



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A PHILOSOPHICAL TREATISE
ON THE
NATURE AND CONSTITUTION OF MAN.

LONDON:
GILBERT AND RIVINGTON, PRINTERS,
ST. JOHN'S SQUARE.

A PHILOSOPHICAL TREATISE

ON THE

NATURE AND CONSTITUTION OF MAN.

BY GEORGE HARRIS, LL.D. F.S.A.

OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW; VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE
ANTHROPOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND; VICE-
PRESIDENT OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF GREAT BRITAIN;
LATE PRESIDENT OF THE MANCHESTER ANTHROPOLOGICAL SOCIETY;
FOREIGN MEMBER OF THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF
NEW YORK; FELLOW OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL
SOCIETY; AUTHOR OF "CIVILIZATION CON-
SIDERED AS A SCIENCE," "THE
THEORY OF THE ARTS,"
ETC.

Γνωθι σεαυτον.

VOL II.

London :

GEORGE BELL & SONS, YORK STREET, COVENT GARDEN.

CAMBRIDGE: DEIGHTON, BELL, & CO.

1876.

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
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BOOK II.

THE MORAL NATURE AND CONSTITUTION OF MAN.



CHAPTER I.

MORAL DISPOSITION AND CHARACTER.

1. *Constitution and Essence of Moral Endowment.*

OF the three several departments into which the consideration of the nature and constitution of man is divided in the present work, that which relates to his moral being is necessarily on many accounts the most complex, and the most perplexing. The subjects requiring to be embraced in connexion with it, are not only very diversified as regards their extent, but very abstruse in their quality; and the mutual bearing and dependence of each branch of the constitution of man upon the other, demand to be ascertained, and very precisely adjusted, ere any correct decision upon the matter can be arrived at. Hence arises the extraordinary abstruseness and obscurity in which most topics of an ethical nature appear to be frequently so inextricably involved. It is, moreover, with disquisitions upon them, as it is with arithmetical calculations, that the most trivial error in any one of the items renders the whole sum wrong throughout; although, on the other hand, arithmetical exercises are, happily, wholly exempt from all those perversions arising from the bias of the feelings, to which ethical controversies are so peculiarly subject; and which, as I shall endeavour to illustrate when I come to treat on the process of reasoning,¹ is what mainly occasions topics of this nature so liable to be erroneously determined. Law and ethics, whose object and province it is to reduce all other subjects to order and certainty; as respects the conclusions attempted to be effected regarding themselves, but too often prove uncertain and unsatisfactory. Hence, those appliances which we regard as, and which ever ought to be, the surest safeguards against confusion and error, are, on the contrary, frequently found to be among their main promoters.

That which constitutes what is ordinarily termed the moral nature of man, does not consist in any actual independent quality or power possessed by him of a moral kind; but simply

¹ *Vide post*, b. iii. c. 3. s. 7, 8.

in the various medial and mental endowments with which he is gifted, simultaneously and reciprocally acting together upon each other,—some aiding, others retarding the operation of the entire system,—and producing as the result of their united concurrent operations, a certain determinate principle as regards the action they occasion, which forms the real essence of the moral endowment, characteristic, or disposition of the individual.² Hence, the moral endowments of man are none of them simple or separate of themselves, but are all of them formed by the complex and reciprocal operation and influence of the medial endowments, and the mental powers. Moral endowments are, indeed, in this respect somewhat analogous to certain chemical productions which are originated and constituted by the conjunction together of two or more simple substances of an opposite kind, that at once by amalgamation form a new element, in its nature totally different from either of its compounds. In this respect too, moral endowment somewhat resembles man himself, who is, as it were, placed on the confines between mind and matter. So moral endowment springs out of the conjoint operations of the mental and medial parts of our nature.

In the consideration and determination of the moral endowment, and disposition, and character, of any person, we have therefore, to ascertain, and to keep in view, what are the several medial and mental properties, and qualities, and powers of such an individual; the relative proportionate extent, strength, and activity of each of these agents; and their respective influence, both to incite and to retard action in any particular case. The ultimate course of general habitual conduct, directed and produced by these mutual reciprocal and counteracting powers and influences, is that which constitutes the moral character of the man.

If we examine minutely the conduct of any person, we shall find that the emotions, appetites, passions, and other endowments already alluded to, are ceaselessly in operation, according as various circumstances or causes may contribute to excite them, some impelling him in one direction, others in another; so that the influence of one counteracts or balances that of the other, and thus allows the operations of the reason to exercise their legitimate sway in the regulation of the actions. Thus, to put the case of an ordinary criminal, appetite

² According to *Mr. Darwin*, "a moral being is one who is capable of comparing his past and future actions or motives, and of approving or disapproving of them."—*Descent of Man, &c.*, vol. i. p. 88.

Professor Mill defines morality to be "an obedience to the law and constitution of man's nature, assigned him by the Deity in conformity to His own essential and unchangeable attributes, the effect of which is the general happiness of His creatures."—*Theory of Moral Obligation*.

and passion urge him on to the commission of crime; while the emotion of fear from the chances of discovery, and the dictates of reason pointing out to him the iniquity and danger of his course, urge him in an opposite direction. If his reason predominates in influencing his conduct, it will in such a case prevail, and will determine him to resist the temptation before him. If, on the other hand, his reason be subjected to the lower impulses, appetite and passion will prevail, and he will rush into crime. This final result, produced by the reciprocal opposite and counteracting influence of these various medial and mental endowments and powers, is that which constitutes the moral character and disposition and endowment of the individual.

The emotions, and even the passions, will nevertheless in certain cases be found serviceable, and directly conducive to the amelioration and exaltation of the moral constitution of man's nature. Thus, a person who is but little susceptible of emotion, or of excitement by passion, although more entirely under the guidance of reason than those who are extensively liable to be thus moved, is apt to be wanting in those warm and genial feelings towards others, and in those actions of vigorous effort for their good, which so mark and adorn the character of the latter. Those who are not easily excited by their own internal operations, are not readily moved by the circumstances of others. Hence, indifference about self, is very apt to be accompanied by apathy respecting those near to us.

Not only, moreover, is every endowment and propensity of our nature, however humble and even base in its order, capable of being exercised in its due course, and in fulfilment of its appropriate end, without incurring the violation of any moral rule; but he who neglects, legitimately and to the full, to avail himself of their proper use when required, is liable to fall into errors as gross and as grievous as he who, by his excessive indulgence of them, and from being too extensively swayed by their influence, recklessly abuses the possession of the good gifts.

There is, indeed, this essential distinction between an emotion, an appetite, a passion, an affection, and a moral endowment; in that while the four first of these all spring entirely and solely from the medial part of our nature, however compounded they may be of different emotions and feelings of that class, or one with another, and are in certain cases also aided or consummated by an operation of the mind: each of the moral endowments are compounded of certain operations and properties belonging both to the medial and to the mental part of our nature; and spring and originate from, or are the result of, this compound, instead of arising in any particular

department of our constitution. In addition to this, each endowment or operation of this class immediately relates or has reference to some question of active conduct, in which duty is more or less directly concerned. Where only an appetite or affection is excited, the feeling or desire of the individual is merely called forth towards a particular object, without any action in regard to it being considered, or any mental operation exerted, although both these results may doubtless in such a case be produced. They are not, however, essentially necessary to, but are entirely independent of the constitution of the appetite or affection; and when they are excited, they generally, if not always, extend the appetite or affection to some moral exertion; which is, in fact, always the case when any result in regard to conduct or active duty is occasioned. This is especially seen when passion is called forth, as, for instance, that of anger. Thus, though the passion itself is merely a medial excitement of the mind, the action which it immediately produces, bears relation to the moral constitution of our nature.

As the middle course is generally that which in all moral transactions is the most correct, and the most safe to pursue; so the medial condition appears to be ever that to which nature spontaneously inclines. And to this condition we are reduced by the number of counteracting influences by which we are beset, as emotions of different and opposite kinds balance and resist each other, and reduce our general medial constitution to one of a moderate state, midway between pleasure and pain. So also as regards the moral disposition of each person, a middle or moderate condition is produced by the co-existence and co-operation in him of opposite qualities. Thus, a consciousness of rectitude often tends to pride; while, on the other hand, it is counteracted by pride, and pride by a consciousness of rectitude. Humility may produce baseness, and baseness humility. Benevolence may be the occasion of ostentation, and admiration of piety may stimulate to hypocrisy.

Occasionally indeed, dispositions which are directly opposite in their nature, and apparently even inconsistent one with another as regards their tendency and influence, will nevertheless be observed to be co-existent in the character of the same person. But this is because they spring from, or are produced by, qualities which, however different one from the other, are nevertheless not absolutely hostile to, or inconsistent with, the contemporaneous presence of each other. Thus, for instance, the same person may be a man of great benevolence, and yet of great avarice. In this case, his benevolence will often prompt him to be generous, while his avarice will ordinarily prompt him to be penurious. On urgent occasions the benevolence may predominate, but the avarice will ordinarily exercise sway over his conduct.

As I have remarked with regard to the emotions,³ that those of different kinds are frequently excited together, so that the effect of one to a great extent counteracts that of the other ; in a corresponding manner, in the composition of moral character, qualities of an opposite and counteracting nature will be found commingled together, one contradicting and counterbalancing the effect and influence of the other.

If, however, it be objected to this complex constitution of the moral nature of man, that it is contrary to anything which we see in nature to find various constituent portions of the same composition or subject, dissimilar in their quality and tendency, thus blended together into one and the same compound ; I would reply that, so far from being contrary to, this is exactly in accordance with what we may observe in nature throughout, and even in material substances. Nay, even the very constitution of our corporeal frames, is exactly analogous to it in many respects. Thus we find one part of these frames constituted of bone, another of flesh, another consisting of blood, while other parts are made up of two or more of these elements compounded together. There is, indeed, in reality, greater apparent variety in this respect in our material, than in our mental constitution ; although probably, if accurately examined, there would be discovered a strict and close analogy between them in this, as in many other respects ; and it would be perceived that here as elsewhere, the design and constitution of the one would but serve to elucidate that of the other. Man himself is, moreover, essentially a complex being, compounded of the very different and opposite elements of body and soul. In his case, too, sometimes the soul acts alone ; sometimes the body alone ; and occasionally both conjoined.

The soul moreover affects the body, quite as much as the body does the soul ; and the body the soul, as much as the soul does the body. In nearly every motive that influences us, each counteracts the other ; and in nearly every action that we perform, the tendency to effect it is opposed by an inclination to do some other. Any affection of the one part of our being is, forthwith, communicated to the other ; and injury to the one, at once occasions pain to the other. The constant mutual contentions between the inclinations of the mind and those of the body, each striving to attain the pre-eminence, and to influence and direct the conduct, may indeed be traced in the career of every person alike ; on particular occasions the medial endowments becoming invigorated and excited, and those which belong to the intellectual part of our nature being correspondingly weakened and depressed. Hence, it may happen that men of very different moral character, will both be endowed with

³ *Vide ante*, b. i. c. 2. s. 8.

precisely the same power of discerning right from wrong, and of correct reasoning and decision upon these topics ; but who will vary in their course of action and conduct, entirely and solely from the constitution of one inducing him to be much more readily influenced by the temptations to commit evil, than does that of the other.

Possibly, both as to their essential nature and as to the mode in which they may be dealt with hereafter, a difference may exist as to those crimes which are corporeal, and are committed directly through the body, such as lust and drunkenness, by which the body mainly is defiled ; and those which are spiritual, and committed directly through the soul, such as envy, malice, and the like, by which the soul itself becomes defiled, and which defilement cleaves closely to it, and from which it may not be entirely freed, as in the case of corporeal defilements, by shaking off the gross corporeal frame, and exchanging it for one of a spiritual nature. Possibly, too, and on this account, by "sin against the Holy Ghost," may be meant those sins which are of this latter nature, by which the influence of God's Spirit is counteracted and effaced.

Moral subjects themselves appear also, on a close examination of them, to be in every respect as complex, and to be constituted of as many different elements, as are those of a material nature, which must necessarily add greatly to their abstruseness and obscurity. On the other hand, as we know most subjects mainly by their operations and combinations, the more distinct elements any subject contains, and the more active they are, the greater are the opportunities afforded of investigating their real nature.

As God is the perfection of moral excellence, so to moral excellence and virtue He ever inclines ; which is indeed necessarily the case with One Whose intellect is of infinite perfection, Whose knowledge is unbounded, and Who is swayed by no debasing influences of any kind.⁴

2. *The Will, its Nature and Prerogative.*

As the line of conduct adopted, resulting from the mutual reciprocal influence of the various medial and mental excitements and endowments, constitutes the general moral character and disposition of any person ; so the final free decisive determination of that person in each case to adopt any particular course, is that which constitutes his will, which is nothing more than the

⁴ *Origen*, nevertheless, ascribes a limit to the Deity in His operations, from the imperfect nature of matter.

resolution arrived at by him to perform any particular act,—the fiat that he gives forth for the thing to be done.⁵

It is the grand prerogative of the mind, wherein it differs entirely from, and is vastly superior to the material frame, to be its own absolute director and self-controller. The body is ever dependent on external causes, and on the operation of the mind, for its own action. The soul relies only on itself, however external objects may influence its exertions; and this power of absolute self-control is what constitutes, and what we call, the will; which essentially consists in the capacity of the mind to act, or be passive, with regard to any particular matter, and to exert itself in the precise direction that it chooses.⁶ The mind, however, has not the power to be wholly passive, inasmuch as perpetual, if not ceaseless action, appears to be an essential condition and property of its being. The control of the will over the mind is, probably, directly and closely analogous to that of the mind over the body. We infer, therefore, that the will is no actual independent endowment or faculty by itself belonging to the mind; but is simply the power possessed by the mind of arriving at any particular decision in regard to the course of conduct to be adopted, by the exercise of the reason.

The will in regard to its freedom, much resembles a pair of balances which are quite at liberty to incline to one side or the other when no weight is put into either, but the preponderance of which is determined by the relative weight of the substances placed in them. So the will, independent of external motives and influences, while wholly free and at liberty to act, is balanced, and influenced, and swayed in its determinations,

⁵ "We possess a free will, by which we can withhold our assent from what is doubtful, and thus avoid error."—*Des Cartes, Princ. Phil.*, pt. i.

"As will to do is appetite, and will to omit, fear; the cause of appetite and fear is the cause also of our will."—*Hobbes, Hum. Nat.*, c. 12.

Dr. H. More remarks that we are conscious of a faculty or "power in ourselves, notwithstanding any outward assaults or importunate temptations, to cleave to that which is virtuous and honest, or to yield to pleasures or other vile advantages."—*Works, Immortality of the Soul*, b. ii. c. 2.

"The soul always wills or chooses that which, in the present view of the mind, considered in the whole of that view, and all that belongs to it, appears most agreeable."—*Edwards on Free Will*, s. 9.

According to *Mr. Herbert Spencer*, "the will is a simple homogeneous mental state, forming the link between feeling and action, and not admitting of subdivisions."—*Psychology*.

"We may define volition or will, as a determinate effort to carry out a purpose previously conceived."—*Dr. Carpenter, Mental Physiology*, c. ix. s. 1. p. 376.

⁶ *Malebranche* holds that the will of man essentially depends on the love that God bears to Himself, and that it is only because God loves Himself, that we love anything.—*Search after Truth*, tome ii. b. v. c. 1. s. 1.

by the external motives that operate upon it,⁷ and over which it has no control, although they control and rule over it; its disposition to submit to them being more powerful than any inducement that can excite it to resist them.

The prerogative of the will may be also said to be analogous to the privilege and power possessed by a court of justice to deliver an authoritative judgment on any particular subject, which privilege is distinct and independent of itself, and is quite separate both from the judge who delivers the judgment, and from the judgment that is delivered. The freedom of the will corresponds, in fact, with that of the freedom of action in a judge, while it is also placed under corresponding restraints. Thus, the judge is entirely free to act and determine as he thinks proper; and yet, at the same time, his decision must ever be in strict conformity both with the principles of justice, and the precise law applicable to the case. So the will is entirely free to act, but its determinations will be ever in favour of pursuing that course which, under all circumstances, the reason points out as the most desirable one to follow.⁸ The will is, consequently, the ultimate determination or resolution made by the reason,⁹ between the various conflicting influences alluded to, as to the precise course of action which the individual decides to pursue.¹ It is, as it were, the pivot or hinge on which the action turns. Indeed, in some operations, particularly those which are directed by mere instinctive impulses, to will implies to act as well. The performance itself, at once and spontaneously, results on the decision of the will. The mainspring which sets the mental machine in action, is constituted of the various emotions, feelings, appetites, passions, and affections, by which we are excited. The will regulates the proceeding of each of these, directs and controls their operations, and allows or disallows of their gratification in each particular case, as each impulse from them arises. In some instances they rebel, and for a time act in opposition to, and overcome the dictates of reason. But even in these cases the acquiescence of the will is obtained, and without its consent no

⁷ "A primary and essential element in the due regulation of the will, is a correct knowledge of the truths and motives which tend to influence its determinations."—*Abercrombie on the Moral Feelings*, pt. ii. s. 1.

⁸ *Des Cartes* remarks that "there is a great difference between willing to be deceived, and willing to yield assent to opinions in which it happens that error is found."—*Princ. Phil.*, pt. i. s. 42.

⁹ According to *Hobbes*, in deliberation, the last impulse of the appetites is will.—*Leviathan*. And he observes that "our wills follow our opinions, as our actions follow our wills; in which sense they say truly and properly, that the world is governed by opinion."—*Human Nature*, c. xii. s. 6.

¹ *Aristotle* held that the will is determined to what is good, for good is the only object of rational desires.—*Rhetoric*, b. i. c. 10.

voluntary action takes place.² It, as it were, keeps the keys to every avenue in the way of action that we can pursue.

The extent of the power and vigour of the will consequently results from, and, in fact, depends upon, the extent to which the individual is bent upon any particular object or resolution, and the unanimity with which the different controlling and active influences or *stimuli* which sway such person, co-operate together in urging him to pursue one and the same course. If these various influences are opposed to and counteract one another, the will is necessarily weak and vacillating, and the balance is uncertain as to which way it will preponderate. But where they are all thrown into one and the same scale, their united weight at once decides the issue. The whole energy of the soul is, in this case, concentrated in one point.

The nature and character of the will differ, moreover, in different people, according to the motives by which they are peculiarly liable to be actuated; and the relative strength and influence in each particular case of these various motives vary, and are dependent upon the medial, moral, and mental character of the individual; in some persons, sensual, or appetital, in others moral, in others mental motives possessing more power, and in others less.³ Indeed, the same man, from various causes, differs much at different times in this respect.

The value or relative preponderance of the motive, its adaptation to constitute the chief good or *desideratum* in which consists the essentially prevailing and biasing influence, must depend on the condition and position of the individual, and varies extensively accordingly. Thus, to a starving man, food may be the chief good; to a poor man, money; to a thirsty man, drink.

It is farther to be observed that the will is ever determined by that which is the strongest among contending influences, whether medial, moral, or mental. The decision made by the will upon any specific question is, indeed, in this respect analogous to the preponderance evinced by a balance, which at once shows the predominance in regard to weight possessed by any particular object, and forthwith decides the

² According to *Professor Bain*, "the two fundamental component elements of the will," are, "first, the existence of a spontaneous tendency to excite movements independent of the stimulus of sensations or feelings; and, secondly, the link between a present action and a present feeling, whereby the one comes under the control of the other."—*The Emotions and the Will*, Second edition, p. 297.

³ *Malebranche* asserts, however, that the will of man essentially depends upon the body, since it is by reason of the motion of the blood and animal spirits that it is conscious to itself of all its sensible commotions.—*Search after Truth*, tome ii. b. v. c. 1. s. 1.

question as to that point, which before hung in abeyance and doubt.

In one respect, therefore, the freedom of the will is absolute, in that every one has the entire power to will and determine according to his own inclination. In another respect there is no freedom of the will whatever, in that every one is under the necessity of choosing that course of action which, under all circumstances, whether from its apparent probability to produce pleasure, or safety, or wealth, or whatever other good, appears to him at the time to be preferable. Different people will be swayed by different motives, and the same person by different motives at different periods. But every person alike is absolutely compelled to be determined by that which is the preponderating motive at the time.

It may, however, be said that if men are not free to choose, being compelled to select that course which appears the chief good; it must be unjust to inflict punishment for not acting in a particular course, when men are not free to act. To this I reply that the very introduction of the punishment alters the balance of motive, and leads the individual to act in conformity with the law; which he does, nevertheless, quite voluntarily and from choice, as he still follows the course which will ensure him the greatest good, and preserve him from ill.⁴

The frustration of the will, when the individual is compelled by circumstances to pursue a course of conduct different to that dictated by his will, as when he is under restraint; occasions direct violence to his feelings and emotions, and produces a vehement perturbation in the soul.⁵ Where a course of conduct is pursued different to that which the general result of the concurrent medial and mental influences would have directed, on account of some special evil threatening us in case we do not follow the former course; it is still the will by which we are determined, although in such case the will itself is not free, but is constrained. Nevertheless, even here, the will is the result of the reciprocal influences by which we are affected.

In strict reason, indeed, it may be concluded that there is no act whatever done by us in any case, which is done contrary to the will; inasmuch as the mere act of our doing it

⁴ "Not the necessity, but the will to break the law, maketh the action unjust; because the law regardeth the will, and no other precedent causes of action."—*Hobbes, Of Liberty and Necessity*.

⁵ According to *Burlamaqui*, all human actions are voluntary, but where violence is used, the act is that of the agent exercising the violence.—*Principles of Natural Law*, pt. i. c. ii. s. 12.

"Liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent."—*Hobbes, Of Liberty and Necessity*.

"The will is that desire or aversion which is the strongest for the then present time."—*Hartley on Man*, vol. i. p. 371.

evidences, if it does not actually constitute, the operation and consent of the will. In many instances, where the will is said not to consent, it in reality does so by voluntarily choosing to follow a course by which the least of two evils will be incurred, although different to what under ordinary circumstances the mind would prefer; as where a man parts with his money to a highwayman in order to save his life. But even here the will is, strictly speaking, free, however its decision may be influenced by circumstances. Where the money is forcibly taken from him, the will is directly violated, inasmuch as it does not consent to the money being parted with. So also in the case of a felon being put to death. No one can say that he meets his death in this way by choice. And yet it is of his own free will that he suffers himself to be pinioned, and that he walks to the gallows. But he does this voluntarily, as feeling conscious that it is the most desirable course for him to pursue under the circumstances; and that the alternative, in case of his refusing, would be that he would be compelled to perform the act by the strong arm of the turnkey.

A man ought not, therefore, to be punishable for every act that he commits with the consent of his will, but for those acts only to which his will consented without such bias being put upon the motive which finally influenced it, that it was so far compelled or constrained to direct the act; inasmuch as, in the event of it not being done, an evil to such an extent would have been incurred as would decidedly and clearly have outweighed and exceeded the evil arising from the commission of the act. Nevertheless, although a person may be excused so far as to exempt him from direct and positive punishment, who commits wrong, even willingly, in order to avoid a greater wrong or evil to himself,—and self-protection and benefit are a duty, superior to, and which override that of protection and benefit to any other;—yet no one is excused who wilfully commits wrong for the mere purpose of obtaining benefit to himself, however great that benefit may be, and however much it may exceed the injury inflicted upon others, or however paramount may be the necessity of doing so in order to secure it. The highest and most perfect of all liberty, consists, indeed, in the freedom and the ability to act without restraint, exactly as the being wills, and in order to ensure those which appear to be the most beneficial results from the course pursued. And this is essentially the freedom of the Deity. Opposed to, or the counterpart of this, is the freedom to act in all respects exempt from every restraint, and regardless of all consequences of any kind, but exactly as the being wills or is impelled. And this is the freedom of the Devil.

In certain respects indeed, and thus considered, neither liberty nor power can be in any case, or in any being, abso-

lutely infinite. Thus, God Who is the freest of all beings, is not free to do that which man is ever prone to indulge in,—to commit evil. And He Who alone is omnipotent, possesses not entire power over Himself. He cannot annihilate His own existence. In one respect, nevertheless, God is essentially and alone free. He is bound only by His own laws, and His own laws are all of His own free will and making. He can at any moment abrogate them. And He obeys them, not from necessity but from choice. And from choice, He does that only which is best.

Prescience by God as to all that man will do, does not necessarily destroy, or even interfere with, man's freedom of will, inasmuch as each individual is perfectly free to choose what he prefers; although the omniscience of God enables Him to know, and to calculate with certainty, what the individual will prefer, and will, and perform.

An animal that does not reason, cannot perhaps strictly be said to have a will; but it is influenced and directed only by its emotions, and appetites, and passions, and affections. The will necessarily implies an effort of mental action and deliberation, which animals are wholly incapable of exercising. They appear, however, on all important occasions to hesitate, and to act guardedly and cautiously. In these cases, however, it is not deliberation, but the strongest among contending impulses, which determine their conduct, whether proceeding from fear or from hunger, the excitement of passion, or the influences of affection.

3. *Supremacy of the Reason, and Freedom of the Will.*

A question has, however, been raised by the preceding section, whether the will does always determine our actions, even as regards those which are voluntary; and whether, in some cases, we do not act contrary to it, although in strict accordance with the dictates and the decision of our reason. It appears to me, however, that, even in these cases, the will is a consenting party, and consequently a free agent, although it may be a reluctant one, to the action in question; and that indeed, without the concurrence of the will, no voluntary action is performed. In fact, this consent of the will it is that renders the action voluntary. The will may differ as to its decision, both from the dictates of reason, and the impulses of any particular appetite or passion; but it is still the will which makes the decision, and it makes it freely.⁶ Thus, a man influenced by, and acting from,

⁶ "Whoever in the end may be the author of our being, and however powerful and deceitful he may be, we are nevertheless conscious of a free-

the excitement of passion or appetite, may act directly at variance both with the dictates of reason, and with what he must be aware is his obvious interest; but still he acts in accordance with his will, and his will in such a case is wholly free, and by it alone he is determined in the course that he pursues. Even in those cases where the individual has made a resolution to maintain the freedom of his will, and to decide each action solely and entirely according to the strict rules of propriety and moral justice, he is here swayed by this very determination to do right, which is the real motive that impels his will, in a mode analogous to that in which the wills of others are swayed by some less worthy influence.

But it may be said that in some instances a man decides against his own apparent interest, so that it cannot be that the prevailing motive which guides the will is always the attainment of the end which seems most desirable. In these cases, however, what appears to be his interest, may not be the most desirable ultimate end; as in the case of a man injuring himself to benefit his neighbour, but by which he hopes to gain reward, either temporal by the credit he thus obtains, or eternal by the goodness of the act; so that even here, the will is really swayed by the hope of attaining the end aimed at, which is ultimately that which is most desirable.⁷

There is, of course, a vast and essential difference in all these cases between the freedom of the will to act under the circum-

dom, by which we can refrain from admitting to a place in our belief, aught that is not manifestly certain and undoubted, and thus guard against ever being deceived."—*Des Cartes, Princ. Phil.*, pt. i. s. 6.

⁷ Mr. F. Galton, F.R.S., to whose valuable work on "Hereditary Genius" references are made in these pages, obligingly allowed me to submit to him certain of the proof-sheets of the present chapter, and kindly mentioned to me that the necessitarian view chiefly here advocated seemed to him to be imperfect, and to clash with the passage at p. 20, which is a pure necessitarian expression, while at p. 24, "resolve" and "subjugation" are spoken of, which imply free will in the popular sense. "In short, we all believe we have in any given case the power of doing or not doing, of exerting an effort which is in one sense disagreeable to us, or of not exerting it. The problem remains, how does the necessitarian theory account for this?" To this objection, so fairly and so forcibly stated, and which may probably occur to others who read these pages, the author ventures to submit that these two apparently contradictory assertions, as the words in which they are expressed indeed imply, are put forward rather as alternative suggestions of what may be the truth, than as intended to be positive assertions of what is really the case. Several apparent objections and inconsistencies of the same character will probably occur in other parts of the work, and for the same reason, the extreme difficulty of arriving at any certain or absolute conclusion respecting a subject upon which, as Mr. Galton in his note well observes, so many have thought, but none hitherto solved, to complete satisfaction. Moreover, the words "resolve," "subjugation" of the lower propensities to the higher, alluded to at p. 24, do not there relate to the freedom of the will, but to what is termed the essence of moral virtue.

stances, and a freedom of choice as to the circumstances themselves. The person robbed, and the condemned felon, voluntarily submit to their aggressors, as the most desirable course under the circumstances; although, if either of them had the free choice, he would doubtless desire that an entirely different state of circumstances should exist as to what actually takes place.

From the different emotions, appetites, passions, and affections ever balancing each other, as it were, by their mutually contending influence, and counteracting the effect or power of one another, the reason is enabled to acquire the ascendancy over them, in the general regulation of the conduct, and the direction of the actions; and hence, the will becomes liberated from the domination of any one particular feeling, and free to act according as the reason may direct it, or point out a proper course to be pursued: and thus, however, on certain occasions circumstances may enable certain of the medial endowments already alluded to, to acquire an extensive influence, yet the mind is, nevertheless, in all cases actually and entirely free to act, according either to the dictates of the reason, or of the medial impulses which influence it in an opposite direction; and thus the will is left altogether at liberty to follow its own inclinations, according as the relative value of the preponderating motive that ultimately determines it, may point out to be most expedient or desirable.

Indeed, the more numerous are the conflicting motives which strive contemporaneously to influence the will, the more complete does its liberty of action and determination seem to be.⁸ But in certain cases this rule requires to be relaxed; inasmuch as among these contending motives, it is always that which is, or appears to be, the preponderating one, which inevitably, and irresistibly, and ultimately, determines the act and choice of the will.⁹ In the decision which the will makes, the reason is, however, actively employed; and it is by this faculty that the value or preponderance of particular motives is determined, referring in this case to the standard of value existent in the mind, which varies much in different persons, according to their quality, tastes, education, habit, and disposition. The con-

⁸ "Deliberation lasteth so long as the action whereof we deliberate is in our power; for, so long we have liberty to do or not to do; and deliberation signifieth a taking away of our liberty."—*Hobbes, Human Nature*, c. 12.

"In deliberation, the last appetite, as also the last fear, is called will, viz. the last appetite, will to do, or will to omit."—*Ibid.*

⁹ "The will is always, and in every individual act, necessarily determined by the strongest motive."—*Edwards on Free Will*, pt. iii. s. 4.

"The determining to suspend acting, is not only an act of the will, but 'tis supposed to be the only free act of the will, because 'tis said that this is the thing wherein the liberty of the will consists."—*Ibid.*, pt. ii. s. 7.

science, too, is appealed to here, however much its influence may vary in the case of different persons, according also to their character and disposition.

One circumstance which tends to lead us to suppose that we are free to direct our inclination as well as our will, is the fact that that inclination varies much, not only with different persons, but with the same person at different times. Thus, at one period we prefer pleasure, at another wealth; but it is, nevertheless, that particular object which we most desire at the time, that determines our inclination, and which we are irresistibly impelled to follow, however apparently free may be our conduct in so doing.¹ The circumstances, or influences, which act upon, or determine the will may, however, be either internal or external.

There appears, moreover, to be implanted in the mind, in counteraction of any individual influence which might be calculated to captivate it, or lead it astray, a strong and vigorous love of liberty;² together with a determination to shake off all restraints which may impede its freedom of action, which is more openly manifested with regard to matters that externally affect us. Man, indeed, exhibits, in various ways, this ardent love of liberty which he possesses; and the deprivation of it as regards his power of acting with respect to external circumstances, is calculated to affect his whole constitution and disposition. From the existence of this love of liberty is, moreover, derived that of his desire and pertinacity to defend those rights and that property which he possesses; any infringement upon, or abridgment of, which, he resents so keenly and so vigorously. This desire to preserve their liberty, is also evinced largely by animals in general, and a violation of it is calculated strongly to excite them.

The pain and annoyance occasioned by restraint of the will, have, indeed, already been adverted to. So universal is this feeling, that restraint of the will is one of the most ordinary modes of punishment devised by civil government. And this is of two kinds; restraint of the will with regard to personal liberty, as by imprisonment; and restraint of the will with regard to property, as by fine and forfeiture.

From what has here been premised concerning the will, its entire and perfect freedom may surely be granted. However

¹ *Professor Bain* lays it down that "it is the nature of the will to connect at once and decisively a pleasure with the exertion that sustains and increases it, and a fear with the exertion that relieves it."—*The Emotions and the Will*, Second edition, p. 429.

² According to *Montesquieu* "philosophical liberty consists in the free exercise of the will, or, at least, in an opinion that we have free exercise. Political liberty consists in security, or at least in the opinion that we enjoy security."—*Spirit of Laws*, b. ii. c. 2.

it may be influenced by different, and even opposite causes, it still remains at liberty to pursue the course that it prefers ; and indeed the very opposition to one another of these various counteracting influences, contributes materially to preserve and to insure its freedom.

The will, nevertheless, although it is ever free to determine exactly as it chooses, invariably and inevitably preponderates, with unerring certainty, towards that which appears to the mind to be the greatest good, or the most desirable object under all circumstances, on the present occasion, to pursue;³ just as surely as, and in a manner corresponding with, that in which the heaviest of two weights or ponderous bodies, is that which, notwithstanding its uncertain previous vibrations, ultimately decides the declivity of the scale in which it is placed. Consequently, the particular influence that determines the will, is what we commonly term the motive for action ; by which we mean that one special inducement out of several, which is the preponderating one, as appearing to be the most desirable object, or the preferable course to pursue. When, on the other hand, we say that there is an absence of motive for action, we simply mean that there is no particular inducement which is of importance beyond others, so as to determine the will.

But if it be contended that this opinion of the will being absolutely determined by the motives that influence it, destroys all notion of moral responsibility for action, and renders men merely the agents of external impulses ; it may be replied that, although all men alike are swayed by the motives which influence the will, yet the quality of these motives depends upon, and is entirely decided by, the moral disposition and character of the individual himself ; and so, ultimately, the decision of the will is regulated by, and, as it were, reflects, the disposition and character of the individual. Consequently, by the decision of his will, ought his conduct to be judged. Thus, the man of high moral principle is swayed by the love of virtue, and the desire of acting rightly ; considerations which would have but small influence over one of a depraved disposition. And this rule prevails through all orders of men in a corresponding manner. Indeed, there is hardly anything in which people differ so much one from another, as they do in regard to the motives by which their wills are influenced ; a point on which they vary quite as widely as they do in the choice of their food. On the other hand, nothing so truly, so unerringly, and so exactly exhibits the disposition of the individual, as does the nature of the motives that actuate his will. Thus, the

³ "It is that motive which as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest, that determines the will."—*Edwards on Free Will*, pt. i. s. 2.

intellectual man is swayed by motives which have reference to his exalted pursuits; the sensual man by those which bear relation to the gratification of his appetites; the religious man by considerations concerning God and Heaven; the covetous man by thoughts of gain; and the voluptuary by those of pleasure.

From all this, it follows that although the determinations of the reason, on which the will mainly depends, are themselves dependent upon external circumstances and events over which we have no control, and upon the preponderance of particular motives which constitute the hinges as it were, on which they turn; and so it may be contended that we have no actual liberty of action here, or that that liberty is very limited and imperfect: yet, on the other hand, we have a further source of liberty, in the choice allowed to us as to the relative weight or importance which we attach to certain of these circumstances and motives by which the will is determined.⁴ According to the constitution or condition of the mind, does it give greater or less weight to some of them; while in doing this, it is at perfect liberty. And as it is by the relative weight of these several influences thus decided, that the will is guided; so as regards its guidance also, it is consequently, ultimately, as well as originally, free.

Thus one man may voluntarily attach more importance to a particular act of duty than another man does; another to a question of self-interest; another to considerations of affection: and one man may be more influenced than another by a dread of poverty, or of physical pain. Over our estimate of these events, we therefore possess a control; and hence even the very determinations of our will are not wholly beyond our choice.⁵ Thus, as already observed, a man surrounded by robbers with loaded fire-arms, is free to act as he chooses, inasmuch as he is not under actual physical restraint. But the consideration that if he attempts to move, he will at once be shot dead, is one of such weight that it amounts to a necessity, and imperatively influences, in other words, compels him to remain passive. He is, nevertheless, actually free to prefer attempting to escape, at the risk of being shot.

The essence of free-will may be determined, therefore, to consist in the power of the mind to decide absolutely as to the ultimate course that it shall adopt, with regard to its conduct in any particular matter, notwithstanding the influences of different kinds which may be in operation, and by which it may

⁴ According to *Kant*, practical liberty is the independence of the will from necessity, or the impulses of sensibility.—*Critic. of Pure Reason*.

⁵ When it is said the will decides or determines, the meaning must be that the person in the exercise of a power of willing and choosing, or the soul acting voluntarily, determines.—*Edwards on Free Will*, part ii. s. 1.

be affected. In the majority of cases the preponderance between opposing influences will be decided by the relative force or weight which the mind, after due deliberation, gives to each of them. When, however, the weight of one particular influence outbalances every other, it may be deemed to amount to a necessity; and the will is then no longer able to contend against it, or to preserve its freedom, but at once determines to be guided by that alone.

It must consequently be held that, in all ordinary cases, although a man is quite free to act according to the determination of his will, yet he is not free, nay, has no choice in selecting the motives that produce that determination.⁶ Here he is dependent on external agents, his own powers and innate endowments being wholly insufficient to aid him. The cause of this is, that although he wills pursuant to the dictates of his reason, which is also free; yet these dictates are guided by circumstances about him over which he has no control. He is therefore free as regards the determinations of his will, and as regards the acts which he performs in pursuance of these determinations; but he is a slave as regards the events which govern those determinations.⁷ So long, therefore, and so far as the reason is free to act, man himself, in respect to his will, is also free. And the impulse of the different emotions and appetites, and passions, many of which influence us in opposite directions, so far from being a restraint on our determinations, greatly conduces to set us at liberty, to enlarge the sphere of our choice, and to aid the freedom of the will.

In one sense, therefore, every man is in every case wholly and absolutely free to act, so far as he possesses the real power to do so, independently of, and without regard to the consequences of his act. In another sense, no man is free as respects even the commonest operation of his life, so far as he is absolutely constrained to follow that particular course alone which his reason dictates to be the most eligible. It is between these two extreme points, that the real course of freedom runs.

The ultimate result as regards the freedom of the will, and the conclusion to be drawn from the whole of the argument, appear, consequently, to be as follows. The will is on all occasions absolutely and entirely free to act; and every one is able

⁶ On the question of liberty, necessity, and free will, which is discussed by *Locke* with characteristic acuteness and perspicuity, he holds that liberty is a power to act or not, according as the mind directs. A power to direct the operative faculties to motion or rest, is what we call the will. That which determines the will is some present uneasiness, accompanied by a desire, which is guided by the judgment.—*Essay on the Understanding*, b. ii. c. xxi. s. 71.

⁷ "If the mind in its volition can go beyond motive, then it can go without motive."—*Edwards on Free Will*, part ii. s. 10.

to follow, precisely as he pleases, the bent of his own inclination : but the determinations of that inclination are, in each case, influenced, and indeed absolutely swayed, by the resolution of the mind to pursue that end which appears, under all circumstances, the most desirable. As to what particular objects are most desirable, and consequently form the preponderating motive which invariably determines the will ; this depends on the particular disposition of the individual, some preferring motives which are virtuous, others those which are vicious ; some those which are intellectual, others those which are sensual. On this account, and from the diversity of choice which lies before us, the freedom of the inclination, as well as of the will, frequently appears more absolute than it really is. Hence, at all events, the mind is free, by the decision of the reason, to determine on the preponderating motive. But when the motive has been determined upon, the will is not free whether to choose it or not, but is irresistibly impelled to do so.⁸ All are alike determined by their inclination, though free as to their actual will ; and the inclination of each is determined by the relative value which he attaches to the motives by which he is influenced. The apparent and immediate motive which determines the will may be uncertain, and variable, and capricious ; but it is nevertheless the attainment of the ultimate end, being the security of that which is, or rather which appears to be, the most beneficial to the individual under all circumstances, and which at that

⁸ *Mr. C. S. Wake*, Vice-President of the London Anthropological Society, and author of "Chapters on Man," and of some valuable papers read before the British Association for the Advancement of Science, the Anthropological Institute, and the Anthropological Society, to whom I have submitted the proof-sheets of the present chapter of this work, has been so obliging as to favour me with the following note on the above paragraph :—

"1. It should here be noted that the freedom thus claimed is *intellectual* merely, and not moral (i. e. the intellect decides which is the stronger motive or set of motives, and the will acts accordingly), except so far as a motive may gain or lose in strength by the action of the mind in relation to it, in which case, as the *resulting action* is to a certain extent *decided* by the intellect, there may perhaps be predicated moral freedom.

"2. The desire of the highest good is too general to operate as a motive to action in many cases. The will has relation to particular, and not general aims, and its action is governed by what appears *desirable* at the present time, although to another person, or at another time, it may be evil.

"3. The desirableness of any particular line of conduct depends chiefly on *disposition*, which has great influence on the mental determination known as will. On the other hand, disposition is affected largely by the *bodily organism*, which becomes, therefore, an important factor in relation to the freedom of will, constituting often, especially in adult life, the most powerful motive to a special line of conduct.

"4. Where the bodily organism is in such a condition that the intellect is affected, and thus the power of weighing motives is lost, there is no longer freedom of will in any sense."

particular time commands the will, and compels it to act in that direction. Consequently that, and that alone, which the will is entirely free to determine, is not its own inclination to do any particular act, but its choice as to which motive out of many shall be the preponderating one by which it is to be guided: in other words, that course which, out of several that are offered to it, is the most beneficial or desirable, under all circumstances, to be adopted. The attainment of the highest good is in all cases the ultimate object of the will; good and evil, or rather the desire and the dread of them, being the two grand magnetic influences of attraction and repulsion which never cease to actuate us, and to the attainment or avoidance of which our will ever points, like the magnet to the pole. The will may frequently appear to fluctuate or vibrate in making this decision, inasmuch as what appears to be the greatest good to one, may not seem so to another, and the opinions of different persons must vary much in this respect. In all cases, however, the aim is essentially the same.⁹

In those instances where the will seems to be for a time undetermined how to act, and the mind appears perplexed in making its choice as to which course it shall pursue; the real fact is, not that the will has lost its freedom, or is under any constraint, but that the mind is doubtful which object is that which is most desirable, from being the greatest good out of several; inasmuch as that is the one which the will, directly that it has discovered it, is certain to prefer.¹ Indeed, this very power of suspending the decision of the will upon any point, has itself been appealed to as a proof of the freedom of the will. But even here, the determination of the will is sure to be decided by the preponderance of the motive, which may either lead us to suspend or to complete our decision.

Nevertheless, when apparently under constraint, the will itself is, in many cases, free; inasmuch as by the former condition nothing more is in reality implied than the presence and influence of such a motive as will operate so strongly as at once of itself, independent of all other considerations, to determine the inclination of the will. Possibly, indeed, the most apt term by which to express what we mean by real liberty, is not freedom of the will, but freedom of the inclination. By the latter is understood, not only the liberty to determine as we please, but

⁹ *Mr. Wake's* theory on this subject is, as he informs me, that "all direct freedom of will is purely intellectual, and that this is combined with moral necessity, i. e. the intellect to a certain extent governs motives, but ultimately these must necessarily govern conduct."

¹ According to *Professor Bain*, when suspense arises, it is through some nerve influence that checks the regular and ordinary course of the voluntary faculty. The deliberative veto is one mode of giving a check, but this withdrawn, action ceases.—*The Emotions and the Will*, Second edition, p. 429.

the liberty also to engage in or to follow that course of action, or to adopt that principle of conduct, which is agreeable to the decision of the will. The will may be free, although it chooses to conform its course to certain rules which it prescribes for itself:—as for instance, where it determines absolutely to be guided by the reason as its minister, and from which it never deviates. Its very determination to do this is a part, and the consequence of its freedom. Liberty without restraint is licentiousness. It is like the course of a ship relieved from the control of its rudder, and so left to float as the wind or tide drive it along.

It may be concluded, therefore, on the whole, both with regard to persons and political bodies, that the more entirely free and unbiassed the will is to follow the direction and dictate of the reason, uncontrolled and uninfluenced by external or other causes, the more complete is the liberty which in such a case is enjoyed. The will is quite free to determine how to act. But this determination is always influenced by the desire to perform that act which, under all circumstances, appears calculated to be most for our good; and which influence is termed the motive for our action. The choice of this motive, however, will be determined by the character and disposition of the individual, whether virtuous or vicious; and according to our quality in this respect, do we attach proportionate value to, and are swayed by this or that motive.² Hence, two men of different dispositions, will each act in a manner quite opposite, when placed in the same situation. For instance, a dishonest man, when temptation arises, will determine to steal, inasmuch as to obtain the coveted article seems to him to be the greatest good. An honest man when so tempted, will refrain from stealing, inasmuch as to preserve his innocence seems to him the greatest good. Both men were alike free to act, and the same influences operated on each; but the value of the motives appeared different to one from what it did to the other.

4. *Virtue and Vice, their Principle and Essence.*

The subjects with which the moral endowments of men have to deal, and about which alone they are ever occupied, are actions of a certain class, being those connected with matters of duty; and which are consequently characterized by, or have

² "Whether the will be considered in a popular, or a philosophical sense, it appears that its determinations must be directed by certain invariable laws, depending upon the previous state of mind, and the ideas present to it at the moment of forming any resolution; so that in no case whatever, could they have been otherwise than they actually are."—*Priestley on Philosophical Necessity*, sect. iv. p. 53.

reference to two qualities only, virtue and vice. These are the only essential qualities with which all moral actions are concerned; and by this criterion alone is the nature of each of them alike determined.

Virtue consists in the conformity of an action in a particular course, to the rule prescribed with regard to it, and which it is our duty in that case to follow.³ Vice consists in acting either in disregard of, or in opposition to that rule. But this obedience to, and disobedience of a prescribed rule, are of so many different kinds, and branch out into so many different characters, that their various ramifications become as complicated as their original character was simple. Thus, a rule may be either literal or liberal in its interpretation; and our obedience may be either strict, or only general.

The qualities of good and of evil, or good and bad, as regards ourselves, appear to have reference rather to well-being and injury, than to pleasure and pain, as stated by Locke.⁴ And the qualities of right and wrong must be referred to, and determined by, some standard rule as regards their real character. Considering indeed, how all our desires, and motives, and actions concentrate in self-love;⁵ it might be laid down that every action is regarded as good, according as it tends to be beneficial, and bad, as it is calculated to be injurious to our interest.

The essence of moral virtue, or morality, consists in the rigid adherence to a right rule, to the knowledge and observance of which the reason directs us; and which we resolve to obey, notwithstanding the impulses of appetite or passion which urge us to disregard it. Immorality, or vice, on the other hand, consists in yielding to these lower influences, to the disregard of this prescribed rule of conduct. The essence of morality may, therefore, be said mainly to consist in the subjugation of our lower medial propensities to our reason, in the determination of the moral course we decide upon pursuing. A virtuous man governs his emotions, and appetites and passions. A vicious man is governed by them. With a moral man, duty and right conduct form the ruling principle. With an immoral man pleasure, and the grati-

³ According to *Dr. Samuel Clarke*, virtue consists in regulating our conduct agreeably to certain eternal fitnesses of things established in the Universe, from which arise certain moral obligations, which are of themselves incumbent on all rational creatures.

Paley defines virtue to consist in "doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness."—*Moral Philosophy*. But if this definition is correct, it seems difficult to conceive how any who have not believed in future and everlasting rewards, can be accounted virtuous.

⁴ *Essay on the Understanding*, b. ii. c. xx. s. 3.

⁵ *Vide ante*, b. i. c. v. s. 1, 4, 5.

fication of his lower impulses, determine his course. Hence, also, the essence of moral depravity consists in the subjugation of the mental part of our nature, more especially of the reason, to the dominion of the medial part, more particularly of the appetites and passions; and in the determination or acquiescence of the will, in favour of such a course.

Actions, apparently very different in their actual nature, are often but manifestations of the same vice, variously modified, under existing circumstances. Thus, what in the man wanting daily sustenance would produce theft or burglary, in the man who has an ample supply of it, but who is deficient in intellectual wealth, would exhibit itself in literary piracy, or stealing the ideas of another; or, it may be, in the practice of deceit and falsehood: all which crimes are but the development or progeny of that very prolific parent-crime, dishonesty.

Moreover, precisely the same influences, and calculations, and mental operations, which in one case will terminate in a deed of heroism, in another will result in an act of felony. Virtues and vices often proceed from the same source, but resolve into good or bad acts, according to the direction that is ultimately given to them. What is denounced as deception in one case, is applauded as stratagem in another. Virtue and vice are, moreover, both of them, to a certain extent, although common to all ages, the creatures of circumstances. Thus, virtue is often engendered by the opportunities which are presented for its exercise; and vice, by the temptations to commit it, which occur. Different ages and nations differ however vastly one from another as regards the character which they attribute to the same acts; while human nature ever remains the same, and individuals are uniformly in the same manner affected, whenever corresponding events occur so to influence them.

Virtue and vice may, nevertheless, in some instances consist in mere negation, and in the absence only of any positive commission. Thus, the virtue of chastity in woman consists not in any positive act, but in the mere abstinence from unchastity. Honesty too, consists, not in doing any particular act, but in the mere omission to commit dishonesty. In both these cases, however, an adherence to a prescribed rule is observed, and all impulses to violate it are resisted. Vice also, in some instances, may be as purely and entirely negative in its nature, as is virtue. Thus, the mere neglect to worship God, to protect or maintain those dependent upon us as our offspring, to contradict gross and mischievous error when this is within our power, may amount to crimes really as great, and as pernicious, although omissions only, as do many positive acts.

But although virtue is sometimes merely negative and

passive, instead of being active and positive, yet it will frequently be found that it is quite as difficult to practise it in the former as in the latter case. Thus, what is occasionally more perplexing than to keep strictly to truth, which is merely omitting to tell untruth; or to do what is strictly honest, which consists solely in omitting acts of dishonesty?

The practice of benevolence, and even of natural affection, may, however, as directly lead us to vice, as does the exercise of appetite or passion, which is the case when truth and justice are disregarded; and it is this disregard of them that constitutes the essence of vice. So also, an act primarily bad, such as killing a man, may be virtuous if required for the ends of justice; while an act which is primarily good, such as saving his life, may be vicious, if in defiance of the requirements of justice, or if effected through injustice. Nevertheless, the ordinary spring of vice appears to be the indulgence of our appetites and passions, when carried out in disregard of the dictates of truth and justice.

Virtuous actions may, moreover, no doubt occasionally spring from a bad motive, and those that are vicious from a motive that is good; but this no more alters or affects the actual character of the deed, than having a good or bad mother affects the real character of the man. It, nevertheless, does greatly alter the degree of merit in the person by whom the action was performed; which depends, not on the action itself, but on the motive from which it was done.

Occasionally, moreover, what seems to us to be a virtue, is in reality a vice; and actions that we believe to have originated only in benevolence, spring in truth entirely from self-love.⁶ Thus, the man who subscribes his name for large and liberal contributions for public purposes, has the reputation of making great sacrifices, and gains credit for extensive liberality and benevolence; when, in truth, the donation may have been bestowed mainly to gratify his vanity, and to gain for him that esteem which he so much covets, while his family, not himself, are the real sufferers by his bounty. Some classes of religionists, indeed, carry their principles to the extreme of denying that any voluntary acts whatever can be in themselves in any way meritorious; and contend that goodness consists solely and entirely in the condition and excitement of the involuntary emotions, over which we have no control.

It is further to be observed that, whatever grounds may exist, either in reality or imagination, with respect to the induction of certain results from certain data, as regards particular abstract questions; no such inferences are deducible with regard to matters which are practical. Right and wrong must

⁶ One writer concludes that "the sole and universal motive to virtuous actions is self-love, interest, or pleasure."—*Innes on the Original of Moral Virtue*, p. 310.

there stand on their own intrinsic merits and demerits, however acute or plausible may be the arguments and the inferences which subtle casuists may attempt to effect. Hence, in the exact determination of the relative magnitude of any particular crime, we have no right either to increase or diminish its essential quality or amount, by comparing it with other crimes with which it may be allied, and endeavouring to prove that, either from its nature or its consequences differing from those of the crimes in question, it must therefore be greater or less than it would otherwise appear to be. Its real quality and essence are neither altered nor affected by any such considerations or conclusions. Theft is theft, perjury is perjury, and adultery is adultery, be the consequences of the particular offence great or small. In the natural world, certain plants and animals appear nearly allied in their qualities one to another. But for all this, the distinction between them exists, clear and perfect; and no amount of logical acumen can convert a reptile into an insect, or an insect into a plant. Moral actions are, however, as little affected by technical terms as are natural objects.

Because a person commits wrong worthy of punishment, who incidentally, and without any direct motive, good or bad, when engaged on an indifferent subject, propagates error; does it therefore necessarily follow that a person who, when engaged on an indifferent subject, incidentally and without any direct motive, good or bad, propagates truth or virtue, is worthy of reward? This may appear to be a difficult case to solve. I should reply, however, that it does not so follow, inasmuch as, while sin, as I have already shown, may be perpetrated by the mere negation to act, whether there may be a motive or not to excite us; virtue can only be achieved by some positive act (so far, at least, as withstanding the impulses of our lower feelings amounts to this, and which would not in the case supposed be required), whether there be a specific motive in this particular case to excite us or not. In morals, moreover, it is not allowed to resort to the *à priori* mode of consequential reasoning, which is sometimes adopted in abstract speculation.

5. *Natural Inclinations to Good and to Evil.*

As the moral endowments of different persons are constituted of and directed by so many different excitements and influences, and as moral actions are characterized by the two opposite qualities of virtue and vice; so the natural inclination and disposition of each person to the pursuit of actions of one or other of these kinds, will be regulated and determined according to

the relative predominance of certain of the constituent elements of which his moral endowments and dispositions are made up.

It is in general very difficult, and in many cases almost impossible, to trace out and define with precision the origin from whence our motives to perform particular acts really spring. The source is necessarily dark in itself, and many circumstances contribute to render it more obscure. Our flattery of ourselves, our fears, our wishes, and our hopes, alike add to our perplexity here. In most, if not in all cases, moreover, our motives are of a mixed kind, derived in part from one source, in part from another; and are seldom, if ever, in this respect pure and unmixed.

If we examine the actions of any particular person, we shall, however, soon discover that he is in all ordinary cases more prone to commit evil than to do good;⁷ by reason that the temptations to the former are much more frequent and powerful than are the inducements to the latter; inasmuch as in many cases, as already pointed out, even the mere indulgence of his natural feelings, or appetites, or passions, is of itself an act of sin. In addition to this, it must often happen, as we have also seen, that negative conduct alone, without any positive evil being performed,—the neglect to perform an action of virtue, without the actual commission of an action of vice—will be in itself, and is, essentially, evil. The actual constitution of virtue or vice must, however, in each case, be decided by reference to a certain fixed rule or principle which is established, and compliance with which is prescribed, and is dictated, by the reason; and according to the observance of which, the lawfulness and rectitude, or unlawfulness and badness, of any action, whether positive or negative, will be determined; and which may be ascertained by each individual through the exercise of that test which, by the Creator, has been implanted in his mind—that is, his reason.⁸

That man is naturally, of his own inclination, independently of all temptation, and of every influence that may direct him, necessarily and determinately prone to follow evil and vice, and to forsake virtue, I see, nevertheless, no reason to suppose: that he does possess certain feelings and propensities which may lead him to this course, and that the allurements to it are very great and powerful, cannot be denied.

As already observed, the mere indulgence of the emotions, and appetites, and passions, which are a part of every

⁷ The relation which the human soul in its original constitution bears to matter, *Plato* appears to have considered as the source of moral evil. Since the soul of the world by partaking of matter has within itself the seeds of evil, he inferred that this must be the case still more with respect to the soul of man.

⁸ *Dr. Henry More* thought that the soul possesses innate sensations and notions of good and evil, just and unjust, true and false.—*Life, by Ward*, p. 5.

man's nature, amounts in many cases to the commission of actual sin. But it should ever be borne in mind, that it is owing to the artificial, unnatural state in which, in a civilized condition, man is placed with regard to these endowments, and because their due exercise is, in many respects, thwarted and restrained, that this is the case. Thus, as regards the indulgence of the appetite for food, man in a state of nature would be content to eat simple substances, sufficient only for his necessary sustenance, and to drink water or milk, without endeavouring to stimulate his appetite by artificial luxuries, which unnaturally excite the palate, and the senses connected with it. Men are seldom led to excesses from partaking of plain, simple food. Indeed, they are no more prone to gluttony by eating bread to excess, or to drink immoderately of pure water, than are animals; which, being at all times, even when domesticated, more in a state of nature than man is, are not liable to fall into the errors consequent on an artificial condition. So also with regard to the indulgence of the appetite of concupiscence; man is able in a state of nature to give vent to this appetite without committing sin, inasmuch as he may at once select an individual to whom he may be united for life, and with whom sexual intercourse may be lawful. In an artificial state of society, such as exists in all highly civilized communities, marriage is necessarily restricted, as so many artificial provisions consequent upon it have to be made. Savages, who live as nearly as possible in a state of nature, are found to err but little as regards the irregular exercise of their appetites, their food being but plain and simple; and, no impediments being offered to the legitimate indulgence of sexual desire, as soon as they are by nature adapted to exercise it, they are not so strongly urged to violate the laws of chastity; whatever irregularities custom may have, in certain instances, or any particular races, introduced which militate against virtue and morality.

Thus, we see that the natural indulgence of the appetites is by no means necessarily sinful in itself. It is only the abuse of them that is sinful, even though that abuse may be occasioned by the state of society, and by the circumstances in which the individual so erring is placed. Hence, it cannot be correctly laid down that man is, by nature, necessarily prone to evil, even from the influence over him which his medial endowments and impulses possess.⁹

In strict truth, indeed, it may be affirmed, on the one hand,

⁹ According, however, to the opinion of some of the leading Calvinistic divines of the seventeenth century, who have many ardent followers in the nineteenth, "as in every man's body there is a mortal and corruptible principle within, which exposeth to diseases, and at last to death itself; so in the soul there is a vehement inclination unto everything that is evil,

that there is no emotion, or passion, or appetite, or other feeling or propensity which is directly and essentially evil in itself; and, on the other hand, that there is no capacity, or disposition, or endowment, of whatever kind, which may not become depraved, and directly tend to evil when so perverted. In each case, and in the case of each endowment, it is, nevertheless, not the propensity itself which is either good or bad; but the application that is made of it is that which alone determines its quality. That which in reality constitutes the character of a person who is said to be sensually disposed, and to have strong appetites and passions, consists, not in his merely having his emotions, or appetites, or passions more vigorous than they are in other people; but in having his mind and mental powers comparatively weak, and in being so wanting in energy and resolution, that he is unable to maintain and exercise a due control over his medial propensities.

We are told, in Scripture, that the flesh is continually warring against the spirit; which amounts to no less than what I have stated as to the medial emotions, appetites, and passions, which oftentimes incline us to evil, being in a constant state of contest or warfare with our mental powers, more especially the reason, which points out to us the evil of being influenced by the former, and serves to guide us aright.¹

And if, indeed, we are by nature so frail as to be ever liable to be led astray by every temptation which may assail us, and to follow every evil inclination that may arise, we may be justly denounced as depraved creatures; but this argues not, in the least degree, that we should, if left altogether to ourselves, if temptation and allurements were withdrawn, be naturally inclined to evil, for evil's sake alone.² The individual disposition of any person in this respect, depends greatly upon, and is, to a large extent modified by, the habits to which he has been trained by education; whether to resist evil, to abhor and shun

it's most suitable and connatural to him."—*Burgess, Of Original Sinne*, part iv. c. i.

"Sinne is as sweet, and as pleasant to a man by nature, as water to a man scorched with thirst."—*Ibid.*

¹ *Malebranche* holds that the inclinations of spirits, being the constant impressions of the will of Him who has created and preserves them, must be concluded to be like His, and to have no other principal end than His glory.—*Search after Truth*, b. iv. c. ii. s. 2.

² According to *Burgess*, however, as regards the will, "no tongue of men and angels can express the depravation of it." And "our will, as it is now corrupted, of all objects it is most averse to God."—*Of Original Sinne*, pt. iii. c. iv. s. 3.

"The will, that commanding faculty, which sometimes was faithful and ruled with God, is now turned traitor, and rules with the Devil."—*Boston's Fourfold State*, State ii. head 1. "There is, in the unrenewed will, an utter inability for what is truly good and acceptable in the sight of God."—*Ibid.*

it, or to indulge in it.³ The propensities which spring from the medial part of our nature cannot, however, be changed, either by education, or by the reason; they can only be subdued or diverted. On the other hand, it would be wholly at variance with the general benign dispensation of Providence, to suppose that He would create beings in a probationary state, whose eternal condition depended on their conduct in it, and yet so bias their dispositions as to lead them inevitably to follow evil instead of good.⁴ Not only, indeed, has the benevolent Governor of the Universe afforded us power to resist the evil of our disposition, when such from any circumstance is rendered prevalent; but moreover, spiritual aid to resist spiritual influence to evil, with which we are also liable to be assailed.

The inquiry whether man is spontaneously inclined to moral good, or to moral evil, whether his dispositions are naturally good or bad, is not affected by the question of free will and grace; which relates solely to the influence of the Holy Spirit that enables him to live entirely according to God, and which is quite independent of the natural disposition and character of the individual: as without the aid of this influence, all persons, whatever be their natural disposition, are alike incapable of wholly resisting the flesh, and attaining righteousness; and by the aid of it, all are alike capable of becoming righteous.

In Scripture itself, the views, which in the present treatise are taken of this subject, are fully borne out. Right and wrong, sin and good, are expressly spoken of as solely consisting in obedience to, or disobedience of a prescribed rule, "the law;" and the intellectual part of our nature, "the inward man," or "mind," is described as inclining us to "do good," and "serve God;" but which is perverted and corrupted by our animal propensities, the "flesh," or "law in the members." The mind being imbued with the Holy Spirit, is strengthened, and enabled to overcome the impulses of the flesh.⁶

³ *Mr. Wake* remarks on this paragraph, that in his opinion "the line of argument denying the existence of any natural inclination of mankind to evil is satisfactory, but it would be more so if it were shown—

"1. That what we call 'nature,' in this relation, embraces ancestral influences, operating and accumulating through hundreds of generations, which have moulded the bodily organism and the mental disposition, and thence the will.

"2. That 'evil' is a relative term, having a different sense at different times, and therefore the same inclination might be good at one time, and evil at another."

⁴ "It is in its power of fixing the attention on those higher considerations which ought to be paramount to all others, and of withdrawing it from the lower, that the will has the chief influence in the direction of the conduct according to the dictates of virtue."—*Dr. Carpenter, Mental Physiology*, pt. i. c. vi. s. i. p. 249.

⁵ Rom. vii. 7, 18, 22, 23, 25.

⁶ 1 Cor. ii. 14, 15; xv. 34. Gal. v. 17—23.

From the passages last referred to, it appears to be clear, that the meaning of the Apostle is, that there are two principles of our nature, "spirit," and "flesh," which act contrary to each other; the former inclining us to good, the latter to evil: the former consisting of the mind and intellectual faculties; the latter of the medial appetites and feelings. Man, in his natural state, is too often ruled by the latter; unless the former be by the Holy Spirit strengthened, and enabled to acquire the ascendancy. Hence, although man as a whole, is corrupt, that is to say, is destitute of the power of attaining holiness; yet, it is by no means true (as many writers and preachers assert, which however the Bible nowhere authorizes them to do), that his *mind* is naturally inclined to moral evil; but, on the other hand, St. Paul expressly tells us, that the mind and flesh are "contrary one to the other." Both, therefore cannot, of necessity, be inclined to evil. We are indeed taught that, in consequence of the influence of the flesh, we "cannot do the things that we would,"⁷ i. e. we are morally unable to follow fully the good inclinations of our minds.

That by the terms flesh and spirit, contained in different parts of Scripture, and especially in Galatians v., are meant the opposite and contending influences of the body and of the soul, and not those of our general natural inclinations, and of the Holy Spirit; is further evinced by the way in which both flesh and spirit are here spoken of. Thus, we are told, not only that "the flesh lusteth against the spirit," but that "the spirit lusteth against the flesh"—an expression which would surely not be used to denote the operations of the Holy Ghost. Again,⁸ the Apostle speaks of "the filthiness of the flesh and spirit," when he cannot possibly be supposed to refer to the Holy Spirit of God.

To some persons, however, the expressions contained in Gal. v. may possibly, on a cursory perusal, appear to favour the opposite notion to that which I am endeavouring to establish, and believe to be correct: and it might be urged that spirit and flesh evidently mean the influence of the Holy Spirit, and man in his unregenerate condition; reference being made especially to v. 16, 17, and 18. A closer examination of the passage will, nevertheless, I am persuaded, convince us that this is not the case. We are told v. 16 that if we "walk in the spirit," that is, are under the influence of the higher part of our nature, aided by the Holy Ghost, we "shall not fulfil the lust of the flesh;" the clear meaning of which is, as already stated, that by the Holy Spirit the mind is refined and strengthened, and enabled to overcome the impulses of the opposing part of our nature, that is, the flesh. It is thus brought nearer to that

⁷ Gal. v. 17.

⁸ 2 Cor. vii. 1.

perfect and exalted condition, in which it will exist hereafter; when it will be freed from "the burden of the flesh," and its degrading control, and will be led by the Holy Ghost to act purely and rightly. In this respect, as both tending in one and the same direction, the influences of the two, of the mind and of the Holy Ghost, are identical, and are thus often spoken of in Scripture as synonymous.

In Eph. ii. 3, the words, "fulfilling the desires of the flesh and of the mind," would seem to import that the flesh and the mind are not, as expressly asserted in other passages which I have quoted, opposite and contending, but on the contrary, similar and agreeing, principles of our nature. But it should here be carefully borne in mind that, while in the passages before quoted, as in Gal. v. 17, the words flesh and spirit, or mind, are in the original *σὰρξ* and *πνεῦμα* (the latter of which strictly means spirit or mind, as contrasted with flesh, or body); in the passage from Ephesians which I have just quoted, the words translated "of the flesh and of the mind," are in the original, *τῆς σαρκὸς καὶ τῶν διανοιῶν*; which latter word is better rendered by Dean Alford "thoughts," and cannot, certainly, be correctly translated as "the spirit," or "mind" itself, in opposition to the flesh or its influences.

The flesh, or medial propensities, are often spoken of in Scripture under the denomination of "the heart," which we are told is inclined to evil.⁹ It is from not observing the distinction here stated,—from mistaking the denunciations pronounced in Scripture against the evil influences of the "heart" or "flesh," or medial propensities, as though these related to the intellectual parts of the system, which are not only entirely different from, but are opposed directly to the former—that the erroneous doctrines to which I have alluded, have arisen. In some cases indeed, the reason itself being brought under the control of the medial propensities, as already pointed out, may lead us to commit evil; but this does not prove it to be naturally prone of itself to do so. Hence, however, the necessity for Divine Grace, to purify and strengthen the mind, and to determine us to do good only.

It is on the principle which I have maintained, that while the medial propensities, or "flesh," incline us to evil, the intellectual faculties, or "mind" incline us to good, that fasting, and "mortifying the flesh" are so often enjoined in Scripture; by means of which (as is well expressed in one of the Collects of our Church for Lent) "our flesh may be subdued to the spirit;"

⁹ "The heart, that was made according to God's own heart, is now the reverse of it, a forge of evil imaginations, a sink of inordinate affections, and a storehouse of all impiety. Mark vii. 21, 22."—*Boston's Fourfold State*, State ii. head i. p. 38.

¹ *Vide ante*, vol. i. p. 333.

—that is, the latter may be enabled to acquire the ascendancy over the former. If, on the other hand, as contended by many, the mind is equally corrupt, and equally inclined to evil with the flesh, why should we endeavour to mortify the latter, and to aid the influence of the former over it?

In Genesis vi. 5, where God speaks of the general corruption which then prevailed on the earth—a text which is often quoted by the supporters of the doctrine here alluded to,—we are told that “God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his *heart* was only evil continually.” That is, that every imagination or desire, arising from, or originating in, or springing out of, his heart (which throughout Scripture is spoken of as the seat of the medial feelings and propensities), tended only to evil. But this is very different from asserting that every desire or imagination of the *mind* or *spirit* was utterly depraved, and prone only to evil.

As regards, however, the correct interpretation of the words spirit and flesh, *πνευμα* and *σαρξ*, contained in Holy Scripture, it may be concluded that the words in question must at any rate, in each case be rendered in one or other of these three modes. 1. Either they must mean soul and body, and the respective emotions, appetites, passions, and inclinations, respectively springing from them. 2. Or they must be rendered the spiritual, or regenerate man, and the carnal, unregenerate man. 3. Or they must mean the Holy Ghost and Its Divine influences, and the nature of man in general. In certain instances, nevertheless, it appears that they may be held to bear, sometimes the first, sometimes the second, and sometimes the third of these constructions. If, however, in any one instance, the interpretation rendered by the first of these modes can be put upon them; then it must be admitted by those who contend universally for the second and third modes of interpretation only, that they must, at any rate, bear an open construction; sometimes according to one mode, sometimes according to another; and which we may conclude to be their true meaning.

In many parts of Scripture, it may be observed that a double interpretation is allowed to the same expression, and the same descriptive language—the one literal, the other symbolical. In a corresponding manner, it appears most reasonable to suppose that the terms flesh and spirit are so intended to be used, and in a threefold sense; being sometimes meant to denote the opposite influences of the evil propensities of our nature and of the Holy Spirit; sometimes the opposite influences of the carnal and the spiritual parts of our nature; and sometimes the joint influence of these two opposite principles combined. That in several instances the in-

fluence of our carnal and medial propensities, opposed and counteracted by those which are intellectual and spiritual, is denoted in Scripture by the terms flesh and spirit, cannot be doubted.

The following passage may be appealed to as one where it is unreasonable to put any other interpretation upon the words "flesh and spirit" than that comprised in the first mode. It is that where St. Paul, in 1 Cor. v. 5, after alluding to the sin of fornication, which springs directly from the body, speaks of delivering such an one to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that his spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord. Now, it appears impossible that any other than medial endowments and propensities, which spring from the body or flesh, can be here meant by the "flesh," which by the affliction of the body would be mortified and subdued; and not the unregenerate, carnal man as a whole, both soul and body: and that by the "spirit" can only be meant the faculties, and endowments, and inclinations of the mind or spirit, which would then acquire their due ascendancy; and not the spiritualized or regenerated man as a whole. But if flesh and spirit—*σὰρξ* and *πνεῦμα*—are allowed to bear the interpretation which is contended for here, surely they must bear the same interpretation in other places as well; nay, more than this, *primâ facie*, they must be taken to bear it generally until the contrary be actually proved.

In several other passages of Scripture also it appears that no reasonable doubt can be entertained that the words "spirit," "mind," "inward man," and "soul," signify the mind, and its faculties, and inclinations; and that the words "flesh" and "members" signify the body, and the propensities springing therefrom.²

In some passages of Scripture, however, as in the following, the construction of the second kind must be put on the words significative of flesh and spirit, as in 1 Cor. ii. 14:—"The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned. But he that is spiritual judgeth all things." Here the words "natural man," "spiritual," and "Spirit" undoubtedly mean the unregenerate and carnal man, and the influence of the Holy Spirit; and not the soul and the body, and their respective influences and propensities.

In certain particular passages of Scripture I understand the word "Spirit" to mean, not the soul or mind of man, but the

² See for instance. Matt. xxv. 41; Mark xiv. 38; John vi. 63; Rom. vii. 18, 22, 23, 25; viii. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 16; 1 Cor. ii. 10; v. 3, 5; xv. 50; 2 Cor. iv. 16; vii. 1, 5; Gal. v. 16, 17, 19, 24; Eph. ii. 3; iii. 16; iv. 23; Col. ii. 5; 1 Thes. v. 23; 2 Thes. ii. 2; James iv. 5; 1 Pet. iv. 1, 6; 2 Peter ii. 10, 18.

Holy Ghost and His divine influences;³ while in other passages, which include some of those cited above, the signification appears to admit of doubt, and in some instances may bear either interpretation, although in each case I believe the true one to be according as I have already rendered them.⁴

The extent to which the influences of the mind and of the body are ever opposed to and affect each other, and to which in our present state the impulses proceeding from the latter generally prevail; is seen especially in the various inconsistencies of many really good men, whose souls incline them directly to do that which is right, but who from the influences of the body are guilty of many indulgences of their medial propensities: as was sublimely said, upon a very solemn occasion, by One who had perfect knowledge of what was in man, "The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak."⁵ The history of the Church of Christ affords, indeed, a great practical illustration of the correctness of this principle as regards man in the aggregate. The most perfect system which the mind could originate, has been established for the worship and service of the Creator; but which is wanting only, and here entirely deficient, because its machinery is too weak, too slenderly constructed, to withstand the strong influences of the flesh, and which has been the real efficient cause of all its corruptions. Thus, what might have been deemed perfection in Heaven, and served well for angels' rule; on earth has not only proved defective, but been the cause of anarchy and error. What, moreover, are many of the most vehement displays, both of superstition and of fanaticism, but the fervent aspirations of the soul after the highest point of theoretiical excellence on the one hand, borne down and counteracted by the gross medial influences, the appetites and passions, which lead to its perversion, on the other.

It has been asserted indeed, although without any authority, as a proof that the mind of itself inclines to evil, that Intellect without God is the Devil. The fact that spiritual, and even intellectual, influence does not of itself alone, in every case, necessarily tend to good, is at once conclusively proved by the example of the Devil, who is at the same time a being of a spiritual nature, possessing intellect of the highest order, but who is nevertheless, directly, and to the fullest extent, inclined to evil. In this case it may, however, be inferred that the inclination to evil arises, not from a natural preference for debased over

³ See for instance, John iii. 5, 6, 8, 34; Acts ii. 4; xviii. 25; Rom. viii. 11, 14, 16, 23, 26, 27; 1 Cor. ii. 12, 14, 15; xii. 1—13; 2 Cor. v. 5; Gal. iii. 2, 3, 4, 5, 14; iv. 29; v. 5, 18, 22, 25; vi. 8; Eph. ii. 18, 22; iv. 3, 4; v. 9, 18; Phil. ii. 1; 1 Thes. v. 19; 2 Thes. ii. 13; 1 Tim. iii. 16; 1 Pet. iii. 18.

⁴ See for instance, Rom. viii. 27; Gal. iii. 3; iv. 29; John vi. 63; Rom. viii. 1, 4, 5, 9, 10, 13; 1 Cor. ii. 10; Gal. v. 16, 18, 22; 1 Pet. iv. 6; 2 Pet. ii. 10, 18.

⁵ Matt. xxvi. 41..

exalted pursuits; but from a spirit of determined and uniform opposition to God, who is the Author and the Promoter of all good, and which is the main principle of action by which the Deity is ever directed. Moreover, although intellect and goodness united constitute angelic beings, and intellect and badness united constitute devils; yet it does not appear that intellect by itself would form a being either of one moral nature or the other. Hence, the mind of man, although it is influenced to good or to evil by being so directed; yet when not so influenced, and until it is influenced, it leans neither to one nor to the other, but is in a state of perfect equipoise or indifference. Nor can it be said that men naturally incline to, and prefer justice and right, and condemn and express a repugnance to injustice and wrong, where these are regarded in the abstract, and without any preference for, or prejudice against either the parties committing the act, or those suffering from it. But this surely would not be the case if men naturally and spontaneously inclined to evil and hated good, as they would in that case incline also to injustice and hate justice. They may, nevertheless, be induced to prefer justice from their love of truth. So that, although this circumstance proves them not to be naturally inclined to evil, it fails to prove them to be naturally inclined to good; but their disposition is one of indifference alike to either, which is the principle or condition here maintained. Indeed, even the desire to promote justice, where it is directly evinced, may originate in, or be extensively influenced by, a consideration of self-interest; inasmuch as the person so affected may be biased by the reflection that if injustice is permitted towards one person it may be towards another, and that eventually he himself may be a victim to the oppression which he has seen exercised over others.

In the disposition of every individual there is, nevertheless, not only an immense variety, but an absolute contrariety of opposite and opposing qualities. Thus, with people who profess more than they mean, and who pass under the denomination of hypocrites, much of their insincerity will in many, if not in most, cases be found in reality to result, not from the desire to deceive, but from their zeal outstripping their power to perform that at which they aim. Consequently, among the most sincere there is necessarily some alloy of insincerity, and among the most hypocritical there is ordinarily some of the gold of sincerity. Their ardour makes them promise what they cannot perform. Their weakness, not their will, occasions them to fall short in their fulfilments.

But it may be said that if moral depravity consists merely in the higher endowments of the soul being subjugated to the lower impulses, the reason to the appetites and passions, the spirit to the flesh, this would not render the whole man de-

praved, as is seen to be the case ; but that the only result of it would be that his mental endowments were proved weaker than his medial propensities, while the mind was of itself quite pure and uncorrupted ; that, though the heart was prone to guilt, the soul was still inclined to good. Here, however, it must be observed that this subjugation of the higher endowments to the lower impulses, has the ultimate effect of debasing the whole man, and rendering his intellectual powers the slave of, and the panderers to, his lusts and medial propensities, instead of enabling him to resist them. All the vices of servitude, its degeneracy and baseness, are thus engrafted on the nobler parts of man's nature, and the whole man becomes debased. Hence it is impossible for a man who is the slave of his appetites, however inclined to virtue his mind may be, long to continue himself unpolluted. A person of the purest principles, if he has not strength of mind to resist the temptation to bad practices, is, as a whole, but a depraved and corrupt being, although he may not be so naturally, or originally.

Hence, in many cases, not only does the body influence the soul in leading it to evil, but, in certain cases, the soul also influences the body in the commission of crime, and even contrives the plan for its performance. Indeed, when the mind has become wholly depraved, and is entirely enslaved to the baser influences of the body, it will exert itself to procure the gratification of the medial desires and appetites, even after these influences have ceased to actuate it ; and when the body itself, by its excessive indulgence in these propensities, has become too enervated any longer to desire their continuance. It is only, however, when the soul has been subjected to the medial influences, that it is thus degenerated. Independently of itself, and when not thus corrupted, the mind naturally inclines to good, and the body, independently of itself, naturally to evil. But when they are united in aim, each may aid and urge on the other to the commission of sin. The body, in the first instance, stimulates the soul to desire the commission of the evil deed ; and the soul, in its turn, aids the body in the attainment of its nefarious purpose.

As man is internally influenced by the opposite springs of flesh and spirit, so is he influenced, externally, by the two opposite springs of the Devil, or the spirit of evil, which ever inclines him to ill, and the Holy Ghost, or Spirit of God, which ever inclines him to do right. To what extent, and in what cases, he acts entirely independently of either the one or the other of these contending influences, either directly or indirectly, if he ever does so, it might be difficult to determine.

But if the influences of Satan on the soul are exercised through the mind, in a manner corresponding with that in which the Holy Spirit operates upon it ; it may be urged that in these

cases the mental, as well as the medial, influences of our nature must be considered to incline us to evil. This, however, is not their natural inclination, but is their direct perversion. Probably, moreover, the Devil mainly exerts his power by applying himself to, and acting upon, our medial endowments, and exciting and invigorating the appetites and passions, and other fleshy propensities. Indeed, when Satan assails us, he ordinarily attempts this more by stratagem than by open attack. He resorts rather to enticement than to compulsion. He seeks oftener to allure than to lead us in any particular path. Sometimes he endeavours to deceive or ensnare us, by the false glittering which he causes even facts to assume. At other times he tries to beguile our reasoning powers, and to pervert their application. In some cases emotions, appetites, and passions are wrought upon by him, and are excited and roused to energy. In none of these instances, however, can it be said that our own nature, of itself, and without any external influence, leads us into sin, much less that our intellectual faculties have this tendency. Their liability to perversion, and to be thus wrongly influenced, is surely no proof of their natural evil inclination, but goes rather, if anything, to establish the reverse. It evinces, indeed, that when they do act wrongly, this is at variance with their natural bias, and may be traced to impulses which are external, and which are wholly independent of those powers themselves. Probably, moreover, in most, if not in all those cases, where the influence of the mind, or of either of the intellectual faculties, is exerted to lead us to an erroneous course; Satan is, either directly or indirectly, the active agent in the impulse, the original spring that sets in motion the operation.

According to the Calvinistic theory, however, man is ever, and alone, inclined to evil; and is never, on any occasion, inclined to good. How can such a being be considered to be in a probationary state? His only chance of salvation, according to the doctrine of this party, arises from some special interposition of Providence, which controls his inclination, and compels him to act directly contrary to his natural disposition.⁶ We are told indeed, by one of the theologians of this school, that "there is in the will of man, a natural proneness to evil, a woful bent towards sin,"⁷ and this wholly independent of the influence of the appetites, or of any temptation that may arise. Indeed, according to the same author, so irretrievably bad are we all, and so decidedly determined to evil, and averse to good, that "even the memory bears evident marks of this corruption.

⁶ *Mr. John Stuart Mill* well observes with regard to the Calvinistic theory, "Human nature being radically corrupt, there is no redemption for any one until human nature is killed within him."—*Liberty*, chap. iii.

⁷ *Boston's Fourfold State*, State ii. head 1.

What is good makes but slender impression.”⁸ We are also assured that what is evil is difficult, in fact, almost impossible to be forgotten. And further, that human nature naturally, and spontaneously, clings to whatever is evil and corrupt. That lying and falsehood are both natural and agreeable to it. That the Will is naturally averse to good, and prone to evil. That sin is man’s natural element. That the affections and the conscience are also corrupted and defiled. In fact, that man is by nature inclined entirely to evil, and utterly disinclined to good.⁹ Beings such as are here described, are surely not only fitter inhabitants for hell than for earth, but ought to have been created at once in the former.

The only conclusion to be drawn from the doctrine here propounded, is that man while on earth is not in a state of trial, but is at once placed in one of condemnation, from which there is no possible escape by any efforts of his own, but solely by Divine interposition. His very creation and continuance for a period in the world were, according to this principle, effected with the object of ensuring his condemnation through all eternity!

Although, from its union with the body, the soul is frequently, and at length becomes, in certain cases, almost naturally inclined to evil; yet we cannot but consider that its true and original bent would be to aspire to good rather than to evil, to pursue the path followed by the great Being to Whom it is allied as to its origin, and of Whose essence it partakes. As the body which is earthy falls by natural attraction to the earth; so the soul, which is celestial, soars as to its natural region, upwards towards heaven.

The pleasure which is derived from good actions is, moreover, for the most part mental. That which arises from bad ones is mainly medial, or springing from the emotions and excitements of that class. This is not, however, uniformly the case; and even the impulses of conscience are of a medial, as well as of a mental kind.

Our nature as a whole, does not, however, by any means, always lead us wrong, even as regards the influence of our medial endowments and excitements, for these may sometimes incline us right; and it may be that occasionally, our acting wrongly was caused by our acting contrary to, or disregarding their dictates. For instance, in the discharge of our natural duties, such as those of affection, social intercourse, charity, our medial endowments and feelings at once lead us to a correct course. And the worst of crimes, such as murder, rapine, fraud, are committed, not in accordance with, or from

⁸ *Boston’s Fourfold State*, State ii. head 1.

“Sinne is as sweet and as pleasant to a man by nature, as water to a man scorched with thirst.”—*Burgess of Original Sinne*, part iv. c. i. p. 441.

⁹ *Burgess of Original Sinne*, part iv. c. i. p. 441.

the impulses of, but in direct violation of our natural inclinations. Moreover, although the endowments and excitements originating in the medial part of our nature, may for the most part influence us to the commission of evil; yet, a sort of compensation is to a certain extent, rendered by them as regards even this circumstance, in the pleasurable sensations which they produce in us as accompaniments to good actions, such as those of affection and charity, on the one hand; and of the painful emotions which they produce, as accompaniments to actions of an opposite character, on the other.

One particular circumstance which contributes to afford greater influence to the medial endowments, and emotions, and feelings, than to the intellectual endowments and inclinations, is that the former come more immediately and closely, and also more constantly, into contact with the objects which excite them, than do the latter.

Possibly, in the constitution of a being of so complex a nature as is that of man, and who is placed here in a probationary condition, even certain defects in his material frame, through which the vigour of particular medial endowments and excitements is restrained, may be expressly in some cases ordered, and made to work a moral remedy. Nay, this defect alone may be the very means through which the remedy is effected. Pain and sickness, thus considered, are essential to its welfare; and which is the more to be inferred, as they are ordained by the same great Being who regulates all the other operations of nature.

In the union together of soul and body, one in its nature divine and pure, the other gross and carnal, and the influences and operations of the two being diametrically opposed to each other, the condition and constitution of man might be taken to be, in a manner, typified by, or analogous to, that of the Redeemer; who was at once, both in His origin and nature, divine and pure, although having taken upon Himself the nature of a man, He was also subject to the inclinations and infirmities inseparable from such a state. As in the case of the Redeemer too, the flesh, or gross part of man's nature, must suffer and undergo many pains and trials, and death eventually; when the nobler part shall rise to be united forever with the Divine origin from which it sprung.

It might, perhaps, be contended, that men in general, naturally exhibit a preference for virtue, and a hatred of vice, from the circumstance that persons whose countenances express the former quality are the most liked, their company is sought after, and their faces are universally deemed agreeable and pleasing; while those whose countenances are supposed to express vice and depravity, are at once thought disagreeable and forbidding, and their society is shunned. This may, moreover, be urged to

be the case, not only with regard to persons with whom we are brought into intimate communion, and by whose disposition or actions we may be in some way affected, but with respect also to persons with whom we have no expectation, or even possibility of being connected; nay even as regards the pictures of deceased, or merely imaginary persons. With respect to this circumstance, it cannot, however, be admitted to be any proof of our innate independent preference for virtue; as, although we may not be immediately connected with the persons whose expression we so scrutinize, yet we speculate upon the possibility of this occurring: and it is really in reference to it, and in the prospect of deriving pleasure or pain from their virtuous or vicious conduct or qualities, that we are so moved with regard to them; just as we are gratified by the prospect of fair weather and of abundance, although we may not be so circumstanced as to be immediately affected by the event. Here, however, as in the former case, it is the consideration of self-interest, which really determines our approval or disapproval. But even in the human countenance, beauty, though unaccompanied with the expression of goodness, is generally, if not universally, more actually pleasing than the expression of virtue; and the expression of beauty conjoined with that of vice, would, I fear, be generally preferred to the expression of plainness conjoined with that of virtue. All however that I contend for here is, that our judgment is determined solely by our own feeling of interest in the matter, and not by any abstract preference of a moral kind.

Nevertheless, if on the other hand, as certain moralists very strenuously contend, human nature is in its origin so utterly corrupt, and so entirely prone to evil and to vice, independent even of any allurements which may arise; it appears but probable that we should discover the traits of these innate characteristics most perfectly developed in those persons where Nature is most free to exhibit her own bias and propensities, and where the least has been done to alter the course of conduct which would spontaneously be pursued. Thus, in children might we expect to find vice flourishing in full vigour; and instead of that period of our career being pointed out as emblematic of innocence and purity, we ought surely ever to appeal to it as affording an example of vice raging unrestrained, and with all the vigour incident to youth.

It has been contended, indeed, by one who had a great knowledge of human nature,¹ that the depravity of the human heart is strongly proved "by the imperfect sense displayed by children of the sanctity of moral truth," and that the love of truth is only an acquired habit. But in this case it is from want of knowledge of right and wrong that the child errs, not being aware of the heinousness of telling a lie. The

¹ *Sir Walter Scott, Demonology and Witchcraft*, p. 214.

child has no natural inclination either to truth or falsehood, except so far as he is inclined to one or the other by some independent influence. He would not depart from the truth, unless induced to do so by some urgent cause; and he does so with readiness from not being aware of, or considering the sin that he is committing. As he grows older he learns to despise falsehood, because he is taught that it is wicked and despicable. Before the child is instructed in the duty of adhering to truth, the motive to speak falsehood may be stronger in certain cases than the motive to speak truth, and so may induce him to utter the former; but this surely is no proof that he is naturally independently inclined rather to falsehood than to truth. Children are, moreover, more easily led astray than are adults, both from their want of instruction, and their want of experience. But, on the other hand, they are also more easily trained to good. They are not naturally and spontaneously inclined to either good or evil; but are swayed towards either, according to the motive which impels them.

The minds of children are, indeed, like pure water, which is ready to receive taste or colour from a foreign ingredient, but is wholly void of taste or colour of any kind of its own. So children are inclined neither to good nor to bad; but imbibe, with the utmost readiness and facility, a tendency to either; and whatever is at this early age impressed on the mind, is vividly retained there, and at once gives a character and bias to the yet untutored disposition.

In case, however, the Calvinistic principle of the utter depravity of human nature, and the decided inclination of the infant mind to evil, be correct;² it might surely have been surmised that our blessed and benevolent Saviour instead of commanding little children to come unto Him, and saying, "Of such is the kingdom of heaven," and rebuking those who kept them from Him; would have sternly forbidden their approach, have declared that "of such is the kingdom of hell," and have commended those who kept them from Him.

On the contrary, we find that here, where Nature is most free to display, and to follow her own original and pure bent and inclinations, vice is the least exhibited;³ and that it is, as men advance in age, and their emotions, and appetites, and passions, arrive at maturity, and obtain full power and influence, that they run into vicious excesses. Man, indeed, appears to approach nearest to his Maker, as regards his nature at the

² "Every child is set to damn itself, if left alone. It is not more prone to runne into the fire then it is to fall into hell, and this maketh chastisement so necessary."—*Burgess, Of Original Sinne*, part iv. c. iv. p. 448.

³ *Mr. Herbert Spencer*, however, says that "the popular idea that children are innocent, is totally false with respect to evil impulses."—*Education*, chap. iii. And that "as the children's features resemble for a time those of the savage, so, too, do his instincts."—*Ibid.*

two extreme periods of his career, childhood and old age. During the former of these he is all innocence and loveliness, fresh from the hands of his Creator. During the latter of these periods, he is dignified, and grave, and reverent; as most befits him, when about to enter into that Maker's presence.

Another proof that men are not naturally wholly depraved, and that their theoretical notions of human nature are even higher than what general practical observation might lead us to conclude; may be deduced from the circumstance that children form so high a moral opinion of those about them, especially of their parents and governors, to whom they are ever wont to impute the best and purest motives, and whose conduct they regard as models of correctness. But this would not surely be unless they were induced from their own internal reflection upon what they themselves feel, to attribute the same to others, and to judge of mankind at large from what they experience in their own minds. Nothing, indeed, so truly reflects our own moral state, as our opinion of the state of those around us. Those persons whose minds are full of fraud and guile, are ever prone to suspect others, judging of their motives by their own.

From what has here been advanced, may, I hope, be acknowledged the truth of the proposition which I have maintained; that man, independent of temptation, and of the allurements and influences of appetite, and passion, and other medial endowments, is not naturally inclined to evil, nor is induced to this through the inclinations of the mind, however the various medial endowments may impel us in this direction.

The true theory, and the strict duty, as to the regulation of our appetites and passions, and the medial influences generally, is, consequently, not to repress or even counteract, much less to extirpate them, but to direct them aright and to their appointed ends.⁴ Each of these endowments were given to us by God, and were given to us to be used. He who refuses to use them, errs as much as he who abuses them. To use them, and to use them aright, is the proper, and the only proper course, by which we at once follow nature and obey God, the author and the orderer of nature.

It may also be observed that, although many medial influences are the cause of moral evil, yet, on the other hand, the want or weakness of some of those influences which are apt to be regarded as directly pernicious, may, in turn, be the cause of it; as the want of ambition leads to indolence, the absence of

⁴ According to that eminent prelate, *Bishop Burnett*, "the animal affections considered in themselves, and as they are implanted in us by nature, are not vicious or blameable;" and "our natural affections are not wholly to be extirpated and destroyed, but only to be moderated and overruled by a superior and more excellent principle."—*Life of God in the Soul of Man*, pp. 10, 11.

avarice to neglect of our affairs, and our not being to a legitimate extent excitable by anger, to our being imposed upon by unprincipled persons.

The view here taken of the subject of the "natural depravity of human nature" is that which appears to me to be most in accordance with reason, and also with Scripture; although I am quite aware that it is not at all in accordance with the interpretation which has by certain persons been put upon the expressions of Scripture on this point. To Scripture and reason, and not to their perverters, do I make my appeal, and by them alone do I claim to be judged, and to which alone I am amenable. Many persons, indeed, are condemned, not because what they advance can be proved to be at variance with Scripture; but because it is at variance with the constrained and false interpretations which have been put upon it by persons equally fallible, and equally liable to erroneous conclusions with themselves.

Much less am I desirous of, as it were, bringing into collision Revelation and the apparent system of nature. I would ever rather seek to reconcile, than to oppose them; and would cite them to confirm, instead of to contradict one another. Poor human nature, too, I cannot but consider as sufficiently weak and debased, without making any extraordinary efforts to torture the meaning of expressions in Holy Writ to exaggerate its deficiencies.

6. *Benevolence and Malevolence not innate principles.*

If, indeed, any moral principles, qualities, or propensities whatever, can be supposed to be originally and naturally innate in the mind, or in the moral department of our constitution; surely those of benevolence and malevolence,—which, of all qualities or propensities with which man can be endowed, most nearly concern his dealings with his fellow creatures, and, therefore, might be expected to be inherently implanted in his nature—would assuredly, be so.

Whether man does naturally possess a disposition of benevolence, or malevolence,—whether he is really anxious, or concerned, about the good or evil of his fellow creatures, when such does not in any way whatsoever affect his feelings or his interests,—may on a first view appear very difficult to determine. To ascertain whether there is innate within us any principle of this kind, we must first inquire in what degree that feeling of benevolence is felt towards others, in proportion to the love of ourselves; for we cannot suppose that the mere wish for our neighbour's prosperity, is any evidence of our benevolence, if we are not willing, in any

degree to further that wish, by some sacrifice on our part. Our apparent desire for his welfare may arise from our unwillingness to think ourselves so unfeeling, or so uncharitable, as not to desire it, through the flattery which we are apt to bestow upon our own natural dispositions and qualities. The only candid way to decide whether we really have, or have not, this disposition of benevolence, appears therefore to be to inquire of ourselves—1. To what inconvenience we are willing to submit, in order to relieve the necessities and distresses of our fellow creatures; what pain suffered by us, that would relieve them, would be sufficient only to balance the pain which we feel from their distress? And, 2. Whether we are not sometimes led secretly to rejoice at their calamities, when we expect to become richer, or to obtain promotion by it; although such advantage be to us but exceedingly small, and the evil to them very considerable, much greater than what is sufficient to balance any measure of distress which we might experience by our loss, against what they suffer? If, therefore, the sentiment which we experience be no other than a mere preference, or supposed preference for the happiness rather than the misery and misfortune of our neighbours, when both events are alike unconnected with our own welfare and happiness; we must surely admit that this cannot, in the least degree, be taken as evidence of any real, natural, innate disposition of benevolence; inasmuch as this apparent feeling of it may proceed from our flattery of our own disposition, or from our conviction that it is a virtuous feeling, in which latter case it is not innate, but acquired. Or, in certain instances, the narration of some dreadful suffering may fill us with fear for ourselves, or with grief; not however on account of our disposition of benevolence towards those afflicted, but because narrations of this kind call forth ideas in the mind which themselves are painful. The feeling of benevolence is, moreover, altogether distinct from the emotions of pity and sympathy, which are, doubtless, felt more or less, whenever we behold a fellow creature suffering.⁵ We may, however, be keenly excited by these emotions, and yet be wholly devoid of benevolence.

It may be said, indeed, that the exercise of benevolence is ever accompanied by pleasure, and that of malevolence no less certainly by pain. The one arises from, or rather consists in, the desire of good, the other in the desire of evil, to some being. Conscience, however, probably bears its part in both these

⁵ "How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others."—*Adam Smith, Theory of the Moral Sentiments.*

cases ; and instils into us the conviction that the sentiment of benevolence is in accordance, and that that of malevolence is more or less at variance, with our social moral duty.

We have already inquired⁶ to what extent, and in what precise mode, affection may be supposed to originate, in self-love. But if affection originates in this feeling, why should not benevolence do so, which is but an expansion of affection,—an extension of it from our kindred to our countrymen, or to mankind at large? In favour of this view it may be urged that, while affection is a desire for good to those whom we regard as a part of ourselves, as having sprung from, or as being connected with us ; benevolence in many cases indirectly originates in the hope of good resulting directly to ourselves. Self-love and benevolence may appear to be opposed to each other, and to be counteracting impulses. Nevertheless, in reality, much, both of our affection and our benevolence, originates in self-love ; even though self-love owes nothing to benevolence, of which it is the parent. Indeed, unless self, and the consideration of our own interest, is the grand turning-point,—the pivot on which all our considerations of various matters, and their consequences, revolve,—how shall we reconcile the fact, which we may hold to be as certain as any proposition which admits of mathematical demonstration, and which is proved by that most unerring of all modes of probation, our own experience, that we should at any time prefer the occurrence of a great calamity to a whole race of people, to a comparatively trivial misfortune happening to ourselves. Desire, too, for the good of our country, even after we are dead, may originate, not in benevolence, but in a wish to see accomplished schemes to which our own efforts have been devoted ; or in the hope that the interests of those who are sprung from us may be benefited thereby.

In many cases, indeed, selfishness is not only the ruling, but the sole acting principle in man ; whether prompting him to deeds of benevolence or malevolence, and whether influencing him as regards his conduct towards himself, or towards others.

Mentally, as well as materially, our own selves are the main objects of care, and of interest, to each of us. Each individual is indeed the centre of his own system, so that all subjects concentrate in himself ; are of importance proportionally as they affect him ; are great or small in relation to himself. So light, and heat, and darkness, and motion, are each regarded according to our own condition in relation thereto. Hence also, in our reasoning process, the criterion by which we judge everything, is self. Self is the weight in the balance by which all subjects are tested. When we are materially moving, we seem to be standing still, while the mountains, and trees,

⁶ *Vide ante*, b. i. c. v. s. 1, 4, 6.

and objects around us, appear to be changing position. So also, as regards our progress through the world, we seem to ourselves not to be advancing or receding; but others who were our equals, appear to be either rising or declining, according as we either suffer them in rank or station to outstrip us, or in this respect rise above them. Self is, indeed, the sun in our system, round which all things in any way relating to, or affecting us, revolve; by which their course is regulated, through which they are retained in their spheres, and by which they are attracted or repelled, as circumstances induce. This is, indeed, the pivot on which all our actions turn; and in all cases of deliberation, the issue is determined by reference to ourselves, by what will be the surest and greatest benefit to us under the circumstances.⁷ Hence, self influences all our actions, and biasses every thought and desire that passes through, or arises in the mind. Every proceeding has relation to self; as has every judgment that we form of every other person. As the people, who inhabit this planet, appear to presume that they are the only beings in existence at all; so we act as regards others, as though we ourselves were the only creatures deserving of any consideration in the regulation of our conduct. Not only indeed do all our motives proceed from a consideration of self, but even the Deity is adored as the author, and the orderer of all that we do: not as a separate Being from us, but as that Being in which solely, and wholly, "we live, and move, and have our being."⁸

Here, however, are carefully to be distinguished the qualities, or rather propensities, of self-love and selfishness, which are both in their constitution and tendency essentially distinct one from the other. Thus, self-love consists in the natural and legitimate desire of every one to consider his own good as the first object of his efforts. Selfishness consists in the neglect to allow the consideration of the good of our fellow creatures, and our duty towards them, to have a reasonable influence upon, and duly to modify without counteracting, this desire. That consequently, which in reality and essentially constitutes what is

⁷ It is observed by *Aristotle*, that the ruling principle in man's nature is himself, as the sovereignty in a community constitutes the state.—*Ethics*, b. ix. c. viii. And *Malebranche* asserts that "self-love is the ruling and universal love, since it is to be found, and bears the sway everywhere. Also that self-love is the most extensive and powerful of all passions, or the ruling and universal passion."—*Search after Truth*, b. iv. c. v.

Dr. Abercrombie remarks that "self-love is to be considered as a part of our moral constitution, and calculated to answer important purposes, provided it be kept in its proper place, and do not encroach upon the duties and affections which we owe to other men." And thus rightly viewed, self-love "appears to be placed as a regulating principle among the other powers."—*On the Moral Feelings*, s. 3.

⁸ *Vide ante*, b. i. c. v. ss. 1, 4, 6, pp. 378, 388, 395, and in the present chapter, s. 4. p. 24.

ordinarily termed selfishness in any individual, is not his extensive care about his own interest and concerns, by which all persons are influenced to a large amount; but the comparative indifference which he evinces in the well-being of those about him. According as the latter is weak, the former counteracts it, and weighs it down; and in the direction that the one or other preponderates, will be the turn of the character of the individual as regards his selfishness or liberality. An unselfish man may, in reality, therefore, be fully as anxious about, and quite as careful of, his own interest, as is the most selfish man. But in the case of the former, his care of his own interest is combined with, and modified and regulated by, his concern for others; and his efforts for his own good are so directed that they may not injure, but, as far as possible, may promote that of others. A selfish man cares only about himself. An unselfish man cares for himself, but for others also.

Our first concern therefore, in all cases, is for ourselves, and for our own good. But as we desire also to promote the good of those nearly connected with us; so this love of self becomes, as it were, reflected upon others, to the extent that in our efforts to promote our own happiness, we are careful to promote theirs as well, and that, occasionally, even to the neglect of our own apparent interest.

The leading counteracting or balancing influence against self-love, is benevolence. According as the latter is powerful and energetic, the force of the former is corrected and modified. Occasionally, indeed, our very benevolence is aided and urged on by self-love, and may be traced as springing indirectly from this principle: while, on the other hand, benevolence, in its turn, occasionally aids self-love; some rays of light emitted from the planet, and falling upon its satellite, being thus reflected back from the satellite upon the planet. According, moreover, as our concern about the welfare of others is weak, and is but little or seldom called forth, that respecting our own welfare grows gradually and comparatively stronger; while in proportion as that for our own welfare is neglected and becomes weaker, that for others increases and expands. The pleasure arising from the exercise and gratification of either of these propensities, according to the particular character of the person so acting, contributes also to confirm and strengthen the habit or inclination in question.

Nevertheless, although the consideration of self is, as already remarked, the pivot on which all our actions turn, and the general centre of attraction throughout the system of human operation: yet it is remarkable, on the other hand, that in our daily life and conduct, self is frequently the last thing thought of; and that the most trivial every-day occurrences are sufficient to divert the mind from the consideration of self, but to which

it at once reverts, although then only, when it is not occupied with extraneous matter.

As too much, and too excessive a love for self, is the direct cause of most of the crimes which are committed; so too little a consideration for self is also their main ultimate producer. The first operates to urge us to attain our immediate gratification. The second operates so as to cause us to disregard what is the best course for us to pursue for our real and substantial, our eternal good.

Even in his religious duties, it is by selfishness, by the desire to promote his own good and his eternal happiness, that man is mainly actuated; and it is, moreover, even to this principle that the great Author of our being, of whom, when on earth, it was emphatically declared that "He knew what was in man," in Scripture itself, directly and constantly appeals. It may be doubtful indeed whether not only benevolence, but even virtue and wisdom are, either of them, ever pursued for their own sake alone; and whether they are not in all cases, each of them sought after wholly and solely for the sake of the fruits which they may be calculated ultimately to produce. The acquisition of knowledge is often painful and wearisome in itself, although we pursue it eagerly; to which, however, we are stimulated by the consideration of the ultimate reward that it brings. As regards the pursuit of virtue, and the practice of benevolence, it appears probable that the Deity, and the Deity alone, of all intelligent beings, acts purely and entirely without any motive of self-interest operating as the *primum mobile* to urge him forward in his course; and that He, and He only, does everything solely and spontaneously of His own free will, and with the view alone of doing that which is in itself, wholly and absolutely, the most just and right. Nevertheless, it may be hoped, and cannot indeed but be admitted, that many virtuous actions are performed from the highest motives, whatever be the considerations which indirectly promoted them; and from which no direct reward, either temporal or eternal, could be anticipated. These spring, however, not from actual benevolence, but rather from the dictates of conscience; from the habitual desire to act in conformity with the will of God, or our moral duty, arising from the consideration that by such a course we exalt our own nature and disposition, and acquire the character of men of benevolence and virtue: and thus, self-love, after all, is found to be skulking behind the scenes, and to be the real director of the movements which occur.

Nevertheless, I do not here deny the existence of benevolence, or love towards mankind. I merely maintain that it is not an innate, independent principle of itself, but that it both originates from, and results in, love of ourselves. When, however, it is

once excited in us, it spreads forth and expands itself towards others; and it is then manifested as vigorously towards them as towards ourselves. Indeed, love of ourselves stimulates benevolence, and benevolence self-love; both being in fact the same feeling, although excited in a different manner. Farther than this, it is quite possible that even the purest benevolence may originate in the desire of self-gratification; as when our highest gratification consists in seeing another made happy: here our own pleasure is promoted, but the exercise of benevolence is the cause of its promotion. Sympathy⁷ with others serves also to connect, and to cement, or consolidate into one feeling, our own self-love, and our love of mankind in general. It is not improbable, moreover, to a certain extent, that self-love regulates, even by checking it, the exercise of benevolence; and that, in a corresponding manner, benevolence also regulates self-love.

Nevertheless, it may be inferred that in a future and more perfect state of being, our benevolence may be excited more generally towards all those around us, as well as towards the Deity, who may form a common and strong bond of union between them and us, through our connexion with Him. The more, therefore, that benevolence is excited on earth, the more does earth resemble heaven.

With respect also to malevolence, I cannot find any evidence that we really possess such a principle innate within us: nor should I think it sufficient to prove this, if it were urged that men derive pleasure from the sufferings of their fellow-creatures; inasmuch as this feeling may be produced by so many independent causes, such as envy, revenge, hatred, jealousy, or the like: or the gratification at witnessing such occurrences may be occasioned by some tragical circumstances which accompany it, and which are calculated to call forth pleasurable feelings of excitement in the minds of some persons who are endowed with temperaments to which such an impulse is agreeable. We may therefore conclude that a feeling of indifference as to either the welfare or the misery of mankind, is that which prevails among men by nature; or rather, would prevail in case their feelings were not influenced by some other collateral causes. In deciding a question of this kind, we are too apt to be weighed down by prejudice, to act fairly and impartially. It is this which hinders us from forming a correct opinion of our own disposition and characters, as also of those of others.

Indeed, if it were not for the appetite of hunger, which operates as the mainspring in setting in motion their course of action,

⁷ "That it is by changing places in fancy with the sufferer, that we come either to conceive or be affected by what he feels, may be demonstrated by many obvious assertions, if it should not be thought sufficiently evident of itself."—*Adam Smith. Theory of the Moral Sentiments.*

and in stimulating their passions, even many of the most savage animals would not commit acts of cruelty, or be prone to prey one upon the other. In man, indeed, several influences besides those of appetite and passion, urge him on to oppress and injure his fellow-creatures, some of which impulses spring from the medial, others from the mental part of our nature. From the operation together of these various counteracting and reciprocal agents, it is that his ultimate moral disposition is formed.

7. *Moral Qualities and Propensities.*

Having in the first section of this chapter endeavoured to demonstrate the constitution and essence of moral endowment generally, I now proceed to describe and to define the nature of certain of the leading moral qualities and propensities which serve to distinguish the character of different individuals.

A moral quality consists in the inherent turn or adaptation of the mind as regards its liability to acquire a bias or inclination towards any particular line of conduct. A moral propensity is the settled inclination itself so acquired, of the mind towards such a course, wanting only to complete it the determination of the will in its favour. That which is properly termed the moral disposition or character of a man, consists in the general bent of his mind in any particular direction, whether virtuous or vicious, benevolent or malevolent; and which is produced by the predominance of certain medial or mental endowments, excitements, or feelings, whether occasioned by natural inclination, habit, or education, combined with the determination of the will in favour of such a line of action.

Of the various moral qualities, propensities, and characteristics by which man is distinguished, it is unnecessary here to specify more than a very small proportion; which may suffice, however, to be representative of the whole class. Such are what are termed good nature and kindness, amiability, and the reverse of these qualities; as ill-nature, maliciousness, and moroseness. Also the qualities or propensities of honesty and dishonesty, of courage and of cowardice, of good temper and bad temper, the particular nature of which will be presently examined.

Some naturalists assert that from the inspection of an ordinary bone of any animal, they are able at once to form an opinion as to its size, and shape, and general nature and adaptation. So is it also with regard to the moral constitution of man, that from the simplest and apparently most trivial circumstances in the career of each individual, may be inferred with tolerable certainty his general moral character and disposition.

Not only, indeed, is this the case, but the mere tone of his voice, the structure of his hand-writing, and his ordinary demeanour, may each serve to indicate the quality and peculiarity of his moral being. The natural moral disposition and characteristic tendency in each individual is, moreover, evinced as much, or perhaps more, by his pleasures as by his serious pursuits; inasmuch as the former, like straws on the current, serve more correctly than weightier substances to show the real course of the stream. Thus, the man of shallow mind delights in frivolities, while an individual of solid power is never so happy as when engaged in the loftiest pursuits of literature or of science. And as we see in nature certain animals, such as the cat and the hawk, resembling those of a larger species, such as the tiger and the eagle, in their particular propensities and dispositions, but widely differing from them as regards both the extent of their power, and the mode of exhibiting their respective endowments; so some little minds resemble certain great ones, but are like them only in their foibles, and wholly differ from them both in the extent of their capacities and powers, and in the mode in which these endowments are exercised.

From what has already been remarked in the preceding sections of this chapter, it may be concluded that the qualities of good nature, and kindness, and amiability, and the reverse of them already specified, are produced by the predominance of the inclinations allied to those virtues that contribute to constitute them in any particular individual, and which occasions actions of a corresponding nature habitually to spring forth. Thus, the man, in whom a sense of justice and the kindly affections, predominate over appetite and passion, will be prone to exercise benevolent acts towards those about him; while the man who is the slave of his appetites, and whose passions are unbridled by the higher endowments, is careless about the welfare of his fellow-creatures, and concerned only for his own good. It is here, moreover, especially to be observed, that a deficiency in certain endowments and excitements, whether medial or mental, will in some cases produce as powerful an influence on the moral character, as will the abundant possession of any of them. Thus, different propensities which distinguish many individuals, are caused, not so much by the extensive endowment of those persons with certain characteristics; as by the limited amount in their constitution of those qualities and characteristics which are antagonistic to them, or would serve entirely to counterbalance their influence and operation. Hence, as already remarked, selfishness in any particular character arises, not from that individual being peculiarly endowed with a desire to take a due care of his own interests, which all ought to possess; but from a deficiency in disposition towards benevolence or amiabi-

lity, which causes him to neglect, or unduly to disregard, the interests of others. So generosity, on the other hand, is frequently produced, not so much by an actual indifference about wealth, as by the disposition of benevolence towards certain objects, sufficiently strong and influential to induce us to make a sacrifice to relieve this distress. Generosity exists, consequently, mainly in those cases where the pleasure which arises from benefiting others, is greater than that which is produced by benefiting ourselves.

Honesty and dishonesty, or rather the propensities to commit acts of that nature, are the two opposite counterparts of their kind. The essence of honesty consists in framing and directing our conduct strictly according to the rule which reason prescribes to be that which is correct. Dishonesty is caused by the liability of an individual to be deterred by fear, hope, avarice, or other cause, from the observance of the strict rule of right duty; and by the influence of which motives, the reason and the conscience in such an individual, are prevailed over, and borne down. This propensity originates in, or results directly and mainly from, the predominance of the medial over the mental part of our nature; and is most strongly exhibited in persons of naturally weak and uncultivated minds, as also, among those depraved persons who are given up to sensual pursuits, and who are subjugated to the influence of their appetites and passions. It is not merely in these individuals, however, that the vices springing from dishonesty prevail; but those of the loftiest powers, and the most cultivated intellects, are not only often found to be a prey to this unfortunate propensity, while in their case their minds are made subservient for this purpose to their medial endowments. Among persons of different rank and condition, dishonesty is nevertheless displayed under very different aspects; although the same originating causes prevail in each instance. As regards the predominance both of this, and of certain other evil propensities of our nature, the subjugation of the higher influences to the lower impulses, may happen in either of these cases. 1. When the individual has become subject to the control of his emotions, and appetites, and passions, as in the instance of habitual drunkards, the influence of the intellect being altogether subdued. 2. When the emotions, and appetites, and passions, obtain such an influence over the intellect, as to engage it, and lead it captive, in their service; and to compel it to exert itself to gratify them, while it nevertheless still retains its freedom and power.

Courage might seem in many respects to be rather a medial complex emotion, than a moral quality, or propensity, or endowment.⁸ If carefully considered, however, as regards its essen-

⁸ *Vide ante*, b. i. c. ii. s. 5, p. 292.

tial constitution, it will be found to belong rather to the moral than to the medial part of our nature, being generated by the conjunction together of certain opposite emotions, and excitements, and influences, and endowments, mental as well as medial, relating in many, though not in all cases, to an action concerning duty; and being consummated by the determination of the reason and of the will with respect to the course of conduct to be pursued.

This quality, the counterpart of which is cowardice, consists therefore in such an amount of firmness and resolution, and freedom from fear of consequences, as will induce a person to pursue that course which he desires, or deems expedient. A man is under the influence of cowardice, when he is so far impelled by any considerations of that kind as to be deterred from the pursuit of this course; and is led to adopt one which is contrary to his inclination or judgment. Courage, on the contrary, is constituted by the power of the mind through its resolution or will, to resist the impulses of fear, and to pursue steadily the line dictated by duty and honour.⁹ It does not necessarily or essentially depend upon the absence or the presence of the emotion of fear; but on the power of the soul, the influence of the mental part of our nature, to control this emotion, and to direct the conduct notwithstanding its impulses. Courage may be wanting where there is no fear; and it may be present where fear largely exists. Daring indeed, when it is the result of ignorance or blindness, or want of foresight, is not real courage, but merely the impulse to act rashly; inasmuch as, if the individual thus endowed could perceive the dangers which wiser men see, his bravery would really fall far short of theirs, instead of being, apparently, much greater. That alone is true courage, which is able to face danger, knowing it to be danger; and to approach it with a full knowledge of the power and the perils which he is about to encounter. Genuine bravery is alike and equally removed from cowardice on the one hand, and excessive daring, amounting to fool-hardiness, on the other. The latter of these qualities leads a man to rush blindly into danger; while cowardice prevents his acting at all. Courage alone induces him to act, and with foresight and firmness.

It may consequently be inferred that in courage or bravery, are comprised many other qualities besides that of fearless-

⁹ *Cicero* defines courage to be an affection of the mind, that bears all things with subjection to the chief law.—*Tusc. Disp. On Perturb. of Mind*, 24.

According to *Hobbes*, "courage in a large signification is the absence of fear in the presence of any evil whatsoever; but in a strict and more common meaning, it is contempt of wounds and death, when they oppose a man in the way to this end."—*Human Nature*, chap. ix. s. 4.

"The truest principle of courage, is some passion that shall operate more powerfully than the love of life."—*Dr. Priestley. Education*, p. 83.

ness, which is an animal, and but merely a negative endowment. Indeed, in courage or bravery, there are certain intellectual and moral ingredients, which serve to raise it in the scale of qualities to a much higher rank than what mere brute-fearlessness could claim to possess. Bravery and boldness are, moreover, two very distinct and totally different qualities, the one being positive, the other only negative in its nature. The one implies mainly the presence of intrepidity, and of those mental, moral, and medial endowments, which contribute to its constitution; the other merely the absence of fear, which is an emotion of an entirely medial kind. Boldness is in reality, courage incomplete, wanting the decision of the reason to cement together the several medial, moral, and mental constituents or elements of this quality.¹ Bravery on the whole, seems therefore really and essentially to consist, not in blindly and heedlessly rushing into danger, however great,—for if so, courage would mainly be constituted by the incapacity, or neglect, of the individual to calculate accurately the consequences of the act contemplated;—but in the power to maintain amidst danger, that equanimity of mind by which we may be able to act with the same resolution, and discretion, and firmness, that we exert when no danger exists.² Cowardice, on the other hand, consists, not in shunning danger, when it is really present, but in the inability to maintain ourselves unmoved on its approach; and in not being able to order our conduct discreetly, and without perturbation, or in being unduly influenced by the circumstances about us. Timid men are by no means necessarily cowards. Nor are the most reckless, always the most courageous. Boasters are seldom brave.

Moreover, courage, although doubtless originating in, and caused by, the consciousness of power, certainly does not wholly consist in, or arise from, this conclusion of the mind; inasmuch as many beings, and many men, who have a vast amount of strength of which they cannot but be aware, are greatly wanting in courage; while others who want strength, and even exhibit a consciousness of their deficiency, are endowed with vast courage. Courage consists, consequently, in the consciousness of power, combined with the possession of firmness and discretion, which induce us to exert it, and to surmount all obstacles that would deter us from its use. Without the existence of these qualities, which constitute the main elements of courage, boldness only, and not courage, will be the quality possessed.

In the case however of physical courage, a great deal must

¹ *Aristotle* denotes five different kinds of courage.—*Ethics*, b. ii. c. viii.

"There are many kinds of courage, as many as there are circumstances in life."—*Dr. Priestly. Education*, p. 80.

² "Fortitude is well defined by the Stoic philosophers, when they call it 'a virtue contending for justice and honesty.'"—*Cicero. Offices*, b. i. 19.

necessarily depend upon the material conformation, especially upon the nervous constitution, its vigour and stability; as, whatever be the resolution or judgment of the individual, if the nerves are too weak to support the decisions of the mind, his courage must necessarily fail. In moral courage, this is indeed of less consequence than in the case of that which is physical; inasmuch as the want of nervous stability does not directly affect our resolution; and this stability is less liable to be tried by questions of moral, than by those of physical courage. When however an effort requiring moral courage does so affect the nerves, it is perhaps, equally with physical courage, dependent upon the constitution and condition of the physical system.³

Although women, and females generally, have, in most cases, owing to the difference in their material constitution, less physical courage than men; yet it will, I believe, be often found that women possess more moral courage than do men, which is, I conclude, mainly owing to their being less under the influence of those causes, such as love of popular applause, and dependence on the opinion of those around them, which tend to damp and destroy moral courage in man.

Physical and moral courage are therefore not only very different in their nature, and arise from totally different, and even opposite causes; but these two qualities or endowments (corresponding with the two complex emotions of mental and moral fear, already alluded to⁴), are not unfrequently opposed to, and counteractive of, each other. It may consequently happen that deficiency in moral courage will conduce to invigorate, and to supply any deficiency in that which is physical; inasmuch as (as already pointed out in the case of mental and moral fear⁵), a man deficient in physical courage, will be urged on to deeds of valour or of enterprise, through his want of moral courage to face the ridicule and obloquy that he would incur by failing to perform the act in question. Thus, while physical cowardice urges on a man to flee in battle, moral cowardice frightens him from fleeing. He is impelled, in the one case, to escape from injury to his body; in the other to escape from injury to his

³ *Dr. Chapman*, the learned and accomplished editor of the *Westminster Review*, and author of some able and well-known works relating to disorders of the nervous system, who has kindly allowed me to submit to him certain of the proof-sheets of this work relating to topics peculiarly within his province, remarks on this passage that "my own opinion is that courage as well as all other mental qualities, is exclusively a product of the cerebral organization. I presume that you agree with me in this, and that you use the words 'nervous constitution' to denote a peculiar ascendancy and excessive excitability of the nervous system which characterizes some persons much more than others; but even in this sense I incline to think that as a general rule persons so endowed are especially courageous."

⁴ *Vide ante*, b. i. c. ii. s. 5, p. 290.

⁵ *Ibid.*

character. Physical fear leads us to shun physical pain. Moral fear to shun moral pain, such as disgrace, and loss of reputation ; which may be, in reality, more poignant than loss of limb.

Feats of valour quite as daring, and even more heroic, may be achieved by moral, as by physical courage. To scorn a lie, may be as perfect a proof of prowess as to slay a lion. The desire to defend our fame, is far more noble than the anxiety to preserve our frames. The man who is brave enough to stand forth singly in the defence of truth, when it is overwhelmed by the champions of error ; is entitled to as much praise for his heroism, as he who places himself alone in the breach, to resist the attack on a besieged city. Moreover, the sharpest sword which we can wield is that of truth. The most impregnable armour which we can wear, is that of a clear conscience. The noblest victory of all, is that by which we subdue our own base passions and inclinations. The greatest courage we can possess, is that which renders us devoid of all fear of ourselves.

In the case of animals, who have not the same mental or medial endowments with those of man, courage is entirely and exclusively an animal or medial, rather than a moral quality, consisting mainly if not wholly in the absence of fear ; and ought consequently more properly to be termed boldness rather than courage. Even among men, the basis of bravery may very often consist in the consideration of the animal constitution of the individual, as regards the comparative physical strength with which he is endowed, and the amount of animal spirits, or nervous stability, that he possesses ; which at once induce him to rely on the efficiency of his own power, to combat that which is opposed to him. The moral qualities of firmness and resolution, combined with these considerations, are however necessary to complete the quality of true courage. In some cases, courage may possibly be owing to deficiency of the particular person in penetration or discernment, through which he is unable to perceive dangers that are really present ; or, it may be, in certain instances, that what passes for courage, is simply the result of the predominance of anger over reason. Most men are bold when they are provoked. It is boldness however which is the animal, bravery which is the manly, endowment. The one is a really noble, the other only a brutal, quality. If indeed mere boldness be entitled to the rank of an exalted endowment, then doubtless the common fly ought fairly to be regarded as one of the noblest of created beings ; inasmuch as it displays this quality far beyond what any of our own species ever exhibit, by attacking animals a thousand times its size, at the risk of death every moment, while it sees its fellows constantly fall a victim to their valour.

As connected with honour, courage is further entitled to

rank as a moral attribute, especially that branch of it ordinarily denoted moral courage, which differs from physical courage as regards its subject; that of the former being a moral, that of the latter a physical act.⁶ Thus, lying is held especially despicable, as it is a certain mark of deficiency in moral courage, which ought surely to command as much respect as physical courage, the latter being of a decidedly lower grade. Honour, too, is important as the test of moral courage; and lying is the most direct breach of honour. Hence, honour and courage have ever been united, and have ever been regarded as mutual supporters of the interests of each other. Nevertheless, too much boldness and too little boldness, over-confidence and want of confidence, are the ruin of half the world. In all these cases, the just medium between the two is the point to be aimed at; and it is to this very point that true courage ever directs us.

That quality, propensity, or disposition, which holds the foremost position in the moral character of each person, inasmuch as it is the one that most immediately affects those about him, is his temper; which constitutes, as it were, his leading social attribute, and is what is most excited and influenced by the occurrences around him. The moral endowment, ordinarily termed good temper, appears to be caused by, and constituted of, a certain magnanimity and vigour of the mind itself; which prevents the person so gifted from being excited by those ordinary incidents and common casualties by which souls of less depth and power are apt to be affected. While every ripple on the surface of the waters, agitates the light bark, it is only by the raging of the tempest, and by the fiercest turmoil of the ocean's billows, that the stately man-of-war, which reposes on its bosom, can be moved. Several great men, remarkable for the eminent qualities and powers that they possessed, were distinguished also for the equanimity of temper by which they were characterized; and which is in part constituted, as in the case of every other exalted moral endowment, by the influence of the mental powers, which restrains the excitement of the soul by inadequate causes. Bad temper, on the other hand, is often the result of a weak mind, which has not the power of self-restraint or self-control. The medial influence here, mainly and directly operating, is that of the passion of anger, the nature of which has already been considered in a former chapter.⁷ Good or bad temper is, moreover, ever more or less dependent on bodily constitution, particularly as regards sensibility and irritability, which are directly communicated to, and influence the mind.⁸

⁶ *Vide ante*, b. i. c. ii. s. 5, pp. 290, 292.

⁷ *Vide ante*, b. i. c. iv. s. 2.

⁸ To this paragraph, *Dr. Chapman* has obligingly supplied me with the following note:—"Every physician, and especially every physician who

Nevertheless, good-tempered people are said to be often selfish, are thought to exhibit this quality to an extent beyond the generality of mankind, and seem to be apparently unconcerned about others; while those whose tempers are easily roused, are the most inclined to exert themselves for the welfare of their neighbours. The reason of this is, that a person of what is called good temper, is but seldom moved by events which are not really important: and as those which affect himself, and which are of moment to him, do not rouse him unless they are very weighty; so by those relating to others, which are necessarily of still less immediate importance to him, he is inapt to be excited, and consequently is not very frequently induced to action in cases of this sort. On the other hand, a person of excitable temper is soon roused, and easily moved, not only by the concerns of himself, but by those of others; and hence it is that ill-tempered people are often what is termed more good-natured, and more warm and ready in their display of acts of benevolence and kindness towards those around them, than are those who are easy and good-tempered.

Persons of irritable temperament, although they are easily ruffled, and are on that account subject to disquietude and discomfort, are, on the other hand, equally easy to please; and occurrences as trivial as those which displease them, afford them delight. The man of even temper, therefore, while he escapes many little troubles, loses also a proportionate, if not an equal number of little pleasures. The mountain which protects the waters of the lake from being agitated by the blasts of the tempest, has the effect as well of preventing the sun from brightening its surface.

Probably, both among nations and individuals, there is no moral quality or endowment which is more important, or which leads to more extensive results, than does that of energy. It constitutes the real strength, and substance, and moving impulse by which the machine is set in operation. It forms the actual mainspring, by which it is kept in motion. Energy, however, is not an original or independent, but is only a derivative and resulting force. It is produced by the healthful condition of the system, accompanied by the union together of several endowments all tending in the same direction; combined with a consciousness of being capacitated to attain certain ends, and which of itself urges us to attain them. From this qualification springs the important capacity, alluded to in the next book, termed the endowment of inspiration innate.⁹

gives much attention to mental phenomena, cannot fail to assure himself that the influence of bodily constitution on good or bad temper is a most potent factor on the production of either the one or the other."

⁹ *Vide post*, b. iii. c. ii. s. 7.

The whole result as regards moral qualities, propensities, and other characteristics of this kind, appears to be as follows. —That as man is naturally inclined neither to good nor to evil, independent of external circumstances; so none are, either naturally or inherently, benevolent or malevolent, amiable or vicious, good or ill-natured; although each of these qualities, propensities, and characteristics, may doubtless be eventually acquired. Certain persons are nevertheless, more easily excited to certain actions than others are, as regards their medial endowments more especially; and in some individuals, the reason and higher endowments, which incline them to good and virtuous actions, more entirely predominate than they do in other persons, so that the former are more prone to actions which are benevolent and amiable, than to those which are malevolent and cruel. Honesty and good temper are also the result, not of any inherent virtuous principle in the individual so endowed, but of his not being susceptible to be led away by temptation, or roused to excitement, without any adequate cause; and of the vigour of his mind to resist all undue efforts to deviate from the right course, or to be ruffled by trivial events. As regards, also, natural moral propensity, there is, in reality, no such thing as an innate good or bad inclination, except so far as either of these characteristics are constituted by the predominance of those particular feelings or endowments, whether medial or mental, which conduce to the preference of virtue, on the one side, or to the commission of vice on the other.

Although from some of the high and noble qualities by which certain men have been distinguished, the almost godlike attributes with which they appear to have been endowed, we might be disposed to flatter ourselves that we discern the alliance between God and man, and perceive mainly the Divine lineaments in the characteristics of our race; yet, on the other hand, when we contemplate the baseness, the cruelty, and the dishonesty, by which, it is to be feared, a much larger portion of our race are wont to be marked, we may apprehend that it is to the Devil, rather than to God, that the actual relationship is to be traced; and that mankind, as a whole, far more resembles the former as regards its attributes, than it does the latter. It is however by the application of his various endowments of each kind, not by his mere possession of them, that the character of each individual is essentially and alone determined.

8. *Disposition and Character, on what dependent.*

The several moral qualities, propensities, and endowments, already described, with certain others of the same class, too numerous to specify, are what together contribute to constitute the elements or principles of moral disposition and character. We have therefore next to inquire into the particular causes or circumstances operating in regard to these several elements, on which disposition and character are mainly dependent.

Each man is endowed with certain animal or medial propensities, on the one hand, and with certain moral endowments and mental capacities on the other. Both are calculated to, and are what mainly, direct his conduct; although on many occasions they urge him in exactly opposite directions. According as the influence of either is vigorous and extensive, and as it preponderates, will be the turn of his general moral character and conduct, and consequently his disposition also. Moreover, as moral endowments, whether qualities, propensities, or dispositions, are especially of a complex quality, springing in part from the medial, in part from the mental nature of man; so do they appear to spring in part from the body, and in part from the soul itself, depending, it may be, in some respects more or less upon the essential properties of that being. How far indeed, and if so, to what extent, and in what respect, any innate qualities of the soul appertaining to its very essence, may have the effect of influencing the moral disposition and character, might form an intensely interesting subject of inquiry. Into this topic, which has already been touched upon as regards one branch of it,¹ I shall have again to recur, in a subsequent chapter, when considering the nature of the intellectual faculties in general.² In a certain measure, however, not only are disposition and character dependent on the medial influences in our constitution; but there are special influences, arising immediately from the material frame itself, which demand to be taken into account.³ These influences have already been considered while treating on the quality of the emotions, appetites, and passions. In the case of temper especially, the soundness or disorder of the physical frame, in conjunction with the due regulation, or ill-conduct of the mind, must have an important effect. The dependence of temper on material texture and temperament,⁴

¹ *Vide ante, Prel. Diss.*, s. v. a. 3, p. 80.

² *Vide post*, b. iii. c. i. ss. 3, 8.

³ *Mr. Isaac Taylor* considers moral qualities and endowments more or less dependent on physical constitution.—*See Physical Theory of Another Life*, s. 5.

⁴ According to *Helvetius*, "temperament decides the moral qualities."—*System of Nature*, c. ix.

is at once evinced by the change as regards the former which takes place in the same individual during different periods of the growth of the body, and according to the varying condition in which that body happens to be ; as for instance, during youth and age, sickness, and health, when suffering from hunger, and when satiated with food.

It appears indeed that, while organic structure, as regards the material intellectual organs, extensively, if not principally, influences the intellectual faculties; texture and temperament are what mainly influence the moral disposition, although to some extent they affect the action and direction of the faculties also. It is this which mainly contributes to produce the general difference in disposition, observable throughout nature, between the male and female sex ; which seems greater in certain animals than in the human species, and which may be affected by particular qualities existing, not in the soul but in the body.⁵

The climate of a country, will oftentimes be found to exercise an important and extensive sway over the moral disposition and character of its people.⁶ The effect here produced, is, of course, upon the material frame, which acts upon the mind ; and, according as the influences of the former are weakened or strengthened, those of the latter will also be correspondingly affected. Indeed, we owe almost as much, mentally as well as materially, to the atmosphere which we inhale, and by which our frames are surrounded. Not only vigour and activity, but actual course of conduct, are in many cases dependent on, and directed by, this condition.

On the whole, therefore, it appears that we may conclude, from a comprehensive survey of the entire subject, that general moral disposition and character in each individual, are mainly dependent on the following causes and circumstances, which, as already mentioned, either themselves contributed to, or else operate upon and affect, the several elements constituent of such disposition and character.

1. Bodily texture and temperament, according to which we not only find different people differing greatly from each other ;

⁵ *Vide ante*, s. 1, a. 4.

Dr. Richardson has kindly favoured me with the following note to this paragraph, of which I am glad to avail, although his conclusions do not appear to coincide with those which I had formed :—

“I doubt whether it be true that there are greater differences of disposition between the male and female sex of the lower animals, than obtains in the human species. I should infer from my observations that the nearer the mere instinctive faculties were approached, the closer are the dispositions ; and that the qualities of the soul, using the term as it is defined elsewhere in this work, are as distinctive as are the physical distinctions which separate the sexes.”

⁶ Some valuable observations will be found in *Condillac's* dissertation on national character, and its connexion with and influence upon national language. *Origin of Knowledge*. (*Nugent's Trans.*) pp. 283—291.

but that the same persons vary considerably, as by age, growth, disease, or other causes, their own frames undergo change. 2. Peculiar co-existence of certain medial endowments and qualities, in the mode already pointed out in the preceding sections of this chapter. 3. Peculiar co-existence of certain intellectual capacities; as, for instance, the extensive possession of the capacity of analysis, inclines a person to captiousness; of wit to severity; of taste to refinement; of sense to quietude.⁷ 4. The innate qualities which belong to, or are inherent in, the very soul itself. 5. The education and habits of the individual, the circumstances in which he happens to be placed, and the events which befall him. Thus, some tempers naturally good, are soured by disappointment and distress; while others who are not by nature happily endowed in this respect, are rendered calm and placid by the serene and fortunate course of their affairs. In the case of temper, however, we should always be careful to distinguish between agitation arising from infirmity of temper, and agitation occasioned by mere nervous excitement or over-sensibility; the two very frequently resembling one another closely as to their result, though differing entirely as to their origin and nature.

According also to the particular events which befall people, as the temptations to evil are greater or less, they will vary much as to the development of their character and disposition. By indulgence, our appetites and passions acquire influence and power; while through the restraint of them by the reason, they become softened, and subjugated to it, whereby it is enabled to obtain greater control over them.

But although the appetites, and passions, and propensities, and other endowments, the mere indulgence of which, we are told, is sinful, are all implanted by nature; yet, on the other hand, an antidote to this temptation to commit sin, is also supplied by nature, in the pain which is, almost inevitably, either immediately or ultimately, consequent upon any breach or violation of nature's laws; and through which, in a state of nature, aided also by reason, man is, in the main, directed to good, and deterred from evil. Thus, the system of nature itself is really perfect after all; our condition, and mode of using it are, alone, imperfect, and reflect somewhat of their imperfection upon it.

Whether the soul itself is endowed with distinct individual qualities of its own, which influence it in any of its tendencies or operations, may doubtless admit of much dispute. I cannot, however, but conclude that it is so endowed; and that although its moral inclinations may be more extensively influenced, and modified, and affected, than are its capacities,

⁷ *Vide post*, b. iii. c. vi. ss. 3, 5, 7.

by the peculiar nature of the particular physical frame to which it is united ; yet that the former are not so far changed by this circumstance, as to destroy and efface altogether the traces of their own original characteristics, and which are rooted and spring up in the very soul itself.

Disposition and character, although not less owing to natural endowments than are the intellectual faculties and capacities, are nevertheless in many respects more liable to be modified and influenced by circumstances.⁸ Thus, a man who would be called naturally inclined to be humane and benevolent, is induced to exercise cruelty from the position in which he is placed ; as when surrounded by enemies, or by those whom he suspects are endeavouring to defraud him of his rights, or to stand in the way of his advancement. The individual who would be considered naturally inclined to be malevolent, may be led to exercise extensive acts of charity and kindness towards those around him, either from a desire to acquire popularity, or from a sense of gratitude for favours conferred upon him.

Disposition and character are, probably, more concealed from the world, a variety of causes conducing to this end, than are the intellectual faculties and capacities. Education, also, may produce a prodigious effect on the disposition and character, by strengthening the power of the intellectual faculties, and extending their influence over the medial part of our nature. They thus restrain and counteract many impulses to which the latter would lead us.

How far character and disposition are dependent upon, or influenced by, the condition of the material frame, its organization, texture, and temperament, may be difficult precisely to determine. Nevertheless, we cannot doubt that the influences, springing from these causes, are very powerful, and very direct, although, perhaps, not so immediate or so extensive as those which affect the medial endowments.⁹

The moral disposition of each individual, as well as his intellectual capacity and character, is, as already pointed out, largely, and in various ways, influenced and affected by his material texture and temperament. The extensive influence which is exercised by the texture and temperament, as also by the particular organization of the body, on the general actions and character, we see evinced in a variety of ways ; and not only

⁸ "There is no change that chance cannot produce in the character of a man."—*Helvetius on Man*, vol. i. sect. i. chap. 7.

⁹ On this subject *Dr. Chapman* remarks as follows, in continuation of what he stated in the note at p. 57 :—"It seems to me equally evident that the influence of cerebral development, and of the nervous constitution on moral disposition and character generally, is no less powerful. In fact, I hold that every intellectual, moral, and emotional quality is a phenomenon of nervous organization ; in other words, that every vital function, whether bodily or mental, has a material origin."

among those of our own species, but even more plainly among different kinds of animals. Thus, the ox and the sheep, which have gross phlegmatic frames, differ as much in character and disposition as they do in intelligence, from the horse, and the deer, and the goat, which are lively and agile, while the former are dull and heavy.

The peculiar manners of each person, are strongly indicative of his particular qualities. The texture and temperament of the body, are what mainly contribute to form the manners both of different men and different animals. Persons are found to vary in the same degree, and in a corresponding mode, as regards their respective individual physical texture and temperament, and also as regards their individual disposition and their general character. In the human race we may observe how great is the difference between the manners of a refined and delicate lady, and those of a common peasant female; or between those of a highly-cultivated gentleman, and of a coarse vulgar clown.¹ So also between those of a lively youth and a decrepid old person; and between the manners of a man and those of a woman. In all these cases, the difference in physical or corporeal texture, is nearly analogous to that in manner and character.

The material frame, and the spiritual part of our being, exercise a mutual and reciprocal influence upon each other; and the bias and operation of the one, serve frequently to counterbalance and counteract those of the other. Thus women whose minds are pure and virtuous, appear to be ordinarily more morally disposed than men whose minds are equally well regulated; because the material frames of the former being weaker, in a less degree influence the spiritual part of their nature than do those of men. But, on the other hand, when the minds of women become corrupted and debased, we find them generally more degraded and vicious than men are; whose more powerful and inflexible frames impede many of the influences of the soul upon them, whether good or bad.

Sometimes, indeed, the same concurrent influences will exhibit themselves very differently, according to circumstances, in different parts of the career of the same individual. Thus, how often do we find a youth of frivolity succeeded by fanaticism in mature age. The cause of this is obvious: the weakness and shallowness of mind which led the individual in the first instance altogether to disregard matters of importance in respect to conduct; led him also, when he turned his attention to them, to act extravagantly, and without the guidance of reason.

¹ *Captain Cook*, nevertheless, remarked on the extreme dignity and gracefulness in the manners of one of the female natives of the higher rank, in an island near Otaheite, which, he said, would have done honour to the first princess in Europe.—*Cook's Voyages*, vol. i. p. 112.

Action and reaction, moreover, seem to constitute the main motive principles, both in the material and the moral world; and alike in the conduct of man individually, and of man collectively. An undue pressure on one side, at once occasions a rebound to the opposite extreme; and this very rebound is productive of an impulse in another direction. The correct and legitimate, and most desirable line is, doubtless, in all cases, to steer straight onward; disregarding alike both the winds and the currents that would divert our course. And the power to do this evinces in each case a moral strength, and a mental superiority, which raise the being so endowed far above those who follow a career less direct and manly.

Even certain virtuous endowments may indirectly contribute to indulgence in habits which are vicious; while endowments which are generally deemed depraving and immoral, may also indirectly lead us to acts which are commendable. Thus, a man of easy temper and generous disposition is more apt to be a prodigal, and to indulge in conviviality to excess, than a person of morose disposition and miserly turn. Benevolence may induce to ostentation, and excess of affection to neglect of parental duty.

We find but few of the common vices of society existing among rude and savage people, who have but little or no temptation to fall into them. The fear of retaliation is alone sufficient, without any express laws, to prevent them from doing injury to each other. The inhabitants of New Zealand, as also of several other islands which were first explored by Captain Cook, and the North American Indians, visited by Mr. Catlin,² are described as existing in a pure moral condition. And we may conclude that men when living in what we may call a state of nature, are not necessarily vicious, or immoral.³ When the allurements and temptations almost incident to a state of civilized society are absent, they will be found to pursue an even course, neither transgressing to any considerable extent the bounds of morality, nor performing any great or signal acts of virtue. But we also learn from Captain Cook's narrative, that the intercourse of Europeans with these simple people, very soon corrupted their pure dispositions. As temptations and opportunities to commit fraud and dishonesty were offered, they were at once led into those crimes: and as, on the one hand, they had hitherto had nothing to impel them to run into vice; so, on the other hand, they were equally destitute of any principle to restrain them from it. Theft was the first crime of which they were guilty,

² *Catlin's North American Indians.*

³ Several travellers have recorded, and have even expressed their surprise at, the high moral condition, the strict honesty and chastity, evinced by certain savage tribes.

According to *Sir John Lubbock*, "savages have the character of children, with the passions and strength of men."—*Pre-historic Times*, chap. xv.

because it was the first to which they were tempted. In certain cases, however, the most striking examples of stern and rigid honesty were afforded in the conduct of some of these people.⁴

From the accounts which we have received of races of mankind who were discovered and observed in an almost pure state of nature, or of natural society, we are best able to reason concerning the real condition of human nature, especially as regards the existence or non-existence of particular dispositions, either to do good or evil. We shall thus find men mainly acting from, and guided by, purely selfish motives; seldom, if ever, committing injury or immorality of any kind, merely for the sake of doing so. As regards their dispositions of benevolence or malevolence, it appears that among savage people, although they will do all in their power to preserve, or benefit a child, a relative, or a friend; yet they regard with unconcern, and without any efforts to save him, the destruction of a stranger.⁵ Savages, like animals, who are guided by instinct only, seem to be utterly indifferent about the welfare of their fellow-creatures individually; although they are ever ready to aid each other mutually, when united in bands for general defence. Nevertheless, they appear to have no private sympathy in each other's misfortunes. This must be in part, at least, owing to a deficiency in power of reasoning, which, if duly exercised, would teach them that they themselves are liable to the ills which affect their companions; and that it is their mutual interest to do all they can to provide against such calamities. Men, we find, are oftentimes, in a civilized state, generous and kind, from a desire to obtain applause and influence by this means, rather than from pure benevolence towards their fellow-creatures.

In whatever situation men may be placed, there are, however, certain emotions, and feelings, and dispositions, and desires, and principles, by which they will be ever more or less characterized or influenced, although some may be more directly affected by them than are others. Thus, all persons, whatever be their station in life, are alike liable to be affected by covetousness. Those in power, whatever principles or feelings they may possess, will be more or less disposed to exercise tyranny and oppression. And those of all sects and parties in religion, are alike, if not equally, apt to fall into error and superstition; although, according to the different circumstances in which they are respectively situated, will these various characteristics become developed and manifested, or exhibit their peculiar tendency.

Indeed, it seems as unreasonable to denounce any particular religious denomination as exclusively superstitious or fanatical, and to consider these defects as characteristics, and

⁴ *Cook's Voyages round the World.*

⁵ *Habitable World Displayed.* (Laplanders).

not merely corruptions, of the species; as it would be to speak of decay in a tree as of itself characterizing a particular species of vegetation, and not as a defect to which trees of all species are alike liable. Some religious systems indeed, like some kinds of wood, may be more liable to corruption than certain others; and causes, which mightily affect one species, may not at all affect another: but there are none which are altogether free from these defects and blemishes; and, perhaps, on the whole, all are equally subject to them.

So intolerance and persecution are not the especial characteristics of any particular sects or churches, but are the defects incidental to poor human nature itself: although, as different animals display their inherent propensities in a very different mode, according mainly to their physical power and vigour, and the circumstances in which they are placed; in like manner different communities of Christians display their foibles in various ways, according as the temper of the times, and the spirit of the age, may direct or restrain their exhibition.

In many of these cases, it is not the form of religion, but the nature of man, which is at fault. As in the case of bodily infirmity in any part of the material frame, which will be sure to exhibit itself whenever that frame is attacked, with whatever kind of disease; so the liability of man to err and to pervert the truth, is made manifest alike, whatever form of religion he may have adopted: although in these different forms, very different errors may be exhibited, and will be more or less apt to occur.

Not improbably, it may be the intention of the Almighty to render man finally both intellectually and morally perfect, by means of the various trials and excitements of each kind through which he is destined to pass, which particularly, and to the fullest extent, stimulate the reason; and such a being as this alone can be fully meet for Heaven. Moreover, as it has been conjectured that the whole planetary system is destined ultimately to be absorbed in the sun; so may man ultimately be united to, and made one with, God.

9. *Moral Direction and Discipline.*

Man being gifted with reason, which is given him for his guidance in matters in general, but more especially in reference to those which are of a moral nature; and his will being, as we have seen, free to act according to the determination at which his mind may arrive, and the various influences which simultaneously affect him, springing from different parts of his nature, and so counteracting and balancing each other as to promote and ensure this freedom: it necessarily therefore follows that he possesses the entire control over his moral

conduct; and that he is, on the one hand, fully enabled to direct it, and consequently, on the other, wholly responsible for the course in regard to it which he may pursue. Nevertheless, of all rule, self-rule is the most difficult perfectly to effect. And there is no subject so pertinaciously rebellious to legitimate sovereignty, as is self. Moreover, the more absolute may have been the power in any particular man to rule others; the less extensive will, probably, be his power to rule himself.

In all cases it will be found that the greater is the variety, either with regard to interests or individuals, of which any assemblage is made up, the more susceptible is it of external influence being exerted to sway its deliberations. The vast number of different excitements, and feelings, and propensities, and endowments, and powers, medial as well as moral, and of operations proceeding from them, which together contribute to the constitution of each moral endowment; tend to give an ascendancy to the reason over our conduct here, and to render moral discipline peculiarly efficient in regulating our actions, more especially in subjecting the lower and baser influences to those which are higher and nobler.

Nevertheless, although it is the province of the intellectual part of our nature, like the highest authorities in a state, not only to direct the general course of affairs, but to prescribe what particular measures shall be adopted; and of the medial portion of it to obey and follow what is so laid down: yet it often happens that, while the former has nominally the command, the latter is, in reality, both the originator and the director of most of the measures that are espoused; and which, though designed and carried out by the legitimate authorities, are, in reality, proposed by them, not because from their skill and judgment they believe those measures to be the best, but because they suppose them most likely to be accepted and adopted by those lower influences, of which, instead of being the rulers, they are in reality the slaves. This is extensively the case, alike in the political constitution of every civil community, and in the individual constitution of each man.

It may, however, appear remarkable, perhaps unaccountable, at any rate to a large extent inconsistent with some of the foregoing arguments and conclusions, that, as already pointed out, persons of great intellectual power are also frequently endowed with peculiarly and strong animal or medial endowments and propensities. But it should here be borne in mind that, while, on the one hand, the more vigorous are these medial impulses, correspondingly the more vigorous also is the power which restrains them. Moreover, as a vigorous soul is most perfectly developed in a vigorous body; so it often happens that those whose medial qualities are from this cause the strongest, are also those whose intellectual endowments are the

most complete and the most energetic, and consequently the best adapted to regulate the medial influences.⁶

As regards the control which man is enabled to exercise over his mind and conduct, apparent inconsistencies not unfrequently occur; although, in reality, the higher influences of our nature prevail, and are those by which we aim and believe ourselves to be governed, however thwarted and diverted by those of an opposite nature. As gold and the precious metals are never found unmixed with ore, while the baser products of the earth are discovered without any other substances being intermingled with them; so religion of the most fervent and pure nature is often wont to be tainted with uncharitableness and superstition, which, in our weak nature, are almost the necessary adjuncts to so sublime a subject, and are produced by the very heat and earnestness with which religion is followed up. On the other hand, religion of that dull, and spiritless, and sickly nature, which is too feeble to exhibit any glow of fervour; is that alone which is found to be wholly free from any alloy or impurity of this kind. Hence the numerous perversions, and superstitions, and inconsistencies, which characterize alike the best of men, and the purest of churches. Some, even among ardent and professedly devout Christians, who are led away by a partial view of their duty, are wont to talk and act as if profession and practice were quite distinct and independent matters; as though the end of religion was not to make men better, but to serve them as an excuse for being bad. Thus, one atones for his licentiousness or his dishonesty, not by repenting of it, but by referring to his devotion in private, or to his regular attendance on public worship. Another excuses his profanity, by setting off against this, his charity to the poor. All such Christians will, nevertheless, find that there is no such law as the law of set-off among the ordinances of God. A man must be influenced and controlled by religion as regards his conduct as a whole, and cannot serve God by one act, while he obeys the Devil by another; any more than he can please two different and adverse masters, by obeying and disobeying each in turn. In all these cases, however, it is not that religion or reason has no control over our conduct, but that the proper direction of that control is neglected, or lost, either through error of judgment, or self-deceit. Man, indeed, deceives extensively several of his fellow-creatures, but himself most completely of all. He misleads many of his friends, but himself more than any of them. Each man, moreover, has many enemies, but none so great as himself. He is as false to himself as the Devil is to him. God alone is true and just, both

⁶ According to *Hobbes*, "fools and madmen manifestly deliberate no less than the wisest men, though they make not so good a choice; the images of things being by disease altered."—*Of Liberty and Necessity*.

to each man individually and to all men alike. As ingratitude is the basest of crimes, and one which God especially abhors; so it is that crime in particular of which man is most prone to be guilty, and above all towards his Maker, to whom he owes the most.

Not only are many persons unable with certainty to trace and define the motives by which they are actuated, but it will often happen that an entirely contrary origin to their actions is ascribed by differently constituted minds, each being influenced by the feelings and disposition with which it is mainly endowed. Thus, the meek and humble-minded may estimate very lowly their own motives; while the proud and self-confident may assume that they were led by those which are the highest and purest. Hence, it may be that those who think they were influenced by the noblest principles, were, in reality, stimulated by the most ignoble; and that those who considered they were fulfilling only an ordinary duty, may have been impelled by sentiments the most laudable. The publican was, in reality, actuated by higher motives than the Pharisee; although the Pharisee took credit to himself for superior principle to that of the publican.

How often do we find persons renouncing certain amusements, when the age for enjoying them has gone by, on the ground that they are lawless, as ministering to pride or vanity; and yet unscrupulously engaging to a large extent in other occupations where these faults are as easily and as frequently fallen into. How much better would it be, if, instead of renouncing such amusements, and severely denouncing all who continue to follow them; they would simply avoid the errors to which they are supposed to lead, but to which many other things besides will quite as often tend.

Real genuine insincerity is probably, however, as I before observed, a far less frequent failing than is generally imagined. Fickleness is, in ordinary cases, the actual fault, which is mistaken for insincerity; and which is one of a far less pernicious kind, and, indeed, rather weakness than actual wickedness. Thus, men in general do really mean what they profess at the time; but, from fickleness they either change their intention, or fail in carrying out their resolution. When a positive promise is given, this of course ought to restrain the exercise of fickleness; inasmuch as where the performance is unfulfilled, other, and worse crime than that of either fickleness or insincerity, one of actual fraud, is perpetrated.

Much, too, as we deceive other people, I again repeat that we each deceive our own selves most of all. Self-deceit is, nevertheless, always done unwillingly. It may therefore be fairly inferred that deceit of other people is unwilling also. Hence, there is not by any means, as a necessary consequence, that

amount of insincerity which might be inferred from people deceiving one another.

As man possesses in himself the full and complete control over his whole moral conduct, so is he able to subject to proper discipline his various medial propensities and endowments; and according as that discipline is duly and legitimately exerted, will be its efficiency in the proper regulation of the moral being.

All the moral endowments of our nature appear to have reference not only to our individual, but to our social adaptation; and fit man not merely to be a perfect being himself, but capacitate him perfectly for society also. And as each medial endowment is requisite in order to render man's constitution perfect; so the moral endowment of man is requisite for the perfection of society, and for social intercourse among men. Supposing a man to exist alone without any other person, there would be but comparatively little application or employment for his moral endowments. Charity, and benevolence, and honesty, could not be exercised, if there was but one individual in the world. And as man is the only creature capable of carrying on mental and social intercourse with the rest of his species; so he is the only creature capable of forming friendships with them, beyond what the impulses of parental affection, or casual attachment, may promote. Little, if any actual sympathy for each other's happiness or pain, seems to exist among animals, except in those cases where immediate apprehension is excited for their own individual wellbeing. Hence, the constant exercise, wherever man is placed in society, of the different moral virtues: and through this exercise it is that our medial and moral nature becomes controlled and disciplined; and the more it experiences of this subjection, the more perfect the individual himself becomes. Hence, also, the influence of habit, which is so powerful, especially in moral discipline; and which is the result or offspring of moral education, and of long continuance in a particular course of conduct. Education and habit, probably, direct us in many actions, which, if not actually virtuous in themselves, nevertheless conduce to virtue.⁷

As regards moral, far more than mental education (which will be treated of separately and particularly in a subsequent chapter⁸), we are influenced by the conduct and habits of those about us, and are dependent upon others for receiving such education. Mental education, indeed, we may obtain to a large extent by ourselves, independent of others. But although, in a certain degree, this is the case as regards moral education also, it is far less so than with respect to mental discipline. From our parents especially we receive, probably, almost to as great an amount our

⁷ Cicero, alluding to absolute reason, speaks of it as synonymous with virtue.—*Tusc. Disp. Whether Virtue be sufficient for a Happy Life*, 13.

⁸ *Vide post*, b. iii. c. vii.

moral, as we do our material being ; and from them all our first and most important moral nutriment is derived, as to them we look to direct us in our choice of food of this kind. Nevertheless, no precepts are so powerful, as those which are proved to be good through our own practice of them. No exhortations are so encouraging, as those which are enforced by our own example.

With respect to the reciprocal mutual influence between the soul and the body, more especially the medial endowments and propensities springing from the latter, and the power of the mind to discipline and control them ; it may be observed that the appetites and passions are comparatively weak during early life, although by indulgence and exercise they each acquire vigour, and increase in their authority over the mental part of our constitution, which, on the other hand, has a tendency to gain strength, and to increase its predominance as the soul develops itself, and the bodily powers become debilitated by age. Hence, in the person of well-regulated habits and conduct, who has duly disciplined his appetites and passions, by which he is more or less influenced, and often led away during youth ; he gradually acquires the mastery as his reason advances and becomes matured, and his medial endowments decline. In the epicure and debauchee, on the other hand, his appetites and passions gradually increase, both in power and influence, by indulgence ; and in time reduce to their authority the reason itself, ruling through that very power to which they themselves ought properly to be subject.⁹

There are divers analogies traceable between moral and material, as well as between mental and material subjects and actions. Cleanliness is said to be an indication of moral, as well as of physical purity ; and certain it is that the abhorrence of everything that is irregular, and incorrect, and offensive, in the one state, conduces also to repugnance at a corresponding condition in the other. Dirt and depravity are, doubtless, very constant and very choice companions ; while a spotless soul most often dwells in a clean body. Neglect and carelessness conduce alike to physical and to spiritual impurity ; and idleness and recklessness are the common parents both of spiritual degeneracy, and of physical deterioration.

⁹ To this passage *Dr. Richardson* has appended the following note :—

“Yes. The passions may reduce the intelligence to the complete subjection named. But sometimes by very indulgence, the passions themselves may become reduced, and the intelligence may then reawaken to its original condition. This is, however, exceptionable. The rule, though not absolute, is that the intelligence once subjugated by the passions, is permanently reduced, as stated in the text.”

10. *Qualities and Propensities analogous to Moral Endowment, existent in, and exhibited by, certain Animals.*

The question whether animals are any of them capable of moral endowment, and if so, how far, in what respect, and to what extent, forms a very interesting subject of inquiry. On the whole, it appears that animals, many of whose medial endowments are in common with those of man, have, nevertheless, no actual moral endowments of any kind; inasmuch as the possession of intellect, and the consequent knowledge of right and wrong, and a perception of obligations of this description, are essential in order to constitute qualities of this high nature.¹ Animals nevertheless possess certain propensities to commit certain actions, and are endowed with certain characteristics also as regards their general habits, closely analogous to the moral endowments of man, which demand a particular consideration here.² Hence it would seem that, although animals exhibit several of the medial qualities common to man, to a limited extent only, and very imperfectly; yet they are nevertheless influenced by them in part, so far as the medial excitements extend; while they are wanting in mental direction, and in moral control, as regards the actions in which they result.³ Thus, with respect to courage, we have already seen that animals display boldness, which is courage incomplete, comprising it so far as the medial excitement producing or constituting it extends. So also, in a corresponding manner, they may be taught to obey the command to abstain from taking the food that is not allotted to them; which is an exercise of honesty promoted mainly by the medial emotion of fear that prevents its violation. As regards temper, too, in the case of animals, its operation is varied by their relative excitability as regards this propensity, but without any reference whatever to mental operations affecting it.

Animals, although differing from each other in this respect, appear to be more good-tempered generally than is man, in so far that they are less liable to be excited to anger; as, in the first place, the provocations of temper are more

¹ "The moral sense, perhaps, affords the best and highest distinction between man and the lower animals."—*Darwin's Descent of Man, &c.*, vol. i. p. 106.

² *Smellie* remarks that "on every animal nature has imprinted a certain character, which is indelibly fixed, and distinguishes the species," and which character, however modified by education or domestication, is never fully obliterated.—*Philosophy of Natural History*, c. xviii. p. 464.

³ *Buffon* observes that man has the greatest tendency to knowledge, and the brute to appetite.—*Natural History. Nature of Animals.*

Sir W. Lawrence attributes the differences between man and animals in moral endowments, to a difference in organization.—*Natural History of Man*, s. 1, c. vii.

frequently mental than physical. And in the next place, the superior bodily health which animals enjoy, renders them considerably less liable to irritation, such as ordinarily produces attacks of temper.⁴

Animals, although devoid of reason, and consequently incapable of government by moral rule, not only live together in greater harmony than do mankind, but commit very few crimes; inasmuch as, in the absence of moral obligation, there can be no moral breach. Moreover, without moral rule to guide them, they fulfil more regularly both their parental and social duties than is the custom with mankind.⁵ And even their appetites and passions they appear to keep under better control than we do; the main cause of which is, that although they have not reason to restrain them, yet, on the other hand, they are never liable to be urged on to excesses by reason, as is the case with man, when this faculty has become wholly subjugated to the medial endowments. Animals are therefore less prone to evil than man is, because, in the first place, the indulgence of their appetites incurring the breach of no moral rule, can never conduce to sin; more especially as they do not stimulate the over-excitement and abuse of their appetites and passions by artificial means. In the next place, animals, as we shall see in the next chapter, are not liable to be stimulated by ambition and avarice, which both directly and indirectly are the cause of so much crime among mankind. Indeed, these desires among the brute creation appear only to develop themselves so far as the emotions extend of emulation and prudence, and are consequently mild and harmless.

But it may be said that animals are fully capable of, and do evince gratitude, which is doubtless a moral quality, and requires the exertion of intellectual operations to constitute it. I question, however, whether animals do really exercise what may be strictly termed gratitude. All that they can do is to evince attachment towards those who show kindness to them; and, becoming so attached, they are willing to exert themselves for their protection. This disposition has doubtless the semblance of gratitude, but not the substance.⁶

⁴ *Dr. Richardson* remarks with regard to this statement:—"Of this I have no doubt."

⁵ *Mr. Darwin* says that "birds sometimes exhibit benevolent feelings; they will feed the deserted young, even of distinct species; but this, perhaps, ought to be considered as a mistaken instinct."—*Selection in relation to Sex*, vol. ii. p. 109.

Dr. Richardson has suggested that the two last words in this paragraph might have been more properly rendered, "a mistake of instinct."

⁶ As regards certain points of interest connected with animal nature, about which considerable differences must necessarily exist, I have referred for his opinion to the *Rev. J. G. Wood*, M.A., F.L.S., author of "Homes without Hands," whose deeply interesting and highly instruc-

Animals, as well as men, appear to derive pleasure from the exercise of those particular habits to which they are most prone; and it may reasonably be inferred that they are most prone to those for which they are by nature peculiarly adapted. Thus, animals of prey, whose chief occupation is the capturing, and slaying, and devouring other animals, exhibit great enjoyment in this pursuit, which develops all their energies and propensities: and they seem even to revel over and delight in the very agonies which they occasion, correspondingly with the mode in which men of high principle exhibit the utmost gratification in the performance of deeds of virtue or heroism; or as those of exalted and highly cultivated mental endowments, are eager to exercise themselves in those lofty pursuits in which they peculiarly excel.

But if any animals exhibit the proneness here stated, to kill other animals, and appear to delight in the sufferings which they occasion; does it not necessarily follow that at any rate certain animals, if not the whole race, must possess an inherent and natural disposition towards vice and cruelty? If, however, we examine closely into their nature, it will be found that in each case, as in man, between whose nature and theirs a strict analogy may be observed, they are stimulated to the actions from which they acquire this character, solely by their appetites and passions; and that independently of the influence of these endowments, they are devoid of any disposition either to do good or harm. Thus, beasts of prey possess a proneness to pursue and kill animals upon which they live, in order to appease the cravings of appetite. Independent, however, of these wants, they would be wholly indifferent about efforts of this kind, and would not be inclined to exert themselves; but to which they are roused only by their appetites, and passions, and affections. When these cravings are satiated, we find these propensities no longer excited.

Hence, their dispositions originate entirely in the manner I have pointed out, and are independent of any exercise of a reasoning faculty, as in man, by which, therefore, they are altogether unrestrained. The emotions alone, by counteracting
tive work, "Man and Beast," has been published, and has reached me, while the present sheet was passing through the press, the first volume, and the sheets preceding the present one in Vol. II. having already been printed off. Mr. Wood very naturally prefers referring me to what he has already advanced in his recent work, as a reply to my queries, to repeating his opinions to me. From the book in question, it appears that Mr. Wood does consider that animals are influenced by gratitude, and adduces several anecdotes in support of his views. Whether the facts there stated can be admitted as evidence of what is strictly meant by gratitude, and not mere attachment, I must leave it to the readers of them to determine. The question appears indeed ultimately to turn on whether animals have reason or not, in favour of which Mr. Wood expresses himself, while I am unable to assent to this opinion.

each other, serve to restrain and moderate them. Such endowments may therefore most fitly be denominated propensities.

In proof of what I have advanced, we may refer to the accounts given of the propensities of animals by naturalists. The lion, we are told, never slays but when excited by hunger; although tigers and wolves, and some of the most ferocious species of animals, generally fly at and attack whatever creature comes in their way; which, however, they do from being habitually used to kill in order to satisfy their cravings, and from the pleasure which they derive in so doing.

Animals, nevertheless, differ very much as regards their dispositions or propensities in this respect, according to the temperament of body which they possess; those living in mild climates being comparatively gentle and mild as compared with those of the same species which inhabit the torrid regions. In the case of man, as I have already observed, different individuals vary greatly as regards what may be termed their disposition, according to the particular temperament with which they are respectively endowed.

In Captain Cook's "Second Voyage round the World," he records a very remarkable and striking illustration of the natural harmony existing between creatures of different kinds, and which was only broken by the calls of hunger strongly urging them to prey on one another.⁷ It appears that the animals here spoken of, had abundance of dead carcasses to feed upon, and therefore were not induced to molest any of the living creatures about them, on whom they might have seized. On the other hand, we find animals not naturally carnivorous, or used to prey upon those of another kind, will, when very strongly pressed by hunger, attack and devour their fellows of the same species; so powerful an effect have the appetites and passions, even in changing the very disposition and nature of those over whom they exercise control.

The existence upon earth of animals as well as man, who are brought into constant communion with him, and by whom his actions are in many ways influenced, is, doubtless, very important in many respects as regards its moral results. It may be that it is of the same use in the development and discipline of the moral endowments, and bears the same analogy to them, as the union of soul and body accomplishes in the development and discipline of the mental powers. It prepares us for many social duties, and

⁷ He mentions that in Staten Island, the wild animals of different kinds lived together in a state of perfect harmony, and seemed careful not to disturb each other's tranquillity. Sea-lions, bears, shags, and penguins, associated together like domestic cattle and poultry in a farm-yard; while eagles and vultures sat together among the shags, neither being disturbed at the other's presence.—*Cook's Voyages*, vol. ii. p. 685.

serves to call forth many latent qualities and emotions, which might otherwise fail of cultivation. Nevertheless, like certain other causes and influences of a corresponding nature in the moral world, when the result of any arrangement appears calculated to be beneficial, it is often discovered to be also capable of being rendered extensively the reverse. Thus, among many persons, where intercourse with animals has failed to call forth their better feelings, its tendency has frequently been to harden and brutalize them ; and where this latter result has occurred, it has prevailed to a great extent. So among all people, the influence of women is either refining and humanizing, where they are treated with proper respect and regard ; but where this is not the case, and they are degraded, it is hardening and degenerating in the petty tyranny and cruelty that are exercised. The possession of children has also, ordinarily, a very humanizing and beneficial moral effect, in softening the feelings, and drawing out benevolent dispositions and sympathies ; but the very reverse is the result where no affection for them is felt, and they are treated with barbarity.

Perhaps, indeed, the best and surest test of goodness as regards moral disposition in man, and of his inclination to virtue and the exercise of benevolence, is his performance of acts of kindness and charity towards the animal race ; from whom no direct return can be expected to gratify his self-interest, and for which no reward of any kind, temporal or eternal, is either promised, or to be calculated upon. On the other hand, the spontaneous maltreatment of any of these creatures, cannot but seem, to a certain extent, to be indicative of innate inclination to vice, and to malevolence. In each of these instances, however, both of kindness and of cruelty, the particular acts will in most, if not in all cases, be found to have proceeded, not entirely, or directly, either from virtue or benevolence, or from vice or malevolence ; but to have been instigated, as we observe with respect to the other moral actions, by some consideration of self-interest, either direct or indirect, in one of the various modes already pointed out, which was sought to be gratified, and which the act in question conduced to appease. Nevertheless, as regards the general conduct of man towards the inferior race of creatures, he is not only their tyrant ; but from his ceaseless cruelties towards them of every variety, he might be rightly denominated the devil of the animal world. As mankind have many foes among themselves, but the devil is the arch-tormentor of them all ; so, many as are the enemies which animals possess among their own species, the arch-foe and arch-tormentor of them all is man. Man is, moreover, not only the devil of the animal world ; but in nothing do animals so nearly resemble man, as in their ready obedience to their tormentor.

If, as some old writers have conjectured, the souls of animals

at their deaths turn into demons, their delight in torturing man must be greatly invigorated by the revenge they will bear him ; although their utmost ingenuity could hardly devise torments more intense, or more varied, than what they have endured from him : having been subjected to tyranny and slavery of every kind, received the most barbarous treatment, been deprived of their liberty, despoiled of their offspring, had their deepest attachments ruthlessly violated, their habitations destroyed, and their frames tortured ; while nearly all of them of every species have been at last put to death by man.

CHAPTER II.

THE MORAL DESIRES.

1. *Origin, Constitution, and Quality of these Desires.*

HAVING investigated the process, and traced the course of moral action, as regards the various medial impulses, counter-acted and diverted, although ultimately guided and directed by different opposite and contending causes; and having considered, in conjunction therewith, the influence and exercise of the reason and the will, through the operation of which the general moral disposition and character are at length consummated and rendered complete: we have next to inquire into the nature of what may be most correctly termed the moral desires, which also belong to the moral part of our constitution; and to consider their respective influence and use in the general economy of our nature.

In the elementary constitution of a desire of this kind, the same principle is observable as in that of a moral quality or disposition. Thus, a desire springs from an impulse, originally arising in most cases in the medial, although occasionally in the mental part of our nature, directed, and in many instances produced, by a mental operation, and relating, or having immediate reference, to some moral action or course of conduct. Where a simple excitement only, urging us to the possession of some object, exists, not a moral desire, but a mere complex emotion or appetite, is that which is called forth. Hope, for example, is not an actual moral desire, but merely an accompaniment to it, a concomitant emotion which aids the impulse of each moral desire. Nevertheless, whenever the mind is influenced by any ardent wish for, which implies also the determination of the will towards, any particular object, it may strictly be said to be excited by a desire in respect of it; which is, however, only a desire of an ordinary kind, and not a moral desire.¹ There are, nevertheless, certain feelings or excitements of this description, of a very

¹ "Desire is the immediate movement or act of the mind towards an object, which presents some quality on account of which we wish to obtain it."—*Abercrombie on the Moral Feelings*, pt. i. s. 1.

complex nature, which especially claim to be denominated moral desires. As we proceed analytically to inquire into the nature of a moral desire, we find that it is essential and peculiar to the constitution of every moral desire, that it should possess two objects, altogether separate and distinct, and even opposite in their kind, by which such desire is stimulated. 1. An immediate object of the desire; which is in its nature uncertain and changeable, and varies from time to time with the condition or position of the individual. 2. An ultimate object of the desire, which is ever fixed, certain, and determinate.²

The immediate objects of a moral desire, are such as are obvious to us, and at once perceptible, both as to their actual existence and mode of operation. These immediate objects may be either a condition of life, or some article which is applied for our use, and which is the subject of a continual longing or anxiety of the soul towards it, either for its own sake, or for the sake of some good; which may be either a state of being, or thing, supposed to be intimately and inseparably associated or connected with it, and which may prove to be the ultimate object of the desire. The ultimate objects of a moral desire, consisting in the advantages themselves supposed to be secured by the immediate object of it, often lie concealed, and as it were beneath the surface; and their influence, however extensive, is nevertheless imperceptible, or but dimly seen.

Each moral desire, moreover, has reference not only to a particular object of it, but also to some especial moral action in regard to such object, without which, indeed, it would not be complete as a moral endowment. Thus, both riches and power are desired, not for themselves, but for the sake of the actions which they enable the possessors of them to pursue.

The moral desires of each kind, are primarily excited and stimulated by mental irritation, analogous to irritation of the body, which agitates and sets in motion, in the first instance, the mental emotions, and also the mental faculties; after which the other medial endowments generally are affected and operated upon, and made to sustain and consummate the progress and constitution of these desires. By means of this irritation is produced, in the first place, a sensation of uneasiness or restlessness, which is ever urging the individual affected by it to endeavour to move out of his present condition. Succeeding to, and consequent upon this feeling, is the longing of the soul, already alluded to, after the new object or condition, whether immediate or ultimate. Hence, the moral desires in the soul are, in a manner, analogous to the instinctive irritative animal

² *Malebranche* holds that the mind of man has two essential, or necessary relations, extremely different; the one to God, the other to its own body.—*Search after Truth*, tome ii. b. v. c. i. s. 1.

impulses in the body. An irritative impulse, however, arises without an object; while a desire is always stimulated by an object.³

It may be observed that in many cases, and in the pursuit of many employments, we are urged to follow them with great ardour, not actually for the sake of the employments themselves, but on account of some advantage intimately associated with, which is nevertheless altogether independent of them. Thus, the lawyer devotes his whole mind and his utmost energies to his profession, sacrificing every other pursuit, and much enjoyment; not indeed on account of his actual love for the business in which he is so engaged, but from a desire to acquire those honours and emoluments which are attendant on professional success. The student pores diligently over his books, not from the mere fondness for the employment of reading, excess in which is often irksome and painful; but from a desire to acquire knowledge which will aid him in his career. Just so is it with those who are actuated by the moral desires, the immediate objects of which—whether wealth or fame—they pursue, not for their own sake, but on account of the advantages and delights, which, although quite independent of, are intimately and inseparately associated with them.

The object of a moral desire seems to possess a kind of magnetic influence, attracting towards itself the whole soul. A desire, whether moral or ordinary, is to the soul somewhat analogous to what an appetite is to the body. The former craves ceaselessly after the object desired, and cannot be tranquillized without it; in the same way that the body when suffering from hunger, does for food. Corresponding languor or lassitude is in each case produced; and in each case, the appeasement of these feelings occasions considerable gratification. The ultimate objects of both are fixed and permanent, until they are satisfied; and, while they continue active, these desires exercise supremacy over all the feelings: so that, so long as they are unsatisfied, neither ease, tranquillity, nor enjoyment can be fully experienced.

Both the moral desires, which are respectively termed ambition and avarice, originate in self-love, and are the result of the efforts which the mind makes in its anxiety to improve the condition of the individual. Envy and jealousy have also their origin here; and even patriotism may be traced to resolve itself into this, as its final, although not its original stimulating motive.

There appears, nevertheless, to be this peculiarity about the

³ According to *Aristotle*, the causes of all human action are seven—chance, force, nature, custom, reason, anger, and appetite.—*Rhetoric*, b. i. c. x.

moral desires, which appertains, more or less, to every moral endowment: that while with respect to the emotions and appetites, we are dependent on ourselves alone as regards our excitement by them; in our excitement by the moral desires, we are dependent entirely on our relation to others. Thus, the attainment of neither wealth nor power can afford us any pleasure, except so far as they enable us to exercise ourselves in some way in relation to those about us. Neither riches nor honours can confer any benefit on an individual, unless he is a member of a community which may render him homage on that account. But this is the case, to some extent also, with regard both to the passions and to affection.

In God, neither ambition nor avarice find place for existence. As the Supreme of all beings, no ambition can excite Him, having exceeded the utmost bounds to which ambition can impel. And possessing all things, it is contrary to reason to suppose that avarice can ever in any way influence His proceedings. He is however probably, for the reasons stated, the only intelligent being who is not so moved; as wherever there exists in any being the prospect of obtaining either property or elevation beyond what he has already gained, full scope for both ambition and avarice is at once afforded.⁴

2. *Particular objects of Desire, peculiar to each part of our nature.*

Each department in our constitution, although so intimately and inseparably connected with the other part, and partaking of and affected by all its excitements and impulses, is nevertheless influenced independently, and is peculiarly directed by the respective and distinctive desires appropriate to it, although each of these desires originates in, and springs from, the same source. As each part of our nature is thus in a manner distinct and independent in itself, and carries on operations differing from, and to a certain extent at variance with, those of the other part; so each has its own distinct, and independent, and ever-opposing inclinations.

There are three principal and especial motives, or springs of action, which separately influence man, according to the three constituent parts of which he is made up; and these respectively form the stimulants to or objects of desire, according to the different parts of our nature. 1. The first of these is the

⁴ As regards moral desire in the case of God, *Behmen* asserts that His will is imperceptible without inclination to anything, for it has nothing to which it can incline itself, but only in itself.—*Revelation, quest.* 3, c. xiii.

Also, that it brings itself forth out of itself.—*Ibid.*

desire of pleasure, and of the avoidance of pain, which is the principal mainspring of action in every operation carried on, or derived from, the medial part of our constitution. 2. The second of these is the desire of liberty, and of the avoidance of constraint, which is the principal mainspring of action carried on, or derived from, the moral part of our constitution; being that in which the will is immediately concerned, and on the attainment of which its freedom depends. 3. The third of these desires is that of knowledge, and of the avoidance of ignorance, which is the principal mainspring of action in every operation carried on, or derived from, the mental part of our constitution. This is true alike, whichever faculty or capacity is exerted; and the agreeable feeling afforded by novelty, is a proof of the production of pleasure from this source.

In each case, however, and in the operation of each desire, whether ordinary or moral, the attainment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain are the ultimate and moving objects, and are what are alone either wished for, or shunned for their own sake. Liberty, and ease, and knowledge, are coveted, not for their own sake, but for the sake of the pleasure they insure. Riches and honours are sought after, not for their own sake, but because they bring liberty and ease with them. Hence, in each of these desires, the ultimate object of attainment is the enjoyment of pleasure, coupled with the avoidance of pain.

It is further to be observed that there is no desire of any kind excited in any branch of our nature, without the determination of the will. Indeed, this determination of the will is absolutely essential to constitute the desire, and the will always points, as it were, in the direction towards which the desire impels us.

As pleasure is the immediate object of desire in our medial nature, so self-preservation is probably the ultimate object here, and destruction the ultimate object of avoidance. It appears to me, however, that it is not so much the love of life as the dread of death and its attendant pangs, by which we are mainly actuated. All change is naturally obnoxious, especially to an unknown condition. Particularly so must be that change which is the greatest of all that we can undergo, and to a state of the nature of which we are utterly ignorant.

Next to the desire of self-preservation, is that for the preservation and well-being of those immediately connected with us. The desire of protecting their young, evinced by the whole animal creation, is probably derived from that of self-preservation; and the horror of death in any being, from the dread of destruction to self.

Some have considered happiness as the ultimate object of desire generally. It is not, however, happiness, but what produces or insures happiness, that is the apparent object

of desire, whether liberty, or power, or knowledge be the subject of pursuit. The happiness of heaven, which is the highest happiness that man can attain, consists, according to the notions of some races of men, in having every desire gratified to the full. On the other hand, most of the unhappiness endured on earth, arises from the numerous disappointments to which our desires are here doomed.

Terrestrial happiness depends, however, in reality, much more upon our constitution, than our condition. The ills that are insufferable to one man, are trifles to another; and comforts which one man deems indispensable, another regards as useless superfluities. Some persons, too, are excited by every casualty which befalls them; while others regard with stoical indifference the most important events in their career. It is, moreover, a singular circumstance connected with happiness, which appears to be so peculiarly positive in its nature, that it is itself dependent far more on negatives than on positives; more on the absence of certain ills, than on the presence of any particular goods, for its existence. But this is mainly owing to, and of itself proves, the adaptation of man for this state; and that this is in reality his natural condition, unless disturbed in, and driven from it, by external causes. So prone, indeed, are we by nature to be in a condition of happiness, that almost every affection, either of the mind or of the body, which does not do violence to nature, is directly pleasurable; while nearly every such affection that does violence to nature, is painful. Happiness appears, consequently, to be the natural condition of man, and misery his unnatural state; inasmuch as perfect health, accompanied by freedom from annoyance, either through mental, moral, or physical causes, almost of itself conduces to promote and insure happiness;⁵ while, on the other hand, the impairment of health, and the presence of care or pain, at once conduce to create a

⁵ *Epicurus* placed happiness in the tranquillity of the mind, and indolence of the body.

According to *Aristotle*, happiness may be defined to be "a state of virtuous and prosperous exertion, or a state of independence and contentment, or one overflowing with safe pleasures; or one abundant in worldly goods, with power to preserve, and wisdom to enjoy them."—*Rhetoric*, b. i. c. 5.

He also asserts that the greatest human happiness is theoretic and intellectual. And that the exercise of intellectual energy, constitutes the best and firmest portion of human happiness.—*Ethics*, b. x. cc. vii., viii.

Cicero tells us that "they who are under no apprehensions, no ways uneasy, who covet nothing, are lifted up by no vain joy, are happy."—*Tusculan Disputations*; *Whether Virtue be sufficient for a Happy Life*. vi.

Locke states as regards happiness that "in its fullest extent it is the utmost pleasure we are capable of, and misery the utmost pain; and the lowest degree of what can be called happiness, is so much ease from all pain, and so much present pleasure, as without which any one cannot be content."—*Essay on the Understanding*, b. ii. c. xxi. s. 42.

condition of unhappiness.⁶ And as happiness is our natural, so is it also our most perfect condition, and will be completely enjoyed only when our state is rendered perfect, either by the soul being freed from the bondage of the body, or united to a spiritual body fitted alike for its complete action and complete happiness. And as misery is a condition unnatural to man, so is it one of punishment also, both here and hereafter; and in both states is the consequence of a departure from the correct course set before us. Moreover, as is the case with our happiness, so our misery too, will only be complete in a future state. Nevertheless, the soul while united to the body may possibly be capable of as extensive and vivid happiness as when in a separate state, and enjoying the bliss of heaven; the main difference between the two being, that it is incapable while in this condition of enjoying it for any permanence. It obtains here but a transient and momentary glance, of what hereafter it will have the full view.

It is no proof of the attainment of the immediate object of a desire not producing gratification and happiness, that the condition occasioning it is not permanent, but soon subsides into one of ordinary feeling; inasmuch as (which I observed when treating on the emotions⁷) all mental pleasure is produced by some change in our condition out of a worse state to a better; and the contrast presented in our favour on a review of the two states, which is but a temporary and transient feeling, soon subsides into one of insensibility, and of apathy, regarding it. Thus, a person who has long desired any particular object of ambition, on his obtaining it is filled with great joy; which continues just so long as the novelty of his condition continues to excite him, and he is led to contrast it with that in which he was lately placed, which was one of continual uneasiness and dissatisfaction, in consequence of his being excited by this desire. Just so is it also with regard to any loss or deprivation which we may sustain, the remorse concerning which soon ceases actively and permanently to affect us. Probably, moreover, this love of novelty which is so strongly implanted in our nature, is one of the most vigorous and active stimulants to invention, and enterprise, and advancement, that could have been supplied to us. It is like the principle of gravitation in matter, which causes a stone to be continually rolling until it has reached the lowest point on the earth's surface to which it is capable of descending. Indeed, it is mainly from the love of novelty that the desire of knowledge springs.

A sensation somewhat similar to, or rather corresponding

⁶ *Vide ante*, b. i. c. ii. s. 6. p. 298.

⁷ *Vide ante*, *ibid.*

with, that which I have described, we may notice with regard to any change of local position as respects our own persons, as when either ascending a great height, or descending a considerable depth. So long as the consciousness of the contrast with our late situation continues to occupy our attention, our minds are excited by the change; but they very soon wholly neglect to notice it, and we seem as though we still remained on the same level as before.

In many respects, however, our condition occasionally so varies from one state to another, that what at one period is productive of pleasure, at another brings only pain; and what at one time occasions pain, under different circumstances insures pleasure. Thus, the food which causes so much delight to one famishing with hunger, to the same man when surfeited may occasion only disgust: and while at one time exercise may be productive both of pleasure and health; when we are weary, rest from exercise is no less agreeable or necessary.

Nevertheless, the circumstance of our ceasing to be permanently affected by the attainment of an object of desire, affords no proof that such does not confer real and substantial happiness, especially as it relieves us from a previous condition of uneasiness and unhappiness. Ease and tranquillity are, indeed, the highest and only permanent state, not merely of comfort, but of happiness, in this life.

Luxury is rather a condition than a desire of any kind, or the object of it. It consists mainly in being under the dominion of the love of pleasure, or rather indolent ease, which gains the predominance over all other higher pursuits. It differs from avarice in having no ultimate, but only a present and immediate object, and it is far less powerful than this desire. In the main, indeed, it is opposed to the desires both of avarice and of ambition, and is the mark of a weak mind, deficient in energy, which is subservient to the medial emotions, or has not strength to withstand their allurements.

The desire of liberty, which is one springing from the moral part of our nature, appears to be the moving principle in a great many of our actions, and animates several of our undertakings, as it is also the principal aim in some of the most important of them. Thus, with regard to that wish which is so generally felt while engaged in any task or employment not at all disagreeable or irksome in itself, to get to the end of it—this arises solely from the desire to be at liberty, and to be freed from the restraint, however gentle, and otherwise agreeable, which such an occupation imposes. This desire of liberty we may especially perceive, as is the case with many of their endowments, to be exhibited more openly, and to operate more directly, in animals than in man, although in both alike it is ever active and influential.

In some respects, the desires of each class may be considered as feelings towards things, as passions and affections are towards persons. Thus, while avarice is excited only, and entirely, towards gross material substances and subjects, and ambition towards objects which are immaterial and incorporeal; anger and affection are excited only towards rational beings like ourselves. But there is this grand difference between the feelings and impulses generated by affection, and those springing from desire; that while the former produce mainly a wish for the well-being of the object, those emanating from desire create a wish for its actual possession and enjoyment. The primary and immediate objects of avarice are gold, and lands, and property of various kinds. The primary and immediate objects of ambition are honour, and praise, and power. The former are the objects of desire of a creature of this world who is allied to materiality. The latter are the objects of desire of an immortal intelligent spirit. We can hardly suppose, indeed, that spirits can be excited by avarice; nor can we imagine a being who is not gifted with intellectuality to be influenced by ambition. In many cases, however, it may happen that the ultimate object of both these moral desires is the same, being that of glory or power, and beyond this of perfect liberty, finally reducible into the enjoyment of pleasure. Hence, both these two moral desires may be also reducible to one and the same; although, from the constitution of different minds, some who are of a more noble nature resort to ambition, others, less highly endowed, to avarice, as the surest means of obtaining their end. Indeed, in all cases, the objects of each desire, both immediate and ultimate, vary extensively, according to the mental and moral character of the individual, and the circumstances in which he is placed.

3. *The same originating Impulses, and a corresponding Mode of Operation, characterize both the Moral Desires.*

In the investigation of nature, whether of animals or of man, and whether moral or material, it behoves us in our process to examine carefully into the constituent elements and parts of each subject; as also to analyze the various principles which contribute to form it, observing at every stage the characteristic features which serve to denote the individuality and peculiarity of its race and genus.

In the constitution of both the moral desires, as distinguished from those of an ordinary kind, we may observe that they are formed alike of certain medial excitements and impulses; and

that by these they are both attracted and repelled in a particular direction; that both alike have immediate and ultimate objects of attainment; and that the mode of operation and final result of each is the same. By the union together and co-operation of these several elements, is constituted each moral desire, which consists in the extension and full development of an ordinary desire; analogous to the manner in which an ordinary desire consists in the extension and full development of the operation and results of the medial excitements. It is here further to be observed, that, while as regards the moral dispositions, the medial endowments are what primarily rouse us to action; in the excitement of a moral desire, the medial and mental parts of our nature appear about equally to excite us, and to take the lead in directing our operations. Moreover, in the constitution of each moral desire, the same medial endowments are resorted to, and the same mental faculties are called into exercise. Each moral desire, too, affects us in the same mode, and corresponds as to its final result.

The primary incentives to, and originators and instigators of each moral desire, are of two kinds:—1. Those which attract us to an object. 2. Those which repel us from it. The leading, and most direct incentives to, as well as ultimate objects of, moral desire, are the two simple emotions of pleasure and pain, whose nature, functions, and operations have been already described in a previous chapter.⁸ The first of these emotions attracts us towards an object, and at once produces a wish to obtain it, at least so far as to occasion this emotion; while the emotion of pain creates a wish to break off all connexion with it, at least so far as would cause a repetition of this same emotion. These two emotions are in most, if not in all cases, also accompanied more or less by that of irritation.

The emotions lately referred to are not only the originators of all voluntary action, both mental and medial, but, as has already been shown, they constitute as it were the mainspring in the excitement of each desire, whether ordinary or moral; inasmuch as, whatever may be its immediate or ultimate object, irritation, pleasure, and pain, are the primary impulses which set the machinery in operation. The emotion allied to, and compounded of pain, closely and constantly attendant upon each desire, whether ordinary or moral, is that of disappointment; which is the opposite or counterpart emotion to that pleasurable feeling termed gratification, arising from the attainment of the object of any desire, and the avoidance of which operates as a stimulant in the constitution of such desire.

It is remarkable, indeed, that although in many respects so

⁸ *Vide ante*, b. i. c. ii. ss. 3, 4.

widely differing from each other as do the moral desires, they are closely united by this firmest bond of union, the identity of their origin, and of their mode of operation. Like animals of the same race, which, though varying extensively as to colour and form, and many external peculiarities, they are nevertheless bound together by the strong and indissoluble tie of a community in species.

In the preceding chapter I endeavoured to show to how great an extent the disposition and character of each person may be more or less dependent upon particular causes connected with his general nature, and belonging to each part of his being; the constitution of the material frame, the power both of the medial and mental endowments, the very qualities of the soul itself, and the circumstances in which he is placed, each contributing and conducing to affect his moral condition in this respect. In a corresponding manner may we infer that the moral desires are no less affected and directed by each of these causes, the development of which, although less manifest than in the former case, may be equally vigorous in its operations, and efficient in its results. The condition of the material frame must also have an effect and influence on the moral desires, more or less direct or indirect, according to the nature of such desire, and the circumstances of the individual. But the medial endowments which constitute the moral desire, are the most immediately concerned here.

Although both the moral desires are to some extent dependent on the circumstances of the individual, as certain opportunities are wont to excite avarice, others to stimulate ambition; yet, in each moral desire, equally with a moral disposition, those elements of them already specified are what essentially constitute them, and cause them to exist, however these circumstances may vary their mode both of excitement and of manifestation.

The very different, and indeed opposite nature of the moral desires, as regards their main element and characteristic, the immediate objects of them; renders their uniform similarity with respect to their impulses, mode of operation, and various other constituents, considerably more striking.

It is further here to be observed that, not only do the particular elements, when considered in the peculiar mode here pointed out, and operating as here described, suffice to constitute the moral desires; but that nothing less and nothing more than these particular elements, combinations, and operations, are sufficient to form them. And further than this, that these constituents so united form these desires alone, and that these two are the only moral desires.

In scientific process in every department, whether relating to material or immaterial subjects, the two grand and leading modes of investigation into their real properties and qualities,

consist in analyzing their constitution as regards the several and separate elements which contribute to form it, and observing therewith the effect produced by different combinations; together with the particular result which the introduction of each separate element serves to effect.

Each of the moral desires is less fixed and permanent, and less rooted in the nature of the individual, than are either moral dispositions, or qualities, or characteristics; but the moral desires are less transient than are either emotions, appetites, or passions.

4. *Their Insatiability and Irregularity of Action.*

Two prominent characteristics of the moral desires, especially demand to be noted here. The first of these is their absolute insatiability as regards the objects of their pursuit. In conjunction with this, and perhaps to some extent as a consequence of it, is the eccentricity and irregularity with which they impel forward the individual who is excited by them.

Moral desire, which is in some respects analogous to medial appetite, differs from it entirely as regards its insatiability. Both hunger and concupiscence are satisfied to the full by the attainment of their object; but the gratification of a moral desire, even by the attainment of its ultimate object, very often, so far from quenching it, only adds fuel to the flame. Though this object is fixed, yet no sooner is it gained, than another and more important one rises behind it; as in climbing to the summit of a mountain, we often fancy ourselves near the top, until a higher and more distant one is disclosed, which in its turn gives way to another yet more lofty. While appetite is a longing only of the body which is soon satisfied, inasmuch as it is limited in the amount of food that it can contain; desire is a longing of the soul, which is unlimited as to the extent of its aspirations. Hence, a moral desire is generally infinite as regards its ultimate objects; although these appear fixed and permanent, and so remain until they are fully attained. It is seldom that a moral desire is appeased even by securing the immediate object of it, or that it is satisfied until all the ultimate objects to which it aspires are within its grasp. Thus, present affluence is no bar to avarice, nor is present reputation to ambition for that which is higher. And the more vigorous in any individual are the moral desires of either kind, the more infinitely insatiable they also are. The emotions, appetites, and passions, always cause us to act uniformly. The moral dispositions and qualities urge us to act sometimes and in part uniformly, and sometimes and in part irregularly. The moral

desires, however, impel us far more frequently to act with irregularity than with uniformity.

One great cause of irregularity, which is often more apparent than real, in the pursuit of a moral desire, is the fact that we frequently forego the direct attainment of a minor object of the same kind with the ultimate object of the desire, in order to secure the main object pursued. Thus, though the ultimate end of avarice is the enjoyment of pleasure through the possession of riches, and the obtaining a security against privation; yet those who are vehemently impelled by avarice, voluntarily both forego pleasure and endure privation, in order to gratify the desire itself, which is so powerful as to cause the very object of it to be neglected, in the determination to obey and follow its impulses. A corresponding result is effected in the case of the ambitious man, who neglects present honour and power, in order ultimately to secure a larger measure of it which he believes to be within his grasp.

A person under the strong influence of a moral desire, is like a hound in pursuit of a deer, which he keenly and steadfastly follows when he has once caught the scent of it; and continues to track it through a herd of others, and for many a weary mile until he has hunted it down, although those which he has passed by seem easily within his reach.

Even the reason itself, so regular in its ordinary operations, while aiding in the pursuit of a moral desire, seems occasionally to conduct itself irregularly and wildly. But although it is eccentric and uncertain as regards all the collateral efforts of a man under the dominion of a moral desire, as also with respect to its immediate objects; it is nevertheless ever steady and direct in its progress towards the attainment of the ultimate object in view. In this respect it might be compared to the course of rivers in a mountainous country, the general natural flow of which is towards the sea; but while the main currents ever roll steadily and powerfully in this direction, the lesser streams run irregularly and wildly, although all at last pour themselves into the principal river, and all alike contribute to swell the strength of its waters.

So irregular sometimes are the impulses of the moral desires, and the proceedings which they occasion, that they appear to be as nearly allied to, or as productive of insanity, as are the passions. Indeed, many acts of this kind, if regarded in themselves, seem to be caused by this disease and only differ from those which are exhibited while in this condition, from being strictly under the direction of reason. Several of the resorts too, to which our moral desires impel us, appear more like the ravings of madmen, than the effect of the deliberate reflection and cool calculation of a sober, sensible being. The result, however, is appealed to, to prove the rationality of the operation; although, this

result often fails, while the sanity of the individual remains unimpeached. Perhaps, indeed, in many cases the only essential distinction between the vagaries of madmen and of those impelled by the strong stimulus of moral desire is this: that while madmen pursue a mere phantom of the brain, which has no existence whatever save in their disordered fancy; men impelled by avarice and ambition do pursue something which really exists, and which they actually see, although that something, after all, may turn out to be but a shadow.

There can be no doubt, however, that in the case of intellectual and immortal beings, the pursuit of those objects which are celestial, insuring pleasure the most perfect, constitute at once, not only the highest and most legitimate, as well as the most exalted and really satisfactory objects of their moral desires; but that they are also those the desire for which is best calculated to counteract any debasing or demoralizing tendency which the pursuit of terrestrial objects is prone to produce.

5. *The Moral Desire termed Avarice.*

We now come to the particular and separate consideration of the moral desires themselves, which, as already observed, are respectively termed avarice and ambition. As regards the first of them, that of avarice,⁹ it has for its immediate object the possession of riches; and for its ultimate object, the enjoyment of those advantages which riches bring; as also in conjunction, and to a certain extent identical with such enjoyment, the avoidance of that indigence and deprivation which the want of riches may occasion.¹ To this desire the individual impelled by it is excited by mental irritation; and its operations correspond with those already described as peculiar to a moral desire.

Wealth, which is the immediate object of this desire, is indeed commonly wished for at first, not for itself, but for the advantages and enjoyments of various kinds which it promises to

⁹ *Dr. Abercrombie* remarks that the desire of wealth is "commonly called avarice; though avarice is perhaps justly to be regarded as the morbid excess or abuse of the propensity."—*On the Moral Feelings*, pt. i. s. i.

¹ Covetousness is termed by *Cicero* a disease of the mind.—*Tuscul. Disp. on Perturb. of Mind*, 11.

This, however, is directly at variance with the theory which I have here endeavoured to enunciate.—*Vide post*, b. iii. c. vii. s. 10.

Longinus says that the love of money is the canker of the soul's greatness.—*On the Sublime*, s. 44.

St. Augustine defines covetousness to be a dishonest and insatiable desire of gain. And in one of his epistles he compares it to hell, which devours all, and yet hath never enough.—*Lib. 3, De Lib. Arbit.*

insure to the possessor, and which form the ultimate object of this desire; until in time, by association, the very wealth itself becomes an object of delight. We are seldom, or never, covetous of things which will not bring us some eventual substantial good beyond and independent of themselves. Money is the most general subject of this desire, because it is the most general and efficient means of attaining different objects. The miser, moreover, generally prefers the money even to the object which might be obtained by expending it, because by expending it he gains but one commodity, whereas by hoarding it up he is conscious of being able to procure any commodity that he may wish for; or from time to time, as his fancy may change, a great variety of different objects.

Hence, a person under the dominion of avarice, is induced to hoard up his treasures for the purpose of enjoying the fruit of them, and finds himself unwilling to part with them, even though it were to apply them to the very end—the ultimate object—for which he so painfully amassed them; as he is now loth hastily to let go what has occupied so much time and trouble in collecting, and which will require so much in replacing. He is probably induced in many cases to continue hoarding up his wealth, because he finds the prospective view of pleasure which it afforded, together with the actual pleasures derived from hoarding, greater than that of spending it. A miser may perhaps suffer nearly as much pain from the loss of one pound as from the loss of one hundred, because both form alike an impediment to his designs, and an abridgment of his power.

Money, which reduces all other things to a fixed value, is itself the most difficult of all things on which to place a just estimate. And alone from the two errors of undervaluing it, and overvaluing it, proceed many of the crimes, and most of the miseries of life.² One half of the people in the world are careless about money, and so run into extravagance, and make themselves miserable from want; while the other half render themselves equally miserable by depriving themselves of things necessary, in order to secure that which is in reality serviceable only to save them from deprivation.

Some people regard and value money only for the good things that it will produce; others, on the contrary, appear only to value these good things according as they will produce money. Such persons prefer the shadow to the substance, the semblance to the reality.

An old writer³ truly observes that there is little or no differ-

² *Plutarch* considered covetousness to be one of the main causes of the misery of mankind.—Tom. 2.

³ *Seneca, Morals.*

ence between not wanting a thing, and having it. And doubtless, the most perfect condition as regards wealth in which we can be placed, is that negative one when we want nothing. This is, in reality, the condition of God Himself, and of God alone. As a person, however hungry, requires only to eat until his appetite is appeased ; so a man can only enjoy riches so far as he has occasion, or is enabled to use them. All superfluity beyond this, so far from contributing to his comfort, can, in reality, only conduce to his concern. A man who has sufficient for all his wants, can no more add to his happiness by possessing more ; than one who has a comfortable bed to lie upon, can increase his comfort by having three in his room instead of one, to either of which he may transfer himself at pleasure. The only possible gratification in this case is the reflection that he has the opportunity afforded to him of at any time making the change. Hence, while poverty and want of riches may occasion misery and destitution ; it does not, therefore, by any means necessarily follow that the possession of riches, although it may insure us against poverty, will also produce happiness, or even contentment and comfort. Sufficiency is, in reality, all that we can require. Whoever lacks this, must expect discomfort ; whoever exceeds it, will probably experience disquiet.

The essential defect of riches as regards their contribution to our happiness, is that, although we may possess them ever so completely and so controllably, we cannot by any contrivance make them a portion of ourselves. They are still absolutely independent of us, and separate from us ; and the rich proprietor of an estate is no more a part of it, or it of him, than is the humblest labourer employed in its cultivation. All the use that we can make of riches of whatever kind, is only occasional, and very restricted, and uncertain. In reality, our actual possession of any substance so as essentially to convert it to our own advantage, and make it part of ourselves, is limited to an extent corresponding with what we see in the case of animals. The only things that we can avail of as our own, are the food which we eat, the articles that we hold in our hands, the habitations in which we dwell, the clothes that we wear, with which animals are provided by nature, and the children belonging to us. All these are so attached to our persons, as to form a collateral part of our frames. But beyond this, the sole power that we possess over property, is the ability to turn it to our own account, and to have the exclusive use of it ; as is the case with the clothes and money at our command, and the lands under our control. The only real possessions are not those of property, but of person. The powers and endowments, whether of body or mind, that any man is gifted with, are essentially

his own. The houses and estates to which he acquires the title, are not actually his. The utmost that he can do, is to direct their application in certain limited modes. The ploughman's robust son, who is heir to a sound constitution, is, in reality, far richer than the sickly son of the squire who is heir to every acre in the parish in which he resides.

Still, after all, there is hardly any power so great as that which wealth bestows. There is, in fact, scarcely a material advantage that it does not tend, indirectly at any rate, if not directly, to procure.⁴ Although entirely sensorial in its nature, yet of this class are the majority of those enjoyments which we most prize, and most covet. If its pleasures are perishing, so are the opportunities of partaking of them. And if its ecstasies are but short-lived, so is also our own existence upon earth. Nevertheless, riches, although they may purchase the means of comfort, cannot procure comfort itself, or either health or pleasure. The only contingencies they insure to us with absolute certainty, are care and anxiety. It is remarkable indeed, how very little the possession of the most unbounded wealth can really affect us as regards our personal condition, whatever it may do as regards objects and circumstances indirectly connected with, or bearing relation to us. Thus, the having at our command the wealth of the whole world, would not of itself alleviate one single pain, could not cure the toothache or a headache, or produce an hour's sleep, or even of itself half an hour's happiness, or substantial comfort. Affluence, indeed, may affect our external circumstances, which, in turn, may affect our comfort, so as to produce happiness. But its main use and influence in all these cases, is not so much to produce causes of pleasure or comfort, as to afford us the means of removing the causes of pain or discomfort. Riches are therefore, in reality, rather negative than positive as regards the ultimate result of their attainment.

It is probable that avarice develops itself in the mind, even earlier than ambition. True, as Dr. Priestley observes,⁵ a child only regards a coin as a plaything; but he is as covetous about his toys, and his sweetmeats, as a miser is about his money; and money too, he covets, as soon as he discovers the application to which it may be turned. A miser, indeed, only covets money, or at least does so originally, not for itself, but for the advantages that it may bring.⁶

⁴ "If money go before, all ways do lie open."—*Merry Wives of Windsor*.

⁵ *Priestley's Hartley, Int. Ess.* 33.

⁶ *Helvetius* remarks that penurious avarice "derives its source from an excessive and ridiculous fear of the possibility of indigence, and of the many evils with which it is accompanied."—*Essay on the Mind*, c. x.

6. *The Moral Desire termed Ambition.*

The other moral desire already alluded to, and which in its nature and constitution corresponds with avarice, although differing from it as to its immediate objects, is ordinarily termed ambition. The immediate objects of ambition are rank, and title, and applause. Ambition originates in the love of praise,⁷ the acquisition of which contributes to bring with it power,⁸ the enjoyment arising from which is the ultimate object of ambition; together with that produced by liberty of action as regards the exercise of this desire.⁹ In conjunction with these two objects, immediate and ultimate, and to a certain extent identical with them, exist also the objects of avoidance of dishonour and disgrace, and of restraint as regards our actions.¹ Ambition is the attractive force which excites to activity, and stimulates the tide of human enterprise. Ambition and apathy, or indolence, are the two principles most opposed to each other, and they are the two by which our conduct is mainly regulated. They are the most powerful and influential stimulants by which we are excited; and each would be far more so if it was not continually counteracted by the other. Were it not for our ambition, our inclination to indolence would induce us to do nothing. Were it not for our indolence, our ambition would urge us to attempt everything.²

Mental irritation excites us in the production of this moral desire; and the general operations incident to ambition, will be found to correspond with those described as peculiar to a desire of this kind.

It appears therefore, that the essential object of ambition is strictly rather liberty than power, so far, at least, that liberty is the end of power, as power is of ambition. The immediate objects of ambition are offices of authority, and influence, and dignity; but they are only desired because they insure to us that perfect degree of liberty which is consequent on their

⁷ *Helvetius*, however, denies that ambition is founded on the desire of esteem.—*Essay on the Mind*, c. xi.

⁸ According to this writer, "power is the only object of man's pursuit."—*Treatise on Man*, c. iv.

He also asserts that "the love of glory, of esteem, and importance is nothing more than a disguised love of power."—*Ibid.* c. v.

⁹ *Cicero* remarks that there is "in the soul an impatient desire and inclination to pre-eminence."—*Offices*, b. i.

¹ "The desire of greatness is always produced by the fear of pain, or the love of sensual pleasure."—*Helvetius on the Mind*, c. vi.

² *Lord Bacon* remarks that ambition is a humour that maketh men active, earnest, full of alacrity and stirring, if it be not stopped.—*Essay xxxvi.*

possession. True indeed that to gratify ambition, men will often sacrifice temporary liberty, as they will also rank and power—just as the avaricious man sacrifices some enjoyment, although that is the ultimate object of his desire; but which does not prove that the enjoyment arising from liberty is not the ultimate, any more than that rank is not the immediate object of ambition.

The objects of ambition seem to be more varied than are those of avarice, whose immediate object is wealth; although this is coveted, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the multifarious consequential advantages and enjoyments that it brings, and which form the ultimate object of both the moral desires. As regards the precise objects of ambition, both immediate and ultimate, it is determined and directed in their pursuit mainly by the mental and moral constitution of the individual; some desiring and deriving pleasure from civil power, others literary fame, others military glory, according to the capacities, circumstances, and character of the particular person.

In the attainment of an object of ambition, we seek to secure a certain and acknowledged proof of the ability we possess, the rank gained being the reward of such ability, and of the proper exercise of it; whether it be a feat in arms, or a great discovery in science. Hence, the fruits of ambition are more essentially personal and a part of ourselves, than are the fruits or attainments of avarice. The results of ambition may indeed of themselves change our condition. The results of avarice only afford us the means of effecting such a change. Ambition may stimulate a man to become an orator or a hero. Avarice may enable him to become the possessor of an estate. The one is a part of himself. The other is only appurtenant to him.

As our position in the world and in society is entirely relative, and is regulated solely by our condition as compared with others; so we are ever at each turn stimulated more or less by ambition to excel those about us, on which our own condition essentially depends. Thus, every excellence and every failing, both of ourselves and of others, is a constant stimulant, more or less powerful, to ambition. The real secret of our love of applause is, that we accept each tribute of this kind as an instalment paid to our ambitious desire. Reputation is the concentration of applause or fame upon an individual.

The desire for the admiration of others, and of exaltation by the world, which is the essential and moving cause of ambition, is of itself evidence of some conscious superiority, where pride and erring judgment do not lead to an over-estimate of self;³

³ "Great ambition is the passion of a great character. He who is endowed with it, may perform either very great actions, or very bad ones; all depends upon the principles which direct him."—*Napoleon I.*

and is, indeed, one distinguishing mark of our alliance to the Supreme Being, who has proclaimed Himself to be "a jealous God," so far as regards desiring and taking delight in the reverence and respect done to Him by the creatures of His hand. And if He feels honoured by their homage, how much more so may we be allowed to be so, when partaking of some of that tribute which He deigns to receive, and to deem worthy of consideration.

Ambition, in many cases, originates in the consciousness which the individual possesses of being gifted with intellectual faculties and endowments that may enable him to accomplish great undertakings, and to rise to eminence; and which causes the irritation to exertion to be excited. Hence ambition has been very correctly regarded as the symptom of a powerful and godlike mind.⁴ The longing for immortal fame, or for high reputation, is one of its main characteristics.⁵

In one respect this desire resembles the simple emotions of pain and pleasure, which contribute, as has been seen, to its constituent elements; in that it is, to a certain degree, dependent for its satisfaction on the previous condition of the individual, as whether he has advanced or receded in his career to his present position. As the enjoyment of present pleasure is marred by a desire after a greater degree of it, so nothing so surely detracts from the present gratification of ambition, as desiring another and a higher object of it. It is this, in fact, which renders the actual attainment of the immediate objects of it so seldom satisfactory. The enjoyment resulting from the attainment of an object of ambition may, no doubt, be as extensive as that resulting from any subject of pleasure or joy; the experience of which is but seldom felt as actually present, and for the sensation of which we are dependent on the nature of the previous state out of which we moved. In most cases, however, every advancing step towards the object of our ambition, affords some degree of gratification. The actual attainment of such object proves, nevertheless, oftentimes unsatisfactory; not because that object is paltry or unsubstantial, but because it has been supplanted by a new and higher one, the desire after which, as I have already observed, hinders the enjoyment of that which is attained. Hence, however, it is clear that the immediate object of ambition may be one of a determinate and real nature.⁶

⁴ "Whose spirit with *divine* ambition puff'd."—*Hamlet*.

⁵ *Aristotle* remarks that "Emulation is a laudable affection, and flowing from a virtuous character."—*Rhetoric*, b. ii. c. 4.

And *Lord Bacon* tells us that "he that seeketh to be eminent among able men, hath a great task; but that is ever good for the public."—*Essays*, xxxvi. *Of Ambition*.

⁶ Nevertheless, in the great majority of cases, how true is the saying

If we deny the actual existence of any such thing as happiness in this life, we must of a consequence also deny the actual existence of any such thing as unhappiness, which is but the counterpart of the former. If we admit the existence of the one, we must also necessarily admit the existence of the other. If no such states of being as happiness and unhappiness exist, of course there are no objects or events which can occasion either of these conditions. Supposing therefore unhappiness to exist, we must admit the existence of happiness also; and if we admit that there are certain objects and events which cause the former, we must also admit that there are certain objects and events which cause the latter. And if the loss or deprivation of honours, and rank, and reputation—such as may be the immediate objects of ambition—can occasion unhappiness or pain, surely the acquisition of them must be allowed to occasion happiness or pleasure.

The circumstance of the objects of ambition ceasing to afford any happiness or pleasure when the opportunities for enjoying them have passed away—as at the close of life—is no proof whatever (although it has often been asserted to be so) that they were not once capable of, and did not afford, gratification and happiness.

Perhaps indeed in this life, unhappiness may be more fully and perfectly experienced than happiness and pleasure can be, inasmuch as physical pain is more fully and clearly felt than physical pleasure; emotions allied to pleasure and joy, being of a more spiritual nature, or resulting more directly from the intellectual part of our system, than those allied to pain, which arise mainly from the medial part of our nature, and are more essentially allied to it.

The immediate object of ambition may be not only present, but future, and even posthumous reputation or glory. Thus, we desire fame and admiration, and derive the highest gratification from them, although we are not present on the occasion when they were accorded to us. The reason of this is, that it is not the mere act of witnessing this tribute of homage, or even of being able to derive direct advantage from it by the extension of our power, which causes this gratification to arise; but the testimony thus rendered to our abilities, and the proof afforded of the extent and existence of them, are what occasion in this instance, an ardent feeling of delight. Men are consequently desirous of posthumous fame—by which they cannot possibly derive any immediate benefit as regards the extension of their power,—as well as of fame while they are living. If we experience gratification from having our praises

of *Shakspeare*—"The very substance of the ambitious is merely the shadow of a dream."—*Hamlet*.

sounded in distant lands, in India, or in America, which we may never intend to visit, and with the inhabitants of which we may probably never have any immediate intercourse; why should we not be equally gratified with the applause of the people of a future age, with whom we shall not indeed be actually less acquainted? And if the contemplation of actions long ago performed, and the praises of which have long ceased to resound, still affords us pleasure; why should not the contemplation of actions which we hereafter intend to effect, be equally gratifying to our minds? It should moreover be borne in mind that most of the applause, as well as the abuse, which every man receives, is conferred upon him in his absence; and that but a very small proportion is uttered when he is actually present, although the testimony of the former may be immediately presented to him. But another, and perhaps the strongest and most direct reason why men thirst, as they sometimes do, after posthumous reputation, is the opinion, in addition to the confirmation which they will thus obtain of the existence of their abilities and power, that in a future state they may still be conscious of what is passing in this world; and may have the gratification of witnessing on a much more extended scale than they can now do, the applause and admiration which their performances continue to excite among mankind.

When the object of ambition is posthumous fame or glory, this must however be allowed to be quite independent of the hope of direct power or liberty; although, even here, the opportunity of exercising authority over the minds of others, may be a species of power, and of liberty too, which may well deserve to be coveted. Perhaps the humblest and most common order of this ambition as regards posterity, is the desire of having children who may perpetuate our name. Persons, however, whose works to remote generations engage the minds of those who come after them, may be said in a great measure to continue their life upon earth; their souls existing in these their intellectual productions, and influencing all who read and reflect upon what they have written.

7. Influence and Use of the Moral Desires.

Among the writers of a certain party upon subjects of a moral nature, it has been the custom to denounce as essentially and as necessarily pernicious in themselves, however directed and disciplined, and as leading men only to the commission of evil, every effort, and every exercise of whatever endowment

springs from our medial nature.⁷ It appears, however, as has indeed already been contended, that there is in reality, no ground whatever, either in reason or in Revelation, for such an assumption: but, on the contrary, that we have a right, and that it is our duty, to assume that whatever is implanted in us by God Himself, is given us for certain purposes, not only wise but practical; and that our aim and object should ever be to direct to their legitimate and appointed end, these several endowments, which, if so used, will be found to be not only not pernicious, but eminently beneficial and useful. Although, as pointed out in the last chapter, the medial propensities of our nature are those which on certain occasions may induce us to the commission of evil; yet, even in these cases, it is only the perversion of our endowments of this class which renders them pernicious; and thereupon we vainly and wickedly find fault with God, when we ourselves alone are to blame. If these remarks apply to the constitution of man as regards his appetites and passions, and his medial being generally; they do no less so to his moral endowments as well, more especially and above all, to his moral desires. A careful consideration of the design and capabilities of these latter endowments, cannot fail to convince us that neither avarice, nor ambition, are actually and essentially sinful of themselves, or in the exercise of them; but that their good or bad tendency depends entirely on whether we direct them aright, or neglect or pervert their due application;—whether, in fact, we use or abuse them. An inquiry, therefore, into the influence and use of the moral desires, is necessarily of the utmost importance here.

As regards ambition, this moral desire is condemned by many as bad in itself, simply because it often leads men on to actions which occasion evil; such as lying, perjury, murder, and the like.⁸ These, however, are the results, not of its proper use, but of its abuse; and it is surely unreasonable and unjust to condemn any propensity merely on account of its perversion. Moreover, in the Bible, it is not the moral desire itself which is condemned, but the wrongful application of it. Thus, as regards ambition, the Bible deals with the object of it in a manner exactly analogous to that in which it does with wealth, which is the immediate object of avarice. It does not positively prohibit

⁷ *Vide ante*, b. ii. c. i. s. 5.

⁸ *Cyprian* describes emulation to be “a rare moth of the soul, and consumption to make another man’s happiness his misery, and to torture, crucify, and execrate himself, and to eat his own heart.”—*Ser. ii. De Zelo et Livore*. These remarks, however, obviously apply rather to envy and jealousy than to ambition, which is not necessarily polluted by the admixture of those base qualities in its constitution. In the *Whole Duty of Man*, it is nevertheless asserted of ambition that it “is not only a great sin in itself, but it puts man upon many others,” p. 131.

the use, or even the enjoyment of wealth; nor does it assert that it is necessary to abuse it if you possess it: but it warns us that wealth is a great snare, and that it is very often abused. So of the objects of ambition; they are not pronounced as sinful in themselves, but we are cautioned not to be led into sin by them. The Bible indeed, teaches us to extinguish our moral desires, in the same spirit in which it tells us to cut off a right hand, and to pluck out a right eye. The meaning is, not that the use of a hand or of an eye is prohibited, but their abuse is forbidden; and that it is even better to part with them altogether, than to apply them to improper purposes. Both the moral desires alike, as they are used or abused, are beneficial or baneful. They lead us right or lead us wrong, exalt or debase us, according as they are so applied.

Such, nevertheless, are the power and influence of the moral desires, that not only the appetites, but the passions and affection also, are subjected to them. Though less intense in their influence than these medial endowments, they are more durable and permanent, and more steady in operation. It is, indeed, this very strength of the moral desires—which enables them, and urges them on, to overbear the dictates of reason, (although to a large extent dependent upon this faculty,) and also those of conscience, and to overcome all opposition; that renders them so dangerous when they possess the minds of unprincipled men.

It is, however, with regard to the objects of our desires, as it is with regard to objects viewed in perspective, that those which are nearest to us ever appear the most important; while those that are distant appear trivial, and of but little moment. The present occupies most of our concern, to the neglect of the future; although events in the latter may be of far more consequence, and much greater value.

Ambition, more perhaps than any propensity or desire, requires to be checked and balanced by the other endowments, and powers, and faculties of the soul; and according as it is so influenced and directed, will be the nature of ambition itself, and the quality of the ends to which it induces.⁹ But, above all, the conscience should be made to exercise a strict control over it; both urging it to good purposes, and deterring it from those which are evil. Ambition is a vast motive power; but without any directing influence independently annexed to it to superintend or guide its efforts.¹ For this purpose it relies

⁹ "When ambition meets with an honest mind united to great abilities, it does infinite service to the world; on the contrary, when a man thinks only of distinguishing himself, without being thus qualified for it, he becomes a very pernicious, or a very ridiculous creature."—*Spectator*, No. 570.

¹ "Who knows to what extent the rage of ambition may lead us?"—*Napoleon I.*

upon the other endowments, and qualities, and powers of the soul; infusing into them vigour of action, while they communicate to it right direction for that action.

Comparing it, I suppose, to a wheel, Horace alludes to avarice as the rust of the soul, which impedes its energies and operations, and retards its progress. If the comparison may be carried on further for the sake of metaphorical illustration; ambition might be termed the oil of the soul, which quickens and accelerates its energies and operations, and facilitates the accomplishment of great enterprises.

The world proceeds by action and reaction; and more energetically perhaps by the latter than by the former. Perpetual motion seems to be its never-failing law; and this motion onward is ever and anon diverted, first in one direction, then in the opposite one, and afterwards back again, and thus continually, so that an even course is seldom for long, if at all, directly pursued. Our troubles of each kind, which operate at once both as the stimulants to exertion, and the trials by which we are tested, are so contrived that they never cease to beset us; so that the very act of escaping from one, often proves the snare through which we fall into another. Thus, relief from poverty, leads to luxury and its consequent evils; the triumphs of ambition, to its attendant mortifications; the enjoyment of friends, to our mourning at their departure. Not unfrequently, when we feel most secure we are most in jeopardy; and are struck down at the very moment when we thought ourselves entirely safe. No terrestrial enjoyment is perfect, or even positive; but is only proportionate and comparative.

The most baneful effect of avarice, is its subjugation to the mere craving for wealth of the noblest faculties of the soul; and its enslaving in its service, and in the pursuit of merely sordid objects, those sublime powers which are adapted for the attainment of the purest, and most exalted, and even celestial pursuits and occupations.

It must indeed be acknowledged, whatever may be urged as to the occasionally beneficial influences of avarice when it is duly controlled and regulated, that there is nothing which so degrades and infects the whole soul, as the predominance of this desire;² and it seems to draw into the vortex formed by it, every other and ordinary desire, each of the emotions, and appetites, and passions, as also affection, and to

² *Cicero* says of avarice that "there is no vice more detestable."—*Offices*, b. ii. 22.

According to *Burton*, covetousness is "the pattern, image, epitome, of all melancholy; the fountain of many miseries, much discontent, care, and woe; or as *St. Austin* describes it, a madness of the soul; *Gregory*, a torture; *Chrysostome*, an insatiable drunkenness."—*Anatomy of Melancholy*, pt. i. s. 2, sub. s. 12.

paralyze the exertion of all the faculties of the mind. The acquirement of knowledge, and other intellectual pursuits, are neglected to promote its gratification. Beneath its sway, the noblest souls have sometimes been compelled to bend, and the loftiest minds have been laid prostrate.

As age increases, the love of wealth frequently waxes stronger instead of decaying; and the higher we rise in the world, the greater is our ambition to rise higher. The more we have, the more we want. No persons are so tortured by ambitious desires, as are monarchs; and misers overloaded with wealth, covet most after money.

Of all the degrading moral spectacles which man is doomed to behold, that which most touchingly reminds him of the humiliations to which his nature is liable, is the melancholy picture which is occasionally presented to us of reverend old age shorn of its glory by its subjugation to avarice. What is otherwise hallowed and must command our veneration, we here see turned into a sordid slave of wealth. Manhood in its most sublime and solemn aspect, is beheld prostrate before the idol of Mammon. The wearied pilgrim within sight of eternity, casts back a sorrowing look on the slough he has passed through. Not only the beauteous form of humanity has here decayed into a wreck, but the majestic and glorious soul itself seems reduced to a ruin.

It appears indeed, on first reflection, as a somewhat remarkable arrangement connected with the moral constitution of our nature, that in the case of beings of high intellectual faculties and aspirations, and whose destinies extend to eternity, so large a portion of their time should necessarily be occupied with the gross concerns and cares of wealth; the providing for the wants of the body, to the neglect of the demands of the soul. We are in fact literally, and even necessarily, more engaged in these matters than are the brute creation; inasmuch as, although they have no intellectual pursuits to raise them above such occupations, they have no avaricious employments to degenerate them. We may presume, however, that in our condition here in a probationary state, a considerable attention to gross and sordid avocations, is not only advantageous, but even essential, in order to prove us thoroughly, by bringing us into close contact with material objects, and material occupations. And this may be also serviceable for the complete development of our whole moral constitution, and for adapting us fully for that state where intellectual and moral objects only will engage our minds, while those which are material may for ever be lost sight of, and be abandoned. For the entire pursuit of, and for perfecting ourselves in the former, not only ample time, but all eternity, will then be allowed us.

The general effect, both as regards our moral and our mental

condition, which is occasioned by the excitements and changes, and the ceaseless alternations between joy and sorrow, resulting from the moral desires; is undoubtedly beneficial on the whole in stimulating us to exertion, and in developing many powers and energies which might otherwise for ever lie dormant. In this respect it is analogous to the effect arising from the change of the seasons upon the material world, and the alternations from heat to cold, by which the successive and ever-varying mutations in nature are produced.

These and other considerations of a corresponding character, appear to me fully to confirm the truth of the principle which I ventured to propound in the Preface; that the Bible, if fairly investigated and liberally interpreted, in reality contains the most profound and perfect system of human philosophy anywhere to be met with.

Persons of every degree, and in whatever situation or rank of life, are equally liable to be excited both by avarice and ambition; although these moral desires influence people in very different modes, according to their particular circumstances and position. The lowliest may as fully evince them in their thrifty hoardings or petty aspirations, as the highest in their accumulated wealth, or their grasp at supreme political power. According also to the particular disposition and character of any person, mental or moral, will be the course of his moral desires. Probably indeed every action of every person's life is more or less influenced, either directly or indirectly, by one or both of these desires. Actions however, as in the case of trees, bear fruit, some good and some bad, but all are sure to produce fruit in the end; although this may in each case differ as to its quality, and also as to the ripeness which it has reached before it is gathered.

The moral desires operate like magnetic forces, or the principle of gravitation, invisible and unfelt, and yet ever either attracting or repelling the progress of each object that changes its position. Avarice is generally most influential towards the decline of life, when the opportunities for the nobler objects of ambition begin to decay. Ambition, on the other hand, is ordinarily most powerful in middle age, when not only are the mental faculties the most vigorous, but the occasions for gratifying this desire are the most abundant. Men are said to be more acted upon by both the moral desires than are women; but this is probably because on the former mainly devolves both the management of property and the direction of public affairs, whereby the opportunities for the influence of these desires are peculiarly presented to them. Where circumstances have contributed to place women in the way of their control, they have been equally the slaves of these desires.

Ambition is, as it were, the hunger, and avarice is the thirst

of the soul. The one excites it to action; the other exhausts and debilitates it, and rather retards than aids it in any important enterprises.

Perhaps, if we compare together these two moral desires as regards the results which they have respectively effected, whether for good or evil; our conclusion will be that although avarice has produced but few, if any, virtues, it has led to but few of the crimes with which the pursuit of ambition has ever been charged.³ On the other hand, if the pursuit of ambition has often led to great crimes, it has nevertheless frequently been productive of great and magnanimous exploits, if not of heroic virtues also. In many respects it has a direct tendency to promote virtue, and never fails to exact due homage to it; inasmuch as those actions only which are virtuous and honourable, and deserving of our esteem and commendation, can obtain such applause and honour as it is the object of ambition to secure.⁴ Indeed, ambition constitutes as it were the mainspring, and the very life of ability. It is the source of activity and energy in the greatest minds, the real germ of the noblest actions, and the immediate cause of the grandest undertakings which have exalted human nature. Without ambition our mightiest capacities might lie torpid. And were this desire to be banished from the human soul, the constitution of man would be left like a planetary system without a sun, which rouses into vitality and vigour each latent power and endowment. Extinguish ambition, and with it the love of glory would also fade. No efforts would be made to excel by painful labour, in arts, in arms, in eloquence, poetry, philosophy, or knowledge. All stimulant to exertion, and to overcome indolence, or to brave danger,⁵ would be gone for ever. Competition, both between individuals and nations, would thenceforth cease. The enjoyment of present pleasure, instead of the desire of doing good and of gaining approbation, would alone predominate over the mind. Ambition, although it may occasionally impel us too vigorously, or too rapidly, when we submit entirely to its influence, and by which we abuse it, is

3 "The noble Brutus
Hath told you Cæsar was ambitious;
If it were so, it was a grievous fault,
And grievously hath Cæsar answer'd it."

Julius Cæsar.

⁴ Hence, *Aristotle* observes of emulation, or ambition, that "it always implies a certain sense of worthiness: men actuated by it must deem their power commensurate to the honours and advantages which they are emulous to acquire. The young and the high-minded are easily roused to emulation."—*Rhetoric*, b. ii. c. 11.

⁵ *Lord Bacon* observes that "to take a soldier without ambition is to pull off his spurs."—*Essays*, xxxvi. *Of Ambition.*

"Ambition, the soldier's virtue."—*Antony and Cleopatra.*

not on that account never to be indulged in; which would indeed imply that, because we are in danger of sometimes proceeding too fast, we should resolve to remain for ever immoveable. As reasonably might we object to the sun because it occasionally scorches, and forget its general fructifying and genial influence; as denounce, as we have seen that many do, the very existence of this noble desire, implanted in man by God himself, which of all his endowments raises him the nearest to his Maker, and proves baneful only because of its perversion. The richer too in natural gifts, either mental or moral, any person is, the greater is his consciousness of his own powers; and although, on the one hand, he will be more influenced by ambition, yet, on the other, he will be proportionably less liable to envy others. Indeed, as ambition is the characteristic of noble, so envy is the mark of ignoble minds;⁶ and arises from a perception of weakness in their own capacities, and of inability to emulate those whom they would fain excel. They are consequently fully conscious that their only chance of appearing great in the eyes of mankind, is not by any efforts to raise themselves, which are quite beyond their power, but by lowering others down to their own base level.

The pursuit of a grand object of ambition, has already been compared to climbing a steep mountain. Rocks and crags present themselves on all sides to the enterprising traveller, and perils threaten at each step. And when at last he has fairly gained the summit which few are destined to reach, it but too often happens that either the prospect which was to reward his pains, is obscured by the hazes of the damp valleys below; or another and higher mountain is found to intervene, which shuts out from his sight the enchanting view on which he had vainly hoped to gaze.

8. *Power over, and Discipline of these Desires.*

If however it is our imperative duty to direct our desires aright, it must be correspondingly important to ascertain exactly and clearly, the precise extent of the control over them which we possess, so as duly to regulate and discipline them, and to promote their proper use, and prevent their perversion.

⁶ *Aristotle*, indeed, contrasts emulation with envy, of which he says that it "is bad in itself, and proceeds from a bad source: emulation animates our exertions to merit the same advantages which others have obtained; envy inspires no such ardour, but makes the envious brood in sullen sorrow over the hated joys of their neighbours."—*Rhetoric*, s. ii. c. 11.

The moral desires, which owe so much to the aid and operation of the emotions, and appetites, and passions, as regards their vigour and energy, and also to the action of the mental powers; are nevertheless, in a corresponding measure, restrained and controlled in their exercise, by these opposite and counteracting impulses, and by the efforts of the reason.

To a certain extent indeed, avarice and ambition contribute essentially to control and moderate each other. Thus ambition, which urges a man on to attempt great exploits, leads him also to sacrifice his love of money in order to gratify this desire; as many a man has spent his fortune in the pursuit of power or of fame. On the other hand, avarice, which causes a man to delight in the possession of riches, checks him strongly in the pursuit of ambitious desires, by restraining and hindering that expenditure of wealth which is in many cases essential to secure them.

Although a great man may be largely influenced by these desires, yet he is in reality great, not because he is ruled by, but because he has the power to rule them. Although few men attain eminence without ambition, yet how many to this desire fall a prey? The moral desires are, indeed (as has already been remarked with regard to the appetites and passions), like the elements of fire and water: when allowed to overwhelm us, they spread havoc and ruin on all sides; but when duly subjected to our use, they are beneficial and serviceable.

The principles already laid down with regard to the discipline of, and giving a proper bias or direction to the dispositions, are to a large extent, if not generally, applicable to the discipline of the moral desires also; the same causes and influences conducing in each case, to a corresponding result. And these desires, like the appetites and passions, become also checked and softened, and as it were tamed, by restraint and training; like wild and unruly animals prone to wander uncontrolled, which are brought into subjection by being held captive.

Avarice and ambition, although in their constitution so nearly allied, are nevertheless developed in individuals of very different orders. As was observed in the last section, the extensive endowment with ambition, ordinarily denotes a mind of considerable capacity. Avarice is however, a plant which is produced by a much baser soil, and is mostly found in persons of ordinary ability; who are, moreover, conscious of not possessing great intellectual power, and who are therefore led to look mainly to wealth instead of to glory as the attainable object of their efforts. Where these two moral desires are co-existent in the same person, they may be, to a certain extent, useful, not only, as recently remarked, in counteracting, but

also in correcting each other ; and may aid his power over them, and enable him to discipline them more efficiently. Thus, ambition may contribute to raise the covetous man from low desires and thoughts, and to cause his avarice to direct him to higher purposes than those to which he would be otherwise wont to aspire. Avarice, on the other hand, may conduce to render cautious and prudent, the man actuated by ambition. Indeed, when avarice is seen to influence men of powerful minds, it is ordinarily made subservient to ambition ; and when ambition is developed in men of weak minds, and of but feeble powers, it is wont to be made subservient to avarice.

As the turn which both avarice and ambition take in any particular person in regard to their moral course, depends greatly on the general character, mental and moral, of the individual ; so on this will mainly depend his power over these desires, and his success in disciplining them. A virtuous person of great abilities, will be disposed to achieve the noblest ends by the purest means. In one of narrow abilities, and who is less scrupulous or virtuous, ambition may impel him to the attainment of trivial or unworthy ends, by base and discreditable means. According also to the peculiar capacities and circumstances of the individual, will be the peculiar object of his ambition ; one being impelled to obtain eminence in arts, another in science, another in politics. This fact, which has already been alluded to in the preceding section, opens a wide field for the direction and discipline of the moral desires, and affords numerous opportunities for obtaining power over them. By this means also, the influence of the reason is brought to bear, both as regards their discipline and their direction. In all these cases indeed, it will be discovered that the strength of our reason is that by which we rule our desires ; and that by the weakness of our reason it is that the desires obtain the dominion over our minds.

The power that man possesses over his moral desires, is far more extensive to direct, than to eradicate them. Ambition especially is peculiarly open both to direction and to discipline. Like a tree, some of whose branches are lopped off, this desire, if checked in one way, will shoot out in another with equal vigour, and will set before itself some new purpose of accomplishment. But here, also, a fresh opportunity is afforded for disciplining the desire, by supplying it with a proper object for its pursuit.

The moral desires also, like a tree, go on growing ; and the further they advance, the more vigorous are the shoots which they from time to time put forth. Thus the young aspirant aims only at transient distinction among his fellows. But as soon as this is attained, he is eager for fame in the world at large. And when he has gained this, so far from being satisfied, he considers what he has done only as the means of effect-

ing higher and far greater achievements. Hence it is indeed alike both with avarice and ambition. The richer we get, the more covetous we become. The higher we rise, the more lofty are our aspirations. More especially as we advance in age, the moral desires are apt to take deeper root, and acquire more vigorous frames. Youth therefore is the time when they should be both restrained and disciplined. The branches are then tender and docile, and without difficulty may be made to grow in almost any form to which they are directed. As we get older, this docility ceases; and towards the close of life, when old age has come upon us, we are rather directed by, than able to direct our moral desires. At the prospect of death, as the objects of them, both immediate and ultimate, fade away, and are discovered to be beyond our grasp; the desires themselves, having as it were lost the support by which they were sustained, fall powerless and lifeless, like the body itself when deprived of the spirit by which it was quickened and animated.

9. *How far common to Animals as well as to Man.*

An interesting and instructive topic of inquiry, calculated to elucidate many points already discussed, is afforded by the question whether animals are endowed with the moral desires in common with man, and if so, to what extent? Animals may appear, at first sight, in certain respects, and on some occasions, to be as vigorously excited by moral desires as is the case with man. In each of these instances however, it will be found on a close investigation, that it is not an actual moral desire which directs them, but, as in the corresponding case of animal propensities, that they are impelled merely by an emotion, or appetite, or passion, which forms a constituent part of a moral desire; and which medial excitement acts with more vigour, possesses more influence over their conduct, and assumes more the features of a moral desire, from the very circumstance which occasions the defect in the constitution of an endowment of this kind in their case, and prevents its complete formation—the absence of reason that might restrain these medial impulses, which are consequently allowed to exert themselves uncontrolled, and to follow unchecked their wonted career.

Among animals, who are principally under the dominion of their emotions and appetites, fear and hunger, next in succession to pain and pleasure, and irritation, appear to be the most influential, and, indeed, the ruling motives; and after these, concupiscence has most power. Among mankind, the moral desires have greater influence than either the emotions or

the appetites. Indeed, the former of these are absorbed in, so far as they contribute essentially to constitute, these desires.

The emotions of pain, pleasure, fear, pride, envy, jealousy, and several others which contribute to the constitution of a moral desire, being found existent in animals, they are by many persons supposed to be endowed with moral desires.⁷ But although having the elements in part of a moral desire, may create a resemblance to this endowment; the being deficient in certain of these elements occasions an actual incompleteness as regards its constitution. Consequently, animals are really and essentially destitute of moral desire; just as a dead body, which has many of the elements that form an animal, wanting vitality only, is on account of this one simple defect, not an animal, but a mere mass of flesh and bone.

From this it follows that we never see animals under the dominion of a moral desire, as is the case with man. All the incitements of this kind which possess them, are transient and momentary. Free as regards all the impulses of their own nature, the only tyranny they have to endure is not internal but external; not from their own endowments, but from the despotism of man.

If we examine more minutely into the constitution and operation of the moral desires, we shall find that animals are destitute of avarice, although some species of them do exhibit an inclination, and evince a habit, which may amount to an ordinary desire, of storing up articles of food to serve for future sustenance.⁸ This is however, wholly and essentially distinct from avarice; the marked characteristic of which is the proneness to possess things for which we have no direct or immediate use, and apparently with the sole object of possessing them, although other and ultimate objects in such cases excite us.

A bird abandons its nest immediately that it has no longer any use for it; man, on the contrary, never abandons what he has once seized upon, unless in exchange for some other possession. He retains everything of any value which comes within his grasp; because everything of value will bring him money, and money will bring him everything of value. Animals have no notions of barter or exchange, which appear almost essential to the exercise of avarice, and no system of mone-

⁷ "The pride and ambition of animals proceed from their natural courage; that is, from their sense of their strength, agility," &c.—*Buffon, Natural History; On the Nature of Animals.*

⁸ *Mr. Wood*, in his work already referred to, quotes from another writer, who remarks with respect to certain birds while feeding, that "the males of one and the same kind endeavour to grasp all the supplies for themselves, unmindful of the wants of others." This, however, constitutes rather greediness than avarice.

tary commerce.⁹ Avarice may, nevertheless, be quite independent of money, and its object may be jewels or land, equally with money. With animals, moreover, riches are unable to bring enjoyment, or any other good, independent of themselves, which might induce a desire for them, and so originate avarice. And perhaps man in a state of nature, or in a barbarous condition, may exist for a time as free from avarice as are animals, and for the same reason. But so happy a condition could not, I fear, last long.

Nor is there any moral desire, such as that of ambition, discoverable in the operations of animal nature, although feelings of emulation very much resembling it, are exhibited by animals;¹ and they are excited by a desire of rivalry, which is, however, but a very imperfect kind of ambition, corresponding probably with that, as instinct does with intelligence.² One mode, in which it has already been observed that ambition sometimes develops itself, in the desire to have a progeny, by which our own existence may, as it were, be continued after our death, appears to be as strongly, and as directly evinced in certain animals as it is in man; although, probably, in the two cases, entirely different motives or stimulants operate to produce the propensity. They are, nevertheless, closely analogous excitements.

Although animals have not, properly and strictly speaking, any moral constitution, inasmuch as they are wholly wanting in intellectual discernment between right and wrong, and are not guided in their actions by moral precepts, and, consequently, are incapable of the exalted moral endowments possessed by man; nevertheless, of certain endowments which belong to this part of our nature, as with certain of the ordinary desires, animals are fully as capable of being endowed, and of possessing them extensively, as is the case with man. The desire of liberty especially, is as deeply implanted, and as vigorously excited, in animals as it is in ourselves. Indeed, as regards ordinary desires in general, animals may probably be endowed with them, inasmuch as they each possess the requisite medial emotions and appetites and passions to excite them whenever objects of such desires are presented before them.

⁹ According to *Mr. Darwin*, however, animals do possess something approaching to an idea of property.—*Descent of Man*, vol. i. p. 52.

¹ *Mr. Wood* has not in the work to which I have already adverted, expressed any decided opinion as to whether animals are actuated by ambition. But pride, self-esteem, jealousy, and also emulation, he considers to be prominent characteristics in certain species.—Vol. ii. pp. 72, 75, 76, 77, 85.

² *Mr. Darwin* remarks with regards to birds, that "it is certain there is an intense degree of rivalry between the males in their singing."—*Descent of Man*, and *Selection in relation to Sex*, vol. ii. p. 53.

This emulation in animals appears to be also obvious in the case of horses running against each other.

We observe, moreover, in the case of animals, how directly appetite, and the desire for satiety, and to provide food, urge them on in one direction, and repel them in another, so as, on the whole, to exercise the entire control over their conduct. Their economy in this respect is but analogous to, or reflective of that of man, who is equally governed by his appetites. But, while in the case of animals, appetite is generally the immediate and direct impelling principle, in the case of man it is frequently only the ultimate and indirect; riches, which are in reality desired solely because they enable him to satiate his appetites, being the immediate and direct object of his wishes and his aim.

It cannot, however, be doubted, that this defect, or rather incompleteness in the nature of animals, if so without presumption we may venture to term it, arising from the absence of moral desire, contributes not unessentially, and in no small degree, to the large share of happiness which, in a state of nature at any rate, they enjoy.³ By this economy in their constitution, although deprived of all the delights of mental exercise, they are at the same time both free from the anxieties which are inseparable from wealth, and the tortures which ambition ever brings in its train. Indeed, it cannot be denied, notwithstanding the value in many respects of these moral desires in the constitution of our moral nature, which would without them be wholly imperfect,—being possibly even required to prepare us for eternity, where alone, as I have already observed, the highest objects of both the moral desires can be attained, and the complete attainment of which constitutes the essence of the felicity of that condition;—that to the exercise of them, even without abusing or perverting them, must be attributed at least a very large share of that vast sum of misery and of crime which appears to be the inseparable lot upon earth of man.⁴ Severe as are the pains which men inflict on one another by way of punishment, the pains which each man⁵ inflicts on himself in the pursuit of pleasure, which is essentially the ultimate resulting end of every ambitious desire, are far more severe. The greatest enemy to his own enjoyment which man has to fear, is man. The most inveterate foe to his real happiness which each individual possesses, is himself; and through his abuse—which must be admitted after all to be his ordinary application of them—of his own innate insatiable desires.

³ Indeed, if *Buffon* be correct, "Animals have but one mode of enjoying pleasure: the satisfying their appetite by the exercise of their sensations."—*Nat. Hist.; Nature of Animals*.

⁴ According to *Plutarch*, of all animals, man is the most miserable.—*Morals*.

⁵ "There is scarce a man living who is not actuated by ambition."—*Spectator*, No. 570.

CHAPTER III.

THE CONSCIENCE.

1. *Supremacy of Conscience in the Moral Constitution of Man.*

OF the several endowments belonging to the moral constitution of man, so varying in their nature, and so different in their modes of operation, the most exalted, and the most important by far, is that of Conscience,¹ which consequently ranks as the

¹ It is, doubtless, remarkable that so little—if any—direct reference should have been made to what we understand by the word “conscience,” as a distinct, independent, moral endowment of itself, by the leading ancient writers on subjects of this nature; either by Aristotle, Plato, or even Cicero, which they probably deemed to be the mere exercise of the reason on moral topics. Nor do I find mention of it in “England’s Morals of the Ancients.” It has, however, been suggested to me that by the “demon” of Socrates may have been meant conscience; and that there is an allusion to conscience by *Euripides* in the *Orestes*, 386.

The Rev. Dr. Vaughan, the able and learned Master of the Temple, and late Head Master of Harrow, who has kindly allowed me to consult him on this point, remarks that “the references to conscience in ancient heathen writers, must be looked for rather in the *sense* than in the *form*. They had *paraphrases* for conscience in expressions like ‘*conscia mens*,’ &c. And even where they did not mention the *faculty*, they by implication recognized its workings.* In the form, at all events, of *retrospect* of actions, it would be impossible to describe the action of conscience in stronger or more terrible terms than we find (especially) in Juvenal; and if the workings of *remorse* are thus depicted in the ‘*animus tortor*,’ and the like, how can we refuse to suppose that there was also a *premonition* of wrong, and a *monitor forbidding*?

“Wetstein’s Greek Testament, in his note upon Rom. ii. 15, might be consulted with advantage in reference to this subject.”

Mr. G. M. Tagore has favoured me with the following interesting note as to the opinion of the Hindoos on the subject of conscience:—

“The Hindoos have no word for conscience. Such an expression as ‘it is against my conscience’ cannot be translated either into Sanscrit or into Bengali. The Hindoos do maintain the existence of a moral faculty by which to discriminate right from wrong actions, but under the guidance of a revealed law inaugurated by their legislators. Custom also has considerable influence in aiding the development of this faculty; for instance, the invariable maxim with the Hindoos is, ‘What our fathers and forefathers have done, the same must we abide by.’

“Conscience as the vicergerent of God in the human soul, is a pure upgrowth of Christianity, and there is nothing analogous in the philosophy or religion of the Hindoos.”

* *Vide post*, p. 148, note 7.

supreme among them. Not only, indeed, is conscience supreme among the moral endowments, but it is mainly from his possession of conscience, that man himself holds the supremacy among created terrestrial beings. Superior intelligences only among other beings, are endowed with conscience in common with man. And as man is the highest of terrestrial beings through conscience, he is probably the lowest of intelligent beings with conscience.

Perhaps, indeed, a question might be raised whether intelligent beings of a nature superior to that of man, and more especially the Deity Himself, can be said to be strictly endowed with conscience, or with any capacity correspondent therewith. All intelligent beings inferior and subject to the Deity, who possess both reasoning power and emotional endowment, must undoubtedly possess conscience also. In the case, however, of the Deity, perfection of reason may be inferred to supply the place of conscience, or rather to suffice for all that conscience could perform. But being subject, and owing allegiance to no one, the Deity could not be guilty of any breach of rule to which conscience must necessarily have reference; and therefore, in His case, it does not appear how conscience can exist. Nor could any emotion be excited in Him in reference to a transgression, so as to constitute a qualm of conscience. God as regards His conduct, however, exhibits the very perfection of conscience, never erring, nor inclining to err. He alone is endowed with the absolute and complete perception of good; and towards that, and that only, He ever tends. Knowing fully what is right, and inclining entirely to what is virtuous, conscience in Him is not a mere director, but an immediate spontaneous impulse.

The nature of this endowment has been a subject of controversy among various writers upon man and upon morals, its office being of the utmost consequence in the regulation of human conduct. But though all who have treated upon this topic appear to admit not only the existence, but the influence in our moral operations, of conscience; yet nearly all of them differ as to its essential qualities and constitution.²

The particular moral disposition and character of the indi-

² Some writers have contended that man possesses a distinct moral faculty relating exclusively to moral subjects; which is denominated "the moral principle or conscience;" and which "in every mind in a state of moral health is the supreme and regulating principle, preserving among the moving powers a certain harmony to each other, and to the principles of moral rectitude."—*Abercrombie on the Moral Feelings*, p. 22.

Bishop Butler also speaks of the conscience as "a faculty" natural to man.—*Sermons, Works*, vol. ii. p. 31.

Reid too, styles the conscience "an original power or faculty."—*On the Active Powers*, Essay iii. pt. iii. c. vi.

vidual, serve to denote his moral rank and quality. The moral desires serve to stimulate him to certain actions, good or bad, according as a direction is given to his inclinations. But the conscience serves to guide him in the application and conduct of each of these endowments, and to direct him in the course of every moral action; and alone dictates to him what is right to be done. Conscience, when it obtains its legitimate sway, brings into subjugation even the moral desires, if opposed to them; and by its influence the moral disposition and character become also modified. All the medial endowments are moreover more or less swayed, and even controlled by conscience.³ Consequently, both in power and in influence, the conscience will be found to exceed all the other endowments, either medial, mental, or moral; and its impulses to prevail over the most energetic efforts of the other agents in the economy of our constitution, and indeed of all of them combined. And while the several endowments referred to respectively tend to good, if rightly directed; conscience ever tends to good, where not perverted, but allowed to exert its natural sway. Moreover, the other endowments tend to good in those cases where, and according and so far as, they are each respectively directed by the dictates of conscience.

The existence of the various counteracting influences already alluded to, arising from the rivalry between the medial, moral, and mental endowments, contributes greatly and essentially, not only to the free exercise of the conscience, but also to the establishment of its supremacy. Nevertheless, it is to be observed that the conscience is of all the moral endowments, that which is the least in subjection to the medial impulses. Indeed, they in most cases rather aid than impede its operations, and add to, instead of diverting the strength of the current that it creates. Here, too, the mental effort, so far from being restrained by other influences, itself ever takes the lead in the direction of their operation. And while the dispositions and desires influence us according to the circumstances by which we are surrounded, and which operate upon us; conscience ever peremptorily impels us with authority, and unhesitatingly proclaims to us the course that we should pursue.⁴ While they merely entreat, it alone commands us to obey. Hence the conscience may be said to resemble in the constitution of our nature, a deliberative council or judicial assembly

³ *Dr. Chalmers* observes that "conscience is the rightful sovereign in man; and if any other, in the character of a ruling passion, be the actual sovereign, it is a usurper."—*Works*, vol. i. p. 311.

⁴ "I find something within me that directs me to such actions, contrary to my sensitive appetite; there must be something above me therefore, that puts this principle into man's nature."—*Charnocke on the Attributes*, p. 24.

in the constitution of a state, to which recourse is constantly had for advice and direction upon every question of doubt and importance, and without whose authority and sanction no action of conscience is ever undertaken. The supremacy of conscience is moreover analogous to the legitimate sway of a constitutional sovereign, the due exercise and proper direction of which are essential to the right ordering of the affairs of the state, and which should ever be devoted to promote the well-being of the whole community. When the dictates of conscience are disregarded, anarchy and misrule are the sure consequences, corresponding with the result of neglecting to obey the constituted authority in a civil community.

Conscience, as it is especially given to us to direct us in our course of conduct through life, may also be compared to a pilot who stands at the helm of a bark, directing its onward career across the mighty ocean, and whose action is essential to protect it against the dangers by which it is ever beset.

This supremacy of conscience extends however, only to the moral constitution of man, and relates solely to the other moral endowments. And it is only with regard to actions of a moral nature, that the offices of conscience are called into requisition, as these are matters which immediately and directly affect us; and which, moreover, concern not merely our material well-being, but our active conduct and duty, and at once influence the well-being and destiny of the soul, from whence originates this moral endowment. The operations of conscience, therefore, concern all moral actions, and those only, but do not extend to actions of a general nature having no relation to moral duty. Nor does the supremacy of conscience interfere with the mental operations, inasmuch as there are many faculties and capacities whose efforts range more extensively than do those of conscience, and which achieve undertakings that are wholly out of its province, and beyond its sphere.

The laws, moreover, with which conscience has to deal, and which it is employed in administering, are universal as regards our moral actions, and as regards their moral application, and extend to the regulation and discipline of every operation of this kind. And indeed, as questions of duty are the highest and the most important with which we have to do, and as it is with these, and with these alone, that conscience, and conscience only, is exclusively concerned, and in which it, and it alone, serves ever and perfectly to guide us; the importance of its office, and the supremacy of its position, must be at once apparent.

There is, moreover, attached to the offices and duties in which conscience directs us, a solemnity and a dignity characteristic of those actions which have relation to the Divine Being; as conscience is also that endowment of our nature which

serves to bring us into the closest connexion, and most immediate relation with Him.⁵ Conscience being the distinguishing characteristic of intelligent immortal beings, and of those only, it is that endowment through which our duty as regards our existence in a future state is discerned by us; and it is by the due observance of its dictates that we hope to attain to that condition, in common with those other beings, who with us partake of this moral endowment; and without which, even beings of that high order could not be perfectly adapted for that state.

Hence conscience, of all the moral, or even of the mental endowments, is doubtless that which is most entitled to the appellation of Divine, as it is that alone which directly leads us to the performance of acts which are wholly and solely consonant to the will of the Divine Being, whose moral essence is of that purity the attainment of which is the end of all the efforts of conscience. And as conscience is supreme among the moral endowments, so there is nothing that so contributes to the real moral dignity and supremacy of a man among his fellows, as his superior conscientiousness.

2. Reason the leading element in the constitution of Conscience.

As conscience is, of all the moral endowments, the most exalted and the most important; so is it also that among them which is the most influenced by, and the most intimately connected with, that part of our constitution which is the highest and noblest, our mental nature. The reason is the mental faculty which aids here, and is the leading element or ingredient in the constitution of conscience, performing its operations, and assisting in its proceedings, in the manner I shall now endeavour to point out.

While all subjects about which the mind is occupied, more or less call forth the exercise of the reason, those which have immediate relation to matters of active conduct, particularly as regards their moral rectitude, do so especially; and it is in the regulation of these concerns that the authority of the reason is supreme.⁶ The

⁵ Dr. Carpenter remarks that "the conscience of the religious man may be said to be the *resultant* of the combination of his moral sense, with the idea of duty which arises out of his sense of relation to the Deity."—*Principles of Mental Physiology*, p. 249.

⁶ "The judgment passed on moral actions by the understanding, as it is supposed conscious of a law, and therefore accountable to the law-giver, is commonly called conscience."—*Puffendorf of the Law of Nature and Nations*, b. i. c. iii.

"Conscience is very frequently taken for the very judgment we pass on the morality of actions; a judgment which is the result of perfect reasoning, or the consequence we infer from two express or tacit premises."—*Burlamaqui's Principles of Natural Law*, pt. ii. c. ix. s. 2.

medial endowments and excitements, in common with the mental powers, each exert their influence in directing our opinions, and in forming our tastes and inclinations; but the ultimate determination of the issue of each matter of practical action, is peculiarly the province of reason: and conscience is, in fact, derivable from such exercise, although not from that alone. Moreover, in every question concerning an act of moral duty, the reason ever constitutes the immediate referee. In all matters of conduct, we are at once compelled to resort to the reason, inasmuch as we have in such a case to choose between two or more courses of action; and the operations of reason, as I shall hereafter show,⁷ consist mainly, and indeed essentially, in the comparison one with another of two or more ideas, and drawing a conclusion therefrom. Each of the capacities of the faculty of reason is exerted when conscience is employed, according to the particular nature of the subject to be determined upon; although most frequently that capacity which is ordinarily denominated common sense, is the one which is specially resorted to. It is not, however, necessary that the matter to be decided by conscience should be one in which some doubt or uncertainty is involved as to the course we should pursue. On the contrary, the plainer is the course, the more forcible is the impulse of conscience; while at the same time, doubt, and uncertainty, and obscurity here, do not preclude its operation. In each question of doubt, the mind naturally at once appeals to the reason to solve the difficulty, and looks to it for counsel and direction.

In the constitution of conscience, the reason, as the leading element, ever assumes the supremacy, and is the active and moving principle; and until its determination is made, no other effort of this endowment is called forth or excited. The reason it is that pronounces the decision upon which the other parts of our nature, as it were, manifest their inclinations.⁸

So fully adapted in all respects indeed for this purpose, is the reasoning faculty, that it has led many persons to doubt whether there were not some principle or impulse immediately implanted in the mind, beyond and superior to that of the reason, to serve as a monitor to guide us, which has been denominated the conscience; and which irresistibly and unerringly prompts us as to the course that is correct for us to pursue in all cases where an act of moral duty has to be decided upon. With regard, however, to this asserted moral

⁷ *Vide post*, b. iii. c. iii. s. 8.

⁸ According to *Dr. Abercrombie*, the important purposes which conscience fulfils are accomplished "by a combined operation of conscience and reason."—*On the Moral Feelings*, pt. iii. He here therefore considers the reason and the conscience to be two distinct and independent powers.

monitor implanted in our minds, and directing our conduct upon all occasions (such as the conscience is supposed to be), it must be observed that, although we might find such an aid of essential service, and highly useful to us in directing us aright; yet that as regards the conscience, it appears to operate in an entirely contrary way at different times, and, occasionally leads persons as fully and constantly into error, as it serves at other times to guide them in the light of truth: that the barbarous savages of certain countries are as fully impelled by the dictates of conscience to the perpetration of the most appalling superstitions and enormities, as the Christian is to the exercise of the pure rites of his holy and benign religion. We may also refer to the accounts of human sacrifices which have been carried on in several nations, in confirmation of this opinion. Yet these people, in all the ordinary duties and relations of life, are found to be strictly moral—in other words, entirely obeying the dictates of conscience. Therefore, it cannot be supposed that they are destitute of what may be termed the moral sense, or conscience; but we must believe that in some cases only they are rightly directed by it.

Moreover, the inhabitants of certain countries, as those of Lapland and Tartary, were formerly utterly wanting in the feeling of decency and natural modesty, and were even gratified by allowing their wives and daughters to receive promiscuously the embraces of strangers.⁹ Yet if there is one feeling which, more than any other, seems to be innate, and to be dictated by nature, it is surely that of the duty of chastity. If therefore, there be such a moral monitor within us as conscience is contended to be, it is one which is efficient in some minds, or in some circumstances only, and not in others; which it is impossible to suppose would be the case if it was a being whose directions were communicated to us independent of our own mental operations. But the exercise of the reason is both sufficient to guide us when we cultivate it aright, while it is liable to be perverted by error or superstition; and there is, therefore, no ground to conclude that the conscience is an independent, innate faculty, such as has been imagined.¹

It may, however, be contended against conscience consisting

⁹ "Among the natives of Otaheite, a promiscuous intercourse was carried on between those of different sexes; and the children of this intercourse were generally destroyed at their birth."—*Cook's Voyages*, vol. i. p. 96.

¹ Nevertheless, it was contended by *Dr. Whewell*, that "the oft-repeated argument against the existence of a moral faculty, drawn from vile practices and monstrous opinions of savage or corrupted man, is of no more weight than it would be to urge that because rude and barbarous tribes do not know, or do not assent to, the complex and recondite truths which we here teach concerning figure and number—that therefore the human mind contains no faculty by which such doctrines can be independently known."—*Foundation of Morals*, p. 42.

in the mere exercise of reason, or rather originating from this, instead of being an unerring irresistible impulse, such as has been supposed, that this is too unimportant, and too trivial a mode to account for the existence of so exalted a faculty, and one which is of immense importance to us in the discharge of our duties; and that we should never on such momentous occasions be left to the mere guidance of our reason, which is constantly liable to be deceived. Here, however, we may reply that it is an important part of our duty to exercise fairly and discriminatingly our reasoning faculty; and that the obligation to do so is in the strongest manner evinced by the judgments recorded in Holy Writ against those who refused to receive Divine testimony, when their reason told them it was supported by conclusive evidence.

The reasoning faculty, moreover, all will admit, is liable to be perverted by abuse. But so is the endowment which is termed conscience. A deadened conscience is justly regarded as a punishment for perverting it. Precisely so is it with regard to the reason, which is also liable to be warped by abuse. Among children, in whom this faculty is least likely to be affected by prejudice, we find that in such matters as are within the sphere of their reason, especially on moral points, their judgment is ordinarily and singularly correct. Children, we also observe, are peculiarly subject to the dictates of conscience.

But it will be contended that the mind by conscience is impelled at once, and the conviction of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of any action instantaneously, and without the slow and complicated process of reasoning, is forced upon it; and that therefore the reason here is not the director of the mind. On the other hand, if we examine narrowly into the operations of our minds, we shall be convinced that it is no proof that reason is not exerted in any case, that we do not feel its efforts within us, or that we are impelled too quickly for this operation to be performed;² inasmuch as, in many of the various and sudden motions which our bodies make, they are instantaneously directed in the same manner by the reason.

The exercise of our reasoning power, as I shall endeavour to demonstrate in a subsequent chapter, is all-sufficient for our guidance both in our moral and religious duties, and in the multifarious actions and pursuits which we may be called upon through life to fulfil.³ But what is denominated the conscience has been shown not to be infallible; consequently, the reason is equal to it as a monitor, even supposing the former to exist

² *Vide post*, b. iii. c. vi. s. 9.

³ *Ibid.* c. iii. ss. 6, 9.

as an independent principle, which appears however to be contrary to all probability. Nor does it seem likely, or would it be for the good of man, or apparently more consonant with the wisdom and justice of God, that any director beyond this of the reason, should exist to guide us in our moral course; but it appears to me more consistent with our present situation in a probationary state, to suppose that an intelligent monitor like the reason only, whose advice could be obtained alone by a fair inquiry of it, than that one like what the conscience is supposed to be, which would be ever intruding its dictates upon us, should be provided by our All-wise and All-beneficent Creator, to regulate our conduct; especially when such an independent moral monitor would in some cases lead us entirely into error, and be liable in all cases to be perverted or deadened by abuse.

One particular cause why conscience is so efficient and so powerful in directing us aright, arises from the thorough sifting and reiterated examination of each doubtful question of conduct which it ensures, by keeping the subject so long before us, through the anxiety that it occasions, and by which every point of it becomes debated; so that if any matter of moment escapes our examination on the first view of it, or fails to be correctly apprehended, it is almost certain to be set right on a subsequent survey. A series of appeals from one decision to another is thus afforded, and the evidence is carefully scrutinized on each argument, whereby at last the real truth is discovered.

Reason and experience are indeed the surest and safest, if not the sole guides to man, not only in moral, but in general conduct. Yet even in dealing with experience, reference to reason is ever required; and indeed, without the employment of reason, experience could be but of little avail.

Reason in its operations however, always refers to the existence of some definite rule of conduct by which it is guided. But this reference by reason to a rule of conduct, implies also necessarily a giver of that rule, and by consequence also, a superior ruler to whom we owe allegiance; as without such ruler, there can be no authority either to prescribe, or to enforce obedience to a rule. That ruler, in the case of man, is the Supreme Being, to the existence and authority of whom conscience therefore appears tacitly ever to bear testimony.

As conscience is so largely constituted of the faculty of reason, it may also be inferred, and indeed observation renders it obvious, that according to the peculiar characteristic of this faculty in each particular individual, will be also the particular character of his conscience. Thus, corresponding with the various endowments and developments of reason in the

manner hereafter pointed out,⁴ the conscience of some persons is peculiarly susceptible of excitement on ordinary matters of practical import; of others on subtle questions of morality; of others on grand and important subjects only.

Immediately connected with the reference to the reason of each question in which moral conduct is concerned; is the consideration of the precise standard of moral right and wrong which every individual establishes in his own mind, and in which respect different individuals widely differ one from another.⁵ The efficient causes of variety in the adjustment of this standard, originate not only in the reason, or in mental endowment, but equally so in the medial endowments and inclinations; and perhaps more than all in the education which the individual has received, and the circumstances in which he is placed. Thus, considerations of duty which would weightily affect one man, by another are completely disregarded; although this same person might be much moved by other considerations, which the former would deem as but trivial. According however to the nature and precision of this standard of right and wrong, the determination by the reason of any person upon each question of moral duty, must be very largely dependent.⁶

The man of high rectitude and honourable dealing, is he who, in addition to his being very perfectly endowed as regards his reasoning faculty, which guides him steadily and unerringly in the right course when dealing with any matter where duty is involved, is also largely endowed with those particular, medial emotions and qualities which urge on the Will to confirm, and strenuously to act upon, whatever the reason may determine to be right. But the man of high conscientious feeling also owes this character entirely to his possession of endowments of this nature. The two may therefore be considered as very nearly, if not entirely identical.

3. *Medial Excitement attendant on its Exercise.*

But, although the reason appears to be the chief and leading element in the constitution and direction of the conscience, experience may be appealed to to prove that it is

⁴ *Vide post*, b. iii. c. iii. ss. 5, 7, 9.

⁵ *Dr. Abercrombie*, however, considers that conscience conveys conviction to the mind of what is morally right or wrong in regard to conduct "without reference to any other standard of duty."—*On the Moral Feelings*, pt. iii.

On the other hand, *Dr. Carpenter* holds that owing to a difference in race, education, and habits, "the moral standards of no two men shall be precisely alike; while the moral standards of men brought up entirely under different circumstances, shall be of the most opposite nature."—*Principles of Mental Physiology*, p. 243.

⁶ *Vide ante*, b. ii. c. i. s. 8. *Post*, b. iii. c. iii. s. 9.

not the only element or agent here; and that in each case, where a question of moral duty has to be determined upon, the decision is accompanied by a feeling or emotion of the soul, too vivid and too powerful either to pass unheeded or to be neglected.⁷ The excitement of this emotion attendant on the decision of the reason appertaining to matters of conscience, forms, as it were, the touchstone of its operations, the test that an action of conscience has really been achieved. This emotion so accompanying the exercise of the reason concerning a moral action, consists in a feeling of pain, or pleasure, remorse or satisfaction; according as it condemns or approves of such action. That which causes the emotion attendant on a decision of the reason to arise, is the circumstance of a decided determination of this faculty respecting some active duty having been made, and the conclusion immediately drawn therefrom, that we are morally obliged to exert ourselves to carry out the decision which the reason has effected, and that we shall be involved in some measure of guilt in case we neglect to do so; the fear of which constitutes the emotion, or qualm of conscience, alluded to.

Conscience appears indeed ever to have a bias towards fear or pain, being always excited in that direction where danger is expected to arise; like a careful pilot, who keeps a sharp and constant watch towards the shoals and billows, while he is comparatively inert in the deep still waters where he may sail in safety. On the other hand, the conviction of having taken every requisite precaution against danger, creates in its turn, a firm consciousness of security. Hence these emotions when thus excited, have been mistaken for supernatural or divine impulses. Nevertheless, every effort of the reason, and every excitement of an emotion, is not conscience; although all conscience consists, in part, in an effort of the reason, and, in part, in the excitement of an emotion. Conscience however, is exercised through the operation of the reason merely about some moral action, which we are impelled to perform, the consideration of which serves to excite in us an emotion of the nature described.

The emotion so excited, rather immediately succeeds than accompanies the decision of the reason, referred to in the last section: but this it does so closely as to become completely incorporated or blended with it; and the two actions, although different in their kind, and proceeding from a different part

⁷ While some writers have considered conscience to be a faculty of the mind, others have thought that it is only an emotion. Thus, *Dr. Henry More* defines conscience to be "a fear and confusion of mind arising from the presage of some mischief that may befall a man beside the ordinary course of nature, or the usual occurrences of affairs, because he has done thus or thus."—*Works*, b. i. c. x.

of our constitution, are ordinarily mistaken for one single operation. And as this emotion is stimulated by the action of the reason, so by this emotion in its turn, is the reason also stimulated. By the joint operation of the two, is generated that intense moral irritation, if we may so term it, as distinct from the sudden and transient impulse excited, in which consists what is ordinarily called the sting, or qualm, of conscience.⁸

These two operations of the mental and medial part of our nature, above described, consisting in the concurrence of the dictates of reason with the emotions of the soul, and which together constitute the operation of conscience, might be well compared to the lightning and the thunder in the natural world; both of which, although they appear to take place at different moments, are in reality but each parts of one single act. Thus, the reason, with all the vividity and force of lightning, instantaneously flashes forth its decision, and is followed by the deep-felt murmur of emotion, which is the voice of conscience; and which, although less swift in its progress, is sure ere long to follow, to make itself heard, and to strike terror into the soul by the deep and solemn notes in which it utters its denunciations.

As in the physical frame we find that any, even the least possible disarrangement, or disorder of, or injury to the system is, in each case, accompanied by corresponding physical uneasiness, or pain, which serves to afford sure and infallible warning of the evil that is in progress, and which feeling is never, in any case experienced, except where there exists to some extent at least, the disorganization alluded to; so in our moral constitution do we also find in a corresponding manner, that each false step or wrong action in our conduct, is ever accompanied by remorse, which affords us immediate notice of our error: so finely, and so perfectly, and upon so nice a balance, are both our material and our mental and moral systems, ordered and adjusted.

Although various different emotions are excited during the operation of conscience, yet those only of pain and pleasure are wont to take the lead, and are what mainly impel us in the determination of the course to be pursued. Nevertheless, among the most common attendants upon the exercise of conscience, are the complex emotions of aversion, apprehension, contempt, shame, and hope. The simple emotions which accompany, or are blended with, and form part of the operation of conscience, act in a double manner, corresponding

⁸ "Conscience is the regulating power, which, acting upon the desires and affections, as reason does upon a series of facts, preserves among them harmony and order."—*Abercrombie on the Moral Feelings*, pt. iii. p. 107.

with the mode in which the moral desires both impel us towards, and repel us from particular objects. Thus, the emotion accompanying conscience is one of a pleasurable character, in an approving, and of a displeasurable character, in a disapproving act, whereby a stimulation is afforded to all its operations.

If we take a survey of the ordinary course of conduct connected with the operation of conscience, we shall find that whenever a person is beset by any temptation to wander from the path of virtue or rectitude in regard to his proceedings, he is excited by the two following emotions, and their attendant impulses, which urge him in opposite directions. 1. The pain arising from a certain want, which may be apparently relieved by the proposed deviation from the correct line of duty that would incur a violation of conscience. 2. The emotion of pain or remorse which such a violation of conscience would occasion. Probably in most persons, the pang of the first kind will be much about the same, both as regards its quality and extent; making the necessary allowance for the different degrees in which different persons may stand in need of the required object. The pang of the second kind will differ extensively in different individuals, according to their medial, moral, and mental constitution. In proportion, pretty exactly to the power of this latter emotion,—which is, to some extent, dependent on the reason, that acts upon, and contributes to excite it,—and as it is enabled to weigh against the opposite contending feelings,—will be the relative strength of the conscience in such a person, and the force of his resolution to adhere to the strict line of moral rectitude. When however the emotion attendant upon conscience is feeble, or but lightly felt, it is easily counterbalanced by the one opposed to it; while, on the other hand, the more energetic and decisive it is, the less liable is it to be so counteracted.

Occasionally indeed, when the conduct has not been altogether in exact accordance with what might be desired, although strictly and morally correct, a mere feeling of shame is excited; which closely resembles the operation of conscience, just as an ordinary resembles a moral desire. This result is caused by the consciousness, not indeed of having done wrong, but of having failed to do all that might be expected, owing, perhaps, to our inability or deficiency in some particular respect. The emotion produced here is occasioned by the reflection, not that we have acted improperly, but that we have exposed ourselves to contempt. The feeling of shame very often, perhaps indeed generally, though by no means always, accompanies the violation of conscience. Self-satisfaction is the feeling opposite to it, and is often excited by acts which do not necessarily approve themselves to the conscience; although

this emotion is very frequently attendant upon, or follows, the expression of approval by the conscience.

Diffidence also, in some respects, resembles the operation of conscience, as there is here the determination by the reason, and an accompanying emotion. Shame, and self-satisfaction, and diffidence, differ however alike mainly and especially from conscience, in that they relate not to a moral action, but to mental ability. They are both caused, not by our consciousness of having done wrong, but by our opinion of our inability to act efficiently.

It is here especially to be noted that although the conscience appeals to, and is immediately connected with the emotions, it does not seem to have any direct relation whatever to either the appetites, passions, or affection. In the case of any individual however, a peculiar liability to be excited by fear, especially of a moral kind, or by nervous susceptibility to a large extent, may occasion also a peculiar susceptibility as regards his conscience, so far as the emotion of which it is constituted is concerned. And on this account it may be contended that women are more strictly conscientious than men. In such a case however, the excitement of the emotion is very apt to be mistaken for a qualm of conscience; but where the emotion only, quite independent of conscience, is all that was in reality excited. It is, indeed, alone when the emotion is acted upon through the reason, that a qualm of conscience is produced. But we often experience the emotion, and erroneously attribute to the reason what directly originated in the emotion only. The relative perfection however, of the emotion which acts upon, and stimulates the conscience, appears to correspond with that of the emotions generally, and also of the senses from which they spring. Thus, in the case of the sense of feeling in its most perfect and healthful condition, it is not so sensitive as to be disturbed by every impression, nor yet so dull that ordinary impulses do not excite it. When either of these extremes occur, disease must be considered as the cause.

Allusion has been made to the emotion of irritation,⁹ and it has been shown that it is mental as well as medial in its nature. Conscience appears, as already stated, to be peculiarly dependent on the existence of this emotion in its mental development: as not only are the excitements or stings of conscience closely allied to, and entirely of the nature of those of irritation; but, as in the case of all emotions of an irritable quality, they are endowed with that insatiable and irresistible desire for satisfaction which so peculiarly characterizes the operations of conscience. And as in the case of bodily

⁹ *Vide ante*, b. i. c. ii. s. 3.

irritation, we are most powerfully urged to appease the emotion, and the endurance of direct and severe pain is not only encountered, but resorted to in preference to this excitement; so with regard to the irritation which ensues from, or is produced by a disturbed conscience, mental pain to a very great extent, is preferred to this emotion, and we hesitate not to incur the sharpest inflictions of it in order to appease the stings of conscience.

Where the Holy Scriptures speak of our "heart" condemning us,¹ they mean those emotions within us which act directly upon the conscience. Occasionally indeed, they allude to the mind as being the conscience; thus fully confirming my theory that it is the reason acted upon by an emotion, which serves to constitute this endowment.

As the pressure of want, and the necessity of self-preservation, compel men to apply vigorously to their own resources; so the pangs of the emotion accompanying conscience, stimulate a person to exercise his reason with the utmost vigour, in order to probe to the bottom the wound that has been inflicted, and thus ascertain alike the cause and the cure. Both parts of conscience are, however, useful and serviceable to us as regards our course of action. Thus, the rational part points out clearly the path that we ought to pursue, while the emotive part urges us along in that path, and prevents us from wandering into any other. The due regulation of the emotions, and the correct cultivation of the reason, are what mainly conduce to the proper operation of the conscience, whatever be the medial endowment of the individual. Of our capacity to promote this end, I have treated in a separate section of this chapter.²

It might however, be urged that in many cases we feel within us a pang, or an emotion of a painful nature, such as that which conscience excites, where the reasoning faculty has pronounced that our conduct was correct; consequently that in these instances we find the conscience and the reason directly at issue with each other. In reply to this statement, I would however observe that it may happen where the opinion of the reason has been pronounced in the most decisive manner with regard to a particular subject or action, sufficient doubt will still exist in the mind to cause considerable fear, and thereby excite this emotion. As in the case of one who had fully determined by his reason that he could with safety undertake a particular enterprise; yet a degree of apprehension with respect to its result, may continue to haunt him. This however does not prove that his reason with respect to its safety was not exerted, or that it was not correct; nor can this feeling so arising within him, be deemed to be an impulse of conscience. Yet, if not in this case, why so in the

¹ 1 John iii. 20.

² *Ide post*, s. 11.

former? Both in this instance, and in those where questions of a moral nature are to be decided, emotions of this character are excited, and they appear to flow in opposition to the decision of the reason. In each case however it will be found that these misgivings or emotions arose from the same cause, from the inability of the reasoning power completely to control the medial feelings. Such perturbations may nevertheless sometimes guide us wrong, when the reason alone would direct us right. As in the case of those poor heathens who have been converted to Christianity, but who on their death-beds, when men are supposed most likely to act purely according to the dictates of conscience, have relapsed into idolatry, and died invoking their once renounced deities. Now if conscience with its accompanying qualms, constitutes a divine, innate, independent, or infallible guide, how came it that these persons were urged by it to such a course as this? In their case, at least, it must have proved but a faithless and treacherous monitor. The real fact however, is, that in this, as in many other instances, the emotions of fear will be excited on that side where danger appears the greatest, however decisively the reason may have pronounced its opinion; as happened with regard to those deluded people, with whom the superstitious terrors of their faith preponderated over their reason, and the calm and deliberate conviction of their judgment on the side of Christianity. In each case where the reason is in doubt, fear will be excited towards that quarter where danger appears most likely to occur.

4. *Conscience not an Intellectual or Moral Instinct.*

From the circumstance of the conscience appearing so absolutely essential to our moral nature, and from the regular and direct manner in which its operations are occasionally carried on, closely analogous to the certain and unerring operations of instinct in animal nature; it might be contended that conscience itself is an intellectual or moral instinct belonging to the soul, corresponding with the instinct appertaining to the being of animals in general. Many moral writers have, moreover, treated of conscience as though it were a quality of this kind.³ Indeed, what might be termed the popular notion

³ *Bishop Butler* in his *Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue*, referring to the moral faculty, speaks of it as "whether called conscience, moral reason, moral sense, or divine reason, whether considered as a sentiment of the understanding, or as a perception of the heart, or—which seems the truth—as including both."

Dr. Reid defines the conscience to be "an original power or faculty,"

of conscience, appears to me to be that it is a sort of moral instinct, which at once, without any exercise of the reason, or any mental exertion whatever, impels forward the individual directly, unhesitatingly, and peremptorily, in the path in which duty would lead him.

The several questions or points for determination here raised, must however each of them be decided by the consideration of the nature of conscience itself; as must also the inquiry into the reason and necessity for the existence of such an instinctive quality as might be contended for.

With regard to the first of these points, if we examine closely into the quality of conscience itself, it will appear that there is no real ground for concluding that there is anything in its nature or constitution allied to instinct, even if that might be supposed to be of an intellectual or moral kind; while, on the other hand, all the operations of conscience may be fully accounted for, and are plainly explicable, by reducing it to an effort of the reason, accompanied by an emotion, according to the theory which I here maintain. Each of its acts, moreover, are rational as regards their nature, and complex in their kind, consisting, as regards the intellectual portion of them, in the comparison of ideas one with another; while those of instinct are simple and only perceptive, consisting merely, as regards the intelligent portion of them, in receiving ideas or sensations, which appear to contribute mainly in impelling the being so affected in a particular course.⁴

In respect to the question of the necessity for the existence of an intellectual or moral instinct connected with or constituted by conscience; there appears, as far as our information on the matter will enable us to judge, to be no occasion whatever for any such endowment as this supposed instinct in the economy of our moral system. While instinct serves to guide those impelled by it in every action which they undertake, conscience is exerted as a guide in moral actions only. But if this instinct is of an intellectual nature, it could hardly be expected to be qualified to direct us in moral, and not in intellectual pursuits. Or, if it be supposed to be of a moral nature, it is still more difficult to understand how it can be endowed with moral discernment only, and not necessarily therewith

which may, he says, "without impropriety be called the moral sense."—*Reid on the Active Powers, Essay iii. pt. iii. c. vi.*

And according to *Dr. Abercrombie*, "Conscience seems to hold a place among the moral powers, analogous to that which reason holds among the intellectual."—*On the Moral Feelings, pt. iii.*

Dr. Whewell also tells us that "if by right and by equivalent words, we intend some quality or attribute, which useful and similar words do not express, we must have the faculty of conceiving such a quality, and this faculty is the moral sense."—*Foundations of Morals, s. 34.*

⁴ *Vide ante, Prel. Diss., s. x. as. 2, 5.*

possess that which is intellectual. Instinct, moreover, in its exercises, is not generally accompanied by an emotion, any more than is the mere exertion of the understanding. Conscience, on the other hand, is never exercised without an emotion, which is, indeed, an essential part or constituent of it.

Another argument, which it appears to me might be availed of to support the notion that conscience is a kind of instinct, either intellectual or moral, is the circumstance that children and uneducated people, whose reason seems but very partially developed, are as vigorously excited by conscience as are grown-up and highly-educated persons. If however, conscience be an intellectual or moral instinct, it must be as dependent upon the development of the intellectual powers, or moral endowments, as if it were in part constituted of the reason in the way I have maintained. But common sense, which, as I shall hereafter endeavour to show,⁵ is the capacity that is the earliest developed, and the least dependent upon cultivation, is also that which is mainly and most commonly exerted when conscience is exercised; and therefore we might expect, if conscience is constituted in the manner I maintain it to be, that young people, and those of but little mental cultivation, would be found to be vigorously moved and influenced by it, as from experience we learn to be the case. That conscience is not an intellectual instinct, is further obvious from the fact adverted to in a previous section, that it does not serve us for other than moral uses, or even to direct us in any way in the actual pursuit of knowledge; and yet, if it be an intellectual instinct at all, it is difficult to understand how it should operate without serving to communicate knowledge whereby conscience should be guided as to the course in which it impels us.

What is by some persons termed the moral sense, is therefore in reality no independent or separate faculty or endowment by itself, but consists only in the application of the reason,—which is qualified to discern the difference between, and the relative merit and value of, particular subjects,—to questions of morality, and of practical conduct, concerning which conclusions may be drawn with a certainty as complete as, and corresponding with that, with which we determine questions respecting the relative size, and shape, and colour of material substances.

In regard to moral topics and actions, the emotions and passions are more vividly excited here than they are respecting indifferent matters, such as those of size, and shape, and colour; because the former more immediately affect us, and are more closely connected with our well-being and course of conduct.

⁵ *Vide post*, b. iii. c. iii. s. 2.

One essential point which might be urged against conscience consisting in an instinct of any kind, is the absolute and undeviating regularity and uniformity with which instinct, on the one hand, performs all its operations; and the occasional uncertainty and irregularity with which, on the other hand, those act who are impelled by conscience: so that at different times it sometimes happens that the same persons act conscientiously about the same matter, in a totally different manner. This is, however, wholly at variance with the impulses of instinct. As well, indeed, might we expect the attraction of gravitation or of the magnet occasionally to vary. The operations of reason are, nevertheless, necessarily varying, and are liable to be affected by different influences: exactly corresponding with them are the excitements of conscience.

The most cogent argument, however, which it appears to me could be urged in support of the existence of an innate, intellectual or moral instinct in which conscience might be supposed to consist, is from analogy with animal nature: from which it might be contended that as animals are unerringly directed in their pursuits, which are of an animal and sensual nature, by an animal instinct; it is reasonable to suppose that man would be in a corresponding manner unerringly directed in his pursuits, which are of an intellectual and moral nature, by some kind of intellectual and moral monitor, such as conscience is supposed to be, and which might therefore be aptly termed an intellectual instinct.

In reply to this argument, I would observe that man being here in a probationary state, it is hardly reasonable to suppose that he would be unerringly guided in it without any effort of his own, as animals are, for whose express guidance instinct is given to them. If so, of what use is the reason to us? But, on the other hand, if we suppose no such innate moral instinct to exist, the exercise of the conscience through the direction of the reason, is all-sufficient, if we apply it properly, for the ends required.

Hence we may conclude that an economy in the moral system of man, such as I have here supposed, by which each individual would be in every case involuntarily, and without any exercise of his reason, impelled forward at once in the pursuit of that course which is most strictly in accordance with moral rectitude, can hardly be expected to exist; either if we regard man as placed here in a probationary state, or as endowed with a free-will, and the liberty to choose between right and wrong: or if we consider him as a being gifted with reason, which is amply and peculiarly in all respects adapted to guide him in his career; and which we may infer to have been given to him for that express purpose.

5. *Spiritual Conscience no separate kind of itself.*

Some writers contend that there is, besides what is usually termed conscience as it exists in man in general, and which they occasionally term moral conscience, another endowment of this nature, though of a higher kind, and more important authority, which they denominate "Spiritual Conscience;" but which they assert exists only in those who have a deep religious feeling.⁶

It will, however, be found on close examination, that this spiritual conscience, as it is called, differs in nothing from what is termed moral conscience, or conscience of the ordinary kind, except as regards the nature of the questions or duties to be decided, and the rule of government, or standard of right principle, adopted by the person in whom this conscience exists. Thus, while moral conscience, as it is called, consists in the exercise of the reason respecting any matter of duty, accompanied by an emotion, in the manner I have stated; that which is termed spiritual conscience consists in the exercise of the reason, also accompanied by an emotion: but in which case the decision of the reason is referred to, and is regulated by a higher and more explicit rule or standard of right—that of strict conformity with the precepts of religion as afforded by Divine revelation. In both cases, the nature and the exercise of conscience are the same in all respects. They only differ from a different rule or code of laws being appealed to in the two cases, and by which the reason is to frame and to regulate its decisions.

Certainly, in one respect, as regards the unerring nature of the decisions made by it, that which is termed spiritual conscience can have but slender claim to superiority over conscience of the common kind; inasmuch as there are hardly any subjects respecting which men have so widely differed, and in regard to which they have been so much led astray, and to such violent, and fearful, and heinous measures, as those of religious duty, wherein they are supposed to have been influenced by conscience of this description. Many of the most abhorrent cruelties and superstitions which zealots and bigots have revelled in, can be apologized for only on the ground that the perpetrators of

⁶ According to *Burgess*, although the understanding is the gold among the other powers of the soul, and the pearl or diamond in that gold, and the apple of the eye of the understanding; yet the conscience is so polluted, "lying in every man's breast fast asleep," that a pure and good conscience "only those that are regenerate have."—*Of Original Sinne*, pt. iii. c. ii. pp. 221, 223, 226.

them were impelled by the dictates of conscience. It is not to be denied that in their case they were actuated by what they considered to be the highest and the holiest motives, and that they were sincere and ardent followers of religion.⁷ Indeed, their grand error seems to have been implicitly trusting to the impulses of what they, and what those who maintain the theory I have alluded to, believe to be a Divine and infallible guide and monitor.

It is, moreover, evident that Scripture recognizes no distinction of the nature I have alluded to, of a moral and a spiritual conscience; inasmuch as St. Paul, when speaking of "the Gentiles which have not the law," tells us that they shall be judged "every man according to his conscience, their consciences bearing witness, and their thoughts excusing or accusing them."⁸ No difference is here made between a moral and a spiritual conscience, nor is there any allusion to the existence of the latter: but, on the contrary, we are told that those Gentiles who had not the law, who were utterly ignorant of religion, and who could not therefore be possessed of what is termed a spiritual conscience, were to be judged according to their conscience, which must necessarily mean their moral conscience; but which would doubtless be most unjust if a spiritual conscience alone were fitted to guide them in religious matters. If, however, an ordinary moral conscience were sufficient for this end, what need is there for one of another kind—a spiritual conscience?

That those who are endowed with a deep and due sense of religion, would be the most likely to be guided by their conscience according to the dictates of religion, I have no hesitation in admitting; but this is not because they possess a conscience of a nature distinct from that of other men, but because they make religion the moral rule or standard by which their decisions of conscience are alone regulated.

What is termed spiritual conscience has not, moreover, been found sufficient to guide men to the truth when they have been involved in difficulties relative to questions of duty of a religious nature. Thus, the same persons have, at different periods, conscientiously followed both Romanism and Protestantism, and have conscientiously persecuted others for not believing and acting just as they do. Some have all their lives scrupulously and conscientiously adhered to one form of doctrine; while others have, with equal scrupulosity and conscientiousness, zealously opposed them, and adhered to an opposite creed.

⁷ "The time cometh that whosoever killeth you will think that he doeth God service."—*John* xvi. 2.

"I verily thought with myself that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth."—*Acts* xxvi. 9.

⁸ *Romans* ii. 14, 15.

But how could this be if both parties, who are alike sincere and earnest, were guided by spiritual conscience?

On the whole, therefore, I cannot but conclude that there is nothing in this supposed spiritual conscience but what will be found to be comprehended in the functions of conscience as it is generally considered; and, on the other hand, that ordinary conscience accomplishes everything which this supposed spiritual conscience would be capable of effecting.

An interesting inquiry, closely connected with the subject of the present section, might be instituted as to whether, in a future state, either of happiness or misery, we shall still be endowed with conscience; as it may be contended that after our lot is determined, and our moral course is at an end, such an endowment will no longer be required. But if both reason and the emotions continue to exist, surely conscience must be supposed to exist as well, unless it is shown how its existence ceases. And so far from conscience being unnecessary, or not exercised, in a future state; I should conjecture that in each of these conditions the approving voice of conscience, and the qualms of conscience, will constitute the most essential, and most efficient cause of our pleasures in the one, and our pains in the other.

6. *Conscience, to what extent the Voice of God in the Soul.*

By some persons, a claim on behalf of conscience has been advanced, in its nature far higher and more authoritative than any that have here been considered; and it has been contended by them to be nothing less than the voice of God Himself, speaking in the soul of man, and infallibly proclaiming His edicts as to the correct course of conduct which ought on all occasions to be pursued.⁹ How far this is the case, whether there is any actual foundation for such a belief, and if so, to what extent it may be allowed, we will therefore proceed to inquire.

When however it is contended that the operation of conscience is nothing less than the voice of God speaking in the soul of man, it is necessary to define accurately and precisely

⁹ "Conscience is indeed the gift of God. It is the impression of His hand; and in some manner it supplies His place, whether in directing or in judging us."—*La Placette's Treatise of Conscience*, b. iii. c. ii.

"And I will place within them as a guide,
My umpire Conscience."

—*Paradise Lost*, b. iii. l. 125.

"I feel not
This deity in my bosom."

—*Tempest*.

what is really meant by the voice of God so speaking. If by this it is intended merely to describe the influence of the Holy Spirit upon the soul, invigorating its energy, strengthening its moral inclinations, infusing into it good desires, and both aiding its powers, especially when engaged on moral subjects, and stimulating the action of those emotions which contribute to the constitution of conscience; I am ready not only to admit, but to contend that, to this extent, the voice of conscience is really the voice of God in the soul. But if by the conscience it is intended to mean the voice of God speaking in our souls, independent either of the reasoning faculty, or of the emotions which accompany its exercise; and that this voice is sent to teach and to guide us whenever questions of moral duty have to be determined upon, wholly independent of our own exertions, and quite apart from any influence arising from the general operations of the Holy Spirit upon our souls; I must, in that case, contend, as contrary to reason, and wholly unsupported by evidence, against the supposition that the impulse of conscience is to be considered as the voice of God speaking in the soul of man.

The operation of conscience is doubtless so far the voice of God speaking through our souls, inasmuch as they are both excited to action, and rendered more acute, and vigorous, and energetic,—alike as regards their powers of acting and of being acted upon, their faculties, and their emotions—through the exercise of the influence of His Spirit, which communicates itself immediately to them without the intervention of the senses; and, moreover, the decisions which the conscience makes, are, by this aid, confirmed and supported. The conscience may also be regarded as the voice of God in the soul, so far as the Holy Spirit, by its influence upon the soul, not only quickens and sharpens its powers and faculties, especially those of the reason; but accelerates their action, and directs them aright, freeing them from error and delusion, and also purifying them by enabling them to acquire the ascendancy over the medial influences and impulses. The Spirit of God may further aid the operation of conscience, not merely by assisting the reason, but by illumining the understanding; and both enabling it to discern with greater force, and clearness, and correctness, and also affording it subject-matter upon which the reason may be exercised.

The mode in which the Holy Spirit acts upon and influences the soul of man, may be presumed to be somewhat analogous to, and correspondent with, the manner in which the sun acts upon and influences the material being, and growth, and vitality, of plants and animals; silently and imperceptibly, but at the same time most powerfully, invigorating and inspiriting them, and calling forth latent energies and dormant powers. In certain

special cases it may be, however, that the Holy Spirit acts directly upon the inferior, instead of the more exalted parts of our nature, repressing and subjugating them to the higher ; while on the other hand, the efforts of Satan, or the spirit of evil, may be directed to assail and pervert the higher and more intellectual parts in our constitution, the reason and the conscience. This is, nevertheless, in all probability, not their ordinary and general, but merely their extraordinary and supernatural mode of being acted upon, pursued only in special and peculiar cases.

There can be no doubt indeed, from a perusal of the sacred Scriptures, that not only is knowledge in certain cases communicated to the mind by inspiration ; but that, to a very large extent also, its faculties and capacities are invigorated and extended by this means : the reason is strengthened, the imagination stimulated, and the taste purified. That the influence of the Holy Spirit confers intellectual as well as moral endowments, is indeed evinced by the fact that the prophets and apostles through its power received many gifts of the former kind, and produced compositions which men only of the highest genius could bring forth. The lofty flights of poetry displayed in the writings of Isaiah, Ezekiel, Job, and Joel ; the masterly and eloquent reasonings of St. Paul ; and the sublime and daring imagination contained in the Apocalypse, afford abundant testimony to the truth of this assertion, and bear unerring proof that the impulse which stimulated and directed the minds of the writers, was no less than that of the Divine Spirit. The vast intellectual acquirements of Solomon, we are moreover expressly told, he owed to Its special aid, as was the case also with David.

It appears to me, nevertheless, to be a great error to suppose, as many seem to do, that the instructorial office of the Holy Spirit as regards mankind, is entirely of a moral, and not at all, or only to a very limited extent, of an intellectual kind. From what the Sacred Scriptures teach us, the very reverse might, indeed, be argued to be the truth. The gift of prophecy, as also that of tongues, and the endowment with wisdom, are purely intellectual, not moral gifts ; and even moral directions may be regarded as intellectual also, so far as the ability to follow them perfectly is aided by a due discipline or invigoration of the reason. But if on sacred subjects, men are aided by the invigoration of the mind through the influence of the Holy Spirit, may they not be so on subjects only indirectly connected with religion ; and if on these, on subjects altogether unconnected with it ? And if so, may not many persons, such as the pagan philosophers of old, who wrote, some on moral, some on purely intellectual topics, have been thus aided and illumined ? Moreover, if holy men are influenced by the Holy Spirit in matters which are merely moral or intellectual, as well as in those which are purely reli-

gious; may not men who are not of this exalted character, be also influenced on moral and intellectual topics by the same Spirit?

As it has been thought by some learned men that inspiration was extended not merely to prophets and apostles, but to other persons, deep searchers after truth; so, on the other hand, it may not unreasonably be questioned whether in all that inspired persons did, they acted directly under inspiration, and not from their own natural inclination and judgment. Certain acts, not only of David, but of Samuel, may be referred to in support of this conjecture. As instinct is dimmed, not extinguished, by reason; so reason, although it may be superseded, is not necessarily suspended by inspiration.

It is also surely not irrational to suppose that inspiration not only dictated poetry, eloquence, and philosophy, but assisted the sublime conceptions of several Scriptural painters, and, above all, the truly Divine designs of some of our cathedrals, consecrated to the service of God; as also those heavenly strains of music which echo through their aisles. Indeed, in the case of the architects and artists employed about the building of the Temple, we are expressly assured by Revelation, that they were immediately aided in their great and solemn undertaking by the influence and inspiration of the Holy Spirit.¹ Why should the workers in equally great and sublime achievements in later times, whether poetical, pictorial, musical, or architectural, be denied to be correspondingly directed?²

The exercise of the reason, already alluded to, and whether in operations of conscience or those of a general nature, necessarily always implies, and includes also to a large extent, as we shall presently see,³ the exercise of the understanding as well; inasmuch as the former faculty cannot in any case act, unless it be first supplied by the understanding with ideas on which to act.

On the whole, therefore, it appears to me that it is decidedly incorrect to term the conscience the voice of God speaking in the soul of man; for although we cannot doubt that God does appeal to us through the influence of His Holy Spirit, yet He, even in such cases, operates through the reason, which is the intellectual part of conscience, and which He may do quite independent of the conscience; inasmuch as He enlightens the understanding, acts upon the other parts of our nature, subdues the

¹ *Exodus* xxxvi.

² On this point *Dr. Vaughan* remarks;—"I see no warrant for a *direct* operation of the Holy Spirit, except in persons consciously living in communication with God. In its full New Testament sense, it is exclusively a Christian gift. Where the heart is right with God, by a living faith, there I readily grant that we see an illumination even of *natural* powers, sometimes to a marvellous extent. In heathen and unbelieving men, I should not be inclined to imagine an *inspiring* action, only the action through *creative* gifts of the 'Creator Spirit.'"

³ *Vide post*, b. iii. c. ii. s. 6; c. iii. s. 8.

medial appetites and passions, and diverts and directs the inclinations and desires, in the way already stated. So that the voice of God in the soul of man, though it does not itself constitute the conscience, yet in reality extends its influence far beyond the confines of conscience, and effects considerably more than even the conscience itself is able to accomplish—an additional proof, indeed, that conscience cannot be constituted by, much less be exclusively confined to, these Divine impulses.

Nevertheless, if God does through His Holy Spirit, on certain occasions hold close and intimate communion with our souls; He would surely communicate with that part of them which especially relates to, and is peculiarly intended as our guide in moral and religious duty, and through which alone we are most directly concerned with the Deity as regards our course of life. And, therefore, if He so communicated with our souls, and in regard to the matters stated, it appears but reasonable to conclude that He would speak to us through the conscience in the way here supposed. So far, indeed, as any particular action has reference to moral duty, and consequently to our duty to God, God may be said to appeal to us through the conscience; or, rather, the soul in many cases thus appeals to and communicates with Him; and in this manner not only seeks for, but obtains, His gracious aid and direction.

The conscience is, however, as already observed, liable to err, and occasionally misleads us, as does also the reason. This may be thought inconsistent with the conscience being the voice of God in the soul, even to the extent and in the manner here admitted. But then it must be borne in mind that, although the conscience deceives us sometimes, yet this occurs only when it is not fairly inquired of, or has become perverted in the manner I shall presently point out.⁴ So the voice of God may be supposed to speak to us when it does not; or when it does speak, we may not hear it. In other cases, its responses to our inquiries may be misinterpreted. Where the reply is quite different to what we had expected, we may be disposed either not to attend to it, or not to construe it fairly; or it may so happen that God does not deem fit to give any answer to our interrogations.

It appears not improbable that as the Spirit of God infuses itself into our minds, and incites us to do good, fills the soul with pure and holy desires, and raises the influence of the higher and more intellectual part of our nature over that which is inferior, and carnal, and gross; so the spirit of evil, or the influence of the devil, may, in a corresponding and counter-acting manner, also infuse itself into our minds, filling them with evil thoughts and desires, debasing and defiling, instead of exalting and purifying them, and rendering subservient the

⁴ *Vide post*, s. 10.

intellectual and higher part of our nature to that which is inferior, and gross, and carnal. Moreover, as the influence of the Holy Spirit subdues the appetites and passions, and exalts the power of the reason; so the influence of the spirit of evil excites, and stimulates, and invigorates the power of the appetites and passions, and weakens that of the reason. Hence, the evil spirit is occasionally in Scripture denominated unclean, from the filthy, fleshly desires to which it directly inclines us. Possibly, and indeed very probably, evil spirits, when they affect the mind or the reason, do not do so in a direct manner, but carry on their machinations by acting upon those corporeal organs through which the mind operates, and by affecting which the mind itself becomes affected.

This inquiry however as to the connexion between God and the soul of man, is not only one of the highest possible importance to us, as well as the most sublime in its nature; but the consideration of it contributes, more than anything else, to exalt human nature, and to evince to us our dignity as so nearly allied to, and in such direct and constant communication with the great Author of our being. It should lead us also to reflect upon the supreme importance of every action in our moral conduct, as so immediately connected with and under His cognizance.

7. *Essential Quality and Constitution of Conscience.*

Having proceeded thus far in an analytical investigation of the subject, we are able to arrive at a tolerably correct conclusion as to what are the essential agents and elements which together contribute to constitute the conscience. From what has been advanced, it will appear to be a moral endowment in which the following properties mainly predominate, if they do not wholly compose it:—

1. An effort of the reason, terminating in a decision made by it, concerning some subject or question of moral duty.⁵

2. An emotion connected with, and accompanying this exercise.

3. It is essential also that some moral action to which it has relation, towards which it is tending, and the immediate performance of which is in contemplation, shall be present to the mind, in order to call forth an operation of conscience. Thus,

⁵ Certain writers of high authority have considered that conscience consists merely in the exercise of the reason on moral subjects, and a decision on the morality of our actions.—*Burlamaqui's Principles of Natural Law*, pt. ii. c. viii. s. 2.

it is seen in the constitution of conscience, that it is composed, correspondingly with each of the other moral endowments considered in the two preceding chapters, of an operation of the mind, a medial excitement, and an action to which both these refer.⁶

In conscience however alone, as has already been pointed out, the reason, and the emotions, and other medial excitements and impulses, co-operate together to guide us correctly. In most, if not all other cases where they operate simultaneously, they directly counteract, instead of aiding one another; and reason, which of itself would lead us aright, and which when excited in the case of conscience is confirmed in its decisions by the emotion that accompanies it, is, through their interference or influence, perverted or led astray.

The conscience, which is consequently in reality but the simultaneous concurrence and operation of the reason and the emotions on a subject of moral action, is, essentially, not a moral faculty, or even a separate faculty at all, as many have contended it to be;⁷ inasmuch as a faculty is always a simple, uncompounded, original power of the soul. Conscience may however be rightly termed a moral endowment of the soul, compounded in the manner we have seen.⁸ In a certain mode, it may also be said to constitute a sort of complex moral sense, by which we at once discern the moral qualities and relations of different subjects, and determine upon, or are impelled in a particular course of action with respect to them; in a manner closely analogous to that in which, by our corporeal senses, we discern the physical properties and elements of different material substances, and determine upon the operations to be adopted with regard to them. In this respect, it corresponds closely, though at the same time, as has already been shown, it essentially differs from, instinct, both in its nature and its operations. Conscience is, moreover, ever

⁶ According to *Bishop Hopkins*, however, "Conscience is nothing but a practical syllogism, or argumentation, and always infers a personal conclusion, either excusing or accusing."—*Works*, vol. iii. p. 444.

Hobbes defines conscience to be merely the opinion of evidence.—*Human Nature*, c. vi. s. 8.

And *Locke* asserts of conscience that it is "nothing else but our own opinion of the moral rectitude or pravity of our own actions."—*Essay on the Understanding*, b. i. c. iii. s. 8.

Burton, too, defines conscience to be simply "that which approves good or evil, justifying or condemning our actions, and is the conclusion of the syllogisme."—*Anatomy of Melancholy*, pt. i. s. 1.

⁷ *Vide ante*, s. 1, p. 117.

⁸ *Dr. Adam Smith* observes that "the word conscience does not immediately denote any moral faculty by which we approve or disapprove. Conscience supposes indeed the existence of some such faculty, and properly signifies our consciousness of having acted agreeably to its directions."—*Theory of Moral Sentiments*, vol. ii. par. 7, s. 3, p. 338.

guided by reason; while sense and instinct are both the teachers, rather than the rulers of reason, and direct, rather than follow its dictates.

From what has been premised, we may conclude therefore that this endowment called conscience, essentially consists in nothing more than, and is constituted by, the silent dictate or operation of the reason, which at the conviction of error about to be perpetrated, or already effected, at once excites the soul, and produces simultaneously, or immediately subsequent, a vivid emotion of pain or pleasure, or of feelings allied to, or derived from one of these emotions, in regard to the act in question, whether already accomplished, or forthwith to be performed.

As in the case of all the other moral endowments, the particular character of the conscience in each individual, necessarily more or less depends on that of the various constituents which contribute to form it; such, for instance, as the strength and activity of his emotions, and of his reason. On the vigour and clearness of this faculty, and on the characteristics of the constituent capacities which compose it, by means of which the discernment between right and wrong is at once and decisively effected, the efficiency of conscience must be also greatly dependent. And the more vividly conviction strikes the mind, the more vigorous must be the emotions by which its decisions will be enforced.

How far, and to what extent, the conscience may be supposed to be dependent upon the essential qualities and nature of the soul itself, must be mainly determined by the question how far the medial and mental endowments generally, and above all, the reason itself, are so dependent; subjects which I have endeavoured to dispose of as satisfactorily as the information to be obtained will enable me to do, in other parts of this Treatise.⁹ Of all the feelings, propensities, powers, or endowments, belonging to man, the conscience, however, appears to be the least dependent upon his material frame. But even here, the condition of the body is not without its influence, more especially as regards the mode in which the operations of the soul of each kind are accelerated or impeded by the state or tone of the material organs. The condition also of the animal fluids, the tide of the animal spirits, and the state of the nerves, by which care and anxiety are increased or relieved, may have important, although perhaps only indirect, influence here.

If, however, it be objected that conscience, as I have here supposed it to be constituted, is far more complex than is ordinarily supposed; I can only reply that in this respect it

⁹ *Vide ante, Prel. Diss., s. 5, a. 3, vol. i. p. 80.*

strictly corresponds with every other endowment of our moral nature; and that without allowing it to be thus complex, it is impossible to conceive perfectly, or adequately, of all its various, and variously regulated operations. There appears, indeed, to be this striking difference as regards the acts of conscience, and those of the other moral endowments, which requires especially to be borne in mind while considering the constitution of conscience, and which has been already passingly alluded to; that while in the dispositions, the medial parts of our nature are what primarily affect us, although the reason is called in to correct, and direct, and occasionally indeed either to retard or to accelerate the movement which they excite; and while the moral desires result from the joint operation together, and equally, of the medial and mental endowments and influences; in conscience it is always the reason that takes the lead as regards the action to be achieved, while the medial excitements follow instead of leading in the effort, and serve only to control and regulate, instead of directing or producing it. This circumstance contributes to render the constitution and operation of conscience apparently less complex than it really is, inasmuch as the reason is the active agent in the operation, modified by the various compounded influences which are brought to bear. They are, nevertheless, as essential and as important in the constitution of conscience, as though they occupied a more prominent position.

It may also be objected with regard to the subjects on which I have contended that conscience is exclusively exercised, that on other besides moral topics on which men reason, they become warmly excited; and so their emotions are roused contemporaneously with their reasoning efforts in respect to them, and also with regard to an action to be performed, —as when questions of art or science are debated upon. This, however, does not prove that conscience is not exercised in the former cases. In the latter, there is, moreover, this essential difference, that the emotions excited are all external, and not internal; that they regard not our own actions, but those of others; and that they relate not to our own well-being or duty, but to the affairs of strangers, or to subjects which have no immediate, or direct, or real concern with ourselves.

But, it may be urged that the decisions of conscience and those of reason are not unfrequently opposed to each other; the reason in this case being actively and sedulously employed, not in supporting the decisions of conscience, but in endeavouring to controvert or overturn them. How is this consistent with reason being a constituent element in the constitution of conscience? and how is it possible for the same faculty to be employed at the same time, on the same subject, in two different and opposite mode:

It is here, however, to be borne in mind that in those cases where conscience and reason are opposed, a decision has already been pronounced by the reason as a constituent branch of conscience, which the reason is subsequently engaged to call in question, or to controvert. It does not oppose itself in arriving at a decision during the process of the argument; but it reviews its own decisions previously made, and long after the argument has ended. The reason is employed as an advocate on many points where the conscience has decided as a judge, and urges matters in extenuation of the crime which is condemned. But in both cases, it is the reason which pronounced the decision, and the reason which now reviews it; just as an individual might at one time sit with other persons to form a judicial tribunal, and pronounce a decision which he subsequently considers to be erroneous, argues against, and endeavours to controvert.

8. *Office and Influence of Conscience.*

That question however which, after all, most immediately and seriously concerns us with regard to conscience, and which is the practical point of most consequence connected with the subject; is as to what is the essential office assigned to conscience in respect to the performance of our moral duty, and what extent of influence over our general moral conduct it is able to exert.

As regards the office of conscience, the sphere of its operations appears to be as extensive as is the general line of moral action open to man. Every question relative to duty or conduct, comes within its province, whether of a religious, social, or domestic nature,¹ and whether between man and his Creator, or between man and man in society; all which, indeed, so far as conscience is concerned in dealing with them, are ultimately reducible into questions of moral duty. In each question of difficulty or emergency of this kind, it is the office and prerogative of conscience to guide us in that course, and in that alone, which is the correct, and the only correct one for us to pursue, according to the nature of the event, and the circumstances in which we are placed. This moreover, however great may be the apparent difficulties and intricacies of the case, it will seldom, if

¹ *Mr. Wake* lays it down that the fundamental error of the popular notion of conscience, is in limiting its operation to moral questions alone. Conscience, he says, may be defined as an instinct of truth, which operates as well when scientific, as when moral phenomena are presented to the mind.—*Chapters on Man*, p. 49.

ever, fail to do, if candidly inquired of,² and sufficient knowledge of the nature of the transaction be supplied. Knowledge is to conscience what light is to the eye. Although no actual part of the endowment itself, it is absolutely essential to enable it to act.³ Very faint rays, however, will, in most cases, serve for all that is really needed. The twinkle of the stars will generally suffice to point out a safe road, although the light of the sun alone can enable us to read the figures on the guide-post.

Conscience, moreover, is quite as active and as efficient in its negative, as it is in its positive operations. It is as powerful to restrain, as it is to excite us; to repel us from the commission of a base act, as to impel us to perform one which is honourable. And while by disposition we are inclined to indifferent actions, according to the particular bias of particular inclinations; and while the desires stimulate us to due exertion, conscience alone ever arouses us to the strict performance of our duty.⁴ So powerful, moreover, is the influence of conscience when it obtains its legitimate authority, that the moral disposition and character are modulated by its power, the moral desires are directed by its impulse in their proper course, and the appetites and passions are restrained from all undue excesses.

What is considered by many persons to be the innate instinctive perception by the soul of right and justice,⁵ is, I believe, in reality, nothing more than the power of the mind to discern truth from error, from which all right and justice are derived, and to decide between good and bad, for which the reason suffices, and which is the main purpose for which it was given. The office of conscience extends to all subjects in which questions of this nature are involved, or on the determination of which moral action is dependent; and it is the duty of this endowment in all such emergencies to direct us in the correct course, according to the rule either expressly prescribed, or to be discovered or interpreted by reason, and which it is also the office of conscience both to point out and to impel us to follow. And although the direction and discipline of our own conduct alone fall strictly within the province of conscience, yet the conduct of other people may here be made available, so far

² "Conscience is called by *Bernard*, *speculum animæ*, the soul's looking-glass:—By beholding thy conscience, thou mayest see what are thy sinnes, what are thy duties, what is to be repented of, what is to be reformed."—*Burgess of Original Sinne*, pt. iii. c. ii. s. 4.

³ *Dr. Abercrombie*, however, lays it down that conscience conveys its convictions of what is morally right and wrong, "independently of any acquired knowledge;" but "by a rule of right which it carries within itself."—*On the Moral Feelings*, pt. iii. p. 104.

⁴ "It is by this faculty, natural to man, that he is a moral agent; that he is a law to himself."—*Bishop Butler. Sermons, Works*, vol. ii. p. 31.

⁵ "By our moral faculty we have conceptions of right and wrong."—*Reid on the Active Powers*, Essay iii. pt. iii. c. vi.

as it serves us as a mirror wherein our own misconduct and irregularities are reflected, and by which we are enabled to set ourselves right.

The influence of conscience might be compared to the principles of attraction and gravitation in the material world, which, although imperceptible to the vision, and silent in their operation, are ever at work, and more or less affect every movement of every object, and to which, moreover, every movement of every object owes its regularity and its order. Analogous to these operations in the material world, in the moral world there is hardly any voluntary action which is not influenced in an important manner either directly or indirectly by conscience. Thus the complex and counteracting external influences which are ever at work in our constitution, correspond precisely with those which are connected with us, and are internal.⁶ The conscience is, moreover, as it were, the bell of the soul, which is necessary to warn it, to remind it, and to regulate its whole economy. It alarms, awakens, and rouses to action. It encourages, dissuades, forbids, and commands. And as there is no pang of the soul so acute, or so unendurable, as that which arises from a violation of conscience; so, on the other hand, there is no delight so pure or so ecstatic as that which springs from its approval. The one is a bitter foretaste of the torments of hell; the other is the real experience of the bliss of heaven.⁷

Moreover, as there is no pain more intense than that which accompanies a reproving conscience, and no pleasure higher than that which accompanies a conscience that is approving; so no terror is so great as that which an evil conscience produces, and no courage so high as that which an approving conscience inspires; although at the same time a constant fear of doing wrong,⁸ which conscience occasions, seldom fails to haunt us. It is probable, indeed, that the pangs of remorse in a future state

⁶ "In every mind in a state of moral health, conscience is the supreme and regulating principle, preserving among the moving powers a certain harmony to each other, and to the principles of moral rectitude."—*Abercrombie on the Moral Feelings*, p. 22.

⁷ The blessings of a good conscience survive all others. They neither wither in disease, nor expire in death. They delight the living, solace the dying, revive the dead, and fail not through eternity."—*St. Bernard, Epist. ad Pap. Coel. Opera*, tom. i. p. 148.

"A good conscience is a continuall feast; but a galled conscience is as great a torment as can possibly happen—a still-baking oven, another hell."—*Anatomy of Melancholy*, pt. iii. s. 4, p. 649.

Horace, though a heathen, speaks in the same strain of the advantages or what may be denoted a good conscience, although he does not expressly use the term; which he compares to a brazen wall of defence, and being blessed with which we need not fear any accusation.—*Epist. i. lib. i.* So a man acting thus rightly, he pronounces second only to Jupiter.—*Ibid.*

⁸ "Conscience does make cowards of us all."

Hamlet.

of torment, will be greatly, and indeed mainly heightened by the throes of conscience, and by the calm and just review that a person will then be able to take of his conduct in this life, and of the motives and causes by which he was actuated.

There is, moreover, no verdict concerning any of our actions so entirely satisfactory to us, as the approval of our own conscience.⁹ Without this, our acquiescence in the correctness of our conduct can never be complete. The conscience is, in each case, the ultimate court of appeal belonging to the mind; and the more momentous any moral question or action is, the more are we concerned to secure its judgment in our favour. There is no suitor more urgent or more importunate than is a man to his own conscience. There is no judge more severe, though more just, than a man's conscience is to himself. Further than this, conscience is the only court from whose sentence there is no possible escape for the culprit, and whose emissaries are able to follow the criminal wherever he may flee.¹

But conscience, although so strict in its requirements, both as regards the principles which it dictates, and the obedience to its decrees which it demands, is, nevertheless, the only absolute tyrant whose commands each individual feels bound ever to recognize, and to submit to without reserve. And the fullest liberty that any one can demand for himself, is to be allowed to the utmost extent, and on all occasions, to follow the dictates of his conscience. Hence, although obedience to conscience is at once the severest and most perfect moral discipline that could be devised; yet freedom of conscience is at the same time the highest attainment of civil liberty.² As no person and no law can free us from the allegiance which we owe to conscience, so they ought not on any occasion to attempt to coerce us to act contrary to its commands. Moreover, he alone who allows his conscience full liberty over himself, is completely himself adapted for the exercise of perfect liberty. No freedom consistent with conscience can be condemned. No liberty at variance with it ought to be tolerated. The stricter therefore is the subservience in which we are held to this monitor, the more loose may be the civil and moral ties by which we are kept in check.³

⁹ "The reward of great men is in their own conscience, and the opinion of posterity."—*Napoleon I.*

¹ "I'll haunt thee like a wicked conscience."

Troilus and Cressida.

² "The conscience is the inviolable asylum of the liberty of man."—*Napoleon I.*

³ "While, on the one hand, the greatest amount of toleration and political liberty to which any one can reasonably desire to attain, is to be entirely free to act according to the dictates of his conscience; yet, on the other hand, the severest restraint under which all alike are placed, results from the allegiance which they owe to that most absolute of despots, who of all

Indeed, the most exalted opinion that we can entertain of any individual is, that he acts in strict accordance with the dictates of his conscience. There are some men of whom, whatever be their acts and opinions, and however differing from our own, we at once feel assured that their motives are the best. Others, whatever be their acts and opinions, although consistent with our own, we always, though involuntarily, view them with suspicion. The feeling as regards the former is the consequence of our conviction of their conscientiousness. That, as regards the latter, results from a misgiving as to their being correct in this respect. The one is the highest, the other the humblest judgment that we can entertain of their real moral worth.

But it may be said that, although we are fully persuaded that conscience appeals to us, how are we to be satisfied that it directs us aright, and what is its power in this respect? As regards this matter, conscience, by the perturbation in our minds which it occasions, urges them to the utmost to shun the path which appears likely to lead to error; and it also, on the other hand, vehemently impels our reasoning faculty, of which it is in part constituted, to seek out and determine the road that will conduct us right. This power is thus exerted with the utmost vigour, and its energy is put forth to the full. Nothing, indeed, so much invigorates the mind, and stimulates the exercise of each of its faculties and capacities, as the excitement of the soul through its emotions, from whatever cause. This not only sets it in operation, but accelerates its action when such has commenced. And, correspondingly with the efforts of the body, the most vigorous and energetic throes of the mind are those which are stimulated by the excitement of the emotions. In the case of conscience, moreover, we are doubly urged on by opposite emotions in the same direction; the one threatening pain in case of the commission of an act, and the other promising pleasure in the event of such commission being abandoned.

Nevertheless, the same vices appear to be frequently very differently regarded, according to the particular character of the persons and period by whom, and in which, they are witnessed. What in one age is considered as a crime, in another is looked upon as a merit; and what one individual condemns as an enormity, another may deem to be a very trivial offence. The same principles, and the same standard of right and wrong, are however applicable in each case alike.⁴ And it is the aspect,

rulers is the most arbitrary, and whose decrees far exceed in severity those of any state, either ecclesiastical or civil."—*Civilization considered as a Science in relation to its Essence, its Elements, and its End.* By George Harris, F.S.A., &c., p. 177 (*Bohn's Library Edition*).

⁴ Dr. Abercrombie lays it down that it is the province of conscience to

not the essence, of the act, which alone in reality differs. That which is a vice in one man, can never be a virtue in another; although circumstances may to a certain extent vary the degree of heinousness in the crime.

It has already been observed that the moral desires themselves should be subjected to, and directed by the conscience. And doubtless, the truest test as to the propriety or impropriety of any course of conduct to which we are stimulated by either of these desires, is whether the conscience approves of it or not. Possibly, indeed, the most precious use to which we can apply the conscience, is to ascertain the correctness of, and to direct us aright in the pursuit of the objects of these desires, whether immediate or ultimate. Thus shall we be at once urged to the attainment of those ends which are the highest and noblest; and shall be also led to follow them in the most desirable and virtuous manner.

There seems to be no difficulty in supposing that man might have been created a perfect moral being, endowed only with dispositions and desires which would impel him instinctively to the commission of good alone, just as animals are instinctively impelled to choose proper food, and to avoid whatever is noxious to them. Indeed, it is not impossible that Adam may have been so created; but that he fell, just as animals are liable to be misled, by a snare prepared for him by a being of superior intelligence to himself, against whose acts it is no part of the province of instinct to provide. Possibly also in a future state, a moral instinct of a similar or corresponding nature may be possessed by us. Indeed, through the endowment of conscience, the office and influence of which are adapted to lead us precisely in the same mode, and with even greater force, if not with equal clearness, we may be said to possess it already; although, in certain instances, opposing and counteracting influences, which probably in the state alluded to will be either withdrawn or greatly subdued, are ever exerting themselves to lessen its authority.

An important and interesting question may here be raised, —whether a person can commit sin when his own conscience approves the act which he is doing; whether the violation of his conscience is not necessary to constitute crime; and whether the approval of his conscience of itself suffices to acquit him of it? It may even admit of controversy, whether, on the one hand, acting contrary to the dictates of conscience, does not of itself constitute a moral offence; and whether, on the other hand, acting in conformity with them, does not of itself

convey to man a certain conviction of what is right and wrong in regard to conduct, which it does “without reference to any other standard of duty. It does so by a rule of right which it carries within itself.” — *On the Moral Feelings*, pt. iii.

extenuate crime. This very neglect to follow conscience, our appointed guide, with such light as it may be able on any given subject to afford, independent of the obligation to seek for clearer illumination, may not however be of itself a direct dereliction of duty; and the acting strictly by its dictates may not be a positive merit. So far, indeed, as the conscience, when fairly exercised, approves any act, the individual is exempt from sin by its commission. But he may be blameless as regards this act, and yet be culpable in neglecting or refusing to supply himself with the information respecting the matter on which he is to decide, by which alone he would be capable of proceeding correctly with regard to it. Hence, where his conscience is at ease concerning the commission of an act, it may reproach him as regards this latter point, in the omission to obtain information respecting it, by which alone his conscience would be enabled to decide fairly on the matter. So a court of law may deliver a judgment which is quite correct as regards the evidence submitted to it, but wholly wrong as regards the merits of the case, which were concealed from it. And the judge may be right as regards the opinion which he delivers upon the evidence before him, but wrong in not requiring more ample evidence to be adduced.

A corresponding question with the above may also be debated, —whether, when a man's conscience condemns him in the commission of an innocent act, he is free from sin in doing that act? In this case the reason and the conscience appear to be at variance; which must be owing to some defect, or misinformation as regards the conscience, which prevents it from proceeding aright. Its dictates are, however, here, over-ruled by the decision of the understanding and the reason, to which appeal is made. This is like the case of a judge who decides contrary to the apparent and strict rule in the matter; but in order to avoid direct injustice, and in conformity with a higher authority to which he acknowledges allegiance.

In all ordinary cases, it is indeed not the act itself, but our own opinion of its moral quality, which determines its character. Thus, a man who believes that he is telling a falsehood while in reality he is unknowingly speaking the truth, is morally guilty of lying; while the man who believes that he is speaking the truth, although he is unknowingly uttering a falsehood, is morally innocent of the crime of telling an untruth.

Nevertheless, although it will almost in every case, if not invariably, happen, that a man will act wrongly who does an act which his conscience condemns; yet it does not always follow as a necessary consequence, that he who acts in accordance with his conscience, is sure to do right. An acquittal by the tribunal of conscience, is no doubt highly satisfactory; pro-

vided that the question with which it deals is fairly and fully within its province, by complete knowledge of the matter, and a due examination of the subject to be decided upon. Unless this is the case, the conclusion of the conscience is of no avail; and is like the sentence of a court which attempts to deal with persons, or with properties, that are beyond its jurisdiction.

In regard to our conduct as scrupulously as in regard to our estate, we ought to keep a ledger in which should be contained a strict and exact account, both debtor and creditor,⁵ in relation to all our actions, generally towards our fellow-creatures, but most especially and particularly towards our Creator, from Whom all our resources are drawn, and into Whose care and keeping all our concerns are committed.

9. *Involuntariness, and Irresistibility of its Impulses.*

One peculiar and characteristic feature about the conscience, in which respect it differs entirely from all the other active endowments and powers of the soul, whether medial, moral, or mental, is that it may often, and indeed does ordinarily, act wholly involuntarily, and altogether independent of our originating, or endeavouring to influence its operations; and that the impulses which proceed from it, we are entirely unable by any efforts of our own to restrain.⁶

Not only indeed are the impulses of conscience involuntary and irresistible, but there is nothing in our own nature that we strive so hard to overcome, while there is, at the same time, nothing which we possess so little power to vanquish, as the throes of conscience. Even our internal organic operations are hardly more involuntary than are the impulses of this endowment. We may endeavour indeed to still the voice of conscience by ceasing to act at all, so that there may be no question of moral conduct to which it can refer. In certain cases however, this mere neglect to act, may involve a dereliction of duty, for which we may be condemned by our conscience; so that it is in reality as impossible wholly to prevent the excitement of conscience, as to stay the motion of the soul. Indeed, in order entirely to effect the former, it is necessary also to accomplish the latter, inasmuch as the action of the soul in the operation, is a leading element in the constitution of conscience.

⁵ *Burton* says of the conscience that it is "a greate ledger-booke, wherein are written alle our offences, a register to lay them up, which the Egyptians in their hieroglyphicks expressed by a mill, as well for the continuance as the torture of it, to grinde our soules with the remembrance of some precedent sinnes, and make us reflect upon, accuse, and condemn our own selves."—*Anatomy of Melancholy*, pt. iii. s. 4, p. 699.

⁶ "A man has less power over his conscience than over any other faculty."—*Charnocke on the Attributes*, p. 36.

But it may be urged, and with much apparent reason, that if the conscience is neither voluntary as regards its exercise, nor subject to our control as regards its direction, how can it be considered as really a part of our being; and how can it be available in any proceedings with respect to acts of moral duty, which must necessarily originate of our own free will, and also be the subject of our voluntary choice?

To this, however, it may be satisfactorily replied that, like many other parts of our being, the senses for instance, although we may have no choice as to its action unless we ourselves remain wholly inert; and although we may have no power in any case to influence its direction when exerted; yet, as is peculiarly the case with the senses, and which is indeed their main object, it may nevertheless serve to guide us in our conduct. And moreover, that its determinations not being subject to our control, is the necessary result of their having relation to matters which are entirely external; in which respect the actions of the senses respecting objects about us, are also equally, and for the same reason, beyond our control.

Indeed, if the conscience were absolutely at our command as to whether we exerted it or not, or if we could control its operations at pleasure, and direct them at our will; this endowment would be of but little real use to us, either as a monitor or a guide: inasmuch as it is probable that we should often be disposed to stifle its impulses at the precise period when they were most required—possibly indeed the more essential they were to our well-being, the more prone we might be to subdue them—and instead of being guided by its dictates, we should cause our own inclinations to guide the course of conscience.

On the whole, it may be concluded that the actual control which any person possesses over his conscience, depends upon, or is reducible to, these two principles. First, the power which he possesses of controlling and directing the operations of his reason. Second, the power that he possesses of controlling and directing the emotions, and other medial impulses, which contribute to constitute the operations of conscience. We can control reason as to its action, by withdrawing from it the subject on which it is engaged. Its decisions however are wholly beyond our control; although we may influence them but partially by the nature of the basis for its determination which we submit to it. But even here, it is not so much the reason itself, as the subject matter which engages it, that is really altered or biassed. We appear, as already remarked,⁷ to have considerable power over our emotions, both as to restraining and exciting them; but very little, if any, to direct their course.

⁷ *Vide ante*, vol. i. b. i. c. ii. s. 8.

What however, at first sight, appears most extraordinary of all, is that even the reason itself, although forming an important, and indeed the leading element in the constitution of conscience, is unable to resist the impulses of conscience when employed to do so; and which indeed is the faculty resorted to for this purpose when any decisive opposition to them is attempted. This may, at first sight, appear to be a paradox. But here it should be borne in mind that, as has already been pointed out,⁸ when conscience has arrived at any express determination, the decision of reason has already been pronounced; so that the task of the reason in controverting conscience, is not that of resisting its operations, but of endeavouring to obtain a reversal of a judgment previously made. Hence, when conscience and reason are diametrically opposed to each other, conscience will generally prove the stronger of the two; as, in the first place, a decision already promulgated stands upon a much firmer basis than a point of argument which we are aiming to establish. And in the next place, where conscience is exerted, the reason is aided and confirmed in its decision by the excitement and influence of a medial emotion.

The impulses of conscience are, however, in reality, irresistible so far only that we cannot annul or disregard them. They do not actually subdue the will, or prevent our adopting a course of action, even in a direction diametrically contrary to these impulses; but they protest loudly and vigorously against our pursuing such a line of conduct, and upbraid us with a voice that cannot be silenced.

Of all the moral endowments, conscience is nevertheless, that over which, on the one hand, the mental faculties, especially the reason, and the understanding also, although indirectly, possess the greatest influence; while, on the other hand, from the emotions which impel its operations being of a simple nature, and so powerful as are those of pain and pleasure, the medial excitements attendant on conscience are extremely influential. From this circumstance, probably, mainly arise the involuntariness and irresistibility with which its impulses are exerted, in the manner pointed out in the present section.

10. *Defects and Perversions incident to Conscience.*

But however valuable, and in most cases infallible as a guide, if duly resorted to, the conscience may prove; it is nevertheless, like every other endowment belonging to human nature, liable

⁸ *Vide ante*, s. 7.

not only to be abused or perverted, but has certain defects necessarily inherent in it, or inseparable from its very nature and constitution.⁹ There are, indeed, two especial defects or liabilities to perversion peculiarly incident to conscience, which are, however, not only very dissimilar, but entirely opposite in their kind, to which all persons are more or less liable, and both of which impede, although in a very different mode, the due operation of this endowment.

The first of these defects is the liability of the conscience to become insensible, and callous, and hardened, by which it fails to be excited as regards either of its constituent elements, when the proper occasions for this purpose arrive. This is the most ordinary of the disorders to which it is subject, and to which probably the consciences of most men are more or less exposed. The other leading defect of the conscience, consists in an over-susceptibility with which it is sometimes affected, so that it is too easily excited, and is startled by trivial incidents which ought not to disturb it. Matters with which we have in reality no concern, are in this case made to appear as though we were directly connected with them. The conscience is thus rendered over-watchful, and is like a person in dread of phantoms or of shadows, who is ever conjuring up ideas of beings which have no existence.

Cases of this kind, if they do not amount to actual disease of this endowment, are strictly analogous to disease in the material frame; and indeed the leading manifestations of disease occasioned by organic disarrangement, are undue insensibility and undue over-sensibility. But what may strictly be termed disease of the conscience, can only arise from actual disease in one or other of the powers and endowments which constitute conscience. Possibly, indeed, anything in the nature of deformity or irregularity in these powers or endowments themselves, may develop itself in actual disease in their complex combinations. Thus, what might be considered disease in the conscience, would probably originate from the undue predominance of any particular capacity in the faculty of reason in the manner I shall point out when discussing the nature of that faculty,¹ and through means of which the wrong capacity is employed about a particular subject. Or this defect in, or disease of, the conscience may spring from some cause existing in the medial part of our nature, and residing in the emotions which contribute to the constitution of conscience. For instance, the irregularity in question as regards the emotions is experienced when they are either too dull or too susceptible; when important events fail to

⁹ "Conscience, as in other respects, so in this also, is like the eye, which can see all other things, but not itself."—*Burgess of Original Sinne*, pt. iii. c. ii. p. 236.

¹ *Vide post*, b. iii. c. iii. s. 7, et c. vii. s. 10.

rouse them, or they are apt to be irritated by every trivial occurrence. While some persons appear as dead to any moral appeals, and as insensible to conviction, as the sturdy oak in winter is to the winds which whistle round it;² others are like certain trees whose leaves are ever quivering with the slightest breath of air, their feelings being agitated by every trifling concern which comes under their cognizance.

Conscience is, however, mainly dependent for its efficiency on the constitution and condition of the faculty of reason; and on the soundness, and proper cultivation, and healthiness of this faculty. Probably, indeed, most of the defects and perversions of conscience, originate in, and are caused by, defects and perversions of the reason. The condition and discipline of the emotions, and of the other endowments, both medial and moral, especially of the dispositions and desires, must also have considerable influence here. When the character and conduct are duly regulated, all parts of the system act in harmony together. Thus, an action which is prescribed by the reason as strictly in accordance with the principles of right and truth, is determined on by the will, and the emotions urge forward its pursuit. Men comparatively seldom, however, act deliberately in opposition either to what the reason directs, or the conscience dictates. Those who are either incapable of discerning error from truth, or wrong from right, or whose moral feelings are thoroughly depraved, must, of course, be made exceptions to this rule.³ Different persons, however, differ greatly one from another both as to their power of determining upon what is right and what is wrong, and also as to their susceptibility of being moved or excited by considerations of this nature. The quality of the standard for this purpose which is set up in the mind of each person, and which has already been alluded to, must also, of course, occasion considerable variation here.

Conscience is, moreover, always liable to be deceived, in the same way as are both the reason and the senses.⁴ It is, how-

² According to *Burgess*, "the consciences of all men by nature are polluted and defiled. Conscience is naturally polluted, not only by the blindness, but also by the senselessness and stupidity that is upon it."—*Of Original Sinne*, pt. iii. c. ii. pp. 222, 226.

³ It is remarked by *Mr. Darwin* that some of the worst criminals have been, apparently, entirely destitute of conscience.—*Descent of Man*, &c., vol. i. p. 92.

⁴ "In what have been designated as 'cases of conscience,' the most enlightened moralist may have a difficulty in deciding what is the right course of action, simply because the moral sense finds so much to approve on both sides, that it cannot assign a preponderance to either."—*Dr. Carpenter's Principles of Mental Physiology*, p. 244.

Bishop Taylor, however, observes that "an erring conscience binds as much as the right conscience."—*Duct. Dub., Works*, vol. xi. p. 423.

ever, comparatively less frequently deceived than are the latter, inasmuch, and just so far, as we generally have a clearer and nearer view of moral, than we have of material subjects. In all these cases, however, it is ordinarily, and for the most part, rather ourselves than our endowments which are at fault. It is not that they are inadequate to the duties which devolve upon them; but it is because we neglect to use them properly, or with due care, that they fail us so frequently as they do.

It may be objected, however, and with much apparent reason, to the genuineness of certain of the operations of conscience, that in many cases, where the commission of a fault by any one is made public, he feels great remorse for it, and his conscience is much troubled; whereas it suffers but little on the commission of the same fault so long as this is kept secret from the world. The fact is, however, that in this case it is shame, not the sting of conscience, which mainly excites him; in addition to which, the pointing to the action as heinous by the world, doubtless conduces to set the conscience at work, and urges it on to pronounce our condemnation. The throes of conscience and the pangs of remorse are often, indeed, mistaken for each other. Both appear habited in the same garb; and when they are either of them discovered in the places most natural for the other, great difficulty in discriminating rightly between them is experienced. A criminal suffering from fear of death, often appears overwhelmed by conscience; a man overwhelmed by a reproving conscience, is frequently deemed a prey to poignant, and perhaps causeless sorrow.

Sometimes the imagination, or that trivial effort of it which we term fancy, intrudes to disturb the due operation of the conscience, and usurps the proper place of the reason in its constitution. The different emotions, too, often combine to interfere with the regular economy of the conscience, and that in various ways; so jealous of, and so opposed to the higher operations, do the lower endowments occasionally appear.⁵

⁵ The chaplain of one of our largest lunatic asylums, who has held the office several years, and whose accurate observation and sound judgment peculiarly qualify him for dealing with such topics, writes to me as follows in reply to some queries which I submitted to him for his opinion respecting the conscience being influenced by mental disease, and the mode of this influence, whether deadened or quickened, or altogether perverted:—

“I have an opinion as regards many of the insane, that they have a modified responsibility; but I would regard it with reference to the subject of religious obligation. As the consolations of religion are experienced by the insane, so we may infer that in such cases the obligations of religion are in some degree binding. But it always seems to me that it is almost impossible to draw a line between responsibility and irresponsibility in a person proved insane which will meet every case, or indeed fully meet any single case.

What is ordinarily intended by perversion of conscience, consists in this endowment being either led astray through the error of the reason, in the mode lately alluded to; or by the conscience having become deadened and rendered insensible by frequent violations of it: when finding its dictates wholly disregarded, the reason ceases to act in pointing out the course of right and wrong; and the attendant emotion also ceases to operate and to excite us upon each departure from the correct line of duty. As deadness of conscience is the most common kind of defect or perversion, so this condition is ordinarily occasioned by repeated violations of the conscience itself.

Every affection of the soul by sin, more especially when it has been in any degree subjugated to its influence, more or less taints or infects it; and it may be doubted whether this blemish is ever entirely got rid of, even in the case of those whose former evil courses act as an ardent stimulus to the practice of virtue so soon as their reformation has been effected. But even in these individuals, there is a weakness, and a degree of callousness, which renders their condition very different to that of persons who have never indulged in habitual or gross sin. A healed wound is better than a sore; but to be altogether sound, is more desirable still.

And as in the material frame a sense of pain is occasioned by lacerating the skin wherein the sense of feeling is contained, and no new excitement of pain is produced by cutting deeper into the body when this is once passed; so with regard to the pain occasioned by the violation of the conscience, when this is once produced, no new or greater pain results from plunging deeper into crime. The conscience being once violated, the moral pang is experienced to the full; and no additional commission of evil excites it afresh. On this account it is that persons once plunged fully into guilt, whose consciences have been completely violated and become seared, are no longer under any moral restraint, and run without remorse into the utmost excesses to which vice may allure them.

As the excitement of feeling by action upon the skin which covers the entire body, serves as a warning of danger to the whole material frame; so the conscience which is aroused by the first wilful wrongful act of whatever kind, serves as a protection against evil to the whole moral constitution and course of conduct.

Nevertheless, it is possible for a person to be guilty of the greatest and even basest crimes, without being naturally actually depraved; while one, who is naturally depraved, may

“When there is only a partial loss of moral consciousness, and of the power of self-control, there can be only a partial suspension of the obligation resulting from these faculties, whether they are enfeebled generally, or wholly perverted in relation to particular actions.”

be proved to be so by the commission of offences of less magnitude and turpitude than those effected by the other. Thus, a bad or neglected education, or a long course of iniquity from youth, may altogether deaden the conscience; so that dishonesty, and many other crimes of a serious nature, may be committed without remorse, or even without the consciousness of having done wrong.⁶ On the other hand, when a person has been educated in a virtuous course, and the evil, and moral baseness of crimes of this nature have been pointed out to him; in the event of his committing these offences, he not only does so knowing them to be such, but in direct violation of his moral feeling of right and wrong. The depravity of such a person is natural and inherent. His mind is essentially corrupt, while that of the other is merely untaught. In the one case it is misdirected, while in the other no right direction has been given to it. Hence, a Christian whose conscience is seared, is in a far lower moral position than is a heathen. The latter has at least a moral guide and monitor, while the former is without any pilot at all. The one steers in friendly seas indeed, but in darkness, and without a compass. The other steers in strange waters, but has a compass and chart to preserve him from the perils in which the other must inevitably sooner or later be involved.

The reason why in some particular instances, the commission of a crime not only affects the conscience, but degrades the whole moral being, appearing even to suspend altogether the operation of conscience,—as in the case of loss of chastity in a woman, which so often leads her on without scruple to indulge recklessly in other crimes;—is that from the consciousness of having abandoned the main position, the citadel of virtue having been surrendered, the rest of the city is left a prey to the invader without resistance, and all hope of recovering the abandoned stronghold, or of rescuing what is now rendered defenceless, is entirely given up.

Trifling with conscience, and torturing it by frequent violations of it, are like trifling with the material frame, and straining its sinews by over-exertion. Although at each successive effort it may feel less pain, and may become less and less sensible to the evil that is being effected; yet by degrees, however gradually and imperceptibly, the whole vigour of the body is destroyed. By being thus constantly forced, the conscience at length entirely loses its elasticity, and

⁶ *Captain Cook* alludes to and describes the acts of lewdness and obscenity, openly practised without any feeling of delicacy, or sense of shame, by the natives of Otaheite.—*Cook's Voyages*, vol. i. pp. 68, 93.

And *Sir John Lubbock* observes that "the ideas of virtue extremely differ. Neither faith, hope, nor charity enter into the virtues of a savage."—*Pre-historic Times*, c. xv.

in time becomes unable to act at all. Moderate stimulus to the conscience, like moderate healthful excitement of the material frame, invigorates instead of weakens it, and prepares it for greater undertakings.

The most direct and certain mode of deadening and perverting the conscience, is by moral self-delusion,⁷ or hypocritical outward professions of extraordinary sanctity and purity, while the soul is habituated to wickedness, and full of guile. To such persons, of all others, genuine repentance is the most difficult, nay, almost impossible; for they have been so long in the habit of deceiving their conscience, that it in turn retaliates by deceiving them. They are at last unable to tell when it really does act, and die the hypocrites to themselves which they have lived to the world.

And here we may observe that there is more ground for the suspicion of their sincerity, which often attaches to ostentatious professors of extraordinary piety, than many real Christians may be disposed to allow. For, in the first place, true religion sinks too deep into the soul to be for ever disporting and displaying itself upon the surface; and, even if observed there, it will at once instinctively retire down to its accustomed depths, in order to shun the vulgar gaze. And, in the next place, when upon a matter so solemn, men have once begun to profess what they do not feel, and to substitute the spurious for the genuine; no limit can be fixed to their career in the course of deception, both of the world and of themselves.

11. *Conscience capable of Cultivation.*

If, however, as I endeavoured to point out in a former section of this chapter, our power over the conscience to control or direct its operations and impulses, is so very limited; it is important to ascertain whether we are able by any voluntary efforts to extend or accelerate, or by any course of action to discipline them, so as to render them in reality more efficacious in the regulation of our conduct. The cultivation of the conscience, the mode of carrying it out, and the practicability of such a proceeding, require therefore next to be considered.

As in the case of every other moral endowment, the conscience is susceptible of cultivation and discipline, whereby it is rendered in all respects more efficient and perfect in performing its operations; as also better adapted to answer the various

⁷ As *Locke* truly remarks, "it is not safe to fly into error, and dress it up to ourselves in the shape of truth." The mind loses its relish for truth if reconciled to error.—*Conduct of the Understanding*, s. 33.

purposes for which, in the constitution of our nature, it was intended to serve.

With respect to the mode of effecting this grand object, inasmuch as the conscience is in part compounded of the faculty of reason, and as any defects in this faculty correspondingly affect the conscience; it must necessarily follow that whatever contributes to the cultivation and discipline of the reason, contributes also more or less to the cultivation and discipline of the conscience. Moreover, whatever conduces to strengthen and perfect the exercise of reason, conduces also to render more correct the decisions of conscience. In a corresponding manner also, the emotions contributing in part to the constitution of conscience, their right discipline and regulation are essential to the due operation of conscience, which fails to act properly when they are either too callous and insensible, or too excitable and irritable. Not only, indeed, the emotions, but the appetites and passions, as also the moral endowments already described, in common with that of conscience, require to be duly ordered and directed; and the more completely this is effected, the less will they interfere with the proper exercise of conscience, to whose sway they should ever be made to acknowledge their allegiance. In addition, moreover, to the improvement of these endowments, the cultivation of the understanding as well contributes greatly to the more correct operation of the conscience; and the more extensively the mind is supplied with ideas, especially those relating to moral subjects, in a corresponding degree the conscience will be the better enabled to steer with exact propriety our moral course.* Hence, the inculcation of sound, and correct, and definite principles as to our moral conduct, is the surest and most efficient mode of cultivating the conscience, by means of which it possesses a true and unerring test to which may be referred all its deliberations and decisions. There can be no doubt, moreover, that in proportion as high and correct moral principle is implanted in the mind of any individual, his conscience will become both more vigilant, and more sound. By this means also the standard of right and wrong already referred to, and to which the reason of each person appeals during the determinations made by conscience, is rendered at once more exalted, more definite, and more clear.

Another efficient mode of cultivating the conscience, by

* "The consciences of all would come forth with the same moral decision were all equally enlightened in the circumstances, or in the essential relations and consequences of the deed in question; and what is just as essential to this uniformity of judgment, were all viewing it fairly as well as fully."—*Dr. Chalmers. Works*, vol. i. p. 342.

which indeed it receives a sort of training, is the strict discipline and ordering of our own conduct in regard to acts of moral duty, by means of which in time the conscience itself is made to protest against any and every deviation from this course.

In the case of children, the conscience is as fully existent, correspondent with the development of their reasoning faculty and their emotions, as in the case of grown-up persons. It acts, however, in the former case, occasionally irregularly and imperfectly, not from any deficiency in itself, but from want of exercise, and of sufficient data to work upon; just as the physical frame of the child from corresponding causes, acts less energetically and powerfully in certain instances, than does that of the grown-up person.⁹

It is nevertheless, probably, not so much in acuteness as in correctness, that the conscience is improved by cultivation, whatever may be the result of this proceeding upon certain capacities of the reason. Indeed, as we have seen, the conscience is by no means necessarily more perfect in its decisions, because it is more susceptible in its excitement. Its highest attainment in this respect is reached when it learns to give the just and due proportion of regard to each impression or vibration, so as, on the one hand, not to be too readily moved by every trivial cause, or, on the other hand, not to be callous when events of real moment ought to arouse it. A well-regulated conscience is to the soul, what a sound state of health is to the body. All its functions are carried on with due vigour and power. The frame is free alike from the deadness of paralysis on the one hand, and from the excitement of fever on the other.

The real and essential test indeed of excellence in conscience, is its truthfulness. Exactly according as in its admonitions and decisions it adheres to the standard of veracity, it is perfect; and it is erring precisely in proportion as it deviates from that standard.

According therefore to the extent and the nature of the intellectual and moral cultivation which they have received, different persons will differ much both as to the vigour and the accuracy with which the conscience of each individual exerts itself. Indeed, as regards conscience, cultivation appears to constitute a greater difference between different persons, than does even variety in natural endowment with respect to the constituents of conscience. Among those alone where the reasoning faculty has been duly cultivated and developed, is the conscience per-

⁹ *Mr. Herbert Spencer* says:—"Do not expect from a child any great amount of moral goodness. During early years every civilized man passes through that phase of character exhibited by the barbarous race from which he is descended."—*Education; Intellectual, Moral, and Physical*, c. iii.

fectly exercised. And not only by cultivation are their reasonings rendered more correct, but the standard of right and wrong to which they appeal in these reasonings, is more elevated and more discernible. Savages are as inferior to civilized men as regards their moral decisions, as they are in the exercise of their intellectual faculties, although in both the same moral endowments and mental powers are existent. They differ one from another in each case, according to the difference in their development. But inasmuch as the temptations to commit crime are much fewer in an uncivilized than in a civilized state of society, so savages are often apparently more virtuous than civilized men. Whenever the temptations to commit crime arise, it is at once seen how undisciplined and uncultivated beings act without moral restraint; and so have neither power to resist evil when it assails them, nor discernment to choose the correct course between different roads which are open to them.

The conscience will moreover vary much, perhaps not indeed as to its correctness, or its vigour of operation, but as regards the precise direction towards which its impulses incline, according to the peculiar creed, or the governing principle of conduct, of the party in question. A heathen and a Christian will have the same conscience; but it will be directed very differently, according to the particular moral principles by which each is guided. Man is everywhere man; but man varies essentially, according to the climate he inhabits, the society he cultivates, and the education he receives. The conscience moreover, acts not so much according to what a man knows and sees, as according to what he believes and feels.¹ Thus, the same man at different periods of his life, although his conscience may be throughout essentially unchanged, will be influenced by it very differently, according as his views or sentiments of a moral kind may chance to vary. Hence, conscience can be infallible only in those cases where perfect principles are appealed to as its guide, and perfect knowledge is supplied as to the matter on which it is to decide.

It is a clear duty to take care of our conscience, both as regards keeping it pure, and cultivating it properly; more especially as, in the case of the intellectual faculties, its improvement may be by the latter means so largely promoted. Its value to us demands that we should do all in our power both for effecting its preservation, and for ensuring its perfection.

¹ "One of the chief diversities of human character arises from the circumstance of one man being habitually influenced by the simple and straightforward principle of duty; and another merely by a kind of contest between desires and motives of a very inferior or selfish nature."—*Abercrombie on the Moral Feelings*, p. 22.

12. *Conscience how far common to Animals, as well as to Man.*

From several circumstances connected with the constitution of the nature of animals, considerable controversy might be raised as to whether they are not, to a certain extent, if not absolutely, gifted with the endowment of conscience; or, at any rate, with a sort of moral or directing impulse as regards their conduct, closely analogous to it.² Many of them appear to possess a knowledge of right and wrong; and they are most of them capable of receiving a certain sort of education or training to a large extent. They exhibit, moreover, a very keen perception of having transgressed the rule of duty prescribed. Indeed, with regard to the subject of the last section, we may here observe that whatever animals possess, I will not say of conscience, but resembling or analogous to it, they owe entirely to the cultivation or training which they are adapted for receiving. But how is such an opinion consistent with the supposition that they are not endowed with conscience?

It appears to me that the deficiency of animals in regard to conscience, is strictly analogous to what I have already observed with regard to their deficiency in moral qualities, and

² "Any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, would inevitably acquire a moral sense, or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers have become as well developed as in man."—*Darwin's Descent of Man, &c.*, vol. i. pp. 71, 72.

Reid, on the other hand, lays it down that conscience "is a faculty of which no trace can be discovered in any of the inferior creatures."—*On the Active Powers*, p. 258.

A very decided opinion is expressed by *Mr. Wood* in his work before mentioned, that animals do possess conscience, and to the full extent; as also a "sense of moral responsibility, and a capability of distinguishing between right and wrong."—*Vol. ii.* pp. 111, 112, 134.

On the subject of conscience in animals, an interesting note has been communicated to me by *Professor de Quatrefages*, to whom I applied for his opinion on the topics embraced by the present section; in which, after premising the necessity of defining exactly the meaning here attached to the term "conscience," he proceeds to remark that "the moral conscience does not exist in the dog. We teach him that which is right or wrong in our eyes; but nothing will induce us to suppose that the abstract idea of moral right or wrong exists in him. Among animals that live in society, there is nothing more of either right or wrong there, beyond what is useful or what is hurtful to the social body. A bee will incur death to defend its hive; the stallion when free, and the bull in its wild state, protect their families and their young against the attacks of wild beasts. But beyond this I see nothing."

Vide ante, Prel. Diss., vol. i. s. 10, a. 5, p. 211.

disposition, and other endowments generally of this nature.³ They possess, to some extent, certain of the emotions, and appetites, and passions, and affections, which contribute to those endowments; but they are wholly wanting in the mental powers which should complete their constitution, and direct their operation. Hence, in questions of moral conduct and duty, such as would come within the scope of conscience, they are guided by their medial excitements and endowments only; and by the reciprocal and counteracting operations of these agents, they are impelled in a certain course, but without any intelligent direction to guide them. Thus, they may act right, although they do not know right. They may follow a proper course, though they pursue it blindly.

One essential element in many of the operations of conscience, is the recognition of obedience to a superior. Animals are fully capable of this effort, which does not however comprise the whole of those exerted in the operations of conscience. And while animals recognize it so far as to submit to constraint from motives of fear; man alone does so from motives of duty, and at the dictate of reason, which is, as we have seen, an essential and leading element in the constitution of conscience.

Hence animals, whose instinctive impulses so much resemble those of conscience, are nevertheless wholly destitute of it. These impulses are none of them intellectual, but proceed from the medial excitements and endowments only, and have no reference whatever to moral subjects. Nearly, therefore, as their impulses, or many of them, are akin to those of conscience in the vigour, and in the correctness too, with which they direct their actions; animals nevertheless differ entirely from man, in that they are totally wanting in this important moral endowment.

Animals, moreover, although they have abundant social relations, have nothing strictly of the nature of social duty which devolves upon them. Though they perform many acts in respect to one another, they perform them by impulse, without the aid of intellect, and therefore without any sense of duty, or of moral obligation; and consequently without the direction of conscience.

Some particular animals, however, appear to be so dull and inanimate as to be destitute not only of every endowment analogous to conscience, but even of most of the medial excitements and impulses which contribute to constitute it. Hence it might be contended or inferred, that although some animals are essentially and entirely wanting in conscience, all animals

³ *Vide ante*, vol. i. b. i. c. iv. s. 10; c. v. s. 2.; vol. ii. b. ii. c. i. s. 10; c. ii. s. 9.

whatsoever, inasmuch as they are not each alike gifted with the same essential qualities and endowments, but exhibit them in very different degrees, cannot be in the same manner so wanting. Without presuming to determine whether, and to what extent, the argument here raised might hold good; I may content myself with referring to the principle that I have already laid down, which appears equally applicable to animal nature generally, and from which I conclude that all animals alike are essentially and entirely destitute both of actual mental and moral endowment, and consequently of conscience also. And however widely animals may differ one from another, this deficiency as regards the non-existence of conscience in its strict and full sense, is exhibited in every animal alike, correspondingly, and completely.

Animals generally appear to be entirely wanting in those feelings or impulses which occasion or relate to a sense of decency and shame, as regards the discharge of the natural functions belonging to an animal frame. Even the most refined and delicate of them evince not only no sense of diffidence, but no bashfulness whatever, in performing those functions in the most public manner, both in the presence of each other and of man; although as to some actions, especially in eating, and in cherishing their young, some of them occasionally exhibit much shyness and reserve, and seem to be desirous of avoiding observation when thus engaged. It is clear, therefore, that shame and modesty, which are so often connected with the operations of conscience, are not capable of being thus excited in them. Perhaps, indeed, according to reason and nature, shame ought never to attach to the discharge of duties which not only spring from the peculiar quality of our constitution, but which are actually necessary to be done. Indeed, shame in this case among mankind must originate, not from the due operation, but from the over-susceptibility or irritability of the conscience, as in the cases of perversion of the conscience already described. A sense of shame can only legitimately result from a consciousness of wrong doing; and this cannot arise from the discharge of what is either essential to our nature, or necessary to be performed. Hence, Adam and Eve before they knew sin, did not know shame. Animals do not know shame, because they are not capable of committing sin, which might be appealed to as another proof that animals are destitute of conscience. When, however, an animal has been trained to avoid any particular act, it at once exhibits a feeling analogous to a sense of shame, on being detected in transgressing the prescribed rule; which, however, arises solely, as I have before stated, from the excitement of the emotion of fear as to the consequences of its disobedience. In man, the feeling of modesty is caused, not by any emotion connected with his natural functions, and

innate in the mind ; but from the consciousness of transgressing a moral rule, whenever we discharge them so as to offend the feelings of others. When they are performed without this violation, no sense of shame arises.

Savages, indeed, who are not supposed to be destitute of conscience, although in their case it is uncultivated, exhibit the same deficiency in regard to decency that animals do ; and it might therefore fairly be urged that if it is no proof of want of conscience in their case, it ought not to be admitted to be so in the case of animals. These people are, however, in a condition but little above that of animals, either mental or moral, of which, indeed, their deficiency as regards the operations of conscience in many respects, is one of the most striking proofs.

Although instinct may be said to guide animals in their various proceedings, in a manner analogous to that in which reason guides man ; yet it does not appear that any emotion accompanies their actions of any kind, corresponding with that which contributes to the constitution of the conscience in man. Nor is it to be inferred from any circumstances connected with their conduct, that such emotion is ever excited ; if, indeed, we except those cases where fear of punishment from breach of an act of discipline affects them, but which, as has already been pointed out, is totally different, both in man and animals, from a qualm of conscience.

But although animals are wholly destitute of any such endowment as conscience, to guide them in their career ; through their instinctive endowments, and the subtilty and susceptibility of their material organs, they are probably more extensively influenced, and more immediately impelled by certain emotions, as also by their appetites and passions, than is the case with man. From this arrangement in the economy of their nature, they are in many respects arbitrarily restrained and directed, which in a great measure serves them for their mere animal duties and requirements, almost as efficiently as, and in a manner corresponding with that in which, the conscience does man.

BOOK III.

THE MENTAL NATURE AND CONSTITUTION OF MAN.



CHAPTER I.

THE INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES.

1. *Distinction between, and peculiar proper Province of, the Mind, the Intellectual Faculties, and the Will.*

THE consideration of the faculties of the mind, which is proposed as the subject of the present book, is at once one of the noblest, and at the same time one of the most difficult topics upon which that mind can be engaged. Knowing all things but imperfectly, itself it appears to know least intimately of all; just as the eye which sees every object about it, is to itself alone always invisible.

In order however to acquire a clear and distinct idea of the subject before us—which must be a principle of the first importance in every process of philosophical investigation—we ought to regard the soul as not merely made up of certain active powers, which the intellectual faculties constitute; but as a being which, like every other being of whatever nature, possesses properties and qualities, distinctive, characteristic of, and essential to it, as well as its more prominent features and endowments. The moral qualities and attributes of the soul, have been considered more particularly in the preceding book of this treatise; and in the first book an inquiry was instituted into the various excitements and affections to which the soul is liable.

By the term mind,¹ I mean the whole active intelligent power of the soul—as distinguished from its feelings, or passive power or liability to be excited or moved, on the one hand, and its moral and other qualities, on the other. By the intellectual faculties, I mean the active powers or capabilities of the soul.² By the will, I mean the resolute determination of the mind, after due deliberation, as to the course which it eventually resolves to adopt. Of the nature and prerogative of the

¹ *Vide ante, Prel. Diss. s. iv. a. 2.*

² "This perceiving active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul, or myself."—*Bishop Berkley. Principles of Human Knowledge, s. 2.*

"I find in myself divers faculties of thinking, that have each their special mode; for example, I find I possess the faculties of imagining and perceiving."—*Des Cartes. Medit. vi.*

will generally, I have already treated in a previous chapter,³ where its constitution was defined, and its office was pointed out; while the nature and extent of its freedom, were also attempted to be demonstrated.

Soul and spirit are in reality the same, and constitute the being or substratum in which the mind, and all its faculties, exist or reside.⁴

An idea is the picture, image, or notion, of any subject, or object, which exists in the mind; and which is what, and the whole of what, the mind perceives of such subject or object: analogous to a sensation, which is a visual or oral perception, or impression, of a sight or sound, for instance, which is excited in the corporeal organ of seeing or hearing.

The soul is to the mind, what the body is to the man; the vehicle or principle of existence or reality.⁵ The faculties and capacities of the soul, are the powers by which it acts. They are to the soul, what the limbs and sinews are to the body; and the operation of the soul by these faculties, is what motion by means of the limbs is to the body. Hence action is only the motion, and not, as some have erroneously supposed and contended, the essence of the soul.⁶

It is not impossible, nor indeed improbable, that the main and real distinction between human and animal nature, may be simply this: that man has a soul with intellectual faculties annexed to it; while an animal has a soul, but without any intellectual faculties.⁷

The mind, the intellect, and the intellectual faculties, mean therefore in reality the same thing; although one term may sometimes comprehend rather more, or rather less, than another: just as a person may talk of his house, his residence, and his abode, meaning thereby the same identical dwelling-place. Thus, the house might be contended to include the kitchen and the cellar, which are not necessarily comprehended under the

³ *Vide ante*, b. ii. c. 1, ss. 2, 3.

⁴ *Vide ante*, *Prel. Diss.*, s. 4., a. 1, 3.

⁵ "By the word spirit, we mean only that which thinks, wills, and perceives; this, and this alone, constitutes the signification of that term."
—*Bishop Berkeley. Principles of Human Knowledge*, s. 138.

⁶ *Vide ante*, *Prel. Diss.*, s. 6, a. 2.

⁷ *Buffon* considers that all the actions of animals may be explained without allowing them either thought or reflection, the internal sense being sufficient to produce all their movements.—*Natural History. Nature of Animals*.

Le Roy, on the contrary, holds that "the commonest actions of animals, their daily proceedings, suppose memory, reflection upon the past, comparison between a present object which excites their desire, and the indications of danger which repel them, a power of distinguishing between circumstances which are alike in some points, while differing in others; finally, a power of appreciating their relations, and deciding among them."—*On the Intelligence and Perfectibility of Animals*, letter vii.

denominations of residence, or abode. So, in alluding to our intellectual constitution, we speak indifferently of the mind, and intellect, and intellectual faculties; although, at the same time, we no more mean that they are three different, independent beings, than a man who talks indifferently of his house, his residence, and his abode, intends us thereby to infer that he has three separate and distinct places of dwelling.

Each of the different capacities of the several intellectual faculties, are distinct and independent, but each have relation to the mind, and are therefore apt to be confounded with it, and to be supposed to constitute but one organ; just as the different nerves and muscles each vary in their nature, and fulfil very different offices in the economy of the constitution of the body, but are nevertheless frequently confounded together, and have been supposed to form but one organ or instrument.

The different faculties of the mind are moreover each as distinct from, and independent of one another, as are the different senses belonging to the body. And these different capacities of the several faculties, are also each as distinct and independent of one another, as are the nerves and muscles of different kinds connected with the various bodily senses. But as one sense can never be substituted for, or perform the functions of another; so one capacity of the mind can never undertake the proper duties of another. Both the senses and the capacities, however, essentially aid, and mutually influence each other. Indeed, as we shall presently see,⁸ not only all the faculties of the mind, but all parts of the system of man, communicate and co-operate together

The senses supply the understanding with ideas, or rather with the materials for them, which are termed sensations. Reason and genius are made use of to turn these ideas to account. The memory is employed to preserve them. Or, if we assimilate the constitution of man to a commercial country, the ideas may be considered as the merchandize which is brought to its shores, and the senses as the ports by which that merchandize enters. The understanding is the quay on which they are landed. Reason and genius are the manufactories of different kinds in which its raw articles of merchandize are worked up. The memory is the magazine or storehouse in which its merchandize is deposited.

2. *Various and unremitting Action of the Mind.*

As all material objects are known to us primarily, and perhaps principally also, by their prominent sensible qualities, which are perceived by their substance; so mind is primarily and

⁸ *Vide post, chap. vi. ss. 4, 5, 7.*

principally known to us by action, which is its prominent, or, at any rate, main cognizant characteristic. Speech shadows forth, as it were, the shape of the mind; but action alone serves to acquaint us with its essence. In ascertaining therefore the main qualities, and the leading powers of the mind, we must inquire into its mode of action.

When the ideas of any object or any subject have been communicated to the mind, it exerts itself with regard to them in different ways according to circumstances, which are principally of three kinds. Occasionally, the mind simply perceives, and informs itself of, their general qualities and nature, without reference to anything besides or beyond this fact. In this operation, as we shall presently see, the faculty which I have denominated the understanding, is that which is called into action.⁹ It frequently happens, however, that when the mind has obtained these ideas, it is not satisfied with merely viewing or contemplating them, but it proceeds to compare them, either one with another, or with other subjects or ideas, and to endeavour to discover the difference between them. This it performs by the faculty which I have called reason. In some cases it exerts itself to unite together different ideas, or subjects, in various modes, so as to form new combinations out of them. This it accomplishes by the faculty which I have termed genius.

Thus we have exhibited to us the three principal and distinctive operations of the mind; and hence may we most correctly derive and determine the nature of its powers of operation, or faculties themselves.¹ As regards also the mode of

⁹ The receipt by the mind of impressions, or simple ideas, is termed by *Locke* perception (*Essay on the Understanding*, b. ii. c. 9. ss. 1, 2); and which operation, he asserts, is the first step and degree towards knowledge, and the inlet of all the materials of it.—*Ibid.* s. 15.

According to *Burton* the rational soul is divided into two chief parts; the understanding, which is the rational power, apprehending; and the will, which is the rational power, moving.—*Anatomy of Melancholy*, pt. i. s. 1. p. 27.

Des Cartes says,—“By the understanding alone I merely apprehend the ideas regarding which I may form a judgment.”—*Medit.* iv.

“It is the understanding which perceives; since it is only its business to receive the ideas of objects. For the soul to perceive an object, and to receive the idea which represents it, is one and the same thing. It is also the understanding which perceives the modifications of the soul; since I mean by this word understanding that passive faculty of the soul through the means of which it receives all the different modifications it is capable of.”—*Malebranche. Search after Truth*, b. i. c. 1.

“By understanding I mean that passive faculty the soul has of perceiving; that is, of receiving, not only different ideas, but also an abundance of different sensations, as matter has a capacity of receiving all sorts of external figures, and internal configurations.”—*Ibid.*

¹ According, however, to *Burlamaqui*, the principal faculties of the soul are understanding, will, and liberty.—*Principles of Natural Law*, pt. i. c. i. s. 5.

dealing with ideas, it may be observed that the understanding, deals with, that is, receives, but one idea, or collection of ideas, at a time. The reason, in comparing them, deals with never less, and not often at a time with more, than two. And genius, in combining them, with seldom less than three.

The soul is moved to action by various causes, and in various modes. In beings endowed with vitality, and with the power of changing at will their position, motion may originate in two kinds of ways; either by some independent being or object affecting them, and causing them to move, or by the exercise of the power which these beings possess within themselves, of producing in their own bodies such motion. Thus, also, it is with the soul. Motion of the former kind, such as results from the operation upon it of external causes, is occasioned by the emotions, appetites, passions, affections, and desires; and also by the sensation arising from the entrance into the mind of impressions from any objects. Motion of the latter kind, is produced by the exercise of that power of action which the mind possesses in itself, and which it is able in various ways, and upon various subjects, to make use of, the determination to exert which I have denominated the will.²

Nevertheless, when the soul is excited by external causes, the faculties themselves are not necessarily called into action, but the emotions, passions, and affections are then so moved, by which is understood the agitation of the soul as a whole, in a particular way; just as any external cause which moves the body, does not necessarily set the sinews or limbs in activity, but agitates the frame as a whole, quite independent of any of those organs by which it is able to move itself.³

The will is determined in its course of action by some influence or motive, consisting ordinarily in the prospect either of immediate or eventual pleasure or pain, good or evil, as the result of its decision, according to the principles laid down in the preceding book.⁴

Hence, while the emotion of irritation is in most cases, the original and exciting, those of pleasure, and joy, and pain, and anguish, are in all cases, the final, and in many cases also more or less, the original causes of action in the mind. The emotions of irritation, pain, and grief, are what first excite, or *will* us to exertion; and by those of pleasure and joy, and to attain the condition allied to these emotions, are we directed, or

² *Dr. Carpenter*, nevertheless, remarks that "it may be stated as a fundamental principle, that the will can never originate any form of mental activity."—*Principles of Mental Physiology*, b. i. c. 1.

³ *Des Cartes* asserts that the mind is of such a nature, that the motions of the body alone are sufficient to excite in it all sorts of thoughts.—*Principles of Philosophy*, pt. 4. a. 197.

⁴ *Vide ante*, b. ii. c. i. ss. 2, 3.

willed, in all our actions. In this respect, the current of our thoughts might be said to resemble that of a river flowing through a mountainous country, which is constantly being diverted by some obstacle, or drawn aside by some descent. Thus are the cogitations of the mind naturally urged forward in the course which is most agreeable, and are ever being attracted by new objects. If left to themselves, like a stream in a level country, they would flow in a regular course of succession, one idea being introduced by another, according as it happened to be associated with it. When we endeavour to fix our attention on some very dry subject which is unpleasant to the mind to dwell upon, we shall observe our thoughts constantly being diverted from it, running off into another channel, and following a more agreeable topic.⁵

That, however, which ultimately determines the operation of the mind as regards its attraction towards, and the attention which it bestows on, any particular subject in preference to others; is the extent to which it immediately affects us by its apparent liability either to produce pain or pleasure, and so stimulates us at once to deal with it, while other ideas not so calculated to affect us, pass unheeded. Thus, trifles may be for the moment of great consequence in this respect, and the direction of our thoughts is irregularly impelled this or that way, according as the current drives it on.

The mind is nevertheless able of itself to direct not only its actions, but also its thoughts, to pursue a regular train of them, and to keep the attention fixed on one particular subject. Different minds, however, differ very much from each other as regards their power to resist these external impulses, and to control their own action, independent of the latter, which is one of very great importance.⁶ In some cases, the mind steers its

⁵ *Dr. Carpenter* observes that "in proportion as we are able to concentrate our attention on the subject proper to the time, and to exclude all distracting considerations whilst pursuing the train of thought which the contemplation of it suggests, will be our power of advantageously employing our intellectual faculties in the acquirement of knowledge, and in the pursuit of truth; and all men who have been distinguished by their intellectual achievements, have possessed this faculty to a considerable degree."—*Principles of Mental Physiology*, b. i. c. 9. pp. 387, 388.

The same able and distinguished writer also remarks that among the lower animals, "we find no evidence that any of them have a volitional power of directing their mental operations at all similar to that of man."—*Ibid*, c. 2. p. 105.

⁶ *Locke* points out the importance of being able to dispose of our own thoughts, and to obtain a full mastery over them; which, he says, is one of the hardest things in the conduct of the understanding.—*Conduct of the Understanding*, s. 5.

Dr. Carpenter observes that the power of fixing and directing the attention, is not within the power of every one, and expatiates on its value—as in the above extract from his work.—*Principles of Mental Physiology*, b. i. c. 9. p. 387.

course steadily onward, like a ship whose sails are set with the wind, and whose helm is skilfully plied, in consequence of which its voyage is rapid and straightforward. At other times, the mind suffers its thoughts to wander, and its faculties lose their control, when its course becomes uncertain and wavering, and it drifts aside like a ship without a rudder.

Although a great many ideas are brought to the mind from their connexion or association with other ideas which are already there, it does not necessarily follow, as some⁷ contend, that all ideas are so introduced. Many, as it were, fly into the mind at once by themselves, quite independent of any others. And we often jump from one topic to another without being directed to it by association, or without the matter in which we are engaged leading us to it. In calling up ideas, the mind, indeed, often resorts to association; but this is only one out of many modes by which they are obtained.

It is however when we are in solitude, that the mind is most free to follow its own bent, inasmuch as it is then, to a large extent, liberated from external influence. This is a state highly favourable for acquiring knowledge in general; but particularly so for self-knowledge. In society we are introduced to, and become acquainted with, other men. In solitude we are introduced to, and become acquainted with, our own selves. We live indeed in two worlds; the world without and the world within. Society is the sphere of the one, solitude that of the other. The one is like the day, when we see clearly objects near and about us. The other is like the night, when objects near are obscured, but the wide expanse of the universe is unfolded to our gaze. The objects of the one we can survey at a glance. Those of the other are illimitable, and boundless. And yet, although the subjects by which we are attracted in the latter are far more sublime than those of the former; we ever shun night and solitude, and seek for day and for society, as though these alone were the conditions suitable for our existence. But while society is the sphere of the body, solitude is that of the soul. In society we commune with the external world; in solitude with the world within. Society is the state of man; solitude that of God.

The action of the mind, however originated or caused, or however directed, is almost—if not absolutely—ceaseless,⁸ and it never entirely suspends its consciousness. As I observed, in the Preliminary Dissertation of this treatise,⁹ action is as natural to mind as inaction is to matter. Even during sleep, the soul is still active; and while we are in a state of

⁷ *Priestley's Hartley*.—Introductory Essay, p. xxix.

⁸ *Locke* remarks on the difficulty of keeping the mind stationary by fixing it on one idea.—*Essay on the Understanding*, b. ii. c. 11. s. 13.

⁹ Section vi. a. 2.

insensibility, although the body appears lifeless, the soul is both alive and awake. From the moment of our birth to the moment of our death, and from death through all eternity also, there is scarcely a second during which the soul is not vigorously in activity. Not only indeed is the mind almost ceaselessly in operation, but it ever moves itself. It moreover contains within itself independently, the original spring and first cause of its own motion or action.

Inertia is a greater violence to many minds, than the utmost activity to which they can be stimulated. To be over-fatigued is more desirable than to be in fetters. Better to wear out with too much work, than to waste away with rust. The mind itself is indeed never subject to fatigue; although this is occasionally experienced by the material organs on which it operates, and through which it performs certain of its operations, when it has acted strenuously upon those organs. But even in this case, when the body is affected, or appears to be affected, by intellectual exertion, it is rather through the passions or emotions being excited, which act directly on the body, than from any efforts of the mind, that this is the case.¹ Anxiety, and fear, and anger, are what really cause the wear and tear which we often attribute erroneously to mental labour. In ardent controversy, for instance, it is not the mere intellectual effort which tells on the brain, but the wear and tear, through anxiety and other causes, which excite the material organs, and dilapidate the system. So also in many other pursuits, it is not the exertion of the mind, but the want of exertion for the rest of the system, the confinement and loss of exercise, that destroy the health.

Not only is the whole mind almost ceaselessly, to some extent, in action, but even the faculties themselves but seldom suspend, even momentarily, their operation, or cease to exert themselves. Indeed, all voluntary motion of the mind results from its faculties; and its cause is mainly internal, though it is occasionally external as well. Involuntary motion of the mind, as already stated, is that of the emotions, passions, and affections; and is principally and generally, although not wholly or uniformly, external.

Real exertion of the mind consists, however, not merely in the faculties being in operation, but in their being directed and employed in a regular and constrained course. It is this that actually constitutes labour, especially of a mental kind. The mind and the body are, both of them, ever in activity; but they are strictly engaged in labour only when that exertion is not merely left to follow the bent of the incli-

¹ According, however, to *Dr. Priestley*, the mind is as much fatigued with thinking, as the body is with walking.—*Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit*, p. 128.

nations, but is ordered, and controlled, and made to proceed in some specific and systematic mode of operation. Nevertheless, analogous perhaps to what we find to be the case in material engines, and both in natural and artificial agencies; it often happens with regard to mental constitution, that those minds which are the most vigorous and active, are also the most impatient of control. More especially is it the case with persons of powerful imagination and originality, that they have peculiar difficulty in fixing the attention, and in guiding correctly the course of their cogitations. And in proportion as at any particular period of the day, the mind is lively and energetic; so is it correspondingly also rebellious of control in its operations, and unwilling to direct steadily its career. On the other hand, the weaker the mind at any time feels, and the more relaxed and subdued is its condition; the more easy is it of guidance, and the better is it able to fix its attention to any particular topic without wandering away from it. A great, and powerful, and well-regulated mind should however not only be distinguished for the vigour of its operations, but also for the efficient way in which those operations are directed, and by the complete control which the individual possesses over them. An army may be well manned; but unless it be well disciplined also, its success must necessarily be but doubtful.

3. *Nature of the Intellectual Faculties, and their Relation to the Soul.*

The voluntary power of action, or operation, of different kinds which the mind possesses, by which it is able to exert itself in those various modes when, and in the manner that it pleases, is what constitutes its ability for intellectual exertion; which, as already pointed out, is of a threefold nature, evincing the existence, and consisting, of three separate and independent faculties. As the body without the limbs and sinews, would be but an inert, helpless mass, and dependent on other beings for obtaining change of position or place; so, without the intellectual faculties, would the soul be dependent on the medial endowments only, or on being moved by the communication to it of ideas, events alike uncertain and irregular, for its action; and it would be altogether unable to direct itself when so moved, or to perform any of those various and important operations which it is now able to effect with the utmost ease and precision.²

² Mr. F. Galton, whose opinion I have solicited on the principle enunciated in this paragraph, as regards the possession by the mind of

When we admire the extraordinary wisdom and skill displayed in the constitution of our material frames as regards the various functions and powers of motion with which they are so perfectly endowed; it is only reasonable, and consonant with the wisdom of the Creator, to conclude that our intellectual being, which is the higher and nobler part of us, should be constituted with equal care and perfection, although from its not being ocularly perceptible to us, this does not become at once apparent. It is surely also but reasonable to suppose that this more exalted and more active portion of our being should be at least as extensively gifted with powers, and endowments, and qualities, of every variety; and that it should be in all respects as well adapted and perfect, and even complicated in its constitution and contrivance, as is the material frame.

Some persons, nevertheless, contend that we are in error when we speak of the faculties of the mind; and that as they are in reality nothing but powers of that being, so we ought to say, not that the faculty of understanding receives ideas, or that the reason compares them, but that the mind alone does so.³ Surely, however, this is a mere trifling and quibbling about words. It is like contending that the arm does not strike, nor the legs walk; but that it is the body which performs both these operations. The faculties have, indeed, an existence, as real as the mind itself; in the same way that the limbs are quite as much an actual substance as is the body.⁴

distinct faculties, which are independent of each other, and constitute its power of action, remarks, "A good reason for your view is that cerebral disease dissects the mind, obliterating certain faculties, acting differently in different cases."

³ Thus, according to *Bishop Berkley*, a spirit as it perceives ideas, is called the understanding; and as it produces, or otherwise operates about them, it is called the will.—*Principles of Human Knowledge*, s. 27.

⁴ On this point the note which follows has been contributed by *Mr. Serjeant Cox*, the able and learned author of "*What am I?*" already quoted from in these pages, and President of the Psychological Society of Great Britain; whose deep and searching investigation into psychological and intellectual phenomena, are well known to all who take an interest in these pursuits, and give him a high claim to offer an opinion on the subject before us.

"I assent entirely to this view of the structure of the mind. Whether the mind be the brain, or something other than the brain, and of which the brain is merely the material mechanism, observation of mental phenomena compels the conclusion that the whole mind is not called into action for each separate thought and emotion, but that distinct departments of the mind are devoted to its different operations. If the brain be merely the organ through which the mind maintains communication with the external world, it may well be that the mind itself acts as a whole, and that it is the machine only that works by parts. But inasmuch as the measure of the intelligence of the mind, so far as is possible to, and

That is a faculty or capacity of the mind, by which it is able to perform any effort. Those particular faculties or capacities by which the leading operations of the mind are effected, are those which are selected for classification in a work of this kind: and it is no valid objection to the existence of such faculties, to assert that there may be others of more or less importance, which are not here included; any more than it is a sound argument against the division of the parts of the body into limbs and members, such as the legs, arms, and heart, to assert that there are other parts of the body, as the liver and the gall, which might be also included in the classification. Every power, whether mental or material, that has a distinct, independent capacity of action, may claim to be ranked by itself independently.

Certain writers who deny that the mind has any separate independent faculties, contend that it is but a single organ of itself, and that there are no such things as particular powers and capacities adapted for particular pursuits and studies.⁵

known to other minds, is the measure of the capacity of the brain, for all practical purposes it is necessary to recognize the machine, and not the power that moves it. And that machine is constructed of various parts, each part having its own functions."

⁵ *Des Cartes* tells us that the faculties of the mind cannot properly be called its parts; for it is the same mind that is exercised in willing, in perceiving, and in conceiving.—*Meditat.* vi. He, however, fully admits the existence of distinct and independent faculties, in the passage from his writings recently quoted. He also says, "I cannot doubt but that there is in me a certain passive faculty of perception, that is, of receiving and taking knowledge of the ideas of sensible things; but this would be useless to me if there did not also exist in me, or in some other thing, another active faculty capable of offering and producing those ideas."—*Ibid.* This active faculty, however, he concludes to exist in some substance different from the individual, which may be either a body, or God Himself, or some other creature of a rank superior to body, in which the same is contained eminently.

Locke states that he does not "deny there are faculties both in the body and mind; they both of them have their powers of operating, else neither the one nor the other could operate. For nothing can operate that is not able to operate; and that is not able to operate that has no power to operate."—*Essay on the Understanding*, b. ii. c. xxi. s. 20.

Lord Bacon also, as will be seen from the quotation of his works already made, distinctly recognizes the possession of the mind of distinct independent faculties; and *Hobbes* and *Malebranche* appear to have been of the same opinion.

Among the ancient philosophers, both *Plato** and *Aristotle*† held that the soul possesses distinct faculties. From the general tenor of his sentiments, *Cicero* seems to have also maintained this opinion.

Dr. Carpenter, however, states that it appears to him to be "a fundamental error to suppose that the active intellect can be split up into a

* *Tim.* c. iii.

† *De Animâ*, l. iii.

In reply to such persons, I would ask them to appeal to nature, and to the result of their own observation of the abilities and qualifications of different men; when they will find some eminently fitted to accomplish efforts in certain departments, which they effect with ease and celerity, but which others are unable to perform without great toil and trouble, and even then but very imperfectly.⁶ And surely disqualification for undertaking any pursuit, goes as much to prove that the performance of it is dependent on the capacities suitable, as does the qualification for it. If all were alike adapted by nature for the same occupations and studies, there would then be no such thing as variety in powers and talents. But as different persons are so very differently adapted, both as to their qualifications and disqualifications, it appears impossible to account for this fact, otherwise than by concluding that the mind is necessarily and directly endowed with certain peculiar powers and capacities, by which it performs the operations in question; and that, in proportion as it is so endowed, will it accomplish perfectly, and with facility, those several and particular efforts.⁷

Some philosophers, moreover, who deny the mind to possess any distinct and independent faculties whatever apart from itself, resolve all its different powers into mere indications of states of mind. But if the mind has no active powers, then must it be subject only, and entirely, to external impulses; and can never be in any case a free voluntary agent. It would in fact consist merely of sensations and emotions. Surely, however, such a theory is contrary alike to all reason, to all analogy, and to all experience.

If, on the other hand, we allow the mind to possess faculties, certain number of faculties; for each faculty that is distinguished by the psychologists expresses nothing more than a *mode of activity* in which the whole power of the mind may be engaged at once." And that "it is the direction to *external* objects for example, that constitutes the 'faculty' of observation; which is simply that form of activity in which the mind is occupied by the sense-impressions it is receiving." And that in efforts of this sort the whole mind may be so completely engaged that different activities cannot go on simultaneously.—*Principles of Mental Physiology*, b. i. c. 6. pp. 260, 261. And yet Dr. Carpenter, in the work quoted from, as will be seen by an extract lately given (*ante*, p. 176), expressly speaks of "our intellectual faculties;" although this may perhaps be contended to be rather in a metaphorical than a literal sense. But why maintain the non-existence of that with whose existence you cannot dispense?

Mr. Alfred Smee, in his recent valuable work on *The Mind of Man*, distinctly recognizes the possession by it of faculties of various kinds, pp. 34, 36, 194.

⁶ Vide Galton on *Hereditary Genius*, p. 16.

⁷ It is laid down by Hobbes, that natural wit consists principally in two things, celerity of imagining, and steady direction to some approved end. On the contrary, a slow imagination is commonly called dulness or stupidity.—*Leviathan*, pt. i. c. viii.

must they not be of the class here enumerated? and may they not be of the precise nature here described? Those who deny the correctness of the classification attempted in this work of these various faculties and capacities, should at any rate propound a more correct, rational, or probable theory, by which it may be superseded.

It has also been argued against the soul consisting of different parts, or faculties, that this cannot be the fact, because we cannot recognize these faculties. Also, that in efforts belonging strictly to reason, the imagination assists as well; so that the same faculty must be in both operations employed, though for very different purposes: and that if this is the case, why should we suppose faculties to exist for particular ends, when other faculties will serve them as well, or they themselves will as well serve other ends?

As regards the first of these objections, it may be replied that we cannot recognize the different faculties of the soul, because we cannot perceive the soul at all. Not being able to see the whole, we cannot see its parts. As regards the other argument, I may reply that the supposition of the same faculty being employed both in reasoning and imagination, results from the circumstance into which I shall inquire more particularly in a subsequent chapter;⁸ that in most of our intellectual operations, several different capacities are simultaneously exerted. Few, if any, will deny to the mind a distinct capacity of taste; and probably most persons will allow the existence of understanding and of reason. And if the mind has some distinct faculties, it is but natural and reasonable to suppose that it may possess others. But both taste and reason are aided in their operations by the other faculties or powers, which however has never been considered to create a doubt of the actual existence of the former.

These considerations have indeed further confirmed me in the adoption of the principle which I suggested in a former section of this chapter,⁹ that the real and essential distinction between man and animals, as regards the spiritual being of each, and in fact between intellect and instinct, in addition to what I have already advanced on this topic,¹ may be concluded to be that, while men have souls endowed with active powers, termed faculties and capacities, as described in the present and three following chapters; animals have souls or spiritual beings, but to which no such powers, faculties, or capacities are annexed, their souls being entirely passive, although capable of being acted upon by sensations, emotions, and passions, in the manner already described. Indeed, the economy in the

⁸ *Vide post*, chap. vi. ss. 4, 8.

⁹ *Vide ante*, s. 1.

¹ *Vide ante*, *Prel. Diss.*, s. 10, a. 2.

spiritual system of both men and animals, is, after all, but strictly analogous to what we see exhibited in nature as regards their material structure; the higher order of animals possessing bodies endowed with limbs, which they can exert for various purposes, and at pleasure; while in the case of others, in is to be observed with respect to fishes generally, and many reptiles, they are furnished with bodies to which no limbs are annexed.

The mind is therefore able, at its pleasure, or will, to exert itself, and to originate or direct its operations; and the ideas which are received into it, are the medium or matter on which it acts in general. These it collects, examines, compares, analyzes, and compounds in various ways; according as the occasion, or will, may direct: prefers some ideas, or compounds of them, to certain others; and by making arbitrary combinations, invents systems and schemes of several kinds. This power of the mind is observed to differ greatly in different persons, in many respects, both with regard to its extent and manner of acting; and hence results the variety in intellectual ability, which is seen to exist in different persons,² to which, and its nature and causes, our attention will be more particularly directed in a subsequent section of this chapter.³

On the whole, however, it may be concluded that our capacities are all sufficient for our wants, if we duly adapt the latter to the former. He is in reality rich, whose expenditure is below his means, however small those means may be. He is in reality poor, whose expenditure exceeds his means, however magnificent may be those means.

4. *Division and Distribution of the Intellectual Faculties, and their distinctive Capacities.*

Having endeavoured to demonstrate the constitution of the mind as regards its active powers, which are ordinarily termed the Intellectual Faculties, as also to point out the nature of these endowments, and to exhibit the relation in which they stand to the soul itself: in the present section I propose to specify the particular and distinctive capacities, or subordinate powers or faculties, which must be assigned to each of these principal faculties; and also to lay before the reader the reasons which have determined me in the foregoing division of the mind into the several faculties and capacities enumerated.

² *Hobbes* indeed states the cause of the difference of wits, in different persons, is the passions.—*Leviathan*, pt. 1, c. viii.

³ *Vide post*, s. 5.

The precise nature, and the particular application and use of each of these faculties and capacities, I shall consider in the three following chapters. It seems however most correct and regular that I should demonstrate their actual existence, before I proceed to treat on their proper application.

The active voluntary power of exertion which the mind possesses, is exercised, as we have seen, by means of the three intellectual faculties, which I have respectively denominated the faculty of understanding, the faculty of reason, and the faculty of genius. Each of these faculties appears to me to possess three distinctive independent subordinate powers or capacities, which may be assigned to them, and may be arranged, in the following order :

<i>Understanding</i> . . .	{ Apprehension. Deprehension. Comprehension.
<i>Reason</i>	{ Sense. Analysis. Judgment.
<i>Genius</i>	{ Wit. Taste. Origination.

The *faculties* of the mind are complex capacities, each including in itself three separate simple capacities of the same nature and character with the faculty itself. A *capacity* is a simple single faculty or power of one of these complex intellectual faculties; in a manner analogous to, and corresponding with, that in which a complex intellectual faculty is a capacity of the whole mind. A simple capacity is to an intellectual faculty, what a single finger is to the hand. An intellectual faculty is to the whole mind, what the hand is to the whole body.

Thus, the mind possesses three active faculties or principal powers, each of which is triplex as regards the number of capacities with which it is endowed, and simple as regards the mode and uniformity of their operation. It also possesses another endowment, into the nature of which we shall presently inquire. This latter power is duplex as regards the number of its capacities, and complex as regards the mode of their operation, which is altogether different in each; the one of them being passive, the other active. It is ordinarily termed the memory.

The division which I have here made with respect to the intellectual faculties and capacities, is based principally on

these two grounds. I. That it is according to nature. II. That it is according to reason.

I. This division exactly accords with what we may observe in nature as regards the constitution of different minds, which are severally characterized according to their possession in different proportions of the various faculties and capacities here enumerated, as I shall endeavour to point out.

That the mind possesses the three principal powers of receiving ideas, of comparing ideas, and of compounding ideas, such as I have attributed to the faculties of understanding, reason, and genius, no arguments, I trust, are required to prove.⁴

A close examination of the mental operations of persons afflicted with insanity, at once affords a direct proof of the correctness of my theory—1, as regards the general division which I have made of the faculties of the mind; and, 2, of these faculties being independent of each other.

1. Thus we find in all the different phases of intellectual disorder exhibited by this disease (although insanity, in reality, consists, not in disease of the mind, but in disease of the material organs, or its fluids, through which the mind is exerted), that it is considered as consisting in disorder of one of the three faculties, whereby we receive ideas, whereby we reason upon them, or whereby we compound them. For instance, the mind losing its power of receiving correct ideas of different subjects, and so having erroneous and incoherent notions about them, is regarded as one of the commonest kinds of insanity. Of this we have experience in cases of idiocy and imbecility, where these ideas are very deficient and imperfect; and also where certain delusions exist from perverted or erroneous ideas being received, and which is no other than disease of what I have termed the faculty of understanding.

Irrationality, or loss of the power of judging correctly, whereby, although the premises are sound, wrong conclusions are deduced from them, which is another marked phase of insanity, is no other than disease of the faculty of reason.

Disease of the imagination, or of the faculty of genius, is that which is commonly spoken of as the habit of unwittingly uniting together in the mind ideas which are unfit so to combine, whereby false and erroneous impressions are made upon it, causing wild and fantastic delusions to arise.

2. These different faculties are each of them liable to be affected independently of the others, which will continue to

⁴ *Mr. F. Galton* remarks on this passage, in reply to my query, as to whether in his opinion I am correct as to the division which I have made of the operations of the mind, and as to the deduction therefrom of its powers or faculties of action; "all depends on the way you define the word used, viz. compounding."

exercise their functions unimpeded; but which would not result if the entire mind were a single faculty. Thus, in one case the power or faculty of receiving ideas is suspended, while those of reason and of imagination remain in all their vigour. In another case, the faculty of receiving ideas continues unimpaired, while that of judging correctly respecting them is altogether lost. In a third case, the power of receiving ideas and of reasoning upon them is retained, while the most incongruous combinations of them are made; and the mind is led away by the phantoms of its own creation, and is haunted by spectres, or deluded by vagaries, which are of its own originating.

Insanity may, however, consist in one or more of the faculties or capacities obtaining an undue influence or preponderance, in consequence of their acquiring supernatural strength and energy, or through their becoming debilitated or relaxed. Thus, the imagination will sometimes obtain the supremacy over the reason, when the patient is led away by fancies, and is induced to disregard both the dictates of the reason, and the information which he obtains through the understanding. In certain cases, indeed, insanity appears to consist in a general debility of the whole mind, which becomes subjugated to the animal feelings and passions.⁵

The difference between, and the independence of each other, of the several intellectual faculties, having been I trust established: I now proceed to demonstrate the existence of the several capacities which I have enumerated as belonging to those faculties; and also to point out that these different capacities are as distinct from, and independent of, each other, as are the different faculties one from another.

As regards the existence of these different capacities, apprehension, sense, wit, taste, and invention or origination, are powers which, I believe, all will allow the mind to possess. I also think that close observation of the operations of the mind will lead to the conviction of the existence of the capacities of deprehension, comprehension, analysis, and judgment. Allowing them so to exist, I am induced to conclude that it will be admitted that the order and disposition which I have made of them as regards each other, is at any rate reasonable and natural.

That the different capacities of origination, taste, and wit, in the faculty of genius, do exist, and that they are distinct capacities, is at once too obvious to require dwelling upon. The existence of, and the distinction between, judgment, analysis, and sense, although less obvious at first sight, will appear no less clear and forcible, on a close examination of the

⁵ *Vide ante, Prel. Diss., vol. i. s. viii. a. 4.*

operations of these different capacities ; each of which, as will be pointed out in the following chapters where their nature and use are more particularly described, is quite unfitted to adapt any one for the pursuits for which the others are qualified. The man of powerful argument in general debate, which he owes to being largely endowed with judgment, may be, and often is, found to be wholly incompetent to conduct an acute, and refined, and subtle process of reasoning, which an extensive possession of analysis would give him ; and is frequently also observed to be greatly deficient in sense. The man largely gifted with sense, or analysis, may be much wanting in those powers which judgment confers. So also as regards the capacities of understanding ; the man who is able with extraordinary accuracy, successfully to pursue the narrow intricacies of a complicated subject, which the being fully endowed with deprehension would adapt him to do ; may be, and often is, found to be wholly unable to take large and extended views of subjects, which comprehension qualifies a person to effect. The same may be observed with regard to the man who with great facility acquires knowledge, being largely gifted with apprehension ; but who might be utterly unable and totally disqualified to obtain that minute and accurate knowledge of a subject which deprehension would capacitate him to acquire.

Every distinct and independent act or operation of the mind implies, and is *primâ facie* evidence of, the existence of a distinct and independent power or capacity. To prove that any particular act or operation is not performed by a particular capacity, we must show that some other capacity is capable of effecting it. Now, in the case of the different operations of the mind, for the performance of each of these particular operations, certain of the particular capacities which I have described are adapted ; while none of the other faculties or capacities of the mind are fitted, or able, to perform those special operations for which those capacities which I have enumerated are individually qualified.

The independence of one another of each of the different capacities of the mind, is also proved by some persons largely possessing certain of these capacities only, while they are very deficient in others. In the case of each individual, however, the several faculties and capacities with which he is endowed, are the same in essence and in quality ; they differ only as to the degree and the extent to which different persons are respectively endowed with them. Thus, some men have a great share of sense, but are very deficient in analysis and judgment ; while others are very sparingly endowed with sense, but are abundantly gifted with analysis. So also is it with respect to each of the other capacities of the mind. Now, if the mind possessed not these separate and independent capacities,

but of itself constituted only one single faculty, and as such performed all the different operations which these several capacities distinctly effect, we should not find different minds so varying as they do, being adapted only for certain kinds of action, while they are deficient as regards certain others; but the mind, as a whole, would be powerful or deficient. The modes of operation of these different capacities in the case of each individual are, moreover decidedly and essentially far more distinct and independent than are the operations of the different senses, which no one, nevertheless, contends to be operations of the same sense.

In insanity, too, we find the different capacities, as well as the different faculties, separately and independently affected. Thus, how common is it for the imaginative capacity alone to be disordered, while all the other faculties and capacities remain in full health and activity. The capacity of taste, also, is liable to be diseased by itself, and is observed frequently, both in idiocy and insanity, to be depraved and fantastic. Idiots, for instance, often display this malady by their extreme love of gaudy colours and grotesque dresses. Madness is moreover sometimes evinced by the loss, or perversion, of the capacity of sense alone, while the other capacities of reason remain unimpaired; and, in other cases, this is exhibited by the inability of the mind to obtain accurate and precise ideas of any matter, such as deprehension, in a healthy and well-ordered state, would enable him to acquire.⁶

⁶ *Dr. Maudsley*, whose opinion on any subject connected with the science and the physiology of the mind, must always be treated with the deepest respect, and be deemed worthy of the highest consideration, informs me with regard to the theory here advocated, that he is directly opposed to the doctrine of the mind possessing distinct faculties of its own, and of course does not therefore assent to the views above expressed.

He also remarks:—"As a matter of fact, I should say that insanity is not so limited to special faculties as you have represented. According to my reading of its phenomena, I could not say that the reason was ever sound, where the imagination was diseased; or that madness ever consisted in loss or perversion of sense, while the capacities of reason were unimpaired. My experience is that in even the seemingly most limited unsoundness of mind,—in madness confined, as it is said, to one subject,—there is far more general derangement than is popularly supposed."

The principles with regard to insanity as an evidence of the independence of each other of the different faculties of the mind, laid down in the text, were deduced from the expressed opinions of writers of recognized authority on the subject of mental disease; about which, however, as evinced by the contrariety of evidence of medical men in almost every trial in our courts of law where questions of insanity are involved, the conclusions appear to differ in every possible way.* In support of the theory expressed

* "No better proof could be adduced of the imperfection of our acquaintance with the phenomena of insanity, and the consequent conflict of opinion in relation to it, than the contradictory evidence given by experts

The distinctness and independence one of another, both of the faculties and of the various capacities of the mind, is further shown, and in nothing more fully, than by the way in which the mind is able to commune with itself; and that to so great an extent that we might occasionally almost suppose we possessed within ourselves several separate souls. And the more powerful the faculties in any mind are, the more extensively will they delight to engage in such internal intercourse.

Another circumstance, which indeed of itself affords conclusive proof of the entire independence of each other of these several capacities, is the different periods of their respective development, and the various requirements of each as regards such development by cultivation; which I have particularly pointed out in the following chapters while considering the nature of these capacities.

The several faculties and capacities of the mind appear, however, not only to be distinct from and independent of each other, but also as regards the mind itself. This is evinced by the fact that although the mind as a whole is ever in activity, particular faculties and capacities may be, and frequently are, entirely at rest; sometimes one faculty, sometimes another, being exerted or in repose, and occasionally certain capacities of a particular faculty being in operation, while the others are dormant.⁷

The mind, in a variety of instances, casts its shadow, as it were, and reflects its own form through the operations which it effects. And between the physical and the spiritual world, there is in many respects a close analogy which is continually exhibiting itself to our view. If we may institute a comparison between our material and our mental constitution generally, may we not also between our material and our mental organs and endowments; especially as regards the

in the present work, the author would refer more especially to *Ray's Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity*, pp. 68, 144, 147, 156, and the numerous high authorities there cited. No writer on this perplexing topic has, however, treated the subject more scientifically, or gone deeper into the whole matter, than Dr. Maudsley in his justly celebrated work on *The Physiology and Pathology of the Mind*, already several times quoted in this work.

⁷ *Mr. F. Galton*, who has kindly allowed me to consult him as an authority on this point, expresses his opinion that the arguments here urged for the independence of each other of the different faculties of the mind, are satisfactory, at any rate to a great degree.

in the witness box, where insanity is in question. No two are found to agree in the definition of insanity. According to the one set of doctors, no man could be proved to be sane; according to the other, it would be impossible to prove any man to be mad."—*What am I? A Popular Introduction to Mental Philosophy and Psychology*. By E. W. Cox, Serjeant-at-law.

former in reference to those properties and qualities which peculiarly distinguish our material constitution from that of the ordinary animal race, and seem fully adapted to serve as material organs for a mental being? I may particularly refer to the hands, which are the active organs of the body. With them may fairly be instituted a comparison of the active powers, or organs, or faculties, of the soul; and each may be considered as possessing alike subordinate organs or capacities. In the case of each, moreover, although the organs and faculties, and their constituent capacities, are so apparently simple, their application is almost indefinite as regards the variety of the ends which they are capable of attaining. And if it be objected that I debase the soul by comparing it to a being so inferior to it as the body; I may reply that if man's form is created after the image of God, it can be no degradation to the soul to correspond with the body.

But it may be urged against this division of the intellectual powers effected in the present work, that it is altogether contrary to what we experience in nature, to find duplex or triplex powers of the same kind, varying only in their quality or degree. To this, however, I at once reply, that such an arrangement with regard to our mental constitution, exactly accords with what we observe in our material constitution, where all the principal organs and limbs, such as the eyes, the ears, the hands, with their subordinate constituent organs, are duplex; while these subordinate organs differ only from one another as regards their size and flexibility.

In addition to this I may remark that, if these capacities seem too few to serve for all the multitudinous intellectual operations of which the mind is capable; it should be borne in mind that their number is quite equal to that of the primitive figures made use of in arithmetical calculation, the multiplications and transmutations of which are so vast, nay infinite, but which do not admit of more varied combinations, and complex productions and operations, than do the several exercises of these different intellectual capacities, as I hope to demonstrate in the succeeding chapters.

In a corresponding manner as regards colours, there can be no doubt that the original and primitive colours are those which are pure and uncompounded, and from which all others are derived; and not those, such as violet and pink, which are obtained by a combination of two or more colours into one. Nor is it any proof of a colour being primitive and uncompounded that it is found in nature, which is the case with green, an obvious compound of blue and yellow. The three and only pure and primitive colours are blue, red, and yellow; added to which are the two opposite tints of black and white, which are indeed not properly and strictly colours, but merely shades.

Perhaps it may be also objected to the foregoing distribution of the faculties and capacities of the mind, that it is founded on nothing which is exhibited or developed by the mind itself; that it is not deducible from nature in any way; but that it is suggested solely by the application of the mind to the three principal branches of learning (which are all mere arbitrary arrangements); and by the mode in which we are wont to apply to them our different mental powers.

To this argument however it may be replied with confidence, that it is in reality not the arbitrary (although at the same time true and natural) division of the various branches of knowledge, which first originated the division of the faculties here made; but that this threefold existing and natural division of the faculties it was which first prompted this threefold division of knowledge; and also that man's experience of, and reflection upon, the mode of operation of the mind by its capacities, was what first led to the division of the different modes of study and mental operation, which I have assigned as the peculiar provinces of these respective capacities.

Nor does it appear clear why the division, and analysis, and classification of the various powers of the mind here effected, according to the distribution of the first elements of thought; should be more open to objection than the division, and analysis, and classification of substances, according to the distribution of the primary elements of matter. If this is the only true and philosophical mode of proceeding in the one case, why should it not be so in the other? And although the difference between the various capacities of each faculty may be caused only by their variety in extent, and may be only that of degree, and not of kind; yet it will be observable in the operation of these capacities, as in many other operations in nature, that a mere difference in degree not unfrequently occasions a difference in kind also, and that in a variety of modes.

In the distribution and definition of the several faculties and capacities of the mind, I have, moreover, in each case considered what are the leading, fundamental, and essential principles and properties by which they are characterized, and have classified them accordingly; instead of arranging them only according to some merely arbitrary or secondary and comparatively unimportant qualities by which they are distinguished.

But it may be contended that the division and distribution which I have made of the intellectual faculties and capacities, is perceptible, and actually exists, merely in an analysis of the different principal modes of action of which the mind is capable, without reference to the actual natural endowment of it as regards its real faculties and capacities. Here I would observe that in deciding upon the nature of any being, our sole knowledge of which we derive from its operations; our only method

of accurate progression, is to effect a due classification of these operations: that the classification which I have made is just and correct according to the first principles of action; that it is not in any respects at variance or inconsistent with what we find in nature; but is, in reality, in strict accordance with its general proceedings.

It would be unreasonable to assert that a seal received the figure indented on it from the wax of which the impression was formed, instead of the impression being made by the seal. But no less unreasonable is it to suppose that the operations of our faculties are what cause or produce those faculties, and that it is not the faculties themselves which produce the operations. This would be like contending that the shadow occasioned the substance, and not the substance the shadow.

Nor is it less philosophical or reasonable to recur to its primary principles when arguing respecting mind—i.e. the first principles of action; than it is to recur to its primary principles when arguing respecting substance—i.e. the first principles or elements of matter. It is, moreover, doubtless as correct to reason upon the nature of the mind by resolving it into its different principal modes of action, instead of considering it according to the common and ordinary distribution of its constituents, such as its powers of discernment, of doubting, of hoping, of moral perception, and the like; as it is to reason upon the nature of any animal, by analyzing its primary constituent chemical particles, instead of considering it in its more ordinary constituents, of body, limbs, head, nerves, bones, and the like.

When we proceed to analyze and to dissect the different parts of an animal body, it is true that the first and principal division which immediately offers itself to us is that of the various members and organs which together constitute it. But the ultimate, and only real and correct analysis which we can make of such a subject for the purpose of strict philosophical inquiry, would be as regards the several primary chemical particles or ingredients which together in sundry modifications contribute to this frame. So also as regards the analysis of the mind, the first and most natural division of it would be into those various conditions arising from and indicated by the several affections and excitements of which it is susceptible. If however we extend our researches further, and would institute a deep and strict philosophical inquiry into the primary elements of this being, we must examine into the different principles and leading modes of intellectual operation which it is capable of voluntarily effecting; and according to what we ascertain respecting them, must be the true and just distribution of its faculties and capacities.

Those divisions and analyses of various kinds which have

been found most convenient for legal and scientific purposes, have not been in each instance effected strictly according to nature; yet they are not on this account to be rejected if they serve more perfectly than others the end for which they were made. Thus, many of the divisions into classes and species adopted in natural history; the partition of a country into districts and departments, without any regard to the various productions, or condition, or geographical situation of each; and the classifications effected in chemical and in anatomical science, are, most of them, not only inconsistent with, but in utter violation of many of the laws which would direct such divisions. In the present treatise, however, I believe that there is little, if anything, actually at variance with nature in the divisions and classifications which I have adopted; in the formation of each of which I have studiously endeavoured to discover, and to be guided by, the rule that nature herself has laid down; while, on the other hand, these divisions and classifications appear to me to be those which are best adapted for the consideration and elucidation of the subject in the manner I propose.

II. The division here made is the most accordant with reason, as regards the comprehensive and just distribution of these different powers.

Of beings in general, we know nothing with respect to their essential properties; and but little as regards their common constituent qualities. We therefore judge of them by the effects which they are capable of producing. How much more reasonable is it that in the case of the mind and its faculties, we should draw our conclusions from what we observe of their operations, inasmuch as we are wholly ignorant of all their qualities. Spiritual beings are principally characterized by action; material ones by substance. If we are to judge of the latter by their operations, as we frequently do, how much more reasonable is it to do so with respect to the former.

As in constructing a mechanical machine, we are guided in our labours by certain scientific calculations, without actually seeing the engine, as to what such and such motions and powers will produce; so in the investigation of the system of our mental machinery, which we cannot in any case see, we are able to calculate on the nature of that machinery from the operations which we find to be produced by it.

It might, however, be contended by some—who by experience, and observation of nature, are satisfied of the correctness of my theory, so far as regards the distribution and characterizing of the different powers, and modes of operation, of the mind—that what I have here termed separate capacities of the different faculties, are, in reality, not distinct capacities, but only distinct qualities with which these different faculties are endowed; one

person possessing, for instance, the faculty of understanding of a ready and active quality, another possessing it of a nice and accurate, and another of an enlarged and comprehensive character. With respect to this supposed hypothesis, I would however observe, that, as already pointed out, each of these different capacities is distinct from, and entirely independent of, the others; and that several of these distinct and independent capacities of a different and even contrary nature, may co-exist together. This could not be the case as regards qualities, inasmuch as opposite and contrary qualities could never be found together in the same subject. But, as I have already observed, each of these capacities possesses independent powers, and also qualities of its own. Each of them, moreover, is exerted for distinct and independent purposes. Occasionally they act in concert, while, at other times, only one single capacity is exerted. In this respect they are like the different pipes of an organ, which, though but very slightly dissimilar in tone from those placed next to them, so that the different sounds might be supposed to be all of them merely variations of the notes of the same pipe, are each of them quite distinct from and independent of the other.

It may also be objected to the theory here advanced, of the soul possessing certain independent capacities in the way stated, for the performance of actions of different kinds, that as the eye—to which I have already compared the soul—is able to perform several distinct actions, such as to survey objects generally, to scrutinize them minutely, and to view them at a distance, without any distinct powers being required for this purpose; it cannot therefore be necessary for the soul to possess distinct capacities, although different souls, like different eyes, may be endowed with different particular qualities and properties, adapting some more than others for certain pursuits.

In reply to this objection, I may however observe that, although the eye has not different distinct powers of vision, it has different distinct powers of contracting its pupil, so as to adapt it for these various operations, without which it could not perform them; and which constitute, in fact, and essentially, different independent capacities, closely analogous to the different powers of the soul. So far, therefore, the case of the eye is strongly in support of, instead of in opposition to, the theory that I have advanced. Moreover, if the mind does exert itself in any particular mode, it necessarily follows that it must possess the power of doing so. Seeing and hearing are only particular modes of perceiving certain qualities in bodies; but they are, nevertheless, evidence of the existence of the powers to perform these operations, which we term the senses. They are, however, no more distinct and independent powers of the body, than the intellectual faculties are distinct and

independent powers of the mind. True it is that the whole mind exerts itself; but it does so through its faculties. Thus, we say the body sees, but it does so through the eye. The body walks; but it does so by means of the legs. The circumstance of our saying that the body sees, or walks, does not prove that it is able to do this without the possession of independent powers which enable it thus to act. So the soul perceives, and judges; but it does so through its faculties of understanding and reason.

If it be objected that some, if not all of these faculties, are complex in their nature, and not simple, and consequently cannot be supposed to constitute primary independent powers; it may be replied that several organs of the material frame are complex in their nature, such as the eye, the hand, the ear, but which are nevertheless primary independent powers.

It may perhaps be further objected, and with great apparent reason and truth, to the division which has been made of these capacities, that they are, in fact, not each individual independent capacities, but each varieties only of the whole mind. That apprehension is not a distinct capacity, but only the characteristic of an individual mind as regards its activity and clearness. That deprehension is not a separate capacity, but merely the result of attention, and care, and industry; and that comprehension is no independent capacity of the mind, but only arises from the habituating it to exalted and enlarged pursuits and views. So also it may be contended that sense is but the result of a well constituted, well-disciplined mind; and judgment, that of one accustomed to a vigorous style of reasoning.

In reply to this argument, I will however commence with observing that, if we carry it on further, and inquire into the nature of the other capacities of the different faculties, we shall not conclude taste, wit, or analysis, to be either varieties, or characteristics only, of particular minds; or the result merely of some particular study or pursuit. A close investigation into their nature must convince any one that, not only taste and wit, but also deprehension, comprehension, sense, analysis, and judgment, are each particular and independent capacities of the mind, by which it is enabled to exert itself in the peculiar and distinct modes for which these capacities are each especially adapted.

It may be contended further, that close attention and application may supply the place of deprehension; and that it is, in fact, the exertion of these efforts which really effect the result supposed to be attained through the agency of that capacity. Also, that a proper and discriminating exercise of the judgment, and a due regulation of the mind, are all that are required to perform the several functions which I have peculiarly attributed to the action of sense.

Supposing however these various exertions to be duly used, there will still be found to be a vast difference between different people as regards both the facility with which they perform the operations that I have assigned to these two capacities, and the relative perfection to which they attain in doing so : and if the same degree of labour and care is used by different people while employed on the same topics ; then the difference observable as regards the results they obtain must be necessarily owing to, and must correspond pretty nearly with, the difference between them in regard to their particular, individual, mental constitution and powers.

But the functions performed by the two capacities of apprehension and sense, are as distinct from, and as independent of the functions of the other capacities, as are those performed by wit and taste. How few will dispute the latter operations being effected by particular capacities, and that certain persons are by nature much better adapted to perform them than are others ; although, perhaps, some of them may be more or less affected by the agency, wholly or in part of the other capacities which are not adapted for their special performance ; —just as, in the case of the body, certain actions may be performed by organs different to those more properly or peculiarly adapted for these operations. This however does not prove that we have no organs of the latter kind ; or that some of these organs are not by nature much better fitted for the performance of particular actions than are certain others.

Each of the capacities of the different faculties are also evidently not mere qualities or variations of the whole mind, but they are particular distinct powers, and they are each independent of the other. They are, moreover, the original powers or springs of mental action of each kind ; and by them may be, and is, performed every intellectual operation of which the mind is capable ; while no intellectual operations are performed beyond those which these capacities effect. Such endowments as these cannot be derived from, or be conferred by, mere qualities of the mind, or mere variations of particular mental constitutions ; but can only result from, or be owing to, certain particular powers with which the mind is endowed, in the way I have here set forth.

The real point indeed at issue between myself and those who oppose my theory, is in reality therefore, not whether there are such and such capacities of the mind as I contend for, which will be generally admitted ; but whether, in accordance with the laws of nature in all her other departments, and the deductions of right reason, these capacities are, as I also contend, appended to the particular faculties to which they are assigned, and also orderly and systematically arranged : or

whether,—as those who oppose me appear to assume, if they do not directly contend,—they are loosely and irregularly distributed, without reference to, or connexion with, any particular faculties, and without either method or order.

The system nearest to my own as regards the arrangement of the intellectual faculties, is that of Lord Bacon, who divides the mind into memory, reason, and imagination;⁸ making memory serve for the purposes to which I have applied the faculty of understanding, as well as for its own distinct and proper ends. Here therefore is asserted by this very great authority, the possession by the mind of independent faculties, and those of the precise kind which I have stated; and if we admit a capacity of imagination, we must surely admit those of wit and taste, which are of the same nature, and are as fully evinced. And if we allow distinct capacities of one faculty, why not allow distinct capacities also to belong to the faculties of understanding and reason?

Lord Bacon indeed further confirms⁹ the justness of my theory, at least as regards the foundation of it, by his three-fold division of the branches of knowledge, and by his allotment of the studies proper for each faculty; by which moreover he evinces that in memory he includes understanding; and in imagination, at any rate, taste, if not wit; as also analysis in the faculty of reason.

5. *Character of the Mind from the relative extent of its different Faculties and Capacities.*

That which constitutes in reality the great and essential difference between various persons as regards their intellectual power and character, is the relative comparative variation in extent of the several faculties and capacities of these different individuals. The soul as well as the body, the mental as well as the medial part of our nature and constitution, has also its peculiar and special inclinations and instincts. Close and attentive observation and investigation will moreover convince us that men differ from one another, and are as essentially characterized by their particular intellectual faculties and capacities, as they are by their bodily organs, and their physical structure

⁸ *Advancement of Learning*, Book II.

⁹ *Ibid.*

Burton's division and classification of the actions of the mind, to a large extent, correspond with the distribution of its faculties here effected; although the arrangement is totally different. According to this writer, the actions of the mind consist in apprehension, composition, division, discoursing, reasoning, memory, which some, he says, include in invention and judgment.—*Anatomy of Melancholy*, pt. 1. s. 1. p. 28.

and endowments.¹ There is indeed in reality not only a greater, but even a greater perceptible difference, between the mental, than between the material constitution and powers of various men. The latter, although depending on a vast variety of causes, is exhibited only through the difference in size, shape, and colour, possessed by different persons. But the variety in intellectual character and capacity is shown in a number of different ways, and is evinced by almost every act that each individual performs, on which is impressed, in some way or other, the peculiar character of the mind that directed it.²

Not only indeed does the extent to which persons are respectively endowed with the different intellectual capacities, constitute an intellectual difference between them; but a variety of character as regards their medial and moral endowments and properties, is also produced by this means, as I shall point out when considering in a future chapter the subject of the concurrent operation of the different faculties and capacities.³ Education itself also creates a vast difference between the intellectual character of different people, inasmuch as it serves to bring into exercise, and to develope, many capacities which

¹ "Our excellence and our defects flow from the same common source."
—*Longinus on the Sublime*, s. 5.

² "There is, it is visible, great variety in men's understandings, and their natural constitutions put so wide a difference between some men in this respect, that art and industry would never be able to master; and their very natures seem to want a foundation to raise on it that which other men easily attain unto. Amongst men of equal education, there is great inequality of parts."—*Locke. Conduct of the Understanding*, s. 2.

According to *Hobbes*, however, "the difference of wits hath its original, from the different passions, and from the ends to which the appetite leadeth them."—*Human Nature*, chap. x. s. 2.

Helvetius considers that, "among men animated by nearly an equal love of study, our success in measuring the greatness of their mental abilities, seems entirely to depend on the greater or fewer distractions occasioned by a difference of tastes, fortunes, and stations;" as also on the choice of subjects, and the people we converse with.—*Essays on the Mind*, c. iv.

In another work he remarks that "in children the difference of understanding and character is not always very obvious."—*Treatise on Man*, sect. i. c. vii. And that talent is nothing more than "the produce of the attention applied to ideas of certain sorts."—*Ibid.* sect. v. c. ii. However, in another chapter of the same work he lays it down that, "all men have an equal aptitude to understanding."—Sect. iv. c. xxii. Although he subsequently inquires, "Whence then proceeds the extreme inequality of understanding?" c. xxiv.

Mr. F. Galton remarks that "there can hardly be a surer evidence of the enormous difference between the intellectual capacity of men, than the prodigious differences in the numbers of marks obtained by those who gain mathematical honours at Cambridge."—*Hereditary Genius*, p. 16. Allowance must of course here be made for the difference in application between different men.

³ *Vide post*, chap. vi.

would otherwise have been comparatively dormant. It does not in the least essentially, although it does to a large extent practically, change the actual nature of the individual capacities; so that there is as much difference between an educated and an uneducated man, as between a grown-up person and a child. Not only moreover does education itself make a great difference between individual minds; but still further, the particular mode of that education very greatly, and in many respects, augments that difference.

Among the different kinds of animals of the same species, of which so extensive a variety exists widely differing one from another, by what is this distinction mainly caused? Does it not chiefly result from the various proportions of the limbs, and different parts of their bodies; and the particular habits and pursuits which they severally follow?

Exactly analogous to, and corresponding with, this difference, is the distinction among different men as regards their intellectual character, which is so very extensive: but which arises entirely from the different degrees in which they are severally endowed with the intellectual capacities that are possessed alike by each; and from the different modes in which these capacities have been cultivated, and the peculiar pursuits to which they have been devoted. In chemical compounds too, the greatest difference as to their effect and actual qualities may be produced solely by the various proportions in which the several ingredients they contain are contributed.

As regards the difference in intellectual character occasioned by a difference in the relative extent of the different capacities, this will be at once observed and admitted. Thus, an individual who is largely endowed with origination, is in all respects quite as superior as regards the extent to which he is enabled to exercise this power, to a person of ordinary ability; as a man of vast physical strength and stature, is superior as regards his physical powers, to one of a diminutive feeble frame. Another man will, in a corresponding manner, be found naturally to excel as regards his reasoning capacity; another in the clearness and distinctness of his perceptions. Those who are gifted with only ordinary intellectual powers, whose faculties and capacities are but very moderate in extent, may doubtless do much to improve them by proper cultivation; yet, after all, they will still fall far short of persons who are naturally highly gifted as regards their intellectual constitution.

Versatility of capacity is a sure proof of real talent. On the other hand, universality as regards the undertaking of various pursuits and matters, is a sure proof of the want of it of a solid kind. The one is prompted by the conscious power of being able to excel in certain efforts which the individual is impelled to undertake. The other is prompted by the conscious-

ness that there is no one peculiar walk beyond another for which he is specially adapted, and therefore he attempts all alike. None of the great men that I have known were of universality in acquirement. Most of them were nevertheless endowed with versatility of talent.

The difference here pointed out is moreover perceivable, not only as regards its actual existence, but its active power. Thus, minds which are extensively gifted and highly endowed, exercise an influence over inferior ones, corresponding with that which in the animated world man exercises over the lower grades of creation. Nor is the dominion of the former less absolute because it is unseen. But although in higher matters the higher minds thus possess a supremacy over those which are lower; yet, in the common ordinary affairs of life, common and ordinary minds far exceed those gifted with higher capacities. This is especially seen in the pursuit of wealth, which is the ultimate end of so many persons; and whether or not the legitimate, it certainly seems to be the successful aim of lower minds mainly. It may be that the higher minds prosper less in worldly affairs, chiefly because they ordinarily soar too high to observe with sufficient accuracy the baser things of the earth; which those of a lower order, who only hover over its surface, are ever intent on watching, and keep close to them. Hence, moreover, as these loftier souls are less adapted for the present state of existence than are those of inferior capacities and inclinations, to whom it seems more natural, and more exactly fitted; we may reasonably from this state of things infer that there is, and must be, a higher condition, a state better adapted for the former, and to which they may ultimately aspire.

It will also appear from a close examination of the intellectual faculties, that those capacities of them which are of the most general utility, and most serviceable for the common purposes of life, such as apprehension and sense, are those with which the greater part of mankind are largely endowed; while those which are of less ordinary application, but serviceable only, to the few,—to those of distinguished talents and endowments, who must always form but a very small proportion of every community,—such as the capacity of origination, and also the higher capacities in the faculties of understanding and reason, are the most rarely possessed in an extensive degree. Each of the faculties and capacities are nevertheless alike valuable, and are adapted in the best manner for the various occasions of those different persons endowed with them. This distribution of them in the way stated, has been wisely ordered for the general welfare of mankind, and the practical benefit of society; and is, indeed, an instance of the wisdom and foresight of Providence, which, among many others, affords an ample test

of an over-ruling dispensation being exerted in all such cases for our good.

We perhaps, however, occasionally unfairly depreciate the intellectual character of some persons, by attributing the results which they effect to their energy and perseverance,—as though these qualities were something quite beyond, and independent of, their mental constitution,—instead of ascribing them to their superior ability: the real fact being that energy and perseverance are, in many instances, not so much independent qualities of themselves, as the proof, and the result, of the possession of great talents; and the consciousness that the person endowed with them feels of being able through them to achieve important ends, which induces him to apply them closely and arduously to whatever he undertakes.⁴

6. *Cast, and Consortment together, of Faculties and Capacities to constitute a Mind of high Talent.*

The essential ingredient in what is ordinarily and comprehensively understood to constitute a man of great and extensive intellectual ability, or talent; demands to be especially inquired into in a treatise, the object of which is to illustrate the real nature of the mind, and of the endowments by which it is distinguished and characterized.

It may appear at first sight that an individual is entirely dependent for his eminence here, on the relative comparative extent to which he possesses the highest capacities of the mind. I must however premise that this does not always follow. Indeed, it will often happen that the extensive endowment with one particular capacity alone, when certain others are not possessed

⁴ *Mr. Sopwith*, F.R.S., the eminent engineer, whose scientific acquirements, combined with his extensive knowledge of the world, and acquaintance with men of science, render his opinion upon topics of this nature of peculiar value, while expressing his dissent from the sentiment here expressed, so far as it may imply that the exhibition of energy is to be deemed an evidence of the existence of "genius,"—a doctrine which was not intended to be advocated; and remarking, with great truth, how often the existence of genius and great talent is found to be unaccompanied by perseverance,—bears me out in the opinion that the possession of energy and perseverance does of itself afford proof of the possession of ability to carry out projects of importance, which this endowment stimulates and invigorates the person possessing it to undertake. He says:—"In many, probably in by far the greater number of cases, genius does 'give birth' to ardour, which as here used, is only another name for energy, or great mental activity. Most commonly they are thus united, and separately they are of little use in promoting any really high or important result. Talent without energy, is little known; and energy without talent, is only suited for ordinary, or, it may be, trifling occupations."

in the same proportion, or are proportionably limited, will not only be no advantage, but a positive defect. As the perfection of an intellectual system is to have all the different capacities, as regards their amount, and their relation to each other, duly balanced and adjusted; so the most imperfect constitution is that in which they are both so ill proportioned, and so unfairly adjusted, as not mutually to aid and co-operate effectively together. Many mental constitutions in which are certain great intellectual elements, are ruined by the defective assortment of these elements, and their consequent inefficiency for co-operation. The same rule holds also as regards our medial and moral endowments. There is, in truth, a mental as well as a physical deformity. And this happens when any one of the capacities of a particular faculty is wholly out of proportion as regards its extent, either to the other capacities of this faculty, or to the other faculties; which, as in the case of physical deformity of this character in any of the limbs or bodily organs, distorts and disarranges the whole frame, and disorders its operations. That conformation is most favourable for efficient action, in which all the capacities and organs are fairly and regularly proportioned as regards their mutual relation; and in relation also to the functions which they have to discharge.

The mind of each individual is endowed with some particular one, or with certain of, the before-mentioned faculties or capacities, to a moderate extent; and with every faculty and capacity, in some degree or other. No two persons, probably, possess in an equal measure each of these several faculties and capacities; but they exist in different minds, in innumerable varieties, and form that difference of intellectual character which we discern among them. Sometimes the possession of one particular faculty, or capacity, serves to characterize an individual mind; and, on the other hand, the different faculties, or capacities are occasionally so parallel with each other in extent in the same mind, that no particular character appears to mark such an individual. Many who are deficient in some faculties, or capacities, may excel greatly from the possession of certain others. Particular persons who are endowed with very great and eminent capacities, are so wanting in others, as to render them incapable of attaining general eminence by their endeavours. It is not, however, necessary to form a character of the highest intellectual kind, that he should possess extensively each of the faculties or capacities above enumerated. The being endowed with some of them in due proportions, and of a suitable nature as regards each other, according to the particular character of the talent which he possesses, without being unduly deficient in any of them, is what is mainly required in order to constitute a character of this description. The different faculties and capacities are so ordered as never

actually to clash with, although, to a certain degree, they appear occasionally to counteract the operations of each other; and there are particular capacities which are not often found extensively co-existent in the mind of the same person. The definition however of a person of first-rate talents, and intellectual capacity of the highest kind, must be in a great measure determined by the estimation in which the person who makes it holds certain qualities or abilities: inasmuch as those which one may highly appreciate, others may comparatively condemn; and the attainments or achievements, which one may deem to be of the utmost importance, another may regard with indifference.⁵

Four essential points are especially to be borne in mind as regards the result of the extensive co-existence of the various capacities in producing a mind of high talent. 1. It must be considered what degree of excellence will result from the extensive co-existence of certain capacities. 2. It must be considered what degree of excellence will be counteracted by the extensive co-existence of certain capacities. 3. It must be considered what deficiencies will be directly occasioned by this means. 4. And what deficiencies will be by this means counteracted.

The first of these points however is that into which the main question here to be considered must be ultimately resolved. As regards the general utility to the individual resulting from the extensive possession of particular capacities, it may be premised that the adaptation of those capacities with which he is gifted for the peculiar station or purpose to which it is the lot of the possessor to have the opportunity of applying them, is what renders them of most esteem in his eyes. Talents indeed mainly and essentially depend for their value on the demand that exists for them. The weeds of one country are the choice flowers of another; and herbs that are contemned in one nation, are valued in another for the medicinal virtues they contain. On the other hand, it should be the object of the possessor to employ himself especially in those pursuits for which he finds his capacities best fitted.

Some people appear to be at once what we might term both half-witted and double-witted. The profound genius, who may be peculiarly simple-minded in ordinary affairs, is at the same time a philosopher to the learned, and a fool to the world: such a man would in one age be adored as a sage, and in another slighted as a simpleton.

As regards the general extensive co-existence of those capacities which are most directly adapted to constitute a mind of

⁵ "The esteem for different kinds of genius, is in every age proportioned to the interest the people have in esteeming them."—*Helvetius. Essays on the Mind*, c. xix.

real talent; it must be concluded that those in whose minds co-exist the particular capacities which would each tend to enable them to accomplish one particular object, or to excel in one particular pursuit, are the most fortunately gifted, inasmuch as they are the most sure of success, and of distinguishing themselves in these undertakings. It is from a defect in this respect, from having no peculiar characteristic as regards their mental endowments, that some persons pursue a vacillating career, aiming at many things for which they find themselves imperfectly, although about equally qualified, but obtaining success and eminence in none of them. And the desired result to which I have referred, is most sure of being attained when each of the different capacities of the same faculty are extensively possessed, without any undue or disproportionate deficiency being existent in any of the faculties or capacities.

Apparent vacillation of conduct, or instability of purpose, is not however in every case an unerring test of a disproportionate co-existence of intellectual capacities: inasmuch as it will often happen that this seeming indecisive line of action may be the result of a steady determination to achieve the end aimed at, and to try different means for this purpose, instead of relying on one only; as when we ascend a steep mountain we wend our path by circuitous routes, if we cannot pursue a direct road. This apparent instability may therefore be either the determination of a great mind, varying in its course according to its exigencies; or the fickleness of a weak one which has no certain course to follow. The line of the stately frigate and of the humble raft may be both alike wavering and indirect; but while the one is the scientific tack directed by nautical skill, the other is merely impelled by the wind and tide.

Versatility of talent appears to be a main characteristic of man, as distinguished from all other creatures; and is the result of the extensive possession together of several independent capacities of different kinds.

7. *Endowment of Inspiration Innate.*

A question may however be raised by the acute and attentive observer of human nature, whether there is not in reality something which meets not the common gaze, by which alone can be accounted for those amazing and stupendous operations that the minds of certain men, the greatest indeed, have occasionally produced;—mighty throes, which giant efforts only could have achieved, and which we accordingly infer to have necessarily proceeded from some power of corresponding extent.*

* *Mr. F. Galton* well remarks that "no one who has had the privilege

Now it does appear to me, after much patient thought and painful inquiry, that there is in reality one peculiar endowment which men of great talent occasionally possess, and which is generally thought to be ambition, or enthusiasm; but which upon examination will be found very different to, and much more powerful and extensive than, either of those excitements in many respects. This power seems to consist in an ability, of which the individuals themselves become eventually conscious, to attain each object at which they aim, whether in science, art, politics, or war; and to turn to their own account every circumstance however adverse that may arise. It leads on the person so endowed ceaselessly to exert himself, and to be ever awake to the object he has in view.⁷

In the investigation of the laws of matter, it will be found that, in many instances, particular elements are wont to operate in a very different manner when united together, to what any of them would do individually when not so combined. By being thus brought into contact, not only are their aggregate properties increased; but out of this union, a new and original principle or power appears to be generated, which is quite different from, and entirely beyond, what any of these elements possessed in a separate condition. I might instance that composition of different ingredients termed gunpowder, which is formed from the union together in certain proportions, of several simple substances, each of which by itself produces no important or striking results when ignited; but which, when so united together, form a compound which is endowed with properties alike powerful and astonishing. So also it will be found that a body of men will act on a given emergency, very differently from what the same men would individually do if placed by themselves. But if it happened that this body of men constituted a company peculiarly fitted for action, one being adapted and used to command, and the others accustomed to act under a leader; and supposing them to be placed in a position peculiarly qualified to excite them to action; it cannot be doubted that the circumstance of their being thus united, would conduce greatly to the efficiency of their conduct. Indeed, both in the case of the union of the chemical elements alluded to, and also in the union of persons here supposed, a new and original element or power is generated or produced by the combination itself, of the greatest importance.

of mixing in the society of the abler men of any great capital, or who is acquainted with the biographies of the heroes of history, can doubt the existence of grand human animals, of natures pre-eminently noble, of individuals born to be kings of men."—*Hereditary Genius*, p. 24.

⁷ Aristotle tells us, that "there is a power of the mind, call it cleverness, keenness, or sagacity, of which the nature consists in enabling us to accomplish our purposes" (*Ethics*, b. vi. c. xii.); and which, to a certain extent, coincides with the capacity here described.

It is indeed this perfection in the exact correspondence, and harmony, and mutual co-operation of all its varied, and apparently conflicting constituents, which results in the order and perfection of the universe at large; and which marks it out as the production of a Being at once omniscient and omnipotent.

In a manner therefore analogous to what occurs in the combinations here supposed, may it not be that certain of the intellectual faculties and capacities, and also certain essential properties and qualities of the soul, when largely each of them co-existent together in the same individual, in suitable proportions, render him capable of the greatest attainments and exploits; and endow him with powers far beyond what any of those faculties or capacities, when singly possessed to a large extent, appear able to confer?^s

From this peculiar co-existence in certain degrees, of particular capacities and qualities as above described, results the extraordinary and important talent which is the subject of the present section, and which I have denominated "The Endowment of Inspiration Innate." I term it an "Endowment," because it is distinct from the faculties and capacities of the mind; being no simple independent power of itself, but only the result or product of a union of powers. I term it "Inspiration," because it so nearly resembles in its operations what have been deemed to be the effects of Divine influence on the soul, although wholly distinct from them in its nature. And I term it Inspiration "Innate," because it is essentially and entirely innate in the mind; and is derived from no external cause, or influence, but is produced by the particular condition referred to.

This is indeed a very rare, and a very valuable endowment. It is moreover one with which some of the most renowned men in different ages of the world have been adorned, which has been their distinguishing attribute, and to which doubtless they have been mainly indebted for their celebrity, and their eminence.

From the existence of this endowment, it is that in times of great civil commotion, or on the most important occasions, characters of eminent abilities suited to those occasions, have appeared to be created, and have risen up. The fact is however, that it is not so much the occasions that are suited to the individuals, as the individuals to the occasions; there being in most ages men of great abilities, which will eventually be called forth by whatever events or circumstances excite them

^s According to the author of *Vestiges of the Natural History of the Creation*, man is mainly indebted for his superiority, to the concentration in him of all the various powers, qualities, and habits of other animals. And this characteristic marks the greatest individuals of our own species; in whom were united a multiplicity of different acquirements and powers.—*Ninth Edition*, p. 214.

to action, and in whatever line they may chance to be employed, whether in arms, politics, philosophy, or arts. Events, no doubt, greatly contribute to render different persons what they are: for although, as regards their faculties and capacities, they are the children of nature; yet as regards their actions and pursuits,—the application of these powers,—they are no less the children of circumstances. Chances and events may change altogether the course, or vary the direction of the latter; but can never actually alter the former. They may cause us to follow different pursuits or professions from what we originally intended; or may serve to call into action latent powers which we had not before exercised; but they can never confer upon us faculties or capacities which we did not before possess,—such as endowing us with genius, or powers of reasoning,—or creating new intellectual talents. They may however conduce to the enlargement, or to the cultivation of any of those powers with which we are already gifted, by stimulating their exercise, and inciting them to make extraordinary efforts. Great men have moreover usually sprung up during revolutions and civil commotions; because then the shackles which bind persons in society are thrown off, and people rise in the world according as they have the ability to do so. In the general scramble, the strongest is sure to succeed; although, while they all stood still, he had no opportunity of proving his strength. A state of civil commotion enables men of extensive talent to rise with more facility, and to make themselves known; both because it affords them so many opportunities for exertion, and because it levels all the barriers of rank and fortune. It also serves to direct men's energies to a certain point, and to sharpen the faculties by the excitement which it produces.

As I have already observed, this endowment arises, in part, from the consciousness of the possession of talents fitted for, and able to achieve particular purposes; as, in some animals the possession of certain qualities leads them instinctively to follow those pursuits for which they are best fitted, and to strive to achieve efforts of great importance, which they only can attain; while in men of inferior or limited mental capacity, as among animals of but feeble power, this faculty does not exist. They are conscious of possessing no extraordinary ability; and consequently feel no desire to make extraordinary exertions.

Men of great abilities in one way, have however frequently very great deficiencies in other respects. Indeed, there are certain defects so generally, nay almost invariably, common to men of talent, that we are led to doubt the existence of the talent, if the defects are not found to accompany it.⁹ Hence it happens

⁹ *Mr. F. Galton* remarks on this passage:—"I do not agree that the greatest characters have almost invariably certain great deficiencies. Take

that their very deficiencies come at length to be regarded as a part and parcel of, and as inseparable from, nay even as a proof of their exalted endowments. But the greatest men of all, are unquestionably those who possess these great abilities, unaccompanied by these great defects. Such persons are perhaps extremely rare; and it is among those who are gifted with the endowment of inspiration innate, through the extensive co-existence together of certain capacities in the manner described, that they are most likely to be found.

As this endowment is occasioned by, or results from, the co-existence and combination, in suitable proportions, of certain capacities in the same individual; so it may be inferred that the production of offspring gifted with extraordinary or extensive talents, ensues when those of the parents are of such a nature that,—as we see with regard to certain elements in the material world,—although when separate they are but of little power or force, when brought together and combined, they constitute a mind of consummate ability. Thus, energy in one parent, and origination in the other, may be developed in children in whom both these endowments are conjoined, and so rendered fruitful; but which, when existing separate, were barren and unproductive.

8. *Comparative Variation of different Minds, as regards the Innate Qualities they possess.*

The varieties observable in different persons, not only as regards their active powers, but the innate essential qualities of their minds, which have been alluded to in the preceding section, deserve next to be considered. This difference in mental constitutions, cannot but have been noted by every one who has examined attentively the various developments of character exhibited in human nature; and it will have been remarked that the intellectual endowments of different individuals vary as much one from the other as do the physical frames of these several persons. Those minds which are the most volatile and quick, are oftentimes wanting in strength and profundity. A ready and dexterous man is seldom a very deep or profound one. A peer, like a beggar, may have but a penny in his pocket; but the peer will be able to draw upon his bankers for as many pounds as he pleases. Heavy artillery cannot be brought to play in a moment, or to point at any small

Cæsar, spoilt ultimately by absolute power, but naturally a very perfect man."

object; but when its energies are once aroused, its power is far greater, and its force more efficient than that of light infantry, whose motions are sudden and rapid.

As some souls are more easily moved or excited by emotions and passions than others are—either from being more volatile and active, or less grave and solid, and are thus more apt to be affected by trifles—so the intellectual faculties, or active powers, of certain persons, perhaps of the greatest and most energetic, are less agile, and less easily roused to exertion, than those of others are; although very possibly they are when so roused, more powerful in their operations than are minds which every trifle engages. Thus deep men, in ordinary society, are often deemed dull men; and those of the greatest talents are the least liable to be moved or excited by petty objects. So also it is with animals, that the nimblest and most easily roused are by no means the most powerful; and those streams which make the loudest rattle, and which every pebble that lies at the bottom agitates, are never very deep.

Moreover, almost as soon as a child is born, he betrays some marked peculiarity and individuality of character, more especially as regards temper, irritability, quickness in observation, and the like. But if infants, with so little opportunity for this display, evince it thus distinctly and forcibly; and if different infants, in the treatment of whom at this early period there is but little difference pursued, vary so much in this respect, how great in reality must be the difference between them, even before their faculties and powers, either mental, moral, or medial, are developed, and are as yet immature. Nevertheless, this difference, so great in infancy, becomes greater in childhood, widens still further during youth, and when manhood arrives, has increased so immensely that its limits are hardly discernible.

Probably moreover among different families, and different nations as well, different faculties and capacities will be found to predominate, and to bear the fruit characteristic of each. Thus, artistic studies in Italy, the pursuit of knowledge in one country, and speculative studies in another, may be the prevailing mental efforts induced by the comparative predominance of particular capacities.

How then is this phenomenon satisfactorily to be explained? Perhaps the following solution may suffice for the purpose.

If indeed, as appears absolutely necessary, the soul itself possesses some substance or substratum, in which it exists, then must this very substance possess certain qualities, more especially as regards its texture and temperament; and further, different souls must differ from one another with respect to their individual particular texture and temperament, and also with respect to all other qualities dependent

upon, or resulting therefrom :¹ and hence it also follows that the various qualities of souls must essentially differ ; unless indeed we can show that the same causes do not operate alike in each. Moreover, as material frames vary as to their qualities of vigour, activity, and energy, so also may those which are spiritual.²

Different souls however cannot be supposed to differ from one another as regards their form or extension, inasmuch as these may probably vary in each soul at different times, and can constitute no essential property of their being. Even in material substances, size and shape are not necessary to them ; and these they may often change, while not only their identity, but their constituent particles, will remain the same.

This variety in different souls, resulting from a difference in their essential being, is important to consider as constituting the difference in the qualities of different minds, and as evincing moreover in what those qualities consist, or on what they depend. From this also we satisfactorily learn, that what we here considered as the powers of the soul are quite independent of its qualities ; and that some of its endowments are dependent on its powers, others on its qualities.

Possibly however it may be discerned that certain qualities of the soul extensively influence the bent and exercise of certain of its powers or capacities ; and that the co-existence to a large extent of certain powers or capacities, contributes in its turn, although perhaps in a secondary degree only, to produce or originate certain qualities.

Extensive results may indeed be dependent upon the qualities, as well as upon the powers, of the soul. So in material beings, although their powers, whether active or passive, and their essential qualities, are quite distinct ; they are nevertheless each alike important to understand, and to bear in mind.

We cannot but attribute to the soul qualities of some sort, as well as powers ; and if so, the qualities of vigour, activity, and energy, seem almost essential to it, and to pertain especially to spiritual beings. Moreover, if souls possess these qualities, different souls must necessarily vary as regards the comparative extent to which they respectively possess them.

Energy is probably owing in part to the essential constitution of the soul itself, in part to the essential constitution of

¹ From *Locke's* comparison not only of the organs, but of the *faculties* of the mind to melted ore, we might almost infer that he considered the mental qualities to a certain extent dependent on the essential constitution of the soul. See his *Essay on the Understanding*, b. ii. c. 29. s. 3.

"There seems to be no necessity at all for admitting that assertion of *Origen's*, that all rational souls whatever, even those of men, and those of the highest angelical orders, are universally of one and the same nature, and have no fundamental or essential difference in their constitution."—*Cudworth's Intellectual System of the Universe*, b. i. chap. 4, p. 566.

² *Vide ante, Prel. Diss.*, vol. i. s. v. a. 3, p. 80.

the body, and in part to the stimulus afforded to the individual, either by the consciousness of the possession of talents fitted for the end to be attained, or by the opportunities held out to him. An animal ordinarily lethargic becomes energetic in defence of its young; and probably to an extent corresponding with the power that it is conscious of being able to exert. Hence, energy itself is a proof of talent, as well as of the existence of a stimulus to exert it. Energy is, in fact and in reality, not a quality or endowment in itself, but merely manifestation of one; an evidence of the strength and power of the soul to accomplish great purposes. As the effort of a man lifting a heavy weight, is not an endowment of itself, but affords proof of his possessing great physical strength; so, when we see a person exerting himself with energy, this may be regarded as evincing the power and vigour of his mind.

It has already been suggested in this Treatise, that the emotions, and passions, and, to a certain extent, also the appetites and affections, are probably dependent rather on the qualities, than on the powers or faculties of the soul.

The possession of qualities inherent in, and inseparable from, the soul, as well as powers, is moreover important to bear in mind in considering the soul as a real being or substance, and not a mere idea, or nonentity, or creation of the imagination. As there is a regular and almost imperceptible gradation between the various species of animals and vegetables, blending the one into the other; so, analogous to this regulation in the order of nature, may there not be a corresponding gradation between the various faculties and capacities of the mind, and between the intellectual faculties and the medial powers and endowments? It is difficult, in some instances, to define where animation ends and vegetation begins. It may be as difficult to point out with certainty where sensation ends, and perception commences; as also what operations are within the province of the understanding, and which are accomplished by reasoning. In particular cases it may happen that those different beings, and powers, and operations, have each of them properties and endowments common to one another, which renders the clear definition of this distinction still more difficult.

9. *Dependence of the Faculties and Qualities of the Mind on the Constitution of the Material Frame.*

Not only however is it important, and indeed essential, for the constitution of intellectual power generally, but more especially for that of the highest order, and for the existence of inspiration innate, above all, that some particular faculties and capacities should to a certain extent co-exist; but also that

a particular texture and temperament of the material frame, and a corresponding quality of the vital fluids, should be possessed, in conjunction with the former. Our material and medial constitution should, moreover, be so ordered, that they will completely harmonize and co-operate with the higher part of the system.

Another subject of considerable importance consequent on the foregoing considerations, is the inquiry to what extent, and in what respects, the various intellectual faculties and capacities are influenced by the constitution and condition of the material frame, and its different organs and members.

It does not seem probable, nor can we reasonably suppose, that any of these faculties or capacities are at all dependent upon the body, or upon any part of it, either for their actual existence, or for the extent to which they may respectively be found; or for the powers or qualities with which they may be endowed: or that these peculiar characteristics are, any of them, affected or altered by the constitution or condition of the corporeal frame. On the other hand, it does appear that these various faculties and capacities, and also certain qualities relating to them, are very greatly dependent upon the particular nature and constitution of the material frame, and its organs;³ and also on its texture, temperament, and fluids,⁴ both for their vigour in operation, and for the facility and alacrity with which they carry on their several actions. Thus, a vast difference is perceptible owing to this, not only between different persons, but in the same person at different periods of his life and growth, according as his frame changes; and even at various periods of the same day, as that frame is languid or vigorous.⁵ And if we find that the several characteristics of the different faculties and capacities change, in exact correspondence with these bodily changes; can we, without some very powerful and adequate cause for so doing, doubt of the intimate connexion between, and of the essential dependence of the one upon the other?

The exercise of this influence by the material frame over the intellectual faculties, is not however always uniform in its operations. Thus, that particular condition of the body which by its exhilarated state will heighten the flow of invention, and stimulate

³ *Sir W. Lawrence* lays it down that "the differences between man and animals, in propensities, feelings, and intellectual faculties, are merely the result of a difference in organization."—*Nat. Hist. of Man*, s. i. c. vii.

⁴ *Mr. Smee* considers that even "the mental faculties arise from the organization of the nervous system."—*Instinct and Reason*, p. 311.

⁵ *Dr. Richardson*, remarks with regard to this passage:—"On the view you take respecting the condition of the body as affecting the mind, I agree with you. You seem to me to place the positions fairly and fully. Your observation on night and morning work is most true."

the exuberance of wit, will greatly impede the exercise of each of the reasoning capacities, and of those of understanding also. The mind is most active and volatile when the spirits are high, as is generally the case in a morning; and it is then capable of the most vigorous efforts. But it is when the spirits are more depressed, as in the afternoon part of the day, that the action of the mind is easiest to control, and the readiest to obey the discipline to which it has been subjected. For original conception and energetic exertion, the former condition is the most favourable; although for deep reflection and earnest continuous application, the latter is the best fitted. The student at sunrise, enunciates the most brilliant ideas. But the student by lamplight, produces thoughts which are the most mellowed and well digested.

It does not, however, appear to me, so far as I can judge from my own observation, and from internal reflection, that the condition of the body in any degree either extends or limits the actual power of the mind. The real essential result of bodily disorder, or defect of this description, is that it greatly affects the ease with which the organs of the body obey the impulses of the mind, and are able to act in any intellectual operation for which they are required. The mind and the body are ever distinct and independent, although so closely conjoined. Thus, a horse harnessed to a carriage, is exactly the same animal, and undergoes no change, whether the carriage is empty or whether it is overloaded, although his movements are far more agile and easy in the former case than in the latter.⁶

Nevertheless, when we consider the vast variety of substances, of which our bodies are made up, and the diversity of organs employed in our intellectual operations; when we reflect on the numerous properties and constituents appertaining to each of these subjects, flesh, blood, nerves, sinews, gastric juice, vital fluids of different kinds, and the like, each of which varies in different persons, and in the same person at different periods; when we remember, moreover, how each of these sub-

⁶ The following note by *Mr. Serjeant Cox* has been contributed on this passage:—"I cannot assent to this view of the exemption of the mind from the influence of the body. The individual *Ego* holds communication with the external world through the medium of the material mechanism of the brain. The resulting action of the brain is what we call the mind. The soul (or self) is the conscious thing that receives the impressions of brain action. If the body is in an unhealthy condition, the brain usually partakes of that condition, and its action is either deadened or disordered. When the body is weary, the mind in its normal state is wearied also,* as is shown by the difficulty we feel in thinking, or following any other mental action. This is one instance only; but they appear to me to be innumerable. What is insanity itself but disordered brain action?"

* *Vide ante, Prel. Diss.*, vol. i. s. vii. a. 1.

jects is liable to be affected by the temperature and pressure of the atmosphere, and numerous external causes, some of which are ever in operation; we cannot but be convinced that the condition of the body must necessarily exercise a very considerable influence over the mind, especially as regards its activity, and adaptation for exertion.⁷

That the higher the intellectual faculties and capacities are, the more independent they are of the body, is well evinced by the state and operation of the mind during sleep, when it acts altogether uncontrolled by the material frame, from which it becomes for the time disconnected. Thus, at this period, the faculty of understanding, which is the most allied to, and dependent on, the body, as through the senses alone all ideas are received into the mind, is in a state of entire inactivity, although while we are awake it is almost ceaselessly active. Reason is occasionally, though not frequently, and but seldom to a very great extent, exercised when we are in this condition. Genius, especially the imaginative capacity, that of origination, which is the highest, is during this period very fully and very constantly exerted. Wit, being dependent for its operation on the communication of new ideas by the aid of the understanding, is probably then less active than are any of the other capacities of this faculty. And taste, for the same reason, is also limited, it may be to a less extent, in its exercise; although occasionally it is at this period very fully exerted.

We may also observe in old age, when the corporeal organs have decayed, or become enfeebled, that the understanding is that faculty whose activity and vigour appear chiefly to be impeded, from this being the faculty most intimately allied to, and extensively dependent on, the body. That the faculty of reason is that which is in ordinary cases the next to suffer; while the faculty of genius, which is the least dependent on the body, continues in full vigour. Wit—although from there being less abundance of animal spirits humour is not so much exerted at this period—is as keen as ever, the taste as refined, and the imagination as powerful.

That the individual nature, and peculiar endowments and qualities of the soul, and not the quality or particular formation of the body, or any of its parts or organs, are nevertheless what determine the actual character of the man; is proved by the fact that whatever changes the latter may undergo, whether in texture, or temperament, or even in general constitution, the same peculiar, intellectual, and moral character remains,

⁷ *Mr. Isaac Taylor*, indeed, asserts, that "reason in man is not absolute reason, but a reasoning faculty dependent to a great extent upon, and characterized by, the particular cerebral conformation, and by the constitution or temperament of the individual."—*Physical Theory of Another Life*, c. v.

modified, indeed, by these changes, so far as its development and exercise are affected by them. Certain faculties may be late in becoming displayed; but when they have once been brought into action, they never cease to exist. The man of extensive genius, or of powerful reasoning, ever possesses through life the same endowments and intellectual character; and although these powers may be modified by age, and various causes, their actual nature remains unchanged. If, on the other hand, the intellectual and moral character of a person depended on his physical formation, this would necessarily alter with his growth. The bodily frame of each individual is very different in youth and in old age, and so also are his habits and pursuits. But his intellectual faculties and capacities, his disposition, and moral character, remain the same, notwithstanding these vast changes; inasmuch as his soul retains unaltered her pristine character, which may indeed be well regarded as an additional and sure proof of her immutable and purely spiritual nature.

10. *Growth and Development of the different Faculties and Capacities.*

The several faculties of the mind are developed at different periods of the growth of the body, according as the material mental organs attain maturity, or the faculties of the mind are respectively excited to action, and arrive at a state of vigour. The various capacities of these different faculties are also displayed at different periods of age; those of the more ordinary kind, such as apprehension and sense, being of more general utility, are developed and called into exercise sooner than those of a more exalted nature. Apprehension, indeed, is probably exercised shortly after the individual enters upon his existence,^s while others may be a long period before they are roused

^s "The child when he first comes into the world, may care very little for what is passing around him, although he is, of necessity, always learning something even at first; but, after a certain period, he is in a rapid progress of instruction; his curiosity becomes irrepressible; the thirst for knowledge is predominating in his mind, and it is as universal as insatiable. During the period between the ages of eighteen months or two years, and six,—I will say even and five,—and he learns much more of the material world,—of his own powers,—of the nature of other bodies,—even of his mind, and of other minds,—than he ever after acquires during all the years of boyhood, youth, and manhood. Every child, even of the most ordinary capacity, learns more, gains a greater mass of knowledge, and of a more useful kind at this tender age, than the greatest philosopher is enabled to build upon it during the longest life of the most successful investigation,—even were he to live to eighty years of age, and pursue the splendid career of Newton or La Place."—*Lord Brougham*,

to exertion. The capacities which constitute reason reach perfection in middle age; while those of genius appear to be most active during youth, but most perfect and vigorous in old age. The capacities of the understanding are most docile during youth. Probably, however, the capacity of apprehension possesses the greatest vigour during middle life, and comprehension at that period, and in old age.

Does this prove that the intellectual faculties and capacities are wholly dependent on the body? Not by any means, inasmuch as reason improves while age advances; which arises, however, not from the material frame having reached maturity, but in consequence of the exercise and experience which this faculty gradually acquires.

So also is it with regard to the capacities which constitute the understanding. Apprehension is certainly most pliable, and ready to receive impressions, during youth. Like a sheet of paper which is but very partially written upon, there then is greater facility for communicating to it new ideas than when it has been covered over with cyphers.

Genius is, perhaps, most apt to be exercised during youth, when the spirits are high, and leisure is afforded for the pursuits in which it aids; but, as I stated before, it often happens, as in the case of Milton and Michael Angelo, that the imagination, and taste, and wit, are even more vigorous in old age than they were during youth.

In children, apprehension, and sense, and wit are principally constituted, simply because these are the capacities which are principally called into action. Mirth prevails most during youth, as we see also among animals, which at that period gambol and frisk about, and appear to be endowed with exquisite humorous qualities.

On the whole, therefore, I believe that youth is the season when the understanding is in its prime; manhood that of reason; and old age that of genius; although the latter faculty is perhaps most frequently exerted during the first period. The whole number, or full extent, of a person's faculties and capacities may possibly not be known even to himself, until he has reached maturity, when he begins to observe the general operations of the world around him, and his abilities and energies are for the first time called forth into active play. And, on the other hand, for the same reason, his

Speech on the Education of the People. Lord Brougham's Speeches, vol. iii. pp. 234, 235.

"The child is distinguished by the quickness of apprehension through the medium of its senses, which decreases from early youth, to extreme old age. In early infancy the child obtains much knowledge of the external world, and remembers before it has any use of language."—*The Mind of Man. By Alfred Smea, F.R.S., pp. 34, 35.*

deficiency in certain faculties or qualifications may not until this period be ascertained. The development of the intellectual faculties may, therefore, be considered as depending on two circumstances: the growth of the material frame, and of the organs in which, and through which, the soul exists and acts; and the cultivation and exercise of the faculties themselves, by which they become expanded and improved, and are gradually brought into a state of greater power and activity.

Some men appear, during youth, to possess great intellectual capacity, and to be endowed with a very extraordinary degree of power and activity in the exertion of it; but who in subsequent life, after they have reached maturity, do not seem to be gifted with the same amount of ability, and entirely neglect to fulfil those sanguine expectations, which their early display of talent had raised. This may be extensively, although not entirely, owing to the constitution of their material frames and organs, which in their younger days possessed the activity and energy capacitated for the exercise of a soul of a powerful and enterprising character; but which, when the body became matured by age, for want of a due elasticity and vigour, is restrained in those efforts which it was formerly wont to exhibit.

Each of the intellectual faculties is capable of improvement by cultivation to an almost infinite extent, and is dependent on such a course for reaching maturity. It is also rendered more energetic and more powerful by this means. By exercise the intellectual organs of the body become better fitted for exertion, and the mind acquires greater ascendancy and control in the direction of them.⁹

The general enlargement and improvement of the mind by this method is, however, a topic far too important to be disposed of summarily. Its discussion at length has, therefore, been reserved as the subject for a separate chapter in this Treatise.¹

⁹ *Lord Bacon* remarks that the intellectual powers have fewer means to work upon, than the will or body of man; but the one that prevaieth, that is, exercises, worketh more forcibly in them than in the rest.—*Helps of the Intellectual Powers*.

¹ *Vide post*, chap. vii.

CHAPTER II.

THE FACULTY OF UNDERSTANDING.

1. *Quality and Constitution of this Faculty, and of its Subordinate Constituent Capacities.*

As the first intellectual operation which the mind of every one performs is that of knowing, so the understanding, by which that act is achieved, must be ranked as the first in order among the intellectual faculties.¹ And as the senses are the first excited of all the powers possessed by an animated being, so the understanding is exercised the earliest of all the faculties of the mind, and is probably exerted very soon after the soul is united to the body.² To the senses the understanding is indebted for supplying it with intellectual food, and it is the only faculty immediately connected with them.³ The infant, immediately on its emerging from the womb, and, it may be, even before that period, is actively at work through the instrumentality of this faculty in imbibing a vast store of ideas for its use in after-life. Silently and unobserved, but not the less surely or diligently, does this important process go forward.⁴ Every sense is then fresh and lively, and awake to each impression, whether of sight, of sound, of feeling, or of touch; while

¹ "The power of perception is that which we call the understanding."—*Locke. Essay on the Understanding*, b. ii. c. xxi. s. 5.

"What is in man the understanding? The assemblage of his ideas. To what sort of understanding do we give the name of talent? To an understanding concentrated in one subject, that is to say, to a large assemblage of ideas of the same kind."—*Helvetius. Treatise on Man*, sect. v. c. 2.

² According to *Burton*, the apprehensive faculty consists of two parts, inward and outward. Of the outward part are the five senses. Of the inward are common sense, phantasy (imagination?), and energy.—*Anatomy of Melancholy*, pt. i. s. 1. p. 22.

³ *Hobbes* asserts that there is no conception in a man's mind, which has not, at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense.—*Leviathan*, pt. 1. c. i.

According to *Condillac*, the mind perceives nothing but sensations. What *Locke* terms reflection, appears to be omitted from his system, except so far as it is confounded with memory.

⁴ *Locke* remarks on the eagerness of new-born children to obtain ideas. *Essay on the Understanding*, b. ii. c. 9. s. 7.

the various sensations so produced are at once communicated to the understanding, and form the materials of study for this most attentive learner.⁵ Probably, indeed, as soon as the soul itself enters upon its separate independent existence, it commences the reception of ideas, inasmuch as action seems essential to its very being; and of all acts that of receiving ideas must necessarily be one of the simplest and easiest. If therefore, during the first stages of infancy, ideas do not enter into the mind, it may reasonably be questioned whether the soul is then united to the body; and whether that process takes place before, or only contemporaneously with, the dawning and exhibition of intelligence.

The activity and vigour of the understanding in infants, is further extensively promoted by the circumstance that the other faculties of the mind are not at this period developed, and consequently do not, as in the case of adults, interfere with the operation of this faculty.⁶ The emotions however, when, and so far as, they do accompany these early mental efforts, are of important use to imprint on the mind the ideas thus obtained. Until the understanding is stored with ideas, the other faculties, whose province it is to operate on the materials supplied, are but little, if at all, exerted.

The understanding consists in the power of the mind to receive readily, distinctly, and amply, the ideas of any subject which may be presented to its notice, and thereby to take an accurate and complete survey of it. It is by the understanding that the simple process of ascertaining the nature of any matter which may be submitted to our observation is effected.⁷ This faculty is more dependent than the other intellectual faculties are on the perfection of the organs of the senses, by means of which sensations, and from them ideas, are received into the mind, as, unless these are correctly received, no correct view of them can be obtained.

There appears indeed to be no reason why ideas should not be communicated to the mind with equal facility and correctness through the sense of feeling, as through those of seeing and hearing. Whatever sense serves to convey a sensation affording information respecting external objects, serves to

⁵ *Locke* compares the uninformed mind, which has yet to be impressed with ideas, to a sheet of white paper.—*Essay on the Understanding*, b. ii. c. i. s. 2.

⁶ Nevertheless, *Des Cartes* remarks that “in our early years the mind was so immersed in the body, that, although it perceived many things with sufficient clearness, it yet knew nothing distinctly.”—*Principia*, par. i. s. 42.

⁷ *Malebranche* holds that there are four different modes of perception: 1. Knowing things by themselves. 2. Knowing them by their ideas. 3. Knowing them by internal sensation. 4. Knowing them by conjecture.—*Search after Truth*, pt. ii. b. iii. c. 7, s. 1.

communicate ideas to the mind. It is only, however, in the case of those who are deprived of the sense either of sight or sound, that resort is had generally to that of feeling to supply ordinary ideas. With all persons nevertheless, the latter sense serves to produce a vast variety of sensations, from which ideas spring.

As already remarked in the previous chapter, the lower the faculties or capacities are, the more directly dependent are they on the constitution of the body; while those of the highest intellectual order are the least so. Thus apprehension, which is nearly connected with sensation, is more dependent in this respect than deprehension, whose efforts are grounded on the operations of the former capacity; deprehension than comprehension, the understanding than reason, and reason than genius.

The sensations communicated by the senses, form the main foundation of the efforts of the faculty of understanding; as the ideas obtained by the understanding, do of those of the faculty of reason.⁸

The understanding, although only one of the faculties of the soul, perhaps indeed the lowest in the order, is very exalted in its nature, very extensive in its powers, and is possessed by man alone of terrestrial beings, in common with his Creator and the angels.⁹ Of itself, it is sufficient to constitute him an intelligent being, and it serves as a medium of communication between the mind and all exterior objects. It is, as it were, the eye of the soul, by which all the rays of knowledge are enabled to enter.

The understanding, being one of the most important, and the most active of the intellectual faculties, and the one to which the other faculties are indebted for all the ideas about which they are exercised, is constituted of the three several capacities here described; and its nature and use will be accordingly best understood by an examination of these constituent capacities, with each of which every person is in some measure endowed, although they are not necessarily or generally all extensively possessed by the same person. It is indeed very seldom that

⁸ "Sense is not knowledge and understanding. There is a higher faculty in the soul of reason and understanding, which judges of sense, detects the phantasy and imposture of it, discovers to us that there is nothing in the objects themselves like to those forementioned sensible ideas, and resolves all sensible things into intelligible principles."—*Cudworth's Intellectual System of the Universe*, b. i. c. 4, p. 635.

⁹ *Aristotle* holds that perception differs from intellect, the former being common to all animals, the latter to a few. By perception however he probably intended rather sensation, than what I have here termed understanding.

"Birds possess acute powers of observation."—*Darwin's Descent of Man*, vol. ii. p. 109.

they do each so exist together, although in some individuals they are thus found.

Like the ocean of the material world into which innumerable streams from all quarters are ever flowing, and contributing to its vastness, while on the other hand it loses every minute by evaporation some portion of its mass; so the mind of man from the first hour of his existence until his death, is constantly receiving fresh streams of knowledge through the ideas which the understanding is ever imbibing: while, on the other hand, a never ceasing efflux is going on, by the fading and obliteration of ideas from the memory. From this it results that the mass of ideas in the mind is always in a state of mutation, which must necessarily have its influence on the whole mental and moral condition and constitution. In this respect, indeed, the body and the mind much resemble each other.

2. *The Capacity of Apprehension.*

Apprehension is that capacity of the faculty of the understanding, by which it is enabled to receive with celerity, ease, and clearness, and to convey to the mind in an intelligible manner, any simple ideas of outward objects, or any combinations of ideas, that have been formed and rendered into language by any person for the description or illustration of any simple subject or matter, such as in common conversation would be made use of in describing it, so as to communicate a general acquaintance with it.¹

The ideas received by this capacity, are of each kind as regards their source, but are mainly those obtained by sensation. Indeed, no ideas are dealt by, or even received into, the mind, unless they are clearly apprehended. The nature of some, however, is perceived immediately that the sensation of them is communicated; while about others delay takes place, during which the mind apprehends their quality. Probably indeed, every idea, whatever be its character, is submitted to the apprehension ere the other capacities of the understanding are exercised upon it; although certain of those ideas may occupy more of the attention of apprehension than others do.

If it be objected to this theory, that upon the principle thus propounded, ideas of whatever character or quality, are

¹ According to *Archbishop Whately*, logical writers define simple apprehension to be "that act or condition of the mind in which it receives a notion of any object; and which is analogous to the perception of the senses."—*Logic*, b. ii. chap. i. s. 1.

obtained through apprehension, including those proper for deprehension and comprehension as well; I would observe that all the ideas of each subject must be perceived clearly by the mind, which it effects through apprehension, ere they can be minutely scrutinized by deprehension, or widely surveyed by comprehension; that the ideas when first received into the mind, are all of one character or quality; and that their real essential variety is caused by the different modes of dealing with, or surveying them, whether by deprehension, or comprehension. Thus, in an analogous manner, although some of our food is liquid, and other solid; and though some is secreted by one organ, some by another; yet all is alike received into the frame in the first instance through the mouth.

It may perhaps also be objected to this capacity consisting in a facility and readiness in receiving ideas and knowledge of subjects of different kinds, that the mind is indebted for this power to the general perfection and excellence of the other capacities, more especially those of deprehension and analysis; and that the endowments which I have described this capacity to possess, are merely those which the mind obtains through the perfect development of these other capacities. On minute and careful examination, however, this will be found not to be the case. None of the other capacities, either singly or combined, can confer the precise endowments which this capacity bestows. The extensive possession of deprehension secures exactness in observation; analysis, precision in comparing different ideas. But apprehension is the power, not of taking a minute, but a general survey. Not of fixing the mind steadily upon, but of viewing rapidly and with facility, a particular subject. Apprehension is to the other capacities of the understanding, what sense is to the other capacities of reason. If however it be urged that this capacity effects more in the reception of ideas than could be attained by one single capacity; we may refer to the variety of objects from which the eye, to which I have assimilated this capacity, is capable of receiving sensations, embracing not only shapes and colours of every kind, but also enabling us to measure distance and space, and to discern the motions of bodies.

The senses serve merely to convey to us sensations corresponding with the nature of the object exciting them. These sensations are communicated to the mind, and by the capacity of apprehension are rendered intelligible so as to be availed of by the intellectual faculties. Receiving sensations, and understanding their nature, are obviously two very different matters. Sensations of an object or a sound, may strike the senses, and yet the mind may be ignorant of their quality; as we may have events communicated to us, and yet do not obtain a knowledge of them on account of our not understanding the language in

which they were narrated. To ascertain this fact, is the first necessary action of the mind; and to perform this operation, is the province of the capacity of apprehension, which is effected by reducing the sensation into an intelligible idea, or becoming acquainted with its actual nature; as in the case of receiving sensations of an object or sound, when by exerting the capacity of apprehension we discover and perceive their distinct quality.

We do not however necessarily always exert this capacity whenever sensations are communicated to us; inasmuch as those of many objects and many sounds, pass altogether unobserved. It is only in those cases where the mind distinctly perceives these sensations, and observes their actual particular quality, that this capacity is called into action. The mind acts with respect to sensations, as men in general do with regard to common domestic articles. Out of a vast number around them, they notice and apply those only for which they have immediate occasion, while the rest are entirely neglected as though they were not present. Ordinary subjects are in general the least apt to strike the mind. They become, as it were, polished down by use, so that the mind easily glides over them without its attention being arrested. Thus, we see that the same matters which have been neglected by one person to whom they were but of common occurrence, excite very great notice by another to whom they were novel and interesting.

It is in the ability thus to receive ideas, that the power consists of attending to, and acquiring knowledge of, common and simple subjects or objects of different kinds, whether by mere observation, or by conversation or reading. The mind is fully adapted for this effort, and the endeavour to obtain knowledge in this manner, is its most simple and ordinary exercise. Apprehension enables a person to perceive at once the nature and quality of the sensations he receives, and to acquire information respecting any subject with facility. The extensive possession of this capacity, is necessary to constitute the man of general and ready observation of ordinary matters; and the exertion of it is the first of all the intellectual actions which an individual performs, when commencing any operations of that kind. It is almost constantly in use, and consists in the mere act of reducing into some intelligible form or ideas, the sensations communicated by the senses. Though this capacity is so generally called into exercise, different persons differ much in the degree in which they possess it. The great power of observation with which some men are endowed, is owing to their being very largely gifted with this capacity, by which means they seize hold of, and reduce into an idea, every important sensation that they receive; while others, who are not so constituted, allow these sensations to pass away unheeded and unexamined.

Deficiency in this capacity is the cause of stupidity and dullness, by which we literally mean slowness and difficulty of apprehension, or of converting into an intelligible form or idea the sensations we obtain.

As different mirrors vary much with respect to the clearness and force with which they reflect various objects on their surface; so the capacity of apprehension differs much in different persons as regards its power, activity, and general excellence. If we cannot explain the causes on which the facility and readiness with which this capacity receives ideas, depend, any more than we can explain the reason why different eyes are able to perceive objects with different degrees of celerity; yet this surely militates nothing against the existence of this variety. Nor is it essential to ascertain whether this difference is occasioned by simple or compound causes operating to produce it; or whether it depends, as is not improbably the case, on something inherent in the very essence and constitution of the soul itself.

Apprehension is often found more largely developed, and is more fully and freely exerted, when the other faculties and capacities are proportionably small and inactive, inasmuch as they are occasionally prone to check, if not to divert, the operation of this capacity. In persons largely endowed with imaginative and reasoning powers, their ideas are apt to be tinctured, and the rays of knowledge are distorted, by the prism of prejudice through which they pass. Hence it is that children, who exercise but little the reasoning and imaginative capacities, receive ideas with great purity and correctness.

As the understanding is the first which is exercised of the intellectual faculties, so apprehension is the first which is exercised of the capacities of understanding.

3. *The Capacity of Deprehension.*

The Capacity of Deprehension, as I have here denominated it, is that capacity of the understanding by which it is enabled to receive with distinctness and accuracy all the different particular ideas of any subject, such as would be used in giving a minute description, so as to obtain an exact knowledge of it. The mind by this means is enabled to form the correct basis for an argument respecting these matters, of the most precise character, and to define and determine the real and essential points in a controversy. In this capacity also consists, or rather from the possession of it is derived, the power of applying the mind closely to the observation and knowledge of

the details of any system or branch of learning, so as to view it not merely at a distance, and to obtain an acquaintance with its general characteristics; but to acquire exact information respecting its particular qualities. In the investigation of any subject, the capacity of apprehension adapts us to advance a step further than that to which apprehension carries us. By the former we obtain clear and intelligible general ideas of a topic. The latter enables us to perceive all its minute and peculiar characteristics.

This capacity may perhaps at first sight seem to be of a complex, rather than of a simple nature; and it may appear as though the operations effected by it were the work, not of a single capacity, but of several different capacities acting together. The mistake however arises from the circumstance that we do not accurately distinguish between the efforts of this one capacity, which consist only in receiving ideas and knowledge into the mind, and by this means afford data for the other capacities to exercise themselves upon; and the operations of the different capacities on the ideas so obtained by this one alone. Thus we are led to suppose that, because in following up any subject through all its minute points, and inquiring into all the particulars connected with it, and drawing inferences and deductions with respect to them, several other capacities are concerned besides that of apprehension, as, for instance, those of sense, analysis, and of origination perhaps occasionally; the capacity of apprehension alone is not exercised in, or sufficient for, receiving ideas, on which may be founded an inquiry of this nature: and that therefore it is altogether erroneous to suppose that the extensive possession by any person of this capacity, of itself confers the power of receiving information respecting the exact details relating to such a subject. We must however consider that, although in the examination of the matter, the capacities of sense and analysis may be useful, or indeed essential, where different comparisons have to be instituted; yet in all these cases the capacity of apprehension is that by which the ideas and knowledge of the subject which form the foundation of the whole inquiry, are communicated to the mind; and on the extensive possession of it therefore mainly depends the ability of any individual to survey it in this manner.

The ideas presented by the capacities of the understanding, are to the reasoning capacities what grain is to the mill. Unless the corn be sound and good, no good flour can be produced; as on the quality of the grain, rather than on the excellence of the machine by which it is ground, will that of the bread depend. Thus, however accurately the mind may be able to compare ideas one with another, unless those which it receives be of a correspondingly accurate and precise cha-

racter, no accurate and precise knowledge can be obtained respecting any matter that we investigate.

It may also perhaps seem at first sight as though the existence of this capacity, as an independent and distinct one, was somewhat doubtful; and as if the operations and results attributed to it were in reality performed simply by the other capacities of the understanding being energetically exerted; by close attention in fact being paid to our endeavours while we are engaged in examining any subject. But although attention and care are very essential efforts in the pursuit of knowledge of whatever kind, and especially in acquiring that of the nature for which deprehension principally fits us, where any error in observing correctly the minutest point is of important consequence; yet these efforts themselves are altogether different from the capacity in question, the exercise of which they usually accompany. Such precautions are moreover equally as essential for the due exercise of the capacity of analysis, as for that of deprehension; and they are also very important in the exercise of taste, and indeed of all the other capacities. Nevertheless, the power to receive or compare ideas with accuracy, is evidently altogether distinct from that of close unvarying attention to the process. The application with the closest attention to any subject of the capacity of apprehension, would no more enable it to perform the operation for which deprehension is exclusively adapted, than applying the eye with close attention to any very minute object, would enable a man to observe it with the accuracy with which it is seen through a microscope. Great care and attention may indeed in part, and to some extent, and in certain respects, supply the want of deprehension, but can never wholly compensate for the absence of it; as great care and attention may, to some extent, compensate for the want of a microscope to observe any minute object. And although the person who uses with attention his naked eyes may be more successful in his observations than he who inattentively uses the finest microscope; yet this does nothing to prove that the microscope, when duly availed of, is not superior to the naked eye, or that it will not enable us to effect purposes for which the latter is wholly inadequate.

Nor is the habit of attention and care always found in those who largely possess the capacities of deprehension and analysis, although it is probable that the extensive possession of these capacities conduces to this habit. The capacities of deprehension and analysis, although often confounded one with another, are moreover in reality as distinct from, and independent of, each other, as they are from the habits alluded to. Nor can it be doubted that men differ from one another most materially, according as they possess the power of receiving

ideas with extreme precision, or of examining them with great acuteness. This capacity of receiving ideas with accuracy, in the manner I have stated when defining it, is quite as important an one, as distinct, and as independent, as are either of the others of this faculty.

It is the extensive possession of this capacity, which peculiarly fits a person for studying accurately, for obtaining an exact knowledge of particular branches of learning of an abstruse kind, or for the pursuit of practical business of a complicated nature, in which so much depends on gaining precise and correct information with respect to minute facts.

For the ability to conduct scientific experiments with accuracy and precision, the philosopher is indebted to this capacity, rather than to that of analysis; as it is through apprehension that the facts are obtained for reasoning upon which analysis is employed.

Deficiency in this capacity occasions want of accuracy in the perception of minute points and matters, and hence leads also to incorrect conclusions; inasmuch as it is impossible to reason with accuracy, unless we first determine with accuracy the premises concerning which we are to reason. Hence the capacity of analysis in the faculty of reason is very commonly exercised in conjunction with apprehension. The exercise of apprehension is, as it were, the singular of analysis. It is conversant about the same ideas and matters as are the province of logic and mathematics. The grand distinction between the operation of apprehension and that of analysis is that, in the former, matters or ideas are only taken singly and independently, and simply viewed; in the latter they are taken together, and compared one with another.

Apprehension is probably created at our birth less perfect than is analysis; is developed later, and is more dependent for attaining excellence upon education, than is the former capacity.

4. *The Capacity of Comprehension.*

The Capacity of Comprehension may be considered as the counterpart of that of apprehension. It is that capacity of the faculty of the understanding by which it is enabled to receive adequately and completely all the different ideas of any important subject, such as would be sufficient to afford a comprehensive description, so as to present at once a full, and ample, and extended view of it. By the possession of this capacity, the mind is fitted to take a wide and expansive survey of such a topic, and to comprehend at the same time all the grand principles by which it is regulated. It adapts

a person to perceive, not merely the several parts distinctly which together constitute the system ; but to comprehend it at once as a whole, and to regard it as one perfect scheme. It consists in a certain expansion or greatness of the mental vision.

This capacity is of considerable importance in the study of the higher branches of learning, and for the purpose of attaining just and adequate notions, either in politics or religion, as regards the comprehensive survey of the subject, such as a great statesman or divine should be able to take. It serves to constitute the man of great mind, and of enlarged and extended views, whether in science, jurisprudence, or theology. It seems to place a man on a high mental eminence as regards his intellectual prospect.

In carrying out any scheme, comprehension aids in the general conception of the outline, while deprehension directs in filling in the minute details.

But although the extensive possession of the capacity of comprehension leads a person to take an enlarged and comprehensive view of each subject ; yet, on the other hand, it will sometimes be found to operate as regards its result in a very different, if not to a certain extent contrary, direction, by its influence in inducing him to consider each division of a matter as complete in itself, as well as to survey the whole of it together ; just as a telescope, which would enable an individual to command an extensive view of a country, would also induce him to select particular parts of the scene for independent observation.

Deficiency in comprehension occasions narrow-mindedness, and an imperfect conception of questions of a comprehensive nature. Comprehension is probably created at our birth far less perfect than are either apprehension or deprehension. It is also less dependent on education than is the latter capacity ; but is more so than apprehension. Its development is later than that of either apprehension or deprehension.

5. Illustration of the Nature of these Capacities.

From the absolute invisibility and imperceptibility of everything connected with the nature of mind, we are deprived of all assistance to our knowledge of it from the organs of the senses, which are the main inlets and the leading aids to knowledge in general. In the absence however of visible material objects, we may have recourse to metaphors drawn from them, which in many instances serve certain of the ends of the

objects themselves. For the purpose therefore of illustration, I venture to institute the following comparisons of the mental organs to visible objects with which we are familiar.

The understanding has already been assimilated to the eye, and bears the same relation to the soul as the eye does to the body. There is a strict analogy indeed deducible from nature as regards the constitution of this faculty, which is afforded by the eye, whether or not the material organs of the body have any relation to, or are in any way typified by, the organs of the mind. Thus, some persons are endowed with eyesight which can see objects at long distances, but cannot accurately perceive small objects that are near. Others possess eyesight which can perceive accurately small objects that are near, but cannot survey those which are at a distance. Others can take a moderate and tolerably clear survey of objects either near or distant. These three different sorts of eyesight in a great degree correspond with the qualities of the understanding conferred upon it by the relative extent to which it is endowed with the three capacities of the faculty of understanding,—comprehension, deprehension, and apprehension.

Or these capacities may be still more aptly compared to the different instruments made to assist the eye in its operations. Thus, apprehension is to the understanding what an ordinary optic glass is to the eye, by which it is enabled with facility and celerity, and as it were at a glance, to take a clear and correct view of any subject presented to it.

The capacity of deprehension may be compared to a microscope, by which the eye is enabled to discern the most minute and intricate points in any object, which without this aid it could not discover; and thereby to obtain an accurate and exact knowledge and perception of such matters.

The capacity of comprehension may in like manner be compared to a telescope, by means of which the eye is enabled to take a wide and extended view of distant objects, and to survey them all at once; an effort which without such assistance it would have been unable satisfactorily to effect.

These three capacities, as in the case also of those of the other intellectual faculties, might also be assimilated to the three different kinds of angles defined by mathematicians; apprehension being represented by the right angle, deprehension by the acute, and comprehension by the obtuse. Indeed, we not unfrequently in common language hear minds of the second class denominated as acute, and those of the third as of an extended or comprehensive character. Although some persons might be disposed to sneer at the idea of seeking for philosophical truths from the opinions of the multitude, yet we should recollect that, as I have already remarked, whatever opinion has obtained the sanction of general approval, is at

least stamped with the authority of experience and observation, on which alone all true philosophy ought to be based.

Moreover, with regard to the numerous varieties in the operation and development of these different capacities, it will be found that the mental characteristic in each case is determined solely and entirely by the different extent and degree in which the several qualities and powers here assigned to them, are possessed; and not from their being endowed with any other qualities or powers whatsoever beyond those already enumerated and specified. All the capacities of all persons are the same in essence, and as regards their constituent qualities and powers; although differing as to the relative proportion in which their essential properties are respectively possessed.

6. *Peculiar Functions and Adaptation of this Faculty, and of each of its Constituent Capacities.*

An inquiry into, and an accurate investigation of, the functions and adaptation of the faculty of understanding, and of its different constituent capacities, is of the highest importance, not only for obtaining a practical acquaintance with the subject, but because it is by their operations alone that we are able to ascertain the real nature of these powers.

Although each of the capacities of this faculty is exercised independently about the particular ideas proper to it, and in receiving its ideas in the mode already stated; yet when the mind is occupied in obtaining knowledge of any subject of a complex nature, these capacities are all of them exerted, if not simultaneously—which may doubtless be effected—at least rapidly, by turns, as occasion requires. Moreover, each of them aids the other, and the whole faculty as well, in acquiring information respecting any matter, which being, at once, general, accurate, and extensive, is effected by the operation of these several capacities together. The gaining of knowledge is indeed in certain respects closely analogous to the growth of vegetation. The sensations from external objects form the seeds, and the understanding which obtains them the ground into which they fall. The operations of reason and of genius correspond with the heat, and moisture, and other causes, which make the seed grow. Some information comes to the mind through the senses, some to the mind direct, independent of the senses. Of the former kind is the idea of a tree, or any other object that we see before us: of the latter is a mental calculation, which is obtained through the operation of the faculties, independent of the senses.² As regards certain kinds

² *Locke*, when pointing out how we obtain the notion of spirit (*Essay on the Understanding*, b. iii. c. vi. s. 11), contends that we obtain it, not through the senses, but from internal cogitation.

of knowledge, even of material objects, the senses, if relied upon alone, would fail to inform us aright, and require the interference of the mind both to guide, and to correct their impressions. In many cases, too, the aid of the senses is essential to direct and to regulate the operations of the mind. Hence, knowledge is derived not wholly through the body, nor wholly through the mind, but by the conjunction and co-operation of both.

Nevertheless, if God or any Spirit afforded knowledge to our minds, it may be inferred that He would do it directly, and without the intervention of the corporeal senses.³ Indeed, we may presume, from all that we can know on the subject, that when the Holy Spirit communicates with our souls, It does so in a direct manner, independent of sensation, by infusing ideas into the mind at once through the capacity of apprehension, as also by stimulating the reason, and influencing the emotions, in the same way that information in general is communicated to us and affects us, except that in this case, the material organs are not exerted. Inspiration may therefore be defined to be an immediate and direct communication from the Holy Spirit, in Whom exists the infinity of knowledge of every description, to the soul of man, of information and ideas of a particular kind, for a special purpose. Nevertheless, beyond such special knowledge and ideas, and beyond what is necessary for the object in question, it is not to be supposed that any information is communicated. Nor does inspiration imply the imparting of ideas or knowledge relating to collateral matters connected with the subject, which are not necessary for its right understanding, or to answer the purpose directly intended. Thus, from the Scripture narrative, it would appear that, while to apostles and prophets, knowledge and ideas were communicated relative to some special matters, which it was desirable they should know, and to answer certain special purposes; beyond what was necessary, for these particular ends, no knowledge was imparted, and they were left in, and allowed to evince, an ignorance common to the rest of

³ When *Locke* asserts that all our ideas come from sensation and reflection; that the objects of sensation are one source of ideas; that the operations of our minds are the other source of them; and that all our ideas are obtained by the one or the other of these modes (*Essay on the Understanding*, b. ii. c. i. ss. 2, 3, 4, 5), I infer that he does not mean to include those which are communicated by inspiration. But this may be questioned from s. 24, where he says that the original of all our knowledge is by sensation and reflection, and that "all those sublime thoughts which tower above the clouds, and reach as high as Heaven itself, take their rise and footing here."

Malebranche suggests that spiritual subjects may be communicated to the mind without ideas, immediately by themselves.—*Search after Truth*, pt. ii. b. iii. c. i.

mankind, to whom no inspiration was afforded. But if ideas are thus communicated to us by God or by any spirits in this way now, may they not have been communicated to us before, and antecedent to the period of our birth? And hence many ideas and notions may be in reality innate, or originally communicated to, and implanted in, the mind, directly by God.

There is however, a great and essential difference between innate ideas, and innate capacities in the mind which may induce it to imbibe or to create certain ideas. In the one case, notions are implanted there by nature, and exist without any exercise of the mind at all. In the other, they are not found in the mind until produced there by some operation of it; to which exercise however, it is predisposed by its own natural bent or constitution. Ideas indeed are like the nutriment on which any animal is naturally adapted to feed. Such aliment is commonly found in its stomach, whenever it is dissected. This, however, does not prove that the food necessarily existed there; but merely that the animal was wont to devour such food in the ordinary course.

We may conclude therefore, that all ideas are not derived through the senses; but that all ideas which spring from sensation, or are obtained from external objects of which our senses take cognizance, and these only, are so derived. In every case, however, the faculty of understanding, and that alone, is the power by which such ideas are obtained.

It may consequently be determined that all knowledge of whatever kind, is derived entirely and solely from the three following sources:—

1. Direct communication to the soul, independent of the body, from the Deity, or some other spiritual being, of certain ideas and notions.

2. Ideas obtained through sensation, as regards external material objects.

3. The conclusions of the mind respecting these communications of both kinds, and which we ordinarily term reflection.

As regards our knowledge both of spirit and matter, it may be that our souls, being immersed in matter, are rendered incapable of knowing thoroughly the nature of spirit; and that being themselves of the nature of spirit, they are incapable of knowing perfectly the nature of matter.

Hence, in the case of man, each sensation is converted into an idea by the operation of his faculty of understanding, and is thereupon applied and dealt with by the other faculties of the mind, according to its nature, and the end to be attained. In the case of animals, these sensations are acted upon directly, without being converted into ideas; and it is by its sensations, and not by the operation of any intellectual faculties, that the

animal is impelled. Animals indeed, as already stated,⁴ do each possess a spiritual being, but it is devoid of any faculties and capacities of its own. It may however be supposed to be aided by the operation of their sensitive system, in a manner analogous to that in which a body which is either inanimate or inorganic, is moved by the action upon it of any other body with which it comes in contact, by the weight of such body, or by its being propelled against it; but without its possessing any organ or machinery fitted to enable it of itself to move or act in any way.

7. *Acquisition of Knowledge through the Understanding alone.*

As hunger, or an ardent desire for food, is a healthful sign in the case of the body; so hunger for knowledge, or for intellectual nutriment, is no less healthful in the case of the soul. And in regard to both these beings, that food which is taken with an appetite, is most likely to be favourably received, and to turn to good account. Indeed, mental equally with material food requires mastication and digestion; and probably, alike in the material and the mental frame, a vast variety of diseases spring from the neglect of this rule. Both in the case of material and mental food, until it is digested, it does not become a part of the being which consumes it, but remains essentially foreign matter. In the one case, it affords no nutriment to the frame which has imbibed it. In the other case, it not only contributes no nutriment, but becomes the source of disease, and hinders nutriment generally from being derived. And it is with intellectual as it is with material aliment, that when received into the system, and duly digested, it becomes absorbed into, and as much a part of the constitution as is the very frame which it contributes to nourish. The flesh of animals when thus taken into our bodies, becomes a portion of our own flesh. The ideas of other minds, when obtained by the understanding and treasured up in the memory, become a part of our own stock of ideas. In the case however of food, both material and intellectual, but a small portion of it is absorbed by the system, the greater part being rejected and passing away. The essence only is extracted and retained.

A question of much interest, and of considerable importance, more especially as regards the due arrangement and proper division of the various faculties and capacities of the mind, here however arises, concerning the process of the acquisition of knowledge, and the investigation of truth. This is the ascertaining with precision in what manner the understanding is not only capable of obtaining knowledge; but how far and

⁴ *Vide ante, Prel. Diss.*, s. 10, a. 3, vol. i. p. 200.

to what extent also, it alone exclusively, and without the aid of any other faculties or capacities of the mind, is able to effect all that is included in the acquisition of such knowledge.

Upon a close and attentive investigation into the nature and process of the understanding, it will be found that this faculty is not only more adapted for, but is more exclusively employed in, not merely the acquisition of knowledge, but the penetration into many abstruse and difficult points even in philosophical investigation, than might at first sight be supposed. Several great truths have been discovered by this faculty, which have been attributed to the reason.⁵ The knowledge of various matters is indeed obtained, not by actual reasoning upon them, but through an acute and deep penetration of mind with respect to them, which enables the individual at once to dive deep into the subject. This however, is mainly effected by the extensive possession of both the capacities of deprehension and comprehension; by which a person is adapted at the same moment to view a subject minutely and accurately, and also comprehensively, and in all its bearings.

Thus, by the penetration and acuteness of mind which they possessed, in consequence of their being so endowed, rather than by their reasoning faculties, were Bacon, and Des Cartes, and Hobbes, and Newton, and Locke, and several other distinguished philosophers, enabled to discover fresh truths, and to make further advancement in the exalted pursuits which they followed. Many of the new facts which they perceived and brought to light, they moreover found out, not by their reasoning faculty, but by that of understanding; inasmuch as the most valuable of their discoveries were not the deductions of reason, nor even the product of invention, but the perceptions of a profound and penetrating mental vision; just as precious jewels and costly metal are first discovered by the eye, although afterwards refined and polished by different processes. I might specify, in proof of this, the theory propounded by Des Cartes concerning the seat and action of the soul, and those by Locke respecting the origin of our ideas, and the operations of our intellectual faculties. Certain of these opinions when urged upon the public, were indeed maintained with great force, and skill, and power of reason, and were consequently supposed to have necessarily originated in the operations of that faculty; whereas, the real source of them was in the perceptions, and not in the deductions of the mind.

Indeed, the only legitimate ultimate end of all reasoning, is

⁵ According to *Kant*, all cognition flows from two sources, either from what is given, or from principles. In the first case it is called historical, in the second rational.—*Critic of Pure Reason*.

the attainment of a knowledge of the real facts, and the true condition, of any subject or matter.⁶

Metaphysical studies, indeed, seem to be so intimately associated with the reasoning faculty, that we naturally, though very erroneously, attribute to the exertion of the reason whatever truths are discovered in this department of learning, however clear the claim of the faculty of understanding may appear to be to the attainment of this result.

Even in controversy, the understanding is oftentimes that faculty which really avails us, although to the reason we suppose ourselves to be indebted; mainly perhaps, because controversy is more immediately the department of the reason than of the understanding. Wherever facts only are stated without any deductions being made respecting them, the understanding, and not the reason, is however the faculty that is exercised.

All direct knowledge, or when we at once perceive the nature of the subject without instituting any comparison with other matters, we obtain by the faculty of understanding.⁷ Not merely simple ideas, but matters of argument also, when they have been once solved, are communicated to the mind by this faculty.

When the reason is exercised, two or more ideas or subjects must be adduced, which are respectively compared together, and their difference is ascertained. Understanding, on the other hand, may be exercised about one idea, or collection of ideas, only.

It has several times happened that persons who had but little talent for argument or logical deduction, such as the faculty of reason would have conferred, were nevertheless great discoverers in philosophy, for which they were indebted to their faculty of understanding. Locke, who was so eminent for his original perceptions, has been thought to be deficient as a logician, and knew but little of mathematics. In this respect it was that Locke and Butler so widely differed. The former was mainly indebted for his discoveries to the faculty of understanding, the latter to that of reason.

It is indeed, in many cases, extremely difficult to discern between the operations of understanding and those of reason; and to ascertain by which of them it is that certain intellectual actions are performed. This we have seen to be the case with respect to conscience, which has been deemed to be an instinctive impulse, through the exertion of the faculty of under-

⁶ Truth as regards ideas, *Locke* defines to consist in their conformity to their archetypes.—*Essay on the Understanding*, b. ii. c. xxx. s. 1.

⁷ It was held by *Dr. Henry More* that the soul has innate sensations in it both of good and evil, just and unjust, true and false.—*Life*, by *Ward*, p. 5.

standing, whereby we at once perceive the good or evil nature of any act; whereas it is clearly shown to be directed through an effort of the reason.

Knowledge obtained by the faculty of understanding, is generally more sound and correct than that resulting from the exercise of the reason, inasmuch as the former faculty is less liable to err. An intellectual, like an artificial machine, the more complicated it is, the more apt it is to become disordered, or to be impeded by friction.

A person of powerful and extensive intellectual capacities of one kind, will indeed, probably, be similarly endowed as regards those of another class. Each of the capacities appertaining to the different faculties have relation to each other. Thus apprehension and sense, often largely coexist in the same person, and are commonly exercised together. The same may also be observed with regard to deprehension and analysis, and comprehension and judgment. In genius, wit is most allied to apprehension and sense, taste to deprehension and analysis, and origination to comprehension and judgment.

The importance of the faculty of understanding in the performance of all our intellectual operations, must therefore be apparent. Reasoning cannot be correct, unless the premises on which it is founded be accurately supplied. In works of genius also, the artist's skill depends in the first place on his nicety of perception, without which he would be unable to effect a proper combination of ideas suited to his subject. Nevertheless, those whose boast it is that they proceed in their investigation of truth entirely and solely upon facts, despising alike inference by reasoning on the one side, and speculation through origination on the other, rely too exclusively on the understanding alone, when both the reason and the genius ought to be united with it to aid the process. Facts are the best, and the only safe and sound foundation on which to ground our arguments; but they should be used for this purpose only, and not to supply the place of conclusions, or of inventive efforts, and as the basis merely of such operations.* On the one hand, unless our conclusions are supported by facts, they are unsafe and unsound. On the other hand, unless from these facts reasoning and speculation can be deduced, the facts themselves are barren and valueless. Facts by themselves may lead apparently to either truth or error. It is causing the sign-post to point correctly, not the mere placing it in the ground, which renders it of use to the traveller. Like fire and water,

* "Facts are not truths; they are not conclusions; they are not even premises, but in the nature and parts of premises. The truth depends on, and is only arrived at by, a legitimate deduction from *all* the facts which are truly material."—Coleridge. *Table Talk*.

facts serve for either good or evil, according as they are applied.⁹

We are in general more prone to exercise the faculty of understanding than that of reason, because the effort of the former by which we obtain new ideas, produces novelty, which is one of the most agreeable sensations of the mind. Reason, on the other hand, is only exercised in digesting those ideas which are already received; and the effort often appears dry and tedious. On this account it is that pure mathematics are so irksome and unattractive to many, because in this kind of reasoning, the ideas are destitute of novelty or variety. In some of the most acute and refined exercises of reasoning, the ideas made use of are oftentimes but very commonplace and ordinary; just as some of the most valuable chemical substances are composed of but very gross and coarse ingredients.

8. *Origin and Use of Language.*

As different persons are desirous of not merely receiving, and examining, and combining in their own minds, according to the peculiar faculties or capacities with which they may be individually endowed, various simple ideas; but also of communicating to each other these ideas, and the respective combinations of them; and of comparing, not only these several ideas in their own individual minds, with each other, but also of ascertaining and comparing the impressions made by them in other minds, with those produced in their own, and of mutually communicating such knowledge to one another:¹ they have invented certain signs of these ideas of each kind, or of the more important among them, which are perceptible to each other, and serve as tolerably exact copies of the ideas which they are intended to represent, and thus create ideas in the mind of the person who receives them, very similar to those in the mind of him by whom they are communicated, and as though the ideas were directly, without any intervention of such a symbol, communicated from the mind of the person by

⁹ "Every author has found facts which agree with his theory, some almost fabulous numbers of indigents, others ridiculously small numbers."—*Cherbuliez*. And it has been asserted, no less truly than satirically, that there is nothing so fallacious as figures,—except facts!

¹ *Archbishop Whateley* remarks that "language affords the signs by which the operations of the mind are not only expressed and communicated to others, but even, for the most part, carried on by ourselves."—*Logic*, c. i. s. 2.

Dr. Farrar defines language to be "the possibility of perfectly expressing the unseen and immaterial, by an articulation of air which seemed to have no analogy with it."—*Chapters on Language*, c. viii. p. 92.

whom they are generated;² which we may suppose to be the case as regards the communications between purely spiritual beings.

The highest intellectual pleasures are those which result from the junction of two souls by the bond of mental intercourse and interchange of ideas. They thus for the time, are not only brought together, but united. They form not two, but one being; so free is the communication from soul to soul of ideas which flow between them.³ And from this union, the offspring which is produced is the most valuable. Indeed, intercourse, whether mental or material, appears essential to, and is generally calculated to produce, fecundity. As the union of bodies is necessary to occasion the multiplication of the species, so the union of souls is no less requisite to aid the multiplication of ideas. Neither bodies nor souls which never associate with others of their kind, are likely to prove prolific.

Language may be said to consist, and it at any rate originates in, the power of a being, more especially of an intellectual being, particularly of man, to communicate emotions and ideas from one mind to another, by means of sensations which he causes to arise in the mind with which he desires to communicate.⁴ These sensations may be excited either through the organs of sight, of hearing, or of feeling. Taste and smell have not, as far as I am aware, ever been availed of for the purpose of mutual intercourse. The subjects which produce these sensations, if they are addressed to the eye, are termed signs; and this class comprehends all symbolic language, whether

² *Bishop Berkeley*, however, observes that "mankind are generally averse from thinking, though apt enough to entertain discourse either in themselves or others; the effect whereof is, that their minds are rather stored with names than ideas—the husk of science, rather than the thing."—*Minute Philosopher*, Dial. vii. p. 128.

³ "To be without language, spoken or written, is almost to be without thought; and if, not one individual only, living among his fellows whose light may be reflected upon him, but our whole race had been so constituted, it is scarcely possible to conceive that beings whose instincts are so much less various and powerful than those of the other animals, could have held over them that dominion which they now so easily exercise."—*Dr. Thomas Brown, Lectures on the Philosophy of the Mind*, Lect. xx.

⁴ *Hobbes* asserts that the intellect peculiar to man, is a faculty arising from speech.—*Leviathan*.

"When mankind had once acquired the art of communicating their conceptions by sounds, they began to feel the necessity of inventing new signs for perpetuating them, and for making them known at a distance. The most natural way, therefore, was to delineate the images of things."—*Condillac. Origin of Knowledge*, chap. xiii. 1.

"Speech is the correlation of the understanding. It can express nothing which has not been developed by intelligence and thought. It can have no existence independent of, or separate from, our conception of things."—*Dr. Farrar. Chapters on Language*, chap. i. p. 5.

written, or by gestures, or pictorial representations.⁵ Subjects producing language by sensations addressed to the ear, are termed sounds; and this class includes all oral language, whether by speaking, music, or ejaculation through passion or emotion.⁶ Subjects producing language by sensations addressed to the organ of feeling, are confined to those instances where information of some fact is communicated from one person to another by exciting this organ; as by pressing the hand, or touching the body, which may constitute a sign of the simplest nature where such a mode of announcing a specific event has been preconcerted. Language by the sensation of feeling may also be said to be resorted to, and that very extensively, in cases where letters are moulded into tangible forms, so as to be availed of by persons who are deprived of sight.

Language is as it were, the reflection of the soul, which, although unseen by mortal eye, casts its shadow on the course of thought, and in this mode exhibits to us the various motions and attitudes which the soul from time to time assumes; and by which means we arrive at some indistinct conjectures as to the form and demeanour of the mysterious being itself whose manner of action is thus evinced.

Language might be termed the congealment of ideas, as ideas are of cogitations. Through the medium of language, ideas are reduced to a sort of qualified reality, which before existed only in thought.⁷

Or language might be compared to the ship, or the railway train, inasmuch as, by means of the former, thought is transposed from one sphere to another, from the mind of the utterer to other minds, and through which traffic and intercourse are carried on between remote regions of intellectual intercourse. Again, language may be said to have a relation to ideas, corresponding with that which monetary notes have to coin in specie. Words

⁵ "Words may not be insignificant, although they should not every time they are used, excite the ideas they signify in our minds, it being sufficient that we have it in our power to substitute things or ideas for the signs where there is occasion."—*Bishop Berkley. Minute Philosopher*, Dial. viii. p. 143.

⁶ "Language was for a long time without having any other words than the names which had been given to sensible objects, such as these—trees, fruit, water, and others, which they had more frequently occasion to mention."—*Condillac. Origin of Knowledge*, part ii. s. 1, chap. 9.

⁷ *Bishop Berkley*, nevertheless, remarks that most parts of knowledge have been so strangely perplexed and darkened by the abuse of words, that it may almost be made a question whether language has contributed more to the hindrance or advancement of the sciences.—*Principles of Human Knowledge*, p. 70.

Mr. Isaac Taylor considers language as the point of contact, where mind and matter artificially, yet most intimately, blend, and reciprocate their respective properties.—*Phys. Theory of Another Life*, c. viii.

serve to typify the idea, and pass current for it during its absence, although they are essentially of no value themselves, and all that they possess is as representative of that idea.⁸ The word, moreover, like the note, represents the idea only in the special character in which we have to deal with it, and not as regards those of its general or essential qualities with which we are in no way concerned.⁹

The object of language¹ is to form a medium of communication between one intelligent or instinctive being and another, by which the wants or feelings of the one may be made known to the other. Sensation is essential to, and is the vehicle of language. When two such beings, however humble their instinctive or intellectual powers may be, are placed near together, if either of them utters a sound, or moves a limb, with the intention of communicating his feelings or thoughts to the other, this constitutes language, and it is in efforts of this kind that it originates. The language of the infant is either a scream or a struggle. As the child advances towards maturity, its cries and its contortions become gradually more systematic, regular, and intelligible.² But however complete, and even complicated, the system is eventually rendered, all language originated in this rude and simple mode.

⁸ "Words are signs: they do or should stand for ideas; which so far as they suggest, they are significant. But words that suggest no ideas are insignificant."—*Bishop Berkley. Minute Philosopher*, Dial. vii. p. 127.

⁹ "Mankind did not multiply words without necessity, especially in the beginning, for they were at no small trouble to invent and to retain them. The same noun which was the sign of a tense or of a mood, was therefore placed after each verb: from whence it follows that every mother tongue had at first only one conjugation."—*Condillac. Human Knowledge*, part ii. s. 1.

"Words do not appeal directly to the intuitions of other minds, but must be comprehended by translation through their ideational consciousness; signifying to each one the ideas he is prepared by his previous habits of thought to attach to them."—*Dr. Carpenter. Mental Physiology*, p. 225.

¹ The end of language, according to *Locke*, is to convey ideas from one mind to another, with as much ease and quickness as possible, and thereby to convey the knowledge of things. Language, he adds, is either abused or deficient when it fails in any of these three.—*Essay on the Understanding*, b. iii. c. x. s. 23.

Hartley remarks that "words and phrases must excite ideas in us by association."—*Observations on Man*, part i. chap. iii. s. 1, prop. 79.

² Nevertheless, as *Professor Max Muller* points out, "children in learning to speak do not invent language. Language is there ready-made for them."—*Lectures on the Science of Language*, sect. ix. p. 360.

According to *Dr. Farrar*, "it was not the mere possession of vocal cries that enabled man to invent a language; but the innate idea of language being already in his mind by virtue of his divinely created organism, the possession of these natural sounds taught him how, and supplied him the materials wherewith, to develope the idea into perfect speech."—*Chapters on Language*, chap. viii. p. 92. note.

Language, whether sonorous or symbolical, was in its origin, no doubt, representative of some sound, or some object in nature; and in time, objects were in turn adapted to represent sounds, and sounds to represent objects. As the system advanced, and became more complicated and more perfect, the lineaments of its origin gradually vanished; just as a plant after it has attained its growth, loses all resemblance to the germ from which it sprang, although exhibiting this similarity clearly when it first reared itself above the soil. No letters in the alphabet now bear any resemblance to forms in nature; nor do words, except those few which are strictly imitative (as the names of animals, such as the cuckoo, from an imitation of their cry), to either sounds or objects.

Articulation of the voice is said to have derived its name from the articulation of the bones; the different particles of speech corresponding and fitting in one to another, in a manner analogous to that of the bones in an animal frame.

Language is of three different kinds as regards its mode of production;—by sounds, by sights, and by signs. The last generally accompanies, and aids the first. Language by sounds consists of those through which we either imitate certain sounds in nature, or which are indicative of some peculiar emotion or condition in the being making them, and by which he intends to attract the attention of the hearer to his state.³ Language by sight consists in the first place, of the visual imitation of particular objects; and in other cases, of cyphers which stand for tokens of certain ideas. Language by signs consists of those made by the variations in the expression of the countenance, and in those effected by gestures⁴ through the motion of the limbs, or of the entire body.⁵

There appear also to be three distinct and independent kinds of language in use, as regards both their mode of application, and the beings by whom it is availed of. The first is the language of the emotions, such as is expressed by all animals, and by man as well, in the manifestations which they afford, either by voice or action, of the feelings and

³ According to *Diodorus Siculus*, *Vitruvius*, and some other writers, men at first made only uncouth and incoherent sounds; until, being induced to associate together, they were led to communicate their wants by signs, and giving names to things, and so, at length, language was invented.

⁴ As to the progress which the language of gesture made among the ancients, where he refers to the *Abbé du Bos*, see *Condillac* on *The Origin of Knowledge*, part ii. s. 1. c. 4.

⁵ *Archbishop Thomson's* definition of language is, that it is a mode of expressing our thoughts by means of motions of the organs of the body.—*Outline of the Laws of Thought*, p. 27, 7th thousand.

passions by which they are affected.⁶ The second is the language of reason, such as man uses in his communications with his fellow-creatures. The third is the language of sentiment, consisting in the ideas which objects of an artistical character, whether natural or artificial, visual or oral, raise in the mind; and which is a class of language as intelligible and powerful as either of the other.

In real strictness, oral and written language are not only entirely distinct, but wholly different, and are totally independent sciences. The written and the oral language, even of the same people, have nothing to do with one another, and no connexion whatever. From both kinds of language being used by the same persons, certain of the words of one language have been copied by the other. But this casual union at a late period of their growth, does nothing to disprove their original and entire independence. Moreover, language, both oral and written, varies among people of different nations,⁷ indeed, among those of the same nation, and even among those of the same family; serving to reflect with precision the mind and character of the speaker or writer. National languages more especially, may be regarded as the shadows, and denote the character of those who framed them; being distinguished, some by their vivacity, others by their harmony, others by their precision, according to the turn, and peculiarity of mind of those among whom they are in use.⁸ The ear and the eye are the only senses employed in the construction of a language; the former sense directing the voice in forming oral, the latter sense directing the hand in forming written language. Among animals, their oral language is of great variety, corresponding, as in the case of man, with the character of the utterers.

In tracing the origin of oral language,⁹ it may perhaps be laid down that each distinct sound of which the human voice

⁶ "I cannot doubt that language owes its origin to the imitation and modification, aided by signs and gestures, of various natural sounds, the voices of other animals, and man's own instinctive cries."—*Darwin's Descent of Man*, vol. i. p. 56.

⁷ *Sir John Lubbock* refers to the difference of the sounds of which language is constituted in different parts of the world, specifying the click of the Hottentots, as a striking illustration of this fact.—*Pre-historic Times*, chap. xv.

⁸ "Even the symbols by which the feelings are expressed, are very different in different races."—*Sir J. Lubbock. Pre-historic Times*, chap. xv.

⁹ *Mr. F. Galton* refers me here to the valuable contributions to this branch of science of *Dr. Max Muller* and *Dr. Farrar*, with which all who take a deep interest in the subject will be probably more or less familiar, and who, as *Mr. Galton* remarks, "have discussed the origin of language as fully as the ordinary data seem to admit." References to, and extracts from their works have, as will be seen, been made in these pages.

is capable, serves to constitute, or to form the type or germ of, a distinct word. In time these different sounds come to be classified, and also to be united and blended together. This variety of sounds in the human voice, both causes and limits the variety of words that are originated. Written words are ordinarily the types or reflections of those which are oral, certain shapes being adapted to correspond with certain sounds.

Sounds are moreover divided into those which are articulate, and those which are inarticulate; in other words, those which are definite and clear, and those which are indefinite and not plainly audible. Sounds of the former class only can be made use of in intelligent language; but sounds of the latter class are serviceable, and indeed very efficient, in that language which may be said to be of a mixed or medial class, and is common to animals as well as man,¹ by which not mental ideas, but emotions, and passions, and affections are expressed; such as sighs, and groans, and mutterings, and wailings, which are among the most striking, if not the most explicit, elements of, or auxiliaries to, language.

The mode in which oral language is primarily acquired and developed among mankind in general,² is forcibly evinced in the case of infants, who commence by degrees to articulate, using at first those sounds which are the easiest, gradually forming them into the simplest words, and after a time into those which are more complex and difficult; until at length by reiterated effort, and through the instruction of those about them, they acquire the full use of verbal language. It has been thought indeed by some, that, at first, man had no language of an articulate kind, but only made signs, and uttered rude sounds. By degrees, these sounds would become more distinct and definite; and so language, out of its originally chaotic form, gradually acquired coherency and character. Music itself indeed, is but a branch, and a most important one, of inarticulate language, and has been termed the language of passion. It is at any rate, as fully expressive of passion and emotion, as articulate language is of any definite idea. When music and poetry are united, articulate and inarticulate language cooperate together, and the effect is very powerful.

Verbal imitative language consists in copying the sound made by any subject, such as thunder in the case of lightning, the cry that it utters in the case of an animal, its roar in the case of the sea. In the origination of written language, this imitation consists in a very rude representation of the shape of the object,

¹ *Vide ante, Prel. Diss.* s. 10, a. 2, vol. i. p. 195.

² *Archbishop Thomson* well observes that "language is a divine gift; but the power, and not the results of its exercise, the germ, and not the tree, was imparted."—*Outline of the Laws of Thought*, p. 47, 7th thousand.

whether an animal or an inanimate being. Thus, a horizontal line with two perpendicular lines below it Π , may represent the idea of an animal; a horizontal line with a perpendicular line in the centre below it Γ , that of a tree; or a simple triangle Δ , that of a tent. Strictly speaking, all real and visual objects are the subjects of written language; and all sounds, of that which is oral. Those things which are between the two, may be symbolized by either, according as the ingenuity of man devises means for this purpose. In course of time, subjects of both kinds come to be represented by language of both kinds; whether this is effected through its imitation of anything in the things themselves, or in the language of the alternative kind by which they are typified.

As in the commencement of oral language, the simplest sounds served as a foundation for the vast and complicated structure that was afterwards to be raised; so in the commencement of written language, the simplest marks or symbols, such as a mere line, or cross, or circle, drawn by a stick on the ground, or by chalk or coal on a wall, or other flat surface, would serve for the purpose, until by degrees the system was extended, and became more complicated: as for instance, by making two or three straight lines parallel, instead of having one only; and two circles, or two crosses, and those of different sizes, instead of one; and perhaps adding a square, or an oblong shape, each being symbolical of some sound or object. The surface of the earth was, we may infer, first resorted to on which to draw simple signs or figures, which were the germs of the earliest letters. After this, people might have had recourse to soft stone on which to indent these marks. By-and-by, the leaves and bark of trees, and the skins of animals, were used for the same end.³

As sounds, and indeed oral language itself, are divided into those which are articulate, and those which are inarticulate; so the figures or shapes which constitute the types of written language, may be divided into those which are imitative, and those which are ideal: the former being copied directly from some objects in nature; the latter originating either by accident, being compounded of the former, or being a corruption of them. When once constituted and recognized, and availed of as the types of certain ideas, they each serve alike for the purposes of intel-

³ *Sir John Lubbock, Bart., M.P., F.R.S.*, late President of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, from whose valuable and well-known works bearing on subjects embraced by this treatise, I have made several extracts, has very obligingly perused the proof-sheets in the present chapter relating to language, its origin, various kinds, and classification, and has expressed his general concurrence with what is here advanced. Particular suggestions or remarks made by him, will be found in subsequent notes to the passages to which they relate.

lectual communication, and the interchange of sentiment. And as in oral language certain inarticulate sounds serve only to express emotions, and passions, and affections, and not to represent intelligent ideas; so in written language, certain rude plain strokes, and lines, and figures, serve, by giving emphasis to the words or letters to which they are annexed, merely to signify the strong feeling and intensity of the writer.

Words differ extensively in their nature one from another. Thus, some are independent, while others depend on certain others, as conducing to designate their particular quality. Some serve only as connecting links, as in the case of conjunctions. Some are active and moving, as in the case of verbs; while others, such as substantives, are the representatives of objects which are only set in motion by the verbs. Like the several disjointed pieces in a wooden map, the different words in a sentence are each made to fit into their particular parts, and to those parts only. In the Greek and Latin languages, their terminations serve to show exactly the precise places in the sentences to which the words each belong, and their actual relation one to another. Our own language is in many respects less exact and explicit to fulfil this purpose. It appears to me however, not to be correct, as has been done by one distinguished writer, to say, that "written words are the figures or pictures of sounds;"⁴ inasmuch as both sounds and symbols are wholly independent of, and have no reference to, each other; both the sound and the symbol being designed directly to represent some object in nature, and neither of them having in any case the slightest relation one to the other.

Each word in a sentence, and each part of every word, is composed of certain sounds which are united together in a manner exactly analogous to that in which in the construction of material forms out of various elements, different substances are blended into one; in the case of both, the quality of each of these elements being more or less affected by those proximate to it. Verbal language must however be considered in point of invention, to have been long anterior to written language, which is a material embodiment or copying, or rather reproduction of the former; a reduction of it to visual objects, or symbols, an operation towards which animals have never made any approach. Words in a sentence may indeed be said to be strictly analogous to the materials which compose a building; the stones being represented by the substantives, the nails and mortar by the conjunctions, the hinges by the verbs, and the beams and other constituent elements by the pronouns, adjectives, and other parts of speech, which severally contribute to make up a

⁴ *Bishop Wilkins on Language*, b. i. c. v.

sentence. The declensional terminations of words, are moreover as it were, the grooves by which they fit one into another, and serve to show their connexion and relation in the construction of a sentence.

As regards the actual meaning of words, this must after all in each case be finally determined by the use which is ordinarily made of them; not by the exact appropriateness of their signification pointed out by the learned. We use a knife to cut with, and a spoon to eat with, not merely because their names denote that they are especially adapted for this purpose, but because from practical experience it is proved that these are the ends for which they best serve.

Animals of different kinds emit various sounds,⁵ according to the nature and constitution of those animals themselves, and corresponding with the different exigencies by which they are excited.⁶ Indeed, many animals, in common with man, are gifted with the power of utterance, but man only can articulate. The speech of parrots and starlings, to which they attach no definite meaning, ought not to be termed articulation, which consists in words resorted to for the purpose of conveying distinct and definite ideas of which they are the prototypes. And although different animals differ so widely one from another as regards the language which they use; they do not appear, correspondingly or essentially, to differ as regards the approach to intellectual communication which they make. Indeed, some of those creatures whose language is the most limited, appear to be the most closely united in social intercourse; such as fishes, and certain reptiles, and insects.⁷

⁵ "The sounds uttered by birds offer, in several respects, the nearest analogy to language."—*Darwin on the Descent of Man*, vol. i. p. 55.

"No one can doubt that certain animals possess all the physical requirements for articulate speech."—*Max Muller. Lectures on the Science of Language*, Lect. ix. p. 362.

⁶ "Dogs bark in several distinct tones."—*Darwin on the Descent of Man*, vol. i. p. 54.

"Every species of animal has its own language, which is perfectly understood by the individuals. They ask and give assistance to each other."—*Smellie. Philosophy of Natural History*, p. 157.

"Animals never fail to distinguish between the cry of terror and that which expresses love. Their different agitations have different intonations, which characterize them."—*Le Roy. The Intelligence and Perfectibility of Animals*, Letter v.

"Animals attach a particular meaning to particular sounds; and therefore we must try to ascertain to what extent animals can understand sounds from things."—*Snee on Instinct and Reason*, c. ix. p. 180.

Mr. Wood considers that in certain animals each species has its own dialect.

⁷ According however to *Helvetius*, "speech, or the power of communicating ideas, is common to almost all animals. Some of them even possess it in a higher degree than man in certain states of society."—*System of Nature*, note D, chap. viii.

Closely analogous to this difference in animal sounds, is the difference in language of different nations among whom it is produced or developed; being occasioned in part by the difference of, and peculiarity in, the organic constitution of the people, and in part by the particular wants which they are desirous of making known. Language moreover appears to correspond pretty exactly with the intellectual condition of the nation in which it is in use. Where the language is observed to proceed but little beyond that of brutes, the people themselves who are confined to this mode of communication, are but little removed from brutality. Where it is found adapted to the expression of the wants of various kinds created by civilization, the people who use it will be remarked to be more or less civilized.

As letters were invented to represent sounds, so figures were invented to represent numbers. The latter might be expected to be originally more simple than the former, as in this case the quantity of strokes or lines would merely correspond with the amount of numbers to be recorded. But as it would be found inconvenient to carry on the same process to an indefinite extent, complex figures would soon be invented to typify a continuation of numbers.

Serviceable as language is as a medium of intercourse, it is nevertheless remarkable to how large an extent intercourse may be carried on without it. Animals who herd together for mutual protection and assistance, and have constant communication and transactions one with another, have no language of an intellectual kind such as we should think worthy of the name. And probably, the most perfect intercourse of all, such as we may infer to be carried on by celestial beings, is wholly independent of language. Moreover, no one will doubt of the possibility, and indeed the frequency, of thinking without resorting to words. Equally possible is it to use words without resorting to thinking. When we are well accustomed to a set form of words, or can read any subject with great facility so as not to require minute attention in doing so, the words will occasionally be spoken by rote, and without the current of thought attending them; or at any rate, more closely than what is just sufficient to keep the utterance in motion.

There is not unfrequently, however, more meaning, and more

Nevertheless, as *Professor Max Muller* tells us, "the one great barrier between the brute and man, is language."—*Lectures on the Science of Language*, Lect. ix. p. 367.

And *Mr. Smee* observes that "the use of language appears to involve a high power of organization; for perhaps no other animal has the power to use language in the manner in which we clearly possess it."—*Instinct and Reason*, c. ix. p. 177.

force, in the mode of expressing words, than in the words themselves. The one is real, the other artificial. The one is living, the other dead. The one too, not seldom unveils the fraud of the other. Probably, indeed, as already observed, even in the case of man, that portion of his language which is the most expressive, and the most powerful and affecting, is that which is inarticulate, consisting of signs and modulations of the voice, and of gesticulation through the members of the body.⁸ It is the proper application of this branch of language, that constitutes acting; and it is in its due use that the most important element in the attainment of eloquence, which is termed action, also consists. Weeping is more efficacious than words to move the hearts of our fellow-creatures, and no tones can touch them so effectively as tears.

The possibility of the invention and establishment of one language which would serve for the whole human race, has been much discussed. The language of emotion, as expressed by sighs, and groans, and mutterings, and contortions, is of this nature; and is at present, and ever has been, the universal, and the only universal language of mankind. A universal artificial language, if any such could be established, must consequently be founded in nature, which is the common resort for ideas of all people alike as regards the symbols which it employs, and with which the minds of all people have sympathy; just as pictures and statues, which are true to nature, appeal in the same way, and with equal force, to the people of all countries and all languages.

A universal language might possibly be serviceable as a means of carrying on general intercourse with regard to ordinary matters of social or domestic import; although probably this would not be effected by such a medium much further than what the cries and gesticulations of animals enable them to do, as regards the means of communicating to one another their wants and feelings. For expressing with precision and accuracy even these wants, and for intellectual intercourse to

⁸ "Every passion of the heart has its appropriate look, and tone, and gesture; and the whole body of man, and his whole countenance, and all the voices he utters, re-echo like the strings of a harp, to the touch of every emotion of the soul."—*Cicero. De Oratore*, iii. 216.

Mr. Wood points out to me that gestures in certain cases, take the place of words, and form a universal language; and that it is this which is chiefly resorted to by the lower animals when they wish to convey their ideas to man.

And Mr. Darwin in his *Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, remarks that with social animals, "intercommunication between them is generally effected by means of the voice, but it is certain that gestures and expressions are to a certain extent mutually intelligible," p. 60.

any great extent, it must necessarily be but very imperfectly adapted.⁹

Words are indeed by no means adequate or entirely apt representations of the things or the ideas which they are intended to typify;¹ but they serve to suggest to the mind certain qualities of them only, and those not the most important or essential, although they may be those which are the most fully representative of those objects. In this respect they are analogous to the shadows of material substances; which, although they contain none of their actual properties or essences, yet serve most correctly and aptly to portray to the vision their shape and size, which are the two qualities of which we mainly require to be cognizant.

The prototypes of ideas invented for the purpose of constituting language, have therefore no necessary or natural connexion with the ideas which they represent: any sound or sign, which is sufficient to afford a just notion of the idea that it symbolizes, is alike ample and good; although these prototypes differ much from each other as regards their adequacy for this purpose. In fact, but very few words appear to originate directly in nature, or to be exact copies or imitations of sounds thus produced. Such however are the names given to certain animals, from the sounds which they utter.

The signs used in symbolical, or written language, serve perhaps, not so much to represent or imitate ideas of objects or subjects, as to create in the mind associations with, or suggestions of them, and by this means to recall them into the memory. As matter seems ever mainly to influence not only our actions, but our whole train of thought; so material objects probably first supplied names for the words whereby language of this kind was originated, and on which the foundations of this mighty structure were laid. Next to the objects themselves, their visible and tangible qualities would obtain some verbal denomination; which is, indeed, a still further progress of the influence of

⁹ "Even if it were possible to establish a universal language, which should serve as the means of communication between the people of every nation; the imperfection, and constant liability to error, of such a medium, must be necessarily extensive in proportion to its comprehensiveness. Language in general is perhaps availed of nearly as much to confuse, as to communicate ideas; and the more general and less specific are its terms, the more is it liable to this defect. As a medium of diplomatic communication, where the greatest precision and certainty are essential, and the want of which would be a constant source of contention, a universal language would therefore be most objectionable; while from the perfect acquaintance possessed by those who carry on such communications, with the language of foreign countries, it is not required."—*Civilization considered as a Science*. *El.* x. p. 339, Bohn's Library Edition.

¹ The imperfection of words, in various respects, is pointed out by *Locke*.—*Essay on the Understanding*, b. iii. c. ix.

materiality. Sounds are what would subsequently claim attention, and would, we may suppose, excite imitation. The extent to which the language of signs and gesticulations, independent of, and without words, may be carried, are most perfectly evinced and illustrated in the case of representations and narrations through the arts of painting and sculpture; where, although the expression is entirely mute, the description of events, and even of thought and feeling, is not only very varied, but very exciting and forcible.

Language, as already observed, forms as it were a connecting link between matter and spirit. While, in its being and essence, it is purely and entirely immaterial and spiritual; in its operation it is material, and is perceptible, even by sensation. It is moreover to thought, what sensation is to substance. As sensations serve to convey to the mind certain only of the qualities of bodies, and by this means to afford a notion of them, although but a very inadequate one; so language serves to convey from one mind to another a notion of certain only of the thoughts passing in the mind of the speaker, although but a very imperfect notion. And as a large proportion of our errors about substances are traceable to the erroneous impressions conveyed by our senses; so a large proportion of our errors as regards knowledge derived from other persons, is traceable to the erroneous impressions conveyed by the terms used in language.

The extent to which man is endowed with the power of speech above the brute creation, is probably, in an analogous proportion to the degree in which beyond them he is endowed with intelligence, which appears in each case to be commensurate with the wants of each.² Animals, and also infants, possess the means of utterance sufficient for their common purposes of life, to express a sense of pain or pleasure, of want or satisfaction; but having no intellectual ideas to communicate, it is enjoyed by them no further than it conduces to the former end.³

² As *Smellie* observes, "man alone enjoys the power of communicating and expressing his ideas by articulated and artificial language."—*Philosophy of Natural History*, c. xvi. p. 417. He also informs us that "artificial" language, which we learn entirely by imitation, distinguishes us, more than any other circumstance, from the brute creation. "The proper use of it likewise forms the chief difference between one man and another; for, by language, one man discovers a superiority of knowledge, and of genius, while others express by it nothing but borrowed or confused ideas."—*Ibid.* c. xix. p. 470.

And *Professor Max Muller* tells us that "it is by a comparison of the mental faculties alone, such as we find them in man and brutes, that we may hope to discover what constitutes the indispensable qualification for language, a qualification to be found in man alone, and in no other creature on earth."—*Lectures on the Science of Language*, Lect. ix. p. 362.

³ *Sir John Lubbock* remarks on this passage: "It still seems to me

It is indeed peculiarly observable in the case of children, that the progress of intelligence, and the power of speech, or of expressing and communicating their ideas, proceed simultaneously together; that as they acquire ideas to convey, so they also acquire the organs to convey them; that as the soul obtains its influence over the body to use it for its own high purposes, the body obtains those organs which adapt it to become the instrument of the soul.

Man being endowed not only with the various emotions and sensations common to animals, but also with some others, and having many ideas of different kinds constantly passing through his mind, which he is desirous of communicating to those of his species who are about him; he possesses the faculty of speech in a proportionate degree, and is able sufficiently for all ordinary purposes to hold intercourse with other persons by this means.

Probably, if animals possessed the power of using language to as full an extent as man does, they would communicate either with one another or with man, but very little more effectively than they do at present by inarticulate signs and sounds, inasmuch as they have no ideas to be represented by language; while, for the sensations which they receive, their present language by signs and sounds is fully adequate. Even in the case of singing birds, who appear to be gifted with voice to the fullest extent—and who in the rhapsody of their melody, as well as in the power of traversing the air, and in the beauties which they display, seem almost to resemble angelic beings—no ideas are communicated in what they utter; mere unmeaning notes, or, at most, the expression of emotional excitement, being all that is conveyed. And as regards those which are taught to repeat certain sentences, they speak them without attaching any meaning to the very words which, when spoken by man, are pregnant with the most significant sentiments.

It appears nevertheless that in material knowledge of a certain kind, animals as far exceed us, as we do them in things immaterial. Very possibly, some of their species may perceive, not merely the form and the colour, but the very essence, and essential properties, of substances in general, our acquaintance with which is of the most superficial character. This conjecture is supported by observing the almost intuitive knowledge which certain animals appear to possess of the virtues of particular herbs, as also of other substances, earths and mineral waters, to which they resort successfully in case of sickness or bodily injury. Their discernment in this respect, is probably owing to the great acuteness and perfection of their

very doubtful how far animals can communicate ideas as distinguished from feeling."

sensorial organs, which also enable them to detect and avoid poisons.⁴

⁴ I have been favoured with the following interesting and valuable notes on this passage, from several able and distinguished men, who kindly allowed me to refer to them on the subject of it, and which I give in their own words.

Mr. Darwin says, "I know of no facts making it probable that animals perceive any qualities which are not perceived by us, though they may do so in a higher degree. A sense of direction forms perhaps an exception, though this is doubtful. I do not believe that any animal knows what herbs are poisonous, except through experience during former generations, by which an inherited association or instinct has been acquired against any particular herb. When sheep are turned out into a new country, they often eat poisonous plants; but it is said, at least in parts of Australia, they gradually learn to avoid them."

Sir John Lubbock remarks that "the passage, though short, opens up a number of most difficult questions, on several of which I do not feel prepared to offer any decided opinion. For instance, is it clear that we can apply the word 'knowledge' to animals? I quite agree however that their senses are not only in some respects more acute, but also perhaps very different from ours."

Professor De Quatrefages, of Paris, writes to me as follows:—"The questions which you have put to me are very nice, and are difficult to treat on in a few words. I send you the result of my thoughts. To a certain extent, I agree in your opinion. Two instances of this perfect condition of the senses may suffice to explain the facts. The bat, when it has been deprived of its eyes, flies about a room with such accurate sensation, that it never touches the walls with its wings. But in some cases it is necessary, I believe, to admit the intervention of instinct. The blow-fly is deceived by the smell of certain plants; and when it has laid its eggs in particular flowers, it supposes that it has deposited them in putrid flesh."

Dr. Richardson suggests that some modification of the hypothesis as stated in the passage, is desirable; and that it should be made applicable to certain substances only, and not to substances in general; that the word "grasses" should be substituted for "herbs." He appears also to doubt animals resorting to earths or to mineral waters, as has been asserted by some naturalists; and also, which has been stated as well by attentive observers of their habits, whether they seek to avail of those remedies in cases of bodily injury. He believes, moreover, that it is only certain poisons which they can detect. He adds, "The evidence on the subject in favour of the animal over the man, is very small when it is carefully analysed, and certainly in regard to the avoidance of poisons by the lower animals, the faculty (as I found by direct observation) is extremely limited. It extends I believe only to odorous substances."

Mr. Alfred Smea, F.R.S., author of the interesting and valuable works on "Instinct and Reason as deduced from Electro-Biology," and "The Mind of Man," several times referred to in these pages, has also favoured me with his sentiments on the hypothesis contained in this passage. He expresses great doubts whether animals do resort, as there stated, "to earths and mineral waters," and says, "that they resort successfully in sickness or bodily injury," is not in accordance with observed facts. They have great power in recovering from bodily injury by simple rest.

"With the exception of these words and statements I think that the whole idea might be thrown into a form, especially if somewhat lowered in tone, unexceptionable, or at any rate in accordance with my system of natural philosophy, as detailed in my 'Instinct and Reason,' and in my new work, 'The Mind of Man.'"

Wild animals appear unerringly to shun substances, such as particular herbs, which are naturally poisonous; but they do not detect and avoid those which are artificially rendered poisonous, as by the admixture with them of arsenic. This confirms the view suggested in a former page,⁵ that against contrivances and contingencies which are out of the order of nature, no provision has been made in the economy of animal nature.

Many animals indeed seem to be as far above us in their qualifications for earth, as we are above them in our qualifications for heaven. And yet we are able to subdue them, and make them our slaves; so superior, and so power-giving, is mental above material knowledge. Nevertheless, notwithstanding all this, we care and concern ourselves far more about animal and material, than about intellectual and celestial pursuits.

Mr. Serjeant Cox writes as follows, "The intuitive knowledge possessed by animals is extremely perplexing. They appear to possess a special (or sixth) sense, which is to them a substitute for the reasoning power with which man is endowed. I do not think it is explained by evolution, or by inheritance modifying brain structure. The knowledge of poison could not be transmitted, for it could only have been discovered by the death of the animal. But it may be that the neighbourhood of poisons produces certain painful effects upon the nervous organization, and so the animal is deterred. The suggestion of a *sixth sense* (of which we can form no conception) appears the nearest approach to the solution of the problem, and explains also many other phenomena. The addition of one new sense, would change almost the whole of our own range of knowledge, and probably the aspect of most existing things. If, for instance, we were to be endowed with a sense that could perceive atomic structure as our present senses perceive molecular structure, our knowledge of the universe and its belongings would be multiplied a millionfold."

Dr. Carter Blake expresses the following opinion: "If, as appears clear, some animals possess greater physical faculties to apprehend material objects (e. g. smell in dogs, sight in some birds, sight and smell combined in vultures), we may infer as probable that a greater knowledge of the *substantiæ* of objects may also be possessed by them. A horse or mule will discern dangers that his rider does not perceive; a goat will select plants, and choose the nutritious from amongst the deadly; a canary will reject seed which to men's eyes is indistinguishable from that he selects; so admitting the existence of *noumena* as opposed to *phenomena*, a greater knowledge of the former may be possessed by the animal than the man."

Mr. Wood assents to my opinion as to the knowledge possessed by animals of herbs and other substances, but says, "I am inclined to attribute it to instinct, and not to reason;" and which is the conclusion at which I have arrived, basing both this perception and instinct itself on the acuteness and perfection of their sensorial organs.*

Mr. A. R. Wallace however tells me that in his opinion the statement contained in the above paragraph is "unfounded and erroneous."

⁵ *Vide ante, Prel. Diss., s. 10, a. 2, vol. i. p. 194.*

* *Vide ante, Prel. Diss., s. 10, a. 2, vol. i. p. 194.*

As it is, the language of animals serves only to communicate feelings, while that of man conveys ideas. Sensation is the foundation of the former, the understanding of the latter.

We may conclude therefore that animals have language, correspondingly, and so far only, as they have matter to communicate from one to the other. The language of emotion and action serves to a great extent for this purpose, and it is perfect as far as it goes. It forms indeed a portion of the language of man, the inarticulate branch. Man resorts to it as an auxiliary to articulate language, for which it is very efficient, although as an auxiliary only. Animals use it as a distinct branch, and in many cases as sufficient by itself.

Hence, intellectual language, or the speech of man, is an active process, the operation and product of the intellectual faculties. Emotional language, or the language of animals, is a passive process, the result of their medial endowments being acted upon. These considerations contribute essentially to support the theory enunciated in a former chapter of the present book,⁶ as to the main difference between the nature of man possessed of intellect, and animals gifted only with instinct; man having a soul endowed with active faculties annexed to it, while animals have a soul or instinctive spiritual being, although without any active faculties annexed to it, but merely passive medial endowments, which are capable of being acted upon in the way stated. Nevertheless, inasmuch as feeling is more stimulating than intelligence, so the language of sensation is often more vigorous than that of mind. Consequently, however we may consider the language of brutes to be limited and imperfect, yet perhaps the most forcible branch of the language of man is that which he possesses in common with animals, when the soul speaks not through the lips, but by the contortions of the frame, by signs and gestures, by sobs and sighs.⁷

We may I think fairly conjecture, so far as we can reasonably speculate upon such a subject, that the motion and activity of our minds by their own operations, when engaged in self-communion, is as superior and free, beyond what they can effect in communication with each other by the power of speech; as the motion and activity of spiritual beings, is superior and free beyond that of man in his present state. Speech is indeed in many respects imperfect and inefficient to express our

⁶ *Vide ante*, c. i. s. 1. p. 172; s. 3. p. 183.

⁷ According to certain of the Rabbinical and Mohammedan writers, Solomon's wisdom was evinced in one way by his understanding the language of animals. Thus in the *Koran*, chap. xxvii., he is described as listening to and interpreting the conversation between the ants; while a bird, we are told, understood and obeyed the voice of Solomon, and addressed him in reply!

ideas. And it may also without exaggeration be affirmed that the activity of our minds by themselves independently, is as superior to what they ever exert by means of speech; as the power of the eye, in darting over and surveying a prospect, is to that of our ability to travel over it in person. Thus it is that a much more forcible effect is produced by objects which are at once communicated to the mind through a visual survey of them, than by the most perfect description that language could afford.

Language moreover, like sensation, although very serviceable and efficient, and even adequate in certain cases, is both very defective as regards its material, and often very erroneous as regards the ideas that it conveys. As sensation merely presents us with a copy of the real quality which it represents, so language describing that sensation, only affords us a copy of the former copy. Hence, the mistakes arising from the misuse, and abuse, and imperfection of language, are of great variety, even far exceeding those caused by erroneous sensation.

How little necessary language is to thought, is proved by our internal cogitations, when the soul carries on conversations as it were with itself, without resorting to the aid of words. In this manner too, may we suppose that disembodied spirits communicate one with another. However man may delight to hold intercourse with other minds, it is with his own mind mainly that such intercourse is effected, through the operation of the different faculties and capacities. Self is not only our constant companion, but one from whose society there is no escape, and on whom it is impossible to impose silence. And the more powerful and active are our intellectual faculties, the more independent are we of external communication.

Solitude may however be mental, as well as material; of the soul, as well as of the body.⁸ This may happen in two cases: (1.) When there is no other intelligent terrestrial being with whom we hold intercourse, or for whom we have a concern. (2.) When the soul entirely forsakes, and ceases to hold any communion with, its Creator. This latter, of all solitude is the most profound. The darkness here is such as is not only felt, but the gloom penetrates into the inmost recesses of the mind.

Ideas when conveyed to the understanding through words, are not so forcibly impressed upon it as when caused directly by any objects or events. In those conveyed by words, a treble process takes place in their reception.

1. The mind receives the sensations of the sound of these words.

⁸ "I long for your dreaded solitude as a refuge in which I might repose; for I look upon retirement as the most charming solace of old age."—*Cicero. De Orat.*, cap. lx.

2. It reduces these sensations to ideas.

3. It translates the words into the ideas represented by them.

Thus, ideas are communicated much less rapidly, and less perfectly, by this means, than when transmitted directly to the mind from objects themselves. These types of ideas are not indeed fitted to create in other minds such vivid impressions as the calling forth in a direct manner of the ideas would produce: pictures of objects, for instance, cannot excite such lively sensations as the objects themselves are calculated to do. Narration however, like painting, should serve not only directly to state facts, but also to suggest them to the mind, and to evoke new flashes of thought at each turn. Inferences so thrown out, should conduce, like seed scattered about, to originate ideas of various kinds, and to be the germs of sentiments which will spring up, and fructify, on each topic that is to be touched upon.

Language is variously compounded and adapted to answer all the different purposes of communication; and thus arises that complex science called grammar. It is indeed, singularly interesting to observe, and to trace out, the mode in which language grows, and becomes developed, and gradually forms itself into a methodical system, according as the circumstances of the people among whom it is used—their advancement in knowledge and in arts, increase of wants, and particular occasions, require. Even among animals we may distinctly trace something of this cause and effect.

When language has once been formed among any people, the simplest circumstances would influence its development during its early progress. Any peculiarity of pronunciation, turn of thought, taste, or inclination, either in the nation generally, or in particular individuals, might at this period affect its character, and give a direction to the current. Among those of the same nation, even of the same town, how great a variety is there in expression, and dialect, and style of diction; and how vastly do they differ in the character of their handwriting, which is a reflection, as it were, of the impulses of the mind. For these various manifestations however, a greater scope would be afforded during the infancy of any language, than at a later stage in its career. Need we wonder therefore that, among different nations, different languages should spring up, although the ancestors of all may have originally commenced with one common tongue.

Grammar may be defined to be a sort of intellectual vegetation, the seed of which is the thought of the mind, whose first shoot is the earliest expression of its wants; and which in time developes itself gradually, and in various directions, through all the idioms of speech and language that have been formed. In its origin it is as simple as is the infantile budding of the plant;

but during its growth it becomes as complex, and puts forth as many branches and fibres, and runs into as many ramifications, as does the most exuberant shrub, or wide-spreading tree. Language is the genus of the plant in question. External communication is the soil in which it grows. Ideas are the rich fruit which in its maturity it bears. These ideas are nevertheless the parents of words, as words are of language, and as language is of symbolical representations. Moreover, ideas existed long before speech was uttered, and speech was uttered long before writing was invented. Sounds too, were resorted to as the media of communication, considerably prior to the time when regular speech was used.

Words may be said to constitute a kind of intellectual currency between different minds, by which thoughts, as are commodities in ordinary cases, are exchanged. From the nature of the coinage which is in circulation, we may judge pretty accurately of the nature of the traffic that is carried on. And as in a great commercial country, the quantity and variety of the coinage must bear relation to the transactions that are in progress among its citizens;⁹ so, in an age rich in thought and ideas, the language which is used as the vehicle of communication, must be correspondingly rich and flexible.¹ Words however, form, not the idea itself, but are merely representations of it, as coinage is of commercial commodities.

Nevertheless, both coinage and words, alike from their frequently deceptive appearance, their spurious application, and the occasional difficulty of distinguishing their true character, which the framing of both would often seem intended rather to further than to prevent, are very similar both as regards their use and their abuse.² And as coinage affords means for fraud by passing off for genuine that which is counterfeit; so words, through the errors that are committed in regard to their signification, serve almost as much to confuse, as to convey ideas. More-

⁹ *Sir John Lubbock* has kindly pointed out to me, with regard to this passage, that "the relation of the coinage to the commerce of a country depends much on the condition of banking and other financial arrangements;" and therefore suggests that I should omit to assert, what I had originally done, that its coinage is in proportion to its traffic, which I have accordingly struck out.

¹ *Sir John Lubbock* remarks that with many, if not in most of the savage tribes, though their vocabulary is rich, and they have separate names for different parts of the body, and for animals and plants, "yet they are entirely deficient in words for abstract ideas. They have no expressions for colour, time, sex, spirit, &c."—*Pre-historic Times*, chap. xv.

² *Bishop Berkley*, however, observes that "words may not be insignificant, although they should not, every time they are used, excite the ideas they signify in our minds, it being sufficient that we have it in our power to substitute things or ideas for their signs when there is occasion."—*Minute Philosopher*, Dial. vii. p. 143.

over, a new language which we are striving to acquire, is to the original one somewhat analogous to what a paper currency is to a metal coinage. The genuine coin is applied to purchase at once different articles for use, just as the words of our own language serve directly to call forth ideas. On first learning a new language, and before we become familiar with it, we translate each word into the original language, ere we attempt to call up the ideas it expresses;³ just as in the case of a paper currency with which the public is not familiar, we exchange it for real coin, before we venture to purchase commodities with it. A translation of the words of one language into the language of another is, indeed, but the shadow of a shade. The substance is the idea of the thing itself described by the original language, the original language is the shadow of that idea, while a translation is but a shadow of the original language. A translation, therefore, bears the same relation to the original language, that the original language does to the idea of which it is the type, or shadow, or reflection; and as the idea does to the being itself.

Words consequently form the ordinary and general substantial media of communication between intelligent beings endowed with corporeal organs, and capable of receiving ideas, which are as it were the spirits of words. Nevertheless, when we communicate with the Deity or any other spiritual being, the ideas themselves are the direct media of communication; and in all cases where language is resorted to, unless our thoughts accompany our speech, the latter is dead and soulless. Written words are a sort of clothing to oral words, a still more substantial frame in which they are sometimes garbed.⁴

9. *Reality and Limit of Human Knowledge.*

From the considerations embraced in the foregoing sections, it must be concluded that the reality of the knowledge⁵ obtained by the understanding, depends mainly on the relative degree of perfection of the capacities of that faculty possessed

³ "In learning a new language, the words of it are at first substitutes for those of our native language, i.e., they are associated by means of these with the proper objects and ideas. When this association is sufficiently strong, the middle band is dropped, and the words of the new language become substitutes for and suggest directly and immediately objects and ideas; also clusters of other words in the same language."—*Hartley. Observations on Man*, vol. i. part i. chap. iii. s. 1, p. 282.

⁴ *Mr. Darwin* remarks that "a language, like a species, when once extinct, never reappears."—*Descent of Species, &c.*, vol. i. p. 60. Also that "single words, like whole languages, gradually become extinct."—*Ibid.*

⁵ Knowledge is defined, by *Locke*, to be the perception of the agreement, or disagreement of two ideas.—*Essay on Understanding*, b. iv. c. vi. s. 2.

by the particular person; and that the limits by which that knowledge is bounded, mainly depend on, or are regulated by, the amount, and the adequacy, of the ideas respecting the particular subject received by the understanding.⁶

It may also be concluded that, although all ideas of whatever nature, are alike communicated to, and obtained by the understanding, and by that faculty alone; yet that all ideas are not necessarily derived through sensation. Thus, as I observed before,⁷ the ideas imparted directly to the soul by God, or by any spirit, are received by the understanding independent of sensation; as are also the results of the operations of any of our own faculties or capacities. And as no direct knowledge of God, or of His nature and attributes, could be obtained or received originally through the senses; so this knowledge may be conveyed to us independent of sensation, and by the direct communication of the Divine Spirit with our spirits, which needs no material or sensual medium, or intervention, or organ, for this purpose. All knowledge of material sensible objects is gained through the material senses, which are expressly adapted for this purpose. And all language by material beings, is so communicated. But that which proceeds directly from spiritual beings to our spirits, obviously needs no such intervention.

It is essential in the pursuit of knowledge, to determine the following preliminary points:—1. What subjects are within the scope of our knowledge? 2. What are the limits imposed as to the extent of that knowledge?⁸ 3. What is the process most proper to be pursued in obtaining that knowledge? There are moreover three states or conditions in regard to knowledge, in which we may be placed; and it is of great moment for us to be aware exactly how we stand, and in which relation we actually are:—1. Absolute certain knowledge. 2. Entire doubt and uncertainty. 3. Absolute and profound ignorance. In most cases, however, our condition is of a mixed kind, partaking in part of each of these states. In certain instances it is quite as important for us to possess a knowledge of our ignorance, as any other knowledge that we can obtain. The ascertaining exactly what we do know, and a precise perception of what we do not know, come, however, to pretty nearly the same thing in the end; the conclusion being

⁶ According to *Locke*, we have knowledge no further than we have ideas, and no further than we can perceive their agreement or disagreement.—*Essay on the Understanding*, b. iv. c. iii. ss. 1, 2.

Archbishop Whately lays it down that "knowledge implies three things: first, firm belief; secondly, of what is true; thirdly, on sufficient grounds."—*Logic*, chap. ii. s. 2, note.

⁷ *Vide ante*, b. ii. c. iii. s. 6, p. 138.

⁸ And as *Mr. F. Galton* points out to me, "one must know everything, in order to be able to say what is unknowable."

the same whether we arrive at it by addition or subtraction. In some cases, doubt is the most satisfactory condition which we can hope to attain. He who at once only doubts, is far more likely to be right, than he who wrongly presumes that he knows, or wrongly presumes that he is in ignorance.

The extent of our power of knowing, is analogous to that of our power of sensation of different kinds, as also to our power of emotion, being of a middle or medial quality only : so that on the one hand, no one is entirely destitute of all knowledge ; while, on the other, no one is absolutely omniscient, knowing every subject, and everything about it. The Deity, who alone is capable of both sensation and emotion to infinity, is capable of knowledge, infinite and absolute. He knows everything, and everything that concerns it.

The whole of the knowledge that we obtain, actually and really, of external objects, is of the effects they can produce, and the operations of which they are capable in themselves ;—their powers of acting, and of being acted upon. Of their intrinsic qualities and properties, we literally know nothing.⁹ Of this we may be assured by an examination of the most common and familiar objects around us with which we appear to be best acquainted—as a stone, or a piece of wood, or our own bodies. With regard to the real essential and most common properties of any one of these substances, we are totally and in every respect ignorant.¹

Hence, our knowledge of the nature of spiritual beings, and of our own intellectual constitution, may be as perfect as our knowledge of material objects ;² inasmuch as in both cases we are acquainted with neither of them as regards their essential nature, but only with the operations they are capable of undergoing, or of producing.

Of many physical branches of knowledge, it is not improbable that the soul may lose all traces in a future state ; more especially of those which can be of no service to it in that condition, or the ideas of which will never then be revived. Of some departments however, such as astronomy more especially, it may be expected that the soul will not only not lose, but that when in that condition it will carry on and perfect, the

⁹ *Locke* remarks that we are unable to denominate things by their real essences, because we know them not.—*Essay on the Understanding*, b. iii. c. vi. s. 9.

¹ "Sense is not knowledge and understanding, nor the criterion of truth as to sensible things themselves ; it reaching not to the essence or absolute nature of them, but only taking notice of their outside, and perceiving its own passions from them rather than the things themselves."—*Cudworth's Intellectual System of the Universe*, b. i. c. iv. p. 635.

² *Locke* holds that by putting together the proper ideas, we may obtain as clear a perception and notion of immaterial substances, as we have of material.—*Essay on the Understanding*, b. ii. c. xxiii. s. 15.

acquaintance which it has gained upon earth; and that indeed not only then, but then only, will its knowledge of that science, and of its own real nature also—the two highest species of knowledge after an adequate conception of the Deity—be rendered full and complete.

Moreover, as the science of astronomy directs us in our researches through the spheres, and exalts us from earth to those sublime regions where the Deity Himself is presumed to dwell; introducing an acquaintance with celestial mysteries the knowledge of which will only be completed in eternity, and during a future state of being: so an inquiry into the nature of man, such as is aimed at in the present treatise, induces us to enter upon the noblest and the highest departments of human knowledge which it will be the province of eternity alone completely to unravel; and carries us into the immediate presence of the Deity Himself, into whose stupendous nature an investigation, if not accomplished, is, at any rate, approached.

Ideas of gross and corporeal subjects, are to the subjects themselves what souls are to bodies. They alone live and move, while the latter remain inert; and they will, in many cases, continue to exist long after the objects of them perish.

As regards certain branches of knowledge of each kind, we are erroneously informed, the understanding obtaining incorrect notions of them, not from the ideas communicated to it being absolutely false, but because they are imperfect.³ Hence, the most common, and perhaps the leading source of error, consists in taking the part for the whole. We know one or two qualities of most subjects by the senses; and these we conclude to constitute their entire nature, when, in truth, they make up only a part of it. Such incomplete knowledge amounts in some cases to actual error. In many instances indeed, this very knowledge of qualities, although imperfect in itself, is perfect as regards the ends it is designed to serve. As regards our knowledge in general, it may be observed that on some few subjects, it is real and perfect as to the whole of it.⁴ As to others, it is perfect as regards a portion of it only, but imperfect as regards all the rest. And as regards many others, it is imperfect altogether. Of the first kind, is our knowledge of our own existence. Of

³ *Locke* indeed lays it down, that, "the ideas in our minds being only so many perceptions, or appearances there, none of them are false."—*Essay on the Understanding*, b. ii. c. xxxii. s. 3.

⁴ "Knowledge may be divided into that which is demonstrative and scientific, and that which is deliberative and probable."—*Aristotle, Ethics*, book vi.

the second, the knowledge of our own nature. Of the third, the knowledge of our Creator.⁵

With respect to knowledge which is obtained through that natural and appointed channel of intercourse with the external world, the senses, our information is not only often erroneous, from wrong impressions being communicated; but almost always imperfect, from the limited nature of those senses which, as I have already observed, seem adapted for receiving sensations merely which are of a medial nature. Consequently, objects alone of a certain size, and only motion of a moderate speed, can be perceived by them. Hence, of many created beings even around and about us, we may be wholly ignorant, unless their size and grosser qualities suit the constitution of our senses. This circumstance alone shows us how little we do know, and how much we do not know; how wide a range of knowledge lies beyond our limit, and how small a portion of the universe of knowledge is open to our view.⁶

Probably, moreover, the mind is, in reality, influenced more by what we do not know, than by what we do know. While the latter forms a world of certain terminable subjects of knowledge, the former exists as an unbounded and infinite universe of interminable speculation.

⁵ *Malebranche* asserts that we know none but God by Himself. God alone we see with our immediate and direct view.—*Search after Truth*, pt. ii. b. iii. c. 702.

According to *Hobbes*, God is an object not of apprehension, but of reverence.—*Leviathan*.

Sir Isaac Newton observes, that “as a blind man has no notion of colours, so neither have we any notion of the manner how the most wise God perceives and understands all things.”—*Newton’s Principia*, *Schol. Gen.*

“If you do not understand the operations of your own finite mind, that thinking thing within you, do not deem it strange that you cannot comprehend the operations of the eternal infinite mind, who made and governs all things, and whom the heaven of heavens cannot contain.”—*Locke. Essay on the Understanding*, book iv. chap. xi. s. 19.

Even the heathen philosophers taught that the power and nature of God were only to be discerned by the mind, not by the senses.—*Cicero, De Nat. Deor.*, lib. i. “I never had a sight of my soul,” said the Emperor *Aurelius*, “and yet I have a great value for it, because it is discernible by its operations; and by my constant experience of the power of God, I have a proof of His Being, and a reason for my veneration.”

⁶ Nevertheless, as *Dr. Thomas Brown* has pointed out, “If we knew nothing more of the mind of man than its capacity of becoming acquainted with the powers of so vast and so complicated an instrument as that of speech, and of acquiring this knowledge in circumstances the most unfavourable to the acquisition, without any of the aids which lessen so greatly our labours in acquiring any other language far less perfectly in after life, and amid the continual distinctions of pains and pleasures that seem to render any fixed effort absolutely impossible; we might, indeed, find cause to wonder at a capacity so admirable.”—*Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind*. Lect. lxvii.

Knowledge of external objects, when obtained directly by the understanding, through the communication to it of ideas from sensations derived from such objects, is termed reality, or real knowledge; which is perfect so far as its limits extend, and those ideas are adequate for the end they purpose to serve.⁷ When knowledge concerns ideas which are communicated from one mind to another, it is termed real, so far as it is correct and complete; and false, so far as it is incorrect and incomplete.⁸

It may be that the limits of knowledge are as definitely fixed as are the limits of matter; and that as we cannot extend our wanderings beyond the confines of the earth, so we cannot extend our knowledge beyond the province of the understanding.⁹ On the whole, however, it appears to me, that our knowledge in our present state, although united to a gross corporeal frame, which in many respects greatly impedes our reception of ideas; is quite perfect as far as it goes, and is probably in all respects as correct, where adequate ideas are obtained, as would be gained by a pure separate spirit. The defects under which we labour with regard to knowledge, are in fact material rather than mental. When the obstacles which arise from our being united to matter are overcome, such as those which are occasioned through the grossness of our senses, and the frailty and liability to fatigue of our corporeal intellectual organs, there is in reality nothing as regards the dealing with ideas by the mind, that need impede our intellectual operations, even those among them which are the most exalted.

It has been asserted, indeed,¹ as it appears to me, incorrectly, that while moral truths are stationary, intellectual truths are progressive. The fact is, however, that the basis and principles of each are fixed, although the aspect of, and the opinions concerning each, are variable. Sentiments respecting morals differ in reality in every age, as widely as do those respecting mind, or even with regard to matter. Truth moreover is always and necessarily of itself immutable, although, as in the case of our viewing material objects in nature, its appearance may change according to the different and particular positions from which we regard it.²

⁷ According to *Hobbes*, every conception, being derived from the senses, is finite; we have, therefore, no idea of infinity.—*Leviathan*.

⁸ "Men are too apt to reduce unknown things to the standard of what they know, and bring a prejudice or tincture from things they have been conversant in, to judge thereby of things in which they have not been conversant."—*Bishop Berkley. Minute Philosopher*, Dial. vi. p. 54.

⁹ *Locke* observes that there are certain things of which we have very imperfect notions, and others of which we can have no knowledge at all, and which are beyond our comprehension.—*Essay on Understanding*, b. iv. c. xviii. s. 7.

¹ *Buckle's History of Civilization*, Introd. p. 208.

² *Mr. F. Galton* remarks on this passage that "all Darwinism, all

As the understanding is the eye, so knowledge is the light of the soul. Ignorance, on the other hand, is as darkness to it. As the eye perceives no objects but such as are illumined by rays of light; so the soul has no cognizance of subjects, except by the rays of knowledge which communicate with it. And what hunger and thirst are to the body, avidity for knowledge, and the desire to satisfy the understanding, are to the soul. The latter languishes and wastes its strength through ignorance; and each of its powers becomes enfeebled as much as, and correspondingly with, what the body suffers from want of food.

Knowledge is indeed, in many respects, to the mind, what food is to the body. As some food is absorbed into the system, while other food merely affects it without becoming part of it, only passing through it; so some knowledge becomes incorporated with the mind, other knowledge only gives it a new direction or bias, and some simply engages its transient attention, after which it is no more regarded. Particular studies require deep attention, others are hard of digestion, while certain kinds are like very light food, but afford no substantial nutriment to the mind.³

The soul is, on the other hand, not only ever eager to acquire knowledge of each kind, but it feels itself invigorated and exalted by the possession of it, and perceives additional power infused into it by each accession of information. It moreover derives almost as much pleasure from communicating knowledge as in obtaining it. As with the gifts of fortune, so with those nobler ones of intelligence; a generous soul is as much gratified by giving as by gaining. This is probably however, in each case, caused by the reflection of the good that we are doing to others, and arises from no consciousness of actual benefit to ourselves; except indeed, in some instances, from the reputation which we obtain by the information we impart. Hence, our eagerness to be the first to communicate any new piece of information which we have acquired; which is nothing more nor less than an exhibition of our superiority to those around us, as regards our possession of knowledge on this particular subject. A feeling originating in this consciousness of superiority from the possession of knowledge, will deter many from revealing all that they know on a matter, because that would place them on a level with their hearers; while they are eager to communicate enough to establish this superiority, and to impress the conviction on those about them of their ability to impart more.

Ideas of every kind and variety, when obtained by the under-

Herbert Spencer, all Tylor, and evolutionists generally, are dead against this view of Buckle."

³ "Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested."—*Lord Bacon*, Essay 1.

standing, are blended and moulded together, and contribute to make up our sum of knowledge; in a manner corresponding with that in which atoms of matter of every variety in different ways united, go to make up the structure of the material world.

The Divine economy is, probably, as inscrutable to us, as ours is to the animal world over which we exercise control. We are, apparently, in the same manner, as superior to the brute creation in intelligence and in knowledge, as God is superior to us; and they are as incapable of understanding and scrutinizing our thoughts and our ways, as are we those of God.

Nevertheless, with all our light, and with all our intelligence almost divine, we vainly oftentimes make certain that we know the most, when in reality we know the least. Thus, in the daytime, we boast of seeing the sun, though in truth we see far more at night, when not only one, but whole systems of suns, are disclosed to our gaze. As the withdrawal from the world of the sun's rays is compensated for by the glorious display of the host of heaven, and the whole gorgeous array of the planetary world, which are all shrouded from our view during the day, when we can behold only the objects of our earth; so it has sometimes happened that the withdrawal from the eye of the power of vision, which afforded so many intense enjoyments, opens at once to the eye of the soul the still and undisturbed and solemn contemplation of a host of celestial ideas, which the glare of real objects obscured from the mind.

As man contentedly crawls on the surface of the earth, regardless of any other system than that in which he dwells, and hardly conscious even of the existence of the myriads of mighty and mysterious worlds which float in the universe over his head; so in respect of knowledge, he vainly prides himself on the paltry acquirements that he possesses, regardless of the stupendous systems which range far and wide through the universe of intellectual research with which he is unacquainted, vainly presuming that his own narrow circle of thought bounds the whole expanse of wisdom of which the mind is capable.

It may be, therefore, after all, that the most valuable kind of knowledge for any one to be acquainted with, the most difficult to gain, and the most seldom possessed, is that which consists in a knowledge of what we do not know—a correct estimation of our own ignorance.

We see now but the shadows of things, rather than the real objects themselves. We “behold, but as in a glass, darkly,”⁴ instead of discerning clearly the image before us. And from having been so long inured to the blindness of ignorance, it is with difficulty that we can bear without being dazzled the bright and pure rays of knowledge. We have indeed the double task

⁴ 1 Corinthians xiii. 12.

to accomplish, of disengaging our minds from error, and of habituating them to, and storing them with, truth. But the former must be expelled, ere there is room for the latter. So feeble however are our minds, and so wayward are we in the use of our powers, that we are actually more prone to exert them both to learn and to inculcate error, than to imbibe and to disseminate truth. We have consequently, a harder task to unlearn, than to learn. And yet with all this, the longest life is far too short for either.

CHAPTER III.

THE FACULTY OF REASON.

1. *Quality and Constitution of this Faculty, and of its Subordinate Constituent Capacities.*

NEXT in their order as regards the general routine of their operation, the faculty of reason demands our consideration. This faculty constitutes the power that the mind possesses of reasoning upon the nature of any subject or object; which is performed by instituting a comparison between two or more ideas, and drawing a conclusion therefrom as to the difference existing between them.¹ Separating or dividing ideas, and weighing them as it were one against another, is the process here pursued; in which respect this faculty may be said to resemble a balance, whose office it is to ascertain the difference in ponderosity between subjects.

There is as much difficulty in, and as much skill and exertion are required about, making a decision respecting, or drawing a conclusion from, the various arguments urged respecting any topic, as there is in adducing those arguments themselves. In both cases the actual process is the same; but the quality of mind, and of this faculty, required for accomplishing it effectually, are widely different. Hence we seldom see the same man equally fitted both to argue, and to decide a question. Besides which, the particular capacities that collaterally aid in the one case, do not serve in the other. A conclusion consists indeed in weighing arguments, as an argument consists in weighing facts. Error in our conclusion ensues where facts only are weighed, without weighing the arguments as well; or where either facts or arguments are weighed, without the whole being fairly balanced.

Doubt consists in a hesitation to draw a conclusion, from a feeling of inability to do so; or to arrive at a determination on a given point of rational exercise. Perplexity is that condition of suspense of the judgment which is occasioned by a

¹ According to *Archbishop Thompson*, "a judgment is an expression that two notions can, or cannot, be reconciled."—*Outline of the Laws of Thought*, p. 108, 7th thousand.

difficulty in arriving at a decision or conclusion, resulting from, or caused by, the reason not being able to determine which arguments out of several it ought to adopt, or the due degree of relative value which should be awarded to each in forming such conclusion. Scepticism, on the other hand, consists in a hesitation to place reliance either on the materials for arriving at a conclusion, or on the process resorted to for so doing. Both these conditions conduce to stimulate the reason to exertion, although they are in reality stumbling-blocks to its progress. They serve, however, to show the necessity for the rigid exercise of reason; and it is alone by this exercise that we can be delivered from this condition, which is perhaps analogous to one of suspense as regards the material part of our being.

The understanding, although somewhat of the same nature as regards its receptive operation, and acting in the same direction as sensation, carries on the intellectual process one considerable stage beyond the point to which sensation brings it. The reason, on the other hand, is in its nature, as regards the mode of its operation, very different to the understanding; but, in its turn, it carries on the intellectual process in the acquisition of knowledge a stage yet further, commencing at the point to which it was brought by the understanding.²

The reason is exerted far less commonly than is the understanding, and is not ordinarily developed to any great extent until the understanding is amply stored with ideas. Not only, indeed, are individuals generally advanced in life before they arrive at a habit of regularly, and duly, and steadily resorting to their reasoning powers; but, in a corresponding manner, mankind at large do not appear, until a late period of their career, systematically to have exercised this faculty extensively. And the more valuable and practical, and the more closely connected with facts is this exercise, the later is its development. Thus, pure mathematics were studied comparatively early in the age of the world, and are frequently made a part of the education of youth. But to apply the mind closely to the investigation of facts, especially of an important character, is a pursuit, or a science, which is practised only at a late period

² According to *Hobbes*, the use of reason is the deduction of remote consequences from the definitions of terms.—*Leviathan*.

Comparing ideas one with another, is the second exercise of the mind attributed to it by *Locke*. *Essay on the Understanding*, b. ii. c. xi. s. 4.

"The understanding suggests the materials of reasoning; the reason decides upon them. The first can only say, 'This is, or ought to be so.' The last says, 'It must be so.'"—*Coleridge*. *Table Talk*.

"In matters of science, the necessity of judgment is obvious: all the collections and arrangements of ideas which imagination makes, are immediately subjected to reason, that it may infer truth."—*Gerard on Genius*, part i. s. 4, p. 72.

of the world's career, and with which those only of mature age can venture to grapple.

Different persons, moreover, vary much more as regards the relative extent to which they are endowed with reason, than they do as regards the extent to which they are endowed with understanding. Probably, indeed, the capacities of reason in different men differ as widely and as extensively as do the different kinds and degrees of proof submitted to their minds. And it is in reality the former, and not the latter, which causes this variety in the rational conclusions of different individuals, and sects, and parties. Education, and passion, and prejudice, contribute to extend the divergence still further; and in every way, and in each direction. Nevertheless, capacities of the same kind exist in each person alike, and proofs of the same nature are recognized by all.

The principal cause of the reason being resorted to less frequently than the understanding, is the circumstance that persons are endowed with it to a large extent much less commonly than they are with the latter faculty. They are therefore naturally, indeed almost instinctively, prone to make use of the understanding, with which they are conscious of being the most fully gifted; and which, moreover, they are also conscious that the greater number of those about them mainly possess, and resort to, and are most induced to exercise.

The reason depends, as regards the accuracy of its data or materials for operation, upon the understanding; in a manner and degree analogous to that in which the understanding depends mainly on sensation. And the reason is less dependent upon, although not wholly uninfluenced by, the condition of the material frame, than is the understanding. The three several capacities described in the succeeding sections, together constitute the faculty of reason; and according to the comparative extent of the endowment of any individual with each of these capacities, will be the distinguishing character of his reasoning faculty.

The common and ordinary exercise of the reason respecting the ideas that are in the understanding, is termed reflection, which is the digestion by the mind, through the reason comparing them one with another, of these ideas, and extracting nutriment therefrom during the process, by means of the conclusions or inferences that it draws. Ill-ordered minds, like ill-ordered stomachs, pass their food without digestion, and hence derive no benefit from it. Imbibing ideas, even if they are stored up in the memory, of itself alone confers no benefit on the mind. Man however is mentally, although not materially, a ruminating animal; and is capable of recalling from his memory many recently received ideas, which he then chews and digests, or rejects, as he determines fit.

I observed, when treating of the conscience, that it is in part

constituted of an exercise of the reason.³ But if this is the case, the excellence and perfection of the conscience, as I have indeed already remarked, must necessarily more or less depend upon, and be in proportion to, those of the reason, whether natural or acquired; as, however much a person may desire to act rightly, he cannot do so unless guided aright by his reason, which is the faculty given to aid him in all cases where a decision with regard to different matters of practical import has to be made. On those subjects more especially; where judicial investigation and determination have to be effected, the reason is required to aid the conscience, and to point out the course of conduct to be pursued. An efficient judge is not only conscientious, but acute and discriminating also.

The general exercise of the reason is both improving to itself, and is one of the chief means by which the attainment of knowledge is promoted. In this respect it aids and seconds the efforts of the understanding; proving, sifting, examining, and correcting, the facts which the mind obtains through that faculty.⁴ Nevertheless, a too constant exercise of the reason, especially on matters of controversy, or respecting which strict proof is required, is found to be not generally beneficial to the mind, either mentally or morally: as regards the former, from its tendency to lead it to rely too much, and too entirely, on the reason for the attainment of knowledge, and to incline it ever to espouse one side or other of an argument, instead of surveying candidly, and weighing duly, both sides of the question; and, as regards its moral effect, as giving the mind a relish for engaging in a controversy whenever the opportunity offers; leading it to prefer the combat for victory to the peaceful pursuit of truth; and to aim rather at conquest in argument, than the attainment of knowledge.

Of all the faculties of the mind, the reason is that alone which has been placed under strict discipline, and for which set studies have been provided. But, even as regards the reason, it is rather one capacity only of that faculty, the capacity of analysis, than the whole faculty of reason, which has been so cultivated. Logic and mathematics are the appointed disciplinary processes through which the capacity of analysis has to pass in order to develope its full vigour. And not merely is the capacity of analysis the only capacity for which suitable studies have been framed, but these are the only regular mental studies which have been originated and prepared.⁵ Exercises for the memory have indeed

³ *Vide ante*, b. ii. c. iii. ss. 2, 7.

⁴ *Helvetius*, however, appears to consider the understanding, and the reason, or judgment, as the same faculty of the mind, which he defines to be "an ability to discern the resemblances and differences, the agreements and disagreements, which different objects have with each other."—*Treatise on Man*, c. xv.

⁵ The Rev. Dr. Newman, of the Oratory, Edgbaston, near Birmingham,

been invented ; but these are rather as artificial aids to peculiar operations, than as calculated actually to invigorate or improve the real condition of this power. Neither the understanding nor genius have been systematically attempted to be developed, enlarged, or cultivated, by any studies or exercises adapted for this purpose.⁶

Reason, however, if improperly exerted through any of its capacities, leads not to insanity, but to error. Wrong conclusions are then arrived at, whereas in madness no real conclusions are effected. In the one case, the form produced is misshapen and disproportioned ; in the other, it is but a chaotic mass. The conclusions of reason are, indeed, from different causes, far more frequently, essentially, and entirely wrong, than essentially and entirely right ; but it is only when they are not formed at all, or when they terminate in a manner wholly contrary to the data from which they are drawn, that the cause of this is attributed to insanity.

As a striking illustration of the various modes in which the exercise of reasoning, both as regards arguing and judging, is carried on by different men, we may refer to the different tests adapted by them with respect to evidence of each kind, mathematical, philosophical, legal, and probable or presumptive, such as we are satisfied with in regard to ordinary transactions. There are, indeed, as many kinds of evidence as there are degrees of relative or apparent truth. Evidence is, in fact, the process by which truth is discerned or obtained. Although each and equally desirous to obtain evidence which is satisfactory and conclusive, yet much that the lawyer would receive is rejected by the philosopher, and much that the philosopher would receive is rejected by the lawyer. So also the modes of proof adopted by one people are repudiated by another, and even different courts of law in the same country, are at variance as regards the kind of proof which they deem conclusive or admissible. The main and essential difference between legal and philosophical evidence appears to me to be this : The lawyer adopts one definite and strict rule as to the admission of

formerly fellow and tutor of Oriel College, Oxford, author of several works of high reputation connected with logic and education, and whose world-wide fame as a scholar and a controversialist, is known to every one, has very obligingly allowed me to consult him on certain of the points embraced by the present chapter, and to refer to him the passages relating to those topics on which he has been good enough to communicate with me. In reference to the present paragraph Dr. Newman writes, "I do not quite grant that the capacity of analysis is the only capacity for which regular studies have been framed. Mr. Davison has a good letter among his miscellaneous writings on the Oxford education, and maintains that judgment is the faculty which is especially cultivated by it. Although it wants fulness and detail, it has ever seemed to me to contain a very sound and good view."

⁶ *Vide post*, chap. vii. ss. 3, 7.

evidence, from which he never deviates, and insists on its being applicable to all cases. The philosopher varies his rule to suit every particular case, considering each by itself. The lawyer declines to act in any case unless he deems the evidence ample. In order for legal evidence to be ample it is not required to be certain or absolute, but the lawyer rests satisfied with, and acts upon, such evidence as appears probable, and likely to be true according to the particular principles laid down by him. The philosopher acts upon such evidence as he obtains, whatever it may be, regulating his proceedings upon the matter by the nature of the evidence. Nevertheless, but a small portion of the evidence which is received, either legal or philosophical, is absolute and conclusive. In each case we act upon it when we deem it satisfactory; in the case of legal, where it comes up to the rule laid down; in the case of philosophical, where, under the circumstances, it appears to be ample, and the balance of probabilities seems in its favour.

Certain legal evidence is however rejected, not because it is bad in itself, but because its admission might lead to inconvenient results. The philosopher receives all the evidence which he deems trustworthy, uninfluenced by any such considerations as to the consequences. The lawyer requires the best evidence that can be had, under the circumstances, and is satisfied with, and acts upon, no other. The philosopher is satisfied with the best evidence that he can get, and acts upon it.

Allusion was made in the preceding chapter to the inability of animals to receive ideas, or, as a necessary consequence, to convey them by language. As a further consequence, they are also incapable of reasoning, which is but the power of comparing ideas.⁷ Nevertheless, the instinctive endowments which they possess supply, to an extent sufficient for all their wants,

⁷ "If it may be doubted whether beasts compound and enlarge their ideas to any degree, this, I think, I may be positive in, that the power of abstracting is not at all in them, and that the having of general ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes by no means attain to. For it is evident we observe no footsteps in them of making use of general signs for universal ideas; from which we have reason to imagine that they have not the faculty of abstracting, or making general ideas, since they have no use of making words or any other general signs."—*Locke on the Understanding*, b. ii. c. 2, s. 10.

Mr. Wake is of opinion that "there is in reality no such process in animal reasoning as that intended by 'comparison,' such reasoning being simply a judgment of relation instinctively formed on the presentation to the mind of certain objects of thought, an increase in the number of which renders the operation more complex, but does not alter its character."—*Chapters on Man*, pt. i. c. ii. p. 16.

Mr. Darwin, however, remarks that "few persons any longer dispute that animals possess some power of reasoning."—*Descent of Man*, &c. vol. i. p. 46.

an acquaintance with objects around them, and with the mode of dealing with them, although without imparting any intellectual information, or evincing or implying any reasoning power whatever.

But, although animals may be deemed utterly incapable of reasoning,⁸ or of drawing rational inferences, even of the simplest nature, they appear nevertheless able to perceive conclusions of certain kinds which have been arrived at. Thus, they observe the sum total as regards the difference in qualities and size between various bodies, although they cannot analyze the constituent elements which contribute to make them up. So also, although they are unable to calculate numbers, they can perceive the difference between one object and several, or between a few and a great many objects.⁹

2. The Capacity of Sense.

The capacity of sense, or what we ordinarily term common sense, is that capacity of the faculty of reason by which it is enabled with facility, celerity, and clearness to compare one

⁸ Lord Brougham held that the instincts of animals "are unquestionably mental faculties; which we discover by observation and consciousness, but which are themselves wholly unconnected with any exercise of reason."—*Discourse of Natural Theology*, sect. iii.

⁹ To this passage the following interesting and valuable note has been supplied by Mr. Wake:—

"There is no doubt that according to your definition of reason,* animals are 'utterly incapable of reasoning.' That they are not, however, incapable of 'drawing rational inferences' is, I think, evident from a consideration of animal actions. Take the case of the fox, which—it was chained up in a farm-yard—spread its food just within the radius covered by its chain, and when the fowls trespassed within the circle it commanded pounced upon them. The fox certainly inferred that if the fowls ate of the food it would be able to catch them. There was, indeed, a clear process of reasoning; and here, as it could not, I think, be brought within your definition of that mental process, this definition must be imperfect. If you refer to p. 16 of *Chapters on Man*, you will see that I put 'comparison' between inverted commas in the passage, 'there is in reality no such process in animal reasoning as that intended by 'comparison.' Here it is affirmed that animals have the reasoning power, but not in the sense intended when the mental faculties of man are spoken of. The mere logical process is, however, the same (see p. 20). Animal reasoning appears to have relation merely to the applicability of a certain means to attain a desired end, and the higher animals undoubtedly can make choice of means. Here, however, we see no reference to *ideas*, as distinguished from action, the former being the distinctive mark of human reasoning, which, nevertheless, differs from animal reasoning only in the objects of thought, and not in the mental process. The difference seems

* *Vide ante*, s. 1, p. 263.

with another so as to draw general conclusions therefrom, the ideas relating to any subject.¹

As I observed when treating of the capacity of apprehension, that nearly all the ideas that the mind receives pass through this capacity, by which means the understanding obtains a clear and accurate knowledge of them before it proceeds by its other capacities either to observe them minutely, or to survey them comprehensively; so, in a corresponding manner, the capacity of sense institutes a general scrutiny into the ideas of each subject before they are closely analyzed, or are compared by the judgment. Indeed here, as in the case of apprehension, the essential difference in the ideas consists, not in themselves, but in the mode in which they are dealt with by different capacities.

The capacity of sense, analogous to the capacity of apprehension, is the most commonly of all the capacities in this faculty possessed in an extensive degree. It enables a person to inform himself correctly and satisfactorily concerning the probable truth or general merits of any topic on a superficial or cursory examination of it, to discern the obvious, ordinary, and principal relations between different subjects or objects, and to ascertain with clearness and accuracy their most prominent and characteristic differences. It is brought into use in every kind of reasoning, inasmuch, as already observed, before we exercise analysis or judgment, we usually exert this capacity to a certain extent, so as to effect a general examination of the arguments involved, prior to descending to a minute and particular examination of the different points of the question.²

to depend in fact on the use by man of generalizations which are unknown to animals (see *Chapters on Man*, p. 21). Man's use of generalizations again depends on his special faculty of higher perception, which enables him to distinguish the qualities of objects as separate from the objects themselves as individuals (see p. 24). The incapacity of animals to do more than recognize individuals, as possessing features distinct from other objects, is the source of all this mental inferiority. Here, probably, we agree; but I affirm, nevertheless, that animals can reason so far as the objects of thought they possess will allow them. Here we seem to differ, because I give a wider definition to reasoning than you do. Substitute in your definition 'objects of thought' for 'ideas,' and I think we shall then completely agree."

¹ According to *Condillac*, "good sense and understanding are no more than to conceive or to imagine, and differ only by the nature of the object with which we are occupied."—*Origin of Human Knowledge*, pt. i. s. 2, § 98.

Helvetius lays it down that "the difference between wit and good sense proceeds from the different causes by which they are produced. The one is the effect of strong passions, and the other of the absence of those very passions."—*Essays on the Mind*, Essay iv. chap. 12.

² According to *Dr. Reid*, in his *Essay on the Mind*, the office of common sense, or the first degree of reason, is to judge of things self-evident, as

The being largely endowed with the capacity of sense, constitutes the man of good common sense and correct decision with regard to ordinary matters of life, who, on the first examination, perceives the general bearing of the question in agitation.

Deficiency in this capacity occasions erroneous decision with regard to common affairs, about which we are called upon to give an immediate and unhesitating opinion. It constitutes the silly man, who, in ordinary matters, constantly displays what is vulgarly termed a want of common sense.

This capacity corresponds with that of apprehension in the faculty of understanding, although quite independent of, and by no means co-existent with it in any mind; and it is principally exercised in comparing the ideas which that capacity receives, although those obtained by the other capacities may be also made use of by it.

One great advantage resulting from the extensive possession of this capacity, is that it enables the individual so gifted to profit by turning to account the efforts of other men of more comprehension and acuteness than himself, and to avail himself of the operations which their superior wisdom and power have been carrying on. Thus a monarch of sound sense, surrounded by sincere and able statesmen, may, from their various reasonings and researches and contentions, draw accurate conclusions as to the course of conduct which, on the whole, it is most desirable for him to adopt.³

Sense is probably created at once the most perfect, is the earliest developed, and is the least dependent upon artificial education, of all the capacities of reason.

contrasted with the office of the second degree of reason, which is to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are.

Dr. Carpenter defines common sense to be "an attribute,* which judges of things whose self-evidence is *not* equally apparent to every individual, but presents itself to different individuals in very different degrees, according in part to the original constitution of each, and in part to the range of his experience, and the degree in which he has profited by it."—*Mental Physiology*, c. xi. p. 472.

Mr. Sergeant Cox's definition of common sense is that it is "that confidence common to all mankind in certain conditions of things, as true, which, because it is common, may be presumed to have its foundation in some universal truth, or something which the human intelligence is constructed to recognize as truth, and the belief in which is not a mere intellectual acceptance, but that firm conviction upon which we act without hesitation or doubt."—*What am I?* vol. i. c. xxvi. p. 246.

³ *Vide, Civilization considered as a Science.—Moral Jurisprudence. (Bohn's Library edition), pp. 243, 244.*

* How does *Dr. Carpenter* distinguish an "attribute" from a "faculty," the existence of which he denies?—*Vide ante*, c. i. s. 3, pp. 181, 182.

3. *The Capacity of Analysis.*

The capacity of analysis is that capacity of the faculty of reason by which it is enabled, with the utmost precision, clearness, acuteness, and distinctness, to compare one with another, so as to draw the most accurate and exact conclusions therefrom, the particular and minute ideas of any subject, especially one of a subtle and precise nature.

This capacity is principally of use in controversy, to detect inaccuracy or inconclusiveness in the reasoning of an opponent, by discovering the minute points of difference between the facts as they really are, and as he contends them to be. It is the mode of many disputants to mix a certain portion of truth with what is unsound, whereby the whole is gulped down together as true. Analysis is exercised in unravelling and exposing in controversy fallacies of this nature, by proving these minute and unobserved distinctions.

It is with the treasures of the soul as it is with those of the soil, that things of the utmost value, and those which are mere dross, are frequently discovered united and blended together so as to form but one substance. Thus virtue and vice, truth and falsehood, philosophy and sophistry, are often so commingled in the arguments of a particular writer, or the principles of a particular party, that we unhesitatingly and unwittingly either accept or reject their system and tenets as a whole, without attempting to separate the good from the bad, so as to choose the one and reject the other. It is the peculiar province of the capacity of analysis in these cases to act the part of the refiner's fire, to divide the gold from the dross, and to point out moreover what is gold and what is dross.

I think it can hardly be doubted that this process is performed by the particular capacity of analysis and not by the whole faculty of reason, as might otherwise be inferred from the manner in which efforts of this nature are sometimes spoken of. That the mind possesses such a capacity, endowed with a peculiar power of this nature, is, I conceive, alike essential and evident. Sense and judgment, which are also capacities of this faculty, are wholly inapplicable for the performance of this operation.

The capacity of analysis also assists any one engaged in the pursuit of natural philosophy or experimental science, to analyze and discover the essential properties of beings, or their original elementary principles.

The extensive possession of this capacity confers a great degree of sharpness and penetration on the mind, and enables an individual to argue with acuteness and from first principles ;

it constitutes the subtle logician, metaphysician, or mathematician, and the close and precise reasoner in controversy.

Deficiency in this capacity causes a person to draw illogical and unsound conclusions in controversy, and renders him unable to penetrate deeply in scientific researches.

This capacity corresponds with that of apprehension in the faculty of understanding, and is chiefly exercised in the comparison of those ideas which are presented to the mind by that capacity. It is, nevertheless, quite independent of it, although persons possessing analysis largely, are usually also extensively endowed with apprehension. This is not, however, always the case, and ideas obtained either by apprehension or comprehension may be the subject of the exercise of this capacity.

The extensive possession of apprehension induces a person, when treating on any subject, to amplify or dilate very fully upon it, by entering minutely into each of the different branches and particulars of it, to deal with which this capacity is peculiarly adapted. The extensive possession of analysis, on the other hand, induces a person, when treating on any subject, to do so with conciseness, inasmuch as he acquires the habit of urging arguments which imply consequentially, and without specifically setting them forth, others that are dependent upon them.

Analysis appears to be created less perfect than is sense, is developed less early, and is more dependent upon artificial education than is that capacity. Nevertheless, children may be observed at a very early age to reason from first principles, which is the result of the application of this capacity to any pursuit.⁴ People too in a rude age, or whose faculties are but little cultivated, argue in this manner. This is, however, probably in both cases mainly owing to the understanding being very scantily stored with ideas, to the application of which persons of extensive information are apt to resort for the purpose of supporting an argument, in preference to comparing closely those that they possess.

It is nevertheless, very singular that, although analysis is the only capacity of the mind for which a complete and systematic plan of artificial education has been formed, or even attempted, yet there is no capacity so little availed of as it ought to be as is this; no process being so neglected, although so essential in

⁴ *Dr. Thomas Brown* observes with regard to the case of an infant,—“that he does truly reason, with at least as much subtlety as is involved in the process now supposed, cannot be doubted by those who attend to the manifest results of his little inductions, in those acquisitions of knowledge which show themselves in the actions, and I may say almost in the very looks of the little reasoner,—at a period long before that to which his own remembrance is afterwards to extend.”—*Lectures on the Philosophy of the Mind*, *Lect. XXIV.*

the majority of studies, as that of reasoning from first principles, the power of which is conferred by this capacity.

4. *The Capacity of Judgment.*

The capacity of judgment is that capacity of the faculty of reason, by which it is enabled to compare one with another, so as to draw complete and adequate conclusions from them, the principal and most important ideas of any subject, more especially one of a vast and comprehensive nature.

A mind gifted largely with this capacity, is endowed with the power of embracing a wide range of ideas, and of extensively examining a subject concerning which it has to reason; and is thus enabled to discern and to exhibit the most important differences between various subjects which are compared together, and to adduce in controversy the most convincing and powerful arguments and conclusions. As analysis is the capacity which mainly enables a person to conduct a close and acute process of argumentation, so judgment is that capacity which enables him to arrive at a just and accurate general comprehensive conclusion or decision respecting the matter.

The extensive possession of this capacity constitutes the able controversialist and the convincing debater. It leads a person to select those arguments which are the soundest, the most important, and the weightiest. It makes the persuasive rather than the strictly logical reasoner. The man endowed very largely with analysis overcomes us in argument by the subtlety of his reasonings, but *without* convincing us. The man very largely gifted with judgment, on the other hand, conquers us *by* convincing us. He brings us over completely to his own way of thinking. He adduces such proofs and such arguments, and so disposes and arrays them, as to persuade us that he is in the right.

Deficiency in this capacity occasions a person to adopt in controversy weak and insignificant arguments, to dispose them inefficiently, and to fail in convincing those to whom he appeals.

This capacity corresponds with that of comprehension in the faculty of understanding, and is principally exercised in the comparison of the ideas which that capacity presents to the mind. Those obtained by the other capacities of that faculty may, however, be made use of by it. As by the capacity of sense we compare generally ideas one with another, and as by analysis we compare them minutely; so by this capacity we compare comprehensively not only ideas, but it is by judgment mainly, although not in every case or exclusively, that we compare the arguments or comparisons themselves effected by

the other capacities of this faculty as well as by this capacity, and from these comparisons draw conclusions. It is seldom that a very acute reasoner is equally successful in the latter effort. The subtle advocate frequently makes but an indifferent judge. The circumstances here alluded to of the proneness of persons of acute reasoning power to take only a one-sided view of an argument, while those of an enlarged and comprehensive mind embrace the whole summary of it, proves the correctness of my theory—that analysis is mainly an advocatorial, and judgment mainly a judicial capacity.⁵

Judgment is probably created at our birth less perfect than is sense, but more so than analysis. It is also less dependent on artificial education than is the latter capacity, but is more so than sense. Its development, too, is later than that of sense, but earlier than that of analysis.

5. *Illustration of the Nature of these Capacities.*

The capacities of reason being of the same invisible unsubstantial nature with those of understanding, stand in need of the same material or metaphorical aids for their illustration. The faculty of reason has already been compared to a balance, whose office it is to measure or weigh, and thereby ascertain the difference in ponderosity between, certain material substances. The province of reason in immaterial subjects, as has already been observed, exactly corresponds with that of a balance as regards those which are material; and each of the constituent capacities of this faculty may moreover bear the same comparison. Thus, the capacity of sense might be compared to the common and ordinary scales used for the purpose of ascertaining with readiness, facility, and general accuracy, the relative weight of different common objects or substances. Analysis we might typify by those delicate and exact measures resorted to by the dealers in certain chemical articles, which serve to ascertain with the utmost precision and nicety the relative difference in weight of the refined substances which are possessed by them. The capacity of judgment might be compared to the large machines employed for weighing objects of considerable magnitude, and by means of which the most important only of the measures of difference between them are ascertained. The reason may moreover be very aptly assimilated to an instrument for ascertaining the weight of material substances, both on account of the close analogy

⁵ "To inform, is the business of the philosopher; to prove, of the advocate."—*Archbishop Whately, Logic*, b. iv. c. iii. s. 2.

which does exist between the process of ascertaining the difference between such substances by weighing them through the aid of these instruments, and that of ascertaining the difference between immaterial subjects and matters, such as are examined by this faculty, by weighing the arguments (as the process is very commonly termed) one with another, and comparing their relative value or preponderance. Nothing, indeed, is more usual, more suitable, or more forcible than the expression comparing the relative weight of arguments adduced in a controversy, to the relative weight of different substances, which is ascertained by means of balances of various kinds.

But the simile is applicable yet more extensively, and we may not only compare the faculty of reason and its different capacities to balances of different kinds for ascertaining the difference in weight of various substances; but we may further remark that, as in weighing different substances, different instruments are used, as are different capacities for examining different matters—so also for the examination and test of each matter, is a true medium standard of value, corresponding to the fixed weights used in a balance, adopted, by which its real worth and excellence may be measured. This standard or test is formed either by reference to the highest degree of perfection which each quality may attain; or, in other cases, by reference to the medium average degree of excellence in which it generally exists. In the examination of some subjects (as in the inquiry into the extent of human knowledge attainable,) our own senses and capacities are referred to as the standard test.

As in the case of the understanding, reason differs in different persons, not only from the variety as regards the extent in which its constituent capacities are possessed; but, correspondingly with the types to which this faculty and its capacities have been assimilated, some capacities are more remarkable than others for their distinctness, others for the readiness with which they act, others for the accuracy with which they perform their operations; and this is observable in whichever of the three distinctive departments they are employed. Such a variation is, moreover, quite distinct from any difference which disease, or any inherent defects, or other accidental circumstances, may produce in them.

Each of the capacities of this faculty, aids the other in the process of reasoning. Thus, in legal argumentation, analysis defines the strict line of reasoning to be adopted, which sense modifies, and renders in accordance with ordinary usage; while judgment directs us to urge the whole with force, or to determine upon the matter in a comprehensive manner.

The exercise and improvement both of sense and of judgment, as we see in the case of analysis, might be greatly promoted by

the study of the principles suited to their operation. Nor is the cultivation of them of less practical consequence than is that of analysis. Sense enables us to reason correctly, and in accordance with the nature of the subject, on the ordinary matters of life and conduct; and judgment on those of great importance and dignity. And the more these capacities are so cultivated, the more complete will be their adaptation and operation. As facts are the food, as it were, or medium of cultivation of the understanding; so principles are the food, or medium of cultivation, of the reason.

6. *Subjects within the Province of Reason.*

As regards the inquiry respecting what subjects are strictly and essentially within the province of reason, and to what extent they are within its province, I may reply that all subjects are within the province of reason, of which the mind, through the understanding, has clear and adequate ideas, so that by the reason it may compare them one with another.⁶ Different matters, however, greatly differ as regards their relative adaptation in this latter respect.⁷

It may perhaps seem to some, that the opportunities for, and the incitements to exercise the reason, are much fewer, less important, and less urgent, than are those which stimulate us to exercise the understanding; and that on certain subjects at least, especially the most important of all subjects, as that of religion, the evidence afforded might be as complete as the subject from its nature and its relation to us, appears to demand.

As regards the want of occasions to exercise the reason, such occasions will be found on examination to be much more numerous than at first might appear; inasmuch as the reason is almost ceaselessly in operation, hardly any subject being communicated by the understanding which is not, in some way or other, or on some particular point, submitted also to the reason. More especially on moral and religious topics, and wherever the conscience is exerted or appealed to, the reason also is called into exercise. It is then that it is exerted with the utmost vigour; and it is with questions of religion that this endowment has especially to deal. If, moreover, we consider the

⁶ It is an observation of *Aristotle*, that wisdom is the science of principles and causes; since he who knows these, knows also the effects of which they are the source.

⁷ In philosophy we endeavour to derive cognition from conceptions. In mathematics we seek to deduce it from the construction of conceptions. —*Kant. Critic of Pure Reason.*

vast variety of evidence on the subject of religion which is submitted to the mind, we shall allow that the reason is fully exercised on this topic; and that, if comprehensively considered, and the reason be fairly brought to bear, the evidence afforded is really quite as complete as we could desire, or have any right to demand.

Not only, indeed, is religion peculiarly a matter of reason as well as of feeling, but most of the defects into which men have fallen as regards religious topics, have arisen from a neglect to exercise the reason.⁸ And not only is reason given to man to aid him in the discernment of truth, and the avoidance of error in religion; but each capacity of this faculty conduces to this end, and, indeed, is essential to be employed in its investigation. Sense, no less than analysis, and judgment no less than either, should in turn be resorted to as occasion requires; and the aid of one may correct and remedy the inadequacy of the other. Fanaticism, moreover, results in the mind of any individual when, upon religious or moral topics, especially those of active duty, the medial emotions or excitements are allowed to usurp the supremacy over the reason.

Of subjects in general, it may be determined with regard to their adaptation to the reason, as has already been observed with regard to their adaptation to the understanding, that some are within the province of reason wholly, some are within its province but partially, and some are not at all within its province. Of the first kind is the inquiry concerning the difference in weight between two objects before us, which we may ascertain with absolute certainty and correctness. Of the second is the inquiry into the essential qualities of our own bodies, of which we know but little certainly, and therefore can only reason but uncertainly. Of the third is the inquiry into the Being of God, of which we know nothing certainly, and therefore can reason but very imperfectly.⁹

⁸ "True science and true religion are twin-sisters; and the separation of either from the other is sure to prove the death of both. Science prospers exactly in proportion as it is religious; and religion flourishes in exact proportion to the scientific depth and firmness of its basis."—*Professor Huxley*.

⁹ *Mr. Wake* remarks in regard to this passage:—"Exception might perhaps be made to the statement that inquiry into the Being of God is not at all within the province of reason. The Being of God is the foundation of theological religion, and therefore, according to that statement, such religion is not founded on reason. Again, as by hypothesis we know nothing certainly as to the Being of God, we can reason only inconclusively (not *imperfectly*, since the reasoning may be perfect, although the premises are defective.)* But still, if we can reason at all,

* What in the passage alluded to is intended by the "Being" of God, is not His actual existence, but His essential nature and attributes. It might have been expressed that our reasoning would be perfect so far as the

It is, nevertheless, quite as practical to try experiments on mind as on matter; which in reality consist only in the observation of, and the deduction from, results produced by certain causes. In both cases, experiment is a grand foundation of knowledge, does much to promote the progress of science, and to test the truth of each discovery in it which has been made.¹

Perhaps our greatest errors in reasoning arise from not distinguishing properly between these different subjects in the way here stated; and from our supposing that because we can reason in part correctly concerning them, we can do so wholly. The topics which are entirely within the province of reason are very few indeed; and of these, most of them are confined to, and proper for, one capacity only. Thus, a proposition in pure mathematics is entirely within the province of reason; but the capacity of analysis alone is adapted for its exercise.²

With regard, therefore, to subjects in general, we may decide correctly respecting them on all points that we are acquainted with; that is, which are communicated to the understanding, but only uncertainly beyond that: while, with regard to other matters, we are so ill informed, or know them so imperfectly, that we can decide nothing with certainty respecting them. Concerning some subjects, such as the nature and attributes of spiritual beings, about which we have hardly any sure information, we can reason much, and with apparent satisfaction by analogical process, from what we know of their operations, and by discovering an apparent similarity or connexion between the nature of the principles which regulate and affect

it cannot be said that the inquiry is not within the province of reason. I assume that by 'reason' you mean the faculty of reasoning, and its operations as distinguished from the understanding, which is sometimes spoken of as co-extensive with the reason."

¹ On this passage, *Mr. Wake* observes:—"I do not quite follow you in your conclusion that experiments on mind can be tried as easily as those on matter. Can mind in its operations be distinguished from matter, or rather can you separate the action of each, and say this is referrible to mind, and that to matter? In my opinion, mind can operate only through matter, and I believe that the existence of mind apart from matter—in some form—is not possible. *Mr. Bray's* notion is that mind is force, and therefore the energy of matter. He goes farther, however, and affirms that force is the only real existence; which means that all matter can be resolved into mind. I cannot agree with this, and believe that matter in its ultimate form is as eternal as mind,* and that they have always co-existed and been co-extensive."

² *Mr. Wake* writes with regard to what is here stated:—"You seem to use 'capacity' as equivalent to 'faculty.' Would not the latter term be better, seeing that the former is generally used in the sense of *ability*?"†

imperfect premises supplied would enable it to be, but imperfect as regards the correct determination of the matter at issue.

* *Vide ante, Prel. Diss.* vol. i. s. ix., a. 5, pp. 178—180.

† See Definition of Faculties and Capacities, *ante*, c. i. s. iv. vol. ii. p. 185.

them, and those which relate to other beings or matters respecting which we do possess a limited, though certain degree of knowledge : and thus we apply the principles of the one to the examination of the other, and proceed with apparent satisfaction, or, at least, seem to possess sure grounds upon which to act.

Some persons, however, object to apply the reason to the investigation of topics concerning which they are of opinion that no absolute certainty will be attained. Respecting very few subjects, however, can we be assured of effecting unerring conclusions ; and if we are only to resort to the reason in these cases, it will be rendered but of comparatively little avail.³ The recognition of this principle would go far to exclude not only all speculation, but all experiment as well. Each of these efforts appears indeed to be the opposite, if not the counterpart, of the other. Speculation may be said to be the experiment of the internal mind, and experiment the speculation of the external senses. As regards the capacities here availed of, speculation is the exercise of origination, experiment that of apprehension. In both cases the subject is the same, and facts, and the same facts, are applied. The only difference is that we exercise different capacities about those facts. In the one case we simply obtain a knowledge of them, which apprehension affords ; in the other we combine them in various ways, and modes, which origination effects. Most important, and indeed essential, is it therefore that experiment and speculation should not only be conducted together, but that they should each aid the other.

Distinctions or differences are of various kinds, and are both material and immaterial. Material differences are, mainly, those of weight, of size, shape, colour, sound, and distance. Immaterial differences are, mainly, those of virtue, strength, and other mental and moral qualities. Figures, or arithmetic, serve more efficiently than any other medium to point out specifically, clearly, and exactly the degree of difference between various subjects, both material and immaterial. Pure mathematics, in this respect, correspond with arithmetic, and constitute, as it were, the science of size or quantity.

An illustration of the extreme difficulty of deciding on any subject, especially of an abstract nature, purely and entirely according to the principles of reason, is afforded by the manner in which justice is ordinarily administered by mankind. Although the most strenuous efforts are exerted in order to collect and to frame the most perfect rules for its dispensation, which are devised by men of the soundest judgment, most equitable

³ "Judgment is given to men that they may use it. Because it may be used erroneously, are men to be told that they ought not to use it at all?"—*John Stuart Mill on Liberty*, c. ii.

notions and feelings, and the widest experience, and which rules are carried out strictly and impartially as far as possible; yet how seldom is it that it is meted out precisely according to the true principles by which it ought essentially to be regulated.

Nevertheless, of all the sciences, and all the various studies which are fitted to engage the mind, or to exercise the reason, the law is unquestionably the noblest and the most invigorating, and by which, moreover, each capacity of the reason is alike and extensively brought into exercise. This science is the noblest, inasmuch as the conduct of man, and in its highest relations, it has for its object; and it is one of which God, not man, is the originator and director. The most momentous questions are tested and solved by the application of this science, and the utmost powers of the mind are engaged to the full in its pursuit. And if those who are devoted to its study have, less than other men, been thought to adorn science and learning, it is owing to the abstruse and all-absorbing nature of the pursuit that this is the case; and it is a proof of its power to engross and to rivet the whole soul that it is so.⁴

We must necessarily infer that the moral system of God is fully as perfect, and is as completely carried out, as is His material system; and as far as our experience extends, we know that this is certainly the case. But if so, we must conclude that every single action of ours will be judged of exactly according to its strict and exact merits; and that for each we shall be rewarded or punished precisely as we deserve. And as no one particle of created matter, however changed or dispersed, is ever annihilated, or even diminished; so no one action performed by us is ever actually done away with or forgotten, or obliterated from the Divine memory, however distant, although entirely forgotten by us. Justice, both complete and absolute, will therefore be meted by the Divine decree, and by that decree alone; however, and to what extent, the immensity of Divine mercy, which is commensurate with its justice, may deign to interfere, and to modify or cancel the sentence which strict justice demands.

7. *Right Reasoning on what dependent.*

From what has already been stated with regard to the nature of the capacities both of the understanding and of the reason,

⁴ "Of law, there can be no less acknowledged than that her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world. All things in heaven and earth do her homage; the very least as feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempted from her power. Both angels and men, and

and as respects the subjects within the province of reason, it may be deduced that right reasoning itself must be mainly and essentially dependent on two points: 1. The ideas of the subject being received correctly by the understanding. 2. Those ideas being correctly compared by the reason.⁵ For this latter purpose, the reason of the particular individual must be suited for the subject in question; and it is, further, necessary that the peculiar capacities, adapted for the special subject to be reasoned upon, should be employed about that particular subject. Some are well qualified for reasoning of one kind, but are very inefficient in reasoning of another class.⁶ And some, who are quite capable of reasoning rightly on a topic, fail in doing so because they exercise the wrong capacity about the particular matter to be dealt with.

Abstract reasoning in the purest mode, is nevertheless capable of being applied to the ordinary subjects of life, as well as to pure mathematics; and conclusions as certain may be drawn from premises relating to the one, as from those relating to the other. And it is not because such reasoning is defective, that it is not in the former cases resorted to; but because it is too refined and too subtle for the common purposes of life. So applying it, would be like weighing articles of food by the delicate instruments which we use for ascertaining the exact measures of chemical compounds for medicinal purposes. Accordingly, when recourse is had to them for ordinary appliances, the operations of analysis have to be corrected by those of sense; or rather, their mode of acting is relaxed, and their strictness qualified. This we see especially in dealing with legal subjects, where the acutest reasoning by analysis should be used, but sense should modify it and render it practical. Indeed, as remarked by Bishop Berkley,⁷ while common sense and

creatures of what condition soever, though each in different sort and manner, yet all with uniform consent, admiring her as the mother of their peace and joy."—*Hooker, Eccles. Pol.*, b. i. s. 16.

⁵ *Locke* points out that error is not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of our judgment, giving assent to that which is not there.—*Essay on the Understanding*, b. iv. c. 20, s. 1.

⁶ *Mr. Hyde Clarke*, in a valuable and interesting paper, "On the Influence of Geological Reasoning on other branches of Knowledge," read before the Geologists' Association, and printed among their Proceedings, vol. iii. no. 3, philosophically remarks on "the influence of geological reasoning on other branches of science. Inasmuch as geology is the product of man's influence, so must it react upon him, and entering on its part in the career of progress, exercise a like function in morals to that which matter once set in motion is destined to perform in the universe, moving and affecting all things, and bringing about other movement and perturbation, even by the cessation of its own action. It is this direct and indirect action which has given a real vitality to geology enjoyed by many other branches of science."—Pp. 1, 2.

⁷ *Principles of Human Knowledge*.

instinct serve to guide the herd of mankind aright, reason, and the light of a superior principle, lead men of education astray. The main cause of this is, that men apply the wrong capacity to the pursuit aimed at. They act like a man who uses the telescope to view things near, and the microscope to observe those that are distant.

Primary principles stand like the mountains, ever fixed, and firm, and immutable, whatever storms or contentions may pass over their heads, or however fiercely they may be assailed by the thunders of controversy. Nevertheless, until their essential quality is determined, they may appear from time to time to fluctuate; although it is, in reality, we ourselves, or the subjects to which they are applied, that change. Just as in viewing vast objects of nature, although they are ever stationary and the same, they seem to us to vary according as we alter our position in relation to them, or from other objects intervening and obscuring the view. In reality indeed, knowledge of all kinds, and even history itself, is not of so much value from the information that it directly affords, as from the principles which may be deduced from it. Facts form the dross, from which the gold of deduction may be extracted. It not unfrequently happens, however, that the principles are sound, but they are wrongly applied. On the other hand, we sometimes find that while the principles themselves are erroneous or defective, the practice that is pursued from the application of them is sound and beneficial.

It may be doubted, moreover, whether an argument is really and essentially entered upon, until an actual and precise definition of the subject to be debated, based on specific and real facts, has been laid down. Arguing without a correct definition, is like shooting without seeing the object towards which to direct our aim. Until the definition is supplied, no sound argument can be effected, as it is not ascertained in what precise direction the reasoning is required to be urged.⁸

Alike erroneous, and neglectful of the right use of reason, is it either to demur to assent to any proposition after its truth has been duly demonstrated by rational proof; or, on the other hand, to yield our assent to it before such proof has been effected. In the one case, we err through want of faith in our reasoning powers, or through neglect duly to apply them. In the other case, we are misled by credulity. Hence, while credulity proceeds from, or is the offspring of, too great a disregard of error; incredulity is no less the child of too little love for truth.

⁸ *Vide Owen's* edition of *Aristotle's Organon*, b. viii. c. 3, and note, vol. ii. p. 521; where "definition" is compared to the key which locks the door of the room, by means of which the disputant cuts off all means of escape from his adversary.

Many of the mental systems and metaphysical treatises which have been written, consist of little more than a bandying of terms, instead of endeavouring to grapple with realities. In the place of battling with error, the authors of them are content to beat only the air.

As in knowledge, so in reasoning, our errors are mainly owing, rather to the incompleteness, than to the actual incorrectness of our ideas.⁹ Just as in viewing a vast prospect, the eye can only take in one sphere of it at a time; so the mind in dealing with a comprehensive subject, surveys in many cases only one side of the question. Possibly, in a future state, both our vision will be freed from the defects which now obscure or limit its range, and our minds will be in a corresponding manner expanded.

The two opposite errors already alluded to, into which mankind very commonly fall in the process of philosophical investigation, are alike detrimental as regards the discovery of truth, and are alike consequently to be guarded against and avoided. Credulity, on the one hand, and scepticism, on the other, like two advocates for different sides, each present their own view of the case, while they endeavour to discredit that to which they are opposed. Scepticism in excess is quite as unphilosophical as is the excess of credulity. It is the strict and proper province and office of reason, to adjust the balance between these two contending influences. We must accept so much of either side as reason sanctions, and reject whatever is discarded by the reason.

One main cause of the reason and its decisions, through whatever capacity of this faculty they are effected, appearing so much less certain, and satisfactory, and regular, than the decisions made by any other of the faculties, or their capacities; is the opposition and contradiction that are constantly offered to all the efforts, and to every decision, of the reason; but which is not the case, or, at any rate, not to a corresponding extent, with regard to the decisions made by the other faculties; as, for instance, a determination respecting our knowledge of any fact, or even an opinion of the tasteful qualities or merits of a work of art. But although genius is, doubtless capricious in many instances, yet even this faculty does not, from the circumstances already adduced, appear to be so extensively variable and uncertain as is the reason in matters of argument. And yet, as upon subjects connected with taste, there is the greatest difference of opinion, it is here

⁹ It is pointed out by *Des Cartes*, that "error is a defect in our mode of acting, not in our nature," *Princip.*, s. 38. And that "we shall never err if we give our assent only to what we clearly and distinctly perceive." —*Ibid.* s. 33.

that reason is appealed to in order to procure a satisfactory determination.¹

Another extensive and leading cause of erroneous deductions and conclusions in the process of investigation, is that we frequently allow our determination to precede, instead of follow, the argument upon the subject; that is, we refer to a decision, already pronounced on the matter, and acquiesce in that, rather than pursue a strict course of reasoning. Thus, in inquiring into the meaning of any difficult and mysterious text of Scripture, instead of carefully comparing, and accurately balancing the various considerations on different sides, favouring particular views; we refer only to what preceding critics have laid down. And if we are not absolutely bound by their opinion, we are nevertheless, so biassed, and so prejudiced, that our conclusion almost necessarily follows what has already been decided; instead of the reasoning itself preponderating according to the weight of the arguments which have been adduced.

Hence, the abandonment of old doctrines, and the introduction of new principles, in philosophical, political, or other systems, is strikingly analogous to the dissolution of material frames through corruption, the disruption of their constituent elements, and the formation of new bodies and systems out of them. Something moreover very much resembling, and closely analogous to decomposition, takes place during the process of the conduct of inquiry, and the establishment of opinion. Antiquated notions are as it were dissolved, and their constituent ideas are disunited and dispersed; while recourse is had to a new set of ideas and principles, out of which a fresh system is formed.

In the prejudices which we set up, and to which we pay that homage which reason alone should command, we not only bow down to idols that are of our own fashioning, but the religion observed in the adoration of which is of our own framing.²

Reasons are often urged during the heat of argument, not because they are those which are most logically conclusive as regards the point at issue; but because they are deemed the best adapted from being in accordance with their prejudices, to carry the conviction, or secure the assent, of the particular

¹ *Lord Brougham* entertained a doubt "whether taste itself be anything but a sound exercise of judgment,—a judgment refined by experience, that is, by constant attention to what is pleasing and what disagreeable."—*Dialogues on Instinct. Animal Intelligence.*

² *Des Cartes* observes that while, during our early years, "we exercised our minds in many matters, numerous prejudices were contracted, which, by the majority, are afterwards laid aside." *Princip.* par. i. s. 47. And he accordingly concludes, s. 71, "the chief cause of our errors is to be found in the prejudices of our childhood."

"You may rightly discern the thing which is good, and yet the will of man not incline itself thereunto as oft as the prejudice of sensible experience doth oversway."—*Hooker. Ecclesiastical Polity*, b. i. s. 7.

persons, to whom they are addressed. Too often, indeed, not truth, but victory, is the real object of pursuit in controversy.

Authority too, which is but the opinion of others equally fallible with ourselves, often usurps the place of reason; and, instead of testing the truth of the dogma, by an examination of it through the aid of the faculties given to us by God for this express purpose, we accept it wholesale upon trust without any such test; thereby rendering that deference to the decision of another man's reason, which is due only to our own, and while we are in ignorance of the mistakes and prejudices which may have induced him to this conclusion. Few errors that have misled mankind, have not had authority on their side; and the blind worship of authority has done more to injure truth than even the mistakes of reason.³ Not that authority is by any means wholly to be disregarded. But we are to consult it freely, not to obey it servilely.

Another circumstance which frequently contributes to lead the reason astray, both in its arguments and its conclusions, is the fact that in the process of debate, as in several other undertakings, the mind is able to exercise an arbitrary preference for some arguments over others; and thus it selects certain points only which are most in accordance with its feelings or passion at the time, and neglects, or omits to use, or avail itself of, those which are repugnant to those influences. This interferes in many cases with the due and impartial conduct of the inquiry, and the correct determination of the issue to be decided, in a manner analogous to that in which the fair and impartial decision of a cause in a court of justice would be impeded by the evidence, or the witnesses, being unfairly selected; some, whose testimony was important, not being heard, or sufficiently relied upon, while the testimony of others was received, which was too trivial, or too much tainted, to deserve attention.

An illustration of the extent to which the feelings influence and bias, both the course and the decision of the reason, is afforded by the case of almost every oration that is addressed to a popular tribunal; in which the speaker strives not merely

³ "There is no rank nor character among mankind which has any just pretence to sway the judgments of other men by their authority; for there have been persons of the same rank and character who have maintained different and contrary sentiments. But all these can never be true; and therefore the mere name or reputation that any of them possesses, is not a sufficient evidence for truth."—*Dr. Watts. Logic*, part ii. c. iii. s. 4.

"The great God, our common Maker, has never given one man's understanding a legal and rightful sovereignty to determine truths for others, at least after they are past the state of childhood or minority."—*Ibid.*

⁴ "The tempers, humours, and peculiar turns of the mind, whether they be natural or acquired, have a great influence upon our judgment, and become the occasion of many mistakes."—*Watts' Logic*, part ii. c. iii. s. 3.

to convince his hearers by argument to his side of the question, but is no less strenuous and dexterous in endeavouring to enlist also their prejudices, and to arouse their passions, in favour of the cause which he is advocating, knowing how greatly and how generally the reason is swayed by these feelings, which it, doubtless, ought to control.

The actual and particular condition of the material frame at the time, may also exercise important influence on the reasoning power, although doubts may perhaps be entertained whether the actual *efficiency* of this power is affected by and dependent upon the bodily state of such person in point of health or vigour; or whether any disorder merely *indisposes* him for such exertion, but without disqualifying him for it.⁵

In our efforts to examine attentively the disc of our own souls, the mental eye is, on the one hand, too much dazzled by the glare with which our pride, and flattery of ourselves,⁶ are apt to encompass it; while, on the other hand, it is obscured by the mists of prejudice and error with which it is beset. And the appliances to which we resort to develope truth, serve but to increase the glare, and to intensify the mists; while the real substance, which is concealed, is entirely shrouded from our gaze.⁷ Thus, we draw our conclusions from the very delusions by which we are misled; and the reality itself,—the only legitimate data on which we ought to proceed,—is excluded wholly from our calculation. As certainty and definiteness in the decision to be arrived at, are especially desired in the conduct of an argument; so, in order to insure this object, a corresponding certainty and definiteness should be obtained in the terms resorted to, and made use of, as the basis of such argument. When, however, during the process of reasoning, the term used to test the difference between two subjects

⁵ *Dr. Beddoe, F.R.S.*, late President of the Anthropological Society of London, and Foreign Associate of the Anthropological Society of Paris, writes in reference to this passage, that he considers the actual power of the reasoner, and not merely the readiness and facility with which he reasons, is affected by his bodily condition. "I do not say that the man in most perfect bodily condition reasons best, but I believe that a man's power of reasoning is materially affected by his bodily condition."

⁶ "The fondness we have for self, and the relations which other persons and things have to ourselves, furnish us with a long rank of prejudices."—*Dr. Watts. Logic*, pt. ii. c. iii. s. 3.

⁷ *Malebranche* remarks that "the passions act upon the imagination, and the corrupted imagination makes an effort against reason, by continually representing things not as they are in themselves, that the mind might pronounce a true judgment; but as they are in reference to the present passion, that it might pass a favourable sentence in its behalf."—*Search after Truth*, b. v. c. 11.

According to *Lord Bacon*, "in matters of faith and religion we raise our imagination above our reason, which is the cause why religion sought ever access to the mind by similitudes, visions, dreams."—*Advancement of Learning*, b. ii.

which are compared together, turns out to be different to what was supposed, or stated, or taken for granted, there a fallacy is at once generated. A fallacy may be contained either in the object itself, the idea of which is introduced during the process of reasoning, or in the term made use of to denote that idea. It may, however, occasionally be applied as a test, in order to prove or to disprove the supposed difference between two ideas, but which, upon being closely investigated, turns out to be unsound and false;—to be base instead of genuine metal, to be the shadow rather than the real substance of the object we are seeking. An idea may be fallacious when, although sound and just in itself, it is in its nature different to what we supposed, and is consequently inapplicable for the end for which we designed it. And this is, indeed, the common case with regard to fallacies. A horse may be as valuable an animal as a cow; but if, when we want a cow to milk, a horse is brought to us with saddle and bridle, we are likely to be as ill satisfied as though we were without either animal. Moreover, as bad materials will most likely serve to construct a building equally bad, so fallacious arguments will tend to produce from the whole a conclusion equally fallacious. And this will ensue, either if the arguments themselves be sound and the deduction from them fallacious; or if the arguments be fallacious, and the deduction from them sound.

Occasionally however, fallacies are presented to the mind in such a manner that they completely perplex the reason; either from the uncertain shape in which they appear, or from the mutations which they seem to undergo at different stages of the argument. Thus, some persons justify lying, or other sin, when some good object is to be gained by it, satisfying themselves with the conviction that the end justifies the means; that where a great good is to be accomplished, the sacrifice of a small good may properly be made to insure its attainment.

Nevertheless, differently constituted minds adopt very different modes in conducting their reasoning operations. Perhaps, indeed, the main divergence as regards the opposite conclusions arrived at by the members of different sects and parties, both religious and political, may be traced almost entirely to this source. Thus, one set of men argue from, and are guided by, great and leading principles; while another set argue from, and are guided by, points of detail and minute practical considerations. In many cases, egotism and self-love powerfully operate to impede the right exercise of reason. Certain people judge of others mainly from themselves. When they would take a survey of the nature of man in general, instead of looking abroad, they only look within. Hence, on the one hand, those who are the most upright and

pure, are ever the most open to imposition; while, on the other hand, those who are the most uncharitable of their neighbours, are usually themselves the most depraved.

There is, moreover, no doubt that particular mental and moral constitutions incline different men to particular phases of faith; as some to Catholicism, others to Calvinism, others to doctrines which lie between the two. It is seldom however that men are induced to follow to the full their inclinations in this respect, or to exert their reason in the determination of which creed is the most consonant to their minds. Most men prefer to embrace without inquiry the faith in which they were brought up, unless some searching controversy into which they are led induces them to review the conclusion that they have adopted.⁸ Hence, in the most momentous of all subjects on which reason was given to guide us, is it least of all called into use. Nevertheless, it may surely be not unreasonable to inquire whether the Almighty, Who in His infinite wisdom has constituted different races of men so differently, both mentally and materially, as also morally, correspondingly with the different countries which they inhabit, may not have expressly intended that they should not all embrace the same religion, or follow it exactly in the same way; provided that they all adopt its grand fundamental principles as regards the worship of God, and the observance of a strict code of morality. The mental inferiority of many races of people, which wholly unfits them for understanding certain of the abstruser doctrines of our religion, is a strong proof that God does not deem it essential for mankind at large to enter into all the subtleties which theologians have invented, and for which they are no more qualified than the natives of Africa are to inhabit the Arctic regions, to assume European habits, or to thrive upon European food.⁹ In addition to which, our disagreements in doctrine, and contradictory teaching, form a serious, if not insurmountable obstacle to the conversion of them to our creed, however advantageous in the way of civilization our instruction may prove.

⁸ "Men who are perfectly convinced of the accuracy of their opinions, will never take the pains of examining the basis on which they are built. They always look with wonder, and often with horror, on views contrary to those which they inherited from their fathers."—*Buckle. History of Civilization*, vol. i. c. vii.

⁹ *Mr. Tagore*, in relation to this paragraph, observes as follows:—"The Hindoo cosmogony is the mythical development of the historical realism of the Mosaic, and the absence of the notion of a personal and living God. In all the false religions, the conservation of Hindooism in Judaism, in the first instance, and its further development in Christianity, in the second, forms the most remarkable feature in the religious history of mankind.

"The heathen systems, however philosophical, are at best convulsive and fragmentary. They form in a word the dynasty of confiscation and

We may occasionally observe moreover, that different people will arrive at totally different conclusions, although each drawing their inferences from the same facts, and exercising precisely the same capacity in their operations. But this proves not any actual or essential difference as regards the nature of the reasoning powers with which they are endowed, although in extent of ability for this purpose they may doubtless widely differ;—but it serves to evince the variety and extent of those numerous extraneous influences which act upon them, and which bias the operations of the reason, as well as all their other efforts. Hence also it is that whole peoples and nations, as well as individuals, differ in opinion and mode of thought, according as their reason is variously swayed.

If it is difficult sometimes to determine who are sane and who are insane, and what it is that marks the actual boundary between sanity and insanity; it is probably often no less difficult to determine what is right reason, and what is fallacy, and where reason terminates, and error commences. As drawing accurately is not sufficient of itself to constitute an original imaginative artist; so great skill in logic often fails of itself to form an able reasoner. Indeed, a man may be a very good logician, and yet a very bad reasoner; or a very good reasoner, and yet a very bad logician. But this does not prove, on the one hand, that logic may not be serviceable in the conduct of an argument; or, on the other, that argument may not be successfully conducted without resort to logic. Logic is, in fact, the mere discipline of the reason, which cannot of itself confer skill; although it may contribute to perfect skill already existent. Many able logicians are frequently but indifferent reasoners; and there are excellent reasoners who have never learnt logic.¹

The essential use of logic is that it supplies a test, though not the only test, by which may be discovered the difference between great words and great arguments. Rhetoricians deal mainly with the first, reasoners with the second. In fact, logic bears the same relation to reasoning, that certain chemical tests do to certain chemical substances.² By chemical application

annexation; whereas Christianity constitutes that of centralization without the destruction of individual freedom;—of order, peace, and goodwill to mankind—and thus the centre is restored both as regards the past and future history of mankind.”

¹ Upon this passage, *Dr. Newman* writes as follows: “I quite agree that logic is not reasoning, but an act ministrative to reasoning. Again, that reasoning is a faculty, or again an exercise, or again an excellence of the mind, quite distinct from judgment; and that judgment, and taste, and imagination may be educated, and changed from faculties into excellences of mind as well as reasoning.”

² “The object of rhetoric is persuasion,—of logic conviction—of grammar significance. A fourth term is wanting, the rhematic, or logic of sentences.”—*Coleridge, Table Talk.*

alone you can ascertain their real and essential primary qualities; but without such application their ordinary qualities and practical uses may be discovered and dealt with. Many a person is conversant, and has dealings with, substances of various kinds, and in various ways, but who never resorts to chemistry to enable him to carry out his transactions. So, many conduct controversies without directly resorting to logic. This, however, does not prove that logic is not of service to enable them to accomplish such efforts, in the most regular and efficient mode. Thus also, a man may be able to walk properly without the aid of a drill-sergeant; although the drill-sergeant will teach him to direct his steps with the utmost propriety and precision. Logic is, moreover, applied to support error as well as truth; and to conceal as well as to discover the meaning of words.

Another great use of logic is that it not only directs us rightly in the conduct of an argument, but that it enables us to detect a fallacy which may be lurking about, and by exposing which the soundness of the reasoning on the other side may be controverted. And, perhaps, the detective power in cases of this kind, is the most valuable property which logic possesses; although, as in the case of argument, this may be obtained without the aid of logic, but probably not so surely or so completely.

Logic may, moreover, be applied to the conduct and the correction of an argument in which thought alone is employed, and language is not availed of; inasmuch as it is thought, and not language, to which it has ultimate relation. Language is only the vehicle of thought, not the substance itself, about which logic is employed.³

By means of language, a person is enabled to carry on an argument, or to join with another in making comparisons of different ideas, with nearly the same facility and efficiency with which he carries on this process in his own mind; and thus the two minds are, as it were, united or blended together, a direct channel of communication is opened between them, and an extended sphere of operation, by the ideas which each supplies to the other, is afforded to both. Nevertheless, as regards language, all that has been stated with respect to the errors in our knowledge arising from the imperfection of language, applies in an equal, if not greater degree, to language when used in reasoning.

³ But see an opinion to the contrary, by *Archbishop Whately*, and of *Dean Mansel*, in opposition to him, quoted in a note to *Aristotle's Organon*, by *Owen*, vol. i. p. 267.

8. *Nature and Process of the Operation of Reasoning.*

We have next to inquire into the precise and peculiar mode in which the process of reasoning is conducted, by the faculty and capacities of the mind which are the subject of the present chapter.⁴ This operation, when perfectly and correctly carried on, by which two or more ideas are compared together, and a difference of a certain kind is shown to exist between them, is effected as follows. The mind having obtained a knowledge of the subject, and taken a survey of it by the faculty of understanding, proceeds to the examination of it by one of the capacities of the faculty of reason, according to the nature of such subject.⁵ Thus, if the matter be one of a common and ordinary nature, such as those relating to the general affairs of life, and of which we obtain ideas principally by the capacity of apprehension, that of sense is the most suitable to exercise in the examination of it. If it be one of a very abstruse nature, the capacity of analysis is that which is best fitted for its investigation. If however the subject be one of a large and comprehensive quality, the capacity of judgment is that which is chiefly adapted for dealing with it. In each case, whichever capacities of the faculty of reason are exerted, the process of reasoning is performed in the same manner. Clear and correct ideas or notions of the topic having been obtained through one of the capacities of understanding, according to the nature of the subject; by the exercise of one of the capacities of the faculty of reason, these different ideas are compared, either one with another, their diversity pointed out, and conclusions are accordingly drawn: or the subject or quality under examination, is compared (or, as it were, weighed), with some standard test, or measure of perfection, of the same kind, by which its relative extent or value is tried and determined. As in the operations of the faculty of understanding, so in those of the reason, although one only of its capacities may be applied about the particular ideas proper to it, and in comparing

⁴ As an exposition of the entire mechanism of reasoning, *Aristotle's Organon* may be referred to, as a very elaborate, complete, and altogether wonderful performance.

⁵ "The laws of inquiry, those general principles of the logic of physics, which regulate our search for truth in all things, external and internal, do not vary with the name of a science, or its objects or instruments. They are not laws of one science, but of every science, whether the objects of it be mental or material, clear or obscure, definite or indefinite; and they are thus universal, because in truth, though applicable to many sciences, they are only laws of the one inquiring mind, founded on the weakness of its powers of discernment, in relation to the complicated phenomena on which those powers are exercised."—*Dr. Thomas Brown. Lectures on the Philosophy of the Mind*, s. 5.

them in the way for which that individual capacity is especially adapted; yet when the reason is in full operation upon any subject, each of its capacities is exerted, if not simultaneously (which may doubtless be effected), at least rapidly by turns as occasion requires; and each of them aids the other, and the whole faculty together, in deciding by comparison respecting the merits of a subject, which at once in its different branches, affords scope to each of these capacities.

The mode in which the decision upon any subject is effected through the reason, by thus comparing ideas one with another, and discovering the difference between them, and also by comparing them with a specific standard test; may be exhibited in the case of inquiry into the colour, or into the size of any object. Thus a cow appears red when compared with the earth; but if compared with the colour of a brick-built house, its redness almost disappears, and vanishes into brown; and if compared with a dyed red curtain, it will seem of quite another colour to red; while the red curtain itself will appear but dusky and faded, when compared with the pure and vivid tint of a red flower, whose colour may be taken as the standard test of redness by which the relative perfection of the quality may be tried.

Hence also, with regard to size, the cow is a large animal when compared with a dog; very large indeed, when compared with an insect; but small, when compared with an elephant; and very small, when compared with a whale. All terms indeed, of size and quantity, are but relative. Our only standard for measuring objects with respect to those attributes in relation to which we have no fixed standard for particular purposes,—and to supply which certain measures are framed,—is our own senses, and our own size compared with theirs. Hence, beings of a minuteness almost beyond our conception, may exist as perfectly endowed in all respects as we are;⁶ inasmuch as, although we cannot view, or hold intercourse with them, our All-glorious Creator is possessed of faculties in every way infinite, and to His perceptions these minute beings may therefore be as clear as those which are the best fitted for our observation and use, are to ours. In the same manner also, as I have done with respect to the qualities of colour and size in any object, do we reason concerning moral qualities and subjects, by comparing them with others, and with those of a certain medium standard, where we have any. Thus, in the case of the virtue of any particular individual, if compared with that of bad men, it may appear very great; with that of the world, fair and ordinary; with that of very good men, but indifferent; and with that of the Creator, in

⁶ *Vide ante, Prel. Diss., s. iv. a. 5, vol. i. p. 68.*

Whom is to be found the only correct standard of virtue, insignificant and worthless.

In arguing in favour of a particular view of a question, we ordinarily endeavour to support it by adducing comparisons with subjects of a nature opposite to that with which we have to deal. Thus, in order to prove a man virtuous, we compare his conduct with the vicious; or, to make an object appear large, we compare it with small objects. Where however there is an actual medium standard measure or test by which any matter may be tried, (as that of money in a case of question about value), it is by this test alone that the subject should be determined.⁷

The materials used by the reason in the process of investigating truth, and which we term argument, are called evidence; which is of several different kinds, according to and corresponding with the nature of the subject to be investigated. When evidence leads the reason to any certain conclusion as regards a fact, it is termed proof. Proof, however, like evidence itself, is held to differ widely, and in a corresponding manner, alike as to its nature, extent, and value.

Logicians and lawyers have therefore divided both proof and evidence into several different kinds, according to their nature and relative degrees of excellence. There is, however, no difference whatever in the species of absolute proof submitted to our minds. The only real difference is as to the degree of proof, and the nearness with which it attains actual certainty. In this respect, for the reasons already alleged, mathematical proof is entitled to the preference. What are termed different kinds of proof are, therefore, in reality, only different degrees of approach to certainty, or different modes of effecting that purpose, by means of evidence. Thus, as already pointed out, a mode of proof, or a species of evidence, which is deemed satisfactory to the philosopher, is rejected by the lawyer; and that which the lawyer deems conclusive, the philosopher rejects as unsatisfactory.⁸ The modes and degrees of proof are also regulated by circumstances; such as the facilities for obtaining evidence, and the quality of the evidence itself. Hence, legal evidence, although it aims at absolute certainty as regards its proof, is, nevertheless, regulated by the ordinary rules of common sense as regards both the quality of the evidence, and the nature of the proofs to be adduced. Consequently, as also already remarked, many of the proofs with which philosophical reasoners are satisfied, would be rejected by the acute lawyer; and many of the proofs which satisfy the acute lawyer, would be rejected by the philosophical reasoner. This, however, is owing to the different processes adopted by

⁷ *Vide ante*, b. ii. c. ii. s. 5, p. 95; *post*, s. 9, p. 309.

⁸ *Ante*, s. 1, pp. 272, 273.

the two in their mode of adducing evidence, and the principles which regulate it; in the application of which both may be right, though both may err in their conclusions. But this is because neither of them attain certain and absolute, but both are satisfied with comparative and defective proof; although they each seek to secure what they deem the best and most satisfactory which, under the circumstances, can be obtained.⁹

In the case of legal evidence, however, as already stated, certain proofs are at present rejected, not because they are defective in themselves, but because their admission might in some instances lead to consequences which it is thought expedient to avoid. The unsoundness of this principle has been admitted in the various modifications of the rule which legislation has from time to time effected, and which it is to be hoped may be widely extended.

To a certain extent, it may be said that the various kinds and degrees of proof exactly correspond and coincide with the different capacities for obtaining proof with which our minds are endowed; and it must be concluded that these kinds of proof owe their distinction to the nature of these capacities, and not these capacities to the nature of these different kinds of proof. Moreover, some evidence is deduced from the qualities of things themselves, some from their actions, and some from the circumstances relating to them. The extent to which these different kinds of evidence are satisfactory, must depend

⁹ The following interesting and valuable note on this passage has kindly been supplied to me by *Mr. Sergeant Cox*: "The object of evidence is to ascertain the truth. The character of the evidence requisite for this purpose, differs widely in legal and in philosophical inquiry, because of the difference in the nature of the truth to be sought after. The truths to the discovery of which the law is directed, are for the most part, if not always, past events—facts that consist in something actually done or said. The rules of legal evidence are framed to this end, and therefore are more stringent than are necessary for philosophical research. The object of this inquiry is to ascertain existing facts, and, for the most part, this is done by collecting a large number of *apparent* facts, and trying by examination which is the true one. The law rejects hearsay, because this fact is liable to be misrepresented on repetition; but science accepts it with a reservation of confidence in the witness's honesty, because the evidence is not used as proof of the fact, but as one of many materials from which it deduces a fact not capable of direct proof. When science demands proof of an existing fact, such, for instance, as the motive force of light discovered by Mr. Crookes, it properly insists on the same degree and kind of proof as does the law. It would reject hearsay and secondary evidence where the best was to be had. It would not accept a report of the light-force from one who said, 'Mr. Crookes told me so.' It would require that the discoverer should himself describe his discovery, exhibit his proofs, and subject them and himself to examination and cross-examination. But when searching for new truths, science would take the evidence of all, whether hearsay or secondary, and use it as materials for the judgment according to its various values."

mainly on their precise applicability to effect the proof required in these particular instances. At any rate, whatever processes and operations may take place, and however the end may be accomplished, the real essence of argument and of reasoning in all cases consists in the comparison of two ideas one with another, and of drawing a conclusion as to the difference between them. And this is always effected through the instrumentality of ONE of the capacities of reason.

During this process of comparing arguments one with another, and setting them against each other, the relative value or preponderance of each is, as it were, weighed; and the difficulty of coming to a settled conclusion, or of what might be termed striking a balance, arises from the arbitrary mode in which the weight of each separate argument, or of the sum total of them all, may be determined by the mind of the disputant, according to his will or fancy. Hence, it is owing to the exact precision with which, in arithmetical calculations, the amount of each item may be ascertained, that efforts of this description are so satisfactory and so sure.

It must nevertheless be borne in mind, that weighing proofs is a very different thing to weighing probabilities: the one, if properly conducted, leading unerringly to truth; and the other, however carefully carried on, very frequently to error. Thus, as regards the value of probabilities, crime, which might be strictly proved by argument, would be not unfrequently disproved by the former mode; as it might be very fairly, and indeed conclusively contended, that it is far more probable that a witness should be in error as to his correctness of observation, or narration, or memory, than that an individual should commit an outrageous offence, in many cases without any adequate motive, accompanied too with every prospect of detection and punishment. And yet experience proves that the test of probability in all these cases is entirely fallacious.

Almost every man has, in reality, two separate and independent characters; one being deduced from a consideration of his abilities and virtues, and the other from a consideration of his deficiencies and vices. His friends estimate him according to the first; his foes according to the other. The true and only just way to decide the matter, is to weigh the two characters together, and to adopt as the real measure of merit, the difference between the two so obtained. In the partial and incomplete mode alluded to, it is that people are apt to judge of, and to decide questions in general, alike in theology, in politics, and on all other matters. Instead of surveying the matter on both sides, and adopting the side which preponderates in merit, or in argument; they view one side only, and judge, of course incorrectly, from that very partial and limited survey. Moreover, as regards our general mode of estimating the value

alike of articles for use, and arguments in controversy, we are frequently misled by referring to a wrong standard. That too, which is priceless to one person, is worthless to another. Nor is that always the cheapest which costs the least, unless it be really estimated at its due price. Many things that are bought for very little, are worth much less. Nothing is so extravagantly dear as a favour, although it may be had for the mere asking. It is nevertheless, at once a gift to us, and a judgment against us. It is ordinarily conferred with the liberality of a Christian, while its return is but too often extorted with the rapacity of a Jew.

In the case of the Deity, whose knowledge and whose powers, both of understanding and of reason, are absolutely perfect, and also infinite, proof differs only in kind, but not in degree; as though with Him, as with us, the modes of proof are various, yet with Him knowledge is absolute, and consequently leads to a certain and an unerring conclusion. With us, on the other hand, hardly any proof is conclusive; although some kinds appear more perfect, or perhaps, speaking strictly and logically, less imperfect, than do certain others.

The forcible array of facts that we see occasionally introduced into a controversy, which, if not amounting to argument itself, has a powerful effect in aiding argument; appears to be an effort rather of the reason than of the understanding, although probably both may aid here. In this case, it is not however real argument that is effected, but the words are placed in such a position, that conclusions are directly and inevitably suggested by them. Just as in warfare, a regiment of soldiers may be so disposed that, although they do not actually move in assault, they nevertheless serve as effectually to protect a position, as if they were in motion; while they are prepared at once to move when required.

Suggestions too, are often of great importance in the conduct of an argument; and similes may be introduced to illustrate, although they do not in reality strengthen, the reasoning adduced. Events trivial in themselves, both lead to consequences, and excite ideas, the most important. The plucking of an apple led to the fall of man; and the fall of an apple suggested to Newton the mode of the motion of worlds.

We moreover find that facts are generally preferred to arguments, and are regarded as entitled to more attention and more weight; except when the arguments are stamped with the authority of some mind of extraordinary power, in which case they are received as deductions from facts of the utmost value.

The faculty of reason is exercised in two different ways.
1. In maintaining an argument respecting any one subject, by comparing two or more ideas together, and drawing a conclusion

therefrom, which may be termed its single exercise or power. 2. In deciding between two or more subjects or matters, which may be termed its double exercise or power, and in performing which it embraces the arguments adduced respecting each subject in dispute, and relating to both sides of the controversy. In this case it compares the two arguments, or collections of ideas, and weighs them, and decides on their relative value in the aggregate; in the same manner as in conducting a single argument, it compares together two or more ideas, and draws conclusions therefrom. In the one case, the capacity resorted to may be considered, as already remarked, to act the part of an advocate; in the other that of a judge.¹

As when in travelling in a ship or a carriage, the objects which we see at a distance appear to be moving, and as though we ourselves were alone stationary, while, in reality, the reverse is the case; so, in conducting an argument, we seem to be effecting an actual change in the very facts of the case, while, in reality we are only moving onward to a more close perception and knowledge of the truth at which we are aiming.

Indeed, our condition as regards our knowledge, seems to be the exact counterpart of that contended for by Bishop Berkley with respect to the existence of external objects; for while he argued that things exist only when we see them, and in our perceptions:—so, as regards knowledge, it is evident that all facts, and all knowledge with which we may become acquainted, do actually ever exist the same whether we become acquainted with them or not. It is we only that change as we approach nearer to, or become better informed of, the truth of any matter. Thus, the result both of reasoning and of invention, is not actually to alter the nature of any subject, but only our position with regard to it. It is however mainly by this process of reasoning—of comparing different facts and ideas one with another—that we are enabled to make real progress in the attainment of knowledge of different kinds. Again, as when walking through a country, we see all that is before us, and are entertained with the prospect, but take no heed of that which is behind our backs; so, in our course of reasoning, we are too apt to decide from the argument immediately submitted to us, or directly with'in our view, without taking into account the evidence offered by those who are on the adverse side of the question.

There are nevertheless, but few popular arguments on behalf of error, which have not more or less of truth mixed up with them. Those are alike in the wrong who deny the truth, or the falsehood of the argument, as a whole. The correct course

¹ *Vide ante*, s. 4, p. 280.

is to separate truth from error, and to distinguish between the two. The line set to catch us is, we must admit, well baited; and the proper conduct to be adopted, is not to deny the goodness, or the genuineness of the bait, but to discover the hook that is concealed beneath it, and to induce the unwary victim to swallow which is the only object of the angler, and the cause why he has made his bait appear so tempting.

9. *Essence of Truth, and Efficiency of the Faculty of Reason.*

The essential being and constitution of truth,² although a question which has occasioned much discussion, and one which has afforded to casuists a favourable and a tempting opportunity for exercising their ingenuity to render complex that which God has left clear; appears to be not so incapable, or even so difficult of explanation, to those who sincerely desire to exercise their reason aright, and for the real purpose for which it was given.

The principal and ultimate object aimed at in the exercise of reason, is the discovery of truth, which is the essential end in view of each of the capacities of this faculty, whenever they are exerted. And if these different capacities may admit of distribution in this respect, material truth seems the proper aim of sense, metaphysical truth of analysis, and moral truth of judgment.³

But although truth is thus shown to be the only legitimate object of all our faculties and capacities, all our efforts, and all our knowledge;⁴ yet, at the same time, it may not inaptly be compared to an animal which, although everybody professes to delight in the pursuit of it,⁵ very few chase it with a sincere desire to

² "Opinion seems to me to come from the intellect, either voluntarily or involuntarily; voluntarily indeed as regards false opinion, when it comes from him who unlearns it; but involuntarily as regards every true one."—*Plato. Republic*, b. iii. c. 19.

"Sight is the keenest of our bodily senses, though wisdom is not seen by it."—*Plato. Phædrus*, 65.

According to *Helvetius*, "there is no truth which is not reducible to a fact."—*Treatise on Man*, s. 2, c. 23.

³ "If error owes its original to the defect of ideas, or to ideas not properly determined, truth must arise from determinate ideas."—*Condillac. Origin of Knowledge*, pt. ii. s. 2, c. 1.

⁴ "No one can be a great thinker who does not recognize that as a thinker it is his first duty to follow his intellect to whatever conclusions it may lead."—*John Stuart Mill on Liberty*, c. 2.

⁵ According to *Cicero*, indeed, "Nature herself has given to man the desire to discover truth, which appears obvious when we are free from care, as we then desire to know even what is being done in the heavens. Urged on by this impulse, we love whatever is true, that is, things that are faithful, simple, and consistent; while we hate whatever is vain, false, and fallacious."—*De Fin. Bon. et Mal.*, ii. 14.

capture it; and out of those who do so, but a small portion are willing to eat it if it is taken. Even persons of this latter class, entirely mutilate and disguise it when it is served up for their repast, as though their main object was to render it as little as possible like that which nature made it.

Of all things in the world, the most difficult to counterfeit is truth. And yet the attempts to do this are almost ceaseless. The outward semblance may have quite the appearance of genuineness; but directly the nature of the metal is tested, the baseness of the fabrication becomes apparent. By a momentary glance, we may be deceived; but by a steady gaze, the lurking fallacy at once becomes detected. Gilt may serve very well to glitter in the sun, but gold only can pass current on 'Change.

Nevertheless, as truth has often been supported by false reasoning, and error by reasoning that was in itself sound; so it has not unfrequently happened that both force and fraud have been employed to support right principles, even by those who, while they believed implicitly in the justice of the cause which they maintained, must have been fully conscious of the nefariousness of the means by which they upheld it.

Truth may be defined essentially to consist in the exact agreement or accordance between a subject and its relation, or the matter to which the statement refers.⁶ The question of truth always exists with regard to the agreement of one subject with another,—as whether such a particular measure agrees with the distance to be ascertained. Neither truth nor falsehood can exist except in reference to their accordance between two independent subjects. We cannot say of the sun, or of the sea, that it is either true or false. But of a picture of either, this question may at once be raised, which will be decided by, and depend upon, the agreement or disagreement of the representation with the original. And the real test of the efficiency of the faculty of reason, is its ability to ascertain exactly and clearly the extent of this coincidence or difference. All actual truth is absolute truth. There are no degrees of truth, although there are many degrees of approaches to it, which however are but different degrees and phases of apparent truth. The mind indeed is adapted, and perfectly so, for the attainment, or rather discernment of absolute truth. The hindrances to this attainment are not in the mind itself, but in the many clogs and impediments by which it is beset, and the mazes in which it is liable to be enveloped. A pure mind will discern perfect truth; but to

⁶ *Aristotle* defines truth to be the exact conformity of human conception with the real nature of things.—*Metaph.*, l. 9, c. x.

According to *Locke*, "truth signifies nothing but the joining or separating of signs, as the things signified by them do agree or disagree one with another."—*Essay on the Understanding*, b. iv. c. v. s. 2.

a debased mind, simple truth is difficult of perception. Many of our medial endowments have a tendency, direct or indirect, to shut out truth from the mind. Even sensation, which conveys knowledge, not unfrequently perverts it in the very conveyance.

Nevertheless, while the balance by which truth is weighed may be accurate and trustworthy in itself; if other substances obtrude and interfere with the weights, the test is of course to that extent destroyed. So particular balances may be adapted for certain substances, but not be applicable for others; and those of each kind should be applied to test those subjects, and those only, for which they are peculiarly adapted. The criterion of truth is, as it were, the weight in the balance by which the truth is tested.

Truth is, consequently, the genuine fruit and product of reason, as knowledge is of the understanding. Thus, though the only proper material for the exercise of the reason is knowledge, yet the final result of reason is but to obtain certain knowledge.⁷ Hence knowledge and truth are to a great extent identical in their essence; and each of them constitutes alike the only legitimate end of all intellectual exertion. Truth is in itself moreover whole and complete. The destruction of any one part is the ruin of the whole. The grossest falsehood of all, consists in telling only half the truth.

It may therefore appear somewhat difficult to explain how it is that it frequently happens that totally opposite conclusions from the same premises, are arrived at by persons of equal reasoning power, where all the premises and facts appear clear. This results in most cases from the undue importance which, from the influence of prejudice, different people attribute to particular arguments and facts, which are thus allowed to outweigh others that are really of greater consequence; so that what one person deems highly momentous, another regards as trivial. If however pure reason alone decided the controversy in each case, all men would think and act alike; inasmuch as the determinations of reason are in all cases the same, where the same premises are argued from. A variety of opinions by different persons about the same matter, or even the alteration of opinion in a person on a particular subject, does not therefore by any means necessarily imply a defect in the reasoning power, or that it is liable to err, and is incapable of correct decision. The premises upon which the conclusion is based are ever fluctuating; but the conclusion itself remains unchanged. The view before us varies with every alteration of our position, although the objects themselves are immoveable.

⁷ *Locke* observes that judgment supplies the want of certain knowledge in cases where that cannot be had.—*Essay on the Understanding*, b. iv. c. xiv. s. 3.

On the other hand, occasionally upon those matters respecting which people differ most widely in their general notions, they arrive at precisely the same conclusions on essential points; which proves how precisely the same faculties and capacities in each person act alike, although the premises on which they reason may be wholly different. Probably, indeed, there is no subject on which men differ so widely, as they do on that of religion. And yet even here, on general leading and important matters, most if not all reasonable persons appear to have arrived at nearly the same conclusions. Coincidences in invention are moreover no less striking than are those in reasoning.

But although the reason is the same in each person as regards its nature, while varying in each as to its extent and quality; yet the passions, and desires, and affections, operate very differently in different persons, and in each largely influence the decisions of the reason;⁸ whence such different determinations are made on the same subject by different persons, and by the same person at different times. Probably, however, the main source of error, especially when deciding on the merits either of private persons or political parties, is that to which I referred in the last section, of applying the reason to one side of the question only, instead of drawing a conclusion from the premises adduced on both sides; in consequence of which we omit entirely to take into our calculation the arguments on the side adverse to that in favour of which we decide. Thus, as I said before, a person's general character is estimated either by his merits, or by his demerits only, and separately considered, instead of ascertaining the preponderating balance of the one above the other. A political or religious party we judge of by those of its principles only which accord with our own; instead of, and without taking into account, those which it also espouses with which we disagree. We must, in general, indeed judge of mankind as we do of most other matters; not by what they are, but by what they appear. We can determine only, not by what actually is, but by what we really know. How often, and how extensively, moreover, do appearances, seemingly plain and obvious, entirely deceive us, whereby conclusions utterly erroneous are deduced from facts supposed to be indisputable. Hence, how commonly is hypocrisy mistaken for fervour, and modesty for lukewarmness. Judas would pass off for a sincere friend to Christ, because he salutes Him with a kiss. Nicodemus is condemned as merely a lukewarm ally, because he timidly comes to Him at night.

Prejudice, as already pointed out,⁹ is another very extensive cause of error in, and contributes much to mar the efficiency of,

⁸ *Aristotle* remarks on the mode in which a man's judgments vary with love or hatred, with joy or sorrow.—*Rhet.*, b. i. c. ii.

⁹ *Vide ante*, s. 7, p. 291.

our reasoning. One of the main sources of prejudice is the association of ideas, by which qualities become connected and blended with certain subjects with which they have no sort of proper relation or affinity.¹ This is not only the direct cause of frequent error in our reasoning, but of both emotion and passion being oftentimes causelessly excited. Indeed, so beset by error and prejudice on every side are we all, that the main wonder is, not that we so often decide wrongly, but that we ever decide right. Not only, as already pointed out, do our senses, emotions, passions, affections, and desires, all combine together to lead us astray, against which the feeble voice of reason, is wholly inefficient to guard us; but our fellow-creatures around us, from our earliest infancy to our latest days, are ever seeking to inculcate error and delusion of every kind. And great as is the deceit which men ceaselessly practise on one another; they each, as already observed, exhibit a resolute determination to deceive themselves most of all.

Moreover, as man, false to all others, is most so to himself; so, on that most important subject of self-judging, it is that his flattery of himself is most delusive, and is attended with the most serious consequences. In fact, to such an extreme does our self-deceit occasionally carry us, that we not only call vice virtue, and virtue vice; but even pain pleasure, and pleasure pain; nay, even happiness unhappiness, and misery joy.

A man who thinks for himself, will probably become either the slave or the subverter of the opinions of his time. He is either absolutely submissive to them, and zealous in their support; or else he sets himself in direct opposition to them, and endeavours to overthrow them. Comparatively few, however, examine tenets before they embrace them. Men as soon think of changing their country as changing their opinions; and chance has quite as much, and reason quite as little, to do in directing the choice in one case as in the other.²

How far, therefore, human reason is really in any case absolutely certain and conclusive on any subject whatever, might appear to be a question of no small doubt.³ Its effi-

¹ *Locke* points out the large extent of error which is generated by the wrong connexion and association of ideas.—*Essay on the Understanding*, b. ii. c. xxiii. ss. 7, 8.

² To this passage *Mr. Wake* has appended the note which follows: "The observation as to the 'man who thinks for himself,' is very just as a general proposition. I believe, however, that many such men who began by attacking violently the opponents of their faith, have ended by becoming converts to the opinions they had sought to crush. Many instances of this may be supplied other than that of St. Paul, which is a notable one."

³ *Locke* indeed suggests that from the contrariety of opinions, and the confident manner in which each are maintained, we might well doubt whether there is any such thing as truth.—*Essay on the Understanding*, *Introd.*, p. 2.

ciency must, however, as I have already observed, depend on the perfection both of our faculty of reason, and on the extent of knowledge with which the reason has to deal, which may be perfect and satisfactory as regards some qualities only, or as between ourselves as human beings; but insufficient and imperfect as regards essential properties, or as regards a being of superior wisdom and power, whose capacity in each respect may far exceed our own, and whose perception and knowledge of objects or matters is more complete or extensive than what we possess. The capacities, however, with which we are supplied, are amply sufficient, if properly applied, for all the purposes of this life; and our reason seldom, if ever, deceives us, if rightly exercised, and sufficient and suitable grounds are selected for its object.⁴ A man should, moreover, have confidence in his own judgment, so far as to rely fully on its decisions when finally made; and yet at the same time he should be sufficiently doubtful of it to resort to the opinion of others to aid and counsel him in coming to a conclusion; or, perhaps more properly, in testing the correctness of a contemplated determination at which he has arrived, and perfecting it where wanting.

Errors in reasoning, in cases where our knowledge is ample, most frequently arise from two causes. 1. From the wrong capacity of this faculty having been applied in the examination of a particular subject; as analysis for a subject for which sense alone was adapted, and *vice versâ*. 2. From the adoption of a false standard or test whereby to examine a subject. Thus, as regards the latter of these cases, in deciding whether an act is good or bad, we refer, not to the rule of justice or right, but inquire only what is customary, and according to the way of the world.

Indeed, reasoning has in many instances been imperfectly conducted, owing to this want of some actual standard of value as regards ideas, to which we might refer, corresponding with the standard which money affords as to the worth of material objects.⁵ But of how great an error in its turn has this very standard of money, invented to avoid error, been the cause! Thus, because money is the only real test of value, it has been concluded to be the only thing really valuable. It has been deemed to be, not only the *summum*, but the *solum bonum*. Hence, virtue, fame, honour, have all been regarded as of less account than wealth; and by some only regarded at all so far as they are the means of bringing wealth to the possessor. In this respect truly is the love of money the root of all

⁴ "Reason in its own nature would always lead us into the truth in matters within its compass, if it were used aright; or it would require us to suspend our judgment where there is want of evidence."—*Dr. Watts. Logic*, pt. ii. c. ii. s. 9.

⁵ *Vide ante*, b. ii. c. ii. s. 5, p. 95; b. iii. c. iii. s. 8, p. 299.

evil; absorbing in the desire for it every other object, and exalting avarice above the noblest endowments.

As regards the general question of standard tests, it may here be remarked that in the course of life men fail far more from not fixing a sufficiently high standard which they should endeavour to reach, than from want of ability to rise higher. Each man will do his utmost to attain the standard of excellence which he has determined to gain, but will seldom or never attempt to go beyond that. If he had aimed at a higher standard, he would have reached it readily; but he strives not to go beyond the limits which he has prescribed to himself.

How liable each faculty and capacity of the mind, is to be deceived by the influence of the emotions, appetites, affections, and passions, I shall consider more particularly in a future chapter.⁶

Perplexity with regard to matters of reason, is occasioned by exactly similar causes to those which produce perplexity with regard to our judgment respecting material objects,—from our not obtaining a clear and distinct view of them in their different bearings. We mistake a tree for a man, and an insect for a bird flying at a distance, from want of light to guide us, or through inattention to the object. Respecting moral topics we also err, from not possessing sufficient information to enable us to judge correctly respecting them; or because we are unacquainted with the actual nature of the principles by which the subject is regulated. In the one case, our material organ the eye;—in the other, our intellectual faculty of understanding, our mental eye,—is that which is at fault.

Although from the many differences of opinion, and contrarieties in sentiment which exist among men upon almost all matters, we might be led well-nigh to doubt whether there was any soundness or reality in human reason; yet, on the other hand, we must bear in mind that the generality of men in the formation of their opinions, both on religious and civil subjects, are in reality not so much guided by reason as by custom, or prejudice, or interest, and follow the doctrines or party in or among which they were bred.⁷ Nevertheless, there do appear to be some great fundamental truths or principles, which all agree in admitting; and in particular sciences, such as mathematics and arithmetic, the *data* of which are fixed and certain, our

⁶ *Vide post*, c. vi. ss. 5, 7.

⁷ In reference to what is here stated, *Mr. Hyde Clarke* writes as follows: "There is striking truth in what you say as to men being not so much guided by reason as by custom, or prejudice, or interest. This is a natural influence of the development of culture, which is effected rather under those circumstances described by you, than under the influence of reason. At the same time, the higher stages can only be reached by the application of the processes and results of reason in a greater proportion."

knowledge and our reasoning seem to be perfect; which proves that it is rather our defect of knowledge than of reasoning power which is the cause of our errors.⁸

From the waywardness and perversity with which the reason is wont to be exercised, even on those topics which are the most important, and about which men concern themselves the most, such as questions of religion, and morality, and jurisprudence; and from the opposite conclusions at which different people arrive from the consideration of precisely the same *data*, and the exercise of exactly the same capacities, although very variously endowed with the latter; we might almost suppose that reason was given more to perplex than to guide them, and to lead them into error, rather than to direct them to truth. Moreover, as the world has advanced, civilization has extended, and learning has made progress, it is a singular circumstance that reason has been less and less resorted to in the investigation of truth, while understanding has been more and more employed, and has greatly superseded the use of the higher faculty. Facts rather than arguments are what men now mainly regard, and on which they chiefly rely. The principal cause of this is that, in the first place, the exercise of the understanding is always less irksome than that of the reason. In the second place, its proofs are more palpable and certain. And, in the third place, the great accumulation of facts on all subjects through the increase of learning, affords us an ample and ready supply of this commodity, which forms a great inducement to use them. Facts, too, are found ready made, while arguments have to be spun.

We are probably, however, capable of attaining more absolute certainty and perfection through the operation of comparing ideas, and perceiving their difference, than we are by either receiving or combining them, which latter we endeavour to effect in imaginative or inventive efforts, or by speculation. In the two latter exercises, whatever be the nature of the ideas to be used, our power is unlimited and indefinite. In reasoning only, if the ideas be certain and clear, it seems to be sure and defined.⁹ On the other hand, the limits of our reasoning efforts are in reality quite as confined as are those of our understanding, although our incapacity in the latter respect is more immediately obvious to us, and the fact is more frequently made apparent. Nevertheless, if any one will attentively con-

⁸ We are told by *Locke* that the faculty of reasoning seldom or never deceives those who trust to it.—*Conduct of Understanding*, s. 3.

⁹ "Every man carries about with him a touchstone, if he will make use of it, to distinguish substantial gold from superficial glitterings, truth from appearances. And, indeed, the use and benefit of this touchstone, which is natural reason, is spoiled and lost only by assumed prejudices, overweening presumption, and narrowing our minds."—*Locke. Conduct of the Understanding*, s. 3.

sider any human system which has been constructed through the agency of man, as, for instance, a code of civil laws, or of punishments and rewards, and compare them with what in the Divine economy has been provided, the insufficiency, and narrowness, and feebleness of man's reason, will be at once apparent from the poverty of its fruits.

There is however, no actual absolute certainty in any kind of reasoning, except mathematics, and inductive reasoning upon ascertained facts. *A priori* reasoning upon abstruse questions, is occasionally very fallacious, inasmuch as the conclusions are often drawn from false or dubious premises, and their apparent sufficiency will be too frequently found to be owing to the ignorance or inability of the respondent in the argument. From this kind of reasoning being more difficult and more subtle, many consider it of a higher order than the inductive. It is owing to the confidence which has been reposed in the deductions obtained by this species of argumentation, that so many errors in politics and polemics have sprung up; and that what by seemingly the most conclusive proof has been established by one set of reasoners, by another party of them has, by proof apparently equally conclusive, been completely refuted.

If a vast concourse of people belonging to two opposite persuasions, were to meet together to witness a controversy between two champions of their respective opinions; the almost inevitable result would be that the great majority of those of each party would go away fully satisfied that the champion on his own side had come off victorious. Yet had the same persons met and disputed about the correctness of some arithmetical calculation, or some mathematical problem; nearly every individual among them would have pronounced his opinion on the side of the champion who really gained the victory in the controversy. Whence is this important difference between these two cases? Because, in the one case, the premises to be argued from are inconclusive and uncertain, and of which the mind is unable to obtain a complete and accurate knowledge; it is, therefore, liable to be swayed by errors and prejudices, which, as it were, occupy the vacant space thus occasioned. In the case of the other, the *data* are all fixed and determined, and the whole point in dispute is clearly comprehended by the mind.

Thus it is that men usually continue through life in the same creed in which they were educated. Nor does this arise from any defect in their judgment; but because, when the *data* are so uncertain, such extensive room is afforded, as I have already observed, for prejudice, which will always operate to the full extent against making a change, especially where interest and feeling are materially concerned.

There is however, no cause to suppose that the reason may not perform its operations, and arrive at conclusions in all

respects correct, provided that it possesses accurate *data* on which to proceed. Where these premises are clear and certain, the determinations of the reason will naturally be so also. If prejudice is allowed to warp our decisions, this is no fault of the reason itself; but it is owing to the reason being overawed, that error prevails.

In the majority of cases, however, the knowledge obtained by the understanding, and supplied to the reason, is more or less imperfect, occasionally very incomplete, and hardly ever absolute and definite; that knowledge being, not of the subject itself, but only of certain properties or qualities of it out of a great number: and even as regards the latter, our acquaintance is far from real or finite. But then, on the other hand, the reason is more liable than the understanding to be warped and swayed by prejudice, which but little affects the process of simply receiving ideas of any subject. We do not mistake white for any other colour; or doubt that a tree is a tree, when we see it before us. But when we come to compare, and to argue respecting, the degree of whiteness of the substance, or the comparative size or quality of the tree, numerous external considerations influence our judgment, and prevent our making a decision without bias or prejudice, and based alone on the *data* afforded us for our reason to operate upon.

Perhaps, after all, it may be determined that the reason is, on the whole, more efficient to dispel error than to detect truth; and that it operates more successfully as a defender of the citadel to drive away falsehood, than as a hero who is able to capture and take fresh cities which he assails.

As God alone is endowed with perfect knowledge, and with perfect intellectual faculties of each kind; so He alone of all beings is perfect, alike in His reasoning operations, and in His conclusions. And this is the foundation of His absolute justice. As we in a future state shall more nearly resemble God, so in that state will our knowledge be more enlarged, our faculties more complete, and our reasoning more exact. Indeed, in our present condition, our inadequate idea of the Deity constitutes one grand source of error in many of our reasonings, and those concerning subjects of the highest nature. Next to this, and hardly less pernicious in its consequences, is the inadequate idea which we possess of our own selves. The one great Being we unduly debase. The other, we as proportionally too much exalt. And in addition to this, and in part as a consequence of it, instead of meekly trying to render ourselves after God's image, we presumptuously attempt to render God after the image of man.

As regards our interpretation too of the sacred Scriptures, into how many errors do we fall from our mode of applying our reason to their right comprehension. When we should

read literally, we construe metaphorically; and that which is meant to be metaphorical, we regard as literal. This error proceeds mainly, if not entirely, from our neglecting to apply our reason aright, and in due regard to the principles which I have here attempted to enunciate. In one sense indeed, the Bible is not only to be taken literally, but every word, and expression, and turn of thought, has a full, and pregnant meaning, far beyond what the ordinary interpretation implies. In another sense, the meaning is not intended to be literal, the expressions used being rather figurative than real, and the most precise rules of conduct being but symbolical.

It seems as though, in our present condition, we were ever enveloped in a deep maze as regards our knowledge of things even of the most common and ordinary nature, and with which we are most intimately connected. There are hardly any subjects concerning which our information is complete, or even certain as far as it goes; and that which we obtain one day, and which seems to afford us some real acquaintance with matters, is proved to be imperfect or fallacious, by that which we subsequently acquire. Dark mists appear to beset us on every side, and to obscure or deform every object around us, and to prevent our obtaining clear or correct views of them. We can hardly suppose this to be a natural or permanent condition for intelligent beings. It seems as though we were possessed of the fullest capacity for obtaining perfect knowledge; while at the same time, some clog or disability existed, which entirely hinders our advancement further. This we must conclude to be the union of our intellectual and immortal being with a gross and carnal substance, which unfits it for, and disables it to follow, such pursuits; and we may, consequently, believe that when it is released from this bondage, it will enjoy a free and unclouded view into the wide world of knowledge by which it is surrounded. Hence we may, I think, conjecture that in a future state, our reasoning, if not absolutely perfect, will be far more complete, and more efficient; both because the faculty itself will be rendered more perfect, and our knowledge will be more certain. We shall both perceive subjects, and compare them one with another, not only with regard to their appearances, but as respects their real and essential qualities.

We might well compare the investigation of any matter respecting which we are desirous of obtaining information—and which matter in itself is perfect, and immutable, whatever we, or our knowledge of it, may be—to disinterring from the earth some vast ruin or statue which had been buried there, and whose form, and symmetry, and proportions, we desired to ascertain, and to display to the world. Although the shape of this object remains ever the same and unchanged, yet, at different periods as we advance in our operations of clearing

away the soil, different opinions will be formed on this subject. The work of one day will serve to overthrow the opinions which, on the preceding one, were apparently well founded. Thus are we ever advancing, and ever varying, but perhaps never arrive to a perfect view. Here, as is the case with regard to our intellectual vision, the glorious light of Heaven is shut out and obscured by the gross encumbrance of earth, through which the real form and beauty of the object is shrouded from our gaze.

CHAPTER IV.

THE FACULTY OF GENIUS.

1. *Quality and Constitution of this Faculty, and of its Subordinate Constituent Capacities.*

THE last of the faculties of the mind which remains to be considered, is that which is ordinarily termed genius, which is the most exalted, and in many respects the most important, of them all, possessing as it does powers far beyond those with which either of the other faculties are endowed. Genius is the faculty whereby we compound together different ideas, and so create new combinations out of them, in the various modes which I shall hereafter endeavour to demonstrate.¹ In this respect genius might well be compared to a chemical experimentalist, who unites or combines together several different subjects into one composition or compound. Hence genius is in its nature not only quite different from either the understanding or the reason, and carries on the operation of the mind to a point considerably beyond what the latter reaches, but it also acts in a way totally different from that faculty. While the understanding enables us to receive ideas already existent, and reason to compare them one with another, by genius we obtain the power of creating ideas altogether new, which is indeed the highest effort that the mind can achieve.

This creative power or faculty, which we term genius, is, moreover, the distinguishing attribute as regards man and his Maker on the one hand, and mere animal instinctive being on the other. God, the Maker of all things, created everything out of nothing. Man can create many things, if he is supplied with elements out of which to form them; that is, he can recombine these elements into fresh figures and modifications. Animals, however, can do nothing of this kind, if we except only the instinctive construction of their habitations; by which, however, no new substance is actually produced, but only different materials are placed together without being really

¹ Compounding, or composition of ideas, according to *Locke*, is one of the particular and distinct operations of the mind.—*Essay on the Understanding*, b. ii. c. xi. s. 6.

combined. For mental combinations of any kind, animals appear to be wholly unadapted.

Of the different faculties of the mind, genius is the least commonly possessed to a large extent. It is probably also of all the faculties the least dependent upon the material frame for the freedom and vigour of its exercise; but it, nevertheless, owes much to the aid of the understanding to supply it with materials for its operations.

The precise period of development of this faculty, and of its different capacities, appears uncertain, and probably varies in different persons; depending in part on the circumstances of the individual, and in part on the other capacities with which he is endowed.

Nevertheless, although genius is occasionally late in obtaining its full development, yet it frequently gives early proof both of its existence and of its particular bent, by striking traits in the intellectual character and conduct of its possessor. It is a long time ere its flames rear their heads aloft, yet the smouldering embers acquire force and vigour at an early period. Moreover, the irregular, erratic impulses which genius excites, sometimes cause the person extensively endowed with this faculty to act differently to other persons, especially during youth, when his eccentricities may be mistaken for a want of proper control. What we originally supposed to be the wild, and irregular, and idle chirpings of the youthful bird, who is overheard while in solitude piping to itself; are in time discovered to be the steady preparation for those notes of almost infinite variety and beauty, by which its song is eventually to be distinguished.²

There has been much controversy respecting the actual nature and constitution of the faculty of genius, which is the most exalted among the intellectual powers, and the operations of which have in many instances appeared more extensive and more complex than could be supposed to be effected by one single faculty of the mind.

By some persons this faculty has been deemed to be simply a peculiar aptness for any particular study or pursuit, which has been accordingly denominated a genius for such an employment.³ By others it has been considered as merely a degree of general cleverness and shrewdness, or quickness of the mind. Certain individuals have asserted it to be a capacity for detecting with facility the agreement or similarity between different ideas or their combinations. It has also been spoken of as the power

² "Genius may co-exist with wildness, idleness, folly, even with crime; but not long, believe me, with selfishness and the indulgence of an envious disposition."—Coleridge. *Table Talk*.

³ *Dr. Johnson* defined genius to be "a mind of large general powers, accidentally determined in some particular direction."

of any mind to view any particular subject at once, in all its different points and bearings, when the generality of minds would see it in an ordinary position only.⁴ Some writers have asserted it to be the faculty of invention,⁵ and others that it is the power of executing any work which the mind has designed.⁶

An examination of the constitution of those minds which, by common consent, have been allowed to be eminently endowed with this noble faculty, will, however, serve to evince that none of the foregoing definitions of it at all serve adequately to describe it.

Many of these definitions do, however, to a certain extent go to confirm my theory, inasmuch as they agree in several of the leading attributes which I have ascribed to genius, although they do not contain them all. They are erroneous, indeed, not so much from incorrectness as far as they go, as from incompleteness in not going further. Thus, genius may be truly in part defined to be the power of accomplishing what any person has designed, inasmuch as the capacity of origination, which principally aids in attaining this end, is one of its most important constituents. On the other hand, it is not the power of viewing a subject comprehensively, which the being largely endowed with comprehension confers. Nor of reasoning acutely, which we owe to analysis. Nor is it the ability to excel in anything, inasmuch as the extensive possession of the capacities especially fitted for certain particular pursuits, mainly insures this result, as that of analysis for acute logical reasoning; although even here, the being largely gifted with genius may often aid, as in supplying new arguments and matter, although it is by no means essential to qualify any one to effect this object.

The faculty of genius may, however, be defined, as regards

⁴ Thus *Helvetius* defines genius to be "the faculty possessed by some human beings, of seizing at one glance a whole and its different parts."—*System of Nature*, c. ix. He also asserts that it is "an effect of physical sensibility."—*Ibid.*

⁵ *Helvetius* in another work asserts that the word genius always supposes invention; and this quality is the only one which belongs to all the different kinds of genius.—*Essays on the Mind*, p. 4, c. i. But he adds that, "though genius always supposes invention, all invention does not suppose genius."—*Ibid.* He also tells us that "genius, of whatever kind, is always the effect of an infinite number of combinations, that can only be formed in early youth."—*Ibid.*

Melmoth, in his *Lælius and Hortensia, or Thoughts on Taste and Genius*, lays it down that "the power of invention, especially when supported by an aptness to learn, may be considered as constituting what we understand by genius."—P. 331.

⁶ "Genius has been declared by a great authority to be patience; and patience in this sense means unflinching, undaunted perseverance."—*Darwin's Descent of Man*, vol. ii. p. 328. Perseverance, however, cannot be considered to be genius itself, although it is undoubtedly one main result and manifestation of it.—*Vide ante*, b. iii. c. i. s. 5, p. 202.

the operation which it effects, to be that power of the mind whereby it is able to produce results which cannot be attained by the common and ordinary faculties for receiving knowledge and reasoning upon it—of knowing and judging—which adapt us for the common and ordinary pursuits and purposes of life; results which no operations of those faculties (however extensively possessed they may be, or however energetically exerted) can ever effect, and which are quite beyond the sphere of their action, and of a nature altogether different from anything produced by them. Thus, while by understanding and reason we receive ideas and compare them, by genius we are enabled to create them anew altogether, through the original combinations which we accomplish. While the former faculties only enable us to import and to select our wares, the latter enables us to make them ourselves.⁷

There is this great and essential difference, indeed, as regards

⁷ *Dr. L. R. de Sainte Croix* of Paris, an elegant and graceful critic and writer upon artistical subjects, has favoured me with the following note to this paragraph, in response to my expressed desire for his sentiments on what is ordinarily termed "genius:"—

"What I wish to define here is not what are the most comprehensive definitions of the term, but principally that facility of imagination, of conception, that ingenious reasoning, that quality of the mind of which Voltaire thus speaks: 'Genius is one of those vague terms to which all who use it generally attach different senses; a word which expresses something else besides judgment, ability, taste, talent, penetration, understanding, grace, refinement; and which ought to comprise all those excellences.'

"He who has genius, according to Madame de Caylus, has a ready conception, great penetration, much discernment, memory, and eloquence.

"'Genius,' says J. J. Rousseau, 'is reason well seasoned.' It comprehends besides this the action of the soul in regard to the mental operations, its desires, or, to express oneself more freely, the sentiments of the soul. It is indeed the conglomeration of all the intellectual faculties, aptitude to learn, to seize upon, to judge; it is, in fact, more especially that mental vivacity which effects lively sallies, whether by burning words or through ingenious reflections. It is a power which is able to seize instantaneously upon ideas which the world at large does not catch, because there is a double meaning through which he penetrates vividly and profoundly into the consequences of the principle by which one undertakes a great number of efforts without confusion, following the expression of Pascal, who was distinguished for the force and correctness of his genius, and the greatness of his mind.

"Voltaire in another of his writings says again, 'This what they call genius, is, although a new comparison, merely a fanciful illusion; here it is the misuse of a word which is offered in one sense, while it is sought to be availed of in another. It points out a nice distinction between two ideas, which have little in common. The metaphor is singular. It effects a search after an object which is not as yet present, but of which there is the coming shadow. It is the art of writing two things which are distant, and of dividing those which appear to be joined, or to be opposed one to the other. It is this that suggests bright thoughts to the designer. In fine, if I resorted to all the different figures to show what genius is, I should yet feel that I wanted more.'"

the operations of genius and those of understanding and reason,⁸ that while by the two latter we are simply enabled to advance in our knowledge of truth—to clear away the mists by which it is surrounded—by the first of them we acquire the power of producing various surprising, pleasing, and original effects and results through the combinations which we make of different ideas and subjects. In many instances, however, genius is of important service to us in the investigation of truth, in enabling us to make further advances, and to achieve fresh discoveries, to which result the capacity of origination or invention mainly conduces.

The faculty of genius, like those of understanding and reason, will be found to be constituted of certain independent capacities. Of this we shall be convinced by a rigid examination of the constitution of those minds which have possessed the highest reputation for being endowed with this faculty.

I do not mean to contend that the extensive possession of each of the constituent capacities with which this faculty is endowed, is absolutely essential in order that a person should obtain the character of a man of genius: it is the possession of them according to the degrees in which he is gifted with them respectively, which forms the individual characteristic of a person of this description.

The connexion between the different efforts and capacities of the faculty of genius, is further evinced by the circumstance that the children of a person largely gifted with this faculty, and evincing it by achievements or attainments in one particular line, while inheriting the endowment from the parent, will display it in efforts of a totally different kind, although all produced by the same capacity. Thus, the child of a person extensively endowed with taste, and who excels greatly in music, may excel in painting or eloquence. And the originality of the scientific discoverer descending to his child, will be developed in efforts of the imagination.⁹

As reason is exercised in separating and in discovering the distinction between different ideas; so genius, on the other hand, is exercised in combining them together, and in discovering their resemblance and contiguity one to another.

The exercise of this faculty by persons extensively so gifted is more agreeable than is that of reason, because more novelty is produced by it. It is not, however, so agreeable, because not so productive of novelty, as that of understanding. By the exercise of genius we obtain only new combinations of ideas.

⁸ It is an observation of *Coleridge*, that "talent lying in the understanding is often inherited; genius, being the action of reason and imagination, rarely or never."—*Table Talk*.

⁹ *Vide ante, Prel. Diss.*, s. 1, a. 5, vol. i. p. 18. B. iii. c. i. s. 7, *ante*, p. 209.

By the exercise of the understanding the ideas themselves which are obtained are altogether new.

As genius is the highest of all the powers of the soul, so is its complete exercise in those exalted pursuits which are in their nature the most Divine.

2. *The Capacity of Wit.*

Wit is that capacity of the faculty of genius by which it is enabled to bring together,¹ so as to present a strong contrast or effect, two or more ideas which, although exactly agreeing in some trivial points, are in their general nature altogether different and dissimilar one from another; by means of which is produced a strong and vivid feeling of surprise,² or of ridicule, according to the character of the subject, on account of the singularity or incongruity of their position.

Thus, the mind unites these ideas when, as in the case of what in verbal combinations of this nature is termed punning,³ they appear when so combined to be at once similar and dissimilar. Hence, also, it is the double simultaneous perception both of the similarity and the difference in the ideas of any subject or object, and the absolute and inseparable amalgamation together of these ideas of similitude and dissimilitude, that renders mimicry of any person ludicrous; and which also causes emotions of ridicule to arise when we suddenly and unexpectedly discover a striking likeness of one who is absent, afforded by an individual who is present, and between whom there is no relationship or real connexion.⁴

¹ "Wit is nothing but an assemblage of new ideas and combinations."
—*Helvetius. Essays on the Mind*, Ep. iv. c. iii.

² It is remarked by *Dugald Stewart*, that "the pleasure we derive from the assemblage of ideas which wit presents, is greatly heightened and enlivened by our surprise at the command displayed over a part of our constitution which, in our own case, we find to be so little subject to the will."—*Elements of Philos. of Human Mind*, pt. i. c. v. s. 4.

Dr. Carpenter defines wit to be "a felicitous association of objects not usually connected, so as to produce a pleasant surprise."—*Mental Physiology*, b. ii. c. xii.

³ Punning is defined by *Addison* to be "a conceit arising from the use of two words that agree in sound, but differ in the sense."—*Spectator*.

⁴ *Hobbes* lays it down that judgment without fancy is wit; but fancy, without judgment, not.—*Leviathan*, pt. i. c. viii.

Locke defines wit as "consisting in the assemblage of ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity."—*Essay on the Understanding*, b. ii. c. xi. s. 2. *Locke* also remarks on the difference between wit and judgment, and on the causes contributing to quickness of parts, exactness of judgment, and clearness of reason.—*Ibid.*

The capacity of wit confers upon the mind a power of seizing at once on the minute points of coincidence in any matter, and in being able with rapidity to place together or contrast them. It does not, however, include a very deep or exact discovery of the real and actual nature of the qualities of the subject, but the reverse is often found to be the fact. In these respects it corresponds with the capacities of apprehension and sense, although these capacities are by no means necessarily coexistent with it. Ideas, whether received or obtained through apprehension, deprehension, or comprehension, are alike fitted for its exercise; although those obtained by the first of these capacities are ordinarily best adapted for this purpose.

The term wit is here used to denote the capacity of the mind by which we combine together ideas that are dissimilar, although each combination of this kind may not result in those lively sallies which are ordinarily termed wit.

The operation of this capacity may be indeed divided into two kinds; the one of a light and pleasing, the other of a grave or severe character. The former of these we ordinarily term ridicule, or humour; the latter, satire, or effect. By the last of these operations a deep impression is produced through the strong contrast of ideas brought together. Pathos is occasioned through combinations of the nature of what is here termed effect, so far that all pathos is constituted by a union of dissimilar ideas. Nevertheless, all combinations of this sort do not constitute pathos, and pathos is not effect, nor effect pathos. But effect is a constituent element in the production of pathos. Satire appears to me to be the result of the joint application of ridicule and effect to the same subject. Each of these efforts is performed by this capacity in a similar mode; by placing together, and contrasting ideas, or objects of a very dissimilar nature.

A farther division has also been made of wit and humour, as being each distinct exercises of this capacity.⁵ In reality, however, it appears to me that in both cases the effort is the same, although the materials by which it is carried out are different. What is commonly called wit is merely exercised about words, as in the case of punning; humour about sentiments or things, and is effected quite independent of words.

Nevertheless, while the action of humour or ridicule is swift and sudden, and transient in its operation; that of satire and

According to *Dugald Stewart*, "wit implies a power of calling up at pleasure the ideas which it combines."—*Elements of Philos. of Human Mind*, pt. i. c. v. s. 4.

⁵ Coleridge recognizes the distinction in question when he says, "Men of humour are always in some degree men of genius; wits are rarely so, although a man of genius may, amongst other gifts, possess wit, as Shakespeare."—*Coleridge. Table Talk*.

effect is slow and gradual, and in its result permanent. The one rushes through the plain, like a roaring torrent; the other winds slowly through it, like a tranquil river.

The capacity of wit is often of use in controversy, and is employed in ridiculing the arguments of an opponent, or in giving force to those adduced against him, by making effective and striking combinations of ideas. For the latter purpose it is also of essential value in artistical composition of each kind, through the aid of that effort of it which is here termed effect. Both ridicule and satire are moreover, in reality, as serviceable, and as fully availed of, to express, or give vent to passion, as is the capacity of taste, although different passions will be generally expressed by the two.

The effusions of wit of the lighter kind, such as ridicule accomplishes, are, however, like the precocious blossoms on a tree, often valued for their rarity and their pleasing effect, but which are of no solid value, and too frequently lead to the neglect of cultivation of more sterling productions. These showy and dazzling efforts prove the blight of many a noble intellect, which, but for its appearance, might have brought forth precious fruit. The efforts of this capacity of each description, should be the ornament and the aid of, not the substitute for, knowledge and reasoning: and this may be observed of origination too, and also of taste; of each of the capacities of genius alike. Possibly, moreover, this capacity, when exerted in humorous sallies, which contribute so much to our relaxation and relief, especially during the trying and wearisome process of reasoning, may, by the benevolent economy of Providence, on that account be especially conferred on those particular individuals who most require such diversion, or whose teaching of others peculiarly stands in need to be thus accompanied and aided, or rendered palatable.

Man is the only animal capable of mirth,⁶ or even of laughter, which is a less intellectual effort than is the operation of wit, although allied to and a consequence of it; and originating in the same cause. Possibly, mirth was given to man alone, in order to counteract the many cares and anxieties with which he, beyond all other creatures in the world, is so ceaselessly oppressed.

It appears to me, however, that animals do possess some share of, or, at any rate, something analogous to, humour;⁷ though seemingly nothing of satire.⁸ Probably, the reason of this is that, while satire is almost purely intellectual, resulting from, or being produced solely by, an exercise of the mind;

⁶ *Vide ante*, b. i., c. ii. s. 9, vol. i. p. 310.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Mr. Wood* considers that many animals exhibit to a large extent a sense of the humorous, which they display in something akin to the practical jokes that they play on one another. This he thinks extends to the lower animals, who join with children in their gambols.

humour, although merely another exercise of the same capacity, is occasioned, to a great extent, by medial or material causes. For instance, any exuberance or overflow of the animal spirits, through which the being is for the time endowed with more than is requisite to stimulate it in its ordinary and regular pursuits and avocations, induces it to diversion in the way of gamboling, and to feats of merriment, reflective, as it were, of the inward joyous excitement of the soul, or instinctive being, produced by this overflow of spirits; and this wanton exercise, whether in man or animals, is naturally, if not necessarily, at once, and in every case, of a humorous turn. In the young, more especially, both of men and animals, it is frequently observable. Indeed, many animals, such as dogs and cats and sheep, display it only during youth. In man, too, probably youth is more particularly the period of humour, and riper age that of satire; although the tendency to humour, it may be, depends more on the temperament and texture, than on the actual age of the individual, through which an overflow of animal spirits, such as immediately induces to it, is occasioned.

Deficiency in the capacity of wit induces a person to be dull and slow in discovering the minute and trivial points of resemblance and coincidence between different subjects and ideas, and produces general heaviness and want of sprightliness in the intellectual character of such an individual. To a certain extent, especially as regards satire, it is improvable by suitable cultivation.⁹

3. *The Capacity of Taste.*

The capacity of taste is that capacity of the faculty of genius, by which it is enabled, with the utmost nicety, to combine together those ideas which most suitably harmonize with one another, and to select those only to combine, which are best fitted to be so united; and by a consequence also, to prefer those combinations of ideas which are thus formed.

Every compound subject—and of this nature are nearly all those which admit of any character being given to them as regards their tasteful qualities, those of an entirely simple and uncompounded nature rarely admitting of this—is composed of several distinct and independent ideas, which are there united or com-

⁹ *Locke* appears to hold that wit, or humour, is capable of improvement by cultivation in common with the other capacities of the mind.—*Conduct of the Understanding*, s. 4. *Vide post*, c. vii. s. 6.

bined together. According as these are suitable, or harmonize well together, will the subject, as a whole, be characterized as beautiful¹ or ugly, as conformable with, or contrary to taste.

Thus this capacity tends to the preference of those ideas which, from their mutual agreement and harmony, form combinations of the most beautiful and pleasing and sublime description.² In this respect, it is a kind of intellectual sense, corresponding with the material senses, which lead us to discover, and exercise a preference for, certain objects; or, like the palate, which rejects all unsavoury and disagreeable, and approves only of pleasing food, and of such kinds at the same time as mutually suit well, and harmonize with, each other.³

But it may be contended that the exercise of this capacity as regards the discrimination of one idea from another, and the deciding of their relative fitness for each other, is effected,

¹ According to *Dr. Thomas Brown*, "beauty is not anything that exists in objects independently of the mind which perceives them, and permanent, therefore, as the objects in which it is falsely supposed to exist. It is an emotion of the mind, varying therefore, like all our other emotions, with the varying tendencies of the mind, in different circumstances."—*Lectures on the Philos. of the Mind*, Lect. lvii.

"Any material object which can give us pleasure in the simple contemplation of its outward qualities without any direct and definite exertion of the intellect, I call in some way, or in some degree, beautiful."—*Ruskin. Modern Painters*, vol. i. pt. i. s. 1, c. 6.

Dr. Gerard, however, observes that "there is perhaps no term used in a looser sense than beauty, which is applied to almost everything that pleases us."—*Essay on Taste*, pt. i. s. 3.

² "Taste is so happy a kind of sensation, that we perceive the value of things without the aid of reflection; or rather, without making use of any rule to judge of them. It is an effect of the imagination, which, having early acquired the habit of entertaining itself with agreeable objects, preserves them always present, and naturally forms them into patterns."—*Condillac. Origin of Knowledge*, pt. i. c. xi. s. 2.

Melmoth defines taste "as consisting in the ready perception of, and pleasure arising from, propriety, fitness, or harmony, whether in things of the natural world, in the common manners and customs of mankind, or in works of art and of science."—*Lælius and Hortensia*, p. 11.

"Perfect taste is the faculty of receiving the greatest possible pleasure from those material sources which are attractive to our moral nature in its purity and perfection."—*Ruskin. Modern Painters*, vol. i. pt. i. s. 1, c. 6. "Taste, properly so called, is the instinctive and instant preferring of one material object to another without any obvious reason, except that it is proper to human nature so to do."—*Ibid.*

³ "No doubt the perceptive powers of man, and the lower animals, are so constituted, that brilliant colours and certain forms, as well as harmonious and rhythmical sounds, give pleasure, and are called beautiful; but why this should be so, we know no more than why certain bodily sensations are agreeable, and others disagreeable."—*Darwin's Descent of Man, &c.*, vol. ii. p. 353.

See also on this subject, *The Theory of the Arts, or Art in relation to Nature, Civilization, and Man.* By *George Harris, F.S.A.*, vol. i. pp. 40—53.

not by this capacity, but by the reason; which, as I have already observed, is called into use on every occasion when different ideas are in any way compared together.

With respect to this point, I would, however, observe that, while taste is exercised in combining together ideas, and in perceiving or discovering their similarity; reason is exercised only in separating them, and in perceiving or discovering their dissimilarity. Reason, too, would be quite unfitted for enabling a person to decide in matters of taste, to determine whether the combinations which are made by this capacity are pleasing and harmonious, and for which this capacity alone is adapted. The reason may, no doubt, in many cases, be called in to aid the operations or determinations of wit, as I shall presently⁴ have occasion to point out, when demonstrating that each faculty and capacity is assisted, in most of its operations, by the others. But this does not prove that the capacity of taste is not capable of being exercised in the manner, and for the purpose I have described, or that such a capacity is not essential for such an exercise; any more than because, when in deciding on the merits of a fine painting or prospect, or a beautiful piece of music, we are aided by the reason, in doing so, we must, necessarily, dispense with, or be totally wanting in taste.

The use of this capacity is to fit persons for the discovery of the beauties of nature and art, and to refine and purify the mind. By the aid of this capacity the poet and the painter make apt and suitable combinations, and are led to the selection of those ideas and words and objects, which, in every minute point, most perfectly harmonize with one another, and thus produce compositions of the most pleasing and refined nature. In this capacity of taste, therefore, all the arts, of whatever kind, originate, and towards this point they each converge; and it is alone by their excitement of, and application to this capacity, that they operate on the mind. Painting, poetry, music, and the other arts, are only so many avenues by which this capacity is approached; they are so many different kinds of intellectual nutriment by which this organ of the soul is supplied; but it is to this capacity, and to this alone, that they are all alike, and solely directed. Hence, the extensive possession of taste confers a general power for appreciating art; but the particular kind of art for which the individual is peculiarly adapted, depends, in part, on the constitution of his material senses, especially those of seeing and hearing; and in part on the attention which he has given to particular arts and pursuits, and his manual adaptation for them.⁵

⁴ *Vide post*, c. vi. s. 4.

⁵ It has often been remarked that "different races of men differ widely

A question may, therefore, here be raised, whether, and if so, how far, and to what extent, the large endowment with the capacity of taste may qualify a person for each of the arts, for all of which alike this capacity adapts us; and, on the other hand, whether, consequentially, a display of taste in one of the arts, implies and evidences a corresponding degree of taste for, and ability to excel extensively, if not equally, in each of the other arts.⁶

To this I may reply that, so far as each particular art, in the case of each individual, depends on his proportionate possession of taste, the extensive endowment with this capacity qualifies for each art alike; and the display of it in the exercise of one pursuit of this kind, proves the same person adapted for others of an artistic nature. But, in addition to this consideration, and as a qualification to the conclusions to be deduced from it, it should be borne in mind that certain particular attributes, as well as endowments, both material and medial as well as mental, are requisite for excelling in each intellectual pursuit, in addition to the being extensively gifted with the capacity fitted for it; as, for instance, a correct ear for music,⁷ and a correct eye for drawing. On certain of the emotions, too, and on a certain amount of susceptibility to be affected by them, depend an adaptation for certain arts and other pursuits.

Again, education particularly adapted to qualify us for particular pursuits, as well as capacity to excel in them, is in several instances necessary in order to enable persons to attain proficiency in them, especially in the arts of painting and music.

On the whole, therefore, it may be concluded that, not only is taste necessary for excelling in each art; but that for each particular art also, that peculiar material medial and moral adaptation, and that special training as well which is necessary to prepare the individual for following such a pursuit, are essential.

In conducting controversy, and in verbal composition, whether by speaking or writing, the possession of this capacity directs the individual to express himself with eloquence, and with good taste also.

The capacity of taste is principally exercised in combining ideas which are similar, and which well agree one with another. Wit, on the other hand, is mainly exercised in combining ideas

in their taste for the beautiful."—*Darwin's Descent of Man*, vol. ii. p. 350.

⁶ See on this subject, *The Theory of the Arts, &c.*, vol. i. c. 2, pp. 49—53.

⁷ Nevertheless, as pointed out by Coleridge, "an ear for music is a very different thing from a taste for music."—*Table Talk*.

which are dissimilar and opposite in their nature. The possession, to a large extent, of the capacity of taste, is less common than is that of wit; and a very high degree of beauty is less frequently attained than is great humour.

The capacity of taste is of little general utility for the common practical purposes of life. Like the corresponding capacities of apprehension and analysis, it originates in the acuteness and refinement of the mind; but they are, by no means, necessarily co-existent with it.

Deficiency in this capacity⁸ occasions a person to be dull in perceiving the more minute and nice points of excellence and beauty among many presented to his notice, and to make awkward and unsuitable combinations of ideas, both in pictorial composition and in that by writing. Of the different capacities of this faculty, taste appears to be that which is most susceptible of improvement by artificial education.

So far as they exhibit any preference for objects or subjects, either animate or inanimate, on account of their beauty, or other tasteful qualities, animals may appear to be influenced by some principle analogous to the capacity of taste; although in their case what really actuates them is not this capacity, but those sensations and emotions which certain objects, and also sounds, produce, and which in the case of man are entirely different to the exercise of taste, but are the introductory or incipient processes that lead to its exercise, as causing pleasurable emotions to be excited.⁹

4. *The Capacity of Origination.*

The most important and exalted of the capacities which constitute the faculty of genius is that of origination, comprising the power both of imagination and invention. This

⁸ "Incorrectness of taste may arise, either from the dulness of our internal senses, or from the debility of judgment."—*Gerard on Taste*, pt. ii. s. 6.

⁹ "When we behold male birds elaborately displaying their plumes and splendid colours before the females, whilst other birds not thus decorated make no such display, it is impossible to doubt that the females admire the beauty of their male partners."—*Darwin's Descent of Man, &c.*, vol. i. p. 63.

The same acute observer and able writer also remarks that "birds appear to be the most æsthetic of all animals, excepting of course man, and they have nearly the same taste for the beautiful as we have."—*Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 39. And that "as male birds display with so much care their fine plumage and other ornaments in the presence of the females, it is obviously probable that these appreciate the beauty of their suitors. It is however difficult to obtain direct evidence of their capacity to appreciate beauty."—*Ibid.*, p. 111.

capacity, like those of comprehension and judgment, seems to consist in a peculiar expansion of the mind as regards its ability to embrace a wide and comprehensive range of ideas.

Origination is that capacity of the faculty of genius by which it is enabled to combine together different and very remote ideas of different subjects, so as to form by such combination a new and original subject altogether. The power to effect this operation extends alike to ideas of visible objects and to those of abstract matters, such as the qualities and characteristics of various beings or subjects.¹

¹ *Lord Bacon* defines imagination to be "the representation of an individual thought."—*Nat. Hist., Cent. X.*, 945.

According however to *Hobbes*, imagination is nothing but decaying sense; and is found in man, and many other living creatures, as well sleeping as waking.—*Leviathan*, pt. i. c. ii.

Condillac states that "imagination takes place when a perception, in virtue of the connexion, which attention has established between it and the object, is revived at the sight of this object."—*Origin of Knowledge*, pt. i. c. ii.

Malebranche lays it down that "the faculty of imagining, or the imagination, consists only in the power the soul has of framing the images of objects, by effecting a change in the fibres of that part of the brain which may be called the principal part, as being that which corresponds to all the parts of our body; and is the place where the soul keeps her immediate residence, if I may be so allowed to speak."—*Search after Truth*, b. ii. c. 1.

According to *Mr. Ruskin*, "the imagination has three totally distinct functions. It combines, and by combination creates new forms; but the secret principle of this combination has not been shown by the analyst. Again, it treats or regards both the simple images and its own combinations in peculiar ways; and, thirdly, it penetrates, analyzes, and reaches truths by no other faculty discoverable."—*Modern Painters*, vol. ii. pt. iii. s. 2, c. 1.

Helvetius's definition of imagination is that it is "the invention with respect to images, as genius is with respect to ideas."—*Essays on the Mind*, Ess. iv. c. ii.

"Our imagination is nothing else but the various appearances of our sensible ideas in the brain, where the soul frequently works in uniting, disjoining, multiplying, magnifying, diminishing, and altering the several shapes, colours, sounds, motions, words, and things that have been communicated to us by the outward organs of sense."—*Dr. Watts' Logic*, pt. ii. c. iii. s. 3.

"By imagination we understand the power of comparing images with ideas, of giving colours to our thoughts, of aggrandizing our sensations, of perceiving distinctly all the remote affinities of objects."—*Buffon. Nat. Hist. Nat. of Animals*.

"When ideas, and trains of ideas, occur, or are called up in a vivid manner, and without regard to the former actual impressions and perceptions, this is said to be done by the power of imagination or fancy."—*Hartley. Observations on Man. Introd.*, p. 3.

Dugald Stewart lays it down that "the province of conception is to present us with an exact transcript of what we have formerly felt and perceived; that of imagination, to make a selection of qualities, and of circumstances, from a variety of different objects; and by combining and disposing these, to form a new creation of its own."—*Elements of Philos. of Human Mind*, pt. ii. c. vii. s. 1.

As the ideas of all external and material objects are derived through the senses; so the ideas which constitute any new, original, arbitrary system or matter which has no real existence in nature, are obtained, not intuitively, or by the direct communication to the understanding of the idea of such being from any external object, but by discovering or inventing this new system or subject, through combinations of the nature above described.² The process in question is effected by making fresh compounds of ideas of whatever nature, and through whatever capacity of the understanding they are obtained; as by changing the position of a kaleidoscope, through which the particles of its figures are transposed, we produce others entirely new.

As in the material, so in the mental world, nothing ever originates or is created without some germinating source from which it springs.³ Not only, indeed, is every original composition and every imaginative object created by combinations together of old ideas and substances, but we find that when combinations are attempted to be made out of ideas which are themselves inadequate for the purpose—when, as it were, the mind seems to be making an effort to invent or conjure up objects or phantasms beyond its own experience, and for which it possesses not the materials requisite—such a production fails to strike the mind, the operation of accomplishing it never arriving at maturity; and we discover that we are utterly unable to travel the smallest space beyond the verge prescribed as the limit of our intellectual inventive exertion. Such, indeed, is our poverty, or rather utter destitution, as regards inventive power, beyond the capacity of compounding together ideas in the manner I have described, that we cannot even imagine a new sense beyond those which we have; although it is possible and supposed by some, that in a future state of being we may be endowed with many such, and that those which we now have are but imperfectly adapted even for several of the purposes of this life to which we would apply them; and must be comparatively,

Dr. Carpenter defines imagination, in its lowest and simplest exercises, to be “that reproduction of the mental idea, or representation of an object formerly perceived through the senses, which is more generally understood by the term conception. In strict language, every such reproduction of our image, however distinctly traceable to the laws of association, is an act of imagination.”—*Mental Physiology*, b. ii. c. xii. p. 487.

² *Mr. Grindon* tells us that “the finest part of originality is combination, and the power of generalizing and uniting, discovering new harmonies among familiar elements, and showing us gracefully and eloquently how to see for ourselves.”—*Life*, c. xxiv. p. 300.

³ *Vide ante, Prel. Diss.*, s. 1, a. 1, vol. i. p. 7.

“From the power we have of reviving our perceptions in the absence of objects, is derived that of reuniting and connecting the most distant ideas. Everything is capable of assuming a new form in our imagination.”—*Condilliac. Origin of Knowledge*, pt. i. c. xi. s. 75.

if not wholly, useless, in our condition hereafter. Nevertheless, if we task ourselves to imagine what any new sense would be, we shall at once find that we are trying to effect this exercise of the imagination, by the combination together of the properties and qualities of our present senses, in a manner corresponding with that in which we invent or originate other new objects and ideas, by compounding old materials. Nor can the most ingenious, by any devices whatsoever, advance a step beyond this effort.

As by the operation of the capacity of origination, new combinations of ideas are made; so by this means are new discoveries actually effected. Invention is, however, the power of combining into one different and various ideas, and not the mere power of finding out or discovering them. Most persons, indeed, are able to effect the latter; but efficiently to accomplish the former, requires an extensive endowment with this capacity. Many people can select and bring together, and with great judgment, too, a wide range of different ideas, and even those of an imaginative character; but who, from a deficiency in origination, are unable to melt them together so as to amalgamate them into one. A person possessing this capacity to a large extent, appears moreover able to originate new theories, and to bring forth results which the generality are unable to discover.

Fancy often aids reason in the progress of discovery, and serves as a torch to assist our wanderings through those dark, dreary, and dismal caverns, where the light of truth has not as yet been able to penetrate.⁵ Nevertheless, much that passes for philosophy may, after all, prove to be but mere fancy; and some that pretends to be but mere fancy, may have fair claim to be ranked as sound philosophy, of which it occasionally turns out to be, if not the actual substance, yet the seed or germ.⁶

⁴ To this paragraph *Dr. Richardson* has appended the following note:—“I should give entire assent to this view, which, in the text, is so naturally and forcibly stated. The mind possesses no prime creative power whatever. It merely recreates the created. And even Shakspeare himself, does no more than condense, by his senses, the nature around him, to reconstruct it on paper, according to his reading of it, for the comprehension of less gifted receivers of nature.”

⁵ “Fancy,” according to *Wordsworth*, “is given to quicken and beguile the temporal part of our nature; imagination, to incite and support the eternal.”

⁶ *Dr. de Sainte Croix* has supplied the note which follows to the above paragraph:—“The word fancy ought to be designated here as the faculty by which genius creates for itself the images and the representations of things. This faculty is, indeed, nearly synonymous with imagination, with the difference that ‘imagination is the field where our ideas are sown, which spring up in thoughts, blossom in fancies, and ripen into notions. Idea presents the object, imagination receives it, thought considers it, fancy paints it, and it becomes a notion.’ I think that it is

An individual largely endowed with origination, is also enabled when engaged in controversy, to perceive what new arguments or points which have not before been resorted to, may be adduced in support of his views; and in many cases he is thus capacitated to draw forth apparently great and important results from premises which appeared barren and insignificant. That wonderful power of adapting certain means to ends entirely different to those which they originally served, which is possessed by some men, and, apparently, not at all by others, enabling them to effect such great purposes, and to discover and devise new and original means for accomplishing them, that were never seen before; is also, owing to the capacity of origination, which qualifies the person so gifted to unite one to another, and to cause them effectually to operate, different, and apparently discordant elements, which were never before conjoined.

The capacity of origination, it will therefore be perceived, may be applied for various purposes in the mind of any individual extensively endowed with it. It is alike fitted for aiding the progress of the sciences, for discovering fresh resources in cases of difficulty, assisting in artificial composition of each kind, or in controversial contest.

In matters of knowledge and reasoning, the capacity of origination is either of great advantage, or a serious obstacle, according as it is used for its proper end, or misused for purposes to which it is not naturally adapted. If the inventive power exercised by this capacity is employed as a pioneer to make new discoveries, and to explore the path for the reason to follow, solid benefit may result from its application in this manner:⁷ and, indeed, were it not for the aid which the reason receives from this capacity, but little progress in science would be effected. This, indeed, is the mode in which all new discoveries are achieved.⁸ If, on the other hand, the capacity of origination alone be relied upon for the acquisition of knowledge, or the solution of rational problems,—if the creations of the imagination are accepted as the basis of real information, or the deductions of right reason,—there is no error that may

also well that you have expressed the meaning of the word fancy, which has not its complete equivalent in the French language, at least, for this particular express signification. In the meantime, I believe that an explanation on this subject will not be out of place as regards the above passage.⁹

⁷ According to *Lord Bacon*, the imagination is not “simply and only a messenger, but is invested with, or at least asserteth no small authority in itself, besides the duty of the message.”—*Advancement of Learning*, b. ii.

⁸ “So far from being an enemy to truth, the imagination helps it forward more than any other faculty of the mind.”—*Madame de Staël*.

not ensue from such a course.⁹ In our intellectual as in our physical exertions, all the different capacities and powers should mutually operate together, not to hinder, but to aid each other.¹

As origination is the highest capacity of the mind, so is it the most liable to abuse; and while a great deficiency in it occasions barrenness in the intellectual character of the individual so limited, and causes a person to be wanting in originality of ideas, and to be monotonous and dull as regards his intellectual character; a too great exuberance or activity of it induces too speculative and eccentric a course with respect to the mental operations. According also as the capacity of origination is directed to important or to trivial objects, in which respect it may be largely influenced by the character and application and tendency of the other capacities of the mind, will be its own individual character and result. The nobler its objects, the loftier its aspirations; and the more powerful and extensive its operations, the nearer does it exalt us to the nature and attributes of the Almighty Himself, Whose creative capacity is in reality the highest endowment by which He is adorned.

Nevertheless, the proneness of the imagination occasionally to lead us astray, is evinced in the case of its fondness for inventions of a superstitious nature, which are ever more attractive to the mind than is strict naked truth. For, while in the investigation of the latter we are confined to the severe exercise of the understanding and the reason, in the pursuit of the former the imagination is allowed to have full play; and instead of being checked or restrained, the mind is permitted to revel abroad, and to follow, as it likes, its own devices.

An illustration of the extent to which the operation of the imagination is restrained and subdued by the activity of the understanding and the reason, is afforded by the circumstance that directly the exercise of these two latter faculties is checked by our being in a state of darkness, either mental or material, which prevents our receiving ideas, or directing our attention to subjects which would serve us in the acquisition of knowledge, or the exercise of reasoning; the imagination at once commences its operations, and forthwith conjures up forms, and scenes, and adventures, which, while occupied in our ordinary pursuits, were never permitted to appear.² As

⁹ According to *Hobbes*, without steadiness, and direction to some end, a great fancy is one kind of madness.—*Leviathan*, pt. i., c. viii.

¹ *Vide post*, c. vi. s. 4.

² "A reverie differs from imagination only in that the person being more attentive to his own thoughts, and less disturbed by foreign objects, more of his ideas are deducible from association, and fewer from new impressions."—*Hartley. Observations on Man*, vol. i. s. 5, prop. 91, p. 383.

animals in general, and all persons of regular habits, retire to rest at night, while those of a wild and untameable nature and disposition prowls about, and pursue their fierce callings at this time; so those capacities of the soul which are regular in their operations, we mostly exert during the day, while the wild flights of the imagination are chiefly indulged in during the sleeping hours of the night.

Those minds, moreover, in which origination is most powerful, are apt to be the least careful and precise about facts. If we have the privilege of coining our own money at pleasure, we shall be at small pains to procure it in the ordinary course of currency.

As with the faculty of genius as a whole, so with the capacity of origination; it is that which is the least generally extensively possessed, as it is also the least necessary for the common and ordinary purposes of life. And it is that which receives the least aid from artificial education.

Origination, either in the way of invention or imagination, appears to be but seldom exercised in early life; and we may consequently infer that it is not developed until the mind has attained maturity.³ It is not often indeed that children or youths produce anything very remarkable, either in the way of imagination or of scientific discovery, even in the case of those whose understandings are sufficiently stored with ideas to qualify them for, and to induce them, to attempt efforts of this kind. From the greater freedom of action of the mind at this period, and from its being less shackled by precedent, and being also less timid about effecting new combinations than in after life, it might have been calculated that its inventive capacities would have met with full scope for exercise, and that the productions of youth of this character would have yielded abundant and luscious fruit. Their failure to do so may, therefore, be regarded as a sure proof that the inventive capacity is later

He observes, however, that "in all the cases of imagination and reverie, the thoughts depend in part upon the then state of the body or mind."—*Ibid.*

³ *Aristotle* considers that the powers of imagination and memory originate in the senses, and are common to many animals as well as to man. He however says that animals have sensitive phantasy, or imagination only, and that rational creatures alone possess the power of deliberating, and of comparing ideas.

Buffon, on the other hand, asserts that animals are still more destitute of imagination than they are of understanding or memory.—*Nat. Hist. Nature of Animals.*

Le Roy, however, contends that "from the fact that animals do not push their inventions beyond their requirements, we shall err in arguing that they do not invent at all, nor would the premises warrant such a conclusion."—*Intelligence and Perfectibility of Animals*, Letter vii.

in development, and in attaining maturity, than are those of wit and taste.⁴

5. *Illustration of the Nature of these Capacities.*

The capacities of genius, although the loftiest of all the powers of the mind, and although in no respect allied to materiality, peculiarly admit of metaphorical illustration as to their nature and operation, and that in various ways. Thus, the operations of genius, by which ideas are compounded together, might well be compared to, or exemplified by, the process of compounding or combining together different colours one with another. The operations of wit being represented by the placing together of the two opposite and strongly-contrasted colours of black and white; those of taste by the placing together of colours which best agree and har-

⁴ The following interesting and valuable note has been supplied to this paragraph by *Dr. de Sainte Croix* :—"Genius, like taste, is a natural gift, and is innate, susceptible of development, and of being perfected, under favourable circumstances.

"The germ of one, as of the other, exists all at once, in a state more or less concealed, to some degree in every human being, and this germ is able to receive an immediate impulse. It is probably excited to activity by a vast number of different spontaneous causes. It is able to spring up of itself, when either internally stimulated or externally excited.

"The productive or inventive faculty has also among the human race a germ, but which requires, in order to obtain its complete development, much more constant and repeated nourishment. It is of a nature entirely different, and its actions vary widely from those of genius and taste. The production is an offshoot which is very plain. Physically and psychologically it is the formation or fabrication of a new being, by a being already existent, containing in itself the principles of the new being, which insists on escaping from its shell, and on exhibiting itself in an active and independent condition. Morally and intellectually, this is the creation and the development of a deep thought or sentiment which some one conceives, and which gives birth to the genius or feeling of him who has conceived it, and who feels the want to extend beyond himself.

"In order that the productive faculty bear fruit, it is necessary that it attain full maturity, which cannot be until it has had ample experience of life, of nature, of spirit, and of knowledge; which urges it to make its escape and to fly away and quit its material shell, whether this be intellectual or moral. Just so, the human being in producing, does not give more than it possesses of its kind, so that it is not able to do more than to transmit to others what it has acquired. In order to attain this object it is necessary that to be the parent of another it should have lived a certain space of time, that it should have developed its faculties, have gained more or less experience, with a certain amount of nutrition, intellectual or material. This is plain, that whatever it supplies, it obtains back again in return.

"This is why children are incapable, or very little capable, of bearing fruit, and why this power is reserved for those who have arrived at a mature age, whether of genius, intelligence, taste, or power."

monize one with another; and those of origination by the composition and commingling together of colours which, by their union, serve to produce, not a mere mongrel colour, but one entirely new, independent, and original. Such is the result of the mixture of blue and red, whence is produced the colour of purple; and of blue and yellow, whence originates green.

Or, as already effected with regard to the faculty itself, we might with more strict logical accuracy and propriety, although perhaps with less force as regards the illustration of the subject, compare these different capacities and their operation, and the combination of ideas by their means, to the combination together of different chemical elements. The operations of wit, for instance, being compared to the combination together of those elements which are wholly dissimilar, disagreeing, and opposite in their nature, and which, though ever so closely conjoined, will never actually unite; as in the commingling together of oil and water: the operations of taste to the combination together of those elements which most suitably, easily, and entirely agree and unite and harmonize together, though still retaining the essential qualities belonging to each other; as when water and sugar are mixed together, which at once mutually and harmoniously combine: and the operations of invention to the union together of those elements through the combination of which an entirely new and original one, totally different from either of those united, is produced; as in the case of the combination together of an acid and an alkali, by which is generated a new substance, quite different from either of its constituents.

The faculty of origination, moreover, no less than those of understanding and reason, differs in each person, not only from the variety in extent of its several capacities, but according to the peculiar character and quality of those capacities also; just as the combination of colours or substances may differ according to the skill with which the combination is effected, whichever of the three modes be employed for the purpose, independent of the accidental varieties which disease or defect of the faculty may occasion.⁵

⁵ *Condillac* appears to me to confound imagination with memory. *Essay on Knowledge*, pt. i. c. ii. s. 17; c. ix. s. 75. But he considers that it is assisted by comparison.—Pt. i. s. 2. In pt. i. c. ix. s. 75, he attaches two different significations to imagination. In another passage it occurs to me that he has confounded imagination with instinct, c. ix. ss. 95, 98.

6. *Distinctive Functions, Operation, and Application, of each of these different Capacities.*

We have next to consider the peculiar and distinctive mode in which each of these several capacities discharges its own proper functions in regard to the particular mental operations effected by the faculty of genius, already alluded to.

The capacity of wit is that which, as I have already stated, enables us to combine and contrast together various ideas which, although in some points agreeing, are of a totally different character one from another; and which, whether in painting, poetry, or music, or the other ideal and imitative arts, occasions what we style in some cases effect, and in others humour or ridicule. This exercise of the mind, whether it result in a forcible and striking contrast, such as we commonly term effect, or a ludicrous and incoherent combination, such as we ordinarily style humour or ridicule, is performed by this capacity. In each case the operation is the same as regards the combining and contrasting together ideas widely varying one from another, between which a certain similarity on some points exists.⁶ Nevertheless, persons who possess the power of producing effect are not always (though very frequently they are) endowed with that of producing humorous combinations. This is not, however, because this same capacity does not serve for both purposes, but because the same persons are not often disposed to exercise it for both ends. From this capacity being adapted for both these appliances, arose probably the adage that the sublime or effective is but one degree removed from the ludicrous. Perhaps, indeed, the difference between humour and effect may principally consist in this; that in the former the resemblance between the ideas combined, though trivial, is very obvious: in the latter, though less trivial, it is also less obvious, and not, perhaps, perceivable on a mere cursory view; while the difference is greater and more striking than in the former. As I mentioned before,⁷ from the combination of both effect and ridicule, satire is the product.

The capacity which we call taste, as I observed when describing its nature, consists in a peculiar susceptibility of the mind to distinguish with the utmost nicety the character of different ideas, and to effect the most suitable combinations of them. We find, however, that different minds are very differently constituted with regard to this capacity. Among various persons it may be remarked that their material organs and palates greatly differ, by which one is not only able

⁶ *Theory of the Arts*, vol. i. c. ii. pp. 49, 50; c. vii. pp. 315—318.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

to perceive the nature of any object or the quality of any substance much more distinctly than others can do, but is also led to prefer what to another is displeasing; and consequently the food esteemed the most luxurious by one is disrelished by another. So is it also with respect to the taste or palate of the mind—that those peculiar ideas, or combinations of ideas, which some can scarcely distinguish from those of an ordinary character, afford the utmost delight to others.⁸

The ideas of different objects which enter into the minds of different persons, and variously affect them with regard to the colour, form, or general character of those objects, owe this difference, as regards the particular effects which they produce, not to their entering in a different manner into, or appearing different in the minds of different individuals, although some, from the greater perfection of their material organs, may perceive with much greater nicety than others can; but from different minds being diversely disposed towards them, even where they are perceived with an equal degree of clearness.⁹ Thus is it with regard to colour, which more immediately and forcibly stimulates our senses than either shape or sound. The variety of different colours when viewed together is so extensive and so obvious, that it appears impossible for ideas of them to be received into the mind without a feeling of preference for some one of them in particular being excited. Different individuals, however, possess different tastes for the same colour. The reason of this probably is, not that they receive different ideas of any one particular colour, but that this preference for an individual colour is regulated by their feeling of choice or taste, and by their general mental and moral disposition, and endowments, and qualities. Thus, an individual of active and energetic feelings might be induced to prefer a colour of a glaring hue, which would raise the sensations in his mind congenial to his feelings; while an individual of an opposite disposition likes better one of a more softened tint. As, for instance, among children, who possess more vivacity than persons of mature age, and are

⁸ *Theory of the Arts*, vol. i. c. ii. pp. 38—40. 49. 52.

⁹ "There is naturally a vast difference among mankind, in the acuteness of all their perceptive powers. They are in some of so tender and delicate a structure, that they are strongly affected both with pleasure and pain. In others their dulness renders both enjoyments and sufferings languid."—*Gerard on Taste*, pt. ii. s. 4.

This same writer nevertheless remarks that "men who are affected differently, may notwithstanding judge alike; and men who judge differently, may admit some common principles which serve as a test of both their judgments."—*Ibid.*, pt. iv. s. 2. And that "on the whole the principles of taste are entirely uniform, but men possess very different degrees of these principles."—*Ibid.*, pt. iv. s. 3.

It is moreover observed by *Melmoth* that "the objects of taste are in a constant state of fluctuation; and the preferring or rejecting such objects is frequently attended with uncertainty."—*Lælius and Hortensia*, p. 408.

more fond of excitement, a colour of a bright and striking quality would ordinarily be preferred to one of a more sober and chaste character, but which older persons would choose. Thus, also, by the same rules, might a preference or taste among different persons for different sounds, be, in like manner, regulated.¹

With respect to shape, the choice is also in some degree regulated by the foregoing principles; but, inasmuch as shape has no abstract being in itself, like colour or sound, and cannot be considered apart from the subject to which it belongs, the preference for a shape of this or that nature is necessarily determined by the object in which it exists, and is dependent on fitness, naturalness, proportion, and many other incidental circumstances.

The love of harmony and of proportion in general, arises from the pain which the mind feels from any sudden or irregular motion in its action, caused by too violent a contrast being presented to it, whether occasioned by shape, colour, or sound. These principles of order, harmony, proportion, and fitness are essential to constitute beauty in every object and in every subject. Variety, to a certain extent, is also necessary for this purpose, inasmuch as taste is produced or gratified, not by one, but by an apt combination of several distinct and suitable ideas or objects. It is seldom or never that one colour, or one sound, can be considered as beautiful when not conjoined or combined with any other corresponding colour or sound. So also of shape. The very same colours, and sounds, and shapes, which, when harmoniously and aptly combined, produce beautiful effects; when inharmoniously and discordantly arranged, produce effects of a displeasing and disagreeable character.² From associations connected with it, a single sound or colour may by itself appear beautiful; as a red colour, from its similarity to that of certain beautiful flowers; blue from being the colour of the sky; a sound from its resemblance to some very harmonious note in a tune. So a single colour, when united to a very elegant shape, may be beautiful.

That exercise of the capacity of origination which we com-

¹ *Theory of the Arts*, vol. i. c. ii. p. 47.

Dr. de Sainte Croix remarks on what is here stated, that "if children and young people evince a decided taste for glaring colours and exciting sounds, it is for those exciting sounds and glittering colours which are simple and pure; and so long as sounds which are harmonious, and colours which are chaste, are composed, and combined, and united together by the aid of exalted genius, and by tasteful intellectual efforts. The eyes and the ears of persons of mature age, capable of reflection and of study, prefer those things when they are combined, composed, and united together, so long as these lively colours and exciting sounds strike agreeably the ear and the eye, which are not as yet experienced and habitually accustomed either to reflect, compare, or combine."

² *Theory of the Arts*, vol. i. c. ii. p. 49.

monly term imagination, and which is its most extensive and extraordinary operation; consists in collecting together different ideas relating to the qualities or appearance of various subjects, and uniting them so as to form of themselves a description of a compound nature of some particular subject.

It might appear perchance to some, that the mind possesses, as it were, the power of thinking beyond its own confines of experience, and of creating ideas and objects which it never received, or had any knowledge of in the course of nature. It will however, upon strict observation and inquiry, be obvious, as recently pointed out,³ that the mind is endowed with no such creative faculty or power, and that it never can of itself produce any idea wholly original. The power of this nature that it does possess through the capacity of origination, is simply the ability to compound different ideas together, and to unite into one complex idea certain of those of several different objects or beings; or to place them in a different position one with another from that in which they were formerly stationed. This appears to be the utmost extent of the capacity with which the mind is gifted, and the verge beyond which it can never pass.⁴ In proof of this, if we examine those works of extraordinary imaginative power which the minds of some of our greatest poets and painters have achieved, we shall find that the most striking and wonderful of the objects, or beings, or scenes, which they have portrayed, are each of them constituted by combinations together of various ideas of different subjects which, individually, they have received through the senses.

Thus, to take one renowned instance which will suffice for all, in that very extraordinary and imaginative production, Milton's *Paradise Lost*, in which he has so wonderfully described the appearance and nature of those tremendous and powerful beings, and of those dark and mysterious regions which form the subject of his poem; we shall discover no object,

³ *Ante*, s. iv. p. 47.

⁴ "A special effort of mind is necessary to the act of imagination, which is not required to conceiving or understanding. And this special exertion of mind clearly shows the difference between imagination and pure intellect." (*Des Cartes*, *Medit. vi.*) "The mind, in conceiving, turns in some way upon itself, and considers some one of the ideas it possesses within itself; but in imagining, it turns towards the body, and contemplates in it some object conformed to the idea which it either of itself conceived, or apprehended by sense."—*Ibid.*

"The imagination is no unskilful architect; it collects and chooses the materials; and though they may at first lie in a rude and indigested chaos, it in a great measure, by its own force, by means of its associating power, after repeated attempts and transpositions, designs a regular and well-proportioned edifice."—*Gerard on Genius*, pt. i. s. 3.

Nevertheless, as pointed out by *Coleridge*, "even in dreams, nothing is fancied without an antecedent quasi cause. It could not be otherwise."
—*Table Talk*.

no conception, no description, which might not have been formed in the way I have specified, and the ideas of which may not have been obtained from other objects or beings of which we have sensorial knowledge. It is by the effective and apt combination together of the ideas of subjects of an opposite character, and of the most sublime and imaginative nature, that the result in question was produced.

These descriptions so accomplished, are also greatly heightened in effect, and as regards the beauty and grandeur of the ideas which they excite, by the capacities of wit and taste, which are often extensively co-existent with origination; and without which the efforts of the latter in a composition of this nature, would be but of little avail.⁵ Not only, however, the shape, but also the qualities and characters of different beings, are capable of being diversified and enlarged by the imaginative power of the mind.

Nor can this simplicity in the mode of operation of the capacity of origination, be considered as any deterioration of the genius or power of that wonderful work, which is probably, as an effort of imagination, the most sublime and truly great and extraordinary of human performances.

Of the visible Being or Form of the Deity we can know nothing; and we can imagine nothing, except in the manner I have mentioned—by comparing Him with other beings familiar to us, or composing an object from the several ideas of them; but which in any case affords merely an ideal representation to our minds of such a Being, without imparting any real knowledge of Its nature.

Nevertheless, all the operations of genius, so far as we can see, are perfectly performed during our present state; and there is no reason to suppose that when the soul is separated from the body, although its sphere of action may be then much enlarged, its powers will be actually and essentially increased, beyond the circumstance of its being freed from the restraints to which this faculty is now subjected from the frailty, grossness, and liability to disorder of those intellectual organs of the body through which it is exerted, or which influence its operations, and the dulness or inefficiency with which ideas may have been communicated to the mind.

The capacity of origination is not, however, by any means confined in its exercise to imaginative efforts; but, as I have already stated, it is also extensively exerted in making discoveries in science, and inventing original plans and designs of various kinds, which latter operation is indeed effected in a manner strictly analogous to that of imaginative productions in the arts,—by combining together different ideas and subjects, and

⁵ *Theory of the Arts*, vol. i. c. viii. p. 317.

thereby forming new ones out of them. In chemical science we see at once how fresh compounds are produced, by simply uniting various substances. But so is it also in mechanical and all the other sciences, although the mode of this may be less obvious at first sight.

As to how far the operations of the faculty of genius, or any of its capacities, are influenced by the condition of the material frame, and in what respect; whether the imaginative and inventive power, and also that of taste, are affected by this means, and if so by giving a bias to the views that would be adopted, and the efforts that would be made, as well as extending or curtailing those efforts according to circumstances; whether the state of the body is calculated to vary the character of the imaginative efforts, or to give a tincture to those of taste as well as to influence the celerity and readiness with which they may be performed; might form an interesting topic of inquiry. That the activity of wit is extensively accelerated by the exuberance and elasticity of the animal spirits, is obvious to all.⁶

Intimately allied to the topics which we have been considering in the present section, is the process of imitation, which in its most simple sense is the mere act of doing or copying what has been done by others.⁷ Considered, however, in its more comprehensive sense, and with regard to the imitation of those subjects or objects which are in their nature very complex, or for the performance or construction of which much labour or care has been bestowed, it consists in the exertion of the capacities of apprehension, deprehension, taste, and occasionally origination also; whereby we in the first place obtain a correct and exact knowledge of any subject or object, or of those qualities in it which we desire to imitate; and whereby we, in the second place, effect such a combination of ideas, and are enabled to accomplish such an amalgamation of results and materials also, as to produce an object or subject resembling that which is before us. Invention indeed, is only exercised here when apprehension and deprehension fail to inform us of the nature of the qualities and combinations contained in the subject we are seeking to imitate, and it is necessary therefore to create anew in order to supply the deficiency. This is indeed, rather originating in our minds, than borrowing from others, in which copying essentially

⁶ *Dr. Beddoe* observes in reference to this paragraph, that the powers alluded to are extensively affected by the bodily condition. "Familiar instances are the effects of opium, tea, and other neurotics, upon the imaginative faculty."

⁷ "Imitation is the mesothesis of likeness and difference. The difference is as essential to it as the likeness; for without the difference, it would be a copy or facsimile. But, to borrow a term from astronomy, it is a librating mesothesis; for it may verge more to likeness, as in painting, or more to difference, as in sculpture."—*Coleridge. Table Talk.*

consists; and it is not often that origination is largely employed here, although perhaps there are few cases where it is not more or less called in to aid in this process. But, as in the combinations which we make during the effort of imitation, we are usually guided by the subject we are copying; so apprehension and deprehension are ordinarily sufficient to enable us to effect this result, by informing us of the nature of these combinations, without our exerting ourselves to make any that are new or original for this purpose.

The capacity of taste is occasionally of use to regulate the correctness of the imitation, especially when the subject or object is a composition of an artistical nature.⁸

The power of effecting imitation has by some been regarded as a distinct and independent faculty of the mind. If, however, we examine closely into the mode in which this process is performed, we shall at once discern that the capacities which I have mentioned, are engaged in every act of this nature, which consists indeed in several operations at the same time, greatly varying in their character, for which therefore different faculties or capacities must necessarily be exerted; and which is not like the act of receiving ideas, comparing them, or combining them, that are single and simple in themselves, and may consequently each be performed by a single faculty or capacity.

The power of imitation in various ways which the mind possesses, by the exercise together of these different faculties and capacities, is one of the most remarkable with which it is endowed. Man indeed, appears by nature to be peculiarly adapted for imitating what he sees; and is ever practising this from the first dawning of reason. Men in general too, are ever wont to imitate the manners and feelings of those in whose society they are, and a large portion of their actions consists in the imitation of those of others. As man brings no ideas or notions of his own with him into the world, he derives all that he possesses from objects around him, and forms his habits and manners by imitating the actions of those in whose society he is living. In children, among whom the bias of nature will be most fairly and openly displayed, we may ever observe how prone they are to imitate whatever takes place within their view, such as the actions of those about them, or the sounds which they hear. A child that has been deserted in infancy,

⁸ According to *Buffon*, the perfection of imitation depends on the vivacity with which the internal material sense receives the impressions of objects, and on the facility of expressing them by the similitude and the flexibility of the exterior organs. Persons whose senses are delicate and easily agitated, whose members are active and obedient, make the best actors and mimics. Children habitually imitate others. Nevertheless, those who reflect least, are the most expert at imitation.—*Natural History. Nature of Animals.*

and does not afterwards, or until it has reached maturity, see other human beings about him, and has not the opportunity of imitating their manners and customs, or who from blindness or like incapacity from his birth, is debarred from doing so; grows up a being of an altogether different nature from the rest of his species, according as the extent of this deprivation prevails. Not so with any one of the brute creation, which would attain the same degree of perfection in all respects, although wholly separated from the rest of its kind until it arrived at full age, inasmuch as it is guided by instinct in all its pursuits. In the case of man, no such directing principle being implanted in him, he is stimulated in most of his actions by imitation of the conduct of those he sees around him. It is therefore, I conclude, from his being from his earliest age so incessantly habituated to indulge in this propensity, as we may rightly term it, owing to his constant natural proneness to exercise it, that he is swayed by it to so large an extent. It exerts moreover, considerable influence over his whole intellectual conduct. His power of invention is, in comparison with his power of imitation, but very limited. Moreover, those who are the most extensively endowed with origination, are ever the least prone to exercise imitation; and those who are most successful in imitating, are usually the least capacitated to invent.

There are indeed but comparatively few persons who can invent an original style, either in poetry, painting, music, or architecture; but when they have once seen the task performed by others, they are able to imitate the effort with tolerable exactness. Thus, a painter possessing no inventive faculty, and but moderate skill, will, with a picture of superior merit before him, produce a copy of it so exact that many could not distinguish it from the original; although the artist would by his own genius, without having another picture to imitate, be utterly unable to paint a tolerable piece. In like manner, an individual of but little genius for poetry, can compose an imitation of Shakspeare's or Milton's style, which might pass current among many for the genuine productions of those great and wonderful poets.

The large excess in the power of imitation over that of imagination, is moreover very forcibly shown in the efforts of writers of fiction, where especially origination might seem to be the capacity mainly employed, and where it would have full scope for exercise; but who never fail to copy as far as they can, from real transactions instead, wherever the opportunity offers, and who build upon this foundation many of their most imaginative descriptions and scenes.

It is also remarkable, and well worthy of observation here, that those animals which in their exterior shape and con-

struction, and those which are endowed most largely with sagacious qualities, and most resemble man, such as the ape, the monkey, the dog, and the elephant, are also the most prone of themselves, and the most capable of being trained, to imitate the actions and occurrences that take place around them; while animals totally destitute of sagacity, and bearing no resemblance to man, appear to possess no imitative propensity or power.⁹

Yet, although animals, like man, imitate certain actions, they never effect this intellectually, or through the possession of faculties or capacities; but only instinctively, or through sensorial impulse and direction. They imitate not any mental efforts, but merely those ordinary bodily exercises which they see performed. In animals this proneness to imitate, which is caused by an instinctive impulse, is, however, doubtless very strong, and amounts to a propensity. It is, nevertheless, confined to some particular animals only.¹

All those animals moreover, who appear to exercise and to be influenced by taste in the preference of certain forms and colours, and sounds, so act, not because they are endowed with this capacity; but because they are impelled by those pleasurable emotions which subjects of beautiful and pleasing qualities excite in the sensorial organs, independent of their affecting the mind, and through sensation only.

⁹ *Smellie* observes that "all animals, particularly those of the more perfect kind, are endowed with the principle of imitation."—*Philosophy of Natural History*, c. xix. p. 469.

¹ *Mr. Wake* has been so kind as to favour us with the following valuable note on this passage:—

"When you speak of animals imitating 'the actions and occurrences which take place around them,' I suppose you refer to certain actions originated or performed by human agency. If so, your restriction as to the animals which imitate such actions is no doubt just; but that animals which so act do so merely by instinct, or in obedience to 'sensorial impulse,' I cannot believe. The proof of the contrary is that such animals sometimes show more than imitation in their conduct in relation to their imitative actions. It is impossible to explain their conduct except by supposing a process of reasoning in the animal mind. My opinion is that all the higher animals reason within certain limits just as well as man; and if so, animals which imitate human actions, may be thought to reason about them, or rather to perform them reasoningly. The difference between the mental faculties of man and those of the lower animals, is much overrated. To me those faculties appear to be the same in both, the real difference being in thought objectivity, and not in thought action. I do not see how we can distinguish between the mental action of the shepherd-dog, which will, when ordered so to do, fetch a sheep belonging to its own flock out of a fold containing sheep of other flocks, from that of a man under like circumstances."

7. *Corresponding character in the action of each of these Capacities.*

Having considered the distinctive and peculiar functions proper for each of the capacities of the faculty of genius to be engaged in, and the difference as regards the several objects to which they are respectively applied; we have next to inquire into the character of those operations as regards their correspondence one with another, and their general coincidence with respect to the uniformity of action of this faculty as a whole.

It might indeed perchance appear to some persons, that the various operations of these several capacities are so totally different in their nature, and embrace so wide a range of subjects and pursuits,—comprehending, for instance, the opposite and dissimilar topics of ridicule, poetry, and scientific discovery,—instead of, like the operations and pursuits of the capacities of understanding and reason, all tending in the same direction; that it cannot be supposed either that they all belong to the same faculty, or that, like the other capacities of the other faculties, they each partake of the same nature one with another, varying only as regards the extent, and not as to the mode of their operation.

On further consideration it will however appear, that the different operations and pursuits which engage these different capacities, cannot fairly be urged to prove that the capacities in themselves actually differ in their nature one from another. Indeed, the various operations and pursuits embraced by the several capacities of understanding and reason, very greatly differ, more especially as regards the subjects they embrace; and yet this in no degree proves that they are not each of them merely variations of the powers of receiving and of comparing ideas. So of the capacities of genius, however extensive the differences in their operation, or however opposite the subjects with which they deal, they each correspond exactly and entirely one with another, and with the faculty of genius, as regards both the character and the mode of their operation; and they are each, after all, but separate and peculiar modifications of the power of combining ideas.

In addition to this, it must be borne in mind that, not only are the capacities of genius fitted for the operations here assigned to it, and for all of them, and for those only; but that no other capacities of either of the other faculties, or any other powers of the mind, either singly or combined, are adapted for these exercises, or for any of them, which are the sole and peculiar province of genius, and of genius alone.

From this, probably, it results that wit, taste, and origination are oftener found extensively co-existent together, than that any one of them is seen largely co-existent with any other capacities of the mind.

As in the animal world there are many animals, such as bats and birds, and certain fishes and reptiles, bearing a great outward similarity to each other, but between which there is nevertheless a broad and distinct line of separation, constituted by the difference in species to which they respectively belong ; while, on the other hand, all those animals of the same species, however unlike in their outward appearance, are bound together by one common chain : so the different capacities of the same faculty are, in a corresponding manner, connected ; while those of different faculties are also correspondingly disconnected and distinguished, however nearly certain of their operations may assimilate together.

The faculty of genius nevertheless, differs, as regards its operations, from those of understanding and reason, in that the different capacities of this faculty do not always, or necessarily, act together, or co-operate with each other, with regard to any subject on which the mind is engaged ; although occasionally, but not often, they do so. They are more independent of one another, however, as regards their operation, than are any other capacities of either of the other faculties ; and they less contribute to aid each other.

Moreover, as genius effects new combinations of different kinds at pleasure in so great a variety of modes, it is also necessarily more or less erratic, and uncertain, and irregular in its operations, than are either of the other faculties. Hence the eccentric course which genius often follows, contrasts strongly with the regular movements of the understanding and the reason. But although genius is naturally thus wild and wanton, it is nevertheless fully capable of being tamed. Real fertile genius is wildness rightly ordered, possessing at once the freedom and energy of the one state, and the regularity and steadiness of the other. Steam and electricity are apparently, in their natural course of operation, the most eccentric, uncertain, and irregular of all elements ; yet with these are the surest, steadiest, and most unerring movements effected when they are duly controlled and directed.²

² *Professor C. J. Plumptre* observes, in reference to this passage :—“ Whilst this is perfectly true as regards genius in its maturity, I think that in early life it is frequently so erratic as to be for the time of the most irregular and uncertain character.”

8. *Art the especial Province of the Faculty of Genius.*

In the propensity to imitate, or typify, or reproduce, certain particular ideas or subjects, primarily originated those arts which are denominated the ideal and imitative; and which are mainly comprised in those of sculpture, painting, architecture, eloquence, poetry, and music, although other pursuits and inventions, of a similar or corresponding nature, might also be classed with them. These, however, will suffice for the illustration of the argument contained in the present section.³

Sculpture appears to be the most natural of all the arts, and was probably the first invented; inasmuch as its origin would arise in the mere imitation of the shape of some object in nature, constituted of a certain malleable or hard substance.⁴ Painting is less simple with regard to the first invention and mode of effecting it, but describes more nearly the objects which it represents; and therefore has equally its foundation in the imitative power possessed by the mind.⁵ The origin of architecture is also to be attributed to the imitative power of the mind; and different orders are said to have been first invented from the imitation of the arched coverings afforded by trees, and the form of some caverns; whence people in a rude state were led to shape their habitations after them. Through subsequent efforts to perfect this art, it has grown more complex; and various principles have been adopted for its regulation, which, without tracing out the origin of the art, would seem to have rendered it more of a purely ideal than an imitative art. In eloquence, endeavours are made to effect in the most powerful manner, the description of the circumstance or scene narrated; not indeed, it may be, by strict imitation, but by affording us the most exalted and forcible ideas of the subject through those with which it is associated, and which are introduced for its illustration; while the feelings of the mind are also imitated by the orator in order to excite the sympathy of his audience, and to produce corresponding emotions in their breasts.⁶

The art of poetry may at first sight appear in its character to possess but little of an imitative pursuit;⁷ and like architecture,

³ "All the fine arts are, in some sense, imitative of nature; invention in these arts, is only observing and copying nature in a certain manner."—*Gerard on Genius*, pt. iii. s. 6.

⁴ *Theory of the Arts*, vol. i. c. iii. p. 71.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

⁷ "Ingenuous and well-disciplined natures find in the varieties of melody and rhyme, striking resemblances of anger and meekness, of manliness

to be in many respects entirely ideal, and founded upon principles wholly foreign to either nature or imitation. But if, as in the case of architecture, we trace back the origin of it, we shall find that nature, and the imitative power, were the first producers of it, however other principles may since have been called in to its aid; and that it was adopted to delineate in the most effective form, the feelings of the mind.⁸ The origin of music was in a corresponding manner derived from the imitation of certain sounds in nature, which had for their object the excitement of agreeable sensations in the soul;⁹ and the art was perfected by so regulating them as to affect us in a mode the most forcible and pleasing.

In each of these arts, however, whose origin arose from the imitative efforts of the mind, various other principles have been called in to aid their growth, and to contribute to their vigour and effect; and thus the several capacities of wit, taste, and invention are simultaneously resorted to, and in many instances contribute so largely, and indeed, essentially, to their excellence and energy, as almost to obscure the foundation on which they rest. Indeed, in all cases where any objects or subjects call forth in our minds ideas of beauty or of pleasure arising from their outward qualities, the faculty of genius, through its capacity of taste, is that which is exerted.

The capacities of this faculty have however, ordinarily, but little to do with art of any kind until it becomes developed, and reaches a state of maturity, when its characteristic qualities are first manifested; such as those of effect, tasteful beauty, and imaginative creation. But, as regards these qualities, although of themselves independent of the subjects wherein they reside, they are nevertheless their most important characteristics and features in respect to their application to, and effect on the mind, to which they appeal solely through the capacities of genius; and it is their common power to deal with these peculiar qualities, that constitutes the alliance in their nature between these capacities.

Even in art before it is fully developed, so far as its original creativeness is concerned, and whenever, and so far as, it consists in forming new combinations of any kind, genius is the principal faculty employed, through the capacity of origination.¹

As in the case of our material frames, although their growth

and temperance, and of all other such moral affections, as well as of their contraries."—*Aristotle. Politics*, b. v.

⁸ *Theory of the Arts*, vol. i. c. iii. pp. 79. 85.

⁹ "Of all the objects of our senses, sounds are the most striking resemblances of manners."—*Aristotle Politics*, b. v.

¹ "I define genius as originality in intellectual construction."—*Coleridge, The Friend*, s. 2, ess. 1.

is ceaselessly progressing so far that fresh particles are continually being added; yet with this, there is a contemporary corresponding loss from the increasing decay or wearing out of parts, which takes place: so as regards the progress and condition of certain arts, a large degree of invention is required merely to make up for the loss of productions which, from various causes, in the course of time perish; and in order to prevent any retrogression in relation to our position with respect to this pursuit.

Those exercises of the mind which I have considered in this chapter as employed in the pursuit of the arts, are therefore the principal operations of the faculty of genius; although, both as a faculty of itself, and as regards the several capacities with which it is endowed, there are certain other studies to which they are capable of being applied, and their adaptation for which I pointed out when describing the nature of those capacities. Thus, origination or invention, as already demonstrated, may be used not only during efforts of the imagination, but also for resorting to new arguments in controversy, and for making fresh discoveries in science; and wit, for the purpose of exciting ridicule, as well as for producing effect. Taste is however but little, if at all, resorted to, except in artistical pursuits. Hence, as concerns not only those subjects which are within the province of art, but all other subjects whatsoever, the understanding is mainly exerted as regards their being; reason as regards their essence; and genius as regards their outward and ostensible qualities.

Although to many persons the faculty of genius may appear at first sight to be rather ornamental than useful or practical, especially as contrasted with those of understanding and reason; yet, on the other hand, we should bear in mind in how vast a number of the arbitrary appliances of life we are indebted more or less, if not entirely, to the inventive efforts of this faculty. Thus, the division of times and seasons, and all the regulations effected by numbers, are of this class. And the various arts and contrivances to which origination has been applied in their progress, embracing nearly every domestic occupation, we owe mainly to the exertions of the last named capacity.

The reason why in the history of the world, science steadily goes forward, while art is irregular in its movement, sometimes declining, sometimes advancing; is that when science has once established a foundation, it makes sure its ground, and never retrogrades from what it has gained, but continually makes new and steady advances from the post thus secured. Art, on the other hand, is eccentric and uncertain in its movements, leaping onward at one moment, and then

missing its footing, dependent for its progress on doubtful contingencies, being often thrown back by accident, and entirely losing the position it had so painfully and so tediously won.²

9. *Extent and limit of the operations of Genius.*

Vast however in their extent, and various in their nature, as are the operations, and the creative efforts more especially, of the faculty of genius, and of its several capacities; these are nevertheless restrained in their range, both by the limits assigned to the exercise of this faculty in each person, however perfectly he may be endowed with it; and also by the characteristic defects to which certain persons are liable as regards their individual endowment with this faculty: which is however, essentially different to their being gifted with it in a scanty measure only.

As regards the natural limits of this capacity, although, as I have shown, it can combine ideas of every variety in respect to their quality, and in every variety in respect to its own operation, producing in this manner an almost infinite diversity of new combinations; it can effect, after all, but combinations only. Its utmost range is, (as we have seen in the examination of the exercise of its power of imagination, which appears to be the most extensive as regards its sphere that it is able to exert), out of old materials to mould new forms. It is utterly incapable of making new materials, even of the commonest order, which is the province of that Being alone who created genius itself.

The characteristic defect in the faculty of genius, is its occasional want of vigour, and force, and activity, to combine ideas one with another, so as to consolidate them efficiently whereby they may be severally blended together into one, and new and original combinations may be formed. Thus, the ideas intended to be united, are occasionally so incongruous or unsuitable that they fail to amalgamate; and they disagree with, and repel one another, instead of coinciding and harmonizing together.³ This defect is incident to each of the capacities of this faculty alike. From its existence, as from a want of sufficient heat in a furnace to melt metal, the ideas do not become well fused together, but

² *Theory of the Arts*, vol. i. c. iv. p. 130.

³ "The inventions of poetic genius are the suggestions of analogy; the prevailing suggestions of common minds are those of mere contiguity; it is this difference of the occasions of suggestion, not of the images suggested, which forms the distinctive superiority of original genius."—*Dr. Thomas Brown. Lectures on the Philosophy of the Mind*, Lect. xxxvii.

remain separate and uncombined. The above defect in this faculty may possibly originate in, and be caused by, some certain quality in the very essence of the soul itself.

The possession, however, of force sufficient to combine ideas, is very different from the endowment with vigour sometimes possessed by genius,⁴ and occasionally by one of its capacities only, in so undue a proportion as to overwhelm and subject to its influence each of the other faculties and capacities of the mind; as we find to be the case with madmen, whose understanding and reason are led astray by the impulses of the imagination, or the exercise of the capacity of origination.⁵ The defect here, however, is not in the origination being too vigorous, but in the understanding and the reason being too weak to exert their proper sway, and to maintain their rightful authority and legitimate influence.⁶

Some of the most beautiful exhibitions in vegetation are said to be caused by a kind of disease which affects the plant, and are not the result of its natural development. So as regards the fructifications of the mind, it may be that some of its noblest efforts, and the sublimest flights of genius that have been attained, alike in poetry, in originality, and in invention, have been actually the result of what may be strictly determined to be a disordered or deformed mind; one particular capacity acquiring undue vigour and predominance, and rendering subject to its sway all the other active intellectual powers.⁷

⁴ *Vide ante, Prel. Diss. s. viii. a. 4, p. 160.*

⁵ *Vide ante, Prel. Diss. s. viii. a. 4, vol. i. p. 160.*

⁶ "The mind is such a slave to the imagination, that it always obeys when the imagination is overheated, and dares not answer when the same is incensed, because it meets with abuses when it resists, and is always rewarded with some pleasure when it humours that imperious faculty." — *Malebranche. Search after Truth, b. v. c. xi.*

⁷ *Vide ante, Prel. Diss. s. viii. a. 4, vol. i. p. 160.*

The Rev. Derwent Coleridge, Rector of Hanwell, and Prebendary of St. Paul's, son of the distinguished philosopher and poet, has favoured me with the following very able and interesting note on this passage, in which he says:—"As in grafting,

'This is an art which doth mend nature,—

Change it rather; but the art itself is nature:'

so as regards disease in plants, the disease itself is natural, and works truly for its own end, which may be useful, or even beautiful—however injurious to the stock on which it grows, which is, as it were, subordinate to its parasite. There may be some analogy to this in certain developments of genius. Blake is perhaps an instance, though I myself think that disease did but stimulate the genius which it found, and which it certainly distorted. I have heard my father say (or perhaps it was from my brother Hartley) that *genius was a form of scrofula*; but, on the other hand, far more truly and wisely he denied that great wit was near allied to madness; that contrariwise it indicates, and requires, the highest sanity generally in body, always in mind. Think of Sophocles, and Plato, and

As the value of gunpowder as an article of use to any individual, depends not merely on the amount of it which he possesses, or on its strength or quality, but on the implements which he employs for turning it to account; so the value of the faculty of genius in the constitution of any particular mind, depends not on its comparative extent or power, but on the ability of that mind to direct it to some beneficial purpose, and to employ it advantageously.⁸ Genius is, however, in nothing so often, and so closely, copied as in its defects. These, indeed, are to many, not merely the only remarkable points perceptible, but the only traits within their capacity to imitate. On the purpose to which this noblest of the faculties is applied, whether it is used or abused, entirely depends its value, and its being a benefit or a bane.

The three faculties with which man is endowed, may be concluded together completely to adapt him for that high state of existence to which he is ordained; the understanding fitting him for the reception of all necessary knowledge, the reason enabling him to turn that knowledge to proper account, and

Da Vinci, and Michael Angelo, of Shakspeare and Bacon, of Kant and Goethe. How healthful, how sane in their intellectual constitution! What harmony in their mental faculties! Pope indeed called his life a 'long disease;' but his mind was as clear as a bell. Swift, like Southey, died, as he pathetically prophesied, *ἄχος*, but if his mind was diseased in early life, it was his moral, and not his intellectual life—not his genius. Edgar Poe comes nearer the mark; but he does not go far enough. Swedenborgh is perhaps the most telling example—a great genius, in my opinion a monomaniac. More's the pity."

Dr. Richardson writes in reference to the same passage:—"My impression is that the highest mental endowment, in which I would include the highest genius, is based on the purest and best combinations of mental and physical health and development. An irregular development, bordering on decomposition of the mental faculties, is, nevertheless, in some instances, productive of great, though erratic efforts, which mount to genius. From this fact has sprung, I believe, the observation,—

'Great genius is to madness near allied.'*

It would be better to say 'may be' than 'is.'"

Professor C. J. Plumtre has supplied me with the following note on the same paragraph:—"I think this assertion is fully correct, and we see a very striking instance of it in the case of such a man as Edgar Poe, whose impulses were uncontrollable, and burst through all the fetters of attempted direction or restraint."

May not inebriety, which has occasionally inspired bright thoughts, be considered akin to, if not a species of bodily disease? and has not brain fever accomplished this?

⁸ *Dr. Carpenter* well remarks that, "although no one can acquire, if he has it not in his original constitution, the creative power of genius, yet every one can train himself to appreciate its products, his capacity for such appreciation growing and intensifying in proportion as it is exercised aright."—*Mental Physiology*, b. ii. c. xii. p. 513.

* *Dryden*.

genius qualifying him for the enjoyment of those sublime pleasures which are to be the reward hereafter in Heaven, for the due employment of his mental powers on earth. Through this latter faculty he is moreover enabled to approach, as regards the nature of his prerogatives, his Divine Author, in that loftiest of His attributes, His creative power.

CHAPTER V.

THE MEMORY.¹

1. *Particular Functions and Operation of this Endowment.*

HAVING inquired into, and examined, the nature of the several intellectual faculties, their distinctive capacities, and the mode of operation peculiar to each; we come next to the consideration of that very important, and indeed indispensable endowment or power of the mind, which is called the Memory,² to whose aid these faculties and capacities are more or less constantly recurring, and indeed without the assistance of which, hardly any intellectual operation of whatever nature, is performed.³

The memory is probably, therefore, of all the endowments of the mind, the most frequently resorted to.⁴ It is not however so much a faculty, as a mere simple power or endowment.⁵ While the different faculties and capacities are enabled to deal with the ideas submitted to them in the various modes already

¹ The substance of this chapter was read before the *Psychological Society of Great Britain*, at their meeting in London, on the 12th of May, 1875, in a short paper entitled the "Psychology of Memory," which is printed among their transactions.

² *Mr. Serjeant Cox* very truly remarks that "we are almost wholly without knowledge of what memory is."—*What am I, &c.*? vol. i. c. xxvii. p. 248.

³ According to *Hobbes*, the memory may be accounted a sixth sense.—*Human Nature*, c. iii. s. 6.

⁴ "Take away memory, and we go near to annul government, and to destroy accountability."—*Physical Theory of Another Life*, c. v.

⁵ *Dr. Thomas Brown* says of the memory, that "it is not a distinct intellectual faculty, but is merely conception or suggestion, combined with the feeling of a particular relation, to which we give the name of priority, which admits of being combined with it."—*Lectures on the Philosophy of the Mind*, Lect. xli. According to this eminent metaphysician, conscience is but "a species of memory," which he defines to be "our moral memory, —the memory of the heart." Few however will I think be inclined to accept this definition of conscience as either adequate or satisfactory.—*Ibid.* Lect. xi.

Hartley defines the memory to be "that faculty by which traces of sensations and ideas recur, or are recalled, in the same order and proportion, accurately or nearly, as they were once actually presented."—*Observations on Man, Introd.*, p. 3.

pointed out, the operation of the memory is entirely simple, and its acts are limited to two only. The adaptation of the memory is, indeed, in reference to one of the faculties of the mind, what a pen is to the hand. The use of the pen is simply to write with, and it can be applied to no other purpose. But the hand may be used not only for directing the pen in writing, but for a variety of other ends.

As one sense alone, even the sight, which is the highest and most perfect of them all, serves in many cases but to deceive instead of to inform us ; so one faculty or power alone, if not controlled and corrected by the others, will very often lead us astray. It is only by the united co-operation of them together, that we are directed aright ; and it is analogous to the examination of the system of the Universe at large, as a whole, and not of particular portions merely, that the constitution of man, and man as a whole, ought to be judged.

Memory serves a purpose to the mind, corresponding with that which the power of ruminating does to certain animal frames. By means of memory, we are able to recall ideas, and to ruminate upon them ; examining them fully, and turning them over and over, which we had not the opportunity of doing at the time we imbibed them. Hence, although such animals receive the food itself when they take it into the mouth ; yet the nourishment for which the food serves, they obtain only by rumination and digestion.⁶ And although the process of receiving the mental aliment may be but brief, yet that of ruminating upon, and digesting it, and deriving fresh nutriment continually through the power of memory, may be permanent, nay ceaseless.

Moreover, as some alimentary substances are said to be able to digest everything except themselves ; so the memory appears to be able to retain and to recollect most things better than its own operations. It can recall many facts and conclusions, but it is frequently unable to recall the mode in which it originally acquired them ; whether they resulted from certain efforts of the mind, or whether they were derived from foreign sources. It cannot decide whether they are its own offspring, or have merely foisted themselves upon its parentage.

The memory is therefore that particular endowment, or power, which the mind possesses, of retaining for a considerable and indefinite period, and of recalling to our remembrance in certain cases, with correctness, distinctness, and force, different ideas, both simple and compounded, of various subjects which have been at various times, and in various modes, impressed upon it.⁷

⁶ *St. Augustine* compares the memory to the belly.—*Confessions*, b. x.

⁷ In regard to memory, *Plato* held, that when the forms of things are, by means of the corporeal organs, so deeply impressed upon the mind as

When so retained in the memory, these different ideas lie there silent and unobserved, and as though they had never been received, or had any existence, until they are sought out, and brought to our remembrance in the mode I shall hereafter endeavour to point out.⁸ In this respect they might be compared to the notes of an organ or pianoforte, which are of endless variety, and capable of being at any time produced; although, until this is effected, they lie mute, and seem not to have any real being.⁹

Persons who are endowed with strong and retentive memories for particular subjects, often possess strong minds generally;—from which it might be inferred that the memory is derived from, and is a part of, the soul itself;—both the power of retaining ideas, and that of recalling them, being in such individuals very vigorous. But to this rule there are many exceptions.¹

The following is the intellectual process which is performed in the mind with regard to the reception of ideas, and the retention of them in the memory.

1. On receiving sensations from external objects, these sensations are communicated to the mind through the senses, in the mode already pointed out.²

2. These sensations are in many, though not in all cases, as

not to be easily effaced by time, this permanent impression is called memory.

According to *Dugald Stewart*, the word “memory,” though not employed uniformly in the same sense, always expresses some modification of that faculty, which enables us to treasure up and preserve for future use, the knowledge we acquire.—*Elements of the Philosophy of the Mind*, pt. ii. c. vi. s. 1.

⁸ *Mr. Serjeant Cox* remarks that “memory does not always require an effort to remember. It is more than probable that every sensation brought to the brain (even such as are conveyed without consciousness) is impressed there, and capable of reproduction; and that to this may be attributed much of what appears to come into the mind uncalled for, and seemingly disconnected with any passing occurrence.”—*What am I, &c.*? vol. i. c. xxvii. p. 250.

⁹ “How much of what we call memory is, in reality, imagination.”—*Maudsley, on the Physiology and Pathology of the Mind*, p. 213.

¹ *Cicero* tells us, “I have seen the greatest men endowed with an almost divine memory.” *De Orat.* cap. lxxxviii.

“Though some persons may have strong memories with weak judgments, yet no man can have a strong judgment with a weak original power of retaining and remembering.”—*Hartley. Observations on Man*, vol. i. s. 4, prop. 90, p. 382.

“I conclude, not only that a very great genius does not suppose a very great memory, but that the extraordinary extensiveness of the one, is always exclusive of the extraordinary extent of the other.”—*Helvetius. Essays on the Mind*, Ess. iii. c. iii. “The inequality of the mind depends in part on the choice of the objects placed in the memory.”—*Ibid.*

² *Vide ante*, b. i. c. i. s. 10, vol. i. p. 262.

I have already endeavoured to demonstrate,³ perceived, by the aid of the capacity of apprehension in the faculty of understanding, and are thus converted into what are termed ideas.

The mind may, however, as I have before shown,⁴ be conscious of a sensation only, as is probably the case with animals, without understanding its nature, and an idea being produced from it. A sensation is not received into the memory, unless the mind is either conscious of it, or perceives it, or it becomes converted into an idea by that capacity of the understanding which I have denominated apprehension, and which might be called the observatory of the mind. Of many sensations which strike the senses, the mind is unconscious, and consequently the memory does not grasp them. Unless these sensations are communicated to the mind, or perceived by it, it can no more take notice of them, than an animal does of objects which, although within its range of vision, it does not chance to be aware of, or to observe. A sensation perceived by the mind, but not converted into an idea, is like an object of the presence of which we are conscious, though *without* actually seeing it. A sensation converted into an idea is like an object of the presence of which we are conscious, *because* we actually see it. Sensations may, however, be received into the memory at one time, and may be perceived by the apprehension, and converted into an idea, at a period long subsequent.

3. These ideas are in most cases, but not uniformly, made use of by the faculties either of reason or genius.⁵

4. They are received by, and stored up in, the memory.

5. They are recalled out of the memory to our remembrance.

Ideas are moreover arranged and treasured up in the memory, either in their simple form, or combined with others, until called forth by some willing effort of the mind for that purpose, or by some external circumstance affecting it, which causes them to be again brought into notice.

Certain of our ideas, whether simple or compounded, when received into the mind, are therefore at once transmitted to the memory, and impressed or retained there. A kind of impulse or vibration is apparently produced in the memory by the reception into it of ideas; and without such impression they are not fixed there, or even noticed by it, although transmitted to the mind; and according to the strength or extent of this vibration or impulse, depends the firmness with which they are implanted in the memory. The bare reception of an idea into the mind, is not of itself suf-

³ *Ante*, b. iii. c. ii. s. 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Mr. Serjeant Cox* is of opinion that "each faculty has its own memory, and that memory is usually proportioned to the capacity of the faculty." — *What am I*, &c. ? vol. i. c. xxvii. p. 248.

sufficient to inscribe it on the memory; and this is not effected unless the perception of it is accompanied by some reflection or vibration of this description. Thus, there are many ordinary occurrences constantly taking place around us, of which we have a knowledge; and yet from the ideas of them not striking forcibly on the mind, the memory does not retain them. Moreover, in many transactions, during which a multiplicity of sensations and ideas must have passed through the mind, those only which caused this vibration are fixed in the memory, in various degrees of strength, according to the extent of such vibration. Thus also it is with regard to many trivial actions of life which we are every day performing, and which we can achieve without any intellectual effort, and of which we must necessarily have been conscious while engaged in them, but which, from nothing occurring to strike the mind, are totally forgotten immediately afterwards.⁶

It appears indeed that it is from the non-observance of the fact that so many ideas pass through the mind without attracting notice sufficient to excite a vibration which will indent or impress them on the memory; and that the memory frequently fails to record trivial occurrences, even when they are operations of the mind, so that they are apparently performed without the consciousness of our having thus acted, as also from the celerity of the operation of the intellectual faculties;⁷ that the notion of what has been denominated "unconscious cerebration"—by means of which it is supposed that the mind, or the brain, can perform intellectual operations without our being conscious of their having been effected—has originated;⁸ but which seems to me to be nothing more than the result of ideas being received, or mental operations exerted, which have not been noticed at the time, and so not impressed upon, and retained by the memory.

⁶ *Mr. Smee* writes to me in reference to this passage: "The idea of a vibration into the memory appears to me to have no meaning which is intelligible, although used by some writers." Whether "vibration" be the proper term applicable, and whether "sensation," "emotion," "affection," or some other word might not be preferable, I am willing to leave to the determination of my readers. But it will probably be in the experience of every person who has paid attention to the subject, that, on the occurrence of each of the every-day trivial actions alluded to, we are apt to forget immediately afterwards whether we have done them or not, unless some accident occurs to cause what I have termed a "vibration," to fix the event in the memory. Take the case of winding up a watch at night. Occasionally, a man fails to remember whether he has done it or not, and in consequence omits it. But should the individual happen to drop the watch, or to break the spring, while so engaged, the "vibration" caused by the accident would doubtless effectually impress the occurrence on his mind.

⁷ *Vide post*, c. vi. s. 9.

⁸ *Dr. Carpenter's Mental Physiology*, p. 515. *Mr. Serjeant Cox's What am I?* vol. ii. c. xxi. p. 254.

A vast proportion of the sensations and ideas which affect or enter into our minds, pass through them without being retained in the memory ; and, indeed, fly so rapidly in succession as hardly to be noticed.⁹ This I have already observed to be the case in sleep, during which the retention of ideas that then engaged the mind, is what constitutes dreaming. This constant circulation and succession of ideas might be assimilated to the ceaseless circulation of the blood through our veins. In many respects, as I have before noticed, does the constitution of our material and immaterial frames thus resemble, and serve to illustrate the nature of, each other.

The slightest eccentric occurrence in any of these matters, would at once create an emotion in the mind connected with the transaction, and thus impress it on the memory. And we find that with regard to certain events of very small importance, but concerning which some violent sensation or emotion has been caused, the remembrance of them is forcibly implanted on the memory, and continues longer than that of other matters of incomparably greater consequence. And in general indeed, the more vigorous the emotion accompanying the reception of an idea into the memory, the more firmly is it retained there.¹ So far, however, from the memory thus allowing all trivial ideas to escape from its hold, being a defect in, it is, in reality, a very great excellence in the constitution of the memory ; and by means of which ideas of a striking, and deeply affecting nature only, are treasured up there, while those of a useless character do not impede our intellectual action, or block up the space required for ideas of a more important nature. In this respect, the memory might not unaptly be compared to a net whose meshes are of a certain size, adapted to retain merely such fish as are large and valuable, and to allow those which are diminutive and worthless to pass through it. We may also observe from the foregoing considerations, that the memory, whether a part of the mind or not, is evidently in itself a distinct and independent power. The repetition of different ideas of the same objects, either immediately after they are communicated, or at different periods, serves both to revive the remembrance of them, and to

⁹ "Might not the human memory be compared to a field of sepulture, thickly stocked with the remains of many generations ; but of all these thousands whose dust heaves the surface, a few only are saved from immediate oblivion upon tables and urns ; while the many are, at present, utterly lost to knowledge ? Nevertheless each of the dead has left in that soil an imperishable germ ; and all, without distinction, shall another day start up, and claim their dead."—*Physical Theory of Another Life*, c. v.

¹ According to *Locke*, pleasure and pain contribute most to fix ideas in the memory.—*Essay on the Understanding*, b. ii. c. x. s. 3.

"As a general rule, the power of memory is proportionate to the intensity of the impression."—*Smec. Instinct and Reason*, c. iv. p. 56.

imprint them more deeply on the mind ; or rather, perhaps, to reprint them anew.

The memory is like the register of a court of justice, in which are recorded, not all the pleadings and arguments relating to each cause that has been tried before it, but only the judgments and final decrees which are pronounced. Thus, we seldom retain in our memory all the different reasonings and deductions by which we arrived at a conclusion, but merely the conclusion itself. Until we rest, or make a stand at this point, it would seem that no actual impression is produced on the memory.

Ideas when received into the mind from whatever source, and implanted in the memory, amalgamate entirely with the other ideas, and the general fund of knowledge ; so that in the case of many of them, when they are recalled to remembrance, we are often unable to determine whether they were obtained into the mind from external sources, and are now recollected in the ordinary way ; or whether they are the creations of the mind itself independent of such sources, all remembrance of the mode in which they entered into the memory having been effaced. We are conscious merely of the notion being in the mind ; but whether we originated it ourselves, or learnt it from others, we are unable to trace. Hence it may occasionally happen that ideas which were derived from others, present themselves to our understanding as if produced by ourselves ; although certain modifications of them, arising from the tinge which has been given to them from the influence of our intellectual operations, will probably be effected.

Sensations as well as ideas, may however be impressed upon, and treasured up in the memory. Sometimes, indeed, sensations alone are received, which are afterwards converted into ideas ; and in certain cases these sensations are retained, and are recalled, as sensations only, by the memory. If, indeed, the memory can at any time receive a sensation by itself, without the mind at once converting it into an idea, it may do so on all occasions ; and if it does not turn it into an idea until long after it has received it, this may be delayed for an indefinite period, or may never take place at all. Indeed, the conversion of a sensation into an idea, is the act of the capacity of apprehension, which is quite distinct from, and wholly independent of, the memory. The use of the former is in conjunction with the other capacities of the understanding, to obtain, and of the latter to retain, ideas, and sensations also.

It would, moreover, almost seem as though in some cases sensation itself aided the memory, and served to recall ideas ; especially in those instances where the intellectual process termed the association of ideas, fails. Thus, I remember well that I dreamed last night ; but I cannot recollect in the least

what I dreamed about : consequently, it is not the association of any ideas with my dream that enables me to recollect the fact ; but the sensation only of the action of, or the impression caused by, such dream, which still continues to affect the mind. And if sensation influences the memory in this case, it is probable that it does so correspondingly in many others also.

As in the constitution of each person, there is a spirit as well as a body ; so in the case of every subject which is submitted to the mind, there is an intellectual effect produced by its communication, as well as the sensation by which it is conveyed. This intellectual effect on the mind, equally results when the idea is recalled by the memory ; and hence, one of the great uses to the mind of the memory, is to refresh and enrich it with ideas which would otherwise be lost.

Inasmuch as during early infancy we appear to be entirely oblivious of all that occurs, however striking the event, and although of a nature peculiarly calculated to produce impressions on the memory ; it seems to be uncertain whether at this period ideas are received into the memory : and if they are not received into the memory, it is probable that the understanding itself does not receive them. And if, as I have already conjectured, the understanding commences its reception of ideas directly that the soul enters on its existence, or commences its union with the body ;² it appears to me that doubts might be entertained whether this actually takes place before memory commences its operations. Indeed, the mere circumstance alone that we retain no recollection whatever of the events attendant upon our birth, which are adapted in the strongest manner, on every account, to strike the mind ; is of itself a sure proof that during infancy, from whatever cause, the memory is unformed or inefficient. And if the memory is at that period thus imperfect, probably the understanding and the other intellectual faculties are so in a corresponding manner, and to a corresponding extent, from the same cause ;—the intellectual organs of the body not being then sufficiently completed and developed for the soul to receive its impressions through them.

2. *Its Passive Power, Retention.*

The memory appears to be endowed with two distinct separate and independent capacities, or auxiliary powers, varying from one another both as regards their nature and their opera-

² *Vide ante, Prel. Diss., s. vii. a. 1.*

tion; the one being passive, the other active. The first of these powers is ordinarily termed retention. The second is ordinarily termed recollection. This latter power is of two kinds, or consists of two subordinate powers or faculties, the power of recalling, and the power of recognition.

Retention is the simple power of retaining in the mind, or in the instinctive being in the case of animals, so that they may be recalled to remembrance without the recurrence of the original cause of their being received, and be ever ready for use, any ideas or sensations which have been once communicated. This power appears to be wholly passive and involuntary in its nature, and to exert no influence whatever of its own, either as to the ideas which it will retain, or as to the mode in which they shall be retained; which depends mainly on the manner in which they are imparted to, and impressed upon the memory. Probably, the ideas received by the mind and implanted in the memory, through the instrumentality of whichever of the capacities or senses, are retained with equal proportionate facility, according to the strength or force with which they were impressed. Nevertheless, a quickness or readiness in receiving ideas, and retaining them in the memory, appears to me rather to belong to, and to depend upon, the understanding, than the memory. The reason, probably, why children retain ideas of simple subjects with so much readiness, is that they are conveyed, at once and directly, by the understanding to the memory: the operation of the other faculties and capacities does not, as in the case of persons of maturer years, and more extensive cultivation, intervene to prevent these ideas from striking upon the memory with due vigour, and so being firmly held by the retention.

It is moreover of great importance, in order that any idea be firmly implanted on the retention, that it be clearly perceived by the understanding. Unless this is the case, it is not completely received by the mind; and unless it is completely received by the mind, it is impossible for it to be transmitted to the retention.

One circumstance which materially conduces to keep ideas fresh and lively in the retention, is our frequent recurrence to them during our cogitations and various intellectual operations; while on those subjects which have long ceased to occupy the mind, the retention fails to preserve distinct ideas.³ Hence,

³ "Attention and repetition help much to the fixing any ideas in the memory; but those which naturally at first make the deepest and most lasting impression, are those which are accompanied with pleasure or pain."
—Locke, *Essay on the Understanding*, b. ii. c. x. s. 3.

"The extent of the memory first depends on the daily use made of it; secondly, on the attention with which we consider the objects we would impress upon it, and which, without attention, would leave only slight

ideas which are found useless, are discharged to make room for others of more value. This recurrence to subjects is however quite distinct from the repetition of the ideas themselves, already referred to, by which they are reprinted, as it were, afresh on the retention, instead of being merely preserved there.

Out of the vast numbers of ideas however that are constantly passing through the mind, probably a very large proportion are not only not preserved in the memory, but are never transmitted to the retention at all. Many ordinary ideas which are received into the retention are soon obliterated; but from their frequent recurrence may by degrees take root there. If however we consider the amazing extent of knowledge of different kinds with which the memory of even the most ignorant and illiterate person is stored, of actions which have taken place from the early days of childhood, and of matters of various kinds; we cannot but conclude the power of retention to be vast and comprehensive to an extraordinary degree. Indeed, the memory of every moderately well-informed man, contains, probably, a far greater and more varied store of information than is to be found in his whole library.⁴

Different ideas when implanted in the retention, are not only retained there with perfect accuracy and perspicuity, and as regards all their several qualities and varieties, but also with the utmost order and regularity; and can be recalled according as

traces that would be easily effaced; and, thirdly, on the order in which we range our ideas."—*Helvetius. Essays on the Mind*, Ess. iii. c. iii.

"The tenacity of our recollection is in proportion to the attention which has been exercised upon the several objects of contemplation at the time they were submitted to the mind."—*Lord Brougham, Discourse of Natural Theology*.

⁴ *Dr. Maudsley* has favoured me with the subjoined note on this passage:—"I think that you are quite right in saying that an idea with which some feeling is associated is more likely to be fixed in the mind; but I am not sure that it would be right to say that *every* idea must be attended with some feeling in order to be retained. Take, for example, abstract ideas, or the very general ideas of mathematics."

The following is the opinion of *Mr. Sopwith* on the same topic, which he has been so kind as to forward to me:—"Of the vast number of ideas presented to the mind, comparatively few, very few, make any correct impression, and still fewer make any lasting impression, either in a vague form, or with any near approach to correctness. Even those that are retained are probably inaccurate. Nor does repetition alone suffice to strengthen the accuracy of memory. The power of observation has to be exerted, and *then* a different impression is produced even of objects which have been frequently seen.

"Ask any person who has frequently walked through a room to describe its contents, colour, and pattern of walls, curtains, &c., and it will be found that though there is a difference of capability in different persons for receiving and retaining impressions, yet very few could give a correct description of objects which, having been once clearly brought before the mind, the recollection of them departs."

the occasion may require, a vast period after they have been received. The memory is indeed wonderfully constituted in this respect. We may pass from one subject to another, and so on, successively, to other matters; yet each will be distinctly recorded without any confusion, and the remembrance of any one which has been noticed throughout the day, can be instantly effected. Those ideas which we have most recently received into the mind, we observe, by looking back into the memory immediately after their reception, are the most apparent and prominent, and seem indeed for a short time by their vividness to obscure those which immediately precede them. Thus, we appear to feel a difficulty, in recalling to our minds the actions which occurred just before those of which we have these vivid ideas; but if we wait for a short space until the latter are thrown further into perspective, or have become arranged in the memory, we shall find them all disposed in due order, and alike capable of being recollected with perfect precision and clearness. This circumstance is somewhat analogous to our viewing any large objects at a distance, of which we desire to obtain a general and extensive survey, but which while we are stationed close to them we are unable to do; although if we retire a moderate space, we see them in all their due proportions and relations with each other.

The ideas which are impressed on the memory, lie dormant there, and altogether unnoticed, and as though they had never been communicated to it, except when recalled either by the action of the mind, which, as I have already stated, it is able for this purpose to exert at its will, or by some external circumstance which serves for this end; and on such occasions they appear again in the mind with various degrees of vividness, according to the several circumstances before enumerated. Consequently, many thousands of ideas may be now dormant in any man's memory, of which he is wholly unconscious, and which may possibly never be recalled. Hence also, ideas, that were imbibed during a former state of being, may be lying unnoticed in the memory; but which are not revived during our present existence, because no ideas associated with them are received into the mind, and which would reproduce them in the memory. In a future condition, we may possibly obtain a full and vivid recollection of them. During dreaming, ideas are sometimes forcibly recalled, which we supposed had entirely faded from the memory. It is when the mind wanders forth free and uncontrolled while we are wrapped in sleep, that she is most liable to stumble upon, and to come in contact with ideas which seemed to have been entirely lost to her view, and all traces of which appeared to have been erased from the memory.

In madness too, and during the paroxysms of passion, the

intellectual faculties being very strongly excited, extraordinary recollections have been occasionally brought up by their operation on the memory.⁵ The memory appears often, during the reveries of insanity, as in sleep, to be stronger than ordinary, because no new ideas are then brought into the mind which might efface those already received; but the mind employs itself in conning over those before implanted.

I may here remark with regard to the recollection of ideas, not only during sleep but at other periods, which had been received into the mind a very long time since, especially ideas received in childhood; that during the earlier stages of life, ideas, more particularly of visible objects, and of circumstances which affected us, are implanted in the memory much more forcibly than when imbibed in mature age. They then strike the mind more powerfully, and thus are retained more strongly. The mind is not only then more susceptible, but ideas in general are then more novel and exciting, and each creates greater interest than when we are older, especially during the decline of years, when but little attention is paid to things of that nature in general.

The extent or quantity of knowledge, that the retention is capable of containing, and in what manner this result may be best effected, are matters which admit of much speculation. In determining this question however, we should previously decide in what this possession of knowledge by the memory really consists: which is not in the mere communication to the retention, so as to be ever present to the mind in the precise order in which they were received, of any ideas which may have been transmitted there; but in having them so fixed and arranged that, as occasion requires, we may again have recourse to them, and recall them with readiness and accuracy.

The amount of knowledge that the memory can be made to treasure up, must mainly depend on the method used for this purpose. Thus, a greater degree or measure of information in the aggregate may be preserved if we confine our researches to a few, or a specific quantity of, subjects, than if we endeavour to obtain a knowledge of an indefinite number. The ideas of the different qualities of the same matter, may be retained in the memory, while the same number of ideas relating to separate topics will be forgotten; inasmuch as those of the former kind mutually aid each other by their connexion with and mutual dependence on one another, and are on this account more likely to be often recalled, and thus revived in the mind; while the

⁵ *Locke* observes with regard to ideas lodged in the memory, that "sometimes they start up in our minds of their own accord, and offer themselves to the understanding; and very often are routed and tumbled out of their dark cells into open daylight by turbulent and tempestuous passions."—*Essay on the Understanding*, b. ii. c. x. s. 7.

ideas of the latter kind, having no such dependence, are less apt to be recollected by means of association, which is the frequent cause of the revival of ideas. Thus, when the intellectual faculty so exerted searches for any particular idea which has been retained in the memory, it first seizes the one nearest in resemblance to that of which it is in pursuit; and then, link by link, feels its way to that for which it is seeking. What are usually termed hints, are prototypes of ideas associated with those which we wish to recall into the memory.

With respect also to matters about which we are conversant, we are more apt and careful to examine, and retain, and treasure up in our minds, every new fact or idea relating to such subjects, or which may tend to enlarge and complete them, than we are to retain ideas of those about which we are unconcerned. We interest ourselves about a relation, or a friend, and are desirous that he should remain with us, while we pay little regard to a stranger, and suffer him to depart without regret.

A systematic arrangement of our knowledge is evidently of the utmost importance for preserving it in the memory; and when it is so disposed, each new idea is transmitted to its proper place, and is recalled with the utmost facility as required: no fresh acquisition to our store of learning will in such a case be lost, but will serve to supply some deficiency. Thus it is, that in the study of science or history, wherein the different events or principles are connected with, or dependent on, each other, so vast a store of knowledge may be retained in the memory with the utmost accuracy, far beyond what, in ordinary cases, can be effected; and in these instances the reason may essentially aid the memory by assisting to recall peculiar facts, and directing its progress in so doing.

The retention is as it were, the tablet of the soul, on which figures and characters of every variety may be inscribed ready for use; but which, like the books in a library, afford no information to the possessor except so far as he recurs to them, and applies them for their appointed purposes. So the ideas in the retention remain silent and unnoticed, until they are recalled to the mind. And, as the quality of a tablet serves in some degree to influence that of the letters inscribed upon it; so, on the quality of the retention more or less depends the force and clearness with which ideas are retained.

Or, the retention might be compared to a sheet of white paper, on which the different ideas are written in inks of various colours and hues, according to the different nature of those ideas; and on which those that were the earliest communicated, are usually the clearest, and the most distinct. Those described in dark colours are of subjects the most deeply impressed, and those of light hues are most likely to be effaced. From the ideas of

different topics being thus written in separate colours on the same sphere, they would be prevented from becoming intermixed and confused; while ideas associated with each other, would be readily recognized and distinguished from the others, by their mutual resemblance as regards their tints. Ideas inscribed in dark colours, we might suppose to be those relating to matters of great moment, which have left a strong and indelible impression. Those inscribed in large characters, but comparatively faint colours, may be considered as typical of ideas which, although of considerable importance, have not been deeply engraven, in consequence of the peculiar circumstances under which they were communicated. We may observe in our own minds that different ideas of the same subjects become amalgamated together, although received at very different and distant periods, and seem, when reviewed, as though they had all entered together. Thus might letters written in ink of one colour, be easily distinguished, though intermixed with many others of various shades and hues.

As no particle of matter however minute, which has been once existent, is ever annihilated, but is merely dispersed and changed as regards the relations of its several constituents one to the other; so it has been thought by some that no idea once received into the memory, is ever entirely obliterated or exterminated, and that it is still actually existent, exerting its influence there permanently and for ever. And as the several minute fractions which each severally contribute to make up one large and complicated account, cannot any one of them be subtracted without affecting the quantum of the whole; so it is contended that no one particle of knowledge which has been communicated to the mind, can ever be lost without more or less biasing and changing its whole intellectual acquirement and character.⁶

⁶ To this paragraph, *Mr. Serjeant Cox* has been kind enough to append the following interesting note:—

“We are apt to confuse memory and recollection, treating them as identical. But they are distinct mental faculties. It is one thing to receive an impression upon the memory, another thing to be enabled to recall it. We might lose entirely the power of recollection without the memory being impaired. It is probable that every impression conveyed by the senses to the mind, as well as every self-generated action of the mind, is stored in the memory. This means psychologically that the brain can recall and repeat any action that has once occurred in it. We are ignorant of the process by which that recurrence of certain states of the brain is brought about which we call recollection of those states. We know only that the most potent cause is association, that is to say,—the recurrence of some other state of the brain that took place at or near the same time.”

Mr. Smee well remarks: “If we regard a man who has to a great extent lost his memory, we find at once how judgment, in even the most trilling matter, is lost.” *Instinct and Reason*, &c., c. v. p. 62.

It appears impossible however to doubt that there are many ideas of different kinds which have been for a time firmly implanted in the memory, but which from their not being for a long period recalled, or, owing to other circumstances, at length become entirely obliterated from its tablet, so that no traces of them can be discovered. Of this the experience of most persons will serve to convince them.⁷

3. *Its Active Power, Recollection.*

The second of the powers or capacities, possessed by the memory, is of an active kind, and is termed recollection; consisting, as already stated, of the two powers of recalling, and recognition.

It is through the agency of this capacity that the memory is able to recall ideas impressed upon it, and stored up there by means of its passive power termed retention. Recollection is, as it were, the messenger of the memory, which employs it to search out, and bring back to it, those ideas that have wandered away. By its other power of recognition, the memory is able to inquire, and to determine, whether the ideas so recalled have been previously communicated to the mind, and transmitted to, and treasured up in, the memory; or whether they are but recently received through sensation and apprehension.

Whether the recollection is an independent power belonging and incident to the memory itself, or whether it is merely derived from, or the result of, the exercise of certain of the faculties or capacities of the mind already considered, and which, when so exerted, might be deemed to constitute a part of this power, may admit of considerable discussion. It appears to me, however, that the process of remembering is performed by the action on the memory of one or more of the capacities of the understanding, according to the particular nature of the subject to be remembered, conjointly with the special power of recollection itself, which may be stimulated to action by the effort of these capacities, and when so excited may at once commence its operations. Thus, when any matter which is retained in the memory is to be recalled, sometimes not only the capacities of the understanding, but both the other faculties, and it may be each of their capacities, engage in sedulously hunting out, as it were, the lost idea, while each supplies

⁷ Coleridge suggested that the books which are to be opened at the last day, will consist in the perfect recurrence to the memory of each person of the acts and thoughts which he has done and entertained during his career on earth.—*Biographica Literaria*, vol. i. p. 115.

different aids to track and discover it; and when they have at last found its retreat, one of the capacities of the understanding again receives it, in a mode corresponding with that originally adopted when it was first implanted in the memory. For this purpose the capacity of the understanding so employed, applies itself to the recollection, which discharges the same office in returning the idea into the mind, that sensation performed when it was originally communicated to it.⁸

It seems therefore to me to be most probable that the operation of recalling ideas into the mind is effected primarily by a distinct effort on the part of the understanding upon the recollection; which in turn excites the retention, whose simple duty is to retain the ideas that have been received. We appear indeed on these occasions to be more or less conscious of the distinct operations of the intellectual capacities, and of the two powers of the memory; and each time that the ideas are recalled, it seems that a distinct and independent act of this nature is effected, and not that the ideas when once so recalled, simply remain in readiness for any future emergency. Thus, we may sometimes observe that certain ideas or subjects are recalled with peculiar force and distinctness by the first effort of this nature, with less power by the second; and that after the operation has been several times repeated within a short period with regard to the same ideas or subjects, they will be recollected with considerably less clearness than at first.

The two powers of retention and recollection are evidently distinct and independent of each other; and it is even possible that one of them may subsist in the material frame, and the other in the spiritual part of our nature. They are moreover separate agents, not only as regards their mode of operation, but with respect to the influences which act upon each, and the causes by which the operations of each are swayed, and accelerated, and impeded, whether external or internal, mental or material.⁹

It is possible, however, for a person to have ideas retained in the memory, and yet to be unconscious that this is the fact, so that he is unable voluntarily to recall them. Take the case of a person dreaming, and forgetting entirely what he dreamt; but who has another dream referring to the first, that serves to

⁸ "The mind very often sets itself on work in search of some hidden idea, and turns as it were the eye of the soul upon it."—*Locke. Essay on the Understanding*, b. ii. c. x. s. 7.

⁹ Upon this paragraph *Dr. Richardson* writes as follows:—"It does not seem to me that retention and recollection are 'distinct and independent'; recollection is rather retention brought into activity. I agree, however, in thinking that the faculty with which a retained thought is brought into activity, differs in different persons, and to that extent I should admit a distinction."

recall the ideas retained in the memory respecting the original dream, which, until then, although vividly retained in the retention, had never been recalled by the action of recollection. On the other hand, in many instances where we are unable, as frequently happens in old age, to recall to our remembrance trivial events which have recently occurred, it is probably the retention, and not the recollection, that is really at fault; in consequence of which, although the recollection is in full activity to bring back the ideas of the subject sought for, those ideas have, as it were, failed to catch on the retention, and so are forgotten altogether. From the difficulty which old people experience in retaining ideas in the memory, we might infer that retention was dependent on the material part of our constitution, although recollection also suffers by age. This, however, may be more or less owing to the weakness or fading of the retention. The one is, as it were, the yolk, the other the white of the memory. The one is the passive substance on which the being feeds; the other, the active energetic being itself.

Not only, however, do the various intellectual capacities aid the recollection in recalling ideas into the mind, but the senses also assist in this operation, as do the emotions, appetites, and passions, and probably also the affections and desires. Indeed, hunting a lost idea through the recesses of the mind, is not altogether dissimilar to the occupation of hunting a wild animal. As in a chase in the field, for a time the object of our search seems to be quite lost. Then a notion of its whereabouts is obtained by the appearance of an idea which is thought to be of affinity to it. Speedily, however, the pursuit is at fault. After a while, some fresh suggestion leads us to think that we have got a clue to its hiding-place. Again it is given up for lost; when, all of a sudden, it is started abruptly out of its retreat, by our running unawares bolt against a subject closely connected with it.

Animals, who are void of intellectual capacity, are mainly, if not entirely, aided and directed in their remembrance by certain medial endowments which serve to recall the sensations they experienced. Both in man and animals, the loss of any particular sense, of sight more especially, would doubtless hinder the recollection of a large proportion of the ideas or sensations connected with that sense. Nothing, moreover, is so apt to recall, without any voluntary effort of the mind, the remembrance of ideas and sensations long since forgotten, as the recurrence of sounds, or tastes, or smells, intimately associated with those ideas or sensations. And indeed, those which are recalled by that most ordinary method of books or pictures, must be considered as strictly brought to remembrance through the particular senses which are excited by objects

calculated to produce ideas and sensations associated with those we are trying to remember. And here I may remark that, supposing the soul to have existed in a prior state, our failing in our present condition to remember ideas of what we then experienced, may possibly be owing to our loss of certain senses which we then possessed, or to their being now obscured by their envelopment in matter; but through which senses alone could be excited sensations connected with those ideas, and which would at once cause them to be recollected. In a future state of existence, it is therefore possible that these senses being restored and reinvigorated, we may then also obtain a remembrance of these long-lost ideas.

It not unfrequently happens, moreover, that ideas are firmly impressed on the memory—that is, that its power of retention holds them,—but that the power of recollection is not able to recall them at the period desired. It may chance, indeed, that although actually lying in the retention, they may never be remembered. On the other hand, it is also possible that as ideas may be in the power of retention, but not in that of recollection; so they may occasionally be in the power of recollection, but not in that of retention. This may be said to happen when ideas are recalled into the mind from the memory by the recollection, but we are unconscious of the retention possessing them, or that we ever imbibed them before. In many cases, however, we discover, where we originally supposed the retention was at fault, that it is in reality the recollection, and that alone, which fails us. Thus, when trying to remember certain passages in an author, they appear to have wholly faded from the memory, and to be altogether obliterated. This we, of course, attribute to the feebleness or defect of the retention. But on the passage being recalled by any circumstance, we find it vividly retained in the memory, which proves at once that it is the recollection, and not the retention, which is defective.

In the case of the memory, as in that of the faculties of the mind, its subordinate powers are obviously independent of each other, and are not mere qualities. Not only, indeed, are the powers of retention and recollection quite distinct and independent; but the same person may have the one very extensive, and powerful, and perfect, and the other very limited, and weak, and imperfect. Thus, he may be capable of retaining ideas firmly and clearly in the memory, but may be unable to recall them readily. Or he may be able readily to recall them, but they may not be firmly and clearly retained.

Of the vast number of ideas that are every moment received into the mind, but a small proportion, as already observed, enter into the memory; and of those which are fixed in the retention, but a limited proportion are within the power of the recollection. Many indeed which appear quite beyond the

call of the latter, may be fixed in the retention, and will be brought to light again when an efficient cause for this occurs. It will sometimes also happen that ideas will be recalled into the memory, but not the sensations which produced them. Occasionally, however, when the ideas are recalled with great vividness, a reflection, or shadow, as it were, of the sensation also is produced.

Recognition is an act which results when both the retention and the recollection are jointly exercised about a subject or an idea, which, being in the retention, is recalled by the recollection; not, however, voluntarily, but by the object or sensation which before excited it being again presented to the mind, and acting on the recollection, so as to cause it to recall precisely the same ideas which it before excited, and which are, at once, recognized or pronounced by the understanding and the reason to be identical with those which were before produced. In this case, therefore, the whole function of memory is completely exerted, while two of the intellectual faculties aid it in its operations.

It does not however necessarily follow that when ideas are recalled into the memory, there should be also a consciousness of their previous existence, or a recollection of their being introduced, which are distinct exercises of the memory. We only know many ideas to have been before in the mind, because it is necessary that such should have been the case in order to their being now recalled by the memory; but we have no recollection of the time or the mode of their being implanted.

Ideas imprinted on the retention, but not recalled to our remembrance, might be compared to objects deposited in a dark room, which though not seen, are as certainly and as fully there as though they were perceived. The operation of the recollection, whereby the ideas so imprinted on the retention are recalled to remembrance, might be compared to a torch brought into a dark room, which serves to illumine and render visible those objects which were before obscure.

4. *Characteristic Varieties in this Endowment, and in both its Powers.*

When we bear in mind the multifarious causes of different, and indeed opposite, kinds which contribute to influence the operation of the memory, and of both its powers, we may fairly arrive at the conclusion that the varieties of memory are proportionably as great as are the varieties in character of different persons. Moreover, as there are several sorts of

substances which may be availed of for receiving the impress of figures and letters, some of which retain them more distinctly, some more deeply, and some more durably than others; so, in a corresponding manner, may the power of retention belonging to various memories differ.¹ And the recollection, which has been compared to a messenger, may also differ as regards its character, in the memories of various persons; just as some messengers are more swift, some more intelligent, some more accurate than others.

As there are several degrees of knowledge, varying according to their relative extent and completeness; so in regard to memory, which is but re-knowledge, there are, in a corresponding manner, several degrees, varying according to the extent, accuracy, and clearness, with which ideas are recalled into the mind. Of these, some appear but as dim and indistinct shadows, while others present themselves in vivid traces.

In addition to this, the character of the understanding, and of each of its capacities, directly affects the character of the memory. Nor is the influence of the other faculties and capacities less powerful, although it may be less directly exercised. I should infer indeed that while the clearness and completeness of the power of retention are dependent mainly on the quality of the understanding; the activity and dexterity of the recollection are principally dependent on the power and vigour of the reason and the genius. The moral and medial endowments, the senses, emotions, appetites, passions, and affections, and the dispositions and desires are, moreover, not without their influence, alike as regards the activity, the strength, and the clearness of the memory. Bodily constitution too, and that in various ways, has much influence on this power. And, lastly, it is probable that the peculiar essential constitution of the soul itself, greatly and directly affects the condition of the memory. Habits and exercise, moreover, as we shall presently see, contribute to influence it in different modes.

Hence the memories of different persons vary both as regards their power of retaining, and their power of recalling ideas, and in several ways in relation to each of these powers. Retention varies mainly with respect to its clearness, strength, and extent; recollection with respect to its readiness, celerity, and the uniformity with which it acts.

The peculiar character which distinguishes the memory of each individual, and which is exhibited by the mode in which it

¹ *Dugald Stewart*, however, considers that "the original disparities of men in regard to memory, are by no means so immense as they seem to be at first view:" and that much is to be ascribed to different habits of attention, and to a difference of selection among different objects and events. — *Elements of the Philosophy of the Mind*, pt. ii. c. vi. s. 2.

retains and recalls ideas, appears to be however primarily, and perhaps mainly, dependent upon, and to be principally regulated, and as it were reflected, by the particular and corresponding character that distinguishes his faculty of understanding, which serves as the inlet to the memory, as well as to the mind; and in passing through which the ideas obtain the impression of its features, which they retain and exhibit on being again presented to our view. Thus, where the understanding is remarkable for exact, minute observation, such as the extensive possession of the capacity of deprehension would serve to render it, the ideas retained in the memory will be accurate and precise. Those who are mainly distinguished by extensive comprehension, in recalling ideas of a subject will be found to have retained general and leading ideas of it of a comprehensive character. If, on the other hand, in any particular individual, the capacity of deprehension be very limited, he will impress on his memory but few ideas of the minute details of the matter. And if his comprehension be limited, his memory will be found deficient in retaining the prominent and leading points.

Those topics on which the reason and genius are engaged, are, as I have already stated, communicated to the memory by the understanding, and depend on the principles above enunciated for the manner of their retention. According also, in some measure, to the vigour and vivacity of the capacities of reason and genius, and of their several operations, will be the force with which ideas emitted from them, will strike into, and be retained upon the memory.

From the circumstance of different people being variously endowed as regards the qualities displayed by their memories, we might almost be inclined to divide or classify the memory into so many different and distinct kinds or orders. Some persons indeed, independent of what has already been premised as to the several characteristics of the memory, appear to have a special talent for retaining ideas of one kind, and others for retaining those of another. This however I believe is mainly owing to, and occasioned by, the particular intellectual faculties and capacities which any individual possesses, and the peculiar purposes, and studies, and pursuits, for which he has applied them. Thus the traveller, or the painter, will best remember ideas of visible objects, as these have principally engaged his attention, and will be therefore most firmly impressed on his memory.² The musician, on the other hand, for the same

² *Mr. Sopwith* remarks on this paragraph as follows:—

“*Dr. Buckland* told me he never forgot the contour of a mountain. His power of observation was much directed to landscape in connexion with geology.

“All this paragraph, I think, is correct and fairly expressed.”

reason, will best remember sounds. The metaphysician, or the poet, will retain most strongly the memory of important principles in philosophy, or of exquisite passages from striking descriptions in poetry.

Ideas of sensible objects are, by the generality, more readily retained in the memory than are those of an abstract nature, because they are communicated to the mind more forcibly, and with greater frequency.³ In all studies of the latter kind, we are greatly aided by diagrams, and even by similitudes or metaphors drawn from visible objects. Indeed, to the decided preference of the mind for such objects, and its proneness for contemplating them, may we attribute the origin of idolatry. These are the simplest and the original of all other ideas, which, however abstract or complex, are derived from them.

Words often aid us extensively in recalling ideas, as it not unfrequently happens that the arbitrary name may be remembered, although the actual thing is forgotten. In this respect, words are to ideas, what, in the currency of a country, paper money is to the coin; forming occasionally a palpable substitute for, and serving ultimately to procure the coin itself.

Men of great talents are said not to be commonly endowed with extensive memories for all kinds of subjects, although they may have considerable power in retaining ideas of particular topics. The reason of this probably is: 1. That the number of ideas connected with matters of high importance which pass through their minds, obliterate the traces in the memory of commonplace ideas; which does not occur in persons of but limited capacity who are conversant chiefly with ordinary matters. 2. Objects and events of this class, are less regarded by men of talent, whose minds are wont to be occupied with some special pursuits and studies. Hence, although memory in general may appear to be deficient in such individuals, yet memory of particular ideas and subjects will be found peculiarly powerful. It may be often observed that persons of much readiness and capacity of memory, and who possess a large share of knowledge, and considerable accuracy of information, and whose minds are very energetic, are nevertheless wanting in general ability, and as reasoners or men of genius. This is not only quite explicable, but very natural and probable, when we consider that their extensive reception and retention of ideas, is greatly owing to their having chiefly, and so exclusively, employed themselves in this practice, and to their being so little engaged in examining or combining them. Indeed, the deficiency alone of power to effect the latter opera-

³ It was observed by *Lord Bacon*, that in the act of memory, images visible, work better than other conceits.—*Nat. Hist. Cent. X.* 956.

tions, conduces very largely to readiness in the former. On the other hand, the exercise of reasoning, the habit of examining and sifting thoroughly every proposition submitted to us, although a very valuable and desirable one, necessarily proves a considerable hindrance to the simple accumulation of knowledge; and it also tends to efface from the memory, as also to prevent the revival of, ideas already implanted there.⁴

5. *Voluntary Control over the Memory.*

How far, and to what extent, the mind, through the instrumentality of any of its active powers, is able to exercise control over the memory; or whether the memory is capable of exerting any control over itself, whereby it is able with more or less facility and vigour at its pleasure, either to retain or recall ideas, or to forget them altogether; is another topic which is open to considerable controversy.⁵ It is also an interesting and important question, whether, as in the case of subjects which supply nutrition to the material frame, there is any direct and immediate and independent power of expulsion or evacuation of ideas that are no longer required, or have served their purpose, and are consequently no further needed, while their presence in the retention would only occupy the space of more valuable matter. This doubtless arises in the ordinary course of what is termed forgetfulness; which however consists rather in the omission to exercise the recollection, than in any operation of the retention. But whether the mind possesses any distinct voluntary capacity of obliterating or getting rid of ideas, other than by the ordinary course of their gradually fading through want of being recalled, is a question of much doubt and difficulty. So far as there exists in the mind an ability to discharge ideas from its custody, and also to retain them there ready for use, when wanted, such an effort appears to be mainly exercised through a certain active, voluntary and independent power of the memory itself; inasmuch as it is difficult to conceive how this operation can be accomplished by any or either of the intel-

⁴ Upon this paragraph *Mr. Sopwith* remarks:—"I concur in the view that the memory and judgment are separate exercises of the mind, and cannot both be very actively and successfully exerted. This I think is very well put."

⁵ According to *Des Cartes*, the soul in the act of recollection, exercises a volition by means of which the pineal gland inclines itself successively this way and that way, and impels the animal spirits to different parts of the brain, till that part is found upon which the object we wish to recollect has left traces.—*Passions of the Mind*.

lectual faculties or capacities of the mind alone, which moreover have no immediate relation to, or connexion with, the memory.

On the whole it appears to me that not only has the mind an active power which it can exert at its will, of recalling ideas, and of controlling generally its operations; but that it can also at its will and pleasure effect the retention of them, and discharge them from the memory. And that, as it is able thus to keep ideas ready for use, as also to summon them into consciousness by the recollection when required; so is it able at once to discharge them from the memory, whereupon all traces of them speedily fade, and are entirely lost. This is caused, in part, by a positive exertion of the will, and indirectly, and in an auxiliary mode, by the exercise of the various capacities of the mind adapted for this purpose; and in part, by the neglect of the recollection to recall these ideas for a long period, during which they become effaced from the retention. By means of this voluntary power thus effected for the retention or discharge of ideas, those which are most serviceable are the most likely to be retained, while those of which we never avail, we speedily lose.⁶

⁶ On the important and interesting questions raised in the two preceding paragraphs, the three following valuable notes have been supplied to me. The first of them is by *Dr. Richardson*, who writes as follows:—

“My view is that the will can control the memory thus far, that it can prevent the recollection of things which it *at once* considers worthless or objectionable. But when by repetition, even a few times, the mind has held a thing, it cannot be made to forget it by any act of volition. Then the will can at most set a limitation on the period of remembrance, or remove it by diversion of mental action.”

The next note is by *Dr. Maudsley*:—

“I doubt whether the mind has a despotic power to dismiss an idea from the memory, by saying to it, ‘Go, and it goeth,’—but it can often do so indirectly by voluntarily fixing the attention upon some other idea, and keeping that before consciousness. Then the activity of the idea which it is wished to discharge, will gradually subside, and finally cease. But it is useless to say to ourselves, ‘I won’t think any more of this,’—unless we occupy consciousness with something else.”

Mr. Sopwith expresses himself as follows on the same point:—

“My observation would lead me to suppose that the power of memory may be increased by *exercise, perseverance, and exigency*. For example, country people are known to have had dealings in the market with many people,—transacting many matters of business, and yet retaining all the necessary accounts in their memory. This was learnt by exercise, persevered in from necessity, and perfected by the exigency or absolute need of being accurate.

“We all know how difficult it is to recollect anything that has escaped the memory. It afterwards seems to come,—as we say,—of its own accord.

“All education, especially in figures and geometrical forms, is gained by the mind exerting an earnest will in repetition, whereby a firm and lasting impression is at length made.”

The question as to the power of the mind voluntarily to discharge ideas from the memory, *Mr. Sopwith* considers one of great doubt and difficulty; and adds with regard to this point:—“We have to face our absolute

If indeed we contrast with the vast number of ideas that enter into the mind, and are remembered, the still greater number, I might say the prodigious variety, of which all traces are at once effaced from the memory, and which comprehends probably eleven-twelfths of those that momentarily pass through it, and with which the mind is never for an instant unoccupied; its power of discharging ideas from its repository, which is perhaps oftener involuntary than voluntary, will appear even more extraordinary than its power of retaining them.

There seems to me also to be a voluntary power in the memory of keeping ideas ready for use, and of exerting itself to prevent them from fading, or getting beyond the power of recall. Hence, out of the large shoal which pass through the mind every minute, we are able to select such as we wish to recall for future service; and they are at once set apart, and kept in readiness when wanted, while all the rest are discarded and forgotten.

It appears therefore, that the memory has, to a certain extent, a direct power and influence as to its choice whether or not to retain ideas, and also as to the celerity and accuracy with which it will recall them. In addition to this, both the mind and the memory are able to effect much, both in the retention and recalling, and also in the discharge of ideas, by various circumstances and exertions which conduce to this end, according to the principles here laid down.

Moreover, although in some cases, we cannot absolutely control, or may be unable even to influence, the extent, or force, or clearness, with which the retention preserves ideas, or the facility with which the recollection recalls them; yet in all cases we may direct and stimulate the agency of the latter power, and, at our will, can either incite it to action, or prevent its exercise. The memory is, indeed, as we have seen, in most instances aided in its operations by the intellectual faculties. Thus, when we would recall into the memory ideas which have been forgotten, these faculties direct us in our search for them; and thus lead us to wander through the different stages of the arguments or narrations recorded, for their discovery.

It occasionally occurs when we have no absolute recollection in our minds of the existence of any specific subject, yet we feel a consciousness of its existence, and that it is not beyond the power of recall; and though forgetting the idea

ignorance of what the mind is. We know not how it acts. The line (if there is any) between will and memory seems hard to draw.

"This subject alone would require a volume. I look at the will as the master power, and memory as the servant,—not always willing to obey; and when stubborn, the will is powerless."

itself, we at the same time fancy that it is in the antechamber of the memory, and there seems to be a blank without it. This is owing doubtless to the operation of the reason, which serves to remind the memory of its duty, and directs it to discharge it aright. The recollection of any passage, especially in poetry, is much aided by repeating over the preceding portion of the sentence, which gives, as it were, an impulse to the mind, and enables it to run on without difficulty. This may also be accounted for by three other circumstances 1. By the process alluded to, we are aided through the recollection of the general musical intonation of the passage. 2. There is greater scope for the association of different ideas connected with the subject being brought to our aid, by reference to the preceding lines. 3. By this means the reason is better enabled to lend its aid in pointing to the discovery of the forgotten ideas or words.

6. *Artificial Aids to the Operation of the Memory.*

Another important subject of inquiry in relation to the memory, is the question to what extent, and in what respect, certain artificial aids may be advantageously availed of to assist the operation of the memory, and of both its powers; and as to the degree of the real or comparative utility and value of such aids.

Most however of what are very incorrectly termed aids to memory, are, in reality, contrivances to dispense with memory altogether, and to substitute some artificial resort in its place. All that can be done essentially, and directly, to assist the memory, appears to be to associate with the ideas to be recollected, ideas of some material objects, which are far easier to recall than those of abstract subjects, and by, as it were, attaching the one to the other, keep it from wandering too far; analogous to the custom of tying a log to an animal which is prone to stray. Thus, as the ideas of tangible and visible things are the readiest to be remembered and recollected, by the process alluded to all ideas are rendered of this quality, or made so akin to it that it is largely infused into them.⁷ Recourse to sound is also had in order to assist the memory of words, in those cases where they are reduced to rhyme; the recital of which, as recently remarked, when

⁷ "There is scarce any man with so happy a memory, as to be able to retain the order of words and sentiments without arranging and affixing local ideas to circumstances; nor is there any memory so treacherous, as not to be in some measure assisted by such a practice and use."—*Cicero. De Orat. cap. lxxxvii.*

"It was to assist the introduction of ideas by the force of sensible signs, that the ancient orators used images in the artificial memory."—*Gerard on Genius*, pt. ii. s. 9.

spoken aloud, suggests any omissions in the words themselves. So, if we forget a word in a sentence, we repeat the entire sentence, when the intonation of it at once supplies a recollection of the omission.

It may also I think be laid down with regard to the general utility and value of artificial aids, that they serve rather to recall to, than to fix ideas in, the memory; and that they are far more useful to the recollection than they are to the retention. As respects the former, they are probably more availed of by the capacities of the mind during their operation upon the recollection, than by the recollection itself. The retention is however, to some extent, also occasionally aided by artificial resources. Thus, when we would implant an idea firmly in it, we connect it with some other idea which is vigorously retained there, so that the one is never lost without the other. Possibly however the real value in this instance as well, is rather to recall, than actually to retain the ideas. In the case of memoranda or figures suited to produce ideas intimately associated with any subject, they serve as aids rather to the retention than the recollection, and to prevent them from fading from the former; or rather, perhaps, to revive them when they have faded. So also, a painting cannot strictly be said to assist the memory with respect to the objects that it represents, by helping it to recall the ideas of them to the mind. It is in reality, rather the cause of the production of new and independent ideas, which may be compared with those existent in the mind relative to the objects that it represents. What it in fact does, is to suggest, not recall, ideas, connected with the subject which it portrays.*

The various species of artificial aids mainly available of by the memory, if considered in relation to their general result, may indeed all be reduced to those of suggestion and association. As regards the respective application of these two elements, it seems to me that while suggestion is mainly of use, and is principally resorted to by the active power of recollection, for the purpose of recalling ideas into the memory; association is principally serviceable to keep and fix ideas in the retention when they are once implanted there.

* *Mr. Sopwith* remarks on this paragraph as follows:—"Of the science, so at one time called, of mnemonics, or memory, I form a small estimate. I spent many hours in many days in learning a system. Certain letters represented figures,—certain symbols were *imagined* to be on each of nine squares of four sides in a room. "*Ate*," goddess of revenge, was the first figure,—all the other fifty-three I have totally forgotten. Well,—

"*Ate*' was eating an egg, and a bird on a bank."

This signified that Egbert was first king of England in 527,—these figures being represented by B * N K to which an A was added to make a word. More than sixty years ago I learnt this. I remember this.—And all the other fifty-three symbols *are gone!*"

Hence, the leading artificial aid to the memory, especially to retention, is the record of ideas by means of written language. In this case, however, it appears that it is not in reality the ideas themselves that are actually recorded or retained, but that a means of retaining them, by presenting others to the mind inseparably associated with them, as letters and figures are with the words and ideas they represent, is, in this case, resorted to. In many instances however, the ideas are rather revived than retained, by means of the aid in question; in others they are continually repeated, so as not to need either retention or revival. In several of these cases it will be found that the original impression on the retention has wholly faded; and that by the artificial aid resorted to, whether it be a pictorial or written record of the event, new impressions are made upon the mind instead of on the memory, occasionally greatly varying from those implanted in the retention. From this occurrence it is, that we are sometimes led to remark how different a place appears when we revisit it, to what we had fancied from our recollection of it, aided by views of its scenery. Indeed, so far from representations and memoranda contributing really to aid the memory, their actual use is to enable us to do without relying on the memory, and to serve as a substitute for this power.

As the memory draws from each object whose remembrance it treasures up, ideas of different kinds connected with other objects, as well as itself; so when the ideas of these latter objects are recalled into the mind, they are apt to draw with them, as associated or entwined together, the original object also. Hence the power and influence of association in retaining ideas in the memory.

Ideas of material subjects being those which ordinarily make the most vivid impressions upon the memory; when we would remember an abstract idea, we are apt, as already stated, to connect or associate it with one that is material. It nevertheless sometimes happens that we remember a material idea mainly from its connexion with one that is immaterial.

During the entrance into the mind of ideas by those three inlets of them, the capacities of apprehension, deprehension, and comprehension; the ideas which are lying dormant in the retention, are frequently roused by the arrival of new ideas similar to them in character, and with which they at once sympathize on their approach. This, indeed, moreover, affords another illustration of the close connexion between the understanding and the memory.

Association consists in a natural, and more or less necessary connexion of one idea with another, when they either form a part of the same subject, or have an inseparable relation to each other; so that the retention in the memory of the one, insures that

of the other also. Suggestion, on the other hand, implies no necessary or natural connexion with another idea, although it serves to direct attention towards it, and constitutes a sort of guide-post to lead the way to it. Thus, for instance, planting words in the memory, or memory of language, appears to be effected mainly by creating in the mind associations of ideas with the idea of each word through which the latter may be recalled; as also by remembering the sound that the word produces when spoken; in addition to which there is also the ordinary mode of remembering words from merely hearing or seeing them constantly repeated.

But, although ideas are very often recalled into the mind in consequence of their connexion or association with those already there; yet it does not thence follow, as some metaphysicians appear to have inferred, that every effort of memory is entirely and solely dependent on this circumstance. If so, it would indeed be a purely and entirely passive power; whereas, as I have demonstrated, it consists of two distinct and independent powers, the one active, and the other passive.

It may be concluded, therefore, from what has been premised, that the association together of ideas has a great tendency to preserve them in the retention. This, as it were, unites them together by their relations, so that they can never be entirely disengaged from their hold. Each idea is thus connected with several more; and as long as one of them is retained in the memory, the others can never be wholly forgotten.

It is only however with regard to minor matters, that the aid of association and suggestion is found serviceable in retaining ideas, and in recalling them into the mind; inasmuch as subjects of leading importance present themselves to us, and are retained, and recalled into the memory, without such help. Topics moreover of this class, by means of association and suggestion, will often have the effect of retaining and recalling ideas relating to those of minor consequence with which they are connected.

7. Improvement of the Memory by Education and Exercise.

The memory, like every other power of the mind, is to a large extent improvable by being subjected to a proper course of education and training, and by being duly exercised in the various operations of which it is capable. Indeed, not only is this the case, but it is more or less absolutely dependent upon this circumstance for its full development. Both the power of retention, and that of recollection, are alike benefited by this

means, which renders the one more powerful and more clear, and the other more ready and more active.

Thus, according as it is exerted and becomes accustomed to various exercises, the retention acquires vigour in retaining the ideas engraven upon it, whose characters moreover become more forcible and clear. The strength of memory exhibited by some persons who have duly trained and cultivated their retentive powers, appears prodigious; but of cases of this kind we have less experience since the use of artificial aids, more especially through writing and printing, have become so commonly availed of. What is called learning by rote, in which the memories of young people are occasionally exercised, is a mode of training and strengthening the retention.

The recollection, however, equally with the retention, is improvable by education. By this means, not only, as already stated, are the readiness and celerity with which it is able to recall ideas, much increased, but the control over the memory is considerably extended; and it thereby also learns to apply with the utmost advantage, the various artificial aids already alluded to.

The memory moreover, as regards both its powers, is to a great degree dependent on the various capacities of the mind, and, as a consequence of this, on their particular condition and cultivation, especially on those of the understanding; the aid and operation of which as regards the memory, I have already described, and the general improvement of which by education, will be considered in a subsequent chapter. The character of the memory seems, indeed, not only to improve, but to vary, with the general education of the mind. Thus, savages and uneducated people retain ideas of sensible objects, and of sensations also, much more forcibly than educated persons do; while the latter alone retain ideas of abstract subjects, correctly and vividly, in their memories. Not only however is the memory dependent on the condition of the mind for its own energy, vigour, and activity; but the condition of the body as well exercises an important influence, and that in various ways, upon the state of the memory, as I shall point out in the next section, when we consider how far diseases of the material frame extend to, and affect the memory.

As regards the mode in which the memory is improved by use, the extent to which it becomes invigorated by exercise, and the manner in which one process aids another; these results are exhibited upon various occasions, whether the subject be of an abstract or of a sensorial nature. Thus, in learning a language in which memory is the chief aid, although understanding and reason also assist, we gradually, and step by step, gain a knowledge of it, much as we do a knowledge of the people in a town or country which is new to us; the remem-

brance of the faces of the principal of them being by degrees obtained, as are the words most in use in the language we are acquiring. By-and-by, we also become acquainted with and remember their different characters and pursuits, and all the particular circumstances connected with them; just as we do the nature and application of the words and idioms in the new language.

The manner in which the memory is improved by exercise, is moreover exhibited in the case of language, and by our mode of forgetting it as well as by our mode of learning it. Thus, by neglect to recur to them, and to revive them in the retention, we by degrees, but nevertheless speedily, forget the different words and terms, and also the mode of using them, until they grow fainter and fainter, the impressions gradually vanishing, at length no traces of their existence being left behind, even though ideas closely connected with them are recalled to the mind. This we find to be especially the fact as regards any particular language which we learnt in our youth, but of which we have discontinued the use.

What might be termed and considered as the direct education of the memory, is perhaps most effectively and completely promoted by that of the understanding, so far as it is attainable or practicable by any appliances for this purpose, either natural or artificial.⁹ Whatever indeed educates the understanding, educates also the memory. The retention is mainly improved by the cultivation, the recollection by the discipline of this faculty. The understanding cannot possibly be in good order unless the memory is so; and, whatever improves the memory, in turn improves the understanding too.

The understanding, moreover, cannot be properly supplied with ideas, unless the memory is well stored; and the memory cannot be well stored, unless the understanding is properly supplied.

So also general exercise is directly improving to the memory, as it is to the understanding also.

The development of the memory appears to take place later than that of the capacity of apprehension, but before that of the faculties of reason and genius; and possibly, contemporaneously with that of the capacities of deprehension and comprehension. As far as we can judge, a foetus has no memory whatever; and in infants it must be very weak and limited, inasmuch, as already observed, persons are never able in the least to recollect any of the events which happened during their earliest childhood, although these are attended by every circumstance calculated in the highest degree to impress them upon the memory. Its development seems however to be very rapid when it once commences, as children who

⁹ *Vide post*, c. vii. s. 4.

remember at all, remember very vividly.¹ When the apprehension is first exercised, ideas are not communicated to the memory, and this capacity does little more than accustom itself to take in ideas.

As a general rule, a state of civilization is far more favourable to the development of the memory, than is one of barbarity. It has been remarked, however, that with one kind of memory, that of places, savages appear to be more extensively endowed than are civilized people. Probably, as regards material objects of whatever kind, this is the case; while with regard to ordinary memory, they are deficient. The reason of this I should infer to be, that their attention is mainly directed to local and material objects, and thus memory of this kind alone is exercised; while memory of abstract matters is neglected, and is not in consequence cultivated or developed. Among civilized men, local and material memory is less brought into use than is that of objects and subjects in general. It is not indeed so much in either case that a particular kind of memory is either cultivated or neglected, as that the sphere of the operations of memory is contracted or enlarged, and its exercise within that sphere is extensive or limited accordingly.

8. *Defects and Diseases especially incident to the Memory.*

In common with every other power, and organ, and member, belonging either to the mind or to the body, the memory is subject to defects, and to diseases, of various kinds; and, as it often happens in each of these cases, not only the causes which produce the one produce also the other, but defects and diseases alike have a mutual influence both to originate and to stimulate each other.²

The defects and diseases to which the memory is especially

¹ "According to *Aristotle*, memory is made by the impression of some image upon the soul. Hence, they who retain not the image and figure of sense, either by continual motion, or excessive humidity, as children, or dryness, as old men, remember not."—*Lit. de Memor. et Rem.* Chap. i.

"In early infancy, though the impressions received from new objects must be strong, the memory appears to be weak. Many causes may concur in producing this effect. In this period of our existence, almost every object is new, and of course, engrosses the whole attention. Hence, the idea of any particular object is obliterated by the quick succession and novelty of others, joined to the force with which they act upon the mind."—*Smellie. Philosophy of Natural History.* Chap. vii. p. 203.

² *Dr. Beddoe* tells me, in reply to my inquiry, that, in his opinion, the general condition of the body, especially as to health, extensively affects the memory, and which applies to its power of recalling, as well as of retaining ideas. And that not merely the vigour and activity, but the character also of the memory, are influenced by this circumstance.

subject, are mainly of three kinds.³ The first of them is connected with, and is incident to, its power of retention; and consists in a weakness, or want of clearness, in retaining ideas. The second of these defects or diseases consists in a want of facility and readiness in recalling ideas to the memory, and is incident to its power of recollection. To both these defects old people are particularly liable, although they are not confined to persons of this class, and many individuals of mature age seem to be affected by them. The decay however of memory observable in aged persons as regards common events near at hand, exists probably, as already remarked, not in the recollection, but in the retention; which no longer serves readily to catch and retain the impressions made upon it, and has become, as it were, dull and hardened by old age. As in the case of infants, the memory fails to retain ideas, because the corporeal organs necessary for this purpose are not then developed, although memory gradually appears in them, correspondingly with this development; so in the case of old people, the memory fails to retain ideas, because these corporeal organs have become decayed, and it gradually decreases in its retentive power, correspondingly with the progress of that decay.⁴

It is nevertheless a singular feature in the character of the memory, that while the names of persons and places fade from the minds of old people, they do not in the same way forget the persons and places themselves. The reason of this probably is that it is the recollection, not the retention, which is at fault; so that while there is nothing to recall the names, the mere mention of the persons and places of itself occasions their remembrance. On the other hand, the memory appears in youth to possess a peculiar facility for retaining words as well as things; which however it loses in old age, when names are forgotten, although the remembrance of actual objects continues as vivid as ever. It will now and then happen however that we remember the names of persons and places, while we forget, or are unable to recall, the ideas themselves of these persons and places. This is probably owing to some peculiar circumstances connected with the association of these ideas.⁵

³ *Dugald Stewart* defines the qualities of a good memory to be:—

1. Susceptible; 2. Retentive; 3. Ready.—*Elements of the Philosophy of Mind*. Pt. ii. c. vi. s. 2.

⁴ *Dr Maudsley* refers to the remarkable memories of certain idiots, who, utterly destitute of intelligence, will repeat the longest stories with the greatest accuracy.—*Physiology and Pathology of the Mind*, p. 15.

⁵ *Mr. Smee* remarks with regard to the above passage, that medical men have the matters embraced by it brought before them professionally, "and every variety presents itself. Some, like the late Sir William Lawrence, never forget a name once told him. Now I very rarely forget

The third of the diseases to which the memory is subject, is of an opposite character to the first of them; and consists in the admission into the memory, and impression upon the retention, of ideas which were not communicated to it through the proper channel of the understanding, or any of its capacities; but were either formed by the inventive capacity, or spontaneously generated in the memory, in consequence of some delusion that affected the mind. These spurious ideas when so received into the memory, are retained there, and recalled, as though they had been legitimately implanted. This is the case with persons suffering from insanity of different kinds, the characteristic peculiarity of whose malady displays itself in the affection of the memory in each of the modes I have already described, but especially in the latter.

The memory not unfrequently, moreover, fails clearly and with certainty to discriminate between the determination to do certain things, and the actual performance of them. As it is a rule of equity that things agreed to be done shall be considered as done; so it seems to be a rule of the memory that when a thing is positively settled to be done, it is speedily registered in the memory as effected: the same ideas, indeed, are communicated to the mind from the positive intent, as from the deed itself. Hence, on this head mistakes often arise.

There is another defect or irregularity in the operation of the memory, that is mainly found in people who are either old or out of health; which is, that they repeat the same facts several times within a brief period, without remembering that they have done so. This cannot be said to arise from an actual deficiency either in the retention or the recollection. Indeed, in both cases, the power is in reality too ready, instead of too tardy for action. It is the result, however, of a defect in the retention to receive and retain the circumstance of the narration of the fact in question, and so prevent its repetition; and it is consequently a disease in the retentive power of the memory, which, like other diseases and defects of that power, probably originates in some disease or defect of the material frame. Extraordinary excitement, or over-susceptibility of the memory, through which it recalls ideas with supernatural power and vividness, is also a proof of its being diseased, and evinces that it is labouring under some disorder which produces this condition; analogous to the circumstance that too great a liability to excitement of the senses or emotions, is also a proof of derangement of the material system.

Any defect or disease in, or wrong operation of, any of the

a case, but very seldom remember the name. A great deal might be written on this paragraph."

faculties or capacities of the mind, has also a direct tendency to produce a defect or disease of the memory. And the memory, in its turn, is probably the cause of a good deal of error as regards the operation of each of these capacities; both from its retaining ideas imperfectly, and also from its allowing them in many cases to imbibe a certain tinge through prejudice or other influences, which act upon and bias the operations of memory, alike as regards retention and recollection.

Most of the ideas that are admitted into the mind are thenceforth in a gradual course of fading from the memory, until they become altogether effaced.⁶ Nor would it be, by any means, for the advantage of the memory, or the mind, that it should retain every trivial unimportant impression which is made upon it, and which is at all events preserved long enough to answer the purpose for which it was made. The proper end of the memory may, as already remarked, be attained by the ideas in general merely passing through the mind, which affect it in their progress, although not permanently remaining there; as in the case of food by which the body is nourished, though it does not require to be long in the system for it to be so benefited. The fading of ideas from the memory, is somewhat similar to the fading from our sight of the prospect of a coast from which we are gradually retiring at sea; the smallest and least striking objects soon disappear, a general view only of the country remains, then the outline merely, and the most prominent objects in the horizon; until at last, nothing but the highest mountains and pinnacles can be seen, which remain in sight long after more proximate portions of the land have disappeared. Just so is it with the memory. The most trifling ideas are soon lost, a general retention only of the subject remains for any length of time; after this, striking portions alone are viewed in the mind's eye, which become faint as we retire farther from the prospect, either by lapse of time, or our not approaching again to review it. And as already pointed out, innumerable ideas pass through the mind, without being in any way retained by the memory.

The mind and its faculties are nevertheless ever in active

⁶ "The memory of some, it is true, is very tenacious, even to a miracle; but yet there seems to be a constant decay of all our ideas, even of those which are struck deepest, and in minds the most retentive; so that if they be not sometimes renewed by repeated exercise of the senses, or reflection on those kind of objects which at first occasioned them, the first wears out, and at last there remains nothing to be seen. Thus, the ideas, as well as children of our youth, often die before us: and our minds represent to us those tombs to which we are approaching, where, though the brass and marble remain, yet the inscriptions are effaced by time, and the imagery moulders away. The pictures drawn in our minds are laid in fading colours, and, if not sometimes refreshed, vanish and disappear." *Locke. Essay on the Understanding*, b. ii. c. x. s. 5.

operation. Ideas are constantly being revolved, and are ceaselessly imbibed by the soul. How great, therefore, every hour, must be the amount of ideas which have thus floated through the memory. Hence, the cause of so many different matters being kept in our remembrance which would otherwise fade, did not the mind so often visit and revisit them. During each day indeed, nearly every common subject with which we are acquainted, or in which we are interested, has been brought, though perhaps only momentarily, under our contemplation. Dreaming also, greatly aids to the revival and retention of ideas in this manner.

In many instances where we feel sure that the ideas of certain matters are duly preserved in the retention, we are nevertheless wholly unable to recall them at the time desired, which is occasioned by some defect in the recollection. The emotions and passions also sometimes increase this defect, and cause the mind to wander from the subject on which it is engaged, or disturb the operation of the intellectual faculties. The being able to bring the memory under due control, is the surest antidote to this disease, against which certain artificial aids may conduce to afford protection.

In considering in what manner most efficiently to counteract the tendency and operation of the defects and diseases incident to the memory, I must recur to what I have already advanced respecting the general improvement of the memory by education and exercise. In most, if not in all cases, whatever contributes to the health of the memory, contributes correspondingly to its improvement. And whatever contributes to its improvement, contributes correspondingly to its health.

9. *Essential Quality of the Memory.*

A question of considerable interest, but which does not admit of very easy determination, is that which concerns the real essence, and actual quality, of the memory itself. Whether the memory is a separate independent being or power, or whether it is a part of the soul; whether it is appurtenant rather to the body than to the soul, and depends upon it, or on certain of its qualities or organs, rather than on the former, and if so, whether wholly or partially only;⁷ and whether the memory is endowed with any particular individual qualities of

⁷ *Dr. Maudsley* remarks that "the manifold disorders to which memory is liable, illustrate in the surest manner its organic nature." *Physiology and Pathology of the Mind*, p. 217. The same able writer tells us that "there is memory in every nerve cell, and indeed in every

its own, wholly independent of the mind and the material frame;—are inquiries which, however important to raise and interesting to investigate, it is perhaps impossible satisfactorily to solve.⁸

Possibly, if the soul as well as the body, is endowed with certain essential qualities, more especially those of texture and temperament, or with any properties corresponding thereto; certain of these properties, both in the soul and in the body, may be better adapted for the development of the memory, or of one of its powers,—some for retention, others for recollection,—than are certain others. And if the characteristic varieties in the memory depend so much on the characteristic varieties of the soul itself; then might we infer that the real essence and quality of the memory must both mainly depend upon, and be identical with, that of the soul.

Whether there is received upon the brain, or on any part of it, or upon any other organ of the material frame, certain impressions by which ideas are retained there; ⁹ or whether the memory is a power possessed by the soul alone, and by

organic element of the body.”—*Physiology and Pathology of the Mind*, p. 209.

⁸ Aristotle considered that memory is derived from fancy, and has its seat in the same power of the soul; and that it is the effect of some image impressed upon the soul by means of the senses. He also observed, that to memory is required a moderate temperature of the brain, but that dryness was most favourable to it.—*Lit. de Memor. et Rem.* c. i.

Dugald Stewart remarked that “the theories which attempt to account for memory by traces on the brain, are quite hypothetical. This faculty indeed appears to depend more on the state of the body, as may be inferred from the effects of intoxication, disease, and old age.”—*Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, vol. i. c. vi.

“It is the memory that asks for and admits those artificial aids which bespeak its intimate alliance with corporeal impressions.”—*Physical Theory of Another Life*, c. v.

⁹ “How much the constitution of our bodies, and the make of our animal spirits are concerned in this, and whether the temper of the brain makes this difference, that in some it retains the characters drawn on it like marble, in others like free-stone, and in others little better than sand; I shall not here inquire: though it may seem probable that the constitution of the body does sometimes influence the memory; since we oftentimes find a disease quite strip the mind of all its ideas, and the flames of a fever in a few days calcine all those images to dust and confusion which seemed to be as lasting as if graved in marble.” *Locke. Essay on the Understanding*, b. ii. c. x. s. 5.

“If the pith of the brain contribute to the functions of any power of the mind, more than by conserving the animal spirits, it is to the memory. But that the brain should be stored with distinct images, whether they consist of the flexures of the supposed *fibrilæ*, or the orderly puncture of pores, or in a continual modified motion of the parts thereof, some in this manner, and others in that, is a thing utterly impossible.”—*Dr. Henry More. Immortality of the Soul*, b. i. c. xi. s. 4.

Hartley asserts that “memory depends entirely or chiefly on the state of the brain.”—*Observations on Man*, c. iii. s. 4, p. 90.

which it is enabled to recommunicate to the mind the ideas that it treasures up, appears difficult decisively to determine. From the memory being so liable to be affected by the condition of the body, already alluded to in the preceding section—as, for instance, whether that is in a sound and healthy, or a disordered state, and from the great difference observable in our powers of memory at different periods of age,—we might be inclined to suppose that it was dependent on some bodily organ, and particularly on the texture and temperament of the material frame. From the circumstance also of the memory gradually developing itself as the infant proceeds in growth, we must further infer the dependence of the memory upon the body. In persons suffering from fever, and certain other diseases affecting the brain, and in very old people, we often observe that their retention is affected; that they are unable to retain new ideas in the memory, although they can with the same facility as ever recall those ideas already and early retained. This seems to prove that the retention must be a part of, or dependent upon, the material frame; while the recollection may be independent of it, and probably a purely spiritual and unsubstantial power. The gradual failing of ideas from the memory, is another argument in favour of its dependence on the material part of our constitution; for if it depended on the spiritual part, there would be no reason for this failure. The material being is constantly in a state of change, which alone of itself would account for this frequent fading of ideas implanted in any portion of it. On the other hand, as ideas received in early youth, before the body is matured, are the strongest implanted in the memory, this tends to demonstrate that it is independent of the bodily frame. We may conjecture however, that there may be some portions of our material being that do not change, or are not annihilated; and that to these parts the memory belongs, and on these makes its impressions. What however appears most singular and perplexing in the case of the memory, is that the retention, which may be inferred to be most dependent on the material part of our constitution, continues, with regard to particular ideas, to be unimpaired through age; while the recollection, which seems most to depend on the intellectual part of our constitution, fails, and loses its activity and readiness.

It might also be suggested that the true and correct prin-

And according to *Mr. Smee*, "Memory depends upon organization, and the state of the organ in which it is manifested."—*Instinct and Reason*, c. v. s. 134, p. 54. The same acute and able writer points out that "pictures transmitted to the brain are not transient, but are fixed in the organization, and appear hereafter." *Mind of Man*, c. i. p. 12. And that "an image once formed in the brain produces an indelible impression, and may at any future time recur. This property is called memory."—*Ibid*, c. ap. xv. p. 185.

ciple with regard to the organ or seat of the memory, is, not that it is implanted in, or dependent upon, the material frame, or any of its organs, but that it is inherent in the substratum of the very soul itself. Nevertheless, it may be contended that it is necessarily from the nature of its operations, more dependent upon the condition of the material frame than are those faculties which are exercised quite independent of any external objects, or of ideas derived from them. And that as the material senses are only the organs of the spiritual sense; so the material organs of the memory may be merely the auxiliary instruments of the spiritual memory inherent in the soul.

If indeed the memory has its seat or organ in any part of, or be in any respect dependent on, the material frame, or any of its organs; it must almost necessarily follow that in a future state we shall either be void of memory, or that the memory will be very much decreased or limited beyond what it is in our present condition. And yet during sleep, which is the period when the mind exerts itself more independent of the body than at any other time during our terrestrial career, the memory is not only most active, but seems most forcible. Nevertheless, although during sleep many of the organs of the body are torpid, they are not all so; and the soul is still united to it, and continues to influence it.

The principal reason, however, why the memory appears so vivid during sleep, is not that it is then really more powerful than when we are awake; but that, as in the case of dreaming, the mind not being excited by external impressions, its internal operations are conducted with much more force, and are not interfered with.

Possibly, the soul during its state of separation from the body, will lose all memory of terrestrial concerns, which it may regain on being reunited to the body at the resurrection.¹

All the faculties of the soul, especially that of the understanding, are however more or less affected by the condition of the material frame, to which it is so closely united; and as their being affected by any changes in it is no proof of their consisting of material organs, so the fact of the memory being affected by the state of the body, affords no conclusive evidence of its being a material organ. It is also in consequence of the intellectual faculties being so influenced, that our powers of memory appear to vary. When the due operation of the understanding is interfered with on account of the disorder of the material organs, ideas are not received with sufficient force or clearness to impress them strongly on the memory.²

¹ "The faculty of memory is one which, with the highest probability, we may expect to be greatly extended and improved in a new and a more refined corporeal structure."—*Physical Theory of Another Life*, c. v.

² *Dr. Carpenter*, on the other hand, tells us that "there is very strong

In many respects indeed, the memory seems to be less affected by the condition of the body as regards its vigour and activity, than are certain of the intellectual capacities. On the whole therefore it appears to be most reasonable to conclude that the retention is allied to, and mainly dependent upon, the material frame; and the recollection principally upon the soul.

Whether, in a future state of being, when the soul is in a condition of separation from the body, or when it is united to a spiritualized frame, the memory will continue to exist, might nevertheless admit of considerable discussion. It appears however most reasonable to suppose that we shall then be without retention; but that this will be, not because we shall have no occasion to call to mind the events of the past, but because we shall then have no occasion for the exercise of this endowment to enable us to do so, inasmuch as we shall possess the power of recalling to the mind at pleasure, all the ideas which have ever passed through it, and which will be presented immediately before it, and be open to the full ken of the understanding in all their vividness, instead of being only as it were reflected there by the fading mirror of the memory.

10. *Distinctive Features of the Memory in Man and Animals.*

From a review of the principles advanced in the present chapter, we may draw some certain inferences as to the leading and essential points of difference which distinguish the memory in man and in animals. With the power of retention, animals in general appear to be endowed, although different animals differ greatly as regards the extent to which they possess this power, and few if any of them are gifted with it so fully as is man.³ Sensations alone are what are probably

physiological reason to believe that the storing up of ideas in the memory is the psychological expression of physical changes in the cerebrum, by which ideational states are permanently registered or recorded; so that any 'trace' left by them, although remaining so long outside the 'sphere of consciousness,' as to have seemed non-existent, may be revived again in full vividness under certain special conditions."—*Mental Physiology*, book ii. chap. x. p. 436.

³ *Aristotle* says that those animals only which have a sense of time remember, and that animals have not reminiscence, though they have memory.—*Lib. de Memor. et Rem.*, cap. i. 2.

The existence and extent of memory in animals is adverted to by *Locke* in the following passage:—"This faculty of laying up and retaining the ideas that are brought into the mind, several other animals seem to have to a great degree as well as man."—*Essay on Understanding*, b. ii. c. x. s. 10.

"Brutes can have no such thing as memory, properly so called; for after

retained in their memories; although it is possible that certain instinctive ideas of gross material objects or qualities, may be in a peculiar manner also impressed.

Animals, although endowed with souls or spiritual beings, having no active faculties or capacities annexed to them, are void of the power of recollection, but are wholly dependent on external agents for recalling sensations into their memories, which however are fully gifted with the passive power of retention. Consequently, as regards recollection, it does not seem that animals are at all endowed with it, so far as respects the active exercise of this attribute; but the sensations which are recalled to their memories, are brought back by the recurrence of objects and wants associated with them, and by other circumstances, not by any voluntary self-directed effort of the will or instinctive being. Whatever of recollection they possess, is therefore passive and involuntary.⁴ As regards the varieties of memory to be found among them, not only different animals of different species, but those of the same kind, differ much in this respect. No animals however appear to have any voluntary control whatever over their memories, nor are they capable of extending or improving them by education. By artificial aids, the memories of animals

the impressions are made, or the ideas formed, they leave their imagination without any notice or observation to sway and direct their motives as long as they last. But their ideas decay gradually, so as never to be revived again by any proper recollection, and must be renewed by a repetition of the same, or of a like impression, from the presence of the object; which is as different from memory as natural instinct is from reason.—*Browne's Procedure of the Understanding*, b. ii. c. ii. p. 159.

Buffon deemed that animals have neither ingenuity, understanding, nor memory, because they are denied the power of comparing their sensations. Animals, and idiots, he concluded, possess memory only so far as it consists in the renovation of our sensations, and not that of ideas.—*Nat. Hist.*

Le Roy on the other hand remarks that "the commonest actions of animals—their daily proceedings,—suppose memory, reflection upon the past, comparison between a present object which excites their desire, and the indications of danger which repel them."—*Intelligence and Perfection of Animals*, Letter vii.

Mr. Grindon says that "men alone remember principles; brutes simply remember circumstances."—*Life*, p. 372.

Mr. Wood, who has devoted much attention to this topic, tells me that he is decidedly of opinion that animals are endowed with memory, and instances in support of this view the capability of instruction by man which animals possess, without which, as he says very truly, no teaching would be of the slightest use.

⁴ *Aristotle* held that memory originated in the senses, and that it is common to many animals as well as to man. He, however, supposed that animals have not reminiscence, although they have memory, inasmuch as the exercise of reminiscence requires intellect.—*Lib. de Memor. et Rem.* cap. i.

Mr. Darwin says that "animals have excellent memories for persons and places."—*Descent of Man, &c.*, vol. i. p. 45.

are very little, if at all, assisted; although by having objects and scenes presented before them, the remembrance of the sensations of such subjects, as already stated, frequently recurs. Disease and bodily infirmity produce a corresponding effect on the memory of animals and that of man.⁵

From the possession of memory by animals, it is obvious that this endowment, or at any rate its power of retention, is not the exclusive property of intellect; as even those animals which are of the lowest order in the creation, such as worms and oysters, are more or less supplied with it, remember what they have experienced, and are mainly directed by memory in many of their actions. Those creatures however which are endowed with vegetation only, and have no instinctive power, such as trees and herbs, have nothing approaching to memory; but which is possessed by all intelligent, and all instinctive beings. Sensations, and instinctive ideas, if they have any, equally with intellectual ideas in man, are retained in the memories of animals.

Whether all animals whatever are gifted with memory, it might however be difficult to determine. Of the sensations and instinctive ideas which enter into their minds, or instinctive intelligent beings, and are transmitted to their memories, we are unable to know the exact nature and extent. They are probably, of a gross and simple nature only, sufficing merely to afford them notions of the material objects around them; and which the memory that they possess, may be serviceable upon many occasions in recalling.

⁵ *Professor De Quatrefages* has been so obliging as to favour me with the important and interesting note which follows, on the above paragraph:—

“As regards the memory, and the other intellectual faculties, they are, I believe, fundamentally of the same nature in animals and in man. There is no difference except as to their extent or limitation. The rudiments of them are in animals, but in man they are fully developed. They may appear different in animals. But whatever you say of the one, is applicable also to the other. If you attempt to lay down a fundamental rule as to the sensation which influences animals, you do for them what certain philosophers have done for man, and you resort to crude sensational arguments. Sensation with us also recalls the remembrance of ideas through association. The notes of an air that has struck us, causes a repetition before our eyes of the hall, with its decorations, and all the succession of scenes that have interested us. Don't forget besides that the dog dreams, and that in his dreams he acts to himself a part. Nor are animals so senseless as they are generally supposed to be. The *essential* difference between them and man is not in this respect. It is with regard to morality and religion that we find no traces of their existence in animals, not even in the dog, which we teach what is good or bad as concerns ourselves, but which if left to itself would display no notions of this kind.”

Dr. Carter Blake writes to express to me his agreement in the statements contained in the same paragraph, respecting animal memory, particularly as to their not being endowed with it “so far as respects the active voluntary exercise of this capacity.”

The experience which animals obtain, oftentimes to a very great extent, is of itself sufficient proof that they are endowed with memory. Thus, a domestic animal which has been corrected for any particular fault, will carefully avoid repeating it. Animals are also capable of being taught many acts, and birds remember tunes.⁶

Experience is, indeed, but the retention in the memory of the sensations or ideas produced by past events. In reasonable beings, who are capable of entertaining in their minds a multiplicity of ideas, simple and compounded, of various kinds, the memory serves to treasure up these ideas; and by the action of the intellectual faculties, as also by other causes, each is recalled as occasion may require. In animals, who receive only sensations, or simple instinctive ideas of a gross and ordinary kind, the memory is less frequently called into use. It appears therefore probable that their sensations, or instinctive ideas, are recalled from their memories rather by chance,—as by the presence of objects the sensations or instinctive ideas of which are immediately associated with those in their memories,—than by the voluntary exercise of any recollective power, as in man.

Among animals, their sensations and instinctive ideas being recalled into their memories by association only, it is probable that they are recollected in this manner much more actively and readily than they are by the same process among our own species; and thus with animals, the want of being able to recall sensations at pleasure, is but little felt. Perhaps, indeed, even with us, while *ideas* are recalled into the mind mainly by the action of the intellectual faculties, *sensations* are recalled principally by means of associations connected with them floating into the mind, and starting them from their recesses.

⁶ A remarkable instance of the power of memory in animals, especially in relation to their recollection being excited by means of sound, has been supplied to me in a note on this passage by *Professor C. J. Plumptre*, which is as follows:—

“I remember a curious instance of an animal evidently remembering a language it could not have heard, I imagine, for a considerable time. On one occasion I was walking with my late wife in the Zoological Gardens. We came to the paddock in which the Brahmin bull is kept. He was in his house at the end of the paddock. Several people were trying to make him come out with cakes, and showing bread, and handfuls of grass, and hay; but in vain. Suddenly my wife, who had passed her earlier life in India, said to me, ‘I’ll see if the bull remembers still Hindostanee,’ and called out ‘*Bahmah! Bahmah!*’ the cry with which the Hindoos call their cattle home. In a moment the Brahmin bull left his shed, and trotted swiftly up to her, and suffered himself to be patted and fondled by her, while she called to him in Hindoo terms of endearment, he apparently showing the strongest signs of pleasure at being addressed in a language once familiar to him.”

Hence animals, through the remembrance of certain events,⁷ obtain experience of the past, which is revived whenever objects associated with those events are presented before them; and they are at once impelled to act under the influence of such experience, although without any exertion of their instinctive power corresponding with the reasoning effort carried on by man in regard to the experience which he has gained. Indeed, animals appear to me to act from the impulse of memory, in a manner corresponding with what man does, and to the same extent, when excited by the influence of any mere animal or medial sensation or emotion, but without any exertion whatever of his intellect in regard to them. Hence also in animals, the memory is the main directing endowment by which they are guided in various operations; and at each turn, they are stimulated by impulses originating in remembrance, and in many cases produced by recognition. The memory is, moreover, the principal endowment through which animals are qualified for receiving education of any kind, as it is that wherein they most resemble, and approach the nearest to, man. A man devoid of memory, must be utterly incapable of education; and however extensive his intellectual faculties, he would, for all practical purposes, be inferior to an animal.

⁷ *Le Roy* remarks that "of all the passions of animals, that which seems to leave the deepest traces in their memory, is maternal affection."—*Intelligence and Perfectibility of Animals*, Letter v.

CHAPTER VI.

THE CONCURRENT OPERATION, AND RECIPROCAL INFLUENCE, OF THE
VARIOUS MEDIAL, MORAL, AND MENTAL, ENDOWMENTS, AND POWERS.

1. *Comprehensive Character of the Mental Constitution.*

As I have already observed with regard to our errors upon matters of reason, the most prolific source of them is our neglect to consider all the various points and bearings of a subject together, and to keep in view their mutual relation and influence; and that in general when our conclusions are wrong, the cause of this arises rather from an incomplete and inadequate, than from an actually erroneous survey being taken. In a corresponding manner it is that our opinions concerning the nature of man are frequently false, not because actually incorrect notions are imbibed; but because we neglect when considering any one branch of the subject, to take into our estimate, and duly account for, the reciprocal, and mutual influence which the other parts of it have in a variety of ways, upon each independent branch.¹ This is nevertheless, absolutely essential for obtaining a correct result from our calculation as to the operation of any one of the powers, or endowments, or influences, in the constitution of man.

Much as we cannot but admire the ease and celerity with which each separate function of the different organs of the material frame are performed, the operation of the whole of them harmoniously together is still more astonishing. But as the phenomena of the efforts of mind are far more amazing than are those of matter; so the action of each of the various and differently constituted endowments of the mind, and, still more so, of the whole of this stupendous and wondrous machinery,—all its various and complicated, and apparently con-

¹ "Man is not only man; he is all things, every part of the universe in turn, according to the point of view from which we look."—*Grindon on Life*, p. 104. "He is the continent of the world—rather than contained in it; the aggregate of all properties, phenomena, and uses; the summary and mirror of the whole of God's creation."—*Ibid.*, p. 325. "The study of the three kingdoms of nature, is in effect the study of man, who being the image of God, is the finite archetype and summary of all things, the world over again, at once its Lord and its epitome."—*Ibid.*, p. 347.

flicting energies and influences, moving harmoniously together, —is doubtless more extraordinary, and more admirable, than any thing which we are able to conceive. As the soul is infinitely superior to the body in regard to its performance of action; so it may reasonably be inferred that it is correspondingly as superior to it in its attributes, and in its capabilities for exerting its stupendous powers.

We have therefore, now to inquire how this vast and marvellous machine termed the mind, by which such mighty achievements are effected, accomplishes its various and multifarious operations. Having examined the different wheels separately and one by one, we ought next to survey the whole structure together.

Before proceeding to this part of the subject, I must however revert to what I have already advanced with respect to the intellectual faculties and capacities in general, more especially in regard to their single operation.

In the first chapter of the present book, when describing the several faculties and capacities which the mind possesses, I endeavoured to prove that each and all of the different capacities which I have enumerated, are essential for our complete intellectual constitution; that every one has its proper necessary office, and that none are without their use, or can be dispensed with. In the present section I shall attempt to show that these faculties and capacities alone are amply sufficient for all the intellectual operations of which we are capable, and that consequently no others are required.

The several intellectual faculties and capacities, the nature, and the mode of operation of each of which I have described in the four preceding chapters, are consequently those alone with which the mind is endowed; and the exercise of them, either singly or combined, according as the particular act to be effected may require, is fully sufficient for each performance of the nature alluded to, which, however complex it may appear, is achieved by these faculties, and in the manner I have stated.

As complex ideas and emotions are but compounds of those that are simple, so all complex operations of the mind are in like manner compounded of those of a simple nature; being caused by several of these different capacities being exerted at once, and various operations being at the same time carried on by them, and blended together.

This will appear, perhaps, less extraordinary and improbable, if we consider, as has already indeed been pointed out²—1. The prodigious variety of combinations and efforts which these faculties, with their constituent capacities, are capable of effecting. Many musical instruments have not so great a

² *Vide ante*, c. i. s. 4, p. 191.

number of keys as there are of these capacities, while of colours there are but five different primitive kinds. Yet, by the changes and modifications of which they are susceptible, an amazing, indeed almost infinite variety of tunes and of hues may be produced. 2. A very simple organ or instrument is capable of being applied to several purposes. Of this we have an instance in the wheel, which, although so plain in its construction, is serviceable in so many of the mechanical contrivances that the very diversified pursuits of mankind lead them to require.

The most sure and satisfactory way, however, of determining this point, is to examine into the mode whereby these various complex intellectual operations, which might be supposed to be beyond the power of these faculties to effect, are actually performed.

Now, if we take the widest range in surveying the different exertions of which the mind is capable, we shall at once perceive that each, and all of them, may be effected by the agency of the faculties which I have described.

By the faculty of understanding, we are enabled to obtain a knowledge of facts of every variety, and of the most complicated nature. History of all kinds, narratives of matters relating both to objects and events, and the perception of different beings, are alike communicated by this faculty.

By the faculty of reason, we are enabled to pursue the examination of, and to argue respecting, the greatest and most complicated variety of subjects. Metaphysics, philosophy in all its different departments, mathematics, experimental and practical science, as also guidance in the several avocations of life, are all alike effected by means of this faculty.

The faculty of genius in like manner enables us to perform the multifarious operations of effecting new inventions in the different sciences, as also of originating ideas in controversy. And it confers the power of producing the most imaginative and striking compositions and descriptions in the arts, or of exciting ridicule with regard to any subject.

The same faculties may no doubt be exercised both in the pursuit of learning and philosophy, and in the common avocations of life. When however a person is largely endowed with the higher faculties and capacities, he is apt to be attracted to those occupations which are of the most exalted and intellectual nature, and such as will bring with them the richest reward. The capacities of apprehension, deprehension, and sense, are, as I have before observed when describing their nature and qualities, those which are more peculiarly adapted for aiding in the ordinary affairs of business; while those of comprehension, and judgment, and the faculty of genius, are especially fitted for more ambitious efforts.

It appears indeed remarkable when we reflect that even in our ordinary intellectual operations, so many distinct and independent powers of the mind are simultaneously called into action.

1. Ideas are generated as soon as sensations have been communicated through the senses.
2. These ideas are arranged in the order required.
3. They are compared one with another.
4. They are compounded one with another.
5. Words are selected as apt archetypes of these ideas.
6. These words are arranged in due form, by a process called grammar.

What a vastly complicated piece of machinery is therefore set in operation during every discourse, especially where this is carried on with rapidity. When writing is resorted to, in addition to all this the language has to be represented by visible archetypes, which are to verbal language, what words themselves are to ideas.

2. *Control by the Mind over the various Voluntary Actions of each Kind.*

The supremacy of the reason in the guidance of our actions, and the power of the mind to exercise authority over the general conduct, I have already asserted and maintained in a previous chapter.³ The bias of the mind as regards the direction of its operations from the influence of external causes, was also cursorily adverted to when treating generally on the nature of the Intellectual Faculties.⁴ How far, and to what extent, the mind is able to control itself, to regulate its own actions, to excite or restrain its various operations, and the precise limit to which it possesses this power, may nevertheless appear to admit of considerable doubt, and affords, at all events, a very interesting subject of inquiry. The mind in its mode of proceeding, seems always to have a preference of its own, arising from the influence upon it of the causes alluded to. But in what respect this preference is subject to the mandates of the will, or of the reason, it is important to ascertain.

In the direction of the operations of the mind, we are in many, if not in all cases, extensively biased by the animal or medial part of our nature, so that pleasure and pain are mainly instrumental in guiding us.⁵

³ *Vide ante*, b. ii. c. i. ss. 3, 9.

⁴ *Vide ante*, b. iii. c. i. s. 2.

⁵ *Vide ante*, b. ii. c. ii. s. 3, p. 90. B. iii. c. i. s. 2, p. 176.

According to *Helvetius*, "pleasures and pains are the moving powers of the universe."—*Treatise on Man*, s. 2, c. xvi.

Thus, apart from all other considerations, we prefer light and entertaining studies, because they produce pleasure at once, to those of a difficult and abstruse nature, because a certain degree of pain is directly caused by such an undertaking. And on this account, the mind is but too apt to wander from subjects of the latter kind, to those of the former. Indeed, the action of the mind has, in a preceding chapter of the present book, been compared to a vessel on the sea.⁶ When not guided by the pursuit of, or attentive to, any particular topic, it drifts away as the wind of its inclination, or the current or tide of its feelings, may urge it. Following a deep study requiring close attention, is like sailing against a strong wind; and where difficulties as to the meaning impede our progress, our course resembles going against the tide. When a subject is pursued which is at once easy and entertaining, the mind in its operation is analogous to the course of a ship sailing with both wind and tide in its favour.

The difficulty of concentrating the mind firmly and closely upon any subject demanding intense thought,⁷ proceeds from its proneness to fly away to, and divert itself with, some topic, or a variety of topics, of a light and entertaining character, which afford pleasure in the contemplation. On this account, it will occasionally be found easier to fix the mind on an abstruse or dry subject, while one is engaged in some ordinary occupation, such as walking, or riding, than when wholly unoccupied corporeally; inasmuch as in this case the mental labour serves as a diversion from attention to the bodily exercise, and the two together leave but little room for the intrusion of other thoughts.

The intellectual faculties are on the whole probably much more varied, and more uncertain, in their operation, than are the appetites and passions and emotions, which all act in the same manner in different persons who are excited by them. Animals too, who are guided only by their instinctive impulses, act almost uniformly. But different men, although placed in precisely the same circumstances, will act very differently one from the other; and the more extensively so the more extensively are their intellectual faculties brought into cultivation and full play, and the higher they are removed from the condition of brutes.

It is essential however, for the due economy both of our intellectual and our moral system, that all the various faculties and capacities should be not only exercised; but that their exercise should be controlled and directed, properly regularly and systematically, and not left to mere chance or whim.⁸

⁶ *Vide ante*, c. i. s. 2, p. 177.

⁷ *Vide ante*, c. i. s. 2, p. 176.

⁸ "The want of self-command originates either in rashness or debility. Weak men deliberate, but want strength of mind to persevere in their

Idleness consists indeed, in reality, as already observed, not in doing nothing, for in something we must from necessity be always employed; but in neglecting to act according to a regular course, against which however both the mind and the body are apt to rebel. It is nevertheless, not action, but restraint and direction, to which they are averse, and from which in whatever condition, they appear always anxious to escape. Hence, although an idle man may be as active as an industrious one; yet idleness influences more or less, every action both of body and of mind. So also a ship may be able to sail fast; but of what use is this if it is unable to direct its course? In order to constitute a really great man, he should not only possess great talents, but great power of directing them. And if his passions be great, his power of restraining them must be proportionably great also. He should moreover be able both to direct and to control alike his emotions, his appetites, and his affections.

Probably moreover, men differ from one another as much in the power of controlling and directing their various faculties and capacities, as they do in the different proportions in which they are endowed with them. Each faculty and each capacity ought to be kept in due restraint, and to exercise itself only in its own proper sphere. One of the most common causes of insanity, is the subjugation of the capacity of sense to the dominion of the imaginative power.⁹

Not only however, is the mind able to exercise control over itself, and over its own various operations; but to its sway are also subjugated all the voluntary operations of the body, more especially those of such of the material organs as serve for carrying out the purposes of the soul. Thus, the mind is the director of the voice in speaking and in singing, and of the hand both in writing and painting; so that the character of the impress made by these material organs, reflects, as it were, with more or less clearness according to circumstances, the individual character of the particular soul which impelled them, and by whom they are in each case guided and disciplined. Consequently, what is generally considered as the education of any particular material organ,—as when the hand is trained to paint or to play on an instrument,—is, in reality, simply, essentially, and solely, nothing more than the complete

resolutions; rash men are hurried away by passion, without deliberating at all.”—*Aristotle. Ethics*, b. vii. cap. vii.

“This arbitrary command of the passions can never be effected but by one who has a thorough knowledge of mankind, the whole extent of the human faculties, and those motives which impel or check the soul.”—*Cicero, De Orat.*, cap. xii.

⁹ *Vide ante*, Prel. Diss. s. viii. a. 4, vol. i. p. 160. B. ii. chap. ii. s. 4, vol. ii. p. 93.

subjection of such bodily organ to the impulses of the soul. This is farther evinced by the fact that the left hand which is not so disciplined, (although it fully admits of the same teaching,) is not able to perform these achievements, whatever may be the cultivation that the mind has received.

It might be a question of some doubt, although it is one of considerable interest, whether certain physical efforts, such as the talent of singing well, or of writing a good hand, depend mainly or entirely on the mental, or on the material constitution of the individual; whether on the power of the soul to direct the operations of the body in the most correct and regular manner, or on the perfect formation of the bodily organs. On the whole, it seems reasonable to conclude that the attainment of success in this case, as indeed in most other efforts, depends on the union of a well constituted soul to a well organized body. Without the former, the corporeal organs will not act effectively and harmoniously. Without the latter, however rightly the soul may direct, there is wanting the proper machinery for carrying out the desired operations.¹

We not unfrequently indeed, meet with cases of persons who are endowed with melodious voices, but, from having no ear for music, they never attempt to sing. Other instances may be observed of individuals who possess very inharmonious voices, but who have exquisite ears for music. Such persons, while disqualified to sing, are eminently adapted to perform on musical instruments; by means of which, (as also happens in many other corresponding deficiencies in our corporeal organs,) the defects of the body are supplied by material external contrivances; and the instruments while thus availed of, are annexed to, and used as though they formed a part of, our own physical organization. The same thing happens indeed in the application of warlike weapons, in the resort to carriages for travelling, and to glasses for aiding our vision.

Hence, the character of each person is accurately, forcibly, and unerringly displayed by the peculiar conformity of his writing, the hand being guided by the nerves, which receive through the brain an immediate impulse from the very soul itself. In the formation and style of the letters, the various qualities of the mind are, as it were, shadowed and reflected according as they direct and influence the peculiar shape of each of them;

¹ The note which follows is by *Dr. Richardson*. "The perfection referred to, is, I think, always dependent on perfection of balance between the mental and physical organizations. The mind may be so pre-eminent that it may treat the physical powers by which it expresses itself with positive neglect. In this way the physical performance of the most accomplished scholar may be as indifferent as that of the man who is both mentally and physically low, while it may be much worse than that of him who with a common intellect is physically well trained."

although the finer the texture of the material organs, the more accurate will be the mode in which they obey these intellectual impulses, which will therefore be in each case in part more or less modified by this circumstance. They will also be affected by the bodily temperament of the individual frame. These two facts require therefore to be considered and to be borne in mind, in conjunction with the result produced by the influence of the intellect upon the nerves and hand, in the formation of the writing; although the soul itself is, after all, the leading and directing agent, the mainspring in which the movement originates. As a whole it may be inferred that the various causes operating in the formation of writing, serve well to illustrate how complex are the operations of the several powers, and energies, and agencies, in our constitution; and how many influences are simultaneously exerted in each case, which, although apparently counteracting each other, all at last become united and act together, resulting in one grand central, if not sole, impelling force.

Not only however the handwriting, but every peculiarity in the gait, and habit, and manner, of the individual, and even the very tones of his voice, more or less betoken his character and disposition, medial, moral, and mental; whether this be caused by his material texture or temperament, or by something existing in the very soul itself as regards its qualities, or its essence. In the case of handwriting, we may consider the copper-plate pattern as the model form of the original cyphers, each deviation from which in whatever direction, is caused by some impetus originating in the mind and acting on the nerves, and through them on the hand of the individual: those handwritings where this influence prevails the least,—as in those of law-writers, and copying clerks, who are ordinarily persons of but little cultivation, and not very susceptible impulses—most resembling the pattern type. Thus, any nervous excitement in the system, produces irregularity in the caligraphy; except, as when in the case of the persons last named, they are habituated to follow a certain model pattern of writing; and among ordinary individuals who are free to express any peculiarity in their constitution, the character of the handwriting will vary according to the feelings and temper of the writer. The taste will also exercise a considerable influence on the handwriting of each, and the mental habits and operations must have an important bias here. Boldness, steadiness, energy, decision, cautiousness, firmness, openness, deceit, are especially exhibited by handwriting. Indeed, both mental and moral, as well as medial endowments and habits, strive and emulate one another here, to mark the character of the letters, and through it display their presence. And perhaps to

some extent, as in all other cases throughout the system, the operation of one cause materially affects, and more or less counteracts, that of the other.

Although many and various complicated influences unite to form the character of the handwriting of each person; yet, on the whole, the moral disposition rather than the medial endowments or the mental powers, appear to be mainly indicated by it. Not improbably, indeed, medial qualifications and character are principally evinced by any peculiarity of manner; moral qualifications and character by the peculiarity of handwriting; and the mental endowments and character by the peculiarity of style either in speaking or in writing. Each of these operations is however, more or less influenced by the character of each kind.

3. *Direction and Bias of the Intellectual Character.*

The mode in which the individual intellectual character of each person acquires its direction and peculiarity through the relative predominance, and comparative extent of the possession, of particular faculties and capacities, deserves next to be considered.

The direction and application of the intellectual faculties and capacities which any person possesses, is mainly influenced by two causes.

1. The extent to which he is endowed with other faculties and capacities.

2. The extent to which he possesses certain medial and moral qualities and endowments.

As regards the first of these causes, I would here observe that the extensive possession by a person of any particular capacities, naturally leads him to exert them, and to follow those special avocations for which they are best adapted. By experience, he will doubtless soon discover his endowments in this respect, as the mind is ever in operation in some way or other. Just so is it among the brute creation, who are impelled to those pursuits for which their particular conformation qualifies them, and to avoid others for which they are not fitted.² Accordingly therefore, as a person is largely endowed with certain of these different capacities together, will be his general intellectual character. The application of each capacity is, indeed, modified and influenced by the extent to which the other capacities co-exist with it. Causes of many kinds moreover, operate in a manner very different

² *Vide ante*, c. i. s. 5, p. 200.

when they are combined, to what they do individually, and each is acting by itself. Thus, as already remarked, is it also with the members of the human race, who will oftentimes pursue a very different course when they meet together and act in the aggregate, to what each individual member would have done by himself. This is however especially the case with regard to the intellectual faculties and capacities; and we may observe that the effect produced by the co-existence together in an extensive degree of particular capacities, will be perceptible on the character of the entire mind, every capacity having a reciprocal influence on the character of the others. In chemistry too, several substances being mixed together, will occasion operations very different from what each of them separately would have accomplished.

Thus, we shall find that the application of the capacity of origination, for instance, in any person, will depend entirely on what other capacities he has largely co-existent with it. If he be extensively endowed with taste, he will probably be induced to apply himself to the composition of works of imagination. If he possesses but little taste, and is largely endowed with judgment, he may be expected to be distinguished for the originality of his arguments in controversy. If he possesses analysis extensively with origination, it is most likely that he will devote himself to scientific discoveries.

If he possesses taste with judgment, he will become an eloquent as well as a powerful reasoner. Apprehension, when it exists to a great extent with analysis or judgment, induces a person to exert himself in controversy. When it is possessed, largely with taste, it urges an individual to the study of works of art. When the extensive possession of origination is united with these capacities, it leads him to artistical design. Taste and origination united with comprehension, would make a sublime; and united with deprehesion, a beautiful poet, or painter. The possession together largely of deprehesion and sense, would make a good man of business; and comprehension and judgment mainly contribute to form a great statesman or divine.

The possession largely of wit with any of the other capacities in the same degree, serves at once to give a tincture to the mind; and according to the extent of the capacities co-existent with it, will be its direction and application.

Although it would be incorrect to assert that the extensive possession of any particular capacity is in itself an evil, or a defect; yet where this is found to be the case without certain other capacities existing in a proportionate degree so as to counterbalance or direct the exercise of this particular one, it may lead to irregularity in our operations.

Thus, a person who is largely endowed with origination,

unless this capacity be balanced and restrained by the corresponding proportionate possession of certain others, more particularly those belonging to the reason, will probably be of too imaginative and speculative a turn of mind for the common practical purposes of life.

When taste is largely possessed by any person, without the other capacities existing in a proportionate degree; it causes a person to be over refined and sensitive, and ill-adapted for ordinary affairs.

Wit, when not regulated by the extensive possession of any other capacities so as to give a direction to it, induces a person to turn all matters alike, even the most serious, into ridicule.

A person who is largely endowed with judgment, or with comprehension, without possessing in a proportionate degree analysis and deprehension, will probably be deficient in closeness and conclusiveness as a reasoner, and in accuracy as regards his knowledge of, and inquiries into, subjects.

Analysis, when possessed very extensively, without being counterbalanced by a proportionate possession of sense and judgment, leads a person to be too subtle in his method of reasoning, to require in all cases absolute mathematical proof, and to be dissatisfied with anything short of it, even in cases which from their peculiar nature could not well admit of such a mode of demonstration.

Deficiency in apprehension causes us to be slow in obtaining information, or in learning the nature of any subject; and occasions what is usually termed dulness in perceiving.

Sense, deprehension, and apprehension, which are the most generally useful and practical of all the capacities, and are most frequently possessed in a large degree; appear never to exercise any deleterious influence as regards our intellectual operations, however extensively we may be endowed with them.

As already observed, individuals the most fortunately gifted, are those, all of whose capacities that they possess largely, conduce to one object. And those least likely to be successful, are those who are deficient as regards their extensive endowment with any one particular intellectual capacity. The perfection of the rational system, results from the right ordering of the various agents and operations in the constitution of man; which appears to consist in a due and correct balancing of the different medial, moral, and mental endowments, and influences, and powers, keeping them each within their proper bounds, and promoting their regular and harmonious operation.

The method adopted by any one in the pursuit of a particular study, will at once serve to show, and as it were to reflect, the quality of the intellectual faculties and capacities with which he is endowed. Thus, in the composition of a philosophical treatise, for instance, an individual who is largely endowed

with deprehension, will be very minute and accurate in the facts which he records. One who is mainly characterized by the extensive possession of comprehension, will be remarkable for the wide and enlarged views which he takes. A man endowed principally with analysis, will argue acutely and deeply, deducing one conclusion from another, rather than seeking to adduce the actual fact as it exists. A person richly gifted with originality, will be distinguished by the number of new theories that he advances. Each of these capacities will also be found both to aid and to influence the others ; originality to assist the acute reasoner in his researches, and deprehension and comprehension to render accurate or enlarged his survey of the subject.

The intellectual habits of every person are moreover in a variety of ways, extensively influenced by the relative extent to which he is endowed with the various capacities of the different faculties.

Thus, apprehension, and also deprehension, when largely possessed, lead to readiness and quickness in our intellectual operations ; as they enable the mind and the memory to receive, and also to recall, with the greatest readiness and distinctness, ideas of different kinds. The extensive possession of comprehension and judgment, on the other hand, induces slow habits, inasmuch as these capacities are conversant about ideas and matters of weight and importance, concerning which the mind exercises itself deliberately and cautiously.

The general constitution and character, as well as the relative extent of the different capacities of the mind, exercise a considerable influence in determining both the bent of each person's pursuits, and the mode in which the mind applies itself to them. Thus, the large endowment with apprehension, deprehension, and sense, contributes to form the man of business ; and by adapting him for it, inclines him to this pursuit. The extensive possession of analysis, induces to scientific and philosophical investigation. Each of these capacities, moreover, according to the measure of their existence, influences the moral character in an important manner, and in an opposite direction. Thus, judgment, which stimulates to an enlarged and vigorous style of reasoning, leads a person to take high ground when dealing with any moral subject, and to despise all paltry and trivial considerations. Deprehension, by its attention to minute particularities in general, induces to economy in the conduct of affairs, and to exactness both in narration and dealing. Wit inclines us to severity and sharpness, by the weapons which it places at our disposal. Taste, on the other hand, refines and softens the moral character. Origination gives to the mind by the resources that it supplies, a certain feeling of independence as regards its operations ; and by this

means conduces to render the individual uncertain and irregular in his general line of conduct.

As particular animals are led to locate themselves in certain districts which are found peculiarly adapted to them from their natural productions, or from the climate being suitable or congenial to their nature; so certain men are induced to follow particular studies, and to embrace particular views and notions, because they prove congenial to their mental constitution, or from the bias which they derive from the latter.³

Great variety is caused among different persons, not so much indeed as regards their possession, as their application, of their intellectual capacities and powers, by the difference which exists among them in appetite, passion, and even in texture, temperament, and material organization. Thus, a man through the influence of strong appetites or passions, may be seduced from higher pursuits to promote their gratification. A person of great physical strength, may be induced to turn his attention rather to athletic exercises, than to intellectual pursuits. So, also, on the other hand, the moral character is frequently biased by the mental endowments. Hence, individuals of extensive genius, by which the mind is mainly influenced, have sometimes been found to be deficient in morality; the cause of which is that the reason, and especially the capacities of sense and analysis which constitute the principal intellectual elements in the composition of conscience, are but seldom called into play, or are exercised, in the subjects to which they are devoted. Such persons, moreover, will occasionally be found to be but slenderly endowed with the capacities of reason; while the pursuits in which they are chiefly occupied, and for which their capacities of genius principally adapt them, are but little fitted to cultivate and develope their reasoning powers.

Men generally appear to vary one from another more in their medial, than in their mental qualities. But this is mainly because the result of a difference in appetite, and passion, and affection, through the effects which it produces, becomes visible at once; whereas a considerable difference in intellectual endowment does not readily make itself visible; few outward effects being produced by it, unless some peculiar occasions call forth the energetic exertion of the faculties, and on a subject which attracts the attention of other persons.

As men's moral characters seem to differ from the influence of circumstances, their dispositions being directed and controlled by various events and causes, although in reality the same disposition remains, and is essentially unchanged; so the intellectual characters of men are in a corresponding manner

³ So, also, in an analogous manner, "all male animals which are furnished with special weapons for fighting, are well known to engage in fierce battles."—*Darwin's Descent of Man*, vol. ii. p. 240.

apparently altered by their application being directed to different objects and pursuits, although in reality the faculties themselves remain the same. In neither case however, are the natural endowments changed; but in both cases they are adapted to the exigencies in which the individual is placed. And as every professional or commercial calling or pursuit, is said to impress on the physical frame and habits its peculiar features; so every intellectual study gives to the mind a special bias and characteristic.⁴

The possession to an extraordinary extent of any particular faculty or capacity, will be sufficient to make an extraordinary man. Thus, even apprehension will distinguish the individual largely endowed with it, by his remarkable facility in receiving ideas of common objects; such as we see evinced in the case of those whose knowledge of such topics is very great. Some become eminent as men of vast capability for matters of business, by their extensive possession of deprehension. And a great sovereign or statesman who is fully endowed with comprehension, may be renowned for his enlarged views, and the comprehensive character of his policy. In each of these cases, however, deficiency in any of the other capacities, will exert its influence on the intellectual character generally, and affect the operations of the mind. Thus, deficiency in deprehension, and in origination, in the individual alluded to, will cause his proceedings to be wanting in accuracy, and his measures to be wanting in originality.

Nevertheless, whenever any one of the faculties or capacities is developed to an undue extent, so, as it were, to obstruct or interfere with the due operation of the others, an injury to the whole mind, or intellectual constitution, is the result; analogous to that of the undue ascendancy in a state of any one of its individual members, or constituent bodies. Thus, a man who is devoted exclusively either to scientific inquiry, such as the extensive predominance of analysis would induce, or to the exclusive pursuit of art, to which extensive taste would lead, is seldom well adapted for the general pursuits of life, which the distribution of all his different faculties and capacities in their proper proportion, tends to insure.

Instability in the general career and course of conduct of any particular individual, is ordinarily occasioned by the want of energy, on the one hand, and by the absence of one direct

⁴ The actions of men being determined solely by their antecedents, must have a character of uniformity, that is to say, under precisely the same circumstances, always issue in precisely the same results." *Buckle. Hist. of Civilization*, vol. ii. c. i. But this surely supposes that all men are constituted alike, and swayed by exactly the same motives, which is, however, contrary to nature and to fact.

aim, on the other. Energy should have the effect of keeping a person steady in the pursuit of the grand point which he is endeavouring to reach, the goal at which he is hoping to arrive. He who alternately hunts several different objects in the chase as they successively appear to be within his grasp, will probably fail to capture any of them, but of which the steady pursuer of one alone may make pretty sure. Instability may, and often does, spring from versatility. Thus, when an individual has sufficient talent, and the equal co-extent of certain of his capacities adapts him, to excel moderately in several things, although without attaining complete success in any of them, he is alternately induced to aim at each of these objects, according as favourable opportunities alternately allure him. Energy, together with predominance in some one capacity, which would induce to some one corresponding pursuit, are here wanting in order to correct this deficiency; to ballast and keep steady the mind, and to hold it firm in the endeavour to secure the prize to be obtained. A mind thus defective, resembles a ship without a rudder.

Moreover, each individual varies at the different periods of his age and progress, both as regards his moral and intellectual endowments, corresponding with what occurs in the case of his material structure; although his faculties and capacities themselves ever remain essentially the same and unchanged, so that the actual character of the individual, medial, mental, and moral, never really alters. A decided change is nevertheless produced by the development of the various endowments and capacities, which, according as this occurs, mutually and relatively affect each other; consequently, at these different periods he is adapted for particular and separate studies, and pursuits, and employments. From the development of the reason and its constituent capacities, the conscience acquires greater influence, and more ascendancy over the medial propensities; while, on the other hand, the appetites and passions decline in their influence as age advances, and the mental powers gain more authority. The defects of one period may also be corrected by the acquirements or endowments of another; just as in a society of men, youth and age should mutually assist one another, the one supplying experience, the other vigour, according to the exigencies of either.⁵ The actions and desires of each person change moreover with his age, according to the nature of his disposition; and the final result and natural tendency and counter-action of the whole system, should be to ripen and perfect his general character.⁶

⁵ *Dr. Priestley* says that each sex is naturally the tutor to the other.—*Education*, p. 198.

⁶ In regard to this passage, *Dr. Beddoe* tells me, in reply to my inquiry, that he considers the condition of the material frame does affect the

Probably every endowment, and every operation, which is capable of being influenced by any other, influences it in a corresponding manner, and to a corresponding extent, in return. As in the case of the transactions in the commercial world, exchange and reciprocity are the mainspring, and the cause of each proceeding. Every effect is of itself in return a cause, and every cause is an effect. So powerful moreover is this influence, that aberration of mind is produced by affection of the body; and affection of the mind has sometimes occasioned death itself. Even the very voice, and corporeal action, and manner, are extensively influenced by, and serve to evince the character of, the material texture and temperament.⁷

It has sometimes occurred to me with regard to the ideas which pass through our minds, that certain of them return to the circle of our thoughts periodically, like the planets in their courses, and are plainly and steadily discernible; while others are irregular and uncertain as to their appearance, and when they do appear blaze vividly for a moment, and then vanish into obscurity.

4. *Co-operation and Co-aid of the Different Faculties and Capacities.*

The mode in which each of the different faculties and capacities of the mind aids the other in almost every act which the mind performs, in a manner analogous to that in which the different members of the body, although varying widely from each other as to their nature and end, either directly or indirectly assist one another in many of their operations, is a subject deserving alike of our attention and admiration.⁸

Each faculty and each capacity, and the particular character, and also the condition and mode of cultivation of each, has moreover extensive influence on the other, and in each respect;

powers of imagination and taste, and also influences the views that would be adopted, and the efforts that would be made, as well as operating to extend or curtail those efforts, according to circumstances. Also, that such condition is calculated to give a tincture to the taste, and to alter the character of the imaginative efforts, as well as to affect the ease with which they are performed. And he adds: "Familiar instances are the effects of opium, tea, and other neurotics, upon the imaginative faculty."

⁷ Condillac remarks that "as government influences the character of a people, so the character of a people influences that of language."—*Origin of Knowledge*, pt. ii. s. i. § 143.

Civilization considered as a Science. Essence of Civilization, p. 35. (Bohn's Lib. edit.)

⁸ Nevertheless, as Mr. Smee points out, "the different powers of mind should be subordinate one to another. Each should have its proper influence, none should be in the ascendancy, for if there be any variation in the relative position of any of the faculties of man, difficulties may arise."—*Mind of Man*, c. vi. p. 45.

and to those the most remote is this influence extended, and in a variety of ways.

Thus, reason aids genius, and genius reason; and each of the capacities of each of these faculties assists the operations of the other, while the understanding aids them all, and they all aid the understanding. In these several cases, the faculty or capacity peculiarly adapted for the effort in question, takes the lead in accomplishing it;—as origination in the process of imagination, analysis in that of scientific investigation;—while certain others are called in to assist in the completion of the work; such for instance as taste, deprehension, and sense, each of which undertakes its allotted portion. It rarely, if indeed ever, happens that any single faculty or capacity is exerted by itself alone in any intellectual effort; as in each extensive action of the body,—for instance, in running or in wrestling,—several of its members are called into activity, and assist the one which is prominent in the performance.

Not only, however, do the different capacities of the same faculty, and of a corresponding kind, unite in the pursuit of particular subjects, but certain faculties and capacities widely differing from each other, are occasionally called on to assist one another during certain mental operations. Thus, the imaginative capacity, or origination, is sometimes resorted to to assist the faculties of understanding or reason.⁹ Sense should control and correct the efforts of origination and taste, and also those of wit. The memory too, should aid the operation of each of the capacities of each faculty. And each capacity should aid the operations of memory. Hence, when we hear of events which have occurred in a place that we have never seen, we are enabled by our imaginative capacity to form an ideal representation of it in the mind, and upon that representation to follow the different transactions described. This is also the case with every one when reading a tale of fiction. It will moreover occasionally happen that when we have so exercised the imaginative capacity, and have afterwards seen the place itself alluded to in the description of it, we appear to have two entirely distinct and independent ideas of it in the mind, the one derived from the imagination, and the other real, or derived from experience; although the former will soon become effaced from the memory on account of its not being again referred to as before, inasmuch as it is superseded by the other.

⁹ "Both in genius for the arts, and in genius for science, imagination is assisted by memory, operating in subordination to it, and operating continually along with it." *Gerard on Genius*, pt. iii. s. 3. Human invention is not so fertile as to be able to diversify its productions sufficiently, without ever employing memory to copy from the reality of things; and therefore this latter faculty is a necessary and useful auxiliary to fancy." *Ibid.*

The reasoning powers also derive great aid from origination wherever inventive scientific discovery is aimed at, as also in all cases where the use of metaphors drawn from visual objects is required; and which though doubtless liable to abuse, is of the highest importance in the elucidation of subjects of an abstract nature, particularly that on which I am now treating.

Each of the three faculties of the mind should however not only aid, but correct the efforts of the other;¹ in the same way that while eloquence aids the exertions of logic, logic corrects the efforts of eloquence. Nevertheless, it is not necessary that the different capacities, and endowments, and powers, should all act harmoniously together in order to produce their due effect and influence. Indeed, so far from this being the case, their very antagonism and opposition will occasionally accomplish results greater than the most harmonious co-operation; just as in civil society we experience that not only opposition conduces directly to good government, but that liberty often springs from the exercise of tyranny, and order arises out of misgovernment and anarchy.² It is also observable that genius and reason, so different to each other both as regards their nature and their mode of operation, are never so productive as when combined.³ The union of the two brings forth the most valuable offspring. Although reason not unfrequently restrains the flights of genius, it is often enabled to soar the higher in consequence of this very resistance. And although genius may be somewhat fettered in its efforts by reason, it is when under this control that its labours are productive of works of the most sterling worth.⁴

But while the different intellectual capacities mutually aid and

¹ "Genius must have talent as its complement and implement, just as in like manner imagination must have fancy. In short, the higher intellectual powers can only act through a corresponding energy of the lower." — *Coleridge. Table Talk.*

² *Civilization considered as a Science.* Elt. v. p. 168 (Bohn's Library Edition).

³ Though a bright and comprehensive fancy be the principal ingredient in genius, yet nothing is so dangerous as to affect to display it constantly, or to indulge it without any control from reflection. Nothing is productive of greater faults." — *Gerard on Genius*, pt. i. s. iv.

⁴ "The finest imagination totally destitute of assistance from judgment, would in some measure resemble a blind man, who may be very dexterous in groping the right road, but cannot know certainly whether he continues in it, and has no means of recovering it if he once strays." — *Gerard on Genius*, pt. i. s. iv. "Judgment must preserve imagination from losing itself in its excursions, without obstructing its visiting freely all the regions of nature. It must prevent unnatural associations, without checking such as are bold. It must regulate, but not destroy the impetuosity and ardour of the soul." — *Ibid.*, pt. iii. s. v. And this writer remarks of some artificial precepts, that though they "direct and improve the judgment, they rather curb and restrain genius. They render men so studious to avoid faults, that they scarce aim at beauties."

correct each other in their operations, more especially so do those belonging to the same faculty. Thus, origination is aided by taste, which corrects and regulates with propriety the conceptions of the former, to which wit gives effect and vigour. Origination moreover confers novelty and life on the combinations effected by taste, and taste corrects and harmonizes the combinations of wit. The efforts of judgment are rendered correct by analysis, and made practicable by sense, as are those also of analysis; while sense is corrected by analysis, and its operations become more extended and capacious through the influence of judgment. Apprehension sets in operation each of the other capacities of the understanding; while deprehension corrects, and comprehension enlarges and amplifies, their observations.

As we experience that the loss of, or any deficiency in, one of our senses is compensated for by the increased acuteness and activity of the others; so may it be to a certain extent, though perhaps only indirectly, with regard to any deficiency in one of our intellectual capacities.

In the general progress of the human mind and of the world, the order in which the intellectual faculties and capacities are here classed, is completely reversed. Thus, origination takes the lead as a pioneer in making new discoveries of each kind. Reason brings these discoveries to the test; and, when they have been so tested, but not till then, they are presented to, and approved by, the understanding as established truths, and treasured up in the memory as contributions to human knowledge. Origination, indeed, is like an animal which may thrive, but will not fructify, in solitude. Speculation alone, unless directed and corrected by reason, is not likely to produce anything of real value; while reason, on the other hand, in order to render it fertile, should be aided by original speculation. The efforts of either when single, ordinarily prove barren. When united, they become productive, and a precious progeny is the result.

It will sometimes also be found that operations apparently very simple, and seeming to require only one capacity for their performance, in reality call into action several capacities, and even those of different faculties. Inventive discovery is of this nature. It is carried on by a double process. 1. By combining together ideas for the purpose of forming some new original idea, or object. 2. By comparing, or fitting, this new object, or combination, to some existing system in nature with which it becomes identified. Thus, when engaged in a pursuit of this kind, if we are desirous of discovering the properties of any system as yet undeveloped to us, we first combine together different ideas or objects so as to form a certain original system; and then proceed by comparing this with existing systems, to ascertain whether there are really any such in being corre-

sponding with that which we have framed ; and when we have succeeded in discovering and establishing that there are such, we are said to have invented a new system. In comparing the existing with the invented system, the faculty of reason is called in to aid the capacity of origination. Thus Newton, when he discovered the systems of gravitation and planetary motion, first created or invented the system in his own mind, and then proceeded to compare it with what he found in nature ; and on ascertaining the two to correspond, he concluded that what he had originated, which was in fact identical with the actually existing system, was in reality a new discovery.

When however existing systems are made known without any efforts of this nature, as by mere research, and finding out the objects which we are seeking ; not our inventive capacity, but merely those of the understanding, are exercised.

The erroneous manner in which some persons are wont to contend for the exclusive exercise of one capacity alone in any particular intellectual pursuit, to the exclusion of the others, when all ought to be as far as possible, to some extent, simultaneously excited and exerted to co-aid each other,—some saying that facts only ought to be resorted to and relied upon ; others depending entirely, or mainly, on the exercise of reason ; others upon that of origination :—proves the soundness of the theory which I here maintain, that in each intellectual effort, each faculty should be brought to bear, and should assist the other, however apparently remote from it in character, operation, or the leading purpose for which it is ordinarily applied.

According as opinions fluctuate and vary in regard to those which alternately prevail, acquire a value beyond others, and obtain temporary sway ; so the exercise and application of particular faculties and capacities varies extensively as regards the degree in which they are called into exercise ; at one time efforts of imagination, at another those of taste, at another those where the exercise of reason is demanded, at another those where the understanding is mainly called into action, being principally in requisition.

From a survey of the general operation of the intellectual faculties, it becomes evident that the understanding, the reason, and genius, are each distinct from one another, and each act independently. Thus, a man may read and receive ideas, without at all exercising his faculties of reason or genius. Or he may, contemporaneously with this exercise of the understanding, be exerting his reason on another topic, while his origination employs itself on a very different matter. But this could not possibly take place if the whole mind consisted of but one faculty, and acted all at once. And in that case,

neither could one faculty alone be exercised by itself, nor could different faculties and capacities be simultaneously exerted on several subjects.⁶

It may, I think, be also advanced as an intellectual axiom, that the more extensively on any given subject all the different capacities of the mind are exerted together; the more successful and satisfactory will be the result of the labour bestowed on that particular undertaking.

5. *Reciprocal mutual Relation between the Mental, Moral, and Medial endowments and Powers.*

As each nation in the world is composed of men varying in every respect in character, ability, position, and pursuits, but all of whom act upon one another in different ways, as do these several nations themselves; so each man is made up of a vast number of different and opposing desires, and endowments, and properties, each of which in various modes acts upon, and counteracts, or aids the other. Every man indeed is, in one respect, a world in himself; although in other respects but a minute atom in the entire world of human society. Throughout the system too both of the mind and the material frame, each part, and faculty, and organ is dependent upon, and has relation to, the other; as has also each component constituent, relation to, and influence upon, its corresponding element.⁷ In like manner, each being in creation, whether material or spiritual, has a connexion with, and influences the other.

Even the condition of the animal spirits exercises a considerable influence over the intellectual operations, and the moral conduct; as the intellectual operations and the moral conduct, correspondingly in their turn, exercise a considerable influence as regards the condition of the animal spirits.

The harmonious operation together of the various faculties and capacities, which, though they each have different tendencies and objects, are all alike in their nature and quality; is indeed, in many respects, less extraordinary than the operation together, hardly less harmonious, of the medial and moral endowments and influences, in conjunction with the mental powers.⁸

⁶ *Vide ante*, c. i. s. 3, p. 179.

⁷ "Every organ of the body is in league with every other organ. Every one of them has its own peculiar province and vocation, but is in treaty at the same moment, offensive and defensive, with every other."—*Grindon on Life*, p. 57.

⁸ "There seemeth to be a relation or conformity between the good of the mind and the good of the body. For as we divided the good of the body into health, beauty, strength, and pleasure; so the good of the mind, inquired in rational and moral knowledges, tendeth to this, to

The relation, and reciprocal influence, between the medial, and mental endowments and powers, have indeed already been discussed and considered in a previous chapter, so far as they contribute to constitute the moral system of man.⁹ We have now to consider in conjunction with this subject, the concurrent influence and effect of those various and occasionally conflicting operations, which nevertheless ultimately result in the formation or constitution of no new endowment or attribute; but, although reciprocally affecting each other, continue to act independently, and each to preserve its own peculiar and distinctive quality and characteristic. In a subsequent section, I also propose to survey the action of the whole of them together, and the ultimate and entire result of their operation in the aggregate.

This sympathy and co-operation between the different faculties and capacities, and the medial and moral endowments, all acting harmoniously together, and although occasionally partially counteracting, yet ordinarily, and ultimately, aiding one another in the entire economy of the system; correspond with the efforts and influence of different persons of various opinions and grades in a great social community, each of whom, though pursuing different objects, and influenced by different interests, act generally together for the common well-being of the state, which is the ultimate end of all of them.

Moreover, the various endowments of man, like man himself, act in society, and mutually aid and influence, and also control one another; and perhaps in no case is the action of any one person ever wholly independent of every other. In this view, indeed, ought each action of the one, and each operation of the other, to be considered. In fact, so dependent one upon the other are the different parts of our constitution, that even the senses singly, through which we perform the simplest of our operations akin to intelligence, are frequently unable when unaided to guide us aright. The real shape of many objects is pointed out, not by the eye, but by the aid of reason. Some sounds, such as the vibration of the notes of a bell, which the sense of hearing tells us is a simple note, reason teaches us to be produced by a succession of notes. In seeing, we perceive every object double; but the aid of the other senses, and of the reason, corrects the impression. So in the case of each sense, by the influence of the other senses and of the intellectual faculties, the mistake is rectified early; and by custom we consider the sensations to be as we have been taught to, and not as we in reality do, receive them.¹

make the mind sound and without perturbation; beautiful and graced with decency; and strong and agile for all the duties of life. These three, as in the body, so in the mind, seldom meet, and commonly sever."—*Lord Bacon. Advancement of Learning*, b. ii.

⁹ *Vide ante*, b. ii. c. i. s. 1; vol. ii. pp. 3, 4.

¹ *Buffon* remarks that vision has a greater relation to knowledge than

In some cases indeed, as in that of certain sounds of the nature alluded to, we never do receive the impression correctly, because our senses are not capacitated so to convey them. But this is no defect as regards their practical application, although as regards their scientific use it undoubtedly is. Their main object is, however, to serve us for the former, and not for the latter. If perfectly adapted for the latter, they would be too fragile and too refined, and also too much perplexed by counter-acting sensations, to serve efficiently and practically for the former. Thus also is it with animals, whose senses are however more perfect, because less blunted by abuse, than are those of man. Hence, in the various operations of the senses, we may observe that both apprehension and reason extensively aid, and that genius occasionally assists as well. On the other hand, in each of the operations of apprehension and reason, the senses aid, as they frequently do also in the efforts of genius.

Probably the soul influences and biases the sensations received through the material organs, as it also directs their admission, quite as much as the sensations themselves affect and influence the soul, and modify its operations.² And, perhaps, as every particle of food that we eat, in some way contributes to the constitution of our material frame; so every idea which we imbibe, in some degree more or less contributes to the character of the mind. In both cases however, these foreign ingredients do not create anything of themselves. They influence, rather than form.

There is nothing which better serves to illustrate the reciprocal influence between the mind and the body, and the occasional or alternate preponderance of either, than the effect of drunkenness; which both gives vigour to the medial propensities and influences, on the one hand, and, on the other, depresses or paralyzes those appertaining to the higher part of our nature: in consequence of which the former obtain the ascendancy, while the latter are subjugated to them, so that the whole course of our conduct is misdirected, and error and crime ensue.

to appetite, and in man the eye is open from the moment of his birth. In most animals it is shut for several days, but in whom the senses of appetite are far more expanded, and more perfect.—*Natural History. Nature of Animals.*

On the points here adverted to, *Mr. Smee's* valuable and well-known treatise on the eye,* may advantageously be consulted; wherein, as he remarked to the author of the present work while discussing the subject with him, the mode in which the operations referred to in the above passage are effected, form the particular topic of inquiry and explanation, and in which he has "minutely measured the ranges of vision."

² According to *Buffon*, the sense which has the strongest affinity to thought, is that of touch.—*Natural History. Nature of Animals.*

The intellectual faculties are all of them more or less biased by the other parts of the system, both medial and moral.³ The strength and activity of the emotions, and appetites, and passions, and affections;⁴ and the peculiar character of the dispositions and desires, materially influence both the nature and the action of each of the mental capacities. So vigorous, however, is the operation of the intellectual faculties, that the very senses are frequently paralyzed by this means. We cease to hear the clearest tones of an address, while the soul in its cogitations is intent on another subject; and even the acutest pain may be unheeded in consequence of this. Soldiers in the heat of battle, while intently engaged on the general progress of the encounter, have failed to perceive at the moment the severest wounds. Objects, too, frequently omit to strike the eye, although immediately before it, while the mind is closely occupied. The energetic application of the faculties, which in its intensity absorbs all the other influences, is doubtless, as I have already observed, the main reason why our instinctive endowment, which is principally dependent on sensation, is in man so obscured.

Moreover, as the action of the intellectual faculties often sets at work the emotions and other medial endowments; so the operation of the emotions and other medial endowments, is what often stimulates and directs the action of the intellectual faculties. Indeed, each faculty and capacity influences more or less each moral, and each medial endowment; and each moral and medial endowment, every faculty and capacity.⁵ This is, of course, more immediately and directly apparent in some cases than in others. Thus, wit stimulates the excitement of the emotions, and the flow of the animal spirits. Taste promotes refinement of feeling, and refinement of feeling taste. Conscience stimulates the exercise of reason, and the exercise of reason conscience.

The correct principle as regards the influence of matter upon mind, and the dependence of the latter upon the former for any of its powers or operations, appears to be this. For the actual existence of faculties and capacities, and endowments and

³ *Professor Huxley* points out to me the dependence of memory upon some condition of the brain, which he says is a principle established by several independent facts.

⁴ "The development and marriage of the intellect and affections, is at once the great duty, and the blessedness of our being, and thus our highest life."—*Grindon on Life*, p. 205.

⁵ And yet it is remarked by *Sir Henry Hallford*, "that pain alone does not affect the faculties, is manifested in that most excruciating of all disorders, *tic doloireux*." *Essays and Orations. Influence of Disease on the Mind*. But would it not be more correct to state that pain does not "divert the operation" of those powers, than that it does not "affect" them?

powers, the mind is dependent on itself alone, and is wholly independent of the body. For many of its qualities and modes of operation, such as quickness, activity, vigour, and energy, the mind is in a great measure dependent upon the body, especially as regards the varying temperament, texture, and structure of the material organs.* As our body by its natural gravitation is attracted necessarily downward to earth, so spirit is no less naturally attracted upwards to heaven. Man, by his medial constitution and nature, is adapted for earth; by his moral constitution and nature he is adapted for society; by his mental constitution and nature he is adapted for heaven. In the operation and excitement of the medial senses, emotions, appetites, passions, and affections, man acts in relation to external substances. In his moral exercises, he acts in relation to duties. In the operation of his intellectual faculties he acts in relation to ideas.

The predominating influence of matter over mind, is strikingly illustrated by the circumstance that even in cases where purely intellectual operations are concerned, we judge of them more by the physical action, than the mental excellence of the performer. Thus, in criticizing an oration, and as regards the admiration and attention which it commands; how much more stress is laid by the generality of hearers, upon the manner, than upon the words of the orator. So, also, in deciding upon our liking for any particular person, we are apt to be influenced far more by the outward form and material features, than by the mental and moral endowments which such an individual may be supposed to possess; although as regards the latter, as to some extent we draw our inferences from the visible appearance of such person, the immaterial qualities may be said in both cases to have so far their share of influence.

Not only however does the body impede the operations of the soul, but the soul impedes the operations of the body. Many of the functions of the material frame, such as the power of digesting food, are but imperfectly carried on when the mind is in activity. And it is during sound sleep, when the soul though not itself inactive yet ceases to act upon the body, that these functions are most efficiently performed. There is nevertheless but little doubt that as our thoughts and transactions while we are awake, exercise considerable influence over the current of our thoughts while dreaming; so, in a corresponding

* *Dr. Richardson* has obliged me by supplying the following valuable note on this passage :—

"The qualities and modes of operation noticed in the text, are acts of the body directed by the mind, and are as independent as the other mental attributes named above. I fail to recognize any mental act as altogether dependent on itself alone, i.e. 'independent of the body,' for the simple reason that I can conceive of no demonstration of such an act except through the physical organization."

manner, do our thoughts and feelings while dreaming, over our opinions, and even our actions, while we are awake.

The emotions too which spring from the material frame, exert an extensive sway over the operations of the mind. Thus, even the reason is, directly or indirectly, ever liable to be biased in this manner;⁷ although it appears to act entirely according to the conclusions which guide it. In the choice of amusements, how often do men of the highest principle, wholly unconsciously, object decidedly to those particular recreations which are distasteful, and unhesitatingly approve of those that are agreeable to them. And the same persons at different periods of life will change entirely in their opinion in this respect, just as their tastes and inclinations happen to vary. The value of the emotions, and passions, and certain other medial endowments, even in matters of reason, is, however, exemplified in the instance of religion; where although reason is amply efficient to guide us aright, yet unless the heart—that is, the feelings and inclinations which spring from the emotions,—be also enlisted in the cause, no important result is produced.

In certain cases moreover, the influence of the medial endowments rather aids and corrects than perverts the operations of reason. Thus, in madmen, their conclusions are frequently wrong, not because the reason itself acts erroneously, but because it acts without due regard to external influences, and while deprived of the proper and legitimate bias of the medial endowments. In these instances, it may possibly even perform its operations with more strict accuracy than when the mind and body act entirely in harmony together, and mutually control the operations of each other. The great defect of the reasoning operations in the former case often is, not that they are actually incorrect, or that absolutely wrong conclusions are drawn; but that the course of conduct decided on is (owing to the natural proper influence of the material frame, and the biases which spring therefrom, being suspended,) unfitted for our present condition, in which the soul is united to a material being, and in consequence of which union it is

⁷ “Although in our mature years, when the mind being no longer subject to the body, is not in the habit of referring all things to it, but also seeks to discover the truth of things considered in themselves, we observe the falsehood of a great many of the judgments we had before formed; yet we experience a difficulty in expunging them from our memory, and so long as they remain there, they give rise to various errors.”—*Des Cartes. Princip. par. 1, s. 72.*

“Reason in man is not absolute reason, but a reasoning faculty dependent, to a great extent, upon, and characterized by, the particular cerebral conformation, and by the constitution or temperament of the individual. The same is manifestly true of the moral sentiments.”—*Isaac Taylor. Physical Theory of Another Life, c. v.*

almost necessarily led into many errors, and debarred from following many pure and high impulses. Hence, the reasoning and conclusions of persons labouring under insanity or melancholy, where delusions do not exist, are frequently defective, not from being incorrect, but from being impracticable. Thus, a person suffering under religious depression, will often argue very logically and correctly on the subject he is intent upon, considering it abstractedly—probably even more so than the world around him. His error is that he calculates too subtly, and without regard to the practical operation of events; and that he does not make sufficient allowances, either as regards the actions of himself or those of others, for the inevitable defects and weaknesses inseparable from human nature in its present state. This is probably sometimes occasioned by one of the capacities of reason, that of sense, which is most intimately connected with, and dependent upon the material frame, being suspended, owing to the disordered state of the latter, and the capacity of analysis being exerted in its room: hence the wrong capacity is applied to the subject, which I have already remarked to be one of the most common causes of error.

An interesting question may be raised as to the causes upon which liability to excitement, either by emotion or passion, mainly depends; whether on those affecting the mind, or on those affecting the body: some persons being so much more susceptible than are others, and some appearing to be readily moved as regards one kind of excitement, while they are not so as regards another. Excitability, or what may more correctly be termed susceptibility to irritation,^s is in reality of two kinds, physical and intellectual: the one depending on the constitution and texture and temperament of the body; the other on the capacities and qualities of the mind. Certain material frames, from the delicacy of their fibres, the subtle quality of their fluids, or other circumstances, are doubtless much more liable to be acted on by external agents and influences, than are others; and this is doubtless the case with different individuals belonging to the same species. Plants, too, as well as animals, vary essentially in this respect.

Intellectual excitability, whether as regards an emotion, a passion, and even affection, depends mainly on the peculiar character of the individual mental and moral constitution; particular endowments and powers, and also qualities of this class, conducing to the excitement of particular emotions, and passions, and also of affection. Susceptibility or irritability of each kind moreover affects the other. That which is physical, has an important influence on that which is intellectual; and that

^s *Vide ante*, b. i. c. ii. s. 3, vol. i. p. 277.

which is intellectual on that which is physical. Consequently, actions and conditions of either kind are extensively affected by those of others.⁹

Passion interferes with the due operation of reason, much in the same way that a storm which agitates the surface of the waters, does with the course of a ship, diverting the straightforward progress of the vessel, and tossing it to and fro when it aims to be proceeding in a direct line. On the other hand, the same wind which agitates the billows of the ocean, fills the sails of the ship, and thus accelerates its speed, which during a calm is retarded for want of some moving impulse. So passion, while it clogs the operation of reason, gives energy to its decisions, and urges on each effort with vehement force; while the strength of the resolution, which during the calmer moments is hardly sufficient to rouse the mind from torpor, during the tempest of passion is exerted in full vigour.¹

It may however be thought by many, and has indeed been urged in certain moral treatises, that our medial endowments, more especially our appetites and passions, are a bane to, and a defect in, our very nature; and that our main duty consists, not only in thwarting and subduing, but in as much as possible counteracting them, and eradicating their very existence.²

Such a line of argument as this appears to me to be not only highly impious against the Omniscient Framers of our constitution, but equally unsound and irrational. It is alone, as already pointed out,³ by their perversion, that the appetites and passions become noxious. Without them, our constitution would be wholly imperfect; and, especially in a probationary state such as ours, they are not merely essential for the end of such a condition, but they moreover conduce beyond anything else, to develope and strengthen our mental and moral endowments. Moreover, it is the office and proper province of the reason to be our guide and pilot, as it is of the emotions and passions to follow the direction of reason, and to second, not thwart, its influence. If these lower impulses attempt to take the

⁹ "In voluntary parts we perceive the influence of the mind. It often produces actions independent of the will, especially when those actions are begun by the will, and when the mind is affected by a recollection of them; or even contrary to the will. Thus fear produces a vibratory contraction of all the voluntary muscles, while the will is doing all it can to stop it."—*John Hunter. Principles of Surgery*, c. xi.

¹ "Matters that are recommended to our thoughts by any of our passions, take possession of our minds with a kind of authority, and will not be kept out or dislodged. There is scarce anybody, I think, of so calm a temper who hath not found this tyranny on his understanding, and suffered under the inconvenience of it."—*Locke. Conduct of the Understanding*.

² *Vide ante*, b. ii. c. i. s. 5, p. 29.

³ *Vide ante*, b. ii. c. i. s. 5, p. 44.

command, we are soon led into error, as in the case of soldiers usurping the functions of the general; while, on the other hand, the commands of the general would be but of little avail unless followed by the soldiers. Both the medial and the mental endowments are of great use in each operation, if properly applied; and each is made to aid the other in its legitimate sphere.

One main cause why we are so extensively influenced by the present, however trivial, and so unduly neglect the future, however important, is that in what is present, our emotions, and appetites, and passions, ever impel us; while with regard to the future, it is left chiefly to the reason to direct our determinations.

Not only however do the faculties and capacities largely influence the moral character of the individual, but the moral character very largely influences the exercise of the faculties and capacities. Thus, as regards wit, in a malevolent person this capacity is wont to be exerted in inflicting pain on others; while in a benevolent one, its object is mainly directed to promote their amusement, without at the same time causing pain to any. On the other hand, malevolence of disposition may induce a person to be satirical; while satire may induce a person to be malevolent.

A principal cause why old men are deemed so preferable, and so superior to young men in council, is that, in addition to their greater knowledge and experience, their emotions, and appetites, and passions, and also their hopes and aspirations, have become modified and subdued, and reason is allowed to exercise full sway, unbiassed and undisturbed by the clamours and cravings of the lower feelings.

Not merely, however, are different persons variously affected by these contending influences, mental, moral, and medial, but the same person is so at different periods. And not only does the condition of the body extensively affect the mind and its operations, but there is no doubt that particular conditions of the body are peculiarly favourable to the efficient action of particular faculties and capacities of the mind, and to particular operations of those faculties; which is the main reason why some men prefer different periods of the day beyond others for study, and find them peculiarly congenial for this purpose. Thus, one condition of the body may be favourable for the reception of ideas, another for the separation of them, and another for their combination.⁴

⁴ To this passage *Mr. Wake* has been kind enough to append the following interesting note:—

“This statement is no doubt true, if by body is meant more especially the brain, or perhaps rather the nervous system. Most men prefer the

The association together in the mind of particular ideas, has also an important influence on our intellectual operations. This process may perhaps be not incorrectly described as a current of thought which irresistibly guides the efforts of the mind as regards the subjects on which it is engaged, and by which it is kept entirely to the line in which they run; analogous to the mode whereby electrical fluid is guided by, and kept within a wire or chain; and which affords, of itself a study for the mental philosopher. Through this operation, however, the mind is much attracted by material subjects, inasmuch as those are most frequently before us, and of which the senses are constantly and uninterruptedly supplying new ideas; and not only so, but by this means the thoughts of the soul are continually diverted from contemplations of a moral and immaterial kind, to objects which are gross and material.

The desires of ambition and avarice exert considerable sway over the mental operations. They not only induce many actions in every individual, but serve to give a particular turn to the exercise of the intellectual faculties, and direct the pursuits to which they should be applied.⁵ On the other hand, ambition and avarice often originate in the consciousness, that a person possesses of being endowed with those capacities, which will enable him to gratify them.

Fickleness in general conduct, which is allied to, although not identical with, instability, is ordinarily the result of the possession of strong emotions, and appetites, and passions, by any indivi-

evening for literary composition, as ideas then flow more freely, probably owing to the brain being then, through a concurrence of circumstances, in a more active condition. Others, but I should think comparatively few, prefer the morning for literary labour, perhaps because mental calmness is more favourable in their case to such a work. Judging from my own personal experience, I should suppose that it is chiefly a matter of habit whether the morning or the evening be the most suitable. I have noticed, however, that it is easier to concentrate the mind on a special point requiring solution before it has become roused into full activity by application to the general business of the day than afterwards. This would seem to agree with your opinion as to a particular condition of body being more favourable than another for the reception, separation, or combination of ideas. You appear to refer, however, to purely bodily or physical conditions, whereas what I have said is as much mental as physical, and I should say depends, so far as the latter is concerned, rather on the blood and its circulation than aught else. We know that excitement, whether due to wine or other causes, is often especially favourable to the 'flow of ideas.' I have noticed that literary composition is more easy, 'pen in hand,' than by a pure mental effort without such an accessory;—perhaps because in the former case the ideas as produced are discharged, as it were, through the agency of the pen; whereas in the other case they remain pent up in the brain, and hinder to a certain extent the effort acquired for the production of others."

⁵ "There are some of our natural desires which only remain in our most perfect state on earth as means of the higher powers acting."—*Coleridge. Table Talk.*

dual, which obtain over the mind alternate sway with the reason ; sometimes the former of these endowments directing the conduct, and sometimes the latter, according as these medial influences are vehemently excited, or are lulled to repose. The reason ought however always to possess sufficient power to enable it to retain its authority under all circumstances ; but it should nevertheless exercise its rule so as in no case wholly to disregard, though it should never allow itself to be misled by, the impulses and influences of the lower endowments in our constitution, which are not exerted without an object, and if properly controlled, are directly beneficial in their operation.⁶

We are apt to be most fickle about those matters which concern our emotions, appetites, or passions, such as our likes or dislikes of certain persons or places, and the choice of our food. And we are perhaps least so in those subjects where the reason only is concerned.

6. *Peculiar relation of the higher Capacities to the lower Endowments.*

There appears to be a principle of attraction in mental as well as material subjects. Minds mutually suitable to one another, are naturally drawn together, and delight in intercommunion ; while some minds seem instinctively to avoid coming in contact. In an analogous manner, particular endowments and powers in the constitution of man, possess an attraction towards each other, and are ever prone to act together, and to co-operate in the general conduct of the system. It is nevertheless a singular, and interesting phenomenon, which may be observed during the progress of the operations of the mind, whether through the exercise of its faculties, or the excitement of the various impulses to which it is liable, that very often those powers and endowments in our constitution which seem the most remote from one another, evince while engaged in such operations, the nearest relation, and reciprocally exercise very extensive influence. Thus, the most exalted of the

⁶ In reference to the above passage, *Mr. Sopwith* writes as follows :—

“Exemption from the power of strong emotion, is essential to consistency of character ; and those who ‘feel strongly,’ as it is called, do well when they defer action until time has been afforded for mature reflection. ‘Fickleness’ I take to be only another name for ‘feebleness’ of mind,—a reed shaken by the wind. ‘Instability, is more of a comparative nature, depending on the strength of impulses. The due control of reason over emotion can only be gained by taking time to reflect.”

intellectual faculties and capacities, although, as already observed, the least dependent either for their existence, or their efforts, upon the material frame, will be found to bear close relation to certain of the lower medial endowments. For instance, genius, and especially the highest capacity in that faculty, origination, more particularly when exerted in imaginative efforts, of all the faculties and capacities has the most direct reference to, and is the nearest connected with the emotions of pain and fear, and the passions of terror and love; and is occasionally entirely dependent for the vigour of its operation, on the excitement of these medial endowments.⁷ The efforts of taste also, have immediate relation to the senses, and to the emotions of pleasure and joy, through which external material objects excite certain feelings in the soul. On the other hand, the more ordinary capacities of the reason and the understanding, do not to the same extent appear to possess a corresponding relation to the lower endowments. Each capacity of the reason is indeed frequently perplexed in its operations by their excitement; although, as stated in the last section, the abstract determinations of this faculty alone, without reference to the other endowments and impulses in the system, are not always the most correct guides in the practical conduct of life. It is nevertheless through their influence, that the efforts of the understanding are mainly perverted; although this faculty, as also that of understanding, is at the same time principally dependent on the senses for the ideas which it receives, but not in any respect for its operations in regard to these ideas.

The efforts both of wit and origination, we find to be greatly stimulated and accelerated by alcoholic libations, and to be retarded by disorder of the digestive organs. The capacity of taste has an immediate relation to the choice made by the palate with regard to food. Taste moreover appears to have a peculiar connexion with the passion of love, as well as with the emotion of pleasure. Wit has a close affinity to the condition of the animal spirits, on the state of which mirth is greatly dependent.

Genius is aided and accelerated in its operations, by the excitement of the medial emotions, appetites, and passions. The understanding is aided by the senses only out of all the medial endowments. The reason is probably assisted by none of them, but is retarded more or less by each excitement which they cause. Of the capacities of genius, origination, as regards its imaginative efforts, appears most, and indeed immediately allied

⁷ "Genius for the arts can never exist where the passions have not great power over the imagination, in affecting the train and association of perceptions. An imagination easily affected by the passions, is peculiar to genius for the arts, and it is essential to it in all the forms which it can assume."—*Gerard on Genius*, pt. iii. s. 2.

to the passion of terror, taste to the emotion of pleasure, and wit to that of mirth. Origination, when employed only in scientific discovery, is not connected with or influenced by any of the medial endowments.

Not only however do certain of the mental capacities bear this close relation to, and evince extensive dependence upon, the medial endowments; but in a corresponding manner, certain of the medial endowments, more especially the emotions, and appetites, and passions, and the affections also, are aided in their excitement, while their operation is stimulated by, the mental powers. Hence, the whole machinery in the constitution of man, is united and compacted together; the remotest regions being connected by the closest communication, and the dependence of each portion on the other secured, whereby the harmonious operation of the entire system is effectually guaranteed. Hence also the different parts are fairly balanced one against the other, and each obtains its proper share of influence in the regulation of the whole. Throughout nature, moreover, this close relation of opposite qualities may be observed. Thus, body and spirit are intimately united in our own constitution. Good and evil are also ever conjoined together. Light and darkness succeed each other. And heat and cold are as directly related, as they are opposed, to one another.

This immediate and close connexion and inter-dependence between the higher capacities and the lower endowments of the soul, may also be somewhat analogous to the connexion and inter-dependence between the higher and lower functions of the body. Thus, the brain, which is the organ of the intellectual powers, is dependent for its clearness and readiness of operation on the state of the stomach and the digestive organs.

But, it may be asked, although the soul is in certain cases thus extensively influenced in its operations by the body; how is it that in the higher mental efforts, which appear to be independent of the body, the condition of the body also occasionally affects the operation of the soul, as in the case of idiots? It is not however even in this instance that their souls are actually restrained in their exertions by the defective structure or disordered condition of their material organs; but that they are restrained from manifesting them in consequence of that unhealthy state. The connexion between the soul and the body

⁸ *Mr. Isaac Taylor* observes "that the cause of the difference between one mind and another is corporeal, may reasonably be inferred from the fact that those varieties of power of which every one is conscious in himself, spring from the state of the brain; as when from circumstances unquestionably of a physical kind, such as the constitution of the general health, or the state of the atmosphere, or the influence of stimulants, or the condition of the stomach, the ability to grasp abstract truths is very greatly enlarged, or is as much contracted."—*Physical Theory of Another Life*, c. vii.

is in such a case rendered irregular and imperfect,⁹ by reason of which the efforts of the soul are not impressed on the material mental organs. But even in the minds of idiots, flashes of intelligence and even of genius occasionally sparkle, wild and incoherent as are these exhibitions; and which is exactly what might be calculated upon from the theory here enunciated.

7. *Balance of Contending Influences, and Harmonious Operation of the whole System.*

When we consider the vast number of agents of various kinds which are ever at work throughout the universe, some aiding, some counteracting one another, attraction, gravitation, light, heat, cold, as also matter and spirit, fire and water, each ceaselessly in operation and exerting its influence; it fails to be a matter of wonder that in the universe of man, so many, and such opposing agents, should be allowed to prevail; or that, as in the course of nature, the final issue and ultimate result of the whole, should produce a system at once harmonious and beneficial, and contributing essentially to the well-being of every part.¹

It is indeed interesting to observe how extensively throughout the entire economy not only of the mental, but of the moral and medial operations, various contending agencies are exerting themselves, the immediate result of which is mutually to counteract the effect of one another, in the working of the system. Instincts, and impulses, and cravings are, moreover, as common, as varied, as intense, and as constant in the soul, as they are in the body; and exercise as important an influence, both impelling and retarding, in the one as they do in the other.²

⁹ *Vide ante, Prel. Diss. s. viii. a. 4, vol. i. p. 160.*

¹ Why need we talk of a fiery hell? If the will, which is the law of our nature, were withdrawn from our memory, fancy, understanding, and reason, no other hell could equal, for a spiritual being, what we should then feel from the anarchy of our powers. It would be a conscious madness—a horrid thought.”—*Coleridge. Table Talk.*

² There is not a single perception, or thought, or emotion of man, and consequently not an object around him, that is capable of acting on his senses, which may not have influence on the whole future character of his mind, by modifying, for ever after, in some greater or less degree, those complex feelings of good and evil, by which his passions are excited and animated, and those complex opinions of another sort, which his understanding may readily form from partial views of the moment, or adopt as rashly from others, without examination.”—*Dr. Thomas Brown. Lectures on the Philosophy of the Mind, lecture xliv.*

“The general harmony between the operations of the mind and reason, and the words which express them in almost all languages, is wonderful.”—*Coleridge. Table Talk.*

In calculations of this complex and comprehensive character, the real difficulty frequently is to include, and to give due weight to, each of the varied influences, direct and indirect, propelling and counteracting, which are on all sides arising, which are ever at work, and which are ceaseless in their operation. Each must necessarily be taken into account; and the neglect or wrong estimate of any one, destroys the correctness of the sum entire.³ These principles are important, indeed essential, to bear in mind in the pursuit of philosophy generally. But they are peculiarly so in the due consideration of the subject of the present chapter.

The ultimate result, however, of all these contending efforts, is to regulate, and render consistent and harmonious, the conduct of the whole, and to prevent the occurrence of contradictions and inconsistencies in our career which would otherwise take place. Probably indeed, the effect of this mutual acting together, and impulse, and counteraction of different powers, and feelings, and energies, and desires, is somewhat analogous to, and correspondent with, that of different men, and parties, and interests in a state; but which all alike finally conduce to the due development and proper working of the entire system, each aiding to modify, and balance, and equalize, the vigour of the other, and to harmonize the operation of the whole.⁴ Thus, the influence of the capacity of apprehension, counteracts the too great power of that of comprehension, and comprehension in its turn that of apprehension; analysis that of judgment, and judgment that of analysis; reason that of genius, and genius that of reason. Conscience modifies the impulses and influences of avarice, and concupiscence, and anger; while they in turn modify those of conscience. So also is it with ambition and avarice, which mutually and reciprocally influence, and are influenced by, not only each other, but by the several other endowments, and powers, belonging to our constitution.

Little doubt can be entertained as to the general moral effect resulting from the influence and exercise of affection and animal attachment, both as regards the kindly feeling of the parent towards the child, and the child towards the parent; as also the many valiant, generous, and truly heroic acts

“Our present state is one of alternation between the active and passive faculties, the latter chiefly prevailing; but the future being will, as we suppose, be active only, and always so.”—*Isaac Taylor. Physical Theory of Another Life*, c. vi.

³ “All the principles of the human mind have so near a connexion, that one of them can scarce be considerably altered, but it produces a similar alteration in the rest.”—*Gerard on Taste*, pt. iii. s. 6.

⁴ *Lord Bacon* remarks that, as in the government of states it is sometimes necessary to bridle one faction with another, so is it in the government within.”—*Advancement of Learning*, b. ii.

which this propensity generates. And yet, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that a large portion of the follies, and even of the vices of mankind, owe their origin to a desire to gratify it, in many cases in a legitimate manner; while numerous other foibles spring from its being exerted in a mistaken, or irregular, or partial mode.

When we bear in mind the extent to which every excitement, and impulse, and endowment throughout our whole constitution, is opposed to and counteracted by some other; the wonder is, not only that the entire system is able to proceed, but that it proceeds with the harmony that it does. The greatest marvel however of all is, that this harmony, and indeed perfection in the operation of the whole, is mainly, if not solely, owing to this counteraction through opposite causes, by which,—analogous to the opposite and counteracting principles of attraction and gravitation, heat and cold, moisture and dryness, in the material world, already alluded to,—each of these impulses acquires its proper force, and is restrained from passing the bounds assigned as the limits of its sphere. Thus, as we have already seen, the influences of the body are at once and directly opposed to those of the soul; and those of the medial, moral, and mental endowments, to one another. Hence, the mind not only corrects and counteracts the operation of the emotions, passions, and other medial endowments, but these latter both counteract and correct the operation of each other, and are indeed the most efficient agents in doing so; and, by so doing, subject them to the regulation of the reason. And this is the system of the universe itself; the secret of its security, and the source of its stability.

Not only moreover are these different endowments thus opposed, but, as has already been shown, powers of the same nature are also equally opposed to each other; and not merely do the several intellectual faculties and capacities impel us to different pursuits and actions, but, what is more extraordinary still, the different capacities of the same faculty, even more powerfully and directly contribute to this result, as has already been illustrated during the examination of their nature and operations. By all this, however, not only is each influence restrained within its due bounds; but, as is probably also the result in the material world, by this means every latent principle is developed, and the rivalry of each contending power gives stimulus to them all.⁵ And as there is a moral as well as

⁵ *Lord Bacon* remarks, in reference to the need here adverted to, and with characteristic penetration, that “the mind of man is far from being of the nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein the beams of things should reflect according to their true incidence; nay it is like an enchanted glass, full of superstition and imposture, if it be not delivered and reduced.”—*Advancement of Learning*.

a material atmosphere in the universe; so are our minds as well as our material frames, liable to be affected and controlled in their operations by causes of this kind. And in each case their condition to a large extent depends on the state of the atmosphere around them.⁶

As regards material influences, that of light as well as of air, and the particular character and condition of each of these elements, exercise extensive sway, not merely on the material system and health, but on the mental and moral condition of the individual as well, especially as regards vigour and activity, and demand here to be taken into full account. The influence of intellectual as well as physical light, must also be borne in mind.

Moreover, both in the material and the mental world, results are often produced by certain causes, which are in their nature the most opposite to what might have been expected. Thus, the darker the night, the more visible are the stars; while the intense glare of the sun, so far from enabling us to see it more clearly, is the reason of our being unable to gaze upon it at all. That which, by its light makes all other objects plain, by that same light is itself made obscure. Some men are induced to commit crime through poverty, and the urgent desire to possess more than they have; many more are induced to it through riches, having beyond what they know how properly to use. Some men are led on to do that which is wrong from the audacity which they possess, having no fear to restrain them within the due bounds of propriety and decorum. Others are urged on to this course through fear, not having courage to despise the impulses which lead them astray, boldly to resist vice, and to follow undauntedly the path of virtue and of truth.

In the direction of the course of the operations of the mental system, association is to the action of mind somewhat analogous to what attraction is to the motion of matter. Both mind and matter may be in operation without these causes acting upon them; but it seldom happens that they are not more or less biased or led by them, however apparently independent of such influence their action may be. Even lightning, rapid as is its motion, and ethereal as is its essence, is swayed in its current by the attraction of some gross material substances. Thought is far more rapid than lightning; yet it is generally directed in its course by the proximity of topics which, whatever be their character, chance to be akin to those with which it has recently been in contact; and it may indeed be doubted whether any mental operation takes place without being influenced, more or less, by association.⁷

⁶ *Vide ante*, b. ii. s. 8. p. 63.

⁷ Nevertheless, as pointed out by *Dr. Thomas Brown*, "the influence of the primary laws of suggestion, is greatly modified by original constitu-

Thus also we see in the world that different and opposing principles and opinions, instead of exterminating, serve alternately to confirm and establish one another. Rival arts and sciences also, although mutually opposed to, by their very rivalry advance and improve, and essentially contribute to render one another complete. So is it among different nations, and creeds, and callings; each thwarts and counteracts, but by doing so, ultimately accelerates, though it may temporarily retard, the progress of the other. Without competition, there is no external stimulus to exertion. And where no rivalry exists, the progress towards perfection is uniformly tardy.

Every passion and emotion, even those which appear to be mere failings, have their special use, and are turned to important account, in the economy of our mental and moral system. And, as happens in the generation of the human race, one emotion may be the parent of another, which will prove in character its very opposite. Thus, out of the frail frame of despair, will spring the firm and almost irresistible form of valour by which such wondrous feats have occasionally been achieved. It was a brave despair, so generated and thus animated, that resulted in the victories of Marathon and Thermopylæ. And this is the real secret of success in many corresponding cases.⁸

Moreover, as pain stimulates as well as pleasure, we perhaps often in reality gain as much by disappointment as by success. Experience is to be obtained from both, but far more so from the former than from the latter; and, if every article is to be valued according to the price we pay for it, such experience ought doubtless to be estimated very highly.

Nevertheless, it cannot but be admitted that the very different nature of the various intellectual faculties and capacities, and the manner in which certain of them when simultaneously exercised clash as it were with each other, constitutes the reason why the same person is able to shine in but few pursuits at once; which seems however expressly and wisely ordered to effect a due distribution of avocations and studies among mankind. One particular individual seldom attains excellence in more than one art or science; just as, in the animal world, the same creature is seldom if ever gifted at once, and in full perfection, with the powers of flying, running, and swimming;

tional differences, whether these are to be referred to the mind itself, or to variations of bodily temperament."—*Lecture on the Philosophy of the Mind*, Lect. xxxvii.

⁸ To the above passage *Mr. Sopwith* has appended the note which follows:—

"This observation appears to me to be correct both as regards the special use of all passions and emotions, and also as regards the origin of certain powers of mind from apparently opposite qualities."

although it may perform each of these indifferently, and one of them with great dexterity. This distribution of attributes extends also to the moral, as well as to the mental constitution of man. Few are eminently endowed with a number of high moral qualities, which are in general so diversified among various people, that that in which one person excels, another is found to be deficient. So also is it with respect to disposition, and other moral characteristics.

In the constitution of animals, as has already been pointed out,⁹ this diversity of endowments—each exerting an impulse in a different direction, and the reciprocal and counteracting influence of these concurrent agencies operating together, and resulting in the free and harmonious economy of the entire system,—is as fully existent, and is even more clearly demonstrated, as it is probably more important and powerful, than in the case of man.

The actual existence of what might strictly be termed a perfect character,—of a mind in which all the different mental, moral, and medial powers, and qualities, and endowments, are seen to be developed in full perfection, and to their utmost extent,—is consequently a combination of which, although we may conceive the possibility, it is probable that we may never experience the consummation. We can suppose that such an example might, but cannot hope that it really will, be witnessed. Such indeed is the constitution of our nature, that we must not expect to find in any individual, even the most highly gifted, more than two or three, at the utmost, of his capacities, and qualities, and endowments, largely possessed; while the others are necessarily, even from this very circumstance, thrown into the shade, and their operation and influence are more or less subdued. In certain instances indeed, as we have seen, the very fact of the extensive existence and full development, and cultivation of certain of these powers, and qualities, and endowments; is not only at variance with, but of itself serves to counteract the corresponding development and growth of the others. The most, therefore, that we can aspire to see attained, even in the greatest characters, is the contemporaneous extensive existence of a few only of the highest of the various powers, and qualities, and endowments, possessed by the soul, those being, moreover, the most suitable one with another to be co-united; to which may be superadded cultivation and acquirements the most judicious and advantageous. In the Deity alone, it may be inferred that such a union is accomplished; and to this we conclude, if we may presume to speculate on such a subject, is owing the absolute infinity of His perfection.¹

⁹ *Vide ante*, b. ii. c. i. s. 10, p. 76.

¹ *Vide ante*, b. iii. c. i. s. 7.

8. *Simultaneous Action of different Faculties and Capacities, to what extent effected.*

The question whether, and if at all, how far, and to what extent, the mind can exercise two or more independent faculties or capacities, at the same time, and on different topics, is one which is both interesting and important in itself, although it appears to admit of considerable discussion.² To complete one single common intellectual process, it may doubtless occasionally be requisite that several of the intellectual capacities should be employed, and in which they co-operate together; in the same manner as when the material frame is put in motion, several limbs may be made use of in the performance of this exercise.

But the question here is, not whether several intellectual capacities are required to carry on one intellectual action, but whether several independent intellectual actions can be simultaneously going forward; as, for instance, whether the mind can be at the same moment engaged in obtaining a knowledge of the nature of one subject, in reasoning on another, and in originating new discoveries with regard to a third.

We may exert the body in several independent actions at the same time, as walking, throwing, striking, moving the head, and talking. To a certain extent it might appear on a cursory examination of the matter, that the soul can in a similar manner exercise simultaneously, and on different topics, several independent capacities; as when any one is listening to a discourse and receiving knowledge from it, which he obtains by the aid of the faculty of understanding, his mind may seem to be wandering to another subject on which his reason is being at the same time exerted; and a third subject may also intrude itself, to which his genius is applied. The real fact however is, not that all these various independent capacities are simultaneously exerted on different subjects, but that they each in turn are swiftly transferred from one topic to another; so much more rapid is the action of the mind than the communication of ideas by verbal signs, and which therefore affords the mind time for this exercise.³ In like

² *Dr. Maudsley* remarks that "it is far from easy to fix the point at which mental function begins."—*Body and Mind, their Connexion and Mutual Influence*, pp. 5, 6. Also that "actions bearing the semblance of design may be unconscious and automatic." And that "acts consciously designed at first, may, by repetition, become unconscious and automatic."—*Ibid.*, p. 11.

³ While in conference with *Mr. Smee* on the points adverted to in this paragraph, he informed me that in his opinion, upon ordinary occasions part only of the brain is brought into play; but that on the occasions alluded to, several parts of the brain are at work at once, and which, he considers to account for the phenomena in question.

manner is the eye transported instantaneously from one object to another while viewing an extensive prospect; and thus sometimes is supposed capable of observing several objects simultaneously, which in reality are only presented to it in rapid succession. Of this we shall be convinced if we keep the face steadily turned, and the eyes fixed, in one direction, but for a very short space; when we shall discover that we can see at once but very few objects, and take in but a very limited range of vision.⁴

As in the case of one listening to the striking of a clock, the notes of which succeed each other at intervals of some seconds; during these intervals the mind may be directed to other matters, although it will still attend with sufficient care to each note of the hour so as to count it. Just so it is in many other instances. In common discourse, the ideas, owing to the comparatively slow process by which they are communicated, are received by the mind with much less rapidity than that with which it is wont to obtain them; so that it oftentimes reverts to other topics during the lapsing intervals. Thus also is it in the case of reading, and thinking on the subject of it while doing so. The two processes may be observed to be quite distinct and independent. Hence, we may read a passage without thinking about it, and our attention may be concentrated on a different topic; or we may think over a matter without reading upon it, or turning our cogitations into words.⁵

We must therefore conclude that we can only simultaneously exert several independent capacities on the same subject; and that it is from the celerity with which we are able to transfer our cogitations from one topic to another, that we appear to be exerting them on each of these separate topics at one and the same instant of time.⁶

The correct conclusion upon the question as to the ceaseless activity of the mind already several times referred to,⁷ appears also to be this. The mind as a whole is not only not always in this state, but it is very seldom that it is so. Nevertheless, some one or more of its faculties and capacities, scarcely ever, if for a moment, cease from action.

⁴ The note by *Mr. Smee* bearing out on this subject, *ante*, s. 5, p. 421, may here be referred to.

⁵ *Professor de Quatrefages* remarks that "attention, however rapid, is successive, and not simultaneous."—*Report on the Progress of Anthropology*, p. 336.

⁶ *Dr. Maudsley*, however, observes that "consciousness is not co-extensive with mind."—*Physiology and Pathology of the Mind*, p. 15.

⁷ *Vide ante*, *Prel. Diss.*, s. vi. a. 2. vol. i. p. 109.

9. *Celerity in Action of the different Faculties and Capacities.*

As action is the especial prerogative of spirit, so no motion in nature rivals in celerity the action of the soul; which surpasses even electricity in its speed,⁸ and light as regards the immensity of space through which it flies. Next to the motion of the mind itself, those of the bodily organs whose actions are impelled immediately by the soul, appear to approach the nearest in velocity to its own.⁹ In certain of the operations of the material organs however, such is the rapidity with which the mind directs their actions, that it sometimes appears as though the different functions of the limbs and organs of the body, in the exercises which they perform, were guided by a kind of instinctive sense of their own, without the mind being called upon to direct them.

In all our original motions and most active operations, the mind is doubtless actively engaged in the direction of them. In many of our common secondary and ordinary motions, which are but the continuance of those originated as before stated,—as when we exert our limbs in walking,—the senses are sufficient to direct us, and are what alone guide us, without any actual interference of the intellectual faculties.¹ Animals, even after their heads are cut off, will continue for a time instinctively to move their limbs; and when touched, will stimulate themselves to ward off the attack as if they were alive. Direction by sensation takes place in all involuntary motions, as in the excitement of the different organs of the senses. As I have before observed, animals in their various actions are directed by these instinctive sensations only, having no intellectual faculties to guide them.

In madness too, a person acts entirely from sensation, and not by the direction of his intellectual faculties. Thus, he will repeat phrases instinctively, and without understanding their meaning. Hence, the principle of the test which Shakspeare mentions, of madmen being unable to “reword the matter”²

⁸ “Mental action may be presumed to have a rapidity equal to 192,000 miles in a second.”—*Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation*, 9th edit., p. 315, App.

⁹ “The mind impels matter with the celerity of lightning, and with a force that is bounded, as it seems, only by the adhesive strength of the engine it employs.”—*Isaac Taylor. Physical Theory of Another Life*, c. iii.

¹ Dr. Carter Blake suggests with regard to this paragraph, that in addition to the direction by the senses of our movements when walking, should be added, “the developments of the spinal chord.”

² *Hamlet*, Act iii. scene 4.

of which they have spoken when in this state ; inasmuch as they have no ideas in their minds, but utter the words only instinctively, or from memory.³

In many of our actions moreover, where the exertion of the intellectual faculties is required to decide, and to direct us, with regard to them, it may also appear as though sensations alone guided us. The mistake here however arises from the celerity with which the mind acts ; whereby, although engaged in the most abstruse contemplations, we are able to transfer our attention from them to the regulation of these motions, and back again, so rapidly that this is not perceived ; but the ordering of such operations is supposed to have been effected by some other impulse. In reference to the conscience, I observed with what amazing rapidity the reasoning process is performed, so that its result is mistaken for an instinctive action. Indeed, in a vast number of our intellectual efforts of each kind, we are wholly unconscious of the process, and discern only the result.⁴

This celerity in our mental efforts, might be assimilated to what we see sometimes effected with regard to material objects, which are moved with such amazing rapidity that the act is imperceptible to the eye. Owing to this fact it is that the feats of jugglers and of conjurers are performed. The agility with which the fingers of a person well skilled in playing on a musical instrument are made to move, evinces the speed and exactness with which the body obeys the impulses of the mind.

As the various capacities of the mind in their nature and constitution exhibit in many respects a strict analogy to the organs and parts of the material frame ; so do the operations, both simple and complex, of these different capacities exhibit also a corresponding analogy to the action of the material organs and functions. And indeed, the rapidity and vivacity of the mental operations, is in some cases almost rivalled by that of certain

³ To this paragraph an interesting and valuable note has been appended by *Dr. Maudsley* :—

“Shakspeare's text, to which you refer, applies only to the worst forms of madness—e.g. incoherent mania. Of the patients in any large lunatic asylum, I have no doubt that a great many of them would be able to ‘reword’ what they say, understanding it perfectly. A patient, for instance, who believes that he has committed the unpardonable sin, and that he is eternally lost in consequence, does not by any means lose his understanding in regard to other matters. The fact is that Shakspeare was thinking of the *raving* maniac, or of such a madman as he represents in ‘King Lear,’ whose nonsense would be unrepeatable now-a-days. However, we recognize many other forms of madness, as perhaps they did then.”

See also on this subject a paper by the late *Sir Henry Hallford*, in his “*Essays and Orations*.”

⁴ *Vide ante*, b. iii. c. v. s. 1, p. 359.

of the material organs, more especially those connected with the intellectual faculties, as in the glance of the eye from one object to another, and the transmission of the nervous fluid and muscular impulses; while the spontaneous unconscious manner in which in both cases these operations are carried on, still further extends the resemblance. Indeed, in some of these movements, we can hardly discern whether it be mind or matter which is the acting principle; and we appear to be wandering into those mysterious regions which form the confines of both.

When however the mind is very intent on some subject of deep interest, it becomes occasionally so riveted to it that the attention is not sufficiently, or at all, given to the control of the corporeal motions; whence arise those mistakes of what is commonly called "Absence of mind," where sensations acting in the direction of these efforts without the control of the reason, induce motions blindly and erroneously.

What is very correctly termed "absence of mind," consists however, really in those actions of the body and its organs, which are ordinarily guided by the mind, being carried on by the instinctive impulses, instead of, and without the active control and direction of the mind over them being exerted. How far intellectual efforts that are commenced by the mind, but carried on without its taking, or appearing to take, any part in the performance,—as where a person reads a book aloud, but is all the while thinking of something else,—ought to be considered as proceeding beyond mere instinctive operations, may fairly admit of considerable doubt. The mind in this case seems to be rather passive than active, inertly and silently watching the course of events, and keeping itself ready to interfere the moment that these operations diverge from the right course, instead of being itself at work to aid in the undertaking. Its functions here correspond with those of a person who is driving horses annexed to a carriage, and whose presence is not the less needed for this purpose because he merely quietly holds the reins, instead of every moment actively exerting himself, which he reserves for the occasion requiring it.⁵

The fact that the motions of the body are impelled momen-

⁵ *Professor Huxley* remarks in reference to this paragraph:—"I should not myself adopt your phraseology, but the statement of my objections to it would take up more time than I can at present spare." He observes that "we have as much reason for regarding the mode of motion of the nervous system, as the cause of the state of consciousness, as we have for regarding any event as the cause of another." And that "modern physiology, aided by pathology, easily demonstrates that the brain is the seat of all forms of consciousness."

To the same paragraph *Mr. Wake* has appended the following note:—"In the absence of information as to what is intended by 'instinctive impulses,' I cannot say whether this statement is correct, according to my

tarily by the mind, and that the senses aid ceaselessly in their direction and control, although apparently both occasionally dormant, is forcibly instanced in the case of walking; which might be thought to proceed without any mental effort, and indeed while the mind was entirely occupied with other matters. But how necessary both the mind and the senses are to direct every movement here, is made evident by the fact that if we close our eyes but for an instant, we at once go wrong, and diverge from the straight course, having no longer the senses and the mind to be our guides.

Reading too fast, will sometimes prevent the mind of the hearer from taking in the narrative, as he is unable to pause and examine the controverted passages, and to decide upon their meaning while the story proceeds. The difficulty in following the reader in this case, is not however because the material motion of the lips which produces the words, is too quick for the mind to proceed at the same pace, inasmuch as the operations of the mind are far more expeditious than those of the body; but because sufficient time is not afforded for the mind to examine the subject as it progresses, and to comment upon it, whereby the thread of it becomes broken, and is lost. On the other hand, reading too slowly renders it almost equally difficult to attend closely to the narrative; as in this case the mind is apt to wander away to other subjects, owing to the large portion of unoccupied time which intervenes between the different periods occurring in the course of the recital.

In the case of a person reading or speaking aloud while he is thinking of something else; the act of reading or speaking may be directed by the mere instinctive impulse, while the intellectual effort which accompanies it, is the necessary and essential act of the mind alone.

It is further to be observed that, how active soever the

judgment. The actions referred to I should ascribe simply to habit, or acquired instinct. See my notion as to the nature of habit in *Chapters on Man*, pp. 22, 23. I doubt whether any process of external activity can be *originated* during absence of mind, although when once begun the mind may apparently lapse into non-observation of the active process. The reading aloud of a book while thinking of something else, assuming this to be possible, would seem however to require another explanation, supposing the book to be one which the reader has not seen before. It is difficult to imagine that the faculty of speech, and the use of language symbols can have become so purely 'instinctive' that new combinations of letters and ideas may be recognized and expressed without any consideration. I should feel inclined to explain the phenomena by the dual theory of the mind, enforced in *Chapters on Man*. Absence of mind is accompanied by a kind of dreaminess, and I should explain it as being due to the non-attention of the instinctive soul principle, which wanders away through the mazes of the mind, although the reflective spirit still guides the active process, and may (as you suggest in relation to the mind itself,) be said to keep watch that the operation may not go wrong."

mind may be,—which appears indeed scarcely, if ever for one moment, to be entirely at rest,—it is nevertheless not liable to suffer from this circumstance; inasmuch, as already remarked,⁶ the mind itself is not subject to fatigue, although the organs of the body upon which, and to a greater or less extent through which, the mind at certain times acts, do require relaxation and ease. When therefore we talk of the mind being overworked, and tired, and requiring relaxation; we mean, in reality, not that the actual mind, but that the material organs which are the instruments of its operations, stand in need of this relief.

Mind indeed acknowledges no allegiance to the laws which ordinarily act upon, and control, matter; while matter submits not to be bound by the laws which regulate, and are recognized by, mind. When these two opposite and occasionally opposing forces or agents are blended into one being; the wondrous product of this union, although it relinquishes certain of the powers and energies which were the property of one or other when dis-united, acquires attributes and endowments as the result of this amalgamation, to which neither when separate could ever aspire.

⁶ *Vide ante, Prel. Diss. s. vi. art. 3, vol. i. p. 113.*

CHAPTER VII.

MENTAL DISCIPLINE AND CULTIVATION.

1. *The Nature, Scope, and Object, of Education in General.*

IN order to devise a complete and efficient system of education, it is essential that we should previously determine in what that education consists; what are the ends which it seeks to attain, and in what manner they will be best secured.

It is very important, moreover, to keep in view the distinction between education and mere instruction. While the latter consists only in supplying the mind with ideas, which are its materials to work upon; education consists in, and is not complete without, both supplying the materials, and also therewith teaching and disciplining the mind to use them.¹

The main object and scope of all mental pursuits, are of a twofold nature,—to train the mind for exercise, and to supply it with ideas; to teach it how to use ideas, and to give it ideas to use. The first of these constitutes mental discipline, the latter mental cultivation. Discipline is to the mind what tillage is to the soil, preparing it for giving growth to the seed it is about to receive. Cultivation is to the mind what sowing is to the soil, by which it is supplied with the seed for the reception of which it has been prepared. Some kind of teaching, such

¹ According to *Lord Bacon* "education is, in effect, but an early custom."—*Essay* xxxix.

"The art of education is no other than the knowledge of the means proper to form strong and robust bodies, and wise and virtuous minds."—*Helvetius on the Mind*. Essay iv. c. 17.

"The true science of education implies a skilful observation of the past, and that long foresight of the future, which experience and judgment united afford. It is the art of seeing, not the immediate effect only, but the series of effects which may follow any particular thought or feeling, in the infinite variety of possible combinations—the art often of drawing virtue from apparent evil, and of averting evil that may arise from apparent good. It is, in short, the philosophy of the human mind applied practically to the human mind; enriching it, indeed, with all that is useful or ornamental in knowledge, but at the same time giving its chief regard to objects of yet greater moment; averting evil, which all the sciences together could not compensate, or producing good, compared with which all the sciences together are as nothing."—*Dr. Thomas Brown. Lectures on the Philosophy of the Mind*. Lecture iii.

as pure mathematics, is adapted to discipline the mind, but without imparting any considerable amount of actual knowledge; while teaching of other kinds, such as light reading generally, is adapted to impart knowledge, but without effecting anything considerable in the way of discipline to the mind.²

Mental discipline, indeed, includes not merely guiding the mind in a proper course, but invigorating and enlarging it by that means. If it does not of itself give actual power to the mind, it at any rate teaches it how to turn to the utmost advantage the power which it already possesses. Mental cultivation comprehends both the storing the mind with ideas,—which applies, however, strictly, to that of the understanding only,—and also exercising the different faculties and capacities through the particular ideas and operations especially fitted for them. Both discipline and cultivation should be followed, and are alike essential; and it is in the joint application of these two exercises, that education, properly so called, consists.

Moreover, by duly cultivating the mind, not only are its powers of exertion enlarged, but its real capacity is thereby actually expanded and extended, as well as invigorated. Education should be so directed that it tends to the increase not merely of the acuteness, but of the intelligent also, of the mind, comprehending its general improvement. Acuteness contributes to form the quick and ready man of business, and the dexterous debater and skilful reasoner. The possession of intelligence constitutes the man of superior ability and acquirements generally, whose intellect is not only well cultivated, but also well stored.

That which education should consequently comprise, and really consist in, is the teaching of the individual how to exert aright, and in the most appropriate mode, the endowments that he possesses. He should be instructed not only in the use of letters and of figures, but how to apply this use in the best and most advantageous manner. He should be taught not merely to read, but to apply properly his reading; not merely to write, but to apply this acquirement beneficially and practically; not merely to cypher, but to apply his cyphering in the way most advantageous to himself.³ And these acquisitions are perhaps the whole of what artificial education can confer. This constitutes the tilling of the soil, into which, when so prepared, the seed is to be thrown. Upon artificial

² *Mr. Herbert Spencer*, however, considers that "Acquirement of every kind has two values,—value as knowledge, and value as discipline."—*Herbert Spencer. Education*, c. i.

³ *Locke* defines the business of education to be, not to perfect men in any one of the sciences, but so to open and dispose their minds as may best make them capable of any, when they shall apply themselves to it.—*Conduct of the Understanding*, s. 19.

education is erected the structure of natural education, which is effected by exerting, appropriately and efficiently, the faculties and powers so prepared for use; which commences as soon as these endowments are ready for action,⁴ and continues in reality all through life.⁵ In this consists the acquisition and application of knowledge, through common observation, experience, and intercourse with the world, which never ceases to be carried on.⁶

Not only however is education insufficient to teach many branches of knowledge, but certain of those which are the highest of all, such as an acquaintance with the nature of our own being, can be imparted by no artificial teaching. So also, many important intellectual acquirements, such as the power of composing poetry, and of producing works of exalted merit in any department of literature, are quite beyond the reach of any system of education to supply.⁷ These are indeed gifts of God, which no labour of man, however assiduous, can by possibility procure. Indeed, many a learned man will be found very ignorant, particularly on the subjects with which he professes to be most conversant. Several of the greatest Greek and Latin scholars, know but little of what is most essential to know of either ancient Greece or ancient Rome. Gorging either the material or the mental frame, does not necessarily by any means conduce to its nutriment. In order to effect this end, the food must be wholesome of its kind, suitable in its nature, and duly digested as well as devoured. Overloading the system, either the material or the mental stomach, often defeats the very object for which the feeding of either kind should serve. Very great readers, and very great eaters, seldom conduce much to the strength of their constitution. Moderation in the case of both, is the only safe and proper rule.

Of all knowledge, self-knowledge is at once the most difficult to obtain, and the most valuable, to possess. Nevertheless, no

⁴ "It is at the very instant a child receives motion and life, that it receives its first instruction. It is sometimes even in the womb where it is conceived that it learns to distinguish between sickness and health."—*Helvetius. Treatise on Man*, s. i. c. ii.

⁵ "It is at leaving the college and entering the world that the education of youth begins."—*Ibid.*, c. vii.

⁶ *Sir John Lubbock* remarks in reference to the sentiments contained in this passage, which he has been kind enough to peruse for the purpose of expressing his opinion upon the principles here laid down;—"We are I think at present in great danger of sacrificing true education to mere instruction."

⁷ *Lord Bacon* remarks that "in the culture and care of the mind of man, two things are without our command; points of nature, and points of fortune: for the bias of the one, and the condition of the other, our work is limited and tied."—*Advancement of Learning*, b. ii.

And *Helvetius* asserts with much truth, that "chance has a necessary and considerable influence on our education."—*Treatise on Man*, s. i. c. viii.

one but himself, knows the real extent of his own virtue, and his own depravity. Each man may deem himself at once, the best and the basest of mankind. And angry as people often are at the faults of others, they are not very apt to be so with their own transgressions.

Education, thus considered, serves not only for the general benefit and advancement of the mind, but it conduces to qualify the higher part of our nature for that higher state of existence to which the present is but preparatory. This life is, moreover, in every way, and throughout its career, probably as much a period of preparation for our intellectual, as it is for our moral being. It is adapted equally both to prove, and to improve, the condition of each.

It may consequently be concluded from what has here been premised, that education of each kind, whether for the discipline or the cultivation of the mind, and whether mental, moral, or medial, is of two classes, natural and artificial.

Natural education is that which every one receives from nature through the common exercise of his senses, the ordinary ideas which the mind obtains through them, and the experience that he derives therefrom of the world around him; all which he gains without the direct teaching of any other person, and without resorting to artificial contrivances for communicating ideas.⁸ Artificial education is that kind which is enforced by arbitrary rule, and which is obtained by any person through the instruction of another, or by resorting to artificial contrivances for communicating knowledge, such as books, maps, and pictures; and by following certain prescribed regulations for this purpose. Natural education is that which is acquired by following the promptings of nature; it is the earliest that the child receives, and upon which it commences long before it learns letters, possibly even before it leaves the womb.⁹ It is also the last kind of education from which he derives instruction before he leaves the world. Savages who never learn letters, nevertheless learn much by means of natural education. Indeed, there are many things taught by it which artificial education cannot teach. Self-knowledge, the most important of all knowledge, and nearly all that we possess of human nature, is imbibed in this way. Natural education is peculiarly adapted for some capacities of the mind, and artificial for others; and for some of them, education of

⁸ "There is an education of man continually going forward in the whole system of things around him; and what is commonly termed *education*, is nothing more than the art of skilfully guiding this natural progress, so as to form the intellectual and moral combinations in which wisdom and virtue consist."—*Dr. Thomas Brown. Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, Lect. xlv.*

⁹ *Vide ante*, b. iii. c. i. s. 1, p. 219.

both kinds is alike fitted. In a perfect system, they should be both blended together, and followed conjointly, as each assists and accelerates the other. Indeed, the most learned is ignorant if destitute of natural education. Natural education alone however, must necessarily fail to perfect the instruction of any man, whatever be his abilities, unless he has obtained artificial education as well. And yet it is probable that for the higher order of beings, angels and disembodied spirits, natural education is all-sufficient.

It is doubtless, moreover, occasionally very difficult to determine what teaching is natural, and what is artificial, the confines dividing the two being frequently but faintly defined. In the case of language, for instance, some appears natural, some artificial. The early lisping of the infant, and all signal and emotional language, is of the former kind. But grammatical language generally, and that which is written, belongs to the latter.¹

To a certain extent, and in many respects, education of both kinds is availed of in what, in the succeeding section, I have comprehended under the terms mental, moral, and medial; as also in that which is manual. And while mental education consists in qualifying the mind for study by rule, and storing it with suitable ideas; moral, in regulating the conduct by correct principles; and medial in disciplining the lower parts of our nature:—manual education consists, properly and essentially in cultivating the material and physical powers and organs, and adapting the individual for manual and practical pursuits.

Whether our Omniscient Creator, in uniting our souls to corporeal frames, and placing us in this material world, had any

¹ To this sentence *Mr. Wake* has appended the following valuable note:—"I think your classification of education into natural and artificial is quite correct, subject to the qualification that the latter is in some sense as much natural as the other. I should prefer to call the two phases *perceptive* and *rational*.* This classification agrees with the compound nature of man. On the lower phase, man is an animal, and as the education of animals must, in the absence of language signs, be purely perceptive, or, as you term it natural, such must also be the lower or more simple process of human education. Man, however, is more than an animal, and for his higher education he requires what you term artificial but what I should describe as rational, means of education. The books, maps, and pictures, you mention, are artificial, but they are all expressive of language, and this is the basis and instrument of all higher or rational education, as being the formal embodiment of the activity of the reflective faculty. When speaking of natural or perceptive education, it should not be forgotten, however, that this is much facilitated by the instinctive tendencies which result from the accumulated experiences of past generations, and which are no less influential over the minds of the lower animals than over that of man."

* It appears to me, however, that artificial education is occasionally "perceptive," where effected through one of the capacities of understanding; and that some natural education is "rational," as where one of the capacities of reason is that which is resorted to.

object in view as regards the knowledge that we might thereby acquire, more especially as regards terrestrial and material subjects, may be matter for conjecture. But perhaps the grand moral lesson in regard to our acquirements which He mainly desired to inculcate, and to blend with mental training, was a perception of the immensity, nay infinity, of our ignorance. That highly endowed as our minds are, and to all appearance peculiarly, nay perfectly, adapted for obtaining wisdom; yet we in reality, in our present state at least, know nothing absolutely, and very little more than superficially. The principal doctrine, the fundamental axiom in the school of philosophy which our experience teaches us, is that we are essentially ignorant of everything.

Probably, every soul has a body joined to it especially suited to its peculiar character, as the particular soul is, in turn, to the particular body. The soul when united to the body, has also a tendency to mould and to influence it so as to suit its own special character. And the pursuits in which the mind engages, influence that character, as, in turn, its character influences the choice of those pursuits.

The adaptation of the world, and of material nature in general, to the wants and convenience of the animal creation, and of man in particular, is moreover universally acknowledged and felt. On examination, they will however be found to be in all respects as perfectly adapted to his intellectual and moral, as they are to his material exigencies. Thus, the stimulus to mental exertion which all our requirements, whether medial, moral, or mental, occasion, and which is so beneficial to us as intellectual and moral beings, is strikingly contrasted with the internal physical constitution and action of our material frames, where every function progresses not only without our care, but without our control, and even independently of our consciousness of what is going on; as though the Author of our being desired to remove from us this concern, in order that we might be at full liberty to direct our conduct in our mental and moral course. Had we indeed, this double anxiety upon us, our physical frames would never be free from pain and disease, or our minds from trouble and from terror; which, now, excite us only on the warning of pain, as friendly cautions of approaching danger. Besides which, our most important natural exigencies, instead of being regulated by the governance of an Allwise Creator, would then be at the mercy of our own passions or caprice, of which they are now happily for the most part independent; and are consequently in their operations far more regular, and consistent, than are those which are mental and moral, and which are ordered by our free will and choice.

How extraordinary, nevertheless, does it at first sight appear that, while every plant and the meanest insect exhibit such

absolute perfection in their construction and constitution, and their adaptation to all the purposes for which they were created; that which is regarded as the noblest and most wonderful production of Divine wisdom and power, and which moreover seems to approach in its nature the nearest to the Being who called it into existence,—the mind of man,—should be apparently so imperfect in its operations, and be so dependent upon discipline and cultivation for the development of its own inherent energies and faculties. But hence arises the grand stimulus to exertion with which it is endowed. By this means, it is made conscious at once of the power that it may possess by putting forth those energies; and, on the other hand, of the imbecility into which it may sink through neglect of this duty.

In a civilized state of society, every faculty and capacity of the mind is brought into full exercise; while in a barbarous age, many of them may never be called into operation, especially those which are of the most exalted kind.² Nor are the moral endowments, in the latter condition, more developed.³ The medial endowments and propensities, on the other hand, will be actively exerted, and will be more completely developed in a barbarous, than in a civilized state of society. From all this, however, we may surely infer that civilization is the proper and legitimate condition for mankind. Nor can it correctly be deemed an unnatural state, inasmuch as it is that alone in which their highest powers can be completely matured, and attain full perfection; while those only are diminished which they have in common with the animal world. To animals indeed, such a state is unnatural, as is proved by their instinctive, which are their highest powers, proportionably diminishing with their domestication. If therefore, we attempt to infer from this fact, that civilization is

² "In the case of the individual, the result of civilization is to perfect and to develop to the full all his higher faculties and powers, and to subject to them the lower propensities and endowments. In the case of the state, its result is to exalt those influences in the community which are the highest and purest, over those which are inferior and debasing; to develop to the full the resources of the nation, both natural and artificial; and to adapt the people in all respects for advantageously and completely availing themselves of these resources."—*Civilization Considered as a Science. End of Civilization*, p. 345. (Bohn's Library Edition.)

According to Mr. Burnett Tylor, "from an ideal point of view, civilization may be looked upon as the general improvement of mankind by higher organization of the individual and of society, to the end of promoting at once man's goodness, power, and happiness."—*Primitive Culture*, vol. i. c. ii. p. 24.

"The advance of European civilization is characterized by a diminishing influence of physical laws, and an increasing influence of mental laws."—*Buckle. History of Civilization*, vol. i. c. iii.

³ Mr. Buckle lays it down that "a double movement, moral and intellectual, is essential to the very idea of civilization, and includes the entire theory of moral progress."—*History of Civilization*, vol. i. c. iv.

unnatural and pernicious to animals, we must also conclude that it is natural and beneficial to man. The proper condition for every being to be placed in, is doubtless that which is best adapted for its attaining perfection. In man, the instinctive powers and the senses, which are the leading endowments of animals, become enfeebled and deteriorated in proportion as the intellectual powers are cultivated.

It has already been remarked in a previous part of this treatise, how extensively Revelation inculcates the improvement, not merely of our moral qualities, but also of our mental powers. This it does not only indirectly in the manner already pointed out, but also in a direct mode, as regards the exercise of them enjoined by the Bible. Indeed, the obligation to cultivate these faculties, appears to be almost as strongly insisted upon as that of exercising them aright; and both are declared in Scripture to be a positive duty, so that the latter is engrafted upon religion itself. Thus, Solomon is chiefly praised by his Creator, because he asked for "wisdom and understanding."⁴ In Proverbs, and throughout the Psalms, knowledge and wisdom are ever spoken of as the divinest gifts. The parable of the talents is an exemplification from the mouth of our Lord Himself, of our imperative duty and obligation in this respect. Not only, indeed, is knowledge declared "better than gold," but understanding is coupled with it;⁵ as if to show that mental improvement, and not merely celestial acquirement—as some contend to be the case, whenever in Scripture we are told to obtain wisdom—is what is meant to be commended.

In their neglect to exercise their reason aright, and to overcome the influences of prejudice, consisted many of the sins of those who refused to believe in the miracles of our Lord, and against which some of the severest denouncements are contained in Holy Scripture. Moreover, in the predictions respecting the cessation of war throughout the world, the turning weapons into ploughshares and pruning-hooks; the mighty influences of civilization and the progress of science, have not been disregarded: while the spread of Christianity has been contemporary with the general dissemination of knowledge all over the globe. The Deity is extolled as much for His infinite wisdom as for His absolute goodness, His mental as well as His moral perfection. And although the latter is of most importance to mortals in a probationary state, where their frailty continually calls for His merciful interference on their behalf; yet it can hardly be doubted that the former as an essential attribute, is the more exalted, and the more sublime.

⁴ II. Chron. c. i. v. 11.

⁵ Job c. xxviii. v. 12. Prov. c. i. vs. 2, 3, 5; c. ii. vs. 2, 3, 6; c. iii. v. 13.

Revelation indeed, in a variety of different ways, excites alike the understanding and the reason; and by leaving many points both of principle and of practice, to be settled by the mind of each person, a full exercise is afforded not only to both these faculties, but the moral endowments are also led to exert their influence. In fact in all these respects, the Bible may be considered as the most perfect of educational books. The vast fund of information that it contains, especially upon matters of history, renders it of immense value as regards the cultivation of the understanding; while the knowledge that it affords of the nature of man, and still more, of the nature of God, are what can be found in no other work. The exercise which it supplies to the reason in a variety of ways, but especially in calling forth its capacities in the pursuit of the right course to be followed,—the many differences in opinion and contentions about which, alone prove how perfect is its exercise in this respect,—is also obvious. In its sublime and glorious poetical and imaginative descriptions, the noblest stimulus to genius is also afforded. And the delights which we experience through the extensive exercise of taste, which are among the loftiest and most ecstatic of all our intellectual pursuits, are there represented as the most transcendent of pleasures, and the very rewards of Heaven to its beatified inhabitants.

In addition to what has already been here advanced on the advantages of education generally, I will also be bold enough to contend, notwithstanding all that has been argued to the contrary both by moralists and divines, although without any authority whatever either from reason or revelation in support of their views, that knowledge, and intellectual cultivation, do of themselves directly tend to virtue, not only by subjecting the lower influences of our nature to the higher endowments,—the flesh, which is the source of all error, to the spirit, which is the only source of knowledge, and in which all our nobler aspirations originate;⁶—but from the fact that knowledge of itself conduces to truth, and truth is founded on virtue alone, the ultimate source of which is God, the Fountain alike of all truth, and of all knowledge. Love of truth indeed, ought to be established as an essential principle, or rather, ruling intellectual desire in the mind of each, and should be contemporaneous with the love of knowledge. Hence also, intellect naturally leads or directs us to good; and the more it is cultivated, the more it inclines to this end, inasmuch as it aims at truth which is the foundation of good. I maintain therefore, that of itself alone

⁶ *Vide ante*, b. ii. c. i. s. 5 vol. i. p. 33.

and independently mental education is directly and essentially conducive to virtue.⁷

In one respect indeed, there can be no doubt that such cultivation leads to virtue, inasmuch as whatever conduces to mental perfection and purity, conduces also to perfection and purity of a moral nature; and that in order to act correctly, our knowledge and our judgment must be accurate and correct. Moreover, our knowledge and our judgment can be sound and perfect in those cases only, where the faculties for attaining this end are completely and properly developed.

In another respect too, education directly conduces to morality, inasmuch, and so far, as truth, whether mental or moral, is promoted and attained through a clear perception of that agreement between a relative and its antecedent in which it essentially consists. Whether in the case of mental truth, or moral truth, this is perceived and arrived at through the reason being correctly exercised about the subject before it, and drawing accurate conclusions from the premises submitted, and whether the topic be a mental or a moral one, matters but little as regards the process to be undergone. Hence, rightly informing the understanding, and disciplining the reason, are as essential to moral as to mental truth; and, as a consequence, must be directly, and of themselves, independently and immediately, conducive to morality and to virtue.

In the early ages of the world, its instruction and education by its Divine Author, its omniscient Tutor, were carried on by immediate manifestations of Himself, when the gross material senses were directly employed in the receipt of knowledge of an order and nature the most sublime. In later ages, moral precepts mainly were instilled. And in times subsequent to these, intellectual teaching, and a pure code of ethics, are

⁷ "Virtue being twofold, intellectual and moral, the former is produced and increased chiefly by instruction, and therefore requires experience and time; the latter is acquired by repeated acts, or custom, from which by a small change its name is derived."—*Aristotle. Ethics*, b. ii.

"Virtue is not easily connected with dull minds."—*Cicero. Tuscul. Disp. Whether Virtue is sufficient for a Happy Life.*

Nevertheless, it is difficult to deny altogether the truth of what *Mr. Burnett Tylor* tells us, when he says, "that whether in high ranges or in low of human life, it may be seen that advance of culture seldom results at once in unmixed good. Courage, honesty, generosity, are virtues which may suffer, at least for a time, by the development of a sense of value of life and property. The savage who adopts something of foreign civilization, too often loses his ruder virtues, without gaining an equivalent."—*Primitive Culture*, vol. i. c. ii. pp. 25, 26.

But may it not be that although on certain occasions and in certain respects, civilization may tend to demoralize the mass; individual culture in most cases conduces to the virtue and exaltation of the individual?

what were principally inculcated. So, in the education of the individual man, we commence by teaching through the senses. The rules of duty are taught during youth; and in after ages, and during the rest of his career, his mind is exercised in the severe mental efforts of practical life;—the last course in the order of natural education.

2. *Medial and Moral, as well as Mental, Discipline and Cultivation.*

As the main objects of education are twofold, and should be adapted not only to store the mind with materials for labour, but to teach it how to use those materials in the most advantageous manner; so the discipline which we exercise over ourselves, should extend not merely to the mental faculties, but also to the medial and moral endowments and powers. And as the mind itself should not only be cultivated, but disciplined; not merely stored but invigorated: so also it should not only be trained as regards its own discipline, but it should be led to discipline the other parts of our nature,—to regulate the desires, improve the disposition, control the affections, restrain the passions, curb the appetites, and direct the emotions. We ought therefore first to discipline the mind itself and then to lead it to discipline all the rest of our being, which should be duly subjugated to it. And to this end should not only all the faculties, but each capacity in them, more or less directly or indirectly contribute.

Education moreover, should be moral as well as mental, and medial in conjunction with both.⁸ Indeed, education of one kind not only aids the other; but neither can be complete without the other, and each are of themselves alike important and essential.

The dispositions, propensities, and moral endowments, are each capable of being both disciplined and cultivated; and this is effected by training the individual to correct moral habits, and by instilling right principles into his mind, which is the main ruling or influencing director in regard to his moral nature.⁹ Habit is in fact to medial and moral, what discipline is to mental endowments. The mental education of each person is

⁸ "What then is education? Is it difficult to discover a better than has been discovered for a long time? that is, surely, gymnastics for the body, and music for the mind."—*Plato, Republic*, c. xvii.

⁹ "The habit of moral virtue, like all other practical arts, can be acquired or preserved by practice only."—*Aristotle, Ethics*, b. ii.

moreover dependent, not only on his mental, but also on his moral condition. He should not merely be imbued with the wish to improve his mind, but to attain that which is right. Thus, education and ethics should not only aid each other, but each should tend to the attainment of that which is most perfect in the system of education.

There is another very important branch of education which is quite distinct from that of the mind, being comprehended in the training or education of certain of the material organs; the essence of which consists in subjecting them fully and entirely to the impulses of the mind.¹ The organs capable of such education are those of the voice, of the ear, of locomotion, of feeling, and of seeing. All education must, however, be effected through the mind, even if it be only of the body. Communication must be made at first to the soul, whence it is carried on to the material frame, and its vibrations are extended from the one to the other. And as the body is most susceptible of these impulses while it is young and pliable; the earlier this education is commenced, the greater is the probability of its success.²

Two independent circumstances are, nevertheless, requisite to be combined in the complete carrying out of material education. 1. The mind must be duly disciplined to impress on the body the impulses that it has received, and to subject the latter to its dictates. 2. The organs of the body so to be impelled, must be well adapted for the performance of the duties imposed upon them; as the ear correct, the eye vigorous, the feeling sensitive. A person with a melodious voice, but which is subjected to no proper regulation, is as unlikely to make an effective singer, as one with a hoarse voice that is well regulated. Both correct discipline and duly constituted organs must be united, if high excellence is to be attained.

Each of the senses, as already pointed out,³ is improvable by cultivation; and both by invigoration, and by an increase in the susceptibility and flexibility of the organ itself, as also in regard to its power and readiness to obey the impulses of the

¹ "Moral education ought to precede the intellectual, and the culture of the body ought to precede that of the mind."—*Aristotle. Politics*, b. v.

² *Professor C. J. Plumptre* has appended the note which follows, to this passage:—

"Here I thoroughly coincide with the author as regards every particular. In reference to the special work entrusted to me at King's College, I have noticed almost invariably that the culture of the voice and speech in regard to expression, has been in proportion to the original susceptibility of the mind, and has progressed according to the education of its various powers."

³ *Vide ante*, b. i. c. i. s. 9, vol. i. p. 259.

mind: while the mind as well, through which the instruction is conveyed, is improved by the same cultivation, alike as regards the information that it acquires, the experience that it gains, and the exercise to which it is subjected.

For the senses moreover, education both natural and artificial, is adapted. As already pointed out, each of the senses may be cultivated, and each in its own way. For correcting the sight, artificial appliances are resorted to, more especially in the study of art, and also where precision of aim in shooting is obtained by practice. So the hearing is artificially cultivated in the study of music, and in that of rhetorical composition. For the improvement of the senses of touch, taste, and smell, it would seem that natural appliances are better fitted than those which are artificial, amounting perhaps to little more than simple exercise, by which alone indeed each sense is much sharpened and improved.⁴

Not only, however, do the moral, and even the medial parts of our nature, require to be disciplined, as well as our mental powers; but, what is of equal importance, is that they should be disciplined in conjunction with mental education. Thus, the senses should be both duly trained to their proper use, and should be also exercised, as should the emotions, appetites, passions, and the affections as well; and, what is of more consequence still, each of these should be placed under proper regulation and control, and subjected to the surveillance, of the reason and the conscience. The discipline and cultivation, both of the dispositions and the desires, should be also carefully attended to, and the formation of the moral character scrupulously watched. Conscience itself, moreover, should be rigidly disciplined and duly cultivated; and its operations regulated with the same assiduity that we bestow on the improvement of the intellectual faculties and capacities.

Nevertheless, it does not appear that it is possible by discipline and cultivation however skilfully applied, to effect any real improvement, or to produce any actual change in the nature either of the emotions, appetites, passions, or affections. All

⁴ According to *Locke*,* not only are the endowments in our constitution the exercise of which is voluntary, and over which we possess a certain degree of control, subject to education; but even certain of the involuntary and internal operations of our bodies may be brought under a considerable amount of discipline and training, and that in a very important respect as regards our health and comfort, and as dependent upon them, our intellectual and moral condition also. How far these operations, or any of them, are regulated by instinctive feelings or impulses, and whether and how far they are liable to be acted upon, and by what causes, might form an interesting topic of research to the physiologist.

* *Education*, ss. 23, 24.

that we can in such cases accomplish, is to occasion an alteration as regards the objects to which they are directed, and also as regards their mode of operation upon them. Thus, although we cannot refine an appetite or a passion, we may select a proper object for it; and although we cannot actually change its nature, we may very greatly vary the mode of its application.

Hence, the ultimate effect of education, is not to eradicate, or even to weaken, either the emotions, appetites, passions, affections, or desires; but simply to reduce their influence to its legitimate level, and to direct them in their proper course. On the other hand, the higher powers and endowments of our nature, those belonging to our mental constitution, will by education be expanded and developed, and enabled to acquire their due ascendancy.

Thus, in the education of each department of our constitution, whether mental, moral, or medial, the ultimate object and the result are the same, being not only to increase, but to direct aright the powers so operated upon. A man may be endowed with great talents, and excellent disposition; and although education cannot alter the actual nature of any of these endowments, it may so direct their application as to render that which would have been pernicious or abortive, useful and productive. So, in the case of a garden, although the most skilful cultivation cannot enlarge its extent, or vary its situation, yet its power of producing may be prodigiously increased by this means; and on this, indeed, mainly depends whether it brings forth flowers or only weeds.

The world is, moreover, the best and most eligible school to which any one may be sent to render his education complete; and nature is the most efficient teacher, although a very strict and severe disciplinarian. It is withal very just; not only punishing impartially every violation of her laws, but visiting them in the precise way they most deserve: in a mode, too, closely akin to the very offence itself, and one from which there is no escape.⁵

In all our proceedings and operations, but more especially with respect to education, nature, which is the most perfect instructor, is therefore ever to be observed and ever to be followed; and natural education, whether mental, moral, or medial, is in each case, where applicable, that which is most efficient. It should be moreover observed alike, in what mode nature has allotted and distributed our several capacities, and our moral and medial endowments as well, and in what way she prompts us to exercise them; and, not least, the influence which she causes one to exert upon the operation of the other.

⁵ *Civilization Considered as a Science. Moral Jurisprudence*, pp. 262, 263. (Bohn's Library Edition.)

By the efforts and products of nature, the most valuable lessons are afforded. Her teaching is the most instructive; her language is the most forcible. Instead of books and pictures, she presents to us life and reality. In the place of shadows, she gives us substance.

Nevertheless, although it is well to observe and to follow nature in framing and carrying out a system of education, whether material or artificial; yet even here, as also in many other pursuits, resort may advantageously be had to certain artificial appliances, not indeed to counteract or supersede, but to assist, and indeed to perfect nature. This is however effected, not by any actual diversion of her efforts, but by continuing their course in their proper channel, and in removing those obstacles which impede the operation of nature, and thus allowing her to pursue her own free bent. Hence, what books are to artificial education, experience is to natural education, or the teaching of nature. Hers is the soundest, because the most impressive, of all education; but her lessons are costly, and the punishment for neglect is generally very severe.

In the case of animals, the education which is imparted to them by mankind, is mainly of a medial kind, and is effected by acting upon those parts in their constitution which are of this class, such as the senses, emotions, appetites, and passions. To a certain extent artificial education is capable of being supplied, as that by which we train horses and dogs, and some other domestic animals, to perform certain acts, and to submit to our rule. So far as obedience to a superior is sought to be regulated, it might be contended that moral education also is inculcated. All the education which animals effect by themselves, and in which they become perfect in their own pursuits and contrivances, may be said to be natural. That by which we discipline them to serve for our domestic use, is artificial. But comparatively few animals have been subjected to artificial training or education of any kind, being those only which from their nature and quality appeared adapted to be useful to us if so taught. Probably many more of them are capable of such education; while to a large number it seems impossible to impart artificial instruction of any kind.

3. Each distinct Faculty, and Capacity, independently improvable by Education.

As it is of the essential nature of the mind to owe its advancement to the education that it receives, which is to this being what exercise and nutriment are to the material frame;

so, according to the quality of that education, will be the character of its development and progress.

There is, however, this peculiarity about the mental powers, that not only is the entire mind capable of being thus benefited and improved, but each distinct faculty, and each distinct capacity, may be by this means ameliorated; and each of them is moreover qualified to receive its own distinct, particular, and individual discipline, and cultivation, either natural or artificial, independent of all the others, and in the way especially adapted for it.⁶ The body has but one inlet for food, and each particle that it consumes contributes alike to the nutriment of the whole frame, and to no one portion of it independent of the other. In the case of the mind, however, each capacity constitutes, as it were, a distinct organ for digesting that share of the intellectual nutriment with which it is especially fitted to deal; and draws from it, and absorbs into its own system alone, whatever it so imbibes, however the other endowments of the mind may indirectly and eventually derive benefit from the food thus obtained.⁷

Moreover, as it is with material machinery, so is it also with the machinery of the mind, that it rusts and becomes disordered for want of use. By neglect, each capacity loses the power of applying itself efficiently; while by over-exertion, each is worn out and destroyed.

The omission to discipline and cultivate any intellectual capacity, of itself at once occasions a deficiency. Narrow-mindedness, for instance, arises from the neglect to develop the capacity of comprehension; want of refinement from the neglect of taste; general want of accuracy from the neglect of deprehension. But, on the other hand, it is especially to be observed, which all experience proves, that the education of one particular capacity, however extensive, is never of itself productive of any such defect, by injuring or subduing the proper influence of any other. For instance, deprehension, however extensively educated, never leads to narrow-mindedness; nor does the education of comprehension to want of accuracy.

⁶ "Every part of the mind should be brought into its regular exercise, that each may attain an equal strength, and none attain to an ascendancy to the detriment of the rest. When any man uses any part of his mind to the neglect of the other part, the whole degenerates, and there is no longer that perfection of which the human mind is capable."—*Smee. The Mind of Man*, c. vi. p. 45.

⁷ Mr. Smee informed me, during a conference on the subject of the points embraced in the above paragraph with which he was so kind as to favour me, that in his opinion very little is effected in the way of education as to the exercise of the mind. He maintains that both the senses and the memory should be cultivated. As education is now conducted, the whole mind, he says, is not brought equally into play; so that when a man exercises his judgment, he does not do so on all points, and in regard to all its powers.

Each capacity should, however, be educated to the full, and each of them together. And it is only when they are duly and appropriately so trained, that the mind becomes perfectly and systematically developed.

Nevertheless, the higher the faculties and capacities are, the more difficult are they of improvement by artificial education. The understanding, on the other hand, is as a whole, dependent on cultivation of this kind for its development, and can never fructify without such aid. Genius, as a whole, owes but little to artificial cultivation, and develops itself, independent of any assistance of this sort. The understanding is like our corn-fields, which, without tilling, would be barren and produce no grain. Genius is like the wild fruits of the forest, which are independent of tillage, and owe nothing to its efforts, however capable of being in certain respects improved by them. This faculty may be also aided as regards the ends at which it ought to aim, by the co-operation of the other faculties.^s

In the case, however, of each of the faculties, the middle capacity appears to be that which most admits of artificial cultivation. Deprehension owes much more to this kind of cultivation, and is far more capable of being improved by it, than is either apprehension or comprehension; analysis considerably more than sense or judgment; and taste, which alone indeed of the capacities of genius is extensively improvable by cultivation of any kind, than wit or origination.

4. *Education of the Understanding by the Acquisition of Knowledge.*

As the reception of ideas, as has been shown in a previous chapter, is the proper function of the understanding; so its education, and that of each of its constituent capacities, is effected by the acquisition of knowledge of each kind. The understanding is however, in reality, cultivated, and disciplined, and invigorated, not by storing the mind with ideas or information, but by the effort of acquiring them in different modes through the several capacities of this faculty, according to the nature of such particular capacity, corresponding with the particular subject on which it is employed.

This faculty is moreover educated by the acquisition of

^s "From whatever source the creative power of genius is derived, it is capable of being *improved* by culture; and in its highest exercise it is directed by *knowledge* acquired by study, and disciplined by *judgment* based on extended experience."—*Dr. Carpenter. Mental Physiology*, p. 509.

knowledge, whether the ideas which it obtains be received from books, such as artificial education consists in, or from surveying the objects themselves, in which mainly consists natural education, both as regards the cultivation that this faculty obtains, and the discipline to which it is thus subjected. Knowledge has been remarked to be the light of the soul. In this respect, knowledge through natural education might be compared to the light of the sun, or natural light; and that which we obtain by artificial education, to artificial light, such as is afforded us by lamps and candles, and which, although varying much in its nature according to the material by which the light is supplied—analogueous to the case of artificial education—is as dim and feeble when compared with the light of the sun, as artificial education is when compared with that which is natural. By storing the understanding with ideas, it becomes well furnished with knowledge; although these ideas are actually deposited, not in the understanding itself, but in the memory, which serves as the treasury or storehouse of this faculty. The understanding is, however, able, having so imbibed these ideas, to recall them from the memory; and possesses, when it has once received them, the ability to summon them to its service at its will, and continues to be constantly nurtured by them. Hence, it results that by storing the understanding with ideas, it not only becomes enriched, but is able to turn its riches to account.

Where the communication of knowledge is the branch of education aimed at, it is of great importance not only to supply actual facts, but to supply them by real objects, the remembrance of which is far better retained, than is the narration of events relating to them.⁹ It is this circumstance that occasions diagrams and experiments to be so useful in the illustration of lectures,—without which, indeed, lectures are very inefficient substitutes for books. And more especially, it is peculiarly this which renders foreign travel so essentially serviceable in the promotion of education, more particularly of that kind of it which aims to store the mind with information.

Education of the understanding consists therefore, in disciplining the different capacities of this faculty in the exercise of acquiring knowledge, in cultivating them by the nutriment which they derive from such knowledge, and in storing the mind with ideas. As the understanding itself, and each of its capacities, is improved by the acquisition of knowledge; so from the neglect thus to educate the understanding, it sustains

⁹ "If England desires to rival Germany, she must do as Germany does, by teaching her sons and daughters a knowledge of natural objects before they study the abstract sciences at our great universities."—*Smee. Mind of Man*, c. v. p. 36.

injury, not only from the actual want of ideas, but from the debility and deterioration which such neglect directly occasions. Soil which is wholly uncultivated is not merely devoid of vegetation, but is of itself unfitted for its growth. So a grossly ignorant person is not only wanting in knowledge, but his mind is also debased and enfeebled. The understanding is, moreover, disciplined by the restraint to which it is subjected in obtaining knowledge, from its attention being fixed, and from the capacity so employed being constrained to pursue a direct course to the end of the allotted task.

Disciplining the capacities of the understanding to perceive ideas correctly, without which they cannot be rightly received, is analogous to disciplining the eye to view objects accurately, without which no true sensations from such objects can be communicated.

The efficiency with which the education of the understanding is attained, must moreover necessarily greatly depend on the correctness with which the reception of ideas, by whichever capacity, is accomplished. Our perceptions ought to be alike ready, clear, and adequate, in order to our obtaining due knowledge of each subject. Unless the intellectual food is duly masticated and digested, but little nutriment from it is derived. And this should be a leading object in mental discipline.

By the reception of knowledge according to its kind, is each particular capacity of the understanding both disciplined and cultivated according to its adaptation. As already pointed out in a former section, the kind of education best fitted for apprehension, is that which is natural, which qualifies it both for receiving ideas of, and for describing with readiness and facility, different common subjects, whether this is effected by speaking or by writing. This sort of education, however, although very valuable, and indeed essential, is but little resorted to systematically. The experience of daily life, for which also this exercise should completely prepare us, is the best mode of perfecting this capacity; and which in order to render it efficient and complete, should be fully carried out, although in such a way as not to render it artificial.

There seems to be no satisfactory reason, indeed, why the development of apprehension, which is a matter of very considerable importance, and which is accomplished mainly and directly by natural education—and indeed why natural education generally,—should not be rendered as essential a portion of the regular instructory course pursued in every educational institution, as that of analysis, or of any other of the capacities of the mind. By the acquisition of ordinary ideas of common objects, the apprehension both gains facility in obtaining

such ideas, and is itself improved through their reception, drawing from them its nutriment as it were, by which this capacity is invigorated, and its development is promoted. Our powers of general observation, which we owe to the capacity of apprehension, become greatly increased by exercise, alike through the practice acquired thereby, and the experience that is thus gained.

The description of education best adapted for the capacity of apprehension, is that which is artificial, by which means it is trained to give an exact and minute description of any subject, as also to receive ideas of it of this quality. The exercise which of all others is probably mainly fitted to discipline this capacity for this purpose, is that of arithmetic, which is the most precise and exact of all pursuits. Learning a language is also an exercise well adapted for this purpose. Apprehension receives in general a certain amount of cultivation, indirect perhaps rather than direct, casual rather than systematic, and practical rather than actually perfect. It occasionally also comes in for a share of this by chance, owing to its alliance with, and essential service to the capacity of analysis.¹ Apprehension is moreover indirectly educated through the artificial education of, and the artificial efforts made to strengthen, the memory.

For the development of the capacity of comprehension, an education of a mixed kind, partly natural, and partly artificial, appears best fitted. This capacity is exercised and perfected by the act of taking a comprehensive and enlarged view of any subject, and affording a description of it, either by speaking or writing. The study of history is that which mainly conduces to a habit of this sort. And while engaged in this pursuit, it is serviceable for the cultivation of this capacity, to mark well the leading points for consideration to be embraced, and which constitute the prominent features in the events under our notice. Indeed, whatever tends to the enlargement and expansion of the mind, is effected by the education of the comprehension, either natural or artificial. Foreign travel is, consequently, one of the most efficient modes of the natural education of this capacity, both as regards its discipline and cultivation, but more especially the latter, although it is essentially and extensively disciplined as well as cultivated by this means.² No regular, complete, or systematic plan for the education in any way of this important capacity has however been devised, nor has the necessity for it been pointed out. As a whole, the faculty of understanding is, as already observed,

¹ *Vide ante*, c. ii. s. 3, p. 228.

² "Travel in the younger sort is a part of education."—*Lord Bacon. Essays*, xix.

not only that which is the most susceptible of education, but it is also the faculty most dependent upon this for its development and improvement.

But even language, which is the grand instrument of intellectual artificial education, more especially as regards the understanding, and the general medium of mental communication between mind and mind, has not only its defects, as already pointed out,³ but those defects have a deteriorating influence characteristic of, and inseparable from, this indispensable resort.⁴ Language, too, is ever fluctuating in its idiom and its form,⁵ so that the language of the people of one age, is unintelligible to those of another; and those words which are the most definite and exact, in the course of a generation or two change their meaning entirely.⁶

The acquisition of a general, accurate, and extensive knowledge of facts, is therefore the especial province, and the main employment, of the faculty of understanding.

That part of education which relates to the storing of the mind with ideas, and the cultivation of the understanding, should be so contrived as that not only the mind be enriched with knowledge,—ideas constituting as it were the coinage of the soul,—but that that knowledge be such as will naturally tend to fructify, and lead on to the acquisition of more knowledge. The ground should not merely be well tilled, and abundantly sown; but the seed ought to be such as will germinate extensively, and in its turn produce more. An acquisition of a knowledge of the elementary rudiments and outlines of any subject, which will both adapt, and also lead on, the mind at its leisure to follow up such a matter in detail, is of great use on this account.⁷

Education is, indeed, as regards its general results, and the advantages that it secures, closely analogous to learning a lan-

³ *Vide ante*, b. iii. c. ii. s. 8, p. 256.

⁴ "It is not too much to say that half the vast defect of language as a method of utterance, and half the vast defect of thought as determined by the influence of language, are due to the fact that speech is a scheme worked out by the rough and ready application of material metaphor and imperfect analogy, in ways befitting rather the barbaric education of those who formed it, than our own."—*Burnett Tylor. Primitive Culture*, vol. ii. c. xix. pp. 403, 404.

⁵ As *Mr. Hyde Clarke* has well remarked:—"The shape of man keeps the same for thousands of years; the Negro, the Arab, or the Nubian, as drawn on the Pyramids, is he of this day; but the speech of man is ever shifting; and writers, however skilful, however great, however mighty, will be left behind, while the swelling tide bears on."—*Grammar of the English Tongue*, p. 5.

⁶ "Barbaric philosophy retains as real, what civilized language has reduced to simile."—*Burnett Tylor. Primitive Culture*, v. ii. c. xix. p. 166.

⁷ *Locke* recommends a general knowledge of matters beyond our immediate concern, to enlarge and liberalize the mind.—*Conduct of Understanding*, s. 19.

guage which we did not before understand. The circumstance of becoming acquainted with this new language confers no actual power upon us, and of itself affords us no information which we did not before possess; but it supplies us with the means of exerting our minds, and of constantly obtaining knowledge by inquiry, and by reading. As a man who is ignorant of the language spoken by a people of whose sentiments he desires to gain an acquaintance, is utterly lost, and in the dark; so a person without education is unable to pursue his researches after knowledge generally, because he has not the means and appliances by which to take it in.

A soul starved for want of knowledge, is closely analogous to a famished body; and a soul which is too weak to receive, or to imbibe information from the knowledge that it receives, nearly resembles a body wasted by sickness. And as in the case of the body, there is no sign more surely indicative of a healthful condition, than the excitement of a good appetite for food; so in the case of the soul, there is nothing which more clearly evinces a healthy state, than hunger after knowledge, the food of the soul. Nevertheless, in the case both of body and soul, this hunger, in order to be healthful, should be moderate, and well regulated; not too craving, on the one hand, and yet sufficiently vigorous, on the other; such as to excite a strong stimulant for wholesome food, and derive a hearty satisfaction, as well as nutriment, from it when it is imbibed.

The mental appetite in infants, is quite as keen as that which is material. What is that ceaseless and uncontrollable restlessness observable in all young children alike, turning their eyes in every direction, staring eagerly and earnestly at each fresh object, and feeling and examining each article with which they come in contact; but a proof of the ardent hunger of their minds to take in knowledge of every description, as the opportunity offers, and to inform themselves of whatever they can that presents itself to their notice?⁸

The capacities of the understanding appear to be on the whole more dependent upon cultivation than they are upon discipline, for their improvement; although both alike are necessary to be pursued, and both conduce extensively to the growth and development of this faculty.

5. *Education of the Reason by the Investigation of Science.*

As the comparison of ideas one with another, has already been shown to be the proper function of the reason; so its education,

⁸ *Vide ante*, b. iii. c. i. s. 10, p. 216, note.

and that of each of its constituent capacities, is most fully and completely effected by the investigation of science of different kinds.

The reason is however essentially cultivated, and improved, and invigorated, not by the quantity of arguments or of conclusions that are stored up in the mind; but by the exercise of reasoning upon different subjects in various modes, through the several capacities of this faculty, according to the nature of such capacity, corresponding with the particular topic upon which it is employed.

By this pursuit, each capacity of this faculty is both disciplined and cultivated, and it derives from this exercise its nutriment, as it were; so that the more it engages itself in this study, the more vigorous, and the more completely developed, do its powers become. In proportion as the reason is perfected, the greater is the facility, dexterity, and efficiency, with which it compares ideas one with another; and the more certain and precise are the conclusions that it draws therefrom. The neglect to educate the faculty of reason, is correspondingly injurious in its consequences with the neglect of the understanding. From such want of education, the reason is enfeebled, and is unfitted efficiently to exert itself when the occasion arises.

Education of the reason consists, therefore, in the discipline to which each of the capacities of this faculty are subjected through the process of reasoning upon, or comparing ideas one with another, in different modes, as hereafter pointed out, and according to the particular capacity employed. In consequence of the restraint to which every capacity is then subjected, great pain and labour are often experienced, and the severest exercises are imposed. Education of this kind is further promoted by the cultivation that each capacity receives, through the nutriment imbibed from the ideas with which it thus deals.

In the case, moreover, of the reason, correspondingly with what has been observed of the efforts of the understanding, it should be so disciplined as that the comparisons which it makes of ideas, by whatever capacity effected, be complete and perfect, so far as the *data* for such comparisons extend, and the precise nature and degree of the difference between them be fully and clearly perceived, corresponding with the characteristic adaptation of such capacity; in which consists the act of drawing a conclusion from an argument, by whichever of these powers it is accomplished, although this has been pointed out to be the ordinary and legitimate province of judgment.⁹ Judgment however draws conclusions from comparisons as well as ideas. Sense and analysis draw them mainly, though not solely, from ideas.

⁹ *Vide ante*, b. iii. c. iii s. 4, p. 279.

The reason is educated by the investigation of science, whether the ideas it compares be those obtained from the study of scientific treatises, or from experimentalizing upon material objects themselves; and both as regards its cultivation and its discipline.¹

Science indeed thus considered, consists in ascertaining the real relation of different subjects and substances, or their ideas, one to another; and the actual extent and essential nature, so far as our faculties and capacities, or any of them, serve for this purpose, of their agreement and disagreement. Of this study, philosophy forms a branch; and although but a branch, yet doubtless the highest and the most important.

In the pursuit of philosophical reasoning or investigation, we include the process of reasoning upon our own being and nature, and upon that of other beings, with respect to their properties and qualities; and also as regards our duty as social and moral creatures, who are looking forward to another state after this life is ended, and for which it is but preparatory. The study of philosophy, may be therefore aptly divided into two principal branches. 1. That by which we reason concerning the qualities and properties of beings and objects of different kinds, and through which we discover in what manner they are constituted, or exist, or may be applied for our use; such as is included in natural, metaphysical, and experimental philosophy. And, 2. That by which we reason concerning the nature of our moral and social relations, and the duties that we owe both to our Creator, and to mankind; or moral philosophy.

From what has been remarked in the present, and in preceding chapters, it may therefore be concluded that with regard to the faculty of reason, as is also the case in that of understanding, their different constituent capacities are principally exercised, and in the case of each, both its discipline and cultivation are effected, by different branches of study. For the capacity of sense, education which is natural appears to be best adapted. This capacity is therefore exerted and is cultivated by the act of comparing ideas respecting, and in dealing with and deciding upon, the common affairs of, daily life,² concerning which a determination as regards our course of operation has at once and unhesitatingly to be made, on a general and superficial survey of them; and which is accomplished by comparing together ideas relating to matters of an ordinary kind. The conduct of every-day transactions affords the best exercise for this capacity; and the more we are occupied in the business of the world about us, the more fitly is it developed and educated.

¹ "Not only for intellectual discipline is science the best, but also for moral discipline."—*Herbert Spencer. Education, c. i.*

² *Vide ante, b. iii. c. iii. s. 2, p. 274.*

Artificial education is but little adapted and little required for this capacity, for which that which is natural is both the most efficient, and for which abundant and ready and frequent opportunities are offered. Sound precepts may possibly be serviceable for this end, although but little, if anything has been attempted in this way, and that only partially. These would moreover appertain strictly to that branch of education which is artificial.

For the capacity of analysis, education which is artificial appears best and peculiarly adapted, and is preferable to that which is natural. Such education consists in mathematical and logical exercises, by which this capacity is trained to compare together with the utmost precision, clearness, acuteness, and distinctness, the particular and minute ideas of any subject of a nice, and subtle, and precise quality, corresponding with the character of this capacity.³ For this capacity therefore a direct and complete system of education has been supplied.

The capacity of judgment is perfected by an education of a mixed character, which is partly artificial and partly natural. It is exercised in reasoning respecting matters of an enlarged and comprehensive character; in comparing one with another, so as to draw complete and adequate conclusions from them, the principal and most important ideas of any subject, of a vast and extended nature;⁴ and in adducing arguments of this class in controversy, as also in summing up the different arguments that have been urged on both sides, and in drawing a conclusion therefrom. Cultivation of this capacity is directly effected by the study of the reasoning adduced during an important debate or trial, and more especially by noting down as we proceed the points of most weight on each side that might be adduced, and those which have been, or appear to be, omitted.

While direct education of analysis is the most frequently resorted to, that of judgment is but very seldom availed of as a systematic and practical branch of education. This is much to be regretted, especially as regards the training of those who are intended for forensic or senatorial life.

In the case of each of the studies by which the reason, or either of its capacities, is educated; the discipline that accompanies the cultivation, which is quite independent of it, is as valuable, and as essential, for the perfect development of our intellectual constitution, as is the latter. The capacities of reason, indeed, on the whole, unlike those of the understanding, owe more to discipline, and admit more extensively of this, than they do of cultivation. Both however are essential to this faculty.

³ *Vide ante*, c. iii. s. 3, p. 277.

⁴ *Vide ante*, c. iii. s. 4, p. 279.

6. *Education of Genius by the study of Art.*

As the compounding together of ideas has been shown to be the proper function of the faculty of genius, so the discipline and cultivation of this faculty, and of each of its constituent capacities, is effected by the study of art of each kind; as has, indeed, already been pointed out when considering the nature of this faculty. Genius is however, essentially and really educated, and improved, and invigorated, not by the amount of ideas of this character with which the mind is stored; but, corresponding with the case of the other faculties and capacities, by the exercise of combining together different ideas in various modes, through the several capacities of this faculty, according to the nature of such capacity, and of the particular subject on which it is employed.

The capacities of genius, although not equally with those of the other faculties, are improvable by the education bestowed upon them, and are each more or less dependent upon this proceeding for their invigoration and development. Thus, wit is sharpened and enlivened by exercise; and taste improves perceptibly, both in keenness and refinement, as it receives the discipline and cultivation proper for it; while origination is strengthened, and its powers are increased, by use. According indeed as it obtains this requirement, and as the nutriment supplied to it is wholesome and suitable, will be the growth of this faculty; and it will compound together ideas with greater force, dexterity, and efficiency, proportionably as it is thus developed by education.

As genius is improvable by education, so it suffers correspondingly from neglect; through which not only is the nutriment derivable to the whole mind lost, but the ability of this faculty to exercise itself efficiently is much weakened.

Education of the faculty of genius, consists therefore in the discipline to which each of the capacities of this faculty are subjected through the process of combining ideas; and in the cultivation which they also receive by this means, through the ideas so availed of. Genius is consequently educated by the study of tasteful and imaginative pursuits, whether the ideas applied be derived from the beauties of art, or from those of works of nature, both which render corresponding ideas alike as regards its discipline and its cultivation. By efforts of this kind, the mind is indeed effectively disciplined, as well as extensively cultivated; and thereby much invigorated as well as refined.⁵

⁵ "We ought to spare no pains to educate our souls to grandeur, and to impregnate them, as it were, with generous and enlarged ideas."—*Longinus on the Sublime*, pt. i. s. 9.

In genius, as in the other intellectual faculties, as we have already seen, its different constituent capacities are each peculiarly fitted for certain particular branches of the study for which the faculty itself is generally applied, and by exercise in which its education is effected.

For the capacity of wit, the only education adapted to improve it, is that which is natural, and which consists in exercising it on suitable opportunities. Artificial education is promoted by reading the best examples of efforts of this description, and by endeavouring to effect compositions in the same style; expertness in which may be useful to those who enter largely into controversial disputation, and who are extensively endowed with the capacity in question. But education of this kind, has scarcely, if at all, been systematically attempted.

Taste is mainly educated by artificial appliances, such as the study of the most perfect examples, whether in poetry, painting, or some other of the Arts, and by endeavouring to produce works of this character. Viewing beautiful scenes in nature, in which consists the natural education of this capacity, is also very desirable. For the natural cultivation of taste, a ready opportunity is indeed afforded in pointing out the charms of nature, especially as regards scenery, and flowers, and the sights presented by the heavenly bodies, as for instance in the rising and setting of the sun. Such education would moreover be the best preparation for that which is artificial, in the study of works of art, whether in poetry or painting, by which a description of those beauties is successfully attained. Never-

We have nevertheless, been told by one who is at once peculiarly qualified to enter into the subject, and who has had the amplest experience of the matter under discussion, that even "Homer, if read at our public schools, is, and probably must be, read only, or in the main, for his diction and poetry (as commonly understood) even by the most advanced; while to those less forward he is little more than a mechanical instrument for acquiring the beginnings of real familiarity with the Greek tongue and its inflexions"—*Mr. Gladstone on the place of Homer in Education. Oxford Essays*, 1857, p. 13.

Lord Byron once remarked, when alluding to his education at Harrow; "We become tired of studying the Greek and Latin poets before we can comprehend their beauty; their freshness is worn away, and the future pleasure and advantage are deadened and destroyed by the didactic anticipation at an age when we can neither feel nor understand the power of compositions which it requires an acquaintance with life, as well as with Latin and Greek to relish or to reason upon; so that when we are old enough to enjoy them, the taste is gone, and the appetite is faded."

In a paper read before the *British Association for the Advancement of Science*, at their meeting in 1872, by the *Rev. Edward Hale, M.A.*, one of the masters at Eton College, it was remarked that "the system of classical education at last degenerated into the mere teaching of Greek and Latin, or rather of Greek and Latin Grammar, and this, too, not in a scientific manner."—*Report of British Association*, 1872.

See also on this subject *The Theory of the Arts, &c.*, vol. ii. p. 255.

theless, to the education of this capacity, but little general attention is paid, important as it is, and necessary for all. And it is capable of being extensively benefited by this means.

Origination, on the other hand, is a capacity which is incapable of being extensively benefited by education, either natural or artificial, although it is probably improvable as much by one kind as by the other. And this applies to efforts by this capacity, whether inventive or imaginative. The experience and observation of what others have done in this way, and analyzing their proceedings and mode of operation, seems the best kind of artificial education to be resorted to. But little, if any, direct attention to the education of this capacity, has been devoted, or even attempted.

Not only, however, the capacity of origination, but the faculty of genius as a whole, is that which is the least capable of education, at any rate of that which is artificial, and admits of it but to a very limited extent; unless perhaps we except the capacity of taste.

Storing the mind with humorous combinations of ideas, cannot be strictly regarded as cultivation of the capacity of wit; as it is not thereby that the latter capacity is actually exercised, inasmuch as the faculty of understanding which receives these ideas, is that which is actually in such a case exerted.

Nevertheless, if the understanding is well stored, the reason and genius have the full opportunity of exercising and cultivating themselves; but if the understanding is neglected, and is ill-supplied with ideas, reason and genius are necessarily starved. As regards the application of artificial education to origination and wit, they are probably both of them more capable of, and owe much more to discipline than they do to cultivation. They do not admit so much of being actually enlarged, or invigorated, as directed aright; the former of which results in each faculty and capacity is effected by cultivation, the latter by discipline.

Taste, indeed, may doubtless be refined and sharpened by cultivation, and by discipline rendered capable of making its combinations with more nicety and propriety; and still more of discerning and selecting those combinations which have been so made. This capacity owes more to artificial education, than it does to that which is natural.

From the inaptness of genius, in comparison with the other faculties, to receive artificial education, it results that while for those professions and callings in life for the discharge of which the faculties of understanding and reason are required, men may be regularly educated and brought up; for those for which genius alone can qualify them, they must be born. Indeed, although taste may be improved by cultivation, yet this after all can be accomplished but to a very limited extent as com-

pared with what we see in the capacities of understanding, and reason; more especially of deprehension and analysis, which mainly serve for professional and other occupations.

7. *Each particular Capacity should receive its appropriate Education.*

Not only indeed, as already pointed out, is each distinct faculty and capacity of the mind improvable by education, but each is improved in a different, and in a special and peculiar manner; and occasionally even those capacities belonging to the same faculty, vary widely one from another in this respect. Thus, apprehension is thereby rendered more ready in its application, deprehension more minute, and comprehension more extensive in its surveys. Sense by education becomes more sagacious, analysis more acute, and judgment more vigorous. The capacity of wit is made by this means more vivacious, taste more refined, and origination more effective. Consequently, must not only the education of each separate capacity be different to that of the other, but each must have its appropriate and individual mode of education.

In order, moreover, completely to effect the grand object of disciplining and cultivating the mind, and qualifying it duly to exercise its several functions and powers, all these different modes of education should be availed of, and availed of contemporaneously; inasmuch as they not only each conduce to the general improvement of the intellectual faculties, but to aid and further one another.⁶

Hence therefore, not merely each of the intellectual faculties, but each capacity of these faculties, should be both disciplined and cultivated, and should receive its suitable discipline and cultivation. Thus, ought the understanding to be exercised not alone in acquiring knowledge of leading events, and receiving ideas of transactions of importance such as

⁶ I have been favoured with the following interesting and valuable note on this passage by *Mr. Gladstone*, whose eminence alike as a scholar, a statesman, and an orator, peculiarly qualifies him for expressing an opinion upon all matters connected with education; and of the advantages to be derived from which he himself affords so illustrious an example:—

“I am certainly at one with you in the belief that education, in its highest walks, ought to be directed to the proportionate development of all the faculties of the man; and I look back with some regret and longing to the Greeks, who held with such a firm grasp this idea of proportionate and comprehensive training; and I think that the men of the middle ages, and of the transition period before the modern manner, seem to have had more of it than we have.”

general history affords, and for obtaining which the capacity of comprehension peculiarly fits us; but this faculty should be exerted as well in gaining accurate and exact information respecting different matters, such as deprehension adapts us for acquiring; and should also be trained in the habit of general and ready observation of things around us, by which is cultivated and perfected the capacity of apprehension.

In like manner also the reason should be cultivated, and should be disciplined, not only in abstruse acute argument, which many appear to think all-sufficient for the education of this faculty, but which, in reality, serves to develop only one of its capacities, that of analysis; but also in reasoning of a more wide, and enlarged, and comprehensive character, such as I have shown to be effected by the capacity of judgment. The capacity of sense should be equally exercised by habits of examining and arguing upon common and general topics and matters of daily import and occurrence.

So also is it with regard to the faculty of genius, that not only should the taste be disciplined and cultivated, which is, indeed, the only capacity of this faculty towards the improvement of which education ever appears to be in any way directed, and that but very imperfectly; but the capacities of wit and of origination, so far as they are capable of being by this means improved, should be exercised and developed. Probably indeed, the rareness with which these two latter capacities are found to exist in a high degree, and the little practical use which is made of them, are what have mainly contributed to their neglect.

It is from inattention to the rule here laid down,—that each capacity of our intellectual faculties ought to be educated,—that the mistake to which I have alluded of the wrong capacities being applied in the pursuit of different objects and studies, is so prevalent. Hence it is that men fall into gross errors, and appear to be essentially deficient in intellectual endowments; but whose fault consists only in this misapplication of their powers. Thus, as regards the exercise of the faculty of reason, persons from having during the period of their education devoted themselves to the cultivation and discipline of one capacity only of this faculty,—that of analysis,—consider in after life, when they have occasion to resort to their reasoning powers, that this capacity alone is all-sufficient to be exerted; and therefore, when dealing with great and comprehensive subjects of controversy, to which the capacity of judgment ought to be applied, they adopt a narrow and confined mode of reasoning upon it. Or when examining a matter of ordinary general import, which is proper to be examined by the capacity of sense, they deal with it as though it ad-

mitted of strict logical or mathematical proof, resorting solely to the capacity of analysis.⁷

Education of each of the mental capacities, must, it appears, directly result in increasing the power of such capacity in the particular direction to which it naturally tends; as, for instance, education of analysis, in rendering it more acute; education of comprehension, in rendering it more extended; of deprehen-sion, in making it more exact. Indirect as well as direct results, are probably also in each case effected by mental education, such as the general invigoration and enlargement of the whole mind, and consequently of all its faculties and capacities together; in a manner corresponding with what in the general invigoration of the material frame, conduces also to the health and strength of each separate organ.

Something in all these cases, must of course depend on the state of the mental constitution at the period, and its aptness for education, both as regards the nature of the cultivation pursued, and the course that is followed.⁸ From time to time, changes occur both in our material and our mental constitution and condition; and indeed these changes are constantly in operation, if not entirely ceaseless.

These various changes in our condition, more especially as regards our health, and spirits, and feelings, at different periods, are, however, highly favourable to our intellectual and moral development; corresponding with the effect produced upon our planet by the alternate and periodical changes of the seasons. Each dormant feeling and energy is, by this means, in rotation developed. Each weakness, and doubt, and failing, comes thus to be examined. Occasional despondency brings into discussion points of doubt, which at periods of elevation are despised. The trials of poverty test many failings, which in the day of wealth are overlooked.

Nevertheless, the changes which occur in our mental constitution, are no more occasioned by any change in the material

⁷ *The Rev. Dr. Newman*, whose notes on the subject of the exercise of the different faculties and capacities of the mind, and the proper course to be pursued in the education and development of each, have already appeared; * merely remarks in reference to this passage, and its bearing upon the sentiments expressed in those before mentioned, that he entirely concurs in the views here maintained, which seem to him to be "especially apposite and sound."

⁸ *Lord Bacon* observes that "there is a kind of culture of the mind that seemeth yet more accurate and elaborate than the rest, and is built upon this ground, that the minds of all men are sometimes in a state more perfect, and at other times in a state more depraved. The purpose therefore of this practice is, to fix and cherish the good powers of the mind, and to obliterate and take forth the evil."—*Advancement of Learning*, b. ii.

* *Vide ante*, b. iii. c. iii. s. 1, p. 271, s. 7, p. 295.

frame, than the changes of the material frame, are occasioned by changes in the mental constitution. Changes in the constitution of the mind are of a nature entirely differing from any of those which would be produced by material causes; and indeed, the material frame, so far as it could possess any influence in such a case, appears calculated rather to retard than to promote these mutations.

8. *Opposite Tendency of certain Intellectual Pursuits.*

As in passing through a country, different objects which never themselves change, appear to be constantly varying, according as we view them from different points, or under different aspects as regards the light and atmosphere by which they are surrounded; so the same studies, and the same authors, strike the mind, and affect us, very differently at different periods, according to the condition in which we chance to be when contemplating them, and the influence upon our minds of other studies and pursuits, together with the ever-varying frame of mind, intellectual or moral, in which we were temporarily existent. Some men read to enable them to think. But too many read to save themselves from thinking. Reading that sets the mind in action, is wholesome and nutritious. But reading that lulls the mind to torpor, is paralyzing as well as fruitless. Much reading without a corresponding amount of accompanying reflection, is like much eating without digestion; and in both cases the efforts are productive of disorder to the system, while they bring but little nutriment to the frame.

It forms moreover, an extraordinary feature in the character of the mind, that some of the noblest studies which are most calculated to expand the soul, and to invigorate the intellectual faculties by exercise in them, are also those which have had an extensive effect in debasing and narrowing them. This may at first view appear to be a paradox; but experience will prove its truth. The reason of this results from the different manner in which different persons engage in these respective studies. Certain pursuits, which are the most comprehensive, and vast, and noble, that the mind is capable of contemplating, are either viewed in an enlarged manner, and as forming one entire and magnificent system, and thus serve greatly to expand and elevate the mind; or, on the other hand, they are regarded in the narrow survey of one insulated and separate principle, which is erroneously considered as perfect and independent in itself. Thus, with respect to either ethics or jurisprudence, if considered as the grand science, or scheme, by which the conduct of intelli-

gent beings is sought to be regulated; the whole system, when thus extensively and duly contemplated and comprehended, is of a most improving and elevating nature. But if, on the other hand, one trifling principle, or rule of conduct, which may form but a subordinate part of this great subject, be extracted from it, and considered as perfect and independent in itself; then will this study, being pursued upon such narrow principles, be even degrading and paltry, and may tend to limit and narrow, rather than to extend, the capacities of the mind for action. The sublimest of sciences so followed, shrinks forth- with into a trivial and worthless occupation.

So also in the case of astronomy, this study has been from the earliest period in the history of the world, at once the most ennobling and the most degenerating, as regards its effect, both mental and moral, upon mankind. It has conduced at the same time, and in the highest degree, to purify and exalt the mind by the study of celestial objects and pursuits; and to debase it by the superstition which it has engendered. It has raised the soul to heaven by the noble nature of the topics which it has presented for our contemplation; while it has sunk the soul down to hell by the degeneration and fanaticism to which it has given birth. It has proved the parent alike of the sublimest piety, and the most debasing idolatry.

The capacity of comprehension, which is one of the constituents of the faculty of understanding, is that by which a person is enabled to survey adequately, and in the most enlarged manner, a grand system of the nature above alluded to. By judgment he is able to reason amply upon it, and by origination to make new combinations of the ideas which it suggests. Deprehension and analysis should be used for obtaining knowledge of, or examining, parts only, of systems. From a disregard of this principle, arise the errors to which I have alluded. The wrong capacities are employed about subjects, which is the cause either of narrowness or of inaccuracy in the method of treating them, according as the case may be.

What practice can be more erroneous or more unreasonable, than that of attempting to apply to the common rules of life and of society, the abstract principles which are fitted only for mathematical or philosophical investigation? Yet thus do those men act who insist on positive demonstration, where only probable should be demanded; who are wont to exert the capacity of analysis, for purposes for which that of sense alone is adapted.

9. *Development and Invigoration of the Mind, dependent upon Discipline and Cultivation.*

The main, and indeed the essential end of education, is to perfect the development and exertion of the various endowments and powers which nature has given to us; invigorating those which are useful, correcting and directing, and in some cases even subduing, those which require such treatment. The application of our capabilities and resources of action, is to be considered in a twofold sense: as regards the benefit to be derived to ourselves, and as regards the benefit to be derived to others,—to civil society, and the world at large of which we are members;—and in return for which we have a right to expect the same advantage from others, and from society generally, that we render to them.

In the case of military organization, the aim appears to be to gain force material, by diminishing that which is mental. We deprive the individuals thus disciplined, of all power of self-control and exercise of judgment, in order to render them in the aggregate the ready agents or instruments of one single mind. To make man greater materially, we reduce him from a mental being to a mere machine. Armies, composed of legions of thinking and reasoning men, become, as it were, the body to the one soul who directs their operations. And the more completely by discipline this degradation and dementalization of the mass is accomplished, the more perfect and the more powerful are its action and prowess for all the purposes of its existence as an army.

According to Themistocles, the grandest achievement of human effort, is to make a small nation into a great one. Possibly it may be a more difficult matter still, to turn a small man into a great one; one of small mind and capacities, into one of great parts and powers. Education may do much, but it cannot make. It can only modify and amend; and is no more able to manufacture a wise man out of a fool, than it is to turn a man into a woman.⁹

Discipline and cultivation are to the mind, what exercise and proper nutriment are to the material frame. Although not essential to its actual existence, they are absolutely necessary to its vigour, and health, and growth.¹ Unless the mind receives its

⁹ It is a remark of *Lord Bacon* that nature is often hidden, sometimes overcome, seldom extinguished. And that a man's nature runs either to herbs or to weeds.—*Essays*, xxxviii.

¹ “*Mutatis mutandis*, all the governing principles, requirements, and activities of the soul and the body with regard to nourishment, are the same.”—*Grindon on Life*, c. xvi. p. 192 (third edit.).

appropriate education, and obtains due development, it runs to weed, as it were, and becomes enfeebled and deteriorated.²

As in the case of material, so in that of mental nutriment, something depends on the quality of the food itself, and something on the condition of the frame which is to imbibe and turn to account that food. Some food is adapted for one frame, and some for another; and the same food is not always adapted for the same frame under whatever circumstances it may be placed. That which is wholesome to one frame, may be poison to another; and what is salutary at one particular time, at another period may be very deleterious.

One of the principal advantages which the mind derives from education, and from a proper exercise of its faculties, is that it not only becomes stored with ideas, but that thereby it becomes more powerful and flexible, and better fitted for action; and that thus the individual obtains the opportunity for making constant improvements as regards his mental acquirements, and is enabled both to retain with more facility the knowledge that he gains, and also to use it more advantageously. Thus, also, the mind is adapted to improve itself constantly by reflection and continual communing within itself, which that of an uncultivated person is much limited in doing, especially as regards subjects of a scientific character. With respect however to certain degrees of knowledge, such as that of general objects in nature, and the common affairs of life, each person in a civilized community will probably obtain a tolerably correct acquaintance with these matters by means of what I have denominated natural education; and thus, without what is technically termed education, that is, artificial discipline and cultivation, or a great degree of it, his mind will be to a certain extent stored with ideas by observation and conversation. The higher branches of knowledge, and the ability to follow pursuits of an abstract and abstruse nature, such as society in a highly civilized and artificial state engenders, are those for which it is more especially the province of artificial education to adapt us. The importance, nevertheless, of what may be not unaptly termed natural education, and that as regards both discipline and cultivation, is very considerable; and is perhaps never more fully evinced than by the difference which is manifested between children who are brought up among others, as at a public school, where they imbibe a great variety of ideas independent of books, their habits are disciplined, and their faculties are developed; and those whose early days are passed in their own family, secluded from the familiar

² "Nobody knows what strength of parts he has till he has tried them. And of the understanding one may most truly say, that its force is greater generally than it thinks, till it is put to it. '*Viresque acquirit eundo.*'"—Locke. *Conduct of the Understanding*, s. 39.

companionship of several others of the same age, so that their minds are seldom, if ever, actively stimulated.

From the advantages which the mind directly derives through education, it is evident that it is imbued with an inherent natural tendency to advance in the career of improvement. By this means, and by placing the individual in a position where he will have the opportunity of associating with persons of cultivated minds, and of a high tone of character, a sort of healthy mental and moral atmosphere is created around him. There is, indeed, as already remarked, a mental and moral, as well as a material atmosphere.³ And as the latter is composed of various ingredients, and affects the condition of those who live in it, and inhale it, in several ways; so the mind, in a corresponding manner, is affected by the mental and moral atmosphere by which it is surrounded, and which consists in, or is the product of, the conversation, and tone of sentiment, and feeling, and manners, of those among whom we live, and with whom we associate. And as our material frames and organs vary greatly in health, and vigour, and activity, according to the material atmosphere by which they are encompassed; so, in a corresponding manner, is the health of our spiritual being more or less dependent upon the mental and moral atmosphere in which it exists.

Exercise is, moreover, as essential to the mind as it is to the body, alike to develope its functions, and to preserve it in health. And not only general exercise, but that of each of its faculties and capacities, should be resorted to. Indeed, a large portion of the diseases, both mental and bodily, which we experience, are occasioned by want of exercise, and from not taking it moderately and regularly, so as to excite each member to activity.⁴

The effects that are produced upon the mind by education, in increasing its store of ideas, and enlarging its capacities for exertion, are retained even long after the studies which occasioned them have been obliterated from the memory. Thus it is with the food that we eat, which serves to nourish and strengthen us, and is soon absorbed, or carried away in the usual course of nature, ceasing to have connexion with our frames; but the beneficial result of which we nevertheless continue to experience for some time after. Hence we

³ "Dirty air is the source of incomparably greater evils than dirty water. The temper of a public meeting is often influenced by the condition of the air which it is breathing. To talk of a 'moral atmosphere' is not altogether a figure of speech."—*Grindon on Life*, c. v. p. 61 (third edit.).

⁴ "As it is in the body, so is it not in the mind; practice makes it what it is, and most even of those excellences which are looked on as natural endowments, will be found, when examined into more narrowly, to be the product of exercise, and to be raised to that pitch only by repeated actions."—*Locke. Conduct of the Understanding*, s. 4.

discern the futility of the argument used against the practice of studying the ancient classics, and many branches of learning, in our youth, on the ground that it is not intended that we should follow them up during our later years, and that they will become obliterated from our minds; for although they may be altogether forgotten, and no traces of them appear to be left behind, yet the effects they produced still remain uneffaced, and continue through life.⁵ An education well grounded endures for ever, and might be compared to the massive foundations on which were erected those splendid and during structures, the cathedrals and castles of the middle ages; in the case of which, although those foundations themselves are sunk deep into the ground, and may never meet the eye, yet the solidity and firmness which they impart to the entire fabric, continue so long as the mighty edifice itself rears its stately proportions, and render it a never-failing support, alike through the turmoils of earth, and the tempests of heaven, and remain when the walls which they uphold are mantled with ivy, and the lapse of centuries has crowned their venerable heads with glory.

Nor is the advancement of any one in mental improvement, by any means necessarily the less sure, or even the less rapid, because it is imperceptible to the individual himself in whom it takes place. The universe around us, and the great world in which we live, are ever in motion, and progressing rapidly onward through their respective spheres, although their course to us is wholly invisible.

The growth and development of the mind are, indeed, very similar to the growth and development of vegetation. This is not only true as regards the general expansion, and the increase of strength, which are observable during the progress of each; but is more peculiarly striking in the essential change which also in the case of both occurs in the very nature of the being, which, at first tender and susceptible, gradually acquires firmness and vigour, and imbibes in its career a series of qualities to which, during its infancy, it was entirely a stranger.

Nor is it impossible that something analogous to what we are told takes place in the soul of man as regards his religious condition, may occur as regards his intellectual state also, according as his intellectual growth and advancement proceed; when the mind first becomes opened to the importance of mental cultivation, sensual pursuits lose their attraction and their influence, and are superseded by the desire after knowledge which the soul acquires as its development proceeds.

⁵ *Professor C. J. Plumptre* writes as follows in relation to this paragraph: "I am thoroughly of opinion with regard to this passage, that the effects produced upon the mind by education, leave an influence that is often of an unconscious character as regards the individual, and yet is permanent throughout life in its effects."

Whether the mind does actually, after a certain period of our existence, become formed and fixed, or obtain a peculiar bias, and to what extent this is the case, might constitute a subject for extensive inquiry, alike interesting and instructive. We know indeed that the organs of the senses very gradually arrive at maturity; and we also observe that intellectual habits and tastes are most easily imbibed during childhood: but whether after this period such habits can be acquired, or to what extent, appears to be in many respects doubtful.⁶ As I have several times observed, there is in many points a very close analogy between the constitution and workings of the mind, and those of the body. In the body, we see one part affording protection to, and aiding the functions and purposes of another. The body during infancy is also wonderfully guarded against the numerous injuries to which it would be liable, by the large supply of soft elastic flesh with which the frame is covered. So also in the constitution of the mind, we discern that the various emotions, and appetites, and passions, many of which might appear to be productive only of evil, all have their use, and answer their purposes in our medial, moral, and mental being, which we ought not to consider less perfectly formed than our bodily frames. In infancy too, the simplicity of mind which children possess, is often preventive of deep moral injury; and the vivacity of spirit with which they are endowed, bears them up under the pains and vexations to which they are necessarily subjected.⁷

An individual who had altogether neglected the cultivation of his mind as regards the study of abstruse branches of learning, until he had reached mature age, would find it very difficult, if not impossible, to apply his faculties to those studies

⁶ In relation to the points embraced by this paragraph, *Professor Huxley* writes to me as follows:—"That the mental faculties become less flexible with age, is a matter of experience; but that there is anything to be called a settled formation or determination of the mind, so long as the brain is healthy, in any other sense than that in which such a proposition holds good for all periods of life, is not clear to me."

Discussing the several matters alluded to in the same passage with *Mr. Smee*, he tells me that he considers that the mind after a certain period is worn out. At different ages different capacities are in full vigour, and capable of being advantageously exercised. He is also of opinion that we are unable to educate the senses when the period of mature age has arrived. And he remarks that of all the powers, the senses are cultivated the earliest, and become the earliest developed. The boy, he observes, has less power at fifteen than in mature age. The judgment he deems to be perfect about fifty. It begins then to decay.

On this head may advantageously be consulted the ingenious and explicit diagram to be found at p. 32 of *Mr. Smee's* valuable work on *The Mind of Man*, already several times referred to in these pages.

⁷ *Professor Huxley* observes that "in the individual man, consciousness grows from a dim glimmer to its full light, whether we consider the infant advancing in years, or the adult emerging from slumber and swoon."

in such a manner as to bring his mind to a high state of discipline and cultivation. One who had exercised his faculties generally by pursuits of different kinds, so as to have obtained a moderate state of mental cultivation, and who at such a period should attempt to apply his talents to a branch of study which he had never before embraced, might discover a difficulty in directing the mind to this new path; although, as it was well trained by general exercise, the task would be far less irksome than to the former person, and the pursuit of any branch connected with that to which his mind had been inured, would be attended with but little pain. The difficulty to such a person in following a branch altogether new, appears to be caused by the unaccustomedness of the mind to receive ideas of the quality attempted to be introduced to it; and also, as a consequence, of the intellectual faculty to exercise itself upon such ideas, with facility and vigour.⁸ It therefore seems that, as the body attains maturity, the mind also, and the intellectual faculties, in an analogous manner, attain a degree of solidity, and becomes less flexible and docile. The memory also at an early period, as has already been shown, is much more capable of cultivation and improvement than it is when we have reached a mature age.¹

Advantageous however as cultivation undoubtedly is for the general improvement and development of the being subjected to it, mental, moral, medial, and material also: yet as the mental and moral powers are sharpened and invigorated, while the physical powers are weakened by education and civilization; so although man as a whole, is improved, animals are deteriorated by the training to which they have to submit during domestication. In the case of animals indeed, domestication is not civilization, but is, in many respects, the very opposite to it; inasmuch as while civilization consists in the complete development of the powers of the being to which it is applied, domestication, in the case of animals, has the direct effect of weakening the most important of their powers, their instinctive endowments.² Domestication is, in fact, in its results, analogous rather to luxury than to civilization in the case of man. The education of animals, so far as training them to make them subservient to our purposes, and useful to our ends, already adverted to,³ extends; does not by any means, and in any way,

⁸ *Mr. Grindon* tells us that "a man may learn a language or a science after he is grown up, but he cannot then learn to love nature."—*Life*. c. xv. p. 186 (3rd edit.). From this we may conclude that it is more difficult to attempt to commence late in life natural education, than that which is artificial. Nevertheless, natural education a person will commence early of his own accord.

¹ *Vide ante*, c. v. s. 7, p. 385.

² *Vide ante*, *Prel. Diss.* s. x. a. 2, vol. i. p. 197.

³ *Ante*, s. 2, p. 459.

add to their natural powers or endowments, or develope or improve their instinctive resources, however it may increase the value of these creatures to us as articles of domestic convenience.

10. *Mental Disease, its Essence, Source, and Development.*

From the foregoing considerations with regard to the discipline and cultivation of the intellectual faculties, we are led to infer that were their nature and qualities, and those of the mind in general, more perfectly understood; the education of them might be directed, and their vigour and health promoted and preserved, by appliances as sure and certain as those by which the welfare and regulation of the body are now provided for. A very cursory examination of the mind will serve to inform us that diseases exist in this being as well as in the body;⁴ and that for many of these intellectual disorders, specific remedies might be discovered, seems equally certain.⁵

It may perhaps, however, be contended that, if the mind is spiritual in its essence, it cannot be subject to disease, which is a condition appertaining to material and organized beings and structures only. But if the mind, although spiritual, is subject

⁴ Mental disease, according to *Zeno*, arises from the mind being indisposed through the passions.—*Laert.*

"The disease of the soul is folly, or a privation of intellect, and there are two kinds of folly; the one madness, the other ignorance. Whatever passion, therefore, a person experiences that induces either of them, must be called a disease. Excessive pleasures and pains, however, are what we should deem the greatest diseases of the soul."—*Plato. Timæus.* lxviii.

Cicero tells us that "there are more disorders of the mind than of the body, for the generality, and of a more dangerous nature."—*Tuscul. Disp. On Grief of Mind*, ii. And that "the philosophers called all perturbations of the soul diseases."—*Ibid.* iv. He also contends that "as distemper and sickness are bred in the body from the corruption of the blood, and the too great abundance of phlegm and bile; so the mind is deprived of its health, and disordered with sickness, from a confusion of depraved opinions, that are in opposition to one another."—*Ibid. On Perturbations of Mind*, x. And he observes that, "although the mind when in perfect health may be visited by sickness, as the body may, yet the body may be disordered without our fault, but the mind cannot."—*Ibid.* xiv.

Lord Bacon defines the diseases and infirmities of the mind, to be the perturbations and distempers of the affections.—*Advancement of Learning*, b. ii.

"There are several weaknesses and defects in the understanding, either from the natural temper of the mind, or ill habits taken up, which hinder it in its progress to knowledge. Of these there are as many possibly, to be found, if the mind were thoroughly studied, as there are diseases of the body."—*Locke. Conduct of the Understanding*, xii.

⁵ Philosophy is termed by *Cicero* the medicine of the soul.—*Tusc. Disp. On Grief of Mind*, iii., xxxiv.

to change, it must be sometimes in a superior, sometimes in an inferior condition to its ordinary state. And if, in addition to this, it is capable of experiencing emotions of pain and pleasure; then must it be fully capable of experiencing disease, which is but a state of disorder, and of pain, differing from the ordinary condition of such a being, and which is more or less permanent, instead of being merely transient. That mental pain is as real, as perceptible, and as intense as bodily pain, few can doubt; and if the soul is susceptible of pain, surely it is of disease also, of which pain is but the natural manifestation.

It is probable indeed, that neither the mind nor the body, in the case of any individual, are often, if ever, wholly free from disorder and disease of every kind, if narrowly examined.⁶ Most likely too, disease, whether of body or of mind, is the result of some disorder in the action of the powers which we possess, by whatever cause occasioned.⁷ It is frequently, however, difficult to determine, in the case both of physical and mental disease, whether certain occurrences are to be regarded merely as the symptoms, or as the actual producers of, the disease; whether they result from the disease, or are what occasion it; whether they are the efforts of nature to throw off some disorder, or are the operations of the disorder itself working against, and undermining nature.⁸

⁶ *Mr. Smee* however tells me that he thinks there are certain periods when both the mind and the body are wholly free from disease.

⁷ "Each animal has a variety of susceptibilities which admit of a variety of impressions, each impression producing a disposition peculiar to itself. Also every animal has some of these susceptibilities stronger than it has others, out of all which a vast variety of diseases is produced. Each tendency to a peculiar mode of action gives the character of the animal respecting disease."—*John Hunter. Lectures, Works*, vol. i. p. 302.

⁸ *Dr. Richardson* has been kind enough to allow me to consult him on the subject of this paragraph. To one passage in it as it originally stood, he objects, which I have therefore struck out in deference to his opinion, although the views expressed in it appear to be favoured by some medical writers of authority, viz. "Either disease or its seeds, in an incipient or a developed state, will be found lurking in every capacity, and in every member." As regards the general views of *Dr. Richardson* on the points here adverted to, he tells me that he has already expressed himself fully in his address on the science of cure,* to which he refers me accordingly, and where he observes with regard to the supposed natural cure of disease:—"In my way of thinking, the belief has, in the abstract, no basis what-

* *The Science of Cure: An Address delivered before the St. Andrew's Medical Graduates' Association, &c. By B. W. Richardson, M.A., M.D., F.R.S., &c. London: Churchill, 1869.*—The whole of this able, ingenious, and masterly essay ought to be read and considered by every one who takes an interest in the subject to which it relates, either practically or scientifically. This little work indeed should command universal attention alike from the originality of its views, the profundity of its thought, and the eloquence of its style.

In the case both of material and mental disease, it may, moreover, in a corresponding manner, be frequently a point of considerable difficulty to determine where the disorder in such a case begins, and where it ends; whether a certain amount of bodily or mental activity, or sensibility, or irritation, or torpidity, is the actual result of disease, or a manifestation of it, or of a high state of health. The true criterion here appears to be whether nature is perfectly and strictly carrying out her assigned and legitimate operations, essential to the vigour and activity of the system; whether she is exceeding those bounds; or whether she is simply aiming to correct some erroneous operation by efforts beyond her regular and accustomed course.

Not only, moreover, do different animated frames differ from one another as to their relative susceptibility of pain, and the extent to which they respectively experience it; but the same frames do so at different times, and different parts of the frame at all times. And as is the case with some bodies, so is it also with someminds, that certain conditions are more liable than are certain others, both to imbibe, and to be affected by, disease. Various persons are also, in very different ways, liable to be affected by the same malady, both mental and material; as is also the same person at different periods, according to his condition at the time, which may enable him either to resist it altogether, or may occasion him to be affected by it in a particular mode.⁹ Weakness, in the case of each individual, ever exposes him to attacks of this kind; and proper discipline and regulation are both the surest antidotes against attack, and contribute the most to enable him to

ever: by which I mean that nature goes her own way, without putting out any hand to us for our special and particular aid. If nature were a curer, as is supposed, then all diseases were spontaneously curable, and all other curers than herself were impostors. But nature pursues her way with men as regardless of their infirmities as of their powers, her general course being towards some grand and unknown end in which the individual sinks into his true insignificance by the side of the vastness of her structure, work, design." Dr. Richardson further states that he considers that "the term '*vis medicatrix nature*' is an entire misnomer, except it be limited in application to the simple capacity possessed by the organism at given ages, or periods of life, to resist gravitation. I doubt not that much of the confusion of thought which has ever surrounded this theory of a force leading to natural cure, has sprung from the observation of the resistance of youth to shocks from which the advanced in life are unable to survive. Thus, from a general deduction the mind has been led to individual definitions, and what is only true in respect to the value of resistance to attraction at periods when resistance is most active, has been made to appear true in regard to detailed changes occurring from disease within the body; until at length the most fearful structural changes have been posted up as structural cures."

⁹ "Disease can only be the consequence of some unnatural impression which interferes with the natural action of the body, which impression may take place at the very first formation; or original arrangement of the animal, so as to stamp a permanent unnatural action."—*John Hunter. Lectures. Works*, vol. i. p. 299.

withstand it when made. As regards imbibing material disease in general, much depends on the condition of the frame, more especially with respect to its susceptibility to be so affected. A robust constitution will resist both the approach and the inroads of many maladies, to which those of a feeble body fall an easy and a ready prey. So also as regards our spiritual constitution, both mental and moral, a badly or inefficiently disciplined mind, will be affected by, and will fall a prey to many errors and prejudices, which will harmlessly attack the mind that is well disciplined, or in a vigorous condition.

As many of the material diseases with which our frames are affected, and which we retain through life, we imbibed from our nurses, and sucked in with the material nutriment which we drew from their breasts; so is it also with regard to many mental and moral diseases, that we imbibed them from those who were our earliest teachers, and received by contamination from their impure souls, numerous errors and false notions, which a life prolonged to the utmost age of humanity, and devoted to the pursuit of wisdom, may be inefficient wholly to eradicate.

A state of feebleness, whether material or mental, if not the actual seed of many a disease, is at any rate analogous to the condition of tillage which prepares the soil for its growth. And as there is frequently a predisposition to certain bodily diseases, from the constitution and condition of the material frame; so there is no less a predisposition to certain erroneous opinions, from the constitution and condition of the soul. Moreover, as in bodily disease, the effect and vigour of the disorder, and its result and operation on the frame, depend far more on the disorganized or debilitated condition of that frame at the period of attack, than on the vigour and malignity of the disease itself; so is it also, in a corresponding manner, with regard to mental diseases, the ability to encounter which depend far more on the mind being well trained, and duly fortified to resist such an encounter, and well armed by discipline and cultivation to withstand error, than on the peculiar mode or quality of the effort by which the mind is assailed.

Nevertheless, probably in the case both of mind and body, when the malady has once grasped its hold, the more vigorous is the frame in which such disease exists, the more vigorous will be the disease itself. The richer is the soil, the more luxuriant are the weeds that encumber it. The convulsions of a strong man are powerful in proportion to that strength. The prejudices of a vigorous mind, are robust and insurmountable, proportionate to that vigour. Disease however eventually either wears out itself, or the patient that it attacks. This tests most truly and unerringly, which is the strongest of the two. The poor frame achieves the most victories over the disease; but the disease obtains the complete

and final conquest over the frame at last, which results in, and indeed constitutes death.

In the mental constitution, however, although disease is probably even more prevalent than it is in the material frame, this never terminates in death, as the being so attacked is indestructible.

As certain bodily disorders appear to be in reality but the restorative efforts of nature to correct what is amiss in the system, and ought therefore on no account to be checked or counteracted;¹ so certain mental diseases are, in a corresponding manner, but the efforts of the mind to correct its errors, or to amend its defects: and so far from being prevented, ought to be encouraged, and to be enabled to accomplish fully the end at which they are aiming. That which in both cases constitutes the real disease, is not the development of it, but the secret agent that produces the development; and to the extermination of the latter, not of the former, should our endeavours be directed.

Certain persons have contended that every crime proceeds from, and is an evidence, not only of mental disease, but of the existence of insanity itself to a greater or less extent. It appears however, that the commission of crime cannot of itself be said strictly to afford proof of the existence of mental disease, unless the very crime itself be of such a quality as to evince a derangement of the natural system; as for instance, when the crime constitutes an act contrary to, or out of the course of nature.

Some diseases indeed, instead of developing themselves in defects, appear to create new endowments in our mental constitution. The weakening of the body may, in certain cases, give vigour to the mind; or at any rate, weaken the restraint which the former is apt to be continually exercising over the latter. Thus, how often are flashes of genius the result of some physical infirmity. The craziness of the material structure, lets out the glare of the fire which is raging within. So in relation to what was observed about genius being the result of, or in its effects stimulated by, mental disease,² especially that of over-susceptibility in certain of the material organs; may it not be that while such a condition is favourable to the exercise of its operations, probably to the extent of excessive undue over-exertion, the soundness of the mental frame is the true source of its

¹ To the views here expressed, *Dr. Richardson*, during a discussion with him upon it with which he favoured me, tells me that he hesitates to assent; and that he has already given his opinion on the points alluded to in the address quoted from in the present chapter, in which he further lays it down that "to trust to what is called nature, to the omission or neglect of scientific methods for cure, is to forsake the path of duty, and leave to chance that which strictly falls under the exercise of reason."

² *Vide ante*, b. iii. c. iv. s. 9, p. 352.

production.³ In other words, that while a constitution endowed with material and mental health is undoubtedly most advantageous for the existence of talent; bodily disease of a certain kind may most promote its activity and display.

As adversity is wont to bring distant relatives together, so death and disease serve more than anything else, to exhibit the close connexion between animal and vegetable structures and constitutions. Both lose their powers of every kind by death, alike of growth, of imbibing nutrition, of circulating their fluids. And many of the diseases to which plants are subject, are strikingly similar to those with which animal frames are wont to be afflicted. Several of the causes too, such as heat, cold, mutilation, want of air, which produce death in the animal frame, produce it also in vegetable forms.

We may here also remark that as some material organized frames are defective as regards their power to receive food, others as regards their power to digest it, others as regards their power to pass it when digested; so some intellectual constitutions are defective in their power to receive ideas, others in their power to reason upon them or to combine them, others in their power to apply them to their wonted purpose when so reasoned upon or combined. And, as certain diseases of the body have a tendency to throw off bile and foul humours, and thus purify the system in the end; so some diseases of the mind contribute ultimately to invigorate and correct it, lead it to detect, and to free itself from, errors which, without such disorder, might long have continued to oppress and pervert it.

It is very probable moreover that, both in the case of mind and body, pain does far more than physic or even diet, to regulate its due course, and to stimulate it to efforts that may ward off evils which it is the object of regimen only to remove. And although pain is that which, of all things we most try to avoid; yet, both in the case of mind and body, there is nothing with which we could so ill dispense. Indeed, pain does not of itself constitute the essence of bodily disease; but is only a proof, as it is also a consequence, of its existence. Those diseases, both bodily and mental, of which no warning of their approach or presence is afforded by pain, are the most insidious, and the most to be dreaded.

A strict and perfect analogy may consequently be traced between diseases of the mind and those of the material frame. And as some diseases of the body are in the blood, others in the nerves, and others in the bones; so some mental diseases are in the capacities themselves, others attach to the whole mind. Some too are mental, some moral, and some medial. Thus, enthusiasm is, in the mind, analogous to fever in the body.

³ *Vide ante*, b. iii. c. iv. s. 9, pp. 352, 353.

Superstition is to the mind, what poison is to the body. A mind misled by error, is analogous to a body filled with unwholesome food. Ignorance is to the mind, what deprivation of food is to the body. Pride is to the mind, what inflammation or plethora are to the body. Depravity of mind is analogous to corruption of body. A silly mind is analogous to a weak body, and a strong mind to a vigorous body. What cancer is to the body, prejudice is to the soul. The one eats into, and tortures, and disfigures, and unfits for healthy and vigorous action the material frame; the other perverts, and distorts, and enfeebles the operation of the mind.

There is also, as already pointed out, a deformity of the mind as well as of the body;⁴ and in the former as well as in the latter case, this may occur either by accident, or at birth. Mental deformity exists where one particular faculty, or power, or endowment, is extensive, and vigorous, out of all due proportion to the rest; or where one faculty or endowment is peculiarly, and out of all due proportion, weak, or limited, in comparison with the others. And as in bodily deformity, an unsteady, and slow, and irregular gait is the result; so in mental deformity, the operations of the mind are irregular, and uncertain, and fail to effect their legitimate ends. As the genius of inspiration innately results from the perfect symmetry of the whole mind as regards the co-existence of particular faculties; so mental deformity results when the counterpart arrangement prevails. There are also both giants and dwarfs, intellectual as well as physical; and the same qualities in a great degree appertain to each. The mental giant, with all his strength, is often as unwieldy as the material one; and the mental dwarf, puny as he is, may outstrip the other in agility, if not in strength. In each case, the departure from nature's design constitutes actual deformity.

As in bodily disease, the nature and extent of the disorganization are often mainly indicated by the loss or perversion of the appetite for food, either solid or liquid, or the unnatural and inordinate increase of it, amounting to unhealthy craving; so is it also in diseases of the mind, the quality and extent of which are frequently exhibited in the indifference displayed to all knowledge, the undue craving for some particular kinds of reading, or the perverse longing for useless or pernicious works. And as indigestion constitutes the foundation of a vast number of bodily diseases; so the want of due reflection upon the ideas we have obtained, is the origin of a large proportion of disease which is mental.

Mental as well as material diseases, may be generally classed into those which are acute, and those which are chronic. Of

⁴ *Vide ante*, b. iii. c. i. s. 6, p. 203.

mental diseases of the former kind, are wrong notions suddenly caught up unawares, which have crept into the system, but which a candid and careful examination will suffice to extirpate. Chronic mental diseases are those settled erroneous opinions that have gradually been implanted in the soul, and have grown into the very system and constitution, which time and long examination alone serve effectually to eradicate.

Certain mental and moral, and also certain medial diseases, like many diseases of the material frame, are naturally infectious.⁵ Some attach especially to peculiar constitutions, others to particular times and places. Mental diseases are, indeed, quite as infectious as those which are material; and in the case of the former, the contagion flies more swiftly, and is more subtle, than in that of the latter. For instance, error is propagated more easily, and more extensively, by example than by argument; and men imbibe wrong principles, and adopt wrong modes of reasoning, more readily from contact with other minds thus ill-directed, than from erroneous teaching, or defective education. Prejudice also spreads from soul to soul; and its breath is more blighting to the mind, than is the inhaling of pestilence to the material frame. Among contagious mental diseases, may be also classed delusion in general, superstition, fanaticism, enthusiasm, and many other failings, whether of the understanding, the reason, or the genius. Indeed, probably, as regards both mental and material diseases, many of them are far more contagious than they are generally supposed to be; and in the case of both, the modes in which the contagion is conveyed, are more insidious, and subtle, and perplexing, than it ever enters into the mind to conceive.

Diseases both of the mind and of the body, moreover, not only originate, but feed upon each other. Some material diseases, by their operation on the frame, tend to reproduce the very cause of the disease so operating; while, on the other hand, this cause, whenever called forth, conduces immediately to stimulate the disease. But so is it also in mental and moral diseases. Thus, pride evokes the sentiments which produce pride, and prejudice the errors which produce prejudice; while these sentiments and errors in their turn, reproduce the very failings that evoked them. Diseases of this sort are somewhat analogous to those animals which, being of double sex, are able without intercourse with others of the species, to propagate by their individual action on their own frames.

As regards also the causes of disease of each kind, deleterious

⁵ "Let no man deceive himself by thinking that the contagions of the soul are less than those of the body. They are yet greater; they sink deeper, and creep on more unsuspectedly."—*De Vita Solitaria*.

studies for the mind are strictly analogous to unwholesome food for the body ; light and trivial studies, to light innutritious food ; exciting romantic reading, to intoxicating drink ; and abstruse perplexing studies, to hard indigestible food. Hence, moral and mental instructors should act as physicians to the soul, and not merely as purveyors to supply it with aliment. They should discipline it as to diet, and regulate its choice here, as well as set before it sufficient for its consumption.

As the want of proper exercise is one of the most common producing causes of disease, alike in the mind and in the body, and is the occasion of considerable disorder to both ; so, in the case of mind as well as body, exercise alone develops its energies : and occasional extra exertion of the soul is probably as essential to extirpate error, as is that of the bodily frame to drive out corporeal disease. On the other hand, over-exertion both of mind and body, is among the commonest causes of their disease ; and the object of the regimen in such a case, must be both to allay the excitement to action that has been produced, and to secure tranquillity and repose.

It is therefore possible, nay even probable, that there are in reality as many diseases of the mind as there are of the body. Both in the mind and in the body, moreover, in most cases, disease in part, or at any rate the outward development of it, consists in the efforts of nature to set itself right, or to counteract some opposite failing. Hence, what is frequently exhibited to us is, in reality, not the disease itself, but that which is the product of it. Possibly, indeed, there may be this essential distinction between mental and bodily diseases ; that while we are able to perceive the actual operation of the former, we can witness only the effects produced by the latter. Weakness of mind, and the workings of error and prejudice, are exhibited directly in the soul. But of bodily disarrangement or disease, we discern only the results, or the efforts to counteract them which the system puts forth. In this case perhaps, the action of the mind through disease, corresponds with the manifestation of material malady.

In some minds, moreover, certain mental diseases are as constitutional as are some physical diseases in certain bodies. Thus, superstition and bigotry are, in reality, mental diseases requiring merely the aid of a producing cause, and resulting, although not immediately, from a defect in our mental constitution ; particular capacities or qualities prevailing in an undue proportion in one particular mind, without being counteracted by certain others, the bad effects of which have been probably much accelerated by defective mental education, and by indulgence in evil habits ; but which, by the pursuit of a different course, might have been to a considerable extent, although perhaps not

entirely, remedied : just as in the body, there may be a disposition to certain particular diseases, owing to its peculiar conformation and constitution ; and which diseases were in the first instance fostered, and were finally matured, by the neglect to pay proper attention to the care and regulation of the physical functions.

The mind is, moreover, not only capable of receiving diseases in a mode analogous to that in which they are communicated to the body, but wounds also may be inflicted upon it ; some of which however heal directly, while others are for a long time kept open, and are painful whenever touched. Thus, in the case of error which has been imbibed, or disgrace suffered, a wound to the soul is thereby occasioned ; and whenever the subject is recalled to the memory, the mind, as it were, bleeds anew from the wound, and the injured part throbs afresh. And as it is in the case of sores in the material frame, that when they are brought to a head and burst forth, although at such time they have attained their maturity and most painful condition ; yet they are then most capable of being eradicated and cured : so it is with venom received into the soul, that although when it developes itself by outward acts, it is most pernicious and dangerous ; yet, on the other hand, that is the period when the poison may be drawn out from the system, and when a cure is most likely to be effected.

There are also mental as well as material epidemics. As in the case of the latter, whole bodies of people are at once attacked by the same disease, which spreads from one to the other, each catching the infection as he communicates with his neighbour ; so in the case of epidemics which are mental, some particular false opinion or prejudice, or passion, will seize upon an entire party, or infect a whole nation, spreading from one to the other, and leading them on to the wildest excesses, such as in their sober moments they would utterly deprecate and deplore.

As each animal and each human frame has its peculiar predisposition to particular diseases ; so is it with each soul according to its individual endowments and qualities. Moreover, as certain occupations and localities are especially perilous to the health of the body ; so certain particular pursuits and topics are also especially perilous to the health of the soul. In both cases, however, dangers of very different kinds are produced by each of these causes ; and what to one mind is fatal, to another may be innocuous.

As in disease of the material frame, whenever any particular part or organ is weak, or out of order, that at once suffers, and is the first to fall a prey to the attack ; so in mental and moral diseases, the defects and disorders existent in any member of our system, become forthwith apparent, and the parts so affected are

the first to suffer. Thus, debility in the reasoning power, or deficiency in moral rectitude or probity are, ordinarily exhibited when the mind is assailed by error, or temptations to crime are laid in the way. It is when beset by trials, that the failing points in our character are displayed. Both in the mind and in the body, disease may be long latent, until some developing cause occasions its manifestation.

The body when once infected or tainted by disease, gradually becomes disordered, and the inflammation spreads from one member to another, until in time the very vitals are consumed by it. So is it also with diseases of the soul, when it is tainted with error or crime, that this extends from one endowment to another, which becomes gradually affected by it; until at length the whole system is brought under its influence, and the very reason, and even the conscience, become perverted or paralyzed, and are made a prey to the malady.

It is the opinion of certain naturalists, that most, if not all of the diseases which afflict the material frame, are caused by the presence and attacks of insects of some kind or other, many of which are too minute to be visible even to the microscope, and which in various ways injure and disorder the system. So may it also be as regards our intellectual and moral constitution, that a large proportion of its diseases, are occasioned by spiritual beings or agencies of different kinds, who, unperceived by us, interfere with, and disorder our mental operations, and distort and pervert, the actions of the mind.

A further analogy between bodily and mental disease, may be traced in the mode in which, what in each case may strictly be termed poisons, are received into, and operate upon, the system. The mind indeed, appears to be quite as susceptible of poisonous influences as is the body; and in both cases some poisons are speedy and violent, while others are insidious and slow, working almost imperceptibly. And as some poisons when admitted into the frame do not openly develop themselves until long afterwards, but continue unperceived to prey upon the vitals, until the power which they have attained, and the havoc which they have effected, all at once become manifest together; so a subtle seductive principle of error, is occasionally very early instilled into the mind, poisoning the very springs of thought, and polluting all its streams; although the result of this may not be openly evinced, or its operations developed, until long after the poison has been imbibed.

Nevertheless, as in the mental, so in the material frame, that which is innocuous and even nutritious to one person, proves poison to another. Certain books which, to a man whose mind is too well fortified to be led astray by any errors that they contain, may be of essential value in the suggestion of new ideas, and be serviceable to set in operation such a mind; to one

who is not so fortified, may be extensively pernicious, and may lead him entirely wrong.

Both physical and mental disease, as also physical and mental regimen, further resemble one another, and there is a corresponding relation between them, as regards the nature of the effect produced by each. Thus, some bodily diseases by the application of a particular regimen, admit of immediate relief; as in certain mental hallucinations, the correction of the error may tend at once to restore the mind to a right condition. In other cases, however, the material frame will be found to have sustained permanent injury; although the evil itself which produced it was but transient, and one admitting of instantaneous relief. So also a neglected derangement of any bodily organ, may grow in time into a settled and confirmed malady; and error in principle long assented to, becomes eventually rooted in the mind, and exhibits itself there as an established incontrovertible axiom.

There is an analogy also between the pains and other emotions of the body symptomatic of disease, and those of the soul. In each instance, some are acute, others grave. Some are transient, others permanent. In the case of both body and mind, irritation is a frequent forerunner, if not actual producer, of disorder. Over-excitability of the frame, and too great a susceptibility of irritation, constitute the basis of several maladies. In the mind too, an excessive excitability of the emotions, or of the passions, and too vehement a craving of the desires, and in particular cases even an extreme susceptibility of the conscience, are certain indications of, and indeed of themselves constitute mental disease. Moreover, as there is no doubt that (as already remarked) animal frames of different species vary from one another much, both as to their susceptibility to feel pain, and the mode in which, and the degree to which they are excited by it; so we may also infer that it is with regard to the frames of animals of the same species, and also with regard to different human frames. And further than this, that the souls of different persons correspondingly differ both as to their susceptibility to feel pain, and the extent to which it affects them.

Moreover, as disease of the body may originate not only in the organs themselves, but in the fluids, or from the disordered condition of the texture and temperament of the material frame; so mental diseases are produced not merely by the derangement or ill-assortment of the intellectual powers, but by any disorder in the general constitution of the system, whereby the lower influences and endowments obtain the ascendancy over the higher, and disarrange or pervert their

⁶ *Vide ante*, b. ii. c. iii. s. 10, vol. i. p. 156.

operation. The conscience is diseased, not only when it is too excitable; but a far more common case of disease of this endowment exists when it is too callous. The one is the fever, the other the paralysis of conscience.

In addition to, and independent of, the diseases of various kinds to which the mind as well as the body is subject, there are also certain states of an irregular kind to which, corresponding with those of the body, the soul is liable. Of these, intoxication is one; and this condition in the case of the soul, not only nearly resembles that of the body, but is produced by very nearly the same causes. Thus, a mind filled with superposition, or fanaticism, or wild extravagant notions, approaches in its state that of a body made drunk by alcoholic liquor.

Not only however, are diseases of every variety natural to both body and mind; but in nature alone are to be discovered the most efficient remedies for each disease. Nevertheless, in the mental as well as in the material frame, the constitution undergoes a change more or less revolutionary in the course of years; which is occasioned in part by the events and influences that act upon it, and in part by its own quality and growth: in consequence of which diseases that affect it at one period, have but little force or operation at another; and it is but slightly subject to diseases at one time, which at another endanger its well-being.

In a former part of this treatise, I observed, that in cases of insanity, it is not the mind itself which is actually diseased or out of order; but that the bodily functions or organs through which the mind performs many of its operations, become deranged.⁷ The only cases in which the mind itself is actually diseased, are those which we have been lately considering, where it is warped by prejudice, or narrowed by bigotry, or depraved and tainted by vice and error. In these instances, the very soul itself may be strictly said to be disordered; and it is in this mode alone that it is liable to be so affected. To injuries of this description, it is, from its own inherent nature, subject; and is so wholly independent of its union with the body. Nevertheless, mental diseases, however they may distort or pervert the proper operations of the mind, seldom, or never, actually suspend or paralyze them, as in the case of disease of, or injury to, the physical mental organs. Diseases of the mind, are, however, more permanent than those of the material frame; as while the latter entirely terminate with death, the diseases contracted by the mind may continue to cling to it during the endless ages of its future existence, and may not improbably be a part of the punishment prescribed to condemned souls for the evil committed during their union with the body.

⁷ *Vide ante, Prel. Diss.*, s. viii. a. 4, vol. i. p. 158.

A large portion of what are erroneously deemed to be diseases of the mind, arise nevertheless entirely from its union with the body, and originate in that part of our constitution, from which they are communicated to the mind. As they depend on the body for their vigour and influence; so when the soul is freed from the restraints of the body, may we reasonably suppose that from all maladies of this nature, if it does not at once entirely escape, it will at any rate be able eventually to be exempt.

But after all, even as regards the body, diseases of the material frame are in reality, in many cases at least, not so much to be considered in the light of unmitigated calamities, as the benign and needful efforts and contrivances of nature to remedy certain defective operations existent in her system. And so is it also in a variety of instances in respect to mental as well as bodily diseases.

As in diseases of the body so in diseases of the mind, it is often very hard to discover not only their cause, but their actual nature; and in this not unfrequently consists the main difficulty in dealing with them, inasmuch as it is impossible to apply an efficient remedy, unless we first know the particular evil to be removed.

We may nevertheless, not unreasonably determine from what has here been premised, that disease in general consists or originates in two distinct conditions of the frame so affected.⁹

1. A derangement of the proper functions of such frame.
2. An extraordinary effort of nature to restore those functions to a sound condition; and in some cases to escape or avert the immediate effect of their derangement. Thus, in the case of any bodily organ becoming disordered, there is first, the derangement of the particular member; and there is the second condition of extraordinary excitement in its functions consequent upon this disarrangement. The legitimate object of regimen is directed alike to the restoration of the former, and to correct any evil effects resulting from the latter. Closely analogous to this operation, is the process of mental disease. And the efforts of the mind to disenthral itself from the derangement into which it has fallen, are sometimes attended with consequences as injurious as the disease itself.¹

⁸ "Pain is of advantage to the moral character in two ways; as warning from vice by the penalties attached to vicious conduct, and as giving strength to virtue, by the benevolent wishes which it awakes and fosters, and by the very sufferings themselves which are borne with a feeling of moral approbation."—*Dr. Thomas Brown. Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind*, lect. xiv.

⁹ *Mr. Smee* tells me that he considers disease to originate in a specific variation in the structure of the frame.

¹ On the principles laid down in the above paragraph, *Dr. Richardson* has been good enough to communicate to me his views. But as he has

It appears from all that we know of their nature and constitution, that animals in general are not subject to mental disease of any description, at any rate in a mode corresponding with that in which it affects mankind. Indeed from their not being endowed with intellectual faculties, it would seem that in their case there is no substratum in which disease of this kind could exist. Having no mental machinery to become disordered, it is difficult to conceive how they can be liable to derangement of this sort. In those instances where their instinctive endowments appear to act erroneously, this is caused not by any actual disease of their spiritual being, but by that of the material frame, more especially of the sensorial system, which acts upon and stimulates the action, and consequently largely influences the operations, of such spiritual being.

11. *Mental Pathology, its Principles and its End.*

From what has been here laid down on the subject of mental disease, its essence, source and development, we may I think with a rational degree of a certainty, arrive at the opinion that as complete and scientific a system of medical treatment for the maladies of the mind might be established, as for those of the body, if our acquaintance with the economy and mode of operation of the former, equalled what we know of those of the latter.² In the case of material disease, a perfect system of patho-

detailed them at length in the address quoted from, which contains his mature, and deliberate, and well-considered opinion on the subject, I quote them from that address:—

“The royal road to success in combating disease, lies, it is surmised, in knowledge of symptoms and remedies, and use of instruments for cure. Perfect knowledge of function, it is assumed, is very good for the student to learn, necessary for the teacher to sustain, interesting for the busy practitioner to possess, but cumbersome and laborious, and of small service for him to retain. Oh! sad delusion. As no study is more elevating and expanding than the study of the living organism and its functions, so to the obedient and free mind none is so easy; none so easy because of this beauty of it, that what is learned as new serves only to fix more persistently on the memory what has already been learned; none so easy because the simplicity of the study increases in proportion as the scope of it extends, and the unities of action are discovered; none so easy because a knowledge of the whole elucidates parts, and reduces the complex, I mean the apparently complex, into simple harmonies.”

² “As in medicining the body, it is in order first to know the divers complexions and constitutions; secondly, the diseases; and, lastly, the cures: so, in medicining of the mind, after knowledge of the divers characters of men’s natures, it followeth in order to know the diseases and

logy—if even here such a system can ever be hoped for—might be expected to comprehend, and should embrace, in the first place, a complete and exact knowledge of the cause of each malady; and, in the second place, a knowledge, correspondingly precise and perfect, of the mode of counteracting that cause; in other words, a knowledge of the remedy by counteraction of erroneous operation, as regards every disease.³

The main end and use probably of all pathology in case of disease, whether material or mental, is not to create or originate any new principle or impulse, but merely to correct some irregularity which is in operation. We seek not to alter or amend nature's laws, but only to restore their due course. We attempt to supply, not the deficiencies of nature, but the deficiencies which we, by our perversion of her system, have caused in her career. And for this purpose it seems that not only pathology for the body, but pathology for the mind, is mainly available. Our efforts must be directed, not to change the natural faculties or endowments which we possess, but to remedy those errors and perversions which bad habits have engendered, or wrong principles have established. Counteraction and correction, not new creation, is consequently the legitimate object of every system of this sort; which simply

infirmities of the mind, which are no other than the perturbations and distempers of the affections.”—*Lord Bacon. Advancement of Learning, b. ii.*

³ On the main points raised in this paragraph, which I have had the advantage of discussing with *Dr. Richardson*, he tells me that he has expressed his opinion carefully and explicitly in the same address before quoted, to which therefore it will be most satisfactory to refer. He there says “that to be able at one flash of memory to take in the whole organic mechanism as though it were laid open before the eye, even as the works of the watch are open to the watchmaker; to see the central heart beating in the order of its work; the lungs expanding; the gases in the lungs diffusing, the blood oxidating; to see the stomach dissolving the food, the fluid food coursing into the circulation; to see the blood changing in its circuit, yielding up its colloids to the tissues, and retaining its crystalloids; to see the busy lymphatics drawing off the superfluous plasma, and the glands separating and discharging their respective fluids; to see the nervous screens of the senses picking up impressions, and the brain receiving them; to see from its centres the animal force distributing from point to point; to see the sympathetic regulating function; and lastly, with this one grand view of structures and functions clear before the sight, to be able to detect how far perversion, observable in one function or part, influences other functions and parts, and excites those phenomena which constitute what are called the symptoms of disease,—to see these things is to be a physician indeed, such an one as every physician should be.”

According to *Willis*, we ought to know the several places or parts of the body in which medicines begin to operate, the subjects on which they operate—as also how they operate upon the spirits—together with the several sorts of humours, and how medicines act upon them.—*Works. Of the Operation of Medicines in Man's Body.*

consists in the device of an artificial remedy intended to arrest some irregular operation, and to restore nature to her proper and ordinary condition. Medicine, therefore, ought only to go the length of counterbalancing, as it were, this deleterious influence, and of extinguishing it; but should not in any case aim to originate any new independent action of its own. So far as pathology is merely counteractive and restorative, it is harmless, and also beneficial. So far as it goes beyond this, and originates any operation of itself, it is not only harmless, but injurious. The result of medical treatment should be to bring back the system to where it was before the attack, and to place it in the same position as though the attack had never occurred. It should simply obliterate the mark of the wound, without leaving any trace of that of the cure.

Both in mental and material disease, we nevertheless frequently mistake for the disease itself, the efforts of nature to throw it off; and instead of attempting to cure the malady, counteract the operation which is in reality its best antidote. In this respect we act like children, who dislike and try to avoid taking the dose which is to cure them, far more than they do the disease which is to be cured. In mental and moral, as well as in material diseases, men often hate the medicine, quite as much as they do the malady. Medicines indeed, sometimes do violence to the system as well as to the inclination; although their ultimate end is to produce a restorative for the frame, and to relieve it from that violence by which it has been suffering. And in all cases of this kind, it behoves us to be specially careful that the regimen adopted to cure the complaint, does not of itself generate a malady far worse than that which it was designed to remove. Some medicines are considerably more pernicious to the constitution, than are the very evils which they aim to eradicate. And we occasionally find after a long and patient endurance of intense suffering, that the doctor is far more difficult to drive from our doors than is the direst disease!

Remedies like education, are of two kinds, natural and artificial; and where that which is natural admits of application, it will generally be found to be the most efficient of the two. Thus, in many cases of mental disease, might the appropriate exercise of the mind, conjoined with the adoption of sound and wholesome moral and religious discipline, be found efficacious to correct some defect or derangement in the condition of the capacities, to regulate the ideas, to bring the operation of the faculties into a proper train, and to purify and ennoble the soul.

Philosophy is not, however, as Cicero considers it,⁴ so much

⁴ *Vide ante*, p. 124.

the medicine of the mind, as a nourishing diet; it may be, a sort of tonic to restore it to a stronger condition. For each mental disease or failing, fitting mental remedies should be applied. Just as in the body we correct acidities, and laxities, and astringents, by particular appropriate medicines; so in the soul, we should correct narrowness, and prejudices, and evil habits, by corresponding intellectual regimen. And as, in the case of the material frame, diet is at once the surest and safest of all medicines; so, in the case of the soul, engaging it in some congenial occupation is the best corrective of its ailments, which is to be regarded perhaps rather as an aliment than a medicine, and one by which its course is not actually changed, or even deviated, but merely directed aright.

It is not improbable therefore that a system of mental pathology might be devised, far more complete and efficient than any which has been invented for the material frame. Indeed, the remedies which have been tried for the latter, have been ever uncertain, and varying, according as our knowledge of matter advances, or our opinions respecting it change. As the extent of our knowledge of mind is in proportion to our knowledge of matter; so is the extent of our skill in mental, to that of our skill in material medicine. We know but little about either; although I am inclined to think that our ignorance about matter is, on the whole, the most profound.⁵ It is indeed, almost a wonder, that as the diseases of the soul are quite as multifarious, as complicated, and as difficult to heal, as are those of the body; there are not physicians of the mind as well as of the material system, whose skill is devoted to curing and correcting the maladies of the former. That there are not, is a further proof how much more we care for the things that concern the body and matter, than for those of the mind.

The basis on which the science of medicine is founded, may therefore be defined to be this. That as there are certain deleterious causes, or occurrences, or operations, which affect the body in a certain mode, and occasion it to be disordered, and to act erroneously or irregularly, however healthy it might have been when it encountered them, and each of which influence it in a particular way; so there are also certain causes, or occurrences, or operations, either artificial or natural, which affect it in an opposite manner, and may tend to restore it when it is out of order, and lead it to act correctly and regularly, and the result of each of which is uniformly to influence it in a specific and determinate mode, according to their nature and

⁵ "The evidence for the existence of mind, is to the full as complete as that upon which we believe in the existence of matter. Indeed, it is more certain, and more irrefragable."—Lord Brougham. *Discourse of Natural Theology*.

tendency. This theory of medicine is applicable alike to our material, as also to our mental and moral being, and to diseases incident to each.

In a complete system of pathology, the producing causes of health, or rather of restoration to it, would be as certain and unerring as are the causes of disease. Both alike would be ascertained, and would be acted upon systematically. The science of medicine, mental and bodily, consists indeed essentially in reducing this knowledge and application of remedies to a system at once practical, positive, and perfect.

It may nevertheless happen, both in our material and mental system, that the most complete condition of health may of itself be a cause of, if it do not actually constitute, disease. As a very exuberant state of body may lead to plethora, and thence to death; so the highest cultivation of mind, and the ample storing it with ideas, together with the vigorous exercise of all its powers, may ultimately produce derangement of the system, and occasion disease of the direst kind.

In many cases moreover, both mental and material, the cure proposed is in reality, more to be dreaded, and occasionally proves more pernicious, than the very disease itself. The disease distorts and deforms the suffering member; but the effort to drive it away, destroys it altogether. Sickness disorders the frame; but the potion that is given to expel it, may infect and poison the whole system. Many who can bear the wound, break down under the lancet. Error may be pestilential; but the means resorted to to extirpate it, may be more so still, and may prove ruinous to the soul.

Both in mental and in physical sickness, however, not only is the nature of the disease frequently misunderstood; but it sometimes happens that the very symptoms of health are mistaken for disease: while the supposed exhibitions of extraordinary vigour are, in reality, but the spasmodic or delirious exertions of some malignant, though perhaps latent malady.

Diseases, moreover, both mental and material, change at different periods, assuming new forms and varieties, one disease disappearing and being supplied by another; such change originating, not in the diseases themselves, but in some alteration in the condition of the beings subject to them; and not unfrequently the cure of one disease operating as the producing cause of another. Diseases, both material and mental, eventually also appear to wear out and exhaust themselves, and gradually grow weaker and weaker; provided they do not, in the meantime wear out and exhaust the frame upon which they have fastened, between which and the disease a resolute contest is carried on, until one or the other is compelled to give way. Prejudice in particular is a mental disease which time

often cures, and which may gradually subside, if the soul be vigorous enough to stand the trial—analagous to the case of fever or cold attacking the bodily system.

In the case of diseases of the physical frame, important beneficial results are occasionally produced by the discovery and extirpation of humours and other affections, which would otherwise have remained latent in the system. In the case of mental diseases, the results are not less important, or less extensive, as regards the effects which they sometimes produce in the development of particular false opinions, which would not otherwise be brought out; and by the eliciting of peculiar erroneous notions, which thus become exposed and counteracted.

So not only may medicine be prescribed for mental as well as material ailments, but anatomy of the mind may be effected as well as that of the body, and dissection may be accomplished of the mental as well as of the material frame; its wondrous structure exposed to view, its operations surveyed, and the machinations of its maladies exposed and remedied.⁶

12. *The complete Development, Discipline, and Cultivation of the Mind, the ultimate Aim in the study of the Constitution of Man.*

The discovery and establishment of an efficient remedy for mental disease, as also the complete development, cultivation, and discipline of the entire mental system and constitution, are indeed the main among the many advantages, both to individuals and to mankind collectively, which the study of, and an acquaintance with, that very important topic which I have attempted in this treatise to investigate, will serve to supply. It is in this that education, in its truest and fullest sense, must be allowed to consist. This moreover, is the highest and the most important object of all our intellectual efforts, and is the choicest fruit which can result from our most successful intellectual researches. The most gigantic minds cannot, indeed, consecrate their lofty powers to undertakings more laudable, to purposes more beneficial to their fellow-creatures, or more ennobling to themselves, than the discovery of a system of mental pathology, by which this

⁶ *Professor Huxley* relates that on some one asking *Des Cartes* to let him see his library, he took him into his dissecting-room, and showed him his various anatomical preparations. During the progress of the present work, many hundreds of minds have been dissected by the author, and their various functions attentively examined while in full operation. This is nevertheless a species of vivisection, which may be performed without cruelty or even pain, and of which the patient, however sensitive, is wholly unconscious.

great end may be secured. As that education alone is satisfactory through which is effected the complete development of all our various endowments and powers; so is that condition not only the highest, but in truth the most natural to us, wherein what is in reality the essential part of our being, attains maturity, and developes to the full its loftiest energies. In Heaven alone, may we conclude that disease of the mind, as well as of the material frame, will for ever cease to exist. In complete exemption from calamities of this class, and in nothing more than in this, shall we then resemble our Creator; Whose sublime condition, free from all liability to evil, either mental, moral, or medial, is not only one of His leading attributes, but without which not even He could be deemed to be absolutely perfect.

THE END.

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
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