, which, under
various denominations, and various appearances, pervades
all nature, informs and animates every thing in the material
world ; I mean Mind, — and to afcend to a higher principle
flill, and through nature and man to lead us up to the JifJI
mind, the great Author and Preferver of the Univerfe,

This Philofophy I am defirous to revive in Britain ; for
there it was, as well as in other parts of Europe, and particu-
larly in England, where it continued down to the days of
Dr. Cud worth, before French learning was in falhion, or the
Philofophy of Mr. David Hume known.

There are many I know who think a Philofophy of this
kind chimerical, or at leafl: ufelefs, and defire a Philofophy
of Works, as they call it, which will add to our power by
fea and land, promote our trade and manufacflures, and in-
creafe both our national and private wealth. Whether Wealth
and Power, and the arts which procure them, have contributed
to the happinefs of mankind in general, or how much we in
particular have profited by them, I do not at prefent inquire ;
but I afli. Is there nothing of any value among men except
wealth and power r Are not knowledge and underilanding
necefTary to direct men to the proper ufe of them - and may

a they

iv PREFACE.

they not be ihc fource of tlie greatcft mifcry in the pofllfTion
of the ignorant and foolifli ? But further : 1 defire to know,
whether knowledge in iti'elf, abflra^led from all profu or
advantage by ir, is not tlic highefl enjoyment of the rational
nature: Whether it be not the only enjoyment of man, con-
fidered as an intellectual creature .' Thefe are queftions that,
I think, mult be anfwercd in the affirmative, in an age that
pretends to be learned. In an age which, by many, is
reckoned a barbarous age, I mean the age of the Trojan
war, we are told by Homer, that Ulyflcs, the wifeft of all
the Heroes who fought at Troy (for Nellor did not figiu there,
but only affifled with his Counfels), was invincible by plea-
fure, as well as by toils and dangers, and could not be kept
from his country, his family, and his friends, by the
charms of two GoddefTes, and by all the pleafures of a gay
and luxurious Court ; but the fame hero it was neceffary to
bind with ropes upon ropes in order to reflrain him from
going to the Syrens. And what did thefe EnchantrefTes pro-
mife him ? Nothing but Knowledge *. And if Knowledge
makes the happinefs of man, muft not that Knowledge, of
which the object is the highcft and moft excellent, make his
chief happinefs. Now what is fo high and excellent as God,
and Nature, and the Univerfe?

But I fay further ; that as Religion is neceflary for the
well-being, I think for the very being of Society, it is of the
greatefl confequence to a nation, that the Philofophy in it
fhould be of the religious kind. In a country where Letters
are cultivated, there will of neceffity be a fpirit of curiofity
and inquiry, which will lead men to philofophife right or

* Whoever comes to us they fay, Ti^-^'afJ.tvtf vsirai, xx.^ irMtovx iJui. OSu<t. f/..

s wrong J

P 11 E 1- A C E. V

wrong ; for it is impoflible that a man of genius, andwhofe
mind is but a little elevaitd above the vulgar, fliould fee all
the various motions in the Heavens, or on this our Earth,
and not inquire into the caufes of them. A man, for ex-
ample, who can fee a (tone fall to the ground, and only
meafures and computes its motion in falling, as Galileo
did, without thinking of the caufe of its motion, fuch a man
may be a very good Geometer or Mechanic, but whatever
he may think of himfelf, he has not the philofophical Ge-
nius in him. In fuch a country, therefore, there muft ne-
celTarily be an enquiry into the caufes and principles of
things, unlcfs we could fuppofe no genius at all in the people ;
that is to fay, there muft be Metaphyfics of one kind or an-
other. Now it is of the greateft importance, that thefe Meta-
phyfics (hould not be adverfe to the Religion of the country.
For the opinions of Philofophers will fooner or later become
the opinions of the people, efpecially in matters of popular
concern ; fuch as Religion : and accordingly Polybius tells
us, that the Epicurean Philofophy became the prevalent Phi-
lofophy in Greece, the confequence of which was, a general
corruption of manners *.

Whether the Metaphyfics that have prevailed in Britain,
from Mr. Locke down to Mr. David Hume and Dr. Prieflly,
are a-kin to this Philofophy of Epicurus, which deftroyed
the religion, and corrupted the morals of Greece, the
Reader will judge from what is faid in this and the preced-
ing Volume ; but this I will venture to affirm, that a Philo-
fophy which maintains, that Mind is not only the author of
all the motion in the Univerfe, but that which carries it on,

* See what I ha\c laid further upon this SubjeiSl, page 301.

a 2 and

VI

PREFACE.

and that the bufmefs of Nature, as well as the affairs of
men, is under the immediate diretftion and infpc6tion of
the Supreme Being; in fliort, that there is a prelent Deity
every where in Heaven and in earth, is a religious Philofo-
phy, and a foundation upon which the eftabliflied religion of
a country may fecurely ftand. On the other hand, a Philo-
fophy which teaches that all the Motions in the Univcrfc, if
they be not begun, are carried on by matter and mechanilm,
and that our affairs are governed by the fame laws of ma-
terial neceffity which govern the natural world, mud be ac-
knowledged to refemble at Icaft that Philofophy which
placed the Gods in extramundane fpaces, taking no concern
in the bufmefs of Nature, and

SejunHi a rebus nojlris femotiqne longe.

Such a Philofophy makes prayers and fupplications vain,
and indeed puts an end to all Religion, by taking away that
fear of God, and that fenfe of a prefent Deity, which I hold
to be effential to Religion. But it is a Philofophy befitting a
Philofopher who, in his laft words and dying fpeech, has let
the people of Britain into his grand fccret, that the lefs Reli-
gion there is in a nation, the more flourilhing that nation is *.

It is objecT:ed, I know, to this Philofophy of mine, that it
does not explain or account for any of the phaenomena of
Nature. To this 1 anfwer, that the bufmefs of the Science I
profefs to teach, is to explain the general Principles and
Caufes of Things, and particularly to give an Account of the
Origin and Continuation of Motion, not to afcertain the Laws

* See page 301.

of

PREFACE. vii

of the feveral Motions in the Univerfe, by which only parti-
cular phsenomena can be folved. Further ; it is the Study of
the Metaphyfician to difcover, as far as pofTible, the final
Caufes of Things, and to fliew, from what we know of Na-
ture, that there muft be a Syftem in the Univerfe worthy of its
great Author. This, with the explication of fome univerfals
of high abftracTiion, fuch as Motion, Time, and Place, is all
that can be expected of the Metaphyfician, till he comes to
treat of what is higheft in his Science, and in all human
knowledge, I mean Gud. Thefe are all the SubjecTts of Me-
taphyfics ; and a candid Judge will confider whether I have
properly treated them fo far as I have gone.

I am very fenfible that thofe among us who imagine
themfelves Philofophers, becaufe they have ftudied Geome-
try, Mechanics, and Natural Hiftor}', will be very angry
with me for recommending, as the only Philofophy, what
they neither do nor can underftand, not being fcholars. But
though I would not willingly give offence to thefe Gentle-
men, I cannot perfuade myfelf that our ancellors, who I
believe were at leaft as wife men as we, were fo much mif-
taken, as they feem to think, when they founded at fo great
an expence Schools, Colleges, and Univerfities, and obliged
our youth to fpend fo many of the moil precious years of
their life in learning the language of the ancients, in order
to be qualified to learn their arts and fciences, and particu-
larly their Philofophy, the profeflion of which is the mofl
honourable in all fuch feminaries ; and with good reafon,
as Philofophy not only explains the Caufes of natural things,

but

<vm

PREFACE.

but alio lays down the Principles of the Arts invented hy-
men, as is evident from what Ariftotle has vrritten upon the
popular Arts of Poetry and Rhetoric. They proceeded un-
doubtedly upon the fuppofition that the antients were wifer
and more learned than we -, and the longer I live, and the
more I ftudy their writings, the more I am convinced that
our anceftors were in the right. I would therefore have
thofe Gentlemen be contented with their Mathematics,
which no doubt arc a valuable fcience, and may be very
ufeful to the Philofopher, and with Natural Hiftory, which
furnidies materials to Philofophy ; and if they defne the re-
putation of being learned, they have the French learning,
which I can aflure them, from my own experience, is much
eafier to be come at than the Greek or Latin, and it will en-
able them to write, if they be fo minded, in a very fafliion-
ablc flile, fuch as will gain them great reputation as well as
profit ; but I would ferioufly advife them not to philofophife
without the afliftance of the ancients, which has been moll
unluccefsfully attempted by fo many moderns, from Dcs
Cartes down to Dr. Prieftly.

As to Mathematics, I am fenfible that, in the courfe of this
Work, and particularly in what I have written upon Sir
Ifaac's Aftronomy, 1 have given many arguments as llridt
demonftrations, which thofe who are Mathematicians, and
Mathematicians only, will not undcrftand. Fori have obfervcd,
that the men whofc iludies are fo confined, underfiand no de-
monftration except by lines and figures, or numbers ; al-

thougli,

PREFACE. ix

tliougli, as I have obfcrvcd *, even the Principles of their
own Science cannot be dcmonflrated.by lines and figures.
This is to be learned by a man xAio is like Dr. Horfely, not
only a Geometer, but aPliilofopher and a Scholar, from a va-
luable Work of an antientPhilofopher, upon the Firfl Book of
Euclid's Elements ]', as indeed all Works mull be, that are
■written by a man who is both Geometer and Philofopher^

The mofc exceptionable part of this Work, and which to
fome I am afraid will give much offence, is the laft Book
upon Sir Ifaac's Ailronomy. But, iwo, In a Work fuch as
this, which treats of the Principles of all things in the Uni-
verfe, it was impofiible I could avoid enquiring into the
Principle of Motion, the grand Agent in all natural opera-
tions, and without which it is impofiible to conceive a ma-
terial world ; and my Work would have been exceedingly
defeAive, if I had faid nothing of that Principle in the
grandefl: and nobleft part of the vifible Creation ; I mean
the Celeftial Bodies. But, 2do, It is not the Aftronomy of
Sir Ifaac that I find fault with, but the manner of teaching
it. The Principia is entirely a Work of Geometry and Aftro-
nomy, in which tne Principles of Geometry and Mechanics
are wonderfully well applied to the rriotions of the Planets.
Now in a Work of this kind, the only purpofe of which was

* Page

t The Author is Proclus, an eminent Platonic Philofopher of later times, and who
appears to have been as ftudious of Geometry as his mafter Plato. The book is not
tranflated, and the printed copy of it very incorreft, fo that it is not to be underftood
but by a very good fcholar. See fome Obfervations that I have taken from it. Vol. I,
pages 449, 450 j alfo pages 443, 444.

to

X PREFACE.

to inveftigaic the laws of the Planetary Motion, and from
them to deduce the phccnomena, what occafion was there to
inquire into the Caufe of the Motion, whether Body or Mind,
or both: Or whether it: had a beginning, or was from all
eternity ? and whether it is to continue through all eternity,
or to have an end ? for it is evident, that whatever way thefe
queftions are determined, the Motion, the Laws of the Mo-
tion, and the confequences deducible from them, will all be
the fame. Now, if Sir Ifaac or his followers, leaving their
Geometry and Mechanics, their Menfurations and Compu-
tations, have intrenched upon the province of the Philofo-
pher, and run their Science up to Metaphyfics, and I fay bad
Metaphyfics, maintaining Propofitions which, at the fame time
that they are of no ufe to them, are dangerous to the Reli-
gion of Nature, am I to blame, if, without going out of my
way, I have refuted thofe Propofitions ; or am I not rather to
be commended for endeavouring to place upon true Prin-
ciples fo valuable a Science, and which does fo much ho-
nour to this nation, and, 1 think, to modern times.

After concluding the firft Volume of this Work, I propofed,
as I have faid in the Preface to it, to proceed to the noblcfl
Work of God, here below — Mati. But the Philofophy of Mind,
though it be truly the only Philofopliy % is fo little underflood
in this age, that without explaining it more, I perceived, that
what I was to fay of man could not be underflood ; much lefs
what would be neceilary to be faid, if I fliould live to carry
on the Work to God and Nature. I have therefore added
this Volume to my firft Part, in which I hope I have ex-

* Page 457.

plained

PREFACE. xi

plained fo clearly the namrc, and diftinguifhed fo accurately
the feveral fpeciefes of it, that what I fhall fay in the after
Parts of this Work, will appear no more than Corollaries, or
Confequences of the Principles here laid down.

I cannot conclude this Preface, without acknowledging my
obligations to thofe who have aiTifted me in this Work : That
I fhould need afTillance in a Work of fuch variety and ex-
tent, which takes in the Intelledtual, the Animal, and Vege-
table Life, and even the moving principle in bodies, faid to be
inanimate (though there be nothing in nature, that is not in-
formed by Mind of one kind or another), the Reader will
eafily conceive. My firft Thanks are due to Dr. Horfely, with-
out whofe encouragement I fhould not, as I have faid elfe-
where*, written a fccond Volume of Metaphyfics. I have
been particularly obliged to him for his affillance in what I
havewritten upon Sir Ifaac Newton's Aftronomy; and, indeed,
without the help of fuch a man as the Do(5tor, who is not
only a Geometer and Aftronomer, but a Scholar and Philo-
fopher, I fliould never have been able to have adjufted my
Philofophy of mind to the Principles of that Aftronomy.

My next thanks are due to Mr. Stuart, ProfefTor of Ma-
thematics in the Univerfity of Edinburgh, and moft eminent
in that profeffion, who has helped me likewife where I was
moft deficient, I mean in the Mathematical Part. But that I
may not father my errors (if they be errors) upon others, I
think it is a piece of juftice I owe Mr. Stuart, to let the Pub-

* Page 357.

b lie

\ll

PREFACE.

lie know, that he docs not agree witli me in thinking the
common way of teaching Sir Ifaac's Aflronomy improper,
and adheres to the reahty of Projection and Gravitation ; and
beheves, that Motion begun by impulfe, in an unrefifting
medium, is eternal either by a vis infita in the body, or by
virtue of the impulfe.

There is another Gentleman, Dr. Hope, ProfcfTor of Bo-
tany in the fame Univerfity, which he has enriched with
one of the beft Botanical gardens in Europe, to whom I am
much obliged for information concerning the Vegetable
Life ; and I have profited alfo by Converfation with Dr.
Black, Profeilbr of Chemiftry in the fame Univerfity, well
known for his eminence in that Art; and accordingly the
Reader will obferve, that I have argued much both from
the motions of the vegetable, and from the motions of the
fmall particles of matter with which Chemiftry is converfant,
to the great motions in the univerfe, believing that there is
an Analogy of fome kind or another betwixt all the motions
of this univerfe.

A N T I E N T

METAPHYSICS.

BOOK I.

Of the Diftindion betwixt Mind and Body, and of the
Properties of each.

CHAP. L

The Foundation of all Philofophy^ that there are tivo Suhjlances in
the Uni'verfe — Three Opinions upon this Subje^l — The Patrons of
tiuo ofthefe — The Iqft revived of late by Dr Prieftley — The con/e-
quence of this Opinion — The Philofophy of Metaphyjics not to be in'
•vented by any one Man — only to he learned from antient Books.

TH E foundation of Metaphyfics, of Theology, of Natural
Philofophy, and, indeed, as it appears to me, of all Philofo-
phy, is this propofition. That there are in the univerfe two fubftan-
ces altogether different and diftind from one another, however clofely
they may be joined and connedled together — Mind and Body. Be-
fides this, there can be only two other opinions upon the fubjed.
Vol. II. A namely,

if ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book L

namely, That all is Mind, and that the material world has no exig-
ence ; or that all is Body.

'C' s , „ ,

If the fn-ft of thcfe opinions be the truth, we mult renounce the

evidence of fenic, believe its perceptions to be all delufion, and that
our whole life is nothing but a dream. An opinion, fo contrary to
common ki\{e, and the feelings and experience of every one, has
had very few patrons in anticnt or modern times ; nor do I believe
that it was ever really believed by any, the maintainers of it being
generally fceptics, who, from a vain oftentation of the fuperiority of
their parts, difputed againft every thing that was held to be moft
certain, in order to fubvert the principles of all fcience and certain-
ty, with which, as will appear in the fequel, the evidence of fenfe is
intimately conneded.

The latter opinion has been maintained by many philofophers,
antient and modern, and particularly by our Scotch philofopher, Mr
David Hume. I was in hopes that it might be buried in his grave, not-
wiihftanding his endeavours to make it furvive him, by the valuable
legacy, as he no doubt thought it, of his pofthumous works,
left to the public, but which have not been received with the ap-
probation he expeded, nor added at all to his reputation as an author,
which he vainly iraagined was to increafe after his death. But it is re-
vived.by a living author of fome reputation, Dr Priellley, fo far, at
leafl, as concerns our vucrocofm. This author has maintained,
with a boldnefs which is really aftonifhing, and very mu<;h exceeds
that of any freethinker of this or former times, ' That man is
' but one fubflance, viz. Body — that we have no foul, that our
' thoughts, fentlments, refolutions, and adlions, are nothing but mere
* matter and mechanifm, refulting from a certain organization and
' arrangement of the parts of our body, which being diflblved
*" by death, there is an end of all our thoughts and intelligence, and

♦the

Chap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 3

* the whole man, Body and Mind, is buried in the fame grave, to be

* reftored again,' as he fays, ' at the great day, when all the fevera!

* particles, which compofe this body of ours, fhall be put together a-

* gain, organized, and arranged, in the fame manner, fo as again to
' produce thought and intelligence.'

This is the fubftance of the opinion of our Chrirtian materiallft, a
defignation that he has given himfelf, but which has hitherto been
unknown in the learned world. Of this opinion I fhall fay no more
at prefent, but that, if I really believed, as Dr Prieftley feems to do,
that, in this little world of mine within my clothes, there was no
thought or intelligence but what was produced by Matter and Me-
chanifm, in fliort, that I was no better than a clock or a watch,
which being taken down, or the pieces of which it is compofed dif-
arranged, there is an end of all its motion, I fhould alfo believe that
there was but one fubftance in the w^hole univerfe, and that all the
intelligence which appears ia it is nothing elfe but various modi-
fications of matter.

I would not, however, be underftood to fay, that Dr Prieftley is
of this opinion, as he profefles not only to believe in God, but to
be a Chriftian, and even a reformer of the Chriftian fyftem, which
he fays he has difcharged of many enormous errors *, one of which
he reckons the diftin£tion, that hitherto has been made by all
Chriftians, betwixt foul and body ; and from what I have heard of the
man, (for I know him not perfonally), I have no reafon to doubt of
his fincerity. But I think it is unlucky that he fhould hold the
fame opinion concerning Man that Mr Hume maintains, and, be-
fore him, Mr Hobbes f . He has written a great deal upon various

A 2 fubjeds,

* See his correfpondence with Dr Price, p. 60.

t Leviathan, cap. 34 and 38, Vindication of Leviathan, p. 90 and qi. where Mr

HobbM

4 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I.

fu,bicas, anJ has been very fuccefsful in the experimental philofophy,
as it is called, particularly upon the fubjea of air ; and it is to me a
proof of his being a man of genius, that, not contented with experi-
ments, fads of natural hiflory, and mathematics, he has afpired to the
knowledge of the caufes and the principles of things ;. for, though I
hold phyfics to be the ground-work of all good metaphyfics, and
mathematics an excellent handmaid to philofophy of every kind,
I, have always thought him a man of low genius, and of little
elevation of mind above the vulgar, who relied fatisfied with the infe-
rior fciences, amongft which I reckon even geometry and aftronomy,
and could not raife his mind to the jirfi philofophy, which explains
the principles of them all, and inquires concerning the univerfe, and
the lirft caufes of things. — But, by how much this philofophy is
higher than any other, fo much I hold it to be more difficult ; and,
however great the genius of Dr Prieftley may be, I think it is abfo-
lutely impoffible that he could invent it. It was the labour of ages,
not only in Greece and Italy, but in Egypt, to bring it to the per-
fedion in which we find it in the writings of Plato and Ariftotle. It
is only by the diligent ftudy of thefe authors that we can hope to be
good metaphyficians ; for, though I think it is poffible, even in thefe
latter days, that we may make difcoveries, not only in natural hiflo-
ry, but in philofophy, of things unknown to the antients, we muft
begin with the ftudy of their works, and take what afliftance we can
get from them : For, if we would fee further than the antients, w^e
muft get upon their fhoulders ; and, in that way, as it is commonly
faid, a dwarf may fee farther than a giant. It is evident, I think,
from the writings of Dr Prieftley, that he has not learned his meta-
phyfics in the fchool of Plato or Ariftotle. And he acknowledges

no

Hobbes maintains the fame doftrine as Dr Prieftley, and with the fame falvo, of om
renovation at the rcfurre£iion.

Chap.I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 5

no mafter except Dr Hartley, whom I never fo much as heard of,
till I dipped into the -writings of Dr Priefllcy : From whom he
learned his philofophy, Dr Prieftley does not fay ; but, fuppofe he
had been taught in the beft fchool, Dr Prieftley had much better
have gone to that fchool, than have taken it at fecond hand from.
Dr Hartley.

CHAR

AN TIE N'T METAPHYSICS. Book L

HAT. II.

Mind and Body are each of them Subftances.— y/// Things Subftances
or Accidents. -Subftances knoivn to us only by their Operations -De-
fnitlon given /Body and om'md^.—yld'v ant ages of thoje Definitions.
—Mind docs not al-ways move,— nor is Body alivays moved— but
the Definition is from the Vov;er.— Difficulty of defining Mind ac
knoivkdged by the Jntients.

H

O L D I N G, therefore, that there are two Subftances in the
univerfe, one Mind, the other Body, the next thing to be in-
quired into, is, What thefe Subftances are ? That they are Subftances
I hold to be certain ; for, as every thing in nature is either Sub-
ftancc or Accident, they muft be either one or other. Now, they
are not Accidents, (for of what are they Accidents ?) ; they muft,
therefore, be Subftances.

Thofe who have not learned logic will be difpofedto fay, that this
is a mere logical diftindlion, without any foundation in the nature
of things ; but thofe who have learned their logic know that all lo-
gical diftiniTtions are taken from the nature of things ; for from what
other fource can they be taken ? — and that every Quality or Acci-
dent, of every kind, muft belong to fome fubjed, and be inherent In
fomething that is called Subfiancc. And thofe who have ftudied
the nature of truth and evidence, know very certainly, that we have
not the knowledge of the exiftence of any thing, not even of our-
felvcs, but by its operations ; for we do not know that any
thing without us ex:fts, except by its operations upon the or-
gans

Chap. II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 7

gans of our^enfes : nor do we know that even our ovv-n Mind
exifis, c -ccpt by its adtions and energies ; for Des Cartes ar-
gued well when he faid, ' / think, therefore I am.'' Neither are
thefetwo propofitions identic, as fome believe, but diaerent : And the
argument is a fair conclufion from this general topic. That whatever
a<3;s, or energizes, exifis. Nov/, if there be actions and operations,
there muft of neceflity be fomething that ads or operates ; and this
fomething is what I call Suhjlance. This is the definition of Sub-
fiance in general ; but, as to particular Subftances, they can only be
known by their particular operations, and qualities, of one kind or
another.

In this way Mind and Body are to be defined ; and, as Mind and
Body compofe the whole of things, and are fo conneded and related
to one another, that, without them, the material world could not ex-
ift, I have chofen to give a definition of them, or defcription, as the
mathematician and accurate logician would rather choofe to call it,
by v hich I have expreffed that neceflary connexion and relation ;
for I fay that Mind is that which moves. Body that which is moved,
it being abfolutely neceflary, that, when a thing is moved, there fhould
be fomething that moves it ; or, vice verfa, that, when a thing moves,.
there fhould be fomething that is moved. This definition has ano-
ther advantage, that it is taken from a quality of each of the two
n things, as evident as any thing can be to us in this ftate of our ex-
iflence ; the evidence of them being immediately derived from the
two fources of all human knowledge, viz. the perceptions of fenfe
and confcioufnefs : For, that Body is moved, is a perception of fenfe ;
and, that there is fomething within us which moves our bodies, we
know from confcioufnefs. Now, that principle of motion ib what I
call Mind.

When 1 fay that Mind moves, and Body is moved, I would not
be underflood to mean that Mind always moves, or that Body is al-

wavs

H ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Bookl.

ways niovcul ; but I mean that Mind has the poiver to move, and
Body the power or capacity of being moved ; for it is by poiver or
capuity, not by then- energies or operations, that things are properly
defined, thofe being the caufe of thcfe ; for, though we know no
caufe but by its cffeds, nor, confequently, any power but by its
operations, it is fit that every thing Ihould be defined by its caufe,
rather than by the cfFeas of that caufe ; for, in that way, we
better exprefs the internal nature and eflence of the thing. Thus,
we define man, by his powers and faculties, to be a rational animal,
capable of Intelleft and fcience, not by the energies or operations of
thefe faculties.

Moreover, it is to be obferved, that Mind, though it be the author
of all motion, docs not always move Body immediately. This is
obvious to common obfervation ; for, even our own bodies are not
moved by our Mind, without the intervention of bones, mufcles,
a^d finews : Mind, therefore, moves Body, either mediately or imme-
diately ; and, when it moves mediately, it moves by the intervention,
either of other Bodies, or of other Minds. It is in this laft way that
our intelledual Mind does, in my opinion, move its own Body ; for
it is, as I conceive, by the miniftry of the animal life that our Intel-
led moves our Bodies, and, by their intervention, other bodies : And
it is in this way that, I think, we ought to conceive that the Deity
moves the whole univcrfe.

That Mind, therefore, moves Body, mediately or immediately,
and that Body cannot move itfclf, is a fundamental propofition of
this philofophy and of the religion of Natine ; for, whoever be-
Jievcs that Body can move itfelf, is, whether he knows it or not, an
Atheift. And, as the power of moving is a common property of all
Minds, of the loweft, as well as of the higheft, as the power of beitig
;;,v7-/]i: of all Bodice. I thought I could not give better definitions

of

Chap.II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 9

of them, than thofe by which they are perfe^ly diftingulfhed the
one from the other, and, at the fame time, their nccelLiry connexion
with one another exprelfed *.

Vol. IL B There

* That the Peripatetics were much puzzled to give a definition of Mind, which ap'
plied to all the feveral kinds of Mind, is evident from what Alexander Aphrodifienfu,
theoldeft commentator upon Ariftotlewehave, fays, in a treatifehe wrote, a-iji '^'•jxm-
The paflage is in the firft book of this ireatife, in the chapterentitieJ, '•r< \'jx. ctTUpxi
tti Tn; 4-1/^/1)5 ivmftHi. There he fays, That the kinds of Mind are fo difTerenr, fome
lower, fome higher, fome fiift, fome laft, that it is very difficult to give a definition
that will apply to them all; for, fays he, what will apply to the bweft, or the
^rjl Mind, as he calls the vegetable, (being the foundation of all the other Mind*
that are incorporated with Body), will not apply to the /aji, or moft perfccH:, viz.
the Intelle, .ual Mind. And Ariftotle himfelf, in the beginning of his fecond
book a-sjt 4"'X'>^y where he gives a general definition of il^u^j^, introduces it in a
way which fliows that he had fome difficulty to find any thing that was common to
all Minds ; for, fays he, lih n )t.j»o», j'a-< ^tca-r.s ^vf^nf In Afy«». Then he gives the
definition, which is, 'o vfutn {trtxt^ux vufi»TK ^urixn, i^yanKH ; "Thefirfl pcrfeSlion of'
organized body : meaning, by ihcfrfiperfe^ion, that perfeftion which confifts Jw-
itcftft, not In^yua \ that is, in iht power, not in the aHion, or operation, refulting from
that power ; And fo far the definition, as I have obferved above, is proper : And
it is alfo proper, in another refpeft, that it applies to the Mind of every organized
Body ; for, certainly, the Mind is fo much the perfedion of fuch a Body, that we
cannot conceive an organized Body to exift without Mind. And it agrees with my
definition in this refpeft, thatfuch a Body muft neceflarilybemovtd by fome internal
principle, and in fuch a manner as is fuitable to its nature. But my obje£lion to it iy
1/?, That it is too general, and therefore obfcure ; and, 2diy, That it is not compre-
henfive enough, as it does not take in the Mind which moves unorganized Body :
For this laft, an apology may be made in behalf of Ariftotle, that this treatife of his
is entirely confined to the vegetable and the animal Mind, and to the intelledlual
confidered as united with Body ; fo that he does not fpeak at all here of the ^v^n,
or MiTTEj ^J't/;!;!), which is in all natural Bodies, but of which he had fpoken in the
preceding books, • De Phyfica Aufcultatione;' fo that it appeared to him unnecef-
fary to fay any thing more of it in this treatife vi^i 4"Kii- And, indeed, the Greek
word ^vxn, neither in common ufe, nor in the language even of philofophy, has a
fignification fo comprchenfive as to take in this kind of MinJ. And, accordingly,

L

10 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I.

There are, I know, who cannot conceive a Mind, that does only-
move, and nothing clfe ; becaufe their own Mind, and the Minds of
other animals, which move their Bodies, have thought and refledion,
or, at leaft, fenfations, appetites, and defires : But this proceeds
from having too narrow a notion of Mind, and not being able to di-
ftinguifh things, which, though they cxift together, are different in
their nature. It is true, indeed, that the power of moving is joined
with thought and refledion, fenfation and appetite ; but it is very
different from all thefe ; and we are fure that motion can be produ-
ced without any of them ; for Body, that has none of them, moves
Body ; and, as all motion muft, of neceflity, be produced either by
Body or Mind, if Body can produce motion without fenfation or
volition, Why not Mind ? — The faiSt truly is, that the Mind, the
moft powerful thing in nature, has many powers and faculties, fome
higher, fome lower, of which the power of moving is the loweft :
And this fometimes exifts by itfelf, as in Bodies unorganized, at
other times joined with higher powers, as in bodies organized,
fuch as vegetables, animals, and intelledual creatures.

Another advantage of this definition is, that it takes in Motion, the
grand Agent in all natural operations, by which the whole bufinefs
of the material world is carried on, the knowledge of which is, ac-
cording to Ariftotle, fo eflential to the philofophy of Nature, that,
without knowing it, we cannot know what Nature is *.

And,

1 obfervc, th.it the Aphrodifian, in his treatife above quoted, never fo much as men-
tions it, but fpealis always of the vegetable Mind as the loweft of Minds.

Am fiti >c>$«>iir Ti I5-T< xiKiiri;- '«tieyK»iiif y*j 'xytallui>r,i 'nvrrtf, 'xytciiiriui kxi tiji <pii-

Til. This is what I wifli our modern philofophers of Nature would attend to, who
are very bufy in calculating the motions of natural bodies, without knowing what
motion is.

Chap. II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. n

And, lajlly-, from the quality that I have made to be chara^terif-
tical of Body, will be found to flow, if I am not miftaken, all the
other qualities of Body, and from my definition of Mind all the qua-
lities of Mind, fo far forth, at leaft, as it operates by moving Body.
This I will endeavour to fhow in the following chapter.

B 2 CHAP,

x2 ANTJENT METAPHYSICS. Book I.

CHAP. HI.

Properties of 'BoAj refulthig from its Definition — ift, Having Parts,
and being divifible — 2d, Occupying Space, or Extenfion. — Exten-
fion not being the EJence of Matter, fuppofes Matter not extended. —
3d, Refiftence another Property of Body. — 4th, Impenetrability. —
5tb, Solidity. — 6th, Continuity. — Dr Prieflleys Notions concerning
, iliodXy refuted. — Laftly, Bodies a6l upon one another by their Sur-
faces.

WILL begin with Body, being that with which all human
knowledge begins, and from which even our knowledge of Mind
may be faid to be derived in this ftate of our exiftence ; for it is
from the operations of our Minds upon the perceptions of fenfe that
we firfl; get the notion of Mind.

In the fir/l place, as every Motion, of whatever kind, muft be a
change of place, either of the whole Body, or of its parts, it is of
neceflity that every Body in motion muft have its parts fucceflively
in different places ; for, fuppofe that it only turns round its centre,
fo that the whole Body does not change its place, ftill, of neceffity,
the parts muft change their place, otherwife there could be no mo-
tion at all. ^

The confequence of this is, that every Body that is moved, or ca-
pable of being moved, muft have parts ; fo that here is a quality of
Body that is plainly deducible from its property of being moved, or
moveable. Having parts, therefore, it muft be divifible, and infi-
nitely divifible too, but only potentially, or in capacity : For, what-
ever

Giap III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 13

ever may be faid of that incomprehenfible thing Matter, or the Firft
Matter, as it is called by fome modern philofophers, the Bodies,
which are made of this Matter, are not ailually fo divided. But
Nature has fixed fome Bounds to the dividing or breaking of things,
as Lucretius has exprefled it *.

Another elTential quality of Body, and which alfo refults from its
property of being moved, or moveable, is, that it muft needs occupy
fpace ; for it is impoffible to conceive a Body in motion, without
occupying fpace, and different parts of fpace at different times. This
quality of Body, by which it occupies and extends over fo much
fpace, is called extenfion, and is fuch a neceflary quality of Body,
that Des Cartes has made it the effence of Body, and faid, that Body
and Extenfion are the fame thing. But this is not the opinion of the
Britifh philofophers, who hold that Extenfion is only a quality of
Body, and that there is fome thing befides, which is extended : And
this opinion I hold to be right. But what is this Jbme thing that is
extended ? The anfwer is, That it can be nothing elfe but the mat-
ter, ox jirjl matter^ as it is commonly called, without form, dimen-
fions, or qualities of any kind. This notion, therefore, of the firfl
matter, however incomprehenfible it may feem, and however much
it hath been ridiculed by our modern philofophers, as much as ano-
ther antient notion, that of fubjlantial forms , is a neceflary cChfe-
quence of their maintaining that Extenfion is not Body : And it
{hows, at the fame time, that, if we will fpeak accurately, and not
in the confufed and unphilofophical manner, in which the moderns
exprefs themfelves, we muft diftinguifh betwixt Body^ which un-
doubtedly is extended and has feveral other qualities, and Matter^

which

* Lucret. lib. i. v. 562.

At nunc nimirum frangendi reddita finis
Certa manet.— —

14 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I.

which is not extended, nor has any quality of any kind, but is fuf-
eeptible of all qualities. And, indeed, the antients thought this di-
ftindion was fo real, that they made it the foundation of their natu-
val philofophy ; for they faid all Bodies, and the whole material
world, wctc compofed oi inatter and/orm. This diftindlion is fo im-
portant, that it appears to me to be the foundation of the whole phi-
lofophy of Mind, and all the dodrlne of ideas ; for an idea is nothing
clfe but the form of the thing feparated from the matter*. — That part
of Space, which Body occupies, is called its p/ace^

Anotherconfequence ofBodyheingmoved^ormoveahk^ is,that,when
it is moved, it muft neceflarily impel any other Body that maybe in its
way, and which, therefore, obftrudls it in that change of place which
is eflential to Motion. And, accordingly, it is a matter of daily ob-
fervation, that Bodies in motion either difplace other Bodies, or their
motion is flopped by them. From thence refults another neceffary
property of Body, viz, refijiance ; for it is impoflible that Body can
either impel, or be impelled, without Refiflance.

With refiftance is neceflarily joined what is called impenetrahd'ity y
by which it is impolFible that one Body can occupy the fame portion
of fpace with another. Without this quality there could be no re-
fiftence in body, nothing ai/riTUTo?, to ufe the expreffion of Greek
philofophy, but every Body would pafs through another, as it does
through empty fpace.

Solidity is commonly enumerated among the qualities of Body, as
diftindt from Refiftance: I hold it, however, to be the fame in philofo-
phical language; but, in common language, a Body is faid to be folid,
which refifts more than fome other Bodies do, and has a ftronger and

firmer

♦ See what I have further faid upon the fubjeft of Matter, Vol. I. p. 47.

Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 15

firmer cohefion of its parts : And in this {enfe Jblidilj zxi^Jluidity
are oppofed.

Continuity is alfo efteemed one of the properties of Body : And,
for that reafon, Body is faid to be quantity continuous^ whereas Num-
ber is faid to be quantity difcrete ; for, though Matter be divifible. as
I have faid, and infinitely divifible, at leafl potentially, yet, in the
ftate of Body, we confider the parts as having a coherence and con-
tinuity, by which they are joined together, fo as to have one com-
mon boundary. The parts, however, even in the moft folid Bodies,
are not fo joined together as to touch one another in every point ;
and therefore there is no Body hitherto difcovered fo folid as not to
be contracted by cold.

Dr Prieftley maintains a dodlrine that appears very extraordinary
for a material philofopher, ' That Body, or Matter,' which is the
fame thing in his language, ' has neither refiftance nor folidity ;'
which appears to me to be the fame thing as if he maintained, ' That
* Matter was not Matter.' The only qualities that he afcribes to
Matter are Attradion and Repulfion. But there muft neceflarily be
fomething that attrads or repels ; for it is impoffible to conceive that
nothing fhould attradl or repel, or operate any way : And it is as in-
conceivable that a thing, which muft be admitted to ht fomething^
fl:iould have no quality at all, and be really nothings if the Bodies
round it were taken away, fo that it could not attract or repel. Now
this fotnething, which, of neceffuy, muft exift, has, I fay, the quali-
ties of refiftance and folidity. Dr Prieftley, indeed, fays, that this
can never be proved by fad; and obfervation, becaufe Bodies never
come into contad with one another ; but to this I anfwer, jf/j/?,
That, fuppofe it could not be proved by experiment that matter did
adually refift, or was folid, yet it muft be fuppofed that, being Mat-
ter, it has at leaft the capacity of Refiftance. And, 2^/y, I fay that,

though

i6 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I.

though there be, no doubt, what is commonly called Attra^ion and
Repulfton among Bodies, yet there is alio Conta6l and Impulfe. Sir
Ifaac Newton has, indeed, fhewn, that the rays of light are reflected
from the furfaces of Bodies before they touch them : And there
may be other inftances where Bodies feem to touch, but do not really
touch. But it will not from thence follow, that, contrary to com-
mon fenfe and obfcrvation. Bodies do never come into contadl, and,
in that way, impel one another. Further, I fay, that thofe qualities,
which, the Dodor fays, only belong to matter, are fuch qualities as
cannot be the qualities of Matter ; for it is impoflible that either
Matter or Mind can a<3: ivhere it is not, any more than njuhen it is
not ; which, however, muft be the cafe, if Body cither attracts or re-
pels Body without being in conta£l. It is therefore evident that At-
tradion and Repulfion are only names for the fads of Bodies ap-
proaching to, or receding from one another, which are effeds of a
caufe that muft be different from Body : And that caufe is no other
than Mind, which moves Bodies to zxi^from one another..

Solidity, therefore, and Refiftance, are qualities of Body, by which
it is eflentially diftinguifhed from Mind. And the qualities, which
Dr Prleftley makes eflential to Body, are no qualities of Body at all.

From what has been faid, another property of Body is evident,
viz. that Body can only ad upon Body by its furface : For, as Bodies
cannot ad upon one another except when they ad in contad ; and,
as the inmoft particles of two Bodies cannot touch one another — it
is of neceilary confequence that they can only ad upon one another
by their furfaces, which alone can be in contad. Where, thereforcj
Bodies impel, or are impelled, or exert in any way that quality
which I have fhown to be eflential to Body, viz. Refi/iance, it muft
be by their furfaces ; fo that, when Bodies are faid to attrad or re-
pel one another, without being in contad, it is fpeaking unphilofo-

phically,

Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 17

phically, becaufe it is, by the nature of things, impofTible that Bodies
at a diftance fhould ad upon one another. There muft, therefore,
be another agent in the cafe, namely, Mind ; and if it were true,
what Dr Prieftley fays, that Bodies never touch one Another, the
confequence only would be, that Body never moves Body, and that
Mind is not only the original caufe, but the dired and immediate
caufe, of all motion in the univerfe.

And fo much at prefent for the qualities of Body.

Vol. II. < G C H a P,

i8 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I.

CHAP. IV.

O/NTmd, and its ^alities. — Mind only cifiive. — ^oAy pajive. — The
Nature of ACt'ioa and Paffion. — Of the Vis Inertiae of Body. — 0/"
Adion atid Readion. — Body does not properly move. — The Cohe-
fion of Body produced by Mind. — Mind tiot extended, figured, or
^ivifible, according to Dr Clarke's Notion. — Mind, ne'uerthelefs,
exifls in Space, but not as Body does. — Infinite Space no Attribute
of the Deity.

IB E G I N with a quality of Mind which will make the diflFerence
betwixt it and Body ftill more evident, and, at the fame time,
will fhow the neceflary connexion and relation betwixt them. It
is this, that Mind a^s, whereas Body is a6led upon^ or, in one
word, is paffive. And this diftindtion goes through the whole of
Nature ; for every thing in Nature is in a perpetual round of gene-
ration and corruption, which cannot be without fomething a6iing^
and fomethingT/^^nng-. It is therefore true, what is faid in the
moft antient book of philofophy extant, * Ocellus Lucanus *,' that
the Univerfe is compofed of what a^s dLiifS.fuffers.

And here it is to be obferved, that, by A^lion^ I mean that energy
of the agent ^ by which fome change is produced in the other thing,
which I call the patient ; fo that, of neceffity, there muft be two
things, viz. an Agent and a Patient ; and, wherever there is an A-
gent, there muft of neceffity be a Patient ; and "vice 'verfa "j".

According

• See ihepaflage from this Author quoted and explained in a note upon p. 31.0/
Vol. 1.

f See this more fully explained in the Firft Vol. p. 29. and following.

Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS.

19

According to this definition of Aaion and PafTion, Mind, that
moves, muft neceflarily act. Body, that is moved, muft as ncceffarily
fuffer, or be pajftvc. And, as every thing in the univerfe either ads
or fuffers, here, again, we may fee that it is true what I faid above,
that there is nothing in the univerfe but Mind and Body.

Paffivity is as effential a quality of Body as Adivity is of Mind. It
is improperly exprefled, as I have obferved elfewhere, by the New-
tonians, when they call it vis inert iae, becaufe the term vis expref-
fes a power, and even a power exerted, which does not belong to
Matter. Nor do I approve of their language, when they fpeak of the
Readion of a Body, when it is impelled by another Body ; for that
alfo implies a principle of Adivity in Body ; and I would rather call
it by the well known name of Refiflance, which, as I have fhown,
is an effential quality of Matter ; for the Body that is impelled does
not ad, but is aded upon, and is only paffive, as all Body, by its na-
ture, is. And, as to the Refiflance, which the Body impelled makes,
it is the neceffary confequence of its Paffivity ; for, whatever is paf-
five, muft, in fome degree, refift. It may be objeded, that Space is
paffive of Body, and yet makes no Refiflance. But I fay it is fpeak-
ing improperly to fay, that Space is paffive, or that it has any qua-
lity at all, being, as 1 have ftiown in my Firft Volume, and fhall
fhow more clearly afterwards, a thing which has no exiftence by
itfelf, and is nothing, except in relation to Body.

»
The meaning, therefore, of that law of Nature of the Newtonians,
That the Adion and Readion of Bodies are equal, when properly
explained, comes juft to this, that, as aBing 2in<\ fuffering are Rela-
tives, as much as the agent ads, fo much muft the patient fuffer ;
from whence it follows, that any Body, which receives motion from
another, deftroys juft as much in that which gives it *. And though,

in

* Sec what I have faid upon this Newtonian axiom Vol. I. p. 29. and p. 18?.

And

20 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I.

in this way, it produces a change upon another Body ; yet, as it does
not produce this change, except when it is aded upon, it muft be
toniidered as ftill pafTive, and not adive ; for nothing is truly adive
that docs not ad of itfelf without being aded upon. And, therefore,
even wlicn Body moves Body, it does not, properly fpeaking, ad,
but is only aded upon ; and the Motion of the other Body is only
the confequence of the firft Body being aded upon ; fo that, if the
motion begun by Mind were to be propagated through never fo ma-
ny Bodies, all thefe Bodies would only be aded upon, but could not
be faid to ad, and would be no more than inftruments which the
Mind employs to move, not movers themfelves. Mind, therefore, is
ti'uly the only adive principle in the Univerfe ; and Body ads no
more than the lever that moves the ftone, or the tool ufed by the
artift.

And, to fliow ftill more plainly the perfed paflivity of Matter, it
i-s to be obferved, that even the cohefion of Matter, by which it is
quantity continuous, not difcrete, and to which it owes its quality of
Refiftance, is the operation of Mind ; fo that, though no doubt it
be a fubftancc by itfdf, yet it cannot be faid to have any qualities
but what it derives from Mind.

Nothing, therefore, is more true than what Proclus has faid in the
Second Book of his Commentary upon the Timaeus, * That every

* thing that ads is incorporeal ; for, though it be Body which ads,

* it is by incorporeal powers that it ads *.'

Before

-Ami I am very happy to "be able to f^y, tb.it Dr Ilorflcy perfccl'y agrees with mc
in the feiife that 1 have given to this axiom.

• I hr.ve quoted the words in a note upon p. 73. Vol. I.

Chap.IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 21

Before I conclude this chapter, I muft obferve, that there is a qua-
lity afcribed to Mind by Dr Clarke *, which, I hold, does not belong
to it, but is, as I have faid, efTential to Matter. The quality I
mean is Extenfton. For if Mind be extended, it muft necefTarily be
divifible ; and it muft alfo be figured, if it be not infinite. So that
here we have Mind both figured and divifible, two properties that 1
hold to be effential to Body, and belonging to Body only. This
fo ftrange a notion of Mind extended, if it be carried to Deity, which
I think it muft be, becomes a moft impious, as well as moft abfurd
notion ; for, though the Mind of the Deity, being infinitely extend-
ed, as thofe philofophers fuppofe, cannot be figured or difcerptibie,
yet it muft be divifible by lines, like any thing elfe that is extend-
ed ; fo that we can fay here is one part of it, and there is another.
But, as to the human Mind, it muft not only be divifible' and figu-
red, but alfo difcerptibie. This laft Dr Clarke will not allow, and
maintains, that it is not difcerptibie any more than Space. But I
fay it muft be difcerptibie, unlefs the Doftor will maintain that it is
nothing but Space ; for, if it be not Space, but fomething that is in
Space, and is extended, it muft neceflarily be both divifible and dif-
cerptibie. Now, what a ftrange kind of Mind is this, that has
length, breadth, and depth, and may be cut and carved like a piece
of meat ?

And here I cannot help obferving, that I think it is impoflible that
Dr Clarke could have fallen into this ftrange error of making exten-
fion a property of Spirit, if he had ftudicd the antient metaphyfics
as he ought to have done, particularly the metaphyfics of Ariftotle ;
for there he would have learned what quantity continuous, or Ex-
tenfion, as we call it, is. And Ariftotle would have firft informed
him what the genus of this fpecies is, viz. Quantity ; for we can
never underftand what any fpecies of things is, unlefs we know the

genus

• See his correfpondencc of letters with the Gloucefterfiiire gentleman.

22 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I.

genus to wliich it belongs. Now Ariflotle tells us, in the beginning
of his third book of metaphyfics, that Quantity is that which is di-
vifible into parts, eacli of which is o«<f, and fomething by itfelf ; and
he divides it into quantity dilcrete, and quantity continuous. The
former of thefe has its parts feparated and disjoined one from ano-
ther, and is what we call Multitude^ or, if limited and defined,
Number ; the latter is that which has its parts contiguous, and joined
together by one common boundary. Now, is it poffible that any
man, who had read this chapter of Ai-iftotle, could have maintained
that the Deity, or even the human Mind, was quantity divifible into
parts, each of which was one thing, and which parts lay together
contiguous, and having one common boundary ?

This fo grofs error of Dr Clarke fhows us, that a very pious man
may unwittingly maintain opinions that lead to very impious con-
fequences. The Doctor is a man to whom I think both natural and
revealed religion owe a great deal j and yet his opinion of an ex-
tended Spirit, and a Deity that has length, breadth, and thicknefs, is
as abfurd and as impious a dodtrine as can well be imagined. But
this error of the Doctor's, and, I have the charity to believe, the er-
rors alfo of Dr Prieftley, and, in general, of all our modern meta-
phyficians, proceed from their pretending to fpeculate upon thefe very
abftrufe fubjeds, without the afliilance of the antients, who ought
to be our guides in all philofophy, and particularly in \htjirji and
higheji.

It is, however, true, that our Minds muft fXA^ fotneivherey as the
Divine Mind exifts everywhere ; but it does not from thence fol-
low, that they mufl exift in the fame manner that Body does, that
is, with the three dimenfions ; but, on the contrary, as Mind is a
fubftance of a nature quite different from Body, it follows of necef-
fary confequence that it raufl exift in a manner altogether different.

This

Chap.IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 23

This manner^ indeed, we cannot explain ; but we ought to be con-
tented to know as much of Mind as we do of Body, with which we
are fo much converfant. Now, extenfion is but a property of Body,
an eflential property indeed, but not Body itfelf, as the Cartefians
would make it. There is fomething^ therefore, which is extended ;
for extenfion is not a mere ideal abftraclion, fuch as length from
breadth, but Body is really fomething without its dimenfions or
bounds : So that we are obliged, whether we will or not, to come
back to the antient notion of a uXn, or Jirji matter^ which has been
attempted to be fo much ridiculed. Now, if any man can tell me
how he can conceive that this Firft Matter can exift without di-
menfions, I will tell him how I can conceive that Mind exifts, and
exifts in Space^ without having either length, breadth, or depth.
The fadttruly is, that we know nothing, either of Mind or Body, but
by their operations ; and we know that both Mind and Body ope-
rate in Space, and therefore exifl in Space : But, as to their man-
ner of exiftence, we can fay nothing with any certainty, except that
Body cannot exift in Body, that is, two Bodies cannot occupy the
fame fpace ; whereas, we know that Mind can exift in Body, and
occupy the fame fpace that Body occupies ; for that is the cafe
when Mind animates Body. Now this appears to me to fhow evi-
dently that Mind cannot be extended, nor occupy fpace in the man-
ner that Body does.

I have been the fuller upon this fubjed, of the extenfion of Mind,
that I think it is an unwary conceflion which Dr Clarke has made
to the Materialifts, and of which, accordingly, I obferve that Dr
Prieftley hath availed himfelfin his difpute with Dr Price*, where he
{hows very clearly all the difficulties that thofe femi-materialifts, as
he very properly callsthem, run themfelves into. And, indeed, I muft

own

* Page 268. et feq.

24 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I.

own tliat the Dodor's fyftem of pure materialifm is more confiftent
with itfelf than their fyflem.

Upon the notion of the Deity being extended over infinite fpaecj
Dr Clarke has raifed another notion, which appears to me alfo very
ftrange, that infinite Space is an attribute of the Divinity. Iffo, it
is a part of the Divine Nature, that was utterly unknown to all the
philofophers and theologians of antiquity : But, concerning Space>
I am to inquire fuxjther in the next chapter.

CHAP;

Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 25

HAP. V.

0/" Space — Space a third thing in Nature bejides Body and Mind,
according to fome Fhilofophers. — According to Epicurus, Space and
Body the only tivo things m Nature. — Strange Conjequences from
the Notion 0/" Space being a thing exijiing by itfelf. — Space main-
tained by the modern Theijls not to be a Siihjlance^ but a ^lality of
Divinity. — Strange Confequences of this Notion. — If it be true, ifi-
tire/y a modern Difcovery . — ^Space beany thing, it mufl be eitherSuh-
ftance or Accident — 7iot Subftance — tiot Accident — not mere Capa-
city, ivhich is nothing — Space jiich a Principle of Nature as A-
riftotle's Privation. — Space has no Properties. — Not extended there-
fore, nor, properly fpeaking, meafured. — Duration, Time, Eternity,
no j)roperties of things, though necejfary for their Exijlence.

IT is a principle of this philofophy, which I have often inculca-
ted, that there is nothing in the univerfe, except Body and
Mind, and their Properties. But many philofophers, antient as well
as modern, have maintained that there is a third being in Nature,
namely Space. This was the philofophy of Epicurus, and, before
him, of Democritus, who maintained, that there were only two
things in Nature which were the caufes of all things, viz. Body,
and the vacuum or inane, fo they called Space. For they held, as I
do, that there were only two principles in Nature ; but, inftead of
Mind, they faid one of them was Space, which they faid was the
only immaterial or incorporeal thing in Nature ; and, befides thefe
Vol. II. D two,

i6 AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. Book I.

two, they Aiicl there was no tlurd nature in the univcrfc *". The
modern philofophers, who are materialifts, muft, I think, maintain
thfe dodrine of Epicurus. But even fuch of them as are Thclfts
give a being to Space, and aiTert the exiftence of three things in
Nature, Mind, Body, and Space : The confequcnce of wliich ne-
cefTarily is, that Space is eternal, infinite, and immutable, as well as
God, and, like Him too, has an exiftence neccflary and independent.
And as Sir Ifaac Newton has exprefled himfelf, one ihould think
he believed that Deity had an exiftence dependent upon Space ; for
he fays that infinite Space is a kind of Scnforium or Organum to the
Teity. It is, therefore, of great confequence to philofophy and
theology, to examine well this Notion of the Being of Space, from
which fuch ftrange confcquences rcfult : And though I have faid a
good deal upon the fubjed in my Firft Volume t, to which I beg leave
to refer, where I have endeavoured to fhow, that Space has no ex-
iftence by itfelf, but only in relation to Body ; yet, as the fubje<ft is
of fuch importance, I will fay fomething more of it here.

Upon the fuppofition that Space is fomething, and has a real ex-
iftence with the attributes above mentioned, it is no wonder that the
Athelfts have fet it up as a rival to Deity, and have rejedted all the
arguments ufed to prove that God is the only Eternal, felf-exiftent,
neccffarily exiftent, independent, indivifible, and immoveable Being.
On the other hand, it was as natural that Dr Clarke, and other
theifts, fuppofing it likewife to be a Being, ftiould contend that it is

a

• Omnis ut eft igiturper fe Naturn, duabus

Confiftit rebus ; nam corpora funt, et inane. Lucret. lib. i. v. 410.

Praeterea nihil eft, quod poftis dicere ab omni
Corpore fejun£lum, fecretumque effe ab inani ;
Quo quafi tertia fit rerum Natura reperta. IbU. v. 431.

i" Bock 4. chap. 2.

Chap.V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 27

a quality or property of the Supreme Being, that it is an yfccijent,
of which, the Sub/lance, God, is the Sub^ratum : So Dr Clarke has
expreffccl himfelf in his anfwer to the third letter of the Gloucefier-
ihire gentleman. But I think it was by no means neceffliry, even
fuppofing it to have a real exiftence, that Sir Ifaac (liould make it fo
eflential an attribute of the Divinity, as to ferve him, by way of
Jenforium ; fo that one fhould be apt to imagine, though, I am per-
fuaded, it was not the cafe, that Sir Ifaac thought the Deity could
have no perception or intelligence without Space, any more than
we could have without oxxr fenfor'mm.

There is one confequence of Space being a property of the Divine
nature, and which, I fee, is obferved by the Glouceilerfhire gentle-
man, that, if injinite Space be a property of the Divinity, Tzh//^ Space
muft be a property of inferior Minds, fuch as ours. The Doitor's
anfwer to this, in his third letter to that gentleman, is to me altoge-
ther unintelligible, I muft therefore take it for granted, till I am
better informed, that the Gloucefterfliire gentleman is in the right,
and, confequently, that there are certain portions of Space that are
common property betwixt the Deity and inferior Minds. And Bo-,
dy muft alfo be a fliarer in this propeity, fo far as it occupies Space ;
for, if Space be a property of Mind, I think it is impofTible but that
it muft be likewife a property of Body, which we are fure it occu-
pies in a manner we very well underftand ; whereas Mind occupies
it in a manner we cannot at all explain.

Thefc are ftrangc notions ; and, if they be well fouiided,- they
may be fet down among the other great difcoveries that we moderns
are fuppofed to have made in philofophy. The antients difputed
very much, whether fuch a thing exifted as a vacuum, which we
mean by the word Space. And, in Ariftotle's Fourth Book of Phy-
fics, there is a very long and fubtile difputatlon upon the fubje£t.

D 2 But

28

ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I.

But none of thcra appear to have had the lead notion that Space
was either a fubftance by itfelf, or the quality of any other fub-
ftance. And Thcophraftus, the fucceflbr of Ariftotle, has faid ex-
prefsly, that Place, (which i^ nothing elfe than Space tilled with
Body), was no Being of itfelf, but only relative to the order and
pofition of Bodies *. It is, therefore, I think, a matter of great cu-
riolity, and alfo of great importance to the dodrine of Theifm, to
inquire whether the antients or the moderns are in the right in this
matter.

The moderns, both Theifls and Atheifts, agree in this, that Space
is a Being ; whereas I agree with the antients, and fay, that it is no
Being itfelf, however necelfary it may be for the exiftence of other
B«ings.

And, in ihejirft place, I fay, that, if it be a Being, it mufl: be ei-
ther Subftance or Accident ; for no man can conceive a Being that
is not either the one or the other. Now, it is certainly not Sub-
ftance ; for, if it were Subftance, it muft be either Body or Mind,
that is, material or immaterial ; becaufe, betwixt thefe two, it is Im-
poflible there can be any third Subftance. No man will fay that it
is Body; for it is Space without Body : And no philofopher, that ever
I heard of, maintained that it was Mind. The Atheifts, therefore,
are certainly miftaken when they make a fubftance of it.

The only queftion, then, is, Whether it be an Accident ? Now,
the Accidents are reduced to nine clafles, as they are arranged by
Ariftotle, in his Book of Categories, which I hold to be the founda-
tion

• This quotation from Theophraflus is prefcrved to us by Simpllcius, to whom
wc arc indebted for many paflages of authors now loft, in bis commentary upon
the 4th book of Ariftotle's Phyfics, fol. 149.

Chap V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 29 'M

tion of Metaphyfics, and the fcicnce of Generals, and is, I believe,
as antient a piece of philofophy as any in the world, being taken by
Ariftotle from the School of Pythagoras, and brought by Pythagoras,
as I believe, from Egypt. Now, I would defire to know, to which of
thefe nine clafles Space belongs ? Is it quantity ? Dr Clarke, as he
makes it an attribute of the Deity, will certainly fay that it is not. — Is
it quality? If it be, I defire to know what quality it is, whether co-
lour, figure, hardnefs, foftncfs, &c. — Is it doing or fuffering ? I need
not go through them all : And I fhall only mention one more,
which may feem to include fpace, and that is the category ofichere:
But it denotes place, and fignifies the relation that any portion of
fpace has to the body which occupies it ; fo that it falls under one
of the three relative fignifications which I have afligned to fpace.

But there is one argument which to me is demonftration, that it
is neither fubftance nor accident ; and it is this, that it has no place ;
for every thing exifting, whether Subftance or Accident, mufl exift
in fome place, the Subftance primarily occupying the place, and the
Accident fecondarily, as being in the Subftance. In fhort, every
thing exifting muft exift fomewhere. Novvr, I defire to know, Where,
or in what place, does fpace exift ? And I fay it has no place itfelf,
though it be the place of every thing elfe ; for it is impoffible there
can be a place of a Place, becaufe that would go on in injinitum ; from
whence I conclude, that Space having no place, is no real Being ;
becaufe every Being, whether Mind or Body, or the Accidents of
Mind or Body, muft be fomewhere.

To make this matter ftill clearer, if poflible, let us fuppofe that
nothing exlfted, neither Mind nor Body, I fliould defire to know.
What Space would be upon that fuppofition ? or. Whether it would
be any thing ? And, Whether it would not be ftridly true, what e-
very man would fay, who has not confounded his head with mo-
dern

30 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book I.

deni metaphyfics, thai nothing exifted ? for, if any thing has a real
exiftcnce by itfcif, it would exifl; if nothing elfe in the uuivcrfe ex-
ifted.

I know it may be faid, that there would be, in the cafe I fuppofe,
a capacity of containing Body, and that this may be confidered as
fomething : But I deny that this capacity merely will make Space a
Being ; for there is no Being exifting, nor, indeed, can we con-
ceive fuch a Being, which is only Capacity ^ and nothing elfe ; for,
though Beings have mar./ properties in Capacity only, or Svm[i», not
mfy««, as Ariftotle exprefles it, they are always fomething befidcs
mere Capacity : And I deny that we have any conception of a
being that exifts only Svv»^n. and not at all m^yax.

It is, however, true, that nothing could have exifted without
Space ; and it was for that reafon that Democritus, and, after him,
Epicurus, made Space, or a ■vacuum^ one of the principles of Na-
ture: For the fame reafon, Ariftotle has ma.de Friv at ioji one of his
three principles of Natural things; Matter and Form being the other
trvo. But, though privation of one form be, no doubt, neceflary,
before Matter can receive another, as a piece of wax or clay cannot
receive the form of a globe before it lofes the form of a fquare, or
any other form it might have had before ; yet Ariftotle never dreamed
that the privation of the fquare was any property of the globe, or
ih&t privation was to be reckoned a Being : On the contrary, both
he, and his commentator Simplicius, tell us that it is a no Beifig, or
a TO /A»i o'v, and is not the prefcnce oi any thing, but the nbfence, though
that ahftnce be abfolutely neceflary for the exiftence of any particu-
cular thing *. In this way, we may, if we pleafe, confider Space,
and fay it is the privation of fiillnefs, or of Body, which it certainly

• See Aridotle's Phyfics, cap. u!t.

Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 31

is with refpc£l to Body, that cannot exift where another Body is.
As to Mind, we cannot exactly tell how it exifts, only we are fure
that it exifts in Space, and even in the fame Space where Body is ;
for that is the cafe of Mind animating Body.

It may be faid that, as I admit that nothing can exift with-
out Space, I make it a Property, and a necefl'ary Property too,
of every thing. But thofe who make this objedtion do not
diftinguifh betwixt a part or property of a thing, and what is
only an adjunct or concomitant. An adjundl of a thing may-
be abfolutcly neceffary for its exiftence, and yet be no part or
property of it. Thus, nothing can exift that is not pojjtble to ex-
ift; ihcrefove 3. po//Il?iIity of exiftcnce is a neceffary adjunct cr con-
comitant of every Being that exifts ; yet it is no part or property of
any Being, nor is it a Being itfelf. Now, Space is a thing of that
kind ; for it is a Capacity or PoJiblUty of receiving Being; yet it is
no part or property of any Being ; nor is it any Being itfelf.

If Space be nothing, the confequence ncceflarily is, that not only
it is no property of any thing, but it has no property itfelf; and
therefore I fay it is not extended, though I know the contrary is
commonly believed. But I hold extenfion to be a property of Body-
only ; and, if I believed that Space was extended, I fhould alfo be-
lieve, as the Cartefians do, that Space and Body were the fame. But
as I hold that Matter is a Subftance, of which Extenfion is no more
than a Quality or Accident, if I believed that Extenfion was likcwife
a quality of Space, I muft believe that Space was a Subftance, as
well as Matter ; for ther^ can be no Quality or Accident without a
Subftance in which it is inherent. Even thofc, who fliy that Space '
is only a quality, fliould not maintain that it is extended ; for that

is

32

ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I.

is faying that Extenfion Is a quality of a quality. Now, though
there be different fpeciefes of qualities, yet there is no ^ulitj, or
Accident^ of a ^tality, but only of a Subjiance.

What leads men to believe that Space is extended, is, that it is
meafured ; but the fa£t truly is, that the Space .is not meafured, but
fome Body, which is in it, or fuppofed to be in it ; though it be na-
tural enough that, in common language, we fhould apply to Space
that extenfion and meafure, which can be properly predicated only
of the Body that is in it.

And thus, I think, I have proved to be true, what indeed I have
always fuppofed to be true, that there is nothing in the univerfe but
Mind and Body and their properties ; and that Space is neither a fub-
ftance by itfelf, nor a property of either Mind or Body.

Duration alfo is by fome made a property of things ; and Dr
Clarke, if I am not miftaken, makes Infinite Duration a property of
the Supreme Being : But, if Lifinite Duration be a property of
the Supreme Being, Duration limited^ that is, Time^ muft be a pro-
perty of Inferior Beings ; fo that here we have more common
property : But the fa£t truly is, that ivben, as well as ivhere, are
circumftances without which no being can exift, but which are
not properties of any being. We ought, therefore, to fay of
things, that they have endured fo long, and will endure fo much
longer : And, of the Supreme Being, we fhould fay, that he has
always endured, and will endure for ever. But we cannot predi-
cate, with any propriety, Time or Eternity, or Duration, of any

thing

Chap.V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. :i:i

thing as a quality of that thing, any more than we caa predicate
Space *.

Vol. II. E CHAP.

* See what I have further faid upon this fubjeft in vol. i. p. 347. I will only
add here, that Lucretius appears to me to have underftood very well the philofophy
•of Time, when he fays,

Tempus item per fe non eft : Sed rebus ab ipfis

Confequitur fenfus, tranfaftum quid fit in aevo :

Turn quae res inftet ; quid porro deinde fequatur.

Nee per fe quemquam tempus fentire, fatendum eft,

Semotum ab rerum motu, placidaque quiete. Lib. i. v. 469.

Where the Nature of Time, as only an adjunft and concomitant of things, not any
part of them, is very well explained ; and what is true of Time, is true alfo of Du-
ration; for Time is nothing but Duration bounded and meafured by Motion. And
what is true of Duration and Time, is alfo true of Space ; for it is no more than an
adjunct or concomitant, not a part or property, of any thing.

34 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I.

CHAP. VI.

Proved that Body cannot move itfelf. — Obje^ions anfzvered from the
JntelleSiiial Mindy ivhich can refieSl upon itfelf. — Tijuo Authorities
quoted for this Opinion, one from AnHotle^ and otie from Themiftius.
— If Matter moves itfef, there mufl he Intelligence in Matter, as
•well as Self-Motion. — If the Mover and moved be different, there
cannot be an infnite Series of Movers, of Caufes, and Eff eels. •-• Still
lefs, if the Movement be circular. — If Body cannot afl, it cannot
think. — To think, therefore, contrary to its Nature. — Deficiency of
Dr Clarke's Argument againfl Matter moving itfelf, fupplied. — Dr
Prieftley's Notion of Matter Jlill more extraordinary than the No-
tion of thofe voho fay that it moves itfelf. — Of the Hypot hefts of
Body moving Body by other Bodies interpofed. — ^Body is moved
by a vis infita, it mufl he Intelligent — Body and Mind perfe6ily
difcriminated by the Definition given of them.

IN the courfe of this reafoning, I have taken for granted that
Body does not move itfelf, but that there is fomething that
moves it, which I call Mind. Whoever has taken the trouble to
read the third chapter of the fecond book of the firft volume, will
not, I hope, think that, in laying down this as a certain propofition,.
I have afTumed too much. And, indeed, if it be admitted, as I think
it mufl be, that, to move is to aB, to he moved is X.ofuffer ; it is im-
pofRble to conceive how Body ihould adb upon itfelf, and be, at the
fame time, and in the fame refpedt, both Agent and Patient. The
intellectual Mind, it is true, can make itfelf its own Object. But
Mind is effentially different from Body in this refped, that it can-
not

Chap.VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. jj

not be moved, as I have (hown in the preceding volume * ; where-
as, the capacity of being moved is of the nature and eflenoe
of Body : So that it is impoflible that, when two things are fo
different, any argument can proceed from the one or the other.
idoy It is by its power of refledion that intelled is able to make
itfelf its own objed. Now, by this power, it is diftinguifhed, not
only from Body, but from every other Mtrtd. But he who fays, that
Body can refled, turn upon itfelf, and make itfelf Its own objed,
fpeaks without ideas, or without underftanding what he fays, and
defer ves no other anfwer.

A propofition fo clear does not fland in need of any authority to
fupport it ; but there is one that has occurred to me, fmce publifhing
the Firft Volume, which I will here give the reader. It is from A-
riftotle, in his Phyfics, where he fays, that moving^ and being moved^
are Relatives, belonging to the Categories oi doing 2,n6.fuffering ; and
therefore, what moves, moves what is movedy and what ;/ moved, is
moved by that which moves. I have quoted below the words in the
original *, where the learned reader will obferve, that there is a
clearnefs and emphafis, as well as concifenefs, in the expreffion,
which cannot be preferved in any Englifh tranflation.

E 2 If

* P. 72.

■ + T«» li «•(>«{ Tl, T. ftU X.xf i;t!5«X1' ««' t^E-'t'" My«T«,, TO ^ ««T« T. ».(,T/K.», ««, 3-«^,.

r,*n, Kett ixut k.f«T(««» t( xci ki»i|T»»- re yxf KUtirixot KH^riKtt xtu xiH)t«w, Ksti t» KHmtt

xiitiTo^ Jx« T.u xi.ifTiK.i;. It is needlefs to quote more paffages, as indeed the fum of
his Phyfiology and Theology is, that, in the univerfe, there is fomething that is
moved, and fomething that moves ; txi r„ Kiuvfiiv,, W. t.»oj «/h.t«,, as Simplicius
cxprefles it in his Commentary upon the firft book of the Phyfics, p. 56. The one he
calls the Iaa, or Material Caufe of things, and the other the Efficient, which he
paraphrafes, by calling it the ««ir t! i^x." '■'nnui. I cannot, however, help quoting
one paffage more of the Metaphyfics, lib. i. cap. 3. where, giving a hiftory of the
opinions of the antients concerning the firft caufes of things, he tells us, that, af-
ter

36 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I,

If it be proved that Matter cannot move itfelf, then there Is an
end of the whole philofophy of Materiahfm or Atheifm, which can

be

ter they had difcovered, as they thought, the fubjed matter, or Material Caufe, of
the Univcrfe, out of wh'ch every thing was made, and into which every thing is'
refolved, they were naturnlly led to inquire what produced tlicfc changes in this
fubje£i; for, fays he, the fubjecl c.uinot change itfelf ; — Ou yaj ^n loyt i»-»xfifti»i)« Hurt

Trtm fttrxfijcXXetf lavTo. Xiyu it eio», ivn to |i/Aoii tvTi o p^xXKof a^rion rtv uiT*(!xXXfi*-

sxxTi^cf uurtif Ctitt JttlH TO fitt JuAov XAl»|V, 0 06 y^x'KKti XIO^IXITX' «>iA' ITfJO* Tl Tl)5 f£tT«-
/8o>.II5 UiTtOI. T« Si TOUTO ^)1T«V, |V1< TO TIJH 'tTf^X' X^^tl ^flTfO, fc( «» BfiH? (p»ty)fCif, tilt D

There is anotlier authority which has occurred to me while I was writing this ;■
It is from Themiftius, who lived in the time of the Emperor Theodofius the elder,
a Peripatetic philofopher, who writes a treatife ?r(^i ^t/;t'i«i explaining what Arifto.
tie has faid upon this fubjeft ; and, as he was a Sophift, (fo rhetoricians werccal-
led in that age), as well as a philofopher, he writes both with great elegance and
great perfpicuity ; on which account I would recommend his writings to the flu-
dent of Greek philofophy ; and, for another reafon,^ — becaufe they are better print-
ed than thofe of any other commentator upon Ariftotle, Ammonius Hermeias's
commentary upon the Categories only excepted. He proves, that no Body can be
xvTcr.ifvjTtv, or felf-moved, in this manner : Either, fays he, one part of the body
muft move the other, or the whole mult move the whole. If one part move the o-
ther, then it is not felf-moved ; at lead, not the whole of It, any more than an
animal is felf-moved, whofe mind moves its body. On the other hand, if it be
faid that the whole moves the whole, fo that at the fame time, and in the f<ime re-
fpefl, it moves and is moved, is both agent and patient ; that is, a thing abfolute-
ly inconceivable — ^ri^, ^vp^m ; lib. i. fol. 67. This is pretty much the fame argu-
ment as that 1 have ufed ; but 1 was glad to have it confirmed by the authority of
fo good a philofopher and writer. He gives us in the fsme place another argu-
ment, taken from the nature of being moved and moving, one of which is tn^ytix,
and the other ivtxftis merely : It is fubtile, but I think folid and well worth the
reading — The cafe truly is, that nothing can move itfelf, not Mind any more than
Boiiy ; for Mind cannot, by its nature, be moved •, therefore it cannot move itfelf.
In this way Ariftotle has argued in the firft book De Anima, cap. 5. injine. — 'Otj
fin «'i/» tupi oioi Tl xirtir^tii Tijv ^}-«;^;ll> <fi»»i»o» 'k xtvrui. ii f% c/aff f£)j xiveitki, oii>io> «{ oua

i^' '«i<T,i5. And in this wi'.y he has refuted (cap- 3. of ihe fame book), Plato's no-
tion of Mind, that it was "i/tix<hjto{. — Sec what I have faid further upon this fub-
jcft, vol. I. p. 78.

Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. ., 37

he defended upon no other hypothefis, but that AT.ittcr moves itfclf.
On the other hand, if we maintain tliat Matter, by a I'u infita, or
power belonging to its nature and eflence, moves itfelf, we cannot
ftop there, but muft likewife maintain that it has a principle of intel-
ligence in it, as well as of motion ; fince it is evident that ail the
motions of Nature are for fome end or purpofe, as evident as that
the motions exiu. Ng"', to propofe an end, and to ufe means for
accomplishing that end, is the very definition of intelligence in prac-
tice. This is a confequence which I believe all thofe who maintain,
this notion are not aware of, but it appears to me to be unavoid-
able.

If the Materialift fliouid admit that Matter cannot mo^e itfclf,

but that there muft be a tnoi'cr, as well as a thitig moved, then that
nwucr muft be either Mind or Body. If he admits it to be Mind,
he gives up his caufe : If he fays that it is Body which moves Bo-
dy, then he is reduced to the neceftity of maintaining the moft ab-
furd of all hypothefes — an infinite feries of Bodies, all impelling and
impelled ; for it is evident that Body cannot move Body, unlefs it
be itfelf firft moved. Now, if ihtfr/i Body be moved by they^-
cond, I afk, What moves the ftcond ? If it be faid that it is the
third, I afk. again, What moves the third ? The fame anfwer is
given, and the fame queftion repeated ; and fo on in infinitum : And
thus we have an infinite number of motions without one original
mover; which, in other words, is faying that there may be an in-
finite number of effedls without a caufe.

Let us fuppofe a chain hung down from heaven, and from a height
invifible — If it were afked, What fupports this chain ? Would it be an
anfwer fufficient to fay, thatthe^fr/? or loweft link is fupported by the
fecond, or that next above it, the fecond by the third, the thi^-d by
xkt fourth, and fo on ; and, in this v;ay, a chain of infinite length
might be maintained to be fupported by nothing at all, than w!i:ch

nothing

38 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I.

nothing can be conceived more abfurd. And yet It is precifely the
•cai'e of a fcrles of Bodies moving one anotlier, without an original
mover ; and, indeed, of any ferics of caufcs and effeds, without a
firjl cattfe *.

If this r.T'^nment proves, that Motion in a ftralght line cannot
he produced by a feries cf Bodies moving and moved, without fome
Firft Mover that is not Body, it proves, a fortiori^ thnt the circular
motion, of which kind all the great motions in the unlverfe are,
cannot be produced in that way ; for the circular motion produced
by Body cannot be produced but by a double impulfe, one in
a ftralght line from the center, commonly called the line of projec-
tion^ and the other towards the centre ; fo that here there muft be
two infinite feriefes of bodies impelled and impelling, without one
original caufe of either of the Motions.

If Body cannot move itfelf, it cannot be conceived to adl at all,
and far lefs to be capable of that adtion which belongs only to fu-
pcrior Minds, I mean thinking. It is. therefore moft unphilofophi-
cal, and, indeed, abfurd and contradidory, to fuppofe that the
Deity might have fuperadded to the other qualities of Matter the
faculty of thinking; for that is to fuppofe that the Deity might make
Matter to be Mind — to make that which, by its nature and eflence,
cannot move, but only be monjed, to moue-^w fliort, it is to fup-
pofe that tlic Deity can alter the nature of things, make a fquare a
circle, negation affirniation, and the fame thing to be and not to be.

And

* 'this illiiPtration, by tlie cxaiiiple of a chain, is tak. n from an excellent Book,
emitlecl, ' The Religion of Nature dclineateil,' ft-a. 5 p 6. A book, in which,
witii a great deal of gocd argument, there is nore learning than in any which
has fallen into my hahds of a great while. And in this pafl'^ge b« very properly
mentions the chain in Homer, fafkned to the throtie of Jove, or xi^i {<«. 'o-,>,v^is>>,,
asIIomLTtxprefles it ; for good philc.". phy informs us, that every chain of caufcsan^i
cilicls, hov; long loevcr it m;iy be, hjngs from one great firft Cauf.- which fupport^
it.

Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 3^

And thus it appears, that, if Body cannot move itfclf, there is an
end of the fyftcm of Materialifm and Atheifm ; and every man who
admits this muft be a Theift, whether he will or not.

If I am fuccefsful in this argument, it will fupply a defedl which
I obferve in Dr Clarke's Demonftration of the Being and Atributes
of God, Sed. 3. where he endeavours to refute Toland's pofi-
tion, that Motion is efTential to all Matter ; or, in other words,
that matter can move itfelf. His refutation is by the following
dilemma : ' If Motion, or a tendency to Motion, (which is the
' fame thing in this argument), be efTential to Matter, it muft:

* have a tendency to move fom.e one determinate way at once, or to

* move every way at once. Now, that it cannot have the laft ten-
' dency is evident.' But how does he prove that it has not the firft ?
*■ A tendency,' fays he, ' to move fome one detei'mined way, cannot

* be eflential to any particle of Matter, but muft: arife from fome ex-
' ternal caufe, becaufe there is nothing in the pretended neceffary
' nature of any particle to determine its motion, neceffarily and ef-

* fentially, one way rather than another.' But this is plainly begging
the queftion ; for thofe who maintain that Motion is eifential to
Matter, maintain, that there is not only a tendency in the Matter to
move one particular way, (and indeed it is impoffible to conceive a
tendency to Motion, which is not in fome one direclion or another),
but they further fay, that different Bodies have eifential ly and ne-
ceffarily different tendencies to motion in different dircdions. And
fome of them go fo far as to allow that the Motion is intended for
fome end, and, confcquently, that it is guided by Intelligence which
is in the Matter, together with a principle of Motion, both being, as
they fay, effential to Matter, And, indeed, as I have ohferved,
they cannot be feparated. The true anfwer, therefore, to To-
land's argument, is what I think I have proved, that Matter cannot
move itfelf; and, if it cannot move itfelf, it will follow of necefi'ary.

COUv

40 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book I.

confcqucnce, that it cannot move itfelf with Intelligence, or for a
certain end.

Dr Prieftley's fyftem appears to me to be flill more extraordinary
than the fyftem of thofe who maintain that Body moves itfelf ; for
his fyftem is, that a Body does not move itfelf, but moves other Bo-
dies round it by Attradlion and Repulfion, which he makes to be
elfential qualities of Matter. And I have heard fome Newtonians
explain in this way what Sir Ifaac has faid of Attradion, though Sir
Ifaac himfelf has been at great pains to obviate any fuch niifappre-
henfion, by faying, that he means nothing more by Attraction than
a tendency of Bodies towards one another^ And, for the fame reafon,
he certainly means by Repulfion nothing more than the tendency of
Bodies from one another. I therefore think it hard that thefe gen-
tlemen ihould charge Sir Ifaac with an opinion fo abfurd, and which
is entirely their own ; for no philofopher before them ever thought
of Matter operating upon Matter, otherwife than in contad, and by
impulfe, for a very plain reafon, that nothing can ad where it is
not, neither Mind nor Body : And, indeed, I can no more conceive
a thing to ad 'adhere it is not, than ivhen it is not. But the philo-
fophers of this kind have fuch a rooted averfion to Mind, fuch a
wv£Uf*«Toipoj3i», as Cudworth calls it, that they will fuppofe any thing,
and will adopt the moft improbable, nay, an impoffible hypothefis,
rather than admit the agency of Mind in explaining the phaenome-
na of Natuie. That thofe who deny the exiftence of Mind ihould
do fo, is not furprifing ; but I own I think it very furprifmg, that
the Newtonians, who profefs to believe in Mind, as their Mafter
certainly did, (hould have recourfe to fuch ftrange hypothefes, rather
than make ufe of Mind in folving the phaenomena of Nature.

The hypothefis, that there are other Bodies interjeded betwixt the
diftant Bodies, by which they ad upon one another, cannot be faid

to

Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 41

to be an abfurd hypothefis, as we know that Bodies ad upon one
another by fuch an interpofition. Nor is it a new hypothefis ; for
the phaenomena of the loadftone and the iron has been attempted to
be accounted for in that way ; but it is no more than an hypothefis ;
and, if aethers and fluids, and fubtile fpirits, the exiftence of which
never can be proved, are to be fuppofed, all the phaenomena of Na-
ture may be folved by fuch arbitrary fuppofitions. This would be
contrary to that fundamental maxim of the Newtonian philofophy,
by which we are enjoined not to feign hjpothe/es, and to build only
upon fad and obfervation. But, what is ftill worfe, if the exiftence
of thefe aethers were admitted, it could not be fhown, from any laws
of mechanics known, that they would produce the effedts afcribed to
them : So that they refemble, in every refped, the vortices of Des
Cartes, which are now fo generally exploded.

Thus, I think, I have proved, that Body cannot move itfelf, and
that, if it could, we muft afcribe to it not only a moving, but an in-
telligent Mind ; which, if we could fuppofe, there is an end of the
fyftem of Theifm, unlefs we reckon Spinofa a Theift, who indeed
profeffed to be fuch ; but his God was matter intelligent, or, in o-
ther words, the Material World itfelf. His fyftem of Atheifm is
much the fame with the fyftem of Strato, the Peripatetic, which I
have explained in vol. i. p. 240. And indeed, it appears to me to
be the only fyftem of Atheifm that is not manifeftly abfurd or ri-
diculoufly defective. Of this kind is the fyftem of Epicurus who
accounts for every thing from motion, but gives no account of Mo-
tion itfelf, how it began, or how it is carried on : And, further he
fuppofes, that Motion alone, without Intelligence, can produce all
thofe wonderful works of Intelligence that we fee in the univerfe •
than which I can imagine no greater abfurdity. Dr Prieftley, in the
fyftem he has given us of our Microcofm, (for he has not yet given
us a fyftem of the Great World), has avoided the defed of Epicu-
VoL. II. F rus's

42 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I.

rus's fyftem, in not accounting for the origin of Motion ; for he
fuppofes, tliat our machine was not only frainedby Almighty power,
but was likewife fet agoing by that Power : But he maintains, that
this Motion and MechaniAn does produce Intelligence, and 'not on-
ly Inteliigcnce, but Confcioufnefs ; for he cannot deny the fad, that
this machine of ours does not only go on in the ordinary opera-
tions of Intelligence, propofing ends, and devifmg means for accom-
plifliing thofe ends, but does alfo reJlcSl, and makes itfelf its own
objedl. And he likewife jnaintains, if I rightly underftand his fy-
ftem, that though tliere be Intelligence in the Univerfc, there is but
one Supreme Intelligence, but no Inferior Intelligences; fo that Men,
Animals, and Plants, are but mere Machines, and the names of Jn-
telleclnal^ animal^ and Vegetable life, are nothing but founds. What
we are to think of this fyftem, I leave the reader to judge. It
is better than the fyflem of Epicurus, in as much as it accounts for
the Origin of Motion ; but, in every other refpcdt, it is perfcd E-
picurifm ; and I think it is more abfurd than the fyftem of Strato
and Spinoza, in this refpedl, that it fuppofes mere Matter to produce
the works of Intelligence which we fee man produces, without Intelli-
gence in itfelf. But fuch fyftems we are to expedl from men who will
fpeculate on thcfe high fubjeds, without the affiftance of the Antients.

I will conclude this chapter with obferving, that, if I have fuc-
ceeded in proving that Body cannot move itfelf, it muft be acknow-
ledged that my definition of Mind and Body difcriminate the two
as much as is poflible ; for, if Body cannot move, and if Mind can-
not be moved, it is evident they never can be confounded, accord-
ing to the definitions I have given of them, which are perfedly di-
ftindl, and, indeed, oppofite, as oppofite as affirmation and negation;
for Mind, I fiiy, j/ioues, Body does not move ; Mind is not moved^
as fhall be demonftrated in the next chapter. Body is moved : And
from thefe definitions is demonftrated an eflential quality of Mind,
of which I am to treat in the next chapter, viz. its hmnateriality.

CHAP.

Chap. VII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 43

HAP. VII.

Of the Immateriality of WmA— Difficulty to conceive an immaterial
Subftance.- — This to be done by the method of AbR.r3L&.ion^ as ive
conceive a Point, Line, e^c. — Power, Energy, Activity, effential
^alities of Mind. — That Poiver bejl feen in Motion — therefore
Mind defined by the'Power of moving. — Confequences o/"Mind being
an immaterial Subftance — has no Parts — is indivi/ible, and im-
moveable.— Another confequence isy that Mind moves Body in a
Manner quite different from that in ivhich Body moves Body. — It
moves unorganized Bodies in the fame manner as it moves Animals
and Plants. — !n>f Deity cannot be fuppofed to move Body in that
ivay. — Reafoning from Analogy on that Subje^. — Mind ?;z(?i;£'/ Body
in a manner quite different from that in ivhich Body moves Body.
— Confequences of that Difference. — We hiozu, therefore, infome
refpe^, hoiv Mind moves Body.

UPON this fubjedt, of the immateriality of Mind, one great
difficulty, and perhaps the greateft of all, is to give an idea of
an immaterial Subftance, and to make it conceiveable that fuch a
Subftance fliould exift : This I have endeavoured to do in the 13th
Chapter of the 2d Book of my Firft Volume. I am fenfible I have
loft my labour with thofe who believe that we have no ideas, but
perceive things only by our fenfes and imagination ; for it is certain
that an immaterial Subftance can neither be apprehended by Senfe,
nor figured by the Imagination. But, with refpea: to thofe who
admit the exiftence of Ideas, and who are accuftomed to the abftrac-

^ 2 tions

44 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I.

tions that fcience requires, the matter will not be fo difficult. A geo-
meter, for example, muft abilradl from I3ody a point, a line, and a
furface. He mud not, therefore, lay, that he cannot conceive
length without breadth, or both without depth ; and, in general, he
muft admit that he can conceive the dimenfions of Body without the
Body ; nay, he muft admit that he can conceive what has no di-
menfions at all, neither length, breadth, nor thickncfs, namely a
Point ; for otherwife geometry would be no fcience. In the fame
manner, the natural philofophcr muft have the idea of form wltliout
matter, and matter without form, otherwife he never can explain
properly the principles of phyfics. Now, if, inftead of abftrading
Form or Dimenfion from Matter, I abftrad that Power by which it
is moved, I have the idea of Mind, which, I fay, is as clear and di-
ftind an idea, as the idea of Form, or of a Point, Line, or Surface.
It may be faid, I know, that Power or Energy is no more than a
Quality of Matter ; but I hope I have proved, to the fatisfadtion of
the reader, that it is no Quality of Matter : It therefore muft be a
Quality of fome other Subftance. What that Subftance is, I cannot
tell, any more than I can tell what the Subftance of Matter is, of
which Extenfion, Refiftance, and Solidity, are qualities ; but I know
moft certainly that there is a Subftance of Mind as well as of Matter.
The experimental men, indeed, or fuch a philofopher as Mr David
Hume, who tell us that we have no knowledge but by our Senfes,
will fay that we do not fee or feel Mind ; therefore we cannot con-
ceive that it exifts. But I fay the fame of a point or a line. No
man can fay that he fees or feels what has no parts, or what has on-
ly length, but not breadth. But fhall we therefore deny that a point
or line exifts ? If we do, we deny at the fame time that geometry
is a fcience. It is true, they do not exift in Matter, nor are not ma-
terial, any more than Mind is ; but they have not, for that, a lefs
real exiftence, but rather a more fixed and permanent one ; becaufe,
whatever is material is in a conftant flux and change ; nor is any
thing fixed and ftable except Mind, and its ideas.

Power,

Chap.VII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 45

Power, therefore, ene^gy, or adlivity, (for by all thefe words it may
be exprefled), is an eflential quality of that fubftance I call Mind.
And as this power or energy is mod obvious to the fenfes in mo^
iion, I have defined Mind by the power of tnoviiig, and alfo becaufe
every thing in the material world is in Motion, by which the whole
frame of Nature is fuftained and preferved. There is, likewife, ano-
ther reafon, viz. That, without this power of Mind, Body could not
cxift, though Matter might, according to the dilHndion made by the
antients betwixt Body and Matter ; for it is this moving power of
Mind that makes the particles of Matter run together, cohere, and
form Boxly *.

The quefllon, then, is, What the nature of the fubftance is of
which this power is a quality I And I fay the Subftance muft be
immaterial ; for, as the power is not a quality of Matter, and
yet is a quality, it muft be a quality of fomething which is
not Matter, or, in other words, immaterial ; for immaterial is
nothing but the negation of Matter. And this I think is evi-
den'ce fufEcient for the immateriality of Mind. But, whoever
defires more, may confult the fourteenth chapter of the fecond
book of Volume Firft, where he will find it proved, a priori^ from
the nature of Motion, of Body, and of Mind ; and in the following
chapter there is a proof of it likewife a pojleriori ; both which, joined
together, make, if I am not much deceived, the cleareft proof of the
immateriality of Mind that has hitherto been produced : And it is a
proof which goes to every principle of motion in Body ; and for
that reafon I have called the motive principle, even in Bodies unor-
ganized. Mind, becaufe every thing immaterial, or, in other words,
what is not Body, muft of neceftity be Mind. Ariftotle, as I have
obferved, fays, that the motive principle in thofe Bodies is like

Mind ;

* It is well obferved by Proclus, tbat whatever keeps together aHs, and whatever
a£ts is incoiporea), or Mind. I have quoted the paflage, in a note, upon p. 86. cf
the Firft Volume, which fee. See alfo p. 177.

4€ ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I.

Mind ; and, in another pafTagc, he fays exprefsly, that it is a fpccies
of life to phyfical Bodies ; which is juft what I fay it is *.

If Mind be not material, it cannot have parts ; for that is an efTen-
tial quality of Matter, which cannot belong to any thing that is not
material. And here we may obferve the analogy I before took no-
tice of, betwixt geometrical abftradtions and thofe by which we come
to the idea of Mind; for it appears that the Mind may not be im-
properly defined, as Euclid has defined a point, viz. that which has
no parts.

If Mind has not parts, it follows, of neceffary confequence, that it
cannot be moved, or moveable : For what is moved muft neceffarily
have its parts in different parts of Space at different times. Nor can
it occupy Space, or be extended ; for Space, as I have faid, only re-
lates to Body, not to Mind ; otherwife Mind would have figure,as well
as extenfion. Mind, however, may be faid, in a certain fenfe, to be
fomewhere ; but in what fenfc I fhall, in the fequel, more fully ex-
plain. Mind, having no parts, muft alfo be indivifible ; fo that, as it
is the moft excellent, fo it is the pureft and fimpleft of all Subftances.

Another

• ^*>i T({ lv(rx '.V Tn; <fuj-« trutiffTatri zritri. Lib. 8. De Naturali Aufcultatione., cap. 5.
in initio This kind of life Ariftotle calls Nature, under which he comprehends
the principle of Motion, not only in unorganized Bodies, but in Animals and Ve-
getables. This is evident from what he fays in Lib. 2. cap. i. in initio, De Natu-
rali Aufcultatione. And accordingly he is fo underftood by his Commentator Sim*
plicius, in his commentary upon the Second Book of the Phvfics, p. 86. where he

fays, "O A^irTCTiAi)? (^ve-it «;aA« Kcti Ttti ^v^li s''"' To zn^i rt/fi» x.»Ttcyit»fttti>. Nature,

therefore, in Ariftotle's Linguage, is Mind not Intelligent, operating in Body ; for,
if the Mind have intelligence, it does not belong to Nature ; and, therefore, in A-
riflotlc's philofophy, man, as well as God, is diflinguifhed from Nature.

And here we may obferve the true diftinclion betwixt Phyfics and Metaphyfics.
Phyfics treat of Mind operating in Body and through Body ; whereas Metaphyfics
treat of Mind feparated from Body, and operating without Body. Betwixt thefe two
lies the Subject of what Arillotle calls the human philofophy. This fubjeft is human
Intellect, which is not feparated from Body, but, though joined with it, can nCi
»-;thout it.

Chap. VII. ANTIKNT METAPHYSICS. 47

Another important confcqucnce, and which defcrves particular at-
tention, of the Mind's being immaterial, is, that it cannot move Body
in the manner that Body moves Body, by the furface of the moving
Body impelling the furface of the Body moved ; for it is impoIRble
that Mind, not being material, and therefore having no furface, can
move Body in that way.

The qucftion, then, is. In what manner docs Mind move Body ^
And I fay it is by adting upon every particle of it, even the inmofl:
particles. And, accordingly, it is in this way that gravitation moves
Bodies, not in proportion to their furface, but in proportion to their
• mafs *. In the fame way Mind moves vegetables and animals, which
kind of motion in them is called Animcition. And it may be fo call-
ed, alfo, with refpedl to unorganized Bodies, as it moves them in the
fame manner. Of this I fhall fay a great deal more afterwards.

Another very remarkable difference betwixt the operations of
Mind upon Body, and of Body upon Body, is, that, when Body
impels Body, the motion continues fome time after the impulfe ;
whereas Mind not moving Body by impulfe, but by inceffant ener-
gies, the motion continues no longer than the energy, but ceafes
when the energy ceafes. This we know with the greateft certainty,
from confcioufnefs, the fource of all our knowledge of the operations
of the Mind, and particularly its operations upon Body ; for, with-
out

• In this way Sir Ifaac Newton, in his Scholhtm Cenerah^ fpeaks of gravitation,

• Oritur utique haec vis a caufa aliqua, quae penetrat ad ufque centra folis et

• planetarum, fine virtutis diminutione ; quaeque agit, non pro quantitate fuperfi-

• cierum particularum in quas agit, (ut folent caufae mechanicae), fel pro quanti-

• tate materiae folidac i' where Sir ll'aac fecms to acknowledge that Bodies fo mo-
ved are not moved mechanically ; and, if they are not moved mrchanically, they
muft be moved by Mind ; for, betwixt thefe two, there is no medium.

48 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I.

out confclournefs, we fliould not have known at all that Mind moves
Body.

The confequence of Mind moving Body in this way, is not only
that the Motion ceafes when the energy ceafes, but that it moves
Body in all directions with the fame facility, not only in a ftraight
line, but in a curve, of which the dircdion is continually changing:
And this, as fimply and uniformly, as in a ftraight line ; for, as the
motion is, by the incefTant exertion of the moving power, repeated
every inftant of the motion, it may change its diredion every mo-
ment, without any other motive force being applied to the Body. On
the other hand, as Body moves Body by impulfe, which motion conti-
nues fome time after the impulfe, and as it is a law of Nature, that a
Body fo moved muft go on in a ftraight line, it is evident that it
cannot be defleded from the ftraight line, fo as to be moved in a
curve, without fome other force applied to it. The curvilineal mo-
tion, therefore, produced in this manner, muft neceflarily be a com-
bined motion, not fimple and uniform.

However extraordinary, therefore, this kind of motion by Mind
may appear to thofe who have not attended to the operations of
Mind, but only to thofe of Body, I fay we neither have, nor can have
any other idea of it, becaufe our own motion, from which alone we
derive the idea of the motion of Mind, is of that kind.

Of what ufc tills theory is, in explaining the motions of the cc-
ieftial Bodies, may appear from what I have already faid upon this
fubjccl in the Appendix to the Firft Volume, and will, I hope, appear
ftill more evidently fiom what I Ihall further fay.

In the mean time, it is to be obfcrvcd, that it is not true what is
coimnonly faid, that we know nothing of the way in which Mind

moves

Chap. VII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 49

moves Body ; for I think I have fhown, that we not only know
negatively that it docs not move Body, as Body moves Body, but
pofitively in what manner it moves it. It is true, indeed, that, as
we do not know the Subftance of either, we cannot tell exadly how,
by their nature and eflence, they are fo conned:ed, that the one muft
be always adlivc, and the other always paflive : Nor can we ac-
count how Subftances, fo totally different in their natures, fhould af-
fedl one another as we know they do. But,

Efl quoJam prodire tenus, fi non datur ultra * ;

And we muft give over altogether the purfuit of knowledge, if we
infift to know the very eflence of things, and their moft hidden
principles: All that we fhould endeavour, is to know well what is gi-
ven us to know, and to live in hopes that our knowledge Ihall be
.more perfed in a more perfedl ftate.

Vol. TI. G BOOK

• Horat. lib. I. ep. i. v. 32.

50. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookIL

BOOK II.

Of che feveral Kinds of Mind.

CHAP. I,

Js there are different Motions, Jo there are different Minds. — Of the
loivejl or elemental Mind. — Proclus's notion of that Mind. — OfGra-
vitation, compared -with other motive Principles — Mind ftot al-
ivays moving, nor Body alivays moved, — Of the reality of this
motive Principle in Body. — The feveral Opinions upon this Sitbje^
—Objedion to the Exijlence of this Mind anfivered. — The Vege-
table Mind lefs abundant than the Elemental — more abundant than
the Senfitive. — The Vegetable more artificial than the Elemen-
tal— but lefs than the Senfitive. — Lafl of ally is the Intellectual,
much more excellent than any of the other three.

IN this chapter, I propofe to give an account of the feveral fpccie-
fes of this great genus Mind ; for, as there are feveral different
kinds of Motion in this univerfe, there mufi: be different Minds ; and,
as all the Motions in it are diredled by Intelligence, there muft be
Minds in it that have intelligence, as well as a moving power.

I will begin with the Mind which only moves, and this in the
funpleft manner. The Mind I mean, is that which, according to

the

Chap.I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 5-1

the philofophy of Ariftotle, is in all phyfical Bodies, and may
be called the Elanental Mind ; firfl, becaufe it is in the elements,,
and makes them cohere together, fo as to form Bodies of fome fize,
•which, being compofed of thefe elements, have all this Mind in them ;
and, fecondly, becaufe it is the foundation and groand-work of all
the other Minds incorporated with Matter; for the vegetable, the
animal, and the intelledlual life in Man, are but fuperftruftures upoa
this elemental life, which pervades the whole material world, and-
may be faid to be the bafis of every thing in it *.

As this Mind animates and actuates fimple and elemental Bodies,

G 2 or.

* This principle, as I have obferved before, Ariftotle fjys is '««-7rs/> 4"''X''-> ^nd lici
^OTi \r Toif ^i«r« K»if(rru<ri. But the Platonic philofopHers of later times, particularly
Proclus furnamed his fucceflbr, fpeak much more fully of this principle of life and
a£livity, which they fay pervades all Nature, brute matter, as well as Bodies com-
monly called animate. Proclus, in his commentary upon the Timaeus, p. 4. calls
it ^fliii ciXi*'i""''i "'"'' ^"'"'"fs"""! and he defcribes it thus, ^oira ii» s«>t«>v uxuXvtu;,

It T» xtKru^j T0615 If avTn rut Itiaii ccnixiq e-vnj^tuira' And this principle, which is in
itfelf eternal, as well as immaterial, and preferves the fpecicfcs of things, though
the matter of them be corrupted, is, in the language of thefe later Platonifts,
as well as of Ariftotle, called (pvcij. The firft principle, according to Proclup,
is altogether out of Nature, being llri^vuftttx, and perfeitly feparated from all
matter } but this (fvc-n, he fays, is that alone which proceeds and goes forth into

Body. 'H it 9»rt(, v^ttXHvrx fitttty it* Kiel i^ytttot Xiytrxi tw> 0e*>i', ovk cc^a; iv ii i>.>.f

KittiTiK6t, aA>i f^iurx wui rc «iiTox(»i|To>, TU1 «^' ti»uT»i; ln^ytn' And he defines Nature,
according to the doclrine of Plato, in this way, Oun-i* ««-iu^*to;, i^nata-zc: Tn/iaTut,
hcyivi i-x,iv<ra, ivruf, ii{ iavrtji eg«» iu S'i/»»,ai>ii. Proclus, in Titnaeutn, p. 4. Nature,
therefore, according to him, is precifely what 1 make ir, an immaterial prin^-.ple of
motion in Bodies, acting according to intelligence, but without coafcioufn:rs, or
being able to recognize itfelf. And in a palfage w4iich I have quoted f om the fame
author, (Volume rmt, p. 108.) he blames Ariftotle, and, I think, veiy uftiy, for
fpeak:ng fo much of the Mind which govern- tht Mcions uf toe celefti iBo.Hes, .
and fayini; fo iittle 01 ihis Elemental Mind, which ij the grand agent of Nature here-
on earth.

52 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book 11.

or, if compounded, not of fuch artificial frame and texture as Bodies
organized ; fo the motions it produces here on earth are of the
fimpleft kind, being all in ftraight lines : But, like other Minds, it
moves by inceflant energies, and thefe not conftant or uniform, but
increafmg or decreafmg, according to the dillance of tiie ohjetis to
which, or from which the Bodies in motion are moved. In the moft
remarkable motion of this kind, I mean the motion of Bodies falling
towards the centre of the earth, the ratio of increafe or decreafe, at
the different diftances, has been exadly fixed. But, in the motion
of other Bodies, fuch as elcdrical, magnetical, and chymical, the va-
rious force of the moving power has not been fo exadly calculated,
though we are fure it is governed by fixed and ftated laws, as well
as every other thing in Nature.

This motion of gravitation is Ukewife more conftant than any
other motion of Bodies upon earth ; for in all heavy Bodies here
there is a tendency towards the centre ; whereas the motions of
magnetifm and eledricity are only occafional, when the Bodies are
within a certain diftance of one another. And there is another oc-
cafional motion, which our modern philofophers account for, not
from any reafon or principle, but by a mere word or found, I mean
the word AttraB'wn ; and that is the motion of the waters of the fea
upward, when the moon is in a certain pofition with refped to them.

And here we may obferve in paffing, that, though Mind have the
power of moving, and be the only adive principle in the univerfe ;
yet it is not neceflary that it fhould be always moving, but it may
be fometimes quiefcent, and then it moves only potentially, or in
capacity : And the fame may be true of Matter, with refped to its
quality of heing moved. And, accordingly, Ariftotle maintained,
that the different kinds of Bodies had deftinations to different places,
to which, when they were arrived, they refted. Thus, according

to

Chap. I. ANT I EN T METAPHYSICS. S3

to him, a ftone, if it were at the centre of the earth, would be at
reft ; and therefore he has faid, that Nature is a principle of re/l as
well as of motion. It is, however, true, that we know no Body-
that is not actually in motion, or has not a tendency to motion. In
this ftate are all Bodies here on earth ; the whole folar fyftem is all
in motion, and it is likely every other fyftem in the univerfe.

Neither is it necefTary that every kind of Mind in the uni-
verfe fhould immediately, and diredlly, move Body. And I am per-
fuaded, that the intelledlual Mind is not the immediate Caufe of
Motion, but only the reniote, moving Bodies by the agency and mi-
niftry of inferior Minds, fiich as the Animal and Vegetable, and this
loweft Mind, of which I am now treating ; but we muft never for-
get, that it is a fundamental maxim of this philofophy, that Mind
is the author of all Motion, either mediately or immediately.

That this elemental Mind, or principle of Motion, does really
exift in the univerfe, I hope I have proved to the fatisfadion of my
reader in the firft part of this work. I will, however, add fome-
thing more upon this fubjed:, as I know it is that part of my fyftem
which ftumbles the moft of my readers, more than any other.

There can be, I think, but four opinions upon this fubjed ; for,
either Body moves itfelf, or it is moved by impulfe of other Body,
or it is moved by Mind. And this laft opinion divides into two ;
for, either the Mind is Deity moving diredly and immediately thofe
Bodies, or it is a particular Mind in them, which is the caufe of
their Motion : So that the whole opinions of this fubjed are four ;
and, befides thefe, there can be none other.

As to the /r/? of thefe opinions : Whoever believes that Body
moves itfelf, is an Atheift, whether he knows it or not ; for as it is

54 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II.

undoubtedly moved by Intelligence, that is, for a certain purpofe,
he muft alfo believe, that Body has, by its nature and elTcnce, Intel-
ligence, as well as a Moving Power *.

To they'^fonJ hypothefis the obje£lion is obvious; That it gives
no account of the Origin, or Principle, of Motion, but liippofes an
infinite feries of bodies all impelling and impelled ; a fuppofition, as
I have fhown f, altogether abfuid and unintelligible: And, befides it
fuppofes Bodies, of the exiftence of which there is not the leaft evi-
dence, and which we cannot believe to exift, without renouncing
our fenfes, and making abfurd and incredible Fidlions, inftead of
Syftems of philofophy ; for, who can believe that there is any exter-
nal impulfe upon a ftone when it falls to the ground ? or, who can
believe, that, when the magnet comes near to the iron, there fliould
be thea a Body which impels the iron, but which did not exift be-
fore : — If fo, we muft alfo create bodies to account for all the mo-
tions exhibited by the chymifts, which, like the Magnetical Motions,
are only occafional. I will only fay farther of this ftrange hypo-
thefis, that it can only be adopted by thofe who have raifed them-
felves fo little above fenfe, as to have no idea of any other Motion,
but that which falls under the notice of fenfe, namely, that which
is produced by the impulfe of one Body upon another, and have fo
little ufe of Intelled:, as not to be confcious of their own operations,
by which they might know, with the greateft certainty, that it i»
their Mind which moves their own bodies.

As to the hypothefis of Body attrading Body, or of any thing,
whether Body or Mind, operating where it is not, it is too abfurd
to be ferioufly refuted X' It has arifen from the term Attradion,

which

• See what I have faid further upon this fubjeft, p. 37.
t P. 37-
% See p. I (J.

Chap.I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 55

which is of univerfal ufe in our philofophy of Nature : And it flxows
us how dangerous the ufe of improper words is in all fciences ; for,
though Sir Ifaac has exprefsly warned his readers againft fuch
an abufe of the word, yet I believe, of thofe who ufe it, there are few
who do not affix to it the notion of fome force inherent in the Bo-
dy, by which it attracts other bodies to it ; and, indeed, the word, in
its grammatical and etymological fignification, can have no other
meaning.

The third opinion is the opinion of Mr Baxter, who maintains,
that the Deity is the immediate and dUxeOi Caufe of Gravitation, and
all the great movements in the univerfe. But this opinion, how-
ever pious it may appear, cannot be admitted, unlefs we likewife
admit, that the Deity does himfelf animate the feveral bodies ; that
being the only way, as, I think,! have proved*, that Mind can move
Body. Now, it would be highly derogatory to the Divine Nature,
and it would be truly making of the Deity an anima mundiy not en-
tirely feparated from Matter, as we ought to believe of Deity,
but immerfed in it, and intimately conneiSted with it, as our
Minds are, to fuppofe that he animated every particle of Mat-
ter, and, in that way, immediately produced all the motions
of Unorganized Bodies. It is certainly a much more probable
hypothefis, and more worthy of the Divine Majefty, to fuppofe
that he moves all thofe Bodies by inferior Minds ; and I fhall
prefently Ihow, that it is much more agreeable to the General Ana-
logy of Nature, and to our original idea of the Moving Power of
Mind.

There are, I know, fome who fpeak of Bodies being moved by a
force originally imprefled upon them by the Deity. This ftrange

notion,

* P. 47.

-56 ANTIENT -METAPHYSICS. Book II.

notion, I imagine, is derived from Sir Ifaac Newton's Firfl Law of
Motion, which afferts, that Bodies once fet in Motion continue al-
ways in Motion, by what he calls the 'vis inftta. But, in ihtfrjl place,
I think I have fliown clearly, and fhall further fliow in the fequel,
that this Law of Motion, though laid down as an axiom, is not
true ; and that no Body can either begin or continue Motion by
any power eflential to Matter, but only by a power altogether dif-
ferent, namely Mind. But, 2dly, if it were true, it could not apply
to this cafe, being only applicable to Motion begun by bodily im-
pulfe which, as I have fliown, cannot account for all the Motions
of the univerfe, And, lajlly, though it might be conceived, that
one original impreflion upon the Body, whether given by Mind
or Body, might continue to make it move without ceafing, it is
impoflible to conceive that the fame imprefTion only once given,
fhould make it move for fome time, and, after it has ccafed to
move, move again, as in the cafe of the magnet and the iron, —
of what they call the elective attradion, which the chymifts exhibit
in their folutions of metals, — and of the common phacnomcnon of
a ftone falling to the ground as often as it is taken up from it.

All thefc falfe opinions, therefore, being rejedled, there remains
only the true opinion, that each Body is moved by a Mind belong-
in"- to itfelf. And this opinion I hold to be perfedlly agreeable to
the general analogy of Nature, and to our original idea of the mo-
ving power in Bodies ; for the moving power of any Body is not a
fenfation, but an idea. The Motion of the Body is a fadl that falls
under the fenfes : But it is by intelligence that we apprehend
the caufe of that movement : And, in general, it is only by
intelligence that we have any notion of caufe or eflfed. Now, how
do we get the idea of Mind moving Body ? And I fay it is by Con-
fcioufnefs ; for it is by rcfiedting on -what pafTes in our own little
world, that we know that our Bodies are moved internally, not by

any

Chap. I. A N T I K N T METAPHYSICS. 57

any external force ; for every Body muft be moved, cither exter-
nally or internally : And, as our Bodies are not moved externally,
they muft be moved by fome internal principle ; and that principle I
call Mind : And it is in this way, and this way only, that we form,
or can form, the idea of Mind moving Body. And by applying this
idea to the fcveral motions of the univcrfe, we fhall difcover, with as
great certainty as the nature of the thing is capable of, that unorga-
zed Bodies are moved by the fame internal principle. And I pro-
ceed thus.

In the //J/? place, I know, by the moft certain of all knowledge,
I mean Confcioufnefs, that my Body is moved by this internal prin-
ciple. From myfelf I proceed to other men ; and by analogy I con-
clude, that their bodies are moved in the. fame manner. By the fame
analogy I difcover that the bodies of other animals are moved likewife
in that way : And from thence I proceed to the vegetable, whofe
motions can no more be accounted for from external impulfe than
thofe of the animal : I therefore conclude that they are alfo produ-
ced by an internal principle. Nor can I ftop at the vegetable ; but
the fame analogical reafoning muft make me conclude, that unorga-
nized bodies are moved alfo by an internal principle, fmce their mo-
tions cannot be accounted for, any more than thofe of the vegetable,
from external impulfe.

Thus, far, therefore, I think it is proved, by a clear analogy, that
unorganized Bodies are moved by Alind ; and, as Mind can move
only internally, not externally, or by application of furface to fur-
face, as Body moves Body, it is alfo proved, that thofe Bodies are
moved by Mind internally. And a like analogy further proves,
what I have before endeavoured to eftablifli, that it is not the Uni-
verfal Mind that moves thefe Bodies, but a particular Mind ; for it
will be allowed by every Body, that it is a particular Mind that
Vol. II. H moveji

58 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II.

moves our Bodies : For the fame reafon, it cannot be denied,
at leaft, it is not denied by any philofopher among us, that it is a
particular IVjind which moves the Brute. From the Brute, in the
fame analogical way of reafoning, I proceed to the Vegetable, and
from the Vegetable to the unorganized Body ; making this general
conclufion, that all thofe feveral Bodies, being moved in the fame
manner, are not only moved by Mind internal, but each by a parti-
cular Mind *.

The analogical method of reafoning which hath been ufcd here, is
very much pradlifed by Plato, in all his fpeculations concerning Na-
ture. And, indeed, it appears to me, that if, in natural philofophy,
we do not reafon by analogy, from what we fee and know, to what
we do not fee and know, we can make very little progrefs in natural
knowledge ; nor do I think it is poffible that we can otherwife make a
fcience of it at all. And, accordingly, not only Plato, but our modern

na-

• In this analogical way, Dr Prieflley argues, (p. 258. of his Illuftrations of the
Difquifitions), where he fays, That, if we fuppofe that it is an immaterial fubftance in
Man, and not the mere organization of his Body, that feels and thinks, we muft, for
the fame reafon, fuppofe, that it is not the material magnet that attracts iron, but a
pecul'ar immaterial fubftance within it ; and he adds, * For the fame reafon, we may
' imagine diflinB immaterial fuhjiances for every operation in Nature, the proximate
< caufe of which we are not able to perceive.' And I think the Dodor argues
well ; for, if there be an immaterial fubft.mce in Man, and in other animals, by
•which they are moved, there muft alfo neceffarily be an immaterial fubdance in
unorganized bodies, by which they are moved. The Do6lor, therefore, and I rea-
fon in the fame manner : Only we fet out from principles quite different; the Doc-
tor maintaining, that there is no immaterial principle in man, and, therefore, there
is none in the loadftone, and other unorganized bodies ; I, on the other hand, main-
taining, that there is an immaterial principle in Man, and that, therefore, there is
one in Bodies unorganized as well as organized. This Ihows me, that the Dodlor
is naturally an acute man, and can fee confequences and connedlions of things ;
and I have no doubt but that, if he had (ludied the antient philofophy, he would
have drawn the fame concluGons from the principles of it that 1 dp.

Chap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS.

f9

naturalifts, reafon in that way, when they colledt a great many parti-
cular fads of natural hiftory, under general heads, proceeding upon
the fuppofition, that all fadts of the fame kind are produced by the
fame caufe. In like manner, I fuppofe that all thefe feveral Bodies,
being moved in the fame manner, are all moved by the fame caufe.
If, indeed, another caufe could be aihgncd, as the fame effea:
may be produced by different caufcs, I fhould admit that the argu-
ment was not conclufive. But, as no other caufe is pretended, ex-
cept Ethers, and Fluids, invifible and Intangible, which, if they could
be fuppofed to exift, (for, as to any proof of their exiftence, it is
not fo much as pretended), would not, by any laws of mechanics
known, account for the feveral motions of Bodies, I think I may fay
that this argument, from analogy, is as conclufive as any argument
of the kind can be.

The great objedion to this part of my fyRem arifes from the con-
fined fcnfe which many people give to the word Mind, as if it de-
noted only that which thinks and reflects, but did not comprehend
that principle which only moves. But here again I would argue in
the analogical way, and afk thofe objedtors, whether they do not
give the name of Mind to that principle in the Brute, which, though
without thought or reflexion, moves him ? This principle, it is
true, has fenfation, appetite, and defires ; but what will they fay of
the motive principle in the Vegetable, which has none of thefe ? And
where is the difference betwixt the motive principle in the Vege-
table and the unorganized Body, except that, in the former, it is
more complicated and artificial ? If any one fays, that he cannot
conceive how there (hould be any motive principle without thought
or refledlion, appetites or defires, I would have him confider, that
one Body moves another, and yet the Body moving has neither
thought nor refledion, appetites nor defires : And, if Body can
move Body without any of thefe, why ihould not Mind do it like-

H 2 wife ?

6o ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II.

wife ? If, this notwithftanding, any one flioiild think that there
cannot be a moving power witliout appetite and defire, I lay that
there is in Bodies unorganized fomething, at Icaft, very like to ap-
petite ; for, in what the chymifts call elective attra^ions, we ob-
ferve certain Bodies, not only fhowing the greateft inclination to
other Bodies, and running, as it were, into their embraces, but, af-
ter they have incorporated with them, forfaking them, and, in pre-
ference to them, uniting themfelves with others *.

This motive principle, whether fimply moving, or having other
powers, I denote by the general name of Mind ; becaufe I think I
have proved, that It is not Matter : And, if It be not Matter, it muft
be Mind ; as I hold there is nothing in the univerfe but Matter and
Mind. But, if any man is dlfpofed to call it by another name,
fuch as Life^ Vitality, or a Principle of Motion^ I have no objedions,
provided he allow that it is not a Material Principle : For I have
always held It to be frivolous and inept, to dlfpute about tx'o/v/j-,
when people are agreed about things. At the fame time, I think,
it Is better to give fuch names to thefe things as may ferve to keep
in view the governing power in Nature, and never let us forget that
Mind is the author of all Motion.

I only further add concerning this fpecies of Mind, that, as it is
predominant in the fyftem of the Material world, and makes a part
of all Vegetables and Animals, it is neceflary that it fliould abound
more than any other ; and, accordingly, it animates every particle
of Matter, Mineral, Vegetable, or Animal. Nor is it any objedtion
to my fyftem, that I thus make the number of Minds infinite: For,
though Matter be, in theory, infinitely divifible, yet, as I have fhown

elfe-

• See what I have further faid concerning Appetite, both in vegetables, and in
unorganized Bodies, Vol. i, p. 237. and 238.

Chap. T. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 6i

elfewhere *, it is not, in fad, fo divided ; and it appears now to be
the general opinion of philofophcrs, that all Bodies confift of a cer-
tain number of particles, which are perfectly folid, and, therefore, in-
capable of divifion. Now, as all Nature confifts of Body and Mind,
there is no abfurdity in fuppoiing that there is as much Mind in the
univerfe as Body, and, confequently, that every particle of Matter
is animated by a Mind ; not, indeed, a mind intelleclual, for that
is an abfurd,Atheiftical,fyftem,but a Mind of the loweftkind; — that
which only moves in one uniform way.

The next in degree, as well as abundance, is the Vegetable Life,
which, as it is of a higher kind, fo it is more artificial, and has
movements much more various, by which the plant grows, is nou-
rifhed, and propagates its kind : And, as it is lefs abundant than
the elemental life, fo it is more abundant than the Animal, becaufe
it makes part of the Animal.

And here we rife to what Is much more mixed and compounded,
and confequently much more artificial. The Elemental Life is no-
thing but a principle of Motion, and a Motion always in a certain
direction : The Vegetable is more compounded ; for it is a prin-
ciple, joined with the matter of the Vegetable, by the various
movements of which principle, Growth, Nutrition, and Propaga-
tion are performed : But the Animal is of a ftrudlure very much
more artificial ; for there is fuperadded to the Vegetable, a Mind that
perceives objeds without it, or, in other words, has Senfations, feels
Pleafure and Pain, has Appetites and defires, and, by that power,
which is called Inftind, provides for the gratification of thefe appe-
tites, and, by confequence, for the prefervation of the individual, and
the continuation of the kind.

But
* Vol. I. p. 243.

62 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book 11.

But the variety of Nature docs not end even here ; for, however
more excellent the Animal Life may be than the Vegetable, there is,
even in this our earth, a Nature, by many degrees fuperior to the
Animal — a Mind, which not only perceives external objcds, but
perceives that it perceives them, — which apprehends not particulars
only, but generals, — recognifes its own, as well as other natures, —
and, at laft, rifcs to the contemplation of the Great Univerfe, and its
Greater Author : This Nature is MaJi. The Almighty crowned his
works here below with the addition of Intelle£l to the Animal Nature:
Then indeed, he re/led, andfaiv that all ivas good.

CHAP.

Chap. II. A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS.

HAP. II.

Of the Difference betwixt Man and Brute. — This only to be learned
in antient Philofophy^ — hkeiinfe another Di/iiniiion, betxvixt God
and Nature. — "The Difficulty of dijlinguijhing Man and Brute ari-
fes from the Progrefs of Nature, by degrees, infenftble , from loiver to
higher Beings. — The Di/linclion o/" Man and Brute depends 7ipo}i
difingui/hing Ideas and Senfations. — Thcfe not confounded in an-
tient Philofophy. — Confounded by Mr Locke and by Mr Hume. —
The Uje of the Word Idea in antient and Modern Times, — Sofne
Ideas certainly not Senfations, fiich as the Ideas of Being,
Number, Beauty, Truth ; — bccaife thefe cannot be apprehend-
ed by any Senfe. — This is the Do^rine of Plato in the Theaete-
tes. — Difficulty of applying this Difinclion to particular Subflances.
— This Difficulty fohjcd, by recurring to the original Notion o/^Idea.
— It denotes the inward Form of the Thing. — That innvard Form
Mind. — This differently exprejed by Plato ^«JAriftotIe.— 77?^ Sul-
fations are the outward Appearances or Accidents of Things. —
This Difinclion betwixt the two, explained. — Gefieral Obfervations
concerning Ideas. — OJ Abflraft, — o/" General Ideas. — Ideas of Sen-
fible Qualities, as luell as of Subftances. — The Confequences of
maintaining that Ideas are Senfations. — No Stability of Knonvledge
tipon that Hypothefis. — This the Do5lrine of Protagoras and Hera-
cWtm—fJjould have been the Do5lrine oJ Mr Kume. — Difference be-
twixt the Ideas and Senfations o/'particular Subflances, explained.—
This Difinclion applied to Animals, Vegetables, and Unorganized
Bodies. — Opinion of Savage Nations coticerning the latter. — Of the
Dijlin^ion oJ Ideas ^M^f Senfations, in Qualities —^f/? as the Colour^

White.

64 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II.

White— fuc/j as the Perception of Tonch—alfo the Perception of a
particular ¥\^\.\rc.—Of the Idea of Figure in general— of ExtcnCion
— o/" Motion. — 7I2 have an Idea, even of a particular Thing, is
to perceive the one in the many. — A greater one perceived /« gene-
ral Ideas. — Thefe i/iufi be abftraded in order to be per fed. — The Di-
flribution 0/ Things z«/o Genus rt«^ Species not artifcial, but found-
ed in Nature. — 5o//j Uniformity ^?zi Variety, n.fc^//:)' for a Syftem.
— The "wonderful Variety and Uniforviity in the Syjlem r/Nature. —
Of our Idea o/'Mind. — This Idea acquired by Confcioufnefs. — 0/'
the Nature of Confcioufnefs. — // difiinguifloes us from the Brute
more than any thing elfe — is the highcfl Faculty belonging to the
human Mind — is the Foundation of all Certainty ahJ Knowledge.
— No Reafoning without Confcioufnefs. — From Confcioufnefs ivc
have thefrfl Idea of Mind. — Progrefs in that Idea from the Mind
that only moves, to the Supreme Intelledlual Mind. — 0/" the Final
Caufe. — Of the Difference of our Perceptions and thofe of the Brute.
Man dejlined by Nature for Purpofes quite different. — The Progrefs
of his WmAfrom lefler to greater ones, //'// he arrive at the great-
eft One in the Univerfe.

HAVE fiid a great de:il, in the Firft Volume, upon the dif-
ference betwixt Man and Brute : But fo little is the philofophy
of Mind, which alone can enable us to make that diftincftion, ftudied
at prefent, that many believe Man to be no more than a better fort
of Brute, and that the difference is only in degree, not in kind. I will
once more, therefore, endeavour to make this matter clear, which I am
perfuaded can only be done by the help of antient philofophy: If
fo, I would have thofe confider, who philofophife without that help,
how poor a philofopher a man muft be, who cannot diftinguifli him-
felf from a Brute. There is alfo another diftindlion, which the
antient philofophy will enable us to make, a diftindion of ftill higher

im-

Chap.r. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 65

importance in philofophy ; I mean the diftindion betwixt God and
Nature. This is not made, or, at Icafl:, not properly made, bv any-
modern philofopher I know, though there is nothing we value our-
felves more upon than our knowledge of natural philofopl.y ; yet it
is difficult to conceive how a man can be called a natural philofopher^
who cannot fo much as defme the fubje£l of his faience, nor tell us in
what refpedl it differs from the fubjed of theology. This diilindion
I have alfo endeavoured to explain in the preceding Volume *, and
fhall fay fomething more of it in this : In the mean time, I will en-
deavour to explain, accurately and fcientifically, the difference be-
twixt Man and Brute,

What makes it difficult to draw the line exadly betwixt thefe
two, is the progrefs, that we obferve in Nature, from inferior to
higher Beings by degrees not eafily to be feen and apprehended by
fuch intelligence as ours : For in this chain of Nature, which, as
Homer tells us, reaches from heaven to earth, there is not any the
fmalleft link wanting ; and every thing holds of every thing, without
the leafl: gap or interval betwixt. In this progrefs of Beings Nature
afcends from unorganized Body, to Body leaft of all organized, I
mean the plant ; or, in other words, fhe proceeds from the mere
Elementary Life to the Vegetable. From thence if fhe had pro-
ceeded diredly to the Intellectual Mind, there would have been a
prodigious gap : But this (he has filled up with the Animal, fo won-
derfully framed, that it would feem that nothing more could be
made of mere Matter. Her next flep, therefore, was neceffarily to
the Intelledual Being : And, accordingly, as fhe had before joined
the Senfitive Life to the Vegetable, now fhe joins the Intelleftual to
the Senfitive, by fuperadding Intelledt to Scnfation ; and fhe has
joined thefe three together fo wonderfully, that all operate together
in the fame Man, with a mutual connexion and dependence upon
one another. And thus Man, being both an animal and an intelledual

Vol. II. I creature,

* p. 217. 218. 223.

66 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book 11.

creature, muft of confequence adt, fometimes as a mere animal, and
fometimes as an intelleaual Being. And as it is only by their ac-
tions and operations that things are diftinguifhed, it is no wonder
that Man and Brute fhould be confounded by thbfe who cannot
think juftly, and difcriminate accurately.

In the preceding Volume, I have endeavoured to fhow, that it is
by Ideas that the Intelledlual Nature operates, whereas the Senfitive
operates only by Senfation ; fo that, if we cannot rightly diftinguifti
betwixt Senfations and Ideas, we can never properly make the diftinc-
tion betwixt Man and Brute.

I do not know that thefe two were confounded by any anticnt
philofopher ; I am fure, at leaft, they are not in the philofophy of
Plato and Ariftotle. The word Idea comes from the moft antient
fchool of philofophy in Europe, I mean the Pythagorean, and, if
we fuppofe it, as I do, to be the fame with the Egyptian School, the
moft antient in the world ; for it is ufed by Timaeus the Locrian,
in that moft valuable work of his, ftill preferved to us, De Anima
Mundi. The fenfe in which it is ufed by that author is the true
etymological fenfe of the word, denoting thtform of the thing, not
that form which is feen by the corporeal eye, but what is feen by a
much purer and nobler eye, the eye of the Mind. In this fenfe it is
ufed by all the philofophers of the Schools of Plato and of Ariftotle j
and it has been fo ufed by me throughout this whole work, and in
my other work upon the Origin and Progrefs of Language. The
more antient Englifh writers, even as late down as Bifhop Wilkins,
who writes that grand philofophical work upon Language, do not ufe
the term at all, but, in place of it, the word notion. Mr Locke was
the fiift author in England, as far as I know, that made ufe of it ;
but, not being a fcholar, and altogether unlearned in antient philofo-
phy, he has ufed it moft abfurdly, to denote the perceptions of Senfe,

which

Chap. n. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 67

which are common to us with the Brute : And in this manner he
lias confounded the Brute with Man, in the very beginning of his
work upon the human Mind ; nor does he appear to me ever to
have rightly diftinguifhed tliem, or formed a jull notion of what an
idea was, though it be mentioned in every page of his book. Since
his time, ideas and fenfations have been confounded in all our phi-
lofophical writings ; and the ftrange language, of ideas of fenfatioUy
has been introduced into philofophy ; — a confufion of terms which
the French have avoided ; for they diflinguilh betwixt les Idees and
Ics Jhifations.

Mr Hume, fol lowing the footfteps of Mr Locke, fand, indeed, I
cannot help faying that Mr Locke has laid the foundation, though, I
believe, w'ithout intending it, of all the Atheiflical philofophy that
has been broached fmce his time), has told us that ideas are but
weaker fenfations. If fo, there will be no difference betwixt Man
and Brute, except in favour of the Brute, who has commonly acu-
ter fenfations than we have.

One confequence, which Mr Hume has dravim from this doc-
trine *, is, that, as our Mind can only operate by the organs of the
Body, it mufl perifh with the Body. And, indeed, admitting the
premifes, it is not eafy to deny the conclufion, or to prove philofo-
phically that the Mind, never ading but in conjunftion with the
Body, can have a feparate exiftence. And there is another confe-
quenec, which, perhaps, Mr Hume did not forefee, or, if he did, I
believe he would not have been much alarmed, that, as there mull
be Ideas in the Divine Mind, if Ideas be Senfations, then Matter,
from which they are derived, muft be at leaft coeval with the Deity ;

I 2 and

* In one of the valuable legacies he has left to the public, which I have feen
printed, but I believe it is not yet publiflied.

63 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Bookll.

and Deity mud be fo far dependent upon it, as to derive from it all
his knowledge.

It is, therefore, of the greateft importance in Theology, and the
religion of Nature, as well as in the philofophy of Mind, to be able
to diftinguifh accurately betwixt Ideas and Senfations.

There are fome ideas, which, I think, it mufl; be evident to every
Body, are not Senfations, fuch as the Ideas of bein^ or exi/lence, of
the fame, or different, of like or unlike^ of number, that is, 7miltitiule
defined, of beauty, goodnefs, truth, and fcience \ for by what fenfe
can any of thefe be apprehended ? Is it by the fight, the hearing,
the touch, the tafte, or the fmell ? Is it by any, or all of thefe ?
No body, I think, will fay that it is ; for, though we perceive, by
the fenfe, objeds thatexift, — that are like or unlike to other objeds,
— that are beautiful, — that are number, 8cc. yet we certainly do not
perceive by the fenfe the ideas of Exiftence, Likenefs, Beauty, Num-
ber, &c. And, if they are not perceptions of the fenfe, or fenfa-
tions, they muft be Ideas ; for every thing we perceive is neceflarily
the one or the other.

It is by thefe ex;amples, that Plato, in the Theaetetes, has fhown
the difference betwixt Senfations and Ideas. The former, fays he,
the Mind perceives by the Body, and its organs ; the other it per-
ceives by itfelf, without any afliflance from the Body *. He might

have

* Plato Thaetet. .p 84. editio Serraui. The Greek fcholar will obferve in this
paflage of Plato a diftin^lion, which is fomewhat nice, betwixt • the Relative in
the dative cafe, and Ji' Jk, the genetive with the prepoGtion a** ; the former figni-
fying the Agent, or the Percipient, in this cafe, the other the Inftrument by which
xhe percipient perceives. Thus we perceive all the objedls of fenfe, fuch as co-
lours, fineUs, taftes, tj ^|'w;^;;1, or by the Mind j but we perceive each of them bj

the

Chap.ir. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 69

have faid the fame of all the moft general Ideas, fuch as thofe con-
tained in the Categories, as Subftance, Quantity, Quality, Relation,
&c. But, though this be no doubt an effential difference betwixt

Ideas

the means of, or, as we may exprefs it In Englifli in one word, through the feveral
fcnfes, the fight, the heating, or the tafte, that is, in Greelc, J/ <>":^!*«, ^' «»•«,
tici yvriui ; or, as Plato has likewife expreiled it, )»' l<pia\fii>y, li' art/f, &c. that is, by
the means of the organs of thefe fenfes. This (hows how much the Greelc philofo-
phy contributes to the perfe£t underftanding of the Greek language.

I cannot help here obferving, that this Dialogue of Plato is one of the fined phi-
lofophical dramas that ever was written : Though there be but three perfonages in
it who aft any confiderable part, and the fubjefl: perfectly one, viz. An Inqui-
ry what fciencc is ; yet Plato ha» contrived to give it a wonderful variety, with
incidents, turns, and peripateias, as they may be called, which are moft pleafing
and furprifing : And the ironical charader of Socrates, pretending to know no-
thing himfelf, and to be only the midwife of other peoples knowledge, is no where
better kept up. I would, therefore, recommend this Dialogue, together with the
Protagoras and the Gorgias, as perfed models, for thofe who, not contented with
the plain Didadic and Ariftotelian method, as it may be called, of delivering philo-
fophy, would join with it the ornaments of fine writing. If they think to do this
by treating it in a rhetorical or poetical ftile, they arc very wide of the mark, and
fall into the common error of thofe, who think that it is ornamented didtion only
that makes poetry ; whereas it is fable, charaElers, and manners, that conftitute the
effence of poetry, the language of which may be perfedly plain and Gmple, and
ought to be fo, if the nature of the fubjed requires it.

I have clfewhere obferved, vol. i. p. 401. that the principal queftion in this dia-
logue is not refolved. This was referred, as it would appear, for Ariftotle to do
in his books of Analytics, which, I have no doubt, were written with a defign to ex-
plain what Plato, in this Dialogue, has fo much puzzled and perplexed ; for what
the fchoolmen fay of thefe two philofophers, that difputat PUto, docet AriftoteleSf
will apply, if in any cafe, in this. But, though the principal queftion be not
determined, it is decided very pofitiveiy by the reafoning above mention-
ed, that Senfatlon is not Science ; for, fays he, as there can be no fcience without
thofe ideas I have mentioned, and as thofe ideas are not perceptions of fenfe, there-
fore Science is not Senfation. And I doubt this was all the length that Plato could
go, confiftently with the charader of Socrates, to determine negatively what
fcience was not.

70 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II.

Ideas and Senfations, and which, accordingly, I have made much
life of in the courfe of this work, yet it is fomctimes difficult to
apply it, particularly to Ideas that are fpecial and particular, to certain
things, fuchas a particular fubftance, an Animal, for example, or Ve-
getable, or a quality or accident of any of thefe, fuch as Colour or Fi-
gure ; for, as we have Senfations as well as Ideas of fuch things, it
becomes a matter of pretty nice difcrimination to diftinguifli accu-
rately the one from the other. .Thus, when I fee a man, I pei-
ceive his colour, his fliape, and certain other things that fall under
my fenfes ; at the fame time I have the Idea of the Man : But,
how am I to dlftinguifli what I thus perceive by my Senfes, from
what I perceive by the Mind alone without the Senfes, or, in other
words, the Idea ?

In order to explain this matter, we muft recur to the original, and
etymological fignification, above mentioned, of the word Ideay which,
by a metaphor taken from the outward appearance of the thing, de-
notes that hiivard form by which every thing is what it is, and no-
thing elfe * : And this form I muft be able to diftinguifh from the

matter.

• This/orffj, in the language of the Pythagorean School, as I before obferved,
is called iJ-f«, (from whence our Englifh word idea), a word much ufed by Plato,
but feldom by Arillotle, except when he difputes againft the Ideas of Plato. The
word generally ufed by Ariftotle, and very frequently by Plato, is u'iot, which A-
riflotle very often paraphrafes, by calling it the t» -n hi ut»i of the thing, or fimply
the T» «>«< conftrued with the dative of the thing, as r* «»i»i «»*{««■», or to «»«< '<»•»■• :
And fometimes he calls it the Aeyo? of the thing. The matter he gave the fame
name to, that other philofophers did, calling it vXn' The compofite, that is,
the Matter and Form joined together, he held only to have a real exifl-
ence ; therefore he called it the th «», or the -rot* rt, and gave it a name,
fuch as, atifttvf, or '(x?rc(, and then he didinguiflied betwixt «»«j»5rof and
T» tit»i eift^uzra, and bctwixt tvSv and *« n»«i tvtn' See Ariftotle De Jnima, lib. 3.
cap. 5. On the other hand, Plato, holding that the Form or Idea had an exiftence,
not only out of Matter, but out of the Mind of any intelligence, faid that the idea

was

Chap. II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 71

matter, otherwife I can have no Idea of the thing. In the works of
art, this diftindion between the Matter and the Form is obvious to
common obfervation. And no philofopher will deny that there is
the fame diftin£tion in the works of Nature, if he believes that the
material world is the work of Intelligence ; for, if that be the cafe,
the Form of every thing in Nature muft be, like the Form of artifi J
cial things, the Idea in the Mind of the artift who produces them.
But, it will be afked, How are we to difcover this Idea in the works
of Nature ? And it muft be acknowledged, that it is more difficult
to difcover it in the works of Nature than in thofe of Man, for
this plain reafon, that the former being the work of mod perfed
Intelligence, cannot be fo eafily comprehended by us as the works
of Intelligence, fuch as our own. But it is to be difcovered, even
by us, at leaft in a certain degree ; and there is one difference be-
twixt the works of Nature and of Art, which helps us very much to
that difcovery. The works of Art are, in themfelves, all lifelefs
and inadive ; whereas the works of Nature have, like the images
which Dedalus is faid to have made, life and motion in themfelves ;
and it is this principle of life and motion, which I call Mind, that
makes the Form of every Natural Thing, producing all its motions
and energies, and its every other quality. That there is fuch a

Mind,

was the T« «», or the t» »»t«; o», or, as we would fay in Englifli, the thing, or, the
thing it/elf- And this was his meaning when he fpoke of «wro «»^{»x«{. jtvT»-'<TT»t.
As to the compofite, or form incorporated, he faid it was in conftant change, and
could not be faid to exift, «v* (o-t;, «aa« yi»er«6( ; and therefore it could not be the
fubjed of fcience. But both philofophers agreed in this, that the Form of any thing
was an Idea in the Divine Mind, which, being imprefled, as it were, upon Mat-
ter, produced all ihefe corporeal forms we fee in the univerfe. Thus much I thought
proper to fay, for the information of thofe who would apply themfelves to the fludy
of antient philofophy, where, though they underftand the Greek language, they
will find terms of art that they do not underftand, being altogether different from
thofe ufed in modern philofophy; and which, therefore, without fome fuch expla-
nation as I have given them, may difcourage them very much in the ftudyofthc
two great authors of that philofophy, Plato and Ariftotle.

72 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II.

Mind, or ^ux", in all animals and vegetables, which makes their
fi'Jof, or form, Arlftotle has told us *; and he fays alfo, that there is
fomething like it in all natural Bodies, unorganized as well as or-
ganized.

And tliis fliows us of what rmportance it is in philofophy to efta-
blilh, as I have endeavoured to do, that there is a Mind, or Motive
principle, in all Bodies ; for, if fo, it is evident that, as Mind is
predominant in every thing, that Mind muft be principal in every
Body, and mull: conftitute its form and its ejfenccy from which all
its qualities are to be derived. Every thing here below, therefore,
is a fyflem ; for, as Nature itfelf is a great fyftem, fo every part o
it, animal, vegetable, or mineral, is a lefler fyftem ; and, if fo, it is
evident that, in every one of thefe leffer fyftems, as in the greater,
there muft be fomething principal and predominant, and, by confe-
quence, fome things fubordinate and dependent. And thefe are the
things which are apprehended by the Senfe ; whereas, what is prin-
cipal in the thing, and makes its nature and eflence, is apprehended
only by the Intelled:.

That there is in every thing fomething principal, diftindt from its
material and fenfible qualities, and which makes the thing what it is,
and denominates it to be of fuch and fuch a fpecies of things, is evi-
dent from this, that the matter of every thing is continually chan-
ging. In animal or vegetable bodies, there is not one particle of
them that is not changed in a few years, and their fenfible qualities
alfo are very much altered ; and in mineral bodies alfo there are
continual changes going on, at leaft with refpedt to fize and figure :

Yet

• Lib. 2. De Anima, cap. i. where, in giving a definition of \|'t/;e'i> or Mind, af-
ter he has made a diftin£lion betwixt the vAij or matter, and the f*i>^(pri or «?«?, that
is, the form or idea, he adds, »v»yKtiity «j« Tr,ti ■^vj^i)' ovria* «»«<, «3{ hJoj fufunti ^vrt-

Chap.II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 73

Yet all thofe fubftances contlhue ftill the fame. And not only docs
the fpecies ftill remain ; but even the individual, though every par-
ticle of it be changed, is ftill the fame. Nov\^, what is it that pre-
ferves this wonderful Identity, amid fuch variety oiciiaages ? It is,
Ifay,this internal principle, this Mind, as I call it, which is apprehended
only by the Intellect ; whereas the Senfes perceive no more than the
jnatler of the Thing, and thofe material qualities which are continu-
ally changing. However imaginary this notion of identity may ap-
pear, as, I know, to fome every thing will appear fo that they can-
not fee with their eyes or lay hold of with their hands, yet it is
truly the principle, without which there would be no ftability or
permanency of exiftence in this lower world, but every thing would
be in a perpetual flux, like the ftream of a river, according to the
philofophy of Heraclitus and Protagoras, whom Ariftotle refutes *
by making the diftin£tion I make betwixt the Idea or Form of the
thing which is permanent, and its material and fenfible qualities
which are fleeting and conftantly changing.

I will further add upon this fubjed, that whoever believes there
is no fuch internal principle, or Mind, as I call it, in Bodies, which
makes them cohere, moves them, and produces all their feveral quali-
ties and accidents, but that it is a certain arrangement and configu-
ration of the parts which produces all thefe efFetfls, and confliitutes
the nature and efl"ence of the thing, is a materialift. If this be his
opinion concerning Man or any other animal, he is acknowledged
by every body to be fuch ; and it will fcarcely be denied, if he has
the fame opinion with refped to the vegetable : And if he thinks fo
concerning animals and vegetables, he will, a fortiori, be of opinion
that unorganized Bodies are of the fame kind, deriving all their
qualities from the matter of which they are compofed, varioufly ar-
ranged. It was in this way that the Materialifts of old reafoned, par-
ticularly Epicurus, who made the nature and properties of every
.thing, organized and unorganized, vegetables and animals, and, a-
VoL. II. K mong

• Metaph. lib. 4. cap. 5. p. 878. Ed. Du Val.

74 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II.

mong other things, the human foul, to depend upon the pofition,
order, arrangement, and figure, of the atoms or particles that coiu-
pofe them ; all which Lucretius has exprefled in one line,

Concurfu?, motus, pofitura, ordo, figura.
This was the necefTary confequence of thofe philofophers excluding
Mind altogether from the fyftem of the univerfe, and maintaining
that there was nothing in Nature befides Body and Space ; And it
mufl be allowed that their fyftem was at leafl: confiftent with itfelf.
On the other hand, the Theifts, who maintain that Mind is the
principal thing in Nature, and that which conftitutes the eflence of
every animal and vegetable, if they ftop fhort there, and admit that
Minerals, and other unorganized Bodies, derive their nature and ef-
fence, their motions and their other qualities, from the order and
arrangement of their parts, betray their own caufe, are inconfiftent
with thcmfelvcs and but half Theifts. This was not the cafe of the
Peripatetics, who did not derive the qualities of Bodies from fuch
arrangement, but from what they called iheir Subftantia! Form,
meaning that imuarJ For/fi, or MinJ, as I call it, which made them
to be fubftances of fuch and fuch a character *. And here the reader
may obferve how well my fyftem, whether true or falfe, hangs to-
gether. The principle of Movement in Bodies, when they are not
moved by any external impulfe, I make to be an internal principle,
which, being immaterial,! call Mind. Now, as fubftances, unorga-
nized as well as organized, are diftinguiflied one from another by
the different arrangement and configuration of their parts ; and as
all thefe different arrangements and configurations muft be produced
by Motion, there is nothing more natural, and, indeed, I may fay
neceflary, than that the fame moving principle fhould conftitute the
very nature and elfence of every Subftance. We therefore know fo
much of the eftence of Subftances, that we know, in general, that
it is Mind, the Great Piinciple and Author of every thing in the u-
niverfc : But we do not know particularly what kind of Mind it is

that

-* See what I have further faid concerning fulflantial forms, Vol. j. p. 58.

Chap ir. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 75

that informs each particular fubRance, though we know, in general,
that, as the Subftances are different, fo the Mind, which informs
them and conftitutes their eflence, mud alfo be different. It is,
therefore, true, in one fenfe, that we do not know the efTence of
any Subftance. But then we know efTentlal qualities of different
Subftances ; and by thefe we difcriminate one Subftance from ano-
ther. Thefe when we can difl.inguifli from accidental qualities,
which may exift in the thing, or not exift, and yet the thing conti-
nue the fame, we are faid to have the Idea of that thing.

This diftindtion betwixt the internaiyorw, or the nature and ejfence
of the thing, and its material and accidental qualities, is the founda-
tion of the diftindlion betwixt Ideas and Senfations, laid down by the
two commerita'tors upon Ariftotle, Simplicius and Philoponus, which
I hold to be perfectly juft. The Nature or Eifence of the thing, fay
they, is perceived by the Mind, and by the Mind only, operating
without the Body; and therefore is the fubjedl of our Ideas : Whereas
the Accidents of any thing, which flow from its nature and eflence,
being perceived by the Senfes, are the fubjedl of our Senfations.

With this diftindion, the difference betwixt Ideas and Senfations
may, I think, be made very clear, even with refped: to fubjeds of
■which we have both ideas and ienfations, fuch as the fubjeds above
mentioned. But, before I come to apply it to particular examples,
I will make fome obfervations upon Ideas as they are confidered by
our modern philofophers. And, in the firft place, Ideas and Ab-
ftradl Ideas, are, in the language of that philofophy, confidered as
the fame thing, as if there could be no Idea that was not abftraded
from the matter with which it is incorporated. If that were the cafe,
favage nations would have no ideas at all, and very few of the vul-
gar among us. But the truth is, that we muft neccflarily fee the
Form or Idea in the Matter, before we can abftrad it ; for, how can
we abftrad from Matter what we do not know ? And the fad' is,
that, in the pradice of life, and even in pradical Sciences, fuch as

K 2 natural

76 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS, Book II.

natural philofophy, mechanics, and aftronomy, wc do not abflraa:
the Form from the Matter, but confider them both together. In
pure mathematics, indeed, we do abftratft and confider the Forms
bythemfelvcs without the Matter ; and it is only with refpea to
this fcience, that the antient philolbphers fpeak of Ideas of Abftrac-
tion *. It is therefore true, that Ideas are confidered in the Matter,
as well as ivithout the Matter ; and therefore Ideas, and abftrad
Ideas, are not fynonimous terms. It is true, however, that the
Mind mud have fome notion of the Form as diftind from the Mat-
ter, though not confidered as adlually feparated from it ; and it is
this that diftinguirties eflentially the Ideas of the Man from the Sen-
fations of the Brute, who has no notion, either of the Form or of
the Matter, and, confequently, is incapable of diftinguifhing them.

2clo^ Ideas are not general only, as is commonly believed, but alfo
particular ; that is to fay, they arc not only perceived in many par-
ticulars, but in one particular, fuch as an animal or a vegetable. If,
therefore, there were but one thing of the kind, as fome of the an-
tients fuppofed the fun to be, which, therefore, they faid was 7nona-
dicy ftill we Ihould have an idea of it, though there were neither
genus nor fpecies to which we could refer it ; for, to generalize, is no
more than to make that reference, the Mind having perceived a like-
nefs betwixt particular things, and in that way forming the Idea of a
genus or fpecies. Nor is there any thing to hinder a fenfation being
generalized by the Mind's perceiving that the fame fenfation arifes
from many different things : But it will not therefore become an
Idea, unlcfs the Mind perceive fomcthing of the nature and eflence
of the fenfation which diftinguifhes it from every other fenfation.

Thus, it appears, that, though generalizing be, no doubt, an o-
peration of the Intelled, which is given to Man but denied to the

Brute,
• Plato, nowhere, as I remember, fpeaks of fuch Ideas ; but Ariflotle and his
commentators fometimes mention them, and fay that they are 5"/ «2«<gi«-6«{ j but
they only apply the term to mathematical entities, fuch as lines, figures, and num-
bers.

Chap. II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 77

Brute, yet it is not effential to an Idea, but may belong alfo to a
Senfation. That philofophical language, therefore, among us,
which makes Generals and Ideas to be the fame thing, and fpeaks
of Ideas, Abftradt Ideas, and General Ideas, as all fynonimous
terms, is not accurate.

There is a tJjird general obfervation concerning our Ideas, which
I hinted at in the preceding obfervation, but which it is proper to
explain more fully. It is this, That not only Subftances, or things
exifling by themfelves, fuch as Animals, Vegetables, or Bodies un-
organized, have their nature and eiTence which may be the fubject
of Ideas ; but alfo the qualities of fuch Bodies, fuch as hot and cold,
moift and dry, hard and foft, &c. have a certain nature and ef-
fence, which makes them operate in fuch and fuch a way upon the
organs of our fenfe, and produce fuch and fuch Senfatlons. And,
when we perceive that, then we have an Idea of that Senfation.

There is anotlier general obfervation, I will make, which concerns
both our Ideas and Senfations, as it relates to the manner in which
we acquire our Senfations, compared with the manner of our ac-
quiring our Ideas. Our Senfations are produced by the impreffion
which external objedls make upon the organs of our Senfe. It is
by Motion, therefore, that we have our perceptions of Senfe ; and
this Motion muft: be different^ and confequently produce different
perceptions, according to the difpofition of the objedl, of the organ
or of the medium through which the objed: operates. On the other
hand, the Idea is not produced by the impulfe of any material ob-
jedls upon the organs of Senfe : It has, therefore, nothing to do
with Motion, but is fomething fixed and permanent, not fleeting;
and tranfitory like the perceptions of Senfe. This being the cafe it
is not to be wondered, that thofe philofophers of antiquity, men-
tioned by Plato in the Theactctes, fuch as Protagoras and Heracli-
tus, who maintained that all our knowledge was nothing but Senfa-
tions, maintained at the fame tinae that we had no knowledge that

waa

7« ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II.

was fixed or permanent, but that, as all thofe things which affeded
our Senies were in conftant motion and continually pafling away,
our knowledge was of the fame kind. Further, they maintained
that the Senfations of difter.Mi, men being very different, and of the
fame man at different tinico, varying, as I have faid, according to the
difpolition of the organ, the objed, or the medium, what was truth
or knowledge to one man, was not fo to another, nor to the fame
man at different times ; and, therefore, that every man was, at every
time, a flandard to himfelf of Truth and Knowledge. On the other
hand, the philofophers, who maintained a difference betwixt Ideas
and Senfations, affirmed that all our knowledge confifted of Ideas,
which, as they all proceeded from the Divine Mind, where were the
original forms of all things, the archetypes of all the forms to be (ecn
here below, were as permanent as the Divinity himfelf. If Mr Da-
vid Hume had been learned enough to have underftood the dodlrine
of Protagoras and Heraclitus as explained by Plato and Ariftotle,
he would certainly have embraced it as a neceflary confequence of
his dodrine of Ideas being nothing but Senfations ; and, upon that
foundation, would have raifed a much better fyftem of Scepticifna
and Infidelity than any he has produced.

Having premifed thefe obfervations, I come now to apply this
diftindion, that I have made betwixt Ideas and Senfations, to parti-
cular cafes ; and I will begin with the Ideas of Subftances, fuch as
the Idea of any particular man : The outward form or material part
of this objedl makes an impreffion upon feveral of our fenfes : By
the Sight, we perceive a coloured fuperficies ; by the fame fenfe, we
perceive the objed in different places at different times, that is, in
motion ; by our Hearing, we perceive the founds that it utters ;
and, by the Touch, we feel that it is folid and refifting. But not
one of thefe perceptions, nor all put together, make the Idea of a
man ; for it is a miftake to imagine, that the Idea of any thing is
nothing but a colledtion of the feveral fenfations which it produces.
From thefe, indeed, the Idea may arife, bilt they are not the Idea

itfelf,

Chap. II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS.

79

itfelf, which, as I have faid, is the inward form of the thing, or
fubjiatitialform, as the Peripatetics call it, producing all thofe external
qualities that afTedt our Senfes.

Is it then neceffary, it will be faid, that we fhould be able to de-
fine a Man as Ariftotle has done, in order to have the Idea of a Man T
and I fay it is, in order to have a perfed Idea. But Ideas are more
or lefs perfedt ; and there is a very great difference betwixt the Idea
of a vulgar Man, and the Idea of a Man of Science or a Philofo-
pher : But flill the vulgar have Ideas. And I fay, that every Man
who has the ufe of Intelled:, upon contemplating any objed, fuch as
a Man, perceives that there is one nature in him, which makes him
what he is, and diftinguifhes him from every thing elfe : And this
one nature is the Internal Principle, or Mind, which the greateft fa-
vage, if he be a man at all, will apprehend, from obferving the ac-
tions of the animal ; for it is from energies and operations chiefly
that we know the nature of any fubftance.

And here we may fee very clearly the difierence betwixt the Man
and the Brute ; for the Brute has no notion of that one nature, but
.perceives only the feveral external qualities of the thing which affed:
his fenfes.

It is in this way that we form our Ideas of all animals, which, as
Ariftotle has obferved, are better diftinguifhed by their Mind, or
Inward Principle, than by their Outward Form. The fame obferva-
tion I extend to Vegetables ; for, if there be a Vegetable Life,
which, I think, no philofopher can deny, the difference of that Life,
or Mind, as I call it, muft diftinguifh one vegetable from another.
Nor do I ftop at the Vegetable ; but, as there is, according to my
philofophy, a motive principle, which I likcwife call Mind, in every
Body, unorganized as well as organized, I fay, that Mind makes a
diftindion betwixt unorganized Bodies, as well as betwixt Animals
and Vegetables : And, accordingly, we fee, that, according to the

diiFerence

8o ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II.

difference of this principle, thole Bodies have different motions, be-
ing fometimes moved upwards, fometimcs downwards, fometimcs
to one another, fometimes from one another; and, from the fame
principle, I fay, come, not only their Motions, but all their other
qualities. The notion, therefore, of this principle, is what I call
the Idea of fuch Subftances ; and it is an Idea, which even the favage
nations have, who, in that refpedt, are, I think, much better phi-
lofophers than our Matcrialifts ; for thofe nations believe that there
is a fpirit in all thofe Bodies, which makes them operate in the man-
ner they do *. And fo much for the Idea of Subftances.

I am now to fpeak of our notions of Accidents or Qualities :
Thefe, though they be perceived by the Senfe, and thefe perceptions
retained by the Phantafia, and likewife generalized by the InteHed,
fo that we conceive them to be produced by many different objeds,
yet, if we know nothing more of them, we have no Idea of them,
becaufe we know nothing of their nature and effence ; for that every
quality of any material objedt has a certain Nature by which it ads
upon one Senfe, and not upon another, and produces one kind of
Senfation, and not another, muft be evident to every one. Now,
unlefs we can diftinguifh the different Senfes upon which thefe diffe-
rent qualities operate, and have fome notion, however obfcure and
impcrfed, of the manner in which they operate upon different Sen-
fes we cannot be faid to have any Idea of them.

• This is a fafl well attefted by an author, from whom we have the befl account
of the natives of North America, and the earlieft, before they were infetled with
our vices and opinions. The author, I mean, is Gabriel Sagarde, a religious of the
order of St Francois, who was for feveral years a mifiionary among the Hurons, a-
bout the middle of the laft century, and is, I believe, the firft who has publiflied any
thing concerning them. He is an author that I have made much ufe of in my work
upon the Origin and Progrefs of Language ; and from him, and from another mif-
fionary among another tribe of thofe favages, the Albinoquois, who, I believe, is
yet alive, and with whom I converfcd much, (his name is Roubaud), I have learned
more concerning thofe nations than from any other authors or living perions.

Chap.II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 8i

I will give fome examples of this diftindion Lctivixt Senfations
and Ideas in qualities ; and my fir ft example fliall be of a Colour,
fuch as •white : For, as it is by Colour that the face of Nature ap-
pears to us, I think it is not improper to begin with an example ta-
ken from it.

Thofe, who know no more of phllofophy than what is to be learn-
ed from the works of Mr Locke, will think it ftrange that I {hould
fpeak of the Idea of a Colour ; for Mr Locke tells us, that all fuch
perceptions of Senfe are fimple Ideas, (fo he calls Senfations), which
therefore cannot be defined ; and, if fo, it is clear, that they can-
not be Ideas, in my fenfe of the word. The admirers, therefore, of •
Mr Locke, will be difpofed to ridicule me as much, as he has en-
deavoured to ridicule Ariftotle for his definition of Motion. But
it is Mr Locke that has made himfelf ridiculous, not Ariftotle, by
pretending to philofophife, without being able to diftinguifh betwixt
a Senfation ar\d the Idea of a Senfation. The Senfation itfelf cer-
tainly cannot be defined, becaufe it is a Senfation, and not an Idea :
But the Idea of a Senfation may be explained by definition, as well
as every other Idea, being the operation of Intelled; and it is to
be defined in the manner I have juft now mentioned, by which all
Senfations are to be defined. The Senfation of White is nothing
but the perception by the Senfe of Sight of a patch of light upon
any fuperficies, more or lefs bright, as the Colour is more or lefs
pure. This Senfation, though preferved in the Phantafia, and con-
ceived to exift in many different obje£ts, is not the Idea of this Co-
lour : What makes a perfedt and fcicntlfical Idea of it is well known
to the optician ; for he knows that it is the refledion of all the rays
of light, without feparation or difcrimlnatlon, which, being collec-
t-ed and refra£ted in the pupil of the eye, and forming an image
upon the retina, gives a perception of this Colour. But the vulgar
liave the Idea of White as well as the philofopher, though not near
Vol. IL L ' fo

82 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II.

Co perfcd. What then is their Idea ? It is certainly fomething
more than tlie fimple perception of Senfe ; for they know, in the
Jifjl place, of what Senfe it is the perception ; that it is of the Senfe
of Sight, and of none other : 2d/j, That it is perceived at a cer-
tain diftancc, not too near, nor too far oil': ;^J/f, That it cannot be
perceived without Hght, and therefore not in the dark. The brute
knows none of thefe things, and therefore he has no Idea of the
Colour White ; and this is the cafe of a very young child, before he
has got the ufe of Intelledl.

I will give the example of another Senfatlon, of a kind quite
different, which is not perceived at a diftance like Colour, nor is not
confined to one organ of Perception, but is diffufed all over the
body, and is perceived in the dark as well as in the light. This is
Touch, of which every animal has the Perception, though \\t may
want every other Senfation. But he has not, therefore, the Idea of
it, unlefs he can diftinguifh it from the Senfe of Sight, and the o-
ther fenfes, by its different manner of operating : And the fame is
to be faid of the Perceptions of the other Senfes, of Tailing, Smel-
ling, and Hearing. In fhort, unlefs the Mind can diftinguifli
the Perceptions of one Senfe from thofe of another, even
from thofe that appear to refemble it the moft, as Tailing refem-
bles Touching more than the Perception of any other Senfe, and is
able to give fome account of the difference, it is no more than a
fimple Perception of Senfe, fuch as a Zoophite has, not an objedt
of Intelledt.

I will give one example more in the Perception of any particular
Figure, which enters by two Senfes, the Touch and the Sight. All
that I perceive by the Touch is a certain fubftance, which refifts my
Touch : But this is no more than a Senfation, though I perceive
that this refiftance is not every where, but in a certain fpot. Again,

when

Chap. II. A N T I E N T iM E 1' A P H Y S I C S. S-J

when I perceive Figure by n^y eye, I have no Perception but of Co-
lour confined to a certain fpot : But it will be faid, what is this o-
ther than the Idea of Figure, which is nothing more than extenfion,
bounded and limited ? And here appears the difficulty mentioned
above, of diftinguifliing betwixt the Senlation and the Idea relative
to the fame objedl, A man who has already formed the Idea ot
particular figures, fuch as a Square, a Triangle, and a Circle, does
inftantly apply that Idea to any Figure, the moment. he has the per-
ception of it by the Senfe ; and, therefore, he confounds the Sen-
fiition with the Idea. But we muft fuppofe ourfelves in the cafe of
a Man who has no Idea of any figure whatfoever ; and fuch un-
doubtedly is the cafe of the Brute. Now, what will that man per-
ceive but a patch of Colour, not every where, indeed, as far as the
fight reaches, but confined to a certain fpot. But, in order to have
the Idea of the Figure of this patch, he muft know fomething of
the lines that bound it ; he muft be able to diftinguifti a Straight
Line from a Curve ; and, if it be a Redtilineal Figure, or mixed of
Straight and Curve Lines, he muft be able to number the fides of
it. Now, that cannot be without the Idea of Number, which every
Man, at leaft every Philofopher, will readily acknowledge, is not a
Perception of Senfe ; for the Brute, who has perceptions of Senfe
as well as we, though he perceives Multitude, and can diftinguifli it
from one fingle thing, has no perception of Multitude Limited,
that is. Number ; — much lefs does he know the proceffion of Num-
ber in regular order from Unity upwards.

As to the general idea of figure, if I have proved that the Idea of
any particular figure, fuch as a triangle or a fquare, is not a percep-
tion of fenfe, it will follow, a fortiori, that neither is the idea of
Figure in general fuch a perception, that being ftill further remo-
ved from the Senfe, and more an operation of Intelled, than the
idea of any particular figure. Accordingly, I am perfuaded that fa-

84 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II.

vage nations, even fiich of them as have made fome progrefs in arts
and civility, have neither a notion of it, nor a name for it, any
more than for other general ideas, fuch as fubftance, quantity, qua-
lity, and tlie like.

The fame may be faid of the Idea of Extenfion, v^diich is ftill
more general than that of Figure ; for Figure is F.xtenfion bounded.
There are, however, qualities or accidents of extended fubjeds, as
w(.ll as of figured, which are perceived by the Senfe, fuch as hard
or foft, rough or fmooth, hot or cold, light or colour, which, how-
ever much we may abftradt or generalize them, will never make
the Idea of Extenfion. What the philofopher's Idea of Extenfion
is, I have elfewhere explained * : And the Idea of it, among our
vulgar, if they could folve and explain it, would, I believe, appear
to be pretty much the fame ; for they would tell you, that it was
fomething which they felt or faw, and which had parts, without any
interval betwixt thefe parts ; and that is nothing elfe, in philofophi-
cal language, but Quantity Continuous,

Motion is one of Mr Locke's fimple Ideas of Senfation : But here
he falls into the fame error as with refpeit to colour ; he has con-
founded the fenfations belonging to Obje£ls in Motion, with the
Idea of Motion. The Senfe perceives hardnefs or foftnefs, light or
colour, in the objed: moved ; but thefe furely do not make the
Idea of Motion. It perceives alfo the objedt moved to be in a cer-
tain place. But neither is Place the Idea of Motion ; for the Idea
of Place implies fomething fixed for fome time, however fhort ;
whereas Motion neceflarily implies a change or a progrefs from one
ftate to another, which it is impoflible that the Senfe can apprehend ;
for Senfe can only be affeded by the prefent ftate of the thing, how-
ever

p. 21.

Chap. ir. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 85

ever momentary that ftate may be. The change, therefore, from
one ftate to another, never can be perceived by Senfe. — It may be
faid, I know, that the Senfe perceives the thing in one place, and
then, fome time after, in another ; and that this makes the Idea of
Motion, But I deny that Time is a perception of the Senfe ; for
Time is a Perception of the interval betwixt the changes of any
thing meafured by Motion, or, as Ariftotlc has defined it, it is the
perception of what i^firji and lajl in Motion, or, as he has given it,
in two words, it is the Number of Motion *. Now, I fay it is im-
poffible that the Senfe can have any perception of an interval, — of
firjl and lajl in Motion, or in any thing elfe ; becaufe Number, as
I have faid. Order and Succelfion, is no object of Senfe, but of Intel-
ledl.

This account I have given of the Ideas of particular things agrees
with Plato's defcription of an Idea, — that it is the perception of the
one in the many ; for we mufi; perceive the one principal thing in any
objcdt, upon which all its qualities and accidents depend, otherwife
we cannot be faid to have an Idea of it. But the intelledt perceives
a greater one^ and which, therefore, forms what is truly called a
General Idea. Of this kind are the Ideas of Genus and Species, the
firft of thefe denoting an Idea more general than the other, and to
which the other is fubordinate : And there is the Idea of Difference
likewife a general Idea, by which the feveral fpeciefes of the fame
genus are diftinguifhed from one another. In all thefe Ideas, the
Mind muft perceive one nature common to viany things, and which
is called, in the language of Greek philofophy, the to x«93Aou, oppo-
fed to the t* xaSsxao-ra, that is, the fame Nature perceived only in in-
dividuals.

This

86 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II.

This generalization of Ideas is an arrangement or diftribution of
Things, but which wc are not to imagine is artificial, and deviled
by Man, to facilitate his comprehenfion of them. It is the work of
Nature, or, rather, of the great Author of Nature, who has fo
contrived this wonderful frame of the univerfe, that all things in it
are both like and unlike : Nor, indeed, could it otherwife have been
a fyftem ; for there can be no fyftem, where every thing is the fame,
or every thing different. There muft therefore be a concordia dij-
cors in all fyftems, which is fo confpicuous in this fyftem of the uni-
verfe, that, with the grcateft uniformity it is pofFible to conceive,
there is fuch an amazing variety, that no two individuals of any
fpccies of things are perfectly alike, not two leaves of the fame
tree.

If thefe genera! Ideas are perfect, the Mind only confiders the
common Nature, without regard to the particular Things ifl which it
is found ; fo that there is abftradlion as well as generalization. Such
is the Idea of the Philofopher, but which is hardly to be found a-
mong the vulgar, except in one fubjedl, that is Number, with re-
fped to which, even the vulgar appear to me to generalize and ab-
ftra£t as perfectly as the Philofopher. But, in geometry, even our
mathematicians do not fufficiently abftrad: ; the reafon of which I
take to be, that they accuftom themfelves too much to the ufc of
diagrams, which are fenfible reprefentations of the Ideas. As to
Brutes, I think no Body can believe that they fee this one com-
mon Nature in the ffiany, or that they have general Ideas ; though
a man, that has learned no better philofophy than Mr Locke's, may
confound their Senfations with the Ideas of particular things, which
has obliged me to take fo much pains to diftinguifh them. This, I
hope, I have done, by fhowing that they are different, both as to the
Subje<5l of them, that of the one being the Nature and Eflencc of the

thing,

Chap. II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 8-7

thing, while the fubjed of the other is nothing but accidents or
qualities of the thing ; and lilcewife, as to the manner of the Mind's
operating, when it forms Ideas, and when it has only perceptions of
fenfe ; in the one cafe, operating by itfelf, without the aiTiilance of
the Body, or its organs, in the other, with the alfiftance of the
Body.

Before I have done with Ideas, I muft take particular notice
of one, the fubjedt of which is of the higheft dignity and excellence
in Nature. The fubjedt I mean is Mind, the perception of which
diftinguifhes Man from the Brute, more than any thing I have men-
tioned. This perception even Mr Locke does not confound with
Senfation : Nor, indeed, is it pofhble to conceive how Mind fhould
be perceived by any of the Senfes ; for it is allowed by all to be a
power invifible, whofe operations we may perceive by the Senfes,
but we can never, in that way, perceive itfelf.

The way, too, in which we acquire the Idea of Mind, deferves
our particular attention. Mr Locke has told us it is by refle£tion ;
and fo far he is right: But he has not told us by what power or facul-
ty of our Mind we are able to reflect. This faculty is Confcioufnefs,
which is peculiar to the Intelledual Mind, and diftinguilhes us more
from the Brute than any thing I have hitherto mentioned. By other
facuhies of the Mind we perceive^ but, by Confcioufnefs, we per-
ceive that ive perceivCy or, to exprefs it in common language, we
reJleSi, and know what we are doing : And not only do we know
in this way, what we are doing, but what we have done ; for
Confcioufnefs goes to ihe pajl as well as to the pre/hit. Now, that
the Brute Mind can turn upon itfelf in this manr.er, and review its
own operatiouo, no man can really believe. Even we ourfelves
when we act not as an intellc£tual creature, but as a mere animal
•which we very often do, are not confcious, and are then very

properly

88 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book 11.

properly faid to ad wltliout knowing what we are doing *. In this
way the Brute always ads ; for, though he perceives objcds of
Senfe as we do, — has appetites and defires, — feels pleafure and
pain, — provides for himfelf, for his offspring, and often for the com-
munity of which he is a member, — and, indeed, does very wonderful
things, — he does not know that he does them, any more than the
purpofe for which he does them.

This confcioufne/s of our adions, when it is accompanied with
approbation or difapprobation, aflumes the name of conjcience., and
makes the chief happinefs or mifcry of our lives. I have already
faid, that I think it impofTible really to believe that the Brute has
this faculty of Conlcioufnefs ; but I would have the Materialift. con-
fidcr how much more incredible it is, that mere matter fhould turn
upon itfelf in this manner, make itfelf its own objed, review its
own operations, and approve or difapprove of them.

As, therefore, it is by Confcioufnefs that we attain to the know-
ledge of what is higheft and mofl: excellent in nature, I mean Mindy
it is evident that it muft be the higheft faculty belonging to our na-
ture. And it has this further excellence, that it is not only itfelf
the moft certain of all knowledge, in fuch things as are the objeds
of it, but it is the foundation of certainty in every thing elfe, and
particularly in reafoning ; for it is by our retrofpedive confciouf-
nefs of the truth of the premiflcs that we can infer any conclu-

fion.

As

• Mr Locke, and the French philofophers, who tell us that we have no percep.
tions of any kind, not even the perceptions of Senfe, without conftioufncfs, appear
to me to fpcak without knowing wh.it they fay ; for the fadt is, that we have thou-
fands of perceptions upon which we never rcfleft or look back, and which do not
remain with the Mind any more than images in a lookng-glafs. See what I have
further faid upon this fubjecl, in the Origin and Progrcfs of Language, vol. i. p.
155. — So far was Mr Locke from knowing the nature of Confcioufnefs, which,
howej^r, is certainly the fource of his Ideas of Reflection.

Chap.II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 89

As the knowledge of Mind Is the higheft of all human know-
ledge, it is, I think, worth the while to obferve the progrefs of the
formation of the Idea of Mind, which, as I have faid, takes its rife
from Confcioufnefs. We begin, therefore, with our own Mind, which
we are confcious moves our Body ; and, from analogy, we conclude,
that Mind moves likewife the Bodies of other Men. By reafoning in
the fame way, we infer, that the Bodies of other animals are like-
wife moved by Mind : From thence we proceed to the Vegetable ;
and, as the movements of it cannot be accounted for from any ex-
ternal caufe, any more than the movements of Animals, we con-
clude that it alfo is moved by an internal Principle, that is. Mind :
And, by a like argument, we difcover that unorganized Bodies are
moved in the fame way. — And thus we difcover that Mind is the
active principle in the univerfe, which gives Life and Motion, Being
and Eflence, to every thing *.

There is another and higher faculty of our Mind, of which we
are likewife confcious ; and that is, the faculty of perceiving by our
Senfes, and what arifes from that perception, fuch as Appetites and
Defires, Pleafure and Pain, and every thing elfe belonging to the
Senfitive Nature. And there is a much higher faculty ftill of which
we are confcious, I mean Intelligence, by which tve deliberate
propofe ends, and devife means for accompliftiing thofe ends, and
in (hort, adt with Council and Defign. And, being thus fure that
there is Intelligence in our little Bodies, by the fame analogical way
of reafoning, we conclude, from obferving the fame marks of Coun-
cil and defign in other Men, that they are dir€<fted by the fame In-
telledual Principle that governs us : And I think, with equal cer-
tainty, we conclude, that, as there are, in the univerfe, infinitely
greater marks of Council and Defign^ there is, therefore, prefiding
Vol. II. M in

• See this analogy carried further, (p. 57.), to prove that each Body i« moved by
a particular Mind.

90 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book II.

in the Unlverfe, an Intelledtual Principle, fuperlor, by infinite de-
grees, to ours. — From the knowledge of ourfclves, and from no
other fource, is derived all this knowledge, not only of what is beft
here on earth, but of what is moft excellent in the univerfe. It is,
therefore, not to be wondered, that the feven wife men of Greece,
when they joined all their wits together, could produce no greater
or better fruit of their wifdom than what they prefented to the God,
and inlcrihed in his temple at Delphi ; I mean the precept, ' Know
' thyfelf,' — the fountain of all knowledge, human and divine *.

1 will conclude this long chapter, as I think all fpeculations con-
cerning Nature fhould be concluded, with an inquiry into the final
Caufe of the Author of Nature making fuch a difference betwixt
our faculties of Perception and thofe of the Brute. — If we had
been deftined by Nature, like the Brute, only to preferve the indi-
vidual and to continue the kind, and to enjoy thofe pleafures alone
belonging to the Animal Nature, it would have been fufficient for
u^, as it is for the Brute, and it would have ferved all the purpofes
of the Animal Life, if we had only perceived the external appear-
ance of Things, fuch as incur upon the fenfes ; and, as Nature be-
ftows nothing that is fuperfluous, ftie would have given us nothing
more. But, as our deftination is for much nobler purpofes, we
have P'ot faculties by which we can inveftigate the Nature and Ef-
fence of Things, and can contemplate, in fome degree, thofe ori-
ginal Forms, of which all the Forms here below are but as Types, —
by which we can difcover the one in every particular objed we fee, —
from thence proceed to a greater one in the fpecies, to a greater ftill
in the genus, to yet a greater in the higher genufes, and fo on, pro-
ceeding from unity to itnity^ one ftill rifing above another, till at laft
we arrive at the great one from whom all the reft proceed, and
who, as he is the only Self-exiftent Being, upon -whom every thing

depends

* See Plato, Pr»Pagoras , f- 343 edit to Serrani.

Chap.II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 91

depends for its exiflence, is properly and emphatically faid to be the
Exijling One, by way of eminence *.

Thus, it appears, that we have, from Nature, the faculty of dif-
covering this wonderful union in the fyftem of the Univerfe, which
to know, is the perfection of Human Nature ; and that we are in
the conftant exercife of this faculty from the time we firft begin to
form Ideas, to Think, and to Reafon.

M 2 CHAP.

*Ey» nf«i i Of, — the Septuagint tranflation of a paflage in the 3d chapter of Exo-
dus, where Mofes having alked God his name, the anfwer is, as we have tranflated
it very improperly, I think, • I am that I am.' See what I have faid upon this
fubje£l, and upon the infcription, Ei, on the Temple of Delphos; Orig. of Lang.
Tol. 2. p. 84. 'i''^ 'J' '•

^2 AKTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II.

C I-I A P. III.

Obje£tions anfwered. — \fl 0\i]t€t\ox\^That the \r\X.t\\e€t. cannot operate
•without at leajl Internal Organs^ fuch as the Brain. — 2d Objec-
tion, That the Brute has Senfes,^ Phantafia, and Memory, as ivell
as we. — 3^ Objedion, That the Brute knows the Ohje^ls^ that he
has feer. before^ to be the fame ; therefore he can Review his oivn
Operations. — Ji^th Objedion, That the Brute Compares as luell as
we do^ and therefore Reafons.

T Will now proceed to anfwer fome objedtions that may be maxie
•■- to this difference, that I have endeavoured to eftablifh, betwixt
Man and Brute, and to explain fome phaenomena of the Brute na-
ture, which appear to contradidl my hypothefis.

In \hefrjl place, it may lie objeded, that what I have faid is not
true, that our Intelledual Part operates without the Body ; for,
though it may be true, that it operates without the Senfes, yet it cannot
operate without internal organs, fuch as the Brain : And, accor-
dingly, we find, that any thing which deranges the ftrudure of the
Brain puts a ftop to the operations of Intellect.

My anfw^er is, that this objedlon does not fufficiently diftinguifh
betwixt the Animal and Intelledual Life. It is true, that the Ani-
mal Life cannot operate without organs, internal as well as exter-
nal : But, dees it follow from thence that the foul cannot other-
wife operate ? We are fure that it can operate without the external

organs,

Chap.III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 93

organs, which the Animal Life cannot j and why not without the
internal ? And, if the one belongs not to the Intelled, why ihould
the other ? Nature, indeed, has^ fo connedled our Intelledtual with
our Senfitive part, that the former cannot operate, or even exift, in
ihis compound of Body and Mind, if the latter be deftroyed, or
very much difordered. But the fame may be faid of the Vegeta-
ble part of us : And yet, who will fay, that the Intellect operates
by the fame power which makes us grow and nourifties usj though
it be no doubt true, that, for the fupport of our wonderful compo-
fition, it is neceffary that we fhould grow and be nourished ? — Fur-
ther, we know, that in part, at lead, the Senfitive Nature in us may
be deftroyed, and yet the Intelledt operate. If a nerve is cut, the
member below that nerve will have no fenfation ; yet we ftiall con-
tinue to think as before : And the fame is true of the Vegetable
life ; for, if an artery is ftopt, and the blood ceafes to circulate in
any member, that member will foon be corrupted, and, though it
Ihould be cut off, our reafoning faculty will not be impaired.

The truth, therefore, appears to be, that, if our compofition be
wholly diflblved, by the total deftruflion, or great derangement, of
the animal and vegetable life, the intelledual part cannot exift in
the ftate it is here in, and therefore cannot a£t ; But, becaufe the
prefervation of its union with the Animal and Vegetable Life is
neceffary for its prefent exiftence, we are not from thence to infer,
that it operates by them ; for air and food are neceffary for its exift-
ence in this ftate, and yet it certainly does not operate by their means.

But, 2^0, Though I fhould admit that the Intelle<h: cannot operate
without the internal organs of the Body, ftill, it is true, that it can
operate without the external ; fo that this difference ftill remains
betwixt Ideas and Senfations. And, though all the fame organs
were neceffary for both, which is certainly not the cafe, that would

not

94 ANTIEXT METAPHYSICS. Book II.

not prove tliein to be the fame, when they are fo different in other
refpcds.

Anotlier objection is, that Brutes have Senfes, Memory, and Ima-
gination, as well as we ; and that a great part of Human, as well
as of Brute Life, is conduced by tliefe. To this I anfwer, that
Man being an Animal, as well as the Brute, muft liave the fame
faculties with the Brute, and muft, in part at leaf!:, live the life of
an Animal. Tliat Senfes are ellcntial to the Animal, — that an Ima-
gination a!fo, or Phanlafia, by which the objc'^s of Senfe are re-
tained in his Mind, is abfolutely necefTary for his oeconomy, is evi-
dent : And it is as ncGcfTary that he fliould know thofe obje£ts when
prefented to him again; and this is what is called ihe memory of a.
Brute. — But by all thcfe faculties no Ideas can be formed ; and
therefore the Brute ftill continues a Brute.

3/w, It is faid that the Brute has the perception of Likenefles and
Differences, by which we form our general Ideas. But to this I
anfwer, that it is of abfolute neceffity for the oeconomy of his life,
that the Brute fliould know likenefles and differences to a certain
degree, otherwife he could not difliinguifli individuals, nor one of
his own fpecits from one of another ; but then he does not knov^r
wherein the likenefs, or wherein the difference, confifts. Now, it is
the knowledge of that, wliich makes a general Idea ; for, by know-
ing in what any thing is like its genus, and in what it differs from
other fpeciefes of the fame genus, that is, the fpecific difference, we
have the Idea of the Species. And, further, we generalize ; which
is abfolutely neceifary in forming the Ideas we fpeak of : This the
Brute cannot do, any more than he can difcern in what the likenefTes
and differences confift. Further, Man can feparate the form from the
matter, and make it a diftinct obje<3: of his contemplation : Neither
can the Brute do this j but he fees all fubftances as they exift in Nature,

that

Cliap. III. A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. 95

tliat is, foii'i and matter mixed togctl'.er, with all the accidental
quaHtics belonging to the individual, and without being able to di-
llinguilli the Accidents from the Effence of the thing. And the
Man, who fays that a Brute can take off the Form of any of Nature's
works, might as well pretend that he could take off the Form of any
piece of human workmanfliip.

4^19, It is faid, aUb, tliat Brutes have Confcioufnefs, bccaufe they
know what they have feen before ; therefore they muft perceive
that tlicy have perceived it, and fo can review their own operations.
But this does not follow : They have, it is true, a perception of
the fame objcd ; but they do not perceive that they have before
perceived. The cafe truly is, that the perception, being retained ia
their phantafia, is revived when the objedl is prefented again :
They have then a fecond perception of it, and they difcern the likenefs
betwixt it and the image in the phantafia, juft as they perceive the
likenefs betwixt animals of the fame fpecies ; but how or when the
image came there, they know not. And, as we have many things
in common with the animal, fo we have this too ; for we fometimes
fee a perfon that w^e are fure we have feen before, but how, or
-when, or where, we cannot tell ; that is to fay, we perceive the
likenefs betwixt the Man and the Image in our phantafia, but how
that Image came there we know not. Now, we cannot be faid to
be confcious of a perception which we have forgot ; for there can be
no confcioufnefs of what is paft, without memory : And it is im-
poffible the Mind can review an operation it knows nothing of. It
is true, the Man, though he cannot recolledt his former perception
has the Idea of the objedl being the fame with that he formerly per-
ceived. But the Idea of identity is an univerfal, which certainly
the Brute has not : His perception, therefore, is nothing but a
perception of Senfe, which muft be that of a known objed, other-
wife it could not be the perception in his phantafia revived.

Thoib

96 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II.

Thofe, who would make the Brute confcious of his former percep-
tions, are not, I believe, aware that they give to him the power of
reflecting, or reviewing the operations of his own Mind — a faculty,
which even Mr Locke, though he confounds Senfations and Ideas,
docs not allow to the Brute ; and yet it is the neceflary confcquence
(fo inconfiftent is his philofophy of Mind) of his maintaining, that
every perception of the Brute, as well as of the Man, is attended
with Confcioufnefs. And, indeed, if Confcioufnefs could not be
diftinguiflied and feparated from Perception, it would be very diffi-
cult, if not impoflible, to diftinguifh Man from Brute. But I have
fhown, I think, evidently, that they are very often not conjoined,
even in our Minds ; and, if fo, we may eafily conceive that they
are never conjoined in an inferior Mind. The memory, therefore,
of the Brute, is no more than a fecond perception of the objedt in
his phantafia ; and, as I have obferved elfewhere *, is not, if we
would fpcak properly, memory^ but phantafia only.

And here it may be proper to obferve, that, as we are, upon our
firft entrance on this ftage, nothing more than an Animal, and ac-
quire Intellect only in procefs of time, and by flow degrees, we
perceive things at firft juft as the Brute perceives them, diftinguifh-
ing fpeciefes in the fame confufed manner that they do, without
perceiving wherein the difference confifts : Nor have we, in our in-
fant ftate, any Confcioufnefs or RecoUeQion of our own operations.
"When, therefore, we have a fecond perception of any thing, though
we know it to be the fame with the image in our phantafia, we have
no Confcioufnefs of the firft perception.

Lajily, It is faid that the Brute compares, and therefore he rea-
fons ; for, to reafon, is to compare. And it is fo. But, let us confi-
der what it is the Brute compares ; and then we fhall be able to di-
ftinguifh the reafoning, or comparative, faculty, which, no doubt,

tlie

^ Vol. I. p- 96.

Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 97

the Brute poflefles ia a certain degree, from the reafoning of a
Man.

As all perceptions of Mind are either Ideas or Senfations, and as
reafoning of every kind muft be by comparifon of perceptions, it is
evident that this comparifon can only be in one or other of the three
following ways ; for it muft either be, comparifon of Senfations
with Senfations, Ideas with Ideas, or, laftly, Ideas with Senfations.
Now, the Brute, having no Ideas, cannot compare in either of the
two laft ways. But it is in thefe ways only that Men reafon ; for,
in every propofition, as well as in every fyllogifm, there muft be at
leaft one general Idea. It remains, therefore, that the Brute
can compare only Senfations, either prefently apprehended by the
Senfes, or preferved in his Phantafia. It is in this latter way, as I
before obferved, that he knows the things that he has before feen,
and that he diftinguifties different Speciefes of Animals, and different
Individuals of the fame Species.

There is another reafon why the Brute cannot reafon as well as
we do, namely, that he wants Confcioufnefs ; for no Man, as t
have obferved, can infer the conclufion of a fyllogifm, (and all
reafoning is reducible to fyllogifm), without rejle^ing upon the af-
fent he had given to the two firft propofitions, or, in other words,
without being confcious of the truth of the premiffes. Now, as a
Brute cannot refle£t or recognife his own operations, it follows, of
neceflary confequence, that he cannot fyllogife or reafon as a Man
does.

What, therefore, we read in antlent books, of the Brute being

a rational, or, as it is exprefled in Greek, a logical Animal, muft

be underftood only of his faculty of comparing Senfations ; for A.yoj

in Greek, as I have obferved elfewhere *, properly fpeaking, figni-

VoL. II. N fies

* P. 98. 113. 114. of vol. I.

98 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IK

ties Comparifon, which may be of Senfations as well as Ideas ; but
it is only the Noi* or Intelledl, which the Brute has not, that cart
apprehend or compare Ideas.

Thus, I think, I have fhown, that Man has knowledge much
fuperlor to that of the Brute, not only in degree but in kind.
What has led men to think otherwife, is, firft, the confufion of Sen-
fations and Ideas, which Mr Locke firft introduced, and Mr David
Hume has much improved upon ; and, fecondly, the wonderful o-
perations of the Brute, by which he preferves the individual, and
continues his race. But, if, becaufe the operations of the Brute are
fo artificial, we will therefore afcribe Intelleft to him, we muft alfo
give it to the Vegetable, whofe operations can certainly not be ac-
counted for by Matter and Mechanifm, any more than thofe of the
Animal Nature. And what fhall we fay of thofe moft furprifing
chryftalizations and configurations of falts which the microfcope ex-
hibits to us, fo various, and yet fo conftant and regular ? Muft we
fay the particles of fait have Intelled:, becaufe their operations are
fo various, and, at the fame time, fo conftant and' regular ? Or, if
no Body believes this. Why fhould we think that the Motions of
the Brute, not more various and furprifing, not more conftant or re-
gular, than the motions of the falts, (hould be the effed: of InteIle<Sl
in the Brute ?

The truth, therefore, is, that, though all the operations of the
Animal, Vegetable, and Mineral Kingdoms, are diredted by Intel-
ligence, it is not Intelligence refiding in them, but that Supreme In-
telligence which. governs and direds every thing in the Univerfe :
Nor is there any thing refiding in them, but a Motive Principle, .
moving them in different ways, and^for different purpofes.

CHAP,

c

Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. ^

CHAP. IV.

Of the Oredic Powers of Man and Brute. — Thefe mujl correfpond to
the Gnoftic Powers. — 'Ihe Gnoftic Power in the Brute only one,
njiz. Senfe. — The Gnoftic Power in Man twofold, Senfe and In-
telledl. — 7'i6^Derires ariftngfrom Senfe, Appetite a«i Anger. — The
Defire of the Intelle£lual Nature is the Defire o/* Knowledge. —
This diftinguijhes Msin from Brute.

IN the preceding Chapter, I have treated of the Gnoftic Faculties
of the Man and Brute : In this Chapter I propofe to treat of the
Gredic Powers of each ; and I hope to {how, that Man differs as
much from Brute in thefe as in the others. And, indeed, if Man
had no other appetites and defires, and, confequently, no other en-
joyments, but what the Brute has, he could hardly be efteemed a dif-
ferent animaL

And here I muft entreat the reader, if he thints it worth his while
to accompany me any further in thefe Metaphyfical inquiries, to
caft his eye back to the Seventh Chapter of the Second Book of the
Firft Volume, page no. and fubfequent pages, where he will find
the dodtrine of the Gnoftic and Oredic Powers of the Human Mind
laid down in a more full and accurate manner, if I do not deceive
myfelf very much, than in any other book, antient or modern, that
I have feen. The fum of what is there faid is, that there are two
Gnoftic Powers belonging to Man, viz. Senfe, under which I com-
prehend the Imagination or Phantafia, it being, as I hold it, a kind of

N 2 Secondary

rtJo ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II.

Secondary Senfe, fupplying the abfcnce of the Firft, — and IntelletSt.
One of thcfe is common to us with the Brute, and the objeifl of it is
the Accilental and Senfible qualities of particular and individual
Things; but Intcllc*^^ is peculiar to Man, and its objevH: is Ideas*.

Correfpondent to the Gnoftic Powers of every animal muft be his
Orciflic ; for no animal can Dcfire what he does not know ; and, as
all animals arc made for fome kind of adion or another, and, as
the motive of a<fl;ion is Defire, what he knows he muft defne. Cor-
refpondent, therefore, to the Gnoftic Power of the Senfe, there muft
be certain Defircs, which are common to Man and Brute, like the
Senfe from which they arife ; and, correfponding to the Intelledt,
there muft be Dcfircs peculiar to Man, as Intellect is.

The Defires arifing from Senfe, and which belong to the Anirnal
Nature, are of various kinds ; but they may be all comprehended
under two general heads, Jlppetite and Anger^ in Greek, ETnSu^ia
and 0u/*of, according to the explanation I have given of them in the
Ninth Chapter of the Second Book of the Firft Volume. But all the
Defires, belonging to the Intelle<£lual Nature, may be reduced to one
head, the Defire of Knowledge ; for, as it is by Intelle£l we know, ha-
ving no knowledge of any thing, except by ideas, which are the objedls
of intelled alone, — and as every Nature muft defire what is fuitable to
it, it is of neceflity that the Intelledual Nature fliould defire know-
ledge ; for we cannot conceive IntelletSt exifting, or at leaft operating,
without hwunng. Whatever ufe, therefore, may be made of the
knowledge, whether it be only fpeculative,or practical as well as fpccu-
lative, the IntelleiS can defirq nothing elfe, primarily, but Knowledge;

If it be afked. What it is that Intelled defires to know ? My an-
fwer is, an infinite variety of things ; but they may be all coirpre-

hended

• Sec the difllnftlon betwixt Senfat^'^ns and Ideas, not only in Generals, but in
Pjrtkular Things, luliy exp'.iiined. p. 74. ?$■

Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. loi

headed under one head, — The Form or the Nature of the thing it
contemplates, which we muft be able to dlftinguilh from the Matter
and thofe material qualities that afFeft the fenfes.

Thus, it appears, that, as Man has one gno/lic power more than
the Brute, fo he has, correfpondent to it, likewife one oreclic power
more ; and, therefore, he is, in both ways, eflentially diftinguiflied
from the Brute.

This defire of knowledge belongs, as Ariftotle has obferved, not
only to the philofopher, but to all men more or lefs * ; and the
reafon is plain, that it is effential to Intelled: : So, if there be any
thing of the human form entirely void of curiofity or defire of
knowledge, we need not hefitate to pronounce that animal no Man,
but a Brute, who, having no intelled, has no defire of knowledge;
all his defires being fuch as belong to the Animal Nature, and tend
only to the prefervation of the individual or continuation of the
race.

• Lib. De Poetica, cap. 4, — See alfo Metaph. lib. i. cap. i..

CHAP.

102 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IL

H

Vf the Plcafures belonging to the Man and the Animal. — Thefe Plea-
fiires not eafily di/lingui/hed in Man, as he is an Animal as nvell as
aMnn. — Of the Pleafures of the Animal. — The Brnte has Pleafures
of the Mind as ivell as Pleafures of the Body. — Pleafures of the
Man threefold. — The Pleafures of Truth atid Science, of the Fine
Ans, and of Yinue. — What diflinguijloes all thefe Pleafures yrozw
the Pleafures of Senfe. — The Ohje£l of the Intelled being Know-
ledge, the Pleafure of all the three miifl be Knowledge. — Know-
ledge/»/^^j, becaiife it is Beautiful. — What Beauty is. — It belongs
to the Category of Relation ; — is that Relation of things ivhich
forms a Whole, or a Syftem. — Beauty ofihis kind in Propofitions,
and even in Ideas. — Different degrees of Beauty, as the Syjlem is
greater or lefs. — Of the reality and utility of Logic, by ivhich nve
arrange thefyflems of Things.— Of the Idea of Good, andofVk-
ful.

HAVING, in the preceding chapter, diftingulfhed the defires
and purfuits of the Man from thofe of the Brute, I will, in
this chapter, diftinguifti likewife the Pleafures of the Man from
thofe of the mere Animal ; for, as God has intended that every a-
nimal fliould be happy, he has been fo bountiful as to annex to the
exercife of all his faculties a certain degree of Pleafure, and to the
higheft faculties, as is natural, the higheft Pleafure. And, therefore,
as Intelled is undoubtedly the higheft faculty of Man, the exercife
of it muft be attended with the greateft Pleafure.

But

Chap. V. AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. loj

But, what is the Pleafurc of Intclled, and how is it to be diftin-
guiflied from the Plcafure of the mere Animal ? The diftindion
is perhaps not fo eafy to be made in Man, who is compounded of
both the Animal and the Intelledual Nature, and, therefore, enjoys
the Pleafures of both, and often fo mirced together, as not cafily
to be diftinguiihed. Let us, therefore, confider feparately, the Ani-
mal Pleafures in the Brute, who enjoys no other; and then we fhall
be able readily to diftinguifh them from tlie Pleafures of the
Man.

In thejirji place, it is obvious, that the Brute enjoys all the Plea-
fures of Senfe, as well as we : Nor are thefe his only Pleafures ; for
he has Pleafures belonging to his Mind as well as his Body. To
fpeak of the Pleafures of the Mind of the Brute, will, I know, ap-
pear extraordinary language to many : But what other name can we
give to the Pleafure of Natural AfFedion for their offspring, which
we obferve in them all, and the Pleafure of Fellowfhip with their
kind, which we obferve in the herding animals ; for that they have
great Pleafure in both thefe, we are fure from the pain that they exprefs^
when the offspring is taken from them, or when they are debarred
from the company of their herd. The Pleafures of this fort are
certainly not of the Bodily kind^ and, therefore, they muft be afcri-
bed to the Mind.

On the other hand, the Pleafures of the Man, of which the Brute
has no participation, are the Pleafures of Truth and Science, of the
Fine Arts, and of Virtue ; and we are now to inquire, In what thofe
Pleafures differ from the Pleafures of the mere Animal ?

There is one difference pretty obvious : The Pleafures of the Ani-
mal are immediately perceived and enjoyed without any previous
thought or confideration ; whereas, the Pleafures of the Man are

never

104 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II.

never without thought and confideration j and it often happens,
that what does not pleafe the Intelleil at firft, or perhaps difi)leafes
it, is, upon further confideration, highly rehfhed. And the reafon
of the difference is plain, viz. that the Pleafures of the Man are all
from Intelledt, and Intelled can never adl but with thought and
confideration.

But what is it, that, upon thought and confideration, makes the
things, that I have mentioned, Pleafant to the Intelledual Nature ?
In order to anfwer this qucftion, we muft recolledl what was faid
in the preceding chapter, that the Objed, and the only Objeft of
Intelledl, is Knowledge : Therefore, all the Pleafures of the Intelled:
muft proceed from Knowledge ; and Science, Virtue, and the Fine
Arts, muft all pleafe, becaufe they are accompanied with Know-
ledge.

But this is not a fufficient anfwer to the queftion ; for we muft further
fay. What there is in Knowledge that makes it Pleafing ? And, in the
firjl place, I fay, that even the fearch after Knowledge, and the in-
veftigation of the Knowledge of Things, gives us pleafure in fome
degree ; becaufe this inveftigation is an exercife of Intelled:, and, as I
faid, Nature has annexed Pleafure to the exercife of every faculty.

But what is it, that makes us delight in Knowledge when it is
found ? To this queftion I think it is not a fufficient anfwer, though
it be commonly made, that Knowledge pleafes for its own fake ;
for there muft be fomething in the Objedl known, which, upon re-
flexion, pleafes Mind. And I fay that is Beauty ; for Truth, and
Science, and Virtue, pleafe us, becaufe they are Beautiful ; and every
body will readily admit, that we delight in the Fine Arts for that
reafon.

I

Chap. V. • A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. 105

I know it may be Lid, that we love Knowledge, becaufc it is ufe-
ful : But a Man that loves Knowledge merely for the utility of it
will never be eftcemcd a philofopber by thole who know what phi-
lofophy is ; any more than a Man, who loves Pictures and Statues
merely for the money he may make of them, will be efleemed a
Virtuofo ; or a Man, who does good actions merely for the utility
of them either to himfelf or others, without any fenfe of the Beau-
ty cf them, will be reckoned a Virtuous Man by men of liberal
and generous fentiments. Ariftotle, as I fhall obferve afterwards,
underftood nothing to be 'virtue, but what was pradtifed for the fake
of the fair and band/onie : And, as to the Pleafures of Science, he has
told us, that the Firft Philofophy, or Higheft Science, and which,
therefore, mull yield thegreateft Pleafure,is altogether ufelefs and un-
profitable for the purpofes of life *.

But here a new queftion is ftarted, of more difficulty than any
hitherto propofed ; — What is Beauty? Ariftotle has given .us two
definitions of it, as I have obferved elfewheret : But they are both
of the popular kind, and intended only for the ufe of the Popular
Art he was teaching ; I mean Rhetoric. If the treatife, which he
Vol. II. O wrote

• Arifiotle's Metaph. lib. i. cap 2. and Nicomacheia, lib. 10. cap. 7. — two of
the finefl chapters in Ariftotle, in my opinion, in which he makes a moft magni-
ficent eulogium upon the Jirfi PhJofophy, or <rt^iic ; the fum of which is, That the

fludy of this philofophy is for its own fake, not for the fake of any thing clfe :

That it is the perfe£lion of what is Divine in our natures, and may be truly called
Ourfelf, being that which is moft excellent in us ; fo that a Man, who lives the
life of fuch a philofopher, may be faid to live the life of a M. n, and his own, not
the life of another : — That, if we could fuppofe the Divinity to want or defire any
thing, it would be Knowledge for its own fake. This philofophy, therefore, is tru-
ly Divine, and the pofleflion of it more than falls to the lot of man; fo that, if the
Divinity were capable of envy, the philofophers cf this kind would be the objeft
of it.

t Vol. I. p. 128.

io6 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II.

wrote upon the fubjea by itfelf, had been preferved, we fliould have
probably found there a complete Philofophical Definition of it.
Plato, though he fpeaks of the to x«A9», or the Beautiful, almoft in
every page, has no where given a definition of it. A great deal,
indeed, has been written upon the fubjecl in modern times, both in
French and Englifti ; but, as the authors were not learned in An-
tient Philofophy, though they have faid lively and agreeable things,
they do not fatisfy me. It is, therefore, in the principles of the
Antient Phllofophy, that we are to feek for the folution of this que-
ftion.

And, in xhefrji place, it is evident, that the perception of Beau-
ty is not a perception of Senfe. The Mind, no doubt, perceives
Beauty in the obje£l:s of Senfe : But that perception is quite diffe-
rent from the perception of the objedls ; and, accordingly, the Brutes
perceive the objects as well as wc, but have no perception of
Beauty.

2dOy There Is no Beauty in one fingle thing, confidered by itfelf
and abftrafted from every thing elfe. — To this it may be obje£ted,
that we perceive Beauty in a fingle Animal or Vegetable. But I
anfwer, that it is the parts of that Animal or Vegetable compared
together, and the harmony and proportion which we difcover in
thefe parts, that gives us the idea of Beauty.

3/io, This obfervation brings us near to the true notion of Beau-
ty ; for it fhows us, that it muft confift in Relation, which cannot
be of a fingle thing to itfelf, but of two or more things to one an-
other.

And here we may obferve the connection betwixt Truth and Beau-
ty ; for Truth cannot be of a fingle thing, any more than Beauty.

So

Chap. V. ANT I EN T METAPHYSICS. 107

So far, therefore, we are advanced In our inquiry, as to have dif-
covered to which of the categories Beauty belongs, viz. to Relation;
for every philofopher, that has been taught in the fchoo! of antiqui-
ty, will endeavour to arrange under fome one of the categories e-
very thing, the nature of which he inveftigates. By this means he
knows the mofi: general properties of the thing; and from thence he
will endeavour to deduce the more particular, till he come at laft to
a complete definition of the thing in queftion : As in this cafe, there
being many different Relations of things, he muft inquire, What Re-
lation it is that makes what we call Beauty ? And I fay it is that Re-
lation of things which forms a Syftem ; fo that wherever the Mind
perceives a Syftem in things, it has the Idea of Beauty.

But, what is a Syftem ? It is the Relation of two or more things,
fo conneiSted together, as to be one whole, which when the Mind
perceives, it has the Idea of a Syftem, and confequently of Beauty.

And here again we may perceive a further connexion betwixt
Truth and Beauty ; for they are, each of them, the perception of the
one in the many : And, from hence we may fee, that our definition
of Beauty is fo far a true definition, that it applies to Truth and Sci-
ence, one of the three things, which, I faid, gave pleafure to the In-
telledt ; for no body will deny, that Truth and Science are Beauti-
ful.

But, is it true what Plato fays, that, in every Idea, the Mind per-
ceives the One in the Many ? And it is undoubtedly true ; for we
cannot have an Idea of any one individual thing, and much lefs of
a Species, or a Genus, without perceiving the one in the majty. For,
even in an individual thing, unlefs we perceive what is chief or
principal in it, and upon which all its other qualities are dependent,
we have not an Idea of it j and when we form an Idea of a Species

O2 or

io8 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book 11.

or Genus, It is plain that we make one, of feveral individuals, as in
the other cafe, we make one, of the feveral qualities of the fame indivi-
dual *. Every Idea, therefore, is a Syftem by itfelf ; and, according to
my definition of Beauty, is Beautiful : And, if a fingle Idea be Beau-
tiful, becaufe it is a Syftem, the moft fimple propofition, which only
joins two Ideas together, muft be beautiful likewife, becaufe it pre-
fents to us two Ideas, making a Syftem ; for all affirmative propofi-
tions aver, that the predicate is either the genus or accident of the
fubje<a:t= And, as to negative propofitions, though they have no
Beauty or Syftem in themfelves, they may tend to fhew, that there
is Beauty or Syftem in fome other things. And this we may ob-
ferve, in paffing, makes it evident, that Knowledge is not in itfelf,
and merely becaufe it is Knowledge, Beautiful : For we know a
negative propofition as certainly as we do an affirmative ; and vet
it is not in itfelf, nor for its own fake, Beautiful.

And here again we may obferve the goodnefs of Providence,
which hath annexed Pleafure to every the leaft operation of Intel-
led ; for, as Intelledt perceives nothing but Ideas, it muft perceive
every thing in Syftem, and by confequence enjoy the Pleafure of
Beauty in every perception.

But it is to be obferved, at the fame time, that, though there be
Beauty in the fmalleft Syftem, fuch as that of a fingle Idea or fim-
ple Propofition, the Beauty is greater or lefs as the Syftem is great-
er or lefs. Therefore, the Beauty of a fingle Idea is not fo great as
of a Species, nor of a Species as of a Genus above it : And, for the
fame reafon, the Beauty of a higher Genus is greater than that of

a

* See this explained at fome length, p.
t Vol, I. p. 383-

Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 109

a lower Genus ; t'ae Beauty of a fingle Propofition is not fo great
as the Beauty of feveral Propofitions, fo connected together as to
make one Denionftration ; and the Beauty of one Demonftration is
not fo great as the Beauty of many, forming one Syftem of Science.

It may not be improper here to obferve the very great difference
betwixt Senfations and Ideas. A Senfation does no more than ad-
vertife us that fome material thing exifts, of which we learn, by our
Senfes, certain qualities, that are ufeful or pernicious to the Animal
Life: Whereas an Idea feparates the Form from the Matter, and, by
that means, lets us know the nature of the Thing ; for every Idea
includes the Definition of the Thing, and virtually contains the Ge-
nus, Species, and Difference, which the Definition does no more
than unfold.

It may alfo not be improper to obferve, in pafling, the great uti-
lity of a ftudy too much negledled at prefent ; I mean Logic. Many
people, I know, are apt to imagine, fome French writers particularly,
whom I have read, that Genus, Species, and Difference, are no
more than terms, that we have invented to exprefs the notions of
our Minds ; and that they have nothing to do with the Nature of
Things. But the truth is, they have as real an exiftence as the
Things thcmfelves, denoting the Nature and Eflence of the Things,
as far as it is poffible for us to comprehend them.

Thus, it appears that there is no Beauty without Syftem ; and,
wherever there is Syftem, there is Beauty.

Of a kin to the Beautiful is the Good^ an Idea which we will next
endeavour to develope. — The general Idea of Good is that, which is
conducive to Happinefs, that is, to the pleafure of a Senfitive
Being ; for fo I define Happinefs. But here we muft carefully di-

ftinguiflx

no ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II.

ftinguifh betwixt the Good of the Animal Nature, and of the Intel-
lectual. What is Good to the Animal is that, which nourifhes and
preferves it, — procures it the Pleafures of Senfe, and other Animal
Pleafures : Whereas the Good of the Intelledtual Nature is that which
procures Knowledge, the fole Pleafure of the Intellcdl ; and, as
Knowledge pleafes becaufe it is Beautiful, the Good of Intelled is
that, which procures to it the contemplation of Beauty, either by
furnifhing the fubjeds of fuch contemplation, or preparing and dif-
pofing the Mind for it. It is, therefore, not without reafon, that
the Greeks, in the exprefTion, xaAoe-xayaSoc, or xaXoxayaSi*, have joined
together the Beautiful and the Good, with a proper precedency to
the Beautiful, as the principal Idea j for fo they appear to be joined
in Nature.

The Gooi and the i/y^/ are alfo commonly joined together, in
the fame manner as the Good and the Beautiful ; and for the fame
reafon ; for the Ufefiil is fubfervient to the Good, as the Good is to
the Pleafures of the Animal and Intelledlual Life : Thus, Money is
ufcful, becaufe it procures food, and other neceflaries and conve-
niences of the Animal Life ; and it may minifter in the fame way to
the Pleafures of the Intellectual Nature.

CHAP.

Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. in

HAP. VI.

Of the Pleafure of the Fine Arts. — Ic is Beauty ivhich pleafes in
them. — Their Beauty is in the Piece; and the Piece vuijl be a Syftem.
— The beji Critic is he that can hejl comprehend the Syrtem. — Of
the Pleafure <?/ Virtue. — This alfo arifesfrom Beauty. — Virtue con-
fidered both in Contemplation and Pradtice. — We contemplate it ei-
ther in ourjelves or others — In both Cafes ive approve of ity becaufc
it is beautiful. — For the fame reafon ive pradtice it. — Benevolence
not Virtue, -without a certain Fitnefs or Propriety. — Natural Affec-
tion, Good Will, and Affedion to our Kind, or to any Individual^
are not Virtue, "without a reflex Act of the Mind. — Thefeveral Re-
lation?/^^/ makeN'vclwt a Syftem — confidered voith Relation^oOur-
felves, to Others, and to God and Nature. — 7'/?^ Virtue of the Phi-
lofopher takes in the vuhole Syflem of the Univerfe.

IN the preceding Chapter, I have fliown, I hope, to the fatisfadion
of the Reader, that Beauty is the foundation of the Pleafure we
have in Truth and Science. In this Chapter, I will endeavour to
{how, that it is likewife Beauty which makes us delight in the other
two things I have mentioned as giving Pleafure to Intelledt, namely,
the Fine Arts, and Virtue ; and, in general, I think I fhall be able
to prove it to be that which has the greateft influence in human
life.

As to the Fine Arts, fuch as Mufic, Painting, Sculpture, and
Poetry ; it is acknowledged, I think, by all, that it is their Beauty
which we admire : And it can as little be doubted that it is the Cor-
refpondency or Congruity of the parts of any of the pieces of that

kind,

112 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book H.

kind, or, in other words, the Syftem, that makes their Beauty ; and
the greater the Syftem in any of thefe Arts, the greater the Beauty,
provided it can be comprehended and taken in at one view. What
extent of a Whole can be fo comprehended, muft depend up-
on the underftanding of the critic. He, of little underftanding,
will take in but a fmall part of a Syftem ; the Charaders, perhaps,
in a piece of Poetry, the Verfification, a Simile, a Defcription, or
fomc fucli fplendid patch : But a critic, fuch as Ariftotle, will confi-
der the Fable chiefly, as being that which makes the Piece a Whole,
and to which every thing elfe ought to be fubfcrvient ; and, as to a
Poem which has no Fable, fuch as a Didactic work in Verfe, or a
Poem of mere defcription, he will not give it the naine of a Piece.

The laft of the three I mentioned is Virtue, concerning the Foun-
dation of which there has been much difpute in later times : But I
hold to the philofophy of Ariftotle, who has placed it in Beauty *.
And, firft, let us confider, What it is that gives us delight in the con-
templation of Virtue ; and, next, let us confider, What moves us to the
pradlice of Virtue?

We contemplate virtue either in others or oun'elves. Let us firft
examine for what reafon we admire it in others : And I fay it is
merely for the Beauty of it, for the fame reafon that we admire a

fine

♦ This Account of Virtue is given by Ariftotle, in his Ethics or Nicomacheia, the
beft book of morals that ever was written, not only for the Matter, but likewife
for the flile, which I think a perfeft model of the Didaftic ; for it is of the
popular kind, not fo fliort and obfcure as the ftile of his Efoteric writings, and
as much adorned as a Dida£lic ftile ought to be. In- this work, he has difcriminated
more accurately the feveral Virtues and Vices than any other writer ; and, in ihe
Definition of the Virtues, he commonly adds, inicic t«w kxXou, as a condition abfo-
lutely iitcelTary to make it a Virtue. If this work of Ariftotle's had been diligently
ftudied and underftood, how many idle fyftems of morals had never been written^
or, at leaft,never read by the learned ?

Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 113

fine pidure, or a fine ftatue ; and, indeed, the chief Beauty of
either of thefe is the exprcffion of a noble and virtuous Mind. It
we approve of a virtuous adion, merely becaufe it may be ufeful to
us, every body will allow that we do not give the praife that is due
to Virtue. But, fay fome, it is Benevolence that makes Virtue a-
miable and praife-worthy. To this I anfvver, iwo, That there are
many virtuous adions which we admire highly, but which have no
relation to the good of others ; fuch are the adions that a man per-
forms from the fenfe of the dignity of his own charader, and of
human nature. This Senfe would influence the adions of a man
Hving in a defart ifland, and would make him virtuous, without the
leaft intercourfe with any of his fpecics ; And, even in the middle
of fociety, there are many things we do, merely from that {enfe,
without any regard to what is called the interefl of ourfelves or of
others. And, 2do, I fay, that a benevolent adion is applauded by a
true judge of life and manners, not merely becaufe it is benevolent,
that is, intended for the good of others, but becaufe the objed of that
benevolence is a proper objed, and becaufe, confidered with all its
circumftances, it has that fitnefs and propriety which is eflential to
Virtue : For Virtue has its numbers, meafures, and proportions, as
well as outward forms ; and what is Beauty, but number, meafure
and proportion ? Benevolence, therefore, itfelf, we admire only for
its Beauty.

If, therefore, we admire Virtue in others for its Beauty, for what
other reafon fhould we admire it in ourfelves ? If we only efteem it
becaufe it promotes our intereft in the world, and increafes our eftate

and reputation, we certainly are not virtuous or noble minded.

And thus it appears, that it is the Beauty of Virtue, which makes us
approve of it either in ourfelves or others.

If fuch be Virtue in contemplation, why ftiould it be diflerent in

pradice ? Ought we not to perform a virtuous adion for the fame

reafon that we approve of it both in ourfelves and others ? If no

^'OL. II. P i-eajo^

114 ANTIENT M ET A T II YS I C S. Book II.

reafon can be afllgncd for fuch a difference betVvixt judgment
and conduft, then we muft admit, that, if our motive to any ac-
tion be no other than to acquire eftate, title, or public applaufe, the
adtion is not virtuous : Or, if it proceed from the moft difmterefted
Benevolence, yet, if it has not that fitnefs and propriety, vphich alone
can make it beautiful, it is not a virtuous adion ; for I can conceive
adlons perfedly difmterefted, proceeding from natural afFedion,
from a certain inftindive Love which we may have for the perfons
that we are accuftomed to live with, or from a general good-will
to our kind, which are not virtuous, bccaufe they are not perform-
ed with that confideration and refiedion which Virtue requires, but
from a kind of inftindive impulfe, fuch as makes Brutes perform
the fame adions : For the Brutes are as fond of their offspring as we
are ; they have a love for their kind, which makes them herd with
animals of their own fpecies, rather than with any other ; and they
have private friendfhips, too, which they contrad from living toge-
ther. Such adions, therefore, belong to the Animal, not to the In-
telledual Nature. And I fay the fame of an adion proceeding from
the Paffion of Pity, by which we are affeded, fometimcs to a very
great degree, by the fufFerings of our fellow creatures, and in a lefler
degree, by the fufferings of any of the animal race. But no Virtue is
Paffion : And Pity is Paffion arifing from a natural inftindive affedion,
by which we are conneded with our kind, and, in fome degree, with
the whole animal race ; and accordingly it operates inftantly, with-
out any reflex ad of the judgment approving of it. And we fee
fomething like it among the Brutes, for they appear dlfturbed when
any of their fpecies exprefs pain by their cries. — In ll\ort, I hold that
no adion can be virtuous, unlcfs the Mind confider of it before it is
done, and approve of it, as becoming, handfome, and beautiful.
There muft, therefore, be a choice in all fuch adions, and a prefe-
rence given to them, which, by Ariftotle and the other Greek phi-
lofophers, is called Tcoa'^za-a, and is held by them to be efTential to
Virtue : So that, whatever is done without choice and deliberation,
tl\ough proceeding from the kitideft and beft affedions, belongs not

to

Chap. VI. A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. » 15

to the IntelleiStual Nature, but to the Animal ; and therefore it is not
Virtue. To make Virtue of any Affedion, there muft be an appre-
henfion of Merit and Well-dcferving in the Obje£t of the AfFeftion.
In Pity, for example, if we know nothing of the perfon, whether
he be well or ill-deferving, it is no more, as I have faid, than a mere
animal feeling ; and it is only the apprehenfion of fome worth in
the perfon that makes it a virtuous feeling : For proof of which, let
us fuppofe that w^e know the perfon to be worthlefs, we have no
longer that feeling for him which deferves the name of Pity, if we
fuppofe Pity to be an Affedion of the Rational Nature ; and, though
the fight of him in pain may be ofFenfive to our Animal Nature, yet
our reafon, fo far from being diflatisfied with his fufFerings, which it
would be, if he were really an objed: of Pity, will rather approve
of them, and even rejoice in them, if he be a great criminal : — Or,
though he fhould not be a criminal, but of a mean contemptible
character, we will rather defpife him than pity his misfortunes. Of this
Plutarch has given us a fine example, in his Life of Paulus Emilius,
the conqueror of Macedon. He tells us that, when Perfeus, the laft
King of that country, was brought a prifoner into the prefence of
Paulus, he behaved with fuch abjedl fubmiffion, even proftrating
himfelf before him, that, Plutarch fays, he deprived himfelf of the laft
confolation of the unfortunate, that of being pitied.

Thus, I think I have Ihown, that Ariftotle is in the right when he
makes the re k«Xoi/, or the Beautiful, the foundation of all Virtue,
and an effential part of the definition of every particular Virtue.

If it were neceflary to fay more upon this fubjed, I would fup-
pofe a man doing the beft adions, and from motives the moft difin-
terefted, fuch as Benevolence, and Love to his Country and Man-
kind, and yeti at the fame time, without the leaft Senfe that he was
ading a becoming and handfome part, and without any pleafure in
what he did : I would defire to know whether fuch a man could be
cfteemed virtuous ? I think it is impoflible he could ; for Virtue can-

P 2 not

ii6 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II.

not be without PJeafure, and that Pleafure is certainly not of the
Senlual, but of the Intelle(flual kind, which, as I have fhown, can
only arife from the contemplation of Beauty. The cafe I have fup-
pofed never did, nor ever will exift ; which fhows that it is a matter
of fadt, as well as of reafon and argument, that there can be no Vir-
tue without a fenfe of the Beautiful, and that the dulcc and decorum
do both neceflarily belong to it.

The moft of our modern writers upon Virtue feem to forget that
it belongs to the Intelledual part of our nature, and not to the Ani-
mal ; and I am afraid a great part of them are not philofophers e-
nough to be able rightly to make the diftindtion betwixt thefe two
natures. Good and natural affe<ltions, fuch as Animals have for
themfelves, their offspring, and their kind, they call Virtue ; and they
only blame the excefs of one of thefe afFe(5lions above another, fo as
to deftroy what they call the Balance of Affedions in the Mind : But
they are not agreed among themfelves which of thefe Affedions con-
ftitutes Virtue. Some fay it is only tlie Affedion towards the kind,
or to others, which they call Benevolence, that is a Virtuous At-
fedion : Others again, and among thefe our Scottifh philofopher Mr
David Hume, make Virtue to confift only in Utility ; fo that every
Affedion, according to him, which has that for its objed, is virtu-
ous : And, in this, as well as in other points, he endeavours to re-
vive the philofophy of Epicurus, whofe maxim it was, that

Utilitas, jufti prope mater et aequi *.

But the truth is, that, as Virtue belongs to our Intelledual Nature,
and to that only, no Affedions of any kind, however good or na-
tural, nor any perception of Pleafure in tnefe Affedions, or in the
adions proceeding from them, conftitutes Virtue ; becaufe Virtue
cannot be without, 7?r/?, previous Confideration, Choice, and Delibe-
ration, and, fecondly, a reflex ad of the I.lind, approving of itfelf,
and enjoying that Pleafure which belongs to Intelled only ; I mean
the Pleafure of Beauty. This is properly fpeaking, what is called

Virtue,
* Horat. lib. i. Satyr. 3.

Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 117

Virtue, and belongs only to Man : Whereas good Affedions, tending
to the prefervation of the individual and the kind, are as natural to
the Brute as to the Man ; and, although we may call them Virtues,
it is only metaphorically and improperly, as we fpeak of the Virtue
of a Horfe or a Dog.

The heft treatife upon Virtue in modern times is, I think, my
Lord Shaftfbury's Inquiry, But he, too, enlarges a great deal too
much upon good Affedions and Difpofitions towards our fociety
and kind, and thinks, that he has fufficiently explained the nature
of Virtue, when he (hows that thofe AfFedions have a diredt ten-
dency to promote the happinefs both of the individual and of the
kind : Nor do I remember that he ever mentions the reflex ad of
the Mind, which I hold to be effential to Virtue, except once, and
that but flightly, and in pafTing. But I muft do him the juflice to
own, that, when he wrote his third volume, he appears to have come
to a jufter fenfe of the matter ; for there he fpeaks of Virtue being
nothing but a noble enthufiafm, of which Beauty, and the higheft
and mofl: exalted Beauty, is undoubtedly the objed : And he fpeaks
alfo " of the Harmony and Numbers 'of the Heart, and Beauty of
" the Affedions, which form the manners and condud of the truly
« focial hfe *;'

As

• See MIfcellany 2d. — My Lord Shafifbury, whatever his faults in other refpefls
ir.ay be, which 1 have prefumed to cenfure pretty freely in the third volume of the
Origin and Progrefs of Language, page 284. has moralized, it muft be owned, in a.
raoft gentlemanny way, and recommended Virtue upon principles that muft make it
highly agreeable to the admirers of Beauty in Charaiflers, Sentiments, and Manners.
Thefe are the men of the higheft Tafte, much higher than thofe who admire Beauty
and Grace only in outward forms : And it is this Tafte which I hold to be the diftin-
guiftiing charaflerlftic of \.he gentleman. I would further obferve of my Lord Shafiftjury,
that he is a P.riking example of what a great genius, with the afliftance only of claffical
Icarnine, will do, even in philofophy : for, that his Lordlhlp was not learned in An-
tienl philofophy, is evident from what he fays of Ariftotle, " That, as his talent was
«' more towards polite learning and the Arts, than towards the deep and folid parts of
«' philofophy, it happened that, in hij School, there was more care taken of other Sci-
" ences than of ^/Zvi-v, Dialed, or Logic; which provinces were chiefly cultivated by
«' the fuccefibrs of the Academy and Porch ;" {AJvtcc to an Auik»r, Part H. feil. a.)

This

it8 ANTIENT metaphysics. Book II.

As I am engaged thus far in fpeculatlons concerning Virtue, I think
it will not be improper to explain more particularly in what the
Beauty of Virtue confifts, and to enlarge upon thofe connedions and
relations of things which make Virtue a Syftem.

Every virtuous adion, and, indeed, every adion, muft ftand in
fome relation, either to the Agent, to Others, or to God and Nature,
that is, the Whole of Things.

With

This not only (hows that his Lordfh^p had not read Ariftoile's Thyfics, Meiaphyftct, and
other works of abHrufe or efoterk philofopljy, as he calls it, but not all his popular works,
and particularly his ilfsra/f. And it is really furprifing that his Lordlhip had not fo
much as heard that he was the inventor of Logic, and that he was alfo the firft. that re-
duced DialeS}ic, which, I fuppofe, his Lordftiip means by the word Ditkd, to an Art. —
In (hort, it does not appear to me, that my Lord had read any of the numerous works
of Ariftotle, except that mutilated fragment, the Poetics, which he quotes frequently,
but never mentions another work of his, upon a popular art likewife, and which, I
think, of much greater value than the Poetics, if for no other reafon, than that it ii
complete, and the MS. of it more corredl, I think, than of any other of Ariftotle's
works ; the art I mean is Rhetoric, upon which Ariftotle has written three excellent
books. — As to Plato, he was more converfant in him : But he does not appear to me to
hape entered deep even into his philofophy, but to have ftudied only fome of the eaficll
and mod popular Dialogues, fuch as the Aicibiailes ift and zd •, but, as he was a man of
excellent tafte, he has catched the beauties of Plato's ftyle, better, I think, than any
writer in Englifli. His Rhapfody is, in my judgment, the beft philofophical Drama that
has been written fmce the days of Plato ; in which, befides its beauties of the Poetical
kind, there is a very great deal of fublime philofophy. There is alfo another antient
Author whom he has imitated very fuccefsfully, I mean Horace in his Satires and E-
piftles ; for, like him, he has introduced into his writings, even fuch as are not profefled
Dialogues like his Rhapfody, Perfonages, and Charadlers, whom he has made to con-
verfe in the moft pleufant and gentleman-like, familiar ftyle, that is to be found any
where ; and, in this way, he has varied and embellifhed his compofition very much :
And, though I am an admirer likewife of his high ftyle, yet I think his familiar much
better of the kind. The fame is the judgment of the Halicarnaffian with refpeft to Pla-
to's familiar Style of Socralic Dialogue, compared with his high, or Dithyrambic ftyle,
as the HalicarnallJan calls it.

As to thofe of modern times, who pretend to write Philofophy without the afliftance
.of either Antient Philofophy, or Antient learning; I cannot help faying, though I
fliould give offence, that I think their works defpicable, both for Matter and Style.

Chap. VI. A N T 1 E N T METAPHYSICS. 119

With refped to ourfelves, a virtuous adion mufl be fuitable to the
dignity of our nature, to our charadler, and to our rank and ftation
in life : With all thefe, it muft be of a piece, and have nothing re-
pugnant or difcordant to any of them.

ido. With refpe£t to others, it muft be fuitable to our particular
relations or connections with them, to the fociety or community of
which we are members, and to a greater community ftill, — our kind,
with which Nature has connedled us as well as every other Animal.
And here the Syftem of Virtue will take in the moft extenfive Bene-
volence.

And, lallly^ with refped: to God and Nature, it muft be correfpon-
dent with the fyftem of the Whole of Things, that great City or
Community, to fpeak in the language of the Stoics, comprehending
Gods and Men, and of which every individual Man is a part. This
is the Grand Syftem, the moft beautiful, as well as the greateft of
all Syftcms ; a refpedt to which makes the virtuous actions what the
Stoics call a xarofSw/**, or a perfed right aclion : Whereas, Virtues
that refpe<it only lefler Syftems, are no more, in their language,
than x«9»ixovT«, or ojices *. This is the Virtue of their Sage, whom

they

• See Cicero in the beginning of his book of Offices — The Stoic Syftem of Morals wai
eertainly moft comprehenfive, taking in all Nature, and the unlverfuy of things. Hence

it is, that their moral writings fpeak fo much of the Univerfe, — the Univerfal Nature

the Firft Caufe, — the Series and Chain of Caufes, — Matter and Form,— the Succeflive
Changes and Periods of Exiftence, which this our Earth, and every other thing in Na-
ture, has gone through and will go through. He that does not know that there is a
World, does not know where he is, fays.Antoninus, lib. 8. parag. 52. ofMeditat. He
muft comprehend in his Mind the whole world, and not only the Age in which he lives
but the fucccffion of Times and Periods, and the Changes and VicilGtudcs of all thines-
lib- 9. p 32. And it is every where inculcated in this, and other Stoical Works, thic
man ftiould confider himfelf as a part of this great Whole, fubjeifl to the laws of it, and
taken into the fyftem whether he will or no : So that the foundation of all duty, accord-
ing to them, is a chearful compliance and refignation to this Univerfal Nature and
predetermined Order of Things ; and the end of man is to comply with the laws of this

Great

I20 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II.

they likened to a Divinity in many refpects, and particularly in this,
that, in every thing he did, he had the whole fyfteni of the Univerfe
in view, and never aded from partial confiderations. Such Virtue as
this, it is evident, can only be the Virtue of a philofopher, and a
philofopher of the moft exalted kind : But all the Virtues, even thofe
of vulgar men, muft have a reference to fome Syftem, greater or lefs,
and from thence derive that Beauty which is effential to Virtue.

As there can be no Virtue without a Senfe of the Beautiful, fo nei-
ther can there be any Religion ; for there can be no Religion with-
out the higheft admiration of the Deity. Now, the proper obje£t
of admiration is Beauty ; for the Grand, the Sublime, the Majeftic,
are but names for the higheft order of Beauty, which we contem-
plate in the greateft and moft awful objeds. A Religion, therefore,
of which the only pafTion is Terror and Conftcrnation, without any
mixture of Love, Admiration, or Joy, in the Contemplation of the
objedt of its worfhip, is truly no Religion, but a pannic terror, and
miferable diforder of Mind. Nor ought fuch a diabolical Religion to
be dignified with the name of Enthu/ta/m, which is one of the no-
bleft pafTions in our Nature, and which, in a certain degree, muft al-
ways accompany true Religion ; For it is nothing elfe but a high and
ecftatic admiration of Beauty in any objedl ; and the higher the ob-
jeft is, the more rapturous and tranfporting the admiration fhould
be. The Deity, therefore, being the higheft of all objedls, the Re-
ligious Enthufiafm ought, for that rcafon, to be the higheft. The
next to it is the Enthufiafm of the philofopher, who contemplates

the

Great City; lib. 2. p. 16. — Marcus Antoninus, in another paflage, lib. 9. par. 3. gives
an example of the difference betwixt a common ofHce or duty, and a x.xTt^Suft» or per-
fcft right aflion, with refpe(5l to the fear of death : Who chearfullv fubmiis to death,
as a thing as natural as to be born, to grow, bring forth teeth, or any other natural
operation, and that is abfolutely necefTary to the order of Nature, according to which
there is a cor.ftant fucceflion of generation and corruption, compofition and difToIution—
He is a wife and virtuous man : But, who fubmits only in the view of leaving a bad
world, and being free of prefent pain and mifery, is but a vulgar min.

Chap. VI. ANTIKNT METAPHYSICS. 121

the Uulvcrie, and the Whole of things. This Enthufiaftic Admira-
tion, Lucretius, fpeaking of his mafter Epicurus, has exprefifed, by a
very ftrong word, viz. horror, in the following lines,

His tibi vie rebus quaedam di%iifta njoluptas
Percipit, atque horror ; quodjtc Natura tua vi
Tarn man'ifejla patet, ex omni parte retcda *.

And it muft be confefTed, that very profound Admiration, though a
paffion altogether different from Terror, or Horror, has effects very
fimilar ; for both paffions furprife, and tranfport the Mind, as it
were, out of itfelf f .

Vol. II. Q Nor

• Lib. 3. V. 28.

f Horace, I obferve, in one of his philofophical epiftles, I mean that to Numi-
cius, the /ixth of the Jir/l Book, ufes the words, formido, pavar, and tirror^ as
fynonimous with admiration: lie begins with Admiration.

Nil admirari, prope res eft una, Numici—

Then he goes on, and fays,

Hunc folem, et ftellas, et decedentia certis
Tempora momentis, — funt qui /ormidine nulla
Imbuti fpetlent

Then, fpeaking of other things, fuch as Popular Applaufe, Honours, and Ti-
tles, and the like, he fays.

Qui timet his adverfi, fere miratur eodem,

Quo cupiens, patio — pavor efl utrobique moledus.

Where it is evident, that the word pavor is applied both to the Admiration of
th'ofe things, and the fe.ir of the contrary: He adds,

Improvifa fimul Ipecies exterret utrumque :
Gaudeat, an doleat ; capiat, mituatne ;' quid ad rem.
Si, quidquid vidit melius pejufve fua fpe,
Defixis oculis animoque et corporc torpet ?

Where

122 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IL

Nor Is Virtue without its Enthufiarm ; for a Man truly Vir-
tuous has the higheft Admiration of the Fair Forin^ which, as Cicero
fays, if it could be feen with the eyes, incredibiles Amoves excitarec
Jul : But 1 fay it is feen, and by an eye much purer than the bo-
dily eye, and its Beauty preferred to that of any corporeal Form.

The Fine Arts, too, fuch as Sculpture and Painting, are admired
with a certain degree of Enthufiafm, but not fo great as that with
which we admire the Beauty of Charader and Sentiments : For the
fineft Statue or Pidurc is feen with dry eyes ; but a generous, noble.
Sentiment, exprcffed either in verfc or profe, will' make the tear
Hart to the eye, and afled the voice fo much, in perfons of great
Senlibility, that tlicy can hardly read the paflage ; for it is by tears,
and the alteration of the voice, that Nature expreffes, not only
Grief and Diftrefs, and the paflion of Pity for the fufferings of o-
thcrs, but alfo our Senfe of the Beautiful and Noble in Sentiments
and Adions. But no profpedt of utility, either for ourfelves or o-
thers, will excite any fuch commotion in us.

There is an Enthufiafm belonging, not only to Philofophy and
the Fine Arts, but alfo to the inferior Sciences. Of thefe, the Ma-
thematical Science has, I believe, the leaft of that paffion : And yet
I fhould reckon a Geometer, Mechanic, or Computer, of no genius
even in his own art, if he had no Senfe of the Beauties of his The-
orems ; but it Is impoffible, by the nature of things, that he can
have the fame rapturous and ecftatlc emotions of Mind, let him
meafure, compute, and inveftigate, the properties of Figures ever fo
fuccefsfully, as the Philofopher who contemplates the Wifdom and

Good-

Where the reader may obferve, that the lad line is jufl: a pharaphrafe of the horrar
of Lucretius. — I have enlarged the more upon this paflage of Horace, that I think
it has not been rightly underftood by any of the commentators.

Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. J23

Goodnefs of God, maiiifefted in the Syftem of the Univerfe, — a plea-
fure, which to him is an anticipation of the joys of Heaven.
The Stoics, therefore, when they enjoined us not to admire any-
thing, did not mean, or, at leaft, ought not to have meant, to for-
bid us this Admiration : The Admiration they forbid us is of
fuch things as Horace mentions, Wealth, and Power, and popular
Applaufe; though it muft be confefTed, that the precept is exprefled
in too general terms, when we are defired

Nil admirari

But the philofophy of this epiftle of Horace is altogether Stoical ;
and the precepts of that philofophy, as is well known, carried things
much farther than their natural and juft bounds.

Q2 CHAP.

124, ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II.

CHAP. VII.

The Senfe of Beauty ;.f the Source of every J&ion and JffeSJion that
can be called Human. — It produces the Principle of Honour.—
'Ihe Prevalence of that Principle atuong all Nations, barbarous
flnc/ civilized. — Examples of it. — The nature of Honour conne^ed
•with the Univerfal Paflion, the Defire of Praife. — Frotn Honour
proceeds Anger. — (^Revenge : — // operates differently upon different
CharaSlers of Men. — Love and Friendfhip alfo proceed from a Senfe
of the Beautiful. — 7 be Connexion of Friendfhip vuith Anger. —
Vanity alfo from the fame Source : — Vanity of two kinds. — Envy
neceffarily conneBed tuith Vanity. — The Senfe of the Ridiculous is
derived from the Senfe of ivhat is Beautiful. — The fame is the
Source o/" Ambition — alfo o/'Avarice. — ^// our other Affeftions and'
Paflions belong to our Animal Nature, not to our Intellectual. —
Beauty /)/^^^j hecatfe it is Beauty. — The Final Caufe of that Plea-
fure. — Recfon ivhy Beauty confifs in Syftem. — By the Exercife of
our Intellect upon any Subje^ ive are preparing for the Exercife of
it upon the greatefl SubjeH, the Syftem of the Univcrfc.

IN the preceding Chapter, I think, I have fhownthat Beauty is the
Principle of Virtue, and, by confequence, of what is greateR and
nobleft in our Nature : But I fay further, that it has an univerfal
influence in human life, and that every adlion and affedlion, which
are, properly fpeaking, human, proceed from that fource.

In

Chap. VII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 125

In the Jir/l place, I will fliow, that there could be no Scnfc of Ho-
nour without a Senfe of what is Fair, and Handfome, and Becoming,
in Charadler and Sentiments. A Senfe of Honour is found fo uni-
verfal among all Men, barbarous or civilized, that it may be reckon-
ed infeparable from Human Nature. Among civilized nations, it is
the great Principle of A6tion ; for what we call Fafliion, which go-
verns our lives, owes its influence intirely to the Senfe of Honour ;
for what is Falhionable is pratftifed only becaufe it is Honourable.
And, among the barbarous nations, it is as prevalent ; nor have we
hitherto difcovered any nation, in which there does not appear to be a
Senfe of Honour, in one thing or another. 1 he favages of Guiana, in
South America, have fuch a Senfe of Honour, that they will languilli
and die, if they are affronted by adlions, words, or even looks, as I
have been aflTured by a gentleman who was five years among them.
TheEfquimeaux girl, that was at London fome years ago, could not
bear to be exhibited as a fhow : And, whenever fhe fufpedted that
a company was got together to look at her, fhe was highly affront-
ed. Even the Orang Outang, whom many will not allow to be of
our fpecies, is of the fame difpofition, as is atteded by the Briftol
merchant, whofe letter I have printed in the Origin and Progrefs of
Language* ; and was attefted alfo by another very credible narrative,
that I heard, of one of them, who ferved as a failor on board a Ja-
maica fhip that traded to the flave coafl:, melled with the lailors, did
the duty of a common failor, and alfo ferved the Captain as a cab-
bin-boy ; but one day having broken a (>hina bowl, the Captain
beat him, which the animal laid fo much to heart, that he abftain-
ed from food, and died. — In fhort, the Senfe of Honour I hold to
be fo elTential to Human Nature, that, if a man never had it, I
(hould not believe that he belonged to the fpecies : And, if he once
had it, but loft it intirely, I fliould confider him as the moft abje(ft
and degenerate creature of the human race.

Now,
* Vol- I p. 281. fecond edit.

126 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II.

Now, tlic Scnfe of Honour is founded upon the Senfe of Beau-
ty ; for it proceeds from an opinion, that we are poffcired of a cer-
tain Beauty and Dignity of charader, which demands refped from
others. If a man has great ftrength and elevation of Mind, he wil!
not be very folicitous to have this opinion of himfelf confirmed by
the teflimony of others ; he will be fatisfied with the honour he gives
to himfelf. And this is the cafe of the proud Man : But by far the
greater part of Mankind are not proud, but •vain ; and they defire
that the good opinion they have of themfelves fhould be con-
firmed bv the opinion of others ; and thence comes the defire of
Praife, which is fo univerfal a paflion.

From the Senfe of Honour, and Defire of Praife, proceeds the paf-
fion of Anger, one of the ftrongeft paffions belonging to the Hu-
man Nature. This paflion arifes, when we not only do not meet
with the Praife from others which we think we deferve, but when
we are treated by them with negled or contempt *.

Revenge

• See Arlftotle upon the fubjeil of Anger; Rhetorica, lib 2. cap 2 — where
he has given a very accurate ilefiriitio'i of Anger, and explained and diftinguiflied
all the caufes ■which produce it, and which all refolve into honour offended, or,
in one word, affront: For we muft diftinguifh betwixt injury and aflront: A man
may fufFer great injuries and lofs, for which he will grieve very much, but not be
affronted or angry. It was not the lofs of.Brifeis, that made Achilles angry with A-
gamemnon ; but it was W u^itrc* A;^*'*' »<'^" "lo-Ui — and again becaufe he
treated him tirn ■»■"•« aTiftrim ^iT<»»«irTii>. — In (hort, his anger rofe from the
fenfe of his own dignity and worth, to which Agamemnon had fliown no regard.
Having mentioned Arirtotlc's Rhetoric, I would recommend very much to the fludy
of the learned reader this 2d Bock of it, concerning the P.-.fllons and Charadlers of
Men, as containing more of what is called the Knowledge of the World than any
book I ever read. And, in general, I would recommend the Moral and Political wri-
tings of Plato and Ariftotle, as the bed fchool in which a man can learn this Sci-
ence of the If^crld ; for it is with the World, as it is with other things, we fhall
never be perfect in the Pradice of it, unlefs we know likewife the Science. ,

Chap. III. ANTIENT iMETAPHYSrCS, 127

Revenge is nothing elfe but Lifting Anger, or M»wf, as the Greeks
c; 11 it ; and, if the palhon is violent, a man will ratlier die than not
fatisfy it. This is the cafe of fome barbarous nations, who, by the
pradice of war and hunting, have got a ferocity of manners, which,
inftead of making them languilh and die when they are affronted,
like the tame and gentle favage of Guiana or the OrangOutang, will
not reft fatisfied, till they have appeafed their anger by the death of the
perfon who alTrontcd them. And, as thofe men haA^e greater ftrcngth
of Mind than we have, and greater perfcvarence in al! their refolu-
tions and enterprifes, they will wait many years for an opportunity
of fatisfying their revenge.

As, from a Senfe of Honour, and of what is Beautiful and Refpec-
table in Characfter, arifes Anger, fo alfo Love and Friendfhip, As
to Love, it Is acknowledged by every body, that it is founded up-
on our Senfe of Beauty ; and, as to Friendlhip, it cannot be with-
out Mutual Efteem ; and that again cannot be without each of the
parties having a Senfe of Worth and Beauty of Charader in
the other. This connedion betwixt Anger and Friendfhip A-
riftotle appears to have known very well, when he tells us, that
the nations in whom ©"/*«?, or Anger, is a prevailing Paflion,
are moft inclined to Friendfhip * : And, accordingly, the In-
dians of North America are as remarkable for their Friendfliips,
as for their Anger and their Revenge. And Homer has made the
charader of Achilles perfedly confiftent, when, at the fame time

that

• De Republica, lib. 2. cap. 7. As the conneclion betwixt Anger .nnd
Friendfhip is not very apparent, 1 will fubjoin the words of Ariftotle : 'o ivfUi it.

Til i rrtmt t» fihuriKtu — icvrn yct^ %J\ii n t^j ■4'''X''5 ov'^/k!, S (piXcvf.it. <rtiunn it- xoof
yicf T»t/{ e-vtr,tii( Kxi ^iXcuf o iticof «i{It«< jI*«AAbv,)i jtjos t»v{ «y»4)Ta;, •A(y»>jf(irSai tcuirccf — ■

And a little after he quotes a poet, who fays, 'Oi to» a-sj* o-n^lxnif/ti h xxi s-i^k
fiirtuTi. — And it is a common obfervation, that mens Anger and Hatred are in pro-
portion to their Love and Friendfhip.

12 9 A N r I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book II.

tliat he lias m?.de him fo Tafiionate and Revengeful, he has made
him as violent in his Friendfliip ; i'o that, rather than not Revenge
the death of his friend, he chofc to Die himfelf *.

But not only do thofe violent paffions of ftrong Minds proceed from
a Senfe of Honour, but there is that common paflion of Weak Minds
above mentioned, vphich is derived from the fame fource; I mean Fa-
tiitj, — an equivocal word, denoting, cither the Love of Praife for mean
and frivolous things, or an exceffive Love of Praife for great and valu-
able qualities + ; but flill it is the Love of Praife, which cannot be
without a Senfe of fomething Beautiful and Praifeworthy in Charac-
ter. It is Vanity that gives that univerfal dominion to Fafhion,
which I obferved before : And, however contemptible a vain man
may appear in the eyes of a man of fenfe, I fhould think it a very
bad fign of a young man, to have no Vanity ; for a man muft have
attained to great fenfe and knowledge, more than can be fuppofed in
a young man, to be too proud to be vain, as Dean Swift very well
exprelfcs it.

And here I cannot help making an obfervation, which, I know,
will appear very ftrange to the niofl; of my readers ; That, to diredl
well the vanity of men, and particularly of young men, who are
more governed by that paffion than thofe of riper age, is the great-
eft work of legillation, and of good government. For Virtue may
be made fafliionable, as well as Vice : And men who have a Senfe
of Honour, (and fuch only are, by Nature, deftined to be free citi-
zens), will not be out of that fafhion, more than any other; where-
as, thofe who, by Nature, are intended for Slaves, wanting the Senfe

of

• See Arift. Rhetor, lib. i. cap. 3.

t It is in this 'alter fenfe that we fay Cicero was Vain, who defircd Praife for
Great and Noble Qualities ; but he defired it too much. In the latter fenfe, wc
fay a man is Vain, who dcfircs Praife for his Houfe, his Equipage, or his Drefs.

Chap.VII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 129

of honour altogether, or having it in a fmall degree, mufl; be com-
pelled to do what is right by ftripes, the punilhment of Haves, not by
difgrace, thegreateft punifhment of freemen. While, therefore, what
is right, and truly praifeworthy, in life and manners, continues to be
honourable in a State, that State will continue to be free and pro-
fperous ; but, on the contrary, if what is bad becornes honourable,
or even things in themfelves indifferent, fuch as Wealth, but which,
by the ufe that is made of it, is truly faid to be the root of all evil,
that State wV\ foon ceafe to be free and happy. To abftain, there-
fore, from Money, in an age of Wealth and Luxury, is the higheft
compliment which Horace thought he could beftow upon one of his
friends; of whom he fays, that he was

abftinens

Ducentis adfe ctaiBa pecuniae *.

Nor do I think that Livy has any where praifed his countrymen
more, than where he has faid, " That, in no country, Poverty con-
tinued fo long honourable f." — But to return to our fubjedl.

To this Vanity is commonly joined Envy ; for the vain are almoft
all invidious. This is one of the worft paflions belonging to human
Nature, and yet it arifrs from a Senfe of what is Beautiful and
Praifeworthy in Character, and the Delire of being more efleemed
and refpe(Sted than others, upon that account.

From the Senfe of the Beautiful arifes a Perception that appears al-
together oppofite, namely, the Perception of the Ridiculous:]; ; for the
Ridiculous is that which is Deformed : But philofophers know that
Vol. II. R there

• Ad Lollium. — Lib. 4. Ode 9.

t Iviv. in Proacmio.

% See what I have faid upon this fubjcft, Vol. 3. p. 298. of Origin and Progrefs

of Language.

130 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II.

there Is the fame knowledge of contraries ; and, though a man be not
a philofopher, he will readily perceive that it is impofhble to know
what is Beautiful, without knowing, at the fame time, what is not
Beautiful, or Deformed, and v/Vf'yf//^. This Scnfe of the Ridiculous is
exprefled by that ftrange agitation of the mufcles of the face, and often
of the whole body, which we call Laughter, and which every Body
knows is peculiar to Man, who therefore has been defined a rifihle Ani-
mal: But every Body does not know tliat the reafon,why it is peculiar
to him, is, that he is an Intellectual Animal; for it isonly Intelledl that
perceives Beauty, and its contrary. Deformity : And therefore the
Brute, not having Intelled, is neither a Rifible Animal, nur perceives
Beauty.

But, though every man muft perceive the Ridiculous, as well as
the Beautiful, yet every man does not delight in it. It is the plea-
fure, chiefly, of the vain, the invidious, and the malignant, not of
the great and good, who delight in the contemplation of the Beauti-
ful, but turn their eyes away from the deformed. Hence it is that
Savages, who are commonly high minded men, are very grave, and
feldom laugh : And, among civilized nations, neither philofophers,
nor high-bred men, are addided to laughter; which, therefore, is tlie
paflion of the vulgar only, in fuch nations.

Ambition is one of the paffions of great Minds, and is evidently
founded in a man's fenfe of the dignity and fuperiority of his cha-
racter, which he thinks entitles him to govern others : And in all
fuch characters, the Senfe of Honour, and the Love of Praife, is very
ftrong. Even Avarice, one of the moft fordid pafhons belonging to
our Nature, has a mixture of the Love of Praife in it ; for a rich
mian defires to be refpeCted for his Wealth : And, accordingly, I
have obferved, that all the Avaritious are Vain to a certain degree,
that is, as far as it does not interfere with their Love of Money.

All

Chap. VII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 131

All our other Defires and Pa/fions belong to the Animal Nature :
For they are either the defire of bodily pleafures, or of the means of
enjoying thefe ; or they are affeQions of the Mind, fuch as are
common to us with the Brutes.

And thus it appears that Beauty is the fole delight of our Intellec-
tual part, — the fource of the pleafure of arts and fciences, — the foun-
dation of all our Virtues, — and of our Vices too, fuch as Anger and
Revenge, Vanity, Envy, Contempt, and Derifion.

If it be afked, Why Beauty pleafes us ? the anfwer is. That it
pleafes us becaufe it is Beauty ; or, in other words. It is the ultimate
caufe of the pleafure : And, in this refpe£t, it is the fame with the
Pleafures of Senfe, which pleafe us for no other rcafon but becaufe
they are Pleafures of Senfe. And the fame may be faid of thofe
pleafures which arife from natural afFedion and fociety.

If it be farther afked. What is the final Caufe of Beauty giving
us fo much pleafure ? I anfwer. That the goodnefs of the Author
of Nature has thought proper to annex to the exercife of all our fa-
culties a certain pleafure. This is the cafe of all the Energies of the
Animal Life ; and it would have been very extraordinary, if, to our
nobleft energy, and to the exercife of our higheft faculty, no plea-
fure had been annexed.

It may alfo be afked. Why Beauty is made to confifl in Syflem,
and nothing elfe ? To this the anfwer is obvious, from what has
been already obferved. That Beauty being a pleafure of the Intelledl,
it could not have been perceived by Intellect in any other way.

I will conclude this Chapter with obferving, that, as the Syftem
of the Univerfe muft be not only the greateft but the moft perfect

R 2 that

132 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II.

that can be conceived, and, confequently, of the higheft Beauty, — and
the contemplation of it being the nobleft occupation of Man, as well
as the happieft, — we are, by Nature, fo much framed for that contem-
plation, that our Intelle£t apprehends nothing but in Syftem : So that
every exercife of our Intelledl, upon every fubjedt, may be faid to be
a preparation for the enjoyment of that higheft happinefs, for which
we are by God and Nature deftined. Whoever, therefore, cultivates
his underftanding properly, is acquiring, by degrees, the capacity of
this higheft enjoyment, which may be called the Beatific Vtfion of
Philofophy.

BOOK

Chap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 133

BOOK III.

Of the feveral Minds in Man, confidercd as diftincl
Subftances.

CHAP. I.

The Intelledlual Mind, a dijlincl Subjlance from the Animal. — Only two
Opinions upon the Subje^. — Things, to be diJlinguiJJied by their Pro-
perties— Adive Beings, by their Operations. — The Operations of
the Intelledt, and of /^(f Animal Life, quite different. — Man ope-
rating by Intelled, «<?/ a Senfitive Being. — 77;^ Animal Nature, no
Impro'uement or Refnement of the Vegetable. — No more is the Intel-
ledtual an Improvanent of the Animal. — The Vegetable Life exifs

feparately from /A<f Animal — therefore they arefeparateSub/iances.

For the fame Reafon,thelnteUeQ.usi\ ^k^ AnimalNatures arefeparate
Subjlances. — Our lit tie World, compofedofiouv Subflances — This the
Tetradys of the Pythagoreans. — £^'^;7 Vegetable cni Animal, cow-
pounded o/" three different Natures. — This Doflrine, 0/' three diflinB
Subjlances in Man, the Do£lrine of the Peripatetic School, as ex-
plained by Philoponus. — ObjeBion to this Dodrine^ anpwered.

HAVING, in the preceding Book, diftinguiflied the feveral
kinds of Mind in our wonderful compofition, and, particu-
larly, having fhown that the Intelleftual Mind is perfectly diftindt
from the Anini:.l, in every view in which it can be confidered, whe-
ther with refped to its Objects, the manner of apprehending thefe

Objeds,

134 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III.

Objcds, its Defires and Indinations, and, laftly, its Pleafures, the
Reader, it is hoped, will he prepared for what I am to undertake to
prove in this Chapter — That the Intelledtual Mind is a Being alto-
"•ethcr diftind from the Animal Life, as diflind as the Animal
Life is from the Vegetable. This I have endeavoured to prove in
my Firft Volume *; but, as the fubject is of fuch importance, I will
fay fomething more of it her?.

There can be but two opinions upon this fubjed : One, that Intel-
led is nothing more than a fuperior faculty of the Animal Nature ;
—The other, that it belongs to a different Nature, and is a quality
of a fubftance altogether diftind from the Animal.

In \\\tfr/l place, as wc know not the Subftance or Eflence of a-
ny Thing, we cannot judge of the difference of Things, otherwife
than by their qualities : And, if the Things we compare together
are Adive Bcirgs, it is their Energies and Operations that we are
chiefly to cor.fider ; and, if thefe appear to be eflentially different
in kind, not in degree, we ought to pronounce the Beings to be
likewife different ;n kind. Now, I think I have Ihown raofl; clear-
Jy, that the Operations and Fundions of the Animal Life are quite
different from thofe of the Intelledual Mind : And, indeed, the
difference is fo great, that Man, confidered as an Intelledual Being,
cannot be faid to be a Senfitive Being, which is the very definition of
an Animal ; becaufe it is by the Senfes the Animal Operates, and, in
tliat way, is diftinguiflied from the Vegetable. It is true, he operates
alfo by the Phantalia : But the Phantafia is a kind of Secondary Senfe,
and may be reckoned a Bodily Organ, as well as the Senfes. Then
.all hie affedions and difpofitions are referable to the Body. On the
other hand, the Intellcd does not operate either by the Senfes or
the Phantaiia, but, in a manner, as I have fhown, quite different ;
fo that, when we perceive external objeds by our Senfes, or Phan-
tafia,
• Book II. ch.ip. \7.

Chap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 135

tafia, we do not a£t as a Man, or Intelledual Creature, but as a
mere Animal.

The Defires and the Pleafures hkewife of the Intellectual Nature
are quite different from thofe of the Senfitive. It is true, indeed,
that Intellect operates upon Matter ; and that our Intelled: ufes the
Materials which the fenfe furnifhes. But it is of neceflity that In-
telledl fhould operate upon Matter, either mediately or immediately,
otherwife the Material World could not be fuch as it is : And we
fhould not be men, if our Intellect could operate without the Mate-
rials furnifhed by Senfe.

2^0, Nobody will fay, that the Animal and Vegetable Natures are
not diftiiKH:, though joined together in the fame compofition ; and,
Why fhould not the Intellectual Nature be as diftindt from the Ani-
mal, as this is from the Vegetable ? It is faid, that Intellect is no-
thing but an improvement of the Animal Nature : Why may it not
be as well faid, that the Animal is no more than an improvement
upon the Vegetable ? If it had pleafed God to join the Intelle<^ual
Nature to the Vegetable, without interpofmg the Animal, Would it
not have been ridiculous to have faid, that the Intellectual Nature
was nothing but a finer kind of Vegetable ? Whatever is faid to be
a Refinement or Improvement of another thing, mufl be of the fame
kind. Thus, if the fenfes of any Animal be made more acute, — if
the Phantafia be made to reprefent the obje(5ts in it more perfeiftly,
and to retain them longer, — if an InflinCt fhall be given him, direc^
ting him better to prefervethe individual, and continue the kind, — the
Animal, no doubt, will be improved : But, if Powers and Faculties
are given him of a quite different kind, and ferving purpofes quite
different; then the Nature of the Animal will not be improved, but
another Nature of a different kind will be added to his.

136 . ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III.

3^/0, If the Animal Nature did not exift feparately, and if alfo
the Intellediial did not exift in that way, it might be thought that
the fuppofition of their exifting conjoined in Man was a mere hy-
pothefis, and that Man was truly a fimple, uncompounded,fubftance.
But we are fure that the Animal cxifts feparately ; and, if we be-
lieve in God, we muft believe that Intelledt exifts likewife fepa-
rately. And, if fo. What fhould hinder them to exift conjoined ?
Body and Mind exift in that way ; and certainly the Animal and
Intelledual Minds are not fubftances more different in their natures,
than Mind and Body.

Thus it appears, that, in our various Nature are joined together
the Vegetable, Animal, and Intellectual Natures; to which may be
adJed a fourth Nature, which I call the Elemental Life. This makes
Man the moft wonderful compound here below : And he is truly
what the anticnts called him, a Microcofin, or Liitle World ; for we
cannot conceive the Great World composed of any other ingredi-
ents. And I am perfuaded thefe four are the famous Tetradys of the
Pythagoreans; which was thought fo great a myftery of philofophy,
that the Pythagoreans fwore by him who firft difcovered to them the
Tetra^js, the Eternal Source of ever fioivlng Nature *.

Nor

• See Tlieon. Smyrnaeus's Alathematica, cap. 38. p. 147. — See alfo Nicomachus
xi{i rx hoXoyevfit'tc i> Ti) A^iffctiTiKt], — and Ihemiflius ^1^1 4"'X^'f' ''''• '• ^^^- ^'^- — ^
Know, that the veneration, that the Pythagoreans had for the number/oar, is afcri-
bed to its being a fymbol of the progrcfs of Nature in the formation of Phyfical
Bodies i the monad ftanding for the point the duad iot the line, the number three
for the fimplefl fuperficial figure, viz the triangle, and the nurnberyiur for the
fimplefl foiid figure, viz the Triangular Pyramid, confift ng of three fides and a
bafe : So th.it the number four completed the progrefs of Nature in the formation
of Phyfical Bodies. But though, no domt, the Pythagoreans confidered Arithme-
tic as t!'.e Primary Science, and Geometry as nothing more than the application of
Numbers to Lines and Figures; yet it is likewife ceitain, that they made Num-
bers

Chap.r. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 137

Nor fhould we be furprifed that Man is To compounded, when
there is alike compofition in every other Animal, and even in Vegeta-
bles : For, in each individual of thefe, there is, iw/o. The common
Nature of the genus ; ido^ The more particular Nature of the fpe-
cies ; 3/zo, That more particular Nature ftill, which diftinguifh-
es one individual from another ; and, lajlly^ The common Elemen-
tal Life, or Principle of Motion, which is in all Bodies unorganized,
as well as organized. Nor will any one who has attended to the
varieties of Nature to be difcovered by the analyfis and decompofi-
tion of Bodies, be furprifed that the compofition of Minds fhould be
as various as that of Bodies.

Thisdocftrine of three of the four Minds in our wonderful compofi-
tion, 1 mean the Vegetable, Animal, and Intelledual, being diftiuNft
fubftanccs, and not different qualities of one and they^"?W(? fubflance, is
no difcovery of mine, but the dodlrine of Ariftotle, and of the Pe-
ripatetic fchool,as delivered and mofl clearly explained by Philopo-
nus, in the introdudlion to his Commentary upon Ariflotle's books
De minima ; and, as Philoponus was a Chriflian, I have no doubt
but this was the dodrine of the church at that time. — As to ihe/oiirlby
or Elemental Mind; I have given a reafon in the note below, why they
do not mention it as any part of the compofition of Man.

There is an objedlion which Philoponus, in that introdudion,

ftates to this dodrine, calling it a vulgar and popular objedion ;

namely, That, in this way, w^e have three Minds inftead of one. But,

though it may appear a vulgar objedion to a philofopher, who

Vol. II. S knows

bers the fymbols of Divine and Spiritual things : And, therefore, I think, it i»-
better to explain this grand myftery of the Tetra^ys, by applying it to Mind rather
than to Body ; and, by fuppofing it a fymbol of thcfe four Minds, which, riling one
above another, as numbers do, animate the whole univcrfc, and govern its move-
ments. But, in the fchooi of Plato and Ariflotle, the Elemental Life was confi-
dercd as belonging only to Nature, not to Man; and, therefore, in the compofi-
tion of Man, they fpcak only of a trinity of Minds, the Vegetable, the Animal,
and the Intelledual.

138 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III.

knows the variety of Nature, and has learned to diftinguifh be-
twixt the fcveral things that enter into the compolition of Natural
Subflances ; yet I am perfuadcd it is the fource of the coniinon er-
ror upon this fubjed : For we fpeak of Man as having but one
Mind, without dirtinguifliing betwixt his Soul and his Animal or
Vegetable part ; and we think a man, now a days, a good phi-
lofopher, if he can diftinguifh betwixt this fingle Mind in Man and
his Body. But, for the fame reafon, as Phlloponus has well obfer-
ved, that we conceive the Body, and the feveral kinds of Mind, to
be diftind fubftances, though clofely joined together, fo we ought
to conceive thefe minds as diftind from one another *.

From this dodrine of our Intelleftiial Nature being a fubftancff
xliftinifl from our Animal Life, as diftinft as that life is from the
Vegetable, there refult feveral moft important confequcnces, as I
fhall fliow in the following chapter.

C HAP.

• T will give the wor-Is of Phlloponus, becaufe there is an error in the text,
which I thinlc I am able to correft. Mii «o-»{mt4i ^i th i^m-xxxi <«t»5i«» fK«>ni».

T« ««» ; T{i/f i^«>5«f 'X'M't **' ""■•'■{I*' ■4'UX'" ^lOiKcvfiifx' /t"/« y«j iti *»■»■«{ ttulur*
li ■vJ'k;^!) t«p riftxTi T»t/Tf(, JjKH fto it n ?rj«y«« iitiiit ; KtcTx aXr.^eictt it »«j; «» ft
•»1ir, iuTU Ti| T« i\tym, kxi t<\ (fvTiKri (rvfigu^Etif fiiaf fti> rittt (rvit)(,nxt iT«i« CiX
TijiF cvtx'Pttxf iJiiTCW y«{ TT^tri^iif tijj fcm Aoyixii? it a>.ay>fy Ti){ S's «A«yot/ i <fvTiKn.
hix )t rr,i yitifiit^i ix r^f rvyaipHx; Tai/ii){ e-f;wjrK.^««», fiixt ^xftli' Kai in uf «{y«(»«if »•-

x;iiT«i T«({ <»AA«ij Ivfxuts-it i »>.>yt(. Ih the laft part of this paflage there fliould not
be after the ?>«««» a full flop, but only a coma ; and, in the end of the paflage, in-
ftead of i «A»y»«, we fhould read « xtyixn : And then the fenfe is clear, which is this ;
" Becaufe ihefe feveral Minds, by reafon of this connediion, have a mutual fym-
*• pathy, we fay that they are one, and that the Rational Mind ufes the other two
*' as organs.'

I cannot help obferving here, that it is much to be wiftied that this valuable work
of this Chriftian commentator upon Ariflotle were reprinted, and the many errors
in the only edition we have of it, both in the pun(Stuation and the words, correc-
ted : And I have no doubt but that it will be done in England ; as I hope that couni.
try will have the honour of reviving the Greek Philofophy, which it will not be
difficult to do where the Greek learning i$ fo well underflood.

Chap. II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 139

CHAP. II.

7'he Confequence of the Doctrine «5/" three dijlinci Subftances in Man. —
Theje Subftances cannot be tranfmuted into one another — nor nvill
//j(f Deftrudlon of one. be attended zuith the Deftrudlion 0/" another.
— Still lefs "will they be deftroyed by the Deftru(Slion of the Body.
— The Intelledual Subftance cannot be fo deflroyed^ as it operates
ivithout Body : — Nor the Animal or Vegetable Subftances, though
they do not operate ivithout Body. — 'Thefe are not perifliable by their
oiji'n wfl/Mr^,^«';z§- Immaterial Subftances. — Of the feparateExiftences
of thefe Minds. — The Intelledlual does fo ex'i/l. — The Animal and
Vegetable Minds do not exijl feparately. — Of the Doflrine oj Tranf-
migration. — Hoiv to be underftood upon the Principles of this Phi'
lofophy. — Into ivhat Bodies the fcueral Minds tranfmigratc. — Whe-
ther the Human Mind tran/migrates into the Brute. — NoTranf-
migration of the Elemental Life. — This Philofophy eJiablifJoes the
fcparate Exiftence, and the Immortality of the Soul, upon thefurejl
Foundation. — The Do^rine of h\icvc\.\\x% and o/Mr Locke eaftly refu-
ted upon the Principles of this Philofophy. — Coniparifon of the Hu-
man Soul to the Mafter of a Ship. — Of the life of this Philofophy
in Theology. ^

AND, in (he frjl place, it Is evident that, if the Intelledual,
Animal, and Vegetable Life, which make our wonderful
compofition, are diftindt Subftances, it is impoffible that the one can
be tranfmuted into the other ; for there is no fuch thing in Nature
as a metamorphofis of any Individual Subftance, or any Species of

S 2 Sub-

140 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III.

SubftanceSj into another. In natural Subftances, indeed, fuch as
Vegetables and Animals which are propagated by Generation, we ob-
ferve that the mixtures of fome of them produce a motely oflspring,
participating of the nature of both Speciefes. But this confufion
goes no farther than the firft generation : And, if we could fup-
pofe it to go fiirther, it could not affed the prefent argument ; for it
is impoflible to conceive that Mind can propagate Mind, in the way
that Plants and Animals produce one another. We muft therefore
hold, that the Intelledual, the Vegetable, and the Animal Natures,
whatever improvements they may receive in their feveral kinds,
continue always diftindl Subftances, and never run into one another ;
fo that the Vegetable never becomes an Animal, nor the Animal
an Intelledual Being. And, if fo, we muft not dream, as fome phi-
lofophers appear to have done, of an afcent of Minds from the low-
eft to the higheft ; nor imagine, that the Vegetable, by being pafled
through certain Strainers ond Refiners, can ever become Intcl-
ieaual.

2do, It follows, from the three Subftances being diftind, that the
deftrudion or annihilation of one cannot produce the deftruclion of
the other. If, indeed, the Intelledual Mind was nothing but a Qiiality
or Property of the Anhnal, and the Animal the fame of the Vegetable,
it would be impoflible that the one could fubfift after the other was de-
ftroycd : But, as they are fcparate Subftances, they muft have a fcpa-
rate exiftcnce, not dependent upon one another, or upon the exiftence
of any other Subftancc, as Accidents or Qualities are dependent upon
the exiftence of the Subft.inces in which they are inherent. Suppo-
ftng, therefore, that, at our death, the Animal Life in us was wholly
annihilated, as it no doubt ceafes to exift in the fame compofition of
Matter, our Intelledual Mind, being a diftind Subftance, would ftill
continue to exift : And the only confequcnce with refped to it

would

Chap. II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 141

would be, that it would lofe the miniftry of the Animal Life, and
could not move Bodies, nor receive perceptions and impreflions
in the fame manner as it did before. Our Intellectual Part is not
more connefted with our Animal, than the Animal is with the
Vegetable in us ; and yet we know, not from reafoning only, but
from fad: and obfervation, that the Animal or Senfitive Life may
ceafe in one of our members, and yet the Vegetable continue.

It may, therefore, be laid down, as a general propofition, That,
when Subftances are diftinft, however they may be conneded toge-
ther, the deftrudion of the one will not be attended with the de-
ftrudion of the other. That this is the cafe of Bodies, we have ocu-
lar proof; for different corporeal Subftances, however intimately
they may be mixed and incorporated together, can be feparated and
analyfed, without any hurt to any of the compounds by the diflb-
lution : And the fame is true of the compofition of Mind.

^tioy If the incorporeal Subftances in us cannot be deftroyed or
annihilated, by the feparation from one another, or even by the an-
nihilation of any one of them, if we could fuppofe fuch a thing,
much lefs can they be deftroyed by the feparation or diflblution of
the Body to which they are joined ; for they arc Subftances ftill
more diftind, if poflible, from Body, than from one another. Body
being of a nature much more different from Mind, than any Species
of Mind can be from another. As to our Intelledual Mind, it is not,
as we have feen, immediately conneded with our Bodies, but only
with our Animal Life, through which it operates upon our Bodies,
and receives impreflions and perceptions from thence : But in
that way only it is conneded even with the Animal Life ; for, when
it forms Ideas, thinks and reafons, it ads by itfelf, without the leaft
afliftance from the Animal Part of us. And, as we know the Na-
ture

142 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IIL

ture or effeiice of nothing, except by its operations, or, indeed, that
it at all exifts, Ariftotle, I think, nioft philofophicaliy, concludes,
that the Intelledual, as it operates feparately, has a fcparate and
independent exiftence *. — And thus it appears, that, by the dillblu-
lion of our Bodies, or their annihilation, if we could fuppofe fuch a
thing, our Intelledual Part cannot be deftroyed, any more than by
the dilTolution or annihilation of any other parcel of Matter.

As to the Animal Life, there may appear more doubts, beca.ufe
the Animal Mind operates by bodily organs. But, if we are con-
vinced, that it is a Subftance diftin£t from thefe organs, we cannot
fuppofe that, by the derangement, or total dinblution of thofe or-
gans, the Mind itfelf fhould be deftroyed. It ufes other organs or
inftruments, by which it operates upon Bodies, fuch as Levers and
wedges ; yet nobody fuppofes that, by the deftrudion of thefe, the
Mind who employs them is deftroyed. Now, the only difference
betwixt the two kinds of inftruments is, that the one is remoter,
and the other nearer and more clofely connecfled with the Mind. I
think, therefore, we may fafely conclude, that the Animal Subftance
in us, and in other Animals, is not deftroyed by the deftrudion of
the organs or inftruments which it employs. Whether it can be
fuppofed to exlft feparately, without being annexed to any organs,
as our Intelled may exift, is another queftion, which I fhall conf^-
der prefently.

"What I have faid of tlte Animal Life will apply equally to the
Vegetable ; for, if the Vegetable Life be an Immaterial Subftance,
it is impoffible that it can perifli with the compofition of Matter to
which it is annexed : But it will not from thence follow that it
exifts in a feparate ftate.

4/(7,
* See Vol. I. p. 196.

Chap. II. A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. 143

4/«7, As, therefore, none of tlic three Minds can perifli by the dc-
ftriidion of one another, or of the Body, it is evident that, if they
do perifh, it muft be in confequence of fomething in their own na-
ture that makes them liable to Death and Dcftrudion. Now, this
cannot be the cafe ; for, in the ordinary courfe of Nature, of which
only I am fpeaking, not of any extraordinary or miraculous interpo-
fition of Deity, there is nothing annihilated : And what we call the
Death or deftrudion of any Subftance, fuch as Animal or Vege-
table, is nothing but the diflolution or feparation of the Bodily parts
of it, and the derangement of the organization by which the Plant
or Animal operated. Now, of an immaterial Subrtance, which has
no parts, it isimpofTible that there can be any diflolution or derange-
ment of parts ; and I will venture to affirm, that whoever fpeaks of
the death or annihilation of a Soul, or of any other Mind, has no
Idea affixed to his words, and fpeaks without underftanding what he
fays.

5/0, As to the queflion, Whether thofe Minds exift leparated from
all Matter and Mortal Concretion, I think there can be no doubt
but that the Intelledual Mind may exift in that way ; for, as it can
operate without Body, there can be no reafon given why it fhould
not exift without Body. We are fure that the Supreme Mind exifts
in that manner. And, as our foul is in a conftant ftate of progref-
fion, even in this life, when we live as we ought to do, there is the
greateft reafon to believe, and none at all to doubt, that we at laft
fhall be fo refined and purified from all the contagion of Matter,
.as to become pure fpiritual creatures. But this will not happen,

Donee hnga dies, perfeSfo temporis orhe,
.Concretam exemit labetn, purumqiie reliquit
Etherium Sen/um et aiirdi Jmiplicis ignem *.

Even

* Virgil. jEn. Lib. (J. t. 745.

144 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III.

Even in this life, a common imderftanding ads without Body ; and
the philofophical Mind ads fo much in that way, that it may he
faid to exift, for the greater part, without Body. It is true, indeed,
that a perfed Savage, that has not formed Ideas, can hardly be faid to
operate without the Body, or to be any better than a mere Brute. But
ftill he is an Intelledual 'Qoing potentially, as we are in our ftate of
infancy : And it is a fine obfervation of Ariltotle, That, in things
eternal, fuch as the Mind is, whatever gsa^s, potentially, will, fome
time or other, exift in energy or actuality ; fo that, in fuch Beings, there
is no difference betwixt the pojfe and the ejfe *. And, therefore, as it is
impoffible to deny but that the human foul ?nay exift in that way, it is
fair to conclude that, fome time or other, it ivill fo exift, not only fe-
parated from Body, with which I have fiid it is not immediately con-
neded, but even from Animal Life.

As to the Animal Life, I do not think we have any reafon to believe,
that it either does, or ever will, exift in a feparate ftate: For we fee, that
all its energies and operations arife from Body, and are relative to Body
only ; and, therefore, as we know nothing of the nature of any thing
but by its operations, we ought to conclude, that it is of fuch a Nature
as never was deftined to exift without Body. And, if this be true
of the Animal Life, it certainly cannot be otherwife in the Vegeta-
ble Life : Nor indeed can we have any idea of a Vegetable Mind
without a Vegetable, which it nourifties, makes to grow, — preferves

the individual, and propagates the kind f.

6 to,

* To y«e^ i»J^i;i;lir^«( T«u litai (ivh» >i«^f{!i 1» Tcif «<5"iOI5* De NdtU, Aufcult. Lib- 3.

cap. 5. Seil. 6. And the reafon is, that, if what is in potentiality never exifts, the
potentiality would be given in vain, and would exiil for ever to no purpofe. Now,
fays Ariflotle, Nature does nothing in vain ; MaS'sh « i^vtrn i^aiu futrry Lib. 3. cap,
10. De j47iima. It may be obferved that Ariftotle applies this maxim only to things
eternal, meaning the Principles and E (Fences of things, which, being immaterial, as
I have fliown, (p. 72. )> are all eternal ; whereas the corporeal forms are in conftant
diange and fucceffion.

t See what I have further faid upon the feparate exiftence of the feveral Minds
in us, in the firft volume of this work, book, z^ chap. 16.

Chap. ir. A N T I E NT M M T A P H Y 8 I C S . 145

Gto, The (loilrhie, therefore, of Tranfinigration, wliich I believe
is the nioft antient philofophy in the world, co:nes to this, upon the
principles of my philofophy ; That, as Mind never perilhes, when-
ever the Body to which it is annexed is difTolved, if it he by Nature
deftined not to exift feparately without Body, it muft, of noceiTity,
animate fome other Body, and, therefore, mult tranfinigrate into an-
other compofuion of Matter. This mufl: be the cafe of both the
Vegetable and Animal Life, and, for the greater part, I believe, of
the Intelledual Life ; as there are very few fouls that are prepared,
upon quitting this Body, for the higheft ftate of refinement, which
muft be in a feparate ftate of exiftence.

■ The only queftion upon this fubjed appears to me to be, F/oiii
what form, to what form the feveral kinds of mind may be moved ?
and, Whether the tranfmigration be univerfal to the three feveral
orders of Being, Vegetable, Animal, and Man ?

That the Soul of Man tranfmigrates into Man, cannot, I think,
be doubted, unlefs we fhould fuppofe that there is a creation of a
new Soul for every Human Body that is born, which no philofo-
pher will believe, and which Synefius, the moft learned Bifhop of
the antient Chrifl:ian Church, declares he could not believe *. Or, if
we {hould fuppofe this new creation, what is to become of the Souls
of the departed ? They are not fit, for the greater part, as I liave
faid, to exifl; in a pure Spiritual State : They muft, therefore, ani-
mate fome body ; And what Body fo fit as that of Man ?

But what fhall we fay of the Animal Mind ? Does it tranfini-
grate into the Body of Man ? And I am of opinion it does not :
For, as the Animal Mind cannot, as I have faid, be transformed into
the Intelledual Mind, if we could fuppofe fuch a tranfmigration,
Vol. n. T the

*■ See Vol- I. p. 260.

146 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III.

the Animal might have the form of a Man ; but he would not be
really a Man, any more than an Idiot or a Changeling.

The greatefl difficulty in this matter is, to know whether the Hu-
man Mind tranfmigrates into the Brutal form. And it is the opi-
nion not only of the philofophers of the Eaft, but of fome of the
Weft, particularly Plato, that the Human Soul may, by way of pu-
nilhment, be degraded to inhabit a Beaft. Whether it be fo or not,
is a queftion, which, I think, philofophy cannot determine : Only
this w^e know with certainty, that, if the Human Intellect be in a
Brute, it muft be there latent, as it is in us in the womb and during
our infancy.

That there muft be a tranfmigration of the Animal Mind from
Animal to Animal, and of the Vegetable Mind from Vegetable to
Vegetable, is, I think, evident, if it be true, what I have laid down,
that neither of thefe Minds is annihilated, or periflies, any more
than the Intelledual. I think We alfo know with certainty, that thefe
tranfmigrations of the Animal and Vegetable life are governed by
certain rules, as well as every thing elfe in Nature : But what thefe
rules are, I believe no philofopher ever can difcover.

But, What fhall we fliy of that principle of Motion, that Ele-
mental Life, as I call it, which is in every particle of Matter ? Does
it tranfmigrate from one particle to another ? And, I fay, it does
not ; bec.iufe no reafon can be affigned for fuch tranfmigration : For,
as this Life is in the minuteft particles or indivifible atoms, there is
no dilTolution or feparation of parts, as in the Bodies of Animals
and Vegetables ; and, confequently, the life, which animates them,
continues always in them, without tranfmigration or change of any
kind=

What

I

Chap. 11. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 147

What I have faid in this and the preceding chapter, will, I hope,
put the important dodtrine of the feparate exiftence of the Intellec-
tual Mind in a clearer view than it has been hitherto put, and will
fliow the truth of what Ariftotle fays, " That, when it fo exifts, it is
" what it truly is *;" by which he means, that, being free of the con-
tagion of the Body, and delivered from all the paffions and difor-
ders which its conjundion with the Animal produces, it is truly it-
felf. And indeed it is much more difficult to conceive it joined
with a fubftance fo diflferent as Body, than to conceive it exifling by
itfelf.

What I have faid will, I hope, alfo put the immortality and e-
ternity of the foul upon the fureft bottom, on which philofophy can
put it : And, accordingly, Ariftotle makes that conclufion from its
feparate exiftence "j". And, indeed, it anfwers at once all the objec-
tions that have been made to its immortality : For, if it be a fepa-
rate fubftance from the Body, it is not merely a certain modification,
or organization, of Matter, as Dr Prieftley maintains, which, there-
fore, muft be at an end when the Body is diftblved ; and, if it be
a feparate fubftance from the Animal Life, it will not perifli when
that life ends, as Lucretius fuppofes.

And indeed, the arguments ufed by this philofopher plainly fhow,
tTiat the fourcc of the error is confounding the three fubftances, of
which we are compounded, with one another, and with the Body with
which they are all incorporated. And, indeed, if I really believed tliat
all the three were qualities of the fame fubftance, fo united together,
that they could not exift feparately, I fliould be much difpofed to

T 2 believe,

* ^«»,r9-t<j, Je erii fi«»o» rtvi' ixi^ tTTt. lib 3. De Atiima, cap. 6.

t The words he ufes are, •^«».xt<ij *«. a.?^(«». — See the explanation of tliefe words,
v'hich I have given in a note upon p. 140. of vol. i.

148 ANTIENT METAPMYSICS. Book III.

believe, that tlie Body, in which they are all inherent, was that fub-
ftance, and that, when there was an end of it, there was an end of
them alfo.

Further, tliis dodrine of the Intclledual Mind, or Soul, being a
feparate fubftance, not only {hows the impoflibility of Mr Locke's
notion of Matter thinking, but fhows us alfo the ground of his er-
ror ; for he thought, no doubt, that the faculty of Thinking was
no rnorc than an improvement, or refinement, of the Animal Life.
Now, if we Ihall likewife fuppofe that the Animal Life is notliing
more than the Vegetable exalted, and, as it were, fublimated, it is
hut going one ftep further to fuppofe, that the Vegetable is nothing
eli'e but Matter organized, and of a more artificial texture than com-
mon Matter : And, if fo, the whole of us is Material, the Soul as
well as the reft ; whereas, if the foul be a diftind fubftancc, it is
impoffible, as I have fhown, that either of the two Animating Prin-
ciples can be tranfmuted into it, much lefs that Matter can become
SouJ.

The Human Soul, therefore, may be fitly compared to the Mafter
of a Ship, who fits at the helm^ and governs the vefl'el : This veflTel
muft be properly equipped with mafts and fails and all inftruments
or organs proper for navigation ; otherwife the Mafter cannot per-
form his office. In like manner, the Body muft have all the necef-
fary organs, and thcfe in good order; otherwife the Soul cannot per-
form its fundion of government. The next in command, under the
governour of this Veflel, is our Animal Nature ; and, under the
Animal, the Vegetable. Thefe two operate diredly and immedi-
ately, by their feveral organs or inftruments, which are parts of our
Bodies, in the fame manner as the Mafts, Sails, and Rigging, may
be faid to be parts of the Ship : Whereas, the Soul does not operate
immediately or diredly by thefe organs, but, like the Mafter of the

Ship,

Chap. IL ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 149

Ship, gives dire£lions to the officers under him to employ them.
And, though the conjundion of our Souls with our Bodies is no
doubt clofer, and more intimate, than that of a Mafter with a Ship,
yet our Soul is no more a part of our Body than the Mafter is of
the Ship : And, therefore, as the Mafter, even while he is in the Ship,
can aft by himfelf without the Ship, and can do other things befides
governing the Ship, fo can our Soul, even when it is in the Body.
— If this comparifon be juft, it is as improper to fay, that it is the
organization of the Body that makes the Soul, as it would be, to
fay, that it is the conftruftion of the Veflel, and its being furnifhed
with all proper inftruments of navigation, that makes the Mafter ;
and it is no more true, that the Soul perifhes when it leaves the
Body, than that the Mafter perifties when he leaves the Ship *,

Lajlly^ If we are convinced that our own Souls have a feparate
cxiftence, both from our Bodies, and from our Animal Life, and
are eternal, we ftiall be eafily difpofed to believe that there is in the
Univerfe an Intellect infinitely fuperior to ours, that has the fame
feparate and eternal cxiftence. And, in this refpe£t, the dod:rine I
have maintained in this Chapter will be of great ufe in Theology ;
for, as I have more than once obferved, it is only from ftudying our
own Mind, and its properties, that we can ever rife to any compre-
henfion of. the Supreme Mind.

CHAP.

•This comparifon of the Soul to the Mafter of the Ship, T am indebted for to the
Author, above quoted, of the Religion of Nature Delineated, p. 192.

150 ANT IE NT METAPHYSICS. Book III.

HAP. III.

Whether there be not tivo Intelledlnal Subftances 'uiithin us. — Dijlinc-
tions necejfary to be made for refolving this ^leftion. — ly?, Diftinclion
betivixt Mere Power, or Capacity, and Actuality. — 2d., Diftinflion
betivixt Form rt«^ Matter. — 3d', Dijlinclion betivixt Subftance and
Accident. — Accidents are perceived by the Senfcs, but Subftance is
an Idca/ormed by Intelled. — The Human Intelled exi/Is only po-
tentially— not only in the Individual, but in the Species. — The
Frogrefs from Potentiality to Adluality flovt) in the Individuals of
Civilized Nations — very much floiver among Savage Nations. —
Of the Nature of the Firft Ideas formed by Savages.— Z^f Form
.in them not fepardted frofn the Matter. — Practical Intelfigence in
Civilized Nations, not much different. — Great Difference, in Point
o/" Intelligence, betivixt the Savages it'^o fubfift by Induftry, in the
Practice of certain Arts., and thofe ivho live upon the Natural
Fruits of the Earth.— The S:iv age does ?w/ Speculate — therefore has
no Ideas oj High Abftradion — is neither Arithmetician nor Geo-
meter.— What his Ideas of Number a7id Figure are. — Of his Idea
o/'Mind — does 7iot make the Di/linSiioii betivix't Natural Caufes and
the Operations of Mind — believes in fuperior Minds. — Speculative
Intelligence contrajled ivith Pradlical.

BY what I have faid in the preceding Chapter, I hope I have
made it evident, that our Intelleduul Mind or Soul is a Sub-
ftance, diftind, not only from our Body, but from our Animal and
Vegetable Life, however clofely it may be conneded with them, in
this our prefent State. — But Intelledl appears fo different, in dilTer-

ent

Chap. III. ANT IK NT METAPHYSICS. 151

ent Men, and in the fame Men at different times and in different
ftates, that fonie have doubted whether there be not different Intel-
ledlual Natures in us, and whether the Animal, Man, be not ftill
more compofed than I make him : For, as Ariftotle has obfer-
ved *, there are very many parts of the Mind, fuch as the Intellec-
tual, the Senfitivc, the Phantaftic, the Oredic, &c. ; and it is diffi-
cult to determine whether they be Subftances by themfelves, or
Qiialities of the fime Subftance. As to this doubt concerning Intel-
led, I mentioned it in the preceding Volume t, ftartcd by one
of Arillotle's commentators ; and, even in Ariftotle himfelf, there
are fome paffiiges, which look as if he were inclined to give us two
Intelleds, diflinguiftied from each other by their feveral operations ;
and no lefs a philofopher than Plotinus underflood this to be Arif-
totle's meaning, as we are informed by Philoponus, in his commen-
tary upon the Sixth Chapter of the Third Book of Ariftotle, De
Anima. This is a matter of no lefs curiofity than importance in the
Phllofophy of Mind ; and therefore I propofe to examine it in this
Chapter ; for which purpofe it will be neceflary to premife fome
diftindions ; for there is nothing more true, than the common fay-
ing of the Schoolmen, that, ' Qui bene diftinguit, bene docet.' And
he who thinks that, by the force of his genius merely, he can appre-
'hend thofe things in the lump, without taking the trouble to make
fuch diftindions, may bid adieu to philofophy.

And there is one diftindion often mentioned in the courfe of this
work, but of which it is proper to remind the Reader here, as,
without it, it is impoffible to explain this fubjed. It is a diftindion
which runs through all Nature, difcriminates things Eternal and Di-
vine from things Mortal and in Generation, as the Antients ex-

prefled

* Lib. •?. c 10. De Jnitna-
■\- Vol I. p. 167.

152 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III.

preffed it ; yet it is never mentioned in our modern philofophy,
though it be found ahnoft every where in Ariftotle. The diftindion
I mean is betwixt i'oif^r ov Capacity to become any thing, and Energy
or Jchiality : For the Antients, who had comprehenfive views of
things, and believed that Nature propofed an end in all her opera-
tions, confidcred not only what a thing was for the prcfent, but
what it was by Nature dcftined to be in future. Thus, they confider-
cd the Seed of the Animal or Vegetable as an Animal or Vegetable
in Capacity : The embryo in the womb, and even the infant when
it is born, was no more, in their language, than a Man in Capacity.
And not only in particular fubftances, fuch as Animals and Vege-
tables, did the antients fuppofe a ftate of mere capacity, but alfo in
the whole material world : For they underftood that all the Bodies
we fee,.fo various in their form and texture, did all proceed from a
firfi; Matter, which had no form at all, but was capable of receiving
all forms ; fo that it was every thing potentially^ but nothing a^ually.
And this Ariftotle underftood to be the cafe, even of Minds incorpC'-
rated with Bodies ; for he has faid that the Human Intelledl is, at
firft, nothing but mere capacity.

In all things that are generated and corrupted, there is a ftate be-
twixt the two, which is the perfect ftate of the thing, and to which
it has, by Nature, a tendency and progrefs ; as, on the other hand,
when it has pafled that ftate, it has a tendency to decay and diflblu-
tion. This ftate of perfection is, in the language of Ariftotle, call-
ed, by a word of his own making, enteleheia.

As Nature does nothing by ftarts and bounds, there is a regular
progreflTion in every thing, and fometimes a very flow one, from
mere capacity to this perfedl ftate, beft fhown in its energies and
operations, by which the end of Nature is fully accompliflied, every
thing, by Nature, being deftined for adion and operation ; for other-
wife

Chap.III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 153

wife It would exift to no purpofe. — But nothing can operate, that is
not fitted and difpofed, by its nature, to operate. This difpofition
is called, in Greek, t'^.f, or habit : And, though it makes the thing
perfedt, yet, as it is only preparatory to Adtion, which is the ulti-
mate end of Nature, it is called by Ariftotle the Firfi Entelccheia ;
whereas the other is the Complete Entelecheia or, Energy^ of what is
come to its ftate of perfedlion *.

This is the progrefs of things in generation and corruption. As
to things divine; we conceive no fuch progrefs in them, nor any di-
ftindtion betwixt Capacity, Habit, or Energy ; but we hold Energy
to be eflential to their Nature, fo that they cannot exift without e-
nergizing. But this does not hinder that inferior Beings of this kind
may be improved in their Natures and Energies, though we cannot
conceive them when exifting by themfelves, and not joined with
Body, in a ftate of mere Capacity, without Energies at all, or with
interrupted Energies.

There is another diftindion that I likewife think of abfolute ne-
ceffity in this argument ; but neither is it made by our modern phi-
lofophers, though it be the foundation of the antient philofophy of
Nature : The diftindion I mean, is between Matter and Form. Thofe
who are perfedlly unlearned in the antient philofophy, will readily
conceive this diftincSlion in the works of Art, in which they fee the
fame materials afluming very different forms : And the antients faid
there was the fame diftindtion in the works of Nature, and that there
was Matter^ or, as it is commonly called by modern philofo-
phers, Firjl Matter, which received indifferently all Forms and
Qualities, and was the common fubftratum of all material thin^-s •
the exiftence of which we muft admit, as I obferved before *

Vol. II. U unlefs

* For this diftindlion betwixt the »rj»T» and hvrt^t i>TiM)i»», Sec Arid. lib. 2.
De Animay cap. 1 .

t P 12- 3.--

154 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III.

unlefs we will maintain, with the C;irtcrians, that Matter and
Extenfion are the fame. — This philolbphy is much more antient
than the philofophy of Plato and Ariftotle, and, I am perfuaded, is
as antient as any in the world : For it was the philofophy of the
School of Pythagoras ; and, I think, there is no reafon to doubt that it
was brought by him from Egypt. It is to be found in that moft va-
luable piece of Pythagorean philofophy, Timaeus de Anima Mundiy
who fays that the Material World confifts of three things, the Idea,
that is, the Form, — the Matter, — and the compofite of thefe two, that
is, the things which are perceived by our Senfes *. As to Subftan-
ces immaterial ; it is almoft needlefs to obferve, that they could ad-
mit of no fuch compofition ; they were all Form, and therefore the
moft fimple of all Beings.

The laft diftindtion I fhall mention is well known, even to thofe
who are no farther advanced than to the threfhold of philofophy ; it ia
betwixt Subftance and Accident, — a diftindlion which runs through
the whole of things, every thing exifting being either Subftance
or Accident. It is fo obvious, and has been fo often taken
notice of before, that I fhould not have mentioned it upon this oc-

cafion.

•See what I hav€ Lid before in a note upon p. 70. of the different ways in which
Plato and Ariftotle exprefs themfelves, concerning the Form, or Idea, of a Thing,
and that Idea joined with Matter, fo as to make a Compofite, which is apprehended
by the Senfes. — Without entering into the controverfy betwixt Plato and his
fcholar about Ideas, I think it muft be admitted, that the Matter of which any na-
tural fubftance is compofed, is in conftant change, and never one moment the fame:
It is, therefore, the Idea of fuch fubftances alone that has a permanent ex*
iflence ; and, accordingly, it is only by the Idea that any thing is an objedi: of
Intelleft. And it is in this way that Ariftotle himfelf argues againfl. Heraclitus,
and others, who faid. That nothing had any permanent exiftcnce, but every thing
was in a perpetual flux like the ftream of a river; Metaph- lib. 4. cap. 5. — p. 878.
edit. Du Val.

Chap.III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 155

cafion, If it had not been to obferve, that, by our fenfes, we only
perceive the Accidents of things : But it is by our Intellect only that
we perceive the Subftance of any thing ; for the Intelle£t, colle£bing
together the feveral Accidents of the thing, and perceiving that they
muft exift in fome Subjlratum or Subjedt, does, in this way, form
the Idea of Subftance.

Having premifed thefe obfervations, I will now apply them to the
Human Intelledl. And, in ihcjirji place, I think it is evident, that,
in our entrance upon this ftage of our exiftence, it exifts only Po-
tentially, not Adually : For, though our Soul be, as I hold, im-
mortal and divine, yet, being fo intimately connedled with the Body, it
is fo far mortal and in generation, and therefore muft have the fame
progrefs from Potentiality to Adluality, that all things mortal and in
generation have. I hold, therefore, Ariftotle's comparifon to be juft, of
our Mind in that ftate to an unwritten tablet *, or, as we would fay,
to a blank fheet of paper : For, whether we fuppofe, with Ariftotle,
that our Ideas originate in this ftate, and are formed by the Mind
from objeds of Senfe, — or with Plato, that thefe obje<3:s only excite
and refufcitate them, as it were, from the dormant ftate they are
in at our birth, — it is certain that then we have them not, at leaft, in
Energy and Ufe.

And not only is there this progrefs, from Potentiality to Aduality,
in the Individual, but, as I hold, alfo in the Species. To be convinced
of this, we need only confider how flow the progrefs of our chil-
dren is in underftanding, notwithftanding the intercourfe they have
with IntelleQual creatures, and how much they learn by imitation
and inftrudiion. But how much more flow muft the progrefs of
the perfedt Savage be, without fuch advantages ? And, indeed, it

U 2 appears

• Lib 3. De Anima, cap. 5. injtne.

156 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III.

appears to me, that, if Societies had never been formed nor Arts
invented and pradiled, we never lliould have had any ufe of Intel-
le»ft. And, as there is no reafon to doubt but that every nation was,
at fome time or another, in this favage ftate ; therefore, I fay, this
progrefs from Potentiality to Aduality is of the Species, as well as
of the Individual : And as cur Intelledt is by far our nobler part,
fo the progrefs of it is very much flower than of our Animal and
Vegetable part. But of this progrefs of Man I will fay a great deal
more in the fubfequent part of my work : I ihall therefore only add
here, that, if there were not fuch a progrefs in Man, and a progrefs
not to end with this life, human life would be not only miferable,
but rldiculoufly imperfedt, and quite irreconcileable with any Syftem
of Wifdom and Goodnefs in the Univerfe.

Of our progrefs from Senfations to Ideas, and of the difference
betwixt thefe two, I have fpoken fully elfewhere. As the firft exer-
cife of Intelledl among Men muft have been pradical, and, as the
fubjed of Pradlice is Particulars, or Individual Things, it is evident
that, in our firft Ideas, there could not have been the feparation, a-
bove mentioned, of the Form from the Matter ; but the Compofite
would be the Subject of fuch Ideas. Of the manner in which we firft
form our Ideas, I have already fpoken at pretty great length *. I have
there faid, that, among the feveral qualities, which, we fee, are inhe-
rent in the fame Subjedl or Subftance, as it is called, we perceive one
that is principal, which makes the thing what it is, and diftinguifhes
it from every other thing. This is the Idea of the Thing, which
when we perceive to be common to many things, we are faid to^^-
neralife, and to have the Idea of a Species. In this way we perceive,
indeed, the One in the Many ; but we perceive it only with the Many.
Such are the Ideas of all Savages : For, to deny that Men who

Speak,

* P. 72. 85.

Chap. III. A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. 157

Speak, Conkilt, Deliberate, and Rcafon, oftffn much better than we
do, have Ideas, and affirm that they have only Senfations, fhews the
grofleft ignorance of the philofophy of Mind. Nor, indeed, is
Pradical Intellect much diflcrent among us ; for we muft necefTarily
know Individuals: And, if the Savage be inferior to us in the know-
ledge of Generals, he does more than make it up in his accurate
knowledge of Particulars ; and, therefore, in the pradice of thofe
Arts to which favages apply, fuch as Hunting, and War of the kind
they ufe, they difcover much more fagacity than we do. I fpeak of
thofe Savages whom the neceffities of Life oblige to pradice Arts,
fuch as the Indians of North America ; for, as to thofe who live in
a country and climate where Nature is fo bountiful as to give them
every thing necelTary for their fubfiftence, without art, and with
little or no labour, fuch as the Caribs and other inhabitants of the
Weft India Iflands, they have little ufe of Intelled of any kind ; — fo
little, that the Spaniards, when they firft came among them, could
hardly believe them to be human creatures ; and it required a Bull
of the Pope to eftablifh their humanity.

As the Savage does not fpeculate, it is impoflible that he can have
Ideas far removed from Matter and Material Things. He cannot,
therefore, have Ideas of Exiftence, Time, Space, Subftance as op-
pofed to Accident, Quantity, Quality, Relation, and other Ideas of
higheft Abftradion. Even Number, — that Idea of fuch neceflary
ufe in Human Life, that no Society can fubfift, or Art be pradiced
without it, being that by which weconfider a thing, either as one^ fub-
fifting by itfelf and feparated from other things, or as a multitude of
fuch feparatc things defined and limited, the Savage only perceives as
applied to particular things, but cannot ufe Numbers as we do, with-
out fuch particular application, nor confider their nature and proper-
ties by themfelves, and abftraded from every thing elfe. He is there-
fore no Arithmetician, and ftill lefs a Geometer ; For, though he

muft

15 8 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III.

mufl. have the Idea of Figure in particular things, he has not learned
to abflrad the Dimenllons of Body from Body, and to make a Science
of them by themfelves. As to Subftance Immaterial ; it is an Idea
of the higheft Abftradion, and the nobleft fubje£l of Speculative in-
tellcifl ; But it is fuch an Idea, as it is impolRble the Savage can
have perfedt, that is, abftradlcd from all Matter ; for -it is only by
entering into ourfclves, and ftudying our own Minds, for which the
Savage has neither leifure, being wholly occupied with the concerns
of the Animal Life, nor inclination, that we can attain to iuch an
Idea. He cannot, however, be faid to have no Idea of it : But his
Idea of it is the fame that he has of Number and Figure ; that is, he
perceives it incorporated with Matter ; for he perceives that there is
a Power that moves Body, and which is not Body, Nor do I believe
that there is any Savage who thinks that Body moves itfelf, or who
makes the diftind;ion, which our modern philofophers make, betwixt
Natural Caufes and the Operations of Mind ; for thofe Natural Cau-
fes, when diftinguifhed from Mind, can be nothing elfe but Matter
and Mechanifm, by which they fuppofe all the Operations of Nature
are produced. But the Savage is fo far from being of that opinion,
that he underftands, and, I think, rightly, the winds and waters,
and every part of Nature, to be moved by Mind ; though, I believe,
he is not philofopher enough to diftinguifh the feveral kinds of
Mind, or to conceive that there may be Mind that ynovcs without
Intelligence or Volition, But he perfedly conceives that the Mind
which performs thofe operations is a far greater Power than his
Mind ; and, therefore, all favages believe in Superior Minds : And
fo far the Indian,

ivhoje uiUutorJ Mind

Sees God in clouds^ and bears him in the "wind *,

is much wifer than many of our philofophers.

Let

• Pope's F-JT'iy on Man.

Chap. Iir. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 159

Let us now contraft, with the operations of the Pradical Intellea,
the Speculative Life and the Occupation of a Philofopher. He
Jives, as it were, in the Intelleaual world, and is converfant with
pure Ideal Forms, refembling, in fome degree, thofe in the Mind of
the Deity, the Patterns and Archetypes of all Material Tilings, which
have no reality or permanency of exiflence except in fo far as they
participate of them. He dwells, too, within himfelf, ftudies himfelf
that is, his owA Mind, and from thence proceeds to the contemplation
of fuperior Minds, and even of Deity itfelf. The employment,
in this manner, of his Nobleft Faculty upon the Nobleft Objeds,
muft, of neceflity, produce the greateft happinefs of which human
Nature, in this ftate of its exiftence, is capable. Nor is this hap-
pinefs difturbed, in any great degree, by the clamorous wants of an in-
digent Animal Nature, more indigent in vulgar men than in any other
animal, the imagination of man being more rich and fertile than that
of any Brute, and confequently producing more appetites and defires,
which having invention and fagacity fufficient to gratify, he is thereby
rendered more miferable. It is no wonder, therefore, that Ariftotle
thought the Contemplative and Philofophical Life fo much prefera-
ble to the Pradical * ; and that Plato judged it neceffary to compel
the citizens of his commonwealth, after they had continued to phi-
lofophife fome time, to defcend to govern the ftate, and to mix in the
affairs of men, as the Gods of Homer did in the battles of the
Greeks and Trojans, — Qiof m notoi/ utf^w^ for fuch a Man is truly a
God among men.

CHAP..

• See the note * upon p. 105.

i6o ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III.

CHAP. IV.

The Sluefiionjiated^ Whether the Pradlcal and Speculative Intelled
he the fume ? — They are the fame. — This the Opinion o/"Simplicius.
— Objeclions to this Opinion. — ift, That the Oh]tGis of the two
Intelleds are different. — zdo, The Authority ©/"Ariftotlc on the o-
ther Sith.—Anfiver to the firft Objedion., that the Pradical Intel-
led is a neceffary Step in the Progrefs to the Perfed Intellcdl, and
that the Objeds 0/ Pradical and Speculative Intelled are not more
different than the Ideas o/perfed and imperfed Intelled 7niiji be.

Difiinfiion betivixt Pradical Ideas and Senfations. — Anfiver to

the Authority ©/"Ariftotle — that, ivhen he /peaks of the Intelled 0-
perattng by the Phantafia, he means the Pradical Intelled. — The
fame ivhcn hefpeaks of a pafTive, incorruptible, Intelled. — The In-
terpretation of Simplicius of that Paffage, better than o/'Philopo-
nus. — This is evident from Ariftotle's Words. — No Philofopher ever
thought more highly of^ the Pluman Soul. — He makes Energy its
Effence in a fe par ate State — Joined -with the Body it mufi befome-
times quiefcent, as is Senfitive Life. —Difference, in this refped,
betivixt the Senfitive and Vegetable Part of us. — What Ariilotle
means luheu he fays, that the Soul, in a feparate State, does not
Remember, Reafon, Love, or Hate. — Wonder that Ariftotle's
meaning fjjould have been miflaken. — The Reafon of the mijlake. —
Ohfervations on the DoBrines of this Chapter — as to the Mind's in-
tuitive Perception in a feparate State, and as to its conftant Adivi-
ty — the Mind's Sympathy -with the Body iii this State — ivhat
Ariftotlc ?neans by the Soul's not Loving or Hating in a feparate
State.

H

AVING thus made the diftindion betwixt pradical and fpe-
culative Intelled, let us now inquire, \yhether the Mind,

that

Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. i6i

that perceives only the perifliable- Forms incorporated with Matter, —
is converfant only with individual things, and employs itfelf in the
government and diredlion of the Animal Life, — be the fame with
that which contemplates the eternal and unchangeable Forms of
things, — makes Mind its principal objeft, — abftrads itfelf as much as
is polTible in this ftate of exiftence from all external things, — and
places its whole happinefs in the fludy of Beauty and Truth ; or,
in other words, Whether the Pra<fl:ical and Speculative Intelled: be
the fame ? And I am of opinion, that they are the fame : And I
find, that the two commentators upon Ariftotle, Philoponus and
Simpllcius, are of the fame opinion. When I wrote the Firfl: Vo-
lume, I had fome doubt about the opinion of Simplicius ; but, up-
on ftudylng his commentary more diligently, I find, that he makes
our Intellect only one ; but, as he is full of the Platonic notions of
the proceflion of Mind, he fuppofes that our Intelledual Mind, per-
fed: in its own nature, goes out of itfelf, as it were, mixes with
Material Things, and becomes that Pradlical Intelled, which is of-
ten fo imperfedL

To this opinion it may be objeded, into, That the feveral facul-
ties of Perception of the Human Mind are diftinguifhed from one
another by their feveral objedts. In this way, Senfe is diftinguifh-
ed from Intelled, the one perceiving individual things, the other
generals. Now, as we have one faculty by which we perceive Forms
incorporated with Matter, and another by which we perceive the
Forms pure and unmixed with Matter, and even Mind itfelf, the au-
thor of all Forms, thefe faculties muft be different.

2do, The authority of Ariftotle may be urged againft me, who,

though he allows there is an Intelledin us, which is immortal and e-

ternal, exifts feparately, and energizes by itfelf,does,at the fame time.

Vol. II. X fpeak

i62 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III.

Ipcak of an Intellecl that does not operate without the Phantafia, —
is pafllve and corruptible.

To tliefe objccftions, it may he anfwercd ; That, as there is a pro-
grefs in our Intellcdl from mere potentiality to a pcrfe<fl ftatc, hut
which mull ncceflarily be tlirough fcveral ftatcs lefs perfevTl:, accor-
ding to a general law of Nature, which holds, as I obferved above,
in all things in generation, and particularly in the Animal and Ve-
getable parts of us, as is well known to Naturalifts, I fhould defire
to know, what more natural progrefs, or indeed what other pro-
grefs, can be imagined, than that the intellect, inftead of perceiving
the pure Forms or Ideas, which, no doubt, are the proper objects of
Intelled, fhould perceive them mixed with Matter ?

As to what is faid of the difference betwixt the Ideas of the Prac-
tical and Speculative Intelled: ; they are not more different than the
Ideas of Perfecft and Imperfect Intel le£l muft neceflarily be. That
there fhould be a difference is abfolutely necelTary ; and it is not
pofTible to imagine any other. But the Ideas even of the Practical
and Perfe(n: Intelletfl are flill Ideas, and altogether different from Sen-
faiions : For the Senfe, as I obferved before, perceives only the ac-
cidents of things ; whereas the Practical Intelle(5t, imperfe(n: as it is,
perceives the Form of the thing, though not without the Mat-
ter.

ido, As to the authority of Ariftotle, it is true that he fays, that
we do not think without Phantafms, that is, Appearances in the Phan-
tafia *. But it is evident from the context, that Ariftotle is there
fpeaking of the Pradlical Intelledl, which, as it is converfant about

particular

• OuJ(9r«Ti ytH a>«t> ^xtTxcfiarti ij ■^vx>'>. Lib. 3. De Aiiima, cap. 8.

Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 163

particular and individual things, mufl: operate with the afllftance of
the Senfes and the Phantafia : But, as to the Speculative Intelleft,
which is converfant only with the Ideas or Forms of things with-
out the Matter, it is evident that it cannot operate properly, if it
takes the afllftance of either Senfe or Imagination ; and it is cer-
tainly true what Plato fays, that nothing difturbs the Intelledt more
in its operations than the Phantafia. And, when it is employed upon
its nobleft objedt, — Mind and things divine, it is evident, that, if
we try to pidure them in our Imagination, we never can have any
proper Idea of them. It is true indeed, that it is very difficult to
think even upon fubjedls of fpeculation, without any help either
from Senfe or Phantafia: But, to think fo, is undoubtedly the per-
fedion of Intelledt, to which the philofophers of the Platonic
fchool, in later times, afpired, by a certain regimen and manner of
life, which they called Cathartic *. But, without fuch preparation,
though in Geometry we ufe the Senfes and Phantafia more, I think,
than we ought to do, yet in Arithmetic thofe, who have learned
the fcience, operate upon numbers, and inveftigate their nature and
properties, without applying them to particular things, and confe-
quently without the Senfes or Phantafia. And, therefore, I per-
feftly agree with the Pythagoreans, who held, that nothing was fo
proper a preparation for the contemplation of Divine things as the
ftudy of Numbers, which, for that reafon, they ufed as the fym-
bols of Divinity and of all the myfteries of Nature f ,

X2 It

• See Philoponus in the beginning of his commentary upon Ariftotlc's books
De Anima.

* See Nicomachus Gerafinus' Arithmetic, and the t« StoAoy.i/^i.* rm A^itfmn.
Hnj, — a compilement from this author and fome other Pythagorean writers ; a very
rare and curious book, which I faw in the King of France's library and had the
ufe of for fome time, but do not know where elfe it may be found.

i64 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III.

It is true, alfo, that Arlftotle fays, that the Intellect is pafTive and
perifhable * ; and it is from this pailage chiefly that it would fcein
Ariftotle makes a diftindtion of Intelledl into that which is operative
and immortal, and that which is paflive and perifliable. To avoid
this interpretation, Philoponus fuppofes that Ariftotle means here,
by the Nou? -n-aSjiTixcf, the Phantafia. But Ariftotle every where di-
ftinguifties betwixt the Intellect and the Phantafia, particularly in
liib. 3. De Amma^ cap. 3. et 4 ; nor do I fee with what propriety
he can call the Phantafia Intellect, any more than the Senfe. I
therefore agree with Ariftotle's other Interpreter, Simplicius, that
Ariftotle here means, by the paflive Intelled, the Intelle<f!t that
is pradical, of which he had faid before, that it does not operate
without the Phantafia, and, confequently, not without the Senfes.
Now, this Intelledl is certainly paflive, as it has its Ideas not from
within, but by imprefllons from without ; for whatever is aded up-
on is paflive. But the commentators upon Ariftotle very properly
diftinguifli betwixt a TAOofj or fuffe ring, which tends to impair or
deftroy the thing, and that which tends to improve and perfed:
it. The firft kind is what is called ?i9of*, or Corruption : But the
ir«6o{ here is of the latter kind ; for, by the impreflion of external
objects upon the Senfes, the Intelled is excited, improved, and
brought to perfedion in us. Ariftotle adds, that this Intellect is
corruptible or perifliable : And, I think, Simplicius has given alfo a
very good meaning to this expreflion ; for, fays he, whatever ope-
rates by Organs, if thefe organs are perifliable, may be faid alfo to
be perifliable. Now, as the Pradical Intelled operates by the Or-
gans of Senfe, which are perifliable, fo far forth it may be faid to
be perifliable alfo t.

That

• Hnhrix*; ««( tpSufTiK, Lib. 3. De Jnlma, cap. 6. in fine.

t Simplicius's commentary upon the firft book of Ariftotle, De Anima, p. l6.
of the commentary, and alfo his commentary upon the 3d lib. p. 69.

Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 165

That this is the meaning of the paiTage, and that Ariftotle is there
fpeaking of the Pradical Intellca, as oppofcd to the pure Theoreti-
cal Intelledt, is, I think, evident from the words, which plainly
oppofe to one another the two different manners of operating of the
Intellecft. And, indeed, through the whole chapter, the two are
contrafted together ; and the one is faid to be vnpajfive^ or «T»9»if,
and «/uiy»if, or unmixed^ while the other is faid to be pajjive and
corruptible *. But that he did not believe that thefe two Intelleds
were two diftinft Subftances, and not one and the fame Subftance,
is evident from the whole dodrine laid down by him in this and the
preceding chapter, which is, That our Intelled, without any diftinc-
tion betwixt the Speculative and Pradtical, proceeds from a ftate of
potentiality to a flate of perfection : And, if fo, it is evident that, be-
fore it can arrive at perfedion, it muft operate imperfedly, and be
at firft paffive, before it can be active ; a diftindion with which A-
riftotle fets out in the beginning of this chapter.

Bur,

* The whole words in the particular paflage referred to are as follows : X^jurSnf,

(fpoking of N«t/f), Jl »<rl< fintt Touj' oarij gcrlj* k«i Tturt fttrtf tc6x>»Ttf khi aiiiot, Ou
fitnftciivcfUf ot, cTi revTo f<ii' xsruhf' i n v»iitTiK»{ »•»;, (fix^Tof, K»t «>iv rtuTtv tvSlt

»o«. Lib. 3- De J/iima, cap. 6. where it is evident that the t»wt« fcn nTTxttf, which
he oppofes to the uxintiKu N»v5, is the pure fpeculative Intelledt, which, he had
faid before, in the fame chapter, was both «/«yiis and nrrxttit : The «» fitiiftttiv*'
fiit, with which the fentence begins, I hold, applies to the pure Intellect, and
means not that it forgets, but that it has not any ufe or need of memory ; as I think
is evident from a paffage in the firfl book of this treatifc, cap. 5. towards the end,
where, fpeaking of this pure Intelled, he fays, That, when the Body to which it is
joined is dilTolved, okti /utnutvivn, tvrt fiixn j of which paflage I fliall fay more in
the fequel. What he fays in the end of the paffage before us, that, without
the paffive Tntellefl, the Mind thinks of nothing, refers to the progreffion from
that ftate of mere capacity in which the Intelledl is, before it is impreffed by ex-
ternal objefts ; which impreffion is abfolutely neceflary for its operating in this
our prefent flate.

i66 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III.

But, whether Ariftotic believed that we had two Intelledbs, or
only one, it is perfedly clear that he believed that at leafl we had
one Intelledt that was incorruptible and immortal. And, indeed, it
appears to me, that no pliilofopher or divine ever thought more
hi"-hlv of the Human Soul than Ariftotle. Even when he confiders
"it as adling in conjunction with the Body, he fays it is x^f'V) that
\s,jeparable ; but, when it is adually feparated, (for that is the force
of the word x"f"&«0> '^^^^^ ^'^'X ^^ '''» what it truly is, immortal
and eternal *.

But, farther, he fays that, in this feparate ftate, it is, by
its eflence, active ; fo that it cannot exift without ading or energi-
fing, T« ouT»« m t)ii^yii*-\ : And, a little farther down, in the fame

chapter,

• Xwfi^sc, ^i srTi juomv T«w«' iit'n Irli" kki Tot/To fimf mtxticTty k«i «iJie». De Anima, Lib 3.

cap. 6. The diflin£liori betwixt mUtxrat and xiiitf I have obferved elfewhere, (vol.
I. p. 140.) When he fays, that the Intellect only is immortal and eternal, he
means, as Philoponus has well explained the paflage, that the other parts of our
compofition, fuch as the Senfitive and the Vegetative, are mortal ; for, it appears
from other paffages in this work, particularly lib. i. cap. 3. in fine, that Ariftotic
did not believe in the Pythagorean dodtrine of Tranfmigration.

If the Intelleft alone be immortal and eternal, and the other parts of our compo-
fition not eternal, it is evident, that, according to the opinion of Ariftotle, it muft
be a fubftance by itfelf, and not a quality, improvement, or refinement of the Sen-
fitive or Vegetative parts of our Nature; and, accordingly, Ariftotle, lib. \.De
Jnima, cap. 5. has exprefsly faid, that the Intelieft is a fubftance by itfelf, which
is not corrupted or impaired by the decay of our Senfitive Faculties : 'O h »»v( t„-

xlf tyyinrBcii, ivrim T»» ovrit, k*i ov fiiiifirB*f fttc\iTr» yu^ «^<i({iT mt vac fttt «» tm yn^a

»na.-j^uirtv!, &c. where it is to be obferved, that the word iyyi»«f5«» implies, that the
Soul is added, or, as it were, infertcd, into the corporeal part, being a fubftance
quite diftinft from it. And, in the ift chap, of the 2d book, and indeed every
where through the whole work, he fpeaks of Mind, in general, as being a fubftance
by itfelf.

\ Lib. 3. cap. 6.

Chap. IV. ANT I EN T METAPHYSICS. 167

chapter, he fays, That it docy not fometnncs think, and fomctlrncs not
think, cvz oTi junK mi, on h cu mi ; that is to fay, it always thinks.
This Philoponus feems to think is going too far, and making the
Human Mind equal to the divine ; and therefore he would under-
ftand it to mean, that there is always fome one Human Intelligence
in the world that is thinking ; but the words will not bear that
meaning ; for Ariftotle is not fpeaking of many Intelligences, but
of one. Nor does the Senfe require it ; for, though the Human In-
telligence, when feparated from all concretion of Matter, thinks al-
ways, (and, indeed, it appears to me it is impoffible to conceive it ia
that ftate without thinking), we are not to fuppofe that it either has
the fame extent of thought, or the fame power, as the Divine Mind.
On the other hand, I am perfuaded, that our IntelledV, when joined
to this Body, as it was at firft in a dormant ftate and did not exert
itfelf atall, fo, after it is put in adlion, it fometimes retires, n^ Milton
fays, into its private cell, ivhile Nature rejls *, in the flmie manner as the
Senfitive part of our Nature is quiefcent while we fleep ; for this is the
confequence of the Animal and Intelledual Minds being fo intimately
joined with a fubftance inert and fo different in Nature, as Body,
by which they are funk and weighed down, fo as to need rcpofe.
As to the Vegetable Life in us ; having a principle of motion in it
refembling that in unorganized Bodies, which is always adivc, it
continues to a£l, even in our fleep ; and indeed it was neceflary that
it fliould do fo, for the prefervation of the Animal f.

More-

* Paradife Lod, Lib. 5- v. 108.

t The reader will obferve, that I have altered my opinion concerning the con.
ftant operation of Intelledl:, which 1 have maintained in vol. i. p 141 20J. But I
am not aftiamed to acknowledge my error, and to confcfs, that I was led Into It
by that exprelBon of Ariflotlc's above mentioned, ov^ in ^s» mi, in Ji tv me which

1

i68 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III.

Moreover, Ariftotle fays, that our Intcllcdual part, in this fepa-
rate ftate, does not love or hate, nor remember, nor make ufe of the
A.awia, or Difcourfe of Reafon ; all v^rhich, he fays, belong to the
compound of Soul and Body, not to the Soul by itfelf, it being then
impaflive, and of a Divine Nature *. The meaning of which is,
That our Soul, in that State, has all its Ideas prefent at once : It fees,
intuitively, premifles and confequences, without deduction or infe-
rence, or any procefs of Reafoning : It has no need of Memory or
Reminifcence, which are only neceflary in this ftate of our exiftence,
to prevent our Ideas from being as fleeting as our Bodies, which,
as they muft affedt our Mind, are the caufe of forgetful ncfs, impart-
ing to the Mind, in fome degree, their fleeting Nature ; and, there-
fore, in the paflage above quoted, Ariftotle fays very properly, that
the Intelleft, in its feparate ftate, does not remember, becaufe it
is not pafllve, that is, not affeded by Body f : And, lajlly^h.^ fays,
That it does not love or hate ; by which he means, that it is free
from all fuch afFedlions or pafllons which he confiders as belonging
to the Animal Nature, from which it is feparated, as well as from
the Body.

Such being the dodrine of Ariftotle concerning the Soul, laid
down fo clearly and diftindly, it muft appear very furprifmg that

his

I inadvertently applied to the IntellecTV, even 'when united to the Body; wlierea*
Ariftotle certainly underftands it only of the Intellect ;g*{<«-5ii«, or feparated from
Body.

• T« S'l Jianiicr^jti, xNi ^iAii», » ft'Titf, tvK !s-1( •««>»« (t»u iov) irx6ii,xXXu revh rev t^ot'
rt( fxiix, It lx!<>« ixi>- ^'»> «*' feuTjti (fHt^tftiiov, evri ftynfioiuii, tuTt (fiXti' »v ya( ixw
ftv r,», «?t>i« T»v K.»inu,i »ua>i0Xif i ii ttvs iirtif #ii«ri{or ti icxi xwtill; t/lit. Lib. I. Cap. f.

Where Philoponus obferves, that Ariftotle ufes the word «r*{, becaufe he had not
yet fo fully proved, as he does afterwards, thrft the Soul was of a Nature Divine,
and therefore impaflible.
j- 0» (ifiifittinet, in xwalti.

Chap. IV. AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. 169

his meaning fhould have been miftaken by any of his commentators;
and yet the eldeft of them, Alexander Aphrodifienfis, was pf opi-
nion, that Ariftotle believed the Soul to be mortal, and to perilh with
the Body. Of this we are informed by Philoponus, in his commen-
tary upon the Sixth Chapter of the Third Book, De yln'wia; and that
he does no injnftice to the Aphrodifian, is evident from a work of
his, ftill extant, upon the fubjed: of Mind, in which he pretends to
deliver the dodrine of Mind upon the principles of Ariftotle's philo-
fophy. I cannot fee any other ground for his error, except that
Ariftotle fays, that Mind is the «iJ'of, or Form, of the Animal; which
is faying no more, than that it is the Mind which makes any Animal
of a Species diftindt from a Vegetable or an unorganized Body.
But, furely, it does not follow from thence, thaf Mind is not a di-
ftind: Subftance fromBody : For two Subftances, united together, will
make a Species diftindl from either ; and, according to Plato, all the
feveral Forms and Speciefes of things are Subftances, which have a
feparate exiftence, not only out of Matter, but out of the Mind of
any Intelligent Being ; which Subftances, being united to Matter,
compofe the feveral Speciefes of Corporeal Things.

I will conclude this Chapter with a few obfervations. — However
extraordinary this philofophy of Ariftotle's may, at firft fight, appear,
yet, if we attend carefully to what pafles in our Minds even in this
life, we fliall be difpofed to believe that his notions of the feparate
ftate of the Soul are not ill founded.

And, in xh.tjirfl place, it muft be admitted, that our moft perfect
knowledge, at prefent, is our knowledge of Axioms or Self-evident
Propofitions, of which we perceive the truth intuitively, without any
difcourfe of Reafoii. Now, in a more perfed; ftate of our Intelli-
gence, it is evident that we muft perceive the truth of more propofi-
tions in the fame way; and, in a more perfedl ftate ftill, we muft
Vol. II. Y perceive

170 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III.

perceive every propofition in the fame manner as, we arc fure, Supe-
rior Intelligences apprehend them.

And here we may fee, that, when we knoiv in this way, the Me-
mory is entirely ufelefs. In reafoning, we muft remember the pre-
mifes before we can infer the conclufion : But, when our Ideas are
all prefent to us, and when we perceive intuitively their connection,
we have no need of Memory or Recolle<ftion.

2d0y As to the unceafing Energy of Mind in its feparate flate, it
will not at all appear incredible, if we confuler the wonderful acti-
vity of our Mind even in this life. While we are awake, we al-
ways think ; and, as there are but few people that do not dream,
even in our fleep our Phantafia at leafl:, if not our Intellect, is bufy:
For the Phantafia I hold to be a faculty of our Mind, quite diftinCt
from Intellect ; and I make the fame diftinCtion of the Phantafia,
that Philoponus docs in his commentary upon the 4th Chapter of
the 3d Book De Anhna. He there fays, that the Phantafia is cither
retentive only of the perceptions of Senfe, or it is operative and a
kind of Painter, joining together the forms of things, which it
has received from the S«ifes, often in a very flrange and fantafti-
cal manner. Of the firft kind is the Phantafia of the Brutes,
which appears only to retain and prefent to them, waking or fleeping,
the impreflions of fenfible objeCts, juft as it receives them from the
Senfes : Of the other kind is our Phantafia, which is exceedingly ac-
tive, both when we are awake and afleep. This Phantafia, if it is
by Nature fo happily conftituted as to put together its images
in the moft beautiful and graceful manner, makes what we call
Genius ; and, if it be cultivated and improved by ftudy and art, it
produces artifts of every kind, fuch as Poets, Painters, Muficians,
and Architects. — In the feparate ftate of the Soul, there can be no
Phantafia, any more than Senfes or Senfationj but the mind con-
templates

Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 171

templates the original Forms of things in the Intellectual World,
where it dwells.

How much the Mind fympathifes with the Body in this our pre-
fent ftate, muft be known to every body. If the Body is in ill ha-
bit, it difturbs all the operations of the Mind, — its Memory, its
Phantafia, and its Ihtelledtual powers : And, on the contrary, if the
Body is in good habit, and if the Mind be not difordered by Paf-
fion, all the fundions go on well. But, let the Body be ever fo
well difpofed, every philofopher, who may be faid to live by the
Mind, muft acknowledge, that the Body is a dead weight upon him,
difturbing more or lefs the operations of his Intelledt, and making
them ceafe altogether for a great part of Iiis time. It was to pre-
vent this, at leaft in fome meafure, and to feparate the Body from
the Mind, as much as it was poflible, in this life, that the Cathartic
Regimen above mentioned was invented by the later Platonifts ; by
means of which, fome of them have told us, that they were exalted
above Humanity, and enjoyed for fome time communication with
fupeiior Minds. Thofe, who do not believe that there are Minds
fuperior to their own, will laugh at fuch ftories; but, as I do moft
firmly believe that there arc fuch Minds, and that we are by Nature
deftined for intercourfe with fuch Minds after our death, if we live
as we ought to do, I can eafily believe, that men favoured of Heaven,
and who abftraft themfelves as much as poflible from the Body,
may, even in this life, anticipate the enjoyment of fuch communi-
cation,

3/1*0, What will appear moft extraordinary In this account of our
Soul given by Ariftotle, is, that it does not love in its feparate ilate.
Can we conceive, it will be faid, that the Mind, in its moft perfedt
ftate, fhould not enjoy the greateft pleafure of the Rational Mind ?
For, what can give greater pleafure than that pure love, which

Y 2 Plato

172 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IIT.

Plato fpeaks fo much of, and which, from him, is called Platonic
Love? But the love, that Arlftotle here fpeaks of, belongs to the A-
nimal Nature: And, where it is, there muft alfo he the contrary paf-
fion of Hatred ; and, accordingly, Ariftotle joins the two together,
and fays, that the Mind, in its perfe(fl ftate^ neither Loves nor Hates.
Now, all thefe alTedions of the Animal Nature are, as it is well
known, much ftronger in Man than in any other Animal :' And,
though they no doubt give pleafure of fome kind, yet it is certain
that they produce the grcatert: part of the mifery to which human life
is liable; for they muft neceflarily be attended with Anger, Jealoufy,
Envy, Malignity, and fuch like perturbations, as cannot be the por-
tion of perfed Intelligence. But, as in that ftate we muft enjoy the
greateft happinefs our Nature is capable of, and as that cannot be
without defire of fome kind or another, (for Happinefs is the ac-
complifhment of defire), the mind, in that ftate, muft neceflarily de-
fire the enjoyment of Beauty and Truth. Nor indeed is it polfible,
I think, to conceive, that Intelligence, entirely feparated from the
Animal Life and all its concerns, can have any other enjoyment be-
fides the contemplation of Beauty and Truth; which, as they are to
be feen in the higheft perfedion in Nature and its great Author, the
ftudy of thefe higheft objeds muft be the occupation and delight of
pure Intelligence. — But, of this, I have faid enough in the preceding
part of this volume.

CHAP.

Chap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS.

BOOK IV.

Of the Origin of our Ideas, and the feveral Properties
of Mind.

CHAP. I.

Ariftotle has /aid nothing of the Origin of our Ideas. — Different Opi-
nions of his Co7nnientators upon the Subje^. — Mr Locke's Difco've-
ries upon this Subjed. — All our Ideas, accorcfuig to him^ derived

from Corporeal Objects that are in perpetual Change. — This Ma-
terial Origin of our Ideas degrades the Human Mind — fuppofes
that the Soul had no Exiftence before it came into this Body. — All
Ideas not derived from Niaiter, particularly the Ideas of Mind. —
Our Mind, being after the Image of, God, has fome of thoje underived
Ideas. — -^// Ideas that are not, originally. Perceptions <)/ Senfc,
cannot be derived from Sen{e. — -Exatnples o/' original Ideas m otfr
Minds. — The Idea o/'Subftance 07ie of thefe. — Mr Locke's Notion of
Subftance. — No Knowledge of any thing ivithout the Idea oj Sub-
ftance. — The Idea o/" Matter and Yorm, another Example — a If o of
Caufe and Effect. — Mr Hume argued ivell, ivhen he denied, upon
the Principles of Mr Locke's Philofophy, that there ivas any Idea
o/" Caufe and Effedt — alfo the Idea o/" Beauty. — Mr Locke's impcr-

feEl Notion o/" Beauty. — Alfo the Idea of Good, not derived f'om
Senfe or Refledtion. — Jlfo the 'whole Clafs of Ideas oJ Relation. —
The ayitient Divifion and CloJJif cation <?/ Ideas, different from Mr

Locke's.

174 ANTIKNT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

Locke's The new Language, that Mr Locke has introduced into

rhilofophy, not Jo good as the antient ^—obfcure and complexed, com-
pared-with the antient.— Two Reajons for injijiing fo much upon the
Defers of Mr Locke's Philofophy.

HAVING, in the preceding Book, explained fufficiently the na-
ture of our Ideas, I propofe, in this, to treat of the Origin
of them, — a fubjed of which I have often wondered that Ariftotle
has faid fo little ; for, though he every where diflinguifhes Ideas
from Senfations, yet he no where tells us, as far as I remember,
from whence we derive our Ideas. But Plato has been more expli-
cit upon the fubjeft, and has written a whole Dialogue, to prove
that the Mind derives all its knowledge from itfelf, and that, every
thing it now knows, it knew in a former ftate of its exigence, and
is only excited to the remembrance of it by the operation of ex-
ternal objeds upon our Senfes ; fo that all our knowledge in this life
is Reminifcence : And I obferve, that fome of the Akxandrian com-
mentators upon Aiiftotle, who have joined the philofophy of Plato
with that of Ariftotle, (and, indeed, I think, they ought never to be
feparated), fpeak the fame language. This opinion 1 hold to be the
truth.

Thofe, who know no more of the philofophy of Mind than what
they have learned from Mr Locke, will be furprifed that I fhould
make a queftion of what he has determined fo long ago, and what
has been received with fuch general approbation, not only in Britain,
but all over Europe. But, I think, they would have much more rea-
fon to wonder, if Mr Locke, unafTifted by learning, or any know-
ledge of the antient philofophy, fhould have difcovered what efcaped
all the philofophers ot antiquity, though there was no branch of
philofophy that they cultivated fo much as the Philofophy of Mind.

To

Chap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 175

To add to their difcoveries upon this fubjed, even after the mofl: di-
ligent ftudy of their writings, I hold to be very difficult. But, with-
out fuch fludy, I think it is, by the nature of things, impoffible that
a fingle man, in the fpace of a fhort life, fhould, by his own abili-
ties merely, and fuperiority of genius, have difcovered what had
not been difcovered by the labours of fo many eminent men in E-
gypt, Greece, and Italy, through a fucceffion of thoufands of
years.

This great difcovery of Mr Locke, fo celebrated by his admirers, is
fhortly as follows :We have perceptions of the operations of external
objects upon our organs of fenfe ; or, in other words, we have percep-
tions of Senfe : We havealfo perceptions of the operations of our own
Minds, fuch as perceiving, thinkingy believing, &c. The percep-
tion of individual objeds by the Senfc, Mr Locke calls Ideas of
Senfation : The perceptions of the individual operations of our own
Minds, he calls alfo Ideas, and diftinguiflies them from the other,
by the name of Ideas of Reflexion. Thofe fmgle perceptions,
whether of the objeds of Senfe or of the operations of our ov^n,
Mind, when generalized, he calls General Ideas ; and they are ge-
neralized by the Mind's comparing together particular Senfations
with one another and alfo particular Refledions with one another,
and obferving what they have in common, and feparating or ab-
flrading that which they have particular or peculiar. And thus is
formed the Idea, which, from having what is common to fo many
of them, is called a General Idea ; and, from being feparated or
abftradcd from what is peculiar to each of them, is likewife called,
in the language of Mr Locke's School, an Abftrad Idea. And all
Ideas, according to Mr Locke, by which he means all appearances
in the Human Mind, of whatever kind, (for in that Senfe he has told

us-

I yd

ANTIENT METAPHYSICS.

Book IV..

us he ufc3 the word *,) are either Ideas of Senfation, or Reflcdion,
ia the fenlc wliich I have given to thefe terms.

If this dodlrine he true, we have no Idea that is not made out of
perceptions of Senfc, or perceptions of the operations of our own
Minds. Senllition, therefore, and Refledion, are, according to Mr
Locke, the only Sources of our Ideas : Or, to fpeak more properly,
there is hut one fource of them, viz. Senfation, as the Mind, at
\n-(\, onlv operates upon tlie ohjcds of Senfe ; fo that, even our
Ideas of Refiedion are to be derived from Senfe. And, further,
as Senfe is excited by external objeds, thefe objeds are ul-
timately the fource and origin of all our Ideas ; fo that all we
know and undcrftand, all thofe eternal truths which philofophers
talk fo much of, have no better origin than thofe tranfitory, material
objeds, which are running a conftant round of generation and cor-
ruption.

Mr Locke does not appear to have believed, that the Human Mind
had any Ideas, or, indeed, any cxiftence, before its appearance oa
this ftage : And, if fo, our Intelligence, which cannot be concei-
ved without Ideas, mufl: be derived entirely from Matter. A philo-
fophy., which debafes the Human Mind fo much, ought to be care-
fully examined : And, if the reader is not violently prejudiced in
favour of this material origin of our Intelledual Part, I hope to be
able to convince him, tbat, however much fomc of our Ideas may
be conneded with Matter, we have others, and thofe too of the
greateft importance, which have no connedlon with Matter, and
cannot be derived from any reflex ad of the Mind upon its own o-
perations, but are immediately and diredly from thofe ftores,
which, I fay, arc originally in the Mind itfclf.

Ill

• Introdud'on, k€t. 8.

Chap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 177

In the fvjl place, Neither Mr Locke, nor any body that believes
iu God, will fay, that all the Ideas of every Mind, and particularly
of the Divine Mind, are from Matter; or, that the Ideas, or
Forms, which we find incorporated with Matter in the Material
World, are not derived from thofc Ideas in the Divine Mind which
make what we call the Intelle£lual World, of which the Material
is no more than a type, or fhadow, that is continually pafTing away.
If then it be true, that we are made after the image of God, is it
not natural to fuppofe, that we have in our Minds fome, at leaft,
of thofe original Forms underived from Matter, which, though they
may be latent fome time, are, at laft, roufed and excited, Jirjl, by
Impulfe from external obje£ls Upon our organs of Senfe, and then
by that adive power which is eflential to the Intellectual Mind.

But the matter does not reft upon this probability ; for, I will
give many examples of Ideas, and thefe too of the greateft impor-
tance, which can have no other origin : And I will fhow, that Mr
Locke's fyftem, which derives all Ideas, or Appearances, in the hu-
man Mind, from Senfation and Refledtion, however plaufible the
novelty of it may have made it appear at firft, is, when thoroughly
examined, exceedingly defedive and altogether erroneous.

The firft example I give of an Idea that is original and Indige-
nous in the Mind, and not derived either from Matter, or from the
operations of our Mind upon Matter, is an Idea which ftands at the
head of the categories : The Idea I mean is Suhjlance, which be-
longs to the Unlverfity of things, as all things in the univcrfe are
either Subftance or Accident. Now, this Idea is certainly not a per-
ception of Senfe, as I have fhown elliewhere * ; and, accordingly,
the Brute has it not : Nor is it a Perception of any operation of our
Vol. II. Z own

• P- 73.

i;8 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

own Mind ; for, let us abftrad, generalize, combine, and repeat, as
much as we pleale, any Senfation or Refledion, we never can pro-
duce the Idea of Siihftunce.

It may be faid, perhaps, that the Mind, by abftrading the quali-
ties of any thing from the fubjeifl of which they are qualities, gets
the Idea of Subftancc. But the Mind, before it can make fuch an
abflradion, mull have already acquired the Idea of Subllance ; for
we only abflra£l one thing from another, which we know. Thus,,
we abftra^rt the fmell of a rofe from the colour, and both from the
feel ; but we cannot abftradl any of the three from the Subflance
of the rofe, till we have got the Idea of that Subftauce.

It will be afkcd. How then do we get an Idea, which neither
Senfe^ nor attention to the operations of our own Mind, furnilhes ?
My anfwer is. That the Mind produces it out of her own ftore; be-
ing excited to this production , by confidering that there muft be
fomething to which the qualities of any external objedl, perceived
by the Senfe, belong, and in which they are inherent. Thus, 1 dif-
cover, by my fenfes, the c|ualitics of Extenfion, Solidity, and Rc-
fiftance, in Bodies ; upon confidering which, the Mind immediately
perceives, that there muft neceffarily he fomething which is extended,
folid, and refifling : And this /omctbing I call tl>e Subftance of each
Body. I know, by Confcioufnefs, certain Operations of my own Mind ;
and, in like manner, I difcover, that, where there are operations, there
muft he fomething that operates : And this fomething is the Subftance
of Mind.

Mr Locke feems to have been fenfible, that the Idea of Subftance
cannot be drawn from either of the two fources, which he has af-
figned to all our Ideas : And, therefore, he would fain deny that we
have any fuch Idea ; at Icaft he fays, it is fo obfcure and imperfed,
that it does not in the Icaft add to the ftock of our knowledge. But

there

Chap. I. A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. 179

there are many things that we are fure do certainly exift, and yet
wc have no clear conception of the manner of their exiftcncc. This
is the cafe with refpedt to the Supreme Mind, and even our own
Minds, of the exiftence of which we have much greater certain-
ty than of the exiftence of Body. And, as to our knowledge, it
would be exceedingly imperfedt without the Idea of Subftance, or
rather we fhould have no knowledge at all : For we could not con-
ceive Qualities, without, at the fame time, having an Idea of fome
Subftance in which they are inherent ; and I hope I have already
fhown, and will further fhow, that, by diftinguifhing the feveral
fubftances of which we are compofed, there is fomething to be ad-
ded to our knowledge.

There are other two Ideas of the greateft importance to philofo-
phy ; but which likewife are neither Senfations nor Reflexions.
Thefe are the Ideas of Matter and Form^ of which the whole
Material world is compofed : For it is only the compofite of thefe
two that is perceived by the Senfes ; but it is Intellect alone that
can make the feparation, and conceive each of them by itfelf. Mat-
ter, without form of any kind, is not only no Perception of the
Brute, but it is an Idea of the Human Mind, fo remote from com-
mon fenfe and obfervation, that I doubt very few of our modern
philofophers have any fuch Idea : And, as to Form without Mat-
ter, 1 do not believe that Mr Locke was learned enough to know,
that Ider.s, of which he fpcaks fo much, are nothing elfe but Forms
of that kind. And, as to fubftaniial Forms, it is plain from what
he fays, that he had not the leaft Idea of them ; for he did not
•know enough of the fyftem of Nature, to know, that, in all natu-
ral Subftances, there is a certain Form from which all the qualities
of the Subftance refult: And this is what is called, in the language of
the Peripatetics, the Siihjl ant nil Form of the thing. In every fubjed of
Science this Form muft be difcovercd, otherwife there could be no
^Science. Thus, for example, the Geometer muft know the Effence

Z 2 or

i8o ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV,

or Subflantial Form (for thcle words are fynoni;nous)of the Triangle^
or any other Figure of which he treats, otherwife he never could de-
nionftrate the feveral quahtics and properties of the figure relulting
from that Form. It is the fame in the works of Art, if they are ported
in their kind ; for in them theie muft be fomething principal, to which
every thing elfe in the piece is to be referred. Now, to fuppofe that it is
otherwife in the works of God, and that an Animal or Vegetable is
nothing but brute lifclefs Matter, with fo many qualities inherent in
if, but unconneded, and without any bond of union among them,
would be contrary to the whole analogy of Nature, in every part of
wliich we obfcrve a wonderful union and fubordinacy of things to
one another. But of this I have faid a great deal more in the
Firft Volume of this work*.

Farther, there are two other grand Ideas, which never can be
derived from Senfation or Refledlion ; and yet they are fuch, that,
without them, we never can philofophife upon the fubjedl of God
or Nature, or indeed upon any other fubjed : The ideas, I mean,
are thofe of Caufe and Effccl. For, whatever Idea we may have from
Senfation or Refle£tion, of the thing that produus or the thing
-produced^ we never can derive from thofe fources the Idea of Pro-
du£lion, or of the one being the Caufe of the other. Mr David
Flume, therefore, argued very well upon the Principles of Mi:
Locke's philofophy, when he maintained, that we had no Idea of
Caufe and efFedt ; and that we only knew that one event preceded
another.

There is alfo another Idea, of fovereign ufe in human life, the
foundation, as I have ihown t, of Virtue, and of every thing that
gives delight to the nobleft part of our Nature, which is neither an
Idea of Senfation nor Reflection. The Idea, I mean, is that of
Beauty^ which, though perceived in objeds of Senfe, is perfectly

diftind

• B. 2. chap. 2.
t P. 112. &C.

Cliap. I. A N T I £ N T M E T A P H Y S I C 3. v8t

diftind from the perception of thefe objcdls : And, accordingly, tiie
Brutes, which perceive thcfe objeds as well as we do, have no per-
ception of Beauty ; and many of our own fpecics fee numbers of
moft beautiful things without perceiving any Beauty in them. And
it is the fame with refpedt to the operations of our Mind ; for tlie.
perception of Beauty in them is quite diftindt from the perception
of the operations themfelves.

Mr Locke fays, that the Idea of Beauty is a complex Idea of Co-
lour and Shape. If his own Idea of Beauty had been more perfcd,
he would have added Motion ; the Beauty of which is a much higher
Beauty than that of cither Shape or Colour. But I fay, that a
man may combine what Ideas he pleafes, and perceive the combina-
tion as diftindlly as poflible j yet, if he has not in his X ind a pre-
conceived Idea of Beauty, or, in common language, if he has not
Tafte, he will have no perception of Beauty in any fmgle thing, or
in any combination of things.

Moreover, I fay, that we have not, from Senfation or Refledioriy
the Idea of Good^ for the fame,reafon that we have not the Idea of
Caufe and Effedl ; becaufe Good is that which has a tendency to
produce Hoppinejs. Now, how defective muft any fyftem of Ideas
be, that does not take in thofe two governing Ideas of Human Life,
the Beautiful and the Good?

But what need I infift upon particulars, when that whole clafs of
Ideas, which, according to Mr Locke's own account of them, is mofl:
numerous, cannot be derived either from Senfation or Refledlion ?
The Ideas I mean are thofe of Relation . For, though from Senfa-
tion and Refledtion we may have the Idea of each of the two things
related^ it is impoffible that from either of thefe fources we can have
the Idea of the Relation ; which, therefore, is an Idea that the Mind
muft draw from its own ftore, without the afTiftance of either Senfc
or Reflexion.

Thu«^

i82 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

Thus It appears to be true, what the Bifhop of "Worceftcr has
maintained in his difpute with Mr Locke, that all our Ideas are not
derived from Senfation or Reflection, but that many of them are
from Reafon * ; by which he means the Mind operating oiherwife
than either by Senfe or Refledion.

Mr Locke has thought proper to clafs our Ideas according to their
origin, as he conceived it. But the Antients diftinguifhed betwixt
the origin of them, and the chiffification or arrangement of them.
With refpe(ft to the arrangement, they diftributed them into ten
clalfes, called Predicaments or Categories; and human wifdom has
not invented any better divifion of them : As to the origin of them,
they confidered that as a feparate fubjedt of inquiry, of which I have
faid a good deal in this chapter, and fliall fay more in the next.

But, before I leave the fubjedl of Mr Locke's philofophy, I can-
not help obferving, that, not only the Matter of it is very erroneous
and imperfedV, but the language of it, and the terms of art he ufes,
are fuch as I cannot approve of.

The language of antient philofophy, which came down from the
School of Pythagoras to the Academy and Lycaeuviy is fhort, clear,
and comprehenfivc, as their Ideas of things were. They divided the
univerfity of things according to their manner of exiftencc, whether
primary ox Jecondary \ calling thofe things which exifted /jrzwrt:^/)',
that is, independently by themfelvcs, Subjiances, and denominating
thofc things which had but Tifecondaty exiftcnce, dependent upon o-
thcr things, Jccidents. This diftindion of things Mr Locke has
endeavoured to ridicule t : He has, however, been obliged to ufe it,

though

• See the Bifliop of Worcefler's anfwer to Mr Locki:'s Jctter concerning fome
pafTages relating to his EflV.y of Human Underflanding, p. loo.
t Lib. 2. cap. 13- parag. rp. and 20.

Chap. I. ANTIENT M E T A P PI YS I C S. 183

though he has thought proper to change the name of Accident (a
moft fignificant appellation, as I have ellevvhere obferved, efpecially
in its Greek origin,) into Mode. — Further, they diftinguifhed and ar-
ranged things, according to their Genufes, Speciefes, and DiflFerences,
that is, the qualities winch diftingulfh one fpecies of the fame genus
from another. This dlvifion of things, likewife, Mr Locke has
thought proper to reprefent as merely nominal, adapted only to the
ufe of different languages, but without any foundation in the Nature
of things*. But the antients thought this diftindlion fo much
founded in Nature, that they defined things according to their Genus,
Species, and Difference. And, indeed, nothing (hows more that Sy-
ftem of the univerfe, the contemplation of which is the chief delight
of the philofopher, but of which Mr Locke appears to me to have
hardly had any Idea : For it fliows the proceffion of things, fuch as
it is in Nature, from the higheft to the loweft, from what is moft
general, that is, the higheft Genus, fuch as thofe that compofe the
Categories, down to the loweft Speciefes, below which there is no-
thing but Individuals : Then it fhows moft manifeftly the rerum
Concordia difcors^ that wonderful fimilarity and yet difference of
things, and that connection and dependency of one thing upon an-
other, by which every Species is a Syftem, the Genus above it a
greater Syftem, and fo on till we come to the Category, or higheft

Genus

' Book 3. chap. 5. fefl. 8. and foil. And, in his difpute with the Bifhop of
Worcefter, he has gone fo far as to maintain, that there is no Nature ctmnian to the
feveral individuals of a Species — that Man, for example, is a common name for Pe-
ter, J.imes, and John, but denotes no Nature common to thefe three; fo that it is
impoffible there can be three perfons in one Nature. — See the Bifliop of Worcefter's
anfwer to Mr Locke's 2d letter, towards the end, where the Bilhop (hews the dan-
gerous confequsnce of fuch a philofophy to Religion. And, indeed, a philofophy
which maintains that there cannot be three perfons in one Nature, or two Natur.s in
one perfon, is totally adverfe to the myllerics of the Chriftian faith, as it mult denji
the doQrinc both of the Trinity and the Incarnation.

1 34 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Buok IV.

Genus of the order. This divifion alfo Iliows the wonderful tenden-
cy there is in Nature to the owf, and chat afcent by which things rife
above one another, till they end, like a pyramid, in a point. And fo
comprehenfivc is tlie divlfion, that it includes all the poffible variety
there can be in the matter : For every thing muft either be only a
Species, only a Genus, or both Genus and Species ; and, bcfides
thcfe, there can be nothing elfe. Man, for example, being the loweft
Species, and having nothing under it but Individuals, is a Species only :
The Genus, Animal, which is immediately above Man, is both Genus
and Species ; for it is a genus with refped: to Man, but it is a Spe-
cies with refpeil to the ro iij.^lv^ov, or animated Being : And fo we a-
fcend till we come to Sitbfiancc, which is a Genus only, and not a
■Species; and, as I obferved elfewhere *, we may reduce all the Cate-
gories, or highefl: Genufcs, to one, viz. Subjlance and its Attributes,
which makes this Logical Syftem of the Antients a kind of Syfteni of
Theology.

Thus, it appears that tlie language of antient philofophy mofl
clearly exprefles the nature of things ; and the terms of Art, fo far
as concerns this philofophy of Ideas, are very few, being no more
than five, viz. Subftance and Accident, Genus, Species, and Differ-
ence. In place of this language, fo fimple and plain, Mr Locke has
thought proper to introduce a new one, much more perplexed and
obfcurc : For, in the firjl place, he has confounded Senfations and
Ideas, making Ideas to be Senfations, and Senfations Ideas ; — things,
as I have fliown, in their nature, perfedlly different : What is, pro-
perly fpeaking, Ideas, he calls Abftradl Ideas, as if there were no
Ideas but what were abftradtcd from Matter : Then he fpeaks of
Simple Ideas and Compound Ideas, and Simple Modes and Mixed
Modes ; — terms which heufesin fuch a way, that I am often at a lofs
tp know whether he means by them Accidents or Speciefes. And I

think

« Vo!. I. p 36.

I

Chap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. i8j

think it is not without reafon that the Bifhop of Worcefter, in the
treatife above mentioned *, accufes h'ltn of confounding Men's
apprehenfions with his new Terms, fuch as Complex and Abftraci
Ideas, and Specific Navies ; to which, I think, he might have added.
Modes, and Mixed Modes. — In fhort, I cannot help faying, though
I fliould give offence, that the philofophy of Mr Locke is, under the
appearance of a new philofophy, nothing but the antient, much
mangled and deformed, and expreffed in a barbarous jargon. From
this barbarity, Mr Harris has the merit of having firft refcued Philo-
fophy : And I defpair not to live to fee both the dodrines and the
language of antient philofophy reftored.

I have infifted fo much upon the errors and defeats of Mr Locke's
philofophy, for two reafons : frji. To clear the way for Plato's doc-
trine of Ideas, which I am to deliver in the next chapter, by remo-
ving thofe objedions to it, which will naturally arife in the Mind of
every one who has ftudied Mr Locke's book upon human under-
flanding ; and, idly, To ftiow how infuflicient the beft natural parts
are, unafTifled by antient learning, in the ftudy of philofophy; for
Mr Locke was undoubtedly a man of excellent natural parts, very-
much fuperior, in that refpeA, to Mr David Hume, or to any that
has philofophifed without the affiftance of the Antients fmce his
time. And his llyle is as good as, I think, that of any man can be,
who is not a Scholar and has not formed his Tafte upon the befl:
models of antiquity ; without which it is as impoflible to write well,
as to excell in the arts of Sculpture and Painting, without ftudying the
antient monuments of that kind.

Vol. n. A a CHAP,

* P. 121.

i86 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

CHAP. II.

The general Propofition maintained in this Chapter ^ That all Ideas are
originally in the Mind, is demonjlratedfrom /^<? Nature o/" Ideas, and
the Dijlinciionbetivixt thernand^cnianons, — ^ II Ideas ffui^ origi7iatey
either from Mind or Body. — The Ideas ^External Forms^r/? fo«/?-
dered. — The Senfations zvhich thcfe Forms produce^ not Ideas, hoiv-
cver much generalized or ahft railed they may be. — Our Senfations not
the Materials out of nvhich Ideas can be made. — Ideas refenible the
Form of any Piece of Workmanfljipy ivhich is not from the Matter
but from the Mind of the Artijl. — Without Senfations ive cannot
have Ideas ; but Senfations, therefore^ are not the Caufe of our
J Ideas. — They are excited by Senfations — are lejs perfetl at frft —

more perfect afterivards. — Some fo perfect as not to exijl at all in
Matter. — 0/"Ideas of Reflcdion. — Every individual Perception of
the Operation of our Mind, u, according to Mr Locke, aji Idea. —
— This not true. — There mujl be the Knowledge of the Nature of
the Operation. — This cannot be it'ithout the Knowledge of the A-
gent. — This Knowledge can only be derived from Mind. — The only
^efiion remaining is^ Whether our Mind creates its Ideas ? — This
cannot be conceived. — Ideas cannot be difcovered in the Objects in
nvhich they are inherent ^ iinlefs they be previoufly knoivn. — The
Soul being a diflincl Subftance, puts this A'lattcr out of doubt. — No
Soul can be ivithout Ideas. — If it creates Ideas, it creates itfelf. —
This impoffible. — Jill our Ideas, as ivell as our Minds, are from
God. — In his Mind the Ideas cannot be abflr acted from Matter. —
This Origin of our Ideas much nobler than that afftgned by Mr
Locke — is the conftqucnce of our being made after the Image of
God. — No innate Ideas in one Sevfe. — A previous State of the

Human

Chap. ir. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 187

Human Soul. — T'hs latent Ideas in us not called up by an Act of the
Mind, like the Ideas ive have already acquired. — That ivc have no
confcioufnefs of any thing in a State of pre-exi/lence, no proof that there
ivas nofuchState. — Mr Locke's Error^ inconjounding Confcioufnefs
and\6,cn\.\X.j . — The Intelledual Part of us may be dormant and quiefcent
for fame Time. — This agreeable to the Analogy of Nature. — In/lances
offuch a State, both in the Vegetable and the Animal, — Our Intel-
led;ual VA.rX.fome times quiefcent, even after ive are groivn up. —
Ideas even then lie dortnant in our Minds_/or Tears.

IN the preceding Chapter, I think, I have fhown, that there are
very many of our Ideas, and thefe of the greateft importance,
which are not derived from Body. The Reader, I believe, will not
be inclined to divide the matter, or to think that fome of them come
from Body, and fome from Mind ; and, therefore, I hope he will
be prepared for the general propofition which I am to maintain in
this Chapter, that all the Ideas of our Mind can come from no other
fource than the Mind itfelf. This, I think, I am able to demon-
ftrate from the account I have given of Ideas in the preceding
Book, and the diftindlion I have made betwixt them and
Senfations. I have there fhown, that, by the Senfes, we only
apprehend the external and material Qualities of things, which are
continually changing and paffing away, as well as the Matter in
which they are inherent ; whereas, by the Intel ledl, we apprehend
the Nature and Eflence of the Thing, that which makes every thing
what it is, and continues always the fame, in all the viciflitudes of
Generation and Corruption and amid all the changes to which the
material and outward Form of the thing is liable. And this is what,
in the genuine fenfe of the word, and, as it is ufed by antlent philo-
fophers, is an Idea ; which, therefore, they fay, is eternal and un-

A a 2 changeable.

i88 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

changeable, and which to know is the only Knowledge and Science *.
And, as this internal Nature and Eflence of every corporeal form is
nothing elfe but tliat internal principle which moves the Body, —
makcsit cohere, — producesall its Qualities and Accidents, — and which,
therefore, can be nothing elfe but Mind, as it is Mind that gives
being and energy to every thing; — I fay, it is only from Mind that our
knowledge of this or of any other Mind can be derived, and not
from Body, which never can produce Mind, nor any conception of
Mind,

All our Ideas, it is evident, mufl: originate either from Mind or
Body : I will begin with thofe which are moft likely to originate
from Body,— I mean our Ideas of external Forms ; of which as we
have Ideas as well as Senfations, it is fometimes, as I have obferved f,
not eafy to diftinguifh the one from the other.

Mr Locke has been pleafed to call even our particular Senfations
by the name of Ideas : But this is a language which no Man, who
cither thinks or fpeaks accurately, will ufe ; and the utmoft that
the greateft Materialift can pretend, is, that our Senfations, when
abftradted and generalized, become Ideas. But I think I have fhown
moft evidently, that Senfations, however abftradted from the Mat-
ter which produces them, or from one another, or, however much
generalized, that is, applied to different fubjedis, are ftill no more
than Senfitions, that is, impreiTions made upon our organs of Senfe,
preferved in our Phantafia or Memory J. And, if Senfations, by be-
ing

• To kno'M, therefore, in the language of Plato, Is ipxrt<rl»i ms ounxi : And
Ideas are, in his language, the r* «»t»,- o>t», and uTxvratf «im tx,tir»; while things,
In generation and corruption, ouk is-tj, ttxxx yi»Tii. The more I ftudy the do£trine
and the language of this philofopher, the more I admire him ; and I am perfuaded
that no man ever knew more of the inmoft Nature of Things, without excepting even
his fcholar Ariflotle, or had more exalted notions, both of divine and human things,
than Plato.

t P. 69.

< P. 78.

Chap. II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 189

ing abftraded and generalized, cannot become Ideas, I think it is as
evident, that, neither by feparating, compounding, or combining
them in any way, can they be Co transformed.

But, it will be faid, that, though our Senfations are not themfelves
Ideas, they are the materials ouc of which the Mind makes them,
in the fame manner as an artift makes any piece of work out of
Timber, or Stone, or any other Material j and this I know is the
common opinion of thofe who derive all our Ideas from Senfa-
tion.

But I (hould be glad to know how the Mind can operate upon its
Senfations, otherwiie than by abftrading, generalizing, feparating, or
compounding them ; and, if by none, nor all of thefe operations, no
Ideas can be produced, it is not to be conceived how Ideas are to be
made out of Senfations. — As to the woi-ks of art that are made out
of Stone or Metal, thefe materials only change their form, and the
piece of work produced is ftill Metal or ftone. But an Idea is not
a Senfation in any refpedt, but is as different from it as the Fonn of
the piece of work is from the Matter : And, as the Form has an o-
rigin quite different from the Matter, fo is the Idea derived from a
fource quite different from the Senfation.

It is true, indeed, that, in this ftate of our exiftence, confined as
we are in this prifon of flefh and blood, we can have no Ideas with-
■out imprefhons made upon that flefh and blood by external objeds.
But this is faying no more, than that our Mind at prefent cannot o-
perate without Senfations : But it will not from thence follow, that
'our Senfations are the Caiife of our Ideas ; for we muft diftinguifli
betwixt the Caufe and that without which the Cau/e cannot operate.
An animal cannot adt, or exert the fundions of the Animal Life,
without a certain degree of heat and moillure ; and yet heat and
moifture are not the Caufes of the Animal ading : I cannot fee an

objedt,

190 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

ohje(f!t, If a perlbn ftands betwixt me and it j but tliat perfon moving
out of the way is not the Caufe of my feeing it *.

Thus, it appears, that the Ideas, even of objedls of Senfc, are
not from Senfe : And, if not from Senfe, they muft be from Mind ;
and all that the Senfe can do is, to excite the Mind to produce them
out of its own ftore.

But, as there is a progrefs in our IntelletStual Part, as well as in e-
very other part of our wonderful compofition, fo the Ideas of fenfi-
ble objeds, when they are firft excited in us, are far from being
perfed : But the latent Idea is only by degrees difclofed and per-
fedcd. This is evident in the Idea of Figure, which being excited
by our fenfcs in the manner that I have defcribed f, is, no doubt, at
firft, very imperfect ; but, when it comes to be perfeded by the
fcience of Geometry, it is an Idea which cannot be derived from
Matter, becaufe it does not exift in Matter ; for there is no fuch
thing in Nature as a perfedl circle or globe, fuch as is defined by
Geometers; — there cannot even be drawn a ftraight line, in which
many crooks and Inequalities may not be perceived with a micro-
fcope.

The fame is true of thofe Forms, which we admire fo much in
Painting and Statuary ; for it is acknowledged by all the connoif-
feurs in thofe arts, that, if an artift did no more than copy life
exactly, as the Indian and Chinefe painters do, he would not de-
ferve the name of an artift. The Ideal Beauty, therefore, (for fo
it is properly called), makes the perfedlion of all the fine arts ; and
this Beauty is not colleded from Senfe or Obfervation, but arifes
from our own Mind.

Here,

• See upon this fubjed, vol. i. p. 163.

t P. 83-

Chap. II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 191

Here, therefore, we have two fets of Ideas, which cannot be de-
rived from Matter, becaufe they do not exifl in Matter; and in this
they differ from other Ideas which exift in material objedts, as well
as in our Minds. If then we have Ideas which we do not exift in
Matter, but only in our Minds, and which, therefore, cannot be de-
rived from Matter, we ought not, as I {aid in the beginning of this
chapter, to divide the matter, but to fuppofe that all our Ideas are
originally in the Mind. — And fo much for the Ideas of fenfible ob-
jed:s.

As to Ideas of Reflexion, Mr Locke does not pretend that they
arife immediately from the objedls of Senfe ; but they arife, accor-
ding to him, from our Confcioufnefs of our perceptions, of thofe
objedts : And every individual perception of the operation of our
Minds upon thofe objeds, is an Idea in his language, as well as
every individual Senfation. But I deny the one as well as the o-
ther ; and I fay there can be no Idea without fome knowledge of
the Nature of the Thing. Now, it is impoffiblc that we can have
any knowrledge of the Nature of any operation^ without knowing
fomething of the Agent. In order, therefore, to have an Idea of
Perception, Volition, Thinking, and Reafoning, we muft know that
the Agent in thefe operations is fome Inviiible Power, by whatever
name we call it, whether Mind or Spirit, And fo far even the moft
barbarous nations have Ideas of Refle<Slion ; for they know that all
that they themfelves do is the operation of a principle, which is di-
ftindl from their Bodies and will furvive their Bodies. And thus
it appears, that the Ideas of the operations of our own Minds, as
well as the Ideas of fenfible objedts, are all originally from Mind,
.and not from Body.

The only queftion then remaining is. Whether our Ideas arc
created by the Mind? — or, Whether they are always in the Mind, but

192 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

in a dormant and unconlcious flatc, till they arc excited by the iin-
prcHions of external ohjct'ls upon our organs of Senfc ? For, as I
have (hown tliat our Scnfations cannot he the nuitcrials of whicli
our Ideas are nuule, it follows of nccelfary confeciucncc, that, it they
were not originally in the Mind, they murt he created hy the Mind,
that is, produced out of nothing. Now, a power of producing out
of nothing is what the antient jjliilofopliers would not allow, even to
the Supreme Mind : But no philolbpher, antient or modern, has ever
thought tliat it belonged to any Inferior Mind. If, therefore, the
Human Mind does not create Ideas, it mud derive them, like the o-
ther Materials upon which it operates, from a Superior power ;
with this din'erencc only, that the materials of the one kind are Ex-
ternal, hut our Ideas are Internal and Original in the Mind.

It way be ohjeded, that we do not create our Ideas, but only
difcover them lurking, as it were, in external obje£ls, and immer-
fed in Matter, from which we evolve them. But here I repeat
what 1 faid before*, fpeaking of abftratfb Ideas, wliich, by many, arc
believed to be the only Ideas, That it is impoflible to ab(lra£t an I-
dea from the Matter in which it is inherent, or from other Ideas
with which it may be mixed, without previouily knowing what
that Idea is. In all compofitions of Bodies we never can find any
ingredient in the compofition, or fcparate it from the reft, unlcfs we
lirll know what it is : And, if we feck for any man in a crowd, we
cannot expe£l to find him, unlcfs wc have fomc knowledge of him
before hand. — The truth, therefore, appears to be, that our fenfations,
and the perceptions of the operations of our Mind, make us recognize
Ideas which were before in our Minds but without our being confcious
of them, in the fame manner as the Idea of an old acquaintance,
whom I had long forgot, is revived in me by feeing him, or any
thing that I knew belonged to him.

What

• P. IS'

Chap. II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 193

What appears to me to put this matter out of all doubt, is the
dodlrine that I have maintained, and, I hope, have proved to the fa-
tisfadtion of the reader, That our Intelle£lual Mind is not a fuperi-
or facuhy of our Animal Nature, but a fubftance diftindt by itfelf.
If fo, it is neceflary that it muft always, while it exifted, have had
Ideas; for it is impoflible to conceive Intelligence without Ideas,
either latent and ina<Sive, or exerted and produced.

It may be faid, that the capacity of forming Ideas is of itfelf fuf-
ficient to conflitute a Soul, or Intelledual Part. But there is no-
thing in Nature that confifts of Capacity merely ; for, though there
be many things that have Capacities, without having thofe things
a^lually of which they are capable, there is nothing exifls that hath
not fomething in Aduality and Energy ; for, if it wanted that, it
would be really nothing.

If, therefore, vre could fuppofe that our Intelledtual Mind created
its own Ideas, we mufl fuppofe that it likewife created itfelf: Now,
this is a thing altogether inconceivable, even of the Supreme Intelli-
gence, which we do not fay created or produced itfelf, but that it
exifted neceflarily from all Eternity : And, if we could conceive
the Intelledual Nature producing itfelf, Why may not the Animal
nature ? — Why may not the Vegetable likewife produce itfelf ?

It is, therefore, the Supreme Mind, from which all fubftances
material and immaterial, the vifible and the invifible world, are de-
rived, that is the Source of our Ideas, as well as of our Minds, in
which they exift. In his Mind there are undoubtedly Ideas, which,
it would be impious to fay, originated from Matter; an«' yet I doubt
thofe who fpeak of all Ideas as AhftraH Ideas^ muft believe either
that he has no Ideas, or that they are of that k'nd. This I ft Mr
Hobbes denies, and calls, very properly, fuch Ideas a 'lumult in the
Vol. IL B b Mind,

194 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

Mind, excited by external things prefling upon the organs of our
Senfes *. But he does not fay what other Ideas are in the Divine
Mind : And the fatft truly is, that he believed there were none, or,
in other words, that God did not exill ; and, thofe who believe that
there are no Ideas but Ahjlrafl Ideas, mufl: believe the fame, if they
know the confequences of their own dodlrine.

This origin, which I have alTigned to our Ideas, muft, I think, be
acknowledged to be much more noble than that which Mr Locke has
given to them, and more conformable to our divine original ; for we
mufl: fuppofe, that there is fome refemblance betwixt us and that o-
riginal. If there was not fuch refemblance, we could not, as I
have often taken occafion to obferve, have any comprehenfion of
the Supreme Mind. And what more natural refemblance than this,
that, as all the Ideas of the Divine Mind do not arife from any
thing foreign, but are originally in his Mind, fo are ouk ; and
that our Ideas are not, any more than our Minds themfelves, deri-
ved from fo vile and low a thing as Matter. If this were not the
cafe, I do not think we could be faid to be made after the image of
God.

At the fame time, I agree with Mr Locke, that there are no In-
nate Idens, if, by Innate Ideas^ he means Ideas that are prefent to
the Mind, and contemplated by it, before they are excited by that
tumult^ to ufe the words of Mr Hobbes, which the prefTure of ex-
ternal objeds upon our organs produces. But I fay they were
there, though latent and unproduced, before any fuch Tumult, and
were there even before our exiftence in this world*

There are, perhaps, who believe, that our Souls did not exift
before they came into this Body, and that there is a new creation of

Soul

* See Mr Hobbes's words, quoted vol. i. p. 143.

Chap. ir. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 195

Soul for every Body ; — a dodtrlne, which I hold to be as unphilofo-
phical as it is unwarranted by Revelation : But, fuppofing it were
true, what the learned Bifhop woald not believe *, that our Soul is
the younger brother of the Body, I fay, that our Souls, at whate-
ver time created, muft have been created with Ideas, and not mere-
ly the capacity of forming them, when they fliould be joined to
our Bodies ; for it is inconceiveable, that a fubflance, fuch as 1 have
proved the Soul to be, fhould exift with a Capacity only to exert
certain powers at fome after time. A Being, no doubt, may have
powers only in Capacity ; and we ourfelves have many fuch : But
we are fomething, in the mean time, without thofe Capacities.
Now, a Soul, without Ideas, either exerted or latent, is, as I have
faid, a mere nonentity ; for it is a fubftance without the qualities ef-
fential to it.

We are not, however, to imagine, that thofe latent Ideas are like
the Ideas preferved in our memory in this ftate of our exiftence,
which can, by an ad of our Mind, be called up, and prefented a-
gain to the Mind ; but Nature has fo ordained it, (and, no doubt,
for very wife purpofes), that they can only be excited by the im-
pulfe of objeds upon our organs of Senfe ; and even this not at
once, but with a good deal of difficulty, which makes the progrcfs
flow from Senfations to Ideas.

Neither is it neceflary to fuppofe that, if we had thofe Ideas for-
merly, we muft be confcious of them when they are excited in us,
as we are confcious of Ideas that we recoiled from our Memory. If,
indeed, it were true, what Mr Locke has maintained, that Confci-
oufnefs is the principle of Identity, being that xvhich make us the fame
to-day that we were yefterday or twenty years ago, there would be an

B b 2 end,

• His name is Synefius, the moft learned in philofopliy of all the Fathers of the
Church whofe writings I have perufed. See the paflage from him quoted in Vol.
I. p. 26*. in the Note.

196 ANTIKNT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

end, at once, of the dodrine of the pre-exlAenceof Souls; becaufewe
certainly are not conrdoiis of what paiicd in our former ftatc. But here,
again,theBifliopof Worcefter isrigft,\vho,inhisanfwertoMrLocke's
Second Letter, maintains, that, for Identity Confcioufnefs is not
neceilary, but only tliat the Vital or Intelle6lual Principle Ihould
continue the fame, whatever Hate it may be in. And, indeed, the
confounding Confcioufnefs with Identity, is one of the groflefl and
moil: nonfeiiiical errors of modern Metaphyfics, fuch as never enter-
ed into the imagination of any antient philofopher * : For it is con-
founding the evidence of a thing with the thing itfelf; confciouf-
nefs being no more than a proof, which our memory furniflies us, of
our prior exigence ; — a proof, indeed, as clear as any we have of our
prefent exiftence, of which Confcioufnefs is the only proof. But,
fuppofe we have not that proof, will it from thence follow that we

did

• WVioever will take the trouble to read, with attention, what Mr Loclce has
written upon the fubje£l of PerfonaJ Identity, will not think this cenfure too fe-
vere. It is the moft obfcure and perplexed piece of reafoning I ever read, upon a
fubje<J\ in which there is really no difficulty, if he had known the nature of the
thing which he has made the fubje£l of his book ; I mean Ideas : For, if he had
known that the Idea of every corporeal thing is that internal principle which makes
the particles, that compofe it, cohere together, produces its movements, and all its
qualities and properties ; — in fliort, makes the thing what it is, he would have
been at no lofs to know what conltitutes the Identity of every thing in the Animal,
Vegetable, or Mineral kingdoms. And, if he had underflood, as he ought to have
done, the philofophy cf Mind, he would have known, that this principle of Iden-
tity could be nothing elfe but Mind ; which being, by its nature, eternal, continues
always the fame, while the Body to which it is annexed is in a perpetual change
and flux. He appears to have had fome glimpfe of this truth with refpe£t to Vege-
tables and Brute Animals; for he fays, that it is the principle of vitality which
conflitutes their Identity. But, what evidence is there that this principle always
continues the fame ? He will not (ay that there is confcioufnefs in the Vegetable j
and I think he will hardly affirm that it is in the Brute, though he ought to fay fo,
fince, according to his philofophy, Confcioufnefs accompanies all perceptions of
every kind. Now, if the principle of the Brute or Vegetable continues always the
fame, though there be no evidence of it from Confcioufnefs, Why may not that
principle in Man, which we call the boul, continue always the fame, though want-
ing likewife the evidence of Confcioufnefs.

Chap. II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 197

did not exlft in any paft time ? Becaufe we have no Confcioufnefs
of what we did in our ftate of infancy, are we from thence to
conclude that we did not then exift, or that we never were infants ?
And the fame rcafon that makes us believe we exifted then, fhould
make us believe that we exifted in the womb, and that we may have
exifted thoufands of years before. The philofophers, who argue as
Mr Locke does, do not appear to me to make a diftindion, which
is the foundation of all good logic, and, indeed, of all found philo-
fophy ; — betwixt Subftances and Accidents, nor to have known that,
if the Soul be a Subftance, it may undergo a change as to its Acci-
dents, and yet continue the fame. It may, therefore, have Memory
and Recolledlion of its paft actions at one time, and not at another,
and yet be the fame individual Subftance. And, indeed, if this recol-
ledion be neceflary to aflure us of our exiftence in every paft time,
there is no man can be fure that he is the fame man that exifted all yel-
terday : For, though he may recollect his actions in fome part of that
day, he cannot recollect ihem in every part of it ; and ivhen he
cannot recoiled them, then he muft be fuppofed not to have exifted.
Virgil, therefore, I hold to be a much better philofopher than Mr
Locke, when he tells us, that the Spirits, before they are reimbo-
died, drink of the waters of Lethe : And it is no doubt for very
good reafons that Providence has fo ordered it, that we have no me-
mory or recolledlion of our former ftate.

It may be objeded, that an Intelligence, quiefcent and dormant
in the womb, and during the time of our infancy, is difficult to be
conceived. But to this I anfvver, that many of our Divines main-
tain that our Souls are in that ftate, from the time of our death till
the refun-edion : And, indeed, thofe who deny an intermediate
ftate muft fay fo. Nor is there any thing unphilofophical, or con-
trary to the general analogy of Nature in fuch an opinion ; for
we know that both plants and animals may be in fuch a dor-
mant ftate, fome of them for a very confiderable time, A wil-
low,

i98 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

low may be ufed as a (lick fevcral years, during which time
the Vegetable Life appears to be quite extiiid ; and yet, when
it is put into the ground, it revives, and puts forth buds and
leaves. In the animals that llcep during the winter, there is a
total ceflation, at leaft, of the animal and fenfitivc part of them.
And there is an inftance, well vouched, and recorded in the Philo-
fophical Tranfad:ions, of fnails, which, after being kept in a dry
place for above fifteen years, and without the leaft marks of Animal
Life in them, were revived, by being put intowater a little warmed*^
Another inftance of the fame kind is recorded of Animalcules that hav-c
been difcovcred in the grains of blighted wheat, which, after being
kept four years, revived likewife by being moiftened t« Now, if the
Vegetable and the Animal Life may be fo long fufpended. Why not
the Intelledtual ? Why may not that part of us be in a dormant
and quiefcent ftate, while we are in the womb or in a ftate of in-
fancy ? Even when we are grown up, it feems often to be at reft
in our fleep, when the Animal part of us, and particularly the Phan-
tafia, is very adive : We, indeed, fometimes reafon in our dreams,
but not always ; and, I believe, our philofophic poet is in the right,
^vho fays, in the paflage above quoted :):, That Reafon retires

hito her private cell, ivhcn Nature rejls.

Oft in her abfence viimic Fancy ivakes

To imitate her ; but tnisjoining fijapes

Wild "work produces oft, and mojl in Dreatfis.

And Ariftotle fays, what I am perfuaded, upon inquiry, will be
found to be true, that children do not dream : So that even their
Phantafia is quiefcent while they fleep. And he fays the fame of

fome

• PhiloC Tranfa£lions, vol. *?4. p, 432.

t See a book publiHied by Henry Baker, F. R.. S. entitled, Employment for the
Micrcfcope, p. ijo.

% V. 167 — I have quoted Milton more than once in this work : For I efteem him
not only as the gre.itefl Poet, and belt Writer, in modern tiir.es, both in profc and
vcrCe, in Latin and Englifh ; but he appears to me to be exceedingly learned in
Anrient Philofophy, as well as in Amiint Arts, and Antient Iliftory.

Chap. II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. jc^j

fome grown people ; but that happens, he tells us, very rarely *.
Even while we are awake, and after our Minds are ftocked with
an infinite number of Ideas, from Experience, Reafon, Science,
and Converfation, how many of them lie dormant in our Intelle<£l,
till they are refufcitated by recolleilion, teaching, or the operation ol
fome of our Senfes. What we call proving or demonftrating, is not
giving us new Ideas, but calling up old ones, as Plato has {hown, by
an admirable example of a mathematical demonflration, in the Aieno^
And, indeed, it is charadtcriftical of the Human Mind, and what
diftinguifhes it as much, or, perhaps, more, than any thing elfe,
from Superior Intelligences, that it has not all its Ideas, and, in-
deed, but a very few of them, prefent at the fume time, and is there-
fore obliged to pafs from one to another, and to call them up by Rc-
mlnifcence and Recollection, as it has occafioa for them. Now, if
it be true that fome of our Ideas lie dormant in our Minds for years
together, Why may we not fuppofe that all our Ideas are in that
ftate while we are in the womb, and during the firft years of our
life, till they are excited by our Senfes, by Converfation, and by the
Intercourfe of Life ?

What has led Mr Locke, and all our modern philofophers, into
the error, that our Ideas are derived from Matter, is the term of
Abjlra6l Ideas^ which, as I have obferved f , is underftood to be fy-
nonymous with Ideas : So that all our Ideas, by thofe philofophers,
are underftood to be abftrafted from Matter, and, confequently, as
they think, derived from Matter. That all Ideas, even the Ideas
of the Divine Mind, are fo abftraded, no man can believe who
believes in God. But even the Ideas of our Mind muft, as I have
obferved f, be known and recognized, before they can be diftinguifli-
edand feparated from the Matter with which they are joined.

]

* Liber, De Infamniis, cap. «■

t P- 75-

X Ibidem.

200 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

I have, in a preceding Chapter *, explained in what fenfe Ariftotle,
and his Commentators, fpeak of Ideas by Abjlr action^ or in Abjirac-
tion, which laft is the expreflion Ariftotle commonly uies f. By
fuch expreflion, they did not denote all Ideas, as our modern pliilo-
Ibphers do, but only the Ideas of certain Accidents of Subitances,
confidered by the Mind as feparated and abftradted from the Sub-
ftances in which they are inherent. Of this kind are ma-
thematical Ideas, fuch as the Ideas of Magnitude, Figure, and
Number, which the Mind contemplating by themfelves, and as
abftradled from the Natural Subftances, of which they are Accidents,
has formed out of them the Sciences of Geometry and Arithmetic J.
And hence it is, that Mathematics are faid to be in the middle, be-
twixt Material Subftances, and Subftances Immaterial : For thefe,
both in Idea, and real exiftence, are entirely without Matter ; where-
as the Subjedls of Mathematics, Figures, and Numbers, do really ex-
ift in Matter, and are only feparated from it by our manner of con-
ceiving them and thinking of them.

The procefs by which thofe Ideas are abftraded I have minutely
defcribed in Volume Firft ||, It is no more than an analyfis made
by Science, of that operation of the Human Mind. It may be com-
pared to the analyfis, which Ariftotle has made in his books of Ana-
lytics,

• P. 75-

t His commentators commonly fay that thofe Ideas arc J/ «^«({i5-(«f, which, I
think, is not fo good an expreffion, as importing that they are formed from
Material Obje£ls, which, I am perfuaded, Ariftotle did not believe ; but Ari-
Ilotle's own expreffion is, t» i» w^aijirH Afyo«i»*. Lib. 3. De Anima, cap. 8. in fine,
et cap, 9.

\ See the Commentary of Simplicius, p 77. upon the eighth Chapter of Ariftotle'*
Third Book, De Anima, where ail this is moft accurately explained, and at great
length.

II P. 1 03. et feq^.

Chap. II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 201

lytics, of a more complex operation Rill, — that of Reafoning : Rut it
would be as ridiculous to fay, that Men could not have Ideas with-
out analyfing them according to the Rules of Art, as to pretend that
we could not reafon without Ariftotle's Art of Reafoning ; though,
no doubt, we do both the better for being taught by Art.

To be convinced of this, let us confider the cafe of Savages.
They have no Logic or Science of any kind, know nothing of Genus,
Species, or Difference, nor have any Arts, except a few of the necefla-
ry Arts of Life ; yet they have Ideas, though not fo perfect, to be fure,
as thofe of the men of fcience among us, and likewife a language
to exprefs them, by which they not only converfe in private, but
deliberate in public, upon the affairs of their tribe and nation, with
as much or more wifdom than moft civilized nations. But, as they
cannot anlyfe and abftradt according to the Rules of Art, they have
not Sciences, nor even Arts reduced to a Syftem. Thus, not being
able to analyfe the dimenfions of Body, as Euclid has done, into
Points, Lines, Surfaces, and Solids, and to feparate and diftinguifh
them accurately from Body and from one another, they have no
Science of Geometry ; though, undoubtedly, they have the Ideas of
different Figures. And not being able to abftradl Number accurately
from the Things Numbered, and to inveftigate its properties by it-
felf, they have no Science of Arithmetic ; though they have the Prac-
tice of it to a certain degree. And, in fhort, becaufe they are not
able to analyfe accurately compounds of any kind, and to divide
things into their genufes and fpeciefes, they have no fcience of any
kind ; though, in matters of common prudence, and fuch arts of life
as they practice, in which the Form is never confidered feparated
from the Matter, and the knowledge of Individuals is more neceflary
than of Generals, they excel very much.

Thus, it appears that we have our Ideas from within, and not

from ivithoiit, as is commonly believed. But, if our Minds furnifhed

Vol. n. C c us

202 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

us only with Ideas, we fliould be able to make but final! progrefs in
knowledge ; as, in this ftate of our exiftence, we cannot immediate-
ly and intuitively fee^the connedion of our Ideas, otherwife than by
Circuit and Colleaion,— that is, by Reafoning, Now, in reafoning,
• as Ariftotle has well obferved, nothing could be proved, if every
thing was to be proved. There muft, therefore, be fome propofi-
tions which are felf-evident, and the foundation of all our Reafoning.
Thefe propofitions I hold alfo to be from Nature, as well as the Ideas
of which they are compofed ; for they certainly are not from Senfe,
nor from Rcafon or Argument.

And here we may obferve, that, in this refpe£t alfo, we differ from
Superior Intelligences only in degree : For thefe Intelligences mull
fee very many things intuitively, which we can only fee by inference
and dedudlion ; and the Supreme Intelligence muft fee every thing
in that way : But it was of abfolute neceffity that we fhould fee fome-
thing in that way, otherwife we never could have difcovered any
thing by Reafoning.

Thus, I think, I have fhown, that Ideas are as different from Sen-
fations in their Origin, as they are in their Nature — that Senfations
arife from the impreflion of Material Objeifls upon the Organs of our
Senfe ; and, therefore, they indicate nothing but the various Motions
of thefe objetfls, and the alteration thereby produced upon our or-
gans— that they only ferve the purpofe of the Animal Life, and,
therefore, are common to us with the Brute, and are retained in the
Memory and Phantafia, as long only as they are ncceffary for the
purpofes of that Life; — That, on the other hand. Ideas are from the
Mind itfelf — That they indicate to us the Nature of things, that is,
the Form without the Matter — that, as they are from Mind, they
are, like Mind itfelf, eternal, being there before our exiftence in
this life, and continuing after we ceafe to exift here — and, lajilyy

that

Chap. II. A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. 203

that Nature has (o connected our Intelledual with our Animal
part, that the former cannot operate till it is roufed and put into
Action by the operations of the latter : And, as our Intelleft is in
a dormant ftate while we are in the womb, and during the firft
years of our infancy, it is of ncceflity tliat our Ideas {hould be fo
alfo. -

I will conclude this Chapter with obferving the wonderful pro-
grefs of Man from the rudeft and mort imperfed: ftate to the per-
fedion of his Nature in this life, and by what flow degrees the fe-
deral ingredients of his wonderful compofitioa difclofe themfelves.
At firft, his Vegetable Nature appears to be entirely predominant ;
for the Embryo feems to be no more than a mere Vegetable, fo that
even the Animal is then latent. It is, however, there ; and fo alfo is
the Intelledual. Then, by degrees, the Animal Life appears; but
he can hardly be called a Senfitive Being till he is born, and his
Animal Powers are difclofed and brought into energy by the Adion
of External Objeds upon his Organs of Senfe. But ftill his better
part lies buried under the Vegetable and Animal, till it is likewife
produced in its \.nvn,frji, by the neceflities of Life, and the Arts in-
vented to fupply thofe neceflities ; then, by the Arts of Pleafure and
Entertainment, the Fruit of Plenty and Leifure j and, laji of all,
by Science and Philofophy.

This is undoubtedly the progrefs of the Individual, — flow enough in-
deed, being from a ftate no better than the mere Vegetable and Animal.
But the progrefs of the Species to a ftate of civility and Arts, that is, of
Intelligence, is very much flower. For the Individual in the civilized
nation learns both by Imitation and Inftrudion : Whereas Savages
learn neither way, but muft invent every thing ; fo that their progrefs
muft be wonderfully flow, — fo flow, that the Antients thought that the

C c 2 ' afliftance

204 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

afliftance of Gods, or Superior Intelligences, inventing Arts for them,
was neceflary to carry them on.

This progrefs of the Species is an important article in the hiftory
and philofophy of Man ; and I (hall make much ufe of it in the fe-
quel.

CHAP.

Chap. HI. A NT IE NT METAPHYSICS. 205

I

CHAP. in.

Of the Difference o/" Minds.— Gr^<7^ Errors proceed from not knoiring
accurately that Difference. — The Vegetable differs from the Ele-
mental Life, as to the Body moved — the Motion — the Growth
— and the Final Caufe. — Difference betivixt the Animal and Vege-
table.— The Animal fenfitive, the Vegetable not. — Reafon for this
Difference.— !r-6f Animal has a Feeling of Pleafure and Pain —
the Vegetable not. — 77?// Difference betivixt the Animal and Ve-
getable proved by Experiment. — The Vegetable propagated many
more ivays than the Animal. — The Vegetable lAh fubfervicnt to
the Animal. — Remarkable Jnflance of this in the Conftrudion of the
Vegetable Part o/" Animals. — The Vegetable ^/ir/ Animal Life come
very near one another.

HAVING thus fhown, that our Intelledual Mind is a fubftance
quite diftind from Matter, and borrowing nothing from it,
I return to a fubjedt upon which I have faid a good deal alreadv,
but which I think it is neceffary further to explain : The fubjed I
naean is the difference of the feveral Minds. To know this accurately,
is, I think, of great importance in philofophy ; and I obferve, that
many of our modern philofophcrs have fallen intogreat errors by not
diftinguifhing accurately the feveral kinds of them. Des Cartes, for
example, not being able to diftinguifh betwixt the Intelledual Mind
or Soul and the Animal Life, — and being perfuaded that the Brutes had
no Soul, but not conceiving how they could have Senfations, Appe-
tites, and Defires, without a Soul, maintained, that they had no

Minds

2o6 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

Minds at all, but were mere machines. Others, rcjeding this no-
tion of Des Cartes, but as ignorant as he of the dillcrcnce betwixt
the Intelledual and Animal Life, go to the other extreme, and be-
lieve, that Brutes have Intelligence as well as we, difTering only in
degree. Others, again, not dircrlminating exadtly the Vegetable
and the Animal Life, feem to think that Vegetables, for any thing
we know, may have Senfations as well as Animals, though perhaps
lefs perfedl. And, as to the Elemental Life, as I call it, which in-
forms every particle of Matter ; having no Idea at all of it, they
endeavour to account for the motion of fuch Bodies by certain
Ethers, Fluids, Subtle Matter, and I don't know what : And, per-
haps, from their inability to account for thefe Motions upon any hy-
pothefis that has the leafl: degree of plaufibility, they are driven to
abfolute Atheifm, and maintain that Matter can move itfclf.

I will begin with diftingulflilng the Elemental Mind from the
Vegetable : And there is one diflindlion, which I have already ob-
ferved, taken from the Bodies that are moved ; namely, That the E-
lemental, or Unorganized Bodies, are much more funple and lefs
artificial in their ftrudture than the Vegetable. — Another difference
is from the nature of their Motion, which, like the Body moved,
is much more fimple and uniform in the Body unorganized, than
in the Body organized. And there is another remarkable difference
in the Motion, that the Body unorganized is moved altogether, and
not one part before another or without another : Whereas, the Vege-
table and Animal having Organs and Veflels, there is Motion in them,
when there is none in the reft of the Body ; and it is by their means
that the other parts of the Body are moved.

Another very material difference is, with refpedl to the produc-
tion and the growth of the two kinds of Bodies. The unorganized
Body is produced at firft by particles of Matter, homogeneous, no

doubt,

Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 207

doubt, in many refpe£ls, though in fome particulars they may be
of difierent kinds, coming together by a certain fympathy, and co-
hering, fo as to form one mafs, to which, according to their diffe-
rent Natures, we give different Names, fuch as Gold, Silver, Iron,
&c. And the growth of thcfe Bodies is, by accretion, or appofi-
tion, from without, of certain particles of the fame kind. — On the
other hand, the Vegetable is produced from feeds, and in a way of
generation, which has been difcovered to be very analogous to the
generation of Animals ; and its growth and nutrition is not by ac-
cretion or external appofition of parts, but by nourifliment, which
it receives from the earth by the means of certain organs, which
convey it into the inward parts of the Plant, where it is digefted,
aflimilated, and diftributed all over the Body. Hence comes the
growth of the plant, its foliage, flowers, fruit, and feed.

The laft difference I fliall obferve, is from the final Caufe, which
ought never to be out of the view of the philofopher ; As the Ve-
getable is of a Nature much more excellent than any unorganized
Body, and as it is a law of Nature, that what is lefs excellent is
produced for the fake of that which is more fo, the unorganized
Body, being lefs excellent than the Vegetable, is intended for the
fake of it. And, accordingly, the Earth, the Air, the Water, the
Fire, Salts, and all other Mineral Subllances, ferve for the pro-
duction of Vegetables.

As the fcale of life rlfes higher, the difficulty of diftinguifliing the
feveral principles of vitality increales. It is, therefore, more difficult
to dlftinguifh the Vegetable from the Animal Life, than the Vege-
table from the Elemental : And the fimilarity has of late been dif-
covered to be fo great, that fome, as I have obferved, are inciiueJ
to think, that the difference is only in degree, fuch as they luppofe

th.

2o8 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

the difference betwixt the Animal and Intcllcdual Life to be ; and
that the Vegetable has even Senfation.

It was Senfation which the antients made the characHieriftical dif-?
icrence betwixt the Animal and the Vegetable : And they were
certainly fo far in the right, that whatever is Senfitive is an Animal.
But why has the Animal Senfcs, and not the Vegetable ? This leads
to the final Caufe of the diftindtion, which no genuine philofopher
will ever have out of his view ; and the general principle, from which
I imagine all the differences betwixt the Vegetable and Animal may
be deduced, is this, that the Vegetable is fixed to a certain fpot from
which it draws its nourifhment ; whereas the Animal is locomotive,
and has its nourifliment to feek, fometimes in places very diftant.
This makes Senfes neceflary to the Animal, which would be entire-
ly ufelefs to the Vegetable ; for the Animal being obliged to go a-
bout in fearch of his food, it requires that correfpondence with ex-
ternal things which the Senfes furnifh, and by which it is enabled
both to find out its food, and to defend itfelf from the dangers
which threaten a Being that goes about, much more than one that
is fixed to a certain place.— In fhort, it is by the information of the
Senfes that an Animal is enabled both to preferve the individual and
continue the kind.

If the Animal has Senfes, it follows of neceflary confequence,
that he muft have likewife the feeling of Pleafure and Pain : For it
is impoflible to conceive that a creature fhould have the Senfe of
Touch, which may be faid to be an univerfal Senfe common to all
Animals,, or of Tafte, withcut feeling Pleafure or Pain ; nor in-
deed would thefe Senfes anfwer the purpofe for which they are given,
if they did not inform the Animal, in that way, of what was ufe-
ful £>r not ufeful.

Further,

Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 209

Further, if he has the fccHng of Pleafure and Pain, he mud like-
wife have Appetites and DeHres, by which he feeks the one and a-
voids the other. " Thofe, therefore, ^vho maintain that the Plant
has Senfttion, muft alfo maintain that it has both Pleafure and
Pain, and likewife Appetites and Defires.

Thofe, who philofophife only by fails and Experiments, will hardly
believe what they cannot fee with their Eyes or perceive with
fome other of their Senfes. They will not, therefore, be convinced
by this Reafoning a priori and from Final Cajifes, that the Vege-
table has not Senfition and a feeling of Pleafure and Pain. But,
luckily for thefe philofophers, there is an Experiment, which, if they
pleafe, they may make upon their own Bodies, and which will con-
vince them that the Senfitive Nature in them is quite diflindt from
the Vegetable ; for, if they cut the nerves of any member of their
Body, they will immediately perceive that they have no Senfation
in that member below where the nerves are cut, and yet the Vege-
table part there, if the artery be not cut, and if the blood coatinue
to circulate, will remain entire and uncorrupted.

As the Vegetable part of the creation is intended for the fake of
the Animal, it is therefore more abundant, and is propagated in more
different Avays : For almoft all Animals are propagated only by feed
in the common way of generation ; whereas the Vegetable is not on-
ly propagated in that way, but by Slips, Grafts, Laying, Suckers
from the root, and even by Cuttings, in which laft way it is now
difcovered that all Plants, with fufficient care and attention, may be
propagated.

And from hence refults a remarkable difference betwixt the Ani-
mal and the Vegetable ; namely, that the Vegetable Life appears to
be in every part of the Vegetable, whereas the Senfitive Life has
Vol. XL D d a

2 10 ANT I EN T METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

a particular Scat, which is the Brain, in all Animals that have Brain ;
fo that the communication with that Seat being cut o(F, by the cut-
ting of the Nerves, which all proceed from the Brain, there is, as I
have faici, an end of the Senfitive Life in the Animal.

Further, as the Senfitive Life is more excellent than the Vege-
tative, fo the latter, according to the order of Nature, is made fub-
fervient to the former. And this accounts for a remarkable differ-
ence betwixt the Vegetable, when it is by itfelf, as it is in the Plant,
and when it is joined with the Senfitive Life, as it is in the Animal :
For, in the Plant, the fap by which it is nourifhed only afcends and
defcends, but does not circulate as the blood does in Animals ; nor
has it one common Fountain or Rcfervoir, where it is thrown out,
and again taken in ; for that was not neceflary for the oeconomy of
the Plant : Whereas, for the fupport of the Body of the Animal, fo
much more artificially organized than the plant, and for enabling
the organs to perform their feveral functions, it was neceflary that
there fhould be a circulation of the Blood, a diftribution of it to
every part, and a fecretion from it of many different juices, of which
the Vegetable has no need.

Another remarkable difference is, that, as the Animal is an e-
manclpated fon of the earth, (as he is called by fome philofopher,
whofe name I have forgot), and goes from place to place, he has
members adapted to that progreflive Motion, by which he moves not
only on the Earth, but in the Water and the Air. And he has alfo
a certain impulfe of his Mind, called in Greek '»fjwi, and, in Eng-
lifh, Spoilt aneiety^ by which he is excited to that Motion ; whereas
the Vegetable, being fixed to a certain place, has neither..

The laft obfervation I fhall make upon this fubjed: is, that, as
there is no gap in Nature, the Vegetable Life comes fo near to the
Animal, that there are Animals which partake fo much of the Vege-
table,

Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 211

table, as to be denominated by both names, and called Zoophytes,
fuch as Polypufes and Corals, and fevcral others that have been of
late difcovered and cuiioufly examined. In them the ufe of that
great principle, which I have laid down as a diftinguiihing charadte-
riftic of the Animal from the Vegetable, is well exemplified ; for,
as Animals are more or lefs locomotive, fo they have more orlefsthe
ufe of Senfes. Thofe Animals, who, like the Vegetable, are fixed to
one place, and only move themfelves in that place in order to take
in their nourifhment, have very few Senfes, perhaps only one, viz.
the Touch, without which they could not be an Animal at all.

Thus, I have endeavoured to explain the Differences betwixt the
Animal and the Vegetable : Some of the Similarities I have likewife
mentioned ; and I will fay more upon that fubjedl when I come to
treat of Nature, and to (how what a wonderful analogy the differ-
ent parts of Nature have to one another.

The only two Minds, that remain to be compared, are the Animal
and the Intelleftual. But, upon this fubje£t, I hope I have already
faid enough for the fatisfadtion of thofe who can be convinced by o-
ther evidence than that of their Senfes : For there is no experiment
that can fhow this difference, as in the cafe of the Animal and Ve-
getable Life ; it is only found reafoning and good philofophy which
can fatisfy a Man that he is not a Brute.

D d 2 CHAP.

212 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

CHAP. IV.

'The Importance of the Doflrine of Caufes. — Arlflotlc's Account of
QAd.\x{t%^ full and complete. — l^htoh -Addition of tnvo other Caufes, not
neceffary. — Abufe of the Term, CanCe.— -Thi/igs [aid to he Caufes
ivh'ich are only the remo'val of Impediments that hinder the real
Caufe to operate. — The Poiver of the Mind ivithout the Organs of
Senfe, enjident in Dreaming and Night-walking, or ivhen the Body
is affeHcd by certain Difeafes. — The Internal Organs, fuch as the
Brain, not properly Caufes, any 7nore than the External. — The
Intelledual Mind, not immediately conne^ed at all ivith the Body
or its Organs. — Hot and Cold, Moift and Dry, no Caufes of
Things. — I he confidering Juch Things as Caufes, leads to great Er-
rors.— The common Diftin^ion betivixt Firft and Second Caufes,
not fufficicntly attended to by our Modern Philofophers, particularly
the Newtonians.

I

N order to think and fpeak accurately upon Metaphyfical Sub-
ie£ls, we muft not only diftinguifh betwixt the different kinds of
Mind, but alfo betwixt the different kinds of Caufes, Mind is un-
doubtedly the Caufe of all things in Nature, and the only active
Being in the Univerfe, all things elfe being merely paffive ; and yet
we fpeak of many other things as Agents and Authors of various
produdlions : And 1 doubt not, but that an inaccurate language of
this kind has led into many errors in philofophy.

No philofopher has fo well diftinguifhed the different kinds of
Caufes as Ariftotle; and, as philofophy is the knowledge of Caufes,

he

Chap.IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 213

he may be faicl thereby to have laid the very foundations of philo-
fophy. There are, according to him, four kinds of Caufes, the Ma-
teria/, the Formal, the Efficient, and the Final. This Divifion I
have explained in the firft part of this work *; and I fhall only add
here, that, however Httle Final Caufes may be ftudied by philofo-
phers at prefent, yet, if we believe in God, and hold that every
thing in this univerfe is produced and governed by Intelligence, we
muft of neceffity, at the fame time, believe that the Final Caufe is
truly the Firft of all Caufes, and therefore moft worthy of the ftudy
of the Philofopher, being that for the fake of which every other
Caufe is employed : So that it may be called the Cau/e of Caufes ;
for it is for the fake of the end that the Efficient Caufe a£ls, that the
Form is given to the thing, and the Matter provided to receive that
Form. And, as the Final Caufe is the firft: and higheft of Caufes,
fo the Material is the loweft ; yet it is of abfolute neceflity, as it is
the fubjedl in which the Form muft exift, in the works both of
Nature and of Art t.

To

* Vol. I p. 33.

t Ariftotle, in the laft chapter of his 2cl Book of Phyfics, fpeaking of thejffn.:/
and Tnaf^r/a/ caufes, exprefles the diiTerence of them in this way. He fays, a thing
is done «i* "Ji, meaning the final Caufe, or the iv h%x.a. ; but, at the fame time,
he fays, that the thing cannot be done «i/k a.iiv t^vJi, meaning the Va«, or material

Caufe. And he adds, xa* nu-^a fi.ii t* (pus-iit* Aixtmi in ccHimi, ftaXXet it 'n Tift inx»'
itiTitt y«5 rtvTt T7i< »A)i;, <icA>.' tv^ iwro rev nXtUf, that IS, " Both Caufcs, (the Final
♦' and Material), ought to be treated of by the Natural Philofopher -, but chiefly
" the Final, becaufe this is the Caufe of the Material, not the Material of il."
Our modern philofophcrs have juft reverfed this method of treating Phyfics ; for
they fpeak a great deal of Material Caufes, but little or nothing of Final.

1 will fubjoin here Simplicius's account of the pre-eminence of the Final Caufe ;

To x{<«T(c-1«» «it;o» t» ri>.ix»f iu inxn x«i r» vtir.rixct ?r«i«, x»i t» {i^icir •{'^a, x«; r» »A(-

xo» cciTf 'vvt7T^0Tca •iKKOf T«i{ TT^Kyfittu — in libros Dt Anima, lib. 3. fol. 80. p. 2.
where the learned reader will obferve, that he fays the r» eiJif, or Species, ij/^ii
T« 5r{«yft«, that is, bounds or determines the thing, becaufe it is by the Species,
not by the Matter, that every fhing is what it is, and is 'Vpirrir-»d from every thing
elfe ; and accordingly it is by the Species that we know every thing.

214 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

To theio four Caufcs Plato has added two others, viz. the Iiiftru-
mental Caufe and the Exemplary, but without any neceffity or
good reafon : For the inftrument, by which any agent performs any
work, is not the Caufc of the work, properly fpeaking, but the means
by which it is performed ; and, accordingly, in common language,
we do not fay that the pencil is the caufe of the piiSture, or the gra-
ving-tool of the ftatue, but the Artift of both *. Or, if the Platonicians
will dignify it with the name of a Caufc, it is to be referred to the Ef-
ficient Caufe; but it is only a Secondary Caufe of that kind, and of a
nature very much inferior to the Primary, as much inferior as Body
is to AlinJ, or the Tool to the Art'i/l. And I fay the fame of all the
operations of Body upon Body ; as, when one Body impels another,
the impelling Body is only the Secondary Efficient Caufe of the Mo-
tion, but the Primary Caufe of it is Mind, moving either that im-
pelling Body, or fome other which impels it. And here again the
truth appears of what I have elfewhere obferved t, that Mind is ul-
timately the Efficient Caufe of every thing in the univerfe. As to
what is called the Exemplary Caufe, if it is to be confidered as a
Caufe, it muft be referred to xht formal ; and the expreffion denotes
no more, than that the Form, inftead of being derived from the
Mind of the Artift, which is commonly the cafe of the works of Art
and Intelligence, is taken from fome thing without the Mind of the

Artift t-

Having

• The learned in the Greek language will obfcrve, that the inftrument or means,
by which any thing is done, is exprefled by the prepofition im, conftrued with the
genetive ; for they fay a thing is done hit t$vIi n rovh : Whereas the Final Caufe is
expreffed by the fanne prepofition joined with the accufative, as appears from
the paffage of Ariflotle quoted in the preceding note.

t P. 20.

J I will enumerate all thefe fix caufes, as they are exprefied by the various
ufe of the Greek prcpofitions. Ttrjajj*; «u» n x^-^n x«tT» t»» A^nrTonM'' « -/aj t»

»J iv, oJ; i! i/Ai)' I! TO x»t' i, '«; T« JiS'»;' i) to i/p' iu, u( To ■xtituf i) To J(' i i; to TiAoj, Kxrtc
U>MT»tic KXt TO ?r5«5 0, is to irec^itiliytix' xxi to J(' iv, i; to i^ytttixct, OrK-^Ui h 4 tefKn

Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. z .

Having faid fo much of Caufcs in general, I will proceed to take
notice of fome things which are commonly fpokca of as Caufes, but
which are truly not fuch. It is commonly faid that the Eye fees,
and the Ear hears; by which expreffion, one might be induced to
believe, and, I imagine, it is generally believed, that the Eye is
the Caufe of our Seeing, and the Ear of our Hearing, or that the
Eye is the Agent in the operation of Seeing, and the Ear in the ope-
ration of Hearing. But neither is true ; for it is moft certainly the
Mind that both Sees and Hears. Neither is the Eye or Ear even the
Inftrumental Caufe, or the Means by which the Mind Sees and
Hears. But true philofophy teaches us, that the Mind perceives all
things by its own Natural Powers, and that the Body, fo far from
affifting its perceptions, is an impediment to them, which is only in
part removed by thofe five Inlets of knowledge we have from the
Senfes; fo that a Man cannot be faid to See by means of his Eyes, any
more than a perfon can be faid to See an object by another going
out of the way, who is betwixt him and it. The obftrudlion, indeed,
is removed ; but there is a great difference betwixt the Caufe of any
thing, and the removal of an impediment, without which the Caufe
could not adt *.

This

xi'/iTcci, rnr»MT»x,*>i lutt T« airitv. — Simplicius, upon the Phyfics of Ariftotle, lib. I.
fol. 3. I have given this quotation for the fake of the young fludent of Greek,
■who, if he has made any confiderable advances in the language, will perceive,
that the ufe of the prepoGtions, either (ingle or in compofition, is one of the great-
eft niceties in it. The Theologian alfo may, from this paflage, learn how impro-
perly the words ««< >«'/♦! ii» »■;•? t«» ei.i', in the beginning of St John's gofpel, are
tranflated, " And the word was iu«7A CoJ;" whereas i: fliould be, " after thti-
•' mage of God,' as it is exprefled in other parts of (cripture.

• This I have explained at more length in the firft volume of this work, p. 16/.
where 1 have quoted the words of Plato in the Phaedoi where he has exprcfsly made
the diftinftion betwixt the Caufe, and that without which the Caufe cannot operate.

A^;^• ftn »( lirli T« xiTitt T« «iTi, aAXe it iKiiFt ctttu iv T« teiTitr tvx at jr«T iiji tiiTitf.

This paradox, as I know it will appear to the moft of my readers, that the Min.l
fees without eyes, the learned reader will not be difpleafed to fee explained by Ci-

•' cero.

zi6 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

This will appear the Icfs incredible, even to the Reader who is no
philofopher, if he confidcrs the common phacnomcnon of Dreaming^
which evidently fliows that the Mind has the Power of Perception,
independent of the Body and its Organs ; for, in our Dreams, we
fee and hear without our Eyes and Ears, and fometiraes in fo lively
and forcible a manner, that we are more affe£ted than by the fame
perceptions when awake. The cafe of the Night-walker is ftill a
more remarkable example of what the Mind can do by itlelf ; for
the Mind of the Night-walker, as it appears to be more feparated
from the Body than in common Sleep, does things which are gene-
rally not believed, becaufe few people are philofophers enough to
know the Power of Mind ading by itfelf *. The fame is the cafe

of

cero, with that copioufiicfs and elegance wliich illflinguifli his philofophical ftyle,
as well as that of PlatOj from every other of the fame kind. The paflage is in the
firfl Book of his Tufculan Queftions, cap. 20. where, after fpeaking of the enlarged
views anil wonderful profpeiSls that the Mind fhall enjoy after its feparation from the
Body, he adds, " Nos enim ne nunc quidem oculis ctrnimtis ea quae videmus, Ne-
" que enim eft ullus fenfus in corpore, fed ut non folum Phyfici decent, verum
" etiam Medici, qui ifta aperta et patefafta viderunt, viae quafi quaedam funt ad
•' oculos, ad aures, ad nares, a fede animi perforatae. Itaque faepe aut cogitatione,
•' aut aliqua vi morbi impediti, apertis atque integris et *culis et auribus, nee vi-
" dermis nee audimus : Ut facile intclligi pofTir, animinn et videre et audire, non
■" eas parteis quae quafi feneftrae funt animi: Quibus tamen fentire nihil queat
" mens, nifi id agat et adfit. Quid quod eadem Mente res difTimillimas comprc-
" hendimus, ut colorem, faporcm, odorem, fonum ? ^ae nunquam quinque nun-
" tiis animus cegne/ceret, nift ad eum omnia referrentur, et is omnium judex fotus ef-
*' fet. Atque ea prcfefto turn multo puriora et dilucidiora cernentur, cum, quo
" natura fert, liber animus pervenerit. Nam nunc quidem, quanquam foramina
" ilia, quae patent ad Animum a corpore, calidiflimo artificio natura fabricata eft,
*' tamen terrenis concretifque corporibus funt intercepta quodam modo. Cum
*' autcm nihil erit pratter animum, nulla res ohjeUa impediet, que minus percipiat
*' quale quidque fit.'" I have faid the fame thing in vol. i. p. 162. when I had not
this paffage of Cicero before me, in which it is fo much better exprefled.

• See what I have faid upon the fubje£t of the Night-walkers, vol. !•
p. i6t.

Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 217

of perfons affected by certain difeafes, of which I have given one ex-
ample in the preceding Volume, which fell under my own obferva-
tion ; and I will here give another, which I had from very good
authority. It was communicated to me in a letter from the late Mr
Hans Stanley, a gentleman well known both to the learned and po-
litical world, who did me the honour to correfpond with me upon
-the fubjeft of my firft volume of metaphyfics. I will give it in the
■words of that gentleman. He introduces it, by faying, that it is an
extraordinary fadl in the hiftory of Mind, Avhich he believes ftands
fingle, and for which he does not pretend to account : Then he
goes on to narrate it. * About fix and tvv^enty years ago, when I

* was in France, I had an intimacy in the family of the late Ma-

* rechal de Montmorenci de Laval. His fon, the Comte de Laval,

* was married to Mademoifelle de Maupeaux, the daughter of a

* Lieutenant General of that name, and the niece of tlie late Chan-
' cellor. This gentleman was killed at the battle of Haftenbeck ;
' his widow furvived him fome years, but is fince dead.

* The following fadt comes from her own mouth. She has told
' it me repeatedly. She was a woman of perfe£l veracity, and very
' good fenfe. She appealed to her fervants and family for the truth :
' Nor did fhe, indeed, feem to be fenfible that the matter was fo ex-

* traordinary as it appeared to me. I wrote it down at the time j

* and I have the memorandum among fome of my papers.

* The Comtefle de Laval had been obferved, by fervants who fate
' up with her on account of fome indifpofition, to talk in her fleep

* a language that none of them underftood; nor were they fure, or,

* indeed, herfelf able to guefs, upon the found's being repeated to

* her, whether it was or was not gibberilh.

* Upon lier lying in of one of her children, fhe was attended by
' a nurfe, who was of the province of Brittany, and who imme-

VoL. II. E e ♦ diately

2i8 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

* diately knew the meaning of what (lie faid, it being in the idiom

' of the natives of that country ; but fhe herfelf, when awake, did

' not underftand a nngle fyllable of what fhe had uttered in her

' fleep, upon its being retold her.

* She was born in that province, and had been nurfed in a family
where nothing but that language was fpoken ; fo that, in her firft
mfancy, fhe had known it, and no other ; but, when flie returned
to her parents, flie had no opportunity of keeping up the ufe of
it ; and, as I have before faid, flie did not underftand a word of
Breton when awake, though fhe fpoke it in her fleep.

' I need not fay that the ComtefTe de Laval never faid or ima-
' gined, that fhe ufed any words of the Breton idiom, more than
' were necefTary to exprefs thofe ideas that are within the compafs
' of a child's knowledge of objedls,' &Ci

I have not the leaft doubt of the fadt, being attefted by a man of
fo refpedable a charadler, I think with Mr Stanley, that it is a very
extraordinary fa (St in the hiftory of Mind, though I am not furprifed
that the Comteffe, who, I fuppofe, was no philofopher, did not think
it fo. I will endeavour to explain it upon the principles of the phi-
lofophy of Plato and Ariftotle, leaving it to thofe, who believe
that we arc nothing but Matter and Mechanifm, to account for it up-
on the principles of their philofophy.

In xht frji place, the reader will be furprifed, when I tell him, as
I believe Mr Stanley was when he read my letter in anfwer to his,
that I do not think the Gomtefle was dreaming,, though fhe was cer-
tainly fleeping ; but fhe was in the ftate of a night-walker or fom~
nambtile, as the French exprefs it: And I have two reafons for think-
ing fo. The firft is, that fhe remembered nothing of what fhe had

uttered

Cfiap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 219

uttered in her fleep. Now, as I have obferved in my Firft Vo-
lume *, the difference betwixt dreaming and night-walking is,
that we remember our dreams, but never what we do when we
are in the other flate f- 'idly, Our dreams are compofed of what is
at the time in our memory and our phantafia, not of things which
never were there, or, though they may have been there, are, at the
time we dream, utterly forgot and obliterated. Thus, in our dreams,
we fpeak or hear a language which we underftand, though it may
not be our native language; but we neither fpeak nor hear a language
that we never underftood, or, having once underftood, have utterly
forgot. In the fame manner, we fee in our fleep perfons that we
know, or have known, and ftill retain the memory of, but never
perfons that we know not, or have never known. At the fame
time, I do not deny that, in our dreams, as well as in night-walk-
ing, the Mind may perceive objects that it never perceived before
or, perhaps, never could perceive by any of the five Senfes. That
it will have fuch perceptions in a ftate of perfeft feparation from
the body, I have not the leaft doubt. Nor do I deny that, even in
this life, it may perceive ivhat eye hath not feen, nor ear heard
neither hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive. But this
I hold to be fupernatural : And of this kind I believe Lucullus's
dream to have been, which I have mentioned in ihe Firft Volume t,
and likewife the dream concerning Pompey §. And if the Coratefle
had fpoken a language that fhe had never before underftood, I fhould
have thought the cafe altogether beyond Nature, and not to be ac-
counted for upon any principles of philofophy that I know.

E e 2 Holding,

• Page 161.

t Arillotle has obferved this in his treatife De Somno et Vigilia ; and he fays that,
in his Problems, he has given a reafon for this difference betwixt dreaming and
night viralking ; but I have not been able to find the paffagc.

t Page 155.

§ Page 156.

220 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

Holding, therefore, that there was nothing fupernatural or mira-
culous in the cafe, it is, I think, a neceflary confequcnce, that thefe
articulate founds, with the fignification annexed to them, muft have
been in the Mind of the Comtefle before fhe fell aflcep, or became
difeafed ; for, if they had never been in her Mind, it would have
been, as I have faid, miraculous ; and it would have been fo like-
wife, if they had been once in the Mind, but had been altogether out
of it at the time fhe became difeafed, or fell afleep ; for their coming
back again to the Mind, in that cafe, muft have been by the opera-
tion of fome fupernatural power, as much as if they had been pre-
fentcd to the Mind for the tirft time.

The fadt, therefore, as I underfland it, was, that this Breton Lau"
gunge was in the Mind of the ComtefFe at the time fhe became difea-
fed and fell afleep, though the perception of it was not, at that time,
prefent to her Mind. Nor is this fmgular ; for we very often dream
of things, the perception of which was not prefent to our Minds
when we fell afleep ; but then thefe things we could have recollect-
ed, and fo prefented to the Mind before we fell afleep, if any occa-
fion of fuch recolledlion had been given us ; and the Angularity of
the cafe of the Comtefl~e was, that fhe had totally forgot the Breton
language, and could not have recolleded a word of it before fhe fell
afleep. This Angularity makes the cafe a phaenomenon of Mind,
which cannot be explained without knowing, better than is to be
learned in any modern book of philofophy, the nature both of Mind
and Body.

And, in xkitjirjl place, as Mind is an immaterial fubftance, of a
nature perfedlly different from Body, we cannot conceive that the
perceptions of our Minds make an impreffion upon it, fuch as a feal
does upon wax, and every Body, more or lefs, upon another ;
though, as almoft our whole language concerning Mind confifls of

metaphors

Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS, 221

metaphors taken from Body, we frequently fpeak of impreflions up-
on Mind ; and even Ariftotle, whofe philofophical language is lefs
metaphorical than any I know, often fpeaks in that way. Whatever
perceptions, therefore, were once in our Mind, we cannot conceive
to be worn out of it, or effaced, as we are fure all impreflions
upon Body will he fooner or later : And it is for this reafon that
we cannot conceive that any perception of the Mind, whether Idea
or Senfation, which was once in it, can ever go out of it, though it
may not be actually prefent to it for a reafon that ihall be immedi-
ately given.

On the other hand. Body is, by its nature, fleeting and tranfitory,
in fo much that it is not precifely the fame Body for two moments
together, but is in a confliant flux and viciflltude of change and
fuccefl^ion.

This being the nature of Mind and Body, the next thing
to be confidered is, what the confequence muft be of their being
fo clofely joined, as they are, in our wonderful compofition. And,
in the jirji place, as the union is fo intimate, it feems- to be ne-
cefl*ary that the Mind fhould fo far partake of the nature of its com-
panion, as not to have its perceptions fixed and permanent, but
tranfitory as the particles are, which compofe the body to which it
is joined. And, accordingly, its perceptions of Senfe it has only by
fucceflTion, one after another ; nor does any perception of that kind
laft longer than the imprefllon, made by the external objed upon the
organs of fenfe, continues : And, in like manner, our Ideas, which
are excited by thofe perceptions, are fleeting and tranfitory.

But, if thefe perceptions, thus excited, were to be carried away
by the flux of the body, as by a ftream, fo that we could not recall
them again and prefent them anew to the Mind, it is evident that

222 ANTIENT rsIETAPHYSICS. Book IV.

we fliould have no knowledge at all in this ftate of our exiftence,
but all the impreffions upon our Minds would be immediately
effaced, like traces in water. But we have a faculty, by which our
perceptions, after they are part, are revived and prefented anew
to the Mind. This faculty is called Memory *y without which we
could acquire no knowledge in this life ; and the exercife of it is
what we call Reminifcence or Recollefiion^ which cannot be, unlefs
we have the confcioufnefs that we formerly knew the thing. The
lofing of that confcioufnefs is what is called Oblivion : And then there
can be no Reminifcence or Recolleftion ; but we muft learn it again,
that is, know the thing anew, or be forever ignorant of it.

And here we may obferve a wonderful analogy between Plato's
fyftem of Reminifcence of what we knew in a former life, and our
Recolledion of things in this life. For this Recolle£tion is never
without either the thing itfelf being prefented again to the Mind, or
fomething that has a connedion with it. In like manner, fays Plato,
we have no Reminifcence of any thing in a former life, without that
thing being again perceived by the Mind, or fomething that has rela-
tion to it ; yet the notions of both are in the Mind, but latent, and
not perceived, till they be excited in the manner I have mentioned.
And I lay fo much weight upon arguments from analogy, in que-
ftions concerning Nature, that, if there were no other reafon to
convince me of the truth of Plato's philofophy upon this point, it
would be to me fufEcient. But I hope I have given other reafons
for this opinion, that will convince the reader, as they have convin-
ced myfelf f*

I

* I have, in the Firft Volume, page 96. made a diftin£tion betwixt Memory
and Phantafia, the one teing, according to my apprehenfion, the receptacle of
Ideas, the other of perceptions of Senfe ; but it is unneceffary to embarrafs this ar-
gument with that diftinftion.

t See Chap. 2. of this book.

Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 223

I will add another obfervation upon this fuhjed : That the flate of
the Night-walkers bears a moft perfed refemblance to the ftate of
pre-exiftence in which Plato fuppofes our fouls to be before thev
appear upon this flage : For the Night-walker has ideas and percep-
tions of the objeds of Senfe, though without the affiftance of the
Senfes *, fuch as we muft fuppofe our Mind to have, in its
pre-exiftent ftate j and it ads likewife upon Body, as there is all
the reafon in the world to believe it does in that ftate. But
when the perfon awakes, he enters, as it were, on a new fcene
of exiftence, with a total oblivion of what pafled while he was a-
fleep.

But, when we are awake, and found in Body, the ftate of our
Mind in this life, while we are confined in this dark prifon of flefh
and blood, muft be very different from its perfedt ftate, when it is
feparated from the Body, and is pure and unmixed "f, as Ariftotle
exprefles it ; then it has no Memory, as the fame author tells us,
becaufe all its perceptions are prefent to it, and confequently it has
no Reminifcence, Recolledtion, or Oblivion.

But how can our foul be fo much feparated from our Body while
it remains in it ? How could the Comteffe recoiled in her fleep the
words of a language of which (he did not remember a word when
{he was awake ? My anfwer is. That fhe could not have done it in
her ordinary ftate of Body and Mind, even when ftie was afleep ;
though, at that time, the Soul is uiore difengaged from the Body
than when we are awake, becaufe the Animal Life and the Senfes
are then at reft : But the Comteife was then not only afleep, but
flie was difeafed ; and in certain difeafes the Soul is more difengaged.

from.

• Sec what I have faid upon the fubjeft of the Night-walker, Vol. i. p. i6l.
t See Vol. I. p. 141. and this Vol. p. 165.

224 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

from the Body than at any other time. In fainting fits, for exam-
ple, nrcn very often fee extraordinary fights, fuch as may be called
Viftons^ fo far they exceed any thing that is to be feen when they
are in a good ftate of health *.

The tye, therefore, betwixt the Comtefle's Soul and Body being
much loofened, both by her being afleep and difeafed, ftie exerted
fome part of that power which her Mind would have had, if it had
been altogether feparated from her Body. If fhe had been a woman
of Science, or a Philofopher, fhe might have had perceptions of
theorems, which fhe had either never known in this life, or, if fhe
had known them, had altogether forgot them ; and of this kind
I had likewife fome experience myfelf, in the fever mentioned in
the preceding note : But, as I prefume fhe was not a Lady of that
kind, all that was prefent to her Mind at that time was the language
and ideas of her childhood.

Thus, I think I have Ihown, that this extraordinary fadt is not
only to be explained by my philofophy, but ferves very much to
confirm the truth of it, and, indeed, is the befl illuftration I could
have given of it. Our fouls, in their pre-exiftent flate, muft have

had

• This Ariftotle has obferved in his third chapter, De Somno et Vigilia ; and in a
pamphlet that was publifhed in London in 1778, entitled, « Conjedures upon
the Materiality of the Soul,' the author relates that he was prefent when a
friend was blooded, who fainted as foon as the blood began to fpring ; and, when
he recovered from bis faint, faid that he had feen the mod charming fcenes that it
is poflible to imagine ; and the furgeon who let him blood faid that it happened fre-
quently. I myfelf had fome experience of this kind; for, when I was thought to
be dying of a £ever, about three years ago, I had a dream, or, as I would rather
call ft, a vifion, in which I was happier than ever I was in my life : And it was a
happinefs of a kind altogether fpiritual and intelleftual, fuch as I could not exprefs
by words •, but next morning I told my phyficians that I had been in elyfium laft
flight, and, upon feeling my pulfe, they declared me to be out of the fever.

Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 225

had Ideas, as wc cannot conceive a Soul without Ideas ; but, when
we come into generation, and are united to the Body, thefe Ideas are
obliterated, and, as it were, effaced. They continue, however.
Hill in the Mind, though in a latent ftatc, obfcured and overlaid, if
I may Co fpeak, by our vegetable and animal part, but are excited
and revived by the operation of external objects upon our organs
of Senfe ; for fuch is the connedtion which God and Nature have
ordained betwixt our intclledual and fenfitive part. Being fo revi-
ved, they continue in the Mind for fome time, but not all prefent
together, as we muft fuppofe they were when the Mind was pure
and difengaged from Matter, but only called up, and prefented to
the Mind, upon occafions. This faculty of Recolledion and Re-
mlnifcence is loft by degrees, and then the Idea or Perception,
of whatever kind, is loft for the prefent, as much as if it had
never been in the Mind. In this cafe was the Comtefle with refpedt
to the Breton language ; and in the fame cafe is every one with re-
fpedt to what he has once learned, but has abfolutely forgot. In
that ftate, thefe perceptions are as much latent as when we came
fir ft into this world j nor can they be again revived (fuch is the or-
der of Nature,) while our Mind continues perfedtly united, as it is
in our ordinary ftate, with the Body ; but, when that union is en-
tirely diffolved, then will all thefe perceptions be again revived,
and the Mind will enjoy itfelf, and continue in the pofleflion of all
its Ideas, without interruption or difturbance from Body ; and I think
it is a comfortable thought to every philofopher, and lover of know-
ledge, that, whatever we acquire of that kind, during this life, fhall
not be loft to us in the next. Now, betwixt the utter diflblution of
Mind and Body and our ordinary ftate, there is a kind of middle
ftate, in which we are while we are afleep, or affeded by certain
difeafes j and then the Mind, being difincumbered in fome de-
gree of the body, exerts her native power, and refumes fome part
of that knowledge which fhe had loft by oblivion. In a fituation
Vol. II. F f not

226 AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. BooklV.

not unlike that of tlic ComtefTe, is a very old man ; for the diflblu-
tion of his Mind and Body being then near at hand, he lecollciits
what he tuid known in his youth, but had abfolutely forgotten for
many years. And there is a gentleman flill living, concerning whom
I have had occafion to be well informed, who, in his youth, loll his
judgment by a blow on his head, and has ever fince been in a ftate
of idiotry, not remembering or giving any attention to what happens
every day ; but he remembers very pcrfcdlly every thing that paifed
before that accident, fmce which, his Mind may be confidered as in a
ftate of feparation from the Body, and as in another life, remem-
bering every thing that pafled before that feparation.

Thefe are my notions of the Mind's power of perception, either
when it is entirely feparated from the Body, or in part by fleep or
difeafe. But, when we are awake, and found in Body, I admit
that we cannot perceive Objedls of Senfe without the ufe of the
Organs of Senfe, which, therefore, are then of the nature of thofe
things mentioned by Plato, that are not Caufes, but without which
the Caufe cannot operate.

Of this kind, I hold not only the External Organs to be, but alfo
f, the Internal Organs, fuch as the Brain or Heart, which are not Cau-
fes of the operations of Mind, but only things without which the
Mind could not operate.

What I have faid here, the Reader will obferve, applies only to
the Animal Mind, which alone perceives the objects of Senfe ; for,,
as to the Intelledual Mind, whofe Objeds are o£ a quite different
kind, I hold that it has no immediate connexion with any Organs,
External or Internal, but only mediately, by its connection with the
Animal Life, which is fo neceflary to it in this ftate of its exiftence,
that it cannot ad without it.

The

Chap. IV., ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 227

The phyfiologlfts, who are not philofophers, fpeak of a certain
temperature of Hot and Cold, Moid and Dry, as being the Caufe
hoth of the Animal and Vegetable Life. But it is truly not a Caufe,
but only that without which the Caufe cannot a(5t.

I have been the more full upon this fubjed, becaufe I am perfua-
ded, that the confidering thofe things as the Caufes of the Operations
of Mind, not the concomitants only, has been the original fource
of Materialifm ; for it has led men to believe that Mind is nothing
elfe but Body modified and organized in a certain way : And, ac-
cordingly, Epicurus has endeavoured to prove the mortality of the
Mind, by fhowing, that it cannot adt without the Body ; from which
he concludes, that it is infeparable from the Body, and muft fubfift
or perifli with it *. And in this way all the Materialifts, from him
down to Mr David Hume, have always argued.

I will conclude this chapter with putting the Reader in mind of a
diftindtion of Caufes, which, though commonly made, feems to be
forgotten by fome of our modern philofophers ; — the diftinftion
I mean is betwixt Firft and Second Caufes. This diftindion fup-
pofes, what I hold to be certainly true, that nothing can exifl:
without a prefent Caufe : So that, though there may be a remoter
Caufe, there muft always be fome immediate Caufe operating in
the produdion of the Effeft, the fyftem of Nature being nothing
elfe but a feries of Caufes and Effedls, at the head of which is the
great Author of Nature, who is the Caufe of all things, but only the firft
Caufe, not the neareft, or immediate. Thus, he is the Caufe of the Life
and Movement of all Animals, but only the remoter, not the imme-
diate : And in this fenfe St Paul is to be underftood, when he fays,
" that in Him we live, move, and have our being f." In like manner I

maintain

• See Lucretius. " '•' ''"" ' '

t I could have wiflied, for the honour of our Englifli tranflators, that they had

not

228 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

maintain againft Dr Baxter, that God moves unorganized Bodies, not
immediately, but by the intervention of that Mind which I call the
Elemental Mind. With refpedt to things in Generation and Cor-
ruption, which are the Caufes of other things of like nature, the
remoter Caufe may no longer have an exiftence, and yet the thing
produced continue to exift by virtue of fome immediate Caufe con-
tinually operating. Thus, an Animal or Plant, produced in the or-
dinary way of generation, receives its exiftence and firft movements
from the parent Animal or Plant ; but it continues to exift and to
be moved by virtue of the Animal or Vegetable Life, that is in it,
after the parent, which firft began its motion, has ceafed to exift.

If the Newtonians had attended to this diftindion, they would
not have maintained, that a Body, put in motion by impulfe of an-
other Body, continues in motion by virtue of that impulfe, after it
has ceafed, but would have feen clearly that the impulfe was only
the remoter caufe of the Motion, and that the Motion muft be con-
tinued by an immediate Caufe, which can be no other than Mind.
And I think they were the more inexcufeable, for giving fo great a
handle to the Atheift, by the "uis in/tla, which they devifed for car-
rying on the Motion, when they knew that there were other Mo-
tions, which were carried on in the fame direction, which could not
be accounted for from any impulfe, fuch as the Motions of magne-
tifm, which, if we fuppofe to be produced by a "uis injitay there
is an end of Theifm, — But of this more hereafter.

CHAP.

not followed the vulgar idiom in rendering this palTage, but had tranflated siF*v^il<e>

■we are moved, inftead of we move- JHs of the /^poflUs, chap. 17. v. a8.

Chap.V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. iig.

CHAP. V,

The Seat of Dreams is the Phantafia — The Phantafia belongs to the
Animal Nature, for the Prefervation of -which it is abfolutely tie-
cejfary. — Dijiinclion of the Human Imaginations zw/o /^o^ ofivhich
•we perceive the Delufion^ and thofe -which -we believe to be Reali-
ties.— This Dijlin^ioji applied to our waking Imaginations. — Di"
flitiBion of our Imaginations into Voluntary and Involuntary. — Of
this latter Kind, the Phantafms that appeared to Bonnet's old Man.
— Another Inflance of the fame Kind — O/^waking Phantafms, -which
'we mi/lake for Realities. — This the Cafe of the Madman. — Dif-
ference bet-wixt Madnefs and Folly. — Difference bet-wixt a lively
Imagination aw^ Madnefs. — Of our fleeping Phantafms, or Dreams.
-—Difference bet'wixt Dreaming and Night-walking. — Of the Au-
thors -who have -written upon the SubjeB of Dreams. — viz. Ari—
ftotle, Synefius, and Baxter. — FaEls ioncerning Dreaming. — The
Dreamer is afleep. — Difinclions bet-wixt fleeping awJ waking made
by Ariftotle. — Di/linfiioti bet-wixt Dreams and other Appearances
in our Sleep — Defnition of Dreams. — Certain Pofitions laid do-wn
concerning Dreaming. — Inquiry into the Philofophy of Dreaming,
that is, the Caiifes of it. — iff. The Opinions fated of the three
Philqfophers abo-ue meiitioned -who have -written upon this Subje^,
beginning -with Ariftotle. — His Theory of Dreams. — They are, ac-
cording to him, the Reliifls of our Senfations during the Day. —
Dreams not prophetic, according to him, though there may be a for-
tuitous Concourfe of the Event -with the Dream. — ObjeSlions to A-
riftotle's Syffem of Dreaming. — It can only account for our Dreams
of things recent. — // does not define the Phantafia nor a Phantafm
properly. — General Obfervations upon his Philofophy. — O/'Syne-

fiu&'s

230 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

fius's Syf.em of Breaming. — Account of the Author. — A great be-
Uei'er in Divination hy Dreams — kept a Journal of bts Dreams. —
The Seat of Dreams., according to him, is the Phantafia. — It con-
tains the Forms of all Material Things, and is the Organ by "which
the Mind perceives them. — In the Fhantafiaj/y'j- Synefius, are the
Forms of all things paft, piefent, and future. — Thefe /^f Mate-
rials of our Dreams. — Our Dreams are of tivo kinds — plain and di-
ireft — or myfterious atid fymbolical. — Ihe latter kind the more com-
mon.— Thefe accounted for. — Of the Art of interpreting them. — No
tommon Art for interpreting all Di'eams, but an Art peculiar to each
Mail, nvhich he hiufl learn by Experience. — Objedions to Synefi-
us's. Syfl^m. — Apology for Synefius. — Baxter's Opinion concerning
Dreams. — The Author's Syflem upon the SubjeSI. — An Account of
the Phantafia — ivhich is divided i7ito retentive and a^t'ive^di/lin-
guijljed from Body — from the Vegetable— yro/« the Intel le6lual
Life — belonging therefore to the Animal Nature. — That Nature not
to be divided into three Parts, but one Nature operating differently.
— Nece/fity of thefe different Operations. — Progrefs of the Animal
Nature in Man. — The Phantafia exceedingly imperfe6l at firfl. — De-
finition of the Phantafia. — The fame nxnth the Common Senfe of h.-
riftotle. — It has a Poiuer of perceiving Likenefles and Differences
in Objedls of Senfe. — This comparative Faculty is ivhat is called
the Reafon of Brutes. — Of the Human Phantafia. — And, ift, Of

our Phantafia, ivhen ivaking 7 he Images in it exceed the Reality

of Nature. — Much influenced by the Habit of the Body. — By the
Love of Beauty it is di/linguifljed from the Phantafia of the Ani-
mal.— The Perception of Beauty, in the Intelleft. — The Phantafia
fubfervient to Intelleft, as the higher Power. — Difference betwixt
Genius and Tafte. — The Influence of the Ridiculous «/><?« /^<? Ima-
gination.— Of other Difpofttions of Mind — The Influence of the
Studies and the Purfuits of Life upon the Imagination.— Oar wa-
king Phantafia Jinder the controul of our governing Vowtx—but that

Poiver

Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 231

Poiver not abfolute or unlimited. — 6'/</.7r Sleeping Phaiitafms, as
dl/iingni/hed from the Operatioyis of our Intelled: in Sleep. — Theft
likeiv'tfe under ihe Influence of the Habit of the Body. — Of the Phan-
tafms in our Sleep confidered as diflinci ft orn our Reafonings at that
Time. — Such Phantafms mufi neceffarily exift. — Confequences of our
Dreams being the Operation of 02ir Phantafia, and not our \n\.t\-
ItQ.. — The World in our Phantafu very much finer than the Natural
World. — OftbeT>rt2im^ ij/'Poets— o/'Philofophers. — Of the Dreams
of the wicked. — Thefe a great addition to their Mtfery. — The
Dreams of the generality of Men, betivixt thefe txvo, neither happy
nor miferable. — No Order or Regularity in the Phantafms of a vul-
gar Marty fleeping or waking. — Otherivife in the Brute and the
perfe(9: Man. — Baxter's Account of the Origin o/" Dreams refuted. —
0/^ Prophetic Dreams. — ObjeSlions to Synefius's Syflem concerning
them. — All Prophetic Dreams plain and direSl^ and proceeding
from Minds yap^n'or to ours. — Such Minds may cojnmunicate ivith
ourst though embodied. — The Revelation by Dreams in one of tnvo
Ways. — FaSls concerning Dreams — Particular Account of the
l!)reams o/*Ariftides^«n«^ 13 Tears; — Cured of a Difeafejhat lafl^
edfo longy by Advice that he got in DTeams.— Delivered fro?n other
Dangers in that Way. — Nothing incredible in the Narrative of A-
riftides.— iZ^^wjybr believing it to be true.—Obje^ions anfivered,
to theTeflimony o/'Ariftides. — The authority o/"Synefius in favour of
Dreams. — His ivhole Life condu6led by them. — Of the Final Caufes
o/'Dreams. — The Philojophy ^Human Nature v^ry imperfe6l ivith-
out the knoivledge of that Caufe. — That Cau/e the Happinefs of Scn-
fitive Intelligent Beings during their -whole Lives. — The virtuous
happy in that Way^ as the vicious are miferable. — Another End of

Dreaming, to convince us that ive are to exifl in a Future State.

The Final Caufe of Supernatural and Prophetic Dreams is the Direc-
tion of Human Life, "which othervuife cannot be properly dire£ied,

TH E phaenomena of Dreaming and Night- walking, of which I
have fpoken in the preceding Chapter, being fo curious, and as
the beft way we can judge of the operations of our Mind in a fepa-

ratc

232 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

rate ftate, and after death, is, by its operations in that death of each
day's life, as Shakcfpeare defcribes Sleep, the reader, I am perfua-
ded, will not be difpleafed that I return again to the fubjcdl, and
beftow a whole Chapter upon it. I do it the rather, that I think it
will make ftill more evident the diftin£lion I have endeavoured
to eftablifla betwixt our Animal and Intelledual Nature.

That Dreams of all kinds, whatever way they come to us, whe-
ther through the gate of Horn or Ivory, or whether, to fpeak
plainly, they are mere idle fancies or of fome Truth and Reality,
have their feat in that part of the Mind which is called the Phanta--
Jxa or Imagination, is acknowledged by every body. I will therefore
begin this inquiry with examining the nature of this wonderful fa-
culty of the Mind, and which, as I have faid elfewhere *, prefents
to us fuch ftrange fcenes, both fleeping and waking, that it may not
improperly be called the magic lanthorn of the Mind..

It is by this faculty that the want of the ufe of our Senfes is fup-
•plied ; for, by the means of it, we perceive objeds of Senfe, both
.when we have no ufe of our Senfes, as in Sleep, and when the ob-
jeds are out of the reach of them, which is the cafe of our Imagi-
nations when we are awake. But, though it operate without the
Senfes, it has fuch a connedion with them, and dependence upon
them> that it never prefents to us any objeds but thofe which we
have, either at fome time or another, adually perceived by our Sen-
fes, or which are of the fame nature with our perceptions of Senfe, but
magnified or dirainifhed, or put together in forms and fhapes differ-
ent from any thing that is to be feen in Nature. This manner of o-
perating of the Phantafia is not only to be obferved in our Dreams,
b'.it alfo when we are awake : For what we call caftle-building is of
that kind ; and a I'oet is nothing elfe but a fkilful caftle-builder.

It is therefore true, what I have elfewhere obferved, that the
Phantafia, however various and wonderful its operations may be,
prefents to us no new objed of Senfe, or, to fpeak more accurately,
no objed of a new Senfe. So that what the Schoolmen fay of the

Intelled

• Vol. I- page 90.

Chap. V. A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. " 2jj

Intelle£t is undoubtedly tnje of ine Pnaatafia ; anu i would have the
propofition altered in this manner, Nihil ejl in Phantafia^ quod non
,'uit in Senfu. It is evident, therefore, that this faculty bckMigs to
the animal part of our Nature, and is, as I have fhown in the Firfl:
Volume *, an eflential part of it ; fmce, without it, the Animal
could not fubfift, nor perform the fundions for v/liich Nature has
deftined it.

There is, with refpedt to the Operations of the Phantafia in Man,
a diftindion to be made, which ought to be carefully attended to ;
and it is this. Sometimes we perceive the illufion of thofe fairy
fcenes in our Imagination, and fometimes we do not. The former
is generally the cafe when we are awake ; the latter when we are a-
fleep. I will begin with applying this diftindlion to our waking i-
maginations.

That there is a principle within us, fuperior both to Senfe and
Imagination, is what cannot be denied by any man who deferves
the name of a philofopher. This principle, which I call Intelkfl^
is the governing principle of our Nature. It therefore corrects the
appearances, both of Senfe and Imagination. And, particularly,
with refpeck to the Imagination, it informs us, when we are awake,
that the Scenes, it prefents to us, are no better than the fcenes
of a play, with which we may be amufed and entertained, but
ought not to believe them to be realities.

Of thefe reprefentations of the Phantafia when we are awake,
we ought to diftinguifh two kinds. The firft is of thofe which de-
pend upon our Will, and of which we may be faid to be the poets
or painters ourfelves. Of this kind are all the works of Fancy
Vol. XL Gg and

* Vol. I . page 90.

^34 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BooklV.

and Genius, which give fo much delight, both to the performers,
and to the fpedtators or hearers. But of this kind there are fome
which are not altogether voluntary, but obtruded upon us by cer-
tain affcdions or paflions, under the dominion of which we are at
the time. It is in this way, that objeds that we have feen, and have
interefted us very much, come acrofs our fancy, and prefent them-
felves to us when we often would chufe not to fee them. But ftill
we know them to be no more than Phantafms or Imaginations, and,
by employing our thoughts another way, we may, if they be
troublefome, get free of them.

But there are fcenes of another kind, which our Imagination pre-
fents to us when we are awake. Thefe are not only involuntary,
but entirely unconnected with any afFedlion or paffion ; and there-
fore they are nowife interefting or affedling. The fcenes I mean
are fuch as appeared to the old man of whom Bonnet fpeaks in the
paflage quoted in the Firft Volume "*. And fuch are the appearances,
mentioned by Ariftotle t, of figures upon the wall to men in fevers.
Thefe, fays Ariftotle, the fick man knows to be illufions, if the fe-
ver be not very high ; but, if it be very high, he miftakes them for
realities. Thefe vifions, which Bonnet's old man faw, were, I

am

* Page 158 — I am well informed of another inflance of the fame kind. My in-
formation is from the late Sir James Stewart, who had a relation of his, an old gen-
tleman, whom I knew and efteemcd, that lived forr.e years in his houfe, and died
in it. Sir James, in a letter that I received i'rom him, on the publication of my
Firft Volume, told me that his old friend, who retained iiis fenfes to the laft, was
in ufe, when he was perfectly awake, and in broad day, to fee figures upon the
wall, not coaches and equipages, fuch as Bonnet's old man faw, but libraries and
colIe£tions of books, and fometimes %vomen fitting and fpinning. This he never
told to any body, for fear he fhould be thought delirious, till one day, that Sir
James happened to read to him the (lory from Bonner, which I have related, and
then he informed Sir Jimes of the vlfions that he had, and not once or twice, but
yery frequently.

t Ariftotle de Infomniis, cap. 2.

Chap.V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 235

am perfuaded, the efFefts of difeafe, not in the organs of fight, any-
more than the like apparitions to a man in a fever, but of the
Mind ; and, if the difeafe had gone much farther, I have no doubt
but he would have miftaken them for realities. And thus much of
our waking Phantafms, which we know to be fuch.

"What we are next to confider, is thofe Phantafms which appear
to us when awake, and which we miftakc for realities. This
I take to be the cafe of Madnefs, and of that leffer degree of Mad-
nefs in women or weak men, which we call Fapottrs, if they come
to a certain height. The Phantafia of the madman prefents to him
Vifions, which he believes to be realities, and a(5ls accordingly ; for
it is a fadt not more flrange than it is true, that, though the go-
verning principle of the madman cannot correct or redrefs thofe falfe
appearances in his imagination, yet it enables him to reafon and aCt
Gonfequentially, upon the fuppoiition of the appearances being real
exiftences. And he argues and afts commonly much more confidently
than thofe who do not miftake appearances for realities, buthave weak
underftandings, or Arong paffions, or both : Such men we call fools.
And here lies the difference, in my apprchenfion, betwixt the two :
The fool knows that the appearances in his Phantafia are not realities,
but reafons ill, and makes falfe conclufions from them ; the mad-
man miflakes them for realities, but reafons well upon that fuppofi—
tion.

As almoft all things in Nature run into one another, like fhades
of different colours, which makes it difficult to fay where the one
begins, or the other ends ; fo it is with refpedt to madnefs, and a
very lively fancy under the influence of ftrong paflions. A man of
that kind, though he have ftlll the faculty of reafon, yet his imagi-
nation may be fo heated, and the colouring of the pidtures there be
fo ftrong and lively, that he may fometimes, like a man at a play,

G g 2 when

236 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

when he is much moved hy the reprefentation, forget himfelf, and
imagine thefe pictures to be realities, or, at leaft, not reflect upon
the illufion. While he is in that condition, he is truly in a ftate of
madnefs ; and the only difference betwixt him and thofe we com-
monly call 7nad^ is, that his phrenzy does not lall: fo long, and he may
be waked out of it, by the ufe of his reafon, like a man out of a
dream ; for, even in dreaming, as Ariftotle has obferved *, the im-
preflion may be fo ftrong upon us, that, after we are awake, we be-
lieve, for a confiderable time, that what we faw in our dream.s is a
reality : And if they are the dreams of a fick man, that impreflion
will continue as long as his ficknefs continues, as I myfelf experien-
ced in the fever above mentioned that I had not long ago.

Having faid fo much of the Phantafia in general, and of our wa-
king Phantafms, I come now to fpeak of what is the principal fub-
jed of this Chapter, our Phantafms in our fleep, and particularly
in our dreams. Night-walking is, as I have faid, very different from
dreaming ; and, indeed, the night-walker, though he adts upon
Bodies, as I am perfuaded feparate Spirits do, appears to me to be
in the World of Spirits, rather than in this world, and much more
feparated from the Body than the Dreamer is. For the Dreamer has
Confcioufnefs and Recolledtion of whatpafled inhis fleep ; and in that
way his fleeping life is conneded with his waking : Whereas the
Night-walker, when he is awake, exifts, as it were, anew, and is as
ignorant of what pafled in his fleeping life, as the Spirits mentioned
by Virgil were of their former life, after having drunk of the waters
of Lethe. And, befides, the body of the dreamer gets that refl: which
the animal requires, and which is the purpofe that Nature intends
by Sleep; whereas the Body of the Night-walker is as much em-
ployed as when he is awake ; fo that Night-walking is altogether

an

♦ De Infomniis.

Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 237

an unnatural ftate *. But of Night-walking I have faid enough in
the preceding Chapter, and fhall now proceed to treat of Dreams.

Upon this fubjed, there is no modern author that has" written, as
far as I know, except Mr Baxter, in his treatife upon the Immate-
riality of the Soul. But there are two treatifes of Ariftotle upon the
fubjedt ; one of which he entitles, * Concerning Dreams,' and another
* Concerning Divination by Dreams.' And there is an excellent dif-
courfe upon Dreams by a moft learned Chriftian philofopher of the
fourth century, Synefius by name, who, in treating of this fo com-
mon phaenomenon, has taken occafion, as he informs us in his in-
trodudion, to enter into the moft abftrufe myftcries of philofophy.
And indeed it appears to me, that, nnce the days of Plato and Arif-
totle, there has not been a philofopher of greater depth than Syne-
fius.

From the writings of thefe authors, and from what has occurred
to myfelf, I have endeavoured to form a kind of fyftem upon a
fubjedl, which appears, at firft fight, to be fo ftrangely odd and whim-
fical, as not to be capable of any fyftem. And I will begin with
colleding the fadls relating to dreaming, as it is only upon fads
that any good theory, concerning any part of Nature, can be
founded.

One fa£l concerning dreaming is axlmitted by all, that it happens
while we are afleep ; and, therefore, before we go farther, it is pro-
per that we ftiould diftinguifti accurately and philofophically betwixt
fleeping and waking. And here, likewife, we are aflifted by Ari-
ftotle, who has written a fmall treatife, which he has entitled, ' Con-

* cerning

• I am credibly informed that a night-walker does not feel pain. The perfon,
who told me fo, faid that he himfelf made the experiment upon a female night-
walker, into whofe arm he ftuck a pin, and (he did not exprefs the lead fenfe of
pain. If fo, the night-walker mufl be in the ftate of a feparatc Spirit, which atls .
upon Body, but is not ailed upon by it.

238 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

* cerning fleeplng and waking.' The difference betwixt the two he
makes to be, that, in the one ftate, we have the ufe of our Senfe,%
in the other we have not. They both, therefore, belong to the
fame part of our Nature, viz. the Animal or Senfitive ; the one being
the Adion or Energy of our Senfes, the other the CefTation of that
Adion,

But this alone, as he obferves, is not fufficient to dillinguifli ac-
curately the two ftates ; for it often happens, that, when we are a-
wake, we have not the adlual ufe or exercife of any Senfe. We
muft therefore add to the definition of fleeping, that not only we
have not the ufe of our Senfes in that flate, but that we have not the
capacity of ufing them, during our continuance in that flate ; fo
that, while we are afleep, though objeds of Senfe be prefented to
us, and ad upon the organs of Senfe, as when we are awake, we
do not perceive them. And from Hence Ariflotle infers, that if, in
in our fleep, we fee any light, or hear any noife, as fome people do,
w^e are not perfedly afleep ; nor are fuch appearances in the Mind
Phantafms or Dreams, but real Senfations *.

It appears, therefore, as Ariftctle has obferved, that Sleeping does
not belong to any one Senfe, or to all confidered feverally, but to
the common Senforium, by which we fee, hear, fmell, tafle, and
touch, and diflinguifh one of thefe Senfations from another, and per-
ceive the difference betwixt Senfations of the fame kind. This is
what Ariftotle calls, ' the Common Scyijc -^ and that part of the Mind
to which it belongs, ' the Comynon Scnjor'ium f. And, as this Senfe
belongs to all animals, though they may want fome of the particu-
lar Senfes, and even all of them except touch, fleeping, there-
fore, belongs to the whole Animal Nature j and there is no Animal
that does not fleep.

Sleep,

• Lib. de Infomniis, cap. ultimum.
t Lib. de Somno et Vigilia, cap. 2.

Chap.V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 239

Sleep, therefore, Is a temporary incapacity of the Co?7imon Senfo-
r/«;;/, or Senfitive Part of our Mind, to perceive the impreffions made
upon the feveral Organs of Senfe, by external objedsj I fay tem"
forary Incapacity^ becaufe, if we fuppofe a perpetual incapacity,
then fuch a Body would not be an Animal, but a Vegetable, or feme
Inanimate Subftance. And as what never a£ls, mufl: be fuppofed
not to have the capacity of a£bing, which, in that cafe, would be
to no purpofe ; therefore all Animals, according to Ariftotle, muft,
at times, wake as well as fleep ; that is, at fome time or another^
they muft have the ufc and exercife of one Senfe at leaft *.

Thus, one lliould think that Sleeping was fufficiently diftinguifhed
from Waking : But it is not fo ; for, as Ariftotle has obferved, there
are temporary incapacities of perception by Senfe, which are not
Sleep, becaufe they proceed from difeafe, or from fome hurt. And he
inftances Fainting, in which we have no perception by Senfe, and yet
fee wonderful Phantafms f. The temporary incapacity, therefore,
of Senfation, properly called Sleep, is that which proceeds from Na-
ture, not from Accident or Difeafe ; for, as Ariftotle informs us,
the Operations of Mind, by means of the Body, fuch as Senfation,
cannot, by their nature, be perpetual ; and, therefore, when they
are continued for a certain time, the Senforium becomes wearied, as
it were, and incapable to perform its functions, and then the Ani-
mal falls afleep. And this, according to Ariftotle, produces the ne-
ceflity of Sleep in all Animals \. The Final Caufe, therefore, of
Sleep, according to him, is the relaxation and refrefliment of the
Animal, while the Senfes are locked up : And the Efficient and
Material Caufe is certain Vapours, which, he fays, arife from the

nourifti-

• Ibid cap. I.

t Ibid. cap. 3. in initio. See an extiaordlnary fact of/ iliis kind, mentioned
page 224.

± Ibid. cap. 3.

240 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

nourlfliment we take in, and afcend to the head, which they make
heavy and unable to fuflam iifelf ; then returning back again, and
going downward, they produce Sleep *.

Having thus fliown what Sleep is, namely, that it is a Cellation
of the Adion of our Senfes, proceeding from the wearinefs of Na-
ture, we are next to confider what Dreaming is, and to diftinguifli
it from fome phacnomena which appear to be Dreams, but are not.
And, in the firft place, it is agreed by all, that we can only be faid
properly to dream when we are afleep ; and therefore thofe Vifions
I juft now mentioned, which a man has in a fainting fit, are not
dreams, though they be the operations of the Phantafia, bccaufe wc
are not then afleep.

Secondly^ Thofe perceptions above mentioned, of Light, orNoife,
which fome people have while they feem to be afleep, are not Dreams,
for the fame reafon, and likewife for another reafon, namely, that
they are the perceptions, by the Senfes, of objedls of Senfe adlually
prefent, confequently not the operations of the Phantafia, which all
dreams mufl: necefl'arily be.

But, 3//0, Even all Phantafms in our Sleep, though they be the-
operations of the Phantafia, are not Dreams, unlefs the Mind be de-
ceived by them, and believe them to be real exiftences ; for, if the
Mind tell itfelf, as it fometimes does, that this is but a Dream and a
Delufion, then it is not, properly fpeaking, a Dream, but fuch an I-
magination as we have when we are awake and in our fober Sen-
fes f. And the reafon is, as Ariflotle has told us, that we are not
then perfedtly afleep ; becaufe the governing principle in us is adive,

and

* Ibid. cap. 3.

t Arift, de Infomniis, cap. 3. in medio.

Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 241

and reviews our Phantafias, and correds appearances, in the fame
manner as it does when we are awake.

/^thly. There are other operations of this governing principle,
while we are aflcep, which we ought hkewife to diftinguifli from
our Dreams : What I mean is, our Reafoning upon the Phantafms
which our Dreams prefent to us ; for we often reaibn, and reafoa
very well, in our Sleep, upon the Suppofition that the ohjects ap-
»earing to us are real objects. But fuch Reafonings Ariflotle very
properly dillinguilhes from the Phantafms which give occafion to
them, and wluch alone are our Dreams *.

And here we may obferve, in pafling, a very great refemblance
betwixt Dreaming and Madnefs ; for the Madman has Phantafms
that he believes to be real, as well as the Dreamer, and, as I have
obferved, generally reafons very well, upon the fuppofition of their
being realities.

Further, we not only reafon in our Sleep, upon the fubjed of thefe
Phantafms, but fometimes abftradtly ; and there have been examples
of perfons folving difficult problems of geometry or arithmetic in
their Sleep, that they were not able to folve when awake. And
Plato fays, that, if we were to live temperately, and keep our Minds
free from diforderly pafTions, we fliould have Philofophic Dreams,
in which we might make great dilcoveries t. But fuch operations
being not of the Phantafia, but of the Intelled, are not what are
properly called Dreams.

Vol. II. H h Lajlfy^,

* 1 hefe reafonings Aridotle calls, ir»( t» rm »!»»« yitorou nx^ift; tttuxi, t«{« t«
^Mvrcts-fticrcc' 'ut tu^iv t>uTrn»> <pxTitf De Infomniis, cap. ult. iiijine.

t Lib. 9. Dc Republ. in initio 1 have no doubt that Plato fpoke from experi-
ence ; and I can fay, from my own experience, that the more a man philofophifes, .
and the older he grows, the more philofofhical his Dreams will become, and lefs
^hantajiical.

242 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV,

La/ily, There is a difference betwixt dreaming and walking in our
Sleep ; which, as I have fufficiently explained already *, I will fay
no more on it here.

From thefe ohfcrvations, the following definition of Dreams may
be colledled : ' They are Phantafms, which appear to us, while wc
* are fleeping and the Body is at reft — believed, while the Sleep con-
' tinues, to be Realities — of which wehave Memory and RecoUedtion
' while awake, but then are convinced that they are delufions, and
' mere creatures of the Phantafia.' By Memory and Recolledlion
when we are awake, I have diftinguifhed dreaming from walking
in our Sleep ; and by our conviction, when awake, of the delufion, I
have diftinguiflied it from Madnefs ; for a Madman perceives Phan-
tafms, which have as little reality as thofe we fee in our Dreams, but
believes them to be realities, as well when he is awake as when he is
afleep. And, therefore, as I have faid elfewhere, Dreaming is a ihort
Madnefs f, and it may be added, that Madnefs is a long Dream.

Having thus defined what Dreaming is, and diftinguifhed it from
other things with which it may be confounded, I will now proceed
to lay down certain pofitions concerning it, which I hold to be cer-
tain.

And, in xhefrjl place, it certainly belongs to the fenfitive or a-
nimal part of our Nature, as much as our Senfations do ; and, indeed

the

* Pages 216. — 223. 223. and 237.
t I will here give Ariflotle's definition of Dreams, if any body likes it

better : To ^xyrtc^fe* ra ««-o Tij; Kii/,7iu% Tan tciirlti/tuTi'y, irxt I' ru kkIivouv it, »)

xtttivln, t««t' nrT( iwisiitt, De Injmnniis in fine. "Which may be thus tranflated, * A
' Dream is a Phantafm, proceeding from the motion of our Senfations while we
' arc Sleeping, fo far forth as we are Sleeping.' What he fays of the motion of our
Senfations will be explained when I come to fpeak of the caufe he afligns for Dreams.

I

Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 243

the Pliantafia, which is the feat of Dreams, may be confidered as a
fecondary Scnfc, fupplying the place of tlic five Scnfes \Yhen they
cannot operate, cither through weariiiefs, as in Sleep, or bccaufe
their objedls are not within their reach ; and, as it belongs to the
Animal Nature, fo it is common to us with fome of the Brutes, as
Ariftotle has obferved *»

Secundo, As our Dreams are fo much connected with our
Senfations, it is certain that they, as well as our Scnfations, de-
pend very much upon the habit of our Body. Sick men's dreams
are wild and extravagant, even to a proverb : But, on the contrary,
the Dreams of men in good health, and that live temperately and
regularly, and whofe Minds are not difordered by unruly paffions,
are commonly not wild or extravagant, but containing fome regular
ftory, which, if we wake and fall afleep again, is often refumcd and
carried on.

Tertio, Our Dreams not only depend upon the habit of our Bo-
dy, but alfo upon our age or time of life ; and I believe it is true
what Ariftotle has obferved, that children do not commonly Dream.
And he fays further, that fome men, when they are young, have no
Dreams, but, when they are farther advanced in life, they have
them. And he adds, that fome never Dream through their whole
lives ; but this, he fays, is rare "f.

^larto. When we Sleep foundeft, which is generally in the be-
ginning of the night, we very often do not Dream, or, at leaft, we
do not recoiled our Dreams, if we fliould happen to be then a-
waked ; but it is generally in the morning, or after midnight,
when we do not Sleep fo found : So that what Horace favs,

H 2 Pod

• Lib. de Divinatione per Infomnium, cap. 2- in initio.
i Lib. de Infomniia, in fine.

244 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

PoJ} mediam Jiofiem ubi Somnia I'era,

will apply to all Dreams, as well as to true Dreams.

^intOy In our Dreams we have no Memory, nor make any di-
ftindion of time paft, prefent, and future ; and therefore every thing
in a Dream, whether paft or future, is reprefented to us as prefent,
without any recolledlion of what is paft, or forefight of what is to
come : For this reafon it is, that, in our Dreams, we fee and con-
verfe with people dead, as if they were alive ; and things that are to
happen appear to us as if we were fpedators of them.

SextOy Our waking thoughts, our ftudies, occupations, and the e-
vents of our life, have no doubt a great influence upon our Dreams,
and very often furnifh the fubjed of them. It is therefore, in a
great meafure, true what Petronius fays.

-cum projlratafopore

Urgct membra qiiies, et mens Jine pondere ludit ;
^idquid lucefuit, tenebris agit. Oppida bello
^li quatit, et Jtcunmis mtferandas fae'vat in urbes^
'Tela videt, 'uerfafque acies, etfuncra regum^
Atque exundantes perfufo f anguine campos.
^li caiifas orare folent^ lege/que fonimque
Et pav'ido cernunt inclufum corde tribunal.
Condit ai'arus opes^ defojfwnque invenii aurum.
Venator faltus canibus quatit. Eripit undis^
Aut premit cverfum periturus navita puppim.
Scribit amatori meretrix. Dat adultera munus.
Et canis injhmmis leporis 'vejligia la t rat.
In no^is fpatio miferorum vulnera durant.

I

But

Oaap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 245

But it is not true that what our thoughts were laft employed a-
bout is always the fubjedt of our dreams; but, on the contrary, it
happens more frequently that we dream of things that we have
not thought of for a great while, or perhaps never thought of at
all.

And, lajlly^ I hold it to be certain, that future events, or pad or
prefent things, that we could not ocherwife know, arc fometimes re-
vealed to us in Dreams, more frequently, I believe, in the antient
world, and among people nearer to the natural ftate than we are, but
fometimes, though rarely, to fuch men as we. And this I the more
readily believe, that I cannot doubt the many flories that I have
heard concerning what is called the Second Sights by which things
are reprefented to men in vifions while they are awake, which other-
wife they could not know. But it is to be obferved, that I fpeak
only of clear and dired: Dreamjng, called by Ariftotle £yfluo»£»ft« *,
by which the event is plainly, and without ambiguity, revealed ;
for, as to the art of reading Dreams, as it is called, that is, expound-
ing fuch of them as are fuppofed to be fymbolical and enigmatical,
I do not know that it has any foundation in Nature.

Having thus eftablifhed the fads, and laid down certain propofi-
tions concerning Dreaming, which I hold to be inconteftible, I will
now endeavour to explain the philofophy of it, that is, aflign the
caufes of this wonderful phaenomenon, not the lefs wonderful for
being fo common ; and I will begin with ftating the opinions of the
two antient philofophers I mentioned, Ariftotle and Synefuis, and
alfo of Baxter, the only modern philofopher, as far as I know, who
has examined this fubjed. This is the method that Aiiftotle fol-
lows in all his philofophical inquiries ; and I think it is the bcft me-
thod

• Lib, (le Divinatione per Infomnium, in fine-

246 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

thod pofTiWe, fir ft to fludy what others have faid upon any rubjed,
and then to try what you can add to their difcoveiies, or corred in
tliem.

Ariftotle, as I have laid, has v/ritten two books upon the fubjed,
one upon Dreams, another upon Divination by Dreams. In the
firft, his theory of Dreams is as follows : All Senfations, he fays, are
produced by a certain movement of the Organs of Senfe ; which
movement is caufed by external objedls. This movement of the
Organs being carried on, and propagated to that internal principle
of animal life within us, which we call the Senforiumy and which he
calls a Common Senfe, produces that perception of the Mind called
Senfat'ion. The Motion of the organs, fays he, continues after the
aftion of external objeds upon them ceafcs, in the fame manner as
the Motion of a Body, impelled by another Body, continues after the
impelling Body ceafes to touch the Body impelled, the Motion being
continued by the Air propagating the Motion, which it receives from
the Body impelling, to other Air, and that Air to other Air \ and fo
on, till the impelling force growing weaker and weaker by degrees,
the Motion at laft ceafes *. And that this general Law of Motion
holds with refpedl to our Organs of Senfe, he proves by fundry ex-
periments. A man who has been looking at the fun for fome time,
when he is brought into a dark place, or a place with much lefs light,
fees nothing : And a man who has looked ftedfaftly, for fome time, at
one colour, when he transfers his fight to an objedt of a different
colour, it appears to him to be of the fame colour. All which, fays he,
can be owing to nothing elfe but the Motion of the Organ of Sight,
produced by the firft impreflion upon it, ftill continuing "f". Now,
this continued Motion in the Organ of Senfe is not perceiveable by

us.

• Lib. de Infomniis, cap. 2. in initio,
t Ibid. cap. 2. p. 693. Edit.du Fal.

Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 247

us when we are awake, (except in fuch particular cafes as thofe juft
now mentioned), by reafon of the continual movement and agitation
we arc in, and the various impreffions of fo many different Objedts
upon our Organs while we are awake. Uut, in the ftillnefs of the
night, when we are afleep, and when no impreflions are made
upon the Organs, at leaft none that reach to the Senforium, the
Motion, produced in them by the impreffion of external Ob-
jeds during the day, ftill continues ; and being propagated to the Sen-
forium, in the fame manner as when we are awake, the Senfo-
rium being then vacant, and free from other impreffions, per-
ceives thofe remains of Motion in our Organs ; and thence arifc
our Dreams, which therefore he fays are the remnants or relicts of
our adlual Senfations while we are awake *. But, fays he, this com-
munication of Motion from the Organs to the Senforium may be
difturbed and interrupted by other Motions in the Animal Body,
particularly by the Motion of the vapours or exhalations from the
head downwards, which produces broken and incoherent Dreams,
like images in water when the water is moved : And, if that
defluxion is very great, as in the cafe of children, there will be no
dreams at all ; but, if it be moderate, then it will not interrupt
the propagation of the Motion from the Organs to the Senforium.
By this propagation from the Organ of Sight, we fee in our
Dreams; by the fame propagation from the Organ of hearing, we
hear ; and fo as to all the other Senfes f .

This is his fyftem of Dreaming : As to Divination by Dreams
from what he fays in the beginning of the fecond chapter upon that
fubjedt, one fliould imagine that he thought future events were to
be known in that way, and that thofe prophetic Dreams were pro-
duced

• Ibid. cap. 3. p. 695. In fine. His worJs are, t,T»A«^« t,v f» 7^ -u^ynx »i7h •

flXTOf.

t Lib. de Divinatione per Infomnium, in fine.

24& ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

duced by Demons, if not by Gods*. But, upon going farther into
this work, we dilcover that he believed thofe Dreams, which are
commonly faid to be prophetic, to be neither the Caufes nor the
Signs or Prognoftics of future events, but merely a-wirTuiAixTx, or Jcr-
iiiitoiis CQinciUences of thefe events witli our Dreams.

From this account of Ariltotle's do<fl:rine of Dreams, it is plain that
he derives them all from Material Caufes ; nor is it to be wondered
at, thai he did not believe in the Divinity of Dreams, as Homer did "fi
and all antient nations before philofophy came in among them j for
Ariflotle not only had not the leaft grain of enthufiafra or fuperftition
in him, but it is evident that he did not believe in the cxiftence of
fo many Gods or Daemons as the followers of Plato did ; and he is
blamed by Proclus, in a paffage that I have quoted in my Firfl; Vo-
lume X, for afcribing the Motions of the heavenly Bodies to Mind
inhabiting them, but not accounting in the fame way for the vari-
ous Motions here on earth.

But to his fyftem I think feveral obje<n:loTis may be made. In the
ftjl place, I cannot be convinced that the Phantafms in our Sleep
are nothing but reliefs of the Motion produced by external Objeds
upon the Organs of Senfe : For thefe flionld be much weaker than
the firfl; impreHions of Objedls upon the Organs ; whereas, in fadt,
they are often much flronger,, and more lively, and make a greater

im-

* His words are, 0j»7rs^?rT» ^sv ««« «« an t« OfTrxa, *«i^»»ia funci muitnot' i! y«{
^vri; ^«ius>;«, «AA cv tux. cap 2- in imtio.

•}■ — x«i yaf t' oy«^ tK Aim Krri, Iliad. I- V, 63-

And an <i»«{«t«a<i5, or Interpreter of Dreams, mentioned in the preceding line, was.
a man held in great ellimation in thofe times.
\ Page 208.

Ciiap. V. A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. 249

impreflion upon us, than the original Senfatlons, of which, accor-
ing to Ariftolle, they arc but faint copies.

Ariftotle's fyftem, were there any truth in it, which I do not
think there is, will only account for our recent Senfations con-
tinuing to move the Senforium in our Sleep ; and, if it were
true that we did nothing in our Dreams but go over again the Sen-
fations of the preceding day, it might be defended with fome (how
of reafon : But the fadl is very different ; for it is not always, nor,
indeed, I think, commonly, that the bufinefs of the preceding day is
the fubje<n: of our Dreams, but, on the contrary, we very often Dream
of perfons that have been dead for twenty years, and that we have not
thought of for a long while, and fometimes of perfons and things
that we never faw. But, fuppofe that we had feen them, but at
fome diftance of time, it is impoffible to account how the im-
preffion, made upon the organs ofSenfe, fliould remain for any con-
fiderable time, after fo many impreffions have been made upon them
in the interval : For, as to the inftances he gives, of the organs re-
taining, for fome time, the impreflion made upon them, it is only
for a very (hort time ; and, during that time, fhort as it is, there is
no other impreflion intervening.

idOy Ariftotle fays, that a Dream is a Phantafm of a certain kind* ;
and, in the fame chapter, he fays that it is of that kind of Phantafms
which we fee in certain difeafes, and which we believe to be reali-
ties. The quefl;ion, therefore, is, What a Phantafm is, of which
a Dream is a Species ? Now, we cannot know what a Phantafm
is, unlefs we know what the Phantafia is, which is that Power
or Faculty of the Mind, by which thefe Phantafms are created
Vol. II. I i and

* Lib. de Infomniis, cap. i.

250 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

and preferved. If, therefore, Ariftotle has not rightly defined
the Phantafia, it is clear that his docStrine of Dreams cannot
be well founded. Now, both in the chapter juft now quo-
ted, and in the Fourth Chapter of his Third Book, De Jnhna^
he has defined the Phaatafia to be a Motion produced by an adual
Senfation *. But this is plainly the definition of a Phantajm, not of
any power of the Mind by which Phantafms are produced, nor of
any part of the Mind where Phantafms have their feat. Neither is
it, I think, a good definition, even of a Phantafm ; for we cer-
tainly have Phantafms, awake as well as fleeping, of Objeds of
Senfc, which we have perceived many years before, when the Mo-
tion, produced by them upon the Organs of Senfe, muft be fuppofed
to have ceafed long ago. The dodrine, therefore, of Ariftotle, up-
on the Subjedt of Dreams, and of Phantafms in general, I hold, with
all the refped due to fo great an authority, to be very unfatisfac-
tory.

It may be obferved, in general, of the philofophy of Ariftotle,
that, although no man was a more perfed Theift, or thought more
highly of the human Soul, believing it to be a Subftance quite di-
ftindl from the Body, immortal, and eternal, and of unceafing e-
nergy and adivity in its feparate ftate, yet it does not appear that he
Jiad formed any clear opinion of the Animal Mind being likewife an
Immaterial Subftance diftind from the Body; and therefore he endea-
vours to account for the phaenomena of the Animal Life, and par-
ticularly Dreaming, by vapours and exhalations, (afwflu/Afairjr)^ and
fubtle fluids, and the Motions thereby produced, much in the
fame manner as Plato tells us Anaxagoras endeavoured to ac-
eauBt for all the phaenomena of Nature.f ; whereas I hold,

that

• Ariftotle's words are, <p<tvTartii J* »o-1» i tv* tiij xtcr' Mijy«*» mrlnrt»( yUtftitn tuynmi
I See the Phaedo, p. 97. editio Scrrani.

Chap.V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 251

that the Animal Life is a Mind, as well as the Intelic<5lual, being
a Snbftance Immaterial, diftind from Body, operating by it-
felf, as the Intelledual Mind does, and particularly in Dreams,
although being fo intimately united with Body, its operations mud
be much ailcdted by the habit of the Body, not lefs, but, I believe,
more, than the operations of our Intellect. Acknowledging, there-
fore, this influence, I account for its operations, as I do for thofe of
Intelledl, from its own Nature, and not from the Vapours and Ex-
halations of Body, which may difturb and diftort its productions,
but never can be the caitj'e of any of them.

And here our Materialifts may obferve, with fome triumph, that
Ariftotle has been as unfuccefsful as they in accounting for the ope-
rations of Mind by Matter and Mechanifm. It may likewife give
them fome fatisfa£tion to think, that, in the illuftration, above men-
tioned, of his hypothefis of Dreams, he has accounted, as lamely as
they do, for the continuation of the Motion of Projedilcs, which,
he fays, is caufed by external impulfe ; not, indeed, by the origi-
nal impulfe, after it has ceafed, (for of that he does not appear to
have had the leaft idea), but by the trufion of the air, one body of
air impelling another and fo continuing the Motion ; whereas, if
he had ftuck to the Principle of Motion, that, he fays, is in all
Phyfical Bodies, which I call the Elementary Mind, and which, he
fays, is a fpecies of Mind, and dignifies with the name of Nu'
ture, he could very eafily have accounted for the Motion of
Projediles, by fhowing that this Mind moves Body in various
ways, and not conftantly, but occafionally, as, in this cafe, up-
on occafion of the Body. being impelled by another Body ; and
in many other inftances, which ek^ive attrnclion^ as the chy-
mifts call it, exhibits to us : And this may fcrve to fhow us how
true Ariftotle's notion is of the internal Principle of Motion
in Bodies, which he has made the foundation of his whole

Natural

352 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

Natural Philofophy ; for, when he departs from it,hc falls, wc fee, into
very great errors. Thefe errors the Platonifts have avoided, by ma-
king Mind the Author of all Motions in the Univerfe, thofe on Earth
as well as thofe in Heaven, as Proclus has obferved in a paflage
which I have elfewhere quoted * ; and, therefore, it muft be ad-
mitted by the greateft admirers of Ariftotle, that Plato is more the
Philofopher of Mind than Ariftotle, — But to return to Dreams.

I come now to the fyftem of Synefius t upon this fubjed. He
was a firm believer in Divination by Dreams ; and, had he lived in'

this

• Vol. I. p. 208.

t This Synefmi was originally of Cyrene, a Lacedaemonian colony in Africa ^
and he was of heroic race^ being of the family of Hercules, the nobleft family in the
world, and which produced more Kings and Heroes than any other that ever ex-
jfted. His defcer»t from Euryfthcnes, the firft King of Sparta, and the fifth from
Hercules, was vouched by the public records of the city : Synefius, Epijlle 57. If
•we fhould doubt of the proof of a genealogy which goes back into ages of fo remote
antiquity, one thing is certain, that there is an elevation both in his thoughts and Aylc,
that is worthy of a man of the higheft rank, as well as greateft learning, and lets him
much above all the writers of his age. He addifted himfclf to the Platonic Phi-
lofophy, which, as it is well known, was the philofophy of the primitive Chriftian
church, and which beft fuited fuch an exalted genius as his. He was fo famous
for his learning and philofophy, that the Chriftians of thofe days were at very great
pains to make a convert of him, and were fo zealous to bring him within the pale
of their church, that they made him an offer of the bifliopric of his native place,
Ptolemais, (a city near Cyrene, and which had come in the place of it, the antient
city being thf-n in ruins,) even before he believed in the refurredlion of the dead, as
Euagoras informs us, which he was, with much difficulty, perfuaded to accept of.
He flourifhcd under Arcadius the Emperor, to whom he has addrefled an ad-
jnirable oration, (for he was a rhetorician, as well as a philofopher), entitled in^i
^utrtfifiaf, in which he fays he fpoke with more freedom to the Emperor than any
Greek before him had ever done ; and, indeed, it appears from the oration itfelf,
that he animadverted with great freedom upon the errors of his government This
treatife of his, »-sg< tivTrnuy, has been thought worthy of a Commentary by one Nice-

phoruSj

Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 253

this age, he would have been accounted ridiculoufly fuperftitious :
But Synefius was a Platonic philofopher ; and, befides the Greek
philofophy, which he appears to have ftudied moft diligently, he was
learned in the theology of the Egyptians and Chaldaeans, as we are
informed by his commentator Nicephorus in his preface to his com-
mentary. And it is well known that all the philofophers of thofc

times,

p!iorus, a learned Greek of later times ; in the Preface to which he has given a
•wonderful account of the learning and philofophy of Synefius, fpeaking of him as
a man infpired, and exalted above humanity. And as to his ftyle, it is praifed by
Adrian Turnebus, in a ftyle almofl as attick and as elegant as Syncfius's own flyk.
See what he has prefixed to his edition of his works, which is the edition that I
have ufed : See alfo what I have further faid of him, vol. i. p. 260-

I will fubjoin to this note Nicephorus's words, fpeaking of his learning, bccaufc
I think them remarkable. • It was confefled,' he fays, by all, ' ou ftotc iatrn «crx

' T«» EA^nvae Aoy«» trri «ra<«iA«», w«i''>l5 •? »*■(" <rvtuf»o-rtit xxTtrriittci (Xutia-itf), aAA« xost
'' Tti>XtcxiuiKt)t t$cc<rntTni airxfTitt i^ymf »ui i<r»o xv iify^xufiuTOiv rut ir»\»tTtt^ Aiywri-
' »ii IxufcuTTvhyTtt' /ii/iXi» tcxi /nvrriKict TtA»T«i T015 itrnTX }Ci*"'i ^x^t^oc-xv, koi irx AlA-
' ^mf iiiyj<.xrnTxt iuX'yt, tvti lovrm]/ uttKirrtf tfCHttt c «»/ig ' Where we have mention-
cd all the foreign philofophy, (I mean befides the Greek), which was ftudied at that
time; ift the Chaldaic Myfteries, or •^yi*, as they are called by Nicephorus, by
which, no doubt, are meant thofe Chaldaic Oracles which we have publiflied with
the Commentaries of two learned Greeks of later times, Pietho and Pfellus ; and
thefe Oracles, 1 imagine, were nothing elfe but a colkftion from the writings
of the antient Divines and Philofophers of Chaldea : Next the Myftical Philofophy,
preferved in the antient books of the iiji>y;«^f<«THs or Sacred Scribes, of the Egypti-
ans, that is, as I underftand the word, they who underftood and could write the
facred Charafter, to which only thofe Myfterics were committed : And, lad of all,
the Dodrine of the Theologians of Delphi. Till 1 read thefe laft words, I be-
lieved that the Oracles, fo often quoted by Plotinus, Porphyry, Jamblichus, Pro-
clus, and Synefius himfelf, were only the Chaldaic Oracles. But jt appe.irs from
thefe words of Nicephorus, thnt the Delphic God, after he had ceafed lo be poli«
tical, and could no longer dirett the affairs of men by his councls, ftill k pt up
fome authority, by didating in matters of philofophy: And ptihaps fome of the
Oracles, quoted by Synefius in this work, and which are not fo be found in the
above mentioned collection of the Chaldaic Oracles made by Pietho and Pfellus,
aic from the Delphic Priefts. This, I think, is a curjous anecdote of Jueraty hiftory.

254 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

times, fuch as Plotinus, Porphyry, Jamblichus, and Proclus, were
great believers in Divination. In this work he fpeaks of fcveral
kinds of Divination ; but to all of them he prefers that by Dreams,
becaufe it is conftanlly carried about with us, requires no ap-
paratus, or expence, nor any thing clfe but a conflant attention to
our Dreams, and to what happens in confequence of them. For this
purpofe, he recommends it to every one to keep Night Journalst
(iTrii^ujcTtJtf, as he calls them), as well as «?iii/*if»^ff, or Day Journals ;
by which, fays he, we have the hiftory of our whole life. And it
is evident from what he fays, that it was his own practice *.

The feat of Dreams, according to him, is the Phantafia ; In which
he agrees with all philofophers, and alfo in another thing, that the
Phantafia belongs to the ^-^xij o"" -Animal Lifcy confidered as diftind
from the Nodj, or Jntelkd. This J-wX" ^^ holds to be embodied with
a thin vehicle of air, or aether, which he calls n^u/ita, or the o^"/**
7rfwToi/j in oppofition to the (rwf<.« {(rj(,«Tov, or Trtj ipA»)/ii« ofT{£U(J«, that is, the
outward body, which he hkens to an oyfter'sftiell inclofmg us. As the
intelled, fays he, contains in it the forms or fpeciefes twv oi/twi/, that
is, of things really exifting, fo the ^\)-/r\ contains in it the forms twk
yiwptvitfv, that is, of things which have no permanent exiftence, but
are perpetually in generation and corruption, fuch as all material
things. All thefe the Mind has in itfelf, but has the perception only
of fuch of them as are produced and exhibited to the Mind by the
Phantafia, which he confiders as the Organ by which the ^\>yi\ per-
ceives its objetSlst' As all material things are in time^ they are di-
{lin"-uilhed, according to the threefold divifion of time, mto prefenty
pnjl, vind future. And of all the objeds of each of the three kinds
there are Forms, according to him, in the Phantafia : For, though

all

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I Page 100. and lot.

Chap. V. AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. 255

all things here below confift of Matter and Form, it is only one
part of the compofition, viz. the Form, that appears in the Phantafia;
and it is the Forms of things prefent, paft, and future, in the Phan-
tafia, which make our Dreams.

From this account of the Phantafia given by our author, it is evi-
dent that it is the very fame with what Ariftotle calls the Common
Senfe, by which the Mind perceives whatever is reported to it by
the Senfes. And, indeed, our author exprefsly fays fo in page 103.
where he calls the Phantafia the MmtrxTov xiv^nm^iov^ and the «t(r6>io-)r
•«r6»i<ri«i' ; and fays that the outward fenfes are only fo many por-
ters, which inform this fuperior Senfe who it is that knocks at the
door.

Our Dreams, being thus compofed of things paft, prefent, and future,
are, with refpe<fl to things future, of two kinds; the one plain and di-
redt, requiring no interpretation j the other myfterious and enigmati-
cal, and which, therefore, need to be expounded. The firft of thefe, he
fays, is Divine, proceeding from Minds fuperior communicating with
our Minds : And particularly, he mentions one Divinity, that he calls
©£0f f yxoTntiix, ox Mundane God * , by which I fuppofe he means the
4/UX1 Tou MiriAoyx)^ or the Soul of the World, which was the third perfon
of Plato's Trinity. Such Dreams, he fays, can only happen to fuch
as have their '^m'x/i and their Phantafia purged from every thing grofs
and earthly, by philofophy, virtue, and a pioper diet and manner
of living ; or, if they happen to any other, it muft be for feme
very good reafon, and on fome great occafiou !• But the latter

kind

• Page 124.

t Page 125. and i%6^

M

256 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

kind are by far the moll common ; and that Sleep, fays he, may
not be unprofitable to any, he gives us a rule for the interpretation
of them. But, firft, he accounts for them in this manner: He fays,
that the forms, or fiJ'w^a, as he calls them, of all things paft, pre-
lent, and future, are continually flying off from the Things : For,
fays he, as we aie fure that the Corporeal part has always effluvias
from it, by which it is conftantly wafted and diminiflied, fo Philo-
fophy tells us that the Form alfo is conftantly going oft' in the fame
way ; fo that, in no refpeiSl, a material thing has any real or per-
manent exiftence *. Thefe forms, thus flying about, the Phantafia
receives, as a Mirror does the Images prefented to it. Of thefe,
the forms of things prefent are more clearly reprefented ; with lefs
clearnefs thofe of things paft ; and with leaft of all thofe of things
to come, as having a much more imperfedl exiftence than either the
paft or the prefent t* They are, therefore, very obfcurely repre-
fented in this Phaniaftic Mirror ; And if the Phantafia is much mo-
ved and difturbed by Sympathy with the Body, he compares it to
Water, which, if it be much agitated, muft needs reprefent the
Images in it very much diftorted, and out of their natural order J.

For fetting thofe Images of future things right, and thereby fore-
feeing what is to come, he fays there are two ,ways : The firft is by
an art, which, feme pretend, will apply to all Dreams of all perfons.
But this art he rejects as fallacious, and no better than mere impo-
fture : For he fays it is impofllble, by the nature of things, that
there fhould be an Art of Interpretation of Dreams, as there is of
Phyfic ; becaufe the fubjed of Phyfic h much more ftable and per-
manent, and more like in different men, than the Phantafia is, the

moft

• Page 12;.
f Page 126.
t Page 127.

Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 257

mofl; fiihtile and various thing in t!ie work!, and the moft unlike in
different men * The other method, therefore, is that which he
appioves of, by which every man in this matter is made a rule or
ftandard for hlmfclf j fo that a man, in order to learn the art of in-
terpreting his Dreams, needs only ftudy himfelf, obferving diligently
and accurately after what dreams of his what events happen f ; and
thus from Memory will arife Experience, and from Experience
Art, according to the genealogy of Art given by Ariftotle J.

With this account of Dreams, Synefius has mixed a great deal of
the Myflical Platonic Philofophy, concerning the dcfcent of Miads
into Bodies, the way they are afFeded by the contagion of Body
and their rcafcenty or «^«yay»i, towards their native manfions.

This is the fyftem of Synefius upon the fubjecl of Drcanis, in
which the Reader will obferve a great deal of truth and found
philofophy, mixed with a good deal of what appears to me very
whimfical and fanciful. For his fJaAa I take to be as much a fic-
tion as the £»JwA« of Epicurus, and a more extraordinary fidion in
two refpeds : Firft, the ikTciX* of Epicurus are all material, being
films which come off from the fuperficies of things, and which fo far
no doubt, have a foundation in reality, that there are conftant efBu-
\ias, more or lefs, from all Bodies ; whereas the *iSu\x of Synefius
are caft off from the immaterial forms of things. — 2^/;', Epicurus had
no idea of any tJuAat, except of things that either do exift, or
have exifted ; whereas Synefius tells us that there are images of
things that are only to exift, and that thefe images produce our pro-
phetic Dreams.

Vol. II. Kk But,

• Page 126. and 127.
t Page 128- et fi-q.
X Metaplu in initio-

258 y\NTlENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

But, thougli I venture to find thefe faults with Synefius's fyftem,
I am far from being confident that I am in the right, becaufe I mud
confefs there are many things in this work of his, that I do not per-
fedily underftand : And his commentator Nicephorus appears to me
to underftand them as little as I do ; for there is a depth in his mat-
ter, and, at the fame time, an elevation in his ftyle, and a kind of
oracular obfcuriry, which, I fuppofc, is the reafon that makes Nice-
pliorus fay that he writes like one infpired. As, therefore, I am not
one of thofe that rejedt every thing, they do not underftand, as ab-
furd or unintelligible, I am difpofed to believe that there may be a
meaning in Synefius which I have not fathomed, and that what
feems to me odd and extravagant in his fyftem, would appear, if
I underftood it better, to be found and folid philofophy, though, no
doubt, of the fublimeft kind.

The laft author I mentioned, who has written upon Dreams, is
Mr Baxter ; and his fyftem is, that all our Dreams, of whatever
kind, do not proceed from the Mind itfelf, nor are of its own
growth, but are produced by the operations of other Minds upon
it.

I will now proceed to give my own opinion concerning Dreams,
agreeing in fome refpedts with each of the opinions above mention-
ed, but in other refpeds differing from them all. And, in the fr/i
place, as Dreams are undoubtedly Phantafms, and there can be no
Phantafms without a Phantafia, I will begin the inquiry by giving
a more particular account, than I have hitherto done, of this Power,
Faculty, or Part of the Mind, and fo will endeavour to fupply that
fundamental defed which I have obferved in Ariftotle's fyftem of
Dreaming.

That

Chap. V, ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 259

Tluit there is fomething^ within us, which perceives objeds of
Scnfe, without the afliilance of the Organs of Senfe, is a fad of daily-
experience, of which no man can doubt.

This facuky of the Mind is called Phantafui, or, in common lan-
guage, Lnaginatmi, and is very properly divided by Philoponus, as
I have obferved *, into retentive and acliue ; the firfl: retaining the
objedts which we have received from the Senfes, the other calling
them up, and prefenting them to the Mind, upon particular occa-
fions, and combining them together in various forms. And in this
refped the Phantafia refembles Intelled ; for the Intelled not only
forms and retains Ideas, but calls them up to the Mind, and ope-
rates upon them in various ways.

2do, That this power of perception belongs to mere Matter or
Body, is what no man will maintain who is not a downright Mate-
rialift ; for, if Matter can perceive, it may ihiiik, rea/oti, refecl, and,
in (hort, perform every operation that we afcribe to Mind, and there
will be no dillindion betwixt Body and Mind. I therefore do not
approve of a manner of fpeaking which the Material Philofophy has
introduced, as if a part of the Body, which they call a Senforium,
and which I believe they place in the brain, was that which percei-
ved objeds of Senfe, retained them, and operated upon them : For
we ought never to forget that faying of antient philofophy, that it is
Mind only which fees, hears, or perceives, by any of the other Senfes ;
nor that diftindion above mentioned tj made by Plato, betwixt the
caufe of a thing, and that without which the caufe cannot operate.
For there are certain organs of the Body, both internal and external,
without which the Mind, inclofed as it is in Body, cannot operate ;

K k 2 but

• Page 170.
t Page 215.

26o ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

but thefe are not the caufe of lis perceptions, any more than a man
who ftands betwixt me and any obje£t, by moving out of the way,
is the caufe of my feeing that objevl:,

7V/7/0, It is univerfally agreed that Matter, though animated by
the Vegetable Life, has not this power of perception by the Phanta-
fia, any more than by the Senfes ; perception in both thefe ways,
and the confequence of fuch perceptions, viz. Inclination and Aver-
fion, Pleafure and Pain, being the pecuHar properties by which the
Scnfitive Nature is diftinguiQied from the Vegetable.

4/9, Neither is the Phantafia to be confounded with the Intellect,,
the objeds of the two being intirely different; for nothing is more
juft than the obfervation of Synefius, that the Phantafia is the feat of
thin"-s in generation or corruption, or the rx ym(/.im, as he expreffes
it ; whereas the other is the feat of the ra. ovra., which, in the language
of Plato and his followers, is what I call Ideas, being things that
have a real exiftence ^ whereas corporeal fubftances are in a conflant
change and viciffitude of generation and corruption. And it is alfo
very well obferved by Syncfms, that it is the Form, without the Alat-
ter ; by which we are not to underftand, that it is that inward Form
which conftitutes the nature and eflence of every thing, and is no
other, as I have fhown, than the Idea of the thing ; but it is the
outward Form of the thing, fuch as is reprefented to us in painting,
or in a mirror..

Of this dlftindion betwixt the Phantafia and the Intelledl our
daily experience may convince us : For, as the objeds of the two
are quite different, fo are their operations ; the Intelled reviewing
and correding the appearances in /the Phantafia, and informing us
that they are no more than Phantafms, and often wild and extrava-
gant Phantafins. And it is a common faying, and a very juft one,

that

Chap. V. A NT 1 E N T METAPHYSICS. 261

that a man has a good fancy, but a bad judgment ; and, when a
man has no judgment at all, but gives implicit alTcnt to his Phan-
tafms, without queftioning their reality, we fay the man is mad, as I
have already obferved *. '

As, therefore, the Phantafia does not belong to mere Matter, nor
to the Vegetable, or even the Intelle£lual Mind, it muft neceffaiily
belong to the Animal Mind ; for, befidcs.thefe three, and the Ele-
mental Life, as I call it, which animates all Phyfical Bodies, there
is nothing elfe in our Microfcofm, nor, as far as we can conceive,
in the great world, or Univerfe. Accordingly, the better fort of Brutes
have a Phantafia, as well as wc, without which it were impoffible
that they could perform the fundlions of an Animal Oeconomy of
any variety ; and their Phantafia operates, 'not only while they arc
awake, but alfo in Dreams, when they are afleep.

Now, this Animal Life, to which the Phantafia belongs, is, as I
Jiave Ihown, a Mind altogether diilind, not only from the Vege-
table, but the IntelleiSlual Mind, being a Subftance by itfclf in us,
as much as it is in the Brute. We are not, therefore, to confider it
as a faculty only of our Intelledlual Mind, as many do, and which
has produced much confufion among Philofophical Reafoners, but
as a Subftance altogether difierent, incorporeal, as well as the Intel-
lectual Mind, though of a nature far inferior.

But there is no neceflity to fplit the Animal Nature into two or
three parts, fuppofing that there is one that perceives external ob-
je£ls, another that retains thofe perceptions, and a third that operates
upon them. And, particularly, it would be altogether abfurd, to
fuppofe that there is a Mind that only retains the images of fenfible
objeds, but does not operate upon them : For Adion is of the very
effence of Mind 5 nor can we conceive Mind, without a power of

a<!iionj,

* Page 23-..

262 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

a£lion, though that power may not be always exerted. We are,
therefore, to underfland, that it is the fame Sentient Principle or
Mind, operating in different ways, in the fame manner as the Intel-
ledlual Principle operates in perceiving Idea and in combining them
in different ways. And, as Nature does nothing in vain, all the
three operations of the Animal Life are equally neceflary for the A-
nimal Oeconomy : For it would not be fufficient, as I have fhown,
that the Animal perceived external objedls, if he did not retain the
perceptions of them in his Mind ; and again, it would not be fuffi-
cient, if we had only images of things in our Phantafia, which we
perceived as we perceive things in Dreams. But it is abfolutely ne-
cefTary for our fubfiflance in this Body, that we fhould be informed
of what pafles without, as we are by our Senfes, which Synefius
very properly compares to door-keepers or porters, that let us know
who knocks, and defires to inform us of fomething that it is proper
we fhould know. And, laftly, even thefe two would not be fuffi-
cient, if the Animal had not a third faculty, by which he operates
upon his Phantafms, and joins them together in various ways ; for
it is by that faculty that the wonderful thing we call Tnjlin£l ope-
rates, and conduds the whole Animal Life of the Brutes. — But of
Inftind I fhall fay a great deal more afterwards.

I hold, therefore, that, in the full grown or perfect Animal, thefe
three Powers of the Animal Nature are divifible only in Idea. But,
as there is a wonderful progrefs in all things in Nature, from an im-
perfedt to a perfedt ftate, I hold that, when the Animal begins to
exift, they are adually divided, and particularly with refpedt to
Man.

It appears to me, that, when we firfl: enter into this fcene of ex-
iftence, we have no other method of perception but by our Senfes ;
for there is reafon to believe that very young children have no Phan-
tafia

Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 263

tafia at all ; a child in the womb being no better than a Vege-
table, and firft when he is born a very imperfe£l Animal, and
much refembling the lower kinds of the Brute creation, which
I imagine have no Phantafia. And this m-ay be the reafon of the
fad which Ariftotle has obferved, that children have no Dreams ;
and if it be true, as he fays, that there are fonie few elderly people
that likcwife have noDreams, I believe it will be found, upon inquiry,
that thofe perfons are very defective in Imagination. The truth,
therefore, feems to be, that, at firft, our only method of perception is
by the Senfes ; then, in procefs of time, comes another method of
perception by the Phantafia, the neceffities of life fo requiring. And
thus we fee the powers even of our Animal Mind rife one above another,
and grow out of one another: Firft come the Senfes, then the Phan-
tafia ; and thus the Animal Mind is completed : Next in order, and
laft of all, that Superior Mind, which had fo long lain latent, and, as
it were, overwhelmed by the Vegetable and Animal Life, difclofes
itfelf ; and then, and not till then, we are only aSiuaUy men ; for,
before, we were no more than men in capacity, as the Peripatetic
definition of Man has well diftinguiihed.

According to this account of the Phantafia, it may be defined to
be ' The Animal Mind, confidered as retaining the perceptions of
' Senfe, calling them up, and prefenting them to the Mind, as occa-
* fion requires, and performing various operations upon them.' And
I agree with Synefius, that the Phantafia, thus defined, is no other
than that common Senfe^ of which Ariftotle fpeaks fo much *, by
which the Mind, at the fame time that it perceives fo many dif-
ferent objeds, compares them together, and perceives their likenefs
or their difference ; for it is of abfolute neceffity for the oeconomy
of the Animal Life, that the Animal Ihould have a perception of

the

* See Page 255. of this Volume,

264 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

the /ikciicfj, and alfo of the difference, not only of the objeds of
different Senfes, but of the ohjeds of the fame Senfe : And it is
this comparative faculty of the objeds of Senfe with one ano-
ther, that is called the Reafoning of Brutes.

Having faid fo much of the Phantafia in general, I will pro-
ceed to confider the human Phantafia in particular, the feat of
that wonderful phacnomena of our Nature, which I have underta-
ken to explain. But, before I proceed to treat of our fleeping
Phantafms, I will endeavour to explain the operations of our Phan-
tafia while we are awake ; which being more immediately under
the infpcdion of our Intelledl:, we underftand better than its opera-
tions while we are afleep.

In thcfr/I place, it is evident that the operations of the Phanta-
fia, as well as the Intelle«£t, mult be very much influenced by the
habit, difpofitlons, and inclinations of the Mind, and alfo by the
ftudies and occupations of life, and, laftly, by the temperament and
habit of the Body. I will begin with the laft : But firft, I muft ob-
ferve, in general, of all our Imaginations, whether afleep or awake,
that they commonly very much exceed the reality ; and the objeds
of all our pafllons and purfuits appear to the Phantafia much finer,
and more pleafurable, than we find them when we come to be in
poflelTion of them ; the reafon pf which I take to be this, that the
Mind, being of a nature fo much fuperior to the Body, and work-
ing upon its own materials, exhibits feenes, and draws pidlures, very
much finer than any that can be made of the grofs materials which
Nature furnilhes ; and this efpecially in Madnefs, or in Sleep, when
the Imagination is not at all controlled by the Judgment.

As to the Body, every man knows, from experience, how dif-
ferent his Imagination and Fancies arc, when he is in good health,

and

Chap. V. A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. 265-

and when his Body is affedled by any difeafe ; and there are fome difea-
fes which affedl the Imagination more, when we are awake, as well
as when we are afleep, than other. Thus, as Ariftotle has obfer-
ved, men in fevers fee figures upon the wall, even before the difeafe
is come to fuch a height, as to make the fick man beHeve them to be
realities. And there are fome difeafes, which afTcdl the Imagination,
or Spirits, as we commonly fpeak, fo much, that they are called by
Phyficians Difeafes of the Spirits.

Further, as the appetites and wants of the body are the chief con-
cern of many men, the objefts of their gratification are thofe which
occupy the firft place in the Phantafia of fuch men ; and I am per-
fuaded that thofe appetites, and whatever elfe may concern the ani-
mal oeconomy, are the only objeds of the Phantafia of the Brute,
fleeping or waking ; for, as Nature does nothing in vain, there can
be no reafon affigned why there fhould be any thing elfe in their
Imagination. And, as a fenfual man is very little better than a
brute, his Imagination muft be full of what he fhall eat, drink, or

enjoy, of bodily pleafure of every kind. And fo much for the

influence of the Body upon our Imagination..

Had we no other defires but thofe belonging to the Animal Life,
our Imaginations, like thofe of other Animals, would be wholly em-
ployed about the objeds of thofe defires ; but we have other defires
belonging ro the Rational Nature, which make our Imaginations
much more rich and various than thofe of the Brute creation. And
firft, we have the love of Beauty of every kind, whether in objeds
vifible or audible, in manners, fentiments, or adions. This Love
of Beauty, as 1 have fhown *, is congenial with the Rational Na-
ture : And whoever Is entirely void of it, hardly deferves the name
Vol. IL L I of

• Book II. Chap. v.

266 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

of a Man. But la this, as In other refpeds, Man differs very much
from Man ; for fome have the love and tafte for Beauty in a very
fmall degree ; others, whom Nature has formed of her beft clay,
and Heaven bellowed on them a more than ordinary portion of the
Celeftial Fire, have it in a very high degree. Of fuch Men the Ima-
ginations are filled with the moft beautiful fcenes of Nature and Art,
Men and Manners. If it be the Beauty of the vifible kind which
captivates thofe Minds, and if their Imaginations are carried into
works, then have we Painters, Sculptors, and Poets of an inferior
kind, I mean defcriptive Poets. If it be the Beauty of Sounds, then
have we Muficians. But, if the turn of Mind be towards Beauties
of a higher kind, fuch as thofe of Sentiments, Manners, and Ac-
tions, then are produced Heroic and Tragic Poets, Painters, Sculp-
tors, and Muficians of the higheft order, who exprefs in their
compofitions what is mod fublime and exalted in fentiment and
ehafa£ler. The capacity of performing in thefe feveral Arts is what
we call Genius ; and the perception of Beauty in them, and the ca-
pacity of diftinguifliing true Beauty from falfe and afFedted, is what
we call Tajle,

Nor is it to be wondered at, that Intelled, which is the feat of
the Fair and the Beautiful, fliould make this difference betwixt the
Pkantafia of Man and Brute ; for Intelledt being the governing
power in our Nature, every thing elfe is made fubfervient to it, ac-
cording to a general Law of Nature, by which all inferior things are
made for the ufe of what is fuperior and more excellent. Thus, in
Animals, we find that the vegetable part of their compofition, being
lefs excellent than the animal part, is fo formed and modelled, as to
be accommodated to the purpofes of the more excellent Life, and,
for that reafon, is in many refpects different from the fame Life in
the mere Vegetable, as I have elfewhere obferved *. Now, the

Beaii-

* Page 210.

Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 267

Beautiful and the Handfome is the chief and the only Intellectual
Pleafure : For Intellccfl delights in nothing, as I have elfewhere
fhown *, but what is Orderly, Regular, and therefore Beautiful ;
the contemplation and enjoyment of which \& the pcrfedion of our

Nature,

But, as there is neceflarily the fame knowledge of Contraries, it is
impofTible that we can know what is Beautiful and Graceful, with-
out knowing alfo what is Deformed ; and there are many men, who
have a great tafte for what is Deformed, Odd, Grotefque, or, to ex-
prefs it in one word. Ridiculous. The nature of this Tafte, feem-
ingly fo ftrange, and how it comes to belong to Human Nature, I
have elfewhere explained f ; and, though many may not agree with
me in what I have there faid, the fad; is moft certain that fuch a
Tafte there is ; and the imaginations of thofe who have it are filled
with objedts of the ridiculous kind.

Moreover, there are Minds naturally weak and timorous. Of
fuch Men the Imaginations are filled with the objedls of terror and
affright. While there are others, whofe better turn of mind pre-
fents to them objedls of joy and pleafure.

There is nothing more natural to Man than Imitation ; and A-
riftotle has very juftly charadterifed Man ' the moft Imitative of all
' Anivials.' Thofe, who poflefs this talent in the higheft degree,
have their Imaginations filled with objedts that they have feen or
heard ; and, if they produce them into Adlion, they are what we
call Mimics.

The Faffions, too, and Purfuits of Men, their Studies and Occu-
pations, fill the Imagination with correfponding Objeds. Thus, the

L I a vain

• Book II. Chap. 5.

i- Page 129. of this Volume.

i68 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

vain man's Imagination is full of honours done to him, and praifc
beftowed upon him ; The avaritious fee, in the Mind's eye, pro-
digious heaps of wealth amafled : The Men who delight in the
magnificence of houfes, gardens, table, and equipage, have their I-
maginations filled with fccnes of thefe Kinds. And, when thefe
paffions and purfuits become the ftudy and occupation of our lives,
we have hardly any other Imaginations.

Thus, it appears that our Phantafia, while we are awake, is fuited
to the habits and difpofitions of our Minds and Bodies, and to our
ftudies and purfuits in life. As to the Intelle£t, or governing Power
within us, it reviews and corrects the appearances of the Phantafia,
and checks and controuls it in its Tallies and excurfions, and can tranf-
fer it from one objed to another. But, though it be thus under the
government of reafon, it has an adlive power in itfelf, and does of-
ten a£t without the confent or approbation of Reafon ; for our Fan-
cies do not depend entirely upon our will ; and there are often Phan-
tafms in our Imagination, even while we are waking, of which we
can give no account at all.

And here we may obferve, in pafling, that, though Reafon is the
governing Principle in us, yet its authority is much bounde'd and
limited by the conftitution of our nature : For, in ihtfrji place, it
has no power at all, diredlly and immediately, over the vegetable
part of our nature ; for we grow and are nourifhed without our
Underftanding taking any concern in the matter : And, fecondly^ it
can only controul and check the operations of the Phantafia ; but it
cannot operate for it, nor entirely prevent its operating. We may
alfo further obferve, that the Phantafia is not paflive, as the Mind is
in Senfation, but is adive, and creates objedls for itfelf.

Having

Chap.V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 269

Having thus examined our Pbantafms while we are awake, I come
now to fpeak ofour Dreams, that is, our Phantafms in our Sleep ; but,
before I fay any thing of them, I will make fome obfervations upon
what Ariftotle does not call Dreams, but which certainly comes very
near to them, I mean our Rcafonings in our Sleep.

That our Intelle<fl:, which operates, as well as our Phantafia, with-
out the afhftance of the Body, when we are av/ake, (hould operate,
as the Phantafia likewife does, when we are afleep, is very natural j
and, in fa£t, we are fure it fo happens. But it operates differently,
as the Phantafia likewife does in different men ; for, in vulgar men,
it operates, as it does when they are awake, upon the Phantafms
in the Imagination, reafoning, as fuch men do, upon corporeal
things and the events of human life. But, in the Philofopher, it is
very often employed in the fame way as it is during the day, reafon-
ing about truths eternal, and inveftigating theorems of fcience, not
converfant with things in generation and corruption, I have not,
therefore, the leaft doubt of the truth of what Synefius fays, concern-
ing his philofophic Dreams, having had fome experience of that kind
myfelf, and being well aflured that others have had the fame experi-
ence *. And it is very reafonable to think, that the Intelle<fi, in the
ftill and quiet of the night, when its attention is not called off by
any external objects, fhould be more colledled within itfelf, and
fliould operate better, than at any other time.

That the exercife of this faculty of our Mind, when we are afleep,
as well as when we are awake, fhould be much affedted by the ha-
bit and difpofition of our Body and Mind, is both agreeable to rea-
ion, and confirmed by experience. If our Body is perfeftly found
and healthy, without being either overcharged with food, or in want

of

• See page 24 r.

270 AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

of it, and If our Mind is free from paifions and perturbations, and
very much employed in philofophical fpeculations, I have no doubt
of the truth of what Plato fays*, that Sleep will not much interrupt
our progrefs in fcience.

I come now, at laft, to what is the fubjeft of this Chapter, viz.
Dreams, properly fo called ; and I am hopeful, that fo long an In-
trodudlion to the fubject will not appear unneceflary or fuperfluous :
And, if I am not miftaken, from what I have faid, I Ihall be able,
not only to explain the fadls concerning Dreaming, but to demon-
ftrate, a priori, that they muft have exifted ; for the confequence of
an accurate inveftigation of any queftlon of natural philofophy is,
that, by reafoning a pojleriori^ we difcover principles, from which
we are able, by reafoning a priori, to deduce the phaenomena.
And this, I truft, has happened in the prefent cafe.

And, in the jJV/? place, as the Animal Life in us is an Immaterial
Subftance, and, confequently, an adive Principle, though it be qui-
efcent in the womb, and not perfect even when we are born, but,
like other things in nature, coming to perfedlion by degrees, I hold
it to be certain, that, when both the Body and it are arrived to a
ftate of maturity, it will not require that reft which, we ar^fure, the
Body and its Organs require. Although, therefore, I am inclined
to believe, that neither the Animal nor the Intelledual Principle is
perpetually adlive while clogged and incumbered with this Body ; yet
I think it impoflible to believe that our Intellecftual part will be fo
foon tired with thinking, or our animal part in operating upon the
forms in our Phantafia, as the Body is with Motion, the Eye in See-
ing, the Ear with Hearing, or the Nerves, which are fuppofed ta
convey thefe Senfations to the Brain, in performing their functions.

And,

* De Rep. Lib. 9. in initio.

Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 271

And, accordingly, we find that, while we are awake, our Intellect, or
our Imagination, is perpetually at work, though our Body, and all
its Senfes, may be perfecSlly at reft. And, as there is no other
difference betwixt Sleep and a ftate of that kind, except that we are
under a temporal incapacity of perceiving objects of Senfe, fo that
our Senfes can no longer perform the office of Porters, to ufe the
fimile of Synefius, and inform the Mind who knocks at the door, a
ftate which we are fometimes in even when we are awake, if we
be thinking intenfely, it would be contrary to all reafon to fuppofe,
that, at all times, or even for the greater part, when the Body refts
in Sleep, the Mind ftiould lofe its natural adivity.

Thus, I think it appears, that, however wonderful a phaenomc-
non Dreaming may feem to a vulgar Man, it would appear wonder-
ful to the philofopher if we did not Dream. And I am perfuaded we
Dream very much oftener than we know of : For we either are not
attentive to our Dreams, and at pains to recolle£t them ; or we have
not the faculty of recoUeding them, which is the cafe with refpedl
to a great deal of our waking thoughts ; for there is no man alive,
that at night can recoiled one half of what pafled in his Mind
through the day.

2 Jo, As our Dreams are entirely the operation of our Phantafia, if
there be no Phantafia, or if it be very weak and imperfeft, there
will be no Dreams, or very few. And this, ^s I have faid *, I take
to be the true reafon for children, and even fome elderly people, ha-
ving no Dreams, and not the Material Caufe affigned by Ariftotle.

3//0, From the fame principle, of our Phantafms in our Sleep, that
is, our Dreams properly fo called, being entirely the work of our

Phan-

• Page 243. 247. 263.

272 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

Phantafia, it follows, that, as Confcioufnefs belongs only to Intel-
lect, in our Dreams, which are truly fuch, and not operations of
our Intelledt, we have no Confcioufnefs nor Memory of any thing
that is part, but are entirely occupied with the prefent Phan-
tafms : And, as it is only by means of the Intelle<5l that we
recollcdl our Dreams, for want of which it is impoflible to be-
lieve that the Brutes have any recoUedlion of theirs, if our In-
telled he weak, or if the Sleep, we have been in, was very pro-
found, it is reafonable to fuppofe that, if there be any recoUedion
at all of our Dreams, it will be very imperfedt. And this, I think,
may account, both for children not remembering their Dreams, if
they have any, and for full grown people not remembering the
Dreams that they have in the beginning of the night when they
Sleep foundeft ; and I fhould fuppofe that thofe people vs^ho, it is faid,
do not Dream at all, were defeftive in the Intellea;, as well as the
Phantafia.

4/0, From the fame principle, we may account for our having no
Idea in our Dreams of what is part, or of Time in general, which is
an Idea belonging entirely to Intelledl ; for, when we form the Idea
of Time, we compare together what \.sfuji and laji ; and the Inter-
val betwixt thefe two is what we call Time. Now, it is impofTible
that the Phantafia, any more than the Senfe, can make this compa-
rifon ; and therefore its objeds are all apprehended, like the ob-
jects of Senfe, without any diftindion of pad, prefent, or Future.

5/0, The colours with which the Phantafia paints its objeds in our
Sleep muft be much more bright than when we are awake, and the
Shapes and Figures it reprefents more ftriking and lively, not only
for the reafons given above, but becaufe the operations of our Phan-
tafias are not difturbed and interrupted by the intrufion of the ob-
jeds of Senfe, as in the day-time ; and, becaufe our Minds being

more

Chap.V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 273

more drfengaged from our Bodies while we arc afleep, than while
wc arc waking, it is natural that all the operations, both of
the Phantafia and the Inielled, fliould be more perfed than
when we are awake ; and the Phantafia being under no controul
from the judgment, Fancy has its full play. Hence it comes that
men of good Imaginations fee in their Dreams fuch fcenes as no
poet can defcribe. And Mr Thomfon, in his Caftle of Indolence,
has, I believe, given as good a defcription of them as is poflible, by
telling us that they are not to be defcribed, in the following mod
beautiful lines.

No, fair Illuftons ! Artful Phantomsy no!

My Mife nvill not attempt your fairy land :

She has no Colours that, like you, can gloixj ;

To catch your 'ui'uid fcenes too grofs her hand.

But fur e it is, ivas ne*er afubt'ler band

Than thefefame guileful Angel-feeming Sp' rites.

Who thus, in Dreams, voluptuous, foft, and bland ^

Poured all th' Arabian Heaven upon our nights,

And blefd them oft beftdes ivith more refind delights.

I think, however, he has fucceeded pretty well in defcribing them
in the preceding ftanza, which I am fure the reader will not be forry
that I tranfcribe, as I think it as fine defcriptive poetry as is to be
found in this, or in any other language.

And hither Morpheus fent his kinde/l Dreams,
Rai/ing a nvorld of gayer tinSl and grace ;
O'er ivhich ivere //jadoiuy cajl Elyftan gleams.
That play' d, in -waving lights, from place to place ,
Andfhed a rofeatfmile on Nature s Face.

Vol. II. M m Not

274 ANT IE NT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

Not Titian s pencil cer could fo array.
So fleece ninth clouds, the pure aethereal /pace ;
Ne could it eerfuch melting forms difplay.
As loofe infloivery beds all languiJJnngly lay.

Such Dreams a man of poetic genius will have, if his body be
not difeafed, nor Mind difordered by PafTion. But, if he be a phi-
lofopher of the higheft kind, whofe thoughts, as Milton fays,
* Commerce with the fkies,' he may enjoy io his Dreams a kind of
beatific vifion, fuch as is mentioned in a piece of very antient phi-
lofophy, entitled, ' The Chaldean Oracles *:' And I am perfuaded
that it was in Vifions or Dreams fuch as thefe, thatPlotinus andfomc
others of thofe myftical Platonifts of later times pretended to be
united with the Supreme God f. Of this every man may believe
what he thinks proper ; but I have no doubt that a man, fuch as I
have defcribed, will, in his Sleep, live in a world very different from
that he lives in while awake, and very much finer.

On the other hand, if Men live intemperately, if their pleafures
are chiefly of the corporeal kind, their Imaginations, fleeping as
well as waking, will be filled with grofs and fenfual objeds ; and
their Dreams will be wild, broken, and diforderly ; and, as the dif-
orders of their Mind and Body increafe, their Dreams will become
moft terrible, fuch as the fame Poet defcribes.

But

• There is a colkaion of thefe Oracles made by Pletho, with a commentary, both
of him and Pfellus, upon them, publifhed in Paris in 1007, by one Johannes Op-
fopoaeus. See page 81. and 90. of that colleftion, where it is faid that the Philo-
fopher, in fuch Dreams, fees nothing that has form or fliape, but only a (hining
light. Synefius alfo fpeaks of men in their Dreams bein^ thus exalted to an imme-
diate communication with the Divinity.

t See Vol. I. page 140.

(

Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 275

But for thofe Fiends^ ivhom blood and broils delight ;

M^ho hurl the zuretch, as if to hell outright,

Doivn, doivn black gulphs, -where fullen -waters Sleep ;

Or hold him clambering all the fearful night

On beetling cliffs^ or pent iti rui?is deep :

They, till due timejhouldferve, zuere bid far hence to keep.

When a man is In that fitiiation, he is, I think, as miferable as a
man can be in this life ; for, even Sleep, * that balm of woe,' as
Shakefpeare calls it, our refuge from the miferies of life, makes this
man more miferable than he was before, and prefents to huu ano-
ther world, which, if he has any notion of a future ftate, muft give
him terrible apprehenfions of the world he is to go into when this
life is at an end. But, betwixt a life of virtue and philofophy, and
this extremity of vice and mifery, there are many intermediate de-
grees ; .^nd, according as our lives come near to one or other of the
two extremes, our Dreams will be better or worfe. Of the genera-
lity of men, who are not remarkable either way, the Dreams are
commonly trifling and infignificant, giving very little pleafure or
pain ; and therefore they are very little obferved ; nor, indeed, do
they deferve any notice ; and, if a man of that kind were to keep a
regifter of his Dreams, as Synefms advifes, it would be a mod in-
lignificant one. Of fuch a Man even the- waking Imaginations are
but trifling, and not worthy of being remembered. Thofe in his
Sleep, when under no couuoul from his judgment, muft be ftill
more infignificant.

To afk a reafon for the Phantafms of fuili a man, either waking
or fleeping, would be a fuperfluous imjuirT- ; hecauic he is neither
in the natural animal ftate, or in the ftate of .1 < erted rational crea-
ture. In the firft of thefe ftates, his Phantafia, his A{ petites and
Defires, and all his Actions, would be governed by unerring Wif-

M m 2 dom.

276 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

dom, commonly known by the name of Inftind ; and then, no
doubt, a reafon might be given for every appearance in his Phanta-
fia. And accordingly, I am perfuaded, that, in the Mind of the
Brute, at leafl of fuch of them as are in the natural ftate, there is
no Phantafm which has not a diredt tendency, either to the prefer-
vation of the Individual, or the continuation of the race. Again, in
the pcrfedl man, his Phantafia, as well as his Intellect, is governed
by perfe£l Reafon ; his Theorems of Science are without error, and
upon the moft important fubjedls ; and his Imagination, both fleep-
ing and waking, is full of the faireft forms, and the fineft fcenes, of
Nature and of Man. Nor do thefe Phantafms axife in the Mind at
random, but are called up by the governing Power, regularly, and
in order, for certain purpofes. On the other hand, the Phantafia
of a vulgar man is influenced by a bad habit of Body, and is go-
verned by falfe opinions, and unruly paflions, and therefore his
Phantafms are the caufe of much diforder and mifery in his life ; nor
do they arife with any order or regularity ; and, though there may-
be fome connedlion among them, it is not worth inquiring about, or
finding out. Such, therefore, being the influence of our Phantafia
upon human Life, it was an excellent prayer to the Gods, of fome
philofopher whofe name I have forgot, ' To give him good Phan-
' tafms :' But it is a vain prayer, unlefs we live a virtuous and or-
derly life, and cidtivate good affedions and difpofitions.

From this account that I have given of Dreams, it appears that I
differ from Mr Baxter, who derives all Dreams of every kind from
the operations of other Spirits upon our Spirits. But, though I be-
lieve, as he does, that there are above, below, and round about us,
multitudes of other Minds, tnillions, as Milton fays *; yet, as Nature
does nothing but for fome purpofe, I cannot believe that any of
thofe Minds are fo idly employed as to infpire our trifling Dreams.

And

* Paradife Loft, Book iv. v. (578.

Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 277

And even thofe of the better kind may, I think, be derived from a
Phantafia well regulated, and a found conftitution of Body and
Mind. But I am now to fpeak of Dreams, which, I believe,
are from Jove, as Homer fays, or from fome Superior Mind
communicating with our Minds, and imparting to them knowledge,
which they could not otherwife attain. The Dreams I mean are
thofe by which future events are foretold.

And here 1 differ from Synefius, who diftinguiflies, of thefe pro-
phetic Dreams, fuch as are plain and unambiguous, from thofe that
are ambiguous and enigmatical. The former, he admits, are from
Superior Powers ; but the latter he derives from certain effluvia or
idols^ as he calls them, which fly off from things future as well as
prefent, and are imperfe(3:ly reprefented in the Mirror of our Phan-
tafia, fo as to require much attention and obfervation in order to di-
vine futurity from them. But I make no fuch diftin<3:ion ; and I
fay that all Dreams which are truly prophetical are fufficiently
plain.

And, in xhtjirji place, though I agree with Synefius, that our
Phantafia is the feat of the forms of things in generation and cor-
ruption, as our Intelledt is of Ideas of things eternal ; yet, I cannot
be convinced that the human Phantafia contains all things in gene-
ration and corruption, the future as well as the prefent, any more
than that our Intelled contains all Ideas ; but I beheve that the ca-
pacity of each of them is limited. But, 2^/y, if I did believe that
our Phantafia was as comprchenfive as he makes it, I mufl: fee a
rcafon why, at one time, I fhould fee futurity in it, and not at ano-
ther ; for no body will fiy that we always fee future events, though,
according to Synefius, they be always in the Phantafia. I muft
therefore know how they come to be produced to our View at one
time, and not at another. This, I know, he accounts for by his
Idols or Images ; but thefe, as I have faid, are mere fiiftions, and, I

think.

278 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

think, altogether inconceiveable with refpeA to things not yet
come into exigence. But, even admitting this hypothecs, Synefius
himfelf confefles that there is no art of connedling and piecing
together thofe imperfcdl: images, fo as to make a conne(3;ed ftory
of them, that is, in other words, expounding Dreams ; but that
it is merely a thing of experience and obfervation, without any
reafon or principle to guide us ; and therefore it mufl be very uncer-
tain, depending altogether upon the ftate the Phantafia is in, which
muft be very different, even in the fame men, at different times, ac-
cording to the changes of their habit of Body, or difpofition of Mind.

Rejcding, therefore, Synefius's diftin£tIon, I hold that, by no art,
experience, or obfervation, we can find out a meaning in Dreams
other than what they plainly import ; and that all Dreams, truly
prophetical, are clear and unambiguous. And I agree with Synefi-
us, that thofi* Dreams are not derived from the Mind itfelf, but pro-
ceed from fome Superior Power j and fo far I alfo agree with Mr
Baxter.

As I mod firmly believe that there are other Minds in the Uni-
verfe befides ours, and that betwixt our Mind and the Supreme, there
are other Minds interpofed in infinite fubordination, fome of them
of knowledge and power very much fuperior to ours; fo I alfo believe
that thefe Minds may, and often do, communicate with ours. Our
Minds communicate with one another, by the means of bodily or-
gans, which is the neceffary confequence of their being embodied as
they are, not with a thin aethereal vehicle, but with a grofs corpo-
real frame, which fome of the antient philofophers compared to the
fhell of an oyfter. Bui that pure Spirits can communicate with
one another, and even with our Mind, embodied as it is, without
the ufe of bodily organs, I think there is no reafon to doubt. That
the Supreme Mind communicate& in this way with our Mind, every

genuine

Chap. V. AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. 279

genuine Theift, who believes in the Providence of God, and his
influence in the affairs of men, (not to fpeak of Chriftians)j muft,
I think, neceflarily believe. And, if fo, there can be no reafon for
doubting that thofe Superior Minds, whom it is mofl: likely that the
Supreme employs in fuch purpofcs, have an intercourfe with our
Minds, and do fometimes reveal to vis future events.

If the reader is difpofed to allow this to be poflible, he furely will
not think it improbable that it fliould be in our Sleep, when the
Mind is not difturbed by the tumult of the Senfes, or the hurry and
buflle of the world. It is not, however, to every Mind, or upon
every flight occafion, that this revelation is made, but it is to a
Mind fcdate and compofed, and well prepared by religion and phi-
lofophy, as Synefius has obferved, for the Divine Illumination ; and
it is always to ferve feme good purpofe, refpecfling the perfon him-
felf, or others.

The revelation is always in one of two ways : Either by fome
perfon, human or divine, who appears to us in our Dream, and
tells us that fuch a thing is to happen ; or by a Vifion, in which the
thing is reprefented to us as prefent. This vifion of the night very
much refembles thofe vlfions of the day which are called the Second
Sight : And they are not to be dlfl:inguillied from thofe trances in-
to which the Scripture tells us the holy men of old did fometimes
fall ; for fuch Trances I hold to have been no other than Dreams
while they were awake.

There are, I know, very many, in this unbelieving age, who will
think that all I have faid, concerning Prophetic Dreams, is no better
than a Dream fuch as their own, I will, therefore, for the fake of
thofe who are not to be convinced by reafon and argument, which,
I believe, is the cafe of the moft of thofe who at prefent call them-

felves

p8o ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

felves philofopliers, mention feme fafts concerning Dreams of this
kind, which, I think, are well vouched. Some of thefe I have al-
ready mentioned in the Firft Volume *, and I will now give an ac-
count of the mofl; extraordinary Dreamer that perhaps ever was,
though very little known even to Scholars ; I mean Ariltides the So-
phiJI, (o they called at that time Rhetoricians, who compofed and
pronounced orations on fubjeds of learning and philofophy : Such
was Dioji Chryfoftom, who lived before his time ; Maximus Tyrius,
who lived much about the fame time ; and Libanius and Themiftus,
who flourifhed in later times. They were truly, what the name So-
phifi imports, Philofophers as well as Orators ; for the fludy of Phi-
lofophy was at that time always joined witli Learning and the Stu-
dy of Eloquence. This Sophift was from Adrianus, a tojvn of Io-
nia. He flourifhed under the Antonines, the mofl learned age that
has been fince the days of Auguftus Caefar : and was known both to
Antoninus Pius, and to Marcus, and was highly efteemed by both of
them. He had the greateft reputation of any man of letters of his
age, and is mentioned with high commendations by feveral later wri-
ters, none of whom fpeak of him as a liar or an impoftor. Thi&
man, about the thirty-fecond year of his age, was feized with a vio-
lent difeafe, or rather a complication of difeafes : For his lungs, his
nerves, and his inteftines, were all affeded, and he had almoft a
continual fever ; fo that he was reduced to a ftate of the greateft
weaknefs, and was given over by all his phyficians. In this flate he
continued for no lefs than thirteen years, during all which time he
had a conftant communication with Superior Powers, both by
Dreams and Vifions. Of thefe he has given us a very particular ac-
count in fix difcourfes t> which he calls the Sacred Difcourfes^ writ-
ten not at all in the flyle of an Oration, though they are numbered
among his Orations, but in the ftyle of a plain narrative. Thefe

Powers

* Vol. i. p. 155.

■f Page 273. of the Oxford Edition*

Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 281

Powers appeared to him under the form of different Divinities, fuch
as iEfculapius, Apollo, and Minerva, but particularly of iEfculapius,
whom he confiders as his tutelary God, and from whom he got the
moft particular diredions for the cure of his difeafe, which, at
laft, was cured accordingly. Thefe directions he did not at firfl: fet
down in writing, nor what he did in confequence of them ; but, af-
terwards, by the fpecial order of the God, he wrote them down, a^
far as his memory ferved him; and he has carriedthe narrative down
to the twelfth year of his difeafe, in the beginning of which he breaks
off abruptly *, being probably prevented by death from finifti-
ing it. Befides the Dreams, without number, concerning the cure
of his difeafe, he got directions, by Dreams and Vifions, in many
other things ; and, particularly, he efcaped being fwallowed up by a
great earthquake, which almoft totally deftroyed Smyrna while he
was there, by being ordered in a Dream to go to a certain place in
the neighbourhood of the town, and there to build an altar, and to
facrifice to Jupiter : And he fays the earthquake juft flopped at that
place t' Another time, he fays, Minerva with her iEgis, fuch as (he
was reprefented by- Phidias's ftutue of her in Athens,] appeared to him
when three other perfons were prefent, who did not fee her, as he did,
except when fhe mounted up into the air and went out of fight,
but heard her fpeak to him ; and he has told us what fhe
faid %. What was chiefly prefcribed to him by iEfculapius, (be-
fides many drugs which he mentions), was the ufe of the cold bath,
when the froft was fo fevere that he could not get kito the water
Vol. II. N n without

* Page 318.
t Ibid.

% Page 300. She put him In mind of the OJyffcy, and fjid that he ought to
believe, from what he then faw, that the afliftance which Homer faid (lie had given
to Uiyfles and Tclcmachus was not fabulous, and that he might cipeil the like af-
fiftance from her.

28a ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV,

without breaking the ice: And, in the fame weather, he was or-
dered to wear nothing but a linen tunic, to go barefoot, and to flcep
in the open air. Once, he fays, after ufing the cold bath, he was
not only immediately relieved, as to all his bodily complaints, but
he was in a flate of Mind fo pleafant, that, he fays, he cannot de-
fcribe it, otherwife than by telling us, that it was fomething more
than human *.

Thofe who believe that there is nothing in Heaven or Earth
but Body, will, I know, laugh at fuch ftories, becaufe they can-
not account for them by any Powers of Matter or Mechanifm;
but I, who firmly believe that I have a Mind, as well as a Body —
that there are other Minds in the Univerfe, infinitely fuperior to
mine in knowledge and power — and that thefe Minds may commu-
nicate with the Human, and at no time more probably than in
Sleep — cannot difcover any thing incredible in this narrative of A-
riftides. I therefore examine the evidence of it, as I do of any
other fa£l that appears extraordinary, but not impoflible ; and I can
fee no rcafon for rejeding the teflimony of a man of fuch reputa-
tion as Ariftides, fo much honoured and efteemed, by not only the
greateft, but the heft men of his age, particularly the Emperor Mar-
cus Antoninus, and by whole cities, fuch as the city of Smyrna,
that ereded a ftatue to him. When I alfo confider how much he
has been celebrated, not only in his own time, but by writers who
lived after him, without the leaft hint, by any one of them, of a fu-
fpicion that he was a liar or impoftor, which if Pope Pius the
Fourth had believed, he would never have ereded a ftatue to him
yet to be feen in the Vatican, I cannot perfuade myfelf that fuch a
man would have gone on, in a feries of lying and impofture, for
fo many years, without any motive, that appears, either of intereft

or

• Page 296.

Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 283

or of vanity. Intereft he -could have none : And^ as to vanity, the
difcourfes, in which he gives an account of his Dreams, and of the
cures piefcribcd to him, are not, as I have obfcrvcd, written in the
Oratorial and Epidciclic Style ; nor does it appear that they ever were
pronounced as Orations. Neither does any author, who fpcaksof him,
fay that he acquired any reputation by his Dreams, but only by
his F.loquence and Learning,

I cannot therefore rejed fuch evidence, except upon the credit of
a found and folid fyftem of philofophy, fhowing that thcTe fcifts are
either abfolutely impofRble, or in the highefl: degree improbable.
But I am acquainted with no fuch philofophy. On the contrary,
the philofophy I have learned favours very much the credibility of
the narrative : For, in the Hrft place, it affures me that the Soul
will exifi feparated from the Body, after its union with the Body is
diflblved by Death ; and then, being difincumbered of its load, it
will exert its native Powers, and enjoy more freely the communi-
cation with Superior Minds : 2 Jc, It is natural to think that, though
the feparation betwixt the Body and Mind be not entire, as in death,
but .the connexion only impaired, and, in fome degree, loolencd
by difeafe, the Mind may even then aO. more by itfelf, and be more
favoured by extraordinary communications, than at other times :
3//0, The Mind, in ordinary Sleep, is more difengagcd from the Bo-
dy, and more at its eafe, than at other times, not being then difturb-
ed by the Senfes, which, when we are awake, are conftantly folicit-
ing it, and importuning it, zs it were, by the obje<3;s which they
prefent to it. The connexion, therefore, betwixt the Mind and Body
of Ariftides being loofened in both thefe ways, it is no wonder that
he had Dreams and Vifions of an extraordinary kind. — And, iajilry
however improbable it might be that a vulgar manfliouldbefo much
favoured of Heaven, yet, if we fuppofe that there may be an extra-
ordinary injerpofitipn of Providence in favour of any man, it may

N n 2 be

284 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

be well fuppofed in favour of fo extraordinary a man and a philofo-
pher, fuch as Ariftides was.

It may be objected, that, if we give credit to the Dreams of Ar-
riftides, we muft believe in the heathen religion, and in the ex-
iftence of fwch Deities as ^fculapius, Apollo, and Minerva, But to this
I anfwer, that, as we are to fuppofe that Ariftides was a believer in
the religion of his country, it was proper that the Spirits, that ap-
peared to him, fhould afllime fuch fhapes as would give them credit
with him, and difpofe him to follow their counfels.

But if, after all, the reader fhould be inclined to rejedl the autho-
rity of Ariftides, as a Heathen and favouring the Heathen reli-
gion, I fhould defire to know what objection he has to the credibi-
lity of the Chiiftian Bifhop Synefius. He fays that, in his Dreams^
he was forewarned of dangers that threatened him, which, by that
means, he efcaped * : By the fame means, he fucceeded in the bu-
flnefs in which he was engaged ; particularly in his embaffy to Arca-
dius the Emperor, from Cyrene and other Greek cities f : He philofo-
phifed too, he fays, in his Sleep, and difcovered things which he couli
not find out while awake : He compofed, likewife, in his Dreams ;
and, of what he had compofed before, while he was awake, he
fmoothed the ftyle, taking it down, and making it lefs turgidlf. This
very work upon Dreams he was directed to compofe by a Dream :
And he wrote the whole of it that very night §. And, from the ac-
count he gives of the efFed: it had, both upon himfelf and others,
when it was read over, it is plain that he thought he was infpired
when he wrote it. And it is probably to this ftory that Nicepho-
rus, his commentator, alludes, when he lays that he wrote like one
infpired ||. Even in hunting, by which, he fays, and by his books

he

* Page 123. 124. t Page 124.

t Page 123. From what he fays in this paflage, it appears that the obfcurlty of
his ftyle arofe chiefly from his imitation of the antient Attic, and his ufing new^
and ftrange words, which he made himfelf to exprefs his conceptions-

§ Epift. 153. towards the end, page 293. edit. Petavii.

K See page 253. of this Vol. in the Note,

Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 285

he lived, he was direded, by his Dreams, when and where he was to
find the Game f- In fhort, from his account of the matter, it ap-
pears that, through his whole life, in his bufmefs, his ftudies, and
even his fports, he was guided by the counfels and fuggeftions of
a genius, that accompanied him through life, but communicated with
him chiefly in Dreams ; whereas the Genius of Socrates gave him
warning, for the greater part, when he was awake if, never inciting
him. to do any thing, (for he had no need of that, being by nature
difpofed to every thing good and virtuous), but reftraining him from
fome things which would have proved fatal, to him. Of this Plato
has given one or two examples,.

I afk again, upon the credit of what fyflem of philofophy I ought:
to rejedl the teftimony of fo eminent a bifliop of the primitive
church, who, befides, was the greateft philofopher of his age, arid
one of the worthieft and beft men of that or of any other age §,?

Againft authorities, fo refpedable, I know nothing that can be faid,
except that fuch things do not happen in our age ; and that men, in all
ages and|nations,have been always the fame, equally religious, virtuous,
and learned ; and that, in every age and nation, there have been at
all times fuch men as Ariftides, Synefius, and Socrates. But this, I
think, no man, who is either fcholar or philofopher, will maintain ;
and though he be neither, yet, if he is a man of common obferva-
tion, and has lived as long as I have done, he will perceive a de-
cline of men, even in his own time, both in Mind and Body.

But,

t Page 123.

J The Genius, or Daemon, as it was called, of Socrates, fpoke to him in an ao,-
diblc voice, as Plato relates in the Theages. E»1( ym( n Hut fcti^» 7ric^frtaii»i 'tfui 'm

»«|J»S ifS*"*"" 5*'A*»"«». ffi " ftiiTt pawii, ^, iricf yttnrtti, '«(« fitt «-is/(iciMi, • '«» ^iAX«

^mrrur,r»»fv *«*»t{«w»». «r{ir{iT(( Sf '(vSitrtTi, &c. It was the opinion o{ the An-
tients, that every man had a Genius that attended him through life, though he did
not manifeft himfeif, as the Genius of Socrates did, but was of a Divine Nature,
and therefore is called by Horace, Naturae Deus bumanae.

§ See a very particular account of him by Tillereiont, in his EcdeSaftical Hiftory,
Vol. xii. p. 49a.

2t6 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

But, if he is a philofopher, he will not only know that it is fo, but
he will know that, of neceflity, it mu/i be fo ; becaufe he will fee
it, as a philofopher fhould fee things, in its caufes.

It remains now only to inquire into the Final Caufe of Dreaming,
without the knowledge of which there could be no philofophy of
Dreams: For philofophy is the knowledge of Caufes; and the Final
Caufe, as I have obferved, is the Fiift and Principal Caufe, and may-
be faid to be the Caufe of Caufes. The works of man nobody pre-
tends to underftand, unlefs he knows the purpofe for which they are
intended ; and the fame is true of the works of God.

I will begin with thofe Dreams which I hold to be in the ordi-
nary courfe of Nature. Thefe, I think, I have fhown to be necefla-
ry ; fo that, unlefs the nature of our Minds and Bodies be al-
tered, there muft be Dreams. They are therefore a part of the
fyftem of Nature ; and, if that fyftem be the work of Infinite Wif-
dom, it is impoffible but that fome end muft be propofed and attained
by them : For every thing in Nature is for fome end ; and, though
there may be many things in Nature, of which we cannot difcover
the end, our limited underftandings not being able to comprehend
the whole fyftem, thefe things, for the greater part, are out of the
common courfe of Nature ; but it would be ftrange if we could dif-
cover no purpofe or defign in what happens every day, and with
refpe6t to ourfelves too, and in our own little world. Every body muft
acknowledge that our philofophy of Man would be ridiculoufly im-
perfe£t, if we could give no account for what purpofe we are in this
world, and to what end we live while we are waking. Now, our
Sleeping Life is nearly equal to our Waking ; and, therefore,
if we could give no account of it, we fhould know but half of hu-
man life.

If

Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 287

If we believe that the Almighty is good as well as wife, we rniuft
likewife believe that his intention is to make all his creatures happy,
fo far forth as is confiftent with general Laws, without which it is im-
pofliblc that there can be a fyftem of Nature. Further, it is impofTible
but that Intelligent and Senfitive Beings, who alone are capable of
happinefs or mifery, muft, if they be in adion, feel either pleafure or
pain, and,confequently, muft, in fome degree, be either happy or mi-
ferable. And, therefore, as our Senfitive and Intelligent parts are un-
doubtedly adive in our Sleep, it is impoffible that ftate can be indif-
ferent to us, but muft be a fource either of happinefs or mifery.
Moreover, by the conftitution of our Nature, Virtue neceflarily makes
our Happinefs, and Vice our Mifery ; and", if they make the Happi-
nefs or Mifery of our Waking Life, it would be extraordinary if they
had no influence either way upon our Life in Sleep. But it has been
Ihown * that the Dreams of a wicked man make a great part of his
Mifery ; and, indeed, without them, he could not be faid to be com-
pletely miferabJe. Now, it would be a ftrange order of things, and
a very unequal diftribution of rewards and puniftiments, if they did
not likewife make part of the happinefs of a virtuous man ; and,
that they do fo, I think I have likewife fhown : And, indeed, it is
impoffible, by the nature of things, but that there fhould be a con-
formity betwixt our Sleeping and our Waking Thoughts ; and, as the
Waking Thoughts of the virtuous man are far better and happier,
fo muft alfo his Sleeping Thoughts be. As few men, however, very
few, are virtuous in any high d^^ gree, and fewer ftiil are philofo-
phers, it cannot be expefted that we fhould enjoy any great happi-
nefs in our Sleep, any more than Waking. But I maintain, that a
man, who has good fecial affedions, and has love and friendihip in
his nature, and whofe Body is not difordered by an unnatural diet
and an Improper manner of living, will pafs many a plealant night
in his Sleep, with friends and relations whom he loves and efteems,

and

• Page 274. 275.

28^8 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

and with the dead as well as the living ; or, if he has had the mis-
fortune, which, I doubt, is the cafe of many in this age, not to have
known much Virtue or Worth, but is an Antient Scholar, his Ima-
gination will raife from their tombs the heroes of Greece and Rome,
and make him enjoy their Society.

And here I beg leave again to quote Mr Thomfon, in his Caftle
of Indolence, the iineft allegorical poem in any language, and moft
complete, according to my judgment, both in ftyle and verfificatlon,
and particularly beautiful upon the fubjed of Dreams. It is where
he prays for good Dreams, in thefc fweet verfes, following the
ftanza above quoted concerning Dreams of horror and affright,

}"£• Guardian Spirits^ to ivhoni man is dear !
From thefe f mil Daemons Jhield the midnight gloom.:
Angels of Fancy and of Love ! be near, ,

And o'er the Blank of Sleep diffufe a bloom :
Evoke thefacred Shades of Greece and Rome^
And let them Virtue "with a look impart :
But chief, a ivhile^ 0 1 lend us from the Tomb
Thofe long-lojl Friends for ivhom in Love ivefmarty
And fill ivith pious a-we andjoy-mixt ivoe the heart.

But, if to virtue and learning be joined philofophy, and if to hoik.
be added that cathartic manner of life *, by which the later Platoni-
cians faid that they were difengaged from the Body as much as was
poflible in this life, and their Minds exalted to a communication
with Superior Minds, we fliall then enjoy the greatcft happlnefs that
Gur nature is capable qf in this ftate, and, in our Sleeping Life, ftiall
anticipate, in fome degree, the joys that are prepared for the reli-
gious and virtuous in the other life that is to come with the Sleep of
Death.

That

* Page 163. 17/

Chap. V. A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S T C S. 28y

That there will be Dreams in that long Sleep, no man can doubt,
%vho fludies human nature as a philofopher, and confidcrs particu-
larly this phaenomenon of Dreaming ; for, if we have Dreams in the
death of each day's life, why fhould we not have them in that
longer death, which differs not from the other in any refped, ex-
cept that the one concludes the life of many days, the other that of
only one. In both, the Mind has no ufe of Senfcs ; and if, never-
thelefs, it be adive in the one, why not in the other ? And, upon
the whole, I think the argument in favour of a feparate ftate of the
Soul, and of a future life, is fo ftrongly fupported by Dreaming,
that, if it could not be proved to ferve any other purpofe, but to give
the righteous hopes of a blefled Immortality, and to deter the wicked
from their flagitious courfes by the fear of future mifery in a feparate
ftate, I fhould think that fufficient.

With refpe6t to fupernatural and prophetic Dreams, as I do not
believe with Epicurus, that the Divinity takes no concern in the af-
fairs of men, nor am convinced, by the arguments offome of our mo-
dern philofophers, that there is no fuch thing as a particular Provi-
dence, but that the affairs of men are governed by general laws,
fuch as thofe which govern Matter and Motion *, I believe moll
firmly, that, in fome ages and fome nations of the world,
future events were revealed to men in Dreams, by which great
calamities, both to private men and to nations, have been pre-
vented ; and my reafon for fo believing is, that I do not think hu-
man wifdom fufficient to condudl men profperoufly through this
Vol. II. O o Life,

• There is a Diflertation to prove this, In the preface of Hawkefworth's publica-
tion of Captain Coolc's firft voyage round the world. It is as foreign to the purpofe
as any thing that can be imagined : But fuch writers are fond of every opportunity
of (bowing their infidelity, like the French Abbe Chappe, who, in giving an account
of his journey through Ruflia and Siberia to Tobolfki, takes occafion to inform the
reader that the human boul is nothing but eledlrical Fire>

-90 ANTIKNT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

Life, without luch extraordinary communications with Superior
Minds. This was the opinion of all the antient world, philofophers
as well as other men ; and, accordingly, many different kinds of
Divination were pra£tifed by different nations, of which Dreams
appear to have been the moll antient. We fee from Homer what
credit was given to them in his time ; nor does there appear to have
been any other kind of Divination then pra£tifed, except that by the
flight of Birds : And, at this day, it is the only Divination among
the Indians of North America.

How this kind of Revelation has ceafed among us and in other
nations of Europe, and how we come to be reduced to the State in
which Ifrael was in the days of Saul, ' When the Lord anfwcred
* not, neither by Dreams nor by Prophets *,' is a matter of long
difcuflion, and belongs not to this part of my woi'k. All I fhall fay
at pr-efent is, that it appears to me moft evident, both from the phi-
iofophy and the hiflory of Man, that he is not the fame animal, ei-
ther in Body or Mind, that he was in former ages ; and, if he be
fo much degenerated, as I fuppofe him to be, it is no wonder that
he is not a fit velTel for Divine Infpiration, or proper for Communi-
cation with Superior Minds : Tor the order of Nature requires that
there fliould be an aptitude in every thing for certain ends ; and,
in one ftate or condition, a thing will be fit for a certain purpofe,
and, in another condition, utterly unfit. The age, in which Syne-
fius lived, was far from being one of the beft : Nor do I believe that
he could have had thofe fupernatural communications by Dreams,
which he mentions, unlefs his Mind had been exalted by the ftudy
of the fublimeft philofophy, exceedingly different from what we now
call philofophy, which is nothing elfe but Menfuration and Com-
putation, FaiSts of Natural Hiflory, Mechanics, ar;d Properties of

Lines

* I Samuel, chap. Jucviii. v. I. i5.

Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 291

Lines and Figures, which never can give any confiderable elevation
to the Mind : Even in this more degenerate age, when men are
both born and educated worfe than they were then, I do not
think it is impoffible that a man, favoured of Heaven, may, by
Religion and the ftudy of the fame philofophy, be raifed fo much,
above other men, as to carry about with, him the fame oracle that
Synefms did.

Thofe who have not ftudied the hiftory and philofophy of Hu-
man Nature, nor have been taught to diftinguifli betwixt the natural
ftate of the Animal and bis artificial or civilized ftate, will be fur-
prifed to hear of fuch a degeneracy, as I fuppofe, of the Species. But
the learned in Man know that, from the time he forfook that manner
of life which God and Nature had appointed for him, he has been
conftantly degenerating in Body. — That, with refpedl to his Mind,,
he has, in the firft periods of his progreffion, wonderfully improved,
and, in a manner, created, or at leaft refufcitated, his Intellectual part.
But, as all fublunary things are, by Nature, doomed to decay and cor-
ruption, in the latter ftage of his progrefs he declines alfo in Mind,
But, if to this decline in the ordinary courfe of Nature be added
Wealth £;nd Luxury, and their neceflary concomitants. Vice and Dif-
eafe, his degeneracy gaes on with rapidity ; and he becomes, at lad,,
when he is grown as weak as he is wicked, the moft contemptible,
as well as the moft miferable, of all the creatures that God has
made * : For, in that degenerate ftate, he will be vain, and the more

O o 2. dege-

• Homer has faid, and from the motnh of Jupiter too, rhat, of all the Animals*
upon this earth, Man is the moft miferable :

n«i'T#r, ioVU Ti yXIXf tXIT'tlH T< »»t 'l^TH,

So wretched had Vice and Folly made Men, even in the days of Homer. Cut
they were then ftrong of Mind and of Body j and therefore they were not contemp-
tible

292 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

degenerate the more vain. Now, Vanity Is the proper objed of Ilidi-
cule and Contenapt : Nor is any Animal that God has made, even
the meaneft and lowed, without Vanity, ridiculous or contemptible.
Religion, Philofophy, and good Learning, may for a while ftem the
tide of Corruption and Depravity, and retard the dellrudion of fuch
a Nation ; but, if tliefe be wanting, the fall will be precipitate, and
the conclufion muft be the utter extinftion of the Nation : For
it is a law of Nature, that whatever gr6ws worfe, and continues to
grow worfe, muft end at laft. We fee every day the extindion of
Families ; and, as a Nation confifts of Families, for the fame reafon
that Families are extinguiflied, whole Nations may be fo. Accord-
ingly, we know, with the greateft certainty, that Nations dlminifh in
numbers ; and there are examples in the hiftory ofmankind, of whole
Nations, by gradual diminution, difappearing at laft altogether. But,
as all the works of God are eternal, either as individuals or by fqc-
ceffion, nothing perifhes utterly, but every thing is renewed in fome
fhape or another ; and therefore I believe what the wife of antient
limes have taught, that there is to be a ■^x^tfymtrHf or Renovation of

Things^

lible. But the fame Poet tells us, from the mouth of Neftor,that the men in his time,
or even in the time of the Trojan war, were nothing like thofe of the age preceding.
This, I know, the young men of the prefcnt age will not believe, but will think
it a vain boaftiiig of old men, pcevifli and difcontented with the prefcnt times. But
I defire to be informed how they can know paft times, otherwife than by the teftimo-
ny of thofe who lived in them. For, in order to compare two things, it feems ne-
ceffary that one fhould know both : And there is nothing but an extraordinary fupe-
riority of genius that can enable a young man to judge better of prefent and paft
times, than an old man who has known both. By the fame fuperiority of genius,
thsfe men pronounce decifively, that the modern life in Europe is preferable to thelife
of a Savage of North America, contrary to the judgment of many, both French and
Englifh, who have tried both lives, and could not be perfuaded to forfake the Sa-
vages, and return to their countrymen and friends.

Chap. V. A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. 295

Things^ at certain periods. Upon this fubjeft we have a mofl excel-
lent Poem of Virgil in his fourth Eclogue*.

But, to conclude this long chapter upon Dreams, I think, I
have fhown that the Final Caufe of all Dreams, natural or fu-
pernatural, is the fame as the Final Caufe of all the works of
God— ——the happinefs of all Intelligent and Senfitive Beings du-
ring their whole Lives, not only their Waking but their Sleeping
Life. And I will only add, that if I have not given full fatis-
faftion to the philofophical reader, I have, at leaft, the merit of
treating the fubjed more fully and methodically than any other
modern author, and of giving him an opportunity of thinking
upon it himfelf, and trying to difcover fomething better with refped
to a phaenomenon, which, if it were not fo common, would be
thought the moft extraordinary belonging to Human Nature, and
which alone appears to me fufficient to convince the moft deter-
mined Materialift, that there is fomething in our compofition be-
fides Matter and Mechanifm.

Magnus ab integro faeclorum nafcitur ordo :
Jam rcdit ct Virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna ;
Jam nova progenies coclo demittitur alto.

V. 5. ttfeq.

CHAP.

894 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

CHAP. vr.

Of Inftindl, and the Nature of it — different from every other Power ^
Mind hitherto mentioned. — ft isfhoivn chief y in the Generation and
the Education of theYowng. — Shoivn in Incubation — in the Flights
of Birds o/'Paflage. — In^mOifronger in the Natural State of the
Animal, but ivond^rful Examples of it even in the Tame State. —
This Inftinft of Animals, fuperior to Human Intelligence. — What
Inftind Man bad in his Natural State. — Not fo much neceffary to
him as to other Animals in that State. — His prefent State is direBed
by Intelligence, infeadofln^in^. — Tha.t not fufficient to make Men
happy, ivithout the Afftfiance of Superior Powers. — I'his the OrJ^
gin of Religion.

THAT Power of Mind, by which It operates fo wonder-
fully when its connexion with the Body is loofened either
fey Sleep or Difeafe^ and which I have endeavoured to explain
and account for in the preceding Chapter, is common, in fome
degree, to us and to the Brute. But the Power I am now to men-
tion is peculiar to the Brute, and fhows, more, I think, than any thing
elfe, how impoffible it is to account for the operations even of the A-
nimal Mind by Matter and Mechanifm, and manifefts, at the fametime,
the wifdom and goodnefe of Providence in providing fo wonderfully
for the prefervation of the Animal race, which alone is capable of hap-
pinefs. The power, I mean, is denoted by a name well known, In-
fintl : But the thing itfelf is little underftood ; for, I believe, very
few know that it is a power quite diftin(!l: from Senfation, Imagina-
tion, Memory, or even Reafon, which are generally believed to be
the only faculties belonging either to the Animal or Intelledual Na-
ture : Neither* is it acquired by imitation or inftrudion.

It is employed, both for the prefervation of the individual and
the contimiation of the race ; but, as the latter is more particular-

Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 295

ly the care of Nature, It is in ii lliat the power of Inftind is mofl
eminently dlfplayed. The ufe of the parts of generation, and the
various methods of copulation pradtifed by dificrent Animals, are
certainly not difcovered by any of the faculties of Mind above
mentioned; nor are they pradifed from imitation or inftrudion:
But it is Nature herfelf that direds the Animal to do what is nccef-
fary for the propagation of the kind.

The education alfo of the young is n wonderful efleiTc of this In-
ftin£t ; and likewife the preparation for it in fome animals, particularly
inthofe v/hom Nature has direded to pair, being a thing neceifary for
rearing the offspring of certain (peciefes of animals. The beafts that
couple prepare holes and layers convenient for their purpofe: And the
fowls make nefts, fome of them of moft artificial conftrudion, where
that is neceflary; and this, whether they be made by young or by old
birds; fo that it is plain they do not learn by pradice and experience,
p.s we do.

The procefs of incubation in the bird-kind alfo fhows a mofl:
wonderful Inftind ; for the female who fits upon the eggs turns
them once in twenty-four hours, and alfo changes the place of
them, fo that they all may be in their turn immediately under her
breaft. And, after the young are in this way bi ought forth, it is
amazing how both the parents join in the labour of rearing them.

There are fome birds v/hofe oeconomy requires that they fliould
-go over feas at certain feafons : And, accordingly, thefe birds of
pafTage, as they call them, know at what time to begin their flight,
and what courfe to hold tlu-ough the pathlefs air without chart or
compafs.

I (hould write a Volume, if I were to enumerate all the dif-
ferent ways in which Inftind direds animals to preferve the
individual, as well as to continue the race, fome of them much

exceeding

1^ ANTIKNT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

exceeding what human art or fcience can do. But I do not
propofe to write a Natural Hlftory of Animals ; my intention
being only to Ibow what InfliniH; is. 1 fhall, therefore, only
further add, that, as Infl.in<£l is from Nature, it is no doubt
moft perfedl in the natural ftatc : And yet there are animals in a
tame and domefticated ftate, which fhow a great deal of it. The dog,
for example, who, in his natural ftate, is an animal of prey, as
much as the fox, being, as is now certainly known, of the fame
fpecies, becomes fo fond of his houfe and home, that, when he is
carried away from it, he can find his way hack again, which, in
many cafes, it would be impoffible for us to do with all our art and
fcience : For it is a fad; well known, that dogs, who have been
carried by fea from Scotland to London, have found their way
back again by land to the very place from whence they had been
taken away ; and in fo fhort a time, that it was evident they
muft have taken the neareft way : And I have heard a ftory
from a perfon whom I can believe, of a Ship Dog, that is, a
dog bred aboard a fhip, who had been accuftomed always to fail
with the fhip, but having been left by fome accident at Leith
when the fliip failed, found his way acrofs the country to
Lochfine, where the fhip was fifhing for herring. Whether the
dog had ever been there before with the fhip, I could not
learn with any certainty ; but I was allured that he had never
travelled before from Leith to Lochfine by land. I am alfo well
informed of a Tame Serpent, in the Eaft Indies, which belonged to
the late Lord Pigot, and was kept by him in the fuburbs of Ma-
drafs. This ferpent was taken by the French, when they invefted
Madrafs in the laft war, and was carried to Pondicherry in a clofe
carriage. But from thence he found his way back again to his
old quarters, which, it feems, he liked better, though Madrafs be
diftant from Pondicherry above loo miles. This information I have
from a Lady, who was then in India, and had feen the Serpent of-
ten before his journey, and faw him after he returned.

Noi"

Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS.

^97

Nor is it for no purpofe that Nature has given to thefc animals
this wonderful power of Mind ; fince without it they could not car-
ry on their oeconomy, or picferve themfelves and their race. For
this purpofe, Human Intelligence, as 1 have obferved, would not be
fufficient ; nor could the Dog and Serpent, in the inftances 1 have
given, have found their way home, to which Nature had given
them the difpofition to return, if that Intelligence had been their
only guide.

Here, therefore, we have a faculty of Mind, dilTerent from Hu-
man Intelligence and fuperior to it in fome refpeds, beftowed by
the Author of Nature upon the Brutes for enabling them to anfwer
the ends of their being, and to live the life for which they were
deftined by Nature.

Thofe who are not acquainted with the extenfive views which
the antients had of Nature, and who judge of Mind only by the
powers which they fee exerted by the human Mind in its prefent
ftate, do not know what to make of Inftindt, and think it one of
the myfteries of Nature not to be explained. But thofe, who have
ftudied the philofophy of Plato and Ariftotle, know that Nature, as
they define it, comprehends the Brute, as well as the Vegetable and
Bodies unorganized — in fhort, whatever has not Intelligence and
Confcioufnefs. Now, if even Bodies unorganized, Brute and lifelefs
Matter, as it is commonly called, has an inward principle which
governs its motions, and makes them all lublervient to the purpofes
of Nature, there would be fomething very defcdive and anomalous
in Nature, if her nobler produdion, I mean the Animal race, was
not governed by the fame principle. We are not, therefore, to won-
der, that the Animal docs things which cannot be accounted for
from any faculties that we at prefent polTefs, fuch as Senfe, Memo-
ry, Imagination, and Reafoning, provided it appear that thofe
Vol. II. P p things

298 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

things are conducive to the being or well being of the Animal : But,
on the contrary, it would be wonderful if faculties fuperior to ours
were not required to carry on the bufmefs of Nature.

It may be fald that an Inftind, fuch as that of the Dog
and Serpent above mentioned, is not neceflary, either for the pre-
fervation of the Individual, or the continuation of the Kind. But
Nature is fo benevolent, as to intend, not only the prefervation of
Animals, but their pleafure and happinefs. Now, it is well known
what delight the tame and domefticated Animals have, both in the
Men and the other Animals with whom they are brought up, and
what a fondnefs they contradt for their houfe and home : And Na-
ture has been fo kind as to furnifh them with an Inftinft, which en-
ables them to gratify that inclination ; and which not only gives
pleafure and fatisfadtion to ihem*, hut is of great advantage to us; for
without it the animals we have tamed would be of little advantage to
lis, and could hardly be kept by us. It is an inclination fo natural
to the whole animal race, that I think thofe men who have not an
attachment to their natale folum^ their country, family, and friends,
are deficient, even in the animal part of their nature, and ought to
be accounted imperfedt animals, as well as worthlefs intelledlual crea-
tures..

' And here we may perceive that the fame diftindlion, which I have
made betwixt Man and Brute, is to be made betwixt Man and Na-
ture ; for Nature is that which ads without Intelligence, Confciouf-
nefs, or knowing what it is doing, whether in Brute, Vegetable, or
Unorganized Bodies ; being a Principle, which the great Author of
Nature has bellowed upon them, in order to make them fulfil the
purpofes of Nature : Whereas Man has Intelligence, Confcioufnefs,
knows what he does, propofes certain ends, and devifes means to
accomplish thofe ends.

The
• See p. 103. where I have fpokcn of this pleafure which the Brutes *njoy, and

which, I fay, is a pleafure of Mind, and not of Bod^.

Chap. VL ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 299

The operations of this Power ofNaturc,which we call Indind.are fo
wonderfully artificial in feme ani.nals, that I am not furprifcd that a
man not learned in the philofophy of Mind flioulJ believe that they
have Intelligence as well as we. Bclidcs the examples I have already
given, I will give one more, taken from that moft curious little infect^
the greatcfl artift, perhaps, of the Brute kind; I mean the Bee. I be-
lieve nobody will maintain, except it be for the pleafure of difpu-
ting and contradicting, that this animal knows the rules of Geome-
try, by which it makes its hexagons, and joins them together in
fuch a way, that, with the leaft expence of materials, it makes its
cells contain the greateft quantity of honey poiTible, as has been
clearly demonftratcd. it is therefore admitted that the Bee is no
Geometer : But ftill, it may be faid, that the Bee has Intelligence,,
as we fee many men have, though it be not methodiied into Art and
Science. But I aik,Does the Bee know for what endlhe woiks r and
I think we muft anfwer, That fhe does not ; for, if otherwife, we muft
fuppofe that the unorganized Bodies, fuch as falts, which being dif—
folved, form themfelves again into cryftals of figures as regular as the;
cells of the Bees, know for what end they ad, which, I believe, is
more knowledge than any man has. If,^ therefore, the Bee does not
know the end for which fhe ads, ihe certainly does not know that
the means fhe ufcs are fubfervient to that end; and, if fhe knows nei-
ther end nor means, it is clear that fhe has not Intelligence, and alfo
that fhe ads without deliberation, without intention, and neceflarily.
But has fhe not Confc'ioufnefs ? Does fhe not know what fhe is doing ?
— And I fay fhe does not ; for, otherwife, flie would not only have
Intelligence, but that prime faculty of Intelled, by which it recog-
nizes itfelf and its own operations. — In one word, fhe would rejle6l :■
For every Animal, that knows what he is doing, refleds ; a thing which
we ourfelves do not always do : For nothing is more true than what
is commonly faid, that we often ad without knowing what we are
doing. The Bee, however, ads by Intelligence, though fhe has it
not herfelf, but by an Intelligence much fuperior to the human, no

P p a lefs

300 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

lefs Intelligence than the Divine. Nor ought we to be furprifed that
a Being not intelligent fhould a£t intelligently : For it often hap-
pens, even among us who have Intelligence, that we a£t by an In-
telligence fuperior to our own, doing what we are direded to do by
men wifer than we, without knowing for what purpofe we adl.
And this I fay is the cafe of every well governed fociety, where by
far the greater part of the fubjefts a£t by rules, of which they do not
underftand the reafon *.

Tlius, the diftindion betwixt Man and Nature, as well as betwixt
Man and Brute, is manifeft ; as alfo the diftindion betwixt God and
Nature. As to the diftindion betwixt God and Man, it does not
belong to the fubjed now in hand to enter minutely into it. It is
fufficient for my prefent purpofe, to obferve, that man, in this lower
world, is in a kind of middle ftate betwixt God and Nature, fupe-
rior to Nature, in fo far as he has Intelligence in himfelf, and in that
refped participates of the Divine Nature ; but it is an Intelligence
inferior, in infinite degrees, to the Divine f.

But, as Intelledl is latent for a confiderable time in the indivi-
duals among us, and muft have been latent for a very long time,
perhaps for ages, among Savages, it is not to be fuppofed that Na-
ture, in that natural and primitive ftate, would leave us unprovided
with what fhe has fo bountifully beftowed upon other Animals.
"What particular Inftind: Man then had is difficult to fay ; but this we
may be aflured of, that he had all that was necefTary for his being
and well being : But not fo much would be neceflary to him, as to

other

• See what I have faid further upon thisfubjed, vol. i. p. 216.

f See vol. i. book 2. chap 17. where I have defined Nature (p. 218.), and (hown
the difference betwixt God, and Nature, and Man ; and I have alfo faid a good deal
upon this fubjed of Inftind, to which I beg leave to refer the Reader, as alfo to
what I have faid in page 4<5. of this volume.

Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 301-

other Animals, whofe oeconomy is more artificial than that of Man,
his being very fimple, and much refembling that of cattle and horfes.
After he had acquired Intellect, Reafon would, in fome meafure,
fupply the place of Inftindl : And there remains nothing now of
Inftindl among us, except what appears in our infants, before they
have got the ufe of Reafon, fuch as their applying to the brcaft of
the mother for nourifhment. By the ufe of Intellect, and the Arts
and Sciences invented by us, we have formed a fyftem of life al-
together different from the natural ; for the perfection of which we
believe Intelligence alone is fufiicient. But this was not the opinion
of the wifer Antients, who thought that human reafon alone could
not properly conduct human life, without the counfcl and affiftance
of Superior Powers : And this has been fo much the general fenfe
of mankind, that, in all ages, and in all nations, fome methods have
been pradifed to obtain that favour and affiftance. There has, there-
fore, always been religion in the world, grounded upon this perfua-
fion, that Man, with all his fuperior faculties, has not wifdom fuffi-
cient to make himfelf happy : But, as men, the more they dege-
nerate, grow the vainer, they come at laft to believe, that, without
Divine affiftance, by their own wifdom merely, they may be hap-
py ; and in fuch a degenerate ftate, even a philofopher * may arife,

who

* Mr David Hume has been fo kind as to give his countrymen this information,
making it a part of the valuable legacy he has left the public in his pofthuinous
works. See his Dialogues upon Natural Religion, p. 243. where he fays, in fo ma-
ny words, That the profperous and happy times of all nations are thofe in which the
religious fpirit is never regarded or heard of. And for the truth of this he appeals
to hiftory, ami the evidence of fadls. It is true, that he puts this affertion into the
mouth of Philo, the Sceptic in the Dialogue. But that it was really his own opi-
nion, I think is very plain from the whole tenor of his writings ; and, if it were o-
therwife, I ftiould believe him to be intent tonally the greateft enemy of his country.
If this opinion be right, the whole policy of the modern nations of Europe muft be
wrong; and, particularly, our legiflaturc muft be very much miftaken, who have

thought

302 AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. Book TV.

who will inform them, that, the lefs religion they have, the happier
they are.

thought that the chief fecurity the King has for his crown, ami the fubJecEls for
their lives and properties, is the religion of an oath. And, as to the antient na-
tions, the grcateft among them was the Romans; and they were the mod religious
of men; and though they were excelled, as Cicero tells us, by other nations in o-
ther things, in religion they excelled all men. And while they continued reli-
gious, et nondum ilk, qui nunc tenet fecutum, contemptus Deum venerat, (to ufe an
exprefiion of Livy's), they were the mod flourlihing and powerful nation that ever
exifted. The Greeks, too, were a noble and fine people, excelling in arts and armsj
but they were fo no longer than they continued to be religious ; for, after fuch a
philofophy as Mr Hume's was introduced among them, I mean the Epicurean,
which taught that all religion was vain and unneccffary, they became, as Polybius
informs us, the moft worthlefs and faithlefs of men ; and, particularly, he fays that
they were not to be bound by a thoufand oaths. And, in general, I defy any man
to give me an example of any one nation, fince we have any record of human af-
fairs, that has been happy and flourifhing, renowned for the wifdom of their go*
vernment, and great in arts and arms, that was not religious.

As to what I have faid of Vanity being the fource of irreligion, I think it is evi-
dent, both from the nature of the thing, and from the charadcrs of the men who, in
different ages and nations of the world, have been the great apoftles of Infidelity.
See what I have faid upon this fubjeft, p. 247.

CHAP.

Chap. VII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS, 303

CHAP. VIU

A 'wonderful ^ality of Mind not hitherto mentioned. — It exifis in «•
particular Time or Place — is not in the Body, as in a Veflel "which
contains it. — It is, ho'wever, fomewhere, afid in fome time. — // is
in Space and Time, but not as Body is — is converfant "with Objeds
dijlant in Time and Place — therefore mufl exifl in thofe diftant
Times and Places. — Difference bet'wixt us and the Brutes in this
refpefl. — In "what Senfe the Mind is confined to the Body. — Anf-wer
to the Obje^ionof ourfeeing Things at great Difiances. — Difference
bet'wixt our Mind and /^^ Divine in this refpe6l. — The Study of our
O'wn Minds may give us fome Conception even of the Ubiquity of
the Deity. — Of the Kno'w ledge of the Future — notfo different from
the kno'wledge of the PaftrtJ is commonly imagined. — The Brutes have
it in their natural State ajy^r as is neceffary for theOeconomy of their
Lives — they haveit eveninthedovntK\c^\.tdS\.2iK.t. — AFa^ concerning
the Hanoverian Boy. — Alteration made, as to the Divining Power
of the Human Mind, by Society and Civilization. — That Alteration
fill greater m //;f degenerate State of Society. — Of the Difference
bet'wixt the Minds o/" Savages flMJ(?/"Civilized Nations. — Diference

bet'wixt the Animal and Intellectual Minds and the Vegetable.

Neceffity that the Vegetable Part of the Animal fJjould be al-ways
adive, and never abroad. — Thefe Minds have no Situation in any
Part of the Body.

I Will conclude this Book with obferviug a quality of Mind riot
hitherto mentioned, and which, to a reader not accuftomed to
metaphyfical fpeculations, will appear ftill more extraordinary than

any

304 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

any I have hitherto mentioned : I fay that the Human Mind, even
our Animal Mind, is not confined either to Place or to Time.

As to Place; the general opinion is, that our Mind is confined to
our Body,.which it inhabits while we exift in this life; and it is only
by death that it is releafed from this confinement. Even Ariftotle,
who believed that the Mind was not, by its nature, moveable, has
faid that it is moved by accident, or k«t« (ru/*j3»j3>ixoc, as he ex-
prefTes it *, when the Body is moved ; like a man in a boat, who is
not moved of himlelf, but is moved when the boat is moved '\: From
whence it would appear he thought that the Mind was contained in
or bounded by the Body. If that be true, it muft of neceflity occu-
py Space ; for every thing that is contained in another thing, occu-
pies Space in that other thing. Whereas I maintain, that the Mind
occupies no Space, and therefore is not moved, neither of itfelf, nor
by accident : And, in this refpeit, as well as in every other, it is ef-
. fentially difteient from Body, which muft occupy Space, that is,
muft have a Place, and only one Place at a time.

As to Time, the general opinion is, that the common dlvifion of
Time into Paft, Prefent, and Future, applies to Mind as well as to
Body ; that the Mind has been in the Paft Time, ivill be in the Fu-
ture, and is in the Prefent Time ; but that it is impoffible that the
Mind, in the prefent inftant, Ihould exift in the Paft or the
Future : "Whereas I maintain that the Mind does adlually exift in that
way, however ftrange it may appear ; and in this, as in other re-
fpedls, it eflentially differs from Body, which cannot be conceived
to exift adually but in the prefent inftant.

It

• This is a common expreflion in Ariftotle's philofophy ; and it means that what
happens, is not from the nature of the thing to which it happens, but from fomething
adventitious to it. See what I have further faid on this fubjcft, Vol. i. p. 39. and
292.

% See Vol. i. p. 21. and 791.

Chap. VII. A NT I EN T METAPHYSICS. 305

It will be afked, Where or When Mind exifts ? or <lo I fay, That
?v^ind exifts in no PJacc, and in no Time ? To this I anfwci, J hat
the Categories of -where and ivheii muft neceflarily apply to every
thing ; and, therefore, that our Minds muft neceftarily exift in
forae Time, or in fome Place ; for, as they ad at certain Times,
and in certain Places, they muft of necefllty exift iji thofe Times,
and in thofe Places.

In order to folve thefe difficulties, and to explain what no doubt
appears very paradoxical, we muft confider that, as Mind is of a
nature perfectly different from Body, it muft exift in a manner quite
different ; and it is natural to think that it fhoiild exift in a manner
different, even with refped to thefe common attributes of Time and
Place.

That Mind is of a nature quite different from Body, I hope I have
fufficiently proved * ; and, particularly, that it is not extended as Bo-
dy is ; and that it has not the three dimenfions of Length, Breadth,
and Depth ; the confequence of the contrary fuppofition being, as I
Lave Ihown, raoft abfurd and ridiculous, fuch as that of its being
figured and divifible. Now, if it be not extended, it cannot occupy
Space ; for it is impoflible to conceive a thing extended which does
not occupy that Space, over which it is extended. At the fame time,
it is neceifary, as I have faid,that the Mind fliould exift fome where,
that is, in fome Space, but not in the manner in which Body ex-
ifts in Space, but in a manner altogether different, of which we can-
not have any clear Idea, any more than of Mind itfelf, which wc
are fure exifts without Parts : And yet no man can fay that he has a
clear conception of a Subftance exifting without Parts ; the reafon
of which is, that, being fo intimately conneded with Body, as we
are, and converfant only with it in the firft years of our life, wc
Vol. II. Q^q never

■* See Book I. Chap. 7. of this Volume.

3o6 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

never can fo perfedly abftradt ourfelves from it, as to have any clear
conception of Spiritual Subftances, though w^e are fure of their ex-
iftence.

I therefore hold it to be certain, that the Mind is not where the Bo-
dy is, in the fenfe of being contained in it, as a man is in a boat, to
ufe the comparifon of Ariftotle ; becaule a man in a boat mud occupy-
part of the Space in the boat, and I have fhown that Mind can oc-
cupy no Space. And in this I think I am fupported by the authority
of Ariftotle himfelf: For, in arguing agalnft Plato, who faid that the
Mind was felf-moved, and confequently ^cnx moved, he reprefents it
as an abfurd confequence of Plato's dodlrine, that he made Mind to
be in Place *, without which it could not be moved, all Motion
being a change of Place. Now, as a man in a boat has undoubtedly
a Place in the boat, it is impoffible, even according to Ariftotle, that
the Mind can be in the Body, in the fame manner as the man is in
the boat.

Further, the Mind is not where the Body is, when it perceives
what is diftant from the Body, either in Time or Place ; becaufe no-
thing can adt but when and where it is. Now, the Mind a£ts when
it perceives: For Mind only ads in two ways ; either when it per-
ceives, or when it moves Body. The Mind, therefore, of every
Animal, who has Memory or Imagination, a£ts, and, by confequence,
exifts, ivhen and ivhere the Body ia not ; for it perceives objedts di-
ftant from the Body, both in Time and Place.

I know it is commonly faid, that the Mind perceives thofe di-
ftant objeds, by a kind of pidyre in the Imagination. But I afk.
Who drew this pidure ? Where is the canvafe upon which It is

drawn?

* Lib. i. De Anima, cap. 3. where he fays that if, by its nature, the Mind be
moveable by any one of i\\c four different Icinds of Motion which he enumerates, it
niuft have a Place '• n«r«i ya^ «( M^HiT»t Kivtirtii tf too-*.

Chap. VII. A NT I E N T METAPHYSICS. 307

drawn ? And in what part of the Body is this picture hung up ?
Thefe are queftions that cannot be anfwered ; and the truth of the
matter is, that this is only a metaphorical or figurative way of
fpeaking, exprefling, that we fee the things as if they were prefented
to us in a pidlure. All that we truly know of the matter is, that the
Mind is converfant with objedts, diftant both in Time and Place ;
but how it tranfports itfelf to thofe diftant Times and Places, we
cannot account, any more than we can for many other things in
Nature.

This power of the Mind, however extraordinary it may feem, is
common to us with the other Animals ; but in them it is confined to
the purpofes of the Animal Life, that is, the prefervation of the In-
dividual and the continuation of the kind, which could not be
without Memory or Imagination. But the Intelledtual Mind of
Man being deftined for higher purpofes, is not fo limited, but goes
through the whole univerfe, even

extra jlammantia fjioenia mundi *,

and fees beyond this world other worlds. When the Mind Is fo
employed, it is very properly faid to be abroad ;

peregre eft Animus "f" ;

So that, when external objeds operate upon the Senfes, and knock,
as it were, at the door, the Mind is not at home.

This, therefore, is the anfwer to the queftion, Where the Human
Mind is ? That it fometimes is where the Body is,at other times in very
diftant places : And the anfwer to the queftion, When ? is, that it

Q^q 2 is

• Lucretius,
t Horatius.

J

08 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

is foinetimes of the preient moment only, and at other times it
tranlports itfclf to Times far diftant.

But in what Senfe then is it that our Mind can be faid to be in
our Body ? My anfwer is, That it is faid to be in out Body, and
confined to our Body, becaufe there is one part of its power,
namely, the power of moving Body, which it can only exert upon its
own Body, and, by the intervention of its own Body, upon other
Bodies ; for, though we can perceive even objeds of Senfe, with-
out the organs of Senfe, as in Dreams, we cannot move any Body
immediately or diredtly, except our own. In this refpecl, we may
be properly faid to be confined in our Bodies; and, in every re-
fpecl, our Mind is certainly impeded and retarded in its operations,
by its conjundion with the Body.

It may be obje(Sled that I make this matter much more wonderful
than it really is ; for the fad: is truly no more than this, that the
energies of our Mind extend to diftant Places and Times ; but it will
not from thence follow, that the Mind itfelf, its very fubftance, is
tranfported to thofe diftant Times and Places, any more than it will
follow, that, becaufe the Eye fees objedts at a great diftance,
therefore the Eye muft be fuppofed to be prefent where thofe objeds
are.

To this I atifwer, that it is impoffible to conceive any thing ading
or energizing, where or when it is not. The fubftance, therefore,
of the Mind, muft of neceflity be where or when it ads j othcrwife
we muft divide a Subftance from its Adions or Energies, which is a
thing inconceivable. As to the cafe of the Eye perceiving objeds at
a great diftancc, it is eafily explained from what is now known of
the Science of Optics ; for we know that Vifion is produced by the
refledion of the rays of light from the objed upon the pupil of our
eye. If, therefore, it could be proved, that all our thoughts, and

all

Chap. VII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 309

all our perceptions, were produced, as Epicurus fuppofed, by the
appulfe of corporeal images upon our Minds, the comparifon would
hold ; but, as it is believed no philofopher now a days, not even the
Materialift, maintains that our thoughts are fo produced, it proves
no more, than that a Subtile Body, fuch as Light, may, from a
great diftance, come into contad with our organs of Senfe. But this
never will account for our thoughts when we have no ufe of our
organs of Senfe, as in Sleep, nor for our Perceptions, when we are
awake, of objects of Senfe, diftant both in Time and Place.

Holding it, therefore, as certain, that our Mind can tranfport it-
felf to diftant Places and Times, and there operate as it does upon
objedts prefent, we may obferve the difference that there is betwixt
our Mind and the Divinity ; for, as I have taken occafion more than
once to obferve, we can have no conception of the Divine Mind but
from the ftudy of our own*. The Human Mind, as we have feen, is
not confined to the prefent, with refpedt eithertoTime or Place ; and fo
far it participates of the Divine Nature ; But it is not omniprefent,
nor of all' Times and Places, as we conceive the Divinity to be. There
is therefore this remarkable diflFerence betwixt the Deity and us, that
we are in different Places only at different Times, whereas the Uni-
verfal Mind is in all Times, and in all places, at the fame Timef.

Ln this way, the Ubiquity of God is made as plain, as, I think, it
can be, to our Capacities, from whatpaffes in our own Minds ; and
it appears that God is not only prefent every where, and at all
Times, by thofe inferior Minds, which keep every thing in motion-
in this Univerfe, and carry on the Syftem of Nature, but he is him-

felf,

•■ See Vol. i. p. 224 226'

f This difference betwixt the Divine Mind ant.1 ours hss not efcaped the notice
of the philofopheis of the Alexandrian School ; and our manner of operating in
fuccdlion, and thinking of one thing after another, they have very properly cxprcfled
by the term rmo-if inrxfixriKti,

3IO ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

felf, fubftantlally and eflcnlially, every where prefent, as Sir Ifaac
Newton has well exprefTed it *. How this fhouldbe, we cannot com-
prehend ; but no more can we comprehend how our Mind Ihould
tranfport itfelf to a diftant Time or Place, and pafs fo readily from
one of thefe diftant Times or Places to another. But it is a great
deal to he aflured of the fad with refped: to our own Minds ; and
the only way we can have any conception of the Supreme Mind, is
by adding as much as we can conceive to the powers of our own
Mind ; as, in this cafe, we conceive the Divine Mind to be not only
prefent, as ours is, in diftant Times and Places, but in all Times
and Places at the fame Time, not fucceffively, as is the cafe of our
Minds : And thus we ought to reafon concerning all the energies of
the Divine Mind. The fubftance of our Mind is like that of the
Divine, perfedly fimple and one, without parts, and confequently
indivifible ; but its energies are divided, being fucceiTive and one
after another : Whereas, we conceive not only the fubftance of the
Divine Mind to be indivifible, as all other immaterial fubftances are,
but alfo its energies to be fimultaneous, and not fucceffive. And it
is in this way, as I have juft now obferved, that Proclus and fome
of the commentators upon Ariftotle. have very properly diftin-
guiflied the Supreme Mind from our Mind. And, however incon-
ceivable to our weak capacities it may appear, that a Mind fliould
have all its Ideas prefent at once, yet there is fomething like it to be
obferved, even in our own Minds ; for no man can infer the con-
clufion of a fyllogifm, unlefs the two premifles be at the fame time
prefent to his Mind.

Hitherto

* Scholium Cenerale, in the end of his Prlncipla : Ills words are, ' Deus cfl. u-
' nus et idem Deus, femper et uBique : Omniprefens eft, non per virtutem folam
' fed etiam fer fubfiantiam ; nam virtus Rne/ub/lantia fubfiftere non poteft.' This, I
think, is excellent philofophy ; and, if God be prefent every where at the fame time,
ftot accidentally, hai fubjlantially, it is highly probable that the human Mind, which
participates fo much of Divinity, maybe prefent in the fame manner, not every
where, but in different places, and not at ihe/ame time, but at different times.

Chap. VII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 311

Hitherto I have fpoken only of Time Paji ; I come now to in-
quire, whether the Animal Mind has Foreknowledge, as well xs Paft
Knowledge, and whether it can tranfport itfelf into Future as well as
Paft Times. And here I cannot help making an obfervation, which
will furprife even my philofophical readers — That there is not fo great
a difference betwixt ihe Pajl. and. the Future y and betwixt Prefcicnce
and Memory, or P\.ecolle£tion, as is commonly imagined ; for the
Future is no more prefent than the Paft, and, as the one has been^
fo the other ivill be. If, therefore, the Mind can depart from the
Prefent, it does not appear to make a great difference w^hether it goes
to the one fide of it or the other, whether it tranfports itfelf to the
Future or to the Paft : The .one appears to me to be juft as incompre-
henfible as the other. The Deity, no doubt, fees at one view the
Paft, Prefent, and Future, and is of [all Times as well as of all Pla-
ces : And, that he may, in an extraordinary manner, communicate
to any Animal the Foreknowledge of certain events, and that he
has often done fo, I have no doubt. But the queftion here is, not
concerning any extraordinary gift of that kind, which the Almighty
may be pleafed to beftow upon any of his creatures, but whether
there is belonging to the Animal Nature any knowledge of the Fu-
ture. This knowledge, it muft be confefled, is not near fo com-
mon as the knowledge of the Paft ; and for a very good reafon
namely, that, without the knowledge of the Paft, which an Animal
has by his Memory and Imagination, it is abfolutely impoftlble that
an Animal of the better kind ftiould, in any circumftances or fitua-
tion, be able to carry on his oeconomy,. and provide for himfelf
and for his offspring. But, in certain circumftances and fitua-
tlons, it may be neceflary for the being or well being of fome
Animals, perhaps of ajl in the nati^ral ftate, ihat they fhould
have prefcience, in fome' degree, of mz/z/ra/ events, (for of human
counfels and adions there is no Animal that has any certain pre-
fcience, except by extraordinary gift from Heaven) ; and, when that

is-

512 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV.

is the cafe, I have no doubt but the wife and beneficent Author of
Nature has beftowed it. Accordingly, both birds and beafts are ob-
ferved to have a Foreknowledge of Tempefts and fudden and vio-
lent changes of the weather, much beyond any human Forefight.
And I am well aflured, that, in countries where the rivers overflow
annually, the natives know certainly how far the inundation is to
come up into the couutrj, by the birds building their nefts, and take
their meafurcs accordingly, without ever being deceived or difap-
pointed. The fhip-dog I mentioned fome time ago, when the fhip
was in very great hazard in a ftorm upon a lee fhore, forefaw, as I
was told by the fame gentleman, who was an eye-witnefs of the
thing, a prodigious wave, that fwept away every thing upon deck,
and, among other things, a box in which the dog lived. Some
time before the wave came, he went down to the cabbin, where
he was never feen before, which frightened the mafter very much :
But, as foon as the danger was over, he came again upon deck,
ihaking his tail, and licking the hands of all his friends ; which was
as much as telling them, that they might be of good chear, for the
danger was over.

Virgil has obferved the prefcience that the birds have of the wea-
ther; and I agree with him, that it is no proof of any extraordinary
Divinity in their Minds, or that it is revealed to them by any Supe-
rior Mind.

Hand equidem credo, quia Jit divinitus illis _
Ingenium, aut rerumfato prudent ia rnajor *.

But I cannot agree to his explanation of the phaenomenon, ac-
cording to the principles of his Epicurean philofophy, from Material

Caufes,

• Gcorgic. i. v. 4(5.

Chap. VII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 313

Caufes, fuch as the change of the air ; but I hold it to proceed from
an Inftindl, native and congenial with the Minds of animals in their
natural ftate, or that are not far removed from it : For we obfervc
that even hogs domefticated have a prefcience of the weather ; and I
believe one of the fureft prognoftics of a ftorm is taken from their
carrying ftraw to make their beds.

I have no doubt but that Man, in his natural flate, had the
fame inftin£l that other Animals, living in the fame way, have. And
I was informed by a gentleman who is ftifl alive, and to whom I
give entire credit, that the Hanoverian boy, (as he was called), a fa-
vage, who was catched in the woods of Hanover, and brought tc^
England, where he lived many years, but never learned to fpeak,.
fhovved great difturbance and agitation before any great ftorm or
violent change of weather. And this I hold to have been fome re-
mains of his natural InftinQ : For I am perfuaded that man, in his
natural ftate, when he was under the direQion of Inftind; only, had
the prefcience of every thing neceflary for his oeconomy, which we
fee other animals have, and which, I think, belongs to the Animal
Nature ; and therefore I doubt not but, in that ftate, he forefaw
many things, which he cannot now difcover, except by extraordi-
nary communications.

The mere modern reader, and admirer of the prefent ftate of So-
ciety and its refmements, will wonder that I fliould think the na-
tural ftate preferable in any refped to the civilized, or that the
Minds of Savages are poflcfled of higher natural endowments than
the Minds of civilized men. But every man who has been a-
mong favages knows, in the firft place, that their fenfes are much
more acute than ours : I do not mean the luxurious fenfes of Feel-
ing and Tafting, which as they do not cultivate fo much as we do,
they have them not, I believe, fo delicate, but the more ufeful Senfcs
Vol. II. R r of

314 AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. BooklV.

of Seeing and Hearing, which, among us, arc become fo imperfed:,
that we are often obliged to fupply their defedls by machinery ; and
I doubt other organs of delicate ftru£ture, among us, are likewife
very much impaired. 2dly, Their natural parts are much better than
ours, in thofe things upon which they have exercifed them, fuch
as ftratagems of war, and hunting, in which they difcover an ex-
traordinary fagacity. ^dly, They have certainly more ftrength of
Mind than we have, can endure much more pain and fatigue, and
have greater patience and perfeverance in all their enterprifes. Now,
this being the cafe, it is not to be wondered at that they fhould
have more of that inftindive knowledge, which, I fay, is congenial
to the Mind, by which it is converfant with things in diftant Places,
and in Times future as well as paft. And, if any extraordinary
communication or revelation of future events were necefTary for the
condudl of their lives, I hold that fuch uncorrupted Minds, as theirs
were before they learned our vices, are much fitter veflels for Divine
Infpiration than Minds fuch as ouis.

Hitherto I have fpoken only of the Animal and Intelledual Mind,
and have fhown that they are both capable of tranfporting themfelves
to different Places and Times : But fuch a power given to the Vege-
table Mind would be altogether fuperfluous; as the Vegetable is fixed
to one fpot, and has not its food to fearch, or its progeny to rear, in
the fame manner as the Animal has : And there would be flill lefs
reafon for giving this faculty to the Mind which moves unorgani-
zed Bodies.

And here we may obfcrve the wonderful contrivance of Nature in
providing for the prefervation of Animals, and the carrying on their
ccconomy. If the Vegetable part of the Animal was to be abroad
at any time, as well as the Scnfitive or Intellectual Part, the Animal
muf> ceafe to cxift. But, as the Vegetable Life is always at home,

the

Chap. VII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 315

the machine flill goes on, in the fame manner as it does in Sleep,
when neither the Senfitive nor Intelledlual Mind is adivc.

I fhall conclude with obferving, that, if this Theory of mine be
right concerning the Animal and the Intelledbual Mind, thofe philo-
fophers and phyficians have loft their labour who have inquired fo
curioufly in what part of the Body thofe Minds were fituated ; for
the fad is, that they have no fituation, becaufe they are not extend-
ed. Even the Vegetable and Elemental Minds, though of degrees
much inferior, yet, not being material, nor confequently extended,
have no fituation, though they be attached to the Bodies which they
animate, in fo far, that they can not only not move any other Bo-
dies, but have no perception of any thing external to thofe Bodies.

Rr 2 BOOK.

3i6 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

BOOK V.

Of the Principles of Sir Isaac Newton's Astronomy.

CHAP. I.

Of Aftronomy, and the difference betivixt it and Phil ofophy.— Sir
Ifaac Newton's Principia a Work o/* Aftronomy, not Philofophy. —
Sir Ifaac, hoivevery has philofophifed concerning /^f beginning and
continuation o/" Motion. — If he is in an error in this Philofophy ^
it belongs to this Work to take notice of it. — Short Account of Sir
Ifaac's Syftem. — The Motion of the Planets co?npofed of 'Pro]Q(Xion
cwi Gravitation — both thefe Poivers ailing in Right Lines. — Their
Elliptical Motion, therefore, to be analyfed into a Polygon of an infi-
nite Number of Sides.— -Sir Ifaac thought that both the Motions
ivere produced by Bodily Impulfe. — Reafons for afferting this to be
his Opinion. — Sir Ifaac, ivhen he ivrote his Principia, did not think
(?/"Mind as a Moving Power; — tivo Reafons for that. — Therefore
made a Machine of the Heavens. — Has laid it doivn that Body is
indifferent to a State of Motion or Reft. — This fubverfive of the
antient Philofophy of the difin5iion betivixt Mind ^«J Body.—
Dangerous alfo to the Syjlem of Theiim, by denying the Providence
of God over the Works of Nature. — 77?^ Mechanical Syftem cannot
be confined to the Heavens, but muf defend to the Earth — muf go
even the length of Dr Prieftley's Philofoph) — But Sir Ifaac's Ma-
chine

Chap. T. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 317

chine of the Heavens, not a perfect Machine— //a^/d' to tivo Dc'
fecls^ ivhich even Human Machinery may be free of.

I WILL conclude this Volume, as I did the laft, with fome obferva-
tions upon the principles of Sir Ifaac Newton's Aftronomy, which I
think are neceffarily connected with what I have faidin the preceding
partof this Volume,concerning the nature of Mind and ZJo^Z/jand of
the Motions produced by them. What is contained in the Appendix to
my Firll Volume, upon this fubjed, I know, is underftood by many
as an attempt to overturn Sir Ifaac's Syftem of Aftronomy ; but, on
the contrary, I think I have endeavoured to eftablifh it upon found
principles of philofophy, and fuch as are confiftent with genuine
Theifm, and the true Religion of Nature ; and if I have fuccecded, I
fhall deferve the thanks of all thofe who admire Sir Ifaac as much as
I do, and, I would fain hope, of the nation that has given him
birth, and to which he does fo much honour.

Aftronomy, fo far as it is a fclence, and not confifting of fads
merely, is nothing but the application of Geometry and Numbers to
the Motion of the Celcftial Bodies, and, in that way, difcovering the
Law^s of their Motion. According to this definition, the jPn;2r//m
of Sir Ifaac Newton is the greateft work of Aftronomy that ever
was written, and he himfelf the greateft Aftronomer that ever lived :
For he has firft, by a moft wonderful indudion, difcovered the laws
of the Planetary Motion, and then has applied thefe Laws, thus dif-
covered, to the calculation of their Motions and the folution of the
Phaenomena concerning them; proceeding in the way that I am per-
fuaded all Sciences have been difcovered and brought to perfedion,
that is, firft by Anahfis, and then by Synthefts. But ftill this is no
more than Aflronomy^ not Philofophy : For Philofophy is the know-
ledge of Caufes ; and however fuccefsfuUy we rjay apply Geome-
try

3i8 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

try and Numbers to the Motions of Bodies, p.nd mcafure and com-
pute ever lb well, yet, if we do not know the Caufcs of thefe Mo-
tions, we are not Fhilofopbcrs.

Neither fhould we confound, as many do, the generalizing of any
Eircvfl with the knowledge of itsCaufe. Though I know that a (lone
falls to the ground, not only here, but every where in Europe, Afia,
and America, yet I am not more learned as to the caufe of it, than it
I knew that it happened only in one fingleinftance : And, in general,
we muft diftinguilh betwixt Natural Hiftory and Philofophy ; for,
though we know ever fo many fads of Natural Hiflory, and their
feveral connexions and relations to one another, yet, if we do not
know their Caufes, we are not philofophers.

Unlefs, therefore, the admirers of Sir Ifaac Newton will maintain
that he was as great aPhilofopher as he was an Aftronomer, Geometer,
Scientifical Mechanic, and accurate obferver of the Phaenomena of
Nature, and particularly that he excelled in Metaphyftcs and the
Firjl Philofophy^ which inveftigates the Firjl Caufes and Principles
of things, they ought not to be alarmed at what I have faid in the
Firft Volume, and fhall further fay in this, upon the fubjed of his
Prhicipia ; nor think that it is an attack that I make upon his Syflem
of Aflronomy ; for it is only concerning the beginning and continuance
of Motion, with which Sir Ifaac fets out in that work, that I find
fault. Now, he may be in an error as to the Cauje of the Motion of
the Planets, and yet be perfedly right as to the Laivs of that Mo-
tion, and may have calculated and meafured it with the greateft de-
gree of exadtnefs. And the candid reader will the more readily ex-
cufe me, that, in my apprehenfion, Sir Ifaac was under no neceflity
at all to fay any thing of the Caufe of the Motion of theCeleftial Bo-
dies, which, as I have faid, belongs to a Science quite different from
Aftronomy. If, therefore, he has gone out of his province as an
Aftronomer, and intrenched upon that of the philofopher, and at

the

I

Chap. r. AN TIE NT xM E T A P H Y S I C S. 319

the fame time, maintained principles that I think dangerous to the
Syftem of Theifm, though, I am perfuaded, without intending it, it
certainly belonged to a work of this kind, the chief purpofe of which
is to maintain that SyRem, to take notice of any error that Sir Ifaac
may have fallen into in this refpedl.

Sir Ifaac's Syftem of the Heavens is, as I underftand it, fhortly
this : The Planets are, by an impulfe, or vis imprejfa, as Sir Ifaac
calls it, fet in Motion ; which Motion continues in a ftraight line, by
virtue of that Power which Sir Ifaac csilh vis in/tta ; and by this
Power it will continue forever to be moved in a ftraight line, unlefs
its Motion be flopped by fome obftacle, or unlefs it be adled upon
by fome other Power. In this way, the planets would have gone
on forever in a redlilineal couife, as our author hasfaid in his intro-
dudlion to that abridgment of his philofophy, which he has given
under the title of ' The Syftem of the World: But, in order to pro-
duce their Elliptical Motion, he fays that another Power is employed,
which he calls the Vis Centripeta, by which the Planet is carried out
of the Redlilineal Diredlion, towards a certain point, as its Centre.
How this Power ads upon the Body, whether by Pulfion or Tru-
fion, by propelling or by drawing it. Sir Ifaac has not explained in
the Definition he has given of it ; which is in thefe words, * Vis

* ccntripeta eft, qua corpora verfus pundlum aliquod, tanquam ad

* centrum, undique trahuntur, impelluntur, vel utcunque tendunt.'
But, in the demonftration he has given of the effeds of this Centri-
petal Force in the firft propofition of the fecond fedion of the tlrft
book of his Principia, he fuppofes it to ad, not by drawing, but by
impulfe; for his exprefTion is, ' Agat vis centripcta impulfounicofed
' raagno, efiiciatque ut corpus de reda declinet.' And his dodrinc
of Prime and Ultimate Ratios, which he has explained in the firft fec-
tion of his fecond book, is chiefly intended for the purpofe of ihowing
how a Circle or Ellipfi? may be analyfed into a Polygon of an infi-
nite

320 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

nite number of fides *, always increafing in number and decreafing
in length, till at laft they become evanefcent, as he exprefles it ;
and, if it can be fo analyfed, it muft be fo compounded.

From this account of Sir Ifaac's Syftem, I think, it is evident, and,
indeed, it is admitted by all his followers, that he underftood the
Motion of iheCeleftial Bodies to be actually compounded of a tenden-
cy to go on in a Straight Line, and a tendency towards the Centre ;.
or, as he exprefTed it, of a Centrifugal and a. Centripetal Force ; or,
as it is more commonly exprefled, of Proje£lion and Gravitation.

2^0, Further, I am of opinion that Sir Ifaac, when he wrote his
Principia, believed that both Motions were produced by bodily im-
pulfe ; for, though Sir Ifaac was undoubtedly a Theifl, and therefore
believed that God was ultimately the Author of all Motion in the
univerfe, yet he appears to have thought that the Motions of this our
Syftem were produced immediately by Bodily Impulfe, and car-
ried on by Matter and Mechanifm merely, without the inter-
vention of the Supreme Mind, or of any other. And, as this
Mechanical Motion was to continue forever, or for a very
long time, without the immediate adtion of any Power, whe-
ther of Body or Mind, he has fet out with eftablifhing, by his firft
axiom, the perpetuity of Motion once begun by a Vis Imprejfa. This
would have been altogether unneceffary, if he had not wanted to
make our Solar Syftem go on of itfelf after it was once fet agoing.
But, as I know many of the Newtonians are unwilling to believe
that Sir Ifaac's Syftem is fo Mechanical as I have rep»refented it, I will
give my rcafons for fo thinking.

And, to begin with the Vis Imprejfa producing the projedile Mo-
tion of the Planets, which, according to the firft axiom, is to laft for-
ever

• Ste :*hat 1 have further faid upon this fubjc£l, Vol. I. p, 525.

Chap. I. A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. 321

ever in a ftraight line, when once begun. — This firfl: axiom, I muft
fuppofe, applies to the Motion of the Planets : And, indeed, Sir Ifaac
fo applies it himfelf, in his oblervations upon it ; nor could it other-
wife have flood, with any propriety, at the head of his fyftem of
Aftronomy. Now, as I prefume that Sir Ifaac knew fo much of the
nature of Mind, as to believe it to be an immaterial fubftance, I can-
not fuppofe that he would have ufed the words Vis Imprcjfa or hn-
pulfus^ to exprefs the Aclion of Mind upon Body ; for it is impof-
fible to conceive that an Immaterial Subftance can adl upon Body by
Pulfion, Trufion, PrelTure, or, in Ihort, in any way in which Body
ads upon Body *. I therefore underftand this firft axiom to relate to
Motion produced by Bodily Impulfe only, fuch as is the Motion of
Proje£tiles here on earth ; but I do not underftand it, for the reafons
above mentioned, to be confined to the Motion of Projedtiles, but to
be underftood likewife of the Motion of the Planets, which, there-
fore, Sir Ifaac fuppofes to be produced by Bodily impulfe, as Projec-
tiles here are moved.

2^0, Astother/j Centripeta^ which produces the Motion of Gravi-
tation, if It be admitted that the Vis Imprejfa is Bodily Impulfe, I think
it is impofllble to deny that the Vis Centripeta is fo likewife, in the
language of Sir Ifaac ; for, in his fourth definition, he confiders it as
a fpecies of the Vis Imprejfa : His words are, ' Eft autem Vis Imprejfa
* diverfarum Originum, ut ex I6iu^ ex Prejlone, ex Vi Centripeta ;'
where we may obferve that he joins it with I^us and Prejfio^ by
•which words he never could have meant to exprefs the adtion of
Mind upon Body. And, in his fifth definition, he applies to it the
words dranving and impelling^ which can only be underftood of the
adion of Body upon Body. In the demonftration above mentioned,
of the firft propofition of the fecond fedion of his firft book, he is
Vol. II. S s more

• See this explained at more length, page 47.

322 ANT IE NT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

more prcclfc in the account he gives of its manner of operating ; for
he fiiys that it afts Unico Impulfu, that is, in the very fame way that
the Projedlile Force adts, with this difference only, that the Projedlile
Force adts but once, whereas the Adtion of the Vis Centr'ipeta is in-
cefliintly repeated, as he fuppofes in that demonftration. It is there-
fore not to be wondered that Sir Ifaac endeavoured, as it is well
known, to account for Gravitation from Bodily Impulfe. And if he
believed Gravitation to be fo produced, there can be little doubt
of his having the fame opinion concerning Projedtion ; for, as Gra-
vitation adts inceflantly upon Bodies, and fo far refembles per-
fedtly the Adlion of Mind upon Body, (for which reafon it is now
admitted, I believe, by all the Newtonians, that Gravitation is the
operation of Mind), if Sir Ifaac believed that it was produced by
Bodily Impulfe, he muft, a fortiori, have believed that the Projedtile
Force, which adls only by one Impulfe, is produced by Body.

3/io, If Sir Ifaac, when he wrote his Principia, had thought of
any other Motion befides that produced by Bodily Impulfe, he
would not have fuppofed, as he appears to have done, that all Mo-
tion is, by its nature, redtilineal. Upon this hypothefis, as I have
obferved. Sir Ifaac's whole Syftem is built; and the Jefuits, his com-
mentators, have laid it down in fo many words in their Commen-
tary upon the Firft Law of Motion ; from which they fay it follows,
Omnem mo turn ejfe Naturafua aequabilem et reSiilineum. Now, this is
undoubtedly true of Motion produced by Bodily Impulfe, but is cer-
tainly not true of Motion by Mind, which being produced by incef-
fant energies, the diredtion of it may be varied in every inftant of
the Motion ; and confequently the Circular or Elliptical Motion may
be immediately and diredily produced by Mind, of which every
body may convince himlelf by the Motion of his hand in the air or
upon the table *.'

And,

* Sea upon this fubjeft, page 48.

Chap. I. A N T I E N T M K T A P H Y S I C S. 323

And, hijlly, if Sir Ifaac had believed, as Dr Clarke did, that the
Motion of the celeftial Bodies was carried on by X.\\t conftant agency
of Mind, and not by viitue of any original impulfe*, he never could
have thought either of a Vis Imprejfa, or of a Vis Infita, by which he
fuppofes the Motion to be continued after the Vis Imprejfa, orthe/w-
pulfcy has ceafed ; for both of thefe are entirely unneceflary, accor-
ding to Dr Clarke's Syftem and mine. Nor would he ever have
thought of the Eternity of Motion, which he has laid down in his
firfl: Axiom : For he would have known that, if the Motion be car-
ried on by Mind, it will laft as long as the Mind continues to a£l:
upon the Body ; and that will be as long as it pleafes the great Au-
thor of Nature, and is fuited to the Syftem of the Univerfe.

I will therefore venture to affirm, that Sir Ifaac, while he
was writing his Principia, had no thought of Motion by Mind,
but only confidered Motion by Body : And, however extra-
ordinary and unaccountable this may feem, there are two rea-
fons that may be given for it. In the firft place, the Motion
produced by Bodily Impulfe is the mod obvious to Senfe ; and,
indeed, the only Motion of which we can, by our Senfes, per-
ceive the Caufe : Whereas the Caufe of the other Motion cannot
be perceived by any Senfe, and is only difcovered, as I have elfe-
where obferved, by Confcioufnefsf, with which Geometers and Me-
chanics have nothing to do. id/jr. The Mechanical Phyfics were
fo much in fafhion at the time Sir Ifaac wrote, and tlie Philo-
fophy of Mind and of Nature were confidered to be fo perfectly di-
ftindt, that, if Sir Ifaac had endeavoured to account for the Motions
of the Celeftial Bodies by Mind, no body would have liftened to
him. All, therefore, he could do, in the ftate he found Philofophy,
was to deliver the Heavens from the Vortices of Des Cartes ; but, in
place of them, he was obliged, by the opinions of the times and the

S s 2 preju-

• See Vol. I. p. 512,
t Page 47.

324 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V,

prejudices of men, to fubftltute two other Mechanical Powers in the
place of them, viz. Projection and Gravitation.

It would be faying too much, if I faid that Sir Ilaac had no Idea
of Body being moved by Mind, fince he, no doubt, believed that
God was the Author of all the Motions in the Univerfe : But I
think it is evident that he had no notion of the Planets being fo
moved ; and I hope I (hall be forgiven if I fay that I do not think
Sir ll'aac, when he wrote his Principia, had any clear conception of
the way in which Mind moves Body, or the difference there is be-
twixt the manner in which Mind moves Body, and Body moves Body*.

To

• Whoever reads the following paffage in the Principia, will, I am fure, forgire
me for this affertion. It is where he is fpeaking of Attradlion or Gravitation,
•which, I believe, every Newtonian now allows to be produced by the immediate
and conftant agency of Mind : * Vocem attra^ianis, hie generaliter ufurpo pro
' corporum conatu quocunque accedendi ad invicem : Sive conatus ifte fiat ab aftione

* corporum, vel fe mutuo petentium, vel per fpiritus emiflbs fe invicem agitan-

* tium ; five is ab a£tione .^thcris, aut Aeris, mediive cujufcunque, feu corpirei

* {tu incorporei, oriatur, corpora innatantia in fe invicem utcunque irapellcntis ;'
Principia, lib. \. fe3. II. Scholium. Where I think the ftrange Notion, of Bodies
floating in an incorporeal medium which impells them towards one another,
fhows evidently that Sir Ifaac had not, at leaft when he began this work of the
Principia, any clear Idea, I believe, I may fay any Idea at all, of the manner in
which Mind moves Body. But, not only when he wrote the Queries to his Op-
tics, but even before he finiflied his Principia, he appears to me to have difcovered
that Mechanical Caufes could not account for the Motions in the Univerfe, — that
Mind mud be neceffarlly employed, and that it a£ls upon Body in a manner very
different from that in which Body adts upon Body; for, in his Scholium Generate,
fubjoined to his Principia, fpeaking of this fame Gravitation, he has thefe words :

* Oritur ut que haec vis a caufa aliqua quae penetrat ad ufque centrum Solis et

* Planetarum, fine virtutis diminutione ; quaeque agit, non pro quantitatc fuperfi-
' cierum particularum in quas agit, (ut folent caufae Mechanicac), fed pro quanti-
' tale Mciteriae Solidae " What I hsve faid in the courfe of this work, and {hall
further fav, upon the difference betwixt Mechanical Motion and Motion by Mind,
may be corrfidered as little more than a Commentary upon thefe words ; and, in-
deed, when to them I join what he has faid in his Queries, of which more after-
wards, 1 can have little doubt but thit I agree with Sir Ifaac, at leaft with his latter
thoughts, in my Philofophy concerning the Principle of Motion in the Univerfe.

Chap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 325

Tc know this belongs to the Philofophy of Mind, and to tliat Fird
Ph'.lofophy which diftinguilhcs accurately betwixt Body and Mind,
and fhows the different natures of each. Now, there are not any
two Sciences more different than Geometry or Mechanics, in which
Sir Ifaac exceeded all men, and the Philofophy of Mind, in which
he might have excelled too, if he had applied to it, which he had
not done when he wrote his Principia ; at leaft, it is not to be dif-
covered from that work, where there is nothing but Geometry and
Mechanics, Menfuration and Calculation. Nor, indeed, does he fay
any thing pofitively concerning the Caufe of the Planetary Motion ;
and it is only by inference and dcdudlion from his manner of rea-
foning concerning their Motion, that we fuppofe he believed their
Motion to be produced by Bodily Impulfe. It is only in the Scho-
lium Generale, quoted in the preceding note, that he gives fo much
as a hint that he knew any Caufe of Motion that was not mechani-
cal. But, in his Queries fubjoined to his Optics, he has been more
explicit ; and there, I think, I have fhown, and fhall further fhow
in the fequel, that he faid Mind was the Caufe of the Motions of the
Univerfe.

From what I have faid, I think it Is evident that the Mo-
tions of the Celeftial Bodies are, according to Sir Ifaac's no-
tions when he wrote his Prmcipia, mechanical. He therefore has
made a Machine of our Solar Syflem ; for, whatever Motion
goes on of itfelf by the Power of Body merely, is, as I have
fhown clfewhere *, a Machine, in the proper ki\{e of the word,
even fuppofing, as I am perfuaded Sir Ifaac did fuppofe, that the
Motion proceeded originally from Mind. In order to carry on tliis
Mechanical Motion, he has laid it down as an axiom, that Body is
indifferent to a ftate of Motion or Reft, and has no natural determi-
nation to the one any more than to the other; fo that, being once put
in Motion, it continues in Motion by the fame neceflity of its na-
ture,
* See Pages 501. and 502. Vol. I. where, I think, I have explained this matter
diftinttly and fcientitically.

326 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

ture, as It continued at reft; before it was moved *. If this be true,
there is an end of the antient philofophy, which I have endeavoured
to maintain in this and the preceding Volume, and of the diftindion
I have made betwixt Mind and Body, by which I make Mind to be
the only moving Power in the univcrfe, whereas Body is that
which only is moved, and which, by its nature, is abfolutely inca-
pable of moving itfelf, or of either beginning or continuing Motion.
As this diftindion is the foundation of my whole Philofophy, and
as it is undoubtedly a metaphyfical queftion of very great impor-
tance, What is the Caufe of the continuation of Motion ? which ne-
ver can be properly determined, without knowing accurately the
nature of Body, and wherein it differs eflentially from Mind, I hope
the reader will not think that, from the vanity and affedation of
matching myfelf with fuch an antagonift as Sir Ifaac Newton, I have
gone out of my way, when I have endeavoured to defend my Philo-
fophy againft principles that are entirely fubverfive of it, and to
fhow that Sir Ifaac has not rightly determined this metaphyfical
queftion concerning the continuation of Motion.

If any further apology were neceflary for my differing from Sir
Ifaac, I think I can fay that the Syftem of Theifm, to maintain
which, as I have faid, is the principal defign of this work, is materi-
ally concerned : For, if it be admitted that our Solar Syftem has
gone on for fix thoufand years ^ without the agency of any Mind,

Supreme

* This is evident from Sir Ifaac's definition of the Fis Infita, which is in thefe
words : • Materiae Vis Infita cfl potcntia refiftendi, qua corpus unumquodque,
' quantum in fe eft, perfeverat in ftatu fuo vel quiefcendi vel movendi uniformiter
' in diredlum.* So that, according to Sir Ifaac, by the fame neceflity of its nature.
Matter or Body, for he does not diftinguifli thefe two, refts, or is in Motion ;
whereas, it is a fundamental maxim of the philofophy I defend, that Body is, by its
nature, abfolutely pafTive and inactive, fo that Motion is altogether foreign to its
nature, and adventitious, proceeding from a thing whofe nature and efllnce it is
to move, as much as it is the nature and eflcnce of Body to be at reft.

Chap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 327

Supreme or Subordinate, it will be impofTible to convince the A-
theifts that it might have not fo gone on forever j nor will he be e-
verperfuaded to make the diftindion the Newtonians make, betwixt
the beginning and the continuation of Motion, that is, betwixt the
firft remove of the Body from the place that it occupied when the
Motion began, and its after removes from the feveral places which
it fucceffively occupies in the courfe of the Motion. Even the
Theifts of old, fuch as Ariftotle, who maintained the eternity of
the Material World, would tell us that this dodtrinc of the con-
tinuance of Motion made Deity quite ufclefs in the bufinefs of
Nature ; and that we might as well remove the Gods out of the
world altogether, and place them in certain intermundane Spa-
ces, as Epicurus did, who, therefore, according to a very juft ob-
fervation of Cicero, took away the Gods in faft and reality, and
only left them in words. And, indeed, I cannot help faying that,„
to deny the Providence of God over all his works, and his adual
prefence by Himfelf, or by Subordinate Minds, in all the operations
of Nature, and, particularly, in the Motions of the Celeftial Bodies,
which we fo much admire, and which declare, more than any thing
elfe, the glory of the Lord, is to take away the better part of Reli-
gion, and that which muft have the greateft influence upon the
minds of men *.

But this Mechanical Philofophy cannot, I think, be confined to
the Celeftial Regions, but it muft come down to Earth, and go
through all Nature ; for, if the great Motions of the Univerfe are
Mechanical, what fhall we fay of the lefFer Motions here on Earth,

fuch

* Sec what I ha»e further faid upon this fubjeft, Vol. I. page 498. It was in
this fcnfe of Religion and Providence, that Cicero fays, and, I think, moft tru-
ly, that his countrymen excelled all the nations then known. After enumerating
other things, in which other nations excelled them, he adds, * Sed Pietate et Reli-
* gione, atque hac una Sapientia, quod Deorum immortalium numine omnia P^egi
' Gubernariquc perfpeximus, omnes gentes nationefquc fuperavimus.' Orattj di-
jlrufpicum Refponfis.

328 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

fuch as the Magnetic, Ele£lrical, and Chymical Attradions and Re-
pulfions ? Muil not the Motions of Plants and Annuals, their Or-
ganization, Generation, and regular Succeflion, be produced alfo
by one fingle iinpulfe, according to the philofophy of Des Cartes : And
muft not Man likewife be a machine, according to the philofophy of the
AbhePrade* andDr Prieftley ; for their philofophy is nothing elfe but
Materialifm carried to its full extent : And 1 think Dr Prieftley has
fome reafon to boaft, as he does, that he is a perfed Materialift ;
whereas the other Philofophers of this age are only Demi-Materia-
lifts : And I agree with him alfo, that thofe who maintain there is a
Mind in Man, but not in other Bodies in this Univerfe, are but
Demi-Spirituaiifts. How different is this Syftem of Philofophy
from the Antient Philofophy of Mind, and the dodtrine of Theifm
as delivered by Cicero in his Tufculan Queftions, where he tells us
that, without Mind, this goodly frame of Nature could not fubfift a
moment ; ' a truth,' fays he, 'which ail the Plebeian philofophers (fo
* I call all thofe that differ from Socrates, Plato, and that family,)
' can never overturn +.'

But, fuppofmg that the Mechanical Syftem could be confined to
the Celeftial Regions, (and I do not know that the Newtonians at
prefent carry it farther, though Sir Ifaac has faid fomething tending
that way, as I have elfewhere obferved if, which I wifh he had not
faid), the Machine of the Heavens ought to be a moft perfed one,
and worthy of its great Author. But this is far from being the
cafe.

In

* See concerning him, Vol. I. page 499 ; and concerning Dr Prieftley, p. 58.
of this Volume.

+ See the pafFage quoted at length, Vol. I. page 202.

% See Vol. I. page 547. and page 275. where Sir Ifaac's words are quoted in the
end of the Principia. There he fays, that even Senfation, and the voluntary Motion
of Animals, are produced by a moft fubtile Spirit, which pervades grofs Bodies,
and is latent in them.

Chap. I. A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. ^29

In order to make a machine perfcd: and complete, two things are
nccefTarily required : i/?, Tliat the Moving Power fhould never
fail, fo that the machine may not flop for want of it ; 2^//, That
the machinery fhould iiot be difordered or deranged by the adtion,
or interference, of the fcveral parts with one another. And accor-
dingly, even a machine of human invention, if it be well contri-
ved, will not flop through either of thcfe defedts. And what hi-
therto has rendered a Perpetuiim Mobile impofhblc to be contri-
ved by human art, is the fridtion of the parts upon one another, and
the necefTary tear and wear thereby produced. This defedt of hu-
man machinery we cannot conceive the Celeflial Bodies liable to.
But we are to confider, whether the Heavenly Machine may not
have the two defedts above mentioned, from which even a machine
of human invention may be exempted.

And, firjl, as to the Moving Power, which is two-fold ; either
Gravitation, or the Projedlile Force. As to Gravitation, if it were
the Operation of a Fluid, as Sir Ifaac fuppofed it might pofTibly be,
it is not eafy to fay whether it would ever ceafe or not, Sir Ifaac
never having fufhciently explained the nature of this fluid, which
he only fuppofed might exifl. On the other hand, if this Power be
Mind, as is no\v generally agreed by the Newtonians, it is evident
that it can never ceafe, except by the Will of the Great Author of
Nature, upon whom every thing muft depend for its prefervation
and continuance, as well as for its exiflence at firfl j but, as to the
other Moving Power, the Projedlile Force by which the Celeflial
Bodies are to be carried on forever, it is evident that it mufl be de-
creafmg every moment, and mufl at laft ceafe altogether. This, in-
deed, could not happen, according to Sir Ifaac's hypothefis of the
eternity of Motion once begun, if it were true, as he fuppofes,
that there was a perfedl vacuum in the celeflial regions. And, ac-
VoL. II. T t cordingly,

^3o ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

cordingly, he has faid that the planets will revolve perpetually in
their orbits *. But this is certainly not the cale ; for there is light
there, which is undoubtedly a Body, however fubtile, and, there-
fore, muH; refirt more or lefs, and confequently retard the Motion,
and, at laft, make it ceafe altogether.

But, sJ/y, This is not all ; for Sir Ifaac's Machine, by his own
confeflion, has the other defeat of the machinery being fo ill con-
trived, that it diforders and deranges itfelf ; for he has told us, that
the planets difturb one another's motions, and the comets the mo-
tions of them all ; and, therefore, he has been obliged to admit, that
his fyftem will require the mending hand of the Creator. This is a
conceflion which the foreign philofophers have laid hold of, parti-
cularly Mr Leibnitz, (as appears from the letters of correfpondence
that paffed betwixt him and Dr Clarke), to which no good anfwer
has been given, or can be given, upon the fuppofition that the folar
fyftem is a machine. But, if it be true, as I fuppofe, that the Pla-
nets are all moved by the immediate agency of Mind, we ought not
to fay that there is any difturbance or diforder in their Motions ;
but that fuch irregularities, as we perceive in thefe motions, are all in
confequence of general laws, and for fome good purpofe, though we
cannot tell what it is. And the fame is to be faid of the changes we
obferve in the heavens, which, though they may portend fome alte-
ration of the prefent fyftem, or may be fuppofed to prepare the way
for a new heaven and a new earth, are not to be accounted defeds or
irregularities, but parts of the grand plan of the univerfe, formed by
Infinite Wifdom, and which, I am perfuaded, has its periods and re-
volutions, as \ve fee every thing on earth has, though it is likely by
much flower degrees : For every thing in the material world exifts
by change and fuccefTion ; nor is there any thing fixed and immove-
able, except the Eternal One.

Thus,

• See the paffage quoted. Vol. I. p. 533.

Chap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 331

Thus, I think, I have proved, that tlie progreffive Motion of the
Planet, in its Orbit, is mechanical ; and, further, that it is not perfed of
the kind. But there is another Motionof the Planet, different from the
Progreffive Motion, which is alfo mechanical, according to Sir Ifaac's
Syftcm, and liable to the fame dcfedl : The Motion I mean is that
on its Axis, which the Newtonians fay is alfo produced by a Pio-
jedile Impulfe, fo that the Planet being once fet a fpinning, like a
top, continues for ever to do fo, without any agency of Mind*.
This makes the Machinery of the Heavens not a little complicated :
And, if the Planetary Motion, in all its parts, is underftood to be pro-
duced by Bodily Impulfe, there muft, I doubt, be three Bodies em-
ployed ; one to give the progreflive Impulfe, by which the Planet is
carried round in its Orbit ; one to give it the Centripetal Motion ;
and a third to give it the Motion on its Axis.

Nor do I think that the matter will be much mended, by fuppo-
fmg, as I believe all the Newtonians now do, that one of the Mo-
tions, viz. the Motion of Gravitation, is produced by the conftant
agency of Mind : But, on the contrary, I think it makes the Ma-
chinery more perplexed and intricate, and Sir Ifaac's Syftem much
lefs regular and uniform than it would otherwife be ; for, according
to this hypothefis, two parts of the Motion of the fame Planet are
produced by Bodily Impulfe, and the third part by Mind. So
complicated a Syftem feems to be far removed from that wonderful

T t 2 ^ fimplicity

• Sir Ifaac, in his explanation of his Firft Law of Motion, has thefe words :
' Tiochus, cujus partes cohaerendo perpetuo retrahunt fefe a motibus reQilineis,

* non ceffat rotari nifi quatenus ab ai:re rctardatur." And this theory of the Mo-
tion of a wheel he applies to^the Motion of the Planets in the following words :
' Majora autem planetarum ct cometarum corpora, motus fuos, et progrefTivcs et

* circulares, in fpatiis minus refiflentibus fa£los, confervant diutius.' But, as to
the duration of the Planetary Motion, he exprefll-s himfelf much more ftrongly in
h\& Scholium Generate : ' Corpora omnia in iflis fpatiis liberrime moveri debent ;
' et propterea Planetae et Cometae, in Oibibus fpecie et pofitione datis, fccundum
' leges fupra expofitas perpetuo revolvi.'

332 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

fimpliclty which we obfervc in the works of Nature, where nothing-
is produced by feveral caufes, that can poffibly be produced by one.
Nor is Sir Ifaac's Syftem lefs mechanical, for this amendment, as it
is fuppofed to be, that has been made upon it by his followers : For
it is ftill true, that the Motion of the Planets is carried on by the
Power of Matter and Mechanifra merely ; becaufe the Centripetal
Motion, or Motion of Gravitation, only gives a diredion to the
Motion of the Planet, but does not carry it on.

CHAP.

Chap. TI. ANT I EN T METAPHYSICS. :iii

CHAP. 11.

Comparifon betrvixt the antient and modern Materialijh. — Sir Ifaac's
FirftLaw o/"Motion, the Foundation of all the Mechanical Philofo-
phy of modern Times. — Ought therefore to be mofl carefully exami-
ned.— That this yJxiom /honld not be knoivn to the Antient s^ extra-
ordinary.— To judge of the Truth of it^ belongs to the Firft Philofo-
phy. — Of the Nature o/" Motion; — a thing of conjlant Change and
SuccefTion. — Reft, the oppoftte 0/ Motion. — Improper, to apply the
fame Terms, atid drazv the fame ConcluJionSy concerning Oppofites. —
Other Improprieties of Expreffion by zvhich moving and being mo-
ved, are confounded, and Vis Inertiae applied to Body in a State
©/"Reft and in Motion. — Of the fe'veralWays in ivhich the Motion
can befuppofed to be carried on after the hnpulfe has ceafed. — Thefe
are four. — // is generally underflood by the New'tonians to go on by
Virtue of one of thefe, viz. Impulfe. — ^fo, Sir Ifaac's Term of
Vis Infita, unnecejfary and improper; — not to be underflood of
Mind. — The Firft Law of Motion not a general Propofition, be-
caufe not applicable to Motion begun by Mind — only to Motion be-
gun by Body — nor to all Motion of that kind — only to Pulfion. —
Biflinclion betivixt Pulfion and Trufion. — Two kinds of Trufion
alfo to be difinguifloed. — Similarity betivixt Motion by Mind, and
Motion by Trufion. — ObjecTion, that there can be no Motion by Tru-
fion in Vacuo, anfivercd.^

IN the preceding Chapter, I think I have fliown, that the Ma-
chine which Sir Ifaac has made of the Heavens, fo complicate
and intricate, and which is moft extraordinary, and without ex-
ample.

334 ANT I EN T METAPHYSICS. Book V.

ample in Nature or Art, in this refped, that it continues to be
moved after the imoving power has ceafed to a£t, and goes on of it-
felf, and forever too, without the agency of either Body or Mind,
is a Machine very imperfe£l and defedive, and altogether unworthy
of its Great Author. — But, fuppofe the reader fhould differ from me
in this, and believe that Sir Ifaac's Machine is perfedly well contri-
ved, I would have him ferioufly confider whether a man, who can
behold

Hunc Soktn et Stellas^ et decedentia certis
7'empora monientis Ho RAT.

and can obferve all the wonderful Motions of the Celeftial Bodies,
fo conftant and regular, and yet fo various, and believe them all to
be carried on by mere Matter and Mechanifm, ought to be account-
ed a perfedt Theift, as he does not believe in what I hold to be the
better part of Theifm, that which maintains the Providence of God
over all his works. For my own part, I cannot think that man truly
religious, who has not a fenfe of a prefent Deity in the works of
Nature, as well as in the affairs of men *.

The foundation, not only of Sir Ifaac's Mechanical Syftem of the
Heavens, but of Des Cartes's Mechanical Syftem both of Heaven
and Earth, and, in general, of the whole Mechanical Philofophy,
is Sir Ifaac's Firft Law of Motion, which ought therefore to be
moft fcrupuloufly examined by every genuine Theift, who, though
he may have ever fo great a regard for Sir Ifaac as an Aftronomer
and Geometer, yet, if Sir Ifaac has thought proper, in complai-
fance, as I have faid, to the prejudices of the times, to put his A-
ftronomy upon Pilnciples inconfiftent with the dodlrine of Theifm,
he ought not, for that reafon, to adopt thefe principles, more efpeci-
ally if I can fhow, as I hope I fliall do in the fequel, that Sir Ifaac's
Aftronomy can be fupported without the aid of them.

The

* See further upon this fubjecl, Vol. i p. 498.

Chap. II. A N T 1 E N T METAPHYSICS, 335

The propofitiou is thus exprefled by Sir Ifaac : * Corpus omnc
' perfcvcrat in ftatu fuo quiefcendi vel movendi uniformiter in di-

* redlum, nifi quatenus a yiribus impreffis cogitur (latum ilium mu-
' tare.' The propofition, thus exprefled, I believe, would be hardly
vmderftood by an antient Roman * ; but, to us, who are accuftomcd
to the modern philofophical Latin, very different from that of Ci-
cero, it is intelligible enough, and may be thus rendered into Eng-
lifh : ' All Bodies perfevcre in their fl:ate, whether of Reft, or of

* Motion uniformly in a ftraight line, unlcfs in fo far as, by fome
' force imprefled upon them, they are obliged to change that ftate.'

This propofition, which Sir Ifaac calls an Axiom, and lays down
as the foundation of his whole Syftem, aflerts, that Body, once put in
Motion by the impulfe of another Body, (for fo I underftand the
Axiom, for the reafon given in the preceding Chapter), will con-
tinue always to be moved in a ftraight line till its Motion be flop-
ped, or altered, by fomething foreign or extrinfic to it. And in this
refpeft Reft and Motion are faid by Sir Ifaac to be governed by the
fame law ; for he fays, as the Body continues at Reft till it be mo-
ved by fomething extrinfic to it, fo it alfo continues in Motion till it
be ftopped in the fame way.

And here it muft, at firft fight, appear very extraordinary, that
an Axiom, fuch as this is faid to be, (that is, a Propofition, the truth
of which is immediately acknowledged by every man of common
fenfe, though uninftrudted in any art or fcience), fliould not have
been known to any of the antients. It is, I think, degrading the
antients lower than hitherto they have been degraded by the great-
eft vanity of modern times, to fuppofe that they were ignorant even
of Axioms and Firft Principles. Now that the antients knew no-
thing

• See what I have faid concerning the language of this PropofrtioD, Vol. i.
page 530.

33<3 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

thing of this Axiom, as it is called, the negative argument would be
fufficient to prove. That there is nothing like it to be found in all the
writings, or in any accounts, that we have of the opinions of their
philofophers concerning natural things. But, befides this, there is
pofitive evidence that Ariftotle at lead knew nothing of the matter.
This appears from a paffage above quoted concerning Dreams, and
from another in his book De Naturali Aufcultatione *.

But this propofition, whether true or falfe, is fo far, in my ap-

prehenfion, from being an Axiom, that it is impoffible to judge of

the truth of it, without knowing accurately the nature both of Body

and of Mind, and likewife of Motion ; to know whicTi certainly

does not belong either to Geometry or Mechanics, nor to any other

Science, except the Firfi; Philofophy. And therefore Sir Ifaac, in

beginning his Syftem of Aftronomy with this propofition, has gone

out of the limits of his Science, as much as Euclid would have done,

if he had begun his Elements with the definition of Quantity, of

Body, or of Magnitude. I do not, however, blame Sir Ifaac for

this, as I hold the principles of all fciences to be founded in Meta-

phyfics, or the Firfl Philofophy ; but, on the contrary, I commend

him for laying the foundations of his Science fo deep, and giving

the reader fo much information, which he certainly was not obliged

to give him, — if the propofition be true.

In examining the truth of it, I will begin with confidering the

nature of Motion, which is the fubjedt of it. For this purpofe, I do

not think it is neceflary to have recourfe to Ideas of fo high ab-

flradion, as Poiver and Energy, by which Ariftotle has defined

Motion t ; but it will be fufficient to mention that Quality of it,

,, ,. -T which

'f jf«i 1

• Pages 246. and 251. The other paffage is in his Fourth Book, De Naturali
Ju/cultatitne, parag. 8. From which, and the Commentary of Simplicius upon it,
page 157, it is evident that he had no notion, either of the impulfe, after it had
ceafed, being the Caufe of the Motion of Projediles, or that the Motion continues
forever : The way he accounts for the continuation of it, fo long as it continues, is
from the Prefl"ure of the Air upon the Body in Motion, as I have explained at fome
length, page 246.

f Vol. I. chap. 3.'

Chap. II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. ^^^

which is fo obvious to common fenfe and obfervatlon, and which e-
vcry body muft acknowledge to be effential to it ; I mean Change of
Place, and Succeflive and Continued Change ; for Motion is a thing
of conftant change and fucceffion. The firft change, from Reft tft
Motion, is not more a change than the change from Motion to Reft,
or any of the intermediate changes. It is true, indeed, that the
firft change from Reft to Motion, or the laft from Motion to Reft,
affeds the Senfes more, and therefore is more diftindtly perceived
than the intermediate changes : IJut thefe are not for that the lefs
real. Motion, therefore, is, like TimCj a thing confifting of parts,
which have no co-exiftence. And, in this refpeift, Motion is eflen-
tially different from quantity coutinuous, or magnitude, which is di-
vlfible likewife into parts infinite in number ; but thcfe parts are co-
exifteut-

The very oppofite of Motion is Reft ; for the very definition of
Reft is, that there is no Change of Place : It is, therefore, by its
nature, a permanent and fi.Ked thing.

This being the nature of thefe two things, it muft appear, at firft
fight, very extraordinary that the fame term fliould be applied to
both, and that we (hould hear of ^7?^/^ both of Motion and of Reft.
A State of Reft every body muft underftand, becaufe Reft is, by its
nature and eflence, a fixed and permanent thing : But the State of
a thing, which exifts only by fucceflion, and whofe very nature and
eflence confifts in Change, is, I think, impoffible to be underftood.
We might, with the fame propriety, fpeak of a ftate of Tittle, which
is a Being, as I have faid, of the fame nature with Motion : And,
accordingly, it is the Meafure of Motion, and, again, Motion is the
meafure of Titiie ; which ftiows that they are things perfedly fimi^
lar in their nature, otherwife they could not be a meafure or ftandard
for one another. We are, therefore, not to wonder that there is no
Vol. II. U u fuch

338 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

fuch language to be found in Antient Philofophy ; for a Status Mo-
tus., in Latin, or a xaTao-Touo-if xima-ta?, in Greek, would have beeij
thought, among the Antients, a moft abfurd and nonfenfical expref-
fion. And I am perfuaded that, as inaccurate fpeaking leads to
inaccurate thinking, it has been this inaccuracy of expreffion that
has led the Newtonians to believe that, as there was a ftate of
both Motion and Reft, fo that State was governed by the fame
Law.

If the Newtonians had not confounded two things fo different,
and, indeed, fo oppofite in their natxire, as Reft and Motion, and
had not confidered them both as 3ijiatt, it appears to me impoflible
that they would have fallen into this error, of fuppofmg that
both ftates will continue till they are altered by fomething cx-
trinfic ; for they argue in this way : A Body at Reft continues in
that State, till it is moved to Motion by fomething extrinfic to it ;
and, therefore, a Body in Motion being alfo in a ftate, it continues
in that ftate till it is forced to change it. Now, they ought to have
drawn a quite difl'erent conclufion : For the nature of the two things
being not only different, but diredly oppofite, their qualities will be
alfo oppofite ; fo that, if Reft, by its nature and eftence, conti-
nues till it be changed into Motion by fomething extrinfic, Motion,
being the dired: oppofite of Reft, will not continue in the fame way,
but will ceafe of itfelf. It was in this way the Antients argued con-
cerning oppofite things, and particularly that great mafter of the
Reafoning Art, Ariftotle, who, in his book of Topics, has taught
us, that, if two things be oppofite, oppofite things will follow from
them. Thus, as Health and Sicknefs are oppofite, if Health be a
Good, Sicknefs will be an Evil; if Vice and Virtue be oppofite, and
if the confequence of Vice be Mifery, the confequence of Virtue

will be Happinefs *.

There

* i\riftotle expreflcs this rule of reafoning in his (hort way ihus: E< t» unvrttt e»<«i«-

Chap. 11. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 339

There is another diftindion, of great Importance, which the
Newtonians, as I have elfewhere obferved, do not appear to me to
have accurately made : — It is betwixt fnoving, and being moved ;
for, if they had not confounded thefe two things, according to
the ufe of vulgar and unphilofophical language, they could hare
been at no lofs to make a diftin<3:ion of ftill greater importance,
I mean the di{lin£tion betwixt Mind and Body; for Mind would
have immediately appeared to be that which moves^ and Body
that which is moved. And we fhould have feen at once in
what that Vis Inertiae, which all the Newtonians afcribe to Bo-
dy, but which they do not appear to me to underftand, confifts ;
for the Vis Inertiae is nothing elfe but that perfeft paflivity
and inactivity, which makes Body abfolutely incapable of moving
itfelf, or of exerting any Power of any kind. Of what ufe this ob-
fei'vation is, will appear in the fequel of this argument.

There is another inaccuracy of expreffion in this matter, which it
is proper to obferve, and that is the calling by the name oiVis Iner-
tiae this paflive quality of Body, which, I think, is very improper,
even when applied to it in a ftate of Reft ; for the expreflion un-
doubtedly denotes a Force, or adive Power, by which a thing either
continues or changes its ftate. Now, I deny that Body has any
power of either kind ; and therefore I think it is improper to fay,
that Body continues itfelf in a ftate even of Reft.

But it is ftill more improper, and, indeed, I think, abfurd to fay,
that Body continues itfelF likewife in Motion by its Vis Inertiae. It
fhould have been called by a name very different, viz. Vis Mobilita-
tis ; for it is truly no other, according to the hypothefis of the New-
tonians, than a power of moving itfelf from place to place, and this
forever.

U u ^ Before

340

ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

Before I go farther into this argument, I think it is proper that I
fliould underftand how the Newtonians conceive the Motion to be
continued forever, in confequence of one impulfe. That the im-
pulfe is the Firft Caufe, or Occafion, of the Motion, there is no
doubt. But the queftion is, How it is carried on after the impulfe
has ceafed ? And that can be done, I think, only in one or other of
fourways : For, either the Body niuft carry on the Motion itfelf, and,
by a power eilential to it, as much asExtenfiou or Impenetrability is ;
or, itmuft be carried on by the Impulfe or PiefTure of fome other Bo-
dy, fuch as a Subtile Fluid or Ether, which has been employed to ac-
count for Motion, by fome philofophers both antient and modern ;
or, pio, The Motion goes on by virtue of the Original Impulfe,
without any other Caufe j or, Ai/?/v, It is carried on by Mind, as I
fuppofe.

As to ihcfrjl of thefe ways, I have reafon to believe that even
thofe Newtonians, who, in deference to the authority of Sir Ifaac,
maintain this Eternity of Motion, are unwilling to afcribe it to any
power efTential to the Body, by which it could continue to move it-
felf forever ; for an Eternity of Motion, however begun, by a Power
eflential to Matter, would be giving much too great an advantage to
rhe Materialift, who will deny, as Ariftotle does, that Motion e-
ver had a beginning, and who will fay, that, if Matter can carry
on itfelf in one direction, it can carry itfelf on in every direc-
tion, and, in that way, can do every thing that we fee is done
by Mind and Intelligence *. — Neither do the Newtonians now
maintain, that the Body is carried on by any invifible Fluid or
Ether ; nor does Sir Ifaac appear to have thought of any
fuch thing when he wrote his Piincipia, It remains, therefore,
that, if Mind be not the adive power which carries on the Motion,
according to ray hypothefis, it muft be the third thing I have men-
tioned, viz. the Original Impulfe ; and it is this hypothefis which I
am now to examine, and which I underftand to be generally the
,..;;,' fenfc

• Ste more of this, page 37.

Chap; II. ANTIENT iMETAPHYSICS. 341

fenfe of thofe Newtonians who yet defend this Firft Law of Mo-

tion.

And, if it be fo, I think it is evident that Sir Ifaac has ufed au
improper, as well as an unneceflary, expreffion, when he faid that
the Motion is carried on by a Vis Jnfita^ which certainly leads us to
believe that it is fome power inherent in the Body, which carries it
on. And, as he conftantly diftinguifhes it from the Vis Imprejfa^
by which the Body is fet in Motion, I think it is plain that he be-
lieved the one power not to be intrinfic, or belonging to the nature
of Body, but extrinfic, or from without, as much as the impreflion
of a feal upon wax is, or any preffure or impulfe of one Body upon
another ; whereas the other Power by which the Body continues m
Motion, he confidered as intrinfic, and of the nature and effence of
Body. And this being the cafe, 1 confefs I am a little furprifed that
he has only faid barely, that he did not affirm Gravitation was ef-
fential to Body : Whereas he ought to have affirmed pofitively, as
Mr Cotes does in his Preface to his edition of the Principia, that it
•was an inherent quality of Body, and effential to it. And I am fure, of
the two, it has much better prctenfions to be of the nature and ef-
fence of Body, than what Sir Ifaac calls the Vis Injita : For Gravita-
tion adts always, and is the mod conftant Motion we know here on
earth ; whereas the Vis Injtta ads only occafionally when the Bodf
is impelled by another Body.

I was once much difpofed to believe that Sir Ifaac, by the 7is In-
fita, which carries on the Motion of the Body after the impulfe has
ceafed, meant to denote Mind : But, upon confidering more at-
tentively his definition above mentioned, of this Vis Inftta^ I think it
is evident that he could not have that meaning ; for he makes it to
be a power by which Body continues in Reft, as well as in Motion.
Now, it is evident that it is not by Mind, but by its own nature and

effence.

34* ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

cfTence, that a Body, being at Reft, continues at Reft. And, by the
fame nature and eflence, I am convinced that Sir Ifaac imderftood
Body to continue a Motion once given it by the Vis Tmprejfa : And
therefore I hold that the prefent Newtonians differ from their ma-
tter, when they lay afide the Fis Inftta^ and maintain that the Body
continues the Motion by virtue of the Impulfe^ or the Vis Imprejfa^ only.

Underftanding, therefore, the axiom in the fenfe in which it is
now generally underftood, I proceed to inquire whether it be a ge-
neral propofition, extending to all kind of Motion, however begun,
whether by Body or by Mind. That Sir Ifaac applies it only to Mo-
tion produced by Bodily Impulfe, I think is evident, for the reafons al-
ready given ; and fo far, I think, he is in the right, that it only can be
applied to motion of that kind ; For we have no experience or obferva-
tionthat can carry it to Motion begun by Mind ; but, on the contrary,
our daily experience convinces us that the Motion begun by Mind
continues no longer than the Mind continues to operate, except in cer-
tain cafes, where the a£tion of one Mind prevails over the action of
another, as in the cafe of an Animal Body falling or running down
a fteep defcent ; in which cafe, the elemental Mind, that carries the
Body downward, is too ftrong foi the volition of the Animal that
would flop it.

And this difference, betwixt the Motion by Mirid and the Motion
by Bodily Impulfe, is, I think, clearly deducible from the different
natures of Body and Mind : For Body can only aft upon Body by
its furface ; whereas Mind, having no furface, canrtot poffibly
a6t upon Body in that way, but operates in a manner quite different,
as I have explained above, that is, by Animation, which operates,
not by Impulfe, producing a Motion that continues fome time after
the impulfe ceafes, but by inceffant energies, repeated in every in-
ftant of the Motion, which being difcominued, the Motion ceafes.

It

Chap. II. A N T I E N T M E r A P H Y S I G S. 343

It appears to me, therefore, evident, that this Law of Motion
•will apply only to Motion produced by the a£tion of Body upon
Body. But the queftion is, Whether it will apply to all Motion,
even of that kind ?

In order to determine this qucflion, we muft diftinguilli two ways
in which Body adling upon Body produces Motion. The firft is by
Pulfion, that is, when the Body that ads upon the other propclls it,
fo as to make it go on of itfelf, without the Body propelling it ;
and this way of moTing Body is commonly called Impulfe. For
producing this kind of Motion, it is neceflary that the Body impelled
fhould have a certain degree of elafticity ; for it is by that quality
that it acquires the force which carries it on by itfelf. A Body,
therefore, fuch as nvool^ ^'>'^Jkf^ ^^^y^ "ot being compa<Sted or prefled
together, will not go on in that way, whatever the force or quality
of the Body impelling may be; but it can only be carried on in-
the other way, which I am now to explain, that is, by Trufion.

When a Body is mOT^ed by another in this way, it does not leave
the Body moving, but is carried on along with it ; and in this way,
not only foft unelaftic Bodies, luch as thofe juft now mentioned, are
moved, but alfo elaftic Bodies, if they are not propelled with vio-
lence by the Moving Body, fo as to produce what Sir Ifaac Newton
calls an idus ovjiroke, but are moved only by the preflure of the o-
ther Body.

Again, this Trufion operates upon Body in two feveral ways ;
for, either the Moving Force a£ts upon that part of the Body which'
is oppofite to the direction in which the Body is moved, or it ads
upon the fame fide. In the firfl: cafe, I call it protrujion ; in the o-
ther cafe, it is well known by the common name of draiving or
pulling,

Thefcr

344 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

Thefe being all the difierent ways in which we can conceive
Body to move Body, the queftion is, Whether Sir Ifaac's Firji La-vo
will apply to all thefe feveral kinds of that Motion ; and I fay,
that, as the law is now underflood by the Newtonians in the fenfe
above explained, of the Motion going on by itfelf in confequence
of an impulfe, it will apply only to Motion produced by an /^«/, or
Stroke, or by Pulfion, as I exprefs it, and not to Motion produced
by Preflure or Trufion, whether it be in the way of Protrufion, or
of Drawing, according to the diftindion above made.

If this be fo, the Newtonians muft admit that their Law of Mo-
tion is not univerfal : For, in ihtfrji place, it does not apply, as I
have faid, to Motion by Mind ; neither does it apply to every kind
of Motion produced by Body, and particularly to that kind of Mo-
tion which I call Trufion, by which the Body does not go on by it-
felf, in confequence of any impulfe, but is carried on along with the
Moving Body.

And here we may obferve the fimilarlty betwixt the Motion by
Mind, and the Motion by Body in the way of Trufion ; for both
Motions continue no longer than the Moving Power continues to
a£t : So that here we have a clear inftance, even in the cafe of Mo-
tion produced by Body, of the Motion ceafing in the fame way that
I fay Motion by Mind ceafes, — not by any flop or obftacle, but
merely by the Moving Power ceafing to a£l. For, to fay that Mind
flops the Motion of the Body it moves, is not fpeaking accurately or
phllofophlcally ; we ought only to fay, that the Mind ceafes to move,
and then the Body returns to its natural flate of inertnefs and inac-
tivity, except where the Body, as I have before obferved, is, by the
Elemental Mind overcoming the Animal Mind, carried on, as in the
cafe of a perfon falling or running down a fteep. And, in the fame
manner, when the Body is moved by the PrelTure or Trufion of ano-
ther

Chap. ir. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. -^5

ther Body, the Motion is not flopped by any obftacle or impediment,
but ceafes, merely by the Moving [-"ower ceafing to ad.

Some of the Newtonians, with whom I have converfed, and who
are unwilling to give up this Firft Law of Motion, are very much a-
larmed with this inftance of Motion by Preffure, which, at the fame
time that it explains my notion of Motion by Mind, fhows evidently
that Sir Ifaac's Firft Law is not univerfal, even with refpe«ft to Mo-
tion produced by Body. They endeavour, therefore, to evade it,
by faying, that there can be no Motion by Trufion in "vacuo, but that
all the Motion there muft be by Pulfion ; for they fay, the reafon
why a Body, when only prefled by another Body, does not fly off
and go on by itfelf, is the Refiftence of the Medium.

But to this I anfwer ; i wo. That there is no Space, fo far as we
know, in which there is no Refiftence ; for, in the celeftial regions,
there is light, which, though a very fubtile Body, muft refift in
fome degree, and therefore muft, fooner or later, put an end to the
Motion of the Planets, as I have obferved, if they were moved me-
chanically, as Sir Ifaac fuppofes. 2^0, The only confcquence of the
Refiftence of the Medium is to require a greater force of preffure to
move the Body than would be required in vacuo. But it is impof-
fible, I think, to conceive that a Body which is at reft in vacuo, and
which, by its nature and eftence, is as much difpofed to Reft there as
in plena, could not be put out of that natural ftate of inadivity by a
force fo gentle, as that the Body would not fly off, but continue to be
moved in conta(Sl: with the protruding Body ; or, if it fliould be drawn
gently, and not tugged violently, I cannot conceive that it would
overtake the Body which draws it, or continue in Motion after the
drawing Body has ceafed to move it. And, lajily. What can be an-
fwered to the inftance of unelaftic Bodies ? Will they fay that, in
vacuo, there is no diftindion betwixt elaftic and unelaftic Bodies, or
Vol. n. X X that

346 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

that there an unelaftic Body will fly oflf when it is impelled, as well
as an elaftic Body.

And thus I think I have proved, that this Axiom of Sir Ifaac's,
concerning the Continuation of Motion, is fo far, at leaft, not an A-
xiom, as it is not an univerfal proportion, becaufe it not only does
not apply to Motion produced by Mind, but not even to all Motion
produced by Body, fince I have fhown, that, when the Moving
Body a£ts by Trufion or Preflure, the Body moved does not go on
by itfelf, but the Motion ceafes as foon as the Moving Caufe ceafes
to operate, in the fame manner as the Motion by Mind ceafes.

CHAP.

Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 347

CHAP. III.

The Jtmple State of the ^lejlion. — The Jl range Confequences of this
Axiom. — It cannot be proved by Experiment — muji necejfarily be
proved y a priori, by Metaphyfical Reafoning. — The falfehood of it
proved from three Principles, that cannot be controverted. — Motion
not one, but many, as many as there are Changes of Place. — // /'/
only continuity that makes one o/'many Motions. — (9/" Communi-
cation o/"Motion. — The Neivtonians have erred in this matter from
not confidering tivo things, viz, /^^ Nature o/" Motion, and the Doc-
trine 0/" Firft rt«(i Second Caufes, — The Neivtonians ought not to
be angry that the Metaphyfical Principle, upon ivhich Sir Ifaac
has built his Aflronomy, has been fo freely examined. — Authorities in
fupport of the Author s Opinion. — Jntient Authorities. — Authority
of Ariftotle. — Modern Authorities. — Leibnitz. — Dr Clarke. — Dr
Horfley. — Sir Ifaac himfelf — True Account of the Continuation of
the Motion of a Body impelled is by Mind. — This according to the
Analogy 0/" Nature, as Nature is defined by Ariftotle. — Other Mo-
tions oj the fame kind in Nature, fuch as the Motions of Animals
Vegetables, and the Loadftone and Iron. — The Impulfe not the
Caufe properly of the Motion, but the OccaCion. — Of the Duration
of the Motion by Impulfe. — It decays by degrees. — This likexvife a-
greeable to the Analogy of Nature.

HAVING thus cleared the ground, by removing every thing
that is foreign to the queftion at ifl'ue, I will now proceed to
examine it more clofely. It is, as I have explained it, fimply this.
Whether a Body impelled by another Body, fo as to go on without

X X 2 the

348 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

the Impelling Body, will, in vacuo, continue in Motion for ever,
by virtue of that fingle impuU'e. The Newtonians, who maintain
the affirmative, have not, I am perfuaded, attended to all the confe-
quences of their opinion, otherwife I imagine they would not have
fo readily embraced it : And, particularly, they do not appear to
me to have -confidered that, if they are in the right, a Body muft
continue in Motion to all Eternity, by virtue ofa fingle Impulfe, which
had-ceaicd, we may fuppofe, millions of years before the time in which
the Body ftill continues to be moved; during all which time the Body-
is in Motion, and changes an infinite number of places, without any
power, either of Mind or Body, adling upon it, or any other caufe, ex-
cept the impulfe, which hadceafed long ago. Neither do they appear to
me to have confidered that, tho' it fhould feem that an infinite Power
was neceflTary to produce a Motion of infinite duration ; yet, accor-
ding to this Law of Motion, the flighteft Impulfe given by any Body
liere on earth, ftifficient only to move the other Body out of its
place, will produce a Motion that is to laft forever : And, further,
that, though the velocity of the Motion muft necefl'arily depend up-
on the greater or lefs violence of the impulfe, yet that can have no
effe£t upon the duration of the Motion, which will continue to all
eternity, however gentle the impulfe may be that produced it.

When I confider thefe things, I cannot help faying that I think
this Axiom of Sir Ifaac's is the moft violent paradox that ever was
advanced by any philofopher, much more violent than any of the
paradoxes of the Stoics mentioned by Cicero, and the greateft tri-
umph of philofophy over common fenfe, and the apprehenfion of
the vulgar. If it be true, I could have wifhed that our Sir Ifaac
Newton had had the glory of the difcovery, inftead of adopting it
from the Frenchman Des Cartes, who firft invented it to fupport his
mechanical fyftem of the univerfe.

Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 349

I hope, by this time, the reader is at leaft convinced that this Lav/
of Motion is not an Axiom, or Self-evident Propolition, but a Pro-
pofilion that needs to be proved ; and by how much the more pa-
radoxical it is, fo much the clearer proof it will require. It is im-
poflible, by the nature of things, to prove it by experiment : And yet
the only proof, that is offered of it, is a kind of indirect proof by the
experiment of a pendulum fwinging in an exhaufled receiver, where,
they fay, (and it is no doubt true), that it will fwing much longer than
if it were in the air; from whence they infer, that, if a perfedl -ua'
cuum could be made, it would, continue to vibrate forever. But this
is plainly begging the queftion, unlefs they could prove that the Mo-
tion decreafes and languifhes exa<£tly in proportion to the obftruftioa
of the Medium. But this I hold to be impoflible ; at leaft, no me-
thod of calculation has yet been found out, for difcovering accu-
rately the c^e(X of the different denfrties of mediums upon Bodies ia
Motion. It is not, therefore, by Experimental Philofophy, as it is
called, but by Metaphyfics, or the Fir/l Philofophy, as I have faid
which explains the nature of Body and Motion, that this queftion is
to be determined ; and upon the principles of that philofophy, I fay,
not only that it is not true, but that it is impoflible to be true.

And, for this purpofe, I will aflume only three propofitions, which
I think muft be granted. The firft is, what I have already men-
tioned, and which every Newtonian will readily alfent to. That
Body, by its nature and eflence, is peifedly inadive and inert, and
therefore it cannot move itfelf, but muft be moved by fome other
thing, external or internal. The fecond, alfo, I have already men-
tioned. That Motion has nothing fixed or permanent in its nature,
but its very effence and exiftence is by fucceflion. And the third is,
what hitherto has not been mentioned, but has been acknowledged
by all natural philofophers, antient and modern, That there is a

Caufc

350 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

Caufe for every thing, and that nothing in nature can be produced

without a Caufe.

From thefe principles, I argue thus: As all Motion is by fuccef-
fion, as well as Time is, every Motion, however fmall, muft confift
of fo many Changes of Place, as well as every portion of Time of
fo fnany hours, minutes, or fcconds ; and, if we conceive the
Motion to be infinite in its duration, there muft be an infinite num-
ber of thofe Changes of Place. Now, as Body cannot move itfelf,
that is, make itfelf to change its Place, there muft be fome other
Caufe, external or internal, for thofe feveral Changes. The origi-
nal impulfe may account for the change from the place A, where
the Body is in the beginning of the Motion, to the place B. But
there muft likewife be a Caufe for the Motion from B to C. Now,
this caufe cannot be the original impulfe, which no longer exifts ;
for nothing can be a caufe efficient, actually operating after it has
ceafed to exift. There muft therefore be fome other caufe ; and
this, as it is not the Body itfelf, muft be either fomething external
to it, fuch as an Ether or a Fluid, which I believe is an hypothefis
now univerfally rejedted, or it muft be an internal principle, which
I call Mind.

This appearstG me to be ftridly a demonftration a priori^ and fhould,
I think, convince every Newtonian, if they would confider only two
things. The firft is, That every Motion is truly not one Motion,
though it be faid to be one^ but many Motions ; for it is not only
divifible into parts, but it is atlually divided into parts not co-ex-
iftent but fucceffive ; in which refpedt it differs eftentially from Body,
which is not adually divided, but is only divifible, and into parts
not fucceffive but co-exiftent. It is, however, faid to be one, as
well as Body, not from the co-exiftence of its parts, but from
their continued fucceffion, without ftop or interval ; in the fame
manner as wc fay Time is one^ fuch as a day or an hour, though it

certainly

Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 351

certainly confifl: of parts, into which it is actually divided, and which
cannot poflibly have any co-exiftcnce.

To be convinced that it is only the continuity of the feveral Mo-
tions that makes the Motion one, let us fuppofe any perceptible flop
or interruption of the Motion : Then every one is fenfible of the
divifion of the Motion, which before he did not perceive on account
of the continuity. But the divifion was before as real : For, if the Bo-
dy, after it has been moved from the place A to the place B, is mo-
ved on to the place C, there are there two Motions, as much as if
the Body had flopped at B, and then had proceeded on to C ; for
the number of Motions mufl be the fame, whether there be an in-
terval betwixt the Motions or not ; and, if a Caufe was abfolutely
neceffary for the firft Motion from A to B, it will not be lefs necef-
fary for the fecond Motion, from B to C, whether there be an in^
terval betwixt them or not.

Where there is an interval, every Body will acknowledge that an-
other Caufe is neceffary for the fecond Motion, or a new exertion
of the fame Caufe. But why (hould not that be likewife neceffary,
fuppofe there fhould be no interval ? The Motions are as different
from one another in the one cafe as in the other ; and mufl not dif-
ferent Effe<Sls have different Caufes ?

There cannot, therefore, be any difference betwixt the two cafes,,
except that, in the one cafe, the Caufe of the Motion, or Moving
Power, exerts itfelf continually ; whereas, in the other cafe, it ads
by remitting or interrupted energies.

It may be thought that Motion begets Motion, and, therefore,
that the firfl Motion from A to B is the caufe of the fecond Mo-
tion from B to C. But thofc who fpeak in this way, do not, I

doubt,

^52 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

doubt, well underftand what they fay ; for it is inconceivable how
one Motion fhould generate another, otherwife than by the Body in
Motion Impelling a Body at reft. But, how a Body, becaufe it has
been moved fo far, fhould therefore be moved fo much farther, no
man can conceive.

It is commonly faid, that, when one Body impells another, the
Motion is communicated to the Body that is impelled, fo that the
impulfe is the Caufe of all the Motion that follows. But that is only a
wayof fpeaking, to denote, that what motive Force is imparted to the
Body impelled, is loft to the Body impelling, and, in reality, exprefles
no more, than that the Body impelled goes on with a certain part of
the force of the Body impelling, according to an eftablilhed Law of
Nature, which is perfedlly confiftent with my theory of Mind mo-
ving the Body impelled ; for it would be contrary to the order and
regularity which we obferve in Nature, if that Mind did not move it
according to fome rule or meafure. And what rule more natural
than the force, with which the Body impelling is moved. But, to
fuppofe that one Body, by touching another, (for an impulfe is no-
thing but a more violent contadl:), fliould communicate to the other
Body a power of moving itfelf to all eternity, is a moft abfurd fup-
pofition.

The other thing that I would have the Newtonians confider, is a
very obvious diftindion, which, if rightly made, would, I fhould think,
remove all their difficulties. The diftinftion I mean is, the common
diftindtion betwixt firft and fecond caufes, that is, the remoter and
the nearer or more immediate caufe ; for every thing that is produ-
ced muft have an immediate Caufe operating in its production. This
I have illuftrated in the Appendix to the Firft Volume *, by the ex-
ample of the feeds of plants and animals, which are the remoter
caufes of their movements, though not the immediate. But we need

not

• Page 537- 53?-

Chap. m. A N T 1 E N T METAPHYSICS. 353

fiot go fo far to feek for examples ; for the Motion of every Animal
is a proof of this diftindion. When I move this book upon the table,
my hand is the immediate caufe of the Motion ; but my Mind is the,
remoter caufe. And it is a diftindlion which runs through all Na-
ture, and afcends even to the Great Author of Nature, v?ho is the
Firft Caufe of all the Motions in the Univerfe, and yet he is not the
immediate Caufe of any of them ; at leaft, we are fure not of fome
of them. In the cafe of the Deity, we have an example of the re-
ir.oter and the immediate caufes exifting at the fame time. But this
Is not always the cafe of tilings in generation and corruption ; for
there the remoter eaufe may ceafe to exift, and yet the immediate
caufe ftill operate. It is this that makes the fucceflion of plants and
animals ; for the plant or animal produced continues to live and
move after the parent plant or animal is gone : And it is in this
way that there is a conilant fuccellion of Caufes and Effedts in this
foblunary world. And this diftindlion of Caufes is as well known
in Art as it is in Nature ; for the Mind of the Artift is the firft or
remoter Caufe of the piece, but the Organs of his Body, or Organs
of Art which he employs, are the Immediate Caufes, or the Inftru-
mental Caufes, as they are commonly called. The impulfe, there-
fore, is only the Firft; Caufe of the Motion, or rather the Occafion,.
as we fliall afterwards ftiow, but not the Immediate Caufe. What
that Caufe is I (hall by and by inquire..

It is therefore evident that the Newtonians have erred ih this mat-
ter » f'^t from not underftanding the nature of Motion, and fo con-
fidering eveiry Motion, even Infinite Motions, as one thing, and not
many ; and, fecondly^ from not making the diftin£tion betwixt Firft
and Second Caufes^ and not confidering that there muft be an imme-
diate Caufe for the production of every thing, as well as a remoter
Caufe ; and that, therefore, there muft be an immediate Caufe, or a
Vol. II. Y y Caufe

354 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS, - Book V.

Caufe adually operating iii the produdion of every new Motion, as
Avell as in the produdion of the lirft.

By thefe arguments I hope to convince all the Newtonians, who
are fcholars and philofophers as well as geometricians and me-
chanics ; or, if I fliould not have that good fortune, they will at lead
owe me fome thanks for examining accurately, and, I hope, they
will think, candidly, this principle upon which Sir Ifaac has thought
;proper to rear his fyftem of Aftronomy. And, if they think they
can give a fatisfadtory anfwer to all the arguments I have ufed a-
gainft it, they ought to rejoice that I have given them an opportu-
nity of placing Sir Ifaac's Aftronomy upon a folid foundation of
philofophy, which certainly has not hitherto been done. And, even
thofe Newtonians, who are only mathematicians and learned in
fads of natural hiftory, ought not to be angry that I have applied to
Sir Ifaac's aftronomy the principles of the philofophy of which I am
treating, more efpecially as he has chofen to build his Syftem up-
on a metaphyfical principle, which was certainly not at all necef.
fary ; for hp might have calculated and meafured the Motions of
the Celeftial Bodies, and difcovered the Laws of their Motions, with-
out inquiring into the Caufe af thefe Motions, or laying down fo ge-
neral a propofition concerning the continuation of Motion. If Euclid
had begun his Elements with defining and explaining what Body,
Quantity, and Magnitude, were, and fo had run his Science up into
Metaphyfics, no geometrician, however great his regard for Euclid
might be, could have blamed me, if, in a metaphyfical work, I had
iliown that the metaphyfical principles, laid down by Euclid as the
bafis of his geometry, were not true and folid.

What I have here faid will, I hope, at leaft ferve for an apology
to all the Newtonians, whether fcholars and philofophers, or only
mathematicians. But, as to the pious philofopher, whofe concern is

not

Chap. III. . A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. ^,55

not for the reputation of Sir Ifaac Newton or any particular man,
but for the caufe of Religion and tlie genuine dodrincs of Theifm,
I expedt his thanks and praife, for having fo carefully examined tlie
truth of a propofition, that' certainly gives too much countenance
to Materialifm, to which, it muft be confefTed, that the philofophy
of this age has too great a tendency.?; r.d o-'I li -i

I fliould not, however, have delivered my opinion fo freely upon
the fubjeiSl:, if 1 could only have oppofed, to fo great an authority as-
ihatof Sir Ifaac Newton, my poor opinion. But I have on my fide the
authority of all antiquity ; arid, however mean opinions fome men
may have of the authority of the Antlents in philofophy, it would be
very extraordinary if they were ignorant of an Axiom, and an
Axiom too of lb great importance, concerning the continuation of
Motion in the Univerfe. But, in England, where, to the honour of
the country be it faid, the Greek learning is better preferved than-
any where in Europe, the learned begin to have a better opinion of"
the, Greek philofophy ; and I do not defpair of living to fee the au-
thority of AiiHotle, in matters of philoft)phy, as great in one at leaft
of the Univerfities of England, as it was once all over Europe, and'
as it ftiLl is, according to my informatioq, in the Schools of the
Greek Church. He has laid it down as the bafis of his whole Syftem
of Phyfics, that there is a principle of Motion in all phyfical Bo-
dies, which, as he every where diftinguifhes it from the Matter of
thofe Bodies, can benothing elfe than Mind, not Intellectual or Sen-
fitive or even Vegetable Mind, but, as I have fhoivn,, a Mind of a
different kind, which, as it informs all Unorganized or Elemental
Bodies, I therefore call the Elemental Mind. By this principle, he
underftands that all Bodies are moved^ if their Motions cannot be
accounted for by the agency of other Bodies. In this latter way, he
has endeavoured to account for the continuation of Motion in Bo-
dies impelled *. But, as It is evident that he has failed in that at-

Y y 2 terapt^

• Sec page 336.

35^ A N T ! ?' V T METAPHYSICS. Book V.

tempt, I think he has thereby confirmed the truth of his general
dodlrine of the Caufe of Motion.

Nor am I deftitute of modern authorities, any more than antient.
The firlt I fhall quote is that of Leibnitz, who certainly was a man
of great genius, and, if he had underftood the antient languages
and fhidied the antient philofophy, would have be^n, in my opi-
nion, a very great philofopher. His Monads, as I have fhown from
a paflage of his works that I have quoted *, are nothing elfe but
ASJive Principles, or Principles of Motion, in all Bodies, by which
he accQunts for the Motions in the Univerfe. *

'.^ bltinvv ii ,v/'.oloiirlq ni

My next authority is a greater ftill ; it is that of Dr Clarke, who
was not only a good metaphyfician, but a great fcholar, and aifo
learned in the philofophy of Sir Ifaac Newton. He has declared his
opinion in the cleareft and moft explicit terms, * That all the great

* Motions in the world are caufed by fome Immaterial Poiuer^ not

* having originally imprefled a certain quantity of Motion upon
' Matter, but perpetually and a&ually exerting itfelf every moment,
' in every part of the world.' And, again, he fays, * That the very

* Original Laws of Motion themfelves cannot continue to take place,
' but by fomething fuperior to Matter, continually exerting on it a
' certain force or power, according to fuch certain and determinate
' laws t-'

I have heard it objed:ed to this authority of Dt Clarke, that he J8
only fpeaking of the Motion of Gravitation, not of Projection : But
I think it is impoflible that the Dodor could have expreflcd himfelf
fo inaccurately, as to have faid, that the great Motions of the world,

by

♦ Vol. I. page 233.

+ I have quoted the paflage at large, Vol. I page 23 j.

Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 357

by which he certainly means the Celeftial Motions, were not produ-
ced by any original Force impreflcd upon them, but only by the
continual exertion of Mind, if he had not underftood that the pro-
jcdile or progrefTivc Motion, by which the Planet h carried on, was
not produced by any original imprellcd Force ; for Gravitation docs
no more than dircdt the ProgrcfTive Motion, and binder it from
going on in a flraight line. And, indeed, it is evident to mc, that
he had in his view Sir Ifaac's Firft Law of Motion, though he does
not mention it, (out of regard, it is likely, to Sir Ifaac, with whom
he lived in great friendfhip\ by which the Motion of the Planets,
once begun, was to go on forever, by virtue of the original impulfc,
without any further agency of Mind or Body.

The next authority 1 flxall quote is that of a living author, Dr
Horfley, not a lefs authority, in my opinion, than that of Dr Clarke.
He is well known as a Mathematician ; and he is likewife a fchobr,
and, in my opinion, an excellent philofopher, having fludied the
antient as w^ell as the modern philofophy. He has favoured me
with fome obfervations upon the Firft Volume of my Metaphyfics ;
and, indeed, without the encouragement and the inftru£lion I have
got from him, I believe I ftiould not have perjTifted in my attempt to
revive the Antient Philofophy, nor troubled the world with this Se-
cond Volume of Metaphyfics. Though he muft be fuppofed to be
greatly prejudifed in favour of Sir Ifaac, yet he is fo candid as fairly
to acknowledge, that Sir Ifaac's Firft Law of Motion cannot be de-
fended upon the principles of found philofophy ; and he has furnifti-
cd me with the argument that I have fo much infifted on, from the
nature of Motion, which I will here give in the Doctor's own words,
exprefled with all the clearnefs and brevity of a Geometer. * 1 be-
* lieve, with the Author of the Antient Metaphyfics, that fome ac-
' tive principle is neceflary for the continuance, as well as for the
' beginning of Motion. I know that many Newtonians will riot

' allow

:isS ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

' allow ihis : I believe they are milled, as I myfelf have formerly

* been mifled, by the expreffion, a State of Motion. Motion is a
' Change ; a Continuation of Motion is a further Change ; a fur-
' ther Change is a Repeated Effed: ; a Repeated Effedl requires a
' Repeating Caufe. State implies the contrary of Change ; and

* Motion being Change, a State of Motion is a contradidion in

' terms.'

The lafl authority I fhall mention is that of Sir Ifaac himfelf, in
the Queries fiibjoined to his Optics, where he has faid, in fo many
words, That there are certain adive principles, by which the par-
ticles of Matter are moved, and which are the caufes of Gravitation,
Magnetic and Eledric Attradions, of Fermentation, and the Cohe-
fion of Bodies ; and he further fays, that, by the Vis Tnertiae alone,
which is a mere paflive principle, it is impoffible to account either
for the beginning or the continuation of Motion *. Now, if the

• ■ Vis

on;

* I have given Sir Ifaac's words, Vol. I. page 547. And I will here fubjoin ano-
ther palTage from the fame work, viz his Qiieries, annexed to the fecond edition
of his Optics, page 376. ; where, after having enabliflied that all Bodies are compo-
fed of Primitive Particles, as he calls them, infinitely harder than any Bodies com-
pofcJ of them, fo very hard, as never to wear or break to pieces, by the means of
which /ifrman^'n/ particles, Nature, he fays, is prefervcd, and lalls foiever, amidft
all the various changes of corporeal things, he adds, ' It feems to me farther, that-
' thefe Particles have iror only a Vi^ Inertiae, accompanied with fuch paffive laws
• ! of Motion as naturally refult from thai force, but alfo, that they are moved by
.''certain a£live Principles, fuch as is that of Gravity, and that which caufes Fcr-
' mentation, and the Cohefion of Bodies.' Now, I would defvre to know what
thefe JElive Principles are, by which the Particles of Matter are moved, and by
which, as Sir Ifaac fays, Gravity, Fermentation, and the Cohefion of Bodies, are
produced ? They are certainly different from the Particles tbemfclves, in which
they are inherent. And it is evident, not only fiom this paffagc, and from the o-
iher paiTage I baye quoted in the Fiift Volume, but from every thing that Sir Ifaac

has

Chap. III. ANTIENT M E T A i' H Y S I C S. ;isO

Vis Inertiae of Matter, (fo called, nomine ftgnificantiffimo, as Sir Ifaac
has faid in his Principia), will not account for the continuation of
the Motion of a Body impelled, after the Impulfe has ceafed, there is
an end of the Firfl; Law of Motion ; and the continuance of the Mo-
tion of the Body impelled cannot be accounted for otherwife than
from that principle of adlivity which he fuppofes to be in every par-
ticle of Matter, and which is no other than what I call Mind.

If, therefore, Sir Ifaac has fallen into any error in Metaphyfics in
his Principia, which is a work of a kind altogether different from
Metaphyfics, he may be allowed to corredt himfelf in a later work,
where his profefled purpofe is to inquire concerning the beginning
and continuation of Motion.

Having thus removed the prejudices that would naturally arife in
the Mind of the reader, from the fuppofition of this being a difco-'

very

lias written upon tlie fubjed of Motion, that he did not believe that Matter could.'
move itfelf. Neither do I thinic it is polTible to believe that Sir Ifaac fuppofed thefc
Primitive Particles of Matter to be moved by any other Matter; and, therefore, if
this Moving Principle be not material, it mud neceffarily be immaterial, that is.
Mind. In (hort, I think that Sir Ifaac, in this work, in which alone he has philofo-
phifed concsrning the Origin of Motion, delivers, in very few words, the fum
of my doctrine concerning the Principles of Motion in the Univerfe, and agrees
with me in that part of it which appears the moft paradoxical, viz. that every Body,
organized or unorganized, greater fniall, is animated; (fee Vol. I. page 244.) ; for
tJiis muft be the cafe, if every particle, of which the Body is compofeJ, is acled
upon by Mind, that being the very definition of Animation ; (fee page 47. of this
Volume). And I muft further add, that I think he clearly gives up and retra£ts the
opinion he had formed, concerning the continuation of Motion when he wrote
his Principia : For there he lays it down, that Motion is continued by the ^/j
Inertiae; but here he fays exprefsly, that the particles of matter arc not moved
in confequence of the Vis Inertiae, but by an A£tive Principle. And, indeed, it is
impofTible that a Man, who believes that a Body has an A6live Principle in every
particle of it, can, at the fame time, believe that it will continue in Motion, not
by virtue of that A£live Principle, but by virtue of an Impulfe, which it may have
received fome thoufands of years before.

360

A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS.

Book V.

very of mine, I think that, upon the credit of fuch reafons and
fuch authorities, as I have given, I may venture to deny, with fome
affiirance, that a Body impelled by another Body will go on for-
ever, by virtue of that impulfe, though there fhould be no obftacle
in its way to flop or retard its progrefs. The fadt, however, is cer-
tain, that it will go on for fome time. And, as it goes on in none
of the three ways above mentioned, neither of itfelf, nor by the ac-
tion of any other Body upon it, nor by the impulfe which has ceafed,
it follows of neceflary confequence, that it muft go on in the fourth
way I mentioned, that is, by Mind, the only Moving Power in this
univerfe, either mediately or immediately.

And thus, I think, 1 have accounted for a phaenomenon, which
even Ariftotle has vainly endeavoured to account for by Mechanical
Caufes, when he might have eafily done it upon that hypothefis,
which I have aflumed from him, that there is a principle of Move-
ment, a kind of Life ^ as he calls it, in all phyfical Bodies. And,
likewife. Sir Ifaac Newton has endeavoured to account for it in an
improper manner, when he has afcribed it to a Vis Infitay or power
inherent in the Body,

However wonderful it may appear to a man unacquainted with
the antient philofophy, that a Projedile fhould be immediately and'
direftly moved by Mind, it will not be at all furprifmg, to a man
■who has learned from Ariftotle, that Nature * is a principle of life

• Although I have faid a great deal oi Nature in this and the preceding Volume,
yet, as it is a word fo little underfbood, and which, I will venture to fay, no man
underitands, who has not fludied the antient philofophy, I will put the reader in
miml, that, by Nature, Ariftotle means a Principle of Movement, but without In-
telligence,

Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 361

or movement, in all Bodies, unoiganizcd as well as organized,

and that the Principle which moves Brute Animals is of the fame

Vol. II. Z z kind,

telligence, in all Bodies, whether Animal, Vegetable, or Mineral, or, to exprefs
it in tvvo words, organized or unorganized. Arilloilc's words are, (furH fm m ti i^ai«,

x»i 7a .tijil xvTi>, X.XI Tx ^ur», icxi Tec ttr?iit tu> rufimrtit, iitt yn, nxi uvf, *»i cciip, tmi ■'^'J.

T«t/T« y«{ iirai, xKi T« Ttiovrtc, <Jv9-M, ip«/<i». Lib. 2. De Naturali Aufcultatione, cap. i.
in initio. This principle, which I call by the general name of Mind, diflinguifhing
that fpecies of it which moves the ra iwx» rm mfturtu, or Elemental Bodies, by the
name of the Elemental Mind, though it has no Intelligence in itfelf, yet is diredled,
in all its movements, by Intelligence,, and Intelligence the mod perfect, I mean the
Supreme Intelligence. In this way God and Nature are connected together, and
yet difllnguifhcd from one another. From hence appears the truth of what Ari-
ftotle fays, in the eighth chapter of the fecond book, De Naturali Au/cult. that Na-
ture always afls for fome end or purpofe, of which he gives examples, not in Ani-
mals only, but in Plants ; from whence a man, who has not ftudied the antient
philofophy, and h.is not learned to diflinguifh ailing by Intelligence fiom aUingviith
Intelligence, would be apt to conclude that there is Intelligence in Brutes, and even
in Plants, and likewife in unorganized Bodies which a6l in the fame manner. The
words of Arillotle may be read by any body ; but I will here give the words of his
commentator Simplicius upon that chapter, becaufe his Commentary Is a rare book,
and in the hands but of few even of the learned. They are in the 86th page of

that Commentary; £< ^t t« ?»«« t« a\ty*t,itie }^»ytTfi» nu jthh', i^mru «E«T«t fiiK^tf

iicc T*r» Pioyix*' (I would read ffi4"jx'"t becaufe neither Ariftotle nor his Commenta-
tor is there fpeaking of the Rational Animal, who has undoubtedly Intelligence,)

x«i m?>»ymi r* \hk» ttv, k«< (x*! t« 9«t« a-jtio' (■>•<; •iiTf «T«f/<c T<( vir«X«irlT«< ^i|v«Tf i«
irtitvTit n Ti)^i'i|. Ktci *^tv»t luti «« iKtoti; Tttf pvirit iftK* Tav imcvr»y rariyc; ^vAA«, luct
t* iti^iKU^VM, rg« iec>T«v '(>•»« yoiracc itmi kt (<^<u i'tK» m; rft^nc larit Jio t< ^i (vtw* ttft^i'
IfH/e-j T« rirt^uuTt nr^ithm, ii fit a-«AAil» «;<;! »r{«»»i<«i mj ij »XXriXui T«>(yyi>i«-<«;. AftCf

this, Simplicius goes on, and, having fliown th?.t this principle of movement a£ls in-
animals and plants for a certain purpofe, but without Intelligence, he fliows that
the fame principle operates in the fame way alfo in elemental and unorganized Bo-
dies, according to the dodlrine of Ariftotlc, in the paflage above quoted ; and then
he concludes with thefe words, Mii»-»ri «u> • A^imnxnt ipvnt k*xu kk rut ^vj^tf rut
T« «ri(i r^fi* KicT*yit$fttf»t. So that Simplicius agrees with me, that, according tO'
Ar\&ot[Cf.. Nature is Mind ailing in Body, but without Intelligence But, indee<i,

the

362 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V

kind, though of a different fpecies. This principle in Animals is,
as it is well known, affected and influenced by external objects, and,
in confequence of that influence, produces various movements.
Now, I fay, that, in like manner, this principle of movement in Bo-
dies unorganized, fuch as the proje£tile, being affe£ted by the ac-
tion of the impelling Body upon it, in a manner analogous to the
way in which the Mind of the Animal is affeded by the a£lion of
external objedls upon its Organ of Senfe, carries it on for fome
time, and produces all thofe fucceflive changes of Place, that is,
fo many different Motions, which, as I have fhown, it is impoflible
to account for from the original impulfe : And the only difference
betwixt the two cafes is, that, in the cafe of Animals, the impref-
fion of external objedts operates upon the Mind of the Animal,
and produces the Motions of his Body, through the medium of Ap-
petites and Defires ; whereas, in the cafe of unorganized Bodies,
the imprefl^ion of external objeds operates diredly and immediately
upon the Mind, or Principle of Motion, in them. And in the fame
manner this impreflTion operates upon Bodies organized, fuch as

Vege-

the words above quoted from Ariftotle .-nakes It perfe£lly clear, without the autho-
rity of Simplicius, or of any other commentator. — This is Nature, which, as wc
have feen, comprehends the Brute, but it does not comprehend Man, becaufe he

has Intelligence in himfelf : And thus Nature and Man are diftinguiftied. As

to the diftindlion betwixt Nature and Arty Ariftotle has alfo given it in the above
quoted firft chapter of the fecond book, De Naturali Aufcultatione -, and the
diftinclion is this, That the things of Nature have a Principle of Motion in them-
felves : Whereas the things of Art, confidered as things of Art, have no fuch prin*
ciple, but are all moved from without, either by the Artiftimmediately and directly,
or by fome Power employed by him.

In this w^y, Nature is diftinguiflied from Cod and Alan, as well as from Jrt — di-
ftindtions, I will again repeat it, which are not to be found in any modern book of
philofophy : And yet, how contemptible muft a philofophy appear, that cannot accu-
rately diftinguifli thefe things ! and how contemptible a philofopher that cannot
tell even what he himfelf is !

Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 363.

Vegetables are, which, in this refpeiH:, 'refcmble ex.i£lly Bodies un-
organized ; nor do I know any other difference betwixt tlicin, ex-
cept that the Motion of the Vegetable is more various than that of
Body unorganized.

Thofe who do not believe that the fame Nature^ or Principle of
Animation, in kind, though differing in fpecies, informs unorgani-
zed Bodies as well as the Animal and Vegetable, will not, it is
likely, be convinced by this argument of analogy from Animals and
Vegetables. But I fhould be glad to know what they can anfwer to
the Magnetic, Eledrical, and Chymical Attradlions and Repul-
fions. Thefe Motions are all occafional, as well as the Motion of
the Body impelled. The Iron, for example, does not move towards
the Magnet, nor the Magnet towards the Iron, till they arc brought
within a certain diftance of one another : And it is evident that the
Motion muft be by Mind, as Thales, the moft antient philofopher
of Greece, faid it was, unlefs we will maintain that Body can ei-
ther move it felf, or remain at. reft, as it thinks proper; which I
hold to be downright Atheifm. Here, therefore, we have Mind in
Bodies unorganized, upon certain occafions both beginning and con-
tinuing Motion ; which further Ihows, that, in Nature, there is
truly no difference betwixt^beginning and continuing Motion. And
the two cafes are exaftly parallel, except that we can affign a final
Caufe for the impulfe of one Body producing Motion in another : For,
as there are fo many Bodies on this Earth, juflJing and interfering with
one another, it is evident that neither the bufinefs of Nature nor of
Art could be carried on without one Body impelling and driving
out of its way another ; whereas we do not fo well know the pur-
pofe or end of the Magnetical Motion, though we are very fure that
it is for feme good end.

Zz a And

3'64 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

And there Is a further analogy that, I think, may be obfcrved be-
twixt tlie Motions of Animals, or of fuch Bodies as the Magnet and
Iron, and the Motion of Projediles ; for the impreffion of external
obje«fl;s upon the Organs of Senfe of the Animal cannot properly be
laid to be the Caufc of the Motion of the Animal, but is rather the
Occafion of it ; for it is the Mind in the Animal that is truly the
Caufe of the Motion ; which Caufe operates upon occafion of the
impreffion of external objedts upon the organs of the Animal. In
like manner, the loadftone is not the Caufe of the Motion of the
iron, nor the Iron of the Motion of the loadftone ; for it is impof-
fible to conceive that Bodies can operate upon one another at a di-
ftance, or otherwife than in contadl : But there is a principle of ac-
tivity in the Loadftone and the Iron, which, upon occafion of their
being prefented to one another, at a certain diftance, makes them
move towards one another. And I fay there is the fame principle
in the Body Impelled, which makes it move in a ftraight line, upon
occafion of the impulfe. And there a;re in Nature many other oc-
cafional Motions by which Bodies are moved, not only to one ano-
ther, \)\\X.fvom one another. At the fame time, if any one choofe to
call the impulfe the firft or remoter caufe of the Motion, as I have
hitherto confidered it, I have no objedion ; for, though it be not
the Moving Power, and therefore certainly not the immediate Caufe
of the Motion, yet it is a Caufe, in the moft general fenfe of the
word, being that without which the event, called the efFedt, could
not have happened. But, by whatever name we call it, we ought
carefully to diftlnguilh it from the Motive Principle which carries
on the Body, fince, by not making that diftindion, it appears that
the Newtonians have fallen into the error concerning the Eternity of
Motion produced by Impulfe.

And thus, I think, I have proved, that my hypothefis of Mind
being the Moving Power of the Body impelled, is not afTumed

merely

Chap. in. A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. :i6s

merely for the fake of argument and contradiction to received opi-
nions, but is founded upon fa(^ and obfervation, and the analogy of
other Motions in Nature.^

If it be admitted that the Motion of the Projedile is carried on by
Mind, and not by Body or Bodily Impulfe, I think it is of little
confequence how long that Motion is to laft, concerning which we
are only fure of one thing, that it will laft as long, and no longer,
than the bufinefs of Nature requires : And another thing we may
venture to affirm, that, when it flops, it will not flop at once, but
languilh and decay by degrees ; for there is a progrefs of every thing
in Nature, and particularly of the Movements of Mind in Body.
That this A'lotion is, by its nature, eternal here on earth, if there
were no obftacle in its way, or no power to countcrad it, I cannot
believe. It never can be proved by fad: or experiment j and there-
fore it is not to be believed, unlefs a good reafon could be affigned
why it fhould be fo. For, though I do not admit the argument
from final caufes, againft the exiflence of a thing which is proved by
fad and experience to exifl, I think we may very well argue in that
way againft the fuppofition of a fad which is neither proved nor
probable. As, therefore, in this cafe, no reafon can be given for
the eternity of fuch a Motion ; I think, to fuppofe it, is mere hypo-
thefis. I therefore hold that the Mind which moves the Body im-
pelled does not flop it ; for that would be to fuppofe that it would
otherwife, and by its own nature, continue in Motion; but it exerts
lefs and lefs its Motive Power, till at laft it does not exert at all, and
then the Motion ceafes, like all other Motions produced by Mind.
This Motion, therefore, according to my hypothefis, grows flower
and flower by degrees, till at laft the Body ftands ftill : But the
more violent the impulfe, the longer the Motion continues ; and its
velocity is likewife greater at firft, which no doubt is diminifhed by
the rcfiftence of the Medium, but it is alfo diminiflied by the lefs

exertion

366 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

exertion of Mind. And this hypothefis, I think, is proved hy the
common experiment of a man walking or running againft the wind,
where the velocity of the Motion is conftantly diminifhing, both by
the obftrudion of the Medium, and the languor of the Moving
Power, till, at laft, it will ceafe altogether.

Nor fliould this hypothefis, of the gradual diminution of the Mo-
tion, appear furprifmg to the Newtonians, who now admit that Mind
is the caufe of gravitation ; for, as that Motion is conftantly increa-
fing, there is no reafon why another Motion, produced likewife by
Mind, and in a Body likewife unorganized, fhould not as con-
ftantly decreafe, though in a proportion very different ; for, as I
have faid elfewhere *, the quicker or flower decay of the Motion will
depend upon the greater or lefs violence of the impulfe.

* Vol. I. pages 542. 543.

CHAP.

Chap. IV. A N 1' I £ N T METAPHYSICS. ^Gj

H A P. IV.

An Inquiry concerning the Principle ^Motion o/"/^^ Celeftial Bodies,
not concerning the Laws of their Motions. — 'The ^lejlion Jlatcd
concerning the Eternity of the World. — We can only judge of the
Motions in the Heavens by thofe on Earth. — Thofe can only be pro"
duced in one or other of three IVays. — The firft is by the Body Vo-
ving itfelf. — This Hypothejis exa?nined — -f/joivn that it confounds all
Diftin^ion betnveen Mind and Body, and has a Tendency to donvn-
right Atheifm. — 2d Hypothefis, That Bodies here are moved by 0-
ther Bodies. — This Mo'uement either by Trufion or Impulfe. —
Gravitation not to be accounted for in either of thefe Ways. — Of At-
tradion, and the abufe of that Word. — Of the Motion oj the Tides,
— not to be accoxinted for by Projedlion and Gravitation, nor other-
ivifcy except by Mind. — Of the third Motive Power on Earth,
viz. Mind. — All Animal Motion of this ^zW mediately or imme-
diately.— The manner of Mind moving Body. — The Motions of
Bodies toivards one another mutual.

HAVING fliown, in the preceding Chapter, that Sir Ifaac's
firft Axiom, fo far as concerns Motion, is not; only not a ge-
neral Propofition, fuch as an Axiom ought to be, applicable to all
kinds of Motion, but is not true even of Motiort by Impulfe ; I pro-
ceed now to inquire concerning the Motion of the Celeftial Bodies,
on account of which, it is evident, that Sir Ifaac laid down this firft
Law of Motion. And it is not concerning the Laws of their Motion
that I am to inquire ; for thefe have been inveftigatedand difcovered

with

368 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

with wonderful fagacity by Sir Ifaac Newton, but concerning the
Moving Power or Principle of their Motion, which I would again
defire the reader to obferve, is altogether different from the Laws of
iheir Motions, and belongs to Philofophy, not to Aftronomy.

Whether the Motion of thcfe Bodies be from all eternity, or whe-
ther it has had a beginning, is a queftion that docs not belong to the
fubjecl we are now upon. I have faid fomething of it in the Firft
Volume, and fliall only add here, that the queftion ought to be di-
vided, and it fhould firft be confidered, whether thefe Bodies have
been always moved as they are now ; or, in other words, whether
the fame Syftem of the Heavens, and, in general, of the Material
World, has been from all eternity ? And, 2J0, Whether there ever
was a time when there was no Material World at all, nor any fuch
difplay of the Power, Wifdom, and Goodnefs of God ? As to the
firft of thefe qucftions, there are appearances, both in the Heavens
and Earth, which convince me, that the prefent fyftem of things
neither has been from all eternity, nor will continue to all eternity :
And I am much inclined, as I have elfewhere faid, to the antient o-
pinion, of a -nx^iyyiuTt;^ or renovation of things, that is to happen at
fome time or another ; and, perhaps, the Creation of Mofes is no-
thing elfe but a new Generation or Renovation of that kind. As to
the other queftion, Whether there was ever a time when nothing
exifted in the univerfe but the Deity Himfelf ? it is, perhaps, a que-
' ftion more doubtful ; at leaft, it is a queftion about which the Ari-
ftotelians of later times have differed ; Philoponus maintaining the
one fide of the queftion, and Simphcius the other.

But of this it is not neceflary, nor, indeed, proper, to fay
more at prefent. I therefore proceed to the fubjedl of this Chap-
ter, which is to inquire, How the Motion of the Planets began,
if it had a beginning, and By what Motive Power it is carried

on.

Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 369

on ? And, fo far we have already advanced in this inquiry, as to
have difcovered, that, fuppofing it to have begun by Impulfe of
Body, it could not go- on by that Impulfe merely, without fome
continued agency of either Body or Mind.

As we can have no Idea of the Motions in the Heavens, but from
what we obferve here on earth, fo that our reafoning concerning
thofe Motions muft be all of the analogical kind, I will firfl; try to
difcover by what power the Motions here on earth are begun and
carried on. And 1 am fure the Newtonians will approve much of
this way of reafoning, as it is by the analogy betvt'ixt the Motions
of Projectiles here on Earth, and of the Celeftial Bodies, that Sir
Ifaac has afcertained the Law of the Planetary Motions.

And, in the Jirji place, it is evident that the Bodies here muft ne-
ceflarily be moved in one of two ways ; for, either they muft move
themfelves, or they muft be moved by fomething different from
themfelves. Thofe that are moved in this latter way can only be
moved, either by other Bodies, or by Mind. There are, therefore,
only three ways in which it is poflible, by the nature of things, that
Bodies on this Earth can be moved j for they muft either move
themfelves, or they muft be moved by other Bodies, or, laftly, they
muft be moved by Mind *.

Vol. II. A a a That

* This way of reafoning, by enumeration of all poflible cafes relating to the
thing in queftion, one or other of which muft ncceflarily eicift, is very much ufed
by Ariftotle; and he commonly adds to the enumeration, «•< wa(» t««t« ..^r,
which I think I may add here : And, if it be fhown that none of the cafes can cxift
but one, the conclufion is demonftrative ; and, accordingly, it is a method of rea-
ibuing much ufed by the Mathematicians.

^70 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

That Body does not move itfelf^ I hope I have fufficlently proved
by what I have faid, both in this Volume *, and the preceding f ;
nor fliould I ha\^ here added any thing more on the fubje£t, but
tliat thofe Newtonians, who ftill maintain that Bodies continue in
Motion by a Vis Infita^ that is, a force inherent in them and efTen-
tial to tliert, muft, I think, likewife maintain, that Body can move
itfelf ; it being impoffible to diftinguifii betwixt the beginning and
continuance of Motion. For, as all Motion confifts of many Mo-
tions, every change of Place is a new Motion, which muft have a
beginning, as well as the firft Motion : And, accordingly, in Na-
ture, we fee there is no fuch diftindtion. In Animals, the fame
power that continues the Motion begins it ; and, likewife, in unor-
ganized Bodies, the fame principle of gravitation, that carries on the
Motion of a Body towards the centre, begins it : And, in the Iron,
the fame principle, that continues its Motion towards the loadflone,
begins it : And the fame is true of all the ele<Strical and chymical
Motions. I do not, therefore, at all wonder, that Mr Cotes, who
no doubt believed in the Vis Infita, did alfo believe that Gravitation
was eflcntial to Body f : And, as I have faid, I rather wonder that
Sir Ifaac has faid he did not affirm it to be eflential.

It appears to me that thofe, who make any kind of Motion or
the continuation of Motion to refult from the nature and eflence of
Body, confound altogether Body and Mind, and thereby deftroy
that diftindlion, which, I think, is the foundation, not only of na-
tural philofophy, but of metaphyfics and theology : For, if I can
conceive Body, by its own inherent and innate Power, to move it-
felf fometimes flower and fometimes quicker, and that in a fixed
and determinate ratio to the time of its Motion and the fpace it

moves

• Book I. cliap 6.

t Vol. I. Book II. Chap. 3.

% See his Preface to his Edition of the Piinci/'i<i,

Chap.IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 371

moves through, which is the cafe of the Motion of Gravitation —
and, if I likewife can conceive it to move itfelf at certain times and
upon certain occafions, and not to move itfelf at other times and
upon other occafions, and alfo to move itfelf in different direclions
according to circumftances, which is the cafe of the Motions of
Magnetifm *and Eleftricity, and of the Attiadions and Repulfions
of the fmall particles of matter — and, laftly, if 1 can conceive that
Body may move itfelf towards another Body and incorporate with
that Body, and then, upon another Body prefenting itfelf, which it
likes better, forfaking the firft Body and joining itfelf to the lafl —
if, I fay, all this can be conceived, I afk what diftinction is left be-
twixt Body and Mind ? Muft: I not fay with the Cartefians, that a
Brute has no Mind, any more than thofe particles of matter which
chufe one thing in preference to another, or any more than thofe
other Bodies which move themfelves in fo orderly and regular a
manner? And where can I flop, if I admit that Body can move it-
felf fo conftantly and regularly, and for a certain end and purpofe ?
Muft I not admit, likewife, that all the Motions of the univerfe may-
be performed in the lame manner? And then there is an end of the-
dodtrine of Theifm ; and Atheifm muff fland fecurely on the only
bottom on which it can fland — the power of Matter to move itfelf :
It was upon that bottom, and no other, that the philofophy of
Democritus, Leufippus, Epicurus, and Strato could ftand ; for, as
thofe philofophers denied the exiftence of any Mind in the univerfe,
and gave no other account of the origin or continuation of Motion,
they muft have underftood that Body moves itfelf

And thus, I hope, I have fatisfied the reader, that Body cannot
move itfelf, and, confcquently, that the Power of Motion is not ef-
fential to Body, at leaft, not here on earth ; for it is only concern-
ing the Motions on earth that we are at prefent inquiring. And the
reader will, at the fame time, clearly perceive the dangerous confe-
A a a 2 quences^

3-i ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

quenccs of the perpetuity of Motion, aflerted by Sir Ifaac's firft Axiom,
in confequence of a Vis Inftta in the Body. — And fo much for the
firft of the two ways in which Bodies here on earth can be moved.

I proceed now^ to the fecond hypothefis, which is, That Bodies here
are moved by other Bodies. This muft neccflarily be ip one of two
ways ; either by trufion, or by Impulfe, according to the diftindlion I
have made betwixt thofe two Motions *. I will begin with Trufion.
But it muft be always remembered, that, when I fpeak of Body mo-
ving Body, I mean that the Body is only the immediate Caufe of the
Motion : For, ultimately. Mind is the Author of all Motion in the
univerfe, one Body not being able to move another unlefs it be firft
moved itfelf ; and it cannot be moved, except by Mind, either me-
diately or immediately.

That there is a great deal of Motion here below by Trufion, can-
not be denied. A confidcrable part of the Motion within the Ani-
mal and Vegetable Body, is, I believe, of that kind. But I deny
that the many other Motions, which we obferve on earth, can be
accounted for by any Trufion," or Preflure, of other Bodies upon the
Bodies in Motion: And particularly the Motion of heavy Bodies to-
wards the centre of the earth, cannot be accounted for in that way ;
though that has been attempted by no lefs a man than Sir Ifaac New-
ton, wKo has propofed it as a query. Whether Gravitation might
not be the efFedl of a fluid prefling upon the Body, and urging it
towards the centre ? But this is an hypothefis that, I believe, is now
imiverfally given up by all Newtonians : And, indeed, it appears to
me quite inconceivable, how a fluid, invifible, untangible, and un-
perceived by any fenfe, fliould have neverthelefs fuch prodigious
force, as to prefs down towards the earth Bodies of the greateft

mafs

• Seepage 343.

Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 373

mafs we can fuppofe ; and this fluid to be within another fluid, our
air, and to be conftantly traverfing it, without afietting any of our
fenfcs.

But, befules Gravitation, there are many other Motions upon this
Earth, alfo of Bodies unorganized, fuch as the Motions of Mag-
netlfm, Eledrlcity, and of the fmall particles of Matter obferved
by chymifts, which cannot be accounted for by Fluids, any more
than the Motion of Gravitation: For, as the Motions of thefe
Bodies are only occafional, there muft be both a Creation of a Fluid,
to account for the beginning and continuance of the Motion, and
likewlfe an annihilation of it, to account for the ceffation of it.

As to the Motion of Animals from place to place, I believe there
is no philofopher in Britain that thinks It can be accounted for by

Trufion, or by any Mechanical Caufe whatfoever. And fo much

for this way of Body moving Body by Trufion.

As to the Motion by Impulfe, I hope I have fliown to the reader's
fatisfadion, thatitmufl: be carried on by Mind : So that the onlyque-
flion at prefent is, What Motions here on Earth are begun by Impulfe ?
And, in xhtfrjl place, I think it is evident that Gravitation here on
Earth is not the effedl of any Impulfe, or Original ImprefTion, upon
the Body ; though that opinion alfo has been endeavoured to be de-
fended. It has taken its rife, as I imagine, from the notion of the Pla-
nets being moved originally by Impulfe, and their Motion continued
by virtue of the fame Impulfe. But, even fuppofing the Motion of the
Planets to have been begun and to be carried on in that way, if their
Motion were flopped the fame Impulfe certainly would not be fuf-
ficlent to make them recommence the Motion, but a new one would
be abfolutely necefliary. In the fame manner, when a ftone falls to
the ground, is taken up, and falls again, the fame Original Impulfe

will

374 A NT I EN T METAPHYSICS. Book V.

will furely not account for the renewal of the Motion, after it has
ceafed, hut another Impulfe will be nccefiary, and another as often
as the ftone is taken up and falls again : And, fuppofe all thefe re-
peated Impulfes could be admitted, I afk the fame queftion that I
did with refpedl to Trufion, "What Body can be fuppofed to give an
Impulfe that will make a rock of an hundred tons weight tumble

down from the top of a mountain ? But it is fpending time to na

purpofe, and, I think, abufing the patience of the reader, to ufe more
words to refute what, I think, may be called the Dreams of fick
men ; by which, if they mean any thing, they mean no more than
to get free of Mind, altogether, in the operations of Nature. And,
in converfation with fuch men, I have difcovered that they did not
really believe in fuch Fluids, or Impelling Bodies, but believed that
Body moves itfelf ; for this, as I have faid, is truly the only hypo^-
thefis upon which Materialifm can be defended.

Before I leave Gravitation, it will be proper to obferve, that, as
there is nothing in Nature without rule or meafure, fo the rule of the
Motion of defcending Bodies has been difcovered in modern times ;
and I think it was a very great difcovery. The antients, no doubt,
knew, as well as v/e do, (and, indeed, it is obvious to common ob-
fcrvation), that a Body, in defcending, accelerates its Motion ; but
it was not known, till the time of Galileo, by what rule this accele-
ration was : He firft difcovered that it was as the times of the fall ;
fo that, in a double time, the Body, acquires a double velocity : The
confequence of which is, that the fpace the Body goes through is as
the fquares of the times ; fo that, in a double time, the Body has
gone through a quadruple fpace.

But, though Gravitation be not produced by Impulfe, there are
certainly other Motions on this Earth, both from Nature and Art,
that are fo produced: But, as to fuch natural Motions, as Magnetifm,
Eledricity, and the Attradions and Rcpulfions of the fmall particles

of

Chap. IV. A N T 1 E N T METAPHYSICS. 375

-of Matter, nobody hitherto, as far as I know, has fo much as at-
tempted to account for them from Impulfe.

Tliefc are all the ways in which Bodies can be faid to be moved
by Bodies on this Earth. There is, indeed, another way, that I have
heard mentioned, of Bodies being moved by other Bodies, not in
contadl with ihcm or impelling them, but at a diftance from them.
According to thefe philofophcrs, a Body does not move itfelf, but is
the caufe of Motion in other Bodies, not by impelling them, protru-
ding or drawing them, in the Ordinary way, but by ading upon
them at a diftance from them. This appears to me to be the laft re-
fuge of Atheifm, and of a defperate refolution to believe that there
is nothing elfe in the Univerfe except Body : For, otherwife, I do not
think it is poffible to believe, and I doubt much whether any man
ever really believed, that any thing could adl ivhere it was not,
any more than ivhen it was not ; and yet tliat muft be the be-
lief of thofe who fpeak of Body attradiing Body, or in any ways
operating upon it at a diftance without other Bodies intervening,
if they underftand the meaning of the words they ufe. Some,
I believe, have been inadvertently led into this error, by the im-
proper ufe of the vi^ord Attracllon^ which, in its proper and ety-
mological fignification, denotes one Body drawing another to it ; for,
as I have taken occafion to obferve more than once before, there are
many errors in our modern philofophy, arifingfrom the improper ufe
of words, our modern philofophers not being, for the greater part,
Scholars, and confequcntly not learned in language. But, with refpedt
to this word AttraBion^ though Sir Ifaac ufesit, and, I believe, was
the lirft who applied it to the Motion of Bodies, he has exprefsly
cautioned his readers againft the abufe that might be made of it by
fuppofing that Bodies ad upon one another at a diftance, and has
faid that he meant no more by it than the tendency that Bodies have
to one another.

But

3/6 ANT IK NT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

But Sir Ifaac Iuig elfewhere declared his Mind ftill more e\{)licitly
upon this fubjecl:, and, indeed, as ftrongly as it is poffiblc for words
to exprefs it ; for, in a letter to Dr Bentley, dated 25th February
1692-3, he has ufed thefe words : ' It is inconceivcable that inani-
' mate Brute Matter fhould, without the mediation of fomething
*■ clfe, operate upon and affedt other Matter, without contact, as it
' muft do, if Gravitation, in the fenfe of Epicurus, be eflential and
' inherent in it : And this is one reafon why I defired you would
' not afcribe Innate Gravity to me. That Gravity fliould be innate,
' fo that one Body may act upon another at a diftance, through a
' Vacuum, without the mediation of any thing elfe, is to me fo great
' an abfurdity, that I believe no man, who has a competent faculty
' of thinking, can ever fall into it. Gravity muft be caufed by an
' agent ading conftantly according to certain laws. But whether
' this agent be Material or Immateria.1, I have left to the confidera-
' tlon of my readers *.'

For the fame reafon that thefe philofophers maintain that Body
can attract Body at a diftance, they muft maintain that it can like-
wife repel Body at a diftance, fmce the one is as common a phaeno-
menon, at leaft here on Earth, as the other ; and as all the changes
of corporeal things, and all the various feparations and new aflbcia-
ations, (to ufe the words of Sir Ifaac, above quoted f), are performed
by the particles of Matter either attracting or repelling one another,

the

* The laft words of this paffage I would defire the reader to obferve, as they feem
to roe to indicate the progrefs of Sir Ifaac's opinion concerning the caufe of the Mo-
tion of the Celeftial Bodies. When he wrote his Principia, he feems to have thought
that their Motion was produced by the Impulfe of other Bodies : When he
wrote this Letter to Dr Bentley, he appears to have formed no opinion whe-
ther the Motive Power was Body or Mind : But, when he wrote the Queries
annexed 10 the fecond edition of his Optics, which was fcveral years after the Letter
to Dr Bentley, he determined the matter clearly in favour of Mind.

t Page 358. in the Note.

Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 377

the whole bufmefs of Nature, according to thefe philofophers, is car-
ried on by Attraction and Repulfion, without Mind having any-
thing to do in the matter.

I have cenfured pretty freely the principles which Sir Ifaac has
laid down in the beginning of his Geometrical and Aftronomical
Work, I mean his Prhicipia ; but, when, in his later thoughts upon
the fubjed, and in the only work in which he has philofophifed
concerning the beginning and continuation of Motion, he has re-
traced thefe principles, and laid down others very different, and
perfedly agreeable to the dodrine of genuine Theifm, I muft con-
fefs it raifes my indignation, when I fee the Matcrialifts of this age
endeavouring to fhelter themfelves under the authority of Sir Ifaac,
who has not only declared himfelf, in foftrong terms, againft their no-
tion of Attradtion, (without which, however, I muft do them the juf-
tice to acknowledge, that, I think, it is impoffible that the Mechanical
Motion of the Planets can be accounted for), but has faid firft, nega-
tively, that the Vis Inertiae can no more be the Caufe of the continu-
ance of Motion, than of the beginning of it, and then, pofitively, that
there is a principle of adlivity, which animates every particle of Mat-
ter and carries on all the Motions of the univerfe, and, particularly,
the Motion of Gravitation. Now, I fhould defire to know, In what
words more exprefs he could havefignified his concurrence with that
fundamental propofition of the natural philofophy of Ariftotlc, which
I have endeavoured to maintain ; — That there is a Principle of Life
and Motion in all Phyfical Bodies ?

Before I leave this fubjed of Motion by Body, I cannot help ob-
ferving, that there is one very common Motion that, I do not know,
is accounted for by any Materialift, with the leaft degree of proba-
bility or even poflibility. The Motion I mean is that of the Tides,
or the Elevation of the Sea when the Moon is in a certain pofi-
VoL. II. B b b tion

378 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

tion with refpea to that part of the Sea where the Tide rifes. It
is commonly faid, that it is the Moon which produces this rifmg of
the waters ; and, I believe, moft of our philofophers are fatisfied
with this folution of the phaenomenon. That the Waters do rife up-
on occafion of the Moon being in fuch or fuch a pofition, and
that, therefore, there is a certain fympathy or confent betwixt the
Motions of the Moon and of the Sea, is a fa£l undeniable : But the
queftion is. Whether the Moon be the Efficient Caufe of the E-
levation of the Sea, or by what other power it is produced ? To ac-
count for it in the way the Planetary Motion is accounted for by the
Newtonians, that is, by Projection and Gravitation, by hthers or
Subtile Fluids, or, in fhort, by other Bodies protruding or impelling
the Waters to rife contrary to their natural tendency towards the
centre of the Earth, I hold to be abfolutely impoffible. Neither do
I think that the hypothefis of Attraction, as above explained, if it
could be admitted, abfurd and inconceivable as it is, would explain
the Phaenomenon with the lead degree of probability : For, how
is it poffible to conceive that the Moon, a much lefs Body than the
Earth and at fo great a diftance from it, fhould operate upon the
Waters of the Sea fo much more powerfully than the Earth itfelf
does, upon the furface of which they are, as to overcome the effedt
of their Gravity, which we are fire exifls, and make them rife in
fo extraordinary a manner. Or, if we could fuppofe the Moon to
have fuch an efFeCl upon the Sea, Why has flie not a like effect upon
other Bodies upon the furface of the Earth ? — Why not upon Bodies
lighter than Water, fuch as the Air and Bodies floating in the Air,
which are lighter ftill than the Air ? — Why not upon other Waters,
fuch as the great lakes of America ?— Why not upon the inland feas,
fuch as the Mediterranean ? It being, therefore, abfolutely impoffible
to account for the Tides by any Adtion of Body upon Body either
in contact or at a diftance, one fhould think that a philofopher, who
had not an abhorrence of Mind, or Fneumatophobiaf as Cudworth

calls

Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 379

calls it, that went to a degree of madnefs, like the Hydrophobia of a
dog, mufl be driven to the neceflity of employing Mind, at leaft for
explaining this phaenomenon : And it certainly would be fo, if he
did not believe, not only that Matter could move itfelf, but in the
moft regular and orderly manner ; which, as I have obferved, is a
fundamental principle of all Atheifm.

And this leads me to fpeak of the laft Motive Power I mention-
ed, Mind, by which, I hold, all Motions on Earth are produced, that
cannot be accounted for by the adlion of Body upon Body. Of
this kind, undoubtedly, are the ProgrefHve Motions of Animals, alfo
their inward Motions, by which their animal Oeconomy is carried
on ; for, though many of thefe Motions, as I have faid, may be im-
mediately produced by Trufion, yet, as the Bodies, which move o-
ther Bodies in that way, cannot move them unlefs they be firfl; mo-
ved themfelves, I hold that the Mover of them is Mind, by which
all the operations of Growth and Nutrition are performed, if not
immediately, at leaft mediately. As to the Magnetical, Eledri-
cal, and Chymical Motions, I hold them to be immediately from
Mind.

The manner of Mind operating in Moving Bodies, I have alreadv
fully explained, and (hall not here repeat ; I fhall only fay, that it
is impoflible that any man, who has an Idea of what Mind, or an
immaterial Subftance, is, can imagine that it moves Body by Pul-
fion, or Trufion, or otherwife than by operating upon every par-
ticle of it, that is, in other words, animating it.

1 have only one thing further to obferve concerning the Mo-
tions by Mind, that there is fuch a wonderful Harmony, Confent,
and Sympathy, in all the feveral parts of Nature, that, in every cafe
where Bodies are moved to or frojn one another, the Motion is mu-

B b b 2 tual.

380 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

tual. Thus, as Iron Is moved towards the Loadftone, fo the Loadftone
is moved towards the Iron : And the Newtonians tell us, that, as the
Stone, when it falls, is moved towards the Earth, fo the Earth is moved
towards the Stone. But, as it would be altogether incongruous that
the Earth fhould be moved as fall towards the Stone, as the Stone is
towards the Earth, the degree of the feveral Motions muft depend
upon the mafs and the folid contents of the Bodies.

CHAP.

Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 3»i

HAP. V.

A Conformity betwixt the Motions on Earth and the Motions m the Ce-
leftial Regions. — That Conformity ivill go no farther than the Nature
of things requires,— The Celeftial Bodies not moved by Impulfe of o-
therBo^xci^as the Bodies on Earth are — nor by Trufion. — Thefuppo-
fitions of allfuch Bodies, only fet Mind at a greater diflance. — No
Motion of Body by Body in the Heavens. — The Reafon of the Dif-
ference^ m this refpeS}^ betivixt Heaven and Earth. — So far as the
Motions on Earth are by Mind, there mujl be a Conformity betivixt
them and the Motions of the Heavens. — Some general things in
'which thefe Motions agree. — The ^ejlion concerning the Compofi-
tion of the Motion of the Celeftial Bodies. — This ^ejlion conneSied
ivith the other ^ejlion^ concerning the Firft Law of Motion. — If
that Law be true, the Motion of our Bodies is necejfarily compound-
ed : But, if it be not true, no neceflity for any fuch Compofition. —
Proved from Confcioufnefs, that Mind may move Body in a Curve
Line, ivithout any Compofition of the Motion. — This demonflratcd
likeivife a priori, from the Nature of Motion by Mind. — The ^te~
Jlion examined, Whether the Motion of the ?hncts, though produced
by Mind, may not be compounded ? — General P oft ions concerning
Simple ^Ki/ Compounded Motion. — Simple Motion defied. — Three
/•/W/ 0/ Compounded Motion.— Firft, When the Compofition is by
the A5lion of different Bodies upon the Body in Motion. — Sccundo,
By the hOXon, both of "Rody and Mind upon it. — Tertio, By the

A6tion of tivo or more Minds upon it, in different Directions 77jf

fwofrji kinds of Compofition cannot apply to the Planets. — Thelafl,
therefore, only can be applied. — If the Planets be fo moved, /'/ is a

Motion

38a' ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

Motion tvithout example. — All the Motions, ive knozu, ^7 Mind, ^r^
fimplc and compounded. — Objee'tion, that the Circular or Elliptical
Motion is necejfarily compounded. — Anjiver to this Objeclion. — The
Argument for the Compofition of the Motion 0/ the Planetsyrowz the
Jiippo/ed CovnpoCiuon of the Motion ofProjc^iles^anJiuercd. — One dif-
ference betivixt the tivo Motions /j, that /^f Motion of the Projediles is
begunby Impulfe— M0//0 the Motion o/'r^^? Planets. — Another is^ that
/^(? Planets have not the fame tendency to their Centre, that Projediles
have to the Centre of the Earth. — That the Planets havefuch a
Tendency i not proved by any jufi Argument from Analogy, nor
from Final Caufes. — But even the Motion of the Projeclile not com-
pounded.— This proved from /^^ Nature of the Motion. — ObjeSiion
anfivered^ that the Projedile Motion may be divided. — f the Pro-
jedile Motion be not compounded, neither is the Motion of the
Planets ; but it is a fimple Motion by Mind.

IF the antient faying be true, as I believe it is. That there is a Sym-
pathy of things above with things belov^r*, we cannot doubt but
that there is a Refemblance betwixt the Motions here on Earth and
thofe in Heaven ; nor, indeed, is there any thing more natural, than
that there fhould be a conformity betwixt the Motions of the Bodies
upon this our Planet, and of the Planet itfelf, as well as among the
Planets themfelves. This Conformity, however, will only be where
the nature of the things is the fame ; for, if that be different, and
if the order and oeconomy of the Syftem require that the Motions
of the Planets fhould be different, in any refpedt, from the Motions
of Bodies upon their furface, we may be aflured that it is fo.

And there is one difference that is obvious, namely, that it is ab-
folutely neceflary, that, here on Earth, Bodies fhould be moved by

Impulfc

Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 383

Impulfe of other Bodies ; for, otherwife, neither the Bufinefs of Na-
ture, nor of Art, could go on here below : But no man can figure
to himfelf any neceffity, nor, indeed, any probable reafon, why this
our Planet, or any other of the Planets, fhould have been firft mo-
ved in that way. For, though, if there be any proof or ftrong
probability of a thing exifting, we ought not to argue againft its
exiftence from Final Caufes, and deny its exiftcnce becaufe we can
give no reafon why it fhould be ; yet, if there be no fuch proof of
the exiftence of any thing, and if no reafon whatfoever can be af-
figned why it fhould exift, I think we may fairly conclude that it
does not exift. Now, the fadl: is fo far from being proved, that it is
in the higheft degree improbable, and, I may fay, ImpofTible : For
•who can fuppofe that ever Bodies exifted, of fuch prodigious mafs
and velocity as to give an Impulfe to fuch Bodies as the Planets that
would carry them on with fo extraordinary a velocity ; or, if they
could be fuppofed to have exifted, What is become of them now ?
In fhort, they muft have been created for no other purpofe but to fet
the Planets in Motion, and then annihilated after they had ferved
that purpofe. I do not think, therefore, that any man, who feriouf-
ly confiders the Matter, can believe that the t'lanets were put in Mo-
tion by Bodily Impulfe, if he believes, at the fame time, that there
is fuch a thing as Mind in the Univerfe, and that Mind is the Au-
thor of all Motion.

But, 2do^ I hope I have proved, to the reader's fatisfadion, that,
fuppofe the Motion were begun by Bodily Impulfe, it muft be car-
ried on by Mind ; fo that we have recourfe to Mind at laft, if not
for the beginning of the Motion, at leaft for the continuance of
it.

The only other way, in which Body can move the Planets, is by
Trufion. And in that way it is no doubt poffible that the Planetary

Motion

384 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

Motion might not only have been begun, but carried on ; whereas it
is impoffible that it could be carried on by Pulfion : And, therefore,
I wonder that the Newtonians have not adopted that hypothefis, ra-
ther than the other by which they fuppofe the Planetary Motion to
be carried on by Iinpulfe. But none of them hitherto, as far as I
know, have adopted that opinion : And, if they did, the objedions
againft it would be the fame as againft the hypothefis of Impulfe,
namely, that it would be fuppofmg Bodies in the Celeftial Spaces, of
the exiftence of which there is no proof or probability ; or, if they
did exift, they mull be moved by fome power of wonderful force :
And what elfe can that Power be but Mind ?

For I would have all thofe, who feign fuch hypothefes and fup-
pofe Bodies folid or fluid impelling or protruding the Planets, con-
fider that by thefe devices they only put Mind at a greater diftance,
by interpofmg betwixt it and the Planets thofe imaginary Bodies :
But they never can get free of it altogether, unlefs they can prove
that Body has a Self Motive Power ; and, if it has that, all thofe in-
terpofed Bodies are quite unnecefTary.

From what is faid, it necefl!arily follows, that the Planets are not
moved, as many things on Earth are, by the adtion of Body upon
Body, that is, by Pulfion or Trufion, but immediately and directly
by Mind : And the reafon of the difference betwixt them and the
Bodies upon their furface, at lead upon the furface of this Planet,
appears to me obvious ; for the Motion of the Planets ihemfelves
goes on moft freely in the Celeftial Spaces, as Sir Ifaac expreffes
it *, without interruption from other Bodies ; whereas, upon their

furface,

* Corpora omnia in iftis fpatils liberrime movcri debent ; et propterea, Planetac
et Cometae, in orbibus fpecie et pofitlone datis, fecundum leges fupra expofitas per-
petuo revolvi. Scholium Ceneralc.

Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 385

furface, at Icaft upon the furface of our Earth, there are fo many-
Bodies of different kinds, juflling, as I have faid, and interfering witii
one another, that, if Body did not move Body by Pulfion or Tru-
fion, there wrould be an end of that Motion by which the bufinefs
of Nature is carried on on this Earth.

The Planets, therefore, being all moved by Mind, as very
many Bodies here on Earth are, it is evident that there muft
be a conformity betwixt their Motions and thofe here, fo far, at
leaft, as refpeds the general Laws of the Motion by Mind. And, in
the jirjl place. Mind there cannot, any more than here^ a(fl upon
the fuperficies only of Bodies, as Body ads upon Body, but upon
their inmoft particles ; that is, it muft animate them. 2^0, It muft
adt, as it does here, by inceflant energies, repeated in every inftant
of the Motion, and therefore can move with equal facility in all di-
rections, and can alter the diredion in every inftant of the Motion.
3?/o, We cannot conceive that the Motions of the Planets, being
moved by Minds intelligent or directed by the Supreme Intelli-
gence, can be without rule or meafure. And, lajlly^ As the Univerfe
is a Syftem, the Motion of the Planets muft be governed by general
rules, as well as the Motions here.

But, befides this general agreement betwixt the Motions on
Earth and in Heaven, there is one Motion on Earth, betwixt which
and the Motion of the Planets a wonderful conformity has been
difcovered by Sir Ifaac Newton, and a moft complete fyftem of A-
ftronomy deduced from it. The Motion I mean is the Motion of
Projediles. Of this Motion I will fay a great deal more in the fe-
quel : But, in the mean time, I will inquire concerning the nature
of the Celeftial Motions, and, particularly, whether they be com-
pounded or fimple ; and I will endeavour to fhow that they are
fimple. In this I am afraid I fhall have the misfortune to differ from

Vol. II. C c c all

386 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book V.

all the Newtonians, as, in the other point, concerning the Firft Law
of Motion, I differ from fome of them. It gives me pleafure, how-
ever, to think that this point is not fo intimately connected with the
fyflem of Thcifm, as the other concerning the Eternity of Motion
by Impulfe. I will', however, fhow that there is a great connedion ;
and that, upon the fuppofition of the Planets being moved by Mind
diredly and immediately, it is hardly pofTiblc to fuppofe that their
Motion is compounded.

Several of the Newtonians, with whom I have converfed, think
the compofition of the Motion fo conneded with the Firft Law of
Motion, that, if it be fet afide, the Motion, they think, muft be
fimplc and uncompounded. And, indeed, it aj -pears to me, that Sir
Ifaac has founded the compofition of the Planetary Motion upon
the hypothefis of the Planets being projeded in a flraight line, in
which, he fays, they would hav£ gone on to all eternity, if, by the'
power of Gravitation, their courfe had not been bent into the ellip-
tical curve*. Bat, if I have fucceeded in convincing the reader, that,
even fuppofmg the Planet to have been moved originally by Bodily
Impulfe, it cannot go on except by the power of Mind, there is an
end of that hypothefis ; and the only queftion remaining is. Whether
or not, upon the fuppofition of Mind moving thofe Bodies, It is ab-
folutely neceffary, by the nature of things, that the Motion fhould be
compounded ? Or whether, though not of abfolute necefTity, it be
not, for certain reafons, compounded ?

And, in the Jiiji place, if it were true that Mind moves Body by
Impulfe, as Body moves Body, it might be argued, I think, with
great probability, that, as the Motion is of the fame kind, it is go-
verned by the fame Law ; and that therefore the Body goes on
in a ftraight line, as if it had been impelled by Body. But, as
1 think I have proved, demonftratively, that Mind moves Body in a

manner

* Page 319.

Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 387

manner altogether different, there is an end of that argument. 2do, If
it were true, what the Jcfuit commentators upon Sir Ifaac fay *, that
all Motion is by nature ledilineal, it would follow of neceiliiry con-
fcquence, that the Motion of the Planets, and, indeed, every Motion
in a Curve, muft be necefTarily compounded. And no doubt the
propofition is true, if the Curvilincal Motion be produced by Body :
But, on the other hand, if the Motion be produced by Mind, I fay
there is no fuch necefhty.

As I have fliown that it is only from the confcioufnefs of our own
Motions that we have any idea of Motion by Mindf, I think, in phi-
lofophifing on that kind of Motion, we ought to begin at home, as
Des Carres began his philofophy, when he fct out with that famous
propofition, ' I think ; therefore I am J.' Now, as Des Cartes knew,
by Confcioufnefs, that he thought, fo 1 know, by the fame Confciouf-
nefs, that my Mind moves my Body ; and that, therefore, it is not
moved by any external Caufe, but by an internal principle of Move-
ment.

I fay further, that I know, upon the fame ground of certainty,
that my Mind can not only move my Body in a ftraight line, but in
a curve of any kind. And though I may not be able, in walking to
defcribe a curve, fuch as a circle or an elllpfis, fo perfectly, by rea-
fon of the divifion of my Motion by my limbs, I find that, when
there is no neceffity for the Motion being divided in that way, as
when I defcribe a circle upon the table or in the air with my hand,

C c c 2 the

* See p. 332. t See page 87. 88. 89.

X This propofition has, I know, been treated by fome as a ridiculous tautology.
But, I think, it is a juft conclufion of reafoning, proceeding upon the fureft ground
of certainty, I mean Confc'mtjntfs ; and the argument plainly is this : I know by
Confcioufnefs 'that I think; and from thence I infer that I exift;* becaufe every
thing that ads muft exift : Nor, indeed, du we otherwife know that any thing cs-
ifts.

388 A X T I K N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. Book V.

the Motion is perfcdly fimple, without any centrifugal or centripe-
tal inclination.

Thus far, I argue, from the mod certain of all knowledge, Confci-
oufnefs ; and I proceed further, by the following argument from ana-
logy, which, I think, cannot deceive me — As I am fure that my Body
is not moved by an external caufe, but by an internal principle of
movement ; fo every other Body, whether Animal or Vegetable, or-
ganized or unorganized, is moved in the fame manner, either in a
ftraight line, or a curve, when it is impoffible that any external
caufe of their Motion can be afligned. And this analogy I carry to
the Heavens : For, believing Mind and Body to be the fame there
that they are here, I fay that the Bodies there are moved in the fame
manner, when no external caufe of their Motion can be afligned ;
and, therefore, that the Planets perform their Elliptical Motions by
the operation of Mind, but in a manner more perfedl than Animals
here on Earth can perform them, as not being divided into joints or
limbs, and therefore moving altogether or not at all.

And I think I have given a fatisfadory reafon, why Mind fhould
move Body in a curve, without any divifion of the Motion ; where-
as, it is impoflTible that Body can do fo. And the reafon is, that
Mind moves by inceffant energies, fo that it can vary the direcStion
in every inftant of the Motion : And therefore I think I have pro-
ved my theory, not only from fadt and obfervation, but a priori^
from the nature of Mind, the moving power.

It is, clearly, therefore, not true, what the Jefuit commentators
upon the Principia have laid down as a general propofition, and, in-
deed, as an axiom. That all Motion is, by its nature, redilineal ; for,
if this were true, there could be no fuch thing in Nature as a Circle
or Ellipfis, whether defcribed by Bodily Impulfe, or by Mind, every

fuch

Chap. V. A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. 389

fuch figure being truly no more than a polygon of a great number
of fides.

As, however, it cannot be denied that a polygon, fuch as that into
which Sir Ifaac has analyfed the orbits of the planets, may be defcri-
bed by Mind as well as Bodily Impulfe, fince Mind can move Body
in a ftraight line as well as in a curve, or that, in fome way or o-
ther, the Motion of the planets, though produced by Mind, may be
compounded, I will examine that queftion, and, for that purpofe,
will begin with laying down fome general pofitions concerning
fimple and compounded Motion.

By z fimple Motion^ \ mean a Motion produced by one Moving
Power a£ting conftantly and indefinently, by which the Body is mo-
ved either in a ftraight line or in a curve. If there be feveral Mo-
ving Powers, but all acling in the fame way and in the fame direc-
tion, fo that they only afTift one another, as when feveral perfons
pufh or draw a Body in the fame diredion, I confider thefe powers,
thus co-operating and affifling each other, as but one power. On the
other hand, the Motion is compounded, — Firjl^ when the Motion is
interrupted, fo as not to go on conftantly, but to be diftinguifhed
into parts by perceptible intervals ; — Secondly, When the Motion
does not defcribe one line, whether ftraight or curve, but feveral
lines, fo as to make a figure of feveral fides, like that into which Sir
Ifaac analyfes the Elliptical Motion. Of this kind, according to the
Jefults, all Motion, though apparently in a curve line, muft be. —
Thirdly, When the Body in Motion is adcd upon by two or more
powers moving the Body different ways, fo as not to co-operate but
to counteract one another.

Thefe are all the ways in which, I think, it is pofTible that the
Motion of a Body can be compounded : Let us now confider in which

o£

390

ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

of thefe ways, or whether i'l any of them, the Motion of the Pla-
nets is combined; always remembering that the Motion muft neceffa-
rily be produced and earned on by the immediate agency either of
Mind, or of fome Body diHercnt from the Body in Motion.

In the firft of thefe ways, no one has ever maintained that the
Celeftial Motions are compounded ; for it is certain that they are not
divided into parts, but go on conftantly without interruption. Nei-
ther do I know that it is maintained, or ever was maintained by
any philofopher, that they are actually compounded in the fecond
way, by their Motions being in ftraight lines, and the figure they
defcribe, by confequence, angular ; though it may be maintained that
their curvilineal Motion may be produced by forces adting in ftraight
lines, or that their elliptical orbit may, for the fake of teaching or
demonftration, be analyfed into a polygon of an infinite number of
fides. If, therefore, their Motions be compounded, it muft be in
the third way above mentioned, when the Body in Motion is aded
upon by two or more powers moving the Body in different direc-
tions.

This can be only in one or other of the three following ways.
Fitjly When two or more Bodies are the ading powers ; for it is im-
poffible that the fame Body fhould, at the fame time, move the Body
in different direflions : And, if it were at different times, the Mo-
tion would not be one, but compounded either in the firft or fecond
• way above mentioned ; for the Motion would be diftinguifhed by
intervals of time, or it would be in different lines, and not in the
fame lines. Secondly^ When Body moves the Planet one way, and
Mind another. Or, lajily, When two Minds* move the Planet diffe-
rent ways ; for it is equally impoflible that the fame Mind fhould,
at the fame time, move the Body in different diredions, as that the
fame Body fhould do it.

That

Chap. V. A N T I EN T M E T A P H Y S I C S. 39E

That the iirfl: kind of compofition is not only pofhble, but does
adlually cxift in this Earth, cannot be denied. It is in this way that
a ftone in a fling is moved, which is an example given by Sir Ifaac*.
The ftone is projcdcd by the adion of the hand, and it is retained
from going forward by the firing which the flinger holds in his
hand. It is therefore plainly adled upon by two Bodies in oifTerent
dircdions. And, as the adtion of the hand, always forcing it on,
does, by thefe repeated impulfcs, give it a great progrefl!ivc force,
when the ftring that holds it is let go, it flies to a great diftance.
There is alfo a compounded Motion of the fccond kind, when the
Body is aded upon, partly by Mind and partly by Body. Of this
kind of compofition of Motion we have alfo an example in the cafe
of an Animal which wants to move forward, but, by the adion of
Body upon him, is moved in a curve. Such is the Motion of a
horfe that is lounged^ who would go on in a flralght line, but, by the
adion of a rope upon him, rs drawn into a curve.

Thnt the compofition, if there he any, of the Planetary Mcj—
tion, is not of either of thcfe two kinds, I hope I have con-
vinced my readers, unlcfs we were to fuppofe, in the celeftial
fpaces, Bodies, of the exlftencc of which there is neither proof
nor the leafl: probability. . And, particularly, there is no phi-
lofopher, as far as I know, that has imagined that there is any fuch
thing as a real ftring, by which the planets are drawn into their or-
bits round their centre, like to that by which the horfe or the ftone,
in the examples given, is drawn into a ring. For, though Sir Ifaac has
ufed the example of the ftone in the fling, by way of illuftration of
his dodrine of Projedion and Gravitation, yet, I am perfuaded, he
did not believe that there was any String, or Body of any kind, be-
twixt the Planet and the Centre, by which it is drawn to its centre.
If, therefore, the Planetary Motion is at all compounded, it muft be
fo in the third way I mentioned, that is, by the operation of Mind
only, and not one Mind but two Minds ; one of which carries on

the

• Principiny defin. 5.

592

ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

the planet in a progrefTive Motion, in a ftraight line, and the other
bends it towards its centre.

If the Planets be really moved in this way, it is the only Motion
of the kind that is known in Nature ; for the other compounded
Motions I have mentioned are all combined of Body only, or of
Body and Mind ; but not one to be found that is compounded of
Mind only, though we have daily before our eyes examples of Mo-
tions by Mind : For fuch are our own Motions, and the Motions of
other Animals ; and fuch are the Motions even of unorganized Bo-
dies, Magnetic, and Eledric Attradions and Repulfions, and thofe
of the fmall particles of Matter, which the chymifts exhibit. In all
thefe Motions by Mind, it is not pretended that there is any compo-
fition. It is true, indeed, that thefc Motions are in ftraight lines ;
but, as Mind a£ts by inceffant energies, it can, as I have fhown,
vary the diredtion in every inftant of the Motion : So that it is per-
fectly indifferent to Mind, whether it moves Body in a ftraight line or
in a curve ; whereas Body can only move Body in a ftraight line. Ac-
cordingly, we fee that Mind moves the Body of an Animal in a curve,
with as much facility, and with as little compofition in the Motion,
as in a ftraight line, except that, as I have obferved, the Body being
divided into members, there muft neceflarily be likewife fome divi-
fion of the Motion : Whereas,' the Planets having neither joint nor
limb, and confequently all being moved together, their Motion in a
curve muft be perfe(Slly uniform.

That analogy, therefore, betwixt the Motions on Earth and thofe
in Heaven, by which only we can form any true judgment of the
latter, fails here entirely ; and we muft try whether, upon any other
ground, this ftrange complicated Motion of the Planets can be fup-
ported. If, indeed, it were true, what the Jefuits have advanced,
that, by the nature of Motion, it can only be in a ftraight line, w.e
fould pronounce, with the greateft certainty, that the Planetary

Motion

Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 393

Motion muft neceflarily be combined one way or another. But, I
think, I have fhown very evidently, that this Axiom of theirs can
only apply to Motion produced by Bodily Impulfe, not to Motion
by Mind, of which only we are fpeaking at prefent. We muft,
therefore, feek fome reafon for this ftrange combination of Motion,
other than that it is neceflary for fupporting the Newtonian fyftem of
Aftronomy, which, if it were true, as I hope to fhow it is not, would
certainly not be a good reafon.

And the more extraordinary fuch a compofition of Motion is, the
ftronger the reafons fhould be to fupport it. Indeed, the reafons
ought to be the moft forcible imaginable, to convince any man of
common fenfe, though not a philofopher, that two Minds of the
fame kind, that is, Minds which only move, fhould animate the
fame Body, and that thefe Minds, which, though not intelligent
themfelves, muft be fuppofed to be under the direction of Supreme
Intelligence, fhould a£t againft one another, and fhould both be em-
ployed to perform a Motion that might be performed by one of them.

The only anfwer, that I have ever heard made to this argument, is,
by denying that the Circular or Elliptical Motion can be produced
from one power ; but that the Motion being compounded of two
Motions, one toivards the centre, and the other yrw« it, there muft
necefTarily be two Powers employed to produce thefe two Mo-
tions.

In anfwer to this argument I have faid a good deal, more perhaps
than enough, in the Firft Volume * ; and I fhall now only add here,
that, if the Motion be compounded, the figure defcribed by it muft
alfo neceflarily be compounded. Now, this is a geometrical theorem,
which, if true, could certainly be demonftrated : But it never has
been demonftrated, nor ever will. And, if it fhould, Euclid muft be
in a miftake, who has' defined a circle to be a flam figure^ contained

D d d under

* Appendix, chap. 3. p. 515;.

394 AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

under ^ne line. And, therefore, he has begun his definitions of fi-
gures with the definition of a Circle, as the moft fimple of nil fi-
gures. Now, if the circle be a fimple figure, I think i^ follows of
neceflary confequence, that the Motion, which defcribes it, muft like-
wife be fimple. And, accordingly, Ariftotle every where fpeaks of the
Motion in a circle being as fimple as the Motion in a ftraight line.
The mlftake, I imagine, arifes from confounding the Circular or El-
liptical Motion produced by Body, with the fame Motion produced
by Mind, and not rightly underftanding the nature of Motion by
Mind ; for, if the Circular Motion is produced by Bodily Impulfe, it
is evident that the Motion will be a compounded Motion, as the
figure defcribed by it will not be a fimple figure, contained under one
line, but a figure of many lines, that is, a polygon : But the Mo-
tion by Mind being produced by inceflant energies, does not produce
a figure compofed of different fides ; and, as the figure is uncom-
pofed, fo is the Motion.

• There is another reafon given why the Planetary Motion muft be
compofed, that otherwife the fimilarities, which Sir Ifaac Newton has
difcovered betwixt the Motion of the Planets and of Projedtiles,
could not exift. If this were true, I fhould think the argument
conclufive ; for, if I fee evidence of the exiftence of one thing, and
if it is proved to me that there is another thing which neceffarily
muft exift in confequence of the exiftence of the firft thing, it is to
me proof fufiicient that the other thing muft likewife exift. But,
without entering into this argument at prefent, as I intend to fay
more of it in the fequel, I will proceed to inquire, whether, upon
the fuppofition of the Motion of Projediles being a compounded
Motion, it neceflarily follows, that the Motion of the Planets is
likewife a compounded Motion, and that there is Projedion and
Gravitation in the Heavens, as well as on the Earth. And it will
be faid that this argument from the Projeftile Motion is the ftrong-
er, that, I fay, the Projedik Motion is carried en by Mind, as
well as the Motion of the Planets,

But

Chap. V. ANCIENT METAPHYSICS.

m

But the difference betwixt the two Motions is very great, in thig
refpedt, that the Motion of the projectile is begun by Bodily Im-
pulfe, whereas the Motion of the Planet is begun as well as carried
on by Mind : For, it is impoffible that an Immaterial Subftance,
which has no furface — can neither refifl: nor be refifted — and there-
fore cannot impell or be impelled, {hould begin Motion in that
way. And, not only is this evident from the Nature of the thing,
but from fa6b and experience : For we know, from the moft certain
of all knowledge, that it is not in that way that Mind moves Body,
being confcious that our Minds do not move our Bodies in that
way : And it is only by this Confcioufnefs, as I have elfewhere ob-
ferved *, that we have any idea at all of the Motion of Body by
Mind. If, therefore, there be no impulfe or Projedion of the Celef-
tial Bodies, it will follow, of neceflary confequence, that there is
no Gravitation ; for thefe two muft always go together : So that
the Motion of the Celeftial Bodies will not be compounded of Pro-
jedlion and Gravitation, as the Motion of Projediles is fuppofed to
be.

But, 2do, in order to make out a perfed fimilarity betwixt the
Motion of Projediles and of the Planets, we muft fuppofe that the
Planets, before they were projeded, had that centripetal tendency
which the Projedile has, by which it is carried towards the centre,
with a force increafing, as the fquares of the diftance decreafe.
Now, this is mere hypothcfis, fupported by no fad or experience,
nor, I think, by any juft reafoning from analogy ; for, becaufe
the Bodies on the furface of our Planets have that tendency to the
centre of the Planet, we can never from thence juftly infer, that
the Planet itfelf, or other Planets, have that tendency towards the
fun. The fartheft, I think, that the argument from analogy can
go, is to fuppofe that the Bodies upon the furface of the other Pla-
nets have the fame tendency towards the centre of thofe Planets.
And even this analogical argument is by no means conclufive ; for

D d d 2 the

• Page 56. and 57.

396 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

the Bodies upon thofe Planets may be of natures very different from
the Bodies here, and Laws of Nature may obtain there very diffcr-
•cnt from thofe which obtain here.

Fyrther, this argument, from the Motion of Bodies here, would
have more fhow of reafon, if there was no. other Motion on this our
Earth except Gravitation, But there are feveral other kinds of Mo-
tion here, fuch as that of Fire, which is the diredl oppofite to Gravi-
tation ; for it is not to the centre, hut from the centre : And there
are Bodies, which, fo far from attradling one another, repel one an-
other. Now, what reafon from analogy is there to choofe one of
thefe Motions, more than another, and to fuppofe that our Earth is
moved in that way, with refpedt to the Sun ? I do not know but
the Gentleman at Geneva, who, I am told, is writing a Syftem of
Aftronomy upon the principles of Rcpulfion, inftcad of Attradion,
proceeds upon as probable grounds.

And here I think the argument from Final Caufes may be very well
urged againfi: this hypothefis. This way of arguing, as I have elfe-
where obferved, is not to be admitted againft fad;s, which are either
certain, or very probable. But, when a fadt is laid down, that is
neither one nor other, I think we are entitled to deny it, unlefs the
perfon who avers It can affign fome good reafon why it fhould be.
In the cafe of Projediles, the reafon is evident why all Bodies here
on earth fhould have that tendency : For, otherwife, neither the bu-
fmefs of Nature nor of Art could be carried on; and the whole order
and oeconomy of things below mufl: be altered. Whereas, no reafon,
•which I can think of, can be devifed, for the Planets having that ten-
dency towards the Sun, If, indeed, it could be fhown that, without
fuch tendency, they could not defcribe their Elliptical Orbits round
the Sun, that would be a reafon unanfwerable. But, I hope I have
clearly Ihown that not to be the cafe ; And, if fo, the only confe-

quence,

Chap. V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS.

397

quence, of fuppofing fuch a tendency in the Planets, would be to
make their Motions in their Orbits as violent, and as contrary to
their natural tendency, as the Motion of a cannon bullet. This is
fo ftrange an hypothefis, that it certainly ought not to be adopted
merely for the fake of fupporting a fyftem, efpecially if it can be
£hown that the fyftem may otherwife be fupported.

But, lajlly^ there is nothing in the nature of things to hinder
the Motion, even of the Projedile, to be without any fuch tenden-
cy : For we can very well conceive fuch a figure, as that of the Para-
bola, to be defcribed by the Mind which animates an unorganized
Body, as well as by the Mind which animates the Animal, without
any tendency to a centre ; for the fame reafon that we can con-
ceive the circular or elliptical Motion to be fo defcribed. And, if
the Motion can be fo fimple, there is good reafon to fuppofe that
it is fo ; becaufe I hold that, as nothing neccflary is wanting in Na-
ture, fo there is nothing redundant or fuperfluous.

And here I muft beg the attention of the reader : For, if I
am right in this argument, it puts an end at once to the no-
tion of Projedlion and Gravitation ; becaufe there is no Newto-
nian that win maintain that the Motion of the Planets is compofed
of thcfe two, if the Motion of the Projedile be altogether fimple ;
for it is, as I have faid, from the analogy betwixt the Motion of Pro-
jediles and the Motion of the Planets, that the Newtonians have
eoncluded the one to be compounded as well as the other.

The proof of the fimplicity of the Motion of Projectiles arifes fronx
the nature of the Motion, and therefore is a iproof a priori. This
Motion, as I have fliown, is carried on by Mind, upon occafion
of an impulfe being given to the Body projeded. Now, I argue
in the fame way againft this Motion being compounded, as I
have argued againft the compounded Motion of the Planet ; for I

lav

398 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

fay that the fame Projedile cannot be fuppofed to be animated by
two Minds moving it different ways, a Centrifugal and a Centripetal
Mind ; for, befides the ftrangenefs and oddity of the fuppofition, that
would be to fuppofe what would be altogether fuperfiuous and un-
neceflary, of which there is nothing in Nature. Now, if there be
but one Mind or Moving Power, it is impoffible, by the nature of
things, that one Power can at the fame time move the Body in dif-
ferent, and, indeed, oppofite diredions, that is, from the centre, and
to the centre.

It may be objeded, that, if the Motion of the Projedtile be flop-
ped by a perpendicular Plain oppofed to it, it will fall down ; or, if
by a Horizontal Plain, it will go on for fome time upon that Plain :
Which fhows that the Motion is adlually compounded, fince it can
be fo analyfed.

But my anfwer is, that the Mind, or moving Principle, in the Bo-
dy, is not confined to one way of moving, but can perform feveral
Motions occafionally. Nor is this fingular ; for, in other Bodies,
the fame Mind both attrads and repels, that is, moves the Body /<?-.
•wards another Body, or from it ; and fometimes it faftens upon one
Body, and at other times lets it go, and incorporates with another
in preference to the former, as in the cafe of what is called Elec-
tive Attradion. In the fame manner, the Mind in the Projeftile
moves the Body downward towards the Centre : And this is its
common Motion, and the moft conftant and regular Motion in Na-
ture, and for a reafon very obvious, becaufe, without fueh a Motion,
the bufinefs of Nature on this Earth could not go on. But, occafionally,
it performs, like other Bodies, a different Motion ; and, particularly,
upon occafion of a ftroke or pulfation from another Body, it goes on
in a progreffive Motion, for a certain time, which we know to be
likewife neceflary for carrying on the bufinefs, both of Nature and
Arl here below. This Progreflivc Motion defcribes a curve line,

which

V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 399

which the Mathematicians call a Parabola ; for, unlefs the Body
moved by the Impulfe was to go forward forever, without returning
to the Earth again, the order and regularity, which we obferve in Na-
ture, requires that it fhould defcribe a curve of a regular kind, whofe
properties can be inveftigated and demonftrated : And, according-
ly, fuch is that fedion of the Cone we call a Parabola. But if, in
defcribing this figure, it be flopped or interrupted, it is moft natu-
ral that it fhould refume its natural and ordinary Motion of De-
fcent ; or, if the Progreffive Motion be not quite flopped, but only
intercepted and the diredion of it altered by a horizontal plane,
that it fliould go on in the diredion of that plane, by virtue of the
Progreflive Motion which it receives from the impulfe. In like
manner, the Mind in the Iron or the Loadflone, which moves them
toward one another, if either be removed from the other, the fame
Mind will carry the Loadflone or Iron downward in its natural de-
fcent.

And thus, I think, I liave proved, that even the Motion of a Pro-
jedile is not a compounded Votion : And, if fo, every Newtonian
will, I believe, allow, that neither is the Motion of the Planets
compounded, upon the fuppofitlon that this Motion is produced en-
tirely by Mind ; for, if it be produced by Body only, or both by
Mind and Body moving the Body in different diredions, it is evi-
dent that it mufl be mixed ; whereas, upon the hypothefis of ihofc
who are not demi-fpirltuallfls, to ufe an exprefTion of Dr Prieflley but
maintain that Mind is the only Moving Power in the Solar Syftcm,
it follows, of neceflary confequenee, that the Motion of the Pla-
nets is altogether by the agency of Mind, in the fame manner as the
Motion of Animals is here on Earth ; with this difference only, that
the Circular or Elliptical Motion is more peifedly perfoxmed by the
Planets, as having no organs or members of tlicir Body, and

bein^

400 AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

being moved all at once, than it can be by any animal who has
joints and limbs.

The Newtonians, who infifl: fo much upon the analogy of falling
Bodies here on Earth, will, no doubt, afk me to what diftance I fup-
pofe that this tendency of heavy Bodies towards the centre of the
Earth may reach ; and, if I cannot afcertain that diftance, they will
fay it may go to the Moon, or beyond it. *

v-'i. ^:r\ /,■

But my anfvver is, tliat I know not fo much of the fecrets of Di-
vine Wifdom, as to know, with any certainty, how far this tendency
of Bodies to our Earth, or Attraction, as it is commonly called,
does extend. But this I know, with great certainty, that we have
no experiment or obfervation, which can prove that it extends be-
yond our atmofphere ; and, indeed, I fhould think it highly probablci
that, as the region of our Planet extends no farther, the tendency
of other Bodies to it fhould go no further likewife. If, indeed,
the Newtonians could fhow by any other example in Nature, that,
where there is an attradion, or tendency of one Body to another, it
does not ceafe at any given diftance, I fhould think there would be
a good deal of weight in their argument from analogy. But the di-
redl contrary is the fa£t ; for we know Bodies that have a mutual
tendency to one another at a certain diftance, but have no fuch ten-
dency when they are further removed from one another. This is
the cafe of the Magneiical and Eledlrical Attradions, and all the At-
tractions of the fmall particles of Matter. Thofe, therefore, who
maintain that the Attraction betwixt Bodies takes place at any di-
ftance, how great foever, are not only not fupported by any faCt or
experience, but argue direCtly contrary to it.

Thus, I think, I have proved, that the Motion of the Planets is
both begun and carried on by Mind : Nor will any one be furpri-

fed

Chap.V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 401

fed that it fliould be fo, who has read what I have written on the
fubjedl of the Motions here on earth, but, on the contrary, would
be very much furprifed were it otherwife, efpecially if he beUeve
that there is a fyftem in Nature, — that Mind is the governing Power
in that Syftem, — and that things below have a refemblance to things
above. That the Motion of animals on Earth is by mind, no body
can doubt, who believes that Mind exifts any where. And, for the
fame reafon that he beUeves the Animal Motion to proceed from
Mind, he muft believe the Motion of the Vegetable to be from
the fame caufe, and that the Vegetable truly is what it has been al-
ways called by the philofophers of antiquity, an Animated Suh-
fuince. And, as to unorganized Bodies, that moft remarkable Mo-
tion here on Earth, I mean the Tides in the Sea, is, I think, of it-
felf, fufficient to convince any reafonable Man, that even unorgani-
zed or Brute Matter is moved by Mind, As to this Motion, I have
obferved *, that there is a confent or fympathy betwixt it and the Mo-
tion of the Moon, from which fome readers may poffibly infer, that
the one is produced by the other. If it were fo, it would not, I think,
be eafy to determine which produced which, and whether the Moon
was the caufe of the Motion of the Sea, or the Sea the caufe of the
Motion of the Moon ; but my meaning is, that neither is the caufe
of the Motion of the other, but that there is a mutual confent or
agreement betwixt their Motions, proceeding immediately from a
caufe inherent in each of them, but ultimately from a caufe much
fuperior to either of them. I cannot explain this better, than by the
example of a batallion of foldiers performing their exercifc. There
is a confent, or fympathy, betwixt the Motions of each individual in
the batallion ; but the Motion of not one of them is produced by
another : Nor is there one common principle of Motion for them all ;
but each is moved by a Motive Principle peculiar to himfelf ; and
Vol. II. E e e this

* Page 377.

4oa ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookV.

this principle is the immediate Caufe of the Motion of each of them.
But the remoter caufe, and what produces that confcnt and harmony
in their Motions, fo pleafant to the beholder, is the command of the
officer. In like manner, the mind, in every Animal, and, in general,
in every Body organized or unorganized, is the immediate Caufe of
the Motion of that Body. But what makes the confent or fympathy of
the Motions of Bodies, as when they are moved towards one another
or from one another, (which Motions are commonly known by the
names of Attra£lIon and Repulfion,) is a higher principle. In man
it is Intelle£t, which always ads for fome reafon or another, as in
the cafe of the foldiers, who adjuft their Motions to one another,
either for fear of punilhment, if they do otherwife, or from a con-
vidlion that fucli regular or orderly Motions will be very ufeful in
the day of battle. But the principle, which produces the confent
that we obferve in the Motions of Brute Animals, of Vegetables,
and of unorganized Bodies, is a principle infinitely higher than the
Human Intelledt, even the Divine Intelledl itfelf, which produces,
for the befl of reafons, that wonderful confent and harmony which,
we obferve, runs through the whole univerfe, as far as we can com-
prehend it, making the feveral Minds which animate the Brute, the
Vegetable, and the unorganized Body, to correfpond in their Mo-
tions with one another, but without confcioufnefs, or the knowledge
of the ends for which they a£l, fuch as is in Man. And here we may
fee plainly exemplified the diftindion which I have made above,
betwixt God, Nature, and Man ; God being that Supreme Intelli-
gence which direds the Moving Principle of the Brute Animal,
the Vegetable, and the unorganized Body — Nature being a general
name for all thofe Principles, — and Man^ confidered as Man, and not
as a mere Animal, being fomething intermediate betwixt God and
Nature : For he is fuperior to Nature in one refpedt, as he ha^ Intel-
ligence in himfelf ; but it is an Intelligence inferior by degrees infi-
nite to the Supreme. By this Intelligence, however, he directs his

own

Chap.V. ANTTENT METAPHYSICS. 403

one Motions, and the Motions of many other Beings on this Earth.
And it is for this reafon that he is faid to participate of Divinitr,
and to be in fome fenfe the God of this lower world. And by this
exercife of his Intelled in the government of his own Animal Na-
ture, and other Natures here below, we are to underftand that he
may fit himfelf for a nearer approach to Divinity in another State;
for whicli purpofe, when he firft came into this ftate, dominion
was given to him over the F'ifi of the Sea,, and over the Fowl of
the Air, and over every living thing that movcth ?ipon the Earth, —
See what I have further faid upon the diftindion betwixt God, Na-
ture, and Man, in a Note upon page 360. where I have made a
diftindlon which, I am afraid, will not be underftood by thofe who
have not fludied the Antient Philofophy, betwixt aElitig with Intelli-
gence and by Intelligence: But it may be thus explained by the ac-
tions of men themfelves. A Man, being direded by another Man
of fuperior undcrflanding, may perform many things without know-
ing for what end they are intended, and, confequently, without
knowing that what he does is the necefl'ary means for attaining that
end. Such a man ads by Intelligence, while the man who direds
ads with Intelligence. Now, it is precifely in this way that the
Minds which animate the Brute, the Vegetable, and the unorganized
'ody, ad under the diredion of the Supreme Intelligence*.

3ut, though I have faid that God direds the Motions of the A-
ni"\l. Vegetable, and unorganized Body, but that Man direds his
ownMotions, I ,muft not be underftood tq mean that the Supreme
Being or Inferior Intelligences under him, .do not influence our ac-
tions. This, I think, I have fufficiently explained in the Firft Vo-
lume y, where I hope I have fhown, to the convidion of the read-
er, that 'lis may be done in perfed confiftence with the freedom of

E e e 2 the

* See wha( have furtlier faid upon this fubjeft, Vol. I. p. 216.
t Page iqttjtqueni.

404 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookV.

the Human Will : And it is in this way chiefly that Providence
direds the afFairs of men*.

* The Antients believed that every man had a Genius, or attendant Spirit, that
accompanied him through life, whom Horace calls the ' Naturae Deus Humanae,'
and Menander the Poet has defcribcd in the following lines :

Clem. Alexandrin. Strom. Lib. 5.

One thing, I think, is certain, that many things come into our Minds, when wc
are awake, as well as when we are aflecp, and fome of them of the greatefl import-
ance to us, that cannot be accounted for from any connexion of ideas, and which,
therefore, I hold not to be the production of our ov/n Minds, but the fuggeftion of
other Minds,

Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 405

CHAP. VI.

Proved in the preceding Chapters^ that Mind is the oidy Catife ^Motiori
in the Heavens. — Mind very properly typified by Fire. — Proved alfo^-
that the Motion of the Celejlial Bodies is not compounded but
fimple. — The Purpofe of this Chapter tofjow that Sir Ilaac'j- Syficm
of Aftronomy can be fupported ivithout arbitrary or impoffible Sup-
pofitions. — Prejudice removed that may arife from the Author s not
being learned in Geometry or Mechanics. — No inferior Science demon-
firatcs its own Principles. — Thefe to be found only in Metaphyfics,
or the Firft Philofophy. — EuclidV Geometry an Example of this. —
The fame is true of Sir Ilaac NewtonV Aflronomy. — The- Laws of
the Planetary Motion difcovered by Sir Ifaac Newton. — Before him
Aflronomy no Science, but only a ColleElion of Fads. — A curious
Fa£i difcovered by Kepler, concerning the Proportions betivixt the Pe-
riods and Diftances of the Planets. — This he knew only as a Fact ;
but Sir Ifaac has made a Science of it. — No Science of ajiy things if
an effential Property be not hio%vn^from which all its other Proper-
ties can be deduced. — The Nature and EJfence of every Motion con'
fi/ls of two things^ the Motive Force and the Dire(fl:ion. — The Di-
redtion of the Planetary Motion is a FaH that is knozvn. — Nothing
can be difcovered of the Planetary Motion, or of any thing in Nature, .
except from FaiSs. — The Bufinefs of Afronomy is not to inquire into
the Caufe of the Planetary Motion, . but to calculate that Motion,
and to difcover its Laws. — This the Notion ivhich Sir Ifaac bimfelf

had of this Science DifincJion betwixt Metaphyfics, Phyfics, and

Aftronomy. — Forces or Powers are latent things, to be difcovered
only by tb/ir Eflfe^^s. — The Ejfc^ of a Moving Force is Velocity.

—That.

4c6 A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S IC &. ■ feook V.

That fiot abfolide^ but relative to two things. Time and Space — Jf
the Motion be equable in a Straight Line, and the Time of it be

■ kiiGivn, the Law of the Motion /j obvious. — But if the Amotion be in a
Curve and not equable, though the 'Time be known, the Law of
the Motion not eafy to be difcovered. — The Force mujl be eftimated
by a Motion in a Straight Line, one or more. — But hoxv apply Mo-
tion in a Straight Line to a Curve ? — This tmpoffikle to be done, if no
Straight Line could be difcovered neceffarily refulting from the Na-
ture of the Motion. — Butfuch a Straight Line has been obfcrved in
the DefccJit of the Planet from its Tangent. — This Line obferved
IV! th refpcEl to the Moons Dcfcent from her Tangent. — The Length
of this Line known : — The fame as if the Moon had defended direSlly

from the Tangential Point. — The Law of this Motion of Defcent
wotdd be known, if the Motion was equable — but the Motion is un-
equable.—-i^jr difcovering the Law of this unequable Motion, ;v-
courfc nufl be had to a ftmilar Motion oji Earth, the Motion of the
Projectile. — The Law of the Defcent of the Projected Body afcer-
tained, firf by GalileoV Difcoveries, and then by Sir li'aacV. — Sir
Kaacfr/l difcovered that the Defcent of falling Bodies was both be-
gun and accelerated in the Ratio of the Diftunce from the Centre
invcrfely. — This could not have been difcovered by Padi; and Obfer-
vation here on Earth, but it was itferred from the Defcent of the
Moon. — The Theory of Gravitation in this Way generalised by vyix
Ilaac, and its Law difcovered. — How the Theory of Gravitation,
thus made general, is to be applied to the Planets. — The Motion of the
V\z.\\Q\.^ fuppcfcd by Sir Ifaac to be compounded, as he fuppofed that of
Proje£liles to be, — The two Motions are, the one in the Line o/'Pro-
jedion, the other in the Line of Gravitation. — The Motion of the
Planets not adlnally combined, but only fuppofed to be fo for the fake
of Dcmonf ration. — Afimple uncompounded Motion of the Planets is,
by its Nature, poj/ible. — Iff, all the Properties of the Motion are

from thence deducible, though we may not be able to make the Deduc-
6 tion.'—

Chap. VI. ANTIE^^IT METAPHYSICS. 407

tion — Better to acknowledge our Ignorance than make Jlrange and
improbable Suppofitions. — Our Ignorance viujl be acknowledged in ma-
ny other things, of which -we can wake no Syjlcm. — But Sir Ifaac
has made a Syjlem of AJironomy. — This Syjicm to be fupported with-
out-the a&ual Compofition of lue Planetary Motion. — The HyprAhefts
offuch a Compofition f efficient. — This Hypothefis mofl natural. — // w
according to the Method of Science, and particularly accordiw^ to
EuclidV Method.— If the Hypothefts of a Centripetal Force be ad-
mitted, the Hypothefis of a Projedtlle Force /// the Line of the Tan-
gont, abfolntely neceffary. — The neceffary ConnecSlion betwixt thcfe
two Afotions, and their Dependency upon one another. — The one
being given, therefore the other is given. — The Moving Force ///
the Line of ProjeBion isfjewn to have a relation to the Di/lanct'

from the Centre, as well as the Centripetal Motion What that

Relation is. — The DeduBion from any Hypothefis, if that Hypothefis
be granted, as certain from the Reality. — Example of the like De-
duction from an Hypothefis notfo obvious and natural, in the Cafe of
the Compofition of Motion. — From that Example the Argument of
the Newtonians anfwered, that the fame EfFedt mufl be always pro-
duced by the fame Caufe.

IN the preceding Chapters, I hope I have proved, to the fatisfac-
tion of my readers, that the Planets are moved by an internal
Principle, which, being immaterial, I call Mind. By this principle
very many Motions are begun and carried on in this our earth :
though there be alio many other Motions here, which are carried on
by the inipulfc or preflure of Body : But this, I think I have fhown,
is of abfolute necelTity where there are fo many Bodies juftling and
interfering with one another, but cannot take place in the Celeftial
Regions, where, as Sir Ifaac has faid. Corpora liberrime moventur ;
fo that there the only moving Principle mufl; be Mind. This prin-
ciple

4o8

ANTIENT METAPHYSICS.

Book V.

ciple, Hcraclitus, and ibme other anlient philofophcrs, have, I think,
very W'ell typified by the fymbol of Fire : fij}., becaufe Fire is the
moll fubtile of all the Elements, and, in that refpcdl, therefore,
comes the neareft to Mind of all Material Subftances ; fccoiidly^ be-
raufe, like Mind, it pervades all Bodies, not ading upon their fuper-
ficies only, but upon their inmoft particles, and therefore dilating all
Bodies more or lei's.

Further, I think I have fhown. That, if Mind be the Moving
Power of the Planets, and if Mind can only move Body by animat-
ing it, it is impoffible to fuppofe that the fame Planet fliould be
animated by two minds moving it different ways, and That, there-
fore, the Motion of the Planets is perfedly fimple and uncom-
pounded.

It now only remains that I endeavour to perform the promife I
have made, to fhow that Sir Ifaac's fyftem of Aftronomy may be
fupported, without fucli pojlulata and arbitrary fuppofitions, fome
of which are impoffible to be true, fuch as that of a Body, once fet
in Motion, going on to all eternity, without the agency of either
Body or Mind j and others of them are fuch, as no philofopher can
fee any reafon to admit.

Before I enter upon this argument, it is proper to remove a pre-
judice which will naturally occur to every reader, that a man who
profeffes to know no more than the Elements of Geometry *, and
who knows ftill lefs of Aftronomy, fhould pretend to explain the
■principles of fuch a fcience as Sir Ifaac Newton's Aftronomy,
■which to underftand perfeQly, requires the greateft knov/ledge in
Geometry and Meclianics : And, indeed, if thofe principles were to

be

* Vol. I. p. 268.

Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 409

demoriftrated by Geometry, and by Lines and Figures, I fhould be
very ill qualified for the taflc I have undertaken. But the philofo-
phical reader will readily diftinguifh betwixt the Science and the Me-
taphyfical Principles upon which it is founded ; for, as I have ob-
ferved more than once in the courfe of this Work, the principles of
every inferior Science are to be fouixl in Mctaphyfics, or the Firft
Philofophy. And it is undoubtedly true, what Ariftotle has faid,
that none of thefe Sciences demonflrates its own principles. Thus,
for example, the principles of Euclid's Geometry never can be de-
monftrated by Lines and Figures, which arc the only fubjecl of
Geometry, but muft be fought for in the Firft Philofophy, where
we learn what Extenfion and what Body are, what Quantity is, and
how the two fpeciefes of it, viz. Magnitude^ and Quantity Difcrete
or Number^ are to be diftinguiihed from one another; — how
Body differs from its Dimeniions ; — -what Length, Breadth, and
Depth are ; — and how it comes that a Point has no Parts. * Thefe
are Speculations which Euclid has not meddled with, and which
convinces me, that Euclid muft either have been a philofopher him-
felf, or been under the direction of a philofopher in forming his
Syftem ; for it is the bufmefs of philofophy to difcriminate the feveral
Sciences, and to fix the bounds of each f. But let us fuppofe that
Euclid had not been fo v/ell inftru6te3, but had run his Geometry
up into Metaphyfics, as the Newtonians have done their Aftronomy,
I think, wuth as little neceffity ; — and let us fuppofe, further, that he
had gone wrong in laying down thofe Metaphyfical principles, and
had philofophifcd as ill as fome modern philofophers have done.
Vol. II. F f f concerning

* See what I have faid upon the Principles of Geometry, Vol. I. Lib. v. Cap. -8.

■j- The accurate difcrimination that Ariflotle has made of the feveral branches of
philofophy in the difl'crent Arts and Sciences, is one of the things that I admire
much in that great philofopher ; particularly, he has diftinguifhed very accurately
three Arts, which have a great connection together, and which very few, who
think themfelves philofophers, are able to dillinguifli ; I mean Logic, Dialectic, and
Rhetoric.

4io ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

concerning Body, Magnitude, and Qiiantity Continuous and Dif-
crete*, his Syftem of Geometry would neverthelefs be a perfed com-
plete Syftem, and all his Demonftrations would ftand upon a firm and
folid bottom, and the Metaphyfician would be able to let him right
in Metaphyfics, though, perhaps, unable to follow him through his
Demonftrations. In like manner. Sir Ifaac Newton may be wrong
in his metaphyfical principles, upon which he has thought proper to
build his Aftronomy, and yet his fyftem be perfedly good ; and a
metaphyfician may be able to fhow that he has erred in thefe prin-
ciples, without being able to follow him through all the dedudions
that he has made concerning the Motions of the Celeftial Bodies,
not from thofe principles with which he had nothing to do, but frona
fads, and true aftronomical principles belonging to his Science.

The great difcovery which Sir Ifaac Newton has made, and which
does him fo much honour, is the difcovery of the Law^ as it is
called, of the Planetary Motion. Till this difcoveiy was made, there
was no Science or Syftem of Aftronomy ; and, accordingly, before
Sir Ifaac, there was nothing more known concerning it, but a num-
ber of fads, without any connedion or dependence upon one ano-
ther. Among thefe are fome which are extremely curious, and ap-
pear very wonderful ; fuch as that very intricate and complicated
proportion, which Kepler difcovered betwixt the periods of the re-
volutions of the Planets, and their diftances from the centre ; for he
found out, by comparing the Motions of the feveral Planets with
one another, that the fquares of the periodical times were as the
cubes of their diftance from the Centre. But this he knew only
as a fad ; and it was referved to Sir Ifaac Newton to make a fcience
of this fad, by inveftigating and difcovering the Law of the Plane-
tary Motion, from which this wonderful property of it can, by ne-
ceflary confequence, be deduced : For there would be no Syftem
or Science of Aftronomy, if there were no eflential property of the

Motion

* See Cap. 3d and 4th, Lib. I. of this V^olume,

Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 411

Motion of the Planets, from which all the other properties could be
demonftrated, in the fame manner as in Geometry there would be
no fclence of Triangles, if all the properties of them could not be
deduced demonftratively from that property which conftitutes the
nature and elTence of a Triangle, nauiely, its being bounded by
three lines.

But how is this eflential quality of the Planetary Motion to be
difcovered, from which the phenomenon found out by Kepler, and
all the other phaenomena of the Motion of the Planets, are to be de-
duced ? Before we enter upon this inveftigation, I think we fhould
firft confider what conftitutes the nature and eflence of every Mo-
lion : And this, I think, muft be two things ; firft, the Motive
Force or Power, by which the Motion is carried on ; and, fecondly,
the diredion of the Motion. If thefe two are known, I think
the nature and eflence of the Motion muft neceflarily be known.
Now, one of thefe, I mean the diredlion of the Motion, is a matter
of fa(5t and obfervation ; for in that way it is kriown that the
Planets move in Ellipfes round their feveral centres, or, to fpeak
more properly, the Focus of the Ellipfe, in which the Sun, or Pri-
mary Planet, is placed : And, as the greater and lefler diameters of
thefe Ellipfes are likewife known, and, by confequence, the nature
of the Ellipfis, whether it be very oblong, like that of the Comets,
or coming nearer to a Circle, like thofe of the Planets, it follows,
by neceflary confequence, that the direftion of the Motion, that is,
the Curvlture of the Orbit, muft likewife be known : And fo far
we know alfo with refpeft to the Moving Force, that we know the
period of the Motion. Without thefe fafts being known, it would be
impoflible that we could find out what we are fecking ; for I agree
with the Newtonians, and all the modern philofophers, that we can
know nothing of Nature but from fadls and obfervations, and that
the philoiophy of Nature is nothing elfe but dcdudions, which Sci-
ence makes from thefe fads.

F f f 2 But

412 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

But what way arc we to eftimate this Power or Force, by which a^
planet is carried on in an orbit of certain dinienfions in a given
time ? And here I think it is not at all neceflliry to inquire A^hat
the power is that carries on the Planet in its Motion, whether Body
or Mind, or how that power operates, whether by Pulfion or Tru-
fion, as Body operates upon Body, or whether by Animation, as
Mind moves Body. But all I want to know, and all, I think, that
is neceflliry to be known for the purpofe of Aftronomy, is the quan-
tity of the Moving Force. And this appears to me to have been
the notion that Sir Ifaac had of the Science : For he fays that he
does not inquire concerning the Species Viriurn^ and the ^alitates
Ph^ficas ; fed ^lantitates et Proportioncs Mathemat'tcas expendlt.
And in this way I think Aftronomy is properly dlftinguiflicd, both
from Metaphyfics and Phyfics : For it is the bufinefs of Metaphyfics
to inquire concerning the Caufes of every thing, and particularly
the Caufe of Motion ; and it is the bufinefs of Phyfics to inquire into
the qualities of Bodies, confidered merely as Bodies, and to difcri-
minate them accurately from one another ; and, with refpedl to their
Motions, only to difcover what efFeds thefe produce upon the qua-
lities of the Bodies, but not to meafure, or calculate or inveftigate tlie
Laws of thefe Motions, which belongs either to Mechanics, with
refpeft to the Motions here on Earth, or to Aftronomy, with refpedt
to the Motions of the Celeftial Bodies.

Underftanding, therefore, that it is the proper bufinefs of Aftro-
nomy, confidered as a Science, to inveftigate the force of the Mov-
ing Power by which the Planets are carried on in their orbits, I
proceed to inquire how that Force is to be inveftigated. As Powers
and Forces are, by their nature, latent things, we can only eftimate
the Power which moves any Body by the eifeft that it produces :
And this effeft is no other than the velocity wath which the Body is
moved ; fo that, if we can difcover any rule or ftandard by which
7 we

Chap. Vr. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 413

we can eflimate the velocity of the Planetary Motion, we nuift know
perfedly the nature of that Motion *.

But Velocity, which, I fliy, is the meafure of the Force by wliich
any Body is moved, requires fome meafure or flandard iilelf : I-'or
there is nothing abfolute in Motion ; it is only relative, and relative
to two things j one, the fpace which the Body goes through, and the
other, the time which it requires for that Motion. The Moving
Force, therefore, or Velocity (for thefe two terms may be confidered
as fynonimous, though the one be the Caiifc^ and the other the
EffcSlJ, is as the Space through which the Body is moved, compared
with the Time of the Motion ; fo that, when we find that another
Body Is moved through the fame Space in a fhorter or longer time,
we fay that the Velocity of that other Body is greater or lefs.

If the Space gone through were a Straight Line, of which we
knew the length and likewife the time of the Motion, and if the
Motion were equable, we fhould fay that the Moving Force, in fuch
a cafe, was a Force which carried the Body along a line of fuch a
length in fuch a time. But, fuppofe the Motion not equable, and
not in a ftraight line but in a curve, which is the cafe of the Plane-
tary Motion, by what rule or ftandard can we eflimate the Moving
Force of fuch a Motion ?

Although the Motion In a ftraight line be the moft natural mea-
fure of the Moving Force or Velocity of any Motion, yet, if the
Motion were in a regular curvillneal figure, fuch as a circle of a
certain diameter, or an ellipfis of certain dimenfions, and if it were

equable,

* It is to be obferved, that this rule, that the Moving Power of the Body is to be
eftimated by the Velocity of the Motion, will apply only to the fame Body, or to two
Bodies of equal mafs ; for, if the mafles be different, tliough the Velocity of the Bo-
dies may be the fame, the Power which moves the greater mafs muft nccciliirily be
greater.

414 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

cquabk, and in a given time, I think it would be Itfelf the Mcafure
of its Moving Force, which would be fuch as would make the Body
move in an ellipfis or a circle of certain dimenfions, and in a given
time. But, as the Motion of the Planets is unequable, and quicker
or flower in different parts of the Orbit, it is evident that their Mo-
tions cannot meafure themfelves, but fome other ftandard or rule of
their Motion mufl be found out ; and it is likewife evident that this
flandard mufl be a Motion in a flraight line, one or more, as it is
impofTible to conceive that it can be meafured by another curve line.
But how is fuch a ftraight line or lines to be found out ? How can a
ftraight line, or any number of them, be conceived to meafure a
curvilineal Motion, if it be true, what I have maintained, that no
curvilineal Motion is compofed of flraight lines ?

And here lies the diiKculty of the cafe, which, I think, would be
unfurmountable, if we could not difcover any flraight line with
which the curvilineal Motion has a necefTary connexion. But this
we can do ; for we find that, if a tangent is drawn to any point of
the Orbit of a Planet, the Planet, in its progrefTive Motion, falls
towards the centre, fo far below the tangent at the extremity of any
given arc taken from the tangential point, or point of contadl : And
this fall is meafured by a flraight line from the tangent to the ex-
tremity of the arc. And we know farther, that this fall is necef-
farily connefted with the two things, which, as I have faid, con-
flitute the nature and effence of every Motion, viz. the Moving
Force or Velocity, and the direction of the Motion, that is, in the
cafe of the Planets, the curviture of the Orbit : For, as the Velocity
of the Planet is greater or lefs, with a given Curvature of the Orbit,
or as the Curvature of the Orbit is greater or lefs with a given Ve-
locity of the Planet, fo the defcent from the Tangent, in the fame
time, will be greater or lefs. If, therefore, we can difcover what
this defcent is,, and by what law it is governed, we may poffibly from
thence be able to infer what is the Law of that Force which carries

th€

Chap. VL ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 415

the Planet on in its Orbit, with which, as we have feen, this de-
fcent is neceflarily connected.

That this may be the better underftood, let us take, for example,
the neareft planet to us, the Moon, of which our Earth is the centre.
As we know in what period of time the Moon dcfcribes her whole'
Orbit, fo we know alfo in what time fhe defcribes any given arc of
that Orbit. Suppofe, then, a Tangent drawn at one extremity of
this given arc ; we know alfo how much fhe has fallen below the Tan-
gent, and in what time, at the other extremity of this Arc, and if
the Arc be a fmall one, it is eafy to be fhewn, that if flic had fallen
diredtly from the Point of Contad, (he would have fallen juft as far
in the fame time*. Here, then, we have the Moon defcending from
the Tangent, in a flraight line of a certain length, in a certain time :
And, if the Motion in that flraight line were equable, without in-
creafe or diminution, it would be its own meafurc, and we fliould
fay, that the Moving Force or Velocity was fuch as carried the
Body through fuch a fpace in fuch a time, which, as I have faid, is
the only ftandard by which we can eftimate any Velocity. But we
are fure that this ftandard, when applied to the defcent of the Moon»
will not anfwer ; and, therefore, that her Motion in the Defcent is
not equable ; and, confequently, we muft feek for fome other Law
of this Motion.

And here we muft leave the Moon, and have recourfe to a Motion
on Earth, with which we are much better acquainted ; for, as I
have obferved, nothing is more natural, than that we fhould endea-
vour to explain the Motions in the Heavens by thofe on Earth ■]".

* Speaking phyfically, and not with geometrical Exa(ftners, the Truth is, that as
the Arc is lefiencd, the Diftance of the Extremity of the Arc from the Tangent, and
the direil Fall approximate to Equality, and are ultimately Equal. If the Arc be not
greater than that which the Moon traverfes in the Space of a Minute, the difference
of thefe two Qiiantities will appear quite infcnfiblc.

•t P. 382.

Nowj

4i6 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V,

Now, there is a Motion on Earth well known, which has an extra-
ordinary likenefs to the Motion of the Planets. The Motion I mean
is that of Projediles ; for the figure they defcribe is a Parabola, which
is a Sedlion of the Cone, As well as the Ellipfe, and has the fame
Centre as the Moon, I mean our Earth. Further, as Sir liiiac has
demonftrated, if the Projedlion were of fufficient force, the Pro-
jedile would go round our Earth as the Moon does ; — and lauly,
not to mention other refemblances, the fall from the Tangent,
in any Arc defcribed by the Projeftile, is the fame in the fame
time, as if it had fallen diredly from the Tangential Point, it is
with this lafl refemblance that we are moft concerned at prefent ;
for, if we can determine by what Law any heavy Body here on
Earth falls from any height direftly to the Earth, and if it be true
that there is any Sympathy betwixt things above and things below
(according to the antient faying), that is, any general rule governing
the Motion of defcending Bodies both in the Heavens and here, we
ihall, at the fame time, determine the Law of the Defcent of the
Moon from the Tangent.

And here Sir Ifaac has ufed a Difcovery, made by Galileo before
him, concerning the defcent of falling Bodies on Earth. Gahleo
found out that the Motion of thcfe Bodies was not equable, but
the Velocity increafed as the Times, fo that, in a tloubie Time the
Velocity was double.

But this rule Sir Ifaac found would not apply to the Defcent of the
Moon ; and having difcovered that the Defcent of the primary Pla-
nets towards the Sun, was as the Squares of the Diftances reciprocally,
he conjectured that the fame might be the Law of defcending Bodies
on Earth, but which Galileo had not difcovered, nor indeed could
difcover, by fadl and obfervation on falling Bodies here, as he had dif-
covered the acceleration in the Ratio of the Times. Suppofing, therefore,

that

Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 417

that the Motion of falling Bodies, here on Earth, was accelerated
according to that Rule, he further fuppofed, that the Body in de-
fcending fet out with a greater or lefs Velocity, according to the fame
Rule of its diftancc from the Centre. This theory could not be
verified by any fact or obfervation here on earth, the greatcft
height, from which we can let any body fall, bearing fo fmall a pro-
portion to the diftance from the Centre of the Earth, as not to make
any difference in the fdW of Bodies that could be perceived by the
Senfes. But, when he applied the rule to the defcent of the Moon
from the Tangent, which was fo much greater than the defcent of
any Body here on Earth, he found that it anfwered exactly. And
thus Sir Ifaac not only difcovered the Law of the defcent of the
Moon, but he completed the theory of Gravitation, v/hich Galileo
had only begun ; for he difcovered, firfl, that the defcending Body
fets out with a Velocity invcrfely as the Squares of the diftance from
the Centre ; and, fecondly, that it increafes in that Ratio, as well as
in the Ratio of the Times *.

It is next to be confidered how this theory of Gravity, thus made

general by Sir Ifaac and carried from the Earth to the Heavens, is

Vol. II. G g g to

* The reader, if he be as great an admirer of Sir Ifaac Newton as I am, will be
pleafed to oliferve the prugrcfs of ihe dovSlrine of Gravitation, thus completed by
Sir Ifaac Newton, and which, in my o, inion, is the greateft difcovery of modern
times, Ariftotk maintained, or, at leaft, the Schoolmen, in his name, maintained,
that the Velocity of falling Bodies was as their weight : And it is true that the
greater tlie weight or mafs, the greater the force required to move the Body. From
thence they may have inferred, that, as the Force was greater, fo was the Velocity:
And this ib true of the fame Body, or two Bodies of equal Mafs. But, as I have ob-
fervcd in the preceding Note, it will not apply to two Bodies of different Maflesj
for there the greater Body maybe moved by the greater Force, and yet the Velocity
of both Bodies be the fame. The fa£l truly is, that every particle of Body, great or
fmall, is drawn towards the Earth with the fame Velocity and with the fame Force,
if we fuppofe all the particles to be of the fame Mafs. Now, the more of thefe par-
ticles there are, the more of thefe Forces there muft be to make the Body defceiid.
There muft, therefore, be a greater Moving Force applied to the greater Body ; and,
confequently, its Moment may be greater but not its Velocity, the Moment being

compofed

4i8 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookV.

to be applied to the Motion of the Planets. And here Sir Ifaac ap-
pears to have had recourfe again to the Motion of the Projedile,
which he fuppofed to be a compounded Motion according to the
general belief at this day ; and, therefore, he fuppofed that there

was

compofed both of the Velocity and the Mafs. The Velocity, therefore, of all the par-
ticles of the Body is the fame as in one. This, I think, is well illuftrated by
Montucla, in his hiftory of Mathematics, Vol. II. p. 263. printed at Paris in 1758,
where he fuppofes the greater Body divided into equal parts, and let fall altogether,
but not united, they will certainly all come to the ground at the fame time. Now,
let us fuppofe that they all cohere, fo as to form but one Body, it cannot be concei-
ved that they (hould for that come to the ground fooner.

And, as every particle of the falling Body is moved towards the Centre, fo every
particle of the Central Body is moved towards the falling Body; for it appears to be
an eftablifiied Law of Nature, that the tendency of ait Bodies towards one another
is mutual. But it is likewife a Law of Nature, that the tendency of Bodies to-
ward one another is in proportion to their Mafles ; that is to fay, the greater Body
in the Centre tends towards the lefler falling Body, as well as the falling Body
tends towards it, but with much lefs Velocity. And this explains what the New-
tonians fay, that, as the Stone gravitates towards the Earth, fo the Earth gravitates
towards the Stone, but- is moved with infinitely lefs Velocity; or, to exprefs it ac-
cording to their conceptions of Gravitation, the Earth attrafls the Stone by the Ac-
tive Force of all its particles upon the Stone, while the Stone likewife attradls tha
Earth, by the operation of all its particles upon the Earth ; the confequence of
which is, that the power exerted by the Stone being infinitely lefs than that of the
Earth, and the Mafs of the Earth infinitely greater than that of the Sto.ne, the Ve-
locity of the Motion of the Earth towards the Stone will be infinitely lefs than the
Velocity of the Stone towards the Earth.

It is to be obferved, that when the DoiSrine of Falling Bodies is applied to the
Planets, we are to lay afide entirely the Refiftance of our Atmofphere; which can
have no place in the Celeftial Regions, ubl corpora llberrime moventur, as Sir Ifaac
expreffes it.

Galileo went fo far in the difcovery of Gravitation, as to refute the Peripatetics
by fhowing that the Velocity of a falling Body did not depend upon the Weight of
the Mafs, but upon the Time. But even this he proved no otherwife but by expe-
riments; whereas it may be proved dire£lly and dcmonftratively, from the conflar.t
a£lioa of Gravitation, which is thus to be conceived. The Body, in the fiift inftant
of its Motion, is moved with a certan Force. In the fecond inftant, the fame Force
continues; and there is (ijpperadded another Force as great: The confequence of
which neceffarily is, that the Came Body being moved with a double Force, muff.

Chnp.VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 419

was a Power which urged the Body downward, and made a cur-
vllineal Motion of that which otherwife would have been redili-
neal ; and he made the fame fuppofition with refpeft to the Motion
of the Planets, and maintained that they are defledled from the
RediUneal Motion by the fame Power which makes a ftone fall to
the ground: And thus he compounded the Motion of the Planets,
likewife, of two Motions, the one of which he, called the Projedlile
Motion, ftill carrying on the comparifon with Projediles, and the
other the Centripetal. By the one of thefe, the Body is carried on
in its Orbit, fo that it may be called the Progreflive Motion ; and

G g g 2 by

St the end of the fecond iiiftant, have acquired a double Velocity ; and fo on, during
the continuance of the Motion.

Thus far Giiileo went, and no farther; for he did not know that, at the end of
the fecond inftant, the Body had acquired a further degree of Velocity by its being
fo much nearer tl,e Centre. Nor was it poflibie that he could difcover this by his
method of experiment, as no fpacc, through which we can let a Body fall here on
Earth, can have any fenfible proportion to the diftance from the Earth's Centre. But
Sir Ifaac having difcovered, as I faid, that the primary Planets, in their defcent to-
wards the Sun, were accelerated as the Square of the Diftance reciprocally, did by a
moft h^ppy conjecture fuppofe, that the fame Rule might take place in falling Bodies
here on earth ; fo that their Motion was accelerated two ways, firft, in the Ratio of
the Time, and then as the Square of the Diftance decreafcs.

Further, Galileo did not know with what Force the falling Body begins to be
moved. Neither could this be difcovered by any experiment ; for, as Time and Space
are infinitely divilible, fuppofe we certainly knew with what Velocity a Body is
moved after having fallen the io,oooth part of a Second of Time, or the lo.oooth-
part of an irch of Space, we could not, for that, know with what Velocity it fet
out. But Sir Ifaac, having fo happily conjei£\ured that the motion was accelerated
in the Ratio above mentioned to (he Diftance, would very naturally fuppofe that
the Motion began witli a Velocity t'lat was in the fame Ratio to the Diftance from
the Centre. But this difcovery, of the Velocity of the Motion, both in its continu-
ation and beginning, was no more, I imagine, than a moft fagacious aiiJ happy
conjeiSture, till it was veiified by applying it to the Defcent of the Moon from her
Tangent, without the oblcrvation of which it appears to me impoflible that ever the
theory ot Gravitation could have been completed. But now it is perfcdly com-
plete, becaufe it is known with what Velocity the Body fets out in its fall, — how that
Vtlocity is increafed,_and what Space it gots through in what Time.

42a ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookV.

by the other that Motion is dire(Sl:ed, being bent into a Cun^e in-
ftead of going on in a Straight Line.

That the Motion of the Planets is not actually fo compofed, even
upon the fuppofition that the Motion of Projediles was fo compo-
fed, I think I have clearly proved ; and much lefs can it be
underftood to be fo compoled, if it be true, which I think I have
likewife proved, that even the Motion of Projedliles is fimple and
uncompounded. But it will be faid, that the phaenomena corre-
fpond with Sir Ifaac's Theory of the Compofition of the Motion
of the Planets, and therefore it muft be fuppofed to be true. And,
if thefe phaenomena could not be otherwife explained, except upon
the fuppofition of the actual compofition of their Motion, I think
there might be fome reafon for granting it. But I am perfuaded all
thefe phaenomena may be accounted for, without any fuch actual
compofition ; though, for the fake of teaching and of demonftration,
it may be laid down hypothetically, that the Motion is fo compo-
fed, in the fame manner as Sir Ifaac has for the fame reafon analyfed
the Circular or Elliptic Motion into a Polygon of an infinite number
of fides, though, I think, no body can believe that any Curvilineal
Motion is fo compofed.

That the Motion of the Planets may, by the nature of things, be
a fimple Curvilineal Motion, I think I have clearly proved ; and not
only that it may be fo, but that it is in the higheft degree impro-
bable, if not impofTiblc, that it fliould be otherwife. Now, I would
alk thofe, who maintain the adtual compofition of the Motion,
Whether, upon the fuppofition that it was fimple, as I maintain it
to be, it would not have all the qualities which they afcribe to It,
fuch as the Defcent from the Tangent, — Its being carried on in an
Orbit of a certain curvature, — and with a Force or Velocity by which
it makes its revolution in a certain time? If this cannot be denied,

though

I

Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 421

though I fliould not be able, nor any the moft complete Geometer
or Aftronomer, to deduce thofe qualities of the Motion from its
nature and eirence, that would be no rcafon for making fuch ftrange
fuppofitions ; and it would be much better fairly to acknowledge
that we are not able to make a Syftem or Science of Aftronomy,
and fo leave it in the ftate it was in before Sir Ifaac meddled with it.

Nor would this be anywife extraordinary; for there are many
things in Nature, of which we are fure that there is a Syftem and
a governing Principle, but which hitherto we have not been able to
difcover. This is the cafe of Eledlricity, and of Magnetifm, and of
all the phaenomena which chemiftry exhibits to us; yet, of thefe,
as well as of other things, every man, who believes that Supreme In-
telligence prefides in the univerfe, muft likewife. believe that there is.
a Syftem and a Science.

But, in this cafe, I believe there is a Syftem, which Sir Ifaac has
difcovered ; but it is to me evident that his Syftem can be as well
fupported, upon the hypothejis of the Planets being moved towards
their Centre, as if they were aclually fo. From what I have already
faid, I think it is evident that it is impoflible to difcover the Mo-
ving Force of the Planets in their Orbits, without refolving their
Motion into Straight Lines. Now, this cannot be done except by
Hypothefis, as- their Motion is certainly not actually compofed of
Motions in Straight Lines ; and, if fo, there can be no hypothefis
more natural than the hypothefis which I make : For, in the Jirjl
place, the fadt is certain, that the Planets do defcend from the
Tangent towards their Centre ; 2^/)', It is evident that this defcent
Is according to the Law of falling Bodies here on Earth. Now, as
there is nothing in Nature without a Caufe, there muft be fome
Caufe producing this Defcent ; and, where the Effe£l is the fame as
in the cafe of falling Bodies, there is nothing more natural than to
fuppofe, by way of Hypothefis, the fame caufe. And the only Dif-
ference,

422 ANT I EN T METAPHYSICS. BookV.

ference here, betwixt the reed Caufe and the fuppofed Caufe, is, tliat
the real Caufe arifes from the nature of the Planetary Motion, which,
hke every other Motion, confifts of two things, ^/y?. The Moving
Force or Velocity ; and, ^dIy^ The Diredion of that Force in an
Orbit of fuch a Curvature. The real Caufe therefore of this
Defcent, is the nature of the Planetary Motion in which it is in-
lierent, and with which it is enentially conneded; whereas the
Caufe \ fuppofc is, a Motive Force not neceflarily joined with the
reft of the Planetary Motion, but feparatcd and a£ting by itfelf. —
So that by my Hypothecs I do no more than divide and confidcr,
feparately, what by Nature is neceflarily joined. This, I fay, is the
Method of all Science; and I maintain, liiat without fuch Abftra£tions
no Science could be properly taught. Proceeding in this way, Euclid
has abftraded Length from Breadth, and both from Depth, and all
the three from Body. When Euclid does fo, he p'oceeds upon an
hypothefis, as well as I do in this cafe ; for, as I fuppofe that
there is a feparate Motive Power, which makes the Body defcend
from the Tangent, fo he fuppofes that Length, Breadth, and Depth,
have a feparate exiftencc by themfelves, which is certainly not true
in fa£t \ but no body will fay his demonftrations are lefs conclufive
becaufe they proceed upon this hypothefis. In the fame manner
T fay that Projedion and Gravitation, though they have no feparate
exiftence by themfelves, are inherent in the Planetary Motion as
much as Length, Breadth, and Depth are in Body; and therefore
that Sir Ifaac's Demonftrations are as certain upon the Hypothefis
of the Separate Exiftence of Projedlion and Gravitation, as Euclid's
are upon the Hypothefis of the Separate Exiftence of Length,
Breadth, and Depth. — And it may be obfer\'ed, that there is this
difference betwixt my hypothefis and that of Euclid, that it is im-
pofTible, by the nature of things, that Length, Breadth, and Depth,
can exift feparately ; whereas no body will deny, at leaft no New-
tonian, that the two Motions I have ftippofcd may have a feparate
exiftence, and be combined together, to form the Planetary Motion.

Having

Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 423

Having thus, by feparating the Defcent of the Planet from
the reft of its Motion, and confidering the Defcent abftradcdlv,
difcovered the Law of it, I proceed to what remains to be dif-
covered, and which is the principal thing fought, — By what Force
the Planet is moved in its Orbit. For "this purpofe, I make ano-
ther Hypothefis, or, rather, it is no new Hypothefis, but a necef-
fary confequence of the former ; for, if the Body be moved by any
Power towards the Centre, it is evident it muft be moved by fome
other Power in the diredion of the Tangent from which it falls,
otherwife it never could defcribe an Ellipfis, but muft fall into the
Centre : And thus we have the two Motions of Projection and Gra-
vitation, and the two moving Powers, of which the Planetary Motion
is fuppofed to be combined, the Centripetal Force and the Projedlile.

But how are we to difcover the Moving Power In the Line of
Projection ? For, unlefs we can difcover that, we have done nothing j
becaufe it is evident that, by th«r Moving Force in the Line of Pro-
jection, the Planet is carried on in its Orbit, the Centripetal Force
ferving no other purpofe, except to direCt the Motion in the Prc-
jeCtile Line, and bend it into a Curve, inftead of going on, as it
would otherwife do, in a ftraight line*

But, though the Centripetal Force ferve no other purpofe but to ■
direCt the Motion, it is evident that it muft have a neceflary con-
nection with the Projectile Motion in the Tangent,, or, which is
the fame thing,, the Motion of tlie Planet in its Orbit : For, as that
Motion is quicker or flower, the Defcent from the Tangent muft be
greater or lefs in the fame time ; and, as the Curvature of the Or-
bit is greater or lefs, the Velocity, with which the Phmet performs -
its revolution in the time given, is greater or lefs ; and, with the
Curvature of the Orbit, as well as with the Velocity of the Mo-
tion in it, the Defcent from the Tangent is alfo neceflarily con-
neded.

F.urther,

424 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

Further, it is evident tliat the two Motions being fo neceflarily
connefted together, they muft be fo adjufted as to balance one ano-
ther, fo as that neither fhall prevail over the other : For, If the Cen-
tripetal Force is too violent, the Body will be carried too far tovi-ards
the Centre ; and, again, if the Projedile Force be too ftrong, the
Body will defcribe a Figure different from what we know it docs de-
fcribe.

And not only do the two Motions thus depend upon one another,
but they both depend upon one and the fame thing, viz. the diftance
of the Planet from the Centre ; for upon that muft depend both the
Curvature of the Orbit, and the Velocity by which the Body per-
•forms its Revolution in the given time.

The Motions being thus neceflarily conne£led, and both depend-
ing upon one and the fame thing, it is moft natural to fuppofe that
the one being given, viz. the Centripetal Motion or Defcent from the
Tangent, the other will alfo be given by dedudion from it, I mean
the Motion in the Tangential Line, or Line of Projedion ; and it is
alfo moft natural to fuppofe, that, as by the diftance from the Centre
the Centripetal Motion is governed, fo alfo fhould the Projedile
Motion. And, accordingly, Geometry demonftrates that the Velo-
city in the Tangential Lines, at different points of the Orbit, is
inverfely proportional to perpendiculars drawn from the Sun to the
Tangents of the Orbit at thefe points ; and, if the Velocity be fuch
in the Tangential Line, it muft of neceftity be the fame in the
Orbit of the Planet.

And thus, I think, the Problem is folved, and a moving Force Is
'difcovered, by which the Planet is moved in an Ellipfis of a certain
Form and certain Dimenfions, and in a certain Time. And this
Moving Force is variable, as the Motion of the Planet is, and va-

I liable

Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 425

riable by the fame rule, viz. the greater or the lefs diftancc from the
Centre, upon which, as I have faid, both the Motion in the Centri-
petal Line, and in the Line of Projection, muft depend.

This hypothetical method of reafoning, by which a Motion, in its
nature perfedtly fimple, as fimple as any Motion in one Line can
be, may appear to thofe who are not acquainted with the method of
Science, to be precarious and inconclufive ; but Euclid's whole Sy-
llem of Geometry is, as I have fhown, founded upon a reafoning
of this kind. Sir Ifaac, when, by his dodlrine of Prime and Ulti-
mate Ratios, he refolves the Circular or Elliptical Motion into a Po-
lygon of an infinite number of fides, certainly makes an hypothcfis
for the fake of teaching and demonftration, which has no founda-
tion in Nature ; for I do not believe that any Newtonian will main-
tain that a Circle or Ellipfis is not a Figure contained in one Line (as
Euclid has defined a Circle), but a Redilineal Figure of many
Lines*. And I am fure he will not deny the truth of the propofi-
tion, which Sir Ifaac, upon that hypothefis, has demonftrated, that
the Planet, in its Motion round its Centre, defcribes Spaces propor-
tional to the Times f. And there is another Theorem of his, of
which he makes much ufe in his Princlpia, and which, likewife,
proceeds upon mere hypothefis. It is the theorem of the Compo-
fition of Motion, by which a Motion in a Straight Line, the moll
fimple of any that can be imagined, and which may be produced,
and generally is produced, by one fingle moving Power, fuch as the
Impulfe of one Bcdv, is fuppofed to be produced by the action of
two Powers adling in the diredion of two fides of a parallelogram,
of which the right line, in which the Body is moved, is the diagonal;
and upon this hypothefis the Moving Force of the Body is de-

VoL. II. H h h monftrated.

* See p. 393.

t Lib. 1. Princip. Se*.^. 2. Pfop. i.

426 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookV.

monflrated. The application to this cafe is obvious ; for there, as in
the cafe of the Planets, we difcover the Moving Force by the Hy-
pothefis of the Body being moved by a Force ading in two Straight
Lines : And the only difference I can obferve betwixt the two cafes
is, that the Hypothefis, in the cafe of the Planets, appears to be
more obvious, and arifmg more naturally from the Planetarj'- Mo-
tion, than the other Hypothefis arifes from the Motion in the
Straight Line.

Some Newtonians will fay, that their conclufions, deduced not from
Hypothefes, but from Realities, are more convincing. But my anfwer
is, that, if the Hypothefes are admitted, the Dedudions from them
are as certain as if they were Realities, as in the two inftances I have
given ; fo that the only queftion is. Whether they be Hypothefes
abfurd or impoffible, and, therefore, fuch as cannot be admitted ?
Now, the Newtonians, who maintain that they are Realities, will
certainly not fay fo. Nor will any one be difpofed to think fo, when
he confiders, that with thefe Hypothefes all the phaenomena of the
Planetary Motion perfedly agree ; and that from them, among other
phaenomena, the wonderful proportion, which Kepler difcovered, be-
twixt the Periods of the Revolutions and the Dillances from the Centre,
can be deduced. But this, notwithftanding, if it could be fliewn that
the Planetary Motion could not be produced in the way fuppofed,
I fhould fay, that though the Conclufions, being agreeable to the
Phaenomena were true, the Principles from which they were de-
duced were not true, and confequently that the Reafoning, proceed-
ing upon falfe Principles, was not juft ; and I fhould fay the fame
of the hypothetical Reafoning, with refped to the Compoiition of
Motion, if it could be proved, that it was impoffible the Motion
could be produced by the Adion of two Bodies in the way fuppofed.
But this cannot be faid, and certainly no Newtonian will fay, that
. the Hypothefis is impoffible of the Planetary Motion being pro-
duced, as I fuppofe, when he avers that it is aHuaUy fo produced.

I will

Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 427

I will conclude this Chapter with obferving, that the example
above mentioned, of the Compofition of Motion, is fufFicicnt of
itfclf, I think, to refute an argument much infilled on by the New-
tonians, that the fame EfFe<ft muft be produced by the fame Caufe ;
and that, therefore, as the Motion of the Projedile is of the fame
kind with the Motion of the Planet, it muft be produced by the
fame Caufe, that is, by Bodily Impulfe, and, likewife, by two
Moving Powers, as they fuppofe the Motion of ProjeiStiles to be.
But, in the example above given, we may fuppofe the Motion in
the Diagonal of a Parallelogram to be produced, either by the Im-
pulfe of a fingle Body, or by the Impulfe of two Bodies; or, laftly,
by Mind without any Body at all. Thefe Caufes of tlie Move-
ment are very different, and yet the EfFedt, that is, the Motion,
will be the fame, and will be governed by the fame Law.

And here we may obferve, how neceffary it is to dlftinguifli
betwixt the Motion and the Caufe of the Motion : In the in-
ftance I have given, the Motion, by which ever of the three
Caufes it is produced, will be the fame, and governed by tlie
fame Laws. And in like manner the Planetary Motion, whether
produced by Mind or Body, by Gravitation and Projedion,
a.(£lually or only hypothetically, will be the fame Motion, and
governed by the lame Laws. And therefore the Mathematician
who defires to demonftrate what thofe Laws are, may chufe any
of the HypoChefes that fuits his purpofe beft ; nor is he at all
concerned to fhew that the Motion is adually fo produced, but
only that it may be fo produced.

Hhha CHAP.

428

ANTIENT METAPHYSICS.

BookV.

CHAP.

VII.

The Advantage of thus ftmpUfying the Aftronomy c/'Sir Ifaac Newton.
— Firft, // difinawihers the Sj(/}e7n of the Hypothefts of the Planets
being moved by Bodily Impulfe : — The Confequences of fuch an Hy-
pothefts.— 2do, Of the Notion of a Perpetuity of Motion begun by
Bodily Impulfe. — 3tio, Of Body attra£lhig or impelUng Body at a

Diflance. — 4to, Of the Compofition of the Planetary Motion:

Such a Compofition irreconcileable with the Simplicity of Nature.

5to, Of the Hypothefis of the Planets all falling into their Centres if
their Motions -were to be flopped. — Laflly, Of a Centrifugal Force
fuppofed in the Planetary Motion. — TZ?,? Confeqiience of this Hypo-
thefis downright Materialifm. — Inapplicable to the Motion of the
Planets, whether that Motion be by Mind&r Body. — The Centri-
fugal Force of the Stone and Sling explained. — The Origin of the
Notion of a Centrifugal Force.

WHETHER I have fucceeded, in ^ endeavouring thus to
fimplify the Principles of Sir Ifaac's 4^ftronomy, does not
belong to me to determine. But this I will yehture to affirm, that,
if I have fucceeded, the Newtonians are very much obliged to me j
for I have difmcumbered their Science (one of the nobleft that ever
was invented, and which does more honour to modern Times, than
any thing elfe I know) of Propofitions altogether ufelefs, yet laid
down as Axioms and Poftulata abfolutely neceifary for fupperting
their Syftem, but which are either abfolutely falfe, and impoffible to
be true, or fuch as no philofopher can grant.

The

Chap. VII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 429

The firft of thefe is, that the Planets were firll moved by Bodies
which no longer exift, and without the lead degree of proof or pro-
bability that they ever exifted. This ftrange Hvpothefis, as I have
obferved*, is the more extraordinary, that it only ferves to remove
Mind to a greater diftance. For, What is it that moves the Body
which moves the Planet ? It can be nothing ell'e but Mind, unlcfs
they will fay that Body can move itfelf, or that there is nothing elfe
in the Univerfe but an infinite Chain of Bodies impelled, and im-
pelling one another; and, though I would not acciifc thofe who
maintain this notion of the beginning of the Planetary Motion, as
holding either of thefe opinions, yet I cannot help faying, that it
looks as if they wifhed to get free of Mind altogether in their Sy-
ftem of Nature, or, at leaft, fet it at as great a diftance as poflible.

The fecond of thefe propofitions is that which afferts the Eternity
of Motion, in confequence of this' imaginary impulfe ; which, if
it be fuppofed to be by virtue of the Impulfe, is impoffible by the
nature of things ; and to maintain that it is by a Vis Infta^ or Power
inherent in the Matter itfelf, and elTential to it, is downright Ma-
terialifm. This Axiom, as it is called, gives me the more offence,
that it appears to me to ferve no other purpofe, except to make a
Machine of what, more than any thing elfe, manifefts the Power,
the Wlfdom and the goodnefs of God. For, as Aftronomy has
nothing to do with the Caufe of the Motion of the Celeftial Bodies,
which belongs to a Science quite different, much lefs has it any con-
cern with the duration of the Motion, whether it had a beginning,
or is ever to have an end. And, accordingly, this Eternity of Mo-
tion is not of the leaft ufe in explaining any of the phae.iomena of
the Heavens, which requires nothing more but that the Quantity

of

* P. 384.

4jo ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookV.

of the Mo^■lng Force iliould be known, without inqiurhig what the
Cauie of It is, or how long it is to continue.

The third is, that Body can attrad or repel Body at a diflance,
that is, can a£l: where it is not ; — a propofition impoffible to be true
of any thing exifting, whether Body or Mind ; and, accordingly,
as we have feen*, it is rejeded by Sir Ifaac himfelf in the ftrongcft
terms.

The fourth is, that the Planetary Motion is not fmiple but com-
pounded— a Propofition which makes their Motions fo intricate, and
requiring fuch different operations of different Minds or Bodies, as is
altogether irreconcileable with that wonderful fmiplicity we obferve
in the works of Nature, in which, as there is nothing wanting, fo
there is nothing fuperfluous. It is, therefore, a propofition, which,
though it be ufed as an hypothefis, for the purpofe of teaching and
demonftration, can never be fuppofed to have a real exiftence, unlefs
we are to fuppofe, at the fame time, other Bodies impelling the Pla-
nets different ways, or, what is more inconceivable, two Minds
animating the fame Planet, and moving it in different diredlions at
the fame time.

The fifth propofition I fhall mention is, I think, as Httle fupported
by proof or probability, as any that I have mentioned. It is this,
that, if the Motion of the Planets were to be fliopped, they would
all fall into their Centres, with a force increafing as the Squares of
the Diftances decreafe. It is the neceffary confequence of the prece-
ding propofition, concerning the Compofition of the Planetary Mo-
tions, and ferves, I think, to {how the falfenefs of it, as it is a pro-
pofition

* Page 376.

Chap. VII. ANTIEKT METAPHYSICS. 4jx

pofition that never can be proved nor inferred, as I have iLown, hv
any juft analogy from the Motion of pther Bodies'^'.

The laft propofition, of which I have endeavoured to difinciim-
ber the Newtonian Aftronomy, appears to me as extraordiuarv as
any I have hitherto mentioned. It is this, that every Body, that is
moved in a Curve, has a tendency to go off out of that Curve in
a Tangent ; and to this tendency they have given the name of Cen-
trifugal Force, which is a word much ufed by the Newtonians, more
now, I think, than formerly; nor do I know that Sir Ifaac has
ufed it at all, fpeaking of the Motion of a Planet in its Orbit: And
they have endeavoured to make a Science of it, by fljewing how it
ads in proportion to the fwiftnefs of the Motion in the Cui-ve, and the
diftance from the Centre f . Now, I would have the reader confider
attentively to what confequences this hypothefis leads. In the Jlr/i
place, it fuppofes, that a Body being once put in Motion, continues,
by its Vis Inftta^ to go on in a Straight Line to all eternity. This,
they fay, is in confequence of the Vis Iriertiae, or perfect paflivity
of Matter; — a propofition which, I think, I have fhown is ab-
folutely inconfiftent with the genuine principles of Theifm ; and,
accordingly, many of the Newtonians are not difpofed to afcribc
the continuance of the Motion to any Vis Itijita^ or Adtive Force,
in the Body, but to the Original Impulfe, which I hold is im-
pofFible to be true. But the Hypothefis of a Centrifugal Force
aflerts this Adive Power of Body in the ftrongeft manner ; for,
if there was nothing elfe in Body, but a Vis Inertiae^ or Vis
Pcrfcvcrantiae, as fome rather chufe to call it, by which it continues
in the ftate in which it is, whether of Motion or Reft, Why fhould
it net, after it is deflected from the Straight Line, continue in the

new

* Page 40c.

^ See Montucla, above quoted, Vol. II. p. 408.

432 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookV.

new courfe given it, with the fame perfeverance with which it
continued in the old. But, inftead of that, by the violent exertion
of an A£tive Power, it tends to return to the Straight Line, and
this with a Force not arbitrary or accidental, but governed by Rule
and Meafure, and fuch as may be reduced to Science. And it
is upon this hypothefis that they tell us that Sir Ifaac Newton has
demonflrated that the Moon is retained in her Orbit by the fame
Power that makes a ftone fall to the ground ; without which, they
tell us, the Moon would fly off in a Tangent, and go on in a
Straight Line to all eternity.

Now, here is a Power fuppofed in Matter, by which it not only
continues in a Motion once given it, but begins a new Motion con-
trary to that which was laft given it. If this be true, I muft own, I
think there is an end of the fyftem of Theifm, and of Mind. For,
if Body can, by a Power eflential to it, not only continue Motion,
but begin it, and carry it on in the moft regular and orderly man-
ner, there is nothing in Nature that may not be accounted for by
Matter and Motion merely, without Mind. Li fhort, it puts an
end altogether to the diftinftion that I hold to be the foundation of
the Syftem of the Univerfe — betwixt Mind and Body ; which
ditlindtion confifts in this and this only, that Mind is adive, and is the
Author of all the Motion in the Univerfe ; whereas Body is inactive,
and merely paflive.

Thefe are the confequences of the dodrine of Centrifugal Forces ;
as to the truth of it, it is utterly inconceivable, with relpeil to the
Planets, whether we fupnoie Body or Mind to be the Moving Power.
If they are moved by Bodily Impulfc, it is impoffible, I admit, that
the Motion can be fnnple or uncompounded ; and, inftead ot being
moved in an EUipfe, they muft be moved in a Polygon of many
fides. But it is not credible that, in the Motion in any of thefe

2 fides,

Cha^. VII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 433

fides, there fliould be the lead tendency to' fly away from the
Centre. Again, if we fuppofc Mind to' be flie Moving Power, it i3
ftill more inconceivable, if poffible*: And, indeed, it appears to
liie fo inconceivable, that I cannot admit it, even by way of hypo-
thefiu, as I do the compofition of the Planetary Motion. Nor do I
think that any of Sir Ifaac's demonftrations in Aftronomy require
fach an hypothefis : For, as to his demonflration concerning the
Moon's Motion, I hope I have fliown, that nothing more is necef-
fary for it, than to fuppofe a defcent of the Moon in her Curvilineal
Motion as great, and governed by the fame laws, as if fhe fell down
perpendicularly.

This notion of a Centrifugal Force, and all the other Propofitions
I have mentioned, appear to me to take their rife from one fource,
which is this, that none of the Mechanical Aftronomers, from Ga-
lileo down to the prefent times, appear to me to have had any idea
of the Motion by Mind : And, indeed, fince Geometry and Mecha-
nics came to be applied to the Motion of Bodies, they have been
confidcred as conftituting the whole Philofophy of Nature ; fo that
Geometry, inftead of being the handmaid of Philofophy, as the An-
tients confidered it, is become the miftrcfs, and a Geometer and
Philofopher are now fynonimous terms.

To conclude, the principles of Sir Ifaac's Syftem of Aftronomy,

as they have been hitherto explained, appear to me fo inconfiftent

Vol. II. I i i with

* The common illuftration that is given of the Centrifugal Force, is the Motion,
of a Stone in a Sling: But this is produced by a double aflion of Body upon the
Stone, firft, pufliing it forward by repeated Impu!."?, and then retaining it from
going forward ; which it is impofiible to apply to the Motion of the Planet. See
what i have further faid upon this fubjcft, p. 391, where, I think, I have accounted
for the Force with which the Stone, when it is let go, flies ofF.

434 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookV.

with the Principles of true Philofophy, and of fuch dangerous ten-
dency, that, if I have failed in giving a better account of them, I
fincerely wifh, both for the honour of Sir Ifaac and the nation,
and, I may add, of modern times, that fome author, more learned
in Geometry and Mechanics, would undertake to give a better ex-
planation of them.

CHAP.

Chap.MIT. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 435

CHAP. VIII.

DiJlinElion ^iVif/.v/ Philofophy (77/(S^ Aflronomy. — Much Injujlice done
to Sir Il'aac Newton, ;';/ f"ppo/^"g ^bat he philofophifed concerning
the Caufe of the Motion of the Celeftial Bodies, and bad dtfcovered
that Caufe to be Attraction . — AbfurdWays of T'h'tnkhig and Speaking
thence arifing. — Every Motion made to be produced by Attradtion.
— The Motion of a Stone falling to the Ground. — of the Moon, —
of the Tides, — of the Magnet, l^c. — This Sy/Iem o/" Attraction
may be more fimplifed than it is. — Attraction carried through the
•whole Univerfe ; and different Syfems made to attraCt one another. —
Attraction faid to be eflential to Matter. — Dr. Prieftly'j Notion of

Attraction. — Two Sources of this Error concerning Attraction

The Notion of the Planets being moved by Impulfe of other Bodies,
may be an Hypothefis likewife. — Reafons for fuch Hypothefts^ and for
other Hypothefes made by Sir Ifaac. — The Dfcoveries of Sir liaac,
tiow they are made, appear fo natural and obvious, that it ferns ivon-
derful they were not focner made. — The Refemblance betwixt the
Planetary Motion and the Motion of Projectiles, has led the New-
tonians into Errors ; I mo, to fuppofe that the Planetary Motion
was begun by Impulfe, as well as that by ProjeCliles ; — 2do, That
it was compounded, as they fuppofed that ©/"ProjeCtiles to be; — 3tio,
That the Planet, if not carried on in the Ellipfe, would fall down
to the Centre like a ProjeCtile. — The Errors not only fown, but the
Caufes of thofe Errors. — This ought to give perfe£l SatisfaEiion. —
The Conclifions of the Newtonian Aftronomy may be true, and yet
the Principles falfc. — The only confequence of which is, that the

I i i 2 N£\Yto-

4-^6 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

Newtonians teach their Syjiem in an improper IVny — hjlarice of a
true conclufion from falfe Premiffes. — T^his applied to the Newto-
nians.

ROM what has been fald in the preceding Chapters, I hope
-fl- the reader has learned to make the diftindtion, if he had not
learned it before, betwixt Philofophy and Aftronomy, or, in other
words, betwixt inveftigating the Laws of the Celeftial Motions, or
calculating thefe Motions, and inquiring into the Caufes of them.
Thofe who fuppofe that the intention of Sir Ifaac Newton, in his
Principioy was to inquire into tlie Caufes of the Planetary Motion,
appear to me to do great injuflice to Sir Ifaac, and to mlftake alto-
gether the nature of his work, as it is explained by himfelf in the
paflage above quoted*. Yet, upon this fuppofition, it is generally
believed, that Sir Ifaac has difcovered Attradlion to be the Caufe of
this Motion. This notion has produced very abfurd ways of fpeak-
ing. Thus, it is commonly fald that the Earth attracts the Moon,
and the Sun the Planets : And they tell you, that the Earth, in
the fame way it draws a Stone down to the ground, bends the
Courfe of the Moon into an Elliptical Orbit; fo that, by the fame
Power by which a Stone falls to the ground, the Moon is retained
in her Orbit - And this, they pretend. Sir Ifaac has demonftrated.
And we ufe the fame abfurd language when we fpeak of the Magnet
attracting the Iron, as if it were poffible that a Body, or any thing
elfe, could a£l where it was not. They tell us alfo, that it is by At-
traction that the Moon raifes the water of the Sea, and produces the
Tides ; and, in fhort, they want to make Attraction do every thing
in Nature, as if there were no other kind of Motion to be feen, or
as if Bodies going from one another (commonly called likewife by
an improper name, Reptilfwii, as if the one Body aCted upon the
other), were not as common a phaenomenon as Bodies being moved

towards
* Page 412.

Chap. VIII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 437

towards one another. They are the more inexciifable for fpeaking
in this way, that Sir Ifaac has entered his caveat againft fuch an er-
ror, and has exprefsly faid, that he ufes the word Attraiilion, not
to denote a Caufe, but an EfTedt, viz. the tendency of Bodies to-
wards one another, v/hatever the Caufe of that tendency may be.

Thofe who maintain that the Earth does adually attrafl: the
Moon, and the Sun the Planets, at fuch an immenfe diftancc from
them, may, I think, for the fame rcafon, maintain that thofe
Centres of the Planets are the Caufe of their whole Motion ; for,
if they can operate where they are not, by drawing the Planets to
them, they may as well be the Caufe of the whole Motion, and
make the Planets revolve round them in Ellipfes, in the fame manner
as the Hand makes the Stone go round in a Sling. And this will
fimplify the Syftem exceedingly ; for it will account for their Mo-
tions, without either Gravitation or Projedtion, without Centripetal
or Centrifugal Forces. That this is not Sir Ifaac's fyftem is evident.
And yet I defy thofe who underftand Attradlion, in the fenfe of
Bodies drawing other Bodies towards them, to give any good reafon
why it might not be his fyftem.

Some of the followers of Sir Ifaac, not contented with carr)-ing
Gravitation beyond the utmoft bounds of our atmofphere (withui
which we are warranted, by fa£t and experiment, to believe that it
takes place) to the Moon, and through the whole Solar Syftem, even
to the Orbit of Saturn, want to extend it to other fyftems, and, in
fhort, through the whole Univerfe, and to make one fyftem gravi-
tate towards another, and all the fyftems to gravitate towards fome
point, which they make to be the Centre of the Univerfe*. In ftiort,

wherever

* Therewas publifhed in London, in the yeai 1777, a pamphlet, entitled, • Thoughts

* on General Gravitation,' written, as I am told, by an ingenious gentleman of the

Univerfity of Glafgow. The idea of this author is grand and noble. He uiidctftands

that the Univerfe confifls of many Syftems, fuch as our S^lar Syftem, and that they a!l

3 move

438 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookV.

wherever there is Body or Matter, there muft, according to thefc
philofophers, be Gravitation. And Mr. Cotes has gone fo far as to
maintain, in his Preface to the Principia, that Gravitation is effential
to Matter, though Sir Ifaac has faid, in fo many words, that he did
not affirm it to be fo : And Dr. PrieRley has maintained, not only
that Attradlion is eflential to Matter, but that it and Repulfion con-
ftitute its nature and effence, not extenfion, foUdity, or impenc-
trabiUty, as has been commonly underftood. All thefe errors have
arifen from two fources ; JirJJ, fuppofmg that the hypothefes of Sir
Ifaac were realities, not mere hypothefes for the fake of teaching
and demonftration ; and, fecoiidl)\ that Sir Ifaac intended, not only
to difcover the Laws of the Celeftial Motions, and to meafure and
calculate thdm, but to account for their Caufe.

Whether Sir Ifaac did fuppofe that the Motion of the Celeftial
Bodies was really begun by Impulfe, may perhaps be doubted ;
though he has certainly expreffed himfelf in fuch a way, as to give
reafon to believe that he really thought fo*. At the fame time, I
think it may be maintained, that this alfo was no more than hypo-
thecs ; for, as Motion, by Impulfe, is always in a Straight Line,
and as he was to analyfe the Planetary ?vIotion into two Straight

Lines,

move round fome one point, as a Centre, in the fame manner as one of our Planets
with its Satellites moves round the Sun. If the Uiiiverfe be aSyftem, as I think every
Theift muft believe it to be, it is a necefiary confequence that there muft be fame Prin-
ciple of union in it, and fome point, fuch as a Centre, to which all its Motions mult
have a relation. And it is alfo necefiary that there fhouid be fome conformity betwixt
the Motions of the feveral parts of the Sy ftem, and of the whole : And, therefore, as
v.e know but this our Solar Syftem, and that the Bodies in this Syflcm are moved
round a Centre, it is highly probable, that tlie Bodies in the other Syftems, and that
ihe Syfiems themselves, are moved in the fime way. But what has all this to do with
Gravitation, or that ftrange hypothefis rejeded by Sir Ifaac hidifelf in fuch flrong terms,
of Body operating upon Body at a diftance?

* Whatever Sir Ifaac thoueht when when he wrote his Principia, I think it is evi-
(Jent from his Letters to Dr. Bentley, that when he wrote thtrm, he did not believe
that the Planets were fet in Motion by Impulfe of other Bodies, or by any natural
Caufe. See what I have faid, p, y^G, of the Progrefs of Sir Ifaac's Notions in this
Matter.

Chap.VIII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 439

Lines, of which the Motion in the Projcdile Line was the firft and
fundamental Motion, it was natural enough for him to lay down, by
way of hypothefis, that the Motion in that Line was begun by Im-
pulfe ; And, indeed, as the Projedile Line itfelf is a mere hypo-
thefis, we may, I think, with likelihood enough, fuppofc that the
beginning of Motion, by Lnpulfc, in that Line, is nothing elfe.
But, be that as it will, I think I can ^flcrt, Vv-ith fome confidence,
that his fyftem does not require that the Motion fliould be actually
fo produced, any more than it requires that the Planets ftiould be
ad:ually moved by a Force, either of Body or Mind, impelling thcni
towards the Centre. But it was neccffaty, for diicovcring the
Lav^rs of their Motions, and meafuring and computing them, to
analyfe them into two Motions, both in right Lines ; fo neceflary,
that I believe it was impoffible to do it ocherwife, as impofliblc
as it would have been for Euclid to have demonftrated his Propofi-
tions concerning Lines and Figures, without analyling Body into
Length, Breadth, and Depth, and confidering each of them fepara-
rately, though they can no more exift feparately than the Progreflive
Motion of the Planet and its defcent from the Tangent towards the
Centre; or as impoffible as it would be, in many cafes, to demonftrate
the Velocity by which a Body goes on in a Straight Line, by virtue
of a fmgle Impulfe by one Body, without refolving that fmgle Mo-
ving Power into two Moving Powers. And, in general, it may be
obferved, that no Science, whether of Body or of Mind, can be
treated accurately, without analyfing and feparating w^hat, by na-
ture, is infeparable; for, in the Sciences belonging to Mind, fuch
as Logic, Ethics, and Metaphyfics, it is as neceflary to proceed in
that manner, as in the Sciences concerning Body and its Motions.

The Principles of Sir Ifaac's Aftronomy, as I have analyfed them,
appear to me fo fimple, that, like other great difcoveries, it feems
wonderful they were not fooner difcovered ; for, imo. It was ob-
vious

440 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

vious that, In the Planetary Orbit, it was neccfTary there fliouKl he
a fall from the Tangent, and which, it may be obferved in pafling,
is probably the rcafon that fome have imagined the Circular or
Elliptical Motion was compounded, and produced by diiTerent Pow-
ers ading upon the Body, not diftinguifhlng rightly betwixt a Mo-
ving Power internal and eflential to the Motion, and that which
is external. ido^ It is equally obvlour-, that this fall from the
Tangent, as well as the Moving Force, by which the Planet is car-
ried on In Its Orbit, muft nccefTarily depend upon the diameter of
the Orbit, or, in other words, the diftance of the Planet from Its
Centre, and, confequcntly, muft needs have fome relation or ratio
to that diftance. 3//0, The refemblance betwixt the Elliptical Mo-
tion of the Planets, and the Parabolic Motion of Projedlles, mufl:
have been fo well known to fo great a Geometer and Mechanic as
Sir Ifaac, that It was no wonder If he endeavoured to inveftlgate the
Laws of the one Motion by thofe of the other, and, being enabled
by the help of Galileo's difcoveries, to afcertain exadlly the defcent
of the Projedlle in its Curvilineal Motion, and, by confequence, Its
progreffive Force, it was moft natural for him to apply the Laws of
the Motion of the Projedile to the Planetary Motion,, and finding
that the phaenomena perfedly agreed with thefe Laws, to conclude
from thence that the Laws of the two Motions were the fame.

But though, by thus comparing the two Motions, the Law of the
Planetary Motion has been difcovered, yet that comparlfon has led
the Newtonians Into the errors which I have obferved in their fyftem :
And, _yf/y?, as the two Motions agree in fo many things, they have
been led to believe that they agreed In every thing, and, particu-
larly, that they both began in the fame way, that Is, by Impulfe ;
whereas, there is nothing in the nature of things to hinder that they
may have had different origins, and yet be governed by the fame
Laws. If, indeed, they had not only begun differently, but had

llkewlfe

Chap. VIII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 441

likewife been carried on differently, there might have been fome dif-
ficulty in the matter. But, I think, I have fhown very clearly, that
they are both carried on by the fame Power, namely Pvlind. — There
may have been another reafon, as I have obferved, why Sir Ifaac
fuppofed their Motion to be begun by Impulfe, namely, that this
Motion is, by the neceffity of its Nature, always in Straight Lines ;
and, without analyfmg the Planetary Motion into Straight Lines, it
was impoffible, as I have faid, to demonftrate its Laws. And there
may have been likewife another reafon, viz. that, in Motion begun
by Bodily Impulfe, the Moving Power is perceptible by the fenfe ^
whereas that Moving Power I call Mind falls under the perception
-of no fenfe, and, therefore, is not fo obvious.

Another error, that this comparifon has led the Newtonians into,
is to fuppofe that the Planetary Motion is compounded, as theyfup-
pofe the Motion of Projedliles to be. And, indeed, if the Pro-
je£lile Motion w^ere not only begun by Bodily Impulfe, but car-
ried on, either by Bodily Impulfe, or by Mind defledting it into
a Curve, it muft neceffarily be compounded, according to the defini-
tion of compounded Motion above given. * But, as I think I have
fhown that it muft necefl'arily be carried on by Mind, and by Mind
only, as well as the Planetary Motion, it follows that, by the fame
neceffity, the Motion in both muft be fimple.

3//0, As the Projedile, when it is not moved by Impulfe in the
Parabola, has a defcent, or tendency to defcend, in a Straight Line
towards the Centre ; fo, they fuppofed that the Planet, if it was not
projected (to fpeak in their language), would fall down to the
Centre, but without the leaft proof, or probability, as I think I have
•fhown J.

Vol. n. K k k Thus

* See P. 389. t Sec P. 400.

442 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookV..

Thus, I think, I have not only given a true account of the Prin-
ciples of Sir Ifaac's Aftronomy, but have pointed out the Caufes of
the errors of the Newtonians with refpe£t to them, which ought to
give full fatisfadlion to every man who is difpofed to liflen to reafon
upon the fubjedl.

But there are, I know, who will liften to no reafoning againft the
principles of a Philofophy, as they call it, of which the conclufions
are confelTed to be true. But I would afk thefe gentlemen, Ji'Jl^ Whe--
ther they believe that there is fuch a thing as Mind in the Univerfe?
idly^ Whether they do not believe that Mind, if it does exift, is the
Author of all the Motions in the Univerfe ? 3^/)', Whether or not
the Planets, in particular, are not moved immediately and diredlly
by Mind? and whether there be the leaft proof or probability of
their being moved by Fluids or Ethers, or Impulfe of Solid Bodies?
4//6/)', Whether it be not in the power of the Supreme Being, either
by himfelf, or by inferior^Minds, to move thefe Bodies in the Orbits
in which they are moved, without Projedion or Gravitation, with-
out Centripetal or Centrifugal Forces? Or, Whether he be-necef-
farily confined, by the unfurmountable nature of things, to move
thefe Bodies in the way prefcribed by the Newtonians ? And, lojlly^
Whether, fuppofmg the Planets to be moved by Mind, in the fimple
manner I contend for, the fame Laws of their Motion would not
take place ? Would not their fall from the Tangent be the fame ?
Would not their Velocity in the different parts of their Orbits be as
the perpendiculars to thefe Tangents inverfely ? Would not a Line
drawn from the Centre to the Body in Motion defcribe Spaces pro-
portional to the times ? And, Iqftly^ Would not Kepler's difcovery,
that the Cubes of the diftances from the Centre are as the Squares
of the Periodical Times, be equally true and deducible by neceffa-
ry confequence, from the Laws of the Motion? If all this be
true, and, at the fame time, it be not true that the Planets are moved

by

Chap. VIII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 443

by Bodily Impulfe, much lefs that they would go on for ever by virtue
of fuch Impulfe ? if there be neither Gravitation nor Projeflion in
reality, but only in hypothefis, What is the confequence? Only this,
•that the Newtonians teach their Science in an improper manner and
lay down as Principles, Propofitions which are not true, and fomc of
them impoflible to be true. To endeavour to prove that thefe are
neceflarily connedled with the Science, and that their theorems can-
not otherwife be demonftrated, is, I think, to give up their Science •
and it were better for them, as I have faid, to acknowledge that they
know no more in Aftronomy than what was before known, that is
fa£ts and phaenomena, but do not know by what Law of the Mo-
lion thefe phaenomena are produced.

It may appear extraordinary to thofe who have not learned their
Logic, that true conclufions, fuch as I admit thofe of the Newto-
nians to be, fhould be drawn from falfe premifles : But this is very
often done, and may be done in every cafe. I will give only one
example, which is commonly given by the Commentators upon A-
riftotle :

Every Animal is a Stone ;

A Stone is a Senfitive Being ;

Therefore every Animal is a Senfitive Being,

Here the conclufion is undoubtedly true, and, according to the rules
of Syllogifm, properly inferred from the premifTes ; but thefe are
abfolutely falfe. In this way, I think, the Newtonians argue, when
rhey fay that

All Bodies gravitate towards one another, at however great a
diftance j

The Moon, and the other Planets, gravitate towards the Bo-
dies in their feveral Centres ;

Therefore their Motions are governed by fuch and fuch Laws.
K k k 2 Or

444 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

Or thus,

All Bodies in Motion round a Centre, In a Circle' or Elllpfis,
are moved both by a Centripetal and Centrifugal Force ;

The Celeftlal Bodies, being moved round a Centre, are moved
by both thefe Forces ;

Therefore they are moved by fuch and fuch Laws.

Here the conclufion of both thefe Syllogifms Is true, but the pre-
mifles, in my opinion, falfe. In place of thefe, I have endeavour-
ed to fubftitute other premiffes, which are true, and from which the
fame conclufions may be inferred.

CHAP;

Chap. IX. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 44r

II A P. IX.

Recapitulation of the Contents of the preceding Chapters. — The Diflinc~
tion betivixt Mind and Body, and the different Natures of each.,
the Foundation both of Theology and Natural Philol'ophy, — the one
adtive, the other paflive. — This the mojl ancient Philofophy known
in the World. — The Foundation of MateriaJifm, that Body // both
adive and paflive. — Materialifm, the Philofophy of the Scnfcs. —
Ariftodemus'j Converfation with Socrates. — The Materialift, if he
reafon confequentially, will not admit that his own Body // moved
by his Mind. — Dr. PrieflJey, in deiiying this^ reafons cotfequentially.
— He a perfeSl Materialifl: ; others but Demi-Materialifls. — Of the
difficulty in conceiving Invifible Powers. — All Powers invifible. —
Mr. Locke'j Philofophy., of the poffibility rf Matter thinking, has
laid the Foundation of all our Materialifm. — The great Progrefs of
Materialifm of late Tears. — This owing to Experiments without
Philofophy. — Thefrjl Experimenters in Europe not Materialifts, bc-
caufe they were Philofophers. — The Propenfity of our Philofophy to
Mechanfni^ accounts for the favourable reception both ofDes Cartes'/

Syilem and Sir Ifaac Newton'j- The latter can fand its Ground

without the ajjifance of the Mechanical Philofophy. — All the Cpi-
nions enumerated^ that can pofftbly be concerning the Motion of the
Celeftial Bodies. — Firft Opinion^ that Body monies itfelf. — Tins the
DoElrine of the Antient Materialifts and h.'uKxQ^^.^The mofl fimplc
of all the Hypothefes concerning the Motion of the Celeftial Bodies,
irreconcileable with the Compoftion of their Motion fuppofd by the
Newtonians. — Second Hypothcfts., that the Planets are moved by
Mind only. — This Hypothefts as ftmple as the Nature of Things will

permit.

4i6 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookV.

permit. — // admits^ hoiaever^ of fome Variety.— TWx^ Hypothefts^
that Body is the only Moving Power — admits of great Variety. —
I ft, It may be fuppofed that the Body in the Centre is the Catfe of
the Motion of the Planet. — 'This^ if triie^ a great Difcovery of Modern
Times. — 2do, // maybefippofcd that the Planet is moved /^j'Pulfion,
both in the Proje£tile aiid Centripetal Line. — This Suppoftion has
fome Simplicity and Uniformity in it. — 3dly, // may be fuppofed that
the Planet is ntoved by Pulfion in the one Line^ and Trufion in the
other. — This Suppoftion not fo fimple as the preceding. — -The fourth
Hypothefs^ that the Planet is moved both by Body (7;/^ Mind. — Thisy
too., admits of confderable Variety. — Thefe are all the Opinions pof-
fiblc concerning the Planetary Motion. — Of thcfe the reader may
choofe what he likes bef. — Conclufon of the Book. — Su7n7nary of what
the Author thinks he has proved conceriiwg Mind and Body. — Sir
Ifaac Newton's Principia, though not a Pbilofoj)hical Work^ fif"
Jii/Jjes ample Matter to the Philofopher.

IN the preceding Chapters, I have endeavoured to prove, ffff^
that Motion produced by Impulfe cannot go on for ever, nor,
indeed, at all, by virtue of that Impulfe, nor by virtue of any Vis
infita in the Body moved ; and that, therefore. Sir Ifaac's Firft Law
of Motion cannot be defended, unlefs it be confidcred as only aflert-
ing that Body is perfe<3;ly Paflive, and can neither of itfelf begin
Motion, ftop it, or alter its diredion, fo that it muft always continue
in the fame State of Reel or of Motion (if we will ipeak fo improperly),
unlefs its State be changed by fomething elfe, and can no more ftop
its own Motion than begin it. ido^ That the Celeftial Bodies are not
moved by Pulfion, or Trufion, nor in any way refembling that
in which Body moves Body, but by Mind adting, not upon the fur-
face of thefe Bodies, but upon every particle of them. 3/'/o, That
Mind moves thefe Bodies in the moft firaple and diredt way poffible,

4 and

ehnp. IX. A N T I E N T M E TA P H Y S I C S. 447

and not by any combined or compounded Motion, fuch as that of
Projection and Gravitation. And, lajlly\ that Sir Ifaac Newton's
Aftronomy, the Laws of the Planetary Motions, which he has dif-
covered, and the Theorems founded upon thofc Laws, will all ftand
good, upon my hypothefis of the Planets being moved by Mind ia
the moll fimple and direct manner.

The foundation of my whole argument, and, indeed, I think ,
of Theology and the true Philofophy of Nature, is this Propofi-
tion, — That there is a diftindion betwixt Mind and Body, that Mind
is the Moving Power in this Univerle, and that Body is only movedy
and that, therefore. Body cannot move itfelf ; the confequence of
which is, that Body neither can begin nor continue Motion; for,,
betwixt thefe two, I think I have fliown, both from the reafon of
the thing, and from fa£l and experience, that there is no difference.
In fhort, my philofophy is that moft antient philofophy, more an-
tient than the Schools either of Plato or Ariftotle, which main- -
tains that there are two things in this univerfe, comprehending
every thing in it, one of which ads, and the other fuffers, or, in
other words. Mind and Body ; the former of which is the adive
Power in Nature, while the latter is merely paffive, and only the
fubjedl upon which the other ads *.

On the other hand, the Materiallft, if he truly undcrftands his own

caufe, muft maintain that there is no fuch diftindion in Nature ; that

Body is both adive and paflive, and therefore can both move itfelf,

and be moved by itfelf. This, as I have more than once faid, is the

only foundation upon which Materialifm can ftand ; for it is im-

poffible that Pulfion, Trufion, or any other adion that we can

conceive of Body upon Body, can ac:ount for either the beginning.

or the continuation of the feveral Motions in Nature. .

Materialifm .
* Vol.1, pajje 32.

448 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V,

MaterlalHm may be faid to be the Philofophy of the Senfes : And
it has undoubtedly arifen from Men believing, as Plato fays cer-
tain Philofophers in his time did, that nothing cxifted but what they
could lay hold of with their hands, or otherwife perceive by
their Senfes. Of this Se£t was one Ariftodemus, mentioned by
Xenophon in the Memorabilia. Socrates, in order to convince
him that there were Gods, or Superior Intelligences in the Uni-
verfe, infifts much upon the evident marks of council and defign,
that appeared in their works. ' Ay, but,' fays Ariftodemus, ' I

* do not fee thofe Powers who perform all thefe wonderful things,

* as 1 fee the Artifts of thofe works which we admire here on

* Earth.' ' But neither,' fays Socrates, * do you fee your own

* Mind, which moves your Body, and does fo many other things*.'
This argument I have infifted much upon in this Work ; and,
indeed, if a man is not convinced that there is an invifible Power,
which moves his own Body, it is impoffible he ever can believe in
the invifible things of God ; for the argument, as Dr. Prieftley ad-
mits, fairly proceeds by analogy, from the Motions of our own
Bodies to the Motions of other Bodies in Nature ; becaufe, fays
the Dodor, if there be a Mind in us, which moves our Bodies
there alfo mufl be a Mind in other Bodies, when they are moved,
but not moved by any thing external : And, indeed, it is im-
poffible to divide the Matter ; but we muft either be perfe£t Mate-
rialifts, like him, or Demi-Materialifts, and very bad Reafonei's. I
am, therefore, not at all furprifed, that the Dodor, and other Ma-
terialifts with whom -I have converfed, fhould deny that our Bodies
are moved by our Minds : But, on the contrary, I think they ar-
gue very confiftently ; and, however wonderful it may appear that
our Bodies fhould move themfelves, and not be moved by our
Minds, it is not at all more wonderful, than that many other Mo-
tions

* Memorabilia, lib. i.

Chap.IX. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 449

tlons, which we fee, not of Animal Bodies only, but of Bodies un-
organized, {hould go on of therafelvcs, and without any Mind.

As to the difficulty of conceiving invifihle Powers, I would have
our Materialiils to learn at leaft fo much of tlie Antient Philofophy,
as to know that all Powers and Faculties, however vifible their ope-
rations may be, are themfelves inviilble things, falling under tlie ap-
prehenfion of no Senfe. This Power, therefore, which they fay
Body has of moving itfelf, they muft allow to be invifible, though
they perceive the effefts of it. And, if fo, the only queftion be-
twixt them and me is, Whether this invifible Power belongs to a
fubRance that is alfo invifible, and whofe qualities are likewifc all
invifible, or to a fubftance which is vifible, and whofe qualities are
all perceptible by Senfe, except this quality of moving itfelf, which
thofe Phllofophers have difcovcred in it ? If, indeed, it were true,
as Mr. Locke has faid, that Matter might think, it certainly could
not be difputed that it might alfo have the Power of moving itfelf:
Nor do I wonder that any man, who knows no more of the Philo-
fophy of Mind than what is to be learned from Mr. Locke, fhould
believe fo ; for, if Mr. Locke has convinced him, that Body may
refled, turn upon itfelf, and make itfelf its own obj<;£t, he can have
little doubt but that, in Motion, as well as in thinking, it may be
both Agent and Patient at the fame time, and in the fame rcfpe(fl:.
And this (hows it to be true, what I have obferved elfewhere, that
Mr. Locke, by fo imperfed and erroneous a fyftem of mind, has laid
the foundation of all the Materialifm and Athcifin that has been ad-
vanced fince his time.

The Material Philofophy, as I have elfewhere obferved, has in-
creafed wonderfully in Europe fince we deferted the Schools of
Plato and Ariftotle, and begun to philofophife upon our own ftock,
without the afTiftance of the Antients ; And nothing has contributed
more to the growth of it, than the Experimental Philofophy, as it is
called, which has been fo much in fafliion, for above a century and a

Vol. II. L 1 1 half.

4^0

ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookV.

half. The firft experimental men in Europe were Chemlfts : But they,
as I have elfewhere obferved *, were firm believers in Mind, ac-
cording to the dodlrine of Antient Philofophy ; in which though
it does not appear they were learned, yet, as it was the only
philofophy of thofe times, it was very natural that they fhould
adopt the dodlrines of it ; and, therefore, what they obferved of
Natiu'e, made them admire the more the works of God, and
the operations of Mind in Body ; for it was in that way they
accounted for all the wonderful phacnomena that their art exhibit-
ed : Whereas, our prefent men of Experiment, being ignorant of
Antient Philofophy, and confequently of the Philofophy of Mind,
and obferving furprifing operations of Body by itleif, as they
think, come at laft to be perfuaded, that there is nothing elfe
in the Univerfe but Body ; and that the inherent Powers of Body,
or the Fires Infitae^ are fufficient to account for all the phaeno-
mena of Nature. There have been very few among us hitherto,
that have carried Materialifm the full length. But, if we believe
that Man is a machine, as Dr. Prieflley, and the Abbe Prade
do, and that our whole Solar Syftem is nothing but a Machine,,
where can we flop ? It is but one ftep farther, and, I think, not a
ftride, to believe that there is nothing but Matter and Mechanifm in
the Univerfe.

I doubt it is the propenfity of our modern Philofophy to Mecha-
nifm, that has contributed to make firfl the philofophy of Des Cartes,
and then that of Sir Ifaac Newton, fo eagerly embraced all over
Europe. That Des Cartes's philofophy is entirely of the mechanical
kind, cannot, I think, be denied : But I hope I have fhown, that
Sir Ifaac's Aftronomy can be fupported, without any aid from Ma-
terialifm ;

Non tall Auxil'io nee defenforihits ijl'is

Caufa egli

And
♦ Vol.1, p. 239. Where I have given a pretty full account of their philofophy,
which agrees wonderfully with the Antient Philofophy,

Chap. IX. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 451

And I hope that following the footfteps of Dr. Clarke, and agree-
ing with Dr. Horfely in the capital point, of Body not moving, or
continuing to move itfelf, by any Power eflential to its nature, 1
have founded Sir Ifaac Newton's Aftronomy upon fuch principles of
found philofophy and genuine Theifin, that it will ftand the exa-
mination of ages, in defiance of the predidlion of Dr. Swift, ' That
* it will not laft, but have the fate of other Syftcms * ;' which, like
the comments of opinion, to ufe Cicero's words, Time deftroys,
while it confirms the judgments of Nature f«

But as, after all, I think it is not imlikely that many of my rea-
ders may not agree with me in the principles upon which I have put
Sir Ifaac Newton's Aftronomy, I think it is not improper, before I
conclude this book, fhortly to ftate all the opinions that have been
maintained, or can be maintained, concerning the Motion of the
Celeftial Bodies : So that, if the reader does not approve of my opi-
nion upon the fubjcdt, he may choofe, of all poflible opinions, that
which he likes beft.

And, in the fujl place, it is evident that the Planets muft either
move themfelvcs, or they muft be moved by fomething different from
themfelves, and which, of neceffity, muft be either Mind or Body,
or both Body and Mind ; and the Motion produced in one or other
of thefe ways muft be either fimple or combined. Thefe divifions,
I think, muft exhauft the whole fubjeft ; fo that I may conclude,
in the way that Ariftotle commonly concludes his enumerations,
* That, befides thefe, there is nothing.'

L 1 1 2 If

* Voyage to Laput-i, clup. 8.

f Opinionum commenta delet dies, Naturae judicia confirmat. DtNat.Dter.

452 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookV.

If it be true that the Planets move themfelves, the Materialft may
boaft, that his Syftem of the Planetary Motion is the moft fimple of
any; and, indeed, there can be nothing more fimple than the Hy-
pothefis, that there is but one Subftance in the Univerfe, whether
that be Mind, as Dr. Berkley maintained, or Body, as the Materia-
lifts maintain: Nor is this opinion, concerning the Planetary Mc-
tion, deftitute of antient authority ; for it was the Opinion of
Strato the Peripatetic, and it is that f)'fl;em of Atheifm which Cud-
worth calls the Eylozoic'^, and which is fo far confiftent with itfelfi
that it fuppofes not only a Vis Injitci, or Motive Power, efTentlal to
Matter, but alfo Intelligence ; for the .moft abfurd and fenfelefs
Syftem of Atheifm is that of Epicurus, who maintained, that all that
order and arrangement which we difcover in the Univerfe, and
which is to be fcen, not only in things cocxiftent, but in the
regular fucceflion of Animals and Plants, and, above all, in the
wonderful order and regularity of the movements of the Celet
tial Bodies, w^as produced merely by the Impulfe, Tfufion, or
Preflure of Bodies, and the different configurarions and arrange-
ments of things thence arifing. This fyftem, of Body moving

itfelf, is not only fimple, in refpet^ that it makes the Moving
Power, and the Body moved, to be the fame ; but alfo, in this re-
fped, that the Motion thus produced is perfedly fimple. And here
I obferve, that the Materialifts, who would conhedt their fyftem with
the Aftronomy of Sir Ifaac Newton, which, as it is commonly
taught, neceffarily fuppofes a combined Motion of the Planets, are
very much puzzled and perplexed ; for they find it abfolutely im-
poffible, upon their Hypothefis of the Planet moving itfelf, to fhow
that the Motion is compounded. And fo much for the firft Hypo-
thefis of the Planets moving themfelves.

If this fijft Hypothefis is rejeded, the next to be confidered is that
which I have adopted, namely, that Mind is the only Moving
Power of the Planet, and Mind ading conftantly and indefinently..

And

• See a pretty full account of this Sjftem given, Vol. I. p, 240.

Chap. IX. ANTIENT M ETAP^HY SICS. 453

And this fyftem, I think, has the merit of being as fimple as the na-
ture of things will permit ; for it fuppofes only two things in Na-
ture, that which ads, and that which is aded upon ; and it is not
only fimple in itfelf, hut, as I have endeavoured to fhow, fimplifies
exceedingly the Aftronomy of Sir Ifaac, hy difincumhering it of
Axioms and Poftulates, which cannot be admitted, or, if they could
are entirely unneceflary for the purpofe of Aftronomy. That the
Laws of the Planetary Motion, upon this hypothefis, would be fuch
as Sir Ifaac has demonftrated them to he, and that all the Phaeno-
mena vfould correfpond with thefc Laws, I think it is impoffible to
deny; and, if fo, every Newtonian muft admit that it is a very-
great improvement, if not of the Syftem, at leaft of the Manner of
teaching it.

This fecond Hypothefis, however, will admit of fome variety;
for there are, who, unwilling to part with Sir Ifaac's Firfl: Law of
Motion, and being refolved, in fome way or another, to make a
Machine of the Heavens, are difpofed to think that the Planet may
have been at firft fet in Motion by Mind ; but that it aftervv'ards
goes on for ever, without the agency of either Body or Mind ;
whereas I maintain that it cannot go on without the unceafing ener-
gy of Mind. And there is another difference of opinion upon this
Hypothefis : For I maintain that the Planetary Motion by Mind is
perfectly fimple ; whereas thofe, who believe that there can be
no Motion, even by Mind, but in a Straight Line, muft employ
another Mind to urge the Body towards the Centre : And thus the
Planetary Motion, according to them, though produced by Mind
onlv, is compounded.

This is all the variety, which, I think, the fecond Hypotliefis ad-
mits of But the third, which makes Body (by whidi, I mean,
Body, other than the Planet itfelf) the only moving Power, admits
of much greater; So that, out of it, there grow fevei-al hypothefes,
which it requires fome tiine and patience to confider diftindly;

and

454 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V.

and yet it is neccfiaiy that they flioukl be confiderctl, if we have a
mind to view the fubje<5t in 4ts full extent. I will begin with the
moft fimple of thefe Hypothefes, which is, that the Central Bodies
attradl: the Planets that go round them ; by which I underftand
that they do really attrad them, in the proper etymological fenfe of
the word. This Hypothefis might be ftill farther funpliiied, by fup-
pofmg, as I have faid, that the Central Bodies not only attra£l the
Planets to them, but make them perform the whole Motion round
them, as the hand not only draws the ftone in the fling to it, but
makes it go round: For, if a Body, at the diftance of thoufimds of
miles, can draw another to it, why fliould it not be able, likewife,
to make it go round it? But, as it is commonly underftood only
to attraft the Planet, there muft. be another Motion in the Projedile
Line, by Bodily Impulfe; fo that the Motion is neceffarily com-
pounded. I will only add further, to what I have faid upon this
fubje£t, that, if there be any truth in this Hypothefis, of Body ad-
ing upon Body at a diftance, it is one of the greateft difcoveries in
modern times; for no antient philofopher ever dreamed that Body
could a£l upon Body, without being in contadt with it, either me-
•diately or immediately, any more than that a Body, once fet in Mo-
tion by Impulfe, would continue in Motion for ever, by virtue of
that Impulfe.

The next fuppofition, grafted upon this third Plypothefis, is, I
think, poffible, which, I mufl confefs, I think the other is not ;
namely, that the Planet is moved in the Line of Projedlion by Pul-
fion, and, in the Centripetal Line, by PuHion likewife ; but with
this difference, that, in the Line of Projedion, one Pulfion is fuffi-
cient to make the Body go on for ever, with the fame velocity ;
whereas, in the Centripetal Line, as the velocity is conftantly in-
creafing, repeated pulfations are neceflary. This fyflem has fo far
the merit of uniformity and fimplicity, that it not only employs the

5 fame

Qiap.IX. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 455

fame Moving Power, that is, Body, to produce the Motion, but
alfo that Power ading in the fame way, that is, by Pulfion.

The lafl: pofTible cafe upon this Hypothefis is, that the Planets
fhould be moved in the one Line, by PuIfion, and, in the other, by
Trufion ; for, as to its being moved by Drawing * in either of the
Lines, it is fuppofed, I behevc, by nobody. This Syftem has not the
unifonnity of the kift meutioned ; for, though it employ the fame
Power to move the Planet, that Po^.er operates differently in each of
the. Motions.

I come now to the fourth and laft H)'pothefis, which fuppofes the.
Planet to be moved both by Mind and Body. The common way of
dividing the Motion, thus compounded of thefc different Powers is
to fuppofe that the Projedile Motion is from Bodily Impulfe, but
the Centripetal Motion by Mind. But here, too, there is a confi-
derable variety of poffible cafes; for the Projedile Motion may be
fuppofed to be produced, either by Pulfion or by Trufion, and if
by Impulfe,. either by one PulHvtion, or by repeated Puliations :
Or, the Hypothefis may be changed with refpedl to the two Motions
and the Centripetal Motion may be fuppofed to be produced by Body •
and this in two ways, either by Pulfion, or by Trufion while the
Projedile Motion is carried on by Mind ; and this, by Mind ading
either by one Impulfe, as Body ads, or by conftant and unceafing
energy.

Thefe are all the poffible ways in which the Planets can be mo-
ved ; fo many, and fo various, that, I am afraid, I have wearied

my

* Drawing, as I have explained if, p. 343. is, when the Moving Force aflj
upon that part of the Body which is next to the dircaion in which- the Body is
cd, not upon the oppofite fide ; for then it is Protruft^n, not Drawing,

mov

4i6 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookV.

niy reader, as well as niyfelf, in reckoning them up. But I wanted
to give a full view of the fubjed, fo that, of all poflihle Hypothefes,
the reader might choofe that which he liked bcft — whether the old
atheiftical notion, of Body moving itfelf, — or the new invented
Syftem, and which, I think, does not differ much from the old, of
Body continuing itfelf for ever in Motion once begun — or the
.Syftem of Body adting upon Body at a dillance, vs^hich muft be al-
lowed, for the honour of modern times, to be entirely new ; or whe-
ther he will adopt any of the complicated ways above mentioned, of
the Planet being moved, either by Body, in the common way of Pul-
fion or Trufion, or partly by Body and partly by Mind. Or, laftly,
Whether he will not prefer to all thefe new invented Syftems the
Hypothefis pf the antient Theifts, which I have endeavoured to de-
fend, That the Planets are moved by Mind, in the moft funple and
dire£l manner, and that the refolution of their Motion into two
Motions, is only for the fake of teaching and demonftration.

But, though I fliould have been unfuccefsful in proving that the
Celeftial Motions are as fimple as I would make them, I fhall not
think my time and labour loft, if I have convinced my readers that
Mind and Body are perfectly difierent and diftinil from each other,
Adlivity being of the nature of the one, and perfcdl Inatlivity or
Paftivity of the nature of the other — that, therefore. Reft and Mo-
tion are not indifferent to Eody ; Reft being of the nature and cf-
fence of a Paffive Subftance, fuch as Body i whereas Motion is
adventitious to it, being given to it by mind, either mediately or im-
mediately : fo that, by its nature, it has not the capacity of moving
itfelf, but only of being moved — and that, therefore. Body cannot,
by any Force inherent, or any Power belonging to its nature and ef-
fence, continue Motion, any more than begin it. If I have done
this, I think I fhall have done fome fervice, both to Religion and
Philofophy.

Thu?,

Chap.IX. ANTIENT M E Tx\PH YS I CS. 4^7

Thus, I have fmiflied what I have to fay upon the fubjed of Sir
Ifaac Newton's Aftronomy, to which I have endeavoured to apply
my Philofophy of Mind. Of this Philoibphy, I think I may fay
with truth, that, If there be fuch a thing as Philofophy, and if it be
not a mere found without meaning, Mind mufl: be the fubjed: of it :
Nor do I know that there is any fcience, or knowledge of any kind,
belonging to Body, except Natural Hiftory, Geometry, and Mecha-
nics ; to which w^e may add Anatomy and Phyfic, if we think thev
are not comprehended under Natural Hiftoiy. That Mind is the
fubjed of Logic, Morals, Metaphyfics, and Theology, nobody will
deny. And, if it be true that Philofophy is the knowledge of Caufes
there can be no Philofophy of Nature w^ithout the knowledge of
Mind. This knowledge, when applied to Nature, leads us necef-
farily to the Study of Fitial Caufes, the Firft of all Caufes, and
therefore, the chief obje£t of Philofophy, which is the Science of
Caufes. Now, the difcovery of Final Caufes is, in my opinion, not
only the moft ufeful and delightful part of Natural Philofophy, but
the eafieft : For it is much eafier to difcover why a thing is done in
Nature, than how it is done ; and there are many men who have
employed their whole lives in ftudying the Mechanical Means that
Nature employs to accomplifh her purpofes, who, after all, mufl
confefs, that the Mechanifm of Nature is fo minute and intricate,
that it is not to be comprehended, at leaft by us, nor unravelled and
diffefted, like a machine of human invention.

It muft, however, be confefled, that we are not always able to dif-
cover the Final Caufes of things, even of the moft common phae-
nomena, fuch as Magnetifm and Eledricity ; for I do not know that
it has yet been found out what purpofe either of thefe ferves in the
Syftem of Nature : And, ihould it never be difcovered, it is not to
be wondered at, that our narrow Minds cannot comprehend the
Final Caiife of every thing in fuch a Syftem. But though, in

Vol. II. M m m every

458 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookV.

every cafe, we cannot attain to this knowledge, there is another
thing concerning the Syftem, which, if we can difcover, it is mak-
ing confiderable progrefs in the knowledge .of it: And that is, the
Relation of the fcvcral parts of the Syftem to one another, even of
thofe that fcem the mofl remote, and to have the leaft connection
together. Now, Sir Ifaac has made a difcovery of this kind, the
greateft, I believe, that ever was made by any philofopher : So that,
though his work be not of the philofophical kind, he has furnifhed
ample materials for the contemplation of the philofopher. The
difcovery I mean is that of the fimilarity betwixt the Motions of the
Celeftial Bodies and Projeftiles here on Earth, by which he has con-
nected the Motion of the remotell Bodies with the neareft, the
greateft with the leaft, and difcovered that relation of things beloia
to things above, and of Heaven to Earth, which the Antients ap-
pear to have had fome Idea of*, but never could make out in the
way that Sir Ifaac has done.

What I have faid of the greater facility in comprehending the
philofophy of Mind, when applied to Nature, than in underftand-
ing the Material and Mechanical Syftem of Nature, will, I think,
apply very well to Aftronomy ; for, unlefs we are to maintain that
Body moves itfelf, and, confequently, that there is no dlftindticu
betwixt Body and Mind, — betwixt that which moveSy and that which

is

* 2v/ii7D-a9)i livai ra nocru toi? xmu. — This I have applied to the conformity obfcrved
betwixt the Motions of the Sea and of the Moon ; fee p. 378. and p. 401. And I
am perfuaded that, if the Antients had known that conformity as well as Sir Ifaac
did, they would have afcribed it to that Sympathy which the Great Creator has
eftablifhed betwixt the feveral Motions in the Univerfe, but would rot have made
the one the Caufe of the other, any more than Sir Ifaac makes the Defcent of the
Moon from the Tangent the Caufe of the Defcent of Bodies here on Earth. In that
inftance, there can be no more than fympathy betwixt the two Motions ; anj
the fame fympathy, I hold, is betwixt the Motion of the Tides, and the Moon's
Motion.

Chap.IX. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 459

is moved^ — 'I think I have fliown, that the Syftem of the Heavens, as
explained by Matter and Mechanifm, is exceedingly perplexed and
intricate, if not altogether inconceivable, even if we are to mix
Mind with Matter, and afcribe the Motions of the Planets partly to
both: Whereas the Moving Power of thofe Bodies, according to
my Syflem, is as obvious, and known to us as much, or more, I
think, than any of the phaenomena of Nature ; becaufe we know
it by Confcioufnefs, the inoft certain of all knowledge. The Power
I mean, is that which moves our own Bodies : And, therefore, if a
man only believe that his Body does not move itfelf, but is moved
by his Mind, he will have no difficulty to comprehend how the
Planets are moved.

And, in general, I obferve, that the Mechanical Syftem Is of much
more difficult comprehenfion than any Philofopliy of Mind, even
the moft myfterious parts of the Theology of Plato, and of his later
difciples of the Alexandrian School, fuch as Plotinus and Proclus.
How difficult it is to explain upon that Syftem the Motion of the
Celeftial Bodies, I have already ftiown ; nor is the difficulty lefs to
explain the Motions here on Earth. For, upon what Principles
of Matter and Mechanifm, by what Fluids, or Ethers, or Spirits,
can we account for the various Attractions and Repulfions of dif-
ferent Bodies, and of the fame Bodies, upon different Occafions ?
whereas, upon my Syftem, it is as eafy to account for all thefe Mo-
tions, as for the Motions of our own Bodies, though, as I have
obferved, it may be difficult in many Cafes to affign the Final Caufe
of them.

As the knowledge of God is the end of all Philofophy, and the
perfedion of human nature, and as God is only to be known by his
works, I will conclude with obferving, that the Philofophy of Mind,
applied to the Motions of the Celeftial Bodies, gives us a much

M m m 2 higher

46o ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. BookV.

higher Idea of the beauty and perfe(flion of his greateft and mofl
confpicuous works, and, confequently, of his wifdom and power,
than the Mechanical Syftem can do, even fuppofing it admits, as
not only Sir Ifaac Newton, but even Des Cartes did, that God is
ultimately the Author of all the Motion in the Univerfe : For, I
think, I have fhown, that Sir Ifaac, with all his fkill in Geometry
and Mechanics, has made in his Principia a Machine of the Heavens
defeftive in this capital point, that the Moving Power fooner or later
mull fail, fo that the Machine v/ill not be eternal ; which Ariftotle
fays, all the works of God are in one way or another. Befides this,
it is a fad indifputable, that there are feeming Irregularities in the
Motions of the Planets, which appear at leaft to difturb one another,
and to be all difturbed by the Comets. Now, I hope, I have fhewn
that it is impoffible to account for this by Gravitation., as it is common-
ly underftood, that is, the Action of Body upon Body at a diftance;
and if fo, it muft be admitted that there is an Irregularity in the Ma-
chine, which cannot be accounted for upon any mechanical principles.
But upon the Suppofition that Mind is the Moving Power of the
Planet, the efficient Caufe of all its Motions, however irregular they
may feem, is obvious ; and if we believe this Moving Mind to be
under the diredion of Supreme Intelligence, we are fure that all its
Motions of every kind are for fom.e good Purpofe. — Further, I think,
we know with great certainty, that the Univerfe, being the work of
this Supreme Intelligence, is a Syftem, and a moft perfed Syfteni
worthy of its great Author ; but if the Planets, by coming nearer to
one another, did not affed one another's Motions; or If the Comets,
by traverfmg them, did not affe£t all their Motions, there would be
a defed in the Syftem, becaufe there would not be that Sympathy in
Nature, or that Connedion of one thing with another which a Syftem
requires. I will only add, that as thefe Irregularities of the Planetary
Motion cannot be accounted for upon the Mechanical Syftem, other-
wife than by an Hypothefis which Sir Ifaac has declared to be in-
7 conceivable,

Ckap.IX. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 461

conceivable, fo palpable a defedb ought to put an end to that Syftem,
and convince every one that Planets are moved immediately and
diredly by Mind, not by an Impulfe given them fo many thoufand
years ago.

As to the duration of our Syftem, we may, I think, be affured,
that it will never ceafe by any Material Caufe, or through any defed:
of Machinery. But, at the fame time, we know from the beft autho-
rity, that there will fome time or another be a new Heaven and a
new Earth ; and we are taught by Philofophy, that all Material
Things are in a conftant flux and viciflitude of generation and cor-
ruption— that even Minds change -and that there is nothing ftable,
eternal, and unchangeable except Cod.

I N I S.

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